SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

10534

By

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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
DELHI : VARANASI : PATNA
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PREFACE

Max Müller was the first scholar in modern times to work out a systematic account of the development of philosophical thoughts in India from the earliest time to the medieval period, in his *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* (1899). There is a small book by Richard Garbe giving a brief account of the six systems. In India, Hiriyanna wrote his *Outline of Indian Philosophy*, tracing the development of thought from the Vedas to the medieval times (1932); his *Essentials of Indian Philosophy* (1949) is a smaller book on the same plan. Radhakrishnan has written a very comprehensive book on *Indian Philosophy* in two volumes (1923 and 1927), and Das Gupta has worked out the whole History of Indian Philosophy in five volumes.

There are some books relating to aspects of Indian Philosophy like Deusen's *Upaniṣads*, Keith's *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas*, Ranade's *Constructive Survey of the Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, Naga Raja Sarma's *Reign of Realism*, P. N. Srinivasachari's *Philosophy of Bhedabheda and Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita*, and a very large number of books on *Vedānta*. There were some such books even in India of old, like Mādhashācārya's *Śārvadúranāsāṅgraha* (a Compendium of all the systems of Philosophy).

The book that is now brought out is neither a History of Indian Philosophy, nor an account of any special aspect of Indian Philosophy. It is a general discussion on a large number of problems relating to Indian Philosophy. The book covers the entire fields, starting from the Vedas and coming to the medieval period. The book is the presentation of a new approach to the problems met with in Indian Philosophy.

The book is divided into three parts dealing with the problem of knowing, the problem of the world that is known and the problem of man that knows the world. In Sanskrit it would have been easy to give the Titles as *Pramāṇa*, *Prameya* and *Pramātā* to the three Parts, meaning “means of knowing, objects of knowing and knower.” But I have used terms that are more familiar.

In all the books written about Indian philosophy, much has been said about the unquestionable authority of the Vedas, and it is also maintained that some mysterious sanctity was attached
to the text of the Vedas from very early times. It is also contended that even in the Upaniṣads there is a beginning of revolt against this authoritative nature of the Vedas and the ritualism developed in the Vedas, and that Buddha inaugurated the era of true rationalism in Indian thought, demolishing the authoritative nature of the Vedas; but Buddhism had to quit the country leaving behind some indelible marks on the thought of India.

But the fact is that there is no text in which there is a defence of the texts of the Vedas as of supreme authority, which man shall not question. The most that is maintained is that there are passages in the Vedas that represent some ultimate truths; the whole Veda is not of that nature, nor is truth confined to the available text of the Vedas. The position is that the Veda is authority in so far as it contains statements of some impersonal truths, not that the statements relate to truths because they are found in the Vedas. The Vedas are taken as a unit, and considerable portions of it have an authority only in an indirect way, relating to such few passages that state the truth. What is rational in Buddhism is only the philosophy; in the matter of religion, the Beliefs and their observances depend on authority, and the same is the case with the Vedic religion too. In Buddhism, a statement is true because it is a statement of Buddha, an individual; this is a position which the Vedic philosophy could not accept; truth is impersonal and is objective, not depending on any person for authority; relation to a person is a flaw in the nature of a statement of truth.

Buddhism was never banished from the land of its birth, in the way in which people from Europe had to seek refuge in foreign countries on account of religious persecution, and like the followers of the religion of Zoroaster who had to flee from Iran before the invasion of foreigners who brought a new religion. Buddhists were freely allowed to believe in, to preach and to practice their religion with as much freedom as the followers of the Vedas. They were allowed to freely discuss their doctrines in the assembly of the learned people along with other systems of thought.

Buddha was born in a Vedic atmosphere, was trained in that atmosphere, taught in that atmosphere and left his teachings in that atmosphere; there was never a conflict between Buddha and his Vedic atmosphere. The teachings of Buddha grew and
flourished in the same Vedic atmosphere. But there were
developed some new doctrines that were supposed to interpret
the real teachings of Buddha. One is that Buddha for the first
time knew the Law; the other is that the goal of man is to
disappear into a vacuum. Neither were actually taught by
Buddha. Such doctrines could not survive free discussions in
the open assembly of wise people, and they ceased to convince
the thinking people. Except these two points, which were not
in the real teachings of Buddha, but were only interpretations of
Buddha’s teachings, all other cardinal principles of Buddhism
remained in India and continues in India. Buddha is reckoned
as one among the Teachers along with Sri Krishna.

Indians worshipped a God, but Indian philosophy never
recognised a God as creator and controller of the world. In
philosophy man is supreme and reason dominates his thoughts;
in actual life, there is a gradation even among men, and such a
gradation is allowed to extend to regions beyond man, to the
region of gods, in which men had faith. There is a distinction
between a philosopher and an ordinary follower of religion. This
position was common to the Vedic region and to the region of
Buddha’s teachings. Religion prescribed a goal for man
beyond the world and beyond life in the world; but this is only a
popular way of putting the philosopher’s doctrines. Between
the two positions, there is as much difference as there is between
the position of an astronomer and of the writer of the Epics, in
interpreting the phenomenon of an eclipse; in one there is the
obscuration of a heavenly globe by another while in the other a
dragon swallows a heavenly luminary.

Such is the approach taken up in this presentation of the
problems relating to Indian philosophy. There is no conflict
between the different stages in the development of thought in
India; what there is only a progression. Time changes, environ-
ment changes. Philosophy too must change. There is appro-
priate revision of views when there are changes in the environ-
ment, bringing to light new truths or new aspects of the truth.

The books available in the field now are often too heavy,
stuffed with all kinds of technicalities. They appear to be more in-
ventories, lists of names, catalogues of books, survey maps noting
distances and angles, assemblage of facts which the general
reader cannot comprehend and take interest in. This is also
manifest in all such presentations some unhappy prejudice against the original course of thought in India and its later branches, and there is an unnecessary apology for currents that are supposed to cross the main course. An attempt has been made in this book to bring the whole subject within a common picture.

Such a subject cannot be treated in a way in which readers can purchase a copy of the book when they get into an aeroplane, finish the book by the time he is at the destination and throw it away. The book presumes some education in those who read the book; but no prior familiarity with the contents of the book is presumed in it. Sanskrit words cannot be excluded; English words have not settled down to the exact meanings conveyed by the Sanskrit words. In many cases, the Sanskrit equivalents are given in brackets when technical terms are given in English, and when Sanskrit words are introduced in the body of the book, their English equivalents are given in brackets.

At first I had the intention of writing some notes at the end giving some references and some explanations. But such notes are of no use for the general reader for whom the book is meant. Many passages have been cited from the History of Indian Philosophy by Radhakrishnan, giving samples of the general views of modern scholars on aspects of Indian philosophical thought. Most of the citations or references are too well-known texts in Sanskrit like the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and the systems of philosophy in India. In these days when editions with indices and appendices are available, the few readers who desire to trace the citations and references to the original can easily do so. I only add that in the case of the Sāṅkhyā, I have made use of the edition of the Kārikā by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, my former colleague in the Madras University.

I have used diacritical marks. Even if I use the ordinary spelling for Sanskrit words, the general reader will not be able to get at the correct pronunciation; when diacritical marks are used, at least a few can recognise the words. Gradually readers of books on India must be introduced to the correct pronunciation of Sanskrit words through such marks.

In spite of care taken in reading the proofs, a few mistakes have crept in; but it is not difficult to know that the correct reading is in such cases and I have not added a list of corrections. Comparisons have been made with modern tendencies in
scientific investigations. The attempt has been made to present ancient Indian thought in the light of modern scientific thought. The point of view taken up is that in essentials there is no conflict between ancient religious or philosophical thought and modern scientific thought. Both of them can flow along a common channel. Where there is a fundamental difference, as in the case of "life" and "cells" being accidents in the course of "Evolution" according to modern science and "Life" being the Fundamental according to Indian thought, the possible points of contacts have also been suggested.

Certain chapters in the book have appeared as articles in journals in a condensed form. The contents of some portions have also been made use of for a course of lectures in the Andhra University in January—March term in 1957, and the contents of one chapter (Evil and Suffering) appeared in a Paper read during a Seminar in the Andhra University in November, 1957, conducted under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy.

When the subject was announced for the course of lectures in the Andhra University, Messrs Motilal Banarasidass of Delhi wrote to me expressing their desire to publish the book when it would be finalised. I consider it a privilege to have the book published by such a Firm that has contributed much for the promotion of the study of Indian Culture and for making the culture known in the world.

The book was completed in 1957. But the publishers were shifting their press from Patna to Delhi at that time and this caused some delay in starting the printing. Soon after that, in May 1959, I fell ill from which I have not yet completely recovered. The distance between Delhi and the place where I work and my indifferent health caused much delay in completing the printing. The whole responsibility for the delay is on my shoulders.

I express my thanks to the publishers for the excellent way in which they have brought out the book in their usual way with good printing and get up. I thank also my former student Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja of the Madras University for preparing the index at the end.

Waltair
1st November, 1960

C. Kunhan Raja
Some Fundamental Problems in
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
PART I—THE MODES OF KNOWING
CHAPTER I
GENERAL OUTLOOK

1. When we speak of Indian Philosophy, the term "philosophy" means something different from its usual signification, and the view has also been expressed in recent times that the currents of thought in India cannot with propriety be designated as "philosophy"; they are rather religions. Personally I would have preferred the term "religion" to "philosophy" to indicate the thought currents in India. But I have to use terms that have settled down into some specific meanings and I have to distinguish between religion and philosophy. There is a difference between religion and philosophy in English terminology; in Sanskrit itself, in which the Indian thought currents find expression, such a distinction is not possible. I have to make use of the terminology available in English and I try to make clear the distinction between philosophy in its general meaning and philosophy in the expression "Indian Philosophy".

2. There was originally no such strongly marked difference between religion and philosophy in the West. In the Greek systems of thought, there is very little of what can be designated religion or Theology. There is only what can be termed rational philosophy. Theology came into prominence in the West only at a much later period; it developed in the Ecclesiastical traditions. Thus there grew up two Faculties, that of Theology or Divinity and that of Philosophy. There was no science distinct from philosophy. The early thinkers of the West were philosophers and they investigated into the problems that are now included in science only from the philosopher's angle of vision. Aristotle made no such distinction as science and philosophy when he wrote on biology or on ethics. He also wrote
on social sciences like Economics and Politics, and also on literature. But Aristotle is placed among the philosophers of the West.

3. In the collection of the works of Aristotle, that came into view at a later time, there were treatises on some abstract subjects which had a place after the treatises relating to physical sciences, and they became for that reason metaphysics. Metaphysics became the most important feature in the field of philosophy in the medieval and in the recent periods in the history of the West. The aim was to understand the nature of the world. Although we find traces in the records of early thinkers regarding the nature of man himself, the interest was more about the world than about man. The understanding of the world had no fruit except that it satisfied some intellectual curiosity. Though such a satisfaction is of the form of a relief to the mind, that is not what can be called a fruit which man realises as a result of such an investigation. Man's happiness in the world is the responsibility of the politicians, and philosophers never considered it their business to think of man's happiness in life; and after the termination of life, there is nothing surviving for whom the philosopher could think of a happiness.

4. When at a later stage the problem of God also became another important factor in the fields of thoughts in the West, there was little change in this attitude towards the problems of thought. The religious doctrine was that man is a sinner, that man must suffer. It is only God that can bring happiness to man. The purpose of religion was to bring about happiness to man, rather to save the world from the consequences of man's sins in the form of suffering. In so far as only God can save man, philosophers remained in the same position of aimless speculations about the nature of the world, aimless in the sense that there was no particular fruit kept in view in such a speculation.

5. This attitude towards the function of thought was transplanted into the field of science also when science became a separate field for thought. The aim of science is to find out the truth, and happiness remained the responsibility of the politicians
during the life of man and of the priests after the death of man. Science does not recognise an ethical element in its field of activity. Happiness and suffering, pleasure and pain mean nothing to the sciences except as certain nervous vibrations or as certain chemical actions.

6. In India, the start was different and the course too was different. We do not know if there had been prior stages in the history of thought in India when man did not think of the fruits of his speculations about the nature of the world. Anyway, modern historians do not recognise the possibility of such a prior stage. To them there was the start in primitive Nature-worship and a gradual progress, through gropings in the dark, towards the light, the dawn of light and the later brilliance of philosophical manifestation. The earlier texts of the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, Buddhism and the Vedānta form the four stages in the evolution of philosophy in India according to historians.

7. There is another way of approach. Even the earliest texts of the Vedas shed some light on the problem of man and his destiny. The term happiness (Ānanda) occurs as the goal of man in one of the poems of the Rgveda, in which there is the prayer to make man immortal in the region where there is Ānandī and Nanda, where there is Mud and Pnamud (happiness and enjoyment, pleasure and joy). One of the episodes in the Rgveda of which there is the most frequent mention, is that of the great warrior God Indra smiting down the demon Vṛtra and letting the seven rivers to flow. The episode may be related to the natural phenomenon of breaking the clouds and the shedding of the rain waters. But the number seven has not been satisfactorily explained by any scholar on this naturalistic interpretation. “Seven” in the Vedas is a mystic number, and the references must be to some sort of happiness of a transcendental nature beyond the physical world and man’s physical existence. The waters that are let free represent some kind of happiness in the supra-physical plane of the world.

8. There is no identification in the earliest texts of the Veda, namely, in the Rgveda, between man’s real nature and happiness (Ānanda). Such an identification comes in only in the Upa...
sads. Whether the Upaniṣads started a new system of philosophical speculations or whether they contain records of the investigation of later thinkers into the thoughts of an earlier period, namely, the period of the Rgveda, is a problem on which there is much scope for a difference of opinion. The view taken up by the historians is that there is a new system of investigation into philosophical problems in the Upaniṣads; but my own view is that in the Upaniṣads we see mainly an attempt at interpreting the thoughts of the Rgvedic age. In the Upaniṣads I see no sign of a new stage of philosophical thought different from the thoughts of the Rgveda; I do not deny that there has been progression. The belief in the existence of an absolute truth in the world which can be expressed in ordinary language by the term Ananda (happiness) is Rgvedic; this happiness is not what any one creates. Even Indra has only set it free; he did not create it.

9. In India, the philosophers did not project their thoughts externally; the projection of man’s thoughts on the outside world had its counterpart in a similar projection of the thoughts inward also; it is like the growth of a tree, where there is the expansion of the branches outwardly and where there is also a similar expansion of the roots inwardly. The result was that the understanding of the nature of the world became identical with the understanding of the inward nature of man himself. It is such a simultaneous projection of the thoughts both outwardly and inwardly that resulted in the realisation of the identity of the external world and the internal Person, in India. When there is the realisation of such an identity and when the truth of the world outside is realised as of the nature of happiness (Ananda), happiness becomes the end of philosophy.

10. The goal of religion is happiness for man. The end of philosophy is also the same happiness for man. The only difference is that in religion there is such a goal kept in view, while in philosophy the end comes off as a matter of course. In one there is a purpose for which one works, while in the other that purpose is realised without being kept in view as a goal. In both what is realised, whether it is worked for or whether it naturally manifests itself, is something that is internal to man,
what is his nature and not what has been secured from outside. This is the position in Indian thought. God does not give happiness to man which man did not himself have; God at best helps him to realise what was in him already, though not realised as such. For this reason, on account of this peculiar start and course, the final stages in religion and philosophy meet. In the West, there is some fruit realised only along the religious track, while along the philosophical track, there is only a journey without a specified destination.

11. In the earlier stages of thought in the West, science was taken as a means for understanding the absolute nature of the world. That was the position in the days of the Greek philosophy. All the thinkers approached the problems of science with a view to ascertain the absolute nature of the reality of the world. According to the traditions of the West, it was the Greeks who had started an attempt for the first time to trace the casual relations between parts of the world, though there had been even prior to their times, some sort of an empirical, orderly knowledge left to us in the records of the earlier nations like the Egyptians and the Babylonians. The contribution of India to the evolution of science and to the scientific methods of investigations into problems relating to the nature of the world and its reality, has according to modern historians, played only a very minor part in the history of the developments of Thought in the world, especially in the West; and I have already said that such a development was started among the Greeks for the first time, according to the Western traditions.

12. Science was first introduced into the world, according to this tradition, by the Nature Philosophers of Greece. The Egyptians may have formulated rules for the surveying of lands; but such empirical rules were converted into the exact science of Geometry by Thales and Pythagoras and finally formulated in ancient times by Euclid. The Atomic theory of Leucipus and Democritus was formulated at a later stage on the basis of the belief in some primary elements constituting the reality of matter, of an earlier period. Pythagoras attempted to find out the true nature of the universe by examining the form instead
of finding it in the material content of the universe. He regarded a mathematical approach the right way to understand the reality of the world, considering the world as having been shaped on some mathematical scheme. It is thus that the science of geometry was developed in an attempt to understand the nature of the universe.

13. The Romans have contributed much to the development of Law, and Law implies that the world is constructed and functions according to some definite Law, that there is some definite order in this world. The supremacy of reason in solving the riddle of the universe was brought to the fore-front at a later stage, and this resulted in the view that the nature of God and of the universe can be grasped by the mind of man. The fundamental basis of modern science is that there is some definite Law controlling the world, that the process of the world is orderly, and that man's mind is competent to grasp everything that is real in the world. Man can understand everything through his own internal faculties and man needs no text, no scripture, to understand anything in the world, and also the truth of the world around him.

14. When science got itself separated from the currents of philosophy it has also inherited most of the fundamental tenets of philosophy. The purpose of science, as that of philosophy, is only to know, and there is no further purpose in such knowledge. But science is gradually giving up its position that through science man can understand the true nature of the world. The absolute nature of the universe has ceased to be the business of the scientists. The scientists confine themselves to the sphere that can come within their observations and what such observations can naturally yield as legitimate conclusions. Perhaps the scientists see only the surface, and science may never reveal what is behind the surface and below it. This is a recent departure from the position taken up during the Greek period, and even when modern science began to develop along its own lines, the earlier scientist believed that science would reveal the true and absolute nature of the universe. According to early scientists its absolute nature must be what can come within the sphere of science, and there is
nothing outside of it that can be called true. But modern scientists have accepted the position that science deals with only aspects of reality and not the reality itself. What the scientists now claim is only this much that science can work out a consistent theory of the field within its survey, from within the limits of science, and that science need not go beyond that, to the regions of what are fundamental for the explanations of facts ascertained within the limits of science, to the regions of the absolute. The basic problem how and when and why the lifeless matter in the state of uniform started on its course of diversification and modification need not be solved for the science of physics and chemistry to develop their own theories. Similarly, the conditions under which there appeared in the course of evolution the new phenomenon of life within matter that was dead need not be ascertained for solving the theories in the science of biology.

15. If scientists recognise a beyond for their field of investigation, that field comes within the domain of the philosopher. But the scientists do not worry themselves about such a field beyond of their own area of activity. In this way there arose a distinction between science and philosophy, though there is no enmity between the two; the two that were companions at one time parted company. As for religion, it is a field that came to the view of thinkers at a later time in the West. Science was always an enemy of religion, and religion persecuted the scientists; religion also looked upon rationalistic philosophy with suspicion. That antipathy continues even now. The present position is that there is a science without a philosophy and a religion, there is a religion without a science and a philosophy and there is a philosophy without science and religion. They remain in three separate regions with no point of contact or chance of mutual migration. The fact is that in the evolution of thought in the West, man and his nature played little part, and the investigations and doctrines were centred round the world outside. It was all a problem of the world and of God and their mutual relation, and man was just recognised as being there, without man’s nature coming within the purview of rational investigation. The three currents of thought, namely, the currents
of science, philosophy and religion, could meet only if ultimately they became concurrent aspects in a unified investigation about the nature of man. And it is only the problem of man that could unite the three currents.

16. Indian philosophy had its start in an inquiry about the nature of man himself, and the nature of the universe is known only as part of the understanding of man’s own nature. It is man that knows and the knowledge depends on a knowledge of the knowing man. Thus man is both the agent and the object of philosophical inquiry. Even in the earliest records of India, namely, the Rgveda, we find the prominence of man’s position in the world duly recognised. Man had the capacity within himself to understand the hidden sides of the world. It was not a gift from outside; it was a development from within. This knowledge of the secrets of the world is not what man can get even from a teacher; it has to shine within himself. Gods were only man’s companions. There was mutual co-operation between men and gods; it was not a contract of give and take, of profit and loss. God is not an aweinspiring emperor to men. They are strong and valorous, friendly and helpful, kindly to those who are in difficulty, angry, if at all, only to the enemies of good, and merciful to those in repentence. The relation between men and gods was that of friend and friend; Gods were never revengeful, and left men completely free in their affairs. They never interfered with any one’s affairs and they never arrogated themselves the responsibility for men’s conduct in their life. Sin is only a deviation from the law of nature and Gods were indifferent to the attitude of man towards them.

17. The doctrine of man’s supremacy in the world, starting in the Vedas, continued uninterrupted in the channels of thought in India until very recent times. If the world is an emanation from a supreme spirit, and if God is identified with that supreme spirit, man too is identified with the same supreme. Man was never subordinate to anything, not even to a Supreme God. That is how the absolute was thought of as Ananda (happiness); and just as God is happiness, so are men too. To know man is to know the absolute and to know the world, and they are
known as happiness. The knowledge of man’s true nature or
the true nature of the God or of the world was not sought after
for an ultimate fruit in the form of happiness from outside;
such a knowledge is the knowledge of man and of the world and
of God as happiness itself. Philosophy is a journey and at the
destination, there is happiness. Happiness in man is like sweet-
ness in sugar; man’s nature and happiness are identical.

18. If religion teaches that man is by nature a sinner and des-
tined to suffer and that release from sin and suffering can come
to man after death only through the grace of God, a knowledge
of the true nature of man along the path of philosophy can lead
man only to suffering. That is how religion and philosophy
had to part company even at a very early stage in the evolution
of thought in the West. Philosophy led man to nothing except
to a knowledge of the universe, and it was religion that could
promise and secure happiness to man.

19. In India, there was no such distinction as religion and
philosophy; science made use of the explanations of the
phenomena of the universe supplied by philosophy and
philosophy tried to account for such phenomena. It is in this
way that right from the very beginning, the three currents ran
together along a common channel. In the currents flowing
along a common bed, there can be a difference in velocity and
depth; there can be ripples and also whirl-pools. There was no
conflict. Science, like the religious texts, began to be known as
Veda; we have Gāndharva-veda (music), Āyurveda (medicine)
and Dhanurveda (archery or science of war). Another term that
we meet with in Sanskrit is Śāstra which means "that through
which instruction is given". There is another term "Anuśāsana"
from the same root, and this term means "instruction".

20. Still another term that is found associated with a treatise
on any subject is "Jñāṇāsā", which means a "desire to know".
This is very close to the term "philosophy" itself. But in India
there is no such distinction between Veda, Śāstra (instruction)
and Jñāṇāsā (desire for knowledge) as there is between science,
religion and philosophy in the West. The three terms are inter-
convertible. The three aspects of science, religion and philoso-
phy formed a single current in India. Each pre-supposes the
other and each depends on the other. This point must be borne
in mind if one is to understand the exact meaning of the term
"philosophy" in the expression "Indian Philosophy". If Indian
Philosophy had happiness as the aim, it is just like sweetness
being the aim of sugar. Happiness is not something external
that is attained through philosophy in India. The truth known
through philosophy is happiness itself; that is the position.

21. Another point that has been raised against Indian Phi-
losophy, to indicate that the term "philosophy" is not appropriate
to it, is that Indian philosophy accepts an authority transcending
reason, while philosophy must be rational, reason being the highest
judge in all matters relating to the investigation of truth. The
criticism will have a force if what is accepted in Indian philo-
sophy as transcending reason is any scriptural authority. Scrip-
ture in Indian philosophy is only a record of direct experience of
a transcendental nature, and not any external authority origin-
ating in God or a Teacher. The element of pessimism is an-
other target of criticism against Indian philosophy. Here also
what can be termed pessimism is different from the pessimistic
tone in Western philosophy; it is not Vedic either, and is what
for the first time originated and developed in Buddhism. Lack of
a strongly marked out ethical tone is another such element that
has called for some criticism against Indian philosophy as philo-
sophy. All such points will be taken up in appropriate contexts.

22. It is not my intention to write a text book on Indian
Philosophy. I am interested only in examining certain general
problems and in indicating certain lines of approach into the
field of Indian Philosophy. My standpoint amounts to this:
has Indian Philosophy been correctly and faithfully presented
to the modern world? Are the criticisms levelled against
Indian philosophy fair and reasonable? There are two sides
to these questions. One is the side of direct attack on the
doctrines contained in Indian Philosophy and the other relates
to the antithesis postulated between the Vedic current with its
various drawbacks and the Buddhist currents as a corrective
to these drawbacks.
23. I have to analyse the questions of the modes of knowing. Perception, inference and Authority are not three water-tight compartments without any sort of flow from one to the other. There is no perception without an element of inference as an integral part of it, and perception by its very nature presupposes the existence of certain realities that require the application of the inferential process, since such realities fall outside the sphere of perception. In the same way, it is the limitation of the inferential process that warrants the postulation of a mode of knowing in the case of realities that do not come within the range of perception and inference. What is termed “Authority” as a mode of knowing in the field of philosophical speculation, is a natural and direct consequence of the nature of perception and inference.

24. As between the Vedic path and the Buddhist tendencies, there is a confusion of thought that is responsible for the postulation of an antithesis between the Vedic current of thought and the Buddhist current; in both the currents there have developed certain ripples of the nature of “belief” and “superstition” and also of rituals. There is also a rationalistic element in both. Usually, the religious current consisting of “beliefs” and “superstitions” and rituals in the Vedic current are put against the purely philosophical and rationalistic sides in the Buddhist current. All the criticisms against the Vedic current in comparison with Buddhist current are the direct consequences of such a confusion of thought and of such a lack of discrimination in approach.

25. India has never countenanced a pessimistic view of the world and of man’s life in it. It is only in Buddhism that the world is condemned as a source of sin, as a seat of suffering. There is a difference between the recognition of suffering as an element in the life of man in the world and the condemnation of life as nothing but suffering. In the former case, a progression to a higher state may be a natural culmination to life in the world; in the latter case, an escape from the world becomes the goal kept in view. In all the Vedic currents of thought, there is recognised an association of the Spirit with Matter in the world. But such an association is the means for disentangling the spirit
from such an association. Certain Vedic currents, like the Mimāṃsā, do not accept such an association as an entanglement at all. Thus, in the Sāṅkhya Text there is the statement:

The mutual association of the two, the Spirit and the Matter, are for the purpose of discriminate viewing and effecting the release, like the association of a lame man and of a blind man. The world process has been started through such an association.

Here there is no antithesis between Matter and Spirit; there is only a co-operative understanding between the two. In the Nyāya system of philosophy, experience is either of the nature of happiness or the nature of suffering; it is not unqualified suffering. It is in the Vedānta that there is a possibility of suspecting a doctrine of life being suffering, inclusive of both happiness and suffering as understood in the ordinary language. But here the difference is not between happiness in release and suffering in life; the difference is between perfection in release and imperfection in life. There is a difference between suffering and imperfection.

26. We must also distinguish between a purpose for which any activity is undertaken and a natural culmination of such activities. There are activities like what are prescribed in.

One desiring heaven shall perform the Jyotistoma (Fire-Worship) Sacrifice.

Here there is the prescription of a means for a purpose. But there are also passages like,

One realises Brahman (The Absolute); one becomes the Brahman.

Here there is no means prescribed for the attainment of an objective. The latter is the real philosophy, and this is recognised in the Vedic current itself as superior to activities leading to a prescribed fruit.

27. An ethical element as it is understood in the investigation of religions, comes in when there is predominance of sin over virtue in a religion. Punishment for sins and reward for good life, ordained by a Supreme God, form the essence of an ethical element in religion and philosophy. In India, man is supreme,
and virtue is the dominating power in man and his life. It is for this reason that critics are not able to detect any high ethical, moral level in the Vedic traditions. There is the application of a standard that does not fit into the context and as such the conclusion is vitiated.

28. It is some such general problems that I propose to take up for consideration in the following chapters. Is there a real system of philosophy in India? What is a purpose that can be kept in view in, and what is a fruit arising from, rational investigation? What is Authority that transcends reason? Can Indian philosophical systems help man to understand the nature of the universe? What is the relation of Indian Philosophy to modern science? Is there conflict or concord between the two? Can Indian Philosophy form a back-ground for the growth of rationalistic science? Does Indian philosophy reflect any advanced and mature thought of man? Does Indian philosophy represent a stage in the development of civilization among men, and does it form a foundation and source for the development of human civilization? I raise some problems and consider them. I may not give a reply to them.
CHAPTER II
DIRECT EXPERIENCE

1. I have already said that there has been no conflict between science, religion and philosophy in India; but the three are not indentical. And we can notice some such distinction between the three in the thought currents of India. Such a differentiation is fairly well-marked in the system of philosophy known as Śāṅkhya. It is in this system that there is a definite and direct enunciation about suffering being the urge for the investigation of truth. If man had been absolutely happy, there would have been no occasion for any philosophical speculations. The view that "the security of life, the wealth of natural resources, the freedom from worry, the detachment from the cares of existence and the absence of a tyrannous practical interest stimulated the higher life of India" is not supported either by the texts relating to Indian philosophy or by examples in other countries. What is true is that "the suffering of the world provokes the problems of philosophy".

2. The mere experience of suffering does not result in a course of philosophical speculation. If suffering is the nature of man and his life in the world, if there be no termination to it, if there be no way of effecting such a termination, then too there can be no philosophy. If there are other ways also by which such termination of sufferings in life can be brought about, then too man may seek such ways, and philosophy may not develop. This is the position taken up in the Śāṅkhya philosophy. The Śāṅkhya system analyses the various possible ways in which man attempts to free himself from his sufferings. One such way is what science prescribes. Another is what religion teaches.

3. There are different kinds of sufferings which man experiences in his life. Some are brought about by man himself; they are sufferings of the nature of diseases and poverty through carelessness. Then there are sufferings arising out of the elementals
of the world; they are of the nature of floods, earth-quake and fire. Then there are sufferings brought about by supernatural agencies, what men usually call the working of Providence, like the sudden death of a child in the home. In the case of some such different kinds of sufferings, the causes are within the command of man, and there are remedies prescribed in sciences like medicine. In the case of others where the causes are not within the command of man, there are religious practices prescribed to propitiate the elementals and other supernatural powers in the world, which it is that bring about such sufferings. In this way the common man is satisfied with the available modes of freeing himself of sufferings.

4. But a philosopher takes up a different point of view. Science has its own limitations; science can look at only the surface, and on the surface there can be seen only aspects of facts and not the facts themselves. On account of this defect, neither is the cause correctly and fully understood for the suffering, nor are the remedies of an absolute nature, with no possibility of a fail; and even when they are effective, their effects are not lasting. They bring about only a temporary cure for the ailments.

5. Religion may prescribe cures for sufferings for which sciences are incompetent in so far as science operates only within facts that man can command, and there are sufferings for which the causes and the nature do not come within the sphere of man’s knowledge and abilities. But even religion does not prescribe a uniform cure of absolute values. There are terminations for such cures and there are gradations for the effects of various cures. Some of the ways prescribed in religion practised at that time were not quite clean also, in so far as animal sacrifices were included in such methods.

6. Ordinary men may be satisfied with cures of a temporary nature; even when there are cases of lapses in the operation of such cures, he is not much bothered and consoles himself with future hopes of cure. Even decays and gradations in such affects of cures and the unclean nature of the practices like injury to animals may not shake the minds of the ordinary men. It is suffering that is the root of sciences and religions; but it is this
defective nature of the remedies found in science and in religion that urges a philosopher to try further ways. Thus, there is the beginning in the Sāṅkhya kārikā, the most authoritative exposition of the tenets of the system:

Being overcome by the three-fold sufferings, there arises a desire to find out some means for overcoming them. If it be said that when there are practical remedies available a desire of that nature has no purpose, it is not so; because such remedies do not produce a lasting and an absolute effect. What are prescribed in scriptures are not different from what are found in practical sciences; they are associated with decay, gradation and lack of cleanliness. Something different from them is what has to be chosen, what arises out of a discriminative understanding of the manifested word, the unmanifested absolute and man himself who it is that knows.

7. In commenting on this, the great scholar Vācaspati Miśra says:

The subject matter of this treatise will not be an object of any one's desire to know if (1) there is nothing called suffering in the world, (2) it is not wanted to be avoided and (3) even when it is wanted to be avoided it is impossible to completely cut it off. There are two contingencies under which it becomes impossible to cut it off; either the suffering is eternal or the method of cutting it off is not known. Even when it is possible to cut it off, the knowledge which is dealt with in the treatise may not be a way of effecting it or there may be another way which is easier to accomplish; for these two reasons also there may not arise any such desire.

"What is" given above is just what Buddha also has said.

8. In the Dhammapada (the Path of Law), which is one of the most authoritative books relating to the doctrines of Buddhism, it is said that there are four truths:

He who takes refuge in Buddha, in the Law and in the Holy Order finds the four-fold Noble Truths, through right wisdom;

Suffering, the origination of suffering, and getting over
suffering, and the Noble Path of Eight Elements that brings one to the cessation of suffering.

There is little difference between the position taken up in the Sāṅkhya system and in Buddhism. The eight-fold path mentioned here consists of (1) Right View (Sammā-diṭṭhi), (2) Right Aspiration (Sammā-Saṅkappo), (3) Right Speech (Sammā-Vācā), (4) Right Action (Sammā-Kammanta), (5) Right Living (Sammā-Jīvo), (6) Right Exertion (Sammā-Vāyāmo), (7) Right Learning (Sammā-Sati) and (8) Right Meditation (Sammā-Samādhi). Knowledge and right living are the two pre-requisites of knowing. There is something more than dry logic in the process that leads to correct knowledge.

9. The question of knowledge cannot be dissociated from the way of knowing. What is wanted is not mere knowing, but correct knowing, and there arises the need for a test of the knowledge whether it is correct or false. There has been various schools of thought in India that have held different views about the ways of knowing and the tests for the correctness of the knowledge. There was a school of thought known as the Cārvākas. No text relating to their doctrines have remained, and there is no specific community or group of people who are known as having held such views. It has sometimes been said that it is the “Priests” of the Hindu Religion that completely eradicated all traces of that school of thought, it is the work of the orthodox defenders of tradition. It is unfortunate that there should have been such condemnations. We must remember that it is the “Priests”, the defenders of orthodoxy that have preserved some element of their system. If we have any information about the doctrines of the Cārvāka system, it is not at all due to the efforts of the opponents of Hindu Orthodoxy like the Buddhists. Such “Priests” have preserved many other things that must be objectionable to orthodox virtuosity.

10. Thus, there is a treatise known as the Science of Love (Kāma-Śāstra); it is essentially sexual science. There, it is said that one marries for maintaining Law and one enjoys the company of a “free woman” for pleasure. Many objectionable processes are described in that science, from the point of view of
social decency. Yet the text has been allowed to come down to us, and there have been later commentaries and recasts of the contents of the original work. The original work is ascribed to a great Hindu Sage by name Vātsyāyana. Its commentator is known to be Śaṅkarācārya; we do not know if it is the same great Śaṅkarācārya who has written the authoritative works on Vedānta. But tradition has no hesitation to assert such an identity, and tradition also says that Śaṅkarācārya was a bachelor. There are adaptations of that original work and some of them are ascribed to kings; none are ascribed to an opponent of Hindu orthodoxy. In dramas, scenes are presented on the stage that could have offended the susceptibilities of the orthodox people; yet such dramas continued popular and were freely allowed to be staged. In the drama named the Nāgānanda by king Harsha of Kanauj, there is a scene of a festivity in the Capital City after the wedding of the hero, and during the revels, the citizens caught hold of the character called the Vidūṣaka who was a Brahmin and began to force him to drink alcohol. In another drama named the Venu-saṁhāra, there was a quarrel between two generals about the leadership of the army, when the commander of the army fell in battle. One of them who belonged to the Kshatriya community whose profession was war, taunted his rival because he belonged to the Brahmin community that had been prohibited from wearing weapons of war, and the Brahmin broke off the sacred thread he had on his shoulder as a symbol of his community on the open stage saying that if his birth in the Brahmin community is his disqualification, there goes the symbol of that affiliation. Manu-Smṛiti, which is usually condemned as the scripture of Hindu orthodoxy, recognises the legitimacy of the various kinds of sons born outside wed-lock and prescribes their share in inheritance. In philosophy questions are raised about God and the authority of scripture. The tenets of the Cārvāka system are also taken up for open discussion as legitimate issues to be argued and settled by reason. How can we say that the "Priests" and defenders of Hindu orthodoxy are responsible for the elimination of all records about this school of thought? We must be grateful to them for preserving the main lines of thought.
11. In this system only direct perception is recognised as the valid means of knowing. Direct perception leads to some natural secondary forms of knowledge and they too are valid. Some such secondary forms of knowing may be what is termed inference. Certainly they recognised that fire is hot without touching it every time. To them what is called inference and such other forms of secondary knowledge come under recollection and recognition. Their position is exactly what the scientists of modern times take up, that truth can be established by means of direct perceptions and natural deductions therefrom. They do not recognise things that can be known only by inference and on the authority of others, like an enduring soul that continues to experience moment by moment and that continues to live in another body when this body drops out, sin and virtue, heaven and hell, God, and the efficacy of religious rituals for bringing about happiness here or hereafter and for warding off sufferings.

12. The Buddhists also took up the same position. They too accepted only one way of correct knowing, and that is the way of direct perception. They accepted natural deductions from direct perception also as a way of correct knowing, like the Cārvākas. But they differentiated between direct perception and inference as two distinct modes of knowing. The difference is only of a technical nature. When some invariable concomitance is established between two events by direct perception, then through such concomitance, we can infer the presence of one of them when the other is present. But Buddhism restricted the possibilities of such concomitance to the relation of cause and effect and the relation of the general and the particular. Thus if there is fire, we can infer that there is heat and when there is heat, we can infer that there is fire. Similarly, when we see a tree that belongs to a particular class of trees also, like mango or pine, we infer that it is a tree. There can be no establishment of such a concomitance between two events one of which is absolutely outside the sphere of direct perception, and as such they do not recognise things that can only be inferred; they do not recognise any other mode of knowing also. For this reason, they like the Cārvākas reject things like an enduring soul and the
efficacy of rituals that bring about happiness in another world.

13. What Buddhism refuses to recognise is only the authority of the Vedas as prescribing a valid mode of securing happiness after death; they too accept the distinction of sin and virtue, and of heaven and hell. They accepted the authority of the teachings of Buddha. It is not right to say that Buddhism is rationalistic and Hinduism is dogmatic. In judging Hinduism and Buddhism, there has come about a lot of confusion and a mixture of what should have been kept separate. In the Tipiṭakas, the canonical literature of Buddhism, "the views set forth..., if not the actual doctrine taught by Buddha himself, are yet the nearest approximation to it we possess." "In the Questions of Milinda we seem to get a more negative interpretation of the Buddhist teaching. Nāgasena seems to commit Buddha to a negative dogmatism which denies soul, God and a future for the liberated. He is a thoroughgoing rationalist, who adopted the scientific method rigorously and tore off the screen of make-believe which pious hands had woven round the image of truth to disguise its uglier aspects." " Suspended judgment was Buddha’s attitude; reckless repudiation was Nāgasena’s amendment."

14. When it comes to a judgment of the conditions of Indian thought prior to the advent of Buddha, it is said that "the Vedas had already gained a mysterious sanctity", and that it was an age of speculative chaos, full of inconsistent theologies and vague wranglings." Further, "anarchy in thought was leading to anarchy in morals." "Buddha.........felt that the world would be better for the triumph of natural law over supernaturalism. It was his privilege to start a religion independent of dogma and priesthood, sacrifice and sacrament." Here we find an apologia for the distortions of Buddha's teachings in the Milindapañha (Questions of Milinda) and a condemnation of the speculations of the Brāhmanas and the Upaniṣads of the Vedic literature.

15. This is followed by the statement that "Buddha himself admits that the dharma which he has discovered by an effort of self-culture is the ancient way, the Aryan path, eternal dharma. Buddha is not so much creating a new dharma as rediscovering an old form." "To develop his theory Buddha had only to rid the
Upanisads of their inconsistent compromises with Vedic polytheism and religion." Here is an admission that there had been even in a prior age the reign of rationalism; and who could they be who had developed this rational outlook on the problems of life? Since they must be prior to the Upanisads, they must be the very people who had developed the culture represented by the Vedas including the Brāhmaṇas.

16. What I want to make clear is that there was nothing started through the advent of Buddha as an original course in the thought of man in India, absolutely different from the ways of thought of a previous age. What we have is only a continuation of the old course with slight changes in directions, in contents, in volume and in relative emphasis. We do not know much about the nature of thought in India prior to the time of Buddha, in what is called the Vedic Age. The position is the same even during the time of Buddha. We have little materials for evaluating the Indian thoughts even in the time of Buddha. Even the records of the teachings of Buddha, which relate to a much later date than the time of Buddha, do not help us very much. Systematic accounts of how man thought, how man knew, are found only in the post-Buddhistic age in the history of Indian thought.

17. We do not have a work like Aristotle's Logic in the whole range of Vedic literature, nor does such a work make its appearance in the literature recording the teachings of Buddha. But we cannot say that they did not have logic at that time. There is no doubt about it that people came together, that they debated, that they discussed and that they arrived at conclusions. What we do not find is only the text books on logic, and not logic itself. They knew of different modes of knowing; they recognised differences in what were known. They analysed and classified; they compared and they investigated. We may not find a classification of the modes of knowing as direct perception, Inference and Authority; we may not find the classified categories with divisions and definitions.

18. But we do find terms that suggest logical ways of thinking. In a work called the Taittirīyāranyaka, which may be late within the Vedic literature, but which certainly is early in Indian litera-
ture, there are the terms Pratyakṣa and Anumāna, meaning Direct perception and Inference. There are the other two terms Smṛti and Āitihya. Both relate to Authority. Smṛti is what is remembered and Āitihya is Tradition. Smṛti or what is remembered is a very definite system of knowledge handed down from the past which is accepted as authoritative and dependable. Āitihya or tradition is just what was known as having come down from the past and what they took for granted without the same sanction for validity and dependability.

19. There is a distinction drawn between things that are Pratyakṣa or coming within the sphere of direct perception and that are Parokṣa or falling out of such direct perception. What comes within the sphere of direct perception for some, may fall outside such direct perception for others. In such matters the former becomes “Authority” for the latter. This shows a recognition of the fact that perception takes us only to aspects of reality and not to reality itself. The latter does not come within the sphere of all, though the former may. All can have a direct perception of some aspects of things. Such aspects are limited by forms (Rūpa) and names (Nāma). We find various records, within the Vedic literature, of how some gave instructions to others about the reality of things. Even learning, folklore, is not sufficient for understanding the reality. This stands in need of special capacities. Ordinary men may perceive forms of things and may designate such forms by names. But they do not see the thing itself. For that there must be ratiocination (Manana or Mīmāṁsā, both derived from the root Man-to think). Even this leads only to a general idea, and for a specific understanding there must be direct perception through a special insight.

20. Nothing was accepted on blind faith. There was doubt, Vicikitsā, which is a very popular terminology found in the Vedic literature. The word is from the root Gīt (to know) with the suffix Sā (meaning “Desire”) and with the prefix Vi (meaning distinctly or separately). This is a logical doubt and not an aspect of ignorance. Here when two alternatives are known, there is the desire to know the one as distinct from the other and also to know which is acceptable. It may be that other terms
that appear as preludes to a determinate knowledge, like Vipa-
ryaya (Wrong understanding) terms like cause and effect with
their true relations, terms like Prawyiti and N蠆yiti (Activity and
Retirement), and terms like Visaya (object of knowledge)
are missing from the Vedic literature. We may not find a
definition of the relation of the general and the particular, of the
universal and the individual. But we cannot say that thought
was still undeveloped. The fact may be that the intellectual
level was so high that there was no need for text-books, that such
things may have been taken as matters of course.

21. We find the clear distinction drawn between what is and
what is not (Sat and Asat). They distinguished the appearance
from the real nature, and they had been freely making use of the
suffix Tā or Tva to indicate the nature of things, adding the suffix
to the name. Logic is closely inter-linked with grammar, and cer-
tainly considerable progress had been made in the investigation
of the nature of, language in the Vedic times. Division of the
sentence into words classified as various “Parts of Speech”
like noun and verb, the analysis of words into roots, suffixes
and prefixes, distinctions of cases and numbers (Vibhakti and
Vacana), ascertainment of accents and metres and all such facts
show that there had been a very minute analysis of the facts
of language. Can we say that they could not think logically,
that thought had not properly developed among the people
at that time? We may not find a treatise on logic, but we do
not miss any logical, any systematic way of making state-
ments, and this shows a systematic and logical way of thinking.
Further, we have regular treatises on Phonetics and on grammar,
including etymology and prosody, which fact shows that logic
too must have been developed to a high standard in the Vedic
times. Do we say that there was no logic in Greece in the time of
Socrates or Plato in so far as it was Aristotle who for the first
time wrote out a treatise on Logic?

22. A treatise on logic cannot arise out of a vacuum where
there was no logical thought at all previously. A treatise on Logic
is a codification of theories already current, accepted and prac-
tised. In the literary records of the teachings of Buddha we see no more evidence of a system of logic than what we find in the Vedic Literature, namely, the Brāhmaṇa and the Upaniṣad literatures. In both we find the influence of logic though not logical details.

23. The āryavāka mode of approach must have been an integral part of Vedic thought. Vedic tradition ascribes the system to Bṛhaspati, who is one of the important Deities of the Veda, and who is the teacher of the gods according to post-Vedic traditions. In the ārvāka system there is an emphasis on the facts of life and the doubts raised against the other world and the paths towards it. In the Rgveda we find the same emphasis on the facts of life; there is practically nothing of a desire to reach another world exhibited by the poets of the Rgveda. This has been the traditional approach to the interpretation, and Śaunaka, a great authority on Vedic interpretation in the early stages, says that he was not able to see much of a prayer by the poets for attaining heaven, in his exegetical work called the Bṛhaddevatā. The insignificance of the world in which we find ourselves and the eagerness to escape from it are found very prominently even in the earliest literature relating to the teaching of Buddha. If there had been any intellectual force working against the doctrines of the ārvākas, it could have been in the Buddhist currents. And it is the literature bearing on the Vedic tradition that has preserved the doctrines of this system and not the Buddhist literature.

24. In the Vedic tradition there is the distinction drawn between normal experience of the many and the super-normal experience of the few. The normal experience consists of direct perception and inference. The fruits of the super-normal experience of the few are passed on to others through what was known as Smṛti (what was remembered), what was dependable authority. There were many other things that remained outside the sphere of direct perception and inference, and that were also known and communicated from age to age through generations and that were taken for granted by the people. That is what is called Āīitya or Tradition.
25. The three categories of knowledge coming within direct perception, inference and tradition related to the normal experiences. They had a bearing only on the aspects of truth. Then, there is another channel of perception, inference and direct experience coming within the capacity of the few. The latter is philosophy. Science and religion came within the scope of the former. The Čārvākas and the Buddhists were confined in their thought to the category of normal perception and inference therefrom. Things falling absolutely outside the sphere of such normal experience had no bearing on the thoughts of Buddhists and Čārvākas. It is here that there is the real difference between the Vedic and the Buddhist currents of thought. The Buddhist current stopped short of the point to which the Vedic current flew. Direct perception of the normal type found a place in both, and reason of a particular group also found a place in both. But in the Vedic current there was reason of another group, and also direct experience of a super-normal nature.
CHAPTER III

REASON

1. When we speak of the position of "reason" in Indian Philosophy in contrast to scriptural authority, it is unreasonable to say that there was an age dominated by scriptural authority and that it was Buddhism that introduced or revived the element of free reason into the philosophical field. Perception, reason and authority—all played their respective parts in the Vedic thought and also in the Buddhistic thought. We cannot distinguish the one from the other on this basis. There is a difference in approach, in the nature of reason as accepted in Buddhism and in the Vedic path. Scant justice has been done by recent writers to the philosophy of the Vedas. "Against tradition of this kind, human ingenuity is valueless......If the Taittiriya Samhitā in a moment of sanity admits the possibility of doubt whether a man really exists in yonder world or not, that candour is accidental and episodic. The theologians of the Brāhmaṇas are not prepared to admit to ignorance of any sort, and revelation reduces them to interpretation at their pleasure, aided by the fact of the bizarre nature of the revealed texts." Such remarks are unfortunate.

2. The condemnation is directed mainly against the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Vedas, with which are associated the "Priests". There is better appreciation of the Upaniṣads where they find some element of free thinking. There is the denunciation of "the mechanical sacerdotalism of the Brāhmaṇas"—-; "The Upaniṣads sought to square a growing idealistic philosophy with the dogmas of a settled theology" which in the context is the religion of the Brāhmaṇa portion. "The advance of the Upaniṣads on the Vedas consists in......a protest against the externalism of the Vedic practices and an indifference to the sacredness of the Veda." --- "The attitude of the Upaniṣads is not favourable to the sacredness of the Vedas". ---The reason for such contrast between the Vedas, by which the Brāhmaṇa or
ritualistic portion is understood, and the Upaniṣads is that such writers find some close relation in the Upaniṣads to the Buddhist thought, as already stated in the citations given in the previous chapter. The real position is that Buddha was born, was trained, and lived in an atmosphere of Vedic rituals and Vedic thought. All the Ṛṣis (Sages) whom he met and with whom he had discussions belonged to the Vedic tradition, and there was nothing but cordiality and mutual regard between Buddha and such Ṛṣis. There was absolutely no disapproval of the Vedic ways on the part of Buddha, except what we can detect within the Vedic literature itself, like the Upaniṣads. This has special reference to the value of rituals in comparison with the approach of rationci-
nation to reach the goal of final happiness. The Upaniṣads recognised that the fruits of rituals are of an impermanent nature and that permanent fruits can be obtained only from a realisation through knowledge. This is also the principle found in the earlier stages of the development of Vedic thought. In the Rgveda, the superiority of intellectualism with the deep mysteries of the world, with the concealed positions of the gods, with the supreme position of the great God Visnū and with the immortal nature of that position obtained through knowledge, is quite plain. In the Vedic tradition itself there is the record of an admission of the close of the age when people could see the “beyond”, the true nature of the Law (Dharma), as is found in the statement of Yāska in the Nirukta.

3. It must also be understood that practically everything that we find in the records of the teachings of Buddha relate to the Monks (the Bhikkus), whom Buddha had gathered round him. Buddha seldom addressed the “public”; he was addressing his own disciples and associates, and the admonitions that we find in the teachings of Buddha are mainly directed against the Bhikkus, who were his disciples and associates, and their ways of life and their ways of approach to reach the goal. Buddha did not originate the Order of Bhikkus (monks). He used to meet them and it is his contact with the Bhikkus that urged him to take to their ways for the realisation of the right goal, abandoning the worldly ways to happiness in the form the enjoying luxuries in
the palace, with ritualisms and various forms of religious practices and religious beliefs. He was at first dissatisfied and he had to move along an independent path. When he reached the goal by walking along his own path, he was able to get some of his old associates around him, and his following increased. His teachings were meant for such recruits to his new religion. It was not at all a rebellion against the Vedic Path, it was a reform of the Path trodden by some people who did not follow the true Vedic Path of rituals along with knowledge as a unity. They were the Brahmacārins of the Rgveda and the Atharva-Veda, people who lived a particular mode of life in search of Brahman, the Ultimate, in contrast to others who may be designated Brahmavādins, people who realised the Gods and who sang songs (Brahman) bout them, the Ṛṣis.

4. "A congeries of conflicting theories and guesses, accepted by some and denied by other, changing with men, reflecting the individual characters, emotions and wishes of their authors, filled the air. There were no admitted facts or principles which all recognised, but only dissolving views and institutions. Discussions were ripe about the finiteness or infiniteness, or neither or both, of the world and the self, and the distinction of truth and appearance, the reality of a world beyond, the continuance of the soul after death and the freedom of the will......It was an age of speculative chaos, full of inconsistent theologies and vague wranglings. ......The exhuberant fancy of the metaphysically minded thus sported with time, space and eternity, and vulgarised the noble art of philosophy. Great truths were hidden away in the fogs of misty metaphysics." This is just the situation in which Buddha saw the Monks with whom he came into contact. Naturally "Buddha was struck by the clashing enthusiasm, the discordant systems, the ebb and the flow of belief, and drew from it all his own lesson of the futility of metaphysical thinking. Therefore Buddha wished to steer clear of profitless metaphysical discussions." Nothing can be more true than the view that "Whatever metaphysics we have in Buddhism is not the original Dhamma but added to it (Abhidhamma). Buddhism is essentially psychology, logic and ethics, and not metaphysics."
5. In the above passages we have the correct explanation for the difference in the position which reason was accorded in the Buddhist philosophy and in the Vedic philosophy. In the Vedic system, reason was a passage to reach the higher truths through a process of realisation instead of being a wild chase which reason chanced to be among the predecessors of the Bhikkhus whom Buddha organised into a regular Order. Buddha wanted to hold reason back from such an aimless rush. Buddha never denied a "Beyond" for the legitimate sphere of reason. That "beyond" could not be reached along the path by which reason was flowing among the Brahmacārins, who became the Bhikkhus of the Order organised by Buddha. Buddha had to stop with the stage of such a restraint; he did not point out the way along which reason could go further, so that the intellect could reach the right goal. What Buddha did not teach became what did not matter, what did not exist, according to the later followers of his teachings. There was no conflict, there was not even a difference between what Buddha taught and what was the accepted position in the Vedic thought; the difference and even a conflict arose at a later stage, on account of this positive conclusion drawn out of the negative position taken by Buddha.

6. The Cārvākas recognise only perception as the mode of knowing. This includes also experiences naturally coming out of direct perception. Thus they know that fire burns, without directly perceiving the burning sensation, just from the knowledge that there is fire. The Buddhists accepted the latter as a separate mode of knowing, and called it inference from a "universal relation". But they reduced such a universal relation to two patterns, the relation of cause and effect and the relation of the class and the particular. Thus, there is a universal relation between fire and burning produced by it, and there is also such a relation between a tree and its nature as a particular class of tree like "Mango". We can infer one from the other, as between these two pairs. We can infer fire from heat and the nature of being a tree from the nature of being a mango tree.

7. In such relations, both the things that are so related come within the sphere of direct perception, though at the particular
moment of inference, one of them may not be within the sphere of a direct perception. In the Čārvāka system, such a knowledge at the time when the fact was not within the sphere of direct perception is included under recollection, and they do not accept anything like a universal relation. It makes little difference in practical matters whether both of them are brought within a single mode of knowing like perception, as the Čārvākas do, or whether they are spoken of as two distinct modes of knowing like perception and inference, as the Buddhists do. The actual scope of knowing is the same in both. This is the position taken up in modern science also. They accept universal relationships only in so far as they came within the sphere of direct observation and only in so far as they are warranted by such observation.

8. Such a mode of perception is natural to all intelligent beings, not excluding beasts. This is what Śaṅkara says in his Bhāṣya (Commentary) on the Vedānta Sūtras in the Introductory portion, that so far as the knowledge through perception and related modes are concerned they are common between man and beasts. That much of reasoning is found in beasts also. When a man approaches a cow with a stick or with green grass in his hand, the cow knows the difference that in one case there may be some harm done to it and that in the other it may get something acceptable. But man's reasoning faculty brings something more than this within its sphere. Man deduces from observed facts certain relationships that go beyond the sphere of direct perception. Man's reasoning faculties carry him to a stage where reasoning itself becomes defunct and where something transcending it has to step in for proper functioning. It is here that there is the true difference between the Vedic approach and the Buddhist approach to problems in philosophy.

9. I have already said that in the Sāṅkhya system we can find a clear demarcation of the line between the normal functioning of reason and the super-normal functioning. There are two sets of problems that face man. Some come within the scope of science (what is termed Drsā or seen) and others come within the scope of religion (what is termed Ānusvārika or what follows scripture). The sufferings which create the problem for man are
of three kinds, what arises from man himself (Ādhyātmika), what arises from the Elementals (Ādhibhautika) and what arises from Providence (Ādhidāsītika). Science and religion provide remedies for all the three kinds of sufferings.

10. But there is a still higher problem, not the problem of finding a remedy to particular sufferings, but the general problem of why there is suffering at all in the world. Neither science nor religion prescribes a remedy for the mental suffering brought about in the form of this higher problem. Ordinary sufferings of the above three-fold nature come and when some remedy is applied they go. But there are cases when the remedy may not be affective. There is no case when the remedy brings about an absolute cure. At least the suffering in the form of having to face the problem of why there is suffering, cannot be removed by any of the remedies prescribed in science or in religion. Here is a limitation to science and religion. It is not a case of absolute helplessness in the matter of completely eradicating the element of such a suffering. There is a higher remedy for this transcendental suffering and the remedy is found in philosophy, in knowing the true nature of the world in its absolute nature, where there is no differentiation or manifestation, of the world in its changing and differentiated condition and of the man who knows; there must also be the relation of the three among themselves.

11. It is wrong to say that philosophy prescribes a remedy against suffering and that as such it has a purpose and ceases to be true philosophy. Philosophy does not deal with this or that form of suffering in the world; it deals only with the problem of suffering in its universal aspect, why there is suffering and what the nature of this suffering is. It is only an intellectual discomfort and it is only the few that can have such an intellectual discomfort having to face such a problem about suffering. Generally people are interested only in this or in that suffering and in the cure for that suffering. They are indifferent to the general problem of how suffering has arisen in the world at all; But there are others who are indifferent to the problem of this form or that form of suffering and whose interests are confined to the
general problem of how suffering has arisen in man's life. This latter problem is for philosophers (for Paññitas) as is said in Indian works and not for the ordinary people (for Pāmaras).

12. This is exactly what Śaṅkara has said under the first Aphorism in his Bhāṣya (commentary) on the Vedānta Sūtras. He enumerates four qualifications for being a philosopher. He must distinguish between the problems of this impermanent world and the eternal problems of the world. He must have certain mental disciplines. He must not have any motives of realising the common fruits of action whether in this world or in the world beyond. He must have a desire for release from bondages. The last is the real qualification.

13. The term "Release from bondage" connotes only an intellectual limitation, felt only by the intellectuals; it has nothing to do with any physical discomfort. Such a discomfort is produced on account of some problems of a transcendent nature, and has no reference to the day-to-day life of man. All scientists feel such discomfort, and all advances in science are due to the effort of the scientists to obtain release from this bondage in the form of such a discomfort. Such a purpose in the form of obtaining release from bondage is common between Indian philosophy on one side and modern philosophy and modern science on the other side. The fundamental question in philosophy is, "How do we know?" Thus the modes of knowing, the criterion for determining whether what is known has been validly known and other questions claim the first place when philosophy has to be started. The Sāṅkhya philosophy, like all systems of philosophy in India, assigns the foremost position to this problem in its scheme.

14. Modes of knowing are recognised as three-fold—perception, inference and testimony of a reliable person; all the various modes of knowing found in other systems are included within this. Indeed, objects of knowledge can be established only through modes of knowing. The term for perception here is Dṛṣṭa, which in the first verse was used in the sense of what is known through experience, and I had brought science under that term. That includes both
direct perception and deductions that naturally follow from such observations. There it meant the wider field of direct experience and here it is used in a restricted sense of "perception." The term for "testimony of a reliable person" is Āpta-vacana. Āpta literally means "one who has attained," that is, one who has understood truth and who, as such, can be trusted, who is reliable.

15. In the Veda there were the two terms, Śmyti and Aitihya. Both of them are brought within this term here. The testimony of reliable persons comprehends the knowledge realised by the Rṣis, the Sages, who could see into the truth of things in the world, such knowledge being handed down from generation to generation and that is remembered through such passage. It also comprehends such truths that were known and that were handed down from generation to generation, but that may not have had the same validity as the former; this may be mere tradition. Every information derived indirectly on the authority of another person comes within this second category.

What is called "perception" is a determinate knowledge relating to and restricted to each individual object. Inference has been spoken of as of three kinds. This has the "mark" and the "marked" kept in view before it. What, on the other hand, is called "testimony of a reliable person" is the authority of a reliable person and also the authority of scripture.

Certainly, a "determinate knowledge" is not confined to a knowledge derived through a bare, direct contact of the object with a sense-organ. The primary mode of knowing is when an object comes in contact with a sense-organ. But neither in men nor even in beasts does such a contact stop with the production of a mere isolated impression of the object. Certain common features between such objects that come into contact with the sense-organ, certain associations between different objects that come into contact with the sense-organ, and other factors are direct and natural consequences of such contacts. Thus when I see a red jar, I do not get the impression of the colour and an object as two distinct ones. I get the notion of a jar through the
recognition of common attributes found in various objects. When I am burned by fire I know that there would result burning from another fire that I may see. I may know from another person that a particular fruit is sweet. Thus practically every kind of knowledge can be included within perception (which comprehends what are naturally deduced from the direct perception). So, why is it that two other modes are also mentioned in this list of modes of knowing?

16. I have already said that the classification of the modes of knowing into perception and inference in the Buddhistic systems is more academic than real. If what comes within the sphere of inference in Buddhist philosophy can be accepted as a natural extension of the sphere of perception, then perception alone can be held as sufficient as the mode of knowing. Here in the passage cited above, there is need for holding the two other modes as distinct from perception, incapable of being recognised as a natural extension of the sphere of perception. It is for this purpose that there are the three items given in the classification of the modes of knowing. There are objects in the world that cannot be understood through deductions that naturally follow from direct perception. It is true that inference cannot function where there has been no perception. But the extension of the sphere of perception for comprehending such facts of the universe is not a process of natural deductions that follow from perception. It is a special process. And all the facts known on the testimony of a reliable person do not come within the sphere of ordinary perception of the individuals from whom such information has proceeded. In the original source there might be processes different from the normal process of perception. Thus within inference and the testimony of reliable persons there are facts of the universe that can never come within the sphere of normal perception. For this reason, perception is defined as a determinate knowledge in respect of and restricted to individual facts, confined to themselves, without extending such knowledge to the further processes of deductions that may naturally follow from the perceptions.

17. It is not my purpose to write a text-book on Indian logic.
I cannot deal with the divisions of the modes of knowing and the
details relating to each of such modes. But I have to enter into
a few minor details to make some general topics clear. I took
up the Sāṅkhya text as the basis, since that gives a simple, clear
picture of the modes of knowing recognised in Indian Philosophy.
But unfortunately, there is no uniform tradition regarding the
interpretation of the text, and so I have to enter into such
minor details. If the text had been clear and if interpretations
had been uniform, so far as this particular point is concerned, I
could have straight away passed on to such general principles.

18. In the above classification and explanation of each
of the modes, there is mention of a three-fold division of inference.
The text itself does not say what the three divisions of inference
are. And this has an intimate bearing on the relation of inference
to perception. In the text-books relating to logic as developed
by the Nyāya system, there are three kinds of inferences mentioned,
namely, Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat and Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa. Pūrva means
“prior” and “Śeṣa means “posterior”. The first two divisions mean
“what has a prior” and “what has a posterior”. The
third is “what has been seem (Dṛṣṭa) in general (Sāmānyataḥ).”
In the inference of a flood from a rain (which is prior), and in
the inference of rain from the flood (which is posterior), we
have the instances of the first two kinds. The third is the usual
system of inferences through a universal.

19. In all inferences, there must be the “mark” and the
“marked” known in advance. The classical syllogism of Indian
Logic is:

There is fire on the mountain.
because there is smoke on it.
Here smoke is the “mark” that has been seen, and fire is what is
known as “marked” by smoke. That means, smoke is a mark
from which we can know that there must be fire. But in an
inference there must be the knowledge of the smoke (Middle
Term) and of fire (Major Term) as being held together by a
universal relation. There must also be the knowledge of the
mountain (Minor Term) as being marked by that mark of smoke.
Thus we must have the mark and two things marked by that,
and this necessitates the repetition of the element of "marked" in the above explanation.

20. Here what is meant is that in all cases of inference, there must be recognised a universal relation between the Major and the Middle Terms. But there is another interpretation that this expression refers to inferences of the "marked" from the "mark" and of the "mark" from the "marked", as in the case of the inference of a man being a monk from his staff ("marked" from the "mark") and in the case of the inference of a staff being the mark of monk from the fact that it is carried by a monk ("mark" from the "marked"). If this be the correct interpretation, we would have expected some mention of the third division also, in so far as three divisions were indicated just previously. So this is not an elaboration of the three-fold division mentioned previously.

21. In the interpretation of the above terms "mark" and "marked" I do not accept any of the old commentators. My own view is that by using the two terms there was no indication of two separate points taken as preceding an inference, a "mark" and a "marked". What is meant is only the antecedence of a relation of the two, the "mark" and the "marked", before an inference is possible. So, the passage means:

That (inference) has as antecedent (the relation between) the "mark" (i.e., Middle Term) and the "marked" (i.e. the Major term).

The three-fold inference is based on a universal relation between two events.

22. There is another explanation of the three-fold division of inferences. One is the inference from positive concomitance and another is the inference from negative concomitance. Thus from the presence of smoke we infer fire and from the absence of fire we infer the absence of smoke. The former has two divisions. In some cases the concomitance may be known by actual observation as in the case of smoke and fire in a kitchen etc. (This is the classical way of explaining the position). Then there are cases where the relation is not directly perceived and established, but is itself known only through deductions based
on other pieces of knowledge. Thus we can understand the concomitance of smoke and fire by direct observation of the facts in a kitchen etc. But how do we know the concomitance of the perception of colour, sound etc. with the functioning of sense-organs like the eye and the ear? It is not by direct observation, since the sense-organs and their functioning do not fall within the sphere of observation. But we know from the activities of a potter or a weaver when they make a jar or weave a cloth, that every activity is related to an instrument. In that way we deduce that the perception of colour etc. requires an instrument, and we deduce further that the respective instruments are the eye, the ear etc. But my own view is that the reference of the three-fold division of inferences is to what is accepted in the Nyāya system, mentioned above; the statement here is that the three-fold division has been recognised (Akhyāta), which means recognised in some authoritative text.

23. The important point is that in this three-fold division of inferences, as recognised in the Nyāya system, there is the third division called the Sāmānyato-Dṛṣṭa (What has been seen in general). In the next verse in the Sānkhya text this expression is found, and the verse is:

"Generally, on the other hand, from what is seen, of things falling beyond the sphere of sense-organ, there is the cognition, from inference.

I have given a literal translation of the different words that occur there (only first half), and I have marked the meanings of the individual words by commas. The question is whether we have to take the first and the third words together as forming a single group, and take that group as an adjective qualifying the last word. If this be so, then the translation will be:

There is the cognition of things falling beyond the sphere of sense-organs, on the other hand, from the inference of the nature of what is seen generally.

This is the interpretation that is generally accepted by the commentators. But in interpreting the passage in this way, there is some serious difficulty. In the second half of this verse what is given is the content of the sphere of "Authority,"
the objects that can be cognised only through the authority of another. If this first half is interpreted as giving the content of the sphere of inference, then the question arises why the content of the sphere of perception is not specified. It is may be said that although such a content of the sphere of perception is not given, it is implied in the statement that the content of the sphere of inference falls outside the sphere of sense-organs. By implication the content of the sphere of perception falls within the sphere of sense-organs.

24. Even then, there is still a great difficulty remaining. In this first half, as interpreted in the above way, it is not the content of inference that is stated; what is stated is only the content of a particular form of inference, one of the three varieties mentioned in the previous verse. There it has been stated that there are three varieties of inference, and the commentators give the three varieties in different ways. In one of them, the term "of the nature of what is generally seen" (Sāmānyato Dṛṣṭa) has not been given a place. In the other the term occurs; but the question arises why cognition of things that fall outside the range of sense-organs is restricted to this particular variety of inference and not to inference in general.

25. Therefore, the first half has to be interpreted in another way. It has to be split up into two parts. The meaning will be:

The cognition of things is generally from perception (Dṛṣṭa); that of things falling outside the sphere of sense-organs is from inference.

Some commentators have adopted such an interpretations also. The position is like this. Generally, we know things through perception, and by perception may be meant deductions that come out naturally from perceptions, in addition. But there are things that fall completely outside the sphere of sense-organs, and for the cognition of such things, we must have resort to inference. There is also the possibility of extending the scope of generalisation beyond the sphere of sense-organs.

26. I have already said that the Buddhists accept only two kinds of universal relations, that which exists between a cause and an effect and that which exists between a general and a particular,
like fire and burning, and a particular kind of tree and tree in general from a particular tree.

When burning is inferred from fire, and tree in general from a particular tree, there are the cases of the two kinds of inference.

But there is a third variety of universal relation, what subsists between two objects that are observed as concomitant, without necessarily a relation coming within either of what has been accepted by the Buddhists. This is what is called inference of the nature of "what is seen generally". An instance has already been given, the inference of the functioning of a sense-organ in the perception of colour, sound etc. Sense-organs and their functioning are absolutely outside the sphere of sense-organs. In the same way, we find that in every activity that produces an effect there is the functioning of an intelligent agent, like a potter or a weaver in the production of a jar or of a cloth. Can we infer such an agent in the case of the production of other objects, even when such an agent is beyond the sphere of sense-organs? Who produced the clay, out of which a potter can make a jar? Can we infer an agent in the form of God in such a case? Every material effect like a jar goes back on a material cause like the clay. Is it possible to establish a universal relation between a material effect and a material cause, even in cases where such a material cause falls outside the sphere of sense-organs? Does the whole material world go back on some finer, infinite, indivisible and unproduced matter? Everything is found to have an opposite; since there is change in matter, can we say that there is an opposite in the form of a changeless Spirit? These are cases where we have to resort to inference, that proceeds beyond the scope of perception.

27. The real difference between the Vedic schools of thought and the Buddhist schools is not that one is authoritarian while the other is rational. The difference is essentially in the scope of inference, which is brought about by the difference in the scope of universals. The fundamental position of the Buddhists is that a universal relation exists only between what are determined as cause and effect and between what are determined as the two
aspects of the same thing, what are really identical (*Tādātmya*). The general and the particular are aspects of the same thing and as such there is a universal relation between the two aspects; the two aspects are of what is identical, are of the same thing. They do not accept a universal relation established through the observation of concomitant presence and concomitant absence.

28. But there are many cases in our experience where we do not see either a relation of cause and effect or a relation of identity, being aspects of the same thing, and where still we see invariable concomitance, justifying the postulation of a universal relation. Thus, when a thing is found in two different positions at two different times, we know that there had been some movement, as when a man goes from one place to another. We can see the man moving from one place to another. Thus from such an observation, we establish a universal relation between change of position and movement. We cannot actually see any movement when the sun is in two different positions; but from such a universal relation established already, we infer some movement when the sun is found in two different positions. When the first asterism is high above the horizon, we know that the next asterism is just rising. Here, there is no question of a cause and effect, nor is there a question of two aspects of what is identical. It is only a question of establishing a universal relation through observation of concomitance.

29. Inference has a limited scope in the Buddhist system, while its role is much wider in the Vedic schools. When relations are observed between facts that come within the sphere of sense-organs, can we extend such relations even to facts that fall completely outside the sphere of sense-organs? This is the point on which there is a real difference between the Vedic schools and the Buddhist schools. It is not a question of a particular fact falling outside the range of perception at a particular moment and of its being inferred through a universal relation. In the Vedic systems, it is a question of recognising facts in the world that fall absolutely beyond the sphere of sense-organs and that can be cognised only through inference. And there are also
facts in the world that fall entirely outside the sphere of reason and inference and that can be cognised only through some other mode of knowing.

30. Perception and deduction of some relationships from perceived facts come within the range of beasts also. Here there is analogy between man and beasts. But man has a higher faculty and that faculty plays in the case of facts that fall entirely outside the sphere of perception and deductions from perceptions. Such a faculty has two aspects; one falls within the field of inference and the other falls outside the field of inference and transcends inference, just like inference transcending perception and deductions from perceptions.

31. It is this transcendental variety of inference that has a position in philosophy. Philosophy is essentially a matter of inferences from perceived facts, of facts that can never be perceived, that can only be inferred from relations observed in facts that are perceived and that are extended to facts that fall outside the sphere of perception. It is only through the process of such an inference that the nature of suffering in general and the cause of such suffering in general can be understood, as distinct from this particular or that particular kind of suffering that comes within the sphere of observation and study.
CHAPTER IV.

PATTERNS OF INFERENCE.

a. Formal Inference.

1. The term inference can be given two meanings. One is of a general nature and the other is of a technical nature. In giving the Title to this chapter, I have used the term in its general meaning. When we perceive a thing, some other facts are also brought within the scope of our cognition, and it is such elements in the cognition that I call inference. If I see a person weeping, I know also that he is in grief. I "infer" that he is in grief. If I ask a person whether I can reach a particular place by taking a particular road, instead of simply saying that I cannot, he would even say that I must take such and such a road different from what I had asked about. He "infers" that what I wanted to know is not merely something about a particular road, but is about any road that will take me to a particular place, even if that particular road of which I put the question does not satisfy my needs; and he answers a question which I never asked, which is about another road. There are various cases of such "inferences" in our day-to-day life.

2. But in logic, the term "inference" is used in a technical sense. It is a particular mode of deducing a fact from another fact that is known already. When a universal relation between two facts are known, and when a particular case comes within my knowledge that has such a universal relation with another fact, I understand the presence of a case of that other fact also. It is such a knowledge through a universal relation that is technically called an "inference" in logic. This technical inference is only one among the many patterns of inference of a general nature.

3. The classical example in Indian logic of an inference is; There is fire on the mountain, because there is smoke there.
Here one knows that there is a universal relation between fire and smoke, and when one knows the presence of smoke, there arises in one the knowledge of the presence of fire also, though one is seeing only the smoke and not the fire. It is the cognition of this nature, of something resulting from the cognition of something else that is called inference.

4. There are various views regarding the nature of the inference itself and also regarding the nature of the statement of such an inference in language form. The statement of an inference in a language form is called a syllogism. What was given above is not a syllogism. All statements of an inference must be put in the specific form of a syllogism. The above inference has to be given as:

1. There is fire on the mountain
2. Because there is smoke there
3. Wherever there is smoke there is also fire, as in a kitchen
4. On the mountain there is smoke.
5. Therefore there is fire also on the mountain

This is the form of a syllogism specified in the school of philosophy in India that is intimately connected with logic, namely, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. But in the other schools of thought, only the first three or the last three are accepted. They do not adopt this repetition. This is a small matter. What is important is that the syllogism must have a regular, uniform mode of expression. And this is the standard mode.

5. Here the question has been raised whether this inference is a cognition of a particular object from the cognition of another particular object. Is there the inference of a particular fire on the mountain from the sight of a particular smoke there? If that be so, there is no universal relation having a part in this inferential process. Or is it the relation of fire in general that is inferred from the knowledge of smoke? In that case, there is nothing that is newly inferred. Such a relation of smoke with fire has already been known. Therefore nothing new is known in an inferential process. The reply follows.

6. The position is that a universal relation exists only
between two generalities and not at all between particulars. But a pure generality is beyond the comprehension of man, and such a generality cannot also be expressed in language in an unadulterated form. We know a generality only as manifested in particulars. But a particular becomes a fact within a class only through such a generality, and never by itself. Thus a fire in itself, by its pure nature, neither comes within the class "fire" nor falls outside the class "fire". It is only on account of this generality that we say that a thing belongs to this class and that a thing does not belong to that class. This generality is not the colour or size or any such factor that the thing may have in common with other things. And yet such a generality is there, and we cognise such a generality. The universal relation is between such generalities. When we see a particular having such a generality, we infer another particular having another generality that is in universal relation with the first generality. What is inferred is not a generality nor is it a particular. What is inferred is a particular from another particular through a universal relation between two generalities that are manifested respectively in the two particulars.

7. Various attempts have been made to state this relation of a universal nature between two generalities. A generality does not come within the scope of a verbal statement in its own nature; it requires a particular for such a statement. And when the particular comes, all the limitations of the particulars introduce an element of imperfection in the statement. Such statement of the universal in language form, the defects of such statements and improvements of the statements to remove the defects, constitute one of the most important parts in the literature relating to logic in Sanskrit. We can no more make a verbal statement of a universal, give a definition of the universal, than we can define a point or a line in geometry. It is the imperfection in the definition that enables us to have some idea of what the perfect universal may be.

8. Doubts have been raised whether a true universal plays any real part in the process of inference in Indian logic. It has been said that the inferential process is from particulars
to particulars. From the way in which the syllogism is put formally, an impression is unavoidable that the process is one of particular to particular. There are five parts in a syllogistic statement. A universal is not a part of that syllogistic form. There is an element in that syllogistic statement which contains a universal relation also stated, and that is the third part, among the five parts. The part is really the presentation of an example to justify the inference. Just as in a kitchen smoke has been observed as associated with fire, here on the mountain also, the smoke that has been observed must be so related to fire, in the same way. The statement emphasises the relation of the two facts, smoke and fire, in particular places that are exemplified by a kitchen.

9. The position taken up in Indian logic is something like this. It is true that the part is called an 'example', and an example is a particular and not a general. But the particulars are not given as particulars, but only as particulars coming within the generalities. An abstract generality cannot be stated in language form. It is only a particular that can be given expression to in a language form. But the real meaning of the sentence is this. Just as a universal relation has been established between the two generalities that exist in the particular smoke and the particular fire noticed in the kitchen, a universal relation exists between the generality in the particular smoke that is seen in the mountain and the generality in fire, and therefore there must be a particular fire here where such a generality too exists. The particulars mentioned in the "example" only helps one to comprehend the generalities, and do not by themselves help in inferring another particular. Thus the "example" only emphasises the universal that acts as the medium for the inferential process.

10. I cannot deny a particular alternative; I cannot prove the opposite alternative. But I can state certain facts that have a bearing on the problem. The problem of the universal is the most important topic that comes into play in the literature relating to logic in Sanskrit. The attempt of all thinkers and writers on logic had been to evolve a definition that would express
the nature of the universal in the most accurate way possible, recognising the limitations which the nature of a universal imposes on such a definition. From the earliest times, we notice the spirit of quest for the universal aspect in all inquiries, so far as Indian thinkers are concerned. This is the genius of the Indian mind. From such facts it is reasonable to presume that they recognised the nature of inference as a cognition through the medium of a universal instead of its being a passage from particulars to particulars.

11. We meet with elaborate discussions regarding the nature of the process for the induction of such a universal from the observation of particulars. No one can straight away have a cognition of the universal; what one cognises is only the particular. Even the recognition of a generality running through all the particulars is an abstruse process. The detection of a universal relation between two such generalities must be a very subtle thing, indeed. I have already said that the Buddhists recognise a universal relation only between cause and effect and between two aspects of what is identical.

12. In Indian logic, there are two views on this point of the induction of a universal relation. One is that a single observation of a universal relation is sufficient for the detection of such a universal relation. Another view is that repeated observations are necessary for the establishment of such a relation. The former school of thought holds that when a man sees smoke and fire together, there arises in him the knowledge of such a universal relation between smoke and fire as: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. If there is any factor noticed that may vitiate such a universal relation, then to determine the presence or absence of such a vitiating factor, further observation is necessary. There is something in the very nature of such objects that produces such a cognition of a universal relation. The number of cases of concomitance has nothing to do with the establishment of a universal relation, for "we find deviation even between two facts that have been observed as coming together a hundred times".

13. According to the other view, the elimination of such
vitiating factors is an essential and integral part of the process of establishing the universal relation, and a universal relation is established only when all possibilities of the presence of such vitiating factors are completely eliminated. When one sees smoke and fire appearing together in the kitchen, the concomitance may be due to the presence of the factor called the kitchen, and then he has to observe smoke and fire coming together without this possible vitiating factor of kitchen, that is, outside the kitchen. Then the factor may be the house, may be the village and so on. One has to eliminate all such factors and then finally he comes to the conclusion that the relation is absolutely between smoke and fire and that other factors in association with them like the kitchen or the house where the concomitance has been observed, have no part in determining the nature of the relation between smoke and fire.

14. The first view that a universal relation is established as a result of a single observation, is held by Prabhākara, the founder of one of the two schools of the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy. It is the other view that is held in all the other systems, namely, in the other school of Mīmāṃsā founded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, and in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy. In all such matters, the Vedānta system and the other systems have the same doctrines. Thus Prabhākara stands alone in his theory of “universal through a single observation”.

15. There is practically very little real difference between the two schools. It is only a question of emphasis. When a man goes to the cottage of a potter and sees him day after day, laying the clay on a wheel, turning the wheel with a rod and shaping the jar when it so whirls on the wheel, and when he also sees a donkey near the potter at that time, he knows that the clay, the wheel, the rod and other things are intimately related to the jar that is made; but he never suspects that the donkey too might have some hand in the production of the jar. The donkey is there only in so far as the potter uses the donkey to carry the clay. The universal relation for the jar is only with the potter, the wheel, the rod and the clay, and not with the donkey, in spite of equal concomitance. It is here that Prabhākāra says
that there is something peculiar in things that enables one to understand such a universal relation. The presence of a vitiating factor is not a constant factor in all cases of concomitance that may be observed. When such a factor is suspected, then there is need for further investigation to know if such a factor vitiates the universal relation. This does not alter the nature of the two facts between which the relation is established. This is the position of Prabhākara.

16. In the other view, the universal relation is established only after the elimination of all possible factors that may vitiate the relation, and as such, repeated observations are necessary for such elimination and they form an integral factor in the establishment of a universal relation. There may be cases where the presence of vitiating factors need not even be suspected; but the important factor is freedom from such factors and such freedom presupposes repeated observation. The inductive rules relating to the establishment of the universal are very subtle, definite and elaborate.

17. Apart from the Major Term (Śādhyā) and the Middle Term (Hetu) whose mutual relation it is that enables one to draw an inference, there is the Minor Term (Pakṣa) that is also tested very closely in Indian logic. The Minor Term (the mountain in the classical syllogism) is that in which there is a desire to infer the Major Term (the fire). If besides smoke, fire too has been seen on the mountain, is there scope for an inference of fire? There is the saying that “when an elephant has been actually seen, no reasonable person takes the trouble of establishing the presence of the elephant through a process of inference from its sound etc.” There is also the other saying that “even in matters that have been determined through actual observation, people who engage themselves in finding out the truth through the application of reason, make a further effort to establish the fact through an inferential process as well.”

18. The various factors that may invalidate inferences are also examined very closely. They are classified and defined. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, all such invalidating factors are related to the middle Term as its defects. But in the Mīmāṁsā, the
factors are related to the other Terms also as their defects. This too is only a technical difference and not a real difference in doctrines.

19. In this connection, one point may be noted in the field of Indian logic, in comparison with the development of logic in the West. Logic and grammar, two subjects very closely related to each other, have been developed in India and in Greece. There are no other ancient nations who had developed these two subjects. There is no evidence to show any mutual borrowing or influence. They must have developed the subjects independently in the two countries. There are certain common features in the way in which the subjects have been developed by the two nations; but such similarities are inevitable when the same subject is being developed.

20. I am more interested to point out the differences between the two developments. In the medieval times in the West, logic, based on Aristotelian logic, divided propositions into universal and particular. When the entire field of the subject is included in a proposition, as in "All men are mortal", it is called a universal proposition and when only a part of the subject is included in the proposition, it is called a particular proposition. Propositions are also either positive or negative. They classified propositions into four groups on this basis as:

- **A** Universal positive
- **E** Universal negative
- **I** Particular positive
- **O** Particular negative

A syllogism contains, as in Indian logic also, three propositions (in the five-fold statement of a syllogism, it has been found that two are repeated). According as these propositions can be one or the other of the above four groups, syllogism too have been classified into various groups, and they had the mnemonic lines:

- Barbara, belarent etc.

This is due to the fact that the idea of a generality hadn't been sufficiently developed in the west.

21. In India, there was no need for such classifications. All syllogism came under the normal of:
There is fire on the mountain, because there is smoke there. This sort of reduction to a single pattern became possible on account of the emphasis laid in India on the generality aspect of the Terms coming within a syllogism, in relation to the particulars coming under that generality expressed by a Term.

b. Presumption

22. Among the intellectual processes employed for the establishment of truth, the formal inference that has been described in the previous section deserves the pre-eminent position. Every theory has to be tested by the rules framed within the scope of this process. But this process does not exhaust the field for the play of the intellect in its quest for truth. There are other modes of knowing things as deduced from a knowledge already derived. They are also processes of inference in a general way, though they are not included within the scheme of inference according to some schools of philosophy. The essential nature of a formal inference is that there must be a universal relation through whose medium such deductions are made. But there are other processes where some schools do not accept the medium of such a universal, and they are brought under other forms of general inference, bearing other names. Some schools try to evolve a universal even within the frame of such processes and bring them also within the scheme of formal inference.

23. What is really wanted is that any theory must be based on observed facts, must not go against facts and must conform to some patterns of reasoning. And reasoning cannot always be brought under the pattern of the formal inference. Such processes also must be recognised as legitimate in the investigation of truth. As a matter of fact there is a very wide field where we are not able to introduce the element of a universal, and yet where we are able to draw a conclusion that has to be recognised as valid.

24. The most important process that comes within this pattern is what is called “Presumption” (Arthāpatti). The
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school tries to bring this process also under the pattern of a formal inference with a universal included in it. But in the Mīmāṁsā school, this is recognised as a distinct and independent process. A very large number of cases within our experience come within this pattern.

25. The general nature of this pattern is very simple. We have some information of a general nature, which we have no reason to doubt, and in this state, another particular case of information comes within our experience that is in conflict with the general information that we already had. But we cannot abandon the general information, and in order to reconcile the conflict, we presume something. This process plays a very important part in philosophy and also in our ordinary experience. Mīmāṁsā brings a large number of cases within our day-to-day experience within this pattern of the process of valid knowing.

26. The classical illustration of this process is very simple and may be stated as follows. There are two of them that are generally introduced when this process is described. They are:

1. A particular person does not eat by day and is found to continue fat; therefore he eats at night.

2. A particular person, known to be alive, is not in his house; therefore he is outside.

The examples may seem too simple and common-place for inclusion in any scientific and philosophical treatise. But that was the case with the example cited for inference, regarding mountain with smoke and with fire. They took common objects for illustration, so that there could be no chance of confusion and uncertainty.

27. Take the first of the two examples given above. The usual practice is to eat by day-time, and when it is reported that the particular person does not eat by day time, the impression is that generally he does not eat at all. Now this general proposition comes into conflict with another proposition that he continues fat. If a man does not eat, he must get emaciated. To reconcile this conflict, there is the presumption that he eats at night.
There are so many possibilities. It may be that he was actually eating by day-time and that the report was wrong. But when there is no evidence to suspect the truth of the report, the reasonable course open is to make such a presumption.

28. Similarly, a man goes to the house of his friend who is known to be alive. When he reaches the house, he is told that the friend was not at home, and immediately he comes to the conclusion that he must have gone out.

29. We cannot have a general notion of a man being alive; he can be alive only in relation to a particular place. and the place with which he would be generally associated is naturally his home. But when that place is sublated, the knowledge that he is alive has not any particular place comprehended within it, and such a place is necessary for the knowledge to endure. So, there is the presumption that he is alive elsewhere.

30. Let us take another example that is not so very simple. A man comes into the room and leaves the door open. Then the person within simple says, “The door, please”. The man who enters understands it to mean, “please shut the door.” But he did not utter the word ‘shut’. Here the steps are as follows:

When he said “door” he must have meant something to be associated with the door.

But he has not said anything to indicate the thing that is to be associated with the door.

Therefore it is presumed that he must have meant shutting the door.

Here is a process of knowing that is peculiar in its nature. It is not a syllogistic inference with its “universal”. There is no verbal statement either. Still there is a knowledge. This is what is technically called presumption (Arthāpatti) in Indian logic.

31. We do not always think in terms of syllogistic logic. Our life is not always regulated through the rules of syllogistic logic. As a matter of fact, both in ordinary affairs and in science, this sort of knowing plays a far more prominent part than syllogistic logic. The essence of this process is this. We think in general terms; but such general ideas must rest on some particular and when the particular is sublated, the general proposition cannot
stand, for want of a particular to rest on. Therefore another particular is presumed, to afford the general idea some resting place.

32. Our mind is incapable of comprehending a pure negation. In this process of knowing about the man, the stage “He is alive, but not in the house” has a pure negative as its sphere, and this is impossible. Such a negative idea is possible only if there is the knowledge that he is dead (a positive idea) or if there is the knowledge that he is outside the house (also a positive idea). A statement like “There is no jar here” means either that there is something other than a jar here or that the jar is elsewhere. Without one or the other of these two alternatives, a purely negative idea is impossible. That is why the process known as “Presumption” starts. When one finds that the man whom he was looking for is not at home, there is the other possibility that he may be dead. As a matter of fact Prabhākara, the founder of one of the two schools of Mīmāṃsā, accepts such a stage in the process of “Presumption”. He says that the presumption of the man being outside is resorted to to avoid the doubt regarding the other alternative of his being dead. But Kumārila, the founder of the other school of Mīmāṃsā, does not accept this stage. According to this school, presumption is resorted to to avoid the impossible stage of the mind having a negation as its object. They ask whether, when a valuable property is lost, the owner may resort to such a presumption and entertain the consolation that the property may be elsewhere.

33. Although in logic, the formal inference may be more important, in actual experience, there are more cases of presumption functioning than of formal inference. And this is a very important process of knowing, recognised in Indian philosophy.

c. Analogy.

34. Analogy is another process whereby knowledge is obtained in our experience. The process is recognised by all. But there is a difference of opinion whether it should be recognised as a distinct process or whether it may be brought under formal
inference. There is also a difference of opinion regarding the final result of this process.

35. The process may be stated in a simple form as follows. A man in the village has heard the name “wild bull”. But he does not know what it actually is. A man from the forest comes to the village and from him, the man in the village understands that it is an animal resembling an ordinary bull. At this stage he has only understood that a similarity to the ordinary bull, which he knows already, exists in the “wild bull” also. But he does not know the substrate of that similarity, namely, the “wild bull.” He chances to go to the forest and sees an animal that is like the bull, and he understands that that animal must be what is meant by the word “wild bull”.

36. Here the process is not one of mere perception. If he had seen the wild bull, without knowing that the “wild bull” is just like a bull, he would not have known that that animal is the “wild bull”. When he simply heard that the wild bull resembles an ordinary bull, then also he did not know what a “wild bull” is. So, this is a special process, distinct from perception and also from knowing something through a verbal statement. This is the position taken up in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

37. There is a slight difference in the point of view of Mīmāṁsā. When a man hears the statement that a wild bull is like a bull, he understands that the similarity of a bull exists in a wild bull. When he sees the wild bull later, he understands the similarity of the wild bull as existing in the bull, which he had been seeing in the village. This is also a distinct process, different from perception. There had been three successive stages in his knowledge. There was a time when he knew nothing about any similarity between a bull and a wild bull, though he knew the bull and he had heard about a wild bull. Then the stage comes when he knew that the similarity of a bull exists in a wild bull, though he did not know what that wild bull was. In the third stage, he also knows that the similarity of the wild bull, which he has come to know, exists in the bull that he knew already. At the time of hearing the statement, he had not known the wild bull. At the time of seeing the wild bull, he was not
seeing the bull, which is in the village. So, in this third stage, the knowledge of the existence of the similarity of the wild bull in the bull cannot be perception, since the bull is not in sight.

38. Philosophically, this process has little importance. It plays a very subordinate part in our day-to-day experiences too. It is dealt with in philosophy only as a fact in the processes of knowing, and not on account of its importance. The case is quite different with "Presumption", which has as much importance in philosophy as inference itself, if not a greater importance.

d. Inclusion

39. This is a very minor thing, and it is not recognised as a distinct process in any system of philosophy. It is included within the process of formal inference. It is a knowledge like this: If there are five hundred things, certainly we know that there are a hundred things. Or if there is a gallon, there is certainly a pint. I have introduced the point here only in so far as it has been suggested as a distinct process of knowing, only to be discarded in so far as it is definitely an inferential process.

e. Belief

40. This is also not recognised as any distinct process of knowing, in any system of philosophy. This too has been introduced here only in so far as it, like "Inclusion" has been suggested as a distinct process, simply to be discarded. Here the reason for discarding is different. People may say and may also believe that "there are ghosts in a particular place". In Sanskrit, the word used is Aitihya or tradition. But I use the term "belief", as more suiting in the English language. It may be either an erroneous knowledge or it may come under "authority" if such a belief has any basis. I have entertained these two items of "Inclusion" and "Belief" only to show how minutely they have analysed the various modes of knowing, in ancient times in India.

f. Negation

41. The mode of cognising a negation has been treated as a distinct process in some systems and is included in the other
modes in other systems. It is recognised as a distinct process in the system of Mimāṃsā propounded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, it is included in the other modes of cognition. In the school of Mimāṃsā propounded by Prabhākara, a fact called a negation is not accepted at all, and as such the question of the mode of knowing it does not arise in it.

42. The cases of knowing a negation are like this: “There is no jar on the ground”, “The Fruit is not sweet”, “The stone does not smell”. “Fire is never cold,” and “There is no sound in the place”. If a person says that there is no water in the river, another knows about the negation of water in the river. This too is a case of cognising a negation.

43. In a negation there are two factors. There is something that is negated, and there is the locus (place) where there is the negation of the something. Thus, when it is said that “there is no jar on the floor”, what is negated is the jar and the locus with reference to which there is the negation is the floor. The thing that is negated and the place with reference to which there is such a negation may be called the two correlates of the negation, and I specify them as “the objective correlate” and the “locative correlate” respectively. In Sanskrit they are called Pratijogin and Anuyogin.

44. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the mode of knowing the negation of the jar on the ground is identical with the mode of knowing the jar itself, which it is that is negated. Here the process is perception. Their rule is this: if something is known according to a particular process, its negation is also known according to the same process. If a thing is known by visual perception, like a jar, its negation is also known by the same process of perception. Therefore, the process of knowing negation cannot be brought under any distinct class. It varies according to the mode of knowing the thing, of whose negation we are dealing with.

45. In the Mimāṃsā also, there is the recognition that positive objects are cognised in different ways like visual perception, perception through other sense-organs, inference etc. But there is a common factor in all cases of cognising the negation, irrespec-
tive of the mode of cognising the positive object. In this way it is possible to bring all cases of cognising the negation under one pattern, and that mode is called "Negation". The process may be stated as:

If the thing had been there, it would have been cognised.
The thing has not been cognised.
Therefore, the thing is not there.

Although this statement may look like a syllogism, it is not an inferential process, involving a universal. There is no such universal in this process. It is a distinct mental process. When a man looks at the floor, and when there is bright light and when he does not see any jar on the floor, he knows that there is no jar on the floor. There is no difference of opinion on this fact. But what is it that had taken place, and what has been the actual result? On this point there is a difference of view. We must recognise a distinction between a direct perception of a negation and the negation of a perception of a thing. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, what has taken place is the former mode of knowing; according to the Mīmāṃsā view, it is the latter mode. The difference lies in the distinction between the knowledge of an absence and the absence of a knowledge. They are not identical.

46. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, what is called a negation is as much a reality and an object of cognition, as a positive fact. We can have a perception of a jar, and we can equally well have a similar perception of the absence of a jar. But in the Mīmāṃsā system, what is called absence is not an independent reality; it is only an aspect of another positive reality. The independent reality is the presence of something positive. When a man sees a floor where there is no jar, he is actually seeing a floor without anything else in it, and it is such a floor that is perceived as the negation of a jar. When there is no independent reality like an absence, there can be no preception of an absence also. What has taken place is that there was the perception of something else, of the bare floor, and the consequence is that there was no perception of a jar.

43. This mode of knowing is very important in philosophy,
having as prominent a place in philosophy as perception, inference and presumption. Some of the big problems in philosophy are discussed on the basis of the mode of cognising a negation. For example, take the problem of God. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, God is recognised as the creator of the world. The Mimāṁsā school does not recognise a creator for the world. They say that the world has no beginning and will have no end; it was there as it is now, and will continue so for ever. They argue that if there has been such a creator he would have come within the sphere of our knowing, just as the maker of a jar or of a cloth comes within the sphere of our knowing. If there is the argument by the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system that there is a God who is not seen because he has no body, and not because he does not exist, the reply is that an agent must function and there can be function only in a body. If God has no body, he is not an agent also. The individuals function only through a body and there is no way of establishing that the Supreme can function in another way, different from the way of the individuals. In this way, the cognition of negation plays a very important role in philosophy.

48. The above patterns were described in such a brief way only to show what prominence reason assumed in the field of Indian thought. Reason rests on observation and reason functions in various ways. The essential nature of reason is that from some cognition, there arises another cognition as a natural consequence. There are some rules according to which such deductions of facts from observed facts can come in. Whether it is the process of formal inference or whether it is the process of any of the other patterns of inference, the function of reason is the same. Both formal inference and the various other patterns of inference have been very carefully scrutinised and analysed and the laws which they obey have been properly formulated. If there had been no rational element in Indian philosophy, there would have been no occasion for such labour.
CHAPTER V.

AUTHORITY—RELATIVE

1. It is being said again and again that we are now living in an age of reason, that we have been able to escape from the domination of religion and scriptural authority, that we are now intellectually free, that we can hold any view on any problem and that we can also express our views on any point without having to fear any persecution from those in charge of religion. So far as India is concerned, there was no period in its history when thinkers were under the domination of religion and of scriptural authority, when there was no intellectual freedom enjoyed by the people, when people could not hold any views on any problem and when they could not give full expression to such views without any fear of persecution from those in charge of religion. The fact is that in India, the custodians of religion were also the real guardians of intellectual freedom. But they faced facts.

2. Humanity is not a collection of isolated individuals, each having no relation to the others. As a matter of fact, human society is an organism, every part being related to every other part. In such an organised social life, one cannot say that one can trust only one's own experience, that one cannot go beyond what one can directly experience, that one cannot take anybody as authority on any point. If such be the position, there can be no progress. Each has to start at the zero longitude and proceed to the point to which his own unaided powers can take him, and then stop; and others too have to do the same. There can be progress only when some people can start where others have stopped. Further there are many facts in life where one has to trust modes of knowing beyond direct experience. When one suffers or enjoys under some specific situations, how can another person know that he too may have the same suffering or enjoyment under similar conditions, except through a process of inference that goes beyond experience? When one suffers or enjoys and behaves in a particular way under these two con-
ditions, how can he know that another person has also similar enjoyment or suffering from his behaviour of a similar nature, unless there is resort to inference? Unless there is mutual belief, mutual trust and mutual faith, how can people live in a society? How can one walk along the road with a heavy traffic unless he has faith in those who handle a fast-moving vehicle? How can one handle such a vehicle, how can one travel by a railway train or by an aeroplane, unless there is such trust and faith in science and scientists? How can one take a medicine unless there is a similar faith in medical science and in medicines? The entire system of organised social life will collapse if faith is undermined in the society, unless some kind of Authority is allowed to function in the society. And unless one can trust another, if one distrusts all others, how can one trust himself? He is only a man like any other, and if another cannot be recognised to be in the right, what guarantee is there for the trustworthiness of one's own experiences? Thus direct experience, inference and authority are all factors that have a place in any organised social life.

3. This is the position taken up by the thinkers in ancient India when they classified the modes of knowing under three headings of direct experience, reasoning and authority. "Authority" was accepted only on the sanction and foundation of both direct experience and reasoning. It was never imposed on the people; the thinkers never surrendered to any extraneous authority. The authority was what they themselves established in conformity with the nature of direct experience and reasoning.

4. What is true of life is true of philosophy also. The modes of knowing adopted in life are exactly the modes of knowing that can be adopted in philosophy also. Since the three modes are adopted in life, the three modes of knowing have to be recognised in philosophy also. There is no other nation, either ancient or modern, among whom so much freedom was given to reason, as in ancient India. It may be in science, it may be in philosophy, it may be in religion, it may be in social organisation; there was no point that was kept out of discussion. Every one was free to ask any question and to discuss any point. The only restriction
was that in discussions, certain rules of decent logic must be followed by those who consider the point. Any one was free to deny God; any one was free to raise the suspicion that religious teachers were imposters and that scripture was a hallucination. All the different views were freely admitted for open discussion at learned assemblies. No one need fear fire or dungeon or the various kinds of instruments of torture when he holds or expresses his views on any point. There was no question of wounding anybody's religious susceptibilities, in so far as no one gave way to his susceptibilities. They had only religious convictions, and convictions cannot be wounded. All the different religions and all the different schools of the same religion or philosophy lived together without any mutual enmity, with full mutual tolerance. In the whole literature of India, there is no reference to any atrocity perpetrated on people for holding adverse religious views. And when other religions came from foreign countries, the same tolerance and freedom was extended to them also. When we consider the question of "Authority" in Indian philosophy, we must not shut our eyes to such historical facts.

5. We must also understand that what is called "Authority" is not a special feature of any particular system of thought, either in religion or in philosophy, in India. Organised social life demands the recognition of the three modes of knowing, the modes of direct experience, reasoning and "Authority". All logical thinking also demands this three-fold approach to the problems included within philosophy. When it is generally stated that the Cārvākas recognised only direct experience, that the Buddhists included reason also within the scheme of modes of knowing, and that the Vedic schools accept "Authority" also within this scheme, we must rightly understand what is meant by this statement. I have already said that the Cārvākas also accepted the possibilities of certain deductions from knowledge derived by direct experience, like the knowledge of fire being hot even when its heat may not be experienced at that time. They also derived knowledge from the statements of their neighbours and they trusted such statements too. The Buddhists accepted the teachings of Buddha as authority in their systems.
6. Then what is the difference between the Cārvākās and the Buddhists on one side and the Vedic Schools of thought on the other side? The Cārvākās and the Buddhists believed that man’s mind in its normal state is capable of knowing everything, and that there is nothing beyond the sphere of the normal capacities of our mind. In the Vedic thought, there is a recognition of a normal and a super-normal function for our mind, and there is also a recognition of certain aspects of realities that can be known only through such super-normal functions of man’s mind. There are realities in this world that cannot be brought within the range of the normal experience of our thinking faculty and that cannot also be cognised through the normal inferential processes. The real difference between the two schools lies in the conception of what is meant by our mind and its capacities. The belief that man’s mind is capable of grasping truth in this world is common to all of them. The difference is in the range of mind’s capacities and not in the relation of man and the world.

7. Direct experience and reasoning fall within one’s own authority, while what is called “Authority” is the authority of another person’s experience. This experience of another is communicated through the medium of language, and so this mode of knowing is termed “Language” (Śabda) also. Here also we can distinguish between what may be relative authority and what may be termed absolute authority. Relative authority is what is derived from the experience of another, but what can also fall within one’s own experience. The question is whether the person who has communicated his experience has really had that experience, whether that experience was real or only a delusion, and whether he has correctly communicated the nature of his own experience, in short whether that person can be trusted. A person who can be trusted in such a communication is called an Āpta in Sanskrit, “one who has attained” the truth.

8. It is this mode of knowing that is given as the third variety in the Sāṅkhya system, already cited above. It was first spoken of as “the testimony of a reliable person” (Āpta-vacana). Then the term is explained as “the authority of a reliable person
and also the authority of scripture'. This is my own interpretation. Generally it is not so bifurcated into two sections. It is explained as forming a single idea, what has been handed down by reliable persons. I have already given the sphere of the two modes of knowing, namely, perception and reasoning, as described in the Sāṅkhya systems and there it was stated that the second half of the verse gives the sphere of the third variety of the modes of knowing. What is given is this: "What cannot be established even thereby and what fall outside the sphere of the sense-organs can be established on the basis of reliable persons and scripture." Here also I have divided the sphere into two sections as what can be known on the authority of a reliable person and what can be known only through scripture. Here too I am departing from the traditional interpretation, but there are ancient authorities for such a bifurcation, although such is not the usual interpretation.

9. Here there is a recognition of the reality of certain facts of this world that fall outside the sphere of perception and reason and that can be known only through some extraneous authority. It may be due to the inherent nature of the facts of the world, that they are always outside the sphere of perception and reason, or it may only be on account of the facts, for the time being, falling outside the sphere of perception and reason. If a man says that one can get fruits by going to the river bank, another person believes the man and goes to the bank of the river to get the fruits. Here the river and its bank and the fruits there are within the reach of the man, and he could have known of them by simply going there without the authority of another person. But if there is the statement that "one can secure a wealth of cows by performing the religious ritual called Citrā", one has to depend entirely on the authority of the statement. He cannot know the truth of it either by perception or by reasoning. In one case the facts are not known at the particular moment, but can be known without the authority, and in the other case, the facts cannot be known, such is its nature, without that extraneous authority.

10. What the Cārvākas deny is the existence of such facts in
the world as are exemplified by the second set. They relate to supernormal facts. That is why Udayana in his Nyāya-Kusumāṇjali, states the position of the Cārvākas as: Because there is denied a super-normal means for the attainment of another world different from what is experienced as the normal world”. Here there is the denial of all the three: anything different from the normal world, another world and a means of securing it.

11. So far as the position of the Buddhists is concerned, the difference is not in the acceptance of “Authority”. The difference lies in the question, “which authority?” There are statements in the Vedas like, “One desiring heaven should perform the religious ritual called Jyotisṭomas”. The Buddhists have the tradition of Buddha’s teaching, “One shall worship sacred spots (Ca tya)”. Both statements contain facts that cannot be established on the authority of experience, either perception or reason. Fruits of activities according to religious prescriptions like heaven, the higher world, the ultimate goal and cessation of life and death, are prescribed in both sets of statements. Are both authorities? Are both false? Is one authorititative and the other false, and if so which? This is the position that has to be settled, as between the Vedic statements and the statements of the teachings of Buddha.

The question of the authority of scriptural passages comes within the range of what I have termed “Absolute Authority”. And that will be taken up in the proper context in the next chapter. Here we are concerned with what I have termed “Relative Authority”. It is this distinction that is made clear in the terminology used in the Sāṅkhya text as Āpta and Śruti, a reliable person and scripture respectively. The term Āgama is also used instead of Śruti, and this term too has the same meaning.

12. So far as such facts are concerned which come within the range of direct experience, but which for the time being may not have fallen within that sphere, there is no difference of opinion. They are recognised in all systems of thought, in the Cārvāka system, in the Buddhist system and in the Vedic system. Such a recognition does not reduce, even to the smallest extent, the value of the system as a rationalistic one. The question that
we have to consider here is only whether all the Vedic systems recognise a transcendental mode of knowing, what I have termed "Absolute Authority". Here I am taking up the position of some of the systems of thought within the field of Vedic currents, relating to this point. First I take up the position of the Sāṅkhya system.

13. Does the Sāṅkhya recognise certain facts in this world that can be known only through some extraneous authority, that transcend the normal ranges of human faculties like perception and reason? When it is said that generally things are known through perception and that such things that fall outside the range of sense-organs are known by inference, and when after this it is said that things that fall outside the scope of both of them are to be known through such extraneous authority, the presumption is that Sāṅkhya system recognises such facts that fall outside the range of perception and reason. Here also, ancient commentators are of little help. There is no uniformity in interpretations, and some are silent on the point.

14. Facts that fall outside the range of both perception and inference are spoken of in some classical commentary as consisting of facts like the heavenly beings, the gods and the celestial nymphs. But they have no special position in philosophy, and I cannot believe that such facts were included within the scheme of a distinct mode of knowing in a system of philosophy. My own interpretation is that by this type of the modes of knowing, what is wanted to be implied is the existence of certain absolute facts in the world, as distinct from the relative facts; in a rationalistic system of philosophy, only such facts of a relative value have a place, and if there are facts of an absolute nature, they have no position in the system of philosophy contemplated by the Sāṅkhya system.

15. The Sāṅkhya system postulates twenty-five categories, and they all fall within the range of perception and reason. Realities are finally brought under a duality of Matter (Prakṛti) and Spirit (Puruṣa). Matter has three aspects. Matter comes within the scheme of a Subject-object relation, and here the aspect of Matter is called the Sattva. There is change and
movement in Matter and this is called the *Rajas* Aspect. Matter has materiality, being endowed with mass, volume and form, and this is called the *Tamas*. Matter becomes the Object of a Subjective function, as changing and moving and as having mass, volume and form, on account of a disturbance in the relation of these three aspects, and if these three aspects are in a state of equilibrium, there is Matter in its absolute state. As distinct from this absolute Matter, there are also a large number of "Spirits" recognised in the system. Thus, there is a duality between Matter and Spirit, and there is a plurality in the matter of the Spirits. Can all the Spirits be reduced to a Single Spirit, or can there be another Spirit which will be Supreme as distinct from the individual Spirits? Can Matter and Spirit also be reduced to a unity? These are absolute problems, which are not dealt with in the system, and they fall outside the range of reason; of course they are outside the range of perception. Such absolute problems can be dealt with only in a philosophical system where what is called "Absolute Authority" is also entertained. In the *Sāńkhya* system, such points are not included. This is the interpretation that I put on the passage.

16. The *Sāńkhya* text started with pointing out the limitations of science and religion for understanding the truth of the world, and thereby there was a justification for undertaking a philosophical investigation of the nature of the world. Here in this latter statement there is an admission of the limitation of the scope of philosophy also, as taken up in this system. Here also, there arises no occasion for taking up the problems of the Absolute, for deciding absolute values in this world. The scope of reason is extended beyond the range in which it functions in science, so far as this system is concerned; that is all. The Absolute is still beyond the scope of this system of philosophy. But here, reason takes us beyond the range where science stops.

17. The *Sāńkhya* system postulates twenty-five types of realities. And all of them fall within the sphere of the sense-organs or of reason with its extended range. But reason cannot tackle the Absolute, and the problem of the Absolute is left off to other systems. "Authority" has no place in this system.
But Authority is not ruled out as a philosophical possibility and
even as a philosophical necessity. It is this possibility and
necessity that is implied by the postulation of realities that fall
outside the sphere of perception and reason, for the understanding
of which there must be the aid of Authority called in. In order
to show that everything that is recognised in the Sāṅkhya system
falls within the range of reason, I state the types of realities that
are recognised in this system. Further details will be taken up
in appropriate contexts.

18. (1) There is the ultimate matter of a uniform nature,
free from the distinction of subject-object, free from change and
movement, without volume, mass and form. Matter as we
know it has these features. The reality of such an absolute stage
of matter is known through inference. Matter assumes different
forms and such different forms we call the effects of the original,
causal matter. Thus from gold or clay or threads, we can make
various kinds of ornaments, various types of jars and various
kinds of cloth. If we proceed along such a line of simplification of
the complex structures of effects into less and less differentiated
causal matter, a stage must come when we have only matter
without any differentiation, when we have matter as an unquali-
fied uniform. Thus the material world has two aspects, the aspect
of differentiation and the aspect of uniformity. This stage of
uniformity is one of the realities.

19. (2 to 4). The first change of the undifferentiated
matter is into a subject aspect, according to Indian philosophy.
This is in opposition to the modern scientific theory according
to which the subject side is a later evolute and the first stages were
of the nature of "dead matter". But according to Indian thought,
when the uniform matter started on the course of change and
differentiation, the first evolute is of the nature of the absolute
"Subject". But a Subject has a reality only in contrast to the
"Object" and so there is the stage of the differentiation of the
Subject from the Object. In such a differentiation of the subject
from the object, the subject nature can manifest only in the form
of a function. Thus there is the functioning instrument in the
constitution of the subject. They are called by the terms Buddhi
(intellect), *Ahaṅkāra* (subject object distinction) and *Manas* (mind) respectively. These three together form what is termed "the internal instrument" of cognition (*Antaḥ-Karaṇa*).

20. (5 to 9). The body has the power of putting other things into motion. The body is found to have a five-fold functioning within. It can move from within itself without the need of any external propulsion. There is the automatic function of excretion of unwanted matter from the body. Certain glands work, and there is the flow of certain types of fluid material within the body. Then there is the apparatus for producing sounds. These are called the five-fold motor activity (*Karma-Indriya*) within the body.

21. (10 to 14). Then there are the five sensory functions of seeing, tasting, smelling, touching and hearing.

(15 to 19). The objective, material world as experienced through the five-fold sense-organs, has a reality as it is in itself, divided into five types according to the five modes of sense-perception. They are called "things in themselves" (*Tattvātmaḥ*). They are colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. They form the nature in themselves of what are cognised through the five sense-organs by us.

22. (20 to 24). These five "things in themselves" when they are within the range of sense-perception, assume material forms and are known as the five elements of Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ether. I will explain the exact significance of this division and of these terms at the appropriate context. Here I use the popular terms.

23. (25). The phenomenon of uniform matter changing into differentiated matter requires explanation. There must be something external to it whose presence it is that created the urge for such a change. The change cannot come from within itself, without any external stimulus. Therefore something called the "Spirit" as distinct from matter is also inferred from the phenomenon of the change of the uniform matter into differentiated matter. In so far as the Subject side of the differentiated world consists of an infinite number of individuals, such "Spirit" aspect of the world is also accepted as infinite in number.
24. I am not presenting all the doctrines of the Śāṅkhya system of philosophy here. I am only stating that the system classifies realities under twenty five categories, and that all of them come within the sphere of perception and reason. There is not a single item that stands in need of the authority of scripture for its establishment. There is its metaphysical side and there is also its ethical side. Neither wants the support of any extraneous authority. Thus, the system is essentially rationalistic in its approach to the problem of reality.

25. Nature and the power within Nature and the Laws of Nature explain everything that is included within this system. There is the first change of the uniform matter into differentiation and this is due to the working of the power within Nature, and this follows the Laws within Nature. There is no scope for a God or His Will, or the teaching of his Messenger or the interpretations and doctrines of the various personages who are installed as guardians of the Will of God as it spreads and operates among men in the world. There is the Law of Nature in the world; it can be stated in language form, it can be transmitted from generation to generation through the medium of language. But there is no one who has made the Law, there is no one who has made the first statement of the Law in language form. No such statement is eternal either. There is a gradation among those who try to understand, interpret, and transmit the knowledge of the Law. There may be a recollection of what was known before. There is no first start for the Law and its statement.

26. The Yoga System is closely related to the Śāṅkhya system. The metaphysics of the Yoga is identical with that of the Śāṅkhya. Thus, the position of the modes of knowing are also identical in both. As such the position of Authority as a mode of knowing need not be specially dealt with in considering the Yoga system.

27. Another important system that must be taken into consideration in this connection is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika group. Here also perception, reason and Authority are accepted as modes of knowing. A fourth mode called “Analogy”, is also accepted in this system. But I have already said that this has no impor-
tance in philosophy. This is the system in which the modes of knowing are specially treated as the chief topic. It has its own metaphysics; but its metaphysics has dwindled into insignificance. In the Sāṅkhya, it is the metaphysical side that has gained a great importance, though the question of the modes of knowing has retained its place in it.

28. On account of the identity of the metaphysical side, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems came into close contact, so much so that we speak of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system. Similarly, the two systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika also fell together into a single group; they even became a single system. There is practically a complete identity between the two systems, in metaphysics and in the problem of the modes of knowing. The term Vaiśeṣika really dropped out, and in the later stages of their growth as a single system, it is the term Nyāya that continued, and another term, Tarka, also designated the combined system. Many of the works on the system use one or the other of the two terms.

29. In their original form, the question of the relation of the modes of knowing (Pramāṇa) and the objects of knowing (Prameya) formed the chief topic in the Nyāya system. Various other questions like doubt and false cognition and vicious arguments also found a place in the system. Thus, the work started with an enumeration of sixteen topics or Padārthas for treatment in the system. In the Vaiśeṣika system, there are six topics (Padārthas) dealt with, and the six topics exhaust the world. Every kind of reality in the world is brought under these six groups. Negation as a separate reality has not been mentioned in this enumeration in the beginning, though negation has been accepted in the system. Later, it was given a place in the Categories or padārthas accepted in the system, and the Categories of the combined Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system became seven.

30. It has already been found that in the Sāṅkhya system, “Authority” has been recognised as a mode of knowing. But in its philosophy “Authority” had no place at all. It was only a recognition of what was a fact and not of what was a necessity in the philosophy. The philosophy stood in need of only perception and reason, and all varieties of reality could be brought
within the sphere of these two modes of knowing. The position of the Nyāya system is also the same. Authority is a fact in the world as a mode of knowing. But the philosophy of the system had no need of this aspect of the mode of knowing. The whole world, so far as it was included in the system, could be known through perception and reason.

31. We know the facts of the world as a series of individual substances with some quality and with change and movement. When we examine them, we find that there are also elements like generality and speciality, some special relationships and also the element of negation. All these seven kinds of realities in the world are established on the strength of perception and reason. There is nothing that stands in need of an extraneous authority for its establishment as a reality.

32. When I was dealing with the modes of knowing recognised in the Sāṅkhya system, I had to depart slightly from the traditional way of interpreting the text, and I drew a distinction between relative authority and absolute authority. They relate to facts which can be known through perception and reason but which are also sometimes known through an authority, and also to facts that can be known only through such an authority. The Sāṅkhya system excluded the latter type from the scope of its philosophy, though it did not exclude the possibility of such facts in the world.

33. In the Nyāya system, there is no such distinction drawn. The system does not countenance any fact that transcend the scope of perception and reason and that can be known only through some extraneous authority. The distinction between the authority of trustworthy persons and of scripture is not recognised in the Nyāya system. Even scripture derives its authoritative nature from the trustworthiness of the author, like any science or any statement in the world. The ordinary statements and science may be the words of the individuals in the world. Scripture forms the words of the Supreme Soul, God. Scripture has no absolute and independent authority. Scriptural passages can be cited only in support of the findings of other modes of knowing and cannot establish any statement on its own strength.
34. Of the six systems of philosophy, recognised as forming the group of Vedic systems, four can manage without scriptural authority for their conclusions. Without directly perceiving a thing and without applying one's reason to know the thing, one is able to know certain facts of the world on the authority of the statements of other persons; this is a fact and must be accepted as such. Otherwise it has no value in philosophy, and so far as the philosophical side is concerned this third mode of knowing has no place or value at all in establishing any doctrine or in recognising any fact. The mode of knowing on the basis of authority is found operating among men and that fact is recognised in philosophy.

35. In this situation we have to seriously consider the question whether at any time in ancient India, the thinkers could have associated their scripture with any mysterious sanctity. Such an element of sanctity has no value in their philosophy. There is no instance found anywhere in the philosophical literature of India for insisting on the unconditional acceptance of the inviolability of statements in the scripture; on the other hand one meets with the frequent statement that no scriptural passage can make a thing other than what it is found to be in experience and in our reasoning faculty. All criticisms by modern scholars about the place assigned to scriptural authority in the scheme of thought in ancient Indian are very unfair and devoid of any foundation.

36. It has already been said that what is called Authority finds expression in language form, and for this reason, the nature of language has played a very important part in the philosophical speculations of ancient India. There has been some sort of mystery associated with this phenomenon of "sound" in the world. It is transmitted as a kind of "wave" in a medium, usually the medium of air. Some sort of impact produces a system of waves in the neighbouring air and the impact is transmitted in this form of waves until it reaches the human body. It produces some reaction in a part of the body called the ear-cavity, and its impression is carried to the mind. Every kind of impact on the air does not set such a wave in motion. It is only some special
kind of impact that results in the formation of such air-waves. Within man’s body also, there is a particular mechanism that can produce a variety of such air-waves which react on the mind through the ear-cavity in the form of “sound”. Sounds are of infinite varieties. Such sounds and their combinations have been associated, as symbols, with various objects of the world. Such sounds as have this symbolical value is what is called language.

37. This language can be produced only within the mechanism installed in the human body. There have been various theories propounded regarding this language. All the systems of thought in ancient India have this one view in common that what is experienced as sound, as language, is not a phenomenon in the physical air, that it is an effect in the air originating from some phenomenon in a finer medium, and that both in origin and final cognition, there is a point in some medium which is finer than the air through which it is transmitted as waves.

38. Some systems hold that what is called “sound” is a momentary phenomenon and that the association of such sounds with the facts of the world is purely arbitrary and conventional. Others hold that what appears as “sound” is the basis of the facts of this phenomenal world, and that the facts of the physical world and the forms of language associated with such facts are both evolutes of this basic cause of the phenomenal world. Still others hold that though what is experienced as “sound” has a finer reality which is eternal, there is no causal relation between such eternal sounds or language and the facts of the world. They are separate realities in the world. Language is eternal and its relation to the facts of the world are also eternal. The manifestation of this absolute, basic, eternal language is what we understand as audible sound or language, and it is only this manifestation that is momentary.

39. The momentary nature of sound and its artificial and conventional association with the facts of the world are theories held in the Nyāya-Vaiśāsika system of philosophy. The sound as the basis of the phenomenal world is recognised in the philosophy of Grammar; in this system the basic, absolute sound is termed Sphota. The eternal nature of language and the eternal relation
of sounds with the objects of the world are accepted in the *Mimāṃsā* system.

40. According to the philosophy of grammar, there are no isolated words. The basic fact of language is a unity and it is only its audible, produced aspects that can be analysed into parts called words and syllables and sounds. Such an analysis is arbitrary and has no relation to the real nature of the basic sound. A sentence is the smallest unit of language and unitary fact of a *subject* related to a *predicate* is the simplest form of reality.

41. In the *Nyāya* philosophy, words, syllables and sounds are all facts and a word or a part of a word like a stem and a suffix and a prefix has a real, separate existence. They are individually related to the individual facts of the world also. The school of *Mimāṃsā* bearing the name of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accepts this view of the *Nyāya* philosophy, with the qualification that what is audible is a manifestation of something that is eternal. In the other school of *Mimāṃsā* that bears the name of Prabhākara, the unity of the sentence and the unity of the *subject-predicate* combination are accepted, with the limitation that language and the facts with which the language is related are separate realities. In grammar these two are the manifested aspects of the same reality.

42. According to Prabhākara, the world is dynamic and there is no reality as the fact unless it is related to the dynamic aspect of the world. Thus, language must ultimately be related to a change and movement, which is the nature of the dynamic world. Language has no meaning unless it is related to a change and to a movement in the world. In the school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also, the dynamic nature of the world is accepted. But the reality of the individual facts, even without being associated with a change or movement is recognised in this school.

43. Language, which is associated with "Authority" as mode of knowing, had formed a far wider field for investigation in philosophy in India than in any other country, and has been as wide a field of study as any other aspect of the world in India. It is unfair to dismiss the doctrines relating to language as endowing scripture with mystetrious sanctity.
CHAPTER VI

AUTHORITY ABSOLUTE

1. The standard text on the sānkhyā system of Indian philosophy recognizes three types of realities, namely, what come within the sphere of perception, what come within the sphere of reason while falling outside the range of perception, and what transcend the range of both perception and reason. It may also be stated as a primary classification of realities into what come within the range of sense-organs and what fall beyond such a range, and the further classification of the latter variety into what fall within the domain of reason and what transcend reason. But there is no reality that is completely outside the intellectual capacity of man. Man can grasp everything in the world. To speak of transcendental realities that fall outside the capacity of man involves a contradiction. A reality is a reality only to the extent that it is known as real.

2. But there is a gradation in the intellectual capacity of man. Perception and deduction of facts directly from such perceptual knowledge come within the normal capacity of all men, and even animals have this capacity. But there are realities in the world that come only within the range of an extended application of reason, and this capacity is what distinguishes a philosopher from other men. But there is a still higher, a transcendental capacity in man's intellect. This takes the form of a direct perception in its application and in its function. But it is not normal sense perception. It bears the semblance of a direct perception only to the extent that it is not of the form of a secondary cognition arising out of a primary perception.

3. The recognition of such a faculty in man's intellect can be understood only if we understand the prior history of the evolution of thought in India. Indian civilization had its start with persons who had such super-normal powers of knowing aspects of realities that fall outside the sphere of the understanding
of normal intellect. The earliest literary records of the civilization of India is full of references to such persons of super-normal powers of understanding. In this literature such persons are spoken of as ancients, whose traditions the people of those days were following, whose ways they were trying to imitate.

4. Yama, son of Vivasvat, was the earliest person in the history of Indian civilization recorded in that early literature. We know little about the father of Yama, namely, Vivasvat, beyond the bare name. The name does not appear in the literature as that of any god worshipped by the people. There is no poem in the collection of the Vedas addressed to him. But this name is very familiar in the Rgveda, which is the earliest text among the Vedas. He is the father of Yama and also of Manu. He is sometimes spoken of as the father of the twin gods called the Āśvins. There is a statement in the Rgveda that Vivasvat is the father of the gods in general. In some of the later Vedic literature, he is spoken of as the primal father of humanity, a position that is also assigned to his son Manu. Vivasvat had his wife named Saranyu, who is the daughter of another god named Tvaṣṭar. Although Vivasvat is not a god to whom prayers are addressed, so far as the available literature is concerned, he is associated with the beginnings of Indian civilization. Fire was first manifested to him, along with another god named Mātarīśvan (who is himself an aspect of the Fire God). They sing about the seat of Vivasvat, in which the gods, and especially the god Indra, take delight. The poets sing of the glories of Indra from that seat. Vivasvat must have been himself an ancient poet, and Indra is spoken of as delighting in the songs of Vivasvat. Vivasvat is closely related to the pressing of Soma. Vivasvat is also related to other gods like Varuna and the Āśvins. In the mention of the manifestation of the fire to Vivasvat, we find an allusion to some of the powers possessed by him, that transcend the normal abilities of sight possessed by ordinary men.

5. Yama, the son of Vivasvat, is also not a god. He is one of the earliest founders of the civilization of India, preserved in the Vedas. He was a mortal who became immortal; he had attained some new type of enlightenment, in so far as he for the
first time saw the Path. This is the most conspicuous trait of Yama. Yama, unlike his father Vivasvat, has become the theme of some songs in the extent collection of the Rgveda. There are three poems about Yama. In one of them, Yama is also mentioned as the author of the poem. We know nothing about Yama prior to his discovery of the Path, prior to this enlightenment. He had a sister named Yamī, and in one poem there is a dialogue between the two, Yamī trying to persuade her brother to enjoy some illicit connections with her and Yama trying to dissuade her from such an unworthy course. In the Rgveda we find Yama as having gone over to the region beyond and ruling there as King. He is intimately connected with some of the gods, especially with the great god Varuṇa. He is also connected with Bṛhaspati (who also seems to be more a man than an original god) and with Fire. Yama is enumerated among the gods, and he, though a mortal in the beginning, had become a god in so far as he enjoys the Soma offered to the gods and he is prayed like a god by the poets and along with the other gods. His discovery of the Path to the region beyond shows that he too had developed intellectual faculties which men generally do not have.

6. Manu is another son of Vivasvat. Manu is spoken of as the father of humanity. When he had kindled the fire, he made the first offering to the gods along with the seven Sages. The sacrifices which people perform are based on the sacrifice performed by Manu as prototype. There are various places where the sacrifice performed by Manu is spoken of as the model for later rituals. It was Manu who established the Fire as the light for all. Manu is associated with a large number of Sages of old, who were his partners in settling the pattern of sacrifices in the earliest times. Such associates of Manu are Bhṛgu, Āṅgiras, Atharvan, Dadhyān, Kaṇva, Atri and Kāvyā Uśanas. They are all ancient Sages who had gone over to the region beyond, after Yama had discovered the Path to that region. Manu is also closely associated with Soma. While Yama went over to the region beyond and became King there, and as such he had become a real god, Manu seems to have remained on earth. But the super-normal powers of intellect which he had attained are there.
7. There were other mortals who had become immortal gods; thus Maruts were the sons of the god Rudra through Prśni (spotted cow); they were mortals and became gods, partakers of Soma at sacrifices and helpers of Indra in his fight with Vṛtra, the Demon. They had become real gods. The Ṛbhūs, three in number, were first sons of Sudhanvān, and they too became immortal gods who partook of the Soma offered to the gods at the sacrifice. Many of the gods, including Mitra and Varuṇa, are spoken of as sons of the goddess Aditi, and hence they are known as Ādityas (sons of Aditi).

8. When we pass on from this ancient age of pre-Rgvedic times, and when we come to the period of the Rgvedic poetry, we find this belief in the attainment of some kind of Enlightenment, the development of some kind of super-normal vision, continuing. The Sages who sang about the gods had a direct vision of the gods in their true nature. It was only when a person could have such a direct vision of the gods and when they could sing of the gods in poetry that they were recognised as Rṣis or poets.

9. There are frequent allusions to the secrets and to the mysteries in the world. They speak of the concealed positions and the concealed names. Varuṇa gave instruction to the Sage Vasiśṭha about the twenty one names of the cow (Agnā or what shall not be killed), when he had attained wisdom. Dirghatamas had a vision of the secret mysteries of the universe and he sings of this in a whole poem of fifty three verses. There are the concealed positions of the gods. The place of the God Viṣṇu can be seen only by poets.

10. If language is divided into four parts, the three parts remain concealed in the cave, and only the wise, the poets, can see the whole of that language. Only a fourth part is in use among men. Men may look, but cannot see language. Men may listen, but cannot hear. Like a loving wife wearing charming robes, language reveals its form to the poet.

11. The distinction between learning and “Enlightenment” is continued in the Upaniṣads. This is one of the most conspicuous features of the Upaniṣads. There are many people who have learned all the books on all the subjects known at that
time, and yet such a person has not really "known". The three Vedas (or the four) are not recognised as the source of complete knowledge. This in itself is full proof for the broad-mindedness, and for the tolerance of the people. They were not slaves of a few texts. There is no religion other than that of the Vedas, where a part of the scripture is spoken of as not authority for real knowledge. This does not mean that the Upanishads began to depart from the orthodox and exclusive path of the earlier Vedic texts. Such a view is a mutilation of the spirit of the times and of the texts.

12. Buddha was born in such an environment and he grew up and functioned in that atmosphere. When there was a prophesy, at the time of his birth, that he would become a Buddha or "Enlightened," when later he told the king of Magadha that he was in search of the true "Light" and that he did not care for the royal throne, when he actually attained the "Enlightenment", there was universal recognition of the fact, because of the Vedic tradition of the possibilities of such attainments. Otherwise he would have been condemned as an imposter. Buddha was in search of what he knew to have been attained by previous "Enlightened" persons. The term "Buddha" itself was very familiar in the Upanishads as the real nature of the Self. It was the latter-day Buddhism that made a deviation from this ancient path and made Gautama Buddha the only "Enlightened". From the time of Yama who saw the path to the time of Buddha who also saw the Path, and even later still, such "Enlightenment" was a familiar feature in the national life of the people in the country.

13. The Upanishads speak of two kinds of knowledge, the lower and the higher. The lower type of knowledge consists of all sciences and even religion, and the higher type of knowledge consists of the direct realisation of the truth through a special faculty of the intellect. Buddha must have had a thorough course of study on all the subjects; he had also the opportunity to associate himself with the people who had renounced the world in their search for the reality of the world. Then, he had the "Enlightenment". Certainly, this "Enlightenment" must be of
the nature of the dawning of a new knowledge that was not contained in his early studies and in his later efforts in the company of the ascetics. This is just the distinction that has been drawn in the Upaniṣads about the lower and the higher knowledge.

14. We do not know in what ways the problems were discussed about the Absolute by the learned people and the wise people of those days. The Upaniṣads record such discussions conducted in the courts of the kings. We know that such problems were also considered at the Seminars or Academies of the Ṛṣis, the wise people, in the gardens. We do not have any literature presenting any systematic treatment of the subject, going back to those days. The real need for such systematic treatment of the subject arose only when there came about a real cleavage between two currents of thought in India. Till then, there were only differences, and differences show only a healthy growth. A time came when there arose also a real conflict, and conflict is a sign of a disease. The fundamental point of difference was on the question about the position among the “Enlightened” people which must be assigned to Gautama Buddha. Gautama Buddha himself did not claim any special position for him. He was one among the many Buddhas, and he speaks of the Buddhās in the plural number. He also speaks of the path of the Ṭrāyās. But the phenomenon of the “First Enlightenment” is a departure from the Indian tradition and from the teachings of Buddha. The true tradition and the teachings of Buddha are reflected in the statement found in the text on the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy that facts, aspects of reality, that fall outside the range of both direct perception and reason, must be known through the authority of trustworthy persons and of scripture. We must correctly understand who the reliable persons are, what the scripture is.

15. The world has two sides; there is the material content of the world and there is also its aspect as change and movement. In our normal experiences of perception and reason, both of them find a place. But are we knowing the material content as it is when we apply our sense-organs or when we apply our reasoning faculties? Are we knowing the change and the movement in
it as they are really when we perceive them or when we try to apply our reason? Do we see the reality or do we know only aspects of reality? The meaning of what is stated in the text on the Śāṅkhyā philosophy is only this. In science and religion, we get to know only aspects of reality, and to know reality as it is, we must apply another faculty.

16. That faculty is what lies as the basis of rational philosophy. But even rational philosophy has its limitations. It may take man beyond where science stops. Philosophy may take up questions of fundamentals and investigate problems of “why” and “how”. But rational philosophy recognises that, through the application of reason, we reach only certain generalities. At best we may know that there are certain ultimate principles, certain fundamentals, lying beneath of the facts known through science. Reason only brings to light the existence of certain things in a general way and not at all its nature. Thus philosophy has two aspects, the aspect of general problems through reason and the aspect of ultimate truths. The conclusions of reason are relative in the former, and it is in the latter that we reach absolute conclusions.

17. This latter is found in the two other systems of philosophy in India, which deal with the two sides of the reality that we are trying to know. There is the material content of the world and there is the change and movement in it. They were dealt with in the two parts of the Vedic literature. In the commentary portion called the Brāhmaṇas in the Vedas there is dealt with the change and movement in the world, and in the Upaniṣads, there is a consideration of the material content of the world. Both go back on the original texts, which is now predominantly concerned with the change and movement in the world; the original texts relating to the material content of the world have not been preserved with the same care. These two aspects that had been dealt with in the two portions of the Vedic commentary, the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads, are taken up for a detailed consideration in the two schools of thought in India known as the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta.

18. In the Śāṅkhyā system there is a definite statement that
there are facts in the world that fall outside the sphere of sense organs and of reason. Such facts must be known through scripture. In the Nyāya system, there is nothing specifically stated as falling outside the range of sense-organs and reason. But there is a distinction drawn between knowledge in general and specific knowledge, in this system. It is only through perception that one can secure specific knowledge. Inference takes us only to a generic knowledge. Thus, when fire is inferred from smoke, as existing on the mountain, we know that there is fire in general; but fire can have many specific attributes, and they are not brought with our knowledge through such an inference. Similarly, there are many facts of the world that are known only through inference, and as such only in a generic way. This is the case with the ultimate particles of matter that constitute the world. From inference we know that there must be some such states of an absolute nature from which the experienced world arose. But we know nothing about their specific nature. All such facts that fall within the scope of reason and that are outside the range of sense-perception, are known only in a generic way as a consequence.

19. But the Nyāya system recognises some kind of transcendental perception called Yogic perception (Yogi-Pratyakṣa). God also can have a direct perception of such facts. This amounts to a recognition of facts of realities that transcend the normal scope of man’s perception and reason. A mere generic knowledge arrived at through inference is not a true knowledge. All that we know is that there are such facts; we do not know what such facts are, what their natures are. Thus the specific nature of such facts fall within the scope of what is called Yogic knowledge and of the knowledge of God. In fact, there is no difference between the position taken up in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system and in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. In these two groups, they specify the modes of knowing in respect of the facts that come within the scope of the systems, and they recognise facts and the modes of knowing them that fall outside the scope of the systems.

20. In the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta group, the position is reversed.
These two systems recognise facts that fall behind the scope of their philosophy, and they confine their consideration to facts that are not reached by the other two system-groups, that are recognised in those systems as going beyond their scope. Thus, both the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta recognise modes of knowing like perception and reasoning. But they depend entirely on "Authority" for the establishment of the facts dealt with in the systems. This dependence on "Authority" for the treatment of the subject-matter in the Mīmāṃsā and in the Vedānta, is explicit in the opening sentence of the original texts relating to the systems. The Mīmāṃsā system and the Vedānta system have both a set of short texts, called Śūtras or Aphorisms, as the basis. They start respectively with the statement, "Then, therefore, there is a desire to know Dharma and Brahman". Dharma is the Law that governs the change and movement in the world, and Brahman is the absolute material content of the universe disentangled from changes and movements.

21. The term "then" in both mean "after the study of the scripture". In the Mīmāṃsā text, the interpretation is accepted by all commentators. In the Vedānta, the interpretation is indirect and of a secondary nature. Śaṅkara says that the term "Then" means "after the attainment of the requisite eligibility". But he adds that "sequence to study of the Veda" is also understood. Ramanuja’s position is that the term means "after knowing Dharma", which is the content of the Mīmāṃsā system; in so far as a study of the Vedas is a necessary preliminary to the knowledge of Dharma, the prior study of the Veda is to be recognised even in relation to the Vedānta.

22. In the Mīmāṃsā system it is definitely said that the subject-matter of the system, namely, Dharma, is what can be known only from scriptural injunctions. In the Vedānta also it is said that the understanding of Brahman, the subject-matter of the system, has scripture as its source. What is meant by this "Authority" on which the two systems depend for a treatment of the subject-matter? There are two possibilities, when we try to find out an answer to this question. The "Authority" may be a set of Texts known as the Vedas, or the "Authority" may be
a distinct mode of knowing certain realities in the world. The \textit{Mim\={a}\={a}s\={a}} and the \textit{Ved\={a}nta} lose their claim as philosophy if it is the first alternative, and if it is the second alternative, they become super-rationalistic philosophy. In both there is a “desire to know”, what is identical with “philosophy”. Among the systems of philosophy in India, there are two types. Four of the six are rationalistic, and the remaining two are super-rationalistic. Can there be such a super-rationalistic system of philosophy? Is not rationalism the essence of philosophy?

23. If we do not accept such a super-rationalistic system of philosophy, there are some great difficulties. We will have to say that human mind is incapable of understanding reality in all its aspects and gradations, unless there is some super-rational faculty in the intellect of man. Perception and reason take us only to aspects of reality and not to reality itself. Through science and rationalistic philosophy, we know the world only in the way in which sense-organs and reason can present it to us, not in the way in which the world really is. And reason tells us only that there is some such thing, and not what that thing is. For understanding the nature of fire on the mountain ascertained through the process of inference after seeing smoke on the mountain, we must go there and see the fire. And when there are some facts that do not come within the range of perception and reason, we must either say that the nature of such facts cannot be known or we must recognise certain modes of knowing that transcend sense-organs and reason. What is done in the \textit{Mim\={a}\={a}s\={a}} and in the \textit{Ved\={a}nta} is to assert the absolute and unconditional competence of human mind to grasp all aspects and shades of reality in the world, both in respect of the change and movement in the material content of the world and in respect of the material content of the world itself. It is not a dependence on “Authority” on account of mind’s incompetence.

24. The very nature of the function of the sense-organs and of reason warrants the recognition of a higher power in man’s intellect. The only other alternative is utter despondency in man’s incompetence to grasp truth. Ancient Indian thinkers were not such cowards; they were not also impostors who claimed
to have known the reality when they have known only aspects of that reality. In the Mīmāṃsā and in the Vedānta systems we have the noblest examples of courage and devotion to truth among Indian thinkers.

25. We cannot assert that a thing is there simply because we have seen it or simply because we have rational proof of its existence. We cannot also say that since we have not seen a thing or since we have no rational proof of it, there is no such thing. Errors are experienced in these two modes of knowing. In the text on the Sāṅkhya system it is said that there are many factors that vitiate our knowing through sense-perception. We experience that immense distance is such a vitiating factor. Too much proximity also is a vitiating factor in our vision. The sense-organs are liable to defects like jaundice, blindness and deafness. Even when a thing is in front of us and even when we keep our eyes wide open in broad light, the existence of the thing is not noticed when the mind is wandering far away. There are certain things that are too fine by nature to be caught by the sense-organs. A thing may remain concealed behind another object and is hidden from view. Stars are not seen by day time when the sun's rays suppress the rays that proceed from them. A thing may be mingled up among similar things and may not be differentiated. There are various ways in which the functions of sense-organs are vitiated.

26. Reasoning is also not an absolutely dependable mode of knowing. The vitiating factors in the process of reasoning form one of the most important topics dealt with in all texts relating to logic. When there are possibilities of mistakes in our modes of knowing either through sense-organs or through the application of reason, when such mistakes are recognised both in our experiences and also by thinkers, neither of the modes can bring us into contact with reality. Through these modes we know reality only as it is presented by the modes and not as it is. When a new mode, transcending these two modes are postulated, it is with the sanction of these two modes, on account of the necessity of these two modes. In the rationalistic systems of Indian philosophy there is an apparent claim that they deal with ultimate
truths, with realities, and not merely with relative truths or aspects of realities. Thus, in the text on the Sāṅkhya system, it is said that a mode differing from both science (observation) and religion, is the better one in so far as through that there is a discriminative realisation (Vijñāna) of three-fold truths, namely, the manifest (Vijakta), the unmanifest (Ajitakta) and the knower (Jīna). But this claim is to be compared with the confession of limitations when it is said that there are realities that fall beyond the scope of observation and reason, which can be known only through what is spoken of as "Authority". In the Nyāya and in the Vaiśeṣika systems it is said that the systems lead man to the realisation of truth (Tattva-Jīna) and thereby to the highest bliss (Nīśreyasa). Here also there is a veiled confession of limitation when it is said that certain facts are known only through Yogic Vision (Togi-Pratyakṣa) and that reason brings man only to the generic knowledge of a thing and not its real and specific nature. Thus, the position taken up in the Mīmāṁsā and in the Vedānta systems is just what has been sanctioned by the other systems and what has been also necessitated by those systems.

27. There was a time when scientists also held that they are able to know the truth of the world through their science; that they are able to bring Nature under their control. But views are changing. Now scientists are satisfied that they are able to know only aspects of reality and not reality itself; that what they know is superficial (only in the literal sense), that they move only on the surface of reality, that they cannot penetrate into the depths, into the secrets, into the mysteries of reality. Science deals with aspects of realities which they can observe either directly or through their instruments. In the Sāṅkhya system, it was definitely said that the knower, the scientists or the philosopher himself, comes within the scope of the treatment in the system. In the other systems also, the nature of the Self (Ātman) is a subject of inquiry coming within the scope of the system. But in modern science, the scientist has no place. The question of the relation of the scientists to the reality does not arise in modern science, as it does in the philosophical systems of ancient India. There is a "beyond" to what are brought into
the scheme of investigation in science, both prior and posterior. How dead matter, uniform and motionless, started on a course of differentiation and change, how the phenomenon of life arose within that "dead" matter, why the changes in the world take such a course and not another, why the direction is from simpler to the more complex and not from the complex to the simple—there are many points that are not introduced into science for consideration. A cell is the smallest living matter. When the cell is destroyed, where does its "life" element go? Tangible matter is made up of atoms and atoms are made up of electrons. When an atom is broken up, there is energy released. In what form did that energy exist in the atom, and what happens to it? The energy radiating from the Sun is preserved in plants in the form of matter, especially as carbon. How does energy convert itself into matter? There are various problems in science, both in physical science and in biological science, that afford scope for some kind of further investigation, either within the field of science itself or along a line parallel to the course of science.

28. Just as science promises by the very nature of science some scope for another kind of investigation, within this further investigation itself there is provided by rationalist philosophy, scope for a super-rational philosophy. It is in this way that there arose two courses of philosophical investigation, of which one does not stand in need of any "Authority" for establishing the facts admitted into it, and the other rests entirely on such an "Authority". We must understand the term "Authority" in its right connotation.

29. It has already been said that both the sense-organs and reason have limitations that make them incompetent to grasp the reality. There must be some mode of knowing where there will be no such limitation, so that through that mode there will be a direct contact between the Subject and the Object, independent of any mediation. This is what is known as the Impersonal Mode of knowing (Apauruseya-Pramana). Purusa is "Person" and Pauruseya is "what relates to a person". Apauruseya is what does not so relate to a person. Pramana is a mode of knowing. It is such a mode that is termed Veda or
scriptural authority, in Indian philosophy in its absolute sense.

30. The civilization of the West started with an objective bias, the emphasis being laid on the nature of the world outside; the subjective side was neglected and little investigation was made either to understand the nature of the knowing subject or to develop its full capacities. But in India, the position was reversed. The great emphasis was on knowing the nature of the subject and in advancing the abilities of the subject to know. The scope of knowledge thus widened on account of this increase in the ability of the Subject to know. The discipline of developing the abilities of the subject is generally known as Yoga. We do not know how old this system of Yoga was. Just as there had been logical thinking even without treatises on logic, there must have been logical disciplines even without text books on Yoga, in the earliest stages. Yama had his illumination through this Yoga, whereby he was able to find out the Path. Manu established the system of religious rituals regulating life of man, through the same Yoga. The various Rsis (Sages) had the direct knowledge of the gods through Yoga. There was the tradition of Yoga in the Upanisadas. Buddha had his enlightenment through Yoga.

31. Through this Yoga, the limitations of the sense-organs and of the reasoning faculty are removed. Besides this physical and mental limitation that restricts the scope of knowing there is also a moral limitation, which too must be eliminated. This limitation is of the nature of traits like "attachment" and "aversion". They too bring about a limitation on our knowing, and on account of the presence of such limitations, we do not know the thing as it really is. We usually consider the sense-organs and our whole mechanism of mental activity with its faculty of reasoning and various emotional aspects, as the channel for our knowledge and as the means for our entire life activity. The fact is exactly the opposite of it. They are barriers to our knowing, to our real and full life. They are really filters.

32. About the conditions in the Vedic times, all that we can say is that the people had some special powers. There have been attempts to interpret the Vedas as illustrating the principles of Yoga. I am not able to say anything about this method of the
interpretation of the Vedas, this way or that way. But I am very
definite that there is the Yoga back-ground for the Vedic culture.
It cannot also be a case of a sudden and accidental illumination
flashing on the minds of a few people. There must also have been
some deliberate attempts to develop such powers, and such an
attempt is impossible without a method and a science regulating
the methods. Such methods must have taken two different
directions, each depending on a separate doctrine about the rela-
tion between the Subject or the sense-organs and the mental
apparatus on the one side and the Objective world on the other
side. If what is called the Subject is an obstacle to correct knowing,
then they must be suppressed and repressed. There is the other
view that the Person must get released from such subjective limi-
tations. The former method was adopted by the Brahmacārins, the
predecessors of the Ascetics whom Buddha came across earlier
in his life. The latter represent the Rṣis or Sages of the Vedas.

33. Through this method of Yoga the Rṣis were able to get
into direct contact with the world, both its changes and move-
ments and also its material content. They knew the nature of the
unchanging material source of the changing world and also, the
nature of the changes in that world. In the change and move-
ment, there is a design, a Law consciously introduced. What
is called intelligence must have been behind this system of change
and movement in the world even from the beginning. The Law
is called the Rta in Vedic terminology. The change and move-
ment according to this Law is called the Yajña or Sacrifice. Even
the first change and movement is called by this term of Yajña
or Sacrifice in the Veda. There was the Supreme Intelligence,
called the Virāt, which is the first manifestation of the Universal
Intelligence along with the first change and movement. There
resulted a Form in the world, and that is the first “Person”.
There were also individualised Intelligences without the limitations
of sense-organs and mechanism of the mind. They are the gods.
They continued this process of change and movement or the
Sacrifices, and this process became the first operation of the Law
in the universe. Men also perform the Yajña or Sacrifice that fall
within the scheme of the first Yajña performed by the gods.
34. It must be understood that what is called a **Yajña** or Sacrifice is not a mere system of religious ritual; all the activities of man fall within this scheme of **Yajña**, which became the **Dharma** or Law in the world. It operated both in what may be called the religious aspect and in what is called the secular aspect of life among men. There is the term **Iṣṭa-Pūrta**, which enables men to go to the other world, and this consists of **Iṣṭa** (Sacrifice) and **Pūrta** (Social Service). Yama, Manu and the various Sages associated with this establishment of the Vedic **Dharma** or Law, consisting of Religion and Social Service, had a direct vision of the nature of the Law operating in this process of change and movement in the world; they are known as having a direct vision of (Sākṣat-kṛta) Law (**Dharma**), in exegetical works relating to the Vedas. There had been known a gradual decay of this capacity among men.

35. In the two systems of philosophy in India where these two problems are discussed, namely, the nature of the operation of the Law in the change and movement in the world (**Dharma** dealt with in the **Mīmāṃsā** system) and the nature of the material content of the world (**Brahman** dealt with in the **Vedānta** system) the mode of knowing must necessarily be recognised as that mode which was within the capacities of the peoples of the Vedic age. The records of their knowledge are known as the Vedas. The Vedas are not confined to a few texts. Any literary record of direct vision of the truth of the world without the limitations of the individuals come under the term Veda. Śaṅkara speaks of the immense, limitless Veda as the source for the knowledge of **Brahman**. **Brahman** is not dealt with in the limited texts called the four Vedas. If Śaṅkara had only these few texts in his mind when he spoke about the Vedas as the source for the knowledge of the **Brahman** dealt with in the **Vedānta**, he would not have used the term “immense” and “infinite”. After all, the available text of the four Vedas do not together exceed the size of a single work known to them, the **Mahābhārata**.

36. When there is a direct, immediate Subject-object relation between the sentience and the world, when the Object is grasped by the Subject in its real nature and not as it has been
presented by the medium, there is the knowledge of the thing gained by the knower without any limitations, without any error; such limitations and errors are brought about by the limitations and the defects in the medium, and here the knowing is direct and immediate. Therefore in such a knowing there can be no flaw at all. A record of such a knowledge is what is accepted as the Veda. That is why the Vedas are recognised as free from all taints.

37. There is a slight difference in the standpoint of the two systems, the Mimāṃsā and the Vedānta. In the Mimāṃsā there is no recognition of the possibility of a correct grasp of the entire Law by any individual. There is no "Omniscience" accepted in the Mimāṃsā system. There is a perfect world changing and moving according to a perfect Law. The individuals know only a part of it, and the extent Vedas contain a record of such partial knowing of the Law. To this extent there is an imperfection. But in the knowledge of the parts as recorded in the Vedas, there are no defects that are associated with ordinary literary records, defects of the "personality" of the knower, the imperfections of his sense-organs and of the apparatus of the mental functioning, and emotional defects like attachments and aversions. The Vedic Texts do not record the entire wisdom about the change and movement in the world according to the Law; the only thing that is claimed is that what are recorded must be in accord with the facts of the world, not what form only the personal views of a few individuals. Even this claim is considerably diluted when they accept the theory of what are termed Arthavādās in the Vedas, which are passages that shall not be taken in their literal sense representing a truth, which have only a secondary significance, which do not state any "fact". Thus, there is a frank and honest confession that the Vedas do not contain the whole truth and also that what are stated in the Vedas are not all of them truths about the world. Is there any other scripture in the world of which there is a similar confession by the guardians of such scriptures? When it is said that the Vedas are the Authority for Dharma in the Mimāṃsā, for the Law that governs the change and movement in the world, there is only a philosophical necessity
as the basis for such a theory and there is not at all any kind of religious narrow-mindedness or fanaticism behind it.

38. In the *Mimāṃsā* system there is no mode of knowing recognised that can operate beyond the scope of the sense-organs and the apparatus of the mind. In the process of knowing, such medium cannot be dispensed with; their defects can be removed. The system does not also accept the technical *Yogi-Pratyakṣa*, the direct and immediate perception of a transcendental nature. Thus in the *Mimāṃsā*, an individual is only an individual, and an individual has his limitations. The only limitations that an individual can get over are the defects of the sense-organs, the defects of the apparatus of the mental process of reasoning and the emotional defects of the mind.

39. In the *Vedānta* system, every individual is a potential omniscient. There can be a direct and immediate Subject-object relation between the sentience and the world. The truth is not stated in its perfection in the Vedas. After all, the Vedas are only a kind of medium for knowing the truth. The Vedas may point towards the direction in which one has to focus the mind to get a knowledge of the truth of the world. The real knowledge of the truth must be secured through personal contact with the world. Here also, what is called the "Authority" is not the text of the Vedas; it is only the direct and immediate perception of the world in its true nature by the individual. Even this "Authority" is only in indicating the direction and not in presenting the truth. Every individual must grasp the truth of the world by himself and ultimately there is no "Authority" for him, beyond his own experience.

40. Such limitations in the "Authority of the Vedas" are postulated by the followers of the Vedas themselves. When we closely scrutinise the theory of the "Authority of the Vedas", what is most prominent is their tolerance, their freedom and their catholicity, so far as the defenders of the Vedic authority are concerned. According to the true view of what is meant by the term "Vedic Authority", every scientific statement, every statement of a Law in the secular life or in the religious life of the people come under this term. All that is wanted is that such
a statement shall not have the limitation of being the "views" of individuals; they must be the statements of the facts without the limitations of personal considerations.

41. To understand the true import of this mode of knowing, through the "Authority" of an absolute nature, we must know certain details in the back-ground of the development of Indian thought through the ages. It is not proper to estimate the value of this mode of knowing adopted in Indian philosophy with a back-ground that is exotic to Indian thought. Modern Indian conditions do not form the true back-ground for the picture of ancient Indian thought, and conditions in other countries have no bearing on the conditions in ancient India. This candour this courage, this devotion to truth, that is at the back of the adoption of this mode of knowing, is something unique in India, un-noticed in any other country. Full discussion on all points till a decision is made; loyal adherence to the decision after it is made. This is the position taken up in India in ancient times.

42. I will give two examples from many, to illustrate the point, one from a real philosophical work and another from a work that forms the correct back-ground for Indian philosophy. Śaṅkara gives four points as eligibility for one to be a philosopher, to start the investigation of the problem of Brahman. The first is that there must be a discrimination of what is eternal and what is transient. In the commentary on the work of Śaṅkara, Vācaspati Miśra says that this is not the starting point in philosophy but the closing point. And he interprets the statement in such a way as to mean that the point of eligibility is a determination to accept at the close of the discussion any conclusion that has come out as the truth.

43 There is an anecdote about Śaṅkara, described in the life of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara met a great scholar who was a staunch follower and advocate of an active life in this world, while Śaṅkara had taken to asceticism. They met and they came to the terms that after the discussion, if Śaṅkara could convince his opponent about his own point of view, he would join Śaṅkara's Monastic Order, and if on the other hand Śaṅkara could be convinced about the position taken up by the opponent, Śaṅkara would
leave off his Order and lead an active life. In the end, Śaṅkara won and the other scholar became a disciple and of Śaṅkara, follower joining his order.

44. Is it possible that in such a tradition, any individual or any group of people could endow any set of texts with some sort of mysterious sanctity? The acceptance of "Authority" as a mode of knowing is an intellectual necessity and not at all an infliction and a chain on the intellect of man.

45. In this doctrine of "Authority" developed in the Indian philosophy we see the supreme example of honesty of intellect, the bold confession of the limitations of man's normal capacities to know, and the assertion of the maximum abilities of man's life. There is a recognition of the possibilities of man in his intellectual pursuits with an admission of the bare facts of man's life that man, though perfect, is not exhibited always as a perfect being, the possibility being that man in his true nature is free from all limitation in his powers of knowing and that there is nothing in the universe that is really and eternally concealed from man's knowing powers. The "Authority" in Indian philosophy is the most misunderstood and most misrepresented doctrine in the entire range of philosophy, and at the same time the noblest doctrine possible in any system of philosophy.
CHAPTER VII

TRUTH AND ERROR

a. Their Relation to Knowledge.

1. If we could completely trust our sense-organs or our reasoning faculty in knowing the truth, if we could be satisfied that when we know, we have also known the truth, there would have been no philosophy, there would have developed no logic as an aid in determining the true nature of things in the world. It is the errors in our experience that is the basis for the development of systematic philosophy and systematic logic. We find that we cannot trust the teachers of religious doctrines and of religious practice also. Just as there have been noticed in our knowledge of things through the aid of sense organs and of reasoning, certain conflicts and contradictions, there have been noticed conflicts and contradictions in religious teachings and religious practices as well. Therefore such religious doctrines and religious practices also must be put to strict scrutiny, like the facts of normal experiences in the life of the people.

2. When I experience a fact in one way at one time and in another way at another time, there is contradiction in my personal experience. When I experience a thing in one way and another person experiences the same thing in another way, there is a conflict. Can there be such contradictions and conflicts in the field of true knowledge in the world? Can two contradicting or conflicting religious doctrines and practices be both true? When we find such contradictions and conflicts, there arises the need for consideration and discussion. If both parties say that each is right and the other is wrong, that will not make matters better. Physical force and implements of torture cannot settle problems of truths. The greatest contribution of India to the intellectual wealth of humanity lies in this method of reconciling contradictions and settling conflicts through rational processes. There is no other nation that has agreed to submit their religious doctrines
and religious practices for discussion in open assembly and to accept the decisions after full and frank discussions.

3. In India, there had been differences in religious beliefs, in religious doctrines and in religious practices. But they were only differences, and differences could be accommodated through tolerance. In the Vedas we find a large number of religious teachers and a large number of gods whom such teachers, and the people following them, worshiped. The mode of worship was also of various kinds. Between the path taught by Buddha and the Path of the Vedas, there was only difference, if at all, there was any such thing. There was no conflict. But a time came when the two Paths came into conflicts. The conflict could be settled, and should be settled only, through discussion.

4. The people who followed the Vedic path had the strength of numerical majority; they could also influence those who could employ physical weapons to support the path. It has been agreed by all that ultimately, the Buddhist path was closed in the country. Was it through this numerical majority? Was it through the employment of physical power against those who refused to join the Vedic path? Indian literature records no case of religious persecutions, though later Buddhist literature preserves some such memories. If physical might had been the weapon employed for the defence of the Vedic Path, there would have been no need to introduce the doctrines maintained by the Buddhists into the discussions. The very fact that the doctrines of Buddhism have been given full chance for defence in open assemblies and that in all the literary records of such discussions relating to religious doctrines, the doctrines of Buddhism have been truly and openly introduced, shows that there was no question of employing force to destroy Buddhism or to drive back the followers of the Buddhist Path to the Vedic Path.

5. The great importance of this problems of truth and error in our modes of knowing for humanity lies in the fact that this question was not confined to the sphere of sense-perception and reason; it was extended to the region of religion, and of the scripture. Both the Buddhist scripture and the scripture that follows the Vedic Path were put to the same test. As a mat-
ter of fact the problem of truth and error in modes of knowing was taken up in philosophy to test the validity of the truths stated in the scripture following the Vedic Path.

6. A mode of knowing deserves that appellation only if by that mode something can be known which cannot be known by any other mode. If everything can be known through sense-perception and if the purpose of reason is only to confirm what was otherwise known, reason ceases to be a mode of knowing, in the technical sense of the word. Thus to know is to know what was not known before and in any other way. If philosophy has recognised a mode of knowing called "Authority", there must be facts in the world that cannot be known by any other means like sense-perception and reason. It is for this reason that the limitations of reason as a mode of knowing has to be substantiated. This position about the mode of knowing is taken up in those systems where a mode of knowing like "Authority" is also accepted. In this way, what is called "Authority" is not merely a mode of knowing, it is a mode of knowing which brings to us the knowledge of what cannot be known through other modes; this is the position taken up in the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta systems. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, knowing is simply knowing, whether or not what was known before or by other modes.

7. If the Buddhists assert that there are only two modes of knowing, namely, sense-perception and reasoning, then the position must be that there are no facts that cannot be grasped by these two modes and that whatever things are mentioned in scriptures, which do not come within the sphere of these two modes, must be dismissed as not being "facts". Such are the rituals which secure heaven according to the Vedic texts. There are also statements in the Vedic texts like the truth being positive, one and immutable. This too must be false. Is this their position? This question has been asked in the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy. The Buddhists take the five vows of abstention from (1) injury to animals, (2) acceptance of what is not given, (3) speaking what is false, (4) vain indulgences in worldly pleasures and (5) alcoholic drinks. Buddha knew in his Enlightenment the four great truths about suffering, its cause, its destruction and
the way to that destruction, which way is the eightfold path, already given earlier in this book. Are all these things within the sphere of sense-perception and reason, which are common to all people? Then there are religious practices among the Buddhists like worshipping sacred spots (Caityas). If Buddha knew only what others also can know and have been knowing through their senseperception and reasoning faculty, how is Buddha a "Buddha"? If it be said that Buddha is omniscient and that he is an exception, then how is it known that only one person could be omniscient and that a particular person is that omniscient one? Does this belief come within the scope of unaided reason? It cannot also be said that the modes of knowing are different in religion and in philosophy. And if Buddha knew what others cannot know, others too can know such facts of the world that fall outside the sphere of normal sense-perception and reasoning. And Mimāṃsā and Vedānta do not claim anything more. The truths about the nature of the change and movement in the world dealt with in the Mimāṃsā and about the nature of the material content of the world dealt with in the Vedānta fall outside the scope of sense-perception and reason. And for knowing such truths there is a mode of knowing distinct from the senseperception and reasoning. That is what they call "Authority".

8. What is the test by which we can determine whether a knowledge grasps truth or error? Various theories have been put forward about this problem, according to the basic position taken up in the systems. They may be stated briefly as:

1. Both truth and error are inherent in knowledge.
2. Both truth and error are extraneous to the nature of the knowledge and must be ascertained from outside.
3. Truth is inherent in knowledge, but error is extraneous to it and must be ascertained from outside.
4. Truth is extraneous to the nature of knowledge and must be ascertained from outside, but error is inherent in knowledge.

The theories associated with the four positions are related to the metaphysical and other views found in the systems that take up the positions.
9. In the Sāṅkhya system, what is called knowledge is a material phenomenon. It is a function of what is simply an evolute of matter, and what is called function is only an aspect of the matter, matter in a certain state. There is a subject-object concord, and that is what is called the phenomenon of knowing. When I see a rope at night in an indistinct light, only certain factors constituting the rope are in subject-object relation and not all. These factors are common with a snake also, and so the knowledge takes the nature of a snake. This defect is in the nature of the knowing, and as such the error is inherent in it. If all the factors constituting the snake come into the subject-object relation, then the knowledge takes the nature of a snake itself. And that is what is known as a valid one, the knowledge of the thing as it is. For this reason, the knowledge has its nature either as truth or as error. There cannot be a knowledge without one or the other of these natures. Of course, knowledge has forms like a doubt, which really come under the nature of being an error, in so far as there is no ascertainment of the truth in it.

10. According to the Nyāya systems, what is called knowledge is an attribute generated in the Self, the Subject that knows. This attribute generated in the Self, has not got any definite nature. It is just an attribute. Some object or other is the cause of the production of this attribute, among many other causes. It has no such definite nature as either in concord or in discord with the object as it is. Its nature either as true or as erroneous has to be decided later through other methods. If a later test shows that the previous knowledge is in accord with the object as it is, then we say that the knowledge was true, and if the test ends in the opposite way, we say that the knowledge was erroneous. In the desert, the glare of the rays of the sun may produce an impression of the presence of water at a distance, and if there is a lake, then also there is the impression of the presence of water. The impressions are alike. It is only after going to the place and testing it by actually touching it that one is sure if the impression of water, the knowledge of the presence of water in the two cases, was true or erroneous. Prior to that, one can say only this much that there is the knowledge
of water. Its nature of truth or error is not a factor in that knowledge. We may see smoke or we may be seeing only vapour, and in both the cases, there is the possibility of the inference of fire. Similarly, if a man says that there are fruits available on the bank of the river, there is only a knowledge about fire or about fruits in the two sets of cases; truth or error has to be established by later tests.

11. There is nothing in the world that does not come within the sphere of sense-organs and of reason. Our experience shows that both of them are liable to err. Therefore, when they secure us a piece of knowledge, we must recognise their nature as liable to error, and so it is only a piece of knowledge that may be true or that may be erroneous. It is in a state of suspense, without a definite form either as true or erroneous. It is only a later test that can endow the knowledge with the form of being true or erroneous, and that nature itself depends on the nature of the later test either as true or erroneous. The result is that there is nothing that can be called a final truth or error as the nature of a knowledge; such nature is only relative. Then is there nothing that can really be true or that is really erroneous? The position is that a doubt is legitimate in respect of any knowledge, and if the tests are sufficiently well done, then the proof of the truth or error in the knowledge is also sufficiently dependable. When a further doubt becomes an absurdity, that is the final stage, and we accept the conclusion at that stage. We recognise the possibility of error; but all that we can say at that stage is that to the best of our tests the knowledge is true or erroneous.

12. In the Mimāṃsā system there is accepted a mode of knowing by a direct relation of the subject and the object, without any limitations in the sense-organs and in reason. It is a knowledge of a thing as it is, not the knowledge of a thing as is presented to us by a medium. A knowledge arises when there is a subject-object relation, and the truth of the knowledge may be affected by the presence of any limitation in the medium between this subject and the object. There cannot be a knowledge without some object being in relation to the subject. Therefore
a knowledge arises as that of the object, that is, it arises as true. But this truth may be limited by the medium that may come in. The limitation to the nature of the knowledge as true has to be determined by the presence of factors that may stand between the subject and the object. A knowledge in which no such limiting factor can even be suspected is by its very nature true. This subject-object relation may be in respect of the changes and movements in the world, or it may be in respect of the material content of the world. In both the cases there is a possibility of the object being in direct relation to the subject, with no kind of limiting factor. The nature of knowledge as true is inherent and what we have to do is only to doubt the presence of factors that may limit its nature as true, and to eliminate such factors. Thus it is only its nature as error that is brought about by the external factors, and its nature as true is inherent in it. If we do not accept such a position, we will be admitting the incompetence of our mind to understand truth, and it is a contradiction in terms when we speak of things that our mind is not competent to grasp. A thing is a thing only if it is within the sphere of the competence of our mind to grasp.

13. According to the Nyāya system, there are two modes of knowing where the knowledge has absolute truth as its nature, and they are the knowledge of God and the knowledge of Yogins. In these cases too, the nature of the knowledge as being true is not inherent in it as a knowledge, but is brought about by the merits of the knower. It may be noted that the difference between the position of the Nyāya system and that of the Mimāmsā system is not in the nature of their respective doctrine, but in their basic assumptions. The Nyāya system deals with facts that come within the sphere of sense-organs and reason, while in the Mimāmsā system the subject matter is what falls outside the normal competence of man, outside the sphere of ordinary observation and reasoning. It is more a terminological difference. Knowledge derived through observation and reason are liable to err, and knowledge derived through a direct and immediate subject-object relation is true: this is the position in both.

14. In the Buddhist philosophy, there are different points
of view taken up: the world is a real void and experience is only a positive appearance of this void, which must be an error. Or what is experienced as external is really the inner phenomenon of the mind and there is the consequent error. Or what is only to be inferred from their experience is experienced as what is directly perceived and as such there is the element of error. Or what is momentary is experienced as continuing and lasting and this is an error. This element of momentariness is common to all the schools of thought within Buddhistics philosophy. Thus, experience as experience is an error, which becomes its inherent nature.

15. Buddha is Omniscient, and as such his knowledge cannot err. It is not because that is a knowledge; it is because it is the knowledge of an Omniscient person. Thus, the truth in the knowledge is dependent on extraneous factors.

16. There are many factors that form the basis for such a doctrine that has developed within the Buddhistic philosophy. If they say that Buddha too can err in his knowledge, that knocks the bottom out of all their philosophy. Then, there is a particular presentation of the teachings of Buddha, that has contributed to the development of such a theory in the system bearing his name. It does not mean that Buddha actually taught such theories. The teachings of Buddha were interpreted to mean such a view.

17. The four-fold truth of Buddhism is that there is suffering in the world, that there is a cause for such suffering, that suffering can be terminated and that there is a way for such a termination of suffering in the world. Thus, imperfection becomes an inherent factor in the world, which is the abode of suffering. Our awareness is confined to momentary experiences and we do not experience an enduring expericencer. We know nothing about the absolute nature of the world. Now the line of argument is that if Buddha believed in a permanent expericencer and an absolute positive reality, he would have taught such things, and what he actually did was to refuse to answer questions about such absolute matters. The nature of the world being a void without any absolute positive basis is an interpretation of Buddha’s silence and not an element within Buddha’s direct teaching.
18. Here, there is a fundamental difference between the Vedic systems and the system bearing the name of Buddha. According to the former, man’s mind is competent to grasp every fact of reality; according to the latter, man cannot grasp reality, and his experience, as experience, is erroneous by nature. According to the former, all men have equal capacities, though it may be dormant in many and may be functioning only in a few; according to the latter, there is one person who is different from all others, and he alone can grasp and has grasped truth. There is no question of a difference between the two currents on account of Buddhism being rational and Vedic systems accepting an Authority.

19. There is one great thinker in India, whom I will place on the highest pinnacle among the thinkers of the world; and he is the least known, and I may even say that he is not known at all to the students of the evolution of thought in the world. He is Prabhākara who expounded the Mīmāṃsā system of philosophy in a particular way and whose name is given to one of the two schools within the Mīmāṃsā system. For obvious reasons I kept his name away when I dealt with the position of the Mīmāṃsā system in the matter of the relation of truth and error in knowledge.

20. No error; no sin; no void—this is the essence of the philosophy of Prabhākara. When we know, we know correctly. When we act, we act rightly. When we experience, we experience only positive facts and never a void, never a negation. It may be said that a person who denies a distinction between correctly knowing and wrongly knowing is a lunatic, that a person who denies a distinction between virtue and sin is a danger to public morality, and that a person who denies a distinction between what is positive and what is negative must be blind to facts. The first of these three points will be dealt with in this chapter when the question of the nature of error in knowledge will be taken up. The others too will be taken up in appropriate contexts. But here I assert again that the question of truth and error in knowing has no place in the philosophy of Prabhākara. The problem of what is inherent is and what is extraneous to, knowing
as between truth and error does not arise at all when we take up
the position of Prabhākara. That is why I did not introduce
this school of *Mīmāṃsā* along with the position of *Mīmāṃsā*.

B. Nature of Error in knowledge.

21. This problem has been dealt with in a very elaborate
and comprehensive way in all the systems of philosophy in India,
both the Vedic and the Buddhist systems. When it is said that
a particular knowledge is erroneous, we must know what we
mean by the term erroneous. There must be some common
theory about the nature of an erroneous knowledge; it is not
enough if every one holds that what is different from one’s notions
is erroneous. That is not rational philosophy. When a thing
is experienced as what it is not or is not experienced as what
it is, there is an error. This is a simple way of putting it.
But it requires more careful scrutiny.

22. The difference between some of the cases noted below
may be very slight; yet they have been advocated by different
schools of thought and they must be kept distinct from each
other. What is of great interest to a student of ancient Indian
thought is the great variety of thought patterns, which shows
their mutual tolerance, their spirit of accommodation. They all
together form what can be called the rich legacy of thought from
ancient India. There is neither an enforced uniformity nor a
conflicting meddley. An enforced uniformity bursts into pieces
in course of time. Conflicting currents destroy one another
and arrest progression. Indian tradition has steered clear of
both the dangers.

23. All the different schools of Buddhism hold in common
that our experience is always an error; and there is no scope for
drawing a distinction between truth and error in knowledge.
The various schools of Buddhism hold different views regarding
the erroneous nature of our knowledge.

24. The *Mādhyamika* school holds that there is only a void,
complete void, as truth in the world, and we have an experience
of a positive existence in the world. That experience must be
an error. This error consists in a knowledge as positive of what is
negative (*Asat* = negation—*Khyāti* = knowledge).
25. Another school of Buddhism is known as the Yogācāra, according to which the ideas are real and what is experienced as external realities are only aspects of these ideas. The ideas in their real nature have no external objects. What is called the Self is only these ideas as an aggregate. In dream there is the cognition of the Self (the ideas) without any external objects, and yet there is a differentiation of the subject and object, which is an error. This is what is called Ātma (self) Khyāti (cognition).

26. The cognition of objects having a form while the objects do not have any specific form of their own, is also a form of Asat (negation) Khyāti (cognition). The difference is only in this that in the Mādhyamika school, there is a cognition as positive of what does not exist at all, while in this latter school what has no form is cognised as having a form. Here the form is attributed to what is formless. This is the view of the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhists.

27. Another school of Buddhist philosophy is called the Saunrāntika, according to which there is a cognition without something to depend on; and this is called the Nirālambana (void of support) Khyāti (cognition). To them nothing is within the sphere of sense cognition; the external object is inferred. Sometimes we have the experience of things that are there, and sometimes we have experience of things that are not there, as seeing some wooly things before our eyes, which is an optic phenomenon. This is what they call the cognition without anything for it to depend on.

28. There are other ways in which erroneous cognitions are accounted for. Neither the object nor the idea has a form. Yet we see that things are known as having a form like a colour. This form is a new product on account of the contact of the idea with the object, and in our experience we see that a new colour arises when two things are mixed together though neither of them has that colour.

29. In the Yoga system of Patañjali, one of the schools of the Vedic group, it is held that in such cases of error, there is a cognition void of a real object. We can state the nature of the
knowledge in language form; but there is no object corresponding to what has been stated in that language form.

30. Cognition of a thing as something else is another form of error as when a piece of nacre in bright sun-light is mistaken for a piece of silver. This is called Anyathā (as something else) Khyāti (cognition). This is the position taken up in the Nyāya system.

31. In the School of Mimāṃsā as expounded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, there is the theory of error as the cognition of something as something opposite. This is termed Viparīta (opposite) Khyāti (cognition). What appears in an erroneous cognition is not what does not exist. The thing must have been the object of a cognition at some other time and at some other place. Such things find their place in another cognition. This is what takes place in an error. This is not different from the doctrine of cognising something as something else. The difference is more in terminology than in fact.

32. In the Vedānta School as expounded by Bhāskara, there is what is called the cognition of what really exists. When there is a piece of nacre shining in bright sun-light and when there is the cognition of a piece of silver, the silver is there for the time being. When later on through some test, it is found that there was no silver, then silver disappeared. This is called the Sat (real) Khyāti (cognition), the cognition of what is really existing.

33. In the Visiṣṭādvaita (Monism with a qualification) school of the Vedānta system, expounded by Rāmacārja, there is the same realistic touch even in an erroneous cognition. The whole physical world is made up of the “Five Elements” mixed up in different proportions, and we are seeing some such combination even in what is later found to be an error. At that time when the cognition arose, there was the object in the cognition.

34. The Advaita (Monistic) school of Vedānta expounded by Śaṅkara, advocates a theory of error not much different from the stand-point of the Buddhists. In this school also, experience is erroneous by its very nature. Thus whether we are seeing a real piece of silver as silver or whether we are seeing a piece of nacre in bright sun-light as silver, there is an element of error.
The experience of silver as silver is also an error. But there is some real difference also here, in relation to the Buddhistic approach. Experience is not an absolute error; the content of the experience is neither absolutely true nor absolutely erroneous. It is indefinable either as true or as unreal. Thus it is called the theory of Anirvacaniya (Indefinably) Khyāti (cognition). There cannot be a cognition of what does not exist at all; and yet there is not the cognition of the thing as it really is. When a piece of nacre in bright sun-light is cognised as silver, there could not have been the cognition of silver unless there had been silver, and if it were silver in truth, it could not be sublated by a later knowledge that it is nacre. Even when we say that we have known a piece of silver as silver, there is an element of error in it. Silver is not a truth; it is only an appearance, the truth being the Absolute, the Brahman. Thus our entire experience is in the form of what cannot be defined as absolutely true, in so far what is absolutely true, the Brahman, cannot be cognised in our experience. At the same time, our experience is not absolutely erroneous in so far as what we experience is that Absolute in another form, as an emperical fact.

35. We have seen that in many of the Vedic schools of thought there is an element of realism associated with what is termed erroneous knowledge. But the uncompromising realism is found in the Mīmāṃsā school associated with the name of Prabhākara. While in the various schools of Buddhism, there is no such distinction like truth and error in knowledge, in so far as experience as experience is error, in the Mīmāṃsā school of Prabhākara too there cannot be any distinction like truth and error in knowing; but this is for another reason; experience is true by its very nature, and there is nothing called an erroneous cognition.

36. When in bright sun-light a piece of nacre is experienced as a piece of silver, what happens is that the sight of that object produces a complex cognition, partly of the nature of a direct experience and partly of the nature of a recollection. The cognition is of the form "This is silver". In such a cognition the element "This" is of the form of a direct experience and
the element "Silver" is of the form of a recollection of what has been experienced before. There is no awareness of the fact that there is an element of recollection in this cognition and as such the experience is defective; there is an imperfection in the experience. But is there anything that can be accepted as a perfect cognition? No one is omniscient, and there is an element of imperfection in every case of experience.

37. The intermixture of experience and recollection in the same cognition is also a common fact; as a matter of fact there is no event of a pure experience. In all cases of experience, there is the element of recollection also. When we see many material masses, we get the experience of "This is a cow", "This is a horse", and "This is a jar". This is due to the presence of the element of recollection of cows, horses and jars coming in these cases of experience. Unless there is the element of the recollection of forms experienced previously, all the perceptions should have taken the form "This" and not "This is a cow" etc. But in such experiences, there is no awareness of a recollection at all. It is known only as a unitary experience. In the same way, in the experience "This is silver" when what was in front was only a piece of nacre, there is a unitary knowledge. Where is the error?

38. I have not given the above brief notices of the various theories about error as a complete study of the problem. I am dealing only with certain general principles. My object is only to show the true distinction between the thoughts in the Vedic schools and the thought in the Buddhist schools. According to the latter, man always errs in his experience; according to the former, man may err, but man is capable of being right also. As a matter of fact, we can speak of a cognition being an error only in contrast to the nature of truth associated with other cognitions. An absolutely erroneous knowledge is impossible. A cognition can be an error only relatively to other cognitions that are accepted as true. Prabhākara represents the true Indian spirit, that "man can never err". Man may be imperfect in his knowing, but cannot be in the wrong. This unfailing trust in man's abilities is the true spirit of India.
PART II

THE WORLD: WHAT WHY AND HOW

CHAPTER VIII

The Vedas: The Form.

1. The Vedas are essentially poetry and not at all works relating to any subject in particular. Especially is this the case with the Rgveda and the Atharvaveda. The Yajurveda relates to the rituals. The Sāmaveda is only the Rgveda set to music, along with a few passages which are not different from the Rgveda either in form or in substance. In the Brāhmaṇas and in the Upaniṣads, we have the interpretations of the rituals and the thoughts of the original texts of the Vedas. In the main picture of the Vedas, we cannot meet with any real philosophy dealt with; but we see a philosophical back-ground. Neither the poets of the Vedas, nor those who described the rituals have worked out a consistent philosophy, though they must have been philosophers, though they lived in an age of advanced philosophical thoughts and deep philosophical speculations. From the available texts of the Vedas, we must try to understand the possible philosophy of the times; it is not fair to draw conclusions about the philosophy of the times from the actual statements of the texts as the basis. We must not say that their philosophy is thus much, in so far as thus much alone is stated in the texts. We must draw conclusion from the texts regarding the extent and depth of philosophy, from the implications of the texts.

2. The texts belong to a large number of authors who might have been separated from one another by vast intervals of time, and they might have been distributed along distant regions. The poets had, perhaps, the philosophy of an earlier day as the back-ground and not necessarily the philosophy of their own times. The philosophical doctrines that were known to the people as inherited from an earlier date is perhaps the real back-
ground for the Vedic literature. Thus the doctrines found reflected in the poetry of the Vedic texts were what were discussed and settled in an age that preceded the days of the texts; it is also possible that what we find in the later phases of the Vedic period, in the Upaniṣads, were discussions about philosophical doctrines of the days of the early Vedic Texts, represented by the available Rgveda and the Atharvaveda. When we speak about the Philosophy of the Vedas, we are not speaking about the philosophy of any particular time; we are speaking of the philosophy that could be deduced from the texts known as the Vedas, which formed the back-ground of such texts.

3. We must also keep in mind this fact that we are dealing with poetry as our source for understanding the philosophy of the Vedas. Poetry is not a scientific, systematic treatise on any subject. The poet sees something, and they write poetry with something deeper in their minds. What they see actually is only a symbol for what they had in their minds. When they sing about the Earth and Heaven and about the Region between them, when they sing about the various phenomena of water and light in these regions, when they sing about certain powers abiding in those regions, generally known as the gods, we must understand that they had something beneath and beyond of the physical facts that we see and that we may usually understand by the language which they employ.

4. In so far as we do not have any record of the real philosophy of the times of the Vedas dealt with systematically, there is another great difficulty that we have to surmount. We do not know at what point we must make the start, and we do not know also the direction along which we must proceed after the start. I propose to start at the point of the world as we see it with our eyes, and then I will deal with the questions of the why and the how, regarding the world. Whether the world has always been there, whether it evolved out of something, whether it was created and if so, by whom—all such matters must receive our very close attention. We must also examine the philosophy of the Vedas as deduced from the contents of the Vedic texts, also as the foundation for the development of the later philosophy of India.
We see the world as consisting of the Earth on which we live and also of the space above us. We can see nothing below of us; while we can see upwards through the space above the Earth, we cannot see downwards through the Earth on which we live. Above us we see the vast firmament separated from the Earth by the expanse of the atmospheric region. The poets of the Vedas also must have seen the same phenomenon. But they must also have seen something deeper and something beyond which we do not, and cannot, see. The Earth and the Heaven or the Earth and the Sky form a pair sung about frequently by the poets.

5. They are the Mother (Earth) and the Father (Heaven or Sky) for humanity. The Heaven or the Sky as Father is found in the mythology of nearly all the nations of the world. We have the term Zeus Pater and the term Jupitar, to designate this. But to the Vedic Indians, the Mother Earth is also of equal importance if not of greater importance. There is no poem about the Sky or Heaven taken singly, while there are poems about the Mother Earth alone. There are many poems about the Mother and the Father taken together as a pair. The most familiar term is Dyāvā-Prthivī (Heaven and Earth). Other terms are Rodasī, Bhūmi and Kṣosī; the last two are the name of the Earth, used to designate both in the dual number. They are two halves jonined together. They are also thought of as two vessels; they are also compared to the two wheels at the end of an axle in a chariot. In spite of such comparisons, they are the Father and the Mother; this is the most prominent idea.

6. There is a short poem in which the Earth is praised alone, in the Rgveda, while in the Atharvaveda there is a long poem of sixty-three verses in which the poet sings about the Mother Earth. This shows what partiality the people of that age had for the Mother Earth, in relation to the Heaven or the Sky, which is the Father. Then there are many words which the poets use to designate the Mother Earth. In the later list of synonyms, found in work known as the Nighantu-Nirukta of Yāska, there are twenty one names for the Earth, and Vasiṣṭha, one among
the greatest of the Vedic poets, says that when he attained wisdom, the God Varuṇa gave him instruction about the twenty one names which the Earth (Agni—what shall not be killed, cow) bore. The word Agni means the “cow”, and in the context it means the Earth; there are many words that mean both the Earth and the cow. A set of primitive people, wandering from place to place in search of pasture, fighting and invading, and even plundering, cannot be expected to have such a rich vocabulary, and so many names for the Earth. To the Vedic people, the world could not have been a wonder; the Earth was a loving mother, long known to them and loved by them for a long time.

7. The Vedic people loved the Earth much more than the Sky or the Heaven, and the word for the Sky or Heaven, Dyaus, occurs more often in combination with the name of the Earth as a dual compound than alone. There are such dual-compounds of the word Dyaus with a few names of the Earth, Dyāvā-Prithivi, Dyāvā-Kṣāmā and Dyāvā-Bhūmi. And this pair appears far more times in the Rgveda than any pair of god, of whom also there are many. A single word in the dual number meaning the pair, Rodasī, occurs about a hundred times in the Rgveda. They are spoken of as parents, many words meaning “parents” being applied to them like Pitarā (the two fathers), Mātarā (the two mothers) and Janitrī (the two producers); They are also spoken of as having the gods as sons (Deva-Putre).

8. But the gods are also spoken of as having produced the Heaven and Earth. Dirghatamas, a great poet of the Rgveda, says that he who produced the Heaven and the Earth (Rodasī), is the best among the gods who do great deeds. Vāmadeva, another great poet, also speaks about such a creation of the Heaven and the Earth by the gods. This shows that when the gods are spoken of as the off-spring of the Heaven and the Earth, the gods are also spoken of as having had some hand in the production of the Heaven and the Earth.

9. The Heaven and the Earth are also spoken of as being a Bull and a Cow. They are rich in seeds and yielded milk and ghee and honey in aboundance. They also produce the nectar,
They never age; they are wide-extensive, broad, forming great abodes. They are manifold with their ends far apart from each other. Apart from the physical aspects indicated by the above features, they are endowed with divine qualities, being the father and the mother. They are wise and they uphold and promote righteousness. They guard the beings and they protect them from disgrace and misfortune. They grant food and wealth. They bestow great fame and dominion. They sit round the sacrifice, they go to the worshippers along with the heavenly folk. They carry the oblations to the gods.

10. The Heaven and the Earth are what we see with our own eyes; the Heaven is above and the Earth is below, where we are. The Earth is what is around us, circular in shape, resembling a wheel. The four cardinal points are indicated by terms that mean what is behind (West), what is in front (East), what is downward (South) and what is upward (North). There is often the mention of the four points, and there is also mention of the five points. Later literature of the Vedic texts mention six, and the Rgveda itself speaks of even seven such points. The fifth may be what is above or the place where the speaker stands, and the two more must be above and below. I am not quite sure which is which; but the seven points must be the four cardinal points, above, below and the place where the speaker stands.

11. The Heaven is Div, a word that is related to the word Deva meaning "god"; it has its counterpart in Greek and in Latin with the same meaning. We have Zeuz Pater and Jupiter; we have also Deus from which we have words like Divine. It is only in the Iranian language that the word has changed its meaning, and in the Avesta, Daeva means "demon". This meaning continues even in modern Persian in Div (Devil). There are other words also that mean "heaven" in the Veda. Nāka is a word that is found very often, and its meaning is quite uncertain. Later commentators interpret the word as being a combination of the two negatives Na and A, with the word Ka, (happiness), the whole combination meaning what is not other than happiness. But this is not scientific etymology. There is another word V y o m an, which is divided in the Veda itself as Vi-oman; the latter
part means "help" or "protection" in the Veda. Heaven is also spoken of as Rocāna (luminous), Uttama or Uttara (highest). It is also designated as Pārya and Parama (supreme, farthest).

12. From these references it is certain that the Vedic poets had the physical Heaven and Earth that we also see, in their mind when they sang of the two, as a pair or even singly. Poems are not addressed to the Heaven singly, though the Heaven is mentioned alone in many places, sometimes as the abode of the gods. But did they have only the physical Heaven and Earth in their mind when they sang about the Heaven and Earth or when they made mention of them in casual allusions? To determine this point, we must examine their conception of the physical world as seen by us, more closely.

13. The world is not merely what is encompassed by the Heaven and the Earth, one above and the other below, two "Bowls" two wheels, kept asunder, far removed from each other, and yet forming an inseparable pair like Father and Mother. They sing about three worlds, there being the Atmospheric region between the Heaven and the Earth. It is called the Antarikṣa (what is in the middle). There is no poem in praise of the Atmospheric region, either alone or in combination with others. The atmosphere is only space and not an object of worship. It is only the abode of some gods, the place where there are waters. The word Rajas is used to express this region, and sometimes it is said that the Rajas is dark. I am not sure whether in such cases, the word is used in the specific meaning of Atmospheric region or whether it is used only in the generic sense of "region". Words denoting the Earth or Heaven are also used sometimes in the sense of "World" in general. Thus there is mention of the "Three Rocana" (the luminous region, the Heaven). There is also mention of the Earthly Rajas in plural. They speak of the three Antarikṣas, and the three Rajas and the three Rocana in the same place. In another place, there is mention of three Rocana, three Dyaus, and three Rajas. These words may mean specific regions or simply region in general. Or it may be that they mean a three-fold division of each of the three. There is also mention of the Farthest Rajas (in plural) that are not beyond of
Indra; there is also the highest Rajas (in the singular); it is also called the third Rajas (in the singular).

14. They speak about the distance between the Earth and the Heaven. Heaven, which must be what is meant by the abode of the god Viṣṇu, is so far away that even the birds cannot soar up to it. It takes a thousand days for a bird to reach the Heaven when it flies from the Earth. The later commentaries on the original texts speak of the distance in the same terms of a thousand days journey for a bird or in terms of a thousand cows standing each above the other.

15. The impression may be that the poets had the physical world in their mind when they describe the three regions in this way, the Earth being below and the Atmospheric region being above it, with the Heaven as the highest. It may be that each of them had further sub-divisions into three. But there are ideas found scattered in the Vedas that show that the poets must have had something deeper in their minds, and not merely the world with its three divisions within our view. They speak of the two divisions of the Earthly regions, and the third or the highest being the abode of Viṣṇu. Men can see the region of the two strides of Viṣṇu, while none can view the third. The highest abode of Viṣṇu is known only to the wise poets. There is "the wonderful world". The Sun-god Savitar comes through the "dark regions", has domain over the "dark region" and reaches the "heaven" through the "dark regions".

16. Many other gods are associated with regions that are beyond the view of ordinary men. "There are three heavens of which two are in the lap of the Sun-god Savitar, while the third is in the region of Yama". The whole world is a fourth part of the great "Universal Person", while the three other fourths are "immortal and in heaven." There are questions asked about the abode of the Asvins. "Concealed, Names" and "Concealed Places" are frequently found mentioned in the Rgveda. They are the names and the places of the gods.

17. The "Names" here cannot be dissociated from the views which they express about language." Language can be divided into four quarters, and it is only the wise poets that have known
it. Three quarters of it remain concealed in the cave, and only a fourth part is in use among men.” The mystery of language is thus mentioned by Dirghatamas. Bṛhaspati also sings about the mystery surrounding language. “One may look, but one cannot see the language: one may listen, but one cannot hear it. But she reveals her full form to this person, like a loving wife with charming robes.” Dirghatamas has much to say about the wonders of language and of poetry, about metres and modes of singing. Various mysterious positions and objects are associated with the various metres. “He has fixed the Sindhu (river) in the heaven through the Jagati metre; he saw the Sun in the Rathantara song.” There are various mysteries associated with numbers. The seven language forms and the seven rivers are very often spoken of in the poetry of the Vedas; it may be referred to as the seven names or the seven sounds or the seven tongues or the seven mouths. “There are four horns, three feet for this, two heads, seven hands for this; the bull tied on in a three-fold way, roars and roars. The great god entered the mortals.” Dirghatamas has much to say about the Sun and about the time and the divisions of time, and in this presentation he uses various numbers like five and seven and twelve. “They yoke seven horses to a chariot having one wheel; the horse is one, bearing seven names. The wheel has three navel, in which all this world has been remaining.” “The chariot has seven wheels.” “The seven sisters sing in laudation, in which remain concealed the seven names of the cow.” “It has twelve spokes; indeed it is not subject to decay; this wheel of Law goes round and round the heaven.” “Here there stand seven hundred and twenty sons, in pairs.” “The father has five feet, with twelve forms.” “He is spoken of as placed in the high (chariot) with seven wheels and with six spokes.” “In the wheel with five spokes that is rolling, the entire world has been remaining.” The Vedic poetry abounds in numbers that have a very mysterious and symbolic meanings; we cannot understand the real meaning, since we have lost the key to open up the mysterious chamber.

18. People live an active life on earth. They worship the gods. There is the Law in the world, what is termed Rta. The great
warrior, god Indra, kills the dragon Vṛtra as a result of the worship of men on earth, and thus he lets "the seven rivers" flow freely. He also kills another demon, Vala and he releases the cows that are concealed behind the mountains in the caves. In the fight against Vṛtra, Indra was assisted by the gods named the Maruts, and in the fight against Vala and in recovering the cows concealed behind the mountains, he had the assistance of Brhaspati. The Maruts are intimately associated with Soma, and Brhaspati is related in the same way to songs, and there are many words relating to songs that are used in his descriptions. Both the Maruts and Brhaspati are more closely related to Indra than any other god, and of them the Maruts are related to him through Soma and Brhaspati through song.

19. The Maruts were first mortals who later became gods eligible to receive Soma at the Sacrifices, and they formed the most important gods in the matter of Soma offering. They got their share of the Soma at the Sacrifices in advance of others, and this precedence in the matter of drinking the Soma at the Sacrifices has become practically a synonym for "Honour" or "Eminence". The Maruts became inhabitants of the Atmospheric region. Brhaspati must have been a mortal too and he remained a god on Earth. He is more like the god Fire, being called the "Elevated Preceptor" (Purohita). Like the Fire, he remains among men, though a god. Insospite of his abode on the Earth and in spite of his relation to Indra and to the Fire, what is peculiar to him is his relation to song, to language; and the terms like "having seven mouths" or "having seven tongues" refer to him. This distinction between a Soma group and Song group among the gods is very plain in the Vedas. I prefer to designate the latter as the "Wisdom group" of gods.

20. The Soma group is more related to the Atmospheric region and the Wisdom group is more related to the Celestial region. The gods of the Atmospheric region are, to mention only the more important, Indra, Mātariśvan, Rudra, Maruts, Parjanya and Waters (Apāk). In the Celestial region, there are Dyauṣ (Heaven), Varuṇa, Mitra, the sun-gods of Sūrya and Savitar, Viṣṇu, Uṣas (Dawn) and the Aśvins (the twin gods). Some of them
like Viṣṇu and the two Sun-gods, are not invoked to the sacrifices to drink the Soma; Aśvins are fond of Madhu or the "Sweet Honey" and there is also reference to "the Honey Wisdom" in the Rgveda. The Waters mentioned among the gods of the Atmospheric region cannot be the waters that we have; if they had been so, they should have found a place on the Earth, and the Rivers find a place among the gods of the Terrestrial regions. It may be said that the Waters are assigned their place in the region in so far as the rains come from that region. My point is that the Waters of the Rgveda do not correspond to the waters on the physical earth. Here we must take note of the fact that Indra kills the demon Vṛtra and releases the Waters, the "Seven Rivers", while after killing Vala, he releases the light. Thus, we get two series:

1. Indra, the demon Vṛtra, the Maruts associated with Soma and the Waters released.
2. Indra, the demon Vala; Bṛhaspati (associated with songs) and the Light released.

I am inclined to equate this division of the world with the "Five Elements" of a latter stage in the development of philosophy in India, the Elements being the Earth, the Water, the Fire, the Air and the Ether (Ākāśa). The close relation of the first three of the Five Elements with the three worlds of the Veda, cannot escape the attention of even the most casual reader of the Vedas. The references to Sound, to language and to songs and the mysteries related to them, may be equated with the fifth Element, Ākāśa, (Ether) which, according to the later philosophy, is connected with sound. There are prayers to Vāyu and Vāta, both meaning "Air". One may be tempted to connect this Vāyu or Vāta with the fourth element. But these gods are placed in the Atmospheric region, and there is nothing to show that their seat is deeper than the seat of "Light" or the third of the Five Elements. The other gods that may be given some close connection with the notion of "Air" are the Maruts, their father Rudra, and Mātarīśvan, all of them belonging to the Atmospheric region.

21. I am not at this stage in a position to work out a complete theory of the possibility of the conception of the "Five Elements"
The Form

being traced back to the cosmology of the Vedas; yet I cannot help taking note of the close relation of the three worlds of the earth, the Atmosphere (with Waters) and the Celestial region (with its Light) with the first three Elements. I cannot also shut my eyes to the close relation of the mysterious regions connected with the “place of the gods” and of the “names” to, and its possible identity with, the Ether (Akāśa) having sound as its essential attribute according to later philosophy. There can be no doubt regarding the relation of the Light in the third region with “colour” as the attribute of Fire, the third element among the “Five Elements”. I am not able to find in the Vedas any equivalent to “Smell” which is the attribute of the first element, the Earth. The position of the fourth element is not at all clear, and so I do not take up the question of its attribute of “Touch”.

22. Taste, the sweet taste, plays a very prominent part in the Veda, and it is associated with wisdom. According to classical philosophy, it is the attribute of water, and water is in the second region, the Atmosphere. I had already said that wisdom must be related to the third region, in the Rgveda. Just as the realisation of the Waters in the second region is effected through Tajña or Sacrifice in the first region, the Earth, similarly the Light in the third region is to be realised through the essence of sweetness in the second region. I must confess that the position is not all at clear. I am dealing with poetry and I have to draw conclusions about philosophy which formed the back-ground of that philosophy. That is my difficulty. I feel sure about the position of at least four out of the “Five Elements” in the Rgvedic thought, the fourth being rather dubious.

23. We must also recognise, in this connection, the fact that many of the phenomena found on the earth are spoken of in very clear terms, as having originated in the higher regions. Especially is this the case with the Soma and the Fire. There is some region behind and beyond from which what we see around us arise: this is clear in the thoughts of the Vedic poets. The world is spoken of as consisting of the Earth and the Heaven above, the (Dyāvā-pṛthivī). Then there is a three-fold division of the
world consisting of the Earth, the Atmosphere and the Heaven. There is frequent mention of the concealed position of the gods, the secret names, the cave, the place which only the wise can see, and the dark regions. They all refer to what is beyond of the earthly region known to men. The poets had the visible world in their eyes when they spoke of the world in such a way; but in their heart, they must have had something more than this, something deeper than this, when they sang about the visible worlds. Ultimately there is the division of the world into aspects that are within the cognition of men and aspects that are deeper than what men can normally understand.

24. Many of the terms used in the Vedas have no meaning and no relevancy to the context unless we assume that what the poets had in their hearts when they sang of the nature of the world had relation with deeper and finer aspects of the ultimate reality of the world, and not merely with what is seen with the physical eyes. Terms like “dark” and “cave” and “what the wise see” do not relate to the visible world divided into the earth, the atmosphere and the heavenly region.

25. Apart from a two-fold division of the visible world into the Heaven and the Earth and also into the three-fold division of the Earth, the Atmosphere and the Heaven, there are other divisions also found referred to in the poetry of the Vedas. Thus, when one poet prays for permanence in the region with light and freedom and joy, they speak of it as the Threshold of the heaven, as consisting of three vaults of the heaven (Nāka), of three heavens. In some places this vault of the heaven is spoken of as distinct from the three regions of the earth, the atmosphere and heaven, forming a fourth division. There is mention of three earths, three atmospheres and three heavens. Perhaps here, what is meant is only the three-fold division into earth, atmosphere and heaven, the terms being used only in a generic way and not in their specific sense.

26. In later Indian thought we have the conception of seven regions. This is clear in the Upaniṣads. There is mention of the three regions of Bhūḥ (Earth), Bhūwar (region above) and Ścar (the highest region), along with seven regions, four more being
added above the three worlds mentioned here. The three may be equated with the three regions of the *Rgveda*. The highest in this seven-fold division is called the *Satya* (Absolute Truth).

27. Do the *Upasād* indicate an advance on the thoughts of the *Rgveda* or do they show only greater details than what could be found in the poetry of the *Rgveda*? This is a problem on which no final solution is possible with the materials that are available and that are too scanty for the purpose. One thing is certain and that is that the poetry of the *Rgveda* had as back-ground some thoughts about the nature of the world which included aspects that are beyond and beneath of what is within the view of men. There is a gradation of the world into finer and finer aspects. The gross world in which we live and which comes within our experience and our awareness has evolved from the finer aspects of the world. There is a changing and a changeless, a mortal and an immortal part in this world. The changing, mortal part is small in comparison with the changeless and immortal part of the world. Man can expand the scope of his vision and his knowledge and man can in this way enable himself to see aspects of the world concealed from the view of the ordinary men. The gods and the Law (*Rta*) are within such deeper positions in the world, and few men see those sides of the world. The relation between the visible part of the world and the concealed parts can be expressed in terms indicating the divisions of the world into the Earth below and the regions above it. This is what the poets have tried to do in the *Rgvedic* poetry.

28. Before I close this chapter, I must make one point clear. The philosophical development at a later stage in India can be traced to the Vedic thoughts, with the "Five Elements" forming the basis of the world. What we see is the grossest of them, namely, the Earth. There are finer and finer aspects of this world represented by the other four elements of Water, Fire, Air and Ether. This is an evolution of the Vedic thought found in its cosmology of the world being divided into the Earth, the Atmosphere and the Heaven; these are the first three of the five elements. The full theory is developed in the *Upasād*. There are traces of the fifth element of Ether, found in the *Rgvedic*
poetry. The position of the fourth element of Air is rather uncertain.

29. Certain other aspects of the development of thought in India at a later period have no basis in the Vedas. Thus, though in the Vedas, the Earth is thought of as a circle, being spoken of as circular (Parimandala) and being compared to a wheel, there is no evidence in the Vedas for the later theory of the world consisting of seven concentric circles of land and water coming one after the other in succession. There is mention of the oceans on all sides, in the Rgveda. But there is no mention of land beyond this ocean with further oceans and lands.

30. In the same way, there is no basis in the Vedas for the theory of the worlds below the earth, that has become prominent in the latter-day cosmology of Indian literature. There is no evidence for the belief as current in the Vedic times of the Sun having gone to a region below the earth and coming back from below the earth. There is also no mention of “Hell” in the Rgveda, and even when the conception of a “Hell” has come into Indian thought, it is not specifically spoken of as being below the earth. There is absolutely no trace of a conception of seven worlds below the earth, corresponding to the seven above including the earth. Such a cosmology of a later day in India with seven worlds below or with seven lands and seven oceans in circles, cannot be traced to the Vedas, and this has no philosophical significance either.

31. The doctrine of the Five Elements was accepted as a foundation for the evolution of the world and of man, in all systems of thought in India; this is not merely in the philosophical systems. In the medical science also, this is a cardinal doctrine. The material content of the world consists of the Five Elements, and man’s body also consists of the five Elements. The ailments of man’s body are traced to the deficiency and disorder in three constituents designated Vāta (Air), Pitta (Bile) and Kapha (Phlegm). The original words in Sanskrit and their translation in English contain ordinary terms used in a technical sense and they should not be taken in their normal meaning in the languages. They refer to three out of the Five Elements, namely, Air, Fire and Water respectively.
32. In all systems of philosophy, the five sense-organs are related to the Five Elements. There may be minor differences in the various systems of philosophy on this point; but the main doctrine is common among all of them. Death results in a decomposition of the body into the five elements, and one of the synonyms for “death” is “to become five-fold” (*Pañcatāṃ gamanā*).

33. The doctrine of the Elements constituting the world developed in Greece, and it continued to modern times in the Western systems of thought. Aristotle mentions the Four Elements of Earth, Water, Air and Fire being the constituents of the world, and later science has recognised an all-pervasive fluid called Ether, in which certain phenomena of physics take place. I do not propose to enter into the problem of relative chronology or of mutual borrowing or adaptation. Indian thoughts relating to this point goes back to an age far earlier than when the Greek civilization started. I do not desire to say anything more.
CHAPTER IX

The Vedas : THE FORMATION

1. In the last chapter it has been shown that the thinkers of the Vedic times drew a distinction between a “Here” and a “There”. In later Vedic literature and in the literature relating to Vedic exegesis, and also in the religious and philosophical literature of the classical period, the two terms for such a distinction became very popular, having a specific connotation. “This” and “That”, and “Here” and “There” mean this earth and that world beyond, the experience on earth and the experience after death. The Sanskrit terms are Ayam and Asau (this and that), Iha and Amutra (here and there), and Aihika and Anuṣmika (what relates to this world and what relates to the world beyond).

2. What is connoted by “This” and “Here” is a definite object, namely, this earth and the life on earth. But there is no such definite connotation for the other terms “That” and “There”. There are subdivisions for this world beyond. It may be Earth and Heaven or Earth and Atmospheric region and Heaven. It may also be further worlds that are the concealed seats of gods, the place of concealed names, the place seen by the wise people, the dark region, the cave. By its very nature, the “That” and the “There” cannot have such a definite connotation as “This” and “Here”. The former indicates what is beyond the normal experience of man while the latter is what is within the experience of men. Language can clearly express only such things that come within the experience of man, things about which there is the convention regarding the word and its meaning. The latter has to be expressed through symbols, through similarity with what are experienced normally by men. Thus gods and the various phenomena of the regions beyond the normal experience of man are expressed in terms of man and what man experiences as phenomena of nature, like the Sun and the dawn and the clouds and the rain and the storms, and day and night. The physical
forms and the feelings and the accompaniments of the gods as well as their costumes and weapons and vehicles, are represented in terms of man’s experiences. Such limitations necessarily create an amount of indefiniteness also in the presentations. We must try to interpret what we have been told, with the material available, taking note of the back-ground also of such a presentation which we have at our command.

3. The intellectual freedom enjoyed by the people and the courage and devotion to truth of the thinkers are other factors that bring about an amount of differentiation in the presentation of such facts relating to the other world. The people were physically strong and brave, proud of their freedom, and this national trait is seen in the intellectual qualities of the thinkers also. They questioned, they discussed and they arrived at conclusions. They tolerated the rights of people to doubt and to ask questions and they questioned the gods also. Thus, a great poet Gṛṣṭamada refers to questions asked about Indra “Where is he” and also refers to denials about the existence of a god like Indra, “They say that he does not exist,” and in the end he asserts that one has to take note of him. Another great poet Vasiṣṭha says that he was suffering because of the wrath of the God Varuṇa, as people tell him, and he asks Varuṇa openly what his offence could be. Under such a situation we cannot expect any pre-ordained patterns of thought in ancient India regarding the other world. The thinkers were searching for the truth about that other world which is beyond the normal experience of man and were trying to ascertain what the relation of that world could be to the world of experience. Such views do not arise in a vacuum; the environments, the general outlooks on the problems of life and other factors have a great influence on the formation of philosophical views among a nation, and we must try to understand the evolution of philosophical doctrines with the proper back-ground.

4. One of the views about the world that is common among all thinkers and that has persisted through the ages, is that there is an order, that there is a law operating, in the world. It is not a dead course of changes and movements in the world;
there is an intelligence behind the course of events in the world. Human society was at that time organised on some basis of a definite order, and human activities were also regularised according to a law. In such an environment no thinkers develop a theory of a dead system of change and movement in the world, devoid of a design and a purpose. When they think of the world of experience, they also think of the activities of man in this well-organised system of life. When the question arises in them "Who made this world" and "With what did he make this world", they think of the art of a chariot-maker, how he makes a beautiful chariot from timber. It is not merely a question of an order and a design and a purpose, it is also a question of art and beauty in the activities of man in a properly planned society. A poet named Kavaya Ailūśa asks the question, about the All gods (Viśve Devas), "Which was that wood, what was that timber, out of which they fashioned the Heaven and the Earth?" The same passage is found in another poem also, that is assigned to Viśvakarman (The maker of all) and the poem is also mentioned as being about the same. The Ṛgveda abounds in such questions about various points.

5. Another point that is common among all the thinkers and that has consistently persisted throughout the development of philosophy in India is that the world has evolved from within, that it is a course of change of what is real, a change from one state into another of what always exists as a positive entity, that there is no "Creator" for the world who made the positive world from a void and who controls the entire course of its coming into being and its further changes. There is a positive material from which the positive world has come into being. There is also a design and a purpose, which are necessary elements in an orderly process following a law, and this suggests also the presence of an intelligence behind the process. But that intelligence is not something outside the world, something above the world. It is a part of the world. The intelligence is the presence, the law is its manifestation. Thus, there is no inconsistency between the intelligent agent and evolution from within, regarding the development and the changes and movements in
the world. The gods had their part in the formation of the world; but they did not create or make the world. There was no freck in their agency so far as the formation of the world is concerned. The position is that the law functioned through the presence of the gods, but was not subject to any whim of the gods. The gods could be gods only when they helped in the operation of the law, and they would have ceased to be gods if they deflected or can deflect the course of the law through their power.

6. The Rgvedic poets were trying to express the relation of the gods to the formation of the world in terms that come within the experience of man. The world is sometimes thought of and presented as a great architectural art. There must be measurements, and there must be instruments for such measurements. One of the most familiar ideas in the Rgveda about the God Viṣṇu is that he measured out the three worlds with his three steps. Measuring spacial dimensions with the feet was a normal practice, and the greatness of Viṣṇu is indicated by his ability to measure out the whole world with three steps. Indra has also measured the six wide regions or earths. He measured out the vastness of the earth and the immensity of the heavenly region. There are many places where Indra is spoken of as having made firm the earthly and the heavenly regions. The mountains had wings and they were soaring over the earth, and Indra cut the wings and made the mountains firm on the surface of the earth. Indra is spoken of as having made use of measuring instruments. Varuṇa is spoken of as having measured the earth, making use of the Sun-god as the instrument. Such a measuring process is compared to the process in building a house. Such a function in relation to the formations of the world is attributed to various gods like Agni (Fire) and Maruts. The material used for the construction of a house, namely, timber, and many parts of a house are frequently mentioned in connection with the description of the formation of the world through the agency of the gods. The sky is supported without a raft. The Sun-god made the sky firm without any support and he had mechanical devises (Yantra) for making the earth steady. The poets wonder why such a house does not collapse. There are references to the foundations
and to the doors. The whole world is conceived of as a house of architectural beauty, with a design and a purpose.

7. The idea foremost in the mind of the poets of the Rgvedic age when they tried to describe the formation of the world is that of building a large house, which requires the skill of a great architect. A primitive people new to the place cannot have developed such ideas. We cannot say that the people lived only in very simple habitations, in mud-houses. The Atharvaveda speaks of villages and cities. Varuṇa is mentioned in the Rgveda as living in a vast palace with a thousand pillars. We cannot have a clear notion of the philosophy of the Rgveda unless we associate it with a very advanced civilization, unless we assume that the people had been living a highly civilized life, enjoying material comforts in large houses and in vast cities. The world to them was a big city with immense buildings in it.

8. Although the various gods were given some function with reference to the formation of the world, there are a few gods who must be specially taken note of in this connection. Tvasṭar is a god who had a special part in giving a shape and a form to the world. The word itself means a builder or an architect. It would be more appropriate to call him an artisan than an architect. His activities have been more in the created world than in the formation of the world. He appears very prominently in the poems of the Rgveda, though there is no poem in praise of him. He is just like Vivasvat, very prominent in the Vedic poetry though not a god worshipped through any song in the available text of the Rgveda. The only indication, perhaps, of his divine nature is the reference to his yoking the steeds to his chariot and shining brightly. Practically all the references are to his hands, and that shows his profession of being an artisan. He is a very skilled artisan shaping various wonderful objects in the world; he made the weapon of India, the Vajra, and he sharpened the axe of the god Brhaspati. There is a very mysterious feat spoken of him; he made a cup which contained the food of the gods. It is also said that the gods called the Rbhus (three brothers) divided it into four, which is the most wonderful accomplishment of these gods.
9. It was Tvaṣṭar that gave a form to the world; he developed the germ in the womb. He shaped all forms, both of the men and of the beasts. He is associated with generating off-springs, and he also nourishes a variety of creatures. His daughter named Saranyū is the wife of Vivasvat and the mother of Yama; as such he is the ancestor of the human race. He generated the Fire. He was born prior to all.

10. While Tvaṣṭar is more an artisan than an architect, there is another god who is the real architect in the matter of the formation of the world. He is called the Viṣṇukarman, the maker of all. The word does not occur many times in the Rgveda. But there are two poems about him in the available text of the Rgveda. The poet is also given out as Viṣṇukarman. This is one of such enigmatic pieces found in the Rgveda, where we are not certain about the real author of the poem. The two poems describe the process of the formation of the world with Viṣṇukarman as the active agent in giving the form to the world. He is a poet, he is an invoker of the gods, he is the father. He made an offering of the whole world.

11. There is the question which his abode could have been when he created the world. He has eyes all around, he has his face turned in all directions, his hands stretch in all directions, his legs expand in all directions. He, the one god, created the Heaven and the Earth, and in so doing he blew out with both his arms, with wings. What could have been the wood and the timber when he constructed the Heaven and the Earth? Wise people can ask this question in their mind, what abode he had when he supported the created worlds. What were his highest abodes, what his intermediate abodes and what his lowest? Viṣṇukarman is asked to give instruction about oblations and also to perform the sacrifice himself with his own body. Viṣṇukarman expands through oblations, and he is asked to perform a sacrifice with the Heaven and the Earth. All the ordinary mortals around remain ignorant and confused on this point, and only Indra can be the wise person for us, the mortals, on this point. This is what in general is said about Viṣṇukarman, in the first poem.
12. In the second poem there is mentioned his various great qualities of intellect, being the creator and the author of the diversifications in the world, one who sees all, one who knows all the worlds, bearing the one name of the gods. All the people approach him with questions. There is a reference to others talking about the seven poets as one. There is mentioned the ancient poets who were singing songs. The waters are spoken of as bearing the first “Law”, where all the gods had the vision. The entire world remained established there. In Viśvakarman we see a personification of the active Power in the matter of the formation of the world.

13. There is another poem in the Rgveda where there is some clear information regarding the formation on the world. This poem is attributed to Hiranyagarbha (the Golden Womb) as the author according to the traditions preserved in later works relating to Vedic exegesis. But the poem begins with a glorification of this very Hiranyagarbha, as the one who existed in the beginning at the head of all, the one lord of all that have come into existence. The Deity or subject-matter of the poem is given as Ka, which really means “Who?”. The poem contains ten verses, and in the first nine of them there is a refrain at the end, “To which god may we make offerings?”. In the body of the verses, certain functions and certain great attributes are mentioned, and in the end there is the question as refrain in all the passages except the last verse. He is described as supporting the Heaven and the Earth, as the giver of the soul and of the strength, as one whose commands the gods adore, whose shadow both immortality and death are, as the king of all that breathe and that keep their eyes open, as the overlord of the bipeds and the quadrupeds, as the one to whom belong the snow-clad mountain and the oceans and the cardinal points. He made the Heaven and the Earth firm, he established the heaven and the vault of the heaven, he measured out the space in the atmospheric regions. The Heaven and the Earth look upon him, vibrating in their mind, when they were established firm through his help. The whole of the immense waters went to him, bearing pregnancy, creating the Fire. The life of the gods was produced
from him. He viewed the waters in his greatness, when the waters bore dexterity, when they produced the Sacrifice. He was the one god above all the gods. In this poem, it is more his overlordship that is prominently seen and not his part in the formation of the world; but the latter aspect too is there.

14. The poem begins with the mention of Hiranyakarbhā (Golden-womb) as the theme of the poem, as the great Power behind the world during and after its formation. In the closing verse, there is an address to the same Power as Prajāpati, the “Lord of people.” Both the terms have become synonyms of the “Creator” in later Sanskrit and in later mythological literature in India. Prajāpati is also a class of superior persons who had been the ancestors of humanity, according to the same later mythologies. Unlike the term Tvaṣṭar, which occurs many times in the Rgveda (and he also plays a very prominent part in the mythology of the Rgveda) the terms Hiranyakarbhā and Prajāpati occur very rarely, and this poem is the only place where the former term is found, and the latter term in this special meaning; in the few other cases of its occurrence, it means only the “lord of the people” as the epithet of some gods. In this poem also, we find a personification of the Creative Power of the world.

15. While Tvaṣṭar and Viśvakarman and Hiranyakarbhā-Prajāpati are active agents in the formation of the world, there is the description of the “Supreme Person” as the source of the world that was formed and also as the agent in such a formation. In the case of the former group, there is no indication that they formed the ultimate material out of which the world grew up. They are only the active agents and the material is outside of them. In the “Supreme Person”, we see a combination of the material and the agent. The description appears in a poem of sixteen verses. The author is given as Nārāyaṇa for this poem, and the theme or the deity is Puruṣa, the (Supreme) Person.

16. In the first three verses, there is a glorification of the Person as having a thousand heads, a thousand eyes and a thousand feet. He encompasses the whole world and stands out ten fingers beyond that. This all is the Person, whatever had been and whatever will be. He lords over immortality. Such is his greatness,
and the Person is greater than that: the whole world is just a quarter of His, and the three quarters of His, the immortal, is in the Heaven. The numbers and the measurements here indicate only immensity. Here there is a contrast between the world and the heaven. Heaven, here, is not the division of the world; it is what is beyond the moving and changing world. Mortality and immortality refer to the changing and the moving part and the changeless, unmoving part of the entire universe. The Person is not an agent in the world; he is the entire universe himself. This is indicated in the fourth verse, where it is said that the three quarters rise upwards and the one quarter is here. Then there is an all-round traversing.

17. It is here that what is termed Virāṭ, what manifests as diverse, arose. The Person was produced out of this diversification. Certainly this second "Person" is not the original Supreme, but a personified event comprising the manifolded world. This Person, being born, surpassed the world both before and behind. The gods took hold of this Person as an oblation and performed a Sacrifice. In this Sacrifice, the Spring Season became the Ghee (cooked butter), the Summer Season became the fuel, and the Autumn became the Oblation. The demi-gods (Sādhyas) and the Poet-sages (Ṛṣis) also took part in this Sacrifice, that person being the material.

18. It was from such a Sacrifice that all the beings in the air, in the woods and in the villages, were born. The Vedas arose out of this Sacrifice. The various animals like the horses and the cows and the goats and sheep were also produced in this Sacrifice. Such is the description of the process of manifolding in this uniform, ultimate reality and also the process of the creation of animals. The entire process is spoken of as a Sacrifice.

19. Here follows a question about this Person that was transformed into the material at the Sacrifice by the gods, and the reply is given that the wise people were his face, the warriors were his arms and the thighs became the people at large; out of his feet were produced the manual labourers. The moon was born out of his mind and the Sun from his two eyes. Indra and the Fire were born from his face and the air was produced from
his breath. The atmosphere was produced from his navel and the heaven from his head. The earth was produced from his two feet and the cardinal points, or rather the space, came out of his ears. The whole world was produced in this way. This is what happened when the gods performed the Sacrifice with the Person as the sacrificial material. The poem concludes with a verse in which it is said that this Sacrifice performed by the gods became the first process of the Law; the great gods were united with the vault of the heaven where the ancient demi-gods had been.

20. Here there is a self-transformation of the infinite into a finite manifoldness, and the further diversification through the activities of the gods, demi-gods and Poets. The Supreme Person becomes an agent only in the first stage of the change of the infinite into the finite. The further stages are effected by the gods and their associates, in which the finite, manifold aspect of the infinite becomes the main material, and the whole process is conceived of as a Sacrifice conducted by the gods and their associates.

21. In this process of the formation of the world, there is mentioned a three-fold agency, the gods, the demi-gods and the poets. The term for "god" is very familiar, namely, Deva. There is a term Sādhyā, which I have translated as "demi-god." I am not sure who they are; they are ancient. In a description of the world beyond where the pious people go after their death, there is mention of Mātali as being there. Vivasvat (the father of Yama) is also there. There is also mentioned a class of residents there named Virūpa, which means "possessing various forms." Brhaspati too is there, and he, a god, is still on the earth. I feel that some of such demi-gods are meant by the term Sādhyā. There is no doubt about the poets; the term is Rṣi, and the term is usually translated as "Priests". I do not accept the term "Priest" as appropriate in dealing with the conditions of the Vedic period. There were no priests at that time in India. They were all great poets who could have a direct vision of the gods and of the nature of the world.

22. There is no indication about the way in which these
agencies came into being. They are ancient, and in so far as the Sacrifice performed by them with the Person as the material preceded the appearance of beasts and birds, they must have been items in the first manifestation of the Ultimate Person as the Virāṭ, the diversified world. Nothing is said about human beings either in this process or the formation of the world. From the mention of the four-fold division of functions among men, along with the phenomena of nature like the sun and the moon, it may be assumed that according to their notions, humanity was a primary manifestation in the manifold world when such diversification came about in the Ultimate Person.

23. The general process must have been of some such nature as is noticed below. There was the Ultimate Person, the undivided universe, which became diversified. The cause of this diversification is not specifically mentioned here. That diversification took up the form of a Person (Virāṭ resulting in the Person), and in this stage of diversification, men, with some advanced souls like the ancient poets, and with the gods and demi-gods were integral items. Such ancient poets and the demi-gods and gods were the active agents in the formation of the world with beasts and birds and with the Vedas. The Sacrifice here implies the application of some Law, and this Sacrifice is the process of the working of that Universal Law in the world. The sacrifices performed by men at a later stage are only the processes of the application of the same Law in individual cases.

24. The presence and functioning of an intelligence behind the process of the formation of the world is an integral part of this doctrine of the formation of the world, and that is the most important thing here. The Vedic poets could not think of a period in the history of the world when there were no human beings and no intelligent operation of a law. The whole of the manifested world is an organism with a form and a shape functioning according to a law. The law operating in the individual cases in the world are only aspects of this Universal Law set into motion by the ancient poets and the demi-gods and the gods. The phenomena of Nature and the civic functions of humanity are all parts of the organism.
25. Here was a doctrine of the evolution of the world from out of a Person of an absolute nature; it is said that such a person was the active agent in the first process of the manifestation of diversification in this absolute Person, besides his being the material out of which the diversified world arose. But it is self-transformation and not a functioning in respect of some external object. Now, there must have been another doctrine current about the formation of the world, which is found in another poem of a highly philosophical nature. It is one of the profoundest pieces of poetry that can be found in any literature, to say nothing of the literature in India. In this doctrine, the evolution started from an Absolute "Being", which is not specifically mentioned as a Person, but which is not divested of the elements of intelligence.

26. The poem starts with a description of the state of the world prior to the appearance of diversification and manifold, when there could be no distinction between what is and what is not. There was no Atmospheric region, nor the Celestial region beyond. In such a condition what is it that can cover up, and where, in whose support? Was there water deep and vast? There was no death and no immortality. There was no indication of night and day. There was that One which breathed without a breath of air. Other than that there was nothing. In the beginning there was darkness hidden in darkness. All this was a sea of water with no mark or indication. What was concealed in husk, such a one came out through the greatness of intense activity. On this there arose a will in the beginning, which was the first germ for the mind.

27. Here there is the description of a state of absolute and ultimate unity developing a will, which resulted in the faculty of a thinking process arising in that Ultimate One. A will and mental process presuppose an original intelligence. Thus the doctrine of intelligence being the urge behind in the manifolding of what was unitary is found to be an integral factor in the formation of the world, even at that time. In the previous poem, it was said that what was in the beginning as the ultimate was a "Person", and there is no reference to its intelligence working as the prelude to its diversification. Here there is no reference to
a "Person", but only to an absolute "Being", and there is mention of a will and a mental function. If we join up the two and build up a consolidated philosophy, we find that the manifolding of what was ultimately a unity was the result of a will and a mind operating, just as all the facts of the world are due to the working of the will and the mind of the individuals.

28. The poets pondered over and searched in their hearts with their intelligence and they found out in what is not, the companion of the manifold world which alone is what is in the world; what is not in this context is what cannot be described as what is or what is not, what is absolute and abstract unity in the beginning. Their rays of light stretched across, was it below or was it above? There appeared in consequence of this change, the bearers of seeds, there appeared powers; self-power beneath and activity above there arose.

29. Who then knows, who can explain, whence there arose, whence this manifold creation? Even gods appeared only after this manifolding process. Hence who knows whence that came into being? Listen, this manifolding came from something, whether that something created this or did not create it. That supreme lord in the highest heaven it is that is such a something, and perhaps he too does not know it.

30. Such in brief is the process described in this poem. In the previous poem there was no mention of a will and of a mental process that was the cause of the manifolding of what was an ultimate unit, and here there is a specific mention of such a mental process. Such a process must be quite different from what we know as a mental process, and such a process took place prior to the formation of any individual, prior to the appearance of even the gods. Therefore we cannot assert that the ultimate unity in which the operation of such a will arose, knows that process, in the way in which we can say that we know the process of our mind and its results. Such an ultimate unity and the processes that took place in it are what we cannot bring within our knowing. What we know are what took place after the manifolding, and we cannot know either what preceded such a manifolding or the way in which such a manifolding took place.
31. Viśvakarman and Hiraṇyagarbha and the Person are not gods in the Rgvedic religion. They can be only presentations of certain monotheistic tendencies current in adjacent countries, through the medium of the Indian thought, in a way in which Indian people could understand and appreciate such tendencies. They also form the foundations for various doctrines that took definite forms in later periods in the history of thought in India. Although there is no Supreme God, no "One God" in the Vedas, there are doctrines about such a One God, about the Supreme God in later phases of Indian thought. But no such doctrine took the form of Monotheism.

32. In the Nyāya system of philosophy there is the acceptance of a Supreme Soul distinct from the individual Souls, all belonging to the common category of Soul (Ātman). He is the Lord of the entire world and is the common cause, as agent, of all events in the world. He sees everything and he knows everything. The same doctrine is found in the Rgveda regarding the Hiraṇyagarbha and the Viśvakarman.

33. According to the Vedānta, God is the material cause of all the things in the world, the world is a product from the God. God is the conditioned Absolute. This is what we find in the Person, described in the Rgvedic poem about the Person. The conditioned, manifold and diversified world is the material for the activities of the human agencies like the Poets (Ṛṣis), while such a conditioned world, though the Person, does not function at all, according to the same poem. This is the position taken up in the Mimāṃsā, though the system does not accept the personification of the changing, manifold, diversified world, and does not also accept the agency of gods and demi-gods in the operation of the Law (Ṛta). A will in the absolute was the cause of the diversification, according to the poem about the condition of the world prior to diversification, and this is also accepted in the Vedānta, following the Upaniṣads, which declare that the Absolute had a "view", had a "will", and there arose diversification.

34. The difficulty arises only when the several poems in the Rgveda are regarded as isolated pieces and when the Rgveda itself is taken as an isolated literature. Such an attitude leads the
investigator into differences in the spirit and purport of the
different pieces within the Rgveda and also into differences in the
spirit and in the purport of the various parts of the Vedic literature.
If we consider the Rgveda as literature with a back-ground, we can
understand the differences as differences in the aspects taken
up by the different poets and different contributors to what now
forms the Vedic literature with a more or less common back-
ground. The philosophical thoughts of the Vedic age and the age
that preceded the composition of the available Vedic literature,
formed the back-ground for the literature, and that back-ground
must have been more or less uniform for the entire Vedic literature.
We must look at the doctrine of the formation of the world accor-
ding to the Vedic thoughts, in such a way. Some Absolute as
the ultimate basis, some diversification of this Absolute, further
changes and movements in this diversifed world on account of the
activities of human, semi-divine and divine agencies, the possi-
bility of looking at the entire changing and world as a "Person",
as a Supreme power: there are many such points that reveal them-
selves as forming the back-ground for the Vedic poetry. The
gods played their part in giving a form to the world and there is
no Supreme God who actually created this world or who com-
pletely controls the events in this world of changes.
CHAPTER X.

Vedas : THE SUPREME

1. Indian Philosophy is essentially a system of thought centering round the reality of the world and the competence of man to understand the world. A Supreme God and the Doctrine of Monotheism had little relation to such a philosophy. What is termed a Supreme God is a development in thoughts outside of India; it made its appearance in India at a comparatively later period in the history of Indian thought, and it produced little impression on the Indian mind until very recent times. As a matter of fact, man and the world form the chief items in Indian thought, and God had only a very subordinate place in it, if it had any place at all. I am not speaking of gods; I am speaking of God. It is for this reason that I am confining the problem of the Supreme God to a chapter within the consideration of the problem of the world, instead of giving the problem a more prominent place by treating the subject in an independent part of the book.

2. The development of thoughts in India relating to God is something unique in the world, ancient or modern, like many other aspects of thought. From the most ancient times, Indians refused to surrender themselves to a Supreme God; according to the traditions of India, man is supreme in the affairs of the world. They recognised gradations; they recognised also gods. But they did not accept a category called gods different from man, to say nothing of a Supreme God, beyond of and higher than man. If gods were higher than the generality of men, there were also men of superior powers who were greater than the generality of men, and there were also men who rose to the position of gods. Thus the distinction between gods and men, as two separate categories, did not find a place in the thought scheme of the ancient Indians, and this tradition continued to the last days in the development of thought in India in an independent way.
3. The world has seen two currents of thought in relation to the problem of God. Practically all the nations of the ancient world thought of God as some Transcendental Being different from man. Some nations might have accepted a plurality of gods, all such gods being subordinate to One Supreme God. Other nations accepted Beings superior to men and different from men, as being associated with the God, though they may not have the status of gods. Such a doctrine in religion was transferred to the civic life of the people, and the result was the recognition of an Emperor with other royal personages subordinate to him, with aristocrats and wealthy people, all with privileges, all different from the generality of men. There was such a distinction drawn between the One and the few and the many.

4. Even in ancient times there were leaders of thought in some nations who did not recognise a God at all. To them men alone counted in the world. The modern development along that line is the positive denial of anything that transcends men, and also a postulation of the equality of all men without any gradation at all. A gradation among men according to intellectual qualities can arise only if "Life" is a fundamental in the world. In modern times there is a denial of this position also, and it is attempted to be made out that what is called "life" is only an accident, that evolution started before the appearance of the phenomenon of life, that matter, dead matter, is the only fundamental in the world. This is practically a denial of a real position for men in the world.

5. It was in India that a third line of thought had evolved, and this evolution started even in the earliest stages for which we have any record and evidence. The world is a unity. We cannot draw any hard and fast line between any two parts of the world; one part merges in the other at what can be drawn as a border line. There is a gradation, which presupposes a difference; but there is no separation of what are different, and there is no conflict also among the different. The result is a recognition of each such different part as being a presentation of the whole unit.

6. In the poems found in the Rgvedic collection relating to the
process of the formation of the world, it has been found that there was no time when there were no men. When there took place a diversification of what was a unit, there appeared men and demi-gods along with the gods, and the further stages in this process of the formation of the world are the results of the activities of representative men, called the poets (the Rṣis), in collaboration with the demi-gods and the gods. And when this process made its start, the Ultimate ceased to have any function. The only function associated with the Ultimate is that of the first diversification.

7. In the poem about the Person, it was found that there was a presentation as a Person of what is Ultimate and what is impersonal; then there was a diversification process, which too is personified as Vīrāl, and there appeared the diversified world, which too is presented in a personified way as the Person. Along with this second appearance of a diversified Person, there were also the three-fold agencies of poets, (which implies the presence of men), demi-gods and gods. The personified world of diversities has no function, rather it is the material coming within the functions of the three-fold agencies. In the poem relating to the condition of the world prior to diversification, there is, without any personification of this ultimate unity, the mention of the appearance of a function and a process, the will and the mind and the thought, as causes of the diversification. In the poems about Viśvakarman (the All-maker) and about Hiranyagarbha (Golden womb), there is little indication of the primary Absolute. There is only a description of the further processes of diversification and manifolding after the first appearance of diversification.

8. There is some unity of idea found in these poems. The Ultimate has no function; what can have a function is not the ultimate, the Absolute. The personification of what is impersonal in the poem about the Person is only a necessity of expression, in presenting in language form what is beyond the scope of language.

9. In looking at the problem of gods in the Veda, we must have such a back-ground. In studying the available Vedas
we must also recognise the truth that we are dealing with poetry from which we must try to deduce the back-ground of philosophy lying behind the poetry, and that we do not have any real texts on philosophy before us, relating to that period. When in the poem about the Person, it is said that the gods and demi-gods and Rṣis (poets) were the first agents in progressing the process of diversification, there are references to the parents of the gods. Thus the Heaven and Earth are the parents of the gods. The gods are spoken of as the off-spring of the goddess Aditi. Some gods are mentioned as the off-spring of other gods. Here we may keep aside such gods about whom there is no doubt in the matter of parentage. Thus, the Maruts are the off-spring of the god Rudra; the gods called the Ṛbhus are the sons of Sudhanvān. Yama is the son of the god Vivasvat, and his mother is Saranyū, the daughter of the god Tvaṣṭar. We need consider the question of parentage only in connection with the other gods about whom there is no such specific mention of parentage, without falling into any contradiction either verbally or by implication.

10. It is here that we must recognise the fact that we have only poetry and not text-books on philosophy. In poetry words are used in a poetic way, in a symbolic way. Thus when the arrows are spoken of as the off-spring of the quiver, we know what it means. The mention of parentage must be accepted in such a way. There is either some importance implied or there is implied a relation of support and what is supported. The statements should not be taken in any literal sense.

11. Further, in the case of the poems of a philosophical nature of which I gave some indications in the previous chapter, we must recognise that the thoughts contained in them do not constitute the philosophy of the author; they are poetic representations of certain types of thoughts that had become very popular through tradition by that time. Otherwise such poetical presentations in symbolical language would not have meant anything to the people of the times. We do not know who the authors had been in the case of those poems. There is an element of fiction associated with the names given as the author. Thus the poem
on the Person is given as by Nārāyaṇa, who must be the personification of the Absolute as the Supreme, and that is the theme of the poem also. The poems on Viśvakarman (the All-maker) are by himself. So is the poem on the Hiranyagarbha (Golden womb). The poem describing the nature of the world prior to differentiation is by Prajāpati Paramesṭhin (the Lord of the people abiding in the highest position).

12. The major part of the Rgveda consists of poems by a large number of poets, addressed to a large number of gods. No god is a fact dissociated from the rest of the world. Each of them is a representation in a limited way, of the Ultimate, the Absolutes. In that Ultimate, in that Absolute, there had been only a diversification, a differentiation. There was never a break up of the Absolute Unity into parts. The poets addressed songs to the various gods with this back-ground.

13. The poets were singing songs about the individual gods that were known at that time, and at the same time they had the Absolute, whose representation the gods were, in their mind, besides the diversified phenomena. When such an Absolute is presented through the individual god, the element of the Supreme cannot be missed in that description. Thus each god is a god and at the same time the Supreme also. This is not a stage of the thought current passing from many gods to a single god. Such an admixture of the features of the individual gods and the elements of the Supreme is found throughout the Rgveda. We are not able to make a sifting and say that such and such portions of the Rgveda collection represent the stage of the worship of many gods and that such and such portions represent the stage of the worship of the One God, with poems in-between representing the stage of the admixture of the two elements. Nor can we find any trace of a progression through such stages. In the whole history of thought in India, we do not reach a stage when the worship of the many gods came to a stop and the worship of the One God became the essence of the religion of the country. What we find in the Rgveda is not a series, a number of stages in a progression. What we find is only a particular mode of approach to the problem of god in the world. This approach
takes note of each god being a representative of the Absolute. This is what we find in later stages in Indian religion represented by works like the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. There is no stage in the history of Indian thought when people worshipped One God. Gods are personal, and what are personal cannot be the One; what is the One cannot have a personal aspect and cannot, for that reason, be God also. A “One God” is a contradiction in terms. The Indian tradition kept up the spirit of the Vedic thought.

14. It was about a century ago that Western scholars came into contact with the Vedic literature that preserved the Vedic traditions, including the original Vedas. Max Muller could not bring the religion of the Vedas under any category of religions known to him. Polytheism and Monotheism were the two main divisions of religious doctrines relating to the problem of God known to him. The Vedic religion was neither, or rather it was both. And he coined a new term, *Henotheism* (One God). In so far as each of the god in the Vedic religion was such a “One God” in turn, he revised his terminology as “Kat-henotheism”; but it was only the original term that found favour with scholars. I accept this terminology without any qualification. Neither of the two terms known at that time could express the feature that is distinctive of the religion of the Vedas, and it is better that a new term be coined to express this new feature of religion.

15. Max Muller did not stop at this point. He also wanted to bring the religion of the Vedas into line with the religions that were known to him, and so he postulated this religious feature as an intermediate stage between the two religious features that were known to him, namely, Polytheism and Monotheism: this feature of gods being in turns described as the One God is a stage between the worship of many and the worship of the One God. It is this side of the theory of Max Muller that I cannot accept.

16. But I cannot also deny the clear indications of certain monotheistic tendencies in some of the poems that I took note of specially in the previous chapter. In the poem on the Person,
both the absolute and the diversified world are spoken of a "Person". But neither of them had any function. The former was the material for the formation of the diversified world and the latter was the object on which the gods, the demi-gods and the poets operated. There is no "One God" here. In the poem describing the world prior to diversification, there is no personification of the Absolute, and the only indication, very faint indeed, is the mention of "Will" appearing in that Absolute. Here also there is no "One God" functioning in the world. But both Hiranyakarbhā (Golden Womb) and Viśvakarma (All-maker) are individuals and are described as the Supreme. Here we must take note of the fact that Hiranyakarbhā is more a presence than an agent in the formation of the world; in the case of Viśvakaraman, there is the mention of activity when there is the question asked about the material he had in giving a form to the world and the place which he occupied in that activity. Thus in this latter case also, what we have is more a personification of the diversified world in the first stage of such a diversification, and there is no hint about an agent functioning in the further processes in the course of the formation of the world. In all these cases, we have the description of certain great Powers that operated in the primary stage of the evolution of the world, and they are not the gods who later functioned in the processes of the formation of the world with all its diversifications. They are not gods. Those Powers are not worshipped either. A god is god only as an object of worship; a simple presence is not a god. It is in this sense that I have made the assertion that there is no Monotheism in the Vedic religion.

17. India could not have been an isolated country in those times, from the point of view of the development of thought. There were other countries that were evolving their own cultures which were different from the course of the development of culture in India. Certainly their religion was different, and in the Veda we often meet with the mention of peoples who did not give offerings to the gods as the Vedic people were doing. There is reason to believe that in the matter of religion, there were nations at that time that were developing certain Monotheistic tendencies.
Such a tendency has been preserved in the regions to the west of the seat of the Vedic culture. In the Avesta we find the one Supreme God in Ahura Mazda. This cannot be a direct development of the culture that is preserved in the Vedic traditions. It cannot also be said that that was the line of religious evolution among the Aryans prior to the separation of the Indian and the Iranian groups of the main Aryan nation, and that the Vedic Aryans diviated from the original Monotheistic religion and developed a religion of many gods. The greater likelihood is that a prior religion of many gods was later converted into a religion of One God in a certain region. Such a Monotheistic tendency could not have been keeping clear of the religious tendencies that were developing on the Indian side.

18. My own view is that the Monotheistic tendencies found in the Vedas are the reflections of such tendencies in the outside regions, and that the reflecting medium must have affected the nature of the reflection. There is a personification of the Absolute that is by nature impersonal, as is found in the poem about the Person, and there is also a personification of the diversification as Virāt and also a personification of the diversified world, designated as "Person", again. In the poem about the condition of the world prior to diversification, there is mention of the appearance of the feature of a Person like the will. The Hiranya-garbhā (Golden Womb) and the Viśvakarman (All-maker) are personifications of the diversified world, the only difference between these two poems and the poem about the Person consisting in this that in the former, it is given the status of an agent, while in the latter it is only the material for the operation of individual agents, namely, poets (Ṛṣis), demi-gods and gods.

19. But there is no comparison between the Supreme in the religion to the west of the Vedic regions and the reflections of Monotheistic tendencies found in the Vedas. The Supreme God of the Avesta is the creator of the world and the creator of the Law in the world. He gave out that Law to the world through a Teacher. But in its Vedic counterpart, the world arose out of that Supreme, that Absolute, and the advanced persons who were integral parts of such a transformation of the Absolute into the
phenomena operated the world. Even when the diversified world is described as a Person, either as the Virāṭ or the Person originated out of that Virāṭ, or as Hiraṇyagarbha (Golden Womb) or as Viṣvakarman (All-maker), there is no question of a creation of the world by a Supreme God, and there is no creation of the Law or giving out the Law to the world through a Teacher. The diversified world as personified is also the embodiment of the Law (Sacrifice), and the advanced individuals knew it and operated it. In this way we find again a unity between the diversified world and its Law and the operations in that world according to that Law. This is not Monotheism, though there are reflections of Monotheistic tendencies in such a doctrine.

20. If we recognise some consistent and co-ordinated thought in the Vedic people, there is no need to evolve a principle that "Monotheism is inevitable with any true conception of God". The Vedic people could evolve a religion with gods, and still they did not recognise, and they did not tolerate also, any Monotheism. They knew of Monotheism, perhaps, and they gave their own interpretation of it. They recognised both "One" and also "gods". But they never united the two together, and their view was that what is One cannot be God and what is God cannot be one. It is true that "the Supreme can only be one" and that "we cannot have two supreme and unlimited beings." A god can be "himself the creation of another", though that another may not be a god; a god is a creation from the One, from the Supreme. The truth is that what is uncreated can be no god at all. The whole position became the proper way to an escape from the logical contradiction of "God" and "One", where the heart showed the right path and belief too followed in accord with it. Henotheism is the clear path without any need for groping in the darkness towards Monotheism.

21. The position is made clear by Dirghatamas, one of the greatest among the Vedic poets and thinkers, when he said that "What exists is One, which the poets sing about as many gods". As an Absolute, it is one, as gods they are many. All cannot see and know that "One". There are people who do not know and who do not seek for knowledge; others ask and may not know
while there are those who know. As between the latter two, the one who asks and seeks but do not know and the one who knows, they are like two birds that sit on the same tree, one just looking on while the other eats and enjoys the fruits of that wisdom-tree.

22. In the whole course of Vedic exegesis from the earliest times, this passage from the famous poem of Dirghatamas has been interpreted to refer to the Supreme Self and the Individual Self, one of whom simply sits and sees while the other eats the bitter fruit of activities in the world. In the context there is no indication of a contrast between the Supreme Self that sees and the Individual Self that suffers. In the poem, Dirghatamas describes how he attained "Illumination". At first he did not know and he asked many people whom he expected to know. Then he speaks of the two, one who stares and the other who eats. They must be the one who looks at truth without seeing it and the other who realises and enjoys the fruit of knowledge. After this, Dirghatamas says that "there where the birds (the wise people) sing about the portion of immortality (the unchanging truth in the universe) in the assembly of the wise people, there that lord of the world, the protector of beings, the intelligent, entered (me) who had not known". In the next verse, the birds are spoken of as drinking the honey, and honey is identified with superior wisdom in the terminology of the Rgveda; there is also a reference to the sweet fruits, and it is said that one who does not know is not the object of such an illumination.

23. It is after this that Dirghatamas enters on a discourse on the mysteries of language and poetry and song. The interpretation is put on the verse after segregating it from such a context. In the commentary portion of the Vedas there are many cases like this where the passage is taken out of its context and interpreted to suit other contexts. Thus many verses are applied at rituals with which the verse had no relation in its origin.

24. What I want to assert is that what Max Muller termed "Henotheism" is the essence of the religion and theology of the Rgveda and that it is not "groping towards Monotheism" either conscious or unconscious. There are many gods in the
Rgveda, which represents the thought of the Vedic age, and when each one of them is an aspect of the “One Absolute”, they all become friends of man, being real and functioning in their real nature. But the position changes completely when a “One God” is installed in a position of eminence and authority. There is no such reality, and it is entirely the creation of persons enjoying the patronage of Emperors. It is in such a situation that “man’s parvellous capacity for creating gods......had free scope. Gods and ghosts, with powers to injure and annoy, as well as to bless and glorify, governed the life of the peoples......

Even the one Almighty God of the monotheistic was......kindly when allowed his own way, angry when thwarted and merciful when his rage had spent itself. The relation between the one God and his worshippers was that of master and slave. He is a revengeful war-lord....... He interfered rather too much with the world......Stern Monotheism, moreover, resulted in a shifting of responsibility to God’s shoulders....... Sin is an offence against God, who alone has to be satisfied.”

25. Such is the situation created by the installation of “One God”, and that is just the situation which the Vedic people wanted to avoid, and that is just the situation which they succeeded in keeping off from India. Not a single one of the many gods in the Vedas answers to such a description, and India never allowed such a god to have any place in the religion and life of the people. There were the gods of the Vedas, and there were the gods of a later day like Viṣṇu and Śiva and the Goddess (under various designations), and many other gods like Gaṇeśa (God with Elephant face) and Skanda the (God with the form of a Serpent); not one of them could be included under the description cited above.

26. Viṣṇu or Śiva or the Goddess may be Supreme according to the respective worshippers. But all such worshippers were tolerant and they allowed other similar Supreme Gods also to function in the world and to be worshipped by their devotees in the world. They all became gods within the religion that developed from the Vedas. Never was sword or fire or any other instrument of torture made use of in the defence of any such a
Supreme God or against the devotees of another Supreme God. The fact is that in India there never was a Monotheism in the strict and narrow sense of the term. A God was only the manifestation of the One, and such a God never found it necessary to oust another God or to persecute the worshippers of the other God for his own Supreme position. A God was Supreme only as the manifestation of the One Absolute.

27. In the later literature with a religious spirit like the grand epics of the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana, there is no Monotheism at all. Shri Krishna, the Incarnation of the great God Viṣṇu in the Mahābhārata, and Shri Rama, another Incarnation of the same God in the Rāmāyana give ample room for Śiva and the Goddess. They are accepted as standard works of an authoritative nature in matters of religion by the worshippers of Viṣṇu and of Śiva and of the Goddess. Viṣṇu is described in such works as the Supreme, and similarly we find in other contexts description of Śiva and of the Goddess as also the Supreme in the same works. And this is Henotheism. Henotheism started in the Vedas and continued to the end of the period of living culture in India. Even when the religion got divided into Viṣṇu group and Śiva group and the group of the worshippers of the Goddess, it never deteriorated into a battle-field with all sorts of inhuman weapons of torture in play for the settlement of religious matters. The differences were placed before one another by the intellectuals and the fight was only on the intellectual plane. And there remained a very strong and influential group among the people who did not recognise any such division. They had only religion and they never circumscribed their religious beliefs into this pattern or that pattern and they never showed any enmity towards people who adopted another pattern.

28. If there had been any tendency in the Vedic period to grope from Polytheism to Monotheism through the obscure path of Henotheism, we would have expected one or the other of the Vedic Gods to be raised to that status. Important Vedic gods like Fire, Indra, Varuṇa, Aśvins, Maruts, Rudra, Savitar, Sūrya, Viṣṇu, Bṛhaspati and Uṣas (Dawn) never aspired to attain that position, and people never made an effort to raise any one of them
to the position of that "One God". Some monotheistic tinge is noted only in the Hiranyagarbha (Golden Womb) and in the Person and in the Visvakarman (All-maker). They are not really Vedic gods, and Macdonell rightly styles them as "Abstract Gods". They are personified presentation by poets in poetic language of functions and situations. The tendency which "showed itself very early to indentify one god with another or to throw all the gods together" is the result of the doctrine of all the gods being manifestation of the "One", not of the "One God". Terms like Hiranyagarbha and Purusa and Visvakarman were employed to bring out the unity among the gods in an abstract way. There was no sign of a suppression of the many gods or of favouring any one god. The entire function in the world can be expressed by some terms denoting abstract ideas, and that is what we find in the use of terms like Hiranyagarbha and Visvakarman. The view that "In the worship of Varuna we have the nearest approach to monotheism" has as its source the modern theory that it was the Vedic god Varuna that become Ahura Mazda in the religion of Zoroaster. "Attributes moral and spiritual such as justice, beneficence, righteousness, and even pity were ascribed" to all the god alike and no god is a god without such attributes. Varuna cannot be isolated from the other gods of the Vedas on such a basis. "Man and nature, this world and the other all belong" to all the gods and not merely to Varuna. All the gods care "not only for external conduct but also for inner purity of life."

29. The great strength of the religion of the Vedas is that the Vedic thinkers did not permit "One God" to dominate the world and man's affairs in the world. If such a "One God" had been installed as dominating world and man, there would have been messengers, carriers, of that God's command in the world and there would also have been interpreters and defenders of such teachers and thier teachings. The result would have been dissentions and quarrels among the followers of such interpreters of the teachers and their teachings about the Will of God, and religion would have been subordinated to such interpreters and would have met with ruin through corruption and distortion.
There might have come about some changes in their terminologies relating to the religion of the Vedas; but the spirit of the Vedic religion continued and influenced the people of the country. The Vedic people did not prop up a "One God" because they never tolerated an Emperor, a "One Man" above all.

30. It is not unlikely that terms like Viśvakarman (All-maker) and Prajāpati (Lord of the people) were not original in the Vedas, but were suggested by the monotheistic tendencies among the neighbouring nations. In the Avestan tradition we find that a "One God" was simply accepted, while in the Vedic tradition, it was adapted and interpreted with the back-ground of the Vedic spirit. The terms became very popular in the ritualistic traditions of the Vedas, more popular than in the tradition of the intellectual current of the Vedic people. This itself shows that there was no attempt at transforming the polytheism into monotheism through Henotheism. Such an attempt must have been in the intellectual plane, rather than in the ritualistic plane, if there had been such an attempt. The real significance of the adoption of the terms as the creator of the world and the Lord of the humanity must be that what the other nations called the "One God" is nothing but the activities of man represented by the rituals, in a personified form; the original process of diversification is the arch-type for the ritualistic activities of the people in later times. Ultimately, the acceptance of a Viśvakarman and a Prajāpati into the ritualistic religion amounts to a recognition and assertion of the sufficiency of man and his activities to explain the world-process and to an assertion that a Supreme God need not be introduced into the life of man.

31. Those who maintain that there was a tendency in the Vedas to progress from polytheism to monotheism and that what is termed Henotheism is a stage of groping towards monotheism, must find an explanation for various difficulties which such a theory raises. I have already said that not a single one among the important gods was raised to that status at any stage in the development of the religion of the Vedas. If Varuṇa is an approach to the monotheistic ideal, why was he not raised to that level? On the
other hand, he dwindled into a very subordinate position, even ceased to be a real god, in the classical period.

32. If Viṣvakarman or Prajāpati were representatives of the stage of the passage to monotheism, we must consider why they did not develop into the "One God"? Viṣvakarman became the artisan of the gods, a very subordinate position indeed, and the Prajāpati became the superior Sages, only men and not gods. The word also became a synonym of Brahmā, and Brahmā is not one of the great gods in the Classical religion of India; that position was assigned to Viṣṇu and Śiva.

33. Viṣvakarman and Prajāpati were only ritualistic deifications; they did not have any importance in the Upaniṣads. It is Brahmā that became the prominent reality in the Upaniṣads; if there had been any monotheistic tendency in the Vedas we would have expected some closer association of such a monotheistic tendency and the monistic tendency. The ritualistic literature represented by the Vajurveda and the Brāhmaṇas and the rationalistic literature represented by the Upaniṣads took different courses. There is the Prajāpati ideal in the former and the Brahmān ideal in the later.

34. There is no consistent and continuous series of points along which we can draw the line of development in the religious doctrines of India, from the polytheism to monotheism through the intermediary state of Henotheism. The points are all scattered about, and they do not allow a line to join them all together; such lines have to get broken up and have also to pass clear of many important points. All the points have to be taken as a solid group and not as points that mark a progressive line.

35. The fact is that what is true of other countries is introduced into the conditions in India where it has no application and relevency. No other country has exhibited such a continuity and progression in the matter of its civilization. In all the countries, there is a start and there are changes and there is the ultimate disappearance, so far as cultural matters are concerned. In the case of India, there has never been such a change as to create any danger to the continuity and permanence. The changes are just what is found in any organic body. There may be alternations
in names and forms; but the spirit continues. The many gods representing the visible phenomena of Nature and the personifications of functions and the ultimate Brahman, all are integral parts of a unitary culture and lived together. What is very prominent is that there has never been a "One God" in India. It was always the "One" along with the "gods". There is no Supreme with a personality; what is Supreme is just a Presence, a Reality.

36. It may be that in some other countries the people had been worshipping a multitude of gods, and even that through images; it may also be that some Teacher preached the doctrine of "One God" and that such a doctrine became established among the people. But that has no universal application. There is no universal law either that Polytheism, Monotheism and Monism should come in a chronological succession among a people. As a matter of fact, in the later history of India, the three stages arose in the reverse order; Sankara advocated Monism, denying absolute reality to a personal god, while Madhva, much later, advocated the absolute reality of God as completely different from man. Between them, Ramanuja advocated a Doctrine of the Absolute being a God, with reality of the world and of the individuals as parts of that One God. Philosophy does not come out of a factory, made to order.
CHAPTER XI

Vedas: THE ABSOLUTE

1. We know of the Vedic people only as a great nation with a very advanced civilization. They had settled down in the country, developing their culture steadily, for a very long time. They had their own religion and their own social organisation. They had their own political institutions. They developed various sciences and various kinds of arts. They had their pastimes and amusements and sports. They had various professions and avocations. We know the Vedic peoples only as settlers on the Indian soil. If evidences of comparative Philology and Ethnology require the acceptance of a foreign home for them from which they migrated into India in comparatively recent times, after the development and decay of many civilizations within the Indian border and outside of the region to its west, all differing from the Vedic civilization, there is no such evidence found within the Indian literature and other records nor even in the actual records of the other nations of ancient times. On the other hand, the evidences of the Indian records go to show just the contrary.

2. The Vedic people did not have an easy time. They had to fight against the freaks of Nature and the uncertainties of weather. They had to fight against other powerful nations who were opposed to their own culture and who were attempting to ruin their religion. Against great odds, in the face of very adverse conditions, they had been developing an advanced civilization with various kinds of amenities and recreations in life, and when such an active nation was also endowed with great intellectual qualities, certain problems regarding the “what” and the “why” and “how” also began to agitate their minds. In this way there was a parallel growth of a high degree of culture along with their civilization. Among them there was a joint development of material and intellectual achievements. They valiantly resisted
agression from outside, and within, they raised the standard of intellectual and emotional life. Both went hand in hand.

3. We cannot say that the people were divided into groups on a vocational basis, developing a sharp distinction between the intellectual class who supported the religion and the martial class who built up kingdoms and even empires, leaving the great mass of the people with their simple avocations of agriculture and trade. In many of the modern works relating to ancient Indian civilization a hard and fast distinction between the warrior class and the class to be called “Priests” is drawn, with mutual jealousy and even enmity. It is said that while the ritualistic religion grew among the “Priests”, the intellectual philosophy originated and grew up among the warrior class. All modern scholars do not accept such a class division and mutual conflict; yet nearly all writers draw a distinction between the intellectual growth and a religious growth among the people, with mutual jealousy though not with antipathy.

4. There is no evidence to prove that the authors of the vedic poetry were patronised by the kings and that they sang the glories of such kings in return for rich presents, along with singing about the glories of the gods to invoke their aid on behalf of the kings against their enemies. The poets must have been warriors and the warriors must have been poets too. We cannot ignore names like Apālā and Viśvavārā, two poetesses of the Vedic literature, who were also warriors. Such a combination of intellectual and physical might is found in the gods of the Vedas, being endowed with Kratu or intellectual power and Kṣatra or physical might. Great kings in the Upaniṣads are also found to be great philosophers and thinkers and teachers. The tradition continued as in the sage Vasiṣṭha who was a great sage and who could train Shri Rama in archery and in the art of war-fare. Drona, another Brahmin, was the teacher of the heroes of the Mahābhārata and he also led the army when there broke out a war between the two cousins who claimed the throne. His son Aśvatthāma was also an equally valiant hero. When we draw a mutual antipathy or even an antithesis between the class of religious leaders who developed complicated ritualism
and the class of warriors, we shall not shut our eyes to such references both in the Vedic and in the later literatures.

5. In the Upaniṣads also discussions took place in the courts of kings who were great thinkers, philosophers and teachers too, besides the hermitages of the Rṣis (Sages). Even the glories of the kings and the teachings of the kings were preserved by the leaders of the religious life who were developing such complicated ritualism and that as integral parts of their own sacred literature. And within the ritualistic part there are passages designated as Upaniṣads. The thoughts about the nature of the Absolute contained in the Upaniṣads formed a vital part of the religious literature of ancient India with a ritualistic partiality. Both formed a unit. The Upaniṣads did not grow as a deviation from the current of the ritualistic portion of the Vedic literature; there was no opposition in the Upaniṣads to the ritualistic portion of the Vedas.

6. The investigations about the Absolute have no meaning without the background of the ritualistic religion, except as an attempt at an interpretation of the full significance of the rituals, and the full significance of the rituals cannot be realised unless one goes behind the forms and behind the details and try to find out the ultimate basis of such practices. Further, we must also understand that such a combination of religion and philosophy had been going on in the country from the earliest times, and what we find in the Upaniṣads is not merely an interpretation of the thoughts of the earlier Vedic literature, but also a continuation of the spirit and methods of that earlier age.

7. The most philosophical poems of the Rgveda are found to have a ritualistic setting and they are intimately associated with ritualistic details. Even a god like Varuṇa will vanish from the Vedic pantheon if we divest him of his ritualistic features. And he is associated with moral qualities and spiritual eminence by modern writers, tracing the moral God of Zoroaster to him. No one can dissociate gods like the Aśvins (the twin-gods) and Sarasvatī (the holy river) and Uṣas (Dawn) from an intellectual touch, and what are they without their ritualistic elements? And gods of a ritualistic nature like Indra and Agni (Fire) and
the Maruts are also holding a high position on the intellectual side. Bhāspati is the type of the concord between ritualism and intellectual eminence.

8. Dirghatamās asks the question what use there is in the Vedic Songs for one who does not understand the nature of the Absolute, the ultimate position in which all the gods abide. After singing about the glories of wisdom and of the nature of language and poetry, he speaks of the Sacrificial Altar as the farthest end of the world and of the Sacrifice as the navel of the earth, of Soma as the seed of the world, and the Poet as the highest seat of language. There is no portion of the Rgveda that can be dissociated from a ritualistic setting, there is god who is not in some form or other, directly or at least indirectly, related to ritualism. There is no author of the Vedas who is not also connected with the ritualism of the religion.

9. The text of the Rgveda and of the Atharvaveda as we have them, are full of references to the nature of the Absolute, though they are given in poetic form and not in the form of a direct presentation of such a nature. The references to the concealed position and the concealed names, to the regions beyond the comprehension of ordinary men which only the wise can see, to the dark regions, to the cave—all are related to the nature of the Absolute that is at the basis of our experience of a diversified nature in the world. Terms like what moves and what is stationary, and what is mortal and what is immortal, express the relation of the phenomenal world that we experience to the Absolute beyond our experience. Two out of the three worlds are in the lap of the Sun-god Savitar (unseen by us) and only one is within the domain of Yama (within our experience). This shows that what is within our experience is a very small part of the whole universe. The numbers must not be taken in their literal sense. It is only a poet's way of expressing absolute truths.

10. The Upaniṣads discuss fundamental problems about the truth of the world, and in doing so, there are citations from the original texts of the Vedas. This itself shows that they were aware of the philosophical back-ground of the original texts and that they were trying to understand the problems indicated by such texts.
They were not evolving any brand new philosophy nor were they trying to move along a new channel of thought, deviating from the old currents. There is no doubt about the relative chronology of the original texts of the Vedas and the Upanisads, and passage of time implies also a progression with a change and an advance; but an advance does not mean a break. We have only hints in the poetry of the original texts of the Vedas about the doctrines regarding the nature of the Absolute and the relation of the world of experience to that Absolute, as could have been current in those early days. But the thinkers of the Upanisadic period must have had more material for their purpose preserved from the earlier days, than what we now have.

11. In the poem about the Person, there is an attempt to present in poetic form, what is absolute and what cannot be expressed in language. From that Absolute there arose the differentiation and from that arose another Person of a conditioned nature. By certain numbers and measurements the poet tried to give some idea of the immensity of that Absolute in comparison with the phenomenal world. We get no information about the Absolute from that poem; rather, we are told in that poem that it is impossible for us to know what the Absolute is, and that it is equally impossible for the Poet to describe its nature in language and thereby communicate to others some idea of its nature. The most that could be expressed there is that the Absolute is all this and much more.

12. In the poem about the condition of the world prior to diversification, there is a more successful attempt to give in language form some idea about the Absolute. Even here the description is negative. Nothing that we now see, nothing that is experienced now, was there in the world at that stage. It was all darkness. The distinction between what is and what is not could not be applied to the condition at that time. Neither death nor immortality had any application to the condition in that stage. Still there was life though without the function of life. The essence of life was alone there, and in that essence of life there arose a will and a mental activity. It is just One, and there is nothing other than that One.
13. In the description of Viśvakarman (All-maker) there is the question about the material for the construction of the world corresponding to the material which a builder of houses uses in constructing a house. What was the support on which he could have been sitting while working on the construction of the house? The reply is implied that no one knows that material and that there was nothing on which there could have been an abode.

14. We get only some implications about the philosophical back-ground for the poetry of the Vedas. We do not have a direct knowledge of that philosophy. What is quite certain is that according to the thinkers of that time, the world in which they lived and worked is not something to be ignored, something which was only an appearance, something that had no basic material beneath. The world is something real, has some reality as the foundation. There is an intelligence behind the formation of the changing and moving world, and there is also some plan and some design behind the formation, being the product of the operation of an intelligence. Thus the two fundamental views behind the philosophy of the times are (1) the positive back-ground and (2) the design, the orderly plan behind the formation of the world of experience. In the original texts of the Veda, there is no specific statement of what that fundamental positive reality is behind the changing and moving world. We have only terms like what does not move, what does not decay, what does not die. There is also the term Skambha (what is firm). It is in the Upaniṣads that we find the term being finally settled to express this ultimate reality behind the phenomenal world, and the term is Brahmaṇ.

15. But the term Brahmaṇ did not mean the ultimate truth in the early Vedic literature. Various attempts have been made in modern times to trace the meaning of this term and settle its etymology and to get at certain cognates to this term in related languages.

16. The nature of the Absolute is that it is a combination into a unit of three elements, Truth (Satya), Knowledge (Cīt) and Bliss (Ānanda). That it is truth shows that it is positive in nature. That it is knowledge shows that intelligence is at the root
of the formation of the world. That it is Bliss shows that what is called the world is not a seat of suffering, a result of sin; man and the world are by nature of the form of happiness, and what is called suffering is only an accident; man is found to suffer through an error and when the truth is known, man is found to enjoy, to be of the nature of happiness.

17. In the Rgveda, the word Brahman means a song about the gods, who represent the various aspects of the ultimate truth. There are many passages where there is a reference to the composition of a song, and the word used is Brahman. There is also its correlate Bhyat, from the same root, and this word too means a song addressed to the gods. Any song or any poem is not a Brahman or Bhyat. It is only such a poem or song which is addressed to the gods, which describes the true nature of the gods, that can secure a place among what are termed Mantra (sacred poem or song), that is designated by the term Brahman or Bhyat.

18. The word for the recitation of poetry in the Rgveda is derived from the root Vad (to utter or to speak). In later Sanskrit also, this root has retained a meaning which is something more than "to say". The utterance of the sound in this context is related to musical sounds, and there is the term Vadya from this root which means "a musical instrument", that on which the musical sound is produced. There are many places in the Rgveda in which the term Bhyat or Brahman is associated with the verb from the root Vad (to utter). This also shows that the word Brahman or Bhyat means a song or a poem.

19. There is also the name Brhaspati, with Brhma萘aspati, in which the former element is related to Bhyat and Brahman. The latter element of the compound means "Lord". The two words are the names of the god in the Rgveda and that god is specially connected with songs and poetry. The seven-fold words are familiar in the Rgveda in expressions like "Sapta vajih" which mean "the seven kinds of words". Brhaspati has the epithet Saptasya and Saptajihva which mean "having seven mouths" or "having seven tongues".

20. No one has raised any doubt about the general meaning of the term Bhyat or Brahman, which is "prayer to the gods". The
differences are only in respect of the etymology of the word, its original meaning and the later change of its meaning as the "ultimate reality". The term has been associated with "spells" and "magical power" and other factors that are connected with primitive tribes. But there can be no doubt that the word Brhat means "high class poetry" composed by poets with a transcendental vision. This must be the original meaning.

21. Brhat and Brahman are convertible terms. They mean exactly the same thing. There is the name of the metre called Brhati, and this is the feminine form of the word Brhat. There are other words in which the feminine form denotes a metre and a form in the neuter gender denotes a song in that metre. Thus we have the feminine form Gāyatri as the name of a metre, while the the neuter form Gāyatra means a song. Both are from the root Gai (to sing). It is true that from the feminine form Gāyatri meaning a metre, the neuter form to denote a song in that metre is Gāyatra, and that similarly from the feminine form Brhati, the neuter form should be Bārhati to denote the song in the Brhati metre; and this form occurs in that meaning. But the form Brhat is also used in the sense of such a song. There are also similar formations like Jagat meaning a song in the Jagati metre, besides the term Jāgata in the same sense.

22. But this does not take us any nearer to the etymology or the original meaning of the word. We do not know why the metre and a song in that metre are called by this term. There are many terms denoting metres and songs, used in the Rgveda, of which we do not know either the etymology or the original meaning. There is the word Vāka meaning a kind of song, from the root Vac (to speak). There is also the term Sakvari, which means a kind of song, and the word also means a metre; the word must be related to the root Sak (to be able). The root also has relation to "instruction". There is also the term Rathantara, which must mean "what overtakes (Tara) a chariot (Ratha)".

23. All such terms have settled down to some specific meanings. But we are not at all sure whether the terms had the same restricted sense in the original stages also. We do not know the language of the Rgveda. There can be little doubt that the word Brhat
and Brahman are to be traced to the root Bṛh (to expand, to wax, to grow). I do not know why the word came to mean song or poetry. There are also other terms that are equally doubtful, so far as their original meaning is concerned. Terms like Gāyatrī and Anuṣṭubh are related to song, since the roots themselves mean “to sing”; Gāyatrī is from the root Gai (to sing) and Anuṣṭubh is from the root Stubh (to sing in praise) with the preposition Anu (after). But how did the word Śakvarī from the root Śak (to be able or to instruct) come to be associated with poetry and song? The words Bṛhat and Brahman also came to be associated with songs for a similar reason. In this connection, we must not ignore the relation of song and poetry to the formation of the world. The great poet Dirghatamas says that Sindhu (river) was established firm in the heaven through the song in Jagati metre and the Sun-god (Sūrya) was seen in the song known as Rathantarā (what overtakes a chariot). Indra was able to kill Vṛtra and Vala through the power of the songs, gods developed their powers to kill the demons through the songs and the songs were inspired by the gods.

24. The terms Nāma (name) and Pada (position) are used in identical meanings in the Rgveda. They are the concealed positions and the secret names. Taken along with the view expressed by the poet Dirghatamas that only a fourth part of the language is in use among men and that the three parts are concealed in the cave which only poets can see, we have to identify the place and the name, the denotation and the word. In this way, Brahman is not merely the song, but ultimately the truth expressed in that song. And here it must be remembered that every song is not a Brahman; only such songs that describe the truth in the form of gods or in the form of the Absolute, seen by the poets of transcendental vision, can be called Brahman.

25. The language of poetry need not be identical with the language of the people, and even with the language of science and philosophy. The poets of the Rgveda used the term Bṛhat or Brahman in the sense of poetry; that does not mean that at that time the word did not have the meaning of “what is sung about in that song”. I cannot say anything definite about the meaning
of the words in the time of the *Rgveda*, whether it meant only song at that time and whether the meaning of "ultimate truth" was a later transformation at the time of the *Upaniṣads*. It is not at all impossible that the term *Brahman* meaning the "absolute truth" in the language of philosophy, was used in the *Rgvedic* poetry as a kind of song about that "truth". But there is the difficulty that there is no instance of the word clearly meaning "truth" in the *Rgveda*.

26. In considering the meaning of the term *Brahman* in the *Rgveda*, we have to take note of two words more in the Vedic literature. There is the combination of the word *Brahman* with words from the root *Vad* (to utter or to recite) occurring many times in the *Rgveda*, and there is the term *Brahma-vādīn* in the masculine and *Brahma-vādīni* in the feminine meaning "one who sings about *Brahman". Here the connection of *Brahman* with "song about the ultimate truth" is quite clear, and later on the term *Brahma-vādin* came to mean some one who discourses on that "truth" (need not be in songs).

27. But there is the other term *Brahmacārīn* that occurs in the *Rgveda* to designate a particular type of person. In later language, a *Brahmacārīn* is one who studies the Vedas. In so far as the student marries after his term of study, *Brahmacārīn* came to mean "a bachelor", a "celebrate", and *Brahmacarya* meant "celebacy", "abstinence from association with women". There is only a single verse about a *Brahmacārīn* in the *Rgveda*, and this verse is repeated in the *Atharvaveda*. In the *Atharvaveda* there are also two poems about *Brahmacārīn*. From the description, a *Brahmacārīn* must be one who leads a particular kind of life different from the normal, with peculiar costumes and with peculiar codes of conduct. Abstinence from association with women seems to have been an obligation with them. There is reference to a process for crushing the sexual impulse in a *Brahmacārīn*, in the *Atharvaveda*. He must be growing his hair and his beard. They are the ascetics.

28. He must have been styled a *Brahmacārīn* in so far as he lives (Cārin) a life dedicated for the knowledge of *Brahman*. In this term, the element *Brahman* can mean only the truth
and not the song about that truth. It is for this reason that I suggested the meaning of "ultimate truth" for the word even in the Rgveda, so far as philosophical language is concerned; in the language of poets, it meant only the song about that truth.

29. The word used in the Rgveda for the ultimate is Ātman. Just as there is some doubt about the etymology and original meaning of the word Brahman, and different views have been put forth on the point by scholars, there is the same doubt and the same difference of view regarding the etymology and the original meaning of the word Ātman also. Many of the modern views that are expressed are as fanciful as the etymologies for words suggested by ancient commentators, if not more fanciful. I find that the word Ātman must be related to the word Prāṇa, both being derived from the root An (to breathe). In the poem about the condition of the world prior to diversification, there is the statement that the One, Ultimate Reality breathed without a breath of air. It is in that "One" that there arose a will which produced the diversification and differentiation in the Absolute. That Absolute is of the nature of the essence of life, though there is no life-function in it.

30. In the Upaniṣads there are various discussions recorded about the nature of that Ultimate, conducted by the various thinkers of the time in their own gardens among themselves or between the teacher and the disciple. There were also discussions conducted in the royal courts in the presence of kings who were as great thinkers as others. The nature of the Absolute and the why and the how of the change of that Absolute into the phenomena of the world: this is the topic of practically all the discussions.

31. We experience many different objects in the world and we are also able to recognise some gradation of finer and finer things constituting the world; there is also the relation of cause and effect found coming within our experience in our normal life. They apply the ordinary terms that denote such a gradation and variation to express the gradations and variations in the constitution of the world. When they use terms like the various sense-organs and the mind or when they use terms like
the various Elements, namely, Water, Fire, Air and Ether (Ākāśa), they had in their mind certain aspects of the physical world that are finer and finer in the formation of the physical world. What we know as sense-organs and what we know as the Elements are all forms of the physical world and it is not they which are really meant in the Upaniṣads by the terms that ordinarily denote such objects. This was the case in the Rgvedic terminology also, where the Atmosphere and the Heaven really meant finer and deeper aspects of the world and not the Atmosphere and the Sky that we see.

32. All these finer and finer aspects of the world are only stages in the formation of the changing and moving world, and not one of them is the Absolute. The Absolute is not what can be known, what can be expressed in language, what can be communicated to another. The Absolute is what must be realised through direct vision, and the Absolute is not what is described in literature. The entire literature and the entire lore known to the people and studied by the people have reference only to aspects of the changing and the moving world and not to that Absolute.

33. There are references to various disciples who had studied everything that is found in literature, everything that is comprehended within the schemes of normal study and the scope of understanding, and who yet did not know the Absolute. Even a Sage (Ṛṣi) like Nārada enumerates the various items of study that he had finished, and yet it is found that he did not really know. During the discussions, various thinkers try to explain their own views about the Absolute by going backward along a series of finer and finer objects, and yet even at the final end they find themselves only within the realm of the phenomenal world, and they are nowhere near the Absolute, nowhere within sight of the Absolute.

34. There is practically nothing in the Upaniṣads that fall outside of what has been said in the poem in the R̄gveda about the condition of the world prior to diversification: in the Absolute there is neither a “Being” nor a “Non-being”; there may be the “Life Essence”, but no life-function, no breathing process, and
no distinction like death and immortality. Why and how did all this change come about? That Absolute in the Ultimate stage—he alone can know the answer, and perhaps he too does not. We come only to a negative notion of what is positive in its nature. We do not know; it is not this, it is not this.

35. Then, is it a failure to know, is it a surrender to despondency regarding an Absolute truth in the world of changes? The answer to this question given in the Upaniṣads is an absolute “No”. The world is positive both in its phenomenal nature and in its Absolute nature. We experience the world as positive and what is positive cannot go back on a negative, on a void. However back we go, we must be all through in the realm of a positive truth. We experience ourselves also as a knowing agent and not as an ignorant existence. This also shows that however backwards we proceed regarding the nature of our real being, we must always remain within the realm of life and of knowing. A stage cannot come when life and knowing cease and when there is reached a condition of “death”. It is an intellectual necessity that in both directions, whether we trace our life and our experience backwards to its source or forwards to its ultimate evolution, the final end must be “life” and “knowing” and “positive existence”. Life cannot lead to death and knowing cannot lead to ignorance and existence cannot end in void.

36. This has been the experience of those who had developed the capacity to see “beyond”. They had tried to express their knowledge in poetic language, and the Upaniṣads presuppose such a poetic record as their basis. The poetry that the people of the Upaniṣadic age were in possession of, deal with only the changing world and not with the Absolute, and this limitation is a necessity, having regard to the nature of what can be the Absolute. If something can be expressed in language form and communicated to others, that is no “Absolute”. Thus the Rgvedic poetry has a value in understanding the nature of the Absolute, and this value has its own limitations.

37. The “beyond” cannot be learned on the authority of others, while others can show the way to that beyond, point out the
direction towards that "beyond". The Rgvedic poetry must be accepted as sign-posts at cross-roads and should not be treated as rest-houses where one can break his journey. We do not know how for the first time some one could find out the Path towards that "dark" region. From the Rgveda we know only this much that Yama had such a vision, and we have no information of the method of developing that power. He had many associates and they had instituted some system of rituals whereby they and those who came after were also able to reach that same "beyond". Although the ritual may be some specific form, in essence it is the path of the movement of the Law of the world, based on the arch-type of the operation of that Law which started diversification in the world.

38. Activities according to the Law of the world keeps one within the changing and moving phenomenal world. It is only by developing certain super-normal powers that one can understand the nature of the Absolute out of which the phenomenal world arose. That is why there is a distinction drawn between the fruits of active life according to the Law of the world and the fruits of such super-normal powers that can be developed. This does not amount to any condemnation of the active life. What is condemned, if any condemnation is implied, is only the tendency to stop at the active life. The Vedic poetry shows that there is a "beyond". The Upanisads show that the "beyond" is something different from all that we experience. There is absolute identity of purpose in both. The Upanisads contain descriptions of rituals; they allude to the literature relating to such rituals, cite from them as authority and expound the doctrines implied in such literature.

39. The Upanisads cannot be understood unless we accept the texts as extensions and continuations of the ritualistic texts starting with the Rgveda and concluding with the Brāhmaṇas. In the same way there are considerable portions in the Rgveda that cannot be understood except as the sources of the Upanisads. Those who had learned the texts and who do not yet know the truth, approach those who are expected to have known, and ask them questions about the Absolute, and later they receive the illumination.
This is what we find in the case of Dirghatamas. Both the doctrines and the methods found in the Upaniṣads can be traced to the Ṛgveda and must be so traced along a continuous line of development backwards.

40. I cannot say definitely whether in describing the Absolute as a combination of the three elements of Sat (Truth), Cit (knowledge) and Ānanda (Bliss), there is a hint that certain currents were visible in the history of Indian thought even at that time which went against such a doctrine. There developed in later times in India a view that the Absolute is a void (opposite of what is meant by Sat or positive truth), that what is called knowledge is only an accident, a series of momentary phenomena (the opposite of what is meant by the term Cit) and that there is only suffering in the world (opposite of what is meant by Ānanda). That a positive reality, intelligence and bliss form the fundamental in the world became an established doctrine in India, which doctrine had its origin even in the earliest stages of the Vedic period. It is this doctrine that has given a definite form to the philosophical thought of India.
CHAPTER XII
SANKHYA EVOLUTION OF MATTER

1. The basic principle in the Vedic philosophy about the world is that the world is a reality, that it has originated from a reality, that there is a design behind the change that has come over the unchanging, immutable source of this world, and that the real nature of the world is happiness. A certain view contrary to this in all its aspects came into prominence at a later stage in the history of Indian thought. It is very likely that such a view was also current in the earliest stages along with the views that were accepted generally in the Vedic times as the true nature of the world. This latter view, which goes contrary to the Vedic thought, is generally associated with Buddha who is usually presented as an opponent of and a rebel against the Vedic traditions.

2. The most we can say is that while what is contained in the Vedic literature is an authentic record of the thoughts of the times, as for the Tipitakas, the Buddhistic scripture in Pali, “the views set forth in them, if not the actual doctrine taught by Buddha himself, are yet the nearest approximation to it we possess.” We do not have any authentic contemporary records about Buddha and his teachings. But I am satisfied that the verses that contain certain basic teachings, can be assigned to Buddha himself, while many of the stories and many of the discussions recorded in the Tipitakas may be only reports and traditions about him. I do not propose to say anything about the language in which Buddha gave his teachings. If the Pali texts do not contain his exact words, they contain at least a faithful rendering in Pali of what he would have spoken. He must have put the essence of his teaching, after some discussion or discourse, in the form a metrical passage and such passages must, in many cases, have been preserved faithfully.

3. “While the Pali piṭakas may be substantially identical with the teaching of Buddha, in the Questions of Milinda, we seem to
get a more negative interpretation of the Buddhist teaching." We shall not ignore this position. And the views which came into conflict with the doctrines advocated in the Vedic systems of philosophy in India are the views found in the *Questions of Milinda* and their subsequent developments. There has been no conflict between the teachings of Buddha and the Vedic doctrines.

4. The chief points of conflict between the doctrines of Buddhist philosophy and the Vedic thoughts may be summarised as follows:

1. Vedic thought: The world is real both in its phenomenal and in its absolute states.
   Buddhist doctrine: The world is only an appearance, and in the absolute nature it is a void.

2. Vedic thought: There is a permanent element in the world.
   Buddhist doctrine: Everything is momentary, even if the world is positive in its nature. (The real Buddhist doctrine is that it is only an appearance of a void).

3. Vedic thought: There is an eternal Law operating in the world both in origin and in progression.
   Buddhist doctrine: The Law was for the first time set in motion by Buddha (*Dharma-cakra-pravartana*).

4. Vedic thought: No one can know the whole Law, no one is Omniscient, no one can know the whole truth (*Mimāṃsā*); or all are potential Omniscients (other schools).
   Buddhist Doctrine: Only Buddha is Omniscient. In the case of others, their knowledge is in itself invalid.

There is not a single view advocated in Buddhist philosophy that really represents the original teaching of Buddha, and there is not a single view advocated in the Vedic systems that goes against the original teachings of Buddha.

5. Buddha certainly taught a philosophy of suffering, as contained in his Four-fold Truths. We do not find such a categorical statement about the nature of the world being suffering, in the Vedic literature. But we must realise that the second of the four
truths actually states that what is known as suffering is not a nature of the world or of life in the world, but only an accident; it is something that has a beginning and what has an origination is not a nature. This accident of suffering in life can be terminated by discipline, and the essence of that discipline is the restoration of life to its true nature of "righteousness" (Sammā). This is the Vedic position, that Ananda (Bliss) shines when there is right knowledge. There came about a shift in emphasis. The emphasis was shifted from right knowledge as found in the Vedic thought, to the termination of suffering as is taught in Buddhist systems.

6. The Sāṅkhya system of philosophy has accepted this changed position and starts with the problem of suffering in the world. The Yoga system, which in essence is not different from the Sāṅkhya system, also accepts this prominent place assigned to the problem of suffering in life, in philosophy. The stand-point of the Sāṅkhya system has already be explained in an earlier section. To the Yoga system, the purpose is to arrest the fluctuating functions of the internal organ, which is of the nature of suffering in life.

7. The Absolute nature of the world is the combination of Sat (Truth) and Cit (Knowledge) and Ananda (Bliss), and the knowledge of truth is Bliss. How are we to know? What is that truth? The Sāṅkhya system presents the Vedic view in a particular way. It is not a question of making an assertion that such and such a view is found in the Vedic texts and that the truth must be that. The truth is presented in a way that would take into consideration the conditions of the times, in relation to the environment. The nature of the world, its origination and its evolution are accepted in other systems of thought as well, with modifications and adjustments.

8. We are positive, eternal entities. We live in a world that is positive. This world has originated from a positive Absolute. This is the point that is taken up as soon as the modes of knowing are disposed of. These modes have already been presented in an earlier part of this book. There are two questions that have to be considered. Is there an absolute source for this world?
What is the nature of that source, is it a positive reality or a negative void? There is also the question why, if there is such a primary source, it is not known.

9. That a thing is not known is no ground for denying its existence. In our ordinary life we know of many cases where a thing is there, which is not found to come within our knowledge; there are conditions that limit our powers of knowing. The point has already been considered. The Absolute does not come within the sphere of our comprehension for the reason that the Absolute is too fine, too subtle for our powers of knowing; otherwise it is not an Absolute.

10. What is this subtlety (Sauksmya)? We can investigate the facts of the world. There are many facts for comparison with varying degrees of differentiation. But the differentiation becomes lesser and lesser when we go from effect to cause in a series. We can have a black jar and a red jar and jars of other colours. We have various kinds of jars differing in size, in shape etc. But as jar, they are uniform, and the differentiation thus gets narrowed down. Then there are various things, besides jars, that are made of clay. When we reach the stage of clay in our investigation of the nature of things, there is in this way a further reduction of the differentiation. The clay is made up of an infinite number of particles, each particle being tangible. But if the particles are divided into smaller particles, a stage must come when they cease to be particles. We call a thing a particle when it has a size, a shape, a structure etc. In the process of division, a stage must come when the last particle must lose its size and shape and structure. A process of division can be carried on only so long as size, form and structure persist. If they persist always, then there can be no end to a process of such a division. But there must be such an end. What is indivisible is what is indistinguishable. What enables distinguishing a thing is such a speciality like size and shape and structure, So, through the process of reasoning we arrive at a stage in the process of reducing the effects into their causes, when the cause cannot be further reduced into its cause. It has been found that when we proceed from cause to effect, there is an elimination
of specialities. A process of eliminations must end in a zero. A process of division can never end in a zero. Joining the two together, we arrive at the position that matter persists with all its specialities ended. That is the stage when investigation also finds its stop. That is what is meant by Subtelety (Saukṣmya).

11. The acceptance of such an Absolute cause for the differentiated world is necessitated by “Reason”, by the very nature of the effects that we experience. Such effects that we experience have specialities, are within differentiation. Without specialities and differentiations, there can be no investigation into a problem. There must also be the differentiation between the “Subject” and the “Object”. Both the “subject” that can investigate and the objects that are to be investigated, are effects after differentiation. On this account also, investigation into the problem of the Absolute is a contradiction in terms. Such an investigation falls outside the sphere of reason. We arrive only at a general notion of an Absolute. The true nature of that Absolute is outside the scope of reason, and it must come within another mode of knowing, transcending reason. It is this mode that is designated “Scriptural Authority” (Āgama). The nature of this mode is not what can be expressed as, “It is said so in scripture, and it must be accepted.” It is a transcendent mode of direct experience of the Absolute in its absolute nature, not as specified by limitations brought about through differentiations. Even the question whether such a direct experience is possible falls outside the scope of investigation through reason. Reliable persons (Āptas) record such facts, and we cannot question it. We need not also accept it in a blind way.

12. The point that we do not know of such a mode and that the Absolute does not fall within the scope of modes of knowing that we know of, does not warrant the denial of such an Absolute. Reason warrants and even necessitates the acceptance of such an Absolute. It is in this way that the text on Sānkhya states:

The absence of cognition thereof (of the Absolute Cause) is due to the subtlety (Saukṣmya) of that cause, and not due to its non-existence, because we can arrive at such a
thing from the nature of the effects (that come within our experience).
In this way there is an establishment of the experienced world as being the effect of an Absolute cause.

13. What are the effects of that Absolute cause and how do we arrive at such an Absolute cause from those effects through a process of reasoning? The effects are categories starting with the "Great" (Mahat). They will be explained in detail later. The process of arriving at such an Absolute is based on the nature of the effects, which are partly similar and partly dissimilar to their respective causes. The effects contain elements that are similar to one another as in the case of a jar and a piece of wood being both solid, and the cause of both are also solid in nature. But there is a distinction also between a solid as a solid and a solid as a jar, in so far as a jar contains features that are not seen in other solids. In this process of going back from the most differentiated effects backwards through the chain of cause and effect, there is an elimination of dissimilarities, and a stage must come when dissimilarities disappear and when there remains only a uniform. That is what is meant by an Absolute. So it is said:

And that effect is the aggregate of what starts with the "Great" (Mahat), which are similar and dissimilar to the cause. The cause unifies the effects and the effects differentiate the cause. When in this chain of cause and effect we arrive at a stage where there is no further stage of another cause, there is only a uniform without any differentiation.

14. We know the effect as what is differentiated. When through any process of reasoning we arrive at a stage at which differentiation vanishes, does it not amount to a cessation of a positive reality? Does it not come to the acceptance of a void as the Absolute? When there is no differentiation which alone warrants the acceptance of a positive reality, how can we maintain that even at that stage, the positive nature continues? It is this point that is next taken up in the Sānkhya text.

15. A cause is what produces. What is not, cannot be what
can do anything. To say that it produces while it itself is not, is a contradiction. When we say "it", we mean that "it is". What is it that produces? It must be something that "is". What "is not" cannot be something. A positive effect always necessitates the acceptance of a positive cause for its coming into being.

16. When we want a positive effect we take up something positive for producing that affect out of that. We never take up a negation and produce a positive effect out of it. This is what we all experience. We cannot reason along channels that run absolutely counter to our experience. Ultimately every argument must conform to our experiences. The cause must also be the effect without the differentiation as effect. It is not enough if we take up any positive thing for producing some positive effect; the effect must be in that cause already in an undifferentiated condition. A positive effect is only a positive cause with additional differentiations brought into it.

17. It is not possible for any effect to be produced from any cause. In our experience we find that only particular causes produce particular effects, not that every thing is produced from everything. Such a regulation that only particular causes can produce only particular effects can be explained only on the postulation that the effect is contained in the cause. It is the presence of the effect in the cause that regulates the relation of cause and affect.

18. The cause possesses an "efficiency to produce", and the effect is restricted by a "possibility to be produced". A cause can produce an effect only if there is such a relation between them. Such an efficiency in the cause and such a possibility in the effect indicate that there is a design and a plan in the formation of the diversified world, both in the origination and in the progress of the diversification. Really, it is not a case of a new specification, a new differentiation being produced in the cause for the production of an effect. The differentiation must already have been there. What happens is that there is the manifestation of such a differentiation when there is the effect produced, and the differentiation disappears when the effect is reduced back to the cause. It is regulated in the original diversification that only
such and such a diversified fact can be further diversified into such and such effects. Thus the differentiation as an efficiency in cause and a possibility in effect, is already there. The only difference is in the manifestation and operation of the efficiency and of the possibility and in the disappearance of such an efficiency and possibility. There is no production and destruction of such an efficiency and possibility.

19. We never produce an effect that is absolutely different from the nature of the cause. Some aspect of the nature of the cause is maintained in the effect. On account of such a similarity between the cause and the effect, we have to accept that the effect must have existed in the cause in some form.

20. It is for these reasons that there was the statement in the Sāńkhya text that the effect is similar and dissimilar to the cause. The effect was already there in the cause. There is no production, no creation of an effect. All is eternally there. There may be a manifestation and a disappearance. About such an existence of the effect in the cause, the Sāńkhya text says:

The effect "is", because what "is not" cannot produce, because we take up particular materials as cause, because everything is not produced (from everything), because what has the efficiency produces what has the possibility (and) because there is the nature of the cause (in the effect).

Since the effect "is" and since the effect was in the cause, the cause also "is". Therefore, on account of the disappearance of specialities we cannot say that the Ultimate stage is the disappearance of a positive nature. What is called the Ultimate cause is not really Absolute in the sense that there are no differentiations; it is Ultimate only to the extent that the efficiency for differentiation is not manifest in the Ultimate stage. The entire differentiation is potentially a positive reality in the Ultimate cause, in its absolute condition, which too is positive in spite of the disappearance of specifications.

21. The entire phenomena of the world fall under three categories. One category is the Absolute, and the phenomenal world comes under two groups. If the Absolute is taken to remain in the
lowest level, the phenomenal world can also be divided into two upper levels, the lower being an evolute from one group and also the source for the evolution of another group and the higher level containing groups that are only evolutes without giving rise to another group.

22. The Absolute is what is called the Absolute Matter or the primal material cause of the evolved world. From that the first evolute is called the Great (Mahat), which is the Will or the Intellect. This is the Absolute Subject; but there cannot be a Subject without a Subject-object differentiation. In its absolute condition, it is just the Will. But in its condition of being the Subject in relation to an Object, it is called the “Ego”, “the I-ness” (Ahaṅkāra). There are also the objects of this subject divided into five groups which give rise to the material world constituted of the “Five Elements”. These five absolute forms of matter, not as manifest, but in their own nature, are termed the “Thing in Itself” (Tānmātra). They are modifications of the I-ness. In this way we get seven groups which, being produced from another group, give rise to another group. They form the middle level.

23. The Subject-object relation requires some function and some object. If there is only an absolute subject and the absolute objects, there would be an eternal knowing, which is not a function but a presence. A function implies a functionary also. There is one such functionary which functions inside, close to the “Great” and the “I-ness”, being an intermediary between the external objects and the external functionaries, on one side and the internal functionaries, namely the I-ness and the Intellect on the other side. This is termed the “Mind” (Manas). Mind is a material object and a functionary; it is not merely a function. But this mind does not give rise to another group of objects. Then there are the five functionaries corresponding to the five kinds of “Thing in Itself”. They are called the five sense organs. Again in the body there are certain organic functions; they are the function of moving other objects, moving itself, excretion of unwanted matter from the body, certain glands that emit fluids to bring about various physiological
purposes; there are also organs that produce the phenomenon of sound, within the body. In this way there are eleven functionaries including the mind. They are all evolutes from the I-ness. Not one of them can give rise to another group of things.

24. Further there are the "Five Elements" evolved from the five-fold "Thing in Itself"; the "Elements" themselves do not give rise to another group of material phenomena. It is true that within the "Five Elements" there are distinctions like the original matter and its effect like gold and the ornaments, or clay and a jar. But they do not form separate groups of phenomena.

25. In this way, the whole world is first divided into the Absolute and the phenomenal. The phenomenal part of the world consists of a Subjective phenomena and an Objective phenomena. In each of them there are basic stages evolved from a yet lower stage and the evolutes from such basic facts which do not themselves evolve into the other groups. It is in this way that the world is divided into three groups.

26. But how does the Evolution take place? How is it directed and regulated? In order to explain this aspect of the world, there is postulated another factor in the world called the pure Intelligence. Within the material phenomena there is the Subject aspect that is intelligent; but that is not "Intelligence". The Intelligence is other than what has that Intelligence, what is intelligent. This Intelligence is neither an evolute nor the material source of any evolution. This is a fourth category.

The whole division may be represented as follows:

1. The unchangeable
2. What can change into another, but not itself a change from another
3. What can change into another and what is itself a change from another.
4. What cannot change into another while it is a change from another.

This is the broadest division of the world into parts. A more logical division will be.

I. The Unchangeable
II. The changeable

2. The Evolutes.
   a. The basic
   b. The products from the basic.

It is this classification that is given in the Sāṅkhya text as:

The fundamental matter is not an evolute; there are the seven starting with the "Great" that are both basic as well as evolutes; but the sixteen are only evolutes. The Person (Intelligence) is neither a basis (for evolution) or an evolute.

Perhaps from the point of view of modern physics, psychology and physiology, this may seem crude and clumsy. It is better that we understand than that we should sit in judgement at this stage.

27. The nature of the evolutes, what is within our investigation, what comes within the sphere of our intellectual and physical activities, what is tangible, in contrast to the fundamental, which is beyond the scope of our direct investigation, is given as:

The manifest is caused, non-eternal, limited, functioning, manifold, supported, indicatory, divisible and depending on another; the unmanifest is the opposite.

Here a distinction is drawn between the Absolute, the unmanifest matter and the evolved matter.

28. There are three aspects of the evolved matter that may require some explanation; others are self-explanatory. There are two terms used here, "Supported" (Āśrita) and "Depending on another" (Paratantra). There is also the term "Indicatory" (Liṅga), that is, a "Mark". The first two terms do not seem to have any distinct connotations; they appear to mean more or less the same. The third term is not clear and not at all self-explanatory. The commentators also do not help us much in understanding the exact significations and purposes of the terms.

29. What is supported is what depends on another; a supported thing depends on the support. My own view is that what is "Supported" is what originates from another, and refers to the individual phenomenon, being supported on another. What is "depending on another" has reference to the entire aggregate
of the evolved world, which is dependent on the Absolute matter. The former term refers to mutual dependence within evolution and the latter refers to the evolution as a whole and its dependence on the Absolute matter. No individual fact within evolution can stand by itself, since it has to be supported on another. And the whole evolution depends (Tantra) on another (Para), that is outside of the evolutionary process.

30. The individual facts of the evolution and the whole of the evolution help us in inferring the Absolute matter, which is itself outside the sphere of our direct investigation. But the Absolute matter, being beyond the scope of our investigation, does not form the basis for inferring any other reality in the world. The question may arise whether the Absolute matter is not the basis for the inference of the "Intelligence" and whether as such that too is not "indicatory". This is the difficulty of the commentators. So they give some fanciful etymology for the word "Liṅga" (indicatory), deriving it from the root Li (to dissolve) and assigning to it the meaning of "what dissolves into its own cause". The real position seems to be that what forms the basis for the inference of the "Intelligence" is not the Absolute matter, but only the phenomenal world. The process is not that at first the Absolute matter is inferred from the phenomenal world and that after this, the "Intelligence" is inferred with that Absolute as the "Mark". The Absolute, being an Absolute, is beyond the sphere of our investigation, and as such it cannot serve as a "Mark" for the inference of another. We infer the "Intelligence" from the phenomenal world and we also infer the Absolute from the same phenomenal world, as the "Mark". If the phenomenal world is a diversification of a uniform, the question arises why such a diversification takes place at all; and to answer this question, we postulate the "Intelligence".

31. There are various aspects in which both the absolute matter and the phenomenal world are similar to each other. Both are composed of the three constituents (being material, functioning and insentient). Both are devoid of discrimination. Both are objects in their absolute stage, being the object in relation to the "Intelligence". Both are common as objects to all the in-
finite "Intelligences". They are not sentient in themselves, the sentience being a reflection from the "Intelligence". Both are capable of producing evolution.

32. In our experience, we find that everything has an opposite. We do not get at an absolute contrast between the fundamental aspect and the evolved aspect of matter. If we had been able to bring about such a sharp contrast between the two, there would have been an end for all our difficulties. But in spite of the differences drawn between the Absolute matter on one side and the evolved phenomena on the other, there are many aspects in which they are similar to each other. And for this reason, we have to postulate a category in the world which is absolutely different from both of them, and that is the "Person" (Puruṣa), the "Intelligence".

33. The world is a material reality. Within this reality there is a distinction between the phenomena and the Absolute. Perhaps there has never been a system of thinking in the world at any time or in any country where some such division has not been attempted. Besides the world as a reality, there is the fact that the world as a reality is known as such. This brings in an element different from the world itself, the element of knowing the world. That means that there is a distinction between the objective world and the subjective knower. Thus the world is a subject-object combination. The mystery is about this factor namely that of the subject.

34. The Sāṅkhya system accepts the whole world of the subject object combination as a complete materialistic reality. In what is called the Matter, there are three constituents, called by the technical term of Guṇa. The meaning of the word Guṇa is "Thread". A thread is composed of the smaller fibres that are twined together. But in the Sāṅkhya philosophy, such constituent fibres which, when twined, form the "Thread", is itself called a Guṇa (thread). Matter is made up of three such constituent parts, called Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Sattva is "the nature of being existent", and in the Sāṅkhya terminology, it is more the awareness of the existence that is expressed by this term. Rajas is the element of movement and change. Tamas, meaning
“darkness”, is in the Śāṅkhya terminology, the material aspect of Matter. The world contains Matter that is moving and changing and that is known in that way. Thus, the subject element is within the material world, and it is not something outside. The Śāṅkhya text says:

The three constituents are of the nature of contentment, discontent and sullenness, bringing about illumination, activity and inertia, and operating in mutual conflict, mutual support, mutual generation, and mutual co-existence.

Here contentment and illumination are the nature of the Sattva element; discontent and activity are the nature of the Rajas element; and sullenness and inertia are the nature of the Tamas element. These two sets relate to the subjective and the objective side of the world, respectively. Contentment implies correct knowledge and discontent means doubt and other aspects of subjective activity. Sullenness is ignorance and indifference. On the objective side, there is the aspect of being clearly known, manifestation, the aspect of movement and change, and the aspect of materiality or mass that resists movement. The contentment aspect of the subject and the illumination aspect of the object satisfy the needs of a subject-object relation, and what is called “knowing” is nothing but a material phenomenon. Thus matter explains everything in the world, and there is no need to postulate another category called the Spirit, call it Puruṣa or Ātman.

35. It is at this stage that the need for the postulation of something that is absolutely different from everything that is experienced in the world has been introduced, whereby what is called “Intelligence” (Puruṣa) is inferred, to satisfy this need. If such a contrast could be drawn between the phenomenal world and the Absolute cause of that phenomenal world, we could have stopped at that stage. But there are many aspects in which there are similarities between the phenomena on one side and the Absolute on the other side, in spite of their mutual differences in other aspects. On account of this similarity, there is the need to postulate a category that is absolutely different from both of them.

36. Besides such an abstract necessity, which in itself is not a
sufficient ground for the postulation of what is not known, there must be other reasons for establishing a category outside the material content of the world. It can as well be that the abstract need is a hallucination, making the extension of the generalisation unwarranted. In our experience, everything is found to have some opposite, but this may be a feature confined to the individual facts and shall not be extended to the world as a whole, taken as a unit. So, other facts of experience are also brought in to show that we have to assume something outside of the material part of the world which is divided into the Absolute and the phenomenal.

37. In our actual experience, we find the three constituents in a state of flux; they are in mutual conflict, one overcoming another, or they depend on each other, or one gives rise to the other or they exist in co-ordination. But in the Absolute state of Matter, they must be in a state of equipoise in such a way that they are not recognised as three separate constituents. There must have been an initial disturbance in what was in equipoise; there must have been a first movement and a first change in what was still and immutable. How did it arise?

38. The three constituents forming matter in its absolute state on the basis of equipoise, lost their positions and got entangled in each other. In themselves they could have remained in their respective places and in their respective conditions. If there had been a disturbance, that has to be explained through some external factor.

39. We do not find a disturbance to a position in the case of any factor unless there is some purpose for the disturbance. If there is a design and a plan, every event within the design and plan should be purposive. Either we have to admit that there is no design and plan behind the evolution of matter to form the world, or if there is a design, we have to accept a purpose for the events in the plan. That purpose must be external to the factors constituting the event. Thus, if a potter makes a jar or a weaver makes a cloth or a carpenter makes a furniture, there is the purpose in the person who will use such things. We cannot say that the purpose is within the factors constituting the events, namely,
the agent and the materials used for making the articles. In the

case of the evolution of the world as a whole, such a purpose must

be sought with reference to some factor outside of the material

constituents of the world. It is such a factor that is accepted as the

Puruṣa, the Person, the Spirit, distinct from matter (consisting

of the three elements of Subject, Motion and Material). And

that factor must be absolutely different from all attributes and

nature of the material world.

40. In our experience, we find that unless there is an agent
to operate, there is no movement in the materials. It is the asso-
ciation of materials that results in the production of an effect;
but such a mutual association, such a mutual combination and
co-ordination does not come into being by itself. Thus a lump of
clay cannot get on to the wheel, and the wheel cannot rotate
and the clay cannot convert itself into a specific shape, unless
there is the potter. This applies to the production of a cloth or a
furniture or any event in the world. Even what is termed an
automatic machine is not absolutely automatic. It is only when
the machine is set to some adjustment that it begins to work.
In the case of a potter or a weaver or a carpenter, the operation
of the agent must be continuous, and when that operation stops,
the production of the material also stops. But in the case of a
clock or an apparatus in a materiological station the apparatus
continues to work even when the hand of the first operator is with-
drawn. But there must be the first operator who had made the
initial adjustment. In the case of the whole world also, there
must be some such agent to whom must be ascribed the
first adjustment for the evolution process to start; it may be that
when the evolution starts, the further processes may continue
even if the first agent remains inactive after such initial stimu-
lus. Such an original agent for the start of the evolution
process is the Puruṣa or the Person or the Spirit.

41. In relation to all the events and all the factors in the
world, the individuals have a feeling that he is the experiencer.
The experiencer must be different from the experienced object.
The Subject must be different from the Object. Therefore
with reference to the entire material, objective world there must
be some Subject who is the experiencer of the world, which is the Object.

42. But do all these facts of our experience warrant the extension of such a relation to outside the totality of the world? What is found within the world of experience is different from what falls outside the world of experience. From within experience we are inferring that there is something outside that experience. Even within experience there are cases where the relations do not exist. A person can make a thing for himself and he also falls within the process of the production. If within the world A implies a non-A, does it mean that the whole world implies something other than the world? It is the limitation of what we designate A that implies a non-A; what we designate the "whole world" implies an absence of limitation, and excludes the possibility of something other than it. Sometimes the experiencer is also the Object of the experiencer himself as the Subject. If I am happy over my own success, "I" qualified with "Success" become the Object of my experience of happiness.

43. Further, the constitution of the world as made up of the three elements of Subject, Activity and Matter can explain everything. The constituent of Sattva, the Subject, can satisfy everything that has been presented as the ground for the postulation of an extra Purusa or Person or Spirit; what is required is that in the matter of evolution there must be a design and a plan, and a design or plan implies the presence of intelligence that settles the law and order in the process of the evolution. If that is accepted as a constituent of the world, in the form of the Sattva or Subject in the constitution of the world, every requirement is satisfied to explain the first start of evolution and also the orderly progression in the process of evolution.

44. There is still another factor in our experience. We hear about the activities of people directed towards the goal of "Release" (Kaivalya). Kaivalya means "to be by itself" free from any entanglement in a foreign material. If the activities within the scheme of the world has as its goal a certain isolation, a state of "being by itself", there must be a freedom for something from something else. There must be, for this process, a certain duality
of the world and the non-world. If there is only the world, what is \textit{Kaivalya} or isolation or the state of being by itself is already there for the world.

45. Where does this doctrine of working for \textit{Kaivalya} (Release) come in? It is not through reasoning that such a destiny for man kept as a goal in his activities, can be established. It is what is found in religion, may be certain higher aspects of religion. Here we must revert to the modes of knowing that are accepted in the \textit{Sāṅkhya} system. If there are factors in the world that transcend direct experience and reasoning, such factors fall within the sphere of the testimony of reliable persons and of the authority of scripture.

46. If we accept a goal called \textit{mokṣa} (release), then there must be some factor that has to be released, the world being the bondage from which such a release is sought. The acceptance of that goal is dependent on the acceptance of religious doctrines. It is not a part of philosophy. All that the \textit{Sāṅkhya} system admits is that if on the basis of religious doctrines, such a \textit{Puruṣa} or Person or Spirit is accepted distinct from the world, then they are prepared to concede that our experience is not against such a doctrine and that there is no objection to the recognition of a Spirit distinct from the world. But from the strict rational stand-point, the material world contains everything that can satisfy all our rational needs.

47. Just as the person who may make use of a jar or a cloth or a piece of furniture has no place in the process of the production of the jar or the cloth or the piece of furniture, the Spirit has no place in the world process. His position in the world is just that of a possible purchaser for the commodity that is produced in a factory. Without such a possible future purchaser there would have been no production.

48. The entire world forms purely a material phenomenon, a process within matter. The active agents, the experiences and the objects of activity and experience, all become a unit as an evolution of matter within matter. The whole position would have been quite satisfactory if the philosopher could stop at that point. But difficulties arise on account of the assumption
of an external factor called a Spirit. This aspect has not been ignored by the writers and exponents of the system.

49. Such a Spirit can be recognised only to explain the beginning and the goal of the world process. He has no place after the beginning and prior to the goal, during the world process. If a goal is accepted, there must also be the recognition of a beginning, which too must be absolute like the goal that is recognised. If Matter in the state of a uniform is there and if the Spirit is also there, was there a time when there was no diversified world? What is it that is at the basis of the first urge which the Spirit gave the uniform Matter to diversify? We have to accept a third factor in the form of the cause for this urge from the Spirit which Matter received for diversification. The only way in which we can escape from this difficulty is to accept that there was no time when the Matter was entirely and absolutely uniform. There is no absolute beginning for this world process. That leads us to the rather irrational position of accepting an end to what has no beginning, a release, an isolation for what was always in bondage, in entanglement. If there had been a prior stage of such isolation and freedom for the Spirit before the world process started, there is the future possibility of the world process starting even in respect of a Spirit that has been isolated, released.

50. The religious doctrine of a "Release" demands the recognition of some element that is outside of the world process. And this demands that what has no beginning has an end and that where there is an end, there will be no new beginning. If there had been a prior state of freedom from entanglements for the Spirit, there would have been no beginning for an entanglement, and if there had been no beginning, that means that by nature such an extra-world entity is entangled. And something cannot be released from what is its nature. If that be not its nature, there should have been a prior state of freedom from entanglement, a state of isolation. What was free by nature can get entangled and even after "Release" the Spirit may again get entangled. So, the Sāṅkhya system has to postulate that there has been no real entanglement for the Spirit. The Spirit
was always in a state of isolation, continued to be so and will ever remain in that state of release.

51. If the religious doctrine of a "Final Release" had not been admitted into the system, all the problems would have had an easy solution. There is a world process. There are three factors involved in this process. There is the Subject or the Intelligence or the Sentience; there is the activity and there is the matter also. There was no beginning for this world process. There will be no end. The design and the plan, the law and order within the world, is established by the presence of the Sattva Constituent, the element of the Subject, the Intelligence, the Sentience. There is only Matter with its three-fold constituents. The world is a reality without a beginning or an end. The exotic element of Mokṣa (Release) which is a religious doctrine, brought in an aspect that limits the rationalism of the system. Yet, ultimately the system accepts only the material world while it just tolerates the Spirit.

52. The Sāṅkhya system continues and maintains the Vedic Spirit of realism and rationalism. But the system has to take note of the change in time and the change in the beliefs of the people. If it ignored such a change, there would have been a break up to their spirit of realism. The purpose of the system is to explain the nature of the world, and if what is real in the environment is ignored, that will be ignoring the nature of the world also.

53. In the Vedic times, there had been no notion of the world being the seat of suffering and there was no eagerness for man to escape from the world. A belief in the nature of the world being suffering is a later ingredient in the thoughts of India. If there is suffering, there must be an end to suffering and there must be some method for bringing about such an end of suffering. The end of suffering is what is called Mokṣa (Release).

54. What is the nature of that state of Release from suffering? Is it a complete void? If there is suffering, and if there is release from suffering, there must be some positive entity that is released. It cannot be a void being released from a void to get into a state of void. Such a position is absolutely irrational.
The belief in sin and consequent suffering and later release, all exotic to the true Vedic thought, is incorporated into the Vedic ways of thinking, and there is a new presentation of the nature of the world. The Release must be for some positive entity. There cannot be a first entanglement of this entity in this world of suffering, and so suffering as a feature in that external entity must be an error, a delusion, an aspect of nescience. The world from which that entity is released is also a positive reality.

55. In bringing about such an illusory entanglement for the Spirit in the world, there is no God as an agent; so in effecting the release also, God has no place or function. In between the two extremes, during the course of the world process also, God has no place. What is brought about from within and what is terminated from within, can also proceed and operate from within. A material world with sin and suffering and a Spirit got entangled in it and a Release for the Spirit from the world can be accommodated into the Vedic system as expounded and as presented in the Śāṅkhyā system to suit the new environments.

56. But Indian genius can never surrender to a God. In this way, while there is a compromise on the question of Spirit and his Release from entanglements in a world of suffering, there is a positive refusal to accommodate a God in the system. Nothing is said about God in the standard text on the system from which I had made certain citations. But there is another text which positively states that God cannot be established on a rationalistic basis. The world is sufficient in itself. Everything that has to be explained in philosophy can be explained from within the nature of the world. If we recognise a God, we will have yet to say that he functions from within himself in a particular way through his nature, and we can as well say that the world functions from within on account of its own nature.

57. The Śāṅkhyā system sets forth various facts of experience to illustrate the process of the world evolution from within its own nature, without an external agency. Thus the milk flows from the cow for the nourishment of the calf. There is the magnet attracting iron from within its own nature. The position taken up in the Śāṅkhyā system has been severely criticised in other
systems of thought which too attempt to interpret, expound and present the Vedic thought.

58. This only shows that what is called Indian thought is not a set pattern modelled on some external authority and that on the contrary there is independence and freedom in thought. There was no organised agency to say, "Thou shalt think only along such and such lines and what is right has been decided long ago which thou shalt accept". Indian nation formed a live organism. The nation had growth, variety and unity. Each factor in the variety had its own function and its own nature, while they all fitted well into the whole organism. Each part was consistent within and also in concord with the other parts, while they are different from the other parts. It is not maintained in the Sāṅkhya system that the system contains the only true presentation of the Vedic thought and that all other presentations were wrong. The system never claimed a monopoly for the interpretation of the Vedic thoughts. All that the system claims is that it is a rational and consistent presentation of the Vedic thought, looked at from a particular angle.

59. No one can know the ultimate truth, no one can define it and no one can express it in language. Looked at from different angles, the truth may appear in different forms, and the Sāṅkhya system presents one such form. It is true that difficulties can be pointed out if the picture is accepted; but such difficulties can be pointed out in any picture. The difficulty is due to the nature of the Absolute, that the Absolute is beyond the scope of knowing and presenting in its true nature. All such different pictures must present the essentials of Vedic thought.

60. The essentials are:
The world is real.
The world has originated from a real Absolute.
There is an intelligent plan and design behind the origination and the process of the world.
Man is a reality.
Man can know the world while he cannot know the Absolute from which the world has arisen.
There is no God as creator and controller of the world.
Man is supreme and the world is self-sufficient.

These essentials are correctly presented in the Sāṅkhya system.
CHAPTER XIII.

Nyāya : ORIGINATION FROM ATOMS

1. The main standpoint of the Vedic philosophy that the world is real and that there is some design behind the phenomenon of the process, is maintained by the Nyāya system in a way different from the point of view taken up in the Sāṅkhya system. In the poem on the Person in the Rgveda, the whole world consisting of man and matter is an emanation from some Absolute; what can be called a symptom of life or intelligence appears only at the stage of and after diversification. In the poem about the condition of the world prior to diversification there is the symptom of a life principle even within that Absolute, in so far as Will made its appearance in it. In the Vedas I have not been able to see any trace of a doctrine relating to a Spirit outside of the world process, as is accepted in the Sāṅkhya system. In the poems about the Hiraṇyagarbha (Golden womb) and about Viśvakarman (All-maker) there is mention of a universal agent for the world process, while in the poem on the Person, there is mention only of the individuals as agents for the process of the world. It is the aspect developed in those two former poems that has been adopted in the Nyāya system of philosophy.

2. In the two poems in the Rgveda where there is a reference to the Absolute, there is an indication that such an Absolute contains all the elements that are needed for a world process, namely, intelligence, activity and matter. Although in the poem on the Person, there is no hint of any life or activity in the Absolute there being only a reference to an immense presence, yet the terminology used in it indicates that the Absolute possesses such elements. The term Puruṣa implies both intelligence and activity. A Puruṣa is an agent, and there is no agent without intelligence and activity. The presence implies the material content.

3. In the poem about the condition of the world prior to diversification, there is again the indication of the three constituents
of sentience, activity and matter in the Absolute, and this indication is more clear. If the Will is to appear in the Absolute, sentience and activity are implicit in it. In the Sāṅkhya, what is added is the aspect of a Spirit outside of and distinct from the three constituents. And that is only a recognition of certain current doctrines in religion and not a fundamental principle inherited from the Vedic traditions. In the Nyāya system, the start and direction of approach are slightly different. But the main method of procedure is the same. The attempt is to understand the reality from the surface of the reality that is within the sphere of our normal experience.

4. In the Sāṅkhya system, the start is from the variety of effects that are modifications of matter, and the there is the procedure towards the material causes of such effects, which in their turn are also transformations of matter in an earlier stage. Thus, from a jar, they proceed towards the clay; the jar is a variety of clay with greater variations than what the clay had. In the Nyāya system, the start was made with the effects that are taken up as combinations of parts. Thus a jar is a combination of two pans and the pans are combinations of smaller parts. The conception of the final stage in such a procedure from effects to their causes and their own causes assumes different forms on account of this difference in the line of procedure in details.

5. When the effect is considered as the cause itself, so far as the material is concerned, with new diversities added to it, the cause and its cause and so on will be a series of the same material in different degrees of diversification, the diversities increasing along the line of cause and its effect and the effect of that and so on, while the diversities diminish along the line of effect and its cause and its cause and so on. Such a series takes note of only the materials and not the points of diversities. As a matter of fact, in the Sāṅkhya what is real is only the matter, while its attributes are only manifestations of what have only a subjective reality without any objective reality. In the ultimate stage, we come to a uniform matter without any division, an all-pervasive fluid in which even the three constituents become indistinguishable. They are in that stage spoken of as in equilibrium. The
cause becomes the effect with the addition of diversifications, and the effect is the cause itself and existed in the cause in a state in which the differentiation was not manifest.

6. In the *Nyāya* system, what is called the effect, so far as the material is concerned, is the combination of parts, which parts are thus the causes of the effect. In a process of elimination, we come to a zero point; thus if we eliminate any part in succession from one hundred, a stage comes when there will be only zero remaining. That was the case with the differentiations in the *Sāṅkhya* system; the ultimate stage is devoid of differentiation, when differentiation is reduced to a zero. That is what is called the Absolute stage, the stage beyond which the process cannot proceed. But in the *Nyāya* system, the process is one of division of the whole (which is the effect) into parts (which form the cause), and a process of division can never reach a stage of zero. Thus if we divide a hundred into two, the results again into two and if we continue the process, however far we may go, we are still in a stage of positive reality. A zero can become a positive factor by addition of positive elements, while zeroes multiplied cannot become a positive factor. Even in the ultimate stage, the parts are there as positive facts, and we come to a continuum of parts, parts that do not admit of further division into parts.

7. To understand the position, we must try to transport ourself, in our imagination, to the conditions of the times when the thoughts developed in India. The students must have finished their general studies of a very high standard, and most of them return to their homes and take to their appropriate avocations in the civic life of the nation. But there remain a few who develop a desire to further investigate into the problems that had been taught to them in a general way. Such further investigations have no bearing on the normal life of the society. They want to know the truth that must be of a permanent nature, as distinct from the truths known to the normal people which have only a temporary value; they have sufficient discipline so that the higher wisdom so earned after the investigation will not be put to any improper use and that it will not be sold for any profit. It will not be even made a basis for any fruits in life or in any possible stage after
death, as taught in religion, like heaven. They have some sort of intellectual dissatisfaction and they look for a release from such intellectual dissatisfaction. That is what Śaṅkara must have meant when he speaks of the four-fold eligibility for being initiated into philosophical studies.

8. There were many teachers who had spent their time in such investigation after their higher studies under a teacher, and they in their turn accept students to prosecute further investigations about higher problems under their guidance. The usual teaching was imparted in the homes; but the teachers choose the quiet seclusions in gardens as the appropriate place for giving instructions relating to such higher problems. Let us try to enter such a garden school, what I may call an Academy.

9. Kapila, the great Teacher who propounded the doctrines contained in the Sāṅkhya system, had his own garden school. In his Academy there were students trying to understand the nature of the Absolute. We can watch his class-lesson for a short while. The disciples have their own doubts and a discussion takes place or Kapila may give a discourse on some important point. Kapila may say something like this.

10. "Here are many jars. We have all our clothes. Here is a shed. Here are trees. A jar is not distinguished from another jar by its material constituent. The difference is only in some shape and size and colour and other external factors that are not within the real constitution of the jar. If we eliminate all such points, the jars become uniform. Similarly, the clothes and the trees and the other objects coming within a class are distinguished from one another only by such factors and not in the material content. We can eliminate the distinction between the material that forms a jar and the material that forms the cloth. In that stage, we get only undifferentiated material. If we proceed along this line of eliminating differences we come to matter as a uniform.

11. "But our experience comprehends matter as having change and movement and differentiation, thus necessitating a three-fold distinction even in the last resort. There is the Subject-object relation, there is differentiation and there is also the
material. What is called differentiation and unification is only the manifestation and the disappearance of certain aspects of the reality even in its ultimate stage. The capacity for manifestation is there even when there is no manifestation. Thus even in the ultimate stage, the capacity for the differentiation is there, while there is no manifestation of the differentiation. That is what is meant by the ultimate stage being an undifferentiated uniform. Thus even the distinction of matter and change and subject-object relation disappears, retaining the capacity for their manifestation. That is the stage of the uniform fluid, all-pervasive, indistinguishable. That is the ultimate state of matter.

12. “This matter cannot be divided into parts. There is the stage when matter is divided into parts. The distinction is due to the presence of aspects. Matter is never divided in the process of differentiation. Matter undergoes only a process of differentiation, of diversification through the manifestation of aspects. It is that same matter in the absolute stage that appears before us as jars and clothes and trees and other things. There is a manifestation of aspects in the various objects that we experience, while the aspects are all submerged in the stage of the Absolute. All these effects existed in that Absolute matter with also all the aspects in a latent, submerged, unmanifested state.”

13. If we enter the Academy of Gautama, we may witness another approach to the problem of the relation of the facts of experience and the Absolute. What Gautama would be saying in his discourse to the students, what is found in the Nyāya system, may be something like this.

14. “Here we have many jars, we have our clothes, we see trees, and so on. I can break the jar into two. What was one has now become two. Similarly we can break the clothes and the trees also into parts. The parts have another number and another size. The parts have a size smaller than the whole, while they develop a number higher than that of the whole. Other attributes like colour may remain, and others change. Even without such breaking, the attributes may change. So, the real change that
we experience in this process of dividing a whole into parts, is what relates to number and size.

15. "If we continue the process of division, we must necessarily reach a stage when a further division becomes impossible. If the parts have a size, there is an inside and an outside, and there is this side and that side. That means that there is a middle also. In such a case, reason demands that there is a possibility of further division. Division into parts can become impossible only if what is called size is eliminated. Even if the size disappears, the number can remain. Therefore we have to postulate a stage in this process of division of a whole into parts, when the parts do not have dimension, size.

16. "If we designate the positive dimension of the parts as +1, then the dimension of the whole consisting of two such parts will be \((+1) + (+1) = +2\). That is how we get higher and higher sizes for the whole in relation to the parts. But at the stage when the part has no size, the only possibility of assigning a numerical symbol to it to indicate its non-existent size is to represent the dimension as \((-1)\), and if two such parts are combined and if we assume that it is this negative size that produces the size in the whole, we come to the position that \((-1) + (-1)\) is the size of the whole, which will be \((-2)\). This means that the size of the whole is smaller than that of the parts. Thus we are landed in an absurdity. To avoid such an irrational contingency, we have to say that at the stage when the size ceases to have a positive value, what produces the size of the whole is not the size of the parts, but the number associated with the parts. Each such non-dimensional part has the number 1, and we find that the size of the whole is produced by the number resulting from the combination of the numbers 1 and 1, that were associated with the non-dimensional parts.

17. "At the stage of the last dimensional parts in the process of division, we arrive at a continuum of smallest material particles. But that is not the Absolute stage. If there is dimension, there is the possibility of division; the stage of the Absolute is when further division becomes impossible. So the continuum of material particles is further reduced to a continuum of non-
dimensional material points. The term particle ceases to have propriety in such a context.

18. "Our experience shows that the parts of what is divisible are themselves divisible. So, even at the stage of the continuum of non-dimensional points, we have not reached the Absolute. Since such points have no dimension and have only numbers, the parts too can have only numbers, without any size in what are numbered. If the number 2, constituted by the number 1 in each of the parts, determines the dimension of the smallest material particle, what determines the nature of the parts (without dimension) of those particles must be another number, and we assume it to be the number 3, since in all cases of assumptions, we must assume the least. So, three material points (without dimension) combine to form such a point which, with the number two, forms the smallest material particle with dimension. It is at this stage of the continuum of points that are also parts of points (the points being material and without dimension) that we reach the Absolute.

19. "But if the non-dimensional points can also be thus divided, have we reached the Absolute? Can we not proceed further with divisions of the points into further points, each succeeding point having a higher numerical symbol attached to it? The position is this. We started the assumption of non-dimensional parts and of numerical values for the parts discarding their dimensional values, to avoid an absurd position. If we reach another irrational position like this, there was no need to go beyond the smallest dimensional material particle and to proceed to non-dimensional parts, which has been designated material points. We can apply our reason only to a rational order of things. Therefore beyond the position of non-dimensional points that are themselves parts of non-dimensional parts reason cannot proceed. We need not stop at the first stage; we can proceed to the second stage. What is true of one need not be true of two; but what is true of one and two and three, without any conditioning factor to effect a restriction, must be true also of any number up to infinity. Therefore we cannot go beyond the number two, if we are to function in a rational way within
a rational order of the world. Therefore reason takes us to the stage where the world in its ultimate stage has to be recognised as a continuum of material points which have no dimension, but which have a numerical value, such points being themselves parts of points which too do not have dimensions but which too have numerical values, and these latter points combining to form the smallest material particles with dimensions.

20. "What is called a cause and what is called an effect are both aggregates of many factors and not merely the material; the material is only one of such factors in the aggregate. The number and the dimension are the chief factors in the aggregate. Between the cause and the effect, these factors always alter. Other factors like colour and similar attributes may persist or may change. Therefore we cannot say that the effect existed in the cause. It is only particular factors constituting the aggregate which we call an effect that existed in the cause, not the effect itself. Therefore the effect is a new creation of what did not exist prior. When the effect is destroyed, there is a complete stop for the effect."

21. We do not know who Kapila is that had propounded the Sāṅkhya doctrine nor do we know who Gautama is who propounded the Nyāya doctrine. Kapila, according to tradition, is a semi-divine Sage; the name Gautama occurs in the Vedas. That is all that we can say. Here I must make one point clear. The doctrine of the division of the material world into such ultimate parts is really associated with another Sage named Kaṇḍāda, and the system in which the doctrine is propounded is called the Vaiśeṣika. But the doctrine cannot be unacceptable to Gautama and to his Nyāya system. Latar, the Vaiśeṣika system merged with the Nyāya system. That is why I associated the theory with the Nyāya system.

22. In both the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya systems, the foundation and starting points are in the Vedic doctrine. There is a positive absolute which became changed into a diversified positive world of phenomena. There is the modern Atomic Theory, and the theory is traced to the Greek Philosopher Democritus, who lived in Thrace about the middle of the fifth century before Christ.
We know nothing about the personality or the date of the first propounder of the theory in India. The Indian philosopher must have had an age-long tradition behind him. We do not also have any information about the person who for the first time codified the doctrine in book form, in India. In relation to the start of the theory in Greece, the first systematic and scientific presentation of the doctrine in India may be chronologically later. But the doctrine itself must be far earlier in India, and there is no proof for assigning a very ancient period for the first start of the thought along such line in Greece, which line of thought was presented in a systematic way by Democritus. And scholars do not accept such antecedents for Democritus, who is credited with the first exposition of the doctrine. The theory cannot owe its origin in India to any foreign inspiration. I have no desire to postulate any reverse current either.

23. If the Absolute is of the nature of a continuum of non-dimensional points, then the question may arise whether they exist in space, whether there is any space separating a point from another point. If the world is formed by the combination of such points, that existed apart from one another, was there a spacial approach to one another among points in the process of such a combination? If this be case, what existed in the space between the points?

24. A point is a point as distinct from a particle, because a point has no spacial extension while a particle has a spacial extension. It is spacial extension that is called size or dimension. What have no spacial extension cannot have spacial disjunction also. Thus the Absolute is an all-pervasive continuum without any spacial separation of what continue. In the process of combination there is no spacial approachment mutually between the parts that combine. It is a structural approachment. What were isolated units became combinations on a numerical basis, and this combination ultimately resulted in the emergence of spacial extension, or dimension, in the combination. The formation of the world, the relation between the Absolute and the diversified world, follows some mathematical design. When it was said that the constitution of the smallest material particle
has two stages prior to it regulated on a numerical basis of two and three, that was not meant as a true representation of the process; that is only what reason leads us to and nothing more; and it has to be recognised as a limitation to this inference that we are in a realm where reason cannot have any direct function. All that we can say is that the dimension as known to us, fails at a certain stage. This is all that we can say about dimension. But what we can be more sure about is that even in that stage, the number can play its part.

25. Just as in the Sāṅkhya system it was recognised that the Absolute condition of the material world is beyond the scope of our reasoning capacities, here also the stages below the formation of material particle with a dimension, is beyond our intellectual abilities. And in so far as there is some order in the world, since there is a law operating in the phenomena of the experienced world, since what our mind is competent to know is only the phenomenal world, we postulate an order and a law in the lower stages also of the formation of the phenomena of the world. We also assume that there must be some intelligence who can know such stages. There must be some intelligence behind the formation of the phenomenal world.

26. It is here that the problem of God comes in. What can that intelligence be which is behind the lower stages in the formation of the world, what can that mind be who regulates that formation, that supervises the operation of the law? It cannot be the intelligence of man, is so far as we are dealing with facts beyond the range of human intelligence. There are two facts to be explained; there are the stages below the level where alone man can operate and there are facts of the entire universe including even its phenomenal stage. Man can operate only at the phenomenal stage and that only within limitations in range. It is to explain the facts of the pre-phenomenal stages and the facts of the entire world as a single machinery, that some intelligence is postulated transcending the limitations of man.

27. Such an intelligence is not limited by a body and by functions. There is only a will and a knowledge; there is no function of a mind. According to the Sāṅkhya system, the very constitu-
tion of the material world in its absolute state explains the process of the formation of the world and the function of the entire phenomenal world in co-ordination.

28. The real difference is that in the Sāṅkhya system, what is called intelligence, what is at the root of knowing, is a constituent of the material world. But according to the Nyāya system, matter is dead, and intelligence is something external to matter; and this external factor is termed God. In the Sāṅkhya system, the element of Satteva (Subject constituent) in its absolute stage) determines the design of the phenomenal world as a unit, and in its diversified aspect, the individual facts of the phenomenal world are determined by the intelligence of the individuals. In the Nyāya system, there is the Supreme intelligence and also the individual intelligences to take that place. In the Veda, the Hiranyagarbha (Golden womb) and Viśvakarman (All-maker) are deified in a personified manner, and that is what is accepted in the Nyāya system.

29. In the poems about the Person and about the condition of the world prior to diversification, there is no mention of such a deified agent behind the facts of the phenomenal world, and there is a mention of only individual agents. This is what is adopted in the Sāṅkhya system. And following these two poems, the Sāṅkhya system accepts the agents as formations from the Absolute.

30. In the poems accepted in the Nyāya system as the basis, there is no mention of the deified agent as an evolute from an absolute, and as such the Nyāya system does not recognise its God as part of the constitution of the material world; nor are the individual intelligences a part of the Absolute evolved along with the facts of the material world. There is recognition of an absolute state only for the material world, and the intelligences are outside of this. There is a pluralism with the material world and the God and the intelligences. Even if we put God and men together as one category of intelligences, there is a distinct dualism. I have already said that in the Sāṅkhya system, there is a materialistic monism in the Absolute matter; the acceptance of the Puruṣa or Spirit as a presence, as an illumination., without function, is exotic, necessitated by entertaining the doctrine of Mokṣd
(Beatitude, Final Release) into the system, which doctrine has no Vedic foundation.

31. In the *Nyāya* system, God is intelligence or sentience; intelligence or sentience is not an attribute of God. It is just an illumination. But the individual intelligences are dull by nature, and they get illuminated through association with the facts of the evolved world. It is the presence of the illumination designated God that there is the orderly process of the first formation of the world and its orderly progression subsequent to that first formation. This order, this design of the world, has a mathematical basis. The numbers have an intimate bearing on this process and on this progression. Geometry too plays a very important part in this initial process and in the subsequent progression. The world is designed on the basis of a large number of "Forms". There is the "Form" of the entire diversified world as a unit. This ultimate "Form" consists of many "sub-Forms" and each such "sub-Form" is made up of further "sub-Forms". Such a design implies that the "Forms" in which the facts of the diversified world are manifested are inclusive or exclusive; they cannot be intersecting. It may be represented in the following way:

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          A
          |
        /\  
       /  \ 
      B1  B2  B3
       |    |
      /\  /\  /\ 
     D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15

It will be found that the B Class are included in A, and each of the B Class is exclusive from the other. There are no two classes that can intersect each other in such a design that lies behind the formation of the world. And such a division is possible only if it is accepted as a Cardinal doctrine that the world is formed on such a design. Such "Forms" must be recognised as eternal and unchanging. Each such "Form" is technically called a Genus (*Jāti*). We must distinguish the concept of mere common attri-
butes from such a “Form” which is an integral part of the World-design. The texts use the term Ākṛti (Form) and also Aṣṭāvārasaṁsthāna (configuration of parts) besides Jāti (class or genus) to designate the “Form”.

32. There is occasion for the recognition of such a form only when there are more than one fact which can adopt a common form. If there is only fact, its individuality will determine its nature. The facts must be distinct from one another, differing from one another in nature and not merely in appellation. There shall be no inter-section. These restrictions that have to be imposed on the nature of the “Forms” is quite plain from the very purpose for which the “Forms” have been postulated. Unless the third restriction is recognised, there will be no geometrical design behind the formation of the world.

33. In the world there are two kinds of realities. There is an objective reality and there is what is only a subjective reality. We experience the facts of the world as a thing with some attributes and in a state of movement and change. We cannot experience a mere thing nor a mere attribute nor a mere change and movement. The three are closely intertwined with one another. At the same time, they are experienced as distinct facts. Every one has such an experience. It is not what only the philosopher postulates. Therefore they are recognised as having an objective reality.

34. Philosophy postulates certain facts. The “Forms” which the facts of the world assume, according to the geometrical design of the formation of the world accepted in philosophy, do not have that objective reality. They are accepted as certain abstract forms which the concrete facts are supposed to assume, in philosophy. Therefore if in philosophy, “Forms” are further assumed for such “Forms” also, there will be no end for such assumptions. Therefore the Nyāya system does not recognise such a “Form” for these “Forms.”

35. If all the facts of the world are classified on the basis of such geometrical design, a stage must come when we have only a large number of individual facts each distinct from the other. Then each such fact at the last stage of the classification will have an
individuality, and such individualities are infinite in number. If we assume a “Form” for all such individualities abiding in each of the final facts in the scheme of that classification, that individuality ceases to be an individuality to the extent that each individuality has something in common with the other individualities, namely that “Form”. What we want at that final stage is an absolute individuality, a complete distinction between the individuals without any trace of a common factor. If such a “Form” is postualated for the individualities, the very nature of the absolute individuality breaks up. Therefore no “Form” is recognised for such final, absolute individualities postulated as the nature of the final facts of the classification. Such an ultimate individuality in the final facts of the classification of the world on a geometrical design is designated by the technical term Višeṣa (particularity).

36. Similarly, in the world we normally know only of two relations. We see two facts related to each other as in mutual contact, as in the case of a jar in contact with the floor. If I have seen a jar before and when I see that jar a second time I know that both are the same; here there is the relation of identity between the two facts. But the relation of a thing and its attribute or the relation of a thing and the movement and change in it, is neither. The Nyāya system recognises a distinct relation between such facts, namely, between a thing and its attributes (only certain attributes) and between a thing and the movement and change in it; it is called Samavāya (usually translated as “Inherence”). They recognise the same relation between the part and the whole, and also between a fact and the “Form” postulated in the system on the basis of the geometrical design of the constitution of the world.

37. If in the system a “Form” is recognised for such postulated relations, the question will arise regarding the relation between such postulated relations and their form. It must be a new relation and there will arise the need for assuming new forms for such new relations. Therefore, for lack of the relation that can be fixed between relations and the “Form” postulated, a “Form” is not recognised for such relations.
38. In this way there are six factors that limit the nature of the "Form" postulated in consequences of the acceptance of the geometrical nature of the design in the world. There is the statement in the Nyāya Texts:

Non-diversity of the fact, similarity (the difference being only in appellation), inter-section, infinite regression, break up of the nature, absence of a relation—these are the limitations for the recognition of a genus (the "Form"). Thus there is no genus recognised in God that is only one and not diversified, and also in a jar and in a pot as a class. The two words mean more or less the same thing. This applies only to absolute synonyms.

39. In later times, this geometrical design was ignored by text-book writers and they do not accept the third as a bar to the recognition of a genus. If A B C D and E form one group and if D E F G and H form another group, there was no recognition of two genera for the groups; there is an intersection as:

In later times, such a restriction was not recognised as an absolute one. The limitations came only under certain special conditions.

40. Unless we accept that there is such a geometrical design with "Forms" either inclusive or exclusive, but not intersecting, the very start of the system will break down. Such a design is recognised because it was assumed that every fact can be distinguished from every other fact through a scheme of similarities and dissimilarities. In the strict scheme of classification, the genus forms the similarity among the sub-classes coming within it, and the distinct attributes that separate one sub-class from another sub-clause forms the dissimilarity. In the case of such intersecting classification, there cannot be such a statement of similarity and dissimilarity; there is partial similarity and partial dissimilarity in the case of such facts that are common to both the intersecting groups.
41. If the above six facts are not recognised as bars in the way of the acceptance of the design of the world-formation on a geometrical basis with regular "Forms" inter-related to one another, there are difficulties, as have been indicated when the items were considered. But if such bars are taken note of, there are difficulties in any rational system of thought regarding the world both in its phenomenal and its absolute states and regarding their mutual relation. Do such facts excluded from the scheme of the geometrical forms come within the unitary "Form" of the entire universe? If they are, then they must have "Forms" within that scheme, and this is what is denied by the recognition of the bars. If they do not come within that scheme with a unitary "Forms", are we to recognise facts outside the scheme of the world?

42. The Nyāya system recognises this difficulty. Such facts that have to be excluded from the scheme of the geometrical design of the world do not have an objective reality. The term "This is real" cannot be applied to such facts, and is confined to "Things" and their "Attributes" (some of them) and to the "Change and Movement" in them. Still they are not hallucinations; there is no error related to such concepts. They have only a conceptual reality, a subjective reality. They are facts that determine the forms in which we experience the world and are not themselves within the form. They are facts within the knowing of the world and not aspects of the world that is known.

43. In such a geometrical design, there is the World-unit as a reality at the top. This can be divided into groups and subgroups and their further sub-groups in an infinite series; a subsequent set of groups in this scheme of division is included within a prior group and each such subsequent group within the prior group is exclusive of each other. At a certain stage at the bottom, only the number "One" remains. They are the ultimate material points. Such points go below the level of the ultimate material particles.

44. The process of diversification in the world is one of such a combination of parts and reduction of the combination into its
constituent parts. Attributes appear and disappear in such a process. There is a shift of the matter from one "Form" to another in the geometrical design. There is a universal design and each part follows a planned design. God is the designer for the process. There is no personality for Him; there is only a presence.

45. The question has been raised in recent times whether God is an integral part of the philosophy of the Nyāya system; the original texts of the system do not raise the point at all, and it is only in certain later commentary works that the problem of God becomes an important and noticeable subject in the system. There are also later works solely devoted to discuss the problem of God, within the system. But the fact remains that there is no personal God in the system, a God who punishes and rewards, who interferes with the world-process. The orderly world-process and the design in the world imply an intelligence behind, and that intelligence is termed God; God is not a Creator in the sense in which the God in a theistic system of philosophy is a creator. Nothing is created, according to the Nyāya system, just like the Sānkhyā system. Everything is there, was there and will continue to be there.

46. Creation in the Nyāya system is a technical theory; the facts of the world are complex aggregates of various constituents. Each such complex aggregate is different from every other complex aggregate. What is new in the Nyāya theory of creation is the structure of the aggregate and not the constituent factors of the aggregate. Creation of a fact means only the assumption of a new form by the constituents, which constituents were already there. Constituents combine to form the facts of the world only according to a certain design, and God is the intelligence that is implied by every design.

47. In the geometrical design according to which the phenomenal world has been formed and the phenomenal world is progressing, there are certain realities that can be divided and others that are indivisible and unitary. It is only the divisible things that can be reduced to the smallest material particles and further into non-dimensional material points. Such facts consisting of the
indivisible units and the ultimate material points form the eternal basis for the formation of the phenomenal world. In the original condition, they were just there without falling into any scheme or design or plan. Their structural formation according to the scheme and the design and the plan is due to an intelligence, and when they are fitted into such a scheme they are retained within such scheme and design and plan. There are three factors in the world, the effects (which are only materials within a certain scheme and design and plan), the combination of the isolated facts of an ultimate nature to fit into that scheme and design and plan, and the retention of such formation according to the scheme and design and plan. The power behind this, which must be of the nature of intelligence, is God. God is postulated to explain these facts.

48. The world is experienced as constituted of things having attributes (specific ones) and having movement and change. Such things, the material content of the world, are either unitary and indivisible or are divisible. The system recognises nine varieties of the material content of the world. Of them five are the Five Elements; then there are “Time”, “Space”, “The Souls” and “Mind”. Time and Space are unitary and indivisible. Their division is arbitrary and is made with reference to certain adjuncts associated with them. Thus time is divided into parts with reference to various events in the world. Space is also divided with reference to various facts. It is events like the movement of the Sun and the Moon that enable the division of time and it is facts like a solid body that enables the division of space.

49. The Souls are simply certain entities that have a presence without many of the attributes associated with them in our experience. It is not any illumination, it is not even what by nature is illuminated. It is something dull. It has no sentience, no will. These are all attributes generated through association with the facts of the world. In their real nature, the Souls, according to the Nyāya system, are only shadows, without sentience, without desire, without attachment and aversion, without a will and a volition. Such attributes are experienced in the
phenomenal world, and what are called Souls are postulated as abodes for such attributes, which cannot be assigned to matter.

50. Experience is either happiness or suffering, and ultimately experience is reduced to a series of sufferings. Even what are experienced as happiness are really forms of suffering on account of interception by suffering and on account of gradation and termination. There must be some termination to this series, which is the stage of Mokṣa (Final Release), and Mokṣa can be only for some entity that is in bondage. If there is no such final terminus to the world of experience, there is no need for postulating such shadows called the Souls. In the Sāṅkhya system happiness and suffering, and good and bad are material phenomena; in the Nyāya system these are phenomena in the material world generated in, and possible to be terminated in, the Souls through particular associations with the material phenomena. If there had been no doctrine of Mokṣa (Final Release), they could have been accepted in the system as material phenomena in the process of the world. In later texts, attempts have been made to reduce Time, Space and Souls, into a single category.

51. In the Sāṅkhya system an exotic element called “Isolation” (Kaivalya) or Release necessitated the postulation of certain entities called Puruṣa (Person) or Sentience (Caitanya) or Spirit, which are some sort of presence of the nature of illumination that produces the illumination in the material world. In the Nyāya system the same doctrine called Apavarga or “Extrication” created the same necessity to postulate certain shadows called the Soul (Ātman) which receive illumination through association with material phenomena. But for this exotic doctrine, the doctrine of the world being a material phenomenon in which life or intelligence is an integral part, would have been sufficient for the Nyāya system also.

52. Mind is a material point in the world, infinite in number, which functions to produce the illumination called knowing in the Souls, which in themselves are only shadows. It is the same mind that produces the experience of other attributes in the Soul like pleasure and pain, and attachment and aversion.
Mind is not a function in matter; it is a functionary matter. It has no dimension; it is just a material point. It moves with the body with which it is associated, and also within the body from point to point.

53. I reserved the problem regarding the Five Elements till the other substances are dealt with, for a specific reason. The question is more complicated, and the question cannot be handled by itself in this context, since there is an aspect of physiology in it apart from the aspect of physical matter. The topic can be dealt with in a full way only in connection with Man and his body and his life in a later chapter. Although the position is the same in respect of the Soul and the Mind, the points are not so complicated.

54. Before I take up the Five Elements for treatment I like to consider one important point in the Nyāya system, namely, its absolute realism and its absolute positivism. I have already said that the system accepts two sets of categories, one that has an objective reality and the other that has a reality in the subjective sphere only. Thus a thing with its attributes and in a state of movement and change, forms a triple objective reality, that is designated a Dravya (Substance) with a Guna (Quality) and with Kriya (Movement). Generality (Sāmānyya) and Speciality (Vīśeṣa) and Samavāya (Inherence) form another triple reality within the subjective sphere.

55. This exhausts the universe, and there is no other reality recognised in the system, either objective or subjective. It is true that there is a category called Abhāva (Negation or Absence) that is also included within the scheme of realities in the Nyāya system at a later stage. But in the original texts there is no enumeration of such a reality, though there is mention of "Negation" and its definition and classification and mode of knowing, and they are dealt with even in the original texts. If it is a reality, why is it not enumerated among the categories? If it is not a reality, why is it dealt with in the texts?

56. There is no absolute void in the world. The whole world consists of a continuum of positive points or of the all-pervasive substances like the Souls. When we see one thing, we do not
see another thing. So the reality behind is the same for both cognitions, i.e., of one thing and of the absence of the other. What is called a negation is only another positive thing. When we see a jar on the floor, we do not see the floor below it. What is termed the absence of floor in respect of that cognition is only the jar. When we see only the floor without a jar, what is called the absence of the jar is only the floor. Negation has not even a conceptual reality of its own, distinct from a positive thing. At a much later stage, negation was admitted as a distinct reality in the texts dealing with the system.

57. This point is necessary to explain certain features relating to substances, especially to the Five Elements. I have already said that the substances are either divisible or are all-pervasive and unitary. Of the five elements recognised in the system, four are divisible and one of them is unitary and indivisible. The four divisible elements are what are accepted in Aristotle’s scheme of the world, namely, the Earth, the Water, the Fire and the Air. We experience them as masses of different dimensions, that can be divided into smaller pieces or can be combined to form bigger units. They can be divided into the smallest particles that have a dimension, and such particles can be reduced to material points without spacial dimension.

58. It is only such things that can be reduced to a state of spacial limitation that can move. Mind, another substance that falls outside the Five Elements, is also limited in space being of the nature of a material point. Such things as are limited in space, have a special designation in Nyāya terminology, namely, Mūrta. In the case of such things that have a spacial limitation, the question will arise whether there is a vacuum between two pieces and whether they are, in the final stage, just material points or whether they have a dimension. Logic demands that either they all must form an indivisible, all-pervasive fluid or they are separated by a vacuum, which is only a negation or an absence of a positive entity. At the final stage, there must be continuum of points and a continuum implies the absence of an interval. That is not what is actually experienced in the case of pieces having a dimension. They do not form a continuum; they are
separated from one another, which it is that is meant by the state-
ment that they are pieces with a dimension.

59. Here I must say that as developed in the system, at least
as found in the texts relating to the subject, the Four Elements
out of the five are the material and physical substances that we
know in the world. Aristotle also meant the same four elements
in his scheme of the world. In developing such a scheme, Aris-
totle had to contradict the earlier theory of Atoms propounded
by Democritus. In the Nyāya system we see a synthesis of both.

60. In the Nyāya system, there is a three-fold classification
of the material content of the world. There are the four out of
the Five Elements that can be thought of both as forming a
continuum of non-dimensional material points in the ultimate
stage and also as having some structure and form and value,
being combinations of parts according to a design and a plan.
Minds can be thought of only as material points. Then there
are the four substances, namely, the fifth of the Five Elements
Time, Space and Soul. They form indivisible, all-pervasive
fluids. The last group do not admit of a vacuum. In the case
of the combinations of the material, non-dimensional points,
there may be an interval between one such structure and another.
But the interval is not a vacuum. The material, non-dimensional
points are there, which form a continuum. The combination
into structural forms does not result in a break of this continuity.
It is the nature of the continuity that there is no break. Even
when there is such a combination into structural forms, the contin-
nuity is kept up through such formations.

61. The identification of the four of the Five Elements with
the facts of the physical world as Earth and Water and Fire
and Air, has no support in the Vedic philosophy. In the Vedas,
we find only a division of the world into the physical and the sub-
physical stages. The sub-physical stage is again divided into sub-
stages. What is called the Atmospheric region with Water and
the Celestial region with Light are quite clear as further divisions
of the sub-physical part. They may be equated with Water
and Fire of the Five Elements. There is something deeper that
is dark, beyond the view of ordinary men, the concealed abode
of Names. I equate it with the fifth of the Five Elements, Ākāśa or Ether. In later Indian thought, Sound is the special attribute of this Element. "Name" in the Vedic terminology may be equated with this "Sound." But the forth Element, Air, is not plain in the Vedic texts. But I have no hesitation in asserting that what has developed as the doctrine of the Five Elements is based on the Vedic cosmology.

62. So far as the Earth is concerned, that is the Physical stage of the evolution of the world. There is Soma in the Earthly region, and gods of the Second region, the Atmospheric region, are intimately related to Soma. There is mention of sweetness associated with wisdom and with some of the gods of the celestial region. And in later thought, water is associated with taste as its specific attribute. This gives a clue to trace the development of the doctrine of the Five Elements, associating taste with water, which is the second of the Five Elements.

63. Then we have Light in the third region. There is also another concept in the Veda, and that is Tapas, heat. The world occurs many times in the Rgveda, and its association with heat is clear. Heat-light is a unity; the difference is only in the way in which it is apprehended. In later thought there is touch associated with the fourth Element, the Air. Touch may be hot or cold, and heat is related to light also. Touch may be hard or soft. This is an aspect of impact, and impact implies motive power. In the hymn on the condition of the world prior to diversification, it is said that Tapas (heat) was the source of the manifolding of what was an undivided One. I see no clue to the association of "Smell" (Gandha) with the Earth, which is found in later thought. In the Atharvaveda there is mentioned the "Smell" in the Earth and in the various objects in the world. But that has nothing to do with the relation of smell with the earth in the cosmology of the Vedas. When taste, light, touch and sound can be related to our sense-organs, and also to the four stages in the evolution of the world, according to the Vedas the association of smell with the one remaining Element becomes natural; smell is also related to the remaining sense-organ.

64. In the Veda the reference is to finer and finer aspects
of the material world, when there is a description of the two divisions of the world as Heaven and the Earth, or of the three divisions as Earth, Atmosphere and Heaven. It is this that has developed into the doctrine of the Five Elements in the later stages of thought in India. The Five Elements refer to different stages in the evolution of the material world from some absolute stage beyond the sphere of man's knowledge.

65. I will present the Five Elements as standing for the following stages:

1. The physical world, the Prthivī, the Earth. This can be divided into material parts, and the parts again into smaller parts, until we come to the smallest material particle.

2. Water with sweetness, as found in the Vedas, is associated with knowledge or wisdom. This is the "Thought Stage" from which the objective world evolved. Even in the Veda, and prominently in later thought, waters are given as the source for the formation of the physical world.

3. and 4. The Energy Levels. There is the light-heat stage and the motive energy stage. The first is the Fire and the second is the Air.

4. Sub-energy level. This is Ether.

66. It will be found that according to the Nāyāya system, there is no heat at the Air level, and above the Fire level there is the cold touch, which means a complete cessation of the heat aspect. In the Air level, there is heat as motive power, and so it cannot be spoken of as completely free from heat; yet heat is not apprehended as heat. Thus Air is spoken of as neither hot nor cold. It is when the level rises above the Fire endowed with heat and light that heat completely stops and there is cold touch. That is the "Thought" level, the Water level. The relation of Water to "Thought" will be clear at a later-context, where physiology will be taken up; here sensory activities of the human body will be related to water. The sub-energy level also will be dealt with in a later section.

67. The substances, divided under nine headings as the Five Elements, Time and Space, Soul and Mind, cannot be appre-
hended except through some attribute. It may be through colour or smell etc. it may be through two objects being near and far so far as time and space are concerned, or through happiness etc. in the case of the Soul. The system enumerates the qualities that can abide in substances. Some of them abide only in specific substances like sound in Ether and knowledge in the Soul. Others like number are found in all substances. Some are eternal, like the number “One” in Ether or Time or Space which are indivisiable and unitary. The dimension of substances like the all-pervasive, unitary substances and of the ultimate states of material points (applying the term dimension to them in a rather loose way) cannot change and so is eternal.

68. The most conspicuous feature regarding the relation of the “Qualities” to the substances is the appearance and dis-appearance of certain qualities in the first four of the Five Elements and the combination of parts to form a whole and the division of a whole into its parts. The appearance and disappearance of qualities and the changes of qualities are brought about by a particular kind of contact between the substances and a certain energy, the heat abiding in the element known as fire. Matter in the energy level either converts itself into matter at the physical level, or operate in and through the matter in the physical level.

69. When there is such a particular kind of contact of “Heat” with a substance or when a whole is divided into its parts, what happens is not a mere surface phenomenon. The Nyāya theory is that there is a dislocation to the very last stage of the material points constituting the matter. Thus if I break a jar into two parts, there is a reduction of the whole matter to the final stage of the material points and a recombination into the two parts.

70. This conversion of the material points into gross matter through the various stages of gradation of matter in the energy levels on account of the operation of energy and the reduction to the ultimate material points of the gross matter, go on eternally and in the whole universe. There is no isolated event in the world nor is there an event that is confined to the gross matter or to the
energy or to the ultimate material points. The world is a "Whole", without a blank or a vacuum or a negation or an absence. There is a design in the world that accord to certain geometrical forms and also to certain numerical patterns. Matter in every form and in every numerical pattern at the various moments and at various places constitute the effects in the world, and every effect is a new entity, being a new combination of factors to form an aggregate. It is in this sense that there is "Creation" of the world out of the non-dimensional material points. A design implies an intelligence, and this universal intelligence behind the universal design is termed "God".

71. The material world is a designed combination of the ultimate material points. What is called an all-pervasive entity, as distinct from the combinations of smaller parts of matter to form larger structures, which latter thereby are divisible, is only a postulate to explain facts in the experienced world and is in itself beyond the sphere of our investigation. Thus the all-pervasive entities of Ether and Time and Space and Soul are all postulated on the evidence of facts known to us, and they do not come directly within our experience. But effects cannot come into being in such an all-pervasive entity in its absolute state. An effect, being an effect, has a limitation, is finite; what is limited and finite cannot be directly related to what is ultimated and what is infinite. Therefore an effect which is limited, can be produced in an infinite substrate only when such substrate is conditioned by a limited factor. Thus a jar cannot be produced in Infinite Time or in infinite Space; it can be produced only at a Time that is conditioned by certain limited factors, and so is the case with Space; the conditioning factor is the existence of the causal aggregate. Similarly, knowledge cannot arise in the infinite Soul; it can be produced only in the Soul as conditioned by a limiting factor, the limiting factor being the physical body of the knower. Thus, there can be no finite events in infinite Substrates. The substrate is presumed to be infinite, all-pervasive and eternal only to the extent that its real nature is not within the sphere of our direct experience; they are postulated only to explain finite facts.
72. When a ray of light is produced in a material source, it was presumed in modern science, that the light is propagated through some extra-material medium, which is all-pervasive and infinite. The material source of the light moves away on account of the rotation and revolution of the Earth, and if the light is projected towards a target, that target also moves in space, the result is that the light-wave is cut off from the source and the target. This is the theory. But in actual fact, it is found that the movement of the source and the target has no influence on the propagation of the light in the form of a wave in the extra-material medium. According to the Nyāya philosophy, the light that is produced from the source and projected to a target is an effect, and being an affect it is a limited event; what is limited cannot be directly related to what is unlimited. For this reason, the light remains tied on to the conditioning factors, namely the material source and the material target.

73. Light, and every kind of energy, is a material phenomenon. It operates in the material world. When a source of light emits light and when it falls on a target, the whole of the source and the target is affected by the light. It is absorbed into the material content of the target, and it was emitted by the material content of the source. That material content has a physical aspect and also sub-physical (Energy) and sub-energy levels. The light may be reflected by the target or it may be allowed to pass through it and go beyond. What is absorbed into the target may be re-emitted in another level within the energy levels.

74. From the ultimate stage of the material non-dimensional point, there is a two-fold development. One is along the organic line and the other is along the physical line. Some of such ultimate material non-dimensional points remain and get associated with the organic formations. They are termed the sense-organs in the Nyāya system. This the material content of the phenomenal world consists of physical matter, organic bodies and sense-organs. To the extent that the whole world develops according to a design, and to the extent that a design pre-supposes an intelligence, the whole world is an organic body presided over by the universal intelligence.
75. All the three important doctrines in the Nyāya system noticed above regarding the development of the physical world, namely the Atoms and the Geometrical Design and the Numerical Scheme have their counterpart in the development of philosophy in the West, from the time of the Greek civilization. Some of the theories like the relation of matter and energy and the production of effects in extra-material medium, have their counterparts in modern science also. In ancient India there had been two stages of philosophical development. In the Vedic age there were thinkers who could see beyond the physical world, but the thought of those times are preserved only in the poetic literature of the Vedas which we have and not in the terminology of philosophy current in those days. We have to infer the philosophy from the poetry that we have. In later stages, thinkers were trying to explain the philosophy of the Vedic times, preserved in tradition in terms of the physical world, and they used the terminology that was appropriate for the physical facts known to them.
CHAPTER XIV

Vedanta: Transformation of the Absolute

1. The Rational and the Transcendental.

1. After the Vedic age, the thoughts of India took two directions, both of them being continuations of the Vedic thought. They did not develop conflicting currents; both of them were in mutual concord. The difference was only in the emphasis. In one set of systems the emphasis was on the nature of the diversified world, and the nature of the Absolute got a place in those systems only as an auxiliary. The consideration of the problems of the diversified world led the thought into the border-lands of the Absolute as a necessary "Thither". But the considerations stopped at that stage. They did not take the Absolute into the sphere of the systems.

2. Consequently, the systems depended only on two modes of knowing, perception and inference (with subsidiary aspects of inference), for establishing the facts that came within the scope of the investigation. These two modes implied their limitations also; there was need to recognise another mode of knowing, transcending perception and inference in range, to bring certain problems relating to the Absolute within the general scope of philosophical investigation. Such a need was inherent in the very nature of the two modes of knowing. But all the problems coming within the specific scope of the systems could be investigated by the application of the two modes; thus they are absolutely rational.

3. Other systems of thought also took shape in which the main problems related to the Absolute nature of the experienced things in the phenomenal world; they did not ignore the phenomenal world at all. But the chief field of investigation was the Absolute, and the phenomenal world came into the systems only as the "hither" of the Absolute, just as the Absolute came into the other systems only as the "beyond" of the phenomenal world.
In the former set of systems, perception and inference formed the chief modes of knowing, and a mode of knowing transcending these two, in the form of what is designated "Authority" was recognised corresponding to the reality that transcends reason, recognised in the systems, but not dealt with in detail. In the latter set, it is this "Authority" that is accepted as the chief mode of knowing, and perception and inference are also recognised as modes of knowing for realities on this side of the Absolute.

4. The two systems that constitute this latter set are known as Mimāṃsā. One is called the Pūrva-mimāṃsā (former system of investigation) and the other is called the Uttara-mimāṃsā (latter system of investigation). Just as the term Brāhmaṇa means only the interpretation of Brahman or the original texts of the Vedas, and consists of the interpretation of the ritual and of the philosophy, and yet is restricted in general application to the interpretation of the ritual portion, with the term Upaniṣad applied to the interpretation of the philosophy, in this case also, the term Mimāṃsā is restricted in general application to the ritualistic investigation, and the term Vedānta is used to designate the philosophical investigation. Thus Mimāṃsā in the restricted application is related to the Brāhmaṇa portion of the interpretation of the original texts of the Vedas, and the term Vedānta is related to the Upaniṣad portion. In these two systems, the fundamental problems about the Vedic rituals and the Vedic philosophy are handled. I should have dealt with the problems in the Mimāṃsā system earlier and the problems of the Vedānta system later. But the contents of the Vedānta have greater affinity with the contents of the two systems already dealt with, and so, that system is taken up first. There is another reason for reserving the Mimāṃsā system to the last; that system is uncompromising, and resisted without any reservations the changes that had come over in thoughts and beliefs after the Vedic age.

5. It has already been seen that the same truth about the nature of the world of phenomena and its relation to the Absolute, has been presented in different aspects in the Sāṅkhya and the
Nyāya systems. The difference was brought about by the slight difference in the angle from which the problem was looked into. The Sāṅkhya took the positive world to be an evolution of the Ultimate through changes in attributes and other aspects. As such, the Absolute must be a positive continuum, an all-pervasive fluid filling the universe without any difference in aspects, a uniform. In the Nyāya system, the positive world was taken to be a combination of positive parts assuming different structures, different forms and different sizes. The Absolute, as such, is a positive continuum of the smallest parts, each with an individuality and a speciality, a multi-form. In the Sāṅkhya system, the cause and the effect are the same material with different attributes, in different aspects. In the Nyāya system the material cause and the material effect are the parts and its whole, as distinct entities.

6. In both the systems, the main subject matter was the phenomenal world. In what has come to be known as the Nyāya system there had been two starting points. One is called the Nyāya system (primarily a distinct one), and the other is called the Vaiṣeṣika system, and the latter practically merged in the former and ceased to continue as a separate system. In the primary Nyāya system it is said that through a correct knowledge one can attain the highest goal. Correct knowledge consists of a discrimination among sixteen categories consisting of modes of right knowledge and objects of correct knowledge, along with various modes of erroneous knowing and imperfect knowing. In the Vaiṣeṣika system, it is said that the system deals with Law and defines Law as what leads to Elevation and the ultimate Goal. The goal is to be reached through a discriminative knowledge of the six-fold categories with their mutual similarities and dissimilarities. The Sāṅkhya system proposes to expound a method of terminating suffering through a discriminative knowledge of the manifest world and of the unmanifest Absolute and the knower. The process of knowing in all the three essentially one of rationalism. All the systems recognise some modes of knowing that transcend rationalism, thereby implying realities that fall outside of the sphere of rationalism. It is clear that these
systems did not propose to consider the nature of the Absolute, and confined their treatment to the phenomenal world.

7. In the Vedānta and in the Mīmāṃsā, the scope and the method are both entirely different. The scope comprehends the Absolute and the method is what lies beyond rationalism. The Vedānta starts with the definition of the scope of the subject as Brahman (Absolute), which is the source of this phenomenal world and in which this phenomenal world is maintained and into which the phenomenal world dissolves itself. A “Science” is the only channel for knowing this Brahman, and the subject of Brahman pervades uniformly the entire “Science” of the relevant nature. It is after this preliminary statement that the main subject matter is taken up.

8. “Thereafter, hence, a desire to know Brahman (Brahman-philosophy), arises”. This is how the original text starts. The Sanskrit word for “thereafter” can also mean “what follows”; but what follows is not a desire but a treatment of a subject, and as such, the meaning of the word cannot be that. If the desire to know arises “thereafter”, one has to specify what it is after which such a desire can arise. There is some slight difference of view on this point among the various exponents of the tenets of the system. But all are agreed that a study of the Veda is a necessary preliminary for such a desire to legitimately arise in a person. There is one school according to which after the study of the Vedas, one must investigate into the nature of the Law working in the Universe and live a life in accordance with that Law, and it is only at this stage that a legitimate desire can arise to know the nature of Brahman (the Absolute). Another school holds that the desire to know the absolute can arise when one studies the Vedas; neither the investigation and understanding of the nature of the Law, nor life according to such Law is a necessary preliminary for the desire to know the Absolute to arise in a man. All that is needed is that there should be some intellectual and moral qualities in a man, besides the study of the Vedas.

9. In this connection it must be understood that the other systems of philosophy come within the scope of the general
study of the disciple along with the study of the Vedas. Literature, grammar, logic and various other subjects formed integral parts in the general study of the disciples who were receiving instruction under a teacher in his home. Such instructions in the earlier stages were not imparted in the gardens of the homes of the teachers. Classes were held in the seclusions of the gardens by the teachers only for imparting instruction in the mysteries, in the secret doctrines relating to the nature of the Absolute. The true nature of the Law as developed in the Mimāṃsā must also have been taught in such gardens, though there is no express mention of it in the texts available regarding the system of education in the Vedic times. In so far as both the Vedānta and the Mimāṃsā contain critical investigations into the real nature of certain truths coming after the general study of the Vedas along with various related subjects, it may be presumed that both the subjects were taken up for instruction in the gardens. Students following that higher course of studies were exempt from various disciplines and restrictions that were obligatory for the general students. The Sāṇkhya and the Nyāya came within the general course of studies, while the Vedānta and the Mimāṃsā (both being critical investigations into the nature of the contents of the Vedas) formed subjects for a course of studies that came after the general course, meant only for the few students who had a desire for such a higher course of critical studies about the subjects that were taught in the general course.

10. Corresponding to this difference in the gradation in the course of study, there is the difference in the nature of the problems that were taken up for discussion in the Mimāṃsā and in the Vedānta. In the Sāṇkhya and in the Nyāya, the phenomenal world was the chief topic for study, and the problem of the absolute was just taken up and set aside as falling outside of the system of investigation in them. What fell within the scope of reason was what was taken up in these two systems, and there was only an indication, even an assertion, of realities that fall outside the scope of man's reasoning faculty. Here in the Mimāṃsā and in the Vedānta, realities that transcend reason form the real topic for investigation. Perception and reason come into the picture
only as a side issue and not as the principal modes of knowing the subject matter in the discussion.

11. There had been the tradition of a time in the far ancient past when some persons of transcendental faculties and abilities could see things of the world in a way different from the way in which ordinary people can see them. There is also literary records preserved for such experiences of the few gifted people. Yāśka who has written a book on vedic exegesis known as the Nirukta says that there were in the past some gifted poets, Sages, who could have a direct vision of Dharma, the Absolute Truth of the objective world and of the Absolute Law functioning in the world. The days of such gifted poets had vanished, and they have left for the later generation a set of literature recording such transcendental records, in the form of the Vedas.

12. In such records there is found frequent mention of things known only to the few, concealed from the ordinary people. Such hidden facts were revealed to the transcendental vision of the few gifted poets who have left such records behind. There are discussions about the nature of such truths preserved in texts known as the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. The Vedāṇta takes up such records contained in the original texts left behind by the gifted poets and in the Upaniṣads. The Mīmāṁśā takes up the records left in the Brāhmaṇas or texts interpreting the ritualism of the Vedas, along with the original texts.

13. The teachers of the Vedāṇta take notice of statements in the Upaniṣads like: “I am Brahman”, “Know Brahman and one becomes Brahman”, “Thou art That” and “Here there is nothing that is many”. They take such statements found in the Upaniṣads along with many discussions and many views found scattered throughout the Upaniṣads in a consistent way, and also along with statements found in the original texts regarding the vision of realities that are concealed from the view of ordinary persons. Both for the initial knowledge of a reality that is beyond the reason of man and also for the final realisation of such a reality, the only authority are the statements consistently met with in the Vedas. The final realisation is a direct experience, but one can be directed along that course only by the statements found in the
Vedas. If one develops some kind of transcendental vision, then too there is the realisation even without the help of the Vedas. But such cases are few, and for all practical purposes it is taken as a fundamental postulate that the efforts of a person towards the understanding and realisation of the Absolute are the consequences of the statements found in the Vedas. Here the term Veda should not be taken in the limited sense of the texts known as the Vedas; any statement of a person who had a direct vision of the Absolute is a Veda; so far as the ancient thinkers of that period in India are concerned, the Vedic texts formed the only Veda in the wider sense of the term. But they never confined the signification of the term to such a small set of texts.

14. It has been found that in the Sāṅkhya system there is a dissatisfaction in the intellect on account of its own limitations. There is some higher faculty, and there is a reality transcending the normal faculty, coming within the sphere of only such a higher faculty. This is recognised in the Sāṅkhya system. This is indicated in the Nyāya system. The Sāṅkhya system is explicit in the matter when it is said that whatever falls outside the sphere of perception and reason can be cognised only through the testimony of reliable persons and of scriptural authority. In the Nyāya system the view that there is what is called the direct experience of God and also of people endowed with Togic powers, comprehending truths that fall outside the sphere of normal modes of knowing, indicates the insufficiency of the normal modes of knowing and also the existence of realities that can be comprehended through such transcendental modes and only through such transcendental modes.

15. In the Sāṅkhya system, it was promised in the beginning that the intellectual dissatisfaction, some kind of internal suffering, can be remedied through the discrimination of the knower, the phenomenal object of knowledge and the absolute object of knowledge. All that the system could establish was that there was such a distinction in the universe; the exact nature of the three did not come within the investigation of the system. This latter aspect is clear from the postulation of realities and of modes of knowing that transcend the normal objects and the normal
modes of knowing. In the Nyāya system the highest goal is reached only through the realisation of the absolute truth, and that included the knowledge of God and of persons with Yogic powers and the objects of such knowledge that fall outside the normal modes of knowing. Thus the special subject matter of the Vedānta is implicit in the Sāṅkhya and in the Nyāya.

(ii) The Absolute and the Phenomenal.

16. The Vedānta elaborates the points of view that are only touched upon, that are implied in the Sāṅkhya and in the Nyāya. The Absolute comes only within the sphere of some super-rational modes of knowing, and such an Absolute is found mentioned in the available records about the direct experience of that Absolute by persons of ancient times who could have such a direct vision of the Absolute, and such mention is very consistent in the texts. The insufficiency of reason to grasp the Absolute is also clearly dealt with in the Vedānta. The Absolute is that from which this world of experience has arisen, in which it is sustained and into which it merges. This world of normal experience that comes within our perception and reason, cannot have come into existence by itself, it cannot continue and be sustained by itself, and it cannot resolve into itself. There must be something beyond.

17. The texts of the Vedas that preserve the records of the experiences of thinkers with transcendental powers of vision, contain statements relating to the impossibility of diversification as an absolute factor of the universe: “Here there is nothing that is many”. It is also stated that there is an ultimate reality whence this world has arisen, in which it is sustained and into which it resolves. The many cannot be the absolute truth; this is taken as some sort of intellectual necessity; this is found in the thoughts of various countries and of various periods in the history of man’s thought. Even in modern times, this is taken as an axiom. In the Evolution Theory what is accepted is not merely a regulation of gradation of species in this world, but also the emergence of a higher from a lower, the transformation of what is undifferentiated into a differentiation or the transformation of what is less differentiated into greater differentiation. The
differentiated world is an emergence from an undifferentiated Absolute; this is the foundation of the Theory of Evolution. The other two points in the Vedic thought that the differentiated world is sustained in the undifferentiated Absolute and that it resolves itself into that, may not be cardinal doctrines in the Theory of Evolution. But such two postulates are implied in the one point that is common between the Vedic thought and the modern Evolution theory.

18. When there is differentiation of what was absolutely uniform and when this process of differentiation continues, a stage will come when further differentiation becomes impossible. In the first stage of differentiation, elements of uniformity too continue, and this element of uniformity becomes reduced in extent as differentiation proceeds. In the course of such a reduction of the element of uniformity between two facts or more, it must end in the complete elimination of the element of uniformity between any two facts. That is the stage when the world is an assemblage of individual facts that cannot be further divided into smaller facts and when no two facts have any factor that is common between them. That is the stage of indivisible facts, while the first stage is that of an undivided fact. We speak of differentiation only in respect of facts that can also be grouped together. The differentiation is between groups of uniform individual facts. When what was a unity and what was undivided becomes what cannot be divided, what is indivisible, there is no difference between the first stage when there was no division and the closing stage when too there is no division. The final stage is again the stage of the Absolute.

19. When there was the stage of the Absolute and when there arises another stage of the Absolute, there being no division in either, it goes without saying that the Absolute did not vanish from the world. The differentiation could have been only in this Absolute, and not in something that is different from the Absolute. The differentiation is sustained in the Absolute and therefore the differentiated facts are also sustained in the Absolute. Thus in the modern Theory of evolution also, there are the three points of differentiation starting from an Absolute, being sustained in.
the Absolute and culminating in the Absolute. The difference between ancient Indian thought and modern Scientific theories is not on the question of the Absolute and the Differentiation; but there is a difference and that difference is in the relation between the Absolute and the Differentiations, in the ground for this differentiation of the Absolute. Why did the Absolute start on a course of differentiation and change and Evolution? On this question there is a great difference between ancient Indian thought and modern scientific theory.

20. In ancient India, the Absolute was accepted as of the nature of the essence of Life, what they term Brahman. Thus in the Rgveda, the Absolute is spoken of as of the form of a Person, immense and transcending the world of experience, and there arose differentiation (Virāt) in this Absolute Person. Elsewhere the Absolute is spoken of as an immobile Existence, in which there arose the phenomenon of a Will, which shows that the essence of Life was in that Absolute. The Upaniṣads also refer to the desire in the Absolute that it may become differentiated. The differentiation is an intelligent process in the Living Absolute. In modern science the Absolute is dead matter and the differentiation is a blind process without any life or design behind it. In modern science it is not a mere agnosticism, a mere indifference to the problem of the "why" in relation to the change of the Absolute into Differentiation. The dead nature of the Absolute Origin of the differentiated world is a cardinal doctrine in the science of modern times, and yet they assert a Natural Law followed in this process of Evolution. If the Natural Law can be identified with the Essence of Life, there is no more any difference between the two systems of thought.

21. Modern science simply asserts that the original Absolute has no life and that there appeared the phenomenon of change and Evolution; it also asserts that what is called Life is a later phenomenon in this process of Evolution. But they refuse to discuss the problem when and why and how this change first started in the Absolute and what exactly is the relation between the Absolute and the phenomena. It is none of their affair. Even without discussing the problem and finding a solution for
it, their science can function and progress. The nature of the world process is, according to modern science, a change from what is uniform to what is differentiated. There is also such a change. It is not merely a question of the world being constituted of an infinite number of facts that can be grouped and arranged in a series of gradation. There is a movement from one step to another, and the step is in the direction of differentiation from the stage of uniformity. Lesser and lesser uniformity and greater and greater differentiation—this is the nature of the world process. The degree of differentiation settles the position of a fact or group of facts in this gradation, whether it is in a higher gradation or in a lower gradation.

22. In ancient Indian thought, the doctrine that a change from what is uniform to what is differentiated marks the direction of the world process, seems to have been accepted. But the other point that this change is one of progress does not seem to be so clearly recognised. In Indian thought, the position seems to be that what is more differentiated marks a lower position in the series of gradations and the world process is a movement from the higher to the lower. According to the Vedic belief, as recorded in the Rgveda and continued in later literature, there was only the perfect Absolute in the beginning, from which arose a differentiation; the first product of this process of differentiation is the personal God, and then there were the gods and the demi-gods and the wise Sages, who started the process of creation. Beasts and birds and humanity came at a later stage. Some of the original human evolutes of this first process in differentiation are the real creators of the facts and events of the world, and they are called the Prajāpatis (the Lords of people). They assert different stages and gradations in the process of the creation of the world, from the original creation to the creations by such Prajāpatis.

23. Although there is reference to the Absolute and the production of differentiation in it, and also to the origination of a Will in it, and although there are various references to creation and the birth of even gods, the idea of a beginningless nature in the world is also there. This becomes very prominent in
the discussions of the philosophical implications of the original texts of the Veda, in the \textit{Upaniṣadic} portion of their commentaries. In later philosophical systems of India, this idea of there being no absolute beginning for the world process has become a cardinal doctrine. As a matter of fact, what is called time is also an evolute, and we cannot speak of a relation to time for the Absolute and its first modification into a differentiation. The Absolute is Absolute free from limitations of time, and differentiation too is outside the limitations of time. Arrangements of events in the world on the time scale can come into operation only after the appearance of the evolute called "Time".

24. All kinds of difficulties arise if we relate the Absolute to the limiting factor of time and also refer the differentiation also to such a limiting factor. For one thing, the Absolute ceases to be Absolute by such a relation to a limiting factor. If we say that the limiting factor was there in a dormant state and did not operate as a limitation, we have to say why and how and when the limiting factor became an operative factor. Did the cause for this change exist in the limiting factor or in the Absolute? Why did it not start its operative course prior? Are we to postulate the appearance of a new factor besides the Absolute and Time, which brought them into mutual relation? Who brought it, why and when and how? These are difficult questions that will arise. Reason defeats itself by raising such questions. The only way in which reason can save itself is to deny any relation of the Absolute with the limiting factor of Time. The Absolute is there, and the events of the phenomenal world are there arranged on the scale of the time which too is within the phenomena. There is the Absolute and there is also the phenomenal world, in which Time is an integral factor. The individual phenomena in the world can be related to Time, but the phenomenal world as a totality cannot be so related to what is within that totality, what is a factor within itself.

25. In the \textit{Sāṅkhya} and in the \textit{Nyāya} systems, there is the postulation of an Absolute and also of a phenomenal world. But the question of the nature of that Absolute and of the relation of that Absolute with the phenomenal world is not taken
up for detailed consideration in the two systems. In the Vedānta, that is the main point for discussion. The great difficulty is that we can speak of a relation only between two known things that are to be related. The phenomenal world comes within our powers of comprehension. But the other factor in postulating the relation, namely, the Absolute, is outside the sphere of our knowing. It will cease to be the Absolute if it comes within the scope of our knowing.

26. The Absolute is spoken of as what is different from the phenomenal world, what cannot be known through any of the sense-organs, what cannot be pondered over by the mind, what cannot be stated in language form. Thus we can at best speak of a relation between the knowable world of phenomena and what is not that. The gifted Sages have some vision of that; but they cannot state what its nature is in language form. The Absolute is not what can be denied, while it is not what can also be specifically comprehended and stated in language. The position is not that of the denial of anything beyond the phenomena, an assertion of such as a vacuum, as a void, what is technically called a Śūnya. Nor is it the position that the phenomena as a whole can be related to what is beyond the phenomena in the way in which one phenomenon can be related to another phenomenon. By the very nature of the problem, such a relation cannot be specifically stated or known. And this is the position that is found in the texts of the Veda, both the original texts and the commentary portion. The point of such an uncertainty is clearer in the commentary portion known as the Upaniṣad. Various views are stated, various attempts are made to state the view of such a relation in language. The purpose is not to reach the point of success in the effort; what is kept in view is to emphasise the imposibility of success in such an effort. This is what is found to be the position in the Upaniṣads.

27. This might have been sufficient in the time of the Upaniṣads; but the situation changed when there was a specific doctrine about the “beyond” of the phenomenal world. When it is asserted, as the thinkers of the Buddhist School do, that the phenomenal world including its experience, is a series of errors
and that the beyond, which is the Absolute and which is the Reality, is a vacuum, a complete void, the Śūnya, the position of the Vedic School too has to be stated in language from, and the Vedic view is that the Absolute is also of the positive nature which the world is. In the phenomenal world there is an admixture of what is positive and what is negative. What is Absolute cannot be such an admixture. If it is only one or the other, then the positive nature is nearer the truth than the negative nature so far as the Absolute is concerned. This is the position taken up by the followers of the Vedic tradition in thought. In the later literature, called the Vedāntic literature, there is an attempt to express the nature of the Absolute in language form and also to express the relation of the phenomenal world to that Absolute.

29. This has taken different channels, for its flow; we speak of different Schools within the Vedānta. One view is that there is no kind of relation between the phenomenal world and the Absolute. The other view is that the phenomenal world is related to the Absolute. In the latter alternative, there are various views regarding that relation. The Monistic School Sāṅkara is itself divided on this issue, one section postulating a relation and the other denying any relation at all, between the phenomena and the Absolute. There are two other main schools, which accept a relation between the two. In the Monistic School, the identity of the two, the Absolute and the phenomena, is recognised, while in one of the other two schools, such an identity is recognised only with some qualification, and in the other no sort of identity of the two is recognised. It cannot be a real difference of view regarding the nature of the Absolute and its relation to the phenomena, in so far as the real nature of the Absolute is beyond the capacity of man. The difference is only in the way in which such a nature can be stated in language which, by the way, is applicable only to the phenomena, and in which such a relation between the two can also be stated in language.

29. The nature of what can be accepted as Absolute is that it is not an accumulation of what is finite. If we start with the finites and proceed, we can never reach a stage when it ceases
to be finite and when it converts itself into the infinite. We have an infinite number of finite facts in the world; the totality of all such infinite facts can only be still a finite reality, and such a process can never end in infinity. If we start from the number "One" and proceed through "Two", "Three" and so on, we will ever remain in the region of finite numbers. It may be that our capacity to count may get exhausted. But that is not the stage of arrival at infinity. Infinity is not inability to continue in finity. Infinity is the cessation of a finite nature and not the cessation of the ability of grasping the finite nature. The former is inherent in it and the latter is what is external to it. Thus, the Absolute or the Infinite is not the aggregate of the finites or of the phenomena.

30. This is more or less the standpoint in the Monistic school of Vedānta. What we experience is what has a limitation; what has not a limitation cannot be comprehended. At least there is the limitation of the division into a subject and an object in all events of a cognition. This bifurcation is in itself a limitation. Further, in actual experience too it is found that we cognise only a limited object, something as different from other things, something confined to limited space and time. We never cognise a thing as a mere "this" with an independent individuality. And our own awareness of ourselves is as the experiencer of such limited objects. So, a limitation in nature is inherent in every experience. What is Absolute must not have this limitation of a distinction between subject and object and this limitation in time and space. The Absolute just "Is"; it is just an "Experience". It is freedom from any limitation that constitutes the Absolute nature. There is the Absolute and there is also what is Relative.

31. If the Relative is entirely different from the Absolute, then there are two things that are real, and each is different from the other. Such a position brings about a limitation in what was accepted as Absolute. The Absolute by its very nature is real; and what is experienced cannot be denied, in spite of the limitations in it. Thus, in relation to what is recognised as the phenomena with limitations, we cannot postulate either reality
or unreality. Both come into conflict with facts, either by a denial of the Absolute nature to what is Absolute or by a denial of reality to what is really within our experience. Thus the phenomena is neither absolutely real nor is it totally unreal. This is what is meant by the view in Monism that the phenomena is an illusion, what is technically called \textit{Mīthyā}.

32. The literature relating to this School of thought makes use of other terms also like \textit{Alikā}, \textit{Tucha} and \textit{Anṛta}. In all such terms there is an element of truth associated with error in the connotation. Not one of them mean a void, a vacuum. The word for void or vacuum is \textit{Ṣūnya}, and the world of experience is not accepted in this system as \textit{Ṣūnya}, the absolute vacuum or void. As a matter of fact here is no vacuum or void in this world. It is a continuum of positives associated with a negation, and such a continuum of positives as associated with negatives is what is called the phenomenal world; the phenomenal world is neither the continuum in its own nature nor is it the aggregate of the negative elements.

33. The phenomenal world is experienced; but it does not come within our experience in its entirety. It is just like the finite numbers; the mind of man has a limitation beyond which even the mind cannot comprehend the finite; this is loosely termed “infinite”. But the true infinite is not a stage in the ascending order of the finites. In the same way what is truly the Absolute is not the phenomenal world in its stage that transcends the sphere of human comprehension. What is called the finite, phenomenal, world is alo infinite in the sense that it goes beyond the sphere of human understanding. Such an infinite world of phenomena is without a beginning and without any spacial limitation, so far as our own capacity to understand goes.

34. It is this latter aspect of the infinite that is called the \textit{Iśvāra} (the Supreme God) in the Monistic School of \textit{Vedānta}. It is the aggregates of the finite that is within the sphere of human understanding and something more, something that human mind cannot grasp. It is the “Beyond” (The \textit{Śeṣin}, as mentioned in the \textit{Vedānta} School that accepts the Absolute as qualified, the \textit{Viśiṣṭādvaita} School), of which the particulars within the under-
standing of the human mind form parts (Aṁśas), as mentioned in the same School. This Absolute is capable of being associated with differentiation, it is capable of being the whole of the experienced differentiations, and something beyond. It may also be that the differentiations within the sphere of human understanding form a group, and what is beyond is another category; this latter being the Absolute. Within the differentiation, there is life and inert reality, with their mutual differentiations as two groups and with internal differentiations between the individual differents.

35. In this way there are five aspects of differences, according to the last variety of thought within the Vedānta, mentioned ust above. There is the difference between the Absolute and the differentiated, which itself forms two groups, the sentient and inert. Thus the differentiation from the Absolute is of two kinds, corresponding to the two groups of the differentiated world. Then there is the mutual differentiation of the two groups, one being the sentient and the other being the inert. Within each of these two groups, there are the differentiations between the individuals. These are the five kinds of differentiations.

36. It will be found that the three doctrines (i) the doctrine of Līvara (the Supreme God) and the world of man and of the inert matter, both being the phenomenal world with the Absolute, being only an abstraction entirely beyond man’s capacity to understand by any means either perception or reasoning, and (ii) the doctrine of the Absolute being the Beyond (the ṣeṣin) and being the Whole (the Aṁśin) in relation to this experienced world that is what remains (Ṣeṣa) and that forms the parts (Aṁśas), and (iii) the Doctrine of the Absolute being the Supreme (Para), different from the experienced world of the sentient individuals and the inert matter, are not antagonistic to each other. They are brought about by the way in which man’s limited capacity to understand attempts to understand what is beyond its capacity. “I am That”; “I am in and of That”; “I am different from and subordinate to That”. In the first position, there is an absolute denial of the “I” as separate from “That”; in the second there is the inclusion of the “I” in
"That"; in the third, there is a surrender of the "I" to "That".

37. I may try to illustrate many point by taking the example of a picture by a true artist. Are the individual colours identical with the Art without any individuality of their own? Or are they realities in the Art, being parts of the Art, with. the Art itself as something more too? Or is there an Art with the colours different from the Art? The Art is there; but no one can understand that Art as it really is. Each sees the Art in his individual way. No one can say that only one way of looking at it is right and that the others are against the facts. All are aspects of the truth, and not one of them is the truth, the whole truth and the only truth. This is the relation between the art and the colours in the art.

38. There is the Art. Even the artist could not have understood the Art in its absolute nature. Perhaps he could have identified himself with the Art, and in that case, his individuality is lost and he is merged in the Art. The nature of that stage is what he cannot remember when his identity is restored. That is what he cannot represent by any means in a way that could be understood by others. Thus the painting is not the Art; it is only the aspect of the Art that can be comprehended by human mind. Another artist may have the experience of a true Art through that painting; and in that stage he too loses his individuality. Even to the artists, Art is only an abstraction and not a reality within his experience, what he can communicate to others. The experienced Art is not the Absolute Art. The experienced Art can be thought of as a collection of colours with an Art that is beyond of the individual colours with their dimensions and mutual relations and mutual proportions, with an Art that includes the colours within itself. It can also be thought of as an Art that is separate from the colours. This is only an attempt at illustrating what is without an example.

39. Even the Monistic School of the Vedānta does not deal with the absolute "Absolute" in any categorical way. The true sphere in this school is only the phenomenal world. The goal is a dissatisfaction with experience, with the insufficiency of experience
to find satisfaction within itself, while there is nothing that is beyond that can give that satisfaction. This results in an abstraction of something that is not What is experienced. This is only an abstraction from what is experienced; it is not a grasp of what is not within experience; as a matter of fact the term "what is not within experience" is a contradiction in itself. This is a negative stage. So, the content of Monism is only a denial of the "Many" as the Absolute. Even what is spoken of as the absolute "Absolute" in Monism is only a denial of the absolute nature of what is within experience and not an assertion of the absolute "Absolute".

40. It is this negative position that is criticised in the other two Schools of Vedānta, namely, (i) the School of Monism with a qualification, that is, Monism of the Absolute that is within the comprehension of man, not of the absolute "Absolute", Monism that does not culminate in a pure negative state, and (ii) the School of Dualism, where both the Supreme and the Individuals are accepted as absolute realities, within the comprehension of man's mind. In these two latter Schools, there is no positive denial of what can be termed the absolute "Absolute". There is only a refusal to admit such a doctrine along with a will to stop at what is within man's comprehension, at relating the "All" to the "Few" that are known, or at least can be known.

41. When the different aspects are understood in their real nature, there is no conflict among the different aspects. I have been always saying that there cannot be any conflict among the "Teachers". If the Teachers had met, they would have understood mutually; there would never have been any quarrel among them relating to the aspects. They would have recognised each as possible aspects of what is one. The quarrel arose because of the propagandists who took up the cause of the different aspects. They wanted adherents, and adherence to any one is not true adherence, unless there is departure from the others. Schools of pure philosophy got entangled in the schools of Monastic Orders.

42. The three Schools of thought are related to three Teachers, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. They advocated the
three modes of approach to the content of man’s experience. Śaṅkara is not the originator of the School of Absolute Monism, nor is Rāmānuja the originator of the School of Monism with a Qualification. Gauḍapāda, who is according to tradition, the teacher’s teacher of Śaṅkara, had already expounded the doctrines in the form of a work in verses, added as supplement to one of the Upaniṣads, to the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad. There is a view that this is a Buddhistic work; but it has become one of the authoritative texts as the basis of the Monistic doctrines. Rāmānuja definitely says that he was only reviving an ancient system of doctrines, doctrines that had previously been taught by Yāmunācārya. The absolute nature of the experienced reality was an old doctrine in India. It is this that is accepted in the Nyāya and in the Śāṅkhyā Schools of philosophy. The reality of differences among the various types is also an old belief.

43. It is the three Teachers who gave a form to the different aspects of the same doctrine about the Absolute. There is a view that Śaṅkara gave the death-blow to Buddhism in India; it is also held, as supported by the Buddhistic tradition, that Śaṅkara even influenced the great Rulers of India to persecute the Buddhists. It is very likely that Śaṅkara was brought up in the Buddhistic School of thought; perhaps he had his education in such centres where the rationalistic tendencies and anti-Vedic tendencies were very prominent. He must have had his orthodox training, in the traditional way, in Vedic texts. He accepts a study of the Vedas as a necessary preliminary to philosophic thinking, though the seeker of truth need not have performed the various rituals prescribed in the Vedas. On account of his training in the Buddhistic centres of learning, he himself had no occasion for the performance of the rituals prescribed in the Vedic texts which he had occasion to study. But he claimed his right to take part in philosophical speculations and discuss matters in open assemblies.

44. From the time of Nāgasena, who has expounded his negative doctrine that the world is a void and who expounded it as the true doctrine taught by Buddha himself, the denial of an absolute value to the reality of the world of experience had become a cardi-
nal doctrine in all Buddhistic centres of thought and learning. The Buddhistic texts give no support to a doctrine of the positive nature of the world of experience, while Śaṅkara had imbibed the doctrine of the positive nature of the world as taught in the Vedic texts and in its traditions. The interpretation of the Buddhistic texts asserted the nature of the world as an absolute void. Although the statements in any text is not authority for postulating any theory about the nature of the Absolute, the texts give some hint for such a postulation, and that is why Śaṅkara has said that the study of the Veda is a necessary preliminary for the postulation of the doctrines that he was trying to enlarge upon in his system. What he really could have in his mind is that the deliberations about the Absolute cannot be a natural sequence to the investigations about the experienced facts of life. The urge must come from some transcendental source; the light comes from some super-normal source. Perhaps there is a hint here that he was not able to derive any such urge to think of the nature of the absolute from the Buddhistic texts which he had learned and that he had his urge on account of the Vedic texts that he learned.

45. He accepted the position of the interpreters of the teaching of Buddha that what is experienced has no absolute value as reality. But he rose to the further abstraction that there is something that is of a positive nature, that is beyond of this and is not this. The “This” and the “That” cannot be two separate realities and the only conclusion that is possible is that “This” is also “That”, that the “This” is an aspect of “That” and that the “That” is the Absolute in itself. He did not demolish Buddhism at all. He gave it a new turn, and the new turn is in the direction indicated by the Vedas. The question whether the traditional interpretation in Buddhism had any correspondence with the actual teachings of Buddha or whether what is interpreted is a deviation from the Path of Buddha, did not arise at that time. He was concerned only with Buddhism as interpreted by the followers of that School. He did not deviate from the Buddhistic doctrines as interpreted in the tradition of Buddhistic schools; he passed beyond that, having accepted it only as a stage in the journey towards the goal. He was not at all
an anti-Buddhist. His relation to Buddhism may be compared to the relation of the "Vitalistic School" of modern thought to the Theory of Evolution.

46. While Šaṅkara accepted the Buddhistic stand-point, he did not rebel against the Vedic school with its ritualism. Just as he did not accept the position of the Buddhists as the final position, but only as stage, he did not accept the ritualistic doctrines as a final position. Ritualism too was only a stage in the journey towards the goal. He pointed out a goal that can be reached both through the Buddhistic path and also through the Vedic path of ritualism. He was not a partisan; he found unity between the two conflicting paths. Because he was not a partisan, he was considered as an opponent by both; that is the irony of neutrality, the tragedy of impartiality. He could be a friend of the two conflicting parties; but the parties' position was that one who is not an enemy to one's enemy is no friend to the one.

47. Within the original texts of the Vedas, there is no conflict between the portion where the rituals are interpreted and the portion where the philosophy is interpreted; similarly, within the "Systems of Philosophy" also, there is no conflict between the School that advocates Vedic ritualism, the Mimāṁsā system, and the system in which the Vedic philosophy is interpreted, the Vedānta system. Neither in the original text of the Vedānta School, what are called the Śūtras, nor in the interpretation of the text by Šaṅkara is there an open attack on the doctrines developed in the Mimāṁsā system. All that Šaṅkara has said in the earlier portion of the commentary that he has written on the original text, is that ritualism is not the only gate through which one can enter the garden of philosophical wisdom; that is one of the gates and there is the other gate of the Buddhistic. The final goal is beyond both ritualism and the Buddhistic theory of negativism; it is also beyond the position of absolute positivism and a qualified acceptance of Monism.

48. The great objection to the doctrine of the Vedānta system which Šaṅkara evolved from the side of the other Schools of the same system relates to the term Mithyā, which may be
rendered as "Illusion". Śaṅkara used the term in one sense and the criticism was based on another meaning of the word. The word is a technical term. The word, in Śaṅkara's terminology, means what cannot be accepted as either absolutely real or as absolutely unreal. This is what is only relative in the matter of its reality. Our whole experience is a composite of factors that are relative. There is the difference between the experiencer and the experienced object, and also the process of experiencing and the modes of experience. Not one of them can be thought of without relation to the others. Then there is the difference between "This" and "That" between "Here" and "There" between "Now" and "Then" and between the various other attributes associated with the factors without which the factors themselves cannot be thought of. In so far as not one of them can be asserted within itself, without relation to one or other of the factors, there is no absolute value to any one; each one is relative to the other. This is not a denial of the "I"; this is not a denial of "You"; this is not a denial of "This" or of "That". An "Illusion" in ordinary language contains an element of a denial. Even in a statement that "This is not that", there is no denial of anything; the nature of being "This" is not denied of "That", in this statement. What it means is that there is "This" and also "That", and that "This" is relative to "That"; "This" cannot be "This", unless it is related to a "That", without a "That" there is no possibility of thinking of a "This". There is no denial of one in the other; there is an assertion of the two, each in relation to the other. This is not what can be called "Illusion".

49. There can be no relation between two things that are absolutely different from each other. Two things are related to each other only if both are aspects of a single fact. Unless the object and its colour are aspects of a unit, we cannot think of the object as having that colour. So, the relative nature of what appear to be isolated factors is itself the basis for evolving a doctrine that the isolated factors are aspects of a single unit: each factor is the whole of that unit. It is when there are two factors each of which is the whole of what is the composite, that we can say that they are related to each other. Thus relativity itself guarantees
the absolute nature of what are related. Śaṅkara uses the term Mithyā (Illusion) to express this experience of the unit as composite factors. If there is any element of denial in the system evolved by Śaṅkara, it is only a denial of any possibility of a real denial with reference to anything in this world.

50. The objection raised against Śaṅkara’s system is that if the experincer and the experience and the experienced object and the mode of experience are all “Illusory”, what is it that is to be considered, who is it that can consider and how. This is not a true presentation of the position and an honest criticism of it. It is a distortion. What Śaṅkara says is that all the factors are there as aspects of a unit, and that unless they had been related to one another as factors in a unit, they could not have been related at all.

51. Each factor in experience of the world is the entire Unity, the Absolute, and the experience of the Unity, the Absolute, as factors related to one another is not the experience of the Unity as a unity but as aspects of the Unity. This experience of the Unity as merely the aspects of the Unity is what is termed Mithyā, the “Illusion”. Such an experience is also expressed by many other terms, like “Avidyā (nescience), Māyā (delusion), Adhyāsa (super-imposition) and Bhrama (confusion). The essence of everything is that the Unity is experienced as aspects of the Unity. The aspects constitute the reality within the sphere of experience, and Śaṅkara never called people to abandon the relative realities of experience. It is the Unity itself that is experienced as the aspects, and if the aspects are abandoned, the Unity too is abandoned. What Śaṅkara emphasises is that the aspects should not be taken as absolute realities; they must be accepted as aspects of the real Unity.

52. The aspects are as eternal as the Unity itself. The difference between the aspects and the Unity is not that the former is produced and liable to end, while the latter is eternal. The difference is only in this that the Unity is real in itself, while the aspects are real only in relations to other aspects. Such an experience of the Unity as aspects is termed a Vivarta or transformation. Śaṅkara has to use language, which is not sufficient for the
subject matter which he is dealing with. So, the terminology used by Śaṅkara must be taken with the limitation when we interpret his doctrines.

53. Just as Śaṅkara says that though it is the contents of the Vedas that give the urge for man to turn his attention to the metaphysical problems and that the Vedic ritualism has no part in it, similarly, Saṁnyāsa, "Renunciation", too is not a necessary preliminary for philosophical inquiry. Any one with the necessary equipment can start on the inquiry. The equipment consists in a desire to secure relief from an intellectual dissatisfaction. The relief shall have no relation to any temporary profit, to any worldly, practically gain, to any mental passion. The aspirant for philosophical inquiry shall be absolutely scientific in his approach; just a desire to know shall be his urge.

54. In the teachings of the Vedānta, there is no call to leave this world and to go to another place or to reach another condition. Emphasis on a difference between this and that world, between Matter and Spirit, between worldly suffering and escape therefrom and on such matters is against the true spirit of the original Teachings. Śaṅkara might have been a Saṁnyāsin, a Recluse. But one does not become a Śaṅkara by wearing the robes of a wandering ascetic, which Śaṅkara was. The system degenerated into a system of escapism, indolence and indifference on account of association with religious systems, and Saṁnyāsa, renunciation, is only a religious institution. The system of Vedānta teaches only a scientific way of looking into the nature of the particulars in our experience, which, being particulars, are relative and do not have an absolute reality. The Life Absolute is an undifferentiated Unity, and each one of the factors in the differentiated world of experience is that Unity itself. The differentiation is a feature in the life of experience and not the nature of the Life Absolute. It is only a way of looking at things, a way of understanding things, and is not a path to any goal. If differentiation in the Absolute can vanish then the Absolute is absolute; when there is differentiation, the Absolute is phenomenal. We can say in ordinary language that the Absolute transforms itself into the differentiation. But this is only a state-
ment and not the true fact. To state that each different is the real Unity is a nearer approximation to the nature of the Absolute.

55. In this way there are the three systems of thought in India which have evolved three distinct modes of stating in language what the real nature of the world is. Ultimately, that nature is to be realised through no other mode than that of a direct experience; the teachings in the various systems are only sign-posts on the road of the seeker, giving directions towards that goal, and they are not at all rest-houses at the end of the journey.

56. In all the three systems, namely, the Sānkhya-cum Yōga, the Nyāya-cum Vaiśeṣika and the Vedānta, Matter with Life as inherent in it would have been sufficient to explain all their metaphysical doctrines. But a dualism of Matter and Spirit came into the systems as a cardinal doctrine, being a necessary sequel to the belief in what is called “Release” from a world that is in its own nature a bondage for the Spirit, Matter being the binding factor for the Spirit. This is a compromise with religious beliefs on the part of philosophy.

57. Approach to the problem of God, which is a vital factor in Religion, has also become different in the different systems, on account of the difference in the starting point. Terms like “The Supreme” (Īśvara) to designate God found their way into the systems on account of the nature of the language current at that time. A term like “Natural Law” would have been sufficient for philosophy to satisfy their terminological requirements.

58. Now we pass on to an entirely different system of thought. The above three are interpretations of the philosophy of the Vedas with a compromise with Religion, while the fourth, now to be presented, is the uncompromising picture of that philosophy, interpreting Religion.
CHAPTER XV

Mimāṃsā—ETERNAL AND DYNAMIC AND REAL

1. Mimāṃsā is a system of thought that is something unique in the world. It is the direct heir to the wisdom of the Vedas, but was later displaced from that position. It was even dis-inherited, and had to go to the wilderness, so to speak. The system was neglected from very early times in India itself; in some parts of India, the system had practically gone out of currency, and few scholars studied the subject. It will not be far wrong if an assertion is made that the system continued to be studied and understood only in the South of India in later times. It was never a system that was despised by the adherents of the Vedānta system in ancient times, although there is some such notion current in modern times. As a matter of fact, practically all the exponents of the Mimāṃsā system were also celebrated scholars in the Vedānta and writers in that field.

2. The system must originally have been a part of the Mimāṃsā system in its wider application, namely, an investigation into the purport of the Vedas, comprising ritualism and philosophy. The Mimāṃsā text consists of twelve chapters; there is another work called the Saṅkaraśa-Kāṇḍa, which deals with some forms of contemplations and disciplines, and then there is the text of the Vedānta system expounded in four chapters. All these twenty chapters form a single system. The separation of the Mimāṃsā text in twelve chapters and the Vedānta text in four chapters into two separate systems is a later phase in the development in the system of investigation into the ultimate purport of the Vedas. It is also based on a mistaken reading of the philosophy of Śaṅkara, who gave a form to the Monistic interpretation of the Vedānta thought. Śaṅkara is a Saṅnyāsin, an ascetic, and as such he must be antagonistic to ritualism; Śaṅkara criticises the interpretation of the Vedānta, which latter interpretation took a definite shape in the School established by
Rāmānuja and that is known as the Viśiṣṭādvaita or Monism with a qualification. In this School, there is a synthesis of Saṅnyāsa (Renunciation) and Ritualism. It is according to this system that the twenty chapters form a single system, consisting of the twelve chapters of Mīmāṁsā proper and the four chapters of Vedānta with the intervening four chapters called the Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa dealing with forms of contemplation and disciplines.

3. All that Saṅkara has said is that the understanding of the system of the ritualism of the Vedas and the observance of such rituals do not form necessary preliminaries for the investigation into the philosophy of the Vedas. If there is some sort of intellectual dissatisfaction and if there is a desire to find a solution for some mysteries that agitate and disturb the mind, and if there is the correct scientific attitude towards such philosophical problems, developed in a man, he is equally eligible to enter the field of philosophical speculations. The Vedānta system can become a part of a single system of twenty chapters or it can be also an independent system.

4. To understand the position of Saṅkara correctly, one should know the mutual relation of the three portions of the original text relating to Vedic interpretation. The text is generally known as Brāhmaṇas, just as both the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta are to be called Mīmāṁsas. But the ritualistic interpretation came to be known as the Brāhmaṇas, and the other portions are called the Āranyakas and the Upaniṣads. Saṅkara has recognised the Upaniṣads as later portions of a set of unitary texts, when he comments on the Upaniṣads. The Mīmāṁsā, the Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa and the Vedānta have the same relation to one another which the Brāhmaṇas and the Āranyakas and the Upaniṣads have mutually within the texts on Vedic interpretation. Saṅkara interpreted the Upaniṣads without interpreting the earlier portions, and in the same way he interpreted the Vedānta part of the text relating to the system of Vedic interpretation without taking up the Mīmāṁsā portion. While in the commentary on the Upaniṣads, the texts are expressly stated to be the later portions of the texts, following the portion relating to ritualism, Saṅkara does not expressly state a similar relation of the Vedānta text to the Mīmāṁsā text in so many words.
But he admits that a study the Vedas is to be presumed before starting on the philosophical investigation, and he accepts that the investigation can also start after the understanding and practice of the rituals of the Vedas.

5. In modern times, Mimânsâ is practically neglected and in dealing with the philosophy of India, some small space is allowed to the Mimânsâ system more out of courtesy and as a mark of adherence to the tradition of Mimânsâ being one of the systems of thought in India, rather than as a recognition of its philosophical importance. It is the Vedânta that takes the major portion of the treatment of the different aspects of Indian thought, and even here, the Monistic interpretation of the Vedânta is allotted more space relatively to the other modes of interpretation. Thus Max Mûller devotes 90 pages for the Vedânta in his Six Systems of Indian Philosophy and only 20 pages for the Mimânsâ. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan allocs 215 pages for the Vedânta in its Monistic School, and allows only 55 pages for the Mimânsâ system, in his History of Indian Philosophy. M. Hiriyanna in his Outline of Indian Philosophy gives 70 pages for the Vedânta and 38 for the Mimânsâ; S.N. Das Gupta in his History of Indian Philosophy has 320 pages for the Vedânta and 40 for the Mimânsâ. Even here, the Vedânta is the Monistic School of the Vedânta, and the other Schools are ignored, and sometimes even omitted from the treatment of the Vedânta system.

6. While many books are available in modern times giving an account of the Vedânta system, practically very few books are available where the Mimânsâ system is interpreted. Indian philosophy has come to be identified with the Vedânta system, and for all practical purposes, Vedânta is restricted to the Monistic School of the Vedânta. But it must be asserted that there has been a shift from the Mimânsâ to the Vedânta, in India itself, and the present emphasis on the Vedânta is due to this shift. An ancient work called the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha or the Compendium of All the Systems of Philosophy, by Vidyâranya lays an emphasis on the Vedânta system. The great Bhagavat Gitâ, which must have been originally a work with a partiality for the Mimânsâ has become a basic text of the Vedânta system. A Vedântic interpre-
tation is attempted for most of the great works in Sanskrit, which must originally have had a Mimāṃsā bias, like the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata. Kālidāsa, it is tried to make out, was also a Vedāntin advocating Saṃnyāsa, renunciation.

7. But we shall not lose sight of the fact that if the great scholar Vidyāranya has emphasised the Vedānta system in his Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha or the Compendium of all the System of Philosophy, he has also written authoritative works on the Mimāṃsā, the (Jaiminiya-nyāya-mālā-vistara) the Stringing Together of the Garlands of the Rules of Logical Investigation, as expounded by Jaimini in his Mimāṃsā), and he has also interpreted all the Vedic texts, both the original texts and the commentary portion, which form the basis for the Mimāṃsā system. Vidyāranya was the Head of a Monastery Dedicated to the Advaita (Monistic) Thought at Sringeri; this fact also we must keep in mind. In the Bhagavad Gītā, there is no denunciation of ritualism, there is a frequent and continuous and consistent advocacy of an active life, and there is open denunciation of renunciation by those who are not worthy of it. The Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata glorified the active life led by the heroes there. Kālidāsa really sings of the beauty of life on the Earth and contrasts that beauty with the lesser life of the gods in the Heaven.

8. There is no literary work, small poems or longer epics or dramas in Sanskrit literature, where Saṃnyāsa or renunciation and the Vedāntic ideals are glorified. Practically no ascetic comes on the stage, and if any ascetics are introduced, it is only to engage them in helping active life in the world. There is practically no literary work where ritualism is not glorified. Home and married life, duty of the citizens, the aspirations and the activities and the disappointments and successes of the individual, are the main themes worked out in all the literary works.

9. Certainly, the value of understanding and some sort of idealistic touch are found in all such works; but Mimāṃsā is not against either, and they form integral factors in the Mimāṃsā doctrines. The Mimāṃsā system had deviated into paths of materialism, interpreting the world as a sort of dead machinery, with no place for human personality and for thoughts and under-
standings, just a series of formal actions without any goal. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s attempt was to restore the human element to the Mimāṃsā system when he wrote his monumental works explaining the doctrines of the system. He says: “For the most part, the Mimāṃsā system has been turned into Materialism in this world and this work is undertaken to re-direct it into the realistic channels.” The great difference between the Mimāṃsā view and the later phases in the interpretation of the Vedānta doctrines is not in their attitude towards understanding as a factor in philosophy; the real difference is in respect of the need for Saṁnyāsa or renunciation for philosophical speculations. Mimāṃsā holds that the highest form of philosophical investigation is possible with the maximum of success even in an active life. The two systems began to go apart from each other only when the Vedānta began to be interpreted as a system of escape from the world with all its sufferings and when the Mimāṃsā maintained the original attitude that philosophy aims at understanding the world, so that one may lead a really true life. True Vedānta recognised the value of life and true Mimāṃsā recognised the value of understanding.

10. What is unique in the Mimāṃsā system is that it refused to compromise with the new trends of thought which had been finding their way into the life of the Indian people, and which gradually permeated the whole of the life of the Indian people. The new trend may be stated to be the belief in the nature of life in the world as suffering. There is a pure Self which got entangled into Matter that is impure. The goal of man’s activities must be to secure release from this entanglement. The method is to retire from activities. This is a position which Mimāṃsā refused to recognise.

11. The Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems recognise a pure Puruṣa, (the Person) and the entanglement of this pure Self in Prakṛti (the Matter). The goal is Kaivalya, the state of being “Itself” without being entangled in something else. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems speak of the goal being Niṣṭhāyoga or the Supreme Bliss; they also make use of the term Apavarga, to get cut away, which must be from some foreign ingredient. The Vedānta has the term Moksha or Mukti, both meaning freedom or
release. In all the systems, man in the state of life is different from his real nature; and man’s goal is to be restored to his real nature, free from such entanglement. Life is a state of Bandha or bondage, a state of Dukka or suffering. If this process of life has a beginning, then the question has to be answered how the Pure Self got entangled in the Matter; if there is no beginning for such an entanglement, there can be no end either, and the goal is knocked off. This difficulty is recognised in all the systems, and to get over the difficulty, they argue that the life process with the Self entangled in Matter has no real beginning; the cause for such an entanglement is what is to be called Adšta, what cannot be known. Although what has no beginning cannot have an end, they have to accept one exception, in the case of the Pure Self securing release from the bondage though the bondage has no true beginning. Yet they say that the Self is Pure and has got entangled in Matter, which is foreign to it. From the true rationalistic point of view, either the Self is by nature associated with Matter, and as such there is no question of a bondage or release, or the Self that is pure got entangled in Matter from which the Self has to be released; and in this case the method of such entanglement must be explained. If there is an entanglement of what is Pure, then even after the release, there is the possibility of re-entanglement just like the prior entanglement. But the systems cannot accept any of the alternatives. They are in the curious position of having to assert that the Pure Self got entangled and can and must be released, and when once the Self is released, there is no danger of another entanglement in future; at the same time, there is no prior time-limit when the entanglement took place, which can be ascertained.

12. The Mimamsa does not recognise a Self absolutely detached from Matter, a Self that is free from activity, a Self to which association with Matter and activity are limitations producing suffering. The world, according to the Mimamsa system, is in a state of eternal movement, it is dynamic by nature. The Self and Matter form a unit, which unit is Man. Man is a dynamic reality. Suffering is not an inevitable factor in human activity, and man can attain the ultimate goal of unalloyed
happiness even in a state of activity. There was neither a beginning, and there will neither be an end for this mutual association of the Self and the Matter, and for this dynamic nature of the world and of Man in it. Man was ever here and the world was always here, and they will ever continue so.

13. What is characteristic of the \textit{Mimāṃsā} is this refusal to move by even a hair's breadth from the original and pure philosophy of the Vedas. In the Vedas, even including the \textit{Upaniṣads}, there is not the slightest hint of the world and the life in the world being of the nature of a bondage and of suffering. The world is there and man is happy in it. Life is noble for man in the world. There is no reference to sin and its consequences in the form of Hell, in the \textit{Ṛgveda}, which is the earliest of the Vedic texts. There is Heaven, which is only an extension of life on earth. There is no migration from life on the Earth to Heaven, in the \textit{Ṛgveda}. The element of suffering in life and the doctrine of release from this world which as a bondage, is a far later development in Indian thought. Buddha never taught a system of pessimistic philosophy; to Buddha, what is called suffering is only a temporary deviation from the normal course in the world, which normal course is of the nature of happiness.

14. When Buddha's teaching makes an assertion that there are four great truths, namely, suffering, the origination of sufferings, termination of suffering and the method of such termination, there is no hint that one has to leave this world and to migrate to another region and another stage. If the eight-fold path for the termination of suffering has any meaning, it teaches the possibility of attaining supreme happiness \textit{in this life}. If through the eight-fold path, man cannot be happy in life, then Buddha ceases to be a Buddha, in so far as he continued in life, and in so far as life is bondage and sin and suffering. Such a doctrine of suffering is quite welcome to the \textit{Mimāṃsā} and that is the philosophy of India. But many new factors got admission into the Buddhistic thought, and \textit{Mimāṃsā} comes into conflict only with such later accretions. As a matter of fact, the complaint of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who is the greatest exponent of the Vedic thought, is that those who interpret the teachings of Buddha are
not faithful to the Teacher.

15. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's position is that man is in this world; unless this is accepted, philosophy has no meaning. The scope of philosophy is to understand the ultimate meaning of what is known and what is experienced; the understanding, the experience may not have any ultimate truth within them. But unless there is some truth related to them, may be externally, there is no meaning in trying to understand them. The purpose of philosophy is not to deny what is experienced and what is known in that experience. He says that Buddha's teaching was based on this premise. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa knew that he would be condemned as one who was trying to demolish some noble systems of thought; he appeals to his possible critics to recognise his honesty of intention. Says he: "No one shall look at this with a mind set too much of fault-finding; he himself has no desire to find fault with others and why should others have such a desire towards him? Even if there be no fault, those with a mind set on fault-finding will be able to find out faults in the place. Is there any fact in the world on which there is a unanimous view of freedom from faults? If people can keep their mind free from malice, then they will be able to detect good things in the words of others and will accept them also as such."

16. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa does not want philosophy and metaphysics to be detached from life and the problems of life; and the problems of life are what fall within man's experience. That is why he starts from the world as it is experienced. This is the position taken up by the Vedic people also. There is no conflict between religion and philosophy; philosophy is only the understanding of religion, and religion has no value without philosophical understanding. Here, there is perhaps a hint that even in the other systems of thought in India, the position of religion has not been duly recognised; the Sāṅkhya and other systems are too philosophical, and the implications of life and religion are not taken note of there. In the Buddhistic systems, there is even an open conflict between the two.

17. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was interpreting one side of the Vedic teachings, the ritualistic side. He was interpreting the teaching
of the Vedas and not the text of the Vedas. There is another side also in the Vedic teaching, the side of philosophy; his interpretation is not in conflict with the other side, and that side is fully recognised in his interpretation. But the other side falls within the field of the Vedānta part of the Mīmāṃsā. Since both are aspects of a unitary teaching, there cannot be any conflict between the two; there must be a positive concord between the two, and such a concord exists between the two. It is often said in modern times that in Buddhism, religion and philosophy are kept apart from each other and that neither interferes with the field of the other. But the question of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa is this: Is it the same Buddha who has taught the religion and the philosophy in that system? If it is, how is it that there is the great conflict between the two fields? What is explained by modern scholars as the great success in Buddhism is the great weakness in it, according to Kumārila Bhāṭṭa. As for the interpretation of the Vedic teaching by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, he starts from ritualism and discusses the philosophical implications of such ritualistic teachings. Here, ritualism must be taken to mean the entire field of man's activity in his life in the world. If there is a religion, what should be the nature of the world in which the religion can start, function and produce its results? This is the problem which is taken up when Kumārila Bhāṭṭa starts on the discussion about the nature of the world in which we live.

18. Even in our ordinary life, we do not know everything which we speak about and which we engage ourselves in for securing some fruits; and in the matters relating to religion, we depend entirely on the instructions of others. So we must know what is the reliable authority and what is not. We speak of what is good and what is bad. There is no definite standard for determining the nature of these two kinds of actions, and here also tradition and social convention have a great influence. In the teachings relating to the distinction between what is good and what is bad and between their fruits, what in short is called "Religion," people cannot depend entirely on their own experience and their own reasoning powers. We have to depend on the experience and reasoning powers and on the reports of such experi-
ence by others. What is called life is not a series of momentary impressions; life has also an element of the knowledge about similar experience in others and the relation of their own experience to the experience of others. In this way, religion stands in need of some doctrine regarding matters that fall outside of the direct experience of oneself. The nature of the objects of experience outside and their relation to one's own experience also become necessary factors in discussing matters relating to religion. This is the stand-point taken by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa.

19. The reports of the experiences of others contain elements like "Thou shall do this", "Thou shall not do that" and other factors. There are doubts and there are questions and there are replies. We must determine what all such things actually mean. There are various views regarding the nature of the external world and man's relation to this external world, dealt with in various systems of thought; within the Vedic field itself, there is the view of the Sāṅkhya and of the Nyāya; there is also the view of the Vedānta. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa is tolerant enough to recognise the various modes of approach to such matters. They are different from the point of view of the Mīmāṁśā system, which Kumārila Bhāṭṭa is explaining. There is only a difference and there is no conflict.

20. But the Buddhist School of later days evolved an entirely new line of thought regarding the nature of man and of the external world and of the relation between the two. There are various views developed by them, and they are mutually opposed. He takes up the most important ones among them; he takes his stand on the Buddhistic Forum itself and discusses the points from their own position. His stand-point is not that their views are opposed to his own and that he cannot, for that reason, accept their position. He handles the same weapons which they have supplied and he fights with them. He lays aside his own weapon, the doctrines of the Vedic systems. He argues his point from the position taken up by his opponents, the position of reason.

21. Among the Buddhists, the Yogācāra School holds that there are ideas, but that the ideas do not have any external reality
corresponding to it. The Mādhyamika School denies even this reality of the ideas. The denial of the reality of the external world is common to both. So, the question of the reality or unreality of the external world is taken up first for discussion. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa does not say that the reality of the external world is asserted in the Vedas and also in the systems of thought among the adherents of the Vedas, and that, as such, such a reality must be accepted. He says that the reality of the external world can be denied in two ways either by an examination of the external objects themselves or through the application of reason. That is, it can be done either objectively or subjectively.

22. The reality of the external world is the cardinal point which the Mimāṃsakas want to establish. If there are differences regarding the details of the nature of such a reality, that does not matter. It is only in the Buddhistic Schools that the external objects are unreal. That is why Kumārila Bhaṭṭa attacks only the position of the Buddhists in this context. The external objects should be real if religion has any value. The unreality of the external world is also against the experience of man and the reasoning faculty of man. It is not only the Vedic religion that suffers if the unreality of the external world is accepted; the Buddhist religion too suffers equally. Thus, the position of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is one of a defence of religion in general and not one of a defence of any one religion in particular and a demolition of any other religion. And Kumārila Bhaṭṭa states the position of the Buddhists very clearly, without any bias, without any partiality.

23. Now, the defenders of religion, not of any particular religion, should examine the nature of the external objects, whether they have a reality or not, and in this investigation, they should apply only such methods as are acceptable to all the parties in the discussion. If it be argued that the absolute reality of the external world is not necessary for explaining the functions of man within the region of religion, in so far as all such things can be explained through an apparent reality of the external world there being the Ideas as the absolute reality and also the apparent reality of the external world presumed therefrom, and
that as such there is no need to recognise an absolute reality for the external world, there is the difficulty. We cannot speak of two kinds of realities, one being absolute and the other being only apparent. What is apparent cannot be absolute. If what is apparent is not absolute, how is it absolutely real, and if it is absolutely real, how is it only apparent? The term reality cannot be applied to both what is real and what is apparent, just as the nature of a tree cannot be common to a tree and a lion. If it be said that though they are two separate words, there is no difference in their sense, this is not an honest procedure. What does not exist does not exist and what exists exists; such a position is the honest one.

24. A denial is reasonable if it can be shown that the cognition thereof was through a faulty mode of comprehension. If, on the other hand, it is asserted that whatever is known is unreal, then that proves the invalidity of the knowledge of the unreality of the external objects, as well. If both the subject and the predicate in an inference are unreal, how can there be any inference at all? The distinction between subject and predicate can be real only if both are real. If the cognition is not of a real nature, how can one talk about it at all with a view to making it known to another? How is it known at all to the one who talks about it? The position is quite different in the case of the knowledge of an absence; absence is a reality in the external world and its cognition is also valid, just as it is in the case of any positive object in the external world.

25. If it be said that in the cognition of an object like a pillar, there is no external object like the pillar, this is in conflict with an experienced fact. It is true that in the Mimāṃsa realism also, there is the absence of an object at a certain stage in the process of the cognition. There are three stages in the process of the cognition. There is the production of the cognition as the first stage; then there is the reference of the cognition to a definite fact, and the third stage is the full cognition of the object. In the first stage there is no object for the cognition, at the point of its own production. This does not conflict with realism. What is
opposed to realism is the denial of an object as an external reality in the case of cognitions at all times. We have a variety of experiences, each with a different form, and it is not possible to dispense with a basic substrate for such cognitions until such cognitions are set aside by something that is its contradictory. The differences in the form of the cognition are themselves proof of the differences in something that is external to the cognition.

26. Further, if there be no real difference between what is good and what is bad, if there be no difference between teacher and disciples, as facts of the external world, there can be no real instruction by the teacher to the disciple regarding the nature of what is good; what is good is not a mere idea in so far as what is good is prescribed for being done also, not merely for being thought of. A denial of the external reality of the object that has been instructed as what is good would result in a direct contradiction of the teaching of Buddha himself. Thus the Buddhists in their philosophy of "Idealism", denying the reality of the objects corresponding to the Ideas, repudiate the doctrines of their own Teacher. There are many works that are accepted as the direct teachings of Buddha himself, and there is a conflict between the religion and the philosophy of the followers of the path of Buddha. If there is no difference between a cognition of a pillar outside and the dream about a pillar, then Buddha and his teachings are not different from dreams. This is the point that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa again and again brings forward in refuting the philosophical doctrines of the Buddhists, that they are opposed to their own religion; he does not bring in the conflict of Buddhist philosophy with the doctrines of the Vedas.

27. If it is held that the ideas involved in all arguments are devoid of any externally real object, that would result in a universal negation, and if it is held that some of the ideas involved in the argumentation have reality in the case of the object comprehended in the argument, then the whole argument falls to the ground. The very distinction of what are comprehended within a syllogism and others would itself be impossible without a reality attached to objects, whether they are comprehended within the syllogism or fall outside of it. Is there any reality for the object
in the notion of the unreality of dreams? If the notion is false, then dreams are not false. In the same way the falsity of the notions like a pillar is also contradicted and the notions of pillars are not instances to prove the falsity of notions of external objects as external realities. In the same way, are the notions about momentary character, distinctness and existence correct or not? If they are, the inference about all ideas being devoid of an external reality as the basis will not be conclusive; if they are not, there is contradiction of the very theory that is put forward.

28. Are there distinctions like "being in bondage" and "being liberated"? Here also, there would be contradiction with the religion of Buddha, where prescriptions are made for liberation from this world which is a bondage. It cannot be said that the doctrine of a denial of external reality in the case of ideas has application only in the case of ideas regarding concrete objects like a pillar and not to abstract ideas like good and bad, and bondage and liberation; there is no way of making a distinction like that. And how can one say that the ideas exist? This would result in all our notions being unreal. All doctrines become false, and why should one say that while falsity is common to all systems of thought, there must be preference for the doctrines of the Buddhistic systems, and that the doctrines of Sāṅkhya and other systems should be rejected? If external reality is rejected as false, then the ideas too must be rejected for the same reason; and if it be said that some unreal things need not be rejected, there results the absence of any restrictions regarding what is real and what is unreal. In the case of the realistic school of thought represented by the Mīmāṃsakas, falsity and rejection go together. Dream experience is contradicted by waking experience and is rejected. But a waking experience like that of a pillar is not contradicted by another experience.

29. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's courage and loyalty to truth is manifested in the next point that is taken up. The Idealist may say that even experiences of waking conditions are contradicted in the Yogic experience. And the question may arise whether the Mīmāṃsā system would repudiate the Yogic vision. The
Idealists may argue that invalidating conceptions do arise in the case of the experiences of pillar and other things when there is a Yogic vision in which all the differences in the worldly experience are unreal, the Absolute as a unity being the only reality. This is on a par with the invalidity of the dream on the basis of the experience in waking condition. What is Yogic vision is possible for all, although it is not attained by all.

30. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is ready with his answer. He is not ignorant of a factor called the Yogic vision. But no one is found to develop such a vision in this life; if any one attains to the Yogic powers, we do not know what happens to them. What little we know of the experiences of the Yogins in the Yogic state, is against the idealistic doctrine of the unreality of the objects in experience. From the point of view of reason also, the Yogic vision must have some external reality, in so far as they are experiences like our own waking experiences which have some external reality as the basis. The Idealists may say that in the case of waking experiences there are counter-factors that serve as instances to invalidate them like the experience of a mirage. The realists do not refuse to admit such factors in our waking experiences. False cognitions, as in a dream, are invalidated through correct cognitions of the waking condition. Even in the cases of cognitions of the waking condition, there can be a similar invalidation of some, although they too have the character of being a cognition, have an object and have also counter-cognitions, like false cognitions. On the analogy of these two kinds of cognitions, namely, the cognitions in dream and cognitions in waking conditions, there is no impossibility of Yogic cognitions too being invalid sometimes. Therefore the introduction of Yogic cognitions brings no new factor into the discussions, which was not accepted previously. If it is argued that Yogic cognitions must be excluded from the sphere of invalidity through the want of an external reality as the basis, all the difficulties about discriminating between the two kinds of cognitions, while avoiding an external reality as basis, will reappear. If there is no external reality as basis for cognitions, dream, waking experiences and Yogic cognitions are all alike false, in so far as
not one of them has an external reality as the basis. So any attempt to draw a distinction between waking experience and Yogic cognition on the ground of the latter being free from passion etc., will have no place in the discussion. Thus, we have to remain in the position that there are external realities, and that a cognition is valid if it is based on such external realities and false if there be no such basis.

31. Further, dream cognition is not absolutely false. An external reality as the basis of cognition is not absolutely lacking even in a dream. In all cases of dream there is an external reality as the basis; the relations may be different in dream from what are known in waking conditions. There cannot be a dream without some previous experience of a real external object. It may be during the present life, it may be in some previous birth; it may be at some other time or in another place; they appear in dreams as related to another time and another place, and under different circumstances. Similarly, in all cases of erroneous cognitions like that of a continuous circle when a firebrand is whirled, or like that of a notion of cities in the clouds or of water in a desert, there are realities. Even in the case of a “hare’s horn”, there is a reality. Things that are real come within cognition with different relations. The error is only in respect of the relation and not in respect of the objective material, and the cause of such error in respect of the relation can be explained. The notion of a vacuum and the statement of a hundred elephants on the tip of a needle also have reality as basis, with some other relation.

32. The realists accept certain entities that are never perceived and yet coming within cognitions, like the Ultimate Uniform of Matter in the Sāṅkhya system, called the Prakṛti. Perception requires that the object exists at the “Present time” but other forms of cognitions do not require such an existence at the “present time”; all that is required is that the object has a reality in the external world, now or at any other time. To the question how a cognition can arise in respect of an object that does not exist at that time, there can be the reply in the form
of another question how it may be concluded that objects that do
not have an existence at the particular time, cannot be the basis
for a cognition. The real point at issue must not be dislocated.
The point at issue is in respect of cognitions having an external,
real object as the basis. This shall not be confused with the
point of the proximity of the object in a cognition. A cognition
can be asserted to be devoid of a basis only if the comprehension
is of the object in a relation that is different from what it is in the
external world. Even a cognition that has a negation as the
object has, in fact, a real basis; the negation is not an independent
entity in itself and it is not so comprehended either. What is
called a negation of something is in fact the assertion of that
other positive thing. Certain points of a very minute nature are
introduced in relation to arguments based on negative premises.
The Idealists cannot bring forward a syllogism like: "That which
is not devoid of a basis is not a cognition." A negative
instance for such a premise must be of a positive nature, a double
negation being a positive assertion. And no such affirmation
can be made if the objects in the external world have no positive
reality. If it be argued that such is the case with all negative
arguments, the reply is made that in the assertion of the impos-
sibility of any person being an omniscient, there is no such diffi-
culty. The argument can take the form: "The perception of one
who is accepted as omniscient cannot apply to objects that have
an existence only in future, like our own perceptions." A nega-
tive argument can be like: "That which comprehends objects that
have an existence only in future is not a perception, like an infer-
ence." Such a position is not possible in the case of the denial
of a reality as basis for cognitions, according to the Idealists.
Either the argument should relate to a positive external reality
or the negative aspect must relate to what is positive.

33. Now, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that he does not want to
use any weapon in the fight which the opponent too does not have;
he does not take up a sword that is longer than what the opponent
is also equipped with. But he does not want the opponent to
conceal weapons in the sleeves. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accepts the
authoritative nature of the Vedic scripture; but in so far as the
opponents do not accept it, he does not also use it in the argument himself. The opponents depend entirely on reason and he accepts reason. But in wielding that weapon, they must handle only clean reason. As for those who do not accept any reality, either of the objective world or of the Idea, there is no argument at all. But in the case of the Idealists, they must recognise one fundamental factor in syllogistic reasoning, that an argument must be such as is acceptable to both the sides. This is a fundamental position which they shall not ignore in so far as they are experts in syllogistic arguments. There are two possibilities; one is that the opponent does not accept the position and the other is that the arguer himself does not accept the position. For the former, there is some remedy; but when the arguer himself does not accept the position that he takes up, where is the remedy? And the present case is one of this latter type. If the opponent establishes what he does not accept, he would be contradicting himself, and if he does not establish the thing, then there is no satisfaction for the other side. Here there is a long discussion regarding the acceptance of the premises by the two parties. I do not propose to elaborate on the point. I have given so much from the arguments advanced by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa against the Idealists, only to show that when he tries to establish the reality of the external objects, he does not deviate even by a hair's breadth from the straight path of reasoning. He may have as his ultimate purpose the defence of things that are confined to religion and prescriptions about the fruits of religious rituals. Unless we are real and unless we live in a real world, there is no Moral element, no scope for religion in life. The metaphysical problem may not be the primary factor in the Mīmāṃsā system; but metaphysics plays as important a part in this system as in any other system, just as even in the Vedānta or Sāṅkhya or Buddhistic systems.

34. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa concludes the arguments with a statement that the followers of the teachings of Buddha are not faithful to their Teacher. After all, Buddha is not worshipped as a metaphysician who has established the nature of the world as a void or a vacuum. He has taught the Dharma or the Moral Law. His object could have been only to see that people do not
stray into the paths of worldly indulgences, which position His disciples have converted into a doctrine of the total negation of the world. There is a difference between indifference to the world and denial of the world. Buddha's real teaching has reference to the former, and the latter is only the interpretation of His disciples. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa must have felt that he had more affinity with Buddha and his real Teachings than even with the propounders of the other systems of philosophy, recognised as orthodox and in conformity with the Vedic Path. He was interested only in the Moral Order in the world and he took up other points like the metaphysical and psychological ones, as accessories to the problem of the Moral Order in the world. The same is the case with Buddha and his Teachings; not so are the contents of the other systems in the Vedic Path. They aim at something beyond the Moral Order and its functions. That is why he concludes his exposition and refutation of the doctrine of Idealism which asserts that there are only Ideas without any real basis in the external world with the statement: This denial of the external objects was taught by Buddha with a view to turn away the longings in men for the worldly, postulating a doctrine of "residual impression", which in truth is false and devoid of any rational but somehow or other others began to cling to it.

35. It is in the same strain that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa takes up the other views held by other Schools of Buddhism, like the Schools that asserts the whole, including cognitions, as an appearance of a void, of an absolute vacuum. He states their position clearly, consistently and faithfully, and then he refutes them. In the section from which I have taken the points in detail, the subjective point was taken up, namely, an examination of the content and nature of our cognitions. Later he takes up the nature of the objects of cognitions. His position is that both from the subjective and the objective stand-points, there must be some concrete, positive reality in the outside world as the basis for our experience. An Idea is an idea about a reality; a Universal is what runs through a series of particulars. Our direct experience of objects and our reasoning faculty compel us to accept such a position.

36. Our interest is more in the approach which the thinkers
of ancient times made in relation to such problems than in the conclusions which they arrived at. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa never lets the scripture to dominate man and his life problems in the world. It is experience and reason that necessitates the postulations of factors transcending the scope of reason and direct experience. That was the case in the Sāṅkhya; that was the case in the Nyāya. That too was the case in the Vedānta. Here too the same position is upheld.

37. The world is a reality. The world is always in a state of dynamic movement. There was never a time when the world was not; there was never a time when the world was in a state of complete stand-still. There will never come a time when the world will cease to be or when there will be a condition of stand-still. If the world did not exist at any time, the question of the Creator will arise; if the world was in a state of stand-still, the question of the agent in starting the movement also arises. These are questions that cannot be solved either through our experience or through our reasoning faculty. And Mīmāṃsā system is the last to say that we must accept a thing because scripture says so. At the same time, the Mīmāṃsā does not assert that our experience and our reasoning faculty exhaust the sphere of man's knowing process in the Universe; what transcends them must be a direct consequence of the application of our powers of experiencing facts and our powers of reasoning.

38. If there is an origination either for the world or for the activities in the world, the question of the Creator and of the agent for the start of the movement baffles us; and if we avoid this contingency, there are only two landing places for us that are safe. Either we must say that there is nothing, and Mīmāṃsā cannot accept this position. Or we must say that the world is always there. This is the position taken up in the Mīmāṃsā system, and the world is always in a state of dynamic movement. Nothing is a movement unless there is some result produced from it, and so the real problem about the world is the ascertainment of the nature of the activities in the world and the results of such activities. It may be that we can speak of a thing as it is; but that is
not a statement about the true nature of the thing. Its nature is that it has a movement producing some result.

39. Just as the individual facts of the world, though real, must be brought under some Universals, i.e., comprehended within some genera, similarly, such individual activities also must be brought under some general rules; there must be a Law governing the movements. The process of bringing the particulars under universals in respect of the individual facts of the material world may be accomplished within our normal powers of experiencing and reasoning. But the process of such a division and classification on the basis of universals comprehending the individual facts, in respect of their functions in the world, is not such a simple matter. If it were only a matter of activities that come within our normal experience or within our reasoning faculties and also a matter of their results that too come within our experience or reason, the process would have been simple. But we find a gradation in this world, and we also find activities having as their ultimate purpose a progression from one stage into another higher stage. It is also found that certain activities are looked down upon as what would result in a reverse movement, a regression from one stage into another lower one. This is what can be found only within the scope of the Vedic Teachings and also found within the Teachings of Buddha. There is a distinction drawn between Dharma (Virtue) and Adharma (Vice) and also between Punya (Meritorious) and Pāpa (Sinful). Dharma and Punya are associated with Progression (Abhyudaya) and Adharma and Pāpa are associated with Regression (Pratyavāya).

40. The Buddhists may say that certain activities that are prescribed in the field of the Vedic Teaching as leading to progression and certain other activities condemned there as what would lead to Regression, are not really so, and that the division is correct only as effected within their own Teachings. The followers of the Vedic Path may say the same thing against the Buddhistic demarcation. But that is not the point at this stage; what is important is that such a distinction has been made by both. And such a demarcation is not possible on the basis of man's normal experience or by the application of his reasoning faculty. They
are factors that stand above normal experience and reason.

41. The realistic position taken up by the Mimāṃsā is that the reality of the world is only to the extent that the real is what can be known. What is absolutely beyond knowledge is not what can be called a reality; what is spoken of as beyond the sphere of knowing in an absolute way, is a self-contradiction. If something is spoken of, it must be within knowing and what is within knowing can also be spoken of. If something is within knowing, then it must also be within the scope of language expression. Thus there are three things that go together, and they are reality, knowing and expression. It has already been said that the world is eternal in its dynamic aspect, and as such a knowledge of the world is also eternal; so is the expression of this reality in language form. That shows that an agency to know is also an eternal factor in this universe.

42. It does not mean that the whole of the universe was known to any single knower at any time; what it means is that the universe was partly known at all times to people with differing capacity to know. They could also express in language form what they had been knowing. What is meant by knowing the world in parts is not that the individual links in a chain of events were known to different people; it means something more, that the individual links were known in some mutual relation and also in their real nature. The real nature is that there is an element of dynamic movement associated with the links. Thus, there is no fact in the universe which is not related to some sort of movement, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, knowing is knowing a thing as a factor in a movement. Such a movement in the world may be what is in its own inherent nature, and such a movement is what is called the movement according to Natural Law. The knowing agents are also agents for producing movements and such movements may be along the lines of the Natural Law. It may also be against such a Natural Law. Such movements that come under the latter group may either produce an adverse effect, or they may produce no effect at all; they do not produce beneficent results.

43. A movement must have some destination, and the des-
tinuation of movements according to what is called the Natural Law is what may be termed a higher stage. We call it a movement according to the Natural Law because it results in an elevation; that is, it is of the nature of a progression; and we call it the Natural Law because the movement according to it is of the nature of progression, from one stage to a higher stage.

44. This progression may be of two kinds. One is what can be determined by our own experience, including our reasoning faculty. Helping others in distress, abstinence from injury, cleanliness, nutritious food and various remedies for suffering in the physical life—all such factors come within our experience. Such actions as follow the Natural Law and that come within the sphere of our own experience are designated Pûrta in Sanskrit terminology, and this term is as old in Sanskrit as Indian civilization itself; it occurs in the earliest literature of India, the Rgveda.

45. It is found that there is a gradation in this world. Existences can be grouped under different classes. There is the difference between sentient and inert beings. Sentient objects can be either within the plant group or within the animal group, and even in the latter, there is the distinction of man and lower animals. Such a distinction is within the knowledge of all, and there is no society, ancient or modern, civilized or primitive, in which such a distinction has not been made. Even within men, we find a gradation in powers of various kinds, physical, intellectual etc. It is assumed that a stage of lesser power is lower and a stage of greater power is higher. If progression means anything, it must be a movement from the lower to the higher.

46. There must be some Law functioning, according to which there is a movement from such lower to such higher stages in the case of man; the change is not found in the same man, though there is such a progression from childhood to old-age. But what is meant here as progression is the change from one man to another in such a way that in the latter stage, the man is able to develop greater power in the course of advancing age than another man. What are the actions in a man's life which will result in the developments of such a capacity in another man at a later stage, and what is the relation between the first man who
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did something and the second man in whom such a development arose? There must be some Law regulating such actions and results. Such a Law also must be an eternal fact in this life, and there must always have been agents that could understand such a law, though it may be only partly, and such agents must have been able to express such a law, to the extent of what they have known, in language form.

47. Thus there are three factors in this world; some come within our direct experience, some come within our reasoning faculty and some come within faculties that transcend both. Such facts are brought under science, philosophy and religion, respectively. They are not at all water-tight compartments, nor are they in mutual conflict. They form a unit. The difference is only in emphasis. Unless we accept the reality of the facts that come within the three modes of knowing and unless we also accept the three modes of knowing, there is conflict with the teachings of religion. Buddha’s teachings also contain all the three factors. What we accept entirely on the basis of the teachings of Buddha regarding matters that cannot come within our direct experience and our reasoning faculty, fall within the mode of knowing called “Authority”, included in the Buddhistic religion also. Buddha must be a reality, Buddha’s knowing must be valid and the objects of His knowing must be real; the Law taught by him must also be an eternal Law. Mīmāṃsākas have no quarrel with Buddhism, they have a quarrel only with those who expound a philosophy that repudiates the teaching of Buddha as Authority for the distinction between good and bad.

48. If Buddhists accept the teaching of Buddha and recognise such teachings as related to some eternal Law of Nature, why should they object to similar teachings by others also? The Vedas are records of such teachings by persons as wise as Buddha himself. Where is the criterion to prove that it is only the teachings of Buddha that relate to the Eternal Law? If a distinction is to be made, then the advantages are on the side of the Vedas, in so far as we do not know when such teachers gave out their doctrines, while we know Buddha as a recent teacher. In this way, the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the three modes of knowing,
the nature of the objects of knowing and the nature of the Law governing the facts of the world are all common to true Buddhism and to the Vedic Path, and it is the philosophy of the followers of Buddhism that tends to demolish Buddhism as an ethical religion.

49. The philosophy of the \textit{Mim\=ams\=a} system arises out of the contents of the Vedas that prescribe what are to be done and what are not to be done, and such a philosophy is in keeping with the experience and with the reasoning faculty of man. Tradition records Kum\=arila Bha\=t\=ta's intimate relation to the Buddhist Schools of thought and to the Buddhistic centres of learning. He was deeply learned in Buddhistic literature and Buddhistic doctrines. He was dissatisfied with the latter day growths in Buddhism, in the form of "Idealism" and "Doctrine of Void"; both of them come into conflict with the original teachings of Buddha. Kum\=arila Bha\=t\=ta has nothing to say against Buddha as a great Teacher; his criticisms are directed against the latter-day philosophers in the Buddhist Schools. It is true that in some contexts Kum\=arila Bha\=t\=ta criticises Buddha also, so far as certain teachings are concerned, and such a criticism is directed against Buddha in common with Teachers within the Vedic fold.

50. Realism is a necessity arising out of the teachings of the Vedas; there is also the need for denying any beginning or any end for the world, which is in the form of a process, a progression. Kum\=arila Bha\=t\=ta is a realistic "Realist". There is another personality in the system of \textit{Mim\=ams\=a}, who has started another School of thought within the system, and that is Prabh\=\=akara. I do not propose to discuss here the question of the chronological relation of Kum\=arila Bha\=t\=ta and Prabh\=\=akara, the founders of the two Schools of \textit{Mim\=ams\=a}. The accepted view is that Prabh\=\=akara was a disciple of Kum\=arila Bha\=t\=ta. But Kum\=arila Bha\=t\=ta appears to be giving a new orientation to the \textit{Mim\=ams\=a} current, taking up an attitude of realism even in defending Realism. Prabh\=\=akara was an idealist in his Realism. Perhaps his philosophy represents an earlier phase of \textit{Mim\=ams\=a} thought.

51. Kum\=arila Bha\=t\=ta accepts a subjective reality to what is designated "Negation". Negation has no absolute reality in the
external world. It is only an aspect of the positive, which alone has an absolute reality. A positive object can be looked upon in another form, and that other aspect of the positive is called the negative. When we look at the empty floor, we can think of it as a positive object, and when we are thinking of another object that can be on the floor, which object is not the floor, we can think of the floor as a negation of that object. But Prabhākara does not accept even such a subjective reality for a negation. Prabhākara holds that there is only a positive cognition and there is only a positive object, in seeing the floor without an object on it. This is idealism in Realism.

52. When the world is there and when it was ever there and will also continue to be there for ever, the dynamic nature of the world must also be an eternal fact. There can be no creation of the world and there cannot either be some agent for the supervision and control of the functions in the world. There are the individuals who function as agents; but they function only within the frame-work of the operation of the dynamic world. So, the Law Regulating the functions in the world also must be within the world itself. Thus only a Natural Law regulates the functions in the world, and there is no external power from whom such regulation can originate or function. This Law of Nature is of the form of intelligence, and it is not the intelligence of any one; it is just intelligence. And what we call the intelligence of the individuals works in subordination to this super-intelligence in the form of the Law of Nature. This Law of Nature has the feature of intelligence only to the extent that there is a fixed goal and that there is a fixed method of reaching the goal. The elements in the doctrines of the other systems of philosophy in India, relating to the Absolute being Intelligence or Sentience (Caitanya) when there is a pure Puruṣa (Person) or an Iśvara (God) or the Brahman (Brahman) postulated, are contained in this acceptance of a Law of Nature, what is called Dharma, in the Mīmāṃsā. At the same time, there is also the element of modern science that what is called life and its functions came after the operation of the Law of Nature. In the Mīmāṃsā system there is accepted an entity called potency (Sakti) in all causes. A function means a
cause and an effect. It is the successive production of the potency that maintains the function of this dynamic world. Such a potency is within the nature of the world.

53. There is the real world outside and there are the individuals functioning in this world. The individuals have a body and that body falls down at some stage. But the world process goes on. The question arises whether, when an individual stops as an embodiment and as a functionary, it is an absolute terminus, or whether the function of the individual have a continuity in the later phenomena in the world. We can speak of a systematic and regulated progression only if what is prior is connected with what follows. For this it becomes necessary to postulate a substrate on which the prior activity of the individual and its later fruits after the fall of the body, is to be related to each other. This continuous line on which the various links of cause and effect are united to form a chain is what they accept as a soul, the Ātman. It is only an individuality without a material form; the personalties represented by the functioning of the successive bodies are joined together into this individuality called a soul. A soul is only such a line; the progression is only in the material bodies.

54. A plant or an animal cannot develop the potency necessary to produce any progression along such a line, which is a chain of separate personalities forming into an individuality. It is the Law of Nature that works the progression. But in man there is the origination of such a potency, so that man from within himself can produce the urge for the progression. Thus, while a crow has remained a crow with no change in its food habits or its abilities to make a nest, man has changed and is changing. A crow is not able to use its free-will either to do a thing or not to do a thing or to do a thing in another way; man has this ability. Thus man can work along the lines of the Law of Nature, man can work against such a law, man can remain inactive, and also active along new lines of his own choice. For this reason, the Mīmāṃsā system asserts that the function of the Law of Nature is confined to man and his life. Dharma has reference only to man’s life. Man’s life, for this reason, is artificial, what he can
make and what he is making. Man can change the course of his life, and can also change the course in the life of plants and animals also. The *Mimāṃsā* system has no need for a God, nor for gods. Man is self-contained, man is supreme. The system is tolerant and they do not condemn any one who believes in the gods or in God, and who worships them or Him. God or the gods are of no help to man and they can do no harm to man also; that is why they are tolerated in the system.

55. The ultimate metaphysical problem is not discussed in the *Mimāṃsā* system. The system takes note of only the world as a dynamic mechanism. Is there a unity in the world, or is it only a collection of parts? There is no doubt that the individuality of the facts in the university, the difference between matter and the soul and the distinction between soul and soul, are all cardinal doctrines in the system. The problem relating to the unity is taken up in the *Vedānta* system, and this is recognised in the *Mimāṃsā* system. Just as in the *Sānkhya*, there is a recognition of possible facts that transcend the sphere of experience and reason, here also there is such an unconditional recognition of factors that fall outside the scope of the system. Such factors must be known from the *Vedānta* system.

56. The recognition of the absolute positive nature of the world implies an ultimate unity. What is called negation is only an aspect of what is really a positive factor, and if there is no negation as an absolute fact, there is no difference also as an absolute fact in the universe. The difference is only of a subjective nature. This is an indication of the acceptance of a positive unity as the nature of the universe, in the *Mimāṃsā* system as developed in the School of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. In the other system developed by Prabhākara, this recognition of a positive unity as the nature of the world, is clearer. That School does not accept even a subjective reality for negation. There are only positive facts, cognised only as positive facts, in the Universe. If, in this way, there is a refusal to recognise negation, which means a refusal to recognise difference, as a fact, what difference is there between ‘this Monism’ and the ‘Monism of the *Vedantins*’?

57. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, each word indicates an
external object; it may be a material thing, it may be an attribute, it may be an action or a state. But no one has a concept of isolated objects; in his mind what he has is a notion of things in relation. What are called isolated objects are really a unity, and man’s mind also cognises objects in such a unity. Thus language is inadequate to express what is in the mind, and when a person utters a sentence, what he utters is only a series of isolated words. But one who hears him concludes that he has in mind a notion of a unity of the individual facts denoted by the separate words. If a man utters two sentences, there is the presumption that both the sentences together are meant for a unitary idea in the person who utters them. All the sentences in a treatise on a subject ultimately turns out to be the expression of a unity. Different treatises together form a similar unity. The position is that both in the external world and in the mind of man, there is only a unity. The purport of language is to express this unity, though language by its nature is incompetent to express this unity.

58. Prabhākara holds that language is sufficient for the expression of the facts of the external world; a word means an object in relation to another. Thus, in a sentence, there are words of which each one expresses an object in relation to the others, and as such each word expresses the whole of the sentence. Ultimately it would result that each word expresses the whole of the universe as a unity. This is the ideal; but normally, a word expresses only a part of this universe, what could be grasped by the limited mind of man.

59. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa a word can express an isolated object. But the real nature of all objects in this dynamic universe is that it is related to some movement. It may be that an object is cognised in its partial aspect and not in its real nature, and there may be a statement expressing the relation of the object to another object, and not to a movement. But that is not a statement of the real nature of any object. A statement expressing an object in its own nature, i.e., as related to a movement, is what is called a Vedic statement. Whatever statement there may be without such relation to a movement, does not serve the true purport of a statement, which purport should be to express an
object in its own nature of being related to a movement. According to Prabhākara, a statement which does not express an object in relation to a movement does not convey any meaning at all. Thus, all valid statements should express an object in relation to a movement. The difference between the two views is that while Prabhākara does not recognise the validity of a statement about an isolated object or about an object in relation to another object, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa recognises their validity in so far as some sense is conveyed; but Kumārila Bhaṭṭa too does not accept or recognise their ultimate validity in so far as ultimate validity depends on the statement conveying the real nature of an object in the form of a relation to a movement.

60. The Veda is an expression of the totality of the world with the totality of movement in the world according to the Law of Nature. No one can know this in its entirety; there is none who is Omniscient. What is called such a “perfect machine” is only an ideal. But the world is not a “perfect machine”. There are the individuals who have the will and the capacity to make movements contrary to or deviating from the Law of Nature. That is why some diversity and variation is experienced in the world. If the world could be a “perfect machine”, then there can be no difference between the world in movement and the world as stand-still.

61. Suppose everything around us suddenly grows larger or smaller in a uniform proportion with our own ability to adjust the eyes similarly altered and, we ourselves undergoing the same change in size, there is no difference experienced between the two states, prior to the change and after the change. Or again, if there is a central sphere rotating on its axis and if there are spheres revolving around of this central sphere in the same direction of the rotation of the central sphere and with the same velocity and completing a rotation too along with each revolution, then it makes no difference whether the spheres are moving or are in a stand-still state; this applies only in respect of the spheres. Thus what is called movement is in relation to something that is stationary. There can be no difference between the universe as a “perfect machine” in a dynamic state and the world as an.
Absolute, still and motionless. The Brahmā of the Vedāntins and the dynamic universe of the Mimāṃsā become identical. So far as the differentiated world is concerned, both hold identical views, and this is accepted by all who have expounded the doctrines in recent times.

62. The nature of the universe as a "perfect machine" and the perfect Law of Nature in the Universe—these are the two fundamental doctrines which Mimāṃsā proposes to expound. The particular forms of the rituals and the particular texts where such rituals are described—these are side issues that had to be taken up for explanation on account of the special circumstances in which the system grew. The adherents of Buddhism held the view that the world has no real existence; at best there is the projection of the world from Ideas. They also held that the rituals practised by the people have no beneficial fruits and that the texts dealing with such rituals have no validity. The position of the adherents of the Mimāṃsā is that if there is a rationalistic approach to the problem of the nature of the world, a recognition of the reality of the world cannot be avoided; and if the Buddhists have a religion, such a religion demands the recognition of the reality of the world outside. Further they too have their scriptural texts in their religion. It cannot be shown in a rationalistic way that the texts of the Vedic Path are not valid and that the texts of the Buddhist Path are valid. Mimāṃsā does not say that the Vedic texts that are available can be proved to be valid; all that they say is that the various arguments brought forward to show their lack of validity are inapplicable to the context. Perhaps they can be applied with far greater effect against the validity of the scriptures of the Buddhists in so far as they assert that the texts were revealed for humanity for the first time by a known individual. As between an unbroken tradition accepted by all the great people of all the ages, without a known beginning and without a known person or groups of persons as the founders, and also a set of Codes revealed for the first time by a single individual of known identity and time, the preference must be for the former in point of validity. The validity of the former rests on its own inherent
stability and continuity, while the validity of the latter depends on the "Omniscience" of an individual. What is the criterion by which it can be established that some particular individual is Omniscient? Why did he appear at that time and not earlier nor later?

63. The position of Mimāṃsā is perfectly rational. There is a real world, where there is a perfect Law of Nature operating. There are men also in it. Man is supreme. There may be a gradation among men, while there cannot be a difference in kind between One Man and all the others. Nor is there such a difference between God and men. It makes no difference whether God makes his appearance from above or whether a man is lifted up above all others. Both are equally bad in so far as both limit the supremacy of man in the world, the absolute reality of the world and the perfect nature of the Law in the world. If the world is real both the cognisability and the cognition of the world are also real; if the world is eternal, the two latter factors about the world are also eternal. There is another real and eternal factor about the world, and that is what is known can be expressed in language; this results in the postulation of a language counterpart as a reality for the real world, and also as an eternal factor. All that Mimāṃsā says is that the texts known as the Vedas may be included as a part of the system of language that expressed the nature and function of that perfect Moral Law, in a partial way. It is not contended that the available texts exhaust the statement of the entire Moral Law, leaving no room for any more statement. It is not also contended that the texts in their entirety describe the Moral Law and its nature and its function. All that Mimāṃsā claims is that the texts contain some element of such a nature. Mimāṃsā opens the door for Buddhism or any other religion to come in. Every statement of a Moral Law, every statement about a fact of the world in its own nature, is a Vedic statement. This is all that is claimed for the Vedas as texts, that are available. There are scientific flaws also that state the truth about the facts of the world, and they also can be designated Vedas.

64. The philosophy of the Sānkhya practically got merged into the Vedānta. Yoga became acrobatics to frighten people.
Nyāya became empty dialectics. Vedānta became a system of pessimism with the world being condemned as a place of suffering, with every activity being condemned as a sin, with a contrast between the phenomena and the Absolute, with a doctrine of escapism from the world to another state or place. Similarly Mīmāṁsā might have fallen into the hands of a newly developing school of "priests" with dry ritualism, with exclusiveness and intolerance. Just as we must distinguish the true Yoga, Nyāya and Vedānta from the latter-day contaminations, we must distinguish the true Mīmāṁsā as a mode of approaching the fundamental problems about the world, from priestcraft of latter days. The Mīmāṁsā is the only system of thought in the whole world where there is a bold denial of God, and of the creation of the world and its control by God, and also of One Man above humanity, along with an interpretation of the Moral Law of the world, bringing Moral Law into line with scientific laws, and making full use of rationalism of philosophy.

65. Mīmāṁsā attempted to restore the philosophy of the Vedic days. But after the Vedic period, God and Super-man came into Indian territory. Mīmāṁsā wanted to save the nation from these new encroachments. Mīmāṁsā fought bravely, fell in the battle like a great hero. Still man and the world remain what Mīmāṁsā wanted to present them to be as their nature, real and free.
PART III—MAN AND HIS DESTINY

CHAPTER 16

I KNOW

1. The world is only what is known to man; there is nothing that is absolutely outside the knowledge of man. Man’s knowledge is limited by his abilities to know and by the modes of knowing available to him. There is no knowing of the world without knowing what man is. Every individual knows himself as an “I”. What are to be termed the “You” and the “He” and the “This”, the others and the world outside, are there only to the extent that they are within the knowledge of the “I”. When I speak of a white building or a tall tree or a constellation of seven stars or of a horse as distinct from a cow or a man on the bridge or a long distance or a short space of time or of happiness or of physical strength, I do not know whether there are such things as absolutely objective facts, whether there are others like myself who know the same things and in the same way. They are all entirely within my knowing. I have no method of making a test about their objective reality, which standard for testing must come from outside my knowing.

2. When it is said that there is only “my knowing” and that what are known to me are only projections from my knowing, only aspects of my knowing, constituents of my knowing, when it is said that there is no such thing outside of and independent of my knowing, which reality I can know independent of myself, this represents the true approach of a rationalistic philosopher to the problems of “What is all this?” When it is said further that even this knowing process is not endowed with any reality, that too is a legitimate position for a rationalistic philosopher to take up in handling such a problem. Such an attitude to the problem of the world and of man in the world is usually associated with the Budhistic philosophy. But this is the position taken up in Indian philosophy in general.
3. No one has categorically stated in modern times that the theory of the fleeting consciousness (Vijñāna-vāda) constituting the whole of reality, without any reality outside of such consciousness and independent of such consciousness, and the further theory which denies a reality even to this consciousness (Śūnya Vāda) are the actual teachings of Buddha. All are agreed in modern times that Buddha refused to be drawn into such metaphysical regions of intellectual speculations that have no direct and immediate bearing on moral life. It is also held in modern times that such a theory, developed within the Buddhistic schools of thought, is in direct conflict with the orthodox views that developed within the Vedic fold.

4. What is actually found in the Vedic thought has always been that there is no world outside of knowledge and that the knowing by any one individual is not the whole reality. The individual knower and his knowing and what is known by him are all aspects of a transcendental knowledge. The world has originated from knowing, remains within knowing and is reduced to knowing. I have to further explain such a position lest it may be misunderstood as postulating a theory of an origination and an end. Meanwhile I propose to deal with this main problem. I know, I feel and I behave. I notice the same behaviour in others in similar circumstances; from this there is a deduction that others too have a similar knowing and a similar feeling as antecedents to their behaviour, exactly like myself. "I" can be only a knowing, and it may be that this "I" exhausts the "Whole". Or it may be, if the above deduction is valid, that the "I" and the "He" and the "You" are all aspects of some transcendental knowing which exhausts the "Whole", is identical with it. It makes no difference whether the "Whole" is included in the "I", comprehending "He" and "You" and "This", or whether the "I" is only a part and an aspect of the "Whole" which comprehends also the "He" and the "You" and the "This".

5. The "He" and the "You" cannot be anything other than a knowing just like the "I", if they are co-ordinates of the "I" within the "Whole". In either case there is a "Whole" which is of the nature of a knowing, as a
unity or as an aggregate. If the deduction of the "He" and of the "You" as co-ordinates of the "I" is valid, then it becomes rational to assume that the "This" is not within the "I" or the "He" or the "You", but something outside of them, and yet within the "Whole"; the "Whole" consists of a knowing subject, may be a plurality of it, and a known object, also a plurality. In so far as one feels the "Whole" as constituting his own knowing, there is an instinct for "Monism" within oneself. In so far as there is a deduction of similar knowing agents, there is an intellectual necessity for accepting a pluralism. There is also a necessity for accepting a dualism between the knowing subject and the known object. The deduction of other knowing agents has as its basis the acceptance of a common known object that reacts in a uniform way on the various knowing subjects. There is the common doctrine that there is no objective reality outside of and independent of the sphere of the knowledge of the subject.

6. Some questions naturally arise in such a context. Is there an absolute subject-object differentiation? Is there a plurality within the subject and within the object? Can there be a unity within the sphere of the subject and within the sphere of the object, the dualism between the subject and the object remaining? Or, is there a unity between the subject and the object? If this be so, is one the product of the other or are both the products of that higher unity? Such are some of the questions that had been exercising the intellect of the people from the earliest known times in the history of India. The earliest literary evidence for the history of India is found in the Rgveda. Even here the people are fully possessed of the complicated problems regarding the nature of the world in which they found themselves and also regarding the nature of man himself who is in the world, and regarding their mutual relation.

7. There are frequent references in the poetry of the Rgveda to the limitations of the normal man, and even those who are far up in the progression towards true wisdom, there are limitations. We come across references to the secret "Names" and secret "Positions" and secret "Teachings". There is the differ-
ence between the man who does not know and the man who knows. There are references to the transient nature and to immortality relating to the man who does not know and the man who knows. Wisdom is associated with sweetness and with light. In the poem relating to the condition of the universe prior to its "Becoming", there is a reference to a "Will" (Kāma). It is said that in the beginning there arose a "Will". Prior to that there was only some Power (Tapas). In the poem about the "Person", the Absolute, Supreme Person is the source of differentiation (Virāṭ). It is the same philosophy that we find in the later phases represented by the Upaniṣads.

3. "That One willed—I shall become many". "There is nothing that is many in this world". "The individual and the Supreme are identical." "Thou art That." "Know the Absolute; one becomes the Absolute." "There is the Absolute whonce all this came, in which they remain and into which they are re-absorbed." This world was "Non-being" in the beginning; this world was "Being" in the beginning. In all such statements there is the essential factor that the differentiation arose from a unity which is of the nature of knowledge. The differentiation is not a "Being" in the beginning, but had its origin in a "Being" and was a "Being" even from the beginning only to that extent. We do not know how they arrived at such conclusions about the nature of the world. The tradition is that they had developed certain transcendental powers of intellect whereby they could see beyond the normal sphere of vision. The capacity dwindled among the people at a later stage. It cannot be that they, in their personal nature as individuals, could see the unity and communicate their knowledge in language form. What they could see was only some "Beyond" of this aggregate of differentiation. Such a "Beyond" can be nothing but an Absolute Unity. What is not any of this differentiation, not even the aggregate of the differentiation, is what is termed the Absolute.

9. The postulation of the Absolute as the source of the differentiated world as its effect, is only a statement in language of what cannot be stated in language. This is again and again emphasised in the Upaniṣads. That the "Absolute" is beyond of
the normal vision is also stated frequently in the poetry of the Rgveda. The statement about the Absolute being the source and the differentiation as the effect does not mean that there was a time when there was only an Absolute and that at a certain stage, in course of time, there was a "Will" and an activity in the Absolute which produced the differentiation. At best it can mean that in terms relating to the facts within the differentiation, the relation of the differentiation to the Absolute is one of cause and effect. In the world of differentiation, the process from cause to effect is one of composition of parts into a whole and of differentiation from uniformity. If we take a piece of material and start breaking it into parts and into their parts and so on, we must reach a state when a further break will not be possible; that is the absolute stage from which we can start the process of building up. Different kinds of such combinations produce different composites, and in this process, differentiations and further differentiations are also produced. The process of a change from the cause to the effect, from the parts to the whole, from the less differentiated to the more differentiated is only within the differentiation; it can have no reference to the Absolute.

10. From the reference to the Will which is at the root of the differentiation, as mentioned in the poem about the condition of the world prior to differentiation, and from the reference to the the "Person" as the source of the differentiated world, found in the Rgveda, and also from the mention there itself of the "Secrets" in the world known only to the few gifted people of wisdom, and further from the relation of wisdom to sweetness, we have to conclude that if there is a cause and effect relationship between the two, it is the object that is the effect and it is the subject that is the source. No Indian thinker has postulated that primarily there was only dead matter and that in that dead matter, life and intelligence came at a later stage. The world is a manifestation in a differentiated form of the unity of the nature of Intelligence or Knowledge; or the world is manifested to the intelligence and through the intelligence. Within this differentiation, there are the individuals who are the subjects
and the facts outside that are the objects. The world is a composite of this subject-object variety.

11. The phenomenon known as cognition may be momentary. But there is a continuity in this series of momentary cognitions. It is this continuity that is called the man. If there is a continuity, then the continuous momentary facts must either be a manifestation of such isolated facts in a common medium, or they must be the aspects of a continuous substrate. To say that there is a continuous momentary functioning without a functionary is a contradiction within itself. It is the continuum itself that is the functionary. The same is the the case with movement or cognition. If there is a continuous series of movements, there must be something that moves; it may be the continuity itself that moves. In the same way, if there are momentary cognitions that form a continuous series, there is the continuity that is the cogniser. At least the function, the movement and the cognition, are the aspects of a substrate in the form of the continuity in them. If there is no such fact as what functions or what moves or what cognises, how can we say that they form a series, distinct from another series. What differentiates one series from another series is this individuality. The momentary phenomena are aspects of this individuality.

12. The position remains unchanged whether the other series are distinct from the one series relating to a particular subject that we can think of, or whether they are within the sphere of the cognitions of a momentary nature forming a series, which is the subject. If there is only one "I" and if the "He" and the "You" and the "This" are all within the sphere of this "I", then there is unity in the world and that unity is in the form of intelligence. If there is a variety in such series, then they all should form into a unity coming within a higher "I" as the subject. When once the objective world is accepted as not in itself real, and when once it is accepted that the object is only an aspect of the subject, the unity of a subject, of an "I" in the world, is unavoidable.

13. If the "I" comprises the "He" and the "You" also within its sphere, it is reasonable that what is called the "He" and the
"You" are also similar subjects in the form of "I" and that the original "I" becomes a "You" or a "He" comprised within that. Such are deductions necessitated by the very nature of the "I". Just as "I" have no means of knowing what the "He" or the "You" really can be as subjects in the form of "I", in the same way the "He" and the "You" as subjects in the form of another "I" cannot have any means of knowing the original "I", what this "I" may be. The only rational position is to take the "I" and the "He" and the "You" as co-ordinate aspects of a Super "I" or as facts within the sphere of such a Super "I".

14. If, on the other hand, the series is accepted as just a continuum without a common substrate, then perhaps a position of rejecting the absolute reality of even this continuum of momentary cognitions becomes inevitable. That will be equivalent to the recognition of a fact outside of the sphere of cognition. One may call it a void (Śūnya); one may say that it is not a fact. Yet it is at least a "State". And that "State" is absolutely outside of the sphere of the momentary cognitions. The recognition of such a "State" demands the recognition of some subject within whose sphere that "State" comes. It is such a necessity that resulted in the postulation of a Super "I". A negation is only another positive. It is the nature of consciousness that it cannot absolutely negate itself. There can be a negation of this aspect or that aspect, which really is nothing but positing another aspect. Everything is within the sphere of consciousness, if it is not within the sphere of one consciousness, it is within the sphere of another. Thus, prior to the coming into existence of series which may be designated "I" and after the lapse of this series, there must have been and there must come into existence other series, which in themselves are forms of "I", but which I have designated "He" or "You".

15. In this way we come to the position that within the sphere of "I", the series known as "He" and "You" are as much realities as the "I" itself. Each such series is an individual. Thus, the world consists of an infinite number of individuals, distributed in space and in time with their respective extensions, each such individual occupying only a limited extension in time and space.
There is a gradation among them in respect of their powers of bringing objective facts within their sphere. Some can see facts not seen by others; some can hear sounds not heard by others and some can react to facts mentally to which other minds may be dead and insensitive. In so far as the entire universe is in the form of a Super Consciousness, the gradation must be measured from the top to the bottom. In terms of the language that expresses facts of the known world, the start is from that Super Consciousness and the movement is to the lower strata. Emphasising again the fact that there was no absolute starting point for such a differentiation, it is found stated that the first stages consisted of forms of consciousness higher in grade than man and than the lower living beings like animals and birds and trees. Thus, in the poem in the Rgveda relating to the condition of the world prior to differentiation, there is mention of the gods as coming within the early stages of this differentiation. In the poem about the Supreme Person (Puruṣa), gods, demi-gods (Sādhyas) and poets of transcendental vision (Ṛṣis) are spoken of as having started the creation of the world after the first stage in differentiation. If there is a source, if there is something that can be designated by the term "Source" in relation to the world of differentiation, that is the Supreme. It does not mean that the course of the world process is one of decadence; what it means is that the differentiation started from the undifferentiated which is Supreme and that the individual facts of the differentiated world are only aspects of the Supreme. And that Supreme is of the nature of intelligence, life, sentience, consciousness.

16. If the knowing individual is to be traced back to the Supreme Intelligence, the objective world cannot be traced back to another source. The fact of the objective world must also be aspects of that same Supreme; they are aspects of the same Intelligence. Unless they are aspects of Intelligence, intelligence cannot bring them within its own sphere. "I" can cognise "This" only when the "This" has some factors in common to the "I". The "I" becomes the knowing "I" because of some increased ratio in it of the subjective factor in the differentiation, and "This"
becomes the known “This” because of the increased ratio in it of the objective factor in the differentiation. Thus, both the subject and the object in the differentiated world are aspects of the same undifferentiated Supreme. The difference between the subject and the object is not in the matter of their content; the difference is in the matter of the ratio in their constituents. When I see an object, I am not an immaterial consciousness, nor is the object an absolutely lifeless matter. I am able to see the thing because of the material constituent in me, and also because of the consciousness content of the object.

17. Does it mean that when I see a rock, the rock is seeing me too? That is exactly what it is. When I am seeing another man, I know also that he is seeing me, besides my knowing him. But I am not able to know how the rock is seeing me. This difference is due to the more or less equal ratio of the constituents in me and in the man I see and to the unequal ratio between the rock and myself. All the same, there is the subjective element in the rock and there is the objective side in me so far as that objective nature in the rock is concerned. In the same way, there are the gods and the demi-gods. In them the objective side is in such a small ratio in relation to their subjective side that I am not able to get them within my subjective factor. That is why I am not able to see the gods and the demi-gods. Even the great poets of transcendental vision are not within the sphere of my cognition. But they all see me, just as I am able to see a rock.

18. When there was the differentiation, what took place was not a division of the Absolute into a pure subject side and a pure object side. What took place was an uneven distribution of the subject and the object sides in the world of differentiation. There is nothing in the differentiated world that is only a subject and there is nothing in the differentiated world that is purely an object. On account of the difference in the ratio, we make a distinction like gods and demi-gods that are only subjects, who can never be the object of our cognition, and rocks and other things that are only objects and never subjects, while men and and other living beings are both subjects and objects. Science
may not recognise the first variety, what are only subjects without their being objects of our cognition. They may not also accept the subjective side of rocks and other dead material. But science accepts that man and the living beings have a faculty called the faculty of cognising, and that they are at the same time objects of cognition by others. How far below in the gradations of organic formations does such an ability to cognise persist? We do not know. Scientists are not agreed on this point. Theories have been brought forward that even plants and trees can react to external stimuli, that they too have pleasure and pain and hunger and thirst and sleep and waking. In ancient India, the presence of a subjective element is accepted in all forms of the differentiated world.

19. The phenomenon known as cognition is a wonderful feature in our life. It is not merely a reaction to the immediately present facts. It ultimately comprehends the whole world. Man is able to see the whole universe. Whatever may be the proportion of the actual world to the world that has actually come within the sphere of man's cognition, this sphere is amazingly vast in comparison to the size of man. It has been suggested that man holds more or less a middle place among the material formations of the world. The electrons are as much smaller than man as man is smaller than the giant stars. If such a tiny part of the world can bring within its own sphere of comprehension such an immense part of the universe, such a capacity must be something wonderful. Can such a factor be confined to the Earth and to a small part of the facts of the Earth? At present, the number of men on the Earth is calculated to be less than thirty hundred millions, really an insignificant number in comparison to the numbers which scientists make use of in calculating the facts of the world. If what is called life be confined to the Earth, and even on the Earth if rationality is confined to men, it must be an accident in the world and not a fact that has to be seriously taken note of. And yet such a tiny factor in such a tiny part of the universe has such an immense scope, to bring such an immense field within its comprehension. It is far more rational to hold that what is called life on earth
is an aspect of something that is universal in origin and scope.

20. Such a "Life Universal" implies a universal intelligence, a universal cognition, a universal volition and many other things. All such things are implied by the terms "intelligence and life". The world is at least intelligently planned and intelligently operated. Whether it is intelligence itself or an evolute from intelligence, it makes no difference. Intelligence controls itself and also it evolutes. When scientists say that the world is controlled by a natural law, what does it mean? They have the experience of the results of an intelligent planning and an intelligent operation; they see such a result in the plan and in the operation in the whole world. Law is nothing but the external counter-part of intelligence. If there is no intelligence, there is no difference between law and chaos. If a scientist plans an apparatus and if a child plays with toys, there is intelligence in the former and there is also a law, while there is only caprice and chaos in the latter.

21. When we examine the world as what "I know", then the world has to be thought of in terms of intelligence. I have an intelligence and I have a notion of what is law and order and a regular relation of an event and its sequence. There is no law absolutely independent of what "I know". When we examine the world as "What is", then we transfer the law regulating the events that we know into that system in the world also. Even without assuming an intelligence to the events so regulated, such a transfer of the effect of intelligence to such external events is possible in the case of the scientists. At best what can be said about the point of view of science is that they can manage the whole of their science without recognising an intelligence behind the events of the world as a whole; there is a law. But they cannot deny that what is a law is nothing different from what is known by intelligence, and as such they cannot deny the presence of an intelligence behind the events of the world. If, instead of the indifference to the problem which scientists show to the problem of a universal intelligence at the back of the plan and operation of the events of the world, they are given only two choices, namely, either to recognise such an
intelligence or to deny it, certainly their own position will compel
the scientists to recognise such an intelligence.

22. When there is a recognition of such a Universal Intelligence,
there is the recognition of an agent that can know everything,
that is present everywhere and that has power to do anything.
Some one among men has to be recognised as capable of knowing
such an agent, of communicating with him and of passing on his
Law to the people. There must be successors to such an extra-
ordinary person to guard the law that has been communicated
by the original Teacher, to teach the law and to enforce the law.
The result has been that law was thrown out by chaos in social
organisation among men. I am not unaware of such events in the
world prior to the emergence of what is hailed as rationalistic
thought and science. But fear should not compel us to evade
truth. Other methods must be devised to maintain truth and
also to save humanity from the evil consequences of a deviation
from the path of truth.

23. Adherence to the path of truth need not result in any such
calamity to humanity. The scientific method could be followed
up even in the realm of the investigation into such a universal
intelligence. Men and the events experienced by men are all
manifestations of such a universal intelligence, and are also
evolutes from such an intelligence aspects of it. The law,
which is the manifestation and operation of that intelligence,
needs no super-man and no hierarchy of guardians. It is just
there. Science recognises a gradation in knowledge; what
science refuses to recognise is a gradation in authority according
to such a gradation in knowledge. It has been found in actual
experience that the authority alone continues and not any super-
iority in knowledge. It is possible to recognise a universal intel-
ligence behind the events of the world and at the same time to
protect humanity from compulsory beliefs and dangers of
failure to submit to such beliefs.

24. Science knows that even within the limits of our ex-
perience and of the experiments of science, there are grad-
ations in intelligence and that the apparatus of intelligence
does not function according to any invariable pattern. Thus,
the human eye can react only to some forms of light radiation. The light waves that pass through the spectrum, light waves that are visible to the human eye may have wave-lengths varying from $\frac{1}{100}$ to $\frac{1}{100,000}$ centimetres, the violet being at the shortest end and the red being at the longest end. Even here, there is the gradation of intensity. A certain gradation of intensity blinds the human eye, while some animals may be able to see in such an intensity; in very weak light man cannot see, while some animals can see only in such mild light and become blind when the intensity is increased. Light waves cannot pass through certain medium when they are within the wave-lengths of the visible light, while they pass through such medium when their wave-lengths are reduced to $\frac{1}{10,000}$ or $\frac{1}{100,000}$ centimetres, what are known as X-rays. There are instruments in use among scientists that can record the presence of waves having far higher and far lower wave-lengths, the cosmic waves far beyond the violet end and the long radio waves far beyond the red end. Scientists refer to unknown rays even beyond of this at both ends.

25. Knowledge of electricity is a recent event in science; the light waves beyond the spectrum on either side, the ultra-violet and still shorter waves on one side and the infra-red and the still longer waves on the other side were known only during the last half a century. Electric transmission without some metallic medium is a still later discovery. Why should science say that it is, "Thus far and no further"? If there are waves and if there are instruments that can record such waves, which are not caught by the eyes, why should there not be living organisms that can react to such waves?

26. If certain objects are opaque to some kinds of light waves and if they are transparent for other waves, if ordinary electric waves can be transmitted only through metallic media and if longer waves can be transmitted without such media, is it not also possible that what are called obstacles to the movement of physical bodies need not be obstacles to other forms of bodies? What is called touch can also behave like what is called light. The air does not obstruct the movement of my hand, while it
obstructs the movement of a piece of paper, which is kept suspended in it.

27. What I want to assert is that when "I know" it does not mean that my knowing exhausts the whole sphere of knowing and the entire mode of knowing. There are different forms and gradations in living and in knowing. The modes of knowing are also varied. What is a help to know for one becomes an obstacle to know for another. What is presumed to be "dead matter" may have a life of its own nature. What is insentient in our view may be sentient in its own way. All that the words dead and insentient may mean is only this that there is no life and no sentience in them in the way in which there is life and sentience in us, not that there is no sort of life and sentience. In this sense, there is life everywhere, life pervades everything in the world. The world as a whole is "living", the world is sentient.

28. What is the distinction that we generally draw between living and dead matter? There is life when there is a force generated from within for growth. Growth is a kind of movement. This force for movement from within takes another form when the body itself can change its position, as in the case of what are termed "living beings". A plant can grow; but its movement is restricted to that much change in space. But a bird or an animal can change its position. Man develops another capacity of changing the environments for his life, which plants and animals cannot do. Man changes his environments, and the environments change the nature of man. Thus there is what is called progression in man, which is not found in plants and animals. If there is any change and progression in them, it is brought about from outside, by man. Movement implies energy. In this way, we come to the conclusion that life and energy are ultimately the same. Absolutely dead matter cannot develop any change and growth and evolution in it. This also shows that there is life at the root of all change and evolution in the world.

29. We receive solar energy; solar energy sustains life. Plants grow receiving the energy and by conserving the energy in the
form of various kinds of matter, especially in the form of carbon and its compounds. Such vegetation gets into the system of human body and helps life in man. What is called energy is not a mere physical, dead, mechanical phenomenon in the world. Life force and mechanical force are not two different things in the world; nor is it a fact that mechanical force simply helps life to develop. Life force and mechanical force are aspects of the same force. Since it is found in our own experiences that mechanical force cannot be generated without some force behind it, it follows that it is life force that converts it self into another aspect called the mechanical force. The movement of electrons in an atom, the movement of the planets round the sun and of the satellites round the planets, the movement in the solar system within the stellar system and of the whole stellar system in the universe, and the movements outwardly of the whole universe, the phenomenon that is now known as the expanding universe—not one of them can be called a mere mechanical process. There is mechanical movement following certain laws, because it is the process of a life force, a process controlled by intelligence.

30. We speak of the Sun as a burning mass of matter; we speak of the moon as a cold mass of matter, too cold for "life," and also of some plants as too near the Sun or too far from the Sun to have the temperature in which alone life can operate. All that we can say is that in such regions there cannot be life as we understand life on earth. That does not mean that there is no life at all. What is a burning mass of matter and what is called a cold mass of matter can be the very regions that have the natural temperature for another form of life. The life-phenomena in such regions may not react to our modes of communication. The mode of life there, the mode of sensation, the mode of movement, all of them may be different there from what it is on the Earth. We on the Earth cannot respond to their life and to their life activities. We may send radio signals. But do they understand the phenomenon of such waves as we understand it? Our eyes cannot react to such waves and we know only the behaviour of physical objects under the influence of such
waves. May be, that to the life elsewhere they are what are light waves to us.

31. Science takes note of only the reaction of the external phenomena to instruments devised by the scientists to record the behaviour of things in specific conditions. Science knows only such behaviour; science does not know, and does not claim to know also, the true nature of the thing whose behaviour is recorded by the instruments. The conclusions arrived at by the scientists are late to very important matters connected with the nature of the world. But there are other aspects of the things of the world that too have a great importance. When we approach the problem of the nature of the facts of the external world from the point of view of the reaction of the things on our knowing faculty, the problem takes another direction. That is what I have tried to explain till now. That inanimate and animate (organic) matter are different from each other that the latter is a later phenomenon and is also a phenomenon of a higher grade in the process of evolution, and other scientific theories are only postulates made out of facts as recorded on instruments. When we approach the problem from the point of view of the reaction of the facts of the world to our own knowing faculty, the conclusion is that everything is an aspect of "Intelligence", that there is no such absolute distinction between animate and inanimate matter, that there is no gradation between the two and no progression from inanimate to animate matter.

32. The presence of life behind every fact of the universe is accepted in all systems of thought in India. Even in the Buddhistic system of the doctrine of momentary cognitions with their objects as aspects of such cognitions, the fact of the presence of Intelligence behind the objects of the world is a cardinal point. In the other important system of Buddhistic thought, namely, the view of even this series of momentary cognitions being an illusion, the presence of the cognition is accepted; the only difference is that its ultimate reality is denied here. There is no world without Intelligence, according to both the systems.
33. In the Vedic system of thought, there are two main currents. There is a view that in so far as every form of movement and change has to be taken as being controlled by an Intelligence, the Intelligence itself has to be recognised as of the nature of energy, of change and movement. In its ultimate nature, there is a harmonious, rhythmic movement; in the phenomenal nature, there is clash, there are cross currents. The former state is not noticed as movement, while the latter is what is known as change and movement.

34. There is the other view that the Absolute Intelligence is of the nature of still, silent, static, positive “Being”, with no “Becoming”, with no scope for any negation. The phenomenal world is a disturbance in its true nature. This is the position taken up in the Monistic School of the Vedānta system. The other two schools of Vedānta is more inclined towards the other view. The Mīmāṃsā is definitely this latter. In the two latter Schools of Vedānta, there is a tendency to identify this Absolute with a Person, with Intelligence, while in the Mīmāṃsā this Absolute is taken only as an existence, and intelligence is attributed only to the phenomenal world; intelligence follows the nature of this absolute “Being”. They call it Dharma (Law). The Law and “Life” are concomitant, neither being without the other.

35. “I know”. This is the starting point for me. I take the world as objective; it can be objective only to the extent that it is the object for a subject. I accept the full implications of such a starting point. We can deal with the problem of man and the problem of man’s relation to the world only if we consider the world as the object of man, man being the subject. From this start, we may have to move to further oppositions, like man being himself an object for another Super Subject. In this position taken up here, there is no conflict with modern science. Since the start is different, the direction and the goal are also different. The problem relate to the world in both; but the actual problems are not identical, in spite of this identical subject-matter. The aspects are different.
36. Various important problems that can legitimately come within the scope of scientific and rational investigation relating to the world, are now kept outside the sphere of science on account of the restrictions which science has imposed upon itself; science recognises only such phenomena which can be recorded by the apparatus of science. There is an internal apparatus that can react to the phenomena of the external world, and that cannot react on the scientists’ apparatus. On account of this restriction, subjects like sub-conscious phenomena, clairvoyance, telepathy, premonition and all such facts as come within Para-Psychology, do not receive the attention they receive. Religion is discredited: Yogic practices are discredited. May be that religion and Yoga, as they are understood—and practised at present—have to thank only themselves for such a neglect from science. But science itself was not the science which it is now. A defect is no reason for neglect; defects must be remedied and facts must be accepted for investigation.

37. Science is perfecting instruments for recording the behaviour of things under different conditions, and such perfected instruments perfect science. Here is a progression along a double line. Man’s internal apparatus also stands in need of the same perfection, and along with such perfection, knowledge of things in the world that do not react to the scientists’ apparatus will also progress towards perfection. Such a new course will take along time to yield any appreciable results; but that is no reason for any diffidence in taking up the investigation. Science did not make progression in a day. What is the science of Galilio and Newton by the side of the science of today? Galilio did not know Kepler’s Laws of planetary motions, and he did not know the planets on the further outskirts of the solar system now known to us. Newton’s physics has given place to Einsteinian physics. Faraday had no notion of transmission of electricity by wireless and of trans-spectral rays. Then we have Aero-planes and rockets, unbelievable to the scientists of the last century. It may take a few centuries of progression before man will be able to have direct contact with the facts of the world without the aid of records made by instruments. In that condition, scientists will know what
a thing is, not merely how a thing behaves under a certain condition as recorded by an instrument.

38. It is such a power that we find recorded in the poetry of the Vedas and in the discussion recorded in the Upaniṣads. The Yoga system of philosophy deals with the same problem. In the Sāṅkhya system there is the theory of a subtle-body (Līṅga-saṁāra) which takes up and casts off the gross bodies. The problem of cells still remains a mystery to the scientists. There are many other mysteries in the world which scientists have not been able to explain. The Vedānta speaks about an Absolute which is of the nature of Intelligence, of which the phenomenal world is an evolute, of which the phenomenal world is a part, to which the phenomenal world is subordinate. All systems of thought in India speaks about a continuity in life transcending the changes noted from body to body. A large number of such bodies can be strung together along the Time-Line into a unity, and all such strings can be brought together into another unity along the Space-extension.

39. The only concession that is wanted from the scientists is that they must recognise the existence of an apparatus within man, parallel to the instruments which the scientists perfect. For this, the scientists must recognise that there is a real scientist also in the picture along with his science and the facts of science. Can the scientists say that what their instruments can perform is absolutely beyond their own capacity? If radio communication is possible through empty space, why should a similar mental communication be impossible through space? If an instrument can record very minute waves and electrons, why should not man himself receive the impressions? If through fuel-energy, the gravitation of the Earth can be counter-acted enabling bodies to revolve round the earth at speeds nearly twenty times the velocity of the surface of the Earth in its rotation round the Sun, why should not some energy be developed from within man himself to perform such a thing? Instruments have not been perfected that can recorded radiations of wave-lengths shorter than the "Cosmic Waves" or longer than the "Long Radio Waves". Instruments have not been perfected that can record the
behaviour of material particles that are smaller than electrons. Does radiation reduce itself into an absolute zero, do material particles reduce themselves into an absolute zero value at any stage? Or is it a reduction into a state of absolute fineness in both cases and yet retaining a positive value? Or is it a reduction into an infinite gradations of fineness? What is meant by "Unknown"? Is it what is absolutely outside the sphere of man's knowing? Or is it what is outside the present knowledge of man? The former alternative is an impossibility and the latter implies a means of knowing. Man himself must contain such a means of knowing what is postulated on the basis of what is already known.

40. There are facts beyond what are now known by man, and such facts can be known by man, because—I KNOW.
CHAPTER 17.

ORIGIN OF MAN.

1. There is practically no system of thought in the world in any country and at any period in the history of man, when the thinkers did not postulate a beginning for the world and for the human race in the world. Belief in some Supernatural Power as the cause and as the source of the world and of man is common to practically all ancient systems of thought. Modern science too accepts such a Power, though the scientists give a new appellation and a new role to that Power. The ancient thinkers identified this Power with a person; it is the God. God is always there, is all-powerful and all-knowing. He is terrible to those who do not follow his commands; but he can be merciful to those who worship him, who obey his law. He created the world and man in the world. He created animals and trees. He distributed the surface of the Earth into land and water, and into rivers, plains, mountains and oceans. In most of the systems, it is not said that God would destroy the world which he created at a later time.

2. In modern science, there is that Power. But that Power has no relation to a person. It has no relation to life either. Its function started earlier than life, and life is a consequence of its operation. They call it the "Natural Law". While God created the world from "Nothing", the "Natural Law" operated in a positive source. It was undifferentiated, uniform matter from which the world evolved through the operation of such a Natural Law. They also postulate an end for the world. I need not go into the various theories about the nature of the Universe, its origin and its destiny as formulated in modern science. Newtonian physics and Darwin's theory of the origin of the world have given way to the Relativity of Einstein. Cold, uniform matter, development of heat, radiation and lowering of temperature, solidification and the remnants of cold solid
matter, the possibility of complete death for the Sun and for the world, and the possible disappearance of the universe—all such speculations are liable to give way to a theory of an eternal universe. The theory of "the Expanding Universe" has given rise to various theories about the origin of the world; it may be from some Atom.

3. If there is radiation from a centre, there must be some accumulation in another centre. If cold matter developed heat at any point within, there must have been radiation from another point. If there is decomposition, there must be re-composition. Otherwise, the question "Why" stares us in the face. The only rational conclusion is that the universe is eternal, eternally dynamic. Cold materialism, ignoring man and his life and his feeling, worshipping the instruments of measurements and of recording—all these are also giving way to some element of humanism in modern science. Newton, Darwin and Einstein are the three giant pillars to support the modern theories about the nature of the universe. Einstein sometimes flies up into, philosophical heights. The sensation of the mystical has produced in Einstein the experience of the most beautiful and the most profound emotion. He considers a man to whom such an emotion is a stranger, who cannot wonder and stand rapt in awe, as nothing better than dead. To him the centre of true religiousness is to know and to feel that what is impenetrable to man does really exist, that it manifests itself as the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty which man's dull faculties can comprehend only in the most primitive form. Einstein is not afraid of God. He speaks of his humble admiration for the illimitable "Superior Spirit" who reveals Himself in the slight details which man is able to perceive with his frail and feeble mind. To him, the idea of a God consists in an emotional conviction that there is present a "Superior Reasoning Power", revealed in the incomprehensible universe.

4. I do not think that Einstein was acquainted with Indian thoughts relating to the nature of the universe. Yet, what a close relation there is between his views stated above and the approach of thinkers in ancient India regarding the same.
problem. India never accepted an origin for the world and for man. There may be a relative beginning; there is no absolute beginning. There is no God who is the creator of the world and who is also the controller of the world process. Einstein has been able to postulate his "Unified Field Theory" to construct a bridge between the Theory of Relativity which he himself has evolved and the Quantum Theory. The former has given a shape to our concepts of space, time, gravitation and the realities in the universe too remote and too vast to be perceived. The latter has given a shape to our concepts of the atom, the basic units of matter and energy and the realities that are too elusive and too small to be perceived. Einstein was impressed by the harmony and uniformity of Nature, and what he has done is to evolve a single edifice of physical laws to encompass both the phenomena of the atom and the phenomena of outer space. Einstein has brought the laws of gravitation and the laws of electro-magnetism within one basic structure of universal law. According to him two structures of space independent of each other is intolerable. Einstein has not constructed a still higher superstructure to incorporate this second Theory and his belief in a "Superior Reasoning Power" revealed in the incomprehensible universe.

5. It is this latter that has been achieved by the thinkers of ancient India. They were able to effect a unity between matter and energy, and this unity was further extended to a unity between the objective world and the subjective man. The physical law that governs the behaviour of the facts in the external world and the moral law that governs the life of man, came under a common law of the world. The moral law is as much an objective fact of the world as the physical law. Neither of them were created by any individual. They are ever there in the world. All of them come under the "Superior Reasoning Power", as revealed in the incomprehensible world. The position taken up in the Indian systems of thought is something unique in the world. It is only hinted at in modern science; it is not yet an accepted doctrine of the modern science. If any sort of approachment is possible between modern science
and ancient thought, it is only in the field of ancient Indian thought. Modern science has only to incorporate the views given expression to by Einstein into the structure of science to make it more or less identical with ancient Indian doctrines. If Indian thought is to make an approachment to any other system of thought, ancient or modern, regarding the fundamental problem of the nature of the world, the possibility is only in the case of modern science. Even the most ancient thought on religious matters in the world, as represented by the religion of Zoroaster, which is the closest genealogically too to Indian thoughts found in the Vedas is very far from the Vedic thought, and is more allied to the Semitic way of thinking on such problems.

6. In the Avesta, which is the literary record of the teachings of Zoroaster, there is the description of the creation of sixteen regions by Ahura Mazda, the creation of sixteen counter-regions of evil by his enemy. Ahura Mazda is the all-powerful Lord of the world. There is no such One, All-powerful God in the Vedas. In the Vedas, the differentiated world came out of an impersonal "Person", or it came out of an undifferentiated "Uniform" on account of some mysterious "Will" in it. The All-maker and the Golden Womb are not creators in the strict sense of the term "Creator". They gave a form to the world according to some law which is eternal. They moulded the world. The Heaven and the Earth are spoken of as the father and the mother. There is mention of the birth of even gods. That "reason" controls the evolution of the world, that "Life" is behind the entire process in the world, is the cardinal doctrine of the Vedas. This position has been interpreted in various ways in later times in ancient India; but the fundamental position remains constant and unaltered in all systems of thought.

7. The Sāṅkhya system postulates a dualism between Matter and Life. The terms "Matter" and "Life" are not quite precise. What is called "Matter" has the potentialities of "Life" and what is called "Life" has no function. That Life is only a superior reason. It is just there; it does not act, it does not operate, it does not function. Function is only in the "Matter", and this function in "Matter" consists of the "Life" function and
mechanical function. But such a function can be explained only through the postulation of a superior reason. The “Matter” in this dualism, is called Prakṛti “the primal cause” and the “Life” is called Purusā (the Person). The “Life” cannot function, and the “Matter” can function only on account of the presence of the “Life”. It is the combination of these two factors that accounts for the differentiation.

8. It is definitely stated in the standard text on the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy that the creation, i.e., the differentiation, is brought about by the conjunction of the Purusā (Life) and the Prakṛti (Matter); their conjunction is like the conjunction of a lame man and a blind man for a journey. The lame man is in need of some one to carry him so that there can be the movement and the blind man wants some one to show him the way for the same purpose. Neither can accomplish the journey without conjunction with the other. This is my presentation of doctrine of the Sāṅkhya system. The traditional interpretation has something more to say. What I have given above is only the second half of a verse; the first half says that the purpose of this conjunction is that there may be “sight” on the Purusā side and “detachment” on the Prakṛti side. This is what is found in the commentators of the medieval times, and this is the interpretation given in modern time also, following the medieval commentators.

9. There is some fundamental question involved here, and for this reason, I am giving one of the standard translations into English for this verse:

The association of the two, which is like that of a lame man and a blind man, is for the purpose of the Primal Nature being contemplated (as such) by the Spirit, and for the release of the Spirit (from three-fold misery); from this (association) creation proceeds.

In this translation, there is a definite purpose introduced in the case of the association of Matter and Spirit and the consequent creation. The purpose is that the Spirit might see the Matter in its true form and thereby may get release from the three-fold sufferings of man, which three-fold sufferings have been given in an earlier chapter, dealing with the Sāṅkhya system.
10. There is another interpretation possible for this passage. I have to give the English equivalents for the various terms in the passage in the order in which the terms occur there.

Of the Puruṣa—for the purpose of vision—for the purpose of abstraction—similarly of Pradhāna—like that of a lame man and a blind man—of even the two—there is the conjunction—produced thereby—is the creation. Puruṣa is the Spirit and Pradhāna is another term for Prakṛti or Matter. Instead of taking the two words in the possessive case, “of the Puruṣa” and “of the Pradhāna” as syntactically related to the two purposes, it is equally possible to syntactically relate them to the numeral “two” in the possessive case in the second half, being in apposition to the latter. There is a combination of the two, namely, the Puruṣa and the Pradhāna; the factor brought about by the Puruṣa is “Vision” and the factor brought about by the Pradhāna is “Abstraction”. The world of differentiation is made up of these two elements, Puruṣa and Pradhāna in conjunction. If there had been only one, there would not have been either the factor of vision or the factor of movement.

11. In the classical interpretation, there is implied a beginning and a close, some ultimate purpose served by one of the elements, by Pradhāna, for the other, the Puruṣa. This creates all kinds of difficulties. Why did what is essentially detached, get entangled? The ultimate purpose is necessitated by this unwanted beginning. There is also some difficulty in construing the passage in this way. There are two possessive nouns and two purposes mentioned, and normally we attach each purpose to each noun. But the purposes are for only one of them, namely, the Puruṣa (Spirit). Then the possessive at the end of the first half will have to be taken as the object for vision by the Puruṣa. This is not a very happy construction. Yet the usual construction is in such a way that the Puruṣa sees the Prakṛti and gets released from Prakṛti. But all are agreed that there is no real beginning for such an association. Even then there is to be an end for what has no beginning, a rather illogical position to take. If the association has not got any beginning, such an association
becomes natural to the Purusa, and what is natural has no end. This is another difficulty.

12. The term Kaivalya (Abstraction) has been interpreted by classical commentators as signifying a release from the three-fold suffering in man’s life. They are what are brought about by one from within (Adhyatmika), what are brought about by the Elementals (Adhibhautika) and what are brought about by Providence (Adhidaivika). The remedy for all such sufferings is prescribed in the various sciences like medicine and in religion. It is none of the business of a philosopher to find out and prescribe and provide remedies for the normal sufferings of a man in his ordinary life. A philosopher deals with the sufferings of a philosopher, and prescribes philosophical remedies. Kaivalya, Abstraction, is something different from this release. Kaivalya is the state of being Kevala, the state of being just oneself, free from any admixture with other factors. This must be the factor which Pradhana, Matter, provides in this combination of Spirit, the Spirit contributing the element of “Vision”.

13. I do not know how far we can push the comparison with the association of a blind and a lame man, in this context. Certainly what the lame man contributes is vision and what the blind man contributes is movement, which the lame man cannot provide. The Kaivalya, Abstraction, must have some relation to what the blind man provides in that combination, if we are to take the comparison to mean all that it is capable of meaning, just as what the lame man provides is vision, which the Spirit also provides. If we are to accept the classical interpretation, the lame man must be the superior; his business is to see that the blind man takes him in the proper direction and leaves him at his destination, free and alone. The blind man has no destination and no purpose of his own. Thus their union is not on a co-ordinate basis; it is on a basis of the superior and the inferior. This interpretation is necessitated by the religious beliefs of the classical period, when Matter was condemned and Spirit was elevated to the high pedestal.

14. In the beginning of the text, it has been specifically stated that religion does not provide an adequate remedy
for the philosopher's suffering, involving as the religious remedy does, gradations and impurities. This itself is the philosopher's true suffering, why there is such a gradation and differentiation, such a distinction between what is pure and what is impure. Yet the classical commentators interpret the text on the basis of religious beliefs current in the classical period. It is the religious bias of the classical period that lies at the root of theories like "the higher life, how to live more perfectly in the spirit". This is the preference of the man of religion; this is not a correct presentation of the position of a philosopher.

15. Matter and Spirit are equal and co-ordinate partners in a joint function. The destiny of man is not the point at issue here, where we are dealing with the problem of the origination of man; that point will be dealt with in the appropriate context. The position is quite clear that the world process has its origin in a combination of Matter and Spirit. There is no purpose in this combination; there is only a consequence natural to the combination. There is Vision, there is Abstraction, associated with this combination of Matter and Spirit. From the comparison with the combination of a blind man and a lame man, the "Abstraction" seems to be in the form of a movement, which the Spirit is not capable of providing.

16. In the passage immediately previous to the one that has been considered now, it is said that Matter is really insentient, lifeless, and yet in this combination it appears as if it were sentient, as if it is endowed with life, and that the Spirit that has no activity, being just an indifferent observer, appears as if it is functioning, which function is really the part of Matter. Thus, in this combination there is a mutual transfer of attributes. The two factors constituting the world are so intermixed that one cannot separate them, one cannot distinguish them. What we find is only a living and functioning mechanism as a unit. We cannot say that this is life and that this is the mechanical functioning. Such an admixture is the world process. And this is due to the combination of two factors, the Matter and the Spirit. It is a combination of two distinct factors into an indistinguishable unity, that is called the world.
17. The question may be raised why we should accept a dualism at all. Why should we not say that what is called the world is a unity, just a functioning Spirit or a living Matter? Why should it be presumed that this is a combination of two distinct factors called the Matter and the Spirit? This is the subject-matter that had been dealt with prior to the statement of the appearance of unity in a combination of two separate factors with separate attributes. The functioning, differentiated world must be traced back to an undifferentiated state. We find that what we experience is a chain of cause and effect in the world. The effect is more differentiated than the cause. What is called an effect is the cause in a new form, with some additional differentiating attributes. Tracing the chain backwards from effect to cause, we must reach a stage when there are no differentiations. That state is what is called "undifferentiated" (Avyakta). In this chain of cause and effect, impermanent, limited, functioning, manifold, dependent, constituted of parts, originating from another, there must be some parallel line that is the opposite of this. In the experienced phenomena we find three elements, some material content, in a state of movement and being cognised by man. The differentiation cannot be from within this itself. It is experienced as an object. There is something common among all the differentiated phenomena; they are not in themselves sentient. They produce their effects. Even when we reach the stage of the Matter in its absolute nature, we do not go beyond this condition that is experienced in the case of the differentiated phenomena. Therefore we postulate some entity that is entirely different from Matter both in its phenomenal and in its absolute conditions.

18. The above is only a negative argument, that there must be something different from all. It is not a positive argument for establishing an entity called the Spirit, entirely distinct from Matter, instead of assuming that Matter has life as its own nature. The difficulty arises on account of the distinction between subject and object in our experience. We can unify all the objects; but the distinction between the subject and the object cannot be eliminated in any such process of unification.
The unification is among what come within the sphere of one who cognises the differentiated phenomena. If the knower is eliminated as a distinct entity, the whole ground for accepting a reality is washed away. Further, even among the objects of our experience, the fact that they are in a state of flux, moving and changing, necessitates the assumption of some external ground for such a change and movement. It is this external factor as the subject and as the ground for the change and movement in the objects that is called the Spirit. Such subject factors and such factors as form the ground for the change and movement in the object must be a plurality according to the plurality of the knowing subject. It is in this way that a dualism between Matter as object and Spirit as subject and a pluralism in such subjective factor, the Spirit factor, is postulated in the Śāṅkhya system. Thus the world is a combination of Matter and Spirit; yet the distinction cannot be known except as an intellectual process. The two factors are so inextricably interwoven and each has transferred its distinctive attribute to the other in such a way that they appear to be a unity.

19. The Śāṅkhya system does not specify the condition under which such an association took place. Nor does it take up the question whether the condition continues when new associations of such Spirits with Matter can take place, whether the process took place only at a certain stage, what the condition was prior to that stage, whether there was any such prior stage, and many similar questions of a fundamental nature. It is said that the association is natural, which must mean, if it means anything, that there is no prior stage when such an association has not taken place, when the Spirit and Matter stood apart. If it is natural, then why should there be a termination? Why should the activity in Matter be spoken of as having some purpose to be served for the spirit as the cause? And such a statement is met with very frequently in the text on the system. It is said that both exist together even after the attainment of that purpose for the Spirit by Matter; the only distinction is that in such a condition, there will be no new process of a creation, which is the result of a particular kind of association between the
two. That particular association is such that there is a purpose to be served by the Matter for the Spirit. In the final stage, there is no such purpose and so the co-existence of the two, the Matter and the Spirit, is distinct in that stage from the association of the two in such a way as to produce the process of a creation. There is something incongruous in such a position, assigned to the doctrine of the world process in the Sāṅkhya system. I feel that it is the admixture of religious beliefs with philosophy that has produced this incongruous position. The fact remains that in the world process, the two elements, Matter and Spirit, are inextricably inter-woven and the two cannot be distinguished from each other; each has transferred its attributes to the other. The world is neither Matter nor Spirit; it is both, as an indistinguishable unit. There is no origination for man; there is no origination for the world. The world is there by its nature; the world functions by its nature.

20. It is not a mere movement that is found in the world process; the movement is of the nature of a progression, a movement upwards. There are occasional lapses and reverse movements. But the general direction is upwards for this world process. There is an element of activity, and there is also an element of an activity according to a law. The activity as a simple phenomenon is in Matter, and the element of the law comes from the Spirit. That is why there is a dualism in the thought found in the Sāṅkhya system. But there can be no movement according to a law, unless there is a law, and there can be no law unless there is some movement within which alone law can have a meaning. There can be no mere law; law is a mechanical law, law found followed up in movement. We find them as distinct and yet they cannot be separated. That is the world; there is Matter in movement and there is a "Vision" that makes the movement to conform to a law. Law implies a "Vision" and a "Vision" implies an Intelligence. The world is an intelligently worked mechanism.

21. There is no Creator as the starting point for the world process and for man. There is no Law-maker. Both the world process and the law within this process are within the world
itself. The question whether there is a unity in the Spirit in its absolute nature is not taken up in the system; it is left for other systems, in so far as such a position does not come within the sphere of reason. A plurality of Spirit is necessitated by experience. There is at least a plurality that conditions this Spirit, even if there is any ultimate unity in it. Spirit is known to reason only in this aspect of plurality, associated with the plurality of the conditioning factor. Another question is neither openly asked nor answered in the system; but an answer to this question is necessitated by the nature of the doctrine in the system. If there is no unity in the Spirit, how can we explain the harmony and unity in the world process? The reply can only be that the Spirit is assumed only to explain the law in the world process; and even if the Spirit has a plurality, their mutual harmony is implied by their very nature. So an inherent unity in the Spirit is not necessary. Their mutual unity and harmony are radical factors in their very nature. If the plurality is only in the conditioning factor and if the Spirit is in itself a unit, there is no rational way of proving such a radical unity; that unity is found in the world only as conditioned into a plurality. The conditioning factor will be made clear when the "Embodiment of Man" will be dealt with. What is very definite in the system is that there is no God as a Creator or as a Law-maker. There is no ultimate agent for the world as a whole, and as for the parts of the world, individual men can satisfy the needs of reason.

22. In essence, the position taken up in the Śāṅkhyā system is found in all the systems of thought in India. There may be differences in aspects, in details. There is the Nyāya system which postulates a God as Creator and also as Law-maker. There is the Vedaṇta system which postulates a unity in the world, so far as most of the interpretations of this system are concerned. The Mīmāṃsā system neither recognises a Creator or a Law-maker, nor does the system accept a beginning or end for the world process. There is no one who can know the entire law of the entire universe, since there is no omniscience. There are the individuals in various gradations of powers and knowledge. They
know the facts of the world and also the law that controls the activities in the world, i.e., the mechanical law in the world, to the extent of their powers of intellect, and they function in the world to the extent of their powers of action. A difference between Matter and Spirit is recognised in the world, according to this system. This eternal combination rolls on in the world. Matter and Spirit and their mutual association are all eternal factors in the world, with no end.

23. In the Nyāya system also, there is a combination of Matter and Spirit. The system recognises an infinite number of entities called Ātman, the Self. It is just there with no attributes of its own. Only such attributes which other forms of reality possess are found in the Self also, like number and size. They are infinite in number and universal in extension. They are also eternal. Knowledge, desire and volition which are the specific attributes of the Self, are not natural to the Self. They are all produced during the world process and are momentary in character. In the final stage all such specific attributes come to an end. The system does not accept any absolute beginning for the Self to become embodied and to develop the specific attributes of knowledge, desire and volition as momentary creations in the Self, coming and disappearing as a series. But the series has its final stage, which is the goal of life, what is called Mokṣa (Release).

24. The universe in its absolute condition is a vast expanse of Atoms with their specific attributes, with an infinite number of the Self. It is some inscrutable factor in the Self that started the process of the world as a cause and effect sequence. On account of the inscrutable factor in the Self, the Atoms are set in movement; they combine and re-combine and also decompose. In such a change, new attributes are developed by the Matter, which originally existed as Atoms, like size and form. Matter evolves into dead matter, into living organisms and into organs of sense. Associated with Matter in its three-fold state, there is the Self with a body, and the Self becomes a knower, doer and enjoyer.

25. It has been noticed that in the Sāṅkhya system, the
manifold Spirit can manage the evolution in the world with no need for a Super-Spirit to unify the world process and to harmonise it. But in the Nyāya system, it is found that the individuals cannot effect such a synthesis and bring about such a harmony; they postulate a special Self as the Super-Self. This is God. Unlike the manifold Self, this Super-Self has knowledge and volition as eternal factors in Him; they are not fleeting functions in Him, as it is in the case of the individuals. Thus, the cause of the start in the world process is three-fold, God, the individuals with their inscrutable factors, and the Matter in the form of Atoms. Every individual is an integral factor in the causal group relating to the events associated with that individual, and God is in all such causal groups. Some individual or other and God find a place in all the events of the world as causes. In the beginning the inscrutable factor in the individual brought about the initial movements in the Matter, while in the later stages, the series of his knowledge and desire and volition are factors in the individual who functions as a cause. Sentience is an attribute developed in the Self at a later stage after the world process had its beginning. It is only God who at that stage had a sentience. A movement in dead Matter without some external stimulus coming from an Intellect is not accepted in this system also.

26. There is the three-fold source for the start of the world process, namely, God, Individual Self with an inscrutable factor, and Matter in the form of Atoms. For the earlier steps in the process, only God can be the agent, and not the Individual Self. The individual can handle only Matter in its "effect state" after the first few steps. It is only the inscrutable factor in the Individual Self that comes into play at the initial stage. The Individual Self can handle matter only when Matter acquires a size, i.e., some spacial extension. Such a spacial extension can be acquired only in its effect condition, through the combination of the Atoms. A cause and effect relation necessitates a time factor also. The Individual Self or man can bring within his comprehension only Matter as related to space and time, in the above way. What is just there, without a spacial extension,
without a cause-effect sequence, is beyond the sphere of man's capacity. That is why Space and Time are important factors in the Nyāya System; they are varieties of "Substance" (Drauṣya) in the system, unitary, indivisible and eternal. Space and Time can be known to man only as limited by Matter of spacial extension and by Matter with the cause-effect sequence.

27. The Atoms are aspects of Matter with their specific qualities (Guṇas) like colour, touch and smell. They are radical, non-produced (Anudbhūta) and do not help man to comprehend the Matter. For this reason, there must also be developed in the Matter another factor, namely, produce qualities like colour, smell and touch. When two Atoms combine, their respective sizes do not produce the size of the effect, i.e., the combined matter. Their sizes are of the nature of a minus quantity. Just as 1 & 1 can result in 2, while (−1) & (−1) can result only in the (−2), in the same way, the positive size of produced forms of matter may give a higher, positive size when combined, while the size of the Atom, that has only a negative value, can produce only a smaller size of minus value. That is why they accept only the number in the Atom as the cause of the size in the produced aspect of matter, and not the size of the Atom as parts. Such a positive size is what is called the "Gross Size" or Mahat-Parimāṇa. Since the Individual Self can play his part as an agent in the world process only after the production of Matter with such attributes, namely, spacial extension of a positive value, and produced qualities like colour and touch, it is found necessary to postulate a Super-Spirit, known as God, as the agent in the start of the world process, when man cannot function. He continues his position as a common agent in the production of all events in the world, even after man is able to function as an agent.

28. Besides the three-fold source of the world, namely, God, the Individual Self with the inscrutable factor, and Matter in the form of Atoms with their specific qualities, there is another factor also as an eternal element in the constitution of the world. There are an infinite number of specific "Forms" into which alone things can be fitted, when there is the change from cause to effect or when there is decomposition from effect to
cause. Thus every object in the world like a cow or a man or a jar or a cloth, has some specific "Form", and it is on account of such a form that we call it by such names and that we distinguish them from one another, as classes. They are called Genus (Jāti). Such genera exist in the world on a design; no two genera intersect each other. The sphere of each larger genus can be divided into a large number of smaller spheres, and such a division can continue until we come to the "Final Effect". An effect is produced from its parts, so far as material formations are concerned, and such a "Final Effect" is called the "Final Whole", which cannot in it turn function as part for another whole. The Atoms are the smallest constituents and the "Final Whole" are the largest combinations. Thus the body of men, the body of a cow, a jar and other formations stop at that stage and do not function as parts for any higher formation.

29. What is called "Creation" in this system is not a real creation. Nothing is produced in such a process from a vacuum, from a zero. What is called "Creation" is only the association of the matter with a new form, dissociating it from another form. Thus, the threads have their own form or genus, and they cease to have that form when they are woven into a cloth, and the matter now acquires a new form. Although the matter existed prior to the creation of the cloth, that matter did not exist in association with the new form. It is such an association that is really known as "Creation", in the Nyāya system. God and man can only associate matter with new forms, but cannot produce new matter. The world process consists in such dissociations and associations of matter from and with those forms. Such a relation of matter with the form is also an eternal factor in the world; it is technically called a Samavāya, usually translated as "Inherence".

30. Such a relationship is accepted as subsisting between a matter and the qualities in it, between matter and the movements in it, and also between parts and the whole. The relationship, being what is postulated for specific reasons, is accepted as a unitary one and eternal; its further nature whether it is produced, whether it is manifold etc. cannot be determined. All that is presumed is that there is such a relationship, different
from contact which is between two distinct pieces of matter, and
from absolute identity, where there is no distinction at all between
the two related facts. This new relationship presumed in the Nyāya
philosophy is different from both, somewhere between absolute
identity and absolute difference between the two related facts.
Each eternal, non-produced thing in the world has also an
individuality of its own, which necessarily has to be eternal.
The phenomenal world has to be traced to some eternal sources
in its absolute nature; they are God, the Individuals, the inscrutable factors in the Individuals, Time and Space, material
particles called Atoms with their specific qualities, some eternal
relationships, some eternal individualities and some eternal
"Forms" (the Genus or Jāti). The world process is eternal,
without a beginning; there is no "Creator". There is a Law
also in the world, which only God knows in its entirety. God
formulates the Law in language form and transmits the knowledge
of the Law to man. There is Intelligence as an eternal factor
in the world, behind its change into the phenomena; that
Intelligence is in God.

31. In the Vedānta also, the position is not much different
from what is accepted in the Nyāya system. There is no School
of Vedānta that does not accept a God. There may be differences
in aspects. The fundamentals are the same. In the Monistic
School, there is an Absolute that is immobile, with no change;
there is a transformation of this Absolute into the phenomena.
There is no real transformation; the world is experienced as
phenomena while it is really the Absolute. Every individual
fact in this phenomena is the whole of the Absolute; it is not a
part of it nor an aspect of it. Within the phenomena there is
God (Īśvara) and some mysterious Power which it is that presents
the Absolute as phenomena. This Power is called Māyā,
something that is incomprehensible, something that appears as
what it really is not. It may be called "Illusion"; what is not
appears as what is, and what is appears as what is not, on account
of this Power. It has no beginning; but it has an end. Every
system of thought in India has to compromise with this illogical
position of accepting an end for what has no beginning, except
the *Mimāmsā* system which accepts neither a beginning nor an end for the world-process. In the Monistic School of the *Vedānta*, there are only the two factors as the source of the world, God and *Māyā*. On account of this *Māyā*, God is able to create out of Himself the whole of the phenomenal world. God himself is neither an Absolute Reality, nor an Absolute Unreality; God is God on account of the *Māyā*. What is produced by Him, the phenomenal world, is also neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. Here also there is no question of a “Creation” of what is from what is not. There is only a transformation of what is neither real nor unreal into what is again neither real nor unreal.

32. In the School of Qualified Monism within the *Vedānta*, there is God with the Individuals and Matter. They are all realities. The Individuals and Matter are Parts (*Āṁśa*) of God as the Whole (*Āṁśin*); God is the beyond (*Śeṣin*) of what is here (*Śeṣa*). In the Dualistic School, there are the three eternal factors of God, the Individuals and Matter, each distinct from the other, with absolute differences mutually between each fact within that category. God is Supreme, and the other two are subordinate to Him. In not one of the Schools within the *Vedānta* is there any doctrine of a “Creator”. The Law too is there. Law and God may be identical; God did not create Law. There is nothing called “God’s Law” any more than there is the “King’s Law” in a Constitutional Monarchy, or the Law of Parliament in a Republic. Man is controlled, along with all the events of the world, by a “Law”. There is nothing called an “Obedience” to Law. There is no beginning for the world process nor for man nor for Law. They are all there. There is either a metamorphosis of matter or there is a change from one “Form” into another. Nothing is which was not. The question of any chronology for the origin or for any event in the evolution of the world had no scope in any of the systems of thought in India.

33. But there are other channels along which thought had been proceeding in India. That is found in the great Epics. That is also found in the tradition of the people; it is
accepted in Astronomy. There is the following Table:

1 Year = 360 days
4320000 Years = 1 Mahā Yuga (Great Aeon)
1000 Mahā Yugas = 1 day-time for Brahmā (Creator) = Kalpa
1 such day and 1 night = 1 Complete day for Brahmā
30 Complete days = 1 Month for Brahmā
12 Months = 1 Year for Brahmā
100 Such years = 1 Life Time for Brahmā

It is supposed that half the life time of Brahmā has expired and that we are in the beginning of the second half. The calculation is that now 18000 Complete Days for Brahmā have expired and we are in the next Day for Brahmā.

34. There are the Manus, the originator of man, in each period of 71 Mahā Yugas (Great Aeons). There are 14 Manus in each Day of Brahmā. Each Manu period is, therefore, about 857142 Divine Years (360 years). Six Manus period have expired and we are in the seventh Manu Period. The Manus who have expired are Svāyambhuva, Svārociṣa, Auttama, Tāmasa, Raivata and Cākṣuṣa. The present Manus is Vaiśavāvata. 27 Mahā Yugas (Great Aeons) of this Manu Period have already elapsed and we are in the last Yuga or Quarter of the 28th Mahā Yuga. This last Yuga has started in 3101 B.C.

35. Here also, there is no absolute beginning for the world postulated. Here is only a calculation of the age of the world within the present (imponderable) Brahmā Cycle. There is no mention that there was no Universe prior to this present Brahmā Cycle. There is no question of accepting a zero prior to the beginning of the present Brahmā Cycle, nor a postulation of a zero after the expiry of this period. It is only a statement about the present Cycle.

36. Right through there is a reference to the beginning of the world and of man in the world, in the various periods and various types of thought in India. Yet there is also the parallel idea of a beginningless world. In the philosophical systems, what is meant by a beginning is not an absolute beginning. It is more an intellectual abstraction. We find the world as a series of events; we can speak about the beginning in any part
of this series. If we are to extend this beginning to the whole world, then the relation of that beginning to the world as a whole would be the same as the mutual relation of the particular parts of the series. If we extend the relation of cause and effect between the thread and the cloth to the whole world and its postulated cause, the nature of the cause would be of such a particular type; it would be a relation of an effect to an intelligent agent operating a positive material cause. The fundamental position is that the world is positive in its phenomenal nature of change and movement and if it is to be traced back to an ultimate cause, that cause is also of an equally positive nature. Just as there is an agent within the phenomena, for the production of any effect either directly or indirectly, the world process must ultimately go back to the stimulus and to the urge from an Intelligence. But there is no absolute beginning and there is no agent who brought the world into being from a non-being.

37. On these two counts, there is a radical difference in the view-point taken in ancient Indian thought and in modern science. The beginning of the world process and the start of that process from some natural law, free from "Life", are fundamental factors in modern scientific thought. There is an agreement too on the point of there being no "Creation" of a being from a non-being. The world is a positive evolute from a positive source. There is agreement on the point that there is no "Creation" and no "Creator" and also on the point that there is no Law-maker for the world and no Controller of the law in the world.

38. Both the agreement and the disagreement of modern scientific thought with and from ancient Indian thought are due to the environment in which modern science grew up. There is the religion and theology according to which God created the world; man is subordinate to God. The Law is the Law of God and man must obey the Law. A positive source for the world in God according to theology gave the lead to the doctrine of the evolution of the world from a positive source and the doctrine that there is a beginning for this world process. When
God is eliminated from the picture and when man is ignored, the only other alternative is to postulate the beginning from some power within the positive source, which is different from the "Life Power" in man. In the modern science, man only understands and records and makes use of the Law of Nature; science does not recognise that the Law of Nature has the same source as the "Life Power" in man; the latter is only an accident. Theology assigns some definite date for the creation of the world by God; modern science also calculates a specific date for the absolute start of the world process. The date has varied according to the progress in the knowledge of science; but the fact that there is some such date is an enduring doctrine in modern science.

39. There is a fundamental difference between the approach of modern science and of ancient Indian thought to the problem of the origin of man and of the world. The difference is not like the difference among the various Schools of thought within the Indian systems, where the difference is only on details or aspects, the fundamental point of view being the same. Yet the difference between Indian thought and modern science is only what exists between two men standing back to back, and close to each other. They cannot meet. There is needed only a slight adjustment for them to stand face to face, and at the same time to maintain their former directions.

40. Modern science depends too much on the apparatus that records, and ignores man's inner faculties in solving problems. If modern science will extend the reasoning faculty of man a little further, then there will be a mutual reconciliation. An event in the world is an event, only in so far as it has taken place at a certain moment and not earlier or later. That particular moment is determined by the assemblage of factors which we designated as the cause of the event. The moment when such an assemblage should take place is in its turn determined by a prior event which has to be taken as the cause of the earlier event accepted as the cause of the original event. In this way we cannot think of an event without a prior. Thus a "first cause" is impossible. Every cause is an effect in its turn
41. We cannot say that an event took place without a prior by its own nature. If it is its nature to come into existence, it could have come into existence earlier, and thereby at all times, and it could also have come into existence at a later time. If its nature is such that it comes into existence only at that time, what is it that determines this specific time? There is nothing that is absolutely a time in its particularity. A time in its particularity is determined by an event. We cannot say that the time is determined by an event and that the event is determined by the time. There must be something outside of the time and the event to determine the appearance of the event at that time. Reason demands that the chain of cause and effect is without a beginning. We are within this chain, and we cannot think of anything as outside of this chain. A beginning is only for any specific part of this chain, and not for the whole chain itself. If an event can take place from within, that power is what we call "Life" or Intelligence. The position taken up in Indian thought is just where the position and direction taken up in modern science will lead us to, if rationally followed up.
CHAPTER XVIII

EMBODIMENT OF MAN

1. Man experiences himself as a body with a knowing and with a function. The knowing and the functioning are from within the body itself, and man does not depend on any external agency to set the two faculties in operation. A clock or an apparatus in a Meteorological Station can function and record only if they are set to the particular operation by man. Man may understand the world; still man remains the greatest mystery to himself. There are various theories regarding the nature of man, what man is in reality. God created man in His form and endowed the body with a soul, and that is man. Man is only a series of fleeting consciousness. After a long lapse of material evolution with no "Life" element in it, there arose a special condition under which a new phenomenon appeared in this course of evolution, in the form of "Life"; organic bodies arose along with the material evolution, and this organic evolution resulted in man. Such are the various theories about man in ancient thought and in modern science.

2. The constitution of man as of a two-fold nature, as a combination of a body with something that is the essence of "Life", has been accepted by nearly all systems of thought. Even where such a combination of two co-ordinate constituents is not accepted, as in Buddhism, a bifurcation of the constitution in this way is accepted within experience. May be that as a matter of reality, there is only the knowing process and no body, or there is neither a knowing process nor a body. Such is the position taken up in the Vijñāna-Vāda (Theory of Fleeting Consciousness) and in the Śūnyā-vāda (Theory of void) respectively within Buddhism. In all ancient systems of thought, there is a preference attached to the knowing aspect in relation to the body. The knowing element may be termed the Soul. Body is a restriction on the Soul, is an obstacle in the journey to the final goal. Ultimate happiness is possible only when the soul
is finally detached from the body. Such a theory is also more or less common to all systems of thought in the ancient world. God is the Spirit, the knowing factor in an individual, without any surrender to the body. The Soul is the real and the permanent element in the constitution of man, and the association with the body has the element of some "Evil" attached to it. The "Evil" can be overcome and the Soul is released from the body and attains to supreme bliss.

3. In modern science, the order is reversed. Matter, the body, is the really permanent element in man, and its "Life" constituent is an accident. What is called "Living matter" is only Matter in a specific condition; there is no element of a real nature called "Life" in man. "Life" is only a state in matter. Matter attained this state under a certain condition that developed during the evolution of Matter, and this condition does not recur and may not recur too. The effect of the condition continues as the presence of this state called the "Life" in Matter, and the effect may not be of a permanent nature.

4. The Indian thought took a third line in approaching the problem of man. It is too obvious a matter of experience that the body is not permanent and that at a certain stage the body terminates. This is a phenomenon found in the case of all forms of living matter, whether it is a plant or an animal or man. But the question is whether this is an end of everything that constituted the individual. The body of the individual had acquired a new condition and it is taken back to its old condition. How is it? Unless there is something outside the body which became associated with the body and which left the body later, such a change in the condition of the body cannot be rationally explained.

5. A ball of iron is cold in its natural condition; when it is associated with fire, it gets heated and when the fire is removed, it is restored to its natural condition of being cold. Similarly, a copper wire gets electrified under certain conditions. There is some positive factor called "Electricity" which brought about the changed condition in the wire. When a ray of light falls on some surface, there is some change in the surface and
that change is brought about by some external factor called the light. When the nucleus in an Atom is broken up, there is some energy that is released and that energy is different from the nucleus of the Atoms. In all such cases, there is some external agency assumed, to explain the change in the condition. In the same way, when Matter becomes “Living” and when it returns to its “Dead” matter state, there is some external factor that had brought about this change in the Matter.

6. All our experience is that no change takes place in matter, unless there is some “Life” behind it, either directly or through some medium. If we are to make any inference about facts outside our experience, from facts within the sphere of experience, the conclusion is irresistible that behind the entire phenomena in the world, there must be some “Life” functioning. The phenomenon may come into existence and it may disappear; but the power behind such phenomena, the “Life Power”, remains constant. When a tree falls down and is dried up and even burnt to ashes, when an animal dies and its body is allowed to petrify, there must have been some “Life” that remains constant throughout the changes. In the same way, when a man “Dies” and when his body is disposed of according to custom, either buried or burnt up or exposed for birds to eat up, there is some “Life” that is ever there. The only change is that its association with that body is terminated; but the “Life” itself continues.

7. Modern science does not know what this “Energy” is in its real nature. They are able to calculate the behaviour of an object when energy operates on it. The scientists do not know where it comes from, where it goes and how it remains in the thing. It is the same case with thinkers about the nature of “Life”. They know how a body behaves when “Life” is in it; they do not know where it came from, where it goes and how it remains in the body. But they feel that there is this “Life” as a reality. What is called “Energy” is not a behaviour; it is a positive thing. That is recognised in modern science. But when it comes to “Life”, the scientists do not recognise an existence to it separately from the object in which there is a change
in behaviour as "Living", from its state as "Not-living". What is done in ancient Indian thought is that there is effected a unity between "Life" force and energy force. Both "Life" and energy are there; they operate on matter, and matter behaves in peculiar ways under the influence of "Life" and also of energy. Energy is not a thing like the Mount Everest, and when there is mention of "Energy level", it is different from what is meant by the height of the Mount Everest. It is the same with "Life" also; "Life" is not a thing like our food. It is a reality all the same.

8. Modern science has various theories regarding the origination of the phenomenal world from an Absolute; Darwin had his own theory; Einstein has his own theory and other physicists have formulated their own theories. But there is one postulation that is common: energy was developed later in matter which produced the early stages of Evolution, and "Life" appeared still later. Modern scientists do not worry about the metaphysical question whether what did not have an existence can ever be developed at all, whether what is called a development is a new "appearance" of what was there or a "new existence" itself, whether what was not can ever come into existence at all. But the Indian mind was from the beginning saturated with the idea of an absolute positive nature for the universe; there is nothing that can be newly brought into existence and all that is possible is to make a thing appear in a new aspect. It is on this metaphysical foundation of Indian thought that the theory of "Life" is built. Life may be a new appearance; it cannot be a new existence. The same is the case with energy also; energy is there and energy takes up a new appearance under different conditions. Thus Matter, Life and Energy are constant and eternal factors in the world; they are there in the Absolute state and they function in the phenomenal. In the phenomenal world there is nothing that was not in the Absolute state. The Absolute is a composite of the three factors, namely, Life, Energy and Matter, which are termed respectively Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

9. There is one more fundamental factor in Indian thought;
it is the unity of the above three-fold Absolute in a further abstraction into a "Super-Life". That is the view taken up in the Vedānta system of thought. Life, Energy and Matter themselves emanate from this "Super-Life". In the Sāńkhya system, there is no such abstraction into a Super-Unity; there is only a postulation of "Pure Life" distinct from the three-fold Absolute of the phenomenal world, which "Power" it is that lies behind the appearance of the phenomena. Otherwise there would have been only an absolute state for the world, with no conversion into a phenomena. It is our experience that every movement and change must be traced back to some "Life" energy, so far as our phenomenal world is concerned. There is postulated a dualism of the Absolute of the phenomenal world (in a three-fold unity of Life, Energy and Matter) and also of a "Pure Life". These postulations are only the consequences of some intellectual abstractions; there is no doctrine of an Absolute without its phenomenal nature. The phenomena is always there. The Absolute is only an abstraction by man's intellect which is only an aspect of the phenomena.

10. Science once held the view that matter existed in the form of Atoms and that the various objects in the world are aspects of such primary Atoms in various ratios of admixture. Now, the view is that what are called Atoms are themselves components of more subtle forms of matter, and the variety in the Atoms are due to the variety in the combination of such subtler aspects. In Indian thought, the variety in the material phenomena is traced back to a variety in the proportion relative to the three aspects of the Absolute in their combination. The whole phenomenal world is a manifestation of that Absolute, of the three-fold uniform in various proportions of combination.

11. The possibilities of such combinations are infinite. But among such infinite possibilities, only some are within the sphere of man's cognition. As a matter of fact, it is an infinite series as a continuum without a break. The Radio Wave-lengths move in the form of an unbroken series, yet broad-casting is done only in certain specified wave-lengths. Light within the range of man's eyes move in an unbroken series of changing
wave-lengths. But man is able to distinguish such a gradual and continuous change only within specific ranges. There may be instruments that can record the changes within narrower ranges. Yet even the apparatus has its own limitations. What is a continuum is recorded as a series of separate links, even by an apparatus. Otherwise, the notion of wave-lengths has no reality behind it.

12. The Absolute contains in itself the entire possibility of all such variations. The phenomenal world is only a manifestation of what was there in an unmanifest form. It is not a coming into existence of what was not. Man and his body, the animals and birds, the trees and plants, the hills and the rocks and rivers and oceans, the Earth, the Solar system, the Stellar system and the entire world was there, is there and will be there. Evolution in the way in which it is now enunciated is contrary to the theories of Indian philosophy. It is one thing to say that there was a time when man was not, when even life was not; it is another thing to say that this man or that form of life was not manifest at a certain stage. The latter is what is accepted in Indian philosophy; the former is not accepted.

13. Man is a manifestation; the manifestation in the phenomenal world, of the Absolute with its three-fold constituents takes three forms primarily, corresponding to the prevalence of one or the other of the three constituents of the Absolute. Thus, there is one line of evolution from the Absolute in which the Matter aspect prevails, another in which the Energy aspect prevails and a third in which the "Life" aspect prevails. There is nothing in which there is only one of the three constituents, and there is nothing in which one or other of the three is not found. There is nothing either in which two or three of them are in equipoise.

14. Man is constituted of such a manifestation of the Absolute. If this Absolute is contrasted as Matter with the Spirit Absolute, what is called the Purusa (the Person), then Man is just a manifestation of Matter. But if the Absolute is thought of as constituted of Matter, Energy and "Life", then man is a complex of all the three; we cannot disentangle the
Matter aspect from the "Life" aspect in the constitution of man. The Spirit Absolute is just there behind and outside of the constitution of man, and has no part in the make up of man, in the embodiment of man. To speak of the "Embodiment" of man is not a very accurate way of presenting the fact; man is an embodiment, and there is no embodiment for man distinct from himself. Man is the embodiment. The Absolute Spirit has no place in the constitution of man. The Spirit is outside of man, and is behind everything in the phenomenal world, and as such, is also behind man and not in man.

15. This conviction that everything in the world moves and changes and progress on account of the "Life" element in the constitution of the phenomenal world, is very deep-rooted in the Indian mind. The consequence is that when there is a disturbance in the equipoise among the three elements in the Absolute, it is that aspect with a predominance of the "Life" element that has the supreme position in the changes and movements and progressions in the resulting world of phenomena. This aspect is called Buddhi (Intelect). It determines that this is so, this shall be so, and so on. Such an aspect has no meaning unless there is the Subject, the "I". The Intellect along with the "I" controls the entire progression in the world of phenomena. It is this Subject aspect, the "I" aspect associated with the Intellect that takes different channels of evolution. "It is so, it shall be so." This is what is called the "Law of Nature". A Law of Nature can have no other nature. There is no difference between the Buddhi with the "I" and this "Law of Nature".

16. What is called the Buddhi or Intellect is not an unalterable fixture, in relation to the other two aspects of Energy and Matter; it is only a certain ratio within certain ranges between the "Life" aspect and the other two aspects that characterises the Buddhi. The proportion is mainly between the "Life" aspect and the Matter aspect; the Energy aspect operates only in altering such ratios in the combination. And yet there is a difference in the ratio of Energy also, in relation to the other two aspects. It is this difference in the latter ratio that produces the differences in the mutual ratio of the other. The Buddhi itself
can have an immense predominence of the "Life" aspect or there may be a higher ratio of the Matter in it.

17. When there is a Subject, the "I" nature, there must be an Object too. The difference between the *Buddhi* (Intelllect) which is associated with the "I" aspect, and the Objective aspect is that even within the ranges of different ratios between Matter and "Life", there is always a dominance of the "Life" aspect in the *Buddhi* while there is always a dominance of the Matter aspect in the Object. Both are combinations of Matter and "Life" with their ratios determined by the Energy aspect. Within the ranges that constitute the Object, there is a difference between those combinations where the "Life" aspect has a higher proportion and those combinations where the Matter has a higher proportion. The Subject and the Object are brought into mutual relation through some intermediaries that are called the "Sense Organs" (*Indriyas*) and there are eleven of them; in all of them there is a dominant element of the "Life" aspect. There is the external Matter which may take up two aspects "what is in itself" and what is brought within the range of the Subject as Object. The former is called the *Tanmātra* (The thing in itself) and the latter is called the *Bhūtas*, the Elements. The eighteen constituents made up of *Buddhi* and *Ahaṅkāra* (The Intellect and the "I") and the eleven sense organs and the five "things in themselves" (*Indriyas* and *Tanmātras*) form a complex, held together as a unit. This is the *Liṅgā Śarīra* or the *Sūkṣma śarīra* (the Subtle Body); it is in reality this Subtle Body that is usually termed the Self or the Soul which lives and functions and dies.

18. Of the eleven sense organs, there is one that is common to all subjective functions, and that is called the Mind (*Manas*), and this along with the Intellect and the "I" forms what is also called the *Antahkarana* or Inner Sense Organ. The other ten form two groups of five each, one group having the sensory function and the other group having the "Motor function". They are termed the *Jñānendriyas* (Sensory Instruments) and *Karmendriyas* (Motor Instruments).

19. These eleven sense organs and the five "things in themselves" (*Tanmātras*) and the five Elements are accepted in
all systems of thought in India. So far as the "things in themselves" (Tanmātrtras) are concerned there is a slight difference in the view taken up in different systems of thought, regarding their nature and their relation to the five Elements. There is no difference in their essential nature among the different schools of thought. There is a consequent difference in view regarding their relation to the five sense organs of knowing. The following are the groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thing in itself</th>
<th>Sense organ</th>
<th>Element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Šabda (Sound)</td>
<td>Śrottra (Ear)</td>
<td>Ākāśa (Ether)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sparśa (Touch)</td>
<td>Tvac (Skin)</td>
<td>Vāyu (Air)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rūpa (Colour)</td>
<td>Cakṣus (Eye)</td>
<td>Tejas (Fire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasa (Taste)</td>
<td>Jihvā (Tongue)</td>
<td>Jala (Water)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gandha (Smell)</td>
<td>Nāsikā (Nose)</td>
<td>Prthivi (Earth)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Such a parallelism and equation are accepted in all the systems of thought in India. The great difference is in the matter of the nature of the objects in the first column and their relation to the objects in the second and third columns. Ākāśa or Ether is produced from Šabda or Sound, Vāyu or Air from sparśa or touch, Tejas or Fire from Rūpa or Colour, Jala or Water from Rasa or taste, and Prthivi or Earth from Gandha or Smell. The entities in the last column, in the above table are produced from the entities in the first column, in the same order. The entities in the second column form the sense-organs for the congnition of the entities in the third column, along with the entities in the first column. The Matter given in the first column and the Matter in the last column are the same; the only difference is that what are given in the first column are unspecific while what are given in the last column are their specific aspects. The specific nature of each becomes manifest as distinct from the specific nature of another, only when it is within the sphere of the sense organ. Each is distinct from the other in its real nature and is so cognised when it comes within the sphere of their respective sense-organs. Such is the Sāṅkhya view of the nature of the Elements, both Subtle and Gross, what are given in the first and in the last column.

21. In the Vedānta there is a further process. No Element
exists in its pure form. Each of the five elements consists of half of itself and a fourth of a half of each of the other four elements. This is what is termed Pañcikaraṇa or Quintuplication or Five-folding. Everything in the world is a combination of the five Elements, while each is called by a separate name and each is cognised as distinct from the other on account of the predominance of one or the other of the five Elements in it.

22. In the Nyāya System, what are given in the first column above are Guṇas or Qualities abiding in the five kinds of Matter given in the last column. A Guṇa according to the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta is an aspect of Matter in its three-fold nature, while in the Nyāya System, a Guṇa is a quality abiding in the Matter. Every Guṇa is produced in the substance and is destroyed. Śabda or Sound is produced in the Akāśa or Ether and is momentary in character. Sparśa or Touch in its aspect of being neither hot nor cold exists in the Vāyu or Air. Rūpa or colour in its aspect of being brilliant white (Bhāsvara-śukla) exists in Tejas or Fire; it has also hot touch. Vāyu or Air has no colour. Rasa or Taste exists in Jala or Water; it has also dull-white colour and cold touch. Gandha or Smell exists in Prthivi or Earth. Earth has also all kinds of touch (hot, or cold, or neither hot nor cold), all kinds of colour, and all kinds of taste.

23. Touch, colour, taste and smell are eternal in eternal substances and produced and non-eternal in produced substances. Such production of the qualities in the non-eternal forms of the substances are the results of a special kind of contact with Tejas or Fire, which contact is known by the technical term Pāka (really "Baking"). The Atoms of the four kinds of substances are eternal, and their combinations which constitute the phenomenal world, are produced and non-eternal. Ākāśa or Ether is eternal and its quality called Śabda or Sound is momentary. Such a relation of the four Guṇas or Qualities with the four substances is accepted in the Mīmāṃsā; here, Śabda or Sound is not accepted as a Guṇa or quality, being a substance in itself, eternal in nature. A phenomenon called Pāka (Baking), the special contact of the substances with Fire, is also not accepted in this system.
24. After the Evolution of the Buddhi (Intellect) and the Ahaṅkāra (The “I”), there arose the two-fold evolution of the Eleven Organs, namely, the Mind, the Five Functionary Organs (Karmendriyas) and the Five Sense Organs in one line with a predominance of “Life” element in it, and the five Tanmātras (Things in themselves) with a predominance of the Matter element in it. These eighteen constitute a “Complex” which is called the Liṅga Śarīra or Subtle Body. This Subtle Body has no Material existence in the sense in which the tangible objects exist. There is no spacial extension or size, there is no mass, there is no form, there is no structure. It is this Subtle Body that forms a gross body around it, continues with that body, discards the body, and takes up such a new gross body again. This Subtle Body with its gross body is what is called the Man, the Personality.

25. Such a phenomenon of the appearance and the disappearance of gross bodies is what is called Transmigration, Metempsychosis. The appearance of a body must be attributed to the presence of a special occasion for its generation, rather manifestation, at that particular time. If it were a matter of an indiscriminate appearance of bodies without any condition specifying the time of its appearance, why should the body appear at all, why did not all the bodies appear at the same time and finish the world process? The occasion for the appearance of a new body must be the disappearance of another body, and that earlier body and the new body must have been related to each other through some common bond; the Subtle Body is that common bond. Are new Subtle Bodies appearing? Are Subtle Bodies disappearing permanently? The reply is a definite “No”. If a new Subtle Body can be generated now, that leads us to the assumption of a beginning for all such Subtle Bodies that are functioning. It is just like the waves in the ocean; they rise and fall, and they are ever there. Similarly, the Subtle Bodies are all there, and they had no beginning. The Assumption and Abandonment of the Gross Bodies had been going on always, as it is now going on, and will ever go on. Just as the Spirit Absolute (the Puruṣa) is not a thing, in the same way as the Taj
Mahal is a thing, the Subtle Body too is not a thing, and its transit from body to body should not be compared to the movement of a monkey hopping from one tree to another. The Subtle Body has no more material reality than my ideas or my happiness and suffering have. They are a state of Matter and not Matter itself in the sense in which a mountain is a Matter.

26. When the Subtle Body takes up a gross body and when the gross body functions for some time and drops out, it was not a beginning, it is not an end; such functions of the gross body leaves behind some impressions on the Subtle Body, and such impressions determine the nature of the new gross body which the Subtle Body will develop. In the Nyāya System, there is no such Subtle Body accepted. There is the Ātman, the Self, which is associated with some inscrutable factor; and it is on account of the association of such an inscrutable factor that there arises some movement in the Ultimate Atoms of matter; this movement results in combinations and recombinations of parts to form higher wholes, and there arises the body of man. The sense organ known as Mind (Manas) is of the nature of an Atom. The products of the Atoms become either an Organic Body (Śarīra) or an object in the world. There are also the sense organs that too are of the nature of Matter. Man's body contains organic matter (Śarīra) and the sense organs (Indriyas), and there is the external world as object. The position taken up in the system is exactly what is given in the Śāṅkhya System, regarding the origin of man; there is no absolute origin. What is to be termed the origin of man is only an intellectual abstraction and not the statement of a view about a fact. There is the inscrutable factor, in the Self.

27. The functions of the Self in the gross body produce some subtle impressions in the Self itself, and such subtle impressions determine the nature of the next body. The entire body is decomposed after death and after the departure of the Self from the body. New Atoms combine to produce a new body for the Self. The Self, unlike what it is in the Śāṅkhya System, is a knower, doer and experiencer in the world, in association with the gross body. In itself, the Self is just an Existence without
any such functions and qualities. The equations and co-ordinations of the three sets given in the Table regarding the Elements and the Sense-organs and the Qualities are the same both in this system and in the Śāṅkhyā System, except for some slight differences noted above. But in the Śāṅkhyā System the Five Elements are evolutes, while in the Nyāya System, they are all eternal. The Five Elements exist as Ultimate Atoms in the case of four and as an eternal all-pervasive substance in the case of Ākāśa or Ether. The qualities in the parts produce the qualities in the whole. In the Atoms, they are eternal.

28. What are these Five Elements? They are now equated with the four kinds of matter that are experienced and the Ether. The four kinds are the solid Earth, the liquid Water, the radiant Fire and the gaseous Air. Things assume such forms on account of the presence of such matter in a predominant way. If Liquids solidify or are converted into gas and if solids melt, there is the presence of the kind of Element that produces such states. They speak of innate qualities and infused qualities. Thus fluidity in Water is innate and is infused in the Earth, like a piece of wax when melted. But this is taking too concrete and materialistic a view of the facts lying beneath the doctrine of the Five Elements.

29. The point has to be traced back to some very early stages in the development of Indian thought to get at the real significations of the terms. The Term Prthivi (Earth) is found in the Rgveda. It is the lowest of the three regions into which the world is divided, according to the Rgveda Cosmology. There is the Antarikṣa (intermediary) portion above the Earth, which is the Atmosphere, and higher up is the Dyaus or the celestial region. Waters are associated with the Atmospheric egion and light with the celestial region. The first three of the Five Elements cannot be dissociated from this division of the world, found in the Rgveda. There is reference to Vāyu or Vāta (Air) as a god. But there is nothing to show that this is above the three worlds already mentioned. Yet there are references to indicate the nature of this god, relating to the Five Elements. Vāyu is born from the breath of the Supreme Person, in the course of the mani-
folding of the world. Vāta is associated with power, with swift movement. Then there is the unknown region, that can be seen only by the wise; this is the Supreme Position of the God Viṣṇu. There is also mention of the secret Names (Nāman) in such unknown depths. This is a clear indication of the association of Śabda (Sound) with this aspect of the world.

30. After all, the Rgveda is only poetry and not a textbook on philosophy. The Rgveda has only a philosophical background and that philosophical background has to be known from the descriptions found in the real philosophical works relating to the Vedas. The Upaniṣads are the records of the philosophical speculations of the times. We must see if the philosophy described in the Upaniṣads fits in well as a background for the poetry of the Rgveda.

31. There are various places where in the Upaniṣads we see mention of aspects of reality arranged in a series according to their gradation in point of fineness and approach to the Absolute. Gārgya gives the following gradations, in the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad: Sun, Moon, Lightning, Ether (Ākāsa), Air, Fire, Water, Mirror (Ādarsa), Sound, Shadow, Self. There is another series given by Yājñavalkya: Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Sun, Quarters (Diś), Moon, Lightning, Cloud, Space (Ākāsa), Law (Dharma), Truth, Mankind, Self. Yājñavalkya has another series, in the same Upaniṣad: Earth, Water, Sky (Antarikṣa), Air, Heaven (Dyauś), Sun, Quarters (Diś), Moon and Stars, Ether (Ākāsa), Darkness, Light. This is followed by a series consisting of the sense organs and other factors in man. They are: Breath, Speech, Eye, Ear, Mind, Skin, Understanding (Vijñāna), Semen (Retas). In the Chāndogyopaniṣad, Sanatkumāra gives a list during the instruction he gave to Nārada, which is: Name, Speech, Mind, Will (Saṅkalpa), Thought (Citta), Contemplation (Dhyāna), Understanding (Vijñāna) Strength, Food, Water, Heat, Ether, Memory, Hope, Life, Truth. They are given in the order of ascent, from lesser to greater. The Bhagavad Gītā gives a list of the Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Mind, Intellect, “I”. Elsewhere it is said that Intellect (Buddhi) is higher than Mind and “He” is higher than Intellect.
32. All such gradations indicate that in this series we have something more than the gross forms known as the solid Earth, liquid Water, radiant Fire and gaseous Air, and the yet finer Ether. The series gives the finer and finer forms of reality starting from the tangible world. The most that can be said is that there are gradations in the nature of the reality and that such gradations below a certain level cannot come within the sphere of man's awareness and that they can be known only through their reactions on the tangible matter. We do not know what is light, while we know some change in the behaviour of an object when light falls on it. Perhaps what is really meant is this that taste and light and touch and sound are our reactions to certain sub-physical aspects of reality as they are responded to by aspects of the physical matter.

33. Man's nose can detect the presence of gross, solid, dry matter through its smell, like a piece of sandal wood. The tongue can detect the presence of matter only when it is moistened with water. The eye detects matter exposed to light. Touch detects matter without any concrete presence of the matter, even the intangible air. There is a permanence, though relative, in such sensations, while in the case of the sound, there is just a momentary sensation. The five forms of matter, their five kinds of qualities and the five sense organs relating to them have been brought into some sort of parallelism and equation on the basis of such a gradation coming within our direct experience. But the real nature of the objects within these gradations consists in their relative fineness, approaching to the Absolute. We use certain specific terms in modern science to denote such aspects of reality, corresponding to the means by which we detect them, namely, the apparatus in a laboratory. In ancient times, they had only their sense organs and their trained mind for detecting the presence of such finer aspects of reality and they gave their own names to denote them.

34. The sub-physical forms of realities do not produce any impression on man directly. They can impress their presence on man's faculties of knowing only through the medium of the physical matter in which man has his awareness. That is why
in the *Vedānta* it is asserted that none of the sub-physical forms of realities exists in the pure form, that they are all admixtures of the various strata. Unless the grossest form of *Pṛthivī* (Earth) is admixed with the finest form of *Akāśa* (Ether), Ether cannot impress itself on the man in the Earth stratum. Man experiences the Earth stratum directly, as man’s awareness is full in it. But man can have some experience of the other strata only as they reflect themselves on the Earth stratum, and such a reflection is possible because of the presence of the Earth Element in the other strata also. Matter, “Life” and Energy are co-ordinates in an Absolute Universe. What we experience as Energy are only forms of sub-physical matter. There is also a Universal Energy which is the cause of the changes in the Matter and also of the co-ordination of Matter and “Life”.

35. There are various other ways in which the different strata of the phenomenal world has been divided and differentiated in the various systems of thought, besides the recognised “Systems” of Philosophy. In the *Rgveda* only the three divisions of the Earth, the Atmosphere and the Celestial regions are found prominently and specifically mentioned. In the *Upaniṣads* there is mention of three factors as *Bhū, Bhuvār* and *Śvār*. The first and the last terms are found in the *Rgveda* meaning the Earth and the Celestial region. The second may be a substitute for the Atmosphere. Then there is mention of seven gradations or strata as *Bhū, Bhuvār, Śvār, Mahar, Jana, Tapas, Satya*. *Satya* in the later mythology and religion became the highest region in the universe, and there is no doubt that the others are also names of the different strata of the universe in the ascending order of fineness.

36. The *Upaniṣads* speak of the five *Kośas* or Sheaths of the body as *Annamaya* (constituted of Food), *Prāṇamaya* (constituted of the Vital Airs), *Manomaya* (Constituted of the Mind), *Vijñānamaya* (constituted of Understanding) and *Ānandamaya* (constituted of Bliss). There are the five divisions of the Vital Airs in man, ‘namely, *Prāṇa* (breath), *Apāna* (Excretionary), *Vyāna* (Spreading in the whole body.), *Samāna* (in the Naval) and *Udāna* (in the Throat). They all represent some physiological
functions. The medical science speaks of three kinds of physiological disorders possible in the body. They are Vāta, Pitta and Kapha; the terms mean Air, Bile, and Phlegm. But they really represent the three constituents of Air (Vāta), Fire (Pitta) and Water (Kapha). They relate to the respiration, digestion and sensation aspects of the human activity. Respiration includes blood circulation and the activities of all motor nerves. This is a three-fold classification of the physiological functions in the body.

37. Man in his body is not an accident; there was no origination and there will be no end. It is a manifestation and vanishing of the eternal constituents of the universe in various forms and bearing different names. There is no creation, there is no destruction either. Evolution of the subtle matter into gross forms and devolution into the original form is an eternal process. We can speak of evolution from and devolution into, the subtle forms of reality only in a relative way. We can as well speak of devolution into and evolution from, the gross aspect of the reality. In the process of the devolution of the gross body into the subtle form, there is a limit beyond which the process cannot go. That stage represents the eternal factor which persists through all the changes into the gross form and back from that gross form. From the point of view of that persisting aspect, there is an individuality that endures through all the changes, and the gross bodies representing the personalities of man must be strung together into a unit. The world process is an aggregate of all such strings of manifestations. Each such string is an individuality manifesting itself through a large number of personalities. There was no time when the individuality was without a manifestation through a personality represented by a gross body. Religion teaches that there is an end to this process when the individuality will remain just an abstract individuality without any possibility of further manifestation through a personality relating to a gross body.
CHAPTER XIX

TRANSMIGRATION AND KARMA

1. The doctrines of the transmigration of the Soul and of Karma may, in some sense, be accepted as something unique, something that characterises the thought of India and distinguishes it from the thoughts of other nations both ancient and modern. These doctrines can be traced back to the earliest times in the history of Indian thought, though specific mention of it in so many words may not be found in the earliest remnants of the literary records of ancient India. But there are sufficient reasons to show that, although an actual statement of the theory in language form is a little later in the history of Indian thought, the theory existed even in the earliest period in the history of Indian thought. Many scholars have also been able to trace the doctrine to passages in the earliest texts known to us in Indian literature, namely, the Rgveda.

2. It is true that there are scholars who believe that the doctrine of the transmigration of the Soul was not an early doctrine in the growth of Indian thought and that it is a doctrine which the Indians developed, having received the germs of the doctrine from the aboriginal, primitive people whom they conquered before and during their settlement in the country as conquerors and owners of the country. It is also true that the doctrine is not the monopoly of India, that some traces of such a thought can be seen in the records of other nations like the Greeks and that even the Bible is not inconsistent with such a belief. But it is in India that the thought was developed in a rational and systematic way. It is to this extent that the doctrine is unique in Indian thought.

3. Stated in its simplest form, the doctrine of re-incarnation is a belief in a man in a body being only a link in a series of embodied personalities prior and posterior to the particular embodied man we think of. There is some permanent element in an embodied person joined to an impermanent
element called the body. The permanent element is the soul. Before the soul assumed a particular body, that soul had been in some earlier body, rather in a series of earlier bodies. The body falls down and the soul assumes a new body. This is the case with all men. When the body drops down, the soul will get into a new body and this process of a body being assumed and falling down and a new body being assumed after the falling down of each such body, continues for ever and had been going on for ever in earlier times.

4. Closely associated with this doctrine is the doctrine that a man assumes a particular body with particular traits and aptitudes in consequence of his actions in a prior embodied state. *Karma* is the term usually applied to this experience in a specific state and its causal relation with a prior act on the part of the man. *Karma* means "Action"; it may be stated as the doctrine of the relation of an experience as fruit to its cause in the form of an earlier action. Thus man's life is a chain of infinite embodiments, each embodiment being a link in this chain, and each such link being made up of a large number of minor links in the form of actions and results. The division of the chain of human existence into links in the form of bodies is arbitrary; it is really a chain of actions and their results grouped into a large number of embodiments. The action in one body can produce a result in a later body.

5. In systems of religion and philosophy that originated and developed outside India, a man in a particular body is a complete unit. A soul is created by a Great Power and is associated with a body; that body continues for some time and drops down while the soul can continue in another location and in another condition. The Wrath or the Grace of the Almighty determines the state and the location of the soul after death, when the body drops down. Man's action during embodiment determines the attitude of the Almighty. If he disobeys God's Law, there is the Wrath of the Almighty. If he is obedient to the Law, there is the Grace of God. Under such a system, the man himself has no choice in the matter of either appearing in this world or shaping his experiences in
this world. A man makes his appearance in the world when it is the will of the Almighty that such and such a man should be created and he has such experience which it is the will of the same Almighty that he should experience. The termination of his halt in the world is also determined by that Almighty. Man is absolutely a subordinate factor in the Universe.

6. This is the great difference between the systems of thought that originated in India and the systems of thought that originated outside India. In India, there is no Creator, no Overlord for the world. The world is self-contained. If there is a God, that God is a part of the scheme of the world. In India, man is supreme in the world, and the world is independent of God for its existence. If there are references to "that whence these existences originated etc.", in such passages, the term "These" refers only to a part of the world, the real world being the Supreme and these existences. It is not also meant in such passages that "These Existences" came out of a "Nil". They came out of the Absolute. It is on account of such a conception of the world, that in Indian Law, there is really no Law-maker, no controller of that Law. Law functions by itself, and man and the whole world move within this scheme of Law. The doctrine of Karma and of the Transmigration of the Soul also should be traced to this fundamental doctrine of the independence of Man and of the world, God being only a factor in the scheme of the world and not an Overlord of the world, if there be a God.

7. The doctrine is something unique in Indian thought; it has not been developed in the philosophy of any other nation in the world. May be that there are faint indications of some such beliefs in the remains of the culture of other ancient nations; may also be that the belief is in accord with the doctrines of other nations of the ancient world. But no ancient nation has developed the doctrine in such a systematic, complete and rationalistic way outside India.

8. The doctrine is fully developed in the philosophy of the later days in the history of Indian thought. How far backward can we trace the doctrine? Is the doctrine an integral
factor in the thoughts of the earliest period of Indian thought as found in the *Rgveda*? Was it a natural development of India among the Vedic people or did they get the belief from the people with whom they came into contact? Was it a development out of the philosophical instincts of the people or has it any other source for origination? Scholars are not agreed on such problems.

9. In one poem in the *Rgveda* that is addressed to the soul that is departing from the body, there are wishes expressed by the poet who addresses that soul that he may return to the home freed from the blemishes. In the same poem, Yama is invoked to come and take his seat in the spread grass. In the philosophical poem of Dirghatamas, there is a reference to communion and companionship of the mortal with the immortal. Vasishtha speaks of his previous birth in one of his poems. In another poem the author says that once he was Manu and so on. It is doubtful whether such references point out to the prevalence of a belief in the return of man to this world in a new body after his death. After all, the *Rgveda* is only poetry where we can at best note only reflections of philosophical thoughts and not philosophical thoughts themselves.

10. Further, it is not in this manner that the doctrine of re-birth or of transmigration of the soul has been dealt with in later works on Indian philosophy. Practically we do not find any chain of such bodies for a common soul presented in the latter day literature of India, when the doctrine had become a settled fact in the thoughts of the nation. There are certain references to the two births of the same soul. Thus Sri Rama and Sri Krishna were the same person, the Great God Vishnu, in two successive births as men in this world, and along with them came Lakshmana and Bala Rama as the brother of the divine incarnation. Their respective enemies, Ravana and Sisupala also represent the two births of the same Rakṣasa (Demon). The identity of Pāncalī, the heroine of the *Mahābhārata*, in her previous birth is also specified in that poem. But, on the other hand, we have long lists of teachers and kings. We do not find any mention of the prior birth of any one of them.
or the would-be birth of such teachers and kings. In the Durgā-saptasati in the Mārkandeya Purāṇa, there is the prophesy of a king becoming a future Manu, Sāvarṇī. Kālidāsa says in his epic, the Kumārasambhava, that Pārvatī, the heroine of the poem, was Sati, daughter of the Prajāpati (Lord of Men) named Dakṣa, in her prior birth. But such references to the perior or later births of a particular individual are rare in the literature of the country. Re-birth has been treated as a philosophical doctrine and not as a historical record. The references in the early texts like the Rgveda noted above are not like the way in which the doctrine has been predominantly dealt with in later times and may not be taken as indication of a belief in transmigration as current in the early times.

11. As a matter of fact, many of the philosophical doctrines that are very popular in later times are not found to be so very popular in the secular literature like the poetry and the dramas. For example, there is the belief in the world being a place of suffering, and renunciation being the only path to get release from the evils and sufferings in life; there is the consequent and associated doctrine of final release for the soul from the limitations of life in this world. But if we look into the secular literature of poetry and drama, even into what are accepted as literature with a religious bias like the grand epics of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, it will be found that renunciation and Mokṣa (final and absolute release) are not very prominent in the life of the people. An active life according to the Law of nature producing enjoyment are the really prominent features in the life of the people; this is what are known as the goals of life (Puruṣārthas). To estimate the position of the doctrines of transmigration, like the position of the doctrine of renunciation and final release, in the thought of the country, poetry and drama are of little avail; they are separately dealt with in specialised literature dealing with the subjects.

12. Why should conditions be different in the earlier times of the Vedas? It is not by an analysis of the Rgveda that we can determine the position of the theory of transmigration in the time of the Vedas, in the thought of those early periods in
the history of Indian thought. It is in the *Upaniṣads* that we first meet with a definite statement of the factor known as transmigration in the life of a man. Now, the question that we have to ask is this—is there any great difference between the thoughts in the time of the Vedas and in the time of the *Upaniṣads*? Do they differ in content and in spirit and in approach? Or is it that what we find in the Vedas is a reflection of what is found in the *Upaniṣads*? If the positon is that there is only unity between the thoughts in the Vedas and in the *Upaniṣads*, then we can con- clude that there must have been a vast literature contemporaneous with the Vedas having the same content as the *Upaniṣads* and that there must have been the doctrine of *Karma* and of Transmigration dealt with in that literature which is now lost to us, but whose contents are continued and preserved in the *Upaniṣads*, which as literary records are later in date than the texts of the Vedas.

13. Although we do not have any direct record of the doc- trine of *Karma* and transmigration as understood in the Vedic times, the Vedas cannot be explained except with the back- ground of a very profound philosophy, in which the doctrine must have been a prominent element. The relation is more or less the same as the relation of the same doctrine to the latter- day secular literature like poetry and drama. The secular literature cannot be explained except with the back-ground of such philosophical doctrines, though philosophy plays only a subordinate role in that literature; similarly the text of the Vedas cannot be explained except with the back-ground of a deep philosophy. And the Vedas contain even highly philo- sophical poems, which are rather early in age in relation to the major part of the available Vedas. To say that real philosophy came into the life of the nation only later since philosophy is found only in the later poems of the Vedas and that the philosophic poems are of later date because they contain philosophical ideas that are later, is to beg the question.

14. Did the people think at all about certain problems? If they thought about them, did they entertain any doctrines about the position? Some people know and some people do
not know; those who know attain to immortality. What about
the others who do not attain to immortality? When their
bodies fall off, what happens to the permanent part of his per-
sonality, the Ātman? Do they all go to Heaven? It is impos-
sible. Heaven is the destination for those who do good deeds
and not for all. If that had been the common destination of
all, then religion and distinction between what is good and
what is bad, lose their value. There is no Hell either. Even
if there had been a Hell known to the R̄gvedic people, though
there is no mention of it, it is only for the sinner and not for the
generality of those who lead a normal life. Thus neither
Heaven nor Hell is their destination; nor is it total annihilation.
The only alternative left is that they take a new body and live
again on the earth.

15. There are various indications of the prevalence of
such a belief of a return to the earth after death, among the
people of the Vedic age. The description of the region of
Light and enjoyment and freedom and the prayer for being
permanently established there, found in the R̄gveda, indicates
that there is another alternative, and that alternative can be
only a return to this earth without going to that region or with-
out being permanently established there even if the soul goes
there. The distinction between the two paths for those who
die, the Devayāna (Path of Gods) and Pityāya (Path of the
Departed Ancestors) also indicates the belief in the destinations
for the departing soul; one is to attain to a region where there
is permanence and the other is to go to a region whence he
has to depart, and that departure can have only the earth as
the destination. There is a statement that the pasture to which
the departing soul goes shall not be taken away from him.
That shows that there is a possibility of its being taken away
from him, and if that is taken away, his only alternative is to
return to the life on earth.

16. They believed in some permanent element in the
constitution of a person, which endures when the impermanent
body drops down. That permanent element must continue to
be somewhere when the body drops down. When Heaven is
only for the few and when there is no Hell or even if there is Hell when it is only for the sinners, the others can have no other destination than a body on the earth in a re-birth. The only alternative to such a view is that they did not worry and that they did not have any doctrine. That will amount to this that they do not think of the problems and that they had no philosophy. That is impossible, especially when they have given out the view quite plainly that there are various modes of attaining immortality and various gradations after such attainment of immortality. Some gods like the Maruts and the Rbhus, two groups of gods, were mortals who became gods and partakers of the offerings at Sacrifices on account of their great deeds. Yama reached that other world after finding out the Path for the first time, which path others follow, and became ruler there. Aṅgiras and other ancient poets could go to heaven; but they did not attain to the status of gods, though they mingled freely with the gods and enjoyed life there. What happens to the many? They return to the earth. That is only a philosophical doctrine. To propound the view of the great fruits of a good life, they had to bring in the element of Heaven into poetry that dealt with religious rituals. But the problem of the future of the common man did not find a place in such poetry and so we find little of a reply to that problem in that poetry though that poetry reflects some of the philosophical doctrines of the day. There is the back-ground of philosophy in the poetry of the Vedas, and the real philosophy is only in the Upaniṣads, which are the continuations of the philosophical literature contemporaneous with the Vedas.

17. The Karma doctrine must have been more deep-rooted in the minds of the people than the doctrine of transmigration. This former doctrine is more often mentioned in the secular literature too. Man has his ability to shape his future, and that is what is called Puruṣakāra, or manliness. But man’s ability is limited by what he has himself done which cannot be undone. Of this former some are known and there are atonements possible. But many are unknown and are called Providence (Daiva). The antithesis between these two factors in the ac-
tivity of man, namely, manly activity and divine Providence, is very often mentioned in the secular literature. The trans-migration theory is only a corollary to the Karma theory in the secular literature, though in the philosophical literature the relation is the other way round.

18. Both the doctrines are kept within reasonable bounds in the secular literature as well as in the philosophical literature. They are never brought in as an excuse for failings or as a consolation for defeats. Both the doctrines come in as adjuncts to the fundamental doctrine of man's supremacy, in Indian thought; God does not and cannot interfere with man's life in the world. It is very seldom that a poet introduces the doctrine either as an excuse or as a consolation. It is true that the great Prose Romance writer, Bāna, introduces a parrot in his Romance, the Kādambari, and a sage refers to indiscretion in man's life activities and its consequences. But when in the Rāmāyanā the installation of Sri Rama as the Crown Prince met with some obstacle, no one explained the event as the sequel to some Karma (action) done prior in that birth itself or in some prior birth. The same is the case with the abduction of Sītā when Sri Rama and Sītā were in the forest. No one thought of prior births and deeds in such prior births as explanations for the sufferings of the Heroes of the Mahābhārata. Kālidāsa speaks of some adverse Providence in the case of Śakuntalā in so far as the foster-father was not able to find a suitable companion for her though she was coming of age. But when the real suffering of the heroine came, no one found an explanation for it as a sequel to some prior action, though such a prior action was there in the form of failing to show due courtesy to an honoured guest. In the Epic Raghuvamśa, Kālidāsa says that the first king described there, Dīlipa, did not have a son because he failed in showing proper courtesy to the divine Cow. There are some references to Karma found in the secular literature; but nowhere is it a great driving force giving momentum to the theme of the work. Man is never shown as a victim to Karma, though Karma is there. Such a scrutiny is necessary in the field of secular literature to
assess the true value of *Karma* in the life of the Indian nation, to fix its location in the thoughts of ancient India.

19. The fact is that both *Karma* and re-incarnation are in origin philosophical doctrines and not popular beliefs. People did not care much for them. To them the world was real and the present was the only chief factor in their lives. They never cared for a cause to explain the present and never worried about the future. These were the problems that came within the purview of the philosopher. There is a view that the theory of re-incarnation originated as an Ethical theory. If that were so, it should have originated as a popular belief which the philosophers later built up into a system of thought. But it had little hold on the people and we see little of it in the secular literature which represents the life of the people. The theory actually originated as a philosopher's explanation for the facts of the world. If there is no God, there must be either only some freak of Nature and absolute chaos in the world or there must be some internal order in the world as the nature of the world. The life of a man must be a continuous chain, and as a totality it must be a link in a larger chain in which an innumerable such lives form the links. Each such larger chain is related to the other chains and thus the entire world is a unity.

20. There are various problems that face us when we think of the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul. Is there any interval between one embodiment and the next or is it a continuity for the soul, always being in an embodiment, one body coming in when the previous drops off? If that is so, there must be some kind of embodiments that are different from what we experience as earthly embodiments. Because there is what is called the state of heavenly life for the soul as a fruit of good deeds. Thus in the *Bhagavad Gītā* it is said that a man goes to heaven as a fruit of his good deeds on earth and when the fruits of his good deeds are exhausted he returns to the world of mortal man. Elsewhere in the *Gītā*, there is the simile of a man changing his clothes in regard to the change of his body. Certainly there is, according to social etiquette, no interval between discarding a soiled clothe and donning a newly washed
clothe in the case of man; if anything, the wearing of the
new clothe precedes the discarding of the old clothe. Thus,
the soul leaves off a body only after it had taken possession of a
new body. That is what the simile found in the Brhadāraṇ-
yaka Upaniṣad also suggests; here the passage of the soul from
body to body is compared to the movement of a reptile from
grass to grass, abandoning one grass blade only when it had
reached up another one.

21. Here, it must also be made definitely clear that people
believed only in an eternal Heaven. They never thought of
Heaven merely as a Holiday resort. That is what we find from
the secular literature also. The heroes of the Mahābhārata went
to Heaven finally and nothing is even hinted at about a possible
termination of their stay in Heaven and a return to the earth
to continue life as normal mortals. In the Raghuvamśa, the
third king described, Aja, went to Heaven and was reunited
with his consort and took up his residence there; there is no
hint of a terminus for his stay, when the fruits of his good deeds
would be exhausted.

22. The religious view about the transmigration of the
soul is that the soul occupies a body and when the body drops
off, the soul may go to Heaven and after some halt there deter-
mined by the amount of good deeds he has done, the soul re-
turns to an earthly body. The philosopher’s view is that the
soul moves on from physical body to physical body without a
break. There is a third view and that is the scientists’ view.
If the soul is to occupy a new body when the old body drops
off, there must be such a new body made ready and suitable
for that soul to go into. It is not any body into which any
soul can get into. The succeeding body must be in accordance
with the nature of the deeds done by the person in the expiring
life. Will there be always a body ready for the soul? Is
it in the scheme of the world that when a soul leaves a body,
a suitable body is readily available for that soul to enter? The
scientist’s view, as expounded in biological works, is that there
is a state of suspension between leaving a body and entering
a new body; the soul has to wait until a body is ready.
23. In the case of *Karma* also, just like the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, there are complications; it is not also a simple theory. Stated in its simple way, it takes a form like this. When a man does a deed, there is some subtle and intangible result which endures even after the tangible fruit is realised, when there is a tangible result for it, and produces some results at a much later time, may be in a future birth. There are deeds which have only such a intangible fruit appearing at a much later time. A person is born in a particular body and in a particular environment as a result of his past deeds. Such deeds are what are begun with originally (*Prārabdha*) and what are accumulated at later times (*Saṅcita*). A man must endure the fruits of his deeds whether they are good or bad, whether he likes it or not. He cannot avoid them; he cannot assign it away; he cannot inherit it from another. He earns and he experiences. There is no transfer, no termination. Here also various difficulties arise.

24. In religious and secular practices there are various actions that go against this theory. There is the belief that the son inherits the sins and virtues of the father and experiences sufferings and enjoyments in consequence. The father performs rituals for the future benefits of the child, even of unborn child. Even the *Upaniṣads* state that a son takes over all the *Karma* of the father. The son performs rites for the benefit of the dead ancestor. The dead ancestor suffers if the son does not perform the prescribed rites. The son is to make atonements for the sins committed by the father. There are still other beliefs, stated in standard works like the *Upaniṣads*, where there is contradiction with the theory; when a man attains to *Mokṣa* (Final Release) he casts away his *Karma* (good or bad), which his friends and enemies share respectively.

25. There are other beliefs that may not be in direct apposition to the *Karma* theory, but which is not quite in harmony with that theory either. One is the Grace of God which saves a man from his sins and the other is that sometimes a deed does not produce its effect if certain rituals are performed. The *Bhagavad Gītā* says that the Lord does not take up either the sin
or the virtue of any one, and in a later context in the same text, the Lord Himself says that He would save Arjuna from all sins. It is quite reasonable to assume that a certain religious rite prevents the evil deed from producing its effect or counteracts the results after its production. It is not also against reason that God can save a person from his sins if there is repentence and faith in the Lord. That is a deed that counteracts the evil deed. The story of Ajāmila is a typical example of how Divine Grace mitigates even the worst sin. As for the statement in the Bhagavad Gītā, the Lord in the first passage and the Lord in the second passage signify two distinct aspects of the Supreme. The former is the Supreme in human form while in the latter, the Supreme comes as the entire Universe. Some explanation is possible in all such cases of difficulties; but the fact that an explanation is called for is itself a flaw in the theory.

26. The position is this. When there is a purely scientific or purely philosophical theory, it does not fit into the facts of the world. There is nothing like a perfect machine in the world. A theory in its pure state corresponds to a perfect state of affairs. If there is any sort of disparity between the theory of Transmigration and Karma and the beliefs and practices relating to this theory, that disparity should be explained on the basis of the natural disparity between the theories and the facts of the world. This is the case with Geometry and Mathematics. There is nothing corresponding to a Geometrical theorem in the actual world. The science states a relation; but the relation cannot be truly represented in the facts of the world, and, without the relata, there is no relation. When we speak of ultimate states of matter either as particle or wave, it is only a partially true representation of the fact. There is no particle in an atom like the particles in a pinch of salt and there are no waves there like the waves on the surface of a pool of water. There is no inconsistency in the doctrine. The doctrine is self-consistent and its inconsistency is with what is external to it, namely, the beliefs and practices in social life and in religious practices.
27. The theory of transmigration and the associated theory of *Karma* are extensions of the theory of the nature of the world as independent of any external power, working within itself and by itself. There is the notion of *Rta* in the Vedas, the notion of a permanent and settled order in the world. Mutual dependence and mutual consistency are the necessary factors in what can be called an order. All the facts of the world must be brought into some consistent relation with one another and for that, some sort of theoretical classification of the world into factors is necessary. In itself there are no component factors in the world which is a unit. Human mind, being limited, cannot grasp the unlimited unity of the world; as a consequence, it grasps the world only as an aggregate of limited factors. The first classification of such factors is into a large number of chains and the next classification is that of the chains into a large number of links. There are primary chains which are the inindividual lives and there are the secondary links in the form of the particular experiences in the individual lives. All such particular experiences, grouped into individual lives, are thought of as a series of cause and effects.

28. A cause is the cause for more than one kind of effect. Sometimes there are immediate effects. It is only what is an immediate sequel that is usually termed an effect. But in philosophy, what transpires long after an event is also regarded as an effect in some cases. If I eat, the immediate effect is the satisfaction of hunger. But if the eating is of particular sort of stuff and done in a particular way, there is the later effect of health or disease. Indian philosophy accepts another kind of effect, which is subtle and not at all detectable through the normal modes of knowing like perception and inference. Thus, if eating or feeding is associated with certain modes of doing, there is some special fruit arising, which fruit abides in the performer and becomes the source of some final fruit in the form of "progression" (*Abhyudayya*). It may be for the individual, it may be for the community. Thus, the content of a deed produces some tangible fruits and the modes of the deed generate, besides the tangible fruits, some intangible
fruits. Such an intangible fruit is what is termed Adṛṣṭa (unseen). Deeds have a three-fold fruit—tangible or Drṣṭa, intangible or Adṛṣṭa and tangible along with intangible or Drṣṭa-Adṛṣṭa. It is this intangible fruit that may be equated with "Evolution" in modern terminology, which may be for an individual or for the community. Evolution, according to ancient Indian thought, is not merely a case of the blind operation of the dead Law of Nature, but a product of the deeds of man according to the Law of Nature. Man does not simply envolve; man works out his evolution.

29. There was no time in the world when man was not in existence. Modern science is not quite definite about the condition of the world prior to the start of evolution; there are various theories. There is the view of a creation and evolution starting from a single point; there is the view of a continuous process of creation and evolution. Evolution is from an undifferentiated condition towards further and further differentiation; it is a process from a static state to a state of movement. Ancient India also had postulated various theories about the start and process of the same evolution. One fundamental difference between the ancient Indian and the modern scientific view is, that according to the former, man or at least some form of intelligence, was behind the start and process of evolution while for the latter, man and his intelligence are only accidents in the course of evolution.

30. According to modern science there was only dead matter in a uniform; the movement in matter is from within and not through any external impact. In the course of this movement, a certain condition arose, rather very late in the process, when a new phenomenon of movement in matter made its appearance, and that new phenomenon is what is called Life. Dead matter became living matter; that is the first appearance of what are called "Cells". The cells are the products of a new condition that arose in the world in the course of evolution, and it is presumed in modern science that the condition has disappeared and so no new cells can be produced in the world. A cell can produce a new cell; but a cell cannot arise
by itself out of dead matter under modern conditions. The cells had their own evolution and various species of living organisms came into existence. These species can be arranged in an order of continued evolution, each higher species being the evolute of the immediately lower species. Broadly speaking, there are three groups of evolution in living matter, in what is called biological evolution, namely, the plants, the lower animals and man. The entire course of biological evolution is traced back to the original cells. This line of thought in modern science is the result of man’s dissatisfaction about the theory of the creation of the world by God, which prevailed among the Western nations till recent times.

31. In India also, the theory of evolution is the result of man’s quest regarding his origin and his progression. Perhaps there was some theory existing prior to the time of the Vedas, with which the thinkers of the Vedas were dissatisfied. We do not know what that theory was, if there was such a theory. Perhaps it was the theory of God and His creation current among the contemporary nations on the borders. Anyway, the theory that was propounded in India even from the earliest times is atheistic, perhaps even anti-theistic. The Vedic people were strong, valourous, devoted to freedom for themselves and for others and proud of their own achievements; they were not the people to surrender their freedom before a God. To them there was no God, and what they had were only gods who were only their companions, perhaps in some cases, superior companions. We find this national trait in their philosophy also. The world is the world of man and for man, and it is not a gift from any God. Man was the source for the movement and change and evolution in the world, and man was an integral part of the world. Thus, movement in the world is from within itself and not from an external agency called a God. But movement is from intelligence; movement is intelligently controlled and directed. Intelligence and movement were aspects of the same fact in the world. An intelligence is such because there is an orderly movement and evolution within its operation, and an orderly movement is such because it is directed by intelligence.
32. Consistent with such an outlook on the world, they thought of evolution in a way different from what is held by modern science. When uniformity gave place to differentiation, the differentiated matter took forms that could be brought within twenty three groups. They are: Intelligence (Buddhi), Subject-object relation (Ahaṅkāra), Mind (Manas), five organs of knowing and five organs of functioning (Jñānendriyas and Karmendriyas) and the five-fold Matter-in-itself (Tanmātrās), forming one category, and the five-fold Matter in manifestation (Bhūtas). The first eighteen combined to form a complex and there are innumerable such complexes formed. They contained all the germs for every manifested matter and function in that matter. Each such complex started forming manifested facts of the world. Each such complex is termed a Liṅgaśarīra (subtle body) and the manifested aspect of it is called the Sīhūlaśarīra (gross body), which is the visible person. This manifested aspect has a termination, while the unmanifested subtle body persists and develops a new manifested gross body. Perhaps it is the first stage in such a manifestation that corresponds to the Cell stage of modern biology.

33. This subtle body (Liṅgaśarīra, also called Sūkṣmaśarīra) develops into a gross body, acts and experiences, and then the gross body falls out, leaving only the subtle body. Then another gross body is developed round the same subtle body and the same process continues. This is the phenomenon called life. The subtle body is not the Cell of modern biology. A cell has a material existence with a shape and a structure and a mass and a size. But the subtle body of Indian philosophy is not a form of gross matter. It is a stage prior to the appearance of the gross matter, what is called the Bhūta (element). It can very well be a prior stage in the formation of the material cell. A cell has life and when a new cell is formed, that too has life. Is some life-force transferred from one cell to another or does the life-force also expire in a cell along with its own destruction and is a new life-force created in the new cell when that is generated? Indian philosophy accepts the former
position and modern science accepts the latter position. If it is
the same permanent life-force that passes from cell to cell,
then that life-force can be equated with the subtle body of
Indian philosophy.

34. In the Christian religion there is the doctrine of a
person ceasing to continue as a person at the time of his death,
while his soul goes further to Heaven or to Hell according to
the nature of life he had led in the body. But the soul has no
more relation to life on earth. Yet he leaves his first sin behind
for men of the next generation to suffer for. It is possibly
a reflection of this doctrine of the Christian religion that we
find in modern science according to which there is no enduring
life continuing from cell to cell while there is an evolution
of life from cell to cell.

35. The deeds and the experiences of the person during
the embodied stage produce some tangible fruits and also some
intangible, residual impressions, which latter are carried by
the subtle body from one body to the next body producing
fruits in a later body. This capacity to evolve is acquired during
the stage of embodiment, between birth and death. Between
the stage of death and the stage of the next embodiment
there is no evolution at all. The next body is what the subtle
had become eligible for at the time of the falling-off of the previous body, at the time of death. According to modern biology, the evolution is between one cell and another cell. Here is a real difference between ancient thought in India and modern science.

36. The subtle, residual impressions left behind in the
subtle body of a person, as distinct from the tangible fruits of
one's action, in consequence of certain deeds of a person, produce the evolution, what may be called progression or elevation (Abhyudaya). This takes place only when the subtle body is in an embodied condition. There is no evolution or progression without the gross body. The view that the gross body is the seat and cause of suffering is not a genuinely Indian doctrine. In all secular works of India, the importance of the gross body is emphasised. Such deeds that produce the evolu-
tion form Dharma, the ideal life of virtue. Kālidāsa says that the gross body is the prime means for Dharma or ideal life of virtue that brings about evolution. There is a neglect shown to the physical body in thoughts developed outside India, and this is perhaps a migration to and a survival in India of this neglect shown to the physical body in philosophies outside India in ancient times.

37. The doctrine of Karma is an aspect of the doctrine of evolution in modern times, with considerable variations in details. According to Indian thought, man brings about evolution in the world. Man started evolution also. There would have been no movement and change and no evolution in the world unless there had been man, at least man in a subtle form, what is called the Lingāsarīra (subtle body). Man has initiated this evolution and man determines the nature and the pace and the direction of this evolution. It is this mutual relation of man’s deeds and the evolution in the world, including himself, that is called the doctrine of Karma. This evolution is brought about by the subtle and intangible, residual impressions left in man by his deeds, as distinct from the tangible fruits of his actions, and Karma has reference only to this relation of deeds and subtle fruits.

38. It is this subtle aspect of man’s deeds that is termed Īśṭa, which means a sacrifice. The tangible aspects of his deeds is called Pūrta, which I may translate as social service, doing concrete visible good to humanity in general. Both together form what may be called religion. And religion brings about evolution. The subtle aspect brings about evolution directly while the tangible aspect is subordinate to it. Unless there is a social welfare, there is no evolution. What evolution can there be in a suffering humanity? But, in a restricted sense, it is only the Īśṭa, the religious rites, that form what is meant by religion, in so far as they bring about the subtle fruit leading to evolution.

39. We must make a distinction between the two, the religion and the social organisation and social customs. Take marriage, for example. For social welfare, any kind of marriage
may be enough provided the couple agree. But, such marriages may only bring about social well-being and not evolution. The content of marriage is related only to the social aspect, being tangible. But there is a subtle aspect in marriage which comes up only in the mode of the marriage, and it is only such a marriage that can bring about evolution, what is called Abhyudaya, and as such only that marriage is what falls within Dharma what brings about evolution or Abhyudaya.

40. The real question is not whether there is any such thing called an element contributing evolution in certain specific modes of social customs like marriage, which element does not abide in other modes of marriage. The Vedic people believed that apart from the content of deeds, there is an importance to be attached to the mode of the deeds also. The content brings about the tangible fruit and the mode brings about the intangible fruit culminating in evolution. It is such a distinction drawn between two aspects in man’s deeds that is the important point in this connection. They believed that by adopting a particular mode in man’s deeds that could be accomplished in more than one way, something more than a visible fruit could be achieved, and that this has relation to man’s progression or evolution. It is this aspect that is called the Karma theory.

41. At a later time, a distinction was drawn between a Spirit and a Matter. The Spirit was pure; Matter entangled the Spirit. The Spirit struggles to extricate himself from this entanglement. The Matter is the seat and source of suffering for the Spirit. At a certain stage, the Spirit is able to withstand the force of Matter and withdraw from all actions. Finally the Spirit is released from Matter. Such a theory of transmigration and Karma, being aspects of the Spirit in the the state of suffering, is a later feature.

42. Spirit is free and is ever free. Matter is not a bondage for the Spirit. Matter and Spirit collaborate for the progress of man in the world. Body is not a prison for the soul; change of body is not a shift from prison to prison for the soul. Spirit cannot function without the body that is matter, and the body
that is Matter, cannot function by itself, without association with the Spirit. Progression or evolution is worked in the body, from birth to death and not between body and body where there is no embodiment for the Spirit. God and bondage and renunciation and release from the bondage through abstinence are all views that came into the nation at a later stage, or were views that appeared to the different sections of the nation, and gradually the theory of transmigration and Karma became the most powerful factor in the intellectual activities of the nation; it was originally developed as a result of the dissatisfaction entertained by a few thinkers, and it became so powerful a factor in the intellectual life of the nation that all other theories began to be adjusted to this theory; this is what we find in the case of the theory of evolution in modern science.

43. There were various theories at that time, as we find in the Upanisadic literature. There must have been people who believed in an Almighty God and who postulated a Creation of the World by that God. There were people who lived a particular sort of life, the Brahma-cārins, who retired from worldly affairs and contemplated on the Supreme Truth. But the majority of the people lived a life in accordance with the Law of the moving world, and this Law is the Karma. Everyone could freely think according to his aptitudes and inclinations. There was neither a temporal nor a spiritual Power that placed any restriction on the free thought of the people. That is why we find a large number of theories thriving side by side, all being tolerated by, but none being inflicted on, the nation. It is not a state of intellectual unsettlement and chaos. The true Vedic theory was the Law of Karma, that the Law of the movement in the world is within and is from within the world itself, and that there is no external power either to produce the movement or to operate the movement. There is no mutual animosity between theory and theory. Ultimately it was the genuine Vedic theory that survived and dominated, being the most rational and equitable theory.

44. It is only a grand theory to explain man and his life and the external world and man’s relation to it. There is the
great order found in the working of the world. Either there is a designer in the form of a God or there is some superintelligence without a personality behind this orderly functioning in the world. Instead of postulating a God as the designer of the world and as the maker of the Law, the Law itself was identified with the Intelligence. If there is a God, man becomes subordinate to Him; if there is a Law, man becomes a part of that Law. India postulated the latter alternative and there is the great Law of evolution in the shape of *Karma* and Reincarnation.
CHAPTER XX

EVIL AND SUFFERING

1. Everyone feels happy; every one suffers. The source of happiness is what is good; the source of suffering is what is evil. The nature of happiness and of suffering, the nature of what is good and of what is bad, and their distinction, are very clear to every one through personal and direct experience. One may think that there is nothing to consider on such a problem; it may not be recognised as a problem at all; it is just a fact. Yet this is one of the points on which many a thinker has exercised his mind, and failed to find a solution. The difficulty and the failure are not due to the fact that there is no problem; the real reason is the simplicity and the universality of the fact.

2. What is happiness to one may become suffering to another; what is happiness now may be suffering at another time. What is suffering in itself may become a source of happiness. The difficulty does not lie in the nature of the experience; it lies in the understanding of that nature, in defining what it is, in stating its nature in precise language. There are also factors in determining the nature of happiness and of suffering that do not come within the sphere of experience. In actual experience, there may be an element of happiness, without any appreciable element of suffering; and yet there are cases of such a nature that are reckoned as evil, which means, that are associated with suffering. There are various facts that are not associated with any element of happiness or of suffering, that may be classed as indifferent and yet are accepted as aspects of what are good.

3. What one experiences is not always the real nature of a thing; this is true both in the metaphysical as well as in the ethical field. The statement of what one experiences is only the statement of a view; the statement of a fact as it is, is quite distinct from this. What is experienced as a happiness, is happiness only within the limited range, within the experiencer and his environment. What is really a happiness is so in an absolute way,
without any limitation of the personal factors connected with the experiencer and with the special environment of the experience. In the Vedānta, it is stated that a thing is known as it really is, only when in that knowing there is no limitation arising out of the personal factors connected with the knower and with the environments of the knowing; similarly, in the other system of Philosophy, namely, in the Mimāṃsā, it is said that a thing is really good only when it is determined as such without any limitations of the person involved in its experience as what is good.

4. It has already been said that according to the Mimāṃsā the world is dynamic, and that there must consequently be some Law governing such movement and change in the dynamic world; such a law must have universal application. What is really good is what is in conformity with this Law, and the effects of such conformity to the Law is what is happiness. This is the only method of rationally defining what is good, what is happiness, as distinct from what is evil and what is suffering. There has been a view current in the Mimāṃsā System that even in this statement of what is the Law of the dynamic world, there are elements that are not of the nature of good, that are not of the nature of happiness. So, what is good is what is contained in the statement of the Law of the world and can also be classed among those that lead to happiness. The position taken up here is that the distinction between what is good and what is evil cannot be made on the basis of mere experience; and even if we resort to some standard transcending normal experience of man, that does not decide what is good, what is conducive to happiness. This will lead to the position that there is a distinct duality in the dynamic world: some factors that are good and others that are evil. Both are within the nature of the world; what can be called Law is only what comes within this nature and what at the same time brings about happiness. From this nature of the world, what is evil must be kept away when we define Law.

5. There has been another view current among some schools of thought within the Mimāṃsā system that within the statements of the nature of the world, there are some that relate to what brings about some results, and that every result is what can
be brought within the realm of what is good. Such are the factors that are prescribed for man to adopt in his conduct in life. There are other factors that are not so prescribed for man to adopt. What can be called a Law relates only to such factors as are prescribed for man to adopt in his conduct in life.

6. In both these positions there is some unhappy point. Either, we have to say that the nature of the dynamic world is an admixture of good and evil. The statements about the nature of the world in themselves then cease to be authorities for deciding what is good and what is evil. That amounts to going back on the position that the distinction between good and evil can be made out only on the authority of the real nature of the world, transcending the personal limitations associated with the experience of the individual? If the distinction is not within the nature of the dynamic world, what other factor can help man in making the distinction between good and evil, beyond the experiences of the individual? We will have to say that within the factors constituting the nature of the dynamic world such of them as conform to our notions of good, based on our experience, are to be designated as the Law. This makes it unnecessary to have resort to a statement about the nature of the dynamic world transcending the limitations of man's experiences.

7. In the second position also, there is some unhappy point in so far as the world is dynamic and at the same time there are aspects of its dynamic nature that are not prescribed for adoption by man for his conduct. The only rational distinction that we can make is that such aspects as conform to the nature of the dynamic world are to be adopted in man's conduct, and others are not to be so adopted. What is the authority on which we can say that such and such aspects within the nature of the dynamic world are to be adopted and that other aspects are not to be adopted, unless our own experience is accepted as the ultimate authority for such a distinction? This will also amount to going back on the basic position taken up. Whether we think of the nature of the world as consisting of both good and bad, or whether we think of the nature of the world as constituted of aspects that are to be adopted in man's conduct and aspects that
are not be so adopted, such a dualism within the nature of the world leads to unacceptable positions.

8. For this reason, it is definitely accepted that the distinction between good and bad must be made only on such a demarcation that what is in conformity with the nature of the dynamic world is good and what goes against such a nature is evil. Man’s experience serves only in making a distinction between what is good and what is evil within the phenomenal and normal life of man in the world, and the real distinction between good and evil must be made on the basis of the absolute nature of the dynamic world. The only authority in such a matter consists of the statements about the absolute nature of the world free from all kinds of limitations associated with man and his experience.

9. There is no method of rationally proving that such and such a statement represents the true nature of the dynamic world. We cannot start on the assumption that a statement as a statement is invalid and that the statement can be accepted only if it is proved rationally as valid. Such a proof can come only from within the field of man’s experience, and the basic assumption is that man’s experience is not an authority for determining what is good and what is bad, in the absolute sense. The only way in which we can arrive at some ultimate conclusion is to provisionally accept a statement as valid and see if there are invalidating circumstances attached to it. If we can eliminate all such possible circumstances that may invalidate the statement we finally accept the statement as valid.

10. No scientific truth can be established if we ask for a proof at all stages. No ultimate standards for ethical life can also be established if we ask for a proof at all stages. There is nothing called an ultimate proof. Every probans, every basis of proof, stands in need of a further proof, if we continue insisting on a proof prior to every acceptance. Within certain stages, we can ask for a proof and we can also get proofs. Even this has its own limitations. The proofs are proofs only to the extent that their reliability has been established, and not absolutely. The right approach is to see if there is any disproof of it, and in the absence of any possible disproof we must accept the fact as such.
11. The scientific approach is to take the statement as the statement of a fact provisionally, and then investigate the point whether such a provisional assumption can be shown to be untenable. Who is it that made the first statement? Can we trace the statement back to such an original person as the source? If it be possible, has he made the statement as representing his own impression, his own view, or has he made the statement as correctly representing the fact as it is, free from all possible personal limitations? If such a source of an original nature in the form of any person cannot be arrived at through investigation, then why should we assume that the statement is false? Is it not better, more rational, to assume that it is the statement of a fact? The complete absence of a disproof, when all methods have been followed to see if any possible disproof is traceable, is the only reliable basis for accepting a statement as representing a fact.

12. Whether there is a source for the statement traceable or not, has the statement been accepted by people living in different times and in different regions and under different conditions, by such people as may be depended upon as having the necessary ability to detect any invalidating circumstances if such circumstances had been existing? If a statement is available that has been found to be free from any flaw both at the source and during its passage through time, such a statement may be relied upon as valid, even if the statement may appear to go against our normal experiences and beliefs. In our normal experience, any solid material thrown into the air falls down; we do not know of any means of transport being capable of suspension in the air. Are we to say that aerial transport is impossible on this account? Are we to say that there must be some magic in it and that such a method is against the law of nature as we know the Law?

13. In our ordinary life, we depend on "Authority" in nearly all cases. We do not ask for proof for every thing and at all stages; we cannot get proofs for most of the cases. We trust, we believe. In some cases the trust may be in an inherited belief; in others it may be in a contemporary or recent theory. But authority is there; it is accepted as authority, not because there is proof, but simply because there is no disproof, there is no
occasion to suspect and call for proofs. This is just what the thinkers in ancient times did. They had an inherited lore; they had many people of super-normal powers of knowing. They accepted such a lore as recording truth; they accepted the knowledge of such people as corresponding to truth. There is no personal factor; there is only an impersonal reaction intellectually of a bare fact in the external world.

14. The truth of the world is that the world is dynamic; it is a process of continuous movement and change. Our own experience is that the world is dynamic in nature. Our own experience itself is of the nature of a change, some kind of movement. If it were of the nature of an absolute stillness, that will not be an experience. Another experience of ours is that there is a law co-ordinating this series of movement and change. It may be that in our daily experience there are instances of a failure of this operation of a law in the movements and changes in the world. But, it is also experienced that the greater the intelligence and the greater the element of good nature, the greater becomes the approximation of events to the perfect Law.

15. Are we to conclude from the nature of our experience that the world is dynamic with a law governing movements and the changes? Or, are we to assume that the world is static in its own nature and that its dynamic feature is a deviation from its real nature? And, can we also assume that there is no law, that by nature there is only a chaos and that it is man that has been able to bring the events into some sort of law and order? The position taken up in the Mīmāṃsā system is that the world is by nature dynamic and that there is a perfect law in this world of movements and changes. It is man's limitations that bring about some deviation from such a law in the movements and changes in the world. When such deviations are removed, the resulting position of the world in its real and absolute nature will be one of movement in perfect rhythm, not an extinction of movement. Movement as it is experienced may cease; but movement in its perfect rhythm continues.

16. What is non-existent by nature cannot be dynamic. What is produced cannot also be dynamic by nature. The world
is eternal; the world is a positive reality. The world is a good world. What is true, what is really existent, is the Law; what is evil is a deviation from this Law. Thus, evil is not real. It is not a thing. To the extent that there is a deviation from that real nature, evil is not absolutely non-existent either. Each fact of evil is produced and has an end. Each fact of the law, with the limitations, is an aspect of what is real, what is eternal, though as a limited fact it is not experienced in its real nature.

17. The operation of perfect law in the world, in the movements and changes in the world that are experienced, is on the whole along the direction towards the perfection of the operation of the law. Thus, every movement is a stage in a progression. The limitations are brought about through a tendency towards retardation (stagnation is only apparent and not absolute) and reverse movement. The individuals are responsible for such deviations from the real nature of the Law, in the case of its operation. The individuals are individuals only because they have the capacity to operate the Law, not to operate the Law or to operate deviating from the Law. Such deviations constitute the "Evil" in the world. Such deviations produce suffering in the world.

18. The tendency of law is to move towards perfection, a movement of progression (Abhy-udaya); the tendency of "Evil" is to move away from perfection, one of regression (Praty-avāya). When there is retardation or even stagnation, there is either a slower movement towards perfection or there is a cessation of the movement. This is not real "Evil". The former of these two aspects of deviation from the Law is not condemned as "Evil", and the latter is disapproved though not condemned. What is condemned is only the tendency towards reverse movement. That alone is real "Evil".

19. There is one school within the Mīmāṃsā system in which no reverse movement is accepted as possible in such a deviation from the law. Man's capacity is limited to retardation and stagnation. What is condemned as "Evil", what leads to a regression of movement, is not recognised as a fact in this system of thought. When man could have moved forward at a certain pace, he retards his steps or puts a stop to his forward movement.
This alone is what is called "Evil" in this school. What is "Evil", according to this School, produces no effect. There is nothing called an adverse effect. Either there is an effect, or there is lesser effect, or there is no effect. These are the only three possibilities. Production of lesser effect and absence of an effect are the consequences of "Evil" in this world. In both the schools within the *Mimamsa* system, "Evil" is only a deviation from the Law. It is not an independent "thing".

20. The lore inherited by ancient Indians also supported such a view of the world. Even in the absolute state, prior to differentiation, there was a Supreme Intelligence. Manifestation and differentiation are from that Absolute and by that Absolute. An Intelligence is intelligence because it functions according to a Law, and law is a law because it functions according to the will of that Intelligence. Thus, Intelligence and Law are inter-convertible terms. What was produced from that Supreme is not movement and change, but only differentiation. The primal movement subsequent to differentiation is according to the Law, and the people applied the term "Sacrifice" (*Yajña*) to it. The people were themselves performing the sacrifice and such sacrifices were only aspects of the Supreme, Primal "Sacrifice". There is a gradation from the higher to the lower, in the case of the various agents in the form of the individuals, in their approximation to the perfect Law. The first operators, the gods and the demi-gods and the Sages, adhered to the Law in their function, while the individuals deviated much from the Law. Every individual has the capacity to work up a law and to reach up to the prefect Law. Gods are already there in the stage of the perfect operation of the Law, and beings below man do not have that capacity in their present stage. Thus, Ethics, or operations of the Law, are confined to man. An animal or a tree cannot change its nature from within; man can do it for himself and also for the animals and the trees. Thus, an operation of law has application only to the activities of man. We can speak of "Good" and "Evil" only in relation to the actions of man. Animals and trees are out of bounds to this. For gods "Evil" has no scope, no place.
21. In the lore which the ancient Indians had inherited, there is practically no reference to "Evil" and "Retribution". In the earliest phases of this lore there is absolutely no such reference. To them the world is a place where man can be happy. There are references to the higher regions of light (Svar) in the earliest texts representing such an inherited lore, namely, in the Rgveda. But, they never regarded the Earth as a region of gloom. They could see the light from the earth and take the fullest advantage of that celestial light. The gifted people could have a clear vision of that region of light. Gods from that region come to the earth. There is no touch of even the faintest complaint against any hard condition of life on the earth, found in that text. The whole text is pervaded by a spirit of happiness and prosperity and contentment in life on the Earth.

22. It is true that the people had to face their enemies; but they were equal to the situation in which they found themselves. They had complete reliance on their own powers and on the guidance and help they were receiving from the gods, who were their companions and with whom they were in direct communion. One of the oldest texts relating to the exegesis of the Vedas, the Brhad-devatā (an extensive treatise on the gods of the Rgveda) contains a statement that the author had been able to find only very few passages where there is a prayer for the attainment of heaven. There is no mention of a Hell in the Rgveda. This shows that the people did not consider the world a place of suffering, their true aim was never to find an escape from this place where men are doomed to toil in vain and to get no joy at all in life.

23. What is good is of a positive nature; life according to the law consists of positive activity along the lines. "Evil" is not a real "thing" and there is no need to have any avoidance of, or any abstinence from, what is evil. There is suffering; there is evil. But, such things are confined to the limited activities of man and are not in the nature of the world as a whole. For all such evils, for all such consequent sufferings, there are remedies also in the world of limitations; such remedies are within the world itself and one need not escape from the world
to find relief from suffering. Evil and suffering, in their generic nature, are deviations from the law of Progression, which is the truth about the world. Even in the earliest times, in the history of thought in India, we find this distinction drawn between the particular evils and sufferings in this world of limitations, with their remedies also within the world, and “Evil” and “Suffering” in their generic nature. Even the primal differentiation in the world, the original movement and change in the world, had taken a form, which is represented by the rituals which the people had been performing.

24. They considered their rituals an integral part of the operation of the law of Nature; any deviation from such performances was also considered as a factor of evil in this world of change. We find a condemnation of the people who were not performing such rituals. We find words like A-rāti (one who does not make offerings) and A-yajvan (one who does not sacrifice). Such terms should not be taken in their circumscribed application. In so far as their offerings and their sacrifice were in conformity with the law of Nature, and came within the true law of Nature, and also represented, through visible examples, the operation of the law of Nature, there is the condemnation of the departure from such a course. What is condemned is not the refusal to do a particular type of ritual; what is condemned is the departure from the law of Nature in its widest scope.

25. The terms A-rāti (one who does make offerings) and A-yajvan (one who does not sacrifice) relate to the persons in whom “sin” abides. There are terms like Enas and Aṁhas which may be translated as “sin”. We need not go into the etymology of such terms, and it is not easy to trace out a complete etymology. There is also the term Dvij, which may mean “false” or “betrayal”. “Sin” is a deviation from the Right Path; this Path is the Vṛata (Ordinance) of the gods, or it is Rta (Moral Law). Gods are spoken of as Dṛṣṭa-vṛata (holding up the Ordinance) and also as Rta-jāta (born within the Moral Law), Rta-jña (knowing the Moral Law), Rta-pa (protecting the Moral Law) and so on. There is no god who is the creator of the Moral law; nor is there a god who can control the Moral
Law. Gods can only guide man along the Path. Law is law because it is the Law of the world, not because it has been promulgated by God; and not at all because it has been created by God.

26. The rituals which the people were performing should not be taken as exhausting the scope of the operation of the Moral Law; they fall within the Moral Law and they typify that Law. "Evil" is a deviation from that Law in its widest application. Why does man deviate from the Path of the Law? It is this general problem that disturbed the minds of a few gifted people. What they wanted was not an escape from this or that suffering. What exercised their minds was the problem why there should be such "Evil" in the form of a deviation from the Path of the Law, why there should be suffering at all. One of the greatest of the Poet-sages in the Rgveda asks the God Varuṇa what his Sin (Enas) was for which he is suffering. Another great poet, named Śunahṣepa, makes constant references to the deviations from the Law, to "ropes" and to "bondages". Still another poet, named Dirghatamas, speaks about "Ignorance" and the dawn of "Light" and the "Happiness and Immortality" arising from such "Light".

27. Stories have sprung round such passages and the poets who uttered such passages, that give a too materialistic turn to the situation under which they made such references. The great philosopher-poet, Śunahṣepa, has been converted into a young boy, son of a very poor man willing to sell one of the boys for getting money to support his other boys and himself; a king purchases the boy to make an offering of him to the God Varuṇa and ties him to a stake, when the boy implores the various gods to save him from that calamity. The ropes that bind him and from which he wants Varuṇa to release him, become, in this story, actual ropes with which he is tied to a stake for making an offering of him to Varuṇa. The poet's name Śunahṣepa has no part in the origination and development of such a story around him.

28. The other great poet-philosopher, Dirghatamas, becomes a blind man by birth, and his name itself means "one in long darkness". He was relieved of his blindness by the gods when he prayed to them. In the text of the Rgveda itself, there
are twenty-five poems composed by him, addressed to various
gods, and in the last of them there is the story of how he "saw the
Light", and there is a glorification of the sense of immortality
resulting from that "Illumination" within. But, the story goes
that when he was still in the womb, he annoyed a sage who cursed
him that he would be born blind. Both of them are stories for
the laymen, and philosophy can ignore them.

29. Śunahṣepa speaks about the Law, according to which
the sun and the moon move. He asks Varuṇa to drive away
sins (Nirṛti), prays to Him that he may remain free from wrath
(āheṣamāna) and to release him when he is bound. He was bound
on to three stakes and he implores that he may be delivered, that
he may be released. He wants Varuṇa to loosen the grips of his
sins (enāṃsi) which he might have committed. The bonds are
three-fold, above, below and in the middle. He might have com-
mitted many sins as ordinary men; may not Varuṇa hand him
over to Death full of wrath, he prays.

30. The prayers go on in this strain. There is frequent mention
of the Law and the power of Varuṇa and the bondages from
which man suffers. There is repeated reference to his prayers in
the form of poetry to propitiate Varuṇa so that he might be
released from the consequences of his sins. He desires that no
part of his life may be robbed of him. There is enough indi-
cation of physical paralelss in the life of a man, when he is
bound down with ropes to a stake for being offered to the angry
gods for their appeasement. The story that has grown round
the personality of this poet is a natural development from the
contents of the poem.

31. Dirghatamas starts his philosophical poem (coming
at the close of the series of twenty-five poems) with a reference
to the luminaries and to the appearance of the world : how the
gross world (asthanvant=with bones) is supported by the subtle
(anastha=boneless) at the time of its appearance, he expresses
his wonder as to who could have seen that event. He is himself
limited in his intelligence and cannot know, and so he asks
about such secret places of the gods. He, unknowing the truth,
asks of the wise poets who know. Contrasts between one who
knows and one who does not know are brought in through various similes and metaphors, and such similes and metaphors are also introduced to indicate the nature of the world-process and the relation of the absolute to the phenomenal. The most important of them relates to two birds of whom one enjoys the sweet fruits of the tree while the other simply stares blank. Then is brought in the event of the “light” arising in him. This contrast between one who knows and one who does not know, is brought out very clearly by another poet philosopher, Brhaspati, when he says that ordinary men can only stare and listen, while they do not see and do not hear. The immortal one when he becomes wise and the mortal one in ignorance are companions in this world, according to both Dirghatamas and Brhaspati although there is a real distinction according to the latter, just as there is a distinction between two lakes, although people can dive into both and have a bath.

32. What is the real bondage which Šunahšepa was experiencing? What is the blindness which Dirghatamas was suffering from? For the common people, they are presented as the bondage with ropes in the case of one condemned to be offered to the gods at the stake, and as the darkness in the case of one who is born blind. Šunahšepa speaks of the Law and the unfathomable Depth (abudhna). While Šunahšepa speaks of the physical ropes, Dirghatamas does not, it must be noted, speak of any physical blindness. Šunahšepa must have been feeling his innate nature as infinite and as capable of moving according to a perfect law, and he must also have been feeling as his innate nature some perfect freedom. Yet he knew that he was functioning in a way differing from the true nature of what could be a perfect Law. Dirghatamas was feeling the presence of some hidden “Light” as an innate factor in him while he could not see the real Truth with such a “Light”.

33. I have taken up these two poet philosophers specially, as representing the two currents of thought that are observable in the latter-day philosophical systems. One current is that of an imperfection in the function of the dynamic world as propounded in the Mīmāṃsa system, and the other refers to an imper-
fection in knowing the "Absolute Reality" as propounded in the *Vedānta* system. Śunaḥśepa represents the former and Dirghatamas represents the later. There is no contrast, to say nothing of any conflict of approach, between the two currents; the difference is only in the emphasis on the aspects of the world of experience.

34. In neither of these two modes of approaching the problem of the nature of the universe is there any trace of the doctrine about "Evil" being a positive factor within the universe. What is called "Evil" is only a deviation, a vacuum, and the right approach to understand and function according to the real nature of the world is one of getting back the current of activity, away from such deviation, to the normal course by filling up the lacunae in our knowing of the world. Both the approaches are also positive in nature. It is not a mode of departing or withdrawing from "Evil" of a positive nature.

35. We have to take Śunaḥśepa and Dirghatamas as a pair. One is complimentary to the other. Both together supply us with a complete and consistent philosophy relating to the nature of suffering and its cause, and the fruits of the remedies that can be applied, the remedy of wisdom. The two approaches are generally put as in mutual antithesis, one relating to active life and other relating to a life of perfect retirement and of freedom. But, ultimately, they are the same. There is a perfect Moral Law governing the dynamic world. There are the ordinary sufferings; and for such ordinary sufferings, there are the ordinary remedies. Such sufferings may be physical; they may be super-physical. For the physical sufferings, there are the physical remedies by way of medical science, economics and politics. For the super-physical sufferings, there is the super-physical remedy in religion and in the assistance which gods render. But, there is a transcendental suffering, which is produced by ignorance and by a consequent deviation from the operations of the Moral Law; this suffering is of the nature of an unrest in the intellect consequent on the experience of the presence of a phenomenon like suffering in the world. It is not this suffering or that suffering; it is suffering in
general as a phenomenon in the constitution of the world of experience.

36. If there is a perfect Moral Law, why should there be a suffering? It is wisdom that removes this suffering through the cessation of ignorance. There is no hint, in either of the approaches, that life as such is suffering. What is said is only this much that suffering is experienced in life. This is quite different from a doctrine of life being suffering. Even Śunāḥṣeṣa, who speaks about sin and suffering in a very prominent way, never hints at a desire to terminate this suffering through the termination of his life-span. On the other hand, he does not want his life-span being even reduced; and, like all the poets whose poems are included in the Rgveda, he also prays for long life, for the full span of life allotted to man.

37. It is the same philosophy that we see in the Upaniṣads also. There is some slight change in the terminology used in the Upaniṣads. Word like Enas, Aṁhas and Nīrīti, signifying "sin" in the Rgveda were replaced by words like Pāpman, having the same meaning, in the Upaniṣads. Words for suffering like Ṣoka and Duḥkha also became rather popular in the Upaniṣads. Rta, as the Moral Order, lost its early Rgvedic signification, and became equated with Sālya or "Truth". In the Rgveda, the problem of man and his life was approached from the point of view of the phenomenal world with its active life of happiness in it for man; in the Upaniṣads, the telescope was turned on to the Ultimate Reality in the Universe as the starting point. Thus, the active dynamic world was replaced by the Unchanging, the Absolute, in this transfer of the problem from the Rgveda to the Upaniṣads. In the Rgveda, there is a balance between the ritualistic aspect and the "Vision" aspect in the intellectual life of the people, while in the Yajurveda and in the Brāhmaṇas, there is the prominence of ritualism; and in the Upaniṣads, there is a corresponding dominance of "Vision".

38. The difference between the ultimate reality and the phenomenal world is not one of nature; it is one of gradation. I do not want to dilate again on the point whether there is any real difference between absolute stillness and perfect,
rhythmic movement. The Absolute is one or the other. The difference between the Absolute and the phenomenal is that the former is perfect while the latter is imperfect. Thus, perfection and imperfection, not stillness and movement, differentiate between the Absolute and the phenomena. It is the world of phenomena, the world of imperfection, that comes within the cognition of man. Even in the case of the few who have studied all that is prescribed for study, what comes within their intellectual activity is contained in the phenomenal world.

39. The urge to know the real nature of the universe in which man finds himself is consequent on some "suffering", and this suffering is consequent on some "Evil". This evil is not the evil that is ordinarily understood by the term; ordinary evil is a dark stain or something, while the "Evil" of the inquiring man is of the nature of a blank, an imperfection. This imperfection is ignorance, from the point of view of "Vision", and it is limitation in movement from the point of view of function. They are what are respectively represented in the philosophy of Dirghatamas and of Śunahṣeṣa, in the Rgveda. This "Evil" and this "Suffering" of the philosopher must be distinguished from the evils and sufferings in the normal life of man. Such sufferings have their proper remedies in the scheme of the world itself, represented by science and religion. A philosopher will be going out of his legitimate field if he thinks of remedies for the sufferings of his fellow beings. This latter is the province for various professions following various sciences and religions.

40. Śunahṣeṣa and Dirghatamas in the Rgveda, the various teachers in the Upaniṣads like Yājñavalkya and Sanatkumāra, not one of them was attempting to find a remedy for the individual sufferings of man in his life; they were exercised by the general phenomenon of suffering in the world, and by nothing else. There were various discussions, recorded in the Upaniṣads, in the homes of the teachers when disciples, eager to know the "Truth" went to them, and also in the royal assemblies and in the courts of kings like Ajātaśatru of Kāśi and Janaka where philosophers assembled. There is no hint at all that they were agitated by the sufferings of the individuals in the world.
41. We cannot, further, detach the philosophy of the Upaniṣads from the final instructions given to a disciple when he terminates his studies under a teacher, as recorded in the Taittirīyopaniṣad. The disciple is asked, in his civic life, to speak out the truth he has known during his studies, to lead a life in conformity with the Law he has understood during his studies, never to default, from the principles that he has studied, to support the institutions, according to his abilities, in which he has had his education, to marry and to lead a normal life continuing his family line, to help the development of welfare in the country, to discriminate between good and bad conduct in his private life, to carefully observe the conduct of representative people and guide himself in all case of doubt either in the matter of what is true or in the matter of what is good, to be liberal towards the needy and to spend where there is proper occasion and to have modesty, to be free from all fear and sympathetic in his relations with others. There is not even a far distant hint in the whole of this instruction, about the possibility or advisability of renouncing the world at any later stage and of seeking happiness beyond or after life in the world.

42. The normal sufferings in life are not within the scope of philosophical discussions or philosophical "Visions" of which we find records in the Rgveda and in the Upaniṣads. If pessimism means an approach to the problems of life in which the world and life in it are thought of as being the "worst" possible, than which nothing can possibly be worse, without any hope or chance of relief at any stage (with a complete termination and an absolute extinction as the only escape from life and its sufferings) then there is no point of contact between the Vedic philosophy and pessimism. If on the other hand optimism means an approach to the problems of life in which the world is thought of as being "the most happy", than which there cannot be a happier condition, a place where, if there is Evil and suffering, the remedies are also available within the scheme of the world itself, a place where perfect happiness is not merely a theoretical probability but rather a practical possibility, then that is the term that will best express the spirit of the philosophy of the Vedas. As between
the elements of suffering on one side and the elements of happiness on the other side, the ratio is such that the element of suffering may even be ignored: such is the true philosophy of the Vedas. The real suffering, the philosopher’s suffering, is only for the few, and even for them the remedy is readily available. As for the people at large, the element of suffering bears only a very negligible proportion to the element of happiness. Such is the real nature of the world, as reflected in the Vedas, including both the Rgveda and the Upaniṣads.

43. In a world conceived of in such a way, there is no place for a religion and for a teacher who would save humanity from “Evil” and “Suffering”. What is called “Evil” is not “what is”. There “is” evil only to the extent that it is experienced. It is something that vanishes. It is on account of the absence of a teacher or of a God who might save humanity from evil and suffering, in so far as the world contains the remedies for sufferings, and man can manage such protection from evil and suffering by himself—it is on this account—that there is the charge of the Vedic religion lacking in an “ethical factor”. A “Moral God” is a God who rewards and punishes man according to man’s virtues and sins; a Moral Teaching is that in which man is informed of such a God or a method of such a protection external to man himself. There is need for such a Moral God and for such a Moral Teaching in religion only if “Evil” is “what is” in the world and if man is not, in his own nature, able to get over such a positive “Evil.”

44. But, the thoughts found in the Vedas, i.e., in the Rgveda and in the Upaniṣads, do not exhaust all the currents of thought in that age in India. There were other parallel currents also. There were nations and communities that were a danger to the culture of the Vedic people; we do not know whether they were foreign nationals, or whether such opponents were within or without their own country. There were some groups of people known as Brahmacārins (exerting to find out Brahmaṇ or the Absolute Reality) who led a life different from the normal. They were not at all the enemies of the Vedic people who worshipped the gods and who performed rituals
as representing an operation of the Laws of Nature. While the
general people, including the poets, lived a normal, a full life,
these Brahmacārins lived differently, suppressing and repressing
their physical wants, growing their beard and wandering about,
without any definite settled home for life. The material is too
scanty to come to any real conclusions about their philosophy.
45. There is nothing to indicate that even in the case
of Brahmacārins, there was any belief that the world is a
place of sin and suffering. The most that could be said is that
they looked for some transcendental happiness far from the
phenomenal world. In the case of a general philosophy of the
times, there is no indication that there was any element of an
“Evil” in the case of the change of the Absolute into the pheno-
menal. There is the phenomenal aspect side by side with the
Absolutist aspect in the Universe. It is very doubtful whether
the thinkers of the time developed a doctrine of a transformation
of the Absolute into the phenomenal, of the Infinite into the
Finite.
46. It is when we come to the religion of the Buddha that
we see a real shift of emphasis, and a real disturbance in the ratio
between the “Evil” and the “Good” elements in the world. All
are agreed that when Gautama the Siddhārtha became “Enlight-
ened”, b:came a “Buddha”, he saw four fundamental Truths
in the world; and they are that there is Dukkha (suffering)
in the world, that there is an origination for it, that there is a
termination for it and that there is a way to terminate it. It is
here that for the first time in the history of thought in India
we find “Suffering” given a basic position in the system of thought
about the nature of the world. There are references to “Evil”
and suffering in the earlier thoughts in India; but they either
relate to the normal sufferings in the life of man, or are only
casual.
47. On the face of it, it may appear that the Buddha started
a pessimistic philosophy, the philosophy of suffering in the life of
man as a major issue, suffering as an integral and important
factor in man’s life. But we have to consider the environments in
which the Buddha had this “Illumination”. He was born in an
aristocratic family with a royal status. He had married and had a son. At that stage, he decided to renounce the world and take to the life of a hermit, a monk, a wandering Bhikkhu (mendicant). He then received training under hermits who had been resorting to suppressions and repressions of man’s passions to get over suffering and to reach the true happiness beyond worldly life. He was disillusioned; he took to his own method of introspection and he received the “Enlightenment”. The story goes that in his early life he had seen death, old-age and disease and his heart was pained at such suffering in man’s life. Then it was on seeing a monk that he decided to abandon the world in search of escape from life that is full of suffering.

48. Certainly, the Buddha did not start a system of monastic order; if it were so, he could not have seen a monk. What he could have done is only to organise the existing Order after his attainment of Buddha-hood (Enlightenment), since he was not satisfied with the methods adopted by the monks for release from suffering. He must have been a sensitive soul, he must have been thinking of the emptiness of the so-called enjoyments in the world of which he had only an excessive share in early life in his royal home. He must also have been meeting the monks, and he must have felt that their life was far happier than that of a prince in the palace. From the methods adopted by the monks to secure release from suffering, by way of suppressions and repressions, we may conclude that they must have been developing a philosophy of “Suffering in Life”, a philosophy in which “Evil” is a positive thing that “is” and can be got over only through positive methods of avoiding them. If “Evil” has no positive nature, if it were only a blank to be filled up, the method would have been active steps to fill up the blanks and not active steps to remove some stain of a positive nature.

49. Here there is a fundamental difference between the conception of “Evil” as developed in the Vedic philosophy and the conception of “Evil” as developed by such ascetics. The Buddha realised that their methods were not the right ones and that he had to follow another path. If the “Illumination” that he
had were only about the positive and real nature of "Evil" in the world, there would have been no need for him to change his course from what the ascetics had been following to what he adopted. That there is *Duḥkha* (suffering) in the world was known to him; otherwise he would not have renounced his life in the world of suffering. So the chief content of the "Illumination" must be the truth that what is called "suffering" is not a positive and integral factor in the world, but only a casual adjunct that had an origination. The remaining two factors in the "Truth" which he saw in his "Illumination" follow from this nature of the suffering, that suffering is not the nature of life, that it is only an accident in life. The expansion of the fourth item in the four-fold truths, namely, the "Eight-fold Path" is also in conformity with such an interpretation of the nature of the "Enlightenment" which the Buddha had received. Not one of the eight items suggests a suppression or repression of a positive evil. They are all the very opposite of that, positive ways to fill up a vacuum in life.

50. In the *Upaniṣads*, the word *Ānanda* (Bliss) is very prominent; words like *Śreyas* (Beatitude) and *Preyas* (enjoyment) are brought into antithesis with each other. The former restores man to his real nature of eternal bliss while the latter continues man in his life of chequered joys. In the later Vedic literature, namely the *Brāhmaṇas*, we find mention of the name *Śramaṇa*, what is found prominently in later Buddhist literature as *Samana*, the wise people among the Monastic Order organised by the Buddha. The term means "one who exerts"; and the exertion must have been to attain to the positive *Brahman*, and it must have been another term for the *Brahmacārins*, who, as the term signifies, lived a life in search of *Brahman* or the Truth. *Āśrama* is a familiar term in later Vedic literature, and it means "a stage" in the life of man. The word also is derived from the same root as the word *Śramaṇa*, and means a stage in the exertion of man in his life. There is another word in the Buddhist literature, namely *Vihāra* (a monastery) which actually means "enjoyment". The verbal form "*Viharāmīti*", meaning "I live in enjoyment", is also very prominent in the Buddhist literature, and is usually translated as "I live".
51. In determining the philosophy of the Buddha, we cannot ignore such antecedents and environments. All these things show that while the Buddha was dissatisfied with the empty luxuries in his Palace in his early life, he must have been more dissatisfied with the efforts of the ascetics (whose company he joined after his renunciation) by way of positive steps like suppressions and repressions of what “is not” by nature, of what is only an accident in the world, of the “Evil”. The Buddha very often speaks about the physical mortifications he had to suffer in the company and under guidance of such ascetics, and this never at all with approval. Taking the antecedents and environments relating to the Buddha’s “Enlightenment” about the four-fold Truths, the only conclusion possible is that the Buddha restored the original Vedic philosophy of the world being “good” by nature, the philosophy of Evil” being only an accident, merely a vacuum, replacing it by the philosophy of positive work to fill up the vacuum instead of pushing away a shadow. The termination of this accident of suffering is what is called “Nirvāṇa”.

52. The Buddha himself could terminate this suffering, which was only an accident in one’s life and not at all an integral factor of it. His teaching it to others had no value or significance unless others too could similarly terminate this accident of suffering in their life. The Buddha continued his life even after the termination of his suffering; if he did not, he was no Buddha. Is it possible to say that a termination of all sufferings and still a continuation of life in a physical body in this world are the monopoly of a single individual, denied to everyone other than the Buddha himself? How can we reconcile such an interpretation of the doctrine of the Buddha with the Buddha’s own nature as the embodiment of compassion? Is it not an ascription of an invidious distinction between him and the people at large? Is it possible that the Buddha had told his disciples, “I could terminate my suffering and continue my life: but you can terminate suffering only through termination of your whole being”?

53. When we speak of the nature of suffering in the teachings of the Buddha, there is one more important factor that has to be seriously considered. What was the suffering that he had in mind
when he gave out the nature of the "Four Truths" in that form? Is it possible that the Buddha had in his mind the normal sufferings of the ordinary people? Or, was his problem one relating to existence of suffering in general in this world? It is true that a "general" can be comprehended only through a "particular". The problem of suffering in general could have arisen in the mind of the Buddha only through some particular cases of suffering, at the sight of individual cases of disease and old-age and death. If we say that the Buddha in his Four-fold Truth and in his Eightfold Path prescribed remedies against diseases and old age and death and against the caste system and its inequalities and against slaughter of animals in the name of God, and against poverty (and injury to person and property) among the people, it is to debase his whole teaching, it is to convert a great Teacher of Truth to a member of a "Social Service Organisation." It will be a travesty of truth to say that the Buddha saved humanity by prohibiting animal sacrifice and by abolishing the caste-system. He knew that there were medical practitioners and also a government with law and police and judiciary to help the citizens who were suffering. He was not a politician, he was not a professional; he was not a social reformer. He was a philosopher, and his sufferings were the sufferings of a philosopher, an intellectual unrest of a transcendent nature.

54. In the records of the teachings of the Buddha preserved to us in the form of the Pali Tipitakas (Three baskets) there are the three parts named the Vinaya (discipline), the Sutta (doctrine) and the Abhidhamma (philosophy). The first and the last are entirely connected with the life of the monks in the monasteries, and even in the second, considerable portions relate to the monks. The Vedas, including the Upanishads, grew up within city life, relating to the life of the ordinary people in the phenomenal world. The Buddha's teachings had the environment of renunciation, and he addressed mainly to the monks. The Upanishads had the environment of active life in homes and in Palaces. That is why there is this distinction between the teachings of the Buddha and the teachings found in the Upanishads relating to the nature of life in
the world, and the reason why there is this emphasis on the *Duhkha* (suffering) aspect in life in the teachings of the Buddha. He speaks about happiness in life when he addresses the ordinary people, and a whole chapter in the *Dhammapada* is devoted to this aspect. He speaks with great approval about learning and rituals and normal life with family in the world. He condemns the form of asceticism when the person has not attained to the right stage for renunciation. He never said that happiness was possible only when the body dropped down, when life in the body was terminated. What he regarded as suffering, in his addresses to his disciples who are monks belonging to his order, is not suffering to the common man. The common man takes such events as matters of course and puts up with them either as negligible accidents or as steps to happiness. The Buddha recognised this feature in the nature of the world and in the nature of life in it. There is no radical difference between the teachings of the Buddha and of the *Upanisads*. What differences there may be were brought about by the difference in the environments in which the two sets of teachings were imparted, the environment of asceticism and the environment of a full life. Both aspects are in both the systems; but there is a difference in their ratios. There is happiness in the world; and, if there is suffering also, there are proper and effective remedies available in the scheme of the world, for such sufferings; a philosopher need not play the role of a member of a Social Service League. The role of a philosopher is to seek solution to the higher problem as to why there is suffering in this world. To this extent, both the Buddha and the philosophers of the *Upanisads* gave identical teachings.

55. Buddhism started as an organisation of ascetics; later it became a religion entertained by people at large. At this stage, Buddhism brought about some great changes in the notion of "Evil" in the Indian thought. According to the Vedic thought, what is called the "good" is a positive entity in the world. What is called the "Evil" has only a very minor role to play in the Vedic scheme of life. It was in Buddhism that the "Evil" began to get some importance; there came about, as a consequence, a negative form for what was a positive entity in the Vedas,
namely, the element of the "good"; what is good turned to be an absence of what is "Evil", "Evil" being looked upon as something positive in nature. The "Five Vows" (Pañcaśīla) of Buddhism, attributed to the Buddha himself, and forming a cardinal fact or in Buddhism along with the Four Truths and the Eight-fold Path, are all negative in character, an abstinence from "Evils" which according to Buddhism, must be positive in nature.

56. This is a great shift, a shift from what was positive to what is negative in the nature of the "good". Although such a negative notion of what is good has its influence in Indian thought of later stages, what is good remained ever a positive entity, and a new interpretation had to be given to this negative aspect, to this abstinence from 'Evil'. According to this later interpretation, abstinence is not a voluntary, positive activity of the mind; it is only a denial of an occasion for what is prohibited to make its appearance in man's life. As a matter of fact, when this point had to be discussed in the system of philosophy in later times, they could not get an example from the Vedic texts, and the examples cited in such later treatises are all artificial, and not natural like those in the context of the "Five Vows" of Buddhism. "Thou shalt not kill a wise man" and "Thou shalt not drink alcohol" are passages taken up to illustrate "Prohibitions"; but they are not passages really existent in the Vedas.

57. Another great change that came about in Indian thought refers to the relation of man and woman, in the life of the nation. In the Vedic scheme, no man could lead a full moral life, in the religious sense of the word, unless he had married and had children, unless he led a full family life. The Rgveda is full of references to the birth of children as major factors in a full life. Man has no religious life without a wife. A woman was a full partner in the life of the man both in his secular and in his religious life. A man could not kindle his "Sacred Fire" in the home for the performance his daily worship without a wife, and all later forms of religious ritual required the association of a wife. The story about Sri Rama is well-known that after he had discarded his Queen, he had to make a golden effigy of the Queen to perform his great Royal Ritual in so far as he did not
want to have a second wife and in so far as he had abandoned his first.

58. In Buddhism, association with women in wedlock is sanctioned for the ordinary people, and violation of such relationships is condemned in severe terms; but it is an aspect of "Evil" and is prohibited for the monks; women lead men away from the "Goal", and form a barrier across his path to the goal. Buddha himself had discarded his Queen; he entertained women into the "Order", which he had organised, in the earlier stages, while a change seems to have occurred even in his own attitude towards the problem, and in the later stages he refused to admit them into the Order and it was only in the most hesitant way that he allowed his own foster-mother to join the Order. He also prophesied decadence in the purity of the Order by the entry of women into it.

59. We cannot definitely say how far the texts recording the teachings of Buddha do correctly represent the actual teachings given by Buddha himself, any more than we can say how far the available text of the Mahābhārata represents the work of Veda Vyāsa who is recognised as a contemporary of the events narrated in that great Epic; this is also the case with the text of the Bhagavad Gītā, which is also recognised as the actual words in which Sri Krishna gave his teachings to Arjuna. But the Pali texts must contain much that Buddha himself gave out to his disciples in the form of sermons and discourses. One thing is certain that in course of time, there was a great divergence in the two courses of thought from each other, the current of Vedic thought and the current of the teachings of Buddha as transmitted by his disciples and their successors.

60. Life is "Evil" by nature and one has to withdraw from it through conscious, deliberate efforts: this is the doctrine transmitted along the Buddhistic channel. Life in its ultimate nature is good, and one must avoid the entry into it of the accidents of sin: this is the doctrine that existed in the Vedic thoughts. Buddhism accepted "Family Life" as one amongs the "Evils", in its philosophical sense originally, and even in its ordinary sense at a later stage, and condemned it along with Drinks
and other "Evils". In the Vedic thought there is no good life for man without a partner in wedlock, and without a full family life. Evil can find a place only in a vacuum; sin is a blank in the real nature of the world, produced through inactivity, and if there is a full life led by man, there is no scope for "Evil": such is the doctrine of the Vedas. But the Buddhistic current left its indelible mark in Indian thought, though it did not obliterate the full significance of the Vedic thoughts. It was only one among the many currents of thought-developments in India that could preserve the original doctrine in its purity, even with a vengeance, namely, the doctrine that there is nothing that can be called a positive Evil: what is called Evil is only such a blank or a vacuum in the continuum of good deeds that form the real nature of life in the world.

61. Latter-day Buddhism dealt with the problem of the nature of life and of the world in a more systematic way than what is found in the records of the original teachings of Buddha. Life is suffering; experience is illusion. Life cannot continue after the termination of suffering, rather, there can be no termination of suffering so long as life continues; nor can life continue after the termination of illusion, rather, there can be no termination of illusion so long as life continues. The Vedic philosophy, especially the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, had to adjust itself to the changing environment, to the prevailing outlook in the country regarding the nature of the world and of man and of life. What survives suffering and illusion may not be the life function and the sentience process as they are known within the field of phenomenal experience, and yet a positive reality and a subjective realisation survive suffering and illusion: this is the point of view taken up by the systems of thought in the later stages of the development of Indian philosophy. An Evil, the philosopher's Evil, is admitted to be the starting point for the world process, and the Evil has a termination allowing the positive good to survive its disappearance.

62. The Sāṅkhya philosophy takes up the same point of view as the Upaniṣads or Buddha. Perhaps the starting point is nearer to Buddha than to the Upaniṣads, in so far as there
is the enunciation of "Suffering" in the world as the basis for philosophical inquiry. Such a philosopher's suffering comes to an end when there is true knowledge arising in man as a result of rationalistic investigation into the problem of man and the world. Duḥkha (suffering) is of the nature of a lack of discrimination between three elements, which are distinct from one another, and which are known as mutually inter-linked in an inextricable manner. There is the Prakṛti (the Nature) which in its absolute form must be a combination of three elements in equipoise, namely, the material aspect and the energy aspect and the "objectivity" aspect of the external world that is known; this combination, naturally in equipoise, is known as having fallen into a state of flux, not one of the three constituents being in equipoise with the others at any location or at any time. Then there is the pure sentience, which is neither the agent of action nor the experiencer of the fruit of action; and still it is known as doing and experiencing. Thus there is an admixture of three elements in the phenomenal world which three ought to be kept distinct from one another, the absolute and undifferentiated nature, the differentiated nature and the sentience. Such an experience of a truth in some other way is the Duḥkha in the world, the suffering in the world. The "Evil" is the metamorphosis of the Absolute and the pure into a differentiation and into an amalgam. Within this metamorphosis there is the distinction between good and bad, and there is also provided within it the necessary methods of avoiding what is bad and retaining what is good; but the method of avoiding the "Evil" which is of a primary nature, is not normally provided within this metamorphosis, and that method is what is taught in philosophy.

63. This "Evil" is of the form of ignorance, and ignorance is a blank in sentience. To that extent "Evil" is not what "is". It was not, it is, but it will not be. It has only such a limited reality of a positive nature. True knowledge terminates the "Evil" in the form of ignorance. But how did this "Evil" originate? The only answer that can be given is, "I do not know". The cause is given as Adṛṣṭa, what is not seen, what cannot be seen. It is some inscrutable factor. Man's limited rationalism cannot go beyond
this limitation of the differentiated, and as such, reason itself demands that this primal cause of differentiation, which cause is outside of differentiation, is outside the scope of reason. That is why it is spoken of as Adṛṣṭa, what is not seen. Such an Adṛṣṭa is the "Evil" in the world. The pure sentience gets its sentient powers slightly blunted, and this imperfection is what is called suffering, the philosopher's suffering. The power to restore the perfect nature of the sentience is within the scheme of the differentiation though not normally and though not for all, and the method is rationalism, which will take the individual to the transcendent "Vision". Reason must be accompanied by some disciplines, which are both physical and mental, and such disciplines are taught in the system known as the Yoga. There is no system of thought in India which does not recognise the indispensable nature of this discipline, whether they agree or not on the nature of the "Evil" and of suffering. Such a philosopher's "Evil" is recognised in the Nyāya system also. Just as in Sāṅkhya the Adṛṣṭa was the primal cause of the metamorphosis of the pure sentience into a part of a complexity with the Prakṛti as an amalgam, producing differentiation in this uniform Nature, in the Nāya system too there is an Adṛṣṭa recognised, as the root of the phenomenal world. This Nyāya system recognises a God also as responsible for the change of the uniform matter into a differentiation. The Nyāya system does not recognise a "pure sentience" except in this God. Elsewhere, sentience is produced and momentary. In the absolute stage, there is neither knowledge nor ignorance, neither happiness nor suffering. There is just the existence of an entity that can know and that can experience, while God always knows.

64. In the Mīmāṁsā system, there is no cause for the phenomenal world, there is no metamorphosis of an absolute into phenomena. The world as a dynamic mechanism is there, it was always there and will ever be there. In the movements within the parts, there can be an accord to the absolute mechanical law of the dynamic world, there can be a deviation, there can be a retardation, there can be a temporary stop, as it were (though there is no absolute stop), and there can even
be a reverse movement; this last possibility is not accepted in one School within the Mīmāṁsā. While in the Nyāya system, the "Evil" or Aḍṛśta, is controlled by God, neither the Sāṅkhya nor the Mīmāṁsā system accepts a God. "It must be there; I do not know what it is, whence it is, how it is". This is their position. In the Mīmāṁsā system, there is no Primal Aḍṛśta or "Evil". But man's action produces a two-fold effect, one that is tangible and the other intangible, and this latter is what is called Aḍṛśta. Such an Aḍṛśta or inscrutable factor in man's activities cannot be called "Evil" at all in the Mīmāṁsā system. It is mainly this factor in man's activities that produces the "Evolution" in the world, and as such, it is the "Good" in the world. This Aḍṛśta can be designated "Evil", only when there is a movement in the direction which is the opposite of the law of Nature. In the School of Mīmāṁsā where such a reverse movement is not recognised, there is no "Evil" at all in the world. Even in the other School where such a reverse movement is recognised as a possibility, it forms only a small factor.

65. In the Vedānta system, there are different Schools of thought. In the Advaita or Monistic School, the source of this metamorphosis is termed Māyā, which can be called "Illusion". This Māyā, as such, and the entire products of the Māyā too, cannot be spoken of either as "it is" or as "it is not". It is also spoken of as ignorance (Avidyā). There are again two main sub-sections of this School, one section holding that this Māyā abides in the Absolute, the Brahman, and the other section holding that it is outside of, and parallel to, the Absolute. According to the School of Viśiṣṭādviṣa or Qualified Monism, the metamorphosis is due to the Will of God, which is spoken of as God's Sport (Īśvara-līlā). In the third School of Dualism (Dvaita), the differences are absolute and eternal. According to this last School, there is no "Evil" as the cause of differentiation. Evil, just as in the Nyāya system, is only within the differentiated world, in contrast to "Good". In all the systems and in all the Schools within the systems, "Evil" has an end, whether "Evil" is primal or only within the differentiated world.

66. There are several stages through which the doctrine
of "Evil" has passed. There is the early Vedic age, there is the age of the *Upaniṣads*; then come the age of Buddhism, followed by the age of the "Systems of Philosophy". A distinction between the Absolute nature of the universe and the phenomenal nature of the world as it is experienced, is common to all the stages. If the absolute nature can be known, that knowledge alone is true knowledge, and all other cases of knowing are phenomenal experiences. Religion and sciences and also the views about the absolute nature of the world arrived at through rationalistic process come within the purview of phenomenal experience. True knowledge is what is contemplated in the super-rationalistic systems of *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*. There is such a reality as the Absolute Truth and there is a mode of realising it. Such direct and immediate experiences cannot be communicated in language and yet they are not absolutely beyond the sphere of communication through language. It is this latter communication through language (of an imperfect nature) about the true nature of the Absolute, that is called the *Veda*, in the Vedic systems of philosophy. They indicate the direction of the "beyond"; they may not state the full nature of that beyond.

67. As between the two elements constituting the complex of our phenomenal experience, the ultimate truth must be along the line of what we experience as a positive reality and also along the line of what we experience as "happiness". The phenomena and the suffering are the results of some inscrutable shifts in the real nature of the Universe, according to most of the systems of thought, though some do not accept such a shift at all; an element of "ignorance" is accepted throughout the systems of thought. Such an ignorance is the source of the experience of an imperfect nature within a perfect Universe. What is "Evil" is ultimately of the nature of nescience, and what is good is of the nature of "science". The philosopher is concerned only with this primary stage of the process of experience, which experience contains both good and evil, both happiness and suffering. In the matter of the individual cases of suffering, they all fall within the sphere of the sciences and of religion; a philosopher has nothing to do with it. It is the sciences and the religion that
are purposive; philosophy has no “purpose” in this sense of term.

68. Even in the matter of the shift of the Universe of a perfect nature into an imperfect phenomena, falling within our experience, producing the distinction between nescience and science, between suffering and happiness, between pure philosophy and purposive sciences and religion, it is the nescience and its effects that are accidents; what is permanent, what is the true nature, is science in its ultimate significance, with its consequence in the from of happiness in its absolute significance. Even in the stage of the shift from the absolute into the phenomena of experience, there is no topsy-turvy turn of the machine. What there is is only an unevenness in the road, and the machine can still move, perhaps with some jerk and shake. There is no damage in the machine that is beyond repair, that demands a complete abandonment of the machine. The tools and the experts for the necessary repairs and over-haul are provided within this scheme of the shift itself. What is “Evil” in the region of religion is the failure to make use of the tools and the experts during the course of the journey by means of such an imperfect machine. The cause of suffering which a philosopher deals with is what philosophy may term an “Evil”. The source of suffering as a consequence of the inscrutable cause, for which religion provides the necessary corrective, may be termed “Sin”. But the cause of suffering for which sciences provide the remedies are not called “sin”; we may call them “mistakes”. “Evil” is that imperfection which the philosopher handles, which is not within the sphere of religion and of sciences.

69. There are four different gradations in the imperfection within the world, that produces different gradations of sufferings also. There are the sufferings for which the sciences provide the remedies, sufferings for which religions provide the remedies, sufferings for which rationalistic thought provide the remedies and finally, the “Suffering” for which supra-rationalistic philosophy provides the instrument for termination. In all cases, nescience is the cause. Nescience has no reference to individual cases of suffering, what come within the scope of sciences and
religion; nescience has reference to suffering in its universal aspect.

70. Such a classification is true of all the systems of thought in India, including the teachings of Buddha. It is only in the later growth of Buddhism that there is a change of view noticeable. In such a later growth, "Evil" and suffering got identified with the world and life of man in the world. What is evil and what is good is what is not, what is designated Śūnya, void. This latter-day aspect of Buddhism may be designated as "Pessimism". But such a current of thought within India was only an accident. Orthodox thinkers in India considered it to be a perversion of the true teachings of Buddha, and it disappeared within the systems of thought in India. There is no difference between the Four Truths of Buddha and the basic doctrines of Indian thoughts regarding the nature of Evil and Suffering.
CHAPTER XXI

THE GOAL

1. Man is here. Every man knows that he started the journey at a particular moment of time, and every man knows also that others too started on their respective journeys at some particular moment of time. Every man knows further that those who had started their journey had also to terminate their journey at some particular time, and reason demands that those who have already started on their journey will have to terminate their journey at some particular moment of time. Man's life is an event, and an event is what has come into existence at some time and what will vanish at some time.

2. Man does not know whence he came into this world and why. Man does not know either whether there is a whither for his journey. Did the men who had terminated their journey come to the end of their journey or were they dropped out in the middle? Einstein says, "To enquire after the meaning or object of one's own existence or of creation generally has always seemed to me absurd from an objective point of view." It is not a question of a particular individual enquiring after the meaning and object of one's own existence or of creation generally. Man has been doing it; man does it. We may reasonably presume that man will continue to do so. It is this problem that a philosopher takes up in his inquiries. We cannot ignore what has been in existence always; we cannot condemn as absurd what always was; Einstein also says, "An individual who would survive after his physical death is also beyond my comprehension nor do I wish it otherwise; such notions are for the fears of absurd egoism of feeble souls." Here also, we cannot ignore the fact that man has always entertained some notion of a survival after a physical death. Einstein has added, "Enough for me the mystery of the eternity of life". This is just what a philosopher also ponders over. If there is an eternity of life, has not the individual life some sort of eternity, at least as an aspect of the
eternal life? Are births and deaths the absolute beginnings and absolute ends for individuals while the phenomena of birth and death are eternal? Or are births and deaths only appearances and disappearances of aspects of what is eternal?

3. Modern science does not consider the problem relating to the individual man, not even of man in general, as a matter for any serious scientific investigation. Life came as an accident and may disappear, while the world was prior to life and will survive life: this is the scientists' view point. Matter and energy did not come from a mere nothing as an accident and may not disappear into a nothing; why should Life be anything different from Matter and Energy, in this respect? Just as aspects of matter and of energy come and go, while matter and energy are neither produced nor destroyed, why should it not be like this that "Life" too is neither produced nor destroyed, while aspects of "Life" may come and go?

4. I must draw a distinction between "End", "Destiny" and "Goal". The end is at the point where something drops out and the destiny is the point to which some extraneous power drags a thing. Goal is the point where one plans to go. The first is in science, the second is in religion, and the third it is that is within philosophy. Neither science nor religion sublates the position taken up in philosophy, while the philosopher's position sets aside the positions taken up by science and religion. In philosophy, the point reached is ascertained and the method of reaching the point is planned according to a law governing the world. Neither the "End" nor the "Destiny" calls for any inquiry; it is the "Goal" that comes within the sphere of a philosopher's rationalistic thinking.

5. A point as a destination may either be what marks an extension from the starting point or what marks a migration from the starting point. The first is what is called Heaven and the second is what is called Release. There are very few systems of thought where the first position of an extension from the starting point of "Life" has been accepted; in practically all systems of thought the destination marks an escape from Life, a migration from somewhere where there is suffering to somewhere where
there is no suffering. In Indian thought, there is a shift from the former position to the latter. The first position is taken up in such a system of thought in which the world is recognised as a place of happiness, where life is a joy, in which there may be limitations that are capable of being moved back farther and farther. In the second position, the basic assumption is that the world is a place of suffering, that life in such a world is the consequence of sin. In Indian thought there has been a change from one to the other, during its development from the early stages to the later stages.

6. Even during the earliest times of which we have any record about the developments of thought in the country, the firm foundation has been laid for the edifice of a stable philosophy about the problem of man and the world and the life of man in the world. The world is a full world, it is a "Whole". Man is in this world and there is no possibility of any migration for man from this world. A house can have apartments, gardens and other parts; but the house is there as a complete unit, and men do not go out of his home in their normal life. There may be movements within the world, but there is no movement from the world into another location.

7. The Vedas are not the teachings of any individuals; they are the records about the truth of the world, as known to the people of those times. The main Veda relates to the great Moral Law that govern the movements in the dynamic world and also it relates to the absolute nature of the world. Then there are subsidiary aspects of the world dealt with in subsidiary Vedas. Thus there is the Gāndharvaveda or Veda relating to music, the Āyurveda or the Veda relating to medicine or science of life, the Nātyaveda or the Veda relating to dancing, and the Dhanurveda or the Veda relating to archery or war in general. Every knowledge is an aspect of the Veda. The world as a unit, is a whole, and every part of it is self-contained. That is how there is a remedy for any disturbance or imperfection that may come out in the mechanism of the world, provided within the world itself. There is no God outside the world and there is no God's world other than the world of man. Such a philosophical structure was erected on
firm foundations, and the structure endures even after such a long lapse of time; some portions might have been discoloured through the influence of weather, there might be some oldish appearance in other parts, there might have been repairs or additions in still other parts, and other small parts may have been pulled down. Yet the structure remains in tact, strong and fit for human habitation with no danger of any collapse.

8. This is the Vedic structure of philosophy, and in such a scheme there is no migration from this into another world; this is the whole and there is no another. That is why we find in the Veda an atmosphere of happiness and contentment, with no fear of dangers within the world, with no dependence on another, either as a God or as a Saviour, with no eagerness to escape from this world. The "ropes of Varuna" so often met with in the Rgvedic songs, do not bind a man to a particular place from which the man wants to escape; there is no external bondage. Šunaḥśeapa who prays to Varuna to loosen the ropes that bind him was conscious of a perfect freedom as his true nature, but he finds that he is not in immediate command of that freedom which is his. Loosening the ropes is nothing more than a restoration of freedom. If it were a real bondage from outside, there would have been some prayer for being released from the bondages of life; but he prays for his full span of life; he prays that no part of his life be taken away from him. Šunaḥśeapa must be taken as an individual, complete and whole within himself, and his poems must also be interpreted in the same way. What Šunaḥśeapa desires is not an escape from suffering; it is a disappearance of an accidental imperfection. There is not even the faintest hint that man is in this world that is like a prison and that man wants to get out of the prison. Šunaḥśeapa wants only full happiness within this world, within this life, and such a full happiness is possible within the world and within this life.

9. Dirghatamas, the other great philosopher, felt some sense of "immortality" when he attained to the illumination of wisdom. He is a kinsmen of the mortal and yet becomes immortal; it is not a question of release from the body and from
the life in this world in a body. It is a restoration of his freedom within this world, within this life and within this body.

10. References to a Heaven, to a world different from this world of life, are rare in the Rgveda. There is no reference at all to a hell in the Rgveda, though a hell is mentioned in other Vedas. Even the heaven is not something outside of this world of life and beyond of this life; it is only a continuation and extension of this world, and whatever enjoyment there may be there is only of the same kind as the enjoyments in this world and a continuation and expansion of such an enjoyment. The gods are there in that heaven, there is eternal light and perfect freedom of movement. The holy sages of old are there. Man enjoys life there in their company and come to the world along with the gods and the sages to attend the rituals which men perform in this world.

11. In the Upaniṣads also, there is no reference to a termination of life in this world and in this body and to an escape into another world and into another condition. There is not a single reference to the life in body and life in this world being a suffering from which man has to escape. Various teachers impart wisdom to their disciples relating to the absolute truths. No teacher has asked his disciple to renounce this world as a prelude to the attainment of absolute bliss. The general tone is that such a “Perfection” is possible within this world and within this life and within this body. There is a famous prayer in the Bhādaranyakopaniṣad:

From the unreal lead me to the real;
From darkness lead me to light;
From death lead me to immortality.

Taken by itself, it may lend itself to an interpretation that there are two compartments and that there is a prayer for a migration from the one to the other. But the passage must be taken in relation to the context of the entire Upaniṣads. The change contemplated in the Upaniṣads is something within this world, within this life and within this body. If there had been any hint of the existence of another world and another condition in which alone “Perfection” is possible, within the Upaniṣads,
such an interpretation would have been proper. In the *Upaniṣads*, reality and light and immortality are within this world and within this life and within this body. It is only an extension, an expansion; there is no migration or a termination.

12. In the whole of the *Upaniṣads* there is no hint of a *Mokṣa* (release) as understood in the later thought of India. There is no hint of *Saṁnyāsa* (renunciation) either. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyako-paniṣad*, there is a reference to Yājñavalkya, the great philosopher and teacher, deciding to close his life as a householder, after settling his worldly possessions on his two wives. One of his two wives named Maitreyī asked him some questions which he replied, relating to the absolute, and in the end Yājñavalkya wandered about in bliss. I am not quite sure what Yājñavalkya actually did. The word used at the end of this section is “*vijahāra*”, which in the Sanskrit language means “lived in happiness”. This term is used in the Buddhistic literature rather often, and is translated as “to live”. An element of joy or bliss is inherent in this word; taken along with the first sentence in the section, perhaps the word meant that Yājñavalkya found bliss in the free world, without the encumbrances of family.

13. We shall not ignore the fact that Yājñavalkya appears in the *Upaniṣad* in an earlier context also, and that in that context he does not say that for real happiness a renunciation is a necessary preliminary. The latter incident must be taken as an individual preference and not as a national trait. There is no mention of a “retirement” in the *Upaniṣads* as a prior necessity for the attainment of the absolute wisdom. The entire set of *Upaniṣads* represent transcendental wisdom with the environment of the life in the world in cities, in homes and in palaces.

14. In the Buddhistic literature, there is reference to the cessation of life, to the final body and the final birth, to an escape from the cycle of birth and death. There is a hint that Buddha was in his last birth and that there would be no further assumption of a mortal body for him. I do not know how far we can accept everything mentioned in a text like the *Dhammapada* as the real teaching of Buddha. Anyway, in this connection we shall not ignore the many references to the refusal of Buddha to be dagged
into the question about the nature of the Soul and to the future of man after death. As for Samnyasa (renunciation) the point is clear in the Buddhistic literature. The major portion of that literature relates to persons who had renounced the world, who did not have a home life, who had no possessions. The goal as a “release from suffering” and Samnyasa (renunciation) as a necessary prelude to such release became settled beliefs in the nation on account of the spread of the religion of Buddha among the people at large, though originally it was a set of doctrines for the few who have renounced the world and who did not have a home-life and possessions.

15. There was a reaction. This reaction is found in the literature known as the Puranas and Itihāsas, the grand epics in Sanskrit literature. The Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata are the most important among them, though there are many texts coming within the category of Purāṇas; the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata are known as Itihāsas. Both sets of literature come within the ancient epics. The reaction is also noticeable in the systems of philosophy that grew up in India after the time of Buddha. Such systems of philosophy did not develop in a desert; they grew up in the rich field of the life of the nation and it is in the “epics” that we see the life of the people.

16. Sri Rama is the hero of the Rāmāyaṇa and the five princes of whom Yudhiṣṭhira was the eldest, assisted by Sri Krishna, are the heroes of the Mahābhārata. Even the most casual reader of the two epics cannot miss the plain contrast between the spirit of the Buddhistic literature, especially such parts as relate to the life of Buddha, and the spirit of the two epics, especially that part where the life of the heroes are narrated. Buddha as Gautama Siddhārtha was born in an aristocratic family of royal status; he married and he had a son. At this stage, he abandoned his claims to the royal position and went away as a monk. Later the members of his family also joined the Monastic Order which he organised.

17. Sri Rama and Yudhiṣṭhira were both born in royal families and they were heirs to the throne. Sri Rama was deprived of his throne through certain accidents, was banished to the
forest where he lost his consort also and had to suffer various kinds of pains, both physical and mental. But he chased the culprit who abducted his consort, killed him, returned to the kingdom and sat on the throne. Yudhishthira too had the same fate; he had to go to the forest as an exile after losing his throne through some accident, along with his consort and his brothers. In the end he returned home after procuring the necessary weapons with which he could defeat his enemy, and regained his throne. He was assisted by Sri Krishna in this endeavour. Sri Krishna too had to spend his early days in the forests on the banks of the river Jumuna on account of the wickedness of his uncle who had usurped the throne. He too killed the tyrant and installed the rightful claimant on the throne. Although he did not sit on a throne, he lived the life of a royal personage with a palace and with queens.

18. Sri Krishna did not think of gaining Mokṣa (release) when fate threw him into the forest in his early days. He did not counsel Yudhishthira to look for Mokṣa when the latter had to go to the forest as an exile. Sri Rama never thought of remaining in the forest as a hermit and attain to Mokṣa. Many sages had met Sri Rama and Yudhishthira when they were in the forest, and not one of them advised the kings to remain in the forest to look for Mokṣa. They all counselled the kings to prepare for war to regain their rightful claims and even helped them with weapons, as in the case of Sri Rama. It was Veda Vyāsa, the great Sage, who advised Yudhishthira to work for winning the divine missile with which alone he could defeat his enemies.

19. There are three values or rather three goals specified in the scheme of a full life, in ancient India. They are Dharma (Law), Artha (means of life) and Kāma (enjoyments in life) and they form a trio, known as Trivarga (the three-fold group). They form the basic truths of a full life, just as the Four Truths form the basis of life for the monks in Buddhism. The Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata refer to these three goals very often in different contexts. There is little mention of the fourth Goal, namely, Mokṣa, which was added to the three for accommodating the Buddhistic ideals into the scheme of life in India. This Mokṣa is
THE GOAL

spoken of as the Parama-puruṣārtha (the supreme goal of man), and the four are together spoken of as Puruṣārtha-caṭuṣṭaya (the four-fold goals of man). But the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata seldom mention this fourth, and give no sort of prominence to it in dealing with the "purpose" in life.

20. We have also to consider the question of the significance of the sequence in enumerating the three goals. Are they given in the ascending or in the descending order of importance? Is Dharma (law) or is Kāma (enjoyment) the most important among the three? If Dharma is the most important and if the others follow in descending order, then Mokṣa should have been given its place prior to Dharma, as the first, when that was added. If Mokṣa is given its position in the order of its importance at the end, then among the three, Kāma is the most important goal. This shows that a full life is the ultimate goal of man.

21. Another great change that came over in the scheme of life on account of the influence of Buddhism is in the demarcation of the stages in a man's life. In the earliest literatures, man had only two stages, that of a student and that of a householder. The three goals fitted well into this scheme. A full religious life and a full civic life was possible only for a householder. But Mokṣa (release) has no place in this division of the stages in a man's life. In later times, we find two more stages coming after the original two, that of Vānaprastha (forest-dweller) and Bhikṣu (a wandering mendicant). The Vedic literature gives no hint of such two further stages for man to complete his full course of life. No one spent his life in a forest after retirement from a home-life, in the Vedic age; even the Upaniṣads do not give any hint of life in a forest. The Upaniṣads record discussions conducted in the homes of teachers and in the palaces of kings. Not a single one of the thinkers who participated in such discussions lived in the forest, not one of them came from the forest for such discussions and returned to the forest-home after the discussion.

22. Even in later practice, such a four-fold demarcation is more theoretical than a fact. We come across the forest-dwellers in the grand epics; but they were not there as a prelude to
become Bhikṣus (wandering mendicants). Many of them lived in their forest hermitages as house-holders, and they had no intention of becoming wanderers at a later stage. There were the Saṁnyāsins (those who have renounced the world and home and possessions) who did not live in the forest as a preliminary stage. They lived in their monastries in cities, attached to temples, or in independent monastries which were centres of learning.

23. Indian literature does not record the experience of any one having attained to Mokṣa. Neither Sri Rama nor Sri Krishna attained to Mokṣa (release). They were God Incarnate in human form and after their Mission, they returned to their real nature; they were not in bondage in human bodies and the question of Mokṣa does not arise in their case. Sri Rama’s brothers and his queen too returned to their original nature, having been divine originally. Yudhiṣṭhira and his brothers and queen in the Mahābhārata went up to heaven and are not known to have attained to Mokṣa. So did many others who are mentioned in the Epic, including the enemies of Yudhiṣṭhira. There are a few cases that may appear to be Mokṣa. That was the case with Sri Krishna’s uncle Kaṁsa, who had usurped the throne; but he did not attain to “union with the Supreme” through Saṁnyāsa. The epics speak of persons who are Ciraṇjīvinś (persons with eternal life), like Veda Vyāsa, who is also the author of the Vedānta Sūtras that deal specially with the problem of ultimate Mokṣa (release), and Mokṣa is denied to him in so far as he is a Ciraṇjīvin (one with eternal life). Literature does not record an event like Mokṣa for any of the other teachers who have imparted the original instruction about Mokṣa, namely, Kapila, the founder of the Sāṇkhya, Patañjali, the founder of the Toga, Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya system, Kaṇḍa, the founder of the Vaishēśika system and Jaimini, the founder of the Mīmāṁsā system. In the case of the last, there is no teaching of Mokṣa either.

24. We must have this back-ground when we discuss the goal of man as evolved in the systems of philosophy that followed the time of Buddha. We must also take cognisance of the later exponents of the systems, especially Saṅkara, who gave the form
to the teachings about the world being Māyā or illusion and about Brahman, the Absolute being the only Reality. Śaṅkara was in his body when he gave the teaching, and what he says is only about the abstraction of a beyond, about "that" and not about an experience of "this". With such a preliminary, the "Goal" taught in the various systems of philosophy can be discussed.

25. The Śaṅkhya and the Yoga speak about Kaivalya as the goal. The word means "state of being Kevala or just by oneself". This must be the realisation of a fact as it is, without being intermixed with other facts, either in constitution or in quality or in function. In the classical interpretation, this Kaivalya or becoming oneself is meant for the Puruṣa, the Spirit, while there is also the Prakṛti or Matter in this universe. Puruṣa or the Spirit is "Vision" and Prakṛti or Matter is "function". There is some kind of mutual exchange or barter of their respective natures between the two. Puruṣa, the Spirit, that is only a Vision, becomes a functionary through a nature received from Matter, and Prakṛti or Matter that is only a functionary becomes also a knowing entity through a nature taken from the Spirit. The world is this "confusion" of Spirit and Matter. The goal is their separation so that the Spirit becomes itself, without a notion of function which is extraneous to it and retaining the whole vision, which has been partly taken over by Matter. This is Kaivalya, the state of being just oneself. According to the classical interpretation, this goal is for the Spirit, and Matter is the cause of this confusion. The guilt, so far as the interpretation goes, is in the Matter, and the Spirit is the victim of the guilt. Here, there is a touch of religion in the philosophical position.

26. There are various places within the original text where there is the mention of this goal of Kaivalya. The first mention is in connection with the establishment that there is a Puruṣa (Spirit) in the Universe, distinct from the Prakṛti (matter):

There is the Puruṣa (Spirit) since combinations must have a purpose for something extraneous to itself, since there must be someting the reverse of the three-fold constituents (of Matter), since there must be some supervisor (for the combination), since there must be an experiencer (for the
effects of such combinations) and since there is activity with Kai\谺lya as the goal.

(1) If Matter is a combination of three-fold constituents, there must be some purpose in such a combination; there is no activity that does not serve some purpose. Just a movement simply for the purpose of the movement itself is not what we have experienced; and rationality can operate only on the basis of what is already known. We shall not assume anything that has no basis at all within our experience. (2) In our experience, we find that everything has a reverse. We speak of a thing as that only in contrast to another, and nothing is that in itself. (3) We experience every movement and change as ultimately controlled and guided by some intelligent agent. (4) We never experience a thing just as that thing; we experience it as what is experienced by us. (5) There is the belief in some “release” and there is the universal activity observed with that purpose in view. The first four arguments rest on our common experience of a universal nature and does not depend on any “belief”. The last rests on a universal activity resulting from some universal belief. This is the religious belief of some goal outside the world of life.

27. In this inference, the first four postulate an entity other than the Matter to explain the behaviour of Matter in the world as experienced by us. The last one postulates such an entity to explain the universal belief entertained at that time and the universal practice based on such a belief. The last argument need not mean that the Kai\谺lya is a goal for the Puruṣa, whose reality is deduced through the argument. If there is to be such a Kai\谺lya, there must be an admixture; if there is Kai\谺lya for one ingredient in the admixture, that is Kailvalya for the other also. We cannot separate gold from copper without the separation of copper from gold as well. It is only the religious belief that requires the goal to be restricted to the Spirit (Puruṣa). There is the fourth argument also that supports such a restriction; Spirit experiences Matter and Matter is experienced by the Spirit. Kai\谺lya is a state, an experience, and it is an experience for the Spirit; thus, Kai\谺lya is the goal for the Spirit that experiences, and not for the Matter that is experienced. That is
what happens in separating gold and copper. The purity of copper is not a goal, though it may be a fact. But gold becomes pure even if copper continues as admixed with other ingredients as well. Even when the Matter remains just by itself, without its functionary nature being transferred to the Spirit and without assuming the “Vision” nature of the Spirit for itself, the Kaivalya is spoken of only with reference to the Spirit and not with reference to Matter which too has the corresponding Kaivalya.

28. The belief that Kaivalya is only for the Spirit and not for the Matter which too may come to possess that Kaivalya, is made clear in another passage:

On account of such a contrast, there is established that such a Spirit is only a witness (not a participant), that it acquired Kaivalya, that it is neutral, that it just has a “vision” and that it has no nature as a functionary.

When there is Kaivalya for the Spirit, there must be the same Kaivalya in the Matter, in so far there is nothing else as a third with which Matter could be inter-mixed; yet Kaivalya is mentioned as a specific nature of the Spirit, as distinct from the nature of Matter.

29. In the verse, where there is the simile of the collaboration of the lame man and the blind man, to explain the nature of the association of the Spirit and the Matter, the commentators restrict the Kaivalya to the Spirit along with “Vision”, though in the text itself there is nothing to show that the goal of this combination and this collaboration is restricted to the Spirit. A direct interpretation of the passage would involve two goals, that of the “Vision” for the Spirit and that of the Kaivalya for the Matter. Taken along with this passage, the passage just noted above need not be interpreted to mean that the goal of Kaivalya is restricted to the Spirit; it may simply mean that the Spirit is distinct from Matter.

30. In another passage it is said that the ground for the function of the sense-organs is to serve the ultimate purpose of the Spirit (Purusārtha). Here, the view is quite clear that the function of Matter (of which the sense-organs are evolutes) has no purpose to serve for the Matter itself, that the purpose
is for the Spirit. Its own Kaivalya (isolation) is only casual. The same view is expressed in another passage where the function of the external sense-organs and of the "Mind" and of the "I-ness" is spoken of as serving the purpose, in so far as they illuminate the entire goal of the Spirit (Puruṣasya-artha) and present it to the Intellect. They present it to the Intellect in so far as it is the Intellect that accomplishes the experience of the Puruṣa in respect of everything; it is also this Intellect that brings about the discrimination as to the distinction between the Spirit and the Matter. The ground for the formation of the functions of the Subtle Body is the purpose to be served for the Spirit; this is repeated in still another passage.

31. Till now, the term used in the original text of the Sāṅkhya is Kaivalya (isolation); towards the close of the text the familiar term of "Release" (Mokṣa) is introduced. And the release is for the Spirit, suggesting that Matter is a bondage. Matter through its functions provide such a release for each and every Spirit, the individual Puruṣa. The function of Matter gives the semblance of working for its own purpose, while it is for another in reality. Such a function starts with the manifestation of the first evolute of Intellect (Mahat-the Great the Great) and proceeds to the formation of the grosser matter, the Five Elements (Bhūta) and their constant modifications. There is the simile of the milk that flows from the cow for the purpose of nourishing the calf. The milk flows by itself as a nature, though there can be no conscious effort on the part of the milk, and yet there is such a purpose served, the purpose of another; the same is the case with the current of evolution within the Matter. There is another illustration given for the function of Matter without any purpose served for itself. One may not have any specific purpose to be served by one's activity; yet one takes up such an activity upon oneself simply for a subjective satisfaction, and the purpose is for another. There is no urge from another; there is no command from another; and yet we see in the world cases of persons doing things just for such a subjective satisfaction.

32. The relation between Matter in function and the Spirit
that is neutral and is only a witness, is illustrated by the case of
an actress whose sole purpose is to show herself off to the audience
to the best effect, and then the actress retires from the stage.
When Matter makes an exhibition of her functions and when the
Spirit has witnessed the performance, Matter ceases the functions
and the Spirit remains isolated like the audience. There is
another, still more interesting, illustration of their mutual relations
(that of the Spirit with the Matter), where the Spirit is compared
to a man and the Matter to a woman. Usually the passage
is interpreted as referring to a master and his woman servant.
My own view is that the reference is to a very faithful and devoted
wife and to her husband who is rather ruthless. She resorts
to various means, she serves various purposes of the husband,
and yet there is no help from him for her. She is full of various
qualities, while the man cannot be spoken of as possessing any
good quality. Here there is a pun on the word which is rendered
here as “good quality”. The word is Guṇa, which in the system
means the constituents of Matter. Matter, compared to the wife,
has Guṇas (the three constituents) while the Spirit is devoid
of Guṇas (such constituents). The word Guṇa means in ordinary
language “good quality”, the wife being full of it and the man
being devoid of it. The wife has no thought of any purposes for
herself in her functions and she functions solely for serving the
purpose of the man.

33. After all such illustrations to explain the relation of
Matter and Spirit, there is again a reference to the actress to
conclude the topic. This shows that of all the illustrations given
above, that of the milk flowing from the cow for the calf and that
of the actress and that of a wife, what correctly represents the
relation is the illustration of the actress. But there is one difference
between the actress and Matter; the actress may re-appear and
attract and bind down the audience through another exhibition
of her skill, while Matter never comes into such a relation with
the Spirit when once there is a cessation of the complexity. To
that extent the Matter is much finer, much more gentle
(Sukumāra-tara); when once Matter is known in its nature by the
Spirit, there is an eternal isolation mutually between Matter and
Spirit. As a matter of fact, the illustration of the actress is kept up till the end of the text.

34. When a person witnesses a performance of the expert actress on the stage, during the performance there is the sense of identity between himself and the actress, the sense that he is himself experiencing all that the actress is representing. But at the same time, the man remains just the isolated man, without any complications in the facts represented by the actress. It is the same thing with the Spirit also. There is neither a bondage nor a release (Na badhyate na mucyate); there is no transmigration either for the Spirit (na saṁsarati). This need not be taken to mean the technical transmigration; it includes all the courses of experience for man in his life in the world. The whole phenomena of physical life, bondage and release are only for the Matter. The limitations, the bondages, are only for the Matter, brought about by Matter itself. Matter releases itself, keeping in view a purpose for the Spirit (Puruṣārtham prati).

35. Such a position is arrived at through repeated investigations into the Categories (Tattvābhāsa), where there is the realisation “I am not, naught is mine, there is no ‘I’”. Such a realisation is pure, being free from any possible contradiction and consequent sublation; it is just a realisation (kevalam jñanam) unmixed with any taint of invalid elements. At the stage of such a realisation, the Matter ceases its combinations and functions, in so far as Matter has accomplished its purpose (arthavaśāt). The Spirit sees the Matter in that form, just like a man among the audience sees the actress who has finished her performance, who becomes cleared of all identifications with the representations of the actress at that stage.

36. One of the two, the Spirit, becomes indifferent with the sense that he has finished witnessing her; the other, the Matter, ceases her representations when she finds that her representations have been witnessed to its close. There is a satisfaction in her at that stage. Both of them remain together, the Spirit and the Matter. But there is nothing more to be served as a purpose, and there is no occasion for any new world process, so far as that individual is concerned. Here the comparison, contained in the
illustration of the actress, shall not be stretched too far. If the actress starts her performance on another occasion and if the same man goes to witness the performance, that must be taken as a new event relating to a new individual. The illustration closes with the first performance comprehended within the illustration.

37. The question of such a final release and its relation to a physical body, is now taken up. Here a new illustration is brought about. A potter turns the wheel and moulds a jar; when the jar is properly formed, the purpose of turning the wheel is finished and yet the wheel may continue to keep turning even when the potter has removed the jar that has been given its shape. The continuance of the body even after the realisation of the truth about the “Categories” is just like the continued turning of the wheel even after its purpose is finished. That body drops down and when there is retirement of the Matter after it has accomplished its purpose, there arises a Kāivalya (isolation) which is both absolute and final. The text is not definite as to the location of this Kāivalya; from the construction of the sentence, it is certain that the Kāivalya is not spoken of the Matter. It can be with reference to the Spirit, though it is not stated so. It can as well be that it refers to some unspecified individual. The exact words are, “One attains to Kāivalya”.

38. The texts started with a statement that the remedies provided for sufferings in the world by science (Dṛṣṭa or seen) and by religion (Ānusāravīka, what follows Śruti or Scripture) are not absolute and final (ekāntātyantataḥ). The remedy excelling both is what is dealt with in the text, which produces a realisation of the discrimination among the manifest, the unmanifest and the sentient (vyakt-āvyakta-jñā-vijñānāt). The text closes with a statement of the final realisation being absolute and final; naturally that realisation must be of the form of a discriminative knowledge of the same three.

39. Nowhere has it been specifically stated in the text that the Spirit has any purpose, that the Spirit is suffering a bondage, that the Spirit looks for release and that the Matter accomplishes this purpose of the Spirit. There is a specific assertion that what is experienced as bondage is only for the modifications within
Matter. Yet there is mention of the purpose of the Spirit (purusa-sartha) served by Matter. Is it a confusion of thought in the system? Or is it an admixture of Philosophy and Religious beliefs? Or is there any explanation possible to reconcile these two apparently contradictory statements?

40. The position is that the term Purusa (Spirit) is used with different meanings. There is the absolute Spirit which is pure "Vision", pure sentience. There is the phenomenal Spirit (a rather incomprehensible combination of terms) which is the Spirit with the element of function adopted from the nature of the Matter (Prakriti), when the Matter itself, in itself insentient, adopted the sentience-element from the Spirit. There arises out of this combination what is termed the Linga-sarira (subtle body). This combination designated the "subtle-body" is also the Purusa (Spirit), being the agent for all activities in the world, which activity presupposes the dual elements of function and sentience. In reality the two elements do not co-exist in the same substrate; but they exist in the subtle-body in the form of a superimposition of the elements of each on the other, by some sort of unreal mutual transfer of attributes between Matter and Spirit.

41. Philosophy is meant for this subtle-body which assumes a gross body also. The purpose, meant in the system of philosophy called the Sankhya, is for the embodied or corporeal Linga-sarira (subtle-body). In this subtle body there is the Matter and the Spirit in mutual transposition, as a unit. In this composition, there is neither a pure Spirit nor a pure Matter; even Matter that is uniform in its real nature gets differentiated in this process of the mutual transposition. The undifferentiated Matter, becoming differentiated, reflects the sentience in the Purusa or Spirit, and there is the pure Spirit also. Kaivalya is the realisation of the mutually distinct nature of the three factors, the pure Spirit, the pure Matter in its undifferentiated state and the Matter in its state of differentiation with the reflection of sentience from the Spirit. In so far as such a realisation is of the nature of sentience, limitations of language requires that this is referred to the Spirit that is sentience, and not to Matter that has no sentience of its own. It must be clearly understood
that the Spirit in its own nature has neither an admixture nor an isolation; they are all in, and for, the Linga-sarīra (the subtle body), which alone has the admixture, which has nescience and which can ultimately understand the distinctness of the component elements in its own constitution.

42. The simile of the actress has also to be examined with care. The purpose for which the actress appears on the stage and exhibits her art is not to release the spectator: but to keep him bound to the art in her. The simile represents, rather, the relation of Matter and Spirit in the state of combination. The theory of art postulates an identification of the actors on the stage and the audience. Those who do not know, who cannot fully enjoy the art, feel that the factors of joys and sufferings are really there in the art presented, and they too feel a corresponding joy or suffering. But in the case of the appreciative, sympathetic critic who understands the art, there is only a continuous joy. That is how a wise person is not affected by the individual sorrows in the world, for which science and religion prescribe remedies. In normal experience, there is no distinction realised between the elements of activity and of sentience. There is only an admixture. There is a difference between lack of discrimination between two things and a realisation of the unity in the two things. Such a realisation of unity exists in the experience of art, where the artist and the spectator are unified into a single “Vision”. Such a stage is not mentioned in the sāṅkhya system; it finds a place in the Vedānta system. In the Sāṅkhya system, all that is stated is that the Spirit reaches the goal at the experience, “The Matter has been seen by me” and at the stage when “She has been seen by the Spirit”. This is a unified vision, and that is exactly what has been stated also as the discriminative knowledge of the three factors, namely, the Spirit, the Matter undifferentiated and the Matter in differentiation. The term “retires” must be interpreted as “arrives at such a goal”.

43. In the exhibition of an art, the termination of the exhibition is not a factor; the real factor is the culmination in a particular state. It must also be kept in mind that the purpose of art is not to terminate any suffering through the termination
of the art; the purpose is to produce a transcendental joy. The purpose kept in view is a particular way of experiencing the art where there is a unity between the art, the artist and the spectator. There is no place in the entire text on the Sāṅkhya where it is expressly stated that the purpose of the inquiry is the termination of a suffering. What is said in the beginning of the text amounts only to this that it is the presence of individual cases of suffering that starts a philosophical investigation, when neither science nor religion produces an absolute and final termination of such ordinary sufferings. The philosopher's method is superior to both these ones in so far as the philosopher's procedure ends in such a discriminative knowledge, which is Kaiwalya or isolation, and which is such a "Vision", which is the goal kept in view in the exhibition of an art. The view that that Kaiwalya is the termination of ordinary suffering is what is found only in the commentators, and is not a doctrine in the system. While the ordinary sufferings are experienced as something "that is", the philosopher's suffering is of the nature of a "blank", and the discriminative knowledge fills up this blank. The ordinary sufferings may be the occasion for the philosophy, and philosophy may not have started on the course of investigation unless there had been an element of suffering experienced as something positive in the world; but removal of such a suffering is not a purpose in philosophy. The philosopher's goal is an expansion into a unity, after and through a discriminative knowledge, of the differentiations in the world, in their real nature. The Sāṅkhya system in its expressed statements does not emphasise this ultimate unity in realisation, but stops at the discrimination. But the illustration of the actress implies such an ultimate unity.

44. In the Nyāya system, the main question discussed relates to the modes of knowing. That the ultimate goal can be reached only through right knowledge is the basic doctrine recognised in this system, as in the case of all systems of philosophy in India. A knowledge is valid when the modes employed in acquiring that knowledge are correct. In contrast to what is a right knowing, there are also considered various forms of imperfect, illusory and faulty ways of knowing. The right knowledge acquired after
a thorough investigation into the correct and faulty modes of knowing is the foundation for the acquisition of the supreme bliss (Nīḥśreyasa). In the Vaiśeṣika system the investigation relates to the objective world. The correct mode of knowing things in their real nature is to divide and classify the objects based on their similarities and dissimilarities. Through such a method, one arrives at a correct knowledge of the things in the world, and that knowledge brings with it the same supreme bliss (Nīḥśreyasa). Nīḥśreyasa is that than which there is nothing (Nīḥ) better (śreyas). It is not at all presumed that either the study or the results of the study contemplated in the systems will directly lead one to the goal. They are preliminaries to the journey to the goal.

45. The problem of a goal does not arise in the Mīmāṃsā system. There are no termini for the world, either a prior one or a posterior one. The world is there and functions like a dynamic machine. The general direction of all movements is of the nature of a progression. The only possible goal that can be introduced into the system is a culmination of the movement in perfect rhythm, free from all frictions. But the actual goal is the continuity of the movement without any retardation, without any deviation from the mechanical law in the world, without any stagnation into stillness; and according to one School, without any movement in the reverse direction. In the other School, there is no such reverse movement possible within the framework of the world-machine.

46. A knowledge of the nature of the world-machine is necessary for one to function according to the mechanical law of the world. This mechanical law is what is found in the Veda. It is a distortion of the fundamental doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā to say that what this law is is what is found in the Veda. The real position is exactly the opposite; they refuse to recognise anything as the Veda that does not state this law. The law must be impersonal, that is, must be what is not the view of a person, what is the real nature of the world. A man will function according to the law if he knows what the real law is.

47. There is no other place where the doctrines of the
Mīmāṃsā system are explained in a clearer way than in the Bhagavad-gitā. An abstract knowledge without relation to the realities of the world is of no purpose. To say that the Spirit has no destruction and that the material evolutes have an inevitable end and that as such one need not function, is a perversion of the real nature of the world. The individuals are neither disembodied Spirits nor dead formations of matter. The individual is a combination of both. There is knowing; there is functioning. Both are in the individual. The individual can do or not do or do in another way. No other individual circumscribes the possibilities of an individual. Yet the whole world is a unitary machine and man can function only within the framework of this machine. The totality of the world-machine limits the component parts of the machine, i.e., the individuals. After disposing of the prima facie view of the Spirit being free from destruction and the Matter being destined to end, the dynamic nature of the individual, combining in himself both the Spirit aspect and the Matter aspect (with Vision and function), is dealt with and the text concludes with the unity of this world as a machine. The text closes with emphasising this dynamic nature of the world, where the individual is limited by this unity. This is the only way in which the apparent conflict in the Bhagavad-gitā between the absolute freedom of the individual, described in the earlier portion, and the dependence of the individual on the Supreme at the closing portion, can be reconciled. There are frequent statements about attaining the Ultimate, the Supreme (the Para). This is the rhythmic movement in the world that is kept as the goal. “Evil” is only inaction, something which “is not”, and this “Evil” is due to want of correct knowledge about the true nature of the world. There is suffering on account of the blanks in the form of inaction, and such blank intervals in the continuum of activity must be filled up for restoring the perfect rhythm in the movement of the world-machine.

48. In the Vedānta, there is not much difference in its ultimate doctrine from what was stated in connection with the Sāṇkhya system except to this extent that while in the Sāṇkhya the element of ultimate unity is only hinted and not expressly stated,
this ultimate unity becomes the central theme in the Vedānta. It may be a cessation of the finity that is experienced, through the realisation of the infinity in the unity; it may be the essential unity in the diversity that is experienced (without a cessation of the differences). It may also be the realisation of the Ultimate unity that exists in the Infinite, which is Supreme in relation to the finity that is experienced with reference to the individuals (living and life-less), the finity being subordinate to the Infinity.

49. Philosophical doctrines are often inter-mingled with religious beliefs. They speak of the dissolution of the individual Self into the Brahmān or Supreme Self. They speak about the individual reaching the world of the Supreme Lord, about assuming His form, about abiding in His vicinity and about having conjunction with Him; such are the different gradations of the Final Release (Mokṣa). The Supreme as Male has a Female counterpart in the form of the World-Power (Śakti). Some speak of this Power as even superior to the Lord, and worship the Power independent of the Lord.

50. What is common is that there is no removal of a positive "Evil" from the individual or from the world in this process of reaching the goal, according to any system of thought in India. If there is a God, then the world is under His protection; if there is no such God, the world is a perfect machine with a perfect law functioning in it, with all the implements and agents within it for the repair of any defect. Even the original Adīṣṭa (the inscrutable factor) which is at the root of the conversion of perfection into an imperfection, is not a really positive factor; it is more the appearance of a blank in what is really a "Whole". The Final Goal is a return to the original real nature of perfection. It is an expansion so as to get the blanks filled up; there is no migration from one state into another, from one region into another. This migration is a popular way of putting such an expansion, the religious statement of what is philosophical.

51. The original state must be thought of as a continuum, as a uniform of a dualism of Matter and Life (Prakṛti and Puruṣa), according to the Sāṅkhya system; in the Vedānta there is a
further unification of these two into an Ultimate Absolute as Brahman. On account of a special collocation of the two, there is a disturbance in their respective uniform nature, and in this disturbance, there is mutual reflection of their respective nature one on the other. The physical matter is the product of such a disturbance in the Primal Matter (Prakṛti) and the Self as an experiencer is the result of the reflection of the Self in such a disturbed Matter. When the disturbance in the Matter subsides, the reflection of the Self on the Matter is also eliminated. On account of this reflection, there was an experience of the Self as only this reflection with limitations, and when there is the cessation of the reflection, there remains only the original pure Self, and Matter too becomes a Uniform.

52. This cannot be done through learning. Books and the process of instruction and study are only instruments. Ultimately, there must be some special training for the individual. This process of training is what is known as Yoga. There is a system of philosophy designated as Yoga System. But it is not a separate and independent system; it is common to all the systems. It describes the practical step to be taken for effecting the teachings of the other systems in actual life.

53. Yoga, as defined in the text on the subject, is the process of arresting (Nirodha) the functions of the internal organ (Citta-vṛtti). What is called the world is the pure Matter (Prakṛti) on which the pure Spirit (Paruṣa) is reflected in the disturbed state of the former. This disturbance in the Matter with the Spirit reflected on it, continues in a subject-object relation. There is neither a dead matter nor an immaterial Spirit in the world. There is a fluctuation in this subject-object relation and the process continues. This process of the subject-object relation is what is called the function (Vṛtti) of the internal organ (Citta). The internal organ is the individualised evolute from matter where there is a predominence of the reflection of the Spirit, and that is called the Buddhi (Intecllect) with an individualisation as subject (Ahaṅkāra), functioning through the mind and the external organs.

54. When there is such a complete arrest of the functions of
the internal organ, the pure Spirit whose reflection is the subject factor in the phenomenal world, is restored to its primal nature of being just a "Vision". Prior to such a complete arrest, there is the "uni-formity" (Sārūpya) of the subject-factor with the object factor as the functions. Such functions of the individualised subject, which is the reflection of the pure "Vision" on the uniform Matter, may be of the nature of a valid cognition (Pramāṇa), erroneous cognition (Viparyaya), unspecified cognition (vikalpa), sleep (Nidrā) and recollection (Smṛti).

55. There is a two-fold way of arresting such five-fold functions; one is voluntary, repeated study (abhyāsa) and the other is detachment (Vairāgya). There is another method, that of contemplation on God (Īśvara-parṇidhāna). Still another method is the training of the body and its functions through the practice known usually as Yoga, controlling the breathing operations. Even in this, the previous methods come in as subsidiaries. This methodical training of the individual consists of eight steps. It is a unified process of training the entire individual with his body and his mind.

56. There are three main physiological functions in an individual; they are the respiratory, the gastric and the sensory functions of the individual. All ailments are due to a disturbance in the equipoise of the three constituents of the body, relating to these function, being the Vāta (Air), Piśa (Fire) and Kapha (Water). The terms must be taken in their scientific sense and not in their ordinary, popular sense. The earliest four steps emphasise the control of the respiratory and the gastric functions, and the last four stages emphasise the sensory functions. But they cannot be detached from one another. There must be the training and regulation in food, daily routine, desires and aversions and all facts relating to the life of the individual. There is the unknown in this world, on account of the limitations of the individual, so long as the individual is only a reflection of the "Vision" on the Matter. When the disturbance ceases, the "Vision" becomes the full vision and the Matter becomes the entire matter, within the sphere of the "Vision".

57. Within the limitations of the life of the individual,
which is the normal and phenomenal life of the individual, the awareness extends to only a limited field. That is why there is the “Unknown” factor in the world. There is nothing that is “unknown” in itself. They are all being known; the only limitation is that they do not come within our conscious awareness. The Yoga is an extension and expansion of this field of awareness. It is a gradual elimination of the blanks in the sphere of man’s conscious knowing. During the course of such a training of the individual, one acquires various kinds of powers, that may be designated super-normal; it is not a process of actually acquiring something that was not there before. It is a process of expanding the sphere of awareness in such a way that powers that were in the individual, that were outside the narrow spheres of his awareness, are manifested to him. Such powers are only bye-products, and one shall not rest at that stage. Such a premature termination of training may even lead to dangers from such powers. Such powers are within the field of the functions. The powers may be manifested to him, but he may not be able to properly control and guide the operation of such new powers.

58. What is usually called a particle of matter may have the inertia element dominating; but it is in reality the store of immense energy. With this training, the individual becomes able to transfer it into that energy by suppressing the material aspect of that particle and thereby letting out the energy side in it. Similarly, what manifests as immense energy can be converted into an inert particle of matter. Gross matter can be converted into fine matter and vice versa; heavy matter may be made into light matter and what is light may be converted into heavy matter. The individual becomes “Master” of the phenomenal world and the phenomenal world comes within his influence. Space limitations vanish and one can reach any place at any time; presence and absence, appearance and disappearance: all such distinctions vanish. The individual is enabled to produce organic matter or to repair any damage to the organic body. Thus decay and death are removed from his body. According to the Yoga philosophy there is no termination to the physical body in consequence of the acquisition of the “perfect knowledge”; what is
terminated is the mutilation and death for the body and that is what is meant by the termination of worldly suffering for the "liberated".

59. Organic matter in the form of "Cells" is not an accidental evolute in the course of the evolution of "Dead Matter". There is no aspect of matter that does not have the "Life" factor in it; the only other philosophic alternative is that there is the dualism of absolute matter and absolute life, or a further monism of pure "Life". Man is a further stage in the evolution of "living matter" and possesses all the powers and possibilities inherent in the primal living matter; man is unaware of this immensity in himself. The goal is the vision, the realisation of this immense possibility inherent within himself.

60. Indian thought has the unbroken tradition of the existence of such individuals who had realised the fullness of the individual, and they are the Sages of the Vedas like Śunaḥśeṣa, Dīrghatamas, Bṛhaspati and the authors of poems relating to the "Person" (Puruṣa), the "Golden-womb" (Hiraṇyagarbhā) and "Creation". Yama, the mortal, had seen that fullness of the individual. The various Sages, the poets, whose poems are preserved in the Veda are known, in Indian tradition, to have had that "Vision" of the Ultimate truth, the absolute nature of man and of the world. Buddha had this "Vision". But when there arose in the Buddhistic tradition a doctrine of Buddha alone having seen the truth and of that truth being of the nature of a "Void", there started a systematic investigation, rationally, into the nature of the world, taking note of the traditions left behind in the earlier literature of the country in the form of the Vedas. To the Sages and the poets of the Vedas, the Goal was within the sphere of a direct vision, so far as tradition goes in India; in the later systems, the Goal may be only an abstraction arrived at by the application of the reasoning powers of man.
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