PHILOSOPHY
OF
ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA

by

Vidyābhūṣaṇa Dr. B. N. K. SHARMA, M. A., Ph. D.,
Head of the Department of Sanskrit and Ardhamāgadhī,
Ruparel College, Bombay - 16.

1962
BHARATIYA VIDYA BHAVAN
BOMBAY-7
Copyright and rights of translation and reproduction reserved by the author.

First published: March, 1962

Price Rs. 15/-

Printed in India

By L. G. Gore at the Perfecta Printing Works, 109A, Industrial Area, Sion, Bombay 22. and published by S. Ramakrishnan, Executive Secretary

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 7.
‘स्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमित्यते’

Dedicated to

ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA

Who showed how Philosophy could fulfil its purpose and attain its goal by enabling man to realize the eternal and indissoluble bond of Bimbapratibimbabhāva that exists between the Infinite and the finite.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AV.</td>
<td>Anu-Vyākhyaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhāg.</td>
<td>Bhāgavata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. T.</td>
<td>Bhāgavata-Tātparya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. S.</td>
<td>Brahma-Sūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. S. B.</td>
<td>Brahmāsūtra Bhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brḥ. Up.</td>
<td>Brḥadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chān. Up.</td>
<td>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cri. Sur. I. Phil.</td>
<td>A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. M. S.</td>
<td>Daivī Mīmāṃsā Sūtras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Phil.</td>
<td>Indian Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. B.</td>
<td>Gitā-Bhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. T.</td>
<td>Gitā-Tātparya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KN.</td>
<td>Karma-Nirṇaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KN. ṭ.</td>
<td>Karma Nirṇaya Ṭīkā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. G. B.</td>
<td>Madhva’s Gitā Bhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Vij.</td>
<td>Madhvavijaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. S.</td>
<td>Madhvasiddhāntasāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbh.</td>
<td>Mahābhārata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbh. T. N.</td>
<td>Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māṇ. Up.</td>
<td>Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mith. Kh.ṭ.</td>
<td>Mithyātvānumāna Khāṇḍana Ṭīkā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munḍ. Up.</td>
<td>Munḍaka Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nym.</td>
<td>Nyāyāmṛta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS.</td>
<td>Nyāya Sudhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV.</td>
<td>Nyāya Vivaraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP.</td>
<td>Pramāṇa Paddhati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. M. S.</td>
<td>Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Sūtras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. V.</td>
<td>Rg Veda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G.B.</td>
<td>Rāmānuja’s Gitā Bhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. N. R.</td>
<td>Sannyāya Ratnāvalī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Švet. Up.</td>
<td>Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tg.</td>
<td>(Nyāyāmṛta )-Taraṅginiḥ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TS.</td>
<td>Tattva Saṁkhyāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSṭ.</td>
<td>Tattva Saṁkhyāna ṭīkā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.T.</td>
<td>Tarka Tāṇḍava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.V.</td>
<td>Tattva Viveka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tdy. ṭ</td>
<td>Tattvodyota ṭīkā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP.</td>
<td>Tattva Prakāṣikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Ā.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Āraṇyaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. B.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taitt.Up.</td>
<td>Taittirīya Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up.Kh. ṭ.</td>
<td>Upādhi Khaṇḍana ṭīkā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTN.</td>
<td>Viṣṇu Tattva Nīrṇaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTNṭ</td>
<td>Viṣṇu Tattva Nīrṇaya ṭīkā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Key to Diacritical Marks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Letter</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>आ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>हू</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>u</td>
<td>कू</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>श्च</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>घ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>च</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ch</td>
<td>छ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ān</td>
<td>भू</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṭ</td>
<td>ट</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṭh</td>
<td>ठ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>ड</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>ण</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>श</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ṭs</td>
<td>ष</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s</td>
<td>स</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jña</td>
<td>झ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# CONTENTS

**Chapters**  
Biographical Note  
Preface  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>xi-xvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ONTOLOGY</td>
<td>xviii-xxv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I  The Function and Goal of Philosophy</td>
<td>1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II  Madhva’s Thought in Relation to Earlier and Contemporary Schools</td>
<td>7-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III  Madhva’s Samanvaya of Upaniṣadic Philosophy</td>
<td>15-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV  Madhva’s Contribution to Indian Thought</td>
<td>26-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V  Madhva’s Ontological Theory</td>
<td>31-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI  Madhva’s Ontological Scheme</td>
<td>42-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII  The Concept of Viśeṣas</td>
<td>45-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII  Madhva’s Doctrine of Difference</td>
<td>58-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX  Some Other Categories : Viśīṣṭa, Amśi and Śakti</td>
<td>67-68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X  Sādṛśya Vs. the Universal</td>
<td>69-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI  Space and Time</td>
<td>72-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII  Causation</td>
<td>78-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII  Negation</td>
<td>80-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV  Madhva’s Theory of Pramāṇas</td>
<td>82-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV  Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony</td>
<td>86-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI  The Status of Memory</td>
<td>93-99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapters

XVII  The Doctrine of Validity  100–105
XVIII The Doctrine of Sākṣī  106–112
XIX  Sākṣī as the Ultimate Criterion of Truth  113–115
XX  Theories of Error in Indian Thought  116–130
XXI Madhva's Theory of Error: Abhinavānyathākhyāti  131–136

IV THE WORLD OF EXPERIENCE

XXII Reality of World-Experience  137–42
XXIII Objections to the Reality of the World Answered  143–48
XXIV Textual Evidence in Support of the Reality of the World  149–50
XXV The Meaning and Nature of Creation  151–53
XXVI Doctrine of "Eternal Creation" Thro' "Parādhīna-Viśeṣāpti"  154–61
XXVII Madhva's Theory of the Evolution of the World  162–64
XXVIII Critique of Brahma-Pariṇāma and Vivarta Vādas  165–76

V. DOCTRINE OF ĀTMAN

XXIX Essence of Selfhood  177–79
XXX Metaphysical Dependence of Souls  180–84
XXXI Self-Luminosity of Souls  185–87
XXXII Madhva's Theory of Bondage: Svabhāvājñānāvāda  188–95
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXXIII Plurality of Selves and Their Svarūpabheda</td>
<td>196–203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXIV Rational Basis of Intrinsic Gradation Among Souls and Their Tripartite Classification</td>
<td>204–13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXV Textual Evidence of Intrinsic Gradation Among Souls</td>
<td>214–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXVI The Souls' Relation to Brahman</td>
<td>218–29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXVII Independence of Brahman</td>
<td>230–34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXVIII Attributes of Brahman</td>
<td>225–45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXXIX Knowability of Brahman</td>
<td>246–47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL Brahman is a Saviṣeṇa Personality</td>
<td>248–53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLI Cosmic Activities of Brahman</td>
<td>254–57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLII Manifestation of Brahman</td>
<td>258–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII SĀDHANA-VICĀRA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLIII Freedom and Freewill in Madhva’s Philosophy</td>
<td>261–69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLIV Problem of Evil in Relation to Ethical Advancement</td>
<td>270–73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLV Classification of Adhikāris</td>
<td>274–75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLVI General Scheme of Sādhanas</td>
<td>276–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLVII Karma-Yoga and Jñāna-Yoga</td>
<td>282–86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLVIII Conception of Bhakti, Its Orders and Kinds</td>
<td>287–98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XLIX Dhyāna and Its Place</td>
<td>299–300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapters

L Pratikopasa
L I Bimbopasa
L II Place of Grace in Redemption
L III Aparoksja-Jñana: God-Realization

VIII DOCTRINE OF MUKTI

L IV Nature of the Released State and Its Stages
L V Critique of the Conception of Mokṣa in Other Systems
L VI Madhva's View of Mukti
L VII Rationale of Ānanda-Tāratamya in Mokṣa

Bibliography

Index
BIографиЧАльНОЕ ЧЕРТВЕНИ

Śrī Madhvacārya (1238–1817) was the historical founder of the Dvaita system of Vedānta, which is one of the three principal schools of Vedānta. He was a native of Tulunāḍ, in Karnatak. Pājaka-kṣetra, eight miles south-east of the modern town of Udipi, on the west coast of S. India, was the village of his birth. He was born in 1238 A. D. and lived for seventynine years.

He appeared on the Indian philosophical scene after the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja had become well-established. The reasons that led him to propound a new system of Vedānta were his doctrinal differences and ideological dissatisfaction with contemporary trends and schools of thought, within and without Hinduism and particularly with the system of Śaṅkara, which was the dominating philosophy of the times. In spite of the Theistic revolt against Śaṅkara led by Rāmānuja, Madhva could not agree with him on many points of Theistic doctrine. So he felt called upon to give a new lead in thought, to his countrymen.

Madhva called his system “Tattvavāda” (Realism). It is described by Vidyārāṇya, in his Sarvadarśanaśāstra, as “Pūrṇaprajñādarsana”. Pūrṇaprajña and Ananda Tīrtha were other names of Madhvācārya. All these three names have been found used by him, in his works. He is now more widely known by the last name of Madhva or Madhvācārya.

While yet in his teens, the call of the spirit took him to Acyutaprekaṇa, an ascetic of the Ekadaṇḍi order, belonging to the Ekāntī or Brahma-Sampradāya. He received initiation from him as a Sannyāsin. After this, Madhva studied the classics of the Advaita school such as the Īṣṭasiddhi. Later he began to expound the Prasthānatrayī, independently and from a new standpoint, laying bare the defects in the received interpretations of Śaṅkara and his school. Sometimes, he used to enter into
scholastic disputations with veteran scholars of the day. Mention has been made in his biography of Buddhisāgara, Vādisimha and Bhānu Paṇḍita. He toured all over India several times and visited Badarikāśrama, Bengal, Bihar and Banaras in the north and many centres of learning on the Godāvari and important places like Goa, Śrīrangam and Kanyākumāri, in the south.

Madhva has left thirtyseven works in all. They include (i) Daśa-Prakaraṇas or ten philosophical monographs expounding his logic and metaphysics; (ii) Commentaries on the Ten Upaniṣads (iii) cc. on Gītā and the Brahmasūtras; (iv) a brief c. on the first three Adhyāyas of the Ṛg Veda, an epitome of the Mbh. in verses and brief notes on the Bhāgavata; and (v) miscellaneous works comprising Stotras, poems and works on worship and ritual. His greatest work is the Anu-Vyākhyāna, a critical exposition of the philosophy of the Brahmasūtras. It is a metrical work. It is his masterpiece. It was commented upon by Jayatīrtha in his famous work, the Nyāya-Sudhā.

Madhva’s writings are characterized by extreme brevity of expression and compression of thought. They need the help of a very good commentary to be understood in their fulness of thought and depth of meaning. His commentator Jayatīrtha has infused into them the necessary amplitude of utterance and expansiveness of thought.

Madhva was endowed with a fine magnetic personality. He was a born leader of men. As a creative thinker, he cared little for the conventions of fashionable belief and interpretation. He was not cowed down by mere technical display of learning. His logic was as inexorable as his faith in Theism was unshakable. He made a deep impression on his contemporaries. Some of his eminent disciples like Trivikrama Paṇḍita, Padmanābha Tīrtha and Narahari Tīrtha were distinguished scholars of Advaita and other systems before they became converted to
his views. They belonged to different parts of India and spoke different languages. After establishing his system on firm foundations, Madhva erected a temple for Śrī Kṛṣṇa at Udipi and installed in it the idol of Bāla Kṛṣṇa secured from Dvārakā. He made Udipi the spiritual centre of his school and entrusted the worship at the temple to eight ascetic disciples. Their lines and those of the other disciples, entrusted with the task of propagating his system, are flourishing to this day. According to tradition, Madhva disappeared from vision and retired to Badarikāśrama, in his seventyninth year. Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita, the son of his direct disciple Trivikrama Paṇḍita, wrote his biography in a Sanskrit Kāvya of 16 Sargas, known as Madhva-Vijaya. It is the main source of Madhva’s life and activities.

Madhva went directly to the fountain heads of ancient thought,—the source-books of Hindu philosophy, to draw his inspiration from them. He followed the streams of thought and interpretation emerging directly from them and flowing thro’ the Epics, Purāṇas and Pañcarātras and other interpretative literature of more ancient standing than the interpretations of later day commentators, however eminent. There was a strong note of mystic fervor in his thought and writings. His arguments were often so intimately connected with the authorities he had so diligently collected for himself from forgotten and fading sources as to appear to be almost entirely dependent on them. It was Jayatīrtha who successfully brought out the inherent logical strength behind his authorities. There were certain great ideas behind Madhva’s writings,—ideas of tremendous philosophical power, significance and potentialities—such as the conception of Sākṣi, the doctrine of Svatantarattva, “Viśeṣas” in relation to the concept of identity and difference, and creation in the new sense of “Parādhīnavigeṣaṇī”. With these fruitful ideas, which he derived partly from his study of his sources and partly from his own cogitations
based on them. Madhva built up a cogent and independent system of Theistic philosophy and worked out its details and put it on a firm and enduring basis of textual sanctions and logical satisfyingness. He urged the necessity of adopting a fresh attitude of mind and a new set of fundamental concepts and categories in place of the old and worn out ideas of the fashionable schoolmen, including the latest in the field. Once the metaphysical necessity of discarding the outmoded ideas and going in for more effective theories and newer modes of approach was established, the whole course of philosophical inquiry was bound to take a new turn and enter upon a new terrain. Providence blessed Madhva with two great assets: an interpreter of such outstanding eminence as Jayatīrtha and a dialectic expositor of the calibre of Vyāšarāya, whom it harnessed to the cause of expounding his system to posterity.

**JAYATĪRTHA (1365–88)**

Jayatīrtha was Madhva's commentator *par excellence*. According to tradition, he was the son of a nobleman of Mangalvedha, now in Maharashtra State. As a young man, Jayatīrtha renounced the pleasures of his married life and became the disciple of Aksobhya Tīrtha, one of the direct disciples of Madhva. This Aksobhya himself was a redoubtable scholar and is reputed to have engaged the famous Vidyāraṇya, in a historic disputation over the "Tat tvam asi" text, at which the celebrated follower of Rāmānuja, Vedānta Deśika, is reported to have acted as umpire and given his verdict in favor of Aksobhya:

"असिना तत्त्वमसिना पर्जीवोमभविना ।
विद्यारण्यमहाराण्यमहोभयुनिरस्तिन्नः॥"

(Quoted in *Muvvāyirappaḍī Guruparamparāprabhāvam* of Brahmatantra Svatantra Jeer).
Jayatirtha studied Madhva’s works under Akṣobhya Tīrtha and later succeeded him as Pontiff of his Mutt in 1365. He toured all over India and propagated Madhva’s Siddhānta by writing commentaries on most of the important philosophical works of Madhva. He seems to have spent the major part of his life at Ergola and later at Malkhed or Manyakheṭa (the old and historic capital of the Rāṣṭra-Kūṭas of Karnataka) now in the Gulbarga district of Mysore State. He passed away at Malkhed in 1388. His mortal remains lie entombed there.

Jayatirtha has left commentaries on most of the important works of Madhva. He has also left us two independent works, one on logic (Pramāṇa Paddhati) and another on metaphysics, (Vādāvalī.) All his works have been printed. His greatest work is the Nyāya–Sudhā the c. on Madhva’s Anu–Vyākhyāna. It is a work of monumental erudition in philosophy.

Jayatirtha standardized Madhva’s thought and its interpretation. He was a born stylist. His style is noted for its elegance, lucidity, brilliance and felicity. His arguments are most scholarly and penetrating and his dialectics superb. His writings are characterized by an extreme orderliness of thought and presentation. He brings out the architectonic unity of Madhva’s philosophical system and the grandeur of his metaphysical ideology of the Svaatanratattva, impressively. He has placed Madhva’s philosophical theory and his interpretation of the Vedānta on a self–sufficient basis in respect of its Adhikaraṇa Prasthāna and Vādaprasṭhāna. For these memorable services to the system, tradition has honored him with the title of “Tīkācārya” or Commentator par excellence.
VYĂŚARĂYA (1478--1589)

About a century after Jayatīrtha came Vyăśarāya or Vyăsa Tīrtha, the Prince of dialecticians in the Dvaita system. He was born about 1460 A. D., in Bānūr, in the Mysore district. He became a Sannyāsin, while still in his teens. He studied logic and Madhva-Śāstra under the celebrated Mādhva Saint and scholar Śrīpādarāja of Mulbāgal (near Kolar). Later, he is reported to have studied the classics of the Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Mīmāṃsā systems at Kāṇcīpuram, in Tamilnād. He succeeded to the Pontifical seat of his Guru, Brahmāṇya Tīrtha, in 1478 and held sway for a long period of sixtyone years.

Vyăśarāya had many sides to his personality. He became the leader of the Devotional Movement of the Haridāsa Kūṭa of Karnatak after Śrīpādarāja. The famous Purandara Dāsa, Kanaka Dāsa and others were his disciples. The illustrious writers Vādirāja Tīrtha and Vijayīndra Tīrtha were also his disciples. He was the religious adviser and spiritual Guru of the Emperor Krishnadeva Rāya of Vijayanagar and was held in the greatest honor and esteem at the court of Vijayanagar, by the Kings of the second and third dynasties of Vijayanagar. We have a full account of his glorious life and career in the Vyăśayogicarita, a fine Campū Kāvya in Sanskrit by Poet Somanātha. Vyăśarāya passed away in 1539 at Vijayanagar (where he lived for the major part of his life) and his mortal remains lie entombed in Navabṛndāvana, an island near Ānegaṇdi, on the Tuṅgabhadrā river.

Vyăśarāya wrote nine works in all. The most famous of these are the Nyāyāmṛta, Tarkatāḍava and Tātparya-Candrikā. They show his encyclopaedic range of knowledge of contemporary thought and philosophical literature and an astonishingly brilliant intellect of great clarity.
and penetration, rarely to be met with in one man. He had the ability to marshal vast quantity of factual material and extraordinary ramifications of thought into half a dozen propositions, couched in terse and telling terms. His works embody the highest achievements of Madhva's philosophy in the spheres of constructive exposition of Siddhānta and polemical refutation of other views and reinforcement of Siddhānta. Dasgupta has paid him the highest tribute in saying that "the logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsatīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole of Indian thought" (Hist. of I. Phil. Vol. iv. p. viii.).
PREFACE

This is the first complete critical and comparative exposition of Śrī Madhvācārya’s Philosophy, in English. I am indeed very happy that it has been possible for me to bring out this work, which I had promised my readers in the Preface to the first volume of my History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature (1960), so expeditiously. I earnestly hope that the present work, together with its companion volumes on the History of the Dvaita school will place in the hands of the reading public ample materials for a close and intensive study of Madhva’s philosophical system, as a whole, in its historical and doctrinal aspects.

Works written on the subject of Madhva’s philosophy, years ago, by pioneers in the field have now become outmoded, naturally. Of more recent ones, in the field, Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma’s Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy (Madras, 1937) is restricted to an exposition of the ten small philosophical monographs of Madhvācārya. It does not draw upon Madhva’s major works like the Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya or the Anuvyākhyaṇa. It is not, therefore, a complete and organic presentation of Madhva’s philosophy. H. N. Raghavendrachar’s Dvaita Philosophy, Its Place in the Vedānta (Mysore Uni. 1941) has erred in representing Madhva’s thought as a pure Monism in principle. This is a novel and revolutionary interpretation, which is opposed to the established traditions of the system. It has not only not found any wide acceptance among scholars; but has evoked refutations from orthodox spokesmen. His advocacy of what he calls “Svarūpa-Sṛṣṭi” (creation of the essence) of Souls in Madhva’s philosophy is, indeed, a very unfortunate misinterpretation of Madhva’s position, as it has been explained in the works of accredited exponents of the Siddhānta. Moreover, the doctrine of Creation as “Pārdhīnavigeśāpti”, specially formulated by Madhva, would lose its point, if Raghavendrachar’s interpretation is accepted. This point has been dealt with in the present work.
The treatment of Madhva’s philosophy in Dr. Radhakrishnan’s *Indian Philosophy* (1927) has been “brief and summary”. We have a more detailed and sympathetic treatment of Madhva’s thought in Dasgupta’s *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. IV (1949). But it has not taken any notice of the new issues raised by Raghavendrachar’s book. Apart from that, Dasgupta’s treatment of the subject is, by no means, exhaustive. Obviously, it could not be expected to be exhaustive as his object was not to write an independent treatise on Madhva’s philosophy; but simply to deal with it as part of the general and larger movement of thought known as Indian philosophy. It is but natural then, that he should have passed over many important aspects of Madhva’s thought. His method of approach has been more or less descriptive in that he does not attempt any expression of opinion on the issues involved or any evaluation of doctrines.

My aim in writing this book is to give a complete, critical and comparative exposition of Madhvācārya’s system of philosophy, bringing out its logical strength and metaphysical consistency and satisfyingness. It is intended to be an organic presentation of the system in all its essential aspects. It differs from all the other works in the field, including Dasgupta’s, in showing how the concepts and categories of Madhva’s philosophical system have been conceived and formulated and have been put into a coherent system and in what relation they stand to those of other allied and rival systems. It brings out the special significance and interconnections of Madhva’s doctrines and the architectonic unity of his system in relation to its parts. The reader is enabled to see for himself and appreciate the precise value and significance of some of Madhva’s distinctive contributions to the perennial problems of religion and philosophy,—particularly Indian philosophy, for which he can justly claim credit,—such as the doctrines of Sākṣi, Svaṭantra, Saviṣeṣaḥbheda and Parādhivaṣeṣaḥpṛthia. The present work may therefore claim to be a fresh interpretation and exposition of Madhva’s philosophical system.
Not only is such a systematic and critical exposition of Madhva's philosophical system called for; but it has long been overdue. Metaphysically, it embodies the most powerful and sustained refutation of Vedântic monism. It has produced front-rank thinkers like Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha. It has an extensive philosophical literature of rare philosophical penetration, in Sanskrit. It has influenced the philosophical thought of Caitanya and his followers in distant Bengal. It has given birth to a Devotional movement of the Haridāsa Kūṭa, from within; which in its turn has enriched the literature of one of the major languages of South India. It has become the living faith of a large section of the Indian people, speaking seven different languages of present-day India.

In its own right, then, this system deserves much more attention than has been given to it by our modern scholars and writers on Indian philosophy. They have done it an injustice by classifying it under 'minor religious systems' belonging 'more to the religious history than to the philosophical development of India'. Every system of philosophy, in India, not excluding the Advaita, has its own religious basis and development. It is an error of judgment to suppose that the religious and theological aspects have overshadowed the philosophical, in Madhva's system; while it (the latter) stands in undiminished brightness in the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. The cult of the Saguna-Brahman has invaded a large part of the philosophical territory of Advaita. The recognition given to such aspects as Pañcāyatana-pūjā and Tantric forms of worship of Śrī-Cakra and Goddesses like Rājarajeśvari among Advaitins shows that the religious element is by no means negligible in Advaita. As for Rāmānuja's system, he "attempts a harmonious combination of absolutism with personal theism", — to quote a modern authority. To quote another, "Rāmānuja's beautiful stories of the other world, which he narrates with the confidence of one who has personally assisted at the origination of the world, carry no conviction. The followers of Rāmānuja move with as much Olympian assurance thro' the chambers
of the Divine mind as Milton thro’ the halls of Heaven” (Radhākrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p 720).

There is as much of substantial philosophical thought in Madhva’s system as there is in those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Failure to recognize this, for want of a first-hand acquaintance with the works of the three great master-minds of the system: Madhva, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha, does not entitle responsible authors and writers on Indian philosophy to pronounce *ex cathedra* judgments on the philosophical status of Madhva’s system or dispose of it in a few pages, summarily: The progress of philosophy is generally due to a powerful attack on current traditions when men feel compelled to go back upon received opinions and raise once more the fundamental questions which their predecessors had disposed of on the basis of some older schemes of thought. The movement of thought initiated by Madhva constitutes a new era in Vedāntic thought in India. It relaid the foundations of philosophy at a much deeper level of philosophical certitude open to man—viz., the Śāṅkṛi and thereby opened up a new line of Samanvaya between authority and experience: Śruti and Anubhava. For this reason, this philosophy deserves careful study by all lovers of thought, as a fresh adventure of the philosophical spirit.

Freedom of opinion and independence of thought are the birthright of every philosopher. In opposing Śaṅkara’s philosophy, Madhva has but exercised this right of a philosopher. There is no point, then, in pompously accusing him for this as a “born foe of Śaṅkara” and make it an excuse for dismissing his philosophy in three and a half pages, as has been done in a recent work on Indian philosophy, claiming to be a ‘Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, written by an Indian scholar. One is amazed at the wrong sense of ‘values’ shown by some of our living philosophers, which makes them forget the claims and importance of living systems of Indian thought and lavish their attention on those that are dead and have often no more than a
purely antiquarian, technical or academic interest today. Without disputing their right to recognition, I will only say that *our living systems deserve more attention from our philosophers*. In this sense, the University of Bombay has given the right lead to the reorientation of philosophical studies in independent India, by making suitable provision for the study of Madhva’s philosophy, in its curricula. I would fain hope that this example will be followed by other Universities in our country and abroad. The honor our temples of learning can show to the thinkers of this country lies in providing facilities for our young men and women to study their contributions to human thought.

Materials from the original Sanskrit texts and sources of the system have been presented here, in a modern garb, keeping in view the modern philosophical temper and its likes and dislikes, in the selection of materials and emphasis on problems. Doctrinal fidelity has been scrupulously observed, side by side with fairness and impartiality of judgment.

The special merit of the work lies in its being designed to be the most fully documented work, so far published, on Madhva’s philosophy, quoting profusely from the accredited works and original sources of the system, for purposes of elucidation and authentication. For this reason, the Sanskrit quotations have been freely introduced within the body of the reading matter in English, in many places. So much textual matter could hardly have been pressed within the limits of a few footnotes here and there. On the other hand, the full weight, significance and bearing of the quotations on the doctrines at issue and the effectiveness of their contextual appeal, as intended by their particular interpretations could hardly have been conveyed to the reader, in full force, if the quotations had all been relegated to a separate
section, at the end of the book. In these circumstances, a via media had to be found. I hope the general reader will see the point and pardon me for the inconvenience that may be caused by this arrangement. I have, however, tried to introduce the texts in a way that would allow the general reader to skip over them, if necessary, without much interruption to thought or intellectual appeal. These quotations have not, however, been translated as a rule, as that would have increased the bulk of the work and the cost of publication. But their general purport has been sought to be brought out by the trend of the discussion or exposition. These quotations are also intended to serve as a corpus of reference-materials (which will be welcomed by many, as the printed editions of the original works themselves are now out of print and very difficult to obtain) for those interested in pursuing specialized study of the system and to stimulate their interest in going to the originals for further light.

I have gone to the standard works of the different systems of Indian philosophy, in Sanskrit, for purposes of comparing and contrasting the views of Madhva and his commentators with those of the other schools, wherever necessary. I have consulted and have often quoted from the works of several modern Indian and Western writers, in English, on Eastern and Western thought. My obligations to these distinguished writers and their works have been acknowledged in the body of the work, and in the footnotes.

This is also the first modern work, in English, on Madhva’s system to present adequate collateral evidence from the standard works of the Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and other schools, for purposes of intelligent criticism, comparison and evaluation. In drawing attention to the value and significance of Madhva’s contributions to the various problems of religion and philosophy, I have invited attention to striking parallelisms of thought between Madhva and some Western philosophers including Christian thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas and Ralph Cudworth. I have
also drawn attention to those aspects of Madhva's thought which strike a modern note or are strikingly in advance of his times and the views of his predecessors and contemporaries. So far as I am aware, these aspects of his thought have not been touched upon or adequately emphasized by any of the modern scholars, who have written on the subject of Madhva's philosophy.

For reasons explained in the Biographical Note, I have incorporated substantial material, both interpretative and dialectical, from the works of Jayatirtha and Vyāsatirtha. Further materials from the works of Vyāsatirtha have been reserved for another work I have in view.

In discussing doctrinal and philosophical issues, I have generally confined my attention to the problems of Madhva’s philosophy alone,—except where a further examination or criticism of their counter-doctrines, pertaining to other schools, was felt to be desirable or necessary in the interests of further elucidation or reinforcement of Madhva’s own doctrines. That is why I have not entered into any elaborate polemical discussions of such doctrines of the Advaita school as “Mithyātva”, the nature of “Avidyā”, its definitions and proofs, “Adhyāsa”, “Ekajīvājñānavāda”, “Śabdāparokṣa”, “Pratikarmavyavasthā” and so on, as falling outside the scope of this work.

Before concluding, I have a very pleasant duty to discharge,—to express my deep sense of gratitude and thankfulness to the Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, Government of India, for the generous grant of Rs. 2450/- in aid of the cost of publication of this work. As a Bhāratīya, I feel richly rewarded and honored by this token of recognition of my work from the Government of my country.

My next duty and an equally pleasant one is to thank the institutions and individuals who have responded to my appeal for further financial assistance to complete the work. I have to mention among these the management of the Ruparel College, Bombay, the Śrīman Madhva Siddhānta Unnāhinī (S. M. S. O.) Sabhā, Tirupati, the Akhila Bhārata
Mādhva Mahāmaṇḍal, Udi, the Svamijis of the following Mādhva Pīṭhas: Śrī Rāghavendra Svami Mutt, Nanjangud, Śrī Adamār Mutt, Śrī Sode Vādirāja Mutt and Śrī Pejāvar Mutt, Udi, and Śrī Vyāsarāja Mutt, Sosale; and several enlightened Mādhva gentlemen: my esteemed friends and well-wishers. I tender my heartfelt thanks to all of them.

I thank the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, for coming forward to have this work printed and published on my behalf. It gives me particular pleasure to record my thanks, heartily, to my son Sudhindra, for the keen interest and ready enthusiasm he has shown in helping me by reading and passing the proofs and in preparing the Index etc.

Ruparel College,
Bombay–16.
_1st March, 1962._

B. N. K. SHARMA.
PHILOSOPHY
OF
SRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA
I GENERAL INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THE FUNCTION AND GOAL OF PHILOSOPHY

There are no people who could be impervious to the demands of this world for an explanation of its apparent chaos and contradictions. Only an all-embracing explanation of life consistent with experience would satisfy the requirements of reason, man’s highest instrument for the regulation of life. For this reason, philosophy cannot be a mere exercise of the intellect or a pursuit for sheer aesthetic interest or curiosity. It must have a spiritual raison d’etre and must satisfy man’s spiritual needs. It must deal with problems which force themselves on our thought and press for a solution, viz., what man is, why he is conditioned as he is, what his goal is and how he is to attain it.

The question is not, therefore, merely one of philosophy or no philosophy; but one of good philosophy or a bad one. Every rational being, then, has a philosophy of his own, whether he knows it or not. It is the business of an earnest aspirant to go thro’ the entire process of thought, under proper spiritual guidance and find a solution of the problems which vex him. The Sāstras are there to guide him on right lines.¹

Philosophy asks for an imaginable unity in place of the mysterious multiplicity. But neither a pure abstraction of being nor a mere totality or aggregate of beings can give us true unity. Some community or reciprocity there must be. "The question is how little would suffice. It seems clear that either each must be connected with all, in at least one way; or that all must be connected with some one. There must be a universal principle directly relating all; or a Supreme Individual to which all are related. The latter would imply the former insofar as thro’ their

¹ Cf: अनादिकाल्योऽव्यतर्द्व तस्य तिर्यक प्रवृत्तिः।
न चोच्छेदं दोषितं कस्यप्यस्येवत्यतो विभुः।

* * * * *

तथापि श्रुतिविद्यावैभवयोगिनाम्।
शुक्लयाज्ञवल्क्यम् हनुत्रारमार्गेऽऽवथतः ।
इति विद्यापति: सम्यक्ष सम्यक्षानं निराकृतिम्।
चकर निजयथातां व्रद्धिसात्तलितिवये॥ (Madhva, AV. ii, 1)
common relation to the Supreme One, all would be related, tho' only indirectly, to each other.”¹

Madhva finds such a principle of unity in the unity of government, sustenance and control of the Universe, by Brahman. He finds this idea tellingly expressed in the Śruti text:

विश्वमेवद् पूर्वस्तःहितकृतांभासाः

The Supreme and Independent Brahman is not so much the cause in time of the dependent realities as the logical and metaphysical explanation of all else that is. Hence the definition of the principle of Independence in Madhva’s system;

स्वहपथमितान्वितमित्वास्वकः पराणेश्वरः (Jayatīrtha, TSṭ)

Reality presents, to an inquiring mind, three primary data: the thinking self, a world of external realities and indications of an Infinite Power rising above them. Tho’ these three data are commonly postulated as distinguishable essences, terms like ‘reality’, ‘substance’ or ‘existence’, are not applied to all of them, in the same sense, by all persons, in all stages of spiritual or philosophical development. It has happened time and again in the history of Philosophy, both in the East and in the West, that the one or the other of them has been raised to a position of greater prominence than the rest. Such shifting of emphasis has led to the emergence of several forms of Materialistic, Panegiotic and Monistic heresies which, in the history of speculation, are quite familiar. Justifications for each point of view could easily be found. The Self is the immediate starting point of all experience. It is so borne in upon us as to easily usurp the place of honor. The existence of things outside of us in time and space and even the reputed existence of a Deity are, after all, secondary, being reached only thro’ acts of private consciousness and may, for aught we know, be illusory or at any rate, not so irrefragably real as the self. From an opposite point of view, Matter which can be moved and measured and is therefore tangible, could be set up as a stern reality than either God or the souls, who seem to shrink into shadowy abstractions by its side. To the Mystics, on the other hand, the Infinite Being alone, conceived as:

नित्यशुद्धबुद्धिमुक्तसत्यबुद्धिगृहस्यकपूर्णम्

(D. M. S. q. by Madhva, B. T. p. 78)

¹ James Ward, Pluralism and Theism, p. 42. An identical view is propounded by Jayatīrtha, in his c. on TS. See P. 5.
is so all-absorbing as to transcend all and constitutes the sole reality of all that there is or can be.

An unbalanced exaltation of any one of these three data, over the rest in the realm of thought, feeling or action, is the cause of much false philosophy and bad morals. The more pretentious philosophies of ancient and modern times, which have sought to resolve the three data into one, have failed inexorably in the end or have been obliged to make compromises, or concede some sort of a "conditional" or "phenomenal" reality to the other data. If the material world, which fills the horizon of senses, is taken to be the single reality that matters most, it would lead us to a Materialism of the West or the Čārvāka philosophy of the East. The ego-centric explanation would land us in a Panegoism, Solipsism or Subjective Idealism, Ekajīvavāda and the like; while the theocratic attitude would end in an Absolutism, Deism or Pantheism.

But the true function of philosophy, aided by reason and experience, is to determine by what relationship of the threefold data of experience could man’s thirst for an ultimate explanation of the enigma of existence be really and fully satisfied. Reason seeks to interpret the plurality of things and processes which constitute the world as a system of parts evolved or conditioned by one Universal Power or Mind so as to be factors of one whole and subject to one universal reason. As a true philosopher, Madhva ignores neither of the three data of experience; nor does he exaggerate the claims of any one of them at the expense of the other. The changeable no less than the unchangeable, the Independent no less than the dependent, is an ultimate component of Reality as a whole:

द्वितिष्ठ हि प्रमेयः, स्वतंत्रमस्वतंत्रेः च (NS. p. 286 b.)

This is one of profoundest conclusions of Dvaita metaphysics reached by the evidence of Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabdapramāṇas. It would not be possible to understand or explain the universe if we are indifferent to Matter and Spirits, much more so to the Deity. One must face facts established by our own knowledge and be guided by them, in interpreting them philosophically.

The fact of knowledge is indisputable. And as there can be no knowledge without a knower, a known or knowable object, the reality of the knower and objects of knowledge must be accepted. Whatever else we may choose to admit or reject, absolute scepticism as to the possibility of knowledge of any kind is unsustainable. Even supposing that all our knowledge of reality, so far, has been proved to be contradicted, the
possibility of knowledge has still to be admitted. One cannot deny the possibility of knowledge and yet claim that knowledge has been proved to be contradicted. Madhva says well, referring to Śrīharṣa’s dogged scepticism:

यदि नाश्चिले किचिदनाश्चिलतापि हि।
नाश्चिलेति मुकः स्वादिति नास्मादवादिता।। (AV).

At the worst, thinking or the mind would still survive as the residuum of universal doubt.

Starting then, from knowledge as one of the uncriticized certainties of life, we are faced with a plurality of objects and with other thinking beings like ourselves. We think and reason, feel pleasure and pain. Can any of these states be less evident to us than our own existence? In conceding, then, the existence of our own good selves, we are also forced to admit the reality of our most intimate and poignant experiences of pleasure and pain, in short, the joys, sorrows and limitations of life:

न हुःखातुमवः क्र्यापि मिथ्यातुमवतः ब्रजेत।
क्रित्वा हार्यो न निबेदेतुः शास्त्रयेत अभ्यादिना।।
भ्रमलम्भः च सर्वे बेदे हि साश्चिल्ला।
शुद्धः साश्ची यदा सिद्धो हुःखितं बाव्यते कथम्? (AV., ii, 3)

The fact of knowledge, again, establishes the presence of many more things and persons besides ourselves. Reality is not apprehended as one but as many; and there is no reason to reject the apprehension of the many as an ‘appearance’:

कल्पनागौरवादेव पदार्थाः न स्तुरेव हि। (AV).

It is at this point that Madhva introduces the philosophical distinction between the Independent and the Dependent. The reals cannot all of them be Independent, lest there should be chaos and strife. Neither can all be dependent, without an Independent principle to relate them. The dependents cannot obviously control one another, without a higher Principle to connect them. Otherwise, there would be a regress of strife and opposition thro’ which they would destroy one another and perish in the transaction.

1. चैत्यकल्लिन सामले परदेद्वस्य साधिते (AV).
And there would be no reality left in the end! It is, thus, very necessary to dichotomize reality into "Sva-tantra" and "Para-tantra". Experience shows that the human souls and their material environments are not independent:

न च कर्मविमामामलाकल्पव्यतिमात्राचित्व तद्ध यतः ।
(Dvādaśa-Stotra of Madhva).

Were human beings independent masters of their own destiny, we should expect to find peace and plenty and bliss unalloyed, in human life. We should lack nothing and have everything for the asking. But we know only too well that it cannot be:

आत्माना: सुखहुःखेतोऽ (Svet. Up. i, 2.)

This shows that things are directed by an unknown agency; which, for want of better name, all the world agrees to designate as "God" or the "Paramātman" or 'the Supreme Being'.

In this way, then, does Madhva establish the existence and reality of Matter, Souls, Svabhāva, Kāla, Karma and other eternal verities under the control of a Supreme Being. The Svatāntara and the Paratāntara are thus the fundamental presuppositions of his system. The dependence of the finite reals is the proof of the existence of the Deity, according also to the great Nyāya philosopher, Udayana:

सप्तेक्ष्यादानानिविष्यांत्र, वैचित्र्यादिस्वरूपितः ।
प्रत्ययानिविष्यांत्र, भून्येतिः हेतुरूपिकः ॥ः
(Nyāya-Kusumāñjali, i.)

The aim of philosophy, then, would be not merely to realize the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'; but to understand and realize the still more important distinction between the Independent Real and the dependent realities. Madhva is not, therefore, an uncritical realist who takes everything to be real; nor a sentimental idealist who would deny all but one reality. He is for a rational realism, which would admit whatever is established on the uncontradicted evidence of the Pramāṇas, the senses, the mind and the Sākṣī, in addition to

1. एके हु एकमेव तत्त्वमिति मन्वन्ते। तदस्य। प्रत्ययादितिविशाराद। सर्वस्य स्वतंत्रः
   नित्यसुखादिविविष्यः। अस्तवर्त्यः, च, न कस्यापि प्रत्ययादितिविशाराद।
   प्रायस्तेषर्वतुप्रवोचः। यदि सर्वमेव स्वतंत्रः स्वातः तत्परत्वादितिविविष्यः।
   नित्यविद्वादिविविष्यः। यदि वा परतंत्रमेव तत्स भवेतु, अनन्तित्वसंभवाच न कस्यापि सर्वादिकः भवातः।
   (Jayatīrtha' Ts)
reason and revelation. He introduces a new element of value into the
discussion of the problem of Pramāṇas in the form of the concept of
Sākṣī, whose nature and scope will be explained in the appropriate
place. The Sākṣī is man’s highest instrument of all valid knowledge and
experience. It is on its evidence that we become conscious, however
dimly, of the existence of a higher power than ourselves, in this vast
and mysterious Universe.

It will, therefore, be seen that any other approach to the problem
of philosophy and any other analysis of the reals or the data of experi-
ence into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ reals (bhāva and abhāva) as in Nyāya
thought, or as Cit and Acit (as in Jain or Rāmānuja view) would be
irrelevant to the aim and purpose of religion and philosophy, which is
to evaluate phenomena and enable man to get out of the bondage of
life which is the outcome of a misplaced assumption of his independence
svātantryābhimāna) in it1.

1. यथापि, भावाभावत्या चेतनाचेतनतत्त्वात्, नित्यानित्यत्त्वात् वा इत्यविषयं शक्यते वक्तृ, तथापि तस्य वैश्वानरद्वैष्ट्यस्य संवाक्षणो स्वयम्। परतत्त्वमेवं स्वतत्त्वमेयायत्त्वात् विदितं हि नित्यानित्यत्त्वाय साय साय भवति। अन्यया, गण्गावल्क्कादिपरिर्गणनवतः, संवित्त स्वसंवित्तवायपायक स्यात्। (ibid.).
CHAPTER II

MADHVA'S THOUGHT IN RELATION TO EARLIER
AND CONTEMPORARY SCHOOLS

The system of Madhva is founded on the continuous authority of
a wide range of religious and philosophical literature of India which has
been the main source of Indian thought, in its widest sense. The history of
the evolution of Madhva's thought from these source-books of his system
and the history of its development at the hands of Madhva and his
numerous commentators and expositors have been dealt with by me in
the two volumes of my 'History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and
Its Literature'.

The present work aims at a fairly complete and comprehensive
critical exposition of Madhva's philosophy, as presented in his own works
and as further interpreted and elaborated by his illustrious commentator
Jayatīrtha, in the first instance and by the famous dialectician of the
Mādhva school, Vyāsarāya, who came a hundred and twentyfive years
after Jayatīrtha.

If Indian philosophy is to be accepted as much more than an
interpretation of certain basic texts and traditions, tho' not as completely
detached from them, attempts should be made to present the various
systems of thought and their logical, epistemological and ontological
foundations and their metaphysical superstructure in their architectonic
unity. The philosophical system of Madhva and his commentators has
not received adequate attention, from this point of view.

No doubt, Indian philosophers, particularly the Vedāntins, have
stressed the limitations of discursive thought and shown the possibilities
of spiritual intuition in understanding the nature of reality, urging the
necessity to correct and supplement the conclusions of pure logic and
metaphysical speculations with the help of one's own intuitions and those
of bygone generations, handed down thro' the Scriptures and intended to
be recaptured in our own religious and spiritual experiences and dis-
coveries.

But this is not to say that reason has had no part to play in the
evolution of their thought. Philosophy, as an interpretation of reality,
cannot spin out its theories in vacuo, away from the world of experience.
As Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it, perhaps a little too extravagantly, "the
Indian philosophers first arrive at a system of consistent doctrine and then look about for texts of an earlier age, to support their position. They either force them into such support or ingeniously explain them away" (I. Phil, i. p. 130).

All schools of Indian philosophy, save the Cārvāka, show two main aspects in their system-building: one rational or philosophical and the other a dogmatic, textual, revelatory or authoritarian aspect. The former examines the fundamental presuppositions of thought and constructs a metaphysical theory on certain a priori epistemological and ontological foundations of its own, on which they erect a full-fledged system and correlate it to the interpretations of texts which have come to be regarded as ultimate sources of philosophical knowledge and inspiration, in the land and community of their birth and invested with special authority and sanction, on problems of philosophy. While accepting the judgments of established traditions and authority, on such problems, the Indian philosophers have, to an equal extent, used the methods of reasoned thought and criticism, to examine the presuppositions of their textual systems and the nature and constitution of their categories of thought and interpretation, in the light of independent proofs.

In doing so, they have always tried to make out a case for their respective theories before the bar of reason, on such unexceptionable criteria of system-building as adherence to a strictly philosophical method and outlook, sound logical deductions and analysis of principles, consistency of thought and faithfulness to experience. It is the business of philosophy to look at experience as a whole and take note of the suggestions forced upon it by the mind of man and confirm them as theories if they have the requisite explanatory value.

Such is the essence of the Hindu method of Tattvanirṇaya (truth-determination). In the body of any Siddhānta, then, there is a good deal of critical analysis and exposition of the principles of epistemology, logic and metaphysics of one's own school, together with a reasoned examination of those of other schools. As a modern writer\(^1\) puts it "Philosophy is essentially a collective and co-operative business. Effective co-operation consists in disagreement. The true process of philosophy, as a science, is that of a Platonic dialogue, in which the propositions, objections and rejoinders of numerous interlocutors are found

---

focussed upon a given question and the argument shapes itself thro' its own immanent dialectic, to a conclusion". The Vikalpa method of Śāstric discussion in Sanskrit philosophical writings is nothing more than the Platonic dialogue in its perfect form. Every important doctrine of logic, epistemology and metaphysics, of the different schools of Indian philosophy, has been developed on the same lines. They are the result of a long and arduous process of thought-dissection. No doctrine or strand of philosophic belief can thus be put down as absolutely original, isolated from or uninfluenced by contemporary opinion or as devoid of a nexus with the past.

So closely are the two aspects of rational thought and textual interpretation and synthesis intertwined in most of the Indian schools that it is often difficult to pronounce any opinion whether they are actuated more by a predominantly philosophical purpose or an authorita-
rian outlook. They disclose both kinds of leanings and it is often a question of emphasis whether a given system is to be treated as being more specula-
tive and rational than dogmatic and textual. Western scholars have generally held that the philosophy of the Vedānta is essentially dogmatic, being nothing more than a clever, ingenious and elaborate system of textual interpretation of the Prasthānas, doubtless with a good deal of philosophic insight and acumen. But its achievement cannot be accepted as truly philosophical, insofar as the pursuit of philosophy is not the outcome of a disinterested love of thought or a quest of truth, but has been undertaken to achieve individual salvation. Others regard the Vedānta as a truly philosophical system, in conception, method and exe-
cution. That it is bound up with the interpretation of sacred texts is only circumstantial in that true to Indian traditions, it has merely used material handed down by former generations, and built on its foundations a new and vigorous system of thought, reserving the fullest right of selection, emphasis, alteration and criticism, in the name of interpretation (Vyākhyāna). It embodies the greatest independence of thought and origi-
nality of conceptions under the guise of Reconciliation (Ekavākyatā) with the help of canons of interpretation. The commentators are seldom obliged to call a halt to philosophic speculation when faced with a trying or obscure text or with contradictory ones. They exercise their reason to synthesize and extract sense out of seeming enigmas and contradictions. In this they bid fair to direct the authorities, instead of their letting them
direct their thoughts. In this sense, then, Indian philosophy can claim to be as genuinely philosophical in spirit as any other attempts made elsewhere, on the basis of pure reason. It is thus a purely historical accident that has made Indian philosophy textual tho' some are inclined to view it as incorrigibly text-ridden. The supreme place Madhva has assigned to the Śākṣī as “Upājīvyapramāṇa” of Scripture, in the event of the latter encroaching on the legitimate jurisdiction of the former is a striking example of the unflinching rational outlook of Mādhyā thought. But with all the limitations imposed on the free movement of thought by the respect for texts and traditions, the Indian philosophers have shown themselves to be actuated by an essentially philosophic spirit like their compeers in the west and have risen to great heights in the art of philosophizing, which for alertness of mind, acuteness of thought and boldness of ideas, cannot be rivalled by others, claiming to be more scientific or free from dogmas. The achievements of Indian thought cannot, therefore, be said to be lacking in merit or devoid of a true philosophic spirit; tho' these are often hidden from view by the trappings of authority in which they are often clothed and concealed.

Criticism is the life-breath of Indian philosophical systems, as philosophic life, like biological, is governed by the same law of strife and survival of the fittest. Each of the older systems of thought should thus have contributed something to Mādhyā thought also, at least negatively, by way of material for criticism. It is not as if his system alone grew up in vacuo, without reference to anything that went before. Historical interpretation must admit, here, as in other cases of contact of minds, the impact of contemporary thought, and echoes of forgotten schools which tho' then out of court or not “living” must still have continued to exercise a great deal of intellectual influence on successive thought currents by their technique and methods of treatment, —in short, by laying down the high-ways and byways of thought along which all current ontological and epistemological progress had to be made with freedom to differ in details and conclusions.

The critical side of Madhva’s system, consisting partly in its dialectical struggles with earlier schools both major and minor, shows how it was able not only to avoid their pitfalls and mistakes but also to absorb

some of their good points, or improve upon them or transcend them into a higher system. That such impact of ideas is by no means denied in Madhva’s case is clear from the description of his commentary on the Brāhmaṇa as a critique of twentyone earlier ones in the field. A critic is not an iconoclast out and out. He receives ideas while in the act of demolishing older opinions. The contact of minds is a very subtle affair. Deeper things happen there than meet the surface. As Vijayindra Tīrtha observes, in his Madhva- Kaṇṭakoddhāra, as an exponent of a new Prasthāna, Madhva exercised his right to agree with or differ from his compeers, to the full and in doing so rejected much that was cumbersome, or effete in the older theories and used whatever ideas were fundamentally sound tho’ not in the same place or within the same design. Often in his criticisms, he rescued and rehabilitated ideas of permanent significance from the ill-balanced views of earlier and contemporary schools and realigned them to better advantage.

The Cārvāka system is condemned outright for its unmitigated hedonism. But its faith in the reality of experience and of sense-awareness is the pivot of realism which is accepted by Madhva. The Cārvāka is condemned, unreservedly for his hedonism, for his atheism and for his Materialism (Dehātmavāda); but not for his bold stand for the supremacy of Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. Only, he had stopped short at Pratyakṣa, refusing to go beyond, which is rather unphilosophical in that there are more things in the Universe than could be measured by Pratyakṣa alone. Enjoyment of life is no sin. One need not, like the Buddhist, give a counsel of despair to shun the world, abhor life and court gradual suicide or extinction. कुछ मुक्त्वतच कर्म निःज निःतत्त्वः says Madhva with the salutary advice : हरिप्रागविन्नमस्थित वसतत्त्वः; for one should not, like the Mīmāṃsakas, surrender the aim of life to a mess of pottage, Svarga, understood in the transient sense of a limited pleasure : अपाम सीमस्थिता अभूम। To take such a view of life’s purpose is to miss the true goal of the Vedic philosophy of Karma, says Madhva. The Vedas enjoin the performance of sacrifices with set rewards, not from the highest point of view, but only in a limited sense. Karma-phala, attractive as it is, is not the ultimate intention or message of the Scripture. It is only an inducement to effort of the right kind\(^1\) with a view to raising the spiritual standard of man higher and higher and taking him on and on the upward march, by stages.

---
\(^1\) रोचनार्य फल्मूचि: ( Bhāg. XI, 3, 46 ) यथा भैषज्यरोचनाम् ( xii, 21, 23 ). कर्ममोक्षाय कर्मीणि विषयेत हस्यं यथा ( XI, 3, 44 ).
Karma is only a step in the ladder tho' a necessary one. It is not the all and end-all of scripture as the Mīmāṁsakas would have it. The best Karma is that performed without attachment and for the sake of no other reward than the satisfaction of God and as His worship: तत्कर्म हृदितीयों यदृ (Bhāg. iv. 29,49) हृदितीयों हृदितीयों यदृ (Chān. Up. i, 7,6). While accepting the Mīmāṁsaka doctrine of Svatahprāmāṇya of Śabda, Madhva emphasizes that the highest subject-matter of the Veda is God and not merely a round of duties or acts of sacrifice.

Jain philosophy and moral code have some affinity to Madhva’s thought. The new type of Vedic sacrifices with flour-made animals (Piṣṭapaśu yajnas) instead of living animals, introduced by Madhva as a much needed reform in Brahminical society was, in all probability, partly due to the moral pressure and influence of Jain ideas. A powerful community of Jainaas inhabited the S. Kanara district then, as now. It was also under Jain rule in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Madhva’s views on some questions of logic, epistemology and ontology show many striking parallels to and affinities with corresponding Jain theories, notably on the nature of the Universal (Jāti) and in the theory of the self as an object of perception (Aham sukhi) which is denied by the Advaitin. The recognition of certain types of cognitions like Manahparyāya and Kevala in Jain philosophy, corresponds in a measure, to the Yogipratyakṣa and Kevala-Pramāṇa of Madhva. The self-revelatory capacity of knowledge of the perceiver ज्ञातव्यवं: स्वधर्मात्माय is based on the triunity of Jñātṛ, Jñeya and Jñāna, all of them being admitted to be revealed in knowledge. So also, the Jain conception of Substance in relation to its attributes, as a distinction of reference and not of existence: अनन्तरीक्षमकर्क्क्तव्य as Haribhadra Sūri, puts it, is perfected by Madhva, by formulating the doctrine of “Saviṣeṣābheda”, to hold the substance and attributes together, in one integrated mould. The further distinction of qualities or attributes as “Paryāya” and “Svabhāva”, in Jain ontology, is parallel to Madhva’s distinction of attributes into “Ayāvad-dravyabhāvi” and “Yāvad-dravyabhāvi”. The Jain dichotomy of reality into Jīva and Ajīva appears in the form of Svatantara and Paratantara, with greater philosophi-

1. The M. Vij. (IX, 44-50) refers to an actual performance of a Piṣṭapaśu yāga, under Madhva’s direction and the opposition he had to encounter. For a work in defence of Piṣṭapaśu yajña see under Vijayendra Tīrthā, in my History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Lit. Vol. ii, p. 187.
cal aptness and justification, as pointed out by Jayatīrtha. The peculiar doctrine of the Jainas that the whole Universe is filled with Jīvas, is also shared by Madhva: परमाणुप्रदेशेऽपर्णन्तः ग्रामाराशयः (VTN).

Madhva is not enamoured of the extreme realism of the Mīmāṃsakas. He recognizes the need for periodical creations and dissolutions of the Universe. He also sets right the extreme epistemological realism of the Prābhākaras and admits the possibility of error in human cognitions. He is for calling error by its proper name and not for confusing the issue by using misleading names like “Akhyāti”, “Akhyātisamvalitasatkhyāti”, and so on. But his realism does not demand that the object of illusions must have a reality of its own elsewhere (anyatra sat) as the Naiyāyikas would have it. If experience is any test, the object of illusions is an absolute unreality. At the same time, Madhva takes care to state that no illusions could be explained without the acceptance of two necessary reals, a substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) and a Pradhāna (prototype) of the superimposed object.

Madhva has rejected much that was defective, superfluous and outmoded, in the conceptions, categories, definitions and methodology (Prakriyā) of the older schools of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. The interpretative principle of “Upakramaprabalya” of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is set aside by him in favor of the more logical “Upasamhāraprabalya”, on the authority of the Brahmatarka. He has given us his own revised views about the Vedāntic conceptions of Sākṣī, Svapakāśatva, Bhāvarūpāṭāna, Māyā, Pratibimba, etc. He has propounded a fresh doctrine of validity of knowledge with special reference to the principle of Sākṣī, as a corrective to all the earlier theories on the subject. Tho’ traceable to some of the older sources referred to by him, the merit of these new doctrines lies in the scientific and forceful way in which he has developed their potentialities and fitted them into their proper places, in his own realistic metaphysics and elucidating their bearings.

1. अभिसारित च सद्यो सत्यवस्तुद्वर्त्त विना।
   न आत्मिसीति क्वापि सत्यमायायिकेक्षपि॥ (VTN.)

2. Madhva refers to the thesis of “Upasamhāraprabalya” in his A.V.

The question has been fully discussed and established, refuting the counter-theory of “Upakrama-prabalya” (of Advaitins) in Vyāsarāya’s T.T., and in the Upasamhāra-Vijaya of Vijayindra Tirtha. For a summary of their arguments see my History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature, Vol. ii. pp. 54-56 and 183-86.
upon the different aspects of his thought. Similarly, his revised definition of ‘Pramāṇa’ as ‘yathārtham’, so as to embrace all types of valid knowledge and its instruments and to ensure the validity of memory is a significant departure and advance on contemporary thought.

But, tho' open to the ideas of the older systems and their thought-patterns, Madhva has made many striking contributions of his own, in many important respects. It is these that entitle him to a place of honor in Indian philosophy. He has drawn the attention of the philosophical world to the imperative need for going in for a new set of concepts and categories like “Svatantra” and “Paratantra”, Śākṣī, Viśeṣas, Bheda as dharmisvarūpa and as saviśeṣābhinna from it, “Svarūpabheda and “Svarūpa-tāratamya” among selves, Bimbapratibimbabhbāva relation between Brahmaṇa and Jīvas and ‘eternal creation’ thro’ “Parādhīna-viśeṣāpti”. These ideas were so radically different from those till then entertained in dealing with philosophical questions, that if their necessity was demonstrated, the whole treatment of the problems of philosophy would change its drift and enter upon a fresh phase. We shall see something of this new aspect and direction of thought, ushered in by Madhva, in the chapters that follow.
CHAPTER III

MADHVA’S SAMANVAYA OF UPANIŚADIC PHILOSOPHY

Labels are convenient as a rule, tho’ they might mislead at times. Insofar as Madhva admits a plurality of selves, for ever distinct from Brahman tho’ always subject to and guided by It, his system might be tentatively regarded as a Pluralistic Theism. But it would not express the whole truth about the system, in its highest reach. There has been a persistent tendency, however, to represent the philosophy of Madhva as an “absolute Dualism.” This has naturally prevented the system from getting its need of recognition, as a sound philosophical system in the first place and a Vedāntic one at that; for most people have an aversion for the term “Dualism” which has some unpleasant associations. That apart, “Dualism” signifies the recognition of “two independent principles.”¹ Madhva is not, certainly, a Dualist in this sense. It will be shown, presently, that neither the term “Dualism” nor its Sanskrit equivalent “Dvaita” is commensurate with the highest metaphysical ideology of Madhva’s thought, which consists in the acceptance of One Independent Transcendent-cum-Immanent Being as the Source and explanation of all finite existence.

There is a fundamental difference in outlook between the ‘dualism’ of Madhva and those of the Sāmkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. Dualism has as much to do with the question of the status of the reals recognized, as with their number. Neither the Puruṣas nor the Prakṛti have, in Madhva’s system, an independent status or functioning-capacity as in the Sāmkhya:

शङ्कृति सा बीजकल्पित: || जीव एव तद्दात्रं भूते (साक्ष्यः)
न तु, तद्दैव वीजस्वति तत्त्वादिन इव भगवद्भवनामः || (NS. p. 329).

Nor does it ascribe to God the position, merely, of an Onlooker (Draṣṭā) or a deus ex machina, or even of a co-operating force in the cosmic evolution, as is done by the Nyāya and Yoga schools. Mere Deism has no attraction for Madhva. God is not only above the universe; but in it. By virtue of these two aspects, He becomes the very ground of the reals,² the giver of their reality to them.

¹. See Dogbert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy, 1902, p. 84.

². cf. प्रकृतिः प्रकृति: ‘ तद्दुःस्वत: सच्च स्वप्रवचनक्रमस्वतः’
‘स जीवनामां भगवानः प्राणाधिकरणक्रमस्वतः: ’।
One distinguishing mark of the Vedānta in all its forms is the fundamental belief that everything in the Universe has to be traced to an absolute principle which is the ultimate source and explanation, both logical and ontological, of all else (सबसब्यायत्सीत्वतःइत्यहिनिविस्तः). Nothing in the world is self-explained or self-explicable. Brahman is the only self-explained reference of all. Such a transcendent reference is denied by the Sāmkhya: (या जगदुपांसा प्रकृतिविद्यकसाध्यक्षिमतीति बृहे । न पुनःवेदादितं इव तामपि शास्किनिःश्रवायताम् (NS. p. 329); while its acceptance is by no means a strict metaphysical necessity in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or Yoga systems. The Vedānta, on the other hand, traces the world of matter and souls to Brahman, which is the cause of the world and gives meaning to its being and becoming.

This metaphysical dependence of the Universe on Brahman is differently conceived in the several systems of Vedānta. Śaṅkara equates it with an Adhyāsa (appearance). The world of appearance would not be there but for the reality of the Brahman, which is superimposed on the world. It has no existence outside the Brahman’s: (तदन्तःयत्र प्रकृतिर्वैणामावः । Śaṅkara, B.S.B. ii, 1. 14). Śrīdhara explains the inner significance of the Advaitic position: ब्रह्मासततपौर्जगतत्तलम् as यस्यतथा मिथ्यासौर ग्याति सत्यवदन-भास्ते (c. on Bhāgavata, i, 1, 1): “in virtue of whose reality, even the unreal creation appears to be real”.

Rāmānuja, on the other hand, views the dependence of the world of matter and souls on God, on the analogy of the dependence of the human body on the soul, for its subsistence. God is the soul (ātmā) of the world. When the soul departs, the body perishes. So it would be, in the case of the world and the souls. While it remains perfectly true that our bodies cannot exist and function in the absence of the life-giving capacity of the soul, Madhva finds this analogy misleading insofar as the soul is not bound to the body as the Viśistadvaitic theory of Brahman would appear to assume. The relation of body and soul does not also do complete justice to the more or less derivative being of matter and souls that is admitted in that system. It is all very well to say that identity means Aprthaśaksīdhi or inseparable existence. But it would cut both ways. That seems hardly fair. The mutual depend-

cf. 1. सहस्कारिभिरस्मभे न स्तोतन्त्र्मौ विवध्नते ।
तत्सत्त्वावन्त्यौः स्वाधीनत्वभविष्यते: ||

(Vedānta Deśika).
ence (अद्वृत्तकृत्तिक्रिया) between God and His ‘body’ (or attributes) viz., matter and souls, could not be of the same kind or order as exists or might be said to exist between God and his essential attributes of reality, knowledge and bliss. It is the inevitable implication of Rāmānuja’s position that the Infinite cannot exist without its attributes of Cit and Acit which are necessary to it. Yet Rāmānuja himself is unable to concede so much in view of many texts to the contrary, especially Gītā ix, 4, wherein he admits frankly that the Cit and Acit contribute in no way to the existence of the Deity: मस्तिष्कतीर्थनन्तर कालिःपुक्कासः (R.G.B.). Here, for once, Rāmānuja gives up his theory of reciprocal dependence and equates inseparable existence (avinābhāva) as “dependence” : अविनाभावमप्रि नियाम्यनवेति ‘भत: सव पवशते ’ इनुपक्कम एवोगिता (R.G.B. x, 21). The logical consequence of such a view is that the world of matter and souls is immaterial and non-essential to God in the end. Such a view is, however, inconsistent with Rāmānuja’s general position that it has its basis in the nature of God. It is also difficult to conceive how Brahman could be said to be unchanging in view of the changing nature of his Viṣeṣaṇas (Cit and Acit). The modes change from subtle to gross state and vice versa. If these changes of modes make no substantial impression on the Brahman, they cannot be said to be grounded in its nature. But Rāmānuja, nevertheless, concedes that Brahman is subject to change of some sort in and thro’ these changes of the modes themselves: उभयप्रकारविशिष्टनियमक्रेत्तदवस्यातुदुभयविशिष्टतालविकारोऽभवति (Śrībhāṣya, ii,3,18).

“Unless Rāmānuja is willing to explain away the immediate perfection of the Absolute and substitute for it a perpetually changing process, a sort of progressing perfection, he cannot give us any satisfactory explanation of the soul of the Absolute to its body” (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil., ii, p 716 ). That is why Madhva abandons the metaphor of ‘body and soul’ and the doctrine of ‘reciprocal dependence’ and the ‘contribution theory’, which it implies.

In his view, the world of matter and souls has come out and exists only as a result of an act of will of God, which is its nimittakāraṇa.

1. पाराक्षेपणं हि शेषलम्। अत: शेषभूतो युक्तः स्वयुक्तेन केनाचिततिशयेन हि शेषांशं संयोज्यति। अर्थानिविकरस्य शेषवातुपपत्ते:।

(Nītīnīlā, X, p. 74, Aunnamalai Uni. Skt. Ser.)

The ‘contribution theory’ would also have to concede that “God is not absolute actuality, but is Himself in the making” (Radhakrishnan, ii, p. 715) [Italics mine]

P. M.—2.
It cannot exist without his sufferance. This is the meaning of texts like:

\( \text{हृद्यामावं प्रभो: स्त्रिः (Mānd. Up.8)} \) द्रव्यं कर्मं च कालं (Bhāg. ii, 10, 12).

But the existence of matter and souls is, in the last analysis, immaterial to God: नाहि जीवप्रतिष्ठन्यात्मानप्रस्तावः (Madhva, B. T. ii, 9, 31). It is the world that is bound to God, not He to it. The Universe is thus dependent on Brahman (व्र्द्धस्तोऽपि) neither in the Advaitic nor in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic sense of the term; but as existing and functioning at God’s will. The self-existent being of God would in no way have been affected if the world had never existed at all. The relation in which the world stands to Brahman is, thus, neither superimpositional as in Advaita, nor physical and intra-organic as in Viśiṣṭādvaita, but a trans-empirical one, symbolized by the idea of “Bimba-Pratibimbabhāva,” in which “Bimba” is defined as that which determines the sattā, pratīti and pravṛtti of the “Pratibimba,” as will be made clear in Chapter XXXV. The statement that the world cannot exist without God means that it owes its very power of existence, functioning etc., to God and derives them from Him: तद्ध्वीन-स्तताप्रतिसतततिभिमित्तु। The entire Universe is thus an expression of the Divine will. It is in His absolute power. He can make and unmake it all, at will. His power over it is absolutely unrestricted. Alone among Indian philosophers, Madhva would concede that, theoretically, there is nothing impossible or absurd in agreeing that God can create a world out of nothing, that He could bring into existence a Universe not unlike the one with which we are now familiar, without the aid of a pre-existent matter or souls. But the fact remains that He has not, in His infinite wisdom, chosen to do so. And all our philosophy has necessarily to take note of this and respect it. Similarly, He does not choose to destroy the eternal existence of Matter and Souls and other entities, even tho’ they are all dependent on Him: तद्ध्वीनस्ततःतत्त्वत्तिभिमित्तु। (Tāy. p. 9).

Madhva introduces the symbolism of “Bimbapratibimbabhāva”, (Original and Reflection) in place of “Adhiṣṭḥānāropyabhāva”, and Śāfrāṣarfrībhāva” of the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, to illustrate the true nature of the dependence of the selves on God. It is intended to avoid the defects of assuming an unreal or a reciprocal dependence and establish, in their place, a real but unilateral dependence of all finite reality upon the Independent, for its existence, knowledge and activity. On

1. स्त्रिः प्रभो: स्त्रिः (Dvādaśa-Stotra)
2. cf. भरसंयोजयगदिन्द मनसेवं जनादेशः (Mbh. iv, 67, 18)
the Advaitic view of Āropa, the adhiṣṭhāna cannot confer any true reality on the superimposed or sustain it of its own free will, as God does¹, in respect of the world. Creation, then, would be completely mechanical and unregulated by a purposive will. The knowledge of the substratum, on the Advaita view, far from sustaining the illusion, would destroy it, at once. Hence, the relation between the world, God and souls would not be a true and permanent one as it appears from texts like: सत्य सत्यम्। निलो निलानो चतुर्ब्रह्मनात्मक्, on this view. But the Original or “Bimba,” as conceived by Madhva, does sustain the reflection (pratibimba) while maintaining its own transcendence and without making the pratibimba an intraorganic part of itself. The mutual relation of विचारप्रतिविश्वास would be permanent and true of all states of the Jīva (and Jāda) and not merely a passing one true of Samsāra alone (as their अविचारप्रतिविश्वास would be ). There will be no destruction of the Pratibimba so long as the contact of Upādhi is intact. The function of an “Upādhi” is to manifest the Pratibimba. In the present case, it is the pristine nature of the Jīvasvarūpa itself as Cit that would suffice to manifest itself, to itself in its true nature of metaphysical dependence on and similarity with the Supreme, in release. (cf. सत्यमेवास्त्र पदरकः। विचारात्। Madhva, G.B.) This power of self-revelation is hidden in Samsāra (B. S. iii, 2, 5; iii, 2, 19.)

Hence, the Pratibimbata, tho’ a fact, always, is not realized in full, in bondage. It is by means of its internal “Visēgas” that the soul acts as its own medium (upādhi) in realizing its true relation of dependence etc., to the Supreme, It is in this sense that an “Upādhi” is at all called for, to manifest to the individual his own Svarūpa and his relation to God. As this true Svarūpa, free from all impurities, constitutes the essence of the Jīva, it is termed “Svarūpopādhi”, in Madhva terminology. The term Pratibimba would be misleading, if understood in its popular sense of an ‘appearance’ brought about by a material and an external medium. This is not the sense in which the figure of Pratibimbata is used and meant to be understood, in Madhvasiddhānta (See B. S. B. iii, 2, 18.)

Madhva takes us to the extreme limit of Divine transcendence. The Supreme is independent of all accessories in creation:

¹ Cf. गीति: प्रथू: साक्षी निवास: शरण सुकुलत्।
गामविक्ष्य च भूतानि धार्यामि। (Gītā).
Thou’ capable of doing without accessories or making such changes in them as He pleases, God, out of his own free will, has made the world different from Himself and भिषण from its material cause (Prakṛti). Jayatīrtha, in explaining this point, shows how the practical and theoretical aspects of God’s omnipotence are to be reconciled, in accordance with the Śrutī.

Taking his stand on Bimbapratibimbabhāva as the only satisfactory metaphysical relation that would do full justice to and correctly represent the Svābhāvika-sambandha between God and his creation, Madhva finds the key to the reconciliation of the “Bheda” and “Abheda” Śrutis in the twin ideas of “Svatantra” and “Paratantra” that underlie the very conception of Bimbapratibimbabhāva. The Bhedaśrutis, bearing testimony to the reality of the world of matter and souls, speak the truth from the point of view of factual existence and dependence of all finite reality on God. The Abhedaśrutis speak the truth from the point of view of the utter transcendent majesty and Independence of One Supreme Principle. There is no essential contradiction in accepting the reality of both these truths. The mistake lies in pressing for “Svarūpaikṣya” by abolishing the finites (as unreal) or in treating them as an intra-organic part of the Infinite, which would destroy its homogeneity. The “Svatantra” of Madhva is not a mere theological concept, into which all plurality is sacrificed. It is a philosophical idea corresponding to the Spinozistic conception of substance, defined as res completa, “complete in itself, determined by itself, and capable of being explained entirely by itself”. Such substantiality is possessed only by Brahman. The Pratibimba

1. "अन्यथा" कारणविना कई शक्तीपि हरि: कारणात्मकार्यादेव कर्मणामाति स्वत्त्वानि: कारणे क्षत्रियव जगद्याति । एवं "अन्यथा" प्रकृत्या आदेशकार्यार्के महामातमेयव, तथा प्रकृति निमित्तिष्ठ्य कालातिक चोपादानीस्वर कई शक्तीपि, एतेनेवदसुपादानानिर्दिष्टेक्षेत्रेद्व शक्तिमाति स्वत्त्वानिष्ठेव निन्यतः: कन्ठरेव लघयतसतास्तक्ष्यादिद्रियेऽव, तथा "निन्यतः: " श्वनितसतास्तक्ष्यादिद्रियेऽव कारणात्मकरिताज्ञाकरोपातित्योजना ।

इत्युपकेष्टम्भाय——यदुकम्भीरस्य कारणोपादाननियोगितस्य न वेति, नित्यस्तीति भवः । तथा च प्रकृत्यादिनां कारणव युक्तः । स च नियमो च कुलत्वदेवत तान्यपाहार्य व्यस्तिः व करणे शक्तिभविन्यम्भम् । वेन, तस्य न्यात्यमन्यम् पारस्य च न स्यात् । किं नाम, स्वत्त्वानिष्ठेव एव (NS. II, p. 299).
cannot be complete in itself, is not determined by itself and is not capable of being explained by itself.

The true reconciliation of finite and infinite must be based on this basic fact. Hence, Madhva holds that God or Brahman is the only Independent Reality or the highest reality, so to speak (Cf. अद्वैत नाम यदुमक्ते तत् भगवद्यक्षेत्रे: Madhva Chān. Up c.) that exists. Everything else, Prakṛti, Puruṣas, Kāla, Karma etc., is ex hypothesi dependent on Brahman for its very existence and functioning, tho' not created by It de novo. As dependent reals, they do not constitute a ‘challenge’ to the Absolute or a limitation of It. Their existence is not irreconcilable with the existence of Brahman in any metaphysical sense. Madhva thus rises to the highest level of Transcendentalism while still keeping his feet firmly on the terra firma of facts, without sacrificing the reality of the world and its values or abolishing the individuals, in the last analysis. If philosophy is an interpretation of reality as a whole, it must have relation to the facts of life and experience. However high and for however long the philosopher might soar on the naked peaks of the Absolute, he must, at last, set his feet on hard earth. We cannot deny this world to have the other. Madhva indicates the right “angle of Brahman” (श्रृवङ्ग ) from which the philosopher should look at the world of matter and souls:

इर्द्रः कर्म न कृत्य इववाच्य स्वभावः जीव एव च ।

यद्युपहः सति न सति यदुपेक्षया (Bhāg. ii, 10, 12).

इर्द्रः हि विश्वं मयाविवेदये यती ज्ञात्स्थानिरिःसंख्यः: (Bhāg. i, 5, 20).

नाहि जीवादृक्तिः भाद्राज्ञस्यः: (B.T. ii, 9, 31).

यद्योष्वाक्ष ज्ञता तदात्मावेदवे भायते ।

विद्यान्नो विदेशवे मयो निल्व स्वरूपः: (B.T. ii, 5, 2).

देवतानां स्वभावोपि स्वरूपां सर्वां ।

तद्धार्यं यत्स मायी: * * * ॥

स्वभावसतादातृतवं येन्तूसमिति कौत्तिः (Brh. Up, c. p. 45)

काल आसि वर्ष आसि वर्ष आसिन्ध, तद्यदातानि, तदश्रीतमातीतं तदश्रीनमातीतं । अय ओकं एव वर्ष आसिन्ध, यस्यैवदायितं न हृदीतानि: (Śruti q. B. S. B. ii, 1, 17).

नाहि तद्धार्यं प्रविष्टंत्व्यन्यते (Brh. Up. C. IV, 4, 14).

अद्वैत परमार्थः: (Mān. Up. i, 17)

यद्यहं नामोच्य तत् “परमार्थः” भगवद्यक्षेत्रे: (Chān. Up. C. II, 22).
In his Bhāgavata-Tātparya, rising to the highest pitch of Transcendentalism, he distinguishes the highest reality from mere existence. What is truly real is what has being in itself and for itself. Such reality is possessed only by Brahman:

पारमार्थिकल्पन वृत्ततत्त्वमा भगवानिव विद्यते।
तद्विश्लेष्याम नान्यत्व तद्निर्व्याह सदासिद्धता॥ (B.T. XI, 24, 1).

The others, especially Prakṛti and Puruṣas, insofar as they depend for their very existence and activity on the Supreme, merely exist from eternity. They cannot lay claim to be as real (Independent) as the Supreme. In a hypothetical sense, then, it is even permissible to speak of them “as if not-existing” or “other than real”.

Such descriptions in Scripture should not blind us to the fact of their actual existence distinct from Brahman and in complete dependence on It. We are welcome to hold that dependence signifies want of substantiality in the Spinozistic sense of the term. Madhva would not be perturbed by this and would accept the contention. But it does not deprive a thing of its reality. Reality, in other words, is not the same as “substantiality”, in the highest philosophical sense. It is just uncontradicted existence (अनारोपितं प्रमितिविषयः). We have no right to deny the reality of the world (of matter and souls), simply because it is not independent or does not exist in the same form, always. It is there, has been there and will be there, changing and depending always on Brahman. Even the eternal substances, we have seen, are not exempt from creation, in a sense, in Madhva’s philosophy. Such creation is the badge of the finite तद्निर्व्याहां नान्यत्वमिव च चः.

Why there should, at all, be such a world of matter and souls, or why God should tolerate their existence, is more then what any philosophy could answer. Nor is it its business to do. The only Theistic answer to such a query is that given by Jayatīrtha:

ननु, भक्त्यापि परमेश्वरस्य दृश्यमातुसर्गः च मुः। इति चेत्। किं कारणं पृथ्विः
उत्त श्राप्तम् अथवा, वर्मालोकोऽवस्थामि ब्रह्मः। द्वितीये श्रुतिस्तिंद्रिति ! (NS. p. 289)

Tho’ Brahman can do very well without Prakṛti or Puruṣas, It prefers, in its infinite glory and inexorable will, to do with them! Such

1. Cf. ‘न हेतृतवासिः’ ‘हैतिमिव भवति’
   Also “Quo comparata nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt”
   (St. Augustine. Con. XI, 4).

2. यवाविरास्त्व अनुस्त्वय स्ववृष्ट्। (Sruti q. by Madhva B. S. B. i, 1, 1.)
'dependence' (apeksā) of Brahman on things which are in themselves dependent on It, is no mark of inferiority or limitation. It is, at the most, a self-limitation out of its own free will and even that attests and enhances its majesty:

साधनानां साधनलेय यदामाधीनमिन्नते ।
तदा साधनसम्बन्धितर्विशेषति केवल ॥

The dependent is often treated as of "no consequence" and having no separate status:

नहि तद्वीनेन पूर्वगीयोबोधते ।
यदवीनाऽयस सता तत्तदाभितिष्यते ।
न वै वाचो न मनासि इत्यावचक्ते, ‘प्राण’ इत्येवावचक्ते ।
(Chân. Up ७, १, १५).

All this would show that Madhva has given earnest thought to the position and status of the reals in his system, with the insight and imagination of a true philosopher. He has substituted a Brahman-centric view for the ego-centric interpretation of Upaniṣadic thought. It is a pity that missing this distinction of Madhva’s philosophy, some historians of Indian philosophy should have tried to dismiss him as belonging "more to the religious history than to the philosophical development of India"! He has shown that if we are to avoid playing tricks with evidence, the only satisfactory synthesis of the conflict between "dvaita" and "advaita" Śrutis, in the Upaniṣads, would be in the adoption of the idea of the One Independent Transcendent-cum-Immanent Reference of all phenomena. He has no sympathy with the reckless monism of Śaṅkara which is indifferent alike to the hopes and aspirations of man and reduces the panorama of creation to a random illusion. At the same time, he is not for ascribing false perfection of any kind to the world of matter and souls. It is given just what is its due and nothing more. The world and the souls are real in that they are Anāropita,—not the effect of any superimposition or Adhyāsa, or personal delusion. Independent they are not; and God is greater than His creation; and is immanent in it. Such, in a nutshell, in the position

1. Cf, अपि च, नेवय पारमार्थिकी सूचि: । नहि द्विन्द्रालात्तचक्कवनात्मकार्थविवरण

2. सारतो जगत: छल्लागृहितिर्कृ जनार्दन: ।
of Madhva. When we emphasize the existence of subordinate reals side by side with the Independence of Brahman, we have a Dualism or, more properly, a Theistic Realism. When we think exclusively of the transcendence of Brahman and isolate or abstract It from everything else, we may and do sometimes resort to the ‘language of monism’. Such, according to Madhva and Jayatirtha, is the summit level of Upaniṣadic thought. Jayatīrtha expounds this ultimate synthesis of Upaniṣadic thought, with his characteristic clarity and brilliance:

सर्वार्थशापि धि वेदान्तवाक्यमानि असवंछेयकस्त्यांगमणाकर्तं सबलदीश्चभिचिन्तुर एकस्यमेव परं भवः ।

\[ N.S. \text{ p 123}. \]

... [All the Upaniṣadic texts, without exception, speak the glory of Brahman, which is the abode of infinite attributes and free from all imperfection. Of these, some (1) represent It as endowed with attributes like omniscience, lordship, inner rulership, munificence, beauty and so on. (2) Others represent It as free from all such limitation as sin, misery, liability to physical embodiment etc. (3) Yet others describe It as beyond the reach of mind and speech to bring home to us its comparative inaccessibility. (4) Others depict It as the Only One that exists in order that we might all seek it to the exclusion of everything else. (5) Others represent It as the Self of all, that It might be taken as the source of all existence, knowledge and activity. But confused heads miss the central unity of Vedic teaching amidst the multiplicity of approaches and introduce artificial distinctions of standpoints like Saguṇa and Nirguṇa, Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika, in interpretation.]

This new synthesis of Upaniṣadic philosophy propounded by Jayatīrtha, in the light of Madhva’s interpretation of the Vedānta, would be seen to be more satisfying than the characterless monism (Nirviśeṣādvaīta) of Śāmkara, on the one hand and the intraorganic monism (Viśiṣṭādvaīta) of Rāmānuja, which hardly allows Brahman to
exist by itself. "Svatantrādvitīya-Brahmavāda\(^1\)" (or Bimba-Pratibimba vāda), if we might so agree to designate the philosophy of Madhva, would appear to be logically the more consistent and philosophically the more commensurate solution of the problem of the finite and infinite. The Advaitin altogether ignores the relative aspect and existence of the Universe and the souls, for all time; while the Viśiṣṭādvaitin detracts from the self-sufficiency of God by his intra-organic conception of their relation. The new synthesis of Madhva has the advantage of preserving these two vital elements in proper blend. Under the terms of

\[
\text{द्रव्यं कर्मं च कालं स्वभावो जीवं एवं च ।}
\]
\[
\text{वदनुप्रहतः सति न सति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (Bhāg. ii, 10, 12).}
\]

which is the corner-stone of Madhva's new synthesis, Brahman as Svaṭantra is implied in the very existence of the relative and the Paratantra.

---

1. This new designation first suggested by me, in 1936, received the approval of the late Śrī Satyanātha Tīrtha Svamīji of the Uttarādi Mutt, the greatest authority on Dvaita philosophy in recent times. It was later adopted as the title of one of my works on Madhva's philosophy, published in 1942. Dr. Radha-krishnan refers to "the implicit monism "of Madhva (J. Phil, i. p. 40.). In recent years, H. N. Raghavendrachar has claimed that Madhva's philosophy should rightly be called by the name of "Brahmādvaita" and that Madhva is a true Monist in the truest sense of the term. Alur Venkataram of Dharwar prefers to call it "Pūrṇabrahmavāda." All this is a sign that philosophical interest among the followers of Madhva is very much alive and resurgent.
CHAPTER IV.

MADHVA'S CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN THOUGHT

Madhva's philosophical categories differ much in their scope and function from those of contemporary schools. Sometimes the nomenclature is retained; but the conception is different. In other cases, everything, including names, is different. Madhva is generally allergic to over-elaboration of details and picturesque Prakriyas, in the establishment of his theories. A robust commonsense and a rigid adherence to the tests of truth characterize his logic and epistemology. He does with the barest minimum of metaphysical presuppositions. His theories disclose both realistic and idealistic trends, in important respects. He does not shrink from them because of their scholastic affiliations with this or that system of contemporary philosophy. His acceptance of 'Sa-viśeṣābheda' (identity-in-difference) between substance and attributes and between "Difference" and its substratum (dharmā) shows a strong idealistic bent. On the other hand, his rejection of the Universal (sāmānya) shows an extreme realistic attitude undreamt of in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā Realisms. There is, therefore, little truth in the assumption that "the philosophical side of Madhva's teaching is mainly based on the Pre-Madhva realisms like those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā" or that "he makes a clever use of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories, in the development of his views".

Madhva is original in his ontological theory of Sva-tantra and Para-tantra, which is the keynote of his philosophy and in his philosophical ideal of a Sva-tantra-advitīya-Brahman, to which it leads. The concept of "Difference" is given an entirely new orientation by the acceptance of "Viśeṣas". Of course, categories like substance, quality, generality, existence, time, space, causation and the like are the common problems of philosophy. But it is the distinctiveness and merit of their conceptions that mark one philosopher from another. So it is with Madhva. His views on the nature of Substance and its relation to the qualities "possessed" by it, and on Space and Time, are quite different from those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā Realists and are, in many respects, strikingly modern and far ahead of contemporary views. He has four new categories: Viśiṣṭa, Amśi, Sakti and Sādṛṣyā, not recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists. He rejects the Samavāya (inheritance) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism, in toto. He makes his "Viśeṣas" do duty for Samavāya. But his Viśeṣas have nothing, save their name, in common.
with those of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Tho' a Bhedavādin, he does not subscribe to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view that substance and attributes should be absolutely different or externally related (by Sama-vāya as in Nyāya). Nor does he accept the Bhāṭṭa view of their identity-cum-difference (bheda-bheda), in all cases. He dismisses the dogma of गूढे गुणावलोकितार that a quality cannot reside in another, as unproved.¹ He has no use for the universal essence (Jāti) and anugatasattō of the Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya schools. He holds a position akin to that of Nominalists that difference and resemblance (sādṛśya) are both unique and sui generis in each case, tho' perceived thro' a countercorrelate (pratiyogini-rāpya), thus effectively barring the argument from universals to Monism. He is as much opposed to the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṁkhyas as to the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya. He does not agree with the Nyāya that the mind is only inferentially established thro' non-simultaneity of cognitions.² It is, to him, intuitively established (Sākṣīvedya)—which has great psychological significance.

There are fundamental differences between Madhva and other Realists in regard to the theory of knowledge and error, on the question of the sources of validity of knowledge, the status of Memory as a valid source of knowledge, on the admissibility of indeterminate perception, the nature of soul, self-consciousness, God and ultimate release. His conception of Sākṣī as the ultimate criterion of all knowledge and validity, is essentially built on Vedantic foundations. He is concerned more with the philosophical status of the world and the selves than with any qualitative and quantitative analysis of phenomena and their properties, as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; or with their physical and intellectual classification of Padārthas. He sets himself, in the spirit of a true philosopher, to discover and elucidate the nature of the highest principle behind the cosmos. The Universe is not self-sufficient or self-important to a Vedāntin, as it might be to a Sāṁkhya or a Naiyāyika. There is nothing to be gained by too much preoccupation with it. It would be enough if it is realized as, at all times, dependent on Brahman³ and controlled by It, in all stages of its being and becoming. This is the main point emphasized by all schools of Vedānta, from different angles. Madhva, also, approaches the Universe from this particular angle. The

1. अस्मलवेष्ये गुणावाच तद्वस्तौ हि विशेषतः: (AV.)
2. गुणपतञ्ज्ञानात्तप्तभिभिन्नं भिभिन्नम्।
3. इशवास्त्रमिदं सर्वं यक्कज्जगलयं जगदः (Isa. Up.)
doctrine of the world is only an "Apara-Siddhānta" or subsidiary truth (ānuśaṅgika) to the doctrine of Brahman, says Madhva.¹ His system therefore, has its roots in the Aupaniṣada standpoint and cannot be treated as divorced from it. It is true that Vedāntic systems have made extensive use of the categories and thought-measuring devices of the Logical Realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the metaphysical bearings of Madhva's system could not be grasped except as a reaction against the different types of Monism that preceded it, such as the pure monism of Śaṅkara (Nirviśeṣādvaita), the correlative or intra-organic monism (Viśiṣṭādvaita) of Rāmānuja and the transmutative Pantheism (Brahmapariṇāmavāda) of Vyātkāra, Bāhubali, Brahmadatta, Yādavaprabhāśa and others, within a strictly Vedāntic set-up. Madhva's agreement with non-Vedāntic realisms is in respect of the general principles of empirical realism such as the acceptability of the reality of the world of difference, the possibility of knowledge, the scheme of Pramāṇas and the dualism of matter and spirit. But the conception, aim and philosophical significance of his categories are quite different from the scholastic traditions of these schools. These have been evolved by Madhva, as a result of independent cogitation and a critical analysis of the principles and categories of contemporary Vedāntic schools, in the light of materials gathered from an older school of Vedāntic Realism, traces of which are found in the texts from Brahmatarka and other sources cited by him. For purposes of logical refutation of other schools, including the Vedāntic, Madhva and his followers have freely drawn upon the dialectical machinery of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools. They have utilized it in self-defence against the Advaitins and in refuting the criticisms of the Advaitins themselves, on all earlier forms of realistic thought, as reorientated in the light of their own special theories. They have also used it in the constructive exposition of their own Siddhānta. This excessive use of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika methodology of logical dialectics, in the later phases of the Mādhva school, tended, in the popular estimation, to give it an air of being an absolute 'Dualism' fighting for the reality of every human being and particle of matter in the Universe, as a birthright and as being of the same order and degree as that of the Supreme Being. But the keynote of Madhva's philosophy has always been the acceptance of the ONE INDEPENDENT REAL as परसिद्धान्त and all the rest as of secondary importance: विषयः स्वात्मकः हि महातत्त्वात्मानं स्वल्पायनामाः।

1. द्रिबिध: सत्सिद्धान्तः। परपरसेवेत् ग्राह्य्णं चैत्यः। प्रपंचसत्त्वात्विदकमिपि ग्राह्यम्। (NS. p. 518 b).
By applying the doctrine of Saviśeṣābheda to Brahman, Madhva preserved its complete homogeneity, without sacrificing the infinite richness of its qualitative content, thereby introducing a more dynamic conception of Brahman thro’ the doctrine of identity-in-difference, for the first time in Indian thought. His theory of “Viśeṣas” is the life-breath of the doctrine of identity-in-difference. Without it, it would be impossible to conceive of an identity-in-difference, in any school of thought, ancient or modern. Since no other school has accepted the “Viśeṣas”, the credit for the philosophical conception of “identity-in-difference,” should also go to Madhva. This theory of Viśeṣas is his most outstanding contribution to the stock of philosophical ideas in Indian thought. Its elasticity and resilience to admit of internal distinctions of reference without the disadvantage of “difference”, “difference-cum-identity”, “Samavāya” or “fictitious difference” (kalpitabheda), thro’ the resources of the substance itself, replaces many worn out and outmoded conceptions of Time, Space, Causation and Creation, by more satisfactory ones. This is no small contribution to thought.

In the field of epistemology, also, his contributions have been outstanding and, in some respects, far ahead of his time. His comprehensive definition of Pramāṇa and its clear distinction into “Kevala” and “Anu”; and above all, his conception of the Sākṣī as the ultimate criterion of all knowledge and validity are front-rank contributions to epistemology. There is nothing approaching it in any other system of Indian philosophy. It remains Madhva’s unique contribution to the theory of knowledge. Its repercussions on Realism in modern thought are sure to be fruitful, if properly exploited. His own Realism is thereby established on the firm philosophical foundations of intuitionism, instead of on empiricism pure and simple. Similarly, his thesis of “Bimbapratibimbabhbāva” between God and soul is a new conception that goes beyond all contemporary attempts to solve the problem of the eternal and mutual relation between God and the finite selves. “Bhedā” (difference) in the sense of pure exclusion, between Jīva and Brahman, has no attraction for Madhva. He is not satisfied with a mere external master-and-servant relation between God and Soul.1 God can neither be excluded from the Jīva at any stage of his being; nor can the individual be utterly merged in the Supreme. The only way in which he could retain his individuality of orbit and yet be bound to the Supreme by a

1. Cf. पारतस्यमामात्माचि दु, राजपृस्यक्तेः प्रतीति: स्याबिधि ||
   (Jayatīrtha Tdyṭ p. 29).
natural attraction of being is thro' the relation of Bimbapratibimbabhāva. It is not extinction of individual consciousness but its sublimation in tune with the Infinite that is at the root of the conception of Bimbapratibimbabhāva between the Supreme and the individual. This touches Mysticism at a crucial point.

It will be seen that Madhva's views on the Svarūpabheda, Tāratamya, and Traividhya among souls make important contributions to the problems of Evil, Freedom and Freewill. He does not promise Sarvamukti. But as a broad hypothesis of human nature and destiny, in the widest sense, his views on these questions are not without their strong points; tho' there may be many other philosophers who may not be disposed to take such a rigid view of the diversity of human nature and destiny. Madhva, for his part, would argue that the business of philosophy is to tell the truth,—whether it pleases or irritates and not simply to indulge in pious platitudes and pleasant imaginings. His theory is a logically derived conclusion. It goes beyond the commonly accepted explanation of the theory of Karma in Vedānta, as an ultimate explanation of the inequalities of life. It points out that if the inequalities of life are to be explained satisfactorily, the theory of Karma, which is supposed to explain such inequalities, must, in the last analysis, take its stand on the basic differences in the "svabhāva" (nature) of the souls themselves. The plurality of selves which is experienced by us will have to be grounded on something that is more fundamental than Prakṛtical vestures and influences, including Karma. If that something is not there, the law of Karma itself would be a cruel joke upon humanity. It is Svarūpabheda alone that would supply the missing link in the theory of Karma. Madhva has shown great boldness of spirit in detecting this weakpoint in the theory of Karma, as generally advanced in Hindu philosophy, and rectifying it by filling the gap in the theory with his doctrines of Svarūpabheda, Tāratamya and Traividhya, among souls. Considering the importance of the Karma theory in Hindu philosophy, Madhva's emphasis on Svarūpabheda of Souls would be seen to put the whole theory of Karma itself in a better light, for the first time, in Indian thought.

1. Cf. कामेन में काम आगाद (T. A. iii, 15, 2).
   नि:त्यसिद्धान्तकाल, साहस्यत्व नित्यानन्दज्ञानादेः; न भक्त्यायन्त्र प्रयोजनाविद्यते ब्रम्हाति—
   अमुक्तमहात्मानु न तथात्माम (B.S. iii, 2, 19). अमुक्तमस्नेहेन । प्रहणं ज्ञानम्।
   भक्ति बिना न तत् साहस्य सम्प्रभविभूति। (Madhva, B.S.B.)
II. ONTOLOGY

CHAPTER V.

MADHVA’S ONTOLOGICAL THEORY

As already explained in the Introduction, Madhva Ontology turns upon two principal ideas of being, viz., reality and independence. The former represents the idea of reality expressed in space–time relations pertaining to the world of matter and souls. The other is the transcendental aspect of reality, that is characteristic of the Deity alone. Reality, in the ordinary sense of the term, may consist in one or more of the three aspects of existence, consciousness and activity: स्वरूपार्थिविश्वसत्तमांसद्धार्मिकम्, as Jayatīrtha refers to them. This idea is found in other systems as well, as in the Advaita, where existence (asti), consciousness (bhāti) and bliss (priyam) are appropriated to Brahman (brahmarūpam);¹ or in Buddhism, which defines phenomenal reality (Paratantrasatya) in terms of practical efficiency (arthakriyākārītvam).

Appearance and Reality

Madhva defines reality as ‘what is unsuperimposed’ (अनारोपितम्) with a rider: प्रसारित्विषयः: (‘and is an object of knowledge’). This embraces Vātsyāyana’s definition of the real: सत्साद्वितीय यथार्थमाणे यथामूलमविचित्रतत्तत्त्त्तम्। The difference between the real and the unreal lies in this—the former is or, under specific and known conditions, may be the object of direct perception, while the unreal would appear in erroneous perceptions only. The tortoise-hair, tho’ unsuperimposed (because it is not a fact) is not a reality as it is not an object of direct perception to any one. Thus, both the terms in the definition are necessary to have an adequate conception of the real. The above definition bars the possibility of a real existing somewhere, without being given as an actual psychological fact in immediate apprehension, such as “a comet rushing thro’ unpeopled space, entirely unbeheld.” For, Madhva, like Bradley, would argue that the real is present to the mind of God as a system of presentations, even when our perception of it is suspended or is not there; or even in respect of realities which no human subject perceives: विवेकसिद्धं सदा पक्षति (Tāy). Madhva derives this

¹. cf. आत्म भाव त्रिविन्द्य नाम चेतयः सदांकम्।
   आच्छ नम भावेन्द्रे जगदुप्रति यमन्॥ (Dṛgdrṣya–Viveka, 20)
epistemological doctrine from his interpretation of the Upaniṣadic text: लोकम् मातमनुभागिति खैमू (Katha Up). This is the implication of his metaphysical doctrine that all acts of conciousness (pramitī) by the dependent selves (Cetana) are ultimately dependent on God’s (प्रमिती पराधीनम्). He would not, therefore, agree with the views of modern Realists that the fundamental characteristic of what is real lies in its independence of all relation to the experience of a subject. This is the reason why Madhva rejects the definition of Svapraķaśatva in Advaita as “unknowability” as an object of knowledge (avedyatvatam). The existence of the ātman must be a part of an experience of the ātman himself: न च स्वप्रकाशतमपि विना मान सिद्धति. The failing of intuitionism is that it offers no account of the way in which things are known. The addition of the explanatory phrase “intuitively” (svapraķaśātvana) seems only to deny an explanation, tho’ seeming to give one:

प्रमाणामेवं, सत्यवं न स्थात, इत्यत्र, प्रमाणेन चिन्ह सिद्धवत्तित्वस्यातुसर्वतः।
sīrṣāyatāसारस्यातुपन्नत्तत्तः। (V.T.N.1, p. 96 b)

Madhva’s definition of reality as Anāropitam raises the question of the nature and limitations of reality. Is mere existence “reality”? Is ‘appearance of existence’ reality? Or, is real existence in space and time; or else, real existence for all time and thro’ all space? It is here that the issue assumes its familiar philosophical aspect. We have here one of the dividing lines of philosophical systems which splits them into different schools. Śarṅkara’s approach to metaphysics is said to lie in his making a philosophical distinction between existence and reality, as against the commonsense view that accepts surface phenomena as real. “If all that occurs or what we perceive were true, there would be no false appearances. Dissatisfaction with the first view of things is the mother of all philosophy. While commonsense accepts surface-phenomena as real, reflective thinking asks if the first view is also the final view. The purpose of philosophy is to distinguish the unreal from the real, the transient from the eternal.”¹ This distinction between the existent and the real is the point of departure between physics and metaphysics. The Platonic distinction of the actual and the ideal, the Matter of the Milesians, Empedoclean element, Pythagorean numbers, all these represent the persistent attempt of philosophers all thro’ the ages, to locate the real behind the apparent. No philosopher would be worth his salt, if he did not undertake such an analysis into the nature of being. Modern philosophy

¹. S. Radhakrishnan, I. Phil. i, p. 527.
has been dallying with the same problems for centuries, under different names. Descartes and Spinoza were both obsessed with it. Wolff and Kant merely changed the names and opposed 'phenomena' to 'noumena'. Hegelian philosophy distinguished 'being' from 'existence'. Modern Science also has its own theories of phenomena as the splitting up of electric energy \(^1\).

The distinction is not, however, the monopoly of idealistic thinkers. Madhva, as a realist, readily admits the criticism of Bradley that between recognizing a datum and blindly recognizing its content as a reality, there is a world of difference. There is room in experience for both truth and illusions \(^2\). Our senses need not always be veridical.

Appearance is not reality. But there is no reason why existence should not be. Even the critical philosopher like Kant, in holding that the thing-in-itself cannot be objectively known, would appear to recognize objective experience as a reality. To say that the objects do not exist simply because they do not persist, is an unwarranted perversion of logic. It involves a confusion between opposites and distincts. Distinction is not denial. If an object perceived in a given setting does not exist at another place and time, we cannot rush to the conclusion that it is unreal. Existence, then, is a test of reality. Madhva would define "satyam" as existence at (some) time and place (किरिक्लससंविनित्तवम्) and not necessarily as existence for all time and throughout space (सब्देश्कलसंविनित्तवम्). Actual existence at some time and place is sufficient to distinguish the real from the unreal (कैकालिकनिषेधार्थसत्तमः), which cannot be said to really exist at the time and place of its appearance (or at any other), save in our distorted imagination. The unreal has no actual existence in time or space tho' it may appear to have it. Such an appearance is indeed the characteristic mark of unreality (असतः सब्दे निषेधार्थसत्त्वदृश्यमः । यथाभूतः न तत्त्वात्तिसिद्धिः । यदि नामभूतः तथापि ॥). The Advaitic dialecticians, in denying that the unreal can appear as the real, in immediate experience, are disloyal to experience. We can have no conception of the unreal apart from such appearances:


\(^2\) Cf. अभ्यस्थायममण्णी (AV.)

अनादी वं संसारे, इन्द्रियअ जन्मब्रजसानेशु हृदयां गतिमुनसमर्थः ।...

(NS. 218 b)
We are, however, concerned here with actual facts. Śaṅkara admits that the illusory snake in the rope has no actual existence at any time: नाहि रजस् आत्मिकूर्दशा कल्याणः सत्यं विद्यमानं साक्षीतत्ति। (G. K. c. i, 17). Illusions, then, arise when the non-existent appears as if existent and vice-versa: यदनिविद्यमानं हुयं तत्व स्तितं प्रतितत्र आत्मिकूर्दशाः। (Madhva, G. T. ii, 26). This is borne out by our own experience and no useful purpose would be served in trying to escape it by dialectic ingenuity.

The second test of reality recognized by Madhva is: अर्थि कथाकारित्वम् (practical efficiency). One cannot make vessels out of the illusory silver in the nacre. Even where an illusory appearance of a snake in the rope is found to produce certain reactions of fear and the like, there is always a definite modicum of reality behind it:

सच्चिदाभ्यायपि हि ज्ञानमयमेव तत्त्त्वम्।
तदेववाचिकीकयाकारी तत्त्त्त्ववाचिकीकारकम्॥ (AV).

It is not the "rope-snake" that causes the fear or worse reactions; but the "consciousness" of there being a snake, however mistaken it might be, at the time. So far as that particular psychological experience is concerned, there is not the slightest difference in the intensity of feeling between it and that of an actual experience of a snake in daylight. The "snaky-feeling" may be overcome soon afterwards; but it exists for the time being and that alone is the cause of fear, not the non-existent snake. 1

The real, then, is neither momentary (kṣaṇika) nor necessarily eternal, as the Buddhists and the Advaitins assume, in their respective theories of truth (यतस्तत्, तत्त्त्वाणिकम्; अवभावितं सत्यम्). Śaṅkara posits that the real must be so for all time. This is metaphysically-motived. It is not an epistemological or a logical deduction: नाहि सता समस्तदेशकालस्ता भवित्वाभ्यामिति नियमकमिति। (NS. p. 217 b). This is the Madhva view of the matter and it cannot be dismissed as unreasonable. As a matter of fact, even those entities whose reality is limited to a particular period of time or place, can be reckoned to be real within the meaning

1. तत्त्त्वान्स्वयम् भव्यकर्पादिनक्तवत्। सर्पस्तया शातरजोरिव विशेषणावशेष, व्यविचाराभावत। सर्पान्तन्यत्त्व। (Pādāvāti, p. 49).

Cf. also Śaṅkara:

क्षणि, स्वसमस्तदेशस्य सर्पविद्यमानोदक्तनानादि कार्याज्ञातस्यत्त्वापि तत्त्त्वागति: सत्यमेव।

B. S. ii, 2, 14.
of the dictum: शैक्षिकिनिषेधाप्रतियोगिति वैलम्यः; for, what actually is, at a given time and place, cannot admit of absolute negation with reference to all periods of time and place: न निधि विनाशो वाप्य:। अपि, कल्पसत्तानिषेधः। न शैक्षिकिनिषेधः सत्त: स संभवति। (VTN†, p. 95) Its present existence must be admitted; tho' it may cease to exist the next hour or day. The Mādhva doctrine of truth reminds us of the timelessness of truth as a logical content, propounded by Plato. Reality, then, consists simply in 'relation to time and place': देशकालसंबन्धित्वम् which cannot be predicated of unrealities like hare's horn. The Mādhva conception of reality is thus a via media between the extreme momentariness (क्षणिकत्वम्) of Buddhists and the eternalism of Advaitins. Mādhva endorses the Nyāya view that a thing is real so long as it is assignable to a definite space-time setting and not simply so long as it appears to be. The immediate corollary of such a position is that the doctrine of tripartite classification of reality (Sattātraīvidhyā) in Advaita, into absolute, practical and apparent (पारमार्थिक, व्यवहारिक, प्रातिभासिक), is a myth. The Mādhva definition of reality as अनारोपितम् is intended to show that the so-called Vyāvahārika and Prātibhāsika are not realities in the true sense of the term. All existents that are not superimposed (anāropitam) are absolutely real (पारमार्थिकत्वम्). The "Vyāvahārika" and the "Prātibhāsika" 'reals', are both admittedly falsifiable (bādhya), one earlier and the other later: न च विवदादिप्रमचाप्यायाचार्यविनिषेधाः सत्तमस्ति। शैक्षिकिनिषेध विवदादिप्रमचाहृत्य व्यवहारिक: भवति। सम्भवायस्वल्प प्रयंचः प्रातिभासिक: वाप्यवत् इति। (Śaṃkara, B. S. B. iii, 2, 4.) They are, as such, both equally unreal and have no common ground with the Pāramārthika, which is never sublated. As Kumārila puts it, there can be no common ground between the false and the true to justify the distinction of degrees between them or their being brought under a single category of thought:

सत्तमेऽगीती न च सामान्यो गृह्यपरमार्थ्योः।

We may speak of the opposition of the real and the unreal; but not of internal degrees of reality between the real and the unreal. We may speak of a man and his shadow; but not of a real man and a shadow man! It would be as ridiculous, if not more, to speak of the truly real, the falsely real (vyāvahārika) and the still more falsely real (prātibhāsikasatyam).

There being, then, only two possible modes of predication acceptable to logic, Mādhva is unable to concede any tertium quid between reality.
and unreality. X is either real or unreal. It is a misuse of language to call it provisionally real: (व्याप्तवहारिक): कालात्तेज्यवमानां चेतनायां मानना कृतं?
as asks Madhva. The unreal cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be accepted as real, in serious thought: नास्तो विद्यते भावः। Such an attempt can only be treated as a piece of sophistry or a perversion of thought calculated to mislead the unwary:

सत्या चेतस्तः: केवल भूषा चेतस्तत्वता कथम्?
बङ्कानाथेषुम्मियातो लालोकतत्तापाविद्यत। (कुमारिला)

Madhva, therefore, rejects the concept of "Mithyātva" as a tertium quid as quite unproved and equates it with absolute negation or unreality:

मिथ्याशेषस्वत्तमावाच्योऽद तदन्तर्याद्रिष्णामावातः (KN.)

The Advaitins have, from the beginning, been trying to distinguish between the two; but to Madhva, it is a distinction without a difference.¹

Orders of Reality

Tho' existence is thus "reality", Madhva is so essentially a metaphysician that he recognizes fully the necessity for a ground-real to account for the reality of the world of reals². Existence is but one aspect of reality; it does not exhaust it. Nor is it the highest or fullest expression of it. As Dawes Hicks puts it so well, "There is no mystery whatsoever about the notion of pure being. Being is simply the fundamental category of thought which denotes everything and cannot, therefore, specially denote anything,-in other words - connotes nothing. That which every entity is, cannot be a property by which one entity could be distinguished from the others. God, whatever else He is, must certainly be. But so must a triangle or a pebble in the street, a planet or the Sun. In short, there is no being which is simply and purely, being. It is what God is over and above mere being that is of primary significance to the religious consciousness" (Philosophical Bases of Theism, p. 117).

While existence is thus reality and is possessed by the world of matter and souls, there must be something more than mere existence, having metaphysical independence or substantiality in its own right which we

---

¹ For fuller discussion of this question see NS and Nyām. and my History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature, ii, pp. 108-10.

² In the true spirit of Upaniṣadic philosophy:

'नित्यी नित्यानां चेतनबेतनानाम्। 'सत्यस्य सत्यम्'

Cf. प्रह्लाददिने विप्रदले चाहूहितमिनाशसय

(T.P.)
may agree to designate as the highest real or the philosophical Absolute, which would be the ultimate explanation of all else. Such independent reality should be immanent in the Universe, whence the latter could derive and draw its sustenance. Without presupposing such a basic and transcendent reality that would have to be immanent in the world, there would be chaos and disorder in the Universe. Madhva makes a strong plea for recognizing such a principle:

1. अग्रिप्पानामिति श्राहुद्दृश्यार्यं विचक्षणां ||
   जस्थतं दृश्ये बस्तु संस्थानं तद् दृश्यार्यं ||
   उभयं ह्यरिस्वत्यं जगतो वसायिति || (B. T. p. 13)

2. द्वेष्यं कर्मं च कालं स्वभावं जीवं एवं च ||
   यददुहात: सति न सति शुद्धेष्याय || (Bṛha. ii, 10, 12)

3. स्थाभासत्सादात्वं ज्ञातव्यासिति कालङ्गी ||
   (Bṛh. Up. C. p. 45)

4. सत्याम्यमुखस्थिति नित्येष्युपरेष्युच्छया ||
  ः महत्तषय ताः सविनिविरं नित्यायामं यत्: ||
   शकीत्सा: पृशस्यतं: तद्न्यानाह सर्वेध || (AV)

5. कालकस्मसमावधि नित्येष्युपरेष्युच्छया ||
   प्रामेव विषेषेण सर्वनाशात्वदशक्तवः || (BT. p. 146)

6. यथापि नित्यतः जीवस्यायस्ति, तथापि सर्वप्रकारणे
   अविनाशितं विषेषेति || (GT. p. 665)

7. दीप्तिशुद्धमत्तत्काद दिव्यव जनादेन: ||
   वेहेविद्यायुज्जयन्वय विविच्य ज्ञाते न तु || (BT. p. 53)

This is quite a new point of view in the interpretation of Upaniṣadic thought, for which Madhva should get due credit. It is not, of course, new in the sense of its having been unknown to the Upaniṣadic tradition. What is meant is that Madhva was the pioneer to penetrate into the tangled mass of Vedic and Post-Vedic literature and rediscover, refine and rehabilitate the point of view and give it a proper exposition.

According to Madhva, independence is the highest form of existence which includes independence of activity and consciousness:

सत्यं स्वात्मक्षेऽहुं तथां कुण्यं न चापरं
अस्वात्मक्षेऽहुं श्राहुमिष्यामस्तः विद्ये \*\*\* \n
1. Cf. न राजाधीनाम मित्र नियमवक्षमात्मात्मायामितम्। अपि हु, सत्याविद्यामिष्यामस्तः
    भविति। (NS. p. 166.)
Independence is philosophical “self-determination” which is explained almost in the same terms as the substantiability of Spinoza, as a *res completa* which gives meaning and completion to everything else. This idea is contained in the classical definition of “Svatantrya” put forward by Jayatīrtha viz., श्लोकप्रभिमित्रश्लिष्टक्षणसतानाविविधेण परान्येशमः। Madhva says that from the highest point of view, even sentence is synonymous with independence: सेच्छानुसारितमेव स्वातंत्र्यं हि विदेश विद्वतः। (AV. p. 20) inasmuch as “self-determination” is the real mark of sentience. The sentient (jāda) is so because it cannot act of its own accord (स्वतःप्रबुद्धकं) . Inasmuch as the human souls are not independent existents, knowers and agents, in a philosophical sense, they are regarded by Madhva as so many “Reflections”, Images, or “Abhāṣas” of the Supreme Reality, in the sense that all their powers are rooted in the Supreme Source and derived from it: नाहि प्रतिविवर्त्तिः किर्त्या। स हि विद्धियन्येव किन्यावान्। (G.B. ii, 19) like the reflected light of the moon.

While the Independent Real is thus the ultimate presupposition of all philosophy, the dependent reals embody the justification and proof of the independent. Tho’ the independence of God is not seriously disputed by other schools of thought, its significance and philosophical necessity have not been so well brought out, as in the system of Madhva. It is not as a concession to religious prejudice or a fashionable belief that Madhva accepts the Svatantrya as the highest expression of reality. It is the warp and woof of all metaphysics. The Advaitic Brahman, being ex hypothesi attributeless (nirdharmaka) and static, could not be spoken of as “Svatantrya” within the definition of श्लोकप्रभिमित्रश्लिष्टक्षणसतानाविविधेण परान्येशमः।

1. Cf. शत्रुभीष्टाः ही शत्रुभीष्टाः। सेच्छ चेतनमेव कतद्वते किं? चेतनेतरत्वमेव। अचेतनमेव प्रयत्ने चातंत्रेत्येन प्रभावितमेव। अचेतनमेव शत्रुभीष्टाः। सेच्छानुसारितमेव स्वातंत्र्यमेव स्वातंत्र्यविवेचने। अचेतनमेव प्रतिविवर्तिः चेतनान्येव। (NS. p. 222)

2. Meaning: विद्यावनिद्वेष्येव।

3. Cf. को हेवान्यातः कामप्रचाय यथेष्ठ आकाश आनन्दः न स्वातः। Taitt. Up. (ii 7); Gītā, xv, 12.
The Viśiṣṭādvaitic Brahman being *ex hypothesi* "Viśiṣṭaikyarūpa", cannot be shown to be superior to its modes of Cit and Jaḍa or independent of them (*Parānapēkaṇa*), so long as the system is committed to their reciprocal dependence of *śeṣaśeṣibhāva* and its corollary of the "*contribution theory*" of mutual advantage between the two ¹, held by at least a section² of the Rāmānuja school, tho' Rāmānuja himself rises above such necessity in one context (under *G.B. ix, 4*) and Vedānta Deśika openly endorses Madhva's view, as already pointed out, and thus abandons the position believed to be characteristic of the Rāmānuja school that "the difference of parts of God, as matter and souls, always existed and there is no part of Him which is truer *and more ultimate than this*" (Dasgupta, *I. Phil. i. i.* p. 200). If this is so, Madhva's stand would by no means be redundant or superfluous.

The independence of God and His freedom from all imperfections is very much compromised in the Pantheistic philosophies of Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa and Nimbārka, so long as these systems adhere to the actual transformation of the Brahman-stuff, whether wholly, directly or in part; or indirectly even, thro' its existential aspect (*sacchakēti*) or energy-aspect (*cicchakēti*). They lead to a great disruption of moral experience of remorse and responsibility. Logical Pantheism is inconsistent with our ideals of goodness and evil. God is perfect. As His personal effects, whatever and whoever exists must also be perfect. But such Pantheistic unity is disproved by the inevitable presuppositions of human life. Our instincts refuse to think that evil is good and to see the Deity in disorder, virtue in crime, truth in error. Nor can our evaluations of truth and error be dismissed as illusory. If the events of the world are the modes of God, how can they be illusory?

We find the same inability to rise and stick to the high level of the independence of God or the Absolute and the necessary dependence of the entire Universe on God, in the non-Vedāntic systems of Theism like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga.

Their limitations in this respect have already been made clear (See reference in *NS. p. 329*, quoted ante.). Even the eternity of the atoms, admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, could not be exempted from the sway of the Deity:

2. Tengalais. See also passage from *Nītimālā* quoted earlier on p. 17 f.n. 1.
There is no need to suppose that what is eternal cannot possibly be ‘dependent’ on another. Let us take a non-eternal object like a pot. It is not a matter of ‘accident’ that such objects are non-eternal. Their non-eternity is ‘determined’ by some reason. Otherwise, they might as well be destroyed the very next moment after coming into being. Similarly, what is wrong if one should suppose that the eternity of the eternal objects is also determined by a governing principle? Surely, we do not find the non-eternal objects like pots foregoing their non-eternity and becoming eternal just because their non-eternity is determined by another principle. It is the nature of the non-eternal to become destroyed sooner or later. In the same way, even where an eternal entity is ‘determined’ by another, there is no fear of its losing its eternity and becoming non-eternal by the caprice of the determining principle. For the governing principle will maintain and guarantee the status quo of the other as an eternal entity, for all time. There is, therefore, nothing illogical or inconceivable in holding the view that ‘eternal’ padārthas also are ‘dependent’ upon God.

The reality of the Universe is, thus, in Madhva’s opinion, an important philosophical accessory (ānuṣaṅgika) to the realization of the ideal of the Svatantarā. He cannot, therefore, be charged with an obsession for the reality of the world and of Pañcabheda, as some critics have done. Jayatīrtha puts the Madhva attitude to the world in its proper perspective by referring to the doctrine of the reality of the world as a “lesser metaphysical doctrine” or Apara-Siddhānta (NS. p. 538 b). The world is not important in itself to the Dvaita philosopher:

Madhva is no theological Dualist. There is no place in his new creation theory of Sadasatkaravāda and ‘eternal creation’ thro’ “Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti” for the ‘Oriental Augustinian monarchotheistic’ idea of creation at a certain date by sheer fiat of God out of fathomless nothing.
Paradoxically enough, Madhva admits the creation of eternal substances also in a Pickwickian sense of "Parādhīna-viṣeṣāpti", which will be explained later. Real creation, in his view, means such an eternal dependence of the world of matter and souls on God, as would involve their non-existence in the absence of God's will to that effect, while His will is the essential condition and sustaining principle that invests them with their reality and without which they would be but void names and bare possibilities. The scientific value of the doctrine of "Parādhīna-viṣeṣāpti" would be evident when it is contrasted, for a moment, with the fact that Biblical chronology in the West fixed the date of creation of the world at 4004 B.C. Geology has since vastly extended cosmic time; but altho' the actual date might be thus thrust back indefinitely, the view of creation as an event in time, at some indefinite period, in the past, still continues to lurk in many quarters and even eminent theologians like Flint have clung to it heroically. But, thanks to the stupendous advance of Science in recent times, such crude notions have no place in serious thinking, quite apart from the difficulty of having to answer the question of why the Deity should have chosen a particular time to create, after having kept in its shell all along, before. It will be clear then, that the dependence of even eternal entities on God and their 'creation' thro' "Parādhīnaviṣeṣāpti", brings out the independence of God, all the more prominently.

The supremacy of God as the immanent-cum-transcendent principle of the Universe, introduces order and unity in the cosmos, in spite of its internal differences. The multiverse of reals becomes a Universe, in that it owes its allegiance to a single source and derives its strength, power and reality, beauty, goodness etc. now and forever, from One:

तत्तत्त्वलावैतत्तत्त्वायः। सर्वमेतः श्रद्धासुच्चवते तदधीनसत्तातीतितितलबातः।
नन्, तस्त्ववहवलात। उक्ते हि पाधृ—
त्वदधीनं नतं: सर्वमहः सवैंभवानिति।
वदन्ति गुणः: सवें न हु वर्त्तस्वर्ग।। हि ॥ (M. G. B. iv, 24)

Thus, Madhva's chief ontological classification of being into Svatantra and Paratantra does full justice to the three primary data of philosophy in the light of the requirements of religious consciousness and speculative reason.
CHAPTER VI

MADHVA'S ONTOLOGICAL SCHEME.

Brahman as the Only Independent Real is the highest ontological principle of Madhva's philosophy. It is Infinite (पूर्ण), of perfect bliss (भूसा; संपर्काव), the Real of reals (सत्यस्य सत्यम्), the Eternal of eternals (सिष्यो नित्यानाम्), the Sentient of all sentients (वेतनवेतनानाम्), the source of all reality, consciousness and activity (सत्ताप्रति तत्तत्रृतिनिमित्ताम्) in the finite.

Dependent reality (परतत्रंस्यामु) consists of Cetanas and Acetana. The subdivisions of the Cetanavarga are, to some extent, theological in character. A special place is given there to Śrītattva as the presiding deity (principle) over the entire domain of Jaṭa-Praṅki. Śrī or Lakṣmi is, for this reason, designated as Cetana-Praṅkti. Similar presiding principles (Abhimāṇi-Devatās) are accepted for other material principles like Mahat, Ahamkāra, Bhūta, Indriyas etc. on the clear authority of the Upaṇiṣads, Brahmasūtra (ii, 1, 6)1 and the Pañcarātras. The Śrītattva ranks next to the Supreme Being, qua Paratantra. But it is not without a partial parity of status with the Supreme in virtue of being co-pervasive in Time and Space and being ever-free from bondage (nityamukta) and therefore designated as "Sama-nā" (B.S.B. iv, 2, 7).

Śrī is placed in the (स्वयंकोरिति) and has cosmic sway2, accordingly, over the destinies of the souls and the modifications of Matter. An analogous position, with some difference in details, is given to Śrī, in the theology of Rāmānuja also.

The rest of the Cetana-varga, is subject to the bondage of Praṅkti and is further subdivided into "released" and "unreleased". There is an intrinsic gradation among the released and the unreleased alike, Hiranyagarbha among the released (and in Samsāra too) occupying a privileged position as Jīvottama. Unlike Rāmānuja, Madhva accepts an innate distinction among (released) souls into Deva, Rṣī, (Pitr, Pa) and Naras. The Devas are Sarva-prakāśa (fit to realize God as pervasive), the

---

1. Śaṅkara also admits as a Siddhānta view, the existence of Abhimāṇidevatās. See B.S.B. i, 3, 33.
2. See Āmbīṛī Sūkta, R. V. X, 125.

and विष्णुविद्यमान्यसर्वभूताविभूतिश्रिष्टिकाशास्त्रायामश्चतन्त्रेऽपि: ।
सत्ता अपांगज्ञाताः * * * (Dvādaśa-Stotra)
Sages are *Antaḥprakāśa* and the rest *Bahiḥprakāśa*.\(^1\) The non-released are again classified as salvable (मुक्तियोग्य), ever-transmigrating (नित्यसंसारी) and damnable (समन्योग्य). This tripartite classification of souls is unique to Mādhva theology. Its ethical and philosophical merits will be discussed later.

The Acetana section falls into two groups of positive (*bhāva*) and negative (*abhāva*). Three kinds of negation are accepted: प्रापभाव (antecedent negation), प्रश्वसाभाव (subsequent) and अत्यन्ताभाव (absolute). The mutual negation (अन्योन्न्याभाव) of Nyāya philosophy is equated with “Difference” and is not treated as an *abhāva*, as it does not involve significant negation in the first act of perception. The conception of *atyantābhāva* differs radically from the Nyāya view in that its counter-correlative (प्रतियोगी) has no factual existence (अप्रामाणिक).

In the domain of positive reals, we have both the eternal and the non-eternal. If everything is eternal and uncreated, causation would cease to have any meaning. Even if it were interpreted in terms of manifestation, the question would still arise about the *manifestation* itself, whether it is caused or uncaused. In the former case, the question could be continuously repeated involving a regress. In the latter case, the same redundancy of causal effort would be there.

It would also be impossible to account for creative evolution, dissolution etc., in the absence of some enduring stuff out of which things could be created and into which they would be resolved. The doctrine of momentary creation and dissolution cannot be accepted by a reflective mind, as it is disproved by our experience (Pratyabhijñā) and conviction of the continuity of the objects.

There is, thus, a clear case for the acceptance of both eternal and non-eternal Bhāvas. Space, time, the Vedas, the subtle aspects of the elements, senses, Āhārmārkika Prāṇa, Mahat, Ahaṃkāra and the qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are deemed eternal. The grosser developments of these are non-eternal. Where the substances show both the aspects, as for example, time viewed as an eternal process and as a succession of moments, each aspect would be referred to its appropriate category and the substance itself could be spoken of as a “Nityānitya”.

\(^1\) ‘अन्तःप्रकाश बहःप्रकाश: सर्वप्रकाशः: । देवा वास सर्वप्रकाशः: ऋषयो ।
सतःप्रकाश मनुष्य: एव बहःप्रकाशः: ’ इति चतुःशिशुक्कामृ। (Madhva, *B. S. B.* iv, 3, 18)
The world of attributes comprising qualities (primary and secondary), actions, Sattā, Śakti, Sādṛśya, Viśiṣṭa etc., are regarded by Madhva as constituting the very essence of the substances themselves. They need not, then, be regarded as having a separate existence of their own requiring independent enumeration or classification. But where they are mentally distinguished from their substances, by the power of (internal) Višeṣas, they could certainly be enumerated, classified and studied separately.\(^1\) Madhva, however, puts forward a twofold classification of attributes in general as (i) yāvad-dravyabhāvi (coeval) and (ii) ayāvad-dravyabhāvi (changing). The former type of attributes or properties, being coessential, are identical with the substances themselves. The latter are to be considered as partly different and partly identical (bhinnābhinna) with their substances, in an equal measure. This relation applies in respect of the pairs (1) cause and effect (2) temporary qualities of substances and their substratum (3) genus and species (4) Viśiṣṭa and Śuddha (the thing-in-itself and the thing as qualified) and (5) part and whole etc.

---

1. It is from this standpoint that the conventional classification of Pādārthas (into ten categories), in Madhvasiddhāntasāra and other works is to be understood.
CHAPTER VII

THE CONCEPT OF VIŚEŚAS.

The relation between substance and attributes is one of the intriguing problems of philosophy. It has well-nigh taxed the ingenuity and resources of philosophers in the East and in the West. Madhva’s contribution to the solution of this problem is both original and significant. He has actually contributed a new idea—the concept of Viśeśas—to the treatment of this philosophical problem. It is an outstanding discovery of his. Madhva accepts a relation of ‘colorful identity’ (सविशेषाभेद) in respect of coessential attributes and difference-cum-identity (भेदाभेद) in the case of transient attributes:

खणिष्ठे भेद ऐक्यं च; यावदसु न भेदवल (TV)

He has thus made a striking effort to rise above the ‘dualism’ of substance and attributes and combine them into a homogeneous whole that admits, however, of logical, conceptual and linguistic distinction, wherever necessary, thro’ the self-differentiating capacity of substances themselves, to be known as “Viśeśas”.

These Viśeśas are ubiquitous and are not confined to material substances. They exist among sentient as well, including the Supreme Being. In sentient beings, these Viśeśas, whether manifested or not, are identical with their substrata; while in regard to insentients, attributes which are coeval would be identical with the substances (and distinguishable by Viśeśas); while changing or impermanent ones would be different-cum-identical with their substances. The whole question has been very clearly expounded by Jayatirtha, in his c. on the G. T. xi, 15, p. 184.

1. चेतनेन कवित्विद्वेशो जायते कवित्विद्वेशित्वं इति एवं निद्विद्वेशित्वं द्विविद्वेशित्वं भवति। चेतनद्रव्यालम-क्लेन निद्विद्वेशित्वं विशेषित्वं व्यक्तिविद्वेशित्वं जननासित्वं संभवत्। अथवा विशेषित्वं व्यक्ति विशेषित्वं यादवद्रव्यालम्यं, कार्यापेन कवित्विद्वेशो जायते कवित्वं यावदवापार्थिवित्वं द्विविद्वेशित्वं विशेषित्वं इति भावः। चेतनवसुद्वर्फःस्तीलिविद्वेश: व्यक्तिविद्वेशः निद्विद्वेशित्वं संभवत्। चेतन: करतीत, सुद्वर्फः, गच्छीत्वं करणमनोजन-विशेषस्य व्यक्तिविद्वेशः [शाक्तिपेन निधा, व्यक्तिपेन जायते] ते द्विविद्वेशित्वं अर्थ विशेषा अत्यतावदिनः।

तथाच, चूतवलस्तवः अस्तीत्वं चूतवलस्तवादिविशेषः यावद्रव्यमानिनविशेषित्वः अत्यतावदिन: गच्छीत्वं चूतवलस्तित्वं चूतवलस्तादिविशेषः कादाचिन्ता, विशेषित्वं भिन्नाभिन्नित्वं इति भावः।
The argument for the acceptance of Viṣeṣas is thus presented by Trivikrama Paṇḍita. The conception of the relation between substance and attributes is a very difficult one. If they are identical, the distinction of 'substance' and 'attributes' is meaningless. We would have substance alone or attributes alone, in that case; and not both of them. If the two are different, their relation becomes a purely external one. If they are related internally by Samavāya, this relation itself has to be related to the terms and so on ad infinitum. The difficulty will persist even if Substance and attributes are treated as partly identical and partly different. The only way in which a regress could be avoided, on any one of these alternatives, would be by agreeing to invest the first relation itself with a certain capacity to take care of itself, explain itself, and relate itself to the relata, without waiting to be explained or related to its terms by another relation. Since an appeal has thus ultimately to be made to the self-explicability of the relation, it will be wiser, more economical and expedient, to invest the substance itself with such an intrinsic capacity of integrating its attributes into a homogeneous whole, with itself, without prejudice to their distinction of references according to exigencies, and without the need for any external relation. This intrinsic capacity of substances is proposed to be called "Viṣeṣas"—a very appropriate name, so far as any one could see, and one which could not be improved upon. We have, here, in the Viṣeṣas of Madhva, a remarkable anticipation of the Hegelian doctrine of "internal relations".

Experience shows that the various qualities of a thing are not the fictions of the imagination. The temporal, spatial, qualitative, quantitative and causal characteristics of objects that we see are not altogether the fancies projected by the mind; for there is no reason why and how all minds should or could project alike and carry on with a sense of pre-established harmony of world-building impressions. But there are attributes like the "light of the Sun" and the "primary qualities" which could not be perceived apart from the objects possessing those qualities. The idea of a triangle as a three-sided figure involves the other idea of the sum of its angles being equal to two right angles. The two ideas are not however the same tho' they involve each other. There are a number of practical difficulties which stand in the way of an absolute identity of the two: substance and attributes. Jayatīrtha draws attention to some
important considerations of this kind which justify a certain measure of practical distinction between the two, consistent with our experience. 1

In the perception 'the jar is white', the whiteness and the jar cannot be regarded as coterminous and coextensive. The jar is something more than its whiteness. When one is asked to fetch a white thing, one does not necessarily fetch a jar. (2) The two terms, the jar and whiteness, are not synonymous in denotation, for there is no contradiction in saying that the jar is not white as there would be in saying that the jar is not a jar. (3) The jar is perceived irrespective of its whiteness as when a blind man feels its presence with his hands, even when he is unable to perceive its whiteness. This shows that the perception of a jar is not the same as the perception of its color. When the whiteness of the object is changed into redness by a coating of paint, we still continue to perceive and recognize the pot as such, tho' not—in its former color. All this points to an undeniable distinction between the ideas of substance and attributes. The attributes not merely subsist, but exist. Their distinction from the substance is not illusory, as there is no correcting judgment to the contrary. At the same time, the attributes have no reality apart from the substances and are always presented in all judgments about them as identical with their substances: छाया पत; नीलें पटः। This identity of form and content between the subject and the predicate सामान्यकल्पणात् is an accepted proof of identity अभेदे प्रामाण्यः। It is in this crossing or intersection of identity and difference that Madhva finds the clue and justification for his concept of Viśeṣas, to bridge the gulf between substance and attributes and preserve the basic unity of experience without in any manner sacrificing the numerous distinctions demanded and

1. द्वस्यन्ते च भेदकार्याणि (1.) पत्तशाख्यमुद्योगठन्यनातिरिक्तविशेषत्वाभावः (2.) तच्छन्द्योगठन्यविशेषत्वाभावः (3.) अयोग्यवाच्यंसम्बन्धकल्पः (4.) ज्ञानरागार्थविशेषत्वाभावः (5.) भेदमान्येवतुहितिकंचात्मकाः (6.) अघचत्य: पत्त्य: तत्त्य: अर्थोद्वित्यप्राप्तिमयाभावः (7.) अभिन्यप्रत्यछण्डक्यमनाति गृह्यक्षेत्रसम्बन्धितं प्रतिद्वेश्वरविशेषत्वाभावः (8.) महाभाषप्रकरणं शास्त्रचतुर्यादित्वाभावः (9.) भेदशङ्क्यस्य शरीरस्यादित्वाभावः इत्येवमात्मेनि। न सैणा प्रतिद्वेश्वरविशेषत्वाभावः (N.S. p. 106)
drawn by the necessities of scientific usage and practical utility. We can never do without such "Viśeṣas", in whatever way we might choose to conceive of the substance. Madhva would, therefore, willingly endorse the criticism of D. M. Datta that "the necessity for an interposition of a third entity or relation arises from a narrow and exclusive conception of "terms". If we widen our outlook and think of an entity as possessing in addition to its essential non-relative and intrinsic character, other extrinsic relative characteristics which it might have in the infinite situations in which it may be placed, then we can easily dispense with the existence of a third entity or relation. A thing thus comes to be viewed as an identity of some intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects. Different words are then found to denote different forms of the same thing in different aspects" (Six Ways of Knowing, p. 115). These criticisms will not apply to the Viśeṣas which are not conceived as extrinsic to or different from the terms. Viśeṣa is neither a "third entity" nor a relation. It is part and parcel of the terms and yet capable of distinguishing them where and when necessary. Its help would be indispensable in any attempt to "widen our outlook and think of an entity as possessing, in addition to its essential and intrinsic character, other extrinsic characteristics, which it might have in the infinite situations in which it may be placed" (Op. cit)—Italics mine. It would be impossible to effect an "identity" between the "intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects" of a thing, without the help of "Viśeṣas". It is the only way out.

Viśeṣa is thus the same as the principle of identity-in-difference. It is defined by Madhva as:

भेदगौत्थसंशयनाव्यमानतन्त्रनियमः।
विशेषो नाम कायत: सोपरस्तं वस्थतः॥

(AV).

the peculiar characteristic or potency of things which makes description and talk of difference possible where as a matter of fact only identity exists. It is a differentiating or pluralising agency which serves at the same time to exhibit the pluralities as flowing centripetally towards a given object which happens to occupy the focus of attention on account of a dominant pragmatic interest at the moment. It renders possible the validity of countless viewpoints while the object itself retains its unity, independence and integrality. Jayatīrtha defines it as- भेदगौत्थसंशयनाव्यमानतन्त्रनियमम्। (NS. p. 106) the principle of thought whereby, in all cases of identity-judgements, a real practical distinction of a non-figurative
nature, is or has to be drawn and accepted, if the judgments in question are not to be tautologous (paryāya), belonging to the pathology of thought—as ‘पद्तो घटः’.

Madhva and his commentator show that such experiences, involving the mediation of Viśeṣas, are to be found everywhere in the Scriptures and in our daily life of lay and scientific commerce:¹ सत्यं ज्ञातमानं ब्रह्म। आनन्दं ब्रह्मणं। राहोऽशिरं। पुरुषस्य चेतन्यम्। युक्तवर्णं। अद्वे: ज्ञातम्। समवाय एकः। सामान्यं सत्।।। etc.

They introduce order into the world of substances (padārtha) and keep intact the unity of the substance in and thro’ all its various modes, predicates, aspects, attributes and relations. Madhva indicates in his B.T. (p. 84) about six places where Viśeṣas usually come into play:

1) “अवयवव्यवानं च 2) गुणानं गुणिनत्तथा।
3) शक्तिकार्यमोक्तापि 4) कियायात्तथा: तथा।
5) स्वायंशान्तिनेत्रेव (निःशान्तेद:। ॥ ॥ ॥ ॥

It is this category or “power of things in themselves” which, thro’ an underlying identity of essence, enables us to distinguish (1) a particular from its universal; (2) a quality from its substance; (3) motion or power or energy from things possessing them; (4) the Svarūpa from the Svarūpin and Svarūpatvam. Jayatirtha points out that in the term “Svarūpatvam”, the use of the suffix tvā stands for Viśeṣas and that without acceptance of such a shade of meaning, its use would be redundant. Viśeṣa is, therefore, but another name for the potency of the thing whereby it maintains its unity and continuity thro’ all its modes, predications and aspects:

स्विस्वाभिमिलयते नित्यं स्वायवैरिपि।
स्वहेपुत विशेषयो व: स्वहेपय तत्स्य सोऽपि तु।
विशेषस्य विशेषोऽप्यो न चैवासित कदाचन।
स्वत्सप्ति तु विशेषत्व स्वयमेव भविष्यति।
यथा जनेरितिभज्ञता तत्स्य बलुश्रिकीविन्।
स्वप्रमापि संस्योः: स्वास्येवं गुण्त्यते।॥


1. Cf. यथा कलत्व पूत्तकरसेदेकारं हितं विशेषयो भवति, पूव्यं हितं विशेषको विशेषादेव। तत्त्व गुणस्वेषप्रयापि ब्रह्माणो विशेषादेव ‘गृह्नि ब्रह्मं’ हितं विशेषणविशेष्यभवाओ गृह्यते हितं भवतः (TP. III. 2, 30).

P. M. 4
A luminous stone is not something totally different from its luminosity. It stands self-related to its lustre:

यथा रल्लत्य संयोगः स्ख्युपलेठु यथयते।
यथा रल्लत्य संयोगः तत्तकाशोन नित्यदा।
रल्लत्य च प्रकाशत्य न भेदः कावियिच्यते॥

(Bṛh. Up. C. p. 18 b)

The thing itself is so constituted:

द्वेयमेव तत्तोष्नत्विष्ङ्खालम्बत्य स्थितः॥
नानाध्यवक्ष्येऽर्तर्हल्लत्य विशेषतः॥ (AV.)

that it can relate itself to and distinguish itself from its modes, predicates or properties, without invoking the aid of any other relation or a "third entity" (as Prof. Datta terms it). It is Svanirvāhaka, self-explicable, self-contained and self-related. It is only by the acceptance of such a potency in things that we can "widen our outlook" and conceive of a substance "as an identity of some intrinsic and extrinsic forms or aspects" (Datta, p. 115). This conception of substance as a unity of countless Viśeṣas:

द्वेयमेव तत्तोष्नत्विष्ङ्खालम्बत्य स्थितः॥ (AV.)

held by Madhva, resembles the Jain theory of substance as that which has many qualities forming its essence: अनन्तभासमित्विक बलु (Hari-bhadra Śūrī). There is however this difference that the Jain theory of substance as a dynamic reality, an identity that changes, would be incomplete, without the acceptance of something like Viśeṣas to round it off. As the Anekāntavāda of the Jains involves the Kṣaṇikatva of things, it will be difficult to maintain the basic identity of the substance per se, without the Viśeṣas.

Viśeṣas should not, therefore, be mistaken for new or additional attributes of things, that mediate among other relations and manage to distinguish them where necessary. Such a view will be not only opposed to the nature and role of Viśeṣas, as conceived by Madhva; but also defeat the very purpose for which they have been conceived. It is such a misunderstanding of the nature of Viśeṣas that is at the back of the criticism that "If Viśeṣa is different from the subject, it breaks its integrity. If it is non-different from it, we cannot call it Viśeṣa" (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil. ii, p. 746) [Italics mine].
The same confusion of thought regarding Viṣeṣas in Madhva’s system, that it is either an attribute of the substance, or an additional entity, is to be seen in the writings of even distinguished traditional critics of the system like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Brahmānanda. The author of the Advaitasiddhi writes: भेदे ऐकत्वशुद्धितिविरोधस्व-अत्ततिपः (सत्यविशेषविपः) तत्तादस्वयमः * * * न । समभवविशेषादेव सर्वसायापरतः । न तद्रूढः विशेषांग्निकायः सम्भवातः प्रवेशा इति वाच्यमः । तत्तदभावारणस्वहृद्यप्रवेच स्थभावविशेषापन्नायांतव्येन, त्वदुस्व- विशेषानुक्तः ॥
(N. S. Press edn. p. 807).

This criticism that the acceptance of Viṣeṣas in Brahman would destroy its oneness quite as much as the acceptance of an internal difference of substance and attributes therein, betrays a presumption that the Viṣeṣas must be different from the substance (Viṣeṣaṇa) which is categorically denied by Madhva. The criticism also suffers from a self-contradiction in that Madhusūdana himself declares that there can be no Viṣeṣas other than the distinctive nature of things, and nothing more is claimed for the Viṣeṣas by the Madhva philosophers also! To say, as does the author of the Advaitasiddhi, that it is not the nature of Viṣeṣas in the Dvaita system, simply shows that he has not rightly understood their true nature according to the Dvaitins. But strangely enough, he himself goes on to point out that "the Dvaitins unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, do not regard their Viṣeṣas as different from the essence of things: द्यतः इव द्वात्तिके स्वतः त्वरकतः लोप्यांग्निकाय वैयाम्यतः। (p. 807). The author of the Tarāṅgini, therefore, points out that the talk (of the Advaitin) of there being no Viṣeṣas, other than the ‘distinctive natures of things’ (तत्तदभावारणस्वहृद्यप्रवेच) in itself involves the presumption of Viṣeṣas: विशेषं विना स्वभावारणस्वहृद्यप्रवेचः ॥ (Tg. p. 383)

In view of so much confusion even in learned quarters about the true nature and scope of Viṣeṣas, it is well to set forth its authentic nature in the words of the original works clearly and categorically:

इन्द्र्यमेव ततोन्नतिविशेषायांत्यसिद्धात्।
नानात्मकांतःसहस्तः ॥
(AV)

Jayatīrtha defines Viṣeṣas in the clearest terms as the “potency of things” स्वविशेषांको विशेषो नाम पदार्थशकारमिहिक्षताम् (Vādāvali, p. 97 b). Rāghavendra’s commentary on it clinches the matter once for all: पदार्थशास्त्रिन् न वस्तुन्तरार्थे। Jayatīrtha again writes elsewhere: नानाय.
There is, thus no point in the criticism that "if it is non-different from the substance, we cannot call it Viśeṣas". Call it by whatever name you will, Viśeṣa will be there in the nature of things as it is only another name for the substance, with all its wonderful capacities.

Madhva is thus fully justified in holding that it would be impossible to establish any adequate theory of the relation between substance and attributes without invoking the aid of Viśeṣas, which are also called Svarūpaviśeṣas in order to show that they are not other than the Substance. Such Viśeṣas are forced upon us by the very laws of thought as a Sarvatantrasiddhānta, says Madhva:

अत्यन्तात्यन्तविशेषादिभ्यः *** * * *।
महादेशः शिरसि विशेषो भार्य एव हि।
एततः विशेषेवर्षिन्म् को हेद्य वादिनं भवेत् ?

(AV.)

They lurk everywhere in relations between substance and attributes from whatever angle they might be approached, as the "mysterious Mrs. Harris of metaphysics", as one writer has racily put it. Viśeṣa is just a "peculiarity" an unnameable something recognized by all, tacitly, and Madhva has only tried to give it a special name and a form and has rendered its existence explicit, in the interests of clearness of thought and judgments. This is no small service to scientific thinking and metaphysics.

Madhva undertakes to convince the open-minded that Viśeṣas must be accepted as a postulate of thought. There are only three possible ways in which the relation of substance and attributes could be conceived, (1) that they are entirely different from each other (atyanta-bhīna), (2) absolutely identical with each other (abhinna) or (3) both identical and different (bhīnābhīna). These three views have been put forward by the Naiyāyikas, the Advaitins and the Bhāṭṭās respectively. Madhva shows by argument that every one of these views has ulti-
mately to fall back on Viṣeṣas. He, therefore, examines them and dismisses them all, in favour of a forth view of Saviṣeṣābheda (identity based on Viṣeṣa) as the only acceptable view, free from the difficulties incidental to the other three.

The theory of absolute difference between substance and attributes is not only full of difficulties but cannot also commend itself to our philosophic imagination. Is the said difference No. 1, different from the terms or identical with them? In the first case, is the difference No. 2, also different from or identical with the terms and so on indefinitely, so that we are left with a regress. If difference No. 1 were identical with the terms, it could not be conceived as the difference of this or that term, as such descriptions would themselves presuppose a difference. The terms and the differences would all be synonymous. If the said difference were said to be self-supporting, is such self-sufficiency (svanirvāhakatvam) different from or identical with the terms and with the act of self-supporting? In the former case, an endless regress is sure to arise and in the latter, the expressions "nirvāhaya" and "nirvāhaka" (supporter and supported) and supporting (nirvāhana), involved in the definition of Svanirvāhakatva, would be tautological. If it be said that the difference between substance and attributes is naturally endowed with such self-supporting and self-linking capacity, it would be but another name for "Viṣeṣas" and such potency could as well be claimed for and vested in the substance itself instead of in "difference"!

If substance and attributes are to be different and externally related by Samavāya, the question arises if the Samavāya relation too, is similarly related to the relata by another Samavāya and so on. If Samavāya is self-linking (svanirvāhaka) without the aid of another link, such a self-linking capacity may as well be posited of the substance itself, at the very outset, so that the luxury of an additional relation (padārtha) may be dispensed with: धातुक्षेत्रोधातुक्षेत्र वरस्।

If the difference between the substance and attributes were however, identical with the relata, there would be no difference left as such, but only the two terms. In the absence of any difference, we cannot even speak of the two terms, substance and attribute as such, as even this idea is born of difference. If the terms and difference are identical, one may contend that difference alone exists as a matter of fact and no terms whatever! Difference then, between substance and attributes
must be accepted not as being absolutely identical with the terms but "identical with a qualification" (Saviśeṣābheda), that would preserve all three of them intact and prevent their mutual synonymity. Such distinction of reference may indeed be most profitably attributed to the substance themselves, instead of to the relation of difference.

The Bhedābheda view of substance and attributes is in need of Viśeṣas, at the very outset. Identity and difference being opposites and therefore mutually exclusive, cannot be brought together and conceived to coexist (samānādhikarana) without the aid of a mediating factor. Either of them should therefore be invested with the peculiar capacity of putting up with its opposite: भेदसहिष्यसङ्गेत् or अभेदसहिष्यसङ्गेत्. Such a peculiar capacity of making opposites meet will indeed be a "Viśeṣa"!

Even supposing that substance and attributes are connected by a relation of Bhedābheda, what will be the sort of relation between the identity and the difference, mutually and to the terms? If that is also one of bhedābheda, there will be a regress, if the bhedābheda is to be accepted as svanirvāhaka (self-linking), it could only be so with the help of a peculiar potency in it called Viśeṣa, for want of a better name. If bheda and abheda are different from the terms, there will be a regress. If identical, they cannot be represented as "belonging" to them (tadīya) without some kind of a peculiarity. Nor can difference and identity between the terms, be again identical with them. If they are, difference and identity will both become identical in their turn, which will lead to an absurdity and there will be no possibility of establishing a relation between them.

The doctrine of undifferenced reality (akhaṇḍatā) of the Advaita is equally dependent on Viśeṣas. This may be illustrated with reference to the famous definitive text (lakṣaṇāvākyā) स्त्रे शान्तमन्त्र श्रद्ध जिः which is in the nature of a proposition or judgment on the nature of Brahman and ascribes to it three attributes of reality, consciousness and infinitude. It will be necessary to call to aid Viśeṣas if the unity of the judgment and the oneness of Brahman in and thro' the three attributes are to be preserved. Are the attributes satyam, jñānam and ānantaṃyam mutually different or not? If they are, we have to admit an element of plurality in Brahman, which cannot be. If they are all the same, there is no need to predicate three of them, as any one of them would do. They will thus be synonymous in effect (paryāya) and hence redundant.
The Concept of Viśeṣas

It cannot be that there are subtle shades of difference among them; for the Brahman is *ex hypothesi* Nirviśeṣa i.e., without any shade of any kind of difference or plurality. Nor can their employment be defended on the assumption of *affirmation thro' negation of the opposites* (अनूत्तादिव्यादिलिमित्वेन). Even there, must be recognized, some kind of distinction from the opposites negated, as otherwise, the entire negation would be a meaningless proposition.¹ The distinction from unreality must perforce be distinct from distinction from ignorance, limitation etc. The doctrine of Saviśeṣabheda is thus forced upon all as a universal principle (वेदांतसिद्धान्त). None who cares for the laws of thought can escape it.

Madhva's Viśeṣa is thus the counterpart of the principle of identity-in-difference recognized by many Western philosophers and that of the Samavāya and Svarūpasambandha recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās and the Advaitins. But it is not just another name for Samavāya. In fact, it is *not a relation* at all in the sense Samavāya is; tho' it is *svanirvāhaka* like the latter. It has a clear advantage over the Samavāya, in that its self-sufficiency is more directly and easily established than that of Samavāya. The acceptance of Samavāya has to be supplemented by the assumption of its self-sufficiency and ability to render a distinction of reference without a distinction of essence, possible (अभिशेषिति सेद्यवहार-नियामकम्।) which is the hall-mark and *raison d'etre* of Viśeṣas (धर्मिष्ठाक्रमणाविशेषायन्त्रम्।).

This concept of Viśeṣas is thus Madhva's most original and substantial contribution to the problem of substance and attributes in Indian ontology. He is in no way indebted to the Samavāya or any other category of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās for this. The general impression of many that Madhva Philosophy is based on the doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikās and their category has already been shown to rest on ignorance of facts and imperfect understanding of the basic principles of ontology upon which the Realism of Madhva is based. It may perhaps be said with better reason that the Viśeṣa of Madhva is reared on the ashes of Samavāya.

Lastly, it has nothing save its name in common with the Viśeṣa of the (Nyāya)-Vaiśeṣikās. (1) It is easily distinguishable from the Vaiśeṣika

---

¹. Cf. व्याख्यान निष्क्यस्य तु, किं व्याख्याव्यक्तव्रतः? (Madhva, AV.)
Viśeṣas which are *ex hypothesi* restricted to eternal entities alone: नित्यविश्वास्य विशेषास्वन्नता एव (Muktāvalī). But Madhva’s Viśeṣas are *not* confined to eternal substances. They exist in non-eternal also. (2) The purpose and function of Viśeṣas too are different in the two systems. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, these peculiarities are found in eternal things alone and serve to distinguish one eternal from another and one eternal of a genus from others of the same class. They are accordingly known as “Vyāvartaka-Viśeṣas” and apply where such differentiation (vyāvṛtti) is *not otherwise possible* thro’ class-concept or other means, as between a pot and a cloth. They are not, therefore, recognized by the Naiyāyikas in “Sāvayava”-entities, which could be distinguished from one another thro’ distinction of parts.

The function of Viśeṣas, in Madhva’s philosophy, is *not merely* to distinguish, but to *unify* the part and the whole, and to render a distinction of reference, without one of existence or essence, possible, where necessary or desired, into substance and attribute, part and whole etc., within inseparable wholes. The Viśeṣas of the Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, operate *only in cases of absolute difference*. *This fact is of utmost importance.* It suffices to keep the Viśeṣas of the two systems as the Poles apart and expose the fallacious assumption of some scholars that the Viśeṣas of Madhva’s system are either derived from or inspired by those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. It is the failure to grasp the true nature of Viśeṣas taught by Madhva, that is responsible for wholly misleading estimate of its role in his philosophy that we have in such sweeping assertions as, “By means of the category of Viśeṣas, it will be possible for us to account for the world of distinction without assuming them to be ultimate” (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p. 746). “It is thro’ the functioning of Viśeṣas that we have difference or Bheda” (ibid. 746). It is therefore necessary to point out that Viśeṣas have been admitted by Madhva, *only in cases of absence of actual difference*, as between parts and whole, substance and attributes etc., and where despite such absence of actual difference, a certain measure of internal distinction of parts, qualities or aspects is met with, in lay and scientific parlance and validated by experience. Viśeṣa is, thus, category of thought or power of things inherent in them which, by definition, is intended to justify and rationalize this lay and scientific acceptance of “difference in identity”. The Vādaratnāvali makes this *raison d’être* of the acceptance of Viśeṣas, clear: न चैवं घटपटादेवपि भेदाभावमिर्गीत्वा विशिष-
The concept of Viśeṣas

It could, on no account, be applied or extended to cases where a genuine and absolute difference reigns supreme, and where there is no room for the slightest trace of factual identity (svarūpaikya) or coexistence (sāmānādhikaranyā). It cannot therefore be universally substituted in all cases of actual difference in the world as between a man and a horse, and difference as such and as a category of thought, banished from the world of experience, or dismissed as not being “ultimate”. To attempt such a substitution is to confuse the original with the substitute and prevent the function of the latter by extending it beyond its legitimate scope and sphere of application. Difference and Viśeṣas has each its own place in life, well-defined and their jurisdiction is fixed beyond possibility of encroachment. It will be illegitimate then, to suggest that difference as such can be replaced by Viśeṣas everywhere under all circumstances and that we may account for the world of differences without assuming it to be “ultimate”, thoro’ the miraculous help of Viśeṣas. It should not be lost sight of that Viśeṣas are strictly limited to cases of proved basic identity which however admit of an internal distinction of reference, valid in experience: यत्र भेदाभावः प्रमाणावस्तितो भवेत्रैव विशेषो व्यवहारिनिवल्लकोहृदाकिरिते। गवादिद्धतु, भेदस्यैव प्रमाणावस्तितल्लात न व्यवहारो विशेषनिविषयनिविषयन हि।

(Jayatīrtha, G. T. Nyāyadīpikā, p. 182).

The position cannot be made clearer than this. Nor can the operation of Viśeṣas, in their own sphere, of difference in identity, in any way lessen the ultimacy of Difference as a category of experience in other spheres of life. The one does not and cannot annul the other, in its legitimate sphere. Both are necessary for the interpretation of reality. “Bhedā” and “Viśeṣa” may therefore be described as the two poles of Madhva’s ontology.
CHAPTER VIII

MADHVA’S DOCTRINE OF “DIFFERENCE.”

Madhva rejects the Universal as a natural corollary of his doctrine of the uniqueness of the particular, be it a person or a thing. This uniqueness is to be understood in terms of difference from all else. Difference is not merely a component part of reality, but constitutes its very essence. So much so, that to know a thing is to know it as distinct from all others, in a general way and from some in a particular way: 

सर्वतौ विशेषण हि पदार्थसः द्यन्ते। (VTN).

This is because difference constitutes the essence of things (dharmisvarṣa) and is not merely an attribute of them, related from outside. A substance, according to Madhva, is not a bare substratum of qualities, or an abstraction, but a synthetic unity, capable of inner distinction of parts and aspects, in speech and thought, according to exigencies, under the aegis of Viśeṣas. For, difference cannot be taken to be flatly and colorlessly identical with objects (but only colorfully identical or saviśeṣābhinna), lest judgments of both identity and difference, that we do have of them, should become unaccountable.

Such, in brief, is Madhva’s theory of Difference. It is plainly different from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mimāṁsā view and this is another striking proof that the logico-philosophical bases of Madhva’s system are in no way borrowed from or inspired by these pre-Madhva realisms and that they are the result of independent cogitation on the problems of philosophy.

We have seen that God, matter and souls constitute the three major realities of Madhva’s system. The number of souls is unlimited and the modifications of matter are numerous, in various states. These three are conceived as distinct entities. The reality of God is of the independent order. That of the rest is dependent. Between matter and souls, the former is of a lesser order of reality. It is only in this sense we can speak of ‘degrees’ of reality in this system. The reality of things in space and time, involves the differences in name, form, attributes, relations, and tendencies. These manifold differences are generally classified under these heads: (1) Sajātiya or difference of one thing from others of its own kind (2) Vijātiya or difference from those of another kind and (3) Svagata or internal distinctions within an organic
whole. The last one is not admitted by Madhva in its absolute sense. In the sphere of the other two differences he has adumbrated a scheme of "five-fold Difference" (Pañcabheda) :

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Jīva} & \text{Īśvara} & \text{Jāda} \\
1 & 2 & 3 \\
\text{Jīva} & \text{Jāda} \\
4 & 5
\end{array}
\]

This fivefold difference is collectively spoken of by Madhva as "Pra-paṇca" - प्रकृत: पंचविधो भेदः प्रपंचः (VTN).

It is real and eternal and admits of no stultification.²

The Advaitins have sought to deny the reality of this fivefold difference, in establishing their thesis of the falsity of all the three :

स्वास्तकालितं जगद्देश्वरतीर्थं वीरमेधकृर्ष्णप्रभृतमभावा। (Saṁkṣepaśārīraka, i,2).

They have, therefore, subjected the concept of Difference to a searching criticism and sought to discredit the logical realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools, grounded on the reality of difference. Realistic Vedāntins like Rāmānuja and Madhva have, therefore, been obliged to review these criticisms of the famous Dialecticians of the Advaita school and redefine their attitude to Difference in such a way as to overcome the difficulties raised by them. We may, therefore, examine Madhva’s position with reference to some of these criticisms of the category of "Difference", urged by the Advaitic dialecticians.

There are only two possible ways in which difference could be conceived (1) as an attribute of things (dharmabhedavāda) and (2) as an integral part of the thing itself (dharmisvaruṇa). Neither can be said to be entirely free from logical difficulties. All attempts at conceiving of difference in a logical manner are eluded by it. The Advaitins therefore hold that it cannot be "real" (Prāmāṇika) and must therefore be put

---

1. Jayatīrtha, in his C. on VTN shows how this fivefold distinction is clearly: presupposed in the very terms of predication made in the Māṇḍ. Up. text अनातीर्थिया (i, 16) and अपूर्व: समर्पितानाम (i, 10)

2. Jayatīrtha has explained the derivation of the term on the basis of Pāṇini, V, 1, 60: पुंचानो वर्गः पुंचः । प्रकृतः प्रपंचः । प्रकृततः च, मौण्डः मौण्डस्यां भवति। (NS. i, 230 b).
down as a product of Avidyā. For the conception of difference is vitiated by many fallacies, such as interdependence and infinite regress, if regarded as an attribute of things. Whether difference is viewed as in its turn ‘different’ from its relata or as different-cum-identical with them, this relation again will have to be similarly viewed as so related and that again similarly, ad infinitum.

The supposition of ‘identity’ between difference and the object will tend to abolish the reality of difference altogether and leave the object alone to exist, inasmuch as difference cannot claim to have a separate existence of its own, apart from an object: भेदस्य कस्तुनो मेदे, भेदाभेद न, तथा तत्त्व भेदाभेदान्तर्योगदेव्य भेद इति, अनवस्थानात्र कवित्व मेदेव वस्तु संस्थाष्टः। अभेद तु एकनेह, तथा वस्तुवेत्। न भेद एव। वस्तुभावे, तत्स्याद्भावात्। (Iśtasiddhi)

The theory of difference as ‘Dharmisvarūpa’, held by the Prābhākaras, is equally objectionable. For difference, being in the nature of disjunction (Vidāraṇātmā), the oneness of a thing will be in danger of disruption by the numerous disjunctions (distinctions) which will form part of or constitute its nature and penetrate its very essence and individuality. The oneness or integrity of the object will thus be destroyed and in the absence of oneness, manyness also would cease to be, so that only nullity (sānya) would be left in the end!

विदारणत्वमो भेदस्य कस्तुनोपत्ते, न किंचिनंकं कस्तु स्वात्। एवं च, श्रद्धस्तव तात्त्विकव बिश्वस्यानेत्। (Ānandabodha, Nyāyamakaranda).

Thirdly, if difference were included in the essence of a thing, such difference should become fully known, once the object is known, and there would be no more room for doubts of any kind subsequently, so far as that thing and its difference from others are concerned. But such is not the case in experience. This shows that difference could not be treated as the essence of things, but as something outside their content: वदि च स्वात्कं भेदः, तदा, धार्मिकाने हृदे स्वात्कं श्रद्धामिति क्वचिच सेवे: स्वात। (Śrīharṣa, Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā)

Lastly, difference is not cognized by itself, and independently, but only in relation to its terms, either as qualifying them, or as being qualified by them. But in any case, unless the terms themselves are previously cognized, their difference from each other which is either
attributive, or bound up with the cognition of the correlate, and counter-correlate, cannot be. But then, the cognition of the terms is dependent on that of the difference already referred to. There is thus an inescapable (mutual) interdependence in any attempt to define the nature of difference or conceive of it.

It is evident from the writings of Madhva, that he has carefully examined the problem in the light of these and many other criticisms of the Advaitic dialecticians like Maṇḍana, Vimuktatman, Anandabodha, Śrīharṣa and Citṣukha and has attempted to find a way out. His position may be summed up in a few words: Whatever may be the difficulties in the way of expounding the nature of difference and accounting for its perception, the fact of its experience cannot be denied. If logical difficulties are felt in elucidating the process by which it comes to be apprehended, it is open to us to go beyond the accepted theories on the subject and explore the possibilities of other suitable explanations and adopt newer angles of vision in dealing with the issue, without discrediting the very truth and reality of the experience of difference itself as such. It would be unphilosophical to give up the attempt as beyond solution: नाहि प्रकरणपरिवर्तयैर वेदपरिवर्तार्द्धः (Jayatirtha, Mith. Kh. 7.8), much more so, to try to escape the responsibility by condemning the perception of difference as a delusion and giving it a bad name (and hanging it) as the Advaitins have done!

Moreover, granting that all known theories on the nature of difference are untenable, it would still be impossible to prove that the conception of difference is itself a delusion, simply because of our incapacity to make it conform to a definite pattern already familiar to us, or to define it in some particular way. The Advaitins have not shown and could not show that the ways and means of accounting for the perception of difference, which they have attempted to overthrow, are the only ways of defining it or that they could not be bettered or improved by suitable devices: किंतु, स्पष्टप्रेय भेदेद्भतेऽप्रकारान्त्तरऽकल्पविश्लेष्यति अशिषेष वा प्रकृतः कर्म-वाचादनां

1. भेदेः धि न स्वतंत्रः प्रतिभूतिः किंतु, घटपटविशेषणतया, तदिश्ययतया वा। तथाच, घटपट-विभूति वा, घटपटनासरिता वा द्वितीयच्छविकारुपयोगिताध्ययतया प्रत्िती, भेद-प्रत्िती: । विशेषणादिभूतिविशेष्यातीतितत्ताविशिष्टततिताविशिष्टततिताविशिष्ट भेद-प्रत्ितीयेष्कः। तथा चाच्योध्याभ्यत। (VTN�. प. 48)
They could not show that the concept itself was fraught with such inherent contradictions that in whatever way it may be defined, one cannot escape them. To show that particular definitions or methods of explanation are wrong, is not to show the things themselves are indefinable and therefore unreal. In order to show that, a particular concept has got to be analysed on the basis of its own occurrence and the inconsistencies involved in such an analysis, shown. The Advaitins could not afford to do this as they themselves are obliged to accept the category of difference and make use of it, not in criticizing the doctrines of their rivals, where one could plead the right of парнанавेशकुण्डम; but in formulating some of their own Siddhāntas on topics like Anirvacanīya and Jīva-Brahmaikya. For example, "anirvacanīya" is defined by the Advaitins as सदसदात्मकत्वम् or the nature of being different from Sat and Asat, in essence. This element of "difference" from Sat and Asat, which is the differentia of Mithyātva, must be real and true; in which case it would be impossible to hold all differences to be false. It cannot be claimed that the distinction from Sat and Asat, present in the conception of Mithyātva, is a spurious one; while the difference that is sought to be denied by the Advaitin, is of the genuine order [पारम्परिक], and that, therefore, there is no self-contradiction between his theory of difference and its application. In that case, Sadvailakṣanya and Asadvailakṣanya being both of them admittedly false, the Universe will have to be regarded as both existent and non-existent (sadasadātmaka), rather than as something different from both. Such a position will be inconsistent with the Siddhānta of the Advaitins.

The dismissal of difference as a fiction of thought and its relegation to the category of a delusion as a product of Avidyā, gives rise to a serious difficulty in defining the nature of tattvajñāna, in Advaita. This knowledge of ultimate truth is said to be knowledge of non-duality (abheda-jñāna) which operates as a "Bādhaka-jñāna" in sultifying the age-long perception of difference and duality. Such a sublating cognition must naturally involve an element of difference and "opposition" to the past. One is therefore entitled to ask if the Bādhaka-jñāna of non-duality embodies some content of difference from the earlier state of knowledge, or simply takes the 'form' non-difference? In the former case, the reality of difference of some kind will stand conceded and come to stay even after the birth of Tattvajñāna, if it is not to relapse
MADHVA’S DOCTRINE OF “DIFFERENCE”

into the former state of ignorance! If, however, the tattvajñāna of the Advaitin is simply one of non-duality, it will be necessary to define the precise significance of the negative element (a-bheda) in terms of one or the other of the three well-known meanings of ‘otherness’, ‘negation’, or ‘opposition.’ In any alternative, difference and its reality will be implicated. For the stultifying knowledge which is to take the form of “absence of difference” (now) - bhedābhāva, must necessarily fix and define its content as something different from its counter-correlate (bheda). It must, in other words, be expressed in any of these three forms: ‘There is not, difference’ (now); or ‘there is no difference (here)’ or else ‘that something has till now been passing for difference.’ Every one of these forms of the sublating cognition will involve an element of difference and would be powerless to transcend it. In this way, the denial of the reality of difference, by the Advaitin, will involve a self-contradiction, in the last analysis.

Madhva meets the logical objections to the reality of difference, positively also. The so-called difficulties of interdependence etc. are no bar to the validity of the experience of difference अन्योन्याभवक्ष्य प्रमात्त्वाः-प्रतिबिंबिक्क्रियाः (Jayatirtha, VTN1). It is possible to find other ways of overcoming these and justify the perception of difference and its reality. Otherwise, it would be equally impossible for the Advaitin to show that the realization of non-difference is the highest teaching of the Vedānta, to be attained by study and meditation; for the conception of Abheda (non-difference) is as much open to these logical difficulties as ‘Difference’ itself.

It should be noted, in this connection, that most of the criticisms of the Advaitic dialecticians of the concept of difference, made before the time of Madhva, have reference primarily to the views about difference held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā realists. The former have treated difference as an attribute of objects. Such a position is hardly tenable as writers like Vīmuktatman and Citsukha have rightly shown. But the other view of difference as “Dharmisvarūpa,” or as constituting the essence of objects, does not seem to have been held by any save the Mīmāṃsakas of the Prābhākara school. The Advaitic dialecticians have, no doubt, urged objections against this view also. But their criticisms in this respect, do not affect the new and peculiar theory of the nature and status of difference formulated by Madhva, and expounded by Jayatirtha, on the basis of the new principle of “Viśeṣas”
and "Saviśeṣābheda", devised by Madhva. These early Advaitic dialecticians, till the days of Citsukha, and including him, do not seem to have been aware of the doctrine of Viśeṣas introduced by Madhva for the first time in Indian philosophy, or its repercussions on the discussion and settlement of the problem of difference. This is conclusive proof of the fact that Madhva's new doctrine of Viśeṣas and its application to the rationalization of the perception of difference, heralds almost a revolution in the history of logic and the Vedānta, in the Middle Ages. With its help Madhva gives a new orientation to the doctrine of difference and tides over the difficulties raised by the Advaitic dialecticians against the theory of Dharmisvarūpabhedavāda. He straightforwardly agrees with his critics that difference as an attribute of things (dharmanbhedavāda) is untenable. In doing this, he has gone far ahead of the Rāmānuja school which clings to the theory of Dharmabhedavāda. If the new solution of Difference as Saviśeṣābhīnna (colorfully identical) with the substratum, does not commend itself to the Advaitins who came after Madhva, it is not because of any further difficulty in the conception of difference viewed in the light of Viśeṣas, but because of a deep-rooted metaphysical bias in favor of the unreality of difference and in the Nirviśeṣatva of reality.

Difference, then, according to Madhva, is not something that falls outside the content of an object or what is generally considered to constitute its essence:

धभिमृत्तिरित्वमेद्यतातिरितित्रत्तित्वद्यावावात् (VTNt, p. 48).

The 'thing—in—itself' is a metaphysical abstraction. A thing is what it is, just because of and not in spite of its difference from others. In perception, the essence of a thing is the sumtotal of its distinction from others: अतो व्याख्यातिरित्वमलप्पू (Taitt. Up. Bhāṣya, p. 10). A world of difference lies latent and hidden in the bosom of everything. But these differences are not all of them necessary or presented to cognition in detail, everytime an object is perceived. The number of differences that might be perceived and correlated depends on the exigencies of the

1. This is the reason why Vyāsatīrtha and the other followers of Madhva have not felt called upon to meet the arguments directed against the conception of difference as पृथक्कर्त, वैभव्यम्, etc. For further remarks on this see Dasgupta; I. Phil., IV, p. 179-80; Chandradhar Sharma, Crit. Sur. I. Phil., p. 375, and my remarks in my History of Dvaita school, Vol. II, p.59.
situation. Out of the world of differences with which an object is for the nonce placed in opposition, only such as are relevant to the occasion or interests of the percipient are marked and emphasized and the rest are excluded and ignored without any reference to their counter-correlates. It follows then, that in all acts of perception of an object, its difference from others is revealed in the same act, in a general way, and for the most part: प्रायः सबैते विद्वृत्तं हि पदार्थसङ्ग्यं दर्शयते। (Madhva, VTN.) Where however doubts arise, they must be put down to the perception of difference from a few prominent counter-correlates only and missing the differences from others, owing to their bearing a more or less, close degree of resemblance to the object in question, aided by other unfavorable conditions like distance, want of sufficient light etc.: उत्तरित्वार्थसङ्ग्यं बलुनः प्रतीतबन्धित्वाच्यर्थसङ्ग्याविशेषां गर्भसंहर्षातः। (Vādāvali, p. 83.) The sphere of doubt is thus limited to cases of resemblance and other contributory factors. It is by no means unlimited as the objectors make out: यदा तु संशयंते, तदापि उत्तरित्वाः भावमेव ज्ञाते। नाहि सबैते भवति नवेति कृत्याचितूः संशयः। (Taitt. Bhāṣya, p. 10 b.) ज्ञातेऽपि प्रायः सबैते विद्वृत्तं गतिचित्तदेव चतुष्य संशयं करते। (VTN p. 5.)

This disposes of the objection of Śrīharṣa: यदै स्वरूपे भेदः स्वातः, तदा भास्मिणि हस्ते सत्यम् द्रष्यते कचन्न्य संदेहः स्वातः। (i, p. 210.)

Difference being thus dharmisvarūpa, the so-called perception of the object is nothing but the perception of its difference—, in other words, the perception of an object is the same as the perception of its difference from all others in a general and from some in a specific way. Inasmuch, then, as there are no two psychoses here, but only one unitary act of cognition, and inasmuch as there are no two things cognized, (viz., the object and difference) but only one, there is no room for the fallacy of interdependence at all: स च मेदे धर्मिणि: सत्यमेवैति धर्मितप्रर्तितिभव भेदसत्यातितिभवति, प्रत्येकमित्वाचारान्योत्पत्तिः। (VTN. t. p. 48.)

This disposes of the objection of interdependence raised by Citsukha and others. Tho' difference is admittedly the nature (svarūpa) of objects, P.M.—5.
the acceptance of Viśeṣas in the svarūpa of these objects, renders occasional doubts, possible: सविशेषलेन ज्ञाताहत्तलोपपति:। (NS. p. 382)

This disposes of the objection of Śrīharṣa that doubts would be unaccountable if difference were regarded as the essential nature of objects, and of Vimuktātman: अभेदे वेक्ष्येच तत्त्वत्वेच, न भेद एव गृहै गृहै। As Jayatṛthra points out, the mediation of Viśeṣas meets all these difficulties, effectively: विशेषणान्यतरमानाकर्षेयथ न भवति। विशेषत्व भेदप्रतिनिधित्वात्। (VTN. ॥p. 52 b).

There is thus no logical impediment, whatever, in regarding Difference as "Dharmisvarūpa" constituting the essence of objects. In the light of Viśeṣas, the category of difference has been fully vindicated by Madhva and shown to be perfectly valid and intelligible.
CHAPTER IX

SOME OTHER CATEGORIES: VIŚIŚTA, AMŚI AND ŚAKTI.

We may now turn to a few other categories of Dvaita ontology which have important bearing on Madhva’s theology and cosmology. These are 1) the group of three represented by Viśeṣaṇa, Viśeṣya and Viśiṣṭa, 2) the pair represented by Amśa and Amśi and 3) Śakti.

VIŚIŚTA

Viśiṣṭa includes the Viśeṣaṇa and the Viśeṣya. Viśiṣṭa means the “composite whole”. Viśeṣaṇa means the component or the qualifying element and Viśeṣya (or Śuddha) the substance to which the qualifying element is attached, in other words, the thing-in-itself.

The conception of Viśiṣṭa varies in the different schools. The conceptual Realists would not look upon it as an objective real:

विशेषणः विशेष्यं च तत्संवचन्भलपर्ष्कम्।
झानहूँ लसामपद्यात्, विशिष्ट्यमिति गीयते॥

According to Nyāya philosophy, all the three are mutually and absolutely different. The Mīmāṃsākās believe in the relation of Bhedābheda among them. The Monists hold them to be simply identical.

Madhva holds that every new relation alters or modifies the Substance to a greater or lesser extent. His view of the Viśiṣṭa is akin to the conception of whole and part in Hegelian philosophy, according to which the whole is something more than the sum of its parts tho’ dependent on them for their existence in the physical world. The subtraction of any one of the parts, destroys the whole. Only, Madhva would add that a new Viśiṣṭa would step in then: दृष्टान्तविशेषणसंबन्धेन देवदत्तो विशिष्ट्यम् रूपान्तरसुलभायति (VTN ट) दृष्टान्तविशेषणसंबन्धित्ववैशिष्ट्यवैशिष्ट्योन्नति: (Up. kh. ट.)

Madhva distinguishes carefully between relations and qualities which are coeval (Yāvaddrayabharśi) with the Substance (Viśeṣya) as for e.g. God and His attributes of Omiscience and those which are changing and impermanent (ayāvaddrayabhavī). In the former case, there is identity (always subject to internal distinction of reference thro’ Viśeṣas). Hence such identity is termed ‘Sa-viśeṣabheda. In respect of changing attributes and relations, there is only Bhedābheda or difference cum-identity.अयावद्वात्वभावविशेषण, विशिष्ट्य, विशेषायण मेधाभावाद्वैसीपायत्।

(G.T. ट, p. 188 b; NS. 365),
The same principle applies to Amśāmsī also. The concept of Viśiṣṭa
has important bearings on Madhva’s theory of Causation, as will be shown hereafter.

AMśA AND AMŚI

These two terms may be taken roughly to correspond to the idea of fraction and unit, understood metaphorically. They are also sometimes used for the part and the whole. Madhva applies the idea of amśa and amśi to sentient beings also. He distinguishes between Svarūpāmśa and Bhinnāmśa. The Avatars of God are His Svarūpāmśa. The Jivas are Bhinnāmśas. The Devas also have their amśas (cf. Indra and Arjuna). The theory figures in Madhva’s theology to a great extent. In respect of ordinary Jivas also, the operation of amśāṁśābhāva is considered necessary to account for the harmonious working of the quantitative adjustment of their innate potencies for bliss, volition and activity in regard to requisite ends, thro’ the agency of Viśēgas (see B. S. B. ii, 2, adh. 7).

ŚAKTI

Śakti is accepted by Madhva as nitya and anitya according to the nature of the substance in which it resides. They are of course inseparable from their substances, if they are coeval with them and bhinnābhīnna, when impermanent. The differentiation of Śakti and Śaktimat, is rendered possible by the agency of Viśēgas, as in the case of amśa and amśi etc.

The creative energy of Brahman, is for instance, identical with the Brahman; but it can be distinguished by the play of Viśēgas. The Śaktis themselves have two aspects: Śaktitā (latent state) and Vyaktitā (manifested state), also regulated by the play of Viśēgas. Hence they do not operate in mutual conflict, at the same time. To illustrate, the creative and destructive energies of Brahman are both eternal and identical with Its being. But there is an inner pre-established harmony which regulates their working periodically and without overlapping. At the time of dissolution, the creative energy of Brahman is in dormancy (Śaktirūpa) and comes into play (Vyakti) only at the right time. The distinction of Time into ‘the time of creation’ and ‘the time of dissolution,’ is likewise based on internal Viśēgas in Time which are also Saviśēgabhīnna from it. ¹

---

¹. शास्त्रहृदयायत्ततायां सैव किंवाशक्तितरितैयंति।
   सा च व्याक्तित्वं जनित्वं किंवया मयं मेव तु ||
   तथापि तु विशेषेण स्वयम्भणं विशेषणं
   जनेज्ञनिविद्वेदवात्रोऽशाश्वाभयान्तिक्रियः || (Bṛh. Up. C. iii, 4.p. I8)
Sādṛśya vs. The Universal

Sādṛśya (resemblance) is the category that replaces the Universal, in Madhva's system. Here, Madhva parts company with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsaka-Realists, and joins hands with the modern Nominalists and the Jainas.

There are three main theories in Western philosophy about the universal. The Nominalists look upon the particulars alone as real. There are only individual things in Nature and particular ideas in the mind. There is no universal at all. Only the name is common to many. This view approximates to that of Madhva and the Jainas.

The Conceptualists think that tho' only individual things exist in Nature, without any universal class-essence running thro' them, the human mind has the power of forming abstract and general ideas about them. The universals then, exist in our minds as concepts. The Realists, on the other hand maintain that the universals exist both in nature and in the mind.

In Indian philosophy, the Buddhists are extreme Nominalists, splitting even the so-called individuals into momentary essences (Svalakṣaṇam). The Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools show varying degrees of realistic bias in their conception of the universal. The argument from universals to Monism is easy to guess. The Jains have argued that the nature of the universal is not one of class-essence, but of similarity or resemblance. Such resemblance is actually experienced and should be taken as the objective ground of the notion of universals.

The same is the stand taken by Madhva. His rejection of the universal (Sāmānya) is a direct corollary of the pluralistic implications of his Svarūpa-bheda-vāda. He believes in the distinctiveness, nay, uniqueness of each individual and particular. He could ill afford then, to recognize a single universal class-essence running thro' a number of particulars, which will surreptitiously open the door to Monism, in the end. He therefore sets his face resolutely against the universal and gives it no quarter.

In his discussion of the problem of Sādṛśya Vs. the Universal, Madhva has surprisingly anticipated many of the arguments against the

---

1. Cf. किंच, न सत्ये नामिकमात्रां किंतु प्रतिविम्बत्वं तत्त्वानि भियतं (NS, i, 1,1.).
Nominalist view of the Universal, advanced by modern writers. The Realists’ contention is that most of the words we use in common life refer to things, qualities and relations or their actions (dravyaguna-karmāṇi) which do not exist by themselves. Unless our words express some elements which a number of particular things, qualities or relations have in common, the purpose of language and thought would not be served. To that extent, inference based on Vyāpti between hetu and sādhya, would also be impossible, as our words and thoughts could not rise above particulars, and inferences take us from particulars to the general.

It is urged by modern Realists that the Nominalist’s attempt to meet these difficulties by substituting ‘resemblance’, for the universal, is futile. Resemblance itself, as proposed to be used, would be a true universal in order to apply to different kinds of resemblances. These ‘resemblances’ would be far too vague, as everything resembles everything else in some respect or other. We should have to admit a different kind of resemblance for each universal term. It would be simpler and less cumbersome to admit, an objective universal characteristic corresponding to each term, instead of trying to detect more and more particular forms of resemblance.1

Madhva points out in reply that there is a basic difference in the modus operandi of resemblances and universals, which the Realist has failed to note in his arguments. It is this. The extension of significance of terms to a number of resembling particulars is achieved by ‘Resemblance’ not, as in the case of the universal, by means of accepting any conventional reference (śakyārtha) or on the basis of etymology (pravṛttiinitimitta) of these words, directly, but only indirectly as pointers (liṅgatayā) as to how these objects could be referred to by the same names, in virtue of their possessing a striking content of resemblance with the one already known: ‘अबो गौरित्यस्यायसमेतसद्दाश्च स्वेदिपि गोशचन्दन्यया इत्यथोत्पित्त्ववेदनपपत्ति वक्ता । ह्वैयरिसि सार्वनिकन्युत्पत्तिकालयन्न एक्यवक्ष्य्य एकप्रिण्डवियपयत्वलक्ष्यनानयपपत्ति । (N. S. p. 372)
The extended significance being already understood in the first instance of learning the language, there is no difficulty in limiting or extending the significance to suit the exigencies of a given context. The further objection that “we cannot distinguish a vast number of resemblances, by inspecting the resemblances of each relation”, is pointless, says

---

1. See Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, A. C. Ewing, p. 213.
Jayatirtha, as such partial resemblances could not be eschewed even in respect of universals: न च राज्ये, गौराद्वयंतृवीतीति तत्रापि गौरावद्वयंतृतातुमानःप्रसंगः। जातिनिमितैर्यायिः एवं प्रसंगस्य समानत्वादः। ( NS. p. 373 )

If the universe of reference is narrowed down to specific forms of the universal and not too generalized ones, the same thing could be done in the case of “Resemblances” too: जातिविदेशोऽनैतिकतानांगीतिकवेदात्तो न व्यभिचारः इति चेतः। ताहि सार्ध्यविदेशः एव लिंगः यो सृणामूलः इति बदामः। ( N. S. p. 373 )

Madhva also takes the wind out of the sails of the Realist by maintaining the extreme Nominalist position that even resemblance is not a universal and that it is sui generis in each case. This is consistent with his Svabhāvabhedavāda according to which no single characteristic can be the essence of more than one entity¹:

न स्वभावं एकाःवदितः * * * * *॥
एततः च सार्ध्यं पदार्थं पृथकः पृथकः ॥
नर्तादिकमयेवं तताद्रादिकयेव॥ ( AV )

The uniqueness of resemblance does not, however, prevent its facilitating inferential extension of significance of terms in required cases, just as “differing” attributes are apprehended as “different” without requiring the help of another difference to render them intelligible.

Madhva also argues that the contention that extension of significance of terms would be impossible without the idea of a universal, will be suicidal. For, if that be so, we should have to admit a series of universals one behind the other in order to justify the title of each universal to be so called. Similarly, to know all the particulars by the name “particular”, we shall have to admit a ‘universal’ of particulars!

जातिवेदेशः कर्षं तात्रुः, तत्र चैदनवस्थितिः।
तथेऽव व्यक्तिविद्याः व्यविद्याभावदृष्टिम॥ ( AV. )

The metaphysical consequence of Madhva’s view that resemblance is sui generis in each case, appears to be that the “pratibimbatva” of each individual self to God, based on a certain measure of Sādṛṣya also, is also unique and distinctive in each case and that no two individuals will bear the same resemblance to the Bimba, i. e. Brahman, in respect of their spiritual attributes of consciousness and bliss.

¹. Cf. सृणामूलः स्वभाववदन्यपत्ते:। ( Udayana )
CHAPTER XI

SPACE AND TIME

The Hindu theory of Mahāpralaya, which could be traced to the Rg Veda (X, 129), presupposes an absolute theory of space and time, according to which, they have a being in themselves, apart from the things in space and events in time. Space and Time must ex hypothesi be infinite. If we deny this, there would be great logical difficulty of conceiving of a boundary to finite space and time. We shall have to recognize more space and more time beyond them and this would lead to a regress: ’अन देशो नासित’ ‘इस्तानी काले नासित’, इत्यस्य व्याहतात्वात, देशकाल्योऽपि तयोपपरिच्छेदिनिति। देशकाल्योऽपि स्थापाय नियुक्ते विरोधेन, अधिरूपाय निष्पाठाध्ययनं देशकालान्तरयोऽवस्थयक्त्वाद। (Nym).

No doubt, the conception of infinite space and time, also, has its difficulty of involving the contradiction of a completed infinite. But Mādhva thought, with its most serviceable doctrine of “Svarūpa-Viśeṣas”, overcomes this difficulty and makes it possible to hold that space and time have infinite potential divisibility.

Mādhva therefore holds that space and time are distinct realities intuited by the Sākṣi and that they are not merely ‘forms of intuition’ as in Kantian thought. Otherwise, they could not be intuited: गणन साक्ष्योऽत्र प्रदेश इति विशेषम् (AV, ii, 3).

The Mādhva conception of space and time is, thus, much ahead of that of other Indian schools and looks surprisingly modern in some aspects. This is due not a little to their being interpreted in the light of the new doctrine of Sākṣi and Viśeṣas, which are Madhva’s most striking contributions to philosophic thought. These seem to hold great possibilities for the future of metaphysics. With these two ideas, Madhva overcomes the antinomies which beset the conception of space and time in other philosophical systems of ancient and modern thought as well.

Space is termed “Avyākrtākāśa” by Madhva, as distinguished from ether (भूताकाश). The former is eternal and uncreated and the latter

---

1. देश: सर्वत्रस्तिः, काल: सदास्तिः, पूर्व: काल, ह्यवाचितप्रत्तीता, तथा: स्वनिवाहकत्वाः, प्रमेयकालदित् स्वसंबन्धसंबंधाच। (Vyāsārāya, Nym).

2. भूताकाशाल्पतिरिक्तात् देशकालपरिच्छेद्यावस्थांतरिक्तकालिन्तदिः एवावाहुताकाशलात। (Vyāsārāya TC).
is a product of matter. *This twofold classification of space, is a special feature of Madhva’s philosophy.* It is tersely termed as आकाशाऔत्त्मू by Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarāya.

The Nyāya–Vaiśeṣikas hold that there is one eternal ubiquitous space (vibhu) which is not open to perception, but is only inferred from the spatial characteristics of proximity, remoteness etc. But spatial properties and relations like distance, size etc., can be perceived directly thro’ touch, sight etc. The Mīmāṃsakas hold similar views. The Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools look upon Space and Time as categories of the understanding (buddhikalpita). Some Naiyāyikas regard space as perceived by the visual sense. Jayatīrtha dismisses this as impossible on the Nyāya view that space is colorless. Nor can Space be left to be entirely inferred thro’ sound, as even the congenitally deaf have a perception of space.

Madhva’s theory of the intuitive perception of space and time has received assent from many modern European thinkers. The ordinary ‘scientific’ view of space is what makes movement possible. The idea of possible movement is formed by abstraction from the experience of movement. This is circuitous. Madhva says that we cannot understand movement as such without being already conscious of space. Movement does not explain space. Space explains movement. He therefore suggests that space must be accepted as a reality given by direct perception, not of the ordinary senses, but of Sākṣi, which is specially fitted to sense the supersensuous. No memory of movement is therefore necessary to establish space inferentially and mentally, as some of the older Naiyāyikas thought and some modern philosophers do.

Madhva’s definition of space as distinguished from ether, is true to its essential nature of providing room for bodies to exist: अवकाशमात्रं हाकाशं: (AV. ii, 3).

This is explained by Vyāsarāya as अवकाशप्रदत्तम्. This is supported by a passage from the Bhāgavata (iii, 30, 43) quoted by Madhva. He holds that space and time are infinitely divisible, into further spaces and further parts of time, each such part being held to be a “natural” part of it and not merely conditioned by Upādhis! For, “Upādhis”, according to Madhva, are not so much the causes of distinction (where they do not actually exist)— भेदकारक as ‘pointers’ (ञापकः) thereof.
Madhva shows that it is logically inconceivable that Space is created: 

अवकाशार्थं ह्याकाशः कथमुपर्ववेतस्मयः ।
व्यवहाराकाशता पूर्णं कि मूलत्रिविषिं जगत् ॥ ( AV ).

We cannot conceive of the antecedent non-existence of space anywhere, if space is to be created. Production also needs a material stuff and there is no such stuff out of which space could be created. If Prakṛti is that stuff, the question could be repeated in respect of it, as to why it should alone be uncreated. If the reply is that the production of Prakṛti from another stuff is inconceivable, the same thing could be said of space also. The Buddhists’ view of space as मूलत्रिविषिं (negation of tangible reals) would lead to other difficulties such as that such reals existed at a time when space was not yet in existence (or created). This would reverse the ideas of Srṣṭi and Pralaya. Madhva therefore pleads strongly that space must be accepted as an uncreated and eternal substance, a view which receives striking support from the remarks of Herbert Spencer: “If space is created, it must have been previously non-existent. The non-existence of space cannot, however, be imagined by any mental effort. If the non-existence of space is absolutely inconceivable, then, necessarily, its creation is absolutely inconceivable” (First Principles, p. 27).

As a Vedāntin believing in the Brahmakāraṇatvavāda of the entire Universe, Madhva seeks to reconcile the essential uncreated nature of space (and other ex hypothesi eternal reals) with the Vedāntic axiom: that everything in the Universe is, in some sense, created by Brahma (B. S. i, 1, 2) by interpreting the ‘creation’ of eternal substances like space, and time in a Pickwickian sense of “Parādhīnaviṣēṣāpti”, (पराधीनविषेषायति) which will be explained later. This shows that Madhva has been the only commentator, who has had the right insight into the raison d’être and metaphysical significance or the principle of Samanvaya enunciated by the Sūtrakāra. Madhva explains the references to the creation of Ākāśa, in Upaniṣadic cosmology, as referring only to the मूलत्रिविषि and this is the reason why he has admitted two kinds of Ākāśa, in his system.

**Time**

Time, in Dvaita Vedānta, is the essential constituent of all experience: तेन च कालं सविशेषाष्टयस्यभूतत्वं इति सर्वार्थात्वस्वयम्। (Vādāvali, p. 95).

1. ‘Creation’ includes other cosmic determinations like स्थिति.
But it is not, as in Advaita, apprehended by the ordinary sense of perception.\textsuperscript{1} It is held to be perceived by the Sākṣi, on the testimony of सौपूर्णिकात्मक. At the stage of Sūṣupti, there is no functioning of the sense organs, including the mind. Hence, there is no scope for Pratyakṣa or Inference. The perception of time in this dreamless state, is borne out by the immediate evidence of its intuitive experience, recollected immediately on waking up\textsuperscript{2} and expressed in the judgment: ‘एतातन्त काले सुखमहामस्त्याःपमा’ (so long, I have slept in bliss). This cannot be disregarded as a mere recollection as there can be no recollection of what has never been experienced by oneself. For the same reason of its immediacy, it cannot be treated as an inference to a condition of complete freedom from any kind of infelicity “at the period of time just elapsed”. If such a condition has been experienced by the person who draws the present inference, he should have had a direct experience of “that period of time which has just elapsed”. There can be no inference of its condition, had it never been experienced by him. There would thus be no explanation of the experience of dreamless sleep (सौपूर्णिकात्मक) unless the perception of time (besides that of the ātman and of bliss i.e. ललृप्यशं) is accepted. For the same weighty reasons, the intuitive perception of time by the Sākṣi, must be admitted:

काले हि साक्षिन्यक्षः सुखसि च प्रतिततः (AV.)

The Naiyāyikās look upon Time as only inferable and not open to direct perception as it is formless. But as Madhva rightly points out, the inference of time would itself presuppose time as its Pakṣa (minor term) and the ascertainments of Vyāpti in respect of time would be impossible without a prior perception of time. There is, thus, no other Pramāṇa, than the Sākṣi, by which time could be proved. The Nyāya, Sāmkhya, and Yoga philosophers would appear to hold that time is more a category of the understanding (दिक्षित) -as a necessary “form of intuition” known only thro’ inference as there is no perception of blank time without a sensible content. Madhva shows that this is not so. It should be regarded, says he, as a fundamental ontological category that conditions all our being and becoming. No experience is possible

\textsuperscript{1} नीपान्विति कालस्वभिन्नवेदयत्व-पुरुषातिति (Vedānta-paribhāṣā, p. 22, Calcutta)

\textsuperscript{2} अपारिकात्मकतिसिद्धस्वत्तुपूर्णिकान्तमहस्विद्यताति
without it. It is experienced along with the experience itself: स्वायत्रस्वाध्यक्ष सभी: प्रतीतयः  न केतन्मक्षेतवमाहोते, किंतु, कार्त्तिकालिमेभ।

The organ by which the intuiting Self becomes aware of time, is termed the Sākṣi or स्वायत्त्रस्वाध्यक्ष, which is no other than the Sākṣi itself turning its own inner searchlight, so to say, upon itself. This answers the difficulty felt by many Western thinkers like William James that we have no sense for bare time, that we cannot intuit a mere duration. The difficulty lies in our taking only the waking experience as the basis for philosophizing. The Vedānta, on the other hand, draws its certified data from the other states also including Suṣupti, in particular, which is the highest state of ideal experience (of bare ego, bare time and bare felicity, if you please) of which every one of us has had direct experience, as the coveting of it so conclusively proves. Madhva has thus anticipated Kant's notion of pure intuition of time without any sensible content in his doctrine of the intuitive perception of Time by the Sākṣi. His view has also a remarkable affinity with Alexander's acceptance of the intuition of time and space prior to sensations and his view that it is thro' intuition that they are immediately perceived.

Madhva does not hold that time is an undifferenced and indivisible whole (akhaṇḍa). It is an infinite and infinitely divisible1. It is an infinite stream of duration without beginning or end. Each duration is pervasive. As in the case of Paramāṇus, the shortest conceivable duration is also theoretically divisible, still further. Electrons in physics, tho' physically indivisible are not logically so. Madhva holds that at whatever size they might be said to be "atoms", we can always conceive parts of them smaller than the whole, altho' it may not be possible, for physical reasons, to split them: अविभाज्यः प्रत्येकः। (AV)2. This enables him to hold that the divisions of time are all "natural" parts of it and not merely औपाधिक or superimposed: अविभाज्यः कालेः स्वभावकः एवं उभ्यमानिः (NS. p. 387 b). As in the case of space, so in respect of

1. In his B. T. (iii) Madhva gives an interesting table of the smaller units of time starting from the occupying a point of three brahmanas. 3 trutis make one vedha, three vedhas a lana, three lanas a nimega, three nimegas a kṣaṇa and so on.

2. Cf. सत्य विभिन्नतेत्तु सत्यस्य, तेषां विभागो न कश्चिपि विभिन्नोति, स परमाणुरिति ब्यास्यानात् (NS. p. 349 b.)
time. Madhva posits that it is eternal and uncreated in the sense of bare empty time (anādi) and non-eternal (divisible). Both are intuited by Sākṣī. This is how he reconciles the Vedic and Upaniṣadic and Purāṇic texts which speak of time in both ways:

- नासदास्यो सदासीत तदानी (R. V. X, 129. 1.)
- द्रव्य कर्म च कालय (Bhāg. ii, 10, 12 )
- सेव निमेया जासिरे (T. Ā X, 1, 2 )
- नित्या कालय सतम (Viṣṇu Pur. q. by Madhva )

It is also pointed out by Madhva, that unless intrinsic parts are accepted in Time, the established order of time in Sṛṣṭi and Pralaya could not be maintained without risk of overlapping and the admission of Upādhis for this purpose would be pointless unless there were already natural distinctions in time to which these Upādhis could attach themselves apart from the difficulty of interdependence which would also ensue, in the event of Upādhis de novo.

---

1. कालमेदेन जगत्स्विद्विरत्यवस्था च परमेते न चढते । कालस्य भावात, ईश्वर्य नियमचन्द्रात्।
स्वते तु कालमेदस्यार्थात, ऐश्वर्याविद्यवस्थोपपत्ति । (SNR. p. 19 ).
CHAPTER XII

CAUSATION.

The Madhva theory of Causation cannot be understood without relation to its doctrine of Viśiṣṭa, already referred to. The true bearing of this doctrine on the question of creation of “eternal substances” like Prakṛti, Jīvas, Space, Time etc., would not be missed if the distinction of यावदन्वय्यभावी and अयावदन्वय्यभावी relations is clearly borne in mind. Jayatīrtha’s statement: बिशिष्टाकार्ण वल्लुक्तपरिभाषा इति तत्वशास्त्रावलिपज्जनो भवति। (NS. p. 431) if rightly understood, in the light of the important distinction drawn between these two types of relations, would have prevented the utterly baseless tho’ sensational conclusion of the ‘essential creation’ (सङ्ख्याढि) of the Jīvas (as of other eternal substances) according to Madhva’s theory of Causation, drawn by Prof. H. N, Raghavendrachar¹. This has evoked protests from many orthodox quarters, as a misinterpretation of Madhva. The embodiment of selves and such other Viśeṣaṇas of finite reality being in the nature of the things, not coeval with the entities concerned, there is no possibility at all of applying the principle of Saviśeṣābheda between them. The proposition बिशिष्टाकार्ण वल्लुक्तपरिभाषा: (NS, p. 431) would not therefore, apply to them!

Madhva’s doctrine of Bhedābheda between Viśiṣṭa and Viśeṣya, (or Śuddha) in respect of changing attributes and relations of things, leads to the corollary of “Sadasatkāryavāda” of Causation, which is his general theory of Causation.

Causation implies a change, a beginning and an end:
सत्तिन्त्र व्यवभाषामाणवेऽपदार्थसङ्ख्येऽवत्तेऽ श्राव्यायाकारणं च नारस्तिति सत्तिन्त्रो लोको व्यवहारति

अवाक्यं: सत्तित्तंसेर्यंवेऽविश्रुतितं

यद्यस्त बिशिष्टोयज्ज जायते, कोऽत्र जायते? (G. T. ii. 16)

“Causation”, therefore, has reference only to the “Viṣeṣa” aspect of the substance in question. Madhva, therefore, rejects the Satkāryavāda (of the Sāmkhyas) and the Asatkāryavāda of Nyāya philosophy as half-truths. He combines them into a new theory of Sadasatkāryavāda; for change is not merely something new appearing, but it presupposes a substratum that changes, in form or state, Ex nihilo nihil fit. Causation would be impossible and meaningless, without the assumption of

¹. Dvaita Philosophy, Its Place in the Vedānta, Mysore Uni. 1941.
continuity of the cause in and throu' the changes it has undergone. Hence Jayatīrtha defines Causation as follows: \( \text{तत्वेऽहि कस्पै} \) अबिक्रोपच्चार्चां-न्यामन्यथा क्रियते \( \text{न पुनर्ज्ञानेत्र भवति इति हि परिणामवादिनो मन्यते} \) \( \text{(NS. p. 394)} \). Such a definition is intended to meet the criticism that if cause and effect were different events they will be absolutely separate and there would be no relation between them, The gulf between the two will remain unbridged. The Buddhist doctrine of causation as an ever-changing, constant, ceaseless flux, each moment \( \text{(क्षण)} \) of existence being but a "specious present" with no duration, is sharply criticized by Madhva and Jayatīrtha. We cannot think of a "change" without a changing thing at the back. There must be a "something" that is not contained in the succession which carries on each vanishing point of the succession and adds it to the next \( \text{(B, S, ii, 2, 21)} \). Such a link would be missing in the Buddhist doctrine of Kṣanīkatva, as a kṣaṇa is, according to the Buddhist view, indivisible like a mathematical point \( \text{(निर्विशेष)} \) at that). There would be no split-second interval between any two vanishing points of moments at which the cause and effect could have met and "causation" taken place by the transference of "Samskāras"! For, mere sequence or succession \( \text{(in time)} \) is not Causation.

Madhva holds, therefore, that the effect is partially non-existent in its definite form and shape, while being existent in the form of the cause:

\[
\text{अस्यत्कारस्तेष्ये भारणासमत्वः हि} \quad \text{(AV)}
\]

He does not, however, subscribe to the Sāṁkhya view of absolute identity of cause and effect, as that will render casual effort superfluous and causation meaningless. Even if that were understood in the sense of "manifestation", the same difficulty would arise in its case:

\[
\text{व्यक्तावपि समेत हेतुददनस्थान्यथा भवति} \quad \text{(G. T.)}
\]

Manifestation and non-manifestation cannot be understood in the sense of the effect being perceived or not perceived \( \text{(tho' pre-existent in the cause)} \). That will land us in solipsism \( \text{(द्विभेद)} \). There will be no answer to the question why the effect is not manifested if it were really and absolutely and without any qualification \( \text{(विशेष)} \) identical with the cause and so pre-existent in it. The idea of manifestation itself will be similarly open to an antinomy of production or manifestation,
CHAPTER XIII
NEGATION

Negation, as a fact of experience, is a Prameya. It is an important ontological category. As a thought-category it lies at the root of many other philosophical conceptions like Bhāvarūpa-jñāna, Mithyātva, Bheda and Causation. The positive and the negative represent the two aspects of reality. The Mādhva philosophers agree with the Naiyāyikas in accepting the negative as an independent category of experience. The argument by which some philosophers have sought to deny independent status to negation, by equating it with the mere existence of the locus, has been rejected by Jayatīrtha, in his TŚṭ. He points out that the judgment ‘there is no jar on the ground’ must signify something more than the mere locus and that that something must be a non-being. Without reference to such a non-being, it will be impossible to define what is meant by the locus per se. Otherwise, it would be open to us to speak of the non-existence of the jar, even when it is present on the ground, as the locus as such exists even while the jar is there on it.

Mādhva defines the negative as: प्रयथ्यात्मकप्रत्ययती निवृत्तप्रत्ययत्तम् or what is presented in the primary act of perception as something that is “given” and which does not involve the significant negation or denial of a “something” or of a relation or property to a given something or in respect of a particular locus: आपत्तायं संविदि विशेषत: सप्रत्ययोगिकप्रतिरोधाकारकः प्रत्ययमानलयम्. In other words, the perception of the non-existent is conditioned by reference to a particular counter-correlate (प्रतियोगी), according to the exigencies of the situation. The doctrine of “Saviśeṣabheda” between substance and attributes enables Mādhva to admit the logical possibility of integrating negative aspects with positive entities and vice versa, in propositions.¹

¹ Cf. चषोपि प्रथमं विषयश्च प्रतिरूपेन, प्रतियोज्यन्तरं पटो न भवतीति पदक्षेपात्मकत्वात् प्रतियते। शाम्भवादिरपि प्रथमं विषयश्च प्रतिरूपेन, परमस्वहृदयावतोज्यन्तरं प्रमेयं इति विषयश्च प्रतियते। अन्येद्वपि परमशर्मिम्बाओ विशेषशक्तिः संगच्छत इत्युक्तमेव।

(NS. p. 286)
Madhva recognizes three types of negation: antecedent (*Prāg-abhāva*), subsequent (*pradhvamsa-abhāva*) and absolute (*atyaanta-abhāva*). The first has an upper limit; the second a lower and the last is unlimited. Its counter-correlate (प्रतियोगी) is the absolutely non-existent (e.g. square circle, hare’s horn, tortoise hair etc.). Such non-existence is also called निन्दनतियोगिक or अप्रमाणिकप्रतियोगिक or a negation whose counter-correlate is a myth.

Jayatīrtha and Vyāsaśāya argue that there is nothing illogical in an utterly non-existent figuring as Pratiyogī in respect of अत्यन्ताभाव; for "प्रतियोगित्वम" (being the counter-correlate) is not an attribute which requires or presupposes the actual existence of an object like other predications of attributes like color. To be the counter-correlate of a negation is merely being the object of such knowledge as would enable us to form the idea of a negation: अभावसानोपक्षयोपिष्टावेशयताभावस्य प्रतियोगित्वम् (*Tdt.*). If the physical existence of the Pratiyogī or its factual reality at the time of the perception of the *abhāva* is insisted upon, even the perception of the antecedent and subsequent negations would become equally impossible, as there surely is no Pratiyogī in actual existence at the time of the perception of the *Prāgabhāva* or of the *dhvamsa*. That a Pratiyogī (like the jar) is going to come into existence later or that it did exist earlier (in the case of *dhvamsa*), makes no difference to the point at issue. If then, it is the idea of the "Pratiyogī" that counts, such an idea is possible even in regard to mythical things like the hare’s horn. The concept of अप्रमाणिकप्रतियोगिकाभाव holds the key to Madhva’s theory of illusions, The अन्योन्याभाव of the Nyāya school is equated by Madhva with "difference" which has already been treated at length,
III. EPISTEMOLOGY

CHAPTER XIV

THE THEORY OF PRAMĀÑAS

Life and human experience being at times vitiated by illusions, it becomes necessary to define truth in experience so as to enable us to distinguish it from the false. The ascertainment of truth being the first and foremost aim of philosophy, it is incumbent on it to define truth and error in clear terms and indicate the instruments or channels of their ascertainment. The value of such preliminary ascertainment of the sources, bounds and limitations of human knowledge cannot be too highly commended. In the words of Max Muller, "Such an examination of the authorities of human knowledge ought, of course, to form the introduction to any system of philosophy. To have clearly seen this, it seems to me, a very high distinction of Indian philosophy. How much useless controversy would have been avoided, particularly among Jewish, Mohammadan and Christian philosophers, if a proper place had been assigned in limine to the question of what constitutes our legitimate and only possible channels of knowledge, whether perception, inference or anything else. Supported by these inquiries into the evidences of truth, the Hindu philosophers have built up their various systems of philosophy or their various conceptions of the world, telling us what they take for granted and then advancing step by step from the foundation to the highest pinnacles of their systems."

Man is essentially an epistemological animal. His irrepressible thirst for knowledge is itself a thesis about knowledge. Whatever differences of opinion there might be about the status and validity of particular experiences, there can be no two opinions that there are and needs must be, certain experiences which are logically valid; for, if logical certainty is denied or impugned, logic itself would be without foundation. All our experiences presuppose the existence of certain a priori or objective standards by which they are judged. A wholesale denial of such criteria would cut at the very roots of our experience and bring all reasoned activities to a standstill. Any inquiry into the true and specific nature of such standards has meaning only when their existence is admitted in a general manner. Absolute scepticism would be unsustainable, even for a moment. If everything is invalid, the contention of scepticism

itself would be invalid. The possibility of doubt is itself a sufficient proof of something that is not open to doubt. The contention of Buddhism and Advaita, that there is nothing in this phenomenal world that is valid or that there is nothing the certainty of which could be accepted, is therefore, inadmissible. It stands to reason then, that there are things of which definite and valid knowledge is possible. That being so, an investigation into the means of such knowledge is naturally in order.

In Indian philosophy, such validity is known as pramāṇya. But the term pramāṇa (from which it is derived) is used in two senses (1) true knowledge and (2) the means or instruments by which it is engendered, according to the two senses of the suffix "ana" (lyut). Madhva has done a distinct service to epistemology in distinguishing these two senses and usages of the term and coining two separate terms "Kevala" and "Anu" pramāṇa, to denote them, without ambiguity. He defines pramāṇa in both the above senses as यथार्थम्.

"Pramāṇa" in the first sense (of valid knowledge) refers to the capacity of true knowledge to reveal the nature of an object as it really is: यथार्थित्वविविधीकारित्वम्. As applied to Anu-Pramāṇas like Perception, Inference and Šabda, it signifies the means (sādhana) by which such correct knowledge of objects is obtained. But there is no difference in the directness of their relation to their objects. The Anupramāṇas function with as much immediacy as the "Kevala". But the instruments produce "श्रेयतः" in Jñāna while Jñāna merely acts as a manifesting condition thereof. Hence the two classifications are based on their respective mode of relation to knowability.

This definition is suitably expanded by Jayatīrtha and others so as to bring out the full force and significance of the terms "यथा" and "अथवः".

1. भवे ल्युट and करणे ल्युट as they are technically known.
2. The term "Yathārtham" is an Ayavibhāva compound, composed of "yathā" and "artham". The adverb "yathā" signifies: पदार्थीनिलोपितं or not going beyond the "artham". "Artha" denotes a knowable object from the root र with the upādi suffix "tha" , the root itself being understood in the specialized sense of "knowing" (avagati): अर्थतः अवर्गीयायमेकस्यव्ययमभृतिरिरित्वरूपस्तय: विविधिति। अर्थतः हत्वर्गीय श्रेयतः अनुस्स्वतः तदाधिकता अस्स्वतः। अर्थस्त्रीयाधिकर्थ तथ्यस्त्रीया प्रहस्तिद्वादाद। अप्राधिनामच ज्ञानार्थितावित (NS. p. 247 b).
as applied to valid knowledge on the one hand and its means on the other. Pramāṇa is defined by Jayatīrtha as the knowledge of a thing as it actually is, with reference to a particular space–time setting: 

वत्साविश्वलेखः ज्ञयते विषयकेरौति, नान्यथा इ other words, as knowledge which “answers” to the nature of the thing. But by correspondence, here, is meant, not either spatio–temporal co-existence of Pramāṇa and Prameya or correspondence on all fours extending to one and all of the aspects of a given object. It is no more than— यद्यन्त्ययोग्याय प्रतीत तथ तद्भक्षयोः तथात्मृ ।

or the existence of such aspects as are actually perceived by each person according to the extent of his capacity or understanding and other conditions governing the rapprochement to the object: कतः यद्यपि अभिप्रायं विषयाय प्रतीत तथैव तद्भक्षयोः तथात्मृ ।

or the actual existence of an object with reference to a spatio-temporal setting in the manner perceived with reference to that setting.

The problem of Perception looms large in modern philosophy,—whether physical objects are directly perceived, and if so, to what extent. The main obstacle to the theory of direct perception of objects as opposed to the theory of perception of the sense–datum is the alleged ‘gap between evidence and conclusion.’ The Mādhva theory overcomes these difficulties by a frank admission that the way in which things appear to us is causally determined by a number of factors which are extraneous to the thing itself and that there are gradations of knowledge and finally that no knowledge at the human level could lay claim to complete comprehension of a thing, in all its innumerable aspects and relations: कस्यापि साधृवणी विषयाय करणाभावात् (NS. p. 251). But this limitation of knowledge does not make it ‘ invalid’. The correspondence to facts (शेषाय बधिभावाविद्यम्) is to be understood naturally with reference to certain definite space–time settings and other properties of objects conditioned by external factors and subject to the ‘normal conditions’ of perception being fulfilled. ¹

Kavala-Pramāṇa is divided into four types, in the descending order of merit as Iśvara-jñāna, Lakṣmi-jñāna, Yogi-jñāna, and Ayogi-jñāna, on the basis of intrinsic difference in quality, luminosity and range. The first two are in the nature of Svarūpa-jñāna alone while the other two include Vṛtti-jñāna (sensory knowledge) also. The classi-

¹. यथाभासति प्रतीतं, तत्स्य तथाभूतस्य सत्त्वम् । देशकाल्योर्धिः, विभिषणात्वत् यथाभूतभिन्ननेनैव गृह्यत्वात् । विभिषणास्तेष्यत्स्यदेशयापस्तेष्य । (NS. p. 248 b.)
fication tho' partly theological, is not without mystic, epistemological and psychological significance. Iṣvara-pratyakṣa is accepted by the Nyāya and Vedānta schools as the necessary presupposition of all human knowledge (as in Berkeley). It is, according to Madhva, all-comprehensive, always veridical, eternal and independent and part of the divine nature itself and extremely luminous,—luminosity being an intrinsic quality of this knowledge itself, unrelated to objects. Lakṣmījñāna is next only to God's, in these respects. The ramifications of Yogi-jñāna include those of Rju, Tāttvika and Atāttvika souls and of the last into those of Muktiyogyas and others. The nature of the constitution of the Svarūpajñāna of these is explained by Jayatirtha in his Pramāṇapaddhati.

Kevala-pramāṇa has two aspects: knowledge consisting of the essence of selfhood and that arising from mental processes. These are graded in regard to validity as regards both, into uttama, madhyama and adhama. Details have been given by Jayatirtha.
CHAPTER XV.

PERCEPTION, INERENCE AND VERBAL TESTIMONY.

Sense-perception is defined by Madhva as निदेशांत्यिन्यसंख्यित्वें शास्त्रम् or knowledge produced by the right type of contact between flawless sense-organs and their appropriate objects. Such contact would be in the nature of an Anu-Pramāṇa. The Nyāya-Śāstras accept six different kinds of contact (sannikāraṇa) including a special one for abhāvapraty- akṣa. With the rejection of the Samavāya school, all of these stand rejected by Madhva. He accepts only one direct type of sannikāraṇa of the different senses, including the Sākṣi, with their appropriate objects and their negations. The senses (indriyas) being the products of Taijasa-ahamkāra-tattva, such contacts are presumed to be effected thro’ the medium of “rays”. Another view is that in the case of the eyes alone, the contact is thro’ “rays” and in others, directly between the organs and the objects and their abhāvas.

The flawlessness of the senses and their contact etc., is to be borne out by the truthfulness of knowledge, within the meaning of “yathārtha” already given, which is itself ascertained by the Sākṣi. Hence there is no mutual dependence in the establishment of the flawlessness of the senses etc. Absolute flawlessness of indriyas is possible only in respect of the knowledge of God, Lakṣmi and the released. The Svarūpa-jñāna of Uttama-jīvas is always true while the Vṛttijñāna of all the three classes of unreleased souls, is open to error, as the senses (here) are material. These limitations in the nature of Svarūpajñāna and Vṛttijñāna of the different orders of beings may perhaps explain from the Mādhva point of view, the impossibility for ordinary human perceptions to know the “ding an sich” as it is. It is another way of explaining that our senses are not constituted in such a way as to enable us to know all about given objects of perception but only as much of reality as is adequate for our normal life. This would suffice to answer the argument of Scepticism about our right to make a transition from sense-experience to physical objects. The contents of individual experiences are proverbially fragmentary. Even of the reality of which I take note, I can never perceive more than just those aspects that attract my attention for the time being or are significant to my interests. There is an element of selective attention in individual experiences. Experience is

1. Technically, Svarūpajñāna also is engendered by Svarūpendriyas.
not a mere awareness of a succession of presented objects or relations, undetermined by the controlling interest or purpose of the pramātā. We are thus forced to admit the necessary existence of a superhuman experience to which the whole Universe of being is directly presented (God’s knowledge being only Pratyakṣātmaka, according to Madhva) as a complete and harmonious system. As reality has been defined as अन्तरोपिते प्रभितिविषय: it follows that it can have no meaning apart from presentation to a sentient experience. Hence Madhva posits a graded series of more and more harmonious wholes culminating in the perfect and systematic unity of the absolute experience of the Brahman which embraces the totality of all existence, all at once, in its sweep (sarvavigayakam). The Mādhva theory has thus deep philosophic significance, tho’ apparently treated as a purely theological doctrine.

As all reality is Saviśeṣa in essence and in the last analysis, and the “bare something” being inconceivable, all Pratyakṣa is considered to be fundamentally “Savikalpa” or determinate, in origin and the distinction of perception into determinate and indeterminate accepted in the Nyāya and Advaita schools, is rejected.

The Sākṣī intuits its own self (atman) and its characteristics of bliss etc., as well as the mind and its processes, Avidyā, knowledge arising from external senses, the feelings of pleasure and pain etc., Time, Space and God. The mind comprehends external reality thro’ the sense organs and acts as the independent instrument of memory (aided by Samskāras).

The other senses have their own well-defined sphere of objects.

Inference

According to Madhva, inference consists in the knowledge of the mark of inference as pervaded by the Sādhyā and invariably concomitant with it, leading to the ascertainment of the Sādhyā, (निदंशुसृपति). The Buddhist logicians regard the principles of essential identity and causality (तात्त्विक and तद्वपश्च) as specific grounds of determining Vyāpti, while the Vaiśeṣikas enumerate five such specific grounds in the Sūtra: अख्येदे कार्य कारण एकार्थसमवाय विरोधि च (V. S.). The Sāmkhyas enumerate seven such principles on which we may base a universal proposition.1 Madhva holds that invariable concomitance is the only relation

1. Cf. मात्रानिमित्तसंयोगिविरोधिसंहचारिभि:।
   स्वस्वाधिभवचातातैः सापेक्षानि सत्ताः।
on which all inferences ultimately rest. Even Pakṣadharma (the middle term) being a characteristic of the Pakṣa (minor term), is not considered by him to be an essential factor in inference as even a Vyadhikaraṇahetu (which is not spatially coexistent with the sadhya) can lead to valid inference. He also rejects the claim of the Naiyāyikas that सपक्षसत्त्वम् and विपक्षसत्त्वम् are necessary conditions of inference as these are not obviously to be found in the Kevalānvayī and Kevalavyatireki types of inference. Madhva dismisses “Vyatirokavyāpti” as providing any independent basis for inference, as it merely corroborates the positive concomitance between Sādhyā and Sādhana, in cases of doubt. Consistent with this position, Madhva repudiates the threefold classification of inference as Kevalānvayī, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki based on purely positive, purely negative and combined concomitance, and recognizes only one genuine type of inference based on anvaya-vyāpti. Jayatīrtha puts down the acceptance of the other types to a love of classification or for the sake of facility of understanding.

The Nyāya school insists on a five-member syllogism in Parārthānu-māna. The Buddhist logicians require two and the Māmaṁsakas three. Madhva is not in favor of any hard and fast rule. The irreducible minimum for him, is the statement of the Vyāpti. The rest would depend on the exigencies of the occasion. Where the subject-matter of dispute is clear to the disputants, the statement of the “Pratijñā” could as well be dispensed with. In any case, if the five-member syllogism serves merely as a reminder to the person addressed, he could reach the desired conclusion by just remembering the Vyāpti alone. In that case, the use of the other members would be superfluous. If the five-member syllogism acts as an authoritative pronouncement (āgama) leading to the inference, it will have no force as the disputants (in a Vāda) have no faith in the trustworthiness of each other. If it is taken on trust, it can be done so outright without the paraphernalia of a five-member syllogism! Moreover, if it should act as an Āgamavākya, the Kevalavyatireki type would have no legs to stand on. If the five-member syllogism is looked upon as a dialectic method, Madhva points out that it would entail the same being pursued till all difference of opinion is finally set at rest and

1. [तत्तद्विद्वदएव व्यञ्जनेः भन्ति वियनम्]
absolute agreement reached between the parties. This would require a series of five-member syllogisms and not one.

The errors in reasoning are classified into formal and material. The most important of these are विरीध and असंगति in which are subsumed all the defects of reasoning including the fallacies and Nigrahasthānas (grounds of defeat) of the Naiyāyikas.

**Verbal Testimony**

Madhva makes out a strong case for according verbal testimony an independent status as a Pramāṇa. The Vaiśeṣikas regard verbal judgments as inferences (बाक्य बाक्यार्थवस्तुमानम्). The Prābhākaras while assigning an independent status to Apauruṣeyavākya subsume verbal judgments of human origin under inference. This is invidious as the accessories to verbal judgments (such as समयस्मरण, शास्त्रायावस्तुसंबंध) are the same in both the cases. As verbal judgments do not involve any Vyāptijñāna, they could not be treated as inferential in character and should be given a separate status.

Śabdāpramāṇa is divided into Pauruṣeya and Apauruṣeya. The Vedic literature is regarded as "Apauruṣeya" and the Smṛtis, Purāṇas and other works based on Vedic authority are accepted as Pauruṣeya Āgama. Madhva is the only Vedāntin, after the Mīmāṃsakas, to have given the question of the infallibility and the Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas serious attention. He has taken special pains to establish the doctrine with some new and original arguments of his own which go beyond the usual and conventional arguments based on the conception of the eternity of Varpas and the impossibility of proving that the Scriptures were spoken or uttered by a particular person.

The Vedas are self-valid. Their validity cannot be derived from the authority (āptate) of any author, human or divine. To the modern mind, the ascription of Apauruṣeyatva and Anāditva to the Vedas may seem absurd. But Madhva introduces a new line of argument, which is indeed thought-provoking, in that it goes to the very crux of the problem—the raison d'être of any Apauruṣeyavākya in the domain of Pramāṇas. It is this that the ultimate sanction for all religion, ethics and morality and for the acceptance of all supersensuous values like dharma and adharma would have to be founded on some textual authority which is not the composition of any particular individual and does not derive its
authority or validity from the fact of being the words of that person regarded as reliable (āpta). Unless our ideas of dharma and adharma are grounded on such impersonal authority, it would be impossible to establish the very existence of such values and concepts on any satisfactory basis. A philosopher who would not admit the existence of such supersensuous values as dharma and adharma would have no scope for his Sāstra, as the object of a Sāstra is to show the ways and means of realizing those truths which cannot be secured by other means, falling within the scope of perception and inference. Nor can such a philosopher claim that his system would, by proclaiming the absence of dharma, adharma and other supersensuous values, confer a real benefit on humanity by ridding society of its superstitious belief in them. Madhva points out that far from benefiting humanity, such teachings undermining the faith of the people in dharma, adharma etc., would let loose violence and disorder everywhere by proclaiming the theory ‘might is right.’ In the long run, the people will curse the philosopher whose teachings would expose them to such misery. As such teachings will only lead to adverse results and as he has no faith in any other unseen benefits, his Sāstra would be futile either way.

Insofar then as dharma and adharma and other supersensuous values will have to be admitted by all rational thinkers and since there is no other ultimate sanction upon which they could be grounded, save the impersonal authority of a Sāstra, one has to accept an Aparuṣeya-Sāstra as furnishing the basis of universal faith in dharma, adharma etc. There is no other way in which their existence could be established. It is hardly possible to determine their nature and existence on the supposed authority of individuals, however great they might be; for, every human being would have the limitations of ignorance and of being liable to deceptiveness. It would not be justifiable to postulate for this purpose the existence of some teacher who will be omniscient. That would be postulating much more than what is warranted in our experience; for omniscience in any individual is not a matter of our ordinary experience. One would have to postulate, moreover, not only omniscience to an individual but also that such an individual is not given to deceiving others and further that he is the author of a particular statement or doctrine or body of texts about the nature of dharma etc.

Postulation of the existence of an Aparuṣeya-Sāstra, on the other hand, would be the simplest thing. It would not necessitate any further
assumptions. As there is no ascertainable author of the Vedas, their authorlessness would follow automatically. On the contrary, it would be an unwarranted assumption that they have an author, when no such author is ascertained or ascertainable. The analogy of worldly testimony would be powerless here as in respect of worldly testimony there is no conception that it is authorless, as there is, in respect of the Vedas. There is no fear that at this rate any statement from any irresponsible source may be claimed as Apauruṣeya; for established traditions would always be a sufficient check against such wild claims and there are other ways of ascertaining the genuine from the spurious, when such claims are made.

The qualification of nirdoṣatva (flawlessness) applies to every Pramāṇa. Verbal testimony, to be valid, must be free from such flaws as want of an objective reference to the words employed, lack of syntactic connection or denotative fitness. There are different theories as to how the verbal judgment is produced by the distinctive elements forming part of a sentence. Madhva holds the Anvītabhidhāna view, according to which the words in a sentence convey their specific senses compositely thro' requisite syntactic interconnection with the rest. This obviates the necessity for recognizing the Sphoṭa Vāda and other theories. The Prābhākaras also hold the Anvītabhidhānavāda. But while, according to them, every word in a sentence is invested with the capacity to convey the net syntactic relation as a whole and in that process its own specific sense also, Madhva would appear to recognize two stages in the process of anvaya, each word having, at the outset, only a general capacity to convey its definite sense as correlated to such others to which it stands immediately related by fitness and then by juxtaposition in the sentence taken as a whole, with yet others, an additional capacity to convey a more specialized form of the same anvaya, in all its completeness.

Other Pramāṇas like Arthāpatti are not given an independent position by Madhva. Arthāpatti ( presumption) shows a way out in cases of apparent conflict between two facts. Given that X is alive, if he is not at home, he must be presumed to be out somewhere. This can be easily put in a syllogistic form: “चैवो वाहिनेति जीवनयचे सति युद्धस्वलाल। मी जीवन, यत्र नासि करतोष्मान्ति, यथा अहम्” (PP.) The point here is that both the alternatives, taken together, constitute the mark of inference. There can be no real conflict between the two alternatives of a man being alive and his not being at home. So there can be no difficulty in one of the alter-
natives qualifying the other and collectively leading to the inference. Should the conflict be real, there would be no room for Arthāpatti either; but only a doubt as to what may have happened to X1 Similarly, Upāmāna also, as a means of establishing similarity between two things, may be brought under inference, perception or verbal testimony according to the conditions of each case. "Anupalabdhi" also, in the same way, could be brought under any of the three according to the nature and conditions of the experience. When a jar is suddenly removed from its place, the perception of its non-existence is the result of direct perception by the Śākṣī, the non-perception of the jar being merely the logical consequent of the former. Where one feels the absence of the jar in darkness by judging thro' groping with his hands, the non-perception serves the purpose not of an instrument of abhāvapratyakṣa but as a mark of inference. The necessity of recognizing Anupalabdhi, as a separate Pramāṇa, is thus obviated by the acceptance of the possibility of direct sensory contact with abhāva as in the case of bhāvas.

The well-known "Tātparya-liṅgas" like "Upakrama", "Upasamhāra" and Śruti, liṅga, vākya, prakaraṇa etc. are also similarly to be brought under the purview of Inference.
CHAPTER XVI

THE STATUS OF MEMORY

The contribution of memory to knowledge is quite considerable and important. The question of its status and title to be admitted as a Pramāṇa or source of valid knowledge has engaged the attention of philosophers in the East and in the West. While some modern philosophers have been very critical and sceptical of the claims of memory, others have overweighted it. In Indian philosophy, the prevailing tendency has been to exclude memory from the title of ‘Pramāṇa’, on the ground of its ‘merely’ representative character. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas have deliberately defined Pramāṇa in such a way as to exclude memory from its scope. The Advaitins generally follow the Mīmāṃsaka view. The followers of Rāmānuja seem to be divided in their opinion. Meghanādārī seems to be definitely against the admission of memory to the title of Pramāṇa, as can be seen from his definition of Pramāṇa as: अन्यप्रमाणायें अर्थपरिच्छेदकम् while Vedānta Desīka is quite in favor of it:

स्वतिष्ठानामाणायें न युक्तिमिति कस्यते।
अवानिष्ठतंत्रेऽवै प्रमाणत्वपरिमहात॥ (Nyāya-Parīṣuddhi)

As a Realist, Madhva stakes his all on the validity of Memory and supports its claim to be admitted as a Pramāṇa or source of valid knowledge:

प्रमाणेण नाटवादृश्य स्थूलरूपि विद्ययते।
याथात्मेति प्रमाणशब्दाभो यथः।॥ (AV).

He brings Memory under Pratyakṣa and considers it as a direct perception by the mind: प्रत्येकं स्वाभिषयं | साक्ष्यिनिद्रिष्टिमेदन। मानसप्रश्यक्षेण स्वति। (PL). Its validity cannot, he says, be treated as merely inferential. Otherwise, even the perception of an object can be treated as an inference from a kārya to a kāraṇa: साक्षात्कारोऽद्यपेष, कर्मकारकत्वता घटायतामानूः। (NS, p. 227). Apart from that, it cannot be said that we may know the past by inference from the retention of the impression of the past experiences or from its revival as an image. Such inferences in their turn would involve memory. Moreover, if memory is invalid as a source of knowledge, then all inferences which are based on the remembrance of Vyāpti between

1. Cf. अनाचिन्तत्तैऽजगानु प्रमाणम् (Mīmāṃsaka)
2. Nayadyumaṇi, q. by Dasgupta, I. Phil. iii, p. 239.
the hetu and the sādhya would cease to be valid; for no knowledge can be valid when it has its basis in what is invalid. Inference then, would be at a standstill. It can similarly be shown that the other Pramāṇas accepted by the other schools would also involve memory of some kind as one of their basic conditions.

Madhva holds that Samskāras (former impressions) provide the necessary contact (sannikarṣa) of the mind with the past. The possibility of such a penetration into the past, by the mind, is established, says he, on the evidence of Yogic perception of past and future and is not, therefore, inconceivable. It is indeed very remarkable that Madhva should have anticipated the views of Western thinkers like Russel, Hobhouse and others in recognizing memory as a primary source of our knowledge concerning the past. He agrees with them that the immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past by inference. Otherwise we should never know that there was anything past to be inferred at all. If the validity of memory is questioned, there would be no proof of our past experiences having occurred to us: पूर्वादि भूते किमानिमित्युक्ते स्वात् किमुद्दर्मस्? (AV). It is no argument against this point that “the fact that one seems to remember an event is a good reason for believing that it occurred; but it is only because there is independent evidence. If we are all to lose our memory of events, it would be harder for us to reconstruct the past events, but not impossible. The cross-checking of written and other physical records, the utilization of scientific theories which they support, would suffice1”. This would not apply to the question of one’s own personal experience and its remembrance. If I lose my memory, I cannot by any written or other records reconstruct my past experience, for myself. Others with their memories intact may be able to do so. But that will hardly help me or have any binding force, so far as I am concerned. If the reconstructor should lose his memory, no interpretation or correlation of evidence would be possible. The part played by memory in human life, is thus considerable and it would be suicidal to question its validity in toto. Of course, there are delusive memories at times. But so are there cases of delusive perceptions and inference also! That does not affect the validity of memory per se. Madhva’s insistence on “nirdoṣatva” of the causal complement would be sufficient to cover such cases.

The general objection to the validity of memory is that it does not fulfill the condition of correspondence (*yathārtham*). The state or condition in which an object is first apprehended is no longer present at the time of its subsequent remembrance. Thus memory cannot lay claim to be faithful to the experience and reproduce it exactly. This objection is answered by Madhava, by pointing out that it is not the re-presentation of the experience *in toto* that makes for the validity of memory but faithfulness to its object-content\(^1\). The existence of an object in the same condition whenever it is known is not essential for the validity of knowledge. What is required is that the particular state or condition, in which knowledge apprehended a given object with reference to a particular space–time setting, should really belong to it in that space–time setting. What memory does is to recall the fact that the particular object was in such and such a condition or state at such and such a time (तदः समयः तात्त्विकः). This certainly is so. It is irrelevant to the validity of the memory that the former condition is *no longer present*. Its existence now in the same state or condition, or in a different one, is simply irrelevant to the validity of memory. It is only in this sense that scientific deductions about the past or future conditions of phenomena could be held to be valid. The same applies to memory also: 

स्मृतिविवेकश्रेष्ठ ० तदस्वत्वत्वार्थभावावर्त्यं स्मृतिविवेकश्रेष्ठं न । अतीतानातान्तरेऽविद्यासः सामान्यम्—

प्रामाण्यभ्रमुति: II (NS. p. 251.)

There is not much force in the objection that it is not the function of a pramāṇa to make known an already known object, to us. For, it can never be seriously maintained that no further knowledge can arise in regard to a known object. Neither is knowledge opposed to knowledge in any way, so that subsequent knowledge may be barred. It cannot also be held that want or absence of knowledge is a part of the conditions which produce knowledge. Knowledge is bound to arise if the necessary conditions for its production are there. The objection that a pramāṇa should not be dependent on anything else, or any other knowledge would cut at the very root of Inference. There is thus no justification to define "Pramāṇa" in such a way as to exclude memory from its purview.

\(^1\) स्यादिद्वृत्त-यथाभावसारिच् याधार्थ्यामिति वदा। अथानुसारिच् हु तथेतुक्तम्। (NS. p. 251.)
Memory is generally supposed to be caused by Samskāras (impressions) left on the mind by the first experiences. A difficulty arises in this connection. Such impressions, then, could only relate to the actual state of the object as it was experienced. But the "experience" did not certainly present its object with the words "I am past", stamped on it, as it were. If, then, Samskāras corresponding to the objective content of experience produce memory, how is this discrepancy to be explained?

This is really a ticklish question. The difficulty seems to have been felt by some modern writers also, on the subject. But their explanation is vague and non-committal. The correct answer according to Ayer is that "perhaps, there is no one thing that is present in every such instance of remembering. Sometimes it is the matter of one's having a vivid image; sometimes with or without image, there is a feeling of familiarity; sometimes there is no specific mental occurrence."

This leaves the difficulty unsolved. Madhva cuts the Gordian knot here by boldly formulating a new theory that our memory experiences are not purely and simply the reflections of the Samskāras, impressions, feelings or beliefs. They are direct apprehensions of the mind penetrating into the past. Only such a theory as this would justify the position taken by modern thinkers like Russel that memory resembles perception in point of its immediacy and differs from it in being referred to the past. That the mind has got this power to penetrate into the past and the future is established on the evidence of Yogic perceptions of past and future, which are recognized as direct perceptions (Sākṣātkāra) and not as inferences. Such mental perception in the case of memory is, however, limited to the sphere of previously experienced objects or events by the nature of the limitations imposed by the Samskāras, which act as the connecting links (sannikarṣa) with the past; whereas, in the case of Yogic perceptions of the past and future, such Sannikarṣa or connecting link is supplied by the power of Yogic merit itself. Hence, Yogic vision is more comprehensive than ordinary mental or memory experiences. This explains why memory is, by its very nature, connected with one's past experiences.

The position taken up by Madhva that Memory should be regarded as an immediate perception of the past by the mind is quite unique. It

1. Cf. the view of Samuel Alexander that "the object is compresent with me as past" (Space, Time and Deity, i. 113, q. by Ayer).
2. The Problems of Philosophy, p. 76.
goes very much beyond the views of the Jainas who have valiantly upheld the right of memory to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge, but have classified it as a form of mediate knowledge (parokṣa). Madhva’s view of Memory as a direct perception of the past by the mind is a remarkable anticipation of the views of some modern philosophers like Russel who claim that “we often remember what we have seen or heard or had otherwise presented to our senses and in such cases, we are still immediately aware of what we remember, inspite of the fact that it appears as past and not as present”. (Problems of Philosophy, p. 76).

Another minor objection to the right of memory to be admitted as a “Pramāṇa” is its alleged inability to serve any useful purpose (nisphalatvam), as a source of knowledge. This is pointless, says Madhva. In the first place, validity is a matter of fact and hardly one of utility. Apart from that, not all instances of memory can be dismissed as serving no useful purpose. We feel happy to remember pleasant experiences and seek to dwell on them and go from one to another. Exercise of memory increases the potencies of the impressions. Feelings of love and hatred are evoked by agreeable or disagreeable memories.

Insofar then as memory is uncontradicted and true, it would be fully entitled to the status of “Pramāṇam” in the sense of “yāthā-rthyam”. It as been argued, however, that there is a peculiarity about memory which deserves notice. “The only claim of memory to the status of knowledge and acceptability rests upon an explicit reference to a past experience, which it professes to reproduce faithfully. A remembered fact is believed to be true just because it is regarded as identical with the content of a past experience, which it claims to reproduce”. 1 This conformity to a past experience and falling back upon it for its own validity are said to be proof of its “self-abdication”, in favor of its archetype. Thus, the question of treating memory as a distinct type of knowledge is “barred by definition”. In this view, the Advaitins follow the Bhāṭṭas, who hold that the only kind of knowledge, so called, is knowledge of the already unacquired: अनाभ्यंतार्थविषयं. Memory, tho’ not, therefore, a distinct source of knowledge, is still a distinct experience that has to be distinguished from knowledge and given a separate name. “The experience in which the new emerges is called


P. M. 7

As a Realist, Madhva establishes the right to validity of memory and anuvāda, both in the enlarged sense of the term “Yathārtham”, as defined by him and in the narrow sense of अनविभित्तिक अनुवादः प्राचीन भाषायम् अनुवादः प्राचीन भाषायम् accepted by the Bhāṭṭas and the Advaitins:

प्रत्यक्ष मानसं चैव स्थादतीतार्थगोचरम्।
तदा स्मृतिप्रमाणलं अतीतलविशेषेष्ठिम्।
आधिप्रत्येकमुद्भूतात्मा यद्तीततविलितस्य।
मानता च कथ्ये न स्यात् स्वतंतरप्राप्तव नात्र नि।
मानलं प्रत्याविभित्तिया अर्पि सर्वाद्भूतिकम्।
अतीतवर्णमानवचरणिणी सा च द्यते।
न च सा स्मृतिमात्राय प्राचीन समानिकूलः।
अतो न वर्तमानमानिकूलः स्यात् सहजश्चेष्ठे॥

(AV. iii. p. 34.).

He argues that we experience the past by means of Mānasapatyākṣa, aided by the Samskāras. The experience of memory is valid in so far as it is unconstricted. Thus, it is not barred by definition. Apart from that, there is an element of “novelty” (anadhdgatārthatā) in memory. It is not a mere photographic reproduction of a previous experience or wholly “identical with the content of the past experience.” For, it comprehends events, or objects qua past i.e., as qualified by the special attribute of “being past” : अतीतविलितिम्; whereas, the first experience of them would, naturally, have conceived of them qua present! Memory, then, involves an element of novelty—a something more than a mere photographic reproduction of experience. As Hobhouse puts it, “Memory is an assertion of the past as past.” In the same way, an analysis of Pratyabhijñāna (recognition) shows that it is an indivisible act of cognition, produced by the visual sense, aided by Samskāras: अनविभित्तिकप्रवृत्तिविषयोऽस्मकस्मकारसमिदं चख्या जातम्। (NS. p. 496 b) and that it is neither a simple perception of a mere “this”; nor an act of memory involving a “that”; nor even two separate cognitions consisting of a perception and a memory; nor even a compound of “mental chemistry”, as the Jainas would have it: तदविद्वस्मृतस्मेकः।
Jayatīrtha quotes Vācaspati Miśra to show that he too is *not* averse to recognizing the validity of memory in the sense of possessing "yathārthya" (validity). For, in commenting on the definition of Pramāṇa in the Śūtra: Ṛtācāra-Vyākhyānta: Pramāṇaḥ! Vācaspati first qualifies the term "Upala-bdhi" (cognition) by the adjunct of "being correct" (Yathārtham), to avoid the overpervasion of the definition in respect of doubts. But, lest the definition as modified, viz., Vyākhyānta: Pramāṇaḥ! should embrace "memory" also, he qualifies "Upalabdhi" once again, by saying that Vyākhyānta: does not here include *all* correct knowledge, *as such*, but only immediate experience. This shows that the validity of memory is accepted by him. Otherwise, he would not have raised any further objection to the qualified definition of Pramāṇa as Vyākhyānta: which would have sufficed to rule out memory, if it had been intended to be excluded from the field of valid knowledge. Or, having raised an objection of that kind, he should again have excluded the validity of Smṛti, by the selfsame adjunct—"yathārtham" instead of restricting the term Upalabdhi to "anubhava" as distinguished from memory. This establishes that in the opinion of Vācaspati, memory is ruled out, not because of its containing any element of invalidity (ayathārthiyam), but because of its *not* being in the nature of a direct or a primary experience (anubhava). This shows that its validity is irrefutable and ergo, a proper definition of "Pramāṇam" must be such as to *include it*. There is no point in giving a partial definition and then exclaim that memory is "barred by definition!" It is unfair to interpret or define the term "Pramāṇam" in such a way as would fail to achieve such a result or foil it. Hence, the need for redefining "Pramāṇa", so as to bring within its range all types of valid knowledge, without any invidious distinction or preconceived ideas.

Madhva has thus done a great service to the cause of truth in restoring memory to its rightful place as a valid source of knowledge and therefore fully entitled to be accepted as a "Pramāṇa". He has also given a great lead to philosophers in bringing it under "Pratyakṣa" by assigning it a special place as "Māṇasa-pratyakṣa" under his scheme of sevenfold division of Pratyakṣa. It is a tribute to the keenness of his mental powers that his recognition of the immediate character of memory is receiving assent from several modern thinkers like Ewing, who have come to recognize the 'direct view' of memory.
CHAPTER XVII

DOCTRINE OF VALIDITY

Pramāṇas give us valid knowledge of things "as they are in fact". The nature of this validity and correspondence with facts, as understood by Madhva, has already been defined. The problem that remains is that of the criteria of truth by which we convince ourselves of the validity of our experiences and judgments. Modern philosophers have put forward different tests of truth such as correspondence, coherence, pragmatic tests and even intuition. In Indian philosophy, also, these different criteria figure under different names.

The Sāmkhyas have held that both validity and invalidity are innate to knowledge. This means that the same factors which produce knowledge make for the validity pertaining to it and similarly, in the case of invalidity. The same principle applies to the apprehension of that validity or its reverse. The factors which make known the knowledge are alone responsible for the apprehension of its validity and invalidity. This theory seems to rest on a naive commonsense realism that both validity and invalidity are organic to knowledge.

The Sāmkhya position is clearly self-contradictory. It may, however, be explained by the Sāmkhyas that as the machinery of the production of knowledge could not at any time be expected to be absolutely free from the operation of guṇas or doṣas that arrest the capacity to produce invalidity or validity as the case may be, one cannot altogether escape the conclusion that knowledge is bound to be intrinsically true or false, according to the prevailing condition of the karaṇas that produce it. The only excuse for such a roundabout explanation will be the acceptance of the principle that knowledge by itself cannot have the contradictory features of validity and invalidity at the same time. The same fear of self-contradiction should have counselled the Sāmkhyas against attributing two mutually conflicting capacities to the Karaṇas themselves, in their attempt to justify the dual nature of knowledge. Such a view will actually make the auxiliaries responsible for the Karaṇas' acquiring this dual capacity. That will land the Sāmkhyas in a theory of Parataḥ-pramāṇya of both validity and invalidity, instead of their Svastatva, as they want to maintain.
Reflection shows, then, that truth alone is organic to knowledge and invalidity must be extraneous to it and must not be put down to the same causes as produce knowledge, but to defective adjustment of conditions or environment.

It is clearly illogical to regard both validity and invalidity as innate characteristics of knowledge. One of them must be natural and organic and the other extrinsic. Tests and verifications are needed to make sure of validity only in cases of reasonable doubt,—and not as a rule. This confirms the position that validity is intrinsic to knowledge and must be so.

According to the Nyāya school, both the genesis and apprehension of validity and invalidity are extrinsic to knowledge, i.e., caused by factors other than those which give rise to or make known the knowledge. This is consistent with the practical realism of the Nyāya and its pragmatic theory of truth. Knowledge, according to this school, is generated by well-defined contact of sense organs with objects or by other specific factors (विज्ञान) (which differ according to the nature of each case, i.e. perceptive, inferential or verbal); while its validity is brought about by certain special virtues in the इन्द्रियाः or other causal apparatus, according to the type of knowledge. Invalidity, on the other hand, is produced by defects of sensory contact or other pertinent factors. This school also holds that while knowledge per se is apprehended by mental perception, its validity is inferred by correspondence or other tests. Invalidity, likewise, is inferred from want of correspondence, unworkability etc.

The weakness of the Nyāya theory lies in its making validity depend upon the satisfaction of external tests. This is clearly unsatisfactory. If the tests require further tests to validate them, there will be a regress of them ad infinitum. If the first or second test itself is sufficient guarantee of validity without the need for further tests, it would be tantamount to an admission of self-validity of the result of that test, which is, also as much a piece of knowledge as the earlier ones.

The Buddhists, on the other hand, regard validity as extraneous and invalidity as intrinsic to knowledge, as all ordinary knowledge according to them is discursive and hence based on mental construction (कल्पना) in terms of name, form etc.
The Bhāṭṭas accept validity to be innate and invalidity to be extrinsic. But then, valid knowledge itself, according to them, is inferred by the peculiar mark of “cognised-ness” (स्वात्मक) which is a property produced in knowledge, while invalidity is inferentially established thro’ want of correspondence etc. The Prāśhākaras regard knowledge as self-luminous and therefore capable of manifesting its own validity in the same act. But they do not accept any invalid knowledge as such,—the so called “invalid”, of popular conception, being regarded by them as due merely to a failure to distinguish properly between an actual perception of a given something and a memory of something else (resembling it), arising almost in a flash.

Madhva disagrees with all these theories. According to him, the sense organs themselves are capable of producing correct knowledge, by proper contact etc. There is no need to assume any special characteristic (गुण) for this purpose. But when vitiated by flaws the natural capacity of these is arrested or distorted and they give rise to invalid knowledge. As knowledge, by itself, is jagga (insentient) as a modification of the antahkaraṇa and therefore incapable of self-revelation, we have to admit some other principle by which the knowledge itself and its validity could be intuited. Such a principle is the Sākṣī or Svarūpendriya of the knowing Self; which, as Caitanyarūpa, is capable of both स्वस्वरूप and प्रपन्ध i.e. revealing itself and its content. Both knowledge and its validity are, thus, grasped by the Sākṣī, in the ultimate analysis. But in respect of invalid knowledge, the Sākṣī grasps only its bare content or essence (svarūpa) while its invalidity, as such, is ascertained by the Sākṣī indirectly thro’ incoherence (visamvāda) or other tests. In respect of Ānupramāṇas, their validity is inferentially grasped thro’ the ability to stand the test of correspondence etc.

Implications of Madhva’s Doctrine of Validity

It will thus be seen that validity, as defined by Madhva, cannot admit of any degrees, such as are recognized in Buddhism and Advaita, in terms of Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika-praṇāṇya. It is indeed difficult to justify the theory of degrees of validity in the light of Svataḥ-praṇāpyavāda, ostensibly admitted by the Advaita, just as it is in the other systems of the Vedānta.
Degrees of validity will be inconsistent with the dictum: अबाध्य अधारणि ब्रह्मचर्यातिरिक्त्तुतस्त द्वारा (Suresvara). On the Advaitic view, it will be more appropriate, logically and terminologically to speak of degrees of invalidity or unreality of experience. Validity, if intrinsic to knowledge, must be ipso facto absolute and unlimited and not relative or confined to particular moments or periods of time: प्रामाण्य च सनातना कालतो व्याहता भवेत (AV). Even supposing that untrustifiability for all the three periods of time (वैकालिकव्याप्त सम्पर्क) is the true test of reality, it will not be difficult to secure such "abādhyatvam" (unfalsifiability) to our empirical knowledge, which in so far as it is uncontradicted with reference to its own space-time setting, is technically वैकालिकव्याप्तसाधिनः—

स्वाभाविकचाष्टायमिँ गृहस्थम् साधारणकारिणिकालगम्।

** ** गृहायमेवव्याप्तसाधिनः॥ (Nym).

If our knowledge is absolutely sure to be disillusioned and set aside at a subsequent period of noumenal level, it would be tantamount to saying that it has not been valid and true to facts, even when it has been appearing to be so all along: कालान्तरस्तप्याधिनेन चैदिकानां मानन्तु कृतः? (AV) in other words, that we have been under a cruel delusion played on the screen of knowledge and have been dealing with metaphysical shadows instead of with the realities of life. The Advaitic philosopher is inconsistent with himself in accepting the doctrine of Svataḥpramāṇya of knowledge and advocating the doctrine of degrees of reality and of validity in the same breath. The Madhva view of validity as "yathārtham" is free from this defect. On this view, correspondence is nothing more than having a real object conceived as it truly is with reference to a given place and time: तद्भिज्ञानमेव तद्भक्तसमूह। नदि ज्ञानेऽयोगेऽकारता। It inclines more to the correspondence theory than to pragmatism. Madhva lays stress on the fact that emotional satisfaction does not make a proposition true nor the fact that a particular belief may induce such a satisfaction: फलवर्त्त न चास्माभ्य: प्रामाण्य हि विवशिष्यम्। (AV).

**Implications of Theory of Pramāṇas**

The definition of Pramāṇa as "Yathārtha" and of Anupramāṇa as यथायन्यबन्धनविश्वार्थकारित्वसाधनम् confers on them a certain measure of self-validity (स्वतस्वत्म). The repercussion of such inherent validity on our experiences of the reality of the world and its values, can be easily un.
derstood. This is one of the strong points in favor of Realism. Madhva has naturally pressed home this argument (from the self-validity of Pramāṇas to the reality of the world and of its experiences). On the other hand, the Advaitic philosophers, tho' paying lip service to the Svatahpramāṇya doctrine of pramāṇas have been at great pains to stigmatize Pratyakṣa as vitiated by flaws (of Avidyā), referring to phenomenal reality (व्यावहारिकमेदः) being limited to the present (वर्तमानमात्रभावं) and so on, and hence incapable of establishing the absolute reality of our experiences. The tendency to pick holes in Pratyakṣa and impugn its validity is found among Idealist thinkers of the West also. Dismissing the belief in the reality of the world as a superficial doctrine of Naive Realism, the Advaitins have tried to invalidate it both by Inference (मिथ्यातुत्तुमान:) : वैश्वे मिथ्या द्वस्यवात् जडत्वात्, etc. and by an appeal to monistic texts like नेह नानास्ति किंचन। which are supposed to deny the reality of world-experience.

In combating these moves, Madhva has naturally tried to take his stand on the validity of Pratyakṣa in its own right. The theory of Pratyakṣa being vitiated by fontal flaws (doṣajanyatvam) cannot be put forward until the unreality of experience is otherwise established and that cannot be done until the Doṣajanyatva of Pratyakṣa is proved. There is thus a palpable interdependence in argument. The argument from illusions: विश्वे मिथ्या द्वस्यवात्।।। ख्यातिरूपवत् to the unreality of all experience is equally illegitimate. The normal experiences of life are not on a par with passing illusions. They are not contradicted within our own experience, as illusions are. The plea of future stultifiability of experience is dubious. Inferences being dependent on sound Pratyakṣa for their Vyāptiniścaya cannot possibly go against their very prop and support (Upajīvya). Perception may be limited to the present, but with the help of the Sākṣi, it can assure itself of absence of stultifiability, as in the case of the perception of falsity of nacre in the shell, which is vested with absolute certainty by the Advaitin himself.

Finding these attempts to discredit Pratyakṣa unsuccessful, the Advaitin tries to base his conclusion on the authority of the identity-texts which, by implication and by express reference, are supposed to establish the unreality of dualistic experiences,
This is also refuted by Madhva on the basis of Upajñayapramāṇa-virodha and the primacy of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa, even as against the Śrutī. He shows in his theory of the Sākṣī, that it is and should be the ultimate criterion of all truth and validity and that its testimony must necessarily be supreme and absolutely binding and one which cannot be transcended by any further experience. He also shows that our experiences of the world, so far as they come within the direct purview of the Sākṣī and are testified by it, are entitled to unquestionable veracity. Since this is so and must be so, the only way to reconcile the seeming contradiction of the monistic texts with the verdict of Sākṣī would be to agree to their reinterpretation in some other ways, short of factual and essential identity of Ātman and Brahman, as have been indicated by Madhva.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE DOCTRINE OF SAKŚI

Tho' Madhva accepts that validity is intrinsic to Pramāṇa, defined as *Yathārtham*, he does not rule out the possibility of error in experience. Under ideal conditions, of course, error will have no chance. But the actual conditions of life being what they are, error cannot altogether be eliminated. This leads us to the question of greater and less chances of error among the different Pramāṇas and to the most important question of epistemology viz., the quest for an ultimate basis of certainty of all experience and knowledge, without which all our claim to secular and scientific knowledge must remain suspect and for the conditions which exclude not merely the fact but even the possibility of error. It is only the discovery of such a principle that could be regarded as the true fulfilment of the epistemological quest. The attempt to put Knowledge on a foundation that will be impregnable and will not be open to doubt is historically associated with the philosophy of Descartes in the West. In Indian philosophy, the issue has engaged the attention of the different schools *from much earlier times*. The frequently occurring discussions on “Svatastva” and ‘Parastava’ of Prāmāṇya are essentially concerned with this moot problem. But unfortunately, most of the schools have touched only the fringe of the problem and have not tackled it in all its bearings and in its proper perspective, as we shall see, presently.

We have shown earlier that the right theory of knowledge is that which admits that truth is organic to knowledge. Knowledge carries and must carry its own proof. If the truth of a cognition should depend upon its agreement with some other factor, such agreement, again, would have to be similarly demonstrated on the basis of further agreement and so on *ad infinitum*. If the validity of the confirming and corresponding knowledge could be intrinsic, such a distinction could as well be conferred on the first knowledge itself at the first blush. The Madhva philosophers point out that if the function of ‘agreement’ (*samvāḍhapramāṇa*) were just one

1. Cf. शान्ति च, भावाभावलक्षणं स्वविषयं स्वचेतसावगाहिते । नास्त्येन, नामन्दिरनिन्द्येण (NS. p. 217 b) प्रमाणं चेतात्तत्त्वावेदकम् । अतस्वावेदकं प्रमाणं चेति ब्यापात: (Vādāvali.)
of "removing grounds of mistrust", the validity of the knowledge in question would turn out to be intrinsically made out:

अतोत्ष्वषेषक्रेवं हुष्टकारणबम्बकानात।
अवाधाबाय प्रसानां वस्तुत्प्राधिन्िर्च्छृतसः॥

If, on the other hand, the samvāda should establish validity inferentially, the validity of the mark of inference would have to be established first and if that is also to be inferred, there would be a regress of inferences. Nor can the proveness of validity be established by the absence of falsification (bādhakābhāva) as the conviction of the fact of there being no falsification is itself a knowledge like the affirmation of validity and it cannot have a greater value attaching to it, than any other earlier knowledge: नान्दि वाष्पक्ष्य श्रेष्ठमर्यसित। If agreement with another item of knowledge is to determine validity, such agreement also, as we have shown, would need further corroboration and ratification.

Jayatīrtha points out in the course of a penetrating analysis of the problem of validity, that there are only six possible ways in which it could be ascertained: (1) by reason of its being caused by flawless senses; (2) or the certainty of its not being generated by defective sense-organs; or (3) on the basis of practical or pragmatic efficiency; (4) or agreement with another knowledge; or (5) at least absence of disagreement with another; or else (6) lastly, in its own right. And in every one of these cases, the acceptance of the doctrine of "Svataḥ-prāmāṇya" is inevitable. For, in the first case, the flawlessness of the senses will itself be open to question. If that is to be decided in the light of the validity of the knowledge itself, there will be a clear interdependence between the two. The same difficulty will remain in the second case also. The test of practical efficiency will not apply to cases of neutral acts of awareness or passive witnessing (udāstenañāna). The awareness of pleasure and pain, being unique forms of intuition, standing apart from other ordinary acts of knowledge, will not admit of coherence with others. If agreement of knowledge with one of its own kind is to be the test of validity, even a succession of illusory impressions (dhārāvā'ikabhrama) will have to be passed as valid knowledge. If the intended coherence is with another unit of valid knowledge, the validity of the latter will have to be similarly established and so on ad infinitum,
Mere absence of contradiction, so far, will not be a sufficient proof of validity as there may conceivably be uncontradicted or undisturbed illusions, in experience, like the common belief of the sky being blue. Any attempt to establish the validity of knowledge thro’ external aids is thus foredoomed to failure. We are thus left with the only other alternative of the inherent validity of knowledge.

But even this is not altogether free from difficulties. Knowledge, as an activity of the mind, cannot be invested with any kind of self-luminosity: इतिहासानां भवतः स्वतंत्रत्वभीत तावदसत्। प्रामाणाभावत् (NS. p. 591) अथ्यतन्त्राय-शान्तस्य स्वतंत्रताभावत् (NS. p. 436 b)। Judgments like “I know this” point to the existence of a knowing self which alone could be claimed to be self-revelatory. Even assuming that knowledge as such is capable of revealing itself, it can only manifest its content or form; but not, also, its validity: भवतु वा ज्ञानं स्वतंत्रम्। तथापि स्वतंत्रात् एव; न तु स्वतंत्रे प्रामाणयेति (NS. p. 591)। If validity is inherently revealed by knowledge, the knowledge arising from Vedic texts must make its validity felt by unbelievers like Buddhists. If they do realize its validity, they could not possibly refute it, as they do. This shows that the validity of knowledge is not revealed by the mere awareness of such knowledge; in other words, that validity is not made known by the knowledge itself, even if it be Sāvapra-kaśā. The power of self-lumination, as has been shown, can at best, help knowledge to manifest its essence, to itself. But it cannot have any power to endorse the validity of its content. Such a power could only belong to a principle of truth-determination which is not materially constituted, like the mind, and can, therefore, be credited with absolute validity in all judgments. Madhva finds such an ultimate and absolute principle of knowledge and validation, in the inner sense (organ) of the Self of man—his “Svarūpendriyam”—which he calls Sākṣi, and which is “Jñāna-grāhaka” and also “Jñāna-prāmāṇyagrāhaka” (intuiting knowledge and its validity). The raison d’être of attributing to Sākṣi-pratyakṣa absolute infallibility and self-validation, which is denied in respect of ordinary perceptions of the mind and the senses, is that the mind is liable to err and is open to doubts, albeit rarely; whereas, the judgments of the Sākṣi could not be doubted and have never been shown to have been in the wrong and invalidated at any time in life;
The Doctrine of Sākṣī

The best proof of the unerring precision and infallibility of Sākṣī is furnished, says Madhva, by the most intimate and poignant experiences of life (of pleasure and pain) of which none of us has occasion to entertain the least doubt in his life: "न जात्‌अनन्म मुख्मति न वैति वश्यम्‌, नापि प्रतीयमानिनिश कुशल सदस्थि तत्त्वतः।" (NS. p. 591 b).

The whole of rational existence in the world would be made impossible, if the verdict of our Sākṣī as the ultimate reference, foundation and criterion of all knowledge and validity is questioned or proved to be in the wrong, even in one single instance at any time. The entire basis and superstructure of all religion, philosophy, and science and of every activity of life would be blown up to nothingness, as by an atom bomb, the moment we dare to question or doubt the verdict of the Sākṣī:

It is, thus, incumbent on all thinking persons to accept the primacy of Sākṣī as the ultimate criterion of all knowledge and evaluate experience in the light of its foundations. The doctrine of Sākṣī, rightly understood, would be seen to be both the true foundation and the crowning point of a really sound and thoroughgoing theory of knowledge, in metaphysics. No theory of knowledge can really be complete without it,
While all other adherents of the Svatahpramāṇa view have been content with assuming that knowledge itself carries with it its own validity, Madhva has been the only one among Indian philosophers to insist upon a further analysis and to probe into the problem and go a step further and demonstrate that only the verdict of the Sākṣi could be the true terminus of validation. This marking off of the spheres of Vṛtti-jñāna and Sākṣi-jñāna constitutes a remarkable advance of Madhva, in Indian epistemology. It may be seen to bridge a gap in the theory of self-validity and answer conclusively the objection of Udayana: प्रामाण्य न लते माहं संश्यायनुपपतितः। It is no use to contend, as do most adherents of Svatahpramāṇa, that if knowledge had no power by itself to affirm its validity, nothing on earth could give it that power and there would be no way in which such validity could be affirmed. But then, is the Svatahpramāṇyavādin aware of any single instance or form of knowledge that is incontrovertible and uncontroversial? If there is any such knowledge or judgment, it must perforce be the verdict of the Sākṣi and nothing else. It is only at that point that real self-validation and self-luminosity are possible: यदि माहात्मिकस्ततिय यथाकथ्यविदेषो प्रकृताश्रय प्रामाण्यस्य पतत्समस्मितस्य; तदा, साक्षिः एव ख्वंत:प्रामाण्यं, अन्यस्य परत इत्यंगीकरोधं न कथितिकिरोय इति सक्षेपः॥ (NS, p. 218).

The ordinary doctrine of "Svatahpramāṇa" explains that doubts do not arise in all cases, but only where there is positive knowledge of conditions which seem to contradict the knowledge we have had; and if arguments are employed to test knowledge, it is not so much for the positive task of establishing its validity, as for the negative one of eliminating the chances of contradiction and clearing doubts. The essence of Svatastva is that knowledge carries with it its own validity, which is implicit in it. This is seen from the behavior of persons who act unquestioningly upon their knowledge, as soon as they have it without waiting for its truth to be tested and ratified by a validating inference. This shows that non-contradiction is the only test of validity and that this guarantee does not forsake knowledge till it is positively disproved or doubted.

It has been objected that this sort of an explanation is unsatisfactory as it "confuses logical certainty with mere psychological belief." A belief of validity is no indubitable index of its truth and no substitute
for certainty. Prof. D. M. Datta argues that "this distinction tho' apparently sound is, in the last analysis, untenable. Certainty is nothing but a quality of knowledge. It is belief strengthened by a process of logical reasoning. It would be useful if we could ascertain the degree of strength or amount of reasoning that would be necessary to turn a mere belief into a logical certainty. But that is logically and psychologically impossible, as different persons require different degrees of certification for the validity of their knowledge and because no objective or logical limit can be set to the degree of strength that is required to establish certainty. There is no way hitherto discovered of wholly eliminating risks of error" (Six Ways of Knowing, p. 356).

It is precisely at this point that Madhva interposes his criterion of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa, backed by Parīkṣā (tests), as the terminus of all tests and processes of reasoning by which "belief could be converted into a logical certainty". The approbation of the Sākṣi is the logical limit of all certainty, clarification and validation, as it is intuitive:

न परीक्षानवस्था स्वतः साक्षिष्ठित्ते त्वसंस्थात्.

He explains all cases of doubtful cognitions as "mental perceptions" not reaching down to the level of personal and intuitive level of Sākṣi-nirdhāraṇa:

यत्किंचिद्भिन्नभाविता स्वाधिष्ठाने मानसे दू तत्।
मानसे दृश्ये दोषः स्वरूपः वै साक्षिद्वस्ते॥ (AV.)

As Jayatirtha explains, "The Sākṣi is the ultimate criterion of all knowledge and validation. Being however accustomed to truth and falsity in respect of sensory, inferential and verbal knowledge, the Sākṣi is not able to come to a decision straightway, about the validity of a particular item of knowledge before it. To this end then, it resorts to the application of tests. These may be tested by further experiments till it reaches a certain level where knowledge issues in an

---

1. Cf. "As to evidence, the kind and amount required to warrant knowledge, in distinction to opinion or belief, varies generally according to the character of the cognizing mind and the kind and amount of knowledge obtainable. The term 'sufficient reason' affords no help here. (G. Trumbull Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, p. 239)."
intuitive perception of pleasure, pain, satisfaction, relief or similar intuitive reactions. Since such intuitive experiences of the Sākṣī have not been known to have miscarried in any instance before, it is not assailed by any further misgivings about their truthfulness and so desists from the application of further tests of truth-determination and rests satisfied in the validity of the knowledge and judgment so arrived at". (NS. p. 218 b. translated).

Knowledge, then, receives its true and highest validation by the verdict of the Sākṣī and no theory of the self-validity of knowledge will be complete without the acceptance of such a final principle of validation. Such is the position of Madhva’s epistemology.
CHAPTER XIX

SĀKṢĪ AS THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF TRUTH

The Mādhva theory of knowledge distinguishes between ordinary knowledge thro’ sensory channels, termed Vṛttiijnāna, and intuitive perception by the self called Sākṣijñāna. This distinction helps Madhva to give a consistent account of both valid and erroneous or doubtful cognitions, without impugning the fundamental claims of truth and knowledge to universal acceptance. It is conceded by Madhva that the normal judgments of the mind are generally correct and valid and that certification by tests is not always necessary. Tests are therefore applied only where validity is desired to be argumentatively established or logically ascertained in case of doubts. The acceptance of the Sākṣī obviates the necessity to carry on verifications up to “three or four stages”, as proposed by Kumārila (Ślokavārttika, ii, 61). For, if truth is to be known and judgments of validity are to be passed at any stage of the process, it could not be at any level prior to the ratification by the Sākṣī. From the ultimate point of view, even tests of non-contradiction would be helpless as guarantors of validity, unless the Sākṣī is summoned to vouch for the satisfaction of the condition of there being not only no contradiction, but also no possibility thereof. Non-contradiction, again, may be uncontradictedness so far; or non-liability to contradiction for ever. The latter cannot be asserted on any authority save that of the Sākṣī.

The epistemological necessity for such an ultimate principle of knowledge and its validation is accepted by the Advaitin also¹: मानानां तात्सिकों विचित्र वस्तुतां निषिद्धा। But such a principle cannot be a mere registering machine, as in the Advaita. The very purpose of recognizing the Sākṣī as a validating principle would be lost, if, as in Advaita, the great Censor of Sākṣī were to be put down as susceptible to both true and false knowledge : साक्षिशानस्तत्वमामासाधारणात् (Brahmānanda). That is why Madhva keeps the Sākṣī above all doubts and vacillation and makes it an absolute principle of infallibility.² It is untouched by any breath of uncertainty– its credentials are never dubious. The reason for

---

1. तथापि — प्रमाता संविद्यानांतरसंदिष्ठः, विपर्ययक्षेत्रविपरीतः: * * * *
   ( Bhāmati )

2. Cf. साक्षात् द्वारिसंज्ञायम् (Pāṇini Saṭra.)

P.M.—8.
this is precisely the same as is given in Advaita: साक्ष्यो वाक्यातः, तत्स्य साक्षीन्यो वाच्यस्तत्साधान्य इत्यज्ञवस्त्रा (Brahmanandīya, i, p. 438, Bombay).

The same point is thus elucidated by Madhva:

अभ्रमवन्मतमुलण च सर्वं वेद्यं हि साक्ष्यं।
स चेक्ताशैव क्वचिदच्छ: कथं निर्णयं ईत्यते?
तत्समाद सत्वमिद्निद्र्य व्यवहारस्य सिद्धते।
साक्षी निर्देश एवेकः साक्षीकार्यं प्रव न:।
हृद्: साक्षी यदा सिद्ध: * * *
स्वभावान्यं सदा साक्षी पस्यत्सेव हनिःश्चताः॥ (AV.)

Madhva has thus gone far ahead of his contemporaries and compatriots in having postulated a new principle of truth-determination in epistemology, in the form of the Sākṣi as the ultimate criterion of truth which is infallible and intrinsically valid. Its raison d'être are (1) that it alone can be the ultimate guarantor of the validity of all other Pramāṇas; (2) that it is the logical fulfilment and culmination of any really self-complete theory of knowledge and (3) that it is the only means of intuitive perception of certain supersensuous categories like Time, Space, the nature of the self and its attributes, the mind and its modes, all knowledge of pleasure and pain etc. These experiences are regarded by Madhva as immediate experiences (sāksātikāra) and not as inferences, as in other systems. Take for instance, the category of time, revealed in dreamless sleep, embodied in the recollection of the happy repose of sleep, expressed in the judgment 'I have slept soundly and blissfully, all this time'. This direct experience of time and bliss in Suṣupti cannot obviously be put down to the activity of the mind which is admittedly at rest then. We have, therefore, to attribute them to the instrumentality of a special sense organ, that is active even during dreamless sleep, when the mind itself is at rest and coordinates the inmost experiences of the Self. It is this spiritual sense-organ of the self that is designated as the Sākṣi, very appropriately: सुक्ष्मां निद्रामं स्वरूपमूलं चैतन्यविदात्रं हि साक्षीसृष्टिः॥ (NS. p. 258.).

Once the existence of such an instrument of intuitive perception is recognized, it would be easy to bring other intuitive perceptions of life, under its scope. The Sākṣi, as an instrument of knowledge and validation, is not something extraneous to the knowing self or Pramātā, as such: साक्षिण्यं आत्मत्वात् (P. L. p. 30). The distinction of Sākṣi into
Svarupa and indriya (self and organ) is only one of reference and not of essence. Such a distinction is rationalized by the play of "Viṣeṣas" (already dealt with).

We cannot go beyond the verdict of the Sākṣī. It is the last word on validation, not only of ordinary experiences, sense-perception and inference, but even of the teachings of Scripture. Even the identity-texts of the Advaitins, to be valid, must concede the infallibility of the identity-judgments based on the verdict of the Sākṣī ratifying their expressed sense as understood by them.

It is easy to see that the validity established by Sākṣī must ex hypothesi be absolute and true for all time (āryantika) or नैन्द्रकार्यसततायुक्त and not merely provisional or Vyāvahārika. If it were not so, even the personal conviction of oneness said to be produced by the identity texts would have merely a provisional and limited validity and would not hold good for all time, so much so that it might be liable to be set aside by some other doctrine of the Buddhist or other philosophers:

तात्कालिके प्रमाण्यं अहंकारश्च यदा मेतात् ।
ऐक्यागमस्य किं न स्वादे । तत्स्यांनेतासं यदि ।
ऐक्यागमांक्ष्यमिथ्यालं यदा विकृत्वमस्य सत्यं ॥ (Av)

The verdict of Sākṣī must, willynilly, then, be credited with absolute validity for all time, by every philosopher, be he a Dualist or a Monist, a Realist or an Idealist. It is the basis, prop and support of all theory of knowledge:

सक्ष्यत्यक्तं तेवं मानान्यं मानतेनेते ।
अत्तर्थस्य च तान्तर्थम व्यवहारः प्रवृत्तं ॥ (Av).

Madhva deserves very great recognition for having discovered and formulated such an a priori criterion of epistemological reference and certitude and built up his system of metaphysics, on its solid foundations:

विक्रियस्यंत्वारी स्म साध्याम हस्यापि द्रष्टव्यम (NS. p. 210). अस्माभिरपि, दूर्खादिन्यं वस्तुतायाः साक्ष्यप्रक्षेपोपयत्तं इति हस्यमू (NS. p. 30 b).
CHAPTER XX

THEORIES OF ERROR IN INDIAN THOUGHT

Error is the reverse of valid knowledge. It is an experience where an object is cognized as something else or as having certain characteristics that really fall outside of its being. The cognition of a shell as silver, of a rope as a snake, and so on are instances in point. The explanation of errors of perception has been a live issue in philosophy. Is error due entirely to the object or solely to the subject or equally to both? Quite a number of interesting theories have been propounded by Indian philosophers as to how error arises and what should be the status assignable to the object represented therein. Five main theories of error are generally referred to in Indian philosophical literature:

आत्मशास्त्रसत्त्वशास्त्र: अख्याति: ख्यातिरन्यथा।
तथार्थविचारन्याति: इत्येतै ख्यातिप्रभाम।

These are held by the schools of Buddhist idealism, Nihilism, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Advaita-Vedāntins, respectively. To these may be added the Rāmānuja theory of error known as “Akhyātisamvalita-Yathārthakhyāti” and the Mādhva theory of “Abhinava-Anyathākhyāti”. The Mādhva theory is the outcome of an implicit criticism of the other theories. Madhva, in his Aν, has briefly reviewed the Advaita theory of error, while formulating his own definition of what constitutes “Bādha” (sublation):

विश्वासत्यान्यथा सम्यक्ष्विज्ञानं हेच्छ तन्मत्तम।

Jayatīrtha takes advantage of this opportunity, while commenting on the above passage, to initiate a full-fledged discussion of all the leading theories of error held by the different schools; and reviews them critically in the light of Madhva’s own theory, which he shows to be the most satisfactory one, in the end.

In his review of the various “Khyātivādas”, Jayatīrtha raises many subtle questions about the problem. His arguments touching the details of the controversies regarding the Khyātivādas are sure to provoke thought on fresh lines among modern scholars and students of Indian philosophy. It seems worth while for this reason to give a resume of his examination of the different Khyātivādas, before we come to his exposition of Madhva’s own theory of Error.
(1) The Prābhākara View

Error, according to the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, is made up of a fusion of two different cognitions. They may both be presentations or representations or one may be a percept and the other a memory image. In any case, error is only a partial truth. It is only imperfect knowledge. It is an omission rather than a commission. In the illusory experience of shell as silver, which takes the form "Idam rajatam" (this is silver), the "this" refers to the perception of the given object. Owing to abnormal conditions of defect, it is perceived as just a shining, white something. There is no perception of the specific class-essence of načreness (श्चित्तल्लसामान्यविक्रिया). This partial perception produces a memory image of silver by reviving the impressions of it, owing to the similarity subsisting between the whiteness and brightness of the presented object and the brightness etc. of silver recalled by the memory image. Tho memory, as a rule, is representative in character, yet, on account of abnormal conditions of defect, it functions here in a purely presentative capacity, by losing its representative aspect of "thatness". Thus, for want of discrimination between the essential features and content of these two different cognitions, they get fused into one and give rise to an identity-judgment, in respect of their relation, owing to the similarity of the forms of the cognition and this is expressed in a judgment of their identity as "Idam rajatam", and the person acts on it.

Jayatīrtha rejoins that the illusory cognition is felt to be a single determinate cognition of a given object (as in ordinary perception): विशेषविषयकेन विज्ञानम्। It is not felt to be a composite cognition or a cross or amalgam of two different psychoses,—a percept and a memory. There will be no responsive activity on the part of the peripient, if there is no positive determinate cognition of the given thing. In the last analysis, the Prābhākara must admit that this dual-cognition appears as what it is not,—viz., a single determinate cognition. That would be a tacit admission of error as a misapprehension (viparyaya), which he is fighting shy of. His attempt to take shelter under alleged non-discrimination between the true nature of the two cognitions, to account for the ready responsive activity, is futile. For, non-discrimination, as mere confusion of knowledge, cannot be the basis of such sure activity as follows the cognition. Moreover, the Prābhākara will have to face a serious difficulty in defining the precise nature of the difference between the two cognitions which,
according to him, is missed in the illusory experience. This difference between the two cognitions cannot be put down as the essence (svarūpa) of the cognitions themselves; or as their differentia (prthaktva), or contrariety (vaidharmya). As knowledge, according to the Prabhakaras, is self-luminous in respect of itself and its content and as no erroneous knowledge as such is recognized in the system, how could the difference between the two cognitions, which is, in reality, part and parcel of the content of a self-luminous cognition, be missed and remain unrevealed? Nor can the said difference be a differentium (prthaktva); for cognition which is an attribute of the self cannot have another quality residing in it. If the difference in question were to be viewed as Vaidharmya (contrariness), one will have to define the nature of such vaidharmya. Is it of the nature of a mutual difference (anyonyābhāva)? Even then, is it the mutual difference between “this” and “silverness” that is not revealed in the experience; or the reciprocal negation between “this” and “silver”? It will not be possible to hold, that where distinctive terms like “idam” and “rajatam” are used in the proposition, in non-synonymous connotation, the difference between “this” and “the class-essence of silverness” remains unrecognized. For, Vaidharmya, in the sense of reciprocal negation of identity, is to the Prabhakara absolutely identical with its correlatives (अभिकरणश्लेष्य). It is, therefore, impossible for the Prabhakara to contend that even tho’ there are two different cognitions here, in the illusory experience, the mutual difference between them as a percept (idam) and a memory image (rajetatvam), is not realized. For the same reason, the difference between the cognition of “this” and “silver”, also, could not remain unrecognized. Similarly, the contrariness between “thisness” and “silverness” must also be admitted to be cognized by the very terms of the judgment—“Idam rajatam”, where the attribute of “thisness” (idamiva) which is incompatible with the silver is cognized in the object presented to the vision and the attribute of “silverness” (rajetatva), which is incompatible with the object presented to the eye, is also grasped in the silver. The explanation that what is missed in the illusion is the absence of association between “this” and “silverness” (इदरूपवैरूपसत्तासम्बन्धः) and not the presence of their difference, would also be futile. For, ‘absence of association’ (असंबंधः) is the same as negation of such association (संबंधभाव) and such negation, according to the Prabhakara, is absolutely identical.
with its correlatives (अधिकरणात्मक). Hence, neither difference between
the cognitions in question nor absence of association could remain
uncognized, on the Prabhakara view. Jayatirtha is quick to point out,
that no such difficulty will be there on the Madhva theory of Anya-
thakhyati, wherein also the given entity is mistaken for something else,
by missing the difference between the presented and the represented
objects; for to Madhva, ‘difference’ or अन्योन्नताभाव is not absolutely
identical with the correlatives, but something that is only colorfully
identical with it (विशेषाभिन्न). The Prabhakara cannot also explain the
responsive activity to secure the silver, in the illusory experience, on
the ground that there is the non-comprehension of the specific attribute
of the given object viz. shellness which would distinguish it from silver
and of the specific attribute of silverness as being present somewhere
else which would distinguish it from the given object. Jayatirtha says
that the two non-comprehensions together will prevent all activity. They
will hardly explain the person greedy of silver stretching out his hand
to the object before him unless he is under the strong (mis-) concep-
tion that what lies before him is the silver (that his memory image
has brought up before him, as the Prabhakara would have it). Such
activity, then, is clear proof of the perceiver laboring under a misap-
prehension. The Prabhakara attempt to evade the fact of misapprehension
in illusory experience and explain it away as a case of non-discrimi-
nation between two separate cognitions is epistemologically unsound.

(2) Ramanuja’s View

Ramanuja propounds the Yatharthakhyati view which he inherits
from the precursors of his school, tho’ he expresses approval of the
न्यायाल्प्याति view also. However, it is the Yatharthakhyati view that
has come to be prominently associated with his school, as its official
view. Accordingly, Jayatirtha also takes special notice of it and ignores
the other view in dealing with Ramanuja’s theory.

According to Ramanuja, the object represented in error is always
real and there is, strictly speaking, no invalid cognition at all. His
theory is influenced by the Prabhakara view. The cognition of silver
in the shell is relatively true and not absolutely false. The perception
of silver in the shell is true enough, with reference to the element of
silver present in the shell. For, says Ramanuja, every object in the
world has some elements of the other objects, in its constitution,
in varying proportions. He finds support for this idea in the doctrine of triplication (विनिवृत्तकरण) and of quintuplication (पञ्चबीकरण) of elements (out of tejas, ap and anna) taught in the Upaniṣads and Purāṇas. He also argues that Vedic texts which permit the substitution of Pūtika for Soma and of Nīvāra by Vrīhi (in the case of non-availability of the original), clearly presuppose that the substitutes have in their make-up some elements of their originals. Perception also establishes so many resemblances among things. Such resemblances must necessarily be on account of their possessing similar parts. Hence, the experience of silver in shell is to be treated as a valid experience to the extent that it is a perception of the actual silver elements in it. The reason why it is regarded by ordinary people as invalid is because it has no practical utility. The question of designation and acceptance of validity of a particular experience are governed, in normal life, by the fact of given objects possessing a preponderance of the distinctive elements that constitute their being. The cognition of silver in the shell is, no doubt, a correct one in the sense already explained. Only, it is a partial experience of silver in the shell. But owing to certain defects in the sense organ, there is a distortion of the shell element and the small portions of silver which constitute the shell gets undue attention for the nonce and we have a perception of the silver in what is really shell-silver. This perception is wrong, not because it is a cognition of the unreal or what is not in fact there, but because, it is a partial view or an imperfect cognition of the real. Thus, error, according to Rāmānuja, is not so much a misapprehension of one real as another; but a blundering into a subtle truth about things, unawares,—which, under normal conditions, is generally missed or ignored.

Jayatīrtha rejects this theory as a picturesque fancy. The doctrine of Trivṛtkaraṇa (triplication of elements) on which Rāmānuja takes his stand to support this novel theory of illusions, has reference primarily to the combination of the primal elements of tejobanna in primordial creation. It would be extremely far-fetched to attempt to legitimize our perceptual errors on its basis. If remote causal relation is to be relied upon to validate the perception of silver in shell, on the basis of Trivṛtkaraṇa, it would be possible to have the illusory perception of ever so many other things also in shell. It cannot be argued that owing to Adṛṣṭa (unseen merit) and other special factors, only
silver comes to be perceived in shell. Such an explanation would be in order only after it is conclusively established that silver is actually present in shell.

The presumptive reasoning based on the examples of Pūtika and Soma etc., is equally unsustainable. For then, the question would arise: Are we to ascribe to Pūtika a preponderance of Soma elements; or an equal measure of them; or only a very small number of Soma parts? In the first case, Pūtika would be indistinguishable from Soma and could not be treated as a mere substitute for it. Indeed, even Soma, according to this theory of Rāmānuja, is not pure and simple Soma but something else besides and called Soma by virtue of preponderance of Soma-parts, in its composition! If, then, the Pūtika also should have a preponderance of Soma parts, there is hardly any reason why it should not be regarded as Soma itself instead of as a substitute for it. If the Pūtika should contain Soma and Pūtika parts in equal measure, it will lead to the perception of both, in the object. If Pūtika should contain only a small number of Soma parts it could not do duty for Soma. Otherwise, even the shell could do duty for silver in normal life. If the authority of the Śruti confers such right on Pūtika, one could as well bow to the Śruti and dispense with the luxury of ascribing to Pūtika parts more or less similar to Soma, on the basis of some farfetched theory of things possessing all sorts of undetected similarities with all other things.

The question of responsive activity, in such cases of illusory experience, would pose a serious difficulty to Rāmānuja. What on Rāmānuja's view is it that makes one who desires silver, as in the case of Śuktirajatabhrama, stoop to pick up the shell? It can hardly be the non-perception of the preponderant elements of shell, in the given object. For non-perception cannot lead to such activity and if it does, even a man in his sleep may be expected to act that way. It cannot also be the perception of the limited number of silver-elements in the shell. In that case, it should be clarified by Rāmānuja if it is the perception of the small number of silver-elements as such that inspires the activity or their perception as preponderant, or their merest perception (ञानामालम्). On the first view, the shell will never become perceived as silver and there will be no responsive activity, to pick it up. The second view would open the door to Anyathākhyātivāda or the theory of misapprehension, which Rāmānuja seeks to avoid. On the last
alternative, every other object in the world bearing similarity with silver elements may come to be picked up and the activity may not be confined to the shell.

Again, why should the perception of the small number of silver elements in the shell be normally regarded as an ‘erroneous experience’? If it is only because it is an experience of a partial truth and not a complete truth comprehending the fulness of the attributes of the given object, then, the Visistadvaitin will have to accept that knowledge of the Supreme Brahman attained by the very best among gods and men would remain the biggest error¹.

(3) Buddhist Views

The idealistic school of Buddhism looks upon the silver represented in the illusion as real but not external, as in the Nyāya school. This silver, if actually non-existent, could neither be presented in the illusion nor sublated. There is no proof of its existing elsewhere, outside, as an extra-mental reality. Error consists in projecting subjective ideas as objective extra-mental facts. The silver represented in illusion is thus merely “ideal” and therefore “internal” (jñānarūpa) and its immediate apprehension without actual sensory contact also proves its internal existence. The sublating cognition also merely corrects the misinterpretation.

Jayatīrtha shows that this (Yogācāra) view of error is not supported by the sublating cognition, which clearly establishes the truth that the silver represented in the illusion is totally non-existent. (तत्त्वातिदेव रज्जतिमित्यसवत्त-बैद्यक्रत्यविरोधस्त्र उपत्तिवाद्). We have no right to twist its verdict and confer upon the silver represented in the illusion any reality of its own either internal or external. The Buddhist idealist himself has to admit that the totally non-existent can be represented in illusions, when he opines that what is internal appears as external. Does this not amount to an acceptance of the position illusion is the presentation of a given something as something that it is not or as involving a non-existent association?

¹. कथं चालस्य ज्ञानस्य भ्रान्तिलम्ये० अत्याचरणार्यादिति चेतं नूतंग्रह्याञ्जनानिन्दिति महाभ्रान्तिराणि।

(N.S. p. 53 b.)
The element of externalism (बाह्यता) that is presented here, on the Yogācāra view, is certainly not something that pertains to the silver, which is claimed to be a purely internal reality. The contention of the Yogācāra that there is immediacy in the presentation of silver, without sensory contact, is untenable as there is actual sensory contact with the shell, which is responsible for the misrepresentation. The theory of internal reality of objects represented in illusions would lead to absurd results. There would be an actual burning sensation inside the body when there is an erroneous superimposition of fire on a heap of Gunjā-weights. The Yogācāra view seems to be more interested in finding ontological support for its doctrine of Vijñāna as the sole internal reality than in giving a straightforward explanation of illusions. The Asat-Khyāti of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism holds that error lies in the manifestation of the non-existent as existent. But it fails to recognize that this illusion is due to the contact of the sense-organ with the shell as the adhiṣṭhāna, and under certain conditions. This point is brought out by Madhva in his theory of Neo-Anyathākhyāti.

(4) Nyāya View

The Nyāya theory of Error is "Anyathā-Khyāti". It explains error as the misapprhension of one real object as another real object, existing elsewhere. What happens, according to the Naiyāyika, in an erroneous perception of silver in shell is simply this. The visual perception of shell as "this", takes place in the ordinary, normal way. The attribute of "silverness" which belongs to the real silver, existing elsewhere, is presented in this cognition as an attribute of shell, which is before the eye, in a general way. Neither the real silver which is present elsewhere nor its characteristic of silverness could, however, be connected with the visual organ thro' ordinary sense-contact. But as no perception of silverness as synthetically connected with the substratum could arise without such sensory contact, the Nyāya philosophers have thought it fit to invent a special type of extra-ordinary sense-relation connecting the real silver and silverness with the visual sense. This contact is the contact thro' cognition [स्नानलक्यप्रत्यासाति]. Thus, in the present case, three things are presented: a "this" (idamākāra or adhiṣṭhāna), the silver (āropyaṁ) and their identity (tādātmya); or a "this" (idam) silverness (rajatatvam) and their synthesis (samsarga). The Naiyāyikas argue that as silver, silverness (and the substratum) remain uncontradicted (even after the sublating cognition
arises)–as existing elsewhere in actual life–and as only the identity of “idam” and “rajatam” or the association (samsarga) between “idam” and “rajatatvam” stands contradicted, the sublating cognition must be understood to negative only the aspect of this identity or association and not the very reality of the silver (elsewhere). The “Bādhakajñāna”, in other words, should not be taken to establish that the “silver” represented in the illusion is non-existent (asat). It does exist elsewhere. If the silver, which was represented in the illusion, was non-existent, it could never have been presented directly to our perception. We are thus justified in assuming that the silver represented has an existence elsewhere, and that the sense-organ vitiated by defects, though in contact with the shell, causes it to be perceived as identical with the silver existing elsewhere.

Jayatirtha opens his criticism of the above theory by pointing out that it is opposed to the verdict of the sublating-cognition which roundly and categorically asserts that there was no silver anywhere within the sphere of the given substratum and that what appeared is totally non-existent: सत्तेऽपि सति रजतस्य, ‘सत्तेऽपि रजतं प्रज्ञात’ इत्यदुस्यविरोधायत (N. S. p. 54 b). The point is this. There is no evidence in the Bādhakajñāna that the very silver that was represented in the illusion has an actual existence of its own, elsewhere. The existence of real silver (elsewhere) in a real world is one thing and the claim that that selfsame silver was represented here is another thing. The question is not whether silver really exists in the world! The question is of the status of the superimposed silver (āropitarajata) and not of the unsuperimposed real silver (anāropitarajatam). Madhva readily grants that the knowledge of the “āropita” presupposes the knowledge of the “anāropita” and that no superimposition is possible without the reality of the substratum, and the prototype (pradhāna) of the superimposed object.¹ But all that does not mean that we should give more than what is due to the superimposed object and regard it as having an existence of its own per se elsewhere. That, says Madhva, is going beyond the verdict of the Bādhakajñāna. The Naiyāyika Realist seems to be in the grip of a mortal dread of admitting ‘non-

¹. अद्वीत्तमतं च संतते सत्यब्रह्मते विना ।

न भान्तिमभवति कन्यापि ॥ (VTN).
existence’ (asat) coming anywhere within the range of any of our psychological experiences, for fear that it may undermine the foundations of his Realism. But this is sheer nervousness. If the unreal and the non-existent cannot intrude upon our consciousness even in our illusions, where else can they intrude? Not certainly in our valid experiences! If our faith in Realism is strong enough, it can resist the siren song of Viśvam mithyā dṛṣṭyatvā ...sukti rāpyavat. But more of this later. Jayatīrtha rightly points out that it cannot be seriously contended that the illusory experience itself is an evidence of the actual existence of the silver figuring in the illusion, elsewhere. For, this illusory experience is in itself an invalid one. What probative value can it have, then? If it has such value, why should we not give the go by to the Bādhakajñāna and accept that the silver is actually there in the substratum where it is experienced at the time of the illusion? Nor can the sublating cognition itself be cited as evidence for the actual existence of the superimposed silver, elsewhere. Its function is simply to deny the presence or existence of the silver actually in the locus where it was apprehended. It is neutral to the question of its existence or non-existence, elsewhere. There is not much substance in the contention that an illusion cannot be satisfactorily explained without assuming the actual existence of the ‘represented object’ (as such) elsewhere. As the illusion cannot be accounted for without the reality of the substratum, sensory and environmental defects etc., only those factors can be taken to be established by implication. The question: how silver could be perceived, if it is not existent, could be met by another: how could the silver existing elsewhere be perceived here? The existence of an object elsewhere is not an indispensable contributory factor for or a necessary antecedent to its subsequent perception, in another place. The insistence on its existence elsewhere may be deemed necessary either to account for the sensory contact with it or for the purpose of providing the requisite mental impressions for the revival of a memory image. In the present case, sensory contact with silver (existing far away) is clearly out of the question and there is actual sensory contact with the substratum, which will do to revive the Samskāras of formerly experienced silver and thus account for the rise of the illusion without obliging us to invest the very silver (अन्तः प्रतीतस्वरूप राजस्वतः) that is superimposed, with a factual existence elsewhere. One cannot understand the point that Samskāras of silver presuppose a prior experience of silver. And that experience, if valid, would, in its turn, presuppose the real
existence of that silver somewhere within the orbit of our own experience. But all this has nothing to do with the āropita-rajatam with which we are here and now concerned, in error. The Naiyāyika seems to be obsessed by his sense of realism, in trying to confer a sort of vicarious reality upon the superimposed object. But forgetful of his own epistemological dictum that the non-existent cannot be presented, he is prepared to admit that the identity of the given (shell) with the other real (presented) or the association (samsarga) between “idam” and “rajatatva” that is presented is non-existent (asat) and that they are somehow presented. Madhva’s question is: why should we draw the line at ‘identity’ or ‘samsarga’ and not extend it to the āropya as such? Take again the case of a jar which has been destroyed or one which is to be produced. Suppose it is mistaken for some other jar. Some of us at any rate, fall into the former type of error. How will the Naiyāyika explain such cases? Will he maintain that the jar that is no longer in existence or is yet to come into being has even now a physical existence of its own, elsewhere and figures in the misapprehension? That the jar in question did once exist or may come into existence at a future time, may be true enough. But the point is that such existence at other times has no direct bearing on the production of the illusory experience regarding it now. The existence of the object is useful only in producing the necessary impressions of it, which may, under certain conditions, engender a misapprehension. The Naiyāyika is fighting a ghost of his own imagination if he is presuming that theoretically it is possible for any philosopher to explain a perceptual illusion without recognizing the reality of both the adhiṣṭhāna and the pradhāna (prototype) of the superimposed object (āropya). Perhaps the position taken up by the Buddhist Mādhyamika or the Māyāvādin made him think of such a possibility, and safeguard the position of realism by insisting on the reality of the superimposed object elsewhere, with a vengeance. But the Mādhva philosophers, by insisting on the equal necessity for accepting the reality of both the prototype (pradhāna) and the substratum (adhiṣṭhāna) in accounting for illusions, have taken the wind out of the sails of the Nyāya Realist.

(5) Advaitic View

The Advaitic theory of error is known as Anirvacanīya-Khyāti. It prefers to treat the object represented in illusions as ‘neither real and existent’ (as in the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools) nor as unreal and non-existent as in Buddhistic Nihilism; nor even as ‘internal’ as in Yogācāra.
Starting to explain illusion as an epistemological problem, it ends by metamorphosing it into a metaphysical problem. It introduces certain complicated and cumbersome technicalities (Prakriyā) in explaining the genesis of error. By clever dialectical quibbling, it invents the concept and category of an ‘indescribable and undefinable’ tertium quid between the poles of Sat and Asat and introduces it into the realm of erroneous experiences in the first instance and ultimately seeks, by more ingenious dialectics, to extend it to the whole of human experience (including the so-called “Vyāvahārika”) and sweep it off from the sphere of reality and liquidate it in the bosom of the great Anirvacaniya. The Anirvacaniya-Khyāti is, therefore, to say the least, metaphysically-motived. It regards the cognition of silver in shell as a dual-cognition. It also holds that after the contact of the defective sense-organ with the shining shell, there is a mental modification in the form of ‘this object’ (idamākāra-vṛtti). Then, thro’ the operation of Avidyā, supported by the former impressions of silver, revived by the similarity of characteristics of the given object, there is the actual production of ‘indescribable silver’ (अनिवैचारिक रज्जत). This indescribable silver lasts as long as the illusion itself lasts (dhiṅkāla). But then, its status is only “Prātibhāsika” (apparent). It is neither real (existent) nor unreal (non-existent) nor both (Sadasat). Its special status as defying characterisation in terms of Sat and Asat (and both together) is established by the famous Arthāpatti argument adumbrated by Śāmkara: सबैं वापेत् | असबैं प्रतिवेद | The concept of Sat and Asat being mutually exclusive, their coexistence also is ruled out.

This theory has its own defects. In the first place, the view that the illusory silver is produced by nescience and is destroyed by the true knowledge of the substratum, will be inconsistent with the terms of the sublating cognition which denies the existence of the silver per se with reference to all the three periods of time: तथाते,जैवकालिकविधायोगात्। रूप्य नानीदशित्त भविष्यतीति स्वप्नेऽस्वत् निष्प्रचात (Nym). The illusory silver being a transformation of Avidyā, which has the Ātman for its locus cannot be presented as an external reality. The externalisation of this illusory silver cannot be explained on the ground that as the Ātman is pervasive, he pervades the shell also and that in this way, the silver which is a transformation of Avidyā having its locus in the Ātman delimited by the shell, comes to be cognized externally as associated with the shell.
Assuming that this is so, this silver should be open to perception by other persons also who may be looking at the shell at the time. Anyway, granting that this silver is actually produced, we may ask how it is actually apprehended. Is it by sensory contact or thro’ Samskāras (impressions) or by Sākṣī? In this case there is no silver prior to the contact. It is said to be produced at the very time of its apprehension. There is a stalemate here. As the illusory silver has had no prior existence, its apprehension by Samskāras is out of the question. Nor can the cognition of the silver be ascribed to the witness-consciousness as in the case of the inner perception of bliss. For this cognition is invariably concomitant with sensory activity and cannot therefore be put on a par with the perception of bliss etc., by the Sākṣī. It cannot be said that as the sensory activity terminates with the awareness of the substratum there is need for the witness-self to cognize the silver produced by Avidyā. For, as the knowledge of the substratum does not seem to have any direct bearing on the perception of the silver, on the Advaitic theory, its indispensability would seem to suggest strongly that far from being due to a transformation of Avidyā and all that, the apprehension of the silver in the shell is the outcome of a mental distortion of the given datum caused by the sense organ being vitiated by certain defects and abnormal conditions and that it is a case of Anyathākhyāti and nothing more. By implicating the Sākṣī in the error the theory takes away the right of the Sākṣī to pronounce judgment upon it thro’ the Bādhaka-jñāna. For it cannot both be the accused and the judge. The Mādhva theory, as will be seen, shows a correct appreciation of the position and the role of the Sākṣī in the sphere of epistemology. However even supposing that sensory contact with the substratum is in some way contributory to the apprehension of the illusory silver by the Sākṣī, in the Advaitic theory, it will entail a compromise with the Akhyāti theory, inasmuch as the cognition of the Prātiḥāsika silver is thus a compound of two cognitions, one of the substratum by the sense-organ and the other of the Āvidyakarajata by the Sākṣī. Such dual cognition will bar activity. Even if the Sākṣī is made to apprehend the identity of silver with the shell and make activity possible, still the fact that there are two cognitions here will militate against the fact of the present cognition of silver being felt to be a single determinate cognition. The attempt to establish a unitary cognition on the basis of the simultaneous reflection of the witness-self in both the mental states of
The concept of "Anirvacanīya" itself rests on the presumption that the object presented in illusions cannot be a non-existent thing as the non-existent cannot be directly presented as existent in experience. This assumption itself is not well-founded. In fact, the Advaitin himself cannot explain the illusion without accepting the fact that the non-existent does appear and is presented as existent, directly, in our illusions. For the anirvacaniya silver must appear as existent in order that there may be responsive activity on the part of the perceiver. If the anirvacaniya is presented as anirvacaniya, there will be no illusion to speak of. Or if it should appear as non-existent (asat). The error can arise only when and where it is presented as existent (sat). How then can the Advaitin assert: अस्तित्व प्रतीचित and conclude that ergo the object presented in the illusion cannot be "asat". Advaitic dialecticians have indulged in a lot of dialectical verbiage to cloud the issue. Jayatirtha has fully brought out their untenability. The responsive activity of the illusion cannot be explained on the assumption that there is merely a presentation of silver without its presentation "as existing" (sat). There can be no direct knowledge which is not expressed without a specific determination either positively or negatively. Hence, the question has got to be answered: whether the "existence" that is presented (of the association of "thisness" with the shell: samsarga) is Sat, Asat or Anirvacanīya? It cannot be Sat as that would be inconsistent with the very concept of Anirvacanīyatā of the silver. How can the silver be Anirvacanīya if its existence (as presented in the illusory perception) is true and real? The second alternative can be accepted without any difficulty. The third will be mutually incompatible and cannot therefore be accepted. If the mutual association of thisness and shell and the association of reality of shell in the silver that are presented in the illusion are both anirvacanīya in their turn, there is sure to be a regress in the argument. The question is bound to arise: what is meant by saying that both these samsargas are 'anirvacanīya'? Are they Vyāvahārika or Prātbhāsika? The first alternative is not accepted by the Advaitin as that would make the silver too "vyāvahārika". If they are purely "Prātbhāsika" even then one should state if they are presented qua Prātbhāsika or as Vyāvahārika? In the first case, there will be no activity, as no one has found a Prātbhāsika to be capable of practical efficiency. In the latter case the question will p.M.—9.
again arise if the Vyāvahārikatva perceived of them, is true or false to their actual nature? It cannot be true to their nature as that would not accord with their Prātibhāsikatva. If it is not true to their nature, it would mean that what is Asat does indeed appear directly as existent. If it is argued that even that Vyāvahārikatva is actually anirvacaniya and is being superimposed, the whole series of alternatives will have again to be raised with reference to this second Anirvacaniya and where such superimposition terminates, there again will arise the impossibility of responsive activity or the direct perception of Asat as Sat. Thus, the concept of anirvacaniya, as applied to the object represented in illusions or its relation, makes the problem of error more confused and complicated than any of the other theories.
CHAPTER XXI

MADHVA'S THEORY OF ERROR: ABHINAVANYATHĀKHYĀTI

A realistic theory of knowledge has no reason to fight shy of errors and illusions in human life. Illusions do not upset the normal foundations of life and knowledge. On the contrary, they serve as foils to valid experience and give it its significance and value. The Mādhva theory of knowledge is, as we have seen, wide enough to provide a place for dreams, errors and illusions in life. The Mīmāṁsakas and Rāmānuja, however, fight shy of errors and seek to explain them away. Madhva feels that there is hardly any justification for doing so. Life is wide enough to hold both truth and error. Human nature and conditions of life being what they are, it is not possible to eliminate errors or expect our experiences and knowledge to be always veridical. This is proof of the limitations of the individual. A sound theory of knowledge, therefore, must take note of the limitations of life and human understanding and reckon with occasional jolts, disappointments and illusions in life and be able to explain their true nature and conditions, so as to arm us against them.

It is idle to shut one’s eyes to errors and refuse to recognize them as such or call them by different names as “Vivekāgraha”, “Pramuṣṭatattākasmaraṇa” and so forth. The senses deceive us at times. But that is only rarely and in exceptional cases and under definite conditions. Madhva feels, therefore, that there is hardly any justification for either extreme of banishing errors altogether from life and transforming them into truths and half-truths, by verbal juggleries and theological quibbles or dismissing all experience, errors as well as certainties, as the merest illusions a la accepted ones, as in the case of Buddhistic Nihilism and Advaita:

यथा माया यथा स्वप्नो गत्वा जन्मनगरेयथा ।
तथोत्सृष्टिः तथा स्वप्नं तथा महा उदाहरतः ॥ (Mādhyaṇamaka-Kārikā)

“स्तन्मात्रिन्ययो मिथ्या प्रत्ययत्वात्तथापि हि ।
प्रत्ययः स मृषा दद्धः स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययः यथा " ॥

The Mādhva theory of truth and error is expressed in the formula:

औत्सर्गिक ज्ञानानि प्रामाण्ये, अपवादित्वः ।
सादी खलु निबित्त्यत्तावायः क्रियविशिष्टे।

1. Cf. यथायथ सर्वविद्वानमेव वेदविदां मतम् ।
अतो यथायथ रुपादिविद्वानं द्रुकित्कारितु। (Śrībhāṣya, i, 1, 1).
This appears to be the most rational attitude to take to the problem of truth and error and stand for a dispassionate assessment of experience. Madhva is no sophisticated realist who denies that there can be any illusions of any kind in our cognitions or disputes the central assumption of all logic and philosophy that things are not always what they seem. The occurrence of illusions, at times, only confirms the possibility of true experiences at other times.

The Madhva theory of perceptual illusions is a bold and dexterous combination of the salient features of the Asat-Khyāti and the Anyathā-Khyāti views. Madhva defines illusions as the contrary appearance of an unreal, non-existent object as real and existent and vice versa: असतः सत्य-प्रतीति: सतोद्विचारःप्रतीतिस्वन्यन्यथा; प्रतीतिरितिः भावितः (G. T. ii, 26). It is easy to see that such must be the nature of an illusion, if reality is defined as "Anāropitam" and "Pramāṇa" as यथार्थम् or यथार्थस्यत्स्यत्स्यस्या प्रतीतिलम्. The root of this theory is the presentation of some non-existent entity, fact or relation as existent and real in a given substratum, with which the sense organ is in contact and when other conditions propitious for the erroneous cognition are also there: अत्यन्तात्सतं रज्ञत्वस्य शक्तिक्षणां, अत्यन्तात्सतं संस्करणं वा, रज्ञत्वस्य तात्त्वस्य वा भावितिविषयं (VTN§ p. 55 b). वश्यति चास्ति रज्ञतात्त्वायध्योजिनित्वावत-माचार्यः (NS. p. 47). This element of false presentation is the differentia of illusions:

अः यथार्थसत्त्वमसद्धत्साध्रात्वत्वे प्रतीति ।

(AV).

It would be futile to deny it:

तत्साध्रात्त्वस्य सन्ततात्त्वशा प्रतीतिपदे ।
तस्तिरालम्बनं सानसादलाभं हि तदद ॥

(Buddhist Kārikā q. in NS.)

The Asatkhyātivādin is therefore right in holding that the object of illusions is utterly unreal. But he is not justified in denying any kind of

1. Cf. Rāmānuja's admission: श्यात्त्वत्त्वाविदितानां प्रत्येकं यथार्थम् गत्वा, अन्यायाबाह्यसवस्याश्रयणीयाः। असत्याविदितभावसत्त्वयोऽसत्यसत्त्व, प्रत्येक्याविदितः अवश्यमातो अन्य-विशेषाण्यमयमविशेषणां श्यात्त्वत्त्वमक्लेन च, विश्याविदितापश्चविक्षेपेदिविश्यामालेन ।

(Śrīdhāra, 1, 1, 1).
reality to any of the constituents of that experience, including the adhistha
āna etc., and dismissing the entire fabric of that experience as a baseless fancy: निराधिष्ठानान्तररुपोगतः।

If nothing in the constituents of an illusion is real, there would be no possibility of sense-contact, without which there would be no perceptual knowledge, true or false. Jayatīrtha clarifies another important point in Madhva’s theory of perceptual illusions that the superimposed object and its identity with the substratum are both non-existent where the former is far away from the latter as in the illusion of the snake in the rope. But where, as in seeing a mango tree and a jack tree standing close to each other from a distance, one misses their distinction and err in thinking that there is only one of them, only the identity is non-existent। Madhva therefore holds that notwithstanding the unreality of “the silver in the shell”, it is thro’ contact with the real piece of shell that the sense-organ, vitiated by defects, gets a distorted apprehension of it as a piece of silver. It is subsequently realized that this silver is absolutely non-existent within that spatio-temporal setting. Jayatīrtha gives classical expression to this view: शुक्तकारासिद्ध ् दुस्थविद्यायो तत्स्वरूपात्मतः जस्तातिसमन्वयाः शास्त्रीये रजो, स अभम् इत्यंगीरात्। (NS. p. 48 b).

He also indicates clearly the parting of the ways between the Mādhva doctrine and the Buddhistic view of Asat-khyāti in this respect: न बध शुक्तकारान्तररुपोगताः निराधिष्ठानां निराधिष्ठानं निराधिष्ठानं निराधिष्ठानं निराधिष्ठानं (Tdy. प. 11 b). अत एव नास्त्यात्मतिस्मिन्। यावत्वश्च विगीते प्रत्येके भास्ते तत्क स्वस्थ्य अस्वस्थे बलु अस्वस्थ्यातः: स्वस्थं। नवैमतेवयुक्तम् (NS. p. 48 b). It is, thus, needless and impossible to confound the Mādhva theory as an “Asat-khyāti”, in the accepted sense of the term.

Since the acid test of an illusion is in the sublating cognition (वाक्षक्षान्तर), its true nature should be fixed in the light of the Bādhaka-jñāna. Now, the stultifying cognition takes the form: “there is no silver here; only the non-existent silver had appeared to exist”। Madhva takes his firm stand on the express authority of this Bādhaka-jñāna, in adjudging the status of the object of illusion as an utter unreality (ātyantāsāt).

1. तात् ्क सर्वनारोपणमस्वतात्मस्वेदः उच्चे। यत्क्षरोपणसौनिष्ठते तत्स्तत्तादात्ममात्र-मस्वेदः। यत्क पुरसर्वनिष्ठतात्मारोपणें तत्स्तत्त, तत्तसात्मेऽर्भयम्प्यस्तो।। (NS. p. 54)

2. ‘नात्र रजस्ते, अतस्बेदश्रजस्ते प्रत्यभावाः’।
The Anyathākhyātivādins merely intoxicates himself with an infer-
tential function that the superimposed object must have a reality of its own
elsewhere, which is hardly relevant to the form or content of the sublating
knowledge. This is precisely the point of departure between the Nyāya
and Mādhva view of Anyathākhyāti. It is to bring out this differentia of
Mādhva’s theory that Jayatīrtha christens it as “Abhinavānyathākhyāti”
(neo-Anyathākhyāti) and contrasts it with the Nyāya theory. He points
out that the scope of the Bādhakajñāna is strictly limited to denying the
presence of silver in the given substratum and its identity with it, and that
it is quite indifferent to the question of the existence or non-existence of
the silver elsewhere. The difficulty of establishing a sensory contact with
an object existing elsewhere (anyatra sat) would also be insurmountable.
It is unnecessary to assume the reality of superimposed objects elsewhere,
when illusions could be satisfactorily explained without such an assump-
tion, by certain defects in the nature of the sensory contact. Even the
Anyathākhyātivādin must admit that, in point of fact, sensory contact has
been only with the actual substratum before the perceiver, viz., the nacre.
If then, sensory contact with the shell should, as has been the case here,
actually produce the misapprehension of silver, for the nonce, it is surely
a piece of misplaced ingenuity to propound a very elaborate theory that
the selfsame silver must be having an actual existence somewhere else
(anyatra sat). That is imagination running riot. What has actually
happened in this case is simply that sensory contact with nacre has
somehow led to its erroneous perception as identical with silver that is not
there, i.e. to say, purely non-existent. The existence of real silver similar
to the one perceived in the illusion, elsewhere, in the shop, is one thing
and to claim that that very thing has come over here or that that very
thing is there, is quite another. Real silver may be remotely responsible
for furnishing the background to the present illusion. Mādhva does not
deny that. What he denies and what the Naiyāyika asserts is that the
selfsame silver (that was superimposed) is existing elsewhere (and could
not otherwise have appeared). The Naiyāyika unhappily is mixing up
the issues. The first proposition is entirely true and unexceptionable—
that there is a real silver outside the present illusion. It is not only
conceded by Mādhva but is laid down by him as the necessary pre-condi-
tion and invariable concomitant of all illusions:

अधिधानं च सद्वः सत्यवस्तुवध्यं विमा ।
न भान्तिर्भृवति क्वापि स्वनमयायदिकृष्यपि || (VTN).
But, there is no justification, says he, for the dogma of the Nyāya Realists that the superimposed object must always, as such and in its own self, have an actual existence elsewhere: अन्तः प्रतीतिप्रेक्षिकये तत्त्व स्तऽ मानामाकालः। अस्थले कथा प्रतीतिर्विच नैत ? अन्यन्तः सत्त्वेदिकये कथम् ? न हान्यन्तः सत्त्वं अन्तः प्रतीतिर्विचः कार्यः ! (NS. p. 54). In the light of this clear and unmistakable criticism of the Nyāya view, one cannot but express astonishment at the statement of Madhva’s doctrine that “the radical Realist that he is, Madhva wants to give a complete objective basis to the content of error after the model of the Nyāya school” (P. Nagarajara, Error, Doubt and Dream in Dvaita Vedānta, Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, xi, pt. 4, p. 295). [Italics mine]. If anything, Madhva denies that the content of error (bhramaviṣṭaya) has an objective basis: को हि तत्त्वं रजतं सदिन्ति ? (NS. p. 46).

The existence of an object of illusion, elsewhere, may be deemed necessary either for securing sensory contact with it, in order to render the perception of silver (or the like) possible, or for awakening the impression of silver in the mind (rajatasamskārodbodha). Neither ground is admissible. There is no possibility of sensory contact with an object existing somewhere else and if such existence is required merely to furnish the necessary mental impression of the object, such a result could be explained by the past experience of it, without making the selfsame object come down and present itself in the illusion1. It is for this reason that Madhva insists on the reality of a “Sadṛśa” (prototype) in addition to that of an adhiṣṭhāna (substratum) as the sine qua non of all illusions. But there is no reason to assign an intrinsic reality of its own to the superimposed object per se. One should not miss this subtle distinction between the Nyāya and the Mādhva view of the status of the āropya and confound the two.

A careful examination of the various theories of error held by different schools of Indian philosophy shows that the ideas of “asat-khyāti” and “anyathākhyāti” constitute their greatest common measure, of agreement. Madhva’s theory of “Abhinavavyāthākhyātī”, combines these two vital elements of the theory of illusions in right proportions and

1. इन्द्रियायनंसविशेषायनं वा तदास्येः, संस्कारसिद्धायनं वा ? नाथः। संस्कारस रज्जातातुसभाव- मान्येन भवतिति व्यायाम तस्मात्वायनसतत्वक्षयना (NS. p. 54 b.)
2. कक्षामो द्वाभिनवान्यथायात्मित्वक्षय स (NS. p. 46 b.)
formulates a balanced theory of Error. Its most important finding is, of course, the fact of the presentation of the non-existent, in illusions (असतः स्त्रिष्टं प्रतीतिवार्षिकः). The whole theory of Madhva turns on this hypothesis. This is itself derived from the nature of the Bādhakajñāna (असदवर्जन रज्ज्वप्रायप्रमाद). The question of the presentability of “Asat” (the non-existent) in erroneous knowledge (असतः स्त्रिष्टं अपरोक्ष्यत्वा अर्थे प्रतीतिवार्षिकः; as it is technically known) has been ably argued and established at length by Jayatīrtha and Vyāsārāya, following Madhva. As a matter of fact, the category of Anirvacaniya itself, by definition, is made to rest on the presumption of the non-presentability of Asat. But the assumption itself is gratuitous and inconsistent with the conviction of difference from asat (asad-vailakṣaṇaṇa), which the monistic philosopher has, in respect of the world:

असत्मस्याद्विन्दृष्टं शास्त्रविधमात्र सत्यमस्तदेव हि।

tasmād vaidyādhiṣṭhā bunte teṇān vādāt? (AV).

1. For details, see my History of Deśīta School of Vedānta and Its Literature, Vols. i, pp. 346-48; and ii, 151-2.
IV. THE WORLD OF EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER XXII

REALITY OF WORLD-EXPERIENCE

Belief in the reality of the world and its values is, naturally, one of the fundamental tenets of Theism. It is thus a metaphysical doctrine and not a mere theological dogma. We may, therefore, turn to the grounds on which it is based. These may be brought under the three heads of perceptual, rational and scriptural grounds admitted in the system of Madhva.

We have seen that Madhva recognizes an additional sense or instrument of knowledge, — the Sākṣī (besides the other six). The reality of world-experience follows as a consequence of the acceptance of the doctrine of Sākṣī and the implications of the doctrine of Pramāṇa (applied to the other instruments of knowledge). The knowledge produced by the senses is normally valid and true, under requisite conditions of knowledge and proper types of contact of the sensory apparatus and this knowledge is not ordinarily contradicted. It is accepted in all schools of Vedānta that knowledge carries with it its own validity which is intrinsic to it. The Dvaita, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita are pledged to this view. Validity implies the factual reality of the object of knowledge with reference to a given spatio-temporal setting: न हि विषयायातास्मातं सर्वदा प्रामाण्यायां नाम! (Nym. p. 142). The reality of the world would thus follow from the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge:

यदि स्वतं प्रामाण्येः विश्वस्तत्ता कथं न ते?

(AV).

The Advaitin, doubtless, pleads that Perception cognizes only the provisional reality (vyāvahārika-satyam) of objects; while inference of unreality and texts to that effect disprove the absolute or noumenal reality thereof and that, therefore, there is no conflict of Pramāṇas:

पारमाण्विकमेवं प्राविश्य शरणं भ्रत: ।

विषयादृष्टीवेब्येन न विवेदिति कदाचः ॥

But this is counting the eggs before they are hatched, inasmuch as the threefold classification of reality into Pāramārthika, Vyāvahārika and Prātibhäsika, upon which the theory of provisional validity of Pramāṇas is based, is still an unproved assumption. The very idea of provisional validity (which ceases to be valid after some time) is meaningless and repugnant to the basic idea of Pramāṇya:
Vyāvahārika-prāmāṇya is, therefore, a mere myth. It is invalidity writ euphemistically large. If the principle of self-validity of knowledge is to have any meaning, there can be no denying or escaping from the conclusion of the reality of world-experience: pramāṇaṁ hi svagocchre prakāśaṁ tattvādhaṁ gṛhitam pravartate. Na puna: saṁyogahāricēṁ n: prameyyaṁ, na punānukṣhitānukṣhitēṁ pravartate。

( Bhāmatī, ii, 2.32 ).

There is, thus, no need to go in search of subtle and elaborate reasonings in support of the validity of Pratyakṣa. As Madhva says elsewhere, reason may have to be summoned, if at all, only to prove the falsity of particular experiences in case of serious doubts; but hardly to demonstrate validity of normal experiences: द्वितीयतः निभावालीकारे च युक्त्य-पेश्य। न हु तत्प्रेषण्य॥ Such validity is furnished by the perception itself where it is normally constituted, as we have seen under the theory of Pramāṇas. Nor are we without sufficient means of testing the soundness of the conditions of knowledge. It is open to us to institute the necessary tests (parīkṣā) and make sure of the reality of normal experience. Madhva contends that all our normal experience and perceptions are capable of bearing such scrutiny and have been so tested and found to be true and valid. It would be preposterous to say that we could never trust our senses and that our perceptions are proverbially and inherently misleading and that we could never know the truth of things or that perception is capable of revealing only the present and that we could never be sure of what the future may hold and so on. Such wild and irresponsible objections would be suicidal to the Monist himself. If the verdict of normal perception is to be disbelieved in every case, there would be no distinction between truth and falsity in experience. There would be nothing to distinguish illusions from valid experiences. All experience would be suspect and no logical or scientific advance would be possible. If the perception of silver in the nacre and the stultifying cognition „this is not silver“ were both of them on the same par of incredibility, all distinction between truth and falsehood would have to be given up. As Vyāsārāya says, in a humorous vein, the monist would stand to lose his principal in trying for the interest1. If he does not concede the validity of the stultifying

1. नेदं रूपांमितः प्रत्यक्षप्रामाण्याविशेषकृतम्। अन्यथा, ‘द्वितीयं’विज्ञाप्रामाण्यं न स्वादितः विद्विदिन्तिज्ञातो भूलशहायनपतेः। (Nym. p. 139 ).
cognition: “this is not silver”, he could never establish his pet theory of the unreality of the Universe, which rests upon the analogy of the illusion of silver in nacre.

Sense-perception could not, therefore, be deprived of its validity, except by a more valid perception: दशकलुनो बलवटटृटि विना नात्यत बाष्काम (VTN). It cannot be set aside by any amount of specious reasoning or bald texts, unless the latter could be shown to be more valid than the perception in question. The attempt to upset perception by inference or texts would thus involve a fallacy of interdependence, inasmuch as the inference or the verbal testimony could not be invested with greater validity unless perception is shown to be invalid and that could not be, unless the inference or the verbal testimony is proved to be more authoritative, for whatever reasons. The validity of perception, on the other hand, is self-evident and does not need any ratification from outside. The superiority of perception to inference and अप्तवाक्या, is also self-evident, in that it is able to grasp even the minutest features of objects which are beyond the ken of inference or correct confusion of quarters which the pious words of an अप्ता are powerless to do. The perceptive judgment ‘Fire is hot’ is intrinsically superior to any inference of its being cold. The reality of experience derives support from the combined evidence of a number of facts like perception of difference, reasoning in support of such perception, the cosmogonic texts, texts prescribing Saguno-pāsanā and the drift of the entire Karmakāṇḍa. Albert Schweitzer rightly emphasizes this point when he says “The ethics of action is hard hit by the assertion that the world has no meaning. Man cannot engage in ethical action in a world with no meaning. His ethical life in such a world must be limited to keeping himself pure from it. But if, further, the reality of the world is denied, then, ethics altogether ceases to have any importance.” (Indian Thought and Its Development, p. 60)

From another point of view, also, perception where tested and found correct, has to be recognized as the basic ground or Upajīvya of any inference or texts in a contrary direction. Such a basic ground cannot be repudiated by any amount of wild reasoning or bald assertions of texts. This is known as the principle of “Upajīvyapramāṇavirodha” or conflict with the basic ground. The experience of the world rests on such Upajīvya-pratyakṣa. It is not the superficial one (of the Śukti-rajata-type) which is liable to be mistaken; but one which has passed the test of
personal endorsement by the Sākṣī after due examination. It is what Madhva calls "स्वप्न" or "स्वपेर्विक्ति", which is indubitable and is the last word on tests, having reached down to the innermost intuitive level of certification by the Sākṣī, which (as has been established) is the terminus of all Parīkṣā and converts belief into certainty. Madhva contends that the finite experiences of pleasure and pain in life belong to this category of Pratyakṣa certified by Sākṣī and must therefore be accepted as impregnable. So too the consolidated experience of humanity of the reality of an objective universe and of its values, not to mention the realization of human limitations and the consciousness of a Power transcending human conceptions. It is on this rock of Sākṣīpratyakṣa that Madhva has built his edifice of Dvaita-Vedānta.

He points out that such universal experiences of the joys and sorrows of life with a deep sense of their reality is not of the hollow variety of the silver in the shell, inasmuch as it stands the test of practical utility and response-satisfaction. The objection of Vācaspati, therefore, that if the verdict of identity (of human souls and Brahman) and the consequent unreality of the experience of duality, is disputed on the ground of conflict with the basic Pratyakṣa (Upajīvyapratyakṣa), even the subsequent perception of "this is not silver," would have to be dismissed as invalid, because it is opposed to the original (basic) perception of 'this is silver', is disingenuous. It purposely confuses the issue. The present is a question of strength between perception and Inference or texts, and the instance cited is one of conflict between two perceptions, which is irrelevant to Madhva's position that no perception can be invalidated save by a more powerful perception. In other words, perception cannot be negated by mere reasonings not based on some other and a more powerful perception. Moreover, the basic nature of reality claimed for perception in this case is not based on considerations of its temporal priority or logical dependence for purposes of negation only (निष्कृतित्वम्); but upon an intrinsic dependence established by rigid tests. The capacity to stand such a practical test is lacking in the 'silver in the nacre'. But in respect of our normal experience of the world, all practical conditions of validity are fulfilled. They cannot therefore be regarded as illusory, with any justification.

As for Śruti texts, which may appear to teach the identity of God and man, not only will they be patently in conflict with numerous others which do teach their difference; but also with the personal experience
(of its own limitations and difference from Brahman) of the Sākṣī. If personal experiences of the Sākṣī are to be set aside by other Pramāṇas, however powerful, the foundations of philosophy would collapse; for, then, there would be no surety left anywhere, in perception, reason or revelation. Even the conviction of identity reached by the monist qua personal and reached at the Sākṣī level, will be in the grip of doubt and stultification by some other conceivable form of knowledge such as that all is void,—so that, nihilism would be the end of philosophical quest. Madhva, therefore, insists that the verdict of the Sākṣī must be accepted as the basis of logical and philosophical certitude. It must be accepted as the ultimate criterion of all validity in experience, including the validity of Scriptural knowledge. Unless this is done, there can be no philosophy worth the name and there would be nothing but a reign of universal doubt and illusions galore. It would be simply suicidal, then, to dare to question the verdict of the Sākṣī or attribute the slightest touch of fallibility or doubt to its findings. This point has already been conclusively established earlier, U.G.E.R. Chapters XVIII and XIX.

The primacy of Sākṣī having been firmly established, the question of giving suitable and reasonable explanations to some identity texts which appear to support the identity of the human souls with Brahman and by implication or otherwise deny the reality of the world, against the firm conviction of the Sākṣī, will not be such a difficult thing after all, having regard to their mystic, figurative and analogical methods of philosophic discourse and approved canons of interpretation of texts, accepted by all.

Madhva cites, for example, the Vedic text "सचमानः प्रस्तर:"
('the handful of grass is the Sacrificer'). Here the literal sense of the text cannot be accepted. We have the authority and sanction of the Pārva-Mīmāṁsā to reinterpret such seemingly absurd or inconsistent declarations as figurative statements based on functional, genetic, etymological, mystic and other considerations: तत्सिद्धञ्जयितिसाध्यम्भवसामृत्यमि-सम्बन्धाया: 1 (P. M. S. i, 4, 23). Madhva claims the same latitude in interpreting the monistically worded texts, in conformity with Sākṣipraty-akṣa and the numerous other texts which teach the reality of the world and the difference between the human souls and Brahman. He has, accordingly, indicated some fresh points of view from which these "monistic texts" could be more properly explained:
Even the most warmly cherished "Mahāvākyas" of the Monists will have to stand on the ground of the Sākṣī for their ratification, in the same way as any intimate personal experience of the joys and sorrows of life. There is not the least difference in the status of these two experiences of the Sākṣī and one cannot be partial to the one at the expense of the other. The highest deference and most fitting homage we can pay the Scriptures is in trying to find their true import in consistency with the logic of Sākṣyanubhava—instead of being swept off one's feet by the literal sense of such quasi-mystic statements of identity and acosmism: न श्रमो वयं नास्तिदं वाक्यमिति । नामेयां पदानामात्र शक्तिनास्तिति । किंतु अस्त्य वाक्यस्य प्रयंच-मिथ्यालेन तात्त्वयं नास्तिति । उपपरिवर्तनाभावेय हि प्रतीतायें तात्त्वयं स्त्रापकः । अन चास्तूपरपारि-बिरोध हृति (N.S. p. 601). It is too well known, that the literal sense of a proposition is, more often than not, found modified by so many exigencies of practical and theoretical considerations, syntactic and other difficulties or philosophical necessities. Literalism would scotch philosophy as nothing else would.
CHAPTER XXIII

SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE REALITY OF THE WORLD ANSWERED

The Monist's attempt to challenge the reality of world on the doubtful analogy of dreams and illusions is like the proverbial drowning man catching at a straw to save himself. If our experience of the reality of the world could be negated by the knowledge that atman alone is real and that all else is false, on the ground that perception is strictly limited to the present (even tho' the conviction of its reality may have been implanted in us from time immemorial, and have stood the test of time), the position of the negating knowledge, which is also claimed to be a perception (tho' not by the eyes) would be much worse, inasmuch as it has admittedly a distinct beginning and is practically an unknown quantity till now. If we could persuade ourselves that what is known and held to have been true and valid from time immemorial by the universal consent of human beings all the world over, is sure to be superseded by some unknown fact of knowledge to come, what is there to prevent our supposing that the same fate may overtake that new knowledge also? If the known is false and the unknown alone true, one may seriously contend that cows and bulls are really without horns, even tho' they may appear to have them and that hares have horns even tho' they are not visible to any of us. The same kind of *reductio ad absurdum* would hold good in respect of any inference about the unreality of the universe. If this inference also is untrue in its turn, the reality of world-experience would remain unscathed. If it is real, the ground of generalization (*dṛṣṭyavahetu*) being obviously fallacious in this case, may be equally so, in other cases. The vague possibility of a future contradiction cannot be seriously entertained to the extent of repudiating the consolidated experience of all humanity. Belief in the reality of the universe, within the meaning of uncontradictability in the three periods of time is held, by Madhva and his followers, to be established not by Sense-perception but by the *intuitive perception of the Sākṣī*. This is where Madhva philosophy is on the vantage ground as compared with the Nyāya school of realism, in meeting the challenge of monism. Most of the dialectics of the school centres naturally on this aspect of the question and refutes the plea of the Advaita that perception is incapable of establishing the truth of things beyond the present. Jayatīrtha says that the perception of uncontradictedness for the present involves the perception of uncontradictability for the future also. This does not mean that it is or must be so in all cases; or that there is no possibility of
illusions in experience. It is, therefore, necessary to explain the Mādhyā point of view, a little more clearly. So long as all Vedāntins are agreed that the validity of knowledge is intrinsically made out and that invalidity alone is dependent on contradiction, the normal and healthy perceptions of life cannot be dismissed as illusory. Even the most ruthless tests fail to prove the contrary, so that the uncontradictability of normal experiences could not be doubted by any reasonable creature. It will be absurd to presume contradictability of experience on mere inferential considerations or as a bare hypothetical possibility. The inference itself will have to depend upon another valid perception for the ascertainment of a sound relation of concomitance and cannot therefore afford to destroy its own standing ground (Upajīvyā) by casting a universal doubt on all perceptions as such. Even the perception of the blueness of the sky is a defect of distance and is not seen to arise in proximity or in case of verifiable scientific explanations. If perception as such is to be suspected of invalidity, there is nothing to forbid a similar fate overtaking the monistic texts on the analogy of “the text referring to the old ox singing foolish songs fit for the Madrakas”:

एक्षेरूऽ गायत्रि मद्रकाणि ।

The reality of experience should thus be admitted as fully borne out by practical and theoretical considerations alike. The test of practical efficiency (arthakriyākārītīvam) is a potent one, in respect of reality. It is in this connection that Madhva raises the question of the reality of certain aspects of dream-phenomena. Dreams are not absolutely unreal phenomena occurring without assignable cause. The element of unreality lies in the identification of the experiences therein with those of the waking state, i.e., in taking them, at the time, to be objects of waking experience. But, the passions, feelings etc., stirred up in the course of the dream and the experiences as such are uncontradicted and are even remembered with feelings of pleasure or aversion as the case may be, and are often accompanied by incontrovertible proofs of their factual occurrence, as in erotic dreams (svapnāminisambhoga). Gauḍapāda (Kārikās ii, 1-7) and Śaṅkara (B. S. B. iii, 2,3) have adduced some arguments for the unreality of dreams. These have been refuted by Jayāttṛtha in his NS and TP. Śaṅkara (following Gauḍapāda) argues that dreams lack spatio-temporal conformity to facts. There is no material stuff out of which objects could be produced in dreams. They cannot be

1. यदन्नायालं जामस्य सा आत्मि: (Madhva, B. S., B. iii, 2,3).
regarded as different from the dreamer; or identical with him. In the former case, they should be perceivable by others too and in the latter case, they would be unreal as it is obviously impossible for the perceiving self to metamorphose itself into so many objects that appear in the dream. These objections are irrelevant to the Mādhva view that dreams are the experiences created by God, for the benefit of the Jīvas and are destroyed by Him, immediately. The dream-creations are made of the stuff of Vāsanās (agelong potencies) embedded in the minds of Jīvas. As these Vāsanās are subtle and supersensuous, by nature, their objectifications also are so and could be accommodated within the dream-centres of the mind (or the brain); so much so that there is no necessity for the dreamer to go out of his physical body to experience those phenomena, or any other difficulty regarding spatio-temporal conformity etc.,¹ as dreams are equipped with their own subtle space-time setting constructed by Vāsanās:

\[
\text{वासना: संवृत्तनामनाधुभवागता:} \quad \| \\
\text{सन्येवशेषजीवनामनादिमनसि सिवता:} \quad \| \\
\text{पिणुतान्त्रक मनोस्थेव यावमुक्तिसदातनयु} \quad \| \\
\text{तत्त्वावेशसंस्कारा: संचयेन्ते सदैव च} \quad \| \\
\text{संस्कारार्ममाननित्यत्र नानाविषय जगत्} \quad \| \\
\text{स्वन्तकः दृष्टयति भानितार्मच्यमेव हि} \quad \| \\
\text{(AV.)}
\]

Śaṅkara himself endorses the position that dreams are the products of Vāsanās²; but he seems to limit them to the Vāsanās of the waking state of the present life, which is hardly justifiable in the light of the Hindu belief in the influence of past lives and past Karma and their Vāsanās on our present lives. The acceptance of Vāsanās as the Upādāna (material) out of which dream-objects are created and projected will answer most of the objections raised against the reality of dreams. Śaṅkara himself admits that in dreams it is the objective element that is contradicted by waking experience and not the experience as such.³ Mādhva goes a step further and claims a special status for dream-creations as produ-

1. यदि बाह्यकारणकः व्यन्नविषयः तदा सम्बन्धितेवपेक्षाः। न चैत्यम्। अतः संस्कारोपादानका एवेति भावः। ऐतनोक्तकोलक्षणः। प्रयुक्तः। वासनायः मेंमदर्मस्वसङ्क्षार्टानो शरीरादिगृहीतः। मनसा दर्शनमभवत्। बाह्यकारणायात्। मृत्तिक्ष्यादिप्रशस्ततिरस्तस्याद।

2. जागतिकवालन्निर्मित्तक्षात् स्वन्नस्य * * * ( B.S.B. iii, 2, 6 )

3. यथापि स्वप्नदर्शनमस्य स्पृहेऽनोदक्षालनादिविधायात्मकवर्ते, तथापि, तदवगति: सत्यमेव।

P. M. 10
cts of these beginningless Vāsanās embedded in the minds of Jīvas, and therefore entitled to a reality of their own (of a subtler order)\(^1\). They are not made of external ingredients (bāhyakāraṇaka) like objects of waking experience. That is why they are of such subtle nature as to be constructed by the mind and experienced internally. Madhva therefore interprets the term "māyāmātram" in the Sūtra (B. S. iii, 2, 3) (1) as 'created by Vāsanās' (as material cause) and (2) by the will of God (as their efficient cause—nimittakāraṇa).\(^2\) These dream objects, because they are the products of Vāsanās, are different from physical objects of our waking experience. It is for that reason that they do not exhibit the properties of grossness or serve one's external needs.\(^3\) But that does not make them any the less real. The element of falsity in dreams lies not in the constitution of dream-objects but in their being (mis-)taken for waking realities, during the dream: \(\text{प्रतित 'स्वनविषयवाण स्वविद्यामर्षवेव बाध्यते (TP).} \) Rāmānuja also agrees with Madhva's view that dreams are real creations of God. According to Vādirāja when sentient creatures are presented in dreams, their bodies are made of Vāsanās of the dreamer and they are temporarily made to be tenanted by some souls at the will of God.

Like dreams, illusions of snake in the rope etc. inspire fear and other reactions by virtue of the indisputable reality of such forms of consciousness underlying those experiences:

\[
\text{सप्तभ्रामादाबिहि ज्ञातमस्थेऽव तत्सत्म}.
\]
\[
\text{तद्वायथक्रियाकारि; तत्सत्वायथक्रियाकरमु} \| (AV)
\]

1. भावनामयासंस्कारः संस्कारः। अनवातित्ववातित्वं संस्कारः। संस्कारित्वधानात्कैरित्वम्। न च तेषां
   गुणलोकोदानात्ववातपति:। मनोविश्वरेण वैवलात्। संस्काराणां चात्मिन्दिश्वरेण ज्ञातज्ञम-
   विनाशयोरिति मारूचं चातुपलभो न दोषाय। (NS. p. 460)

2. ‘माया बुद्धसब्दियांतिप्रजानामेव पाठात। प्रजाशाल्यम् वासनोपक्षमपाठात। न केवलं जैवी
   प्रजामुदया। किन्तू जैवी च। यदि च वासनामात्राः मुख्य एव प्रयोगः। किमेत्, तदा
   इश्वरशर्मा न संप्रद्यताः स्वातः पुरुषुल्लभायं मौर्यव स्वातः। अतो मुखात्येच्यविक्षेपयमुहुः
   मायामात्रित्वकृतं। (NS.)

3. यस्मात् स्वनविषयव विनाविकारः अत एव तेन बाधाकारः। संविदेशवाह्यकाराः
   काशान्तैं न भवति। तेषां तथा बाध्यकृत् क्वचित् स्यात् बाधायथक्रियाकारिता नाति।
   (NS. 499 b.)
The hypothetical assumption of the unreality of world-experience, on the analogy of illusions will end in making out a case for the reality of some other world very much like ours, as the prototype of the one superimposed for the nonce. In trying to damn the reality of this world, as we know it and stigmatize it as an illusion, the monist is in danger of catching a Tartar and accepting the reality of two worlds and thus make the remedy worse than the disease: 

अन्तिकालितः च जगत्, सत्यं जगत् वद्यमेवकः प्रक्षितम् II यदि जगत् अन्तिकालितः स्वातः, तत्त्वं कल्प्यते जगत् जगवस्तकसत्याविभवनस्तवविभवनपूर्वकमनिर्विकारः प्रस्थतः।

As between the known world and its prototype to be, it will be simpler, says Jayatirtha, to admit and be satisfied with the known: 

सत्यजगवस्तकसत्याविभवनस्तवविभवनपूर्वकमनिर्विकारः क्षुव्यावः (Vādāvalī, p. 58).

There is one more obstacle to the reality of the world, raised by Advaitins, viz., the impossibility of establishing any logically satisfactory relation between consciousness and the objects of consciousness in the world (हस्तसंबंधामुपपतिः)1 within the framework of accepted relations like Samyoga, Samavaya etc. It is, therefore, urged by the monists that a "real world" could not shine forth (na prakāśeta) in our consciousness. The objection is as old as the Iṣṭasiddhi. Jayatirtha silences it by pointing out that the question "of the how" of the revelation of the objective world, to consciousness, is an illegitimate one: विवाहारगोचरवाच्यासः । इत्विवयक्तये व्यवहारोपये: (Vādāvalī, p. 61–2). There is no logical difficulty in assuming that objects are revealed to knowledge thro' a process of "mental chemistry", called Vṛtti, facilitated by the sense-organs or by the intuitive self itself, immediacy being as much a characteristic of both, even as knowledge is a common characteristic of mediate and immediate knowledge. He concludes the argument by saying that the difficulty of establishing a nexus between knowledge and objects, within the framework of accepted logic or its devices, is no reason to doubt the existence or reality of such relations between them. The paucity of our vocabulary and logical devices to correctly define the relation between the two in precise terms is no proof of there being no such relation in fact or that such relationship is unreal and superimposed by us. It only means that we have to revise and reorientate our thought-moulds about which there is no sacrosanctity: अन्य एव कश्चात् वास्तवः संबन्धः किं न कल्पनीयः? न हि.

1. Cf. similar objections in modern philosophy, based on the 'dualism of mind and matter' and of the difficulty of bridging the gulf between them.
The difficulties raised are proofs, if at all, of nothing more than the defect in our technique. It is time we sharpen our wits and try to understand the true mechanism of knowledge; but inability to do so, and penetrate further into it than we have done, is no proof of the unreality of the knowledge itself!

The incapacity to define a thing, in some particular way, cannot mean that the thing itself is false. Jayatīrtha winds up the argument with a pertinent question: How is the position bettered by agreeing to treat the world as lacking in reality? How is the nexus between consciousness and its objects rendered more easy or intelligible on the assumption of the unreality of the latter? If the objects are superimposed on consciousness and have no real existence of their own, everyone should be able to see and know everything or none anything at all. How, then, is the individualization of consciousness and the fixity of objects to be explained on the theory of the falsity (mithyātva) of all Drṣya (objects)? If the individualization etc. are to be accounted for by reference to contacts etc. why make a fetish of the superimposition of objects? Why not allow them to be real too: मिथ्यात्वयं दर्शनं कथम्? (Mith. Kh. ॥ p. 8b.)
CHAPTER XXIV
TEXTUAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE REALITY
OF THE WORLD

In view of what has already been said about the primacy of Śaṅkara as
the criterion of all validity and of the doctrine of intrinsic validity of
knowledge, it will be superfluous to cite a large number of texts
from Śrutis and Sūtras in support of the reality of the world of
experience. As Dasgupta observes: "There are so many passages
in the Upaniṣads that are clearly Theistic and dualistic in purport
that no amount of linguistic trickery could convincingly show that they
yield a meaning that would support Śaṅkara's position that the Brahman
alone is the ultimate reality and all else is false" (I. Phil. ii. p. 2).
Śaṅkara introduces an interpretational tour de force by distinguishing
between an ordinary commonsense view of things and a philosophical
view and explains the Upaniṣads in the light of this twofold assumption
that while there are some passages which describe things from a purely
philosophical point of view as the one reality without a second, there are
others — naturally more numerous — which teach the commonsense view
of "a real world, real souls and a real God as their Creator". This
method is applied to the Sūtras also. But such a bifurcation of
standpoints would seem to be hardly consistent with the fundamental
presupposition of all Vedānta philosophers that there is only one
uniform system of thought in the Upaniṣads and Sūtras. That
apart, such a distinction of standpoints into philosophical and
commonsense turns upon a distinction of (two) degrees of validity
as absolute and provisional, which has been shown to be unsustainable. The
argument for the reality of the word has thus been concluded byVyāsarāya:

(1) 'जमात्यय यत्व' हि सूक्ष्मथते 'यतो व' -
ल्यादिश्चतो च जमात्ययक्ति: (2) 'ईत्ततपाणिष्ठ'भिनि सूक्ष्मथते 'तदुपाल': हि-सत्यर्यणज्ञाप्तस्वप्न्यक्तृतः:।
(3) 'लोकत्व' हि सूक्ष्मथते आत्मकम्यय च अयोजनामोक्ति लीलल्यथ: लीलल्यथ:।
(4) 'बौधम्य- नैपृये नेिति सूक्ष्मथते कर्मसाक्षात्वनावैनम्: लीलल्यथ:।
(5) तेज आदेभव्याधिज्ञानयोिकृतसिद्धयवुक्तयत्व तः। नाहि कल्यि:तत्त्व जमात्यकम्ययक्तस्वप्न्यक्तृतः:।
(6) पुरुष्याधिज्ञानयोिकितसिद्धयवुक्तयत्व तः। नाहि कल्यि:तत्त्व जमात्यकम्ययक्तस्वप्न्यक्तृतः:।

(Nym. p. 246). The Mādhva philosophers, on the other hand, seek to
reconcile the monistic descriptions in the Śrutis with the realistic texts,
from the standpoint of One Independent Transcendent-cum-Immanent
Reference viz., Brahman, as explained earlier. In doing so, they have not
been obliged to do any violence to the reality of world-experience. According to the Advaita thinkers, the Scriptures would appear to be speaking with a double voice and deceiving us all along, with realistic descriptions of the world and its creation, which is manifestly untrue: अपि च, नेव पारमाथकी सत्त्वतिः केनातुस्वयः प्रयोजनम् (Bhāmatī, ii, 1, 33). Such a position is hardly complimentary to the Scriptures or compatible with their high position of validity as आत्मनाक्य। It has already been stated that texts supporting the reality of creation and of “a real world, real souls and real God” are to be met with everywhere in the Upaniṣads and Śūtras and in the earlier and later literature also,¹ and it is hardly necessary to quote them here, in extenso.

---

¹ Significant passages are R. V. ii, 15, 1; 24, 6; vii, 88, 6-7; x, 55, 6; 173, 4. Brh. Up. iii, 7, 13-24; Śvet. Up. V, 5; i, 9, Mund. Up. iii, 1, 12; Kaṭha, ii, 2, 13; Īśā 3; etc. and many others cited in my History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature Vol. I, p. 22, fn. 2.
CHAPTER XXV
THE MEANING AND NATURE OF CREATION

The material universe, according to Madhva, is neither an emanation (parināma) of Brahman nor a production de novo. It is merely an actualization of what is in the womb of Matter and souls by the action of Brahman. This creation is a reminder, however inadequate, of the majesty of God. However vivid and profound a man’s religious consciousness may be, he can only be conscious of God thro’ His manifestations and working in the Universe. Creation, thus, gives us a glimpse into the majesty of God: भीषणासाह: पक्षे भीषणेति सुर्ये: (Taitt. Up. ii, 8). Reason bids us assume a First Cause for the Universe. The first cause is advisedly one. Creative activity presupposes a complete foreknowledge of the effects, accessories, degree of effort and consequences of the act and a conscious effort directed towards its achievement. To say, then, that God is all-creator means that He is Omniscient (Sarvajña), All-Powerful and Satyakāma (Jayatīrtha, KN. 7. p. 4 b).

Madhva is aware that creation as an event occurring at a specific date in the past, at the fiat of the Deity, is open to serious difficulties and inconsistencies. The awkward question arises at once,—as to what induced the Deity, which had obviously kept in its shell, all the time, to suddenly take it into its head to come out and call a Universe into being. The objections apply, in the first place, to creation ex nihilo. But no Vedāntin subscribes to such a view. The hypothesis of creation in time and the argument to the existence of God from the supposed necessity of a prius to the temporal series are definitely abandoned by Madhva. Creation, to him, is no doubt a real process. But it is a continuous creation,—a constant dependence of the world on the Supreme for all its determinations: कल्याणेतमापार्थि नित्येनेक्षरेच्छ्या (B. T. p. 14). In so far as it is only the starting point in

1. बहुचिन्द्रदृढाराजानुपरि परपरिविनित्यित्यः (Dvādaśa-Stotra). Cf. also सुखिताप्राणायामेषमोच्यते (Madhva, Chān. Up. C. vi, 1). Contrast in this connection, Śaṁkara’s remarks on B. S. i, 4, 14, and Jayatīrtha’s spirited rejoinder to it: अपक्षायत्वाय प्रपंचसत्तायां तत्त्वमिति चेष्य। सत्यजगतिमातुलवादिरेर्मेशस्मातमहिमसापनतेषव पुरुषार्थेतुलवात। (NS. i, 4, p. 200)

the process of eightfold determinations, Madhva would, in a sense, endorse the view of Ulirici, that "God is not first God and then the Creator". This would not amount to tying down the Deity, as the various attributes are part of His nature (svarūpalakṣaṇa) and there could be no limitation of His Self, and this creative energy of God has a dual aspect of sakti and vyakti (latency and patency) to be exercised as occasion demands:

अनित्यवाचिक्याणां तु ज्ञात एव स्वभापताः
श्रृत्वे वैस्वविषोद्वचित्वा क्रियाशक्त्याञ्च स्थिताः ।
श्रवणिता व्यक्तिता चतुर्विषोद्वचित्वानि विशेषतः (Av. i, 2).

Madhva uses the term "cause" in the sense that a world of imperfect beings and of ceaseless change is explicable only as being maintained by and dependent on a Supreme Being, who is Himself unchanging and perfect in every way and whose constant presence in them, educes the series of forms latent in matter and brings the souls nearer to their self-development at every step and so brings them into full play and actual manifestation:

बलमानद्व ओजोऽहोऽजानमानाकल्मू ।
स्थुस्यादेश जीवस्य व्याहनेन परमांति भोः ॥ (B. S. B. ii. 3,31)
श्रवणविदयु व, तां परिणामस्य, तत्तत्त्वानमिनियमित्वयं तथ स्थित्वा आत्मनो बहुध्राकरणात् ।
(B. S. B. i, 4,27)

The Universe thus depends on God as its ground and ratio essendi, but not as its cause in the narrow sense of the term:

अवधिश्रान्निमित्तमाधुरूबाहारं किच्चश्च: ।
यस्यतः दृष्ट्वेत् वर्तु संस्थानं तदोऽरिदिरम् ।
उभं दृष्ट्वेत् अगतो मुनियुगग ॥

(Vāmana Purāṇa, q. B.T. p. 13).

1. स्थिरस्थितिसंप्रदायनिमनस्यज्ञानाश्यन्यमोक्षः ।
All this will inevitably lead to the assumption of the co-existence of Matter and souls with God. Like Aristotle, and the Greek philosophers, Madhva looks upon the orderly realm of natural process as having neither a beginning nor an end (pravāhata anādi). The cosmos is as everlasting as the God on whom it depends. The changing no less than the Unchangeable is an ultimate component of reality as a whole:

स्वतंत्रं परतंत्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वाभिष्टे (TS).

द्विविधं हि प्रमेयं स्वतंत्रं परतंत्रं च (NS, 286 b).

THE MEANING AND NATURE OF CREATION
CHAPTER XXVI

DOCTRINE OF "ETERNAL CREATION" THRO' "PARĀDHINA-VIŚEŚĀPTI"

The belief in the metaphysical dependence of all finite reality upon Brahman obliges Madhva to hold that all finite existence is in some measure created, preserved, destroyed or otherwise determined in numerous ways, by the Supreme Being. He has enumerated twelve such determinations. These are the expression of this metaphysical dependence of the world of Matter and Souls (including the Cetana-Prakṛti) on the One Source of all existence, activity and consciousness. The Śruti texts which declare Brahman to be the ultimate source and Creator of everything: स इं सचः सचःौजजत । and others like यतो वा इत्यादि भूतानि जापन्ते (Taitt. Up.) should therefore be understood to imply different forms of metaphysical dependence of countless substances, qualities and forces that constitute the world from the highest order of being to the lowest. Of the twelve determinations, creation or coming into existence is ontologically the most important one. It is understood by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in the gross and literal sense of the term as a creation de novo and ex nihilo: असतः सतास्मवावृणो जनम: । Madhva does not, as a Pariṇāmavādin, recognize "अभवन्ति" or "Asat-kāryavāda" in any instance of causation, whatsoever. But this does not mean that all things in the world are eternal and uncreated, in every respect, or abolish "अभवन्ति" in any form or aspect altogether. Madhva has shown, on grounds of logic, elsewhere, that the beginningless and eternal existence of certain fundamental substances or categories like space and time, must be accepted by every scientific-minded philosopher, as an unquestionable axiom. It has already been shown that the creation of time and space is an impossible hypothesis.

The question then arises: How is the existence of uncreated substances like space and time to be metaphysically reconciled with the fundamental presupposition of the Vedānta and its ideal that all finite reality is explicable only as derived from One Supreme Source of all. This problem has not occurred to and has not been raised by any other Indian philosopher or commentator on the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta. This shows how far in advance of his times Madhva's philosophic perceptions

---

1. See Chapter XI, on Space and Time.
were, over those of his compeers. Madhva's answer to the question rests on an analysis of the concept of Causation wherein he shows that it is capable of being distinguished into two kinds: (1) production of a substance de novo in the commonsense view of the term and (2) production in the sense of acquisition of a change of state or peculiarity that depends on the will of another; i.e. God: पराधिनविशेषापि:। This distinction places the entire question of creation of eternal substances in an altogether new perspective and breathes a new meaning into the entire doctrine of Creation and marks a striking advance of thought in Indian philosophy, where the idea is quite novel. In the light of this new theory of Creation, it cannot be said that Madhva "finds it impossible to reconcile the traditional Hindu doctrine of the eternity of the world and souls, with their creation" or that "it is a pity that the teaching of St. Thomas on the possibility of Eternal Creation, never reached his ears".

A correct understanding of Madhva's view of the Creation of eternal substances thro" "Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti", to be explained presently, will show that it is the same as 'Eternal Creation' in the sense of positing an eternal and constant dependence of all finite reality in each and every one of its states of being and becoming (saḍbhāvaviṃkāras) and the eightfold cosmic determinations (Srṣṭyādyaṣṭakam), upon the One Infinite and Independent Principle viz., God or Brahman.

This is the utmost limit to which any philosophical theory of creation could go, short of assuming creation in time of even eternal substances, in some remote undiscoverable past, ex nihilo, which is fraught with logical contradictions. Such a doctrine of creation in time has been abandoned by speculative thinkers both before and after St. Augustine and Madhva's position that creation should be regarded as an eternal act coeval with the Divine nature and existence, is in perfect agreement with that of many early Christian Fathers, particularly Origen. Only we, should understand by "creation", according to Madhva, not only the manifestation of being which is the starting point in the series of eightfold determinations, but one and all of the rest, according to the nature

1. Cf. Remarks in a review of my work "Svatantrādvaita or Madhva's Theistic Realism" in the Light of the East, Calcutta, Feb. 1948, p. 31. (Ed. Fr. Dundoy S.J.). It is interesting to note that St. Thomas Aquinas and Madhva were close contemporaries.
and fitness of each case. On this view, it will be impossible to conceive of anything at any time that could fall outside the jurisdiction of one or the other of the eightfold determinations or predications of finite existence: viz.,

The position is clearly explained by Jayatirtha, in commenting on the concluding passage of the TS: अस्य समस्तस्याल्पतत्त्वः। नन्देत्तरप्रचारिकरां। समस्तस्य संविदिषारोजः, नित्यानित्याविभेदः। अनंतनयं बोधिनारोधिवेदः। तत्त्वकं समात्सेति। उक्तं वर्णति यद तत्त्व केवलोऽन्तरेऽवेदः। संबाधितं तत्र तावस्त्व विश्वविना ज्ञातत्वा। यद त्र वहनः तत तावस्त्व। सर्वत्र यथाप्रत्ययः अस्य तद्धीनाविभि। तत्र रिथित्विभिमान सर्वस्य च। त्रिशिष्ठ्यानि नित्यानित्यार्याविश्वस्य च। (TS²)

The eternal and absolute dependence of all eternal substances upon the Deity is not logically inconceivable. If there is nothing illogical in holding that impermanent things are so, not of their own accord, or for no imaginable reason (akasmār), the same would apply to eternal substances also. Else, the impermanent objects may be expected to be destroyed the very moment after their coming into being. This does not happen, because there is something by which its impermanence is determined. The eternal substances, also, could, in the same way, and for a similar reason, of "eternal dependence" on an eternal reason, be regarded as dependent. Simply because the non-eternity (anityatva) of the non-eta-ernals is limited, we don't find it terminating and making the non-eta-ernals eternal! Even so, there is no possibility of eternal substances becoming non-eternal just because their eternality is said to be 'determined' or 'dependent' on something else like the will of God. Dependence is thus a relation which could be true of both eternals and non-eternals. It is something in the nature of things. So long then, as Creation is not defined in the narrow sense of अमूल्य भवनम् or प्रागस्तः: समुपयति: as in the Nyāya, the acceptance

I. It should be noted here that Jayatirtha's reference to भावनिः and "नित्यानित्य" substances alone does not rule out the "Nityapadārthas" (eta-ernals) from the purview of creation etc., as the term नित्यानित्य itself, includes the नित्य in their subtle aspects, as explained by him, in his own commentary on TV (p. 3-4) and as elucidated by Vyāsakṛtya in his gloss on the same (p. 7 b).
of the creation of eternal substances also in the sense of subjection or liability to new phases of being or becoming at the will of some other agency (viz. God), cannot be said to involve any logical incompatibility.¹

Tho' in one sense all material transformation presupposes a basic continuity of essence of the cause, even after the change of name, form, properties and utility have taken place, there are cases in which the original substance remains intact without surrendering any of its fundamental qualities, temporarily or absolutely. There are also yet other instances of change where the nature of the substance is changed to such an extent or in essential particulars and qualities, so as to be no longer recognizable or nameable by the same term, as the basis of its modified state. We are thus obliged to recognize two kinds of change (1) one in which the substratum and most of its essential features are intact धर्मिष्ठयातादस्ते सति धर्ममात्मपरिलिप्ति:। tho' certain additional traits may have crept in, in the process of change; and (2) another, in which as a result of the complete change effected in the substance, in the course of the casual process, we are faced with a total change in the constitution of the substance itself so as to make it almost a new and a different one, for all practical purposes धर्मसमस्तयोऽपरिणामः। Madhva designates the former kind of change as "पराधीनविशेषाति" and the latter as "अमूल्यं भवनन्

Applying these types of change to objects of experience or to ontological entities, whose existence we are appraised of by scripture or reasoning, we find that most of them come under the second type of change and are therefore to be regarded as "anitya" and ipso facto created at a particular time and place and have a beginning and an end. In regard to some others, however, experience and reason and the

1. Cf. नन्देतद्युक्तम्–नित्यस्य पराधीनतासम्भवादित्व आह्–‘नित्यमिति’। यथा अनित्यं घटायितमनित्यतया नियम्यते, तथा नित्यमपि नित्यास्यादि नित्यं सन्तुष्टेऽवरूणो नियामयति–यथा हि घटागृहितिनित्यस्यभावार्थि नाकाश्चादनावस्य भवति। ततात्र चोत्सक्तकारणः एव विनाशसंवर्धवार्थि। एवं नित्यस्य प्रतिकार्यताय यदि प्राधीनिः तदाऽर्थि दोषः! तथा। नित्यता पराधीनति कबाचिति। घटायित्र: प्राता। विनाशकारणोपनित्यप्रत्ययः। तथा नित्यस्य नित्यतायः पराधीनवेवधिपि, न जातविनिवस्यातः। तत्त्ववस्तुर्विज्ञातस्य। (NS. p. 830).
authority of Scripture oblige us to put them in the former group. They are, therefore, regarded as Nitya or uncreated in essence, tho’ still open to certain new influences. It is useless to deny that the Hindu Scriptures do teach the existence of at least a few of such “eternal” entities called Nityapadārthas or Anādiniyta, which are conceived as existing from eternity without a beginning or an end,—such as Time, Space, Matter, Souls and the Vedas. The question is, therefore, how to reconcile such eternity of theirs with the axiom of the absolute all-creatorship of Brahma, which is not only one of the prominent attributes of Godhead, conceivable by man, but is also the philosophical justification for a Deity. Is it possible to hold that even eternal things are created in some sense? If so, in what sense should such creation of eternals be understood? This question is of the utmost importance, tho’ it does not seem to have been appreciated in its true bearings by any Indian philosopher before or other than Madhva. It is in connection with this momentous issue that he introduces his new theory of ‘Eternal Creation’ or Creation of Eternal entities, throu’ Parādhiṇaviśeṣāpti. This is his most significant contribution to Indian philosophy.

“Parādhiṇaviśeṣāpti” means the acquiring of a new trait or complexion that depends on (the will of) an “Other” (God). These new traits would differ according to the nature of the substance concerned. Some of these have been enumerated and explained by Jayatīrtha:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nitya–Padārthas</th>
<th>Nature of Parādhiṇaviśeṣāpti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cetana–Prakṛti</td>
<td>सिस्कृतव्यापकत्विशेष</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Avyākṛtākāśa (Space)</td>
<td>मूर्तिसंवर्णन</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Prakṛti</td>
<td>महाद्विशेषण विकृति:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kāla-Pravāha</td>
<td>प्रवाहितम</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mahadādi</td>
<td>उपचयापचयावाभि</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Jīvas</td>
<td>देहीत्यति:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Vedas</td>
<td>निविक्रियापुर्वविशेषार्थवृद्धिकत्वाविभाविख:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most important point to note in connection with the doctrine of Parādhiṇaviśeṣāpti is that the special kind of change or creation, applies
to the aspect of the Viṣeṣas (traits) only, that have been assumed by the substance in question and not to its basic essence or Dharmisvarūpa. Were it not so, the entire change would have been more directly termed as "Parādhīna-svarūpāntarāpatti". The specification of the change as (Parādhīna)-Viṣeṣāpatti, instead, is therefore significant. The point is that it is not the viśeṣachār (substratum) that is produced by the acquisition of the new traits (aṇuvrataśīla); but, only the "whole" (viśeṣastrīya). The new traits, moreover, cannot, in the nature of things, be coeval (yaucāsamayam) with the Substance, in regard to the Jīvas, Prakṛti, Space, Time etc. In such cases, the viśeṣaśrūpya and the viśeṣa cannot be said to be absolutely identical with each other, but only "viśeṣabhiṣṭa", as stated by Jayatīrtha (Vide, TVt. p. 5, line 5 and Vyāsārāya’s gloss on it: Mandāramañjari, p. 8, line 16). We cannot, therefore, ignore this important point of distinction and treat the birth of the new trait as equivalent to the birth of the "Whole", taking Jayatīrtha’s remark-aṇuvrataśīlapamajna hi viśeṣākārajāropajñāyavāsamayam | viśeṣaśrūpyaśrūpyabhiṣṭa iti tathāvāsālīrapajñāyavāsamayam | (NS. p. 431) as an unqualified dictum. This statement of Jayatīrtha must be read along with the important distinction of attributes in question, as "Yāvad-drayabhāvi" and "Ayāvad-drayabhāvi", drawn by Madhva and accepted by Jayatīrtha himself, in his TVt. and elsewhere. It is the failure to take note of this crucial point that has led to disastrous results in H. N. Raghavendra’s claiming that in Madhva’s philosophy, there cannot be any "eternal" or "uncreated" entities, in any sense of the term, and that all Substances including Space, Time, Souls and Matter undergo "Svarūpa-Sṛṣṭi" in the full sense of the term, inclusive of the very core of their being. This is a most unfortunate perversion of Madhva’s teaching.

Jayatīrtha makes it clear that creation in the ordinary sense of ābhumā bhavamū applies in the full sense of the term only to the Viṣeṣas, which is therefore fittingly termed "aṇuvrataśīlapajñāyavāsamayam" (birth of a new trait) that was not there before. The substratum (viśeṣaśrūpya) could not, however,

1. H. N. Raghavendra’s contention of Svarūpa-Sṛṣṭi of Jīvas in Madhva’s philosophy was repudiated by orthodox spokesmen like Pandit D. Vasudevachar (in his Kannada work “Devaitapradīpa”) and others. But it appears that H. N. Raghavendra still feels convinced of the correctness of his own view.
be said to be produced as it is termed "अवस्थितस्वस्थ्यम्"
1. This implies that the change or "creation" is only with reference to the Viṣeṣa in respect of eternal substances and it is throv' and because of this acquiring of new traits that the "Viṣiṣṭa" (e. g. Jīva) comes to be designated as "created". There is no point in describing the "Viṣeṣyākāra" as अवस्थितस्वस्थ्यम् "if the Svarūpa-Sṛṣṭi" of the Viṣeṣya is possible. Madhva and his commentator would not have labored so much to distinguish four kinds of change and draw a distinction between "अमूला भवन्" (creation de novo) and creation in a restricted sense of पराधीनविशेषत्व: by virtue of the Viṣeṣya acquiring some new trait, applicable to certain 'eternal entities' only, like Space, Time, Matter, and Souls. These could never have any other kind of creation; whereas objects like jars could be created in the ordinary sense of "अमूला भवन्म"

"Parādhīnaviṣeṣāpti" is the only kind of creation that is possible in respect of Nityapadārthas. An objection may however be raised in this connection. From the point of view of Pariṇāma-विशेषत्व: in evolution theory accepted by Madhva, the production of a jar or a piece of cloth, is hardly other than a case of Parādhīnaviṣeṣāpti, defined in terms of अवस्थितस्वस्थ्यम् बलुन अपूर्व-विशेषत्व: so that, strictly speaking, there can be no other kind of creation maintainable in the system, for any material object. This being so the restricted application of creation, throv' Parādhīnaviṣeṣāpti, to 'eternal entities' alone, is pointless. Jayatrīrtha meets this objection in this way. The crux of creation throv' Parādhīnaviṣeṣāpti is the fulfilment of the condition: अवस्थितस्वस्थ्यम् बलुन अपूर्व-विशेषत्व: The creation of a jar, out of clay, is not a case of this kind, i. e. धर्मिष्ठत्वादि सति धर्माचारविशेषति, even th'o' the material stuff of clay may continue still to underlie the jar. The fact is that there have taken place, in the course of the change of clay into pot, some far-reaching changes; so much so, we have no longer the clay intact, nor can we designate it as clay now nor recognize its original shape or arrangement (samsthāna). We have a 'new entity', jar, i. e. धर्मिष्ठत्वस्वप्निनात्म: Hence we say: स्तर घटो जातात: श्रीरं दण्डे जातात; and so forth:

1. Cf. अस्माकः तु, अवस्थितस्वस्थ्यम् द्व्यय्यमवेवस्वप्निनात्म: तत्त्वा रिमाणकत्त्वा विक्षेपित श्रृं वर्णम् (NS p. 399 b).
"ETERNAL CREATION" : "PARĀDHINA-VIŚEṢĀPTI"

* * * * जन्मतः स्थुलतामितः ।
पूर्वस्वद्विलोकवः यदि जन्मेति कीयेते ।
रसायन नेव जन्माति: चेतनस्वापि केवलम् ।
प्रधानस्य च वेदस्य * * * * II ( AV. ii, 3. p. 28 )

But no such essential transformation could be detected in the case of the eternal substances named. Hence, these are best put down in a separate category of creation, by themselves, as पराधीनविलोक्ष्यसिद्धमिति:।

This new doctrine of creation is intended by Madhva to reconcile and rationalize the existence of certain Nityapadārthas, with the all-creatorship of God.¹

¹. Śaṅkara gives greater importance to the statement of the Śrutī that Brahmān has created everything and interprets texts like आकाशवस्त्रस्वगतस्य नित्यः' as gaṇa. He does not concede the existence of uncreated eternals and is not aware of पराधीनविलोक्ष्यसिद्धमिति.

P. M. 11
CHAPTER XXVII

MADHVA'S THEORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD

Madhva’s theory of the constitution of matter and the evolution of the world is based on the ‘Sāmkhya’ metaphysics of Upaniṣads, the Epics and Purāṇas. He quotes profusely from the Mahābhārata, the Bhāgavata and other Purāṇas and from the vast literature of the Pāncarātras, which still await exploration at the hands of modern scholars. Even a cursory view of the quotations made by Madhva from the literature of the Pāncarātras bears witness to the strong and persistent Theistic tradition of Upaniṣadic thought embodied in them and which Madhva inherited from them1, and upon which he indented so largely, in the reinterpretation of the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras and in the exposition of his own system. The school of Rāmānuja, tho’ ostensibly connected with the Pāncarātras, has not, in its interpretation of the Vedānta, touched anything more than the fringe of that literature. A reference to the numerous quotations from a large number of forgotten Samhitās of the Pāncarātra, occurring in the works of Madhva2, would make this clear.

As a follower of the Epic Sāmkhya, Madhva has naturally accepted the doctrine of evolution of Matter (Prakṛti) as against the theory of Ārambhavāda or ‘atomic genesis’ of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The latter, as explained by Jayatīrtha, is fraught with hourly danger to the stability (śhīrata) of the world of objects. According to the Pīlupākavāda of the Vaiśeṣikas, even the slightest displacement of a single atom in a jar would entail the ultimate destruction of it. Hence, Madhva would have none of it.3

He therefore accepts the theory of the evolution of Matter from a subtle to a gross state. This has the advantage of guaranteeing the basic identity and stability of the material stuff in and thro’ the various changes it undergoes in its process of development from a subtle to a gross state. Only the Pariṇāmavāda would be consistent with Madhva’s theory

3. Cf. यदा हि घटादिषु सूच्याधिदिना एकोऽपि परमाणुपौरी, तदा नष्टव्यमेव तदार्थवेन द्वयुक्तेन, विभागनारसिखिकारणस्य संयोगस्य नष्टवात्। द्वयुक्तमात्रे, समवाधिकारणारात्, द्वयुक्त- नाश इत्येन क्रमेण घटनाभोज्यव्यवस्थावी॥ (NS. p. 394 b).
of Causation and our faith in the stability of material objects. He therefore accepts a primordial material stuff called Prakṛti which undergoes various modifications and develops by a process of evolution and involution of parts. The existence of Prakṛti is not logically established by Madhva. He takes it over bodily from the Upaniṣadic, Epic and Purānic Sāṃkhya cosmology. It is an eternal sentient stuff of the most subtle kind: अनादेशगारानस्य भूतृरुक्षमधान्याभिषेष्यक्ष प्रावन्तात् (NS.)

Madhva has stoutly opposed the attempts of other commentators on the Vedānta who have denied a place to Prakṛti, as the material stuff out of which the Universe is evolved by Brahman, in the philosophy of the Vedānta. He establishes on sound textual authority, the Śāstric character (Śabdatvam) of Prakṛti as an sentient, dependent material principle which is the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) of the world, and repudiates the theory of Abhinna-nimittopādaṇatva of Brahman adopted by other Bhāṭiyakāras on the Vedānta. Madhva thus champions the cause of the Sāṃkhya against the Advaitin and fights successfully for a place for Prakṛti in Vedāntic cosmology. Rāmānuja also, has perforce to recognize a material principle as defined in the metrical Upaniṣads, the Epics and the Purāṇas. Neither of them however could recognize, with the Sāṃkhya, the independence of that principle. Madhva’s point is that the status of Prakṛti, as claimed by the Sāṃkhya, has nothing to do with its being recognized by Vedāntins as the material stuff out of which the Universe is to be evolved. It is accepted as a principle dependent on the Brahman (Paratantra) by Madhva and Rāmānuja.

Prakṛti is both directly and indirectly the material cause of the world. It is the direct material cause of the development of time and the three qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas and indirectly of Mahat, Ahaṅkāra etc. It is both eternal and pervasive; but not unlimited. The three guṇas are supposed to be differentiated at the beginning of creation, in the proportion of 4: 2: 1 (B.T. iii, p. 24). The evolution of other forms of matter takes place on account of the disturbance in their

1. तदेव हि वस्तु अवयोपचयापचयाभास्मात्माभिवृत्त्वा, न दुनास्यदेव भवतीति परिणामवादिनो मन्यते। अतःप्रक्रिय्येते सत्तेच्छन्तु प्रस्तूतिः स्थिरत्वप्रहणे पुकारणेति (NS. 394)

2. The point has been fully discussed in my History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature, Vol. I, pp. 138-187.

3. न च परिमितस्वाय भूतःक्रियानि वापाध्यम् (NS. 326 b.)
equipois which gives rise to the twentyfour principles commonly recognized—Mahat, Ahamkāra, Buddhi, Manas, ten sensory organs, five sense-objects and the five great elements. Mahat is the first and finest evolute of matter and energy. Ahamkāra is the principle of individuation, Buddhi that of discrimination and Manas of thought. The principle of Ahamkāra is divided into three classes of Vaikārika, Taijasa and Tāmasa. From Taijasa, the ten sense organs are produced and the five sense objects (viśayas) and the elements are the products of Tāmasa-Ahamkāra. The tanmātrās stand for qualitatively distinct and irreducible sense-qualities with a definite leaning towards their appropriate objects. These twentyfour evolutes of Prakṛti are the constituents of the microcosm and the macrocosm of the entire Brahmāṇḍa. Madhva gives a proper reorientation to this theory of material evolution by linking it up with a systematic hierarchy of presiding deities from top to bottom. It is under the constant supervision and guidance of these Abhimāni-devatās (or Tattvābhimānins) that all material transformations and psychophysical functions are carried on. The Supreme Brahman itself is ultimately behind all these activities and of each and every one of them:

तत्र तत्र रसितो विष्णुतत्तत्त्वाच्छक्ती: प्रवीणयम्।
एक एव महाशक्ति: कृत्तेत सर्वमृद्यस ॥ (B. S. B.)

The three forms of Matter—viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, are specially controlled by the three aspects of Cetana-Prakṛti, in her three aspects of Śrī, Bhū and Durgā:

श्चायपतात्तस्यो भार्या: शक्ति: सामस्येमुच्यते ॥ (B. T. p. 21)

The period of creation is said to be one-eighth of the period of involution:

व्यस्त्तल्लमो भागः सूक्तिकाल उदाहरः ।
तत्तत्त्वेन बेरसंचारोस्यद्रा खलिमात्त्वाच्छक्ता: ॥ (B. T. p. 71 b)

Involvement takes place by the merger of the effects in their causes, in the reverse order of evolution. This applies to the Tattvābhimāni-devas also, both in Samsāra and in release.
CHAPTER XXVIII

CRITIQUE OF BRAHMA-PARINĀMA AND VIVARTA VĀDAS.

Madhva's conception of the material world and its relation to Brahman is free from the difficulties that beset the Pariṇāma and Vivarta Vādas. Pantheism pulls down the Deity to the gutter. It is worse than irreligion. It utterly negates the independence of God. For, all material modifications are dependent originations (Parādhīnaviśeṣa). They fall under two main heads of change: change of Substance (धर्मपरिवर्त) and change of aspect or attributes (धर्मपरिवर्त). Each of these may again be distinguished into reversible and irreversible modifications. All these four kinds of change are dependent upon external agencies. It would be impossible to recognize any such external cause of change in respect of Brahman, as that would immediately reduce it to a position of dependence. Pariṇāmavāda, moreover, stands committed to the view that Brahman alone existed in the beginning and that there was no other substance in existence then. It does not believe in any other eternal existent, uncreated by Brahman or co-existent with it (as those who believe in creation thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣānti do). No modification of Brahman is thus conceivable or possible in such circumstances, as the urge or direction for such modification must come from an outside agency. It will be inconsistent with Divine perfection to assume that Brahman itself, out of its own free will chooses to transmute itself into the world of beings and objects, - a world which is a state of sin, evil and misery. We cannot say that the Brahman does not recognize the misery and imperfections of the world as it is. For it is ex hypothesi Sarvajña. If Brahman does not experience the suffering in the world, who does? Not the Jīva; for he, too, is a modification of Brahman and is essentially the same as Brahman. Even supposing that the Jīva is only partially identical with Brahman it would not wholly exempt Brahman from a share in the misery of the world. Even the most subtle modifications in the development of sentient creatures are subject to external forces. Sentients are never known to undergo change of state or condition of being at their own free will. It is useless to argue that Brahman being Almighty could change at Its own will, without reference to any external stimuli or provocation or direction. For, the change from a state of blessedness and perfection to one of obvious misery and limitation can hardly be a token of Almightyness! It would be sheer dogmatism to say that we should not raise logical objections in a case that transcends all reason. In that case all philosophy should have to be given up as a wild goose chase. The
plea of 'transcending logic' can be urged with propriety only in cases where the authorities are unanimous. In this case, however, it is not so, as there are many texts which clearly deny to the Brahman any kind of physical or material modification (निर्विकारोऽयः ्युद्द:) so that the employment of reason becomes imperative in coming to a definite conclusion on the vexed question.

It is equally unavailing to put in that the change of state undergone by Brahman is a special kind of modification that does not affect its "deeper nature". For the fact remains that the change of state attributed to Brahman by the Pariṇāmavādin is precisely and unfortunately of this very kind that plunges it into the abyss of misery and imperfection of the world, from a state of bliss and self-sufficiency. How can we pretend that this does not affect its "deeper nature"? That being so, and so long as it is conceded that Brahman does not undergo any change of state that is determined or controlled by external agencies, any state of becoming in which we might find It, will be as natural to It as any other! Since it is admitted (by the Pariṇāmavādin) that Brahman is with and without the forms of grossness at different times, it will be impossible to define which of them is Its "natural" state and which is adventitious; so that both the states would be quite natural to its being. Granting for argument's sake that a transformation of Brahman with a complete loss of original nature is possible, the question will still remain if such a transformation will be partial or wholesale. As Brahman is partless and indivisible, the former alternative could not be true. In the latter case, Brahman having been "exhausted" in the transformation, there would be none left (as Brahman) during the lifetime of the world, with the result that all talk of acquiring knowledge of the Brahman, with a view to attaining the bliss of Mokṣa, will have to cease.

Madhva, therefore, rejects the view of Bhāskara and many others that Brahman is in itself the stuff of which the Universe is made. So far as all our received knowledge and the testimony of the Scriptures go, there would appear to be an unbridgeable gulf between Spirit and matter: Cit and Jaḍa:

न चेतनविकारः स्वाधृत क्षापि नवचेतनम्।
नाशेतनविकारोऽषपि चेतन: स्वाक्षाचनम्॥ (AV. i, 4).

Brahman is essentially Saccidānanda. How, then, could such a perfect being of pure intelligence and bliss evolve, out of itself, an effect that is inert and wholly lacking in intelligence and is, in addition, the abode of
so much misery and subject to ceaseless change? There is no use in taking shelter behind alleged statements in the Śruti to the effect that Brahman is immediately and in its own person, the material cause of the world. For not even the vociferation of a hundred texts could make the crow white! Reason may test even where it cannot build. Where conflicting authorities claim to interpret the Śruti, each to suit his own metaphysics, the employment of reason becomes more important than the bare text itself.

Not even the Scripture says directly that the intelligent becomes the unintelligent. In that case, the Brahman could as well become the individual souls, too; and simplify matters for all philosophers. Moreover, the Śruti says emphatically that Brahman is immutable and unchanging: निविकारोऽवलम्बः शुद्ध। Since no causation is possible without some change or modification in the cause, we must naturally look for the material cause of the Universe, elsewhere than in Brahman\(^1\).

A strict adherence to the logic of facts and the spirit of the Śruti compels Madhva to reject the profanity of Brahmaparīñāmavāda, in any garb. Even the oft-paraded promissory statement about the knowledge of the one leading to the knowledge of the many (on which Śamkara himself tries to base the case for Brahmaparīñāma) does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that Brahman is the material cause of the Universe. Madhva has been the first critical commentator on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad to draw attention to the difficulties in the wording and form of the propositions, as they stand, which definitely militate against any facile conclusion of material causality (मृत्युपापानन्त्यम्) being drawn from that text. No other commentator, ancient or modern, seems to have realized this crucial point. The difficulty pointed out by Madhva is a real and serious one and cannot be lightly passed over. The examples of शून्यवाण, लोहितमणि and नक्षिन्कुट्नम in the form in which they appear in the text of Chān. Up. vi, 1,4–6, are virtually incapable of establishing anything more than a

---

1. The supposed reference to Brahmaparīñāmavāda, in the teaching of the Brahmasūtras (i, 4, 24) has been convincingly shown by Madhva to have no relevance to that problem at all. For a full discussion of the issue and refutation of the remarks of V. S. Ghate and Bhandarkar, on this point, see my HDSVL i, pp. 137–144.
general resemblance or point of contact between Brahman and the
world. The terms "eka" (used thrice), pinḍa, maṇi and nakhanikṛnt-
āna, prevent the establishment of an intimate causal relation (उपादानोपादेय-
भाव ) among the pairs named in the text: अन्यथा, एकश्च: विन्दुश्वद्वयः व्यथः:
स्वातः । मूदा विज्ञातया इत्येतात्वता पूर्णलातः । न हेकम्रतिविद्यामकानि अन्यमृतमानि । साधस्येन हि
तेषाम् । न हेकमयामकमान्यालेवमध्यः । न चेकनखिनिन्तनामकं सर्वा कार्यमभार ।
(Madhva, VTN. p. 25 b.).

A little reflection would show the truth of this contention:

ज्ञाता ब्रह्मविकारलेन तदारोपिनेन वा एकाविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञाने
विवक्षिते, ‘मूदा विज्ञातया, स्वन्धिं विज्ञातं स्वाविज्ञाने विज्ञात
लेहमथं विज्ञातं स्वात्कार्यम्याला विज्ञाते विज्ञातं विज्ञातं
स्वामित्वेतात्वते पूर्णलातः: अर्यामकसद्वद्भरानां पित्तमनिनिन्तनात्वरानां“सर्वा”
शास्त्रां च विवारत्स्वतं स्वातः । सर्वमृतमादीनामेकसिद्धान्तिकार्यमभावः। विरुध्यांता च
स्वातः। (NS. i, 4, p. 226).

There is no use pleading that we should not take the text literally
but look to the spirit; for the spirit itself has got to be deduced from
the wording. However that may be, the third and the last illustration of
nail-scissors has not even the semblance of a causal argument. It gives
the whole case away. For, the nakhanikṛntana is itself an effect and not
the cause of anything else and cannot, in the nature of things, be the
“cause” of ‘all that is made of kārṣṭāyasa.’ It should be clear then,
that the argument for the material causality of the Brahman breaks down,
completely, and at the very first touch of criticism, in this instance. The
position is hardly better in the other two cases.

Madhva, therefore, prefers to take the teaching of Uddālaka in terms
of the primacy of the knowledge of Brahman over all other forms
or kinds of knowledge. To know Brahman is to know at
one sweep, all that is worth knowing, about the world, that is so utterly
dependent on It: शब्दात्वा नेव भूयोः उत्तात् शास्त्रव्यवहितेः (Gītā, vii, 2).
The knowledge of Brahman is the end and aim of all secular learning and the
culmination of all knowledge. Sage Uddālaka is naturally at pains to
impress this great truth on his son who is conceived enough (cf.
स्वति एक्याय Chan. Up.) to gloat over his learning, divorced from Brahman-
knowledge.
There is much truth in Madhva’s contention, therefore, that a relation of material cause and effect could not be easily established among the pairs named in the text, consistent with the actual wording of it. The utmost point of contact between the दयान्त and दार्शनिक that these examples could establish is one of resemblance of some kind: सत्यमति सादृश्यं। किं तु, सत्यादिनैव (NS. p. 451). The point is conceded by the Bhāmati also in the पर्वपाक्षम्: ‘ययेकम् वृत्तप्रेत्स्यादिक्षरणं: परमात्मन: प्राथान्यं स्वत्वाति। यथा सोमकर्मणं एके ज्ञातन सर्वं कठा ज्ञाता महत्तीति॥

The other familiar examples of (1) scorpions being produced from cowdung; (2) hair and nail growing from the human body; and (3) the growth of man from childhood to youth and old age, quoted to establish the material casualty of Brahman, are equally unavailing. The point at issue is the possibility of an unintelligent (jaḍa) effect being produced solely from a sentient being. The analogy of scorpions etc. is therefore, doubly irrelevant as the scorpion is a living creature and the cowdung insentient. Even if such production were biologically true, it admits of other explanations in so far as the scorpion has a material body which might be derived from the dung. But the soul of the scorpion (in so far as it may have one), cannot be a product of dung! Śaṅkara’s explanation (B.S. B. ii, 1, 6) that Brahman has sattā in common with its effects like Ākāśa, overlooks the fact that this sattā is not, like the body of man, distinguishable from Brahman. The growth of hair and nails from the human body is possible only so long as it is tenanted and sustained by a soul and not at other times. But the Pariṇāmavādin has necessarily to conceive of a state when Brahman alone existed in an incorporeal or pre-corporeal state and later produced the world out of itself. But a non-embodied Brahman cannot, on the very same analogy of man, produce anything. It would, in any case, be impossible to show that nails and hair are directly produced from the soul! The example of the development of man from childhood to old age pertains, in the opinion of all Śaṅkarakās, only to the body (śarīradharma) of man and not to his soul. The ripening of wisdom with the advance of years and the appearance of virility in youth, are possible only in the event of a body sustained by the presence of a soul. None of the developments instanced can or is known to take place in the soul as such. And in all these cases, the purely physical developments are traceable to the
physical part in the causal complement. Consistent then, with the implications of these analogies, the Pariṇāmavādins must admit that the purely material part of Brahman—if it can be credited with any—is the material cause of the world and that the soul-part or spiritual element in its make-up is the operative cause. This would be tantamount to a restatement of Madhva’s position, in less accurate terminology. In such a contingency, the material part will have to be regarded as not-Brahman as there cannot obviously be anything material about Brahman! This could give us but a Kevala-nimittakāraṇavāda, in the end:

भागेन परिणामकेत भागयोभैर एव हि।

यो भागो न विकारी स्थाल एवासाध्यक्षिक्षिर:॥

(AV. i, p. 13).

In so far as most Pariṇāmavādins, like Bhāskara and Śrikanṭha, do not admit the co-existence of a purely material principle (Prakṛti) which can figuratively be styled the ‘body’ of Brahman, the illustration of scorpions etc. cannot, with propriety, be cited by them. Bhāskara is the only Vedāntin who holds fearlessly to actual Brahmapariṇāma and regards not merely the material world but the souls also as products of Brahman. This lands him in further difficulties of having to visit the miseries and imperfections of the finite selves also, on Brahman, against repeated assertions in the texts to the contrary: अनश्रवण्यो-भिचारकस्तिति (Up.) संभोगप्रतिविरिति चेष्व वैदेश्यात (B. S. i, 2, 8.).

Rāmānuja is generally regarded as a believer in Abhinna-nimittopādānatva of Brahman. This gives him an apparent advantage over Madhva. But this is altogether deceptive. Rāmānuja cannot afford to go to the same length as Bhāskara and deny the co-existence of a purely material principle called Prakṛti, tho’ it may be subject to Brahman and act as its ‘body’ (स्वात्मकः शरीरं). Rāmānuja frankly admits the existence of Prakṛti: न वयमयपरुपपरिणामविविषेषं स्वप्नते नाध्यायामः। अपि तु, परमज्ञातिरित्य तदालसम्बलितेऽऽ। तथानाध्यायामादेव तदन्तसिद्धकिस्मिनिराकामः।

(Śribhāṣya, i, 4, 3.).

1. पिनादिकान्तानामयं खल निन्द्यात्यथ:। यत्ननात्युपकरणं तत्चतीर्थमुलं नुदानिधित्वाते-पादां भवती। पश्चातात्यासंविचारं (NS. p. 197.).
The so-called Brahmopādānatva, on his view, is really on a par with the procreation of a son (i.e. his body) by the father or the emergence of nails and hair from the body nourished by the soul:

अपादानत्वमेवाश्च ब्रह्मपादानतः भवति ।
अंगीकृतं तत्त्वज्ञानेव विश्वास्मानं भवः॥ (AV. i, p. 12).

The position of Rāmānuja ultimately boils down to Kevalanimitta-kāraṇavāda of Brahman, so far as the Brahma-caitanya is concerned and all talk of Abhinnanimittopādāna, indulged in by him and his school, turns out to be a mere terminological exaggeration and flourish. The point is fully brought out by Jayatirtha in a searching analysis and criticism of Rāmānuja's position: अव कथितं प्रकृतिवे स्वाधीन स्वाभाव ब्रह्माण जगद्युगादानतया भावायां स्वस्वतयेवमेवम्—परमसुविद्याचारानवारियं ब्रहम् योजयकते तिठम्। यस्यात्मकं शरीरं मित्यादिशुशिष्ठित्वमेव। तथा च, विश्वाबिचित्तं विश्वात्मकं प्रायां जगद्युगादानन्यामिति ब्रह्माण जगद्युगादानतयात्यात्मर्षित्वत् दृश्यत॥ तं प्रायां—विश्वाय-अपादानत्वमेवेति।

एवं ति वद्य, जित्वरुप पुनर्ज्ञानम्, जगद्युगस्तः ब्रह्माणोद्विविभविवस्त्रक्षणमेवोपादानत्वमिदं स्यात्। सवङ्गा निविदकार्यब्रह्माणो विकाराधिकारानरिकतय तद्धिर्ग्रतुलेनोपादानतया उदिततात।

एवं श्लोकां चोपादानात्वं ब्रह्माणोद्विविभविवस्त्रक्षणमेवेति नाशस्माण प्रभुः।

नन्मैर्गीतिः येवद्युगादानत्वं ब्रह्माण: कथं तत्त्वनिविदकार्यमेव स्यात्—तत्वनिविद। शुद्धचेतनस्यायं ब्रह्माणो विश्वास्मानं भवे मात्रकार्यात्मकतज्ञो नाशस्माणविभिन्नकीर्तते अत्तलकार्यमुक्तचेतन्तमेवेति।

अग्रेभविभाविधि:—यथापि परम्युपादितः ब्रह्माणो जगद्युगादानलं नाशस्माकार्यमं विरोधिः, तथापि नैतिसम चुअणामाथः। तथापि—किमयां ब्रह्मादान स्वतः? न तावद्युगस्यायं निमित्ताद्युगादानन्यालोककरणम्; प्रामाण्यं यथावत्यास्तवायात्यास्तवात्। विकाराधिकारात्मकात्मकस्वतयेव ब्रह्माणोद्विविभविवस्त्रक्षणमेव चेत। लोकविश्वात। लोकस्वरुपवसानस्य एव हि परोद्वारकं कार्याः। न तत्त्वविभावम् लोकस्वरुपो नियतमेव॥ (NS. i, 4, p. 197 b)।

The position of Śrīkaṇṭha and other (Brahma)-Śaktiparināmavādins like Nimbārka, Vallabha and others, is hardly better. In so far as this

1. For an exposition of this criticism, see Introd. to my edn. of Caturũrti-bhāṣya of Madhva, Madras, 1934 (p. xxii).
(Cit)-śakti of Brahman, which according to these writers, is the immediate substratum of the Pariṇāma is distinguished from the soul-
part of Brahman conceived as Saccidānandātmaka, the latter ceases to be the real substratum of the change. It is the Cicchakti1, Śakti or
energy or ‘body’ (as Rāmānuja would call it) that turns out to be the real and immediate material cause of the world. Even this is a
far cry from actual and immediate cent-per-cent Upādānatva or Pari-
ṇāmitva of Brahman. Thus, in most cases, the so-called Upādānatva
of Brahman thro’ its Cicchakti or Sat-śakti, as the case may be, turns
out to be nothing more than an “Apādānatva” i.e. अपायाविधिविध्यम्
‘acceptance of Brahman as the residual spirit’ that remains unaffected
and untransforming in any given instance of change taking place in its
tenement. This point also is convincingly established by Jayatīrtha : अथ मतम-हिस्यं हि ब्रह्मायुम्भयति, अनतन्तरभविद्यान्तः सदाल्पः सेवित। तत्तथेन रूपेण निर्मितं
द्वितीयेनापादानम्। अयो न कथितः: निरुक्तार्थं विच्छक्तिवियतवाददुरुक्षणम्। तेन सच्चितिकं
ब्रह्म परिणामीत्यविदीयं न गुरुत्वाविदीयोः पि। * * * *।

यदि ब्रह्मः सदागृहाण ब्रह्मानन्ना निरुक्तार्थममविदीयम् किं तथा कळव्यम्। तयनेन गौरेन-योगयोगे, नेद्रिर्योगे ? न तावदमेव: । द्वितीयं परिणामाश्रयप्तां भागद्यक्षणावियत्वायः। नापि
नेद्रेण तः। अभिन्नेत्तत्त्वं संस्कृतसंगमसम्भवः। द्वितीयेन निरुक्तार्थोऽविद्यान्तः न तत्त्वा-
ज्ञाग्यत्तमेवं एवाणीकारण:। तत: किमित्यत अद्व-यो भागः ‘इति।

परस्परस्यन्तत्त्वेऽद्वे वस्तुती। तत्त्वं निर्विकारं जगचितिमिश्रते। अर्थं परिणामं जगद्युपादान-
मेवैतिकारकः, नेद्रस्तु केवलनिमित्तविद्यान्तं सन्तीद्रित्वं निरुक्तार्थः। निरुक्तार्थं जगचितिमितत्वासम-
भिरीक्षरसम्बन्धृतानाः, परिणामानि जगद्युपादानस्य व्याख्यातानि चाचाचार्यतत्वात्।

अयो भागः इति पराशुमगमनोक्ततम्। तथाते तु, शब्दशः इति ज्ञातयम्।

( NS. p. 200 ).

This criticism covers every shade and variety of Brahmapariṇāmavāda
thro’ aspects or modes considered as essential part of Brahman.

1. The term is peculiar to Śrīkaṇṭha. Gītahāti, on his view, is Cidacitprapañcā-
kāra. It is sometimes identified with Brahman and sometimes distinguished from
it.—a loose procedure.
As for the Vivartavāda, it is, strictly speaking, no theory of causation at all, as it does not accept any true effect that has got to be accounted for, but only an appearance. Quite apart from this, there is the difficulty of accounting for the obscuration of the Brahman by Ajñāna, which is the root-cause of the appearance of the world. There is again greater difficulty than even in the Pariṇāmavāda interpretation, in reconciling the promissory statement of ēkāvīvādakānaṁ surējñāsānam with the illustration of clay etc. and the requirements of real Vivartavāda: आरोपितवः तु एकत्वापि चृप्तय-स्थैर्यास्मिन गृहिण्मद नास्ति किमुत सर्वं? स्वत्वा समध्येत इति वेत; तत्त्वेव विवादास्वद्वेल द्वानान्तार्यः।attered 1 1. ‘सौकिकारणिनः काणां वस्मिण्यं द्विविसास्यं स द्वानान्त’ इति हि न्यायविदः। (NS. i, 4, 6. p. 226).

It would be truer to say from the Vivarta stand-point that the knowledge of the One sublates: or puts an end to the knowledge of the many, rather than that: it produces or gives rise to any such knowledge (Cf. the wording: अपूर्वं अद्वैतिः अमतं मतं भवति). There is not merely terminological inexactitude. The expressions used by Uddālaka are capable of suggesting a different and more sensible interpretation. There is nothing to show that Uddālaka was trying to equate the many with the unreal. The unreal is something which has been mistaken for another: āvāyo सामात्मस्तस्तवृद्धि: (Śankara, B. S. B. i, 1, 1, ). But the "many" in the promissory statement includes also things which have not at all been brought within the scope of Śvetaketu's understanding or misunderstanding: अपूर्वं अद्वैतिः भवति. In any case, the illustrations of clay etc. would appear to assume the reality of effects,-- the connecting link between the One and the many being nothing more than a resemblance; as actual cause-and-effect relation is unsustainable, for reasons already explained. Clay is never the Vivartopādāna of pots. Since no causal relation could be made out among the pairs named in the text without distorting the actual purport of the terms of the text, or glossing over or ignoring some of them like एक, मणि and पिण्ड, and also asserting a palpable travesty of a causal argument in the last instance of the nail-scissors, the interpretations of Śankara and Rāmānuja are misplaced.
The Advaitic theory of Abhinnanimittopādānatva of Brahman has also been discussed by Vyāsarāya in his Nyāyānītra, in the light of its exposition by Prakāśātman, in his Vivaraṇa. According to the Vivaraṇa, there are three ways in which the position that Brahman is the material cause of the world may be explained. (1) Brahman conjointly with Māyā is the material cause (upādāna) of the world, like two strands of a thread which go to make a string. (2-3) Māyā which may be viewed as a power of Brahman or as dependent on Brahman is the material cause and Brahman thro’ its association or connection with it is also, in a way, the Upādāna thro’ such Māyā. Prakāśātman further explains that on the first view inasmuch as Brahman and Māyā would both conjointly constitute the material cause of the world, there would be no violation of the Nirvikāra Śruti which should be understood with reference to Brahman in its state of isolation, (i.e. when not in conjunction with Māyā). In the other two cases also the Nirvikāra Śruti is to be understood to refer to Brahman when it is not colored by Māyā or is not acting thro’ Māyā.

Vyāsarāya criticizes all these explanations. He points out that in the first case, like the two threads conjointly going to make the string, Brahman also would be as much an Upādāna or transforming cause as Māyā; and there would be no point in claiming the Brahman alone to be “Nirvikāra” in the process. Moreover, as both Brahman and Māyā are the material cause of the world, we should expect to find the essential characteristics of Brahman viz., Pāramārthika reality, consciousness and bliss in the effect viz., the world! It cannot be said that only an intellectual awareness of the essential characteristics of the Upādāna is to be associated with the effect and not the actual presence of those characteristics. In that case, how is the Advaitin justified in claiming that the world possesses the character of anirvacanīyatvam in so far as it is a product of Māyā or Avidyā? If he should say that the world does not possess the character of Pāramārthika reality because it is not solely the product of Brahman (sannītropādānakam), then, by the same reasoning, he should refuse to call the world “anirvacanīya” because it is not solely produced by Anirvacanīya Māyā! Again, if Brahman associated with Māyā is regarded as changing and Brahman unqualified is to be accepted as Nirvikāra, the question will be ‘Is the qualified entity (Viśiṣṭa) to be designated
as Brahman or not? If the qualified entity is Brahman, it could hardly be unchanging! If it is not to be regarded as Brahman, the question of regarding Brahman as Upādāna would simply not arise. Further if the transformation of the Viśiṣṭa is admitted then such transformation would be of the same order of reality as the substratum, which would go against the requirements of the Vivarta theory in which the product of Vivarta has a lesser reality than its substratum. It cannot also be held that real transformation takes place in the Viśiṣṭa while only an illusory transformation takes place in the Viśeṣya (the substratum). For, in order to speak of a Vivarta at all, there should be some illusory transformation in the Śuddha also. Hence it would be difficult to say that the Śuddha is absolutely Nirvikāra. If it is said that there is no real Vikāra in the Śuddha, then, it would be equally wrong to speak of any actual transformation in the Viśiṣṭa too, since it is primarily in the Viśeṣaṇa (Māyā) that any real transformation is taking place. As for the third view that Brahman is to be regarded as Upādāna thro’ Māyā and not directly, like the constituent parts (amśu) of threads forming the cloth, Vyāsarāya shows that the analogy is misplaced. The constituent parts (amśu) of the thread are really the material cause of the cloth. But the Brahman is not the constituent cause of Māyā. How then could Brahman be regarded as the constituent cause of the world thro’ Māyā?

It would be equally unavailing to define Upādānatvam as being the substratum of an illusory change. The term "Upādāna" is nowhere used in philosophical writings in this sense. No one would designate "clay", which is the material cause of pot, as the substratum of the illusory appearance of the pot! Nor is the shell, the substratum of an illusory appearance of silver spoken of as the 'material cause' of silver. If the Advaitin proposes to define Upādānatvam in a novel way which has no relation to the connotation of the term as other philosophers understand it, he may please himself with such a diversion. But it will not make the Brahman the material cause of the world in the accepted sense of the term! Finally, Vyāsarāya points out that the Advaitic position that Īśvara is the efficient cause (nimitta) of the world, Māyā the material cause (upādāna) and Śuddha Brahman the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world makes the thesis of
"Abhinnanimittopādānatva" of Brahman, so eagerly sought to be read into the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa of the Brahmasūtras, by Śaṅkara, pointless.

Madhva thus establishes his point that Brahmopādānatva theory is logically and textually unsustainable, and philosophically unsound. We have to stick to Kevala-nimittakāraṇatva only. This will not land us in a plurality of Causes. The clear fact that Prakṛti is a metaphysically dependent principle just like Space and Time (tho' eternal), will effectively bar the possibility of plurality of causes. This point has been established by Madhva under B. S. ii, 1, 15, et. seq.
V. DOCTRINE OF ĀTMAN
CHAPTER XXIX
ESSENCE OF SELFHOOD

Souls are conceived in Madhva's system as finite centres of conscious experience, each with a unique essence of its own. The essence of individuality is that one finite centre of experience cannot possess, as its own immediate experience, the experience of another. It is this non-transferable immediacy of experience that distinguishes one self from another, in spite of their possessing certain similar characteristics: श्रवण्यचिन्तनमेकसुरुसंधानैकप्रमाणमन्यथा। अतुसंधानां नाम भोगसमाध्यायत: सृजयतया दुःखादिकाशकारोपमिन्त। (NS. p. 507). Each has a specific content of consciousness, reality and bliss and constitutes a focalization which is nowhere exactly repeated in nature. Their very raison d'être is to be distinct personalities or exclusive focalizations of a common Universe. The best definition of the self is that given by Jayatirtha: कथायतान्तःत्वत्स्रवकृतिनां सकारं देशविविविवितिमात्र रूपहितिभिर्भिन्धिति साधितिधन्मुः। (NS. p. 633). This refers to a dynamic personality endowed with the triple properties of will, cognition and activity. The basis of individuality is to be found in the uniqueness of 'personality', which is a blending of consciousness, experience and works, in proportion to its intrinsic stature (yogvartā). It is the core of all hedonistic, ethical and spiritual activities of man:

अहिमित्येव यो वेषः स जीव इति कीर्तितः।
स हुःखी स हुःखी वेषः स पात्रं बन्धनमोक्षोः।

The nature of the souls, at its best, is said to be one of unalloyed bliss and pure intelligence. It is essentially free from any kind of misery or pain: स्वतंत्रित्वान्तःत्वत्स्रवकृतिमृग सुतवर्यस्य (UKty), tho' subject to a natural gradation of intelligence and bliss in a cosmic hierarchy of selves and subject always to the Supreme, in bondage and release. The sense of misery, which is bondage, is external to their essence and is brought about by a real tho' misplaced sense of independence of initiative and conduct:

तत्त्थापरायणत्वानाः यविवाहित्वायतः भ्रमः। 1 (NS. p. 26)
जीवस्य भुक्तस्य न हुःखें किंचिद्विष्णवः।
अतो मनोष्मितान्तः हुःखी भवति नान्नयं। (B.T. p. 106).

1. Dasgupta unhappily has misread and misinterpreted this passage from the NS. in his Hts. of Ind. Phil. (iv, p. 113).

P. M. 12
The question has been raised: "If each individual possesses in finite and material outlines, the perfection of consciousness, it seems to become a mere point of existence when it casts off the body and enters release. Will there not be overlapping of souls there? If not, what is it that distinguishes one from the other?" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* p. 719). In other words, what is it that constitutes the essence of selfhood, if we are to subtract from it, as we should, in the state of release, all the content and vestures that enfilm its essence and are obviously incidental and non-fundamental to its being or make-up in each case? "We seem to be reduced to an abstraction of pure being or intelligence,—a monadism. It is merely then an assumption to hold that the single colorless unit, called "self", is different in each individual".

It is easy to ask such a question or pass such *ex cathedra* judgments. But it is not easy to give a thoroughly convincing answer to it, here and now *sub specie alterna*. Indeed, we should be in possession of the highest form of self-realization, which is the goal of religion and philosophy, if we should be able, *here and now*, to place our finger on what constitutes individuality and define it in precise terms. That will be unravelling the greatest of all mysteries, that has remained inscrutable for ages. We should cease to be embodied, if we catch our selves in their pristine essence of selfhood unconditioned by the floating perceptions of heat and cold, light and shade, pleasures and pain. If the Advaitin could silence the objection to Avidyā with the lofty remark that "if we can understand the relation of Ātman to Avidyā, we must be beyond the two"¹, the Dvaitin could as well plead with equal propriety that it would not be possible to deny the doctrine of intrinsic plurality of selves and their natural gradation, so long as we have no means of realizing the true essence of selfhood here and no means of proving that there is no basis of distinction in release. Madhva does not, after all, lay stress merely on sensations, feeling and bondage, in support of his doctrine of plurality of selves, as if these were the only movements of the real. It does not require much argument to show that the real nature of the souls and their true essence of individuality are now hidden from us by some mysterious veil of ignorance called Avidyā (*Svagunâchâdikâ*). Thanks to the light of Scripture and the exercise of reason and introspection, we may however expect to lift the veil ever so little and to take a peep into the truth of things and the vision might be enlarged as we go up in the scale of discipline and

¹ Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p. 577,
Aparokṣa. We can arrive at some kind of working solution of the problem now, by examining the evidences of Scripture and advancing logically from the known to the unknown. This is the utmost that the best of us can do and we need not despair or despise this method so long as we have no other means of approach open to us. The individuality of experience and the impossibility of our entering into others' experience, with the same fourth dimensional inwardness as our own, are sufficient proofs of the basic distinction of selves: एवं व्यवस्थया नानात्मानः सिद्धः। न द्वारामिथयंमभेदो वा भिन्नाद्यपमभेदो वा व्यवस्थेत्यंत्विनिविद्वेदे। अर्पितु, सुखदुःखाद्व-संधानमावाभवत्वयवस्थया अक्षीरितलवात्। अदुसृद्धानं नाम, अनेन सुखेनाहि सुखी इत्युभवः॥

(Vādaratnāvali, ii.)
CHAPTER XXX.

METAPHYSICAL DEPENDENCE OF SOULS

In spite of their intrinsic nature of consciousness and bliss, the souls, as finite beings, are in a state of absolute dependence and limitation at all times, in bondage and release. Release is only from the fetters which prevent the realization of their true natures and their metaphysical dependence on Brahman. Dependence is not a passing chapter in their lives. It is the very condition of their being as finite entities. The eightfold determinations of the cosmos are simply the expression of such dependence. Such dependence is most vividly felt in the pre-natal and post-mortem conditions of life: समाल गर्भवस्तु जीवस्य धार्मिकत्वं भावति, अतो निधनस्ततः नरकमनाश्व विध्यते। (B.T. p. 76), as well as in Pralaya, dreams, deep sleep and swoons. It is only in the state of sthiti that man is found to arrogate independence to himself. He lies helpless and weak at other times, both before and after. It may therefore be concluded that even this temporary assumption of independence is misplaced:

"विष्णूर्धवं प्राकृतप्रेषस्थापि च लव्यादनु।
अन्य सत्त्वसत्त्वादि विभेदणापूर्वकः।
स्वात्मतः स्थितिकाले तु कव्याचित्तेऽविद्विदतः।
प्रतीच्छात्मनमपि तु तत्स्वात्मकता गम्यते।" (B.T. ii, 18)

"तत्वा: स्वात्माभिमस्तिन्य: प्रायंवोस्मय शरीरिण:।
वस्तुतोभि न चैवविश्व परस्तमवशे यत:।
तत्वादिकः; तत्त्ववेष्य ह्यभिमानावत्स्यते।" (Mānd. Up. C.)

The description of impending death in Chān. Up. Vi. 15, wherein all psycho-physical powers are merged in their causes, one after the other, is another graphic instance of the soul’s absolute dependence. The very fact of its achieving freedom from the shackles of Prakṛti by the grace of God is an unmistakable proof of its continued dependence on Him, even in release. It would be preposterous to expect the essential metaphysical dependence of finite beings on the Independent to be cut off
at any time. It cannot be destroyed without destroying the very constitution of the self *qua* Pratibimba of the Infinite. The relationship of Bimbapratibimba between Brahman and Jīvas, being the result of Avidyā, in Advaita, is taken to be destroyed in release along with the extinction of individuality as such. But the same relation being Svābhāvika and not due to Upādhis, in Madhva’s view, is not therefore liable to destruction in Mokṣa. Hence its persistence in release, also, along with the persistence of individuality, shorn of all obscuring elements. Madhva, therefore, holds that even in the state of Mokṣa the realization of personal bliss, to the full, is dependent on the will of the Supreme:

अन्नानी ज्ञानद्रो विष्णूदेविनामी मोक्षद्व स:।

आनन्दद्वसुभाननां स एवैःको जनादनः (AV).

The limitations of the soul are, therefore, partly intrinsic and partly extrinsic —

पराधीनश बद्धश सत्वप्रभावस्यहित:।

अत्यशक्थः सदोषश जीवात्मा * * *(B.T. p. 4 b)

The extrinsic ones are terminable. The intrinsic remain with the self. The limitations of the self are, in general expressed in and throu’ the eight-fold determinations of cosmic life, which include life in Mokṣa also, to which they are subject. Tho’ essentially uncreated, they are, nevertheless, associated from eternity with a series of material coils known as Āvarāṇas. They are (1) Liṅga-śarīra or the subtle body or psycho-physical mechanism of sixteen elements. This carries the causal potentialities that lead to a number of future lives, in the fulness of time. (2) Prārabdhakarma or Karma which has begun to bear fruit, (3) Kāma or desire which is the seed of activity and (4) positive ignorance (भावस्वाक्षानन्द) or Avidyā which is both real and destructible. This is not simply a negative element (ज्ञानभाव)1. It must be recognized as a positive force in view of its

1. Dasgupta (*I. Phīl.* iv, p.159) is not correct in stating that Ignorance (avidyā) in Madhva’s system “is a negative substance which, by God’s will veils the natural intelligence of all”. He has misread and misinterpreted the passage from the *NS* relating to this topic.
being a product of Tamoguna encircling the soul and getting destroyed by Aparokṣajñāna. The essence of this Ignorance is the assumption of independence and initiative and looking upon the accessories given to the self as his own, in his own right: तत्सापरायत्तवाद्वालो अविभाविमितको अभ्रम । (NS. p. 26)

The locus of this Ignorance is the self. Such ignorance is not incompatible with the self-luminous character of the self, inasmuch as the Supreme Being which is Independent and All-powerful (अत्तरशिप्तपदः पतीयान्) obscures a part of the self’s nature by means of Viṣeṣas. This positive nescience has two aspects – Jivāchchādikā and Paramāchchādikā. The former conceals the true nature of the self (qua Pratibimba and metaphysically dependent on Brahman) from itself: स्कृण्णाच्छादिकाः whereby man comes to assume independence of initiative and believes himself and the world around to be self-subsisting:

हितीया प्रकृति: प्रेक्ष्टा तद्वरा हि गुणात्स्य: ।
तेषं संपातजो भावो ममाहिमिति या मति: (B.T. p. 18).

Indeed, it is the assumption of this independence that is the root-cause of bondage: प्रमादालसकलवालं वन्यस्य (B. S. B.). The marvellous hold of this ignorance on people which makes them oblivious of their own weaknesses, while being alive to the shortcomings of others, is effectively portrayed in the Viṣṇurahasya:

परेऽसं रोगहतारं: स्वरोगं न विज्ञानते ।
एतत्नायावरं विष्णोभवासतेषमाहासन: ॥

It would, thus, be seen that dependence is the distinctive mark of the finite, at all times. It may find expression in one or more of the eightfold determinations of cosmic development. It is for this reason that Madhva brings the eternal substances also, under the causal scheme of Brahman, by means of the doctrine of Parādhinaviṣeṣāpti1.

1. The dependence of eternal substances on God, is accepted by Vedānta Desika also: निद्यानां स्विपक्ष्योऽप्रमादालसकलवालविष्णुवियानि न तत्साभिषिष्ठाम्।
He defines such dependence as the possibility of reversal when it no longer pleases God to let them be: तथा, अविभाविमितको अभ्रम ॥
The second type of Ignorance prevents the souls from realizing the true nature of their dependence on God and their intrinsic resemblance to Him. Such ignorance is beginningless but has an end. There is no logical impropriety in conceiving of an end to what may be beginningless and conversely of endless continuity to what may have a beginning, e.g., Mokṣa. These are facts accepted by reason and supported by Śrūtis:

अनादिमायया स्वते यदा जीव: प्रवुद्धयते ।

The origin of bondage is also in the same way to be put down ultimately to the will of God. There is no other explanation of the beginningless association of ignorance obscuring the selves except the mysterious will of Brahman: अतो बन्धुपि तत् एवेवः—

सततं विशुद्धिद्रिणियोमुक्तिभुवस्यनुपयेर्ते ।
बन्धुपि तत् एव त्यावतसाधकं: ततोः: मभुः: ( B. T. X. p.74)
बन्धको भवपाशेन भवपाशाच मोचकः: ।
कैतव्येद: परं श्रावं विष्णुदेव सनातनं: (Skānda q. by Śrīdhara)

It is the will of the Lord that the souls shall know Him and realize their respective selfhood only by cleansing themselves of the impurities of Prakṛti and the distractions of Avidyā, after a long and arduous process of physical, intellectual and moral effort and spiritual discipline. The seed must be planted in the earth before it could sprout and develop into a fruit-tree. The accessories of Liṅgadeha, Prārabdha Karma etc. are just the material environment provided by God to help the Jivas to unfold themselves. This is indeed the raison d’être of creation according to the Viṣṇurahasya:

अनादिक्रमणं बद्धं जीवं नित्यं ह्यानन्तरः: ।
लिङ्गदेहवता: स्वेयं पतितं मुक्तितं इतः ।
यदि ते स्वेयं दृष्टा न स्यार्थमिहिलान्।
कथं कम्मणं कुर्वर्तस्त विषुःसिन्नितत्परायणः: ?
अपूर्णामर्ययते वा कथं मोक्षमवायुः: ? (Chap. V ).

There is, thus no problem at all of the first Fall of Man, in Madhva’s philosophy, The question is only of the Ascent of Man by degrees.
after he has qualified himself steadily thro' sincere effort to realize the full force and content of his personality. "Not having possessed the freedom and purity of the supreme" at any time in their lives, or have been "in any way sharers in the Divine nature", the question does not also arise for Madhva, of how the souls came to "lose these and transfer themselves to the rule of Karma" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* ii, p. 695–6). "Rāmānuja holds that neither reason nor Scripture can tell us how Karma got the souls into its power; because, the Cosmic process is beginningless" (*ibid.* 696). It is true enough that the cosmic process is beginningless; but, it is the souls that forge their own chains due to basic nature of their Svarūpa.
CHAPTER XXXI

SELF-LUMINOSITY OF SOULS.

The individual soul, as a sentient being, is admitted by Madhva to be self-luminous (स्वाकाश). It is not merely of the form of knowledge (आन्यवृत्त) but is a knower (ज्ञाति). The conception of the self as a conscious personality is the same as it is in respect of God:

स्वेता वेदन्त स्वेते स्वेता वेदः स केशरः ।
परस्ते वेदा विभिन्न वेदाधिति परे: * * ॥ (G. T. xiii)

except for the fact that even the self-luminosity of the Jīva is dependent on the Supreme, which makes bondage possible:

जीवानां स्वाकाशातः तत्तसादातः स्वेतदनम् ।

Self-luminosity, in the Advaita, is a state of pure consciousness, without a subject-object relation: अवेष्ट्वे सति, अपरोक्ष्यव्यवहारयोग्यम् (Citsukha). But this is self-contradictory. The ātman must be both a knowing subject (ज्ञाति) and the object of his own knowledge. He should know himself and others and be known by them also. Jayatīrtha, therefore, rejects the Prābhākara view of the self as essentially jaḍa, in that it is non-intelligent, being only the substratum of qualities like consciousness, action, enjoyment and suffering. The Bhāṭṭas, tho' conceding the ātman to be both conscious and the substratum of consciousness, hold that he is not self-conscious (sva-jñātā), but is only inferred thro' aham-pratyaya (ego-consciousness). This is also rejected by Madhva, who holds that the ātman must be self-intuiting. The epistemological

1. स च, ज्ञानस्वपन्न भिजलावः जहः:। जानामिति ज्ञानभयेनेव भारतः। न दु ज्ञानपलबेन। (Nyāyaratnāvali)

2. न चातम: स्वाकाशाते बिविदित्यम्। अधिमित्यसुवात:। न चार्यं मानसोदुधारः। तत्सापि ज्ञानानवनातुभवान्तरात्मकोपेन्नवस्थानात। कस्याचिदतुभवय स्वाकाशाते, स्वातन्त्र पूतः। ज्ञानायामवनातुभवेनाभुतां इति न वाच्यम्। अर्थविवेकोच्चालं। न ह्यायामन-ज्ञानस्थावे किंचिन्मनां। न च स्वाकाशसंविदाध्यत्वं शाला अवभास्त इति गुर्ज्ञस्म। बौद्धप्रार्थुता तूतिसिद्धान्तायभावमिन्दुस्मांनगान्तं। न हि युक्तसायामातिरित्तेऽसंविदस्तिती संभवति। संविदाध्यत्वातां न संविद स अवभास्त इति। [अत: स्वाकाश शाला] TP. i, 1. 1.
dogma of monism that the subject of all knowledge cannot itself be an
object of knowledge, for fear of offending the dictum of the impossibility
of the subject operating on itself (क्रूरक्षमावाचारिरोध ) is rejected by Madhva
as unwarranted by Scripture and experience. The acceptance of "Viṣeṣas" in the self, enables Madhva to get over the difficulty of
partial obscuration of the self's nature, in bondage, without denying the
law of identity. Viṣeṣa is the peculiar agency by which Madhva is able
to divide consciousness from itself.

Such an explanation will not be available to the Advaitin, to whom
the ātman is essentially colorless and aspectless (निरिषिष्य ); so that there
is bound to be great difficulty in accounting for the temporary and partial
obscuration of ātma-svarūpa by Avidyā or Ajñāna:

निरिषिष्य स्वयं भाते विभवानात्वेतत् भेतत् ? (AV)
निरिषिष्यलादाननानानिभिन्तात विशेषः | सिद्धत्वात स्वह्यस्य विशेषायाभावं नाशानं क्षणचि-
द्वरकमु (Māyāvāda Kh.)

The Śrutis also establish the ātman to be an active knower, employing
such terms like विज्ञात with the suffix (३५) in the active sense, which
Śaṅkara is at pains to explain away as a reference to a philosophical look-
ing back upon the world that was (भूतपूर्वत्त्वा निर्देशः ). But this explanation
breaks down, elsewhere, in Brh. Up. i, 4, 10, where the Supreme Being
is said to have known itself as "I am Brahma", when it existed all
alone prior to creation in a state of blessedness. The knowability of the
self must be recognized, if the pursuit of Brahmacāra is to have any
meaning. The plea of क्रूरक्षमावाचारिरोध is unsustainable here. We can
not surrender facts to a mere dogma: नाहि कल्पितस्वभयत पित्रियापरिविवे गरीयान ।
Jayātṛtha says that the opposition of subject-object in a proposition like ‘I
know myself’; if due merely to the way of defining objectivity in the man-
ner of the grammarians as, परस्मवेत्यऽत्यादापन्यात्तम (or "reaping the fruit
accruing from an act, inhering in another ), could be overcome by rede-
fining subject and object in such a way as to avoid the overlapping:
क्रियायथः कर्मः । क्रियाविषयः कर्म । The Advaitic ātman could not be invested
with any kind of self-luminosity. The idea would presuppose some objec-
tive content. Such a content may be either one's own self or an "Other".
The Advaitin is prepared to concede neither. The self cannot be the object
of such a luminosity. The reality of another self is not admitted. The only sense then in which we are entitled to speak of the Atman as Svaprakāśa in Advaita will be that it has no luminosity with reference to either (Tdy. t. p. 18 b). In the absence of any objective or subjective reference of luminosity, it would be just non-luminous: विषयवावित: प्रकाश एव नास्ति घटक। (Tdy) which is elucidated by Jayatīrtha: आत्मा न प्रकाशः। प्रकाशयुन्य-स्वात। घटक। There is no reason to make an exception in the case of the atman alone and claim luminosity for him even in the absence of an objective reference or content — स्वाद्वे यद्वे प्रमाण यथा। नैतद्वित (Tdy. t. p. 19 b). Nothing beyond the pale of Pramāṇas could be described as real: प्रमाणाभवे सत्यलं न स्वाद्वेर्य, प्रमाणेन विना- सिद्धयतिविस्तुतस्तत्वत्। (VTN. t. p. 96b).
CHAPTER XXXII

MADHVA’S THEORY OF BONDAGE: SVABHĀVĀJÑĀNAVĀDA

According to Madhva, souls exist from eternity, in the chaos of a material *milieu*, under the ken of God. At the conclusion of each Mahāpralaya, He brings them to the forefront of creation\(^1\). He has no purpose in doing so, save that of helping the souls\(^2\), to exhaust throu' enjoyment (*bhoga*) the heavy load of Karma and Vāsanās, lying to their credit from time immemorial and thus work out their destinies\(^3\). Creation is, thus, an indispensable requisite for the ripening of individual Karma and the full development of each soul. This self-development, when complete, leads the soul to its deserts. Madhva thus guarantees both the integrality of the souls, in so far as they exist from eternity, as finite beings and the independence of God as their Ruler. This enables him to meet and satisfy the demands of both the moral and the religious consciousness of man.

The bonds and impurities of the souls are not, however, their essential nature (*svartipa*), at any rate, of those of the highest order\(^4\). They are foreign to the core of their being, like the rust on copper and are taken to be associated with them from the beginning, at the pleasure of the Lord. This event is beginningless in time; but is, all the same, subject to the Lord’s pleasure. He is thus ultimately responsible (metaphysically) for their bondage, — not in the sense that He threw them into it at a certain point of time in history, but that its continuous association with them is, in every way, subject to Him and its riddance will depend on

2. भूलै नित्यालितजनस्य दि स्वाभाविकीशा बमृह (ibid.)
3. आत्मप्रयोजनाय स्वाहा श्रुतिवारस्यत्।
4. ‘न प्रयोजनवलने’ तथ्य भाग ज्ञातप:। (AV ii, 1, 33)
5. अथो, ‘न प्रयोजनवलन क्योः स्वाहा। आत्मप्रयोजनोद्धेशेन निवारितात्, न परप्रयोजनोद्देशस्मै। श्रुतिरपि ‘आत्मास्य का स्वाहा।’ इति हेतुः भिक्षुवेश्याय, प्रयुजान, आत्मप्रयोजनस्वाभास्यवात्। परस्योजनस्वाभास्यस्त्रायामिति (NS.) Cf. ‘यथा निस्यो मृणा।’ (BT).
6. बल्लमानदेश अत्रजन सहो ज्ञातननाकुलम। स्वस्वाभास्य ज्ञेवस्य (BSB. II. 3, 31.) एतच सभीविधाः। (TP.)
His grace and cooperation\(^1\). Its onset is rendered possible by the power of concealment or obscuration of the true nature of souls, which is vested in the Lord\(^2\) and which corresponds to the "Tirodhaṇa-Śakti" recognized by Śrīkanṭha and in Tamil Śaivism, as one of the five characteristics of Parameśvara.

It may, no doubt, appear to be a despotic thing for God to envelop the souls in beginningless Māyā; but as already pointed out, it is a necessary evil in the scheme of the universe. The association with Prakṛti bonds is a necessary step in the spiritual evolution of souls and is, therefore, permitted by God. It is an ordeal thro' which every one of them has to pass before attaining his or her full stature,—whatever that might be. It is the desire of the Almighty that the souls shall fulfil themselves only in this way and in no other. And there is no questioning His will, as He is Satyasāmkalpa.

The bonds of souls are thus real in that they are not imaginary. They have no beginning, in time tho' depending always on His will. The essence of this bondage is ignorance and misunderstanding of the true nature of God and of one's own self: तत्स्वर्गकारश्चापि जीवस्य परमेष्यो-च्छया परमेश्वरे स्वर्गम्यं चाजाने संभवतेव। आश्चानामपि सत्यमेव, नाश्चानकल्पितम्।

(\textit{NS.} p. 64)

That is precisely what the Brahmājñānavāda of Śaṅkara denies. According to it, it is the Brahman that is really obscured by ignorance and appears as the individual.\(^4\) Madhva’s view has certainly one advantage over it, in that one can understand a finite being suffering from ignorance; but not an Infinite Independent Brahman. The greatest stumbling block to the Advaitic view is that Ignorance can never invade the Brahman which is both independent and of the nature of self-luminosity and absolute consciousness (Svapraṇaṣajñānasvarūpam).

---

1. पराभिप्रेयनु तिरोड़िते ततो हास्य बन्धविपयंशी। (\textit{B.S.} iii, 2, 5)


3. Māyā is understood in Madhva’s philosophy as the mysterious will of the Lord. (Madhva, \textit{B.S.B.} 1, 4, 26) A similar power is ascribed to Ajñāna itself in Advaita: आश्चानात्मावर्णविभ्रमशक्तियोगाद। (\textit{Śaṃkṣepapārīvaka,} 1, 20)

It is not inconceivable that a Svatantrya-Devata should have such a power.

4. Cf. ब्रह्मवादियो संसर्ति मुच्चने च। (\textit{Bhāmati})
Madhva rightly points out the weakness and untenability of the monistic theory of bondage.  

अज्ञातिकथस्वेतुप्ये न कुतथन।

उपाधिमेदात्पदति इति चेतस स्वभावतः?

अज्ञानातो वा? तैत्तर्य सत्यता स्वतं एव चेत। (Up. Kh.)

If Brahman is the only real that is, where and whence can ignorance come in? If it is rendered possible by the intervention of “Upādhi”, the question would arise about the Upādhi itself, viz., whether it is a real and essential feature of Brahmā or is itself due to an earlier layer of Ignorance. A real Upādhi would annul Monism. To rely on a previous ignorance to create a subsequent Upādhi would give rise to a double fallacy of a regressus ad infinitum and a mutual inter-dependence between Upādhis and ignorance-layers. It is thus impossible to make out any logically intelligible relation between Upādhi and Brahman. It is passing strange that so insuperable a difficulty should have been represented as a point of honor to the Advaita:

षुष्णप्रविष्ट्या भूय्यव न हु शृण्म् (Istasiddhi)

Commenting on Deussen's remarks that “On this question of how ignorance could possibly affect the Brahman, the authors of the Upaniṣads give us no information”, Radhakrishnan writes: “They give no information because no information is possible. It is true no explanation is possible of the rise of the bewildering force of Avidyā, creator of false values, which has somehow come into being, in spite of the eternal and inalienable purity of the original self-existent Brahman” (I. Phil. ii, 578). “How Avidyā and Brahman can co-exist, is just the problem for which we don't have any solution” (p. 577). Such is the solution of the problem of the origin of bondage, in the system of Śāmkara which is said to be ‘unmatched for its metaphysical depth and logical power, where thought follows thought naturally, until Advaitism is seen to complete and crown the edifice’ (op. cit. ii, 657). The worst that could be said of Madhva's view of the origin of bondage is that it involves God in a benevolent despotism. But Śāmkara's reduces Brahman to a position of helpless submission to its own ignorance. Certainly, there is much to choose between the two.

1. Cf. नष्टि कवित्वपरत्तो बन्धनां आगम्यहू शूलानुपविसति।

(Śāmkara, B. S. B. ii, 1, 21)
According to Madhva, the bondage is real, it does not follow that it is eternal and indestructible. The possibility of its termination does not make it any the less real as a fact so long as it lasts. This follows from his definition of real as अनारोपित्त श्रमितिविनयः। There is no difficulty either in conceiving of the final disruption of ignorance and bondage as a result of the prolonged effort of the Jīvas and the grace of God: तथा विचिंत्सापि बन्धस्य निरुपित्त बन्धायम्। (NS, p. 64).

The objection of the Advaita that if bondage were real it could not be destroyed suffers from a confusion of ideas; for reality is not always the same as eternal existence. If the Lord wills it, even beginningless (real) ignorance can be terminated: अवस्थिति धाबनन्तरबद्धेञ्जनन्तर (NS). The Monist could not appeal to any such mysterious power of God, as self-delusion, thro' Ajñāna, is hardly a sign of independence and sovereignty of Brahman.

The essence of such a theory is that it is realistic. It is not obliged to dismiss any stage of bondage as unreal. It accepts the kārtirva (doership) and bhoktriya (enjoyership) of Jīvas as actually existing in them, tho' dependent on God (B. S. ii, 3, 33). But instead of realizing that these capacities of Jīvas are derived from the Supreme Being, the Jīvas, in their ignorance, look upon them as self-derived. This is Avidyā. Such Avidyā is real, both in itself and as pertaining to the self. Similar is the case with buddhi, the senses, bodies and their objects of enjoyments. These are also as much real as anything else; but God-given. We, however, in our ignorance, look upon them as entirely under our control and as our 'possessions'. The fact, however, is that they are 'our possessions', subject to the Lord's wish. बुद्धिमित्रियासृशि: ज्ञानसन्त एवं इंद्रियेण अष्टि अविधादिविनाशात् आत्मिवत्य अवस्थिते। परामात्मियत्वापि अस्तेऽव। (NS, p. 26). These various 'possessions', tho' essentially different from the essence of selfhood are not apprehended by the selves as clearly and vividly distinguished from 'self', on account of intimate permeation of the self in the body and on account of deep attachment to these. Hence on account of their inextricable association, the self comes to regard them as his very own and is affected by their effects in terms of regarding himself as fortunate or unfortunate and having a feeling of elation or shrinking of his personality as a result. This leads to love and aversion and similar pairs of opposites of feelings in successive efforts to seek what is agreeable and avoid
what is disagreeable in the embodied state. Every successive step is thus
directed by this misplaced sense of values. This is the essence of what
is known as Samsāra, leading to countless births and deaths in the cycle
of life. It is only true knowledge of the soul's relation to God that can
redeem it from this bondage. The true and final explanation of bondage
is, thus, the will of the Lord and not merely, Karma, Ajñāna, Kāla,
Gunas etc.

The objection that Dr. Chandradhar Sharma raises in his *Critical
Survey of Indian Philosophy* (London, 1960), against Rāmānuja's theory
of bondage: "if the soul is essentially pure and changeless and self-
conscious subject, why should it get associated with Karma and be bound?
If the soul is tinged with Karma, it is already bound. Rāmānuja explains
this difficulty by the conception of a beginningless Samsāra. But if
you have to fall back on something beginningless why not admit the
Madhva has gone beyond Rāmānuja in tracing the origin of bondage,
ultimately to the Divine will, for reasons which will be made clear prese-
ntly. Credit goes to Madhva for realizing that neither Karma nor Ajñāna
can be the ultimate explanation of the origin of bondage of souls:

\[ \text{न च कल्मिनमल्लात्काल्युणप्रसूतीशमचित्ततु} \]
\[ \text{दत्ते यत्} \]
\[ \text{}(Dvādaśa-Stotra)\]

unless such Ajñāna is understood in terms of Svabhāvājñāna as defined
by Madhva. The acceptance of Viśeṣas in the nature of the Jīvas, by
Madhva, is a convincing explanation of the difficulty raised against the
'pure, changeless self-conscious subject becoming associated with
Karma and becoming bound' by the Divine will. Dr. Chandradhar
Sharma is very much mistaken if he thinks that falling back on begin-
ningless Avidyā will be a panacea which will cure all his ills. For both
Karma and Avidyā are equally insentient principles and cannot imprison
or obscure the self on their own initiative. It is conceivable that the
finite and ever-dependent souls can be subjected to temporary and partial
obscuration of their full nature by the Divine will. But the other theory
of monism that the Infinite and Independent Brahman itself deludes
Itself by throwing the veil of concealment over its own being:

\[ \text{स्तानकल्पितजन्तीयमहत्सूरेजस्त्रलोकस्मातहमम} \]
\[ \text{खोपुरुषमवित} \]
\[ \text{क्षेत्रकृचितितितिज्ञसे भवनक्षेत्रोति} \]
\[ \text{(Samkṣepapārīraka, i, 2).}\]
and becomes the empirical ego, to which Chandradhar Sharma evidently subscribes is, surely, not more convincing logically! For he himself agrees that "the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ regarding Avidyā are illegitimate questions and therefore an insoluble mystery!" (op. cit. p. 281).

Madhva calls his view of the origin of bondage as "Śvabhāvājñānavāda" or the theory of the souls’ ignorance of their true nature and of their dependence on the Supreme: तद्विध्यक्षमानं जीवस्य, इति वादः "स्वभावाज्ञानवादः" (NS. p.64). The term "Śvabhāva", here, has been explained by Jayatīrtha in six different ways. The first explanation is as given above. The second takes "Śvabhāva" to mean what is in fact and what is not imagined by ignorance. On this view, Ajñāna which is the cause of the soul’s bondage exists in reality and is not merely something which is imagined to exist. Thirdly, "Śvabhāva" signifies, "Independent Being" or God; fourthly, the Jīva’s own nature of metaphysical dependence. Thus, "Ajñāna" of the true nature of God and of one’s own dependence is "Śvabhāvajñāna." It is also explained as "Ajñāna" that is induced in the Jīva by the Independent Being i.e. God.

Madhva contends that even tho’ the Jīva is a self-luminous being, still, it is not inconceivable that he should become subject to ignorance of his own true nature and of the nature of God and of his own true relation to Him, as he is a dependent and finite being. The difficulty of the incompatibility of ignorance obscuring certain aspects of a self-luminous being, which would arise in Brahmajñānavāda will not arise in this theory; for the Jīvas are here, by definition, “Asvatantra” and also “Sa-viśeṣa” (with aspects). It is with the help of such “Viśeṣas” that while some aspects of the self (like its existence) are unobsured, yet others like ānanda are obscured. This is

1. Cf. (i) तथा स्वयं संप्रभुवतात्वित्वम् नाशानकलित इति यावत्. (ii) स्वयं संप्रभुवतात्वित्वम् नाशानकलित इति यावत्. (iii) स्वयं संप्रभुवतात्वित्वम् नाशानकलित इति यावत्. (iv) स्वयं संप्रभुवतात्वित्वम् नाशानकलित इति यावत्. (v) तथा स्वयं संप्रभुवतात्वित्वम् नाशानकलित इति यावत्. (vi) स्वयं संप्रभुवतात्वित्वम् नाशानकलित इति यावत्. (NS. p. 64 b.)

P. M. 13
where Madhva's theory has an advantage over the Advaitic theory of the “nirviṣeṣatva” of the Ātman. On the “nirviṣeṣatva”-view of the Ātman (or Brahman) the obscurcation would be simply inexplicable and inconceivable (दुःस्तावम्).

Dr. Chandradhar Sharma dismisses the arguments by which the Sāṁkhyaśas and Rāmānuja have tried to establish the quantitative pluralism of the spirit as “flimsy” (Op. cit. p. 168) and reaching not beyond the empirical egos “whose individuality nobody denies” (p. 369). It is true that a quantitative pluralism of transcendental subjects cannot be derived as a logical conclusion from the concept of Puruṣas in the Sāṁkhya system as stereotyped, indifferent and inactive beings, who take no real part in the cosmic drama. But this cannot be said of Rāmānuja’s theory of selves, in which the Puruṣas are active self-conscious individuals participating wholeheartedly in the struggle of life for their deliverance from bondage. No doubt, monistic idealism thinks that there will be inconsistency in holding one and the same individual to be subject to actual bondage and suffering in the beginning and achieving freedom from suffering later on in the state of Mokṣa. But as these two states of bondage and blessedness are not coexistent or simultaneous, there is no inconsistency or violation of the principle of non-contradiction, in both being real states of the individual. The contradiction is purely imaginary. There is only a temporary obstruction of the capacities of the individual in bondage and this obscurcation is a reality and a fact and is caused by the Divine will and its removal too is as much due to the same Divine will. This is obviously the opinion of the Sūtrakāra:

प्रामाणिष्यानां तिरौहितं ततो हस्य बन्धविषयः (B.S. iii, 2,5.)

The idealist, on the other hand, is only trying to run away from the problem by dismissing the very problem as an illusion. It is difficult to see how Svājñānavāda of Ātman or Brahman allowing itself to be deluded by Avidyā and getting finitized into empirical egos and fighting mock battles to regain its forgotten status is a better hypothesis than that of realistic pluralism. There is, however, one weak point in Rāmānuja’s theory of selves that they are only numerically different, but otherwise essentially alike. Difference and distinction constitute individuality. If

1. Cf. दुःस्तावम् भूषणं न हु दुःस्तावम्।
कथंचित् घटमानलेखितां दुर्घटं भैते॥ (Iṣṭasiddhi)
the selves are essentially the same, in every respect, there is no meaning in their quantitative plurality. A difference is no difference unless it makes a difference. Madhva removes this anomaly by laying equal emphasis on quantitative and qualitative differences among them. The doctrine may be "peculiar" to Madhva; but it is, nevertheless, quite essential for a reasoned theory of pluralistic realism and it is the failure to accept it that constitutes a logical inconsistency in the case of the Jainas, the Sāmkhyas and Rāmānuja. Even the most merciless critic of Madhva must admit that Madhva is utterly consistent in accepting the quantitative and the qualitative pluralism of souls. We fail to understand why the critics who have been quick to point out the inconsistency in the position of the Sāmkhyas and Rāmānuja should not have expressly noted the improvement made by Madhva, in this respect.
CHAPTER XXXIII

PLURALITY OF SELVES AND THEIR SVARŪPA-BHEDA

The glaring inequalities of equipment, endowments and rewards of life have rightly been made the starting point of the presumption of the plurality of selves by the Sāmkhyas:

\[ \text{जननमरणकरणां प्रतिनियमसुरमज्जयोऽवमे} \]
\[ \text{पुरुषबहुत्रं सिद्ध हैम्पारिपर्यायचैत्यं} (\text{Sāmkhya Kārikā, 18.}) \]

This stock argument emphasized by the Sāmkhyas and Rāmānuja has been sought to be dismissed as proving nothing more than the plurality of the empirical ego “whose individuality nobody denies”. Madhva shows the fallacy of this argument by showing that we have to arrive inductively at some fundamental bases of distinctions among souls taking empirical facts into consideration. Empirical facts and empirical egos cannot be laughed out of existence. They have to be reckoned with. Philosophy is concerned as much with the problem of our genesis as with that of our future and destiny. We have to see if empirical facts can or do throw any light on the ‘how’ of Samsāra. How have empirical differences arisen? By themselves or by earlier empirical ones and they by yet others \textit{ad infinitum}? Do they presuppose or go back upon something that is fundamental? Can \textit{all} the complex variations and differences in the psycho-physical, mental and spiritual lives of beings be explained without going back upon intrinsic and fundamental differences in the essence of beings, with the help of the Law of Karma alone or of the theory of beginninglessness \textit{(anāditva)} of Samsāra? That the theory of Avidyā is an illegitimate intrusion into Hindu religion and metaphysics is clear from the fact that even in the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa only the two theories of Karma and Anāditva of Samsāra have been mooted as legitimate explanations of the divergences in life. These two theories of Karma and Anāditva of Samsāra presuppose the reality of existing differences among selves and try to explain them on some real and more fundamental bases. But neither the law of Karma nor the Anāditva of
Samsāra will be consistent with a repudiation of the present differences as really superimposed ones. The impression that the law of Karma and the anāditva of Samsāra are merely empirical explanations is due to an incapacity to understand their real and true significance in throwing light on empirical differences. This point comes out clearly in Madhva’s interpretation of the law of Karma as applied to the explanation of empirical differences. The inexorable law of Karma is commonly taken to be the final explanation of these inequalities in the lives of beings. But, it will break down as an ultimate explanation of cosmic differences, unless it is admitted that these differences themselves are in principle rooted ultimately in the nature of beings. This is the decisive contribution which Madhva has made to the interpretation of the problem of life and its diversities. He has thus gone beyond the principle of Karma, unerringly, to the “Śvabhāvabhedā” (intrinsic or essential differences in the nature of beings). No other philosopher, in the East or in the West, has done this. Herein lies the boldness, originality and thoroughness of Madhva’s approach to philosophical problems. He does not stop at any half-way house on the philosophical road to Truth.

It is interesting to note that starting from another angle, Prof. Albert Schweitzer, also, comes to the same conclusion as Madhva, in his interesting work: Indian Thought and Its Development: “How do individual souls come into existence from the Universal soul and how are they reabsorbed into it? The doctrine of reincarnation in no way requires the assumption that the individual souls have issued from the Universal soul and will return to it again. Indeed, it can do nothing with it. For this doctrine, the most natural thing is simply to start from the fact that in a way which cannot be further explained, all through eternity, there have been an endless number of eternal individual souls (which constitute the spiritual element in the Universe), for which is prescribed the passing of a constantly renewed existence in the world of senses.¹

¹ With this compare Madhva’s Śvabhāvājñānavāda.
until finally they succeed in winning freedom from it. And what need is there to regard liberation from the cycle of rebirth and return of the soul into the Universal soul as equivalent? The doctrine of reincarnation has no interest whatever in asserting such an inexplicable thing as that the individual soul, in the end, loses its individuality. It is sufficient for it to establish the fact that as a result of the freedom attained, the soul is in a state of perfect bliss" (Op. cit. p. 61)— Italic mine.

Karma implies freedom of choice to do right or wrong, good or bad. But it does not explain why a particular choice alone has been made, in preference to another. This is the crux of the moral problem. We are willynilly thrown back on the hypothesis of innate distinctions of nature among the selves (Svarapabheda), in the ultimate analysis of this question. All other explanations break down in the end. The inequalities of Karma do not carry us very far. It is therefore, only a half-truth to say that it is thro' different Karma that men are not all alike. It simply begs the question and lands us in an anterior distinction of natures, aptitude or outlook. However beginningless the chain of Karma may be, it is still incapable of explaining why a particular course of action has been pursued in preference to another, without reference to an ultimate difference in the nature of the moral agent. Even a beginningless chain of Karma could not fully explain why all souls are not equally good or bad, when all of them are equally eternal, their Karmas too, equally beginningless and their start also, simultaneous. Karma has no self-contained answer to give to this question. It is itself the effect of something else. Desire is the seed of action. This desire or inclination must then be admitted to differ in each case to such an inscrutable extent as to render diversity of natures and activities intelligible. If all souls are constituted absolutely alike, it would be impossible to account for the different courses of action pursued by them as a result of which, they accumulate a heavy load of Karmas, thro' ages. If these inequalities of endowments, opportunities and rewards are to be made consistent with freedom and freewill of souls, they must be attributed to an essential distinction in

1. Cf. बन्धमिमिथ्यालं नैव मुक्तिपेक्षाते (AV)
their very nature and constitution. The plurality of souls cannot therefore, be explained with reference to the material plane alone, as it would not explain the difficulties involved in the theory of anādi-karma, unless these distinctions are proposed to be dismissed as not ultimate. But this is running away from the problem and not solving it. As Jayatirtha points out, the Sāmkhya doctrine of plurality of selves really suffers from this basic defect: यत्रूपशयहुँ चाः जनात्मानं वेदांतीनवीनेऽन्तकम् तदविधि माधवात्मिभिषिक्षनेतरस्मयं विनयमितः। न तु स्वल्पे कथितदलित परस्परोऽविशेषः। (NS. p. 328). If plurality is to be ultimate, it must be grounded on something more than Prākrūtic vestures and influences, including Karma. No doctrine of plurality of selves that shies at this logical decision to ground it upon a principle of innate distinction of essence among selves and invariable concomitance of natural selection of good or bad which that would lead to, could ever hope to give a solution that would be consistent with pure reason. The same is the weakness of Rāmānuja’s position. According to him, there is no basic distinction of Svarūpaviśeṣas, among souls, in the sense of a qualitative gradation of properties of jñāna, ānanda, character and inclination. All are equally endowed in every respect. There is no distinction of measure. Madhva objects to this on the ground that multiplicity without distinction (of essence) would be inconceivable, particularly among Cetanas. Sameness or equality of essence does not rule out individual variations (in an infinite scale) which may be too subtle to be obvious. But such underlying variation of degrees must be recognized to exist, if plurality of selves is to have any real meaning or justification. However much they may be alike, there can be no absolute likeness in all respects between any two beings in creation. If there is, they would be identical and not merely similar to each other. Difference in essence is thus bound up with the idea of fundamental peculiarity. In the case of physical or material objects, it is possible to distinguish between likes on the basis of difference in organization of parts or atoms. But in respect of spiritual entities like souls, which are impartible wholes, there is no way to account for multiplicity except thro’ an essential tho’ mysterious distinction of natures
(Svarūpabheda) or Svarūpa-viśeṣas which are not the same in any two individuals. We have to extend the same principle to the Kingdom of Heaven too, on the analogy of Arnold’s famous lament on the death of his little daschhund:

"And not in the course
Of all centuries yet to come,
And not the infinite resource
Of Nature with her countless sum
Can ever quite repeat the past
Or just thy little shape restore." ¹

To the ordinary passer-by, the sheep may all be just so many numerable units; but to the shepherd who lives with them all thro’ their lives and in daily contact, they are real individuals each with very different features and characteristics. Even so, to Madhva, the Divine Shepherd, who knows all about the constitution of the souls, knows how to distinguish one soul from another, on the basis of essential peculiarities embedded in their natures!

The wide range, then, of deep-rooted inequalities in the lives of the living beings, extending over the human, animal, plant, aquatic and other species of life, could not be satisfactorily explained except on the hypothesis of intrinsic differences of nature, expressing themselves in potentialities for good or bad. It is no use, says Madhva, to take refuge against this inescapable fact in so-called disparities of past Karmas shaping the lives of beings. These Karmas are, in fact, conditioned by some sub-concious influences of past deeds and unseen merit accruing therefrom (adrṣṭa); which, again, presupposes an earlier merit (adrṣṭa) and that another and so on endlessly. We are, thus, ultimately left with a practically beginningless gradation of fitness and potentialities for good or for bad, termed अन्नादिसम्पन्नायता or natural fitness or हठ by Madhva. (See Chapter XLIII).

¹. Quoted from Pringle Pattison, Idea of God, p. 268.
If unseen merit which determines the disparities of Karma is inexplicable and devoid of a reason at any particular stage in history, the same excuse could be trotted out at the outset; so that the very need for a previous birth and belief in metempsychosis could be dispensed with. If this unseen merit recedes in an interminable cycle, we have really a beginningless distinction of essence and potentialities accepted, in a different manner. If such unseen merit is not produced by a previous merit and that by another, but is taken to find its *raison d'être* in the intrinsic nature and worth of each soul, we accept the principle of intrinsic differences among Souls (अनादिद्वस्यपौष्पताविभाद), without further ado:

वदनादिविशिषो न साप्रतं कषमिष्ये?

अद्यादेव चारदं स्वीक्तं संवेदादिरिमः।

आकसिको विवेषकेवदहं क्षत्यिदिश्ये।

सर्वाकसिमकवं स्याननाद्यपोक्षितं क्षतिचित।

अद्यादोधिशिषोध्यमनादिरिमं कुतो न तत्?

(*AV.* iii, 4, adh. 5-6).

The uniqueness of individual experience (व्यवस्था) and the inequalities of equipment etc. point ultimately to the existence of an inalienable, incommunicable essence of personality which underlies all states of experience and coordinates them into a meaningful whole, which is never seen to be repeated or to overlap in any two cases. It cannot be seriously contended that there is actual overlapping of consciousness in release where all material conditions fall off. Such overlapping would be inconceivable without identity of essence _here and now_, also, and identity of consciousness would render the present multiplicity of personalities, purposeless. If it should be true then, that there is really one individual throughout the Universe, that one being must be in a position to co-ordinate to itself the experience of all other apparently different centres, which is not the case, so far as we are aware (Cf. अनादिद्वस्यपौष्पताविभाक्षीति). Moreover, all selves struggling for freedom should get automatically released, the moment a single centre gets switched off from the main. *The very existence of both freed and bound souls at the same time...*
is a proof of their distinction and plurality: संसारिकत्ववस्त्रया च भेदः सिद्दः। न च कोणस्वयं नास्त्ताति प्राणायं युक्तः। (Vādaratnāvali, ii).

The theory of Svarūpabhedakya of Souls elaborated by Madhva is, thus, the only solution of the agelong problem of plurality of selves, their freedom and freewill. Questions like the following have been asked by thinkers, all the world over: “The Jīva was not created of a void, at a particular time. But he is, nevertheless, an expression of the nature of God. How then does he happen to be so imperfect while his archetype is also the type of perfection?” St. Augustine’s agony of soul was still more poignant: “Who made me? Did not God who is not only good but goodness itself? Whence then, came I to will evil and ill good, so that I am thus justly punished? Who set this in me and ingrafted in me this plant of bitterness, seeing that I was made wholly of my most sweet God?” (Confess, Bk. VII, 4; 5). The question is answered by Madhva, under B. S. ii, 3, 51: भातिक्षानां मिथो वैचित्र्ये कारणमाद—अद्यानिष्मादिति। अन्वितवायामाधिविविद्या। वैचित्र्यम्। on the basis of a fundamental difference in beginningless Karma, Vidyā etc., which rest ultimately upon an intrinsic difference in nature. This interpretation is clearly endorsed by Rāghavendra Svāmin: स्वस्यप्रसिद्धिवैचित्र्यस्येव अद्यानिष्मित्वम्। पदेनाल्पकृत्त्वात्। विद्वृत्त- मेतत् चन्द्रद्रवयाम्। (Bhāvadīpa, p. 224 b). This above is an original and suggestive interpretation of the Brahma Sūtra in question by the Mādhva school. It goes beyond the commonly accepted theory of Karma for an ultimate solution of the problem of distinction and inequality among souls. And the solution given is much more definite and precise than the vague one of ‘original sin’, which would not be adequate as an explanation of inequality of nature.

It is, thus, in the nature of some souls to will evil and ill good and of others to will good and ill evil. Yet others there may be of mixed nature and these, in the language of Hume, will be “neither good enough for a supper, nor bad enough for a drubbing”. These will correspond to the “Nitya-samsārins” of Madhva. It is thus only a half-truth to say that “freedom is the cause of our doing evil” (Augustine). The question must inevitably arise as to why, when one is “free” to will good and ill evil, one does the contrary? Not because one has free will! For, the same will might
have suggested to him the other course! That it has not done so must depend on something more fundamental and foundational to the nature of the individual. That something, says Madhva, is the core of the individual,—his Svabhāva. It will be difficult to dispute the ruthless logic of this contention, however distasteful to one's amour propre the conclusion may be. The tripartite classification of souls, put forward by Madhva, is only a comprehensive theory embodying the same idea of Svarūpabhedā and giving it a definite shape in the form of a broad generalization. It will be dealt with in the next chapter.
CHAPTER XXXIV

RATIONAL BASIS OF INTRINSIC GRADATION AMONG SOULS AND THEIR TRIPARTITE CLASSIFICATION

Madhva's doctrine of the Soul insists not only upon the distinctiveness of each soul but also upon an intrinsic gradation among them based on varying degrees of knowledge, power and bliss. This is known as Tāratamya or Svarūpa-tāratamya, which comes out all the more clearly in the released state, where the souls realize their true status. This position is peculiar to Madhva and is not found in any other school of Indian philosophy. Together with the allied doctrine of Jīva-traividyā or tripartite classification of Souls into (1) Muktiyogya (salvable) (2) Nitya-samsārīn (ever-transmigrating) and (3) Tamo-yogya (damnable), it has come in for a good deal of adverse criticism at the hands of modern scholars.

These criticisms suffer mostly from sentimental bias against Tāratamya and appear to confuse the Mādhva doctrine of Svarūpātraividyā, with the Calvinistic theory of Election, without examining the ethico-philosophical grounds on which the twin theories of Traividyā and Tāratamya are based by Madhva. The theory of Election rests upon a dogmatic exercise of Divine prerogative without reference to the worth or eligibility of the souls chosen for deliverance or damnation. In fact, there is no room for any question of fitness or eligibility of the souls, in the view of Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin, that "each soul is specially created and made to vitalize the embryo at the moment of conception". The Mādhva doctrine, on the other hand, is a philosophical theory intended to justify and reconcile the presence of evil with divine perfection, in the only rational way in which it could be done,—by fixing the responsibility for goodness or evil upon the moral freedom born of diversity of nature of the souls who are themselves eternal and uncreated in time.

This question has been discussed at length by Alexander Campbell Fraser, in his "Philosophy of Theism" (Gifford Lectures, 1894–6). His conclusion affords a striking parallel to the position of Madhva; and it is not unlikely that he would have expressed himself more decidedly in favor of the position taken up by Madhva, had it been known to him. Fraser's analysis of the problem is, therefore, of great interest to us in this connection. Says he:

1. James Ward, Pluralism and Theism, p. 453,
"The mixture of good and evil in the Universe is a sure enigma to Theism and a challenge to it. To believe in perfect goodness is to believe that all is as it ought to be and this is destroyed if anything is found existing that ought not to exist, however insignificant the place in which it is found or however rare the occurrence. Pain, error, sin and death are the chief evils in our world. Sin is absolutely evil. Pain is the correlative of pity and sympathy. It is natural and, therefore, a divine means of education of spiritual life. But the continued presence of what is unconditionally bad cannot be disposed of in this way. How to relieve the mystery of moral evil, including what seems an unfair distribution of pleasure and pain and an unequal adjustment of opportunities for moral growth, has been a human perplexity from the beginning. [Italics mine]. It finds expression in the Hebrew poets like Job and in the Greek dramatists like Aeschylus. How can it be reconciled with the goodness of God?"

Discussing the merits of three possible solutions of the problem in terms of (1) a Manichean Dualism or (2) an Imperfect Deity; or (3) an Indifferent Power of the Monist, he continues: "that this world of good and evil must be the issue of a constant struggle between two rival and eternal powers, the one benevolent and the other malevolent is an explanation of these strange appearances. This is symbolized in Zoroastrian anthropomorphism of Ormuzd and Ahriman. Its implied subversion of the primary ethical postulate must alone discredit this dualistic hypothesis. A similar difficulty attends Monism which concludes either that the Universal Power is itself a mixed good and evil¹ or that both are unreal. Manichean Dualism in the form of two eternal powers or Monism of a single eternal power partly good and partly evil or else indifferent to good and evil are both inconsistent with the indispensable moral hope and faith.

"Can moral evil be a necessity of finite personality or of the intractableness of matter or a mere negation? Several attempts have been made to explain the fact of evil in a morally governed Universe. Some are conjectures formed at the expense of moral perfection of the Universal Power. Others explain away moral evil as an unconditional necessity of finite existence or treat it as an unreal negation or hide the difficulty by referring to a Tempter."

---

¹. As it would be in the Pantheism of Bhāskara and others.
Then comes the Professor's own view:–

"The question why God admits into His Universe what is bad seems to involve an unproved assumption. What ought not to exist, it is assumed, cannot co-exist with God. But this dogma has never been proved. As moral agents, persons must be free to originate voluntary acts that are bad or undivine as well as those which are in harmony with the Divine order. To say that if God is perfect, free agents cannot produce volitions that they ought not to is not to vindicate divine perfection, but to destroy it! Omnipotence cannot be power to realize contradictions. God cannot make two and two five; cannot make a square circle. Inability in morally responsible persons to make themselves bad, is as much a contradiction, tho' less obvious. If free to act, one must be able to originate evil acts as well. Offences must needs be, if persons exist. It does not appear that even Omnipotence can exclude what ought not to exist, while there are beings whose essential character is that they are able to bring this into existence.

Is the existence of persons who can make and keep themselves bad, only a transitory episode in the history of the Universe; or must there be ever bad persons increasing in number and increasingly bad? The question is incapable of settlement. That the moral agency of persons, their personal power to depart from their moral ideal, deepened and confirmed by habit may become an absolute final "election" to evil by themselves, which even Omnipotent God cannot overcome, consistent with the free personality of those who persist in keeping themselves undivine, is one conjecture\(^1\). It involves the mystery of existence, in the Divine Universe, of innumerable persons increasing in number and becoming worse.\(^2\) Another possible view is that such persons and their acts are capable of extinction by God and only morality progresses so that only the good are allowed to survive; those who persist in ungodliness being reduced to unconsciousness\(^3\). Perhaps, man's present moral education requires that this mystery should remain unsolved as a teleologically needed mystery" (p. 320–21)

-- Italics mine.

---

1. This answers to Madhva's view.

2. Cf. वैणुभमें विविधविनिवियुक्तः।
   लेन्धोऽस्मः सरीराणि तस्म एव परायणम्। (Mbh. XII. q. by Madhva)

3. Tamoyogyas?
TRIPARTITE CLASSIFICATION OF SOULS

Judged in the light of these weighty remarks of the Professor, it will be seen that the doctrine of innate distinctions of nature among souls, propounded by Madhva, will have to be recognized as the most necessary presupposition of the Hindu law of Karma which would become a vagarious principle, in the absence of such a basis of distinction of the character and behavior of souls. Sir P.S. Sivaswami Aiyer, in his Kamala Lectures (1935, p. 143) comes to very near conceding as much when he admits frankly that "tho' the doctrine of Karma professes to explain the origin of evil and suffering, *it does not really do so*, inasmuch as it involves an infinite regression as expressed in the doctrine that Karma is anâdî". As for Traividyâ (threecold classification) of souls, it is only a comprehensive hypothesis based on the same premises. It may not be flattering to human complacency, as the doctrine of Sarvamukti may be; but no spurious or irrelevant considerations should be allowed to interfere with reasoned metaphysical investigations, which should be carried on in an atmosphere free from all passion and prejudice and from personal and sentimental predilections. "We want hard and straight thinking and not soft or emotional or sentimental thinking. Philosophy should say what is true. *It does not matter whether it pleasures or irritates.* It must prove logically derived conclusions and not defend at all costs, pious wishes and pleasing imaginings. It would be unphilosophical to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality". If there is a possibility of moral and social paragons, it is equally possible to hold that there may be persons who act on the motto 'Evil, be thou my good' and such Satanic conduct could only merit eternal misery.

The doctrine of intrinsic gradation among souls would follow as a matter of course, once the principle of their plurality is admitted, as in the system of Râmânuja. Much more so when the prerogatives of God are not claimed for the released souls and certain irrevocable limitations are set to their sovereignty in release and so long as God is put down as the inner guide (Antaryâmi and Šeṣī) of the souls, who are subject to His control (niyāmya). If the souls attain to a position of absolute equality with the Supreme, in release, it would be difficult to find a rational basis for the stupendous difference between them and God, when they, the souls, had still been in bondage, suffering the worst miseries, while the

Supreme remains untouched by evil and suffering. The Rāmānujiyas, who posit a reciprocal dependence between the souls and God and claim that the joy of Brahman is enhanced every time a new soul, attains release and comes to It, could hardly deny that the bliss of Brahman and of all the released souls, at any time, will be several times more than that of any of the souls still wartering in Samsāra. But what could be there to justify such a vast difference between them, if their original and basic nature are the same? Why should some souls alone get released ages before the others and enjoy communion with Brahman, for a considerably longer period than the rest? Why should the others lag behind or be denied the opportunities and advantages, so long? If the fault be that of the later arrivals in Mokṣa, why should they have been delayed so long? All explanations of such difficulties, based on Karma would be unavailing in the absence of an ultimate appeal to the diversity and gradation of essence. Why should God alone be Independent and the souls dependent for ever on Him? Why should the Brahman be for ever exempt from the ills of Samsāra and the Jīvas alone consigned to suffering, at least for the time being? What law of nature could this be, if it is not one of Svarūpa-tāratamyā between two sentient beings, God and the human soul? Why, again, should the Brahman alone be unlimited in space (aparicchinnā, vibhu) and the Jīvas put down (in Rāmānuja’s view) as essentially atomic in size (aṇu)? These and other essential distinctions between Jīva and Brahman, naturally, imply some kind of an intrinsic superiority of the One over the other, i.e. to say, Svarūpa-tāratamya. It would be preposterous to say that the Jīvas, who realize their essence by the grace of God, manage somehow to shoot up to a position of absolute equality with the Universal King, overnight. Such a position would be not only blasphemous but would offend all logic and common-sense. It will also be a betrayal of the spirit of religion inculcated by the Scriptures:

न ते विष्णो जायमानो न जातो देव महिमम्: परमन्तमाप।
(R. V. vii, 99, 2).

न तत्समोस्तत्तम्याधिक: कुतोस्यः (Gītā, xi 43).

न तत्समंश्राभ्याधिकः हृदयते (Śvet Up. vi, 8).

1. Vide the passage from Nītīmālā quoted on p. 17, fn.
TRIPARTITE CLASSIFICATION OF SOULS

The recognition of a special class of souls called "Nityasūris" who are ex hypothesi exempt from Samsāra, for ever, like God Himself, in the system of Rāmānuja, not to speak of the recognition of a class of "Nityasamsārins"1 also, by a section of the followers of Rāmānuja, will be similarly inexplicable without the acceptance of an intrinsic gradation of souls into ordinary and "elect" and so on. The higher position of Śeṣitva to Śrī vis a vis the Nityasūris, would also point to a natural gradation among souls.

The classification of souls into human and divine (deva) in Hindu religious literature is no passing show based on Karmic disparities only. The Brahmasūtras recognize the gods as a set of specialized beings and discuss the question of their privileges. One Śrutti text refers to the presence in the state of release of "earlier batches of Sādhyās (muktas ?) who are Devas". As already mentioned, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins recognize the existence of Nityamuktas like Viṣvaksena, Garuḍa, Ananta etc. who always remain free from Samsāra, that entangles other souls. The Vedic and Purānic literature assign to the four-faced Brahmā a very high place among the gods, not only as the Creator of all but as the first-born son of the Supreme Being and as the Saviour of mankind:

यो श्रद्धार्यं विद्वानति पूर्व यो वेदित्वं प्राहस्मणि तत्त्रेः (Śvet. Up. vi, 18).
स पुरातनमात्रविश्वभक्तवर्गपुरानमीमांकते (Praśna Up. v, 2).
स प्रतिनाथं भांर्यणमातिम (Chān. Up. iv, 15,6)
स वेद शरीरीहिम प्रथमं स वेद चतुर्व प्रचार्यः
आदिकार्थं स भूतानं ब्रह्मां गायत्रं समस्वर्तं II (q. by Śamkara).

In the Taïtt. Up. (ii, 1) the released souls are said to realize all their desires "in company with the wise Brahmā." This is supported by a Purānic text quoted by many commentators on B. S. iv, 3, 11:

1. Cf. इति तत्त्रेऽमुन्त्र: पवेश न केवल आदु: विषमिति पवेशान्विति न केवल नो० मोदस्ति ।
   सिपियान्वितिः (Tattvamāskāhāpā, Vidūnta Deśika, Medical Hall Press, Banaras, p. 138).

2. यव प्रेमं साध्य: सन्ति देखा:।

P. M. 14
In this and in another text: 'स पूणानं ब्रह्म गमवति' the four-faced Brahmā is given a premier position as the Great Usher of the released souls into the presence of the Supreme, as their Saviour and Guide. In fact, all other souls, who have attained enlightenment in the course of a particular Brahmakalpa, are believed to bide their time and wait for the four-faced Brahmā to be released and to conduct them to the Kingdom of God. This role of Brahmā is a striking proof of his spiritual excellence and superiority over all other souls. Such a distinction in rank must necessarily confer on him some kind of extraordinary merit, not found in or attainable by the others. This pre-eminent position of Brahmā as the presiding deity of Mahat-tattva or the first evolute of Matter, is indisputable. We are told that such special merit of his lies in his being "intrinsically" endowed with four great excellences:

शान्तप्रतिचं वस्त्र वैरायं च जगते: ।
एकर्ष्यं चैव धर्मचं सहस्तिं च लुधयमु ॥

Similar excellences possessed by other Devas of the Hindu pantheon and references to the marvels of spiritual discipline attained by them, oblige Madhva to formulate a comprehensive theory of intrinsic gradation in the entire Cosmos, upon which the whole of reality is grounded in a scheme of graded and graduated order. This cosmic scheme of gradation is omnipenetrative, says Madhva, running up and down the scale from the highest of gods to the vilest of fiends:

अनात्योप्यतं चैव कल्याणीप्र्रावाप्रयमु ।
को निवारनिंशं शकतो युक्तर्याममव्योदतामु ॥ (Av. p. 48 b.).

Gods and men are not equal in their basic nature and powers or in the innate tendencies for good or bad, which determine their future development. This doctrine of intrinsic gradation of souls is thus a reasonable hypothesis of human nature and destiny, suggested by the moral law and supported by reason, revelation and experience.

---

1. इत्यियोम्यं परा हार्थवम् अय्येम्यक परमेन: (Kaṭha Up.).
2. न हूँ वै देवान्प पापः सृष्टाति (Up.).
"Evolution is not only a movement forward. In many cases, we observe a marking of time and still more often, a deviation or turning back. It must be so." 1 Individual development, according to Madhva, is only an unfolding or an unwrapping. The progressive differentiation of selves into one or the other of the three classes is contained in the germ and embedded in the being of each. This reminds us of the Leibnizian theory of pre-established harmony. Taking a comprehensive view of human nature in all its aspects, we find that some men are intrinsically good and some are intrinsically bad and the rest,—perhaps the vast majority of us,—are midway between the two; tho’ it would be impossible to assign any individual to a particular class without superhuman insight into his fundamental nature. We could however draw a generalization of the basis of the consolidated experience of humanity that all men are not alike and there are many orders of goodness, intelligence and ability among them, as also of evil, ignorance and weakness. We can’t gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles. Even so, every good tree brings forth good fruit and every corrupt tree brings forth evil fruit. Adam and Eve succumbed to the temptation of Satan; but Christ thrice said “no” to his Tempter. History and the national Epics of every land are replete with the records of the highest acts of purity, benevolence and self-sacrifice, of ordinary kindness and diabolical cruelty and fiendishness. We must, therefore, take a full view of human nature at its best and at its worst and adjudge its nature and destiny, uninfluenced by sentimental considerations. Taking, then, the immense and irreducible diversities of life into consideration, Madhva holds that we could not satisfactorily account for the presence and continuation of evil in a world created and ruled by a most perfect Being unless it is taken to be natural to some as goodness is to others. Without such a fundamental division of human nature, the disparities of life reflected in the seemingly unfair distribution of pleasure and pain and opportunities for moral growth are not satisfactorily explained. X is a millionaire’s son who rides a Rolls Royce merrily, while Y the pauper scowls jealously at him as he flies past and grinds his teeth at the injustice of Fate. The light of law and religion

1, Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 100,
have not yet penetrated many dark corners of the world, inhabited by barbarous tribes, while they shine brightly on more fortunate beings elsewhere. Why? The law of Karma could not carry us very far, in the quest for an ultimate explanation of such bewildering inexplicabilities. It cannot explain why, given two alternatives of good or evil, certain persons show a marked tendency towards the one and others to its opposite. Moral worth, knowledge, works, experience, heredity, opportunities, culture,—none of these explanations of diversity solves the riddle pushed to its starting point. The final solution could only be found in the inherent nature of beings. It is the magnetic needle which attracts and deflects the Karma of souls according to its own currents and gives the first move to their career:

न कर्मकोश न कन्माणिण लोकस्य स्थानतिः प्रसुः
न कर्माफलसंयोग स्वभावस्तु प्रवत्तिः || (Gitā)

It would, therefore, be illogical to dismiss the theories of Svarūpa-bheda, Tāratamya and Traividhya of Jivas, on extra-philosophical and emotional grounds. Criticisms such as that "on this view of Predestination, the moral character of God is much compromised and the quality of divine love emptied of all meaning" and that "unless we believe in the spiritual possibility of everyone that bears the human form divine, we cannot have a really useful ethics" (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil. ii, p. 751.) not only betray the very weakness to indulge in "soft and emotional thinking" and to attempt to refute a hypothesis "by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality"1; but also an incorrect understanding of the true nature and bearing of the doctrine of Traividhya of Jivas taught by Madhva and the premises on which it rests. After all, philosophy has to say what is true. It does not matter whether it pleases or irritates. The doctrine of Traividhya is no doubt an unpleasant truth, uncomfortable to some. That cannot be helped. As Prof. Thilly says: "The mere fact that a theory

---

1. Against which the Professor himself has spoken in his Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, quoted ante.
leaves no room for freewill, immortality or God, does not make it false, even tho' belief in such ideas should happen to help us over the dismal places in life¹. A gloomy truth is a better companion thro' life than a cheerful falsehood" (such as Sarvamukti ?). It would be irrational to discredit the intellect because its conclusions are not flattering to the future of homo sapiens, in all cases or because it does "not give us the world we want, or the heaven we want or the God we want". "The diremest need", as Prof. Thilly has shown, "cannot make black white, tho' it may persuade us to paint it white"!

---

¹. Quoted in the above-mentioned work, p. 14.
CHAPTER XXXV

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE OF INTRINSIC GRADATION AMONG SOULS

Madhva and his commentators have cited many texts from the Vedic and post-Vedic literature, in support of the acceptance of the Traividydhyam among Jīvas. It will be enough to indicate only the most obvious and prominent of these, in which the doctrine is clearly discernible or has been expressly taught. The passages point clearly to the prevalence of a religious tradition in which the doctrine was accepted and handed down and which other currents of thoughts were unable to expurgate altogether.

Texts from Vedic Literature

1. खले न पर्ष्यािं प्रतिद्विमि भूरि
कि मा निन्दनि दश्यो उनिन्द्रा। (R. V. X, 48,7)

2. शूण्ये वीर उत्पम्म्य दमायन।
अन्यमन्यमति ननीयमानः।
एक्मानब्धुभयस्य राजा
चोष्ठस्ते विशा इत्यदेन सदुप्यानम॥ (R. V. vi, 47, 16)

3. परा शूण्या सध्या शृणवित
बिततैरापो अपरिमिति।
अनातुचूतीवधुव्यानः:
पूव्विरिः शरस्ततैरीति॥ (R. V. vi, 47, 17)

4. दिवे दिवे सब्जीरूपमपेशु॥ (RV. vi, 47, 21)

5. अनारम्म्यमेन तमलिन प्रविष्णयमू॥ (R. V. i, 182, 6)

6. इन्द्रासोमा तपतं रक्ष हुम्यतं
न्यपैवेत ध्वर्या तमोवधः।
पराध्याणीतमच्छते न्योषथः
TEXTUAL EVIDENCE OF GRADATION OF SOULS

7. इन्द्रासोमा वर्तेयत विवर्त्यारि अभिलोक्यत्ववसमसम्हामि

* * * *

8. अंशुया नाम ते लोक अन्धे तमसा बुद्धता (इशा. उप. )

9. सैया आन्दत्य सामारसा मवति ** ** ते ये सत्म मात्राय आनंदा:

स एको भवत्वमधवर्याणामानन्दः। श्रीनियत्या
चाकामहत्यः। ** ** श्रीनियत्या चाकामहत्यः * *(Taittal Up. ii 8).

10. एक्क पादं नोदरति।

Post-Vedic Literature

11. दैवी संपत्तमाग्य साः भवन्धासुरी मतता (Gītā. xvi, 5)

12. दौ हृदबंग्सं होनेकादिन सैव आहुर एवं च (xvi. 6)

13. मामापन्दवेच ब्राह्मण्य ततो याय्यसा गतिम (xvi, 20)

14. अव्य गच्छति सत्वस्या अथो गच्छति तामसा (xiv, 18)

15. निधिष्ठा मवति भवि देहि नां सा स्वभाववा।

सारस्की राजसी सैव तामसी च || (xvii, 2)

16. * * * ये गच्छ्यः सं एव सः (xvi, 3)

17. सुक्तनामोपय बदेदनामा सारायणपरायणः।

सुदुभः प्रशान्ताल्प कोषिष्ठपि महामुने || (Bhāg.)

18. हुज्जळं तीर्थस्य जैलोक्यवर्षसिं: प्रमोः।

देहैश्चुतिमि: सिद्धि: * * * ||
19. एकाल्म्यं नाम यद्विन्दे केनिचदृश्यंगुरंपुर्णः।
शास्त्रतच्चाविज्ञाय शास्त्राणां शास्त्रदस्येऽऽ
तेऽथं तमो शालो रागं तम एव परायण्यऽऽ (Mbh. xii)

20. निष्ठुंशः मुस्यस्वर निरस्ततानस्दम्यमः।
तमो यात्मा यथाजातात् क्षयाद्ब्रह्मसंस्थानं तत् (Paramasamhitā q. BT. x, p. 73 b)

21. नारायणस्वादेऽन सभिद्वान च नुवा।
अयन्तुः क्षस्तिनानं निःशोपसुखविजितानं।।
निष्ठ्मेव तथासुतानं विमिशरोऽणां बहुतं।।
निरस्ततादेशहुः सऺ्रोः नित्यानन्देऽक्षमैगिनः।।
अपश्यत्तितिवियत् वधि साशादेव च जुमुखः।।
(Pādma, q. Madhva, B. S. B. iii, 1, 21)

22. जीवास्तु विविधा राजन नानाकाः। सङ्भावतः।।
सारिकक मुक्तिमाजः स्वस्तास्थानां तमोऽस्तुः।।
मधुमा: सऺुतै नित्यं छाविध्योऽपितंतिनुः।।
(Viṣṇu-Rahasya, xxxiii)

23. एवं सारिकधामस्थानसात्साहित्यानां।
संज्ञयावत हन्तशो वीत्या भक्तत्वानः।।
(Viṣṇu-Rahasya, Ch. V)

The existence of a class of "Nityasamsārins", as already mentioned, has been accepted in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition\(^1\) also and

---

\(^1\) See P. 208. f. n. The "Sayutiyas" are most probably the Tengalai-Vaiśṇavas. There is no reference in the writings of modern scholars on Indian Philosophy, to the acceptance of this peculiar position re. the classification of Souls, in the ancient tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school itself. Dr. Chandrachur Sharma's *A Critical Survey of J. Phil.* (London, 1960) is no exception to this.
by some early Naiyāyikas too, as indicated by Jayatīrtha in his NS: नित्यसंसारिणां केशाचित्तालस्य तैरपंपीछःत्रस्तान, समर्थविव्वभागल्लाच (NS. iii, 3, p. 547). जीवालयष्ठीकारे संसारकथलमानां जीवानां स्वामेवसूरीरत्तनतेिन, तत् वाचात् (NS. p. 548 b). The references, according to the commentators, are to the view of Udayanācārya: संसारकथलमाना: केशमिदासान:। We also have it on the authority of Citsukha that certain Vaiṣeṣika thinkers like Kandaliṅkara (i.e. Śridhara) and Līlavatīkārā held the view of nityasamsāra for some souls: कंट्रीकारप्रभुतिमि: कैशिद्रैशिषिकिविशेषेि: सर्वस्मुक्तिरनगीकारान्॥ (Citsukhī, p. 357).

The doctrine of Traividhyā is not thus an invention of Madhva. It has the support of Vedic and post-Vedic tradition and is the natural corollary of the doctrine of Svarūpabheda of souls without which the Hindu doctrine of Karma would have no force or meaning. It is not simply an extension of the Sāṁkhya theory of Traigunya or based upon it, as is sometimes superficially assumed 1. The three guṇas of Sāṁkhya metaphysics are but the modes of Prakṛti; whereas the terms Sāttvika, Rājasa and Tāmasa applied to the Jivas in their tripartite classification, according to Madhva, have reference to their basic nature of Caitanya going beyond the play of Prakṛti and its guṇas: ब्रह्मचर्यः स एव सः (Gītā, xvi, 3). This is clear from Madhva’s comment on the above verse, where he interprets the term सत्वातुर्ज्मा (सर्वस्य अद्वया) as चित्तातुर्ज्मा which is further and more explicitly rendered by Jayatīrtha as चिन्तन वैतमेि, जीव इति यावत्॥ (G. B. Prameyadipikā, Xvii, 3).

---

1. See R. Nagaraja Sarma, Reign of Realism in l. Phil., pp. 174, 653 and 664. Cf. “पुरुषबहुतं सिद्धं नैपुष्पित्विपरण्याचर्य च” (Sāṁkhya Kārikā)
CHAPTER XXXVI

THE SOULS’ RELATION TO BRAHMAN

Several figures of speech and symbolic expressions have been used in the Śastraś to make clear the relation of metaphysical dependence between the Jīvas and Brahman. Commentators have also added some more of their own choice, in interpreting these ideas. Terms like “Rupa-Pratirūpa”, “Aṃśaṃśī”, “Chāyāpuruṣa”, “Śarīrasarīri”, “Abhāsa”, “Agnivispultiṅga” occur in the original texts. The Advaita philosophy looks upon this relation as one of Adhiśṭhānāropya-bhāva (the substratum and the superimposed appearance) or (Bimba)-Pratibimbabhāva. Rāmānuja prefers to call it as Śarīra-śarīrśibhāva, or Śeṣaśeṣājibhāva. For reasons already set forth, Madhva does not subscribe to any of the ideas underlying these terms as understood by Adwaitins, Bhedabhedavādins and Viśistadvaitins. He has therefore thought it fit to give a new and a deeper significance to the term Bimba-Pratibimbabhāva, met with in the texts and use it in a symbolic sense of metaphysical dependence of the Jīva on Brahman. Along with it, he has also used the other terms used by the Sūtrakāra viz., Aṃśa-Aṃśī, Abhāsa-Abhāsaka, which he interprets in the same sense. We may now discuss the question fully.

The term “Bimba-Pratibimbabhāva” is derived by Madhva from the significant passage in the Rg Veda:

हूँहूँ प्रतिहृद्यो बमूळ।

तद्भस्म हूँ प्रतिचक्रणय। (vi. 47, 18).

The underlying idea in all these expressions is the same, viz., that Brahman is the One independent Source of all reality, consciousness and activity found in the individual selves and which cannot therefore be explained without reference to their dependence on Brahman for their being. As no creation of Jīvas is admitted, the figure of Pratibimba should not be literally construed in the sense of the Jīvas, being the actual reflections projected by Brahman like that of a concrete substance on a mirror. Madhva warns his readers against taking the Scriptural descriptions of the Jīva as a Pratibimba of the Brahman, in its gross physical sense of an actual reflection. That is why he is so careful and particular to insist that there is no medium of reflection (upādhi) in this case. This woul
at once bring out the difference between Madhva’s and Śaṅkara’s conception of the Jīva as a Pratibimba of Brahman. According to the latter, the Jīva is false appearance or projection of the Brahman on the screen of Avidyā. This relation therefore can be transcended: जीवन्तः च मृता जैते रज्ञो सपेन्द्रो यथा।

(Aparokṣānubhuti, 43).

But, to Madhva, the relation of Bimba-Pratibimbabhāva between God and the souls is a sacred and inviolable relation, which is true for all time and goes to the very core of the Jīva and constitutes his very essence and could never be annulled. Its full significance, missed in Samsāra, is realized in Mokṣa. Mokṣa, in fact, is the complete realization of this intrinsic relation of metaphysical dependence and similarity (in some respects) with the Supreme. Pratibimbatva, according to Madhva, is not a false relation, of which the Jīvas are to be ashamed and should try to shake off, as in Advaita. It is the truest and most beautiful permanent bond with the Supreme Being and the purpose of philosophy is its progressive realization, by the Jīva. The two doctrines are thus diametrically opposed!

Madhva brings out the idea of metaphysical dependence, contained in the various expressions, by a proper interpretation of them. There is first of all the idea of a man and his shadow, in one of the Upaniṣads: चषैषा पुरस्ते छाया एतस्मिनेतदत्तमुं। (Praśna Up. iii, 3.) The point of this analogy is dependence and similarity: छाया यथा पुरस्ती पुमधीना च दृश्यते।

The two outstanding features of a shadow are its resemblance to the original object and its dependence upon it for its existence. The Jīvas, also to some extent, resemble Brahman (B.S. ii, 3, 29.) and are metaphysically dependent on It. Hence the figure. The terms “Amsa-Amsi” also, convey the same truth: जीवन्तः परस्मिनेत्रावलं तु, तत्तत्त्वते तद्धीनस्तत्तदिलेकं च चेत्तथे। (NS. ii. p. 453 b). The analogy of छाया पुरस्ति also conveys the idea that God is immeasurably more than and superior to the souls, as the substance is greater than its shadow. The shadow is there because of the Substance. It is bound to the substance; but not vice versa. The dependence is thus unilateral and not reciprocal. The shadow is outwardly similar to the substance, in form. The souls have the same form of reality. consciousness and bliss, resembling Brahman's
It should always be remembered that analogies should not be stretched indefinitely. The point of the analogy is strictly confined to the ideas of dependence and similarity and nothing more. Satyanātha Tīrtha, in his Abhinavaçandrīkā, therefore rightly reminds us that the figure of Pratibimbatvā of the Jīva is merely a technical figure (Pāribhāṣīka) and has nothing to do with the conventional sense of the term. Madhva also gives a similar warning: नातिसाम्यं निद्धिन्ति (AV), that we should not stretch the analogy to the point of the lifelessness of the Pratibimba: जट्टाबिद्विनिवधि नेवयित्वः (NS. p. 505). It is the association of the ideas of physical reflection and the presence of an Upādhi, in the conventional usage of the term (as current in the Advaita) that cause an initial confusion in understanding clearly the nature and implications of the doctrine of Bimbapratibimbabha, according to Madhva. This should therefore be strictly guarded against. That is why Madhva draws special attention to the fact that the analogy of reflection (pratibimba) should not be taken to presuppose the existence of any reflecting medium between Jīva and Brahman. The reason is that such a medium would immediately render the reflection transient (anitya), impermanent and non-eternal. That would snap the relation of co-eternity between the two (वा उपणां सयुज्य सख्ययां), Commenting on B.S. iii, 2, 18, Madhva shows the significance of the emphatic particles ‘अत एव च’ in drawing equal attention to the points of comparison and contrast in the employment of the simile: सूर्याकामितात. The points of contact are the possession, by the Jīva, of certain characteristics of reality, consciousness and bliss similar to those of Brahman and depending upon It for them. The points of contrast from an ordinary reflection are (1) not being conditioned by a medium (Upādhi)(2) not being liable to destruction by virtue of the destruction of Upādhi and (3) not being an insentient (lifeless) effect. The full significance of the Sūtra, according to Madhva, lies in pointing out in what sense the Jīva is to be understood as a reflection of Brahman and in what sense he is not to be understood as a reflection. The emphasis laid by the Sūtrakāra on the two expressions ‘अत पव’ point unmistakably to the
reasons already stated by him, on which the Pratibimbatva of the Jīvas rests. These have been rightly identified by Madhva as भिन्न, तद्धीनम् and तत्स्वरूप्याद् taught in the preceding Sūtras ii, 3, 28; iii, 1, 1; ii, 3, 29. It also implies a point of contrast which is again well brought out by Madhva by adding a rider: न वृद्धिचीन्तलिना. If no point of contrast is intended by the Sūtrakāra, the suffix “कः” in “अत एव चोपमा सूर्याकारिकत. ” would be pointless and redundant as pointed out by Jayatīrtha and the Sūtra could as well have been worded अत एव सूर्याकारिक: उपमम्।

What is, therefore, sought to be emphasized by the figure of Bimbapratibimbabhāva is nothing more than an essential eternal metaphysical-dependence of the Jīvas on Brahman. This relation is natural and intrinsic to them and is not conditioned by anything other than the nature of the Pratibimbas, such as Avidyā. This is achieved by making such Pratibimbatva an essential characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of the Jīvas, resting on an intrinsic relation (nirupādhikasambandha). Were it not so, the relation itself would be snapped, the moment the Upādhis or conditioning factors that have caused and sustained the relation cease to exist. The Jīva would then be no more! But since the Jīvas and Brahman are both ex hypothesi eternal in the Vedānta, their mutual relation, too, must be equally so. So, Bimbapratibimbabhāva must be eternal: (यावददत्तमल्लि।)

It is easy to see that any relation that is not grounded in the nature of Brahman and the Jīvas themselves could not be eternal. Obviously, Avidyā is not, and cannot be, such a relation! Hence, Madhva is justified in thinking of a fresh and more lasting relationship between the Jīvas and Brahman, which would be true of them in bondage and in release. He finds such a relation in the symbolism of “Bimbapratibimbabhāva” which is actually foreshadowed in the Ṛg Vedic passage एवं एवं प्रतिविप्रति ब्रह्मवः; which he quotes in his Bhāṣya. There is evidently a deep scientific idea behind this symbolism. The objection that all ordinary reflections are brought about by conditioning factors is met by pointing out that here we have a symbolism and not a prosaic analogy. Even otherwise, the point of the illustration could be understood in a deeper metaphysical sense (alaukika) than in a conventional sense (laukika).

1. Cf. नित्यो नित्यानामः | नित्यस्वेतस्त्वायः।
If, however, in deference to the letter of the Śūtra, and the technical requirements of प्रतिविधव, one must insist upon having some sort of a medium in the case of the Bimbapratibimba relation between Jīva and Brahman, also, Madhva has suggested that the Jīvasvarūpa itself could be treated as the Upādhi. This is called “Svarūpopādhi”. This is a complicated idea. On this view, the Jīva would constitute both the medium and the reflection, by the force of his own internal Viśeṣas. This point will be explained later. The introduction of the idea of Svarūpopādhi is for the purpose of denying the presence of any external Upādhis in the relation of the Jīva to Brahman (as there is in Advaita: ब्रह्मवाच्याप्रतिविधिविद्वारे जीव;).

The same is the case with the other expression “अभासा” used by the Śūtrakāra (B. S. ii, 3, 50). This term also signifies according to Madhva the ideas of dependence and similarity: ब्रह्मान्यालवदित्वे छैतन्यालवान, तस्तद् ज्ञाते त्यथः । न तू सूर्यकारिक । प्रतिविधवादित्व । (NS. p. 505).

It is needless to say that in dealing with such intricate problems, we should not vulgarise thought by the admixture of popular fancies and superficial associations of ideas. Madhva goes into the etymology of the term अभासा to bring out the hidden sense of the term in which the Jīva is referred to as an अभासा of the Brahman. Jayatirtha, explaining the point, writes that the Jīva is termed an अभासा for two reasons (1) that his consciousness of himself and of others is entirely dependent on Brahman and (2) that he exists, like the Brahman.1 The etymological basis of this explanation is thus set forth by him: भान्ति ज्ञानेन अतिलं सत्त्वम्। भावा भावाः आ सर्वकालवालिनः भावस। आभासे परमात्माभीने आभासे सत्यां जीव: परमात्माभास।। (NS. p. 505) Consistent with this interpretation of अभासा, Jayatirtha has also given us a new interpretation of “Tattvam asi” in terms of the Bimba-pratibimbabhāva relation between Jīva and Brahman, in his commentary on Madhva’s Tdy.

Elsewhere, in his Bhāṣya on the B. S. Madhva has given us another illustration of a puppet in emphasizing the conative dependence on God:

1. तेन परमात्मना निमित्तेन आभासे, प्रतीती भवति इति प्रतीती तद्धीनवाच्ये। तद्वल ब्रह्मस्वरूपान्न इत्यवेत्ते तस्तद्वेषस्वम्। (NS. p. 505)
It may be noted in this connection that the Sūtrakāra also ascribes the creative activity of Jīvas to the Supreme (ii, 3, 41 ). This is merely to emphasize their dependence. It is not as if, human beings are like puppets without life or initiative. The Pratibimba has no independent activity: न हि प्रतिविषयः किया। स हि विवक्तियत्र विख्यात (Madhva, G. B.) which should be carefully interpreted to signify विवक्तियत्र विख्यात as pointed out by Jayatirtha (G. B. ॥, p. 83).

In his Bhāṣya on B. S. ii, 3, 50, Madhva brings out the implication of the figure of ‘‘Bimbapratibimbabhāva’’ between Jīva and Brahman by drawing a clear distinction between ordinary reflections which are dependent on external media (sopādhipratibimba) and those which are not so dependent (nirupādhipratibimba):

सोपाधिप्रतिबिम्बः प्रतिविषयः हिस्यते।
जीव इत्यतः इत्यतः इत्यताम् यथा रेवः॥

The image of the face reflected in the mirror is entirely dependent on the external medium of mirror and it is liable to disappear as soon as the mirror is removed from the range of the bimba or is destroyed. But as there is no destruction of the Jīva at any time\(^1\) the mutual relation between the Brahman and the Jīvas cannot be attributed to the action of any Upādhis. Madhva cites a beautiful illustration of the rainbow as an instance of a Nirupādhi-pratibimba of the Sun’s rays, to elucidate his conception of the Jīva as a Nirupādhipratibimba of Paramātman. As this is an unusual illustration, with a deep philosophical significance, which is not obvious on the surface of it, it requires further clarification to show in what sense the phenomenon of rainbow is to be understood as

---

\(^1\) Cf. अविनाशी वा अरेरृयमात्मा अव्यक्तितिधितम (Bṛh. Up.)
सेवसपि नोपज्जवली न प्रलये न व्यवस्थि च (Gītā)
जीवो नित्यो पंडुरंश्य त्वनित्यः (Sanatsujātiya)
a Pratibimba without an external medium. As everyone knows, the rainbow is caused by the Sun's rays falling on drops of rain water. The rays enter the drops and are refracted and again reflected and then broken into the components of "vibgyor" as they emerge out of the raindrops. The raindrops act exactly as the prism in the physical laboratory. We have to conceive the Jīva as the image and the medium at the same time. The mirror merely throws back the light falling upon it. The raindrops, however, receive the light and they let it traverse through them and let it emerge out of them again and in this process exhibit the glory of sunlight. The raindrops must be deemed to be active, unlike the mirror which is merely passive.

This beautiful simile of the Sun and the rainbow given by Madhva brings out the significance of the relationship between the Jīva and Brahman in a very impressive manner. The Jīva is the agent, the vehicle for the manifestation of the Divine. His Svarūpa has the potency which is activated and energized by the Divine light falling upon it. What we know now of God, of His love and goodness, His compassion and other auspicious attributes is from our association with godly men, His devotees, who, in their lives, manifest these virtues. They are the raindrops that reveal the majesty and the glory that lie concealed in the white rays of the Sun. By this analogy, Madhva wants to convey that every one of us is a tiny raindrop which still has the potency, the capacity to receive and manifest the divine light. The figure of Bimbapratibimba-bhāva thus gives meaning, expresses a great philosophical truth and value and establishes an intimacy of relationship between Man and God, which is the noblest truth of philosophy and religion, to be attained by us. The reader can see in this and in Madhva's equally beautiful interpretation

---

1. That the rainbow is also popularly regarded as a Sopādhipratibimba will be clear from the Bhāṣyadīpikā (p. 634) which dismisses such an interpretation of the above passage from the Madhva-Bhāṣya as untenable:

अन् द्वान्ते वित्तितिरक्तोपाध्यायभाट�ो दायतिनिः तु प्रतिविक्षित्रक्तोपाध्यायभाष्: ।

अतिरिक्तोपाध्यायभाष्: उभयन सम नि:ति द्वान्त: ॥

केठिनु, सोपाधिप्रतिविक्ष्य इत्य- न्यायः उदाहरणम् ॥

तय: महयमद्वै बृहत्तेजो वेदवृद्धिः ।

उर्भदानं च तदेव निष्ट्रिक्ष- प्रतिविक्ष्य तु जीवं उदाहरणम् ॥

इति सत्यावलाब्द्रस्य वाक्यद्वैयमपि द्वान्तदर्पणः

योजयति तेऽव चन्द्राकान्तुगुण्यपाल्मालाभायोपनयः ॥
of the Sūtra *Ambuvaś-agrahaṇāt* the poetic quality and mystic inwardness of his conception of the eternal and intimate relation that binds the Jīva to Brahman.

The conception of "Svarūpopādhi" may now be examined. Madhva clarifies the whole position in his *B. T.* iv, p. 42:

இவோபாதித்திய பித்த: மகர்ய வாதமே வ 

 வாதோபாதித்திய மாதிரி முத்தவிய_nth 

கோராய்ச்சியபியோ இரி பிரதிவிவ்வல்:கடர் மேற்கு ே

கோர் சாமாவியாய மறந்த: மோசாய் கொச்சிட்டே?

அருமர்த்த ந முக்து: சுஷ்ட்வாய்ச்சுத்து ஏற்பது 

This "internal medium" is nothing more than the constituent elements of selfhood operating as "Upādhis" as it were, by the power of Viśeṣas, which are self-linking:

उपाध्यायर्थमद्वाच विशेषब्दनेत्तथः: (G. B. Ṭ, p. 79)

There is no difficulty, says Madhva, in the Jīvasvarūpa operating as a medium, since it is essentially luminous: स्वाध्यायात्र प्रदानः: चित्तात् (G.B.)

It may be objected that all this is highly confusing. Would not the idea of Jīvasvarūpa itself operating as its own medium of reflection be premature, in so far as the Jīvasvarūpa itself would be inconceivable without a Jīva already being there.1 And if he should already be there, where is the need to reflect? Again, whom is he to reflect? Or whose reflection is he? Not God or God’s. Nor even of himself, as there is no point in it.

The correct answer to these and such other difficulties will be on the following lines. We must first of all try to understand the expression "Svarūpopādhi" clearly. That will give the right clue to the understanding of the matter without any confusion whatever. "Svarūpopādhi" then, means nothing more than the constituents of the Jīvasvarūpa viz. his

---

1. குறிச்செய்தலைப் ப்பாயாக்கம்சத்தியந: பிரதிவிவ்வாத்யாய மறந்த (M. S. p. 68 )  

P. M. 15
difference from, dependence on and similarity with Brahman. These are his "Upādhis"—i.e. the factors by which he is "conditioned" (for ever) or constituted and without whose aid we cannot have any clear idea of what a Jīva is. It would not give us any definite idea of the Jīva, to be told that he is simply as a being endowed with sentiency, bliss and reality.¹ How are we to distinguish him from Brahman which is also of like nature? But with the help of attributes like difference, likeness and dependence, we could get a clearer and more definite idea of the Jīva vis a vis Brahman. Since these ideas of difference, dependence and similarity help us to have a specific idea of the nature of the individual as a finite being, these may be regarded as the "Upādhis" whereby we come to have a correct idea of a "Jīva". They thus help to throw light on the nature of the Jīva, to "reveal" him so to say. It is in this sense that these attributes are treated as the Svarūpopādhis, i.e. as conditions that go to define his nature. As it is in virtue of these very attributes that the Jīva is regarded as a Pratibimba of Brahman and of no other, these are termed the "Upādhis" by which his Pratibimbatva is determined. As these Upādhis are not, however, external or extrinsic to the Jīva, they are called "Svarūpopādhis". True to their nature, they manifest the nature of the Jīva (and the extent, intensity, luminosity etc. of his consciousness, bliss and so on) to the full, in release.² As Bhakti grows in depth, intensity and maturity, the Jīva realizes more and more his metaphysical dependence, difference and similarity to the Supreme. And in Mokṣa also, where these conditions of dependence, difference and likeness to Brahman, which constitute the essence of Jīvas, persist, they continue to be the Pratibimbas of Brahman, with the fullest realization of that fact, unlike in Samsāra, where this truth of their real nature and relationship to Brahman is hidden by Ajñāna and other factors, by the will of God. True devotion and loving attachment to God are however capable of moving the Supreme to grace and realization of the true nature of one's own svarūpa by the Jīva (and of the nature of God) then becomes easy and possible. Such in fact is the place, function and role of Svarūpopādhis, in the system of Madhva.

¹. Cf. तत्र यदि विज्ञानानन्दन: त्वानिति दृष्यावायतिकाक्षावति: स्वात: (Tdyt)
². तत्र स्वसद्यातिमात्रहेतुराभ्यन्तर: (उपाधि:) (NS. p. 506)
The relation of part and whole (Amśāmśābhāva) also stands for the same idea of dependence and similarity. The Jīva is an amśa (fraction) of Brahman. This is a purely symbolic idea. He is the ectype of God, endowed with a smaller measure of resembling attributes of reality, consciousness and bliss. The figure has, no doubt, some association of part and whole and may imply some kind of identity-cum-difference as understood by Bhāskara and others. But Madhva rejects the relation of bhedābheda between Jīva and Brahman, accepts fundamental difference and substitutes amśatva for “identity”: अत्यावलम्ब्यती  भेदमेत्यावलम्ब्यत | अम्शात्मकः स्वारुपाम्भ्यं भीनाम्भ्यं | (M.B.S.B. ii, 3, 43). He distinguishes two kinds of Amśās viz., Svarūpāmśā and bhīnāmśā. The manifestations of God like Matsya and Kurma (Avatārs) are His Svarūpāmśas, identical with Him and possessing the same degree and extent of all powers. The Jīvas are Bhīnāmśas (ectypes) with relatively lesser order of powers. The difference is one of both degree and order. It is innate and could not be transcended:

विभिन्दासीत्यत्वभक्तिः स्वारुपिकोलिधात्स्यमान्यकुः।

This relation of Amśa is also used by Madhva to reconcile the conflict of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis. He accepts difference as real and true and uses amśatva to convey the sense of identity: तत्सत्यन्त्रत्वमेव तद्यद्यत्-भिभति विश्रयम्। न्यायिकान्त्रेण भेदजन्त्यं अन्त्येदस्यान् अंत्यत्वं वक्तव्यमितः माहः। (TP. ii, 3, 43). Amśa stands for likeness and dependence of being. It does not denote any physical identity of part and whole. Its use in regard to the Jīva is purely symbolic, just to aid the understanding:

1. This passage does not mean “separateness and non-separateness ought not to be understood literally”, as misconstrued by J. E. Carpenter (Theism in Mediaeval India, 1921. p. 411). We need not, therefore, deplore with him that “unhappily, Madhva did not adhere to this suggestion”. See my His, of Deiva School of Vedānta and Its Lit., i, p. 157. Unfortunately, H. N. Raghavendrachar, too, has similarly misunderstood and misrepresented the text, in his Kannada work: Deiva Vedānta.

2. संज्ञाभाव विभिन्दासीति इति द्रेष्यं इत्यते (B.S.B. ii, 3, 47).

3. तत्सत्यन्त्र तद्यद्यत्वं वक्तव्यमित (NS. p. 453)

4. मूल्यांत्यन्त्रत्वं तत्सत्यन्त्रत्वमेव साक्षात्कार-भेदमेत्यावलम्ब्यं गौणांश्च अन्त्यान्त्र इति यावत्।
Madhva concedes freely that there are points of contact between the Jīva and Brahman. Their distinction, however great and ineradicable, is yet one of order and degree and not of kind. The soul of man at its best possesses the characteristics of reality, consciousness and bliss similar to the Brahman. It is in virtue of this that any relation with the Brahman is possible, and the Jīva is sometimes identified with the Brahman—

\[( \text{ii, 3, 29). The freed soul has a nature akin to God which enables it to be in harmony with the divine in Mokṣa:} \]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{युक्तानां सत्यकामलं सामर्थ्यं च परस्य तु} & \\
\text{कामातुकुलकामलं नान्येषां बिधीयते (B. S. iv, 2, 16)} & 
\end{align*}
\]

It should be obvious then that Madhva is not for any irreconcilable opposition between the two. He allows even the most exaggerated and high-flown description of the affinity between the two in mystic or philosophical parlance, provided the modicum of difference between them, borne out by the authorities, is not tampered with. Absolute exclusiveness of the Jīva and Brahman is not thus a characteristic of Madhva’s position. The Brahman is the Antaryāmī of the Ātman and as such could never be excluded from him. Some community of nature is certainly there and even with that it is possible to keep the position distinct from the complete merger of the Advaita. The intrinsic natures of the two are such that no merger is possible:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{अल्पकरित्सारवे पारसत्यमपरस्यता} & \\
\text{उपजीवकले जीवलम्बीश्च तद्विषयः II} & 
\end{align*}
\]

(Mahāviṣṇupurāṇa q. by Vādaratnāvali)

The Mukta, too, does not bloom into a sovereign lord, overnight. The released are under an irrevocable limitation with regard to the exercise of cosmic functions of the Supreme, according to B. S. iv, 4, 17. These differences which persist in Mokṣa too, should thus be intrinsic (svabhā-
vika) and not brought about by Avidyā or association with the bodies. It is on these grounds that Madhva refuses to merge and absorb the soul in God.

At the same time, God and soul are not so utterly and irreconcilably opposed to each other as light and darkness. In the words of Jayatīrtha the difference is eternal but not absolute:

जीवात्मा: परमात्मा आत्मतिरिक्तः समस्थते (NS. p. 435) परंतु, न जीवो ब्रजाणो घट-इव पटाद्वस्तत्विनः । तथालेक्षेत्र्युत्तम उपरुषेऽर्तर् (NS. p. 453b) The identity-texts are not flouted. They are explained in deeper and richer senses referring to the transcendental oneness of Brahman:

सार्वस्याच्च प्रधानत्वादि स्वातंत्र्यादिपि वाभिदामु।
आहुरीशं जीवस्य न स्थायाभिदाँ क्रियित(AV),
VI. DOCTRINE OF BRAHMAN

CHAPTER XXXVII

INDEPENDENCE OF BRAHMAN

The independence of Brahman is the most vital point in Madhva's conception of God. The twin principles of "Svatantra" and "Paratantra" constitute the pith of his philosophy. It is to this central ontological concept of his philosophy that the traditional name "Dvaita" given to his system has reference. It has been shown that Madhva has gone beyond all other Indian thinkers in emphasizing the absolute independence and unutterable majesty of Brahman. His conception of Svatatntra rises above the dualism of Prakṛti and Puruṣas by denying them any kind of metaphysical independence or independent existence, (consciousness) or activity. We have seen how even the eternal entities have been brought by Madhva under the sway of Brahman by means of the doctrine of creation in terms of "Parādhinaviśeṣāpti". How keen and lively was Madhva’s penetrative insight into the importance of this concept of the metaphysical independence of Brahman is shown by his unerring reference to the famous text of the Ṛg Veda x, 81, 2, in interpreting the term "ārambhana" embodied in the crucial Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa ii, 1, 14 which has become 'the bone of contention' of commentators on the Sūtra, ancient and modern.¹

¹ Most of our modern writers on the R.S. have been content with accepting Śaṅkara’s view that the keyword "ārambhana" in this Sūtra refers to Ukhān. Up. and interpreting the Sūtra on that assumption, in a manner that exposes their interpretation to excessive redundancy. J. A. B. Van Buitenen is the first modern scholar to have made a commendable departure from this beaten track. He proclaims boldly in his Introduction to his critical ed. and transin. of Rāmānuja’s Vedārthasaṁgraha (Deccan College Monograph Ser. no. 16, Poona, 1956), that “there can be little doubt that the term ārambhāyaṃ in (R.S. ii, 1, 14) is taken from or inspired by Ṛg Veda x, 87, 2” and that “with this connection in mind, Rāmānuja tries to show that the Saṁdhyā by advitiya denies a separate adhiṣṭhātra” (ep. cit. p. 11). He is also the first modern writer to approve
The majesty of Brahman is only imperfectly revealed by the
eightfold cosmic determinations: सीमा वक्तृत्व हि। This Universe
is just one among the myriad pulsating in the pores of the Supreme
Being: रोमकूपेष्टन्तानि श्रावण्डानि भवति ते।

Madhva is not very much enamoured of the teleological argument and
knew its limitations long before Hume and other modern philosophers.
It is only good enough so far as it goes. It cannot go the whole way,
and yield complete knowledge of the Deity. It is all very well to argue
that the entire Universe is a huge machine divided into infinite number of
parts, these parts again, being subdivided to a degree beyond human
comprehension and that all these are mutually adjusted with such consum-
mate accuracy and provision as to wrest our admiration and worship
of the Supreme Mind (Cf. वद्वधिसल्वद्धयाकरणात् परशक्तिनर्नगुण: परम:
Madhva: Dvādāsa-Stotra ) that should have designed and executed so
stupendous a thing. But then, this sort of teleological argument could
yield us nothing more than an "architect" of the Universe, a sort of
Demiurge and not a Creator on whom all things will be metaphysi-
cally dependent,

Madhva raises another vital question: Does God have to work
under a limitation? Is He obliged to accept and adapt Himself to condi-
tions independent of His will and attain His ends only by such arrange-
ments as these will admit of? His answer to this question has already
been set forth in the chapter on Creation. It is obvious, from what has
been stated there, that God is not merely an artificer of the Universe, a
mere "Brahmāṇḍakulāla"; but the very source of its being and becoming.

This is sufficient to show how particular Madhva is in maintaining the metaphysical inde-
pendence of God. Save for the difference in terminology, his position is
the nearest Hindu approach to the Christian standpoint. Of the two,

Continued—

of Madhva’s "even more explicitly" referring to Ṛg Vedic verse as Viṣaya-
vākyya of this Sūtra and disagree with V. S. Ghate's curt dismissal of Madhva's
interpretation on the ground that "the topic is irrelevant". The relevance
and the importance of the topic discussed by Madhva under this Sūtra have
been conclusively established by me in my reply to V. S. Ghate’s review of
Madhva’s Sūtra Bhāṣya (See my History of Devata School of Vedānta and
Its Lit., Vol. i, pp. 150–53). The interested reader should note the slight
misquotation from Madhva which has crept into the text cited by Van
Buitenen.
however, Madhva’s is much more philosophical, as eternal creation is no creation at all; while creation in time has its insurmountable difficulties. The only sense in which the world can be said to be a creation of God is that of an eternal dependence of one beginningless real on another and a more powerful One. Madhva makes a concession, in theory, to Christian Theism by conceding that hypothetically God can reverse His present method or create from nothing. But for His own reasons, He has chosen to evolve a world from co-existent matter and souls, which co-existence, too, is as much at His will and pleasure (Bhāg. ii, 10, 12). The Vedāntin if he can admit eternal and uncreated souls (See Śāmkara B.S.B. ii, 2, 42) need not shy at the acceptance of equally uncreated Matter! No Indian philosopher has been able or temerarious enough to derive matter from God. It exists on the Advaitic view, also, as a force latent in Brahman¹. Madhva, therefore, adopts the only sensible and straightforward course by which the sovereignty of God can be made consistent with the existence of such matter and such souls, viz., by making them ex hypothesi metaphysically dependent on God for their very being and becoming. This is substantially the view of the Visisṭhādvaivtits also.² It will also be seen that Madhva has done the right thing in raising this important issue for Theism in general and Vedāntic Theism, in particular, in an appropriate context in the B.S. (ii, I. 15).³

The conception of omnipotence has been much misunderstood and abused by Theological Controversialists. Can God achieve contradictions is a dilemma to Theists. Mere power is the earliest and crudest predicate of Divinity. Primitive man, inured to the arbitrary despotism of a chief, who uses power and glory for his own ends and uses the subjects as feeders of his own pomp and glory, is most easily impressed by the idea of physical power and gigantic strength. In most religions the attitude of a proverbial “Oriental Ruler” is transferred unconsciously to the idea of God. Madhva therefore raises this familiar problem of Theism whether

¹. परमात्मा-विद्यमान समाधित्वं विद्वलक्षणवाष्टिकत्वं विद्वलण्यस्वाभिकः (Śāmkara, Kaṭha, i, 3.11).
². "Māyā exists even in Pralaya, depending on the Supreme Lord" (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil. ii, 573).
³. See Deśika Tattvamuktākāra, p. 255.

See f. n. 1 on Page 157.
God or Brahman can do anything whatever; or whether there are things He cannot do and whether all existent reality other than Him has been created by Him or whether there are other beings, personal and impersonal, whose existence is as ultimate and uncaused as His own. If there are things whose existence is as ultimate, He could not have prevented their existence and to that extent His power over them is limited. An Omnipotent God could get the ends without the means, if He chooses to do so. *Ergo,* it must be inconsistent with His wisdom to use them since they are of no value to Him except to serve a purpose which He could as well have achieved without them, *as with them.* While conceding theoretically that God can do, undo and reverse his ways, Madhva and his Commentators remind us that *He has not chosen to do otherwise than what the established facts show.* Vijayindra Tirtha writes that even the omnipotence of God cannot achieve logical contradictions and absurdities: भगवद्वैद्यमावि लोकमयादतुश्रीवीत्येकारात्। न ही विरोधिन विद्याविद्वयमात्मतः संकल्पः करोति।

तत्स प्रक्षेपणात्। (Madhvādhvākāptakaodhāra, p. 58). As for the contention that it would have been better for God to have done without the accessories, as *with them*¹, Jayatirtha observes that it enhances the greatness of God to make Him act utilizing the accessories that are metaphysically dependent on Him: निरोधेष्यत्वा लक्ष्यस्तः उपयोगसामस्येय महिसोक्ष्यसामस्येयः, साधनः-सत्तामयमेव एकाकितः।

साधारणस्त्यागिनेष्योक्ष्यसामस्यमात्। (TP, ii, 1, 19). This partiality of the Vedāntin, for recognizing accessories in creation, is not a sentimental one. It is, as explained by Madhva due to the necessity of abiding by the facts vouched for by experience and scripture.²

It is difficult for any Theist to assert that all logical contradictions may be consistent with divine nature! It has been asked, from the point of view of ethical Theism, if the moral law is so fundamental that it is meaningless to speak of a Being who is not bound by it. According to some, the reply is not that an omnipotent God is bound by it, but that God is not omnipotent. Madhva resolves the antinomy on the basis of self-limitation by God. The supreme criterion in all such cases, says he, is in consistency with the majesty of God.

¹. तत्तें, उपयोगार्थ महिमोल्लर्यात्॥ कि साधनानार्थावशेष्यात्तः। (TP.)

². Cf. आम्बायस्त्वार्थ वक्तूः प्रभवापो, नामं फ्यांल्योक्तमम॥ (Śaṅkara, B. S. B. i, 4, 3)
Nothing can be accepted that will lower or abrogate this: यत्काविचारिनः प्रतीयमानमपि, ईश्वरः तद्वितर्स्तः वा, प्रमाणसिद्धं इश्वरेऽविचारिक्यथिष्ठति व न भवति, यथापूर्वमद्वृत्तानांपथास्वदिष्ठति तत्काल ईश्वरेऽविचारिक्यथिष्ठत म यत्कालप्रभायि। यत्तनस्प्रभायि तदीशृणावत्तिविचारिमपि न कल्पनीयमु। शरणावाचाराविद्यारत्नायः। यत्काल प्रभामपि ईश्वरेऽविचारिष्ठति तत्र कल्पनीयमेव। कल्प-विसंपतकल्वात। किंतु, तस्य प्रभावितस्य यथायोगं आभासस्य वणीनामेव। ( NS. p. 511 ). In the present case, God’s utilization of accessories that depend on Him does not constitute any loss or abrogation of His majesty:

सहकारिभिरांस्य न व्यास्तव्यं बिहिष्यते।
तस्यद्वायमयः स्वाधीनत्वविस्तिर्यते। (Vedānta Deśika)
CHAPTER XXXVIII

ATTRIBUTES OF BRAHMAN

Madhva’s conception of God emphasizes two aspects of Divinity—the perfection of being (sarva-guṇapuruṣatvam) and freedom from all limitations (sarva-dosa-gandha-dhavishi-hurati-vam). These two aspects cover and exhaust all that is great and good in the idea of God. We have an ‘epistemological argument’ for the perfection of God:

अतोशेष्युनोभं निदोषं यावदेव हि
taavadhevaṁ nām * * *(AV).

that God is the highest form of perfection conceivable by human intelligence. He is the id quo maius cogitari non potest: इत्तदमुक्तं इतं तदर्पितमि सर्वाधिकतेन, ततौशिकाभावविद्यितेतेन ** (B.T. X. p. 71). The ideas of transcendence and infinite bliss of God are similarly brought out by Madhva in his interpretation of the Sūtra: भूमा समसादांतुपदेशात् (i, 3, 8). This perfection of the Divine is to be understood in terms of an unlimited pervasion in time, space and fulness of attributes:

देशत: कालतः गुणतः निधा ततिः इ

ण समसता हृदेषः * * * ||

According to Madhva, this threefold perfection is possessed by the Supreme alone. The whole of finite creation is limited, in one way or another. The Goddess Lakṣmī, for instance, presiding over Prakṛti, tho’ unlimited by time and space, is limited in attributes (guṇa-apūrṇa) and therefore, dependent on Brahman. The souls are limited both by space and in attributes and possess only temporal pervasion (kālato vyāpti), in the sense of existing at all times.¹

The limitations of finite existence are the following:

अष्टले पारवस्तिले के जन्मदिकं तथा

तथा प्राणवदेहां देहवाणादिकं तथा

अनीश्चले च हरिकिर्ति साम्यन्यवेश हीनताम् || (Mbh. T. N. p. 3)

¹ Rāghavendra, Gītāvariṭi, ii, 18.
[Ignorance, dependence, liability to misery, material embodiment, and equality with or inferiority to others].

* * * पारतच्छ जनिन्नति:।
पराधीनप्राप्तिरूपं प्रवेपभव: (AV. p. 26).

The Supreme is absolutely free from all these:

देशत: कालो योसाकावस्थातः स्वतोपन्यतः।
अविलोचनोऽवधात्मा * * * (Bhāg. iii, 7, 5). ।

The term Ātman itself, as applied to the Supreme, in its highest sense, signifies that which is all-pervasive (ā-tata):

आततलाच्छ मातृवादात्मा हि परमो हृदे।।

The above texts emphasize the infinitude of God and His immutability. His nature remains the same at all times and in all places: (B.S. iii. 2, 11). He is above all change and limitations, loss or obscuration of His powers at all times: अविकारः सदा छुटः।। He is not subject to any variation of degrees of power or potency. Such limitations as are caused by external factors are powerless to affect His nature which is absolutely self-contained and He transcends all, having neither peer nor superior. He is not a Person in the sense of being just one among many or possessing any material form or measurable lineaments. His form is nothing more than that of reality, consciousness and bliss unlimited. We have an impressive enunciation of this in the following passages of Madhva's Mbh. T.N. (i, 10–12):

एकः समोत्वाविलोकसत्तातोऽस्वं पूर्णं गुणकोणः बहुप्रमोक्षभूतः।
निद्यंपूर्णं गुणविविष्ठ आत्मतं निवेशतनामकशरीरस्येष्य हीनः।
आनंदमानकरणदुश्चरोदराधि: सर्वं च स्वगतेश्वयविविज्ञाता:।
कालच्छ देशणातीस्य न चादिरत्तो बुद्धिक्षणोऽनु तु परस्य सदातनस्य।
मैतालश: कव च क्षमु न चेत्त भावो नास्तुतरः किमु परातसस्य विषयोः।।
सर्वं इत्यतः स च सर्वशक्तिः पूर्णव्ययात्मवचल्लकुस्वरीयसारः॥
It is this uncompromising faith in the spotless purity and perfection of God that is responsible for Madhva's determined resistance to the theories of Pantheism and Illusionism:

कथा भायाद्रविष्णुः पूर्णाः मुख्यया भवेत्? (A.V.)

It is for the same reason that he refuses to invest the Avatars of popular theology with any material vesture. For, once the Monotheist grants the possibility of the unlimited becoming limited, it becomes immaterial if such a limitation takes place in one particular instance or more. That is why Madhva stands valiantly for the Monotheistic unity of Godhead and its absolute freedom from material defilement and makes use of Puranic fictions and theodicies to justify their seemingly ungodly acts and career on earth:

पूर्णिद: पूर्णिदं पूर्णांत्पूर्णसुदच्यते ।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादियम पूर्णभिवाचित्यते ॥ (Bṛh. Up. v, 1)

न च गर्भिसंरेव न चापि बहुदेवतः ।
न चापि राज्यवाज्यो न चापि जमदग्निः ॥

न वै स आलमात्वतामधिश्रो ।

भुक्तेति हि दुःखं ममवन्यामुदेवः ।
स ज्ञाववस्थारो जनमोहाय ।

ब्रह्मिन्याम्बिति रति प्रयत्नवचार ॥ (Bhāg. v, 19, 6).

तथाप्यसुरसोचाय परेषां च काहित्वचित ।

ढुःखान्तोस्मादीश्वरं दशष्ट्रधूलसदुपुणः ॥

The perfections of God are ex hypothesi infinite:

मथनन्तुरुपोः सन्तुरुपतोः सन्तविवेणः (Bhāg. vi, 4, 48).

They are natural to His being and are not, as in Advaita, unreal projections brought about by contact with Avidyā. This is supported by the clear statement of the Śvetāśvata: 

पराश शनितिविचित्रं शून्यं स्वाभाविकी श्राविनिविषयाम् ॥ (vi. 8).
In the light of such a large number of clearly worded statements, we cannot deny all attributes to the Supreme, on the strength of a solitary Nirguṇa text. Besides, as pointed out by Madhva, the Nirguṇa text itself (केवलोनिर्गुणव ) posits a number of attributes such as oneness, divinity, transcendence, immanence and omniscience\(^1\); so that the solitary term “Nirguṇa”, occurring by the side of such an array of positive predications could only be taken in some restricted sense. The description of Brahman in several Upaniṣadic passages as ‘unsullied by sin’ (अपहतपापा) and ‘spotless’ (निरक्ष) gives us the proper clue to a consistent interpretation of the Nirguṇa texts in the sense of denying Prakṛti or empirical attributes like grossness to Brahman. Such an interpretation has the support of the Purānic tradition also:

सत्सादयो न सत्तशे न सति प्राकृता युग्मा: (Viṣṇu Pur. i. 9, 43)

झानशास्त्रिकलेखकर्मीयोत्तरण्योपतः।

भगवन्नदवान्यानी किनाहैगौराधिभिः: (op. cit. vi, 5, 79)

जैगुण्यान्तितमजं विश्वाधामीश्वर (Mbh. i, 1, 1)

The plea that “when the Absolute is said to be Nirguṇa it only means that it is trans-empirical, as guṇas are products of Prakṛti and the Absolute is superior to it” (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil., ii, p. 536) is quite acceptable to Madhva. In his latest work on the Brahma-Sūtras (1960) Dr. Radhakrishnan comes out with a pronouncement: “The creative thought ‘Let me be many’ belongs to Brahman. It is not simply imagined in Him. The energy that manifests itself in Brahman is one with and different from Brahman.”

भेदभेदात्मिका यशस्वः ब्रह्मानिक्ष सनातनी।

The world should become an ordered beauty. If we do not accept such a subtle power, abiding in God, God cannot be a creator. He cannot move towards creation” (p. 142) - [Italics mine]. All this, however, is inconsistent with Śāmkara’s conception of Brahman as “Nirviśeṣa”,- as a Being that is essentially and fundamentally devoid of any attribute whatever, whether such attributes qualify it or are separate from it, as in

\(^1\) एको देव:सङ्कृतसेव गूढः: सर्वभाषपि सर्वभूतान्तराभा।

क्रांवविध्यकः: सर्वभूतान्तराभा: साङ्की चेता केहलो निर्गुणः॥

---

1. Radhakrishnan, I. Phil., ii, p. 536.
the Nyāya philosophy; or are non-material and part and parcel of it, as in Madhva's view. Otherwise, Śāmkara could not have so vehemently denied and criticized the doctrine that "Brahman has in it elements of manifoldness" and that "unity and manifoldness are both true," as he has done in his c, on B. S. ii, 1, 14. The statements that "Brahman and Isvāra are not distinct entities but different aspects of the same Reality" and that "it is wrong to imagine that the absolutistic doctrine is for the philosophically initiated and the theistic doctrine for others" and that "the view that the representation of Brahman as Isvāra (i.e. "Saguṇa") is a concession to the weakness of the human mind as some Advaitins hold is not supported by the Brahmasūtra" (op. cit. p. 126-27) show a sense of intellectual dissatisfaction with "Nir-viśeṣādvaita" as propounded by Śāmkara in his accredited works¹ and a reluctance to accept it as the true interpretation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. Madhva's opposition to the concept of Nirguṇa Brahman is also based on precisely the same dissatisfaction with Nirviśeṣādvaita.

The question of Saguṇa vs. Nirguṇa Brahman has been fully discussed by Viṣṇudāsācārya in his Vādaratnāvali (Pariccheda, iv) and by Vyāsārāya in his Nym. (ii, 4). There is much confusion of thought, in the popular mind over the terms "Saguṇa" and "Nirguṇa". Unfortunately, such loose ideas have sometimes a tendency to rear their heads even in the writings of experts on Indian philosophy. "When the Absolute becomes embodied as a personal God", we have the Saguṇa is not a proper definition of "Saguṇa" as understood and debated in the original texts of the Vedāntic school. The "Saguṇa" of the Upaniṣads is certainly not what is endowed with empirical attributes. For the Śrutis clearly refer to the Brahman endowed with attributes like Satyakāmatva as the transcendent Being (Ādityavarṇam tamasah parastād). The Chāndogya and other texts also refer to the act of seeing (iṅkṣaṇa) on the part of Brahman prior to the emergence of antaḥkaraṇa and other Upādhis of the empirical creation.² It cannot also be argued that the texts

1. Cf. निविषिषयं परं श्रद्धा साश्चतक्कुर्मगीनिधरः।
   ये मन्त्रस्ते ज्ञातकम्यते साधिशेषनिलक्षणेण:। (Kālpatārṇa)

2. Cf. "The creative thought, 'let me be many' belongs to Brahman. It is not simply imagined in him" (Radhakrishnan, Brahma Sūtra, 1960, p. 142.) [Italics mine].
like "Satyakāmaḥ satyasamkalpaḥ which speak of the various attributes of Brahman are merely intended for the purpose of meditation (upāsanā) without any implication of their being actually present in the Supreme Brahman. In the first place, there is no reference to Upāsanā in texts like "Yas Sarvajñāḥ sarvavid" (Śvet. Up.) and secondly there are texts like "Ātmyevoopāśīte" etc. which refer to meditation on the attribute of identity, which is not an unreal one but is actually present (according to the Advaitin, in the self). Further, Śomkara himself in his Bhāṣya on B. S. (iii, 3, 11; 37) admits frankly that the quality of "Ānanda" etc., and the mutual identity of ātman and Īśvara should be meditated upon. This shows that the fact of being prescribed for meditation does not take away the ultimacy of the attributes in question. Nor can the Saguṇa texts be explained away as mere re-statements (of facts already known or established) to be set aside by the Nirguṇa texts. For, the very conception of Brahman as "Sa-guṇa" is derived a priori (from the Śrutis themselves) by Dharmigrāhaka-pramāṇa. The Nirguṇa texts cannot, therefore, falsify those very attributes which the Śrutis themselves have, on their own authority, given to the Brahman.1 It is thus impossible to resolve the apparent conflict between Saguṇa and Nirguṇa texts of the Śruti on the basis of such fanciful and subjective criteria as the standpoints of Upāsanā and Anuvāda, put forward by Advaitins. The right way of resolving the conflict will be to apply to their harmonization such recognized principles of Mīmāṁsā exegesis as (i) the Upakrama-nyāya; (ii) Śrutilinga-nyāya; (iii) Viśeṣa-sāmānya-nyāya; (iv) Niravakāśa-(Savakāśa)-nyāya; (v) Bāhulya-nyāya; (vi) Upajjyopajjivakanyāya; (vii) Saviśeṣa-nyāya and others, some of which have admittedly been followed by the author of the Brahma-Sūtras, himself, even according to Śomkara's showing.

The following is a brief elucidation of the application of some of these principles of interpretation, to the present question, based on the Vādaratnāvali of Viṣṇudāsācārya: (i) The Saguṇa texts should have precedence over the Nirguṇa as they are prescriptive in form and content, whereas the Nirguṇa texts are proscriptive; and in cases of a conflict

---

1. तस्मात् सत्य-नियुक्तविवर्णोऽविकल्पेन समुच्चायायोगारं, अवृक्तानेन इव च कर्मसिद्धिनिकल्पा- 
संमवात् एकताभित्त्वः प्रतीतायायाग्रहे वाधचे वक्तव्ये, निर्गुणवाक्यसूतीय स युक्तः। न हु अव- 
बलविश्व सत्य-नियुक्तविवर्ण (Nym. ii, 4).
between the initial and final statements (upakrama and upasamhāra) as in एको देव: सर्वभूतेऽगृहः सर्वभृण्याय जग्मगमत्त्रात्। the decision has been taken in the Vedopakramadhikarana of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā that the first part shall prevail over the last and determine the scope and meaning of the other. ( i i ) Texts which predicate certain auspicious attributes of Brahma cannot put up with any but their literal sense ( niravakāśa ); whereas the Nirguna texts can easily be accommodated in the sense of denying material or empirical attributes and so find their fulfilment of purpose. It will not be possible to establish an absolute negation of attributes as the very same text: एको देव: सर्वभूतेऽगृहः गृहः: * * lays down certain attributes like oneness ( एकत्रः ), divinity ( देवत्वः ) etc. in Brahma, in the first half ( or major part of the text ) and uses the term " Nirguna " at the tail end. It is, therefore, necessary to restrict the scope of this negation conveyed by the expression " निर्गुण " to material attributes alone ( निर्गुण विविषयः ) just as the prohibition of killing in the Vedic text : न हिस्मात् सर्वं भूतानि, is restricted by the Mīmāṃsakas to cases other than those statutorily recognized as in अमवोधनोऽयं पहुँचामात्रेत्. If it is contended that the prohibition " न हिस्मात् " refers only to injuries provoked by human passions ( रागदः प्रातः ) and not to those enjoined by Vedic injunctions ( वैधः ), it may be answered back that in the present case also the text " Nirgunaśca " does not negative the attributes duly predicated by Śrutis like य: सर्वसंस्कृतः सर्वविभि। तस्य नाम सहीवः etc. but only such attributes as are conceived or advanced by the empirical intellect or imperfect logic. Absolute and unqualified negation of attributes cannot, therefore, be accepted in any case, since both the predication of attributes and their denial have equal statutory recognition. It thus becomes necessary to interpret the denial in a way which will not annul the attributes solemnly predicated. If even statutory prescriptions can be totally set aside, there will be no need for recognizing Vikalpa ( alternative or optional rule ) provided in the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra, in such cases as उदितः जुगितः; अजुगितः जुगितः. The very conception of a Vikalpa ( optional rule ) is based on the presumption that what is laid down by law cannot be totally repudiated. ( iii ) The Nirguna texts are general in scope and cannot negative special attributes of Brahma expressly mentioned by the Śruti texts. But specific

P.M.—16.
negations like अस्सूलमन्नण् can always be taken at their face value and
made to deny material attributes like grossness, that may come to
be suggested by spurious reasoning. After all, grossness and other
attributes are not laid down in regard to Brahman in any Vedic text.
Nor are they inherently auspicious attributes, tho' their opposites may
be so. (iv) The Saguṇa texts are logically self-consistent; while the
Nirguṇa texts bristle with contradictions 1. If the Nirguṇa-Brahman
is endowed with the necessary attributes which justify its being charac-
terized as "Nir-guṇa", it will not be really and wholly "Nir-guṇa"
i.e. attributeless. If there is no such appellative basis in the
Nirguṇa-Brahman, it cannot be regarded as "Nirguṇa" in the true
sense of the term. (v) The Saguṇa texts should be regarded as
"sustainers" (उपजीव्य) of the Nirguṇa texts. The sustainer, being
independent of the sustained, will obviously be more powerful than
the sustained, in the event of a conflict of interest or meaning between
them. The latter, then, will have necessarily to submit to the former.
This may be illustrated by the inference of fire being cold, which has
absolutely no chance of survival, against the evidence of tactile perception
of its heat. It cannot be argued that the Saguṇa texts are sustainers of
the Nirguṇa texts only to the extent of providing a subject for negation
(निष्कृतसम्पर्केष्य उपजीव्य) by the Nirguṇa texts. For, there are no texts,
so far as we can see, which say that Brahman is not Sarva-jña, not
Sarva-akṣaṁhitat and so on. The omniscience of Brahman is, thus,
gathered only on the evidence of the Śrutis. Such an august truth
cannot therefore be simply set aside. There is no force in the contention
that the Nirguṇa texts depend on the Saguṇa and require their help only
to the extent of requiring a "bare existence" (svarūpa-mātrat) of the
thing to be divested of attributes and nothing more. Such a 'bare
existence' can be found in many other things also besides the present
subject (Brahman); so that the denial of attributes, in the circumstan-
ces, will not necessarily affect "Brahman" and deprive it of its
attributes! It will be futile to argue further that the attributes of
the subject of a proposition (uddeśya) have generally no syntac-
tic value as in महां सम्माधि and that therefore, the omniscience of the

1. Cf. निविशिष्यविषयकान्तरस्य नििष्कृतार्थके, तेन निविशिष्यकालिकस्य तत्सिद्दिष्टवेत्वं विशेषामान-
प्रक्षेपितः विषयकान्त्रस्य आवख्यकत्वित्वः (Nyāya, ii, 5)
subject (*uddeśya*) in the present case, viz., Brahman is not to be taken into account. The Mīmāṁsā interpretation of "सत्योक्तय्य हिविरातिमाध्यातृत्" does not support this contention. Even in the Sammārgadhikarana, it is seen that the specific attribute of "ग्रहःग्रहम्" plays a decisive role in restricting the "सम्मार्जना" (cleaning) to the "ग्रहाः" (cups) as against the other vessels like "कम्पास", by virtue of the distinctive attribute of "ग्रहत्वा" which is intended to be taken into syntactic account. It is only the *singular number* of "ग्रहा" in प्रहसम्मान्त तिति that is not taken into account, by reason of there being not *one but many* vessels (*ग्रहाः* to be cleaned with a piece of cloth: द्वारापिनेण प्रहसम्मान्ति। But, so far as the distinctive attribute of "ग्रहत्वा" itself is concerned, it is certainly taken into account, lest the injunction (प्रहसम्मान्ति) should apply to some other vessels also, used in that sacrifice. That is why Bhavaṇātha says: न जैत्यसदेवज्ञात्सिद्धान्तात्। उद्देश्यस्तथे लघुः, वद्विषम् तत् विशेषणं न विख्यति०। "Else, we could not establish the distinctive essence of the "uddeśya". Once this has been achieved, other additional attributes of the *Uddeśya* are superfluous and need not be taken into account". Applying the same principle of interpretation to the present case, we have to accept that Brahman being inconceivable without the attribute of omniscience, it could become the subject of a proposition, affirmative or negative, only as characterized by the attribute of omniscience. In these circumstances, a conflict with the basic evidence of the subject (परिमाहकम्ब्रमा) is bound to arise, if the Nirguṇa texts are taken to deny attributes to the Brahman, absolutely.

It will be proper to hold that texts like "Satyam jñānam anantam Brahama" which posit certain attributes of Brahman should be taken in their *express sense*, which is also their *primary sense*. Resort to any *labored explanation* of such texts, in terms of the elimination of the opposite of the qualities named (लट्टीयय्यळंसेतत्यापादः) resorted to by Advaitins, will naturally entail an abandonment of the primary sense of the texts. The text, on such a view, will not teach that Brahman is possessed of the characteristics of reality, consciousness etc. but that it is *devoid of*
unreality, ignorance, limitation etc. The Advaitin is thus fighting shy of the positive construction and running away from the express and primary sense of the terms “Satyam jñānam” and running after roundabout meanings and distant echoes resulting from the primary senses. But such roundabout explanations cannot be accepted as the proper, legitimate or straightforward meaning of the propositions. Such farfetched meanings extracted laboriously from the first sense of the words cannot be accepted as the import of Vedic propositions, as pointed out by the Mīmāṁsakas;

यक्षाधार्यिणों न स चोदनाथः।

Sureśvara himself has admitted that the roundabout explanation of “Satyam jñānam . . .” adopted by the Advaitin, in terms of the elimination of the opposite sense of the terms employed, is not derived from the actual expressions used, but from their ‘potential fitness’: तद्विषेषविधायकः सामव्यायां न तु साह्यतः। It is thus clear that the primary sense of the texts “Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma” is maintainable only on the Saguṇa view. (vi) The Saguṇa texts, being specific enunciations: (विशेषविधायकः) are more powerful in their own right than the Nirguṇa texts which only function in a general way and tell us that Brahmā is (निर्विद्या) ‘attributeless.’ They do not tell us what particular attributes it lacks. It is therefore open to us to interpret this general statement without prejudice to the specific enunciation of attributes like “Sarvajñatvam” and hold that the denial of attributes has reference to attributes other than those specifically predicated. That will be the right attitude to take. As the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali points out exceptions only restrict the scope of the general principles: अपवादेक्तस्यार्थः बाध्यते। The Nirguṇa texts are general statements and the Saguṇa texts are exceptions. The latter have therefore the right of overriding the former and laying down the law as to the sense in which they can and should be restrictively interpreted. This is based on the well-known principle of interpretation: सामान्यविहितस्य विशेषस्य विशेषविधायकेन बाधो युक्त: that a negative proposition in general terms should be modified and interpreted in the light of other categorical and affirmative statements about the same subject-matter embodying specific predi-
cations. The difficulty of how a prior fact or enunciation can override a subsequent one is easily met. We have in Pāñinian grammar a prior enunciation मृड्युध्गुष्य (i, 2, 7) overriding the subsequent prohibition न क्ला सेट्र (i, 2, 18). It is clear, then, that mere posteriority or negativity of content of one statement as against another is not sufficient ground to override the positive. We have, therefore, no reason to set aside the conception of Brahman as endowed with numerous transcendental attributes, taught by the Śrutas.
CHAPTER XXXIX

KNOWABILITY OF BRAHMAN

There is difference of opinion between the views of Dvaitins and Advaitins about the knowability of Brahman. While both look upon Brahman as self-luminous, Advaitic dialecticians have denied the knowability of Brahman by defining self-luminosity in a manner that precludes its accessibility to knowledge:

अवेशयन्ति सति, अपरोक्ष्यवहारयोग्यतम (Citsukha).

Madhva, on the other hand, emphasizes the knowability of Brahman, tho' not to its fullest extent and in all its glory and completeness. However imperfect our knowledge of Brahman may be, it is still knowledge so far as it goes. Each one of us can know God and realize His majesty so far as lies in his power to do so:

पत्यन्तोपि न पत्यति मेरो रूपे विपिनित: (B. S. B).

Here again, the difference between the two schools is one of substance and not of mere words. They are as sharply divided as the views of Christian Mystics and Theists are from those of Spencerian Agnosticism. Pringle Pattison hits off this difference so well that it is worth while quoting him:—“Can'st thou find out the Almighty unto Perfection? If He is as high as Heaven, what can'st thou do? Deeper than hell, what can'st thou know? If to comprehend means to grasp as it were with one hand, to understand thoroughly, see all round an object, then unquestionably, the infinite must ever remain incompassable by the finite. So far as Agnosticism simply emphasizes the unfathomability of the Absolute by any human sounding-line and opposes the little we know to the vast unknown, it is a praiseworthy lesson in humility. Curiously, neither Hamilton nor Spencer seem to realize the fundamental difference between the two conceptions— that of the inherently unknowable and that of the unknown, the not-yet-known and doubtless never-by-us-to-be-fully-known, but still, the ever-to-be-better known” (Idea of God, p. 165).

These remarks apply mutatis mutandis to the views of Advaitic dialecticians as against that of Madhva, that God or the Absolute is neither absolutely unknowable nor fully knowable:

नालिवेशो न चोवधः तस्मात्त परेश्वर: (Madhva).
Madhva says that partial knowability establishes at least partial characterisability: ईश्वरीयतादायन्येव. The very possibility of Ignorance concealing particular aspects of Brahman, while disclosing it in its general aspect of pure consciousness (as admitted by Śaṅkara,1) is sufficient to prove that Brahman is not altogether un-aspected (Nirviśeṣa) or devoid of characteristics. It is philosophically impossible to speak of an absolutely featureless entity being obscured by partial ignorance, even for the nonce:

निरिशेष स्वर्य माते किमज्ञानात्रूतं भेजेत्? (AV).

Ignorance cannot spread over a blank and conceal it from anything. There can be no total eclipse of Brahman’s reality, as it is admitted that the pure consciousness of being is manifested in the consciousness of the ego. An absolutety uncharacterizable entity is therefore a myth. It would be inaccessible to proofs and, therefore, beyond the jurisdition of logical or metaphysical thinking.

1. Cf. Śaṅkara B.S.B. i. 1, 1, the passage beginning with तत्तुन्मेब्र गुरुमुलान्तर्प्रसिद्धम् and his reply to it.
CHAPTER XL

BRAHMAN IS A SA-VIŠEṢA PERSONALITY.

Such an entity cannot be the object of any superimposition also:

नवर्णकः बिच्छिन्नस्य थमौरायोः कस्य द्वैतम् ? (AV).

The assumption of a characterless entity on the ground of alleged absence of all terms or bases of reference is refuted by Trivikrama Paṇḍita who points out inter alia that it would be equally impossible, in that case, to connote such a reality even thro’ secondary signification (lakṣaṇāvṛtti) as proposed by the Advaita. Immeasurable as are the attributes of divinity, the unity of God in and thro’ all of them, is secured by Madhva thro’ the mediation of Viśeṣas. It is also possible to bring the numerous attributes under four leading ones (for meditation) as Sat, Cit, Ānanda and Ātmā.¹ Sat signifies absolute perfection and freedom from all defects and limitations (nirdoṣa). The term “ātmā” is explained as possessing pervasion and overlordship: आत्मचातुर्, मातृचातुर्. From another point of view, the conception of God as “Svatantra”, in the sense of the definition of the term already indicated, will comprehend all the other attributes.

The Supreme Brahman is thus a Person in that He has a character of His own. The term personality as applied to Godhead denotes, according to Madhva, not merely the existence of self-consciousness so conceived, but also that the entire Universe is to be thought of as an experience and not as an abstract content,—not limited to the intermittent and fragmentary glimpses of this or that finite consciousness, but as embracing the whole life of the world in a way that is necessarily incomprehensible save by an absolute knowledge. The Divine personality constitutes such a centrality of reference, endowed with the faculties of cognition, conation and activity, as part of its being:

1. सर्वभूतानामात्रे गुणचक्रविशेषत्वस्य वक्तुं शक्यतवात् । (TP. iii, 3, 12).
2. B. S. iii, 3, 18.
The term 'Person', as applied to Brahman, should, therefore, be distinguished carefully from the circumscribed connotation of the term as a spiritual being embodied in a psycho-physical tenement. Limitation is no essential constituent of personality. It all depends. We may understand God to be a great centre of consciousness, will, force and action,—as a unit whose strength and capacities are beyond measurement or conception: अतिपरिपूर्वातःतत्त्वात्मायांधक:प्रक्तिम् भवनां (M.G.B., p. 180) परस् मानया तत्ता दृष्टान (R. V. vii, 99, 1) इति देशतः कार्यो गुणाध्यापरि- नित्यमयानस्य (NS. p. 421). If the Supreme Reality is not to be a mere indeterminate mass of non-willing, non-thinking and non-acting being, described as Saccidananda, just for courtesy's sake, we must recognize, with Madhva, that it is both knowledge and knower, bliss and the blissful. There is nothing anthropomorphic about Madhva's conception of God as a Person, everything about whom is non-material. He has, by definition no form of gross or subtle matter:

न तस्य प्राक्तं दृष्टिमांसमेवतस्यसमयं (Varāha)
स्त्रीपुरुषार्थायोगास्ते देवो विषयो जायते।
fः हु निर्दैशैतन्यसहस्ते नित्यं लक्षणं तत्तनः॥

Madhva brings together a number of texts from the Upanisads and Purāṇas, in support of such a dynamic conception of the Divine personality: तस्यापि शारीर, शारीरिक, 'अन्नदुन्दकममुखम्' (Mund. ii, 2, 7) 'सुर्याण्यस्यतः' (Taitt.) 'कहरोलिताजनानुकासा' (Chān. Up. viii. 1, 1.) इत्यादिषु। यदि रूप न स्वात, आनन्दमित्येव स्वात, नत्वानन्दस्यसम्यकान्तमिति। कथं हुर्यङ्गमवघ्यं स्वादुथप्यं ? 'सहस्तीपार्यं पुरुषः,' 'सस्मवर्णं कलिं', 'आदिवर्णं तस्यः परस्तात,' 'सर्वत्र-प्राणिगाते ततः,' 'विश्वविस्ततुपि विश्व-तथा मुख' 'क्षणिकानान्त, विश्वाद्वाय-अवस्येत्व रूपान्तरयते। 'परास्याशक्तिपरिविधे धृतते भवाभावं विशिष्टी श्यानतासंखिया च,' 'य: सर्वं: सर्वित्वं,' 'अनन्दं उदारण,' 'सम्पन्नतुपर् अनन्तोद-
But then, these attributes are not separate from the essence of God. God is not a "bare something" qualified by or clothed with a number of attributes from without. We have seen that Madhva’s conception of substance as an identity-in-difference, maintained by the self-differentiating capacity of intrinsic Viśeṣas, enables him smoothly to preserve the integrality of being of the Supreme Person in and thro’ His numerous attributes, which are an expression of His being and not so many external trappings attached to Him. Madhva’s view of the attributes of God is the same as that of the great Christian thinker St. Thomas Aquinas that ‘in God, the distinction between existence and essence must fall away. God can have no nature or essence distinguishable form His actual existence. Here and here only, the distinction between existence and essence would have no meaning, and consequently the distinction between an attribute and that which is subject of the attributes, would be meaningless also. Of the Divine Being we can say, as of no other, that it is its own goodness. Its goodness is not adjectival to It; because, in it, it is all one, to be and to be good.” (quoted from Dawes Hicks, Philosophical Bases of Theism, 1937).

The statement that God has His own body and limbs:

बुद्धिमनोज्ञात्यंगक्तां भगवतो व्यक्त्यामेव बुद्धिमान् मनोवानं अंगवानं \* \* \* इति only means that He has His own instruments of knowledge and activity which is all one of knowledge and bliss: यदात्मको भगवान् तदात्मिका व्यक्तिः। किमात्मको भगवान्? ज्ञात्मक ऐत्मीयत्मक:। शक्त्यात्मक इति।

सहिः: उसनन्दसः ज्ञात्मा: सत्यराकमः।

ज्ञाज्ञानः: सुखसुखः स विष्णु: परमोश्चरः। (Paimgil)

In so far, then, as the several attributes partake of the nature of Brahman, they are also inseparable:

तानि सवैण्यन्यन्यन्यन्यर्पणि (G. B. ii. 72)

So far as it is necessary to concede that the Supreme Reality has a profound character of its own and is by no means an utter blank, it
would be unphilosophical to limit the attributes to six or eight, as the Naiyāyikas have done. Madhva quotes the Śvetāṣṭarata text: परास्य शास्त्रितार्थविप्रत्येक दृष्टिते (vi, 8) and that of Bhāgavata मन्यापनतपेतनते  *  * (vi, 4, 48) to refute such a narrow view. Jayatīrtha points out that the six qualities commonly associated with the epithet “Bhagavān”, are capable of subsuming the countless other attributes: ब्रह्मणयमित्युपस्करणं वाहुः वर्गणात्मकविवृति वा (G. B. Ṭ. ii, 72). The term “gūṇa” is understood in the sense of an attribute (dharma), and the qualities of knowledge, power and activity spoken of in the Śvetāṣṭarata and other texts would naturally be seen to posit a variety of them (vividha). In the light of the clear statement of Śvet. Up, vi, 8, that the attributes are “intrinsic” (svābhāvikī), the plea of Ānandabodha and others that even the omniscience of Brahman actually presupposes, rather than opposes, the presence of ignorance in Brahman: सम्बूच्छलमाप्यविवाहलक्षमाधिक्षितं, न ह वित्तिक्षित ति can only be characterized as audacious.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the knowledge, activity and other attributes of God are abstract objectless wholes (akhaṇḍa). Such a position would render the conception of omniscience etc. meaningless. Omniscience is knowledge of all that exists. Creative and other powers also would similarly have reference to relevant objects. No knowledge or activity can thus be conceived as objectless. The eternity or non-eternity of objects has nothing to do with the question.

In the absence of something like an internal Viṣeṣa to demarcate the distinctive terms of reference, it would be rationally impossible to define the limits of the creative and destructive activities in God and explain the orderly arrangement of the evolution and involution of the world and the succession of events. In other words, God must be accepted as “Saviśeṣa”. Tho’ Madhva admits with the Naiyāyikas that divine knowledge is eternal and all-embracing, it is not, on that account, undiversified. It
is multi-colored (anantaviṣeṣātmakam) and adjusted to the different exigencies of creation, dissolution etc. by the agency of Viṣeṣas. There are two aspects of the Divine Will the latent (śakti) and the patent (vyakti), which operate in pre-established harmony, preventing overlapping and encroachment. (See page 152).

The Divine nature is not only all-knowing but also self-luminous. God not only knows everything but also that His knowledge is all-embracing. The question of Divine omniscience in respect of human illusions has been raised by some writers. Does God know our illusions also? If not, He is not omniscient. If He does, He would be as much subject to them as we are. Jayatīrtha disposes of this dilemma by pointing out that God only perceives every thing as it is in reality. When we perceive silver in nacre, God sees that we have fallen into a delusion: न चेष्वरप्रमा ऋक्तिरजस्तादिविद्विधिश्च। किन्तु, अन्तोऽयं ऋक्तिकाशकलं कल्यात्तत्या कल्यात्ते सा धृतिरुपेव (TVt. p. 1).1

Madhva also takes special pains to point out that tho' the attributes of God are transcendental and trans-empirical, they are nevertheless designated by the same terms as are applied to corresponding empirical qualities. This is merely symbolic and intended to give us some idea of them, however limited and inadequate (B. S. B. iii, 2, 32-34). The tran-

1. Cf. तथापीश्वरलां न प्रमाण, विषयवलात्। यदा कल्लेतस्मादिविश्वानांकत्वं तदा एतस् विषयमय्यक्ततो न ज्ञात्वानवाहसंविचार इति तद्वेयःप्यालंबनमभुवेयः। तथाच तद्रि विषयः * * * न। विश्ववाणमय्यवेंष्यि तद्दश्येक्ष्य क्षुद्रमोक्षितोऽण्टतलात्। प्रत्यार्थवनस्त्र चेन्वशिष्ठतः। सकृत ययार्थवलात्। नाविनं न तद्रज्ञं, नाविन तत्त्रासत, नाविन तथावत्कालित्य || (Udayana, Kusumāṇḍali, iv)
scendental cannot be fully made known or represented by empirical categories and epithets:

"अलौकिकाःपि ज्ञानादिस्तचछद्दैरेव भवते।
शापनायां लोकस्य द्वा राजेव देवरात।" इति पाण्डे
लोकविलक्षणेऽप्यानन्दादि तत्त्वदवर्गो युग्यते। तत्त्वानुसूचियथादिशापनार्थस्वात। ज्ञातताबन्धु-अर्थेश्वत्तरवलेन अलौकिकत्वादिश्व भवतीति (TP. iii, 2, 34).

This is a remarkable anticipation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s famous doctrine of ‘analogue senses’ underlying all human concepts of God.
CHAPTER XLII

COSMIC ACTIVITIES OF BRAHMĀN

The cosmic powers of the Supreme are eight in number: creation, preservation, dissolution, control, enlightenment, obscuration, bondage and release. It is the sole and ultimate source of every one of these determinations. The accounts in the Epics and Purāṇas dividing these activities among the members of the popular Hindu trinity are taken by Madhva in a deeper Monotheistic sense. He holds that the Supreme Being itself (identified with Viṣṇu) acts thro' the instrumentality of the other gods:

निमित्तमात्रकृतं विश्वसंगमनिरोधथयोः ।

हिरण्यगर्भं शरीरं कालावश्यायोऽणविन्तत्व (Bhāg. x, 71, 8)

तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुस्तत्तत्क्षती: प्रवीणयम् ।

एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरो हर्मवसा (Q. B. S. B. ii, 3, 11)

This applies to the processes of nature also:

मतः स्यूतिज्ञानपोहनं च । (Gītā, X, 8)

खण्डिनी पाचिनी शक्तिः । । ।

नैव राज्यं र्वे: शक्तिः शक्तीनारायणस्य सा ॥

(Pādma q. by Madhva).

This is how Madhva reconciles the apparent polytheism of the Vedic and post-Vedic sources with the Monotheistic idea of the One Supreme: एकः शास्त्रा न द्वितीयोरस्ति शास्त्रा (Mbh). But Madhva finds for the popular gods (Devas) of Hinduism a place in his theosophy and regards their limited jurisdiction over particular aspects of cosmic determination as a delega-

---

1. Cf. "Madhva believes that the characteristics mentioned belong to the nature of Brahman. Creative activity is an essential defining quality of Brahman" (Radhakrishnan, Brahma Sūtra, p. 237) and his own remark (in regard to Śaṅkara): "If we do not accept such a subtle power abiding in God, God cannot be a Creator. He cannot move towards creation" (Op. cit. p. 142). [Italics mine].
tion of powers or as an *imperium in imperia.* This overcomes the limitation of a plurality of causes, by making the Supreme Brahman alone the ultimate and independent source in every act of emergent evolution. This point has been explained by Madhva in his comments on *B.S.* i, 4, 15 and ii, 3, 11. In this sense, God is called "'Kāraṇa-kāraṇa' (cause of all causes) working in and thro' each of them:

बह्वविष्णुविभाविणि श्रीणि विष्णुमेहातमः।
बह्वविणि बह्वत्स्तैः श्रवणी श्रव्य स्वरः।
प्रस्थगंविभाविणि देवो विष्णुप्री जनादेवः। ॥ (B. T. p. 4)

It is the same Brahman that sustains the selves in and thro' every one of their five states of life: Jāgrat, Svapna, Sūsupti, Mūrchā and Maraṇam. So too, in the states of dissolution and release. The dependence of souls on God in the state of dissolution is obvious enough. Dependence in release, too, is clearly taught in the Scripture: उत्तममृततत्तवायेशाः (RV. x. 90, 2) मुक्तानां परमागातिः (Mbh. xii. 254, 17) मुक्तोपसयम्यपेदात् (B. S.) जगद्वायापार-वज्रां (B.S. iv, 4, 17).

The *Viṣṇurahasya* puts the idea tellingly:

सर्वलोकः या शक्तिः सा मद्यवै नान्यथा।
मयेव दत्स्वातंत्र्यं केवलेष्वपि वस्तुं।
तावत्तथायेन मौनवशा: स्वातंत्र्यं मन्यते निजम्।
स्वातंत्र्येवपहस्ते पवाज्ञानान्ति परतत्त्वातम्। (XII, 22-23)

The *B. T.* states that both intrinsic and empirical forms of knowledge of selves are dependent on God:

स्वातंत्र्यं शान्तं हु सदा जीवस्य विद्युतः।
नियतं; प्राक्तं शान्तं मक्त्या तेनेव दीयते॥

1. खण्डायशः सांविशेषस्य प्रक्तः
   बन्धेशायः छृते ते सुसातिन्द्रः (B. T. X, 74).
The Supreme is thus the ultimate source of every one of the sixfold determinations of organized matter and the eightfold determinations of the lives of thinking beings. Of these, release from bondage is the most cherished ambition of man. No conception of God can therefore be complete without making room for its fulfilment by the Supreme. God, then, is the ultimate source of redemption of the world: संसार मोहस्वरूपित सूक्ष्म-हेतुः (Svet. Up. vi, 16); and no definition of Brahman that does not embody this idea will be complete or proper. That is why Madhva goes beyond every other commentator on B. S. i, 1, 2, and interprets "ādi" there to include a pointed reference to the redemptive function and some others also. The very need for an inquiry into Brahman arises because of the desire for redemption, which cannot be achieved without the grace of God; which is facilitated by knowledge: यतो नारायणप्रसादं न मोक्षो न च ज्ञानेन विनायकप्रसाद: अतो ब्रह्मज्ञासा कर्तव्यम् (B. S. B.)

Philosophical reason bids us assume that God should be the ultimate ‘cause’ of bondage, if He is to be the source of our redemption. There is no escaping this. Madhva accepts this position, with the Śūtrakāra (B. S. iii, 1, 5). The logic of this is confirmed by the following texts:

सत्तो विमुक्तिदात्रिष्णोगुणितिर्यथा यथायुपेते ।

बन्धोपि तत्त एव र्यायस्मादिकस्तत्त: प्रमु: (B. T. p. 74)

बन्धको म्वपश्चेन म्वपशाच्च म्वचकः ।

कैवल्यद: परं अहम विभुरेत सनातनः ॥

(Śkāṇḍa, q. by Śrīdhara Svāmin)

Madhva carries the point further and shows how even in release the full manifestation of intrinsic bliss of the selves is brought about by the grace of God Himself, thus making the soul’s dependence on God complete and literally true in every respect:
The giver of Mokṣa should *ex hypothesi* be Independent and Self-determined (Svatantra) and Pūrṇa. God, then, as the great Redeemer of our selves, stands out as the One Independent Transcendent Being of metaphysics:

\[ \text{मोक्षदे हि स्वतन्त्र: स्यात् परस्तन्त्र: सच्चैं सत्तैं} \]

\[ \text{वर्तभान: कथे शक्त: परमोक्षयं केवल्मू?} \]

*(AV. p. 33)*
CHAPTER XLII

MANIFESTATIONS OF BRAHMAN.

The Supreme Lord of all creation remains wrapped up in His glory and bliss at a time when the entire Universe is in a state of nebulous chaos (R.V.x, 129, 2-3). Later, He puts on a multiplicity of forms to evolve the universe thro' different stages. These forms, tho' innumerable, are nevertheless identical with one another, save for their numerical distinction. The first in the order of Divine manifestations is the quarternity of Vāsudeva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha and Samkarsana, popularly known as the (Catur-)Vyūha, credited with redemptive, creative, sustaining and destructive functions. The Supreme further differentiates itself into ten (familiar Avatars) or twelve, hundred, thousand and so on (G.T.ix; Mbh. T.N.i,10). These personal manifestations of the Lord are spoken of as Śuddha-Sṛṣṭi, in Pañcarātra terminology. They are also designated as Vyūhas (groups) in a general sense. The Rāmānuja school recognizes five kinds of manifestations of God: (1) Images (2) Avatāras (3) Vyūhas (4) the Transcendent and (5) the Immanent.1 Madhva accepts all but the first one, tho' he does not use this nomenclature. But there is one important difference that in Madhva's view, these various manifestations are absolutely on a par with one another. There is no gradation among them in respect of powers or potentialities. Madhva is vehemently opposed to the idea of making any invidious distinctions among these manifestations of God or putting some on a higher pedestal than others. There is no room for Svagatabhedha in the Supreme (Neha nānāsti kiñcana). It is the same Infinite in every manifestation. This rigorous note of Monotheistic puritanism is absent in Rāmānuja's system, wherein the Para-

1. Cf. स्वालीत्वअन्तविभिक्तव्यूहपार्नत्यामिभिमेधन व्यष्ठायव्यतित्तु॥
Vāsudeva (or Transcendental Brahman) alone is credited with all the six qualities of godliness; while the members of the Vyūha: Vāsudeva, Pradyumna etc. are assigned less number of attributes! The “Bimbārūpa” of Madhva may be taken to correspond with the Antaryāmī of Rāmānuja. The “Bimbārūpas” have a special place in Madhva’s system in that they constitute the archetype of each soul, a vision of which is the sine qua non of liberation (B. S. iii, 3, 53). The Avatāras are on a different footing and are concerned with specific functions like balakārya, jñānakārya etc. Their number exceeds ten as commonly recognized. There are other Avatars like Hamsa, Datta and Hari, not included in the popular list of ten. Neither Śaṅkara nor Rāmānuja seems to have been inclined to treat Kṛṣṇadviḍaṇya Vyāsa as a full-fledged Avatar of the Supreme; tho’ the latter’s commentator Sudarśana Sūri is prepared to follow Madhva’s lead that Vyāsa is a real full-fledged Avatar of Viṣṇu. But his younger contemporary, Vedānta Deśika, thinks otherwise and treats Vyāsa as subject to the influence of Prārabdhakarma, as an ordinary human soul (R. G. B. t. iv, 9)! This will be nothing short of a sacrilege, according to Madhva. To him, all Avatāras are of equal merit and status. There is no question of degrees of fulness among them, no “partial” and “complete Avatāras”.¹ He takes his uncompromising stand on the authority of the Upaniṣadic and other Pāṇcarāḍīka texts and rejects the commonly accepted interpretation of the Bhāgavata text:

\[
\ast \ast \ast \ast \ast \ast \ast \ast \text{ कृष्णस्तु भगवान् स्वयम्} \quad (i. 3. 23)
\]
as inappropriate on philosophical and syntactic grounds. He has thus no partiality or preference for any particular Avatar of God and treats all of them as equal in rank, attributes and powers.

1. पूर्णमदः पूण्मिदं पूण्मयूण्मद्वेद्यते \| उदरमन्तरं क्रृष्टे \|
   वासुदेवा एकते सबे \ast \ast \quad (S. B. S. B. ii, 2, 44)
Śāṅkara holds the bodies of Avatars to be Māyic and material in stuff. The Rāmānuja school regards them as essentially non-material: दिव्यमपः (R. G. B. iv, 9) and formed out of the transcendental form of the Lord, residing in His highest Heaven: अवतारविभूत्स्यापि अप्रकृतपरमपदनिलयविभूतिविद्वृत्तम (R. G. B. Deśika, p. 13). Deśika also quotes the same authority as Madhva:

न तथ्य प्राकृता सूतिमत्समेकसेवीसंबंधा (Varāha xxxiv, 40).

But the Rāmānujiyas seem to regard the Avatāra forms as non-eternal. This is not acceptable to Madhva: सर्व निधि: शाब्दतत्त्व देहातत्त्वः (B. T. p. 5 b).
VII. SĀDHANA-VIĆĀRA

CHAPTER XLIII

FREEDOM AND FREEWILL IN MADHVA’S PHILOSOPHY

The question of human freedom and Divine control assumes great importance in philosophy and ethics. Madhva emphasizes both and maintains that they are mutually consistent. In the first place, it is man himself and not God that is responsible for the evil and suffering in the world. This is the corollary of the Svarūpabhedaavāda of Madhva. In the Advaita school of Śaṅkara, which regards the ātman as essentially nirviśeṣa, the self is not really an agent. All activity is due to the play of Avidyā or ignorance and is essentially the result of a superimposition on the ātman. Since Mokṣa, in this school, is understood in terms of identity with Brahman, it is not something to be achieved afresh, but is the essence of the ātman himself, though seemingly obscured and hidden. Hence, on this view, even the spiritual effort cannot be regarded as a true purposive activity of the self in all seriousness. Madhva is unable to accept such a position which reduces all activity on the part of the self, whether hedonistic, or ethical, secular or spiritual to a mere make-believe. It is therefore necessary to ascribe real activity to the self. If, as is contended by the Advaita school, the kārtyāva of the ātman is merely due to a superimposition of the kārtyāva that really belongs to the mind, just as the redness of the japa flower is superimposed on the crystal that is placed by its side, then just as one has both the kinds of experience in a case of Sopādhikabhrama viz., that (i) the crystal is red and at other times (outside the bhrama) that (ii) the japa flower is red, even so, one should have the distinctive experiences: that the ‘ātman is the doer’, ‘the mind is the doer’. Since the mind is also open to the perception of the Sākṣī, the doership that is said to belong in reality to the mind (or buddhi) cannot possibly fall outside the perception of the Sākṣī.

Following the Sūtrakāra (कल्पी शास्त्रार्थवल्लभ, ii, 3, 33) and consistent with his ethical realism, Madhva maintains the human soul is a rea
agent in all its actions. If we do not admit this, the Śāstra which lays down injunctions and prohibitions with reference to the achievement of specific results and the moral law on which these are ultimately grounded would lose all significance and lapse into a cry in the wilderness. The Śāstra cannot be addressed to the sentient or to God. The Jaḍa is incapable of responding to any mandate\(^1\) and God is above the purview of commandments. They cannot, therefore, have reference to any but the souls.

The means of realization of Brahman, such as Śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsaṇa, prescribed in the Śāstras, clearly imply that they are to be carried out by a real agent. If the activities in respect of these are only a matter of superimposed assumption, there is no possibility of the fruits of such Śādhanas practised being realized by the aspirants. The Advaitin is hardly justified in denying kartrṭva to the ātman and relegating it to buddhi, inasmuch as Śaṅkara himself, in his Bhāṣya on B.S. ii, 3, 36, has categorically rejected the view of the Śaṅkhya that kartrṭva pertains to buddhi and has upheld the view that it belongs really to the Jīva, as the Siddhānta view. The absence of discrimination (vivekāgraha) between buddhi and ātman has been alleged by the Śaṅkhya-s also. Hence, the position of the Advaitin would be hardly different from the Śaṅkhya view if he were to reject the view that kartrṭva does really belong to ātman. Moreover, if bondage, in the form of doership, enjoyment etc. viewed as an undesirable state (anartha), were to be regarded as belonging only to the buddhi, then deliverance from such bondage also should logically be for the benefit of the buddhi alone, and not for the benefit of the Jīva. Even ajñāna which is regarded by the Advaitin as pertaining to the Jīva is a source of misery to the Jīva, by giving rise to enjoyment and sufferings. So, then, unless such kartrṭva and bhokṛṭva brought about by ajñāna are really accepted in the Jīvas, they need on no account bother about deliverance from them.

---

1. जट हि परशुतन नोदनादिना कियावज्जृवति | न त्वागन्तु भक्षरमन्तरण स्वेच्छ्या ।
   जीवलु * * * | (Jayatirtha, G. B. । p. 897).
Whatever may be the aim of spiritual effort, —whether to achieve something new, or to discover a forgotten state, the effort in that direction must be a very real serious effort on the part of a true and a real agent. It is for this reason that Albert Schweitzer argues that the doctrine of reincarnation cannot accept the hypothesis that the soul’s contact with the bodily experiences is not real. His contention is the same as Madhva’s that “if moral conduct is to play any part in the liberation of the soul from the cycle of rebirth, the soul must, in some way, participate in the corporeal and be affected by the human experience and actions. So the doctrine of reincarnation can in no sense agree to the assertion that the Universe is not real, but must hold fast to its reality” (Op. cit., p. 62).

The acceptance of real kartṛtva to the soul does not however make the Jīva an absolute and independent agent. He is circumscribed by factors like the physical body, the sensory apparatus etc. which are the “gifts” of God. As Rāmānuja points out, under Gītā xviii, 16, where the activity of the soul is said to be not independent but dependent on the five determining factors of the body, an agent, organization, bodily functions and the direction of the Lord: परमात्मस्: तदाधारेऽवः करणकलेवरादिभि: तदा- हितशक्ति: स्ववे जीवाभिस्ताधारस्तत्ताहितशक्तिमात्। The ultimate power of direction is vested in God. The Jīva pursues of his freewill a course of action that is determined mostly by his own deep-rooted nature inclinations and past Karma. But even this is possible because God has given him the power to do things in conformity with his own innate goodness or its reverse. He is not, therefore, a mere puppet in the hands of God. The right to choose between right and wrong is his own and the choice is his own, made on his own responsibility and at his own risk (Yathecchasi tathā kuru).

It may, therefore, be stated that the Jīva is both a doer and a non-doer from different points of view, like a carpenter in the service of a building-architect. He works with his own hands and tools; but looks up to the architect for direction. The skill of the carpenter is his own. He does not owe it to the other. But not so in the case of the Jīva. He
has derived even his ability to do things, metaphysically, from the Creator. \((B.S. \, ii, \, 3, \, 41)\). But for God, he cannot move an inch \((R. \, V. \, x, \, 112, \, 9)\). This does not, however, involve God in the meshes of action and make Him responsible ultimately for the behavior of souls. For, God merely \textit{enables} the Jīva to pursue a course of action, not arbitrarily, but in relation to his former life and deserts \((\text{कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षः} \, B. \, S. \, ii, \, 3, \, 42)\).\footnote{1} \textbf{He does not \textit{interfere} with the Jīva’s decision in any way. He sustains but never constrains} \((\text{Gītā \, xviii, \, 63})\). The Jīva chooses, out of his freewill, a particular line of action for good or for bad, with sufficient foreknowledge of its moral worth and has himself to thank for the consequences. \textbf{He cannot, therefore, blame any one, least of all God, for the unpleasant consequences of his acts, should he have chosen wrongly. He has freedom of choice within the realm of works.}²\footnote{2} God does not throw the creatures blindfolded into an unknown region or set them adrift, chartless on the high seas. Each is provided with a chart, a book of instructions of where lies the haven and how to reach it. \textbf{This book is the Śāstra} \((\text{vidhiṇिःधातनकम्})\).

Another overriding consideration why the individual should be regarded as a dependent agent is set out, according to Madhva, in \textit{B. S. ii, 1, 26} : \textit{हर्यस्तत्वादितिस्मरयथक्षीति वा}। \textbf{For, any theory that makes the Jīva the sole initiator of his actions, will have to face a dilemma sooner or later. The creative energy of the Jīva} \((\text{sāmarthya or prayatna})\) \textbf{is not something that can be treated as different from his essence. That being so, every time any task is to be accomplished, the individual would have to throw in the optimum of his creative energy into it, irrespective of the magnitude of the task. That will hardly be wise or fair. Nor can we}}

\footnote{1}{तदत्तरवक्षत: \, परमात्मा \, स्वातुमतिवानेन \, तं \, प्रवर्तयतीति \, जीवस्य \, स्वच्छुद्यथेऽव \, प्रश्निःधौतकम्य। \textit{(M. G. B. \, xviii, \, 15)}}

\footnote{2}{स्वादिः \, प्रश्निःधिविधिवेब्य वा \, जीवस्य \, क्रियास्वातंत्र्यालक्षणं \, कर्ष्टत्वं \, स्वर्थया \, न। \textit{(NS. \, 327)}}
create internal parts into the Jīva’s personality to get over this difficulty. That will destroy the unity of his being, by introducing an element of multiplicity. We cannot take the help of Viśeṣas also at this stage, as they are not known to possess anything more than a capacity to render internal distinctions possible in an identity of essence. But what we require here is something more than that—a power to regulate the proportion of effort to the given task, which is not a normal power or Viśeṣas, such as we find in other places,—say in an insentient object. Someone is, therefore, required to put such a power into the Viśeṣas. It is not in the competence of the Jīva himself to confer such a new power on the Viśeṣas, which is not found elsewhere. The only deus ex machina who can do this would be God. By His mysterious power of accomplishing the seemingly impossible (अप्रतिमापनप्रदीर्घशक्ति), He could very well do what the Jīva cannot do and set the Viśeṣas in motion investing them with the capacity to secure proportional adjustment of effort and creative energy of the Jīva to carry out different tasks. In this way, the Jīva cannot do without the regulating control of God in his actions. This is, indeed, a very remarkable point made by Madhva, in support of the Jīva’s dependence on God, in putting his creative energy to use.

There is still another difficulty. “If God’s inexorable impartiality is secured by the doctrine that He renders unto every man according to his work, the other view in the ‘Kauśitaki Upaniṣad (iii, 8) that He himself is the one who causes man to do right and wrong, according to His pleasure (B.S. iii, 2, 41) remains unexplained. If God pulls the strings for every kind of action, He is the agent as well as the patient. Here, the Śiṭrakāra resorts to Śruti; but he does not attempt to remove the contradiction”. (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil. ii, p, 441). The contradiction can only be removed by accepting Madhva’s interpretation of the Śūtra : उपपक्तेः चायुपपक्तेः च (ii, 1, 37);

वेष्मेः निर्धेयतेः च वेदार्थायामान्यकरकम्।

नाशीकार्यमतोन्नत्तुं न वेष्मादिनामकरकः॥ (AV).
A partiality which interferes with right and wrong is a blemish. Hence it has been rejected in the Sūtras. The proper control of right and wrong by meting out rewards and punishments in accordance with them is not a fault. It is an asset. Hence, it is acceptable to the Sūtrakāra. As Jayatīrtha explains: There are two kinds of partiality and pitilessness. One results from disregard of individual Karma and deserts. The other lies in depending on them in so far as they are themselves subject to God. Of these, the first one must be rejected as it impairs the validity of the Vedas. For, the Veda prescribes right as the means of achieving happiness and warns us against unrighteousness as it brings on misery. Such being the case, if God should act in a partial and pitiless way in utter disregard of individual karma, it would mean that the law of right and wrong taught in the Vedas would be rendered meaningless. They would then lose their validity. Therefore, the Sūtrakāra, while admitting the view of God’s acting in accordance with Karma, has set at rest the possibility of partiality and pitilessness in the divine dispensations. The sort of ‘partiality and pitilessness’ in meting out punishment and rewards in accordance with one’s deserts is not, strictly speaking, a foible. It does not amount to a defect.¹

This solution of the conflict between the seemingly fatalistic determinism of the Kauśitaki and the rationalism of the Karma theory of the Vedānța lies, as pointed by Madhva, in the doctrine of “Svarūpābheda” of souls. Most Indian commentators would rather take shelter under

¹. द्विविधं खलिखवं बैषम्यं निर्भूषणं च। एकं कर्मचरवनपेक्षात्रस्युक्तम्। ततार्थं वेदामार्थकारकलङ्क्ये दूषणलाङ्क्यं किंयतैतदुः सक्षम्पन्यत। तत्, यदी-श्रेष्ठो धर्मसंसाधनवेष्ट्य विषमो निर्भूषणं स्वात, तदा वेदोदितचर्मरमिमयो: सुखदुःखकारण्यस्य स्वात। तथाच, कथं तस्य प्रामाण्यं स्वात? अतः सूक्ष्मप्रयो कर्मसिद्धापेक्षातप्रकफूरीक्ष्य तत परिहृतम्। अतोत्स्थेता द्विविधेन बैषम्यं स्वादिः कृच, न बैषम्यादिनामकः। दोषपञ्च न भक्तितयावत् (NS. p. 312 b).
the inexorable law of Karma to reconcile the presence of evil and inequalities in this world with the goodness of God. Madhva has been the only one to push the question to its logical extremity. _Karma_ implies freedom and freedom implies a choice. But it does not explain why a particular choice is made. Even a chain of beginningless Karma could not explain why all souls are not equally good or bad, as all of them are equally eternal and their Karmas too were equally beginningless and the start simultaneous. The only possible explanation is that offered by Madhva' viz. that the Karma itself is the result of the distinctive nature of each soul (हठ) which is intrinsic to it. (_Svarūpa-yogyaṭā_). This point is elaborated by Madhva in his _Mbh. T. N._ (xxii, 184-88):

स्मावास्या योस्यता या हठास्या
या अनाविसिद्धा सन्भैत्वेषु निस्या ।
सा कारण प्रधानं तु; द्वितीय—

मनाविद्मेव; तथा तृतीयः॥

जीवप्रयत्नः पौष्याचार्यस्तदत्
नयं विश्वाश्येश्वरं सर्वदेव ।

हठाच्छ कर्मीणि भवति कर्मीजो
यलो यलो हठकर्मीप्रयोक्तात ।

विना न यलेऽन न हठो नापि कर्म
फलप्रदो बाहुदेवोदिकल्य ॥

स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिविनियमको हि
तथापन्येतानु सौभाग्यपेशेव युजेतु॥

एतानपेशेव फलं ददानी—

त्यस्येव संकल्प इति स्वतंत्रता ॥
This takes us one step **definitely beyond** the stage of *anādikarma* of Jivas and traces it to the intrinsic nature (*anādi-svabhāva*) or fitness (*svarūpa-yogyatā*) of individual selves. Madhva gives it the name of "Haṭha". From this "Haṭha" Karma flows as its outward expression in terms of good or bad actions, thro' volitional activity (*Puruṣaprayatna*), without which the Svabhāva cannot be developed to its full stature: *svabhāvā bahuprāyatanābhirhāvā karājanāriśvārā (NS. p. 316). All these factors are however *ex hypothesi* dependent on the will of God, for their *sattā* (existence) and *pravṛtti* (functioning). In allowing this basic nature of the souls to develop without detriment to the moral law, God is not open to any charges to partiality or cruelty; for there is no violation or flouting of the moral law, which is God's own law. He allows it to have its course. He does not interfere in its working and change the nature of beings. *Theoretically, He may have* the power to do whatever He pleases; but the fact remains that *He does not choose to upset the moral law* or change the nature of beings.

And facts matter more than vague musings and conjectures of what may be possible for God. The evidence of Scripture and level-headed reason uphold the supremacy of the moral law as an expression of the Divine will itself. ¹ "The ghost of Darius moralizes on the Persian downfall: "When, of our own free will, we rush to sin, God Himself becomes our ally" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil. ii*, p. 419 f. n.). The nature of the soul is allowed to have its course, whatever it may be. There is no fear of the sovereignty of God being compromised on this view. The moral character of God is not also challenged on this view. For, one can accuse God of partiality and cruelty only when He changes the nature of some in preference to others. Moreover, to change the Svarūpa of the Jivas would be to destroy, to annihilate, the Jivas; for, the "Svarūpa" is the essence of Jivahood and any change of "Svarūpa" would be tantamount to a destruction of individuality.

---

¹ Cf. न ज, प्रकटे: संसारभावादिना, इश्वरेणात्यान्यथाकुमारक্঵लेन, हुद्दलात, सवसामयेभ इश्वरेण, इति युक्तम। इत्यत्म महामहिमलात नित्यसांतारिक्य नित्यः तदनुप्रिणेवोपपत्ते: (*Nyāya Viśarāṇa*, iv. 2, 6).
The theory of Svarūpabhedā and Svarūpayogyatā elaborated by Madhva is thus the most far-reaching and at the same time highly suggestive solution of the problem of plurality of selves and their freedom and freewill and of the presence of evil and suffering in a moral Universe under the government of a moral and merciful God. Questions like the following have been asked all the world over:—The Jīva was not created out of a void, at a particular time. But he is, none the less, an expression of the nature of God. How then does he happen to be so imperfect, while his archetype is also the type of perfection? St. Augustine’s agony of soul was still more poignant. “Who made me? Did not God who is not only good, but goodness itself? Whence, then, came I to will evil and nil good so that I am thus justly punished? Who set this in me and ingrafted in me this plant of bitterness, seeing that I was wholly formed of my most sweet God?” (Confessions, Bk. VII. 4–5). The answer to these questions is found by Madhva in B. S. ii, 8, 51 (अद्द्यानियमत,) in the intrinsic diversity of human nature (adṛṣṭāniyama). It has been shown earlier that this “adṛṣṭa” is another name for the “anādi-svarūpayogyatā” of the individual souls. Rāghavendra Tīrtha brings out this point, very clearly, in his gloss Bhāvadīpa on Jayatīrtha’s TP.: स्वरूपाधिवैचित्र्यस्येव अद्द्यानियमपदेनाभिप्रेतत्वात्व विद्वृतमेतत् चन्द्रिाकायम् (Bhāvadīpa, ii.3, 58).
CHAPTER XLIV

PROBLEM OF EVIL IN RELATION TO ETHICAL ADVANCEMENT

The problem of Evil and suffering in the world is the most difficult one in Theism. We have explained Madhva’s attitude to the allied problem of freedom and freewill, on the basis of the doctrine of natural selection (ānādisvarāpayogyatā) of good or bad and of the tripartite classification of souls. It is not therefore necessary for Madhva to answer the question of the consistency of evil with Divine goodness. This question has also been touched upon in the Vaiṣamyanairghṛṇyādhikaraṇa of the B. S. It is possible to hold, on the traividhya view also, that the presence of evil is an incentive to the better class of souls, to keep off from its temptation:

* * * ततोपयायानु जीवान्मयमतामसान।
सृजनवति हन्तीशो भक्तानि भक्तिचिंद्रे॥ (Viṣṇurahasya, V, 12).

There are many worshippers of Satan and his ways and they have no moral code or spiritual values. They are unmitigatedly anti-social in their outlook. Their type is outlined in the Scriptures1:

Any thoroughgoing theory of man’s spiritual destiny must therefore take note of the irreducible distinctions of human nature and formulate a theory that would cover the diverse aspects of its character as a whole. If reason and experience are any guide in such matters, Sarvamukti or universal salvation would appear to be a day dream. Bondage is not only real, but it may be absolutely irremediable for some. It all depends on the basic nature of free beings. It is futile to throw up our hands and exclaim that we cannot have a really useful ethics unless we believe in the spiritual possibility of every one “who bears the human form divine”. Why forget the animal and other forms divine? Ethical systems all over the world have been devised only for the benefit of those who may care to profit by them. The ethicization of the entire cosmos is no practical politics. The utmost that any useful system of ethics can

1. Cf. Gītā, xvi. 16-20; R. V. निरामिषो रिषो वेदलेवु जागुरुं। and अथ ज्ञानोपसर्गं—
\textit{वे चान्ये मिथ्यावादे; कुष्ठेषु जालैःदिके परस्थायुमिच्छिन्ते ते: सह न संबसेत} * * *
\textit{( Maitri Uṣp. vii, 8 ).}
do is to show the ways and means of advance. Whether particular ethical doctrines will be accepted by all sections of humanity, and acted up to, is more than any ethical system can predict or guarantee. Believers in I. C. B. M. as a means of banishing capitalistic ideology from the world as well as those who believe in peaceful co-existence of nations with different ideologies will always be there. With due deference to those “who bear the human form divine”, Madhva maintains that their future is unpredictable. The diversity of human nature is such that we cannot shut our eyes to it, or squeeze every one into the same mould. An ethical system would be of no use if people are indifferent to it or are not prepared to abide by it नहि सर्वाधिकारिः शास्त्रमु। Some are bound to look askance at the most perfect system of ethics or scoff at it. The existence of professional liars does not invalidate the noble commandment of Christ and the Upaniṣads, to speak the truth. It is hardly necessary, then, to shed sentimental tears over the doom of Satan, Beelzebub, Balial, Kali, or Kālanemi. They have their reward, each according to his own deserts. As men and women are not machine-made, they will and must differ from one another in most minute respects. Difference of character and temperament is the law of the Universe:

अनादियोमयतां वै च कलिवाणिः कश्चिदिकिः।
को निवारयितः शक्तो युक्त्यासमवेशोदशामु ? (AV).

Experience shows that all men are not moved by the same considerations or values of ethical conduct. Some are frank Hedonists to the core, who not only take delight in their hedonism, but are proud of it. Philosophy or no philosophy, they won’t care. You may call them “philosophical swines”, but they will treat your condemnations as those of babes and imbeciles who run away from the charms and pleasures of life unfit constitutionally to enjoy the gifts of nature.

Cf. यथा यूनः पतमरणीशापिरमणी

जूरारणामन्तः करणहरणः नेच जूरेः (Naiṣadha).

It is quite possible that, say what you will, this type of men and women which may presumably form the majority of the race, may go on content with its philosophical hedonism. The Omar Khayyam type is by no means a hypothetical monstrosity. Below this self-complacent,
pleasure-loving type in creation, is the wicked and un-moral type of the most devilish propensities for destruction, vice and moral degradation. Such a type is typified by the demons and Asuras of the Purāṇas and its counterpart is not difficult to recognize in our own times of atomic and ballistic warfare. It is unphilosophical to close our eyes to the darker sides of life and dismiss them as mere illusions or passing shadows. We must find a place for the best and the worst of natures in our philosophy of life. Madhva has had the boldness to look at it from the practical point of view. There is no need for the philosopher to be a moral Alchemist and seek to convert base metals into gold. As a practical philosopher, Madhva refuses to coquet with the idea of Sarvamukti. Man will be served according to his deserts,— neither more nor less. Mukti is not a prize for good conduct to be conferred from without. It is nothing but the realization of our being by each one of us:

मुक्तिहितान्याचार्येः स्वरूपमिं स्वविचारितः ( Bhāg. ii, 10, 6 )

Nature will find its expression in any one of the three patterns indicated already. We need not fight shy of nature’s laws.

The question why there is evil and suffering in this world is thus as profitless as it is illegitimate. It is there and cannot be driven out of existence on any ground of alleged incompatibility with the moral perfection of God and His government. We have to reckon with it and fight against it, if we can; or else go under its weight. Such has been the history of man, all thro’. And philosophy proposes to show us how to rise above the influence of evil and attain goodness. And it stands to reason that while many may falter on the way and fail to reach the goal, others may struggle on and on till they reach the summit; while some others may not even care to think of the goal.

Attention to the baneful effects of evil helps to cleanse the personality of all dross. It hastens Vairāgya which strengthens devotion to a life of purity and godliness: साधनेषु बैराग्यमेवादि अपेक्षितम्। तदर्थं गत्यागतिस्वरूप- नक्कासादिस्वरूपमन निरूपयते। गत्यादिः: खलु दु-स्वरूपतः शुल्लद्यतो। अधिकारणः स्वरूपितवेगे विच्छयते (TP. iii, 1, 1). It is to draw attention to the miseries of Samsāra that the Śāstras describe at some length the souls’ sojourn thro’ heaven
and hell and their sufferings in the womb (B. S. iii, 1). The desire for release is in proportion to the intensity of suffering and the keenness of its realization.

The reality of experience is thus the strongest driving force behind all efforts to attain spiritual perfection. Many and untold are the cares and anxieties to which human beings are exposed in the cycle of transmigration. We are groping in the dark for the light of knowledge and struggling every minute of our lives to find peace and happiness that eludes us all the while.¹ Since we cannot extricate ourselves from this net of bondage save by the grace of God, we must naturally turn to the schemes of discipline by which release is possible to be attained.

---

¹ Cf. इश्वरविश्वानितस्तरे संसारकार्यस्तरे परिपूर्णतामानसिनिरहुलक्ष्योतिकासु विधोतमानानाकामोऽवित्तः ना:प्रासादमनासाद्यताः देहिनाम् * * * (Tdy. ॥)

P.M.—18.
CHAPTER XLV.

CLASSIFICATION OF ADHIKĀRIS

The scheme of Śādhanas embraces the entire field of man’s spiritual uplift comprising the physical, moral and spiritual perfection of the individual. The paths of Karma Bhakti and Jñāna of the Śastraś pertain roughly to the physical, emotional and intellectual aspects of Śādhanā. The scheme of Śādhanas is set out by Madhva with reference to different orders of aspirants (Adhikāris) based partly on generic distinctions (to be acquired). The former class of Adhikāris is distinguished into (1) the highest (2) middling and (3) lowest type of souls, comprising respectively, the gods, Ṛṣi-Gandharvas and the best among men (manuṣyottama). It is pointed out that the human souls can only realize the Supreme from without (bahiḥprakāśa) the Ṛṣis inwardly (antaḥprakāśa) and that the gods can intuit Brahman as omnipresent (sabdhakāśa)—(Madhva, B.S.B. iv. 3, 16).

A different classification of souls is made in an ascending order of spiritual merit into (1) devoted, (2) purified and (3) enlightened. Such of the human beings as are fit for nothing more than a ceaseless cycle of transmigration and those who are ‘damnable’ are ranked below the “best of men”. The term “Manuṣyottama” does not, however, involve any distinction of caste or sex, tho’ each group of Adhikāris may have its own distinctive way of approach to spiritual progress. As faithful followers of the Śūtrakāra, and believers in the Smārta code, all commentators on the Vedānta have, however, maintained that the attainment of philosophical wisdom thro’ Śaстрic investigation is open only to the Traivartenikas, qualified for Vedic study, (B.S. i. 3, 36-38) while the women and Śudras are given access to the saving knowledge only thro’ the literature of the Epics and Purāṇas and Pañcarātra. A faithful adherence to the duties of Varṇāśrama is naturally insisted upon. But Madhva does not make a fetish of entering the fourth order of life as an external condition precedent to the attain-
ment of wisdom (as in the Advaita)\(^1\). At the same time, he concedes the obvious advantages of the Sannyāsa order over other āśramas, on account of the increased opportunities therein, for one-pointed devotion and purity\(^2\). He is the only Bhāsyakāra who has recognized the existence of women of the highest spiritual attainments, eligible for Brahmavicāra thro' the Vedānta\(^3\).

---

1. Cf. the practice of 'Āpatsannyāsa' current in this school.

2. यत्याथांत्र प्रायश्चितः भगवतोपाध्ययः। अप्रायत्वमेव हि प्रायो गृहस्थाधीनाम्

   (B. G. B. iii. 4)

3. आदुरपुस्तकविः नामामिव कर्मविरुद्धः। (B. S. B. i, 1, 1)
CHAPTER XLVI

GENERAL SCHEME OF SĀDHANAS

The aim of metaphysical inquiry is the attainment of release thro’ Divine grace. One has naturally to think of the means of earning it. The Śāstras describe them as leading to one another, in the following order: freedom from worldly attachment (Vairāgya), devotion to God (Bhakti), Śravaṇa (study) Manana (reflection), Nididhyāsana (meditation) and Sāksātkāra (direct realization):

वैराग्यज्ञानोऽसाधिनिद्धारणसाधनम् (TP)

tasmābhāvonāḥ abhāvādītābhāvādayoḥ dānādānādayō gatiḥ (Nym 629 b)

Dispassion or Vairāgya is the first step or primary requisite of a true aspirant. The spirit of detachment and freedom from passions is indeed the most valuable discipline and preparation for a life of genuine godliness and spirituality. It constitutes the essence of spiritual life:

नाबिरतो दुःखरितताः प्रान्तमाहित: (Kaṭha Up)

नासान्तानानसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनानाध्यायात् (Kaṭha Up)

शान्तो दान्त उपत्तस्तितिपुत्र: समाहितो मुखव गान्यो निर्वेदमातृत (Bṛh. Up. iv, 4, 23)

Attachment to sensuous life is the greatest impediment to devotion to God. One cannot serve two masters. One must choose sooner or later between the two, Attachment to the flesh includes the misplaced notion of possession and independence:

ते वो विद्वाननित्य च देस्यां (Viśnu Purāṇa)

Nātho mamāḥ śānto māmāḥ (Viśnu Purāṇa)

Steadiness of attention and exclusive contemplation of the Supreme can only be achieved thro’ deep-rooted love of God. The intimate
relation of Bimbapratibimbabhāva, subsisting between God and souls, gives such devotion an element of naturalness and spontaneity that is needed to make it an ideal one. The worship of the Supreme, under such favorable conditions, earns the grace of God, who is pleased to reveal Himself to the seeker. This conviction of the comparative evanescence of worldly goods and the perishability of all material attractions, so necessary for the birth of Vairāgya, is to be acquired by Karma, patient study and reflection.

The knowledge thus acquired is seen to bear fruit in respect of persons who have done good deeds in former lives and who, as a result, are placed in this life in a congenial atmosphere, for spiritual advancement and whose temperaments are properly attuned to spirituality. Śravaṇa supplies the basic materials for philosophical thought and Manana (reflection) is needed to give it definiteness of content and freedom from doubts.¹ They are both preliminaries to contemplation which leads to direct vision:—

श्वषत्वा ज्ञानसुपपत्तिचिन्तनम् ।
मति: ; निर्द्देता चिन्ता निदिष्यासमुच्चयेत् ॥ (Nym).

Sravaṇa is defined as the acquisition of the sense of the sacred texts under the instruction of competent teachers. It dispels ignorance about the subject-matter (अज्ञाननिवृति); Manana is the systematic employment of the canons of textual interpretation and logical examination with a view to arriving at a firm conviction that the final interpretation of the Śāstras thus arrived at is alone the correct and unimpeachable one. Manana removes doubts (समशया) and misapprehension (viparyaya) and confirms the true import of the Śāstras (parokṣata ttāvanīścaya). Then comes nididhyāsana or dhyāna (continuous meditation). Dhyāna leads to direct realization (darśana). Sravaṇa and manana are thus subsidiary

¹. मननं च बेदाधर्मतिहृतं संशयाभिपथयै स्निवारयति (TP. iii, 3, 43).
(āṅgabhūta) to nididhyāśana, which is the chief means (āṅgi) of Śāksat-kāra. The Vivaraṇa school of Advaita, on the other hand, gives the place of honor among Śādhanas to Śravaṇa (fixation of the import of the Śāstras) and relegates manana and nididhyāśana to a secondary position as contributory factors (कलोपकारयंगम्). As against this, Madhva and his commentators accept all the statements: धोत्त्वं मन्त्रयो निदिध्यासितंय: as primary injunctions (aparāvadhi). These three, according to Madhva, represent the authoritarian, critical and contemplative approach to philosophical truth.

Rāmānuja dismisses धोत्त्वं and मन्त्रयो: in the text: आत्मा वा ओऽ द्वित्य: धोत्त्वं मन्त्रयो निदिध्यासितंय: , as mere restatements (अनुवादमानं) and accepts only Nididhyāśana as being actually enjoined by the Śruti. As for direct vision of Brahman (darśana) enjoined in "द्वित्य: ", he is not prepared to give it any independent position over and above Dhyāna or meditation (nididhyāśana) which he regards as the ultimate means of Brahmic realization. He holds that intensified meditation practised without interruption attains the character of a direct perception: (सा च स्वरूपा दर्शनसमानाकारा ). But then, Rāmānuja admits also that from the time a Seeker comes to accept Brahman as the sole and only means (upāya) of deliverance, his knowledge of Brahman becomes transfigured into a deep attachment for Brahman. In these circumstances, just as one may naturally be expected to go on thinking constantly of a person to whom one has become deeply attached, without the necessity for any special injunction to do so, similarly one can dispense with the necessity for any injunction with regard to Nididhyāśana also. If the injunction is felt to be necessary in the interest of laying down a constant and uninterrupted flow of it, similar injunctions with regard to Śravaṇa to be practised under a proper Guru may also be considered necessary.

In his commentary on B. S. iii, 3, 44–46, Madhva discusses the place and importance of the ideal Guru and the importance of his grace in the final flowering of the spiritual personality of the aspirant (Ṣādhaka).

---

1 Similar emphasis is laid in the Haridāsa literature of the Mādhva tradition:

"गुहितिः गुरुमानागुरु तन्क दोषवद्धण मुक्ति " (Kannada)

'Not until one becomes the slave of his Guru, dear brother, Can Mokṣa be attained.'
He emphasizes the point that the instruction and guidance of a competent Guru and his grace (prasadā) are absolutely necessary for Śravaṇa and Manana to bear fruit: आचार्यानां पुस्थो वेदः (Chān. Up.). This is in keeping with the esoteric tradition of the Upaniṣads, so well exemplified in the story of Satyakāma in the Chān. Up. iv, 9, where the young Brahma-carin, Satyakāma, after receiving instruction from the Devatās still begs to be initiated and instructed finally by his own Guru. Madhva says that the grace of the Guru is part of the modus operandi (इतिकारन्यायता) of the means of jñāna, viz., Śravaṇa, Manana etc. It is therefore a necessary complement of Jñānasādhanā. He further says that of the two viz., individual effort and the grace of the Guru, the latter is to be deemed the more powerful factor and therefore indispensable for one's spiritual realization. The importance of Guru Bhakti has not been so well brought out as an integral part of the Theism of the Brahma Sūtras by any other Bhāṣyakāra than Madhva. The emphasis on Guruprasāda does not mean that individual effort and the deserts of the aspirant do not count. They are the foundations of one's spiritual progress; but Guruprasāda is the crowning point of this development. There is, undoubtedly, an element of deep religious mysticism in the special significance which Madhva attaches to the role of the Guru and his grace in regard to the subject of Śādhanas and their fulfilment. It is to be noted that this represents a completely new and different interpretation of B.S. iii, 3, 44-46, as compared with those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and others. It is an interpretation which has the most vital and intimate bearing on the question of spiritual Śādhanas and therefore quite a relevant topic to be considered in the Śādhanādhyāya and one which has the full support of the Upaniṣadic traditions and teaching:

यस्य देवेन प्रर्ष भक्तिवंशे देवेन तथा गुरौः।
तस्माते कथिता हयथे: प्रकाशते महालम्। ॥

A seeker is allowed to change his Guru if he secures another with a superior spiritual illumination, provided the latter is able and inclined to impart the full measure of grace and illumination that may be required for the self-realization of the disciple. Where both the Gurus happen to be of equal merit and disposition to grant the full measure of their grace qualifying for illumination to the aspirant, the permission of the earlier Guru shall have be obtained before receiving instruction from the other one.
Madhva has given a higher place to be Nididhyāsana or Dhyāna than to Śravaṇa and Manana, which are put down by him as aṅgas to Dhyāna. This is because his conception of Dhyāna or Upāsanā is radically different from that of Śaṅkara to whom all Upāsanā as such is based on superimposition as will be made clear. He does not agree to the doctrine of Śabdāparokṣa of Maṇḍana and other Advaitic writers, according to which Śravaṇa alone is the true and ultimate source of illumination in respect of Brahman, Manana and Nididhyāsana acting merely as accessories to it by removing obstacles to steadiness, such as mistrust and misunderstanding. But to Madhva, they are both subsidiary to Nididhyāsana. They merely help to establish the nature of the philosophical truth (tattvaniṁśaya). Then comes prolonged meditation of particular attributes of Divinity, which is known as Upāsanā.

There is an intimate and balanced relation between Sādhana and Sādhyā on Madhva’s view. He maintains the position that there should be a gradation of spiritual joy in Mokṣa, commensurate with the amount, quality and intensity of Sādhanas or spiritual effort of different levels and orders of Adhikārins:

"दशकल्यं तपस्वीर्ग द्रेष्टेऽक्षण लघुपाणनेवः।
लक्ष्मी सुखस्वर्ग सवौत्तर्क्षेत्र्वत्क्षेत्र लघुपाणमभस।।
शक्रेण वर्षाकोटिः ध्वसः यीतो जतितुः सः।।
वर्षापुरुङ्गः हृ सुरेण मयोज्याक्षिरसा कुतुः।।
हुःस्येन हुः स्वत्व लक्ष्मी इति दशमावाक्षायिनः।।
पीता मरीच्योऽवर्षसहास्मतिसादमाः।।
अतिक्रूत्स्वरुङ्ग यत्वरुङ्ग पिते प्रमाविदोपि च।।"

इत्यतदशिस्ते मोक्षे विदेश्यामाकात: कथ्यमूः।
युक्ते च साधनाधिकायत: साध्याधिकायं सुरादितुः।

नाथिक्यं यदि साध्यं स्वातः प्रयत्नं साधने एत:?

(AV. iii, pp. 45-46).

1. समस्तयुपपरिपूर्णं नात्मकं इत्यमेव वेदार्थं: यति ज्ञातं वेदत्त्वं निमित्तं:। उपपत्त एवंभाव इत्याधिकं: तत्रविश्व:।। तैं ब्रह्मस्ते: पृथ्विकं। तत्साधनेयपासनापूर्वंभाविनः (TD.)
A comprehensive scheme of spiritual discipline is thus the very foundation of all spiritual progress. The importance of ethics to philosophy has been accepted by all philosophers, who look upon it as a system of Sādhanas for the achievement of the highest good (niḥśreyasa). A complete theory of the Universe must necessarily include ethical judgments on the value or worthlessness of objects and thereby secure an influence over our conduct. Since philosophy, in India, owes its inspiration to the deep yearning for the realization of the religious purpose of life, rather than the satisfaction of the speculative instinct, it is natural to expect a remarkable affinity amongst the various systems of Indian philosophy in the postulates and conditions for such a realization. They are agreed on certain general principles of ethical conduct and Sādhanas tho' there are many differences of emphasis, divergence of detail or technical terminology and the relative position and value of certain forms and items of the discipline. The goal of life, the attitude to the world and, above all, the means of attaining the goal, tho' broadly the same, are still marked by certain fundamental differences in philosophic theory.

The special features of Madhva's scheme of ethics relate to the following points: the place of (1) Vicāra or reasoned thought and philosophic inquiry in the scheme of Sādhanas; (2) of Karma in the triple scheme of Karma, Bhakti and Jñāna Mārgas; (3) the nature and importance of Bhakti and Upāsanā and (4) the importance of Aparokṣajñāna as the final means of deliverance and (5) the ethical responsibilities of the Aparokṣajñānin.
CHAPTER XLVII.

KARMA-YOGA AND JÑANA-YOGA.

The most prominent forms of spiritual discipline are those going by the names of Karmamarga, Jñanamarga and Bhaktimarga. Of these, Karmayoga or the path of Works is generally believed to constitute the first rung of the ladder. The term Karmayoga is however understood in most schools of Vedanta in the narrow sense of Pravritti-Marga, as defined by the Mimamsakas, consisting of a faithful performance of the round of Vedic sacrifices and ritualistic rites prescribed by the Srutis and Smritis, with the expectation of their rewards in this or in the next world and the adherence to the duties of Vartha and Asrama. Throughout his commentary on the Gitā, Śaṅkara denounces the possibility of effecting any synthesis (samuccaya) between Karma and Jñana, all the while defining the Karma in question, to himself, as Kāmyakarma. But he hardly ever envisages the possibility of a true Samuccaya between “Nīskāma karma and ātma-jñāna. Indeed, he seems to deny even the name Karma to be given to the works performed by the enlightened soul as Lokasamgraha or the work of Kṛṣṇa himself as a Kṣatriya in upholding Dharma. But the whole emphasis of the Karma-Yoga of the Gitā is on recognizing the need for giving a reorientation to the concept of “Karma” and redeeming it from the spell of rewards and fruits, and making it possible for blending such exalted form of Karma with Jñāna. Śaṅkara is hardly fair to the spirit of the Gitā in denying the possibility of the synthesis of even such exalted form of “Nīskāmakarma” with “Ātmajñāna”,¹ of which Kṛṣṇa himself and persons like Janaka and Priyavrata were standing examples. Madhva’s point in not accepting Jñānakarmasamuccaya is not due to any under-estimation of Nīskāma-Karma as such; but to

---

¹ सांक्यानां द्रव्यमुक्तरणात् अत्मानेव हि कर्मयोगः न ज्ञानिनाम्। ज्ञानिनां तु, गुणरचयमाणानां स्वतंत्रलक्ष्म्यावत् कर्मयोगो नोपप्पले (Śaṅkara G. B. iii, 5)
the unique place which Aparokṣa-Jñāna or direct vision of God occupies in his philosophy. The case is different with Rāmānuja to whom Dhyāna marks the highest stage of Sādhanā which is but a mere approximation to direct vision; but is not actually a direct vision of the Lord. It is obviously for this reason that Rāmānuja pleads for a Samuccaya of Jñāna and Karma as Mokṣasādhanā. Among older Vedāntins, Bhāskara and Brahmadatta too are known to have supported the Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda

Madhva resolves this apparent conflict between the so-called Karma and Jñāna Mārgas by enlarging the scope of Karma-Yoga as understood by Śaṅkara and raising it to the level of a way of enlightened action (*nīskāmam jñānapārvam karma*). He makes a vigorous plea¹ for enlightened spiritual activity *by all*, which cannot be binding in its consequences. There can be no true wisdom without such activity, at least for all of us, mortals, and no true Karma without enlightenment and devotion to God:

\[ \text{तत्क्रमेण ह्रितोष्य यत् (Bhāg. iv, 21, 49 )} \]

\[ \text{यज्ञार्थात्कर्मे} \text{विण्यन्त लोकोऽयं कर्मविघ्नः (Gītā)} \]

Madhva interprets the statement of the *Gītā* that there are two different groups of Adhikārīs in the world, called Śaṅkhyaśas and Yogas, to mean that there are two *orders of beings* among the wise and eligible souls (i) the select ‘few’ (Jñānanisṭṭhāh) like Śanaka and other born-Yogins who pursue the path of knowledge to the exclusion of all Karma (in its external form): सुहस्यादिकम्यायिण ज्ञानिण्यः: सनकायित (G. B.) and (ii) all other enlightened beings, including some of the divinely appointed leaders of society like King Janaka, Priyavrata and others, who tho’ highly enlightened, have been ‘commissioned by the Divine will to follow the path of active Karma’² and serve as an example of disinterested

---

¹ For an exposition of this topic, according to Madhva, see my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 56–58.

² King Priyavrata the God-intoxicated King had made up his mind to retire to the forest. Brahmadeva himself comes down to persuade the King to give up his resolution to renounce the world. He is charged by Brahmadeva to stick to his duties and responsibilities as a King, even tho’ he is a highly enlightened Jñānin. The story of Priyavrata is given in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* Sk. V. 1). The relevant passage from the *Bhāg.* has been cited by Madhva, in his *G. B.* iii, 4.
action to their fellowmen and guide them (lokasaṁgraha). The average run of humanity has, therefore, necessarily to work thro' Karma: कर्मण ज्ञानमात्तोति। ज्ञानेनाग्रुः कर्मणि। But this Karma is not to be viewed in the narrow hedonistic or ritualistic sense of the Mīmāṁsakas. Madhva cuts the Gordian knot here, by distinguishing the Karma-Yoga of the Gītā from what the other philosophers call the Pravṛttimārga of the Vedas. He points out, on sound textual authority, that the latter is deservedly censured in the Gītā and other Śāstras and that true Nivṛtti-Mārga is not what the other commentators think it to be viz., the abandonment of all Karma, but its active performance in a spirit of devotion and dispassion:

निजकामें ज्ञानवृत्ति तु निःतत्तमिः चोच्चते (Vyāsa – Smṛti)

This is indeed the true spirit of “Sannyāsa” and Naiṣkarmya, inculcated in the Gītā. Hence it is that Madhva propounds a new theory of typical Vedic injunctions which are almost invariably followed by goodly promise of attractive rewards to come: ज्ञोत्सीतिः स्त्रीविद्याम वेदतेऽज्ञत। He suggests that the purpose of these prescriptions is, paradoxically enough, to wean us away from the attractions of perishable rewards and pull us up, gradually to a life of disinterested action (Niṣkāma Karma), even as a child is induced by its mother to take a medicinal dose of castor oil, by the tempting offer of sweets in reward. Jayatīrtha puts the case admirably: अन्तात्प्रियविषप्रभाववस्तितान्तः करणा न सहसा ज्ञानसाधने कर्मणि, प्रवत्तितं शक्यन्ते। अन्तत् श्रीचतुर्भुजण।

1. गृहस्थानंध्रमण्योऽवं ज्ञानलिङ्गः। जनकास्रवतः ज्ञानलिङ्गाः अपि आधिकारिकत्वावातीश्च चेतुवच्छयो लोकसंपर्काधिश्च ये कर्मयोगम भवति, तेषपि योगिनः। संस्कृति योक्तेः चेतुवच्छयो लोकसंपर्काधिश्च। सततिः हीवर्च्छया कर्मस्थितं। प्रयत्नविनिविषाधिकारः।” (Bhāg v, 1.23) ह्रतिः (M. G. B. iii, 4)

2. Cf. passage from Vyāsa Smṛti cited by Madhva. The same passage occurs in the Maṇu Smṛti also. The Kārma Purāṇa (i, 2, 64) also defines Nivṛtti Karma in the same terms and Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya has cited a similar passage from a Pañcarātra text:

“तस्मात्सम्बन्धं परवर्त्या वादाध्यमाध्यमः।”

अत्माद्वायं शास्त्रात् ज्ञानपूर्वेण कर्मणा।

3. रोचनार्थः पत्तुः (Bhāg, xi, 3, 43).
KARMAYOGA AND JÑANAYOGA

कर्मयमिश्रितज्ञनाथाः, 'स्वर्गकामः' इत्याविद्वतः प्रमुहः। कर्मविन्द्रविलमः भवनेतः कामो त्वाज्ञानी- 

tयभिमायवैधी (G. B. t. p. 139). Madhva thus makes out that Scripture only 

enjoins acts but not also the pursuit of their rewards: अत एव कामी 

व्रजेत्यथः:। न तु कामी मूलवेत्यथः: (G. B. ii, 47). Jayatirtha brings out the 

technical point of the argument that it is only a visesyatvaidhi and not a 

ViShistavidhi. The mandate is only with reference to the performance of 

the act but not also with reference to desire for the fruit thereof. The 

latter is mentioned in the Vidhi only by way of anuvada or an allusion to 

what is even otherwise established and is not therefore intended to be 

specially enjoined: कामावृत्तदेवन यजन्य विचेत्यत इति यावतः। कामविशिष्टवैधनिवाणं 

तु नेत्यथः।। We have bare injunctions in Scripture without any reference to 

the usual statement of rewards, as in वसन्ते वसन्ते ज्योतिष्य यजेत। विश्रविल 

व्रजेत्यथः। which show that Scripture is not necessarily interested in the 

pursuit of rewards as the invariable objective of the performance of 

sacrifices enjoined by it. This line of interpretation (adopted by Madhva) 

has the support of the Advaitic commentator Sridhara Svamin himself, 

who is much influenced by Madhva's views in this and in some other 

respects.

Even this NiSkama Karma which is, strictly speaking, the only kind 

of Karma that is philosophically admissible or effective — is not to be 

admitted as anything more than an accessory to spiritual realization. It 

is to be pursued for the purpose of acquiring the necessary mental purifi-


cation: अक्रमकोणामत: करणामुददया, ज्ञानामौखि 

्ष्मति (G. B. iii, 4). The reason why Karma cannot be treated as an independent means of release 

is that it is by nature, irrepressibly found to be inexhaustible by the 

enjoyment of fruits. It breeds like bacteria. It is estimated that on an 

average, it takes at least ten future births for an individual to work out 

the amount of Karma accumulated by him from the fourteenth year of 

his life, in one birth:

आ चावद्यमार्दाः वर्णो निर्मीतेः तु।

दशावराणां देयानां कारणानि कर्तेत्यथामूः।

स्वीपथ्यन्त्रदशकं देहे मात्रामाज्येतेः।

अत: कर्मश्रविद्यन्तित: क्षत एव सत्वित्वति। (B. S. B. iii, 1, 8)

1. See his C. on Bhāg (xi, 3, 45).
It would be a vain hope, then, to expect to work it out by enjoyment. The help of Jñāna is, therefore, indispensable to destroy or neutralize the latent effects of past Karma. Such a power of destroying the accumulated load of past Karma, or rendering it nugatory, is ascribed to the actual vision (aparokṣajñāna) of God, thro' meditation (dhyāna). Madhva, therefore, regards enlightened activity (Niṣkāmakarma) merely as contributing to such knowledge thro' Vairāgya, Akāmakarmamīritā:karṇadhyāra Jñānavidhi jāyate (G. B. t. p. 200) [karma] yogātāravādāra sattvadhyāmikādhyāya avanādiināyupkārakōti (G. B. t. ii, 52). Karmayoga, then, is not at all a stumbling block to spiritual progress. It is not, by itself, binding in its effects as it depends on the motive behind it and the end in view with which it is performed. That is why Madhva maintains that every approved activity after the dawn of Aparokṣa has its reward in the form of a welling up of spiritual bliss (ānandodreka) and never goes in vain: ‘न हास्य कर्म शीत्यते’ (Bṛh. Up. i, 4, 15) इति ज्ञानासरसमुचिलेन नित्यान्तकर्मणा प्रसन्न: परमात्मा सुकृती ज्ञानविभवायकमधि सुखं व्यक्तिकरोतिः (G. B. t. p. 104).

Madhva is, thus, quite clear that disinterested activity, carried on in a spirit of devotion to God, is a powerful incentive to the acquisition of knowledge, which alone is the highest means of release. Karma and Dhyāna and others are just accessories to it: अतो अपरोक्षाज्ञानावेष मोक्षः। कर्मं तु तत्त्वाध्यमेव II (G. B. iii, 20) सर्वे निद्रिष्ठादिकमंतरा मथे ज्ञानमाध्य, सुक्तः साधने साधवति I (G. B. t. iii, 31). There is no place, then, for the theory of Jñānakarmasamuccaya:

अत तथा समुच्छयनयो निरांकुः (G. B. iii, 32)

---

1. Jñānāsāṁ: सर्वकारणी सत्साकास्यवेंद्रज्ञ (iv, 37). This applies only to such Karma as has not begun to bear fruit (aprārabāda).
CHAPTER XLVIII

CONCEPTION OF BHAKTI, ITS ORDERS AND KINDS.

Madhva has given a unique place to Divine grace in his system, in making it the ultimate cause of self-realization and God-realization. But, then, the Deity has got to be moved to graciousness (savyāpārikaraṇīyaḥ). This can only be done by Bhakti as the deepest attachment to the Lord, deeprooted and based on a clear understanding of His greatness and majesty, Jayatīrtha has given us the most comprehensive definition of Bhakti, based on the above, in which the religious, philosophical and emotional aspects of devotion are beautifully integrated: परमेष्ठितब्रह्मतथे निर्विकल्पनान्तराधिकार्यकेषैः: स्वामात्मात्मायंसमतवस्मिन्योजननतुण्डिकोत्तरायसह-क्षणायश्चतिवद: निरालम्बप्प्रभुवाहः || (NS.) Bhakti is, thus, the steady and continuous flow of deep attachment to God, impregnable by any amount of impediments and transcending the love of our own selves, our kith and kin, cherished belongings etc. and fortified by a firm conviction of the transcendent majesty and greatness of God as the abode of all perfections and free from all blemish and by an unshakable conviction of the complete metaphysical dependence of everything else upon Him. This definition can be accepted as a classical definition of Bhakti.

Such Bhakti is necessary to manifest the natural and intrinsic relationship of Pratibimbatva of the souls to God, which lies dormant in the state of bondage. Madhva has been the only Bhāṣyakāra on the Vedānta Sūtras, who has thought it fit to give Bhakti a locus standi in the Sūtras. This is as it should be if the BrahmaSūtras are to be a complete and self-contained exposition of Bādarāyaṇa’s philosophical system, embodying all the principal aspects of his thought, derived from the Upaniṣadic and other sources. In view of the clear and significant contribution that the early metrical Upaniṣads like the Kaṭha and Śvetāsvatara had made to the doctrine of Bhakti in the Upaniṣads, it would be impossible to brush aside the concept of Bhakti as something either unknown to the Śūtrakāra or as a topic that he did not consider such an important Sadhana of Mokṣa, in

1. महाशास्त्रवृत्तस्माः दुर्दश: सर्वतोदिष्ट: || स्मेध: भक्तितरितिप्रोक्त: तथा मुक्तिः चावन्यथा ||

(Mbh. T. N. i. 86.)
his philosophy of Theism! The only rightful place for dealing with the
topic will be in the third or Sādhana-Adhyāya. That earlier commenta-
tors on the Śutras like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja have not been able to
find a place for Bhakti within the body of the Śutras shows nothing
more than a defect in their inherited traditions of interpretation or in
their way of approach to the Śutras: व्याख्यानतो विशेषपतिपति: नन्हि
सन्देहादल्प्रणमस्। There is bound to be general agreement that Bādarāyaṇa
is presenting a philosophy of Theism in his Śutras. It will be a strange
type of Indian Theism, indeed, that he will have expounded in his work
on the basis of the Hindu Scriptures, if he had decided to ignore the
doctrine of Bhakti altogether in his chapter on Sādhanas, in his great
work! Even the Saguṇa-Brahmavāda accommodated by Śaṅkara, in
his interpretation of the Śutra cannot afford to ignore the doctrine of
Bhakti as a major Sādhanā. Thus, looked at from any point of view,
the failure of the Pre-Madhva commentators to find a right and
rightful place for introducing the topic of Bhakti within the Sādhanā
adhyaṇa must be accepted as a serious omission and Madhva must be
given special credit for having made good this omission and filled this
gap in the Theistic philosophy of the Śutras.

1. The argument that, as Bhakti has been fully elucidated in the Gitā, it need not
be dealt with in the Śutras would be of no avail when it is remembered that the
Śutras are anterior to the Gitā (xii, 4). As for the Pañcarātras, one would
expect the Śutrakāra who feels called upon to discuss its Vyūha doctrine in the
Śutras (according to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja) to be equally solicitous of the
claims of Bhakti vs. Jñāna. It would be very strange, indeed, if the Śutras should
leave out “Bhakti” while discussing so many sundry and comparatively less
important topics of Sādhana and Upāsanā, besides many topics dealt with
threadbare in the Upaniṣads and the Gitā itself,—such as the ways of exit.
Nothing but a sort of prejudice against Madhva can be responsible for the
general; reluctance of many scholars still to give proper credit to Madhva
where his interpretations are decidedly better than those of his predecessors.
(See for e.g. some remarks of Svami Adidevananda in his review of my
History of Dvaita School of Ved. and Its Lit., Vol. I, in the Prabuddha-
Bhārata (May, 1961).
The point in Madhva's insistence on माहात्म्यांग as one of the constituents of Bhakti is that a blind and ignorant devotion is of no philosophical worth. Since the function of Bhakti is to manifest the true relation of Jiva to Brahman, it must naturally be properly informed about that true relation, which presupposes a right knowledge of the majesty and greatness of God as the One Svatantrya. Hence, Bhakti has to be enriched by study, reflection and concentration:

राज्यसारं प्रतिलक्ष्ये बोधे यथा जसा त्वापकुष्ठविच्छयम्।

( Bhāg. iii, 5, 45 )

We must, therefore, first of all, enlarge the horizon of our knowledge of God thro' a wide range of study ( śravaṇa): श्रुतमायें गतो भक्तया शास्त्रवादेशि ज्ञानार्थम् (Mbh. iv.) Bhakti is, thus, not a mere wave of sentimentalism or Emotionalism, to Madhva. It is the outcome of patient study and deep reflection: ज्ञानानामगुणहितम् as Rāmānuja (G. B. ix. p. 65) puts it. It presupposes a certain amount of knowledge in the same way as the pursuit of knowledge needs the urge of devotion: विना ज्ञाने कुन्तो भक्ति: कुन्तो भक्ति विना च तत् (G. B. ix, 31). Madhva also demands a high degree of moral perfection from the true devotee of God. He affirms that there can be no true devotion to God without a real sense of moral purity, sincerity of purpose and detachment to worldly pleasures. One cannot serve two masters. True devotion to God would be impossible without the cultivation of a natural distaste for the pleasures of the world. It is one of the constitutive elements of true devotion:

भक्ति: परे स्वेतज्ञांको विरिति—

रघ्व चैष भिक एकालन्: ( Bhāg. xi, 2, 42 ).

स शत्मतिस्मारति योजाृतृणां

तमगामकारोऽवहित नायत्व भक्तम्। ( Viṣṇu Purāṇa iii, 7, 30 )

सा अध्यात्मः विकस्यमान।

विरितमन्यः करोऽति पुंसः।

1. नावेद्विमांस्ये तं वृहतम् ( T. B. iii, 12, 9, 7 )

अध्यपिय: गुर्ग्म: ( Bhṛ. Up. iii, 9, 26. )

P. M.—19
Acāra or purity of life, in all its aspects, is thus the sine qua non of true devotion and knowledge. Devotion without such purity will be a travesty: अतोत्तु: कविद्वृति चेत दामिकलेन सोतुम्येषः || (G. B. ix, 31). Complete control of the passions of the flesh, calmness of mind, impartiality of conduct and love of God are emphasized by Madhva as the pre-requisites of devotion and knowledge:

गुणानि चतुर्वि यथागमे मेशानी च मिने च समोदरिम नित्यम् ।
ते चापे देवं शरणं प्रप्नं एकान्तभावेन भजाम्यजगम् ॥
एतत्किंचिर: परिशुद्धस्वर्तं कस्मात्र पद्येयमन्त्यम् ?

(Mbh. xii, 343, 3, Q. Madhva, G.B.).

He emphasizes two aspects of devotion: the positive and the negative. The positive has been dealt with by Jayatīrtha in the definition of Bhakti quoted before. It is worthy of note that the theory and practice of Bhakti, as taught by Madhva and his followers, are free from all traces of erotic manifestations, which dominate or at least color the conception of Bhakti in certain forms of North Indian Vaiṣṇavism, like those of Jayadeva, Caitanya and Vallabha. This sensuous and passionate side of it is first to be met with in the writings of the Tamil Vaiṣṇavas (Āḻvārs) who preceded Rāmānuja, in the South; wherein the love of God is placed on terms of the tender quality softening down to the rapturous emotion of conjugal love and wherein we come across most of those pathological symptoms of amorous longings which have been systematically reviewed and vividly described in the works of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. But Madhva’s conception of Bhakti avoids these emotional excesses and identifications and remains at its exalted intellectual and spiritual level of firm philosophic devotion to the Supreme Lord of the Universe who is to be worshipped with loving attachment as the Bimba of all Pratibimbas (Jīvas). But it is not, on that account, lacking in intensity of fervor and feeling. For, Madhva has recognized, in the clearest terms, that Bhakti is in essence an ineffable blending of the emotion and the intellect. He gives expression to the intensity of his love God in its sublime and raptu-
rous aspects in the benedictory and concluding stanzas of his works. This abiding aspect of his teaching found fuller expression in the writings of his great followers in the Haridāsa Kūṭa such as Śripādarāja, Vyāsarāya, Purandara Dāsa, Vijayadāsa and others. The following verse from the *Harikathāmṛtasāra* of Jagannātha Dāsa furnishes a fine example of how readily God responds to the call of the heart:

```
“मलगि परमादरादि पाठलु
कुछल्ट केल्लु, कुछल्ट पाठलु
मल्लु, मिन्तरे नल्लु, नल्लदरे वोल्लि निम्मेम्ब।
खुमानो हरि तनत्वरनरे-
घाणे विदुर्गल्ट रमाधव-
नोलिसलियंदे पामरह बल्लुवह भवदोऽगे।” (Kannada)
```

“God listens seated, to the Bhakta
That sings to Him in ecstasy, lying down.
He stands and listens to the one
Who sings to Him, seated comfortably.
He comes dancing unto him that sings standing.
To him that dances and sings,
God says ‘I’ll show Myself to him’
Verily, Hari is most accessible to his own
Never for a moment does He stay away from them.
But fools caught in Samsāra
Know not how to make Him their Own.”

(*Harikathāmṛtasāra*, ii, 5)
But the possibilities of erotic devotion, as a means of contacting the Divine, are not unknown to him. Madhva's peculiar doctrine of intrinsic gradation of fitness among various orders of souls enables him to correlate the different forms of devotion to different orders of selves. In his view, Kāma-Bhakti or erotic devotion is the special privilege of Apsarases and ought not to be practised by others. He indicates a variety of standpoints of devotion with reference to different orders of Jivas and harmonizes the various accounts on the basis of adhikāras:

(1) सेवनतः सदा देवा: कामिल्लवाप्सरः दिमयः।
कान्तिकाविष्ठ कामेन भक्त्या केवलवैवः हु।
मोक्षायान्ति नान्येन भक्तिः योग्याः विना क्याचित॥ (Pādma)

(2) भक्त्यं वा कामभक्त्यं वा मोक्षो नान्येन क्याचित॥
कामभक्त्याप्सरः ष्टीणामन्येषः नैव कामतः॥
उपास्यः श्रूरलेन देवशीणा: जनार्दः॥
जारलेषाप्सरः ष्टीणा: काशाचिंदिति योग्यता॥
योग्योपासाः विना: नैव मोक्ष: कस्यापि स्तेर्याति॥
अयोग्योपासानाकर्तुरिरस्य भविष्यति॥
तस्मातु योग्याः झाल्या हरः काशुपासनमस्॥ (Bhadrikā)

(3) पतिलेवं भ्रयोपासो भ्राणं में पितेति च।
पितामहत्यापेषां निद्घानां जनाईः॥
प्रपितामहः में भगवानिति सर्वजनस्य हु॥
गुरः: श्रीश्रद्धाणो विष्णु: सुराणां च गुरोगुरः॥
मुनिप्रभृतो गुरः: सर्वजनानां पुरुषोऽत्मः॥
Devotion being a state of loving attachment: माहात्म्याः पत्निः हस्तसमुदायो
हि भक्तिरित्यक्तम् (N.S) born of knowledge and regard for the object of
devotion¹, it will be obvious that no contrary emotion of positive dislike
or hatred of God could be taken to help in the attainment of Mokṣa,
notwithstanding the presence of certain stray passages in the Purāṇas
stating that certain persons had reached God even throu’ aversion
and hate:

1. Cf. ‘स्नेहृषिष्दन्तयांभक्तिरित्यम्मलितायते। महनीयग्राह्योऽरीरैव हि भक्तिरिति
भाव।। अन्यथा, स्नेहृष्द्वमित्रायंतमात्रायांभक्तिविलासंतंगात्।।’

( R. G. B. t. vii, 1 )
Such passages ought to be treated as \textit{arthavāda}, says Madhva:

\begin{quote}
\textit{द्वेषपान्त्यनन्तिकस्यतं स्तुतिभक्ष्यसिद्धिगति} \textit{तत्} \textit{॥} (AV).
\end{quote}

They are meant to emphasize that God should somehow be kept in mind, always. "\textit{द्वेषायादयं सुगा:} * * * \textit{इति} भक्तिमिश्रत्सापनार्थि नियत्यानस्तन्तर्यक्षि च, स्नमकपयक कर्ताचिच्छापवलत देविणोऽयि भक्तिकलमेव भगवान, ददातीति। भक्ता \textit{वह वह} \textit{ते} \textit{पूर्वो शिष्यपालादयं: शापवलत, द्वेषिण:} * * *( M. G. B. ix 12 )." The acceptance of "\textit{Dveṣa Bhakti}" (hatred of God) as a possible means of salvation\footnote{Contrast: } will be quite inconsistent with the prevailing spirit of the Śastra which is to bring out the majesty of God. If the Scriptures meant to teach that God can be reached by cultivating hatred against Him they should have expatiated upon His demerits and imperfections instead of on His great and infinite perfections, as they do. Madhva, therefore, strongly disapproves of "\textit{द्वेषमान्ति}". The \textit{NS} and the \textit{Sannyāyaratnāvali} undertake to show that none of the contexts and instances cited above is able to contradict the fundamental position of the Vedas that Mokṣa could not be obtained save by loving devotion.

Devotion, then, to be meaningful and justifiable must be founded upon a firm and adequate knowledge of the merits of the object of such devotion:

\begin{quote}
\textit{शान्यपूर्णं परः} \textit{स्नेहो नित्यो भक्तिरित्यथे} (\textit{Mbh. T.N. p. 5}).
\end{quote}

Madhva speaks of three different types of devotees (1) Uttama-Bhaktas (2) Madhyama and (3) Adhama, according to the nature and intensity

\footnote{Contrast: }
of devotion characteristic of them. (B.T. XI, 2, 42–45). He insists further that devotion, to be impregnable, must be guarded against the insidious influences of various forms of anti-theistic tendencies:

\[ \text{जीवाभेदो नियुक्तवं अपूर्णगुणतः तथा।} \]
\[ \text{साम्याविक्ये तदनेषां मेदस्तत्त्व एव च।} \]
\[ \text{प्रादुर्भवविपर्यासः तदुक्तस्व एव च।} \]
\[ \text{तद्ग्रामण्य निन्दा च देशा एतेऽहित्वा मदतः।} \]
\[ \text{पत्तेवहित्या यथा भक्ति: सा भक्तितिर्ति निश्चिता॥} \]

(Mbh. T. N. i, 113–15).

Bhakti, then, is the outcome of a profound admiration for Divine majesty coupled with a spontaneous love and regard for the Supreme. It cannot be dissociated from knowledge. But this knowledge of God is not the cold intellectual apprehension of Reality. It is a vivid perception of the Supreme Reality as the pivot of one's own reality, consciousness and bliss (सतारत्नेविनिश्चितिमेवर), with the utmost warmth of love and attraction for one's own Bimba that the soul is capable of.

Bhakti of the right kind is thus a blend of both knowledge and love:

\[ \text{ज्ञानस्य भक्तिभावगतः, भक्तिज्ञानसमितियते।} \]
\[ \text{ज्ञानस्य विशेषो यत, भक्तिरित्वभिभधीयते॥} \]
\[ \text{परोक्षारोपोऽध्वे विशेषो ज्ञानो यथा (AV).} \]

Jñāna is a constituent of Bhakti. For this reason, the latter is very often referred to as "Jñāna" itself, in the Śāstras. Where, however, the distinctive aspect of attachment is sought to be emphasized, their fusion is designated by the term "Bhakti" but they are basically aspects of the same thing; even as mediacy and immediacy are but the integral aspects of knowledge. Texts in Scripture which refer to Jñāna as the means of release have therefore to be interpreted as inclusive of the aspect of Bhakti also and vice versa. If this basic
affinity between the two is properly understood and kept in mind, much of the controversy regarding the claims of Bhakti and Jñāna to be regarded as the immediate means of release would vanish. Madhva has shown ably that they are but different aspects of the same approach with more or less an interpenetrative content.

Madhva insists, further, that due regard must be paid to the principles of Tāratamya in respect of the nature and extent of devotion to be shown to the hierarchy of devotees (of the Supreme) among the gods and men:

तारतम्येन तद्वक्त्रेष्वापि भक्तिविनिमित्वयात्।

कल्याणेष्वापि तद्विभविन्याकेदानुसारः॥

तस्मात् पूज्यान्ति नम्यान्ति भेयान्ति परितो हृदिः॥ (AV. p. 52)

अतो विषयों पराभवतिः तद्रेखु रमादिकु इ।

तारतम्येन कल्याणा पुरुषार्थमभौपत्ताः।

समेतू स्वात्मचतुर्द्वेहः सत्तव्यत्र ततो द्या।

काव्यकामरोपिशेषेण दश्यते क्षिप्रमीमित्रः॥ (AV. p. 41)

He also distinguishes three stages of Bhakti (1) that precedes Parokṣa-jñāna; (2) one that follows it; and (3) a third that comes after direct realization (Aparokṣa-jñāna) and wins the absolute grace (atyarthapraśāda) of God. It is this final stage of Bhakti that fully manifests, by the grace of God, the true relationship between the Jīva and Brahman and completes the aim of realization, viz. the manifestation of intrinsic bliss. These three stages are designated by Jayatirtha as Bhakti, Pakva-bhakti and Paripakva-bhakti. The last one is an end in itself (NS. p.605). It is most impressively described by Madhva himself as:

भक्त्या शानं ततों भक्ति: ततों द्वस्तिस्तविन्द्र सा।

ततो मुक्तिस्ततों भक्ति: स्वात्म दुखत्वापिणि॥

(AV. p. 41).
Here is a very striking and an almost unique feature of Madhva’s philosophy of Bhakti, whose inspiration may be traced in the writings of the Mystics of Mahārāṣṭra and the Gosvāmīs of the Caitanya school. It views sublime Bhakti, not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. The light of Bhakti shines brightly, not only on this side of release; but on the other shore of Mokṣa as well. For the relation between the individual soul and the Supreme Being is not something that is snapped in release. For, this relation is not something that is extrinsic to the nature of the soul and imposed from outside by Upādhis, as in the Advaita system. It is, to Madhva, a sacred relation that holds good for all time; something that is rooted in the very nature and being (svarūpa) of the soul. Its destruction would mean the destruction of the Jīva. It is a unique relation, a spiritual bond which is indestructible. It is the relation which the great Tamil poet-Saint Tāyumānnavar so well puts it as:

Enru nān anru ni; un aḍimai allavo

Mukti is merely the shaking off of what is extrinsic to one’s nature and reposing in one’s own intrinsic nature. The intrinsic spiritual relation between the human spirit and God is so dynamic in its magnetism that the attraction of the latter becomes more fully manifested in release than in Samsāra. Indeed, it breaks thro’ and finds expression there, in a thousand ways, which are beyond our understanding and analysis from here! Surely, it is not open to us, in Samsāra, to peep into the released state and try to describe in detail the behavior of the blessed ones in release, towards the Lord or towards one another. That state of blessedness is obviously something beyond our comprehension in its richness and glory.

It is what the Bhāgavāta Purāṇa refers to as the intrinsic devotion of God-intoxicated souls like Sanaka, who feel a natural bond of attraction to the Lord and go on practising Bhakti even after Siddhi (Mokṣa):

1. Cf. “I and Thou are coeval
   But then am I not your slave?”

   निस्थो निस्यानं चेतनस्थेतनानामको वहूना यो विद्वानोति कामानः।
   तमास्मथे येः स्वप्स्यामि धीराः तेषां पुरस्यान्ति सेविनाम। (Kaṭha Up.)
and who decline even the special status of Sayujya and other forms of Mukti and are quite content with their joy of devotional surrender (ātmanivedana).

नैकाल्यतां मे स्मृतयति केचित् (Bhāg. iii,25, 34)

* * * * * एकवचनमुः

दीयमानं न गुणमिति * * * * (Op. cit. iii, 29, 13)

Madhva himself, in the supreme mood of his ecstatic devotion of this kind, gives expression to this same exalted feeling, at the conclusion of his Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirṇaya, thereby giving us a glimpse of the ripe maturity of his true devotion to the Lord:

व: सर्वगुणसंपूणे: सर्वदौष्टिविविधित: ।

प्रीयर्तं प्रीत एवालं विषुमें परम: सुढ़त।।
CHAPTER XLIX

DHYĀNA AND ITS PLACE.

Madhva accepts the position of many Scriptural texts that direct perception of God (Aparokṣadārśana) alone is the proximate cause of release from Samsāra: Cf. ‘देवेन्तैं तः मुच्छते’; ‘वद्य पद्य: पद्यते स्वयमवर्णम्’; ‘भक्त्वा त्वनया श्रवण अहमवंविविषा’; दृश्यं च तल्लेन *

But inasmuch as God is essentially incomprehensible (avyakta) in the fulness of His majesty, He cannot be visualized save by His favor (B.S. iii, 2, 23–27). Once favorably inclined, He reveals Himself (vivṛṇate tānān svām), in any subtle form. The grace of God, which is the ultimate means of realizing Him, can only be obtained by prolonged contemplation (nidadhyāśana) of His perfections, with steadiness and devotion, to the best of one’s capacity. Such contemplation of the Divine presupposes a preliminary study of the Scriptures (Śravaṇa), which has then to be supplemented by deep thinking or reflection (manana), in order to clear the mind of all uncertainty and misconceptions that may be lurking there from time immemorial and whose presence will retard the constancy and flow of devotion. Hence the need for systematic philosophic inquiry and logical ascertainmet of truth (jijnāsā or vicāra).

The special attention given by Mādhva philosophers to dialectic establishment of their Siddhānta and the refutation of rival theories has, thus, to be understood in the light of an indispensable necessity imposed by the very conditions of philosophic inquiry. It is not inspired by a love of controversy as such or a desire to find fault with others.

The knowledge acquired by study and stabilized by manana is then made the basis of steady contemplation:

शुच्या मल्ला तथा व्यात्ता तद्व्याशानिपर्यये।

संशयं च पराणय लम्बते ज्ञानदीनम्॥

This combination of Śravaṇa, Manana and Nidadhyāśana is termed...
“Jīnāsā.” The last stage of the inquiry may take the form of Dhyāna or contemplation: आविष्कारपोषकानसंसारः (TP. iii, 3, 52), of certain chosen attributes of God or a profound rumination over the truths of Śāstras (Śāstrābhyaśa) whose import has been definitely settled: (लिखितत्व ध्वनिदिन्द्र समाचरतः NS. 536 b) The contemplation of Śāstrārtha is thus treated by Madhva as an independent form of Upāsanā, taught by the Upaniṣads: स्वाभाविकीय्यकर्ता नानो मौलिकः। तद्विष्णु (Tuit. Up. i, 9). It is pointed out that such study and reflection should be continued till all doubts are set at rest. The chosen Guru alone would be competent to fix the time-limit up to which they should be carried on. (NS. p. 535) Where such a perfect Guru is not available, one may study the original Śāstras whose import has been fixed by authentic persons.

The study of Śāstras is partly also an aid to contemplation. The other forms of spiritual discipline are Yama, Niyama, Āsana, Prāṇāyāma Pratyāhāra and Dhāraṇa taught by the Yoga Śāstra. These are to be treated as accessories to Dhyāna.

Dhyāna, defined as आविष्कारपोषकानसंसारः, is virtually the same as the state of Samādhi or introspection taught by the Yoga system. These three stages of spiritual advance of Āravāna, Manana and Dhyāna correspond to the stages of learning (pāṇḍitiya), reflection (mauna) and introspection (brāhmaṇya) referred to in the famous Upaniṣadic text: तस्तवार्थाद्वाम पाण्डित्यं निरविच् 1 बालेन तिष्णातः। बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निरविचारं मूर्तिस्मां च मौलिकं च निरविचारं त्राम्भः: (Bṛh. Up. iii, 5,1)

1. Madhva has pointedly rejected the view accepted by most of the modern scholars and translators of the Upaniṣad, that “a Brahmin should become disgusted with learning” (Hume, Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads, p. 112). He points out (G.B. ii, 52) that if a turning away in mental aversion (vairāgya) from पाण्डित्यम्, बाल्य and मौलिक had been intended to be conveyed by the text, it would have used the proper grammatical case: पाण्डित्यं निरविच
CHAPTER I

PRATIKOPĀSANĀ

There are numerous texts in the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads which prescribe, almost at random, the meditation of any physical, adhidaiva or other principles as Brahmān: नाम ब्रह्मानुपासित। उदरे ब्रह्मानुपासिताः शाक्तराश्य:। आदित्यो ब्रह्मायदेश:। आविदेऽत्त आऽकाशो ब्रह्म्वति। अोमिश्येत्तद्वर्मण्युपासित । मनो ब्रह्मानुपासित। असु ब्रह्मो ब्रह्मो ज्ञानात। These numerous identifications of the adhibhautika, adhyātma and other essences with Brahmān thro' vibhakti-sāmānādhikaranya (case-apposition) very naturally raises the question: whether they are meant to be taken as a meditation of their identity (abhedopāsanā). The usual answer given to this question is that such texts are to be taken as prescribing “Pratikopāsanā” or symbolic meditation. For the sake of efficacy of meditation, these various objects of meditation are to be ‘treated’ as Brahmān, for the nonce. In other words, the idea of Brahmān is to be mentally superimposed on them, so that they could be viewed and meditated upon in an enhanced status. This is Śaṅkara’s explanation of what constitutes Pratikopāsanā: इदेः चात्र ब्रह्मण उपासनें, यत्रतीव्रकृ तदाध्यायांषारपिमम्। प्रतिमादित्तिविविष्वानानाम॥ Rāmānuja also agrees with Śaṅkara’s interpretation of Pratikopāsanās that in respect of such Upāsanās as गणो ब्रह्मानुपासित it is not Brahmān that is the true object of meditation, but only the mind and other objects and that as it is conducive to prosperity to look upon and treat the inferior as superior, as in looking upon the King’s servant as the King, even so,

Contd.—

( Paññ. ii, 3, 28 ). That apart, it is absurd to suggest that true Jñānins ever get tired of or fed up with hearing, knowing and reflecting more and more about God: न श्रव्यं तदेऽत्त वैराग्यमुक्त्यते। न च ज्ञातिनिभक्तिमथिदिदिनयेन \n
विरितगतिनैव। अत्याचारशुक्लादिनाम्। न च तेऽवत्त तत्तथू तुस्य नाशित । तत्सीव महत्त्वस्वायतभावनाच॥ It is interesting to note that Śaṅkara also in his G.B. ( ii, 11 ) has cited the Brāh Up. text in a sense which is fully in agreement with Madhva’s. See Śaṅkara B.S.B. iii, 4, 47. ( Cf. also: पाणिनियम पाणिनियमावादमात्मानं नित्य नित्यवन लक्ष्य (Ānandagiri on above ).
for purposes of meditation, the mind and other objects are to be meditated upon as Brahman.¹

Madhva’s views are quite different here. He refuses to countenance the idea of any superimposition of Brahma-dṛṣṭi on any Pratika, however sacred or exalted it may be: न प्रतीके न हि सः। ‘नाम भवेतृबुद्धिता’ इत्यादिना शब्द-वास्त्यम् न प्रतीके ब्रह्मद्रष्टि: कारणः। (B.S.B. iv, 1, 4.) The proper way of Upāsanā of any Pratika is to meditate on Brahman as being present in it: किंतु, तत्स्थलनेत्र उपासनं कार्यम्। II (B.S. iv, 1,4). It is but natural to expect the mystic way of speaking in regard to so profound a subject-matter as God-realization and the means thereof, in the Āraṇyakas and the Upa-niṣads which are noted for their love of secrecy and esotericism:

परोषक्रिया हि हि देवा: प्रत्यक्षिन्य। II

Even in the writings of modern mystics, the tendency to resort to mystic modes of expression is not rare. Madhva derives the key to the proper interpretation of the subject of Pratikopāsanā in Vedānta from the famous passage of the Aitareya Āraṇyaka (iii, 2, 3) which he quotes in his works: एते हेव बहुच महतुधिके मीमांसलो, एतममा अवध्यं, एतमण्डृतें छन्दोग्या, एतंखमोदेत दिवि, एतामकालो, एतंधू, एतमोपस्वी, सबयु मूलेषेतमेब अप्रेष्यवज्ञने। II ² It is interesting to note that the expression मीमांसले occurring in the above passage has been explained by Śaṅkara also in his commentary on B.S. i, 1, 15 as “Upāsanā.” This shows that Madhva represents correctly and faithfully the genuine tradition of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic Seers in regard to the principles and technique of Brahmapāsanā.

While repudiating the view that the Pratika should be meditated upon as “Ātman” Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are ready not only to condone but to approve of a conscious superimposition of the idea of the Upāsya (Brahman) on the object chosen for meditation on the ground that it

¹. ब्रह्मद्वार्य मन आदिस्सारे:। अपवर्त्त उत्कत्व-द्विती-ज्ञुद्वाय भवति। यथा भुत्वादी राजद्रष्टि:। (Vedāntadīpa, iv, 1, 5).

². 'It is this Paramātman indeed that the votaries of Rg Veda meditate upon in the great Ukttha, the Adhvarus in the fire, the Chandogas in the Mahā-vrata; Him in Heaven, in the Ākāśa, in the waters; in the oṣadhis and in all beings.'
would serve to enhance the status of the Pratīka. But while such medita-
tion may enhance the status of the Pratīka, it would almost certainly
lower the status of Brahman; for in allowing ourselves to think of and
meditate on a limited object or symbol as God, there is a great danger of
spiritual fall. There will be no escaping the fact that when one meditates
upon one thing as another, the identity will apply both ways. It is there-
fore flimsy to talk of meditating upon any Pratīka whatsoever as
Brahman:

भाते लेकर तद्वाचे, तद्वावलोक्यस्य किं न तत्त?

तस्मादेशश्च सर्वमन्यस्य रक्षतानचः ☛ (AV. p. 55 b.)

As a true Theist, Madhva feels that he cannot be a party to any inter-
pretation of the Sūtra: भवतिर्मक्यातः (iv, 1, 5), which will either condone or
approve of any conscious superimposition of the idea of Brahman on any
symbol or Pratīka used in meditations. That will, he feels, be a virtual
sanction of idolatry:

तस्मादतत्त्वं नीपास्यमति वेश्विन्द्रो मतम (AV).

No Christian missionary could have been more critical of the profanity
of idol worship than Madhva has been, here. If one should plead that in
such meditations we tend to annihilate the Pratīka as such, we have only
to say that it is hardly a fact. For, if we really do so, there would be no
talk of Pratīkopāsanā as such, as the Pratīka itself would not be there,
any longer: स्वयंपरमेत्व नामावतीनां, छत्र: प्रतीक्षितम? For these and other
reasons, Madhva discards the interpretation given by Śamkara and Rā-
mānuja for this Sūtra (iv, 1, 5) and finds a better interpretation for it
by treating it as constituting a new adhikaraṇa. According to his inter-
pretation, the Supreme Being should always be meditated upon as
BRAHMAN i.e. as being endowed with infinite attributes and as
transcending all.

In meditating on Brahman, the devotee may concentrate on one
or more attributes of divinity according to his spiritual fitness and capa-
city. The highest number of attributes open to human comprehension are four,¹ tho’ the Scriptures posit an infinite number of attributes of the Supreme Being (Human) souls that can not concentrate on more than one attribute are termed “Tr̥pa-Jivas” by Madhva. The range of attributes upon which superhuman souls like the gods² and the R̥sis can meditate is much wider and only the four-faced Brahmā can meditate on most of them:

सच्चिदानन्द आत्मेति मातुबेल्लु; सुरेखैः।
वधाकम पचुगैः: ब्रह्मण लखिबेल्लुगैः। ||
उपास्य: * * * * * (Aṇu-Bhāṣya)

This sort of contemplative correlation and sublimation of both positive and negative attributes of the Divine Being is known as “Gūṇopasaṁhāra”:

एवं गुणानं स्वैद्वेशाभावार्थ वलन्तः।
शोभितेवं भगवानुपास्य: * * || (Madhva, B. S. B.)

Madhva says further that among all the attributes of Brahman, to be meditated upon, the attribute of “Bhūmatva”, infinitude, is the chief one which is to be meditated upon in unison with the other attributes like ānanda. In other words, each one of the attributes of Brahman, chosen for meditation is to be viewed as infinite in range and content. The Upaniṣads represent Brahman as Bhūma, and Pūrṇa in every

1. Of, “There are only two attributes of God of which we, humans, have any knowledge at all. The being of God is not however confined within the limits of human experience. Our knowledge of God is real so far as it goes. But reality is beyond us. There are an infinite number of other aspects of the Deity along which we cannot travel, since we are restricted to two lines of approach only, viz., mind and matter.” W. G. Bond. Three Things That Matter-Religion, Philosophy and Science, p.73, Watts, London.

2. According to Madhva, the Brahmasūtras as “Para-Vidyā” are meant for the benefit of the gods also. Hence, the details therein, of Gūṇopasaṁhāra by them also, Reference to the mode of Laya of the gods preparatory to their release (B. S. iv, 2,1-16) as interpreted by Madhva, which V. S. Ghaté finds unaccountable, is also to be similarly understood. As the B. S. discuss the fitness and the right of the “gods” to Brahmavidyā, these other questions concerning their Sādhana and goal, raised by Madhva, should cause no surprise!
respect and emphasize the contemplation of this distinctive aspect as the source of the highest spiritual realization: यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नाते सुखमस्ति।
मूमैव सुखम्। (Chān. Up. vii, 23). Human intelligence may be unable to form a precise idea of the infiniteness of any attribute of God. The conception of such infinitude may also differ according to different levels of comprehension. There is however nothing to feel absolutely sceptic about forming some idea of what it would be like, within the limits of our own understanding. Jayatīrtha gives us a good example. Tho' infinite is the number of years and the number of months that must have gone by since the beginning of time, we are still able to conceive of some difference in the infinitude of these two ideas of infinitude. The same is the case with the different conceptions of the infinite attributes of God which different Adhikārins are able to form.
CHAPTER LI

BIMBOPĀSANĀ

As already pointed out, the eternal and intimate relation in which individual souls stand to the Paramātman is conceived by Madhva as a peculiar metaphysical relation of constant dependence of the Jivas on Brahman, not merely in respect of their external outfit of body and senses etc., but even in regard to their very being and becoming. This relation, it has been stated already, is something that is intrinsic to the very nature of the souls and has nothing physical about it. It is difficult to express it in terms of any other relation within our empirical grasp. The term "Bimbapratibimbabhāva (Original and Reflection) which has been suggested for it, by Madhva, is to be taken as the nearest parallel to it in our experience. It is not, however, to be taken literally as depending on any external factor or condition (Upādhi), as in the Advaita school, which would at once render it a conditioned relation and therefore terminable. It is, to Madhva, an indissoluble and perpetual relation (Svarūpasambandha). It is a relation of intrinsic dependence of the Jīva and his essential characteristics of reality, consciousness and bliss. It is coeval with the Jīva (यात्तत्त्वमात्र) and becomes fully manifested in release. The bondage of Samsāra is itself due to this relation being missed by the Jīva and becoming obscured by a false sense of independence in respect of his Sattā, pratiṣṭita and pravṛttī. No wonder that among the various forms of Upāsanā, the meditation on the Bimba-aspect of the Lord has been stressed by Madhva as the sine qua non of Aparokṣa:

मोदिपि भगवन् स्वाभिम्बस्थि एवैवें मोचयति (NV. iii, 3).

Madhva’s commentator gives an example. Mokṣa is attainable only after ‘death’. But that does not mean that one gets Mokṣa at the time of any death at random from among the innumerable ones thro’ which one has to pass, in the course of one’s transmigratory career. The same is the case with Bimbopāsanā, as the requisite of Mokṣa. The conception of Bimbopāsanā and Bimbāparokṣa may well be considered to fall under the domain of mystic communion between God and soul in Madhva’s religious philosophy. By its very nature, it is a consummation which is beyond discursive thought, for elucidation.
CHAPTER LII.

PLACE OF GRACE IN REDEMPTION

According to Madhva, this knowledge of God is not a mere intellectual realization of the Deity. It is more a feeling of deep attraction and attachment arising from the knowledge of Bimbapratibimbabahāva between God and soul and sustained by a sense of spontaneous affection flowing from it. Hence, in Bhakti, there is the element of knowledge and attachment combined. In the last analysis, then, it is not pure knowledge that puts an end to the bondage of souls, but the grace of God, in spontaneous appreciation of the soul's surrender. It is Divine grace that plays the most decisive role in the final deliverance of the souls, according to Madhva. On this point, he differs considerably from other Vedāntins, particularly Absolutists, to whom it is knowledge per se that constitutes the highest means of release. Madhva derives his idea from the Śrutis, which emphasize, in addition to knowledge, the importance of "vision" and "grace of God falling on the individual":

यमेवेऽविद्यते तेन तत्थ्यस्तत्त्रीष आत्मा विद्यते तनू स्वामः।

The difference is due to the difference in the conception of the origin of bondage. The Advaitic conception of bondage as the outcome of a mysterious ignorance concealing the nature of Brahman, which is automatically destroyed by the dawn of knowledge, of the atman and its essential identity with the Brahman: ज्ञानम्महानस्य निवर्तकम्, leaves no room for any kind of personal intervention of a Deity or its grace, in the termination of this ignorance. It is within the power and competence of knowledge (alone) to destroy ignorance, just as it is within the competence of light to destroy darkness. Once this ignorance is destroyed, the spirit of man shines forth in its pristine form as a matter of course: आत्मवाचान्यांहि: । (Śrīharṣa). निवर्तकम् मोहस्य ज्ञातवेनोपलक्षित: । There is, thus, no scope for the intervention of Divine grace in the accomplishment of Avidyānivrūtti, as such: तथा च, ज्ञानविवेकश्च युक्ती किमेक्षोऽप्रतादेन? न
This is the strict metaphysical position of the Advaita, accepted by the older writers. But later writers have been obliged to relax its uncompromising rigidity and make a compromise with Theistic tendencies by conceding some sort of a remote connection of knowledge with grace. Accordingly, grace is required to create a "taste for Advaita":

\[ Khaṇḍana. \]

This is a very unsatisfactory position. As a Theist, Madhva naturally opposes such devious pleas. The theory of Brahmājñānavāda has got to be abandoned as metaphysically untenable. And with it goes the dogma ज्ञानवानस्य निवर्तत्वम्. We come back to the position that the vision of God and His grace are both necessary: द्यौऽक्षम ते सुच्चयेत्; ‘इत्यत्तत्तत्तवायं तत्तत्तवमेति’ ये मेयैष द्यैरेते तेन ज्ञ्यत्तत्तवैप्रय आयमा विद्याय तद्दोऽस्मात्; ‘नायमात्मा *** न मेयव (सम्य:) जः ट्रेवम् *** A proper harmonization of these Śrutis will lead to the acceptance of grace as the most potent factor in achieving deliverance. Taking his stand on both the groups of texts, Madhva argues a strong case for the necessity of Divine grace. No man, says he, can be saved by the sheer force of his knowledge:

\[ * * * * * * * द्यादेन हरिन विना। \]

\[ ज्ञानवानस्य तदोपि स्थानुकित: कः पूर्वव्यतु (AV) \]

Jayatirtha throws great light on this point नास्तामिः केलवियया मोह उच्चते; येन, ध्यानवान आप्स्थत। किंतु, भगवतसाधारकांपि || (TP. iii, 3, 49): जिशास्त्रात् तावच्च साश्चात्मसाधारान्त्वेनात्मामामभिमता। किंतु प्रस्तो भगवानेव || (NS. 527).

All this is because the Divine will itself and not merely a beginningless ignorance is or can be the ultimate explanation of bondage, as has already been explained. This idea finds expression in Śaiva philosophy also and is supported by the B. S. iii, 2, 5 and Śvet Up. vi, 16. Rāmānuja under B. S. iii, 2, 4, comes to very near the same position as Madhva on
the question of what causes the bondage of souls. But his theory does not take us beyond the stage of “anādikarmaparamparā”; which we shall see, will not be a final explanation of God’s concealing or obscuring the self-luminosity of the Jīvas.

According to Madhva, the Sūtra; अनुव्रद्धमण्डलु न तथात्वम् (iii, 2, 19), emphasizes the role of Bhakti in finally manifesting to the Jīva his natural and innate affinity with Brahman as Its Pratibimba. Such knowledge of his true relation to Brahman lies hidden from the understanding of the Jīva, by the will of God Himself, (B.S. iii, 2, 5) in the state of bondage when he is encrusted by Avidyā, Kāma, Karma etc. It is by the quality of Bhakti (devotion) that the Jīva can rise above these impediments and obscurations of his real personality and realize his true relationship to God. Madhva understands the simile of water, (ambuvat) employed by the Sūtrakāra here, as an allusion to the quality of clinging consistence of devotion (like that of water), which alone will enable the soul to know, realize and adhere closely and intimately to God, forever, in the final realization of his intimate and inseparable relation of Bimbapratibimbabhāva to Him. Bearing in mind the keynote of the Sādhanādhyāya in which this Sūtra is placed, every thoughtful student of the Sūtras will be impressed by this original and felicitous interpretation of the keywords of the Sūtra: ambuvat and grahaṇam. It is also the best mystic interpretation of this remarkable Sūtra. If, as Radhakrishnan says, “all signs indicate that it (Mysticism) is likely to be the religion of the future”, 1, the world’s unborn soul also will find in Madhva’s interpretation of the Sūtra: अनुव्रद्धमण्डलु न तथात्वम् the very core of Mysticism. However, one can hardly expect a dry critic like V. S. Ghate, who seems to have started with a preconceived notion against Madhva that “the very fantastic and forced way in which Madhva interprets many of the Sūtras leaves no doubt that he would even have set aside the Sūtras themselves; but that their uncontested authoritiveness prevented him from doing so” to understand and appreciate

1. Eastern Religions and Western Thought, Preface, ix.
the great poetic beauty and deep philosophical suggestiveness of this interpretation concerning so refined and deep-seated a spiritual emotion of the human breast as Bhakti or to pronounce any other judgment upon it than that it is a "very fantastic" one.¹ In the light of what has been stated above, it will be seen that it is not merely a bold and original interpretation, but contextually the most appropriate one. The topic of Bhakti is quite in order, here, in Pāda ii, after the discourse on "Vairāgya" in the previous pāda.² Even according to Śaṅkara, the topic here relates to the Bimbapratibimbabhāva between Brahman and Jīvas.³ But in so far as such a relation is a purely fictitious one according to Śaṅkara, its relevance to Śādhanādhyāya would be open to question, as such knowledge (of their Bimbapratibimbabhāva, brought about by Upādhis, as between the Sun and its reflection, supposed to be established here as a Siddhānta view) would be a hindrance to realization, rather than a help, inasmuch as true realization, according to Śaṅkara, would consist in shaking off the idea of Bimbapratibimbabhāva caused by Upādhis. The use of the double negative construction in Śūtra iii, 2, 19, is also a strong indication that it is a Siddhānta-Sūtra, as taken by Madhva.

Vādirāja, in his gloss on the TP. of Jayatīrtha, has done a great service to Madhva’s philosophy by bringing out the full beauty and depth of thought and feeling that are hidden behind Madhva’s original interpretation of the Sūtra in question. It is worthwhile quoting his explanation:

अल्पाक्षरवाक्याय ‘भक्तभावात’ इति वक्तव्ये, यत्र ‘अमुकबद्धमतात्’ * * * * *,
इति यत्रः,

² Cf. तत्र, प्रथमेऽपौद्ध संसारसत्तिप्रवेषः प्रदत्तति वैराग्याय || (Śaṅkara, B.S. iii, 1, 1).
³ Rāmānuja’s interpretation of this adhikarana as intended to show that Brahman is not vitiated by the imperfections of the world, tho’ immanent in it is, besides being unconnected with the subject of Śādhanavicāra, not entirely free from redundancy (See his commentary on i, 2, 8).
GRACE IN REDEMPTION

Even tho' for brevity's sake, the Sūtrakāra should have used the expression "on account of lack of Bhakti (the real nature of the soul's relation to God is not revealed to him)," yet, it should be borne in mind that he has chosen to use the words "Ambuvat" (like water) in order to embody a succinct definition of Bhakti at the same time. Keeping this intention of the Sūtrakāra in mind, the commentator, Madhva, has accordingly rendered the word "Ambuvat" by the word "Snehana" (with loving attachment) and the word "Grahaṇa" by the word "Jñāna" (understanding or grasping). For, Bhakti is the same as love of God lighted by a full knowledge of His majesty. It is true the Sūtrakāra could have written "Snehanājanand" (because He is not known thro' love) to convey his meaning, explicitly. But there is a special purpose in introducing a metaphor here. It is well known that viscosity is an inborn and deep-rooted quality of water. Man's love of God (Bhakti) should have this quality of clinging firmly to God at all costs. It is only such a love that is capable of revealing to the soul his true relation to God, as His Pratibimba. It is to convey so much deep meaning that the Sūtrakāra, who is a master of language and thought, has used a telling metaphor here to emphasize the greatness of the quality of Bhakti and its place among Śādhanas.

Jayatirtha brings out the rationale of Madhva's position with his characteristic brilliance and clarity of thought. We cannot attribute the condition of bondage, ultimately, to any of the familiar causes of Kāma, Karma etc., each of which has a beginning. Even supposing that each previous stage of Kāma, Karma etc., begets the next one and so on, it should be open to the soul to get back its original and essential charac-
teristic of self-luminosity, in the states of deep sleep and universal dissolution, when there is no play of any kind of desire or activity. But this is not found to be the case. Hence, there must be something above and beyond our actions and desires (however beginningless), which must be regarded as having cast a veil of ignorance on our essential self-luminosity, from time immemorial. This original substance may therefore be identified with what the Śāstras speak of under different names as "Māyā", "Avidyā", and "Prakṛti", obscuring the self-luminous soul (which is finite). For, it is in the nature of "Māyā" or "Prakṛti" to act as an obscuring agency. But then, as this "Māyā" or "Prakṛti" is only an insentient principle, it cannot be said to function independently and of its own freewill. In this way, we are led to accept the position that ultimately it is God Himself that obscures the Svarūpa-Caitanya (self-luminosity) of the Jīvas, by means of (1) the above-mentioned principle of Prakṛti endowed with the three Guṇas (of Sattva, rajas, and tamas) and which in the Śāstras is also known as "Avidyā" because it acts as an obstacle to the soul’s attaining its self-luminosity and knowledge of its true nature; and (2) by His own wonderful and inscrutable power (acintyādbhuta-sakti).

As the ultimate cause of the bondage of the Souls, in this sense, God is also the source of their release:

बन्धको भवप्रेरन भवपासाच मोचकः।

कैलायुः परे श्रायः विष्णुस्व सनातनः॥ (Skānda, q. by Śrīdharma)

1. न चात्मामात्रविनिवन्नोऽवन्यो जीवस्य शृङ्गितस्वितातिहासपुराणदिशृ परमेवर्तत्त्रातिनिमित्ततावपगमतः। ज्ञानन्दसन्ध्यो तथं जीवः॥ तद्वृत्तवृत्तविश्वासतुभविष्यतः। तेनावभ्यते —असित किमप्रावलकः, येन तथा: त्वप्रकाशचेतन्यवहनोऽधि नात्मनस्तत्वं वेदेऽ॥ न च, कामक्षादिकेष्मेव तथा भवितमहंति । तत्स्यापि साधिन: कराणापेक्षावतः। न च पूर्वपूर्वसमाहिततत्तत्तमतिः युक्तम्। हस्तप्रभाध्योः तद्वृत्तवृत्तविश्वासतु, किमकलक्षेत्रत्वञ्चवमाहस्य प्रकाशम्। अतः, कामक्षादिकेष्मेव कार्यकार्यशास्त्रातिहितास्वभाववृत्तयों अनाचेत किमपि द्वयं [[] आवरकं] अंगीकारयम्॥ न च, मायापि कर्म स्वप्रकाशमात्रासितात्त्वम्। आवरकं
This mysterious power or will of God also is known by the names of "Prakṛti" and "Māyā". These two different senses in which the terms are used in the Śāstras should be carefully noted to avoid confusion.

This "Māyic" power of God also has two aspects, one that obscures the soul from comprehending its own essence in full and another which precludes the vision of the Lord to the fullest possible extent:

अथावेऽपि प्रकृति हृदे भयु प्रातिसिन्धि स्थिते ||
स्त्रगुणाचार्यदिक्ष लेका परमाचार्यदिक्षपता ॥
स्त्रगुणाचार्यदिक्षा हत्वा परमाचार्यदिक्षा पर: ॥


It is only the grace of God that can raise these last veils of bondage and uncover the true nature of the self to itself and reveal the true nature of the Lord to it:

हिरण्यकेन पायेण स्त्रययाचिद्विहितं मुखम् ॥

तत् तं नूपरं अयङ्कमु विस्थस्मीय हुः ॥ (īśa Up.)

Contd. –

स्नन्तः तस्य: प्रसिद्धलातुः। कथयते चाचार्यपतिः। न च, जड्यस्य स्वतः:किंचिदावरक्रवं युक्तम्। अतः परमेश्वरं पव व्यायामत्या प्रकृत्या सत्त्वातिरिगुणमय्या वियो-विरोधिविचनावय्या, अचिन्त्यादुभुत्या स्वकृत्या च, जीवस्य स्वप्रक्रा-शामिग्य स्वतत्त्वचतुनयमाचाल्यतातिति युक्तम् ॥ (NS. p. 19b).

Dasgupta I. Phil. iv. p. 159 fn. 3) has unhappily misquoted the last sentence in the above passage from the NS, and misinterpreted it, as a consequence. He has also, on this account, drawn the erroneous conclusion that “Ignorance” in Madhva’s philosophy is a “negative substance.” The fact is that it is a positive substance (भास्कर्य) in Madhva’s system. Cf. न वचन भवरस्तिः भानस्य भिप्लमिि;... (NS. p. 64b).

1. Cf. मद्द्रमोपविवेच्यति निरूतिमाहिनीयति च।

प्रकृतिर्मूले तत्थचानन्ति कथयते ॥” (Madhva, BSB. i, 4, 25).
Not all our Karma, or Jñāna or even Bhakti can achieve this without the grace of the Lord to withdraw this obscurcation from the Jīva: 

अनाधिततो गुणाः सन्तो भक्तयादा न ह्यामुषुचन् ।

जीवं तद्दूषणमुक्तं ह्येन संयोगेद्वितः ॥

कौश्यभ मोक्षायदीस स्वातंत्र्ये तेन तस्य हि ॥

इत्यनादिगुणविस्तरे सत्यपि, अन्यक्षयादिना तत्तद्विन बिना मोक्षायते: ॥ (Madhva, N. V. iii, 3, 33). Such is the raison d'etre of Divine grace, according to Madhva.
CHAPTER LIII

APAROKṢA-JĪṆĀNA OR GOD-REALIZATION.

Madhva distinguishes carefully and sharply between Dhyāna and Aparokṣa. This is clear from his definition of the former as continuous flow of mediate knowledge (अत्यदनसंवक्षणसंवस्ति:); while the latter is, as its names Aparokṣa and Sākṣātkāra show, a direct vision of the Supreme Being, in its “Bimba-form”. The form revealed in Dhyāna is therefore regarded as just a mental picture of the Yogin’s own construction, while the one visualized in Aparokṣa, is the actual revelation of God in His Bimba-form, as He is:

रूपं रूपं प्रतिहयो बभूक

tadāy rūpaṁ pratiṣṭhāya । (R. V. vi, 47, 18).

What is presented in Dhyāna is thus only an image constructed by the impressions of the mind. It is just a substitute and not the original form of God: तदावनाद प्रतिरूपेतः (B. S. iii, 2, 37) यथा जीवावनादेवर्णम् यथा। तथेऽवस्तुस्तथादिपि। नेत्रं यद्रुपस्तात्ति। इति प्रतिरूपेतः॥ (B. S. B.). This is still more clearly explained by Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya: उपासितस्यार्यतदावनादिस्वरूपम् हि स्वरूपः। न च तद ज्ञातं द्दयते। तदावनादिर्यावनेव तस्यतत्स्वरूपज्ञाते। यथा प्रतिमायाम्॥ (Tattvapradīpa).

The highest stage is, therefore, one in which the Yogi or Sādhaka is face to face with the object of his meditation and intuits the Divine Form, which is his archetype (Bimba). This is technically termed Bimbāparokṣa, which is the highest form of spiritual perception, without which no one can hope to be released (B. S. iii, 3, 53): न च प्रमाणन: सर्वं गुणसामावश्यं कल्पयति सत्यत्व दश्चत्स्वरूपं सुविवेकता। समोद्धि भगवान्त स्वाविभवस्त्र एवं भूतयत॥ (Nyāya-Vivaraṇa)
This vivid flash-like intuitive perception of one’s own Bimba marks the journey’s end. It is the fulfilment and culmination of all Sādhanas. It is what is known as Aparokṣajñāna, which is the penultimate state of final release.

Its intensity and vividness vary according to the innate capacity of the selves. In the case of human beings, it is said to be like a lightning-flash; in respect to Devas like the blaze of the Sun. The gods Garuḍa and Rudra visualize it like a reflection of their own faces in a mirror and the four-faced Brahmā sees it in clear outlines (Taitt. Up. Bhāṣya).

Tho’ the Supreme Being is ex hypothesi unmanifest (avyakta) it is possible, says Madhva, to visualize it thro’ grace:

नित्याव्यक्तोऽपि भगवानीश्वरे निजशक्तित: ।
तत्रेत परमात्मानं क: पर्येतत्मिते प्रभुम ॥

(Nārāyaṇādhyātma, q. B. S. B. iii, 2, 27).

The Supreme is pleased to reveal itself to the devotees thro’ sheer grace:

यमेवैव्रुण्यें तेन लभः
तत्स्वेष्य आत्मा विरुण्यें तत्रू स्वामः (Kaṭha Up.)

But for this condensation on the part of Brahma, it can never be visualized by any finite being, however much one may try:

परमात्मायपरमेष्यं तत्वसातदेव न जीवशक्त्या ।

(B.S.B. iii, 2, 23)

Brahman is essentially unmanifest and formless. Unlike the elements of fire etc. which are insensible in their subtle (tanmātrā) form, but visible and manifest in their gross form, Brahma has no such diversity of aspects as gross and subtle. Hence, it is always and essentially avyakta (unmanifest). But tho’ it is essentially avyakta, it reveals itself to the
Upāsaka, by its own grace and inscrutable power. Without Brahman’s choosing to reveal itself, in this way, no one can ever visualize the limitless one.

Aparokṣajñāna, then, is something which, by its very nature, defies any more explicit description. It is to be experienced and felt. Words are hardly adequate to describe it. It is a flash-like revelation of the Supreme, at the fruition of a long and arduous process of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana, in the fulness of absolute self-surrendering devotion to God, as our Bimba. Ultimately, it is He that must choose to reveal Himself pleased by the hungering love of the soul. The Pratibimba (soul) must turn in and seek and see his Bimba in himself. That is Aparokṣajñāna: आपरोक्षज्ञान 전 आत्मन्येवात्मार्ण पर्सेत्।

Such direct perception of God is attainable only when the mind is specially attuned to the Supreme by full discipline of Śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna. Such a perception is immediate and achieved throw the mind specially perfected for the task: मन्त्रात्मेदमात्मात्मम् (Kaṭha Up.)

Vyāsarāja explains further that texts like ‘यम्मन्नसा न मेवै’, which deny the power of the mind to reveal Brahman have reference to minds not properly trained; because there are other texts which establish the capacity of the ‘ripe and disciplined mind’ to do so. Texts like ‘यम्मन्नसा न मेवै’ do not however conflict with the ability of the mind to reveal the Brahman. Such texts merely show that the mind should be perfected and disciplined by Śravaṇa, manana and dhyāna, before it can be made to visualize the Brahman when such direct revelation is given to it by the grace of God Himself. Aparokṣajñāna is believed to confer marvellous powers of eight-fold Siddhis etc.

The Rāmānuja school does not recognize Aparokṣajñāna as constituting a distinctive stage in spiritual realization. According to this school, the highest stage of spiritual attainment open to the Sadhaka is that of nididhyāsana itself and the highest personal impression of the Supreme
Being that one can have in this world does not rise above one’s own mental image of the Supreme formed thro’ constant flow of thought and meditation:

(i) उपासनं च स्मृतिसंतानहं दर्शनसमानाकारं व्यापारसंपीतसंवधायम् । (R.G.B. vii, 1).

(ii) व्याख्या च तैत्तिकावदविचिन्तस्मृतिसंतानहं । सा च स्मृति: दर्शनसमानाकार: ‘भिक्षुते
हृदयार्थिणः छिंडन्ते सर्वसंक्षया:। श्रीयंते चात्म कमांगिणो तस्मिन्, हेते परारे’ इत्यन्ने-
कार्यीत। एवं च सति, निदिष्ठायसतय दर्शनहप्तत विचित्रयते। मस्मति च स्मृतेयमावनां-
पक्षं दर्शनहप्त। वाक्कोरेगतस्यार्थं प्रयथितम् \* \* \* \* \* \* उपासनं स्थात
ध्यायुक्तिः, दर्शनाचिन्तनाभ।’ इति। तत्सैव वेदनस्य उपासस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यस्यद्वादशतस्य भवायु-
स्मृतिव्यवस्थितम्। एवं स्मृतिनिद्रेशत्वा प्रसंपादित। दर्शनस्य च प्रत्यक्षात्रां अप-
वर्गसावनभूता स्मृति विश्वादी।। (Rāmānuja, Śrībhāṣya i, 1, 1)

This means that there is no room in the Rāmānuja school for a distinctive state of Brahmāparokṣa or direct vision or immediate intuitive perception of God, in this life, other than the mental image conjured up by the devotee thro’ constant flow of meditative recollection: ‘व्याख्या च तैत्तिकावद-
विचिन्तस्मृतिसंवधायम् (Vedānta Deśika on R.G.B. vii, 1). This means that
the highest kind of direct experience of God open to man as a seeker is
but mediate (Parokṣavṛtti). Such an experience will be no better than
a mental construct and, therefore, in the final analysis, not the same as a
direct immediate perception of the Lord. Rāmānuja says that the expe-
rience of Dhyāna, tho’ mediate, can be so clear and vivid as to be almost
immediate (दर्शनसमानाकार) which is thus explained by Deśika: (स्मृतेयम
दर्शनसमानाकारं नाम, विद्वदात्मन्यं दर्शनसमानाकारं रघुमेव), that the mental impression
of the Lord achieves a vividness that is almost equal to a direct presenta-
tion. Deśika proceeds further to illustrate his point by the examples of
the extravagant fancies of a person deeply in love with a woman and the
obsessions of those seized by a sense of fear and so on:
APAROKŠAJṆĀNA: GOD-REALIZATION

भवति च स्मृतेनावनाग्रबन्धवे दशीनस्मानाकारता भीरकामुकादिनामः ||

यथा — ‘लीनेव प्रतिबिम्बितेव लिखितेनोलोकीपरिवेच च
प्रतिस्थेव च वजंक्षेपस्तिवाद्वातनिवासेव च ||

सा नेतरतिस कैलितेव विशिष्टेदेवेघोपुर: पाथमि—
विनतासुनतिनायुद्यनिपिदस्तोव वद्या श्रिया || इति ||


Such a view is not acceptable to Madhva, as it reduces Aparokṣajñāna to the level of a pure fancy. That will be hardly in keeping with the profound reality, dignity and supreme significance attached to Brahmasāktākāra in Indian philosophical tradition as the highest and the most desirable state consummation of man's philosophical quest:

द्रव्याद्वर्त्याः ह्वाद्वर्त्याः सृष्टियाः सृष्टिवद्विषिष्टमः: (Kaṭha Up. i, 3, 12).

ह्वाद निर्माण मनसाभिषिष्ट: य एतद्विद्विगुरुतात्स स्वरति (Op. cit. ii, 3, 9)

दिव्य दशमिते चढ़ा: पत्य मे योगमालिकम् (Gitā, ix, 8)

* * * * हाद्माहामादेवचिन्ती (vi, 2.)

यद्य पत्य: पद्येत सृष्टिवर्णम् (Mund Up. iii, 1, 3)

आत्मन्येवात्मानं परस्येत (Bṛh. Up. iv, 4, 23)

एकोस्यार्थम् वेद्विषिष्ट: (Mund. iii, 1, 0)

पराशरं पुरुषमीक्षते (Praśna Up.)

As Vyāsaraṅga points out, in his Nyāyāṁrta, Rāmānuja's view reduces the texts, which refer to the direct visualization of the Lord by the great Seers and mystics as the highest means of deliverance, to a figurative level. Apart from that, it is difficult to see how a meditative cognition can be said to attain a vividness of presentation (विशेषार्थनावि-

ब्यक्ति: ) equal to that of an actual immediate presentation (दशनस्मानाकार: ).
It cannot be in the sense of its acquiring a deeper content and a wider range of details than a mere remembrance-series. For, a recollective experience cannot possess a wider range or deeper content than the original experience from which it is derived or the memory image from which it flows. As for actual identity, with immediate perception, it is out of the question. It is, no doubt, possible to imagine that there is an immediacy of experience in such cases by auto-suggestion or under abnormal psychological conditions. But that will not alter the hard facts of reality and, in any case, it will be too much to expect deliverance by such means!
VIII. DOCTRINE OF MUKTI

CHAPTER LIV

NATURE OF THE RELEASED STATE AND ITS STAGES

In each system of thought, the doctrine of Salvation is determined by the conception of the nature of souls and God. The Buddhists believe in Nirvāṇa or utter annihilation of personality as the highest end and aim of life. The reason is simple. They don't recognize, even in Samsāra, a permanent self other than the five skandhas, as a transmigrating spirit. Hence, the question of the survival of any such non-material principle after the achievement of release does not arise! Some modern apologists of Buddhism, who try to argue that Nirvāṇa is not extinction of self-consciousness, or of the ātman, know not what they are talking about. Buddhism is a frank and fearless Nairātmyavāda and that is that. The Monists hold the absorption of the individual self in Brahman to be the highest form of realization, as individuality is merely the result of a pluralization by Avidyā and is not an intrinsic fact. Madhva's conception of the metaphysical dependence of souls on God as His Pratibimbas, not in the sense of a false reflection, but as coeval and co-eternal but dependent and finite beings controlled by God as their antaryāmi and his acceptance of intrinsic difference and gradation of fitness (yogyatā) among them, as individuals, lead naturally to the persistence of an irreducible distinction among these and from God, in respect not only of the quality and degree of intrinsic bliss enjoyed by them but also in their capacities for such enjoyment. The final state, according to Madhva, is marked by a complete absence of all traces of pain, evil and suffering, coupled with a positive enjoyment of inherent spiritual ānanda. This bliss has nothing material about it and is not conditioned by the possession or enjoyment of material objects. Ergo, there is no fear of its being ever diminished or tainted by evil or otherwise becoming tiresome:

निरजो भ्रामलोको न येषु जिद्व अनुतं न माया चैति ।

(Praśna Up. i, 16).

P.M.—21.
The criticism that in such a description of the released state we are only transferring the distinctions and values of this life to a world beyond loses its point when it is remembered that the bliss in question is not at all dependent on the presence of external material objects and that it is something welling up from the nature of the selves themselves. Else, any dynamic conception of release would be liable to the facile criticism that it involves a transference of values of this life to the beyond. Is release a state of blissful existence? If so, we are hankering after a certain value of life and seeking it there! Is it a state of absolute freedom from all pain and shortcomings? Even so, we are simply transferring what we regard as valuable here, to a life beyond! The charge of transference of values is thus a game at which two can play. Madhva maintains that the realization of truth does not mean the abolition of the plurality of life or the personality of selves; but only the removal of the false sense of separateness and independence, which is at the root of Samsāra. There is no question of transference of values, when it is stated that the bliss of Mukti is not an external possession of souls but an essential characteristic of their being that manifests itself completely, there. That these released souls do not get themselves dissolved in the Absolute is clear from texts like: आणि न रहस्यमुस्तादित तस्थः (R. V. i, 35.6) उतामृतत्तत्त्वेश्चाण: (R. V. x, 90, 2) मुक्तानां पुर्वाण गति: (Mbh. xii), which attribute to the Supreme Being the same kind of sovereignty over the world of the released, as in respect of this one. The text: न अन्त्य संसारस्त (Bṛh. Up. iv, 5, 13) has reference only to the termination of empirical consciousness, even as interpreted by Śaṅkara: न तत्र अन्त्य विदेशसंसारस्त (कार्यकारणसन्धात्तं) विद्यतस्य। It cannot, therefore, be cited as evidence against the persistence of Svarūpa-pajaññā of souls, claimed by Dvaitins. Passages like अविनाशी वा अवयामाः अनुस्रितेऽन्मां (Bṛh. Up. iv, 5, 14) have been cited by Madhva, in support of the persistence of personality in release, in its refined state. This text of the Bṛh. Up., makes two significant statements: (1) that the Ātman is indestructible (aviniśī) and (2) that his attributes also are inviolable (anucchitti-dharmāḥ). The former carries an implied refutation of Buddhist Nairatmyavāda and the latter of the Nirviśeṣa-
Cinmātravāda of Advaita by insisting on the indestructibility of both the Ātman and his attributes. This means that the self is not conceived, even in the highest state of Mokṣa, as a mere abstraction or a yawning void. It is to be noted that Śaṅkara and his commentators, here, have tried to escape the implications of the term anucchittidharmā by treating it as a paraphrase of the first predication itself viz., “aviniśi” which makes it redundant.¹ Jayatīrtha points out in his commentary on Madhva’s VTN that the difficulty felt by Maitreyī was not at all in respect of any supposed contradiction between the earlier and latter declarations of her husband:

(1) विज्ञानवृत्तं एवोत्तेः भूतेश्वर: समुद्याय तांत्येवालुविनिष्ट्यति and (2) न प्रेयः संस्कार अति which may be looked upon as having been set at rest by his explaining the difference between “the human and the Ātmic levels of experience”.² Jayatīrtha rightly points out that Maitreyī’s difficulty was in accepting her husband’s statement that there was no consciousness after death (न प्रेयः संस्कार अति) as that would make the goal of Mokṣa unfit to be sought as a Puruṣārtha: मोक्षस्य अपूर्णार्थविश्वसंगो हि मैत्रेयीवविद्यार्थः। यदि चोत्तरवाक्ये मुक्तस्य ज्ञानाभाव एव सीद्धान्तः: स्वात्ते मैत्रेयीयुक्तशर्स्योस्येतरं वक्तव्यं। न चोक्तम्।

तेन ज्ञायते मुक्तस्य ज्ञानभावो नीतिवाक्यः निम्निलिङ्गितम् इति॥ For, as Rāmānuja rightly points out, in his Śrībhāṣya, unless the survival of the human personality in Mokṣa is accepted, the whole spiritual programme calculated to help the individual self to get rid of his bondage (whether actually existing or merely taken to be real due to the nuisance of Avidyā, and attain to a state of unalloyed bliss for ever afterwards), would cease to have any

1. Cf. नतु, उधिष्ठितिश्च यस्मादलोचितिश्च नीतिस्तितिश्च अनुचितिश्च इति स्वरूपविनाशं तोषते, न तु चर्मौदिचित्तिरिति चेत; न। स्वरूपविनाशं अविनाशितश्च एव नेनेतो-क्तत्वात्। निर्विकारात् नेनेतोक्तमिति चेत; तथापि अनुचितिरिति वहुद्रहिणेन पूर्णवात्

2. धर्मंपद्वेययम्॥ (VTNt.)

2. See his ‘Yājñavalkya Fiction’ (Essays, Jamakhandi, 56) and my criticism in Tattvavāda, Bangalore.
meaning. If all that the Vedânta has to tell the earnest seeker is that he himself will cease to be at the end of all his efforts, he would bid an eternal goodbye to Vedânta. Surely, it would be no consolation to him to be told that even tho’ he himself as a self-conscious personality may cease to be, some bare or rarefied consciousness will survive. For no reasonable person would take the trouble of undergoing all the rigors of spiritual discipline with the fond hope that even when he is lost there will be left some pure consciousness of no particular content. Apart from that, Jayatirtha points out that if Maitreyi’s difficulty was in understanding how the Ātman, who was earlier described as a mass of consciousness (Vijñānaghana) could subsequently be said to lose all consciousness after death, as contended by Śaṅkara, and if the said difficulty was resolved by pointing out to her the difference between the empirical and the trans-empirical levels of consciousness, we should expect to find Maitreyi referring to the two specific statements of her husband and mention their mutual contradiction, as it appeared to her. But, she does nothing of the kind. She merely refers to only one text: न प्रेत्य संज्ञा अस्ति and says to her husband: अनेत्र मा महावान् मोहान्तमापितः – न प्रेत्य संज्ञा अस्ति इति || that she could not understand how there is no consciousness after ‘death’, for the individual. This conclusively establishes the point that Maitreyi’s difficulty had nothing whatever to do with “the human and the Ātmic levels of experience” as Prof. R. D. Ranade has tried to explain it, in defence of Śaṅkara’s interpretation of the text. It plainly shows that her difficulty was concerned only with the denial of the survival of consciousness in the released state which was apparently what Yajñavalkya’s words seemed to suggest: न तु, ‘अनेत्र मा महावान्’ इति न मोक्ष्य अनुसेर्यते प्रसेसाभिमाप्य: किंतु, ‘विज्ञानवन’ इत्युक्तः, पुनः: ‘न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति’ इत्युक्ते, व्याह्यविन्यायेण अथेवेलुक्तम्। तत् संतरे विज्ञानवनो मोक्षे तु, केन के परस्तु इति परिहारः संगत पवेति || भैवयः। तथा सति, अनेत्र मा महावान् मोहान्तमापित यथा विज्ञानवन इति, न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तिः च, इति वाक्ययोगदानसंसंगातः; व्याह्यविन्य उभ्याश्रितत्त्वतः। एकस्येव तु वाक्ययोगदानात् तद्विषयमेव दोषोऽयनमिति श्यायते || (VTN!.)
This crucial point, raised by Jayatirtha, is of the utmost importance in assessing the relative merits of the different interpretations put upon the famous Yajnavalkya dictum. It shows the complete inconsistency of Saumkara’s interpretation about the nature of the Atman, with the context. It would follow from this that we cannot take the statements made by Yajnavalkya in reply to his wife’s objection, beginning with the words: यन तु सर्वसम्बन्धातित्तत्त्वेन केवलः ** as a statement of facts (वस्तुर्विशेषितिकथनम्) but as a vigorous plea for the survival of self-consciousness in Moksa, by means of a reductio ad absurdum. Such is precisely the stand taken by Madhva.

It may be noted that such an interpretation is clearly supported by the two categorical assertions of Yajnavalkya in his clarification that both the Atman and his attributes are alike indestructible:

अबिनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा अनुप्रवृत्तिः

which establishes beyond doubt Yajnavalkya’s anxiety to emphasize not merely the survival of the Atman in Moksa, but also the survival of his attributes of consciousness, bliss etc.

The distinction drawn by the Advaitin between the Atman as the ‘pure self’ and our ‘ego-personality’ (aham-artha) is unsustainable. For, even the deepest experiences of the self in our dreamless sleep (which according to Saumkara himself reveals the Atman in his pure state. See B. S. B. iv, 4. 16) establishes the identity of the ‘ego-self’ (ahamartha) with the witness-self of dreamless sleep. The evidence of this identity is furnished by the reference to the experience of the happy repose of dreamless sleep made by us in recalling the experience immediately on waking up: एताबन्ते कालं सुखमहंस्त्वान्यम्। If the ego-self who

1. In his VTN. Madhva has convincingly demonstrated the untenability of Saumkara’s interpretation of the passage from the Brh. U.P. embodying Yajnavalkya’s harangue to his wife. Jayatirtha in his c. on the VTN., has gone into the details of the interpretations of Madhva and Saumkara and shown that the latter’s interpretation cannot be sustained.
recollects himself after waking from the Suṣupti state is not the true inner reality (pratyagartha) that stands distinguished from all external reality (parāg-arthā), one should expect the ego-self, sometimes on waking up from his deep sleep to entertain a doubt whether it was his own self or some one else's that had undergone the happy repose of sleep! Here is sufficient evidence that it is the inner self (pratyagātmā) himself that is the subject of the recollection of the happy repose of sleep and that it is that same pratyagātman that is referred to by the term “Aham” when he recalls his own earlier experience. It is no use to contend against this that tho' it is only the pure self that is really the subject of the recollective judgment, still, as there is no activity of the antahkaraṇa (mind) in Suṣupti, the Ātman who is revealed in Suṣupti gets himself fused with antahkaraṇa on waking up from the Suṣupti state and in virtue of this contact with the mind he gets the “ego-feeling” and that this accounts for the configuration of the recollective judgment (parāmarśa) in the words: अहंकारस्य ज्ञानम्। The explanation, no doubt, is ingenuity itself. But it creates a more serious difficulty to the Advaitin. For, it is admitted in Advaita that Avidyā or Bhāvarūpājñāna is present in Suṣupti and is there intuited by the pure self. Now, according, again, to the Advaita, ahamkāra is completely merged in Suṣupti and only pure ātman is left there. In these circumstances, the intuition of avidyā, in Suṣupti, by the pure self, cannot be recollected by the ego-self (ahamartha) later on thro' a recollective judgment (sauṣuptikānubhavaparāmarśa) as its own former personal intuition: न किचिदद्विनिद्रिशयं। In other words, as the ego-self (ahamartha), was not the actual witness of Ajñāna in dreamless sleep (according to Advaita), it could not give expression to any recollection about it as its own. This is sufficient to establish that the ego-self and the witness self of Ajñāna in dreamless sleep are one and the same being, and that the attempt to distinguish them is a failure.

The Chāndogya text, जक्षिक्रंद्रृस्माण: refers clearly and admittedly to the sportive activities of Muktas (Cf. B. S. iv, 4,2). There is no mistaking the context here, which is one of final release as can be seen from
the opening words of the section: परं ज्ञातित्वसंक्षेप लेने हयेणाभिनिष्ठते। The Vedānta Sūtra sets an insurmountable barrier between Brahman and the released souls, by prescribing a limit to the sovereignty of the latter by excluding cosmic responsibilities (जगद्वृपाणववृज्ञियं iv, 4, 17) from their province.1 This sūtra is the rock on which Vedāntic Monism has been shipwrecked everytime its ships have attempted to cross over to a haven of safety. Its remarkable significance to a pucka Dualistic interpretation of the Sūtras has been brought out by Thibaut and it is not possible to add anything to his weighty remarks on the point. Without such persistence of personality, the game will not be worth the candle. The ideal of Mokṣa will not be worthy of pursuit without the guaranteed persistence and survival of the self that can be assured of its deep sense of repose and happiness earned after so much effort and suffering:

मनस्त्य हि परेज्जने कि न दुःखतरं भवेत? (Mbh. xii)

संज्ञानाशो यदि भवेत, किं मुक्त्या न: प्रयोजनमू?

‘अहंमर्ज्ञविनाशविशेषमोख इत्यत्ववसाति।

अस्मैपद्वौ मोक्षकष्टास्तात्तात्मात्तात्॥’ (Yāmuna Siddhistraya).

That is why Madhva holds that the released retain their individual consciousness as released and rest in the full knowledge of their deliverance from all misery:

आजममरणं स्वरूपा मुक्त्या हयमभवानूः।

According to Madhva, Aparokṣajñāna or direct vision of God in His aspect of one's Bimba, opens the door to spiritual redemption. It is the dawn of Mukti and carries with it all the promise and potency of the ineffa-

1. P M. Modi in his 'A Critique of the Brahmastūra' p.448, tries to give a new explanation of "jagadvyāpāra", which is redundant in the light of the last sūtra and is at variance with the sense of 'vyāpāra' used in an earlier sūtra (iii, 1, 16).
ble and endless bliss of complete self-realization and God-realization, to come. It is the foretaste of the bliss of Mokṣa:

शान्ति निर्वाणपरम मस्तंखामभिगच्चति।

सुखभावितं यत्र उदितमाधुर्यतिरिमु (Gitā).

It is natural that close on the heels of Brahmāparokṣa, the shackles of material bondage should begin to fall off, one by one, and that Aparokṣa should usher in a state of increased blessedness at every one of its successive stages. Madhva distinguishes four stages of the fruits of Aparokṣa: (1) Karma-nāśa (2) Utkrānti (3) Laya and (4) Bhoga. The third one has reference of the gods,\(^1\) who have no “utkṛṇti” as such: देवानां स्वोत्समवेशेन तत्र देहालयः। अन्येपां तु ब्रह्मानांवय देहोलकालितः (TP.).

Of the three kinds of Karma that clog the way and dog the steps of the Jīva from time immemorial, Saṅcita or the accumulated heap is consumed by the fire of Aparokṣajñāna: यस्य पापस्य कार्यं हुंलं मोक्तुमारावं तस्येव ज्ञानेन नाश:। यस्य पुण्यस्य कार्यं सुवं मोक्तं नारावं तस्येव नाशः। (TP. iv, 1, 15). Madhva distinguishes between two kinds of anārabdha-karma (Karma that has not begun to bear fruit) viz., “इष्ट” and अनिष्ट (the agreeable and the disagreeable). The latter is destroyed and the former is “credited” to the account of the released in Mokṣa. The ‘Prārabdha’ alone remains to be worked out. This is a fixed

\(^1\) V. S. Ghate (The Vedānta) has confused these two aspects of Utkrānti and Laya and speaks of the utkṛṇti of the gods (misunderstanding the opening sentence in Madhva’s bhāṣya: देवानां मीक्र उत्कातिविशारंभाय उच्चयेत्।, iv, 2). He is also puzzled why the gods should at all be introduced in this context. Well, the gods also are recognized as adhikārins for Brahmacidyā both in the Upaniṣads and in the B.S. The question of their release would not, therefore, be irrelevant in the Śūtras. Hence, Madhva allots some space to them (iv, 2, I-16 ). In Muṇḍaka iii, 2, 7, we actually read of the entry of the gods in their archetypes and ‘merging’ into them,—a clear case of Laya preparatory to Mokṣa.
quantity, the sources of fresh accumulation having been cut off. Even in regard to Prārabdha Karma, reductions and concessions are possible (B.S. iii, 4, 16). The Karmas performed by Aparokṣa-Jñānins after the dawn of Aparokṣa has the effect of enhancing the spiritual bliss in Mokṣa. Knowledge by itself confers release from pain and misery of Samsāra; but the welling up of the intrinsic spiritual bliss is possible only by good Karma, Jñāna, Upāsanā or Bhakti:

सांवेद्यानिद्रातिव ज्ञानिनो निबिद्धव हि ।

उपासया कर्मभिषेक भक्त्या चानन्दनित्वात || (B.S. B. iii, 4, 38)

The Aparokṣajñānin is also known as Jivanmukta.1 He continues in his physical frame as long as the arrears of prārabdha continue to exact their debt: अपरोक्षज्ञानिनोदित्य स्वयंस्वपरमानं-शहुपरमकाणापूर्वकपविवेचर्तस्वरूपसाधनायामावेन, प्रारंभकर्मणां संसारानुतुभया जीवनमुक्तिः (Nym., iv,4). The destruction of his Linga-śarīra takes place along with the four-faced Brahman's:

श्रृवणा सह ते सवें संग्राम प्रतिसंचरे ।

परस्यान्ते क्रुद्धात्मानः प्रविष्टिः परं पदम ॥ ॥

It should be noted that there are two distinctive aspects of realization according to Madhva, the negative and the positive phases of the attainment of freedom. The negative aspect consists in riddance of all obscurations of personality by the crust and consequences of past Karma etc. and the destruction of all suffering and the Lingaśarīra. दुःखाभाव and लिंगमेद, as they are briefly referred to, constitute the negative side. The positive aspect is the enjoyment of intrinsic bliss of selfhood. Jayatīrtha accordingly defines Mokṣa in its dual aspect (dvidalātmaka):

आत्मनिर्द्वै:खनिन्त्रलिः औपरमानन्दावलिः (VTNT. p. 117).

1. The term is used by Vyāsārāya in his Nym. (iv, 4).
2. Text cited by Śamkara in his B.S.B. iv, 3, 11.
The system of Madhva accepts also the four-fold distinction of Mokṣa into Sālokya, Sāmīpya, Sārūpya and Sāyujya, (see M. BSB. iv, 4, 19) taught in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Vyāsārāya, in his Nyāyāmṛta, mentions that these represent an ascending order of blessedness. The nature of Bhoga in release will be dealt with in Chapter LVI.

1. M. Nandi, in his doctoral thesis at the Bombay Uni. on "the Philosophy of Baladeva", (1955,) is quite mistaken in assuming that Madhva does not recognize these four kinds of Muktī and making it an argument for his supposition that Baladeva, who recognizes them, could not have been a follower of Madhva out and out (Op. cit. p. 453). These and other contentions of M. Nandi have been refuted in my History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature Vol. ii. pp. 335-37.
CHAPTER LV

CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPTION OF MOKṢA IN OTHER SYSTEMS.

Madhva and his commentators have briefly reviewed the conception of release according to the other systems, in order to bring out the distinctive features of their own conception of it and its superiority.

The Jain theory of Mokṣa as a ceaseless upward flight in Alokākāśa has nothing spiritual or divine about it, says Madhva, to kindle the heart of the seeker and make it glow.

Entry into Mahāśūnya, advocated by the Buddhist, is equally forbidding in its prospect. The Buddhists are frank Nairātmyavādins. There is no Ātman or Self, on their view, which can be said to coordinate the fleeting experiences of moments into a meaningful whole. Reduction to nullity may thus be said to be achieved, every moment of time. From this point of view, there will be nothing to distinguish the reduction of a pot or something else to such a state of disintegration to the limit of Śūnyatā, from the other Śūnyatā arising from the annihilation of a so called “individual”. The Void being absolutely characterless, there is nothing to mark off one phase or aspect of Śūnyatā from another.

The Advaitic view of absorption into Brahman is hardly different from the Buddhist ideal, save for the difference in terminology: ब्रह्मावधम् न श्रव्यमावात् भिक्षु हस्तपारितम्। (NS. p. 633). The spiritual volatilization of the human personality into the colorless and featureless Absolute is quite as bleak and dreary a prospect as its nullification. It could never touch the heart and make it glow to be told that some spiritual spark will continue to be, even after we ourselves or what we hold dearest viz., our self is destroyed in the process of realization: मोक्षे अहंमयंभवे, आलमाशो मोक्षे इति वाक्षमतापि:। प्रेमाश्वयमयस्य स तद्वति:पि नावाल तत्त्वस्य श्रव्यादेः: तन्मत्त्रयोऽवाशात्। ‘अहं लुभी स्याम्’ इतीच्छावत् ‘विनःमात्रं मुक्तं स्यात्’ इतीच्छाया: क्वाप्यदेशनेन मुक्तेषुनिःप्रलापात्। ‘य: कालिदासमा मुक्त: स्या’ दितीच्छ्या च न मुमुक्तप्रभवति:। ‘ममत्वमा मुक्त: स्या’दितीच्छ्या ह अहंमयंर्वैष मुक्तीच्छ्या (Nym. p. 383). It cannot be argued that the aim of life is not so much to ‘be happy’ as ‘to become
happiness itself'. Philosophers have to respect the law of life. They cannot change the aim of life to their whims and dictates. Otherwise, the Buddhists and the Nyāya philosopher may as well get away with their dogma that the extinction of the Ātman or the extinction of all happiness is the aim of life.

In the absence of the survival of personality and full scope for the enjoyment of the innate bliss of selfhood, it would be a misuse of language to call the condition of Mokṣa promised by the Advaita a state of bliss:

आनन्दहृपता व वाह्मानिकन्तुक्तमेव (NS. p. 534).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya account of Mokṣa is purely negative. Pleasure unmixed with pain or unattended by it, they argue, is unknown in the world. If, then, one should be so sentimental as to insist upon the enjoyment of happiness in release, one should, by the force of the same logic, admit the possibility of some measure of pain and suffering also, therein. But that would be ridiculous. It would make release as good or as bad as Samsāra. The only rational course would therefore be to accept Mokṣa as a state of complete absence of any kind of pain coupled with the absence of any kind of pleasure or 'joy' so called. Madhva contends that such a purely negative ideal of Mokṣa could not supply the necessary dynamism and motive force for any fruitful spiritual effort to achieve release, on the part of the aspirant. Jayatīrtha points out that a positive hankering after happiness could be seen to lie at the back of attempts of persons suffering from incurable maladies to put an end to their lives by suicide:

रोगादिपीडिता उद्वन्धयादिनालविनां कुर्वेसीपि द्वेषान्त इति चेष्य। रोगादिवाद्वेषिः परिव्याप्तमेव आत्मानं निरुद्धेशीकृतमेव तेषां प्रदृष्टिः। 'निरुद्धेशी भूयासम्र' इति हि सर्वसाधारे। न तु 'भूयासम्र'

1. Cf. "A tendency to escape from oneself into God may have been the central motive of some seers of the Upaniṣads, the Orphic brotherhood in ancient Greece and some Christian and Sufi Mystics. But there is no evidence that any Mystic achieved such a goal. In the nature of things, evidence of such absorption is impossible. He who has become God cannot return to tell of his experience and he who narrates the story has not become God," (Radhakrishnan, I. Phil., ii, p. 712).
The doctrine of absorption, in Advaita, cuts at the very root of the idea of self. The self, as we all understand it, is the deepest spring of personality. It is what is revealed and implicated in all our experience as “Aham” (“I”). It is the basic principle of life, the élan vital, which possesses an inalienable and incommunicable individuality of its own, which furnishes the basis of the self-conscious psycho-physical mechanism of life carried on thro’ a series of transmigrations. It is this underlying principle that is the most cherished possessions of man: तदेत्तल्ये प्रेयः पुजार्ये प्रेयो विताल्ये प्रेयः सवर्णमादन्त्य यदवमाल्य (Bṛh. Up.). There is no place in the consolidated experience of humanity for a deeper or a more fundamental essence of the self of man, — the one to which he clings with desperate tenacity throughout life and into which we enter in the inmost experiences of our lives. This self must therefore survive in the released state, if that state should have any meaning and reality for us. A self devoid of such a living content and a link with what it was in the state of bondage would be but an empty abstraction and a spectre of the absolutist fancy. Even supposing that such an abstraction is possible, we cannot be persuaded to love and cherish it above all things in life and hold fast to it, as we do the self we know in the purest moments of our bliss, or go through a lot of trouble to help some ‘pure consciousness’ that will rise on the ashes of our own self, to manifest itself; न हेतुमाधूर्यादिविभक्तं किमापि निराकारं रूपमुस्तन्याय, मा न भूते, भूवासि, इति लेक आशास्ते। चछुषी निमित्य तथेति वद्वत्स्तु कः प्रतिमद्रुः? (NS. p. 633)

In any case, it would be little more than a verbal jugglery to say that the absolutist goal is essentially ‘blissful’. It is the capacity to feel and enjoy the bliss and the presence of one who enjoys, that makes happiness meaningful and worth striving for and not the bare presence of happiness, much less our ‘identification’ with it: तत्र, न तावर् वृषालम्बता पुष्कार्थः। सुखी स्नामतिच्छावत्, ‘सुखं व्यास्’ इतीच्छाया अदश्यि। (Nym. pp. 635-36). On the absolutist view, however, there can be no question of enjoying the
bliss of selfhood, in view of the avowed difficulty of ‘Kartṛkarmabhāva.’ Moreover, one may ask the Advaitin: how is the Ātman to be conceived in Mokṣa? If simply as a bare consciousness, then, there will be no room left for any realization of bliss (in the Ātman). If he is to be conceived as the essence of bliss alone, there will be no consciousness or realization of that bliss! If he is to be conceived as both of the nature of bliss and consciousness, the thesis of Ātman as a differenceless oneness is shattered. Without the acceptance of an internal Viśeṣa, in the Ātman, it will be impossible to have the “aspects” of bliss and its consciousness (or revelation) integrated in the being of Ātman: अपि चाल्मन: सुखमात्रले, प्रकाशात्रले च, सुखप्रकाशात्मवेन, अपुर्व्यत्त्वम्। उभयात्मसः कते च अखण्डवहानिः। (Nym. p. 627 b). Apart from this, the bliss of Ātman, being always self-subsistent, will always be there and it cannot therefore be made an object of spiritual pursuit. It is no use contending that this bliss has been obscured by nescience in the state of Samsāra (bondage) and comes to be realized only after the obscuration has been removed. For, according to the Advaitin, this bliss is ex hypothesi self-luminous and indistinguishable from the self and identical with it. It should, therefore, be capable of being fully revealed along with the revelation of the self all along. It cannot be held to be vaguely or partly and imperfectly revealed or felt in the state of bondage and fully manifested in release. For, such ideas of partial and full manifestations, clarity and obscurity of revelations etc., imply and presuppose the presence of aspects or Viśeṣas or a diversity of features in the subject or a principle of identity-in-difference, in the essence of the Śuddhacaitanya, by which the hidden shades come to be progressively realized. But all this is impossible in a theory of Nirviśeṣa-dvaita or Nirviśeṣa-cinmāstravāda or Akhaṇḍa-Caitanyavāda, such as has been sponsored by Śaṅkara and his followers. There can be no talk of Śaṁkara and Viśeṣa, general and particular, in the “Nirviśeṣa”. There is no place for any such inner shades of being or diversity of content or aspects or by whatever name one may choose to call it, in the conception of the Ātman as a bare consciousness, without aspects (nirasta-
Samstavisesham) adumbrated by Saumkara. There can be no new or fuller stages of bliss of being yet to be intuited or rediscovered in a pure being that is ex hypothesi colorless, shadeless and aspectless:

निर्विशेषत्वादालम्नी नानधिगतो विशेषः (Madhva)

This criticism is not only hard to rebut; but has not been rebutted convincingly.¹

1. प्रकाशामानोद्धारान्नद्य न विशदः प्रकाशतः इति चेति | निविदेशप्रत्यायः ||
बेशाबेशामानोद्धारान्नद्य निविदेशप्रत्यायः || यद्यः सह विवेषः प्रकाशते तद्विदेशप्रत्यायः || यथा
साधारणमेः सह, तद्विदेशप्रत्यायः || अविद्यावरणायामेः प्रकाशतः इति च कौशलः ? किं प्रतीयतः इति; उत्त प्रस्थतिः ? नोभाविषयः || अनुभाविषयः || प्रदीपः प्रकाशतः इति कौशलः इति
चेति || भास्तरसुच्चारा वर्त्ततः इति न किंचिदेवति || (NS. p. 684b)
CHAPTER LVI

MADHVA'S VIEW OF MUKTI

Madhva, therefore, lays great stress on the survival of every individual personality, as such, in release. This is the corollary of his belief in the distinctiveness of the Svārupa of each Jīva. As release is the realization of the intrinsic bliss of selfhood by each one of us, it must be a positive experience, to be felt and be realized by each and at the same time, incommunicable to others. We cannot, obviously, press the point further and ask how the blissful experience of one self differs from that of another. It is purely a matter of intuitive experience of each individual and we have to leave it at that. As Rāmānuja says:

जीवारसलपः * * * * ज्ञानानवेद्वकुणतम्। तस्येवःस्य * * *
स्वरूपमेते वाचामगोचरः स्वसंवेदः ज्ञानस्वपि सत्यतावदेव निर्देशस्यम्।
(Vedārtha–Saṁgraha)

Hence, it will be presumptuous on the part of anyone to attempt to define in clear and precise terms what exactly the released state would be like, from this side of release! Nevertheless, man is irrepressibly curious and inquisitive about what lies in store for him in the great beyond. People expect the philosopher to throw some light on these questions. As an interpreter and an expositor of the traditions of the Vedaśāstra, on this point, Madhva bases his account of the released state on a coordinated interpretation of the Scriptural facts and evidences. He also adduces his reasons in support of these interpretations. He gives a thoroughly consistent picture of the released state, harmonizing the realistic and idealistic accounts of Mokṣa found in the Vedic, Upaniṣadic and Post-Upaniṣadic sources. It must be said that his is a distinctive view of Mokṣa rich in its details, uncompromising in principles, trenchant in its logic and full of mystic inwardness, in some respects.
The first and foremost fact about Mokṣa emphasized by Madhva is its positive aspect. He opposes the purely negative view of Mokṣa, held by the Śaṅkhya and the Naiyāyikas. To be a “Puruṣārtha” and the highest one at that, it must be a state of supreme bliss. This bliss must be fully manifested, i.e., capable of being actually felt and enjoyed with a full consciousness that it is being enjoyed. This would naturally presuppose the survival of the one who is to enjoy the experiences of this blessed state. In this connection, Madhva discusses the famous text of the Chāndogya: अक्षरों वा व रत्ने न प्रियाप्रिये स्पर्शते: and shows that the juxtaposition of the words: न हूँ वै वर्तरित्व प्रियापियोपप्रियति: establishes clearly that it is only the material joys and pleasures that are regarded as disagreeable to the Mukta and therefore ruled out; while the intrinsic bliss of selfhood and its enjoyment are accepted without reserve. Similarly, another Śruti which speaks of the destruction of all desires of the heart (यदा सेव प्रस्थवन्ते कामां वेदस्य हृदि स्थिताः:) has reference only to the material longings of the antahkarana: सर्वार्थार्थिकामान्वयेरतिः व्यास्यानें ‘हृदि श्रव्यं’ इति कामान्ति विशेषेण्य व्यवें स्वातः। व्याक्ष्य्याभावः। अतःकरणपरिणातीनां कामान्याचेत मुक्ताभावः। न तु स्वयमुस्तानाम्। (NS. p. 573), because other Śruti texts, connected with the Mukti state, do speak of the fulfilment of every spiritual desire in Mokṣa—भवेदेततर। यदीदत विशेषेण स्वातः। न चैवं: व्याक्ष्य्याभावः। सर्वार्थार्थिकामान्यांनन्तः-परिणामबलमेव, न वात्थ्यंन्ति: कामोदकत्वायांस्कव निषेधिति। ‘मुक्तानां कामितामाहृत्युक्तशाक्षादु च शुभित्। कामशून्तिस्वविशीर्षकाश। तद्भावशून्तिस्वतः साक्षाभास। ‘परेतसः मनं एवेकत्वापि कामशून्तिस्वशून्तिरिति वात्थ्यायांकरणेद्विमिहितम्। कामशून्तिस्व स्वात्विन्यं शक्ताव्यतिः। तदमान्वशून्तिस्व कामविदेशैति कबन न वात्थ्याव्यक्तभावः। (NS. p. 573). The Vedānta Sūtras specially discuss the question of how the released spirits enjoy themselves at all, as they have transcended the material plane and have no physical bodies or sense organs and answer the question (iv. 4, 10-16) from different standpoints, consistent with the trans-empirical character of the released state. The Śūtrakāra says, for instance, that the released can fashion, at their will, (which is also satyasamkalpa in conformity with God’s will) suitable bodies out of Śuddhasattva or enjoy themselves with their own
spiritual bodies composed of Cit, ānanda etc. These answers are merely intended to show that we cannot judge the state of Mokṣa from our own limited range and angle and conclude that no kind of enjoyment of bliss is possible for these Muktas, because they have no material bodies like ours and that therefore, the state of Mukti should be one of utter inactivity and inertia for the souls. This is an unfair view to take of a state of supreme felicity according to all accounts. There is nothing to prevent the Muktas from enjoying themselves in their state of blessedness, in ways which human imagination can hardly comprehend. Man has hardly yet fathomed the mysteries of nature. He has just begun to coquet with outer space. We may wish him Godspeed; but it will do him good to remember that there are still many things which are beyond his understanding and are bound to remain so:

अचिन्त्या: कल्पु यें मात्रा न तस्तत्तेकं योजयेत् ।

प्रकृतिमय: परं यथु तद्विन्यस्य वैभवम् ॥

Mbh. ( ) q. by Śaṅkara (BSB. ii, 1, 6).

अनिन्द्रया अनाहारा अनिध्यं: सुगन्धिन: । (Mbh. xii. 337,29)

देहिन्द्रयासुध्वीनां वैक्कृष्णपुरवासिनाम् ॥ (Bhāg. vii, 1, 34)

Realization, then, makes it possible for the souls to have a sense of realization of something and rest on their oars and taste the unalloyed bliss of their pure being, which has so long been obscured by the encrustation of Avidyā, Kāma, Karma etc. There is no difficulty of manifestation of the full-fledged personality of the self, in all its richness and entirety of aspects in the state of release, on the Dvaita view, as the self there is admitted to be a unity-in-diversity (Saviśeṣa-svarūpa and not Nir-viśeṣa, as in Advaita), some of whose aspects have been obscured by the will of God and the influence of Prākr̥tic bonds. There is no impediment therefore to these essential aspects becoming fully manifested and realized in Mokṣa. when the Lord is pleased to lift the veil of His ‘Māyā’ and manifest the
true and essential nature of the soul to it, in full. The so-called Kartṛkarmavirodha is therefore an untenable objection since it is the very negation of the idea of self to deny self-consciousness to it\(^1\).

Madhva, therefore, regards Mukti as a complete self-expression, self-manifestation and self-realization, in short, a complete unfolding of the self in all its promise and potency:

परंत्योतिष्ठसंपन्न लवण्यांभिनिष्ठयाते (Chān. Up.)

मुक्तिहित्वान्यायः स्वतःयोग्यवस्थिति: (Bhāg. ii, 10, 6).

The realization of the truth does not mean the abolition of the plurality of the world; but only a removal of the false sense of separateness and independence.\(^2\) It is a new insight that changes the face of the world and makes all things new. The Mukta sees everything thro' the eyes of God,\(^3\) as dependent on God, in their proper perspective, which he has failed to do in Samsāra.

The pleasures of the highest state, described in some of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic passages, are not the last word on the subject. They are only broad indications of what the supreme state of felicity may be like:

प्रत्ययाम्बः त मोक्षः सद्यः संप्रकृतिः।

(Sāttvata q. by Desīka, B.G.t. xviii, 32).

Consequently, then, we need neither take them too literally, nor dismiss them as garish fancies. Madhva has left us in no doubt as to the manner

1. तदात्मानेनेवेदवेदं श्रास्त्रामिति। आत्मनेवात्मानं पश्येत। (Bṛḥ. Up.).

2. वो हि श्रास्त्रानाद्यपक्षात्मानं स्वातंत्र्योप लव्यस्यभावं पश्याति, तं मिथ्याविष्ठां जगत्याकर्ताति। (Śamkara, B. S. B. 1, 4, 19)

3. स श्रास्त्रम पश्याति, श्रास्त्रम शृणुभौति श्रास्त्रावेदं सववनुभवति।

(Śruti, Madhva B. S. B. iv, 4, 5),
of life led by the freed souls in release. Like the Lord, they are for ever contented. They don’t have to seek satisfaction; for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven. Wisdom and enjoyment of perfect bliss are their own nature. With all that, there is no fear that their condition would be one of stagnation all round. A Theistic account of Mokṣa cannot, any day, make conditions there more stagnant than an Advaitic view of it! Madhva is satisfied that there is scope for activity and full play of capacities for every one of us, there, according to his or her abilities. The released may rest in the contemplation of their own blessedness, like the Advaitic Brahman. They may contrast their present with their past and feel thankful for their deliverance. They may adore the majesty of God and sing His praises or worship Him in a thousand ways:

शालापि मम माहात्म्यं तनोऽकुक्तया पुनः ।
विशेषाय विशेषेण शाल्या मामसुतेवशिक्षम ॥

(Vijñāna, q. B.T. p. 89).

They may offer sacrifices, if they wish to, — the only difference being that nothing is obligatory there.

There is no prescribed round of activities or code of conduct in Mokṣa, which means there is unlimited scope for spontaneous, creative work of every kind, — Karma,1 Jñāna, and Bhakti.2 There is no call for activity in that there is no one to call upon you to do this or that. The urge is from within, entirely:

कदाचित्कम् कुर्वन्नि कदाचित्वेव कुर्वते ।
नित्यज्ञानस्वप्नस्वासिष्यं व्यावहितं केलाम् ॥ (B. S. B. iii, 3, 30, ).

1. तुष्यो मुनोरित्रेषु वित्तमेहः । (Mbh. xiii. 18, 16).

2. आत्मारामाथ मुनयो निर्माणया अप्युक्तमे ।
कुर्वन्त्योहेऽकथे भक्तिमित्यमभृतः हृते: ॥ (Bhāg. i, 7, 10).
The worship and activity in Mokṣa, such as they are, are an end in themselves. They are not means to an end:

साध्यान्वेशस्वरूपेव भक्तिनावाचर साधनम् ।

हरेवासना चाक्र सदैव सुखरुपिणि ।

न तु साधनभूता सा सिद्धोद्वाच ला यतः ॥

( B. S. B. iv, 4, 21 ).

The assumption of activities cannot reduce the released state to the level of this world as these are no longer determined by injunctions and prohibitions; or attended by unpleasant consequences in the event of non-performance. It is this freedom from all conditions that distinguishes the life in Mokṣa from ordinary life. Madhva’s point: चन्द्रश्वरयाऽयामाये हि मोक्ष्याेश्वरः । अन्यथा मोक्षेयं न स्यात् (B.S.B. iii, 3, 30) is really unexceptionable. Unless some kind of activity is recognized, it will be difficult to differentiate the liberated souls from stones and sticks, despite the reputed possession by them of “consciousness”. Such service as the freed render to God is purely voluntary and an end in itself:

भक्तिज्ञानं तथा चानं मुक्तानामपि सर्वंश: ।

साधनामि तु स्वांभि भक्तिज्ञानप्रदाये ।

नैवान्यसाधानं भक्ति: फलरूपं हि सा यतः ॥

(Madhva, Bṛh. Up. C.)

Madhva has brought together certain texts,¹ bearing on the nature of life in the released state and these have been elucidated by the author of the Madhvasiddhāntasāra.

---

1. The most important of these are:

सर्वं नन्दनिति यशसा गतेन समालोच्छन सविक्ष्या सब्याय: (RV. X. 71,10)

अक्ष्मवन्तः कर्णवन्तः सवायो मनोज्वेषसम बर्हूवः: (RV. X. 71, 7)
1. केलितनीमोणं कुञ्जित्ति (Cf. Chān. Up. viii, 12, 2)

2. केलितु र्यागज्वरादीन्द्र्यावानि (ibid).

3. केलन श्रावादिवेदोच्छारणेन मार्गवतं स्वावनि (Cf. RV. X, 72, 11)

4. केलन मुखोदेशं के ‘हालु, हालु,’ इत्यादिशब्दानु उच्चारयानि
   (Taitt. Up. iii, 10, 5)

5. केलन पूर्णाभासवेन यज्ञादिकं कुञ्जित्ति (Cf. Mbh. xiii, 18, 6)

contd.—

पुत्रस्म गायत्रातो हालु हालु हालु (Taitt. Up. iii, 10, 5).

तथस्य मध्ये वेतस: प्रूणयान्वो सहस्याखो बिमलो बिभावति।

तथस्य मुखासरिति: प्रशावस्ति मधुक्रपर्व्ययो रंगयो: (Q. SNR.)

‘आचार्ये मे परं मोक्षे धीरा यं प्रवन्दितम्

इत्युक्त इष्टाद्वैव परं मोक्षे प्रजापते।

शाखां शाखां महानथं: संयान्ति परितःख्या।

धानापूष्प मोक्षकामं: सदा पायसकर्मं:।

यस्मिचाचामुखा देवा: सेत्रा: सह मर्यम्।

इंजेरे करुभि: अश्वसदाग्रुपदस्ते।

प्रवियान्ति परं देवं मुक्तास्तनैव भोगिनं।

निर्मलान्ति यथाकामं परेश्वेव चोदिता:।

(Mbh. Udyoga Parva. Q. Madhva AV. ii, 3, p. 29 b.)

यजनान्त्रः मोक्षस्म मुद: ममुद आस्ते।

देवी: सुहस्तप्रमृत्त मममृतं कुष्ठि। (RV. IX, 113,1)
6. केचन “आज्ञामरण स्मृता सुक्ता हृदवाप्न्यः” II

7. केचनेष्वामाने विमादिद्विसवन्तो भवन्ति II

(Chān. Up. viii, 2, 1-10 and Śamkara BSB iv. 4, 8)

8. केचन सकेलेकारिण: (Chān. Up. viii, 25, 2)

9. केचन शुद्धसच्चानिमितज्ञलावरीराम्यादाय कीडन्ते

(BS. iv. 4, 12, and Śamkara’s Com. thereon.)

10. केचन द्वितयन्तु।

11. केचन वाध्यानि वाद्यन्ति II

As individuality persists in Mokṣa,¹ there must be some outlet for the energies of the freed. Scripture does not deny desires to the released. It is the desires of a worldly nature and born of the mind that are denied:

* * * * कामा वेशस्य हृदि स्थितातः।

इत्यत:-करणस्थानां कामानां मोक्षमेव हि।

प्राह शुल्कह्दिवेय न चेद्यवर्धविवेशणम् (AV. p. 45).

¹. Cf. अविनाशी वा अर्द्धमाय्या अपुश्चिस्तिष्म (Bṛh. Up.)

2. Madhva points out that the term “Hṛdy” in the Up. text shows that only the desires arising in the mind are intended.
CHAPTER LVII

RATIONALE OF ĀNANDA-TĀRATAMYA IN MOKṢA

All Theists recognize the persistence of personality in release. Since the souls are many, their plurality must survive there. But as multiplicity without distinctions and gradations is inconceivable among thinking selves as we know them, Madhva finds it necessary to maintain that there are distinctions in the quality, intensity, range etc. of the Svarūpānanda enjoyed by them, in the released state, according to their capacities and intrinsic fitness (svarūpayogyatā). Rāmānuja, in his theory of selves, is inclined to put down the difference among the different classes of souls, such as gods and human beings, as the outcome of Karma and other Prākṛtic accretions and therefore not touching their essence, which he regards as equal, in all; tho' there is numerical distinction. This is not acceptable to Madhva, who finds sufficient evidence in the Śāstras to accept the differences between the gods and the other classes of souls as inherent distinctions among different orders of beings—not traceable to Karmic or other causes. As a matter of fact, Rāmānuja is not quite consistent in not accepting intrinsic gradation among the souls in his general theory; tho' the tradition of Vaiṣṇava theology which he inherits from the Ālvārs is committed to the existence of a special class of Nityasūris among the (released) souls as distinguished from the ordinary Muktas, who have attained release after bondage. This inner inconsistency in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic position has been taken note of by Vyāsārāya in his Nyāyāmṛta in support of Madhva’s theory of Ānandatārataamyam in Mokṣa, as against the Sāmya theory of Rāmānuja, as will be shown presently.

Madhva’s theory of Ānanda-tāratamya, in Mokṣa, is a logical conclusion from the hypothesis of Svarūpabheda and Tāratamya (gradation) among souls. It is one of the main points of disagreement between the schools of Madhva and Rāmānuja; tho’ both are schools of staunch and uncompromising Vaiṣṇava Theism and show many other points of mutual agreement in doctrine and theology. Much contro-
versely as raging between these two schools over this issue from the days of Vyāsarāya and some controversial works written on the subject by champions of the respective schools are actually in existence.\footnote{For details see my History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature Vol. II.}

It should be borne in mind that a theory of possible difference and gradation in the qualitative enjoyment of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa has meaning only in a system of thought in which the difference among the souls is accepted as a fact. It has no place in a monistic system like Śaṅkara’s where all difference among souls (ātmabheda) even in Samsāra is merely due to false Upādhis and is utterly wiped out in release for an Advaitin. It has significance and bearing only in Theistic systems like those of Rāmānuja and Madhva wherein the plurality of souls is admitted as an ultimate fact. Of course, as against Śaṅkara and his school, Madhva and his commentators have, as we have seen, tried to establish the thesis of plurality of Ātmans as a fundamental fact, on strong grounds including textual evidences. Acceptance of the doctrine of plurality of Ātmans is the same as accepting “Svarūpabheda” among Ātmans and rejecting the view of “Ekātmavāda” that there is, in reality, only one Ātman, who appears as many on account of Upādhis. Once “Svarūpabhedavāda” among Ātmans is accepted as a philosophical fact, it will be easy enough to establish “Svarūpa-Tāratamya” also among such Ātmans which will logically lead up to Svarūpānandatāratamya among them, in Mokṣa. The latter is the inevitable logical corollary of the former, Madhva and his commentators feel strongly that the Rāmānuja school is not justified in accepting Svarūpabheda of Ātmans warmly but in refusing to subscribe to the doctrine of Ānanda-Tāratamya among them, in Mokṣa, which will be the most natural deduction from it. As for the main arguments in favor of Madhva’s theory, they will be dealt with, presently.

Since Mokṣa is only the discovery and enjoyment of one’s own selfhood, in its pristine purity and bliss, there is no possibility of exchanging one’s experiences of bliss with another’s, or of its transference to another, whether wholly or in part. Each soul rests fully satisfied and immersed in the enjoyment of its “Svarūpānanda”, to saturation point, so to say. Many weighty arguments have been urged by Madhva, Jayatirtha and Vyāsarāya, in their works, in support of this important doctrine of Theism. As the subject of Mokṣānanda and Svarūpānanda
pertain largely to the domain of Mysticism, students and critics of Madhva’s doctrine of Svarūpānanda-Tāratamya of souls, in Mokṣa, should not fail to take due note of the mystic inwardness of this doctrine, however strange and unfamiliar it may seem to them, at first sight. Viewed in the light of an expression and an interpretation of the mystic joy of self-realization, in Mokṣa, its contribution to the philosophy of Mysticism itself will be seen to be quite remarkable.

All souls could not have put forth the same quality or quantity of effort of the same intensity or duration. It thus stands to reason that there must be a proportionate difference in the nature of the reward reaped by them. This is one other ground of Tāratamya (gradation) of ānanda (bliss) in Mokṣa. There are highly evolved souls like those of Brahmā and the other gods, whose spiritual perfection must certainly be greater than that of us mortals. And it cannot go in vain. The evidence of Scripture tells us of superhuman Sādhanas practised by some of the gods and the wide difference in their quality, quantity, duration etc. which are beyond human conception. These could not all be treated on the same par:

'दशकत्वं तपश्चर्कृतं ख्यातं सवर्णं।
लयक्तव खङ्खानि सवर्णि क्रिष्टं ख्यातं।
श्रेष्ठव वर्षकोटीव धूमः पीतोत्सिदुःखतः।
वर्षसंतु तु सुर्यं सत्स्वर्गक्षिपिल्लरसुः ज्ञातम्।
सदाचेन सुक्लं लयक्तव धर्मेणाकाशास्यना।
पीतामरिच्छयो वर्षसहभ्रास्यादाय।
अतिक्रमेण ख्यात्वं वलनं श्रमविदेश्प्रः च।’

इत्येतदाक्ष्यत्म भृजते विशेषाभावतः: कथम्?
मुक्तं च साधनाधिक्या साधारणिकं हृदासिद्धु?

नाधिकां यदि साध्ये स्यात् प्रयत्: साधने कृतः?

(Adv. iii, p. 45-46)
Again, the Śāstras tell us that there are persons who work deliberately for their salvation as well as great souls like Sanaka (Ekāntabhaktas) who love God for His own sake (and not for their salvation) and decline the prospect of unity with Him. Surely, any theory of Mokṣa, if it is to be balanced, must take note of these intrinsic differences and give a proper place for Ekāntabhaktas and others, according to their worth. Madhva bases one of his arguments for accepting Tāratamya in Mokṣa on this point also: यदि तात्तत्त्वे न स्यात्—

' नात्यतिर्क्तं विगणवन्त्यधि तेन प्रसादम् ' (Bhūg. iii. 15, 48)

' नैकालम्यता ने स्रुःत्यति कथित् ' (iii, 25, 34)

' * * * एकसमस्यूति।

दीयमाने न गृहतिः * * ' || (iii, 29, 18) इति

मुखिमनिच्छतामपि मोक्ष एव फलं, तमिच्छतामपि सप्ततिकादीनामिति कथमनिच्छतां स्वतिस्वप्वा स्यात ? (G. B. ii, 52).

Vyāsarāya, in his Nyāyāmyta, has given us the best critical exposition of Madhva’s doctrine of Ānandatāratamya, in its logical and textual aspects. Some of his arguments have been specially directed against the school of Rāmānuja. This school accepts Svarūpabheda between God and the souls and among the Mukta-Jīvas themselves. But, it is not prepared to go further and accept, with Madhva, any Svarūpa-vaitkṣirya (distinguishing characteristics) among the souls or any gradation in their Svarūpāṇanda, in Mokṣa. Vyāsarāya shows how it has accepted Svarūpa tāratamya, in principle, not only between Brahma and the Mukta-Jīvas but among the Mukta-Jīvas as well, at least in a few cases. If, then, Svarūpatāratamya can be accepted among Jīvas, in principle, there is no reason to shy at the acceptance of Svarūpāṇanda-Tāratamya also. For, in the last analysis, Svarūpāṇanda of each individual and of Brahma is nothing but the expression of their own nature. Madhva and his commentators do not also accept the position of Rāmānuja that the differences between the Devas (including Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the goddesses) and other souls referred to in the Śāstras are not Svabhāvika but are the result of bodily and other Karmic Upādhis alone. Madhva is not prepared to endorse such an extreme view; which, he feels, will be out of tune with the spiritual traditions of the Śāstras.
Anyway, the principle of Svarūpatāratamya is accepted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin in respect of the Jīvas and Brahman. Brahman here is conceived as Vibhu, Śeṣi and Svatāntara; while the Jīvas are all Aṇu, Śeṣa and Paratāntra. In this circumstance, complete equality between such widely differing natures is out of the question. It will lead to multiplicity of Iśvaras, if pressed further.

The Śūtra: जगद्यापारकर्मः (iv, 4, 17) denies cosmic functions to the released souls. Such cosmic activities of Brahman are obviously and admittedly an expression of His own inner joy. (Cf. को हैवात्मात् कः प्राण्याय-वदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्मात्, (Taitt. Up.). Rāmānuja himself admits that the Muktaś owe the very manifestation of their Svarūpa to the eternal will (samkalpa) of Brahman: मुक्तस्य सत्यसत्वविशेषां पूर्वशयप्राणानन्दस्य परमंत्रम् एव हैव-रिति शुभेच्छस्य दृश्यत्। एष योस्यानन्दस्य इति।(R. B. S.B. iv, 4, 20). Thus, he accepts the relation of Niyama-niyāmakabhāva (controller and controlled), between them, to be intrinsic to their natures. This should lead to the legitimate conclusion that the bliss of the Niyāmaka (controller) must be greater, wider and more intense than that of the controlled:

इंतरानन्द: जीवात्मातुल्य: तदवस्तत्तनामकानन्दतात्। यदेवे तदेवे, यथा तेतका नन्दता, तेषामानात्नदः॥ (Nym). Since Brahman is capable of enjoying an order of bliss superior to that of the Jīvas under its control, in release, there is no reason why it should not do so.

The Śūtra भोगमापारसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च (iv, 4, 21) will not conflict with this position. For, according to Rāmānuja, this Śūtra is not an independent one; but one that is syntactically connected with जगद्यापारकर्मः (iv, 4, 17). The term mātra in bhogamātra here, has been explained by him, not in the sense of the entirety of the bhoga (कार्यवर्ष) but in the sense of emphasis (वार्थमयी) intended to restrict the equality with Brahman (जगद्यापार) to the aspect of bhoga or ānanda alone and prevent its extension to the cosmic activities (जगद्यापार) of Brahman and Its other characteristics. On the basis of this Śūtra भोगमापारसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च, then, as interpreted by Rāmānuja, it cannot therefore be decided whether

1. जगद्यापारसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च मुक्तस्य जगद्यापारसाम्यप्रतिपादनाच्च लिङ्गात् जगद्यापारवर्जन-मिलितगम्यते (R.BSB.)
the equality in the enjoyment of bliss between the Jivas and Brahman is just in respect of its general aspect of bhoga (भोगामान्य एव); or whether it applies to each and every aspect of Brahman’s enjoyment (भोगविशेष.) The same suffix mātra in bhogamātra cannot bear two separate senses of emphasis and entirety; nor has Rāmānuja made any such suggestion, in his commentary. Hence, the Śītra भोगामात्रासम्यताच्च will be of no use to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin in establishing the thesis of complete equality of Mukta-Jīvas with Brahman, in the enjoyment of all its bhogas, extending to each and every aspect of it.

The cosmic activities of Brahman are indeed an expression of its inner joy (नमःपरशुपरिश्रगतियोगलन्) and it must stand to reason that the Mukta-Jīvas who do not engage in such activities, cannot be enjoying the bliss of Brahman associated with such activities.

The Rāmānuja school recognizes further that the Goddess Lakṣmī also occupies the position of श्रेष्ठ to all the Jīvas (including the Mukta Jīvas) and also that certain superior souls like Viśvaksena, who are given the special status of “Nityasūris”, exercise control over the other Jīvas in release. This is a clear and unambiguous acceptance of the principle of Jīvasvarūpa-tāratamya in the Rāmānuja school, notwithstanding its supposed denial on the ground that all difference among Jīvas is due to Karma alone. This special status given to Lakṣmī and the “Nityasūris”, in the Viśiṣṭādvaita hierarchy, gives solid support to Madhva’s doctrine of Svarūpa-Tāratamya among Muktas. From Svarūpa-tāratamya to “Svarūpānanda-tāratamya” it is but a single logical step, forward.

The Hindu Scriptures refer to an ascending order of Mukti: Sālokya, Sāmīpya, Sārupya and Sāyuja, in which each succeeding stage includes the joy of the preceding one. This would certainly imply an intrinsic gradation of bliss in Mokṣa. As Sāyuja carries with it an element of Sarūpya also, it cannot be equated with ऐक्यम् or identity of being. This is evident from the Upaniṣadic text: चन्द्रसः सायुखे सलेखतामाप्नोति where the knower who has attained Sāyuja with the moon is again referred to as enjoying the benefits of Salokatā. The etymology of the word Sāyuja सायुज्यम् also disproves the sense of “identity”. The gradations of the four kinds of Mukti accepted by the Rāmānuja school also, makes it incumbent upon it to accept the principle of Tāratamya in Mokṣa.
Tho’ the Svarūpānanda of each individual Mukta-Jiva is a single unit of atomic dimensions, it is conceivable that there can be gradations in their Svarūpānanda, in regard to their quality, range, intensity etc. Since Mokṣānanda is ex hypothesi trans-empirical, it will be difficult to clarify the exact nature of its inner gradations in clear and precise terms from the empirical level. We can only say, in the words of Rāmānuja, that the Svarūpānanda of the Jīvas, in Mokṣa is, like the very Svarūpa of the Jīvas, “Svasamvedya” and “Vācām agocarah” sui generis and that, their gradations too are स्वस्वेद्य and वाचामगोचरः। Vyāsarāya has made the point clear by means of an analogy,—the different levels of joy and satisfaction derived from the tasting of water and nectar.1

Vyāsarāya has also argued in his Nīyāmṛta that the principle of parity between means and ends, if applied to the two different types of Śādhanas accepted by the Rāmānuja school, viz. Bhakti and Prapatti, will inevitably lead to the acceptance of gradation of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa among the released souls. The validity of the principle of parity of means and ends is not weakened, as Śādhanas in both the systems merely help to manifest (abhivyakti) the Svarūpānanda of the Muktas and not to produce it (janaka).

Prapatti is trustful surrender of self to God (bhara-nyāsa)2 and Bhakti is continuous flow of contemplative thinking of God, without break.3 These two are conceived as independent means of release; and not as complementary. According to the Rāmānuja school, the way of Bhakti calls for the faithful performance of the duties of Varṇāśrama and Śrauta-Smārtta dharma,4 in order to fit the mind for nididhyāsana. It

1. स्वहसुखानां प्रत्येकमेकंतेनालोलोन च संन्यापरिमाणान्तेन्त्रमान्याभावायेव जलसुधापानसुखोप-रितैः महुरसुधातालिन्दित्व स्वपपहतवैवयं युक्तम्। (Nym. p. 642)
2. अनन्यसाध्ये स्त्रामान्ये महाविवासपुरुषकमः।
तदेकोपावताच्या प्रवत्ति: सर्वास्तमित:॥ (Q. Deśika, R. G. B. xviii 66)
3. व्हान्तं च तैवाधाकोविभिन्नसंविस्तिस्तन्ता नरैं। वस्त्यति च ‘नाहुनिरस्त्वृद्धेषां’दिति। तस्येकं
वेदन्योपासनायस्मात्तथं ध्वातुद्धन्तत्वम्। (Sūbhāṣya 1, 1,1)
4. एवेकाध्या ध्वातुद्धन्तेः साधनानि यज्ञादिक्मणि (ibid)
is such Upāsanā of God with the help of any one of the Vidyās taught in
the Śrutis that earns the love and grace of God on oneself.1

The two ways of Bhakti and Prapatti are thus different.2 Bhakti
needs repetition of Upāsanā and requires adherence to the Śrāuta and
Smārta Karmas and Varṇāśrama dharmas. Prapatti, on the other hand, is
free from the obligations of such Karma and needs no repetition (āvṛtti).
It is enough to offer Prapatti but once with all one’s heart. The way of
Bhakti is thus the more arduous one and long drawn out. It is also burden-
ened with the obligations of Śāstric Karma.3 In view of this structural
and other differences between them, as Śādhanas, one will have to accept
a corresponding difference in the nature of the ānanda which they will
help to manifest in release.4

Vyāsarāya argues that they cannot be equalized in respect of their
final fruit, by our proposing to invest Prapatti with a greater measure of
trust in God (viśvāśādhyaka) and attributing less of such trust in God
to the discipline of Bhakti.5 On the contrary, there would seem to be a

1. उपासनायांवलाते सति द्वद्वस्य (ibid)
2. “Prapatti is an old doctrine in Southern Vaiṣṇavism. In the Nyāsatilakā-
Vyākhya great emphasis is laid on the fact that Prapatti as a path of appro-
ach to God is different from the path of Bhakti and superior to it. (Dasgupta,
I. Phil. iii, p. 380, fn. 2 ).
3. “In the Nyāsatilakāvyākhyā it is said that the chief difference between
Bhakti and Prapatti is (i) that the former is of the nature of unbroken
meditation while the latter has to be done once for all; (ii) the former needs
varying accessory methods of worship and continual action, whereas in the latter
we have excessive faith” (ibid). (Italics mine).
4. लब्रीया प्रत्येक मौकेहेऽऽि निरस्तराचितांभवन्यासलोकः मलंति: कमङ्गिनाः-
पक्षाभामापराध्वाचः च विपमलातः. (Nyrm. iv, 5)
5. न क तथोकतंतरीया अपिकाप्लेवपि, विविधात्वाचिक्वालोः सामयामिति वाच्यम्.

(Nyrm. p. 644 b.)
better case for holding that there will be a greater measure of trust in God created by Bhakti, on account of constant and repeated practice of Upāsanā, which is defined as:

बेदनस्योपासनायस्य असद्धान्यस्य ॥ ॥ ॥

than in Prapatti, which it is enough to offer once. It would lead to the fallacy of interdependence, if one should still disregard the disparity between the two Śādhanas and assert that they are both on a par and that their results also would be the same. For, unless their parity as Śādhanas is first established on satisfactory grounds, the equality of their fruits cannot be taken for granted; and unless the equality of fruit is first proved, the equality as Śādhanas cannot also be established.

It is, therefore, futile to deny that Bhakti and Prapatti are not on the same par, as Śādhanas. The former must be accepted as the more arduous one and the latter as the easier one. The Śāstras would be violating the principle of equity, if they allow the same fruit as is attained by those who practise the more arduous means. A God who rewards the different types of Śādhakas, who seek Him thro’ such admittedly unequal means, to the same extent and degree would also be liable to the charge of partiality and cruelty. The principle of equity in regard to efforts and results established in B.S. ii, 1, 34, would also be flouted on such a view.¹

In his commentary on Rāmānuja’s G.B. (xviii, 66) Vedānta Deśīka, introducing an alternative explanation of the verse given by Rāmānuja, refers to Prapatti Mārga as intended for the benefit of those who, for social and other disabilities, are unable or incompetent to follow the more arduous course of Bhakti coupled with Upāsanā and the Varṇāśrama and

¹ विष्णुस्यावते सैव भक्तयोग्यवाक्तव्यक्तिवत् सपत्योवितात्तत् । यदि
च फलसामयं साधनसामायः प्रकारविधिकविज्ञानःकष्ठ्येत तत्त्वोन्नयायः । साधनवैभव्यायं तिप
साधनसामयं च अधिकविधानयः श्रुतेन्द्रप्रदेश्वलं फलदातुरीशरस्य वैयमादिकं च स्वाद ।

( Nym. p. 644 ).
other Karmas. In other words, the disparity of the Sadhanas is to be reconciled with the final result achieved by both the Margas and types of Adhikarins being the same, on account of the difference in the competence and capacity of the Adhikarins. But then, it appears from Desika’s further comments in this connection, that he is viewing “Prapatti” not so much as an independent means on a par with the Vedic Upasanā Marga based on Karma and Bhakti, but as an aid to overcome the obstacles and ‘sins’ which come in the way of one’s putting the regular Bhakti-Yoga into practice: एवं सक्ल्याभिप्रयागसाधनत्वा भगवच्छालस्यादिव प्रसिद्धं भगवतपदनमिद्रो प्रज्ञामयोगमस्माधिविभिवानबहुःपदार्थविषेषं प्रदर्शितम्। ‘सुतुष्क- रेण शोचेऽयो रेन शोचंश्रेणु। स स तत्त्वादेवेति चर्मःशोकसंप्राद्यः। अत एववाचत्वभाष्य- 
प्रक्ष्यवस्तूलेख्य अविरोधः।” (ibid).

The view referred to by Vyāsarāya, in his Nyāyāmṛta very probably represents the position of the Tengalai school of Śrīvaiṣṇava thought, which has given special prominence to Prapatti as an independent Sādhana of Mokṣa which can be practised by all without social and other restrictions, i.e. to say as an alternative to Bhakti in its Vedic aspect.

1. ‘सर्वधर्मान् पतियय्’ इति त्ववययाग एवायां योजनायाम्। न च ताबता नित्यनैमितिक- 
लोकप्रसंगः। दुरुच्छाधनार्थविशिष्टिविषयकतः। तुल्यन्यायत्वा, हु, नित्यनैमितिकविप, यानि 
दुरुच्छायानि तैवें स्पात। शास्त्रमिक्रयेव शास्त्रप्रज्ज्वः। अशक्तया अकर्षणे दोषावात्।

(Desika, R. G. B. xviii, 68)

2. इह च मुख्याशक्तिय सर्वक्षार्मुखाकुलतया एकश्वेव भगवत्पदन्तत्व विचारात् श्रवण- 
श्लोकाचारिनेष्ठत च, मुखयाकुलम्। सर्व फलाविषेषोपपत्ते।

3. “The older school thinks that the person who adopts the path of Prapatti should give up all Scriptural duties assigned to the different stages of life (āśrama); for it is well evidenced in the Gītā text that one should give up all one’s religious duties and surrender oneself to God.” (Dasgupta, Hist. of I. Phyl., iii, p. 91.) See in this connection the views of the Tengalai sect such as Pillai Lokācārya and Alagiyar Manavāla Muni.
Vyāsārāya says that there is no warrant in the Śāstras for making any such distinction or dichotomy in the field of Sādhanas. Even conceding that there are two different levels of Sādhanas viz., Bhakti and Prapatti, suited to different levels of Sādhakas, they must necessarily involve a corresponding difference in the nature of the result achieved by them. The principle of parity of means and ends can, on no account, be set aside. That is why Kumārila Bhaṭṭa himself, in his Vārtika recognizes:

कर्मणामल्यमहत्तां फलनां च स्वगोचरे ।

विभागः स्थानसामान्यादिभेदेषापि चोदिते ॥

that even tho’ there are no express statements to the effect, in the Śrutis it is accepted on principle, that lesser rites have lesser fruits and bigger rites have higher fruits.

Vyāsārāya further points out that the religious duties, meditations and other spiritual activities performed by Aparokṣa Jñānins like Śuka, who may be Bhaktas or Prapannas, cannot be regarded as accessories to the acquisition of Jñāna, as in the case of unenlightened Adhikārins, by way of creating a zest for knowledge in them; or by way of putting an end to their sins arising in the event of non-performance of those duties, because persons like Śuka are already Aparokṣajñānins. Such religious activities carried out by them, cannot also be taken to contribute directly to the fruit of Mokṣa, as that would entail the acceptance of the Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda, by the Viśiṣṭādvaṭtin. If the Samuccaya of Jñāna and Karma is admitted, then the diversity of Karmas after Jñāna is attained would have to be accepted as producing a diversity in the result, to that extent, which would not be acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaṭtin. Such activities in which Jñānins, Bhaktas and Prapannas engage in (after attaining Jñāna) can, obviously, have no other goal except Mokṣa, because they would care for no other fruit. Their activities cannot be explained away merely as activities performed for the benefit of the world or its improvement (lokasaṅgraha) or as commandments of God. None of
these can be ends in themselves. If it is supposed that they are performed by them merely to earn the love of God for themselves, we will have to point that they have already earned such love of God by rising to the level of Jñānins, Bhaktas and Prapannas. If they wish to achieve a greater measure of God’s love upon themselves by such activities, there will be no point in striving for it, if by such a fresh measure of God’s love being showered on them, their joy in Mokṣa is not enhanced to any appreciable extent. Nor can their activities be mere sportive activities as in the case of God Himself. For, the Śrutis do enjoin upon the Aparokṣa Jñānins, such performance of actions, in all seriousness:

‘आचार्यांहिंद्रियामवैपैत्यसात्मनभिप्रत्येकशान्तोभवेतातोभवेत्’

‘मकरम्खलत्वरो मद्यवस्तः संगवजितः’

‘मन्नना भव मद्यवस्तः मत्याजी मां नमस्तुह’

इत्यदिना भक्तिप्रपातविततं तद्विधातात् (Nym.)

We cannot therefore escape from the conclusion that all spiritual activities of Aparokṣa Jñānins, whether they take the form of Karma, Bhakti or Prapatti, must have their own rewards in Mokṣa. As there is no possibility of any other kind of reward in Mokṣa than realizing and enjoying one’s own innate bliss, some kind of a fresh welling up of this Svarūpāṇanda will have to be admitted as an indisputable certainty. There is thus a very strong case for accepting the thesis of Svarūpāṇanda-Tāratamya in Mokṣa.

The nature and degree of bliss enjoyed by each soul should thus be in proportion to its natural fitness (yogyatā) and amount of preparation (sādhanā) including its qualitative and other differences. As, between them and God, there is already this wide difference that they could not take part in the cosmic functions of the Supreme (B.S. iv, 4, 17), there must be a wide difference in the bliss of the Supreme and that of the released. This is accepted by the Śruti text:
As in an ideally Communistic State, the released can be expected to know what is good and best for them and they can be trusted to carry on their way, without encroaching upon one another's province or liberties of God. They neither do nor can will what is impossible of achievement or beyond their deserts. While it remains true that all their desires come true, Madhva would explain, that on no occasion would they entertain a low and unholy desire or one beyond their powers of achievement or jurisdiction:

The rights and liberties of the freed are thus constitutionally defined and properly safeguarded by the principle of und dictated harmony (satya- kāmata) of their nature. There is no room for discord or jealousy there. Each one has his reward and each feels happy and full to the brim:

1. Cf. "Thy Will be done on Earth, as it is in Heaven."
Each is so much absorbed in his own contentment and has no thoughts to give to the disparity between him and the others. He sees nothing more than that every other person, also, is likewise happy and contented and full to the brim: भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गः (B.S. iv, 4, 22). Madhva’s Mokṣa is, thus, a philosophical Communism come true.

One of the familiar objections to the admission of multiplicity with difference (Tāratamya) in Mokṣa is that if there are differences and inequalities there, they would inevitably lead to jealousy and strife among the released and reduce the released state to the level of our own world.

An obvious reply to this is that difference is consistent and compatible with cooperation and goodwill also,—not necessarily with conflict. Madhva goes a step further and argues that inequality by itself cannot lead to strife. It is the feelings of jealousy and other bad passions that are ultimately responsible for it; and as these are ruled out in Mokṣa, differences, or inequalities, by themselves cannot do any harm.

For, there is no assurance that such discord will be completely eliminated, if absolute ‘equality’ is accepted! Instances are not wanting, within our own experience (at the domestic, national and even international levels) of persons, communities and nations harbouring jealousy, hatred and evil designs against their own equals:

वहेयुः चैव चेष्याचाय: समेष्यपि कुतो न ते?

तप्यमानः समानः हृद्य द्वेष्यानिदिः उत्तरापि।
Such tendencies, in the last analysis, should be traced to defects in the human character. But inasmuch as Mokṣa is, by definition, a state of blessedness free from all such imperfections and bad passions of embodied existence, there can be no possibility of any strife or discord arising among the released souls. Hence, the presence of gradation in the Svarūpa and Svarūpānanda of Jīvas in Mokṣa would not, in any way, disturb the peace and harmony of the released state.

Precisely the same line of argument has been adopted by Aristotle in defence of private property against the alluring pleas in favor of community of property:

"Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence. Men readily listen to it and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner, everybody will become everybody’s friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in the States (suits about contracts etc.), which are said to arise out of possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause,—the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common—tho’ there are not many of them, when compared with the vast number who have private property.” (Aristotle’s Politics, Tr. Jowett, Oxford, 1931, p. 68). [Italics mine].

Madhva silences such frivolous objections against the presence of difference and gradation in Mokṣa by quoting the words of the Sūtrakāra: अक्षरोधः त्वायिन लक्षितायः समान्यतत्त्रावन्यां आपसवद्वत् तदस्वत्। (B. S., iii, 8, 34).

1. Madhva reads अविरोधः as against अवरोधः of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, here. Their interpretation of the term “ānapasada” also, is different.
The released souls are fully attuned to the Imperishable Brahman (\textit{akṣara-dhī}). They are, as such, absolutely free from all evil and other disturbing passions of embodied existence. Hence, they will all be mutually well-disposed to one another. Those in a higher status will be extending their help and friendship to others below them. The humbler among them would look upon those above them with love and reverence like true disciples (\textit{aupasada}) looking upon their Gurus with unbounded love and regard. This is indeed a refreshingly new and original interpretation of this important Śūtra from the Sādhanādhyāya of the Brahmāsūtras. It completely disarms all objections to the doctrine of Ānandatāratamya among souls, in Mokṣa.

Such is the beautiful picture of complete mutual harmony and goodwill prevailing in Mokṣa, according to Madhva. It shows how absurd and ridiculous it would be to judge the trans-empirical state from the standpoint of the passions and prejudices of our earthly life. The state of Mokṣa, as a state of blessedness, precludes by its very nature, all disturbing passions and psychological complexes. The freed souls there lead a life of unalloyed happiness in blissful mutual fellowship and communion with the Lord. It is a state above strife and disharmony, which are left behind, once for all.\footnote{Cf. अस्य इव रोमाणि विधूय पापं, चन्द्र इव राहोधुङ्खातः प्रसूच्चर धृतरा शरीरस्य खतात्त्वम् ब्रह्मलोकमसंभवामिति II (\textit{Chān. Up.} viii, 13.)}

Thus does Madhva conclude his exposition of the subject of Mokṣa, with a beautiful and spirited defence of the concept of Svārūpānanda-tāratamya therein. Every released soul is perfect in its own way; but the perfection (\textit{pūrṇatva}) of each is distinctive \textit{sui generis}. \textit{It is an expression of its own selfhood. The significance
of this unique doctrine lies as much in its logical trenchancy as in its unfathomable mystic inwardness. It is a conception which applies to spiritual life, the principle of peaceful co-existence and fellowship to the whole community of the released souls and guarantees to each one of them the fundamental right to exist sui juris and be in a position to have the complete and distinctive enjoyment of its own selfhood and Svarūpānanda, in communion with Brahman.

भाष्याकादिकालश्रुतग्रहणानुपजीव्य मया कृतम् ॥
प्रकटमेव सुधियो विवृतत्व सकौतुक्म ॥

॥ श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Works in English)

C. R. Krishna Rao
H. N. Raghavendrachar
R. Nagaraja Sarma
B. N. K. Sharma

Śrī Madhva, His Life and Doctrine.
Dvaita Philosophy, Its Place in Vedānta
Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy.
Catussūtrībhāṣya of Madhvācārya (Ed.)
Svatantrādvaita: Madhva's Theistic Realism.

History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature, Vols. I and II.
Śrī Madhva's Teachings in His Own Words.

S. N. Dasgupta
S. Radhakrishnan

A History of Indian Philosophy, Vols II, III and IV.
Indian Philosophy, Vols. I and II.

Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy.
Brahma Sutra

Chandradhar Sharma
Datta D. M.
Ghate V. S.
Ayer A. J.

A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy.
Six Ways of Knowing.
Vedānta.
The Problem of Knowledge.
Carpenter E. J.  
Ewing A. C.  
Fraser A. Campbell  
Dawes Hicks  
Pringle Pattison  
James Ward  
Herbert Spencer  
Albert Schweitzer

*Theism in Mediaeval India.*

*Fundamental Questions of Philosophy.*

*Philosophy of Theism.*

*Philosophical Bases of Theism.*

*Idea of God.*

*Pluralism and Theism.*

*Fundamental Principles.*

*Indian Thought and Its Development.*
DVAITA VEDÂNTA

Madhvâcârya

Brahmasûtrabhâsyâ, Anu-Vyâkhyâna
Nyâya-Vivaraña and Ânu-Bhâsyâ;
(Daśa-Prakarañâs : Viññutattva-nir-
ñaya; Tattvodyota, Karmanirñaya,
Tattvasarînkhyâna, Tattvaviveka, Upâ-
dhikhaññâna, Mâyâvâda-Khaññanâ,
Mîthya-tvânûnûnakhaññâna, Pramâña-
Lakṣañâ ), Bhâgavata-Tâtparya; Mahâ-
bhârata-Tâtparyanirñaya ; Gîtâ-Bhâsyâ,
Gîtâ-Tâtparya (with c.c. of Jayatirtha);
Dvâdaśa-Stotra and Commentaries on
Taittirîya, Chândogyâ, Brhadârañyaka,
Mândûkya and Kena Upanîsads.

Padmanâbha Tîrtha

Sannyâya-Ratnâvalî

Trivikrama Paññita

Tattvapradîpa

Jayatirtha

Nyâya-Sudhâ, Tattvapraekâsikâ,
Pramāṇa-Paddhati, Vādāvalī and cc. on Daśa Prakaraṇas

Viṣṇudāsācārya Vādaratnāvalī

Vyāsatīrtha Nyāyāṃśa, Tātparya-Candrika,

Tarkatāṇḍava and gloss on Tattvaviveka

Rāmācārya-Vyāsa Nyāyāṃśa-Taraṅgiṇī

Vijayīndra Tīrtha Madhvādhva-Kaṇṭakodhāra

Vādirāja Tīrtha Tattvapraṅāśikā-Gurvarthadipikā

Vidyādhiśa Tīrtha Vākyārtha-Candrika

Rāghavendra Tīrtha Tattvapraṅāśikā-Bhāvadipa

Jagannātha Tīrtha Bhāṣya-Dīpikā

Vedagarbha Padmanābha Madhvāsiddhāntasāra

ADVAITA-VEDĀNTA

Gauḍapāda Kārikās with c. of Śaṅkara

Śaṅkara Brahmasūtrabhāṣya C. on Brhad- 

āraṇyaka Up. and Gītā

Maṇḍana Brahmaśiddhi
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sureśvara</td>
<td>Vārtikas (on Bṛh. Up. and Taitt. Up.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vācaspati Miśra</td>
<td>Bhāmati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vimuktātman</td>
<td>Iśtasiddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ānandabodha</td>
<td>Nyāya-Makaranda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarvajñātman</td>
<td>Samkṣepa-Śārīraka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prakāśātman</td>
<td>Pañcapādikā-Vivarana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śrīharṣa</td>
<td>Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citsukha</td>
<td>Tattvapradīpikā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhusūdana Sarasvatī</td>
<td>Advaita-Siddhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahmānanda Sarasvatī</td>
<td>Brahmānandīya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**VIṢIṢṬĀDVAITA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yāmuna</td>
<td>Siddhitraya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rāmānuja</td>
<td>Śrībhāṣya, Gītābhāṣya; Vedārītha-samgraha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vedānta Deśika</td>
<td>Tattvamuktākalāpa; c. on Gītābhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nārāyaṇārya</td>
<td>Nitimālā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OTHER SYSTEMS

Nāgārjuna  
Mādhyamaka Kārikās

Vātsyāyana  
Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya

Iśvarakṛṣṇa  
Sāmkhya-Kārikās

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa  
Vārtikas

Udayana  
Nyāya-Kusumāṇjali, Baudhādhikāra

Jñānadeva  
Jñāneśvari
## INDEX

(Diacritical marks have been dropped)

(Note.—S.—Samkara R.—Ramanuja M.—Madhva)

### A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abhava</td>
<td>43,80-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhedasrutis</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhimanidevatas</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— S. on</td>
<td>42f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhinavacandrika</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhinavanyathakhyati</td>
<td>135-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— as a dexterous combina-</td>
<td>134-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— its distinction from</td>
<td>133-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist view</td>
<td>133-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— from Nyaya view</td>
<td>133-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhinannimittapadana</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>view of R</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhasa</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— theory of</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acintyabhinavasakti</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advaite view of absorption,</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vy’s criticism</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrshita</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advaita Brahman</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhikarins</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahamartha, survival</td>
<td>331-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Moksha</td>
<td>331-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aiyer Sivaswami</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnosticism</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhandata, dependence on</td>
<td>345f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viseshas</td>
<td>54-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhyati</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksharadhi</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsa-amsi</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsa-amsi</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anandabodha</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anugatasaatta</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anubhashya</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antahprakasa</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anandataratamya</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— controversial works on</td>
<td>345f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aparasiddhanta</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aparthaksiddhi</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearance and reality</td>
<td>31-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aparokshajana</td>
<td>299, 315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— texts on</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— attained by mind</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— variations in intensity</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— stages after</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— in R’s system</td>
<td>318-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— not recognised by R’s</td>
<td>317-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school</td>
<td>317-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anadisvabhava</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anirvacaninirkyati,</td>
<td>126-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— review of</td>
<td>126-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anupalabdhi</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anvitabhishvatana</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— diff. bet. M. and</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prabhakara view</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antahprakasa</td>
<td>153, 155,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquinas St. Thomas</td>
<td>205, 250, 253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— his defence of private</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>property, q. in support of</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anandataratamya</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthapatti</td>
<td>91-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asariram va (SrutI)</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— interpretation</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributes, twofold classfn.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atma, meaning of</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atman, survival in Moksha</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— identical with</td>
<td>325-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ahamartha (ego)</td>
<td>325-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atoms, as partible</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustine St.</td>
<td>155, 202, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aupasada (disciple)</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avatars</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avidya</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avaranas of Jiva</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayer A. J.</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bergson</td>
<td>211, f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhakti (defn.)</td>
<td>287, f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— as blend of love</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and knowledge</td>
<td>287-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— in B.S.</td>
<td>297-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— in Moksha</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— as an end</td>
<td>351-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Prapatti</td>
<td>351-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(diff. bet.)</td>
<td>351-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bharanayasa</td>
<td>350-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhaskara</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhavabhuti</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhamat                   113 f; 188, 150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bheda</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— as dharmisvarupa</td>
<td>18, 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bimbapratibimbabha</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— of God and souls</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— in Advaita</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bimbaparoksha</td>
<td>306, 315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bliss of Moksha,
— texts on 342
Bond W.G. 304 f.
Brahmajnanavada
— criticized 190
Brahmaparanaanavada 165-66
167; f.
Brahmopadanatva, analogies 167-69
Brahmasaktiparinamavada 171-72
Brahma, prominent position among souls 210'
— as Usher of Souls 210
Brahmananda, on Vishesas 51
Buitenon J.A.S. 230 f.

C

Carpenter J.E. 227 f.
Calvin 204
Causation
— Buddhist view 79
— bhedabhedabhet. cause and effect 80
Chetana Prakrti 42, 158, 164
Christian Mystics 246
Citsuha 61, 63-65, 185
Chandradhar Sharma
(on Vy.) 64f.; 192; 194; 216 f.
Change, two kinds of 157
Conceptualists 69
Contribution theory 39
Consciousness and objects, qn. of nexus 147-48
Correspondence of knowledge 84

D

Dasgupta 39, 149, 177 f.;
181f; 313 f; 351 f; 355 f.
— remarks on Vy. 64 f.
Datta D.M. 48, 97-98, 111
Dawes Hicks 36, 250
Desika Vedanta 318, 355 f.;
— on Aparoksha 319
Dharmabhedavada 59
Dharmisvarupabhedavada 64
Difference
— Advaitic dialecticians on 60-61
— concept implied in
Advaitic view of non-duality 63
and anirvacaaninya 62
— critique of (answered) 63-66
Divine Personality. 249-50, 251
Dreams
— unreality (in Advaita) 144-45
— reality estabdi. 144-46
Dualism, defn. 15
Dundoy Fr. 155 f.
Dvesha-bhakti, refuted 294

E

Enjoyment, in Muki 337
— texts on 342; f.
Error (review of)
— Prabhakara view 117-19
— R’s view 119-22
— Buddhist views 122-23
— Nyaya view 123-26
— Advaitic view 126-30
Eternal substances
— in what sense ‘created’ 158
— metaphysical dependence of eternals 40, 156; 157 f.
Evil, its consistency with
God’s goodness 270
Ewing A.C. 70 f.
Fellowship, in moksha 359
Fivefold difference 58-59
Flint 41
Fraser A. Campbell (on pro-
blem of Evil) 204-06

G

Gaudapada 144
Gitatatparyatikta
— on Vishesas 44 f.
Chate V.S. 231 f; 304; 309-10;
328; 378
God, as a Personality 248-49
— Vishesa in God’s Personality 251-52
— His trans-empirical nature 252-33
— His ‘body’ non-material 260
— as Source of bondage 183
— as Source of release 256-57
— God’s knowledge not ‘akhanda’ 251
— and our illusions 252
Grace, M’s view 307
— Advaitic attitude to 308-09
Gradation bet.
Salokya and Sayuia 349
Gunopasamhara 304
Guruprasada 279

H

Haribhadra Suri 50
Harikathamrtasara, 291
INDEX

Harmony (in difference in Moksha 356
Hatha 267
Herbert Spencer 74
Hobhouse 98
Hume, 202; 300 f.

I

Identity-in-difference 29
Identity of Jiva-Brahman in what sense 229
Ignorance, is real 189
— in M’s phil. 182-83
Individuality, basis of 177-79
Infallibility of Sakshi 109
Inference, nature of 87
— types of 88
Infinitude different conceptions of 305

J

James Ward 2, 204 f.
Jayatirtha 2, 5, 38, 147,
148, 159, 296, 305,
325 and passim.
Jiva, as abhasa of Brahman 222 f.
— his karttṛta real 261-63
and dependent on God 264-65
Jvacchadika 182
Jivopadhi, two kinds 225
Jivatraividyha 204
— Evidence of 207-09
— rationale of 211
— not same as predestination theory 212
— doctrine not derived from Samkhya theory of trīgunas 217
Jivanmukta 329
Jnanakarmasamuccayavada 282, 286
Jnanottarakarma 286
Jnanesvari 294

K

Kamabhakti 292-94
Karma, not an ultimate explanation of plurality of selves 197-98
— law of its limitations as an expln. of taratamya 212
Karmanasa 328
Karma of Aparokshajnanins 329
Kartrikarmabhavavirodhā 338
P.M.—24,

Kevalapramana, dns. of 84-85
Kevalanimittakaranavada 176
Khyatiudas (See Error) 113
Kumarila (Bhatta) 35, 36, 113
Knowledge, gradations of 84

L

Law of Karma, its limitations as leading to Jivasvarupa-bhedavada 266-67
Laksmi as Seshi to released souls 349
Laksmijnana 84, 85
Laya 328
Lingabhangaa 339
Lingasarira 181
Lovejoy Arthur O 8; f.

M

Madhusudana Sarasvati — on Visheshas 51
Madhva 176, 185, 232
and passim
— his monotheism 254-55
— new solution of problem of difference 64
— interpretation of B.S. iii, 2, 19. 309-11
Madhoasiddhantasastra 44 f.; 341, 342-43
Mandana (Misra) 61
Maya 312
— as material cause 174
— in M’s phil. 189
— its two different senses 146, 313
Mahabharatatapatparyanirnaya 236, 295
Maitreyi her philosophical difficulty 324
Manana 276, 277
Max Muller 82
Memory, as immediate perception by mind 96-98
— qn. of its correspondence with experience 96
— its validity a/c to Vacaspati Misra 99
— element of ‘novelty’ in 98
— significance of M’s contribution to the concept of 99
Meditation variations in range 305
Meditative cognition 319
Meghanadari 93
Mimamsanyayas for
Sagunaprabalya  240-43
Mithyatva  36
Modi P.M.  327 f.
Moksha,
— fourfold distinction  330
— Advaitic view (examined)  334
— Buddhist view (examined)  321
— Nyaya-Vaiseshika view (examined)  332
— criticism of M’s view  322
— scope for activities and enjoyment in  340
Moral Evil, how reconcilable with God’s goodness  205
Monistic texts,
— figurative interpretations: sanctions for  141
— how to be explained  142, 229
Muktas, their attitude to mutual taratamya compared to Gurusishyabhava  358

N
Nagaraja Sarma  217 f.
Nandi M. (on four kinds of Moksha a/c to M.)  320 f.
Nairatmyavada  321-22
Nayadyamani  93 f.
Negation (defn.)  80
— as a ‘prameya’  80
Nimbarka  39
Nirguna, meaning of  238
Nirguna Brahman  239
Nittimala  17 f; 39 f; 208 f.
Nirvikalpakapratyaksha
— untenable  87
Nirvisesha  334-35 f.
Nishkamakarma  282, 285
Nidhidhyasana  276-77
— a/c to M.  260
Nityamuktas  209
Nityasamsarins  202
— in R’s system  209, 216 f.
— in Nyaya school  217
Nityasuris  209, 344, 349
Nominalists  69
Nyayasudha  15, 20 f, passim
Nyayamrta  347 passim
Nyasatilaka-Vyakhya  351 f; 2-3

O
Omnipotence of God  232-33
Origen  155

P
Parinamavada  162 f.
— of M.  160
Paramacchadika  182
Paripakavabhakti  296
Perception,
— validity of  138-39
— uncontractedness of  143
— by Sakshi as Upajivya  140
Prabuddhabhurata  288 f.
Prakasatman  174
Prakrti  163
— two senses of  313
— its evolutes  164
Pramana (derivation)  83
— twofold dn.  83
— implications of M’s theory of  103-105
— defn. applicable to Memory  97-99
Prapatti (defn.)  350 f; 2
Prapannas  354-55
Pratikopasana,
— M’s view  302-03
— S’s view  301
— R’s view  302
Prabhahdakarma  328-29
Pringle Pattison  151 f; 200 f; 246
Priyavrata (King)  283

R
Radhakrishnam Dr.  7, 32 f, 33 f;
178 f; 190,
207 f; 212, 238, 239 f;
255, 265, 268
— on Viseshas  50, 56
Raghavendrachara H.N.  78, 159 f; 227 f.
Raghavendra (Tirtha)  235 f; 269
Ramanuja  16, 17, 39, 170, 195;
199, 278, 310, 319, 349
— on intrinsic gradation of selves  207-08
— his expln. of B.S, iv, 4, 17
not against anandataratamya
in release  348-49
— his view of different classes of souls  344
— on dreams  146
— on nididhyasana  278
Ranade R.D.  323 f; 324
INDEX

Recognition, as a unitary cognition 98
Realists 69
Reality (M’s defn.) 31, 38
— orders of 36-41
— threelfold classfn. in Advaita 35
Released State
— as one of blissful enjoyment (texts) 342-43
Resemblance Vs. class-essence 70-71
Russel 94
Runes Dogbert D. 15 f.

S

Sabdapramana 89
Sabdapatarksha 280
Sadasatкурьяvадa 40, 78
Sadhanas, diversity and gradation, as pointers to taratamya in mokshananda 346
Sakshi 6, 10, 105
— raison d’etre 114-15
— field of 87
— primacy of 141
— as completing doctrine of self-validity of knowledge 110
— as ultimate criterion of truth 115
Sakshijnya alone can be self-luminous 108
— its right to override identity-texts 115
— in rel. to identity-texts 111
— in Advaita 113-14
Samana (Laksmi) 42
Samavaya, needs Visesha 55
Samkara 16, 34, f; 35, 144, 190, f; 240, 260, 302, 322
— on amsata 228
Samskaras, as links in memory 94
Samskaras in memory 96
Sarvamukti 213, 270, 272
Schachhtiparimalama of Brahman 172 f.
Satyadhyana Tirtha 25 f.
Savishabhedha 23, 29
Sayujiya 230, 349
Schwitzer Albert 139, 197-98
Scripture, attitude to Karma, 285
Simile of Sun and rainbow 224-25
Simile of water 309-11
Solfisim 3
Space, as uncreated 74
— Buddhist view of 74
— M’s view of intuitive

perception of space cf. modern European views 73

Space and Time
— absolute theory of 72
Spinoza 38
Spiritual efforts, gradation 281
Sravana 276-77
Srikantha 170
Sridhara Svamin 16, 183, 256
Sribhashya 17, 318
Sriharsha 4, 60, 307
Sudarsana Suri 259
Sukuta (as Moksha) 331
Svabhayajnnavada 193; f.
Svaparaka 43
Svaparaksatasva of Atman 185
— in Advaita 186-87
Svagunacchadika 178
Svarupajnana 84, 86
Svarupabhedha 30
Svarupasrshhi (of Jivas) 159
Svarupopadhi 19
— of Jivas 225-26
Svarupataramya
— among Jivas in R’s system 347
Svarupayogya 267
Svatantra 41
Svatantra-advitiya-Brahman 25
Syllogism (members) 88-89
Synthesis of
— Upansadic thought 24
Synthesis of
— Hatha, Karma and Prayatna 267-68

T

Tamil Saivism 189
Tarangini (on Viseshas) 51
Taratamya, in Moksha
— objections met 357-58
— in moksha as a mystic doctrine 346
— in moksha not liable to discord 357
Tattvamasi 10 f.
Tattoamuktakalapa 39 f; 209 f 232 f.
Taparalingas 92
Tayumanavar 297
Tengalais 39; f 355
Thibaut G. 327
Thilly Prof. 213
Time, perception by Sakshi 75-76
— Jayatirtha on 74
— Nyaya, Samkhya and
other views untenable 75-76
Tripartite classification of Souls 203
Tranijvas 304
Trivikrama Pandita 248
Trumbull 111, f.
Truth, as organic to knowledge 106

U

Udayana 252, f.
Ulirici 152
Upamana, subsumed 92
Upasamharaprabalya 13; f.
Upasana 300
Upadhis, function of 73
Utarkanti 328

V

Vadacali 65
Vadaratnavali 179, 202
— on Viseshas 52
Vadiraja 310
Validity (of knowledge) 102
— Buddhist view 101
— Bhatta view 102
— Nyaya view 101
— Samkhya view 100
— ascertainment impossible without acceptance of Sakshi 107-08
— implications of M's doctrine of 102-03
Vasanas, as material cause of dreams 146
Vairagya 277
Vatsyayana 31
Vedas, apaurushayatva
— arguments for a/c to M. 89-91
Vedarthasamgraha 336
Vedanta Desika 16, f; 93, 182, f: 209f; 234, 259, 318-19
Vijayindra Tirtha 11,233
Vikalpa method 9
Vimukhtatman 61, 66
Visesha (defn.) 48

— arguments for 46-48
— function in M's phill. 56-57
— implied in Bhedabheda relation 54
— as self-explicable 50
— as a Sarvatantrasiddhanta 52
— where applicable 49
— M's view radically different from Nyaya-Vaiseshika 56
Visheshana, two kinds, — ayavaddravyabhavi 67
Visishta 67
Visishtadvaitic Brahman 39
Vishnurahasya 182, 183, 260
Vivarana on Sravana
— on Brahmapadanatva, refuted 174
Vivartavada (criticism) 173-76
Vyapti, grounds of determination 87-88
Vyasa, as Avatar 269
Vyasaraya 138, 149, 159, 317, 319, 330, 347, 354
— on Space 72
— on Time 72
— criticism of R's view of Aparoksha 320
— on Anandataratanya 347-55
Vyavaharikapramanya 138
Vyuhas 258

William James 76
Will of God, as ultimate cause of bondage 312-13
Women, Brahmacara by 275

X

Yadavaprakasa 39
Yajnavalkya 324
Yajnavalkyaan fiction 328, f.
Yogipratyaksha 12
Yogic perception of past 96
# INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanskrit Word</th>
<th>Page 1</th>
<th>Sanskrit Word</th>
<th>Page 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>अनादिशया</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>जीवात्मा</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनादिविवेष</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>जीवनुक्तिः</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अनुपाधिप्रतिस्मर्थिम्</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>शान्त्वस्यप्रत्यापार्थि</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अधस्त्वयानम्</td>
<td>177, 179</td>
<td>तमोयोग्य</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अधिमनवान्यथात्वायति</td>
<td>135 f.</td>
<td>तु-खात्मव</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अर्थात्माभाव</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>हस्तमयसंबन्धवाकुपरति</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अन्धमतिकाराय (शच्चिनिनिः)</td>
<td>83 f.</td>
<td>धर्ममात्वाप्रेतिः</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अन्यायाकृतिकाश समाधि</td>
<td>72 f.</td>
<td>न प्रेत्य संज्ञानिः</td>
<td>322, 324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अन्यायानोपाल निषेधप्रतियोगिलम्</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>नित्यसंसारि</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अम्बुदधडागण अर्थोपरति</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>पराधीनाविशेषायति</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>अंधवमृ</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>पुख्षबुलमृ</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>श्रीपादः</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>प्रपंचः (शब्दः)</td>
<td>59; f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>भजान सत्यम्</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>प्रपंचः</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>आकाशशैत्यम्</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>प्रवाहतोषनादि</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>आस्मनः स्त्रकसाधलम्</td>
<td>185 f.</td>
<td>फलव्या भक्ति:</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>एकविशाल्यन सत्वविशालम्</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>बन्धः प्रमादात्मकः</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>क्रिकरमभाषाविरोध</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>बाधः</td>
<td>35, 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>चुतुवेदोपशिष्का</td>
<td>43 f.</td>
<td>ब्रह्मास्ति</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>जगद्यापारवर्जिणू</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>ज्ञोपादानत्वम्</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>जगत्सत्यालम्</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>ज्ञावह्याचानम्</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>सतात्त्विक्य</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>341</td>
<td>सर्वत्रत्वसिद्धान्त</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>सूपरीक्षितप्रत्यक्ष</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>स्वामावासानवाद</td>
<td>198; f.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>स्वत्योपाधि</td>
<td>269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>हठ</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 f.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Read</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Wherever</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>not given</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>does involve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>elsewhere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>there</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>ब्रह्म</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>आत्मत्वा</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>313</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>नानाविवधा</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323</td>
<td>t.n.2</td>
<td>See Prof. Ranade’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"A book that is shut is but a block"

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

GOVT. OF INDIA
Department of Archaeology
NEW DELHI.

Please help us to keep the book clean and moving.