NANA PHADNIS
NANA PHADNIS
AND
THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE

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Foreword by
Prof. George M. Moraes

POPULAR BOOK DEPOT

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FOREWORD

This critical study of Nana Phadnis fills a long-felt want. It contains a full and thorough account of the conduct of the external affairs of the Maratha state by this great master of statecraft.

It has been truly remarked that the plains of Panipat were not more fatal to the Maratha Empire than the death of the Peshwa Madhavrao. For the struggle consequent on the ambition of Raghunathrao, the uncle of the Peshwa, to secure the succession for himself rocked the Maratha state to its foundations. In his efforts to realize his object Raghunathrao sought the assistance of the powers waiting for an opportunity to exploit the Maratha weakness, the English, the Nizam and Haider Ali, by offering them concession of territory. It is to the credit of Nana Phadnis that by his skilful diplomacy he detached each of these powers from its alliance with Raghunathrao, and rendered him innocuous. It is also noticeable how confronted with two enemies, the English and Tipu, each of whom was casting covetous glances at the territories of the Marathas, Nana tried to ensure the neutrality of the one, while he crushed the other. Then again, when Tipu attacked the English, Nana joined the latter and helped to bring about Tipu's discomfiture which resulted in the restoration to the Marathas of the territories which the Mysore rulers had wrested from them earlier. Finally, finding that the Nizam was turning a deaf ear to the repeated Maratha demand for the payment of the arrears of Chauth, Nana attacked and defeated the Nizam and compelled him to accept the humiliating treaty of Kharda.

Dr. Deodhar has brought considerable skill to bear on his description of the diplomatic finesse of Nana, pressing into his service all the sources available to him including the unpublished material. His work is fully documented, and is an original contribution to the subject of great value.

Elphinstone College,
Bombay,

20th December, 1961.

G. M. MORAES
PREFACE

Modern history has come to stress the need for adequate documentation for the facts it expounds and the reliability of the documents themselves. There is also a growing tendency to pay more attention to the forces lying behind men and events, atmosphere and attitudes and a host of elements that go to make up the individuality of a people. It is in the light of these considerations that I have attempted to examine and evaluate the subtleties of statecraft of Nana Phadnis in his conduct of the external affairs of the Maratha Empire.

The attempt involved a detailed study of the sources in different languages. English sources are of immense value for ascertaining facts and dates. English translates of French, Portuguese and Persian sources are also very useful as confirmatory evidence. “The Persian Records of Maratha History” are of unique value for ascertaining the corrections of the reports of the noted Maratha envoy Hingne at Delhi. Other thesaurus of information are the Marathi sources. Here the difficulty is not of inadequacy of material but rather of sifting and sorting, selecting and summarising the relevant facts. There are a number of ‘Daftars’ in Marathi lying unpublished. It was from one such ‘Daftar’, “The Bhanu Phadnis Samsthana Belbag Sangrah” that I could obtain eight original ‘Inam’ letters which appear in Appendix, while from “The Phadnis Daftar Parasnis Sangrah” preserved in the Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, I was able to obtain the ‘visiting slips’.

I express my respectful feelings of gratitude to my teacher Prof. Dr. George M. Moraes who inspired me with zeal for the study of the subject and placed his knowledge and experience at my disposal. I am also indebted to Shri S. N. Joshi and Shri G. H. Khare of the ‘Bharat Itihas Samshodhaka Mandala’, Poona, who always gave me their sincere support, guidance and encouragement. My grateful thanks are due to Dr. P. M. Joshi, Director of Archives and Dr. V. G. Righe, Archivist, Bombay, and to Dr. Y. B. Mathur, of the National Archives, New Delhi, for affording me facilities for consulting Mss. and works in their possession.

Y. N. DEODHAR

Bombay,
January 26, 1962.
INTRODUCTION

By the year 1760 the Marathas had despoiled the proud Moghul Empire, had swept like a whirlwind the four corners of Hindusthan, had struck terror in the hearts of their enemies and had valiantly vied for the mastery of the country. But the severe set-back suffered by them, in 1761 in the battle of Panipat, not only gave a rude shock to their ambitious designs, but resulted in the death of the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao.

Madhavrao who succeeded his father, was utterly dissatisfied with the interference of his uncle Raghunathrao. Differences between the Peshwa and his uncle, made Nana most powerful in the Peshwa’s administration. It was in his capacity as the Phadnis-cum-Minister of the Peshwa that Nana, in cooperation with Sindia, deferred the downfall of the Maratha Empire by about thirty years.

A critical estimate of Nana Phadnis’ work as the jealous guardian of the Maratha Empire in its last days, has long been a desideratum. Macdonald, Khare and a few others have written on Nana’s life but they do not discuss in detail the subtleties of his statecraft as seen from his conduct of the external affairs of the Maratha Empire. An attempt in this direction has been made by Dr. Choksey in his History of British Diplomacy, at the Court of the Peshwas, but the author has completely ignored Marathi sources which contain a mine of information on Nana’s activities. This work, it is hoped, will meet the long-felt need.

Nana was appointed Phadnis at the early age of fifteen. In the reign of Madhavrao, differences between the Peshwa and his uncle Raghunathrao, gave Nana extensive powers in the administration. From the relevant documents it appears that the hereditary appointment held by Nana was different from the post of Phadnis in Poona, to which he was appointed by Madhavrao. Narayanrao who succeeded Madhavrao was murdered in 1773 and Raghunathrao usurped the Post of the Peshwa. But Sakharam Bapu and Nana organised the ‘Bārbhāi’ and chal-
lenged his succession. Savai Madhavrao succeeded his father. Raghunathrao who became a wanderer took refuge with the English at Surat. The latter in a bid to defend his rights, captured Salsette and Bassein by force. Nana retaliated by enforcing a complete blockade of their positions till at last peace was restored by the treaty of Purandar in 1776. Thus we observe that the timid Nana showed a rare courage in co-operating with Bapu who was his political rival and a confirmed partisan of Raghunathrao.

These internal dissensions encouraged the enemies of the Marathas and the result was that the English and Hyder Ali sought to become supreme. Finding the English overbearing, Nana opened negotiations with the French envoy St. Lubin. Just then England was defeated by America in the international field and the Directors instructed the Bombay Government to support Raghunathrao. They decided to invade Poona, restore Raghunathrao to the Post of the Peshwa and oust Nana. But the venture met with defeat and in the Convention of Vadgaon, Savai Madhavrao’s succession was recognised as valid and legal.

From these developments it is evident that the English policy in India was always influenced by their position in the international field. They followed by turns the policy of non-intervention, balance-of-power, and aggression leading to acquisition. From Mostyn’s letter it can be stated that the English eagerly anticipated a collapse of the Maratha Empire even in 1773.

As a countermove to English designs, Nana persisted in his negotiations with St. Lubin and actually entered into a treaty with him, in spite of all opposition. Though St. Lubin was an accredited envoy of the King of France, in order to gain his own ends, Nana deliberately professed that St. Lubin was not an envoy and that his approach to him was merely intended to alarm the English. All this was calculated to misguide Moroba whose interference was an obstacle in Nana’s way. Though Nana concluded an entente with St. Lubin, it brought no results, as the French regiments could not arrive in time. It was
the British policy and not Nana’s professed attempt to alarm the English, that caused the Anglo-Maratha war.

Hostilities were started by the English against the Marathas and Nana displayed a rare organising ability by bringing into the Anti-British-Confederacy, every power in India, great or small, native and foreign, till at last, the English were defeated and peace restored by the treaty of Salbai.

While Sindia was conducting the peace-talks with Anderson, he was urged by the Peshwa to attend to the affairs of the Emperor Shah Alam who was anxious to entrust his administration to Sindia. This new work compelled Sindia to expedite the ratification of the treaty at all costs. Free from the work of the treaty of Salbai, Sindia took up the affairs of Shah Alam in his hands; and despite all impediments in his way, he succeeded in obtaining the patent Vakil-i-Mutalik from the Emperor Shah Alam. Innumerable letters exchanged between Nana and Hingne, the Maratha envoy at Delhi, clearly show that Nana was deeply interested in Sindia’s bold enterprise and that he was extremely anxious to support Sindia's cause at all costs and consequences.

Just at this time when Sindia was engaged in the affairs of the Emperor, the Maratha-Mysore war broke out in the South. The English promised Nana to make common cause against Tipu. Nana who always dreaded English treachery, feared that they would suddenly join Tipu against the Peshwa. In order to counter this possible danger on the part of the English, Nana requested them for their regiments against Tipu. But the English broke their pledge. It is believed that Nana was frightened when the English refused to help him against Tipu. But this is incorrect. From original documents it is clear that Nana was quite confident of defeating Tipu. All that he aimed at was to prevent a possible league between the English and Tipu. Soon after the English refusal to co-operate with Nana against Tipu, war broke out between the Marathas and the Ruler of Mysore. Tipu was defeated and peace restored by the treaty of Gajendragarh. But this was followed by Tipu’s attack on the English. It was now for the English to seek Nana’s assistance. Nana exacted full retribution from the English for their
late treachery, by tantalising them for a long time on flimsy excuses. Ultimately he joined the English in the Tripartite Alliance against Tipu and caused complete restoration of all the territories that were captured by the Mysore Ruler. But till the last, Nana prevented annihilation of Tipu by the English.

Hardly had Nana been free from the Third Mysore war, a fresh trouble was started by the Nizam, by refusing to pay the Marathas the arrears of Chauth. The Marathas attacked the Nizam and defeated him at Kharda. Even on this occasion, the English, who had promised the Nizam their help against the Marathas, broke their pledge. The Nizam’s policy of opportunism was thus rewarded by the English policy of non-intervention.

But the success at Kharda proved to be unfortunate, as it was immediately followed by the death of the Peshwa Savai Madhavrao. The result was a prolonged succession dispute which ended in the accession of Bajirao II to the “Gādi”. Differences between Bajirao and Nana made the latter utterly despondent. Nana however prevented the Peshwa from falling into Wellesley’s snare of a Subsidiary Alliance till his (Nana’s) death in 1800.
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<tr>
<td>ALS</td>
<td>Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Aitihasik Patravyavahar</td>
</tr>
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<td>CHI</td>
<td>Cambridge History of India</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Calendar of Persian Correspondence</td>
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<td>DYMRA</td>
<td>Delhi yethil Marathanchi Rajakarane</td>
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<td>HIS</td>
<td>Holkar Shahichya Itihasachi Sadhane</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRDPP</td>
<td>Imperial Record Department, Political Proceedings, New Delhi</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPY</td>
<td>Kavyetihas Sangraha Patre yadi Vagaire or Aitihasik Patre yadi Vagaire</td>
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<td>MSYK</td>
<td>Mahadji Shinde yanchi Kagadpatre</td>
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<td>NHM</td>
<td>New History of the Marathas</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>Peshwas' Diaries</td>
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<td>PDMV</td>
<td>Pararashtrache Durbarantil Marathyanche Vakil</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>Poona Residency Correspondence</td>
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<td>SPDD</td>
<td>Secret and Political Department Diary, Bombay Record Office, Bombay</td>
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<td>HSI</td>
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**N.B.:** — References and notes indicated by numbers and signs respectively are grouped at the end of each chapter.
Sphere of Nana's Activities
Chapter I

EARLY LIFE OF NANA PHADNIS 1742-72

Great men are the children of the present, heirs to the past, and architects of the future. The truth of this observation is borne out by the two outstanding personalities whose concerted endeavours deferred the downfall of the Maratha Empire by about thirty years—Mahadji Sindia, the venerated general, and Nana Phadnis, the celebrated statesman. The imperial structure whose foundations were laid by the great Shivaji had passed through vicissitudes which exposed its inherent weakness. The incompetence of Shivaji’s successors had led to the Generals and Ministers arrogating extensive power to themselves. The great Tarabai tried for a time to arrest the decline, but dissensions and disputes with Shahu led to the reins of power passing from the Royal dynasty to the hands of the Peshwa Balaji Vishvanath. Similar dissensions between the Peshwa’s successors Madhavrao and Raghunathrao, led to a further weakening of the Maratha polity.¹ It was at this critical stage that Nana Phadnis appeared on the scene to rescue and consolidate the power of the Empire.

Nana belonged to the illustrious house of Bhanus who held in heredity the responsible post of Phadnis of the Peshwa.² He was born on the 12th February 1742⁶ and was the son of Janardan Bhanu and Rukhmabai who came of the respectable family of the Mehendales.³ His great-grandfather Mahadji Krishnaji Bhanu was a chipluni Brahmin and originally a Mahajan of the village of Velas.⁶

Fortuitous circumstances brought the Bhanus and the Bhaps, the family of the Peshwas, together. Balaji Vishvanath Bhat who was destined to be the first of the illustrious line of the Peshwas lived at Shrivardhan with his brother Janoji Vishvanath Bhat.⁴ Shrivardhan was then included in the kingdom of the Siddhi who ruled from Janjira as his capital; the Siddhi suspected Janoji to be in league with the Angria his inveterate enemy, and carried him away to Janjira where he kept him
confined in a cell and had him ultimately thrown into the sea. He also suspected Balaji Vishvanath and issued instructions for his arrest. Balaji, therefore, sought refuge in the village of Velas, with Nana's grandfather Balaji Mahadji and his brothers Ramji and Hari. But it was not possible to resist the power of the Siddhi and so after some deliberation it was decided that all four of them should leave Velas. They took a solemn vow to go through together whatever fate was in store for them and started for Satara.

Hardly had the party approached Chiplun, when the news of their departure reached the Siddhi who despatched immediately orders to his Killeedar at Anjanvel to intercept them and arrest Balaji forthwith. The party was overtaken and the very next day Balaji found himself behind prison-bars at Anjanvel. More than fifteen days passed without the least hope of release of the prisoners. But the Bhanus persevered in their efforts and ultimately succeeded in bringing about the release of their companion and reaching Satara. This initial success joined together the two families with a close bond of friendship which endured for over a century.

Safe from the clutches of the Siddhi their next problem was to seek employment in someone's service. They learnt that one of the old acquaintances of Ramji Bhanu, Mahadji Krishnaji Joshi, had arrived at Satara. It was through his influence that they were introduced to the higher circles of the government of Tarabai. In the meantime Balaji managed to secure the post of Divan or Administrator under Dhanaji Janardan who was the commander-in-chief of Tarabai and was a personage of great importance. At about this time, too, Shahu Maharaja arrived from Delhi where he had been imprisoned by the Moghul Emperor.

Accompanied by Balaji Bhat, Balaji Bhanu, and Hari Bhanu, Dhanaji went to pay his respects to him. Shahu received them with great kindness and promised them his patronage. In his dispute with Tarabai regarding the succession to the throne Shahu was anxiously in search of some able counsellor who could secure his claims and get him established on the Masnud. Bahiropant Pingale, who was then the Peshwa had suffered reverses from Shahu's opponents and had thus demon-
strated his utter incompetence. Shahu dismissed Pingale and gave an opportunity to Balaji Vishvanath Bhat for the display of his abilities. He had enquired into the antecedents of Balaji and was sure that he had found the man of his choice. By his achievements Balaji impressed Shahu to such an extent that not only was he confirmed in the appointment but also praised and acknowledged as "a servant of unequalled valour and devotion." As Peshwa it was in the power of Balaji to make appointment to the office of Phadnis, the head of the accounts department. Balaji naturally appointed his friend for this post. Hari Bhanu, however, soon died having held the office for only four months. Balaji Bhanu was appointed to succeed him; but he too died in a faction fight at Delhi whither he had accompanied the Peshwa in 1719. Shahu was greatly afflicted by the death of Balaji Bhanu at Delhi. Balaji Bhanu's devoted and able services in the post of Phadnis had earned for him the royal affection, and in token of his great esteem the Maharaja bestowed on his heirs the gift of a Jahagir in 1719. The post of Phadnis falling vacant a third time, Ramji Bhanu, third of the enterprising Bhanu brothers, was appointed to succeed him. Ramji held the appointment for about five years and on his death, his son Baburao and nephew Janardan, father of Nana, were jointly appointed to the post. Being minors one Antaji Bhanu was assigned the task of assisting them, in their duties and on their coming of age, Antaji retired, leaving Janardan and Baburao in the post of the Phadnis. Janardan acquired great influence and respect in Court Circles where his merits were greatly appreciated. In 1756 he accompanied the Peshwa in an expedition to Northern India and was killed.

Nana thus succeeded to the hereditary post of Phadnis when he was just a boy of fourteen years.

The autobiography of Nana which is the first literary composition of its kind in Marathi literature and which has come down to us in his own handwriting is indisputably the most dependable document for ascertaining the facts of his life during his childhood and youth. It is evident from the autobiography that there was a strong religious strain in his make-up. He was fond of fashioning images with lumps of clay like the ones he
had seen in the temples and would make them offerings.\textsuperscript{24} The up-bringing of Nana in a social environment which was inherently religious, gave a heroic mould to his character which was in evidence on many an occasion, in the course of his illustrious career.\textsuperscript{25} At the age of four Nana was invested with the sacred thread, and the ceremony was made the occasion for overwhelming his father with gifts and rich presents by the Maharaja.\textsuperscript{26} At the age of ten he was married to Yashodabai who traced her descent from the ancient family of the Gadres.\textsuperscript{27} Hardly had he completed his fourteenth year when he escaped death in a fall from his horse.\textsuperscript{28} The first notable event in his career took place on 30th March, 1756, when he had the opportunity of accompanying the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao on an expedition to the Konkan.\textsuperscript{29} The care-free life of Nana was now speeding towards a new phase, when he received the unhappy news of the death of his father in Northern India.\textsuperscript{30} Facing the ordeal composedly he performed the funeral obsequies appropriate to the occasion, and was formally invested with his father's office and presented with the official robes of the Phadnis. This took place at Poona on 29th November, 1756.\textsuperscript{31} His constant association with his father had trained Nana for the post and within a short time he was able to display his talents in civil administration. His regularity, firmness and consistency which was tempered by prudence rarely associated with youth, won the admiration of all including the Peshwa.\textsuperscript{32} Frequent visits to the Peshwa's palace afforded him an opportunity to study the day-to-day administration, the intricacies of which absorbed his young mind and developed in him an exceptional insight into men and affairs. In 1757 the Peshwa, Balaji Bajirao, who had conceived a great affection for Nana, persuaded him shortly after his father's death to accompany him on a journey to Srirangapatam.\textsuperscript{33} About a year after his return from this expedition, his wife was delivered of a son who however died in a few months.\textsuperscript{34} Subsequently, accompanied by his mother and wife, he journeyed to the banks of the Godavari on a pilgrimage. He performed certain religious ceremonies there with a view to curbing his passion for woman, which was becoming uncontrolable.\textsuperscript{35} Having experienced some relief, he decided to repair to the Ganges, for the same purpose and on the 19th March 1760 he joined Sadashivrao Bhau who was on his expedi-
tion to Panipat where the memorable battle was soon to be fought with Ahmed Shah Abdali. From Panipat he sent a letter to Baburao Phadnis on 15th September 1760 reporting the failure of peace talks, a circumstance which shows that he was working as a reporter of the Peshwa on the occasion.

A detailed account of the great battle, left by him in his autobiography makes interesting reading because of the vivid details with which it is described. Nana criticises the innate failings of Sadashivrao Bhau and takes his followers to task for abandoning him in the hour of trial. He himself had been advised to seek safety in flight; but he felt it dishonourable, to leave the field. It was only after the disappearance of Sadashivrao Bhau that he turned his horse from the scene of conflict. As he reached the village of Panipat, he found to his consternation that his mother and wife whom he had left behind in the camp, had disappeared. With a heavy heart Nana started on his return journey to Poona, leaving behind all his belongings and clad only in a loin-cloth. He halted at Bukisarai for some time, and was relieved to learn that his wife had safely reached Jinji with the help of Verojirao Baraunkar. Nana joied her at Jinji where he spent some time, and then went to Dig where his friend Mahadev Purshottam Hingne prevailed on him to stay for over a month. Proceeding on his way to Poona, Nana heard at Seronj that his mother was among the prisoners in Abdali's camp, and so he wrote to Hingne, requesting him to make all possible efforts to trace her and secure her release. But it was not long before the news of her death reached him. He was so stricken with grief that for a long time he thought of renouncing the world and was on the point of setting out for Benaras, when he was persuaded by his friends to return home. Arriving at Burhanpur he met the Peshwa who was leading a large army to the succour of Sadashivraobhau at Panipat. His account of the rout of the Maratha forces was a great shock to the Peshwa who was stricken with grief at the loss of the flower of an entire generation, and immediately repaired to Poona with a heavy heart. Nana who had been able to escape from the field of carnage unhurt, was considered very lucky, and for this reason the Peshwa would not suffer him to leave his company. He was however permitted to proceed to the Narmada where he made mighty
charities and performed religious ceremonies in an attempt to forget his sorrow by devotion to the deity.  

The varied experiences which Nana had to encounter on his long journey illustrate fully the political conditions in the country. His narrow escape from the hands of the enemy, his frequent privations, his utter inability to secure adequate information of his brothers in distress, all these and other difficulties portend the sense of complete frustration which had overtaken the country.

Leaving the Narmada Nana was on his way to Poona, when he came to know at Parner that the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao had died at Poona on 24th June 1761. He was immediately called to Poona by Raghunathrao who received him with great respect.

Madhavrao who was to succeed his father was invested by the King at Satara with the insignia of Peshwa’s office. He was then seventeen years old and Nana was nineteen. From very early, an intimate friendship sprang up between the two.

The succession was however accompanied by internecine disputes; Raghunathrao trying to establish his hold on the young Peshwa Madhavrao. In the midst of the race for supremacy Nana was discharged from the office of the Phadnis by Raghunathrao. But Madhavrao soon worsted Raghunathrao and reinstated Nana on 2nd September 1763.

The ten years that followed the accession of Madhavrao gave a favourable turn to Nana’s political career. The new work which the office of Phadnis now entailed differed considerably from the duties of the old office which had become hereditary in the family of the Bhanus both in respect of control and authority implicit in that appointment. The duties of Phadnis now consisted of two parts: keeping accounts, audit, budget-estimate and administrative supervision at the capital of the Peshwa’s government termed Phadnishi, and similar work at the military camp of the Peshwa whenever the latter used to be on an expedition. Thus, the new appointment afforded Nana greater scope for executive control over the affairs of the Peshwa’s administration at Poona—a situation most favourable to the ambitious Nana. Moreover, dissensions between the Peshwa and his uncle afforded increasing opportunities for
Nana for arrogating to himself extensive executive powers which he could never have expected in the administration of the Peshwa Madhavrao under normal circumstances.

Nana's spartan life and the rigour of his administration also pleased the Peshwa and he allowed him to exercise plenary authority in the state. Thus it was no wonder that within a period of ten years Nana the Phadnis was transformed into the Minister-in-chief of the Peshwa.

In appreciation of his services Nana received a number of grants and presents from the Peshwas and other Maratha chiefs: Madhavrao made an Inam of the village of Wanvaje in his favour, in recognition of his devoted service to the Peshwa's administration; Raghuci Angria made him grant of the village of Velas and four other villages; Haibatrao Bhavani Shankar and Venkaji Girmaji gave him land at Menavli in consideration of his valuable services to them; Chimanaji Pandit Sachiv bestowed on him the village of Ambegaon in recognition of services to him of the Bhanu family and for the expenses of the annual 'Navmi-utsav' function; and finally Sadasiv Chimanaji Sachiv made the gift of the village of Rachatavde to Nana for personal favours he had received from him.

Thus it was that the period from 1762 to 1772 served Nana as a spring-board from which he could plunge into the turbulent sea of politics with a degree of facility so unique in content and consequence.

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1. K. V. Purandare, Purandare Daftar, part II, pp. 4-6; KPY, Lekh 14; Nilkantharao Kirtane, Marathyanche Bakharivar Tika, p. 32.
2. KPY, Lekh 494; Peshvyanchi Bakhar, (ed. K. V. Sohoni), p. 15.

* Three different dates are mentioned as the birth-dates of Nana. According to the horoscope published by D.G. Kelkar in his Raja Sangraha Nana was born on Magha Vadya 4, S.S. 1663 corresponding to 12th February 1742. Peshvyanchi Bakhar gives the same date, (Sohni, Peshvyanchi Bakhar, pp. 1-15), which is followed by Y. V. Khare in his Nana Phadanavisache charitra, (Nana Phadanavisache charitra, (ed. Y. V. Khare.), pp. 6-7.).

But Briggs who had access to certain original papers gives the date as 24th February 1742 without mentioning its equivalent in terms of the Hindu Era, (A. Macdonald, A Memoir of the Life of the late Nana Farnavis, Appendix II, the autobiography of Nana Farnavis, translated by Briggs, p. 161.). This difference of twelve days may perhaps be
accounted for by the fact that Briggs or the sources on which he depends mistook the date of 'Barse' for the date of birth. The barse ceremony takes place on the 12th day of the birth of a child. It is at this ceremony that the child receives its name.

K. N. Sane who has published the autobiography of Nana gives the month as Jyeshtha and not Magha, (KPY, Lekh 53) evidently basing himself on Nana Phadanvisyanchi Bakhar where Macdonald, its author, has it that the date of birth of Nana was 4th May 1741 equivalent to Jyeshtha 1663, (A. Macdonald, Nana Phadanvisyanchi Bakhar, p. 1). J. Brothers closely follow Macdonald (J. Brothers, Nana Farnavis, p. 1), while M. N. Mehta mentions only the month May 1741, (M. N. Mehta, Nana Phadnavis, p. 1.). The source of his information is not mentioned by Macdonald, Rawlinson, the editor, however observes with regard to the sources used by Macdonald in general that he 'used the original MSS, family records and verbose conversations with the relations and personal attendants of Nana Farnavis', (A. Macdonald, A Memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis) —Introduction.

* Sohoni, op. cit. p. 9.

Velas is a village on the Northern border of the district of Ratnagiri. Like Shrivardhan it is situated near the mouth of the river Savitri and is in the Mandangad Taluka. About one mile in length and three fourth of a mile in breadth, the village is surrounded by hills on the East, North and South, the West being guarded by sea which provides the popular route to Velas. It is sixty five miles by sea and one hundred and fifty miles by road from Bombay. It is well known for its vegetable produce, mangoes and coconuts. (K. B. Joshi, Mantryuttum Nana Phadnavis, p. 13, Sohoni, op. cit., p. 9).

4. KPY, Lekh 494.
5. Ibid., Sohoni, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
7. Sohoni, op. cit., p. 9; Joshi, op. cit., p. 54.
8. Khare, Nana Phadanvisache Charitra, pp. 4-5.
* The release of Shahu Maharaja by the emperor had considerable political significance in that it partitioned the Maratha Raj into two halves—one of Satara and the other Kolhapur. Thus the release unmistakably resulted in internecine dissensions as was anticipated by the emperor, (Purandare, op. cit., part II, p. 3, Sohoni, op. cit., p. 11).

11. KPY, Lekh 494.
13. KPY, Lekh 494.
16. Ibid., pp. 154-55; Mehta, op. cit., p. 3.
17. Sohoni, op. cit., p. 13; Mehta, op. cit., p. 3; Khare, Nana
Phadnavisache Charitra, p. 5; Joshi, op. cit., p. 155; Macdonald, A Memoir of the Life of the late Nana Farnavis, p. 2.


19. KPY, Lekh 494. Khare, Nana Phadanavisache Charitra, p. 5; Mehta, op. cit., p. 3.


22. KPY, Lekh 53; Joshi, op. cit., p. 277; Mehta, op. cit., p. 3; Macdonald, A Memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis, p. 2.

* The hereditary 'Phadnishi' given to Nana in 1756 was different from that entrusted to him by Madhav Rao on 2nd September 1763, at Poona, (Khare, Nana Phadanvisache Charitra, p. 10).

23. Macdonald, A Memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis, Appendix II, the autobiography of Nana Farnavis, translated by Briggs, p. 161; Joshi, op. cit., pp. 59-60; (Prof. Bhanu's observations on Nana's autobiography).

24. KPY, Lekh 192.

25. Ibid., Macdonald, A memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis, p. 22.


27. KPY, Lekh 53; Macdonald, A memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis, p. 2.

28. Ibid.

29. Baburao Phalke, Shinde Shahichya Itihasachi Sadhane, Bhag III, Lekh 337-38; (Nana goes to the Konkan on 30th March 1756).

30. KPY, Lekh 53; Joshi, op. cit., p. 227; Macdonald, Nana Phadanvisyanchi Bakhar, p. 6.


32. KPY, Lekh 53; J. Brothers, op. cit., p. 1; Macdonald, Nana Phadanvisyanchi Bakhar, p. 31.

33. KPY, Lekh 53.

34. Ibid.

35. KPY, Lekh 192; Aitihasis Sankirna Sahitya, Khanda V, p.5.


* Position of the Marathas at Panipat:
Reporting the failure of peace-talks, Nana says, "Suja-ud-Daula has been offering a hand for conciliation but he is cunning; Abdali has approached Delhi; Maratha strength is indeed adequate but it is faced with starvation; decisive struggle is now inevitable; our horses have forgotten the act of eating gram; such is the extent of scarcity," (SPD, Vol. 2, p. 31).

* Observing on the temper and ability of Sadashivrao Bhau, Nana says, "Bhausaheb is the prodigy of wisdom indeed, but on the spur of moment he suffers mis-conception of his own reason; he is the emodiment of intelligence, fortitude, valour and capacity to work but is proud in particular." (KPY, Lekh 192).
Nana criticises Bhausaheb's followers:

"The great officers of the left wing showed the example of flight on the right Sindh and Holkar stood aloof, and at last, the royal standard was seen to retreat. Around his highness there were now only about two hundred men left, and he looked stupefied as if unable to see what passed about him of one hundred thousand men, among whom were many officers of distinction, not one stood by his highness at such a moment though I had heard them repeatedly swear in the time of peace that rather than a hair of his head should be touched, they would each sacrifice a thousand lives if they had them; so that they turned out to be the mere companions of his prosperity and deserters in the hour of diversity": (Macdonald, *A memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis*, Appendix II, Nana's autobiography translated by Briggs). "Bhausaheb had left Parvatibai to the care of one Visaji Krishna Jokhdand who was given a force of five hundred 'Dhangars'. Bhausaheb had given Visaji strict instructions to the effect that if the battle was won, Parvatibai was to be taken to Delhi, but in case he (Bhausaheb) was lost in the fight, she was to be killed by him (Visaji) and then only, he was to seek safety in flight. But when the reports of the defeat of the Marathas, reached Visaji, he ran away, leaving Parvatibai to her own fate. One Janu Bhintada Khidmatgar took her behind his back and carried her from place to place, till at last she joined Malharrao Holkar and others at their third halt, on their way home from Delhi," (Sane, *Shrimant Bhausahebachi Kafiyat*, pp. 25-26). "When the pressure of the enemy became unbearable Malharji Holkar started to leave the field. All statesmen began to leave. Bhausaheb interrogated Sonjibaba who was about to leave, but he himself never returned," (Ibid., p. 24; Macdonald, *Nana Phadanvisyanchi Bakhar*, p. 6; J. Brothers, *op. cit.*, p. 3).

37. **KPY**, Lekh 53.
38. Ibid.
41. Macdonald, *A memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis*, Appendix II, the autobiography of Nana Farnavis, translated by Briggs.
42. **KPY**, Lekh 53.
45. **KPY**, Lekh 192; Macdonald, *A memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis*, Appendix II, the autobiography of Nana Farnavis, translated by Briggs.
47. Macdonald, *A memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis*, Appendix II.
50. **KPY**, Lekh 53; Macdonald, *A memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis*, Appendix II.
53. KPY, Lekh 53 and 494; Sohoni, op. cit., p. 13; Phalke, op. cit., Bhag III, Lekh 337-8; Macdonald, A memoir of the life of the late Nana Farnavis, Appendix II: Joshi, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

* The distribution of the work of Phadbni between Nana and Moroba, the former getting the office at Poona and the latter of the camp, confirms the existence of the two major divisions of that work, (ALS, Vol. I, pp. 297, 557, 596, 609, 612 and 623).


† Nana was called to Nasik by Raghunathrao against Madhavrao's wishes (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 34); Raghunathrao interferes with Madhavrao's domestic affairs (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 31); dissensions between Raghunathrao and Madhavrao reach a critical stage; Raghunathrao takes possession of the fort of Purandar (Rajwade, op. cit., Khanda XIV, Lekh 72, Nana's letter to Khasiwale); Raghunathrao makes an attempt to escape from confinement; Nana foils his plans and urgently solicits Madhavrao's orders for the extent of punishment to be given to Raghunathrao (ALS, Vol. III, pp. 1333-70; Madhavrao asks Nana to keep a careful watch on Raghunathrao and take all the necessary precautions (Aithasik Patravyavahar, Lekh 127, pp. 106-7); Nana was ordered to accompany Raghunathrao to the fort of Sinhgad (SPD, Vol. 20, No. 261; ALS, Lekh 780-91).

* We find Nana exercising considerable authority on almost all the affairs of the Peshwa's government: Nana submits to Madhavrao the estimates of the Peshwa's domestic and state expenses (SPD, Vol. 20, No. 275); Naro Devji of Bundelkhand requests Nana to issue orders for the grant of Phadbni of Bundelkhand in his favour (SPD, Vol. 29, No. 202); Madhavrao orders Nana to confiscate the house of Raghoram and Palekar for his treacherous attack on their master Mahadji Sindia—a work which had no concern what-so-ever with the duties of a Phadbni (SPD, Vol. 29, No. 229); Nana directs Janrao Dhalup to send his navy towards Basselin; thus the Phadbnis acts as C-IN-C (SPD, Vol. 36, No. 6; Akopant son of Sakkaram Bapu requests Nana for a permit to bring fuel from Medhe (SPD, Vol. 36, No. 308; Nana starts an arsenal at Poona (SPD, Vol. 37, No. 202), and Vol. 39, No. 108); Nana orders Nagopant at Surat to strengthen the garrisons situated along the coastline (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 6); Nana grants sanads to Balaji Govind Kher (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 25); Nana calls from Bundele the accounts of the credit of a lakh of Rupees ordered by Sadashivrao Bhau in connection with the battle of Panipat of 1761 (SPD, Vol. 29, No. 194A); Nana orders confiscation of Sindia's Yedalabad Saranjam but Madhavrao cancels his orders (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 103); Madhavrao instructs Nana to confiscate the 'Inam' of Appajiram the envoy of Haidar Ali as he failed to carry out the stipulations of the agreement (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 111); Nana intends to arrest Jivanram Shetyaji Atole and Jagjivanram Powaar for their failure to return the Peshwa's dues; Madhavrao allows Nana to take the step; thus the Phadbnis acts as the police officer in Madhavrao's absence (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 118);
Nana accepts by way of a present Rupees five thousand from Yadavrao of Bapujinaik but Madhavrao orders him to return the amount forthwith (Rajwade, op. cit., Khanda XIV, Lekh 73); Nana was authorised to confiscate the Saranjam of Rayaji Powar who left the camp without permission (Parasnis, Ithihas sangraha, Peshwe Daftarantil nyvduk Kagadapata, yadi, 12, p. 61); Nana sends estimates of expenses to Madhavrao (SPD, Vol. 20, No. 275); Nana sends ‘Dhotis’ and the dress of Madhavrao; thus the Phadnis works as the Peshwa’s personal secretary (SPD, Vol. 20, No. 280); Nana sends presents to Abdali under Raghoba’s orders (SPD, Vol. 29, No. 54); Nana protects the Peshwa’s people and property from the Nizam’s attack (SPD, Vol. 38, Nos. 91-92); Nana attends to the complaint of Pabalkar regarding sanitation (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 21); Nana arranges for the shelter to the needy near the Peshwa’s palace (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 26); Nana receives orders from the Peshwa for an early despatch of his dress (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 37); the Peshwa’s officers stationed at Satara, Nagar and some other places, were replaced as they were found to be the partisans of Raghoba; Nana receives this information; it shows how Nana was supposed to be in the know of every move by the Peshwa (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 91); Nana founds a factory in Poona for the manufacture of big guns; thus Nana acts as the Minister of Defence (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 117); Nana attends to the recovery of the Peshwa’s dues of the Thakurs of Yeola from the Thakurs of Poona (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 12); Sakharam Bapu’s letter to Nana states, “Narbekar’s daughter-in-law committed suicide which resulted in the social boycott of the family by the villagers; please cause relief through Ramshastri’s orders”; this shows how the Phadnis was concerned in keeping peace in the Peshwa’s state (SPD, Vol. 39, No. 137); some plastering of the idol of Shiva from the village Pashan suddenly fell down; Nana calls a meeting of the Pandits concerned to study and remedy the consequences of the event; this explains Nana’s responsibility in religious matters (Purandare, op. cit., Bhag III, p. 108); Nana conducts and supervises the ‘Koti Mrutinjaya’ ceremony done in favour of Madhavrao who was ill (ALS, Vol. IV, pp. 1465-66); one Balaji Janardan who was bringing provisions from Akola to Poona was obstructed near Vadgaon by Ramji Powar; the Phadnis had to intervene to set matters right (Rajwade, op. cit., Khanda X, Lekh 15-16).


* Extent of Nana’s plenary authority:

as the Peshwa Madhavrao was in need of huge funds for his expeditions, he directed Nana to bring about all possible economy in his expenses; accordingly Nana ushered an economy-drive which included the expenses of the Peshwa’s wife. Nana desired curtailment of the expenditure incurred by Ramabai on account of ‘Pan-supari’. This was resisted by her. But Madhavrao supported Nana’s policy and she had to submit (G. H. Deshmukh, Lokahitawadi Prakashiti, Aitihasik Goshti, Bhag I, p. 30).

Sakharam Bapu’s observations on Nana’s authority:
“It has been my earnest desire”, says Bapu in his letter to Nana, “to see you vested with full authority and controlling powers, in the Peshwa’s government; and I am glad to see it done by Madhavrao”, (SPD, Vol. 37, No. 46; Vol. 39, No. 103; Rajwade, op. cit., Khanda XIV, Lekh 73; Purandare, op. cit., Bhag II, p. 6.

* We find from the Belbag Daftar a number of other grants and Inams bestowed on Nana all round. A list of such villages and places received by him also appears in the Aitihasik Sankirna Sahitya, Khanda III, p. 135.
(a) Mouje Ghotavde Tarfe Ashra Adharane
(b) Mouje Ghotavde Pranta Pali
(c) Mouje Vengaon Tarfe Umraj
(d) Menavl with all relative rights
(e) Mouje Devdhe Tarfe Lanje
(f) Jahagir of Khadke from Jeur etc., (See Appendix ‘A’).

Chapter II

MURDER OF PESHWA NARAYANRAO AND THE SUCCESSION DISPUTE: 1772-75

Nana’s abilities began to manifest themselves in the administration of Narayanrao who succeeded his brother Madhavrao in 1772.¹ He was endowed with executive ability and the utter incompetence of his new master afforded him a unique opportunity to function as the de facto Minister of the Peshwa.² His statesmanlike qualities could not fail to attract the attention of Narayanrao.³ The result was that in spite of the advice given by Madhavrao before his death that he should regard Sakharam Bapu as the Minister-in-chief, Narayanrao attached himself everyday more closely to Nana.⁴ Nana’s views on matters ran frequently counter to those of the elderly Sakharam Bapu who was the Karbhari of the Peshwa,⁵ so that the situation was bound to land the former in an awkward predicament sooner or later. In the year 1772 the Maratha power had reached its zenith. All along the path of expansion it had grown into an object of envy and a source of embarrassment to the English in India.⁶ While the successor to the throne was too young and inexperienced to conduct the affairs of the state, the heavy but delicate task devolved on the shoulders of the youthful Nana.⁷ Happily for the Maratha State the two statesmen agreed to sink their personal differences and decided on a moderate policy towards the enemies of the Marathas. Accordingly Nana adopted a conciliatory attitude in his dealings with the English at Bombay. The result was that the relations between the two powers became somewhat cordial.⁸ Consequent upon the death of Madhavrao, the English who were eager to capture Salsette, Bassein and other islands in the vicinity of Bombay, commenced equipping their fleet under the pretext of attacking Gujrat.⁹ Rather than break with the English, Nana ordered the strengthening of the garrisons on the west coast from Bassein to Surat, as a counter move;¹⁰ nor was he less conciliatory in his dealings with the Siddhi of Janjira who was
casting covetous eyes on the fort of Raigad. Nana took no
cognisance of the Siddhi's intentions beyond taking measures to
strengthen the defences of the fort. Even in Northern India
where the Maratha armies were on an expedition collecting
revenues from the North Indian districts, he was content with
concluding a treaty with the Mughal Vazier on 17th June, 1772,
through the mediation of Sir Robert Barker.

Nana who had started maintaining his own authority
against all odds was by now actually functioning as the de facto
Karbhari of the Peshwa. His ability was observable in his
tactful dealing with Ghaziuddin Imad-ul-Mulk, a friend of the
Marathas who was anxious to be reinstated in the office of
Imperial Vazier and who was promised help by the young
Peshwa without consulting Nana. Ghaziuddin Imad-ul-Mulk
had however incurred the bitter hatred of the Emperor Shah
Alam by murdering his father and was now a homeless wander-
er. With a view to avoiding fresh complications Nana conciliat-
ed him by conferring a small Jahgir upon him in Bundel-
khand.

Hardly had he concluded Ghaziuddin's affairs, when a new
problem claimed his attention. The Raja of Tanjore had sent
his Vakil to the Peshwa requesting permission to raise an army
of ten thousand men. He feared an attack on the part of the
Nawab of Karnatak who was assured of military assistance by
the English. Nana and Bapu expressed their inability to com-
ply with the request, as both were anxious to maintain peace
throughout the Empire.

Nana was thus fairly successful in the conduct of external
affairs. But in the management of internal affairs he met with
almost insuperable difficulties which also impeded his effective
handling of foreign affairs at every step. The first event that
caused an open rupture between the Peshwa and Raghunathrao
was the question of the reinstatement of Visajipant Lele who
had been dismissed from the post of governor of Bassein on
charges of embezzlement of Rupees twenty lakhs. Encouraged
by Sakharam Bapu, a partisan of Raghunathrao, Lele approach-
ed the Peshwa for reinstatement; but his request was perempto-
riely turned down by Narayanrao. To make matters still
worse, the Peshwa, under the instigation of his mother Gopika-
bai, imprisoned Raghunathrao.\textsuperscript{18} This circumstance so much embittered the latter that he startedconcerting measures with the ambassador of Haider Ali to effect his own escape.\textsuperscript{19}

Another event that added to the degeneration of the situation was the economic depression. Ever since the mercantilists in England advocated a policy of favourable balance of trade by taxing their imports and subsidising their exports, foreign goods had been dumped into the Indian markets.\textsuperscript{20} Naturally the adverse balance of payments reduced the amount of money in the country and thereby the national income.\textsuperscript{21} Moreover, Indian tradesmen required foreign currency to conduct their trade. The English manipulated the rate of exchange of currency in their favour, which resulted in the steady disappearance of liquid-assets from the Indian markets.\textsuperscript{22} At the same time, as if to crown the misfortunes of Indians who had no knowledge of the economic developments abroad, the Bengal famine of 1770 considerably affected all the provinces including the Peshwa’s territory. Under these circumstances, the Peshwa’s treasury which had been depleted by his predecessor, could not be replenished.\textsuperscript{23}

The discontent caused by these factors was further intensified by the two unfortunate decisions taken by the Peshwa in respect of the Nagpur succession dispute and the grievances of the Prabhu community.

The death of Janaji Bhosala of Nagpur resulted in a civil war between the two brothers Sabaji and Mudhoji. Sabaji enjoyed the confidence of the Peshwa while Mudhoji was supported by Raghunathrao and Bapu. Their differences were, however, mutually composed and Mudhoji’s son Raghaji was recognised as the Ruler of Nagpur.\textsuperscript{24} Venkatrashi Gupte of the Prabhu community and his brother Lakshman were sent to Poona from Nagpur, to obtain the robes of the Sena-Saheb-Subah for Raguji from the Peshwa. While in Poona, these agents scented severe tension between the Peshwa and his uncle. They were instigated by Devajipant Chorghode of Nagpur, who was a partisan of Raghunathrao to make capital of the delicate situation in the Peshwa’s family. These Nagpur agents commenced their intrigues in favour of Raghunathrao thereby augmenting the Peshwa’s difficulties considerably.
Just at this time, the Prabhu community was agitated over the use of Vedic rites which had been refused to them by the orthodox section of the Brahmins. They had practised these rites ever since the days of Shivaji, and Shahu, in whose reign protests were lodged against their continuance by the orthodox Brahmins, but they had judiciously avoided any irritating innovation. But Narayanrao imprudently espoused the cause of the orthodox group, deprived the Prabhus of their Kshatriya status and made them adopt the practice prescribed for the Shudras. This was greatly resented. The members of the caste readily joined Raghunathrao in his plot to depose Narayanrao and place himself on the Peshwa’s seat.

Disgusted with the intrigues of the two Nagpur agents, the Peshwa issued prompt orders recognizing Sabaji Bhosala of Nagpur as the Sena-Sahab-Subah and ordered them to proceed to Nagpur.

In the meantime Tulaji Pawar, an influential servant of Raghunathrao, hatched a plot to murder Narayanrao. On 30th August 1773, after midday, the Gardis and Tulaji Pawar rushed into the palace, killed the guards on duty, and directly approached the Peshwa, demanding immediate payment of their delayed salaries. Apprehending danger to his life, Narayanrao tried to escape through a back-door. He ran to Raghunathrao and clasped him begging his protection. With drawn swords and deafening shouts the Gardis followed closely behind. Tulaji Pawar pulled Narayanrao from Raghunathrao and Sumersing Gardi hacked him to pieces. Many other innocent inmates in the palace were also done to death and consternation seized the Peshwa’s attendants. So ended the career of Narayanrao after a short administration.

While the terror was at its height Nana summoned a meeting of Sardars and other high officers of State including Sakharam Bapu and Haripant Phadke at the Budhwar Police Station. He posted loyal Balutes, police guards, at the gates of the city thus preventing all ingress and saving the city from possible plunder and arson.

Meanwhile the palace itself was given to pandemonium. Raghunathrao had promised to pay the sum of rupees five lakhs to the Gardis for murdering Narayanrao. They were now
clamouring for immediate payment. They further demanded
the surrender of three forts to them for their safe resort or in the
alternative, an additional sum of three lakhs. The Gardis threatened
Raghunathrao that if their terms were not complied with, they would place Ali Bahadur on the Peshwa’s throne. Order however was restored when Bhavanrao Pratinidhi, Maloji Ghorpade, and other influential partisans of Raghunathrao entered the palace and pacified the Gardis by meeting their demands. Raghunathrao was proclaimed master of the State and the Gardis withdrew from the palace. Raghunathrao gave presents to his partisans and appointed Chinto Vithal Rairikar as his Karbhari. He then despatched Amritrao to the Raja of Satara to fetch the robes of Peshwaship. It would appear that the Raja was unwilling to bestow the office on Raghunathrao and that the robes were forcibly secured from him by Amritrao. Probably it was on this account that Raghunathrao accepted them at an unknown place like Alegaon near the Bhima without any ceremony instead of receiving them with due pomp at Poona.

In the meantime Ramashastri, the highest judicial authority in the State, instituted an inquiry into the death of Narayanrao notwithstanding the opposition of Raghunathrao. Ramashastri found Raghunathrao guilty of murder; but as there was no other male member in the Peshwa’s family to claim the succession, most people acquiesced for the time being in the new administration out of sheer necessity.

On 8th September 1773 Nana, Haripant Phadke and others gathered on the cremation grounds and pledged themselves to challenge the claims of Raghunathrao. For the moment however, they feigned to fall in with his policy and accompanied him on his expedition against the Nizam. While in camp, Nana and Bapu organised a league known as the ‘Barbhai’ with the object of challenging Raghunathrao’s succession, protecting Gangabai who was then enceinte, and conducting the administration in her name, pending the birth of a child. Nana, who managed to return to Poona soon succeeded in taking possession of the Peshwa’s palace and imprisoning all the partisans of Raghunathrao. He was joined by Bapu and Parsharambha. Together they repaired to the fort of Purandar and proclaimed Raghunathrao’s investiture invalid.
Nana was now busy consolidating his own party. In order to safeguard the situation at Purandar he was anxious to secure the support of the Nizam and Sabaji Bhosala. He had received information from his agents that even though Sabaji and the Nizam were professing sympathy for Raghunathrao, they were not really in his favour. He urged Kale, the Maratha resident at Hyderabad to win over the latter to his side. At the same time, in order to prejudice Raghunathrao’s cause, he persuaded the Raja at Satara to declare that Raghunathrao was responsible for Narayanrao’s murder and to disown the robes of Peshwaship which he had seized forcibly.

All this while Raghunathrao was not idle, but was taking steps to strengthen his position. He secured an assurance of support from the Nizam and in return he agreed to waive the right of Chauth from the Nizam’s dominions. A treaty between Raghunathrao and the Nizam was signed on 18th November 1773.

But Nana was not daunted by this turn of events occasioned by Raghunathrao’s intrigues. Hardly had the treaty between Raghunathrao and the Nizam been concluded, when advices came from Nana’s secret agents assuring him that the Nizam was still inclined in his favour. Thereupon, Nana made frantic efforts to wean the Nizam from his new alliance and even offered to cede extensive territories to him. The Nizam agreed to abandon Raghunathrao, and met Nana and Bapu near Burhanpur where an exchange of presents took place. He pledged his support to the Barbhai and in return received the promise of the grant of the fort of Daulatabad together with Burhanpur and other places. The Nizam however was still manoeuvring to make the best of the bargain with the rival parties and was prepared to change sides once more, provided that the Nawab of Surat or the English undertook to guarantee the extension of his treaty with Raghunathrao; but neither of the powers could agree to stand surety.

On his part, Raghunathrao was also making desperate efforts to win supporters to his cause. He entered into negotiations with Haidar Ali of Mysore and concluded an agreement with him. Haider Ali compounded the arrears of Chauth by paying twenty-six lakhs of rupees and in return obtained
the cession of the three provinces of Madgewang, Ransutak and Chivdinrug.\textsuperscript{55} This was followed by a treaty under which Raghunathrao gave up all the territory between the Kistria and the Tungabhadra, seized by Madhavrao, and Haider Ali promised to espouse his cause.\textsuperscript{56} Raghunathrao’s immediate object in making over territory yielding an annual revenue of three fourths of a crore, was to crush his opponents, the Patwardhans and the Rastas,\textsuperscript{57} as they were the partisans of the Barbhai. He even went so far as to invite Haidar Ali to march on Miraj.\textsuperscript{58} At the same time he wrote to Muhamad Ali, the Nawab of Arcot, seeking his assistance.\textsuperscript{59}

Haidar Ali opened hostilities by attacking Bunkapur and Dharwar with designs on Bidnur.\textsuperscript{60} He himself captured Bellary, Kadepe and Curnool.\textsuperscript{61} His son Tipu took the forts of Shire, Mudgiri, Hoskote and Guramkonda,\textsuperscript{62} and together they pushed his conquests as far as Savanoor.\textsuperscript{63} Haidar Ali entered into an alliance with the Dutch ambassadors—Samuel Constantin and Charles Robert to secure their assistance.\textsuperscript{64}

Nana was aware of Raghunathrao’s treaty with Haidar Ali but was obliged to let him alone, for some time, as he was busy with the consolidation of the Barbhai.\textsuperscript{65}

Leaving the Tungabhadra, Raghunathrao proceeded to Raidurg. It was here that he came to know of the formation of the Barbhai organised by Nana, Bapu, Kale and others. Giving up his plan of proceeding to Arcot, he marched towards Miraj,\textsuperscript{66} on his way to Satara. Anticipating an attack on Satara or Purandar, Nana had issued instructions to Haripant Phadke, who spread out his forces from Gulbarga to Satara at such strategic points that Raghunathrao was completely confounded.\textsuperscript{67} He sent his agents to Purandar asking terms for an accommodation.\textsuperscript{68} He himself would have been captured but sudden aggression on the part of the English afforded him a chance to extricate himself.\textsuperscript{69}

Before ascertaining the details of this aggression, it will be interesting to note in passing, the difficulties which Nana had to face. Though efforts to capture Raghunathrao were being made, the position of the Barbhai was far from certain. The Peshwa had brought the Emperor of Delhi under his control.\textsuperscript{70} But the murder of his successor Narayanrao, left no legal heir
to the Maratha throne. Raghunathrao had been declared a usurper. There was thus a situation bordering on disorder in the Deccan. In Bengal, the position of the English was equally unsatisfactory.\textsuperscript{71} In fact, the whole of Hindustan appeared to be in a state of complete anarchy.\textsuperscript{72} Naturally, there arose a crop of enemies, ready to challenge the authority of the Barbhai. The Siddhi of Janjira had sent his representative to Poona to secure half the revenue of the districts taken by Madhavrao. He had also started negotiations with the Governor of Bombay who assured him of his assistance, in order to detach him from the Peshwa.\textsuperscript{73} The Vakil of the Raja of Tanjore sought military assistance against the English, but the Poona Government was unable to interfere.\textsuperscript{74} Realizing their delicate situation, the English seized Tanjore.\textsuperscript{75} Though Shah Alam had ceded Kora and Allahabad to the Peshwa and owed allegiance to him in 1772,\textsuperscript{76} he now requested Hastings to come to Delhi to regulate his affairs.\textsuperscript{77} Shuja-ud-Daula was trying to take the Doab which the Marathas had seized from the Rohillas.\textsuperscript{78} The Rohilla Sardars in turn were anxious to occupy Etawah and other neighbouring districts belonging to the Marathas.\textsuperscript{79} While the recall of the Peshwa's army from the North encouraged Hastings to grant Kora and Allahabad to Shuja-ud-Daula and thereby to challenge the Peshwa's authority.\textsuperscript{80}

This was the situation that faced Nana when his attention was diverted by the new English aggression. In the administration of Madhavrao the English had appointed Mostyn Resident at Poona, with the object of obtaining Salsette and the neighbouring countryside for the East India Company, by negotiation.\textsuperscript{81} But Mostyn became enthused at the murder of the Peshwa.\textsuperscript{82} He miscalculated the might of Maratha arms and completely misguided his masters. Immediately after the Peshwa's assassination he saw Raghunathrao and offered him British support for his cause.\textsuperscript{83} Later on he instigated the Bombay Government to attack Thana and Salsette. He met Hornby, the Governor of Bombay, and as a result preparations for hostilities against the Marathas were set afoot.\textsuperscript{84} Even at this late hour he wanted to humour Nana and thereby misguide him about the real intentions of the English, but he did not succeed in getting an audience.\textsuperscript{85}
Nana received the news of these doings from his agents who made known to him, as early as 10th December 1774, the English designs on Salsette and urged him to prevent Mostyn's impending visit to Bombay which was calculated to harm the Peshwa's cause. His efficient intelligence service kept him fully posted with the news of every move in the English camp in the quickest possible time. Even minute details such as the manufacture of big guns at Salsette did not fail to reach him. Nana however was biding his time and kept a close watch on the intrigues of Mostyn and his masters. He had anticipated some trouble from the English, since contrary to their pledges, they had declined to hand over Malwan. He conveniently avoided granting an audience to Mostyn as he was busy with arrangements about the removal of Gangabai from Poona. Yet even in the midst of chaos and confusion Nana would not face the prospect of losing Salsette peacefully. Apprehending an attack on that outpost he strengthened the garrisons there with a thousand troops.

The English who eagerly coveted Salsette were convinced that they could not obtain it except by force of arms. In spite of Nana's precautions they started moving their forces towards their objective, and threatened Bassein. Nana's position was most critical. He was urged to send additional forces as the danger to Bassein was quite imminent. They were sighted by the Marathas within a distance of fourteen miles from the Salsette creek. By ten o'clock on 10th December, their forces commanded by Brigadier General Gordon proceeded by land to Thana. The next day about five thousand foot-soldiers landed at Salsette and twelve thousand more were ready at Bandra. On 15th December, the English Communication service between Salsette and Bombay was completely interrupted by the Marathas as the English had openly started hostilities against them. Simultaneously Nana took measures to establish several stations upon Parsik, at which relays were posted to carry news expeditiously. Nana also successfully foiled an attempt to bribe Bhawani Kadam, the killedar of Thana. Even so the Maratha strength was thoroughly inadequate to meet the English attack. On 28th December, the fort of Thana was taken by storm. Varsova, another fort, fell to a separate force, under the command of Lt. Col. Keating,
while the island of Karanja also surrendered. Even Uran had passed into English hands. Thus, in spite of Nana's arrangements the government of Bombay secured by a bold stroke, the island of Salsette which was their prime object.

Nevertheless Nana remained undaunted in his endeavours. He ordered a strict blockade of English trade and cut off all supplies reaching Bombay from the west coast. All exports from Bombay to Pen were stopped, and trade with Surat was intercepted. The move proved so effective that the English had to repent of their hasty action, and thought of relinquishing their plans. Nana pressed home the advantage relentlessly and in order to intensify the harassment, authorised Naro Anandrao to collect revenue from the villages under the jurisdiction of the English. Strict orders were also issued to confiscate the Mahals of the Gaikwad who had espoused the English cause.

In the meantime news reached Nana, that Poona itself was the immediate target of a joint attack by the English and Shuja-ud-daula. He directed Janrao Dhulap who was then near Revdanda to counter attack, by threatening Bombay. He offered special rewards of rupees twenty-five thousand for the destruction and of rupees ten thousand for setting fire to each English warship. He also announced rewards of sums ranging upto rupees ten thousand to each unit of the Maratha navy that would attack Bombay successfully. These inducements had the desired effect and the English forces were confused at the vigorous attacks of the enemy.

In addition to these measures Nana organised a band of fishermen of Belapur and directed them to sail to Bombay and set on fire the houses near the fort. The complete blockade of English trade accompanied by the unprecedented disturbances engineered by Nana, in the heart of the English settlement at Bombay, opened Mostyn's eyes who wrote to Nana stating that the English advance was a countermove to an anticipated attack on Salsette by the Portuguese. This appeared to bear at least a semblance of truth, for in fact, on 12th December 1774, Nana had received information that the Portuguese were moving for such a venture. Mostyn's explanation was accepted and hostilities ended after only two months.
Nana had clearly outwitted Mostyn's machinations, but he had not slackened his endeavours in maintaining his intelligence—service absolutely alert to the movements of the English as hitherto.\textsuperscript{121} He now directed his attention to Raghunathrao, his primary endeavours being to win over Sabaji Bhosala. With this end in view he arranged with Bapu to confer on him the unique honour of Sena-Saheb-Subah.\textsuperscript{122} Raghunathrao who had by this time returned to Pandarpur was busy attempting to wean Sind'a and Holkar away from the Barbhais.\textsuperscript{123} Realizing his inability to make any progress in this task he employed a ruse on Pethe, the Maratha commandant, and killed him at Kasegaon.\textsuperscript{124} But the Kasegaon treachery proved to be a turning point in Raghunathrao's career. It provoked Nana despatching a huge army under Phadke, Sindia and Holkar with the object of capturing him.\textsuperscript{125}

In the midst of these developments fortune smiled on Nana and the happy news arrived from Purandar of the birth of a son to Gangabai on 18th April 1774.\textsuperscript{126} The superstitious and politically ebullient elements envisaged a happy augury in the birth of a son later on known as Savai Madhavrao. This event dealt a crushing blow to Raghunathrao's ambitions.\textsuperscript{127} When only forty days old, the child received the robes of Peshawaship from the Raja at Satara on 28th May 1774.\textsuperscript{128}

The birth of a legitimate heir to the throne at that critical juncture not only changed the complexion of Nana's political career but brought him to the political forefront. It utterly disheartened Raghunathrao who immediately opened negotiation.\textsuperscript{129} Raghunathrao's partisans however were still hopeful for the future and a plot was presently unearthed to murder the infant heir together with Nana, Bapu and Gangabai. But Nana rushed to Purandar in time and foiled the design of the conspirators.\textsuperscript{130}

Notwithstanding Nana's opposition, Bapu and Raghunathrao met in January 1775 at the instance of Sindia and Holkar.\textsuperscript{131} But the effort at reconciliation fell through and Haripant Phadke persuaded Raghunathrao and inflicted on him a crushing defeat at Adas on 17th February 1775, Raghunathrao's army was completely routed\textsuperscript{132} and he himself fled to Surat, where he entered into a treaty with the English.\textsuperscript{133}
Raghunathrao had formerly shown a hesitation to cede Salsette to the English. He now gave them territory yielding eighteen lakhs of rupees revenue. As a result of considerable detachment of European Infantry and sepoys with a large train of artillery embarked at Bombay and sailed for Surat in March 1775. Hornby seems to have been encouraged to conclude the treaty with Raghunathrao because he believed that Nana had been deserted by Sindia and Holkar. In his letter to Hastings dated 30th April 1775 Hornby said, "we are now assured that Sindia has actually entered into engagements for assisting Raghunathrao; Tukoji Holkar, it is also asserted will never act against Raghunathrao and Fattesingh is entering into engagements with him."

When Nana received the news of the treaty of Surat he was incensed at the rank opportunism of the English. He made up his mind to capture Raghunathrao and clinch the issue. But for that purpose he was in need of the co-operation of Sindia and Holkar; and he was at a loss to account for their vacillating attitude. The truth was that both had served Raghunathrao as their master and it was now difficult for them to attack him. Hence they had decided to remain inactive.

But such an attitude incensed Nana who had agreed to make a grant of Sindkhed to Sindia for co-operating with Haripant Phadke in the pursuit of Raghunathrao. After his defeat at Adas, Sindia and Holkar found Raghunathrao's situation desperate, Sindia prevailed on Nana to pay Raghunathrao rupees fifteen lakhs in cash and a further sum of rupees fifty thousand for personal expenses as an act of conciliation. But Raghunathrao proved incorrigible. Sindia thereupon opened negotiations with Nana through Parsharambhau. On 3rd of May, Holkar also wrote in a similar vein. As the common cause demanded the sincere co-operation of all these, a meeting was arranged through Parsharambhau. As a result of this conference on 10th September 1775 Nana and Sindia took an oath to join hands; Holkar followed suit. Having secured the allegiance of the two great chiefs, Nana felt himself equal to face any eventuality.

With the assurance of their support, Nana made considerable advance in the fulfilment of his policy. He was now absolutely alert to the machinations of the English, and obtained
detailed information from his reporter Wamanrao Patwardhan regarding the movements and plans of the Bombay Government.\textsuperscript{147} Hornby had acted throughout merely on the advice of his council.\textsuperscript{148} Hastings had no knowledge of the Bombay developments till the month of March 1775. The Regulating Act of 1773 had vested supreme authority in the Governor General and the aggressive measure adopted without consulting him, provoked severe condemnation.\textsuperscript{149} Hastings was particularly disturbed as Hornby's policy was likely to involve the English in a rupture with Sabaji Bhosla who was Raghunathrao's enemy and Hastings own neighbour.\textsuperscript{150} He wrote to the Governor at Bombay to withdraw the forces that were supporting Raghunathrao's cause.\textsuperscript{151} The Bombay government therefore deputed Taylor to Calcutta to explain their conduct before the Supreme Council. In his convincing argumentation, Taylor elucidated the comprehensive implications of the measures adopted by the Bombay Council and emphatically asserted, that "should the success of the confederates at Poona result in the total depression of Raghunathrao, the very first thing they would do would be to enrich themselves by the collection of the Chauth." The reduction of Tanjore had caused great heart-burning at Poona. The safety and tranquility of the Company's territories would be insured for a longer time by not suffering the Barbhai to predominate.\textsuperscript{152}

But the Supreme Council proved adamant and remained unmoved by Taylor's advocacy.\textsuperscript{153} In his letter to the Governor and the Council of Bombay, Hastings stated, "our duty imposes upon us the painful necessity of declaring that we wholly condemn the measures which you have adopted, that we hold the treaty which you have entered into with Raghunathrao invalid, and the war which you have undertaken against the Maratha state, impolite, dangerous, unauthorised, and unjust. We solely protest against you for all the consequences and peremptorily require you to withdraw the company's forces. It is our intention to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Maratha state at Poona, as soon as possible."\textsuperscript{154}

Simultaneously, in a letter to Nana and Bapu, the Governor General stated that he had issued instructions to the Government of Bombay to stop the war with the Maratha Gov-
ernment and to withdraw the army sent to help Raghunathrao and informed that he was sending Col. Upton to treat with them.\textsuperscript{155} This move was appreciated by Nana who was willing to settle his differences with the English even at that stage, probably on account of the duplicity of the Nizam, the death of Sabaji Bhosala and the disturbing developments which had occurred in his own league, the Barbhai.\textsuperscript{156} He wrote back to Hastings on 13th October 1775.\textsuperscript{157} Nana would have accepted the terms offered by Col. Upton had they been indicative of a spirit of sincere reconciliation. But Hornby had succeeded in concluding a treaty with Fattesing Gaikwad of Baroda which secured the rear and the supply of provisions to the army; Mudhoji, by the death of his brother Sabaji now enjoyed undisturbed possession of the Bhosala’s dominions; while Appaji Ganesh, then in charge of Ahmedabad was in treaty with Raghunathrao to whom he promised the surrender of Ahmedabd. Finally the conduct of the Nizam co-operated with other events, to give the English a perfect assurance for conducting their engagements with Raghunathrao to a successful issue.\textsuperscript{158} All these conditions were a background to the terms offered by Col. Upton.\textsuperscript{159}

When Nana received Col. Upton at Purandar on 13th December 1775, the chances of a settlement seemed quite bright.\textsuperscript{160} But Upton insisted on all the chiefs of the Maratha state being assembled to sign the treaty.\textsuperscript{161} This demand was rejected by Nana, as it could not be complied with, without danger to the tranquility of the state. Upton then indicated that Salsette should be retained by the English because it was then in their possession and that Bassein should be given to them in addition; Surat comprising twenty-eight districts which was ceded to them by the Gaekwar was also to be allowed to be retained. Raghunathrao should be accepted as regent to the minor Peshwa and the Peshwa should pay rupees fifty lakhs to the English for the camp-equipage supplied to Raghunathrao.\textsuperscript{162} On 6th of March Col. Upton gave presents to Nana and Bapu but the negotiations proceeded at a very slow pace.\textsuperscript{163} These prohibitive terms could not fail to disappoint Nana and influence his general attitude towards the English.\textsuperscript{164}

While Nana was endeavouring to arrive at an honourable compromise with the English, the news of sudden disturbances
in the Konkan on the part of Sukhanidhan a Kanoji Brahman reached him changing his whole attitude to the negotiations. The Bombay government had given shelter to one thousand adherents of Sukhanidhan who was claiming to be Sadashivrao Bhau of the Panipat fame and threatening to unleash a sanguinary war against the Peshwa. Nana accepted the terms as a tentative measure; Bapu then immediately addressed the Governor-General requesting him to order the Bombay Government to withdraw their forces from Raghunathrao. Nana also wrote to the Governor General proposing that the English should restore the island of Salsette to the Marathas, being the ancestral heritage of the Peshwa. Bapu also informed the Governor General that the Maratha forces had been ordered to stop further acts of hostility and asked for a reciprocal gesture on the part of the English. Accordingly Hastings directed Col. Upton to issue strict orders to every Englishman prohibiting him from supporting Raghunathrao.

In the meantime the intelligence of the peace-talks reached Raghunathrao who wrote to the Governor General expressing his surprise at the turn which events had taken. But the English were little interested in his affairs. They were espousing his cause with the ulterior motive of capturing the entire Maratha kingdom in anticipation of the death or deposition of Raghunathrao. Notwithstanding his protests the parties signed the treaty at Purandar.

Nana was incensed when he knew that the Bombay Government was still supporting Raghunathrao. He once again protested against the policy of the English of Bombay, and Hastings was left with no other alternative but to issue unequivocal orders peremptorily directing the Governor and the Council of Bombay to compel Raghunathrao to quit the Company’s dominions and to obey implicitly the stipulations of the treaty of Purandar. Nana could now direct his attention to the affairs of Sukhanidhan, the ‘Indian Simmnel’, which had assumed grave proportion in the Konkan territory. He succeeded in overpowering Sukhanidhan, who was ultimately captured by Raghujl Angria and brought to Poona by Sindia where he was tried before a committee of judges and condemned to death.

Nana had been well posted with information respecting
the clandestine co-operation which Hornby and his Council were extending to Sukhanidhan.\textsuperscript{177} He strongly protested to the Governor General but in spite of these protests, the Bombay Government still endeavoured to integrate the armies of Raghunathrao and Sukhanidhan and when the latter was captured by Angria, they demanded that he be surrendered to them. They even sent their servant Abdul Guny to investigate and see if he was really the person he was claiming to be.\textsuperscript{178}

It is to the credit of the ‘Barbhai’ that all their charges against the Bombay Government were accepted by Col. Upton and Hastings.\textsuperscript{179} This interference of the Bombay Government in the Maratha affairs would have surely imperilled the Maratha State had not Nana and Bapu outmanoeuvred Mostyn’s machinations in time.\textsuperscript{180}

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2. SPD, Vol. 39, No. 156.
5. ALS, 1234.
7. ALS, Lekh 1234, 1235, 1238.
11. SPDD, No. 13, p. 81.

* The Siddhi of Janjira:*

The Siddhis came from the East Coast of Africa. Under Bahamani Sultanate it was a fashion to bring into India, Abyssinians, and other Africans and employ them in their service. When the island of Janjira was conquered by Sultan Ahmed Nizam Shah in 1490 he appointed an Abyssinian as its Governor and thus began the long line of its alien rulers. The Nizam fell in the later decades of the 16th century and the Siddhi Admirals became virtually independent. Though Shivaji captured considerable portion
of the Siddhis territory, Janjira proved adamant. Fall of Raigad and the disintegration of the Maratha state encouraged the Siddhis. In 1701 he made an attack on Alibag. It was in 1714 that a joint attack by the Siddhis, the Portuguese and the Moghul Subhedar on Angriya's territory was repulsed with the help of the Peshwa Balaji Vishvanath. The Siddhis were frequently attacked by the Marathas till at last a treaty was concluded by which the island forts of Janjira, Kansa and Underi remained outside Maratha influence and the Siddhis became a tributary of the Maratha State. It went under British control in 1802 and finally became a part of independent India in 1947 (V. G. Dighe, *Peshwa Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion*, pp. 83-84; D. R. Banaji, *Bombay and the Sidis*, p. 3).


The recall of the Maratha armies from in North India was a political blunder as it resulted in impairing the prestige of the Marathas in Rohilkhand, Delhi, Agra and the neighbouring districts and at the same time encouraged Hastings' ambition, (ALS, Lekh 1232; CHI, Vol. V, p. 215).

13. ALS, Lekh 1242.
15. SPDD, No. 14, pp. 56-61.
17. SPD, Vol. 35, No. 5; SPDD, No. 14, p. 92; ALS, Lekh 1234, 1235, 1238.
23. ALS, Lekh 1242, 1243.
24. ALS, Lekh 1242-43.
25. ALS, Lekh 1232.

Correct date of the murder of the Peshwa Narayanrao:

The event is stated to have taken place on different dates by different authors. Forrest gives 18th of August 1773; Calendar of Persian Correspondence (Vol. IV, No. 552) says, "Intelligence has just been received that on 15 Jumada II (3rd September 1773) Narayanrao was assassinated by the orders of his uncle"; according to Khare, (ALS, Lekh 1232) the murder was committed on Bhadrapad Shudha Trayodashi, S.S. 1695 corresponding to 30th August 1773; Khare's account has been confirmed by Mostyn's report (Gense & Banaji, the third English embassy to Poona, Mostyn's Diary and Letters, pp. 199-200). Thus 30th August 1773 was the correct date of the murder of Narayanrao.


Narayanrao's character:

Historians indulge in unkind criticism of Narayanrao's character: Forbes says, "a weak indolent prince destitute of all talent and resolution" . . . "the enfeebling pleasure of the harem had early seduced him" . . . "a slave of sensuality he lavished immense sums on dancing girls (James Forbes, Oriental Memoirs, pp. 299-301) while Luard condemns him as "a weak man given over to sensuality" (CHI, Vol. V, Chapter XV, p. 254). Forrest describes Narayanrao as "without the least share of judgement and wholly devoted to low vices and pleasures" . . . (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 251).

But such observations appear to be one-sided. According to others he was not so bad as he has been made out to be. The "Tarikh-I-Ibrahimkhan" observes that "owing to his tender age he committed various acts that produced an ill-feeling among his adherents both great and small at Puna" (H. M. Elliot & John Dowson. A History of India as told by its own historians, Vol. VIII, p. 257, (article "Tarikh-I-Ibrahim" translated by Major Fuller and edited by Dowson). Grant Duff agreeing with the above observations says, "of Narayanrao little need be said, except to contradict unjust calumnies. His follies were those of a boy, but the feelings and interest of a party blackened them into crimes. He was affectionate to his relations, kind to his domestics and all but his enemies, loved him (Duff, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 250). Khare & Sarde-sal are also of the same opinion (ALS, Vol. IV, Lekh 1243; Sardesal, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 23).

27. ALS, Lekh 1232.
28. Sohoni, op. cit., p. 84.
29. ALS, Lekh 1259.
* Gardi, means a guard. The connotation of the term guard appears to be correct from the names of the Gardis which included men of various faiths, e.g., Sumersing, Mohamud Yusuf, Tulaji Pawar etc. Probably the term Gardi in Marathi is a derivation from the Portuguese word ‘Guarda’ or the English ‘Guard’ (Sohoni, op. cit., p. 84. footnote 6.).

30. ALS., 1261, 2037, 2044 & 2049.
35. ALS, Lekh 1232.
36. Ibid., Lekh 1270.

* Nana & Bapu:

We have seen already that Bapu, the Peshwa's Karbhari, was Nana's political rival. It was Bapu who had given his consent to Raghunathrao for putting the Peshwa Narayanrao in prison. Nana who had come to know the plot of confining Narayanrao had given a hint to the latter to guard against the danger. It was thus most risky for Nana to confide in Bapu who was suddenly changing sides and designing against Raghunathrao. In view of the personal rivalry that existed since long, between Nana and Bapu, the former would have been fully justified if he had declined to extend his co-operation in the formation of the Barbhari that aimed at challenging Raghunathrao's succession. But the timid Nana displayed rare courage in co-operating with Bapu in his most dangerous venture (B. H. Patwardhan Ambekar, Harivamshachi Bakhar, p. 40; ALS, Lekh 1260; Purandare, op. cit., Bhag II, pp. 5-13.

39. SPD., Vol. 35, No. 2; Vol. 10, No. 87; Vol. 5, No. 9, 12, 28; ALS, Lekh 1322; Mehta, op. cit., p. 20.
41. Ibid., No. 29 & Vol. 36, No. 5.
42. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 12.
43. KPY, p. 230.
44. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 5, 8, 9, 10, 12.
46. SPD, Vol. V, No. 32.
47. Ibid.
50. SPD, Vol. 5, No. 30; V. C. Chitale, Pethe Daftar, Bhag II, Lekh 96.
54. ALS, Vol. VI, p. 2741.
60. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 283.
62. Ibid., p. 2742.
64. Anonymous, An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay by the English East India Co. and of the Rise and Progress of the war with the Maratha Nation, pp. 68-72.
66. ALS, Lekh 1233.
67. Ibid., Lekh 1329.
69. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 44, 46, 54.
72. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 381.
74. SPDD, No. 14, pp. 55-61.
75. CPC, Vol. IV, No. 552; D. B. Parasnis, Tanjavarche Rajagharane, p. 91.
77. Ibid., Vol. IV, No. 612.
78. Ibid., No. 230, 584, 613; Sarkar, Fall of the Moghul Empire, Vol. III, pp. 57-58; SPD, Vol. 29, No. 337-43.
79. CPC, Vol. IV, No. 641.
82. ALS, Lekh 1232.
83. SPDD, No. 14, p. 84; ALS, Lekh 2001.
84. SPD, Vol. 35, No. 28; ALS, Lekh 1232.
85. Gense and Banaji, op. cit., p. 304.
87. SPD, Vol. 35, No. 3.
88. Ibid., No. 56; ALS, Lekh 1232.
90. Ibid., No. 17.
91. Ibid., No. 47.
93. SPDD, No. 14, p. 88.
95. SPDD, No. 14, p. 88.
96. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 44, 46, 54.
99. Ibid., No. 19.
102. Ibid., No. 26.
103. Ibid., No. 62.
104. Ibid., No. 128.
105. Ibid., No. 14.

* Salsette:

Salsette island was occupied by the Portuguese in the 16th century. In the year 1662, the English demanded it as a part of the marriage gift of the queen of Charles II; the Portuguese disagreed to the transer and held it till 1739 when it was taken from them by the Marathas. In the campaign of 1774 the English possessed it and finally annexed it in 1782-83 by the treaty of Salbai, (The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XXI, p. 411; G. G. Nalk, Sashtichi Bakhar, p. 29; Forbes, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 284.).

108. SPD, Vol. 35 (Introduction)
111. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 108, 111, 123, 125, 129, 133, 139 and 151.
112. Ibid., Vol. 35, No. 203, 205 & 208.
113. Ibid., No. 206.
114. Ibid., No. 9.
115. Ibid., No. 48.
117. SPD., Vol. 5, No. 74.
119. SPD, Vol. 35, No. 18.
120. Ibid., No. 207.
121. Ibid., Vol. 5, No. 74.
124. Ibid., Vol. 5, No. 43.
125. ALS, Lekh 1428; SPD, Vol. 5, No. 68.
126. SPD, Vol. 5, No. 45; CPC, Vol. IV, No. 1997; ALS, Lekh 2026; Elliot and Dowson, A History of India as told by her

128. SPD., Vol. 5, No. 49; Sohoni, op. cit., p. 92.
130. ALS, Vol. IV, Lekh 1405.
131. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 2283.
134. Ibid., p. 207.

* The policy of the Bombay Government.

In the reign of Madhavrao in 1769 an embassy was sent to him by Bombay Government. In their letter to their envoy Mostyn, they declared, "the growing power of the Marathas is a subject much to be lamented and has not failed to attract our attention as well as that of the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras in as much that nothing either in their power or ours would be omitted to check the same as much as possible." Madhavrao died in 1772 but Mostyn continued in Poona to watch further developments. (Forrest, op. cit., pp. i-xii and 212, 233 & 264; SPDD, No. 14, pp. 87-88; SPD, Vol. 5, No. 60 & 65. Forbes, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 307; SPD, Vol. 36, No. 257-58).


* The places ceded to the English by the treaty between Raghunathrao and the English East India Co. and that between Raghunathrao and Fattehsing Gaikwad were as follows: (i) Salsette with Karanja, Hog island and Canny; (ii) Bassein and its dependencies; (iii) Olpad; (iv) Jambusar; (v) Broach; (vi) Chikhli (Surat); (xii) Varilav (Surat); (viii) a 'mod' adjoining Broach made over by the Peshwa Raghunathrao for the payment of the subsidy . . . the first seven parts yielding a revenue of Rs. 2,253,000 and the eighth part Rs. 487,000 (Forrest, op. cit., p. 261, Report of William Taylor).

(This shows why Hornby and Mostyn were anxious to conclude a treaty with Raghunathrao).

139. Ibid., No. 58, 59.
140. CPC, Vol. IV, No. 1026.
141. ALS, Lekh 1487.
144. SPD, Vol. V, No. 46.
145. ALS, Lekh 1408.
146. Mahadji Shinde Kagadpatra, Lekh 14, p. 16.
147. SPD, Vol. 5, No. 79.
149. Ibid.
151. Macdonald, A Memoir of the Life of the late Nana Farnavis, p. 28.
153. Ibid., p. 235.
155. CPC, Vol. IV, No. 1944.
162. ALS, Lekh 1822.
163. Wad. op. cit., II, p. 60.
164. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 256.
166. Ibid., Vol. IV, No. 2041.
170. Ibid., Vol. IV, No. 2024.
175. ALS, Vol. VI, p. 2672.
176. Elliot and Dowson, op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 294.
177. SPDD, No. 17-A, pp. 251-54.
178. Ibid., pp. 145-46.
179. Ibid., No. 18, p. 45; CPC, Vol. V, No. 448.
Chapter III

THE TREATY OF PURANDAR AND THE CONVENTION OF VADGAON
1776-79

Nana now wielded sovereign power in the state on behalf of the infant Peshwa.\(^1\) The treaty of Purandar had stipulated that the English should withdraw their support to Raghunathrao.\(^2\) But they were certain that the recall of their troops from Raghunathrao would not only destroy all hopes of success but also result in the restoration of Bassein and Salsette to the Marathas.\(^3\) Consequently in spite of the ratification of the treaty the Bombay Government persisted in giving protection to Raghunathrao.\(^4\) Incensed at the deliberate infringement of the treaty Nana addressed a threatening letter to Col. Upton, vehemently criticising their action.\(^5\) Nana’s frequent protests had the desired effect and he was successful in keeping under control the ambitions of Mostyn and Hornby.\(^6\)

After the ratification of the treaty of Purandar Col. Upton had been called to Bengal.\(^7\) He was given leave to return;\(^8\) but his actual departure was delayed because the Bombay Government was still reluctant to give effect to the terms of the treaty.\(^9\) A number of questions which were outstanding resulted in recriminations between Bombay and Poona. Nana thought it expedient to maintain an agent with the Governor General. On 17th February 1777 he appointed Lala Sevakram as the Maratha Resident at Calcutta with a view to securing smooth transaction of business.\(^9\) On the other hand, it was felt that there should also be a responsible person at Poona, to represent English interests. The appointment of Mostyn by the Bombay Government was at first strongly objected to by Nana in view of his previous intrigues resulting in aggression on Maratha territories. The Bombay Council however completely exonerated Mostyn of the charges and Nana ultimately gave his consent to the appointment.\(^10\)

The wanton indifference of the English to the stipulations
contained in the treaty of Purandar, was driving Nana to desper-
ation. He was however suffering it under compelling cir-
cumstances. The treaty had involved the sacrifice of the
Peshwa’s legitimate interests: he had to cede large territories
in order to reconcile the Nizam who, taking advantage of the
difficulties of the Marathas, had annexed their territories. Haidar
Ali also had seized tracts of the Karnatak and exacted fourteen
lakhs of rupees from the Desai of Kittur. Besides he had won
over Thorat, Satvoji Bhosle and the Raja of Kolhapur with a
view to challenging the authority of the Peshwa. Even Moroba
yielded to his blandishments and promised to restore Raghu-
nathrao to his rights. But fortunately for Nana, the desperate
situation of the latter became known to Haidar Ali by this time,
and he discontinued his co-operation with Moroba. It was
necessary for Nana under these circumstances, to win over
Sindia. He made him a grant of the fort of Ashirgarh and
of a Jagir in Northern India. And thus it was that while
Sindia brought the Raja of Kolhapur to his knees and com-
pelled him to sign a treaty on 23rd April 1778, Nana could
despach Haripant Phadke and Parsharambhau to chastise
Haidar Ali and reestablish the Peshwa’s authority in the
Karnatak. But intelligence soon reached Nana of the suffer-
ings of the armies of these two generals due to extreme scarcity
of provender. Parsharambhau had been reduced to such bit-
ter straits that he had lost all credit with the country people,
while conditions in Haripant Phadke’s camp were deteriorating
to an extent which made it impossible for him to maintain dis-
cipline in the army. Accordingly in order to meet the in-
creasing financial demands from the Karnatak, Nana decided
to recover the state-dues from Holkar. But an obstacle to
this design was provided by Sakharam Bapu who persistently
instigated the latter to withhold payment.

This unprecedented financial stringency placed Nana on the
horns of a dilemma. On the one hand the Karnatak affairs
had assumed dangerous proportions while on the other, the me-
nacing machinations of Moroba and Mostyn were demanding
immediate attention. He was obliged to recall Sindia and
Haripant Phadke with their armies to Poona. But a pastmaster
in the art of dissimulation, he turned this very circumstance to
his advantage. By means of his far-flung intelligence-service,
he gave currency to a rumour that the withdrawal of the troops under Haripant Phadke was intended for forming a conjunction with the army of Sindia at Kolhapur and that the combined forces would soon march against Haidar Ali.\textsuperscript{27} This had the desired effect and Haidar Ali sued for peace.\textsuperscript{28} A treaty was concluded and Haidar Ali agreed to pay rupees twelve lakhs in the month of Shravan, and abandoned Raghoba to his fate for good.\textsuperscript{29} Just at this time, news reached India of the out-break of hostilities between England and France in Europe and Haidar Ali was naturally anxious to compose his differences with the Marathas so that he might join the French against his inveterate foes, the English.\textsuperscript{30}

Hardly Nana solved the Mysore problem, when his position on the internal front was getting increasingly insecure, because of the machinations of Moroba and Mostyn. Moroba, by force of circumstances, had come to exercise a malignant influence at the Peshwa’s court.\textsuperscript{31} For a time, Nana lulled and humoured him by lauding the memory of Madhavrao and other illustrious sons of the House of the Peshwa.\textsuperscript{*} With Sindia and Haripant Phadke away from Poonâ, Nana could easily scent the danger ahead, and he voluntarily expressed his readiness to retire from politics.\textsuperscript{32} And so, Moroba won over Holkar by paying him five lakhs of rupees.\textsuperscript{33} He also kept a watchful eye on Nana’s doings. In his secret conferences with Mostyn, Moroba invited the English to invade Poona and restore Raghunathrao.\textsuperscript{34}

Nana, on his part, sent Visaji Krishna to persuade Holkar, but with little success.\textsuperscript{35} He then repaired to Purandar and himself attempted to influence Holkar. Along with Bapu, he contacted him on 12th July 1778 and the three came to an understanding.\textsuperscript{36} In the mean time, Sindia arrived on the scene and succeeded in winning over Holkar completely.\textsuperscript{37} Unhesitatingly submitting to all dictation, Nana had so far managed Moroba, as a lion that crouches before he leaps forward upon his prey. The return of Sindia and Haripant Phadke afforded him the long awaited opportunity and in a fell swoop he bounded on Moroba and imprisoned him and his partisans.\textsuperscript{38} Thus fizzled out the sinister threat occasioned by the intrigues of Moroba and Mostyn.\textsuperscript{39} Nana and Bapu once again decided that Raghunathrao should not be restored to the “Gādi”.\textsuperscript{40}
A check was thus successfully put to the machinations of Hornby and Mostyn who were bent upon violating the treaty of Purandar.\textsuperscript{41} This continued deviation in the policy of the English was due to the despatch of 5th April 1776 from the Directors which supported the Bombay Government in their war against the Marathas, thus casting the treaty of Purandar to the winds.\textsuperscript{42} They openly invited Raghunathrao to Bombay.\textsuperscript{43} Unfortunately for the English, however, Raghunathrao had become entirely disgruntled, as the treaty of Purandar had rendered him helpless.\textsuperscript{44}

Nana was not slow in pressing the English for the restoration of Salsette.\textsuperscript{45} He had already advanced this demand when the treaty of Purandar was being signed. But the English were unwilling to oblige. In a dignified communication to His Majesty the King of England, Nana categorically condemned the tortuous character of English policy, their open violation of solemn treaties and their wicked ambition.\textsuperscript{46}

The Autumn of 1777 saw a grave reverse for the British arms on the river Hudson in America,\textsuperscript{47} and towards the end of the year, England sustained a severe defeat at the hands of the colonists.\textsuperscript{48} In India also, their position had become most insecure.\textsuperscript{49}

Observing that the English were intractable, Nana sought to capitalize on their reverses in the International field, and aimed a blow at them by receiving most ostentatiously a French envoy at Poona,\textsuperscript{50} with a view to entering into a treaty with the French. Hastings’ apprehensions of an alliance between Nana and the French, were not without foundation.\textsuperscript{51} He blamed Nana for receiving the envoy of a foreign power but Nana openly justified himself and unreservedly blamed Mostyn for his intrigues.\textsuperscript{52} Nana’s clandestine conferences with St. Lubin, the French envoy, considerably incensed Hastings who complained that he (Nana) was trifling with them.\textsuperscript{53} Mostyn also tried his best to expel Nana from the Peshwa’s court, as he was the moving-spring behind the whole trouble.\textsuperscript{54}

In the meantime, Moroba with the help of Bapu prepared a plan in consultation with Holkar by which Raghunathrao was to be appointed Regent to the Peshwa and Moroba, Phadnis. But his efforts ultimately failed.\textsuperscript{55}
Nana who was aware of Moroba’s league with the English, perceived that time was not opportune for rousing the British lion with impunity. In spite of his evasive answers to the Governor General, respecting his negotiations with the French, he gave an undertaking to the English, agreeing to dismiss the French envoy.\textsuperscript{56} St. Lubin was finally given leave to depart on 17th May 1778, at the instance of Sindia and an unpleasant episode was brought to a close.\textsuperscript{57} The deliberate step taken by Nana, in entertaining the French envoy was intended as a counterblast to British aggression.\textsuperscript{58} Nana had far-reaching designs in that move, as can be ascertained from the detailed discussion in the subsequent chapter on that subject.

Though circumstances had compelled him to dismiss St. Lubin the French ambassador, Nana was bent upon organising adequate strength for the extirpation of the English power. But his task was rendered increasingly complicated because of the internecine dissensions among his own adherents and other native powers. For a time he pretended acquiescence to the arrangements suggested by Sakharam Bapu.\textsuperscript{59}

Throughout these developments, Mostyn was conveniently nursing his delusions. He thought that Nana would never be able to collect adequate military power sincerely devoted to his cause, so as to defeat the English.\textsuperscript{60} He was even assured that Holkar and others would move on the 22nd of March, with an army of twenty-five hundred men, evidently in favour of Raghunathrao;\textsuperscript{61} even Sakharam Bapu commenced his intrigues in support of Raghunathrao, but trimmer as he was, he declined to keep his promise at the eleventh hour.\textsuperscript{62}

The seizure of Moroba and his party set the Bombay Council deliberating how to effect a change in the control at Poona.\textsuperscript{63} Even then, in an attempted reconciliation by the Nizam’s son,\textsuperscript{64} Nana agreed to allow Raghunathrao to keep an English battalion for his protection but declined to ratify Raghunathrao’s treaty with the English, which involved the surrender of six-sixteenth of the Peshwa’s territory.\textsuperscript{65} Thus in a show of desire for reconciliation and compromise, Nana offered to submit to Raghunathrao, but vehemently opposed to execute his commitments.\textsuperscript{66}

By that time Nana was firmly ensconced in the office of the Minister of the Peshwa but he was fully alive to the fact
that potential conflict was invariably endemic in power politics and as such he kept a vigilant watch on the intriguing Saktharam Bapu who was prone to make common cause with Raghunathrao. He bided his opportunity to punish his other opponents also.⁶⁷

Hastings and his council fully anticipated that Nana would ultimately triumph.⁶⁸ Undaunted by repeated reverses, at the hands of Nana, Hornby and Mostyn however still endeavoured to further Raghunathrao's fortunes.⁶⁹ An arrangement was concluded by which Raghunathrao was to create disturbances in Bassein from Salsette,⁷⁰ so as to distract the attention of Nana who was bent upon punishing the English.⁷¹ Amidst these developments and in order to make the confusion greater, Hastings requested Nana to grant passage for his battalions through the Maratha territory from the North to the South.⁷² The reason offered for this unusual demand, was that these troops were essential to counteract the French machinations, in that part of the country.⁷³ Conscious of the impending developments, Nana objected to the passage of the army under Col. Leslie;⁷⁴ since, after St. Lubin had been dismissed their arrival was unnecessary.⁷⁴

Hastings who had ordered the battalion to march, even before the permission of the Peshwa was secured, had some undisclosed purpose in view which the shrewd Nana was not slow to perceive. The army experienced frequent obstruction in its march and Hastings addressed Nana, condemning the attitude of the Maratha people.⁷⁵ Nana replied that the battalions ought to have been conveyed by a sea-route, and charged the Bombay Government with pursuing a hostile policy.⁷⁶ Moreover Nana entirely disowned the report of his agreement with the French, which was originated by Mostyn.⁷⁷

In his letter of 17th July 1778, Hastings contended that the troops were sent wholly as reinforcements to the settlement at Bombay. Nana strongly objected on the ground that there was no such stipulation in the treaty that one party might send his forces through the dominions of the other without previous agreement.⁷⁸ Moreover he demanded to know whether friendship justified the stationing of garrisons for the sole purpose of making forcible exactions, as was being done by Col. Leslie.⁷⁹ In no uncertain terms Nana pointed out that from time imme-
morial, no forces of any of the maritime European nations had ever passed by land through the dominions of the Marathas. "It is surprising to the highest degree" he observes, "that such an unwarranted demand should proceed from you (Governor General)". Demanding the immediate withdrawal of the troops to their own territory, Nana concludes, "from the commencement of the authority of the Peshwas, they have entered into treaties with many a chief, both of the East and of the West, but have never before experienced such a want of faith from any one." Commenting further on the British policy, he observes that there is an ever consistent want of faith in their policy which resembles the progress of a wheel and which can be discerned only by those who are adequately shrewd and astute. The authenticity of Nana's charges stands fully corroborated by Hastings letter to Raghunathrao dated 8th December 1778 in which Hastings says, "the English detachment will be productive of the greatest advantage to your affairs," and Raghunathrao acknowledges with thanks, Hastings' assistance.

With Moroba overpowered and Sakharam Bapu rendered absolutely inoperative owing to his dubious predilections, Nana had become a source of grave anxiety to the Bombay Council. All their hopes now rested on Raghunathrao, about whose life Farmer had become apprehensive as he highly anticipated Nana to attempt his capture as last and certain resource.

In his letter to the Peshwa, Goddard had once again announced his honest intention of proceeding to Bombay, at the same time, condemning Nana's attitude towards him. But such veiled professions could do little to misguide Nana whose reading of the English policy was absolutely correct. Conscious of the coming help from Goddard the Bombay Council finally decided to espouse Raghunathrao's cause in spite of the reports that Nana was promised troops by the Portuguese and the French.

The progress of the English battalions, had considerably incensed Nana who posted guards on the English Resident at Poona. Remonstrations by the Bombay Council rendered him so furious that he desired all the English to leave Poona as he considered that such a step was highly essential for maintain-
ing absolute secrecy respecting his clandestine conferences with St. Lubin. He was thoroughly convinced of the mischievous intrigues of Mostyn and Hornby and refused to modify the restrictions imposed upon the English Resident as may be observed from Mostyn’s letter to the effect that, “Nana is using every artifice to evade giving an answer.”

While Nana was thus ready to face the ordeal, the Supreme Council at their meeting of second February 1778, decided to give their assent and sanction to the plan of the Bombay Council directing them however to restrict operations to well defined and required objects. This was in consonance with the instructions issued by the Directors in England which indicated a policy as circumstances should require, independent of the personal interests of Raghunathrao.

The policy adopted by the English in India was invariably complementary to their activities in the international field. Hastings’ change of front and recourse to armed intervention, though open to serious criticism, was the kind of undertaking, that only success could justify. In the council meeting held on 2nd February 1778 Richard Barwell said, “we are not warranted by the treaty of Purandar to take a part in the divisions of the Maratha Government”. While Carnac observed that there could never be a more favourable crisis for the English to interfere.

Perceiving the clouds gathering on the horizon, Nana started his relentless endeavours and set afoot the most elaborate preparations to meet the approaching storm. Oaths of fidelity and co-operation were exchanged at Sindia’s camp between Bapu, Haripant Phadke and Parshuram Bhau.

While Nana was organising his own strength, the English were deeply engaged in weighing the probable consequences of their proposed aggression: Carnac observed that the degree of power which Nana then possessed, was so considerable that if he were to be suffered to retain it, the most serious evils would ensue to the Company; this view was further confirmed by Mostyn who anxiously instigated Hornby and his adherents, against Nana. Moreover, the Bombay Council seriously apprehended a probable junction of the French and the Maratha forces which would be highly detrimental to their
interests. Observing on the implementation of the suggestion of the Bombay Council, Carnac and Egerton recommended: that Bapu should be promised the Divanship; Raghunathrao the Naikship; and Sindia and Holkar, the Jagirs free from all demands. Comprising these conditions, a new treaty was concluded with Raghunathrao on 24 November 1778. The next day, the Bombay forces crossed the harbour, and landed at Panvel, but not a single chief joined Raghunathrao’s standard.

Yet even now, Raghunathrao was wavering in his alliance to the English and sent an emissary to Dom Jose Da Camara, asking for help. Unfortunately for him, however, Nana had already established the most cordial relations with the Portuguese, who declined to espouse his cause, because, by that time Raghunathrao had become thoroughly degenerated, and could scarcely command any respect. They gave Nana military assistance against him and the English at Talegaon.

Being apprised of the clandestine intrigues between Raghunathrao and Holkar, Nana took adequate steps, with the help of Sindia, to contain the latter from the former. The campaign actually started in the month of November 1778. Nana had made complete preparations to meet the attack. He had already ordered evacuation of Poona. He had even made up his mind to reduce Poona to ashes, but the precipitated step was prevented by Sindia and Holkar. The English received the information that Nana was determined to follow scorched earth policy by destroying Chinchvad, Talegaon and even Poona. With surging enthusiasm, Nana braced himself to counter the attack by guerilla warfare: hovering about the enemy; cutting off their supplies; but keeping out of the range of their guns. In this way he could even intercept the supply of mutton to Captain Stewart.

On the English side, the command of the army was entrusted to a committee which included Col. Egerton, John Carnac, and Thomas Mostyn. This resembled the “Aulic Council” that commanded the Austrian army during the Napoleonic wars, with identical results. Though the English army ascended the Borghat, contrary to their expectations, Holkar could not join them. Raghunathrao issued touching proclamations urging all the Maratha potentates to espouse his cause, but no one
actually moved, while he himself had become disgruntled with the English because of their excessive demands.

On 4th January 1779 Capt. Stewart was killed by a stray shot as he was reconnoitering from the top of a tree near Karla. On the 9th the English reached Talegaon but began to realize that their object of reaching Poona was a mad venture. Not a leaf or a blade of grass could be seen on the way. At last contact with the enemy was made and their army was completely routed at Vadgaon. They suffered unprecedented losses as a result of the impregnable blockade. They lost four thousand sepoys, four hundred Europeans, ten pieces of cannons and several guns.

Nana came out with flying colours in spite of dormant opposition from within and open hostilities from without. On 16th January 1779 a Convention was concluded at Vadgaon by which the English agreed to surrender all acquisitions of Maratha territories made since 1772. Farmer saw Nana and it was agreed that the Marathas should keep two English hostages against the rigid implementation of the stipulations. Yet even now Sakharam Bapu was deeply engrossed in playing his dubious role and he suggested to the Governor General to propose to Nana that Raghunathrao should be recognised as the Regent of the minor Peshwa so as to compose all differences.

After their unexpected discomfiture at Vadgaon the English army returned to Bombay sorely disappointed. The defeat unquestionably decided the fate of Raghunathrao. He unconditionally surrendered to Sindia, acknowledging the succession of Savai Madhavrao as absolutely logical and legitimate. But in his behaviour he later proved ungrateful and unhesitatingly flouted his honoured pledge.

Commenting upon the Vadgaon Convention, the Governor General, in his letter of 7th May 1779 says, "no Governor had power to make alliances with the Indian Princes", while in his rejoinder Nana refers to the treaty of Purandar and corners Hastings by demanding either acquiescence to the Convention or condemnation of the Bombay Government.

Nana had now become all powerful, in fact, the Raja of the Deccan. Hastings who was annoyed at the hasty deci-
sion of the Bombay Government instructed Goddard to make peace with the Ministerial party at Poona.132 Even Goddard was constrained to observe the steps taken by the Bombay Government as wholly against the orders of the Governor General.133 Initiating the move for peace, Hastings in his letter to the Peshwa, indicated his anxiety to conclude a new treaty.134 Accordingly Goddard was authorised to enter into negotiations.135

While these developments were taking place, Nana was making relentless efforts in strengthening the Konkan district with an army of four thousand.136 Addressing the Governor General on 14th September 1779 he desired Hasting to require the Bombay Government to refrain from offering any help or asylum to Raghunathrao and once again condemned them for disturbing the peace.137 The reply of the Governor General throws a revealing light on the measure of annoyance suffered by him: "I have repeatedly communicated my intentions to you and I think it unavailing to write them again.138 Ultimately Nana agreed to send a trustworthy Vakil to Hastings.139

That the indignant Nana was still far from reconciled to come to terms with the English may be easily observed from his reply to Goddard’s proposals which stated that the surrender of the person of Raghunathrao and the island of Salsette would be the preliminaries to any treaty that might eventually be concluded between them.140 Reports from Devakar Pandit to the Governor General further confirmed this fact as the former conveyed Nana’s sentiments on the peace-talks. According to him Nana demanded from the Governor-General, compensation for the infringement of the treaty of Purandar by the Bombay Governor.141

The defeat at Vadgaon had irreparably damaged the reputation of the English arms in India.142 And this damage could be undone only by a renewal of hostilities.143 It had proved unequivocally that the Marathas were just then far too strong and far too well united, to be overpowered by the English.144 The Bombay Government’s eagerness to monopolise the honours of the venture without appealing to possible allies or to English forces elsewhere in India involved them in a position fraught with dangerous consequences.145 They decided in consultation
with Goddard to repudiate the treaty of Purandar. The latter being apprehensive of success opened negotiaions with Haidar Ali, proposing concerted action against the Marathas, calculated to produce mutual advantage. But Haidar Ali appears not to have been impressed.

Though the struggle with the English at Vadgaon had temporarily relegated to the background the dissensions in the coterie of his adherents, Nana was not inattentive to the disquieting proportions, they were steadily assuming. Even in the thick of the fight in 1778, Sakharam Bapu had shown his sympathies for the English through Moroba. Experienced though he was, he had gone to the extent of maintaining clandestine conferences and malevolent machinations with Raghu-nathrao, Haidar Ali and the English. The victory at Vadgaon afforded Nana, sufficient breathing space to attend to the undesirable elements, in his own rank and file. Flushed with success and stimulated by prospects of absolute political authority, he worked himself up into a mood of intense hostility against all agents of opposition ordering the chopping off, of all the tall poppies without discrimination of their towering height. The truism, that magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom, was unfortunately lost on Nana much to the peril of the cause which he sought to serve. Thus Sakharam Bapu, Nana’s political rival, was confined at Sinhgad, where he died on 2nd August 1781. Though noted at times for his dubious behaviour, he had been acknowledged on all hands to be one of the wisest men of his age.

Nana’s outstanding diplomacy was now discernible in his dealing with Hastings’ most dangerous design calculated to blast the very foundations of the Maratha Empire. Renewed declaration of war in Europe between England and France created new problems for Hastings in India. Nagpur being the pivot of his defence, he decided to make an alliance with that state. In his minute of 9th July 1778 he observes, that if Bombay were to be attacked by the French and the Marathas in alliance, an offensive war must be undertaken in its defence. Mudhoji Bhosala seemed to be the answer to that contingency. But Hastings was not content with only the defence of Bombay. The deliberately aggressive attitude of the Bombay Government was quite conformable with the policy of
Hastings. But the ill-timed proposal of the Bombay Government to repudiate the treaty of Purandar was quite disconcerting to Hastings whose far-reaching designs, in favour of Mudhoji were thrown into disorder, as the positive commands of the court of Directors denied him all liberty of action.\textsuperscript{155} Hastings envisaged a threat to the authority of the Peshwa, in concluding permanent peace with Mudhoji and establishing him as the Raja of Satara, the common liege Lord of all the Marathas.\textsuperscript{156}

Nana was capable of outwitting Hastings in his bold moves. In view of the precarious condition of the Raja of Satara, he was endeavouring to secure some one from the Bhosala's family, formally adopted during the Raja's life-time.\textsuperscript{157} On 15th September 1777, Vitthoji Bhosala was adopted by the Raja of Satara, as his successor.\textsuperscript{158} Unfortunately for Hastings, however, he was entirely misguided respecting bonafides of the claims of Mudhoji Bhosala to the throne of Satara; he was made to believe that: "the Raja of Satara having no issue, had adopted Mudhoji and designed him for his successor; but Balaji Peshwa deceived him; Mudhoji's father Raghujii invaded Poona and by negotiation, obtained for a surrender of his son's actual pretensions, a large accession of territory, still reserving a future claim to the Rajaship and refusing to commit himself by any formal deed; thus Mudhoji's rights were still in force and unquestionably superior to any other." But all this was nothing short of a farago of falsehood. The fact was, that Raghujii Bhosala, Sena-saheb Subah, died in 1775; Mudhoji was Raghujii Bhosala's son by his first wife Sulabai Mohite. This Sulabai was the cousin of Sagunabai Mohite; the wife of Shahu, the Raja of Satara.\textsuperscript{159} In short, Mudhoji's mother and Shahu's wife were cousin-sisters.

Nana's action in getting Vitthoji Bhosala adopted by the Raja of Satara, rendered Hastings' ambitious expectations quite nugatory. With renewed vigour the latter instigated Mudhoji to assert his claims to the throne of Satara.\textsuperscript{160} Mudhoji persisted in misguiding Hastings and advanced a proposal for a perpetual alliance with the English.\textsuperscript{*} In his letter to Hastings he suggested that in case the alliance proposed by him was objected to by any of the chiefs, he would be dispossessed of his territory which would be divided equally between the English
and Mudhoji. Moreover, he promised to grant to the English, Salsette, Bassein and other ports, should the English help him in establishing his claims. In pursuance of his new aggressive policy, Hastings was bent upon extending the influence of the British nation to every part of India. His endeavours to espouse Mudhoji's cause were apiece with it. In the meantime Nana countered his move by bringing to Poona, Mudhoji's son and making him Sena-Khas-Khel (i.e., the protector of the Peshwa). Nana had taken pains to cherish kindly feelings by placing the infant Peshwa in the arms of Mudhoji's son and styling him the protector of the Peshwa. Thus Nana outwitted his opponent Hastings by keeping Mudhoji faithful against British intervention.

Hastings deputed Elliot to sound Mudhoji but the result was disappointing. Notwithstanding the promised assistance, Mudhoji cautioned him to guard the proposed alliance, as a religious secret lest the Peshwa and the Nizam should entirely ravage his country. Had Mudhoji accepted the offer made to him through Col. Goddard, it would have been held superior to any other consideration of the Bombay Government. He had unreservedly communicated his views through the colonel, but the answers received were found to be still more circumspect. They did not clearly disclose his sentiments and inclinations as desired by the Governor General. Mudhoji thus having rejected the proposals made by Goddard and Nana's conditions as a preliminary to peace being impossible of acceptance, Hastings was forced to recognize, the futility of his endeavours and to realise that war with the Marathas was absolutely inevitable; thus the stage was set on either side for a renewal of hostilities.

2. Forrest, op. cit., p. 265.
3. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 86, 113, 270.
* Lala Sevakram goes to Calcutta:

Lala Sevkaram who was appointed as the Maratha Resident at Calcutta, had carried with him presents worth rupees and thousand for Hastings. This clearly shows how Nana was anxious to maintain peace with the English. (PDMV, pp. 50-62).

10. SPDD, No. 18, p. 21.

* Moroba’s intrigues:

Nana was greatly alarmed when he learnt that Mostyn was actually encouraging dissensions at the Peshwa’s court. Nana’s deliberate endeavour of obtaining French assistance, excited the jealousy of the English who made common cause with Moroba for driving away Nana and restoring Raghunathrao to the “Gadi”. Moroba agreed to pay rupees thirty six lakhs to the English and to discountenance French influence from the Peshwa’s court. In return for this, the English agreed to supply him troops (CPC, Vol. V, No. 954; Forrest, op. cit., pp. 320-26; SPD, Vol. 36, No. 332, 346 and 385).

17. Ibid., pp. 2206 and 3219-20.
22. Ibid., p. 3119.

* Moroba’s attempt on Nana’s life:

In the midst of these manoeuvres, Moroba and Bapu made a plot to murder Nana but it was thwarted by Nana’s secret-service (ALS, Vol. VI, p. 2952 and Vol. VII, Lekh 2353).

35. Ibid., Vol. VI, p. 2213.
44. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 297.
46. Ibid., No. 735.
47. Ibid., p. xviii, Introduction.
50. CPC, Vol. V, No. 954; The ship carrying de St. Lubin the French envoy arrived at Chaul on 16th March, 1777, (Forrest, op. cit., p. 326).
64. CPC, Vol. V, No. 971.
65. Ibid., No. 989.
69. ALS, Vol. VI, p. 3003.
70. Ibid., Lekh 2450.
71. Anonymous, An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay ... Nation, p. 163.
72. CPC, Vol. V, No. 849:
* In his reply to Hastings, Nana charged the Bombay Government with pursuing a hostile policy. He supported his statement by pointing out how Sukhandhan, the pretender, and his one thousand followers were sheltered by Col. Halsey at the fort of Salsette, a possession which was obtained by the English in an amicable and friendly treaty (CPC, Vol. V, No. 1080; Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 286.).
73. CHI, Vol. V, p. 266.
77. Ibid., No. 1223.
78. Ibid., No. 1080.
79. Ibid., No. 1227.
82. CPC, Vol. V, No. 1235.
* In his reply to Raghunathrao, Hastings says that the English detachment sent for reinforcement of Bombay would be productive of the greatest advantages to Raghunathrao. Hastings’ letter confirms the charge made by Nana, that there was ever want of faith in the English, (Nana’s communication of 7th December 1778).
83. Ibid., No. 1243.
86. SPD, Vol. 10, No. 197.
88. Ibid., p. 303.
89. Anonymous, An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay ... Nation, p. 121.
96. ALS, Lekh 2398 and 2399.
98. Ibid., 333.
99. Ibid., 359.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., ALS, Lekh 2452.
103. SPDD, No. 17-A, p. 113.
108. PDMV, pp. 21-30.
111. ALS, Lekh 2461.
112. Ibid., Lekha 2460.
* This was for the first time that scorched-earth policy was so extensively resorted to, by the Marathas under the direction of Nana.
113. SPD, Vol. 44, No. 4.
115. ALS, Lekh 2451.
118. ALS, Lekh 2459; Khare, Adhikar yog, p. 127.
* Mostyn's miscalculations:

When the English reached Talegaon they were utterly disappointed. Moroba proved himself a broken reed while Sakharma Bapu refused to announce his support in favour of Raghunathrao (CHI, Vol. V, p. 262.).
120. ALS, Lekh 2459.
121. Khare, Adhikar yog, p. 90.
123. Ibid., No. 1376, 1461; ALS, Lekh 2462.
126. ALS, Lekh 2464.
130. CPC, Vol. V, No. 1462 and 1493.
131. Ibid., No. 1510.
134. Ibid., No. 1435.
135. Ibid., No. 1431.
136. Ibid., No. 1514.
137. Ibid., No. 1589.
138. Ibid., No. 1545.
139. Ibid., No. 1593.
140. Ibid., No. 1493.
141. Ibid., No. 1853.
146. Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I (Goddard’s dispatches of 19th February and 30th March, 1779).
149. Ibid., Lekh 2486, 2488; Aitihasik Patravyavahar, Lekh 164.
152. Purandare, op. cit., Bhag II, pp. 6-9 and 13; Mehta, op. cit., p. 35.

* It is interesting to ascertain how international affairs influenced Hastings' policy in India (C.U. Wills, British Relations with the Nagpur State, p. 47).

153. Ibid., p. 48 (Hastings' Minute of 9th July 1778).
158. Aitihasik Sankeern Sahitya, Khanda IV, Lekh 95, p. 150.
159. Wills, op. cit., pp. 50-53.

* Mudhoji's proposal for a perpetual alliance with the English:

(a) as a well-wisher of Satara Raj it is his duty to see that on
its Musnad the nearest lineal descendant of Shivaji is established:
(b) If any chief offers opposition he shall be defeated and his territory equally divided between the English and Mudhoji:
(c) Mudhoji shall pay rupees ten thousand for each Battalion;
(d) Friends and enemies of one shall be treated as such by the other:
(e) Relations with the Nizam shall be determined in accordance with his attitude towards the Raj of Satara:
(f) If in pursuance of this treaty the Governor General shall join the Maharaja in establishing and maintaining a lineal descendant of Shivaji on the Satara Raj, the Maharaja shall procure to the English the grant of Salsette, Bassein and also a few ports on the sea-coast.

These were some of the important items from an elaborate proposal for an alliance made by Mudhoji to Hastings (CPC, Vol. V, No. 1423).

161. Ibid., No. 1424.
162. Wills, op. cit., pp. 46-47.
166. Ibid., No. 1249.
167. Ibid., No. 1353.

*The policy of the English in India:

The English in India followed one of the three policies that suited their international affairs: the policy of non-intervention; the balance of power; and aggression leading to acquisition.

As early as 1765 Clive had foreseen that they had reached a conjuncture which rendered it necessary for them to determine, whether they should take the whole of India to themselves with the help of a large army of Europeans (CHL, Vol. V, p. 252). In the reign of Madhavrao, they followed the policy of non-intervention, as they were then biding their time. Immediately after Madhavrao's death however, they planned an aggression against the Peshwa's territory but their attempts were foiled by Nana's timely masurs (ALS, Lekh 1232). At that time the Maratha power had become most important; their triumph in the North was complete, as the Emperor granted all their demands (CPC, Vol. III, No. 695; Sarkar, Fall of the Moghul Empire, Vol. III, p. 1; CHL. Vol. V, p. 254). But even then the Marathas always suffered from want of unity, in their rank. This was an inherent defect in them as a political community, which can be ascertained from the conflicts between Shivaji and Sambhaji; Sambhaji and his sardars; Shahu and Tarabai; Bajirao I and Shahu's Sardars; Nanasaheb and Angria. The Peshwa's agent writing from Moradabad on 29th May 1772, indicated grave concern, at the increasing disunity among them and concluded: "Our leaders are not of one mind and everyone acts independently. God only knows what the result of this will be." (SPD, Vol. 29, No. 271 and 276.).

These developments in the side of the Marathas, were fully known to the English. They were aware that the Ma-
rathas were fast verging to a crisis that would compel them (the English) either to take some decisive part or to relinquish for ever the idea of improving their condition, in the west of India (Murry Hugh, History of British India, p. 453). The Regulating Act made Hastings, the first Governor General of Bengal his policy was to eliminate French power from India and to reduce the principal native powers to obedience (Mersey Viscount, The Viceroyys and Governors General of India, p 18). After the murder of the Peshwa Narayanrao, Mostyn openly offered British help to Raghunathrao who was the alleged murderer. Mostyn's mind can be easily ascertained from his letter of 7th September 1773 in which he says, "this great Empire now rests upon Raghunathrao's single life, should he by any accident be taken off, the whole must go to destruction and as many petty governments be formed as there are forts, until some superior power, by degrees, reduces them," (SPDD, No. 14, pp. 64-65, Mostyn's letter of 7th September 1773). In conformity with such views we find Horatio Nelson visiting Bombay in 1775. In consultation with Hornby and Mostyn he examined for several months the naval possibilities of the west coast with a view to strengthening England's maritime position in this region (Sardesal, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 70). In July 1775, war was declared between England and France, which had its repercussions on Indian politics. Hastings got apprehensive of a combined attack by the French and the Marathas. In his Minute of 9th July 1778, he says, "the first attempt of the French would be made against Bombay (Wills, op. cit., pp. 47-48). Hastings was therefore anxious to conclude a treaty with Mudhoji Bhosala of Nagpur for attaining permanent peace and security to the Company's possessions, against the attempt of France, by establishing and upholding Mudhoji, as the Raja of all the Marathas (CPC, Vol. V, No. 1328, p. 273, Note).

We can thus easily ascertained how far the policy of the English in India was directly influenced by their position in the international field. In the words of Sardar Panikkar, "taking advantage of the internal dissensions of the natives they (the English) added fuel to the fire of conflicting interests by supplying arms and armies and exchanging military aid for land," (K. M. Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History, p. 222). To the nations who were "tired out with wars and contentions and who from the repeated conquests to which they were subjected, were lost to all feelings of national pride," the very usurpation of authority, by the English, was a blessing (John Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, pp. 5-8). The English also cautiously ruled the country, always remembering, "that the natives of India can never stand upon the same level with ourselves." (H. G. Briggs, The Nizam, Vol. I, Preface, p. x). But even as our conquerors, they deserve compliment; because it is only the English mind that can candidly admit, "we gained an empire by violence and injustice, it is true, but we maintained it by courage and exploit." (William Fullarton of Fullarton M.P., A view of the English Interests in India and an account of the Military operations in the Southern parts of the Peninsula, Vol. II, p. 70).
Chapter IV

NANA AND CHEVALIER PAILLEBOTE DE SAINT LUBIN
1777-78

A MYSTERIOUS personage makes its appearance in Nana's political career at this stage. He is Mons. de St. Lubin, a Frenchman who had come to stay in Poona in the year 1777. Indeed, St. Lubin's arrival on the scene appears to have been prompted by a mission with far-reaching objectives and had his designs been successful the History of India would have worn a different complexion.

In order to grasp the comprehensive implications of St. Lubin's mission we must make a cursory examination of the political conditions of the French and the Maratha powers in the year 1777. By now, France had lost all hopes of empire in India, and French influence had almost vanished from the Indian shores. Yet the courts of Indian potentates were full of Frenchmen who commanded large bodies of troops and these were always eager to serve their country through the exercise of their profession. In the West, the war of American Independence was in full swing; and the victory of the colonists at Saratoga Springs in 1777 had encouraged the French who had declared war against England. Hostilities in Europe, had emboldened the Bombay Council to support Raghunathrao. By way of a counter move, the French were eager to espouse the cause of the Peshwa, who was confronted with disturbances in his own territories. With the murder of Peshwa Narayanrao Maratha affairs had drifted into a welter of confusion. With Bapu's lead Nana had organised the 'Barbhai' and was eagerly endeavouring not only to put down the Peshwa's enemies but also to counter the intrigues of his political rivals so as to maintain his authority unchallenged.

It was under these circumstances that Mons. de St. Lubin and Mons. Dumas, the late Governor of the Isle of France and a commanding officer in Canada proposed to the French Minister of Marine that a political mission be sent to India for the
purpose of forming an alliance with the Marathas with a view to restoring the French influence and trade and expelling the English from India. The proposal was accepted and St. Lubin was dignified with a military order and he carried with him the credentials from the king and the Ministry of France.

St. Lubin embarked on the Sartine a merchant ship bound to India. Her loading consisting of artillery, fire-arms, copper and cloth was landed at Chaul, a port then well known to foreigners. Amongst the persons who accompanied St. Lubin were two brothers of the surname de Santy, the elder of them being his confidential Secretary. Mons. de Corcelle, a young man from France was also with him.

On 16th March 1777, when the ship arrived at Chaul, Mons. de Santy went ashore with written instruction relating to the points to be insisted with the Peshwa for Lubin’s reception. When the intimation of their arrival was received by Nana, adequate preparations were immediately made to welcome the Frenchman. Passports for his journey were quickly issued, conveyances and facilities for his travel readily supplied and the goods he had brought were admitted free of customs duties, orders were issued by Nana to conduct the ambassador to the Court. A decorated elephant with a “Hauda”, a large escort of troops and some prominent officers were instructed to meet the ambassador near Borghat, and to lead him to Poona, with special marks of respect. In the meantime St. Lubin sent his secretary to Nana desiring an interview with him at an early date in order to deliver the letters he had brought from the king his master and the vazir of France. The Peshwa and his Ministers Nana and Bapu were then at Purandar. St. Lubin therefore proceeded to the hill-fort.

At Purandar St. Lubin was received by the Peshwa in open Durbar when Nana and Bapu were both present. He delivered his letters to Nana and the Peshwa and then exhibited a special large painting which represented the scene of the last Peshwa’s murder. He informed the Durbar that two more ships would soon arrive for which he requested permission to winter in their harbours.

After Nana’s return to Poona from Purandar, St. Lubin paid him another visit on 8th May 1777. Nana and Bapu went with-
out the tent walls to meet St. Lubin on his alighting from the elephant provided for him by the Sarkar. They received him with special marks of respect and demonstration, and conducted him to the presence of the Peshwa who was holding Darbar in the great hall Ganapati Runga Mahal, when St. Lubin again presented his credentials.25

This ostentatious reception accorded to the French ambassador caused considerable heart-burning to the English because when Mostyn their resident arrived at Poona, he had been received by two inferior officers and with much less ceremony.26 Even William Bolts, an accredited agent of the House of Austria had not been given such a grand reception when he visited Poona for the first time.27 Naturally enough when Mostyn conveyed to Hastings the account of the reception accorded to St. Lubin, he was considerably disturbed as there were rumours that St. Lubin was deputed by the French to the Maratha court "to embroil the affairs of the English".28

It is generally believed that Nana knew well that St. Lubin was not an accredited envoy of the king of France but that he used him as an instrument to intimidate the English, and prevent the restoration of Raghoba to the Musnud.29 Original evidence however proves that Nana wanted to enter into a secret treaty with the envoy30 on his own behalf and for that reason he employed political professions which caused much misunderstanding.

Presuming that Nana wanted only to alarm the English, he would have entrusted St. Lubin's affairs to Moroba, his political rival and thus created a situation in which Moroba would be represented as intriguing with the French, a situation which would forever damn him in the estimation of the English with whom he was in league. Far from doing this we observe Nana taking keen interest in the French ambassador.31

Nor was the time opportune for Nana to frighten the English even if he desired to do so. No question had been actually settled by the treaty of Purandar; which had on the contrary thrown a heavy financial burden on the Poona council causing them to sacrifice their legitimate interests. Nana had not till then succeeded in punishing the Nizam or Hydar Ali and other local chiefs who had risen on all directions challenging the
Peshwa's authority. At the same time, Raghunathrao and Moroba were doing their utmost to destroy the power of the Peshwa and Moroba was anxiously awaiting to overthrow Nana. Confronted with such dangerous circumstances Nana had repaired to Purandar with the Peshwa for safety.

In these critical conditions Nana was apprised of St. Lubin's arrival at Chaul. With this background and in view of the expected developments ahead, after his return from Purandar to Poona, it is doubtful, if Nana would have chosen to flounder in an even greater confusion. Could Nana the master of State-craft be so rash as to provoke an earthquake by alarming the English when circumstances had already seated him on the top of a volcano? It is difficult to believe that Nana really wanted to intimidate the English by using St. Lubin as an instrument for the purpose. The motives which prompted Nana to arrange an unduly pompous reception for St. Lubin must be sought elsewhere.

Nana had been already in correspondence with the king of France, much before St. Lubin's arrival; the French ship had appeared at Chaul with his previous permission; and he well knew that St. Lubin had come as an envoy of the king of France.

The perilous circumstances by which Nana was encompassed must have convinced him of the need of securing the assistance of the French on his side. But he must have anticipated a number of obstacles in his way. Nana had already included Moroba in his 'Barbhai' and he must have realised that he would not be able to enter into a secret treaty with St. Lubin, unless he arranged to keep away the natural interference at the hands of Moroba. He must therefore have deliberately professed that St. Lubin was not an accredited envoy of the king of France; that he had no intention of coming to any settlement with the French; and that he was giving an ostentatious reception to St. Lubin, just to frighten the English. He must have disclosed his professions to Moroba in a most confidential manner in order to misguide him and Mostyn. Thus his motives must have been: (a) to keep away Moroba's interference; (b) to engage the French in a treaty on his own behalf; (c) to leave no scope for Moroba to secure the French assistance against
him: (d) to convince Moroba through the said reception, the genuineness of his scheme: (e) and to lull the English into inactivity since his secret professions were certainly going to be conveyed to Mostyn by Moroba who was in league with him.

But Nana's political sophistications could scarcely deceive British diplomacy. His dangerous intrigue of holding clandestine conferences with St. Lubin under cover of intimidating the English, could for a time misguide Moroba, but they failed to lull the English into inactivity. Thus our contention that Nana's so-called profession of alarming the English was a mere hoax employed to misguide Moroba and Mostyn, stands fully confirmed. This contention finds full corroboration in the astute remarks of William Farmer, the British Resident, in his letter of 11th November 1779 sent from Poona; he says: "There is every just reason to suspect that Nana seeks to fortify himself in this government against his competitors and against us by means of his connections with the French, and his hopes of what St. Lubin may affect are strongly marked in the great protection he affords him. His (Nana's) policy therefore must be to keep us quiet and the Bengal government amused and unsuspicious, till he sees the event of his negotiations with St. Lubin. Too public and violent an execution in favour of St. Lubin, whom they affect to disown as an ambassador would be held as clear proofs of a connection with him. Their silence hitherto on this subject of the protection afforded to De Corcelle, confirms my opinion of the conduct they will observe."

Thus it is obvious that according to an ostentatious reception to St. Lubin Nana never intended to intimidate the English specially at a time when he was himself beset with almost insurmountable difficulties. His only object was to secure for himself ample scope for his secret conferences with St. Lubin without suffering any interference at the hands of Moroba, his political rival.

All the same the admission of St. Lubin to the Peshwa's court was sufficient to alienate the English.† Mostyn remonstrated against it, but Nana replied that the reception was in consequence of an application made two and a half years before and that matters had advanced too far to admit of the cancellation of the same. In his reply to a letter from Hastings
dated 27th January 1778, he clearly stated that the French envoy had not come at his request but under orders of the king of France, a fact which entitled him to the highest respect. And later, when on being informed of Nana’s increasing friendship with St. Lubin, Hastings earnestly persuaded him to dismiss the envoy, Nana professed warm sentiments and friendship towards the English and assured the Governor General that the rumours of a secret alliance were the result of machinations of designing persons.

While thus justifying his attitude towards St. Lubin in his letter to the Governor General, Nana continued holding secret meetings with St. Lubin with a view to concluding an entente with the French. It would appear from the correspondence that fell into the hands of the English that St. Lubin warned Nana of the impending attack of the English on Bassein and thereupon Nana solicited French help from Pondicherry. There was also a proposal to transfer to the Marathas the French castle at Surat. Soon the clandestine conference passed the formative stage, and towards the close of June 1777 St. Lubin issued a circular—order to all the subjects of the king of France then in Poona to meet at the house of Nana, relative to the prospective treaty.

It may be recalled here that Nana was deeply engaged in creating a dependable fighting arm for ousting Moroba and punishing the English. For this purpose on the home front, he tried hard to win the allegiance of Sindia, while on the external front, his secret meetings with St. Lubin continued ceaselessly. If Mons. de Santy’s report were to be believed, it is certain that Nana had commenced overtures with the king of France long before St. Lubin’s arrival. According to the plan evolved by St. Lubin and Nana, Mons. de Santy was to proceed to Europe as expeditiously as possible. For this purpose Nana gave him Rs. Seven hundred and some piece-goods worth Rs. three hundred.

No sooner was the treaty between Nana and St. Lubin concluded than it figured as a prominent subject in the proceedings of the Select Committee. Hastings himself believed that St. Lubin had purchased a church near the shore at Chaul, for the purpose of establishing in the beginning a warehouse,
and then converting it into a fortress. In the meantime confirmation of the news of the treaty reached Hastings. It was even reported to him that as a result of the said alliance between Nana and St. Lubin, Mons. de Santy had actually proceeded to Europe overland with despatches from St. Lubin to the French ministry. Detailed advice of the alliance between Nana and St. Lubin, reached Hastings on 19th January 1778. According to that information, the French were to have the possession of Chaul so that, “they might better carry in, their troops and artillery.” Soon correspondence between St. Lubin and Brian-Court, the French resident at Surat, was divulged by Moroba. This correspondence clearly indicated that Nana had not only required the aid of France but also stipulated that the French should, as soon as possible, move against the English, for which service, he agreed to give twenty lakhs of Rupees and Ten ships with sepoys; and to pay a further sum of twenty lakhs, upon their attacking Bombay. Nana’s main object was to punish a nation which had raised her insolent head and thus deserved to perish. Accordingly in compliance with the treaty, St. Lubin commenced necessary arrangements with the Viceroy of Goa, for permission to land the French troops at Goa and to march through Portuguese territory to Poona.

These developments disturbed Hastings considerably. He knew well how Nana with his usual adroitness, had successfully outwitted Moroba and Mostyn, and got himself firmly ensconced, at the court of the Peshwa with the help of Sindia, in spite of English opposition. His resumption of dictatorial authority at Poona, followed by his secret alliance with St. Lubin, convinced the Governor General of the imperative necessity of starting negotiations with the Bhosala of Nagpur. Hastings was quite confident of the political security of Bengal and calculated that the only convenient point of attack for the Marathas and the French, was the settlement of Bombay. He therefore issued immediate instructions to the Bombay government for getting themselves reinforced with six battalions of sepoys, a portion of artillery and a body of cavalry from Bengal.

Perceiving the clouds gathering on the horizon, Sindia advised Nana to stage a strategic retreat by agreeing to dismiss St. Lubin. Accordingly Nana, who had been placed in a state of restless perplexity, consented to the dismissal of the French
ambassador. He reassured Mostyn that he would send away St. Lubin when the latter paid a visit to the Poona Durbar for taking leave. In spite of Nana's assurance, however, Mostyn feared that the French ambassador would continue his stay at Poona, on the pretext of the rainy season. St. Lubin's prolonged stay in Poona proved Mostyn's forecast fairly correct, even though it was generally believed that the English endeavour of supporting Raghunathrao had detained St. Lubin at the Maratha capital. But all doubts were resolved when Sindia, in his letter of 21st November 1778, informed Hastings, that in response to his interview with Col. Upton, he had procured the dismissal of the French ambassador.

St. Lubin took leave of the Poona Durbar in July 1778. At the time of his departure, Nana promised him a respectable establishment in the Maratha territory if he returned with a large French contingent. Even though the remorseless march of events had compelled Nana to send away St. Lubin from Poona, the latter made his stay at Daman and continued his intrigues with Nana and Mons. Briancourt of Surat. From that retreat ultimately St. Lubin left for Suez in a Portuguese vessel sometime after 4th of September 1779. The Marathas still expected that St. Lubin would return with the promised French regiments. But contrary to their expectations the French force never appeared on the Indian shore, perhaps owing to the political developments in the international field. St. Lubin's mission had thus proved a failure.

This failure of St. Lubin's mission has been partly attributed to the innate failings in his temper and character. Apart from his personal failings however, Nana's secret consultations with St. Lubin naturally raised high hopes in the Marathas. Had the French force arrived, as promised by St. Lubin, an accredited envoy of the king of France, it would have resulted in complete subversion of the English influence in this country.

1. SPD, Vol. 5, No. 87.
10. Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 3376; V. V. Khare, Nana Phadnavisache Charitra, pp. 61-62.

Chevalier Pallebote de Saint Lubin—

"Hon. de St. Lubin is a person without any visible fortune. By a long residence in India he has acquired an uncommon knowledge of the customs, manners, policy, trade, languages, situations and dispositions of the several powers of that country, both Native and European. From the situation of a private soldier in Mauritius, by genius, activity, address, fluency of speech and withal a considerable share of assurance he has risen to his present eminence. He ingratiated himself very much with some of the Directors of the East India Co. and since the suspension of their charter, he has acquired the favour and confidence of Mons. de Sartine, in so high a degree that if his abilities had not been thought so high, he would have been employed in a life not so public; he would have been appointed to the government of Pondicherry. He has lately been dignified with a Military order and is now invested with the sole direction of two large trading vessels, on the coast of Malabar, where his address, knowledge . . . of Haidar Ali and Maratha Tribes are likely to attain the object of his employers—the re-establishment of their trade and resumption of their charter. Among many other qualities, he possesses in a great degree the talent of persuasion; he sticks to no assertion and has a pen capable of baffling even truth itself and to give whatever impressions he may think suitable to his views." (Abbe Raynal, op. cit., pp. 64-66; Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, pp. 296 and 326; CPC, Vol. V, p. xii (Introduction).

* The History and Antiquities of Chaul:

Chaul is situated in 18° 33' N. Lat. 72° 59' E. Long. and is about thirty miles south-east of Bombay. Arab and Persian writer Masudi names Chaul as Salmur, when he visited it in 916 A.D. The Russian traveller Athanasius Nikitin visited Chaul in 1470 A.D. Ludovico Da Varthema, who visited Chaul in 1503 names it as Cevul. About 1505 the Portuguese appeared at Chaul. In 1583 the Dutch traveller Jean Huges de Linschoten who visited Chaul described it as a fortified
city with a good harbour well known to the merchants of Cambay, Sind, Ormuz, Muscat and the shores of the Red Sea. The French traveller Francois Pyrard who was in India in 1601-1608 describes Chaul as extremely rich. In 1635 the Moghul emperor handed over all Ahmednagar possessions including Chaul to the King of Bijapur. About 1648, Shivaji overran Chaul and captured the part known as Mussalman-Chaul. In 1676 Moropant, Shivaji's Subhedar lived at Chaul. The English were not unaware of the unique situation of Chaul; they had a hand in the administration and collection of revenue of Chaul since the year 1679. In 1681 upper-Chaul was pillaged by the Siddhi. Sambaji attacked the Portuguese Chaul, in 1683. In 1739 Bassein fell to the Marathas, and the Portuguese were unable to hold Chaul. Even in 1739 there was a Dutch factory at Chaul. In 1741 the treaty of capitulation of Chaul was drawn at Poona between the Peshwa Balaji Bajirao and the Portuguese commissary Dom Francisco Baron de Galen Fles. The city and Moro of Chaul were delivered over to the Marathas on 25th April 1741. On 16th March 1777 a French ship visited Chaul with Chevalier Paillebot de St. Lubin. At present Chaul is an obscure village of the Kolaba collectorate, (J. M. Campbell, Kolaba and Janjira, Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. XI, pp. 296-309; J. Gerson de Cunha, The Origin of Bombay, pp. 153-55; De Cunha, Notes on the History and Antiquities of Chaul and Bassein, pp. 3-7, 18-19, 41, 63, 73-74 and appendix, p. 254; G. S. Sardesai, Shivaji Souvenir, pp. 123-124, an article "Shivaji and the Portuguese" based on original translation of a document preserved in the Archives of the Government of Goa by Prof. P. S. Pissurlekar; S. V. Avlaskar, Kokanchya Itihasachee Sadhane, Lekh 13, p. 19. Shiva-Charitra-Sahitya Khand A, Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandal, Poona, Quarterly, Vol. XXXIV, Nos. 3-4, 1954, January-April, published by Prof. R. V. Oturkar; Islamic Culture, Vol. XXI, Nos. 1-4, 1947, pp. 48-51, "an interesting Adilshahi Farman" by G. K. Khare.).


20. ALS, Lekh 2141.

* Purandar:
The fort of Purandar is situated twenty miles south-east of Poona City. It was captured by Shivaji in 1647. In 1665 it was besieged by Aurangzeb. In 1670 Shivaji recaptured it. Purandar was the usual stronghold to which the Peshwa retreated when unable to remain in safety at their capital Poona. (W. Hunter, The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XX, p. 396; Foster, Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. XVIII, II, (Index).

22. Ibid., pp. 289-93 and 326.
24. SPDD, No. 18, p. 82.
27. A. Macdonald, A Memoir of the Life of the Late Nana Farnavis, p. 31.

* Nana's interest in St. Lubin:
It was so high with Nana that in order to prevent any opportunity of obtaining intelligence, to the English Resident, Nana placed guards upon Mostyn’s house; on Mostyn’s complaining of this treatment he was answered that all Europeans should leave Poona; that if the English desired to have an agent, a clerk would answer the purpose. This was highly resented by the English and a disavowal of it insisted on, but in vain; on the contrary the restraint was increased. (Forrest, Foreign Series, Vol. II, p. 605; An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay . . . Nation, p. 121.

31. It was not till 15th of July 1778, that Nana could receive sincere support of Sindla and Holkar in his designs (Mahadji Shinde Kagadpatra, Lekh 14, p. 16 and Lekh 41; ALS, Lekh 2398, 2399, p. 3225; Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, pp. 66-72.
32. Khare, Nana Phadanvisache Charitra, p. 79.

* From Chaul St. Lubin sent Mons. de Santy his confidential Secretary to Poona, with a letter to Nana expressing his impatience to see him and to deliver the credentials to him and the Peshwa (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, pp. 292-296.)
* "He (Madhavrao Jadhavrao, Nana’s representative) confessed that the French had obtained permission for bringing their ship into Chaul river." "There was a talk of giving the French, a settlement on the coast. That the French had not only this year sounded the harbour of Colaba and Chaul but also last year, that of Gheria, which in my opinion clearly points their views" (SPDD, 18-A (Duplicate), Mostyn’s notes on 8th inst.)

Gheria is known as Vijaydurg. Situated on the neck of the rocky land that forms the south side of the Bay, Vijaydurg is one of the best and most Muhammadan of Konkan fortresses. The Peshwa took it in his possession in 1756. (Foster, Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. X, p. 358).

Mons. Pascoal de Santy who acted as confidential Secretary to St. Lubin stated before Mostyn: ‘I have always understood even in France that some overtures transmitted to the court of France from India had first given rise to the steps taken relative to an alliance with the Marathas... even in Bordeaux, it was mentioned and generally believed that St. Lubin was deputed by the French Ministry and was to form an alliance which would restore the influence of France in this country (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, pp. 291-93, letter from James Madjett to William Lewis).

In his letter to the President of the Bombay Council, the Peshwa says, “Mons. St. Lubin, a Vakil from the French king came here with a letter from the King of France to this Sarkar (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 307).

34. ALS, Vol. VI, pp. 3003, 3016, 2978.

* It is generally believed that Nana wanted only to alarm the English and that he never desired an alliance with St. Lubin. This view seems to have been based on Nana’s professions. In fact Nana entered into a treaty with St. Lubin, (CPC, Vol. V, No. 1003: An Historical Account of the Settlement & Possession of Bombay... Nation, pp. 143-53; Giege, Memoirs of the Life of the Rt. Hon. Warren Hastings, Vol. II, p. 214; Hallward, op. cit., p. 145.).


† The English tried to excite the jealousy of the Marathas by representing the ambitious views of the French and their attachment to Haidar Ali, (SPDD, 18, p. 84, Letter of 5th May 1777.

37. An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay... Nation, p. 116.
39. SPDD, 18-A (Duplicate), Mostyn’s notes of 8th inst.
41. Ibid., No. 973.

* Bassein, the treasure of timber:

Bassein was ceded to the Portuguese by Bahadur Shah, King of Gujarat, in the year 1543. It remained in Portuguese hands till 1739 when the Maratha captured it. In 1780 it was captured by General Goddard. It was restored to the Marathas by the treaty of Salbai. In 1818 it was resumed by the English.

The English prized it because of the provision of timber for the Company’s dockyard. (Hunter, op. cit., Vol. VII, p. 123).

45. SPDD, No. 20, p. 442; An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay . . . Nation, pp. 169-70.
50. SPDD, 18-A (Duplicate), Mostyn’s notes of 8th inst. Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, pp. 291-93 (Madjett’s letter to Lewis.)
51. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 290.

* Letters passing between Poona and Pondicherry which were intercepted by the English fully confirm this intelligence. One of these letters was addressed to Nana acknowledging the receipt of his letter wherein it was stated: the Peshwa promises his assistance with money, and troops against the English, desires the French to establish a factory at Poona on the conclusion of the war and adds, he (Nana) will ob-
tain him a grant of Rupees twenty lakhs from the Peshwa if he takes up arms against the English and that he will send him another 20 lakhs of rupees and ten ships manned with his own sepoys to assist him if he marches upon Bombay... (CPC, Vol. V, No. 1206).

† It is evident that the French corps of about 2500 soldiers to train the Indian sepoys was actually demanded from Europe; for in a letter to the Governor General, dated 6th April 1778, it is said that Mr. Elliot coming from Europe brought the news that M. de Sartine, Minister of Marine at Paris, had determined "to send out persons who in the information are called Des Exercise, to discipline the natives of India" (Forrest, Foreign Series, Vol. II, p. 605): An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay... Nation, pp. 143-63.


60. Macdonald, A Memoir of the Life of the late Nana Farnavis, p. 34.


63. Ibid.

64. An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay... Nation, pp. 135-137 and pp. 168-69; Macdonald, A Memoir of the Life of the late Nana Farnavis, pp. 30-32.


71. An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay... Nation, p. 167.

72. SPDD, No. 21, p. 649.


74. Kalinkikar Datta, Some unpublished papers regarding the Indo British History, p. 414.


77. Ibid., pp. 164 and 301.

* (a) St. Lubin was an accredited envoy of the King of France:

In a number of books St. Lubin has been called an adventurer or an imposter. Shri M. K. Trilokekar in his article "Mons De St. Lubin, a French adventurer at the Maratha Court," raises the same issue (Journal of the Bombay Historical Society, March 1930, Vol. VIII, No. 1, p. 5). The misconception can be attributed to the following details:

(a) St. Lubin by his abilities and address superseded Mons, Dumas, his co-worker, and obtained the leadership of the mission from Mons. de Sartine. This arrogation of the position compelled him to conceal his identity till he reached India. As a result of this, Mons. Belcombe, the French agent at Pondicherry doubted the genuineness of St. Lubin’s representative capacity. Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, pp. 291-96; (An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay ... Nation, pp. 116-17, Anonymous).

(b) Even Francis and Wheeler, members of the Calcutta Council were opposed to Hastings in his plan of countering St. Lubin’s activities, as they considered him just an adventurer, (Forrest, Foreign Series, Vol. II, pp. 602-12).

(c) St. Lubin’s innate fallings of temper created for him a crop of enemies which included his own secretaries who were anxious to get him disowned by their nation (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, pp. 296-98).

(d) Nana's political influence of professing to Moroba that St. Lubin was not an accredited envoy of France but that he was using him as an instrument to alarm the English, caused considerable confusion, (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 298, Letter of William Farmer dated 11th November, 1779).

(e) Lastly, the failure of St. Lubin’s mission, made the above confusion worse confounded.

In addition to what has already been said in the course of our narrative, the following facts go to confirm the representative character of St. Lubin:

(a) St. Lubin had come to India with credentials from the King and the Ministry of France, which he delivered to the Peshwa and Nana (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 307, Peshwa’s letter to Hornby: Forrest, Foreign Series, Vol. II, p. 605, Bapu’s letter).

(b) Mons. Briancourt, the French Resident at Surat, answered his draughts, (An Historical Account of the Settlement and Possession of Bombay ... Nation, p. 117).

(c) Mr. Elliot, an Englishman, who was in Europe had got down at Paris on his way to India. Dependable intelligence brought by him clearly proved the genuineness of St. Lubin’s mission, (Forrest, Foreign Series, Vol. II, pp. 602-12, Elliot’s Letters circulated amongst the members of the Board on 1st October 1777).

(d) Letters of James Madjett and other secretaries of St.
Lubin, who deserted him, easily establish his representative capacity, (SPDD, 18-A (Duplicate) pp. 225 and 234).

(e) The paper of intelligence obtained by Mostyn from an Englishman in St. Lubin's suite, also proves his mission quite clearly. (Forrest, Foreign Series, Vol. II, pp. 602-12, Minute of the Council Meeting of 6th April 1778).

(f) The sudden change in the attitude of Francis and Wheler who in the beginning were opposed to Hastings' proposal of counteracting Lubin's intrigues but ultimately supported Hastings unreservedly, proves beyond doubt, the truth of Lubin's representative capacity.

(g) The high degree of importance attached by Nana to the French envoy, leaves no room to doubt the commission with which he was deputed: (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, pp. 296-298, De Corcelle's letter to Mostyn, dated 14th Jan. 1778).

(h) The two French letters intercepted by Carnac, fully establish the fact that 'Mons. Lubin was acting with authority': "Mr. Carnac acquaints us that the assistant Customs Master has put into his hands two French letters addressed to the chief of Mawe which were received by a country-vessel lately arrived from Bussarah and which he therefore supposes, must be from the gentleman deputed to Europe by Mons. St. Lubin of whom we have rec'd advices in the Public Letter . . . The letters from the Commander of the French vessel mentioned in our proceedings of the 19th January to have arrived at Chaul from Pondicherry, afterwards proceeding to Daman. They afforded very strong evidence of Mons. Lubin's acting by authority. (SPDD, No. 19, p. 249). Thus it is certain that St. Lubin was no adventurer or imposter but that he was positively an accredited ambassador of the King of France.
Chapter V

THE ANGLO-MARATHA WAR, 1779-1783

PILOTING the affairs of the Peshwaship with a rare skill, Nana found himself absorbed in organising an All India Confedera-
cy against the British while at the same time trying to gain time by professed peace parleys with Goddard and Hastings.¹ So far Nana had stubbornly opposed the aggressive attitude of the English and after the second discomfiture in the field, Hastings had found himself caught in the meshes of protracted war with a shifty and indefatigable enemy.² Nana was aware of the inherent hostility of the English for the French, and he had frequent clandestine communications with the latter, and finally had concluded with them an entente.³ Even though, in his reply to Hastings he emphatically disowned such an understanding,⁴ the Anglo-Indian Governments had become so allergic to French influence in India, that even a mere rumour was sufficient to arouse them to hectic activity.⁵ In order to discountenance any such influence from the Peshwa’s Govern-
ment, Hastings in utter disregard of the treaty of Purandar in-
dicated blatant espousal of the cause of Raghunathrao and started hostilities, hoping that the Peshwa would thus be com-
pelled to enter into a more favourable treaty with the English.⁶

In the meantime Nana had the good fortune of receiving the unconditional surrender of Raghunathrao⁷ much to the chagrin of the Bombay Government which had made a covenant with the latter for the purpose of enlarging their territory.⁷ But soon Nana became aware of the mischievous machinations of Raghunathrao who had been handed over to Sindia’s cus-
tody, from which however he escaped much to the annoyance of Nana. Raghunathrao did his best to oppose Nana with the help of the enemies of the Peshwa till at last he became dis-
satisfied with Goddard’s conduct and arrogance.⁸

All this time Nana was seriously engaged in humouring the English by keeping up correspondence with them, pointing out insignificant short-comings in the procedure of peace-talks:
thus in his letter to the Governor-General he points out the contradictory statements of Col. Goddard and Governor General regarding the powers of the Colonel in concluding peace.9 He was thus in effect procrastinating negotiations while Hastings was anxious to enter into defensive and offensive alliance with the Peshwa.10 Ultimately Nana informed Goddard that the surrender of Raghunathrao and Salsette should be the preliminaries to the treaty.11

The unequivocal demand for the surrender of Raghunathrao and Salsette indicated the confidence of Nana in his military strength, which, however, failed to make any impression upon Goddard who dismissed the vakils of Nana and opened negotiations with Fatehsingh Gaekwar.12 The latter had indicated his eagerness to enter into a defensive and offensive alliance with the English for a long time* and in spite of Nana’s endeavours a treaty was concluded on 26th January 1780 according to which he agreed to assist Goddard with a force of three thousand horse.13

In his reply to Nana, Hastings disowned all responsibility for carrying out commitments made in the Vadgaon Convention which he declared to be not only unwarranted but illegal and unauthorised. Thus ended all hopes of a treaty between the English and the Marathas.14 Immediately Goddard made an allowance of Rupees fifty thousand per month to Raghunathrao thereby making the English, the chief party in the struggle which was imminent.15 The critical impasse called forth all the diplomatic talents of Nana who rose to the occasion and countered by forming the grand Quadruple Alliance against the British power.16 But the coalition frequently suffered from mutual distrust among the Maratha chiefs anxious to supplant the Peshwa’s authority.17

The blatant espousal of Raghunathrao’s cause by the British, followed by the treaty with Fatehsingh Gaekwar of Baroda annoyed Nana. He decided to consolidate all elements in his fold, calculated to further his cause. Thus he granted a Jahagir to Ghaziuddin near Kalpi, sheltered the son of Shah Alam and made huge grants to Hindupad of Panna and Chaitosingh of Benares.18 His next step was to put his own house in order.19 He therefore had Sindia and Holkar called and after prolonged
consultations formed with them a comprehensive plan with such secrecy that even Hastings had no knowledge of it for several months.\textsuperscript{20} Realizing Nana’s delicate position, Sindia wrote to him that he and Holkar would sincerely co-operate provided that he was prepared to part with the fort of Ahmednagar together with a Jahagir yielding forty lakhs in his favour and made a similar grant to Holkar.\textsuperscript{21} Sindia had an additional cause for vacillation in the personal enmity of Haripant. Nana who knew very well the state of affairs, immediately conceded all demands and secured the co-operation of the two chieftains.\textsuperscript{22} While thus engrossed in organising his party, occasions were not wanting when Nana’s life was in serious danger, but his secret-service invariably foiled all plots against him.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus in spite of the long-standing natural rivalry between them, Nana and Sindia chose to remain united in view of the necessity of preserving the strength of the empire undivided.\textsuperscript{24} With Sindia safely beside him\textsuperscript{25} Nana was bold enough to misguide the English for the purpose of gaining time. The English were taken in, and as we learn from his letter to Hastings, Goddard began seriously to consider how he should exploit the differences between the two Maratha leaders. He considered Sindia easier game for seduction, as he was reported to be anxious to obtain the direction of the Peshwa’s government.\textsuperscript{9} And it was long before Goddard came to realise how Sindia’s show of animosity against Nana was just a camouflage intended to deceive the English.\textsuperscript{26} Writing to the Governor General in Council on the 10th March 1780 Goddard said: “I plainly perceived from the conversation of this man that his drift was to obtain from me the first overtures towards a particular connection with Sindia either with a view to giving his master the superiority in the course of the negotiations or if he meant to deceive, to draw such a discovery from me as might be of service to his own designs.\textsuperscript{27}

During his prolonged consultations with Sindia and Holkar, Nana had realised that they were incensed with the Nizam for his refusal to join them in the late war against the English. He was therefore anxious to win over the Nizam as early as possible.\textsuperscript{28} While at the same time striving to maintain a correct attitude towards the English, lest he should rouse their suspi-
ctions. At this juncture Nana was pleasantly surprised at the proposal from the Nizam to join a united front against the English. 29

The Nizam had been deeply aggrieved by the conduct of the Madras Government. They had not only demanded remission of the tribute due to him for the transfer to them of the four of the five districts of the Northern circars stipulated in their previous agreement of 1768 30 but had fraudulently possessed themselves of Guntoor, the remaining district. 31 Hastings was alarmed at the developments 31 and immediately started negotiations for ensuring the fidelity of the Nizam and conceded to him all his demands. 32 But the Nizam had by now become one of the promoters of the Anti-British-Confederacy. 33 He assured Nana of his unreserved co-operation against the English, 34 while he refused to be reconciled to Rumbold, the Governor of Mâdras.

Here was a situation which the diplomatic talents of Nana could exploit to the fullest. Nana had consultations with Diwakar Pandit the Diwan of Mudhoji Bhosala of Nagpur. He promised him the city of Hoshangabad, 35 and in return the Diwan consented to lay waste the whole of Bengal within a period of six weeks.

Having thus secured the adherence of the Nizam and Mudhoji Bhosala, Nana next endeavoured to win over Hyder Ali to his side. It may be recalled that the latter had profited at the expense of the Peshwa’s territories and had lately annexed Chitaldurg. 36 Though Parsharambhau had recovered most of the captured districts, Badami was still in Hyder Ali’s hands. 37 Despite this provocation however, Nana had prudently refrained from open hostility with Hyder Ali, and presents had been freely exchanged between the two courts. 38 The reason for this was that both the parties were in need of mutual defence against a common foe. Accordingly when on 2nd November 1779 Nana despatched Krishnarao Joshi his ambassador to the fort of Shrirangapatam with proposals for a treaty, Hyder Ali was glad to accept them. 39

With his usual foresight Nana fully realised that Hyder Ali’s co-operation was only a political gesture. Nor was Hyder Ali taken in, by the sudden outburst of kindly feelings on the
part of the Marathas. He was in sore need of Maratha help. The French allies were being worsted by the English, who on 19th of March 1779 had captured the port of Mahe. Hyder Ali also resented the transfer of Guntoor from Baslatjung who was friendly disposed towards the French, to Nawab Ali Waljah who was a creature of the English. Nana’s efficient secret-service had complete intelligence of the developments on the Southern front and he was not slow to exploit the situation. It was indeed creditable to Nana that he succeeded before long in resolving the differences between the three neighbouring powers—Hyder Ali, the Nizam and the Marathas—and binding them into a formidable coalition against the English.

Despite the fact that Hyder Ali had conveyed his consent through Krishnarao to make common cause with the Peshwa against the English, he demanded more advantageous terms, when the draft-treaty was actually despatched to him. Nana’s proposal was quite reasonable. He suggested, “that the territories conquered from the Naik (Hyder Ali) will be restored to him on condition that he will pay Rupees twenty lakhs (20,00,000) for the present year and Rupees twelve lakhs (12,00,000) annually in future; that he will oppose the English if they attempt to cross... the Peshwa’s territories and that he will lend Nana military assistance against the English.” But Hyder Ali did not agree and under compelling circumstances Nana concluded an entente by consenting to confirm to him all his conquests of Maratha territory south of the Tungabhadra. In return Hyder Ali undertook to devastate Arcot and the lower Karnatak belonging to Nawab Muhammed Ali Waljah.

While Nana was endeavouring to conciliate Hyder Ali news reached him that Moosa Lally, a noted general in the service of the Nizam had left him. He immediately instructed Krishnarao to engage Moosa Lally so that he could be used against the English.

Having won over Hyder Ali to his side Nana proceeded to secure the support of the other country powers with a view to the integration of their armies. Thus he opened negotiations with Shah Alam the Emperor or Delhi who being hard pressed by the Sikhs had petitioned the English for six battalions. Nana was informed by his envoy Hingne that the Eng-
lish were unable to protect the Emperor and in consequence the Emperor wished to see them defeated by the Marathas.\textsuperscript{50} Nana therefore instructed Hingne to try to keep the Emperor under his control,\textsuperscript{51} and urged him to form a strong alliance against the English and prevent them from proceeding to the Deccan.\textsuperscript{52} Hingne’s endeavours were so far successful that not only was the Emperor detached from the English but he became entirely dependent upon the Marathas.\textsuperscript{53} As a result, the Emperor refused permission to the English to start a warehouse in Delhi or Agra.\textsuperscript{54}

Nana next contacted Chaitsingh and Babu Sunhan Singh of Kashi who were ready to join the confederacy.\textsuperscript{55} He sent his servant Bhavani Shankar to assist the Raja of Kashi with five lakhs of rupees.\textsuperscript{56}

Proceeding further with his task of organisation Nana invited Fatehsingh Gaekwar to Poona and conferred on him the title “Senakhaskhel” enjoyed by his brother Govindrao Gaekwar.\textsuperscript{57} In the same way the title of “Sena saheb Subah” was conferred on Raghuji the son of Mudhoji Bhosala.\textsuperscript{58}

Nana was singularly posted with full information of all Indian courts. In order to leave no room for the English to strengthen their fighting arm Nana now decided to rid himself of the cobwebs of traditional rivalry that usually clutter a conservative mind.\textsuperscript{59} Thus we find him opening negotiations with the Siddhi of Janjira the traditional enemy of the Marathas. After prolonged consultations the Siddhi consented to make common cause with the Peshwa, against the English and an agreement was signed on 15th April, 1780.\textsuperscript{60}

Nana next started correspondence with Vandegraef the Dutch chief. At this moment the aggressive policy of the English had not only alienated every power in the country but administered an open threat to their own independent existence, naturally Nana’s proposal was accepted by the Dutch chief and it was decided that they should capture Surat with Maratha co-operation.\textsuperscript{61}

Furthering the project of the Confederacy Nana opened negotiations with the Portuguese of Goa.\textsuperscript{9} He convinced them of the aggressive policy of the English which aimed at destroying Indian cohesion and subjugating all powers one by one.
Nana's persuasive means induced the Portuguese to his point of view and on 3rd June 1780 a solemn treaty was signed by Nana and the Government of Goa. As this treaty had considerable significance Nana despatched the draft to Sindia for perusal.

Having secured the support of the Portuguese and the Dutch Nana was anxious to ascertain the reaction of the French to the new developments in the country when news reached him that the French were making vigorous preparations at Mauritius to help Hyder Ali against the English.

In spite of the fact that Nana had overcome insurmountable difficulties and succeeded in forming a Grand Quadruple Alliance, the real test of his abilities lay in maintaining the confederacy in tact, against the machinations of the English, who were noted adepts in the art of creating insidious difference amongst the indigenous powers and destroying the harmony of their states. We may presently ascertain how far Nana was successful in that difficult enterprise.

It was Mudhoji, a sworn member of the Confederacy, who first apprised the English of the plot against them. Hastings who was struck with alarm at the news, decided to break Nana's organisation at any cost. Reporting on Hastings' reaction to the intelligence, Lala Sevak Ram, the Maratha envoy at Calcutta states, "Hastings in his dismay immediately called to his presence, General Coote and wrenched out of the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, a contribution of a crore and eighty lakhs of rupees. He then invited a meeting of several rich merchants of Calcutta and compelled them personally to yield a crore of rupees. Having thus arranged for sufficient funds, Hastings on 1st November 1779 invited Veniram Pandit and Vishwambhar Pandit and sent them to Khandoji Bhosala at Cuttack who was to overrun Bengal, with a comprehensive request which included permission for a free passage for the English troops through his territory, a friendly alliance with the Bhosala of Nagpur, and the stoppage of the attack on Bengal; at the same time Khandoji Bhosala was deluged with jewelry, presents and cash worth lakhs of rupees by Hastings. Similar presents were also made to Pandit brothers for their valuable co-operation in winning over Khandoji. Hastings thus made
perfect arrangements to wean away Mudhoji Bhosala from Nana's Confederacy. He was fully aware of the strategic position of the Nagpur State, in Nana's plan.† He was therefore prepared to purchase Mudhoji's neutrality at any price. In October 1780, his secretary paid Rupees three lakhs, in March another thirteen lakhs and a further loan of ten lakhs was given to Mudhoji, thereby securing his support in that hour of trial.⁶⁹ Hastings also dangled before him the most enticing proposal that he (Mudhoji) should prefer his claim to the throne of the Raja of Satara, but Mudhoji lacked the courage for the adventure.⁷⁰

Having detached Mudhoji from Nana's Confederacy Hastings opened negotiations with the Nizam who had been known for his dubious behaviour. He therefore immediately suspended Governor Rumbold, ordered the restoration of Guntoor to Baslatjung and promised the Nizam to pay all the dues of his tribute. The Nizam whose purpose in joining the Confederacy was easily served, gave a promise of neutrality to the English by a treaty which was concluded at Madras.⁷¹

Just at this time Gaekwar brothers, Govindrao and Fatehsingh started serious dissensions, both claiming the ancestral patrimony of Baroda. Hastings taking advantage of the rivalry, offered to recognise the right of Fatehsingh on condition that the latter joined the English against the Poona Government. Under the guidance of his clever minister G. G. Kamtekar a treaty was concluded between Fatehsingh and Goddard on 26th January 1780.⁶

Anxious to thwart Nana's Confederacy as far as possible Hastings also made desperate efforts to win over Hyder Ali against the Peshwa, but he could not succeed as the latter had by that time become a confirmed enemy of the English.⁷²

Nana was considerably incensed when he came to know of the treaty between the English and Mudhoji. He wrote to Mudhoji threatening utmost vengeance of the Peshwa's government for his secession from the Confederacy.⁷³ Mudhoji on his part persisted in making a show of his co-operation with the Peshwa. He raised an army of 30,000 professing to attack Bengal but its march was so timed that it arrived at Cuttack
at the commencement of rains, thereby trying to pacify Nana to some extent.\textsuperscript{74}

Though Nana was agitated at the deliberate defection of Mudhoji and the Nizam from the Confederacy, he was unable to punish them till a favourable opportunity afforded itself. He had to bide his time pending the conclusion of the Anglo-Maratha war.

What facilitated Hastings in detaching the Nizam and Mudhoji Bhosala was the mutual jealousy and rivalry among the Maratha chiefs which prevented them from joining their forces against the common enemy. In fact there was no institution or machinery in the social life of the community for imparting instructions with a view to promoting national unity among the rank and file. It is doubtful if the Maratha valour would have ever come to the forefront in the absence of the religious challenge from Aurangzeb and it is equally uncertain that the Bhat's and Bhanus would have ever left their Kolaba district and gone to Poona to become Peshwa and Phadnis, had not the oppressive administration of the Siddhi made them leave their native place. Thus the Maratha enterprise was the effect of a cause and not the cause by itself.

Nor was national consciousness the basis of the structure of Nana’s Alliance. It was merely a coalition of opportunists who had joined together for furthering individual interests without having any fundamental principle or policy to follow. For instance, it was from this motive that the Nizam joined Nana against the English, so that when Hastings conceded all his demands, he agreed to remain neutral. The case of Mudhoji Bhosala was also parallel. Nana requested Mudhoji’s co-operation against the English by promising to give him the city of Hoshangabad, and Mudhoji agreed to espouse his cause. But when Hastings offered him huge sums of money Mudhoji had no scruple for changing sides.

Thus it was that knowing Marathas’ weakness Hastings could easily steal a march over events and exploit the situation to the fullest. That, ‘character is destiny’, was once again proved up to the hilt.

According to Nana’s plan the Bhosala of Nagpur was to open hostilities against the English of Bengal; Hyder Ali was
to attack Madras; the Peshwa’s army was to start the opposition in Gujarat and Konkan while the Nizam was to menace the English on the East Coast.\textsuperscript{75}

Bengal was quite vulnerable to an attack of the Marathas as it was completely denuded of troops of the English.\textsuperscript{76} But unfortunately Khandoji was purchased by Hastings who reached him sixteen lakhs of rupees. The result was that Khandoji gave a free passage to Colonel Pearse’s troops through Orissa and even promised him to supply two thousand horse under their command. Hastings arranged to convey Mudhoji’s orders to Khandoji forbidding him from marching into Bengal.\textsuperscript{77} Had Mudhoji kept his word and acted in co-operation with the allies, Hastings would have been forced to seek terms, as Hyder Ali had already created havoc in Madras at the time.\textsuperscript{78} But that was not to be. And thus it was that owing to Mudhoji’s treachery the Bengal front proved an utter failure.\textsuperscript{79}

This disunity among the Indian powers considerably disappointed Nana. In his predicament he tried to draw consolation from the reports of his envoys Hinge and Lala Sevak Ram. The former reported: ‘I have contrived to disturb the cordial relations that existed between the English and Shah Alam and I am glad to say that the Emperor is now anxious to follow your advice at all costs\textsuperscript{80};’ while the latter in his dispatch to Nana informed him that he noticed serious differences between Hastings and Francis which resulted in the former shooting the latter without any grave consequences.\textsuperscript{80}

Realising the inevitability of a conflict with the English, Nana conducted immediate consultations with Sindia and the Peshwa’s army proceeded against Banda under the command of Shankerji Khanderao a general of repute.\textsuperscript{81} In his report of 8th November 1779 Shankerji informed Nana that the English had left Surat and joined Raghunathrao’s army in the field,\textsuperscript{82} and that Raghunathrao was endeavouring to win over Fateh-singh Gaekwar to his side.\textsuperscript{83}

After prolonged consultations, Nana sent Sindia and Holkar to Gujarat where Goddard had opened a campaign. Ganeshpant Behere and Visajipant Athavle were the two commanders sent by him to co-operate with the two Maratha chiefs. In October 1779 the English took Ahmedabad from Appaji
Ganesh, Peshwa's Sardar, after inflicting on him heavy losses. By the end of July 1780, Goddard captured the whole of Gujarat though he met with determined opposition from the Marathas. In January he captured Dabhoi and on the 15th of that month he established his control over Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat. In the meantime news reached Nana of a savage battle fought between Sindia and Goddard which lasted till the end of May without any decisive results. In the month of June Sindia and Holkar retired into Malwa while the rainy season compelled Goddard to retreat towards Surat. Though he tried to establish English influence in Malwa, as the letter of the Rana of Gohad dated 5th April 1780 indicates, he found it difficult to eradicate Maratha influence from that province. In spite of the fact that Goddard tried to make a good impression in Gujarat, Visaji's success eclipsed his achievements. The result was that the Rana requested Palmer to remain at Gohad only. On the third of August the English captured the fort of Gwalior by a brilliant night escalade.

Considerably agitated by the increasing influence of the English in Gujarat, Nana persuaded Hyder Ali to start hostilities against them. Accordingly Hyder Ali's armies poured down the Karnatak passes to lay waste the coastal plains of Madras. At the same time the French made frantic efforts to capture Chenapatum and punish the English. The result was that while Goddard was confronted with a formidable force of the Marathas in Gujarat and Malwa, he was compelled by Hastings to dispatch large reinforcements to Madras under Sir Eyre Coote, to counteract Hyder Ali's devastations.

While the movements of the English troops were in progress, Hyder Ali's attack against the English continued unabated. He was quite confident of defeating the English specially as the Portuguese had promised him their co-operation at Mushipatam, and he assured Nana in his letter of July 1780, of his resolve of punishing the English, at Madras and proceeding to Poona to defeat Goddard.

Hardly had Hyder Ali's campaign commenced in the South, when the Marathas proved aggressive in Malwa. Fresh contingents were despatched by Sindia and Holkar to establish order in that province, and Sindia with the co-operation
of the Raja of Rajgad inflicted a severe defeat on the English near Seronj. The rout of the English at Seronj cost them two thousand lives, and compelled them to open negotiations with Sindia. At this juncture news also reached Nana of the brilliant victory of Hyder Ali in the South. Hyder Ali had skilfully surrounded and completely annihilated the English army. Thus, by the summer of 1780 the prestige of the English in this country was considerably lowered.

Despite these developments, Nana persisted in his endeavours to intensify the opposition to the English. Thus we find him urging the Emperor through Hingne to compose his differences with the Sikhs and direct his armies to assist Sindia against the English. In another letter addressed to Parsarambhou, Nana instructed him to strengthen the front against the enemy.

In the meantime intelligence reached Nana that Satvoji Bhosala and Manaji Sindia who were partisans of Raghunathrao, had let loose, plunder and arson in Karad but Nana successfully suppressed the disturbance before they could assume serious complexion. This was perhaps due to the fact that Raghunathrao in whose favour Satvoji and Manaji were agitating, had himself become completely disgruntled, owing to the increasing influence of the English, in his own affairs.

Though Nana had cause to be gratified with the rise in the prestige of the Marathas, he was well aware of the dangerous designs of the English in India. In his letter to Sindia, Nana observed, “the English have been essaying approaches through Mohd. Ali Khan of Arcot, professing that they would join the Peshwa and destroy Hyder Ali, while they were simultaneously instigating Hyder Ali with a similar promise to destroy the power of the Peshwa with his co-operation. But Hyder Ali who fully knew the machinations of the English addressed Nana pressing him to continue the war against them relentlessly; his letter of 14th August 1780 is a proof of his correct reading of British diplomacy, according to which the English had realised that they would never be able to succeed, so long as the Marathas and Hyder Ali pulled together.
In the midst of these manoeuvrings for advantage, news reached Nana, that Baillie and Munro had been completely routed by the forces of Hyder Ali in the battle of Arcot.\textsuperscript{109} Congratulating him on his splendid achievement, Nana expressed particular satisfaction because Arcot had been a station of the Masmud for several years and was very securely protected.\textsuperscript{110} Nana was convinced of the superior power of the Mysore ruler and promised him his sincere co-operation till Chenapatum was subjugated and the English exterminated.\textsuperscript{111}

While Hyder Ali had thus rendered the English army absolutely helpless in Madras, Nana despatched large contingents of Poona troops who descended through the Ghats and completely devastated the environs of Bombay, much to the annoyance of the English.\textsuperscript{112} He also took comprehensive measures for the protection of the Bombay-Poona passes.\textsuperscript{113} But while Nana's preparations were speeding completion, Goddard made an attack on Bassein on 11th December 1779 and threatened the Bor-Ghat.\textsuperscript{114} Confronted with a formidable foe, Nana started preparations for a stiff opposition by mobilising all his sources. In the meantime intelligence reached Nana, according to which, Raghunathrao was to establish his firm hold in Gujarat and then to proceed to attack Poona, where he was to be joined by five Sardars of repute, while the English were to despatch their forces through the Bor-Ghat, to create disturbances in the Konkan.\textsuperscript{115} Nana was also informed of acute scarcity of provender in Bombay,\textsuperscript{116} which caused the English to proceed to Salsette, Uran and Belapur.\textsuperscript{117} Anticipating an attack on Bassein,\textsuperscript{118} Nana sent reinforcements in defence of that city under Ramchandra Ganesh and Bajipant Anna.\textsuperscript{119} The strength of the English army was however so formidable that the Marathas had to retreat.\textsuperscript{120} Just then, news reached Nana, that Goddard had been repulsed at Bassein and that his army was proceeding to the Konkan.\textsuperscript{121} But it proved to be a mere pretence on the part of Goddard who attacked Bassein again on 13th November 1780 and finally captured it on 11th December of the same year.\textsuperscript{122} Ramchandra Ganesh fell in the attack and the Marathas suffered a setback.\textsuperscript{123} Nana despatched fresh reinforcements under Bajipant Anna but he was obliged to return owing to the heavy pressure of the English.\textsuperscript{124} The Bombay Government in anti-
icipation of the return of their army, under Colonel Hartley, posted piquets from Kalyan to Bor-Ghat.\textsuperscript{125}

Considerably incensed at the increasing pressure of the English, near Bor-Ghat, Nana issued immediate instructions to the Maratha chief, Hariharao Patwardhan, to repair to Poona, forthwith.\textsuperscript{126} He also informed Sindia of Goddard’s visit to Bombay,\textsuperscript{127} apprising him of all the details of the arrangements that were made for the defence of Bassein and Kalyan.\textsuperscript{128} Further he urged Sindia to move towards Kondaibari which commanded a key position for the movements of the troops, as he anticipated that the English would concentrate troops against Poona.\textsuperscript{129} As expected, in the month of August, the English captured Thana.\textsuperscript{130} It was necessary to hamper the progress of their army, and so it was decided that Nana and Haripant should march with ten thousand men down the Rajmachi Ghat and cut off communications of Hartley.\textsuperscript{131} But in spite of the stubborn opposition of the Maratha forces, Goddard succeeded in advancing as far as Bor-Ghat.\textsuperscript{132}

Nana was annoyed at the progress Goddard had made and seriously indicted Parsharambhau, expressing surprise at Goddard’s advance, in the face of an army of ten to twelve thousand, stationed over there.\textsuperscript{133} Nana immediately issued instructions directing Haripant to reach Bor-Ghat within three days.\textsuperscript{134} On 29th January 1781 he held consultations with Holkar and discussed the position of the Maratha army.\textsuperscript{135}

In spite of these precautions, however, Goddard’s progress continued unabated. Considerably annoyed at the advance of Goddard, Nana, in his letter of 16th February reproached Holkar and Haripant for allowing Goddard to reach the top of Bor-Ghat, when both of them were following him.\textsuperscript{136} He even interrogated Parsharambhau as to how provisions could reach Goddard in spite of the formidable strength of the Marathas.\textsuperscript{137} These reprimands had the desired effect in that more than two thousand bullocks with three camels and five carts, all loaded with provisions of the English, were taken away by Parsharambhau.\textsuperscript{138}

Congratulating the latter on his daring enterprise, Nana in his letter of 9th April 1781 directed him to move towards the fort of Kohaja, from where it was easier to plunder the provi-
sions of the English, coming from Surat. On 4th of May there was a meeting between Nana and Parsharambhau when the latter was given directions to blockade the English at Bombay. Thus Nana completely thwarted the English plans. In his letter to Sindia of 28th March 1781 he gave the details of the rout suffered by the English. He said that Holkar Parsharambhau and Haripant Phadke reconnoitred the terrain, located the enemy and inflicted on them severe defeat; they devastated the whole track upto Panvel; the result was that the English could get no supplies; Goddard receiving fresh reinforcements from Bombay, tried his utmost to bring the necessary provisions from Panvel; but the enemy was subjected to a rigorous guerilla warfare; constant skirmishes ensued below the Bor-Ghat in which the English sustained several setbacks resulting in severe losses; their forces were attacked several times and the enemy was routed in the vicinity of Campoli, Chowk and Panvel.

Despite these developments, Nana was still endeavouring to stifle the opposition to the English. For this purpose he directed Naropant, the Maratha commander, to ascertain the strength of the English from their deserters who were in his custody.

In the meantime Nana was considerably encouraged in his endeavours against the enemy by Sindia's reply in which the latter assured him of all sacrifices in exerting the utmost pressure on the English. Nana now decided to embark on a complete blockade of the English settlements of Bombay. His plan frightened Goddard to such an extent that he wrote to Bombay, in one of his letters which fell into the hands of Parsharambhau, that, "we would have to court total disaster, if the experiment of blockade were seriously enforced." On 29th of March 1781 the English again endeavoured to carry provisions from Panvel with an escort of three regiments under Colonel Brown. But Nana's scheme proved so successful that four thousand bullocks were seized by the Marathas. A similar attempt was made by Col. Macky but this also was thwarted by Parsharambhau. On 12th of April the enemy once again struggled to carry supplies from Panvel but they were frequently waylaid and harassed by Parsharambhau in
front and Holkar in the rear. Thus Nana’s scheme was quite successful.

Encouraged by the reports of the plunder of Goddard’s provisions, Nana now posted piquets at Campoli as he feared that the enemy might escape by Khalapur.

Cornered by the Marathas, Goddard realised the utter impossibility of further advance in spite of fresh reinforcements from Bombay and he decided to try his fortunes in retreat. Amid great hazard, he performed the most creditable feat of returning to Bombay alive, even though his forces suffered unprecedented losses which included the death of Captain Walker at Panvel.

In the meantime it was reported to Nana that the English had received their supplies from Surat. Nana issued immediate orders to blockade Surat and Bombay and thus to harass the enemy as much as possible. On 10th of August, Baburao Salankhe and Harji Naik were specially appointed to organise the blockade with instructions to engage fifty other assistants for the purpose of stopping all goods going to Bombay.

Elated by his victory over Goddard, Nana in his letter of 31st May 1781 informed Hingne that Haripant, Holkar and Parsharambhai inflicted crushing defeat on the English in the Gaths and at Panvel and that the intelligence be conveyed to the Emperor and Najab Khan. At the same time Nana addressed Hyder Ali apprising him of the rout of Goddard near the Bor-Ghat.

The reverses suffered by the English in all the theatres of war—at the hands of Chetsingh at Benares, of Sindia at Kularas, of Hyder Ali at Chenapatam—had dealt a staggering blow to their ambitions, while Goddard’s retreat from Bor-Ghat involving unprecedented losses, rendered them utterly despondent. They were now praying for peace at all costs. To make matters still worse for them, the blockade of Bombay and Surat placed them in such a critical situation that they apprehended fatal consequences if peace with the Peshwa was not concluded immediately.

Though the enemy was reduced to bitter straits, Nana still
endeavoured to stiffen his opposition; for this purpose he once again addressed the Emperor urging him to withdraw his forces engaged against the Sikhs and direct them to Sipri to supplement Sindia’s army. Nana was gratified to learn from Hingne that both the Emperor and Najabkhan were in agreement with his views and that the Emperor was in no way under the obligations of the English. This was followed by another letter from Hingne dated 15th August 1781 in which he stated that the Emperor had unequivocally expressed his anxiety to co-operate with the Peshwa and added that he had directed speedy settlement of his dispute with the Sikhs and movement of his forces to Sipri to assist Sindia. In order to take advantage of the Emperor’s favourable disposition, Nana again addressed him on 24th October 1781, earnestly urging him to execute his plans without further delay. Nana had already despatched a contingent from Poona under Balvantrao Dhondev, a general of repute, in order to strengthen the forces of Sindia who was facing Col. Muir in Malwa. At the same time, Sindia had received some assistance from Indore. If at such a juncture, the Emperor’s armies were joined with Sindia’s troops, Nana was confident of Sindia’s success over Muir. It was with this purpose in view that Nana started frequently addressing the Emperor through Hingne. In his reply to Nana the Emperor agreed to commence hostilities against the English. He ordered Mohamed Beg and Anupgar Gosavi, two military chiefs, to join Sindia and promised to proceed to Agra in order to hold consultations with him.

The English were seriously incensed at Hingne’s frequent approaches to the Emperor which were evidently against their interests; and they engaged Latapat Alikhan Khoja who was in charge of four regiments to compass Hingne’s death. Hingne however outwitted them in their designs. The English then sent Hall their representative to the Emperor on an ostensibly mission of training his forces but really for creating discontent in his army. But the astute Hingne rose equal to the occasion and Hall had to return disappointed. These developments frightened the Emperor who apprehended that the English might attack him as they were near Gwalior which afforded them an easy approach to Delhi. He was now anxious to proceed to Agra to meet Sindia, but was deterred by
Najabkhan who urged him to modify the terms offered by the latter.\textsuperscript{173} Hinge however convinced the Emperor of the necessity of an early agreement and in the month of August he succeeded in securing a draft-treaty prepared by Najabkhan. According to this treaty the army of Najabkhan was to fight in co-operation with the Marathas and that the conquered territory was to be divided between the two.\textsuperscript{174}

Thus it was that while Nana, Hinge and Sindia were endeavouring relentlessly to contain the Emperor in their fold, the English were anxious to counter their moves. Knowing that Hinge was trying to conclude an entente with the Emperor, the English deputed their representative Mir Khalil to win over the Emperor to their side. They offered him fifty lakhs of rupees for discarding the Marathas.\textsuperscript{175}

Despite these developments, however, Hinge successfully counteracted the English blandishments to the Emperor and preserved him in his loyalty to the Maratha cause.\textsuperscript{176} In his communication to Nana dated 31st May, Hinge stated that he had obtained an agreement (Ahadpaiman) from the Emperor in favour of Nana and further promised to secure another, on behalf of Sindia also.\textsuperscript{177} He however informed Nana against trusting too much on the Emperor's help since till the conclusion of the war with the Sikhs, the Emperor could really be of little or no assistance to Sindia.\textsuperscript{178}

While Nana was anxiously awaiting early co-operation between the Emperor and Sindia, Najabkhan died and Mirza Safee and Afrasiyabkhan, the Emperor's representatives went to Agra with him and held prolonged consultations with Sindia near the Chameli.\textsuperscript{179} The Emperor earnestly urged Sindia to manage the affairs of the Empire, as a permanent measure. Sindia promised to undertake the responsibility, after he was free from his commitments to Gwalior and Dohad.\textsuperscript{180}

Amidst these developments on the Northern front, Hyder Ali wrote to Nana, urging him not to enter into any treaty with the English and promising all assistance for retrieving Bassein and Salsette from them.\textsuperscript{181}

The English had by now become so restive and demoralised that they began contacting Nana through every agency,
that was possible. They had grown repentent of their hostilities against the Marathas, which had reduced their financial position to a breaking point. The blockade of their settlements was still continuing and they were apprehensive of the arrival of a French fleet on the East Coast. The whole of Bengal was in famine and starvation. But their greatest headache was the strong alliance between Nana and Hyder Ali, which all their machinations had utterly failed to disrupt. Under these circumstances Macartney in conjunction with Coote, addressed Nana in September 1781 with proposals for an accommodation. In the month of February 1782, Watherstone was deputed to Poona for obtaining permission for the march of English troops which were to canton at Surat. Nana however would not agree. But the Supreme Government had now become weary of the prolonged Maratha war, and desired to bring it to a close, at almost any sacrifice. It was glad to have the final treaty concluded at Salbai between Anderson and Sindia on 17th May 1782.

2. Alfred Lyall, British Dominion in India, p. 194.
5. A. Lyall, op. cit., p. 201.
6. CPC, Vol. VI, No. 12; SPDD, No. 23, pp. 348, 357.
* In his letter to the Ministers Raghunathrao regrets for his misbehaviour and declares that he would never again endeavour to secure the seat of the Peshwa (SPD, Vol. V, No. 97). The news was conveyed to Sindia and Holkar when they attended the thread-ceremony of Savai Madhavrao on 18th April 1779 (ALS, Vol. VII, 2498).
7. Ibid.
10. Ibid., No. 2024.
* In his letter written on behalf of his master Futty Singh, Bappaji says, "My master when lately at Poona, met with such treatment that obliged him to leave it suddenly and is so much incensed thereat that he wishes to shake off all connections with Madhavrao, for which he proposes a
defensive alliance with the Company,” (SPDD, No. 13, pp. 60-61 and No. 21, p. 250.
22. ALS, Lekh 2516.
* Nana and Sindia took a vow to keep together in weal and woe (Parasnis, Itihas Sangraha, Junya Aitihasik Goshti, No. 14).
23. MSYYK, Lekh 101; Itihas Sangraha, Aitihasik Tipne, Bhag I, p. 56.
24. Macdonald, A Memoir of the Life of the Late Nana Farnavis, p. 56.
25. Ibid.
* Feigned animosity between Nana and Sindia:

Writing from the Baroda camp on 17th March 1780, Goddard says: “Sindia desires Raghoba to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, as was decided at Talegaon; . . . Raghoba should immediately go to Jhansi, with actual management of the office of Divan being entirely left to Sindia by which the sole control and direction of government should come into Sindia’s hands. This was what Sindia had authorised Abaji to propose, without any reservation. Thus Sindia wanted Raghoba and his son into his own power by which means, he meant to aggrandize himself in the state without regard to the interests of the English, and through their means to make his terms with the Minister. The proposal clearly shows Sindia’s enmity to the Minister Nana Fadnavis, and his wish to unite with the English in removing Nana from administration,” (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 407; Purandare, Daftar, Bhag II, p. 9).

The above account though misguiding to some extent had no truth in it as can be ascertained from Goddard’s letter of 24th May 1780 in which he says that Sindia’s conduct was just a show of animosity between him and Nana which was a pretext to deceive the English (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 408).

27. Ibid., p. 404.
29. Ibid., No. 1956.
* The Nizam, at the same time, wrote to the Governor General, promising adherence to his former treaties, in order to escape their anger (CPC, Vol. V, No. 1335). According to
the treaty of 1766 as revised in 1768 the English held the Northern Circars by agreeing to pay an annual tribute of nine lakhs to the Nizam. The Circar of Guntoor was however granted for life to the Nizam's brother Baslatjung. As a result of this a deduction of two lakhs was made in the stipulated annual tribute of nine lakhs, the Company holding only four out of five Circars. But in course of time Baslatjung employed French troops to the chagrin of the Madras Government. Rumbold the Governor of Madras opened negotiations with Baslatjung without the knowledge of the Nizam and succeeded in securing the Circar of Guntoor from the latter. The Circar so obtained was leased by the Government of Madras to Nawab Muhomed Ali Waljah. This alienated not only the Nizam but Haider Ali who had long had his eye on the Circar of Guntoor, (R. M. Martin, The Indian Empire, Vol. I, pp. 344-50).

33. Ibid., No. 1732.
34. Ibid., No. 1594.
35. Ibid., No. 1706.
37. Ibid., Lekh 2464.

* Nana's task of bringing about this coalition was aided to some extent by the oppressive administration of the Madras Government. The Poligar affair is an instance in point: In 1772 the Madras Presidency made a war upon the Poligars of the adjacent districts called the Marwars, without any rhyme or reason. The result was that the Poligar of the Greater Marwar (a boy of twelve years of age) was made a prisoner in April 1772 while that of the lesser Marwar was slain through some misunderstanding between the English commander and the son of the Nawab Omdut-al-omrah, the two Marwars thus being captured by the English of Madras, (Martin, The Indian Empire, Vol. I, pp. 345-48; CPC, Vol. V, p. xviii).

Hyder Ali was considerably incensed at this development as he had an eye on the Marwars for a long time. Nana was naturally anxious to exploit the situation to the fullest.

44. MSYK, Lekh 83.
45. CPC, V, No. 1706.

* Commenting on Hyder Ali's bargaining disposition, Nana observes, "in great kingdoms, state promises and plighted
word, constitute state treasure” but Hyder Ali did not hesitate to break his own promise which he had conveyed through Krishnarao Joshi, (Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, Khanda 19, Lekh 69).

46. Ibid., Lekh 84.
47. Rajwade, op. cit., Lekh 73.
49. DYMHR, pp. 1 & 31.
50. G. H. Khare, Hingne Daftar, 2/87.
51. DYMHR, No. 1; CPC, Vol. V, No. 1756, sub-para four.
52. DYMHR, p. 1.
53. Ibid., p. 5.
54. Ibid., p. 15.
58. Ibid., No. 231.
   * At this juncture a rumour had gained currency that Nana was seriously thinking of taking a trip to Goa (Pissurlekar, Portugueese Maratas, Vol. VI, p. 160, letter of Narayan Shenvi Dhume, the Portuguese Vakil at Poona, dated 23rd August, 1780).
63. MSYK, Lekh 54 and 55; Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat Ootur-Vibhag, part I, p. 285.
64. CPC, Vol. V, No. 1607.
   * Khandoji Bhosala was the son of Mudhoji and the younger brother of Raghiji. Khandoji was popularly known as Chimanaaji. It was under Khandoji’s command that a large force had marched from Nagpur to Orissa. He was to invade Bengal and exact chauth (Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 99).
† According to Nana’s plan, Mudhoji had undertaken to lay waste the whole of Bengal; one of his armies lay across the very route which Col. Pearse had to follow, and another was ready to penetrate through Ouddh into Bengal itself. It was this strategic position of Mudhoji’s army that compelled Hastings to purchase his neutrality at such a heavy price. (DMYR, p. 3; Gleig, Memoirs of the Life of the Rt. Hon. Warren Hastings, Vol. II, p. 355).

70. Gleig, op. cit., p. 358.

   When the news of Fatehsingh’s treaty with the English reached Poona, Nana and Sindia warned him of the evil consequences that would attend his move but he decided to throw in his lot with Goddard (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 394.).


73. Wills, British Relations with the Nagpur State, p. 80.


75. KPY, Lekh 274, 321.

76. Aitihasik Patravyavahar, Lekh 193.


79. DYMRR, p. 4.

80. Ibid., p. 5.
   * Hastings’ policy towards the Marathas was objected to by Francis, which resulted in a scuffle; both of them fired together but Francis’ pistol missed fire and he changed it. Francis was wounded but did not die, (PDMV, Letter of Lala Sevakram dated 18th October 1780; Lawson, Private Life of Warren Hastings, Notes of 17th October 1780.)

81. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 381.

82. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 383.

83. Ibid., No. 379.

84. Ibid., No. 378.


86. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 386.


89. Ibid.
   * “Ever since the authority of the king has been ruined in Gohad, the Marathas have been the only people to possess dominions here. Rajas and Chiefs, both big and small, pay their tribute as also Chauth for their inherited possessions. It is very difficult to shake off the terror of the Marathas from their minds” (CPC, Vol. V, No. 1806, sub-para 2, letter from the Rana of Gohad, to the Governor-General through Tafazzul Husainkhan.)


97. SPD., Vol. 36, No. 397.

* "The Raja of Rajgad and Chanderi joined me and we de-
  feated, the English at Seronj" says Sindia in his letter to
  Nana, dated the 28th February 1781. Sindia further states
  that he was receiving solicitations of the English to allow
  their army to retreat peacefully. In reply to Sindia's let-
  ter, Nana observes: "the English are quite faithless and
  should never be trusted. They will amuse and humour you
  till they are cornered and shall not fail to attack you no
  sooner they will have regained their strength". *(KPY, Lekh
  231 and 310; the letter is quite unique in that the con-
  tents have not been recorded anywhere in English sources;
  ALS, Vol. VII, p. 3600).*


100. Ibid., p. 195.

101. DYMR, Lekh 35.


103. Ibid., Lekh 2543.

104. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 388.

105. KPY, Lekh 277.

106. Ibid., Lekh 284.

107. Ibid., Lekh 278.


110. Ibid., Lekh 296 and 472.


113. Ibid., No. 367, 374.


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117. Ibid., No. 396.

118. Ibid., No. 404.


121. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 403.


123. Ibid., 3533.

124. Ibid.; 3532.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid., Lekh 2562.


128. MSYK, Lekh 121.

129. Ibid., Lekh 111.

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133. Ibid., pp. 3602-3.
134. Ibid., Lekh 2577.
135. Ibid., Lekh 2576.
136. Ibid., Lekh 2585.
137. Ibid., Lekh 2609.
139. Ibid., p. 3616.
140. Ibid., Lekh 2623.

* Panwell: A town in the (then) province of Aurangabad, twenty seven miles East Bombay; Lat. 90° N. Long. 73° E.

The river Pan flows up to it seven miles from the harbour; the ruins of a small fort still remain at the entrance, built in 1662 by the Maratha Raja to protect the low districts in the neighbourhood, from the eruptions of the Siddhis, then in the service of Aurangzeb. The town of Panwell is extensive and being well situated carries on a considerable trade (Walter Hamilton, The East India Gazetteer, pp. 642-43).

142. MSYK, Lekh 109, 128, 131, 134; KPY, Lekh 274.
143. MSYK, Lekh 310.
149. SPD., Vol. 36, No. 408.
151. SPD., Vol. 36, No. 410.
152. Ibid., No. 409.
153. Ibid., No. 405.
154. Ibid., No. 426.
155. Ibid., No. 413, 411.
156. DYMRR, Lekh 60; Rajwade, op. cit., Vol. 12, Lekh 15.
158. SPD, Vol. 36, No. 401.
162. Aitihasik Tipne, 3/18, 28; Alfred Lyall, op. cit., p. 197.
163. DYMR, Lekh 31, 43, 63; PDMV, p. 66.
165. DYMR, p. 50.
166. DYMR, p. 62.
167. Ibid., pp. 53 and 56.
168. Ibid., p. 57.
169. Ibid., pp. 33-34, 62.
170. Ibid., p. 39.
171. DYMR, p. 41.
172. Ibid., p. 43.
173. Ibid., p. 45.
174. Ibid., p. 45.
175. DYMR, p. 47.
176. Ibid., p. 48.
177. Ibid., P. 30.
179. Ibid., p. 69.
180. DYMR, p. 66.
   In his letter to Nana, Mudhoji Bhosala of Nagpur says, “I have come to realise that my Kingdom is worth the name, only if the central power—the Peshwa’s government continues powerful”. (Aitihasik Patravyavahar, Lekh 203; SPD, Vol. 36, No. 423; ALS, VII, p. 3549.)
184. Ibid.
Chapter VI

THE TREATY OF SALBAI: 1781-83

While Nana was successfully circumventing the machinations of the English at Bombay, the severe defeat inflicted on Col. Muir by Sindia, near Sipri, rendered Warren Hastings extremely nervous about the British position in India and he ardently desired to bring the hostilities to a close.\(^1\)

On 1st of March 1781 Goddard wrote to Nana, "notwithstanding you are already fully acquainted with the friendly sentiments of the English, and their earnest desire for peace with the Maratha state, which have been communicated to you, yet, in order to convince you still more of the sincerity of my intentions and that you may not possibly urge an excuse for neglecting the interests of the Sarkar, at this important and dangerous time, your ignorance of the favourable and very friendly disposition of the English towards you, I now enclose the proposals of the Hon’ble the Governor General and Council of Bengal, for conducting a treaty of perpetual alliance with the Maratha state, original of which has been transmitted to them by you, through the mediation of Mudhoji Bhosala, the Raja of Berar."\(^2\) In his communication of 9th January 1781 to Nana, Mudhoji Bhosala had indicated the willingness of the Governor General to conclude a treaty on the lines of the one, conducted by Col. Upton agreeing to withdraw entirely from Gujrat, the dependencies of Surat, and the Konkan. He had added that if Raghunathrao were also delivered up to Nana, a treaty would be within the bounds of possibility.\(^3\) From the outset, Nana had never desired a war with the English but it had been thrust upon him by the Governor of Bombay.\(^4\)

Though Nana's personal influence and prestige had been considerably enhanced by the offer of peace, by the English, he was not blind to the implications of such a step. In a letter to Sindia he said, "no sooner we open peace parleys with the English, than we will have lost the co-operation of Hyder Ali."\(^5\) While he was thus moving with the utmost circumspection, the
sympathisers and friends of the English, like the Bhosala of Nagpur, started blaming the Governor of Bombay, for his blatant espousal of the cause of Raghunathrao.6

In the light of the proposals for peace, C. Morgan, Anderson’s secretary submitted to Nana a request for the grant of a permit for the English army to pass through Maratha territory. But Nana skilfully avoided the issue.7 While Sindia defeated Muir near Sipri, intelligence reached Nana that the English army had suddenly increased its pressure as a result of the arrival of thirty men-of-war from England, near Chenapatum.8 But Nana’s political boldness was in sharp contrast with his personal timidity9 and this development caused him no alarm.

Although he was eager to make peace with the English, Nana was equally anxious to exploit the opportunity of the peace offer, to his maximum advantage. In his reply of 15th March 1781 Nana pointed out that a firm and constant friendly intercourse had long subsisted between the two Sarkars till it had been interrupted by the aggressive policy of the English and further remarked, “it is incumbent upon you to make a treaty that shall include the proposals of those persons who are alluded to and connected with, the Councils of this Sarkar.”e Accordingly in reply to Sindia who had informed him that Col. Muir wanted to start peace parleys through him, Nana wrote, “the sincere regard and friendship subsisting betwixt the Shrimant Pradhan and the Nawab Hyder Ali Khan is more conspicuous and shining than the splendour of the sun; therefore it is expedient and advisable that you send a confidential person and after a meeting has taken place with him, we shall mutually confer upon business.”10

Just about the time news reached Nana that Raghunathrao had grown wearied of this friendship with the English, as the latter had discontinued his usual allowance.11

Confident of his unassailable position, Nana employed all manner of excuses for procrastination. He was aware that the struggle was a sort of a triangular contest between the Marathas, the English and Hyder Ali and that until one or the other emerged victorious any convention or truce would only prove hollow and temporary.12 Thus while Hastings dreaded nothing as much as delay, Nana made every effort to gain time, thereby
displaying his outstanding diplomacy. Hastings was particularly apprehensive, lest Nana should learn of the arrival of a French force and throw himself into the hands of Hyder Ali. But that was not the case with Sindia. In his interview with him in the month of August 1781, Col. Muir discovered the latter’s readiness to treat, provided Salsette, Bassein and other places near Bombay were restored to the Peshwa and Muir at once agreed to Sindia’s offer. Accordingly a truce was effected between Muir and Sindia on 13th October 1781. But the English had become so panicke that they addressed Nana again through Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras, and Sir John Macpherson, Member of the Governor-General’s Council, indicating their anxiety to conclude immediately a peace and a treaty of friendship. Thus there sprang up several agencies in the field working to arrange an entente: Hastings through Muir and Sindia; Mudhoji Bhosala acting on the instructions of Hastings; Captain Watherstone the trusted agent of Goddard; and the Nawab Muhammad Ali of Arcot, acting as a mediator, on the instructions of the Governor of Madras. We shall presently study Nana’s reaction to these moves.

Nana had already indicated to Hastings that no treaty would be complete which did not include surrender of Raghunathrao and Salsette, as the basis. His policy was to profess intimate friendship with Hyder Ali and thereby to threaten Hastings; while at the same time inducing Hyder Ali to restore to the Marathas territories which he had unlawfully seized from them. Accordingly Nana wrote to Hyder Ali informing him of Sindia’s willingness to conclude a treaty with the English and promised him that he would not ratify Sindia’s treaty if he agreed to make over to the Peshwa all the territories he had wrested from him prior to the commencement of the Anglo-Maratha War. Also Nana entered into clandestine communications with the French with a view to enlisting their assistance.

Observing Nana’s designs, Hastings decided to placate Sindia and by this means not only to secure peace with the Marathas but to sow the apple of discord between the two Maratha leaders. It was expected by Hastings that the conclusion of a truce between the English and Sindia would antagonise Nana against the latter, and in consequence Nana would
punish Sindia by annexing his territory. To confirm Nana in his belief, Hastings ordered movement of British troops in order to impress Nana that they were being sent to Sindia's assistance. But Nana was too astute to be taken in by this strategy.  

Confronted with such a delicate situation, Nana preferred to watch developments, when intelligence reached him that a French army of seven thousand had arrived at Gudur and that Samru was proceeding to Poona. Nana's position was thus considerably improved while a staggering blow was dealt to the scheme of Hastings. In his panic Hastings urged Anderson to arrange peace with the Marathas on any terms. "It is not peace with conditions of advantage that we want," he wrote, "but a speedy peace; and we would rather purchase it with the sacrifice of every foot of ground that we have acquired from the Marathas"; and continuing, "nothing could be so unseasonable than the appearance of a French armament at this time on the coast; happily its worst effects are past (because peace was declared in Europe); it would have been no less than extirpation of our nation from the Carnatic."  

Coincidently Nana began making arrangements for the performance of the Peshwa's nuptials in Poona and both the Nizam and Mudhoji Bhosala promised to be present. The meeting was to decide either on a renewal of the Confederacy or on a peace. In an attempt to forestall decision, Hastings sent Anderson to Sindia for the purpose of concluding the treaty, even though he was doubtful of Sindia's authority for making a general peace.  

With a view to increasing the difficulties of the English, Nana with his usual perspicacity tried to have the negotiations transferred to Poona where Watherstone had already reached to open the peace-talks, and asked Sindia to repair to Poona with Anderson. His plan was to impress upon the Indian potentates the power and prestige of the Peshwa and to secure the most favourable terms from the English. Fearing that an understanding between Nana and Hyder Ali might throw a spanner into the delicate peace-works started by Anderson and Sindia, Hastings contrived to keep Sindia away from Poona. It was for the purpose of conciliating him that Hastings brought himself to consent to the dismemberment of the possessions of the
unlucky Rana of Gohad (Dholpur) though he had been an ally of the English. Sindia informed Nana that he could not move to Poona as the negotiations required frequent reference to Hastings who had planted-himself near Benares. Moreover, the English were strongly entrenched near Allahabad and there were not a few chiefs in the North, eager to take advantage of any weakening of the Maratha position.26

Observing on this incident Lyall says, "Nana a man of high degree of statecraft saw that by holding the decision in suspense, he could keep in his hands the balance of power between Hyder Ali and Hastings. Hastings cautioned Nana that Tipu, Hyder Ali’s son, would soon after turn against Poona, but the far-reaching statesman found it safer to conciliate the ruler of Mysore than the English.27

In the meantime Nana received independent overtures for a peace, from all three presidencies. These simultaneous approaches reacted on the whole situation with unhappy results for the English policy.28

Nana was bound in a solemn engagement of the confederaody with Hyder Ali, not to make peace separately on any account but to act jointly in every step that was to be taken. Thus Hyder Ali’s inclusion in the treaty became a point of honour with Nana.29 In a letter to Sindia he expressly urged the need for including Hyder Ali even though the English were unwilling to concede that point.30 While in his letter of 31st December 1782 Nana pointed out to Sindia the reasonableness of respecting his pledged word to Hyder Ali and unequivocally cautioned him that discarding Hyder Ali would be tantamount to treachery and would reflect upon the dignity of the Peshwa.9

Amid these developments Nana was informed by Hingne that Najabkhan had died and, the Emperor had become impatient to entrust all his affairs to the Marathas. He also informed Sindia that it was an opportunity for him to secure not only monetary gains but many other solid advantages; and that an occasion of that kind may not come again. Appropriately enough, Nana in his letter of 20th June 1782 informed Sindia that it was most essential on his part to take the affairs of the Emperor in his own hands as little effort was sure to earn great advantages.31 But Sindia was obliged to hesitate for some time.
He knew well that he would get no support from Poona in money or in troops, as the treaty with the English was not ratified, much less could he, with his past experience, rely on the Mughal Court in times of emergency, due to their dubious behaviour.

While Nana was asking Sindia to hold out and protract the negotiations with Anderson on the ground that no separate peace could be made without reference to Hyder Ali, the ruler of Mysore was in no mood to yield as he was expecting the arrival of the French to his assistance to drive the English out of India.

Though Nana's argument had much moral force in it, there was another equally powerful consideration put forth by Sindia which demanded immediate ratification of the treaty. It was that as the peace-talks were not finally concluded, the large force collected for the war could not be disbanded. Hence he urged Nana to endorse the treaty without reference to Hyder Ali.

Nana's main motive was to get back all the conquests made by the English during the seven years of war, specially Thana Salsette, Bassein, Broach and Ahmedabad, as the war was provoked by them. In order to gain his ends he administered a terrific shock to the English by giving out a rumour that the Peshwa's government was negotiating a separate treaty with Hyder Ali.

The English could not but be extremely sensitive to this news. Seeing that Nana was still plotting their ruin, Hastings directed Anderson to conclude the treaty with Sindia, as early as possible. He was so much confused at Nana's intrigues that in his letter of 25th August 1782, addressed to Anderson, he expressed his utter inability to guess the reasons of delay for the ratification of the treaty, on the part of Nana. Hastings was not certain that Anderson would succeed in his mission. He was afraid of Nana and Hyder Ali. In order to counter Nana's influence on Sindia, he made large retrocessions of territory to the Marathas in such a way that the lion's share went to Sindia. He conceded all the demands of the latter and was eagerly looking for signs of disruption between Sindia and Nana, anticipating that a separation between them might compel the
latter to submit to peace.\textsuperscript{37} Thus despite Nana's opposition, Hastings succeeded in prevailing upon Sindia to ignore Hyder Ali's interests.\textsuperscript{38} The result was that on 17th May 1782 Sindia concluded a treaty with Anderson.\textsuperscript{39} Having thus conciliated Sindia, Hastings now endeavoured through Anderson to secure Sindia's co-operation against Hyder Ali.\textsuperscript{40}

Though the preliminaries of peace could be quickly adjusted, the settlement of the actual terms proved a long and vexatious process because constant reference between Nana and Sindia became necessary. Nana on his part was however little disposed to accord ratification to the treaty as he was still unable to guess Hyder Ali's reaction.\textsuperscript{41} He was not therefore inclined to give up the stand he had taken. He endured all provocations with absolute equanimity, much to the annoyance of Hastings. Nana was particularly disturbed when he came to know that one of the terms of the treaty stipulated: "that the East India Company and the Peshwa request Sindia to be the mutual guarantee for the proper observance of the conditions of the treaty. If either of them violate the conditions, he will endeavour to crush the aggressor.\textsuperscript{42}

Hastings was not unaware of the unusual honour he had done to Sindia by accepting him as a gauranteer for the implementation of the stipulations of the treaty by the Peshwa, his own master. Observing on this step he said: "the Nizam has from the beginning indignantly protested against any peace not made by himself; Mudhoji Bhosala complainingly makes the same objection, and says, it has been seriously proposed to deprive Nana of his authority by giving irregular powers to Sindia.\textsuperscript{43} "I have no doubt that the Nizam and Mudhoji would readily become the guarantees for the treaty; but I do not like to change my measures; I have a claim on Sindia for some attention to me in return for my steadiness to him."\textsuperscript{44}

Thus it was that with a rare knowledge and psychological insight of men and affairs, Hastings stole a march over events, beating even the astute Nana at his own game. It is evident from this development that what he eagerly expected was not merely the conclusion of the treaty but complete disunity between the two chiefs who were the pillars of the Maratha Empire.\textsuperscript{45}
Nana’s delaying tactics had by now become a source of perturbation to Sindia who wanted to attend to the affairs of the Emperor. This prospect was very alluring to him as it held out hopes of establishing Maratha influence at Delhi. His expectations were more brightened for Hastings had promised him a free hand in the affairs of Delhi. The Emperor’s control over affairs was fast slipping from his hands every day; the Jamindars of Dohad and Datia had become obdurate and refused to allow his army to pass through the Panchamahals. 46 Obviously enough, Sindia desired Nana to endorse the treaty without further loss of time. But as Nana would not give in, he threatened him not only with the disruption of the Maratha Empire but with the gravest consequences.

Writing to Macpherson on this issue Hastings said, “Sindia expressed great indignation at Nana’s procrastination and deputed a man express to Poona to demand from Nana the instant ratification of the treaty or to declare that he should treat him as his enemy and join his forces with ours against whosoever should oppose it.” 47

Herein indeed lay the greatness of Hastings, that even though Nana and Sindia had joined forces for several years, he could successfully set them apart, with a degree of statecraft so unique in content and consequence.

Even though Sindia had by then concluded the treaty with Anderson, Hastings was still doubtful about the result. He indulged in various conjectures respecting his policy. In his letter to Anderson he said: “I own that I suspect a move in these delays very foreign from the state of differences in the political opinion of Sindia and Naroo Rao (Nana).” 48

Just at this time Nana was engrossed in persuading Hyder Ali to restore to the Peshwa, the territory north of the Tungabhadra while Hyder Ali on his part was endeavouring to exploit the rivalry between Nana and Sindia to the fullest. 49

Nana and Sindia were moving in opposite directions on the question of the ratification of the treaty. But their object was the same, namely, the preservation of the Maratha Empire in its entirety as a strong bulwark against foreign aggression. 50 Theirs was a conflict in harmony; the age of Nana and Sindia was an age of power-politics, the curse of which is that those
who indulge in them, see no other point of view but their own; right is their monopoly and wrong the hallmark of their opponents. In so far as Sindia's point of view tended to reconcile rather than divide and to bring a sense of balance to an otherwise lopsided situation, it served a useful purpose. Nana had a mind and voice of his own, and was not afraid to express them; but they were never antithetical to those of Sindia; it only meant that though they worked together, one was no mere echo of the other. But their honest differences on the question of ratification of the treaty unwittingly exposed the want of unity in the confederacy. 51

While the two leaders were thus engaged in arguments and counter arguments, an event occurred which finally put an end to all their controversy: it was the death of Hyder Ali at Madras on 7th December, 1782. 52

Hyder Ali's demise gave a new turn to the negotiations between the English and the Marathas that were lingering for a long time. Hastings was very anxious to ascertain from Anderson the effect of Hyder Ali's death on the Maratha politics. He thought that it was a crisis that should shake them out of their spirit and their policy of delay. 53 As expected by Hastings, Hyder Ali's death effected a change in the political climate of the country. Unfortunately for Nana, French succour had failed to reach him in time while peace was concluded between the English and other European powers in the international field; Nana had now no alternative but to endorse the treaty; under compelling circumstances Nana ratified 54 the treaty on 24th February 1783, thereby saving further dissensions between him and Sindia. 9

The treaty of Salbai is an important landmark in the history of India. Though the English tried their hand against the Marathas for about seven years, they suffered a setback so severe that they could not recover their position without considerable effort for a long time. Historians however hold divergent view regarding the achievements and the result of this prolonged contest between the English and the Marathas. Keene says, "when Bruce beat up Sindia's quarters Sindia fled and at once took up the negotiations for peace"; while according to other historians, "the victories of the English increased
their prestige and Sindia had to open negotiations for peace". Writing on the treaty of Salbai Col. C.E. Luard observes, "the effect of the fall of Gwalior and of Bassein, his own defeat and the enhancement of his rival Holkar's reputation by the victory at Borghat; convinced Sindia that his real advantage lay in coming to early terms with the English and he never again took up arms against them; he opened negotiations with Col. Muir and signed a treaty on 13th October 1781."

According to the English sources it is generally believed that Sindia had become apprehensive of his future position and as such he sued for peace. But this view is one-sided. The Gwalior State manuscripts and other original Marathi documents throw a revealing light on this event. It was on 16th February 1781 that Sindia was defeated at Sipri by Carnac. And according to the reports available in the "Mahadji Shinde Kagadpatra," it was Hastings who had sent his representatives Ford and Mussey to Sindia to ascertain if he was willing for an accommodation. If Sindia had been convinced of his helplessness, as has been emphasized by Luard and others, he would have availed himself of the opportunity given by the English. But it was just the contrary. In his reply to the English feelers he said: "I saved your regiments from complete annihilation at the hands of the Marathas at Talegaon and concluded a treaty with you at Vadgaon. But you broke your pledge. I cannot now confide in your word." This clearly proves that he was not at all eager for an accommodation on account of his defeat at their hands. Nor is it correct to state as does Luard that he never again took up arms against the English after his defeat at Sipri on 16th February 1781. For it is well known that on the 1st of July 1781 Sindia in co-operation with the Raja of Rajgad inflicted a crushing defeat on the English killing 2000 men while in his letter to the Peshwa, he even expressed his desire to complete his work in Malwa-Bhesa and come to the Deccan to punish Goddard. In fact the several reverses suffered by the English specially at Benares, Kularas, Muslipatam and Borghat had made them repent of the dangerous aggressive policy they pursued. Hastings had to face severe opposition in his council and when the news of Col. Carnac's defeat near Seronj reached him, he grew extremely nervous about the British position, and moved in several directions for effecting a settlement
with the Marathas. "The truth is," says Gleig, "that the sup-
reme Government had become weary of a Maratha war and
desired at almost any sacrifice, to bring it to a close." 58 It was
not Sinda's flight from Bruce that opened the negotiations for
a general peace; 59 rather it was Hastings who in his sore need
asked Col. Muir to try to find out if Sinda could be induced
to bring about an accommodation. 6

Though the treaty resulted in depriving the Marathas of
the valuable island of Salsette and separating Sinda 6 from
Nana, it did little good to the English who had resorted to
aggression for enlarging their own territories. Observing on
the achievements of the English in the Anglo-Maratha war
Beveridge says, "the Marathas were at peace with the Company
and had done nothing to provoke hostilities. The Bombay
Council, merely because they coveted one of their possessions,
attempted to seize it; war immediately ensued. Hastings who
was then in the minority in his Council condemned it, but no
sooner he obtained the majority than he turned round and
enthusiastically supported it; and the result was first the dis-
graceful convention of Vadgaon; next the humiliating treaty of
Purandar; and lastly the equally humiliating treaty of Salbai
by which the Bombay Presidency was stripped of almost all
its older possessions and nearly confined within its original
island. 60

Despite these facts however it must be admitted that
the English with an astute statesman, no less eminent than
Hastings at the helm of affairs, gave a rude shock to the very
foundations of the Maratha Empire by bringing into play all
types of strategy and statecraft with the main motive of
disrupting their political unity; and they would have certainly
succeeded in their struggle, but for the two eminent Maratha
diplomats—Nana and Sinda—who could correctly read British
politics between the lines and thwart Hastings' dangerous
machinations without much difficulty. Appropriately enough
it was Nana and Sinda for whom Hastings entertained profound
apprehensions; and his fears were not altogether unfounded.
According to Hastings anticipation the French Generals Bussy
and Sufferen came to India to oppose the English. 61 But by
the time the French succour actually arrived, the treaty was
already finalised. Had their fleet reached India prior to the
ratification of the treaty, the English would have been completely worsted. But that was not to be. The year 1782 proved to be a lucky year for the English, not only in India but even abroad: the resignation of Lord North who had been in power as Prime Minister of England since 1770, the repulse of the Franco Spanish attack on Gibraltar, the great naval victory gained by Rodney in the West Indies, the death of Hyder Ali and the treaty of Salbai were all events in their favour. Rodney’s victory in particular gave Briton the command of seas on which depended the retention of India.

Nevertheless the Anglo-Maratha war emphatically underlined the vitality of the Maratha nation which had not been exhausted either by the disaster of Panipat or the death of the great Peshwa Madhavrao.

This was no mean achievement for Nana and Sindia.

4. Ibid., No. 285.
8. Parasnis, Chenapattanakadeel Rajakarane, pp. 11-12.
10. Ibid., pp. 467-68.

* It was a highly difficult task to fight with success against Hyder’s powerful army which in the considered opinion of Sir Eyre Coote was the best appointed and best served” of any that had yet appeared amongst the native powers of India . . .” I am now most cruelly situated” wrote Sir Eyre Coote to the Council in Calcutta on 16th March 1782 (Journal of Indian History, Vol. XX, 1941, Parts I-III, ar-
ticle, "The first two Anglo-Mysore Wars and the Economic Drain of Bengal" by Kalikinkar Datta, pp. 12-21.

16. Ibid., pp. 441, 461, 467.
21. *"My whole aim is to unite the Maratha state in one common cause with us against Hyder Ali", says Hastings "whom I will never quit, if I have the power, till the war is ended with his extirpation", (Gleig, op. cit., pp. 362-63.)
23. Ibid., p. 536.
*In his letter to Anderson Hastings said, "Sindia's merit will be lost in the production of the same and with the participation of others and his influence and credit may suffer by it. If he has no authority, a conditional peace subject to ratification by others be concluded, provided he (Sindia) binds himself to support it and oppose other demands upon us", (Gleig, op. cit., p. 536).
29. MSYK, Lekh 94.
*In conducting the negotiations for peace with Anderson, Nana placed Sindia in a delicate predicament. On the one hand he was anxious to delay the final settlement with the English in order to reap the fullest advantage from the situation; while on the other, he urged Sindia to take the affairs of Shah Alam in his own hands. Thus it was that if Sindia were to proceed to Delhi to attend to the Emperor's affairs, his territory would have been exposed to the mercy of the English, as the treaty was not finally ratified. Had he neglected Delhi-Affairs, the English who had already been well settled in Bengal and had also secured considerable control over Gujrat by their treaty with Fatehsinh Galikwad, might have won over the Emperor in their favour and established their influence in Delhi and Agra. Thus, the whole of North India would have been lost to the Marathas. Weighing the probable consequences of his steps, Sindia decided to expedite the ratification of the treaty with the English by Nana, by any means and
then endeavour to re-establish Maratha influence at Delhi. It was perhaps with this purpose in view that he obtained from the English, an entirely free hand in managing the administration of the Emperor. By his diplomacy Sindia silenced all English intrigue in Delhi-Affairs, (Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 174; Charles Lyall, op. cit., pp. 143-45).

31. KPY, Lekh 349, 351.
34. Keene, Madhavrao Sindia, Rulers of India Series, pp. 82-83.
38. KPY, Lekh 381, 182.
41. Ibid.,
44. Ibid.,
46. DYMIR, p. 81.
49. The late Major E. West, History of the Bombay Karnatak Musalman and Maratha Period, p. 660.
54. Ibid.

* Though St. Lubin had concluded an entente with Nana, the French regiments did not arrive in time. This was perhaps due to the fact that the French were not particularly interested in establishing an Empire in India. Their main intention was to secure for their country huge revenue from India. "A close study of the relevant documents will convince any fair-minded critic," says A. Lehuraux, "that not the foundation of an Empire was Dupleix's dream but the acquisition of a territorial revenue that would give the necessary backing to his commercial undertakings and raise his country's commerce to the foremost place". (Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. XX, pp. 72-75, article, "The Policy of Dupleix" by Mons. A. Lehuraux).
Secret understanding between Sindia and Col. Muir can be explained from the instructions which Hastings wrote from time to time to Col. Muir, in the letters of Hastings, which he himself published on 3rd December, 1781 under the title: ("A Narrative of the Insurrection which happened in the Zamindary of Banaris in the month of August 1781 and of the transactions of the Governor General in that District with an Appendix of Authentic papers and Affidavits", Calcutta, 1781, Appendix 4B, pp. 52-54; Keene, History of India, Vol. I, p. 194.)


* Though the Anglo-Maratha War did little good to the English, it provided a great opportunity for Hastings for the display of his statesmanship. He concluded a treaty with the Dutch because Coote refused to risk an engagement with Hyder Ali. They declared that the Carnatic was almost lost. This treaty was a result of their despondency. By the treaty 1200 European soldiers were to be added to the English army and in return Hastings agreed to cede to the Dutch a territory which scarcely belonged to the English. The importance of Hastings' move lay in the fact that on the one hand the treaty was going to render the Dutch, dependent on the English without sacrificing anything of their own while on the other, it encouraged Coote and his followers considerably. Though the treaty was not required to be implemented, it unmistakably showed Hastings' foresight and tact. (Gleig, Memoirs of the Life of the Rt. Hon. Warren Hastings, p. 357).


* Hastings has been criticised for his indifference to the aggrandisement of Sindia, but the fact was that he could not afford to quarrel with the latter. Perhaps the criticism might have been the result of Hastings' letter to Anderson, dated 17th December 1783, in which he says, "we must bring this business in some way to a conclusion, and I have a claim on Sindia for some attention to me, in return for my steadiness to him. I have no doubt that the Nizam and Moodaji would readily become the guarantees for the treaty as it stands and exact the ratification of it; but I do not like to change my measures; on every condition, I prefer the alliance and security of Mahadjji Sindia" (Gleig, Memoirs of the Life of the Rt. Hon. Warren Hastings, Vol. II, p. 557; Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 121; CHI, Vol. V, p. 271).
If Hastings were to accept the Nizam or Mudhoji Bho-sala as a gaurantee for the treaty, in place of Sindia, he could scarcely have succeeded in separating Patilbaba from Nana. His choice of Sindia was thus quite diplomatic. (CHI, Vol. V, pp. 270-71; Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, pp. 121-22).

But Hastings' arrangement of taking Sindia as a guarantee for the treaty, though ingenious, was in fact illogical and was later on ridiculed by the English Resident Col. Collins, when its implementation was found inconvenient to their own interests. (Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 396).


62. Ibid.

* On 12th April 1782, the French Admirals, Suffren and Hughes had a stiff naval engagement with the English near the Madras coast. In July, Suffren and Hyder Ali met at Cudulur and planned a campaign against the British. French forces for land warfare also arrived under Bussy. Suffren inflicted a crushing defeat upon the English Admiral Hughes on 13th September; while Bussy urged Nana to begin a fresh war against the English. Just at this time the seaborne supplies of Madras were severely cut off by the French and the result was a distressful famine in the British Settlement causing heavy mortality. But the situation was saved by the ratification of the treaty of Salbai. (Rajwade, op. cit., Vol. 10, Lekh 257; Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 123).

63. Ibid.


* Despite all the dangerous dissensions caused by Dadasaheb in league with the English, for over a decade, the Maratha power confidently endured all their doings till Raghunathrao's death on 11th December 1783. (ALS, Vol. VII, p. 3660).
Chapter VII

DELHI AFFAIRS 1782-88

With the ratification of the treaty of Salbai, Nana and Sindia succeeded in relegating to the background, their minor differences with the English, the former endeavouring to circumvent their dangerous designs with Shah Alam, and the latter anxiously struggling to reestablish the Maratha supremacy at Delhi. In 1772, when Nana was just a novice on the political stage, Sindia and Holkar, the two eminent sardars of the Peshwa, had successfully restored Shah Alam to the Imperial throne, despite the stubborn opposition of the English. Nana was however quite aware of this Maratha triumph.¹ The Emperor was reduced to impotence,² his sole concern and solace being a copious flow of money, and ruled like the Merovingian Rulers of France, under the control of the 'Maires Du Palais'.³

In 1778, it was reported to Nana that Mirza Najafkhan, the Rohilla general and diplomat had been earnestly expecting the Maratha expedition into Hindustan; while the Raja Hindu of Benares had communicated that the English troops had reduced to submission the forts of Kalpi and Chhatarpur and had established full control in that province.⁴ But the force of events had rendered Nana inoperative for some time. Notwithstanding the fact he was extremely anxious to see Maratha supremacy re-established at Delhi, the death of Madhavrao followed by the murder of Narayanrao had resulted in the recall of the Maratha armies for conducting hostilities against the English, in the Deccan.

Mirza Najif's prolonged and mortal illness followed by the confusion and unseemly scramble for his post had paralysed the government of Shah Alam, for nearly a year.⁵ In his letter to Nana, Hingne, observes "the English have sent their Vakeel from Calcutta, the present situation in Delhi is most delicate and deserves your constant attention."⁶ Nana advised him to maintain a close contact with the Emperor with a view to preventing English interference in imperial affairs.⁷ He also
urged Sindia to rush to Delhi and win over the Emperor, lest the English should overwhelm him with flattery and through officious overtures capture Agra and other territories. By the close of 1782, Hingne reported that all the internal quarrels had been composed by compromise and Mirza Shafy Khan the son of Shah Alam’s sister had been appointed Meerbukhshi.

Nana’s constant endeavours through Hingne for the establishment of Maratha control over the affairs of the Emperor were producing results as may be ascertained from Hingne’s letter to Nana in which the former says, “the Emperor is quite firm in seeking the protection of our Sarkar”. But Nana was aware of the Emperor’s vacillating nature and was urging Sindia to proceed to Delhi. Indeed though Shah Alam had manifested his earnestness for submitting his affairs to the control of the Marathas, he was simultaneously in correspondence with the English and the French, as his administrative officers as well as the army were on the point of starvation, his crownlands having passed beyond his executive authority. Nana’s insistence that Sindia should visit Delhi was essentially prompted by his correct reading of English diplomacy, and his fears were not unfounded. The English were contemplating the partitioning of the sovereignty of Hindustan between Great Britain and the Emperor.

Even though Nana was persistently urging Sindia to take in hand the complicated problems at the Delhi Court even in the teeth of a mendacious propaganda against the Marathas carried on by their enemies, Mahadji could not make up his mind to this, until he had succeeded in establishing a strong base in Bundel Khand and had provided a well-equipped army at his command. While the Anglo-Maratha war was in progress, Nana had invariably indicated his preference for Hyder Ali who was strongly supported by the French, while Sindia had realised the superiority of a modernised army and was bent upon preparing an efficient fighting force, before getting himself entangled into the affairs of the Emperor. Thus we note that Nana was engrossed in creating conditions propitious for the easy penetration of Maratha influence at Delhi, while Sindia was engaged in procuring Portuguese military experts from Goa through Jivbadada Bakshi. Sindia also employed Benoit de Boigne in his service and commissioned him to raise two
infantry battalions for his campaigns. In the meantime, intelligence arrived that a regular race for power was going on at Delhi and in his letter to Nana, Hingne pressed for the extension of the Maratha-Postal service to Delhi, in consideration of the tense situation at the imperial court.

In view of the delicate situation at home Nana could not spare either men or money for the proposed Delhi expedition. Just about this time he was flooded with reports from Hingne which indicated that Shah Alam’s control had reached its lowest mark. Najaf Khan was dead and the government was distintegrating; even the Emperor and the Begam had started quarrelling; harrassed by the mismanagement of his officers, the Emperor had approached the Nawab Wazir Asafuddaulah of Lucknow and Hastings for regulating his affairs. In his letter of 23rd September 1783 Hingne reported to Nana that despite all the unfavourable influences, he had maintained the Emperor well disposed to the Marathas. Although Warren Hastings outwordly avowed for friendship for Mahadji as a matter of policy, he deprecated Maratha penetration at Delhi and appointed Major Brown as English Resident to the Moghal Court. This development incensed Nana and Sindia to such as extent that the former worked himself up into a mood of intense hostility against the English. On 27th June, Sindia paid his first visit to Shafi who had entreated Sindia to come to Delhi. Intelligence however reached Nana that Shafi who was favourably inclined towards the Marathas was murdered by Muhammad Beg Hamadani the keeper and guardian of the fore of Agra, by treachery.

Nana was anxiously endeavouring to obtain detailed information respecting the Sanads, contracts and agreements concluded between the Emperor and the English. In reply to Nana’s letter Hingne observed: “It is by now two years, says the Emperor, that I have been anxiously awaiting the arrival of Sindia: Abdul Ahad Khan his envoy has been conducting consultations with the English”. In his letter of 13th January 1784 he informs how the English were casting their net of menacing intrigue on the malleable Emperor through their vakeel Saluddin Khan. Commenting on the probable outcome of the audience which Major Brown had with the Emperor, he proceeds, “under pressing conditions of
scarcity, the Emperor is anxious to secure ample wealth from the English by granting them a permit to open a warehouse in Delhi.” “Major Brown has been struggling to exploit the delicate situation of the Emperor, to the maximum.” This had natural reactions in Nana. He urged the Emperor through Hingne to discontinue all political consultations with the English as they were fraught with dangerous consequences.

With possible perfidy on the part of the English at any time, Nana was scrutinizing the daily reports of the affairs at Delhi, with assiduity. He was not unaware of the solemn assurance given by them to Sindia, regarding their neutrality in the affairs of Shah Alam. Nevertheless, he had kept himself prepared for circumventing their dangerous designs, having in mind the fact, that their assistance was frequently solicited by Nawab Abdul Ahad Khan for ousting Afrasiyab Khan who had succeeded Najaf Khan. To confirm Nana’s misgivings, news arrived that Jawan Bakht (Jahandar Shah) had slipped out of the Delhi palace, on 14th April 1784 and reached Lucknow where he was welcomed by the Wazir and Warren Hastings. The latter took him to Kashee but at the instance of the home government, sent the Prince to the Sindia’s camp under the protection of Sadashiv Bakhshi. The flight of Jawan Bakht considerably staggered Sindia, who now confessed openly that “the British were false and perfidious, blind to all engagements when self-interest came in the way.” Responsible British elements in India disapproved of Hastings’ policy of neutrality in the affairs of Shah Alam, but Hastings was not prepared to order active participation for reasons best known to him.

Exulting in Hastings’ victory, and heady with pride the ingenious Nana was satisfied with Sindia’s endeavours in outvying the mendacious propaganda of the English, when intelligence reached him that the Emperor had offered to grant patents, “Vakeelmutalkhee” and “Bakhshigiri” in favour of the Peshwa. Hingne communicated that the Emperor had gone to stay under Sindia’s protection and that Afrasiyab Khan was earnestly imploring Sindia to save the crumbling imperial structure. Nana was apprised of Hamdani’s arrest by Sindia as Hamdani was responsible for the murder of Afrasiyab Khan through Zain-ul-Abindin. All this time Major Brown lost no
opportunity for pressing his anti-Maratha policy. Nana who was bent upon thwarting Brown’s dangerous machinations, immediately directed Hinge to offset the English intrigues as he feared they would not fail to dominate the whole of India including the Deccan. On 16th November 1784 Sindia paid a visit to Delhi and the Emperor urged him to accept the Regency of the Empire. Thus a long-cherished ambition was ultimately brought to fruition and Mahadji Sindia became the sole director of the Royal affairs.

While Nana and Sindia were cautiously ascertaining the implications of the grave responsibilities they had shouldered in favour of the Peshwa, Major Brown desperately endeavouring “to revive Warren Hastings” abandoned plan of turning the Emperor into an English puppet and governing the empire through some Muslim Regent who would be under the dictation of the British Resident at the capital, as in the case of the Nawab of Oudh. In the meantime Hinge communicated to Nana that the king of England had demanded Rupees eighteen crores from Hastings, of which two crores were to be paid immediately and that Hastings had sailed for England. Sindia who had out-manoeuvred Brown had become a cause of grave concern to the Supreme Council who declined to order removal of the Fatehgarh Brigade at that critical juncture.

While Nana was deeply engaged in ascertaining the progress of Sindia, information reached him that the administration of Sindia’s territory was far from satisfactory. Hinge observes “the task assigned to Sindia is too heavy and the force at his command is not quite adequate.” Nana who was thoroughly proficient in accounts and administration, was not inattentive to the gravity of the task assigned to Sindia, and had kept himself in constant touch with developments at Delhi. In a report received from Hinge the latter stresses upon the great improvements brought about by Sindia and adds that the Emperor had been sending private letters to the English requesting assistance for the Wazir of Agra against Sindia in order to protect the last surviving Muslim state. The Maratha supremacy over Delhi, Agra, Dig and the neighbouring places was obviously a matter of regret to the Emperor. Hinge further observes, that if an army of 5,000 was stationed in the vicinity
of Attock and Kashmir it would be conducive of effective peace. Simultaneously news also reached Nana that Mohammed Ali Khan the Nawab of Arcot had represented to the Emperor his pitiable plight at the hands of the English. Nana directed Hingne to watch movements of the Emperor and advised him to urge the Emperor to submit every order of title before execution, to the Peshwa and Sindia. By the end of 1786, he was considerably satisfied with the measure of control established by the latter.

Nana was dwelling on the inevitability of a conflict with Tipu and was desperately trying to conciliate the English. At this time a report came that Taimursha Abdali had suddenly advanced to Kandahar as his territory was invaded by the grandson of Nadirshah. Anxious to know the results of the disturbances in the North-west-Frontier, he cautiously directed Hingne to apprise him on a number of issues pertaining to the administration of the contiguous territory of the Rajput princes. Hingne reported back that Taimur’s son had not crossed the Jhelum and hence Sindia did not send any force. Reporting on the developments at Delhi, Hingne states Jahan-girsha, brother of Afrasiyab Khan had been conducting clandestine negotiations with the English regarding the Maratha supremacy at Delhi through one Dayaram of Kashmir. He further averred that Hindu Rule had been established almost up to the confines of the Ganges and failing adequate opposition, the Marathas were certain to capture the whole of India. In the meantime a communication reached Nana that Anderson had gone to Delhi for an interview with the Emperor.

The Mysore affairs posed a delicate situation in the Deccan, and Nana was anxiously striving to secure the co-operation of the English. It was reported just then that Nazar Munjoor-alkhan had prepared a force of 2,000 and won over Gulam Qadir to a plot for overthrowing the Emperor and installing the son of Khairunnissa, sister of the Emperor. In his letter of 11th April 1787 Hingne had stated that the English Vakeel Kirkpatrick had come to stay in Delhi with the permission of Patilbaba (Sindia) in connection with the extension of the postal service from Lucknow to Calcutta. Hardly had Nana taken adequate measures on Hingne’s report when he was ap-
prised of Gulam Qadir’s challenge to Maratha supremacy in Delhi and the neighbouring provinces.66

While Nana was occupied with the affairs of Mysore, Hingne intimated to him the measure of endeavours of the English for establishing a warehouse at Delhi and the consent given by Sindia against a promise of strong military assistance for the regulation of the Emperor’s affairs.57 He also reported in reply to Nana’s query regarding the movements of the British battalions, stating that there was no imminent danger from the English.58

Endeavouring to conclude a treaty with Tipu in the Deccan, Nana was apprised of the sudden set-back sustained by Sindia at Lalsot which became a source of considerable anxiety to him.59 He continued, however, undaunted in spirit and on 25th February, we find him writing to Hingne: “because of perfidy in the military ranks, Sindia was forced to suffer a temporary set-back” and further assured “that a strong force headed by Ali Bahadur was already on its way.60 By this time he had already received requests for assistance from Sindia,61 and Nana lost not a moment in arranging succour and relieving Mahadji’s distress.62 Nana’s communication to Hingne regarding the despatch of the army and funds had made a great impression upon the enemies of the Marathas.63 Engaged in a deadly contest with Tipu, Nana had been helpless to assist Sindia earlier than he did.64 The Maratha debacle after Sindia’s retreat in August 1787 emboldened the English to advance against Sindia’s territory.65 Intelligence, however, reached Nana that Sadashiv Malhar had entered into an agreement with Major Palmer on behalf of Sindia, for obtaining the assistance of two English Battalions.66

Hardly had Nana heaved a sigh of relief, when news was brought to him that the English had declared a policy of neutrality towards Indian Princes.67 Nana fully realized Sindia’s needs; his great endeavours were aimed to secure for the Emperor a regular fixed income.68 But Nana’s misgivings about the perfidy of the English had never subsided. Nana was quite conscious of the efficiency of the Maratha Sepoy in the field and so were the English. In his letter to the Duke of York, Cornwallis observed “I travelled above two and twenty hundred
miles in less than four months... the military qualities of the company's sepoys are so high that a brigade of our sepoys would easily make anybody, Emperor of India; but the company's Europeans are such miserable wretches that I am ashamed to acknowledge them for our countryman". Even though far away from Sindia, he was not blind to the innate failings of his Subordinates as may be ascertained from his instructions to Holkar, says Nana, "Patilbaba is burdened with grave responsibilities involved in the expedition of the Northern India; he cannot succeed in the absence of a strong fighting arm; you shall rush to his assistance and your combined forces shall enhance our Sarkar's reputation". In the meantime, developments at Sindia's camp were taking the most disappointing turn. As Johnson says "misery is caused for the most part not by a heavy crush of disaster but by the corrosion of less visible evils, which canker enjoyment and undermine security." The truth of the statement was fully borne out in the behaviour and the measure of co-operation extended by Holkar in carrying aid to Patilbaba (Sindia), expeditiously.

Anxiously awaiting news of the arrival of Ali Bahadur and Holkar at Delhi, Nana was confronted with disturbing report from Hingne according to which Patilbaba was becoming unpopular in the Delhi circle. This was followed by another communication dated 20th December 1787 in which the envoy says: "The steps taken by Sindia against Gohadkars, Farrukabadwala, Sujadil Khan and Sujat Khan have impaired his popularity considerably. The Emperor wants a noble sardar from our Sarkar who would be capable of managing matters in a more conciliatory manner". Sindia's handling of the Jaipur affairs had been in no small measure responsible for displeasing the Emperor. Hingne further observes "if the English get a footing at Delhi, the whole of India will be captured by them".

Notwithstanding the disappointment occasioned by these reports, Nana had instructed his envoy to keep the Emperor humoured. In his letter of 7th September 1787, the latter conveyed to Nana the grievance of the Emperor: "I wrote to Sindia that he should keep his headquarters at Mathura; Sindia started employing 'Bhaiyyas' of U. P. in great numbers in his army, when I distinctly cautioned him saying that the Bhaiyyas were pure rice soldiers and were prone to perfidy at any mo-
ment; but Sindia utterly failed to hear my advice." The bickering between the Emperor and Sindia assumed such grave proportions that Himmat Bahadur advised the Emperor to occupy Agra province and call the Rajput Rajas to aid him in expelling the Deccanis. "The Emperor was alarmed by the prospect of alienating his troops, consoled and assured all of them that he would never summon Sindia again. In the meantime Hingne wrote to Nana, "the overbearing attitude of Patilbaba (Sindia) has caused general discontent against the Deccanis, the like of which could only be recollected from the accounts of the battle of Panipat fought in 1761." These matters were not unknown to Nana, who however, never anticipated a crisis. Unfortunately for him, the discontent reached its height on 15th November 1787, when His Majesty blamed Sindia for having brought his ruin upon himself.

Nana was now anxiously endeavouring to compose the unfortunate differences that had crept up in the relations between the Emperor and Sindia. But Hingne informed him that Patilbaba had become a slave of flattery, with the result that his own valorous and trustworthy lieutenants were leaving him. Even an eminent person like Jivba Bakshi was confined. Madhavrao Gangadhar fell out of favour and as a result went mad. The arrest of Jivba Bakshi had caused such intense resentment amidst the Deccanis that they were absolutely disgruntled. In his letter of 20th November, Hingne reports that discontent against Patilbaba had reached such ugly proportions that the chiefs of the Emperor had decided to refuse him entry into the confines of Delhi. On 6th of January 1788, when Ambaji interviewed the Emperor and desired him to summon Sindia to his presence, His Majesty as advised by his Ministers, gave him a plain refusal. Nana was in the meantime informed by Hingne that the situation of the Emperor was growing worse everyday and funds and military protection were the crying need.

Even though, the reports regarding the differences between the Emperor and Sindia had depressed Nana considerably, far from being led away by any personal considerations and strictly in conformity with the usual administrative etiquette, he instructed Hingne: "Ali Bahadur has been sent with a strong force; keep the Emperor confident; speak in eloquent terms of
Sindia to the Emperor; there should be no ill will between the two.” When Sindia indicated his desire to retire from his administration in the North, Nana instructed Appaji Ram, Sindia’s secretary: “You must impress upon Sindia, never to think of retiring from his charge of Northern affairs and putting Ali Bahadur in his place; if Sindia retires from those quarters, all the results achieved in the past, would be lost.”

Despite Nana’s sincere endeavour to send succour to Sindia, immediately, it was not possible till the 6th of November 1778 when Ali Bahadur met Sindia at Mathura. In the interval Nana passed anxious moments regarding the relations of Sindia and Shah Alam, which were growing increasingly desperate. He was apprised of the vacillating nature of the Emperor, bent on conciliating Gulam Qadir and the English. Reports also reached him that even though professing friendship with Gulam Qadir, Shah Alam was sincerely devoted to Patilbaba whom he desired to be firmly ensconced at Delhi.

In April 1788 Hingne reported that Ismail Beg had defeated Raiji Patil and Sindia and was doing his best to capture the fort of Agra. By the end of the month Ismail Beg and Ghulam Qadir succeeded in establishing their control over Agra and the territories North of the Ganges. In the month of June Nana was apprised of the endeavours of Ismail Beg and Ghulam Qadir to force the Emperor to stay with them at Agra, but the Emperor declined to move from Delhi. In the meantime reports came that Ghulam Qadir and Ismail Beg were contemplating an invasion of Akabarabad and seeking the overthrow of Patilbaba. Nana was greatly disturbed by reports coming from Delhi about hostilities started by Ghulam Qadir against the Emperor, even though he had learnt of Ali Bahadur’s arrival at the imperial court.

Incensed by the overbearing and aggressive manner of Ghulam Qadir and the inordinate delay of Ali Bahadur in carrying reinforcements to Patilbaba, Nana’s anxieties were further augmented by reports from Hingne that Ghulam Qadir and Ismail Beg had seized the royal palace and resorted to plunder and arson. Subsequent letters from Hingne convinced him of the measures of atrocities that the Emperor and his members had to put up with. Frustration was occasioned by re-
ports conveying the most heartrending intelligence. The 1st of July had already witnessed an event of baleful significance in the history of the Moghul Emperor. Shah Alam, never at any time conspicuous for valour or subtlety of intellect or shrewdness of judgement, was befooled by his Nazir into granting audience to Ghulam Qadir. This was the signal for the final occupation of Delhi which lasted for two and a half months, during which horror was heaped on horror in the best traditions of Melodrama. The impact of this orgy of brutality and sadism dissipated the last vestige of Imperial power. Shah Alam was deposed on the 30th and had his eyes cruelly put out on the 10th of August. Women and children were systematically starved to death. Princes were flogged, princesses outraged, servants beaten mercilessly to death. Loot and unbridled passion were let loose upon the palace to gratify the Ruhela’s lust for women and property. For nine weeks the imperial palace became the scene of a gruesome Witche’s Sabbath, surpassing in horror and poignancy even the downfall of the French monarchy in Europe, five years later.

Ever since the despatch of help with Ali Bahadur, Nana had been issuing repeated instructions asking him to join Sindia and arrange his plans strictly in conformity with the latter’s advice. Unfortunately, however, the inexorable pressure of events ordained otherwise and Nana’s unceasing endeavours to neutralize Ghulam Qadir’s depredations proved futile. Nana and Sindia were sincerely moved by the misfortunes that visited Shah Alam though the Emperor himself was in no small measure responsible for the tragedy. In days of extreme fear to his life or throne he had maintained negotiations with the English but this intention had never included that of serving a puppet in their hands. On 11th October 1789 a relief to this black tragedy was provided when the Marathas captured Delhi. They gave food and water to the starving blind Emperor and established their control on Delhi. Nana was extremely elated, when he was informed that Ghulam Qadir and his followers were arrested by Ali Bahadur. Ghulam Qadir unhesitatingly submitted to Patilbaba and surrendered all his booty. In the meantime intelligence reached that Patilbaba was pleased with Ali Bahadur’s achievements and
had entrusted to him the task of capturing Ghulam Qadir’s mother and his brother who were about to escape.\textsuperscript{105}

While Nana was awaiting full intelligence of the developments at Delhi, Vithal Hari and Gangaji Avad gave him a detailed account of the measure of punishment meted out to Ghulam Qadir. The Ruhela chief was disfigured, his eyes removed, he was paraded on a camel and finally done to death by tortures which were a fitting retribution for the atrocities committed by him at Delhi; his patron, the arch-traitor Manzur Ali also met with a similar fate; and the whole performance continued from 2nd to 4th of March 1789. The greater part of the Doab, with the provinces of Delhi and Agra were annexed to the Maratha dominions. Shah Alam was reinstated on the throne of Delhi.\textsuperscript{106}

In the midst of these developments Nana was apprised of the intrigues of the English for establishing themselves in Delhi. They had taken maps of the whole province and Palmer was anxiously conciliating Patilbaba in connection with the Anglo-Mysore war. With four other foreigners, the English Resident interviewed the Emperor and proceeded to Anupshahr.\textsuperscript{107}

By this time it was learnt that Ismail Beg had gone to Gujarat and was practising perfidy in the army of the Marathas. The Raja of Jodhpur had been cautioned by Patilbaba,\textsuperscript{108} but they had already made common cause with him against the Marathas.\textsuperscript{109}

Despite the frequent reports from Delhi respecting Col. Palmer’s visit, Nana was not disturbed as the purpose of these visits was already known to him.\textsuperscript{110} The developments on the Kabul front however were a source of grave concern specially as Taimursha had established his control over Bahawalpur,\textsuperscript{111} but the letter of Hingne dated the 18th November, 1790, considerably reassured. Nana as Vajhudikhan, the Vakeel of Sindia and Ellis were proceeding to Peshwar for interviewing Taimursha.\textsuperscript{112}

In the midst of these developments in the North, Nana received a request from Sindia in connection with the excessive demands made by the English on the Raja of Tanjore, a descendant of Venkoji, the step-brother of Shiyaji the Great, Sindia
proposed that Nana should mediate in the dispute and influence the English so as to compose their differences.\textsuperscript{113}

When the political condition in the North of India had become normal Nana had the unique pleasure of receiving the happy news that in recognition of their sincere endeavours and devotion to His Majesty's throne, Shah Alam had conferred the patents, 'Vakil-i-Mutalik' on the Peshwa and 'Mir Bakshigiri' on Patilbaba (Sindia), while 'Phadnishi' of the same was to be received by Nana.\textsuperscript{114}

2. Sarkar, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. III, p. 75 and 236; Mehta, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.
   * On 2nd January 1773, the Maratha triumph was completed by the issue of an order dismissing Mede's battalions and the Mughalla horse and other troops newly raised by Najafkhan' (Sarkar, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. III, pp. 75-76).
   * Afrasiyabkhan could not provide the necessary money to the emperor. On 14th of July Shafi was formally received in audience. The capital was once more threatened with a civil war to be fought out in its streets, Sarkar, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. III, p. 238; Hingne's report of 25th September fully confirms the above account, (DYMR, I, pp. 71 and 84; Sarkar, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. III, pp. 238-46).
4. DYMR, I, p. 73.
5. KPY, Lekh 350, 342, p. 305.
6. DYMR, I, p. 73.
7. Ibid., p. 78 (Hingne's letter of 1st December 1782).
8. DYMR, I, p. 93.
   * Observations of an Englishman:
     "A partition of the sovereignty of Hindustan, between Great Britain and the Emperor and a firm alliance between these powers would be attended with the greatest advantage to both and also with tranquillity to all the native Princes of India. I shall endeavour to show how it is not impracticable and also how it may be effected . . . ."
     "The Portuguese, although the first European traders and settlers in Asia . . . have now no other establishment than Goa . . . they should therefore receive every possible discountenance."
     "The Dutch East India Co. having sold their possessions to the King of Denmark, the trade to India is laid open to individuals . . . ."
8. Mr. Bolts and St. Lubin who held negotiations with the Marathas and Hyder Ali must have sunk under losses and charges . . .


11. *DYMR*, p. 79.

12. Ibid., pp. 82 and 213.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., pp. 84-89.


* In the Firman dated 12th of August 1765 Shah Alam lays down, that "in consideration of the attachment and services ..., of the English Co. we have granted them the Dewanny of the province of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, as a free gift ..., with the exemption from the payment of the customs of the Dewanny which used to be paid to the Court", *A Source Book of Indian History*, p. 138, compiled by K. Srinivas Kini).


23. Ibid., p. 104.

24. Ibid., pp. 105-106.

25. Ibid., p. 108.


33. *DYMR*, I, p. 117.

34. CPC, Vol. VI, No. 1473; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 280, 283, 286.


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37. Persian Records of Maratha History, Delhi Affairs, 1953, p. 150, B20a, first sheet (edited by Dr. Joshi and translated by Prof. Sarkar); Sarkar, op. cit., III, pp. 289-90.
41. CPC, Vol. VI, No. 1596.
42. DYMR, I, p. 131.
43. Ibid., p. 133.
44. Ibid., pp. 134, 135, 137 and 139.
45. Ibid., pp. 128, 130, 140 and 145.
46. Ibid., p. 173.
47. MSYK, Lekh 429.
48. DYMR, I, p. 166.
49. Ibid., p. 147.
50. Ibid., pp. 154-55.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 159.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 161.
55. Ibid., p. 162; Persian Records of Maratha History, I, Delhi Affairs, 1953, D1a, first sheet, p. 152.
56. DYMR, pp. 195-97.
57. Ibid., p. 179; Persian Records of Maratha History, I, Delhi Affairs, 1953, D.f, p. 166.
58. DYMR, p. 190.
59. Ibid., p. 199.
60. Ibid., p. 233.
63. MSYK, Lekh 510.
65. Ibid., p. 319.
66. DYMR, p. 234.
67. Ibid., p. 219.
68. NHM, Vol. III, p. 149.
70. Itihas Sangraha, Aitihasik Tipne, 2, 4.
71. DYMR, p. 226.
72. Ibid., p. 203.
73. Persian Records of Maratha History, I, Delhi Affairs, D2a, first sheet, p. 155.
74. DYMR, p. 207 and 183.
75. Ibid., p. 197.
76. Persian Records of Maratha History, I, Delhi Affairs, Second Sheet end, D5b, p. 170.
The Emperor was advised by Himmat Bahadur to occupy the Agra province and call the Rajput Rajas to aid him in expelling the Deccanis, "if you decide to summon Sindia," he said "all the Mughal and other sardars will at once go away from you." The Emperor being alarmed by the prospect of alienating his troops, consoled and assured all of them that he would never summon Sindia again." (Persian Records of Maratha History, I, Delhi Affairs, second sheet, D5b and D6b, pp. 168-170; DYMR, I, pp. 197-227).

77. DYMR, I, p. 227.
79. Ibid., DYMR, p. 259.
81. DYMR, Lekh 212, p. 183.
82. Ibid., Lekh 232, pp. 201-203.
84. DYMR, p. 234.
85. Ibid., p. 238, Nana’s letter of 11th March 1778.
86. MSYK, Lekh 536 and 537.

In the meantime rumours reached Delhi that Nana was planning the recall of Sindia from the North and appointing Ali Bahadur or Holkar, in his place (PRC, Vol. I, p. 226). But this report was incorrect in the light of Nana’s letters to Hingne the Maratha envoy at Delhi and Appaji Ram, Sindia’s secretary. On the contrary, Nana’s letter to Appaji Ram clearly shows his anxiety to keep Sindia in the North; and this seems to be more plausible; because by retaining Sindia his political rival, in the North, Nana would have been easily able to maintain his own prestige and position at Poona, undisturbed. Thus, the rumours reported by the British Resident from Poona to Delhi, appear to be unfounded (MSYK, Lekh 536 and 537; DYMR, p. 238; NHM, Vol. III, p. 168; Sarkar, Fall of the Moghul Empire, Vol. III, p. 444; PRC, Vol. I, p. 226; S. N. Athavale, “A scrutiny of the policy of Nana Fadnis in the North Indian enterprise of the Marathas”, Indian History Congress, Proceedings of the Fourteenth session 1951, Section V, p. 252.

88. Ibid., p. 239.
89. Ibid., p. 241.
90. Ibid., p. 242.
91. Ibid., p. 244.
92. Ibid., p. 249.
93. Ibid., p. 251.
94. Ibid., pp. 250-52.
95. Ibid., p. 262.
97. DYMR, p. 265.
100. A. N. Bhagwat, Holkar Shahichya Itihasachi Sadhane, Khanda I, pp. 16, 26-27.
104. DYMR, p. 304.
105. Ibid., p. 297.
107. DYMR, p. 303, 316, 319.
111. Ibid., p. 21.
112. Ibid., p. 37.
Chapter VIII

THE MARATHA-MYSORE WAR 1783-87

Even though Nana had been considerably interested in Sindia’s bold bid to re-establish Maratha supremacy at Delhi, he was more profoundly engrossed in the Peshwa’s affairs in the Deccan. The long-drawn war with the English had come to a close and the treaty of Salbai had opened a new chapter in his career. In spite of the Maratha success the political sky was not clear and serene. In the South a menacing thunder cloud loomed in the shape of Tipu. The perfidy of the Nizam during the Anglo-Maratha hostilities had caused intense resentment in Nana and now the depredations of Tipu had become a source of grave concern. Unfortunately, the depleted treasury of the Peshwa had precluded Nana from concerting immediate measures against either. But while Nana was absolutely justified in punishing the Nizam for his treachery, his grievance against Mysore was unwarranted.¹ In fact, it was the exclusion of Hyder Ali from the treaty of Salbai that had provoked Tipu who had moved to chastise the Marathas.² Neither Nana nor Tipu however desired the complete destruction of the other.⁵

Circumstances had now placed Nana on the horns of a dilemma which he could not resolve without paying proper attention to the significant part played by each of the political powers in the Anglo-Maratha war. It must be recalled that he had already entered into a treaty with Hyder Ali, stipulating that none of the allies should conclude a treaty with the English independently of the others. His repeated insistence upon Sindia for the inclusion of Hyder Ali in the peace parleys could thus be easily explained. The English however could not accommodate Nana in this respect and Sindia who concluded the treaty, not only ignored Hyder Ali but engaged the Peshwa himself in joining the English in a promise to secure the restoration of their territory captured by Hyder Ali. The treaty was thus concluded in spite of Nana’s frantic appeals, by Sindia who was eager to attend to the affairs of Shah Alam and all that
Nana could do was to delay ratification till the death of Hyder Ali which took place in December 1782.\textsuperscript{4} No sooner had the treaty been signed, than the English began pressing Sindia for the Peshwa's assistance in a bid to expel Hyder Ali from the Carnatic, at which Nana felt extreme chagrin. In the teeth of Nana's opposition, Hastings endeavoured to prosecute the war tenaciously against Tipu. But Lord Macartney of Madras on his own initiative opened negotiations for peace, thus indirectly encouraging the Mysore ruler. Tipu was however too arrogant to accept any terms which were not derogatory to the English. Their Commissioners were grossly insulted and were made to stand with their heads uncovered for two hours. At last the Vakils of Poona and Hyderabad pressed the Dictator into assent, and the treaty was finally concluded on 11th March 1784 at Mangalore. Nana who was biding his time was extremely incensed at this sudden conclusion of hostilities by the English without taking the Marathas into confidence.\textsuperscript{5} He addressed an emphatic protest through Sindia pointing out that this was absolutely contradictory to the undertaking of Anderson to Sindia.\textsuperscript{6}

While these developments were taking place, Tipu had been insulted by Nana who rejected his presents sent on the occasion of Savai Madhavrao's marriage.\textsuperscript{7} Nana was now concerting measures against him for the recovery of the territory which he had encroached upon.\textsuperscript{8} As soon as he was apprised of the treaty of Mangalore, he deliberately relegated to the background his grievances against the Nizam and commenced organizing a united front against Mysore.\textsuperscript{9} He was not unaware of the profound resentment of the English against Tipu,\textsuperscript{10} as the latter had been carrying on secret correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey for the annexation of Bijapur.\textsuperscript{11} But Nana was cautious and more anxious to know the exact position of the English and French in India. He had been thoroughly convinced of the measure of opportunism inherent in the policy of the former.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover his political strategy was extremely complicated and the increased importance of Mahadji Sindia resulting in impairing the prestige of the Peshwa had not escaped his attention.\textsuperscript{13} Nana's main object was to cement the Maratha Confederacy under the authority of the Peshwa\textsuperscript{14} and thereby secure his supremacy.
In the midst of these preparations, intelligence reached him from Hingne that the English were not interested in punishing Tipu.\textsuperscript{15} This sudden change in English policy caused serious apprehensions in Nana who now feared an alliance between them and Tipu against the Peshwa.\textsuperscript{16}

The stage was now being set for a gigantic conflict of powers in South India a conflict which was to draw in its vortex successively at one stage or another, most of the European governments and native rulers, and eventually to decide with whom the political supremacy would lie in this part of India. It would be well to examine at this juncture the position of each of them, the English the French and the Feringhee whose expansionist ambitions in the international field clashed, causing repercussions in this country also, and considerably influencing the course of events and the fortunes of the Indian Princes.

For the English, the eighteenth century was a century of fighting.\textsuperscript{17} The war with France, the war of Spanish succession, the seven years war, the Napoleonic wars and the Anglo-Maratha war being the notable events seriously affecting their prestige and position.

By the treaty of Versailles signed in 1783 Great Britain was compelled to recognize the independence of her colonies in America, to cede the island of Tobago to France, and to part with Senegal in West Africa. In Newfoundland, the area of French fishing rights was somewhat modified. In India alone, there was gain and not loss, to be registered.\textsuperscript{18} The famous India Bill of 1783 which had overthrown to coalition Ministry of Fox, had been replaced by India Act in 1784 and the English in India were forbidden to enter into offensive alliances with one Indian power against another.\textsuperscript{19} The government of East India Co. had become directly responsible to the Crown.\textsuperscript{20} Thus in the political field, the position of England had reached her lowest ebb. On the economic front however, Britain was biding her time; new forces and currents were working steadily though invisibly to her advantages.\textsuperscript{21} The plunder of Plassey had given a great fillip to the industrial enterprise in England and Bengal could indeed boast of having given birth to the Industrial Revolution.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, at a time
when internecine warfare was raging in India, in England Crompton contrived the Mule and Jenny in 1776 and Cartwright patented the Power-loom in 1785.23

Although the French suffered a decisive check to their political ambitions in India, during the Seven Years war, for a long time they refused to accept the position of a mere mercantile community. Indeed they expected to retrieve their position by forming a strong anti-British coalition, consisting of at least the Marathas, Hyderabad and Mysore.24

The Feringhee* who commanded decisive strength in the country were blessed with the services of a governor who was an eminent statesman and a great diplomat, Don Jose Pedro da Camara. He was of frequent and valuable assistance to the Peshwa;25 and thanks to him, the Portuguese had actively co-operated with the Peshwa in the Maratha-Mysore war, excepting for one occasion.26

Nana had worked himself up into intense hostility against Tipu, when the news reached him of the conversion of fifty thousand Hindus to the Muslim faith.27 He had already sent Phadke to oppose Tipu’s advance and Holkar was directed to support him.28 But Nana was convinced of the necessity of placating the Nizam against Tipu in order to secure his flank.29 A meeting took place between the two near Yadgir* and the Nizam assured his sincere co-operation.30 The main object behind Nana’s march was to alarm Tipu and to make a deliberate display of his hostility towards him.31 Tipu’s reaction to the Maratha Nizam demonstrations was however prompt and decisive.32 He struck at the advancing forces but simultaneously sent his vakils to Nana for negotiating peace against an offer of payment.33

Confronted with a critical situation on the Mysore front Nana was very cautious in his dealings with other powers. Hastings had left for Europe on 1st of February 1785.34 Nana who had been apprehending a league between Tipu and the English in the light of the treaty of Mangalore, was considerably disturbed when the English rejected the presents sent by the Peshwa.35 In fact the English intended discontinuation of the practice. In his letter of 24th October addressed to the English, Nana complained of the failure of the Nawab of Surat
to pay Chauth to the Peshwa. Bodam wrote back that he had cautioned the Nawab and desired to ascertain the Peshwa’s wishes regarding Raghunathrao’s valuables mortgaged with the English. Nana had thus succeeded in maintaining cordial relations with the English.

Deeply engrossed in these events Nana was further incensed against Tipu when tidings reached him that the latter had advanced a preposterous claim on the Nizam for the cession of Bijapur and had opened an attack on the Nizam’s districts. His sense of fairness was touched and he strove ceaselessly to despatch military assistance to his ally against Tipu, but the remorseless march of events rendered his efforts nugatory. For, he was faced with a very dangerous development at the Peshwa’s court; certain partisans of Raghunathrao having at this stage conspired to depose the Peshwa Savai Madhavrao and place Bajirao, Raghunathrao’s son, on the Musnad. Ultimately he succeeded in quashing the revolt and joined the hostilities against Tipu.

In the meantime the parleys with Tipu’s vakeels were proceeding apace in Poona and Nana who always preferred conciliation to war, eagerly looked forward to an understanding. But Tipu was playing a treacherous game and directed Buranuddin his chieftain to invade Nargund, while ordering his envoys all the while to keep Nana humoured as long as possible. In his letter to Nana dated 11th April 1785 Parsharambhau had cautioned him about Tipu’s vacillating policy. Intelligence now reached from Hingne that Tipu had kept a large army in readiness at a distance of thirty miles from Madras.

Nothing enraged Nana so intensely as the wanton treachery of Tipu in subjecting Nargund to inhuman and merciless atrocities unprecedented in the history of that province: the town was completely devastated; Vyankatrao and his Dewan were taken prisoners; women were wantonly outraged and the chief’s young ladies were forcibly taken into the Muslim harem: Muslim lads were provided handsome wives from the Hindu fold; several Hindus were forcibly circumcised and two thousand disciples of Shankaracharya destroyed themselves to avoid the detested violation.

Nana was eager to exact retribution from Tipu, when the
English sent a feeler through the Nizam offering to join the Marathas against the foe. Nana and the Nizam met at Yadgir where they had been camping with their armies on 15th February 1786.

Moving with the utmost circumspection, Nana had been directing the Maratha army against Tipu. The fort of Badami was finally subjugated on 1st May 1786 Nana had been thoroughly conscious of the treacherous inclinations of Tipu. Paradoxically enough the latter had been deliberately playing a double game, on one side he seemed anxious to conciliate Nana in favour of the French against the English by offering a bribe of forty lakhs of rupees; while on the other, he had been issuing detailed instructions to his envoys which manifestly indicated his treacherous intentions; he says: "you must both of you continue there" (i.e. at Poona) and contrive by one means or another to amuse them and to deceive them by speeches calculated to flatter their selfish views or to work upon their avariciousness". Observing on Nana’s reading of Tipu’s duplicity and treachery Kirkpatrick described this letter as a curious and interesting document which besides exposing the chicanery and even downright falsehood to which Tipu never scrupled to resort, also threw light on the opinion held by Nana of the conduct and views of Tipu.

While Nana was engrossed in suppressing ruthlessly the dangerous designs of Tipu, he became profoundly occupied in a most delicate development which not only involved the violation of the stipulations of the treaty of Salbai but also had far-reaching repercussions on the stability of the Maratha empire as well as the result of the Maratha-Mysore hostilities: the appointment of Sir Charles Malet, as Minister plenipotentiary at the Court of the Peshwa.

In conducting negotiations for the treaty of Salbai 1782, the British diplomat had opened with an ingenious gambit by recognizing Sindia as a guarantee for the actions of the Peshwa, and thereby engrafting the root of disruption into the body politic of the Maratha state. This move checkmated even the master statesman Nana to such an extent that he not only acknowledged his utter helplessness but invited the British Resident at the Court of the Peshwa.
According to the treaty of Salbai all the Peshwa's correspondence intended for the English, was to pass through Sindia, but Nana finding the procedure cumbersome and dilatory, decided to have direct dealings with the Governor General, the Maratha Mysore hostilities justifying Nana's sudden step.\textsuperscript{32} This intentional departure from the deliberate procedure stipulated in the treaty of Salbai was supported by the English, though skilfully, because of Nana's clandestine conferences with the French. Bodam, in his letter of 29th April 1784, had already requested Nana to permit one Sayyed Nuruddin Husen Khan to stay in Poona as a representative of the English.\textsuperscript{53} In the month of February 1785 Macpherson took charge as Governor General.\textsuperscript{51} Immediately on accession he had received a special directive from the home government which precluded him from intermeddling with the intrigues of Indian Powers.\textsuperscript{55} Fully alive to the implication of Nana's latest move of suffering a British Resident at Poona, the new Governor General, in his letter of 27th July cautiously explained to Sindia the dire necessity of the appointment in the interest of expeditious disposal of public business.\textsuperscript{56} Accordingly Malet was directed to see Mahadji Sindia on his way to Poona.\textsuperscript{57} Addressing Nana on the appointment of Malet, Macpherson made a pointed reference to the cordial relations that subsisted between the English and the Marathas and further assured that he would prove the English to be the best friends of the Marathas.\textsuperscript{58}

Confronted with a dangerous situation on the Mysore front, Nana was endeavouring to ascertain the measure of goodwill that the English had been professing and also to create such conditions as might positively prevent an alliance between them and Tipu. Subsequent to the inhuman atrocities perpetrated on the chief of Nargund, the English had offered their co-operation against Tipu.\textsuperscript{59} Simultaneously, Macpherson's letters to Nana obviously indicated his anxiety to placate the Marathas. With a rare insight, Nana now sent a request for five British Regiments.\textsuperscript{60} At the request of Nana, Malet had come to stay as the British Resident at Poona.\textsuperscript{61} In the midst of these developments, intelligence reached Nana that a vessel carrying merchandise, obviously belonging to the English was seized at Cheria\textsuperscript{6} by the Marathas without previous warning. Nana who was anxious to ascertain the measure
of British reaction to this incident, tactfully closed the issue by returning the vessel to the English.62

Notwithstanding the fact that Nana was confident of defeating Tipu, he deliberately kept on pressing Macpherson through Sindia for making a close military alliance. In his reply dated 20th July 1786 Macpherson categorically acknowledged the measure of friendship that existed between the two powers and concluded stating that he would soon issue instructions to the government of Bombay to keep in readiness as much force as the Peshwa might need against Tipu.63 Even Malet, in his interview with Nana assured that the English force was ready at Bombay and might be requisitioned whenever needed.64 Macpherson had also apprised Sindia of the steps he had taken to meet the Peshwa's request for military assistance and Sindia expressed satisfaction at the gesture of the English against Tipu.65 In his interview with Mudhoji Bhosla, the Governor General referred to the appointment of Malet at Poona and the instructions he had issued to the Bombay Government for assisting the Peshwa but concluded that the regiments could not be used for fighting against Tipu.66 In the meantime information reached Nana of a treaty concluded between Tipu and the French, and the Maratha envoy at Pondicherry remonstrated with the French Governor and accused him of violating the promise of the King of France to the Peshwa.67

Scheming ingenuously to pit the English against Tipu and thereby obviate the danger of a possible alliance between the two, the wily Nana instructed Malet to see him (Nana) at Badami, the theatre of war.68 In his report to the Governor General, Malet69 gives an account of his interview, his reading of Nana's temper and character and the way in which he was attending the operations at Badami.69 Thus Nana's intrigue calculated to frighten Tipu with a professed alliance with the English and thereby convincing him of the utter impossibility of effecting close co-operation with the English, was partially successful.70

Nana had achieved a glorious triumph over the English in the first round, by creating circumstances instinct with fear for the Mysore Dictator. While he was strenuously attempt-
ing to involve the English against Tipu, instructions were received by the Governor General from the Court of Directors, enjoining the policy of "neutrality" towards the Indian powers; the Directors clearly stated that "they were completely satisfied with the possessions they already had and had no desire to engage in any war for the purpose of further acquisitions", that "peace was their primary object"; that they had decided to refrain from interfering in the contentions which might arise amongst the Native princes. Nana was not at all surprised at the sudden turn events had taken. Looking on the English as unworthy of faith and confidence, Nana started negotiations with the Portuguese who assured him of all possible help. Fearing a probable alliance between the Peshwa and Tipu, against the English, the Governor General thought it "his interest, almost duty" to conciliate Nana. With a view to alarming the English and keeping his powder dry, Nana granted an interview to Montague on 12th August 1786. His interview with M. Gudar who had come with a letter from Pondicherry considerably intrigued the British Resident. Introducing M. Gudar to Nana, Montague expressed anxiety at his paying increasing attention to the English. Nana skilfully countered saying that he had come to understand that utmost cordiality subsisted between the English and French and desired to know if his information was wrong; in reply Mons. Montague with a mysterious smile said that "four months would discover," everything and advised Nana to preserve his friendship with them.

While Nana was thus successful in alarming the English, Malet in his letter of 21st August 1786 reported to the Governor General that Mon. Gudar's mission was to engage Nana in the war which was expected in the near future. Malet further expressed apprehension that the French would be politically shrewd enough, to induce Nana to lend a favourable ear to their overtures. (In his letter of 8th September however Malet revised his views and observed that a man of Nana's wisdom may not precipitately be carried off by the French.

Mons. Gudar had his audience of leave on 7th September 1786. Moving with the utmost circumspection Nana managed his negotiations with the French, without letting out any information to the British Resident. This clever move comple-
tely outwitted Malet who immediately addressed the Governor of Madras for collecting intelligence from Pondicherry regarding the intention and the measure of success of M. Gudar’s mission. But, the letter of Sir Archbald Campbell, the Governor of Madras dated 29th September 1786 relieved Malet considerably.\textsuperscript{82}

While Nana was deliberately alarming the English, Malet was successfully tantalizing Nana on the issue of despatching the British force. In this connection it may be recalled that Nana’s consent to the treaty of Salbai had been exacted through the influence of Patilbaba\textsuperscript{83}; and the English were anxiously propagating that the treaty of Salbai obviously stipulated that the friends and foes of the English and the Marathas, were to be mutual; this was the main argument advanced by R. H. Bodam in his letter of 18th October when he addressed Nana on behalf of Sayadee Abdul Rahimkhan.\textsuperscript{84}

Nana was very anxious to reduce all chances of an alliance between Tipu and the English to negligible proportions. He was considerably incensed at the wanton treachery of the English\textsuperscript{85}; their violation of the pledge to Sindia, their interference in the affairs of Shah Alam; their dangerous consent to give military assistance to Nana against Tipu, inspite of the treaty of Mangalore. Appropriately enough, Nana all along, apprehended an alliance between the English and Tipu against the Peshwa.

In a bold move Nana invited Malet to the theatre of war at Badami and frightened Tipu by professing an alliance with the English. Nana, it is stated by some historians, was considerably disappointed to learn of the refusal of English assistance.\textsuperscript{86} The presumption however appears to be far from correct. Moreover, it is argued that consequent upon the British unwillingness to participate in the war against Tipu, the advances of Tipu for a compromise received more indulgence and attention from Nana.\textsuperscript{87} Let us see how far the contention is convincing.

Notwithstanding the fact that Nana was entirely confident of crushing Tipu, Malet underrated the Maratha’s strength and naturally indicated to the Governor General by way of proof, that two days after his conference with Nana, Tipu’s advances
received better indulgence and attention (letter of 8th December 1786). On the other hand from the dependable report of the British spy in the Maratha camp, it transpires that till the end of the year 1786, the propositions made by Tipu were firmly rejected by Nana. If Malet’s presumption was correct, Nana would have positively accepted Tipu’s advances with adequate concern. This proves that Nana’s application for military assistance of the English was evidently based on something else. Let us endeavour to ascertain that reason from Nana’s letter to Patilbaba.

“Any way, our Sarkar,” says Nana in his letter to Sindia, “is not in need of any help from the English; it was just a political trick to frighten Tipu and thereby prejudicing Tipu against the English, leaving no room for a league between Tipu and the English whose measure of treachery and want of rectitude have been completely exposed. There is no worry of defeating Tipu at all.” Nana had rejected the advances of Tipu till the end of the year 1786, even though Cornwallis had expressly indicated his unwillingness to despatch British regiments for fighting against Tipu, the reaction of Nana’s great supporter, Sindia, merits considerable attention. Nana’s letter to Sindia had categorically revealed his intentions in pressing the English for help through Sindia, and the latter while addressing the Governor General says, “Like an ant which grows wings and attempts to soar high, Tipu intends to invade the territories of the Peshwa; the armies of the latter are strong enough to crush the viper.” The trend of the letter throws a revealing light on the mistaken view of Malet respecting the strength of the Maratha’s fighting arm. Sindia’s contention seems to be confirmed when we observe the measure of the rout which the Marathas inflicted upon Tipu.

Even though Nana was moving very cautiously, Cornwallis was in no way hasty in his decisions, as can be ascertained from the comprehensive view he had taken of every political event resulting from his policy.

Despite his confidence of scoring a positive triumph over Tipu, Nana had successfully organised an anti-Tipu front, by entering into an alliance with the Nizam, securing the neutrality of the French through clandestine approaches, concluding
an agreement with the Portuguese, and conciliating not only Mudhoji but even the Nawab of Arcot who commenced pressing the English for making common cause with the Marathas against Tipu.\textsuperscript{95} While Nana had thus raised a crop of enemies for Tipu, the formidable Sindia who was engaged in a life and death struggle in the North, but whose loyalty to the Peshwa could not allow him to remain idle, was persistently pressing the English to dispatch their regiments to assist the Marathas against Tipu.\textsuperscript{96}

Nana’s unflagging endeavours, however, had in no way frightened Tipu. His expectation of a prospective alliance between the latter and the English was not altogether improbable of fulfilment as can be ascertained from Tipu’s overtures to the English for military assistance against the Marathas.\textsuperscript{97} But the policy of neutrality which was nothing less than opportunism still precluded the English from participating in the Maratha Mysore war.\textsuperscript{98}

Nana’s outstanding diplomacy in circumventing Tipu’s alliance with the French\textsuperscript{99} had incensed the latter to such an extent, that he declined to countenance a French Resident in his territory.\textsuperscript{100} While Nana could not entrap the English in his snare by causing the British Regiments in his forces to march against Tipu, Cornwallis consented dispatching the Regiments if they were intended for protecting the Peshwa’s territory.\textsuperscript{101}

By a diplomatic quibble Nana blandly acquiesced, on the plea that the territories which were captured by Tipu were obviously the Peshwa’s territory even though Tipu had attacked them. This led to a prolonged controversy with Malet on the implication of the nomenclature, “Peshwa’s territory,” till at last Nana got disappointed.\textsuperscript{102}

Consequent upon the capture of Badami, the strong fort of Bhadur Band capitulated to the Marathas and Haripant proceeded to capture copal, another fort about four miles distant. It was on 22nd September 1786 that the Marathas marched toward the enemy lines, without any advantage. A stalemate continued on both sides.

Notwithstanding the fact that Nana was feverishly engaged in conducting correspondence with the English and other
powers, he was thoroughly cognizant of the developments in the theatre of war. On the 2nd of October 1786 Tipu made a surprise attack on Haripant Phadke who could save his life, only by a narrow escape. Tipu employed a ruse by making professions of peace and thereby lulling the Marathas into a false sense of security and suspension of hostilities and then attempted a dangerous design on the life of Haripant.

Hardly had Nana received the news of Tipu’s perfidy when other reports from the battlefield reached him to the effect that Tipu had gathered a large army of infantry and cavalry and that three divisions were advancing one after the other; that Tukoji Holkar made a sudden attack on the enemy and succeeded in carrying the day. The Marathas started slaughtering Tipu’s forces who fled from the field, leaving behind, one thousand killed and several wounded; Haripant delivered a violent attack on the enemy and defeated him. Tipu escaped barely with his life and went to Mons. Lally. His forces were completely routed and the Maratha-Mysore War was concluded by the treaty of Cajendragad in March 1787.

So far we have penetrated the cobweb of statecraft so intricately interwoven by the subtle diplomacy of Nana and the English. We have already observed that the English had disgraced the Peshwa by recognizing Sindia as the guarantee for the activities of his master. Not only had they ignored Anderson’s undertaking to Sindia respecting Mysore affairs but had also violated the pledge to Sindia in regard to their non-interference in the affairs of Shah Alam, by offering even fifty lakhs of rupees to the Emperor for rejecting Sindia’s overtures; they had further categorically indicated to Nana their willingness for despatching British regiments to fight against Tipu, obviously in violation of their late commitments to the latter.

This behaviour of the English had convinced Nana of the British perfidy and he rightly apprehended that they would not only withhold their promised military assistance but also enter into an alliance with Tipu for disgracing the Peshwa. Let us endeavour to ascertain how far Nana circumvented the British game.

With Nana exercising the utmost diplomatic vigilance, Malet was profoundly occupied in pressing his point of view.
to the Governor General. Malet’s correspondence on this sub-
ject merits careful attention as it throws light on the real im-
plication of the so-called policy of neutrality and the more so,
since, Malet’s line of argument was accepted by the Governor
General.

Malet feared that if the promised military assistance was
given to Nana it would add too greatly to the Maratha power
by fixing their ascendancy over Tipu Sultan; moreover such a
step was calculated to enable Nana to apply his mind to the
reorganisation and internal regulation of the Maratha Empire
which was by now much deranged; while by withholding the
assistance already promised, the company would get time to
re-establish her affairs by adopting a system of rigid economy;
while the Maratha Mysore struggle, Malet sincerely expected,
would exhaust and incapacitate those powers, which the Eng-
lish had reason to fear. Thus, ”It was not British interest
to see the Maratha household in order.”

Malet’s great hopes had been completely thwarted by the
route of Tipu, and the final outcome of the Maratha-Mysore
War. The wishful thinking of the English who were out to
see the Maratha administration demoralised and disorganised,
was absolutely falsified through the ceaseless vigilance and
shrewd calculations of Nana. Moreover, the English had ex-
pected that the Maratha-Mysore struggle would be prolonged,
in the absence of their military aid and thereby incapacitate
both the powers which the English had reason to fear. But
Nana’s shrewd move of bringing Malet to Badami and thereby
frightening Tipu, culminated in a sudden rout of the latter,
much to the chagrin of the English and to the credit of the
perspicacious Nana. Thus British diplomacy had little reason
to feel flattered except for the solitary yet significant achieve-
ment of getting a British Minister plenipotentiary firmly ens-
coned into the inmost chambers of the Maratha capital—an
unfortunate circumstance resulting from the Nana-Sindia
rivalry.

1. ALS, Vol. VIII, p. 3839; MSYK, Lekh 224; KPY, Lekh 346.
3. ALS, Vol. VII, p. 3705; Vol. VIII, pp. 3839, 3840, 3892; CPC,
   Vol. VI, No. 642; William Kirkpatrick, Select Letters of Tipu
Sultan to various Public Functionaries, pp. 17-21 and 423; DYMR, I, p. 102; Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 38; Sinha and Banerjee, A History of India, p. 523.


11. Ibid., No. 1118.

12. MSYK, Lekh 436.


15. DYMR, I, p. 115.


22. Ibid., pp. 274-76.

23. Ibid., pp. 270-73.

24. S. P. Sen, “ Impressions about India, by Goddard, one of the sixteen General reviews all unpublished except one, dating from 1767 to 1794 lying in the Pondicherry Archives,” Indian Historical Records Commission, Proceedings of Meetings, Vol. XXIV, p. 35, held at Jalpur, February 1948.

* Feringhee: “The term was usually applied to the Portuguese settlers in India or to the people of Portuguese extraction,” (CPC, VII, No. 586, p. 199, Note 1).

25. PDMV, p. 31; PRC, Vol. II, p. 82.


29. Ibid., 2777.


* Yadgir is a taluka town with a fort in Gulbarga district, Hyderabad Deccan (CPC, VII, 450, p. 151).
32. NHM, Vol. III, pp. 177-78.
34. Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 1598.
35. D. V. Potdar, English East India Companycha Peshwe Darbarshe Farsheer Fatravyavahara, L. 55, p. 34.
36. Ibid., L. 59, p. 35.
37. Ibid., L. 61, p. 37.

*Nargund:

Historic town in the Navalgund Taluka of Dharwar district, Bombay. Formerly it contained a fort which has been dismantled (CPC, Vol. VII, No. 450, Note 3).

41. ALS, Vol. VIII, 2833.
42. DYMR, p. 172; Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat Oottur Vibhag, II, p. 290.
46. MSYK, Lekh 435; ALS, Vol. VIII, 2928.
50. Kirkpatrick, op.cit., p. 86.
51. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
54. Ibid. L. 54, p. 32.
57. Ibid., No. 378 and 379.
60. CPC, VII, No. 403, p. 141.

*Gheria:

Gheria is popularly known as Vijaydurg. It was formerly the headquarters of the Angrias in the Ratnagiri district Bombay, (CPC, Vol. VII, No. 472, p. 157, note 2).
Malet:

Charles Warre Malet the noted British Resident was born in 1752; he came to India in 1770 and entered the service of the East India Co. in 1780 as a factor at Bombay. He was appointed Resident at Poona in 1785 and he assumed charge of the office on 3rd March 1786. He successfully circumvented the diplomatic moves of Nana and concluded the Tripartite Alliance against Tipu in June 1790. He was created a Baronet on 24th February 1791. He resigned his post at Poona on 22nd February 1797. He sailed to England on 14th February 1798. Malet died on 24th January 1815 (CPC, Vol. VII, No. 251, p. 75, Note 3; Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 18.)


Ibid.,


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 38.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 39.

Ibid., pp. 39-44.

Ibid., p. 45.

Choksey, op. cit., p. 33.


Potdar, op. cit., L. 49, p. 29.


Choksey, op. cit., pp. 25 and 40.


Ibid., p. 78.

Ibid., Letter No. 43 dated 30th December 1786.


Ibid., Nos. 387 and 929.

Ibid., No. 929, pp. 277-78.

PRC, Vol. II, pp. 18, 28-31; Parasnis, Chenapattanakadil
Rajakarane, pp. 20-22; Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 7; Macdonald, op. cit., pp. 75-82.


100. Ibid.


102. SSR, No. 114, p. 50.


106. Potdar, English East India Companycha Peshwe Darbarshee Farshee Patravyavahara, L. No. 73 (SS. 1708, Ashadha, Vadya 10).

107. SSR, L. 113, p. 49.


109. Choksey, op. cit., p. 35.

Chapter IX

THE THIRD MYSORE WAR: 1787-92

After the conclusion of the treaty of Cajendragad (1787) as the political sky was getting clear of all the recent thunder and smoke, Nana directed all his attention to the administration of the Peshwa’s government which solely depended upon the disinterested counsels of that astute Minister. The calculated duplicity of the English who had refused to abide by their promise of assisting the Peshwa against Tipu, had considerably infuriated him but for all that, he was not inclined to ignore British claims to justice and equity at his hands, as could be proved by the deterrent punishment meted out to his servants who had ill-treated the guards in the employ of the English.

He realized that conflict between the English and Tipu, was inevitable sooner or later; and was anxiously awaiting an opportunity for exacting suitable retribution from the former. He was endeavouuring to ascertain how the Governor General who had lately professed his utter inability to assist the Peshwa, could station 3000 Europeans and 6000 sepoys under the Nizam’s control near Jinji.

While these developments were taking place, reports reached Nana that Ghulam Qadir had been ultimately overpowered and arrested at Meerut; and Shah Alam was reinstated on his throne with much pomp and the patents granted in favour of the Peshwa and Sindia, renewed with solemnity. Highly elated at the turn of events, Nana gave timely instructions to Ali Bahadur for maintaining strict secrecy over the reported internal dissensions among the Marathas.

With his usual circumspection, he was now closely watching the movements of the Nizam, who was endeavouuring to involve Sindia, in some dispute regarding the recovery of dues from him. He did not, however, fail to play the statesman when the occasion offered itself, learning that the Nizam was sorely dejected at not getting a competent Minister, he shrewdly informed him that he considered both the states as one and
offered his sincerer services. Highly gratified at this unexpected move, the Nizam conferred the title, of “Madarulmaha” on him, for this gesture of friendship.7

By preference a statesman, Nana was anxious to deal out punishment to the English through his subtle diplomatic moves rather than by war. On the other hand, Cornwallis was bent upon winning over Nana’s favour by deploying every stratagem at his command. Directing Malet to remain watchful of the Company’s rights and honour, Cornwallis particularly instructed him to guard against French machinations at the court of Poona.8 While Nana was biding his time, Cornwallis was seriously occupied in watching the movements of European rivals in the field,9 while seeking to conciliate the Maratha statesman. But Nana had given signs of such studied indifference towards the English, that he could not but disappoint Cornwallis considerably.10 Seeking to create an atmosphere of cordiality, Cornwallis had written observing that the intensity of their friendship had reached such enormous proportions that their names, Nana and Cornwallis had assumed a literary conjoint like ‘Q’ ‘U’ in their respective languages.11 He encouraged Malet in his enterprise of writing a History of the Marathas,12 and directed that he should extend to the Peshwa some special presents despatched by him.13 In the face of the serious financial difficulties of the Company, Cornwallis had no other course left open than that of conciliation, as the only means of achieving his ends. Nana thus figured as the centre of the political stage. And in conformity with this policy, even Bodam indicated that he would consider it a great pleasure to assist Nana to any extent in recognition of their friendship.14

While attempts to win over Nana were in full swing, the English were going all out to elicit detailed information regarding the strength and weakness of the native princes. Commenting on the Indian army Cornwallis refused to compare the undisciplined rabble that composed a Maratha army with the disciplined battalions in the service of the English.15 His reading of the Maratha temper and character was so perfect that even prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite alliance he openly averred that in case Tipu was to break with the English, he would immediately concert measures to incite the Marathas to
attack him.\textsuperscript{16} This was quite compatible with the policy of empire-makers whose acts are seldom above board.\textsuperscript{17}

Notwithstanding the fact that Nana had maintained an indifferent attitude towards the English, Malet's subtle efforts were steadily widening the gulf between him and Sindia.\textsuperscript{18} The apprehension of an alliance between Nana and Tipu was without basis,\textsuperscript{19} and the shrewd Malet had cautiously appraised the Governor General of the precise state of affairs between Tipu and the Peshwa. He described the rule of the former, as an absolute despotism resting entirely on the person of the despot, while that of the latter was according to him an immense aristocracy, and though imperilled by many accidents, was more certain in its progress to power.\textsuperscript{20} Hence he opined that no channel could be employed by the English with so sure a chance of success as the one of cultivating good understanding with Maratha chieftains like the Sindia, Bhosla or Holkar, avoiding their rivalries and circumventing the dangerous designs of the Peshwa's Power.\textsuperscript{21}

Intelligence reached Nana in the meantime that the English anticipated an attack by the French,\textsuperscript{22} and that the Bombay government was anxiously soliciting orders from Calcutta for seizing Malvan.\textsuperscript{23} Brimming with confidence born of past victories over the English and Tipu, Nana enjoyed absolute regal authority in the Deccan, while Sindia had become Mayor of the palace, plenipotentiary vice-regent of the Empire.\textsuperscript{24}

Apprehensive of Tipu's rancorous hostility which was calculated to annihilate the British power, the English were putting out feelers to ascertain the reactions of the two most powerful Maratha chiefs to their misbehaviour in the late Maratha-Mysore struggle. Tipu was interviewed by Malet on 20th March 1788 and from his observations it transpired that the Marathas were anxious for a closer connection with the Company while the English wanted only a treaty of mutual assistance.\textsuperscript{25} Tidings of hectic preparations for war at Bombay reaching Nana gave the lie to Cornwallis's professions of friendship.\textsuperscript{26} A revolution in France darkened the political horizon of India. The attack on Tellicherry by the Raja of Cherika was reported to be the outcome of Tipu's instigation.\textsuperscript{27} Times had changed, and now it was for the English to cajole Nana to
their views; but Cornwallis was moving with utmost circumspection in his commitments.\textsuperscript{28}

Piloting the affairs of the Peshwa with exceeding skill, Nana was exercising decisive control over the administration, when a report of a plot to murder him, reached him. The attempt was foiled by his efficient secret-service, and he continued his duties with increasing vigour.\textsuperscript{29}

Convinced of the inevitability of a conflict between the English and Tipu, Nana was exerting considerable vigilance, when Cornwallis directed Malet to induce him to renew hostilities with Mysore for the recovery of Maratha territories captured by Tipu and Hyder Ali in the past; but Nana was too shrewd to be caught in the snare and he only humoured the English envoy giving him some evasive replies, as he was not at all inclined to draw British chestnuts out of the fire. True to expectation, Tipu attacked Travancore in the month of December 1789.\textsuperscript{30} The late Maratha-Mysore war had failed to reduce his power and he was entertaining dangerous designs against his neighbours.\textsuperscript{31} Nana was, however, bent upon treating with deliberate reserve all British approaches.\textsuperscript{32}

Ingeniously scheming to pit Nana against Tipu, Cornwallis instructed Malet to convince the wily Maratha statesman that he would never be induced by any consideration to deceive him. But on the other hand, in the case of the Nizam he conveniently relegated to the background his demand for the possession of Guntur Sarkar.

Though open and candid in his professions, Nana did not lose any opportunity of alarming the English: Commenting on the clandestine endeavours of the Nizam seeking an alliance with some European Power, Nana took Malet into confidence and disclosed to him that he (Nana) was awaiting an envoy from the Nizam. But Malet correctly guessed Nana's endeavours to stampede the English and refused to believe in that intelligence.\textsuperscript{33}

While efforts at forming an anti-Tipu-front were in full progress, Cornwallis was busy in arranging a regular postal-system.\textsuperscript{34} But in this as in many other-matters, Nana was a step ahead and his administrative organisation was so perfect, that in course of time the English found it desirable to avail of his postal-service, as it carried the news more expeditiously.\textsuperscript{35}
The conciliatory moves of Cornwallis rendered Nana increasingly, pertinacious, as he was bent upon chastising the English for their recent treachery. His infinitely resourceful and inventive genius constantly presented several issues which considerably annoyed Malet and his master. Some of these were: the Maratha policy towards Janjira, the seizure of vessels under the protection of British flag, the proposal to send an embassy to England and Nana’s own intention of retiring to Benares.36

Nana was absolutely justified in paying the English in their own coin, the more so, as he found them cornered in a dangerous situation. Cornwallis’ anxiety can be easily ascertained from his letter to Malet in which he says “it would be extremely unpleasant to me to take any step or even to hold a language that would be construed by Nana as symptoms of any change in the friendship between the English and the Marathas”.37

Internal dissensions in Janjira had afforded an opportunity to Nana, who was anxious to gain the control of the island by any means. Finding the English inoperative, he succeeded in establishing the Peshwa’s sway over that principality, and it was now acknowledged even by the Siddhi under inexorable pressure of circumstances.  

Despite their own conduct in the late Maratha Mysore war, when Cornwallis withdrew from Nana all aid which had been promised by Macpherson, oriental diplomacy was now found to be chicanery and fraud by the English.38

Malet was incensed at the overbearing attitude of Nana, and in his letter of 23rd October blamed him for disregarding the agreement concluded between the Peshwa and the Siddhi of Janjira.39 Nana who was fully apprised of the delicate situation of the English, pressed his plans, ceaselessly much to the chagrin of Malet and Cornwallis. Yet in spite of all this, Cornwallis sought to placate him and directed Malet, to make use of the most civil and temperate language in his dealings.  

While the affairs of Janjira were settled to Nana’s satisfaction, correspondence between Cornwallis and Malet was swelling every day on the conduct of Peshwa’s officers, who had freely indulged in seizing and detaining vessels under the pro-
tection of the British flag. Even though enraged at this violation of the treaty Cornwallis limited his steps to the mere expression of severe protest carefully couched in polite language. The measure of his helplessness may be easily ascertained from the tenor of his letter in which he instructed Malet to convey it to the Peshwa's Minister.⁹

Nana's proposal of sending an embassy to England had been a source of embarrassment to Malet, who had correctly read the intentions underlying that move.⁴⁰ In his reply to Malet Cornwallis exposed the hollowness of Nana's threat.⁴¹

The existence of a religious taboo against foreign travels, widely prevalent in India, was obviously not unknown to the Governor-General who must have realized that it was the influence of such sentiments that kept Nana completely in the dark of the progress of Western civilization.†

While Nana delighted himself in embarrassing the English, Malet's instructions were to elicit detailed reliable information of Tipu's views, at any reasonable cost.⁴² This indicates the way in which the British maintained a vast network of espionage over the policy and politics of Indian Princes and gives the underlying implications of British diplomacy. How successful their scheming was, may be seen from the fact that while Nana was ceaselessly striving to remove the dissensions amongst his chieftains in Hindustan, Malet observed that he was satisfied at the prospect of the continuance of dissensions among the Marathas whose union was apprehended to be a source of nuisance to their neighbours.⁴³ Indeed no more candid confession of British intentions could be expected.

Nana's lukewarm attitude towards the English did not deter Cornwallis from his ambitious designs. The year preceding the Anglo-Mysore hostilities had witnessed the vigorous endeavours for the improvement of the internal administration in the Company's dominions.⁴⁴ Cornwallis' reforms had indeed inspired such a measure of self-confidence that he could afford to discontinue some of the mal-practices that were calculated to prejudice the dignity of his government; and the first to receive his attention was the formality of giving presents to the Indian power.⁴⁵

Despite the continued indifference with which his propo-
sals, were met Malet zealously persisted in trying to reconcile Nana to the suggestion of starting a postal system through the Maratha territory. The latter gave only a qualified assent and reserved his right to object to it at any time he considered necessary. Even the suggested survey of India by Captain Reynolds was abandoned by Cornwallis as it was considered likely to provoke the suspicion of the Minister.

In the midst of all this, the severely perplexed Governor General received a proposal from the astute Minister of the Peshwa, that an asylum should be made available by the English for him at Benares.

Nana’s intention of retiring to Benares was considered by Malet to be the result of some delicate internal politics of the Maratha government. Though Cornwallis agreed to accommodate him, he was not without apprehensions respecting Nana’s ulterior designs and made efforts to obtain further information. Jonathan Duncan, in his report stated that Nana was satisfied with Cornwallis’ administration of Benares. In the end, however, Nana never went to Benares as proposed.

That the English were still anxious to please the Peshwa’s Minister may be ascertained from the efforts of Cornwallis. Nana’s great partiality for fine cloth was well known and the Governor General gave him lavish presents of his choice. The fact is that Cornwallis was eager to make common cause with the Marathas despite their avowed enmity to the English with a view to preventing an alliance between them and Tipu. Sindia, Haripant, Holkar and Bhau were all apathetic and hence Cornwallis’ hopes for an alliance, lay solely in Nana who was being placated and won over through the indefatigable efforts of Malet.

Apparently, fully conscious of this background Nana took every available opportunity to alarm Cornwallis. The capture of a French ship by the Marathas had resulted in a French demand for indemnification. Commenting on this subject Nana through Bairohi indicated to Malet that a permit for trade might be issued to the French. But the astute Malet was able to read Nana between the lines; he was pretty certain that no such permit would ever be issued and accordingly he intimated his observations to Cornwallis.
The Governor-General was exercising utmost vigilance in his dealings with Nana who was considered quite capable of answering the British needs. Cornwallis was against including Sindia in the Tripartite alliance as the latter’s menacing position in the North of India caused apprehensions. Even though an agreement with Nana was absolutely essential, Nana’s indifferent disposition had become a matter of grave concern. Time and again Nana announced that the English were unworthy of faith.

With Nana engrossed in devising retaliatory measures against the English, the kaleidoscopic dreams of a worried Cornwallis stood unfulfilled. In the midst of these developments, disputes broke out over the possession of Mount Delhi and Dharmapatam between the English factors of Tellicherry and Tipu Sultan. On the 20th January 1790 Cornwallis informed Malet of Tipu’s attack on the Raja of Travancore which was tantamount to a declaration of war against the Company. In fact Cornwallis had never wished for a war with Tipu. But the act of aggression committed on the 24th December 1789 released him from the restrictions placed by Parliament and he immediately issued instructions to the political Resident at Poona and Hyderabad to enter into engagements with these powers, against the Mysore dictator.

Nana was biding his time. To a mind like his, no difficulty appeared insurmountable, no combination of embarrassments exceeded the reach of his imagination. The English obtained possession of Guntur, and the Nizam despatched Meer Abdool Kassim to Calcutta for an alliance. The latter, however, failed to address Nana in the matter. While hatred and fear of Tipu had dominated other considerations with the Nizam, he readily agreed to execute the stipulations of the treaty of 1768 relative to Guntur, but he deliberately avoided replying to Nana’s letters regarding developments on the Mysore front. Hardly had Nana received knowledge of his clandestine agreement with the English when the Vakeel of Hyderabad approached him. He was not at all enthusiastic for a war with Tipu. But it was the Nizam who had as in the past, taken the initiative for a tripartite alliance, against the Mysore Sultan.

Simultaneously Nana was approached by Malet who sought the Peshwa’s co-operation against Tipu: he even desired that
either the Peshwa or Nana should lead the army in person. The fundamental consideration that prompted this move of Malet was the violent apprehension of the Nizam with respect to the Marathas. Nana was cognizant of the promise of the English stipulating the grant of the Carnatic and Balaghat to the Nizam, and he immediately advanced his own specific proposals to the English for an alliance against Tipu.

Notwithstanding that Nana had now showed an inclination to enter into an alliance with the English aiming to recover the Peshwa’s territories captured by the tiger of Mysore, he and Parsharambhau, though most inimical to Tipu, were averse to the overthrow of that prince, while Sindia was even more hostile to that course of policy. Nana was never over anxious to ally himself with the English, but on this occasion he did so only in order to put a spoke in the wheel of Sindia, who was running things “too much on his own”.

It may be recalled that Nana and Sindia had entered into an agreement on oath on 10th September 1775. When Palmer requested Sindia and Holkar to use their influence at Poona in effecting an alliance between the Peshwa and the English, Sindia agreed to unite in the confederacy against Tipu, provided Cornwallis promised to send two battalions similar to those granted to the Nizam and the British government was ready to protect Sindia’s territory in Hindustan. He was not at all enthusiastic about the British move encouraged by Nana.

Inspite of the fact that Nana was yet hesitating to enter into the proposed league, the remorseless turn of events forced his decision: Tipu’s officers attacked the district and town of Padshapur belonging to the Peshwa who thereupon readily signed the Tripartite alliance on 1st June 1790. Cornwallis’ policy however suffered stringent criticism in the House of Commons when Hippsley called in question the justice of war; Francis voiced similar sentiments. Fox went to the extent of denouncing the new combine as a predatory confederacy for the purpose of extirpating the Mysore Prince. But Cornwallis paid scant attention to the outburst of his friends in the House of Commons, and pursued a vigorous policy, ordering movements of his military. He had fully realised the importance of the Mysore State as an instrument to maintain the balance of Power in India.
Even though the Peshwa had formally agreed to join the English against Tipu, Nana persisted in bargaining for better advantages. But Cornwallis managed matters tactfully and the tripartite Alliance became a reality.

Scheming ingeniously to pit Nana against Tipu, Malet had succeeded in bringing about the Tripartite Alliance. Still, he could not fail to discern Nana’s ambitious designs of universal conquest of Hindustan with a view to establishing his unchallenged supremacy. In the light of the above circumstance Malet had reason to heave a sign of relief at the conclusion of the treaty with Nana, which was so long in agitation.

While Nana was thus engaged in diplomatic strategy; intelligence reached him that severe fighting had broken out between Sindia and Ismail Beg supported by Gangaram Badri in which the former scored an astounding victory. In a letter to Lala Sevakram at Calcutta he demanded detailed information regarding the English movements at Calcutta and the position of affairs on the Afghan front. Reports soon came that Taimursha was at Kabul while his minister Kazee was in clandestine communication with the king of Iran for the purpose of compassing the murder or Taimursha. But the plot was thwarted and Kazee put to death.

While Cornwallis was cautiously maintaining cordial relations with Nana, Malet was pressing him to advise the Peshwa to lead his army personally; on the other hand Tipu was struggling to seduce the Peshwa in his favour against the English. Early in January 1790 Haripant started on the expedition, but the plan of his movement was arranged in advance by Nana, which obviously indicated a deliberately slow pace. Amidst these developments rumour was afoot that Tipu suddenly died of a shock, but it was soon found to be a political hoax. A protracted campaign followed under the command of General Medows. While Nana was deliberately delaying vigorous action, the Nizam indulged in intrigues with foreign powers. Holland, the governor of Madras, who extorted considerable sums from the Raja of Travancore had sailed for England while Tipu’s aggressive operations continued unabated. The defeat of Col. Floyd at Satyamangalam had
changed the attitude of the allies. The intrigues of Tukoji Holkar and Rastia in favour of Tipu alarmed Malet considerably.\textsuperscript{91}

Inspite of Malet’s ceaseless approaches, Nana’s endless and vexatious delays continued, Bhau remaining encamped on the Krishna and Rastia’s clandestine conferences progressing without hindrance. Nana’s deliberate indifference incensed Malet considerably and in frustration and desperation he wrote to Cornwallis charging Nana of lack of candour or consistency. In the midst of chicane, fraud and intrigue, Tipu’s depredations were assuming dangerous proportions.

Nana’s intrigues which were born of Malet’s perfidy evidenced four years ago in connection with the Maratha-Mysore war, were not a patch on the machinations of Malet, who could not but express intense dislike of Maratha polity. In fact the latter’s endeavours to bribe the confidential agent Bahiropant and several others were in no way different from his own charges against Nana.\textsuperscript{92} He had played a similar role when he dealt with Nana as a cat plays with a mouse and with the same feline delight and finesse, four years ago.\textsuperscript{92} Was it not the same Malet who wrote to Macpherson that he would humour and fool Nana pending the receipt of the Governor General’s letter.\textsuperscript{93} The pile of correspondence exchanged between him and Cornwallis throws ample light on Nana’s justifiable retribution.\textsuperscript{94}

While at the instance of Nana, the Maratha chiefs were delaying the progress of war, Cornwallis who had become impatient attacked Shrirangapattam and fought a stiff action at Arikera on 14th May. The progress of the British arms hastened the movements of Bhau and Haripant. The want of supplies had caused a tentative retreat of the British army which sighted the allies near Melkota when Haripant who had with him huge supplies, relieved the plight of the British armies.\textsuperscript{95} The Bazar of the Maratha camp presented a great surprise to Cornwallis.\textsuperscript{96} The united armies rolled on again towards Shrirangapattam. Cornwallis’ successful assault on the 6th February 1792 resulted in peace-negotiations from Tipu.

Nana was moving very cautiously as he wanted to keep his control on the negotiations.\textsuperscript{96} Malet was not unaware of Nana’s anxiety for promoting his own interests, quieting the
jealousies and soothing the pride of his court.\textsuperscript{97} He was apprehensive of Nana's intrigues to embarrass the progress of peacemaking,\textsuperscript{98} and managed to get Haripant vested with complete authority regarding the progress and terms of the treaty.\textsuperscript{99}

Cornwallis conveyed his appreciation of Nana's services in the Anglo-Mysore hostilities and stressed his full confidence in his ability.\textsuperscript{100} While reciprocating these sentiments Nana made a pointed reference to the steps taken by him.\textsuperscript{101} The sincere co-operation of the Marathas was also appreciated in full measure by the English Resident Palmer.\textsuperscript{102} While the exchange of felicitations and presents between the Peshwa and the English was in full swing.\textsuperscript{103} Cornwallis paid eloquent tributes to Hurrypant and Parasharambham for their services, more especially to the tact with which the fort of Dharwar was captured.\textsuperscript{104}

In the midst of these formalities, intelligence of another offer of peace from Tipu was conveyed to Nana by Cornwallis.\textsuperscript{105} Commenting on the extent of Nana's co-operation, Malet observed adversely on his refusal to advise the Peshwa to lead the army in person, on his intrigues with Tipu through Rastia, and his anxiety for maintaining the balance of power between the conflicting political interests involved.\textsuperscript{106} Nana was subjugated to unkind criticism by Malet on account of his wiles and snares, which he had intended as retributory measures against Malet.\textsuperscript{107}

The English envoy now addressed Cornwallis requesting him to treat Nana on a par with Haripant or Bhau.\textsuperscript{108} Nana was moving very circumspectly regarding the proposal of holding a congress of the delegates of the allies promoted by Malet and Cornwallis.\textsuperscript{109} Malet was also considerably incensed at Haripant's discarding the proposal for holding the Congress.\textsuperscript{110} While condemning the two he points out to the Governor-General, the Machiavellian cunning of the Maratha and urges Cornwallis to insist that Nana should endorse terms acceptable to the English and the Nizam.\textsuperscript{111} But Nana's primary intention was to maintain the conduct of negotiations in his own hands.\textsuperscript{112}

Notwithstanding the fact that Nana had been responsible for the opposition to the proposal,\textsuperscript{113} Cornwallis, in his letter
of 5th August 1791 categorically assured him that no decisive answer on the subject of peace would be given to Tipu without his consent.\textsuperscript{114} Nana was as usual playing for time, and Malet in his letter to Cornwallis expressed serious apprehension of Nana's machinations for augmenting the Peshwa's advantages which were likely to involve Sindia in this issue.\textsuperscript{115} In the midst of these checks and counter checks, Cornwallis finally prevailed upon Haripant to return to Bangalore with his army, much to the satisfaction of Malet.\textsuperscript{116} Nana came out with a fresh proposal of leading the Peshwa into the field for more expeditious management of pacific negotiations.\textsuperscript{117} Hardly had Cornwallis taken a decision on this when Nana requested the Governor-General to send two battalions, for the protection of Gujarat, as Mirza Ismail was visiting that province. The request was however rejected.\textsuperscript{118} In the meantime, intelligence reached Malet that Sindia was visiting Poona.\textsuperscript{119}

Nana's dubious attitude in the conduct of the peace-parleys was calculated to check the ascendancy of the British power and thereby save Tipu from complete annihilation.\textsuperscript{120} Even Cornwallis was not in favour of complete subjugation of the Mysore State.\textsuperscript{121} He was forced by the Directors to bring about immediate peace, which cut short the dilatory tactics of the allies.\textsuperscript{122} It may be recalled that the tripartite alliance had already been denounced in the House of Commons as a confederacy of plunderers, with the object of extirpating Tipu.\textsuperscript{123} In a letter to the Peshwa dated 15th April 1792 Cornwallis announced the cessation of hostilities and sincerely appreciated the unanimous endeavours of the allies, with a specific reference to the measure of gratification he derived by the association of Haripant.\textsuperscript{124}

Even though Nana's co-operation with the English, coupled with Nizam's assistance had successfully subdued Tipu, the greatness of the Mysore prince cannot escape the attention of an impartial observer, more especially in view of the comprehensive foresight with which he used to conduct the affairs of his state.\textsuperscript{*}

Consequent upon the defeat of Tipu, Nana requisitioned Capt. Little's regiments to Poonah as he apprehended some
trouble from Sindia. Commenting on the differences between Nana and Sindia Malet had aptly pointed out to the Governor-General how the tension was moving from the plane of uncertainty to that of absolute certitude, indicating grave apprehensions for Sindia's dangerous designs. He had been anxious to treat Sindia on a separate footing in view of his predominant position. The request for Little's regiments was perfunctorily dismissed by Cornwallis. Anticipating that the rivalry between Nana and Sindia was calculated to precipitate bitter controversy, the latter informed Nana through Haripant that he would never encourage disrespectful conduct of any Maratha potentate to the Peshwa.

In spite of the fact that the Peshwa had gained considerable advantages by entering the Tripartite Alliance, at the instance of Nana, Sindia had not at all been happy at the turn of events. Palmer believed that the discords between Sindia and Holkar had the blessings of Nana who suspected that Sindia was endeavouring to be independent.

While the Maratha Empire was thus suffering the pangs of disruption, Sindia's magnificent scheme of setting the young Peshwa on his legs still wallowed in the doldrums owing to the stiff opposition of Nana who was anxious to maintain his own authority unchallenged. Though the details of that unfortunate controversy have little scope in our theme, let us touch the fringe of the issue, as it may be interesting to any impartial observer from the point of view of the British who were directly concerned.

The assurance given by Cornwallis to Nana that he would assist in reducing to obedience any Maratha chieftain recalcitrant to the Peshwa, deserves to be read in the light of the reply of Hastings to Anderson on the choice of Sindia as a guarantee for the observance of the treaty of Salbai in 1792. Nana, the Nizam and Mudhoji Bhosala were deadly against Hastings' political move. Hastings deliberately ignored the fact that Sindia was a loyal servant of the Peshwa; while in his reply to Haripant Cornwallis expresses anxiety for maintaining Peshwa's authority unchallenged. This obviously indicates that British diplomacy espouses the principles of justice and equity to suit their conveniences.
When in 1782 Hastings named Sindia as the guarantee on behalf of his master, the chief consideration was to undermine Nana's political power which had become absolutely predominant. But during the regime of Cornwallis, it was unfortunately Patilbaba, who happened to exercise menacing position in the Maratha Empire which was a matter of grave concern to the ambitious British. Thus, it can be said with certainty that the ruling consideration of British diplomacy was expediency, without any regard to the noble principles of justice and equity much less to personalities like Sindia or Nana.

Confronted with a delicate situation on the internal front, Nana was moving with reserve, when Malet interviewed him for denouncing categorically Sindia's demand of Chauth of Bengal from the English, and the indecent behaviour of his servants at Benares.\textsuperscript{132} Though Nana was considerably gratified at the growing ascendancy of the Marathas, he never liked his followers dissipating the fruits of their impressive authority by an excess of exuberance and sincerely promised Malet to inquire into the matter.

While Nana was profoundly occupied in internal affairs, the English were biding their time for an opportunity to undermine Sindia's influence by placating Nana.\textsuperscript{133} Even though internecine strife was widespread in those times and every Indian Ruler and petty prince had his military forces,\textsuperscript{134} Sindia's formidable military had become a thorn in the side of the English. The English were also anxiously struggling to make their position absolutely secure even in future.\textsuperscript{135} Malet and Kennaway suggested to Cornwallis the desirability of a treaty of guarantee entered into by the English, Peshwa and the Nizam. Malet was advancing his own proposals, while the Nizam was anxious to seek the protection of the English against a possible attack of the Marathas. Astute Nana unhesitatingly consented to be a party to the above proposal provided the Maratha's liberty with regard to their relations with the Nizam was in no way affected. Nana's secondary consideration was to secure a promise from Cornwallis to subsidise a British Corps for reducing to obedience any of the Maratha chieftains that might prove refractory; Sindia had already made it a condition for his entering into the Tripartite-Alliance,\textsuperscript{136} which had been rejected by Cornwallis.
The treaty of guarantee could not however come into existence owing to divergent views and conflicting opinions of the protagonists,¹³⁷ Nana maintaining an indifferent attitude to the proposal throughout. *

* "Indeed if we except Yashwant Pansia, a Maratha brahmin, who commands the artillery... the remaining power of the Peshwa rests entirely on the single wise and disinterested counsels of Nana Fadnavis," Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 729, (extracts from a Persian manuscript, observations by a Muslim).

2. Ibid., p. 88.
3. DYM, p. 297.
5. HIS, Khanda I, pp. 78-79.
6. DYM, p. 295.
7. PB, p. 119.
14. Potdar, op. cit., L.83, p. 50:
15. PRC, Vol. II, p. 27.
20. Ibid., p. 68.
22. PDMV, p. 22.
23. Ibid., p. 19.
   Keene, Hindustan under free Lances, pp. 44-45.
28. AP, Lekh 268; Choksey, op. cit., p. 52.
30. Ibid., 3178, p. 4280; Cox, op. cit., p. 193.
32. Choksey, op. cit., p. 53.
   * In the year 1784, Sidi Johar, the commandant of Janjira seized the chiefship to the exclusion of Abdul Rahinis, eldest son Babu Mia, who fled to Poona; his cause was supported by Nana who was anxious to gain the island of Janjira. Arrangements were concluded by which the Peshwa's sway over the island was acknowledged by the Sidi (Aitchison, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 334-35, and Vol. V, p. 20; Campbell, Kolaba and Janjira Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Vol. XI, p. 448; Orme, Historical Fragments..., pp. 10, 44, 56, 78 and 107; Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. VI, p. 269; SPD, Vol. 36, No. 1, and No. 414; V. G. Dighe, Peshwa Bajirao I and Maratha Expansion, pp. 84-88; Grant Duff, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 99; Cox, op. cit., p. 199).
   * Cornwallis' letter to Malet of 26th August, 1789:
     "I shall depend upon your prudence and good sense to make use of the most civil and temperate language, but you will take the first opportunity to convey to Nana in explicit terms that I am much dissatisfied on both the heads mentioned... and expose the offensive conduct of subedar of Suvarndurg in his mysterious designs upon Jangira," (PRC, Vol. II, p. 152).
   * In his letter of 18th December 1789, Cornwallis instructs Malet: "You should convey to the Peshwa's Minister Nana, in guarded language that it has been no small disappointment to me to meet with so unsuitable return from them"... (PRC, Vol. II, p. 161). While in another letter Cornwallis observes, "I shall conclude with repeating that I have so much confidence in your ability and prudence as to be persuaded that you will convey the substance of the instructions, with all the degree of delicacy in words and manner which is due to the Minister of a powerful state"... (PRC, Vol. II, p. 153).
40. Ibid., pp. 100, 146, 151, 163 and 164.
41. Ibid., p. 163.
† "The East India Company's armies," observes Pt. Nehru, "consisted of Indian sepoys; only the Marathas had some national sentiment. Their rank and file was good seldom deserting a post and often facing certain death unmoved. But behind all this courage there was often an adventurism and amateurishness both in peace and war.
   "Their ignorance of the world was appalling. They did not take the trouble to find out what was happening elsewhere and what their enemies were doing." (Pt. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 248).
In striking contrast to the above observations, it is interesting to ascertain the comprehensive outlook of the English; in his despatch of 27th March 1775, to the Court of Directors, Hastings states: "I have now the satisfaction to transmit to you a complete and corrected copy of a
translation of the Gentoo Code (Manusmriti), executed ... by Mr. Nathaniel Brassey Halbed, from a Persian version of the original Sanskrit,” (Letter from Warren Hastings copy of translation of the Gentoo Code or the laws of Jurisprudence, 1775; Preface, page x, dated 27th March, 1775.

43. Ibid., p. 160.
44. Teignmouth, Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of John Lord Teignmouth, p. 160, (letter of Sir John Shore to Anderson, of 8th November 1788).
46. Ibid., p. 164.
47. Ibid., p. 151.
48. Ibid., pp. 12, 149, 164.
49. Ibid., p. 150.
50. Ibid., p. 154.
53. Ibid., p. 149.

* Malet regrets: 

When Malet was given permission to bring daily from Bombay, some fruit and other eatables, not exceeding three palanquin-load, he arranged to bring with the provisions, some guns, without a permit; Nana's secret service got the news, and the palanquin carrying the guns was detained. When interrogated by Nana, Malet regretted the mistake and promised to avoid a recurrence. (PB, p. 116; Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. 518).

58. Mark Wilks, Historical Sketches of the South of India in an Attempt to trace the History of Mysore, p. 155.
60. Murray Hugh, op. cit., p. 390.
61. ALS, Vol. VIII, 3188.
62. Ibid., 3178, pp. 4281-82.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 3188, p. 4320.
69. MSYK, Lekh 14, p. 16.
75. Ibid.
76. DYMRR, Part II, p. 165.
77. Forrest, Selections from the State Papers of the Governors General of India, Vol. I, Lord Cornwallis, p. 98 (Intro.)
82. ALS, Vol. VIII, 3205, p. 4345.
83. PDMV, p. 111.
84. SSR, L. 226, p. 113.
86. ALS, Vol. VIII, 3178, p. 4287.
87. SSR, L. 223, p. 111.
88. ALS, Vol. VIII, 3173, p. 4276
89. Ibid., 3178, pp. 4282-83.
90. Cox, op. cit., p. 194.

* Malet’s letter of 14th March, 1791:*

Criticising Nana’s intrigues, Malet observes, “I have, my lord, endeavoured to make a concise sketch of a negotiatory predicament with a court whose views are conducted by men unchecked by principles, unawed by responsibility and who from their infancy are habituated to the promotion of their designs by all the versatility of Machiavellian art, and all the perseverance of the most stoical apathy, by men, my Lord, with whom chicane is an ability, business amusement, intrigue recreation, and circumvention pleasure, who in their exercise of these qualities, are actuated by an insatiable lust of power and of gain.”

Observing on Malet’s unjustifiable vituperation, Choksey says: ‘Malet must remember that in diplomacy men have to resort an unbecoming and ungentlemanly conduct under the plea of patriotism.” Continuing further he adds, “was Malet justified in his efforts, actually on record, to seduce the minds of several Marathas in responsible post. Malet’s mental agony in keeping the Brahmin to its faith, his charges of chicane, intrigue and circumvention are at times equally applicable to British diplomats as to the Brahmin.”

(Choksey, op. cit., pp. 77-78).

92. Ibid., p. 27.
94. Ibid., pp. 210-212.
II, pp. 17-20; Edward Moor, A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little’s detachment, pp. 72-73; Mark Wilks, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 158.

* Bazar of a Maratha Camp: 26th May 1791:

The bazar of a Maratha camp presented an exhibition of no ordinary character; and to their famished visitors, exhibited a picture of the spoils of the East, and the industry of the West. From a web of English broad-cloth to a Birmingham pen-knife, from the shawls of Kashmir, to the second-hand garment of a Hindoo; from diamonds of the first water to the silver ear-ring of a poor plundered village maiden; from oxen, sheep and poultry to the dried salt fish of Konkan; almost everything was seen that could be presented by the best bazars of the richest towns; but above all the tables of money-changers overspread with the coins of every country of the East, in the open air and public street of the camp, gave evidence of an extent of mercantile activity, utterly inconceivable in any camp.”


97. Ibid., p. 207.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., p. 216.
100. Potdar, op. cit., L, 98, p. 56.
102. Ibid., p. 189.
103. Ibid., p. 224.
107. Ibid., p. 215.
108. Ibid., p. 187.
111. Ibid., p. 204.
112. Ibid., pp. 202-205.
113. Ibid., p. 203.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid., p. 204.
116. Ibid., p. 205.
117. Ibid., p. 206.
118. Ibid., p. 207.
119. Ibid., p. 205.
120. Ibid., p. 223.
* The Ruler of Mysore: “Tipu took the title of Padsha and the prayers were read in his name in the mosque of Seringapatam. He was a better educated man than his father. He has been described as inordinately and fatally vain; he considered himself to be a second prophet whose duty it was to destroy idolaters and establish the true faith. The inhabitants of the forests of Coorg, the Christians of Kana, and the Nairs of the Malabar Coast were surrounded in droves and given the choice of death or Islam.

“But it was the same Ruler of Mysore who used to give enormous charities, even to Hindus; who had established trade relations with Muscat; who endeavoured to found a pearl-fishery; and who wanted to create a formidable Naval force. Thus Tipu’s character was a miscellaneous mixture of virtues and vices.” (Aithisik Tipne, Vol. V, 23, p. 28; Kirkpatrick, op. cit., pp. 235-41).

127. Ibid., p. 232.
128. Ibid., p. 230.
129. Ibid., p. 191.
130. Ibid., p. 189 and 233; Cox, op. cit., p. 197.
132. PRC, Vol. II, pp. 244, 246 and 249; John Malcolm, Sketch of the Political History of India, p. 103; Cox, op. cit., p. 192.
133. PRC, Vol. II, pp. 244 and 258.
134. C. Grey, European Adventurers of Northern India, p. 5.
136. Ibid., pp. 50-56; Mark Wilks, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 312; John Malcolm, Sketch of the Political History of India, p. 100.

* Sindia had made overtures to subsidise a British Corps to accompany him to Poona, while Nana was pressing for the same in the settlement of the Treaty of Guarantee. “It was thus a curious example,” says Mark Wilks, “of two Maratha competitors for Maratha power, reciprocally attempting to render the English Government the instrument of their domestic feuds.” (Mark Wilks, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 312); John Malcolm, Sketch of the Political History of India, p. 142; and Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 120.
Chapter X

RELATIONS WITH THE NIZAM
1795

Though Tipu had been humbled and the Marathas were the only military power which the English had reason to fear, the natural tendency of the Maratha commanders of separate armies to carve independent dominions for themselves, created mutual jealousies and frequently embarrassed common action.1 Even though Nana was confronted with a delicate situation at home, he was more jealous of the English than of Tipu and conveniently advanced the Maratha's claim of Chauth from Mysore, which was rejected by the English and the Nizam alike.2 Nana's splendid achievement in the campaign against Tipu synchronised with Sindia's arrival at Poona which caused considerable stir and bustle at the Durbar. Nana who had then entertained serious apprehensions regarding Sindia's designs, had approached Cornwallis through Haripant indicating his intention of subsidising a British detachment.3 In spite of Nana's supreme authority at the Peshwa's court, this visit was calculated to challenge and undermine his influence.4

Notwithstanding the fact that Sindia and Nana were both the avowed enemies of the English, the sudden upsurge of Sindia's power provoked much speculation and conjecture throughout the country. The success in the allied war against Tipu had considerably augmented the British power in the political arena, and Sindia was bent upon resisting this rising supremacy. This was the main object which had brought him to Poona and which puzzled almost all the political thinkers of the day.5

Nana was exercising utmost political vigilance over the developments at Poona, because even though he was anxious to concert measures for the recovery of Peshwa's dues of chauth from the Nizam, he was more seriously concerned with the maintenance of his own authority at the Peshwa's court unchallenged, either out of lust for power or anxiety for the security
of his person and property. Thus while the differences between him and Sindia were assuming grave proportions, the Nizam was engaged in meditating schemes for creating a barrier between him and the Marathas by engaging the English to fix his tribute to them. Nana and Sindia were greatly annoyed at the arrogant interference of the English in their dealings with the Nizam; but the latter entertained serious apprehensions for his safety against the Marathas and still endeavoured to secure the services of the English on his behalf.

Though Nana and Sindia were ambitious by nature, both of them were inherently patriotic and intensely loyal to the Peshwa. Hence, in spite of all the differences that had agitated the political atmosphere at Poona, it is to their credit, that they never allowed matters to deteriorate to the extent of causing an open rupture between them. In spite of the fact that a full year was spent in composing the differences between them, their final reconciliation proved to be a source of grave concern to their enemies who were eagerly anticipating the disruption of the Maratha empire.

Hardly had their differences been composed when a sudden and unfortunate event shattered all hopes of a bright future. The great soldier-cum-statesman, Mahadji Sindia died on 12th February 1794 at the age of 67. Historians blame him for his helplessness in bringing about solidarity in the Maratha camp, due to petty rivalries in the quest for personal power. It is far from correct, however, to blame the illustrious Patilbaba, who had most tactfully managed matters, without giving even the least opportunity to his eager enemies to exploit the differences among the various chiefs. He had successfully withstood and kept in check the British ambitions and would have given a glowing account of himself in future, had not the logic of events disposed otherwise. No genius can ever forecast or control the play of chance and fate. After all he and Nana were human beings who could not be an exception to the laws of nature. He is to be judged by his noble achievements in the cause of the common ideal.

While the controversy had been in full swing, the English who had entertained grave apprehensions because of Sindia's menacing position were anxious for a stable government under
Nana who was known for his moderation.\textsuperscript{15} They had indeed little sympathy for him but considered him more convenient to their ambitious designs, the principal reason for such a policy being traceable to the international situation which was assuming serious dimensions.\textsuperscript{6}

On the other hand, Nana’s position at the Peshwa’s Court had become a matter of considerable concern to the Nizam too, who looked forward for his removal as early as possible. It may be recalled that in the past when the Marathas were in difficulties, he had captured extensive territories from their far-flung domains; nay, he had even entertained the ambition of recovering the chauth from Bengal in his capacity as viceroy of the emperor, in the Deccan.\textsuperscript{16} Circumstances had however completely changed, and he was now relentlessly endeavouring to secure his safety from the Marathas by concluding the treaty of Guarantee, and this, Nana tactfully rejected.\textsuperscript{17} He thereupon, tried to reconcile Nana and Azil-ul-umra, the Minister of the Nizam, through Mahadji Sindia,\textsuperscript{18} he also implored Kennaway to accompany him to the Peshwa, but to no purpose.\textsuperscript{19} He became increasingly anxious to compose his differences with the Peshwa by placating Nana’s rival, Mahadji Sindia who was engaged in the internal affairs of the Poonna court. Unfortunately for him, however, intelligence reached him that the two had successfully arrived at an understanding; and this news added greatly to his consternation. It would be profitable at this stage to examine the position of the English in India, as it had much influence on the Maratha-Nizam affairs. While Nana was engaged in the internal affairs of the Peshwa, Cornwallis, in his letter of 13th May 1793, informed him of the revolution that had taken place in France and further apprised him of the steps which he proposed to take as a result.\textsuperscript{20} The charter of the East India Company was again renewed for a period of twenty years.\textsuperscript{21} The financial and judicial reforms of Cornwallis had improved their position in their territories.\textsuperscript{22} The fresh annexations carried out, caused considerable concern to Nana.\textsuperscript{23} While Nana was on friendly terms with the English a conflict arose regarding the succession to the regency of Baroda. Nana demanded the payment of dues from Gaikwad, but the intervention of Malet settled matters amicably.\textsuperscript{24}
Though Nana exerted rigorous control over the Peshwa, his fair and impartial administration was sincerely appreciated by the English in the light of their own deliberate injustice to the Marathas in the past. They liked his mild character which was most favourable to their ambitions.\textsuperscript{25} Yet in spite of the most cordial relations, he was not inattentive even to the minutest event concerning them, as may be ascertained from his consultation with Haripant respecting the meeting of Malet and Kennaway near Verool.\textsuperscript{26}

Intelligence came in the mean time regarding the death of Taimurshah of Kabul, resulting in the withdrawal of Payanbeg's forces from Attock which were to invade Hindustan.\textsuperscript{27}

Nana had been adamant about the recovery of arrears of chauth from the Nizam, in the teeth of internal differences. But now he had to hide his time, on account of the sudden death of Mahadji Sindia. Whileconcerting measures to take up the issue afresh, reports reached from Delhi which indicated that Daulatrao,\textsuperscript{28} the adopted son of Sindia — was unable to administer the emperor's kingdom.\textsuperscript{29} He had Aba Chitnis replaced by Pagnis, much to the disappointment of the emperor.\textsuperscript{30} Hardly was he free from these administrative responsibilities occasioned by Sindia's death, when an unfortunate event buried him in intense grief. Haripant Phadke who had been his formidable support in the hour of trial, died.\textsuperscript{31} Thus a succession of events prevented him from pressing his demand for chauth on the Nizam. But no calamity appeared sufficient to immobilise him for good and he now at last, took the matter in hand.\textsuperscript{32}

Azim-ul-umra was using all means at his disposal to reduce the Maratha influence in his territory. He acceded to the British demand for Guntoor and discharged Meer Allum without consulting Nana. He entered into an alliance with the English against Tipu without taking Nana into confidence. These measures coupled with his endeavours to hasten a treaty of Guarantee with the English (1792), his untiring efforts to influence the Peshwa through Kennaway and Cornwallis against Nana, his dangerous intrigues with Sindia for effecting Nana's removal, his boldness in offering a bribe even to Sindia,\textsuperscript{6} his recall of Mir Alam from Poona, his employment of assassins to
encompass Nana’s death and finally his treacherous advice to his master to evade the huge arrears of chauth and utilise them for augmentation of the fighting arm with a view to crushing the Peshwa, all this had incensed Nana considerably.\textsuperscript{33}

But Nana had successfully thwarted all the manoeuvres of the Nizam’s Minister and composed his disappointment to Azim-ul-umra.\textsuperscript{34} He had been already cautioned by Tipu against playing into the hands of the English on Hyderabad affairs.\textsuperscript{35} The only course open to him, short of starting hostilities was to demand from the Nizam the removal of Azim-ul-umra, using the new position of the Peshwa as Vakeel-i-Mutalak of the Emperor for the purpose.\textsuperscript{36} On his side Azim-ul-umra was anxious not only to defeat such a demand but also to capture the Nizam’s throne after his death which was considered imminent.\textsuperscript{37} Nana despatched his official state-paper conveying eight demands to the Nizam and a copy of it was sent to Shore for information.\textsuperscript{38} In a reply, Shore sincerely regretted that the differences between the Peshwa and the Nizam should have assumed such grave proportions and offered his mediation if desired.\textsuperscript{39}

Notwithstanding the fact that Nana was bent upon removing Azimul-umra from the post of the Minister of the Nizam, the English kept reticent about the developments, as they fervently anticipated that the Marathas would weaken the Nizam and that the differences between Nana and Sindia would ultimately lead to their self-destruction.\textsuperscript{40} That this was the motive power behind the British inaction can be easily ascertained from the observation of Kirkpatrick who had unequivocally predicted that the flight of Alighah would enable Nana to interpose and establish his absolute sway over the Nizam.\textsuperscript{41}

Acting with the utmost circumspection, Nana succeeded in thwarting Azim-ul-umra’s design of bringing about a personal interview between the Peshwa and the Nizam, as he feared the outcome of the interview might prove embarrassing.\textsuperscript{42} The decks had by now been cleared for action and Nana issued instructions to the Maratha armies to march in the direction of Bidar. The two forces closed with each other on 11th March 1795, when the Nizam’s army was utterly routed\textsuperscript{40} and the Nizam compelled to accept a most humiliating treaty at Kharda.\textsuperscript{43}
Throughout these developments the English persisted in following a policy of neutrality much to the detriment of the Nizam. Lord Cornwallis was on the eve of his retirement and he declined to embroil the British Power in a war with the Marathas, while Sir John Shore who succeeded him was in favour of non-intervention. When the Nizam appealed to Calcutta for assistance, international affairs influenced the British policy in India considerably. All that the Nizam was now anxious for, was bare political existence. Nana, who had spurned the proposal for a treaty of Guarantee, was biding his time while the English who considered the Nizam’s government too flimsy and unstable were hesitating to enter into a separate engagement with him as they apprehended that anglo-Maratha hostilities would result therefrom. Malet in particular was against exposing the English to the wrath of the Marathas. In the end, however, the Nizam’s offer proved most tempting for the furtherance of the British interests.

While Nana was watching every little move of the English and the Nizam, he had scrupulously preserved the dignity of diplomatic etiquette. He anticipated a challenge to the Maratha supremacy in the Deccan from the English. He was equally certain of Nizam’s duplicity. While the rivalry between Nana and Azim-ul-umra deserved the strictest attention of the English. Shore was well aware of the fact that the Nizam was scarcely able to challenge the English power in India unlike Tipu who was a standing menace to the English. He tried his level best to bring about an understanding between Azim-ul-umra and the Peshwa’s Minister but the latter was found absolutely unamenable. Ultimately he cautioned the Nizam about the probable consequences resulting from his dangerous attitude and instructed the British Resident to observe strict neutrality in the dispute.

Nana’s pressing demands on the Nizam did little to cause any change in the policy of neutrality followed by the English which has since been a subject of serious criticism by many a Historian.

While Nana had ordered an attack on the Nizam, the latter proposed a defensive alliance with the English, but Shore declined to defend Hyderabad at the risk of offending Nana who,
he feared, might retaliate against the English by a league with Tipu.\textsuperscript{55}

Nana’s endeavours to punish the Nizam proved successful while the consequences of the Nizam’s rout at Kharda in 1795 proved derogatory to the prestige of the English. Nizam dismissed the English battalions and commenced to enlist from the French.\textsuperscript{56} Shore at once interposed to prevent the Nizam from augmenting his regular troops.\textsuperscript{57} Shore who had complete information regarding the political situation in India, would appear to have professed a political timidity from diplomatic reasons as he was not unaware of the germs of disruption and self-destruction flourishing in the Maratha rank and file. He achieved his goal by merely granting full scope to Nana, in anticipation of the growing dissensions.\textsuperscript{58} But for the incapacity of Indians for acting together, Shore’s policy would have brought dangerous consequences for the English.\textsuperscript{59}

The success at Kharda (1795) had raised Nana to the zenith of his political career. Nana’s extensive authority had now become a source of anxiety to Shore as he dreaded his design considerably.\textsuperscript{60} The defeat of Tipu, the death of Sindia, the removal of Azim-ul-umra and the death of Haripant were the major developments that had contributed to make Nana’s authority unchallengeable.\textsuperscript{61} Malet could not but regard Nana’s behaviour aggressive and he feared that he might make common cause with Tipu to the detriment of the English,\textsuperscript{62} by fomenting dissensions amongst his neighbours. In his letter of 27th June 1795 Malet specifically points out how Nana’s acquiescence was quite indispensable for transacting any points of government, even though the Peshwa had by now attained to maturity and was treated with every sign of respect.\textsuperscript{63}

The English had commenced to hate Nana in the same way as they hated Sindia in the past. Whether it was Nana or Sindia mattered little to the ruthless policy of the English. It would be interesting to recollect the observations of the so-called religious-minded and timid Shore who declared that his policy of forbearance was absolutely satisfactory as it was found more effective for shaking the foundations of the Maratha Empire than intrigues and negotiations had been.\textsuperscript{64} The predominant position of Nana would not allow the English
any peace of mind. Even routine movements of military used to rouse grave apprehensions in their midst. As in the case of Sindia, the English were awaiting his death in the near future, and that appeared to afford them best prospects.

Notwithstanding Nana’s victory over the Nizam, he could hardly enjoy any rest, as the Maratha empire was menaced by factions from within and by perils from without. The success of Kharda was followed by an unfortunate tragedy. In a temporary fit of delirium Savai Madhavrao jumped or fell from an upper terrace into a fountain below on 25th October 1795 and died two days later. Considering Nana’s astuteness, it is difficult to say with a degree of certainty whether the Peshwa died from an accidental fall from the terrace or whether it was an attempt at suicide. The fact however that he survived the incident by two days and that he was fully conscious before his death gives cause for doubting the rumours regarding his attempt to commit suicide. If it were so, the Peshwa could have ventilated his grievances to those, other than Nana, that had gathered near him, before death.

Nana was deeply agitated by the unfortunate accident, and the British Resident was kind enough to make available the services of his own surgeons, Cruso and Findlay. But nothing could save the Peshwa. The death of the Peshwa placed Nana in a quandary. He could not reasonably ignore the legitimate claim of Bajirao to the Musnad, but he apprehended great danger to his person and property if he were to succeed. As usual, Shore issued strict instructions to the Resident to observe complete non-interference in the matter of the succession affairs.

In the midst of these developments news came that Morington had succeeded in entering into a subsidiary alliance with the Nizam by which the French force at Hyderabad had been broken. Nana was considerably annoyed at the intelligence but was too absorbed in the succession-dispute to pay any attention to British intrigues.

* The execution of Louis XVI of France and the creation of a Republic in that country, altered the relations between the two parent states, war was of course declared in the colonies (Gleig, The History of the British Empire in India, Vol. III, p. 115.)

The intelligence of the revolution in France was conveyed to Nana by the British Resident; but in order to get the confirmation of the news, Nana addressed the Portuguese Government at Goa through their Vakil in Poona (P. S. Pissurlenkara, Portuguese and Marathas, Letter of Vithal Goraksha Walavaleekar of 30th July, 1793).
16. SPD, Vol. XX, No. 47.
18. Ibid., p. 38.
19. SSR, No. 402, pp. 210-211; Hastings Fraser, Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam, p. 61.
26. Ibid., pp. 280 and 378; Aithisak Tipne, part VI, Lekh 1, p. 1.
* Persons belonging to His Highness the Nizam had designs to seduce the Peshwa's people and were accordingly imprisoned, (IRDPP, No. 66, Vol. 150 letters of 2nd January to 30th January 1795).
34. SSR, No. 402, pp. 210-12.
40. Potdar, op. cit., L. 116, p. 69; IRDPP, SP No. 67 of 6th to 27th February 1795.
43. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 280.
* It is generally believed that in the battle of Kharda "when the two hosts met, Nizam Ali gave a signal for retreat after a slight cavalry skirmish." But this is incorrect. It was reported that great numbers fell on both sides, and that a chief of eminence on the part of the Nizam was slain." From the letter of G. F. Cherry of 27th March 1795 it is clear that a general action had taken place between the Maratha armies and the troops of the Nawab Nizamally Khan in which the latter was totally defeated, (Impe-
rial Record Department, National Archives, New Delhi, Political Proceedings, 16th March to 6th April 1795, Vol. 153.)


44. Ibid.,
49. Choksey, op. cit., p. 119.
50. PRC, Vol. IV, p. 80.
58. Teignmouth, op. cit., p. 318; Choksey, op. cit., p. 106.
61. Ibid., pp. 377-78.
62. Ibid., p. 376.
64. Teignmouth, op. cit., p. 318; Choksey, op. cit., p. 106.
6* We have still a further prospect of security to ourselves in the consideration that the present flourishing and formidable state of the Maratha Empire is principally ascribable to the personal abilities and influence of Nana and that his death will probably make a very material alteration in the state. He (Nana) is now an elderly man and is very far from robust (PRC, Vol. II, pp. 371-78, Uthoff's letter to Kirkpatrick, of 27th June 1795).
66. Ibid., Richard Temple, Oriental Experience, pp. 397-98; Brajendranath Banerjee, Begam Samru, p. 78.

* "On 27th October the Peshwa, quiet and conscious called Nana and few others to his bedside and told them that he was passing away and that they should bring in Bajirao and manage the state (Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 307); "The young Peshwa in a temporary fit of delirium jumped or fell from an upper terrace into a fountain below (Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol. I, p. xxix, Introduction, Malet's report.); No foul play was suspected because Uthoff wrote, "I have not heard even a surmise that any one was instrumental towards the late accident; and indeed I understand that the Peshwa has been, since the accident, in such a state that, if it had not been the case, he could have made it known" (Choksey, op. cit., p. 123.)

70. Ibid., Shore's letter of 16th November, 1795.
Chapter XI

SUCCESSION DISPUTE
1795-1800

The death of Savai Madhavrao was followed by all the ingredients of confusion and intrigue that usually attend all succession-disputes. Nana was the sole pilot to steer the ship of state. The important chiefs of the Maratha empire had become very powerful and the Peshwa was hardly capable of exercising his authority over them.¹ Though Nana was the ablest surviving Minister, the death of his sovereign had considerably impaired his authority.² Naturally enough he was anxious to enlist the co-operation of the chieftains on the succession issue.³ Nevertheless, he declined to support the claim of Chimmaji to the Masnad which had the support of Sindia and Holkar;⁴ much less did he show himself to Bajirao's succeeding the Peshwa. In this way he exposed himself on all sides to the resentment of his chiefs amongst whom Daulatrao Sindia was the most powerful.⁵ Gravely concerned with the latter's overbearing attitude, he finally composed his differences with Bajirao and thereby endeavoured to thwart his mechinations.⁶ We are told that for this he apprehended danger from Sindia and made ready for flight.⁷

Though it is difficult to justify Nana's wavering attitude in the succession dispute, he did not appear inclined to allow Malet to interfere in the domestic affairs of his state.⁸ Historians display confused thinking over the issue. Nana would have proved his bona fides and thoroughly vindicated his credit, had he supported the dying declaration of the Peshwa and acquiesced in the succession of Bajirao.⁹

Anticipating grave danger to his life he left Poona on 21st March and settled at Mahad near the fort Raigad.⁹ Here he started to raise troops in order to secure his safety against the formidable power of his adversaries.¹⁰ This dangerous move of Nana incensed Daulatrao who set about persecuting him and his adherents.¹¹ In this miserable plight, Nana started orga-
nising a formidable combine to challenge Sindia’s authority and in furtherance of this resolve entered into an agreement with the Nizam through Mushir-ul-Mulk. He nullified the treaty of Kharda and won over the Nizam to his plans. Later on, he also contacted Tipu and sought to gain his favour. Notwithstanding the serious danger to his life, he succeeded in composing his differences with Bajirao, and tactfully won over Azim-ul-umra, Holkar, Pingale, Baba Phadke and even Daulat- rao Sindia to his point of view; Bajirao was placed on the Peshwa’s Masnad on 4th December 1796.

By means of lavish expenditure of his treasure and grant of large concession to the Nizam, Nana successfully contrived to regain his lost authority, but he could scarcely expect a smooth sailing. He had completely annulled the treaty of Kharda in return for support of the Nizam in his bid to instal Bajirao on the Masnad and retain his position as the sole administrator. But soon Sindia denounced his engagements and even Bajirao appeared little disposed to keep his own word. The former was concerting measures against the Nizam to enforce the execution of the treaty of Kharda. Nana was seriously annoyed when he was apprised of Mushir-ul-Mulk’s design of ordering his battalions to Poona. Fortunately however, Malet paid a visit to Nana in order to take his leave which considerably frightened Sindia as he feared a combined attack on Poona by the Nizam and the English. A complete discharge was finally agreed to by the Peshwa and Sindia in favour of the Nizam on 10th May 1797 and Mushir-ul-Mulk returned to Hyderabad in triumph.

Notwithstanding the fact that Nana had somehow managed to place Bajirao on the Masnad, the latter could not manage matters due to his own weak and vicious temperament and Sindia’s incessant claims for money. In the midst of these developments, relations between the English and Tipu became strained and the Resident urged on the Peshwa the revival of the tripartite Alliance of 1790 to which Nana gave his support. Bajirao and Sindia, however, sensed their ruin in this proposal and they reluctantly rejected the British offer. Once again Nana became the target of enmity of the Peshwa and Sindia.

In the face of the most perilous struggle in which he had
ever been engaged, Nana had honestly fulfilled his engagements with Azim-ul-umra and Raghooji Bhosla and no deviation could be charged to him from his engagements to Daulatrao Sindia. But Azim-ul-umra who placed little confidence in Sindia desired the English to ratify the engagements between Nana and Bajirao. Apprehending grave danger at the hands of Sindia an oblique advance was made to Uthhoff the English Resident for the Company’s mediation between Bajirao and Nana. Insidious endeavours at irritating the English against Nana were also in full swing. Nana even expressed his anxiety to retire to Benares if a cordial reconciliation between him and the Peshwa was not possible.

In spite of the fact that Nana had agreed to pay rupees fifteen lakhs to Sindia, in addition to the ten lakhs already paid, the latter and Bajirao were bent upon wringing out as much money as they could from Nana and his adherents, since Sindia was hard pressed with a monthly payment of rupees 20 lakhs to his army. Fully engrossed in satiating their lust Nana was moving with commendable caution when he received an invitation for a dinner from Sindia through Filose who was in command of fourteen battalions of the former. Filose personally stood guarantee for his safe return. But when he actually went to Sindia on 31st December, 1797, he was seized and detained in his camp. Soon after, however, conditions of Daulatrao’s administration deteriorated to such an extent that Daulatrao found himself as good as a prisoner of his officer, Filose.

Nana’s arrest which created countrywide sensation was obviously prompted by greed for his treasure and by long pent up feelings of revenge rankling in Bajirao’s heart. Nana’s removal from the active scene was soon followed by unprecedented iniquities heaped on the people of Poona. Moreover, the disturbances created by Sindian ladies and the Chhattrapatis, proved so alarming that Sindia and Bajirao found Nana’s assistance absolutely essential. Ultimately with a guarantee for his safety from the Nizam and the English against Sindia and Bajirao, Nana was prevailed upon to accept once again the administrative responsibility.

In the midst of these internal dissensions, Nana was natu-
rally prevented from exploiting to his advantage the grave jealousies that had been witnessed between the King’s and the Company’s services at Calcutta, resulting in the resignation of Cornwallis. In an atmosphere charged with jealousy, suspicion, fraud and treachery, he could hardly put down anarchy and disorder, his late authority being as ineffective as the movement of a live-fan with its blades motionless. With his personal influence dwindled, he could not suffer chaos reigning supreme throughout the country which was then infested by hands of mercenary soldiers who lent their services to any one who could pay them. In spite of such a dangerous situation all round, there was little consistency in Bajirao’s behaviour, while Palmer, the English Resident, was ceaselessly persuading Nana to accept the proposals of a subsidiary alliance.

Before proceeding further it will be well to take a general view of the political conditions in India, which Wellesley witnessed on his arrival as the Governor General in the month of May 1798, and to ascertain the measure of advantage which the ambitious British diplomat, could reap from the political legacy of his predecessor.

Notwithstanding the fact that Nana was the ostensible Minister of the Peshwa, he had neither the will nor the strength to control him and Sindia, when the English were blessed with the superintendence of a diplomat no less eminent than Morington. The six years of peace under Shore’s regime had considerably augmented the power of Sindia and the Nizam, while Tipu’s conduct subsequent to the peace concluded by Cornwallis, had shown an intense spirit of hostility and vindictiveness towards the British. It was self-evident, by this time, that there was no paramount power in India that could maintain a balance between the warring elements. Obviously enough, the ground for an aggressive policy had been already prepared and the process of internecine disensions had received deliberate scope and encouragement from the policy of the astute Sir John Shore. Thus, even though the Nizam, Sindia or Tipu each appeared prominent, they were completely decayed from within and Wellesley could easily steal a march over events.

Despite all his dash and diplomacy, it is difficult to sav
with a degree of certainty whether Wellesley would have been able to cut such an outstanding figure, had not a Shore preceded him and paved the way for his advance. Even when advocating the policy of non-intervention, the latter had not been unaware of the failings, implicit in it but from the way in which he pursued it, it is evident that he was convinced of a fundamental principle: that the more eagerly nations seek security by alliances, the more rapidly they drift to insecurity. Whether he was right or wrong can be easily ascertained from the measure of success attained by Wellesley, who succeeded him in 1798.

Thus, when Wellesley took charge of his office, his attention was mainly directed to the four outstanding powers: The Nizam, Tipu, Sindia and Zaman Shah.

Even though persuaded of the important advantages from a subsidiary alliance, Nana was not inclined to commit himself in any way as the proposal was calculated to effect Peshwa's policy towards the Nizam. He was, however, advised by Palmer to apply for British regiments to ease the tension caused by Sindia's troops on account of non-payment of their dues. In the face of the overbearing attitude of Sindia's chieftains, Nana was convinced of the unavoidable necessity of soliciting the aid of Company's troops to restore order in the Peshwa's government. Only the Peshwa was not inclined to endorse Nana's suggestion as it aimed at impairing his own authority.

In the midst of these developments, Wellesley solicited the Peshwa's co-operation against Tipu but Daulatrao Sindia had effectively controlled Peshwa's authority so that he was prevented from taking any decision on his own initiative, in spite of Nana's sincere co-operation.

While Nana had already received from Wellesley the proposal for the subsidiary alliance, the Nizam concluded a new treaty with the English on 1st September 1798. By its terms he replaced the French officers by British; and was to receive six battalions of English sepoys against an annual subsidy of 2,417,100 rupees. A secret article promised English mediation in any conflict arising between the Nizam and the Peshwa.
Notwithstanding the fact that the alliance of the Nizam with the English had been a source of grave concern to Nana, Sindia and the Peshwa still persisted in their wicked policy towards Nana. The latter frequently bewailed the transactions of the Poona court which caused avoidable irritation to the allies. Wellesley had been taking very cautious steps relative to the internal disputes between Nana and the Peshwa. Thus, in spite of Nana acting as the Minister at Poona, Wellesley succeeded in ending all apprehensions from the Hyderabad front, allowing the Marathas free field for self-destruction.

Despite Nana, all decisions of policy were taken by the Peshwa in consultation with Sindia who was the most powerful chief then at Poona. Hence, when Palmer pressed the Peshwa and Nana to extend their co-operation against Tipu, Bajirao indicated that he would take two months to prepare his troops for the Mysore war. The reason for such an evasive answer was obvious. Even though Nana was considerably perturbed at the deterioration in his administration, he remained patriotic in temper and would scarcely recommend a step which was not conducive to the benefit of his master. He professedly disclaimed all knowledge of communication with Tipu. Since his assumption of office, Govindrao Kale who was said to be responsible for maintaining clandestine communications, was eclipsed. Nevertheless, Nana had received a mission from Tipu seeking the Marathas’ co-operation against the English, or at least an assurance of neutrality. Palmer had elicited confidential intelligence that some correspondence between Tipu and the Peshwa did exist; only this can easily explain how Tipu’s envoys could be publicly received at Poona when hostilities against Tipu had already been commenced by the English.

Left in a state of perplexity Nana was incapable of arriving at final decision about the Peshwa’s policy towards Mysore. Tipu’s evil machinations against the English were nearing completion. He had sent a secret mission to the Isle of France (Mauritius). He had pressed Zaman Shah to march through the Punjab in order to alarm the English; he had deputed an ambassador to the Mauritius (formerly Isle of France). Napoleon was in communication with Tipu and had declared
his intention of appearing on the Indus. Tipu's late engagement with Ali Jah, son of the Nizam was quite fresh in the British memory. Moreover the position of Daulatrao Sindia who had annihilated Peshwa's independent authority and was in communication with Tipu, alarmed the English considerably.

Nana was anxious to maintain a firm policy towards the English, but the Peshwa openly promised his co-operation, at the same time detaining Tipu's vakeels at Poona. Towards Tipu, Nana was eager to make some bonafide gesture, but Sindia, without his knowledge, had engaged the Peshwa to remain neutral, in return for thirteen lakhs of rupees. Neverthe less, Nana was sincere in his word. In spite of the fact that Sindia by his overbearing attitude had practically rendered his independent endeavours absolutely nugatory in every important state-affair, he continued to pursue the road of conciliation with the English. In his reply to Palmer on the question of dismissing Tipu's envoys and dispatching a Peshwa's contingent to co-operate against him, Nana desired that absolute reliance should be placed on the integrity of his state. In the light of this repeated assurance, Palmer rightly observed that poverty and dissensions had disabled the Peshwa from taking any active part against Tipu, while Nana was occupied by cares for his personal safety against the pressing requisitions of Sindia for money to appease the clamours of his troops and to provide for his pleasures. Thus the Minister of the Peshwa had no power to execute any important policy, but was left to lament over the omissions of his master who had an incurable distrust of every power and person. He even offered to pay for the British detachment from his own pocket, but the Peshwa rejected the proposal.

A delicate situation at the Peshwa's court compelled Nana to adopt a policy of 'wait and see'; while Bajirao lost no opportunity of fomenting the differences between Nana and Daulatrao. For obvious reasons Nana was anxious to maintain cordial relations between the Peshwa and the English. He had cautioned Bajirao against engaging in any measures which might involve them in a quarrel with the company. He was endeavouring to send a contingent, to co-operate with the
English, in spite of all the obstacles.\textsuperscript{76} This step seemed essential if not for assisting the English, at least for diverting the attention of Sindia and Bajirao from the internal feuds.\textsuperscript{77} He was however not successful in his attempt,\textsuperscript{78} owing to the opposition he had to encounter from his own people. Even though some kind of mutual understanding did exist between Tipu and the Peshwa,\textsuperscript{79} internal dissensions had rendered it impossible to use it to the detriment of the English or the Nizam.\textsuperscript{80} Nevertheless,undaunted Nana was still anxious to fulfil the commitments of the Peshwa, and wished to know the extent of aid expected by the English.\textsuperscript{81} He had even directed Dhondopant Gokhale to prepare his force for a junction with the Bombay detachment.\textsuperscript{82}

These untiring efforts to maintain the dignity of the Peshwa's engagements were of no avail; much less could the English diplomat play into the hands of the Peshwa for whose rectitude the English had scant respect. Nana had given timely warning to Bajirao for his inexusable procrastination relative to Wellesley's offer for co-operation against Tipu. Hardly had Nana or the Peshwa further respite to prove the sincerity for their professed intentions, when the news arrived that Tipu had been killed on 4th May. The Governor General deliberatley had the intelligence conveyed to the Peshwa, requesting him not to send any troops, as the English had already vanquished Tipu, without his aid.\textsuperscript{83} But he did not fail to reiterate his proposal of a subsidiary alliance, making it all the more enticing for the Peshwa by agreeing to allow the Peshwa a share in the spoils of the war, in spite of his conspicuous failure in carrying out his engagements.\textsuperscript{84}

In spite of Nana's advice to adopt a definite policy in the Anglo-Mysore war, the Peshwa and Sindia utterly failed to mend matters and thereby forfeited their moral right to claim anything.\textsuperscript{85} Nana however was quite alive to the implications involved in the new proposal of the Governor General and he tactfully rejected it so long as he continued as the Minister of the Peshwa.\textsuperscript{86} He had been anxious for composing the internal differences, but the Peshwa and Sindia were quite unamenable and Nana could do little in his declining health.\textsuperscript{87} He was moreover continuously under the threat of the Damocles's Sword and feared being assassinated at the hands of Bajirao.\textsuperscript{88}
Nana’s judgment of the capacity of the English for overpowering Tipu appears to be quite correct in the light of the quick success which Wellesley had gained over an adversary whose intrigues for the extermination of the English and the Portuguese from India had reached as far as the great Napoleon.\textsuperscript{89}

The success at Sheringapatam had become a source of grave concern to the incapacitated Nana, who could do little beyond postponing the evil day.\textsuperscript{90} The reduction and murder of Tipu had left only one power in the Deccan of which Wellesley had to apprehend; that was the Peshwa with Daulatrao Sindia as his military chief.\textsuperscript{91} Nana was not unaware of the next move of Wellesley and he had warned Bajirao in time.\textsuperscript{92} He was against British interference in the Peshwa’s affairs, but he was unable to prevent it.\textsuperscript{93} All that he could do under the unfortunate circumstances was to save his master from the British onrush and he had successfully protected the Peshwa from falling into the snare of Wellesley’s subsidiary alliance which was intended to “hurry every state into a condition of premature decrepitude,” in the words used by Russel in the minutes of evidence.\textsuperscript{94} Thus, in the teeth of Nana’s opposition Wellesley successfully annihilated Tipu, according to his own plan.\textsuperscript{95} Having drunk the cup of frustration and humiliation, to the dregs, the great Maratha statesman was laid down with intermittent fever and expired on Thursday 13th March 1800.\textsuperscript{96}

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1. Alfred Lyall, \textit{British Dominion in India}, p. 238.
6. Ibid., p. 414.
7. Ibid., p. 417.

* “I learn that Nana Furnaves, two days ago submitted to the Peshwa and Sindia some propositions for a general conciliation which all parties approved . . . in this scheme Nana had stipulated no power or emolument for himself” . . . (\textit{PRC}, Vol. VI, Letter 123, p. 194); “Nana had contracted large loans from various Bankers in the name of the late Peshwa and if a son had not been properly adopted and the succession were to pass to a new man like Bajirao II, the latter could easily repudiate these debts as it


* The Portuguese Vakil Walavaleekar at Poona had received instructions from Goa stopping all correspondence with Nana as he had incurred the displeasure of the Peshwa (P. S. Pissurlekar, Portuguese and Marathas, Letter from the Portuguese envoy Walawaleekar, dated the 25th June 1796).


17. Ibid., p. 512.


20. Ibid.


* In his letter to Sir John Shore, Uthhoff, the British Resident, observes: "In spite of the alleged levities of Bajirao, as reported by Nana, they are not supposed to be as much the cause of confusions in the Maratha state as the jarring interests of Nana and Daulatrao Sindia, the former supported by talents influence wealth and experience and the latter by influence and military power which appear to be the most active and energetic engines convulsing the state (PRC, Vol. VI, p. 41).


26. Ibid., p. 49.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 53.

29. Ibid., p. 236.


* "It was the confirmed general opinion," says Unthoff in his letter of 8th January 1798, "that Nana had not made any treachery against the Peshwa or Daulatrao and that no written proofs of the alleged treachery could be adduced against Nana." (PRC, Vol. VI, p. 107).

Michele Filose:

"General D. Bolgne, Sindia's military Chief, is known to have employed two Italian officers and their record is far from exemplary. These were two Neapolitans, brothers named Filose, who were in command of fourteen batta-lions at Poona. When the elder Sindia (Mahadji) died... Michele was driven from the service for a treacherous out-rage on the old Minister, Nana in 1797" (Keene, Hindustan under free lances, p. 74).

Nana's popularity:

"I have no other interest in speaking of this," says Major Richmond in his letter to Major Filose, "but that which I take for every European, whose reputation is dear to me—for we have not yet had an example of European officers having falsified their oaths. I perceive a consider-a-ble storm which is forming, and which undoubtedly will burst to the disadvantage of Daulatrao Sindia. The Nawab Nizam Ali, Raghoji Bhosala, the English and even Tipu Sultan will be fully sufficient to give liberty to Balaji Fan-dit" (Nana). (Itihas Sangaraha, Junya Aitihasik Goshtee, Bhag II, p. 1.


36. Ibid.


40. Ibid., p. 251.


47. Ibid., pp. 261-62.

48. Ibid., p. 262.

49. Ibid., p. 267; Notes relative to Late Transactions in the Maratha Empire, p. 5. (anonymous).

55. Ibid., p. 257.
56. Ibid., p. 238.
57. Ibid., p. 224.
* It is a British Crown colony. It is an island in the Indian ocean, 500 miles east of Madagascar. It was discovered by the Portuguese in 1505, settled by the Dutch in 1598, abandoned in 1710 and taken by the French in 1715 and renamed Isle de France. It became British in 1810, and was confirmed to them in 1814 by the treaty of Paris. The capital and chief seaport is Port Louis. (The Compact Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, p. 293, ed. R. F. Patterson & John Dougall).
60. Ibid., p. 235.
63. Lewin B. Bowring, Tipu Sultan, p. 175.
64. Malcolm, Political History of India, Vol. I, p. 188.
66. Ibid., p. 403.
67. Ibid., p. 271.
68. Ibid., p. 289.
69. Ibid., p. 345.
70. Ibid., p. 376.
71. Ibid., p. 401.
72. Ibid., p. 403.
73. Ibid., p. 495.
74. Ibid., p. 314.
75. Ibid., p. vi, Introduction.
76. Ibid., p. 331.
77. Ibid., p. 41.
78. Malcolm, Sketch of the Political History of India, p. 80.
80. Ibid., p. 47.
81. Ibid., p. 263.
82. Ibid., p. 377.
86. Murray, History of British India, p. 463; Alfred Lyall, op. cit., p. 242; Kalinkikar Dutt, England and India, p. 20.
88. Ibid., p. 531.
90. Murray, op. cit., p. 463.
94. Choksey, op. cit., p. 207.
Chapter XII

CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENTS

During the last two years of his career, Nana had lost all the interest and tenacity that appeared so outstanding a trait in his character, from the beginning of his political life. His activities were paralysed and his actions restrained.¹ His death was a relief to Bajirao II who had long sought to encompass the ruin of the great minister.

In order to arrive at a correct estimate of Nana’s personality, it is necessary to inquire into the strength as well as the weakness of Nana’s character and endeavour to discover the reasons for his failure to achieve what he ardently desired.

Indeed most of his rivals and contemporaries were so unprincipled that the universal praise of his virtues by historians comes as a pleasant surprise:

“The loss of persons distinguished for their talents great qualities and abilities” wrote Wellesley in his letter of condolence which he addressed to the Peshwa on Nana’s death, “is at all times a subject of regret. The melancholy news, therefore, of the death of Balaji Pandit (Nana) the able Minister of your state, whose upright principles and honourable views and whose zeal for the welfare and prosperity both for the dominions of his own immediate and superior and of other powers, were justly celebrated, occasions extreme grief and concern.”² Similar tribute was paid by other British officials who had any dealing with Nana. “He had been a great statesman” said Cox, “and shown himself a worthy and honourable foe of the British Government.”³ While in his report to the Governor General, Palmer observed, “It is with great concern that I have to acquaint your lordship with the death of Nana Furnaves, which happened last night. With him, I fear, has departed all the wisdom and moderation of this Government.”⁴ British historians have one and all admired his statecraft. Sir Richard Temple praises Nana for having frustrated the diplomacy of the French and resisted the rising power of the British.”⁵ Accord-
ing to Marshman, "that great statesman closed his chequered career in March 1800. For more than quarter of a century he had been the main spring of every movement in the Maratha Commonwealth, which he had regulated by the strength of his character and the wisdom of his measures, not less than by his humanity, veracity and honesty of purpose, virtues which were not usually found among his own countrymen. The offer of a subsidiary alliance to the Peshwa, made by Lord Wellesley in 1799 which would have introduced the thin end of the wedge of British ascendancy, was rejected under the advice of Nana Farnavees." Oswald tells us: "Nana, as long as he was alive, was Supreme in the Poona Durbar and was always strenuously opposed to European control." Observing on Nana's records and biography Macdonald says: "I was enabled to get access to his private papers to the number of nine thousand; his piece of biography (a life of Nana in his own handwriting) may truly be considered one of the most remarkable productions of Oriental literature." According to Beveridge: "Nana had conducted the Peshwa's Government with so much ability and craftiness as to merit the surname of the Indian Machiavelli." While in an estimate of his abilities, Colebrooke says: "had he possessed military talents equal to his civil capacity, he might have founded a new dynasty." Describing the Poona of those times, Douglas ranks Nana as greater than his sovereign. Duff hails him as the genius produced by the Maratha Nation. In his observations on Nana's career, Elphinstone says that it was Nana who kept off the downfall of the Peshwa's government till he lived. Writing on Nana, Brown said: "the foreign rulers would no longer feel that awe about the Maratha kingdom which they used to have, so long as Nana was alive." In his estimate of Nana's efficient administration, Marshman observes: "The vigor of his judgment, the fertility of his resources, the extent of his influence and the combination of instruments he called into action, surprised all India, and from his European contemporaries procured him the title of the Maratha Machiavelli." Writing on the death of Nana, William Henry Tone said: "though this great politician was driven by the storms of time into the shacks of temporary obscurity, yet his enlightened genius, like the beams of departed sun, still reflected a strong light through the remote
hemisphere, sufficient to guide through the intricate mazes, those inferior satellites that were but the precursors of the returning luminary. During the long important period of his administration, by the force of energy of his single mind, he held together this vast empire composed of numbers whose interests were as opposite as the most anomalous elements and he excited this mass of incongruities to one mutual and common effort.”17 While the Asiatic Annual Register (London) wrote: “few characters that have ever appeared on the political theatre of India, perhaps in the world, are more deserving of extant record than Nana Fumavees. On the whole we may justly say of Nana that he possessed talents so splendid as hardly ever to have been equalled and never surpassed in India.”

It would be equally interesting to ascertain the observations of Nana’s contemporaries as they may help to throw a searching light on the achievements and character of that Minister: In one of his letters, Hyder Ali said: “Nana is far-sighted; and iron-willed, his respect and rectitude for his word are indeed great; he is well versed with the intrigues and machinations of the English, he wont be led away by their professions.”18 His great predecessor, Sakharam Bapur stated “so long as Nana is there there is no cause for fear.”19 Nana had the unique fortune of receiving such compliments not only from his own followers but from those who had joined his opponents. Thus, in his letter to Nana, Mudhoji Bhosla said, “The credit of organising a united front which was in view of the Marathas for the last twenty years obviously is yours. I am unable to express in adequate terms, the measure of satisfaction I feel at the above intelligence.”20

Nana’s outstanding abilities had become a matter of surprise to all those who had watched his success over the English. When the news of the English rout at the hands of the Marathas reached the Emperor at Delhi, he was overwhelmed with joy and exclaimed. “In the teeth of perfidy at the Peshwa’s court, with the Peshwa himself a minor, Nana proved more than a match to the English for all these eight years; if at all the Lord were to bless a masnad with a Minister, a sardar or diplomat, he should indeed be like Nana.”21 Even Ahilyabai
Holkar, a pious woman unreservedly announced that Nana alone could manage the English with exquisite excellence and comprehensive political manoeuvring all the fronts, simultaneously. His reserved temper invariably caused awe about him but he was impartial to all alike. He would think ten times before giving his word; but once committed he would abide by it in spite of all the obstacles in his way. He was respected not only in India but also abroad. The king of France was pleased to present him with the “order of St. Louis”, through M. Gudar.

Despite his differences with him, Nana had brotherly affection for his great colleague Mahadjii Sindia. On receipt of the news that Nana’s succour had reached Delhi, Sindia exclaimed “In my sore need, no one ran to my help as did my noble brother Nana: great are those who do great things in spite of odds.” Hearing the sad news of the death of Nana, the Governor of Goa said, “Nana was a great genius from amongst the Hindus . . . he was a prodigy of thought and ideas; and was so deep, that none could fathom the depth of the inmost chambers of his mind.”

His wisdom and moderation had been a source of comfort to the needy around him. After his death, says Colebrooke, Raghiji (Nagpur) would look to treaty of alliance with the British government, as the only pledge of his future safety.

Pre-eminently a peace Minister, Nana like Pitt avoided being drawn into a war as long as he could. Like Pitt again whose engrossing idea was for uniting the whole of Europe against the power of Napoleon, Nana’s one obsession was to organise all India against the growing power of the English. It was only a fortuitous turn of circumstances that had transferred the regal authority from the king to the Peshwa and from the Peshwa to the Furnaves, Nana. The conduct of administration under Nana’s control was perfect and the assessments were never immoderate. He had established a net work of reporters and his representative envoys were the pillars of his politics. Nana was fond of astrology and like Matternich he was fond of the fair sex.

He was however against modernising the Maratha army as he was of opinion that the new technique compelled the army,
to fight, when flight was more judicious.\textsuperscript{32} This had indeed more than a marked effect on the future of the Maratha state. But the truth is that though he displayed considerable abilities for the management of civil and financial affairs, he did not even pretend to possess military talents and scarcely cultivated the goodwill of the army.\textsuperscript{33}

A stern taskmaster, Nana could scarcely countenance tender feelings in others with the result that more than twenty times, attempts were made on his life.\textsuperscript{34} Himself a voracious worker, the business personally transacted by him exceeds credibility: the number of letters dealt with by Nana between 1762 to 1800 total 14122 out of which those in English alone number 2185, while those in Marathi 11937.\textsuperscript{35} In fact Nana can claim the credit for the majority of the extant records\textsuperscript{36} in Maratha History.

There are however not a few historians who find fault with Nana for his ignorance of Geography. But considering the times in which he lived, his knowledge in that respect does not appear to be so meagre when we bear in mind that he had the hobby of possessing maps of important districts and forts of the Maratha empire.\textsuperscript{37}

In his administrative etiquette Nana was a polished statesman as may be ascertained from the practice of visiting slips in vogue at his court,\textsuperscript{38} even in the 18th century.

Notwithstanding these outstanding accomplishments no keen observer can afford to ignore the glaring failings so innate in Nana’s character, which frequently placed him in dangerous situations. With all his candour, benevolence and sincerity,\textsuperscript{39} the unfortunate fact cannot be barked, that the galling tutelage administered by him on Madhavrao Narayan, was to some extent responsible for the untimely death of that Peshwa which brought in its wake most deplorable consequences.\textsuperscript{40}

The British Resident ungrudgingly acknowledges the efficiency of his administration.\textsuperscript{41} But he also unequivocally condemns him for his having implicated the Peshwa’s government in a grave predicament through the unprincipled ambition displayed in flouting the rights of Bajirao II to the Masnad.\textsuperscript{42}

In spite of the patriotic sentiment that underlay his administration even the great Nana was not free from considerations
of a personal nature which, on some occasions, made him subordinate the national interests to his own.\(^{43}\)

Despite the fact that Nana's strict discipline was adequate and conducive to a considerable measure of efficiency in his administration, it did not fail to create for him a crop of enemies. We are told that though moderate in his domestic behaviour, he was very exacting in the execution of punishments.\(^{44}\)

That an astute statesman as eminent as Nana should not have been drawn to enquire into the progressive activities of the English at Bombay, is indeed most surprising. It was as early as 1556 when printing was started in Goa and it was in 1793 that the first book was printed in Bombay when Nana's envoy was present there.\(^{45}\) But this event does not appear to have attracted his otherwise inquisitive mind. This fact throws a light on the way in which the Maratha and for that matter Indian outlook towards social life was conditioned.

In the eighteen-eighties when Nana was at the helm of the Peshwa's affairs at Poona, India was passing through a period of transition.\(^{46}\) The century had witnessed the clash of three empires which had followed one another in quick succession: the Moghul empire, the Maratha empire and the British empire.\(^{47}\) Nana's political strategy had to contend against his enemies at a time when the fall of the Maratha empire was almost a foregone conclusion. We must endeavour to evaluate Nana's handling of external affairs in the light of the peculiar situation of the Marathas during the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

The period from 1707 to 1800, which includes Nana's administration, is generally known as the Peshwa period. The Peshwa came on the scene in the reign of Shahu, the grandson of Shivajee the great. Shahu's claims to the Masnud were challenged by Tarabai and the former had to take the help of Balaji Vishvanath Bhat. Balaji established Shahu as the undisputed Raja of the Marathas. In grateful recognition of these meritorious services Shahu made Balaji, the Peshwa, the real power in the realm being transferred from the king to the Peshwa. Internal dissensions which had been the root failing of the Maratha polity still continued and even the end of the second Peshwa was far from happy. In the reign of the third
Peshwa Balaji Bajirao, the rivalry amongst the Marathas became very pronounced and the Peshwa had to seek fight with his own naval chief, Angria. Madhavrao the great, who succeeded the third Peshwa, had to meet with the same unfortunate problem of internal rivalry. The dissensions between him and Raghunathrao gave Nana unexpected regal authority in his hands. Narayanrao, the fifth Peshwa, who succeeded Madhavrao, fell a prey to the rivalry between him and his uncle till he was murdered. This turn in the affairs of the Peshwa practically resulted in making Nana the de facto head of the Peshwa’s administration.

Eventhough Savai Madhavrao succeeded Narayanrao the real power lay in Nana’s hands. Thus we can trace a progressive shifting of the regal authority from the king to the Peshwa and from the Peshwa to the Furnavees, Nana. In course of time, as the internal disputes persisted unabated, the quarrels between Sindia and Holkar finally compelled Bajirao II to sign a subsidiary alliance with the British. The seed of internal disunity amongst the Marathas, ultimately brought about the end of the Maratha empire. The origin of those internal dissensions can be traced to the illogical practice of giving Saranjams, Jahagirs and Inams, which invariably encouraged separatist tendencies. Eventhough the Marathas were not unaware of the dangers inherent in the system, they could not eradicate the evil for fear of inviting increasing disruption. Aurangzeb, who failed to demolish the Maratha empire, in his lifetime succeeded in sowing the dangerous seed of disunity in the rank and file of the Marathas who were compelled to resort to the pernicious practice, by way of countering Aurangzeb’s enticements of granting Jahagirs to the Maratha chieftains for causing effective seduction.

The significance of Nana’s political strategy can be appropriately grasped when we reconcile it with the circumstances under which it was employed. The stupendous endeavours of Nana and Sindia, in the teeth of such disruptive climate, shine out all the more glorious. Nana’s reputation has been sustained through the decades and century by his sincere services to the Maratha empire. Like Machiavelli who was concerned with the immediate problem of uniting Italian principalities Nana had to
hold together powerful Maratha potentates at all hazards. His
greatness lies in combining a keenly-analytic intellect as evid-
enced in his autobiographical fragment, with a flair for practi-
cal politics. If Machiavelli was responsible for the overthrow of
a dynasty, Nana had the credit of rendering Raghunathrao’s
usurpation nugatory. Nana’s outstanding abilities were dis-
played in his dealing with the English, French, Moghuls,
Hyder Ali, Tipu, the Nizam and Sidhi. Throughout his career
we can trace an underlying current of moderation, influenced
by consciousness.

Despite Nana’s outstanding abilities, one cannot fail to rea-
lise a serious void in his political outlook. Perhaps, it was the
natural result of the religious orthodoxy or Taboo. Even though
he had organised an efficient network of reporters, it is simply
surprising that he should not have been inclined to probe into
the activities of the illustrious distant islanders. We have seen
already how the first book that was printed in Bombay as early
as 1793 failed to excite the inquisitiveness of the otherwise astute
Nana. Religious taboo had probably precluded Nana from send-
ing a mission to the west for ascertaining the doings of the Eng-
lish in their homeland.

While from the beginning the English looked upon political
supremacy of India as a means for the expansion of their com-
mercial interests, the Marathas considered political control, as the
end in itself. Thus, while the plunder of Plassey served as an
incentive to the industrial era in England the perpetual scarcity
of funds, ultimately resulted in plunder and arson, amongst the
different Maratha potentates. And even though Mahadji Sin-
dia had created an excellent fighting arm he was at pains to
arrange for the huge monthly expenditure of Rupees twenty
lakhs, required for his military.

The industrial revolution in England was changing the
whole complexion of the nation and its repercussions could
not fail to affect conditions in India, owing to the contact
established by European traders. We are thus presented with
a peculiar phenomenon of a hermit economy struggling to check
the onrush or an industrialised western power. Never did it
occur to Nana to send a deputation to England to ascertain
the activities of the English. Absence of interests in trade and
commerce was one of the most predominant factors that influenced the political destiny of this country.

Regarding Nana as a statesman, the Marathi speaking public has been bewildered by the contradictory views presented by critics. Hostile historians have stigmatised him as a usurper, but admit that his own people placed him in power. Some have denounced him as a despot as inexorable as Nero, while admitting that he won the admiration of his people; Others depict him as a satan while confessing that he was in almost every dealing, moderate and imploring peace; critics are not wanting who condemn him for his insatiable lust for power which led him to trample remorselessly not only the rights of his contemporaries but also his own master, Bajirao II. But it is admitted at the same time that the whole country was astonished by his astuteness, political foresight and moderation. Paradoxically enough, he has been praised and criticised by his opponents and followers, probably because he abhorred war and did everything to avert such occasions, because he highly merited the post to which the fortuitous turn of circumstances had raised him; because he consecrated the most extraordinary abilities and utilised them for promoting the prosperity of his country; because he was regardless of luxury and gaiety but cheerfully endured all suffering for gaining his purpose; because he had a high sense of respect and rectitude, revered religion, and respected the rights of conscience, in all walks of life. Our estimate of the great statesman cannot be quite accurate and complete unless we endeavour to ascertain whether Nana was really a usurper and if so, whether having attained power, he abused it for the promotion of his personal interests, whether the various alliances he made during his regime were of his own making. The preceding pages may serve to show Nana's policy as one of summerising and symbolising the spirit of unity amidst diversity.

Despite the blame of timidity commonly assigned to Nana, it is interesting to observe his inner strength of will, so unique in brightness and sharpness like a sword hidden in a scabbard. That, Nana was inherently of ministerial timber like Gladstone or Bismarck, need not necessarily mean that he was timid; on the contrary, a pertinent issue, whether Nana was really
timid, can be raised, in the light of certain significant events in his life. It remains still the missing piece of a puzzle. As our theme does not permit of a detailed discussion on this issue, we may content ourselves by saying that on some occasions Nana deployed exceptional courage and boldness, which was quite consistent with the Family heritage and indicated in a timid character.

That the innumerable attempts on his life did not deter him from the path chosen by him obviously indicates the measure of Nana's will-power and restless dynamic energy which always remained fresh and vigorous like a river that can never be still until its waters have found their goal and discharged themselves into the sea.

Despite all his intrigue and imagination, Nana could not escape the laws of the Nature and the life that had been used as a measuring tape of time, passed away on 13th March, 1800. Nana was the last of a group, with whose passing away, the tottering structure of the Maratha empire collapsed like a pack of cards.

1. SPD, Vol. 41, Nos. 16 and 17.
15. Choksey, op. cit., p. 15.

"After a variety of convulsions," observes Marshman, "the fortunes of Nana were reduced to the lowest ebb, but re-
trived by his extraordinary genius”, (J. C. Marshman, Abridgment of the History of India, p. 236).
18. KPY, Lekh 284.
19. SPD, Vol. 37, Nos. 35 and 44.
21. DYM, No. 55, 57, 58 ad 60.
23. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
25. MSYK, Lekh 511.
26. K. B. Joshi, Manttryttum Nana Phadnis, p. 44.
27. Wills, British Relations with the Nagpur State, p. 154.
29. E. S. Waring, History of the Marathas, p. 189.
31. Ibid.

* Some of the Celebrated Maratha Residents:
1) Ransod Krishna and his son Raghunath Ransod Sanzgiri at Calcutta.
2) Janardan Shivram and Pillay at Madras and Pondicherry.
3) Narayan Vithal Dhume, at Goa.
4) P. M. Hingne, at Delhi.
5) Vithal Gopal Tambe to Gwallor.
6) Sadashiv Dinkar and many others, (Aitihasik Tipne, Bhag VI, Lekh 22).

† Nana was fond of astrology and on eventful occasions he used to consult his astrologer (Aitihasik Tipne, Bhag VI, Lekh 22, p. 28). Like Matternich, he was fond of the fair sex and in the course of his life, he was married no less than nine times (Kincaid and Parasnis, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 191).

33. PRC, Vol. VI, p. 113.
34. Sardesai, Main Currents of Maratha History, p. 141.
35. K. B. Joshi, op. cit., p. 16.
37. K. B. Joshi, op. cit., p. 46.
38. Aitihasik Sankeerna Sahitya, Khanda VI, p. 77.
42. Ibid., p. 187.
44. ALS, Vol. VI, p. 2693; N. C. Kelkar, Marathe vs. Ingraj, p. 3, preface.
45. Shiva Kaleen Patrasar Sangraha, Khanda 1-2, p. 476; Prof. Prilokkar, “Maratheenteel Aarambheechya Kristee Doumitri” Indica, Indian Historical Research Institute, Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume, pp. 320-21; Rev. Father H. Hosten, S. J., The earliest Printing in India, (Ms. by Rev. Fr. H. Hosten, S. J., preserved in the archives of St. Mary’s College, Kurseong, D. H. Railway, Bengal): Remarks and Occurrences of Mr. Henry Becher during his imprisonment of two years and a half in the dominions of Tipoo Sultan from whence he made his escape; (This book which was printed in Bombay in 1793 is not available; the only known copy is in the St. Xavier’s College, Indian Historical Research Institute, rare-Books-Collection, Bombay.).


47. V. V. Joshi, Clash of Three Empire, p. 40.
49. Pandit Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp. 259-60 and 276.
50. Ibid., p. 281.
APPENDIX
INAM LETTERS

श्री

श्री
शंकरराजी
नारायण

आशापत्र समस्त—राजकारण—धुरूंधर विस्मासिनी राजमान्य राजश्री विमणाजी
पद्मिन सचिव तात्मकम भाई आदिक व भाई मुंडेकरे मु.ग. सीतासिनमया आल्फ
शके १६ (७५) विली ६) नाम पत्र भेजोजे.

राजश्री बालाजी माहादेव उपनाम माळबाणे गोठ वासिण स्वत्त अस्थायतन
यानी हुजूर का भोर ता रोहितक रे मेहील मु.ग. भेजून विणती केली की आशी
पूर्वी पारों स्वामी पदरचे आणि बृहस्व बहिली वेदनन्यें सेवा केली आभो
कुंडण्ड बल्ल आहो श्रीनिवासचा उछाड वरीत आलेठ आहो उसाच कुंडण्डचा व
उछाळणा योगस्थें चाला पाठिजे याकरता स्वामी ने कुंडण्ड होजन नूतन
इनामगाव करून दिसून पाठिजे मणी ही भेंडन केले लावर रमनास आणि हो ने
पुरातन पदरचे सेवक आणि यांपण व यांच्या वहिलीं सेवा वेदनन्यें बहुत
दिसून केले लावर यांच्या चाल्यांच्या अवस्थें जाजस्त यांरी कुंडण्ड होजन यांच्या
कुंडण्डच्या संस्करणस व श्रीच्या उछालणे वेगमीदस्तो मोजे मार हा गाव दूरे वल
स्वामी व मोगाळई व मुकासा व बावडी सागरचै हैकोही इनामती जाइ व हेदीपटी
व पेश रोी कुंडण्ड कुंडण्डणू वेदरेह इनामदार करून जह तर तून काळ पश्चात
निम्न निखेत आधिकाल नूतन इनाम करून करून देवजन हूं
पत्र हुजूरा सादर केले तसे तरी सदृश पो इनामगाव यांकडे व यांच्या पुजारीच्या
वंशापरंपराचे चाल्यांचे जाणिले दत्त २५ जया दिलाचल पत्र हुजूर.

पत्रा भविष्य
भविष्य

(पत्रचे पाठविचा) वार सदृश दुरदुर दारर
(कागदीत एक जाडे आहे. जोड
गीरीवर हि ‘पत्राचिरण भविष्य’ हीच मुद्रा देणाप्रव उठविण हो!)

N 14
(२)  श्री  दाके १६१०  पौर  श्
इ. स. १७६९  जानेवारी  तारीख १२

"छो मोकदमानी मौजे सेवकवी समत हेमाली प्रांत वाई रानी हैंतराव
मधुवनी संकर व बेकाजी गिरमाणी देशपाण्डे प्रांत वाई शासक १६९९ संवत्सरे पौष सुध पंचमी हूँ। सासीतीन महाराणा शेखून दिले इनामपत्र देवेदिके राज्यी श्री-वाडावी जनराज सुपन भांजे खाण आम्हाल्यवेणयाणी
विरूढ देवेदिके मौजे मजकुर वेदेह तुमची देशपाण्डेय वतनाची इनाम जमीन
ईदलशाही काहीची चाचरा ॥। नमे आहें ते आम्हाल दुतत इनाम करार करून
देउन मोगवीयाची पत्रे करून दिल्ही पाहिजेत मुनो वाशुहुन मौजे मजकुरी
आपली देशपाण्डेय वतनाची जमीन इनाम पूर्णांक चाचरा ॥। नमे यो की खों
याच राजाकुलूजा यादी सेवार पूर्ण वाळीचा सेविचा बोदा पक्षपेक, बोदा सेरिमाल
उतरेल सेवार वेदुरली राज्यी मडत हीते थाळ वेद दक्षणेस सता वाळवाट
वाटीचर वुक्कात व कुवान दरवस्त शासी दुतत इनाम करार करून दील्हा
असे तरी यांसी व यांचे पुत्रप्रेमानी वंश परंपरे इनाम चालवणे श्रीमान
पत्राचा आक्षेप न करणे तर पत्राची प्रती शेखून वेजून आक्ष ँ पत्र
मोगवी यास परतो शासनी ठिकाणे देघे जाणीजे छ ३ माहे रमजान मोलगुरुड़े

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(पत्राचे) (नौंद्रीनंबर १४२८ दस्तर सातास तारीख २७ सप्टेंबर सन,
इसवी निलो वासुदेव कांडून दद्दर गरेशा विनायक जाधव १८५४. शही इंग्रजीत.)
राजपत्रि बालाजी जनर्दन उपनाम मानू गोविया कायरण सुन्दर आस्तिकाथान माहाजन मैजे बेलास ताते बेली कुसे दामोदर गोसाइय बाली.

छे सेवक माधवराव कलाल प्रथान नमस्कार दुल। ही दे सबेन मयां व अलङ्क शके १६९२ विक्रतिनाम संवत्सरे दुम्ही दुनार मैजे जलमाग माग बाई बेहील मुकाम बेकुन विनती केरी की आपण लामीचे राज्यावृ अभम लहानाल बुझेर केरी कुडंबवतस यात्रावर योगक्रमार्थ चेक गांव नूतन इनाम दिल्हा पाहिजे महुणोन स्याजवरून मनान आणून दुम्ही लामीचे राज्यांत येऊनियांपण सेवा बुझेर दिवस केरी कुडंबवतस आहां यात्रावर दुम्हे चालवणे आवश्यक जाणून तम्हांजवर हुपाल होऊन दुम्हीस कुडंबवर योगक्रमार्थ मैजे ब्रक्क्ये ताते तलोजे माग कल्याण हा गांव म्हारे व मोळखाये चेकू नुतांना हेरील सर्देशमुक्की व सर्वाठिकी व इनाम तिजाई सुदां दोरोवर कुलवाळ व कुलकाण्ड हाळीपटी पेल्हापटी जल तर भृग काळ पादण्य निविद निविद सहीत लेरीज ह्रस्वदर व इनामदर दरून नूतन इनाम करार करून दिल्हा असे. तरी मैजे मजकूर लदरू प्रमाणे दुम्ही आपणे दुमाला करून बेकुन दुम्ही व दुम्हे पुत्र पीनाम विद्यापरंपरेनं इनाम अनभवून खरखर राहणे वाणिजे े २७ जनवर, आशा प्रमाण
राजश्री बालजी जनार्दन उपनाम भावू गोत्र कास्यप आस्वाद्येन महाजन मौजे वेलास ता वेसवी सुभा ग्रांत दामुढ़ गोखावी यांसि.

छ सेवक सदासित चिमणाजी सचीव नमस्कार सु। लाग्म सबेन मया व अलफ शकॆ १६९४ नंदननाम संवंतूरे देखी इनाम फत ऐसे।

तुम्ही एक्निष्पण सेवा बहुत दिवस केली। यस्ता तुम्ह्याचे चाल्ह्यांचे आवश्यक जाणून तुम्ह्यांच्या कर्त्यांना होजून तुम्ह्यांच्या कर्त्यांना योगक्षेत्रांमध्ये मौजे राहाविले ता खेडेबारे ग्रांत मावळे हा गांव वराज्य मोंगलाई येईल तुलना देखी इनाम तिजाई सुंगा दरोमस्त कुठवाच कुठकानू ह्वीपटी व वेस्टर्न जल तुणा ज्वान कार्शनाम निष्पण सहित खेडेज हुक्काज ब चक्की इनामदर चर्चन नूतन इनाम करार चर्चन देखून हे इनामपत्र मोंगवडीयांत चर्चन देखून आसे। तसेच मौजे मजबूर तुम्ही आपले दुमाळा चर्चन वेईल तुम्ही व तुम्ही पुना पौत्राच्या बोधपरंपरेचे इनाम जानमजन सुकरपण राहण्ये जाणिखे.

छ १५ विलब्ध या। हुजुर।
राजमान्य राजकीय विसाजीराव हवाल्दार ताती सीधीमहाल यांसं माधवराव
मारात्मक प्रभाव नमस्कार हुऱे। कबार्श्वेंकां व अफल मौजे घोटवडें ताती मजकूर हा
गाव राजकीय बाळकजी जनादेश फडणीस यांजकडें आहेहे, त्यास छोटे मजकूर क्या
कुणयांची गुरुं महाशी तीन व टोणगे दोन तोतवाचे गडकर्डितुजें बुलखीं होती
त्याचा यांग मौजे ज्ञानुतप्पा ताती माराबें अंताजी रुग्नाथ फणसे यांचे गुरूंत
लागणा असतांते देत नाहीत महणून हुजूर बीडीत जाहि. त्यावरुन हें पत्र सादर
केलें असे तरी सदरूर गुरुं ज्याकडें असतील त्यात सत्त ताकीद करून देवणे
फिरोन हुजूर बोमाट शें न देवने जानीजे ह २१ जिल्लकाद आशा प्रमाण

लेखन

सिमा
छ अनाम जमीनदार ता।। तलोजे सुभा कल्याण भिन्नकी यांसी राणोजी आंगरे बजारतमाथा सरखेल मुहर सन खैनमीत्या व अछ शक्ते १६९९ हेमलंबी नाम संवत्सरी राजश्री वाळजी जनार्द्न उपनाम भामु गोत्र काशप इत्त आख्यायन माहाजन मौजे जैवाचा ता।। वेल्ही सुभा दामोई हे आमचे दौलतच्या गोळी कल्याण ब्यायायच्या करीत आले हे चालून यास मौजे निताडळे हा गाऊ दुर्गार्य वगैरे जे अंश असलीठे ते इनाम दरोबर कुलकाद कुलकाद हल्हिपथी व पेस्टरपटी देखील इनाम रिजाविभाग सेरोज इत्त इनामदार व इनामदार करून जल्द तरुण काळ पाणिर्य निर्धारित करून इनाम दिव्हा असे तर यास व याचे गुण पौत्राचाच वंशारंभरने इनाम खरे विषय जाणून. साह दरसात नूतन पत्राचा आक्षेप करून ना जाणू. या पत्राची नक्कल करून चेजून असल पत्र पर्त्याचे भोगवटी यास दें. जाणिते छ २६ माहें रविलालर

(पत्रालारें)

(पत्रारंभी)

वार

श्री.
राजाराम नृप
चरणी सादर मान
सिंहसुत राणोजीव
जारत मान सते
ल निरतर.
राजकुमार श्रेष्ठि तिरल वर्तमान व माति सुभा कल्याण भिक्षुणि मित्रांकी गोसांपी यांसि छ अलंकित छैयरी आलंकृत राजकुमार श्री रामराय ओंग सज्जित चरित्र रामराय सुभा। सवा स्वास्थ्यानं व अलंकर व श्री १६५६ देवलवी पान संवेदना राजकुमार वाल्ली जनार्दन उपवास मातृ गोत्र काशिक व आत्मविज्ञन मातृजन वे वेला ता। वेला सुभा श्रीं दामीले हे आमचे दौलतीच्या गोष्टी कल्याण व्यावहार्या करून आहे। हे जाणून यांस नूतन इनाम गांवः

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ta|| देेरैं
१ मैौंजी माजबद
१ मैौंजी देेकडे
३ मैौंजी लोमचवरी
३ मैौंजी निताळें ता।| तत्काल

बेकार हारामांचु दुसारांची बाहेर जे अमल अस्तीत्व ते इनाम दरेकस्तु कुलकार्य कुलकार्य, हालीपटी व पेस्टरपटी देवीहार इनामावरीलेल्या सुभा खेडीज हक्कदिव व इनामदार करून जलत तर तृण काही पाश्चात्य निधि निस्वापद निधि करून इनाम दरेकस्तु दिले। असेल तरी बायस व ल्याचे पुत्र पीरांनी वांतांनी हाय मातृच लिहित जाणे साळ दरसाल नूतन पत्राचा आक्रेष करीत नच जाणे या पत्राची नक्कड करूने वेकून असल पत्र पत्र तत्काल म्होबद्धीयाचे देणे जाणिंचे छ २६ माहे रविवार.

मोरेमबु

मुढ
राजश्री चमाना गोसावी यासी

छ सकल सकल गुणांककरण अंबर्वित कव्वी आलंकृत राजमान्य श्री
कृणावाई पवारं दंडपत विज्ञापना बेशील कृम तागायत छ १ माहे मोहरं पर्यंत
आपणे कुंपकृत मुखरप आतो विशेष आपणे आर्यक्षमाणे आपला विरंजीव मल्हार
पवार व मारांती आतूकृतांचे ल्याणी त्यांही दिलं विरंजीव विहराव हा काळपयतात
आपणे विचारानं नाहीत गूंतरूळू पुण्यांत मुईवीयांकडे व्यावहार लाजन विनंती
करवठीत त्यास केला बंदोबस्त त्या अन्वेषण त्यास ताकाव जाळं पान्हे माझा
आभिमान सर्व सेवंतास मेळा बेहिसी विनंती बिस्तारे काय लिहू पुढेही कृपाकरणार
धर्मच आहेत बहुत काय लिहूणे लोक करावा हे विश्रामी
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