PLATO

I
PLATO.
FROM THE CASTELLANI BUST.
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PLATO
WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
H. N. FOWLER
AND AN INTRODUCTION BY
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EUTHYPHRO  APOLGY  CRITO
PHAEDO  PHAEDRUS

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The Greek text in this volume is based upon that of Schanz, and all variations from his readings are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In some cases deviations from the reading of the manuscripts have been noted, even when adopted by Schanz. In the introductions to the separate dialogues no attempt has been made to discuss the philosophy of Plato or to do anything more than to supply such information as is needed for the intelligent reading of these particular dialogues. For further discussion and information the reader is referred to the General Introduction by Mr. W. R. M. Lamb, of Trinity College, Cambridge.

Harold N. Fowler.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Plato was born in 427 B.C. of Athenian parents who could provide him with the best education of the day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life. He came to manhood in the dismal close of the Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other sophists, and his early bent seems to have been towards poetry. But his intelligence was too progressive to rest in the agnostic position on which the sophistic culture was based. A century before, Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible, because the objects of sense are continually changing; yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by developing some hints let fall by its oracular author about the truth contained in names. From this influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates, whose character and gifts have left a singular impress on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost wholly due to Plato's applications and extensions of his master's
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thought; since, fortunately for us, the pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but brought his artistic genius into play, and composed the memorials of philosophic talk which we know as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew similar sketches of his teaching: the suggestion came from the "mimes" of the Syracusan Sophron,—realistic studies of conversation between ordinary types of character. As Plato became more engrossed in the Socratic speculations, this artistic impulse was strengthened by the desire of recording each definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion and advance.

When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was over sixty, and had long been notorious in Athens for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the Phaedo he tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific explanations of the universe, and found them full of puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anaxagoras,—that the cause of everything is "mind." This was more promising: but it led nowhere after all, since it failed to rise above the conception of physical energy; this "mind" showed no intelligent aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the plan of making definitions of "beautiful," "good," "large" and so on, as qualities observed in the several classes of beautiful, good and large material things, and then employing these propositions, if they appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher
hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science out of a recognised theory of "ideas" or "forms," which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated when we say "this man is good," and which postulates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects of sense. His "hypothetical" method, familiar to mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance in the Republic.

The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate scene of the Phaedo were accustomed to the theory of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and the soul. For some years before the master's death (399 B.C.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was often a spell-bound hearer of the "satyr." But ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which varied according to their age and the extent of their acquaintance with him. Aristophanes' burlesque in the Clouds (423 B.C.) had left a common impression not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet the young men who had any frequent speech with him in his later years, while they felt there was something uncanny about him, found an irresistible attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent eloquence on the principles of their actions and careers. He kept no school, and took no fees; he distrusted the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom he was carelessly confounded; moreover, he professed to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to
know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues, such as the Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches and Lysis, show the manner in which he performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect, the law of definite individual knowledge, above all reason of state or tie of party; and it is not surprising that his city, in the effort of recovering her political strength, decided to hush such an inconvenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate, but he continued his work undeterred.

Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have professed no positive doctrine, there were one or two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue, he said, is knowledge; for each man's good is his happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it awakened and exercised by "dialectic," or a systematic course of question and answer. He also believed his mission to be divinely ordained, and asserted that his own actions were guided at times by the prohibitions of a "spiritual sign." He was capable, as we find in the Symposium, of standing in rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and once for as long as twenty-four hours.

It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in
a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and mystical suggestions must have led his favourite pupils a good way towards a new system of metaphysics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings with the material world, and that the mind has prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic life.

After the death of Socrates in 399, Plato spent some twelve years in study and travel. For the first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara, where Eucleides, his fellow-student and friend, was forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have composed some of the six Dialogues already mentioned as recording Socrates' activity in Athens. Towards and probably beyond the end of this period, in order to present the Socratic method in bolder conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the \textit{Protagoras}, \textit{Meno}, \textit{Euthydemus}, and \textit{Gorgias}. These works show a much greater command of dramatic and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The last of them may well be later than 387, the year in which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the Academy; where the memory of his master was to be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the Socratic discussions among the elect of the new
generation. The rivalry of this private college with the professional school of Isocrates is discernible in the subject and tone of the Gorgias. Plato carried on the direction of the Academy till his death, at eighty-one, in 346; save that half-way through this period (367) he accepted the invitation of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato's talk: now it was a wayward youth who refused the yoke of a systematic training. What that training was like we see in the Republic, where true political wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned, with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.

The Meno and Gorgias set forth the doctrine that knowledge of right is latent in our minds: dialectic, not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived, must be long and difficult: but he felt a mystical rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture the immutable "forms" as existing in a world of their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence it springs—that knowledge is somehow possible, had come to the front of his mind when he began to know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the Cratylus and Symposium, display the strength of the conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest xiv
powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute beauty. The *Phaedo* turns the logical theory upon the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of death.

With increasing confidence in himself as the successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the *Republic*, to show the master meeting his own unsatisfied queries on education and politics. We read now of a "form" of good to which all thought and action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will explain not merely why justice is better than injustice, but the meaning and aim of everything. In order that man may be fully understood, we are to view him "writ large" in the organisation of an ideal state. The scheme of description opens out into many subsidiary topics, including three great proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of private property, the community of women and children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But the central subject is the preparation of the philosopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for dialectic; so that, once possessed of the supreme truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men. As in the *Phaedo*, the spell of mythical revelation is brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The
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Phaedrus takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us allegorically into the realm of "ideas," and thence to point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philosopher's duty of investigating the mutual relations of the "forms" to which his study of particular things has led him.

A closer interest in logical method, appearing through his delight in imaginative construction, is one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato's teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues, the Theaetetus and Parmenides, he puts off the aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as categories of thought which require co-ordination. The discussion of knowledge in the former makes it evident that the Academy was now the meeting-place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had learnt from other schools of thought; while the arguments are conducted with a critical caution very different from the brilliant and often hasty zeal of Socrates. The Parmenides corrects an actual or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle, now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with the theory as he understood it. The forms are viewed in the light of the necessities of thought: knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice which will raise our minds to the vision of all particulars in their rightly distinguished and connected classes.

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Plato is here at work on his own great problem:—If what we know is a single permanent law under which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the link between the one and the many? The *Sophist* contains some of his ripest thought on this increasingly urgent question: his confident advance beyond Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form, which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of a lecture. We observe an attention to physical science, the association of soul, motion, and existence, and the comparative study of being and not-being. The *Politicus* returns to the topic of state-government, and carries on the process of acquiring perfect notions of reality by the classification of things. Perhaps we should see in the absolute "mean" which is posited as the standard of all arts, business, and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The *Philebus*, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge, dwells further on the correct division and classification required if our reason, as it surely must, is to apprehend truth. The method is becoming more thorough and more complex, and Plato's hope of bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is gaining a clearer insight into the problem of unity and plurality.

The magnificent myth of the *Timaeus*, related by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the universe, so as to show how the One manifests itself as the Many. We have here the latest reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the Laws, he addresses himself to the final duty of the philosopher as announced in the Republic: a long habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather than disqualify him for the practical regulation of public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once more on soul, as the energy of the world and the vehicle of our sovereign reason.

Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates' teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle; whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may be able to detect in the Timaeus a tendency to view numbers as the real principles of things; and we may conjecture a late-found interest in the physical complexion of the world. As a true artist, with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life, Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, throughout: but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science we must regard him rather as a great inventor of sciences than as what we should now call a scientist. This is giving him a splendid name, which few men
have earned. Some of his inventions may be unrealisable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly futile. There are flaws in his arguments: to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy.

W. R. M. Lamb.

[Note.—Each of the Dialogues is a self-contained whole. The order in which they have been mentioned in this Introduction is that which agrees best in the main with modern views of Pluto's mental progress, though the succession in some instances is uncertain.]
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EUTHYPHRO
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

The Euthyphro probably owes its place at the head of the list of dialogues to the fact that it is the first of four dialogues dealing with the trial and death of Socrates. It is probably one of the earliest in date of composition, though that fact is not likely to have affected its position in the series.

Socrates comes to the court of the king archon to attend to some preliminaries of his trial on the charge of impiety and corrupting the youth. Here he meets Euthyphro, who is bringing a charge of manslaughter against his father, on account of the death from exposure of a servant who is himself a murderer. Euthyphro says that he is bringing the charge in the interest of piety, and claims to know more than other men about the nature of piety, proper religious observances, and the will of the gods.\(^1\) It is this claim which leads to the discussion of the nature of piety, or holiness, the chief theme of the dialogue.

The purpose of the dialogue is in part to inculcate correct methods of thinking, more especially the dialectic method. Euthyphro, when requested to give a definition of piety or holiness says (5 d) "I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or

\(^1\) Of Euthyphro nothing further is known. He may be identical with the Euthyphro who appears in the Cratylius as a philologian addicted to fanciful etymologies.
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else; and not prosecuting him is unholy." This reply leads at once to the proof that a particular example does not constitute a definition of a general concept. The second definition offered by Euthyphro is emended until it takes the form (9 ε) "What all the gods love is holy, and on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy." The question then arises whether a thing is holy because the gods love it, or the gods love it because it is holy. Cause and effect are discussed. In an attempt to arrive at a third definition, Euthyphro flounders hopelessly, whereupon Socrates shows how terms may be defined by referring a species to a genus. Finally Euthyphro states (12 ε) that "the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness." Hereupon Socrates tries to get him to tell what attention the gods require, what end human service to the gods has in view. In this he does not succeed, and the dialogue ends with this question unanswered.

Instruction in methods of thinking may perhaps seem needless to modern readers; even they, however, may find it interesting, and in Plato's times it was undoubtedly necessary. Such instruction occupies an important place in most of the Platonic dialogues. In the Euthyphro the correct method of thinking is illustrated and inculcated in the course of an attempt to define piety or holiness. The two definitions offered by Euthyphro are rejected; the third is left unchallenged, though a further limitation is demanded. It may therefore be regarded as

1 See 11 ε note.
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

a definition accepted by Plato, but not considered complete until the purpose of our service to the gods is determined. How Plato would determine it may be seen in the Apology (30 a), where Socrates says his life has been spent in the endeavour to persuade men to care chiefly for the perfection of their souls. The Euthyphro may perhaps be regarded as a sort of scientific justification of the position taken in the Apology.

Special editions of the Euthyphro are numerous. Among them those of Schanz (1887), Christ (1890), Adam (1890), and Heidel (1902) may be chosen for especial mention. The last named contains an exhaustive bibliography.
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΟΞΙΟΤ, ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

TA TOY ΔΙΛΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΑ

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

1. ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί νεώτερον, ὁ Σώκρατες, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπτῶν διατρίβας ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περί τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; οὐ γὰρ πον καὶ σοὶ γε δίκη τις οὕσα τυγχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὁστερ ἐμοὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕτως δὴ Ἀθηναίοι γε, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, δίκην αὐτὴν καλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ γραφὴν.

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τί φῆς; γραφὴν σὲ τις, ὡς ἔοικε, 

Β γέγραπται; οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γε καταγνώσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἔτερον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐν.

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Τίς οὕτος;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὖν ἀυτὸς πάνυ τι γιγνώσκω, ὁ Ἐυθύφρων, τὸν ἄνδρα: νέος γὰρ τὸς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς: ὑνομάξουσι μέντοι αὐτῶν, ὡς ἑγγῶς, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιθέας, εἰ τινὰ νῦ ἔχεις Πιθέα Μέλητον οἶνον τετανότριχα καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐγένειον, ἐπίγρυπτον δὲ.
EUTHYPHRO
[or ON HOLINESS, A TENTATIVE DIALOGUE]

CHARACTERS
EUTHYPHRO, SOCRATES

EUTHYPHRO. What strange thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your accustomed haunts in the Lyceum and are now haunting the portico where the king archon sits? For it cannot be that you have an action before the king, as I have.

SOCRATES. Our Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an indictment.

EUTHYPHRO. What? Somebody has, it seems, brought an indictment against you; for I don't accuse you of having brought one against anyone else.

SOCRATES. Certainly not.

EUTHYPHRO. But someone else against you?

SOCRATES. Quite so.

EUTHYPHRO. Who is he?

SOCRATES. I don't know the man very well myself, Euthyphro, for he seems to be a young and unknown person. His name, however, is Meletus, I believe. And he is of the deme of Pitthus, if you remember any Pitthian Meletus, with long hair and only a little beard, but with a hooked nose.
ΕΤΕΣΥΦΩΝ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σῶκρατες· ἄλλα δὴ
tίνα γραφήν σε γέγραπται;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ῥυπίνα; οὐκ ἀγεννη, ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ
τὸ γὰρ νέον ὅτα τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ
φαύλον ἔστιν· ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὡς φησιν, οἶδε, τίνα
τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθεί-
ροτες αὐτούς· καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφός τις εἶναι· καὶ
τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατειδὼν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς
ἡλικιώτατα αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται κατηγορήσων μοι ὡς
πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεται μοι
τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἄρχεσθαι ὅρθως; ὅρθως γὰρ

D ἐστὶ τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὡπως ἔσονται
οἱ τοῖς ἄριστοι, ὡστερ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων
φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἵσως πρῶ-

3 τὸν μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς
βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησιν· ἐπείτα μετὰ
tούτῳ δὴλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθῆς
πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αὐτίκος τῇ πόλει
γενήσεται, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκὸς ἐμμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαῦτης
ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένω.

2. ΕΤΕΣΥΦΩΝ. Βουλοίμην ἂν, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἄλλη
ἀρχικῶς, µὴ τούναντιν γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ µοι
δοκεῖ ἂφ' ἐστίας ἄρχεσθαι κακοουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν,
ἐπιχειρῶν ἀδικεῖν σὲ. καὶ µοι λέγε, τί καὶ
ποιοῦντά σε φησὶ διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτως γ' ἀκούσαι.
φησὶ γὰρ µε ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ
ὡς καυχόσι ποιοῦντα θεοῦς, τούς δὲ ἀρχαίους οὐ
νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὡς
φησιν.

ΕΤΕΣΥΦΩΝ. Μαυθάνω, ὦ Σῶκρατες· ὧτι δὴ σὺ
EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. I don't remember him, Socrates. But what sort of an indictment has he brought against you?

SOCRATES. What sort? No mean one, it seems to me; for the fact that, young as he is, he has apprehended so important a matter reflects no small credit upon him. For he says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who those are who corrupt them. He must be a wise man; who, seeing my lack of wisdom and that I am corrupting his fellows, comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me. And he seems to me to be the only one of the public men who begins in the right way; for the right way is to take care of the young men first, to make them as good as possible, just as a good husbandman will naturally take care of the young plants first and afterwards of the rest. And so Meletus, perhaps, is first clearing away us who corrupt the young plants, as he says; then after this, when he has turned his attention to the older men, he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State,—at least, that is the natural outcome of the beginning he has made.

EUTHYPHRO. I hope it may be so, Socrates; but I fear the opposite may result. For it seems to me that he begins by injuring the State at its very heart, when he undertakes to harm you. Now tell me, what does he say you do that corrupts the young?

SOCRATES. Absurd things, my friend, at first hearing. For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says.

EUTHYPHRO. I understand, Socrates; it is because
τὸ δαίμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γύρνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καννοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεία γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἴδως ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς. καὶ ἐμοὶ γάρ τοι, C ὅταν τι λέγω εἰς τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, προλέγον αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελώσιν ὡς μανιμένου. καίτοι οὐδέν ὃ τε οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰρήκα ἄν προέπον, ἀλλ' ὁμος φθονοῦσιν ἡμῖν πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὐδέν αὐτῶν χρὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' ὁμόσε ἴναι.

3. ξακρατθείς. Ὡ φίλε Εὐθύφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελασθήναι ἵσως οὐδέν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθη- ναίοις γὰρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τὴς αὐτοῦ σοφίας. δὴ ἀν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται D ποιεῖν τοιοῦτοι, θυμοῦνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δὲ ἄλλο τι.

στεφθην. Τούτον οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχουσίν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειράσθηναι.

ΣΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἰσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σειστοῦ παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἔθελε νὴ σειστοῦ σοφίαν· εγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὑπὸ φίλαν- θρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς δὲ τῷ περ ἐχω ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἀνευ μυσθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθέεις ἄν ἡδέως, εἰ τίς μου έθέλοι ἀκούειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν, δὲ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιεν μου κατα- γελᾶν, ὦσπερ σὺ φῆς σαυτοῦ, οὔδεν ἄν εἰς ἀκούεις E παίζοντας καὶ γελάντων ἐν τῷ δικαστήριῳ διαγα- γεῖν, εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τούτ' ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβησε- ται ἄδηλον πλὴν ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν.
you say the divine monitor keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going into court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people. Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy when I say anything in the assembly about divine things and foretell the future to them. And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true; but they are jealous of all such men as you and I are. However, we must not be disturbed, but must come to close quarters with them.

SOCRATES. My dear Euthyphro, their ridicule is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him, either through jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.

EUTHYPHRO. I don't much desire to test their sentiments toward me in this matter.

SOCRATES. No, for perhaps they think that you are reserved and unwilling to impart your wisdom. But I fear that because of my love of men they think that I not only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone without payment, but that I would even pay something myself, if anyone would listen to me. Now if, as I was saying just now, they were to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it would not be at all unpleasant to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter; but if they are in earnest, then only soothsayers like you can tell how this will end.
'Αλλ' ἵσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὡς Σώκρατες, πρᾶγμα, ἄλλα σὺ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιεῖ τὴν δίκην, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμὴν.

4. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Εστιν δὲ δὴ σοι, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, τὴς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις;

ΈΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Διώκω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα;

ΈΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. 'Ον διώκων αὐ̂θι δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; πετομενόν τινα διώκεις;

ΈΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ πέτεσθαι, ὡς ἢ τυγχάνει οὐν εὐ̂ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΈΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. 'Ο ἐμὸς πατήρ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ο σός, ὡ βέλτιστε;

ΈΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Εστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἐγκλῆμα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΈΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Φόνον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ἡράκλεις! ὡς ποὺ, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὡς ποτὲ ὅρθως ἔχειν. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι γε τοῦ ἑπταχύντου ὅρθως αὐτὸ 

Β. πρᾶξαι, ἄλλα πόρρω ποὺ ἑδή σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος.

ΈΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Πόρρω μὲντοι νη Δία, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Εστιν δὲ ὅτι τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ 

τεθνεῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἢ δῆλα δη ὡς οὐ γὰρ 

ἄν ποὺ γε ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίου ἐπεξήγεισθα φόνον αὐτῷ.

ΈΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Γέλοιον, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς οἶει τι 

διαφέρειν, εἶτε ἀλλότριος εἶτε οἰκείος ὁ τεθνεῶς,

1 Schanz, following Madvig, marks a lacuna here. For the meaning of the missing word or words he refers to 9 A and I8 D.
EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Well, Socrates, perhaps it won't amount to much, and you will bring your case to a satisfactory ending, as I think I shall mine.

SOCRATES. What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?

EUTHYPHRO. Prosecuting.

SOCRATES. Whom?

EUTHYPHRO. Such a man that they think I am insane because I am prosecuting him.

SOCRATES. Why? Are you prosecuting one who has wings to fly away with?

EUTHYPHRO. No flying for him at his ripe old age.

SOCRATES. Who is he?

EUTHYPHRO. My father.

SOCRATES. Your father, my dear man?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But what is the charge, and what is the suit about?

EUTHYPHRO. Murder, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, most people do not know where the right lies; for I fancy it is not everyone who can rightly do what you are doing, but only one who is already very far advanced in wisdom.

EUTHYPHRO. Very far, indeed, Socrates, by Zeus.

SOCRATES. Is the one who was killed by your father a relative? But of course he was; for you would not bring a charge of murder against him on a stranger's account.

EUTHYPHRO. It is ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it matters whether the man who was killed

1 The Greek word has much the same meaning as the Latin *prosequor*, from which the English 'prosecute' is derived, 'follow,' 'pursue,' and is at the same time the technical term for 'prosecute.'
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἀλλ' οὕτω μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἴτε ἐν δίκη ἐκτείνειν ὁ κτεῖνας εἴτε μῆ, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκῃ, εἰς, εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἐπεξείναι, εἰάν περὶ ὁ κτεῖνας συνέστιος σοι

καὶ ὁμοτράπτεξος ἦ. ἵσον γὰρ τὸ μάςμα γίγνεται, ἐὰν ξυνῆς τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ξυνείδως καὶ μὴ ἀφοσιώς σεαυτὸν τε καὶ ἐκείνου τῇ δίκῃ ἐπεξείων, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε ἄποθανον πελάτης τις ἦν ἐμός, καὶ ὁς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξῳ, ἐθήτευν ἐκεῖ παρ’ ἡμῖν. παραποιήσας οὖν καὶ ὄργυσθείς τῶν οἰκετῶν τινὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτὸν· ὁ οὖν πατὴρ συνήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χειρὰς αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινὰ, πέμπει δεύορ ἄνδρα πευσόμενον τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ, ὁ τι χρείη ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ

χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ὀλυνάγορει τε καὶ ἡμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὁ πράγμα, εἰ καὶ ἄποθανον· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπαθεῖν. ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ρήγους καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνῄσκει πρὶν τὸν ἀγγέλου παρὰ τοῦ ἐξηγητοῦ ἀφικέσθαι. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ὁ τε πατήρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὔτε ἀποκτείνω, ὡς φασίν ἐκεῖνοι, οὔτε εἰ ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδροφόνον γε ὅντος τοῦ ἄποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ

τοῦ τοιούτου· ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ υἱὸν πατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξείναι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ θείον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὕσιόν τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄνοσίου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Δίος, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, οὕτωσι ἀκριβῶς οἷς ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων,
was a stranger or a relative, and do not see that the only thing to consider is whether the action of the slayer was justified or not, and that if it was justified one ought to let him alone, and if not, one ought to proceed against him, even if he share one's hearth and eat at one's table. For the pollution is the same if you associate knowingly with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by proceeding against him. In this case, the man who was killed was a hired workman of mine, and when we were farming at Naxos, he was working there on our land. Now he got drunk, got angry with one of our house slaves, and butchered him. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to ask the religious adviser what he ought to do. In the meantime he paid no attention to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that he was a murderer and it did not matter if he were to die. And that is just what happened to him. For he died of hunger and cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the adviser. Now my father and the rest of my relatives are angry with me, because for the sake of this murderer I am prosecuting my father for murder. For they say he did not kill him, and if he had killed him never so much, yet since the dead man was a murderer, I ought not to trouble myself about such a fellow, because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. Which shows how little they know what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unholiness.

SOCRATES. But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think your knowledge about divine laws and
δὴ ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὀσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὡστε τούτων οὐτω πραγμάτων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ
δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ αὐτοῦ ἀνοσίων
πράγμα τυγχάνης πράττων;
ἐτεθφαν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὅφελος εἶη, ὡ
5 Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ τῷ ἄν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρον τῶν
πολλῶν ἄνθρωπών, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα
ἀκριβῶς εἰδεῖν.
5. σοκράτης. Ἀρ’ οὖν μοι, ὦ θαυμάσιε Εὐ-
θύφρον, κράτιστον ἔστι μαθητῇ σῷ γενέσθαι καὶ
πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα
προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτῶν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἔγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ
ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ τά θεία περὶ πολλῶν ἐποιοῦμην
εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδή με ἐκείνος αὐτοσχεδίαζοντά
φησι καὶ καυνοτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρ-
τάνειν, μαθητής δὴ γέγονα σός· καὶ εἰ μὲν, ὦ
Β Μέλητε, φαίνει ἂν, Εὐθύφρονα όμολογεῖς σοφόν
εῖναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅρθως νομίζειν ἐμὲ ἡγοῦν
καὶ μὴ δικάζων· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ
λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους
diaφθείροντι, ἐμὲ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ
μὲν διδάσκοντε, ἐκείνον δὲ νοσθεύοντε τε καὶ
κολάζοντε· καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πείθηται μηδ’ ἀφίη τῆς
dίκης ἢ ἀντ’ ἐμοῦ γράφηται σὲ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν
ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ὥς προκαλοῦμην αὐτῶν.
ἐτεθφαν. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἄρα με
3 ἐπιχειρήσεις γράφεσθαι, εὑρομὴ ἂν, ὡς ὀμοι,
ὅπῃ σαθρὸς ἐστῖν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἦμι πρότερον
περὶ ἐκείνου λόγου ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἢ
περὶ ἐμοῦ.
σοκράτης. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, ὦ φίλε ἐτάιρε, ταῦτα
γνωστών μαθητής ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σῶς, εἰδὼς,
holiness and unholliness is so exact that, when the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy yourself in prosecuting your father for murder?

EUTHYPHRON. I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be in no way different from other men, if I did not have exact knowledge about all such things.

SOCRATES. Then the best thing for me, my admirable Euthyphro, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on, to challenge him and say that I always thought it very important before to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovations in matters of religion, I have become your pupil. And "Meletus," I should say, "if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in such matters, then believe that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring me to trial; and if you do not acknowledge that, then bring a suit against him, my teacher, rather than against me, and charge him with corrupting the old, namely, his father and me, which he does by teaching me and by correcting and punishing his father." And if he does not do as I ask and does not release me from the indictment or bring it against you in my stead, I could say in the court the same things I said in my challenge to him, could I not?

EUTHYPHRON. By Zeus, Socrates, if he should undertake to indict me, I fancy I should find his weak spot, and it would be much more a question about him in court than about me.

SOCRATES. And I, my dear friend, perceiving this, wish to become your pupil; for I know that neither
ὁτι καὶ ἄλλος ποῦ τις καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὐτός σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὡρὰν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὖτως ὄξεως καὶ ῥάδως κατείδευ, ὡστε ἄσεβελας ἑγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι, ὦ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἴδέναι δισχυρίζον: ποῖον τι τὸ εὐσεβῆς φῆς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄσεβῆς καὶ

D perὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταύτων ἔστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὁσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἁνόσιον αὐ τοῦ μὲν ὁσιον παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὄμοιον καὶ ἔχον μιᾶν τινα ἰδέαν ἑπὶ τῷ περὶ ἄνελη ἁνόσιον εἶναι;

ΕΤΘΥΡΩΝ. Πάντως δήτου, ὡ Σώκρατες.

6. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δέγε δὴ, τὶ φῆς εἶναι τὸ ὁσιον καὶ τὸ ἁνόσιον;

ΕΤΘΥΡΩΝ. Δέγω τοῖνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὁσιον ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπάς ἢ τῷ ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξείναι, ἕαν τε πατὴρ ὁν τυγχάνῃ Ἐ ἐὰν τε μὴ λήσῃ εὰν τὸ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξείναι ἁνόσιον ἐπεί, ὡ Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἑρῶ τεκμήριον τοῦ νόμου οτι οὗτος ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλοις ἔχει εἶπον, ὅτι ταῦτα ὅρθως ἰν ἐν ὀντὼ γυνώμενα, μὴ ἔπιπτέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μὴ δὲν ὁστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὃν; αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι

6 τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἄριστον καὶ δικαίοτατον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς νεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκη, κἀκεῖνοι γε αὐ τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμείων δι' ἐτερά τοιαῦτα: ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὗτος αὐτοὶ

1 After ἰδέαν BD read κατὰ τὴν ἀνθώποτητα, which Sohanz brackets.
EUTHYPHRO

this fellow Meletus, nor anyone else, seems to notice you at all, but he has seen through me so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now in the name of Zeus, tell me what you just now asserted that you knew so well. What do you say is the nature of piety and impiety, both in relation to murder and to other things? Is not holiness always the same with itself in every action, and, on the other hand, is not unholliness the opposite of all holiness, always the same with itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing some one characteristic quality?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Tell me then, what do you say holiness is, and what unholliness?

EUTHYPHRO. Well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrong-doer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy. And, Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you,—a proof I have already given to others,—that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they acknowledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and he in turn had mutilated his father for similar reasons; but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are...
αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρά γε, ὁ Ἐυθύφρον, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, ὅδε ἔνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαύτα ἐπειδὰν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγη, δυσχέρας πως ἀποδέχομαι; δι’ ἂν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, φησί τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοι ταῦτα ἔννοδοκεί

Β τῷ εὖ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀνάγκη δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἦμιν ἔννοιαίοις. τὸ γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οὐ γε αὐτόι ὀμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἶδεναι; ἄλλα μοι εἰπτε πρὸς Φιλίου, σὺ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἤγεῖ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἢ οἱ πολloi οὐκ ἔσασιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ πόλεμοι ἀρα ἤγει σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινᾶς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα πολλά, οία λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν

C ἀγαθῶν γραφέων τά τε ἄλλα ἵνα ἰερὰ ἡμῖν κατα- πεποικιλται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Πανα- θηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιούτων ποικιλμά- των ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὁ Ἐυθύφρον;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὁ Σώκρατες ἄλλ’ ὅπερ ἄρτι εἰπτεν, καὶ ἄλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, εάνπερ βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν θεῶν διηγήσομαι, ἃ σὺ ἀκούων εὐ ὀδ ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

7. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἀνθαυμάζομαι. ἄλλα ταύτα μὲν μοι εἰς αὕθις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσειν νῦν δέ, ὅπερ ἄρτι τε ἑρόμεν, πειρῶν σαφέστερον εἴπεων.

D οὐ γὰρ με, ὁ ἐταίρε, τὸ πρότερον ἱκανός εἴδιδαξας ἐρατήσαντα τὸ δόσιον, ὁ τι ποτ’ εἶ, ἄλλα μοι
inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

Socrates. Is not this, Euthyphro, the reason why I am being prosecuted, because when people tell such stories about the gods I find it hard to accept them? And therefore, probably, people will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such things, accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who confess frankly that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened?

Euthyphro. Yes, and still more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which most people do not know.

Socrates. And so you believe that there was really war between the gods, and fearful enmities and battles and other things of the sort, such as are told of by the poets and represented in varied designs by the great artists in our sacred places and especially on the robe which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea? for this is covered with such representations. Shall we agree that these things are true, Euthyphro?

Euthyphro. Not only these things, Socrates; but, as I said just now, I will, if you like, tell you many other things about the gods, which I am sure will amaze you when you hear them.

Socrates. I dare say. But you can tell me those things at your leisure some other time. At present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. For, my friend, you did not give me sufficient information before, when I asked what holiness was, but you told me that this was holy
εἰπες, ὅτι τούτο τυγχάνει ὁσιον ὄν, ὃ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς, φόνον ἐπεξιῶν τῷ πατρί.

ἐγείρων. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἔλεγον, ὃ Σῶκρατες.

Σῶκρατες. "Ἰσωσ. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ἀλλα πολλα φής εἶναι ὁσια.

ἐγείρων. Καὶ γάρ ἔστιν.

Σῶκρατες. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὅτι οὐ τούτο σοι διεκελεύομην, ἐν τι ἡ δύο με διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ πάντα τὰ ὁσια ὁσιά ἔστιν; ἐφησθα γάρ που μιὰ ἱδέα τὰ τέ ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁσια ὁσια: ἦ οὐ μνημονεύεις;

ἐγείρων. "Εἰγώγε. Σῶκρατες. Ταῦτῃ τοῖς με αὐτῇ δίδαξον τὴν ἱδέαν, τίς ποτέ ἔστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποθέτων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ἦ, ὥν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἀλλος τις πράττῃ, φῶς ὁσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

ἐγείρων. 'Αλλ' εἰ οὕτω βούλει, ὃ Σῶκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σοι φρίσω.

Σῶκρατες. 'Αλλὰ μὴν βούλομαι γε.

ἐγείρων. "Ἔστι τοῖς μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσ-7 φιλές ὁσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἀνόσιον.

Σῶκρατες. Παγκάλως, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ ὡς ἐγὼ ἐξήτουν ἀποκρίνασθαι σε, οὕτω νῦν ἀπε-κρίνω. εἰ μέντοι ἄληθες, τοῦτο οὕτω οἶδα, ἀλλὰ σὺ δήλον ὅτι ἐπεκδιδάξεις, ὃς ἔστιν ἄληθῇ ἄν

ἐγείρων. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

8. Σῶκρατες. Φέρε δὴ, ἐπισκεψόμεθα, τί λέγομεν. τὸ μὲν θεοφιλές τε καὶ ὁ θεοφιλής ἄνθρωπος ὁσιος, τὸ δὲ θεομυσίας καὶ ὁ θεομυσίας 22
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which you are now doing, prosecuting your father for murder.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, what I said was true, Socrates.
SOCRATES. Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, do you not?
EUTHYPHRO. Why, so they are.
SOCRATES. Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy; for you said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by one aspect. Or don't you remember?
EUTHYPHRO. I remember.
SOCRATES. Tell me then what this aspect is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.
EUTHYPHRO. If you wish me to explain in that way, I will do so.
SOCRATES. I do wish it.
EUTHYPHRO. Well then, what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.
SOCRATES. Excellent, Euthyphro; now you have answered as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, I am not yet sure; but you will, of course, show that what you say is true.
EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.
SOCRATES. Come then, let us examine our words. The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy, and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy; and the two are not the same, but the holy and the unholy are the
Ανοσίας· ού ταύτόν δ’ ἐστίν, ἄλλα τὸ ἐναντιώτατον τὸ ὅσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως;

ετετράπλοι. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

Σικεράσις. Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρήσθαι;

B ετετράπλοι. Δοκῶ, ὁ Σικεράτες. 1

Σικεράσις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ θεοί, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, καὶ διαφέρονται ἄλληλοις καὶ ἕχθρα ἐστίν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλους, καὶ τούτο εἰρήται;

ετετράπλοι. Εἰρήται γάρ.

Σικεράσις. Ἐχθραν δὲ καὶ ὀργά, ὃ ἀριστε, ἂν περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; φόδε δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἃρ αὖ εἰ διαφεροίμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἁριθμοῦ, ὅποτερα πλεῖον, ἡ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροῦς ἃν ἡμᾶς ποιοῦ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἄλληλοις, ἡ ἐπὶ λογισμὸν ἐλθόντες περὶ γε τῶν τοιούτων ταχὺ ἄν

C ἀπαλλαγεῖμεν;

ετετράπλοι. Πάνυ γε.

Σικεράσις. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττωνος εἰ διαφεροίμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μέτρον ἐλθόντες ταχὺ παυσαίμεθ' ἂν τῆς διαφορᾶς;

ετετράπλοι. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

Σικεράσις. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστώναι ἐλθόντες, ἡς ἔγγομαι, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου διακρίθείμεν ἂν;

ετετράπλοι. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Σικεράσις. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἕχθροι γε ἃν ἄλληλοις εἴμεν καὶ ὀργίζομεθα; ἵσωσ οὖ πρὸ-

D χείρον σοὶ εστίν. ἄλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ

1 The manuscripts read Δοκῶ, ὁ Σικεράτες. εἰρήται γάρ. Schanz brackets this and the preceding line. I follow
EUTHYPHRO

exact opposites of each other. Is not this what we have said?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, just this.
SOCRATES. And it seems to be correct?
EUTHYPHRO. I think so, Socrates.
SOCRATES. Well then, have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them?
EUTHYPHRO. Yes, we have said that.
SOCRATES. But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers were the greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic?
EUTHYPHRO. Of course we should.
SOCRATES. Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative size of things, we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring?
EUTHYPHRO. Yes.
SOCRATES. And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing?
EUTHYPHRO. Of course.
SOCRATES. But about what would a disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand; but let Hermann in omitting ἵππηται γὰρ, which may have been once a marginal note or may have been copied by mistake from the next words of Euthyphro.
τάδε ἐστὶ τὸ τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν. ἂρα οὐ ταῦτα ἐστίν, διὸ διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἰκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἐλθεῖν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλους γυγώμεθα, ὅταν γυγώμεθα, καὶ ἐγώ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι πάντες;

ἐτούφρον. Ἅλλα ἐστίν αὐτὴ ἡ διαφορά, ὡς Ἀρκατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ζόκρατις. Τι δὲ; οἱ θεοὶ, ὡς Εὐθύφρον, οὐκ εἴπερ τι διαφέρονται, διὰ ταῦτα διαφέροντ' ἂν;

ἐτούφρον. Πολλή ἀνύγκη.

Εἰς ζόκρατις. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὡς γενναίες Εὐθύφρον, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα ἡ ἡγοῦνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν που ἐστασίαζον ἀλλήλους, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο· ἡ γὰρ;

ἐτούφρον. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ζόκρατις. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέρ καλὰ ἡγοῦνται ἐκαστοῦ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταῦτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;

ἐτούφρον. Πάνυ γε.

ζόκρατις. Ταύτα δὲ γε, ὡς σὺ φῆς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια ἡγοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα· περὶ ἂ καὶ ἁμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζοντι τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλους. ἂρα οὐχ οὗτως;

ἐτούφρον. Οὔτω.

ζόκρατις. Ταύτ' ἄρα, ὡς ἐοικεν, μισεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομοσῆ τε καὶ θεοφιλῆ ταύτ' ἂν εἴη.

ἐτούφρον. Ἕοικεν.

1 καὶ ἄδικα inserted by Hirchig, followed by Schanz.
me suggest it. Is it not about right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies.

Socrates. And how about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree, would they not disagree about these questions?

EUTHYPHRO. Necessarily.

Socrates. Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree; for they would not quarrel with each other if they did not disagree about these matters. Is that the case?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

Socrates. Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

Socrates. But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others; and it is because they disagree about these things that they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said?

EUTHYPHRO. It is.

Socrates. Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ὁσιὰ ἁρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἢν εἶη, ὡ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Κινδυνεύειν·

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἁρα δ ἡρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὥς θαυμάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο γε ἡρότων, ὃ τυγχάνει ταὐτὸν ἃν ὁσιῶν τε καὶ ἀνόσιων ὡς ἁν θεοφιλῆς ἤ, καὶ θεομισσές ἔστων, ὡς ἔοικεν. ὡστε, ὥς Ὁ Εὐθύφρον, ὡ σύ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάζων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ τοῦτο δρῶν τῷ μὲν Δἰ προσφιλὲς ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Ὀύρανῳ ἕχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἡφαίστῳ φίλον, τῷ δὲ Ἡρᾶ ἕχθρόν· καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἔτερον ἔτερω διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἑκείνους κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ.

ΕΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. 'Αλλ' οἴμαι, ὡ Σώκρατες, περὶ γε τοῦτο τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἔτερον ἔτερῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς οὐ δει δίκην διδόναι ἑκείνου, ὃς ἂν ἄδικως τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; ἀνθρώπων, ὡ Εὐθύφρον, ἡ ὅτι τ搡ος ἣκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὃς τῶν ἄδικως

C ἀποκτείναντα ἴ ἀλλο ἄδικως ποιοῦντα ὕποιον οὐ δει δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδὲν μεν οὖν παύονται τἀυτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἀλλοθε καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἄδικοιντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τὴν δίκην.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὡ Εὐθύφρον, ἄδικείν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμος οὐ δειν φασι σφας διδόναι δίκην;

ΕΤΕΟΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς τοὐτὸ γε.

1 Schanz reads for ὃ.
EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement.

EUTHYPHRO. I suppose so.

SOCRATES. Then you did not answer my question, my friend. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods. And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it.

EUTHYPHRO. But I think, Socrates, that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this, or holds that he who kills anyone wrongfully ought not to pay the penalty.

SOCRATES. Well, Euthyphro, to return to men, did you ever hear anybody arguing that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, or had done anything else whatever wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty?

EUTHYPHRO. Why, they are always arguing these points, especially in the law courts. For they do very many wrong things; and then there is nothing they will not do or say, in defending themselves, to avoid the penalty.

SOCRATES. Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthyphro, that they have done wrong and, although they acknowledge it, nevertheless say that they ought not to pay the penalty?

EUTHYPHRO. Oh, no, they don’t do that.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα πάν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγον-σι. τοῦτο γάρ, οἴμαι, οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδὲ ἄμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχί, εἰπερ ἀδικοῦσί γε, δοτέον δίκην ἀλλ', οἴμαι, οὐ φασιν ἀδικεῖν. ἦ γάρ;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἄμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τῶν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἑσος ἄμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἔστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. 1

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτά γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόθασιν, εἰπερ στασιάζουσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασίν ἀλλήλους ἀδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασίν; ἐπει ἐκεῖνο γε δήτου, ὃ θαυμάστε, οὐδέποτε οὐτε θεῶν οὔτε Ε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾶ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἀδικοῦντι δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναί, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθῆς λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἐκαστόν γε οἴμαι, ὃ Ἐυθύφρον, τῶν πραχθέντων ἄμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἄμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεοί, εἰπερ ἄμφισβητοῦσιν θεοί: πράξεως τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασίν αὐτὴν πεπράχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως: ἃρ' οὐχ οὕτω;

ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

10. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡθι νῦν, ὃ φίλε Ἐυθύφρον, δίδαξον καὶ ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφότερος γένωμαι, τὴν τεκμηρίου ἑστιν, ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ἐκείνον ἀδίκως τεθνάναι, ὃς ἂν θητεύων ἀνδρο- 1 οὐκ ἄρα . . . ' Ἀληθῆ λέγεις bracketed by Schanz following Schenkl.

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EUTHYPHRO

Socrates. Then there is something they do not do and say. For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue that, if they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty; but, I think, they say they have not done wrong; do they not?

Euthyphro. You are right.

Socrates. Then they do not argue this point, that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty; but perhaps they argue about this, who is a wrongdoer, and what he did, and when.

Euthyphro. That is true.

Socrates. Then is not the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say, and some say others have done wrong, and some say they have not? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, has the face to say that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty.

Euthyphro. Yes, you are right about this, Socrates, in the main.

Socrates. But I think, Euthyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they differ with one another about any act, some say it was right and others that it was wrong. Is it not so?

Euthyphro. Certainly.

Socrates. Come now, my dear Euthyphro, inform me, that I may be made wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think that the man lost his life wrongfully, who, when he was a servant, committed
δόκησε λέγειν. τόδε δέ σου ἐνενόησα ἀμα λέγοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτῶν σκοπῶ· εἰ δὲ τι μάλιστά με Εὐθύφρων διδάξειν, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντῆσιν τὸν τοιοῦτον βάνατον ἠγούνται ἄδικον εἰναί, τί μάλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρων, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ὀσίον τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομισεῖς μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ὑοικεῖ, εἶπ' ἂν' ἄλλα γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφάνη ἁρτὶ ὁρισμένα τὸ ὀσίον καὶ μὴ' τὸ γὰρ θεομισεῖς δὲν καὶ θεοφιλῆς ἐφάνη· ὡστε τοῦτον ἀφίημι σε, δ' Εὐθύφρων· εἰ βούλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ἡγεῖσθων θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισοῦντων. ἀλλ' ἄρα τούτῳ νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ,
a murder, was bound by the master of the man he killed, and died as a result of his bonds before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers what he ought to do with him, and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. Come, try to show me clearly about this, that the gods surely believe that this conduct is right; and if you show it to my satisfaction, I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live.

EUTHYPHRO. But perhaps this is no small task, Socrates; though I could show you quite clearly.

SOCRATES. I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.

EUTHYPHRO. Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.

SOCRATES. They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself: "If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them; and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and

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ὁς δὲ μὲν ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον ἔστιν, ὃ δ’ ἄν φιλῶσιν, ὅσιον δὲ ὃ ἄν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσιν, οἱ δὲ μισῶσιν, οὐδέτερα ἢ ἁμφότερα; ἀρ’ οὖτω βούλει ἡμῖν ὁρίσθαι νῦν χρήμα τοῦ ὅσιον καὶ τοῦ ἀνόσιον;

ἐτετύφην. Τι γὰρ κωλύει, ὁ Σώκρατες; 

ζωκρατεῖς. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, ἄλλα σὺ δὴ τὸ σὸν σκόπησί, εἰ τούτο ὑποθέμενον οὐτῶ βραχτά με διδάξεις ὃ ὑπέσχον.

Εἰ ἐτετύφην. Ἀλλ’ ἐγώγε φαίνων μὲν τούτῳ εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον, οὐ μὲν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὃ ἄν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἀνόσιον.

ζωκρατεῖς. Οὐκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὐ τούτῳ, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἢ ἐδομεν καὶ οὖτω ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰς μόνον φὴ τῆς τι ἐχειν οὖτω, ἔγχρωμοντες ἐχειν; ἢ σκεπτέον, τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;

ἐτετύφην. Σκεπτέον οἶμαι μέντοι ἐγώγε τοῦτο νυνὶ καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

12. ζωκρατεῖς. Τάχ’, ὁγαθέ, βέλτιον εἰσό-10 μεθα, ἀνύνησιν γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε. ἀρὰ τὸ ὅσιον, ὃτι ὅσιον ἔστιν, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὃτι φιλεῖται, ὅσιον ἔστιν;

ἐτετύφην. Οὐκ οἶδ’ ὃ τι λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ζωκρατεῖς. Ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ ποιράσομαι σαφέστερον φράσαι. λέγομεν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγώμενον καὶ ἄγου καὶ ὅρωμεν καὶ ὅρδων. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαζάνεις ὅτι ἐτέρα ἄλληλων ἔστι καὶ η ἐτέρα;

ἐτετύφην. Ἐγώγε μοι δοκῶ μαζάνειν.

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EUTHYPHRO

say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholi-
ness?

EUTHYPHRO. What is to hinder, Socrates?
SOCRATES. Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.

SOCRATES. Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?

EUTHYPHRO. We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.

SOCRATES. We shall soon know more about this, my friend. Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I don't know what you mean, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.

EUTHYPHRO. I think I understand.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενον τί ἔστιν καὶ τούτῳ ἔστερον τὸ φιλοῦν;
ΕΥΘΥΡΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δέγε δὴ μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον,
διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον ἔστιν, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι;
ΕΥΘΥΡΩΝ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτο.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ, διότι ἄγεται,
καὶ τὸ ὀρώμενον, διότι ὅραται;
ΕΥΘΥΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔκ ἄρα διότι ὀρώμενον γέ ἔστιν,
διὰ τούτο ὅραται, ἄλλα τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὅραται,
διὰ τούτο ὀρώμενον οὔδὲ διότι ἄγομενὸν ἔστιν,
διὰ τούτο ἄγεται, ἄλλα διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τούτο
ἀγόμενον οὔδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἄλλα
diότι φέρεται, φερόμενον. ἂρα κατάδηλον, ὦ
Ο Εὐθύφρον, δὲ βούλομαι λέγειν; βούλομαι δὲ τόδε,
ὅτι, εἰ τι γίγνεται ἢ τι πᾶσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γνωμόμενον
ἔστιν, γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι γίγνεται, γνωμόμενον
ἔστιν οὔδ' ὅτι πᾶσχον ἔστι, πᾶσχει, ἀλλ' ὅτι
πᾶσχει, πᾶσχον ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ γνώμωρεις οὕτω;
ΕΥΘΥΡΩΝ. Ἑγώγω γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἡ γνωμό-
μενὸν τί ἔστιν ἢ πᾶσχον τι ὑπὸ τοῦ;
ΕΥΘΥΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τούτῳ ἄρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὡσπερ
τὰ πρῶτα: οὖχ ὅτι φιλούμενον ἔστιν, φιλεῖται
ὑπὸ διὸ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον;
ΕΥΘΥΡΩΝ. Ἀνάγκη.
EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different? EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO. No, for that reason.

SOCRATES. And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then one does not see it because it is a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?

EUTHYPHRO. I agree.

SOCRATES. Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?

EUTHYPHRO. Obviously.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὀσίου,
ὅ ὁ Ἐὐθύφρον; ἀλλὰ τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων,
ός δὲ σῶς λόγος;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΟΝ. Νάι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρα διὰ τούτο, ὅτι ὀσίον ἐστὶν, ἢ
dι’ ἀλλο τι;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΟΝ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτο.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Διότι ἀρα ὀσίον ἐστὶν, φιλεῖται,
ἀλλ’ οὐχ δεῖ φιλεῖται, διὰ τούτο ὀσίον ἐστὶν;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΟΝ. "Εοίκεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ
θεῶν, φιλοῦμενον ἐστὶ καὶ θεοφιλὲς τὸ θεοφιλὲς. 1

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΟΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἀρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὀσίον ἐστὶν, ὁ
Ἐὐθύφρον, οὐδὲ τὸ ὀσίον θεοφιλὲς, ὡς σὺ λέγεις,
ἀλλ’ ἐτέρου τούτῳ τούτου.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΟΝ. Πῶς δὴ, ὁ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Οτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὀσίον διὰ
tούτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὀσίον ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διότι
φιλεῖται, ὀσίον εἶναι; ἢ γὰρ;

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΟΝ. Νάι.

13. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δὲ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται
ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς
eῖναι, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὅτι θεοφιλὲς, διὰ τούτο φιλεῖσθαι.

ΕΥΘΥΦΡΟΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ εἶ γε ταύτων ἢ, ὁ φίλε
Ἐὐθύφρον, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὀσίον, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ
ὁσίον εἶναι ἐφίλειτο τῷ ὀσίῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς
eῖναι ἐφίλειτο ἀν τῷ θεοφιλὲς, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεί-
σθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἢ, καὶ τὸ

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1 τὸ θεοφιλὲς added by Schanz following Baet.
EUTHYPHRO

Socrates. Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro? It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?

Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates. For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro. No, for this reason.

Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euthyphro. I think so.

Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.

Euthyphro. Of course.

Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.

Euthyphro. How so, Socrates?

Socrates. Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?

Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates. But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.

Euthyphro. Very true.

Socrates. But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because
ΠΙΑΤΟ

όσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ὁσιον ἦν νῦν δὲ ὅρας, ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς παντάπασιν ἐτέρῳ ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὃς Εὐθύφρων, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὄσιον, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν ὥσιν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δὲ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὃ τι πέπονθε τούτῳ τὸ

Β ὄσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ο̣ τ̣ι̣ δ̣έ̣ ο̣ν̣, οὕτω εἰτες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλοι, μὴ με ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἰπτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὑν τὸ ὄσιον εἰτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἰπτε ὡτιδὴ πᾶςχει· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦτον διοισόμεθα· ἀλλ' εἰπτε προθύμωσ, τί ἐστιν τὸ τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ἐτωμφων. Ἀλλ', ὃς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἐγωγε, ὅπως σοι εἰπτω ὃ νοω. περιέρχεται γὰρ πως ἡμῖν ἂει ὃ ἀν προθώμεθα, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπων ἂν ἰδρυσόμεθα αὐτό.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοὐ ἡμετέρου προγόνου, ὃς Εὐθύ- C φρον, ἐοικεν εἰναι Δαιδάλου τα ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἐγώ ἔλεγον καὶ ἐτιθέμην, ἵσως ἂν με ἐπέσκωπτες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκεῖνον ἔννοιαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδι- δράσκει καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει μένειν ὅπων ἂν τις αὐτὰ, θῇ νῦν δὲ—σαλ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰς ἂν ἄλλου δὴ τινος δεὶ σκόμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι σοι μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεί.

ἐτωμφων. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ

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it is loved; but now you see that the opposite is the case, showing that the two are entirely different from each other. For the one becomes lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas the other is loved because it is in itself lovable. And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were asked what holiness is you were unwilling to make plain its essence, but you mentioned something that has happened to this holiness, namely, that it is loved by the gods. But you did not tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please, do not hide it from me, but begin over again and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether it is loved by the gods or anything else happens to it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. But, Socrates, I do not know how to say what I mean. For whatever statement we advance, somehow or other it moves about and won't stay where we put it.

SOCRATES. Your statements, Euthyphro, are like works of my 1 ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the one who made or advanced them, you might laugh at me and say that on account of my relationship to him my works in words run away and won't stay where they are put. But now—well, the statements are yours; so some other jest is demanded; for they won't stay fixed, as you yourself see.

EUTHYPHRO. I think the jest does very well as it

1 Socrates was the son of a sculptor and was himself educated to be a sculptor. This is doubtless the reason for his reference to Daedalus as an ancestor. Daedalus was a half mythical personage whose statues were said to have been so lifelike that they moved their eyes and walked about.
σκώμματος, ὁ Σώκρατες, δείσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα. 

τὸ γὰρ περιέναι τούτοις τὸ τώ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἑντιθεῖς, ἄλλα σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος· ἐπει δὲ ἐμοῦ γε ἐνεκα ἔμενεν ἃν ταύτα ὡστος.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κυινδυνεύω ἃρα, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ὁ μὲν τὰ αὐτῶ ὡστος ἐποίει αὐτῷ μόνα ἐποίει ὃς μένοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἔμαντοι, ὡς ἔσεικε, καὶ 

Ε ὀτι τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δήτα τούτῳ μοι τῆς τέχνης ἐστὶ κομψότατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφὸς. ἐβου- λόμην γὰρ ἃν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως ἰδρύσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαίδαλον σοφία τὰ Ταντάλου χρῆμα κενέθσαι, καὶ τούτῳ μὲν ἁδην ἐπειδὴ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτὸς σοι εὐμμπροθυμήσομαι, ὥστος ἂν με διδάξῃς περὶ τοῦ ὁσίου. καὶ μὴ προαποκάμης. ἴδε γὰρ, εἰ 

οὐκ ἀναγκαίον σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πάν τὸ ὁσίον.

ΕΤΕΤΕΡΩΝ. Ἑμουγε. 

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ πάν τὸ δίκαιον ὁσίον, 

ἡ τὸ μὲν ὁσίον πἀν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὐ πἀν ὁσίον, ἄλλα τὸ μὲν αὐτῶ ὁσίον, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο; 

ΕΤΕΤΕΡΩΝ. Οὐχ ἐπομαι, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῖς 

λεγομένοις. 

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερος γε μοι εἰ σὺν ἐλάττουν ἢ ὁσω σοφὸτερος· ἄλλα', ὁ λέγω, τρυφᾶς ὑπὸ πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἄλλα', ὁ μακάριε, 

1 τούτοις is bracketed by Schanz following Stallbaum. 

2 ξυμπροθυμήσομαι δείξαι the manuscripts. Schanz follows Hermann in omitting δείξαι.
EUTHYPHRO

is; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.

Socrates. Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own. And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.

Euthyphro. I do.

Socrates. But is everything that is right also holy? Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else?

Euthyphro. I can’t follow you, Socrates.

Socrates. And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert
PLATO

ξύντεινε σαυτόν καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπὸν κατα-
νόησαι ὡς λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἑναντίον ἢ ὁ
ποιητὴς ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιήσας.

Ζῆνα δὲ τὸν θ’ ἐρξαντα, καὶ ὃς τάδε πάντ’
ἐφύτευσεν,

B οὐκ ἐδέλεις εἰπεῖν· ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδῶς.
ἐγὼ σοι τούτῳ διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἴπω σοι
ὄπρι;

ΕΤΩΥΠΙΩΝ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἵνα δέος, ἐνθα
καὶ αἰδῶς. πολλοὶ γὰρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους
καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα δεδιότες
dedíean mén, aideíthai de mēden taúta a dedíasin.
oú kai sól dokei;

ΕΤΩΥΠΙΩΝ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ἀλλ' ἵνα γε αἰδῶς, ἐνθα καὶ δέος
eīnai· ἔπει ἔστιν ὅστις αἰδούμενος τι πρᾶγμα καὶ
C aïσχυνόμενος οὐ πεφάβηται τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἀμα
důxan ponoρίας;

ΕΤΩΥΠΙΩΝ. Δέδοικε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἂρ’ ἀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν· ἵνα γὰρ
δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδῶς. ἀλλ' ἵνα μὲν αἰδῶς, ἐνθα καὶ
δέος, οὐ μέντοι ἵνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδῶς. ἐπὶ
πλέον γὰρ, οἷμαι, δέος αἰδοῦς· μοριον γὰρ αἰδῶς
déous, ósper ἄριθμον περιττόν, ὡστε ὅν· ἵνα περ
ἀριθμός, ἐνθα καὶ περιττόν, ἵνα δὲ περιττόν, ἐνθα
καὶ ἄριθμός. ἔπει γὰρ ποι νῦν γε;

ΕΤΩΥΠΙΩΝ. Πάννυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖνυν καὶ ἐκεῖ λέγων
ἡρώτων, ἃρα ἵνα δίκαιων, ἐνθα καὶ ὄσιον, ἢ ἵνα
D μὲν ὄσιον, ἐνθα καὶ δίκαιον, ἵνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ
EUTHYPHRO

yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet\(^1\) said, who wrote: "Zeus the creator, him who made all things, thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence." Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how?

EUTHYPHRO. By all means.

SOCRATES. It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don't you think so, too?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But I think that where reverence is, there also is fear; for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, he does fear.

SOCRATES. Then it is not correct to say "where fear is, there also is reverence." On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now?

EUTHYPHRO. Perfectly.

SOCRATES. It was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is,

\(^{1}\) Stasinus, author of the "Cypria" (Fragm. 20, ed. Kinkel).
πανταχοῦ ὅσιον· μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. οὕτω φῶμεν ἡ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ; εὐθύρρομ. Οὐκ, ἄλλ' οὕτω. φαίνει γὰρ μοι ὁρθῶς λέγειν.

14. Ἑσκράτης. "Ορα δὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτο. εἰ γὰρ μέρος τὸ ὅσιον τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἐσθεν, ἐξευρεῖν τὸ ποιῶν μέρος ἃν εἴη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὅσιον. εἰ μὲν οὐν σὺ με ἡρῴτας τι τῶν νῦν δή, οἷον ποιῶν μέρος ἑστίν ἁριθμοῦ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τίς ἀν τυγχάνει οὕτος ὁ ἁριθμός, εἶπον ἃν, ὥστε ἄν μὴ σκαλνυνός ἂ, ἄλλ' ἱσοσκελής· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; εὐθύρρομ. Ἕμοιγε.

Ἑσκράτης. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι, τὸ ποιῶν μέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὅσιον ἑστίν, ἢν καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγομεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἁσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἰκανὸς ἡ ἡ παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὅσια καὶ τὰ μὴ.

εὐθύρρομ. Τούτῳ τοῖνυν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατος, τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὅσιον, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαι τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

15. Ἑσκράτης. Καὶ καλῶς γέ μοι, ὁ Εὐθυγραμμένος, φαίνει λέγειν· ἅλλα σμικροῦ τινος ἐτι ἐνδείξει εἰμι. τὴν γὰρ θεραπείαιν οὕτω ξυνήμι ἡμῖνα ὄνομαξεις. οὐ γὰρ ποῦ λέγεις γε, οἷον περι καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ ἅλλα θεραπεῖαι εἰσίν, τοιαύτην καὶ περὶ θεοῦς. λέγομεν γὰρ ποῦ—οἶον φαμέν, ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπισταται θεραπεύειν, ἅλλα ὁ ἵππικός· ἡ γὰρ;
EUTHYPHRO

there also is the right; but holiness is not every-
where where the right is, for holiness is a part of
the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent?

EUTHYPHRO. No, I agree; for I think the state-
ment is correct.

SOCRATES. Now observe the next point. If
holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently,
find out what part of the right holiness is. Now
if you asked me about one of the things I just
mentioned, as, for example, what part of number
the even was, and what kind of a number it was
I should say, “that which is not indivisible by
two, but divisible by two”; or don’t you agree?

EUTHYPHRO. I agree.

SOCRATES. Now try in your turn to teach me
what part of the right holiness is, that I may
tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring
suits against me for impolicy, since I have now
been duly instructed by you about what is, and
what is not, pious and holy.

EUTHYPHRO. This then is my opinion, Socrates,
that the part of the right which has to do with
attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness,
and that the remaining part of the right is that
which has to do with the service of men.

SOCRATES. I think you are correct, Euthyphro;
but there is one little point about which I still
want information, for I do not yet understand
what you mean by “attention.” I don’t suppose
you mean the same kind of attention to the gods
which is paid to other things. We say, for example,
that not everyone knows how to attend to horses,
but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do
we not?
πάνυ γε.

'Η γάρ ποὺ ἵππικὴ ἵππων θεραπεία.

Ναὶ.

Οὔδε γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θεραπεύειν, ἄλλα ὁ κυνηγητικὸς.

Οὔτω.

'Η γάρ ποὺ κυνηγητικὴ κυνῶν θεραπεία.

Εὔσεβεια.

'Η δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοῶν.

Πάνυ γε.

'Η δὲ δὴ ὁσίότης τε καὶ εὐσέβεια θεῶν, ὁ Ἔθδύφρου; οὔτω λέγεις;

'Εγώγε.

Ωύκοιν περιλαμβάνεται οὐκ οὐτίκα τοῖς ἰππησίν, ὅσπερ ὅρασ δῆ, ὅτι οἱ ἰπποὶ ὕπτῳ τῆς ἰππησίας θεραπεύομενοι ὀψελθούσαι καὶ ἐμπόρου ἄλλοι καὶ θεῖοι ἡγούνται ὡς οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι;

Εὐμοῦγε.

Καὶ οἱ κύνες γε ποὺ ὑπὸ τῆς κυνη-

γητικῆς, καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ τάλλα πάντα ὅσαιτως ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἱ τοῦ

θεραπευόμενον τῆς θεραπείαν εἶναι;

Μᾶ Δὲ οὐκ ἔγωγε.

'Αλλ' ἐπὶ ὄψεις;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

'Η οὖν καὶ ἡ ἄσιοτης θεραπεία οὔσιν θεῶν ὄψεις τε ἐστὶ θεῶν καὶ ἐμπόρους τοὺς θεοὺς.
EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.
Socrates. Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?
EUTHYPHRO. Yes.
Socrates. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?
EUTHYPHRO. That is so.
Socrates. Then the huntsman's art is the art of attending to dogs?
EUTHYPHRO. Yes.
Socrates. And the oxherd's art is that of attending to oxen?
EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.
Socrates. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO. Yes.
Socrates. Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman's art are benefited and made better; or don't you think so?
EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I do.
Socrates. And dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art and oxen by the oxherd's and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?
EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, I do not.
Socrates. But for its benefit?
EUTHYPHRO. Of course.
Socrates. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and
ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τούτο ἔννοῳ ἔγινες ἄν, ὡς ἐπειδὰν τι ὁσιού ποιήσης, βελτίω τινά τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζεις.

εὐσθεία. Μᾶ Δ’ οὐκ ἐγώγε.

ξακρατής. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, οἴμαι σε τούτο λέγειν πολλοῦ καὶ δέω, ἀλλὰ τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἤγομένος σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

εὐσθεία. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε, ὃ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.

ξακρατής. Εἰςεν ἀλλὰ τις δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἰη ἄν ἡ οἰκίστης;

εὐσθεία. Ἡπερ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οἱ δοῦλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.

ξακρατής. Μανθάνω ύπηρετικῆ τις ἄν, ὡς ἐοικεν, εἴη θεοῖς.

εὐσθεία. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

16. ξακρατής. Ἡ ἔγοσις οὐν εἰπτεῖν, ἡ ἱατρῶς ύπηρετικῆ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν τυγχάνει οὕσα ύπηρετικῆ; οὐκ εἰς ἤγείας οὐει;

εὐσθεία. Ἡ ἔγογον.

ξακρατής. Τὶ δὲ; ἡ ναυτηγοῖς ύπηρετικῆ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ύπηρετικῆ ἔστιν;

εὐσθεία. Δὴλον ὅτι, ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοῖον.

ξακρατής. Καὶ ἡ οἰκοδόμοις γέ που εἰς οἰκίας;

εὐσθεία. Ναὶ.

ξακρατής. Εἰπτε δὴ, ὃ ἀριστερὰ ἡ δὲ θεοῖς ύπηρετικῆ εἰς τίνος ἔργου ἀπεργασίαν ύπηρετικῆ ἀν εἰη; δὴλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἴσθα, ἐπειδήπερ τὰ γε θεῖα κάλλιστα γε φης εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

εὐσθεία. Καὶ ἅλθη γε λέγοι, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ξακρατής. Εἰπτε δὴ πρὸς Δiov, τὶ ποτὲ ἐστιν

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EUTHYPHRO

makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?

EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, not I.

SOCRATES. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by “attention to the gods” just because I did not think you meant anything like that.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.

SOCRATES. Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?

EUTHYPHRO. The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.

SOCRATES. I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly.

SOCRATES. Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?

EUTHYPHRO. Evidently, Socrates, a ship.

SOCRATES. And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. And what I say is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me,
PLATO

ἐκείνου τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἢμῖν ὑπηρέταις χρόμενοι;

εἰςτέφρων. Πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ὡς Σώκρατες.

14 σοκρατις. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ, ὃ φίλε· ἀλλὰ ὦμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ῥάδιος ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ἢ οὔ;

εἰςτέφρων. Πᾶς δ’ οὖ;

σοκρατις. Πολλὰ δὲ γ’, οἶμαι, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ· ἀλλὰ ὦμως τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῇς ἀπεργασίας ἢ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφῆ.

εἰςτέφρων. Πάνω γε.

σοκρατις. Τί δὲ δή; τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται, τί τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐστὶ τῆς ἐργασίας;

εἰςτέφρων. Καὶ ὅλους σοι πρότερον εἶποι, ὃ

Β Σώκρατες, ὃτι πλείονος ἔργον ἐστίν ἀκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἐχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἔδω μὲν κεχαρισμένα τὶς ἐπιστητὶς τοῖς θεοῖς λέγουσι τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενος τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τὰ ὅσια, καὶ σάβει τὰ τοιαύτα τούς τε ἰδίους οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἀσεβῆ, ἅ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπεται ἄπαντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

17. σοκρατις. Ῥ Πολὺ μοὶ διὰ βραχυτέρων, ὃ

Ευθύφρων, εἰ ἔβοηλου, εἴπες ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὃν ἠρώτων· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ πρόθυμος με εἰ διδάζων·

C δῆλος εἰ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἐπειδὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἡσθα, ἀπετράπων· ἔ δ’ ἀπεκρίνω, ἰκανῶς ἂν ἦδη παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὁσιότητα ἐμεμαθήκη. νῦν δὲ—ἀνάγκη

γὰρ τῶν ἐρωτῶν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅτι ἂν ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ· τί δὴ αὐτοῖς τὸ ὀσίον εἶναι καὶ
what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?

EUTHYPHRO. They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Yes, and so do generals, my friend; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work?

EUTHYPHRO. I told you a while ago, Socrates, that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these things. However, I say simply that when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states; and the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is impious, and that overturns and destroys everything.

SOCRATES. You might, if you wished, Euthyphro have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness. But, as things are, the questioner must follow the one questioned wherever he leads. What do you say the holy, or
τὴν ὀσιότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὐχέσθαι;

ἐγωγε. 'Εγώγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔκοιν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαί ἐστὶ τοῖς

Θεοῖς, τὸ δ’ εὐχέσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς;

ἐγωγε. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως

θεοῦ οσιότητα ἤν εἰὴ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ἐγωγε. Πάνυ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐννήκας ὦ

εἰσόν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπιθυμητής γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς

σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τούν νοῦν αὐτῆς, ὥστε οὐ

χαμαὶ πεσεῖται ὁ τι ἂν εὑπτης. ἀλλά μοι λέξον, τὸς

αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φής

αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκεῖνοι;

ἐγωγε. 'Εγώγε.

18. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ ὅρθως αἰτεῖν ἂν

εἰη, ἂν δεόμεθα παρ’ ἐκεῖνοι, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

ἐγωγε. Ἀλλὰ τί;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ αὐ τὸ διδόναι ὅρθως, ὦν ἐκεῖνοι

Ε τυγχάνουσιν δεόμενοι παρ’ ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἐκεῖνοις

αὐτὸν ἀντιδωρεῖσθαι; οὐ γὰρ πον τεχνικόν γ’ ἂν

εἰη δωροφορεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὧν οὐδέν δεῖται.

ἐγωγε. ‘Αληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἄρα τις ἂν εἰη, ὦ Εὐθύ-

φρον, τέχνη ἡ οσιότης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπως παρ’

ἀλλήλων.

ἐγωγε. Ἐμπορική, εἰ οὗτος ἢδιόν σοι ὀνο-

μάξειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἢδιον ἐμογε, εἰ μή τυγ-

χάνει ἄλληθες ὃν. φράσων δὲ μοι, τίς ἡ ὡφελεία

τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει οὐσα ἀπ’ τῶν δόρων ὧν παρ’

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holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And sacrificing is making gifts to the gods and praying is asking from them?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then holiness, according to this definition, would be a science of giving and asking.

EUTHYPHRO. You understand perfectly what I said, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Yes, my friend, for I am eager for your wisdom, and give my mind to it, so that nothing you say shall fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? Do you say that it consists in asking from them and giving to them?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Would not the right way of asking be to ask of them what we need from them?

EUTHYPHRO. What else?

SOCRATES. And the right way of giving, to present them with what they need from us? For it would not be scientific giving to give anyone what he does not need.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then holiness would be an art of barter between gods and men?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, of barter, if you like to call it so.

SOCRATES. I don't like to call it so, if it is not true. But tell me, what advantage accrues to the gods from
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ήμων λαμβάνουσιν; ἀ μὲν γὰρ διδάσκει, παντὶ
δὴ λογὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν, δὲ τὸ ἄν μὴ
ἐκεῖνοι δόσιν: ἦ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, τι
ὀφειλοῦνται; ή τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν
κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὡστε πάντα τἀγαθὰ παρ'
αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν οὐδὲν;
ἐτετυφὼν. Ἀλλ' οὐεί, ὁ Σωκράτες, τοὺς θεοὺς
ὀφελεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τούτων, ἀ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνου-
σιν;

Σωκράτης. Ἀλλὰ τί δῆποτ' ἂν εἶν ταῦτα, ὁ
Εὐθύφρον, τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;
ἐτετυφὼν. Τί δ' οὐεί ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα
καὶ, ὅπερ ἐγώ ἄρτι ἐλεγο, χάρις;

Β Ἰωάννης. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστὶν, ὁ Εὐθύ-
φρον, τὸ ὄσιον, ἄλλ' οὐχὶ ὀφελήσωμεν οὐδὲ φίλον
tοῖς θεοῖς;
ἐτετυφὼν. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε πάντων γε μᾶλιστα
φίλον.

Σωκράτης. Τούτῳ ἄρ' ἐστίν αὐ', ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ
ὄσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.
ἐτετυφὼν. Μᾶλιστα γε.

19. Σωκράτης. Θαυμάσεις οὖν ταῦτα λέγων, εἰν
σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνονται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες,
καὶ ἐμὲ αὐτάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς
ποιεῖν, αὐτός ὁν πολὺ γε τεχνικότερος τοῦ Δαи-
δάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιμόντα ποιῶν; ἦ οὖν αἰ-
C σθάνει, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς
ταῦτον ἥκει; μέμνησαι γὰρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἔμ-
προσθεν τὸ τε ὄσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλές οὐ ταύτῳ
ἡμῶν ἐφάνη, ἄλλ' ἐτερα ἄλληλων ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι;
ἐτετυφὼν. Ἐγώγε.

Σωκράτης. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς
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the gifts they get from us? For everybody knows what they give, since we have nothing good which they do not give. But what advantage do they derive from what they get from us? Or have we so much the better of them in our bartering that we get all good things from them and they nothing from us?

EUTHYPHRO. Why you don't suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?

SOCRATES. Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?

EUTHYPHRO. What else than honour and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?

SOCRATES. Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I think it is precious, above all things.

SOCRATES. Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I remember.

SOCRATES. Then don't you see that now you say
θεοίς φίλον φής ὅσιον εἶναι; τούτο δ' ἂλλο τι ἢ
θεοφιλῆς γίγνεται ἢ οὐ;

ετουθφών. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὗ καλῶς ὀμολο-
γούμεν, ἢ εἰ τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὄρθως τιθέμεθα.

ετουθφών. *Εοικεν.

20. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ἩΕ γάρ ἀρχή ἢμιν πάλιν σκε-
πτέον, τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον· ὡς ἔγω, πρὶν ἄν μάθω, ἔκὼν

D εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μὴ με ἀτιμάσῃς, ἀλλὰ

παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν ὃ τι μάλιστα νῦν

εἰπέ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐσθα γάρ, εἰπερ τις ἄλλος ἄν-

θρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέος εἰ, ἄστερ τὸ Πρωτεύς,

πρὶν ἄν εὕρῃς. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἤδησθα σαφῶς τὸ τε

ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἔστω ὁπως ἀν ποτε

ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπος θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην

πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀν

ἐδείσας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὄρθως αὐτὸ

ποιήσαις, καὶ τοὺς ἄνθρωπος ἁγχύνθης. νῦν δὲ

Ε ἐν οἷδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἷει εἰδέναι τὸ τε ὅσιον καὶ μὴ

εἰπὼν, δὲ βέλτιστε Εὐθύφρων, καὶ μὴ ἀπο-

κρύψη ὃ τι αὐτὸ ἤγει.

ετουθφών. Εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν, ὃ Σώκρατες· νῦν

γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὁρὰ ἀπίεναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὠλα ποιεῖς, ὅ ἐταίρε! ἀπ' ἐλπίδος

με καταβαλῶν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἂν εἴχον, ὃς

παρὰ σοῦ μαθῶν τὰ τε ὅσια καὶ μὴ καὶ τῆς πρὸς

Μέλητον γράφης ἀπαλλάξομαι, ἐνδειξάμενος

16 ἐκεῖνο ὅτι σοφὸς ἦν παρ' Εὐθύφρωνος τὰ θεία

γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνοίας αὐτοσχεδίαξ

οὐδὲ κανονομὸν περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον

βλου ἀμείνων βιωσοίμην.
that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.

SOCRATES. Then we must begin again at the beginning and ask what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if any one does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had not clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.

EUTHYPHRO. Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.

SOCRATES. Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus's indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect to them, and that I shall live a better life henceforth.
THE APOLOGY
INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

In the spring of 399 B.C., when Socrates was seventy years old, he was accused of impiety and of corrupting the youth. The chief accuser was Meletus, who was seconded by Anytus and Lyco. In the Euthyphro Meletus is spoken of as an insignificant youth, and in the Apology he is said to have been incensed by Socrates' criticism of the poets. Nothing further is known of him, though he may be identical with the Meletus mentioned in the Frogs (1302) of Aristophanes as a poet of Skolia. The statement of Diodorus Siculus (XIV, 37), that the Athenians, overcome by repentance for their injustice to Socrates, put Meletus and Anytus to death, deserves no credence. Anytus, who is one of the characters in the Meno, was a man of substance, who had served as general of the Athenian armies and had recently been active in expelling the Thirty Tyrants. He was a bitter enemy of all the sophists, and, according to the author of the Apology attributed to Xenophon, he had been irritated by Socrates' criticism of his conduct in employing his son in his tannery, when the young man was fitted for higher things. Lyco was charged by the comic poet Eupolis with being of foreign descent, and the comic poet Cratinus refers to his poverty and effeminacy, though Aristophanes (Wasps, 1301) mentions him among
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aristocrats. He seems to have been a person of no great importance.

Cases involving religion came under the jurisdiction of the King Archon, to whom Meletus submitted his indictment of Socrates (see the beginning of the Euthyphro), and such cases, like others, were tried before the heliastic court, which consisted altogether of six thousand citizens chosen by lot, six hundred from each of the ten tribes. The court did not however, usually sit as a whole, but was divided, so that cases were tried before smaller bodies, consisting generally of five hundred jurymen or judges, though sometimes the number was less, as four hundred or two hundred, and sometimes more, as one thousand. One additional judge was added to these even numbers to avoid a tie. Socrates was tried before a court of 501 (Apology, 36 a). If the accuser did not receive a fifth part of the votes cast in a case of this kind, he was subject to a fine of 1000 drachmæ (about £35 or $175). No penalty was prescribed by law for the offence with which Socrates was charged. After Socrates was found guilty the penalty still remained to be determined. The rule was that the accused, after conviction, should propose a counter penalty, the court being obliged to choose one of the two penalties proposed (Apology, 36 b–38 b); no compromise was permitted.

The question has frequently been asked, whether the Apology is substantially the speech made by Socrates before the court or a product of Plato's imagination. In all probability it is essentially the speech delivered by Socrates, though it may well be that the actual speech was less finished and less charming than that which Plato has reported. The
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legal procedure is strictly followed, and the manner of speech is that which was, as we know from Plato and also from Xenophon, usual with Socrates. There is nothing inconsistent with what we know of Socrates, and no peculiarly Platonic doctrine is suggested. The purpose of the dialogue, or rather, of the speech, for it is hardly a dialogue, is to present Socrates in a true and favourable light to posterity, and that end could hardly be gained by publishing a fiction as the speech which many Athenians must have remembered at the time of publication, which was, in all probability, not long after the trial.

In form the Apology, if we disregard the two short addresses after the conviction and the condemnation, follows the rules in vogue for public speeches. A brief introduction is followed by the narrative and argument, after which the speech closes with a brief appeal to the judges and to God (36 D). It conforms to Plato’s own rule (Phaedrus 264 c), that every discourse should, like a living being, have its middle parts and its members, all in proper agreement with each other and with the whole, which is, after all, the rule of common sense, followed for the most part even by those teachers of rhetoric whose elaborate subdivisions and high-sounding nomenclature Plato ridicules in the Phaedrus (266 e–267 d). The two shorter addresses after the case had been decided against Socrates cannot be expected to stand as independent and complete speeches; they are, and must be, treated as supplementary and subordinate to the speech delivered before the first adverse vote. Yet they are symmetrically arranged and their topics are skilfully presented. A peroration would hardly be appropriate before the last of
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these and the last itself needs no formal introduction; it serves as a fitting conclusion for the entire discourse. As such it is a brilliant example of oratorical composition.

The high moral character and genuine religious faith of Socrates are made abundantly clear throughout this whole discourse. It would seem almost incredible that the Athenian court voted for his condemnation, if we did not know the fact. His condemnation is to be explained by the general hostility to the sophists. Socrates was, to be sure, not a sophist, though Aristophanes in the Clouds selects him as the representative of that profession to be ridiculed. He did not teach for pay and did not promise any definite result from his instruction. He did not investigate natural phenomena or claim to ensure the political or financial success of his hearers; his aim was to show the way to righteousness, to the perfection of the individual soul. This seems harmless enough, but Socrates endeavoured to lead men to righteousness by making them think, and thinking, especially on matters of religion, is not welcomed by the slothful or the conservative. The mere fact that he was a leader of thought caused Socrates to be confounded with the sophists who were also leaders of thought, and were, chiefly, perhaps, for that reason, regarded with suspicion and hostility. Moreover, Socrates claimed to possess a daimonion, or spiritual monitor, which guided his actions. He did not, so far as we know, attribute a distinct personality to this inner voice, but his belief in it caused him to be accused of introducing "new spiritual beings" or divinities and of disbelieving in the gods of the state, although he was apparently punctilious in religious observances.

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His method had also, without doubt, aroused many personal antagonisms (*Apology* 21 c–23 ι). Probably Meletus and the judges who voted for the condemnation of Socrates believed that they were acting in the interest of religion and piety, though their verdict has not been approved by later generations.

Editions of the *Apology* are very numerous. One of the best is that of Cron (*Apology* and *Crito*), upon which the excellent edition of Dyer is based (revised, 1908, by Seymour). Another good edition is that of J. Adam.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

Α 1. "Ο τι μὲν ύμεῖς, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πεπόνθατε ὧτ' τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγον ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθὸ-μην· οὐτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἁληθὲς γε, ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ἄν ἐφεύσαντο, τούτο, ἐν ὃ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ἴμας εὔλαβεῖσθαι, μή ὑπ' ἐμοῦ

Β ἐξαπατηθήσετε, ὡς δεινοὶ οὖν τοῦτο λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἔξελεγχθῆσονται ἐργά, ἐπειδὰν μὴ ὁπωσοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτο μοι ἠδοξεῖν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὐτοὶ λέγειν τῶν τάληθεν λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγοντι, ὁμολογοῦν ἄν ἐγώγε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ὑπὲρ. οὕτως μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὖν ἑλθές εἰρήκασιν· ύμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἁκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-ναίοι, κεκαλυπτημένους γε λόγους, ὡσπερ οἱ

C τούτων, ῥήματι τε καὶ ὄνομασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμη-μένους, ἀλλὰ ἁκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοὺς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὑνόμασιν· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἡ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως.
THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES
AT HIS TRIAL

[ETHICAL]

How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know; but I, for my part, almost forgot my own identity, so persuasively did they talk; and yet there is hardly a word of truth in what they have said. But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told—when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, because I was a clever speaker. For I thought it the most shameless part of their conduct that they are not ashamed because they will immediately be convicted by me of falsehood by the evidence of fact, when I show myself to be not in the least a clever speaker, unless indeed they call him a clever speaker who speaks the truth; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator—not after their fashion. Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true; but you shall hear from me nothing but the truth. Not, however, men of Athens, speeches finely tricked out with words and phrases, as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything else.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δὴτοι πρέποι, ὃ ἄνδρες, τῇ δὲ τῇ ἠλικίᾳ ὧσπερ μειρακίω πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίναι. καὶ μὲντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τούτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμαι ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητε μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι’ ὦσπερ εἰωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἀλλιθι

Δ μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτον ἐνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωσι. υνὶ λέγω πρώτου ἔπι δικασθῆριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐτῇ γεγονός ἐβδομήκοντα ἀτεχνῶς ὁυν ἔνοις ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὧσπερ οὐν ἂν, εἰ τῷ οὐντε ἔνοις ἔτυγχανον ὧν, ἐνεγεγυγνώσκετε δὴτοι ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνη τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν ὦσπερ ἐπεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιοι, ὡς γέ μοι δοκοῦ, τὸν μὲν πρώτον τῆς λέξεως ἂν ἔσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἔσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἶναυτὸ δὲ τούτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτο τὸν νῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή; δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἄυτῇ ἄρετῇ, δήτορος δὲ τάληθθη λέγειν.

2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιοι εἰμὶ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτὰ μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τὸν πρῶτον κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὦστερα καὶ τοὺς υπόστερους. ἐμοὶ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγοροῦν γεγόνασι πρὸς υμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἢδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθῆς λέγοντες, οὐς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀντιοῦ, καὶ περὶ δυνας καὶ τούτοις δεινοῦς· ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὃ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παῖδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπευθοῦν τε

1 Schanz brackets ψευδῆ, following Hirschig.
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For surely it would not be fitting for one of my age to come before you like a youngster making up speeches. And, men of Athens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making my defence with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market place at the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised or to make a disturbance on this account. For the fact is that this is the first time I have come before the court, although I am seventy years old; I am therefore an utter foreigner to the manner of speech here. Hence, just as you would, of course, if I were really a foreigner, pardon me if I spoke in that dialect and that manner in which I had been brought up, so now I make this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech—for perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better—and observe and pay attention merely to this, whether what I say is just or not; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orator's virtue is to speak the truth.

First then it is right for me to defend myself against the first false accusations brought against me, and the first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. For many accusers have risen up against me before you, who have been speaking for a long time, many years already, and saying nothing true; and I fear them more than Anytus and the rest, though these also are dangerous; but those others are more dangerous, gentlemen, who gained your belief, since they got
καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ ὁδὲν ἀληθὲς, ὡς ἔστι τις Ἴωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τὰ ἐν μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντά ἀνεξητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἢττω λόγου κρείττω ποιῶν. οὔτοι, δὲ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁι ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάζοντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἴσιν μου κατηγοροὶ. οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγούνται τοὺς τἀυτὰ ξητοῦντας οὔτε θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἐπειτὰ εἴσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατηγοροὶ πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἢδη κατηγορηκότες, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἠλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἦν μᾶλλον ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὑποτε, ἐνοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ μειρᾶκια, ἀτεχνὸς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογογομένου οὐδενὸς. δὲ πάντων ἀλογάτατον, ὅτι οὔτε τὰ ὅνωματα οἰῶν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τις κωμῳδιοποῖς τυγχάνει ὁν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρόμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντων ἀπορώτατοι εἴσιν: οὐδὲγὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι ὑμῶν τ’ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοὶ οὐδ’ ἐλέγχαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνὸς ὡσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογογομένοι τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἁρτὶ κατηγορήσαντας, ἔτερους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰκήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἑκείνους πρῶτον μὲ ἀπολογησάσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἑκείνων πρὸτερον ἢκούσατε κατηγοροῦντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἦ

1 After ἐμοῦ the MSS. read μᾶλλον "more" or "rather." Schanz reads μᾶ τὸν—, "by—," Hermann brackets μᾶλλον and also οὔτε ἀληθές, Wohlrab omits μᾶλλον.
hold of most of you in childhood, and accused me without any truth, saying, "There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger." These, men of Athens, who have spread abroad this report, are my dangerous enemies. For those who hear them think that men who investigate these matters do not even believe in gods. Besides, these accusers are many and have been making their accusations already for a long time, and moreover they spoke to you at an age at which you would believe them most readily (some of you in youth, most of you in childhood), and the case they prosecuted went utterly by default, since nobody appeared in defence. But the most unreasonable thing of all is this, that it is not even possible to know and speak their names, except when one of them happens to be a writer of comedies. And all those who persuaded you by means of envy and slander—and some also persuaded others because they had been themselves persuaded—all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question him, but I am compelled in making my defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross-question when nobody answers. Be kind enough, then, to bear in mind, as I say, that there are two classes of my accusers—one those who have just brought their accusation, the other those who, as I was just saying, brought it long ago, and consider that I must defend myself first against the latter; for you heard them making their charges first and with
τῶν τῶν ὑστερον. εἰς ἀπολογητέων δή, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἔπιχειρητέων ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἂν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὁλγῷ χρόνῳ. Βουλοῖμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γεγένθαι, εἰ τι ἂμεινων καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τι με ποιήσαι ἀπολογούμενον οἴμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνω με λανθάνει οἴόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἵτω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

3. Αναλάβομεν οὖν εἴς ἀρχὰς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, εἴς ἂς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ δὴ καὶ Β πιστεῶν Μελήτος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἰς τι δὴ λέγοντες διεξαλλούν οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὅσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεὶ ἀναγρώναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται, ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἠττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ 

C ἄλλους τά αὐτὰ ταύτα διδάσκων· τοιαύτη τις ἐστίν· ταύτα γὰρ ἐσώρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κομῳδία, Σωκράτης τινά ἐκεί περιφρόμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀφοβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φιλοροῦντα, ὃν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίω. καὶ οὖχ ὃς ἄτιμάξων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς ἐστίν. μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύσιμοι. 1 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

D μαρτυρας δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἄξιον ὑμᾶς ἄλληλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ

1 Schanz brackets μή πως ... φύγουμ.
THE APOLOGY

much greater force than those who made them later. Well, then, I must make a defence, men of Athens, and must try in so short a time to remove from you this prejudice which you have been for so long a time acquiring. Now I wish that this might turn out so, if it is better for you and for me, and that I might succeed with my defence; but I think it is difficult, and I am not at all deceived about its nature. But nevertheless, let this be as is pleasing to God, the law must be obeyed and I must make a defence.

Now let us take up from the beginning the question, what the accusation is from which the false prejudice against me has arisen, in which Meletus trusted when he brought this suit against me. What did those who aroused the prejudice say to arouse it? I must, as it were, read their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs: "Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others these same things." Something of that sort it is. For you yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes' comedy, a Socrates being carried about there, proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I know nothing, either much or little. And I say this, not to cast dishonour upon such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such matters (may I never have to defend myself against Meletus on so great a charge as that!)—but I, men of Athens, have nothing to do with these things. And I offer as witnesses most of yourselves, and I ask you to inform one another

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φράζειν, ὃσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἄκηκοατε διαλεγο-μένουν πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιούτοι εἰσίν. φράζετε ὁμν ἄλληλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἢκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε, ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἔστιν καὶ τᾶλα περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἃ ὁ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἔστιν, ὃνδε γ' εἰ τωνο ἄκηκοατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ
Ε ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὔτε τούτο ἄληθες. ἔπει καὶ τούτῳ γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶν εἶναι, εἰ τίς οἴος τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὁσπερ Γοργήας τε ὁ Δεούτινος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἔκαστος, ὡς ἄνδρες, οἶος τ' ἔστιν ὑδ' ἵδω εἰς ἕκαστην τῶν πόλεων τούς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἕαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ἔπνεύναι ὡς ἐν βοῦλωνταί, τούτοις πείθουσιν τὰς
20 ἐκείσιν ἔμνουσίας ἀπολυπόντας σφίσιν ἔμνεῖται χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἔπει καὶ ἄλλος ἄνηρ ἔστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἴσχόμην ἐπιθυμοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἄνδρι δς τετελεκεῖς χρήματα σοφίστας πλεῖω ἢ ἔμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου τούτων ὁμανηρῶν—ἔστον γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο νῦε—
Ω Καλλία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σοι τῷ νῦε πάλω ἢ μόσχῳ έγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἄν αὐτῶν ἔπιστατήν λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, δε ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῶ
Β τε καὶ ἄγαθῳ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἄρετήν ἢν δ' ἄν οὕτως ἢ τῶν ἰππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωρ-μηκῶν νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπων ἔστον, τίνα αὐτῶν ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ἔπιστατήν λαβεῖν; τῆς τῆς τοιαύτης

1 Schanz brackets ἔστιν. 2 Schanz brackets οἴος τ' ἔστιν.
THE APOLOGY

and to tell, all those of you who ever heard me con-
versing—and there are many such among you—now
tell, if anyone ever heard me talking much or little
about such matters. And from this you will perceive
that such are also the other things that the multitude
say about me.

But in fact none of these things are true, and if
you have heard from anyone that I undertake to
teach people and that I make money by it, that is not
true either. Although this also seems to me to be a
fine thing, if one might be able to teach people, as
Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and
Hippias of Elis are. For each of these men, gen-
tlemen, is able to go into any one of the cities and
persuade the young men, who can associate for
nothing with whosoever they wish among their
own fellow citizens, to give up the association with
those men and to associate with them and pay them
money and be grateful besides.

And there is also another wise man here, a
Parian, who I learned was in town; for I happened
to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than
all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus; so I asked
him—for he has two sons—"Callias," said I, "if
your two sons had happened to be two colts or two
calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an
overseer who would make them excellent in the kind
of excellence proper to them; and he would be a
horse-trainer or a husbandman; but now, since they
are two human beings, whom have you in mind to
get as overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind
ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἔστιν; οἴμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέθθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νιέων κτήσεως. ἔστιν τις, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ; Πάνω γε, ἢ δ’ ὄς. Τίς, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Ἐὔηνος, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν. καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Ἐὔηνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὁς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τῆν τέχνην καὶ οὐτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγώ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνύμην ἄν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταύτα· ἄλλα οὖ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὁ ἀνδρες Ἀθήναιοι.

5. 'Τοπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἰσως· Ἀλλ’, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πράγμα; πόθεν αἰ διαβολαῖ σοι αὕται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήποτε σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιπτότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπείτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἐπράττες ἄλλοιοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ;1 λέγει οὖν ὃ ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν ὃν μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδίαξομεν. ταῦτα μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὃ λέγων, κἂν ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξει, τί ποτέ ἐστιν τούτῳ ὃ ἐμοὶ πεπολήκεν τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούε τε δή; καὶ ἰσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίξεω, εὖ μέντοι ἦστε, πάσαν υμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρώτῃ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὁ ἀνδρες Ἀθήναιοι, δι’ οὐδέν ἄλλ’ ἢ διά σοφίαν τινὰ τούτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποιάν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἦπερ ἐστὶν ἰσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ δύντι γὰρ κυνοφυὸς ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὔτοι δὲ τὰξ’ ἄν, ἐνδείξα ἐγένετο μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶναι, ἢ οὔκ ἔχω, τί λέγω. οὖ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼ γε αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμαι, ἄλλα ὡστὶς φησὶ

1 Schanz brackets εἰ μὴ τι . . . πολλοὶ.
of excellence, that of a man and a citizen? For I think you have looked into the matter, because you have the sons. Is there anyone," said I, "or not?" "Certainly," said he. "Who," said I, "and where from, and what is his price for his teaching?" "Euenus," he said, "Socrates, from Paros, five minae." And I called Euenus blessed, if he really had this art and taught so reasonably. I myself should be vain and put on airs, if I understood these things; but I do not understand them, men of Athens.

Now perhaps someone might rejoin: "But, Socrates, what is the trouble about you? Whence have these prejudices against you arisen? For certainly this great report and talk has not arisen while you were doing nothing more out of the way than the rest, unless you were doing something other than most people; so tell us what it is, that we may not act unadvisedly in your case." The man who says this seems to me to be right, and I will try to show you what it is that has brought about my reputation and aroused the prejudice against me. So listen. And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be joking; be assured, however, I shall speak perfect truth to you.

The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom. For perhaps I really am wise in this wisdom; and these men, perhaps, of whom I was just speaking, might be wise in some wisdom greater than human, or I don't know what to say; for I do not understand it, and whoever says I do, is lying and speaking to
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ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μήδε ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῶν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἔρω τὸν λόγον, ὅπε ἂν λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῶν τὸν λέγοντα ἀναίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τὰς ἑστὶν σοφία καὶ ὁἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῶν παρέξωμαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεθώντα γὰρ ἵστε ποι. 21 οὕτος ἐμὸς τε ἑταῖρος ἢ ἐκ νεόου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος τε καὶ ἐγὼ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ, οἷος ἂν Χαιρεθω, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ᾽ ὃ τι ὀρμήσεις. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυ- βείτε, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς· ἡρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἰ τὰς ἐμοὺς ἐκῃ σοφότερος. ἀνείλεπον οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφό- τερον εἶναι. καὶ τοῦτων πέρι ὁ ἄδελφος ὑμῶν αὐτοῦ οὕτως μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκείνος τε- τελεύτηκεν.

Β 6. Σκέψασθε δὲ, ὅν ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμοῦσιν οὕτως· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὕτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφός ὃν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφότατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴπον ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ· καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρώνον ἦπόροιν, τί ποτε λέγει. ἔπειτα μόνος πάνυ ἐπὶ ξηθησίων αὐτῶν τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην.

'Ηλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, C ὃς ἐνταῦθα, εἰ περπόν, ἐλέγξω τό μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ, ὃτι οὕτως ἐμοὶ

1 Schanz brackets ἑταῖρος τε καὶ.
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arouse prejudice against me. And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness. You know Chaerephon, I fancy. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don't make a disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.

But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to myself: "What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him." And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows.

I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the
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σοφώτερός ἦστε, σὺ δ᾽ ἐμὲ ἐφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὗν τούτον—οὐνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἢν δὲ τις τῶν πολυτικῶν, πρὸς ἄν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιούτων τι ἐπαθον, ὢν ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέ μοι οὕτος ὁ ἄνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ᾽ οὐ· κάπετα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἶοντο

D μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς, εἶγε δ᾽ οὔ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παροντῶν, πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ᾽ οὖν ἀπιῶν ἐλογιζόμην, ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἄνθρωπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' οὕτος μὲν οἴεται τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ, ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὕτε οἴομαι· ἔσοικα γοῦν τούτῳ γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ὁ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ ἄλλον ἦν τῶν ἑκείνου

Ε δοκοῦντων σοφώτερων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταύτα ἐδοξέ· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκελῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

7. Μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ἡδῆ ἐφεξής ἦν, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ ἀνπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθαυμόμην, ὁμως δὲ ἀναγκαίον εἴδοκει εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι· ἵτεον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμόν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἀπαντᾷς τούς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τῶν κύνα, ὁ ἄνδρες

22 'Ἀθηναῖοι' δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τὰληθῆ λέγειν· ἡ μὴν ἐγώ ἐπαθῶν τι τοιοῦτον οί μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξέαν μοι ὁλίγον δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου

1 Schanz brackets καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ.
2 Schanz brackets καὶ.
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oracle "This man is wiser than I, but you said I was wisest." So examining this man—for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the public men with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, men of Athens—and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but was not. As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either." From him I went to another of those who were reputed to be wiser than he, and these same things seemed to me to be true; and there I became hateful both to him and to many others.

After this then I went on from one to another, perceiving that I was hated, and grieving and fearing, but nevertheless I thought I must consider the god's business of the highest importance. So I had to go, investigating the meaning of the oracle, to all those who were reputed to know anything. And by the Dog, men of Athens—for I must speak the truth to you—this, I do declare, was my experience: those who had the most reputation seemed to me to be almost the most deficient,
ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι θητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἰναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεὶ δὴ ὅτι τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὦστερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἦ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν τραγῳδίων καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων ἐκαὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαβέστερον ἐκείνων ὠντα. αναλαμβάνων οὐν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἂ μοι ἐδόκει μᾶλλοντα πεπραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρήτων ἂν αὐτοὺς, τί λέγοιεν, ἢν ἂμα τι καὶ μανθάνωμι παρ’ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὡμὶν εἴπειν, ὡ ἄνδρες, τάληθεν ὁμοὶ δὲ ῥήτεων. ὡς ἔτος γὰρ εἴπειν ὅλογον αὐτῶν ἀπαντες οἱ παρ’ ὅτις ἄν ἐξετιόν ἐλεγον περὶ ὅν αὐτοὶ ἐπετοιηκας. ἔγρων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅλῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῦν ἢ ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τωι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥστερ οἱ θεομάντεως καὶ οἱ χρησμοῦδι καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἱσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὃν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτον τι μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες καὶ ἂμα ἵσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν πολὺν οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ανθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἡτὶ οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμιομενὸς περιγεγογοῦναι ὡς οὕτως καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

8. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἢμ·

1 Schanz, following Stephanus, inserts μὴ after ἵνα.
2 Schanz inserts αὐτῶν after τῷ αὐτῷ.
as I investigated at the god's behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to be superior men in the matter of being sensible. So I must relate to you my wandering as I performed my Herculean labours, so to speak, in order that the oracle might be proved to be irrefutable. For after the public men I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, and the rest, thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognised this, that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things they say; it was evident to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort. And at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not. So I went away from them also thinking that I was superior to them in the same thing in which I excelled the public men.

Finally then I went to the hand-workers. For I was conscious that I knew practically nothing, but I knew I should find that they knew many fine
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καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τοῦτον μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ' ἡπίσταντο ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὥς ἀνδρες Ἄθηναίοι, ταύτων μοι ἐδοξάζων ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ δημιουργοὶ.1 διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἔκαστος ἥξιον καὶ ταλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἢ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν. ὡστ' ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἄνερωτάν

Ε ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὖτω ὀστερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὅν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἄ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινύμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυστελοὶ ὀστερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

9. Ἐκ ταυτης δὴ τῆς ἔξετάσεως, ὥς ἀνδρες 23 Ἄθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γὰρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφοῦ, ἢ ἄν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὥς ἀνδρες, τῷ ὃντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τοῦτο τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὁλόγον τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδένος· καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτ' οὐ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι

Β δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὁνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὅπερ ἄν εἰ εἴποι, ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὥς ἀνθρωποί, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὀστερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδένος ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀλήθεια πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιών ἔτου

1 Schanz brackets καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ δημιουργοί.
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things. And in this I was not deceived; they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good artisans also seemed to me to have the same failing as the poets; because of practising his art well, each one thought he was very wise in the other most important matters, and this folly of theirs obscured that wisdom, so that I asked myself in behalf of the oracle whether I should prefer to be as I am, neither wise in their wisdom nor foolish in their folly, or to be in both respects as they are. I replied then to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to be as I am.

Now from this investigation, men of Athens, many enmities have arisen against me, and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I confute someone else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this: “Human wisdom is of little or no value.” And it appears that he does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, and makes me an example, as if he were to say: “This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, recognises that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom.”

Therefore I am still even now going about and

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καὶ ἔρευνῷ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ
ξένων ἂν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν
μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι
οὐκ ἐστὶ σοφὸς. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας
οὔτε τί τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ
gέγονεν ἄξιον λόγον οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ' ἐν
πενία μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

10. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολου-
θοῦντες, οἳς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἔστιν, οἱ τῶν πλού-
σιωτῶν, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἔξε-
tαξομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις
ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἔξετά-
ζειν· καὶ πεῖται, οἴμαι, εὑρίσκοντι πολλήν ἀφθονίαν
οἰσμένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπον, εἰδότων δὲ
όλην ἡ οὐδὲν. ἐνετείθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν
ἔξεταξόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὁργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοὶ,
καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τὸς ἐστὶ μιαρότατος

καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὰν τὶς αὐτοῦς
ἐρωτᾶ, ὁ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὁ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν
οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦσιν; ἃν δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν
ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων
πρόχειρα ταύτα λέγοντων, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ
tὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἦττω
λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἴομαι,
οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται
προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδὲν.

ἐὰν οὖν, οἴμαι, φιλότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ
πολλοί, καὶ ἐξυντεταγμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες
περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἔμπεπτήκασιν ύμῶν τὰ ὃτα καὶ πάλαι
καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ

1 Schanz reads ἀμφίγυροούσιν, “they are in doubt.”
2 Schanz reads ἐξυντεταγμένως, “earnestly.”

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searching and investigating at the god's behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and show that he is not wise. And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or of my own, but am in vast poverty on account of my service to the god.

And in addition to these things, the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that "Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth."

And when anyone asks them "by doing or teaching what?" they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, "the things in the air and the things beneath the earth" and "not to believe in the gods" and "to make the weaker argument the stronger." For they would not, I fancy, care to say the truth, that it is being made very clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing. Since, then, they are jealous of their honour and energetic and numerous and speak concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears both long ago and now with vehement slanders.
Μέλητός μοι ἔπεθετο καὶ Ἀνυστὸς καὶ Δύκαν, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἀνυστὸς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.  
1 Δύκαν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων ὡστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔγω ἐλεγον, θαυμάζομι ἂν, εἰ οἶδος τῇ ἐκήν ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διάβολην ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν μεγαλύνην. ταύτῃ ἐστιν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθε, καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτε μέγα οὕτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυπτάμενος ἔγω λέγω οὐδὲ ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδόν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι ἢ καὶ τεκμηρίων, ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστίν ἡ διάβολή ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αὕτα ταῦτα ἐστίν. καὶ εἶν τι νῦν ἐὰν τε αὕτις ξητισῆτε ταύτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

11. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἄν ὁ πρῶτος μου κατήγορος κατηγόρου ἄφθη ἐστὶν ίκανή ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ φιλότοπων, ὃς φησὶ, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταύτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. ἀὕτης γὰρ ἢ, ὅπερ ἐτέρων τοῦτων οὕτων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὐ τὴν τοῦτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πώς ὅδε. Σωκράτης φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐτέρα

C δὲ δαίμονα καίνα. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλήμα τοιοῦτὸν ἐστὶν. τοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἔγω δὲ γε, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδὴ χαριστίζεται, ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγώνα καθιστᾶς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδᾶζει καὶ κηδεσθαι,

1 Schanz follows Cobet in bracketing καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.
THE APOLOGY

From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men, and Lycon on account of the orators; so that, as I said in the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able to remove this prejudice from you in so short a time when it has grown so great. There you have the truth, men of Athens, and I speak without hiding anything from you, great or small or prevaricating. And yet I know pretty well that I am making myself hated by just that conduct; which is also a proof that I am speaking the truth and that this is the prejudice against me and these are its causes. And whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.

Now so far as the accusations are concerned which my first accusers made against me, this is a sufficient defence before you; but against Meletus, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the later ones, I will try to defend myself next. So once more, as if these were another set of accusers, let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows: it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings.

Such is the accusation. But let us examine each point of this accusation. He says I am a wrongdoer because I corrupt the youth. But I, men of Athens, say Meletus is a wrongdoer, because he jokes in earnest, lightly involving people in a lawsuit, pretending to be zealous and concerned about things


12. Καὶ μοι δεύρο, ὁ Μέλητε, εἰπὲ· ἀλλ’ τι ἢ

D περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὡς ὁς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; Ἑγωγε. Ἐάν δὴ νυν εἰπὲ τούτο, τὶς αὐτοὺς βελτίονες ποιεῖ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἰσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἔσευρόν, ὡς φήσει, ἐμὲ εἰσύγει τούτους; καὶ κατηγορεῖ: τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίονοι ποιοῦντα ἦθι εἰπὲ καὶ μὴν σοι αὐτοὶς, τὶς ἐστίν. ὁρᾶς, ὁ Μέλητε, ὅτι συγάς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καὶ τοι οὐκ ἄσχορον σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἰκανὸν τεκμήριον οὐ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὔδεν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ, ὁ γαθεῖ, τὶς

Ε αὐτοὺς ἁμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ’ ὁ οὐ τούτο ἐρωτῶ, ὁ βέλτιστο, ἀλλ’ τὶς ἄνθρωποι, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τούτο οἴδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὔτοι ὁ Σῶκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Μέλητε; οἴδη τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἴοι τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἄπαντες, ὃ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ’ οὐ; Ἀπαντες. Ἐὰν γε νὴ τὴν Ἡραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὁφελοῦντων. τί

25 δὲ δὴ; οἴδη οἱ ἄκροι αὐταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὐ; Καὶ οὕτω. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταῖ.

Ἀλλ’ ἄρα, ὁ Μέλητε, μὴ οί ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταῖ,2 διαφθείροσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ κάκεινοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἄπαντες; Κάκεινοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἑικεῖν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κάγαθους ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνω σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ’

1 Cobet's suggestion of εἰς τοῦτον for τοῦτοι is adopted by Schanz.
2 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing of ἐκκλησιασταῖ.
THE APOLOGY

for which he never cared at all. And that this is so I will try to make plain to you also.

Come here, Meletus, tell me: don't you consider it of great importance that the youth be as good as possible? "I do." Come now, tell these gentlemen who makes them better? For it is evident that you know, since you care about it. For you have found the one who corrupts them, as you say, and you bring me before these gentlemen and accuse me; and now, come, tell who makes them better and inform them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and cannot tell? And yet does it not seem to you disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have never cared about it? But tell, my good man, who makes them better? "The laws." But that is not what I ask, most excellent one, but what man, who knows in the first place just this very thing, the laws. "These men, Socrates, the judges." What are you saying, Meletus? Are these gentlemen able to instruct the youth, and do they make them better? "Certainly." All, or some of them and others not? "All." Well said, by Hera, and this is a great plenty of helpers you speak of. But how about this? Do these listeners make them better, or not? "These also." And how about the senators? "The senators also." But, Meletus, those in the assembly, the assembly-men, don't corrupt the youth, do they? or do they also all make them better? "They also." All the Athenians, then, as it seems, make them excellent, except myself, and I alone corrupt them. Is this what you mean? "Very decidedly, that is
PLATO

ἐμοὶ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἢ καὶ περὶ ἦππους οὐτώ σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν
Β βελτίως ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρώποι εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τούναυτίον τούτον πάν
eἰς μὲν τις ὁ βελτίως οἷς τὸ ὄν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ
ὅλογοι, οἱ ἰππικοὶ· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐὰν περ ἔμοι ἔβαλαν καὶ
χρῶνται ἦππους, διαφθείρουσι; οὐχ οὗτος ἔχει,
ὡς Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἦππου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαν-
tων ἵππων; πάντως δὴ που, εἰ ὑπ' ἀλλοι καὶ ἰππεῖ
οὐ φήτε ἐὰν τοῖς φήτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία
eἰ ἐστὶν, τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνον αὐτοὺς
diaφθείρει, οὗ δὲ ἄλλοι ἄφελον. ἀλλὰ γάρ,
C ὡς Μέλητε, ἰκανοὶ ἐπιδεικνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώ-
pote ἐφροντίσας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἐποδίαν
tην σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκεν
περὶ ὄν ἐμὲ εἰςάγεις.

13. Ἡτὶ δὲ ἡμῖν εἶπέ, ὡς πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε,
ποτερον ἔστων οἴκειν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς
ἡ πονηροῖς; ὡ τῶν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδέν γὰρ τοι
χαλεπὸν ἑρωτώ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι
ἔργαζονται τοὺς ἄλλη γεννατά τῶν οὐντῶν οὐντας, οὓς ὁ
ἀγαθὸς ἀγαθὸν γίνεται; Πάνυ γε. Ἡστων οὖν ὅστις
D βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξοντῶν βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον
ἡ ὕφελεισθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὡς ἀγαθός καὶ γὰρ ὁ
νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται
βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δὴ, ποτερον ἐμὲ
eἰςάγεις δεύτερω ὅς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους
καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἓκωντα ἢ ἄκοντα;
ἐκόντα ἔγονε. Τι δὴ, ὡς Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον οὖ
ἐμοὶ σοφότερος εἰ τῆλικοῦτον οὕτως τῆλικόδε
ὡν, ὡστε σοι μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν
Ε τι ἐργαζόμεθα ἢ ἐν τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν,
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what I mean." You have condemned me to great unhappiness! But answer me; does it seem to you to be so in the case of horses, that those who make them better are all mankind, and he who injures them some one person? Or, quite the opposite of this, that he who is able to make them better is some one person, or very few, the horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with and use horses, injure them? Is it not so, Meletus, both in the case of horses and in that of all other animals? Certainly it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or agree; for it would be a great state of blessedness in the case of the youth if one alone corrupts them, and the others do them good. But, Meletus, you show clearly enough that you never thought about the youth, and you exhibit plainly your own carelessness, that you have not cared at all for the things about which you hale me into court.

But besides, tell us, for heaven's sake, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens, or bad? My friend, answer; for I am not asking anything hard. Do not the bad do some evil to those who are with them at any time and the good some good? "Certainly." Is there then anyone who prefers to be injured by his associates rather than benefited? Answer, my good man; for the law orders you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be injured? "Of course not." Come then, do you hale me in here on the ground that I am corrupting the youth and making them worse voluntarily or involuntarily? "Voluntarily I say." What then, Meletus? Are you at your age so much wiser than I at my age, that you have recognized that the evil always do some evil to those nearest them, and the good some
ΠΛΑΤΟ

οί δὲ ἄγαθοι ἀγαθῶν ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκο, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄγνοιο, ὅτι, εἰν τινα μοχθηρόν ποιήσω τῶν ἐνυύρτων, κινούμενως κακῶν τι λαβέων ἅπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τούτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῆς σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὖ πείθομαι, ὁ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄνθρω-πων οὔδενα· ἀλλ’ ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἂκων, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ’ ἀμφότερα πειθεί. εἰ δὲ ἂκων διαφθείρω, τὸν τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δείρω νόμος εἰσάγεις ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νοοθετεῖν δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἶν μάθω, παύσομαι ὁ γε ἂκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ἠνυώνεσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδαχθὲι ἐφύνες καὶ σὺν ἡθελήσας, δεύρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμοις ἐστὶν εἰσάγεις τοὺς κολάσεις δεσμομένους, ἀλλ’ οὐ μαθή-σεως.

14. Ἀλλ’ γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἕδη ἐστίν, ὅ εἰγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τού-ὶς οὕτε μέγα οὐτε μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλθησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγει ἡμῖν, τῶς μὲ φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὁ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεοτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν, ἢν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὗ ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἑπερὰ δὲ δαιμόνια καὶνά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὅτι διδάσκον διαφθείρω; Πάντως μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοῖς, ὁ

ὁ Mέλητε, τοῖς τῶν θεῶν, ὅν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν, εἰπὲ ἑτὶ σαφεότερον καὶ ἔμώ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τούτοις. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν µε νοµίζειν είναι τινὰς θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτῶς ἄρα νοµίζω είναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰµὶ τὸ παράπταν ἂθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἄθικῳ, οὐ µέντοι

1 Schanz Iraeckels καὶ ἀκουσίων.
THE APOLOGY

good; whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say? I don't believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world does! but either I do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them, I do it involuntarily, so that you are lying in both events. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law is not to hale people into court, but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private. For it is clear that if I am told about it, I shall stop doing that which I do involuntarily. But you avoided associating with me and instructing me, and were unwilling to do so, but you hale me in here, where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment, not instruction.

But enough of this, for, men of Athens, this is clear, as I said, that Meletus never cared much or little for these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say, Meletus, that I corrupt the youth? Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings? Do you not say that it is by teaching this that I corrupt them? "Very decidedly that is what I say." Then, Meletus, for the sake of these very gods about whom our speech now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these gentlemen. For I am unable to understand whether you say that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not altogether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom the
οὔστερ γε ἡ τόλμη, ἄλλα ἔτερον, καὶ τοῦτ' ἕστιν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἔτερον· ἡ παντάπασι με φῆς οὔτε αὐτῶν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὅσ τὸ παράτην οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. Ωθαυμάσσει Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις;

οὔδε ἥλιον οὔδε σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι; Μὰ Δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταῖ, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου ὁ οἱ ἐκατηγορεῖν, ὁ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὐτῷ καταφρονεῖς τὸν δει καὶ οἷς αὐτῶς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὡστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἕμον μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνώτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὁρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελάν, ἔαν προσποιοῦντάι ἐαυτὸν εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὅντα, ἄλλ', ὁ πρὸς Διὸς, οὕτωσί σοι δοκῶ οὔδενα νομίζειν θεοὺς εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν. Ἀπιστός γ' εἰ, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὅσ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαντίδ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὕτωσί, ὁ ἄνδρες 'Ἀθηναίοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστής καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἄτεχνος τῇ γράφῃ ταῦτῃ ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικεν γὰρ ὅσπερ αἰνήγμα ἐξυπηρέτει διαπειρωμένω, ἀρα γνώστεραι Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοὶ χαριεύομένου καὶ ἐναντί ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἡ ἐξάπατήσῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὅσπερ ἀν εἰ εὑποί. ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης

1 Schanz brackets 'Ἀναξαγόρου. 2 Schanz brackets δοκῶ.
THE APOLOGY

state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people. "That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all." You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do? "No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth." Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such utterances? And forsooth the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometimes (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh at Socrates, if hepretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But for heaven's sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god? "No, by Zeus, you don't, not in the least." You cannot be believed, Meletus, not even, as it seems to me, by yourself. For this man appears to me, men of Athens, to be very violent and unrestrained, and actually to have brought this indictment in a spirit of violence and unrestraint and rashness. For he seems, as it were, by composing a puzzle to be making a test: "Will Socrates, the wise man, recognize that I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the others who hear me?" For he appears to me to contradict himself in his speech, as if he were to say, "Socrates is a wrongdoer, because he does
PLATO

θεοὺς οὐ νομίζωι, ἄλλα θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τούτο ἔστι παίζοντος.

15. Ἐννεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὃ άνδρες, ἦ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὃ
Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παργηγή
ςάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσωθότι πρώτῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. Ἐστὶν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὃ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ οὐ νομίζει τοῖς μηθείει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὃ άνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυ
βεῖτω. ἔσθ' ὅστις ὑπόπτους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππωκα
dὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐληταῖς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἄριστο ἄνδρον εἰ μὴ σὺ βουλεῖ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγο καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τουτοισὶ. ἄλλα τοῦ ἐπὶ
tούτω γε ἀπόκριναι· ἐσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει;
Οὐκ ἔστων. Ὡς ὀνήσιας, ὅτι μόνις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ
tουτοῦ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῆς
με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' ὅνι καὶ 
τοῖς 
καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω εἴν τῇ ἀντι
γραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δὴ
ποὺ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μὲ ἔστιν οὐχ οὗτος
ἐχει; ἔχει δὴ τίθημι γάρ σε ὀμολογοῦντα,
ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι
θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦμεθα ἢ θεῶν παίδας; φῆς ἢ οὐ;
Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ λαίμων ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ
φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἃν
εἰρ ὃ εἴγος φημὶ σε αἰνιττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι,
θεοὺς οὗχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὐ ἡγεῖσθαι
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not believe in gods, but does believe in gods." And yet this is the conduct of a jester.

Join me, then, gentlemen, in examining how he appears to me to say this; and do you, Meletus, answer; and you, gentlemen, as I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to make a disturbance if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner.

Is there any human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but does believe in things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but that things pertaining to flute-players do? There is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, I say it to you and these others here. But answer at least the next question. Is there anyone who believes spiritual things exist, but does not believe in spirits? "There is not." Thank you for replying reluctantly when forced by these gentlemen. Then you say that I believe in spiritual beings, whether new or old, and teach that belief; but then I believe in spiritual beings at any rate, according to your statement, and you swore to that in your indictment. But if I believe in spiritual beings, it is quite inevitable that I believe also in spirits; is it not so? It is; for I assume that you agree, since you do not answer. But do we not think the spirits are gods or children of gods? Yes, or no? "Certainly." Then if I believe in spirits, as you say, if spirits are a kind of gods, that would be the puzzle and joke which I say you are uttering in saying that I, while I do not believe in gods, do believe in gods again, since I
πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ γε δαίμονας ἡγούμαι· εἰ δὲ αὖ ὁ δαίμονας θεῶν παῖδες εἰσὶν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἕκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἕκ τινων ἄλλων, ὅν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγούτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μὴ; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἶη,

Ε ὅσπερ ᾧ εἰ τις ὑπποφω μὲν παῖδας ἡγούτο καὶ ὁμοίως γὰρ ὁμοίως μὴ καὶ όνομα μὴ ἡγούτο εἶναι. ἄλλ', ὁ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἐστών ὡπως σὺ ὁχὶ ἀντιπειρόμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψας τὴν γραφήν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορών ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθῶς ἄδικημα· ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἄν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστών καὶ δαίμονια καὶ θεία ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ 

28 ἡρωᾶς, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἔστών.

16. ἄλλα γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἁθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀνθρώπων κατά τὴν Μέλητου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἄλλα ἱκανὰ καὶ ταύτα: ὅ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλῷ μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὕ ἔστε ὅτι ἀληθῶς ἔστων. καὶ τούτ' ἐστὼν ὁ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρή, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀντωνος, ἄλλ' ἢ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἄ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἔρικεν, σὺμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν: οὐδὲν δὲ δεινόν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στηρ. ἵνα δὲ ἀν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ Σωκρατες, τοιουτοῦ ἐπιτήδειμα ἐπιτηδεύονται, εἴς οὖ κινδυνεύοις νυν ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον

1 Schanz brackets ταῦτα, which the MSS. give after σὐ.
2 After ὡς the MSS., and Schanz, read σὺ. It was omitted by Stephanus.
3 Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets τοῦ αὐτοῦ.
4 Schanz, following Prammer, brackets μὴ τῇ ἡρωᾶς.
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believe in spirits; but if, on the other hand, spirits are a kind of bastard children of gods, by nymphs or by any others, whoever their mothers are said to be, what man would believe that there are children of gods, but no gods? It would be just as absurd as if one were to believe that there are children of horses and asses, namely mules, but no horses and asses. But, Meletus, you certainly must have brought this suit either to make a test of us or because you were at a loss as to what true wrongdoing you could accuse me of; but there is no way for you to persuade any man who has even a little sense that it is possible for the same person to believe in spiritual and divine existences and again for the same person not to believe in spirits or gods or heroes.

Well then, men of Athens, that I am not a wrongdoer according to Meletus's indictment, seems to me not to need much of a defence, but what has been said is enough. But you may be assured that what I said before is true, that great hatred has arisen against me and in the minds of many persons. And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Meletus or Anytus, but the prejudice and dislike of the many. This has condemned many other good men, and I think will do so; and there is no danger that it will stop with me. But perhaps someone might say: "Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit, that you are now in danger of being put to death as a result?" But I should make to him a
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ἀντείπομε, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὃ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οἷς δεῖν κινδύνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφελός ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρος ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαύλου γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἳ τε άλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῖός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομείναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἴπεν ἢ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμιάσειν "Εκτόρα ἀποκτείναι, θεὸς οὐσα, οὕτως πώς, ὥσ ἐγώ οἶμαι: ὃ παί, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἔταρχῷ τῶν φόνων καὶ "Εκτόρα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ: αὐτίκα γὰρ τοι, φησι', μεθ' "Εκτόρα πότιμος ἐτοίμος: ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν βανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὑλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δεῖσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὅν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησὶ, τεθναίγν δίκην ἐπιθείς τῷ ἄδικοντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένῳ καταγέλαστος παρὰ μητρίν κορωνίσειν ἁχθος ἀρουρήσ. μὴ αὐτὸν οἷς φροντίσαι βανάτου καὶ κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναιοὶ, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ: οὗ ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξει ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ υπ' ἄρχοντος ταχTHON ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεῖν, μηδὲν ὑπολογίζομεν μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

17. Ἱγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶν τοιεργασμένος, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναιοὶ, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν μὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἑτατέτον, οὐς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ
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just reply: "You do not speak well, Sir, if you think a man in whom there is even a little merit ought to consider danger of life or death, and not rather regard this only, when he does things, whether the things he does are right or wrong and the acts of a good or a bad man. For according to your argument all the demigods would be bad who died at Troy, including the son of Thetis, who so despised danger, in comparison with enduring any disgrace, that when his mother (and she was a goddess) said to him, as he was eager to slay Hector, something like this, I believe, 'My son, if you avenge the death of your friend Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself shall die; "for straightway,"' she says, ""after Hector, is death appointed unto thee"';¹ he, when he heard this, made light of death and danger, and feared much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, and 'Straightway,' said he, 'may I die;² after doing vengeance upon the wrongdoer, that I may not stay here, jeered at beside the curved ships, a burden of the earth.'³ Do you think he considered death and danger?"

For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth; wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be there, or is stationed by his commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace.

So I should have done a terrible thing, if, when the commanders whom you chose to command me stationed me, both at Potidæa and at Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained where they stationed me,

¹ Homer, Iliad, xviii, 96. ² Homer, Iliad, xviii, 98. ³ Homer, Iliad, xviii, 104.
ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἐμενοῦ δισθερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φόβην τε καὶ υπελαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντα μὲ δεῖν χῦν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτόν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖσα ἡ θάνατος ἡ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦν πράγμα λίπομι τὴν τάξειν. δεινὸν τὰν εἰν, καὶ ὁς ἀληθῶς τοῦτ᾽ ἂν με δικαιῶς εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικα-στήριον, ὃτι οὐ νομίζω θεοῦς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιώς θάνατον καὶ οἶμενος σοφὸς εἶναι ὦν κ.ο.ν. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατον δεδέναι, ὃ ἀνδρες, οὐδέν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα: δοκεῖν γὰρ εἶδέναι ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἴδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ᾽ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἁγαθῶν, δεδίωσι δ᾽ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν B κακῶν ἐστὶ. καὶ τούτῳ πῶς οὐκ ἡμαθία ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ ἔπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἰκεῖα εἰδέναι ἢ οὐκ οἴδει; ἐγὼ δ᾽, ὃ ἀνδρες, τούτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἱσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερον τοῦ φαίνε ἐιναι, τούτῳ ἂν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἰκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου οὐτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἰδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίων, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακῶν καὶ ἁγιχρῶν ἐστὶν οἴδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν, ὃν οἴδα ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶν, ἃ μὴ οἴδα εἰ ἁγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβηθομαι οὐδὲ φεύξωμαι· ὅστε οὖν εἰ C με νῦν ὑμεῖς ὑφίστε 'Ἀνώτω ἀπιστήσατε, ὃς ἔφη ἡ τὴν ἄρχην οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύο ἐσθήθειν ἡ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷον τ᾽ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ως, εἰ διαφευγόμην, ἢ δὴ ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νείες ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἡ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφαρίσσονται,—εἰ μοι πρὸς 106
like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever. It would be a terrible thing, and truly one might then justly hale me into court, on the charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since I disobey the oracle and fear death and think I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know. For no one knows whether death be not even the greatest of all blessings to man, but they fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And is not this the most reprehensible form of ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not know? Perhaps, gentlemen, in this matter also I differ from other men in this way, and if I were to say that I am wiser in anything, it would be in this, that not knowing very much about the other world, I do not think I know. But I do know that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god or man. So I shall never fear or avoid those things concerning which I do not know whether they are good or bad rather than those which I know are bad. And therefore, even if you acquit me now and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought to trial at all, or since I was brought to trial, I must certainly be put to death, adding that if I were acquitted your sons would all be utterly ruined by practising what I teach—if you should say
ταύτα εἰποίτε: οὐ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀντίως οὐ πεισομέθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίημέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτω μέντοι, ἐφ' ὅτε μικρῆς ἐν ταύτη τῇ ἡλίθησε διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν: εὰν δὲ ἄλοχον ἐτί τούτο πράττων, ἄποθανεῖ: εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἴπον, ἐπὶ τούτω ἀφίοιτε, εἰποίμι' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὑστάξομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πεισοῦμαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἣ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἑωσπέρ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἶνος τε οὕ, οὐ μὴ παύσομαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακλειομένον τε καὶ ἐνευκυμόμενος ὅτω ἂν ἂν ἐνευκυμόμενος, λέγων οὐκέπερ εἰσάχθα, ὅτι, ὅ ἁριστε ἄνδρον, Ἀθηναῖοι ὅν, πόλεως τῆς μεγάστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχύ, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονίσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὅσ βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεὶ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ ἕως τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητή καὶ φή ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήγησα αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἀπειμή, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἄρετην, φάναι δὲ, ὄνειδω, ὅτι τὰ 30 πλείστον ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταύτα καὶ νεωτέρω καὶ πρεσβυτέρω, ὅτω ἂν ἐνευκυμόν, ποιός, καὶ ξένω καὶ ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστῶ, ὅσοι μοι ἐγγυντέρω ἐστε γένει. ταύτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεὸς, εὗ ἔστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὑμῖν μείζον ἀγάθον γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τῆς ἐμῆν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὖδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγώ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρως καὶ πρεσβυτέρως μὴτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων Β πρῶτον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς,
to me in reply to this: “Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing so again you shall die”; if you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, “Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: “Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?” And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. For know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell
όπως ὡς ἄριστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρῆματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἁγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἰη βλαβερά· εἰ δὲ τὶς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίνειν ἂν, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτορ ἢ μή, καὶ ἡ ἀφιέτε ἢ μὴ ἀφιέτε, ὅσ ἐμοῦ οὖν ἄν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὔδ' εἰ μέλλως πολλάκις τεθήναι.

18. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐμμείνατε μοι οἷς ἐδείξθην υμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑμαι, ἀνίστησθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῶν ἔρειν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλ' ἑδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἵστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον οὐτα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείξω βλάψετε ἢ υμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὔδεν ἂν βλάψειν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἀνύτος·

D οὔδε γὰρ ἂν δύνατο· οὐ γὰρ οἷομαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἀμείνοιν ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μὲν τὰν ἴσος ἢ ἐξελάσευν ἢ ἀπιμώσειν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὐτοὺς μὲν ἴσος οἴεται καὶ ἄλλοις τὶς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὖκ οἷομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ οὕτως νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἀνέρα ἁδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινυνναι. νῦν οὖν, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δὲν εἰγὼ ὑπὲρ ἑμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τίς ἂν οἷοτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μὴ τι ἔξαιμάρτῃ τῇ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν υμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψήφισθαι·

E φισάμενοι. εὖν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοῖδο·
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you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be injurious; but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is untrue. Therefore I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change my conduct even if I am to die many times over.

Do not make a disturbance, men of Athens; continue to do what I asked of you, not to interrupt my speech by disturbances, but to hear me; and I believe you will profit by hearing. Now I am going to say some things to you at which you will perhaps cry out; but do not do so by any means. For know that if you kill me, I being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me so much as yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus could injure me; that would be impossible, for I believe it is not God's will that a better man be injured by a worse. He might, however, perhaps kill me or banish me or disfranchise me; and perhaps he thinks he would thus inflict great injuries upon me, and others may think so, but I do not; I think he does himself a much greater injury by doing what he is doing now—killing a man unjustly. And so, men of Athens, I am now making my defence not for my own sake, as one might imagine, but far more for yours, that you may not by condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the God gave you. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another, who, to use a rather absurd
teron eîpseîn, prosokeîmenov tî pôlêi,1 óôster
ôpior megâllôr mên kai gevnaiîr, upô megenêthousi de
vôsthêstêrph. kai deomênov êgeîresthai upô muôtopôs
tinos: oîn ou dokeî o thêos èmê tî pôlêi
prostheikeînai toisouton tîna, ós ùmâs êgeîron
kai peîthov kai ônêidizov èna èkastron oudên
paoûmai tîn ëmêran olhûn pantachôu prosokeîzov.
toioutos oûn âllos ou pâdios ùmîn gevnîsetai, ò
ânôres, âll' eân èmôi peîthîste, feîsesthê mou
ùmeis ò Òosos tâx ìn ãchômenoi, òôster oî nusstâ-
êzontes êgeîrômênu, krouûantas àn me, peîthômenoi
'Anûtô, pâdios às ùpokteînaithe, êîta tîon loipôn
bîon kathêdoun te diateîoûte àn, eî mî tîna àlloun
ô thêos ùmîn épistêmîneîn khdûmenos ùmôs. òti ò
êgô tuvychânow às toioutos, oîs âpô tîu thêou tî
pôlêi dedôsthai, êîthêndo àn katanôîsaste: ou gâr
ânôthranîn euîke te ème tôn mên èmautoî ãpîntov
hêmelhênavi kai ánêkêsthai tîon oikeîwv ãmelou-
mênov tosaîta ëphê ëth, tô de ùmêteron pràttên
aî, ïdîa èkastrô prosoînta ôôster patêra û
ándelphôn prêsbûteron, peîthontâ êpîmellêsthai
áresths. kai eî mên ti àpô toîntov ãpêlânou kai
muôthôn lambrânwv tâûta parêkkelûnêm, eîxên2
àn tîna lýgon: òûn de ôraste òh kai aûtôi, ôti oî
kathîgoroi tâllâ pânta ánaioskûntovs ouîw katê-
gorôîntes toînto gê ouî oîôí te ègêûnto àp-
C anaioskûntiçai parasqûmenoi màrtura, às ëgô
pote tîna û èpîraçâmûn muôthôn ëphêthiç. ïkâvô

1 The MSS. give õpô toû thêou, "by the god," after pôlêi. Schanz, following Hirschvig, brackets it.
2 Schanz, with some inferior MS. authority, reads eîxên for eîxen of the best MSS.
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figure, attaches himself to the city as a gadfly to a horse, which, though large and well bred, is sluggish on account of his age and needs to be aroused by stinging. I think the god fastened me upon the city in some such capacity, and I go about arousing, and urging and reproaching each one of you, constantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long. Such another is not likely to come to you, gentlemen; but if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, might be angry, like people awakened from a nap, and might slap me, as Anytus advises, and easily kill me; then you would pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless God, in his care for you, should send someone else to sting you. And that I am, as I say, a kind of gift from the god, you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue; now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessness as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For I think
γάρ, οἴμαι, ἐγώ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀλήθη λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

19. Ἡσιός ἄν οὖν δόξειν ἀτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδία μὲν ταῦτα ἐμβουλεύω περιστών καὶ πολυπραγμονώ, δημοσία δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλήθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ἐμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτω δὲ αὐτίον ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, 1 ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικω- μφών Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτ’ ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γηγυμνεῖν, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἑπιτρέπει με τοῦτο δ ἄν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὕτως· τούτ’ ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὐ γὰρ ἱστε, ὃ ἀνδρεῖ
Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ ἐγὼ ἑπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἄν ἀπολόγηται καὶ οὔτ’ ἄν υἱὰς ὀφελήθη ὦθεν ὦτ’ ἄν ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τὰληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὕτε υἱὶς ἄλλῳ πληθεὶ συνεδρία γηγυμνος ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γήγεροθαι,

32 ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἔστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχομένον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίον, καὶ εἰ μέλλει οἷον χρόνον σωθη- σεσθαι, ἱδιωτεύει ἄλλα μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

20. Μεγάλα δ’ ἐγὼ γε ύμῖν τεκμηρία παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὃ υἱὸς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μοι τὰ ἑμοὶ ἐμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἴδητε, ὅτι οὖθ’ ἄν ἐν ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἀμ’ ἄν καὶ ἀπολογήμην.

1 The MSS. read φωνή, “voice,” after γίγνεται. Schanz, following others, omits it.
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I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty.

Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward. This it is which opposes my engaging in politics. And I think this opposition is a very good thing; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man.

I will give you powerful proofs of this, not mere words, but what you honour more,—actions. And listen to what happened to me, that you may be convinced that I would never yield to any one, if that was wrong, through fear of death, but would die rather than yield. The tale I am going to tell
PLATO

ἐρῶ δὲ ύμίν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικαίως, ἀληθῆ δὲ.

Β ἔγω γάρ, ὃς Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἄρχην οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβουλευσα δὲ καὶ ἐτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή πρωτανεύουσα, ὅτε ύμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλεσθε ἀδρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστερῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ύμῖν ἔδοξε. τὸτ' ἐγώ μόνος τῶν πρωτανευόντων ἡγαντιόθην ύμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους· καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων ενδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ύμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοῶντων, μετὰ

C τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου όμην μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἡ μεθ' ύμων γενέσθαι μη δικαια βουλευόμενον, φοβηθέντα δεσμῶν ἡ θώμαν. καὶ ταύτα μὲν ἦν ἐτι δημοκρατομένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλυγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτὸν ἐντελέχως μεταπεμψάμενοι με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θύλαν προσέταξαν ἄγαγεσιν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Δέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵνα ἀποθάνω. οί δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοὶ πολλὰ προσέταττων, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αὐτῶν. τότε μέντοι

D ἐγὼ οὖν λόγῳ ἄλλῳ ἐργόν αὐτὸν ἐνδεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτον μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἂγροικότερον ἦν εἰςἐν, οὐδ' ὀτιόν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τοῦ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἄρχην οὐκ ἐξεπληξεν οὕτως ἴσχυρά οὕσα, ὅστε ἄδικον τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἄλλῳ ἐπειδή ἐκ τῆς θύλαν ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ψυχοῦτο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Δέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ἄχωμεν ἀπίων οἰκίᾳ. καὶ ἰσως ἂν διὰ ταύτα ἀπεθάναυ, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἄρχη

1 Schanz, following Hermann, brackets καὶ ἐναντία ἐφισάμην, “and I voted against it,” which the MSS. give after
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you is ordinary and commonplace, but true. I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but I was a senator; and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you wished to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the slain after the naval battle; this was illegal, as you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the prytanes who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them with shouts to do so, I thought I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprisonment or death. That was when the democracy still existed; and after the oligarchy was established, the Thirty sent for me with four others to come to the rotunda and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, because they wished to implicate as many in their crimes as they could. Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have been put to death for it, if the government had not quickly been évóvous. Xenophon, Mem. iv. 4. 2, states that Socrates, as presiding officer, refused to put the question to vote.
Διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μᾶρτυρες.

21. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με ὀψεῦθε τοσάδε ἐτή διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἐπραττοῦ τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὡστερ χρή, τούτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιοῦμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις οὐδεῖς. ἀλλ' ἐγώ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσία τε, εἰ ποῦ τι ἐπράξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὕτως, οὐδενὶ πῶς τοῖς ξυγχωρήσας οὐδενὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὐτε ἅλλο οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ, οὕτω διαβάλλοντες ἔμε φασίν ἐμοὺς μαθητάς εἶναι. ἐγώ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πῶς τοῖς ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἰτε νεωτερος εἰτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πῶς τοῖς ἐφθάνῃσα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἅλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίως καὶ πέντε παρέχω ἑμαυτοῦ ἐρωτάν, καὶ ἔως τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν διὸ ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγώ εἰτε τοὺς χρηστοὺς γίγνεται εἰτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἵτινα ὑπέχουμι, διὸ μήτε ὕπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πῶς τοῖς μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξι· εἰ δὲ τίς φησὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ πῶς τοῖς τι μαθεῖν ἦ ἀκούσαι ἵδια ὄ τι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ ἢστε, ὃτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

22. Ἀλλ' διὰ τύ δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοὶ χαίρουσι· τινὲς πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες· ἀκήκοατε, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι· πᾶσαν ύμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγώ ἐπουν· ὦτι ἀκούστες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένους τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὕτω δ' οὖν ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἄγδες. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτο, ὃς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται.
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put down. Of these facts you can have many witnesses.

Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life and had acted as a good man should act, lending my aid to what is just and considering that of the highest importance? Far from it, men of Athens; nor could any other man. But you will find that through all my life, both in public, if I engaged in any public activity, and in private, I have always been the same as now, and have never yielded to any one wrongly, whether it were any other person or any of those who are said by my traducers to be my pupils. But I was never any one’s teacher. If any one, whether young or old, wishes to hear me speaking and pursuing my mission, I have never objected, nor do I converse only when I am paid and not otherwise, but I offer myself alike to rich and poor; I ask questions, and whoever wishes may answer and hear what I say. And whether any of them turns out well or ill, I should not justly be held responsible, since I never promised or gave any instruction to any of them; but if any man says that he ever learned or heard anything privately from me, which all the others did not, be assured that he is lying.

But why then do some people love to spend much of their time with me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; for I told you the whole truth; it is because they like to listen when those are examined who think they are wise and are not so; for it is amusing. But, as I believe, I
Υπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πραττεῖν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντι τρόπῳ, ὑπὲρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἀλλή θεία μοῦρα ἀνθρώπω καὶ ὀτιοῦ προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀλήθη ἔστιν καὶ εὐθελεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγνω τῶν νέων τοὺς ἰδέων παραμέτρων, εἰ μὴ τινὲς αὐτῶν προερήμονες γενόμενοι ἐγνωσαν ὧτι νεότατα τοὺς ἀφοῦ ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτε τὰ ἀντικείμενα καὶ τἱμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτὸν ἢθελον, τῶν ὀικείων τινὰς τῶν ἔκειν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεποίθηκαν αὐτῶν οἱ ὀικείοι, νῦν μεμνημέναι. 1 πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνυπηρετοὶ, οὗς ἐγὼ ὀρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων Εὐσκόπη, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβοῦλον τούδε πάτηρ, ἐπετα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφῆττιος, Αἰσχίνου τούδε πάτηρ, ἐτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισινεύς οὔτοσι, Ἕμμυγένους πατήρ· ἀλλοι τοῖς νυκτοὶ, δὲ αὐτοὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγονασίν, Ἀντιφών θέωτι, ἀδελφός θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὡστε ὄνικ ἄν ἐκείνος γε αὐτοῦ καταδεσθείη—, καὶ Πάραλος οὗτος ὁ Δημοδόκου, ὁ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός. ὡδὲ δὲ ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, ὁ ἀδελφός οὔτοσι Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὥδε ἀδελφός. καὶ ἀλλος πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἐκὼ ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τινα ἔχρημα μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἕαυτον λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ

1 After μεμνημέναι the best MSS. give καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι, “and punish.” Schanz follows Bekker and some MSS. in omitting these words.
have been commanded to do this by the God through oracles and dreams and in every way in which any man was ever commanded by divine power to do anything whatsoever. This, Athenians, is true and easily tested. For if I am corrupting some of the young men and have corrupted others, surely some of them who have grown older, if they recognise that I ever gave them any bad advice when they were young, ought now to have come forward to accuse me. Or if they did not wish to do it themselves, some of their relatives—fathers or brothers or other kinsfolk—ought now to tell the facts. And there are many of them present, whom I see; first Crito here, who is of my own age and my own deme and father of Critobulus, who is also present; then there is Lysanias the Sphettian, father of Aeschines, who is here; and also Antiphon of Cephisus, father of Epigenes. Then here are others whose brothers joined in my conversations, Nicostratus, son of Theozetides and brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus is dead, so he could not stop him by entreaties), and Paralus, son of Demodocus; Theages was his brother; and Adimantus, son of Aristo, whose brother is Plato here; and Aeantodorus, whose brother Apollodorus is present. And I can mention to you many others, some one of whom Meletus ought certainly to have produced as a witness in his speech; but if he forgot it then, let
δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-
χωρῶ, καὶ λεγέω, εἰ τι ἢξεῖ τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ
τούτου πάν τοῖναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὁ ἄνδρες, πάντας
ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακῶ
ἔργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασὶ Μέ-
λήτος καὶ Ἀνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρ-
μένοι τάχ' ἄν λόγου ἔχουν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ
ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἢδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων
προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγου βοηθοῦντες
ἐμοὶ ἅλλ' ἢ τὸν ὅρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὡς ἔνυσαςι
Μελήτῳ μὲν πευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀλήθευοντι;

23. Ἐξεν δὴ, ὁ ἄνδρες· ἥ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχωμ' ἄν
ἀπολογείσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα ἵσος
τοιαύτα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσεις

C ἀναμιμηθεῖς ἐαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τούτου
τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδείχθη τε καὶ
ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων,
παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενοι, ἵνα δ' τι μάλιστα
ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολ-
λούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἁρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα
κυνδυνεύων, ὡς ἄν δόξαμι, τὸν ἐσχατὸν κίνδυνον.
τάχ' οὖν τις ταύτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν
προς με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργίσθησις αὐτῶς τοῦτοις θεύτο
ἀν μετ' ὀργής τὴν ψήφου. εἰ δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως

D ἔχει,—οὔκ ἀξίω μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼσιε: εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικὴ
ἀν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι
ἐμοὶ, εἰ στε, εἰσὶν μὲν ποὺ τινὲς καὶ οἰκεῖοι:
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ
ὅρυς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων,
ὡστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσὶ καὶ νόεις, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
ναίοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία:
him do so now; I yield the floor to him, and let him say, if he has any such testimony. But you will find that the exact opposite is the case, gentlemen, and that they are all ready to aid me, the man who corrupts and injures their relatives, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those who are themselves corrupted might have some motive in aiding me; but what reason could their relatives have, who are not corrupted and are already older men, unless it be the right and true reason, that they know that Meletus is lying and I am speaking the truth?

Well, gentlemen, this, and perhaps more like this, is about all I have to say in my defence. Perhaps some one among you may be offended when he remembers his own conduct, if he, even in a case of less importance than this, begged and besought the judges with many tears, and brought forward his children to arouse compassion, and many other friends and relatives; whereas I will do none of these things, though I am, apparently, in the very greatest danger. Perhaps some one with these thoughts in mind may be harshly disposed toward me and may cast his vote in anger. Now if any one of you is so disposed—I do not believe there is such a person—but if there should be, I think I should be speaking fairly if I said to him, My friend, I too have relatives, for I am, as Homer has it, "not born of an oak or a rock," but of human parents, so that I have relatives and, men of Athens, I have three sons, one nearly grown up, and two still

1 Homer, *Odyssey*, xix, 163.


35 τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν των τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Β Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἄρετήν, οὐς αὐτὸν ἑαυτῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὕτως θυναίκων οὐδὲν διαφέρονσιν. ταῦτα γάρ, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, οὕτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὅπηθον τι εἶναι, οὕτε ἡμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδεικνυόμεθα, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφίσθη τὸ τὰ ἑλειναι ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντως καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἡ τοῦ ἰσχύοιν ἄγωνος.

24. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὁ ἀνδρεῖς, οὐδὲ δι- οι καί οἱ δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δείμενον ὕποφεύγειν, ὥλλα διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.
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children; but nevertheless I shall not bring any of them here and beg you to acquit me. And why shall I not do so? Not because I am stubborn, Athenians, or lack respect for you. Whether I fear death or not is another matter, but for the sake of my good name and yours and that of the whole state, I think it is not right for me to do any of these things in view of my age and my reputation, whether deserved or not; for at any rate the opinion prevails that Socrates is in some way superior to most men. If then those of you who are supposed to be superior either in wisdom or in courage or in any other virtue whatsoever are to behave in such a way, it would be disgraceful. Why, I have often seen men who have some reputation behaving in the strangest manner, when they were on trial, as if they thought they were going to suffer something terrible if they were put to death, just as if they would be immortal if you did not kill them. It seems to me that they are a disgrace to the state and that any stranger might say that those of the Athenians who excel in virtue, men whom they themselves honour with offices and other marks of esteem, are no better than women. Such acts, men of Athens, we who have any reputation at all ought not to commit, and if we commit them you ought not to allow it, but you should make it clear that you will be much more ready to condemn a man who puts before you such pitiable scenes and makes the city ridiculous than one who keeps quiet.

But apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, I think it is not right to implore the judge or to get acquitted by begging; we ought to inform
οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτο κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν τὰῦτα· καὶ ὁμόμοιον οὐ χαριεῖσθαι ous αὖν δοκή αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὕκουν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὕτῳ ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὔτετεροι γὰρ ἃν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῦσιν. μὴ όυν ἄξιοιν ὑμεῖς, διὸ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, τοιαύτα δεῖν πρὸς ύμᾶς πράττειν, ἢ μὴ ηγούμαι καλὰ εἰναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἀλλὰς τε μέντοι ὑή Δία καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτοῦ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πεῖδομι ύμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζόμενον ὁμομοίως, θεοῦς ἄν διδάσκωμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ύμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνώς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροῦν ἂν ἐμοῦ, ὡς θεοῦς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δεὶ οὕτως ἐχεῖν νομίζω τε γὰρ, διὸ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ὃς οὗτος τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορίων, καὶ ύμῶν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἀρίστα εἶναι καὶ ύμῖν.

Ε 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἰγανακτεῖν, διὸ ἄνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψυχήσασθε, ἀλλὰ τε μοι πολλὰ εξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρω τῶν ψῆφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμὸν. οὐ γὰρ φόμην ἐγώγει οὕτω παρ’ ὅλογον ἐσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺν νῦν δὲ, ὡς ἔσκειν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψῆφων, ἀποπεθεύγη ἂν. Μελήτου μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἔμοι δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέθεσαν, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέθεσαν, ἀλλὰ πάντες δηλοῦν τοῦτο γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη

1 Schanz brackets τὸ γεγονός.
and convince him. For the judge is not here to grant favours in matters of justice, but to give judgment; and his oath binds him not to do favours according to his pleasure, but to judge according to the laws; therefore, we ought not to get you into the habit of breaking your oaths, nor ought you to fall into that habit; for neither of us would be acting piously. Do not, therefore, men of Athens, demand of me that I act before you in a way which I consider neither honourable, nor right nor pious, especially when impiety is the very thing for which Meletus here has brought me to trial. For it is plain that if by persuasion and supplication I forced you to break your oaths I should teach you to disbelieve in the existence of the gods and in making my defence should accuse myself of not believing in them. But that is far from the truth; for I do believe in them, men of Athens, more than any of my accusers, and I entrust my case to you and to God to decide it as shall be best for me and for you.

I am not grieved, men of Athens, at this vote of condemnation you have cast against me, and that for many reasons, among them the fact that your decision was not a surprise to me. I am much more surprised by the number of votes for and against it; for I did not expect so small a majority, but a large one. Now, it seems, if only thirty votes had been cast the other way, I should have been acquitted. And so, I think, so far as Meletus is concerned, I have even now been acquitted, and not merely acquitted, but anyone can see that, if Anytus and Lycon had
Ἀνυτός καὶ Δύκων κατηγορίσοντες ἐμοὶ, καὶ

Β ὥφλε χιλιάς δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψῆφων.

26. Τιμᾶται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνήρ θανάτου. εἰεν’

ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῶν ἀντιμιῆσομαι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς
Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δὴ λοι ὅτι τῆς ἄξιας; τί οὖν; τί

ἀξίως εἰμὶ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ

βίῳ ὅτι ἑσυχίαν ἔγγος, ἀλλ’ ἀμελήσας ὄπτερ

οἱ πολλοὶ, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ

στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν

καὶ ξυνωμοσίων καὶ στάσεως τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει

γυμνομένων, ἕγχοσάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ οὕτω ἐπιει-

κέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὡστε εἰς ταῦτ’ ἑνταῦτα σφάζεσθαι,

ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν, οἴ ἐλθόν ὑμῆς μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὀφέλος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἱδία ἐκαστὸν ἱδών ἐνεργεῖτε ἡμῖν μεγίστην ἐνερ-

γεῖσιν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημί, ἐνταῦθα ἦν, ἐπιχειρῶν

ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν

ἐαυτοῦ μηδενός ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν εαυτοῦ ἐπιμε-

ληθείη, ὡς ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος

ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς

πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων ὑπὸ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν

τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμὶ ἄξιος παθεῖν

Δ τοιοῦτος ἂν; ἄγαθον τό, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι,

εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι,

καὶ ταῦτα γε ἄγαθον τοιοῦτον, ὥ τι ἄν πρέποι

ἐμοῖ. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι πένητι ἐνεργείη,

δεσμένῳ ἄγειν σχολήν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακε-

λεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὃ τι μᾶλλον, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι,

πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείᾳ

σιτείσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἐγίν τις ὑμῶν ὑπὸρ ἢ

1 Schanz brackets, ἱδόν.
not come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth part of the votes.

And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what shall I propose as an alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not? And what do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because in my life I did not keep quiet, but neglecting what most men care for—money-making and property, and military offices, and public speaking, and the various offices and plots and parties that come up in the state—and thinking that I was really too honourable to engage in those activities and live, refrained from those things by which I should have been of no use to you or to myself, and devoted myself to conferring upon each citizen individually what I regard as the greatest benefit? For I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own perfection in goodness and wisdom rather than for any of his belongings, and for the state itself rather than for its interests, and to follow the same method in his care for other things. What, then, does such a man as I deserve? Some good thing, men of Athens, if I must propose something truly in accordance with my deserts; and the good thing should be such as is fitting for me. Now what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? There is nothing, men of Athens, so fitting as that such a man be given his meals in the prytaneum. That is much more appropriate for me than for any of you who has won a race at the
PLATO

Ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει μενίκηκεν Ὄλυμπίασιν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὕμαις πολεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἡ ἡγὼ δὲ εἶναι.

Εικαὶ ὃ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἡγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι,

37 τοῦτον τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτίσεως.

27. "Ισως οὖν ὕμαι καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὃσπερ περὶ τοῦ οὐκτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆς, ἀπανθαδιξόμενος τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνυν μᾶλλον. πεπεισμέω ἡγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἡδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτό τοῦ πείθων ὅλων γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλους διειλέγεμεθα ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγνώμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὃσπερ καὶ ἀλλοις ἐν ἀνθρώπως, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπεισθηθεὶ ἀν· νῦν δ' οὖ 

ῥᾴδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὅλῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύσεθαι. πεπεισμένοις δὴ ἡγὼ μηδένα ἡδικεῖν τολμῶν δὲω ἐμαυτὸν γε ἡδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἑρείν αὐτὸς, ὡς ἄξιος εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσθαι τοιοῦτον τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὐ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὁ φημὶ οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτ' εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τοῦτο δὴ ἐλομαι ἃν εὖ ὅτι κακῶν οὔτων, τοῦ τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ;

C καὶ τί με δεῖ ζήν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι, ἐφ' ἂν ἐκτίσων; ἀλλὰ ταῦτο νοὶ ἔστιν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον οὐ γὰρ ἔστι. μοι χρήματα, ὅποθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἱσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τοῦτον τιμήσατε. πολλὴ μὲντ' ἄν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὔτως

1 Schanz brackets eivai, following Hermann.

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Olympic games with a pair of horses or a four-in-hand. For he makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you happy in reality; and he is not at all in need of sustenance, but I am needy. So if I must propose a penalty in accordance with my deserts, I propose maintenance in the prytaneum.

Perhaps some of you think that in saying this, as in what I said about lamenting and imploring, I am speaking in a spirit of bravado; but that is not the case. The truth is rather that I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one; but I cannot convince you of this, for we have conversed with each other only a little while. I believe if you had a law, as some other people have, that capital cases should not be decided in one day, but only after several days, you would be convinced; but now it is not easy to rid you of great prejudices in a short time. Since, then, I am convinced that I never wronged any one, I am certainly not going to wrong myself, and to say of myself that I deserve anything bad, and to propose any penalty of that sort for myself. Why should I? Through fear of the penalty that Meletus proposes, about which I say that I do not know whether it is a good thing or an evil? Shall I choose instead of that something which I know to be an evil? What penalty shall I propose? Imprisonment? And why should I live in prison a slave to those who may be in authority? Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid? But that is the same as what I said just now, for I have no money to pay with. Shall I then propose exile as my penalty? Perhaps you would accept that. I must indeed be
ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ύμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολίται μου οὐχ οἴοι τε
ds ἐγένεσθε ἑνεγκεῖν τάς ἔμας διατριβάς καὶ τοὺς
λόγους, ἀλλὰ ύμῶν βαρύτερα γεγόνασιν καὶ ἑπιφθονώτερα, ὡστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν υπὸ ἀπαλ-
λαγῆναι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἅρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσιν ῥᾴδιως;
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὡ 'Αθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν
μοι ὁ βίος εἰη ἑξελθόντι τηλικῷ ἄνθρώπῳ
ἀλλὰ εἰ ἀλλῆς πόλεως ἁμειβομένῳ καὶ ἑξελαυ-
νομένῳ ζήν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω,
λέγοντος ἐμοὶ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὀσπερ ἐνθάδε;
cἀν μὲν τοῦτοι ἀπελαύνω, οὕτω ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ
ἐξελώσι, πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· εάν δὲ
ESİ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι
d' αὐτοὺς τοῦτοι.

28. Ἰσος οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· συγών δὲ καὶ
ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἶος τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν
ἑξελθόντι ζῆν; τοῦτ' δὴ ἔστι πάντων χαλεπῶτατον
πείσαι τινας ὑμῶν. εάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὃτι τὸν
θεόν ἀπεθανεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἡ

38 εάν τ' αὖ λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον
ἀγαθὸν ὅν ἄνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ
ἀρέτης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἂλλων,
περὶ δὲ ύμῶν ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ
ἐμαυτόν καὶ ἂλλος ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος
βίος οὗ βιωτὸς ἄνθρώπῳ, ταύτα δ' ἐτι ἦττον
πείσεσθε μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως,
ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὁ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ράδιον.
καὶ ἐγὼ ἂμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἄξιον κακοῦ

B ἂν χρημάτων ὃσα ἐμελλὼν ἐκτίσεις· οὐδὲν γὰρ

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possessed by a great love of life if I am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens, could not endure my conversation and my words, but found them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are now seeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endure them. No, men of Athens, they certainly will not. A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes.

Perhaps someone might say, "Socrates, can you not go away from us and live quietly, without talking?" Now this is the hardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say that such conduct would be disobedience to the god and that therefore I cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting and will not believe me; and if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you will believe me still less. This is as I say, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. Besides, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve anything bad. If I had money, I would have proposed a fine, as large as I could pay; for that would have done me no harm.
29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ’ ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὁ άνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὅνυμα ἔχετε καὶ αὐτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν Βουλαρχόνων τὴν πόλιν λοιποῦς, ὡς Σωκράτη ὑπεκτόνατε, ἀνδρὰ σοφῶν φήσον λαρ ἐκ μὲ σοφῶν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἶμι, οἱ Βουλαρχοῦντες ὑμῶν οὐειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὁλίγου χρόνου, ἀρκετοῦ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἡ τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅτατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρῳ ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δε τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς

ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἀν ἐβλαβήν· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστων, εἰ μὴ ἀρα ὅσον ἂν ἕγω δυναίμην ἑκτίσαι, τοσούτου βού

λεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἵσως δὲ ἄν δυναίμην ἑκτίσαι ὑμῶν μὲν ἄργυρίου· τοσούτου οὐν τιμῶμαι.

Πλάτων δὲ οδε, ὁ άνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύσοι

μη τριάκοντα μὲν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγ-

νᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυταῖ δὲ

C ὑμῖν ἐσονται τοῦ ἄργυρίου οὕτοι ἀξίοχρεος.
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But as it is—I have no money, unless you are willing to impose a fine which I could pay. I might perhaps pay a mina of silver. So I propose that penalty; but Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus, and Aristobulus tell me to propose a fine of thirty minas, saying that they are sureties for it. So I propose a fine of that amount, and these men, who are amply sufficient, will be my sureties.

It is no long time, men of Athens, which you gain, and for that those who wish to cast a slur upon the state will give you the name and blame of having killed Socrates, a wise man; for, you know, those who wish to revile you will say I am wise, even though I am not. Now if you had waited a little while, what you desire would have come to you of its own accord; for you see how old I am, how far advanced in life and how near death. I say this not to all of you, but to those who voted for my death. And to them also I have something else to say. Perhaps you think, gentlemen, that I have been convicted through lack of such words as would have moved you to acquit me, if I had thought it right to do and say everything to gain an acquittal. Far from it. And yet it is through a lack that I have been convicted, not however a lack of words, but of impudence and shamelessness, and of willingness to say to you such things as you would have liked best to hear. You would have liked to hear me wailing and lamenting and doing and saying many things which are, as I maintain, unworthy of me—such things as you are accustomed to hear from others. But I did not think at the time
κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὅτε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ξῆν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκη οὐτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ'
39 ἐμὲ οὗτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅτι Ὀμοφείται τῶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται, ὅτι τὸ γε ἀργοθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγῃ καὶ ὡπλα ἄφεσι καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων καὶ ἀλλαὶ μηχανὰ πολλαί εἰς ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὡστε διαφέυγεις θάνατον, ἐὰν τις τολμᾶ πάν ποιεῖ καὶ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπόν, ὁ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπῶτερον πονηρίαν θάττων γὰρ θανάτου θεί.
B καὶ νῦν ἔγω μὲν ἂτε βραδὺς ἄν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐξιὼν, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἂτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὡξεῖς οὔτες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττωνος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἔγω μὲν ἄπειμυ ὑφ' ἕμων θανάτου δίκην ὀφλὼν, οὕτως δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλθείας ὥφληκτος μοχθρίαν καὶ ἠδίκιαν. καὶ ἐγώγε 
τῷ τιμήματε ἐμέμενο καὶ οὕτου, ταῦτα μὲν ποιοὶ οὕτως καὶ ἔδει σχείν, καὶ οἷοι αὐτά μετρίως ἔχειν.
C 30. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῶν χρησιμοδῆσαι, ὁ καταψηφισάμενοι μοι καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ ἦδη ἐνταῦθα, εἰ δ' μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησιμοδοῦσιν, οἷς μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. Ἦμι γὰρ, ὁ ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῶν ἢξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τοῦ ἐμῶν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπῶτέραν ὑπὴ Δία ἢ οἴαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε' νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῶν πολὺ ἐναντίον
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that I ought, on account of the danger I was in, to do anything unworthy of a free man, nor do I now repent of having made my defence as I did, but I much prefer to die after such a defence than to live after a defence of the other sort. For neither in the court nor in war ought I or any other man to plan to escape death by every possible means. In battles it is often plain that a man might avoid death by throwing down his arms and begging mercy of his pursuers; and there are many other means of escaping death if one is willing to do and say anything. But, gentlemen, it is not hard to escape death; it is much harder to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death. And now I, since I am slow and old, am caught by the slower runner, and my accusers, who are clever and quick, by the faster, wickedness. And now I shall go away convicted by you and sentenced to death, and they go convicted by truth of villainy and wrong. And I abide by my penalty, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to be so, and I think they are well.

And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. And I say to you, ye men who have slain me, that punishment will come upon you straightway after my death, far more grievous in sooth than the punishment of death which you have meted out to me. For now you have done this to me because you hoped that you would be relieved from rendering an account of your lives, but I say that you will find
Αποβηστεῖαι, ὡς ἐγὼ φημ. πλείους ἔσονται ύμᾶς
οἱ ἑλέγχοντες, οὐδὲν ἐγὼ κατείχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ
οὐκ ἠθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσο
νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε.
εἰ γὰρ οἴσθησε ἀποκτείνοντες ἄνθρωπους ἐπισχήσειν
τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἦτε, οὐκ
ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὐτὴ ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ
οὔτε πάνω δυνατή οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ
καλλίστη καὶ βάστη, μή τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν,
ἀλλ' ἐκανον ταρακεύσειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς
βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν ὅτι οὐ καταψηφι-
σμένοις μαντευσάμενοι ἀπαλλάττομαι.
31. Τοὺς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένος ἢδέως ἀν διάλε-
χετείν ὑπὸ τοῦ γεγονότος τούτου πράγματος,
ἐν δὲ οἱ ἁρχοντες ἁσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὕτω
ἐρχομαι οἱ ἑθόντα με δεί τεθνάω. ἀλλαὶ μοι,
ὡς ἄνδρες, παραμεῖνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνου ὅπου
γὰρ κολυεί διαμυθολογήσαι πρὸς ἄλληλους,
ἐὼς ἔξεστιν. ὑμῖν γὰρ ὅσ πόλεως ὑπάρχειν ἐντείνει
ἐθελῶ τὸ νυνὶ μοι ἡμβεβηκός τι ποτὲ νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ
γὰρ, οἱ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς
καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἀν καλοί—θαυμᾶσιν τι γέγονεν.
ἡ γὰρ εἰσθεία μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν
μην τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνω πυκνῇ ἀεὶ
ἡν καὶ πάνω ἐπὶ σιγκροῖς ἐναντιομένη, εἰ τι
μέλλοιμι μη ὀρθῶς πραξεῖν νυνὶ δὲ ἡμβεβηκέ
μοι, ἀπερ ὅρατε καὶ αὐτοί, ταῦτα ἀ γε δῆ οἰηθεῖ
ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ
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B οὔτε ἐξεύθεν ἐωθεν ὁικοθεν ἡμαντιώθη τοῦ τοῦ
θεοῦ σημείον, οὔτε ἡμικα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοὶ

1 Schanz follows Schleiermacher in bracketing ἡ τοῦ δαι-

μονίου.
THE APOLOGY

the result far different. Those who will force you to give an account will be more numerous than heretofore; men whom I restrained, though you knew it not; and they will be harsher, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more annoyed. For if you think that by putting men to death you will prevent anyone from reproaching you because you do not act as you should, you are mistaken. That mode of escape is neither possible at all nor honourable, but the easiest and most honourable escape is not by suppressing others, but by making yourselves as good as possible. So with this prophecy to you who condemned me I take my leave.

But with those who voted for my acquittal I should like to converse about this which has happened, while the authorities are busy and before I go to the place where I must die. Wait with me so long, my friends; for nothing prevents our chatting with each other while there is time. I feel that you are my friends, and I wish to show you the meaning of this which has now happened to me. For, judges—and in calling you judges I give you your right name—a wonderful thing has happened to me. For hitherto the customary prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was going to do anything I should not; but now this thing which might be thought, and is generally considered, the greatest of evils has come upon me; but the divine sign did not oppose me either when I left my home in the morning, or when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech,
ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὐτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἑρείν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχεξε λέγοντα μεταξὺ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξειν οὔτε ἐν ἔργῳ οὔδενι οὔτε ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταὶ μοι. τὰ οὖν αἰτίων εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ οὖν ἔρω· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ἕμμβεβηκός τοῦτο ἁγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν, διόσκο οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμηρίων τούτον γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὖν ἡ ἀνατιμῶθη ἂν σὺ μοι τὸ εἰσόθος σημείον, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμελλὼν ἔγω ἁγαθὸν πρᾶξειν.

32. Ἐνοψίσομεν δὲ καὶ τὴν, ὡς πολλῇ ἐλπίς ἐστὶν ἁγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι· δυνών γὰρ θάτερον ἐστὶν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἰσθησίν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῖτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει ὕστα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ἰσχύ ὑπὸ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἑυθένθε εἰς ἀλλὰ τόπου. καὶ εἰτε μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὑπνος, ἐπειδὰν τὶς καθεύδουν μηδ' ὅποι μηδὲν ὅρα, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἰς ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄν οἴμαι, εἰ τινα ἐκκελεύμων δέου ταύτην τὴν νῦκτα, ἐν ἢ οὖτω καταδαρθείν, ὡστε μηδὲ ὅποι ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νῦκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δεοί σκεψάμενον εἰπέων, πόσας ἀμείωνον καὶ ἰδίου ἡμέρας καὶ νῦκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἴμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιότητι τινά, ἀλλὰ τῶν μέγαν

[Excerpt from a Greek text, discussing the nature of justice and its consequences, with a transition to the topic of sleep and its implications.]
THE APOLOGY

when I was going to say anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the reason? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us who think death is an evil must be mistaken. A convincing proof of this has been given me; for the accustomed sign would surely have opposed me if I had not been going to meet with something good.

Let us consider in another way also how good reason there is to hope that it is a good thing. For the state of death is one of two things: either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place. And if it is unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think if any one were to pick out that night in which he slept a dreamless sleep and, comparing with it the other nights and days of his life, were to say, after due consideration, how many days and nights in his life had passed more pleasantly than that night,—I believe that not only any private person, but even the great King of Persia himself would find that they were few in comparison with the other days and nights. So if such is the nature of death, I
τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατος ἐστὶν, κέρδος ἔγονε ἠλέγω·
καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πάς χρόνος φαίνεται
οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἡ μᾶς νῦς. εἰ δ’ αὖ οἶνον ἀποδη-
μῆσαι ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος εὐθέως εἰς ἄλλου τόπουν,
καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἀρὰ ἔκει εἰσὶν
ἀπαντεῖς οἱ τεθνεότες, τί μεῖζον ἄγαθὸν τούτον
ἐν ᾧ ἀν, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ; εἰ γὰρ τις ἄφικόμενος
ἐν ᾧ ’Αδον, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτον τῶν φασκόντων
δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς,
οὗτοι καὶ λέγονται ἕκει δικαζεῖν, Μίνως τε καὶ
Ῥαδάμανθις καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ
ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δικαίοι ἐγένοντο εἰς τὸ
ἔαυτόν βίω, ἢ ἄρα φαύλῃ ἂν εἰη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ ἄμ
Ὄρφει ἄνθενεσθαι καὶ Μουσαίω καὶ Ἱσιόδορο
καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ’ ἂν ύμῶν;
ἔγω μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις θέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ’
ἐστιν ἀληθῆ: ἐπεὶ ἔμουγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστῇ ἂν
Β εἰν ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχομι Παλα-
μῆδει καὶ Αἰαντι τῷ Τελαμώνιος καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος
τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικου τέθυκεν, ἀντι-
παραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτὸν πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἑκείνων,
ὡς ἔγω οἷμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἄρτι ἔγορ. καὶ δὴ τὸ
μέγιστον, τοὺς ἕκει ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνώντα
ἀσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειε, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός
ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἴγεται μὲν, ἐστιν δ’ οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ
δ’ ἂν τις, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δεξαίτο ἐξετάζαι
τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα. τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν
Ο ἡ ’Οδυσσέα ἡ Σίλβουν, ἡ ἄλλους μυρίοις ἂν τις
ἐπίτε καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἶς ἕκει διαλέ-
γεσθαι καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἄμηχανον ἂν
ἐν ἑαυτῷ τούτῳ γε
ἐνεκα οἳ ἕκει ἀποκτείνουσιν τὰ τε γὰρ ἄλλα
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count it a gain; for in that case, all time seems to
be no longer than one night. But on the other
hand, if death is, as it were, a change of habitation
from here to some other place, and if what we are
told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater
blessing could there be, judges? For if a man
when he reaches the other world, after leaving
behind these who claim to be judges, shall find
those who are really judges who are said to sit in
judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and
Acacus and all the other demigods who were just
men in their lives, would the change of habitation
be undesirable? Or again, what would any of you
give to meet with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod
and Homer? I am willing to die many times over,
if these things are true; for I personally should find
the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes
or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of
old who lost their lives through an unjust judg-
ment, and compared my experience with theirs. I
think that would not be unpleasant. And the
greatest pleasure would be to pass my time in
examining and investigating the people there, as I
do those here, to find out who among them is wise
and who thinks he is when he is not. What price
would any of you pay, judges, to examine him who
led the great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or
Sisyphus, or countless others, both men and women,
whom I might mention? To converse and associate
with them and examine them would be immeasurable
happiness. At any rate, the folk there do not kill
people for it; since, if what we are told is true,
εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἳ ἔκει τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἢδη τῶν λοιπῶν χρόνων ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ ἦστιν.

33. Ἄλλα καὶ ὡμᾶς χρή, ὥ τοι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐὰν τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνδρι ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ἦστι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεοῦ τὰ τούτων πράγματα. οὐδὲ τὰ ἔμα νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἢδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἠπηλ- λάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιων ἢ μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἐγὼ γε τοῖς καταψυχησαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπάτων. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψυχήσετο μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἷον,

Ε μενοὶ βλάπτειν τοῦτο αὐτῶν ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι τοὺς υἱές μου, ἐπειδὰν ἤβησθοι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὥ τοις, ταῦτα ταύτα θυσίαν, ἀπερ ἐγὼ ώμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ πρῶτου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μὴ δὲν οὕτως, ὑπειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ὁσπέρ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται δὲν δεῖ, καὶ οἶονται τι εἶναι οὕτως οὕτες ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταύτα ποιήτε, δίκαια

42 πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι υἱ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶς τε καὶ οἱ υἱές. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἢδη ὡρα ἅπιεναι, ἔμοι μὲν ἀπο- θανομένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἐχρονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.
they are immortal for all future time, besides being happier in other respects than men are here.

But you also, judges, must regard death hope-fully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him. So, too, this which has come to me has not come by chance, but I see plainly that it was better for me to die now and be freed from troubles. That is the reason why the sign never interfered with me, and I am not at all angry with those who condemned me or with my accusers. And yet it was not with that in view that they condemned and accused me, but because they thought to injure me. They deserve blame for that. However, I make this request of them: when my sons grow up, gentlemen, punish them by troubling them as I have troubled you; if they seem to you to care for money or anything else more than for virtue, and if they think they amount to something when they do not, rebuke them as I have rebuked you because they do not care for what they ought, and think they amount to something when they are worth nothing. If you do this, both I and my sons shall have received just treatment from you.

But now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God.
CRITO
INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO

This dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and his lifelong friend Crito, which takes place in the prison where Socrates is confined after his trial to await the day of his execution. Crito was a man of wealth and position, devotedly attached to Socrates, and greatly interested in philosophical speculation. Diogenes Laertius (II. 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues on philosophical subjects attributed to him, but Plato represents him throughout as a man of kindly disposition and practical common sense, quite lacking in originality and with no gift for philosophical investigation.

There can be little doubt that Crito tried more than once to induce Socrates to escape from prison, but this dialogue can hardly be considered a mere report of a conversation which actually took place; it is planned and carried out with the exquisite skill peculiar to Plato, and must be recognised as his work. It is difficult, often impossible, to distinguish between the doctrines and beliefs of the real Socrates and those which are put into his mouth by Plato; but in view of the fact that Socrates did not escape from prison, his conduct must have been determined by some consideration of right. We may therefore believe that the doctrine that injustice is always
INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO

wrong and that we must not requite injustice with injustice is really Socratic, and that the exalted patriotism and sublime serenity of mind portrayed by Plato in this dialogue were really exhibited in the last days, as in the previous life, of the master whom he delighted to honour.

For editions of the Crito, see the Introduction to the Apology.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ
Η ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΑΚΤΕΩΤ, ΗΘΙΚΟΣ
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

Α 1. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι τηνικάδε ἀφήξαι, ὁ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρὸ ἐτί ἐστίν;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ὄρθρος βαθὺς.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θαυμάξω, ὡσπο ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακοῦσαι.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἐυνήθης ἦδη μοί ἐστιν, ὁ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεύρο φοιτάν, καὶ τι καὶ ἑνεργεῖ
tηται ὑπ' ἐμοῦ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρτὶ δὲ ἦκες ἢ πάλαι;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειρας με, ἀλλὰ συγῆ παρακάθησαι;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδ’ ἀν αὐτὸς ἠθέλοι ἐν τοσαύτη τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἰναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάξω αἰσθανό-
μενος, ὡς ἠδεός καθεύδες· καὶ ἐπίτηδες σε οὐκ ἤγειρόν, ἴνα ὡς ἦδοστα διώγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν
dὴ σε καὶ πρῶτον ἐν πάντι τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα 150
CRITO
[or ON DUTY; ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS
Socrates, Crito

Socrates. Why have you come at this time, Crito?
Or isn’t it still early?
Crito. Yes, very early.
Socrates. About what time?
Crito. Just before dawn.
Socrates. I am surprised that the watchman of
the prison was willing to let you in.
Crito. He is used to me by this time, Socrates,
because I come here so often, and besides I have
done something for him.
Socrates. Have you just come, or some time
ago?
Crito. Some little time ago.
Socrates. Then why did you not wake me at
once, instead of sitting by me in silence?
Crito. No, no, by Zeus, Socrates, I only wish I
myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful. But I
have been wondering at you for some time, seeing
how sweetly you sleep; and I purposely refrained
from waking you, that you might pass the time as
pleasantly as possible. I have often thought through-
τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ παρεστῶσθαι ξυμφορᾷ, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶς φέρεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Κρῖτων, πλημμελεῖς C εἰ ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτον ὅντα, εἰ δεῖ ἥδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἄλλ᾿ οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἡ ἠλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τόχῳ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστι ταύτα. ἄλλα τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸ ἀφίξαι;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀγγελίαιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπὴν, οὐ σοι, ὡς ἔμοι φαίνεται, ἄλλ᾿ ἔμοι καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιπεδοῦσι πᾶσι καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρείαν, ἤ ἐγὼ, ὡς ἔμοι δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατοι ἂν ἐνέγκαμι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται D ἐκ Δῆλου, οὐ δεὶ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὕτω δὴ ἀφίκται, ἄλλα δοκεῖ μέν μοι ἥξειν τῆμερον ἐξ ὧν ἄπαγγέλλουσιν ἡκοντές τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλυπότες ἐκεῖ αὐτῷ. Δῆλου οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγέλων ὅτι ἥξει τῆμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὲ εἰς αὐτῶν ἐσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

2. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ἈΛΛʼ, ὦ Κρῖτων, τόχῃ ἁγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλου, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι 44 σίμαι ἥξειν αὐτὸ τῆμερον.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πόθεν τούτῳ τεκμαίρεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔρω. τῇ γὰρ ποι ὑπετεραίς δεὶ με ἀποδυνάσκειν ἡ ἢ ἂν ἐλθῇ τὸ πλοῖον.

1 Schanz brackets ἀγγέλων.
CRITO

out your life hitherto that you were of a happy disposition, and I think so more than ever in this present misfortune, since you bear it so easily and calmly.

socrates. Well, Crito, it would be absurd if at my age I were disturbed because I must die now.

crito. Other men as old, Socrates, become involved in similar misfortunes, but their age does not in the least prevent them from being disturbed by their fate.

socrates. That is true. But why have you come so early?

crito. To bring news, Socrates, sad news, though apparently not sad to you, but sad and grievous to me and all your friends, and to few of them, I think, so grievous as to me.

socrates. What is this news? Has the ship come from Delos, at the arrival of which I am to die?

crito. It has not exactly come, but I think it will come to-day from the reports of some men who have come from Sunium and left it there. Now it is clear from what they say that it will come to-day, and so to-morrow, Socrates, your life must end.

socrates. Well, Crito, good luck be with us! If this is the will of the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will come to-day.

crito. What is your reason for not thinking so?

socrates. I will tell you. I must die on the day after the ship comes in, must I not?
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Φασί γέ τοι δή οι τούτων κύριοι.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Όυ τούνων τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτῷ ἦξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἐνυπνίου, ὥσπερα δὴ λέγων πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινὶ οὐκ ἐγεῖραι με.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τι τὸ ἐνύπνιον;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλῇ καὶ εὐευδής, λευκὰ ἵματια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι Β με καὶ εἶπειν· ὁ Σώκρατες,
ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ θύμῳ ἐρῆβωλων ἱκοιο. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὁ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐναργῆς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

3. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Διὰν γε, ὡς ἐ ὕκειν. ἀλλ', ὁ δαυ-
μόνε Σώκρατες, ἐτί καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ 1 καὶ
σώθητι· ὡς ἐμοὶ, εάν συ ἀποθάνῃς, ὅπι μία ἔμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἑστερησθαί
tοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον ἑγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτὲ
eυρήσω, ἐτί δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξῳ, οὗ ἔμε καὶ σὲ
μὴ σαφῶς ἵσασιν, ὡς οἶδος τ' ὅν σε σφόξειν, εἰ
ἡθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καίτοι
τίς ἂν αἰσχίνου εἴῃ ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα
περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; συ ὅπ̄ πεῖ-
σονται οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡθέλησας
ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμομένων.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τι ἢμῖν, ὁ μακάριε Κρίτων,
οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; σύ ὁπ̄ ἐπι-
κέστατοι, ὅν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται
αυτὰ οὕτω πεπράξαθαί, ὡσπερ ἀν πραξθῇ.

D ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀλλ' ὅρας δή, ὦτι ἄνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες,

1 πιθοῦ Schanz, following Burges, πέλον BUDE.
CRITÓ

crito. So those say who have charge of these matters.

sócrates. Well, I think it will not come in to-day, but to-morrow. And my reason for this is a dream which I had a little while ago in the course of this night. And perhaps you let me sleep just at the right time.

crito. What was the dream?

sócrates. I dreamed that a beautiful, fair woman, clothed in white raiment, came to me and called me and said, "Socrates, on the third day thou wouldst come to fertile Phthia." ¹

crito. A strange dream, Socrates.

sócrates. No, a clear one, at any rate, I think, Crito.

crito. Too clear, apparently. But, my dear Socrates, even now listen to me and save yourself. Since, if you die, it will be no mere single misfortune to me, but I shall lose a friend such as I can never find again, and besides, many persons who do not know you and me well will think I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend money, but that I would not take the trouble. And yet what reputation could be more disgraceful than that of considering one's money of more importance than one's friends? For most people will not believe that we were eager to help you to go away from here, but you refused.

sócrates. But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what most people think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more worth considering, will think that things were done as they really will be done.

crito. But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to

¹ Homer, Iliad ix, 363
καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὕτα δὲ δήλα τὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἷοι τ᾽ εἰσίν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σωματοτατα τῶν κακῶν ἑξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εὰν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ἐστιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ γὰρ ὀφελοῦν, ὁ Κρίτων, οἷοι τ᾽ εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἑργάζεσθαι, ἢν οἷοι τ᾽ ἦσαν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἴσθαν, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἴχεν νῦν δὲ οὐδὲτερα οἷοι τε οὕτε γὰρ φρόνιμων οὕτε ἀφρόνα δυνατὸν ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὃ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.

Ε. 6. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἑξέτω· τάδε δέ, οἱ Σωκράτες, εἰπέ μοι. ἂρα γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μὴ, εὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἑξέλθης, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῖν πρώγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἤναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρῆματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τοῦτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γὰρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔσον ἀυτὸ χαίρειν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ ποιν ἰδιαίτερα ἐσμεν σώσαντες σε κωνούσειν τοῦτον τὸν κώνυνον καὶ, εὰν δὲν ἔτι τούτον μεῖξο. ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, οἱ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Μήτε τοινυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τάργυρίων ἐστίν, ὁ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαι καὶ εἰζαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπεντα οὕτως τούτοις τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐπήλεις, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι εἴπτ αὐτοῖς πολλοῦ ἄργυριου; σοὶ δὲ υπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ἴκναν ἔπειτα καὶ εἰ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἶει.
CRITO

care for the opinion of the public, for this very trouble we are in now shows that the public is able to accomplish not by any means the least, but almost the greatest of evils, if one has a bad reputation with it.

Socrates. I only wish, Crito, the people could accomplish the greatest evils, that they might be able to accomplish also the greatest good things. Then all would be well. But now they can do neither of the two; for they are not able to make a man wise or foolish, but they do whatever occurs to them.

Crito. That may well be. But, Socrates, tell me this: you are not considering me and your other friends, are you, fearing that, if you escape, the informers will make trouble for us by saying that we stole you away, and we shall be forced to lose either all our property or a good deal of money, or be punished in some other way besides? For if you are afraid of anything of that kind, let it go; since it is right for us to run this risk, and even greater risk than this, if necessary, provided we save you. Now please do as I ask.

Socrates. I am considering this, Crito, and many other things.

Crito. Well, do not fear this! for it is not even a large sum of money which we should pay to some men who are willing to save you and get you away from here. Besides, don't you see how cheap these informers are, and that not much money would be needed to silence them? And you have my money at your command, which is enough, I fancy; and moreover, if because you care for me you think you
δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τάμα, ξένοι ἐνθάδε ἔτοιμοι ἀναλί-
σκεῖν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκομικεν ἐπ′ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἄρ-
γύριον ἰκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ
Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάντες. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω,
μήτε ταύτα φοβοῦμενοι ἀποκάμης σαντὸν σῶσαι,
μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι
γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχουσα ἐξελθὼν ὦ τι χρῆσο
σαντῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν
C ἀφίσῃ ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἔως δὲ Βούλη εἰς Θε-
ταλίαν ἴναι, εἰσὶν ἔμοι ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ
πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀςφάλειων σοι παρέξονται,
ὡστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

5. Ἕπι δὲ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐδὲ δικαίων μοι δοκεῖς
ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαντὸν προδονύαι, ἐξὸν σω-
θήματι καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαντὸν γενέ-
σθαι, ἀπερ ἂν καὶ οἳ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιεν τε καὶ
ἐπενευσάν σε διαφθείραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις καὶ τοὺς νῦις τοὺς σαντὸν ἐμοίνη δοκεῖς
D προδιδόναι, οὔς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαι-
δεύσαι οἰχήσει καταλιπτών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὦ τι
ἀν τύχωσι, τούτο πράξουσιν τεύχονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ
eἰκός, τοιοῦτων οὐάπερ εἰσθαν ἡγησθαί ἐν ταῖς
ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανοὺς. ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ
pοιεῖσθαι παύδας ἡ ξυνδιατάλαπωρεῖν καὶ τρέ-
φοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σοὶ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ
ῥαβυμοτα αἴρεϊσθαι· χρὴ δὲ, ἀπερ ἂν ἂν ἄνηρ
ἀγάθος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἔλοιπο, ταύτα αἴρεϊσθαι,
φᾶσκοντα γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγονε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ
E ήμῶν τῶν σὸν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δοξὴ
ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὶ τῇ

1 After ξένοι the MSS. read οὕτω, which Schanz brackets.

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ought not to spend my money, there are foreigners here willing to spend theirs; and one of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought for this especial purpose sufficient funds; and Cebea also and very many others are ready. So, as I say, do not give up saving yourself through fear of this. And do not be troubled by what you said in the court, that if you went away you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many other places, wherever you go, they will welcome you; and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and will protect you, so that no one in Thessaly shall annoy you.

And besides, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are undertaking to do is not even right—betraying yourself when you might save yourself. And you are eager to bring upon yourself just what your enemies would wish and just what these were eager for who wished to destroy you. And moreover, I think you are abandoning your children, too, for when you might bring them up and educate them, you are going to desert them and go away, and, so far as you are concerned, their fortunes in life will be whatever they happen to meet with, and they will probably meet with such treatment as generally comes to orphans in their destitution. No. Either one ought not to beget children, or one ought to stay by them and bring them up and educate them. But you seem to me to be choosing the laziest way; and you ought to choose as a good and brave man would choose, you who have been saying all your life that you cared for virtue. So I am ashamed both for you and for us, your friends, and I am afraid people will think that this whole affair of yours has
Ημετέρα πεπράξθαι, καὶ ή εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ
δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ
αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγων τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ
tελευταίον δὴ τοῦτό, ὡσπερ κατάγελως τῆς
πράξεως, κακίας τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ
46 διαπεφευγόμενη ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οὕτως σε οὐχὶ ἐσώ-
ςαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἴνον τε ὃν καὶ δυνατόν, εἰ
τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὅφελος ἦν. ταῦτα ὅνυ, ὃ
Σῶκρατες, ὁρᾶ μὴ ἀμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἦςοι
τε καὶ ἡμῶν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ
βουλεύσθαι ἐτε ὧρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύσθαι. μία
δὲ βουλή τῆς γὰρ ἐπιουσίας ὕπκτος πάντα ταῦτα
dει πεπράξθαι. εὶ δὲ τι περιμένομεν, ἄδυνατον
καὶ οὐκέτι οἴνον τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὃ
Σῶ-
kraτες, πεθὼν μοι καὶ μηδαμός ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

Β 6. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡς φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία
σου πολλοῦ ἄξια, εἰ μετά τινος ὀρθότητος εὖν: εἰ
δὲ μὴ, ὃσφι μεῖξιν, τοσοῦτοψ χαλεπωτέρα. σκο-
πεῖςθαι οὐν χρή ἡμᾶς, εἰτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἰτε
μὴ: ὃς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἄλλα καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος,
oiς τῶν ἐμῶν μηδειν ἄλλω πείθεσθαι ἡ τῷ λόγῳ,
ὅσ ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται. τοῦς
dὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύ-
nαμαι νῦν ἑκβαλεὶν, ἑπειδῆ μοι ἦδε τῇ τύχῃ
γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι οἷοι φαίνονται μοι,
καὶ τοὺς αὐτούς προσβεβοῦ καὶ τιμῶ οὕσπερ καὶ
πρότερον: ὃν ἐὰν μὴ βελτίων ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ
παρόντι, εὐ ἵσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ἐνυγχαρήσω, οὐδὲ
ἀν πλεῖω τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν
dύναμις οὕσπερ παιδας ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται,
δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιτέμπους καὶ χρημάτων
ἀϕιερέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποιμεθα
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been conducted with a sort of cowardice on our part—both the fact that the case came before the court, when it might have been avoided, and the way in which the trial itself was carried on, and finally they will think, as the crowning absurdity of the whole affair, that this opportunity has escaped us through some base cowardice on our part, since we did not save you, and you did not save yourself, though it was quite possible if we had been of any use whatever. Take care, Socrates, that these things be not disgraceful, as well as evil, both to you and to us. Just consider, or rather it is time not to consider any longer, but to have finished considering. And there is just one possible plan; for all this must be done in the coming night. And if we delay it can no longer be done. But I beg you, Socrates, do as I say and don't refuse.

Socrates. My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth a great deal, if it should prove to be rightly directed; but otherwise, the greater it is, the more hard to bear. So we must examine the question whether we ought to do this or not; for I am not only now but always a man who follows nothing but the reasoning which on consideration seems to me best. And I cannot, now that this has happened to us, discard the arguments I used to advance, but they seem to me much the same as ever, and I revere and honour the same ones as before. And unless we can bring forward better ones in our present situation, be assured that I shall not give way to you, not even if the power of the multitude frighten us with even more terrors than at present, as children are fright- ened with goblins, threatening us with imprison- ments and deaths and confiscations of property. Now
αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλαβομεν, διὸν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἔλεγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὔ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὔ; ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποθνῄσκειν καλῶς ἔλεγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἀλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἔλεγετο, ἢν δὲ παιδία καὶ φλαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς;
εἰπιθυμῶ δὲ ἔγον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὁ Κρίτων, κοινῆ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ φθέῃ ἐχω, ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ εἴσομεν χαίρειν ἢ πειθοῦν μέθα αὐτῷ. ἔλεγετο δὲ πῶς, ὅσ εὐγεμένει, ἐκάστοτε φθεὶ υπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ἦστερ πῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ἢς οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἔνδαξοσυν, δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μὴ, τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὁ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γάρ, ὡσα γε ταὐτρόπεια,
47 ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν αὐρομι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφόρα. σκόπει δὴ ὁμοχρι ἰκαιδος δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρή τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δὲ οὔ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δὲ οὔ; τὰ φόρης; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;
κριτῶν. Καλῶς.
ἐπικραθεῖς. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς μὴ;
κριτῶν. Ναί.
ἐπικραθεῖς. Χρησταῖ δὲ οὐχ οἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ οἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;
κριτῶν. Πῶς δὲ οὔ; 7. ἐπικραθεῖς. Φέρε δή, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα
Β ἔλεγετο; γυμναζόμενός ἄνηρ καὶ τούτῳ πράπτων
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CRITO

how could we examine the matter most reasonably? By taking up first what you say about opinions and asking whether we were right when we always used to say that we ought to pay attention to some opinions and not to others? Or were we right before I was condemned to death, whereas it has now been made clear that we were talking merely for the sake of argument and it was really mere play and nonsense? And I wish to investigate, Crito, in common with you, and see whether our former argument seems different to me under our present conditions, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or be guided by it. But it used to be said, I think, by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, just as I was saying now, that of the opinions held by men some ought to be highly esteemed and others not. In God's name, Crito, do you not think this is correct? For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying to-morrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray. Now say, do you not think we were correct in saying that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but some and not others, and not those of all men, but only of some? What do you think? Is not this true?

CRITO. It is.

SOCRATES. Then we ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the good ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish?

CRITO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Come then, what used we to say about this? If a man is an athlete and makes that his
πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνοι καὶ ψόγοι καὶ δόξη τῶν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὅσ ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἵατρος ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὁι;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΣ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεἰσθαί χρή τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπίζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δήλα δή.

ΣΩΚΡΑΣ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ὡ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστατῇ καὶ ἐπαίνῃ, μᾶλλον ἢ ἣν ἐξυμπασὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἡςτι ταύτα.

C ΣΩΚΡΑΣ. Εἰεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμᾶσας αὐτὸν τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους,1 τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίνοντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν πακὸν πείσεται;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ σὺ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΣ. Τί δὲ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σώμα· τοῦτο γὰρ διολλείτω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΣ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα, ὡς Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεθα, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ αἰδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ δὲν νῦν ἢ βουλή ἠμῶν ἔστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ

D δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαί καὶ φοβεῖσθαί αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἰ τίς ἔστιν ἐπαίνοι, ὅν δὲ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαί μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους; ὥστε μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκείνο καὶ

1 Schanz, following Burges, brackets καὶ τῶν ἐπαίνους.
CRITO

business, does he pay attention to every man's praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer?

CRITO. To those of one man only.

Socrates. Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude.

CRITO. Obviously.

Socrates. And he must act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think.

CRITO. That is true.

Socrates. Well then; if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards the words of the many who have no special knowledge, will he not come to harm?

CRITO. Of course he will.

Socrates. And what is this harm? In what direction and upon what part of the one who disobeys does it act?

CRITO. Evidently upon his body; for that is what it ruins.

Socrates. Right. Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others? And if we do not follow him, we shall injure and cripple that which we used to say is benefited by
Λωβησόμεθα, ὅ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἄδικῷ ὑπόάλλυτο. ἡ οὐδέν ἐστὶ τούτῳ;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οἴμαι ἔγωγε, ὁ Σώκρατες.

8. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ψέρε δὴ, εὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ χινεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὕπο τοῦ νοσόδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν
Ε ἐπαινοῦτων δόξῃ, ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῶν ἐστίν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; ἔστι δὲ ποι τούτῳ σῶμα; ἡ οὐχὶ;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ’ οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῶν ἐστίν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μετ’ ἐκείνου ἄρ’ ἡμῶν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ὃ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὄνωσιν; ἡ φαυλότερον ἤγομεθα εἰναι τοῦ σώματος ἑκείνο, ὃ τὶ ποτ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων,

περὶ ὁ ἡ τε ἁδικία καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶν;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τιμιώτερον;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πολὺ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὁ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῶν οὐτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ’ ὃ τι ὧ ἐπαινῶν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἁδίκων, ὃ εἰς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. ὁστε πρῶτον μὲν ταῦτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγοῦμεν τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων.

Β ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ’ ἂν τις, οἷοι τε εἰς ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινώναι.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Σώκρατες.

1 φαίη γὰρ ἂν bracketed by Schanz.
CRITO

the right and is ruined by the wrong. Or is there nothing in this?

CRITO. I think it is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well then, if through yielding to the opinion of the ignorant we ruin that which is benefited by health and injured by disease, is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then is life worth living when the body is worthless and ruined?

CRITO. Certainly not.

SOCRATES. But is it worth living when that is ruined which is injured by the wrong and improved by the right? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong, is less important than the body?

CRITO. By no means.

SOCRATES. But more important?

CRITO. Much more.

SOCRATES. Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. And so you introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of the multitude about the right and the noble and the good and their opposites. But it might, of course, be said that the multitude can put us to death.

CRITO. That is clear, too. It would be said, Socrates.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἂλλ', ὁ θαυμάστε, οὕτως τε ὁ λόγος ὑπνο διελπήθαιμεν, ἐμοιγη δοκεῖ ἐτί ὁμοίως εἶναι καὶ πρῶτερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπει, εἰ ἐτί μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὃτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Μένει.

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τούτων σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε οὐ πειρᾶσθαι ἐξέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον καὶ εὰν μὲν φαίνηται δίκαιον, πειρόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξεῖμεν. ὡς δὲ σὺ λέγεις ταῖς σκέψεισι περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παιδών τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, δὲ Κρίτων, σκέψεως τοῦ ῥαδίως ἀποκτεινόντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂν, εἰ οἷοι τ' ἦσαν, οὔδεν ἔξων νῦν, τοῦτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἴρεῖ, μὴ οὔδεν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἢ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξεων καὶ χρημάτων τελεύτης τούτων τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας, καὶ ἄυτοι ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἄδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιήσωμεν· κἂν φαινόμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δὲν ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὖτ' εἰ ἀποθυμήσκειν δεῖ παραμένων καὶ ἰσυχίαν ἁγιοσας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁπίοιν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἄδικεῖν.

1 Schanz gives ἀληθῆ λέγεις to Crito.
2 The usual reading, ἐμοιγη δοκεῖ ὁμοίως εἶναι τῷ καὶ πρῶτερον was corrected by Schanz, who follows a quotation of the passage by Priscian.
CRITO

Socrates. That is true. But, my friend, the argument we have just finished seems to me still much the same as before; and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important.

Crito. We do hold to it.

Socrates. And that living well and living rightly are the same thing, do we hold to that, or not?

Crito. We do.

Socrates. Then we agree that the question is whether it is right for me to try to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or not right. And if it appears to be right, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up. But the considerations you suggest, about spending money, and reputation, and bringing up my children, these are really, Crito, the reflections of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again, if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude. But we, since our argument so constrains us, must consider only the question we just broached, whether we shall be doing right in giving money and thanks to these men who will help me to escape, and in escaping or aiding the escape ourselves, or shall in truth be doing wrong, if we do all these things. And if it appears that it is wrong for us to do them, it may be that we ought not to consider either whether we must die if we stay here and keep quiet or whether we must endure anything else whatsoever, but only the question of doing wrong.
Κριτών. Καλέως μέν μοι δοκεῖσ λέγειν, ὁ Σώκρατες. Όρα δὲ, τί δρῶμεν.

Σωκράτης. Σκοπῶμεν, ὁ ἀγαθέ, κοινῆ, καὶ εἴ τι έχεις ἄντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἄντιλεγε, καὶ Ε σοι πείσομαι: εἴ δὲ μὴ, παῦσαι ἢδή, ὁ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, ὡς χρῆ ἐνθέντε ἀκούτων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπίναι: ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούτων. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τὴς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν, εάν σοι ἰκανὸς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ ἀποκρί-49 νεσθαί τὸ ἑρωτώμενον, ἥ ἀν μάλιστα οὖν.

Κριτών. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

10. Σωκράτης. Οὐδεὶς τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἄδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τις μὲν ἄδικητέον τρόπῳ, τιμὴ δὲ οὐ; ὡς οὐδαμῶς τὸ γε ἄδικεῖν οὐτε ἄγαθον οὔτε καλὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὁμολογήθη; ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρὸσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖσδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰςίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὁ Κρίτων, άρα Β τηλικοίδε 2 ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδὴ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν παίδων οὐδέν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς περὶ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἰτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰτε μή, καὶ εἰτε ἡμᾶς ἐτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἰτε καὶ πραότερα, ὡμος τὸ γε ἄδικείν τῷ ἄδι-κούντι καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν τυχάνει οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν ἡ οὖ;  

Κριτών. Φαμέν.

Σωκράτης. Οὐδαμῶς ἀρά δεῖ ἄδικεῖν.

1 The words ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, "as has just been said, too," follow in the MSS. but are omitted by Schanz and others.

2 τηλικοίδε γέροντες MSS.
CRITO

CRITO. I think what you say is right, Socrates; but think what we should do.

SOCRATES. Let us, my good friend, investigate in common, and if you can contradict anything I say, do so, and I will yield to your arguments; but if you cannot, my dear friend, stop at once saying the same thing to me over and over, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians; for I am anxious to act in this matter with your approval, and not contrary to your wishes. Now see if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply to my questions to the best of your belief.

CARRO. I will try.

SOCRATES. Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honourable to do wrong? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men, seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children? Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer? Do we believe this or not?

CRITO. We do.

SOCRATES. Then we ought not to do wrong at all.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ δῆτα.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔδὲ ἁδικούμενον ἀρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ σοίνται, ἐπειδὴ γε ὁ ὁδικός δεῖ ἁδικεῖν.

C ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὃ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ δεὶ δή ποι, ὃ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ γάρ ποιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἁδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἀν ὀτιοῦν πάσχῃ
D ἕπ αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὃ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὡς μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογῆσαι οἴδα γάρ, ὅτι ὁ λόγοις τοὺς ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἳ ὁι ὁι οὗτο δέδοκται καὶ οἱ μῆς, τούτους οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνώγηκε τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖς, ὅρωντας τὰ ἄλληλων βουλεὐμάτα. σκότει δὴ οὐκ καὶ σὺ εὖ μᾶλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ εὐνοοικὲς σοι, καὶ ἀρχόμεθα ἐνέτειθεν βουλεύομαι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὅρθως ἤχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἁδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἁνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἁμένεσθαι ἀντιδρόντα κακῶς. ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ
Ε ΚΟΙΝΩΝΕῖς τῆς ἀρχής; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοὶ δὲ εἰ τῇ ἀλλῇ δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδαςκε. εἰ δὲ ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσοθε, τὸ μετὰ τούτο ἀκοῦε.
CRITO

CRITO. Why, no.
Socrates. And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.
CRITO. Apparently not.
Socrates. Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?
CRITO. Certainly not, Socrates.
Socrates. Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?
CRITO. Not right, certainly.
Socrates. For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.
CRITO. That is true.
Socrates. Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us. And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend ourselves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point.
κριτών. Ἀλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι ἀλλά λέγε.

σακρατής. Δέγω δὴ αὐτό τοῖς μᾶλλον ὧ ἔρωτῶ. πότερον ἢ ἂν τις ὑμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ ὅντα ποιητέου ἢ ἐξαπατητέου;

κριτών. Ποιητέου.

11. σακρατής. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπίστων 50 ἐνθὲν ἦμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τίνας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐχ ἦκίστα δει, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὑμολογήσαμεν δικαίους οὔσιν ἢ οὐ;

κριτών. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὑποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ὧ ἔρωτας· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

σακρατής. Ἀλλ' ὥδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθὲν εἰτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἰθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὑμοῖοι ποιήσατε, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔρωτο· εἰτέ μοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἡ τούτω τῷ ἔργῳ, ὡς ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τοὺς Β τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ὑπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷον τε ἐτὶ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἢ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαιαι μὴ ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἱδιωτῶν ἀκυροὶ τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὁ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ῥήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτον τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, δὲ τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάτευε κυρίας εἶναι. ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, Ο ὅτι ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινεν; ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν;

κριτών. Ταῦτα νὴ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες.

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crito. I do hold to it and I agree with you; so go on.

socrates. Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this: "ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements?"

crito. He ought to do it.

socrates. Then consider whether, if we go away from here without the consent of the state, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not.

crito. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

socrates. Consider it in this way. If, as I was on the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, "Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us, the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private persons?" What shall we say, Crito, in reply to this question and others of the same kind? For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator, about the destruction of that law which provides that the decisions reached by the courts shall be valid. Or shall we say to them, "The state wronged me and did not judge the case rightly"? Shall we say that, or what?

crito. That is what we shall say, by Zeus, Socrates.
12. ἘΘΕΡ. ἔσαι, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὁ Σωκράτης, ἢ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοὶ, ἢ ἐμένειν ταῖς δίκαιαι αἱ ἂν ἢ πόλεις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόντων, ἵσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ θαυμάζῃ τὰ λεγόμενα, ἄλλα ἀποκρίνον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰώθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε 

D γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτους ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις· τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι, ὡς οὖ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίνων ἂν. ἄλλα τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν, ἐν ἣ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύσῃς; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέτατο τὴν ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτους τε 

ταχμένου νόμοι,2 παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρί τῷ σῷ σὲ ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; 

Ε καλῶς, φαίνην ἂν. εἰςε. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχους ἂν εἰπείν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἐγγυνος καὶ δούλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ 

εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχεις, ἀρ' εἴξ ἵσου οὐεί εἶναι σοι 

τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἀττ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σὲ 

ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶει δίκαιον εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα 

οὐκ εἴξ ἵσου ἢν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, 

εἰ σοὶ ὅν ἐτύγχανεν, ὦστε, ἀρχεῖ πάσχοις, ταῦτα 

καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὗτε κακῶς ἀκούουτα ἀντιλέγειν 

51 οὗτε τυπτόμενου ἀντιτύπτειν οὗτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα 

πολλά: πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα ἁρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους 

1 Schanz omits τοῖς νόμοις.  2 Schanz omits νόμοι.
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Socrates. What then if the laws should say, "Socrates, is this the agreement you made with us, or did you agree to abide by the verdicts pronounced by the state?" Now if I were surprised by what they said, perhaps they would continue, "Don't be surprised at what we say, Socrates, but answer, since you are in the habit of employing the method of question and answer. Come, what fault do you find with us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? In the first place, did we not bring you forth? Is it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Now tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us who are the laws of marriage?"

"I find no fault," I should say. "Or with those that have to do with the nurture of the child after he is born and with his education which you, like others, received? Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastics?" "You did," I should say. "Well then, when you were born and nurtured and educated, could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring and our slave, you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think right as between you and us rests on a basis of equality, so that whatever we undertake to do to you it is right for you to retaliate? There was no such equality of right between you and your father or your master, if you had one, so that whatever treatment you received you might return it, answering them if you were reviled, or striking back if you were struck, and the like; and do you think that it will be proper for

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ἐσται ὅστε, εάν σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, καθ’ ὅσον δύνασαι, ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος; ἢ οὖτος εἰ σοφὸς, ὅστε λέληθεν σε, ὅτι μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἅπαντων τιμώτερον ἔστιν ἡ πατρίς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ ἀγιότερον καὶ ἐν μείζων μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπων τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἡ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ ἀν κελευθήναι καὶ πᾶσχειν, εάν τι προστάτην παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἀγοῦτα, εάν τε τύπτεσθαι εάν τε δείσθαι, εάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγη τροθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέου ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικέτεον οὕδε ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἄλλα καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέου ἢ ἀν κελευθή νὴ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτήν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέρυκε, βιάζεσθαι δὲ σύν ὁσίων οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἢ τι ἦττον τὴν πατρίδα; τὶ φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Κρίτων; ἀληθῆ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ;

κρίτων. Ἔμουγε δοκεῖ.

13. ἙΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκόπει τοῖνυν, ὁ Ὁκρατες, φαίνει ἂν ἦσος οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς, ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἢ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρεψάντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἅπαντων ἢν

1 So Schanz, έσται BCE.
you to act so toward your country and the laws, so that if we undertake to destroy you, thinking it is right, you will undertake in return to destroy us laws and your country, so far as you are able, and will say that in doing this you are doing right, you who really care for virtue? Or is your wisdom such that you do not see that your country is more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem among the gods and among men of understanding than your mother and your father and all your ancestors, and that you ought to show to her more reverence and obedience and humility when she is angry than to your father, and ought either to convince her by persuasion or to do whatever she commands, and to suffer, if she commands you to suffer, in silence, and if she orders you to be scourged or imprisoned or if she leads you to war to be wounded or slain, her will is to be done, and this is right, and you must not give way or draw back or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere, you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious to use violence against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against your country?" What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?

Crito. I think they do.

Socrates. "Observe then, Socrates," perhaps the laws would say, "that if what we say is true, what you are now undertaking to do to us is not right. For we brought you into the world, nurtured you, and gave a share of all the good things we could to
D οἶοι τ' ἦμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν πολίταις, ὁμοὶς προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἐδή τά ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἦμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, φι λὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἢμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπείναι ὅποι ἄν βούληται. καὶ οὐδὲς ἦμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδοῦν ἐστιν οὐδ᾽ ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τε τίς βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποκλίαι ἵναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἢμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι ἐξὸς, ἵναι ἐκεῖσε ὅποι ἄν βούληται, ἐχοντα τὰ αὐτοῦ.

Ε θ' ἄν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὄρων ὁν τρόπον ἡμεῖς τὰς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τάλλα τὴν πόλιν διωκόμεν, ἦδη φαμεν τούτου ἀμολογηκέναι ἔργον ἡμῖν ἄν ἡμεῖς κελέωμεν ποιήσεων ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τρίχῃ φαμεν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτε τε γεννηταίς οὕς ἡμᾶς οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι προφευσαν, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῶν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ

52 μὴ καλῶς τε ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων ποιεῖν ἄν κελέωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφίεντον δυσὶν θάτερα, ἡ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

14. Ταύτας δὴ φαμεν καὶ σὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αὐτίας ἐνέξεσθαι, εὕπορ ποιήσεις ἡ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἤκιστα Ἀθηναίων σὲ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγώ εὑπομι: διὰ τὴ δὴ; ἵπ πον ἄν μον δικαίως καθάπποιντο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγώ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογήκὼς τυγχάνω ταῦτα τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίεν γὰρ ἂν

Β ὅτι ὁ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἢμῶν τούτων τεκμήρια

1 Schanz omits ὁ and brackets Σώκρατες.
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you and all the citizens. Yet we proclaim, by having offered the opportunity to any of the Athenians who wishes to avail himself of it, that anyone who is not pleased with us when he has become a man and has seen the administration of the city and us, the laws, may take his goods and go away wherever he likes. And none of us stands in the way or forbids any of you to take his goods and go away wherever he pleases, if we and the state do not please him, whether it be to an Athenian colony or to a foreign country where he will live as an alien. But we say that whoever of you stays here, seeing how we administer justice and how we govern the state in other respects, has thereby entered into an agreement with us to do what we command; and we say that he who does not obey does threefold wrong, because he disobeys us who are his parents, because he disobeys us who nurtured him, and because after agreeing to obey us he neither obeys us nor convinces us that we are wrong, though we give him the opportunity and do not roughly order him to do what we command, but when we allow him a choice of two things, either to convince us of error or to do our bidding, he does neither of these things."

"We say that you, Socrates, will be exposed to these reproaches, if you do what you have in mind, and you not least of the Athenians but more than most others." If then I should say, "How so?" perhaps they might retort with justice that I had made this agreement with them more emphatically than most other Athenians. For they would say, "Socrates, we have strong evidence that we and the city pleased you; for you would never have stayed in
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έστιν, ὃτι σοι καὶ ἥμεῖς ἥρεσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις·
οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων
διαφέροντος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδοῆμεις, εἰ μή σοι δια-
φέροντος ἥρεσκεν, καὶ οὔτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ'
ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες 1 οὔτε ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ
μή ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν
ἐποίησω πώποτε, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωποί,
οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδέ ἄλλων
νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἥμεῖς σοι ἴκανοι
ἡμεῖς καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὔτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς
翕ροῦ, καὶ ὡμολόγεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι,
tὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησω, ὡς
ἀρεσκοῦσις σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ
τῇ δίκῃ ἔξην σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλου,
καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἰκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς,
tότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλω-
πίζοι ως οὐκ ὑγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε,
ἄλλα ἴροι, ως ἐφησθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον
νῦν δὲ οὔτ' ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε
ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείραι,

D prátteis te απερ αν δούλος φανλότατος πράξειεν,
ἀποδιδάσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας τε
καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ως ἡμῶν ἐπικείθος πολι-
τεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὕν ἡμῶν τούτ' αὐτὸ
ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε
ἀμολογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμῶς ἔργον,
ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ. τί φῶμεν πρὸς
ταύτα, ὥς Κρίτων; ἄλλο τι ἡ ὁμολογώμεν;
κρίτων. Ἄναγκη, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

1 The words ὃτι μὴ ἐταξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν, "except once to the
Isthmus," after ἐξῆλθες are omitted by Schanz and others as
an early interpolation.
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it more than all other Athenians if you had not been better pleased with it than they; you never went out from the city to a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made any other journey, as other people do, and you had no wish to know any other city or other laws, but you were contented with us and our city. So strongly did you prefer us and agree to live in accordance with us; and besides, you begat children in the city, showing that it pleased you. And moreover even at your trial you might have offered exile as your penalty, if you wished, and might have done with the state's consent what you are now undertaking to do without it. But you then put on airs and said you were not disturbed if you must die, and you preferred, as you said, death to exile. And now you are not ashamed to think of those words and you do not respect us, the laws, since you are trying to bring us to naught; and you are doing what the meanest slave would do, since you are trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements you made with us that you would live in accordance with us. First then, answer this question, whether we speak the truth or not when we say that you agreed, not in word, but by your acts, to live in accordance with us." What shall we say to this, Crito? Must we not agree that it is true?

CRITO. We must, Socrates.
akesthai. "Alla ti oin, an faiein, h eunothkeas
E tas prois hemas autous kai omoiogias paraebainveis,
ouc ou to anagkheis omoiogias oude upatetheis
oude en oligno chrwmoi anagkasfeis bouleusassthai,
alla en etesin ebdominkonta, en ois ezhun sou
apienai, ei mh hereskomenei hemis mhedi dikaiai
efainontoi sou i ai omoiogiai einai: sou d' ou te
Lakedaimonai proproi ou te Krithia, as d' ekasta-
stote phis euomoieisai, ou te allh oudeimai ton

53 'Ellhnikov polleov oude ton barbarkov, alla
elattw eis autheis apedhenisa he oichwlo te kai
tufilo kai ois alloi anapetrou outw sou diafere-
rontos ton allon 'Athnaiow herseken he polis te
kai hemis ois vumoi dhalon ou to tin gar an polis
arasekoi anev vumow; 1 wv de d' ouk emeneis tois
omoiogeminoi; ean hemi ge peithi, o Sokrates
kal ou kataxelastos ge esei ek this polleis
exelthov.

15. Skopei gar d'ha, tausta paraebas kal examar-
tanov ti tou ton ti agathon eragasei santov h
B tou esapistheious touz santou. oti men gar
kindunousou g' he sou oi esapistheioi kai autol
феуγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι τὴς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τὸ δῆλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον
men ean elis ton eghytaata tina poleion elthis,
H Θήβας ἢ Μέγαρα—eunomoynai gar amfo-
terai—polemos hxeis, o Sokrates, tin tou ton
politeia, kai osoiper kidoynai ton auton poleon,
uypobleftontai se diaphorotetp hgnymenoi ton vumow,
kal bebawoseis tois dikaastai thn doxai, oiste

1 Schanz omits dhalon sv . . . vumow, "evidently; for who
would be pleased with a city apart from its laws?"

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SOCRATES. "Are you then," they would say, "not breaking your compacts and agreements with us, though you were not led into them by compulsion or fraud, and were not forced to make up your mind in a short time, but had seventy years, in which you could have gone away, if we did not please you and if you thought the agreements were unfair? But you preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor any other of the Greek states, or of the foreign ones, but you went away from this city less than the lame and the blind and the other cripples. So much more than the other Athenians were you satisfied with the city and evidently therefore with us, its laws; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws? And now will you not abide by your agreement? You will if you take our advice, Socrates; and you will not make yourself ridiculous by going away from the city.

"For consider. By transgressing in this way and committing these errors, what good will you do to yourself or any of your friends? For it is pretty clear that your friends also will be exposed to the risk of banishment and the loss of their homes in the city or of their property. And you yourself, if you go to Thebes or Megara—for both are well governed—will go as an enemy, Socrates, to their government, and all who care for their own cities will look askance at you, and will consider you a destroyer of the laws, and you will confirm the

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dοκεῖν ὁρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὡστὶς γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεῖς ἔστιν, σφόδρα ποὺ δόξειν ἀν νέων γε καὶ ἀναστήσων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεῖς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς τε εὐνομομένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιοτάτους; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται; ἡ πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλέγομενος—τίνας λόγους, ὡς Σώκρατες; ᾗ οὖσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστον ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἴει ἄσχημον ἂν φανεῖσθαι τὸ D τοῦ Σώκρατος πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαι γε χρῆ. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἤξεσας δὲ εἰς Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὡς πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολογία, καὶ ἴσως ἢν ἥδεως σοι ἀκούοιειν, ὡς γελοίως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκευὴν τῇ τινα περιθέμενος, ἢ διῖθέραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἰα ὡς εἰ ἐιώθαις ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων ἄνηρ σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὠντος, ὡς E τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζήν, νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάσας, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐρεῖ; ἵππος, ἢν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὡς Σώκρατες, πολλά καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτόν. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύον· τὸ ποιῶν ἡ εὐχούμενος ἐν Θετταλία,2 ὡσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνων ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι δὲ ἐκείνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τέ καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἄρετῆς ποὺ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παιδῶν

1 Schanz omits δουλεύον, "being a slave."
2 Schanz omits ἐν Θετταλίᾳ.
CRITO

judges in their opinion, so that they will think their verdict was just. For he who is destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men. Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilised men? And if you do this will your life be worth living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on—what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the laws are the most precious things to men? And do you not think that the conduct of Socrates would seem most disgraceful? You cannot help thinking so. Or you will keep away from these places and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly; for there great disorder and lawlessness prevail, and perhaps they would be amused to hear of the ludicrous way in which you ran away from prison by putting on a disguise, a peasant's leathern cloak or some of the other things in which runaways dress themselves up, and chang- ing your appearance. But will no one say that you, an old man, who had probably but a short time yet to live, clung to life with such shameless greed that you transgressed the highest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not offend anyone; but if you do, Socrates, you will have to listen to many things that would be a disgrace to you. So you will live as an inferior and a slave to everyone. And what will you do except feast in Thessaly, as if you had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet? What will become of our conversations about justice and virtue? But
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ἐνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δὲ; εἰς Θεττάλιαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τούτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἤ τούτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοὺς δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ξώντος βέλτιον θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύσονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται ἕαν αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θεττάλιαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσονται, ἢ εἰ δὲ εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εὖπερ γέ τι ἄφελος αὐτῶν ἐστιν τῷ σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδεῖον εἶναι, οἰεσθαί γε χρή.

16. Ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῶν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεύσῃ μήτε παιδαὶ περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἀλλὰ μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ἔλθων ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαίότερον οὐδὲ ὀσιῶτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν σῶν οὐδεὶς, οὔτε ἐκεῖς ἐφικομένοι ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικημένοις ἄπει, εὖν ἀπίθης, οὐχ ζ δι' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἄλλα ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· εὰν δὲ ἐξήλθης οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβᾶς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὐς ἠκιστα ἔδει, σαυτὸν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τε σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἄδελφοι οἱ ἐν Ἄιδου νόμοι οὐκ εὑμενόδις σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι

1 Schanz omits ἐπιμελήσονται here and also the punctuation after αὐτῶν, making one long interrogative sentence.

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perhaps you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them? How so? Will you take them to Thessaly to be brought up and educated, making exiles of them, that you may give them that blessing also? Or perhaps you will not do that, but if they are brought up here while you are living, will they be better brought up if you are not with them than if you were dead? Oh yes! your friends will care for them. Will they care for them if you go away to Thessaly and not if you go away to the dwellings of the dead? If those who say they are your friends are of any use, we must believe they will care for them in both cases alike.

"Ah, Socrates, be guided by us who tended your infancy. Care neither for your children nor for life nor for anything else more than for the right, that when you come to the home of the dead, you may have all these things to say in your own defence. For clearly if you do this thing it will not be better for you here, or more just or holier, no, nor for any of your friends, and neither will it be better when you reach that other abode. Now, however, you will go away wronged, if you do go away, not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you escape after so disgracefully requiting wrong with wrong and evil with evil, breaking your compacts and agreements with us, and injuring those whom you least ought to injure—yourself, your friends, your country and us—we shall be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades' realm, will not receive you graciously; for they will know that you tried, so far as in you lay,
PLATO

tò σὸν μέρος. ἄλλα μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν
D ἄν λέγει μᾶλλον ἡ ἡμεῖς.

17. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε Κρίτων,1 εὖ ἦσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὅσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἄλλα ἦσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγης παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἔρεις· ὅμως μὲντοι εἴ τι οὐεὶ πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγε.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Ἑ ἈΘΕΤΑΣΗ. Ἰδα τοῖς, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πρᾶττομεν ταῦτη, ἐπειδὴ ταῦτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

1 Schanz follows Cobet and Naber in omitting Κρίτων.
CRITO

to destroy us. Do not let Crito persuade you to do what he says, but take our advice."

Be well assured, my dear friend, Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, as the frenzied dervishes of Cybele seem to hear the flutes, and this sound of these words re-echoes within me and prevents my hearing any other words. And be assured that, so far as I now believe, if you argue against these words you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

Crito. No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

Socrates. Then, Crito, let it be, and let us act in this way, since it is in this way that God leads us.
PHAEDO
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

The Phaedo, like the Crito, has for its scene the prison of Socrates, though the dialogue is here supposed to be reported by one who was present, not actually carried on in the presence of the reader. The immediate purpose of the dialogue seems to be to show that the philosopher will be glad to die; and this purpose is never lost sight of, for it appears toward the end, as at the beginning. In order, however, to prove that willingness to die is rational, it is necessary to prove that the soul will continue to exist after the death of the body, and thus the original statement that the philosopher will be glad to die leads to the proof of a far more important truth. The commonly accepted statement that the real subject of the Phaedo is the immortality of the soul has certainly some justification. In order, however, to prove that the soul is immortal the theory is advanced that generation proceeds from opposite to opposite by alternation, that life proceeds from death as death from life, and that therefore the soul must exist after death as before birth. Again, all sensible objects are referable to certain types, of which they are likenesses. These types must be known to us before we can refer objects to them, and we have not seen or learned the types in this life; we must therefore have seen them before this life began; our knowledge is thus seen to be reminiscence of knowledge.
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

gained before our birth. All this proves, however, only that the soul existed for a probably very long time before our birth and continues to exist for a probably very long time after our death, but not that it is immortal and indestructible. This objection leads to the discussion of causation and to the conclusion that "the ideas are the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge." The idea inherent in soul is life, and since ideas are so connected with particulars that no particular can admit an idea directly contrary to its own inherent idea, the soul cannot admit death. The proof of the immortality of the soul has been reached by proving the everlasting truth of the ideas. This last is the most important part of the Phaedo, so far as the development of Plato's system of philosophy is concerned, though it is introduced as a means for proving the immortality of the soul, just as the immortality of the soul is proved in order to show that the true philosopher will not fear, but welcome, death.¹

This dialogue, then, establishes the doctrine of the real existence of ideas as the sole objects of knowledge and also shows how that doctrine is necessary to human happiness, because it serves to prove that the soul is immortal. The ordinary human being is little interested in metaphysical speculation, but greatly interested in his own future; he will therefore pay attention to metaphysical theory if it is so presented as to seem to affect his happiness. The Phaedo, by applying the doctrine of ideas to prove

¹ This brief discussion of the contents and purpose of the Phaedo is for the most part derived from the introduction to R. D. Archer-Hind's excellent edition, to which the reader is referred for a more complete exposition.

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the immortality of the soul, tends to popularise the doctrine of ideas, and this may have been the ultimate purpose of Plato in writing the dialogue; but that he was also fully in earnest in his belief in the immortality of the soul, and that the proof of immortality was an important part of his purpose in writing the dialogue, cannot be doubted.

In composition the Phaedo is elaborate without being complicated. The dramatic setting serves here, as in the Crilo, as an appropriate introduction to a discourse on immortality and offers an opportunity to portray the gentle, genial nature, the kindly humour, and the calm, untroubled courage of Socrates; it also marks the divisions between the various parts of the discussion, and offers relief to the mind of the reader who is wearied by close application to serious argument. Those who take part in the conversation are admirably characterised; this is especially true of the two Thebans, Simmias and Cebes, who play the most important parts after Socrates himself. Both are eager searchers after truth, and both are evidently highly regarded by Socrates—were, in other words, at least respected by Plato; but Simmias appears as a man of somewhat vague notions, inclined to mysticism, and somewhat lacking in keenness, while Cebes is clear-sighted, sharp, and keen, tenacious of his opinion, but quick to see when an opinion is no longer tenable. These distinguishing traits are drawn with few lines, but the few are masterly. The beautiful imaginative description of the life of souls in the other world is not merely a picturesque addition to the variety of the composition; it teaches us how Plato believed that right and wrong actions were rewarded or
punished. Quite different imagery is employed for the same end in the Phaedrus, but in both dialogues the justice of the treatment accorded the souls is made clear, and in both the importance of conduct in this life is emphasised, though this emphasis is stronger in the Phaedo, as is natural in view of the dramatic setting.

The number of persons mentioned in the Phaedo is considerable.

Echecrates of Phlius was one of the last of the Pythagoreans; we know of no particular reason why he is introduced into this dialogue, unless it be that, as a Pythagorean, he might naturally be in sympathy with the doctrine of ideas. Of his personal relations to Socrates nothing is known. Phaedo, of Elis, was taken prisoner in 401 B.C. and brought to Athens, where he was, according to Aulus Gellius (ii., 18), ransomed by Cebes. After the death of Socrates he returned to Elis and founded the Elean school of philosophy, which was afterwards moved to Eretria by Menedemus and known as the Eretrian school. Phaedo wrote several dialogues, but virtually nothing is known of his doctrines. He seems to have been highly esteemed by Socrates and his followers. Apollodorus of Phalerum is of no philosophical importance. He is mentioned several times by Plato and Xenophon as an ardent admirer and constant companion of Socrates, and a man of impulsive, unrestrained disposition. Simmias and Cebes were both Thebans, warm personal friends, and equally devoted to Socrates; both offered money to secure the release of Socrates from prison (Crito, 45 b). The composition preserved under the name of Pinax or Tablet of Cebes is certainly spurious. Crito appears
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here, as in the dialogue that bears his name, as the old and tried friend of Socrates. The others who are mentioned as companions of Socrates in his last hours are Critobulus, the son of Crito; Hermogenes, probably the son of Hipponicus and then identical with a speaker in the Cratylus; Epigenes, son of Antiphon; Aeschines, a well-known follower of Socrates, author of several dialogues; Antisthenes, founder of the Cynic school; Ctesippus, a youth mentioned also in the Euthydemus and the Lysis; Menexenus, son of Demophon and an admirer of Ctesippus; his name is given to one of Plato's dialogues; Phaedonides, a Theban; Euclides of Megara, founder of the Megarian school; and Terpsion, also a Megarian. Evenus, mentioned in 60 d, was a Parian sophist and poet.

The most important separate editions of the Phaedo are those of Geddes, W. Wagner, Wohlrab, Schanz, Hirschig, Burnet, and Archer-Hind. The introduction and commentary in the last-named edition are of special importance.
Α 1. EXEKRAPHEΣ. Αὐτός, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγένουν Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἵ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἵ ἄλλον του ἰχουσας; ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτός, ὁ 'Εχέκρατες.

EXEKRAPHEΣ. Τι οὖν δὴ ἔστιν ἄττα εἴπεν ὁ ἄνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἣδεως γὰρ ἀν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαιμι. καὶ γὰρ οὐτε τῶν πολιτῶν Φλασίων οὐδεὶς πάνω τι ἐπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήνας, οὕτω τις ξένοις ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνοῦ

Β ἐκείθεν, ὡστε ἂν ἡμῖν σαφές τι ἄγγειλαι οἶος τῷ περὶ τοῦτον, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πῶς ἀποθάνου; τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἴχεν φράξειν.

58 ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἀρα ἐπύθεσθε ὅν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

EXEKRAPHEΣ. Ναι, ταύτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἦγγειλέ τις, καὶ θαναμάξομεν γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ υπερούν φαίνεται ἀποθανόν, τί οὖν ἢ τοῦτο, ὁ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὁ 'Εχέκρατες, συνέβη. ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης ἢ πρύμνα
PHAEDO

[or ON THE SOUL; ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS

ECHOCRATES, PHAEDO, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEDES,
SIMMIAS, CRITO, the Servant of the Eleven.

ECHOCRATES. Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?

PHAEDO. I was there myself, Echecrates.

ECHOCRATES. Then what did he say before his death? and how did he die? I should like to hear, for nowadays none of the Phliasians go to Athens at all, and no stranger has come from there for a long time, who could tell us anything definite about this matter, except that he drank poison and died, so we could learn no further details.

PHAEDO. Did you not even hear about the trial and how it was conducted?

ECHOCRATES. Yes, some one told us about that, and we wondered that although it took place a long time ago, he was put to death much later. Now why was that, Phaedo?

PHAEDO. It was a matter of chance, Echecrates. It happened that the stern of the ship which the
ἐστεμένη τοῦ πλοίου, ὁ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναίοι πέμπτοισιν.

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτο δὲ δὴ τί ἔστωι;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ πλοῖον, ὡς φασίν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν δὲ Θησεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δὲς ἐπτὰ ἐκεῖνος ὄχθετο ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἑσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὐξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθείειν, ἐκάστου ἐτοὺς θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἂν δὴ αἰεὶ καὶ νῦν ἔτι εἰς ἑκεῖνον κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπτοισιν. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτινώναι, πρὶν ἀν εἰς Δῆλον τε ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύροι τοῦτο δὲ ἐνιοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπολαβόντες αὐτοὺς. ἀρχὴ δ’ ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἤρευς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψῃ τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δ’ ἐτυχεῖ, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης γεγονός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξύ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ θανάτου.

2. ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τῇ δὲ δὴ τα περὶ αὐτῶν τὸν θάνατον, ὁ Φαίδων; τῇ δὲ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτη- δείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἡ οὖκ εἶναι οἱ ἄρχοντες παρείναι, ἀλλ’ ἐρήμος ἐτελεύτα φίλων;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ὁδόμος, ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τίνες καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήσθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἡμῖν ἀπαγγεῖλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι.
PHAEDO

Athenians send to Delos was crowned on the day before the trial.

ECHECRATES. What ship is this?

PHAEDO. This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present day they send it annually in honour of the god. Now it is their law that after the mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and sometimes, when contrary winds detain it, this takes a long time. The beginning of the mission is when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship; and this took place, as I say, on the day before the trial. For that reason Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death.

ECHECRATES. What took place at his death, Phaedo? What was said and done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present, so that he died without his friends?

PHAEDO. Not at all. Some were there, in fact, a good many.

ECHECRATES. Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy.

PHAEDO. I am not busy and I will try to tell
ψιν διηγήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σω-
κράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα· καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα
ἐμοῦ γε ἀπὸ πάντων ήδιστον.

ἐξεκραθής. Ἀλλὰ μή, ὁ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς
ἀκουσμένους γε τοιούτους ἔτερους ἔχεις· ἄλλα
πειρῶ ὡς ἄν δύνη ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.

Φαίδων. Καὶ μὴν ἔγνω ταυταῖς ἑπάθουν
παραγενόμενοι. οὔτε γὰρ ὅσ τανάτῳ παρόντα με
ἀνδρὸς ἑπιτηδείου ἔλεος εἰσῆλθε· εὐδαιμονικὸν γὰρ
μοι ἄνὴρ ἑφαίνετο, δ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ
τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδεῖος καὶ γευσιαῖος ἐπελεύθη, ὡστε
μοι ἑκεῖνον παρίστασθαι μηδὲ εἰς Ἀδηνὸν ἴστα
ἀνευ θείας μοῦρας ἴσαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἑκεῖθε ἀφικό-
μενον εἴ τράξειν, εἰτερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος.

διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνω μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἰςῆλθε,
ὡς εἰκὸς ἀν δοξεῖν εἰναι παρόντε πένθει· οὔτε αὐτὸ
ἡδων ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὑντων, ὡστερ
εἰςθῆς καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιοῦτοι τινὲς ἔσαι·
ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπὸν τί μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις
ἀθῆνας κράτισι ἀπὸ τὴν ἡδωνῆς συγκεκεραμένη
ὁμοί καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμομενῷ ὅτι
αὐτικὰ ἑκεῖνος ἐμάλλε τελευτῶν. καὶ πάντες τις
παρόντες σχεδὸν τι οὕτω διεκεῖμενα, ὅτε μὲν
γελῶντες, ἐνίστε δὲ δακρύοντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ
diaφεροῦντος, Ἀπολλόδωρος· οἰσθα γάρ που τὸν

Β ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

ἐξεκραθής. Πῶς γὰρ σὺ;

Φαίδων. Ἐκεῖνὸς τε τοῖνυν πανταπασιν οὕτως
εἰχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγνώ τε ἑτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ἐξεκραθής. Ἐτυχον δὲ, ὁ Φαίδων, τίνες παρα-
γενόμενοι;

Φαίδων. Οὗτος τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν

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PHAEDO

you. It is always my greatest pleasure to be reminded of Socrates whether by speaking of him myself or by listening to someone else.

ECHERATES. Well, Phaedo, you will have hearers who feel as you do; so try to tell us everything as accurately as you can.

PHAEDO. For my part, I had strange emotions when I was there. For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present at the death of a friend; since he seemed to me to be happy, both in his bearing and his words, he was meeting death so fearlessly and nobly. And so I thought that even in going to the abode of the dead he was not going without the protection of the gods, and that when he arrived there it would be well with him, if it ever was well with anyone. And for this reason I was not at all filled with pity, as might seem natural when I was present at a scene of mourning; nor on the other hand did I feel pleasure because we were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy;—but a very strange feeling came over me, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and of pain together, when I thought that Socrates was presently to die. And all of us who were there were in much the same condition, sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus; you know him and his character.

ECHERATES. To be sure I do.

PHAEDO. He was quite unrestrained, and I was much agitated myself, as were the others.

ECHERATES. Who were these, Phaedo?

PHAEDO. Of native Athenians there was this
PLATO

ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ ὁ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔτει Ερμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Λισχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιττος ὁ Παιανεύς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ, οἶμαι, ἂσθένει.

C exekrathe. Ξένου δὲ τινες παρῆσαν;
φαιδον. Ναὶ, Σιμμίας τέ γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδωνίδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τέ καὶ Τερψίων.

exekrathe. Τι δὲ; Ἀρίστιττος καὶ Κλέομβροτος¹ παρεγένοντο;
φαιδον. Οὐ δὴτα· ἐν Αἰγίνη γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

exekrathe. Ἀλλὸς δὲ τις παρῆν;
φαιδον. Σχεδὸν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

exekrathe. Τι οὖν δή; τίνες, φής, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

3. φαιδον. �uations σου ἐξ ἄρχης πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. ἀεὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρόσθεν
D ἡμέρας εἰώθειμεν φοιτῶν καὶ έγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη, συνλεγόμενοι ἠκούσατε εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ δική ἐγένετο· πλησίον γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἐὼς ἀνοιχθεῖ τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατριβοῦτε μετ' άλληλων· ἀνεφύγετο γὰρ οὐ πρὸς ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθεῖ, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωϊαίτερον συνελεύσαμεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραία²

¹ Schanz, after Cobet, inserts οὐ after Κλέομβροτος.
² After προτεραία the MSS. read ἡμέρα, which Hermann, followed by Schanz and others, brackets.
PHAEDE

Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epiganes and Aeschines and Antisthenes; and Ctesippus the Paeanian was there too, and Menexenus and some other Athenians. But Plato, I think, was ill.

ECHECRATES. Were any foreigners there?

PHAEDO. Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Cebe and Phaedonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion.

ECHECRATES. What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

PHAEDO. No. They were said to be in Aegina.

ECHECRATES. Was anyone else there?

PHAEDO. I think these were about all.

ECHECRATES. Well then, what was the conversation?

PHAEDO. I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days I and the others had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates. We used to meet at daybreak in the court where the trial took place, for it was near the prison; and every day we used to wait about, talking with each other, until the prison was opened, for it was not opened early; and when it was opened, we went in to Socrates and passed most of the day with him. On that day we came together earlier; for the day before, when we left the prison

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Ε ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἑσπέρας, ἐπιθυμεῖα δὴτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφιγμένον εἶν. παραγγελλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἢκειν ὡς πρῳϊάτατα εἰς τὸ εἴωθός. καὶ ἤκομεν καὶ ἡμῶν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρορός, ὡσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἶπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἔως ἂν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ. Δύνασι γὰρ, ἐφη, οἱ ἐνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἂν τῇ τῇ ἢμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ' οὐν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν ἢκειν καὶ 60 ἐκέλευσεν ἡμᾶς εἰσίναι. εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ Ξανθίππην—γυνώσκεις γὰρ—ἐχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνευφήμισε τε καὶ τοιαύτ' ἀπείπον, οἷα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναικεῖς, ὅτι ὩΣ Σῶκρατε, ὑστατον δὴ σε προσερούσιν νῦν οἱ ἑπιτηδείοι καὶ σὺ τούτος. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα. ὩΣ Κρίτων, ἐφη, ἀπαγέτω τὸν σαν εἴκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπῄγον τινας τῶν τούς Κρίτωνος βοῶσαν

Β τε καὶ κοπτομένην ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζόμενος εἰς τὴν κλίνην συνέκαμψε τε τὸ σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτριψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἄμα: Ὡς ἀτοπού, ἐφη, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἐσικὲ τι εἶναι τούτο, ὁ καλοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢδυ. ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἄμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγύγεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ τὴν διόκη τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ὡσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένῳ δῦ ὅντε. καὶ

C μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Λίσσωτος, μύθον ἂν συνθεῖναι, ὡς ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ

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in the evening we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we agreed to come to the usual place as early in the morning as possible. And we came, and the jailer who usually answered the door came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us. "For," he said, "the eleven are releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving directions how he is to die to-day." So after a little delay he came and told us to go in. We went in then and found Socrates just released from his fetters and Xanthippe—you know her—with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him. Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say: "Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them." And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, "Crito, let somebody take her home." And some of Crito's people took her away wailing and beating her breast. But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said, "What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And I think," he said, "if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and god wished to reconcile them, and when
καὶ διαλλάξαυι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔδυνατο, συνῆγεν εἰς ταύτων αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφάς, καὶ διὰ ταύτα ὅ ἀν τὸ ἔτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὡστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον. ὡστερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔσχεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεῖν, ἥκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἔδυ.

4. Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν Ἡ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὐ γέγονεν ἀναμνήσας δὲ με. περὶ γὰρ τοῖς τῶν ποιημάτων δὲν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Ἀισώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλου τινές με ἤδη ἤρωστο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐνύμος πρόην, ὁ τι ποτὲ διανοηθεῖς, ἐπειδὴ δεύρο ἤθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὖντες πᾶσας ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τού ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐνύμος ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν μὲ αὐθεὶς ἐρωτᾶ, εὐ οἶδα γὰρ, ὅτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπέ, τῇ χρή λέγειν. Δέγη τούς, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὁ Κέβης, τάληθῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκεῖνος ὑπολόγεσθε οὖν τοῖς ποιήσαις αὐτοῖς ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα· ἰδεῖν γὰρ ὡς οὐ βάδιον εἶš· ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειρόμενοι τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιώμενος, εἰ πολλάκις ταύτης τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοντο ποιεῖν. ἢν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνυπνίων ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἀλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὄψει φαινόμενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγου, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζομαι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἐπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτὸ μοι

61 παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύεων, ὡστερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελεύομενοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὖν τὸ ἐνυπνίων, ὅπερ ἐπραττον, τοῦτο ἐπικελεύεων, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὖσας μεγάλης

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PHAEDO

he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after.”

Here Cebes interrupted and said, “By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me. Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop’s fables and the hymn to Apollo, and Euneus asked me the day before yesterday why you who never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison. Now, if you care that I should be able to answer Euneus when he asks me again—and I know he will ask me—tell me what to say.”

“Then tell him, Cebes,” said he, “the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way. They were something like this. The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing: ‘Socrates,’ it said, ‘make music and work at it.’ And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the
μουσικής, ἐμοῦ δὲ τούτο πράττοντος· υἱὸν δέ ἐπειδὴ ἤ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἔορτῆ διεκόλυν με ἀποθείσθηκεν, ἐδοξὲ χρῆμαι, εἰ ἂρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημόδη μουσικήν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν. ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι

Β πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαί ποιήσαντα ποιήματα πειθό-μενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεόν ἐποίησα, οὐ ἢν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητής εἶναι, ποιεῖν μόθους, ἀλλ' οὗ λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἢ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταύτα δὴ οὕτω προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἡπιστάμην μόθους τοὺς Ἀισώπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρὸ τοῖς ἐνέτυχον.

5. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Κέβης, Ἐυήνῳ φράζε, καὶ ἐρρώοθαι καὶ, ἂν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς C τάχιστα. ἀπειμὶ δὲ, ὡς ἐοικε, τῇμερον· κελεύονσι γὰρ 'Αθηναίοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας. Ὁλον παρακε- λεύει, ἔφη, τούτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, Ἐυήνῳ; πολλά γὰρ ἡδὴ ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ· σχεδὸν οὖν, εἴ δὲν ἐγὼ ἡσθημαι, οὔτ' ὀπωστοίου σοι ἐκών εἰναι πείσεται. Τί δαί; ἥ δ' ὡς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Ἐυήνος; Ἑμοῦνγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐθε- λήσει τοῖνυν καὶ Ἐυήνος καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἄξιος τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μεντοῦ ἔσως βιάσεται αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ φασι θεμνὸν εἶναι. D καὶ ἀμα λέγων ταῦτα καθήκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξέμονος οὕτως ἡδὴ τὰ λοιπὰ διελέ- γετο. ἦρετο οὖν αὐτόν ὁ Κέβης. Πῶς τούτο

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greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey. For I thought it was safer not to go hence before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon. So tell Evenus that, Cebe, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can. I, it seems, am going to-day; for that is the order of the Athenians."

And Simmias said, "What a message that is, Socrates, for Evenus! I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it."

"Why so?" said he. "Is not Evenus a philosopher?"

"I think so," said Simmias.

"Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy. Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted." And as he spoke he put his feet down on the ground and remained sitting in this way through the rest of the conversation.

Then Cebe asked him: "What do you mean by
λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἕαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἔθελειν δὲ ἄν τῷ ἀποθυμήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπεσθαι; Τί δέ, ὁ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκόας σύ τε καὶ Σιμμίας περὶ τῶν τουοῦτων Φιλολάω συγγεγονότες; Οὔδεν γε σαφές, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω· ἀ μὲν ὦν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοῶς, φθόνος οὔδείς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει ἐμέλλουσιν ἐκεῖσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεί,1 πολαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἷόμεθα εἶναι· τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοὶ ἄλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνῳ;

6. Κατὰ τί δὲ οὐν ποτε οὐ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτίννυναι, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἦδη γὰρ ἠγοιή, ὡπερ νῦν δὴ σύ ἢρου, καὶ Φιλολάου ἤκουσα, ὅτε παρ’ ἡμῖν διηρτᾶτο, ἦδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὐ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ περὶ 62 αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς πώποτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα. Ἀλλὰ προθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ἐφη· τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσας. ἵσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τούτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἄπλοιν ἑστιν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα,2 ἐστιν οίτε καὶ οἶς βέλτιον τεθνάσαι ἢ ζην’ οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάσαι, θαυμαστόν ἵσως σοι φαίνεται, εἰ τούτως τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ ὄσιον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς εὐ ποιεῖν, ἄλλα ἄλλον δὲ περιμένειν εὑρεγέτην. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἥρεμα ἐπιγελάσας· "Ιττω Ζεὺς, ἐφη τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπὼν. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δύξεις, ἐφη ὁ

1 Schanz brackets τῆς ἐκεί.
2 Schanz, following Forster, puts a period after τάλλα and inserts ἄλλα.

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this, Socrates, that it is not permitted to take one's life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying?"

"How is this, Cebes? Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?"

"Nothing definite, Socrates."

"I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset?"

"Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Socrates? I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this; but I never heard anyone say anything definite about it."

"You must have courage," said he, "and perhaps you might hear something. But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human beings for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor."

And Cebes, smiling gently, said, "Gawd knows it doos," speaking in his own dialect.

"It would seem unreasonable, if put in this way,"
Β Σωκράτης, ούτω γ' είναι ἄλογον· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἵσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὦ μέν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν τινι φρονμα ἐσμεν οἱ ἀνθρωποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἐαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὔδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τὲ τὶς μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διδεῖν· οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γ' μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κέβης, εὐ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοῦ εἶναι ἦμων τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἦμας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι· ἦ σοι οὖ δοκεῖ οὐτως; Ἐμοιγε, ο φησιν ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὡς, καὶ σὺ ἂν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἰ τι αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτινύοι, μὴ σημηναντός σου ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθνάναι, χαλεπαίνως ἂν αὐτὸ, καὶ εἰ τινα ἔχοις τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖν αὖ; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἠσως τοίνυν ταύτη σοι ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἀνάγκην τινά θεοὶ ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὀσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἦμων παροῦσαι.

7. 'Αλλ' εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὦ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τούς φιλοσόφους ῥάδιως ἄν ἔθελειν ἀποδηνῆσειν, ἐοίκεν D τοῦτο, ὃ 'Σωκραταῖς, ἀτόπωρ, εἰπέρ δ' νῦν δὴ ἔλεγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεοῦ τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελοῦμεν ἦμων καὶ ἦμας ἑκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπίστως, ἐν ἂ ἐπιστα- τοῦσιν αὐτῶν ὀπερ ἄριστοι εἰσι τῶν ὑποτῶν ἐπιστάται, θεοὶ, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον. οὐ γὰρ ποι αὐτὸς γε αὐτοῦ οἴεται ἀμείνων ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος· 'Αλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἀνθρώπος τάχ' ἂν οἰηθεὶν ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ 216
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said Socrates, "but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this?"

"Yes," said Cebes, "I do."

"Well then," said he, "if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me."

"That," said Cebes, "seems sensible. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems strange if we were right just now in saying that god is our guardian and we are his possessions. For it is not reasonable that the wisest men should not be troubled when they leave that service in which the gods, who are the best overseers in the world, are watching over them. A wise man certainly does not think that when he is free he can take better care of himself than they do. A foolish man might perhaps think so, that he ought to run away from his master, and he would not consider that he must not run
Ε δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ’ ὁ τι μᾶλλον παραμένει, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι, ὡ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῦ που ἂν ἂεi εἰναι παρὰ τῷ αὑτοῦ βελτίων. κατ’ οὖτως, ὁ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἐννοεῖει εἰκός ἢ ὁ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθυγόσκοντα πρέπει, τοὺς δ’ ἀφρονας χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἤσθηναι τε μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἔπειθλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς. 'Αλλ’ τοι, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευναὶ, καὶ οὐ πάντων εὐθέως ἔθελε πείθεσθαι, ὁ τι ἂν τις εἴπη. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης: τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἄληθῶς δεσπότας ἁμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοντε καὶ βαδίως ἀπακλάττοιτο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω βαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπτων καὶ ἁρχοντας ἄγαθοὺς, ὡς Β αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεοῦ. Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε. οἶμαι γὰρ ἡμᾶς λέγειν, ὅτι χρή με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

8. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὅσι, πειραθῶ πιθανότερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ φίλην ἤζειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἁμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἥδικους ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ: νῦν δὲ C εὖ ἦστε, ὅτι παρ’ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι

1 Schanz brackets ψευκτέων . . . δεσπότου.
away from a good master, but ought to stay with him as long as possible; and so he might thoughtlessly run away; but a man of sense would wish to be always with one who is better than himself. And yet, Socrates, if we look at it in this way, the contrary of what we just said seems natural; for the wise ought to be troubled at dying and the foolish to rejoice."

When Socrates heard this I thought he was pleased by Cebes' earnestness, and glancing at us, he said, "Cebes is always on the track of arguments and will not be easily convinced by whatever anyone says."

And Simmias said, "Well, Socrates, this time I think myself that Cebes is right. For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them? And it strikes me that Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as you yourself agree, good rulers."

"You have a right to say that," he replied; "for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court."

"Precisely," said Simmias.

"Well, then," said he, "I will try to make a more convincing defence than I did before the judges. For if I did not believe," said he, "that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death. But as it is, you may rest assured that I expect to go to good men, though I should not care to assert this positively; but I would
ἄγαθοῦς· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διωχυρισάμην· ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἄγαθοὺς ἦξεν, εὐ ἵστε ὅτι, εὔπερ τι ἀλλὸ τῶν τοιούτων, διωχυρισάμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὡς τε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὅμοιος ἄγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπὶς εἰμι εἰναὶ τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι, καὶ, ὧς περ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἄγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὁ Ὁσκρατείς; αὐτός ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην·

Δ ἐν νῷ ἤχεις ἀπίεναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοθῆς; κοινῶν γὰρ δὴ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἰναι ἄγαθον τοῦτο, καὶ ἀμα σοι ἀπολογία ἐστὶν, ἐὰν ἀπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείςης. Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεφώμεθα, τί ἐστιν ὃ βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί, ὁ Ὁσκρατείς, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἀλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὃ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τῷ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρή σοι φράξειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησί γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγόμενον, δεῖν δὲ οὖθεν τοιούτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ;

Ε ἐι δὲ μὴ, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκαζέσθαι καὶ διὸ καὶ τρὶς πίνειν τοὺς τοιούτων ποιοῦντας. καὶ ὁ Ὁσκράτης· Ἐα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτῶν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἐαυτοῦ2 παρασκευαζότω ὡς καὶ διὸς δῶσων, ἐὰν δὲ δή, καὶ τρὶς. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μὲν τι γῆδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ μοι πάλαι3 πράγματα παρέχει. Ἐα αὐτῶν, ἔφη. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἡδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνήρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν

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1 Schanz brackets ἦξεν, following Hirschig.
2 Schanz brackets τὸ ἐαυτοῦ.
3 Schanz brackets πάλαι.
assert as positively as anything about such matters that I am going to gods who are good masters. And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the wicked.”

“Well,” said Simmias, “do you intend to go away, Socrates, and keep your opinion to yourself, or would you let us share it? It seems to me that this is a good which belongs in common to us also, and at the same time, if you convince us by what you say, that will serve as your defence.”

“I will try,” he replied. “But first let us ask Crito there what he wants. He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time.”

“Only, Socrates,” said Crito, “that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little as possible. He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison; so sometimes he has to make those who talk too much drink twice or even three times.”

And Socrates said: “Never mind him. Just let him do his part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three times.”

“I was pretty sure that was what you would say,” said Crito, “but he has been bothering me for a long time.”

“Never mind him,” said Socrates. “I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is
64 μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπίς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἄγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ πῶς ἀν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

9. Κινδυνεύοντι γὰρ ὁσοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὄρθως ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λειταθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτὸι ἐπιτήδειον ἢ ἀποθητικόν καὶ τεθνάναι εἰς οὐν τούτῳ ἀληθές, ἀτοπον δὴπον ἂν εἴῃ προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τούτῳ, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἄγανακτεῖν, ὁ πάλαι προσβημονυτὸ τε καὶ ἐπετήδευνον καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσασα. Νὴ τὸν Δία, Β ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γε μὲ νῦν γελασόντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἰμαί γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτῳ ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εἴς πάνυ εἰρήσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ ξυμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν πάρ ἢμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὅντε οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι καὶ σφάς γε οὐ λεληθάσων, ὅτι ἄξιοι εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ' ἂν λέγοιεν, ὁ Σιμμία, πλὴν ἐς τοῦ σφὰς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἢ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἢ ἄξιοι εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἴου θανάτου οἱ ὁς ἀληθῶς φιλότητοι).

C εὖ πομην γὰρ, ἐφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις· ἡγούμεθα τι τὸν θανάτον εἶναι; Πάνυ γε, ἐφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶμας ἀπαλλαγῆν; καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγῆν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχήν ἀπὸ τοῦ σῶμας ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν.
naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell you, Simmias, and Cebes, how this would be.

"Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practising."

And Simmias laughed and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I don't feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it."

"And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is. Let us then," said he, "speak with one another, paying no further attention to them. Do we think there is such a thing as death?"

"Certainly," replied Simmias.

"We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists
αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ
θάνατος ἢ τούτο; Οὐκ, ἄλλα τούτο, ἔφη. Σκέψαι δὴ, ὁ ἀγάθε, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοι ξυνδοκῇ ἀπερ ἐμοὶ. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἰσεσθαί περὶ ὁν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται σοι φιλο-
σόφου ἄνδρος εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἥδονὰς καλομένες τὰς τοιάσθε, οἷον σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν; "Ἡκιστα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Τί δὲ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δὲ; τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπεῖας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντὸς ἡμεῖς ἥγεσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἰματίων διαφε-
ρόντων κτῆσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν
Ε δοκεῖ σοι ἡ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; Ἀτιμάζειν ἐμουγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιοῦτου πραγματεία οὗ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἄλλα καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;
"Ἐμουγε. Ἄρ' οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δῆλος ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὁ τι μάλιστα
65 τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται.
Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δὴποῦ, ὁ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὃ μηδὲν ἢδ' τῶν τοιοῦτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ξήν, ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φρουτίζων τῶν ἥδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν. Πάνω μὲν σοὶν ἀληθὴ λέγεις.

1 Schanz brackets ἢ.
alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?"
"No, it is this," said he.
"Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject. Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?"
"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.
"How about the pleasures of love?"
"Certainly not."
"Well, do you think such a man would think much of the other cares of the body—I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal adornments? Do you think he would care about them or despise them, except so far as it is necessary to have them?"
"I think the true philosopher would despise them," he replied.
"Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, so far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul?"
"Yes."
"To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates the soul from communion with the body?"
"It is."
"Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn't deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead."
"That is very true."
10. Τι δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, ἐὰν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινώνων συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; Β οἶνον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἀρα ἔχει ἄληθείαν τινα ψυcis τε καὶ ἀκοῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τὰ γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἢμῖν ἂεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὡς οὐτ' ἀκούομεν ἀκριβεῖς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὄρῳμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὐταί τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσὶν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολὴ αὐ γε ἄλλα· πάσαι γὰρ ποι τούτων φαντάσερα εἰσίν· ἢ σοι οὐ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἡφι. Πότε οὖν, ἢ ὃς, ἢ ψυχὴ τῆς ἄληθείας ἀπτεται; οὔτως γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρητικῶς τι σκοπεῖν, δηλοῦν ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατάται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Ο Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἴπερ ποι ἀλλοθι, κατάδηλου αὐτῇ γίγνεται τὶ τῶν οὐντων; Ναι. Λογίζεται δὲ γε ποι τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδέν παραλυτῇ, μήτε ἀκοῆ μήτε ψυcis μὴτε ἄληθείας μηδὲ τις ἠδονή, ἄλλ' ὃ τι κάλλιστα αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτῆν γίγνηται ἔσσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὃσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομἐνη δρέγηται τοῦ οὐντος. 'Εστι ταῦτα. Οὕκον καὶ ἐνταῦθα Ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχῆς καλίστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γέγρασθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὁ Σωμά; φαμέν τι εἶναι δἰκαίου αὐτὸ ἡ οὐδέν; Φαμέν μὲντοι νὴ Δία. Καὶ 226
"Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom? What I mean is this: Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? And yet if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to these. Do you not think so?"

"Certainly I do," he replied.

"Then," said he, "when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it."

"True."

"In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?"

"Yes."

"But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality."

"That is true."

"In this matter also, then, the soul of the philosopher greatly despises the body and avoids it and strives to be alone by itself?"

"Evidently."

"Now how about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?"

"We certainly think there is."
καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν; Πῶς δ’ ὦ; Ἡδη οὖν πῶποτε τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ’ ὦς. Ἀλλ’ ἀλλή τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἶον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἱσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς Εἴσοδίας, ὁ τυγχάνει ἔκαστον ὁν; ἀρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθεστατὸν θεωρεῖται, ἦ ὁδε ἔχειν ὃς ἀν μάλιστα ἥμων καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἔκαστον διανοηθῇ περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὕτος ἢν ἐγγύτατα ἢο τοῦ γνώναι ἔκαστον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀρ’ οὖν ἕκεινος ἄν τοῦτο ποιήσει καθαρώτατα, ὅστις ὃτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὑοὶ ἐφ’ ἕκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὁφυν παρατεθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην ἄνθησιν ἐφέλκων μιδεμίαιν μετά τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ’ αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ εἰλικρινεῖ ἔκαστον ἐπιχειρῶν θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖς ὃτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὅτων καὶ ὃς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἕξυπνὸν τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔδωτο τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειαν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωῇ, ἀρ’ οὖν οὐτός ἐστιν, ὁ Συμμία, ἔπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὁ τευχόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; Ἡπερφυώς, ἐφή ὁ Συμμίας, ὡς ἀληθὴ λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης.

Β 11. Οὔκοιν ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γυνήσις φιλοσόφοις, ὡστε καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλους τοιαύτα ἅτα λέγειν, ὃτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὁσπερ ἀπράπτως τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, ὃτι, ἔως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυρμένη 228
"And absolute beauty and goodness."
"Of course."
"Well, did you ever see anything of that kind with your eyes?"
"Certainly not," said he.
"Or did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence or underlying quality of everything. Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?"
"Certainly."
"Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?"
"That is true as true can be, Socrates," said Simmias.
"Then," said he, "all this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the other something like this: There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and the
Ἡ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησόμεθα ἰκανῶς οὐ ἑπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς. μωρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἄσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν· ἐτι δὲ ἂν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζοσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἔρωτων δὲ καὶ ἑπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὡστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγύγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἀλλὸ παρέχει ἡ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτων ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα

Κ τάσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπεία· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἄσχολίαν ἅγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταύτα. τὸ δ’ ἐσχατὸν πάντων, ὡς, ἐὰν τις ημῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπέζημα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ξητῆσεων αὐτοῦ πανταχοῦ παραπέπτουν θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καθοριῶν τάληθες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπ’ αὐτῷ δεδεικτεῖ ὡς, εἰ μέλλομεν ποτὲ καθαρὸς τι εἰσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ

Ε ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἐσχατε, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἑπιθυμοῦμεν τε καὶ φαμέν ἑραστάλ εἰναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτησώμεν, ὡς ἡ λόγος σημαίνει, χῶσιν δὲ ὑπ’. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶν τε μετὰ τοῦ σῶματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνώναι, δυνών θάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστων κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτησώμεν· τότε γὰρ αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτῆν ἡ

67 ψυχή ἔσται χωρίς τοῦ σῶματος, πρότερον δ’ ὑπ’
soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of sustenance; and moreover, if diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth. And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone. And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamoured of, but not while we live. For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two thing must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall,
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καὶ ἐν ὦ ἄν ξώμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὦ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὀμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὦ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλόμεθα τῆς τούτων φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι’ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πάν τὸ εἰλικρινές.

Β τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶν ἱσως τὸ ἀληθές. μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐθεμοῦ ἡ τοιαύτα ὁμία, οὐ Σίμμα, ἀναγκαῖον εἰναί πρὸς ἄλληλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὅρθοὺς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὗ δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως; Πιστὸς γε μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

12. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὁ ἐταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐπὶ διαφορέμενοι οἱ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἰκανῶς, εἴπερ ποι ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τούτῳ οὐ ἐνεκα ἢ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὅστε ἢ γε ἀποδημία ἢ νῦν μοι

C προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐπίθετος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἄνδρι, ὅστις ἡγεῖται οἱ παρασκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὀσπερ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάντως μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα οὐ τούτῳ ἐξειμαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζει ὦ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐκάθει ἄντικα καὶ ἀντὶ πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι

ἵνα καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπειτε μόνην καὶ ἀντὶ, ἐκλυσιμένην ὀσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάνω μὲν

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I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure,—and that is, perhaps, the truth. For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.' Such words as these, I think, Simmias, all who are rightly lovers of knowledge must say to each other and such must be their thoughts. Do you not agree?"

"Most assuredly, Soocrates."

"Then," said Soocrates, "if this is true, my friend, I have great hopes that when I reach the place to which I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, attain fully to that which has been my chief object in my past life, so that the journey which is now imposed upon me is begun with good hope; and the like hope exists for every man who thinks that his mind has been purified and made ready."

"Certainly," said Simmias.

"And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters?"

"Certainly," said he.
οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ονομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; Παντα-πασὶ γε, ἡ δ’ ὃς. Ἀνειν δὲ γε αὐτὴν, ὡς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἄει μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσο-φοῦντες ὁρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τῶν φιλοσοφῶν, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἡ οὐ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γέλοιον ἂν εἶχαν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅ τι ἐγγυτάτω ὑντα τοῦ Εὐ τεθνάναι οὐτὸς ἢν, κατεδρ ήκοντος αὐτῷ τοῦ- του ἁγανακτεῖν. 1 οὐ γέλοιον; Πῶς δ’ οὐ; Τὸ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμίμα, οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλοσο-φοῦντες ἀποθυμήσκειν μετελώσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἰκίστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν. ἐκ τῶν δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβηληται μὲν πανταχῆ τῷ σῶματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσί τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τοῦτο δὲ γεγυμόνου εἰ φοβοῦστο καὶ ἁγανακτοῖεν, οὐ πολλῆ ἂν ἁλογία εἰ, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεὶς οἰειν, οἱ ἀφικομένοις ἐλπὶς 68 ἐστὶν οὐ διὰ βίου ἢρον τυχεῖν ἢρον δὲ φρονήσεως. ο’ τε διεβέβηλητα, τοῦτον ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἡ ἀνθρωπίνως μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ νεῶν ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντων ἡθελησαν εἰς Ἀιδοῦ ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαι τ’ ἐκεῖ δὲν ἐπεθύ-μουν καὶ συνέστεψαν; φρονὴσεως δὲ ἄρα τῆς τοῦ ὄντι ἔρων, καὶ ἱερὰς ἱερὰ δέ την αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοὶ ἀλλοθεὶ ἐνεπέξεσθαι αὐτῇ

Β ἀξίως λόγον ἢ εὖ Ἰδου, ἁγανακτήσει τε ἠπο-θυμήσκως καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος εἶσιν αὐτός; οἴεσθαι

1 After ἁγανακτεῖν BT read οὐ γέλοιον; Schanz brackets these words. Burnet reads γέλοιον, giving it to Simmias.
"Well, then, this is what we call death, is it not, a release and separation from the body?"

"Exactly so," said he.

"But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not?"

"Obviously."

"Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could, should then be disturbed when death came to him. Would it not be absurd?"

"Of course."

"In fact, then, Simmias," said he, "the true philosophers practise dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining what they longed for all through life—and they longed for wisdom—and of escaping from the companionship of that which they hated? When human loves or wives or sons have died, many men have willingly gone to the other world led by the hope of seeing there those whom they longed for, and of being with them; and shall he who is really in love with wisdom and has a firm belief that he can find it nowhere else than in the other world grieve when he dies and not be glad to go there? We cannot
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γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ἢ, ὁ ἐταίρε, φιλόσοφος, σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλῇ ἄν ἀλογία εἰη, εἰ φοβοῦτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μέντοι νη Δία, ἢ δ' ὄς.

13. Οὐκοῦν ἰκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἐφή, τούτῳ ἀνδρὸς ὃν ἂν ἱδης ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ὑποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρ' ἢν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλ' τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ ποι οὕτως τυγχάνει ὅν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτο τὰ ἐτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα. Πάνυ, ἐφή, ἔχει οὕτως, ὡς λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σιμμίλα, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὄνομαξομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις μάλιστα προσῆκε; Πάντως δήποτο, ἐφή. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄνομάξουσι σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τᾶς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοήσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅλωρως ἔχει καὶ κοσμίως, ἃρ' οὐ τούτως μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλυγορούσιν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ξώσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. Εἰ γὰρ ἔθελες, ἢ δ' ὄς, ἐννοήσαι τῇ γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείαις τὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἀτοπος. Πῶς δὴ, ὁ Σώκρατες; Οἴσθα, ἢ δ' ὄς, ὅτι τὸν θάνατον ἑγοῦνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μᾶλ', ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβῳ μεικτόνιον κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένομεν; Ἐκι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιώκει ἄριστα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοι εἰσὶ πάντες πλὴν οἱ
think that, my friend, if he is really a philosopher; for he will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world. And if this is so, would it not be very foolish for such a man to fear death?"

"Very foolish, certainly," said he.

"Then is it not," said Socrates, "a sufficient indication, when you see a man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body? And this same man is also a lover of money and of honour, one or both."

"Certainly," said he, "it is as you say."

"Then, Simmias," he continued, "is not that which is called courage especially characteristic of philosophers?"

"By all means," said he.

"And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body and pass their lives in philosophy?"

"Necessarily," said he.

"For," said Socrates, "if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men, you will see that they are absurd."

"How so, Socrates?"

"You know, do you not, that all other men count death among the great evils?"

"They certainly do.

"And do not brave men face death—when they do face it—through fear of greater evils?"

"That is true."

"Then all except philosophers are brave through
Καί τοι ἀλογόν γε δέει τινά καὶ δειλία

Τι δὲ οἱ κόσμῳι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦταν τοῦτο πεπόνθαισιν ἀκολασία

τινί σῶφρονες εἰσὶν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἦδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὅμοιον

τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐθήνη σωφροσύνην.
φοβοῦμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ

ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκεῖνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται υπ' ἄλλων κρατοῦμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσί γε ἀκολασίαν

τὸ ύπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀρχεσθαι. ἀλλ' ὅμως συμβαίνει

αὐτοῖς κρατοῦμένοις υπ' ἡδονῶν κρατείν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὅμοιον ἔστων ὁ νῦν δὲ ἐλέγετο,

τῷ τρόπῳ τινὰ δὲ ἀκολασίαν αὐτοῖς σεσω-

φρονίσθαι. Ὑποκε γὰρ. Ω μακάρει Σιμμία,

μὴ γὰρ οὖχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὅρθη πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἄλλαν, ἡδονᾶς πρὸς ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύτας πρὸς λύτας καὶ

φόβου πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζον πρὸς ἐλάττω, ἀπετέρ νομίσματα, ἄλλ' ἢ ἔκεινο

μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὄρθον, ἀντὶ οὐ δεὶ ἀπαντά

Β ταύτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρονήσις, καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὄνομεμα τε καὶ

πιτασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σω-

φροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐλλήβδην ἀληθῆς

ἀρετὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγυγμομένων καὶ

ἀπογυγμομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν

ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιοῦτων χαριζόμενα δὲ

φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἄλληλων μὴ

σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι

ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγείας οὐδ' ἄληθες

ἔχη, τὸ δ' ἄληθές τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις

1 Schanz brackets ἄλλων.
fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice."

"Very true."

"And how about those of seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible, nevertheless their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for they fear that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others. And yet being ruled by pleasures is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of self-indulgence."

"So it seems."

"My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and courage and self-restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in
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C τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ
dikaiosύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ
καθαρμός τις ἦ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς
teleτάς ἢμῶν οὕτω καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοι
eιναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὦ ἢ
ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἁλίουν ἀφίκηται, ἐν
βορβόρῳ κεῖται, ὃ δὲ κεκαθαρμένοι τε καὶ
tetelestμένοι ἔκεισε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.
eἰσών γὰρ δὴ, ὡς φασίν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς,
ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ, βαίκχοι δὲ τε παύροι.

D οὗτοι δὲ εἰσίν κατὰ τὴν ἔμην δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ
οὶ περίλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. ἄν δὲ καὶ ἐγώ κατὰ
y ς τὸ δυνάτον οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίο, ἀλλὰ
pαντὶ τρόπῳ προοδευμῆθηρ γενέσθαι: εἰ δ' ὅρθως
προοδευμῆθηρ καὶ τῷ ἡμύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ
σαφῆς εἰσόμεθα, ἄν θεοῖς ἐθέλην, ὄλγοι ὑστερον,
ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ, ἐφή, ὦ Σιμμία
te καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ἦμας τε
ἀπολείπως καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς

Ε фέρω οὖν ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κάκει οὐδὲν ἢττουν
ἡ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἄγαθοις ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ
ἐταίροις. εἰ τι οὖν ἦμαν πιθανότερος εἰμι εἰν τῇ
ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναϊῶν δικασταῖς, εὔ ἀν
ἐχοι.

14. Εἰπόντος δὴ τὸν Σωκράτους ταῦτα ὑπο-
λαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἔφη: Ἡ Σωκράτεις, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
70 ἔμοι γας δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
πολλὴν ἀπίστιαν παρέχει τοῖς ἄνθρωποις, μή
ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἐτι ἢ,

1 After ἐταίροις, the MSS. read τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπίστιαν

1 παρέχει, "but the many do not believe this." Ast, followed

by Schanz and Burnet, omits.

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fact a purification from all these things, and self-restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not un-enlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes un-initiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, 'the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few'; and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left nothing undone, and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know clearly, when I have arrived there, very soon, if it is God's will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defence I offer to show that it is reasonable for me not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here, because I believe that there, no less than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in convincing you by my defence than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is well."

When Socrates had finished, Cebes answered and said: "Socrates, I agree to the other things you say, but in regard to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the
PLATO

ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολύται, ἢ ἂν ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἀποθνήσκῃ εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαινοῦσα ὁσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκέδασθείσα οὐχὶ τι διαπτωμένη καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπὶ οὐδαμοῦ ὢ. ἐπεὶ, εἴπερ εἴη ποι αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὃν σὺ νῦν δή

Β διήλθες, πολλὴ ἂν ἐπίς εἰη καὶ καλῇ, ὁ Σωκρατες, ὡς ἄληθὶ ἔστιν ἂ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἢςοι οὔκ ὀλίγης παραμυθήμας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφι, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Κέβθης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογώμεν, εἴτε εἰκὼς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; Ἐνωγε οὖν, ἐφι ὁ Κέβθης, ἢδεις ἂν ἀκούσαμι ἢντια δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὐκοιν γ' ἂν οἴμαι, ἦ δ' ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἴπειν τινα νῦν

C ἀκούσαντα, οὗδ' εἰ κωμῳδιοποιός εἰη, ὡς ἀδολεσχὼ καὶ οὐ περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

15. Σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇ δὲ πῃ, εἴτ' ἄρα ἐν "Αἰδον εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαί τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώ- πων εἶτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσίν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἔκει, καὶ πάλιν γε δεύρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γύρωνται ἐκ τῶν τεθυνωτῶν· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γύρων- σθαι εκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τούς ἔχωντας, ἀλλ' τι ἤ

D εἰέν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἦμων ἔκει; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποιν πάλιν ἐγύρνοντο μὴ οὔτε, καὶ τοῦτο ἴκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταύτ' εἰναι, εἰ τῷ οὕτῳ φανεροῦ γύρωστο, ὅτι

1 Schanz and Burnet bracket οὔχται . . . ἢ.
PHAEODO

day when the man dies it is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it, straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or smoke. If it exists anywhere by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which you have enumerated just now, there would be good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence."

"What you say, Cebes, is true," said Socrates. "Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?"

"I do," said Cebes. "I should like to hear what you think about it."

"Well," said Socrates, "I do not believe anyone who heard us now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end.

"Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there, would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the
πάντα, ούκ ἀλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, όσοις τυχανεὶ διὸ τοιοῦτον τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον ποὺ καὶ δίκαιον ἄδικῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἃρα ἀναγκαῖον, ὅσοις ἔστι τὶ ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίον. οἷον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἐξ ἑλάττονος ὄντος πρῶτερον ἐπειτα μείζον γίγνεσθαι; Ναὶ. Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἑλάττων γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρῶτερον ὑστερον ἑλάττων γενήσεται; Ἡ ἑστὶν οὕτω, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἵσχυροτέρου τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θαττον; Πάνυ γε. Τί δὲ; ἂν τί χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὖκ ἐξ ἄμεινονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἄδικωτέρου; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἰκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνυ γε. Τί δ’ αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον.
living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, then some other argument would be needed.”

“Certainly,” said Cebes.

“Now,” said he, “if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated only from their opposites, in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the disgraceful, the just of the unjust, and there are countless other similar pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and then have become greater.”

“Yes.”

“And if it becomes smaller, it must have been greater and then have become smaller?”

“That is true,” said he.

“And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the slower from the quicker?”

“Certainly.”

“And the worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust?”

“Of course.”

“Then,” said he, “we have this fact sufficiently established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites?”

“Certainly.”

“Now then, is there between all these pairs of
μεταξύ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν
Β ὄντων δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον, ἀπὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐτέρου πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον. Μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὐτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; Ναί, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψυχοῦσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὐτω, καὶ αἱ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὑνόμαις ἐναχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐργῷ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἰναι ἐξ ἐκατέρου
εἰς ἀλληλα; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς.

C 16. Τί οὖν; ἐφη. τῷ ἐκείνῃ ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ὡσπέρ τῷ ἐγρηγορέων τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθνάναι, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταύτα, εἰσπέρ ἐναντία ἐστιν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντων; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Τὴν μὲν τοῖς ἐτέραις συξυγγελῶν ὤν νῦν δὴ ἐλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἐφη, Ἔρω, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ δὲ μοι τὴν ἐτέραν. Κλέω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέων, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέων γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέων τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν τὴν μὲν καταδιαρθάνειν εἰναι, τὴν δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι. Ἰκανῶς σοι, ἐφη, ἢ οὕ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Δέγα δὴ μοι καὶ ¹ Schanz brackets ἐξ ἐκατέρου.
PHÄEDO

opposites what may be called two kinds of generation, from one to the other and back again from the other to the first? Between a larger thing and a smaller thing there is increment and diminution and we call one increasing and the other decreasing, do we not?"

"Yes," said he.

"And similarly analysing and combining, and cooling and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the other?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "is there anything that is the opposite of living, as being awake is the opposite of sleeping?"

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"What?"

"Being dead," said he.

"Then these two are generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them are two; is it not so?"

"Of course."

"Now," said Socrates, "I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its intermediate processes; and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake, and the processes of generation are, in the latter case, falling asleep, and in the former, waking up. Do you agree, or not?"

"Certainly."
PLATO

σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φής τῷ ζῷῳ τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;
"Εγώγε. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ εἶ ἄλληλων; Ναί. Ἕξ
οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνώμενον; Τὸ τεθνηκός,
ἔφη. Τῷ δὲ, ἡ δ' ὡς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος;
'Αναγκαίον, ἔφη, ὀμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἕκ τῶν
tεθνεῶτων ἀρα, ὁ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντα τε καὶ οἱ
Ε ἔναντες γίγνονται; Φαίνεται, ἔφη. Εἰσὶν ἀρα,
ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν εἴν 'Ἀιδου. Ἕσεικεν. Οὐκοῦν
καὶ τοῖν γενεσεόν τοῖν περὶ ταύτα ἢ γ' ἐτέρα
σαφῆς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφῆς
dήπου, ἡ οὖ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἡ δ'
ὡς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τῇν ἑναντίαν
gένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλῇ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ
ἀνάγκη ἀπεδούναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἑναντίαν τινὰ
gένεσιν; Πάντως ποι, ἔφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ
ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἡ δ' ὡς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ
72 ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἀν εἶ ἡ γένεσις
eἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Πάνυ
γε. Ὀμολογεῖται ἀρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοῖς
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"Now do you," said he, "tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?"
"I do."
"And that they are generated one from the other?"
"Yes."
"Now what is it which is generated from the living?"
"The dead," said he.
"And what," said Socrates, "from the dead?"
"I can say only one thing—the living."
"From the dead, then, Celos, the living, both things and persons, are generated?"
"Evidently," said he.
"Then," said Socrates, "our souls exist in the other world."
"So it seems."
"And of the two processes of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?"
"Certainly," said he.
"Well then," said Socrates, "what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying?"
"Certainly we must," said he.
"What is this process?"
"Coming to life again."
"Then," said Socrates, "if there be such a thing as coming to life again, this would be the process of generation from the dead to the living?"
"Certainly."
"So by this method also we reach the conclusion
PLATO

ξώντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τούς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ξώντων. τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἰκανοῦ που ἔδοκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαίον τὰς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς εἶναι που, ὃθεν δὴ πάλιν γύνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἥφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὦμολογημένων ἀναγκαίοιν οὕτως ἔχειν.

17. Ἡδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἥφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀδίκως ὦμολογήκαμεν, ὅς ἤμοι δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ

Β μὴ ἰεί ἀνταποδιδοῖ τὰ ἐτερα τοῖς ἐτέρους γυγνό-

μενα δισπερεῖ κύκλῳ περιώντα, ἀλλὰ εὐθείᾳ τις εὖ ἢ
gένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου μόνου εἰς τὸ καταντικρύ
cal μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐτέρον μηδὲ
cαμπῆν ποιοῦτο, οἷς ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ

αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἄν σχοίη καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἄν πάθοι
cal παύσαιτο γυγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἥφη. Οὐδὲν

χαλεπόν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι δ λέγω. ἀλλ' οἶνον

eἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εὖ, τὸ δ' ἀνεγείρεσθαι

μὴ ἀνταποδιδοῖ γυγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδουτος,

C οἰσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντα ἀν λήρων τὸν 'Ενδυ-
mώνα ἀποδεξεῖν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαῖνοιτο διὰ τὸ
cal τᾶλλα πάντα ταῦτον ἐκεῖνον πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. καὶ εἰ συγκρίνουτο μὲν πάντα, δια-

κρίνοιτο δὲ μὴ, ταχῦ ἀν τὸ τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου γεγο-

νὸς εὖ, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. ὀφαίτως δὲ, ὁ
φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποθνήσκεις μὲν πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ

ξῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπεεὖ δὲ ἀποθάνεις, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ

τῷ σχῆματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιω-

σκοίτο, ἀρ γο πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα

D τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ξῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων

tὰ ξώντα γύγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ξώντα θυήσκοι, τὸς
that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life.

"I think, Socrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions."

"Now here is another method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions. For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all."

"What do you mean?" said he.

"It is not at all hard," said Socrates, "to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep, in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion mere nonsense; he would be nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he, sound asleep. Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, 'all things are chaos,' would soon come true. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead and nothing alive? For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is
μηχανή μη ου πάντα καταναλωθήναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἡφη ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἡἐστιν γὰρ, ἡφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμὸι δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὐτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἐστι τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεότων τοὺς ζῶντας γηγρεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεότων ψυχὰς Ε ἐστιν." 1

18. Καὶ μήν, ἡφη ὁ Κέβης υπολαβὼν, καὶ κατ' ἐκείνον γε τὸν λόγον ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἐστιν, δι' συ εἰσώθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀνάμνησις τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τωλ' χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμμηνησκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἢν τὸν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἰδέν γενέσθαι ὡστε καὶ ταῦτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἑοικεν εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ, ὁ Κέβης, ἡφη ὁ Σιμμίας υπολαβὼν, ποῦ τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις, ὑπόμνησον με' οὐ γάρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέμνημαι. Ἐνι μὲν λόγῳ, ἡφη ὁ Κέβης, καλ- λίσταρ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἀνθρωποί, εάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτά, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἡ ἤχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὁρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν ὁιόν τ' ἦσαν τούτο ποιήσαν. ἔπειτα εάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα
Β ἀγή ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν τουτούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ, ὅτι τοῦτο ὀφθεὶς ἤχει. Εἰ δὲ μή

1 After εἶναι the MSS. read καὶ ταῖς μὲν γε ἀναβαίνεις ήμενον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς κάκιον, "and that the good fare better and the bad worse." Bracketed by Stallbaum, followed by Schanz, Burnet, and others.

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there any escape from the final result that all things
would be swallowed up in death?"

"I see none, Socrates," said Ceberes. "What you
say seems to be perfectly true."

"I think, Ceberes," said he, "it is absolutely so, and
we are not deluded in making these admissions, but
the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact
that the living are generated from the dead and that
the souls of the dead exist."

"And besides," Ceberes rejoined, "if it is true,
Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning
is nothing else than recollection, then this would be
an additional argument that we must necessarily
have learned in some previous time what we now
remember. But this is impossible if our soul did
not exist somewhere before being born in this human
form; and so by this argument also it appears that
the soul is immortal."

"But, Ceberes," said Simmias, "what were the
proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect
very well just now."

"Briefly," said Ceberes, "a very good proof is this:
When people are questioned, if you put the questions
well, they answer correctly of themselves about
everything; and yet if they had not within them
some knowledge and right reason, they could not do
this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if
you take them to mathematical diagrams or any-
thing of that sort."

"And if you are not convinced in that way,
ταύτη γε, ἐφή, πείθει, δι Σιμμία, δι Σωκράτης, σκέψαι, ἀν τῇ δὲ πῇ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δή, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἔστιν; Ἀπιστῶ μὲν σοι ἐγγογε, ἢ δ' ὦ δι Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἐφη, δέομαι μαθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἔξ ὧν Κέβης ἑπεχείρησε λέγειν ἧδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μεντ' ἃν ἤττον ἀκούσμη νῦν, πῇ σοι ἑπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῇ δ' ἐγγογε, ἡ δ' ὦς· ὁμολογούμεν γὰρ δὴπον, εἰ τίς τι ἀνα-

C

αμνησθῆσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερον ποτὲ ἔπιστασθαι. Πάνυ γ', ἐφη. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸδε ὁμολογούμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγγηται τρόπῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τινα τρόπον τόνδε· εάν τίς τι 1 ἢ ἦδων ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τινα ἀλλην αἰσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκείνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτερον ἐννοήσῃ, οὐ μὴ ἡ αὐτή ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ἄλλην, ἄρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι

D

ἀνεμισθη, οὐ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἐλαβεν; Πώς λέγεις; Οἶον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη ποὺ ἐπιστήμη ἄνθρωπον καὶ λύρας. Πώς γὰρ οὗ; Ὀνκοῦν οἰσθα, ὅτι οἱ ἔρασται, ὅταν ἦδωσιν λύραν ἡ ἰμάτιον ἡ ἅλλο τι οὐ τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴσθης χρήσαι, πάσχουσιν τοῦτο· ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐλαβον τὸ εἴδος τοῦ παιδός, οὐ ἢν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις· ἀσπερ καὶ Σιμμίας τὲ ἦδων πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμισθῆ, καὶ ἄλλα ποὺ μυρία τοιαύτ' ἃν εἴη. Μυρία μέντοι νή Δία, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἡ δ' ὦς, τὸ τοιότον ἀνάμνησις τῆς ἐστι· μάλιστα

1 After τι BCD read πρότερον, which Schanz brackets. Τ reads τι ἐτερὸν τι, Burnet τι ἐτερον.

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Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you don't agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?

"I am not incredulous," said Simmias, "but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say."

"It was this," said he. "We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?"

"What do you mean?"

"Let me give an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre."

"Of course."

"Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples."

"To be sure you could," said Simmias.

"Now," said he, "is that sort of thing a kind of
μεντοι, ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθη περὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἀ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τι δὲ; ἦ δὲ ὅστιν ἵππων γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; Πάνυ γε. Οὔκ οὖν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου ἀναμνησθῆναι; Εστὶ μὲντοι, ἔφη.

19. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἄφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀναμνήσεως; Συμβαίνει. 'Αλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνήσεως τὸς τι, ἄρ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ νῦν προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τούτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκεῖνον οὐ ἀνεμνήσθη; 'Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅσ, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἵσον, οὐ δύον λέγω δύλοφ ὡδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἄλλα παρὰ τάυτα πάντα ἐτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φῶμεν τι εἶναι ἡ μηδὲν; Β Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δῆ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. 'Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ δ' ἐστίν; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅσ. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἄρ' οὖκ εἶ δὲ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἦ δύλα ἡ λίθος ἡ ἀλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἵσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο 256
recollected? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Well, then," said Socrates, "can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?"

"Surely."

"And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?"

"Yes," said he.

"All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?"

"Yes."

"And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?"

"Inevitably," he replied.

"Now see," said he, "if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?"

"We shall say that there is," said Simmias, "most decidedly."

"And do we know what it is?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood
PLATO

ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἔτερον ὑν τούτων; ἢ οὖν ἔτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τήδε. ἃρ' οὖ λίθοι μὲν ἵσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνώτε οὐτα δὴ μὲν ἵσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὖ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἢ ο ἵσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώποτε γε, ὃ Σῶκρατες. Οὐ ταύτων ἄρα ἔστιν, ἢ δ' ὃς, ταύτα τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὃ Σῶκρατες. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἵσων, ἔτερων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἵσου, ὃμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννεόηκας τε καὶ εἰληφας; 'Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τοῦτοι ἢ ἄνομοίου; Πάνυ γε. Διαφέρει δὲ γε, ἢ δ' ὃς, οὐδέν· ἔως ἃν ἄλλο ἱδῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὃψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἴπε ὁμοίου εἴπε ἀνόμουν, ἀναγκαίον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμμησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; ἢ δ' ὃς· ἢ πάσχομεν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἵσοις; ἃρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἵσα εἰναι ὁσπερ αὐτὸ δ' ἔστιν ἵσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνῳ τῷ τοιούτων εἰναι ὅλον τὸ ἵσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τῆς τοῦ ἱδῶν ἐννοήσης, ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τούτῳ, δ 258
or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?"
"Certainly."
"Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?"
"No, Socrates, never."
"Then," said he, "those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract."
"Not at all, I should say, Socrates."
"But from those equals," said he, "which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?"
"Very true," he replied.
"And it is either like them or unlike them?"
"Certainly."
"It makes no difference," said he. "Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection."
"Surely."
"Now then," said he, "do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?"
"They fall very far short of it," said he.
"Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, 'This thing that I see aims at being
νῦν ἐγὼ ὅρῳ, εἶναι οἴον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἴον ἐκεῖνο, ἄλλ' ἐστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαίον ποὺ τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο φ' φησίν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; 'Ανάγκη. Τί οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἢ οὖ, περὶ τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον; Παντάπασι γε. 'Αναγκαίον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἱσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἑδύντες τὰ ἵσα ἐνενοήσαμεν, ὅτι ὁρεῖται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἴον τὸ ἵσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. Ἐστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὀμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἀλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐνενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι, ἄλλ' ἢ ἔκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἀφασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων ταύταν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταύταν γὰρ ἐστιν, ὃ Ἔωκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βούλεται δηλώσαι ὃ λόγος. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δὲι ἐννοῆσαι, ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκεῖνον τε ὁρεῖται τοῦ ὃ ἐστιν ἱσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερά ἐστιν ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; ὅπως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἀρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὅρᾳ καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τὰλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει ποὺ εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἱσον ὃ τι ἐστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἵσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτη εἶναι οἴον ἐκεῖνο, ἐστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὃ Ἔωκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὔθυς ἐωρῶμεν τε

1 Schanz brackets ὅτι προθυμεῖται... φαυλότερα.
like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it, he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?"

"We must."

"Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?"

"It certainly is."

"Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, 'All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.'"

"That is true."

"And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike."

"Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument."

"Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?"

"Yes."

"Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it."

"That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates."
καὶ ἢκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἅλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν;

Σ Πάνω γε. ᾿Εδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τοῦτων τὴν τοῦ ἵσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναι. Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἠοικεῖ, ἀνάγκη ἢμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι. ᾿Εοικεῖν.

20. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἡπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὑθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἵσου καὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἑλαττὸν ἅλλα καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἵσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἢμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὀσίου, καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω,

ἀ περὶ ἀπάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τὸ ὁ ἔστι, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον ἢμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. ᾿Εστὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιτελέσθημεθα, εἰδότας ἀεὶ γνωσθαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι τὸ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦτ ἔστιν, λαβόντα τοῦ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι: ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην λέγομεν, ὁ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολὴν; Πάν-

Ε τως ἤππου, ἐφε, ὁ Σώκρατες. Εἰ δέ γε, οἴμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὅστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ὡς ποτε

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PHAEDO

"And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?"
"Certainly."
"But we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?"
"Yes."
"Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born."
"It does."
"Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of 'absolute' in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth."
"That is true."
"And if after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?"
"Certainly, Socrates," said he.
"But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process
καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἃρ’ οὖν ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκεῖαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἶη; τοῦτο δὲ ποὺ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Πάνω γε. Δυσνατῶν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτὸ 76 γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενον τι ἢ ἱδόντα ἢ ἀκοῦσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσεων λαβόντα ἔτερον τι ἀπὸ τοῦτο ἐννοήσαι, ὃ ἐπελέξακα, ὃ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαξεν ἀνόμοιον ὃ ἢ ὁμοίον ὡστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν τὰ ἔτερα, ὥστιν ἐπιστάμενοι γε αὐτὰ γεγοναμένοι καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὐ γὰρ μαθαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀναμμηνήσκονται οὕτω, καὶ ἢ μάθησις ἀνάμμησις ἂν εἶη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὁ Σώκρατες.

21. Πότερον οὖν αἱρεῖ, ὁ Σιμμία, ἐπισταμένοι μεν ἢμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμμηνήσκεσθαι ὑστερον δὲν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἤμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. Τί δὲ τόδε; ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ; ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἂν ἐπιστᾶται ἔχου ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων δὲν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοίμην μὲντ’ ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὖριον τηρικάδε οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὐδές ἄξιος οἶδ’ τε ὑγεῖ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἡρι δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπιστασθαι γε, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; Οὐδαμῶς.
which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?"

"Assuredly."

"For we found that it is possible, on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be recollection."

"That is certainly true, Socrates."

"Which then do you choose, Simmias? Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth?"

"I cannot choose at this moment, Socrates."

"How about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it: When a man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?"

"Certainly he can, Socrates."

"And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matters about which we have just been talking?"

"I wish they might," said Simmias; "but on the contrary I fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly."

"Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these things?"

"By no means."
'Αναμμυνησκονται ἄρα ἃ ποτε ἔμαθοι; Ἄναγκη. Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἂφʼ οὗ γε ἀνθρώποι γεγόναμεν. Οὐ δὴτα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναι. Ἡσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἰναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἰδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα γυγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατε, ταῦτα τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ

D λείπεται ἐτὶ ὁ χρόνος. Εἰεν, ὦ ἔταϊρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντες γε αὐτὰς γνωρίμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὀμολογήσαμεν· ὡς ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν ὕπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλου τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνου; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἄλλα ἔλαθον ἐμαυτῶν οὐδὲν εἰπόν.

22. Ἀρ’ οὐν οὕτως ἐχει, ἐφή, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ὁ θρυλοῦμεν ἄει, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ὑπάρχουσιν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὕσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνη ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὡσπέρ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταύτα, ἄλλως δὲν ὁ λόγος οὕτως εἰρημένοις εἰη· ἂρ’ οὕτως ἐχει, καὶ ἵστη ἀνάγκη ταύτα τε εἰναί καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταύτα, οὐδὲ

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"Then they recollect the things they once learned?"

"Necessarily."

"When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human beings."

"Certainly not."

"Then previously."

"Yes."

"Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence."

"Unless, Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time still remains."

"Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?"

"None whatever, Socrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense."

"Then, Simmias," said he, "is this the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?"
τάδε; Ἄπερφυώς, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμάς, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτή ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὀμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἣν σὺ λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγνω ὦν ὅτι ὄν ὁ τούτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα εἶναι ὡς ὅλον τε μᾶλλον, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τάλλα πάντα ἃ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἐμὸ δοκεῖ ίκανὸς ἀποδέεικται. Τὶ δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἰκανὸς, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμάς, ὡς ἔγνω ὦν· καὶ τοῦ καρτέρωτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοὺς λόγους· ἀλλὰ ὦν· οὐκ ἐνδείξω τοῦτο πεπείσθαι αὐτῶν, ὅτε πρὶν B γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἣν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴν.

23. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἦτι ἐστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀποδεειχθαί, ἀλλὰ ἐτι ἐνεστηκεν, ὃ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀποδημήσκοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαστήται ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτὴ τοῦ εἶναι τούτο τέλος ἦ. τὶ γὰρ καλῦντι γρήγορον μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ἐξείστασθαι ἀλλοθέν ποθεὶ καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπουν σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι; C Ἐν λέγεις, ἐφη, ὁ Σιμμάς, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὕσπερ ἡμῖν ἀποδεεῖχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἣν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ· δεὶ δὲ προσαποδεῖξαι ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀποδεείξεις ἔχειν. Ἀποδεείκται μὲν, ἐφη, ὁ Σιμμάς τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, 268
"Socrates, it seems to me that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that our soul existed before we were born, and that the essence of which you speak likewise exists. For there is nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most real existence. And I think the proof is sufficient."

"But how about Cebes?" said Socrates. "For Cebes must be convinced, too."

"He is fully convinced, I think," said Simmias; "and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals. Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed before we were born. However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved, Socrates, but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains. For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?"

"You are right, Simmias," said Cebes. "It seems to me that we have proved only half of what is required, namely, that our soul existed before our birth. But we must also show that it exists after we are dead as well as before our birth, if the proof is to be perfect."

"It has been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already," said Socrates, "if you will combine this conclusion
καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθείναι τούτον τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταύτον καὶ ἃν πρὸ τούτου ὁμολογήσας, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πάν τὸ ξῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν μὲν ἢ ψυχή καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αυτὴ εἰς τὸ ξῶν Ἰουσίν τε καὶ γυγνομένη μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, τῶς οὖν ἀνάγκη αὐτήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε δεὶς αὕτης αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὁπερ Ἰέγετε καὶ νῦν.

24. Ὅμως δὲ μοι δοκεῖσιν ὑπὸ τε καὶ Σιμμέας ἡδέως ἂν καὶ τούτων διαπραγματεύσασθαι τὸν λόγον ἐτι μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδιέναι τὸ τῶν παιδῶν, μη ὡς ἀληθῶς ἢ ἀνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσά καὶ διαικεδαύεσθαι, ἀλλος ἑ te καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθνησκων. καὶ ὁ Κέθης ἑπιγελάς: ᾗς δεδιότων, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον ἐν μή ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παις, ὡστε τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται· τοὺτον οὖν πειρῶμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον ὁσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια. Ἄλλα χρή, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἐως ἃν ἐξεπάθητε.

78 Πόθεν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκράτης, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθών ἐπερχόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ σὺ, ἐφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσθε; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἐφη, ὁ Κέθης, ἐν ἐνεκίνητον ἂν ἄγαθοι ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὐδεὶς χρή διερευνάσθαι ξητοῦντας τοιούτων ἐποδόν, μήτε χρήματος φειδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὖν ἐστιν εἰς τι ἄν αναγκαίοτερον ἀναλύσκοιτε χρήματα. ξητεὶν δὲ χρή καὶ αὐτοῦς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἴσως
with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and, when it comes into life and is born, cannot be born from anything else than death and a state of death, must it not also exist after dying, since it must be born again? So the proof you call for has already been given. However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather."

And Cebes laughed and said, "Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin."

"Ah," said Socrates, "you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear."

"Where then, Socrates," said he, "shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?"

"Hellas, Cebes," he replied, "is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also. You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could spend your money. And you must seek among yourselves, too, for
γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲ ῥαδίως εἴροιτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δυναμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἐφη, ὑπάρξει, οὐ Κέβης· οἶδεν δὲ ἀπελίπομεν, ἐπανέλθωμεν, εἰ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλεις; Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις. 25. Οὐκοῦν τοιόνδε τι, ἢ δ' ὅς ο Σωκράτης, δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ πολὺ τινὶ ἄρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάνυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδειναῖ μὴ πάθη αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ πολὺ τινὶ οὖ καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδειναὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς; Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. Ἀρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν οὐσικείου ὑμεῖς προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθήσατε ταύτη ὑπὲρ συνθέθησιν εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει δυν αἰξίωματον, τοῦτο μόνον προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταύτα, εἰπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ; Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη, οὔτως ἔχεις, ο Κέβης. Οὐκοῦν ἀπερ αἰε κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὅσαύτως ἔχει, ταύτα μᾶλλον ἐκόσι εἰναι τὰ αἰξίωματα, ἥ δὲ ἄλλοι ἄλλοι καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα, ταύτα δὲ εἴναι τὰ σύνθετα; Ἑμοιγε δοκεῖ οὔτως. Ἰομεν δὴ, ἐφη, εἰπ ταύτα ἐφ' ἀπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν 272
perhaps you would hardly find others better able
to do this than you.”

“That,” said Cebes, “shall be done. But let us
return to the point where we left off, if you are
willing.”

“Oh, I am willing, of course.”

“Good,” said he.

“Well then,” said Socrates, “must we not ask
ourselves some such question as this? What kind of
thing naturally suffers dispersion, and for what kind
of thing might we naturally fear it, and again
what kind of thing is not liable to it? And after
this must we not inquire to which class the soul
belongs and base our hopes or fears for our souls upon
the answers to these questions?”

“You are quite right,” he replied.

“Now is not that which is compounded and com-
posite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same
way in which it was compounded? And if anything is
uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally
unlikely to be decomposed?”

“I think,” said Cebes, “that is true.”

“Then it is most probable that things which are
always the same and unchanging are the uncom-
pounded things and the things that are changing and
never the same are the composite things?”

“Yes, I think so.”

“Let us then,” said he, “turn to what we were
discussing before. Is the absolute essence, which we
in our dialectic process of question and answer call
ture being, always the same or is it liable to change?
Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute
existence, true being—do they ever admit of any
change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence,
καθ' αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμώς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ὡσαύτως, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ὁ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἔπως ἢ ἴματίων ἢ ἀλλων ὀντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ἢ ἔσων ἢ καλῶν ἢ πάντων τῶν ἑκείνων ὁμοιόμορων; ἀρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἢ πάν τούν ἀντίοι ἑκείνους οὐτε αὐτά αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλους οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔτσι εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταύτα; Οὕτως, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης: οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει. 79 Οὖκοιον τούτων μὲν καὶ ἄψαυο κὰ κὸν ἰδείς κὰ τϊς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεως αἴσθησιν, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅταν ὅτε ἄλλο ἐπιλάβοις ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοοῖς λογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀειθή τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὕτω ὡρατά; Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

26. Ὡδὲν οὖν βούλει, ἐφη, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὅρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειθῆς; Ὡδὲν, ἐφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειθῆς οἱ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχουν, τὸ δὲ ὅρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα; Καὶ τούτο, ἐφη, θῶμεν. Β Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἀλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφη. Ποτέροι οὖν ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαίμεν ἄν εἶναι καὶ ἔγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντὶ, ἐφη, τούτῳ γε δῆλον, ὡς τῷ ὅρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὅρατόν ἡ ἀειθῆς; Οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων γε, ὁ Σώκρατες,
PHAEODO

since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change?"

"It must," said Cebes, "necessarily remain the same, Socrates."

"But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?"

"The latter," said Cebes; "they are never the same."

"And you can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen?"

"Certainly," said he, "that is true."

"Now," said he, "shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?"

"Let us assume them," said Cebes.

"And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?"

"Let us assume that also," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?"

"Yes," he replied.

"Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?"

"To the visible," said he; "that is clear to everyone."

"And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"

"Invisible, to man, at least, Socrates."
PLATO

ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ ἰμεῖς γε τὰ ὀρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν· ἡ ἄλλη τινὶ οἶει; Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὄρατον ἡ ἀόρατον εἶναι; Οὐχ ὄρατον. Ἀειδῆς ἁρα; Νάι. Ὀμοίότερον ἄρα ψυχῆ σώματος ἐστιν τῷ ἀειδεί, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὀρατῷ. Πάσα ἀνάγκη, ὁ Ἔρκρατες.

27. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι λέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρηται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὄραν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἁκούειν ἢ δι’ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως—τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τι—, τότε μὲν ἐλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ ἀυδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτῇ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἰλυγμῆ ὁσπερ μεθύουσα, ἃτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη; Πάνω γε. Ὁταν δὲ γε αὐτῇ καθ’ αὑτῆν σκοπῆ, ἐκείσε οὐχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἀεὶ δυ καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὀσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενῆς οὕσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὃτανπερ αὐτῇ καθ’ αὑτῆν γένηται καὶ ἔξη αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυται τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περι ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὀσαύτως ἔχει, ἃτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὁ Ἔρκρατες. Ποτέρῳ οὖν αὖ σοι δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν καὶ ἐκ 276
PHAEDO

"But we call things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we not?"
"Yes, we do."
"Then what do we say about the soul? Can it be seen or not?"
"It cannot be seen."
"Then it is invisible?"
"Yes."
"Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body is, and the body more like the visible."
"Necessarily, Socrates."

"Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?"
"Certainly."

"But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so?"

"Socrates," said he, "what you say is perfectly right and true."

"And now again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Ε τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχή ὁμοίτερον εἶναι καὶ ἔννογενέστερον; Πάς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ’ ὄς, συν-χωρήσαι, ὥ Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλος καὶ παντὶ ὁμοί-τερὸν ἔστιν ψυχή τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μῆ. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

28. ᾧ ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε, ἵτι, ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ ἀνύφῳ δὲ ὡς ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἀρχεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν καὶ κατὰ ταύτα αὐτὸ πόρευν σοι δοκεῖ δῶμοιν τῷ θεῷ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θυντῷ; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄγγελον-νεῦειν περικέναι, τῷ δὲ θυντῷ ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἡμοιογενής. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχὴ εἰςκεν; Ἡλία δὴ, ὥ Σώκρατες, ὃτι ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῷ θεῷ, τῷ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θυντῷ. Σκόπης δὲς, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῶν εὐμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θεῖῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ωσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντι έαυτῷ ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι ψυ-χήν, τῷ δὲ ἕνθρωπῳ καὶ θυντῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀναυτῷ καὶ διαλύτῳ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντι έαυτῷ ὁμοίωτατον αὐτῇ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομεν τι παρὰ ταύτα ἀλλο λέγειν, ὁ φίλε Κέβης, ἡ οὖχ οὕτως ἔχει; Ὡκ ἔχομεν.

29. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἔχοντων ἄρ’ οὐχὶ σῶματι μὲν ταχῦ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχῇ δὲ αὐτῷ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἡ ἐγγύς τι τοῦ-
class do you think the soul has greater likeness and kinship?"

"I think, Socrates," said he, "that anyone, even the dullest, would agree, after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always the same than that which is not."

"And the body?"

"Is more like the other."

"Consider, then, the matter in another way. When the soul and the body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Now this being the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or do you not think that the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to obey and serve?"

"Yes, I think so."

"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"

"Clearly, Socrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal."

"Then see, Cebes, if this is not the conclusion from all that we have said, that the soul is most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging, and the body, on the contrary, most like the human and mortal and multiform and dissoluble and ever changing. Can we say anything, my dear Cebes, to show that this is not so?"

"No, we cannot."

"Well then, since this is the case, is it not natural for the body to meet with speedy dissolution and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or nearly so?"
ποις γὰρ οὗ; Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, διτι, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνθρωπος, τὸ μὲν ὅρατον αὐτοῦ, τὸ σῶμα, καὶ ἐν ὅρατῳ κείμενον, ὥ δὴ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, δὴ προσήκει διαλύεσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν, οὐκ εὐθὺς τοῦτον οὖδὲν πέποιθεν, ἀλλ` ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἔπιμενει χρόνον, ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ, καὶ πάνυ μάλα. συμπεσὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθὲν, ὅσπερ οἱ ἐν Λιγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὅλιγον ὅλον μενεῖ ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον.1 ἔνα δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἂν σαπῆ, ὅστα τε καὶ νεῦρα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατα ἐστιν· ἦ οὗ; Ναι. 'Η δὲ ψυχὴ ἅρα, τὸ ἀειδές, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰκόμευον γενναίον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδή, εἰς Ἀιδόν ὡς ἄλθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἄγαθον καὶ φρόνιμον θεόν, οἱ, ἃν θεός ἐθέλη, αὐτικα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἱτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὐτω πεφυκών ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλωλεν, ὡς φασιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποι; πολλοὺ γε δει, ᾧ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμιλά, ἀλλά πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὀδ' ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ξυνεφέλουσα, ἀτε οὔδεν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτῷ καὶ συνηθροισμένη2 αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν, ἀτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ τοῦτο—τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ὁ ὅρθως φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ 81 ὄντι τεθνάναι μελετῶσα.3 ἦ οὖ τοῖς ἂν εἰς

1 Schanz brackets συμπεσὸν . . χρόνον.
3 The MSS. read μελετῶσα ῥάδιως. Schanz brackets ῥάδιως.
"Of course."

"Observe," he went on, "that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition, does not undergo these processes at once, but remains for a considerable time, and even for a very long time, if death takes place when the body is in good condition, and at a favourable time of the year. For when the body is shrunk and embalmed, as is done in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incalculable time. And even if the body decay, some parts of it, such as the bones and sinews and all that, are, so to speak, indestructible. Is not that true?"

"Yes."

"But the soul, the invisible, which departs into another place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, to the realm of the god of the other world in truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go,—is this soul, which has such qualities and such a nature, straightforward scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say? Far from it, dear Cebrus and Simmias, but the truth is much rather this:—if it departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body, because it never willingly associated with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself into itself alone, since this has always been its constant study—but this means nothing else than that it pursued philosophy rightly and really practised being in a state of death: or is not this the practice of death?"
μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασι γε. Ούκοιν οὔτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὁμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἄειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖον τε καὶ άθανατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οὐ ἀφικο-
μένη ὑπάρχηι αὐτῇ εὐδαιμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἔρωτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη,
όσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὁς ἁλη-
θῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγοισα;
οὔτω φῶμεν, ὁ Κέβης, ἡ ἄλλος;
30. Οὔτω νη Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. 'Εαν δὲ γε,
Β οίμαι, μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος
ἀπαλλάττηται, ἀτε τῷ σώματι ἁμέν ἡνουσα καὶ
τούτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἔρωσα καὶ γεγοιτυερένη
ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἥδουν, ὡς
tε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθῆς ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ
σωματοεἰδεῖς, οὐ τις ἂν ἄρατο καὶ ἱδοι καὶ πῶι
καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρός τα ἀφροδίσια χρῆσαιτο, τὸ
δὲ τοὺς ὑμμασι σκοτώδεις καὶ ἄειδες, ὑπητόν δὲ καὶ
φιλοσοφία αἱρετῶν, τούτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε
καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὔτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οὐεί
C ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινή ἀπαλλά-
ξεσθαι; Οὐδ' ὅπωστιοι, ἔφη. 'Ἀλλα καὶ διει-
λημμένη γε, οίμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὁ
αὐτὴ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ
tο ἁμέν ἡνυεῖν καὶ διὰ τὴν πολὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε εὐμφυτον; Πάντα γε. Ἐμβριδῆς δὲ
γε, ὁ φίλε, τούτο οὔσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ
γεώδεις καὶ ὀρατοὶ· ὁ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη
ψυχὴ βαρύνει τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν
ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ "Διδοῦ,
D ὁσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μυηματα τε καὶ τοὺς
τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁφθη ἄττα
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"By all means."

"Then if it is in such a condition, it goes away into that which is like itself, into the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, and when it arrives there it is happy, freed from error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills, and as the initiated say, lives in truth through all after time with the gods. Is this our belief, Cebes, or not?"

"Assuredly," said Cebes.

"But, I think, if when it departs from the body it is defiled and impure, because it was always with the body and cared for it and loved it and was fascinated by it and its desires and pleasures, so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ in the pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and tangible to philosophy—do you think a soul in this condition will depart pure and uncontaminated?"

"By no means," said he.

"But it will be interpenetrated, I suppose, with the corporeal which intercourse and communion with the body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its constant companion and the object of its care?"

"Certainly."

"And, my friend, we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and heavy and earthly and visible. And such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world, and so, as they say, it flits about the monuments and the tombs, where shadowy shapes of souls have been.
Ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, διὰ παρέχονται αἱ τοιαύται ψυχαὶ εἰδωλὰ, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὅρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται. Εἰκὸς γε, οὐ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὁ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταύταις εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαιλῶν, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνος τις προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὕσης· καὶ μέχρι γε τοῦτον ἔπλανώνται, ἐς τὴν τοῦ ξυνετακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνδεδῶσιν εἰς σῶμα. 31. Ἐνδοῦνται δὲ, ὡσπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαύτα ἢθη ὅποι ἄττ' ἀν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

Τὰ ποία δὴ ταύτα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; ᾗς τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὑβρείς καὶ φιλοσοφιας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διευλαβημένους, εἰς τὰ τῶν ὅνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύουσθαι. ἦ ὅπις οἶει; Πάνυ μὲν ὅπις εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τούς δὲ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἄρταγας προτετμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἅγιον νεκρὴν· ἢ ποι ἄν ἀλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἀμέλει, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὃς, ἄλλως δὴ καὶ τᾶλα, ἦ ἄν ἐκαστὰ ἴοι, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης; Δῆλον δὴ, ἐφη· πῶς δ' οὐ; Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονίστατοι, ἐφη, καὶ τούτων εἰς καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ὑντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν

Β καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἐθος τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυιαν ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ 284
seen, figures of those souls which were not set free in purity but retain something of the visible; and this is why they are seen."

"That is likely, Socrates."

"It is likely, Cebes. And it is likely that those are not the souls of the good, but those of the base, which are compelled to flit about such places as a punishment for their former evil mode of life. And they flit about until through the desire of the corporeal which clings to them they are again imprisoned in a body. And they are likely to be imprisoned in natures which correspond to the practices of their former life."

"What natures do you mean, Socrates?"

"I mean, for example, that those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them, are likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort. Do you not think so?"

"Certainly that is very likely."

"And those who have chosen injustice and tyranny and robbery pass into the bodies of wolves and hawks and kites. Where else can we imagine that they go?"

"Beyond a doubt," said Cebes, "they pass into such creatures."

"Then," said he, "it is clear where all the others go, each in accordance with its own habits?"

"Yes," said Cebes, "of course."

"Then," said he, "the happiest of those, and those who go to the best place, are those who have practised, by nature and habit, without philosophy or reason, the social and civil virtues which are called moderation and justice?"
νοῦ; Πῶς δὴ οὖτοι ευδαιμονεστατοὶ; "Οτι τούτους εἰκός ἔστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικινεῖσθαι πολιτικῶν τε καὶ ἤμερον γένος, ἢ ποιο μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταύτῳ γείσνον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γινεσθαι εἰς αὐτῶν ἀνδρας μετρίους· Εἰκός.

32. Εἰς δὲ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικινεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ. ἀλλὰ τούτων ἑνεκα, ὃ ἑταῖρε Σιμώνα τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὅρθως φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὗ παραδιδόσασιν αὐταῖς ἐαυτοὺς, οὐ τε οἰκοθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβοῦμεν, ὡσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματι· οὔδὲ αὐτίμαν τε καὶ ἰδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὡσπερ οἱ φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλότιμοι, ἐπειτα ἄπεχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὃ Κέβης. Οὐ, μέντοι μα Δία, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τουγάρτω νεοῦτος μὲν ἀπασῶν, ὃ Κέβης, ἐκεῖνοι, οὐδέ τι μέλει τῆς ἐαυτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σώματι λατρεύοντες ἰζῶσι, χαῖρεν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταύτα πομεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδότας ὅτι ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἐκείνῃ λύσει τε καὶ καθαρῳ ταύτῃ τρέπονται ἐκείνῃ ἐσπῶμεν, ἦ ἐκείνη υφηγεῖται.

33. Πῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες; Ἔγω ἐρῶ, ἔφη. ἡγονόςκουσι γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὑπὲρ παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχήν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀληθῶς

1 λατρεύοντες is an emendation proposed by Schanz for πλάστοντες of the MSS.
"How are these happiest?"

"Don't you see? Is it not likely that they pass again into some such social and gentle species as that of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the human race again, and that worthy men spring from them?"

"Yes."

"And no one who has not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to enter into the communion of the gods, but only the lover of knowledge. It is for this reason, dear Simmias and Cebes, that those who truly love wisdom refrain from all bodily desires and resist them firmly and do not give themselves up to them, not because they fear poverty or loss of property, as most men, in their love of money, do; nor is it because they fear the dishonour or disgrace of wickedness, like the lovers of honour and power, that they refrain from them."

"No, that would not be seemly for them, Socrates," said Cebes.

"Most assuredly not," said he. "And therefore those who care for their own souls, and do not live in service to the body, turn their backs upon all these men and do not walk in their ways, for they feel that they know not whither they are going. They themselves believe that philosophy, with its deliverance and purification, must not be resisted, and so they turn and follow it whithersoever it leads."

"How do they do this, Socrates?"

"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of knowledge," said he, "perceive that when philo-
Ε διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὁσπερ διὰ εἰρήμοι διὰ τούτου σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὴν δι᾽ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰρήμου τῆς δεινότητας κατιδοῦσα ὅτι δι᾽ ἐπιθυμίας ἔστιν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος

83 ξυλλήπτωρ εἶν τοῦ δεδέσθαι,—ὁσερ ὁν νέων, γιγνώσκοντιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὐτί παραλαμβοῦσα η φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἠρέμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἑπιχειρεῖ, εὐδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστῇ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων σκέψις, ἀπάτης δε ἡ διὰ τῶν ὄστων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἀνάγκη αὐτῶν χρῆσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ξυλλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευομένη, πιστεύεις δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ.

Β ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτῆ, ὃ τι ἄν νοήσῃ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων· ὃ τι δ’ ἄν δι’ ἄλλων σκοπῆ ἐν ἄλλοις ὑπ’ ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἤγεισθαι ἄληθές· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοῖοτον αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ὁρατὸν, ὃ δὲ αὐτὴ ὀρά νοητὸν τε καὶ ἀειδὲς. ταύτης ὃς τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰκομένη δεῖν ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἦ τοῦ ὡς ἄληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀπέχει τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίων καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, καθ’ ὃδεν δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν τις σφόδρα ἤσθη ἢ φοβηθή ἢ λυπηθή ἢ ἐπιθυμήσῃ, οὐδὲν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐπαθεῖν ἀπὶ αὐτῶν ἃν ἄν τις οἰκεῖ, ὃν ἡ νοσήσας ὃ τι ἀναλώσας

C διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλ’ ὁ πάντων μέγιστον τε κακόν καὶ ἐσχατὸν ἔστι, τοῦτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτό. Τί τούτο, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἔφη ὁ
sophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely fastened and welded to the body and is compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars, not with its own unhindered vision, and is wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy sees that the most dreadful thing about the imprisonment is the fact that it is caused by the lusts of the flesh, so that the prisoner is the chief assistant in his own imprisonment. The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can, considering that when anyone has violent pleasures or fears or griefs or lusts he suffers from them not merely what one might think—for example, illness or loss of money spent for his lusts—but he suffers the greatest and most extreme evil and does not take it into account."

"What is this evil, Socrates?" said CebeS.
Κέβης "Οτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἄμα τε ἢσθήναι ἡ λυπηθήναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ ἂν μάλιστα τούτῳ πάσχῃ, τούτῳ ἐναργείστατον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθεύστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχων ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὀρατὰ; ἦ οὖν;

D Πάνυ γε. Ὅνυκοιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδείκται ψυχὴ ὑπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δὴ; "Οτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὦσπερ ἢλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερνᾶ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματειδῆ, δοξάζονταν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἀπερ ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φη. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὠμοδοξείν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἵμαι ὁμότροπος τε καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε εἰς "Αἰδοῦ καθαρῶς ἀφικέσθαι, ἄλλα ἂεί τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξίναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ Ἐ ὦσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀμοιρὸς εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. 'Αληθεύστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες.

34. Τούτων τοίνυν ἐνεκά, ὁ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμῳ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὅπως οἱ 84 πολλοὶ ἐνεκά· ἢ σὺ οἴει; Οὐ δήτα ἐγώγε. Οὐ γὰρ, ἄλλῳ οὕτω λογίσαιτ' ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθεῖ τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι ἐαυτὴν λύειν, λυνοῦσας δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτὴν ταῖς ἡδοναις καὶ λύπαις ἐαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδείκται καὶ ἀνήμυντον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης.
"The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not. These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?"

"Certainly."

"And when this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body?"

"How so?"

"Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it, like seed that is sown. Therefore it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and absolute."

"What you say, Socrates, is very true," said Cebes.

"This, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; not the world's reason. Or do you disagree?"

"Certainly not."

"No, for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy should set it free, and that then when set free it should give itself again into bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil, like Penelope unweaving the web she wove. No, his
τινὰ ἐναντίως ἵστον μεταχειριζομένην, ἄλλα γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὐσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου

B τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οὐ οὐτω δείν, ἐώς ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων κακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ἡ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμοιν διαφυσιθείσα καὶ διαπτομένη οὐχίται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἑ.

35. Συγγε ὦν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ

C Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἢν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ίδειν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρόν πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ διελεγόσθην καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἤρετο. Τί; ἐφῆ, ὦ μῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεώς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἰ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἰκανῶς διεξεῖναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἀλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δὲ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτο, μηδὲν ἀποκυνήσῃς καὶ αὐτὸι

D εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἰ πῃ μὴν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἄν λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἰ τι μᾶλλον οἶδεθεν μετ’ ἐμοῖν εὔπορησθεν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἐφη. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τάληθη σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἐτερον προωθεὶ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσσαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν

1 After φοβηθῇ the MSS. read ταῦτα τί ἐπιτηδεύσασα. Ast bracketed this and is followed by Schanz and Burnet.
soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, must follow reason and abide always in it, beholding that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food; and in this way it believes it must live, while life endures, and then at death pass on to that which is akin to itself and of like nature, and be free from human ills. A soul which has been nurtured in this way, Simmias and Cebes, is not likely to fear that it will be torn asunder at its departure from the body and will vanish into nothingness, blown apart by the winds, and be no longer anywhere."

When Socrates had said this there was silence for a long time, and Socrates himself was apparently absorbed in what had been said, as were also most of us. But Simmias and Cebes conversed a little with each other; and Socrates saw them and said: "Do you think there is any incompleteness in what has been said? There are still many subjects for doubt and many points open to attack, if anyone cares to discuss the matter thoroughly. If you are considering anything else, I have nothing to say; but if you are in any difficulty about these matters, do not hesitate to speak and discuss them yourselves, if you think anything better could be said on the subject, and to take me along with you in the discussion, if you think you can get on better in my company."

And Simmias said: "Socrates, I will tell you the truth. For some time each of us has been in doubt and has been egging the other on and urging him to ask a question, because we wish to hear your answer,
μὲν ἄκούσας, ὁκνεῖν δὲ ὡχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἄρδες ἢ διὰ τὴν παρούσαν συμφορὰν. καὶ δε ἄκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησίν, Βαβάι, Ε ὦ Σιμιᾶ; ἢ ποι χαλεπῶς ἀν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι, ὡς οὐ συμφορὰν ἡγούμαι τὴν παρούσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηθ' ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε, μὴ δυσκολότερὸν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ καὶ, ὅσ ἐσοκε, τὸν κύκνων δοκῶ φαινότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικὴν, οὐ ἐπειδὰν αἰσθῶνται ὅτι δεὶ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸσθεν χρόνῳ, 85 τὸτε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ μάλιστα ἄδουσι, γεγονότες ὅτι μέλλοντι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἄπιεναι, οὐτέρ έἴσι θεράποντες. οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασίν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται, ὅτι οὔδεν ὄρνευν ἢδει, ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ βρυχῇ ἢ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἢ τε άνδρῶν καὶ χειλιδῶν καὶ ἢ ἐποψί, ἢ δὴ φασι διὰ λύπης θρηνοῦντα ἢδειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε ταύτα μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἢδειν οὔτε οἱ Β' κύκνοι, ἀλλ' ἄτε οἴμαι τοῦ 'Απόλλωνος ὄντες μαντικοὶ τε εἰςι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν 'Αἴδον ἀγαθὰ ἄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθὲν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλος γε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ιέρος τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χείρος ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ τούτου γε ἐνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὦ τι ἄν βούλησθε, ἦσε ἄν 'Αθηναίων ἐώςιν ἀνδρές 294
but hesitate to trouble you, for fear that it may be disagreeable to you in your present misfortune."

And when he heard this, he laughed gently and said: "Ah, Simmias! I should have hard work to persuade other people that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, when I cannot even make you believe it, but you are afraid I am more churlish now than I used to be. And you seem to think I am inferior in prophetic power to the swans who sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die, sing most and best in their joy that they are to go to the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, misrepresent the swans and say that they sing for sorrow, in mourning for their own death. They do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or has any other trouble; no, not even the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe which are said to sing in lamentation. I do not believe they sing for grief, nor do the swans; but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans, and am consecrated to the same. God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask whatever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit."
PLATO

ἔνδεικα. 1 Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ὁ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἵσως ὁσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλειπόν τι, τὸ μὲντοι αὐτὰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ σοὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχὲς σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακὸν εἶναι ἀνδρός· δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γε τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅτι ἔχει ἡ εὐρείτerior, εἰ ταύτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου χρόκῳμενον ὁσπερ ἐτὶ σχεδὸν κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεύσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὑπῆρματος, λόγου θείον τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγνωκε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθῆσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταύτα λέγεις, οὐθέν ἐμαντὸν αὐτιάσομαι ἐν. ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ, ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἴπον δὲ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαντόν καὶ πρὸς τὸνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρήμενα, οὐ δὲν φαίνεται ἰκανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

Ε 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης· Ἡσὺς γὰρ, ἔφη, ὁ ἐταίρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὅτι δὴ σοὶ ἰκανῶς. Ταύτη ἐμοιγε, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ἢ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἀν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τούτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἢ μὲν ἀρμονία ἀνορτόν τι καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλὸν τι καὶ 86 θεῖον ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ λύρα

1 Schanz brackets ἢσ... ἐνδεκα.
"Good," said Simmias. "I will tell you my difficulty, and then Cebe in turn will say why he does not agree to all you have said. I think, Socrates, as perhaps you do yourself, that it is either impossible or very difficult to acquire clear knowledge about these matters in this life. And yet he is a weakling who does not test in every way what is said about them and persevere until he is worn out by studying them on every side. For he must do one of two things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation, and make his voyage more safely and securely. And so now I am not ashamed to ask questions, since you encourage me to do so, and I shall not have to blame myself hereafter for not saying now what I think. For, Socrates, when I examine what has been said, either alone or with Cebe, it does not seem quite satisfactory."

And Socrates replied: "Perhaps, my friend, you are right. But tell me in what respect it is not satisfactory."

"In this," said he, "that one might use the same argument about harmony and a lyre with its strings. One might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful and divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its strings are bodies,
καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδή καὶ ξύνθητα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θυντοῦ ξυνγ-γενῆ. ἔπειδὰν οὗ ἡ κατάξη τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμη 1 καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἰ τις δισυχυρ-ξιτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολολέαναι· οὔδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἃν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἢτι εἶναι διερρωγοίν τῶν χορδῶν 2 καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θυντοειδεῖς οὕσας, τὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν ἀπολολέαναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυὴ τε καὶ ξυνγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θυντοῦ ἀπολομένην ἀλλὰ φάλη ἀνάγκη ἔτι του εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπή-σεσθαι, πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν, — καὶ γὰρ οὗν, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτῶν σε τοῦτο ἐντευμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιούτων τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμ-βάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ύγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν,

C κράσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταύτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυχικῶς ἡ ψυχή οὕσα ἀρμονία τις, δήλου ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σώμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἑπταθῆ ὑπὸ νόσου καὶ ἀλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολολέαναι, καίπερ οὕσαν θειοτάτην, ὡσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς φθονοῖς καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πάσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺν

1 Schanz brackets διατέμη.
2 Schanz brackets διερρωγοίν τῶν χορδῶν.

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and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that which is mortal. Now if someone shatters the lyre or cuts and breaks the strings, what if he should maintain by the same argument you employed, that the harmony could not have perished and must still exist? For there would be no possibility that the lyre and its strings, which are of mortal nature, still exist after the strings are broken, and the harmony, which is related and akin to the divine and the immortal, perish before that which is mortal. He would say that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings must rot away before anything could happen to it. And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed. Now if the soul is a harmony, it is clear that when the body is too much relaxed or is too tightly strung by diseases or other ills, the soul must of necessity perish, no matter how divine it is, like other harmonies in sounds and in all the works of artists, and the remains of each body will endure a
37. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὃσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας. εἶ οὖν τις οὕτως εὐπορότερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ ὦν φαύλως ἔοικεν ἀπτομένω τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι ἐρόμαι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι, τί αὐθ ὀδι ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἴνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσόμεθα, τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἀκούσαντας ἡ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, εἰ στὸ δοκῶσι προσάδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, οὕτως ἥδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ’ ἀγε, ἡ δ’ ὄς, ὁ Κέβης, λέγει, τὶ ἦν τὸ σὲ αὐθ θράπτων. Δέγω δὴ, ἡ δ’ ὄς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταύτων ἐγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὧν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τὸ τὸ εἴδος ἔλθειν, οὐκ ἀνατίθεμαι μὴ ὦ, ἵνα πάνυ χαριέντως, καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἐπανεῖμεν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανός ἀποδεῖχθαι. ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἔτι που ἐσται, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τήδε. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἵσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρωμότερον ψυχὴ σῶματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σιμμίου ἀντιλήψει δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνυ πολύ διαφέρειν. τὶ οὖν, ἄν φαιν ὁ λόγος, ἦτι ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὲρ ἄποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ γε ἀσθενέστερον ἔτι ὄν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρωμότερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἔτι σφέσθαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τούτο τὸ δε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἶ τι

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long time until they are burnt or decayed. Now what shall we say to this argument, if anyone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in what is called death?"

Then Socrates, looking keenly at us, as he often used to do, smiled and said: "Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point. However, I think before replying to him we ought to hear what fault our friend Cebeş finds with our argument, that we may take time to consider what to say, and then when we have heard them, we can either agree with them, if they seem to strike the proper note, or, if they do not, we can proceed to argue in defence of our reasoning. Come, Cebeş," said he, "tell us what it was that troubled you."

"Well, I will tell you," said Cebeş. "The argument seems to me to be just where it was, and to be still open to the objection I made before. For I do not deny that it has been very cleverly, and, if I may say so, conclusively shown that the soul existed before it entered into this bodily form, but it does not seem to me proved that it will still exist when we are dead. I do not agree with Simmias' objection, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for I think it is far superior in all such respects. 'Why then,' the argument might say, 'do you still disbelieve, when you see that after a man dies the weaker part still exists? Do you not think the stronger part must necessarily be preserved during the same length of time?'" Now see if my
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λέγω εἰκόνος γάρ τινος, ός ἔοικεν, κἀγὼ ὅσπερ Σιμμίλας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὅσπερ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου υφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγω τοῦτο τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλολεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ἀλλ' ἔστι ποιοῦσα, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτιον ὧν ἡμεί-χετο αὐτὸς υφηγάμενος, ὅτι ἔστι σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλολεν, καὶ εἰ τὰς ἀπίστοικας αὐτῶ, ἀνερωτάθη

C πότερον πολυχρονιώτερον ἦστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἱματία ἐν χρείᾳ τε ὄντος καὶ φορομένου, ἀποκριναμένου δὲ τινὸς ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷον ἀποδεδείχθαι ὅτι παντὸς ἀρὰ μᾶλλον ὣς ἀνθρώπος σῶς ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ γε ὀλυγχρονιώ-τερον οὐκ ἀπόλολεν. τὸ δ' οἴμαι, ὦ Σιμμίλα, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἡ λέγω. πάς γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβοι ὅτι εὐθεῖας λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὃ γὰρ υφάντης οὕτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαύτα ἱμάτια καὶ υφηγάμενος ἔκειναν μὲν

D ὡστερός ἀπόλολεν πολλῶν ὄντων, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἴμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον τοῦτον ξενικα ἀνθρωπός ἔστιν ἱματίαν φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἴμαι εἰκόνα δέξατ' ἂν ψυχή πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι ἃν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχή πολυχρόνιον ἔστι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενε-στερὸν καὶ ὀλυγχρονιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίνη ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σῶμα κατατρίζειν, ἀλλωσ τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἔτη βιώσει· εἰ γὰρ ρέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολύσωτο ἔτι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,

Ε ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχή ἦ γὰρ τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφαίνοι,

1 σὺς Schanz, after Forster; ίσως BDDE.
reply to this has any sense. I think I may, like Simmias, best express myself in a figure. It seems to me that it is much as if one should say about an old weaver who had died, that the man had not perished but was safe and sound somewhere, and should offer as a proof of this the fact that the cloak which the man had woven and used to wear was still whole and had not perished. Then if anyone did not believe him, he would ask which lasts longer, a man or a cloak that is in use and wear, and when the answer was given that a man lasts much longer, he would think it had been proved beyond a doubt that the man was safe, because that which was less lasting had not perished.

"But I do not think he is right, Simmias, and I ask you especially to notice what I say. Anyone can understand that a man who says this is talking nonsense. For the weaver in question wove and wore out many such cloaks and lasted longer than they, though they were many, but perished, I suppose, before the last one. Yet a man is not feeble or weaker than a cloak on that account at all. And I think the same figure would apply to the soul and the body and it would be quite appropriate to say in like manner about them, that the soul lasts a long time, but the body lasts a shorter time and is weaker. And one might go on to say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if the man lives many years. For if the body is constantly changing and being destroyed while the man still lives, and the soul is always weaving anew that which wears out, then
انياγκαίον μέντ' ἂν εἰη, ὅποτε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὑφασμα τυχείν αὐτὴν ἔχονσαν καὶ τοῦτον μόνον προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ' ἢδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἄσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπέν διοίκοιτο. ὧστε τοῦτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὕτω ἀξιον πιστεύσαντα θαρρεῖν, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἔτι ποι ἴμων ἡ ψυχή ἔσται. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἀ σὺ λέγεις συγχρῆσειν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἴματις χρόνῳ εἶναι ἴμων τας ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλυέω καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἐσεθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖ- σθαι αὐτῆς. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἵσχυρον εἶναι, ὡστε πολλάκις γυνομένην ψυχήν ἀντέχειν δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκείνο μηκέτε συγχρονῷ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσιν γε ἐν τινὶ τῶν βανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι. B τούτων δὲ τῶν βανατον καὶ βαντὴν τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος, ἡ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει διέκθη, μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτροῦν αἰοθάνε- σθαι ἴμων· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως εἴχει, οὐδενὶ προσή- κει βανάτον βαρροῦτι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτοις θαρρεῖν, ὅ τι μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξει ὧτι ἔστι ψυχή παντά- πασιν ἀδάνατον τε καὶ ἀνόλθθεν εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τῶν μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαξεύξει παντάπασιν ἀπολῆσαι. 38. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν C ἀνήσας διετήθημεν, ὡς ὕστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμπροσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἴματα πάλιν ἔδοκοι ἀναταράξει καὶ
when the soul perishes it must necessarily have on its last garment, and this only will survive it, and when the soul has perished, then the body will at once show its natural weakness and will quickly disappear in decay. And so we are not yet justified in feeling sure, on the strength of this argument, that our souls will still exist somewhere after we are dead. For if one were to grant even more to a man who uses your argument, Socrates, and allow not only that our souls existed before we were born, but also that there is nothing to prevent some of them from continuing to exist and from being born and dying again many times after we are dead, because the soul is naturally so strong that it can endure repeated births,—even allowing this, one might not grant that it does not suffer by its many births and does not finally perish altogether in one of its deaths. But he might say that no one knows beforehand the particular death and the particular dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul, for none of us can perceive that. Now if this is the case, anyone who feels confident about death has a foolish confidence, unless he can show that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. Otherwise a man who is about to die must always fear that his soul will perish utterly in the impending dissolution of the body."

Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards, were very uncomfortable when we heard what they said; for we had been thoroughly convinced by the previous argument, and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and
eis ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἰμεν κριταί ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἀπισταὶ ἢ.

ἐξεκρατήση. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὁ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν με νῦν ἀκούσαντα σου τοιούτον τι λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ὃ ἐπέρχεται: τών οὖν ἐτί πιστεύσομεν λόγῳ; ὃς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανὸς ὁν, διὸ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγου, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν. θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μοι ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἂν, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἰναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὡσπερ ὑπέμνησέν με ῥηθεὶς ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ μοι ταῦτα προουδέδοκτο. καὶ πάνω δειμαι πάλιν ὡσπερ εἰς ἀρχής ἀλλον των λόγων, ὅσ με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συναποδημήσει ἡ ψυχή. λέγει οὖν πρὸς Διὸς, ἔ ο Σωκράτης ἐ μετήλθε τὸν λόγου; καὶ πότερον κάκεινος, ὡς περ ὑμᾶς φης, ἐνδηλός τι ἐγένετο ἀχθόμενος ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρῶς ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν ἡ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῶν δίελθε ὡς σύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

Φαίδων. Καὶ μήν, ὁ Ἑσέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας Σωκράτης οὐ πάσποτε μάλλον ἥγασθην ἢ τότε παραγενόμενος, τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὁ τι λέγων ἐκεῖνος, ἵσως οὐδέν ἄτοπον ἀλλὰ ἐγογει μάλιστα ἔθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τούτο, ὡς ἒδεος καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἁγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἔπειτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὁξεός ἔσθετο ὁ πεπόθθεμεν ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἔπειτα ὡς εὐ ἡμᾶς ἱσατο καὶ ὡσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ
distrust, not only in respect to the past discussion but also with regard to any future one. They made us fear that our judgment was worthless or that no certainty could be attained in these matters.

Echecrates. By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathise with you; for I myself after listening to you am inclined to ask myself: "What argument shall we believe henceforth? For the argument of Socrates was perfectly convincing, and now it has fallen into discredirt." For the doctrine that the soul is a kind of harmony has always had (and has now) a wonderful hold upon me, and your mention of it reminded me that I had myself believed in it before. Now I must begin over again and find another argument to convince me that when a man dies his soul does not perish with him. So, for heaven's sake, tell how Socrates continued the discourse, and whether he also, as you say the rest of you did, showed any uneasiness, or calmly defended his argument. And did he defend it successfully? Tell us everything as accurately as you can.

Phaedo. Echecrates, I have often wondered at Socrates, but never did I admire him more than then. That he had an answer ready was perhaps to be expected; but what astonished me more about him was, first, the pleasant, gentle, and respectful manner in which he listened to the young men's criticisms, secondly, his quick sense of the effect their words had upon us, and lastly, the skill with which he cured us and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and
ΠŁATO

 لديناΜένος ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προὔτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ἐκεκρατῆσθε. Πῶς δὲ;

φαίδων. Ἡγὼ ἐρῶ. ἑτυχθος γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ

καθήμενος παρὰ τὴν κλάσην ἐπὶ χαμαίζηλου τινός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ ψηλοτέρου ἢ ἡγόμενος καταψηφίζεις οὖν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπιέζεις τὰς ἑπὶ τῷ αὐχένει τρίχας—εἰσὶ θείοι γὰρ, ὡστε τύχοι, παῖζεις μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Ἀβριων δὴ, ἔφη, ἱσως, ὁ Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἐοικεν, ἢν δ’ ἡγόμενος, ὁ Σόκρατες. Ὁυκ, ἢν γε ἐμοὶ πείθη.

Ἀλλὰ τί; ἢν δ’ ἡγόμενος. Τῆμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σύ ταύτας, ἐνώπιον γε ἢμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.

καὶ ἑγωγ’ ἂν, εἰ σὺ εὑρίσκῃ καὶ με διαφεύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἐνορκοῦμεν ἀν ποιησάμην ὅσπερ Ἀργείδη, μὴ πρὸτερον κομήσεις, πρὶν ἀν υικῆσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμόλου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. Ἀλλ’, ἢν δ’ ἡγόμενος, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ’ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἰός ὁ τε εὑρίσκῃ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἰδέεων παρακάλει, ἔως ἐτί φῶς ἐστιν. Παρακαλῶ τούτων, ἔφη, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ’ ὡς Ἰδεεώς. Οὐδὲν διοίσεις, ἔφη.

39. Ἀλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποίου; ἢν δ’ ἡγόμενος. Μὴ γενῶς-

μεθα, ἡ δ’ ὦς, μισόλογοι, ὡσπερ οἱ μισάνθρω-

ποι γυγόμενοι· ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἔφη, ὁ τι ἢ τις 

μεῖζον τοῦτο τακτάν πάθοι ἢ λόγους μισῆςςας. 

γίγνεται δὲ ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ 

μισανθρωπία. ἦ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται 

ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεύσαι ἢνευ̃ 

tέχνης, καὶ

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defeat and made us face about and follow him and join in his examination of the argument.

ECHERCATES. How did he do it?

PHAEDO. I will tell you. I was sitting at his right hand on a low stool beside his couch, and his seat was a good deal higher than mine. He stroked my head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck into his hand—he had a habit of playing with my hair on occasion—and said, "To-morrow, perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut off this beautiful hair."

"I suppose so, Socrates," said I.

"Not if you take my advice."

"What shall I do then?" I asked.

"You will cut it off to-day, and I will cut mine, if our argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again. If I were you and the argument escaped me, I would take an oath, like the Argives, not to let my hair grow until I had renewed the fight and won a victory over the argument of Simmias and Cebes."

"But," I replied, "they say that even Heracles is not a match for two."

"Well," said he, "call me to help you, as your Iolaus, while there is still light."

"I call you to help, then," said I, "not as Heracles calling Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling Heracles."

"That is all one," said he. "But first let us guard against a danger."

"Of what sort?" I asked.

"The danger of becoming misologists or haters of argument," said he, "as people become misanthropists or haters of man; for no worse evil can happen to a man than to hate argument. Misology and misanthropy arise from similar causes. For misanthropy arises from trusting someone implicitly without
Λεγόντας, ἡ ἰσχρὸν, εἰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπειτὰ ὅλον ὅστερον εὐρέως τούτων πονηρῶν τε καὶ ἀπιστῶν καὶ αὐθεντῶν· καὶ ὅταν τούτῳ πολλάκις πάθη τις καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα οὐδὲ ἡ ἱγνώστα ὀλείστατα· 

Εἴτε τις καὶ ἐπαιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούον μισεῖ τις πάντας καὶ ἠγείται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑμῖν εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὐκ ἡγεῖθαι ς τούτῳ γυμνόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἂν δὲ ἐγώ. Ὅνυχον, ἢ δ' ὅς, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δήλου ὅτι ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ ταύσιονείαν ὁ τοιοῦτος χρήσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους; εἰ γάρ ποια μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρηκι, ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὐτὸς ἂν ἡγήσατο, τοὺς μὲν χρήστους καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὄλγοις εἶναι ἐκατέρως, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφην ἐγώ. Ὡσπερ, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων· οἴει τι σπανιότερον εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἡ σφόδρα σμικρῶν ἐξευρέω ἀνθρώπον ἡ κύνα ἡ ἀλλο ὅτι αυτῇ; ὃς τὰχι ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρόν ἢ καλὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλανα; ἢ οὐκ ἡγεῖθαι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων σπανια καὶ ὅλγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ ἄφθονα καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἂν δ' ἐγώ. Ὅνυχον οἴει, Β ἐφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἄγων προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὅλγοις καὶ ἐνταύθα τοὺς πρῶτους φανῆμα; Εἰκὸς γε, ἂν δ' ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ ταῦτη

1 Schanz brackets αἰσχρόν.
sufficient knowledge. You think the man is perfectly true and sound and trustworthy, and afterwards you find him base and false. Then you have the same experience with another person. By the time this has happened to a man a good many times, especially if it happens among those whom he might regard as his nearest and dearest friends, he ends by being in continual quarrels and by hating everybody and thinking there is nothing sound in anyone at all. Have you not noticed this?"

"Certainly," said I.

"Well," he went on, "is it not disgraceful, and is it not plain that such a man undertakes to consort with men when he has no knowledge of human nature? For if he had knowledge when he dealt with them, he would think that the good and the bad are both very few and those between the two are very many, for that is the case."

"What do you mean?"

"I mean just what I might say about the large and small. Do you think there is anything more unusual than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or other creature, or again, one that is very quick or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very black or white? Have you not noticed that the extremes in all these instances are rare and few, and the examples between the extremes are very many?"

"To be sure," said I.

"And don't you think," said he, "that if there were to be a competition in rascality, those who excelled would be very few in that also?"

"Very likely," I replied.

"Yes, very likely," he said. "But it is not in that
Δια τὸ παραγόμενον τοιούτως λόγος τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἄλθεσιν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ, μὴ ἕαυτὸν τις αἴτιότο μηδὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγείν ἄσμενον ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπόσαντο καὶ ἦδη τὸν λοιπὸν βίον μισῶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν διατελοῦ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἄλθειας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθεῖσα. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ᾧ δ’ ἐγώ, οἰκτρόν δήτα.

40. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς, ἐφ’ ἄλλα, τούτῳ εὐλαβητικῶς
καὶ μὴ παρόψιμον εἰς τῇν ψυχῆν, ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύειν οὐδὲν ψυχῇς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὕτω ψυχῆς ἐξομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέον καὶ προβυπριστέον ψυχῆς ἐχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα βίου παντὸς.
respect that arguments are like men; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity lies in this: when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false, whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again; then you know, those men especially who have spent their time in disputation come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that they alone have discovered that there is nothing sound or sure in anything, whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the tide in the Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time."

"Certainly," I said, "that is very true."

"Then, Phaedo," he said, "if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man, because he has met with some of those arguments which seem to be sometimes true and sometimes false, should then not blame himself or his own lack of skill, but should end, in his vexation, by throwing the blame gladly upon the arguments and should hate and revile them all the rest of his life, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of reality."

"Yes, by Zeus," I said, "it would be sad."

"First, then," said he, "let us be on our guard against this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there is no soundness in arguments at all. Let us far rather assume that we ourselves are not yet in sound condition and that we must strive manfully and eagerly to become so, you and the others
91 ἐνέκα, ἔμοι δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐνέκα τοῦ θανάτου, ὡς κανὼν ἐγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον οὐ φιλοσόφως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὠσπέρ οἱ πάνυ ἀπαίδευτοι φιλονεικῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἄν ὁ λόγος ἢ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὃπως δὲ ἀ αὐτοῖ έδεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παρούσιοι, τούτο προσμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνον διοίσειν οὐ γὰρ ὁποῖς τοῖς παρούσιοι δὲ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἶναι προσμυθήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἰ ἐπὶ πάρεργον, ἀλλ' ὁποῖς αὐτῷ ἔμοι ἦ τι μάλιστα δόξει οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γὰρ, ὃ φίλε ἔταιρε, θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ δυντά ἐν λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι; εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἑστι τελευτήσαντι, ὅπως δὲν τούτων γε τῶν χρόνων αὐτῶν τῶν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἦττον τοῖς παρούσιοι ἁγιός ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος. ἦ δὲ ἄγνοια μοι αὐτῇ οὐ ξυνιδικελεῖ, κακὸν γὰρ ἄν ἦν, ἀλλ' ὁλόγον ὑστερον ἀπολεῖται. παρεσκευασμένος δὴ, ἐφι, ὃ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτωι ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ὑμεῖς Μέντοι, ἄν ἔμοι πειθήσθητε, σμικρὸν φροντίζαντες Σωκράτος, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μάλλον, ἐάν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθές λέγειν, συμμολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μή, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, ὅπως μή ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προσμίας ἀμα ἐμαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαιπατήσας ὠσπέρ μέλλειν τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπών οἰχήσομαι.

41. Ἀλλ' ίτέου, ἔφη, πρῶτον μὲ ὑπομνήσατε ἢ ἔλεγετε, ἔαν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Σιμμίας μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἔγορά, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ τῇ ψυχῇ ὁμοί καὶ θειότερον καὶ
for the sake of all your future life, and I because of my impending death; for I fear that I am not just now in a philosophical frame of mind as regards this particular question, but am contentious, like quite uncultured persons. For when they argue about anything, they do not care what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views seem true to their hearers. And I fancy I differ from them just now only to this extent: I shall not be eager to make what I say seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall be very eager to make myself believe it. For see, my friend, how selfish my attitude is. If what I say is true, I am the gainer by believing it; and if there be nothing for me after death, at any rate I shall not be burdensome to my friends by my lamentations in these last moments. And this ignorance of mine will not last, for that would be an evil, but will soon end. So," he said, "Simmias and Cebes, I approach the argument with my mind thus prepared. But you, if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth; and if you think what I say is true, agree to it, and if not, oppose me with every argument you can muster, that I may not in my eagernessness deceive myself and you alike and go away, like a bee, leaving my sting sticking in you.

"But we must get to work," he said. "First refresh my memory, if I seem to have forgotten anything. Simmias, I think, has doubts and fears that the soul, though more divine and excellent than the
Χάλκιον δυ τού σώματος προαπολλήνηται ἐν ἀρμονίας εἴδει οὕσα. Κέβης δὲ μοι ἔδοξε τούτῳ μὲν ἐμὸι συγχωρεῖν, πολυχρωμώτερον γε εἶναι ψυχῆν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταίον σῶμα καταλποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλύνηται, καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ τούτῳ θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὀλεθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμα γε ἄει ἀπολλύμενου οὔδεν παύεται. ἄρα ἄλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὁ Σμυμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι; Εἰ συνωμολογεῖτιν δὴ ταῦτ' εἶναι ἀμφοῦ. Πότερον οὖν, ἐφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐμπροσθεί λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ' οὖ; Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ' οὖν. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' οἷ, περί ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, εἴν' ἢ ἐφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμαθησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὕτως ἐχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἀλλοθεὶ πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεθῇ; Ἔγω μὲν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεάσθην ὡς αὐτὸν καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὕδεν λόγῳ. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Σμυμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ ἄν θαυμάζοιμ, εἰ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ δόξειν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης Α' ἀλλ' ἀνώγκη σοι, ἐφη, ὁ ἕνει Θηβαῖε, ἀλλ' δοξάσαι, ἔἀντερ μείνῃ ζε δὲ οὕσις, τὸ ἀρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πράγμα, ψυχῆν δὲ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκεῖ-Β σθαί. οὐ γὰρ ποι ἄποδεξει γε σαιτοῦ λέγωντος, ὡς πρότερον ἢν ἀρμονία συγκειμένη, πρὶν εκεῖνα εἶναι, ἡ δ' οὖν ἐδει αὐτὴν συντεθήναι. ἡ ἄποδεξει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκρατες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἢ δ' οἷ, ὅτι ταῦτα σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, όταν 316
body, may perish first, being of the nature of a
harmony. And, Cebe, I believe, granted that the
soul is more lasting than the body, but said that no
one could know that the soul, after wearing out
many bodies, did not at last perish itself upon leaving
the body; and that this was death—the destruction
of the soul, since the body is continually being
destroyed. Are those the points, Simmias and Cebe,
which we must consider?"

They both agreed that these were the points.
"Now," said he, "do you reject all of our previous
arguments, or only some of them?"
"Only some of them," they replied.
"What do you think," he asked, "about the
argument in which we said that learning is recollec-
tion and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily
have been somewhere before it was imprisoned in
the body?"
"I," said Cebe, "was wonderfully convinced by
it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than
any other argument."
"And I too," said Simmias, "feel just as he does,
and I should be much surprised if I should ever think
differently on this point."

And Socrates said: "You must, my Theban friend,
think differently, if you persist in your opinion that
a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a
harmony made up of the elements that are strung
like harpstrings in the body. For surely you will
not accept your own statement that a composite
harmony existed before those things from which it
had to be composed, will you?"
"Certainly not, Socrates."
"Then do you see," said he, "that this is just
φής μὲν εἰναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἰδὸς γε καὶ σῶμα ἄφικέσθαι, εἰναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκειμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρμονία γε σοι τοιοῦτὸν ἐστιν ὁ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἳ

C φθόγγοι ἐτὶ ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταίοι δὲ πάντων ἐξυπάρχεται ἡ ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόκλυται. οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἔκεινφ πᾶς ἐξυπάρχεται; Ὅδαμὼς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίλας. Καὶ μὴν, ἢ δὲ ὡς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνισθῇ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίλας. Οὗτος τούτων, ἔφη, σοι οὐ ξυνισθῇ ἀλλ' ὃρα, πότερον αἱρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἔκεινον, ὁ Σῶκρατες. οὐδὲ μὲν γάρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς

D καὶ εὐπρεπείας, οὗν καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιομένους λόγους ἑξυποδιδόντι ὁὐσίαν ἀλη-ξόσιν, καὶ ἂν τις αὐτοῦς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὐ μᾶλα ἔξαπατῶσι, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀπασίν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀνάμνησις καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δι' ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας ἀποδείξει καθαρίζοι. ἔρρηθη γάρ ποι οὖν ζημὺν εἰναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἄφικέσθαι, ὁσπερ αὐτὴ ἐστιν ὁ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνύμιαν τὴν τοῦ ὁ

Ε ἐστιν. ἔγιν τέ οὖσιν, όσ' ἐμαυτοῦ πείθω, ἴκανοι τε καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποδείξει καθαρίζοι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἐοικε, διὰ ταύτα μήτε ἐμαυτοῦ μήτε ἀλλοῦ ἀποδείξεται λέγοντος, ὡς ψυχῇ ἐστιν ἄρμονία.
what you say when you assert that the soul exists before it enters into the form and body of a man, and that it is composed of things that do not yet exist? For harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be. The lyre and the strings and the sounds come into being in a tuneless condition, and the harmony is the last of all to be composed and the first to perish. So how can you bring this theory into harmony with the other?"

"I cannot at all," said Simmias.

"And yet," said Socrates, "there ought to be harmony between it and the theory about harmony above all others."

"Yes, there ought," said Simmias.

"Well," said he, "there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?"

"The former, decidedly, Socrates," he replied.

"For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely seemed probable and attractive, which is the reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things. But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument. For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists. Now I am persuaded that I have accepted this essence on sufficient and right grounds. I cannot therefore accept from myself or anyone else the statement that the soul is a harmony."
42. Τί δέ, ἢ δ' ὦς, ὡς Σιμμία, τῇ δε; δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως πως ἐχειν ἢ ὦς ἄν ἐκείνα ἔχει, εἰ δὲν ἄν συγκέιναι; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγὼ, οὐδὲ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ’ ἄν ἐκείνα ἢ ποιῆ ἢ πάσχῃ; Συνέφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἴγείσθαι γε προσήκει τρομονιαν τούτων, εἰ δὲν ἄν συντεθή, ἄλλη ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει. Πολλοὶ ἄρα δεὶ ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία κινηθῆναι ἢ φθέγγασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοὶ μέντοι, ἐφη. Τί δέ; οὐχ οὖτος ἀρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἐκάστη ἀρμονία, ὡς ἄν ἀρμοσθῇ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφη. Οὐχί, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἄν μὲν μᾶλλον Β ἀρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἰπερ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἄν ἀρμονία εἶναί καὶ πλεῖον, εἰ δ' ἤττον τε καὶ ἐπ' ἐλαττον, ἤττον τε καὶ ἐλαττων; Πάνω γε. Ἡ οὖν ἐστὶ τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ συμκροτατον ἔτεραν ἔτερας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἐλαττον καὶ ἤττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆς; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἐφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἐφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχή ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἐχειν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἢ δὲ ἀνοιάν τε καὶ μοχ-
"Here is another way of looking at it, Simmias," said he. "Do you think a harmony or any other composite thing can be in any other state than that in which the elements are of which it is composed?"
"Certainly not."
"And it can neither do nor suffer anything other than they do or suffer?"
He agreed.
"Then a harmony cannot be expected to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to follow them."
He assented.
"A harmony, then, is quite unable to move or make a sound or do anything else that is opposed to its component parts."
"Quite unable," said he.
"Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonised?"
"I do not understand," said Simmias.
"Would it not," said Socrates, "be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonised more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonised and to a less extent?"
"Certainly."
"Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?"
"Not in the least," said he.
"Well now," said he, "one soul is said to possess sense and virtue and to be good, and another to
θηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακῆ; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἄληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν οὖν θεμέλιων ψυχῆν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα οὖντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἁρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὖ τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡρμόσθαι, τὴν ἁγαθήν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὐσῆ ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν, τὴν δὲ ἀνάρμοστον αὐτὴν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλην; Οὐκ ἔχω ἐγώγ’, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπεῖν δὴ λοι θ’ ὅτι τοιαῦτ’ ἀττ’ ἂν λέγοι ὁ ἐκεῖνο ὑποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προσωμολόγηται, ἐφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἦττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυ- χῆν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἑπὶ πλέον μηδ’ ἦττον μηδ’ ἑπ’ ἑλαττων ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἁρμονίαν εἶναι. ἦ γάρ; Πάνω γε. Τὴν δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἁρμονίαν οὐσαν μητε μᾶλλον μητε ἦττον ἡρμόσθαι· ἐστὶν οὖτωσ; Ἑστιν. Ἡ δὲ μῆτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡρμοσμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τι πλέον ἢ ἑλαττων ἁρμονίας μετέχει, η τὸ ἵσον; Τὸ ἵσον. Οὐκοῦν ψυχῇ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὖδ’ ἦττον ἂλλης ἁλλῆς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχῆς ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἡρμοσταί; Οὔτω. Τοῦτο δ’ γε πεπονθεῖναι οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ ἁρμονίας μετέχοι αὖ; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τοῦτο δ’ αὐτο πεπονθεῖναι ἃρ’ ἁν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἁρετῆς μετέχοι ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἴπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀναρ- μοστία, ἢ δὲ ἁρετή ἁρμονία εἰ; Οὐδὲν πλέον. Μᾶλλον δ’ γε ποι, ὁ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὅρθον λόγου κακίας οὖδεμια ψυχῇ μεθέξει, εἴπερ ἁρ-
possess folly and wickedness and to be bad; and is this true?" "Yes, it is true."

"Now what will those who assume that the soul is a harmony say that these things—the virtue and the wickedness—in the soul are? Will they say that this is another kind of harmony and a discord, and that the soul, which is itself a harmony, has within it another harmony and that the other soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it?"

"I cannot tell," replied Simmias, "but evidently those who make that assumption would say something of that sort."

"But we agreed," said Socrates, "that one soul is no more or less a soul than another; and that is equivalent to an agreement that one is no more and to no greater extent, and no less and to no less extent, a harmony than another, is it not?" "Certainly."

"And that which is no more or less a harmony, is no more or less harmonised. Is that so?" "Yes."

"But has that which is no more and no less harmonised any greater or any less amount of harmony, or an equal amount?" "An equal amount."

"Then a soul, since it is neither more nor less a soul than another, is neither more nor less harmonised."

"That is so."

"And therefore can have no greater amount of discord or of harmony?" "No."

"And therefore again one soul can have no greater amount of wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue harmony?" "It cannot."

"Or rather, to speak exactly, Simmias, no soul will have any wickedness at all, if the soul is a harmony;
μονία ἔστιν· ἀρμονία γὰρ δήποτε παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐσα ἀρμονία ἀναρμοστίας οὐποτ' ἀν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μέντοι. Οὐδὲ γε δήποτε ψυχή, οὐσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἐκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῶν πάσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζῶν όμοίως ἀγαθαὶ ἔσονται, εἰπερ ὀμοίως πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαὶ, εἶναι. Ἐμοιόν γοκεὶ, ἐφη, ὁ Σωκρατεσ. 

Β 'Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὀρθῇ ἡ ὑποθέσις ἢν, τὸ ψυχῆν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἐφη.

43. Τι δὲ; ἢ δ' ὅς τῶν ἕν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἐσθ' ὃ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρονίμου; Οὐκ ἐγώγη. Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν1 τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σώμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ2 ἑναντιομένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἰου3 καύματος ἐνότος καὶ δίψους ἔπε τοῦνατόν ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἔπε τὸ μὴ ἐσθίειν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ποὺ ὀρῶμεν ἑναντιομένην τὴν ψυχήν 

C τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σώμα· ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὐτ ὀμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μῆποτ' ἀν αὐτῆν, ἀρμονίαν γε οὐσαν, ἑναντία ζυγιῶν οἰς ἐπιτείνωσον καὶ χαλάτο καὶ πάλπων καὶ ἄλλο ὀτιοῦ πάθος πάσχειν ἢκεῖνα ἢξ ὰν τυγχάνει οὐσα, ἄλλ' ἐπεθυμήσαι ἐκείνοις καὶ οὐποτ'

1 Schanz brackets συγχωροῦσαν.
2 Schanz omits ἢ καὶ.
3 oiau Stobaeus. ἢσεl CDE, bracketed by Schanz.
for if a harmony is entirely harmony, it could have no part in discord.”

“Certainly not.”

“Then the soul, being entirely soul, could have no part in wickedness.”

“How could it, if what we have said is right?”

“According to this argument, then, if all souls are by nature equally souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good.”

“So it seems, Socrates,” said he.

“And,” said Socrates, “do you think that this is true and that our reasoning would have come to this end, if the theory that the soul is a harmony were correct?”

“Not in the least,” he replied.

“Well,” said Socrates, “of all the parts that make up a man, do you think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise one?”

“No, I do not.”

“Does it yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them? I mean, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul oppose it and draw it away from drinking, and from eating when it is hungry, and do we not see the soul opposing the body in countless other ways?”

“Certainly.”

“Did we not agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead them?”
ἀν ἡγεμονεύειν; Ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὐ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὖ πάν τοιναντίον ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζόμενη, ἡγεμονεύουσα τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἐξ ὧν φησὶ τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιομένη ὁλίγου πάντα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ’ ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πραότερον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἀλλη οὔσα ἀλλὰ πράγματι διαλεγόμενη; οἴον ποι τοῖς Ὀμηροῖς ἐν Ὁδυσσείᾳ πεποιηκεν, οὐ λέγει τὸν Ὁδυσσέα·

στήθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίνην ἴνα παπε μύθῳ τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίνη καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ’ ἔτλης.

Ε ἄρ’ οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαι διανοοῦμενον ὡς ἄρμονιας αὐτῆς οὐσίας καὶ οἰκα ἀγεσθαί ύπ’ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἄλλ’ οὕς οὐκ οἴκει ἄγειν ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ οὐσίας αὐτῆς πολὺ θειότερον τινὸς πράγματος ἡ καθ’ ἄρμονίαν; Νὴ Δία, ὁ Ὁσκράτης, ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ. Όνκ άρα, ὦ ἀριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμὴν καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὕτε γὰρ ἂν, ὥς ἐοικεν, Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ὁ ἔχειν οὖτως ἔφη.

44. Εἴεν δὴ, ἣ δ’ ὃς ὁ Ὁσκράτης, τὰ μὲν ἄρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Ὑθβαϊκῆς ἦλεα ποις, ὡς ἐοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὁ
"Yes," he replied, "we did, of course."

"Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the opposite way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and opposing them in almost everything through all our life, and tyrannising over them in every way, sometimes inflicting harsh and painful punishments (those of gymnastics and medicine), and sometimes milder ones, sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing, in short, speaking to the desires and passions and fears as if it were distinct from them and they from it, as Homer has shown in the *Odyssey* when he says of Odysseus:

He smote his breast, and thus he chid his heart:
'Endure it, heart, thou didst bear worse than this'?

Do you suppose that, when he wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?"

"By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think."

"Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves."

"That is true," said he.

"Very well," said Socrates, "Harmonia, the Theban goddess, has, it seems, been moderately

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Κέβης, πῶς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφὶ ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν τούτου γρών τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἄρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἴπης ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίδου γὰρ λέγοντος ὁ τι ἡπόρει, πάνυ ἐθαυμαζόν, εἰ τι ἔξει τις χρήσασθαι

Β τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι ἀπότως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἐφοδιώκτο ὑμᾶς αὔξαντο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσασίμα καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὄ γαρ, ἐφὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, μή μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἡμῶν βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τῶν λόγων τῶν μέλλοντα ἐσεσθαι.1 ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελῆσε, ἥμεις δὲ Ὁμηρικῶς ἐγνώς ἑντες πειρώμεθα, εἰ ἄρα τι λέγεις. ἐστὶ δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὅπως ζητεῖς· ἁξίως ἐπιδεικνύθην ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἄθάνατον οὕτων, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἄνηρ μὲλλών ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανόντων ἐκεῖ εἰ πράξεις διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἄνοητόν τε καὶ ἐξίθιον θάρρος θαρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν, ὅτι ἵσχυρόν τι ἔστων ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδῆς καὶ ἣν ἐτὶ πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν καλύπτων φῆς πάντα ταῦτα μηνύσῃ ἄθανασίαν μὲν μη, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τὸ ἔστων ψυχὴ καὶ ἦν τὸν πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὅσον χρόνον καὶ ἦδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἀττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σώμα ἔθεθεν ἄρχη ἦν αὐτὴ ὀλέθρου, ὡσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ τούτον τὸν βίον ζωῆς καὶ τελευτώσα γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ

C

D

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1 Schanz, following Hermann, brackets ἐσεσθαι.
gracious to us; but how, Cebes, and by what argument can we find grace in the sight of Cadmus?"

"I think," said Cebes, "you will find a way. At any rate, you conducted this argument against harmony wonderfully and better than I expected. For when Simmias was telling of his difficulty, I wondered if anyone could make head against his argument; so it seemed to me very remarkable that it could not withstand the first attack of your argument. Now I should not be surprised if the argument of Cadmus met with the same fate.

"My friend," said Socrates, "do not be boastful, lest some evil eye put to rout the argument that is to come. That, however, is in the hands of God. Let us, in Homeric fashion, 'charge the foe' and test the worth of what you say. Now the sum total of what you seek is this: You demand a proof that our soul is indestructible and immortal, if the philosopher, who is confident in the face of death and who thinks that after death he will fare better in the other world than if he had lived his life differently, is not to find his confidence senseless and foolish. And although we show that the soul is strong and godlike and existed before we men were born as men, all this, you say, may bear witness not to immortality, but only to the fact that the soul lasts a long while, and existed somewhere an immeasurably long time before our birth, and knew and did various things; yet it was none the more immortal for all that, but its very entrance into the human body was the beginning of its dissolution, a disease, as it were; and it lives in toil through this life and finally
ἀπολλύοντο. διαφέρειν1 δὲ δὴ φής οὐδέν, εἰτε ἀπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἰτε πολλάκις, πρῶς γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβείσθαι: προσήκειν2 γὰρ φοβείσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἰ, τῶ μὴ εἰδότι μηδὲ ἔχοντι λόγον διδόναι, ὡς ἀθάνατον ἔστι. τοιαύτη ἄττα
Ε ἐστίν, οἴμαι, ὁ Κέβης, ἡ λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπτύκθης πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι βουλεῖ, προσθῆσῃ ἡ ἄφελης. καὶ ὁ Κέβης· Ἀλλὰ οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθεῖναι δέομαι· ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα, ἡ λέγω.

45. Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συνυόν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν καὶ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν τι σκεφθάμενος, ὁ οὐ φαύλον πράγμα, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, ζητεῖς; ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αὐτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι. ἔγω οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βουλῇ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη ἔπειτα ἄν τι σοι χρῆσιμον φαινηταὶ ὅτι ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ περὶ ὅν λέγεις χρῆσει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, βουλομαι γε. Ἀκούει τούτων ὡς ἔρούντος. ἔγω γὰρ, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, νέος ὅν θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἡ δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ιστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γὰρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τὸ γίγνεται ἐκαστὸν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπόλιται καὶ διὰ τὸ

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Β ἐστὶ· καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κατὼ μετέβαλ- λον σκοτῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε, ἃρ’ ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν3 σηπεδόνα τινὰ λάβῃ, ὡς

1 Schanz reads διαφέρει.
2 Schanz reads προσήκει.
3 τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν Eb Stobaeus. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν BD, Schanz brackets ψυχρόν.
perishes in what we call death. Now it makes no
difference, you say, whether a soul enters into a
body once or many times, so far as the fear each of
us feels is concerned; for anyone, unless he is a fool,
must fear, if he does not know and cannot prove
that the soul is immortal. That, Cebes, is, I think,
about what you mean. And I restate it purposely
that nothing may escape us and that you may, if you
wish, add or take away anything."

And Cebes said, "I do not at present wish to take
anything away or to add anything. You have
expressed my meaning."

Socrates paused for some time and was absorbed
in thought. Then he said: "It is no small thing
that you seek; for the cause of generation and decay
must be completely investigated. Now I will tell
you my own experience in the matter, if you wish;
then if anything I say seems to you to be of any
use, you can employ it for the solution of your
difficulty."

"Certainly," said Cebes, "I wish to hear your
experiences."

"Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was
young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind
of wisdom which they call investigation of nature.
I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes
of everything, why each thing comes into being and
why it perishes and why it exists; and I was always
unsettling myself with such questions as these: Do
heat and cold, by a sort of fermentation, bring about
the organisation of animals, as some people say? Is
τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῦδα συντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἐστίν ὁ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ αὕρ ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν, ὁ δὲ ἐγκέφαλος ἐστὶν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἄκοινον καὶ ὅραν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοντο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβοῦσης τὸ ἥρεμεων κατὰ ταύτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὐτοῖς τῶν φθοράς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ τῆς γῆς πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφύση εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρῆμα. τεκμηρίων δὲ σοὶ ἔρω ἢ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἡπιστάμην, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὲρ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὡστε ἀπεμαθὼν καὶ ἂν πρὸ τοῦ ρήματι εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τὰ ἀνθρώπους αὐξάνεται. τούτῳ γὰρ ρήμα πρὸ τοῦ παντὸς δῆλον εἶναι, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔκ τῶν συτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξικαὶ σάρκες προσγεννώνται, τοῖς δὲ ὅστεοι ὅστα, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγου καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστοις προσγενήται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὅλον γόγκον ὅντα ὑστέρον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τοῖς σμικρῶν ἀνθρώπων μέγαν· οὕτως τότε ρήμα· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; Ἑμοίοις, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Σκέψεις δὴ καὶ τάδε ἐτεῖς. ρήμα· γὰρ ἢ καὶ δοκεῖν, ὅτι τοῖς φαίνοντο ἀνθρώπους καὶ παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῆς τῆς κεφάλῆς, καὶ ἔπληθος ὑποποίης· καὶ ἐπὶ γε τούτων ἐναργεστερά, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοὺς προσθέτειν, καὶ τὸ διήθην τοῦ πνευμαίου μείζων εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμέρει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι
it the blood, or air, or fire by which we think? Or is it none of these, and does the brain furnish the sensations of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion arise from these, and does knowledge come from memory and opinion in a state of rest? And again I tried to find out how these things perish, and I investigated the phenomena of heaven and earth until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally unfitted for this kind of investigation. And I will give you a sufficient proof of this. I was so completely blinded by these studies that I lost the knowledge that I, and others also, thought I had before; I forgot what I had formerly believed I knew about many things and even about the cause of man’s growth. For I had thought previously that it was plain to everyone that man grows through eating and drinking; for when, from the food he eats, flesh is added to his flesh and bones to his bones, and in the same way the appropriate thing is added to each of his other parts, then the small bulk becomes greater and the small man large. That is what I used to think. Doesn’t that seem to you reasonable?"

"Yes," said Cebes.

"Now listen to this, too. I thought I was sure enough, when I saw a tall man standing by a short one, that he was, say, taller by a head than the other, and that one horse was larger by a head than another horse; and, to mention still clearer things than those, I thought ten were more than eight because two had been added to the eight, and I thought a two-cubit rule was longer than a one-cubit rule because it exceeded it by half its length."

"And now," said Cebes, "what do you think about them?"
PLATO

dokei peri auton; Porrw pou, efhi, vha Dia eme einai tov oiesbhai peri tovtov tov thn aitiav eidevai, ois ge ouk apodechomai emautov oude ws, epeidh evi tis prosbhi en, h to ev o prosetetghi douy geogonev, h to prosetheven, h to prosetheven kai 97 o prosetetghi dia thn prosbhesin tov etetrou tw etetrou douy egenevoi tharmaza gahr, eis, ote mene ekateron auton xoris allhlon hnu, en ara ekateron hnu kai ouk hsthein tote dou, epei 8 epheiasan allhlon, aouth ara aitia autous egenevo douy gevesithai, h xinodo tov plhsion allhlon tevhmai. oude ge ws, evan tis en diaschihi, dunamei eti peisteshai ws aouth aou aitia geogonev, h schisi, tov douy geogonevai evantia gar gignetai.

B h tote aitia tov douy gignesvai tote mev gar oti anwgheto plhsion allhlon kai prosetitheto etetrou etetrou, vnu 8 oti apangevai kai xorizevai etetrou afi etetrou. oude ge, di o ti ev gignetai ws epistamai eti peisth emauton, oudei alllo oudein evi logw di o ti gignetai h apollutai h esti, kata tovtov tov tropon tis theodou, allha twi allhou tropon autov eikhi phyrw, tovtov de ouvamh prosievai.

46. 'Alla akousas mev pote ek vjblou tinos, ws efhi, 'Anaxagorou anagignwaskontos, kai C legevontos ws ara vou evsti o diakosmw to te kai pantov aition, tahth dei tith aitia onthn to te kai edoei mou tropon tina evi xhein to tov vou wv eina pantov aition, kai hgnismen, ei touthv ouvouss xhein, ton ge vouv kosmounta pantata kosmein1 kai ekai-

1 Schanz bruckets kosmein.
PHAEDO

"By Zeus," said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has become two, or the one which was added, or the one which was added and the one to which it was added became two by the addition of each to the other. I think it is wonderful that when each of them was separate from the other, each was one and they were not then two, and when they were brought near each other this juxtaposition was the cause of their becoming two. And I cannot yet believe that if one is divided, the division causes it to become two; for this is the opposite of the cause which produced two in the former case; for then two arose because one was brought near and added to another one, and now because one is removed and separated from another. And I no longer believe that I know by this method even how one is generated or, in a word, how anything is generated or is destroyed or exists, and I no longer admit this method, but have another confused way of my own.

"Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, 'If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes
στον τιθέναι ταύτη ὑπὲ ἀν ἑλπίστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν
tis βουλομένοι τήν αὐτίαν εὑρέων περὶ ἑκάστου, ὑπὲ
γίγνεται ἡ ἀπολλυται ἡ ἔστι, τούτῳ δὲν περὶ
αὐτοῦ εὑρέων, ὑπὲ βελτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἡ ἑλναι ἡ
ἀλλα ὃτιον πᾶσχειν ἡ ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ

D λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀν
θρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ¹ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἄλλ' ἡ
to ἀριστον καὶ τὸ βελτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι
toν αὐτοῦ τούτον καὶ τὸ χείρον εἰδεναι· τὴν αὐτήν
γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ
λογιζόμενοι ἁσµένοι εὐρηκέναι φῶµην διδάσκαλον
τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐµαντῶ, τὸν
'Αναξιγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσεων πρῶτον μὲν, πό-
tερον ἡ γῆ πλατεία ἐστιν ἡ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδή δὲ

Ε φράσεων, ἐπεκδινηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν
ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἁµεινον καὶ οτι αὐτήν
ἀµεινον ἢν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ εν µέσῳ φαίη
εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδινηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἁµεινον ἢν
αὐτὴν εν µέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταύτα ἀπο-

98 φαύνοιτο, παρασκευάσµην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόµενον
αἰτίας ἄλλο εἴδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἣλιου οὕτω
παρασκευάσµην, ὡσαύτως πευσόµενος, καὶ σελήνης
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν, τάχος περὶ πρὸς
ἀλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθηµάτων,
πῇ ποτε ταῦτ' ἁµεινον ἐστὶν ἑκάστον καὶ ποιεῖν
καὶ πᾶσχειν ὡς πάσχει. οὖ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτῶν
φῶµην, φάσκοντα γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσµήσθαι,
ἀλλὴν τινὰ αὐτοὶς αἰτίαν ἑπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὧτι
βελτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὡςπερ ἔχειν.

B ἑκάστῳ οὖν αὐτοῦ ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ

¹ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου BCDE. Schanz brackets αὐτοῦ. Wohlrab omits ἐκείνου and reads αὐτοῦ. Burnet brackets ἐκείνου.

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each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to that particular thing, and other things too, a man need examine nothing but what is best and most excellent; for then he will necessarily know also what is inferior, since the science of both is the same. As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of things quite to my mind, and I thought he would tell me whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had told me that, would go on to explain the cause and the necessity of it, and would tell me the nature of the best and why it is best for the earth to be as it is; and if he said the earth was in the centre, he would proceed to show that it is best for it to be in the centre; and I had made up my mind that if he made those things clear to me, I would no longer yearn for any other kind of cause. And I had determined that I would find out in the same way about the sun and the moon and the other stars, their relative speed, their revolutions, and their other changes, and why the active or passive condition of each of them is for the best. For I never imagined that, when he said they were ordered by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for these things than that it is best for them to be as they are. So I thought when he assigned the cause
κοινὴ πάσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον φύμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιωγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἔλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνω σπουδὴ λαβῶν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἶδε τ' ἡ ἀνεγλύρωσκον, ἴδ' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χείρων.

47. Ἀπό δὴ θαυμαστὴς ἐλπίδος, ὁ ἔταïρε, φῶχυμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προίον καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκων ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν, οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαινεῖται εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὑδάτα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἐδοξέων ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὅσπερ ἄν εἰ τις λέγων ὅτι Ἐσκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράπτει νῦν πράπτει, κάπενα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὧν πράπτω, λέγει πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μοι τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὁστῶν καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅστα ἐστιν στερεὰ καὶ διαφάνως χεῖν χωρίς ἀπ' ἄλληλων, τὰ δὲ νεύρα ἀντείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσεσθαι, περιαμπέχοντα τὰ ὅστα μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος δ' συνέχει αὐτά: αἰωρουμένων σιὰ τῶν ὁστῶν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ξυμβολαῖς χαλῶντα καὶ συνεϊνοιν τὰ νεύρα κάμπτεσθαι που ποιεί οἶδον τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαρμθῆς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἐτέρας τοιαύτας αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνάς τε καὶ ἄερας καὶ ἀκοδας καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαύτα αἰτιώμενος,

Ε ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἄλθος αἰτίας λέγειν ὅτι, ἐπείδη Ἀθηναίοις ἐδοξέ βέλτινον εἶναι ἐμοὶ καταψήφισασθαί, διὰ ταύτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτινον

1 Schanz brackets καὶ.
of each thing and of all things in common he would go on and explain what is best for each and what is good for all in common. I prized my hopes very highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, that I might know as fast as I could about the best and the worst.

"My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities. And it seemed to me it was very much as if one should say that Socrates does with intelligence whatever he does, and then, in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them, and the sinews can be contracted and relaxed and, with the flesh and the skin which contains them all, are laid about the bones; and so, as the bones are hung loose in their ligaments, the sinews, by relaxing and contracting, make me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. Or as if in the same way he should give voice and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our talking with each other, and should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to condemn me, and therefore I have decided
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αὐ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθήσθαι, καὶ δικαίωτερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν ἂν κελεύσωσιν· ἐπεὶ νῦν τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγγὺς, πάλαι ἂν ταῦτα τὰ νεῦρὰ τε καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἢ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοὺς ἢν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαίωτερον φύμη καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἢντιν, ὃν τάττη. ἀλλ’ αὐτία μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα καλεῖν λιαν ἁτόπον· εἰ δὲ τις λέγω ὃτι ἂνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχειν καὶ ὅστὰ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οἶδος τ’ ἢν ποιεῖν τὰ δόξαντά μοι, ἀληθῶ ἂν λέγων· ὃς μὲντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ δ’ ποιῶ.

Β καὶ ταῦτα νῦν πράστω, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλῆ καὶ μακρὰ ῥάθυμα ἂν εἰς τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶδον τ’ εἶναι ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἔστι τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ὅντι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἂνευ οὖ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ’ εἰς αἴτιον· δὴ μοι φαίνονται ψηλαφώντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὁσπερ ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὑψώματι προσχρόμενοι, ὃς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τις δίνῃ περιτιθεῖς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν δὴ ποιεῖ τὴν γῇν, δ’ ὁ δὲ ὁσπερ καρδότωρ πλατεῖα βάθρων τὸν ἄερα ὑπερεῖδεν τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὅς οἶδον τε

C βελτίστα αὐτὰ τεθήκαι δύναμιν οὐτῳ νῦν κεῖσθαι, ταύτην οὖτε ξητούσιν οὔτε τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν ἰσχύν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ὥγονται τοῦτον Ἀτλαντα ἂν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἄπαντα συνέχοντα ἔξερειν, καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ἰωνεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητῆς ὅτου οὐκ ἢδετ’ ἂν ἔγνωμην ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὕτ’ αὐτὸς εὑρέιν

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that it was best for me to sit here and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty they order. For, by Dog, I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by an opinion of what was best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force, but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that
οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷος τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμαι, βούλει σοι, ἡφη, ἐπὶ δεικτῶν ποιήσωμαι, ὁ Κέβης; Ἡ περφυνός μὲν οὗν, ἡφη, ὡς βούλομαι.

48. Ἐδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἢ δ’ ὡς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δείν εὑλαβηθῆναι, μὴ πάθοιμι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα δεισοῦντες καὶ σκοποῦμενοι· διαφθείρονται γὰρ ποὺ ἐνοί τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ εὖ ὦδατε ἢ τινὶ τοιοῦτῳ σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτον τί καὶ ἐγὼ διενοθήνη, καὶ ἐδείσα, μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείνα βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖσ ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειροῦν ἀπτεσθαί αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τὸν λόγον καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπείν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἦσως μὲν οὖν ὃς εἰκάζω 100 τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἐξικεν. οὐ γὰρ πάνω συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοποῦμενοι τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ὃ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· ἀλλ’ οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ὀρμηστα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὅν ἄν κρίνω ἐρρωμενεστάτων εἶναι, ἢ μὲν ἃν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων, ἢ δ’ ἄν μὴ, ὡς οὖν ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δέ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ὅ λέγων οἴμαι γὰρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἡφη ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

Β 49. Ἀλλ’, ἢ δ’ ὡς, φῦ δέ λέγω, οὖδὲν καίνον, ἀλλ’ ἀπερ ἂι καὶ ἀλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πεπαυμαί λέγον. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ
was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or to learn of it from anyone else, do you wish me, Cebes," said he, "to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted my second voyage in quest of the cause?"

"I wish it with all my heart," he replied.

"After this, then," said he, "since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its image in water or something of the sort. I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the truth of realities. Now perhaps my metaphor is not quite accurate; for I do not grant in the last that he who studies realities by means of conceptions is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts of daily life. However, that is the way I began. I assume in each case some principle which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true, and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean; for I think you do not understand now."

"Not very well, certainly," said Cebes.

"Well," said Socrates, "this is what I mean. It is nothing new, but the same thing I have always been saying, both in our previous conversation and elsewhere. I am going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying,
πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἰμι πάλιν ἔτι ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα· ἀ εἰ μοι δίδως τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἶναι ταύτα, ἔπιξον σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξεις καὶ ἀνευρήσεις, ὡς 

C ἄθανατον ἡ ψυχή. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἄν φθάνοις περαῖνων. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκείνως, εάν σοι ξυποδοκη γώστερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γὰρ μοι, εἰ τί ἐστιν ἀλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, οὔδε δὲ ἐν ἀλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἡ διότι μετέχει εἰκόνα τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τοιῇ αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς; Συγχωρῶ," ἔφη. Οὐ τοιώνυ, ἡ ὡς, ἐτί μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἀλλὰς αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταῦτας γνωρίσκειν· ἀλλ' εάν τίς μοι λέγῃ, δὲ ὃ τι καλὸν ἐστιν ὅτιον, ἢ 

D χρώμα εὐανθῆς ἔχον ἡ σχῆμα ἡ ἄλλο ὅτιον τῶν τοιούτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐδώ, παράττομαι γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἵσως εὐθύθως ἔχω παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ὦτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγευμένη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διωσχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἰναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλω, καὶ τούτου 

Ε ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἄν ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἰναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅτιον ἄλλῳ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλά· ἡ οὖ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγάθει ἃρα τὰ
and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as absolute beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that the soul is immortal."

"You may assume," said Cebes, "that I grant it, and go on."

"Then," said he, "see if you agree with me in the next step. I think that if anything is beautiful it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to everything. Do you assent to this view of cause?"

"I do," said he.

"Now I do not yet, understand," he went on, "nor can I perceive those other ingenious causes. If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely colour, or its shape or anything else of the sort, I let all that go, for all those things confuse me, and I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty. For I think this is the safest answer I can give to myself or to others, and if I cleave fast to this, I think I shall never be overthrown, and I believe it is safe for me or anyone else to give this answer, that beautiful things are beautiful through beauty. Do you agree?"

"I do."

"And great things are great and greater things
μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεῖζον μεῖζον, καὶ σμικρὸ-
τητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναὶ. Οὐδὲ σὺ ἂρ’ ἂν ἀπο-
δέχοισθαι, εἴ τις τινα φαίη ἐτέρον ἐτέρον τῇ κεφαλῇ
μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύρω ἃν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον πᾶν ἐτέρον ἐτέρον
οὐδενὶ ἀλλο μεῖζον ἐστιν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ
tοῦτο μεῖζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττων
οὐδενὶ ἀλλο ἐλαττον ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ
tοῦτο ἐλαττον, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβοῦμενος
οίμαι, μὴ τὶς σοι ἕναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐάν
tῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖζόνα τινα φῆς εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττῳ,
πρὸ τοῦ μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι καὶ
tὸ ἐλαττὸν ἐλαττον, ἐπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρά
Β οὐσία τὸν μεῖζον μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας
εἶναι, τὸ σμικρὸ τινι μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν
φοβοῖο ταῦτα; Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας· "Εγώγε, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν
πλεῖον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερ-
βάλλει, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πληθεῖ καὶ
diὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ ἔπιχον τοῦ πηχυαλίου
ἡμίσει μεῖζον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γάρ
ποὺ φόβος. Πάνυ γ’, ἔφη. Τι δὲ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς
προστεθέντοις τῇ πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο
C γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τῇ σχίσιν οὐκ εὔλα-
βοίῳ ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοήθησι ὅτι οὐκ
οἴσθα ἄλλως πως ἔκαστον γυρόμενον ἢ μετασχῆν
τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν
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greater by greatness, and smaller things smaller by smallness?"

"Yes."

"And you would not accept the statement, if you were told that one man was greater or smaller than another by a head, but you would insist that you say only that every greater thing is greater than another by nothing else than greatness, and that it is greater by reason of greatness, and that which is smaller is smaller by nothing else than smallness and is smaller by reason of smallness. For you would, I think, be afraid of meeting with the retort, if you said that a man was greater or smaller than another by a head, first that the greater is greater and the smaller is smaller by the same thing, and secondly, that the greater man is greater by a head, which is small, and that it is a monstrous thing that one is great by something that is small. Would you not be afraid of this?"

And Cebes laughed and said, "Yes, I should."

"Then," he continued, "you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two and that this is the reason it is more. You would say it is more by number and by reason of number; and a two-cubit measure is greater than a one-cubit measure not by half but by magnitude, would you not? For you would have the same fear."

"Certainly," said he.

"Well, then, if one is added to one or if one is divided, you would avoid saying that the addition or the division is the cause of two? You would exclaim loudly that you know no other way by which anything can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it
τούτοις οὖν ἔχεις ἄλλην τινα αὐτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἄλλη τήν τῆς δυνάδος μετάσχεσιν καὶ
dein ποιόν μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ
μονάδος ὦ ἂν μέλλη ἐν ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα δὲ σχέσεις
taúta kai προσθέσεις καὶ ἄλλα τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐφός ἂν χαίρειν, παρεῖς ἀποθεματίαν
tοῖς σεαυτοῖ σοφότεροι· συ δὲ δεδιώς
D ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σεαυτοῦ σκιῶν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρῶν, ἐχόμενος ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς
ὑποθέσεως, οὗτός ἀποκρίναι ἂν; εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῆς
tῆς υποθέσεως ἐφοτο, χαίρειν ἐφός ἂν καὶ οὖν
ἀποκρίναι, ἐος ἂν τὰ ἄπτε ἐκείνης ὁμοιότατα
σκέψαι, εἰ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ,
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον,
ὡςαντὸ ἂν διδοίης, ἄλλην αὐ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέ-
μενος, ἦτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνοντο, ἐως
Ε ἐπὶ τί ἰκανὸν ἔλθοις, ἀμα δὲ οὖν ἂν φύροιο ὁσπερ
οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ
τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὁμοιότητος, εἰπερ βούλοις τι τῶν
ὡτων εὕρειν. ἐκεῖνοις μὲν γὰρ ἱσως οὔδε εἰς περὶ
tοῦτον λόγον οὔδε φροντίς· ἰκανοὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ σοφίας
ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκλώντες ὡμος δύνασθαι 1 αὐτοῖς
102 αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκειν· συ δὲ εἶπερ εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων,
οίμαι ἂν ὡς ἔγω λέγω ποιοῖς. Ἀληθέστατα,
ἐφή, λέγεις, ὅ τε Σμιμμίας ἀμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.
ἐξεκρατῆ. Νη Δία, ὃ Φαίδων, εἰκότως γε; θαυ-
μαστώς γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργύς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν
νοῦν ἔχοντι εἴπειν ἐκείνος ταύτα.
Φαίδων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὃ Ἐχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι
τοῖς παρούσιν ἐδοξεῖν.

1 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing δύνασθαι.
participates, and therefore you accept no other cause
of the existence of two than participation in duality,
and things which are to be two must participate in
duality, and whatever is to be one must participate
in unity, and you would pay no attention to the
divisions and additions and other such subtleties,
leaving those for wiser men to explain. You would
distrust your inexperience and would be afraid, as the
saying goes, of your own shadow; so you would cling
to that safe principle of ours and would reply as I
have said. And if anyone attacked the principle,
you would pay him no attention and you would not
reply to him until you had examined the con-
sequences to see whether they agreed with one
another or not; and when you had to give an
explanation of the principle, you would give it in the
same way by assuming some other principle which
seemed to you the best of the higher ones, and so on
until you reached one which was adequate. You
would not mix things up, as disputants do, in talking
about the beginning and its consequences, if you
wished to discover any of the realities; for perhaps
not one of them thinks or cares in the least about
these things. They are so clever that they succeed
in being well pleased with themselves even when
they mix everything up; but if you are a philosopher,
I think you will do as I have said."

"That is true," said Simmias and Cebes together.

ECHERCATES. By Zeus, Phaedo, they were right.
It seems to me that he made those matters astonished-
ly clear, to anyone with even a little sense.

PHAEDO. Certainly, Echocrates, and all who were
there thought so, too.
ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἦμιν τοῖς ἀπούσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούσωσιν. ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἢν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

50. ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. 'Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔπει πάντως ταῦτα συνεχρήθη, καὶ ὀμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι Β ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπιωνυμίαν ἔσχειν, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡρῶτα. Εἴ δὴ, ἢ δ' ὡς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἄρ' οὐχ, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους φής μέξω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμία ἀμφότερα, καὶ μέγαθος καὶ σμικρότητα; "Εγὼ γαρ, ἢ δ' ὡς, ὀμολογεῖς τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ρήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθῆς ἔσχειν. οὐ γὰρ ποιν πεφυκέναι Σιμμίᾶν ὑπερέχειν

C τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίᾳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων' οὐδ' αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν, ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ο Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος; 'Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδὲ γε αὖ ὑπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερεχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίας σμικρότητα; ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι, ἐν μέσῳ δὲν ἀμφότερων,

D τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τῷ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχου ὑπερέχον. καὶ ἀμα μειδίασας. "Εσοικα, ἔφη, καὶ ἐνυγγραφικῶς ἔρειν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γε ποι, ὡς λέγω. Συνέφη. Δέγω δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνεκα,
PHAEDO

ECHOCRATES. And so do we who were not there, and are hearing about it now. But what was said after that?

PHAEDO. As I remember it, after all this had been admitted, and they had agreed that each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which participate in these get their names from them, then Socrates asked: "Now if you assent to this, do you not, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in Simmias greatness and smallness?"

"Yes."

"But," said Socrates, "you agree that the statement that Simmias is greater than Socrates is not true as stated in those words. For Simmias is not greater than Socrates by reason of being Simmias, but by reason of the greatness he happens to have; nor is he greater than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness relatively to his greatness."

"True."

"And again, he is not smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias's smallness."

"That is true."

"Then Simmias is called small and great, when he is between the two, surpassing the smallness of the one by exceeding him in height, and granting to the other the greatness that exceeds his own smallness." And he laughed and said, "I seem to be speaking like a legal document, but it really is very much as I say."

Simmias agreed.

"I am speaking so because I want you to agree
Βουλόμενος δέξαι σοι ὅπερ ἐμοὶ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ὃν μὲνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ᾿ ἐθέλειν ἁμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ᾿ ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυὸν τὸ ἔτερων, ἣ φεύγει καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν, ὅταν αὐτὸ εἴη προσίη τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκεῖνον ἀπολωλέναι· ὑπομείναν δὲ καὶ δεξαμένου τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἔτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἡν. ὃσπερ ἐγὼ δεξαμένος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὅπερ ἐγὼ, οὔτος ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρὸς εἴμη· ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετὸλμηκεν μέγα ὅν σμικρὸν εἶναι· ὅσ δὲ αὐτῶς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γένεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὔδεν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὅπερ ἡν ἁμα τούτων γένεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπολλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι. Παντάπασιν, ἐφαι ὁ Κέβης, οὔτω φαίνεται μοι.

51. Καὶ τις εἰπε τῶν παρόντων ἄκούσας—ὅστις δ᾿ ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι· Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττωνος τὸ μείζον γένεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἐλαττων, καὶ ἀπεξετᾷ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἢ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίωσ, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι τούτο ὦκ ἄν ποτὲ γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλόν τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ ἄκούσας, Ἀνδρικοῖς, ἐφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γένεσθαι, νῦν δὲ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο,
with me. I think it is evident not only that greatness itself will never be great and also small, but that the greatness in us will never admit the small or allow itself to be exceeded. One of two things must take place: either it flees or withdraws when its opposite, smallness, advances toward it, or it has already ceased to exist by the time smallness comes near it. But it will not receive and admit smallness, thereby becoming other than it was. So I have received and admitted smallness and am still the same small person I was; but the greatness in me, being great, has not suffered itself to become small. In the same way the smallness in us will never become or be great, nor will any other opposite which is still what it was, ever become or be also its own opposite. It either goes away or loses its existence in the change."

"That," said Cebes, "seems to me quite evident."

Then one of those present—I don’t just remember who it was—said: "In Heaven’s name, is not this present doctrine the exact opposite of what was admitted in our earlier discussion, that the greater is generated from the less and the less from the greater and that opposites are always generated from their opposites? But now it seems to me we are saying that this can never happen."

Socrates cocked his head on one side and listened. "You have spoken up like a man," he said, "but you do not observe the difference between the present doctrine and what we said before. We said before that in the case of concrete things opposites are generated from opposites; whereas now we say that the abstract concept of an opposite can never become
οὖτε τὸ ἐν ἦμῖν οὖτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τὸτε μὲν γὰρ, ὁ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνῳ ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν, δὲν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὅνωμαξόμενα· αὐτὰ δὲ ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ
C φαμεν ἐθελήσαι γένεσιν ἄλληλων δεξασθαι. καὶ ἂμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν· Ἄρα μή που, ὁ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σὲ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν δὲν οἶδε εἶπεν; ὁ δὲ Ὁυκ ἂν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὁ οὕτως ἔχω καίτοι οὕτι λέγω ὡς οὗ πολλά με ταράττει. Συννομολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἡ δ' ὡς, ἀπλῶς τούτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἕαυτό τὸ ἐναντίον ἐσεθαί. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη.

52. Ἐτι δὴ μοι καὶ τὸ δε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις. θερμὸν τί καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἔγωγε. Ἄρι ὄπερ χίονα καὶ πῦρ;
D Μὰ Δὲ, οὐκ ἐγώγε. Ἀλλ' ἐτερὸν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἐτερὸν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναι. Ἀλλὰ τὸδε γ', οἶμαι, δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδὲποτε χίονα οὕτως δεξαμένην τὸ θερμὸν, ὅσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἕτες ἐσεθαί ὅπερ ἦν, χίονα καὶ θερμὸν, ἀλλὰ προσίστος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκ- χωρήσειν αὐτὸ  ἢ ἀπολείψαυι. Πάνω γε. Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσίστος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτὸ ἢ ὑπεξείναι ἢ ἀπολείπαν, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ

1 ὁ δ' αὖ BT. ὁ δ' οὖκ αὖ, Hermann, Schanz.
2 Schanz brackets ὁ Κέβης.
3 Schanz inserts χίονα before χίονα.
4 Schanz brackets καὶ θερμὸν.
5 αὐτό ΒΩΕ; bracketed by Schanz. αὐτὸ c, Wohlrab, Burnet.

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its own opposite, either in us or in the world about us. Then we were talking about things which possess opposite qualities and are called after them, but now about those very opposites the immanence of which gives the things their names. We say that these latter can never be generated from each other."

At the same time he looked at Cebees and said: "And you—are you troubled by any of our friends' objections?"

"No," said Cebees, "not this time; though I confess that objections often do trouble me."

"Well, we are quite agreed," said Socrates, "upon this, that an opposite can never be its own opposite."

" Entirely agreed," said Cebees.

"Now," said he, "see if you agree with me in what follows: Is there something that you call heat and something you call cold?"

"Yes."

"Are they the same as snow and fire?"

"No, not at all."

"But heat is a different thing from fire and cold differs from snow?"

"Yes."

"Yet I fancy you believe that snow, if (to employ the form of phrase we used before) it admits heat, will no longer be what it was, namely snow, and also warm, but will either withdraw when heat approaches it or will cease to exist."

"Certainly."

"And similarly fire, when cold approaches it, will either withdraw or perish. It will never succeed in
τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι
Ε ὁπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. 1 Ἀληθῇ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἐστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ' ὦς, περὶ ἕνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὅστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεὶ ὁπερ ἤταντερ ἦν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τούτοις ἵσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὁ λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεὶ πον δεῖ τούτῳ τοῦ ὄνοματος τυχχάνειν, ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν ἢ οὖ; Πᾶνυ γε. Ἀρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων, τούτῳ γὰρ ἔρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὁπερ τὸ περιττὸν, ὃμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὄνοματος καὶ τούτῳ καλεῖν ἀεὶ διὰ τὸ ὄντω σεφυκέναι, ὃστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οὐν καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἀρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὄνοματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ οὐπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλὰ ὃμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἕμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας, ὃστε οὐκ ὀν ὁπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἐκατός αὐτῶν ἔστι περιττὸς· καὶ αὐ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τέταρτα καὶ ἄπας ο ἐτερος αὐ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὀν ὁπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὃμως ἐκατός αὐτῶν ἄρτιὸς ἔστιν ἀεὶ· συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὐ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. Ὁ τοιών, ἔφη, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ἄθρει. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἑναντία ἀλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁσα οὐκ ὄντ' ἀλλήλους ἑναντία ἔχει ἀεὶ τάναντία, ουδὲ ταύτα ἐαυτίκε δεχόμενοι ἐκείνην τὴν

1 Schanz brackets καὶ ψυχρόν.
admitting cold and being still fire, as it was before, and also cold."

"That is true," said he.

"The fact is," said he, "in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea. But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples. In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?"

"Certainly."

"But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not identical with the odd but nevertheless has a right to the name of odd in addition to its own name, because it is of such a nature that it is never separated from the odd? I mean, for instance, the number three, and there are many other examples. Take the case of three; do you not think it may always be called by its own name and also be called odd, which is not the same as three? Yet the number three and the number five and half of numbers in general are so constituted, that each of them is odd though not identified with the idea of odd. And in the same way two and four and all the other series of numbers are even, each of them, though not identical with evenness. Do you agree, or not?"

"Of course," he replied.

"Now see what I want to make plain. 'This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites;
iδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐσὶ ἐναντία ἢ, ἀλλ' 
C ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ἦτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχω-
ρώντα: ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείτοπαι
πρῶτον καὶ ἀλλο ὅτι οὐ πεῖσεσθαι, πρὶν ύπο-
μεῖναι ἔτι τρία ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι; Πάνυ μὲν
οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μή, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐναντίον
γε ἐστὶ δυᾶς τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἀρα
μόνον τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπίντω
ἀλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλ' ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ
ὑπομένει ἐπίντω. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

53. Βούλευ εἶπον, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔδω όλοι τ' ὅμεν,
ὁμοσώμεθα ὅποια ταύτα ἐστίν; Πάνυ γε.

D 'Αρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, τάδε εἰ ἂν, ἢ ὁ τι ἄν
κατάσχη, μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν
αὐτὸ ἵσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον ἄει τίνως; 1 Πῶς
λέγεις; "Ωσπερ ἄρτι ἐξέγομεν. οἴσθα γὰρ δὴ-
πον, ὅτι ἢ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχη, ἀνάγκη
αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τριῶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.
Πάνυ γε. 'Επὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δή, φαμέν, ἡ ἐναν-
τία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργά-
ζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι. Οὐ γὰρ. Εἰργάζετο

1 αὐτῷ ἄει τίνως BCDE. Stallbaum, followed by Schanz, 
brackets αὐτῷ.
these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them, and when it approaches they either perish or withdraw. We must certainly agree that the number three will endure destruction or anything else rather than submit to becoming even, while still remaining three, must we not?"

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"But the number two is not the opposite of the number three."

"No."

"Then not only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites."

"Very true," he said.

"Shall we then," said Socrates, "determine if we can, what these are?"

"Certainly."

"Then, Cebes, will they be those which always compel anything of which they take possession not only to take their form but also that of some opposite?"

"What do you mean?"

"Such things as we were speaking of just now. You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd."

"Certainly."

"Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result."

"No, it cannot."
PLATO

δὲ γε ἡ περιττῆ; Ναὶ. Ἕναντία δὲ ταύτη ἡ
Ε τοῦ ἀρτίου; Ναὶ. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἄρα ἡ τοῦ
ἀρτίου ἰδέα οὐδέποτε ἦξει. Οὐ δὴν. Ἀμοιρα
δὴ τοῦ ἀρτίου τὰ τρία. Ἀμοιρα. Ἀνάρτιος
ἄρα ἡ τριάς. Ναὶ. ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὅρὶσα-
σθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἕναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ
dέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἑναντίον, 1 οἶον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ
ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα ἕναντία οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ
dέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἑναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ

105 ἡ δυᾶς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα
πάμπολλα—ἄλλῃ ὀρᾷ δὴ, εἰ οὔτως ὅρῳς, μὴ μόνον
tὸ ἑναντίον τὸ ἑναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ
ἐκεῖνο, δὲ ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἑναντίον ἐκεῖνο, ἐφ᾽ ὧ τι ἂν
αὐτὸ ἦ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου
ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀνα-
μμυρίσκον· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἂκούειν. τὰ
πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέχεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν
τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ
αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ οὕς ἑναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ
Β οὐ δέχεται· οὐδὲ τὸ ἕμιόλιον οὐδὲ τάλλα τὰ
tοιαῦτα, 2 τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὕ καὶ

1 Schanz, following Bekker, brackets τὸ ἑναντίον.
2 After τοιαῦτα the MSS. read τὸ ἕμιον, "half," which
Schanz brackets.

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"But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?"
"Yes."
"And the opposite of this is the idea of the even?"
"Yes."
"Then the idea of the even will never be admitted by the number three."
"No."
"Then three has no part in the even."
"No, it has none."
"Then the number three is uneven."
"Yes."
"Now I propose to determine what things, without being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and as the number two brings forward the opposite of the odd and fire that of cold, and so forth, for there are plenty of examples. Now see if you accept this statement: not only will opposites not admit their opposites, but nothing which brings an opposite to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness of that which is brought. Now let me refresh your memory; for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will ten, the double of five, admit the idea of the odd. Now ten is not itself an opposite, and yet it will not admit the idea of the odd; and so one-and-a-half and other mixed fractions and one-third and other simple frac-
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εὖπερ ἔπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔπομαι.

54. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἔφη, εὖ ἄρχης λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὁ ἄν εὐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνοι, ἀλλὰ μιμοῦμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἦν τὸ πρώτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὄρον ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιο με, ὃ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρὼ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἁμαθῆ, ὅτι ό ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψὸτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ό ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη, ὃ ἂν σώματε τί ἐγγένηται, νοςήσει, οὐκ ἔρῳ ὅτι ὃ ἂν νόσσος, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ' ὃ ἂν ἀρίθμῳ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττός ἔσται, οὐκ ἔρῳ ὃ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὧρα, εἰ ἴδῃ ἰκανὸς οίσθ' ὃ τι βούλομαι. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἰκανὸς, ἔφη. Ἀποκρίνοι δὴ, ἥ δ' ὡς, ὃ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματε, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὡμι ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη. Οὐκ-όν ὡς ἂεὶ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἥ δ' ὡς. 'Ἡ ψυχή ἀρα ὃτι ἂν αὐτή κατάσχῃ, ἂεὶ ἤκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; Ἡκεὶ μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωὴν ἐναντίον ἡ οὐδέν; Ἐστιν, ἔφη. Τὐ; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχή τὸ ἐναντίον ὃ αὐτῆ ἐπιφέρει ἂεὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε

1 After τι the MSS. read ἐν τῷ σώματι, “in the body,” which Schanz brackets.
tions reject the idea of the whole. Do you go with me and agree to this?"

"Yes, I agree entirely," he said, "and am with you."

"Then," said Socrates, "please begin again at the beginning. And do not answer my questions in their own words, but do as I do. I give an answer beyond that safe answer which I spoke of at first, now that I see another safe reply deduced from what has just been said. If you ask me what causes anything in which it is to be hot, I will not give you that safe but stupid answer and say that it is heat, but I can now give a more refined answer, that it is fire; and if you ask, what causes the body in which it is to be ill, I shall not say illness, but fever; and if you ask what causes a number in which it is to be odd, I shall not say oddness, but the number one, and so forth. Do you understand sufficiently what I mean?"

"Quite sufficiently," he replied.

"Now answer," said he. "What causes the body in which it is to be alive?"

"The soul," he replied.

"Is this always the case?"

"Yes," said he, "of course."

"Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Is there anything that is the opposite of life?"

"Yes," said he.

"What?"

"Death."

"Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will
δέχηται, ός ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὀμολογηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

55. Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἄρτιου ἰδέαν τί νῦν δὴ ἄνωμάζομεν; Ἄναρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἄν μουσικὸν ἔ μὴ δέχηται; Ἀμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. Ἐλευ. ὁ δὲ ἀνθάνω τὸ μὴ δέχηται, τὶ καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; Ὀ. Ἀθάνατον ἀρα ἡ ψυχή. Ἀθάνατον. Ἐλευ, ἔφη, τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶς μεν ἡ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἰκανῶς, ὡ Σῶκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἡ δὴ ὡς, ὁ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαίῳ ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἡ ἀνώλεθρα ἄν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὅποτε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἔπαγαγος, ὑπεξῆς ἂν ἡ χιὸν οὐσα σως καὶ ἁτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετο γε, οὐδ' αὐ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀληθῇ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὀσαύτως, οἶμαι, καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν τι ἔπης, οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθῶν ὁχετο. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Β Οὐκοῦν καὶ θέλε, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ θανάτου
never admit the opposite of that which it brings with it."
"Decidedly not," said Cebes.
"Then what do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?"
"Uneven," said he.
"And those which do not admit justice and music?"
"Unjust," he replied, "and unmusical."
"Well then what do we call that which does not admit death?"
"Deathless or immortal," he said.
"And the soul does not admit death?"
"No."
"Then the soul is immortal."
"Yes."
"Very well," said he. "Shall we say then that this is proved?"
"Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates."
"Well then, Cebes," said he, "if the odd were necessarily imperishable, would not the number three be imperishable?"
"Of course."
"And if that which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow? For it could not have been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat."
"That is very true," he replied.
"In the same way, I think, if that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away unharmed."
"Necessarily," he said.
"And must not the same be said of that which is
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eίπειν; ει μὲν τὸ άθάνατον καὶ άνώλεθρον ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχή, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ἴη, ἀπόλλυσθαι: θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὔδ’ ἐσται τεθνηκία, ὀσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἐσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὔδε γ’ αὖ τὸ περιττόν, οὔδε δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὔδε γε ἥ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίη ἄν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττόν μὴ γύρνεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἄρτιον, ὀσπερ ὁμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ Α ἀντ’ ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; τῷ ταύτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται: τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρον ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ εἰ τοῦτο ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἄρτιον τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ τρία οὐχέται ἀπίόνται: καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἦ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθάνατον, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχή ἂν εἰη πρὸς τὸ ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου. 'Αλλ’ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἐφ’ οὗ τούτων γε ἑνεκα: σχολὴ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἂδιον ὃν φθορὰν δέχεταί. 56. Ο δὲ γε θεός, οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ἡγήσεις εἴδος καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατον ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθεὶς μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δ’, ἔφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἐτὶ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγνώμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὅπωτε δ’ τὸ ἀθάνατο

Ε καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι ψυχή ἦ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἰη; 366
immortal? If the immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish when death comes against it. For, as our argument has shown, it will not admit death and will not be dead, just as the number three, we said, will not be even, and the odd will not be even, and as fire, and the heat in the fire, will not be cold. But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it (we agreed to that), but perishes, and the even takes its place? Now we cannot silence him who raises this question by saying that it does not perish, for the odd is not imperishable. If that were conceded to us, we could easily silence him by saying that when the even approaches, the odd and the number three go away; and we could make the corresponding reply about five and heat and the rest, could we not?"

"Certainly."

"And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal, but if not, further argument is needed."

"But," he said, "it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable."

"All, I think," said Socrates, "would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish."

"All men would, certainly," said he, "and still more, I fancy, the Gods."

"Since, then, the immortal is also indestructible, would not the soul, if it is immortal, be also imperishable?"
Πολλή ἀναγκή. Ἡ Ἐπίοντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν τὸ μὲν θυτήτων, ὡς ἔσκεψα, αὐτοῦ ἀποθνῄσκει, τὸ δὲ ἰδάννατον σῶν καὶ ἰδιάφορον οὐχεῖται ἀπίτων, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἐφι, ὡς Κέβθης, ἡ ἴδια ἰδάννατον καὶ ἰδιώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὤντι ἐσονταὶ ἕμων αἱ πυγχαὶ εἰν Ἱδίων. Οὐκοιν ἔγωγε, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐφη, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδὲ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Σίμμιας ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ καταστησάμαι. ὡς οὐκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντινά τις ἄλλον κατοῦ ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἡ δ' ὡς Σίμμιας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἔχω δὴ ἀπιστώ ἐκ γε τῶν λεγομένων· ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εἰςίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἁσθένειαν ἀτιμάζω, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστεῖν ἐτι ἔχειν παρὶ ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ' ἐφη, ὡς Σίμμια, ὡς Σώκρατης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ταῖς πρώταις, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἴσιν, ὧμοι ἐπισκεπτέας σαφείστερον καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἰκανοῖς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τὸ λόγῳ καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν μᾶλιστ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσει· καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ σαφὲς γένηται, οὐδὲν ἐξητήσετε περαιτέρω. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφι, λέγεις.

57. Ἀλλὰ τὸδε γ', ἐφη, ὡς ἄνδρες, δικαίων διανοοθήναι ὅτι, εἰπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἰδάννατος, ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, εὖ ὃ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ

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1 After ἀλλὰ the MSS. read ταῦτά τε εὖ λέγεις; bracketed by Ast, Schanz, and others.

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"Necessarily."

"Then when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death."

"So it seems."

"Then, Cebes," said he, "it is perfectly certain that the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will exist somewhere in another world."

"I," said Cebes, "have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions. But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters."

"But," said Simmias, "I don't see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great, and I have such a poor opinion of human weakness, that I cannot help having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said."

"Not only that, Simmias," said Socrates, "but our first assumptions ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain. And if you analyse them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so. And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther."

"That is true," he said.

"But my friends," he said, "we ought to bear in mind, that, if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life,
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ο κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν οἱ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἐρμαιον ἄν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἀμὴ ἀπηλλάξθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετά τῆς ψυχῆς: νῦν δὲ ἐπειδή ἄθανατος φαίνεται οὐσία, οὐδεμία ἄν εἴη αὐτῆς. Δ ἄλλη ἀποφυγῇ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλην τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιμιώτατην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἀιδοὺς ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλην τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς, ὁ δὲ καὶ μεγίστα λέγεται ὀφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτησάντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείστε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ ἀυτῶν, ὡς ἀρα τελευτησάντα ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὡσπερ ξόντα εἰλήξει, οὕτος ἁγειν ἐπὶ- χειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τῶν τόπων, οἳ δὲ τῶν συλ- λεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς Ἀιδοὺ πορεύεσθαι.

Ε μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου φ' δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένθε ἐκείστε πορεύσατε τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ὁν δὲ τυχεῖν καὶ μείνανται ὁν χρῆ χρόνου ἀλλος δεύρο πάλιν ἡγεμόνων κομίζει εἰς πολλὰς χρόνου καὶ μακραίς περιόδοις. ἐστὶ δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὁ δ' Ἀἰσχύλου Τῆλεφος λέγει· ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλήν οἰμόν φησιν εἰς Ἀιδοὺ φέρειν, ἡ δ' οὔτε ἀπλήν οὔτε μία φαίνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡγεμόνων ἔδειν ὡς γὰρ ποῦ τις ἃν διαμάρτησιν οὐδαμώς μᾶς ὁδοί οὐσίς. οὖν δὲ ἐοικε σχίσεις τε καὶ περιόδους πολλὰς ἔχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρό- μενος λέγω. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἐπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἁγιοὶ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκείνῳ πολὺν χρόνου

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but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the
danger now appears to be terrible. For if death
were an escape from everything, it would be a boon
to the wicked, for when they die they would be
freed from the body and from their wickedness to-
gether with their souls. But now, since the soul is
seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be
saved in any other way than by becoming as good
and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to
the other world nothing but its education and nurture,
and these are said to benefit or injure the departed
greatly from the very beginning of his journey
thither. And so it is said that after death, the tute-
lar genius of each person, to whom he had been
allotted in life, leads him to a place where the dead
are gathered together; then they are judged and
depart to the other world with the guide whose task
it is to conduct thither those who come from this
world; and when they have there received their due
and remained through the time appointed, another
guide brings them back after many long periods of
time. And the journey is not as Telephus says in
the play of Aeschylus; for he says a simple path
leads to the lower world, but I think the path is
neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would
be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way
to any place if there were only one road. But
really there seem to be many forks of the road and
many windings; this I infer from the rites and
ceremonies practised here on earth. Now the orderly
and wise soul follows its guide and understands its
circumstances; but the soul that is desirous of the
body, as I said before, flits about it, and in the
visible world for a long time, and after much resist-

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Β ἐπτομένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀνυπείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένη δὲ ὥθησεν αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκυίαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἀδικῶν ἡμέραν ἢ, ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα εἰργασμένην, τὸ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἐργα τυγχάνει ὑτα, ταύτην μὲν ἁπάσας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὕτω ξυνεμπόρος οὕτε ἡγεμών

Ο ἐθέλει γλυκεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένῃ ἀπορίᾳ, ἐώς ἵνα τινὲς χρόνοι γένωνται, ὅν ἐξελθόντων ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴ πρέπουσαν οἴκησιν ἢ δὲ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ ξυνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ὄκησεν τὸν αὐτὴ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσίν ὃ πολλοὶ καὶ θαν- μαστοί τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὕτε οὐκ οὕτος ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰσθότων λέγειν, ὅς ἕγοι ὑπὸ τινὸς πέπεισμαι.

Д 58. Καὶ οἱ Σιμμίας. Πῶς ταῦτα, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σόκρατες; περὶ γὰρ τοῦ γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκόμα, οὐ μέντοι ταῦτα ἀ σὲ πείθει ἡδέως οὐν ἄν ἀκούσαιμι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Σιμμία, οὐχὶ Πλαῦκον τέχνη γε μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι αὐτῇ ὡσ πέρτην ἡ, μέντοι ἄλλῃ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Πλαῦκον τέχνην, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἕσως οὐδ’ ἀν οἶος τε εἶχην, ἀμα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὃ ἔμοι, ὁ Σιμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἔξαρκεί. τὴν μέντοι ἴδεαν

Ε τῆς γῆς, οἷς πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδὲν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἀλλ’, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ. Πέπεισμαι τοῖνυν,
ance and many sufferings is led away with violence and with difficulty by its appointed genius. And when it arrives at the place where the other souls are, the soul which is impure and has done wrong, by committing wicked murders or other deeds akin to those and the works of kindred souls, is avoided and shunned by all, and no one is willing to be its companion or its guide, but it wanders about alone in utter bewilderment, during certain fixed times, after which it is carried by necessity to its fitting habitation. But the soul that has passed through life in purity and righteousness, finds gods for companions and guides, and goes to dwell in its proper dwelling. Now there are many wonderful regions of the earth, and the earth itself is neither in size nor in other respects such as it is supposed to be by those who habitually discourse about it, as I believe on someone’s authority."

And Simmias said, "What do you mean, Socrates? I have heard a good deal about the earth myself, but not what you believe; so I should like to hear it."

"Well Simmias, I do not think I need the art of Glauce to tell what it is. But to prove that it is true would, I think, be too hard for the art of Glauce, and perhaps I should not be able to do it; besides, even if I had the skill, I think my life, Simmias, will end before the discussion could be finished. However, there is nothing to prevent my telling what I believe the form of the earth to be, and the regions in it."

"Well," said Simmias, "that will be enough."

"I am convinced, then," said he, "that in the first
Η δ' ὦς, ἐγώ, ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ ὄυρανῷ περιφερῆς ὁὕτω, μηδὲν αὐτὴ δείν μὴ τέ
109 ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μῆ πεσεῖν μὴτε ἀλλὰς ανάγκης μηδεμίας τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἰκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἵσχειν ἡν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ὄυρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τῆς ἵσορροπίας ἵσορρου-
ροτοῦ γὰρ πράγμα ὁμολογὸν τῶν ἐν μέσῳ τεθεῖν ὅντων ἐκεῖ μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἡπτον ὁυδαμόσε κληθῆναι, ὁμοιῶν ὑ' ἐχουν ἀκλίνεσ μενεῖ. πρῶτον μέν, ἡ δ' ὦς, τούτω πέπεισμαί. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε, ἐφιή ὁ
Συμμαῖς. Ἐντι τόλουν, ἐφή, πάμμεγά τι εἰναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων
Β στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ των μορφῶν, ὡσπερ περί τέλμα μύρμηκας ἦν βατράχους περὶ τῆ
θάλατταν οἰκεύντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἀλλοθεί πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτως τόπους οἰκεῖν. εἰναι γὰρ
πανταχῷ περὶ τῆν γῆν πολλὰ κοῦλα καὶ παντο-
δαπᾶ καὶ τὰς ἱδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς ἡν ξυνερρη-
κέναι τὸ τε ὑδωρ καὶ τὴν ὀμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα.
αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ
ὄυρανῷ, ἐν ὡφὲρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἄστρα, ὅν ἐν αἰθέρα
C ὀνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα εἰσθότων λέγειν, οὐ δὲ ὑποστάμην ταῦτα εἶναι,
καὶ ξυρρεῖν ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοῦλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν
οἰκούντας ἐν τοῖς κοῦλοις αὐτῆς λεληθέναι, καὶ
οἴσθαι ἄνω ἔπλη τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ τις
ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οὐοτό τε
ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ θατας ὀρῶν
tῶν ἦλιων καὶ τὰ ἀλλα ἄστρα τῆς θαλάττης
ἐχουν ὁυδαμόσε κληθῆναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτῆτά τε καὶ
D ἀσθενείαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης
ἀφιγμένος μηδὲ ἑωρακός εἰς, ἐκδικὸς καὶ ἀνακύψας
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place, if the earth is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither the air nor any other similar force to keep it from falling, but its own equipoise and the homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides suffice to hold it in place; for a body which is in equipoise and is placed in the centre of something which is homogeneous cannot change its inclination in any direction, but will remain always in the same position. This, then, is the first thing of which I am convinced."

"And rightly," said Simmias.

"Secondly," said he, "I believe that the earth is very large and that we who dwell between the pillars of Hercules and the river Phasis live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs about a pond, and that many other people live in many other such regions. For I believe there are in all directions on the earth many hollows of very various forms and sizes, into which the water and mist and air have run together; but the earth itself is pure and is situated in the pure heaven in which the stars are, the heaven which those who discourse about such matters call the ether; the water, mist and air are the sediment of this and flow together into the hollows of the earth. Now we do not perceive that we live in the hollows, but think we live on the upper surface of the earth, just as if someone who lives in the depth of the ocean should think he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the stars through the water, should think the sea was the sky, and should, by reason of sluggishness or feebleness, never have reached the surface of the sea, and should never have seen, by rising and lifting his head out of the
Πλάτων

ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσφις καθαρώτερος καὶ καλλίων τυχχάνει ὅπο τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκοοῦσι εἰς τοῦ ἔωρακτόσος. ταῦτῶν δὴ τούτω καὶ ἦμᾶς πεπονθέναις οἰκοῦντας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οἴεσθαι ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανοῦ καλεῖν, ὡς δὴ τούτων οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἀστρα χωροῦντα: τὸ δὲ εἶναι

Εἰ ταῦτῶν, ὡς ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτητος οὐχ οἴους τε εἶναι ἦμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπὶ ἐσχατοῦ τοῦ ἀέρα· ἐπεὶ, εἰ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ ἄκρα ἔβαλοι ἡ πτημοδας γενόμενος ἀνάπτυχότοι, κατιδεῖν ἀν ἀνακέψανται, ὡσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἵχθυες ἀνακύπτουντες ὀρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἄν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἶν ἀνέγερσαι θεωροῦσα, γνῶναι ἃν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐστὶν ὁ ἄληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἄληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἄληθῶς γῆ. ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἄπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἔστιν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὡσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὕτε φύεται οὐδὲν ἀξίου λόγου ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὕτε τελειων, ὡς ἐπος εἰπέων, οὐδέν ἐστι, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἀμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βάρβοροι εἰςιν, ὅπον ἄν καὶ ἡ γῆ ἦ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρεῆμῶν καλλη κρίνεσθαι οὔδ᾽ ὀποστιόυν ἀξία· ἐκείνα δὲ αὐτῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῶν πολὺ ἂν ἐτι πλεον φανεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῶν πολὺ ἂν ἐτι πλεον φανεῖν

Β διαφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δὲι καὶ μῦθον λέγειν, ἄξιον ἀκούσαι, οὐ Σιμμία, οὐ τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τὸ οὐρανὸ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη ο Σιμμίας, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἦμείς γε τοῦτον τοῦ μῦθου ἥδεως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.

59. Δέγηται τοῖνυν, ἐφη, ὁ ἐταίρε, πρῶτον

1 Schanz, following Rückert, brackets εἶναι ταύτων.
sea into our upper world, and should never have heard from anyone who had seen, how much purer and fairer it is than the world he lived in. Now I believe this is just the case with us; for we dwell in a hollow of the earth and think we dwell on its upper surface; and the air we call the heaven, and think that is the heaven in which the stars move. But the fact is the same, that by reason of feebleness and sluggishness, we are unable to attain to the upper surface of the air; for if anyone should come to the top of the air or should get wings and fly up, he could lift his head above it and see, as fishes lift their heads out of the water and see the things in our world, so he would see things in that upper world; and, if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognise that that is the real heaven and the real light and the real earth. For this earth of ours, and the stones and the whole region where we live, are injured and corroded, as in the sea things are injured by the brine, and nothing of any account grows in the sea, and there is, one might say, nothing perfect there, but caverns and sand and endless mud and mire, where there is earth also, and there is nothing at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things of our world. But the things in that world above would be seen to be even more superior to those in this world of ours. If I may tell a story, Simmias, about the things on the earth that is below the heaven, and what they are like, it is well worth hearing."

"By all means, Socrates," said Simmias; "we should be glad to hear this story."

"Well then, my friend," said he, "to begin with,
μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη ἥ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδείν, εἰ τις ἁνωθὲν 
θεότο καὶ δωδεκάσκυντοι σφαῖραι, ποικιλὴ, 
χρώμασιν διελημμένη, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι 
χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς 
καταχρῶνται· ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαι τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων 
εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρω-
τέρων τοῦ τοῦτον τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργὴ εἶναι καὶ 
θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τῆν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ 
ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἡ χιόνιος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ 
τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκειμένη ὁσαύτως, καὶ 
ἐτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλίων ἢ ὅσα ἢμεῖς ἑωρά-
καμεν, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοίλα αὐτῆς 
ύδατος τε καὶ ἄερος ἐκπλεα ὄντα, χρώματος τι 
εἰδὸς παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων 
χρωμάτων ποικιλά, ὡστε ἐν τῷ αὐτῆς εἰδὸς 
συνεχεῖς ποικιλοῦν φαντάζονται. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ 
οὐσι 
τοιαύτη ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα φύεσθαι, δένδρα 
τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς· καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅρη 
ὁσαύτως καὶ τῶν λίθων ἕχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν 
λόγον τῆς τε λειτουργίας καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ 
τὰ χρώματα καλλίων· όν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λαθίδια 
eὶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδια τε 
καὶ λάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ 
τοιαύτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὕδεν ὃ τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ 
ἐτι τοιοῦτον καλλίων. τὸ δ' αἰτίου τοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι 
ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδησεμένοι 
οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνοι 
καὶ ἀλμης ὑπὸ τῶν δεύτερον ἑυνερρηνίκοτων, ἀ καὶ 
λίθοις καὶ γῆ καὶ τῶν ἄλλως ξύσεως τε καὶ φυτῶς 
αἰσχὺ τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν 
κεκοσμήθαι τοῦτοι τε ἀπασὶ καὶ ἐτὶ χρυσῷ καὶ 

¹ Schanz brackets ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἀλμης.
PHAEDE

the earth when seen from above is said to look like those balls that are covered with twelve pieces of leather; it is divided into patches of various colours, of which the colours which we see here may be regarded as samples, such as painters use. But there the whole earth is of such colours, and they are much brighter and purer than ours; for one part is purple of wonderful beauty, and one is golden, and one is white, whiter than chalk or snow, and the earth is made up of the other colours likewise, and they are more in number and more beautiful than those which we see here. For those very hollows of the earth which are full of water and air, present an appearance of colour as they glisten amid the variety of the other colours, so that the whole produces one continuous effect of variety. And in this fair earth the things that grow, the trees, and flowers and fruits, are correspondingly beautiful; and so too the mountains and the stones are smoother, and more transparent and more lovely in colour than ours. In fact, our highly prized stones, sards and jaspers, and emeralds, and other gems, are fragments of those there, but there everything is like these or still more beautiful. And the reason of this is that there the stones are pure, and not corroded or defiled, as ours are, with filth and brine by the vapours and liquids which flow together here and which cause ugliness and disease in earth and stones and animals and plants. And the earth there is adorned with all these jewels and also with gold and silver and every-

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111 ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῷ τοιούτως. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὡντα πολλὰ πλῆθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὡστε αὐτὴν ἵδειν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατών. ξῦβα δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκούντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἄερα, ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ’ ἐν νῆσοις ὡς περιπερεῖν τὸν ἄερα πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὐσας· καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὡσπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ θάλαττά ἐστι Β πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρείαν, τούτῳ ἐκεῖ τὸν ἄερα, δ’ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ ἄηρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὠραὶ αὐτῆς κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὡστε ἐκείνους ἀνώσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ἔτη πολὺ πλεῖον τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὡς καὶ ἄκοι καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ἕμπερ ἄηρ τε ὑδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθήρ ἄερος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἁλσΗ τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὑντε οἰκητᾶς θεοῦς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι ὁ αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τὸν γε ἡλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστρα ὧρασθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν οία τυχάναι ὡντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

60. Καὶ ὅλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὕτω πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἔγκοιλα αὐτῆς κύκλω περὶ ὅλην πολλοῦς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἡ ἐν ὧ ἡμεῖς οἰκούμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντα τὸ αὐτῶν χάσμα ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν τόπου, οὕς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους· τούτους δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ

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thing of the sort. For there they are in plain sight, abundant and large and in many places, so that the earth is a sight to make those blessed who look upon it. And there are many animals upon it, and men also, some dwelling inland, others on the coasts of the air, as we dwell about the sea, and others on islands, which the air flows around, near the mainland; and in short, what water and the sea are in our lives, air is in theirs, and what the air is to us, ether is to them. And the seasons are so tempered that people there have no diseases and live much longer than we, and in sight and hearing and wisdom and all such things are as much superior to us as air is purer than water or the ether than air. And they have sacred groves and temples of the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they have intercourse with the gods by speech and prophecies and visions, and they see the sun and moon and stars as they really are, and in all other ways their blessedness is in accord with this.

"Such then is the nature of the earth as a whole, and of the things around it. But round about the whole earth, in the hollows of it, are many regions, some deeper and wider than that in which we live, some deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some also less in depth and wider. Now all these
γην εἰς ἄλληλους συντετρήσθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἢ πολὺ μεν ὑδωρ ἐξ ἄλληλον εἰς ἄλληλον ὡστερ εἰς κρατήρας, καὶ ἀειώνων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γην καὶ θερμῶν ὑδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ ψυχρῶν πηλοὺς καὶ καθαρωτέρους

Ε καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὡστερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ρύακος πηλοῦ βέοντες ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς οἱ ρύακε, διὸ δὲ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἄν ἐκάστους τὴν ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιφρογγυγομένη ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡστερ αἰώραν τινὰ ἐνυόσαν ἐν τῇ γην ἑστὶ δὲ ἀρα αὐτή ἢ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν τοιάνδε τινά. ἐν τοῖς χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλως τε μεγίστοιν τυχάνων

112 δὲ καὶ διαμπερές τετραμένου δι’ ὅλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὀπέρ Ὁμήρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτῷ

tῆλε μαλ’, ἤχη βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἐστὶ βέρεβρον.

δ καὶ ἄλλοθε καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσι τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοί καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν γηγονταί δὲ ἐκάστοι τοιοῦτοι, δι’ οἷας ἀν καὶ τῆς γῆς Βέρεισι. ἡ δὲ αὐτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρέων τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ εἰσέρχει

Β πάντα τὰ ρεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα ὅμως ἐχεῖ οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ψυχρόν τοῦτο. αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄρη καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ ταύτων πολεῖ. ξυνεπέται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἔπεκείνα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ
are connected with one another by many subterranean channels, some larger and some smaller, which are bored in all of them, and there are passages through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; and there are everlasting rivers of huge size under the earth, flowing with hot and cold water; and there is much fire, and great rivers of fire, and many streams of mud, some thinner and some thicker, like the rivers of mud that flow before the lava in Sicily, and the lava itself. These fill the various regions as they happen to flow to one or another at any time. Now a kind of oscillation within the earth moves all these up and down. And the nature of the oscillation is as follows: One of the chasms of the earth is greater than the rest, and is bored right through the whole earth; this is the one which Homer means when he says:

Far off, the lowest abyss beneath the earth;¹

and which elsewhere he and many other poets have called Tartarus. For all the rivers flow together into this chasm and flow out of it again, and they have each the nature of the earth through which they flow. And the reason why all the streams flow in and out here is that this liquid matter has no bottom or foundation. So it oscillates and waves up and down, and the air and wind about it do the same; for they follow the liquid both when it moves toward the other side of the earth and when it moves toward this side, and

¹ Homer, *Iliad* 8, 14, Lord Derby's translation.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἐπὶ τάδε, καὶ ὃσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἀεὶ ἐκπνεῖ τε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ βέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ ἑναρωμένον τῷ υγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινούς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσίον καὶ

Ὁ ἔξιόν. ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποψωρήη τὸ ὑδώρ εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ βέματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροῖ αὐτὰ ὁσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες: ὅταν τε αὐτ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολύῃ, δεύρο δὲ ἀρμήσῃ, τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροῖ αὕθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα βεῖ διὰ τῶν όχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἐκαστὰ ἀφίκνουμενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους ὀδοποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας καὶ πτωμοὺς καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ ἐντεύθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν

Δ μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ή ἐπηνυλεύτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλύνου πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροής. καὶ ἐνα μὲν καταντικρυ ἢ ἐξέπεσεν εἰσρεῖ, ἐνα δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἑστι δὲ ἡ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἡ ἀπαξ ἡ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελθέντα περὶ τῆς γῆς ὃσπερ οἱ ὀφείς, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν

Ε ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δὲ ἑστὶν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθίσαι, πέρα δ' οὖν ἀναντε ἀμφοτέρους τοῖς πετυχαί τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν ὑλίνονται μέρος.

61. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλὰ τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ βέματα ἐστὶν τυγχάνει δ' ἄρα ὅτα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ ἀττα βέματα, διὸ τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτον ἔχουν κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὁμήρους  ἔστιν, τοῦτον δὲ καταντικρυ καὶ ἐναντίως ἔρων Ἀχέρων, ὅς δ' ἐρήμων τε
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just as the breath of those who breathe blows in and out, so the wind there oscillates with the liquid and causes terrible and irresistible blasts as it rushes in and out. And when the water retires to the region which we call the lower, it flows into the rivers there and fills them up, as if it were pumped into them; and when it leaves that region and comes back to this side, it fills the rivers here; and when the streams are filled they flow through the passages and through the earth and come to the various places to which their different paths lead, where they make seas and marshes, and rivers and springs. Thence they go down again under the earth, some passing around many great regions and others around fewer and smaller places, and flow again into Tartarus, some much below the point where they were sucked out, and some only a little; but all flow in below their exit. Some flow in on the side from which they flowed out, others on the opposite side; and some pass completely around in a circle, coiling about the earth once or several times, like serpents, then descend to the lowest possible depth and fall again into the chasm. Now it is possible to go down from each side to the centre, but not beyond, for there the slope rises upward in front of the streams from either side of the earth.

"Now these streams are many and great and of all sorts, but among the many are four streams, the greatest and outermost of which is that called Oceanus, which flows round in a circle, and opposite this, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron, which flows through
113 τόπων ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ῥέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τῆς Ἀχερονσιάδα, οἱ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαί τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείνασαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπουσι τες τὰς τῶν ζώων γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καϊόμενον, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μεῖζον τῆς παρὰ ἴμιν, βαλάντης, ξέουσαν ὑδατος καὶ πηλοῦ.

B ἐνετέθην δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θόλερός καὶ πηλάδης, περιελλυτόμενος δὲ ἄλλοτε τα ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἐσχατὰ τῆς Ἀχερονσιάδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμιμημένος τῷ ὑδατι· περιελικθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρῳ τοῦ Ταρτάρου, οὕτως δ' ἐστὶν δι' ἐπο νομάζουσιν Πυριφλεγέθοντα, οὐ καὶ οἱ ρύκακες ἀποσπάσματα ἀναφυσώσων ὅπῃ ἄν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τούτου δὲ αὖ καταντικρύ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τόπον πρῶτον1 δεινόν τε καὶ ἄγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρώμα δ' ἐχοντα ὅλον οἷον ὁ

C κυνός, δι' ὅτι ἐπο νομάζουσιν Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, ἣν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγον ὁ δ' ἐμπεσών ἐνταῦθα καὶ δειναὶ δυνάμεις λαβῶν ἐν τῷ ὑδατι, δὺς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελλυτόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι καὶ ἀπαντά ἐν τῇ Ἀχερονσιάδι λίμνη ἢ ἐναντίος· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τούτο ὑδωρ οὐδὲ μάγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέθοντι ὄνομα δὲ τούτω ἐστὶν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κακυντός.

D 62. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφί-

1 Schanz brackets πρῶτον.
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various desert places and, passing under the earth, comes to the Acherusian lake. To this lake the souls of most of the dead go and, after remaining there the appointed time, which is for some longer and for others shorter, are sent back to be born again into living beings. The third river flows out between these two, and near the place whence it issues it falls into a vast region burning with a great fire and makes a lake larger than our Mediterranean sea, boiling with water and mud. Thence it flows in a circle, turbid and muddy, and comes in its winding course, among other places, to the edge of the Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water. Then, after winding about many times underground, it flows into Tartarus at a lower level. This is the river which is called Pyriphlegethon, and the streams of lava which spout up at various places on earth are offshoots from it. Opposite this the fourth river issues, it is said, first into a wild and awful place, which is all of a dark blue colour, like lapis lazuli. This is called the Stygian river, and the lake which it forms by flowing in is the Styx. And when the river has flowed in here and has received fearful powers into its waters, it passes under the earth and, circling round in the direction opposed to that of Pyriphlegethon, it meets it coming from the other way in the Acherusian lake. And the water of this river also mingles with no other water, but this also passes round in a circle and falls into Tartarus opposite Pyriphlegethon. And the name of this river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

"Such is the nature of these things. Now when
κωνταί οί τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἳ ὁ
dαίμων ἐκαστὸν κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδυκάσαντο
οἳ τε καλῶς καὶ ὅσιως βιώσαντες καὶ οἳ μή. καὶ
οἳ μὲν ἄν δὸξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες
ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἄ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὁχή-
ματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνούνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην,
καὶ ἐκεῖ οἴκουσι τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε
ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἰ τίς τι

Ε ἡδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσίων τιμᾶς φέρονται κατὰ
tὴν ἀξίαν ἐκαστὸς· οἳ δ’ ἄν δὸξωσι ἀνάτως
ἐχεῖν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἡ ἱερο-
σύλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἡ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ
παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένου, ἡ ἄλλα ὅσα
tοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα
μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαι-
nουσιν. οἳ δ’ ἄν ιάσιμα μὲν, μεγάλα δὲ δὸξωσι
ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀμαρτημάτα, οἶνον πρὸς πατέρα ἦ
μητέρα ὑπ’ ὀργῆς βλαίον τι πράξαντες, καὶ μετα-
μέλους αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιώσιν, ἡ ἀνδροφόνοι
τοιοῦτω τῳ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένουται, τούτους δὲ
ἐμπεσέσι μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας
δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐναυτὸν ἐκεῖ ἄγον κενομένους ἐκβάλλει
τὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν,
tοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν
Πυριφλεγέθοντα· ἐπειδὰς δὲ φερόμενοι γένουσι
cατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχεροουσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα
βοῶσι τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὐς ἀπέκτειναν,
οὶ δὲ οὐς ὑβρίσαν, καλέσαντες δ’ ἱκετεύοντες καὶ

B δέουνται ἐὰςαι σφάς ἐκβήναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ
dέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσι, ἐκβαινοῦσι τε
cαὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὖθις
eἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποτα-
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the dead have come to the place where each is led by his genius, first they are judged and sentenced, as they have lived well and piously, or not. And those who are found to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the Acheron and, embarking upon vessels provided for them, arrive in them at the lake; there they dwell and are purified, and if they have done any wrong they are absolved by paying the penalty for their wrong doings, and for their good deeds they receive rewards, each according to his merits. But those who appear to be incurable, on account of the greatness of their wrong-doings, because they have committed many great deeds of sacrilege, or wicked and abominable murders, or any other such crimes, are cast by their fitting destiny into Tartarus, whence they never emerge. Those, however, who are curable, but are found to have committed great sins—who have, for example, in a moment of passion done some act of violence against father or mother and have lived in repentance the rest of their lives, or who have slain some other person under similar conditions—these must needs be thrown into Tartarus, and when they have been there a year the wave casts them out, the homicides by way of Cocytus, those who have outraged their parents by way of Pyriphlegethon. And when they have been brought by the current to the Acherusian lake, they shout and cry out, calling to those whom they have slain or outraged, begging and beseeching them to be gracious and to let them come out into the lake; and if they prevail they come out and cease from their ills, but if not, they are borne away again to Tartarus and thence back into the rivers, and this goes on
μούς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὕς ἣδηκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοίς ἐτάχθη. οὗ δὲ δὴ ἢ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὅσιόν βιῶναι, οὕτωι εἰσιν οἱ τῶν μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοι τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὡσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἀνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἰκήσιν ἀφικνοῦμεν καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκεῖσθαι. τούτωι δὲ αὐτῶι οἱ φιλοσοφία ἰκανῶς καθηρᾶμενοι ἂνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἐτὶ τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, ὡς οὔτε ῥίδιον δηλώσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἰκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτωι δὴ ἔνεκα χρῆ ὁν διεληλυθαμεν, ὥς Σμιμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὡστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλον καὶ ἡ ἐπὶς μεγάλη.

63. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα διυπηρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διεληλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ· οτι μὲντοι ἡ ταῦτ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαῦτ ἀτα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀδάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένοι οὕτως ἔχειν· καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κύδυνος καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσπερ ἐπάδειι ἐαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μύθον. ἀλλὰ τούτωι δὴ ἔνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῆς ἄνδρα, ὡστὶς ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἅλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἰσετε χαίρειν, ὡς ἄλλοτρίους τε ὅντας, καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τᾶς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἑπούδασε τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλλοτρὶς ἅλλα τῶν αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ
until they prevail upon those whom they have wronged; for this is the penalty imposed upon them by the judges. But those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from these regions within the earth and are released as from prisons; they mount upward into their pure abode and dwell upon the earth. And of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes which it is not easy to describe, nor have we now time enough.

"But, Simmias, because of all these things which we have recounted we ought to do our best to acquire virtue and wisdom in life. For the prize is fair and the hope great.

"Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while; and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms, which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long. This then is why a man should be of good cheer about his soul, who in his life has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good, and has sought eagerly for those of learning, and after adorning his soul with no alien ornaments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice and
115 ἀνδρεία καὶ ἑλενθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περι-
μένει τήν εἰς Ἀδιόν πορείαν, ὡς πορευόμενος
ὅταν ἡ εἰμαρμένη καλή. ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὦ
Σιμώνια τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαύδης ἐν
τινὶ χρόνῳ ἐκαστοὶ πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἥδη
καλεί, φαίη ἂν ἀνήρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ
σχεδόν τί μοι ὠρα τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λούτρον;
δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ
φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῖς γυναιξὶν παρέχειν
νεκρὸν λούειν.

64. Ταύτα δὴ εἰσόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων. Εἴειν,
Β ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἡ ἐμοὶ ἐπι-
στέλλεις ἡ περὶ τῶν παιδῶν ἡ περὶ ἄλλου του,
ὅτι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἴμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα
ποιοῦμεν; Ἀπερ ἂεὶ λέγω, ἐφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν
καὶνότερον ὅτι ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελοῦμεν ἴμεῖς
καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι
ποιήσετε ἄττ' ἂν ποιήτε, καὶ μὴ νῦν ὀμολογήσετε·
ἐὰν δὲ ὑμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἄμελητε καὶ μὴ θέλητε
ὡςπερ καὶ ἤχυν κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ
ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθέν χρόνῳ ξῆν, οὐδὲ ἐὰν πολλά
C ὀμολογήσητε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν
πλέον ποιήσετε. Ταύτα μὲν τοίνυν προσυ-
μηθησόμεθα, ἐφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν θάπτωμεν δὲ
σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἂν, ἐφη, βούλησθε,
ἐάνπερ γε λάβητε με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς.
γελάσας δὲ ἀμα ἴσωχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἤμᾶς ἀποβλέψας
εἰπεν· Οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ
εἰμί σῖτος Σωκράτης, ὃς νυνί διαλεγόμενος καὶ
dιατάττων ἐκαστοῦ τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἴτεαί με
ἐκείνων εἶναι, ὃν ὁφεται ὅλην ὑστερον νεκρόν,
D καὶ ἐρωτᾷ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτη. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι
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courage and freedom and truth, awaits his departure to the other world, ready to go when fate calls him. You, Simmias and Cebes and the rest," he said, "will go hereafter, each in his own time; but I am now already, as a tragedian would say, called by fate, and it is about time for me to go to the bath; for I think it is better to bathe before drinking the poison, that the women may not have the trouble of bathing the corpse."

When he had finished speaking, Crito said: "Well, Socrates, do you wish to leave any directions with us about your children or anything else—anything we can do to serve you?"

"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new. If you take care of yourselves you will serve me and mine and yourselves, whatever you do, even if you make no promises now; but if you neglect yourselves and are not willing to live following step by step, as it were, in the path marked out by our present and past discussions, you will accomplish nothing, no matter how much or how eagerly you promise at present."

"We will certainly try hard to do as you say," he replied. "But how shall we bury you?"

"However you please," he replied, "if you can catch me and I do not get away from you." And he laughed gently, and looking towards us, said: "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that the Socrates who is now conversing and arranging the details of his argument is really I; he thinks I am the one whom he will presently see as a corpse, and he asks how to bury me. And though I have been saying at
πολύν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν πίω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὑμῖν παραμενὼ, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσομαι ἀπίων εἰς μακάρων δὴ τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτα μοι1 δοκῶ αὐτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθεύμενος ἄμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἄμα δὲ ἐμαυτόν. ἔγγυνησάσθη σοῦ με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἐφη, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγνώην ἢ ὅτι οὗτος πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἤγγυατο. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ ἡ μὴν παραμενείν ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡ μὴν μὴ παραμενείν ἔγγυνησάσθη, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ ἐναντίας ἐπιστεύσατο, ἵνα Κρίτων ῥάνων φέρη, καὶ μὴ ὁρῶν μου τὸ σῶμα ἢ καιόμενον ἢ κατορυττό-
μενον ἀνανακτὴ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πᾶς ὁ σοφός, μηδὲ λέγῃ εἰς τὴν ταφήν, ὡς ἡ προτίθεται Ἡρώδητῇ ἡ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύθη. εὐ γὰρ ἵσθι, ἢ δ' ὅσι, ἢ ἀριστεῖ Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πλημμελεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακῶν τι ἐμποτεί ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ ἀρρενῶ τε χρῆ καὶ φάναι τοῦτον σῶμα βάπτειν, καὶ βάπτειν οὕτως ἔστω ἀν σοι φίλων ἢ καὶ μάλωστα ἡγῆ νόμιμον εἶναι.

65. Ταῦτ' εἶπον ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκήμα

1 Schanz, following Madvig, brackets μοι.
great length that after I drink the poison I shall no longer be with you, but shall go away to the joys of the blessed you know of, he seems to think that was idle talk uttered to encourage you and myself. So," he said, "give security for me to Crito, the opposite of that which he gave the judges at my trial; for he gave security that I would remain, but you must give security that I shall not remain when I die, but shall go away, so that Crito may bear it more easily, and may not be troubled when he sees my body being burnt or buried, or think I am undergoing terrible treatment, and may not say at the funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or following him to the grave, or burying him. For, dear Crito, you may be sure that such wrong words are not only undesirable in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. No, you must be of good courage, and say that you bury my body,—and bury it as you think best and as seems to you most fitting."

When he had said this, he got up and went into another room to bathe; Crito followed him, but he told us to wait. So we waited, talking over with each other and discussing the discourse we had heard, and then speaking of the great misfortune that had befallen us, for we felt that he was like a father to us and that when bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans. And when he had bathed and his children had been brought to him—for he had two little sons and one big one—and
οικείαι γυναῖκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλέχθεις τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἄττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναίκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπείναι ἐκέλευεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ' ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἢν ἦδη ἔγγυς ἦλιον δυσμῶν χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτρησεν ἔνδον. ἔλθον δ' ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταῦτα διελέχθη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ὁ ἐνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς παρ' αὐτὸν ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ καταγνώσομαι σοῦ ὅπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρωταί, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγέλλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἐγρώκα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναίοτάτω καὶ πραᾶτατον καὶ ἀριστῶν ἄνδρα ὑπά τῶν πόποτε δεύο ἀφικομένων, καὶ ἢ καὶ νῦν εἰδὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔμοι χαλεπαίνεις, γυγώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνοις. νῦν, σῖσθα γὰρ ἡ ἦλιον ἀγγέλλων, χαῖρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ρίζτα

D φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. καὶ ἀμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆκε. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὸν, Καὶ σὺ, ἔφη, χαῖρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν, καὶ ἀμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὅσο ἀστείος, ἔφη, ὁ ἀνθρώπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προσήκες καὶ διελέγετο ἐνῶτε καὶ ἦν ἀνδρῶν λόγος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίος με ἀποδικύρει. ἄλλο ἄγε δή, ὁ Κρίτων, πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ ἐνεγκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτρυπνα· εἰ δὲ μή, τριψάτω ὁ ἀνθρώπος. καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ὁ Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἦλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρέσι καὶ οὐτῷ δεδυκέναι.

1 ἐναντίον ἐκείναις, Ebd. ἐναντίον ἐκείναι, BD. Schanz brackets ἐκείναι. ἐκείναις ἐναντίον Herrmann, Wohlrab.
the women of the family had come, he talked with them in Crito's presence and gave them such directions as he wished; then he told the women to go away, and he came to us. And it was now nearly sunset; for he had spent a long time within. And he came and sat down fresh from the bath. After that not much was said, and the servant of the eleven came and stood beside him and said: "Socrates, I shall not find fault with you, as I do with others, for being angry and cursing me, when at the behest of the authorities, I tell them to drink the poison. No, I have found you in all this time in every way the noblest and gentlest and best man who has ever come here, and now I know your anger is directed against others, not against me, for you know who are to blame. Now, for you know the message I came to bring you, farewell and try to bear what you must as easily as you can." And he burst into tears and turned and went away. And Socrates looked up at him and said: "Fare you well, too; I will do as you say." And then he said to us: "How charming the man is! Ever since I have been here he has been coming to see me and talking with me from time to time, and has been the best of men, and now how nobly he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let someone bring the poison, if it is ready; and if not, let the man prepare it." And Crito said: "But I think, Socrates, the sun is still upon the mountains and has not yet set; and
καὶ ἄμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάντα ὅψε πίνοντας, ἐπεὶ δὲν παραγγέλθη αὐτοῖς, δειπνήσαντάς τε καὶ πίνοντας εὗ μάλα, καὶ εὐγγενομένους ὑ' ἐνίοις δὲν ἂν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ἀλλὰ μὴ δέν ἐπείγου' ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Ὁσκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἐφ' ὁ Ὁρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲν σὺ λέγεις, οὐνταί γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως ὁ ποιήσας οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι κερδαίνειν ὅλον ὑστερον πιὰν ἄλλο γε ἡ γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γλυκόμενος τοῦ ζῆν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἔτι ἐνότος. ἀλλ' ἔθι, ἐφ' ὁ πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

66. Καὶ ὁ Ὁρίτων ἄκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἐστῶτε. καὶ ὁ παις ἔξελθων καὶ συγχρόνῳ χρόνων διατρόφησας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα διδόναι τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετραμένον· ἕδων δὲ ὁ Ὁσκράτης τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἔλευ, ἐφ' ὁ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρή ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφ' ὁ πιόντα περιεύαι, ἐώς ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἐπείτα κατακείθησαι καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσῃς. καὶ ἄμα ὥρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Ὁσκράτει καὶ δὲς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἄλεως, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ εἰώθηε ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, Τί λέγεις, ἐφ', περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαι τίν; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὗ; Τοσοῦτον, ἐφ', ὁ Ὁσκράτης, τρίβομεν, ὃσον οἰόμεθα μέτρου εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἢ

Β καὶ ὁ μέγας Ὁρίτων ἄκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἐστῶτε. καὶ ὁ παις ἔξελθων καὶ συγχρόνῳ χρόνων διατρόφησας ἤκεν ἄγων τὸν μέλλοντα διδόναι τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετραμένον· ἕδων δὲ ὁ Ὁσκράτης τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἔλευ, ἐφ' ὁ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τί χρή ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφ', ὁ πιόντα περιεύαι, ἐώς ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἐπείτα κατακείθησαι καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιήσῃς. καὶ ἄμα ὥρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Ὁσκράτει καὶ δὲς λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἄλεως, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρώματος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ εἰώθηε ταυρηδὸν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, Τί λέγεις, ἐφ', περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ πόματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπεῖσαι τίν; ἔξεστιν ἢ οὗ; Τοσοῦτον, ἐφ', ὁ Ὁσκράτης, τρίβομεν, ὃσον οἰόμεθα μέτρου εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἢ

C ὁ μέγας Ὁρίτων ἄκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἐστῶτε. καὶ ἄλλος χρήσαται γε τοῦ τοῖς θεοῖς ἔξεστιν τε καὶ χρή, τὴν μετοικησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε

1 Schanz brackets eikótws, following Hirschig.
PHAEDO

I know that others have taken the poison very late, after the order has come to them, and in the meantime have eaten and drunk and some of them enjoyed the society of those whom they loved. Do not hurry; for there is still time.”

And Socrates said: “Crito, those whom you mention are right in doing as they do, for they think they gain by it; and I shall be right in not doing as they do; for I think I should gain nothing by taking the poison a little later. I should only make myself ridiculous in my own eyes if I clung to life and spared it, when there is no more profit in it. Come,” he said, “do as I ask and do not refuse.”

Thereupon Crito nodded to the boy who was standing near. The boy went out and stayed a long time, then came back with the man who was to administer the poison, which he brought with him in a cup ready for use. And when Socrates saw him, he said: “Well, my good man, you know about these things; what must I do?” “Nothing,” he replied, “except drink the poison and walk about till your legs feel heavy; then lie down, and the poison will take effect of itself.”

At the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. He took it, and very gently, Echecrates, without trembling or changing colour or expression, but looking up at the man with wide open eyes, as was his custom, said: “What do you say about pouring a libation to some deity from this cup? May I, or not?” “Socrates,” said he, “we prepare only as much as we think is enough.” “I understand,” said Socrates; “but I may and must pray to the gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one; so I
εὐτυχῆς γενέσθαι· ἀδὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. καὶ ἀμὴ εἰπὼν ταύτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπειν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἴοι τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὥς δὲ εἴδομεν πινοῦτά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἄστατι ἔχωρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυφάμενος ἀπέκλαιοι ἐμαυτὸν· οὐ γὰρ δή ἐκεῖνοι γε, ἀλλὰ

D τὴν ἐμαυτὸν τύχην, οἴον ἄνδρος ἐταύρου ἐστηρη-μένος εὖν. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἔμοι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἶδας τ' ἢν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἔβαψεν. Απολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλαίων καὶ ἅγια κατέκλασε τὸν παρόντων πλῆν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκεῖνος δέ, Ὅλα, ἐφε, ποιεῖτε, ὁ θαυμάστωι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἦκιστα τούτου ἔνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπεπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαύτα πλημμελοῦν· καὶ γὰρ ἄκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν

Ε εὐφημία χρὴ τελευταί. ἀλλ' ἦνυχλαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἑσχύνθη-μέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύων. ὁ δὲ περιελ-θών, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἐφή τὰ σκέλη, κατε-κλίθη ὑπτίος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἀμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὕτως ὁ δοὺς τὸ φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κατεστησάς σφόδρα πιέσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο, εἰ αἰσθάνοντο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐφή· καὶ μετὰ τούτο αὔθις τὰς κυῆμας· καὶ ἐπανιδών οὕτως ἠμιν

1 Schanz brackets κλαίων καί.  
2 Schanz follows Upton and others in bracketing οὕτως . . . φάρμακον. 

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offer this prayer, and may it be granted." With these words he raised the cup to his lips and very cheerfully and quietly drained it. Up to that time most of us had been able to restrain our tears fairly well, but when we watched him drinking and saw that he had drunk the poison, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself my tears rolled down in floods, so that I wrapped my face in my cloak and wept for myself; for it was not for him that I wept, but for my own misfortune in being deprived of such a friend. Crito had got up and gone away even before I did, because he could not restrain his tears. But Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time before, then wailed aloud in his grief and made us all break down, except Socrates himself. But he said, "What conduct is this, you strange men! I sent the women away chiefly for this very reason, that they might not behave in this absurd way; for I have heard that it is best to die in silence. Keep quiet and be brave." Then we were ashamed and controlled our tears. He walked about and, when he said his legs were heavy, lay down on his back, for such was the advice of the attendant. The man who had administered the poison laid his hands on him and after a while examined his feet and legs, then pinched his foot hard and asked if he felt it. He said "No"; then after that, his thighs; and passing upwards in

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ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὡτί ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πηγνύτο. καὶ αὐθεὶς ¹ ἦπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἔπειδὰν πρὸς τὴν καρδία γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. ἦδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἔτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος ἐνεκακάλυπτο γάρ, εἰπεν, ὁ δὲ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγξατο ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιιῷ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἄλλα ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσῃτε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἐσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἄλλα ὀρα, εἰ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄλλῃ διάλογον χρόνου διαλυπῶν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκαλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὅτα ὁματα ἐστησεν ἰδοὺ δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

67. Ἡδὲ ἡ τελευτή, ὁ Ἐχέκρατε, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἦμιν ἐγένετο, ἄνδρός, ὡς ἢμεις φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὅν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστον καὶ ἄλλοις ² φρονιμωτάτον καὶ δικαιοτάτον.

¹ aúthēs, Forster. aúthōs, BCDE. aŭ, Schanz.
² Schanz brackets ἄλλως.
PHAEDO

this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone. The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said—and these were his last words—“Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it.” “That,” said Crito, “shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say.” To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.
PHAEDRUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS

The Phaedrus is pre-eminent among the dialogues of Plato for the variety of its contents and style, the richness of its imaginative description, and the sportive humour of its conversation. The chief theme of the dialogue is rhetoric, the art of speaking, a subject which formed an important part of the oral and written instruction of the sophists. Plato, and herein he agrees with the sophists, assumes that the result aimed at by rhetoric is persuasiveness, ability to lead the minds of the hearers to a particular belief or action. For the attainment of this result, the sophists claimed that knowledge of the truth concerning the subject under discussion is not essential; all that is necessary is ability to make one's conclusions seem probable. Plato shows that only the man who knows the truth can know what will seem probable; and he must also know the minds or souls to be persuaded. This he cannot do without a knowledge of the nature of the soul. Now knowledge of the truth concerning the various subjects of discourse and knowledge of all the different classes of human souls must be supplemented by knowledge of the different kinds of argument and of the various niceties of speech taught by the sophists. Only he who has acquired all this knowledge is a perfect orator, so far as perfection is attainable by man; but the acquisition
of this knowledge is a great task, which no one would undertake merely for the purpose of persuading his fellows; a higher purpose, the perfection of his soul and the desire to serve the gods, must animate the spirit of the student of the real art of rhetoric.

But if rhetoric is the chief theme of the dialogue, it is not by any means the only theme. The rationalistic (Euhemeristic) explanation of myths is briefly discussed and rejected, the higher and lower forms of love are analysed, the nature of the soul is described in the beautiful figure of the charioteer and his two horses, and here, as in the Phaedo, the doctrine of ideas and its derivative, the doctrine of reminiscence, are intimately connected with the description of the life of the soul. Yet, formally, at any rate, the other subjects of the dialogue are subordinate to the discussion of rhetoric. The processes of collection and division, by which a number of particulars may be brought together under one head and a general concept may be divided, are clearly stated. The latter is of such importance in the dialectic method, which for Plato was the only correct method of reasoning, that we may well believe the discussion of rhetoric to have been undertaken in part for the purpose of giving a concise and clear statement of this principle.

In this dialogue, as in the Phaedo, we find the soul justly rewarded or punished for conduct in this life; but the soul is here described as made up of a charioteer and two horses, whereas in the Phaedo it is one and indivisible; but the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is confessedly and obviously figurative, and the simple, uniform nature of the soul
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is arrived at in the Phaedo by serious argument. It is therefore evident that Plato did not consider the soul a composite creature, but a single being. The two horses, then, represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the body; the good horse typifies the influence of the emotions, the bad horse that of the appetites, and the charioteer is reason. It is important to bear in mind that the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is figurative, otherwise we are involved in hopeless confusion in any attempt to determine Plato's conception of the soul. Since the Phaedo and the Phaedrus were probably written about the same time, no real disagreement between them is to be assumed.

The first of the three discourses on love is ascribed to the famous orator, Lysias, son of Cephalus, and the question has been much discussed whether it is really a work of Lysias which Plato has inserted here. All the extant speeches of Lysias were composed to be spoken in court or at least on public occasions. We have no specimen of a discourse written by him purely as an example of his skill or for the delectation of his audience, nor do we know that he ever wrote such discourses. The discourse on love is certainly in the style of Lysias, that is to say, it approaches the style of his extant speeches as nearly as a discourse on such a subject can be expected to approach the style of a speech intended for delivery in a court of law; but Plato was a consummate literary artist, and there is surely every reason to believe that he could imitate the style of Lysias if he chose. Similarity to the style of Lysias is therefore no sufficient reason for the belief that
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the discourse is not Plato's composition, especially as the introduction of a genuine discourse by Lysias would impair the unity, and, to a certain extent, the dignity of the dialogue.

Toward the end of the Phaedrus, Plato inserts a remarkable discussion of the relative value of the spoken and the written word. It is somewhat startling to find so voluminous a writer maintaining that the written word is only a plaything, or, at best, a reminder; yet this must, apparently, be accepted as his deliberate judgment. In the Academy he laid great stress upon oral instruction, and this passage seems to indicate that he considered that instruction more important than his writings. It is interesting to find this judgment of the written word in a dialogue in which the playful element is so strong.

Of Phaedrus, the only interlocutor and the sole audience of Socrates in this dialogue, little or nothing is known except what we learn from Plato. He was the son of Pythocles, of the Attic deme of Myrrhinus. He appears in several dialogues of Plato as a follower of Socrates, but no writings of his are extant, if any ever existed. Diogenes Laertius (iii., 29, 31), speaks of him as Plato's favourite. Some of the persons mentioned in the dialogue are so well known that no further account of them is necessary. Such are the great orator Lysias, the sophist and rhetorician Gorgias of Leontini, the philosopher Zeno of Elea (who masquerades under the name of Palamedes, 261 d), the distinguished sophist Protagoras of Abdera, Hippocrates, the "father of medicine," and the rhetorician, orator, and sage Isocrates. Acumenus and his son, Eryximachus, were Athenian physicians,
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Herodicus was a physician of Megara, Morychus was an Athenian of some means, whose house had apparently been bought by Epicrates, who is described by a scholiast as an orator and demagogue. The other persons mentioned, Tisias of Sicily, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Theodorus of Byzantium, Evenus of Paros, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Polus of Agrigentum, and his teacher, Licymnius, were all sophists and rhetoricians, whose inventiveness in the matter of rhetorical nomenclature is ridiculed.

Separate editions of the Phaedrus are few. The only one which appears to demand special mention is that of W. H. Thompson (1868).
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΚΑΛΟΤ. ΗΘΙΚΟΣ]

TA TOY ΔΙΔΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

A 1. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ο Φίλε Φαίδρε, ποιή καὶ πόθεν;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παρὰ Λυσίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλουν πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περιπτατών ἔξω τεῖχους. συχνὸν γὰρ ἐκεὶ διέτριψα χρόνον καθῆμενος ἐξ ἑωθίνοις τῷ δὲ σῷ καὶ ἐμῷ ἔταιρῳ πειθόμενοι 'Ακουμενῷ κατὰ τὰς ὄδους ποιοῦμαι τοὺς περιπτάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἄκοπτωτέρους εἶναι B τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γὰρ, ὦ ἔταιρε, λέγει. ἀτὰρ Λυσίας ἦν, ὥς ἐοικεν, ἐν ἁστεί.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ, παρ᾽ Ἐπικράτει, ἐν τῇ πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίᾳ τῆς Μορυχία.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὖν δὴ ἢν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὃτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἰστία;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πεύσει, εἰ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὶ δὲ; οὐκ ἂν οἶει με κατὰ Πίν.
PHAEDRUS

[OR ON THE BEAUTIFUL, ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS
SOCRATES, PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. Dear Phaedrus, whither away, and where do you come from?
PHAEDRUS. From Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus; and I am going for a walk outside the wall. For I spent a long time there with Lysias, sitting since early morning; and on the advice of your friend and mine, Acumenus, I am taking my walk on the roads; for he says they are less fatiguing than the streets.

SOCRATES. He is right, my friend. Then Lysias, it seems, was in the city?
PHAEDRUS. Yes, at Epicrates' house, the one that belonged to Morychus, near the Olympicum.

SOCRATES. What was your conversation? But it is obvious that Lysias entertained you with his speeches.

PHAEDRUS. You shall hear, if you have leisure to walk along and listen.

SOCRATES. What? Don't you believe that I
δαρον καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πράγμα ποιήσα-
θαι τὸ σήν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἄκούσαι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πρόσαγε δή.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγοις ἂν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μὴν, ὃ Σώκρατες, προσήκουσά
γε σοι ἡ ἀκοή. ὁ γὰρ τοι λόγος ἢ, περὶ δὲν
διετρίβουμεν, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὠντινα τρόπον ἐρωτικῆς.
γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρόμενον τινα τῶν
καλῶν, οὐχ ὡς ἐραστοῦ δὲ, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο
καὶ κεκόμψεται. Λέγει γὰρ ὃς χαριστέου μὴ
ἔρωτι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐρώτη.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡ γενναῖος, εἰθε γράψειεν ὡς χρὴ
πένητι μᾶλλον ἡ πλούσιω, καὶ προσβυτέρῳ ἢ
νεωτέρῳ, καὶ ὥσα ἄλλα ἐμοὶ τε πρόσεστι καὶ τοῖς

ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ ἩΜῶΝ ἡ γὰρ ἀν ἀστείοι καὶ δημοφιλεῖς
εἰσὶν οἱ λόγοι. ἔγωγ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα
ἀκούσαι, ὡστε ἔαν βαδίζων ποιῆ τῶν περίπατον
Μέγαράδε, καὶ κατὰ Ηρόδικον προσβᾶς τῷ τείχει
πάλιν ἀπίστη, οὐ μὴ σου ἀπολειφθῶ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὃ βέλτιστε Σώκρατες;

228 οῖκε με, ἢ Λυσίας ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν
συνεδήκε, δεινότατος ὃν τῶν νῦν γράφειν, ταῦτα
ἰδιότητι ὑπὰ ἀπομνημονεύσειν ἀξίως ἐκεῖνον;

1 Pindar Isthm. i. 1. Ματὴρ ἐμα, τὸ τεῖχος, χρύσασσι Θῆβα,
πράγμα καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον θῆσομαι. "My mother, Thebes
of the golden shield, I will consider thy interest greater even
than business."

2 Herodicus, Sch.: Ιατρὸς ἦν καὶ τὰ γυμνασία ἔξω τείχους
ἐποιεῖτο, ἄρχομενος ἀπὸ τινος διαστήματος ὥς μακρὰ ἄλλα συμμέ-
τρον, ἄχρι τοῦ τείχους, καὶ ἀναστρέφων. "He was a physician
and exercised outside the wall, beginning at some distance,
not great but moderate, going as far as the wall and turning
back."

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PHAEODRUS

consider hearing your conversation with Lysias "a greater thing even than business," as Pindar says?¹

PHAEODRUS. Lead on, then.

SOCRATES. Speak.

PHAEODRUS. Indeed, Socrates, you are just the man to hear it. For the discourse about which we conversed, was in a way, a love-speech. For Lysias has represented one of the beauties being tempted, but not by a lover; this is just the clever thing about it; for he says that favours should be granted rather to the one who is not in love than to the lover.

SOCRATES. O noble Lysias! I wish he would write that they should be granted to the poor rather than to the rich, to the old rather than to the young, and so of all the other qualities that I and most of us have; for truly his discourse would be witty and of general utility. I am so determined to hear you, that I will not leave you, even if you extend your walk to Megara, and, as Herodicus says, go to the wall and back again.²

PHAEODRUS. What are you saying, my dear Socrates? Do you suppose that I, who am a mere ordinary man, can tell from memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias, what he, the cleverest writer of our day, composed at his leisure and took a long time for?
πολλοῦ ἐν δὲ ὧν καὶ τοῖς ἐβουλόμην γῇ ἄν μᾶλλον ἢ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι.

2. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅ Φαίδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαίδρον ἀγνοοῦ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέξησαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲτερά ἐστι τούτων: εὖ οἶδα ὅτι Δυσῖου λόγον ἀκούων ἐκεῖνος οὐ μόνον ἀπαξ ἦκουσεν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνον ἐκέλευεν οἱ λέγειν· ὦ δὲ Β ἐπείθετο προβύμως. τῷ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἢν ἰκανά, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν παραλαβῶν τὸ βιβλίον ἃ μάλιστα ἐπεθύμει ἐπεσκόπει, καὶ τοῦτο δρῶν, εἷς ἐσωθινοὶ καθήμενος, ἀπειτῶν εἰς περίπατον ἤει, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἴμαι, νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἐξεπιστάμενοι τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὴ πάνω τις ἢν μακρόσ. ἐπορεύετο δὲ ἐκτὸς τείχους, ἵνα μελετῆσθη. ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῷ νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοῦν, ἵδιων μὲν ἡσθῇ, ὅτι ἔξοι τὸν C συγκορυβαντῶντα, καὶ προάγειν ἐκέλευε· δεομένου δὲ λέγειν τοῦ τῶν λόγων ἑραστῶν, ἐθρύπτετο ὡς δὴ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶν λέγειν· τελευτῶν δὲ ἐμελλε, καὶ εἰ μὴ τις ἐκων ἀκούοι, βλα ἐρεῖν. σὺ οὖν, ὥ σοί, ὅ Φαίδρε, αὐτοῦ δεήσητι, ὅπερ τάχα πάντως ποιήσῃ, νῦν ἢ ἴδῃ ποιεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἑμοὶ ὡς ἂληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστῶν ἔστοι οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι λέγειν. ὡς μοι δοκεῖσι σὺ οὕδαμος με ἀφήσεις, πρὸν ἂν εὑπο ἀμώς γε πως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάνω γὰρ σοι ἂληθῆ δοκῶ.

3. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔτωσι τοῖς ποιήσω. τῷ ὀντὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, παντὸς μᾶλλον τὰ γε ἐφιματα οὐκ ἐξεμαθῶν· τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν σχεδὸν ἀπάντων, οἷς ἐφή διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἔρωτος ἢ τὰ τοῦ μῆ, ἐν κεφαλαίοις ἑφεξῆς διειμὶ, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτον.  

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1 τις B.T. τι Schanz.
Far from it; and yet I would rather have that ability than a good sum of money.

Socrates. O Phaedrus! If I don't know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself. But since neither of these things is true, I know very well that when listening to Lysias he did not hear once only, but often urged him to repeat; and he gladly obeyed. Yet even that was not enough for Phaedrus, but at last he borrowed the book and read what he especially wished, and doing this he sat from early morning. Then, when he grew tired, he went for a walk, with the speech, as I believe, by the Dog, learned by heart, unless it was very long. And he was going outside the wall to practise it. And meeting the man who is sick with the love of discourse, he was glad when he saw him, because he would have someone to share his revel, and told him to lead on. But when the lover of discourse asked him to speak, he feigned coyness, as if he did not yearn to speak; at last, however, even if no one would listen willingly, he was bound to speak whether or no. So, Phaedrus, ask him to do now what he will presently do anyway.

Phaedrus. Truly it is best for me to speak as I may; since it is clear that you will not let me go until I speak somehow or other.

Socrates. You have a very correct idea about me.

Phaedrus. Then this is what I will do. Really, Socrates, I have not at all learned the words by heart; but I will repeat the general sense of the whole, the points in which he said the lover was superior to the non-lover, giving them in summary, one after the other, beginning with the first.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δείξας γε πρῶτου, ὃ φιλότητι, τί ἂρα ἐν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἰματίῳ. τοπάζω γάρ σε ἔχειν τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ τούτο ἑστιν, Ε ὀντωσόλ διανοοῦ περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ σε πάνυ μὲν φιλῶ, παρόντος δὲ Δυσίων ἐμαυτόν σοι ἐμμε-λετάν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται. ἀλλὰ ἦθι, δεῖκνυε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παῦε, εκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἢν εἴχον ἐν σοι ὡς ἐγγυμνασόμενος. ἀλλὰ ποὺ δὴ βουλεῖ καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνώρειν;

229 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεῦρ’ ἔκτραπόμενοι κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισ-σόν ἔμενεν, εἰτα ὅποι ἃν δόξη ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καθιζη-σόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰς καϊρόν, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ἃν ἔτυχον; εὐ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἁεἰ. βάστον ὡν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ ὑδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἰέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἄθηδες, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ὀραν τοῦ ἔτους τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πρόσαγε δὴ, καὶ σχόπτει ἃμα ὅποι καθιζησόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὑρᾶς ὃν ἐκείνην τὴν ὑψηλοτάτην πλάτανον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὴ μῆν;

Β ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐκεῖ σκιά τ’ ἐστι καὶ πνεῦμα μέ-τριον, καὶ πόλα καθίζεσθαι ἢ ἃν βουλόμεθα κατα-κλιθηναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Προάγως ἂν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθεύει μέντοι ποθέν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὀρείθυιαν ἀρτάσαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγεται γάρ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἐνθεύει; χαρίεστα γοῦν καὶ 418
PHAEDRUS

Socrates. Yes, my dear, when you have first shown me what you have in your left hand, under your cloak. For I suspect you have the actual discourse. And if that is the case, believe this of me, that I am very fond of you, but when Lysias is here I have not the slightest intention of lending you my ears to practise on. Come now, show it.

Phaedrus. Stop. You have robbed me of the hope I had of practising on you. But where shall we sit and read?

Socrates. Let us turn aside here and go along the Ilissus; then we can sit down quietly wherever we please.

Phaedrus. I am fortunate, it seems, in being bare-foot; you are so always. It is easiest then for us to go along the brook with our feet in the water, and it is not unpleasant, especially at this time of the year and the day.

Socrates. Lead on then, and look out for a good place where we may sit.

Phaedrus. Do you see that very tall plane tree?

Socrates. What of it?

Phaedrus. There is shade there and a moderate breeze and grass to sit on, or, if we like, to lie down on.

Socrates. Lead the way.

Phaedrus. Tell me, Socrates, is it not from some place along here by the Ilissus that Boreas is said to have carried off Oreithyia?

Socrates. Yes, that is the story.

Phaedrus. Well, is it from here? The streamlet
καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια φαίνεται, καὶ ἑπιτύχεια κόραις παῖζειν παρ’ αὐτά.

C ἘΝΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕκ, ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖθεν ὅσον δῦ ἡ τρία στάδια, ἦ πρὸς τὸ τῆς Ἀγρας διαβαίνομεν καὶ ποῦ τις ἐστι βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ πάνω νενόηκα· ἀλλὰ εἰπὲ πρὸς Διός, ὁ Σάκρατες· οὐ τούτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πείθει ἄλληθες εἶναι;

4. ἘΝΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀπιστολῆν, δόσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ, οὐκ ἂν ἄτοπος εἶνη· εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίην ἂν αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίων πετρῶν σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παῖζονσαν ὅσαί, καὶ

D οὔτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λειχθηναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀναρπαστὸν γεγονέναι· ἦγω δὲ, ὁ Φαίδρε, ἀλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα χαρίεντα ἥγομαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἑπιτόνου καὶ οὐ πάνω εὐτυχοῦς ἄνδρός, καὶ ἀλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὅτι δ’ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τούτο τὸ τῶν Ἰπποκενταύρων εἴδος ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ ἀθεὶς τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπερρεῖ δὲ ὅχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων

Ε ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων· αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβάζα κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἐκαστὸν, ἀτε ἀγροίκῳ τινὶ σοφίᾳ χρώμενος, τολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶ σχολή· τὸ δὲ αἰτίον, ὁ φίλε, τούτων τόδε· οὐ δύναμαι πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνώναι ἐμαυτὸν· γελοίον δὴ μοι φαίνεται,
PHAEDRUS

looks very pretty and pure and clear and fit for girls
to play by.

Socrates. No, the place is about two or three
furlongs farther down, where you cross over to the
precinct of Agra; and there is an altar of Boreas
somewhere thereabouts.

PHAEDRUS. I have never noticed it. But, for
Heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me; do you believe this
tale is true?

Socrates. If I disbelieved, as the wise men do, I
should not be extraordinary; then I might give a
rational explanation, that a blast of Boreas, the north
wind, pushed her off the neighbouring rocks as she
was playing with Pharmacea, and that when she had
died in this manner she was said to have been carried
off by Boreas. But I, Phaedrus, think such explana-
tions are very pretty in general, but are the inventions
of a very clever and laborious and not altogether envi-
able man, for no other reason than because after this
he must explain the forms of the Centaurs, and then
that of the Chimaera, and there presses in upon him
a whole crowd of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegas,
and multitudes of strange, inconceivable, portentous
natures. If anyone disbelieves in these, and with a
rustic sort of wisdom, undertakes to explain each in
accordance with probability, he will need a great
deal of leisure. But I have no leisure for them at
all; and the reason, my friend, is this: I am not yet
able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know my-
self; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet

1 The MSS. insert here ἡ ἐν' Ἀρεοπόλει τάγματος λέγεται γὰρ αὖ
kai ὁ ὁμηρίκος ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἐκείνην ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐνθένδε ἡρπάτη, "or from
the Areopagus, for this story is also told, that she was
carried off from there and not from here." Schanz follows
Bast and many editors in rejecting this as a gloss.
τούτο ἐτὶ ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. οἶδεν δὴ χαίρειν εάσας ταύτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομισματεύμονι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὃ νυνὶ ἐλεγον, σκοπῶν οὐ ταύτα ἀλλὰ ἐμαυτόν, εἰτε τι θηρίου τυγχάνον Τυφόνος πολυπλοκότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμόμενον, εἰτέ ἡμερότερόν τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον. ἀτάρ, ὃ ἐταίρε, μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων, ἀρ’ οὗ τὸ δένδρο ἢν τὸ δένδρον, ἐφ’ ὅπερ ἥγεσε ἤμας;

V ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τούτο μὲν οὖν αὐτό.

5. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νὴ τὴν Ἡραί, καλὴ γε ἡ καταγωγή. ἢ τε γὰρ πλάτανος αὐτὴ μᾶλ’ ἀμφίλαφής τε καὶ ψηλή, τοῦ τε ἅγιον τὸ ύψος καὶ τὸ σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἄνθης, ὡς ἄν εὐωδόστατον παρέχου τῶν τόπων· ἢ τε αὐτὴ πηγὴ χαριστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ἡμᾶς πᾶλιν ὑδάτως, ὡστε γε τὸ ποδὶ τεκμῆρασθαι: Νυμφών τέ τινων καὶ Ἀχελώος ἱερὸν ἀπὸ τῶν

C κορών τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἐοίκες εἶναι. εἰ δ’ αὐτὸ βούλει, τὸ εὐπνοοῦν τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἁγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἥδιν θερινὸν τε καὶ λαυροῦ ὑπηχεῖ τῶν τεττῦν χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομφότατον τὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὅτι ἐν ἧρεμα προσάντει ἰκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέντει τὴν κεφαλήν παγκάλως ἔχεων. ὡστε ἀριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὃ φίλε Φαίδρε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σὺ δὲ γε, ὃ θαυμάστε, ἀτοπώτατος τοῖς

D καὶ ὃν ἐπιχωρίῳ ἐοίκας· οὐτως ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεοῦ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Συγγλυγωσκέ μοι, ὃ ἀριστεῖ. φίλο-

μαθής γὰρ εἰμί· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα

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know that, to investigate irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature. But, my friend, while we were talking, is not this the tree to which you were leading us?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, this is it.

SOCRATES. By Hera, it is a charming resting place. For this plane tree is very spreading and lofty, and the tall and shady willow is very beautiful, and it is in full bloom, so as to make the place most fragrant; then, too, the spring is very pretty as it flows under the plane tree, and its water is very cool, to judge by my foot. And it seems to be a sacred place of some nymphs and of Achelous, judging by the figurines and statues. Then again, if you please, how lovely and perfectly charming the breeziness of the place is! and it resounds with the shrill summer music of the chorus of cicadas. But the most delightful thing of all is the grass, as it grows on the gentle slope, thick enough to be just right when you lay your head on it. So you have guided the stranger most excellently, dear Phaedrus.

PHAEDRUS. You are an amazing and most remarkable person. For you really do seem exactly like a stranger who is being guided about, and not like a native. You don’t go away from the city out over the border, and it seems to me you don’t go outside the walls at all.

SOCRATES. Forgive me, my dear friend. You see, I am fond of learning. Now the country places and
οὐδὲν μ’ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ’ ἐν τῷ ἀστεὶ ἀνθρώπων. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐξώδου τὸ φάρμακον εὐρηκέναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ πεινώντα θρέμματα θαλλόν ἢ τινα καρπὸν προσεῖνοντες ἁγούσιν, σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους ὅτω προτείνων ἐν βελίως τῇ τε Ἀττικῆν φαίνει περιάξειν ἀπασαν καὶ ὅπιοι ἄλλοσε βούλη. νῦν οὖν ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῦρ' ἀφικόμενος ἔγω μὲν μοι δοκῶ κατακελεύσει, σὺ δ’ ἐν ὁποίῳ σχήματι οὐεὶ ῥᾶστα ἀναγνώσεθαι, τούθ’ ἔλομενος ἀναγιγνωσκε. "Ἀκουε δή.

6. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ός νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν γενομένων τούτων ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχήσαι δὲν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔραστής ἢν σου τυχχάνω. ὡς ἐκεῖνος μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ἢν ἄν εὐ ποιήσωσιν, ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωσιν τοὺς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος, ἐν φ’ μεταγυνών ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης ἄλλ’ ἐκὼντες, ὥς ἄν ἀριστα περὶ τῶν οἰκείων βουλεύσαντο, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τὴν αὐτῶν εὐ ποιοῦσιν. έτ’ δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐρώτεις σκοποῦσιν ἂ τε κακῶς διέθεντο τῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ ὁ πεποιήκασιν εὖ, καὶ ὁ εἶχον πόνον

Β προστιθέντες ἤγουνται πᾶλαι τὴν ἄξιαν ἀποδεδωκέναι χάριν τοὺς ἐρωμένους· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔρωσιν οὔτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ προφασίζεσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς παρελημμότας πόνους ὑπολογίζεσθαι, οὔτε τᾶς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας διαφορὰς αἰτιάσασθαι· ὅστε περιηγημένων τοσούτων κακῶν οὐδὲν ὑπολείπεται ἄλλ’ ἢ ποιεῖν προθύμως, ὅ τι ἄν αὐτοῖς οἴκων ται πράξαντες

C χαριεύσαί. έτ’ δὲ εἰ διὰ τοῦτο ἄξιον τούς.
the trees won't teach me anything, and the people in
the city do. But you seem to have found the charm
to bring me out. For as people lead hungry animals
by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves or
some fruit, just so, I think, you, by holding before
me discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica
and wherever else you please. So now that I have
come here, I intend to lie down, and do you choose
the position in which you think you can read most
easily, and read.

PHAEDRUS. Hear then.

You know what my condition is, and you have
heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange
these matters. And I claim that I ought not to
be refused what I ask because I am not your lover.
For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done
when their passion ceases; but there is no time when
non-lovers naturally repent. For they do kindnesses
to the best of their ability, not under compulsion,
but of their free will, according to their view of
their own best interest. And besides, lovers consider
the injury they have done to their own concerns on
account of their love, and the benefits they have
conferred, and they add the trouble they have had,
and so they think they have long ago made sufficient
return to the beloved; but non-lovers cannot aver
neglect of their own affairs because of their con-
dition, nor can they take account of the pains they
have been at in the past, nor lay any blame for
quarrels with their relatives; and so, since all these
evils are removed, there is nothing left for them but
to do eagerly what they think will please the beloved.
And besides, if lovers ought to be highly esteemed
ἐρωταὶ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, ὃτι τούτοις μάλιστα φασὶ φιλεῖν ὅν ἀν ἐρωτήσων καὶ ἐτοιμοὶ εἰσί καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπεκθανόμενοι τοῖς ἐρωμένοις χαρὶ-ζεσθαι, ράδιον γνώναι, εἰ ἄληθὴ λέγουσιν, ὅτι ὅσων ἂν ὑστερου ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκείνους αὐτῶν περὶ πλεῖστον ποιήσονται, καὶ δὴλον ὅτι, ἐὰν ἐκείνους δοκῇ, καὶ τούτους κακῶς ποιήσοντοι. καὶ τοι πῶς εἰκὸς ἔστι τοιοῦτον πράγμα προεσθαι τοιαύτην ἒχουσι συμφοράν, ἢν οὐδὲν ἀπεκθανόμενον οὐδεὶς ἐμπειρὸς ὡς ἀποτρέπειν; καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ οἷομόνησιν νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ σωφροσύνη, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ οὐ δύνασθαι αὐτῶν κρατεῖν· ὅστε πῶς ἂν εὗρον ἐναντίον ταύτα καλῶς ἐξειν ἡγήσαντο περὶ ὅν οὕτω διακεῖμενοι βεβούλευνται; καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρωτῶν τὸν βέλτιστον αἴροι, εἶ πλῆγμα ἃς σοι ἡ ἐκλέξεις εἰς· εἰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν σαντο ἐπιτηδειότατον, ἐκ πολλῶν· ἐόστε πολὺ πλεῖστος ἐξίς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντα τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σῆς φιλίας.

7. Εἰ τοῖς τῶν τὸν νόμον τὸν καθεστηκότα δέδοικας, μὴ πυθομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅνειδός σοι 232 ἑγέρται, εἰκὸς ἔστι τοὺς μὲν ἐρωταῖς, οὕτως αὐτοὶ ἀν οἰομένους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων χηλοῦσθαι ὅσπερ αὐτοὺς ὡς αὐτῶς, ἐπαρθήκην τῷ ἔχειν καὶ φιλοτιμομένους ἐπιδεικνύσθαι πρὸς ἀπαντας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπάνθητοι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ ἐρωταῖς, κρείττους αὐτῶν ὄντας, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀντὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱρεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐρωταὶ πολλοὺς ἀνάγκη πυθέσθαι.
because they say they have the greatest love for the objects of their passion, since both by word and deed they are ready to make themselves hated by others to please the beloved, it is easy to see that, if what they say is true, whenever they fall in love afterwards, they will care for the new love more than for the old and will certainly injure the old love, if that pleases the new. And how can one reasonably entrust matters of such importance to one who is afflicted with a disease such that no one of any experience would even try to cure it? For they themselves confess that they are insane, rather than in their right mind, and that they know they are foolish, but cannot control themselves; and so, how could they, when they have come to their senses, think those acts were good which they determined upon when in such a condition? And if you were to choose the best from among your lovers, your choice would be limited to a few; whereas it would be made from a great number, if you chose the most congenial from non-lovers, so that you would have a better chance, in choosing among many, of finding the one most worthy of your affection.

Now if you are afraid of public opinion, and fear that if people find out your love affair you will be disgraced, consider that lovers, believing that others would be as envious of them as they are of others, are likely to be excited by possession and in their pride to show everybody that they have not toiled in vain; but the non-lovers, since they have control of their feelings, are likely to choose what is really best, rather than to court the opinion of mankind. Moreover, many are sure to notice and see the lovers going about with their beloved ones and making
καὶ ἰδεῖν, ἀκολουθοῦντας τοὺς ἑρωμένους καὶ ἔργον
Β τούτο ποιοῦμένους, ὅστε ὅταν ὀφθαλμοὶ διαλεγόμενοι
ἀλλήλους, τότε αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἢ γεγενημένης ἢ
μελλοῦσης ἐσεσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεīναι· τοὺς
 δὲ μὴ ἔρωτας οὐδ' αἰτιᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν
ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν ἢ διὰ
φιλίαν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἢ δὲ ἄλλην τινὰ ἡδονὴν.
καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν ἥγουμένω
χαλεπῶν εἶναι φιλίαι συμμένειν, καὶ ἄλλοι μὲν
τρόπῳ διαφορᾶς γενομένης κοινὴν ἀν' ἀμφοτέρους
καταστήναι τὴν συμφοράν, προεμένου δὲ σοι δὲ
C περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖ μεγάλην δὴ σοι βλάβην ἀν
γενέσθαι, εἰκότως δὴ τοὺς ἔρωτας μᾶλλον ἀν
φοβοῖο· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐστὶ τὰ λυποῦντα, καὶ
πάντως ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῶν βλάβη νομίζουσι γέγονεθαι.
διὸ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἑρωμένων
συνουσίας ἀποτρέπουσιν, φοβοῦμενοι τοὺς μὲν
οὐσίαν κεκτημένους, μὴ χρήμασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερ-
βάλωνται, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευμένους, μὴ συνέσει
cρείττους γένωνται τῶν δὲ ἄλλο τι κεκτημένων
D ἀγαθῶν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκάστου φυλάττονται· πεί-
σαντες μὲν οὖν ἀπέκθεσθαι σε τούτοις εἰς ἑρημίαν
φιλῶν καθιστᾶσιν, ἕαν δὲ τὸ σεαυτοῦ σκοπὸν
ἀμενὸν ἐκείνων φρονῆς, ἥξεις αὐτοὺς εἰς διαφοράν·
ὅσοι δὲ μὴ ἔρωτες ἔτυχον, ἅλλα δὲ ἀρετὴν
ἐπραξαν ἢν ἐδέοντο, οὐκ ἂν τοὺς συνούσιοι φθονοῖεν,
ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὴ ἐθέλοντας μισοῦεν, ἥγουμένοι σὲ υπ' ἡ-
ἐκείνων μὲν ὑπερορᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ

1 αν inserted by Hirschig and Schanz.
2 δὴ here and after eἰκότως is inserted by Schanz for ἀν of BT.
that their chief business, and so, when they are seen
talking with each other, people think they are met
in connexion with some love-matter either past or
future; but no one ever thinks of finding fault with
non-lovers because they meet, since everyone knows
that one must converse with somebody, either because
of friendship or because it is pleasant for some other
reason. And then, too, if you are frightened by the
thought that it is hard for friendship to last, and that
under other circumstances any quarrel would be an
equal misfortune to both, but that when you have sur-
rendered what you prize most highly you would be
the chief sufferer, it would be reasonable for you to
be more afraid of the lovers; for they are pained by
many things and they think everything that happens
is done for the sake of hurting them. Therefore they
prevent their loves from associating with other men,
for they fear the wealthy, lest their money give them
an advantage, and the educated, lest they prove
superior in intellect; and they are on their guard
against the influence of everyone who possesses any
other good thing. If now they persuade you to
incur the dislike of all these, they involve you in
a dearth of friends, and if you consider your own
interest and are more sensible than they, you will
have to quarrel with them. But those who are not
in love, but who have gained the satisfaction of
their desires because of their merit, would not be
jealous of those who associated with you, but
would hate those who did not wish to do so,
thinking that you are slighted by these last and
benefited by the former, so that there is much more
Ε ὁφελείσθαι, ὡστε πολὺ πλείων ἑλπὶς φιλῶν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ὃ ἔχθραν γενήσεσθαι.

8. Καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μὲν ἑρώτων πολλοὶ πρότερον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ὃ τὸν τρόπον ἔγνωσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἐμπειροὶ ἐγένοντο, ὡστε ἄδηλον εἰ ἐτί βουλήσονται φίλοι εἶναι,

233 ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔρωσιν, οὐ δὲν ἀν ἐν εὐ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκός ἐλάττω τὴν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς πούησαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μνημεία καταλειφθῆναι τῶν μελλόντων ἐσεσθαι. καὶ μὲν δὴ βελτιώνι σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐροὶ πειθομένῳ ἡ ἐραστή. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα ἐπαινοῦσι, τὰ μὲν δεδιότες μὴ Β ἀπέχθωνται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοῖς χείρον διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν γνωσκόντες. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδεικνύει νυστυχοῦντας μὲν, ἃ μὴ λύτην τοῖς ἄλλοις παρέχει, ἀναρὰ ποιεῖ νομίζειν εὕνουντας δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἱδονῆς ἄξια παρ᾽ ἐκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυγχάνειν ὡστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἔλεεν τοὺς ἐρωμένους ἡ ζηλοῦν αὐτοῖς προσήκει. ἐὰν δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθη, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ τὴν παροῦσαν ἱδονήν θεραπεύον συνέσομαι σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Μέλλουσαν ὁφελίαν ἐσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτ᾽ ἔρωτος ἥττόμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν, οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἴσχυρῶν ἔχθραν ἀναιρούμενος, ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως ὄλγην ὀργῆν ποιοῦμενος, τῶν μὲν ἀκουσίων συγγνώμην ἔχουν, τὰ δὲ ἐκούσια πειράμενος ἀποτρέπειν ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ γένσις πολύν χρόνον ἐσομένης τεκμήρια. εἰ δὲ ἄρα σοι τοῦτο παρεστηκεν. ὡς οὐχ οἴνον τε ἴσχυρῶν φιλῶν γενέσθαι,
likelihood that they will gain friendship than enmity from their love-affair with you.

And then, too, many lovers are moved by physical passion before they know the character or have become acquainted with the connexions of the beloved, so that it is uncertain whether they will wish to be your friends after their passion has ceased. But in the case of those who are not in love, who were your friends before entering into the closer relation, the favours received are not likely to make the friendship less, but will remain as pledges of future joys. And then, too, it will be better for your character to yield to me than to a lover. For lovers praise your words and acts beyond due measure, partly through fear of incurring your displeasure, and partly because their own judgment is obscured by their passion. For such are the exhibitions of the power of Love: he makes the unsuccessful lovers think that things are grievous which cause no pain to others, and he compels the successful to praise what ought not to give pleasure; therefore those whom they love are more to be pitied than envied. But if you yield to me, I shall consort with you, not with a view to present pleasure only, but to future advantage also, not being overcome by passion but in full control of myself, and not taking up violent enmity because of small matters, but slowly gathering little anger when the transgressions are great, forgiving involuntary wrongs and trying to prevent intentional ones; for these are the proofs of a friendship that will endure for a long time. But if you have a notion that friendship cannot be firm
D ἐὰν μὴ τὶς ἑρῶν τυγχάνῃ, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς νἱεῖς περὶ πολλοῦ ἐποιούμεθα οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὔτ' ἂν πιστοὺς φίλους ἑκεκτήμεθα, οὐ οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιαύτης γεγονόσιν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐπιτιθεμένων.

9. Ἐτε δὲ εἰ χρή τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μὴ τοὺς βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὖ ποιεῖν· μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην γάρν αὐτοῖς εἴσονται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἑδύας δαπάναις οὐ τοὺς φίλους ἄξιον παρακαλεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προσαιτοῦντας καὶ τοὺς δεομένους πλησιμονίς· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσιν καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θυρὰς ἥξουσιν καὶ μάλιστα ἡσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν εἴσονται καὶ πολλὰ ἄγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὑχοῦνται. ἀλλ' ἵσως προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μάλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν δυναμένοις· οὔδε τοῖς προσαιτοῦσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἄξιοις· οὐδὲ ὅσοι τῆς σῆς 234 ὀρας ἀπολαύσονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδόσουσιν· οὔδε οἱ διαπραξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλοτιμησονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες αἰσχυνόμενοι πρὸς ἄπαντας σιωπήσονται· οὔδε τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρόνοις σπουδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὁμοίως διὰ πάντος τοῦ βίου φίλοις ἑσομένοις· οὔδε οἱ τινες πανόμενοι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχθρας πρόφασιν ζητήσουσιν, ἀλλ' Β οἱ πανσαμένοις τῆς ὀρας τότε τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξονται. οὐ οἶν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο, καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔρωτας οἱ φίλοι νουθετοῦσιν ὡς οὖντος κακοῦ τοῦ ἐπιτιθεμένων,
unless one is in love, you should bear in mind that in
that case we should not have great affection for sons
or for fathers and mothers, nor should we possess
faithful friends who have been gained not through
passion but through associations of a different kind.
Besides, if you ought to grant favours to those who
ask for them most eagerly, you ought in other matters
also to confer benefits, not on the best, but on the
most needy; for they will be most grateful, since
they are relieved of the greatest ills. And then, too,
at private entertainments you ought not to invite
your friends, but beggars and those who need a
meal; for they will love you and attend you and
come to your doors and be most pleased and grateful,
and will call down many blessings upon your head.
Perhaps, however, you ought not to grant favours to
those who beg for them, but to those who are most
able to repay you; and not to those who ask
merely, but to the most deserving; and not to
those who will enjoy your youthful beauty, but
to those who will share their good things with
you when you are older; and not to those who, when
they have succeeded, will boast to others of their
success, but to those who will modestly keep it a
secret from all; and not to those who will be
enamoured for a little while, but to those who will
be your friends for life; and not to those who will
seek a pretext for a quarrel when their passion has
died out, but to those who will show their own merit
when your youth is passed. Do you, then, remember
what I have said, and bear this also in mind, that
lovers are admonished by their friends, who think
τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔρωσιν οὔτε πώποτε τῶν οικελῶν ἐμέμψατο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς βουλευομένους περὶ ἔαντῶν.

Ἰσως μὲν οὖν ἄν ἐροιό με, εἰ ἁπασίν σοι παραινῶ τοῖς μὴ ἔρωσι χαρίζεσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ οἶμαι σοῦ ἄν τὸν ἐρωτήτα πρὸς ἄπαντάς σε κελεύειν τοὺς ἐρωταὶς ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν διάνοιαν. οὔτε γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ Λαμβάνοντε χάριτος ἴσης ἄξιων, οὔτε σοί βουλομένῳ τοὺς ἄλλους λαυθάνειν ὁμοίως δυνατῷ· δεῖ δὲ βλάβην μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὥφηλαν δὲ ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἰκανά μοι νομίζω τὰ εἰρημένα. εἰ δὲ τὶ σὺ ποθεῖς, ἥγουμενος παραλειψθαι, ἔρωτα.

10. Τί σοι φαίνεται, ο Σώκρατες, ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφυσώς τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρήσθαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δαμονίῳς μὲν οὖν, ὃ ἐταίρη, ὡςτε μὲ ἐκπλαγήτα. καὶ τούτο ἐγὼ ἔπαθον διὰ σέ, ὃς Φαίδρε, πρὸς σὲ ἀποθεόστων, ὅτι ἐμοὶ ἐδόκεις γάρ τοῦ λόγου μεταξὺ ἀναγυμνώσκων. ἥγουμενος γὰρ σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ἐπαίειν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοι εἰπόμην, καὶ ἐπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἴην οὖτω δὴ δοκεῖςς παίζειν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δοκῶ γὰρ σοι παίζειν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐσπουδακέναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μηδαμῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπεῖ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου, οὐεὶ ἄν τινα ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἑλληνῶν ἔτερα τοῦτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;

1 λόγῳ B. Omitted by Schanz.
2 δὲ τὶ BT. δʼ ἤτι τὶ Schanz, following Heindorf.
3 δὴ δοκεῖ T. δὴ B. δὲί, Schanz.

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their way of life is bad, but no relative ever blamed a non-lover for bad management of his own interests on account of that condition.

Perhaps you may ask me if I advise you to grant favours to all non-lovers. But I think the lover would not urge you to be so disposed toward all lovers either; for the favour, if scattered broadcast, is not so highly prized by the rational recipient, nor can you, if you wish, keep your relations with one hidden from the rest. But from love no harm ought to come, but benefit to both parties. Now I think I have said enough. But if you feel any lack, or think anything has been omitted, ask questions.

What do you think of the discourse, Socrates? Is it not wonderful, especially in diction?

Socrates. More than that, it is miraculous, my friend; I am quite overcome by it. And this is due to you, Phaedrus, because as I looked at you, I saw that you were delighted by the speech as you read. So, thinking that you know more than I about such matters, I followed in your train and joined you in the divine frenzy.

Phaedrus. Indeed! So you see fit to make fun of it?

Socrates. Do I seem to you to be joking and not to be in earnest?

Phaedrus. Do not jest, Socrates, but, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, tell me truly, do you think any other of the Greeks could speak better or more copiously than this on the same subject?
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι δέ; καὶ ταῦτα δεῖ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν λόγον ἐπαινεῖναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνης μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρογγυλά, καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἔκαστα τῶν ὄνομάτων ἄποτετορευναί; εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, συγχωρητέον χάριν σήμερον ἔτη, ἐπει δὲν ἔγερσεν ἕνα τῆς ἐμῆς οὐδενίας. τὸ γὰρ ῥητορικὸν αὐτοῦ μόνω τῶν νοῶν προσείχων, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὸν φήμη Δυσίαν οἰεσθαί ἵκανον εἰναι. καὶ οὐν μοι ἐδοξέω, διὸ Φαίδρε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, δις καὶ τρίς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὐ πάνω εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἵσως οὐδέν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου· καὶ ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανίουςθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ὡς οἶος τε ὅν ταύτα ἔτερως τε καὶ ἔτερως λέγων ἄμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα.

Β ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὁ Σωκρατες· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ μᾶλλα ὁ λόγος ἔχει· τῶν γὰρ ἐνοτών ἀξίων ῥηθήναι εἰν τῷ πράγματι οὐδέν παραλέλοιπον, ὡστε παρὰ τὰ εἰκονικὰ εἰρημένα μηδέν, ἀν ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ πλεῖον καὶ πλείους ἄξια.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο ἐγώ σοι οὐκέτι οἶος τε ἐσομαι πιθέσθαι. παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες ἐξελέγξουσι με, ἐὰν σοι χαριζόμενον συγχωρώ.

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνες οὖν; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας;

11. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῦν μὲν οὖν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν δήλον δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἀκῆκοα, ἢ τοὺς Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν. πόθεν δὴ τεκμαίρομενος λέγω; πληρέως πως, διὰ δαιμόνιον, τὸ στήθος ἔχων αἰσθά-

1 ἀξίων BT. ἀξίων Madvig, followed by Schanz.
PHAEDRUS

Socrates. What? Are you and I to praise the discourse because the author has said what he ought, and not merely because all the expressions are clear and well rounded and finely turned? For if that is expected, I must grant it for your sake, since, because of my stupidity, I did not notice it. I was attending only to the rhetorical manner, and I thought even Lysias himself would not think that satisfactory. It seemed to me, Phaedrus, unless you disagree, that he said the same thing two or three times, as if he did not find it easy to say many things about one subject, or perhaps he did not care about such a detail; and he appeared to me in youthful fashion to be exhibiting his ability to say the same thing in two different ways and in both ways excellently.

Phaedrus. Nonsense, Socrates! Why that is the especial merit of the discourse. He has omitted none of the points that belong to the subject, so that nobody could ever speak about it more exhaustively or worthily than he has done.

Socrates. There I must cease to agree with you; for the wise men and women of old, who have spoken and written about these matters, will rise up to confute me, if, to please you, I assent.

Phaedrus. Who are they? and where have you heard anything better than this?

Socrates. I cannot say, just at this moment; but I certainly must have heard something, either from the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon, or perhaps from some prose writers. What ground have I for saying so? Why, my dear friend, I feel that my own

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νομαί παρὰ ταῦτα ἄν ἔχειν εἴπειν ἔτερα μὴ χείρω. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρὰ γε ἐμαυτοῦ οὔδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννεὼ-
ηκα, εἷς οἷδα, συνειδῶς ἐμαυτῷ ἀμαθίαν· λείπεται
dη, οἶμαι, ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς
ἀκοῆς πεπληρώσθαι με δίκην ἀγγελοῦ· ὑπὸ δὲ
νωθείας αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τούτο ἐπιλέλησμαι, ὅπως τε
καὶ ὧν τινῶν ἦκουσα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 'Αλλ', ὁ γενναίωτατε, κάλλιστα εἰρή-
κασ. σὺ γὰρ ἔμοι ὧν τινῶν μὲν καὶ ὅπως ἦκουσας,
μηδὲ ἄν κελεύω εἴπης, τούτῳ δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ λέγεις
ποίησων τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ
ἐλάττω ἔτερα υπόσχεσαι εἰπεῖν, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος.
καὶ σοι ἐγώ, ὦσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, ὑποχυνοῦ-
μαι χρυσῆν εἰκόνα ἱσομετρήσων εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθή-
σεων, οὐ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἅλλα καὶ σήμ.

ΣΧΙΡΑΤΗΣ. Φίλτατος εἰ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς,
ὁ Φαϊδρε, εἰ με οἷει λέγειν ὡς Δυσίας τοῦ παντὸς
ήμαρτηκε, καὶ οἶνον τε ὃ δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἁλλα
eἰπεῖν τούτῳ δὲ οἶμαι οὔδ' ἄν τὸν φαινότατον
παθεῖν συγγραφέα. αὐτίκα περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, τῶν
οἷει λέγοντα ὡς χρῆ μὴ ἔρωττι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐρῶτι
236 χαρίζεσθαι, παρέυρι μὲν τὸ φρόνιμον ἀγκω-
μάζειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἄφρον ψέγειν, ἀναγκαὶα γούν
ὅντα, εἰτ' ἄλλ' ἄττα ἐξείν λέγειν; ἄλλ', οἴμαι, τὰ
μὲν τοιαῦτα ἑατέα καὶ συγγνωστέα λέγοντι· καὶ
τὸν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὑρεσιν ἅλλα τὴν διάθε-
σιν ἐπαινετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ χαλε-
πῶν εὑρεύν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν εὐρεσιν.

12. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Συγχωρῶ ὁ λέγεις; μετρίως γὰρ
μοι δοκεῖς εἰρήκεναι. ποιήσω οὖν καὶ ἐγώ οὗτω·

1 ὑποσχέσει: BT, ἐπιχείρει Schanz. The reading in the text
was first suggested by Wex.
bosom is full, and that I could make another speech, different from this and quite as good. Now I am conscious of my own ignorance, and I know very well that I have never invented these things myself, so the only alternative is that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the well springs of another; but, again because of my stupidity, I have forgotten how and from whom I heard it.

PHAEDRUS. Most noble Socrates, that is splendid! Don't tell, even if I beg you, how or from whom you heard it; only do as you say; promise to make another speech better than that in the book and no shorter and quite different. Then I promise, like the nine archons, to set up at Delphi a statue as large as life, not only of myself, but of you also.

SOCRATES. You are a darling and truly golden, Phaedrus, if you think I mean that Lysias has failed in every respect and that I can compose a discourse containing nothing that he has said. That, I fancy, could not happen even to the worst writer. For example, to take the subject of his speech, who do you suppose, in arguing that the non-lover ought to be more favoured than the lover, could omit praise of the non-lover's calm sense and blame of the lover's unreason, which are inevitable arguments, and then say something else instead? No, such arguments, I think, must be allowed and excused; and in these the arrangement, not the invention, is to be praised; but in the case of arguments which are not inevitable and are hard to discover, the invention deserves praise as well as the arrangement.

PHAEDRUS. I concede your point, for I think what you say is reasonable. So I will make this concession:
τὸ μὲν τὸν ἐρώτα τοῦ μὴ ἐρώτος μᾶλλον νοσεῖν δῶσοι σοι ὑποτίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἐτερα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἔξια εἰπῶν τῶν Λυσίου, παρὰ τὸ Κυνελιδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρήλατος ἐν Ὀλυμπία στάθητι.  

σακραθ. Ἑσπούδακας, ὁ Φαίδρε, ὅτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμην ἔρεσχηλόν σε, καὶ οἷεὶ δὴ μὲ ὀς ἀληθῶς ἐπιχειρήσεις εἰπέων παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου σοφίαν ἐτερὸν τι ποικιλότερον;  

φαίδρως. Περὶ μὲν τοῦτο, ὃ φίλε, εἰς τὰς ὅμοιας λαβᾶς ἐξήλθας. ἤρτευον μὲν γὰρ σοι παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ὅτως οἶδος τε εἰ, ἦνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῳδῶν φορτικὸν πράγμα ἀναγκαζόμεθα ποιεῖν ἀνταποδιδόντες ἄλληλοις, εὐλαβήθητε 2 καὶ μὴ βούλου με ἀναγκάσαι λέγειν ἐκείνο τὸ εἰ ἐγώ, ὁ Σωκράτης, Σωκράτην ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέξωμαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐπεθύμει μὲν λέγειν, ἐθρύπτετο δὲ ἀλλὰ διανοήθητε ὅτι ἐντεῦθεν οὐκ ἀπίμευ, πρὶν ἀν σὺ εἰπης δὲ ἐφησθα ἐν τῷ στήθει ἔχειν. ἐσμὲν δὲ  

μόνω εἰν ἐρήμωσι, ἰσχυρότερος δὲ ἐγώ καὶ νεώτερος, ἐκ δ’ ἀπάντων τοῦτον ξύνεις ὅ σοι λέγω, καὶ μηδεμίῳ πρὸς βίας βουλθήθης μᾶλλον ἣ ἐκῶν λέγειν.  

σακραθ. Ἀλλ’, ὁ μακάριε Φαίδρε, γελοίος ἔσομαι παρ’ ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.  

φαίδρως. Οἶσθ’ ὡς ἔχει; παῦσαι πρὸς με καλ· ὅσπιζόμενοι· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω ὃ εἰπῶν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν.  

σακραθ. Μηδαμῶς τοῖνυν εἰπης.  

φαίδρως. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω· ὃ δὲ μοι  

1 στάθητι; BT, ἔσταθι; Schanz following Cobet.  

2 Schanz, following Cobet, omits εὐλαβήθητε.
I will allow you to begin with the premise that the lover is more distraught than the non-lover; and if you speak on the remaining points more copiously and better than Lysias, without saying the same things, your statue of beaten metal shall stand at Olympia beside the offering of the Cypselids.

Socrates. Have you taken my jest in earnest, Phaedrus, because, to tease you, I laid hands on your beloved, and do you really suppose I am going to try to surpass the rhetoric of Lysias and make a speech more ingenious than his?

Phaedrus. Now, my friend, you have given me a fair hold; for you certainly must speak as best you can, lest we be compelled to resort to the comic "you're another"; be careful and do not force me to say "O Socrates, if I don't know Socrates, I have forgotten myself," and "he yearned to speak, but feigned coyness." Just make up your mind that we are not going away from here until you speak out what you said you had in your breast. We are alone in a solitary spot, and I am stronger and younger than you; so, under these circumstances, take my meaning, and speak voluntarily, rather than under compulsion.

Socrates. But, my dear Phaedrus, I shall make myself ridiculous if I, a mere amateur, try without preparation to speak on the same subject in competition with a master of his art.

Phaedrus. Now listen to me. Stop trying to fool me; for I can say something which will force you to speak.

Socrates. Then pray don't say it.

Phaedrus. Yes, but I will. And my saying shall
λόγος ὁρκὸς ἔσται· ὁμοῦμι γὰρ σοι—τίνα μέντοι,
Ε τίνα θεῶν; ἡ βουλεῖ τήν πλάτανον ταῦτην; ἡ
μήν, εάν μοι μὴ εἴπης τοῦ λόγου ἐναντίον αὐτῆς
ταύτης, μηδέποτε σοι ἔτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς
ἐπιδείξειν μηδ' ἐξαγγελεῖν.

13. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βαβάι, ὃ μιαρέ, ὥς εὖ ἀνεύρες
τήν ἀνάγκην ἄνδρι φιλολόγῳ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἄν κελεύης.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δήτα ἔχων στρέφει;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἐπειδή σὺ γε ταύτα
ὁμώμοκας. πῶς γὰρ ἂν οἷος τ' εἶχην τοιαύτης
θούνης ἀπέχεσθαί;

237 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγει δή.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐσθ' οὖν ὡς ποιήσω;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοῦ πέρι;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐγκαλυφάμενος ἐρῶ, ἵν' ὁ τί τάχει-
στα διαδράμω τὸν λόγον, καὶ μὴ βλέπων πρὸς σὲ
ὑπ' αἰσχύνης διαπορῶμαι.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγει μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὅπως βουλεῖ
πολεί.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀγετε δή, ὃ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε δ' ἠδής
εἴδος λόγεια, εἴτε διὰ γένος μονοσικὸν τὸ Δει-
την ἐσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, ἕμ' μοι ὀλίβισθε
τοῦ μόθου, ὅν με ἀναγκάξει ὁ βέλτιστος οὗτος;
Β λέγειν, ἵν' ὁ ἐταῖρος αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρότερον δοκῶν
τούτω σοφὸς εἶναι, νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξῃ.

'Ἡν οὕτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα
καλός· τούτῳ δὲ ἦσαν ἔρασται πάνω πολλοί. εἰς
dὲ τις αὐτῶν αἰμύλος ἦν, ὃς οὔτεν ἦττον ἐρῶν
ἐπεπέλκει τὸν παίδα ὡς οὐκ ἔρφη· καὶ ποτὲ αὐτῶν

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be an oath. I swear to you by—by what god? By this plane tree? I take my solemn oath that unless you produce the discourse in the very presence of this plane tree, I will never read you another or tell you of another.

Socrates. Oh! Oh! You wretch! How well you found out how to make a lover of discourse do your will!

Phaedrus. Then why do you try to get out of it?

Socrates. I won't any more, since you have taken this oath; for how could I give up such pleasures?

Phaedrus. Speak then.

Socrates. Do you know what I'm going to do?

Phaedrus. About what?

Socrates. I'm going to keep my head wrapped up while I talk, that I may get through my discourse as quickly as possible and that I may not look at you and become embarrassed.

Phaedrus. Only speak, and in other matters suit yourself.

Socrates. Come then, O tuneful Muses, whether ye receive this name from the quality of your song or from the musical race of the Ligyans, grant me your aid in the tale this most excellent man compels me to relate, that his friend whom he has hitherto considered wise, may seem to him wiser still.

Now there was once upon a time a boy, or rather a stripling, of great beauty: and he had many lovers. And among these was one of peculiar craftiness, who was as much in love with the boy as anyone, but had made him believe that he was not in love; and once in wooing him, he tried to persuade him of this very thing, that favours ought to be granted rather
αἵτων ἐπειθε τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὡς μὴ ἔρωτε πρὸ τοῦ ἐρῶντος δέοι χαράζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τε ὅδε:

14. Περὶ παντὸς, ὦ παῖ, μία ἄρχῇ τοῖς μέλ.
Οὐ δέχεσθαι καλῶς βουλεύσθαι εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἢ ἢ βουλῇ, ἢ παντὸς ἀμαρτάνειν ἀνάγηκ. τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέγεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται τὴν οὖσίαν ἐκάστον. ὡς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διωκομοντίζετε ἐν ἄρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθοῦντε ἀπὸ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδίδοσιν: οὔτε γὰρ ἐαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὑμολογοῦσιν. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ σὺ μὴ πάθωμεν ὅ ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμᾶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ σοὶ καὶ ἔμοι οὗ λόγος προκείμενος, ἔρωτε ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς φιλίαν ἱτέοι, περὶ ἔρωτος, οἷον ἦς ἔστε καὶ ἂν ἔχει δύναμιν.

D ὑμολογία ἐκείνοις ὅροι, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιόμεθα, ἐπεὶ ωφελίαν εἰς ἐκάστην παρέχει. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὴ ἐπιθυμία τῆς ἔρωτος, ἀπαντά τῇ δήλῳ. ὅτι δὲ αὖ καὶ μὴ ἔρωτες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν, ὑμεῖς. τῷ δὲ τὸν ἔρωτά τε καὶ μὴ κρυνοῦμεν; δεῖ δὴ νοῆσαι, ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ δύο τινὲς ἔστοι ἑὰν ἄρχοντε καὶ ἀγοντε, οὖν ἐπιμέθη δὴ ἄγητον, ἀλλ' ἐμφυτος οὔσα ἐπιθυμία ἴδονων, ἀλλ' ἔστει κατηγορεῖς δόξα.

Ε ἐφεμένη τοῦ ἄριστου. τούτῳ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν τοτὲ μὲν ὅμονοετὸν, ἐστὶ δὲ ὅτε στασιάζετον καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἡ ἐτέρα, ἀλλοτε δὲ ἡ ἐτέρα κρατεῖ. δόξης μὲν οὖν ἔπι τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἄγοντος καὶ κρατοῦσις τῷ 238 κράτει σωφροσύνη ὁνομα. ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγος ἐλεούσης ἐπὶ ἴδονως καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῷ ἄρχῃ ὑβρις ἐπωνομάζῃ. ὑβρις δὲ δὴ πολυώνυμον πολυμελές γὰρ καὶ πολυειδές. καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρεπῆς ἢ ἂν τίχρι γενομένη, τὴν αὐτής ἐπωνομίαιν ὁνομαζόμενον τοῦ ἔχοντα παρέχεται,
to the non-lover than to the lover; and his words were as follows:—

There is only one way, dear boy, for those to begin who are to take counsel wisely about anything. One must know what the counsel is about, or it is sure to be utterly futile, but most people are ignorant of the fact that they do not know the nature of things. So, supposing that they do know it, they come to no agreement in the beginning of their enquiry, and as they go on they reach the natural result,—they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. Now you and I must not fall into the error which we condemn in others, but, since we are to discuss the question, whether the lover or the non-lover is to be preferred let us first agree on a definition of love, its nature and its power, and then, keeping this definition in view and making constant reference to it, let us enquire whether love brings advantage or harm. Now everyone sees that love is a desire; and we know too that non-lovers also desire the beautiful. How then are we to distinguish the lover from the non-lover? We must observe that in each one of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow whithersoever they lead; one is the innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which strives for the best. These two sometimes agree within us and are sometimes in strife; and sometimes one, and sometimes the other has the greater power. Now when opinion leads through reason toward the best and is more powerful, its power is called self-restraint, but when desire irrationally drags us toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called excess. Now excess has many names, for it has many members and many forms; and whichever of these forms is most marked
οὐτε τινὰ καλὴν οὐτε ἐπαξίαν κεκτήσθαι. 1 περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἄριστου
Β καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστρομαργία
tε καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτων τοῦτο κεκλημένου παρέ-
ξεται; περὶ δὲ αὐτὸς τυραννεύσασα, τὸν κεκτη-
μένον ταύτη ἄγουσα, δήλου ὦ τεύξεται προσ-
ρήματος· καὶ τάλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων ἄδελφα καὶ
ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀνόματα τῆς ἀεὶ δυνα-
στευούσης ἡ προσήκει καλείσθαι πρόδηλον. ἢς δὲ
ἐνεκα πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν εὑρηταί, σχεδὸν μὲν
ηδὴ πανερῶν, λεχθὲν δὲ ἡ μὴ λεχθὲν πάν πῶς
σαφέστερον; ἡ γὰρ ἀνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ
C ὄρθων ὄρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἰδοῦνην
ἀχθείσα κάλλους, καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτὸν ἐαυτῆς
συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἐρρω-
μένως ῥωσθείσα νικήσασα ἄγωγή, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς
ῥώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἑκλήθη.

15. Ἀτάρ, ὁ φίλε Φαίδρε, δοκῶ τι σοὶ, ὡσπερ
ἐμαυτῷ, θείων πάθος πεποιθέναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ
eἰσόθεν εὐροία τῆς σε εἰληφεῖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σιγῆ τοῖνυν μου ἄκονε· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ

D θείως ἔσικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι· ὡστε ἐὰν ἀρα πολλάκις
νυμφώληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένομαι, μὴ
θαυμάσῃς· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων
φθέγγομαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτων μέντοι σὺ αὑτίος· ἄλλα τὰ
λοιπὰ ἄκονε· ἐσώς γὰρ κἂν ἀποτράποιτο τὸ ἐπὶ τὸν

1 Schanz reads ἐκτήσθαι here and the corresponding forms elsewhere.
gives its own name, neither beautiful nor honourable, to him who possesses it. For example, if the desire for food prevails over the higher reason and the other desires, it is called gluttony, and he who possesses it will be called by the corresponding name of glutton, and again, if the desire for drink becomes the tyrant and leads him who possesses it toward drink, we know what he is called; and it is quite clear what fitting names of the same sort will be given when any desire akin to these acquires the rule. The reason for what I have said hitherto is pretty clear by this time, but everything is plainer when spoken than when unspoken; so I say that the desire which overcomes the rational opinion that strives toward the right, and which is led away toward the enjoyment of beauty and again is strongly forced by the desires that are kindred to itself toward personal beauty, when it gains the victory, takes its name from that very force, and is called love.¹

Well, my dear Phaedrus, does it seem to you, as it does to me, that I am inspired?

phaedrus. Certainly, Socrates, you have an unusual fluency.

socrates. Then listen to me in silence; for truly the place seems filled with a divine presence; so do not be surprised if I often seem to be in a frenzy as my discourse progresses, for I am already almost uttering dithyrambs.

phaedrus. That is very true.

socrates. You are responsible for that; but hear what follows; for perhaps the attack may be averted.

¹ This somewhat fanciful statement is based on a supposed etymological connexion between ἐρως and ἰμμ, ἐρωμένος, ἰμηθείσα.
PLATO

taúta mèn oún theò melíšseai, òmìn dè prós ton paída pálin tòv lógho íteou.

Elen, ó fèrístte: ó mèn dè tughkaní deu peri ou' bouleutéon, eìrhtai te kai ódòstai, blèpontes dè E dè prós autò ta loqta lègomev, tís òphelía h' bláβh apò te érðntos kai mè tò òphelísménva èz eiðóstos sýmbhsetai.

Tò dè ñpò epídhmías òphelísménvo bouleúonti te ñðòvò òphálkkète pòw tòn èrwmenon às òdòstòt òantífì paràskvenázèin nòsoúnti dè pàw ðòv tà mè òantístinov, krevítton dè kai ìskon ëxhðò. ònte 239 dè krevítto oúte èsoúmenon èkòn èrastètis pàiðikà ònvèsteti, ëttò dè kai ñpodeèstteron òle àpergházètai. ëttòtov dè òmabhètis sòfoú, deilòs òndreíou, èðínavatòs èiðeíw ðèttorikov, ðèrdovs ònhaliov. tòsoúntov kakkòv kai èti ðleíonov kata tìn diànoíàn èrastèn èrwmenov òphálkkè réanagkh ògínnoméon te kai fúsèi èrwntov, tòw mèn òdèsthai, tà dè paràskvenázèin, ò stèréssthai toù paràntikà òdèssh.

B ðhònéðon dè òphálkkè èinai, kai pòllòw mèn òllòw súnovsiòw àpèrhynovta kai òffelímov, òthev òn màlsìt ònìgòv, megálhès àütìon èinai bláβhès, meugiásthè te tòì òthev òn fòumóttatov èiì. toûto dè òh ðheia filosofía tughkaní ón, òs èrastèn pàiðikà ànággèp ;órrwthèn èiðgein, perífòsò ònta toù katàfrofìhènai tò te òlla mèn axhánàssthà, òppòs òn òpònta àgrovòw kai pònta àpoèlxew eìs tòn èrastètì, òlòs òn òw tò ònòv C òdòstov, èantìfì 1 dè blàβerótatov òn èiì. tà mèn

1 èantìfì T Stobaeus: tà èantìfì B Schanz.
PHAEDRUS

That, however, is in the hands of God; we must return to our boy.

Well then, my dearest, what the subject is, about which we are to take counsel, has been said and defined, and now let us continue, keeping our attention fixed upon that definition, and tell what advantage or harm will naturally come from the lover or the non-lover to him who grants them his favours.

He who is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure will inevitably desire to make his beloved as pleasing to himself as possible. Now to one who is of unsound mind everything is pleasant which does not oppose him, but everything that is better or equal is hateful. So the lover will not, if he can help it, endure a beloved who is better than himself or his equal, but always makes him weaker and inferior; but the ignorant is inferior to the wise, the coward to the brave, the poor speaker to the eloquent, the slow of wit to the clever. Such mental defects, and still greater than these, in the beloved will necessarily please the lover, if they are implanted by Nature, and if they are not, he must implant them or be deprived of his immediate enjoyment. And he is of necessity jealous and will do him great harm by keeping him from many advantageous associations, which would most tend to make a man of him, especially from that which would do most to make him wise. This is divine philosophy, and from it the lover will certainly keep his beloved away, through fear of being despised; and he will contrive to keep him ignorant of everything else and make him look to his lover for everything, so that he will be most agreeable to him and most harmful to himself. In respect to
οὐν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐπίτροπος τε καὶ κοινωνὸς οὐδαμῇ λυσιτελῆς ἀνὴρ ἔχων ἔρωτα.

16. Τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἑξίν τε καὶ θεραπείαιν οἶαν τε καὶ ὃς θεραπεύσει ὡς ἂν γένηται κύριος, ὡς ἢδυ πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡνάγκασται διώκειν, δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν. ὄφθησεται δὲ 1 μαλακῶν τινα καὶ οὐ στερεῶν διώκων, οὐδὲ ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῷ τεθραμμένοιν ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ συμμυγεῖ σκιὰ, πώνων μὲν ἀνδρεῖων καὶ ἔδρωτων ξηρῶν ἀπειρον, ἐμπειρον δὲ ἀπαλῆς καὶ

Α ἀνάδρουν διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χρήτει οἰκεῖων κοσμούμενον, ὡσα τα ἄλλα τούτους ἐπεται πάντα ἐπιτηδεύοντα, ἀ δῆλα καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαιτέρω προβαίνειν, ἄλλ' ἐν κεφάλαιον ὀργοσμένους ἐπ' ἄλλο ἱέναι τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον σώμα ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ ἄλλαις χρείαις ὡσα μεγάλαι οὐ μὲν ἐχθροῖς θαρροῦσιν, οὐ δὲ φίλοι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ φοβοῦνται.

Τούτο μὲν οὖν ὥς δῆλον ἐστέον, τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς ἔρητεν, τίνα ἧμιν ὀφελίαν ἢ τίνα βλάβην περὶ τὴν κτήσιν ὡς τοῦ ἑρῶντος ὅμιλα τε καὶ ἐπιτροπεία παρέξεται. σαφές δὴ τούτο γε παντὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ ἐραστῇ, ὅτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εὐνοοῦστάτων καὶ θειοτάτων κτημάτων ὅφανον πρὸ παντὸς εὔξαστ' ἀν εἶναι τὸν ἑρώμενον· πατρὸς γὰρ καὶ μητρὸς καὶ ξυγγενῶν καὶ φίλων στέρεος ἱλασθεὶς ὡς αὐτὸν δέξαιτο, διακολυτάς καὶ ἐπιτιμήτας ἡγούμενος τῆς ἡδίστης πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅμιλλας.

240 άλλα μὴν οὕσιν ἡ ἔχοντα χρυσὴν ἡ τινός ἀλλῆς κτήσεως οὐτ' εὔκαλπων ὑμὸς οὔτε ἄλοντα εὐμεταχείριστον ἡγήσεται. ἐξ ὧν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐραστὴν παιδικὸς φθονεῖν μὲν οὕσιαν κεκτημένοις,

1 3ὲ ΒΤ, ἓν Schanz following Hirschig.
the intellect, then, a man in love is by no means a profitable guardian or associate.

We must next consider how he who is forced to follow pleasure and not good will keep the body of him whose master he is, and what care he will give to it. He will plainly court a beloved who is effeminate, not virile, not brought up in the pure sunshine, but in mingled shade, unused to manly toils and the sweat of exertion, but accustomed to a delicate and unmanly mode of life, adorned with a bright complexion of artificial origin, since he has none by nature, and in general living a life such as all this indicates, which it is certainly not worth while to describe further. We can sum it all up briefly and pass on. A person with such a body, in war and in all important crises, gives courage to his enemies, and fills his friends, and even his lovers themselves, with fear.

This may be passed over as self-evident, but the next question, what advantage or harm the intercourse and guardianship of the lover will bring to his beloved in the matter of his property, must be discussed. Now it is clear to everyone, and especially to the lover, that he would desire above all things to have his beloved bereft of the dearest and kindest and holiest possessions; for he would wish him to be deprived of father, mother, relatives and friends, thinking that they would hinder and censure his most sweet intercourse with him. But he will also think that one who has property in money or other possessions will be less easy to catch and when caught will be less manageable; wherefore the lover must necessarily begrudge his beloved the possession of
ἀπολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν. ἔτι τούτων ἄγαμοι, ἀπαίδαι, ἄοικον ὦ τί πλείστων χρόνων παιδικά ἐραστής εὔξατο ἂν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὐτοῦ γλυκὸ ὡς πλείστων χρόνων καρποῦσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν.

17. Ἐστὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἄλλα τις δαίμων ἔμειξε τοὺς πλείστους ἐν τῷ παραντίκαι ἡδονῆς, οἷον κόλακι, δεινῷ θηρῷ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ, ὡς ἐπέμειξεν ἡ φύσις ἡδονὴν τινα ὡς ἄμουσον, καὶ τὰς ἐταίραν ὡς βλαβερὸν ψέξειαν ἂν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων θρηνόματος τε καὶ ἐπιτυδευμάτων, οἷς τὸ γένος καὶ ἥμεραν ἡδιστοσιν ἐλναι ὑπάρχειν παιδικοῖς δὲ ἐραστῆς πρὸς τῷ βλαβερῷ καὶ εἰς τὸ συνημερεύειν πάντων ἀγαθότατον. ἔλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ πάλαιος λόγος τέρπεται τὸν ἔλικα: ἡ γάρ, οἷμαι, χρόνον ἱσότης ἐπ᾽ ἴσας ἡδονᾶς ἀγούσα δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα φιλίαν παρέχεται: ἀλλὰ δόμως κόρον γε καὶ ἡ τούτων συνονίσα ἔχει. καὶ μὴν τὸ γένος ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ παντὶ περὶ πάντων λεγεῖται: δ δὴ πρὸς τῇ ἀνομοιότητι μάλιστα ἐραστῆς πρὸς παιδικά ἔχει. νεωτέρῳ γὰρ πρεσβύτερος συνόν οὔθ᾽ ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἐκών ἀπολεῖπται, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀνάγκης τε καὶ οἰστρον ἐλαύνεται, δεὶ ἐκεῖνῳ μὲν ἡδονᾶς ἂει διδοῦς ἄγει ὁρῶντι, ἀκούοντι, ἀποτομών, καὶ πᾶσαν ἀξιόθυσιν αἰσθανομένῳ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, ὡστε μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἀρατότως αὐτῷ ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ δὲ δὴ ἐρωμένῳ ποιών παραμύθιον ἣ τίνας ἡδονᾶς διδοῦς ποιήσει τὸν ἴσον χρόνου συνόντα μὴ οὐχὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχατοῦ ἐλθεῖν ἁθίδιας; ὁρῶντι μὲν οὖν πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὁρᾷ, ἐσπομένων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτα, δ καὶ λόγῳ ἐστὶν ἀκούειν οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, μὴ διά δὴ ἑργῇ ἀνάγκης ᾗς προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι φυλα-
property and rejoice at its loss. Moreover the lover would wish his beloved to be as long as possible unmarried, childless, and homeless, since he wishes to enjoy as long as possible what is pleasant to himself.

Now there are also other evils, but God has mingled with most of them some temporary pleasure; so, for instance, a flatterer is a horrid creature and does great harm, yet Nature has combined with him a kind of pleasure that is not without charm, and one might find fault with a courtesan as an injurious thing, and there are many other such creatures and practices which are yet for the time being very pleasant; but a lover is not only harmful to his beloved but extremely disagreeable to live with as well. The old proverb says, "birds of a feather flock together"; that is, I suppose, equality of age leads them to similar pleasures and through similarity begets friendship; and yet even they grow tired of each other's society. Now compulsion of every kind is said to be oppressive to every one, and the lover not only is unlike his beloved, but he exercises the strongest compulsion. For he is old while his love is young, and he does not leave him day or night, if he can help it, but is driven by the sting of necessity, which urges him on, always giving him pleasure in seeing, hearing, touching, and by all his senses perceiving his beloved, so that he is glad to serve him constantly. But what consolation or what pleasure can he give the beloved? Must not this protracted intercourse bring him to the uttermost disgust, as he looks at the old, unlovely face, and other things to match, which it is not pleasant even to hear about, to say nothing of being constantly compelled to come into contact with them? And he
κάς τε δὴ καχυποτόπους φυλαττομένη διὰ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς ἄπαντας, ἀκαίρους τε καὶ ἑπαίνους καὶ ύπερβάλλουτας ἀκούοντι, ὡς δὲ αὐτῶς ψόγους νήφοντος μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτοῦς, εἰς δὲ μέθην ἱόντος πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἀνεκτῷ ἐπαισχεῖς παρρησία κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένη χρωμένου.

18. Καὶ ἔρων μὲν βλαβερὸς τε καὶ ἠθίς, λήξας δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν ἑπετα χρώνον ἀπιστος, εἰς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν ὅρκων τε καὶ δεήσεων ὑπεσχούμενος μόνης κατείχε τὴν ἐν τῷ τότε ἐνυνοῦσαν ἐπίπονον φέρειν δὴ ἐλπίδα ἁγαθῶν. τότε δὴ δέον ἐκτίνειν, μεταβαλῶν ἄλλον ἀρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἀντ' ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας, ἄλλος γεγονὸς λεληθευ τὰ παιδικά. καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν χύριν ἀπαιτεῖ τῶν τότε, ὑπομίμησικαν τὰ πραγματέα τα λεχθέντα, ὡς τῷ αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενος· ὁ δὲ ὑπ' αἰσχύνης οὔτε εἰπεῖν τολμᾶ ὅτι ἄλλος γέγονεν, οὔθ' ὀπῶς τὰ τῆς προτέρας ἄνοιγτον ἄρχης ὅρκομόσια τε καὶ

Β ὑποσχέσεις ἐμπεδώσει ἕχει, νοῦν ἡδὴ ἐσχηκὼς καὶ σεσωφρονήκως, ἕνα μὴ πράττων ταῦτα τῷ πρόσθεν ὁμοίος τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται. φυγὰς δὴ γίνεται ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ἀπεστερηκός ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ὁ πρὶν ἐραστής, ὀστράκον μεταπεσόντος, ἵστατι φυγὴ μεταβαλῶν· ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται διόκειν ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθείσων, ἡγουμένως τὸ ἀπαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρα ἐδει ποτὲ ἔρωτι καὶ ὑπ'

C ἀνάγκης ἄνοιγτον χαρίζεσθαι, ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον

1 ἐπασχεῖς Schanz following Heindorf, ἐπ' αἰσχεῖ BT,
PHAEDRUS

is suspiciously guarded in all ways against everybody, and has to listen to untimely and exaggerated praises and to reproaches which are unendurable when the man is sober, and when he is in his cups and indulges in wearisome and unrestrained freedom of speech become not only unendurable but disgusting.

And while he is in love he is harmful and disagreeable, but when his love has ceased he is thereafter false to him whom he formerly hardly induced to endure his wearisome companionship through the hope of future benefits by making promises with many prayers and oaths. But now that the time of payment has come he has a new ruler and governor within him, sense and reason in place of love and madness, and has become a different person; but of this his beloved knows nothing. He asks of him a return for former favours, reminding him of past sayings and doings, as if he were speaking to the same man; but the lover is ashamed to say that he has changed, and yet he cannot keep the oaths and promises he made when he was ruled by his former folly, now that he has regained his reason and come to his senses, lest by doing what he formerly did he become again what he was. He runs away from these things, and the former lover is compelled to become a defaulter. The shell has fallen with the other side up;¹ and he changes his part and runs away; and the other is forced to run after him in anger and with imprecations, he who did not know at the start that he ought never to have accepted a lover who was necessarily without reason, but rather a reason-

¹ This refers to a game played with oyster shells, in which the players ran away or pursued as the shell fell with one or the other side uppermost.
μὴ ἐρωτῆτε καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντε· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἰς ἐνδοῦναι αὐτὸν ἀπίστω, δυσκόλω, φθονερῷ, ἀδείᾳ, βλαβερῷ μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σῶματος ἕξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσιν, ἢς οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμώτερον οὔτε ἐστίν οὔτε ποτὲ ἔσται. ταῦτά τε οὐν χρῆ, ὦ παῖ, ξυνονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἔραστον φιλίαν, ὅτι οὐ μετ’ εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίων τρόπον, χάριν πλησιμονῆς,

D ὡς λύκοι ἄρν ἀγαπῶσ’, ὃς παιδὰ φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί.

19. Τοῦτ’ ἐκεῖνο, ὦ Ψαΐδρε. οὐκέτ’ ἂν τὸ πέρα ἁκούσας ἔμοι λέγοντος, ἀλλ’ ἕδη σοι τέλος ἐκέτω ὁ λόγος.

Φαιδρός. Καίτω φίλην γε μεσοῦν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἔρειν τὰ ἔστα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐρωτῆτο, ὡς δὲ ἐκείνω χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων ὁ δ’ αὐ ἐχεῖ ἀγαθὰ·

Εἰς ἁκοράθε. Οὐκ ἔσθου, ὦ μακάριε, ὅτι ἕδη ἔπι θέην φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ’ ὀφεῖ κει διαθράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; ἐὰν δ’ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἐτερον ἄρξομαι, τί με οἷον ποιήσεις; ἀρ’ οἶςθι ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αἰσ ὑπὸ προβαλέσει εκ προνοιας, σαφῶς ἐνθυσιασώ; λέγω οὖν ἐνι λόγῳ, ὅτι ὅσα τὸν ἐτερον λελοιδορήκαμεν, τὸ ἐτέρῳ τάναντι τούτων ἀγαθὰ πρόσεστι. καὶ τί δἐ μακροῦ λόγου; περὶ γὰρ ἄρμοιν ικανῶς εἰρηται. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὁ μῦθος, ὁ τι πάσχειν 242 προσδήκει αὐτῷ, τούτο πείσεται. κάγῳ τὸν ποταμὸν

1 δυσκόλω φθονερῷ omitted by Schanz, following Spengel,
2 λέγων ΒΤ, λέγονθ’ Schanz,
able non-lover; for otherwise he would have to surrender himself to one who was faithless, irritable, jealous, and disagreeable, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical condition, and most harmful by far to the cultivation of his soul, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything of higher importance in truth either in heaven or on earth. These things, dear boy, you must bear in mind, and you must know that the fondness of the lover is not a matter of goodwill, but of appetite which he wishes to satisfy:

Just as the wolf loves the lamb, so the lover adores his beloved.

There it is, Phaedrus! Do not listen to me any longer; let my speech end here.

Phaedrus. But I thought you were in the middle of it, and would say as much about the non-lover as you have said about the lover, to set forth all his good points and show that he ought to be favoured. So now, Socrates, why do you stop?

Socrates. Did you not notice, my friend, that I am already speaking in hexameters, not mere dithyrambics, even though I am finding fault with the lover? But if I begin to praise the non-lover, what kind of hymn do you suppose I shall raise? I shall surely be possessed of the nymphs to whom you purposely exposed me. So, in a word, I say that the non-lover possesses all the advantages that are opposed to the disadvantages we found in the lover. Why make a long speech? I have said enough about both of them. And so my tale shall fare as
τούτον διαβάς ἵπτέρχομαι, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖζον ἀναγκασθήναι.

Φαίδρος. Μήτω γε, ὦ Σωκράτης, πρὶν ἂν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ ἢ οὐχ ὅρᾶς ὡς σχεδὸν ἥδη μεσημβρία ἤσταταί; ἡ ἄλλα περιμείνατες, καὶ ἂμα περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλεχθέντες, τάχα ἐπειδὰν ἀποψυχῇ ἤμεν.

Σωκράτης. Θείος γ' εἰ περὶ τοῦς λόγους, ὦ Φαίδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος. οἴμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ Β τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου γεγονότων μηδένα πλείον ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενήθηκαί ἦτοι αὐτὸν λέγοντα ἢ ἄλλους ἐνί γε τῷ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα. Συμμίαν Θηβαίων ἔξωρῳ λόγον τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πάμπολυ κρατεῖς καὶ νῦν αὐ τοῖς αἰτίος μοι γεγενήθηκαί λόγῳ τινὶ βηθήναι.

Φαίδρος. Οὐ πόλεμον γε ἀγγέλλεις ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

20. Σωκράτης. 'Ἡνίκ' ἐμελλον, ὦ γαθέ, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰσθός Σ σημεῖον μοι γύρνεσθαι ἐγένετο—ἀδὲ δὲ με ἐπίσχει, ὦ ἄν μέλλω πράπτειν θαλόσοιμως καὶ τῶν φωνήν ἐδόξα αὐτόθεν ἀκούσαί, ἢ με οὐκ ἐὰν ἀπείναι πρὶν ἄν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὡς τῷ ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν πάντων μὲν, ὥσ πανύ δὲ στυπνᾶισθος, ἄλλα ὅσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαίλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαυτῷ μόνον ἱκανὸς σαφῶς οὐν ἥδη μανθάνω τὸ ἠμάρτημα. ὡς δὴ τοι, ὦ έταιρε, μαντικόν γε τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐθραξίε μὲν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τὸν λόγον, καὶ πως ἐδυσσωπούμην κατ' 1 After ἤσταταί: BT have ἥδη (ἡ δὲ τ, Stobaeus) καλομέμνη σταθερά, "which is called noontide," which Schanz brackets.
2 Schanz follows Heindorf in bracketing ἄδει... πράπτειν.

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it may; I shall cross this stream and go away before you put some further compulsion upon me.

PHAEDRUS. Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is past. Don't you see that it is already almost noon? Let us stay and talk over what has been said, and then, when it is cooler, we will go away.

SOCRATES. Phaedrus, you are simply a superhuman wonder as regards discourses! I believe no one of all those who have been born in your lifetime has produced more discourses than you, either by speaking them yourself or compelling others to do so. I except Simmias the Theban; but you are far ahead of all the rest. And now I think you have become the cause of another, spoken by me.

PHAEDRUS. That is not exactly a declaration of war! But how is this, and what is the discourse?

SOCRATES. My good friend, when I was about to cross the stream, the spirit and the sign that usually comes to me came—it always holds me back from something I am about to do—and I thought I heard a voice from it which forbade my going away before clearing my conscience, as if I had committed some sin against deity. Now I am a seer, not a very good one, but, as the bad writers say, good enough for my own purposes; so now I understand my error. How prophetic the soul is, my friend! For all along, while I was speaking my discourse, something troubled
ΠΛΑΤΟ

"Ιβικον, μή τι παρὰ θεώς ἀμβλακῶν τιμᾶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμείζων· νῦν δὲ ᾧ ἴσθημαι τὸ ἀμάρτημα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δέγεις δὲ δὴ τί;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεινών, ὦ Φαίδρε, δεινῶν λόγου αὐτὸς τε ἐκόμισας ἐμὲ τε ἡνάγκασας εἰπεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εὐθῇ καὶ ὑπὸ τι ἄσεβῆ οὐ τίς ἀν εἰ ἐπὶ ἵνα δεινότερος;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐδὲν, εἰ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί σοι; τὸν Ἐρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεόν τινα ἴχνει;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δέγεται γε δὴ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ τι ὑπὸ γε Λυσίου, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ε σοῦ λόγου, διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφαρμακευθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν, ὡσπερ οὐν ἐστι, θεὸς ἢ τι θείον ὁ Ἐρως, οὐδὲν ἀν κακὸν εὑρὶ τὸν ὑπὸ λόγω τοῦ νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ εἴπετην ὡς τοιούτου ὄντος. ταῦτα τε ὁ θεός ἡμαρτανέτην περὶ τὸν Ἐρωτα, ἔτι τε ἡ εὐθεία αὐτοῖν πάνω ἀστέλλα, τὸ μηδὲν ὑγιεῖς λέγοντε μηδὲ ἀληθῆς

243 σεμνύνεσθαι ὡς τί ὄντε, εἰ ἄρα ἀνθρωπίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ φίλε, καθήρασθαι ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι περὶ μυθολογίαν καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος, διὸ Ὁμηρός μὲν οὐκ ἦσθετο, Στησίχορος δὲ τῶν γὰρ ὀμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἔλενης κακηγορίαν οὐκ ἠγνώσθεν ὡσπερ Ὁμηρός, ἄλλα

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me, and "I was distressed," as Ibycus says, "lest I be buying honour among men by sinning against the gods." But now I have seen my error.

phaedrus. What do you mean?

socrates. Phaedrus, a dreadful speech it was, a dreadful speech, the one you brought with you, and the one you made me speak.

phaedrus. How so?

socrates. It was foolish, and somewhat impious. What could be more dreadful than that?

phaedrus. Nothing, if you are right about it.

socrates. Well, do you not believe that Love is the son of Aphrodite and is a god?

phaedrus. So it is said.

socrates. Yes, but not by Lysias, nor by your speech which was spoken by you through my mouth that you bewitched. If Love is, as indeed he is, a god or something divine, he can be nothing evil; but the two speeches just now said that he was evil. So then they sinned against Love; but their foolishness was really very funny besides, for while they were saying nothing sound or true, they put on airs as though they amounted to something, if they could cheat some mere manikins and gain honour among them. Now I, my friend, must purify myself; and for those who have sinned in matters of mythology there is an ancient purification, unknown to Homer, but known to Stesichorus. For when he was stricken with blindness for speaking ill of Helen, he was not, like Homer, ignorant of the reason, but

1 Fragment 24, Bergk.
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ατε μουσικός ὃν ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐθὺς

οὐκ ἔστι ἑτυμος λόγος οὕτος,
οὐδ᾽ ἔβας ἐν νησίων εὐσέλμοις, οὐδ᾽ ἵκεο

B Πέργαμον Τροίας

καὶ ποιήσας δὴ πᾶσαν τὴν καλουμένην παλινωδίαν παραχρήμα ἀνέβλεψεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σοφότερος ἐκείνων γενῆσομαι κατ' αὐτό γε τοῦτο πρὶν γὰρ τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἑρωτος κακηγορίαν πειράσομαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλινωδίαν, γυμνῷ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ οὐχ ἄσπερ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης ἐγκεκαλυμμένος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοὐτοὶ, ὦ Σῶκρατε, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄττ' ἢν ἐμοὶ εἴπες ἡδίω.

21. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ, ὦ γαθὴ Φαίδρε, εὖνοεῖς

C ὡς ἀναιδῶς εἰρήσθων τὸν λόγον, οὕτος τε καὶ ὁ ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ρήθεις. εἰ γὰρ ἄκοινω τις τούτων ἡμῶν γενεάδας καὶ πράσω τὸ θῆσο, ἐτέρον δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐρῶν ἢ καὶ πρότερον ποτε ἑρασθεὶς, λεγόντων ὡς διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἔχθρας οἱ ἐρασται ἀναιροῦνται καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ φθονορῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ὦι ἄτον ἡγεῖσθαι ἄκοινω ἐν ναῦταις ποιον τεθραμμένων καὶ οὐδένα ἐλέυθερον ἔρωτα ἑωρακότων, πολλοὶ δὲ ἄν

D δεῖν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν ἃ ψέγομεν τὸν Ἑρωτα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. "Ισως νη Δῆ, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτον γε τοίνυν ἐγώοις αἰσχυνόμενος, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἑρωτα δεδώσας, ἐπιθυμῶ ποτίμῳ λόγῳ οἶνον ἀλμυράν ἄκοιν ἀποκλύσασθαι συμβουλεύω δὲ καὶ Λυσία ὧ τι τάχιστα γράφαι,
since he was educated, he knew it and straightway he writes the poem:

"That saying is not true; thou didst not go within the well-oared ships, nor didst thou come to the walls of Troy"; ¹

and when he had written all the poem, which is called the recantation, he saw again at once. Now I will be wiser than they in just this point: before suffering any punishment for speaking ill of Love, I will try to atone by my recantation, with my head bare this time, not, as before, covered through shame.

PHAEDRUS. This indeed, Socrates, is the most delightful thing you could say.

SOCRATES. Just consider, my good Phaedrus, how shameless the two speeches were, both this of mine and the one you read out of the book. For if any man of noble and gentle nature, one who was himself in love with another of the same sort, or who had ever been loved by such a one, had happened to hear us saying that lovers take up violent enmity because of small matters and are jealously disposed and harmful to the beloved, don't you think he would imagine he was listening to people brought up among low sailors, who had never seen a generous love? Would he not refuse utterly to assent to our censure of Love?

PHAEDRUS. I declare, Socrates, perhaps he would.

SOCRATES. I therefore, because I am ashamed at the thought of this man and am afraid of Love himself, wish to wash out the brine from my ears with the water of a sweet discourse. And I advise Lysias

¹ Fragment 32, Bergk.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 'Αλλ' εύ ἱσθι ὅτι ἐξεῖ τοῦθ' οὕτωςοῦ γὰρ εἰπόντος τὸν τοῦ ἐραστοῦ ἔπαινου, πᾶσα ἡ ἀνάγκη Δυσίαν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀναγκασθῆναι γράψαι ἀυτὲρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτο μὲν πιστεῦω, ἐωσπερ ἂν ἦς δὲς εἰ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δέγε τοίνυν θαρρῶν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ποῦ δὴ μοι οὐ παῖσ πρὸς ὑν ἔλεγον; Ἡνα καὶ τούτῳ ἀκούσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀνήκοος ὑν φθάσῃ χαρισάμενος τῷ μὴ ἐρωτήτη.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔτος παρά σοι μάλα πλησίον ἂεὶ πάρεστιν, ὅταν σὺ βούλῃ.

22. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτωσι τοίνυν, ὅ παῖ καλέ,

244 ἐννύησον, ὅσ ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρρινοσίου ἀνδρὸς· ὃν δὲ μέλλω λέγειν, Στησινήρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἱμεραίου. Λεκτέως δὲ ἄδε, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστ' ἐτυμος λόγος, ὅσ ἂν παρόντος ἐραστοῦ τῷ μὴ ἐρωτήμενο τῷ μᾶλλον φήμος, διὸ τὸν σωφρονεῖ, ἐλεγέται, ὅσ μὲν ἠπλοῖ τοῖς μανίας κατ' ἐν, καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θεία μὲν τοι δοσεὶ διδομένη. ἢ τε ἢ τῇ ἐν Δελφοῖς προ-

Β φήτης αἴ ὅτ' ἐν Δοδώνῃ ἱέρεια μανεῖσαι μὲν πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἱδία τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὴν Ἐλλάδα εἰργάσατο, σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχεία ἢ οὐδέν· καὶ ἐὰν δὴ λέγωμεν Σίβυλλαν τε καὶ ἄλλους, ὅσοι 464
also to write as soon as he can, that other things being equal, the lover should be favoured rather than the non-lover.

PHAEDRUS. Be assured that he will do so: for when you have spoken the praise of the lover, Lysias must of course be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same subject.

SOCRATES. I believe you, so long as you are what you are.

PHAEDRUS. Speak then without fear.

SOCRATES. Where is the youth to whom I was speaking? He must hear this also, lest if he do not hear it, he accept a non-lover before we can stop him.

PHAEDRUS. Here he is, always close at hand whenever you want him.

SOCRATES. Understand then, fair youth, that the former discourse was by Phaedrus, the son of Pythocles (Eager for Fame) of Myrrhinus (Myrrhaftown); but this which I shall speak is by Stesichorus, son of Euphemus (Man of pious Speech) of Himera (Town of Desire). And I must say that this saying is not true, which teaches that when a lover is at hand the non-lover should be more favoured, because the lover is insane, and the other sane. For if it were a simple fact that insanity is an evil, the saying would be true; but in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the gods. For the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when they have been mad have conferred many splendid benefits upon Greece both in private and in public affairs, but few or none when they have been in their right minds; and if we should speak of the Sibyl and all the others who by pro-
μαντικής χρώμενοι ἐνθέφ πολλά δὴ πολλοὶς προ-
λέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὄρθωσαν, μηκύνωμεν ἀν
δὴλα παντὶ λέγοντες· τόδε μὴν ἄξιον ἑπιμαρτύ-
ρασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὅνοματα
tιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρῶν ἡγούμεντο οὐδὲ ὅνειδος μανίαν.

Οὐ χάρ φη τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἕτεροντα, αὐτὸ τὸν τοῦνομα ἐμπλέκοντες μανικήν
ἐκάλεσαν· ἀλλὰ ως καλοῦ ὅντος, ὅταν θεία μοῖρα
γίγνηται, οὐτω νομίζαντες ἔθεντο, οἱ δὲ νῦν
ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες μαντικὴν
ἐκάλεσαν. ἔπει καὶ τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἁμητησίν
τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τε ὄρνθων ποιουμένων καὶ τῶν
ἀλλων σημείων, ἀτ' ὁ διανοίας ποριζομένων ἀνθρω-

πὶς οὐκέτει νοῦν τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰονοικτικὴν
ἐπονόμασαν, ἢν νῦν οἰωνιστικὴ τῷ ὅ σεμνύνοντες
οἱ νέοι καλοῦσιν· ὅσοι δὴ οὖν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐν-
tιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικὴς, τὸ τε ὅνομα τοῦ
ὁνόματος ἔργου τ' ἔργου, τόσο κάλλιον μαρτυ-
ροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν σωφροσύνης τῆς ἐκ θεοῦ
τῆς παρ' ἀνθρώπων γνωριμενῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων
γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, ἢ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ
μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἐν τισὶ τῶν γενῶν, ἢ μανία

Εὖγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἔδεε ἀπαλλαγὴν
ἐὕρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θέων εὐχᾶς τε καὶ
λατρείας, ὅθεν δὴ καθαρμὸν τε καὶ τελετῶν
τυχοῦσα εξάντη ἐποίησε τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἐχοντα πρὸς

1 Schanz brackets ποιουμένων.
phetic inspiration have foretold many things to many persons and thereby made them fortunate afterwards, anyone can see that we should speak a long time. And it is worth while to adduce also the fact that those men of old who invented names thought that madness was neither shameful nor disgraceful; otherwise they would not have connected the very word mania with the noblest of arts, that which foretells the future, by calling it the manic art. No, they gave this name thinking that mania, when it comes by gift of the gods, is a noble thing, but nowadays people call prophecy the mantic art, tastelessly inserting a T in the word. So also, when they gave a name to the investigation of the future which rational persons conduct through observation of birds and by other signs, since they furnish mind (nous) and information (historia) to human thought (oiesis) from the intellect (dianoia) they called it the oionistic (oionoistike) art, which modern folk now call oïnistic, making it more high-sounding by introducing the long Ï. The ancients, then testify that in proportion as prophecy (mantine) is superior to augury, both in name and in fact, in the same proportion madness, which comes from god, is superior to sanity, which is of human origin. Moreover, when diseases and the greatest troubles have been visited upon certain families through some ancient guilt, madness has entered in and by oracular power has found a way of release for those in need, taking refuge in prayers and the service of the gods, and so, by purifications and sacred rites, he who has this madness is made safe for the present and the after time, and for him who is rightly possessed of
τε τον παρόντα καὶ τοὺς ἐπείτα χρόνου, λύσιν τῷ ὁρθῶς μανέντι τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὔρομένη. τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μοῦσῶν κατοκώχθη
tε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἀπαλῆν καὶ ἄβατον ψυχήν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατὰ τε φόδας καὶ
kατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαιών ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγυγνομένους παιδεύειν δὲ δ' ἀν
ἀνευ μανίας Μοῦσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφικνηται, πεισθεὶς ὡς ἄρα ἐκ τέχνης ἰκανὸς ποιητής
ἐσόμενος, ἀτελῆς αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς
tῶν μανικεμένων ἡ σωφρονούντος ἡμανίσθη.

23. Τοσαύτα μεντοι καὶ ἔτι πλείω ἐξω μανίας
γνωμομένης ἀπὸ θεῶν λέγειν καλὰ ἔργα: ὡστε
tοῦτο γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβόμεθα, μηδὲ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος
θορυβεῖν δεδιδομένος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου
tῶν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρέσθαι φίλου ἀλλὰ τόδε
πρὸς ἐκείνω δέδοξας φερέσθω τὰ νικητήρια, ὡς οὐκ
ἐπ' ὁφελία ὡς ἔρως τῷ ἔρωτι καὶ τῷ ἔρωμεν ἐκ
θεῶν ἐπιτείμηται. ἦμιν δὲ ἀποδεικτέον αὖ τούναν-
tίον, ὡς ἐπ' εὔτυχια τῇ μεγασθῇ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ

tοιαύτη μανία δίδοται· η δὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἢσται
deινοῖς μὲν ἀπίστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή. δεὶ οὖν
πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως πέρι θεῖας τε καὶ ἀνθρω-
πίνης ἰδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα τάληθες νοησαι·
ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἢδε.

24. Ψυχὴ πάσα ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικύνητον
ἀθάνατον τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινούν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλοι κινοῦ-
μενοι, παύλαν ἐχον κινήσεως, παύλαν ἔχει ζωῆς:
μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν, ἀτε οὐκ ἀπολείποιον ἑαυτό, οὐ
ποτε λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
δια κινεῖται τούτο τηγῆ καὶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.
ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάν τὸ

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madness a release from present ills is found. And a third kind of possession and madness comes from the Muses. This takes hold upon a gentle and pure soul, arouses it and inspires it to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations. But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art, meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madmen.

All these noble results of inspired madness I can mention, and many more. Therefore let us not be afraid on that point, and let no one disturb and frighten us by saying that the reasonable friend should be preferred to him who is in a frenzy. Let him show in addition that love is not sent from heaven for the advantage of lover and beloved alike, and we will grant him the prize of victory. We, on our part, must prove that such madness is given by the gods for our greatest happiness; and our proof will not be believed by the merely clever, but will be accepted by the truly wise. First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows:

Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion. But the
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γινομένου γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' εξ ἑνὸς· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχῆ γίγνοιτο, ὁυκ ἃν εξ ἀρχῆς γίγνοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητον ἔστιν, καὶ ἀδιάφορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ἀρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ἐκ τοῦ οὔτε ἄλλο εξ ἑκείνης γενήσεται, εἰπερ εξ ἀρχῆς δεὶ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι. οὔτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν. τούτο δὲ οὔτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν,

Ε ἡ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μῆποτε αὕθις ἔχειν οἶκεν κινήθεντα γενήσεται. ἀθανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ ὑφ’ ἐαυτοῦ κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγου τούτου αὐτῶν τις λέγων οὐκ άισχυνεῖται. πάν γὰρ σώμα, ὁ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἄψυχον, ὃ δὲ ἐνδοθεὶς αὐτῷ ἔχει αὐτοῦ, ἔμψυχον, ὥς ταύτης οὐσίας φύσεως ψυχῆς· εἰ δ’ ἐστιν τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχου, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχῆν, ἔχει ἀνάγκης ἀγένητὸν τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ψυχῆ ἂν εἴη.

25. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἰκανῶς· περὶ δὲ τῆς ἱδέας αὐτῆς ὃδε λεκτέουν οἶον μὲν ἐστι, πάντῃ πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρᾶς διηγήσεως, ὃ δὲ ἔοικεν, ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἐλάττων· ταύτης οὖν λέγομεν. ἐοικέτω δὴ ξυμφύτω δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ἥσυχους τε καὶ ἴνιχους. θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἴνιχοι πάντες αὐτοὶ τε ἁγιασθεὶ καὶ Β ἐξ ἁγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἅλλων μέμεικται· καὶ πρῶτον

1 Schanz adds τοῦτο before οὕτωσ.
beginning is ungenerated. For everything that is generated must be generated from a beginning, but the beginning is not generated from anything; for if the beginning were generated from anything, it would not be generated from a beginning. And since it is ungenerated, it must be also indestructible; for if the beginning were destroyed, it could never be generated from anything nor anything else from it, since all things must be generated from a beginning. Thus that which moves itself must be the beginning of motion. And this can be neither destroyed nor generated, otherwise all the heavens and all generation must fall in ruin and stop and never again have any source of motion or origin. But since that which is moved by itself has been seen to be immortal, one who says that this self-motion is the essence and the very idea of the soul, will not be disgraced. For every body which derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has its motion within itself has a soul, since that is the nature of the soul; but if this is true,—that that which moves itself is nothing else than the soul,—then the soul would necessarily be ungenerated and immortal.

Concerning the immortality of the soul this is enough; but about its form we must speak in the following manner. To tell what it really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure; let us therefore speak in that way. We will liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and charioteers of the gods are all good and of good descent, but those of other races are mixed; and first
μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἀρχων ξυνωρίδος ἦνοχεῖ, εἶτα τῶν ἔπτων ὁ μὲν αὐτὸς καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁ δὲ ἐξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος· χαλεπὴ δὴ καὶ δύσκολος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡμόχρηστι. πὴ δὴ οὖν θυιτῶν καὶ ἀδάνατον ξόν έκλήθη, πειρατέων εἰπεῖν. πᾶσα η γυνὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἄνδρον, πάντα δὲ οὐρανόν περιπολεῖ, ἀλλοτ᾿ ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεις γυνομένη· τελέα

C μὲν οὖν οὖσα καὶ ἐπιτερωμένη μετεωροτορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμου διοικεῖ· ή δὲ πετεροφυίσασα φέρεται, έως ἀν στερεός τινὸς ἀντιλάβηται, οὐ κατοικισθείσα, σώμα γῆνου λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ αὐτὸ δοκοῦν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν ἑκείνης δύναμιν, ξόν το ξύμπαν ἐκλήθη, γυνὴ καὶ σώμα παγένη, θυιτῶν τ' έσχεν ἐπονυμίαν· ἀδάνατον δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ἐνὸς λόγου λειογισμένου, ἀλλὰ πλάστομεν οὔτε ἰδούτες

D οὐτε ἰκανῶς νοήσαντες θεόν, ἀδάνατον τι ξόν, ἔχον μὲν γυνήν, ἔχον δὲ σώμα, τὸν ἀεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταύτα ξυμπεφυκότα. ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν ἄθροιπη τὸ θεὸν φίλου, ταύτη ἐχέτων τε καὶ λεγέσθων· τὴν δ' αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δὴ η ἐκ τῆς γυνῆς ἀπορρεῖ, λάβωμεν. ἔστι δὲ τις τοιάδε.

26. Πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθέν ἄγειν ἄνω μετεωρίζουσα, ἢ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ· κεκοινώνυκε δὲ τὴ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ

E σώμα τού θείου.1 τὸ δὲ θείου καλὸν, σοφὸν, ἀγαθὸν, καὶ πᾶν ὁ τι τοιοῦτον τοῦτος δὴ τρέφεται τε καὶ αὐξεῖται μάλιστα γε τὸ τῆς γυνῆς πτέρωμα, αἰσχρῶ δὲ καὶ κακῶ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις.2

1 The word γυνή, given in the MSS. after θείου, is omitted by Plutarch and most modern editors, including Schanz.
2 Schanz omits καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις.
the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome. Now we must try to tell why a living being is called mortal or immortal. Soul, considered collectively, has the care of all that which is soulless, and it traverses the whole heaven, appearing sometimes in one form and sometimes in another; now when it is perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward and governs the whole world; but the soul which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body, which seems to be self-moving, because of the power of the soul within it; and the whole, compounded of soul and body, is called a living being, and is further designated as mortal. It is not immortal by any reasonable supposition, but we, though we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, imagine an immortal being which has both a soul and a body which are united for all time. Let that, however, and our words concerning it, be as is pleasing to God; we will now consider the reason why the soul loses its wings. It is something like this.

The natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy up to the place where dwells the race of the gods. More than any other thing that pertains to the body it partakes of the nature of the divine. But the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities; by these then the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, but by the opposite qualities, such as vileness and
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φθίνει τε καὶ διόλλυται. ο μὲν δὴ μέγας ἥγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς, ἐλαύνων πτηνῶν ἀρμα, πρῶτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελοῦμενος.

247 τὸ δὲ ἐπεταί στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαμόνων, κατὰ ἑκάστη κέκοσμημένη, μὲνει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἷς μόνῃ τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὅσοι ἐν τῷ τῶν δόμων ἄριθμῳ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἀρχόντες ἑγοῦνται κατὰ τάξιν ἢν ἑκάστος ἑτάχθη. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θέατε τε καὶ διεξοδοὶ ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ὅς θεῶν ἡμέρας εὐδαίμονων ἕπιστρέφεται, πρῶταν ἑκάστος αὐτῶν τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεταί δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἑθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος. φθόνος γὰρ ἐξω θεῶν χοροῦ ἴσταται. οὗτε δὲ ἂν πρὸς δαίτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην

Β ἠσσιν, ἄκραν ὑπὸ τὴν υπουργίαν ἅψιδα πορεύονται. ἡ δὴ τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα ἰσορρόπως εὐνίαν ὅπια τά βασίσως πορεύεται, τα δὲ ἄλλα μόνιμα βρίσκει γὰρ ὁ τής κάκης ἵππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἰέτων τε καὶ βαρύνου, οὐ μὴ καλῶς ἢ τεθραμμένος τῶν ἴμοιχων ἐνθα δὴ τῶν τε καὶ ἁγῶν ἔσχατος ψυχῆς πρόκειται. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀναντοί καλούμεναι, ἢνίκη ἄν πρὸς ἄκρα

C γένωνται, ἐξω πορευθεῖσαι ἔστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νότῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περιάγει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ βεβούσι τὰ ἐξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

27. Τὸν δὲ υπερουρανίον τόπον οὔτε τις ὑμνησε τῶν τῆς ποιήσης οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνήσει κατ' ἄξιαν, ἐχεῖ δὲ ὅδε. τολμητέου γὰρ οὖν τὸ γε ἁλθῆς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα. ἡ γὰρ ἄχρωματος τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος

1 Schanz reads εὐδαίμονως.
2 Schanz brackets πορεύονται.
3 ἤ δὴ Proclus, followed by Burnet. ἤ δὴ BT Schanz et al.

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evil, they are wasted away and destroyed. Now the great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, arranging all things and caring for all things. He is followed by an army of gods and spirits, arrayed in eleven squadrons; Hestia alone remains in the house of the gods. Of the rest, those who are included among the twelve great gods and are accounted leaders, are assigned each to his place in the army. There are many blessed sights and many ways hither and thither within the heaven, along which the blessed gods go to and fro attending each to his own duties; and whoever wishes, and is able, follows, for jealousy is excluded from the celestial band. But when they go to a feast and a banquet, they proceed steeply upward to the top of the vault of heaven, where the chariots of the gods, whose well matched horses obey the rein, advance easily, but the others with difficulty; for the horse of evil nature weighs the chariot down, making it heavy and pulling toward the earth the charioteer whose horse is not well trained. There the utmost toil and struggle await the soul. For those that are called immortal, when they reach the top, pass outside and take their place on the outer surface of the heaven, and when they have taken their stand, the revolution carries them round and they behold the things outside of the heaven.

But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. It is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colourless, formless, and intangible truly
καὶ ἀναφῆς οὖσια ὄντως οὖσα ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη μόνῳ θεατὴ νῦ, περὶ ἂν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς

D ἐπιστήμης γένος τούτον ἔχει τὴν τόπον. ἄτ’ οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀκηράτω τρεφο-

méνη καὶ ἀπάσης ψυχῆς, οὐχ ἂν μέλλῃ τὸ προσ-

ήκον δέξεσθαι, ιδούσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὀν ἀγαπᾶ τε καὶ θεωρῶσα τάληθή τρέφεται καὶ ἐνπαθεῖ,

ἐως ἂν κύκλῳ ἡ περιφορὰ εἰς ταυτὸν περιενέγκῃ·

ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθαρᾷ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην,

καθορὰ ἐν σωφροσύνῃ, καθορὰ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὖχ ἡ γένεσις προσεστὶ, οὐδ’ ἡ ἔστὶν που ἔτερα ἐν

E ἔτερῳ οὖσα διὸ ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοὺμεν, ἀλλὰ
tὴν ἐν τῷ ὁ ἔστιν διὸ ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν· καὶ
tάλλα ὀσοιότερα τὰ ὀντα ὄντως θεασαμένη καὶ

ἐστιαθεῖσα, δύσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἶχον του ὀφρανοῦ,

οἴκας ἢλθεν, ἐλθούσης δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἱνίχος πρὸς

tὴν φάτνην τοὺς ἵππους στῆσαι παρέβαλεν ἀμ-

βροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ νέκταρ ἐπότισεν.

28. Καὶ οὕτως μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἰ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυ-

248 χαί, ἡ μὲν ἀριστα θεῖο ἐπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη

ὑπερῆρεν εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἱνίχου κεφαλῆν,

καὶ συμπερικεχθεὶ τὴν περιφορὰν, θορυ-

βουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππῶν καὶ μόνης καθορῶσα τὰ

ὄντα· ἡ δὲ τοτὴ μὲν ἤπε, τοτὲ δ’ ἔδω, βιαζομένων

dε τῶν ἱππῶν τὰ μὲν εἶδον, τὰ δ’ οὐ· αἱ δὲ δὴ ἂν

γλυχόμεναι μὲν ἀπασαι τοῦ ἄνω ἔπονται, ἄδυ-

νατοῦσαι δὲ ὑποβρύχιαι ξυμπεριφέρονται, πα-

B τούσα ἄλληλας καὶ ἐπιβαλλοῦσαι, ἔτερα πρὸ τῆς

1 ψυχῆς οὖσα B οὖσα ψυχῆς T. οὖσα Madvig, Schanz.
2 ἄτ’ BT ἢ τ’ Heindorf, Schanz.
3 καὶ ἀπάσης . . . δέξεσθαι bracketed by Schanz, following Suckow.

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existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul. Now the divine intelligence, since it is nurtured on mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving that which befits it, rejoices in seeing reality for a space of time and by gazing upon truth is nourished and made happy until the revolution brings it again to the same place. In the revolution it beholds absolute justice, temperance, and knowledge, not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things we call realities, but that which abides in the real eternal absolute; and in the same way it beholds and feeds upon the other eternal verities, after which, passing down again within the heaven, it goes home, and there the charioteer puts up the horses at the manger and feeds them with ambrosia and then gives them nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of the other souls, that which best follows after God and is most like him, raises the head of the charioteer up into the outer region and is carried round in the revolution, troubled by the horses and hardly beholding the realities; and another sometimes rises and sometimes sinks, and, because its horses are unruly, it sees some things and fails to see others. The other souls follow after, all yearning for the upper region but unable to reach it, and are carried round beneath, trampling upon and colliding with one another, each
τέρας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι. θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἀμίλλα καὶ ἱδρῶς ἐσχατος γίγνεται, οὐ δὴ κακία ἤνιόχων πολλαὶ μὲν χωλεύονται, πολλαὶ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ βραύνονται· πᾶς δὲ πολὺν ἐχοῦσαι πόνον ἀτελεῖς τῆς του ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφὴ δοξαστὴ χρώνται. οὐ δὲ ἑνεχ’ ὡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθεῖα ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὐ 1 ἑστίν, ἢ τε δὴ προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομῇ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὐσα, ἢ τε τοῦ C πτεροῦ φύσις, δ’ ψυχὴ κοιφίζεται, τοῦτῳ τρέ- φεται: θεσμὸς τε Ἀδραστείας ὁδε, ἦτις ἀν ψυχὴ θεῷ ξυνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατὶδρ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τε τῆς ἕτερας περίοδος εἶναι ἀπήμονα, κἂν ἂν τοῦτο δύνηται ποιεῖν, ἂν ἄβλαβῇ εἶναι. ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπιστέσθαι μὴ ἐδῃ, καὶ τινὶ συντυχία χρησαμένη λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πλη- σθείσα βαρινθῆ, βαρινθεύσα δὲ πτεροπρόφητῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ, τότε νόμος ταύτην μή D φυτεύσαι εἰς μηδέμιαν θήρειον φύσιν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πλείστα ἰδούσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γενησομένα φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μονικοῦ τινὸς καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν εἰς βασιλέως ἐννομοῦ ἢ πολεμικοῦ καὶ ἀρχικοῦ, τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ ἢ τινος οἰκονομικοῦ ἢ χρη- ματιστικοῦ, τετάρτην εἰς φιλοσόφου γυμναστικοῦ ἢ περὶ σῶματος ἱασίν τινος ἐσωμένου, πέμπτην E μαντικὸν βίον ἢ τινα τελεστικοῦ ἔξουσαν· ἐκτῇ ποιητικῷ ἢ τῶν περὶ μίμησιν τις ἄλλος ἀρμόσει, ἐβδόμῃ δημιουργικῷ ἢ γεωργικῷ, ὀγδοῇ σοφι- στικῷ ἢ δημοτικῷ, ἐννάτῃ τυραννικό. 1 οὕς is omitted by Schanz, following Madvig.
striving to pass its neighbour. So there is the greatest confusion and sweat of rivalry, wherein many are lamed, and many wings are broken through the incompetence of the drivers; and after much toil they all go away without gaining a view of reality, and when they have gone away they feed upon opinion. But the reason of the great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is, lies in the fact that the fitting pasturage for the best part of the soul is in the meadow there, and the wing on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this. And this is a law of Destiny, that the soul which follows after God and obtains a view of any of the truths is free from harm until the next period, and if it can always attain this, is always unharmed; but when, through inability to follow, it fails to see, and through some mischance is filled with forgetfulness and evil and grows heavy, and when it has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to the earth, then it is the law that this soul shall never pass into any beast at its first birth, but the soul that has seen the most shall enter into the birth of a man who is to be a philosopher or a lover of beauty, or one of a musical or loving nature, and the second soul into that of a lawful king or a warlike ruler, and the third into that of a politician or a man of business or a financier, the fourth into that of a hard-working gymnast or one who will be concerned with the cure of the body, and the fifth will lead the life of a prophet or someone who conducts mystic rites; to the sixth, a poet or some other imitative artist will be united, to the seventh, a craftsman or a husbandman, to the eighth, a sophist or a demagogue, to the ninth, a tyrant.
29. 'Εν δὴ τούτως ἀπασιν δὲ μὲν ἂν δικαίως διαγάγῃ, ἀμείνονος μοίρας μεταλαμβάνει, δὲ δὲ ἂν ἄδικως, χείρονος. εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ θειὶ ἤκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκάστῃ οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτών μυρίων· οὐ γὰρ πτεροῦται πρὸ τοσοῦτον χρόνου, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἡ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας· αὕττα δὲ τρίτη περιόδῳ τῇ χειλετεί, ἐὰν ἔλωνται τρὶς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τοῦτον, οὔτω πτερωθείσαι τρισχίλιοστῷ ἐτεὶ ἀπέρχονται· αἱ δὲ ἀλλαί, ὅταν τὸν πρῶτον βίον τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἐτυχοῦν, κρίθείσαι δὲ αἱ μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς δικαιωτήρια εὐθοῦσαν δίκην ἐκτίνοσιν, αἱ δὲ εἰς Β τοῦρανοῦ τινὰ τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κουφισθεὶσαν διάγουσιν ἄξιος οὐ ἐν ἀνθρώπων εἰδεὶ ἐβίωσαν βίον. τῷ δὲ χείλιστῷ ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσιν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἱροῦνται διὰ τὸν ἐδὲ ἐκάστη· εὑρία καὶ εἰς θηρίου βίου ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχή ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ἐκ θηρίου, ὅς ποτε ἄνθρωπος ἦν, πάλιν εἰς ἄνθρωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ γε μὴ ποτὲ ἴδούσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τὸτε ἤξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνεῖναι κατ' εἰδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν C λογισμῷ ξυναιροῦμενον· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμμησις ἐκείνων, ἀ ποτ' εἰδεὶ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεὶσα θεῷ καὶ ύπεριδοῦσα ἄ νυν εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ δὲ ὄντως. διδ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνως ἀεὶ ἐστὶν μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς

1 Schanz inserts τὸ after κατ'.
2 Schanz, following Heindorf, reads ξυναιροομένων.

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Now in all these states, whoever lives justly obtains a better lot, and whoever lives unjustly, a worse. For each soul returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years; for it does not regain its wings before that time has elapsed, except the soul of him who has been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical lover; these, when for three successive periods of a thousand years they have chosen such a life, after the third period of a thousand years become winged in the three thousandth year and go their way; but the rest, when they have finished their first life, receive judgment, and after the judgment some go to the places of correction under the earth and pay their penalty, while the others, made light and raised up into a heavenly place by justice, live in a manner worthy of the life they led in human form. But in the thousandth year both come to draw lots and choose their second life, each choosing whatever it wishes. Then a human soul may pass into the life of a beast, and a soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into a man. For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form. For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things
οίσπερ θεός ὃν θείος ἔστιν. τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτως ἀνήρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὅρθως χρώμενος, τελέους ἀεὶ τελετάς τελοῦμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται.

D ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος νουθετεῖται μὲν υπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλοὺς.

30. Ἐστιν δὴ οὖν δεύρο ὁ πᾶς ἦκαν λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἦν ὅταν τὸ τῆδε τις ὄρων κάλλος, τοῦ ἄληθος ἀναμμυνησκόμενος, πτερώται τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτερόσβαι, ἀδυνατῶν δὲ, ὀρνιθὸς δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς διακείμενος· ὡς άρα αὐτὴ πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀριστών τῷ τῇ ἄναπται καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχου τῆς μανίας ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν ἐραστῆς καλεῖται. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχή φύσει τεθέαται τὰ ὄντα, ἣ οὐκ ἂν ἠλθεῖ εἰς τόδε τὸ ξύον, ἀναμμυνήσκεσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν οἶκων ἀπάση, οὕτε ὅσαι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τάκει, οὕτε ἄεὶ δεύρο πεσοῦσαι ἐδυστύχησαν, ὡστε υπὸ τινῶν ὁμιλιῶν ὑπὸ τὸ ἀδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην ὅτι τὸ τότε εἶδον ἔχειν. οὐλογεῖ δὴ λείπονται, αἰς τὸ τῆς μυθῆς ἴκανῶς πάρεστιν αὐτῷ δὲ, ὅταν τι τῶν ἔκει ὀμοίωμα ἰδοσιν, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκέθ’ αὐτῶν γίγνον-

1 Schanz omits τε καὶ.
the communion with which causes God to be divine. Now a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect; but since he separates himself from human interests and turns his attention toward the divine, he is rebuked by the vulgar, who consider him mad and do not know that he is inspired.

All my discourse so far has been about the fourth kind of madness, which causes him to be regarded as mad, who, when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below. My discourse has shown that this is, of all inspirations, the best and of the highest origin to him who has it or who shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful, partaking in this madness, is called a lover. For, as has been said, every soul of man has by the law of nature beheld the realities, otherwise it would not have entered into a human being, but it is not easy for all souls to gain from earthly things a recollection of those realities, either for those which had but a brief view of them at that earlier time, or for those which, after falling to earth, were so unfortunate as to be turned toward unrighteousness through some evil communications and to have forgotten the holy sights they once saw. Few then are left which retain an adequate recollection of them; but these when they see here any likeness of the things of that other world, are stricken with amazement and can no longer control themselves; but they do not
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ταῖ, δ’ ἔστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοοῦσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς διασθάνεσθαι. δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὐν καὶ σωφροσύνης, καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς, οὐκ ἔνεστι φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τήδε ὁμοιώμασιν, ἄλλα δι’ ἀμυδρῶν ὄργανον μόνος αὐτῶν καὶ ὅλιγοι ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἱόντες θεῶν τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος· κάλλος δὲ τὸ τ’ ἢν ἱδεῖν λαμπρόν, ὅτε σὺν εὐδαιμονίᾳ χορῷ μακαρίαν ὤψιν τε καὶ θέαν, ἐπόμενοι μετὰ μὲν Δίδ ήμεῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ μετ’ ἄλλου θεῶν, εἴδον τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἢν θέμις

C λέγειν μακαριωτάτην, ἢν ωργιάζομεν ὀλόκληροι μὲν αὐτοὶ ὤντες καὶ ἀπαθεῖς κακῶν, ὅσα ἡμᾶς ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὑπέμενεν, ὀλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἀπλὰ καὶ ἀτρεμή καὶ εὐδαιμονία φασματα μνούμενοι τε καὶ ἑποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, καθαρῷ ὤντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτου, δ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζομεν, ὀστεύου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.

31. Ταύτα μὲν οὖν μυήμη κεχαρίσθω, δ’ ἢν πόθῳ τῶν τότε νῦν μακρότερα εὑρηται· περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὀστευερ εὔπομεν, μετ’ ἐκείνων τε ἐλαμπες οὐ, δευρὸ τ’ ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβου ἐναργεστάτης. ὡς γὰρ ἥμαν ἄξιατή τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεως, ὡς φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται—δεινοὺς γὰρ ἄν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἐαυτῆς ἐναργεῖ εἰδώλου παρείχετο εἰς ὡς οἷον—καὶ τάλλα ὡσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἐσχε μοῖραν, ὡστ’ ἐκφανέστατον

E εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμώτατον. ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελής ἢ

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understand their condition, because they do not clearly perceive. Now in the earthly copies of justice and temperance and the other ideas which are precious to souls there is no light, but only a few, approaching the images through the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which they imitate, and these few do this with difficulty. But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness, when, with a blessed company—we following in the train of Zeus, and others in that of some other god—they saw the blessed sight and vision and were initiated into that which is rightly called the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of perfection, when we were without experience of the evils which awaited us in the time to come, being permitted as initiates to the sight of perfect and simple and calm and happy apparitions, which we saw in the pure light, being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell.

So much, then, in honour of memory, on account of which I have now spoken at some length, through yearning for the joys of that other time. But beauty, as I said before, shone in brilliance among those visions; and since we came to earth we have found it shining most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the physical senses, though wisdom is not seen by it, for wisdom would arouse terrible love, if such a clear image of it were granted as would come through sight, and the same is true of the other lovely realities; but beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore it is most clearly seen and loveliest.
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dieφθαρμένος οὖς ὃξέως ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος, θεώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τῇδε ἐπωνυμίαν, ὡστ' οὐ σέβεται προσορῶν, ἀλλ' ἡδονῇ παραδοὺς τετράποδος νόμον βαίνειν ἐπιχειρεί καὶ παιδοσπορεῖν, καὶ ὕβρει προσομιλῶν οὐ δέδοικεν οὐδ' αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονήν διώκων· ἡ δὲ ἀρτιτελής, ὁ τῶν τότε πολυθεάμων, ὅταν θεοειδεῖ πρόσωπον ἤδη κάλλος εὐ μεμμημένον ἡ τινα σώματος ἴδεαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξεν καὶ τι τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς θεον σέβεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἴδείς τὴν τῆς σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, τούτοι δὲ ἄγαλματι καὶ θεῷ τοῖς παιδικοῖς. ἴδοντα δ' αὐτὸν ὑλὸν ἐκ τῆς φρίκης μεταβολή τε καὶ ἴδρως καὶ θερμότης ἀήθησ

Β. λαμβάνειν δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροήν διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων εὐθεμάνθη, ἢ ὅ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται,1 θερμανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συμμεμυκότα εἰργε μὴ βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρυείσης δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ὑδησθε τε καὶ ὁρμησθε φύσεθαι ἀπὸ τῆς βίξης ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καύλος ὑπὸ πάν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδος· πᾶσα γὰρ ἡν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτῆ.

32. Ζεὶ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ὅλη καὶ ἀνακηκίει, καὶ ὁπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδοντοφυτῶν πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας γίγνεται, ὅταν ἂρτη φύσιν, κυνός τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ οὐλα, ταύτων δὴ πέποιθεν ἢ τοῦ πτεροφυείν ἄρχομένου ψυχῆ· ζεὶ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύσυσα τὰ πτερά. ὅταν μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς

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1 Schanz brackets ἢ... ἄρδεται,
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Now he who is not newly initiated, or has been corrupted, does not quickly rise from this world to that other world and to absolute beauty when he sees its namesake here, and so he does not revere it when he looks upon it, but gives himself up to pleasure and like a beast proceeds to lust and begetting; he makes licence his companion and is not afraid or ashamed to pursue pleasure in violation of nature. But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a god-like face or form which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first, and something of the old awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a god. And as he looks upon him, a reaction from his shuddering comes over him, with sweat and unwonted heat; for as the effluence of beauty enters him through the eyes, he is warmed; the effluence moistens the germ of the feathers, and as he grows warm, the parts from which the feathers grow, which were before hard and choked, and prevented the feathers from sprouting, become soft, and as the nourishment streams upon him, the quills of the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots over all the form of the soul; for it was once all feathered.

Now in this process the whole soul throbs and palpitates, and as in those who are cutting teeth there is an irritation and discomfort in the gums, when the teeth begin to grow, just so the soul suffers when the growth of the feathers begins; it is feverish and is uncomfortable and itches when they begin to grow. Then when it gazes upon the beauty of the boy and
κάλλος ἐκεῖθεν μέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ ἰέοντ', ἢ δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἰμερος καλεῖται, δεχομένη 1 ἀρδηται τε καὶ D θερμαίνωται, λωφῇ τε τῆς ὁδύνης καὶ γέγγεθεν, ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται καὶ αὐχμήσθη, τὰ τῶν διεξόδων στόματα, ἦ τὸ πτερον ὀρμᾶ, συναναίνο- μενα μύσαντα ἀποκλήσει τὴν βλάστην τοῦ πτεροῦ, ἦ δ' εὗτος μετὰ τοῦ ἰμέρου ἀποκεκλημένη, πηδῶσα οὖν τὰ σφύζοντα, τῇ διεξόδῳ ἐγχρίει ἐκάστη τῇ καθ' αὐτήν, ὡστε πάσα κεντούμενη κύκλω ἡ ψυχή οἰστρᾶ καὶ ὀδυνάται· μνήμην δ' αὖ ἔχουσα τοῦ καλοῦ γέγγεθεν. ἐκ δ' ἀμφοτέρων μεμνημένων E ἀδημονεῖ τε τῇ ἀτοπίᾳ τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἀποροῦσα λυτῇ, καὶ ἐμμαίνης οὖσα οὔτε νυκτὸς δύναται καθεύδειν οὔτε μεθ' ἴμεραν οὐ ἄν ἤ μένειν, θεὶ δὲ ποθοῦσα, ὅπου ἄν οἴηται ὄψεσθαι τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος. ἰδοῦσα δὲ καὶ ἐποχετευσαμένη ἰμερον ἔλυσε μὲν τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα, ἀναπνοὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα κέντρων τε καὶ ὀδύνων ἔληξεν, ἡδονήν δ' 252 αὖ ταῦτην γλυκυτάτην ἐν τῷ παρόντι καρποῦται. οἶθεν δὴ ἐκούσα εἶναι οὐκ ἀπολείπεται, οὐδὲ τινα τοῦ καλοῦ περὶ πλείωνος ποιεῖται, ἀλλὰ μητέρων τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἐταῖρων πάντων λέλησται, καὶ οὐσίας δὲ ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης παρ' οὗδεν τίθεται, νομίμων δὲ καὶ εὐσχημόνων, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ἐκαλλωπίζετο, πάντων καταφρονήσασα δουλεύειν ἐτοίμη καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ὅπου ἂν ἔ α τις ἐγχυντάτω τοῦ πόθου· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος B ἔχοντα ἵατρον ἡγῆκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων.

1 After δεχομένη the best MSS. read τῶν ἰμερον. Schanz follows Stallbaum in omitting it.

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receives the particles which flow thence to it (for which reason they are called yearning), it is moistened and warmed, ceases from its pain and is filled with joy; but when it is alone and grows dry, the mouths of the passages in which the feathers begin to grow become dry and close up, shutting in the sprouting feathers, and the sprouts within, shut in with the yearning, throb like pulsing arteries, and each sprout pricks the passage in which it is, so that the whole soul, stung in every part, rages with pain; and then again, remembering the beautiful one, it rejoices. So, because of these two mingled sensations, it is greatly troubled by its strange condition; it is perplexed and maddened, and in its madness it cannot sleep at night or stay in any one place by day, but it is filled with longing and hastens wherever it hopes to see the beautiful one. And when it sees him and is bathed with the waters of yearning, the passages that were sealed are opened, the soul has respite from the stings and is eased of its pain, and this pleasure which it enjoys is the sweetest of pleasures at the time. Therefore the soul will not, if it can help it, be left alone by the beautiful one, but esteems him above all others, forgets for him mother and brothers and all friends, neglects property and cares not for its loss, and despising all the customs and proprieties in which it formerly took pride, it is ready to be a slave and to sleep wherever it is allowed, as near as possible to the beloved; for it not only reveres him who possesses beauty, but finds in him the only healer of its greatest woes. Now this

1 The play on the words μερός and μερός cannot be rendered accurately in English. Jowett approaches a rendering by the use of the words motion and emotion, but emotion is too weak a word for μερός.
τούτο δὲ τὸ πάθος, ὃ παῖ καλέ, πρὸς ὄν δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος, ἀνθρωποὶ μὲν Ἑρωτα ὁνομάξουσιν, θεοὶ δὲ ὁ καλοῦσιν ἀκούσας εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάσει. λέγουσι δὲ, οἶμαι, τινὲς Ὁμηριδῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἑπῶν δύο ἐπὶ εἰς τὸν Ἑρωτα, ὅν τὸ ἔτερον ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἐμμετροῦν ὕμνουσι δὲ δὶς·

τὸν δ᾿ ἦτοι θυντοί μὲν Ἑρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν, ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτεροφύτορ ἀνάγκην. τούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστιν δὲ μὴ ὀμοί δὲ ἢ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώτων τούτο ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὃν.

33. Τῶν μὲν οὖν Διὸς ὅπαδῶν ὁ ληφθεὶς ἐμβριθέστερον δύναται φέρειν τὸ τοῦ πτερωνύμου ἀχθος. ὅσοι δὲ Ἄρεως τε θεραπευταλ καὶ μετ’ ἐκεῖνον περιεπόλουν, ὅταν ὑπ’ Ἑρωτα ἄλωσιν καὶ τι οὐθάδωσιν ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, φοινικὸ καὶ ἠτοίμα καθερεύειν αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τὰ πυδικά.

καὶ οὕτω καθ’ ἐκαστὸν θεόν, οὐ ἐκαστὸς ἢν χορευτῆς, ἐκεῖνοι τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δύνατον ἐπ᾿ ἐκεῖ, ἔσω ἀν ἢ ἀδιάφθορος, καὶ τὴν τῇδε πρῶτην ἑνεσίειν βιοτειχί, καὶ τούτω τῷ τρόπῳ πρός τε τοὺς ἐρωμένους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὁμιλεῖ τε καὶ προσφέρεται. τὸν τε οὖν ἑρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸς τρόπιν ἐκλέγεται ἐκαστὸς, καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὑπὸ τοὺς εαυτοὺς ὅλων ἀγαλμα τεκταίνεται τε καὶ κατακοσμεῖ, ὃς τιμήσοι τε καὶ ὁργιάσων. οἱ μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς δἰὸν τίνα εἶναι ἐστοίκος τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ὑφ’ αὐτῶν ἐρώμενον σκοπούσιν οὖν, εἰ φιλοσοφός τε καὶ ἱγμενικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὸν εὐρόντες ἔρασθόσι, πᾶν ποιοὺσιν ὅπως
condition, fair boy, about which I am speaking, is called Love by men, but when you hear what the gods call it, perhaps because of your youth you will laugh. But some of the Homeridae, I believe, repeat two verses on Love from the spurious poems of Homer, one of which is very outrageous and not perfectly metrical. They sing them as follows:

"Mortals call him winged Love, but the immortals call him The Winged One, because he must needs grow wings."

You may believe this, or not; but the condition of lovers and the cause of it are just as I have said.

Now he who is a follower of Zeus, when seized by Love can bear a heavier burden of the winged god; but those who are servants of Ares and followed in his train, when they have been seized by Love and think they have been wronged in any way by the beloved, become murderous and are ready to sacrifice themselves and the beloved. And so it is with the follower of each of the other gods; he lives, so far as he is able, honouring and imitating that god, so long as he is uncorrupted, and is living his first life on earth, and in that way he behaves and conducts himself toward his beloved and toward all others. Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful according to his character, and he fashions him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were his god, to honour and worship him. The followers of Zeus desire that the soul of him whom they love be like Zeus; so they seek for one of philosophical and lordly nature, and when they find him and love him, they do all they can to give him such a character.
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τοιούτοις ἔσται. ἡών οὖν μὴ πρότερον ἐμβεβῆσι τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι, τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες μανθάνουσι τε ὅθεν ἂν τι δύνανται καὶ αὐτοὶ μετέρχονται,

253 ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὑποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἔναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνθουσιώντες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνονται τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν ἑρώμενον αὐτιώμενον ἐτί τε μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσι, κἀν1 ἐκ Δίδω ἀρύτωσιν, ὅσπερ αἱ βάλκαι, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἑρωμένου ψυχῆς ἐπαντλούντες ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοίότατον τῷ σφέτερῳ θεῷ.

Β ὅσοι δ' αὖ μεθ' Ὡρας εἰποντο, βασιλικὸν ξητούσι, καὶ εἰρύνσετε περὶ τούτων πάντα δρῶσιν τὰ αὐτά. οἷς δὲ Ἀπόλλωνος τε καὶ ἐκάστου τὸν θεόν οὐτω κατὰ τὸν θεόν ἑντες ξητούσι τὸν σφέτερον παῖδα περικέναι, καὶ ὅταν κτήσωνται, μιμοῦμενοι αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πειθοῦντες καὶ ῥυθμίζοντες εἰς τὸ ἐκείνου ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἑδίᾳν ἄγουσιν, ὅση ἐκάστῳ δύναμις, οὐ φθόνῳ οὐδ' ἀνελευθέρω ψυχεῖ νείᾳ χρόμους πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ, άλλ' εἰς ὁμοίότητα

C αὐτοῖς τῷ θεῷ, ὅν ἂν τιμῶσι, πάσαν πάντως ὃ τι μάλιστα πειρόμενοι ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι. προθυμία μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἑρώτων καὶ τελετή, ἐὰν γε διαπράξωνται ὁ προθυμοῦνται ἢ λέγω, οὕτω καλὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δὲ ἔρωτα

1 Schanz, following Madvig, reads χάν.
PHAEDRUS

If they have not previously had experience, they learn then from all who can teach them anything; they seek after information themselves, and when they search eagerly within themselves to find the nature of their god, they are successful, because they have been compelled to keep their eyes fixed upon the god, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in God. Now they consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they love him more than before, and if they draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like the bacchantes, they pour it out upon the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god. And those who followed after Hera seek a kingly nature, and when they have found such an one, they act in a corresponding manner toward him in all respects; and likewise the followers of Apollo, and of each of the gods, go out and seek for their beloved a youth whose nature accords with that of the god, and when they have gained his affection, by imitating the god themselves and by persuasion and education they lead the beloved to the conduct and nature of the god, so far as each of them can do so; they exhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the loved one, but endeavour by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they honour. Thus the desire of the true lovers, and the initiation into the mysteries of love, which they teach, if they accomplish what they desire in the way I describe, is beautiful and brings happiness from the inspired lover to the loved one, if he be captured; and the
μανέντος φίλου τῷ φιληθέντι γύρνεται, εἰν αἱρεθή·
άλοικεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἱρεθεῖς ¹ τοῦτον τρόπω.

34. Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦτο τοῦ μῦθου τριχῇ
dieilόμην ψυχήν ἐκάστην, ἵππομόρφῳ μὲν ὁδὸν
tυνε ἐίδη, ἡμιοχικόν δὲ ἐξόντως τρόπων, καὶ νῦν ἔτι
ημῶν ταύτα μενέντω. τῶν δὲ δὴ ὑπαίτων ὁ μέν, φαμέν,
ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ οὖν ἀρετὴ δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ
κάκια, οὐ διείπομεν, νῦν δὲ λεκτέων. ὁ μὲν τοῖνυν
ἀυτοῖν ἐν τῇ καλλίωνι στάσει ὁν τό τε ἐιδὸς ὀρθὸς
cal diaphrómēnos, ψυχήν, ἐπίγρυπος, λευκὸς
ἰδεῖν, μελανόμματος, τεμῆς ἐραστῆς μετὰ σωφρο-
sύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς, καὶ ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἐτάρας,
ἀπληκτος, κελεύματι μόνω καὶ λόγῳ ἡμιοχεὶται:
Ε ὁ δ' αὕ τοι σκολοῖς, πολὺς, εἰκῇ συμπεριφρωμένος,
cratēpανχήν, βραχυτράχηλος, σιμοπρόσωπος,
μελάγχρος, γλαυκόμματος, ὕφαιμος, ὑβρεως καὶ
ἀλαξονείας ἐταῖρος, περὶ ὑμᾶς λάσιος, καψός,
μάστυν γε μέτα κέντρων μόνης ύπεικῶν. ὅταν δ' οὖν
ὁ ἡμίοχος ὑδάτι τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πάσαν αἰσθήσει
diathēmēνας τὴν ψυχήν, γαργαλαισμοῦ τε καὶ
πόθου κέντρων ὑποπληθσθῇ, ὁ μὲν εὐπελήθης τῷ
ἡμίοχῳ τῶν ὑπαίτων, ἀεὶ τε καὶ τότε αἰδοὶ βιαζό-
menoς, ἐαυτόν κατέχει μὴ ἐπιπηδάν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ:
ὁ δὲ οὕτε κέντρων ἡμιοχικῶν οὕτε μάστυν γε ἐν
ἐντρέπεται, σκιρτῶν δὲ βία φέρεται, καὶ πάντα
πράγματα παρέχων τῷ σύγκτι τε καὶ ἡμίοχῳ
ἀναγκάζει λέναι τε πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μνεῖν
ποιεῖσθαι τής τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος. τῶ δὲ
κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀντιτείνετον ἁγανακτοῦντε, ὃς
B δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἁναγκαζομένων τελευτῶντες
δὲ, ὅταν μηδέν γ' πέρας κακοῦ, πορεύεσθον

¹ Schanz brackets δ αἱρεθέλ, following Badham.
fair one who is captured is caught in the following manner:—

In the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three parts, two of which had the form of horses, the third that of a charioteer. Let us retain this division. Now of the horses we say one is good and the other bad; but we did not define what the goodness of the one and the badness of the other was. That we must now do. The horse that stands at the right hand is upright and has clean limbs; he carries his neck high, has an aquiline nose, is white in colour, and has dark eyes; he is a friend of honour joined with temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory; he needs no whip, but is guided only by the word of command and by reason. The other, however, is crooked, heavy, ill put together, his neck is short and thick, his nose flat, his colour dark, his eyes grey and bloodshot; he is the friend of insolence and pride, is shaggy-eared and deaf, hardly obedient to whip and spurs. Now when the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul is warmed by the sight, and is full of the tickling and prickings of yearning, the horse that is obedient to the charioteer, constrained then as always by modesty, controls himself and does not leap upon the beloved; but the other no longer heeds the pricks or the whip of the charioteer, but springs wildly forward, causing all possible trouble to his mate and to the charioteer, and forcing them to approach the beloved and propose the joys of love. And they at first pull back indignantly and will not be forced to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but finally, as the trouble has no
PLATO

άγομένω, εἴξαντε καὶ ὀμολογήσαντε ποιήσειν τὸ κελευόμενον. καὶ πρὸς αὐτῷ τ’ ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τὴν ὦσιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν ἀστράπτουσαν.

35. Ἰδόντος δὲ τοῦ ἡμίχου ἡ μυήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσει ἡνέχθη, καὶ πάλιν εἴδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἀγνῷ βάθρῳ βεβώσαν· ἰδοὺσα δὲ ἔδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθεῖσα ἀνέπεσεν ὑπτία, καὶ ἀμα ἴημακάσθη εἰς τούπισο ἑλκύσαι τὰς ἡμιάς οὖτω σφόδρα, ὡστε ἐπὶ τὰ ἱσχία ἄμφω καθίσαι τὸ ἱππο, τὸν μὲν ἐκόντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνειν, τὸν δὲ ὑβριστὴν μάλ’ ἄκοντα. ἀπελθόντε δὲ ἀπωτέρω, ὦ μὲν ὑπ’ αἰσχύνης τε καὶ σάμβους ἱδρώτε πᾶσαν ἐβρέξε τὴν ψυχήν, ὦ δὲ λῆξας τῆς ὀδύνης, ἢν ὑπὸ τοῦ χαλινοῦ τε ἐσχεν καὶ τοῦ πτώματος, μόνης ἐξαναπνεύσας ἐλοιδόρησεν ὀργῇ, πολλὰ κακιζών τὸν τὴν ἡμίχον καὶ τὸν ὁμόζυγα ὡς δείλια τε καὶ ἀναυδρία λυπόντε τὴν τάξιν καὶ ὀμολογίαν· καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἐθέλοντας προσείναι ἀναγκάζον μόνης συνεχόρησε δεομένων εἰσαύθις ὑπερβαλέσθαι. ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ συντεθέντος χρόνου, ἀμημονεῖν προσποιομένω ἀναμμυχήσκων, βιαζόμενοι, χρεμετίζων, ἐλκών ἴνα ἂκασεν αὖ προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἔτι τούς αὐτῶς λόγους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔγνυ τὴν κέρκον, ἐνδακὼν τὸν χαλινόν, μετ’ ἀναδείας ἐλκεῖ· ὡς δ’ ἡμίχοχος ἐτὶ μᾶλλον ταῦταν πάθος παθῶν, ὡστερ ἀπὸ ὑστηρήσης ἀναπεσον, ἐτὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ βοστοῦ ἱππου ἐκ τῶν ῥάδων βία ὀπίσω στάσας τὸν χαλινόν, τὴν τε κακήγορον ἐλκώταν καὶ τὰς γνάθους καθήμαξεν καὶ τὰ σκέλη τε καὶ τὰ ἱσχία πρὸς τὴν γῆν

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end, they go forward with him, yielding and agreeing to do his bidding. And they come to the beloved and behold his radiant face.

And as the charioteer looks upon him, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing with modesty upon a pedestal of chastity, and when he sees this he is afraid and falls backward in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins so violently backward as to bring both horses upon their haunches, the one quite willing, since he does not oppose him, but the unruly beast very unwilling. And as they go away, one horse in his shame and wonder wets all the soul with sweat, but the other, as soon as he is recovered from the pain of the bit and the fall, before he has fairly taken breath, breaks forth into angry reproaches, bitterly reviling his mate and the charioteer for their cowardice and lack of manhood in deserting their post and breaking their agreement; and again, in spite of their unwillingness, he urges them forward and hardly yields to their prayer that he postpone the matter to another time. Then when the time comes which they have agreed upon, they pretend that they have forgotten it, but he reminds them; struggling, and neighing, and pulling he forces them again with the same purpose to approach the beloved one, and when they are near him, he lowers his head, raises his tail, takes the bit in his teeth, and pulls shamelessly. The effect upon the charioteer is the same as before, but more pronounced; he falls back like a racer from the starting-ropes, pulls the bit backward even more violently than before from the teeth of the unruly horse, covers his scurrilous tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches


255 36. "Ατε οὖν πάσαν θεραπείαν ὡς ἵσθεος θεραπεύομενος οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ ἑρώτος, ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεποιθότος, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁν φύσει φίλος τῷ θεραπεύοντι, ἔαν ἄρα καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ἄμφοτηρῶν ἢ τινων ἀλλων διαβεβλημένος ἢ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἐρώτη τη πλησιάζειν, καὶ διὰ τούτου ἀπωθη τὸν ἑρώτα: προίτοντος δὲ ἤδη τοῦ χρόνου ἢ τε ἡλικία

Β καὶ τὸ χρεῶν ἤγαγεν εἰς τὸ προσέσθαι αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμολίαν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτε εἴμαρται κακὸν κακῷ φίλον οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν μὴ φίλον ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. προσεμένου δὲ καὶ λόγον καὶ ὁμολίαν δεξαμένου, ἐγγύθεν ἢ εὔνοια γυγνομένη τοῦ ἑρώτος ἐκπλήττει τὸν ἑρώμενον διαισθανόμενον, ὅτι οὐδ' οὶ ἄμφοτες ἀλλοι φίλοι τε καὶ οὐκεῖοι μοῦραν φίλίας οὐδεμίαν παρέχονται πρὸς τὸν ἐνθεον φίλον. ὅταν δὲ χρονίζῃ τοῦτο δρῶν καὶ πλησιαζή μετὰ τοῦ ἀπεσθαί ἐν τῃ γυγναισίᾳ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαις

C ὁμολίαις, τότ' ἤδη ἢ τοῦ ῥεύματος ἐκεῖνου πηγῆ, ὅν Ἰμερον Ζεὺς Γανυμήδους ἑρὼν ὠνόμασεν, πολλῇ φερομένῃ πρὸς τὸν ἑραστήν, ἢ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδω, ἢ δ' ἀπομεστομένου ἐξω ἀπορρέω· καὶ οἷον πνεύμα ἢ τε ἦχῳ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἀλλομένη

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to the ground, causing him much pain. Now when the bad horse has gone through the same experience many times and has ceased from his unruliness, he is humbled and follows henceforth the wisdom of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one, he is overwhelmed with fear; and so from that time on the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence and awe.

Now the beloved, since he receives all service from his lover, as if he were a god, and since the lover is not feigning, but is really in love, and since the beloved himself is by nature friendly to him who serves him, although he may at some earlier time have been prejudiced by his schoolfellows or others, who said that it was a disgrace to yield to a lover, and may for that reason have repulsed his lover, yet, as time goes on, his youth and destiny cause him to admit him to his society. For it is the law of fate that evil can never be a friend to evil and that good must always be friend to good. And when the lover is thus admitted, and the privilege of conversation and intimacy has been granted him, his good will, as it shows itself in close intimacy, astonishes the beloved, who discovers that the friendship of all his other friends and relatives is as nothing when compared with that of his inspired lover. And as this intimacy continues and the lover comes near and touches the beloved in the gymnasia and in their general intercourse, then the fountain of that stream which Zeus, when he was in love with Ganymede, called "desire" flows copiously upon the lover; and some of it flows into him, and some, when he is filled, overflows outside; and just as the wind or an echo rebounds from smooth, hard surfaces and
πάλιν ὁθεν ὀρμήθη φέρεται, οὔτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ἑρύμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων ἰὸν, ἢ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἴέναι ἀφικόμενον, καὶ

D ἀναπτερώσαν τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερών, ἀρδεῖ τε καὶ ὁρμήσει πτεροφυεῖν τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου αὐτοὶ ψυχὴν ἔρωτας ἐνέπλησεν. ἔρα μὲν οὖν, ὅτου δὲ, ἀπορεῖ· καὶ οὖν ὃ τι πέπονθεν οἶδεν οὐδὲ ἔχει φράσαι, ἀλλὰ οἶον ἀπ’ ἀλλού ὄφθαλμας ἀπολε- λυκῶς πρόφασιν εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἔχει, ὅσπερ δὲ ἐν κατὸπτρῷ ἐν τῷ ἔρωτι ἐαυτὸν ὅρων λέληθεν. καὶ

ὅταν μὲν ἐκεῖνος παρῆ, λήγει κατὰ ταύτα ἐκεῖνο 

τῆς ὁδύνης· ὅταν δὲ ἀπῆ, κατὰ ταύτα αὐτὸ ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖται, εἰδώλων ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων·

Ε καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οὔτει οὐκ ἔρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ ἐκεῖνο παραπλησίως μὲν, ἀσθενεστέρως δὲ, ὅραν, ἀπτεσθαί, φιλεῖν, συγκατα- 

κείσθαι· καὶ δὴ, οἶον εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο 

ταχῦ ταύτα. ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοίμησι τοῦ μὲν ἑραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵπτος ἔχει ὑπὲρ ἠλέγγη πρὸς 

τὸν ἦμιόχον, καὶ ἄξιοὶ ἀντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ

256 ἀπολαύσαι· ὃ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὐδὲν 

εἰπεῖν, σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἑπερβάλλει τοῦ ἑραστῆν καὶ φιλεῖ, ὡς σφόδρο εὐνούν ἀσπαζόμενος· 

ὅταν τε συγκατακένωται, οἶος ἐστὶ μὴ ἄπαρνη- 

θήναι τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος χαρίσασθαι τῷ ἔρωτι, εἰ 

δεηθείη τυχεῖν· ὃ δὲ ὀμόζυξ αὐτὸ πρὸς ταύτα μετ’ αἰδοῦς καὶ λόγου ἀντιτείνει.

37. Ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν καὶ 

φιλοσοφίαν νυκτήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοίας

Β ἀγαγόντα, μακάριον μὲν καὶ ὀμονοιτικὸν τὸν 

ἐνθάδε βλέουν διάγνουσιν, ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτῶν καὶ 

κόσμοι ὄντες, δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ὃ κακία ψυχῆς
returns whence it came, so the stream of beauty
passes back into the beautiful one through the eyes,
the natural inlet to the soul, where it reanimates the
passages of the feathers, waters them and makes the
feathers begin to grow, filling the soul of the loved
one with love. So he is in love, but he knows not with
whom; he does not understand his own condition and
cannot explain it; like one who has caught a disease
of the eyes from another, he can give no reason for
it; he sees himself in his lover as in a mirror, but is
not conscious of the fact. And in the lover's presence,
like him he ceases from his pain, and in his absence,
like him he is filled with yearning such as he inspires,
and love's image, requited love, dwells within him;
but he calls it, and believes it to be, not love, but
friendship. Like the lover, though less strongly, he
desires to see his friend, to touch him, kiss him, and
lie down by him; and naturally these things are
soon brought about. Now as they lie together, the
unruly horse of the lover has something to say to
the charioteer, and demands a little enjoyment in
return for his many troubles; and the unruly horse
of the beloved says nothing, but teeming with passion
and confused emotions he embraces and kisses his
lover, caressing him as his best friend; and when
they lie together, he would not refuse his lover any
favour, if he asked it; but the other horse and
the charioteer oppose all this with modesty and
reason.

If now the better elements of the mind, which
lead to a well ordered life and to philosophy, prevail,
they live a life of happiness and harmony here on
earth, self controlled and orderly, holding in sub-
jecttion that which causes evil in the soul and giving
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Ενεγίγνετο, ἔλευθερόσαυτες δὲ ὁ ἀρετής· τελευτή-
σαυτες δὲ δὴ ὑπόπτεροι καὶ ἐλαφροὶ γεγονότες
tῶν τρίων παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς Ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμ-
πιακῶν ἦν νευκτήκασιν, οὐ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὔτε
σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὔτε θεία μανία δυνατή
πορίσαι ἀνθρώπω. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτης ἱστικωτέρα
tε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῳ, φιλοτίμῳ δὲ ἁρπᾶσθαι, ταύχ'

C ἄν πον ἐν μέθαις ἡ τινι ἀλλη ἀμελεία τῷ ἀκο-
λάστῳ αὐτοῖν ὑποζυγίῳ λαβώντε τᾶς ψυχὰς
ἀφρόύρους, ἐνυγαγόντε εἰς ταύτων, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν
πολλῶν μακαριστὴν ἀφίσειν εἰλέσθην τε καὶ
dιεπράξαντο· καὶ διαπραξαμένω τὸ λοιπὸν ἥδη
χρῶνται μὲν αὐτή, σπανία δὲ, ἀτε οὐ πάση
dεδογμένα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράττοντες. φίλω μὲν
οὖν καὶ τούτῳ, ἢττον δὲ ἐκεῖνων, ἀλλῆλοιν διὰ τε

D τοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ ἔξω γενομένω διάγονσι, πίστεις
τὰς μεγίστας ἡγομένω ἀλλῆλοιν δεδωκέναι τε
καὶ δεδέχθαι, δι οὐ θεμιτὸν εἶναι λύπαντας εἰς
ἐχθραν ποτὲ ἐλθεῖν. εὖ δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ ἀπτεροὶ
μὲν, ὀρμηκότες δὲ πτεροῦσθαι ἐκβαλώσθη τοῦ
σώματος, ὡςτε οὐ σμικρὸν ἄθλον τῆς ἐρωτικῆς
μανίας φέρονται· εἰς γὰρ σκότον καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ γῆς
πορείαν οὐ νόμος ἐστὶν ἐτι ἐλθεῖν τοῖς κατηργ
μένοις ἥδη τῆς ἐπουρανίου πορείας, ἀλλὰ φανοῦν
βίον διάγοντας εὐδαιμονεῖν μετ' ἀλλῆλων πορευο-
μένους, καὶ ὁμοπτέρους ἔρωτος χάριν, δὴν γέ
νωνται, γενέσθαι.

Ε 38. Ταύτα τοσαῦτα, ὁ παῖ, καὶ θεία οὕτω
σοι διαφήστειν ἡ παρ' ἔραστον φιλία· ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ
τοῦ μη ἔρωτος οἰκείατις, σωφροσύνῃ θυητῇ
κεκραμένη, θυητά τε καὶ φειδωλὴ οἰκονομοὺσα,
ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἑπανουμένην ὡς

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freedom to that which makes for virtue; and when this
life is ended they are light and winged, for they have
conquered in one of the three truly Olympic contests.
Neither human wisdom nor divine inspiration can
confer upon man any greater blessing than this. If
however they live a life less noble and without
philosophy, but yet ruled by the love of honour,
probably, when they have been drinking, or in some
other moment of carelessness, the two unruly horses,
taking the souls off their guard, will bring them
together and seize upon and accomplish that which
is by the many accounted blissful; and when this
has once been done, they continue the practice, but
infrequently, since what they are doing is not
approved by the whole mind. So these two pass
through life as friends, though not such friends as
the others, both at the time of their love and
afterwards, believing that they have exchanged the
most binding pledges of love, and that they can
never break them and fall into enmity. And at last,
when they depart from the body, they are not winged,
to be sure, but their wings have begun to grow, so
that the madness of love brings them no small
reward; for it is the law that those who have once
begun their upward progress shall never again pass
into darkness and the journey under the earth, but
shall live a happy life in the light as they journey
together, and because of their love shall be alike in
their plumage when they receive their wings.

These blessings, so great and so divine, the friend-
ship of a lover will confer upon you, dear boy; but
the affection of the non-lover, which is alloyed with
mortal prudence and follows mortal and parsimonious
rules of conduct, will beget in the beloved soul the
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἀρετὴν τῇ φίλῃ ψυχῇ ἐντεκούσα, ἐννέα χιλιάδας 257 ἐτῶν περὶ γῆν κυλινδουμένην αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἄνων παρέξει. αὐτῇ σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἑρως, εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὦ τι καλλιστή καὶ ἀρίστη δέδοται τε καὶ ἐκτέτισται παλινφόδια, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἡμαγκασμένη ποιητικοὶς τισιν διὰ Φαίδρου εἰρήσθαι. ἄλλα τῶν προτέρων τε συγγενῶμην καὶ τῶνδε χάριν ἔχων, εἰμενῆς καὶ ἔλεως τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μοι τέχνην, ἢν ἐδώκας, μήτε ἀφέλῃ μήτε πηρόσης δυὸ ὁργῆν, δίδου ὦ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς τίμιοιν

Β εἶναι. τῷ πρόσθεν δὲ εἰ τι λόγῳ σοι ἀπηνὲς εὐπομεν Φαίδρος τε καὶ ἐγὼ, Δυσίαν τὸν τοῦ λόγου πατέρα αὐτίμωμενος παῦε τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν δὲ, ὥσπερ ὦ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Πολέμαρχος τέτραπται, τρέψων, ἵνα καὶ ὁ ἔραστὴς ὦ δε αὐτοῦ μηκέτι ἐπαμφοτερίζῃ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς πρὸς Ἑρώτα μετὰ φιλοσοφῶν λόγων τὸν βίον ποιήσαι.

39. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Συνεύχομαι σοι, ὦ Σωκράτες,

C ἐπερ ἀμείνων ταῦθ' ἡμῖν εἶναι, τῶν γέγενεσθαι. τὸν λόγον δὲ σου πάλαι θαυμάσας ἔχω, ὡσπερ καλλίω τοῦ προτέρου ἀπειργάσω. ὡστε ὅκινω μῇ μοι ὁ Δυσίας ταπεινὸς φανῆ, ἐὰν ἁρα καὶ ἐθελήσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἄλλον ἀντιπαρατέιναι. καὶ γὰρ τις τοῦ αὐτὸν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ἐναγχος τῶν πολιτικῶν τούτων ἀυτὸς λοιδόρων ὀνείδιζε, καὶ διὰ πᾶσης τῆς λοι- δορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφοι τάχ' ὀνυ ἕως ὑπὸ φιλοτεμίας ἐπίνοχος ἡμῖν ἀν τοῦ γράφειν.

D ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Γελοιόν γ', ὦ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα λέγεις, καὶ τοῦ ἑταίρου συχνὸν διαμαρτάνεις, εἰ αὐτὸν οὕτως ἥγει τινὰ ψοφοδεά. ὢσως δὲ καὶ

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narrowness which the common folk praise as virtue; it will cause the soul to be a wanderer upon the earth for nine thousand years and a fool below the earth at last. There, dear Love, thou hast my recantation, which I have offered and paid as beautifully and as well as I could, especially in the poetical expressions which I was forced to employ on account of Phaedrus. Pardon, I pray, my former words and accept these words with favour; be kind and gracious to me; do not in anger take from me the art of love which thou didst give me, and deprive me not of sight, but grant unto me to be even more than now esteemed by the beautiful. And if in our former discourse Phaedrus and I said anything harsh against thee, blame Lysias, the father of that discourse, make him to cease from such speeches, and turn him, as his brother Polemarchus is turned, toward philosophy, that his lover Phaedrus may no longer hesitate, as he does now, between two ways, but may direct his life with all singleness of purpose toward love and philosophical discourses.

PHAEDRUS. I join in your prayer, Socrates, and pray that this may come to pass, if this is best for us. But all along I have been wondering at your discourse, you made it so much more beautiful than the first; so that I am afraid Lysias will make a poor showing, if he consents to compete with it. Indeed, lately one of the politicians was abusing him for this very thing, and through all his abusive speech kept calling him a speech-writer; so perhaps out of pride he may refrain from writing.

Socrates. That is an absurd idea, young man, and you are greatly mistaken in your friend if you think he is so much afraid of noise. Perhaps, too, you think
τὸν λοιπόν μεν ἀυτῷ ὁ οὖς νομίζοντα λέγειν ἂν ἔλεγεν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐφαίνετο γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες· καὶ σύνοισθα ποὺ καὶ ἀυτὸς ὅτι οἱ μέγιστοι δυνά-μενοι τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνονται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλεύπειν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβούμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Γλυκὺς ἀγκῶν, ὁ Φαίδρε, λέληθέν

Ε σε 1 καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀγκῶν λανθάνει σε, ὅτι οἱ μέγιστοι φρονοῦντες τῶν πολιτικῶν μᾶλιτα ἔρωτι λογογραφίας τε καὶ καταλεύσεως συγγραμ-μάτων, οὐ γε καὶ ἔπειδὰν τινὰ γράφωσι λόγον, οὕτως ἄγαπός τοις ἑπαύεται, ὡστε προσπαράμειται πρὸτος, οὐ δὲν ἕκασταχοῦ ἑπαύνωσιν αὐτοὺς.

258 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς λέγεις τούτο; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ 2 ἀνδρὸς πολιτικοῦ συγγράμματι πρῶτος ὁ ἑπαύετης γέγραπται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Εδοξέον ποὺ φησι τῇ Βουλῇ ἢ τῷ δήμῳ ἢ ἄμφοτέρους, καὶ δὲ εἶπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων μᾶλα σεμνῶς καὶ ἐγκωμιάζον ὁ συγγραφέος, ἐπείτα λέγει δὴ 3 μετὰ τούτο, ἐπὶ δεικνύμενοι τοῖς ἑπαύεταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν, ἐνίοτε πάνυ μακρὸν

1 After λέληθέν see the MSS. read ὅτι ἂπὸ τοῦ μακροῦ ἀγκῶν τοῦ κατὰ Νείλον ἐκλήθη. Schanz and Burnet bracket these words, following Heindorf.
2 Schanz, following Madvig, brackets ἀρχῇ. Burnet brackets συγγράμματι below.
3 Schanz, following Krische, inserts τὸ after δὴ.
the man who abused him believed what he was saying.

PHAEDRUS. He seemed to believe, Socrates; and you know yourself that the most influential and important men in our cities are ashamed to write speeches and leave writings behind them, through fear of being called sophists by posterity.

SOCRATES. You seem to be unacquainted with the "sweet elbow,"¹ Phaedrus, and besides the elbow, you seem not to know that the proudest of the statesmen are most fond of writing and of leaving writings behind them, since they care so much for praise that when they write a speech they add at the beginning the names of those who praise them in each instance.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean? I don't understand.

SOCRATES. You don't understand that the name of the approver is written first in the writings of statesmen.

PHAEDRUS. How so?

SOCRATES. The writer says, "It was voted by the senate (or the people, or both), and so-and-so moved," mentioning his own name with great dignity and praise, then after that he goes on, displaying his own wisdom to his approvers, and sometimes making a very long document. Does it seem to you that a

¹ This is a proverbial expression, similar in meaning to our "sour grapes." The explanation given in the MSS., that the sweet elbow gets its name from the long bend, or elbow, in the Nile may be an addition by some commentator; at any rate, it hardly fits our passage.
PLATO

B ποιησάμενος σύγγραμμα· ἢ σοι ἄλλο τι φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ λόγος συγγεγραμμένος;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκ ἔμουγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔκοιν ἐὰν μὲν οὕτος ἐμμένη, γεγηθῶς ἀπερχεῖται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητής· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξαλιφή καὶ ἄμοιρος γένηται λογογραφίας τε καὶ τοῦ ἀξίου εἶναι συγγράφειν, πευθεὶ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ ἐταίροι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δήλον γε ὅτι ὦν ὡς ὑπερφρονοῦντες τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ἀλλ' ὡς τεθαυμακότες.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάντως μὲν οὖν.

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ὅταν ἰκανὸς γένηται ῥήτωρ ἢ βασιλεὺς ὡστε λαβὼν τὴν Δυκοῦργον ἢ Σόλωνος ἢ Δαρείον δύναμιν ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι λογογράφος ἐν πόλει, ἀρ' οὐκ ἰσόθεον ἥγειται αὐτὸς τε αὐτὸν ἐτι ξῶν, καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα γεγυμένοι ταῦτα τάυτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζουσι, θεώμενοι αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἴει τινὰ οὖν τῶν τοιοῦτων, ὡστις καὶ ὑπωστοιούν δύσνους Δυσία, ὅνειδεῖς αὐτὸ τούτο ὅτι συγγράφει;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὧν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὡς ἐοικεῖν, ὅνειδίζου.

D 40. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γαρ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἐκείνο οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἢδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δὴλον δή.

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thing of that sort is anything else than a written speech?

**PHAEDRUS.** No, certainly not.

**SOCRATES.** Then if this speech is approved, the writer leaves the theatre in great delight; but if it is not recorded and he is not granted the privilege of speech-writing and is not considered worthy to be an author, he is grieved, and his friends with him.

**PHAEDRUS.** Decidedly.

**SOCRATES.** Evidently not because they despise the profession, but because they admire it.

**PHAEDRUS.** To be sure.

**SOCRATES.** Well then, when an orator or a king is able to rival the greatness of Lycurgus or Solon or Darius and attain immortality as a writer in the state, does he not while living think himself equal to the gods, and has not posterity the same opinion of him, when they see his writings?

**PHAEDRUS.** Very true.

**SOCRATES.** Do you think, then, that any of the statesmen, no matter how ill-disposed toward Lysias, reproaches him for being a writer?

**PHAEDRUS.** It is not likely, according to what you say; for he would be casting reproach upon that which he himself desires to be.

**SOCRATES.** Then that is clear to all, that writing speeches is not in itself a disgrace.

**PHAEDRUS.** How can it be?

**SOCRATES.** But the disgrace, I fancy, consists in speaking or writing not well, but disgracefully and badly.

**PHAEDRUS.** Evidently.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; δεόμεθά τι, ὁ Φαίδρε, Λυσίαν τε περὶ τούτων ἐξετάσαι καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις πώποτε τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράψει, εἰτὲ πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἰτὲ ἰδιωτικὸν, ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητῆς, ἢ ἀνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης;

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐρωτᾶς εἰ δεόμεθα; τίνος μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα καὶ τις ὡς εἰπεῖν ζῷη, ἀλλὰ ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἠδονῶν ἔνεκα; οὐ γάρ ποι ἐκείνων γε ὅλον προλυπηθήναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθήναι, ὃ δὴ ὀλίγου πᾶσαι αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἠδονάι ἔχουσι· διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἀνδραποδώδεις κέκληνται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε· καὶ ἄμα μοι δοκοῦσιν ὡς ἐν τῷ πυγεύσει ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἡμῶν οἱ τέττυγες ἠδονες καὶ ἀλλήλως διαλεγόμενοι καθόραν. εἰ οὖν άδικεν καὶ νῦ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσθμῇρίᾳ μὴ διαλεγόμενοι, ἄλλα νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ὡφ' αὐτῶν δὲ ἀργίαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαίως ἂν καταγελάθησαν, ἥγομενοι ἀνδράποδα ἀττα σφίσιν ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον ὃσπερ προβάτα μεσθμηρίζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήνην εὔδειν· εὰν δὲ ὅρθω διαλεγόμενοι καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὃσπερ Σειρήνας ἄκυκλη·

Β ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐχουσι δὲ δὴ τί τούτο; ἀνήκουσ γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τυγχάνω ὁμ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα τῶν τοιούτων ἀνήκουν εἶναι· λέγεται δ' ὡς ποτ' ἂτταν οὖτοι ἀνθρώποι τῶν πρὶν Μοῦσας γεγονέναι, γενομένου δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανείης ἤδη οὖτοι ἀρα τινὲς τῶν τότε ἔξεπλάγησαν ὡφ'
PHAEDRUS

Socrates. What, then, is the method of writing well or badly? Do we want to question Lysias about this, and anyone else who ever has written or will write anything, whether a public or private document, in verse or in prose, be he poet or ordinary man?

Phaedrus. You ask if we want to question them? What else should one live for, so to speak, but for such pleasures? Certainly not for those which cannot be enjoyed without previous pain, which is the case with nearly all bodily pleasures and causes them to be justly called slavish.

Socrates. We have plenty of time, apparently; and besides, the locusts seem to be looking down upon us as they sing and talk with each other in the heat. Now if they should see us not conversing at mid-day, but, like most people, dozing, lulled to sleep by their song because of our mental indolence, they would quite justly laugh at us, thinking that some slaves had come to their resort and were slumbering about the fountain at noon like sheep. But if they see us conversing and sailing past them unmoved by the charm of their Siren voices, perhaps they will be pleased and give us the gift which the gods bestowed on them to give to men.

Phaedrus. What is this gift? I don't seem to have heard of it.

Socrates. It is quite improper for a lover of the Muses never to have heard of such things. The story goes that these locusts were once men, before the birth of the Muses, and when the Muses were born and song appeared, some of the men were so
C ἡδονῆς, ὡστε ἄδοντες ἠμέλησαν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἐλαθοῦν τελευτήσαντες αὐτούς· ἐξ ὧν τὸ τεττύγων γένος μετ’ ἐκείνο φύεται, γέρας τούτο παρὰ Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἀσιτόν τε καὶ ἀποτον εὐθὺς ἄδειν, ἐως ἐν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθὼν παρὰ Μούσας ἀπαγγέλλειν, τίς τίνα αὐτῶν τιμὰ τῶν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόρα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς τετιμήκοτας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλουντες ποιοῦσι προσ-

D φίλεστέρους, τῇ δὲ Ἐρατοῦ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἑρωτικοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαίς οὕτω, κατὰ τὸ εἴδος ἐκάστης τιμῆς· τῇ δὲ πρεσβυτάτη Καλλιότῃ καὶ τῇ μετ’ αὐτὴν Οὐρανία τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντας τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἑκείων μουσικῆν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἰ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανῶν καὶ λόγους οὕσαι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἱάσι καλλιστὴν φωνῆν. πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἑνεκα λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δεκτέον γὰρ οὖν.

Ε 42. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ νῦν προούθεμεθα σκέψασθαι, τὸν λόγον ὅπη καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπη μή, σκεπτέον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δήλον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοῖς εὖ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθεσομένοις τῇ τοῦ λέγοντος διά-

γοιαν εἰδυλλίαν τ’ ἀληθές ὅν ἀν ἔρειν πέρι μέλλη; ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐτωσὶ περὶ τούτου ἄκηκοα, ὡς φίλε

260 Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἰσαι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ρήτορι ἔσεσθαι τά τῷ ὑπνο δίκαια μανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντ’ ἀν πλῆθει, οὗπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὑπνως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλά, ἀλλ’ ὅσα δόξει· ἐκ γὰρ

1 Schanz, following Badham, puts ἑνόμενον after εὐθὺς.
overcome with delight that they sang and sang, forgetting food and drink, until at last unconsciously they died. From them the locust tribe afterwards arose, and they have this gift from the Muses, that from the time of their birth they need no sustenance, but sing continually, without food or drink, until they die, when they go to the Muses and report who honours each of them on earth. They tell Terpsichore of those who have honoured her in dances, and make them dearer to her; they gain the favour of Erato for the poets of love, and that of the other Muses for their votaries, according to their various ways of honouring them; and to Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, and to Urania who is next to her, they make report of those who pass their lives in philosophy and who worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven and with thought divine and human and whose music is the sweetest. So for many reasons we ought to talk and not sleep in the noontime.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, we ought to talk.

Socrates. We should, then, as we were proposing just now, discuss the theory of good (or bad) speaking and writing.

PHAEDRUS. Clearly.

Socrates. If a speech is to be good, must not the mind of the speaker know the truth about the matters of which he is to speak?

PHAEDRUS. On that point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so;
PLATO

tουτών εἶναι τὸ πείθων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἄληθείας.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὗτοι ἀπόβλητον ἔτος εἶναι δεῖ, ὃ Φαίδρε, ὃ ἂν εἰπτωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μὴ τῇ λέγωσιν ἕναν καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἡρθὼς λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡδὲ δὴ σκοπῶμεν αὐτό.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς;

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἴ σε πείθομι ἐγὼ πολεμίους ἀμίνειν κτησάμενον ἵππου, ἀμιφω δὲ ἵππου ἁγνοούμεν, τοσύνδε μέντοι τυγχάνοιμι εἰδὼς περὶ σοῦ, ὃτι Φαίδρος ἵππον ἢγείται τὸ τῶν ἥμερων ζωῆν μέγιστα ἔχον ὦτα—

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γελοίον γ' ἂν, ὁ Σώκρατεσ, εἶη.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὗτο γε' ἄλλ' ὅτε σπουδὴ σε πείθομι, συντίθεσι λόγου ἐπαίνον κατὰ τοῦ ὄνου, ἵππον ἐπονομάξων καὶ λέγων ὡς παντὸς ἄξιον τὸ θρέμμα οἰκον τε κεκτήσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ στρατείας, ἀποπολεμεῖν τε χρήσιμον καὶ προσενεγκεῖν δυνατον σκεύη καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὀφέλων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγγέλοιον γ' ἂν ἦδη εἶη.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὃς κρείττον γελοῖον ἢ δεινὸν τε καὶ ἔχθρον εἶναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅταν οὖν ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἄγνωσὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, λαβὼν πόλιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν πείθη, μὴ περὶ ὀνον σκιᾶς ὡς ἵππου τὸν ἐπαινον ποιουμένος, ἀλλὰ περὶ κακοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ, δόξας δὲ

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1 Schanz, following Schaefer, reads λέγοντι.
2 εἶη ή φίλον BT. Schanz follows Bekker in omitting ή φίλον.
3 Schanz follows Spalding in omitting σκιᾶς.

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for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.

socrates. "The word," Phaedrus, which the wise "speak must not be rejected," but we must see if they are right; so we must not pass by this which you just said.

phaedrus. You are right.

socrates. Let us then examine it in this way.

phaedrus. How?

socrates. If I should urge you to buy a horse and fight against the invaders, and neither of us knew what a horse was, but I merely knew this about you, that Phaedrus thinks a horse is the one of the tame animals which has the longest ears—

phaedrus. It would be ridiculous, Socrates.

socrates. No, not yet; but if I tried to persuade you in all seriousness, composing a speech in praise of the ass, which I called a horse, and saying that the beast was a most valuable possession at home and in war, that you could use him as a mount in battle, and that he was able to carry baggage and was useful for many other purposes—

phaedrus. Then it would be supremely ridiculous.

socrates. But is it not better to be ridiculous than to be clever and an enemy?

phaedrus. To be sure.

socrates. Then when the orator who does not know what good and evil are undertakes to persuade a state which is equally ignorant, not by praising the "shadow of an ass" under the name of a horse, but by praising evil under the name of good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them

1 Homer, Iliad ii. 361. 2 A proverbial expression.
πλήθουσ μεμελετηκώς πείση κακά πράττειν ἀντ’ ἀγαθών, πολύν τινα οὔτε μετὰ ταύτα τὴν ῥητορικήν
καρπὸν δὲν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ πάνι γε ἐπιεική.

43. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ’ οὖν, ὃ ἡγαθὲ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λεολοδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; ἢ δ’ ἦσως ἀν εἰποῦ τι ποτ’, ὁ θαυμάσιοι, ληρεῖτε; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὔδέν ἀγνοοῦντα τάληθες ἀναγκάζω μακαράνειν λέγειν, ἀλλ’, εἰ τίς ἐμὴ ξυμβουλῇ,1 κτησάμενος ἐκείνῳ οὕτως ἐμὲ λαμβάνειν·
tόδε δ’ οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὅσ’ ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τά ὄντα εἰδότι οὔδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνην.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαια ἔρει, λέγονσα ταύτα;

Ε  ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φημὶ, ἐὰν οἱ γε ἐπιόντες αὐτὴ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνη. ὡστερ γὰρ ἄκουεν δοκῶ τινῶν προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων, ὥστε κεῖνοι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ’ ἀτέχνους τριβῆ τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Δάκων, ἐτυμος τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἢθαι οὕτ’ ἐστὶν οὔτε μὴ ποτε ὅστερον γένηται.2

261 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τούτων δεῖ τῶν λόγων, ὅ Σωκράτες ἀλλὰ δεύτεροι αὐτοὺς παράγον ἐξέταζε, τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάρτε δή, θρέμματα γενναία, καλλι-παίδα τε Φαίδρον πείθετε, ὥσ ἐὰν μὴ ἰκανός φιλοσοφίη, οὔτε ἰκανός ποτε λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὔδενός. ἀποκρινέσθω δὴ ὁ Φαίδρος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐρωτάτε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὄλον ἡ ῥητορική

1 εἰ τίς ἐμὴ ξυμβουλῇ χρῆται Schanz, following Stephanus. εἰ τι ἐμή ξυμβουλῇ B. εἰ τίς ἐμὴ ξυμβουλῇ T.

2 Schanz brackets τοῦ . . . γένηται.

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to do evil instead of good, what harvest do you suppose his oratory will reap thereafter from the seed he has sown?

PHAEDRUS. No very good harvest.

SOCRATES. Well, do you think we have reproached the art of speaking too harshly? Perhaps she might say: "Why do you talk such nonsense, you strange men? I do not compel anyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice is of any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. So what I claim is this, that without my help the knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion."

PHAEDRUS. And will she be right in saying this?

SOCRATES. Yes, if the arguments that are coming against her testify that she is an art. For I seem, as it were, to hear some arguments approaching and protesting that she is lying and is not an art, but a craft devoid of art. A real art of speaking, says the Laconian, which does not seize hold of truth, does not exist and never will.

PHAEDRUS. We have need of these arguments, Socrates. Bring them here and examine their words and their meaning.

SOCRATES. Come here, then, noble creatures, and persuade the fair young Phaedrus that unless he pay proper attention to philosophy he will never be able to speak properly about anything. And let Phaedrus answer.

PHAEDRUS. Ask your questions.

SOCRATES. Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an
PLATO

ἀν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τὸ γε ὁρθὸν περὶ ποιοῦσα ἢ περὶ φαύλα γυγύμενον; ἢ πῶς σὺ ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ μᾶλιστα μὲν πῶς περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίας: ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ σὺν ἀκήκοας.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ ἄλλ' ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὄδυσσεός τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐν Ἰλίῳ

ΣΧΟΛΑΖΟΝΤΕΣ συνεγραφάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ναὶ μᾶ Δία ἔγγει τῶν Νέστορος, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ τινα Θρασύμαχον τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὅδυσσέα.

44. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ ἰσός. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτους ἐδώμεν' σὺ δ' ἐστέ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρόσιν; οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν μέντοι, ἢ τί φήσομεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἀδίκου;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνη τούτῳ δρόν ποιήσει D φανήμα τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτε μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν δὲ βούληται, ἀδίκου;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἐν δημηγορίᾳ δὴ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ τοτε μὲν ἀγαθά, τοτε δ' αὖ τὰναντία; ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸν οὖν Ἔλεατικόν Παλαμήδην
art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well? And is it not the same when concerned with small things as with great, and, properly speaking, no more to be esteemed in important than in trifling matters? Is this what you have heard?

PHAEDRUS. No, by Zeus, not that exactly; but the art of speaking and writing is exercised chiefly in lawsuits, and that of speaking also in public assemblies; and I never heard of any further uses.

SOCRATES. Then you have heard only of the treatises on rhetoric by Nestor and Odysseus, which they wrote when they had nothing to do at Troy, and you have not heard of that by Palamedes?

PHAEDRUS. Nor of Nestor's either, unless you are disguising Gorgias under the name of Nestor and Thrasymachus or Theodorus under that of Odysseus.

SOCRATES. Perhaps I am. However, never mind them; but tell me, what do the parties in a lawsuit do in court? Do they not contend in speech, or what shall we say they do?

PHAEDRUS. Exactly that.

SOCRATES. About the just and the unjust?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then he whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes, unjust?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And in political speaking he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite?

PHAEDRUS. Just so.

SOCRATES. Do we not know that the Eleatic
Λέγοντα οὖκ ἵσμεν τέχνη, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούοντι τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμοία καὶ ἀνώμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὐ̄ καὶ φερόμενα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστηρία τέ ἔστιν ἢ ἀντιλογική καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλ', ὧς ἔοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἰπερ ἔστιν, αὕτη ἢν εἶη, ὡς οἶος τ' ἔσται πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιόν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατόν, καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοιόντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς ἄγειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τῆδε δοκῶ ξητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι. ἀπάτη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἢ ὅλγον;

262 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐν τοῖς ὅλγοιοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρῶν μεταβαίνον μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δ' οὖ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεὶ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς διειδέναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ οὖν οἶος τε ἔσται, ἀληθείαν ἄγνωσν ἑκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὁμοιότητα σμικράν Ὁ τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγνωσκεῖν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσιν

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Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then the art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES. I think it will be plain if we examine the matter in this way. Is deception easier when there is much difference between things or when there is little?

PHAEDRUS. When there is little.

SOCRATES. And if you make a transition by small steps from anything to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection than if you proceed by leaps and bounds.

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then he who is to deceive another, and is not to be deceived himself, must know accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, he must.

SOCRATES. Now will he be able, not knowing the truth about a given thing, to recognise in other things the great or small degree of likeness to that which he does not know?

PHAEDRUS. It is impossible.

SOCRATES. In the case, then, of those whose opinions are at variance with facts and who are
καὶ ἀπατωμένοις δῆλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τούτο δὲ ὀμοιωτήτων τινῶν εἰσερρύθη.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστίν οὖν ὅπως τεχνικὸς ἔσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὀμοιωτήτων ἀπὸ τοῦ οὕτος ἐκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τοῦτο διαφεύγειν, ὃ μὴ ἐγνώρικὼς ὃ ἔστιν ἐκαστὸν τῶν οὕτων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ μὴ ποτε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δόγμα ἀρα τέχνην, ὃ ἔταιρε, ὃ τὴν ἀληθείαν μὴ εἰδὼς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκός, γελοίαν τινά, ὃς ζουκε, καὶ ἀτεχνὸν παρέξεται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κυιδυνυεῖε.

45. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βούλει οὖν ἐν τῷ Δυσίον λόγῳ, ὅν φέρεις, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν ἰδεῖν τι ὃν φαμέν ἀτέχνων τε καὶ ἐντέχνων εἶναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάντων γε που μάλιστα, ὡς νῦν γε ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχοντες ἰκανὰ παραδεύματα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γε τινα, ὡς ἐοικε, ἔρροθήτην τῷ λόγῳ ἔχοντε τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἄν ὁ εἰδώς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγων τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἔγογγε, ὃ Φαίδρε, αἰτιώματι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς· ἵσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφήται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς φόδοι ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἄν ἢμῖν εἰεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας· οὗ γάρ που ἔγογγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐστώ ὃς λέγεις· μόνον δῆλωσον ὃ φῆς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡθι δὴ μοι ἀνάγνωσθι τὴν τοῦ Δυσίου λόγου ἄρχῃν.

Ε. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ-
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deceived, this error evidently slips in through some resemblances.

PHAEDRUS. It does happen in that way.

SOCRATES. Then he who does not understand the real nature of things will not possess the art of making his hearers pass from one thing to its opposite by leading them through the intervening resemblances, or of avoiding such deception himself?

PHAEDRUS. Never in the world.

SOCRATES. Then, my friend, he who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all.

PHAEDRUS. Probably.

SOCRATES. Shall we look in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in what I said, for something which we think shows art and the lack of art?

PHAEDRUS. By all means, for now our talk is too abstract, since we lack sufficient examples.

SOCRATES. And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps, too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.

PHAEDRUS. So be it; only make your meaning clear.

SOCRATES. Read me the beginning of Lysias' discourse.

PHAEDRUS. You know what my condition is, and
Στασάι, καὶ ὥς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τούτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξίω δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχήσαι ὃν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔραστής ὁν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει—

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παῦσαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὕτως ἀμαρτάνει καὶ ἀτέχνον ποιεῖ, λεκτέον. ἢ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

46. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τὸ γε τοιόνδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἕνα τῶν τοιούτων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δ' ἕνα στασιωτικῶς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δοκῶ μὲν δ' λέγεις μαυθάνειν, ἔτι δ' εἰπὲ σαφέστερον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡταν τις οὖσα εὕπη σιδήρου ἢ ἀργύρου, ἀρ' οὖ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενοήθημεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' ὅταν δικαίου ἢ ἄγαθος; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλη φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ημῖν αὐτοῖς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν.

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. �uations αὐτοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οἷς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔτω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ποτέρως οὖν εὐαπταπτότεροι ἔσμεν, καὶ ἡ ρητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μεῖξον δύναται;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δὴλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὂνκοι τῶν μέλλοντα τέχνην ρητορικὴν μετέδιο πρῶτον μὲν δεῖ ταῦτα οἶδο διηρήσθαι, καὶ εἰληφθῶν τινὰ χαρακτῆρα ἐκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν φ' τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν φ' μὴ.

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καλὸν γοῦν ἄν, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἶδος εἶη κατανενοηκὸς ὁ τούτο λαβὼν.

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you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of—

Socrates. Stop. Now we must tell what there is in this that is faulty and lacks art, must we not?

Phaedrus. Yes.

Socrates. It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?

Phaedrus. I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.

Socrates. When one says "iron" or "silver," we all understand the same thing, do we not?

Phaedrus. Surely.

Socrates. What if he says "justice" or "goodness"? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?

Phaedrus. Certainly.

Socrates. Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.

Phaedrus. True.

Socrates. Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

Phaedrus. Evidently in the class of doubtful things.

Socrates. Then he who is to develop an art of rhetoric must first make a methodical division and acquire a clear impression of each class, that in which people must be in doubt and that in which they are not.

Phaedrus. He who has acquired that would have conceived an excellent principle.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅσπερ γε οἴμαι πρὸς ἐκάστῳ γινόμενον μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ ὧσεϊς αἰσθάνεσθαι, περὶ οὗ ἄν μέλλῃ ἐρεῖν, ποτέρου ὁν τυγχάνει τοῦ γένους.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἕρωτα πότερον φῶμεν εἶναι τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μὴ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων δὴ ποι ἢ ὀικεάντως συνχωρήσαι εἰπεῖν ἂ νῦν δὴ εἰπεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς βλάβη τε ἐστὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἔρωτι, καὶ αὕθες ἀς μέγιστον τῶν ἁγαθῶν τυγχάνει;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅριστα λέγεις· ἀλλ' εἶπέ καὶ τόδε ὡς γάρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικόν ὄν πάντως μέμνημαι—εἰ ὀρισάμην ἐρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Νὴ Δίᾳ ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φεῦ, ὁσοὶ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελώοις καὶ Πάνα τοῦ Ἕρωμοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Δυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἑρωτικοῦ ἦμαγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν Ἕρωτα ἐν τι τῶν Ἐ δυτῶν, ὁ αὐτὸς ἔβουλθῃ, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἢ ὄν τυχάμενος πάντα τῶν ὑστερων λόγου διεπεράνω; βούλει πάλιν ἀναγράφειν τὴν ἄρχην αὐτοῦ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰ σοὶ γε δοκεῖ; ὃ μέντοι ζητεῖς, οὐκ ἔστι αὐτόθι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δέγη, ἵνα ἂκούσω αὐτοῦ ἔκεινον.

47. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὁς νομίζεις συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τοῦτων 264 γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξίω δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀτυχήσαι διὰ δεόμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔρασθης ὅπως σοῦ

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SOCRATES. Then I think when he has to do with a particular case, he will not be ignorant, but will know clearly to which of the two classes the thing belongs about which he is to speak.

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Well then, to which does Love belong? To the doubtful things or the others?

PHAEDRUS. To the doubtful, surely; if he did not, do you think he would have let you say what you said just now about him, that he is an injury to the beloved and to the lover, and again that he is the greatest of blessings?

SOCRATES. Excellent. But tell me this—for I was in such an ecstasy that I have quite forgotten—whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, by Zeus, and wonderfully well.

SOCRATES. Oh, how much more versed the nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in the art of speech than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias also, in the beginning of his discourse on Love, compel us to suppose Love to be some one thing which he chose to consider it, and did he then compose and finish his discourse with that in view? Shall we read the beginning of it again?

PHAEDRUS. If you like; but what you seek is not in it.

SOCRATES. Read, that I may hear Lysias himself.

PHAEDRUS. You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your
ΠΛΑΤΟ

tυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὅν ἂν ἐν ἐνοὺς σωσίσιν, ἕπειδάν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ πολλοὺ δεῖν ἐνείκε ποιεῖν ὅπε γε ὃ ξητοῦμεν, δε ὀπὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἄλλ' ἀπὸ τελευτής ἔξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανείν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ἄρχεται ἂφ' ὅν πεπαυμένος ἂν ἢδη ὁ ἐραστής λέγοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. ἢ οὐδέν εἴπον, Φαίδρε, φίλη κεφαλῆς;

B ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἡστιν γε τοι δή, ὁ Σωκράτης, τελευτή, περὶ οὐ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι δὲ τάλλα; οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλη-σθαί τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἐκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον δεῖν τεθήναι, ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν ῥηθέντων; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξεν, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι, οὐκ ἀγεννὸς τὸ ἐπιόν εἰρήσθαι τῷ γράφοντι, οὐ δὲ ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικῆν, ἢ ταύτα ἐκείνος οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ' ἄλληλα ἔθηκεν;

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Χρηστὸς εἰ, ὅτι μὲ ἡγεῖ ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνον οὕτως ἀκριβῶς διδεῖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τόδε ἑν οἷμαι σε φάναι ἂν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὅσπερ ἔρων συνεστάναι σῶμα τι ἐχοντα αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὅστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἀπον, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντ' ἄλληλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκέψαι τοίνυν τὸν τοῦ ἑταίρου σου λόγον, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει· καὶ εὐρήσεις

D τοῦ ἐπιγράμματος οὐδέν διαφέροντα, ὁ Μίδα τῷ Φρυγί φασί τινας ἐπιγραφῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πολὺν τοῦτο, καὶ τί πεπονθός;

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lover. For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done when their passion ceases.

SOCRATES. He certainly does not at all seem to do what we demand, for he does not even begin at the beginning, but undertakes to swim on his back up the current of his discourse from its end, and begins with what the lover would say at the end to his beloved. Am I not right, Phaedrus my dear?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly that of which he speaks is an ending.

SOCRATES. And how about the rest? Don't you think the parts of the discourse are thrown out helter-skelter? Or does it seem to you that the second topic had to be put second for any cogent reason, or that any of the other things he says are so placed? It seemed to me, who am wholly ignorant, that the writer uttered boldly whatever occurred to him. Do you know any rhetorical reason why he arranged his topics in this order?

PHAEDRUS. You flatter me in thinking that I can discern his motives so accurately.

SOCRATES. But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse must be organised, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. See then whether this is the case with your friend's discourse, or not. You will find that it is very like the inscription that some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

PHAEDRUS. What sort of inscription is that, and what is the matter with it?
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Εστι μὲν τούτο τόδε; χαλκή παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδας ὦ ἐπὶ σήματι κεῖμαι.
ἄφρ’ ἂν ὑδάρ τε νάη καὶ δένδρα μακρὰ τεθήλη;
αὐτοῦ τῆδε μένουσα πολυκλαύτου ἐπὶ τύμβου,
ἀγγελέω παρισσουὶ Μίδας ὦ τῆδε τέθαπται.

Εἰ ὅτι δὲ οὔδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ ύστατον ἢ λέγεσθαι, ἐννοεῖς ποι, ὅς ἐγώμαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σκόπτεις τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν, ὁ Σωκράτες.

48. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἵνα μὴ σὺ ἀχθη, ἐάσωμεν καὶ τοις συχνὰ γε ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖν παραδείγματα, πρὸς ἃ τις βλέπων ὁνύναι ἂν, μυμείσθαι αὐτὰ ἐπιχειρῶν μὴ πάνω τι· εἰς δὲ τοὺς ἐτέρους λόγους ἵωμεν. ἢν γὰρ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς δοκῶ, προσήκον ἰδεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ λόγων σκοπεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἑναντίῳ ποι ἢστην ὁ μὲν γάρ, ὡς τῷ ἐρωτοί, ὥς τῷ ἐρωτεῖται, ἡ δ’ ὡς τῷ μὴ δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐλεγέτην.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλ’ ἀνθρικῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁμιγν σε νατηθῆς ἐρεῖν, ὅτι μανικῶς: ἡ μέν τοι ἐξῆγον, ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τοῦτο. μανίαν γὰρ τίνα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τοῦ ἑρωτο, ἡ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανίας δὲ γε ἐξη ὁ, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θελας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰσοθότων νομίμων γεγομένην.

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PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. This is it:

A bronze maiden am I; and I am placed upon
the tomb of Midas.
So long as water runs and tall trees put forth
leaves,
Remaining in this very spot upon a much
lamented tomb,
I shall declare to passers by that Midas is
buried here;

and you perceive, I fancy, that it makes no difference
whether any line of it is put first or last.

PHAEDRUS. You are making fun of our discourse,
Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then, to spare your feelings, let us say
no more of this discourse—and yet I think there
were many things in it which would be useful
examples to consider, though not exactly to imitate—
and let us turn to the other discourses; for there
was in them, I think, something which those who
wish to investigate rhetoric might well examine.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. The two discourses were opposites; for
one maintained that the lover, and the other that the
non-lover, should be favoured.

PHAEDRUS. And they did it right manfully.

SOCRATES. I thought you were going to speak the
truth and say "madly"; however, that is just what
I had in mind. We said that love was a kind of
madness, did we not?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. And that there are two kinds of mad-
ness, one arising from human diseases, and the other
from a divine release from the customary habits.
PLATO

Β ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τής δὲ θελας τεττάρων θεων¹ τέταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικῆς μὲν ἐπίπτυοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικῆς, Μονσῶν δ᾽ αὖ πονητικῆς, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἕρωτος ἑρωτικῆν μανίαν ἐφῆσαμέν τε ἀρίστην εἴναι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ἑρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἵνα μὲν ἀληθῶς τινὸς ἑφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ᾽ ἄν καὶ ἀλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐθεν παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικὸν τινα ὅμων προσεπαισμέν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμὸν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην Ἕρωτα, ὁ Φαίδρε, καλῶν παῖδων ἐφορον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μᾶλα ἐμοιγε οὐκ ἀνθώς ἀκούσαι.

49. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τόδε τοῖνυν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἔσχεν οὗ λόγος μεταβηναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶσ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ διντί παιδιὰ πεπαισθαί τούτων δὲ τινῶν ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοὶ εἰδόν, εἰ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνη λαβεῖν δύναιτο τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνων δῆ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰς μίαν τε ἵδεαν συνορώντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, ἵνα ἕκαστον ὀριζόμενος δὴλον ποιή, περὶ οὐ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἑδήλη, ὡσπερ τῷ νυντὶ περὶ Ἕρωτος δὲ ἔστων ὀρισθέν, εἰτ᾽ εὖ εἰτε κακῶς ἐλέγχθη. τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὀμολογούμενον διὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἐσχεν εἰπεῖν οὗ λόγος.

¹ Schanz brackets τεττάρων θεων.
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And we made four divisions of the divine madness, ascribing them to four gods, saying that prophecy was inspired by Apollo, the mystic madness by Dionysus, the poetic by the Muses, and the madness of love, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros, we said was the best. We described the passion of love in some sort of figurative manner, expressing some truth, perhaps, and perhaps being led away in another direction, and after composing a somewhat plausible discourse, we chanted a sportive and mythic hymn in meet and pious strain to the honour of your lord and mine, Phaedrus, Love, the guardian of beautiful boys.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, and I found it very pleasant to hear.

SOCRATES. Here let us take up this point and see how the discourse succeeded in passing from blame to praise.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. It seems to me that the discourse was, as a whole, really sportive jest; but in these chance utterances were involved two principles, the essence of which it would be gratifying to learn, if art could teach it.

PHAEDRUS. What principles?

SOCRATES. That of perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars, that one may make clear by definition the particular thing which he wishes to explain; just as now, in speaking of Love, we said what he is and defined it, whether well or ill. Certainly by this means the discourse acquired clearness and consistency.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ δ᾽ ἐτερον δὴ εἰδὸς τί λέγεις, ὦ 
Σῶκρατέσ; 

Ε. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ πάλιν κατ᾽ εἴδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, 
κατ᾽ ἄρθρα, ἢ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπίχειρεῖν κατα-
γνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπορ 
χρώμενον ἀλλ᾽ ὀσπερ ἁρτὶ τῶ λόγῳ τὸ μὲν 
ἀφρον τῆς διανοίας ἐν τὶ κοίνη εἰδὸς ἐλαβέτην, 

266 ὀσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἐνὸς διπλὰ καὶ ὀμόνυμα 
πέφυκε, σκαλά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ 
τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἐν ἐν ἡμῖν πεθυκὸς εἶδος 
ἡγησαμένῳ τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπὶ ἀριστερὰ τεμνό-
μενος μέρος, πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανήκειν, 
πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρών ὀνομαζομένοι σκαλάν 
tίνα ἔρωτα ἐλευθορίζεσθε μάλ' ἐν δίκη, ὃ δ' εἰς 
tὰ ἐν 

267 δεξιὰ τῆς μανίας ἄγαγον ἡμᾶς, ὀμόνυμον μὲν 
Β ἐκείνῳ, θείον δ' αὖ τινί ἔρωτα ἐφευρῶν καὶ 
προτεινάμενος ἐπήνευσεν ὡς μεγίστων αὐτῶν ἡμῖν 
ἄγαθῶν, 

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. 

50. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτων δὴ ἐγνωγε αὐτὸς τε 
ἐραστής, ὁ Φαίδρε, τῶν διαίρεσεων καὶ συνα-
γωγῶν, ἵν' οἴσω τὸ λέγειν ταλ καὶ φρονεῖν. ἐὰν τε 
tίνα ἄλλων ἡγησώμαι δυνατόν εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ 
πεφυκόθ' ὀράν, τούτων διόκω κατόπισθε μετ' 
ἐχυμον ὡστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους 
αὐτὸ ὀράν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θείος 

C οἴδεν, καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τούδε διαλεκτικοῦς. τὰ δὲ 

270 νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ Δυσίλου μαθόντας εἰπτε ς 
τὶ 
χρή καλεῖν ἢ τούτο ἐκεῖνο ἐστὶν ἡ λόγου τέχνη, 
ἣ Ἡρασύμαχος τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ 

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PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. And what is the other principle, Socrates?

SOCRATES. That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver. As our two discourses just now assumed one common principle, unreason, and then, just as the body, which is one, is naturally divisible into two, right and left, with parts called by the same names, so our two discourses conceived of madness as naturally one principle within us, and one discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this until it found among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly reviled, but the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand part of madness, found a love having the same name as the first, but divine, which it held up to view and praised as the author of our greatest blessings.

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and “walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.” And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, God knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians. But tell me now what name to give to those who are taught by you and Lysias, or is this that art of speech by means of which Thrasymachus and the rest have

1 Homer, Odyssey v, 193. ὦ δ' ἐπείτα μετ' ἱχνία ἑαυτῆς θεοὶ (and he walked in the footsteps of the god).
μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγειν γεγόνασιν, ἄλλους τε ποιοῦσιν, οἳ ἄν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεύσιν ἔθέλωσιν; 

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμωνες ἢ ἂν ἔρωτας. ἀλλὰ τούτο μὲν τὸ εἴδος ὁρθῶς ἐμούγε δοκεῖσ καλεῖν, διαλεκτικὸν

καλῶν τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἥδη ἡμᾶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πῶς φήσ; καλὸν ποῦ τι ἂν εἶη, ὃ τούτων ἀπολειφθέν ὁμως τέχνη λαμβάνεται; πάντως οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον αὐτὸ σοὶ τε καὶ ἡμοῖ, λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἄστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ποι λυχνα, ὁ Σώκρατης, τὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγου τέχνης γεγραμμένοις.

51. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλὸς γε ὑπεμνησας. προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεῖ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἄρχῃ ταῦτα λέγεις—ἡ γὰρ; τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;

Ε. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ' ἐπ' αὐτῆ, τρίτον τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα: καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπλέστωσιν λέγειν τὸν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιου ἄνδρα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις θεόδωρον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί μὴν; καὶ ἐλεγχὸν γε καὶ ἐπεξε-λεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ. τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐθύνον εἰς μέσουν οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὡς ὑποδήλωσιν τε πρῶτος ἐμὲ καὶ παρεπαίνους; οἱ δ' αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνήρ. Τις οὖν δὲ Γοργιάν τε ἐάσομεν εὔδειν, οἱ πρὸ τῶν

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become able speakers themselves, and make others so, if they are willing to pay them royal tribute?

PHAEDRUS. They are royal men, but not trained in the matters about which you ask. I think you give this method the right name when you call it dialectic; but it seems to me that rhetoric still escapes us.

SOCRATES. What do you mean? Can there be anything of importance, which is not included in these processes and yet comes under the head of art? Certainly you and I must not neglect it, but must say what it is that remains of rhetoric.

PHAEDRUS. A great many things remain, Socrates, the things that are written in the books on rhetoric.

SOCRATES. Thank you for reminding me. You mean that there must be an introduction first, at the beginning of the discourse; these are the things you mean, are they not?—the niceties of the art.

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the narrative must come second with the testimony after it, and third the proofs, and fourth the probabilities; and confirmation and further confirmation are mentioned, I believe, by the man from Byzantium, that most excellent artist in words.

PHAEDRUS. You mean the worthy Theodorus?

SOCRATES. Of course. And he tells how refutation and further refutation must be accomplished, both in accusation and in defence. Shall we not bring the illustrious Parian, Evenus, into our discussion, who invented covert allusion and indirect praises? And some say that he also wrote indirect censures, composing them in verse as an aid to memory; for he is a clever man. And shall we leave Gorgias and
αληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τά τε αὐτὸν μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαι-
νεθαι ποιούσιν διὰ ῥόμην λόγου, καίνα τε ἀρχαῖως
tά τ' ἐναντία καινώς, συντομίαν τε λόγων και
ἀπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνήρυνον; ταύτα δὲ
ἀκοῦον ποτὲ μου Πρώδικος ἐγέλασεν, καὶ μόνος
αὐτὸς ἦρηκέναι ἐφίν δὲν δει λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ
οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σοφότατά γε, ὁ Πρόδικε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡπιλαν δὲ οὔ λέγομεν; οἵματι γὰρ ἂν
σύμψηφον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν Ἡλέουν ξένου γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δ᾽ οὔ;  

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωμεν1 αὐτὸ
μουσεία λόγον, ὡς2 διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμο-
λογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν, οὐμάτων τε Λικυμνείων
ἄ ἐκεῖνῳ ἐδώρησετο3 πρὸς ποίησιν εὐπετείας;4

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πρωταγόρεια δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν
μέντοι τοιαύτα1 ἄττα;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὺφθοεπεία γέ τις, ὁ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα
πολλά καὶ καλά. τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογών ἐπὶ
γῆς καὶ πενίαν ἔλκομενων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι
tέχνη μοι φαίνεται τό τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος,

ὅρησαι τε αὐτὸ πολλούς ἀμα δεινὸς ἀνήρ γέγονεν,

καὶ πάλιν ὁργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῦν, ὡς ἐφίν
διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς θευδὴ
κράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῆ πᾶσιν

ἔοικεν συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ὁ τινὲς μὲ ξένων,

ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλο τίθενται ὅνομα.

1 πῶς φράσωμεν B. πῶς φράσωμεν T. πῶς οὖ φράσωμεν
Schanz.
2 ὡς B. ὡς T. Schanz.
3 Schanz, following Ast, brackets ἐκεῖνῳ ἐδώρησετο.
4 Schanz reads προσεπολησεν εὐπετείαν (προσεπολησεν after
Cornerius).

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Tisias undisturbed, who saw that probabilities are more to be esteemed than truths, who make small things seem great and great things small by the power of their words, and new things old and old things the reverse, and who invented conciseness of speech and measureless length on all subjects? And once when Prodicus heard these inventions, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered the art of proper speech, that discourses should be neither long nor short, but of reasonable length.

PHAEDRUS. O Prodicus! How clever!

SOCRATES. And shall we not mention Hippias, our friend from Elis? I think he would agree with him.

PHAEDRUS. Oh yes.

SOCRATES. And what shall we say of Polus and his shrines of learned speech, such as duplication and sententiousness and figurativeness, and what of the names with which Licymnius presented him to effect beautiful diction?

PHAEDRUS. Were there not some similar inventions of Protagoras, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Yes, my boy, correctness of diction, and many other fine things. For tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty, I think the precepts of the mighty Chalcedonian hold the palm, and he is also a genius, as he said, at rousing large companies to wrath, and soothing them again by his charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies on any grounds whatsoever. But all seem to be in agreement concerning the conclusion of discourses, which some call recapitulation, while others give it some other name.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἔκαστα λέγεις ὑπο-
μνήσαι ἐπὶ τελευτής τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν
eἰρημένων;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα λέγω, καὶ εἰ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις
eἰπεῖν λόγων τέχνης πέρι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐδώμεν δὴ τά γε σμικρά ταῦτα δὲ
ὑπʼ αὐγάς μᾶλλον ἵδωμεν, τίνα καὶ πότε ἔχει τὴν
τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ἐρρωμένην, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν
γε δὴ πλήθους συνόδους.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐχει γὰρ ἄλλα, ὃ δαιμόνιε, ἰδίὲ καὶ
σὺ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοι φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ
ήτριον ὀστέρ ἐμοί.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δείκνυε μόνον.

52. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι· εἰ τὸς προσελθὼν
τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου Ἔρυξιμάχῳ ἡ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ
Ἀκουμενῷ εἰποί ὅτι Ἔγω ἐπίσταμαι τοιαύτη ἄττα

Β σῶμασι προσφέρειν, ὡστε θερμαίνειν τ’ ἔαν
βούλωμαι καὶ ψύχειν, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν δόξῃ μοι, ἐμεῖν
ποιεῖν, ἐὰν δ’ αὐ, κατὸ διαχωρεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα
πάμπολλα τοιαύτα· καὶ ἐπιστάμενος αὐτὰ ἄξιον
ιατρικὸς εἰναι καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖν, ὃ ἀν τὴν τούτων
ἐπιστήμην παραδῷ τί ἄν οἷον ἄκούσαντας εἰπεῖν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γε ἄλλο ἢ ἑρέσθαι, εἰ προσεπί-

σταται καὶ οὐστίνας δεῖ καὶ ὅποτε ἔκαστα τούτων

τοιοῦ ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὁπόσον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ ὅπως εἰποί ὅτι οὐδαμῶς ἄλλα ἄξιω
τὸν ταῦτα παρ’ ἐμοῦ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἶον τ’ ἔναι

ποιεῖν ἢ ἑρώτας;
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. You mean making a summary of the points of the speech at the end of it, so as to remind the hearers of what has been said?

SOCRATES. These are the things I mean, these and anything else you can mention concerned with the art of rhetoric.

PHAEDRUS. There are only little things, not worth mentioning.

SOCRATES. Never mind the little things; let us bring these other things more under the light and see what force of art they have and when.

PHAEDRUS. They have a very powerful force, at least in large assemblies.

SOCRATES. They have; but my friend, see if you agree with me in thinking that their warp has gaps in it.

PHAEDRUS. Go on and show them.

SOCRATES. Tell me; if anyone should go to your friend Eryximachus or to his father Acumenus and should say "I know how to apply various drugs to people, so as to make them warm or, if I wish, cold, and I can make them vomit, if I like, or can make their bowels move, and all that sort of thing; and because of this knowledge I claim that I am a physician and can make any other man a physician, to whom I impart the knowledge of these things"; what do you think they would say?

PHAEDRUS. They would ask him, of course, whether he knew also whom he ought to cause to do these things, and when, and how much.

SOCRATES. If then he should say: "No, not at all; but I think that he who has learned these things from me will be able to do by himself the things you ask about?"
PLATO

C φαιδρος. Εἴποιεν ἂν, οἴμαι, ὃτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ βιβλίου ποθὲν ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχῶν φαρμακίους ἰατρὸς οἴεται γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἐπαίνω τῆς τέχνης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' εἰ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς οὐ προσελθὼν καὶ Εὐρυπίδη τις λέγω, ὡς ἐπισταται περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ρήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικρὰς, ὅταν τε βούληται οἰκτρᾶς, καὶ τοῦναντίον αὐθ φοβερᾶς καὶ ἀπειλητικᾶς, ὅσα Δ τ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐτὰ τραγῳδίας ποίησις οἴεται παραδοῦναι;

φαιδρος. Καὶ οὕτω ἂν, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἴμαι, καταγελώειν, εἴ τις οἴεται τραγῳδίαν ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν, ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ συνισταμένην.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἀγροῖκως γε, οἶμαι, λοιδορήσειαν, ἀλλ' ὀστερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχῶν ἀνδρὶ σιμένῳ ἄρμονικῷ εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τυχάνει ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἶόν τε ὑδατάτην καὶ βαρυτάτην Ε ἱχοδὴν ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἄγριώς εἴποι ἂν ὁ μοιχθήρε, μελαγχολὰς, ἀλλ' ἀτε μουσικὸς ὅν πραότερον ὅτι, ὁ ἄριστε, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταύτ' ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἄρμονικὸν ἔσσεθαι, οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἄρμονίας ἐπαίνω τὸν τῇ σὴν ἐξὶν ἔχοντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἄρμονίας ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι, ἀλλ' οὖ τὰ ἄρμονικά.

φαιδρος. Ὁρθότατά γε.

269 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τῶν σφήσων ἐπιδεικνύμενον τὰ πρὸ τραγῳδίας ἂν φαίη ἀλλ' οὐ
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. They would say, I fancy, that the man was crazy and, because he had read something in a book or had stumbled upon some medicines, imagined that he was a physician when he really had no knowledge of the art.

SOCRATES. And what if someone should go to Sophocles or Euripides and should say that he knew how to make very long speeches about a small matter, and very short ones about a great affair, and pitiful utterances, if he wished, and again terrible and threatening ones, and all that sort of thing, and that he thought by imparting those things he could teach the art of writing tragedies?

PHAEDRUS. They also, I fancy, Socrates, would laugh at him, if he imagined that tragedy was anything else than the proper combination of these details in such a way that they harmonize with each other and with the whole composition.

SOCRATES. But they would not, I suppose, rebuke him harshly, but they would behave as a musician would, if he met a man who thought he understood harmony because he could strike the highest and lowest notes. He would not say roughly, "You wretch, you are mad," but being a musician, he would say in gentler tones, "My friend, he who is to be a harmonist must know these things you mention, but nothing prevents one who is at your stage of knowledge from being quite ignorant of harmony. You know the necessary preliminaries of harmony, but not harmony itself."

PHAEDRUS. Quite correct.

SOCRATES. So Sophocles would say that the man exhibited the preliminaries of tragedy, not tragedy
ΠΛΑΤΟ
tὰ τραγικά, καὶ ὁ Ἀκούμενος τὰ πρὸ ἰατρικῆς ἄλλα οὖ τὰ ἰατρικά.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

53. ΣΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; τὸν μελώρημα Ἀδραστον οἴμεθα ἢ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἄκούσειαν ὅν νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς διήμεν τῶν παγκάλων τεχνημάτων, βραχυ- λογίων τε καὶ εἰκονολογίων καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα διελθόντες ὑπ’ αὐγάς ἔφαμεν εἰναι σκεπτέα.

Β πότερον χαλεπῶς δὲν αὐτούς, ὀσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ, ὑπ’ ἀγροικίας ῥῆμα τι εἰπεῖν ἀπαίδευτον εἰς τοὺς ταῦτα γεγραφότας ταίς καὶ διδάσκοντας ὡς ῥητορικὴν τέχνην, ἢ ἄτε ἡμῶν ὡςα σοφωτέρους καὶ νῦν ἐπιτιλῆξαι εὐπόντας· ὁ Φαίδρε τε καὶ Σώκρατες, οὐ χρή χαλεπαίνειν ἄλλα συγγενῶςκεν, εἰ τινες μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἄδυνατοι ἐγένοντο ὀρίσασθαι, τί ποτ’ ἔστιν ῥητορική, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πάθους τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν

C ὁμὴν ἦρηκέναι, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ διδάσκοντες ἄλλους ἱγοῦνται σφίσιν τελέως ῥητορικὴν δεδα- δάχθαι, τὸ δὲ ἔκαστα τούτων πιθανῶς λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον, αὐτοῖς δεῖν παρ’ ἑαυτῶν τοὺς μαθητὰς σφῶν πορίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύει τοιοῦτον τι εἰναὶ τὸ τῆς τέχνης, ἢν οὕτωι οἱ ἄνδρες ὡς ῥητορικὴν διδάσκουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσι· καὶ

D ἐμονε ὀκεῖς ἀληθῷ εἰρηκέναι· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ

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itself, and Acumenus that he knew the preliminaries of medicine, not medicine itself.

PHAEDRUS. Exactly so.

SOCRATES. Well then, if the mellifluous Adrastus or Pericles heard of the excellent accomplishments which we just enumerated, brachylogies and figurative speech and all the other things we said we must bring to the light and examine, do we suppose they would, like you and me, be so illbred as to speak discourteously of those who have written and taught these things as the art of rhetoric? Would they not, since they are wiser than we, censure us also and say, “Phaedrus and Socrates, we ought not to be angry, but lenient, if certain persons who are ignorant of dialectics have been unable to define the nature of rhetoric and on this account have thought, when they possessed the knowledge that is a necessary preliminary to rhetoric, that they had discovered rhetoric, and believe that by teaching these preliminaries to others they have taught them rhetoric completely, and that the persuasive use of these details and the composition of the whole discourse is a small matter which their pupils must supply of themselves in their writings or speeches.”

PHAEDRUS. Well, Socrates, it does seem as if that which those men teach and write about as the art of rhetoric were such as you describe. I think you are

1 Tyrtaeus, ed. Bergk, first ed. frg. 9, 7, ἐὰν δ’ εἰς Τανταλίδεω Πέλοπος βασιλεύτερος εἴη γλώσσαν δ’ Ἀδράστον μελιχύγμην ἔχοι, “not even if he were more kingly than Pelops and had the mellifluous tongue of Adrastus.” Perhaps the orator Antiphon is referred to under the name of Adrastus, cf. chapter xliii. above.
τὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ῥήτορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἄν τις δύναιτο πορίσασθαι;  

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, δ' Φαιδρέ, ὡστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, εἰκός, ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ἄσπερ τάλλα. εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥήτορικῷ εἶναι, ἐσεὶ ρήτωρ ἐπιλόγιμος, προσλαβῶν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην ὅτου δὲ ἡ ἐπιτήμη τούτων, ταὐτή ἀτελῆς ἐσεὶ. ὅσοι δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἡ Δυσίας τε καὶ Ἐρασύμαχος πορεύεται, δοκεῖ μοι παύεσθαι ἡ μέθοδος.  

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ πὴ δὴ;  

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κινδυνεύει, δ' ἀριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεότατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι.  

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δὴ;  

54. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάσαι δ' οὖσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν, προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι τὸ γὰρ υψηλόνου τούτο καὶ πάντη τελεσιουργὸν ἔοικεν ἐπιτυόθεν ποθεν εἰσιέναι. ὅ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τὸ εὐφυῆς εἶναι ἐκτήσατο προσπέσσων γάρ, οἷομαι, τοιούτῳ ὁντι Ἀναξαγόρα, μετεωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας ἀφικόμενος, ἄν δὴ πέρι τῶν πολύν λόγων ἐποιεῖτο Ἀναξαγόρας, ἐπιτυόθεν εἰλκυσθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῇ.  

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις;  

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅ αὐτὸς που τρόπος τέχνης ιατρικῆς, ἄσπερ καὶ ῥητορικῆς.  

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ;  

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεὶ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, εἰ 546
right. But how and from whom is the truly rhetorical and persuasive art to be acquired?

Socrates. Whether one can acquire it, so as to become a perfect orator, Phaedrus, is probably, and perhaps must be, dependent on conditions, like everything else. If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowments you have added knowledge and practice; at whatever point you are deficient in these, you will be incomplete. But so far as the art is concerned, I do not think the quest of it lies along the path of Lysias and Thrasymachus.

Phaedrus. Where then?

Socrates. I suppose, my friend, Pericles is the most perfect orator in existence.

Phaedrus. Well?

Socrates. All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuits. This was in Pericles added to his great natural abilities; for it was, I think, his falling in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a man, that filled him with high thoughts and taught him the nature of mind and of lack of mind, subjects about which Anaxagoras used chiefly to discourse, and from these speculations he drew and applied to the art of speaking what is of use to it.

Phaedrus. What do you mean by that?

Socrates. The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric.

Phaedrus. How so?

Socrates. In both cases you must analyse a nature, in one that of the body and in the other that of the
μέλλεις μὴ τριβή μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀλλὰ τέχνη, τῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφὴν προσφέρων ύγειαν καὶ ρώμην ἐμπούχεσει, τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτη- δεύσεις νομίμους πειθῶ ἢν ἂν βούλῃ καὶ ἀρετὴν παραδώσειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ γούν εἰκός, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἄξιως λόγον κατα- νοῆσαι οἷοι δυνατον εἴναι ἁνεν τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτειγα τῷ τῶν Ἀσκλη- πιαδῶν δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι, οὔδε περὶ σώματος ἁνεν τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γὰρ, ὁ ἑταῖρε, λέγεις χρῆ μέντοι πρὸς τῷ Ἰπποκράτειτον λόγον ἐξετάζοντα σκοπεῖν, εἰ συμφωνεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Φημί.

55. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ τοίνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί

D ποτε λέγει Ἰπποκράτητας τε καὶ ὁ ἀληθῆς λόγος. ἂρ' οὖν δὲ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὄτουον φύσεως· πρώτον μέν, ἀπλοῦ ἡ πολυειδής ἐστιν, οὐ περὶ βουλησμεθα εἴναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον δυνατον ποιεῖν, ἐπειτα δὲ, ἂν μὲν ἀπλοῦ ἡ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δραν ἦχον ἡ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, εάν δὲ πλείω ἐδή ἐχθα, ταύτα ἀριθμησάμενον, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἐνος, τοῦτ' ἢεῖν ἐφ' ἐκάστοι, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἡ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κινδυνεύει, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ γούν ἁνεν τοῦτων μέθοδος εἶδοι

Ε ἃν ὁσπερ τυφλὸν πορεία: ἀλλ' οὐ μὴ ἀπεικα- στέουν τὸν γε τέχνη μετίντα ὑσιοῦν τυφλὸν οὐδὲ κωφό, ἀλλὰ δὴλον ὅς, ἃν τῷ τῆς τέχνη λόγους

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soul, if you are to proceed in a scientific manner, not merely by practice and routine, to impart health and strength to the body by prescribing medicine and diet, or by proper discourses and training to give to the soul the desired belief and virtue.

PHAEDRUS. That, Socrates, is probably true.

SOCRATES. Now do you think one can acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of the whole man?

PHAEDRUS. If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body, either, except in that way.

SOCRATES. He is right, my friend; however, we ought not to be content with the authority of Hippocrates, but to see also if our reason agrees with him on examination.

PHAEDRUS. I assent.

SOCRATES. Then see what Hippocrates and true reason say about nature. In considering the nature of anything, must we not consider first, whether that in respect to which we wish to be learned ourselves and to make others learned is simple or multiform, and then, if it is simple, enquire what power of acting it possesses, or of being acted upon, and by what, and if it has many forms, number them, and then see in the case of each form, as we did in the case of the simple nature, what its action is and how it is acted upon and by what?

PHAEDRUS. Very likely, Socrates.

SOCRATES. At any rate, any other mode of procedure would be like the progress of a blind man. Yet surely he who pursues any study scientifically ought not to be comparable to a blind or a deaf man, but evidently the man whose rhetorical teaching
διδῷ, τὴν οὕτων δεῖξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς φύσεως τούτου, πρὸς ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει: ἔσται δὲ ποὺ ψυχή τούτο.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἁμιλλα αὐτῷ τέταται πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶσα· πειθῶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ. ἢ γὰρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δῆλον ἀρα ὅτι ὁ Ὑπαράσυμαχός τε καὶ ὃς ἀν ἄλλος σπουδὴ τέχνην ῥητορικήν διδῶ, πρῶτον πάση ἀκριβεία γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχήν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἐν καὶ ὁμοίων πέρφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδὲς· τούτῳ γὰρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παυτάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὅτι τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρφυκεν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

Β. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τρίτου δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενοι τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένει καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα δίεισι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἐκαστὸν ἐκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκων, οἷα οὕσα υφ᾽ ὅλων λόγων ἢ καὶ αἰτίαν ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν πειθεῖαι, ἢ δὲ ἀπειθεῖαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἂν, ὡς ἔοικ', ἐχοι οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕτωι μὲν οὖν, ὃς φίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνη ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφῆσεται οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τούτο· ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὅν σὺ ἄκηκας, τέχνας λόγων πανούργοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότες ψυχῆς πέρι παγκάλως· πρὶν ἄν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τούτον λέγωσι τε καὶ γράφωσι, μὴ πειθόμεθα αὐτοῖς τέχνη γράφειν.
PHAEDRUS

is a real art will explain accurately the nature of that
to which his words are to be addressed, and that is
the soul, is it not?

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then this is the goal of all his effort;
he tries to produce conviction in the soul. Is not
that so?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. So it is clear that Thrasy machus, or
anyone else who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric,
will first describe the soul with perfect accuracy
and make us see whether it is one and all alike, or,
like the body, of multiform aspect; for this is what
we call explaining its nature.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And secondly he will say what its
action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is
acted upon and by what.

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Thirdly, he will classify the speeches
and the souls and will adapt each to the other,
showing the causes of the effects produced and why
one kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by certain
classes of speeches, and another is not.

PHAEDRUS. That would, I think, be excellent.

SOCRATES. By no other method of exposition or
speech will this, or anything else, ever be written or
spoken with real art. But those whom you have
heard, who write treatises on the art of speech
nowadays, are deceivers and conceal the nature of
the soul, though they know it very well. Until they
write and speak by this method we cannot believe
that they write by the rules of art.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

φαίδρος. Τίνα τούτον;

ζωκρατής. Αύτὰ μὲν τὰ ῥήματα εἰπεῖν οὐκ εὐπτετές· ὡς δὲ δεῖ γράφειν, εἰ μέλλει τεχνικῶς ἔχειν καθ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

φαίδρος. Δέγε δή.

56. ζωκρατής. Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγ- χάνει φυσαγωγία οὔσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ρητορικοῦ ἔστωσαν ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχῇ οὕσα εἴδη ἔχει. ἔστων οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα· οἴτε οἶ μὲν τοιοῦτοι, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι γλύγονται· τούτων δὲ δὴ διηρημένων, λόγων αὐ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστων εἴδη, τοιόνυν ἔκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶν, λόγων δὲ τήν τε τήν αὐτίαν εἰς τὰ τοιάδε εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς· διὲ δὴ ταῦτα ἰκανῶς νοῆσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον Ἑ αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν οὖν τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὁξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἔπακολουθεῖν, ἡ μηδὲν εἶναι ποι πλέον αὐτῷ δὴ τότε ἥκουν λόγων ξυνῶν. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τα ἰκανῶς ἔχῃ, οἷος ὑφ' οὐ̣ων πεῖθεται, παραγγελμένον τε δύνατος ἢ δι- 272 αἰσθανόμενος ἐαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις, περὶ θ̣ς τότε ἤσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἔρχοι παροῦσα ο𝐼, ἡ προσοιστέου τοῦσοι ὅδε τοῦς λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν πειθώ, ταῦτα δὴ ἡ ἦδη πάντα ἐχοῦντε, προσλαβόντι καίροις τοῦ πόθε λεκτέων καὶ ἐπισχετέων, βραχύλογας τε αὐ καὶ ἐλευθερολογίας καὶ δεινόσεως ἑκάστων τε ὅσο' ἄν
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. What is this method?

SOCRATES. It is not easy to tell the exact expressions to be used; but I will tell how one must write, if one is to do it, so far as possible, in a truly artistic way.

PHAEDRUS. Speak then.

SOCRATES. Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul. Now they are so and so many and of such and such kinds, wherefore men also are of different kinds: these we must classify. Then there are also various classes of speeches, to one of which every speech belongs. So men of a certain sort are easily persuaded by speeches of a certain sort for a certain reason to actions or beliefs of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded. The student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life; otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard. But when he has learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, if he comes upon such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man and this now actually before him is the nature spoken of in a certain lecture, to which he must now make a practical application of a certain kind of speech in a certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action or belief—when he has acquired all this, and has added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favourable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes
εἶδη μάθη λόγων, τούτων τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τε καὶ ἀκαριστίαν διαγιόντο, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστίν ἢ τέχνη ἀπειρησμένη, πρότερον δὲ οὖ· ἀλλ' οὐ τι ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείτη λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων, φη δὲ τέχνη λέγειν, ὅ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ. τι δὴ οὖν; φήσει ίσως ὁ συγγραφεύς, ὁ Φαῖδρε τε καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ οὖν τοῖς; ἢ ἄλλως πῶς ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;

Φαίδρος. Ἀδύνατόν ποι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν γε φαίνεται ἔργον.

Σώκρατες. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, τούτου τοι ἐνεκα

Ὁ χρη πάντας τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφοντα ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τίς πη βάσων καὶ βραχυτέρα φαίνεται ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ὅδον, ἵνα μὴ μάην πολλὴν ἢ καὶ τραχείαν, εἶπον ὀλίγην τε καὶ λείαν. ἄλλ’ εἰ τινά πη βοήθειαν ἔχεις ἐπακηκουῶς Δυσίου ἢ τινος ἄλλου, πειρῶ λέγειν ἀναμμυγμυσκόμενος.

Φαίδρος. Ἔνεκα μὲν πείρας ἔχομ’ ἂν, ἄλλ’ οὐτὶ νῦν γ’ οὕτως ἔχω.

Σώκρατες. Βούλει οὖν ἐγώ τιν’ εἶπο τὸν λόγον, ὅν τῶν περὶ ταῦτα τινῶν ἀκήκοα;

Φαίδρος. Τί μὴν;

Σώκρατες. Δέγεται γοῦν, ὁ Φαῖδρε, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν.

Φαίδρος. Καὶ σὺ γε οὕτω ποιεῖ.

57. Σώκρατες. Φασὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδ’ ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περὶ-βαλλομένους. παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατ’ ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν τοῦτο τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων,

1 Schanz reads λέγωι οὐ.
of speech which he has learned, then, and not till then, will his art be fully and completely finished; and if anyone who omits any of these points in his speaking or writing claims to speak by the rules of art, the one who disbelieves him is the better man. "Now then," perhaps the writer of our treatise will say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, do you agree to all this? Or must the art of speech be described in some other way?"

Phaedrus. No other way is possible, Socrates. But it seems a great task to attain to it.

Socrates. Very true. Therefore you must examine all that has been said from every point of view, to see if no shorter and easier road to the art appears, that one may not take a long and rough road, when there is a short and smooth one. If you have heard from Lysias or anyone else anything that can help us, try to remember it and tell it.

Phaedrus. If it depended on trying, I might, but just now I have nothing to say.

Socrates. Then shall I tell something that I have heard some of those say who make these matters their business?

Phaedrus. Pray do.

Socrates. Even the wolf, you know, Phaedrus, has a right to an advocate, as they say.

Phaedrus. Do you be his advocate.

Socrates. Very well. They say that there is no need of treating these matters with such gravity and carrying them back so far to first principles with many words; for, as we said in the beginning of this discussion, he who is to be a competent rhetorician need have nothing at all to do, they say, with truth
δι καὶ ἄνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἡ τροφή, τὸν μέλλοντα ἰκανὸς ῥητορικὸν ἔστηθαι. τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὕδεν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις τούτων ἐλθέθαις μέλειν οὕδεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ· τούτῳ δὲ εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, ὥς δὲ ἔντω προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνη ἔρειν. οὕδε γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ πρακτάντα δεῖν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, ἐὰν μὴ εἰκότως ἡ πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰκότα, ἐν τε κατηγορία καὶ ἀπολογία· καὶ πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκός διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰπόντα χαίρειν τῷ ἀληθεί· τούτῳ γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου γεγομένου τὴν ἀπασαν τέχνην πορίζειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Αὐτὴ γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας δὲ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιούτου ἐφηγήμαθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τούτο πάμμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταύτα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Τιςίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς· εἰπέτω τοῖς καὶ τὸς ἢμιν ὁ Τιςίας, μὴ τε ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τῇ γὰρ ἄλλῳ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἐοικε, σοφὸν εὐρόν ἀμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἐγραφεῖν, ὡς εἰς τις ἀσθενῆς καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἵσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἰμάτιον ἢ τῷ ἄλλο ἀφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγηται, δεῖ δὴ τάληθες μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν δειλῶν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγκεκόψαι, τὸν δὲ τούτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνων ὁ ἡστην, ἐκεῖνω δὲ καταχρήσασθαι τῷ πῶς δὲ ἄν ἐγὼ τοιόσοδε τοιοῦτο ἐπεχείρησα; οὐ γὰρ ἄρει δὴ
in considering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by nature or by education. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability. For sometimes one must not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely to be done, but what was probable, whether in accusation or defence; and in brief, a speaker must always aim at probability, paying no attention to truth; for this method, if pursued throughout the whole speech, provides us with the entire art.

PHAEDRUS. You have stated just what those say who pretend to possess the art of speech, Socrates. I remember that we touched upon this matter briefly before, but the professional rhetoricians think it is of great importance.

SOCRATES. Well, there is Tisias whom you have studied carefully; now let Tisias himself tell us if he does not say that probability is that which most people think.

PHAEDRUS. That is just what he says.

SOCRATES. Apparently after he had invented this clever scientific definition, he wrote that if a feeble and brave man assaulted a strong coward, robbed him of his cloak or something, and was brought to trial for it, neither party ought to speak the truth; the coward should say that he had not been assaulted by the brave man alone, whereas the other should prove that only they two were present and should use the well-known argument, "How could a little man like me assault such a man as he is?" The coward will

1 See 259 e.
τὴν ἐαυτοῦ κάκην, ἀλλὰ τί ἄλλο ἴσεύδεσθαι ἐπιγεερών ταχίν' ἀν ἐλεγχόν πη παραδοῖη τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. καὶ περὶ τάλλα δὴ τοιαύτ' ἄττα ἐστὶν τὰ τέχνη λεγόμενα. οὐ γάρ, ὁ Φαῖδρε;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΘΕΟΣ. Φεῦ, δεινῶς γ' ἔοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δή ποτ' ὁμονήμων τυχόντας καὶ ὁπόθεν χαίρει ὁμομαζόμενοι.

Ω, ἄταρι, ὃ ἑταῖρε, τοῦτο ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγομεν ἢ μή—

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποίον;

58. ΘΕΟΣ. "Οτι, ὁ Τισία, πάλαι ἡμείς, πρὶν καὶ σε παρελθεῖν, τυγχάνομεν λέγουσαν, ὥς ἄρα τούτο τὸ εἰκός τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγυνώμενον; τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ ὅ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὸς καλλιστα ἐπίσταται εὑρίσκειν. ὡστ' εἰ μὲν ἄλλο τί περὶ τέχνης λόγων λέγεις, ἀκούοιμεν ἂν εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς νυνὶ διήλθομεν πεισόμεθα, ὡς ἐὰν μή τοὺς τῶν τε ἀκούσομένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμεῖται, καὶ κατ' εἴδη τε διαπερίσθαι τὰ ὅντα καὶ μᾶ ἰδέα δυνατὸς ἢ καθ' ἐν ἐκαστὸν περιλαμβάνειν, οὐ γὰρ ἄστι τεχνικὸς λόγων πέρι καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ. τάτα δὲ οὐ μή ποτε κτήσηται ἀνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας. ἢν οὖχ ἔνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἄνθρωπος δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, ἄλλα τοῦ θεοῦ κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δὲ πράττειν τὸ πάν εἰς δύναμιν. οὐ γάρ δὴ ἄρα, ὁ Τισία, φασίν οἱ σοφῶτεροι ἢμῶν, ὁμοδόους δεῖ χαρίζεσθαι μελετῶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, ὁ τί μη πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ δεσπόταις ἄγαθοίς τε καὶ εἰς ἄγαθον· ὡστ'
PHAEDRUS

not acknowledge his cowardice, but will perhaps try
to invent some other lie, and thus give his oppo-
nent a chance to confute him. And in other cases
there are other similar rules of art. Is that not so,
Phaedrus?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems
to be which Tisias has brought to light, or some
other, whoever he may be and whatever country he
is proud to call his own! But, my friend, shall we
say in reply to this, or shall we not—

PHAEDRUS. What?

SOCRATES. "Tisias, some time ago, before you
came along, we were saying that this probability of
yours was accepted by the people because of its
likeness to truth; and we just stated that he who
knows the truth is always best able to discover like-
nesses. And so, if you have anything else to say about
the art of speech, we will listen to you; but if not,
we will put our trust in what we said just now, that
unless a man take account of the characters of his
hearers and is able to divide things by classes and to
comprehend particulars under a general idea, he will
never attain the highest human perfection in the art of
speech. But this ability he will not gain without
much diligent toil, which a wise man ought not to
undergo for the sake of speaking and acting before
men, but that he may be able to speak and to do
everything, so far as possible, in a manner pleasing
to the gods. For those who are wiser than we,
Tisias, say that a man of sense should surely practise
to please not his fellow slaves, except as a secondary
consideration, but his good and noble masters.
Therefore, if the path is long, be not astonished;
eι μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσῃς μεγάλων γάρ ἔνεκα περιπτέον, οὔχ ὡς σὺ δοκεῖς. ἔσται μὴν, ὡς ὁ λόγος φησίν, ἓάν τις θέλη, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστα εξ ἐκείνων γυνώμενα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγκάλως ἔμουγε δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, εἴπερ οἶδα τέ τις εἶη.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντι τοι τοῖς ὑπό καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὁ τι ἀν τῷ ἐξιμβῇ παθεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μᾶλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχυς τε καὶ ἄτεχυς λόγων πέρι ἱκανοῦ ἐχέτω.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τι μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δ᾽ εὐπρεπεῖασ δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπεῖασ, πὴ γνωμόμενον καλῶς ἢ ἔχω καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπῶν. ἡ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναῖ.

59. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἰσθ' οὖν ὅτι μάλιστα θεῷ χαριεῖ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἢ λέγων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐδαμῶς· σὺ δὲ;

Ο ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀκοῦν γάρ ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλληθες αὐτοῖς ἱσασιν. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ εὐροίμεν αὐτοῖς, ἄρα γάρ ἀν ἔθ' ἡμῖν μέλοι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δοξασμάτων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γελοιῶν ἐροῦ· ἀλλ' ἃ φῆς ἀκηκοέναι, λέγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡκοῦσα τοῖς περὶ Ναύκρατι τῆς Ἀθηναίων γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, οὔ καὶ τὸ ὅρμεν τὸ ἱερόν, ὥς καὶ καλούσιν ἤμιν· αὐτῷ δὲ ἄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεόν. τοῦτον δὲ ΠΡΩΤΟΥΝ ἀριθμὸν τέ καὶ λογισμὸν εὔρειν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἐτί δὲ πεπείλας τε

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for it must be trodden for great ends, not for those you have in mind. Yet your ends also, as our argument says, will be best gained in this way, if one so desires."

PHAEDRUS. I think what you have said is admirable, if one could only do it.

SOCRATES. But it is noble to strive after noble objects, no matter what happens to us.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. We have, then, said enough about the art of speaking and that which is no art.

PHAEDRUS. Assuredly.

SOCRATES. But we have still to speak of propriety and impropriety in writing, how it should be done and how it is improper, have we not?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. Do you know how you can act or speak about rhetoric so as to please God best?

PHAEDRUS. Not at all; do you?

SOCRATES. I can tell something I have heard of the ancients; but whether it is true, they only know. But if we ourselves should find it out, should we care any longer for human opinions?

PHAEDRUS. A ridiculous question! But tell me what you say you have heard.

SOCRATES. I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. He it was who invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most

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καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Ἀλυστοῦ ὀλης Θαμοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἀνω τόπου, ἢν οἱ Ἔλληνες Ἀλυστίας Θήβας καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν" Ἀμμώνα, παρὰ τοῦτον ἔλθον ὁ Θεῦθ τὰς τέχνας ἑπέδειξεν, καὶ ἔφη δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀλυστίοις. ὁ δὲ ἤρετο, ἤντινα ἐκάστη ἔχοι ὀφελίαν, διεξοόντος δὲ, ὃ τι καλὸς ἢ μὴ καλὸς δοκοὶ λέγειν, τὸ μὲν Ἐ ἔφευγε, τὸ δ' ἐπῆρε. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ' ἀμφότερα Θαμοῦ τῷ Ἐνυθ λέγεται ἀποφήμασθαι, δ' λόγος πολὺς ἃν εἰη διελθεῖν ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἢν, τοῦτο δὲ, ὃ βασιλεῦ, τὸ μάθημα, ἔφη ὁ Θεῦθ, σοφοτέρους Ἀλυστίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον ἡπρέθη. ὁ δ' εἶπεν' ὁ τεχνικῶτατε Θεῦθ, ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τῆς τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι, τὸν' ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὀφελίας τοῖς ἔλλουσι 275 χρῆσθαι καὶ νῦν σύ, πατήρ ὁ γραμμάτων, δ' εὖν οἰον τοῦναντίον εἶπες ἡ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθῶν τήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετήσια, ἂτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἐνδοθεν αὐτοὺς ὦν' αὐτῶν ἀναμμυησκομένους' οὐκουν μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσσεως φάρμακον ηπρές. σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀληθείαν πορίζεις' πολυμε- κοι γὰρ σοι γενόμενοι ἀνευ διδαχῆς πολυγυμόμονες Β εἶναι δόξουσιν, ἀγνώμονες ως ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος ὄντες 562
important of all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god Thamus, who lived in the great city of the upper region, which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth to show his inventions, saying that they ought to be imparted to the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked what use there was in each, and as Theuth enumerated their uses, expressed praise or blame, according as he approved or disapproved. The story goes that Thamus said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts, which it would take too long to repeat; but when they came to the letters, "This invention, O king," said Theuth, "will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have discovered." But Thamus replied, "Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practise their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant.
καὶ χαλεπῶς ξυνεῖναι, δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. ὩΣ Σῶκρατες, βραδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὑποδαποὺς ἄν ἐθέλης λόγους ποιεῖς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἱ δὲ γ’, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Δί σ᾽ οὖν ἰερῷ δρυὸς λόγους ἐφήσαν μαντικοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τότε, ἀτε ὅντι σοφῶς ὅσπερ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι, ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἀκοὺειν ὑπὲρ εὐθείας, εἰ μόνον ἀληθῆ λέγοιεν; σοὶ δὲ ἱσώς διαφέρει τίς ὁ λέγων καὶ ποδαπός. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖς, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχεις;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὁρθῶς ἐπέπληξας, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ γραμμάτων ἔχειν ἦπερ ὁ Θηβαῖος λέγει.

60. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν, καὶ αὐ ὁ παραδεχόμενος ὡς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλῆς ἂν εὐθείας γέμωι καὶ τῷ ὑπὲρ τὴν Ἀρμονος μαντείαν ἀγνοοῖ, πλέον τι οἰόμενος δὲ εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδότα ὑπομνήσαι περὶ δὲ ἄν ἂν ἦ τὰ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὁρθώτατα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεινὸν γὰρ ποι, ὦ Φαίδρε, τοῦτ’ ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ομοιον ἡγοφραφία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνη ἔγραφον ἐστήκη μὲν ὡς σοματα, ἐὰν δ’ ἀνέργῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ συγά. ταύτὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι ὀδαὶς μὲν ἄν ὡς τι φρονοῦντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ τὶ ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταύτὸν ἄει. ὦταν δὲ ἔπεξ γραφῆς, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πάς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαίσιον, ὡς δ’ αὐτῶς παρ’
and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but only appear wise."

PHAEDRUS. Socrates, you easily make up stories of Egypt or any country you please.

SOCRATES. They used to say, my friend, that the words of the oak in the holy place of Zeus at Dodona were the first prophetic utterances. The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplicity to hear an oak or a rock, provided only it spoke the truth; but to you, perhaps, it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only whether his words are true or not.

PHAEDRUS. Your rebuke is just; and I think the Theban is right in what he says about letters.

SOCRATES. He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person, and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written.

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who

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οις οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς
dὲι γε καὶ μὴ πλημμελούμενος δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκη
λοιδορθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς αἰὲ δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς
γὰρ οὔτ' ἀμώνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὐτῷ.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ταῦτά σοι ὅρθοτατα εἰρηται.

276 ἙΘΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τῇ δ'; ἄλλον ὀρῶμεν λόγον τούτου
ἀδελφὸν γυνήσιον, τῷ τρόπῳ τε γύρνεται, καὶ δῷ
ἀμέλων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνα τούτων καὶ πῶς λέγεις γυνώ-
μενον;

ἙΘΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Οσ μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ
τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν ἀμώναι έαυτῷ,
ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ συγάν πρὸς οὐς δεῖ.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδῶτος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα
καὶ ἐμψυχο, οὐ δ' ἐγχραμμένος εἰδωλον ἂν τι
λέγοιτο δικαίως.

Β 61. ἙΘΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. τόδε δὴ μοι
εἰπέ· ο νοῦν ἔχων γεωργός, ὃν σπερμάτων κήδοιτο
καὶ ἐγκαρπὰ βούλιοιτο γενέσθαι, πότερα σπουδῇ
ἀν θέρους εἰς Ἁδώνιδος κήπους ἄρων χάιροι
θεωρῶν καλουσ ἐν ἡμέραισιν ὅκτω γυνωμένους, ἥ
ταῦτα μὲν δὴ παίδιας τε καὶ ἐορτῆς χάριν δρόῃ ἂν,
ὅτε καὶ ποιοὶ· εφ' οἷς δὲ ἐσπούδακε, τῇ γεωργικῇ
χρώμενος ἂν τέχνη, σπεῖρας εἰς τὸ προσήκον,
ἀγαπῆ ἂν ἐν ἅγιοίρ μην ὁσα ἐσπειρεν τέλος
λαβώντα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτω που, ὦ Σῶκρατες, τὰ μὲν
σπουδῆ, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐτέρως ἂν, ἥ λέγεις, ποιοὶ.
have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself.

PHAEDRUS. You are quite right about that, too.

SOCRATES. Now tell me; is there not another kind of speech, or word, which shows itself to be the legitimate brother of this bastard one, both in the manner of its begetting and in its better and more powerful nature?

PHAEDRUS. What is this word and how is it begotten, as you say?

SOCRATES. The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent.

PHAEDRUS. You mean the living and breathing word of him who knows, of which the written word may justly be called the image.

SOCRATES. Exactly. Now tell me this. Would a sensible husbandman, who has seeds which he cares for and which he wishes to bear fruit, plant them with serious purpose in the heat of summer in some garden of Adonis, and delight in seeing them appear in beauty in eight days, or would he do that sort of thing, when he did it at all, only in play and for amusement? Would he not, when he was in earnest, follow the rules of husbandry, plant his seeds in fitting ground, and be pleased when those which he had sowed reached their perfection in the eighth month?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, Socrates, he would, as you say, act in that way when in earnest and in the other way only for amusement.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἄγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα τοῦ γεωργοῦ φῶμεν ἦττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἐαυτοῦ στέρματα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἡ σημεῖα γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα σπουδὴ αὕτα ἐν ὑπατί γράφει μέλαιν σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὐτοῖς λόγῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἰκανῶς τάληθη διδάξαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ τὸ γ' εἰκός.

Δ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήπους, ὡς ἔοικε, παιδιὰς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράφει, ὅταν γράφῃ, ἐαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα θησαυροῖς ἔχοντα, ἐις τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἐὰν ἴκνηται, καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ταύτου ἔχος μετώπτω, ἡσθήσεται τὲ αὐτοῦς θεώρων φυσικὸν ἄπαλον· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλου παιδίας ἄλλας χρώνυται, συμποσίως τὸ σάρκωσε τὰς ἀπεροὺς τὰ στάτους ἄδελφα, τὸτ' ἐκεῖνος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀντὶ τούτων οἷς ἡ λέγω παῖζεν διάξει.

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδίαν, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παιζεῖν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις πέρι μυθολογοῦντα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὑπετε γὰρ, ὃ φίλε Φαίδρε, οὐτωπολύ δ', οἴμαι, καλλίων σπουδή περὶ αὐτα ἴδημεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρόμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἳ ἐαυτοῖς τῷ τε 277 φυτεύσαντες βοηθεῖν ἰκανοί καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἄλλα ἔχοντες στέρμα, θέν ἄλλου ἐν ἄλλοις ἴδεσι

1 οἷς ΒΤ. ὦ Schanz.
PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. And shall we suppose that he who has knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful has less sense about his seeds than the husbandman?

PHAEDRUS. By no means.

SOCRATES. Then he will not, when in earnest, write them in ink, sowing them through a pen with words which cannot defend themselves by argument and cannot teach the truth effectually.

PHAEDRUS. No, at least, probably not.

SOCRATES. No. The gardens of letters he will, it seems, plant for amusement, and will write, when he writes, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path, and he will be pleased when he sees them putting forth tender leaves. When others engage in other amusements, refreshing themselves with banquets and kindred entertainments, he will pass the time in such pleasures as I have suggested.

PHAEDRUS. A noble pastime, Socrates, and a contrast to those base pleasures, the pastime of the man who can find amusement in discourse, telling stories about justice, and the other subjects of which you speak.

SOCRATES. Yes, Phaedrus, so it is; but, in my opinion, serious discourse about them is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other minds other words capable
PLATO

φυόμενοι τούτ᾽ ἂεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἴκανοῖ, καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν μάλιστα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πολὺ γὰρ τούτ᾽ ἔτι κάλλιον λέγεις.

62. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῦν δὴ ἐκεῖνα ἢδή, ὦ Φαίδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν, τούτων ὁμολογημένων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὰ ποία;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὑμὶν δὴ πέρι βουληθέντες ἰδεῖν Β ἀφικόμεθα εἰς τόδε, ὅπως τὸ Δυσίον τε ὁνείδος ἐξετάσαιμεν τῆς τῶν λόγων γραφῆς πέρι, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους οὐ τέχνη καὶ ἀνευ τέχνης γράφοντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐντεχνὸν καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ μοι δεδηλῶσθαι μετρίως.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἕδοξέ γε δὴ πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησον με πῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πρὶν ἂν τις τὸ τε ἁληθὲς ἕκαστων εἰδῆ πέρι δὴν λέγει ἢ γράφει, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τε πᾶν ὀρίζεσθαι δυνατός γένηται, ὁρισάμενος τε πάλιν κατ᾽ εἰδὴ μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθή. περὶ τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διδῶν κατὰ ταύτα, τὸ Ω προσαρμόττον ἐκάστη γνῶσις εἰδῶς ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμῆ τῶν λόγων, ποικίλη μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῆ καὶ πανάρμονιους διδῶς λόγους, ἀπλοὺς δὲ ἀπλῆ. οὐ πρότερον δυνατόν τέχνη ἔσεθαι καθ᾽ ὅσον πέφυκε μεταχειρισθήναι τὸ λόγῳ γενος, οὕτε τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὕτε τι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι, ὡς ο ἐμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος.

1 Schanz omits kal.
of continuing the process for ever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest possible limit of human happiness.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, that is far nobler.

SOCRATES. And now, Phaedrus, since we have agreed about these matters, we can decide the others.

PHAEDRUS. What others?

SOCRATES. Those which brought us to this point through our desire to investigate them, for we wished to examine into the reproach against Lysias as a speech-writer,\(^1\) and also to discuss the speeches themselves and see which were the products of art and which were not. I think we have shown pretty clearly what is and what is not a work of art.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, I thought so, too; but please recall to my mind what was said.

SOCRATES. A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all this, he will not be able to speak by the method of art, so far as speech can be controlled by method, either for purposes of instruction or of persuasion. This has been taught by our whole preceding discussion.

\(^1\) See 257 c.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τούτῳ γε οὖτω πως ἔφανη.

63. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὅτι γνωρύμενον εὖ δίκη λέγοντ' ἂν ὅνειδος ἢ μὴ, ἀρα οὐ δεδήλωκεν τὰ λεχθέντα ὀλγον ἐμπροσθεν —

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὰ ποία;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ὡς εἰτε Δυσίας ἢ τις ἄλλος πώποτε ἐγραψεν ἢ γράψει ἰδία ἡ δημοσία νόμους τιθείς,1 σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων καὶ μεγάλην τινὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφῆνειαν, οὖτω μὲν ὅνειδος τῷ γράφοντι, εἰτε τὸς φησιν εἰτε μὴ τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ὑπαρ τε καὶ ὅταρ δικαίων τε καὶ ἄδικων πέρι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκφεύ-

Ε γεί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὔκ ἐπονείδιστον εἶναι, οὔδε ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὅχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ο δὲ γε ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ περὶ ἐκάστου παιδίαν τε ἡγούμενος πολλὴν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι, καὶ οὕδενα πώποτε λόγον ἐν μέτρω οὐδ' ἀνεύ μέτρου μεγάλης ἄξιον σπουδῆς γραφῆναι, οὔδὲ λεγόνει ὡς οἱ ραγωδοῦμενοι ἀνεύ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθούς ἐνεκα ἐλέ-

278 χθησαν,2 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδῶτον ὑπομήνυεν γεγονέναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδακτό-

μένοις καὶ μαθῆσεως χάριν λεγόμενοι καὶ τῷ ὅτι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν μόνοις τὸ τε ἐναργῆς εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς· δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους

1 Schanz, following Schleiermacher, brackets νόμους τιθείς.
2 Schanz brackets oúde . . . ἐλέχθησαν.
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. Yes, certainly, that is just about our result.

SOCRATES. How about the question whether it is a fine or a disgraceful thing to be a speaker or writer and under what circumstances the profession might properly be called a disgrace or not? Was that made clear a little while ago when we said—

PHAEDRUS. What?

SOCRATES. That if Lysias or anyone else ever wrote or ever shall write, in private, or in public as lawgiver, a political document, and in writing it believes that it possesses great certainty and clearness, then it is a disgrace to the writer, whether anyone says so, or not. For whether one be awake or asleep, ignorance of right and wrong and good and bad is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even if the whole mob applaud it.

PHAEDRUS. That is true.

SOCRATES. But the man who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much that is playful, and that no written discourse, whether in metre or in prose, deserves to be treated very seriously (and this applies also to the recitations of the rhapsodes, delivered to sway people's minds, without opportunity for questioning and teaching), but that the best of them really serve only to remind us of what we know; and who thinks that only in words about justice and beauty and goodness spoken by teachers for the sake of instruction and really written in a soul is clearness and perfection and serious value, that such words should be considered
Λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον ν深化改革 εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐὰν εὑρεθεῖ εὖ, ἔπευγα
Β εἰ τινὲς τούτου ἔγγονοι τε καὶ ἄδελφοι ἄμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἄξιαν ἐνέφυσαν
tοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν εὖ—οὗτος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ κινδυνεύει, ὁ Φαίδρε, εἰναι οἷον ἐγώ τε καὶ
σὺ εὐξαίμηθ' ἂν σὲ τε καὶ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε βούλομαι
tε καὶ εὐχομαι ἄ λέγεις.

64. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἣδη πεπαίσθω μετρίως
ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ λόγων, καὶ σὺ τε ἐλθὼν φράξε
Λυσία, ὅτι νῦ καταβάντες εἰς τὸ Νυμφᾶν νὰμά τε
C καὶ μουσεῖον ἠκούσαμεν λόγους, οὗ ἐπέστειλον
λέγειν Λυσία τε καὶ εὗ τις ἄλλος συντίθησι
λόγους, καὶ Ὄμηρος καὶ εὗ τις ἄλλος αὐτοὶ θυσί
ψιλῆν ἢ ἐν ὀρθῇ συντεθεικε, πρῶτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ
ὀστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμους ὄνομάξων συν-
γράμματα ἔγραψεν εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἢ τὸ ἄλλοθες ἔχει
συνέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἔχων βοῆθειν εἰς ἐλεγχὸν
ἰὼν περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγοις αὐτὸς δυνατός τὸ
γεγραμμένα φαίλα ἀποδεῖξαι, οὐ τι τῶν ἔπωνυ-
D μίαν ἔχοντα δεῖ λέγεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἄλλα ἐφ'
οίς ἐστοῦδακεν ἐκείνων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνας οὖν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῷ νέμεις;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Το μὲν σοφόν, ὁ Φαίδρε, καλεῖν
ἔμοιγε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ μόνῳ πρέπειν τὸ
δὲ ἡ φιλόσοφον ἡ τοιοῦτον τι μᾶλλον τε ἂν αὐτῷ
ἀρμόττοι καὶ ἐμελεστέρος ἔχοι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμιότερα
ἀν συνέθηκεν ἡ ἑγραφεῖν ἄνω κάτω στρέψον ἐν

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the speaker's own legitimate offspring, first the word within himself, if it be found there, and secondly its descendants or brothers which may have sprung up in worthy manner in the souls of others, and who pays no attention to the other words,—that man, Phaedrus, is likely to be such as you and I might pray that we ourselves may become.

PHAEDRUS. By all means that is what I wish and pray for.

SOCRATES. We have amused ourselves with talk about words long enough. Go and tell Lysias that you and I came down to the fountain and sacred place of the nymphs, and heard words which they told us to repeat to Lysias and anyone else who composed speeches, and to Homer or any other who has composed poetry with or without musical accompaniment, and third to Solon and whoever has written political compositions which he calls laws:—If he has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not to derive his title from such writings, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them.

PHAEDRUS. What titles do you grant them then?

SOCRATES. I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet "wise" is too great and befits God alone; but the name "philosopher," that is, "lover of wisdom," or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man.

PHAEDRUS. And quite appropriate.

SOCRATES. On the other hand, he who has nothing more valuable than the things he has composed or
Ε χρόνῳ, πρὸς ἀλληλα κολλαὶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν, ἐν δίκη που ποιητὴν ἢ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον προσερείς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα τοῖνυν τῷ ἐταίρῳ φράζε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δὲ; σὺ πῶς ποιήσεις; οὔδὲ γάρ οὔδὲ τὸν σὺν ἐταίρῳ δεῖ παρελθεῖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα τούτων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἰσοκράτη τὸν καλὸν ὁ τί ἀπαγγελεῖς, ὁ Σώκρατες; τίν’ αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νέος ἐτί, ὁ Φαίδρε, Ἰσοκράτης; ὁ 279 μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ’ αὐτὸν, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποίον δῆς;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Δυσλαν εἶναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἔτη τε ἡθεὶ γεννικοτέρῳ κεκράσθαι· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστὸν προϊόντος τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ περὶ αὐτούς τε τῶν λόγων, οἷς ὑνὶ ἐπιχειρεῖ, πλέουν ἡ παῖδων διενέγκοι τῶν πώτοτε ἄφαμένων λόγων, ἔτη τε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρῆσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μελζῷ τις αὐτὸν ἂγοι ὀρμήθην ὑθειτέρα· φύσει γάρ, ὁ φίλε, ἐνεστὶ τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ. ταῦτα δὴ ὁν ἐγὼ μὲν παρὰ τῶν ἐν τῶν θεῶν ὡς ἐμοὶ παῖδικοῖς Ἰσοκράτει ἐξαγγέλλω, σὺ δ’ ἐκεῖνα ὡς σοὶς Δυσλα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ταῦτα ἐσται· ἄλλα ἰωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμον ἡπιότερον γέγονεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὡσκοῦν εὐχαρένῳ πρέπει τοῦσδε πορεύεσθαι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡ φίλε Πᾶν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇθεοὶ, δοζήτε ὁ μοι καλὸν γενέσθαι τὰνδοθεν· ἐξωθεν

1 Schanz reads δοτέ.
written, turning his words up and down at his leisure, adding this phrase and taking that away, will you not properly address him as poet or writer of speeches or of laws?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.
SOCRATES. Tell this then to your friend.
PHAEDRUS. But what will you do? For your friend ought not to be passed by.
SOCRATES. What friend?
PHAEDRUS. The fair Isocrates. What message will you give him? What shall we say that he is?
SOCRATES. Isocrates is young yet, Phaedrus; however, I am willing to say what I prophesy for him.
PHAEDRUS. What is it?
SOCRATES. I think he has a nature above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character; so that I should not be surprised if, as he grows older, he should so excel in his present studies that all who have ever treated of rhetoric shall seem less than children; and I suspect that these studies will not satisfy him, but a more divine impulse will lead him to greater things; for my friend, something of philosophy is inborn in his mind. This is the message that I carry from these deities to my favourite Isocrátês, and do you carry the other to Lysias, your favourite.
PHAEDRUS. It shall be done; but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler.
SOCRATES. Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we go?
PHAEDRUS. Of course.
SOCRATES. O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful
PLATO

δὲ ὃσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια. πλούσιον

C ὑμῖν ἔντον σοφὸν τὸ ὑμῖν χρυσόν πλῆθος εἰη

μοι ὃσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύνατ' ἄλλος ἢ ὁ

σώφρων.—Ἐτ' ἄλλον τὸν ἰδόμεθα, ὦ Φαίδρε; εἴμοι μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ἥκται.

Φαίδρος. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τὰῦτα συνεῦχον κοινὰ γὰρ
tὰ τῶν φίλων.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡμεῖς.
PHAEDRUS

in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure.—Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? For me that prayer is enough.

PHAEDRUS. Let me also share in this prayer; for friends have all things in common.

SOCRATES. Let us go.
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