THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

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VOLUME IV.

LONDON:
W. H. ALLEN AND CO.,
7, LEADENHALL STREET.
1843.
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CHAPTER XXI.

The Marquis Cornwallis arrived in India prepared to abandon, as far as might be practicable, all the advantages gained for the British government by the wisdom, energy, and perseverance of his predecessor; to relax the bands by which the Marquis Wellesley had connected the greater portion of the states of India with the British government; and to reduce that government from the position of arbiter of the destinies of India, to the rank of one among many equals. His great age seems to have had little effect in diminishing his zeal, and he entered upon the task before him with an alacrity and energy worthy of a better object. On the 1st of August, 1805, he announced to the Court of Directors his arrival and assumption of the functions of governor-general. On the same day (two days only after his landing), he addressed the Secret
CHAPTER XXI. Committee, expressing great concern at finding that the government of which he was the head was "still at war with Holkar, and" could "hardly be said to be at peace with Scindia." With reference to this state of things, the governor-general intimated that he had determined to proceed immediately to the upper provinces, in order to avail himself of the cessation of military operations caused by the rainy season, "to endeavour to terminate by negotiation a contest in which," the Marquis Cornwallis was pleased to observe, "the most brilliant success can afford us no solid benefit." It is not necessary to pause, in order to inquire what was the precise meaning attached by the writer to the words last quoted, or whether in any sense they were true, with regard to the existing position of the British interests. The passage marks sufficiently the spirit in which the letter from which it is extracted was written; and not less strongly indicates the nature of the policy which, under instructions from home, the governor-general proposed to pursue. It is true that the expression of his desire to terminate the contest by negotiation was qualified by the conditional words, "if it can be done without a sacrifice of our honour;" but little importance could be attached to this saving clause, when placed in juxtaposition with the concluding words of the governor-general's letter, in which he declares that the continuance of "the contest" must involve the state "in pecuniary difficulties which" it would "hardly be able to surmount." The war had un-
doubtedly, as in all similar cases, been attended with considerable temporary addition to the current expenses, and some financial difficulties had been the result; but to regard the necessary vindication of the national honour and the defence of the national interests as likely to lead to such a degree of embarrassment as should be nearly, if not altogether, insurmountable, was a view of the subject which the judgment and experience of the governor-general ought to have led him to repudiate with contempt. When such disheartening apprehensions are indulged, whatever professions may be made of an intention to uphold the national honour, and with whatever degree of sincerity, those who are jealous of their country's dignity have always cause for distrust. What constitutes a surrender of national honour is a question which cannot be answered with scientific exactness. In resolving it, the feelings usually exercise a powerful influence over the understanding. An exalted few, endowed with a perspicacity of intellect which prejudice cannot cloud, and a nobility of spirit which circumstances cannot abate, may be able at all times and in all positions to perceive what honour requires—to contemplate without dismay the cost of obeying its dictates, and unshrinkingly to pay it. But such instances are rare. Men, deficient neither in understanding nor in honourable principle, constantly allow motives of a lower character than the proper suggestions of either to influence their judgment. Some abject feeling is allowed to act upon the understanding, which re-
acts upon the moral system by finding reasons for doing that which is desired. The suggestions of the higher feelings are thus silenced; the intellectual faculties and the moral perceptions are engaged in operations of mutual deceit; and the entire mind employed in confusing that which is plain, and distorting that which is true, for the purpose of affording a colourable justification for a course which expediency suggests, but which reason and honest feeling would alike condemn, if permitted to have free course. In such a process originates much that passes in the world for statesmanship.

A month after the date of the Marquis Cornwallis's first letter to the Secret Committee, he addressed to them a second, dated on the river near Raje Maal, in which he avowed his dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs at the courts of the Peishwa and the Nizam. His views were stated more at large in communications addressed by his order to the residents at those courts. Colonel Close, the resident at Poona, had been compelled to animadvert on some of the gross abuses suffered to prevail under the Peishwa's government, as in those of all other Oriental potentates; and he had reported to his own government the representations which he had made, and the results. It is unnecessary to advert to the precise points of discussion, or to offer an opinion on them. The affair is referred to only for the purpose of shewing the deliberately expressed judgment of the Marquis Cornwallis on an important part of the policy of his predecessor.
That opinion was condemnatory. The Marquis Cornwallis had arrived at an age which entitled him to respect. A large part of his long life had been passed in the discharge of important military and political functions, and a portion of his experience had been gained in India. Yet he could refer to the alliance with the Peishwa in the following terms: "It must be in your recollection that during Marquis Cornwallis's former administration, his lordship, foreseeing the evils of mixing in the labyrinth of Mahratta politics and Mahratta contentions, sedulously avoided that sort of connection with the Peishwa's government which was calculated to involve the Company in the difficulties and embarrassments of our actual situation; and that his lordship decidedly rejected distinct proposals conveyed through the channel of Hurry Punt Phurkiah for a more intimate alliance than that which was concluded by the convention of 1792. The evils, however, which his lordship then anticipated from such an alliance appear to his lordship to have been exceeded by those which have actually occurred under the operation of the treaty of Bassein, combined with the distracted condition of the Peishwa's dominions, and with the weakness and inefficiency of his highness's administration."*

* Letter from Secretary to Government to Colonel Close, 18th August, 1805.
CHAP. XXI. ence to his immediate predecessor, who had scarcely vacated the seat of government; it is unnecessary to direct attention to the modesty with which the merit of great political foresight is claimed for the nobleman by whose orders the letter was written; it is unnecessary to dilate upon the eagerness with which this condemnation of the Marquis Wellesley was put forth in a communication to a servant of the government, holding, indeed, an office of high trust and responsibility, but the character of which was ministerial—who was bound to obey the orders of his government, whatever they might be—who had simply applied for instructions on particular points, and whose duty to carry out the instructions afforded in answer was in no degree affected by depreciating remarks on the policy of one governorgeneral, or a eulogistic display of the wisdom of another. All these points may be passed over; nor will it be necessary even to enter into any refutation of the inconsiderate, ill-timed, and egotistic statement which has been presented to the reader. It has been so presented, to shew that the state of feeling which prevailed in England on Indian affairs, and of which state of feeling the Marquis Cornwallis was the representative, was unimproved by time and experience; that the statesman from whom it proceeded was himself alike unaffected by those instructors; and that the statement which has been made, that he came prepared to abandon, as far as might be practicable, all the advantages gained by his predecessor, has not been hazarded
lightly or without cause. If the arguments which have been adduced in defence of the Marquis Wellesley's policy with regard to the Mahratta states have failed of their object, it is only requisite to pursue the course of events a few years beyond the time when the Marquis Cornwallis's condemnation of that policy was uttered, to remove any doubt as to which of the two noble statesmen was in the right.

The manner in which the Marquis Cornwallis proposed to bring the war to an end, "without sacrifice of honour," was expounded by himself in a letter to Lord Lake.* The principal obstacles, he observed, with regard to Scindia, were the detention of the British resident by that chief, and the refusal of the British government to deliver up Gwalior and Gohud. The governor-general had a ready mode of getting rid of these difficulties. It was to surrender both points to Scindia—to give him every thing in dispute, to restore to him territory which the British government had solemnly guaranteed to another, and to allow his right to exercise the discretion of choosing his own time for the release of the British residency—to dismiss his prisoners when he pleased, and not a moment sooner. "I am aware," said the governor-general, "of the disadvantages of immediately relinquishing or even of compromising the demand which has been so repeatedly and so urgently made for the release of the British residency"—strange would it have been had he not been aware of them, and strange it was that an English nobleman, and an Eng-

* Dated 19th September, 1805.
lish soldier, should have perceived only the "disad-

vantages" of such a course, and have been blind to the
disgrace which it involved. The governor-general
continues, "but I deem it proper to apprise your
lordship that, as a mere point of honour"—although
the "sacrifice" of "honour" was to be avoided—
"I am disposed to compromise, or even to abandon
that demand, if it should ultimately prove to be the
only obstacle to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs
with Dowlut Rao Scindia; and that I have hitherto
been induced to support it (the demand), by the
ap-
prehension that the motives of such a concession
might be misinterpreted, and that it might lead to de-
mands, on the part of Scindia, with which we could
not comply, without a sacrifice of dignity and in-
terest incompatible with our security, and thereby
render still more difficult of attainment the desira-
ble object of a general pacification." In this ex-
traordinary passage, "a mere point of honour" is dis-
posed of as summarily as though it were a claim to
a fraction of a rupee, and the promise that no sacri-
fice in this respect should take place might be sup-
posed to be forgotten. Towards the close, however,
a transient allusion to the possibility of Scindia
offering further outrage to the dignity of the British
nation and government, intimates that there was a
point at which the forbearance of the governorgen-
general would have stopped. It would be a curious,
if not a useful inquiry, where it would have been
found. It seems probable that it would have re-
ceded as Scindia advanced, though how far must for
ever remain uncertain. If the chief were to be in-
dulged with the privilege of imprisoning at his
pleasure the representative of the British govern-
ment, what was to be refused him?

For the surrender of Gwalior and Gohud the
governor-general had a better apology. He was
justified by those views of policy which were in
fashion at home, and by which he professed to be
guided, though during his former administration he
had sometimes happily overlooked them. There
was one difficulty in the way of the surrender—a
large portion of the territory had been transferred to
another. But this was not to impede the proposed
arrangement. The obstacle was perhaps regarded
as "a mere point of honour," and therefore unworthy
of much attention. The reasoning of the governor-
general on this point, if reasoning it may be called,
deserves notice. "With regard," says he, "to the
cession of Gwalior and Gohud, in my decided opinion,
it is desirable to abandon our possession of the former
and our connection with the latter, independently of
any reference to a settlement of differences with
Dowlut Rao Scindia." In declaring such a course
"desirable," the governor-general must have meant
desirable for the government which he administered.
Upon this assumption he thus proceeds: "I have
therefore no hesitation in resolving to transfer to
Dowlut Rao Scindia the possession of that fortress
and territory; securing, however, suitable provision
for the Rana: an arrangement which, under actual
circumstances, I am satisfied is entirely consistent
CHAP. XXI. with our public faith." The word "therefore" is
important—it displays fully and nakedly the morality
of the proposed transaction. The governor-general
first asserts that it is desirable—desirable to himself
and his government to dissolve the connection sub-
sisting between that government and a native prince
—"therefore" he "has no hesitation"—such are his
words—in resolving to give away to an enemy the
territory of that prince, territory which he enjoys
under the protection of the British government, and
which is secured to him (as far as a written instru-
ment can be a security) by a solemn treaty. "Under
actual circumstances"—that is, with reference to the
supposed convenience of the arrangement—the go-
vernor-general is satisfied that such a transfer is
entirely consistent with public faith! He returns
to the subject in a subsequent part of the letter to
Lord Lake, and it is but just to give him the benefit
of his more extended argument.

The Rana of Gohud was weak and incapable.
Though his family were the ancient sovereigns of
the country, they had been out of possession for a
period sufficient to eradicate much, if not all, of the
respect originating in habitual obedience. Under
these circumstances, it may readily be believed that
the country was ill governed—rather that, as far as
the Rana was concerned, it was not governed at all,
but was, in common with most native states, a scene
of lawlessness and violence. There is no reason to
distrust the representation of the governor-general,
who says, that the account given by Lord Lake and
the general tenour of the information which he had received upon the subject afforded "abundant proof of the utter inability of" the Rana "to regulate the affairs of his country, to preserve its tranquillity, or to realize its revenue. The territory," he continues, "must exhibit a constant scene of turbulence and disorder, unless it shall be placed under the absolute management and control of a local British authority. The British government must be burdened and embarrassed with the charge of administering the affairs of that country without the advantage of our own laws and regulations, and without any other benefit than that of securing the amount of the stipulated subsidy for the payment of the subsidized troops, which it would be necessary to keep in a state of constant and active employment, for the preservation of tranquillity and the realization of the revenues. The Rana would, in fact, become a pensioner upon the British government, although the nominal sovereign of a country estimated to yield a revenue of twenty-five lacs of rupees per annum. I am aware of the stipulation in the treaty with the Rana, which secures to the British government the realization of the amount of the subsidy, by giving us a right to appoint a person to superintend the collection of that amount, in the event of a failure on the part of the Rana in the payment of it. But there are duties and obligations imposed upon the Rana by the terms of the treaty beyond the mere payment of the subsidy, and his neglect, refusal, or inability to fulfil them, would unquestionably justify the dissolution
CHAP. XXI. of the alliance. But independent of this considera-
tion, it may be observed that, according to the
acknowledged principles of public law, an alli-
ance which exposes to hazard the most essential
interests of either of the allied states, and conse-
sequently endangers the very existence of that state,
may be abandoned without any implication of its
public faith. At the same time, it is incumbent
upon a state so situated to make such compensation
to the other contracting party as circumstances may
render practicable. I have no hesitation in stating
my decided opinion, that the necessity of acquiring
a right to dispose of the territory of Gohud, con-
sidered as a mean indispensably requisite to lay the
foundation of a general pacification (which in my
judgment it unquestionably is), renders the preced-
ing observations precisely applicable to the case of
the alliance subsisting between the British govern-
ment and the Rana of Gohud. Under either, or
both, of the points of view in which I have
considered our alliance with Gohud, my mind is
entirely satisfied of the justice of annulling it, se-
curing at the same time a suitable provision for
the Rana, and affording ample protection to his
person and family. It is superfluous to add, that
the abrogation of the treaty, by which alone the
Rana obtained the sovereignty of Gohud, leaves the
British government at liberty to dispose of that terri-
tory in the manner most consistent with its interests.
At the same time, I am anxious that, if possible, the
right of disposing of that territory should be the re-
sult of a negotiation with the Rana of Gohud; and it appears to me to be probable, that the Rana, sensible of his utter incapacity to govern his country, or even to derive from it a sufficient maintenance, and exposed to the difficulties, dangers, and vexations of such a charge, will be disposed to exchange it for a certain annual income, which will afford him, without effort or trouble, the means of living in comfort, ease, and independence."*

This passage is quoted without abridgment or mutilation, in order to afford the noble author all the advantage to be derived from expounding his own views in his own language; and it is too remarkable a specimen of the dialectic art to be passed over without examination.

From an assumption of the inability of the Rana of Gohud to fulfil the duties and obligations imposed by the treaty, the governor-general infers the right of the other party to dissolve the alliance; and to this position no objection can be taken. Where two states are bound by treaty imposing upon each specified obligations, it is clear that, should one of them become permanently disabled from fulfilling its share of obligation, the other may without injustice declare the treaty at an end, provided the state thus acting be in no degree accountable for the inability of its ally. The governor-general proceeds to take up another ground of justification for the course which he intended to pursue. According to the acknowledged principles of public law, he

* Letter to Lord Lake, 19th September, 1805.
CHAP. XXI. says, "an alliance which exposes to hazard the most essential interests of either of the allied states, and consequently endangers the very existence of that state, may be abandoned without any implication of its public faith." This position is not so clearly laid down as to allow it to be either admitted or denied without qualification. To say that an alliance exposes to hazard the most essential interests of a state, is a form of expression suitable from its convenient looseness to afford a pretense for doing anything which those who use it desire to do. If the sentence be divested of these embarrassing words, and the affirmation be, that an alliance which endangers the very existence of one of the contracting states may be abandoned, the governor-general may demand as free an admission for this position as for the former. One of his principles being thus just, and the other admissible with some qualification, it remains to examine the application of them to the particular case which called forth their enunciation.

The case claims notice primarily with reference to the Marquis Cornwallis's first position. What were those duties and obligations imposed on the Rana by the treaty which he was incapable of fulfilling, or which he had refused or neglected to fulfil? He had bound himself to pay to the Company a certain amount of subsidy. It was not pretended that there was any reason to apprehend loss. The Company were entitled by the treaty to appoint a person to superintend the collection of the requisite amount, in case the Rana neglected to pay it.
It is true that, from the want of vigour in the government, there might at some future time have been a state of circumstances calculated to give rise to just apprehension for the realization of the subsidy; and when such occasion might arrive or approach, it would become the duty of the British government to remonstrate, and perhaps to demand further security. But it is to be remarked, that the pecuniary obligations of the Rana are not those on which the governor-general rests his case. He says—"There are duties and obligations imposed upon the Rana by the terms of the treaty beyond the mere payment of the subsidy; and his neglect, refusal, or inability to fulfil them would unquestionably justify the dissolution of the alliance." It would have been more satisfactory had the delinquency of the Rana been stated positively, instead of being referred to hypothetically. It would have been more for the honour of the governor-general's policy to have stated precisely what the duties and obligations of the Rana were, and wherein he had failed in performance. It was due, indeed, both to the Rana and to the character of the British government, that such an exposition should have been given. Disappointed of finding the requisite information in the statement of the governor-general, it is natural to turn to the treaty. Besides the payment of subsidy the Rana was bound to cede Gwalior to the Company, and he had ceded it; he was bound to allow to the British government a limited discretion as to the placing of troops, and the preserva-
tion or destruction of forts within his country; he was bound to assist the Company against their enemies, not with any specified amount of force, but with all that he could command, whether much or little; he was bound to refer, in the first instance, his disputes with other chieftains to the Company; he was bound during war to act in conformity with the advice and counsel of the commander of the Company's troops; and he was bound not to retain in his service, or admit within his territories, any European, without the consent of the British government. As some of these obligations are not only very extensive but very vague, it is impossible to affirm that in no minute point, and under no possible construction of terms, had the Rana ever deviated from the letter of the treaty; but it is quite certain that in the main and essential points it had been observed. The contrary is never distinctly alleged—it is assumed, and sentence of deposition passed on the assumption. We are told, and justly, that if the Rana did not fulfil his engagements there would be just cause for annulling the treaty; but all the evidence of non-fulfilment is the declaration that the mind of the governor-general was entirely satisfied of the justice of annulling the treaty on the principle just quoted as well as on another. From one who went to India the representative of that class of persons who claimed the exclusive care of the rights of native princes, something beyond mere assertion might have been expected, in justification of so important a measure.
as the removal of a chieftain in alliance with the British government from a throne on which that government had placed him.

The second of the governor-general's positions is now to be investigated. That position, divested of the dangerously vague language in which it is partially enshrouded, supposes the case of an adherence to the obligations of a treaty endangering the very existence of one of the contracting states. And was this, then, the situation of the British empire in India at this period? Was the strength of the British government in that country reduced so low that it dared not maintain a treaty with a petty prince, dependent on its power, for fear of offending a public robber dignified with the name and ensigns of sovereignty? Was the nation that had not only overcome the mightiest of native states, but had more than once expelled from every part of India the only European power that dared to contend with it, whose "merchants" had, without a figure, become "princes," and more than princes—dispensing thrones at their will, and extending protection to the representatives of departed dynasties; was this nation so humbled that its very existence was endangered—this is the case supposed—unless it could be so fortunate as to purchase peace by the abrogation of a treaty offensive to a freebooter known as Dowlut Rao Scindia? Was this terrible enemy in possession of Calcutta, as Sooraj-oo-Dowlah had been, or was he at its gates, as Hyder Ali had been before those of Madras? Not so; he was flying from the
face of a British army, his previous experience power-
fully suggesting to him the inexpediency of en-
countering such an enemy.

The Marquis Cornwallis himself would scarcely
have admitted, distinctly and unequivocally, that by
refusing to tender the Rana of Gohud as a peace
offering to Scindia, the existence of the British go-
vernment would have been endangered. The pro-
position is so monstrous, that if put forth undis-
guisedly, it must have been received, even by the
political alarmists at home, with a laugh of derision
or an explosion of indignation. Mixed up with
vague expressions of "hazard to the most essential
interests" of a state, meant to imply that an ad-
herence to the particular treaty under discussion
would be attended with hazard to the most essential
interests of Great Britain, it passed as a valid reason
for a breach of faith. And what was the interest
specially to be promoted? The conclusion of an
immediate peace. The sacrifice of the Rana of
Gohud was, in the language of the governor-general,
"requisite to lay the foundation of a general pacifi-
cation." In pursuit of this phantom of "a general
pacification," never to be obtained by such means,
was the Rana of Gohud to be despoiled of his terri-
tory—for such, according to the construction of the
Marquis Cornwallis, was to be the effect of dissolv-
ing the alliance. This was certainly a mode of
treating such relations calculated to fill with alarm
all allies of the British government in India who
were not strong enough to defend themselves. Ad-
mitting that the governor-general had good reason to withdraw from the alliance in question, did it follow that the abandoned ally was to surrender possession of his dominions? The Marquis Cornwallis maintained that it did; and so strong did he feel, or affect to feel, that he deemed it unnecessary to support his views by any argument whatever. "It is superfluous," he said, "to add, that the abrogation of the treaty by which alone the Rana obtained the sovereignty of Gohud, leaves the British government at liberty to dispose of that territory in the manner most consistent with its interests."

The governor-general could hardly believe that such a position could be admitted by any one who ever saw the treaty, unless prepared to admit that a strong state may act towards a weak one in any manner consistent with the supposed interests of the stronger. The first article of the treaty with the Rana of Gohud declared that a permanent friendship and alliance was established between the two states—the permanence of the engagement received a happy illustration from the Marquis Cornwallis: it was added, that the friends and enemies of one party should be the friends and enemies of both. This the governor-general might immediately annul at his pleasure, as he might the third, fifth, seventh, eighth, and ninth articles, containing various provisions relating to the subsidiary force, the assistance to be rendered by the Rana to the British government, his dependence, in certain cases, upon that government, and his renunciation of the right to employ Euro-
peans in his service. All this it was competent to
the governor-general to set aside. He might relieve
the Rana from his obligations to the British govern-
ment, and, if necessary, might deny that prince the
protection of a subsidiary force. But there were
three other articles, the second, fourth, and fifth. The
second ran thus:—"The Honourable the East-India
Company hereby agree to establish Maharajah Rana
Kerrut Singh in the sovereignty of his hereditary
countries of Gohud, and the under-mentioned dis-
tricts, to be possessed by him, his heirs and suc-
cessors, free from all deductions, under the guarantee
of the Honourable Company." The districts were
then enumerated. By the fourth article the Rana
agreed, that the city and fortress of Gwalior should
be permanently vested in the Company; and by
the fifth, the Company were bound not to de-
mand any tribute for the country delivered over to
the Rana. The question now to be determined is
this: was the Marquis Cornwallis, as governor-gene-
ral of India, at any time during his administration,
in a situation to annul the second article as illus-
trated by the fourth and fifth? The Company had
bound itself to put the Rana in possession of certain
territories, and it had been done. It was not some-
thing contemplated but actually effected; and though
the governor-general might set aside so much of the
treaty as had prospective operation—might under
such an act withdraw the British guarantee, remove
the subsidiary force, and leave the Rana without
defence, could he reverse what had been done?
Could he justly divest the Rana of territories which had been actually transferred to his possession, even had the transfer been a gift of something to which the receiver had no claim? And if not, how much greater was the wrong of thus acting, when it was admitted by the British government in the treaty that the Rana had a claim founded on hereditary right? If the policy of the Marquis Cornwallis were just, then the surrender of territory by one state to another is to be regarded in all cases as a mere temporary arrangement, and ceded possessions may be resumed at pleasure. Not only so, but any state may also at pleasure take and give away the ancient territory of another, if strong enough to take such a course with impunity. The hereditary right of the Rana is not only directly admitted in the second article, but indirectly acknowledged in the fourth, by the British government consenting to receive from him the cession of the city and fortress of Gwalior. If the British government were by the treaty giving to the Rana territory to which he had no other claim, why was Gwalior mentioned at all? Why did not the conquerors keep it without the formality of a cession from the Rana? That prince had been so long out of possession, that the obligation of restoring him, when his country fell into the power of the British government, may be questioned; but it cannot admit of question whether, when restored, his rights should or should not be respected. The abrogation of the treaty, then, did not confer upon the governor-
general the right of disposing of the Rana's territory, although he thought the right so clear as not to require to be defended, nor even distinctly affirmed. He might abrogate the treaty as to any future effect—he could not abrogate it as to that which was past. The Company had agreed to put the Rana in possession of his territories, and it was no longer a question whether they should perform the stipulation or not. It had been performed; and though the further operation of the treaty might be barred by the withdrawal of one of the parties from the alliance, there was no provision for enabling either to undo what had been done under it. This would have become perfectly clear to the British government had the Rana called for the retransfer of Gwalior. Stript of the flimsy disguise thrown over the affair (and most transparent it is), the transaction stands forth as one defensible on no grounds but those of the most unprincipled expediency. In the language of the governor-general, there was (in his judgment at least) "a necessity for acquiring a right to dispose of the territory of Gohud;" that necessity arising from a desire to please Scindia, and to aid the humble solicitations of the British government to the freebooter for peace, by the offer of the territory thus necessary to be acquired. But rights do not spring up to gratify mere convenience; and though the governor-general was satisfied, posterity will judge differently. He had "no hesitation" in resolving to dispose of the territory of a dependent ally; and those who review
his conduct in this instance will have "no hesita-
tion" in condemning it.

The only plausible excuse that could be offered for the Marquis Cornwallis would be, that he attached some importance to the claims of Scindia under the treaty made with that chief; that he thought Scindia had some reason to believe that he should not lose the territory in question; and that, in the conflict of claims between Scindia and the Rana, he felt disposed to admit the superiority of those of the former. But of this apology the Marquis Cornwallis was sedulous to deprive himself. In the same paper in which he argues away the rights of the Rana, he thus expresses himself with regard to those of Scindia:—

"In any communication with Scindia or his officers, respecting the cession of Gohud and Gwalior, Scindia must be given to understand that the British government does not admit his claim to those places, and that the transfer of them to his possession is totally unconnected with the question of right, and must be considered to be an act entirely gratuitous on our part." It thus appears that the Marquis Cornwallis was ready to deprive of territory a prince who, it could not be denied, had some claim to it, both from hereditary right and under the treaty with the British government, and to give that territory to a person who, it was admitted, had no claim, the transfer being declared to be totally unconnected with the question of right, and to be an act perfectly gratuitous. The generosity of the British government, in giving away that which was
not its own, is not less deserving of admiration than its magnanimity in committing the injustice for the sake of conciliating an enemy equally unprincipled and despicable. Nothing could be more true than the assertion of the governor-general, that the transfer of Gohud from the Rana to Scindia was "totally unconnected with the question of right."

But it would be wrong to withhold from the Marquis Cornwallis the only praise that can be awarded him in this transaction. He was anxious that, "if possible"—these are important words—"the right of disposing of" the "territory" of the Rana of Gohud "should be the result of a negotiation." If the "right" were to be acquired, it could, indeed, be obtained in no other way; but what if the negotiation had failed? In conformity with his generally mild and amiable character, the Marquis Cornwallis preferred gentle means; but if these had been ineffective, he would have taken the coveted territory by force—a fine specimen of regard for the rights of native princes.

Perhaps, however, another ground of justification may suggest itself to the mind. Was the Marquis Cornwallis moved by the disorder and misery prevailing under the sway of the Rana to endeavour to place the country in a better state? Was he actuated by a generous feeling of compassion for the inhabitants, and a desire to deliver them from the evils under which they were suffering? The answer is found in the proposed destination of the country. It was not to be occupied by the British government.
Having been a scene of violence and oppression under one native government, it was to continue so under another.

The Rana of Gohud was not a very important person, and it may appear that the question of his right has been discussed at a disproportionate length. But it should be remembered, that the great principles of justice, and the honour of the British government in India, are involved in the subject; and on these grounds it became not only expedient, but indispensable, to devote to the subject a degree of attention which the intrinsic importance of the transaction would not call for. It was desirable, also, to embrace the opportunity afforded for illustrating the character of that policy which the Marquis Wellesley set at nought during his administration, but which revived in all the vigour of imbecility on his departure. Nothing is unimportant which tends to throw light on a system which so long operated to the injury of both England and India, and to the extension of the evils which it professed to prevent.

Scindia was to keep the British residency in custody as long as he pleased, and he was to be gratified by the plunder of the Rana of Gohud for his benefit, as well as by the submission of the British government in the surrender of the fortress of Gwalior. Other concessions were also proposed. Scindia was to be enticed to peace by the prospect of the restoration of the Jyneghur tribute, and by the rescission of the prohibition of stationing
troops in the districts allotted to him in the Doab. On the other hand, the chief was to be invited to consent to the abrogation of the pensions, and to the resumption of the jaghires in the Doab established by the treaty of peace; to relinquish his claim to the arrears of pension; to give compensation for the public and private losses sustained by the plunder of the British residency, and to make a provision for the Rana of Gohud to the extent of two and a half or three lacs per annum. The pensions and jaghires referred to, it is to be remarked, were not given for the personal benefit of Scindia, but upon grounds of public policy with reference to the British government. On this point the evidence of Sir Arthur Wellesley, by whom the treaty with Scindia was concluded, should be heard. "It would have been impossible," said he, "to arrange this great cession"—the cession of territory north of Jeypore, Joudpore, and Gohud—"in the disturbed state of Scindia's government, under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation in comparison with that of his rival Holkar, without determining to provide, in some degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenues of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar's hands and to add to his armies all the sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries, and who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindia's service, and would have looked to Holkar for protection and future
employment. I chose the former.** It is true that circumstances were, in some degree, changed. Holkar was no longer formidable; but it will shortly be seen that even this chieftain, who, among a confederacy of robber princes, was the most of a robber and the least of a prince, was to share largely in the charity of the governor-general—a charity so wide and sweeping as to embrace all except the dependents and allies of his own government. In this case, too, there was a further breach of faith. The British government had bound itself to pay certain pensions, and to allot certain jaghires. The obligation was to be got rid of by negotiation, not with the parties who enjoyed the pensions and jaghires, but with Scindia, who, in consideration of benefits to be secured to himself, it was expected with great reason, would be quite ready to sacrifice the interests of his dependents. With all the baits to be held out to Scindia's ambition and cupidity, however, the governor-general was still apprehensive that enough had not been proposed. After enumerating the various points which have been noticed, the Marquis Cornwallis thus continued his address to Lord Lake:—"Your lordship will understand this to be the arrangement which I am desirous of concluding with Dowlut Rao Scindia; but I shall be disposed to relax in some of the demands in favour of the Company, and even to extend the cessions to Scindia, if it should appear to be necessary for the

* Letter from Major-General Wellesley to governor-general, 30th December, 1803, published in Wellington Despatches.
satisfactory adjustment of affairs between the two states; but it is my desire that the negotiation should be commenced upon the basis of this proposed arrangement." The proposal was, therefore, merely suggestive—a scheme propounded for the purpose of opening a discussion. The governor-general would ask nothing beyond it for his own government, but he was prepared to give Scindia much more. On one point, however, he was firm in determining to disappoint that chieftain's expectations. Scindia had expressed a hope of obtaining a portion of the territory conquered from Holkar by the British army. This hope Lord Lake was enjoined not to encourage, as the governor-general would not gratify it. The reason for this extraordinary instance of unyieldingness will scarcely be conjectured. The Marquis Cornwallis intended to restore the whole of the conquests to Holkar. In the character of Holkar there was nothing to claim either forbearance or respect; he was an inveterate enemy of the British government, and he had provoked the war in which he had suffered so severely. But his crimes, his enmity, and his wanton provocation of hostility, were all to be forgotten. Amnesty for past offences and no security against future violence were the principles on which the British government in India was to be administered.

In a very submissive letter framed at this time by the governor-general for transmission to Scindia, he took occasion to pass a lofty encomium on his former government, and to lay down the principle
on which the present was to be carried on. "You cannot be ignorant," he said, "of the general principles which governed my conduct towards all the states of Hindostan and the Deccan during the period of my former administration of the Company's affairs. It was the uniform maxim of my government to cultivate the friendship and confidence of surrounding states, by abstaining from any encroachment upon their rights, privileges, and independence, and from all interference whatever in their internal concerns and in their transactions with each other, and by promoting the adjustment of all depending questions, upon principles of justice, equity, and moderation; to refrain from the prosecution of any views of conquest or extension of dominion, and to limit my attention to the internal prosperity of the Company's possessions, and to the happiness and tranquillity of the Company's subjects." In the above passage the writer seems to have forgotten the conquests which he made from Tippoo, and kept for the Company. Far, indeed, was he from deserving blame for this departure from his own avowed policy; it is only to be lamented that he did not depart from it still farther; but if he had acted consistently with it—if he had acted in accordance with the course which at this period he proposed following with regard to Holkar, he would have restored to Tippoo all that he had won from him, and accompanied the restoration with many high-sounding words in praise of moderation in general, and more especially of that
displayed by himself. The governor-general thus continued to address Scindia:—"I have returned to this country with a resolution to regulate every act of my administration by the same just and moderate principles. The states which are disposed to remain upon terms of amity with the British government, and to abstain from the prosecution of designs injurious to its interests, will have no cause to apprehend any design on our part to establish over them any degree of control, or to interfere in any manner in their internal concerns." It would not have been desirable to quote the above specimen of wordy philanthropy for the mere purpose of exhibiting the Marquis Cornwallis's opinion of himself, but it becomes interesting from the fact that it led, in his communication to Lord Lake, to the expression of an opinion on another immeasurably his superior. After informing the commander-in-chief of the communication about to be made to Scindia, and its purport as to the cession of Gwalior and Gohud, the separation of Scindia from Holkar, and the release by the former of the British resident, the Marquis Cornwallis continues: "I have deemed it advisable to combine with a declaration to that effect, a statement of the general principles of policy by which I am desirous of regulating the conduct of the British government towards all the states of India. I am anxious to promulgate those principles, with a view to restore to the native states that confidence in the justice and moderation of the British government which past events have considerably
impaired, and which appears to me essential to the security and tranquillity of the Company's dominions." Two points are conspicuously brought to notice in this passage: first, that the Marquis Cornwallis never lost an opportunity of reviling the policy of his illustrious predecessor; secondly, that he could profess anxiety for the confidence of the native states, not only in the moderation but in the justice of the British government, at a time when all that he proposed was calculated to destroy confidence both in the justice and good faith of that government.

If this position require further illustration, it will be found in the course which the Marquis Cornwallis proposed to adopt towards the native princes beyond the Jumna with whom the British government had recently formed engagements. Those engagements he intended summarily to annul. There was a portion of territory lying to the southward and westward of Delhi, which the governor-general calculated would afford him the means of carrying his views into effect, with some semblance of regard to the claims of those who were to be deprived of the protection of the British government. A portion was to be assigned in jaghires to the inferior chiefs who had joined the British cause, and the remainder to be divided in unequal proportions between the Rajahs of Machery and Bhurtpore, on those chieftains relinquishing their alliance with the British government—a connection which, it is clear, they could not maintain, if the party contracting with them
chose to withdraw from it. The governor-general did not, as in the case of the Rana of Gohud, enter into any argument to prove the consistency of the course which he proposed with the principles of public law and the dictates of good faith. Whether he thought that the preservation of the alliances with the Rajahs of Machery and Bhurtpore "exposed to hazard the most essential interests of" the British state, and "consequently" endangered "its very existence," does not appear. The expediency, or at least the safety, of the arrangement is maintained at some length. "It appears to me," said the governor-general, "that those chieftains (the Rajahs of Machery and Bhurtpore) must be interested in excluding the Mahrattas, and that their territories, thus extended, would constitute the desirable barrier between the possessions of Scindia in Hindostan and our possessions in the Doab, provided they should be able to resist the power of Scindia." To the question of their probable ability, the governor-general answers: "It appears to me to be probable, that in the reduced condition of Scindia's military force, those chieftains would be able to maintain their possessions and their independence against his utmost efforts, especially if aided by the jaghire-dars, who would of course be interested in opposing him." But the sanguine expectations of his lordship did not lead him to overlook the possibility that the result of a contest between Scindia and the abandoned allies of the British government might be
unfavourable to the latter; and he thus treats of Chap. XXI.
such a contingency:—"Even the probability of Scindia's ultimate success would not, in my opinion, constitute a sufficient objection to the proposed arrangement; being satisfied of the expediency even of admitting into the territories in question the power of Dowlutt Rao Scindia, rather than that we should preserve any control over or connection with them."* So anxious was the governor-general to dispossess his country of dominion, that he would rather see its most bitter enemy on its frontier than retain the power and influence by which he was to be kept at a distance. This was the statesmanship of the time. The intense and unmitigated selfishness to which it led ought not to be lost sight of under the overwhelming impression of its folly. The possibility of Scindia possessing the countries which England was about to abandon was regarded solely with reference to the presumed interests of the nation which the Marquis Cornwallis represented. The wrongs and sufferings to be inflicted upon the conquered provinces and their rulers were too unimportant to require even a passing consideration. The British government was to stand aloof and calmly witness the absorption of the territories of its late allies and dependents into the dominions of Scindia, without making an effort to preserve them, or wasting a thought upon their fate. If the detestable principles which then predominated require further elucidation, it may be

* Letter to Lord Lake, ut supra.
found in the words of the governor-general immediately following those last quoted. "But Scindia's endeavours to wrest those territories from the hands of the Rajahs of Machery and Bhurtpore may be expected to lay the foundations of interminable contests, which will afford ample and permanent employment to Scindia; and, under any circumstances, I cannot admit the apprehension of any hostile attempt on the part of Scindia against the British possessions in the Doab; still less should I deem it probable in the event of his rendering the chiefs of Machery and Bhurtpore his perpetual enemies, which must be the consequence of his endeavours to deprive them of a portion of their dominions." It is needless to discuss why, under any circumstances, the governor-general could not admit the apprehension of any hostile attempt on the part of Scindia against the British possessions in the Doab—whether his incredulity rested on the steady and upright character of Dowlut Rao Scindia, on his known friendship for the British government, on the good faith of the people to which he belonged, or the inconvenience of entertaining apprehension with reference to a favourite course of policy—this question may sleep in peace; but the avowal by a British statesman, that he looked for safety to the dominions of which he was the constituted guardian, not to the wisdom of his councils nor to the vigour of his arms—not to the moral influence which the character of his policy tended to exercise over the turbulent and ill-disposed—not to well-considered and judiciously framed
engagements with surrounding potentates, bind-
ing the whole to respect each other's rights—but
to the licentiousness consequent upon the relaxa-
tion of all legal and moral restraint—to "in-
terminable contests" to be waged between neigh-
bouring states, accompanied by all the horrible
aggravations of the evils of war which never fail to
mark the steps of Asiatic invaders—this avowal is
too extraordinary to be passed without comment.
By involving its neighbours in an incessant series of
wars and bloodshed, the British Indian empire was
to be rendered secure. A meaner course the lowest
chronicles of ignorant depravity cannot exhibit—one
more profligate the most crooked diplomatist of the
most unprincipled period of the world's existence
never devised. The subject is too fearful for mirth,
or it would be impossible to restrain its ebullitions on
comparing this part of the governor-general's policy
with his avowed object—"to lay the foundation of
a general pacification."

It is to be lamented that nearly the last official
act of the Marquis Cornwallis's life should have
been the affixing his signature to the letter, the
principal points of which have called for a rather
protracted examination. He was at an advanced
age; his health, which was not good when he left
England, had gradually become worse under the
influence of an enervating climate and of the bodily
and mental fatigue imposed by the duties of his
office, and on the 5th of October he drew his last
breath at Ghazepore, near Benares.

A.D. 1805.
Little remark will be necessary on the character of the departed governor-general. He had many excellent qualities, but his mind was destitute of the originality and power essential to the character of a great statesman. Great minds impress their own character upon their age—inferior ones derive theirs from it. Of this latter class was the Marquis Cornwallis. He was emphatically the man of his age—the representative of its spirit, its opinions, and its prejudices. To these he clung with all the pertinacity of sincere conviction; and, indeed, so far as conviction can be entertained without examination, it may be said that he felt it. He never doubted but that what he had so often heard asserted must be true; and experience itself could not undeceive him. He left India at the conclusion of his first administration with views unaltered by the startling shock which his prejudices had encountered; he returned to it with those prejudices aggravated rather than softened. His mind was of a character not uncommon. It was entirely passive; the impressions it received from without remained undisturbed by any process from within. At the same time it possessed great tenacity with regard to that which had once been admitted. The truth or the error that happened to be in fashion was embraced, and neither reasoning, change of circumstances, nor, after a certain time, even change in the popular current of opinion, could dislodge it. The mental constitution of the Marquis Cornwallis might be described in few words as being of the highest order of the com-
mon-place. His lot was that which often falls to men of like character. He enjoyed an extraordinary degree of reputation during his life, and for a few years after his death; but the artificial brilliancy has passed away. In this respect his fate is strikingly contrasted with that of his illustrious predecessor. Thwarted and reviled, his policy denounced by authority and by the popular voice, and impeachment threatened as the reward of his services, the Marquis Wellesley lived to see his enemies silenced, his policy vindicated, his person honoured by marks of public respect and gratitude, and his fame, like a mighty river, continually increasing in volume and strength as the distance from its source was extended.

On the death of the Marquis Cornwallis, the office of governor-general devolved provisionally on the first member of council, Sir George Barlow. The rapidly sinking state of the Marquis Cornwallis had for several days previously to his death indicated that the fatal event could not be far distant, and a communication to that effect reaching Calcutta, Sir George Barlow had determined to proceed to Benares, either to assist the Marquis Cornwallis in the conduct of the negotiations, if he should still survive, or undertake their entire charge in the event of his death. He was consequently on the spot where his services were required within a few days after power and life had departed from the late governor-general.

Before the letter of the Marquis Cornwallis transmitting that to be forwarded to Scindia was re-
ceived by the commander-in-chief, the aspect of affairs in the camp of Scindia had undergone some change. The ascendency of Shirzee Rao was apparently at an end; and Ambajee Ingla, after being plundered by Holkar with the connivance of Scindia, had attained that degree of elevation in the service of the latter chief, which had been anticipated from the honourable reception which awaited him after the purpose of his imprisonment had been answered. Scindia, from various causes, had become less indisposed to peace, and a negotiation had been opened, which was conducted on the one part by Colonel Malcolm, then present in the camp of the commander-in-chief as the governor-general's agent, and on the other by an old servant of Scindia's, bearing the name and title of Moonshee Kavel Nyne. This person had fled to Delhi when the authority of Shirzee Rao became paramount. Colonel Malcolm, under the authority of Lord Lake, having sent for him to the British camp, induced him to dispatch a relative to Scindia, on whose suggestion that chief sent proposals to be laid before the commander-in-chief by Moonshee Kavel Nyne. Lord Lake's answer to the overture was, that he could not notice any proposal till the British residency was released. It was thereupon allowed to depart. Under these circumstances, Lord Lake thought it not incumbent upon him to forward to Scindia the letter of the governor-general, and for this exercise of discretion his country ought ever to feel grateful. This was not the only instance in which
he sought to maintain its honour against the des-
perate determination prevailing at the seat of go-

government to surrender it. He remonstrated vigour-
ously against the fatal design of severing the British
connection with the princes in the vicinity of the
Jumna, and gave good reasons against such a mea-
sure, which none could have resisted but those de-
termined to be unmoved by any arguments which
were opposed to their pre-conceived opinions. After
adverting to former representations on the benefits
likely to result from expelling the Mahrattas from
Hindostan, Lord Lake said, "I can only add to
what I have before said on this subject my firm
conviction, that the maintenance of the strong
boundary we now possess will soon cause the Mah-
ratta nation to abandon every idea of attacking our
provinces in this quarter, which I am fully persuaded
they never will do if they are permitted either to
possess territory in Hindostan, or to employ their
armies against the petty chiefs and jaghiredars, who
are declared independent (but have not the advan-
tage of the British protection), on the west side of the
Jumna."* The danger of the intended course Lord
Lake illustrated by referring to the feuds subsisting
between the different chiefs—feuds which had been
fostered and encouraged by the Mahrattas for their
own purposes—a notable pattern for the imitation
of the British government of India! Lord Lake
proceeded to shew the importance of maintaining
the British authority with a view to the suppression
of the evils which the Mahrattas had aggravated,

* Letter of Lord Lake to Governor-general, 6th October, 1805.
and the probability that, in the course of time, both princes and subjects would become sensible of the advantages of the peaceful habits imposed upon them. The commander-in-chief did not contemplate the possible subjugation of these states by Scindia with the calm philosophy which the governor-general displayed on the subject; nor did he see the advantages of the proposed imitation of the detestable policy of the Mahrattas—the plan of looking for benefit from the quarrels and sufferings of neighbouring states. "The very contests," said he, "that would immediately take place among the rajahs and chiefs, when they were declared free of all control of the British government, and at liberty to pursue the dictates of their own interests or ambition, would, I conceive, be attended with the worst consequences to the British government. These petty states would first quarrel with each other, and then call in the different native powers in their vicinity to their respective aid; and large armies of irregulars would be contending upon the frontier of our most fertile provinces, against whose eventual excesses there would be no well-grounded security but a military force in a state of constant preparation." After some further illustration of his views on this head, Lord Lake advances from a consideration of the question as a matter of policy to the higher ground of national faith and honour. Here he is not less strong. After dividing the powers to whom the British faith was pledged into classes, and adverting to the circumstances of each, the commander-in-chief thus continues:—"The
different engagements and treaties with the rajahs and zemindars have all been concluded by me, under the orders of the late governor-general, and all the grants of jaghire or istimira* have been made by me, or by officers acting under my immediate orders; and all those measures have been sanctioned by the deliberate approbation of the government. Under such circumstances, I am, I trust, justified in thinking that there is not one engagement or grant of all those that have been concluded or given that the British government is at liberty to dissolve or resume, unless the other party shall have infringed its conditions, or shall agree, from receiving an adequate compensation, or any other cause, to its becoming null and void; and under this view I should certainly deem the plan which your lordship appears to have in contemplation, respecting the countries to the west of the Jumna, impracticable by any other means than by loading the revenues of the Company, to a very great amount, with the compensation which justice would require to be made to those from whom considerations of policy had obliged the British government to withdraw its protection." In the minds of the inferior rajahs, Lord Lake declared, that the mere proposal of withdrawing the British protection would produce the utmost alarm. They would regard it, he said, as a prelude to their being sacrificed to the object of obtaining peace with the Maharrattas. Such, in truth, was the true view of the contemplated arrangement

* At a fixed rent.
—peace was to be obtained at any price. The sacrifice of national faith and honour, the interests of allies, were regarded as nothing in comparison with "a general pacification;" which pacification was to be maintained by a series of "interminable contests" on the British frontier. The question, whether the wisdom or the honour of such a plan were the greater, would furnish a subject of discussion as interminable as the contests which rose before the vision of the Marquis Cornwallis as the elements of British safety. On one point Lord Lake appears to have concurred with the governor-general: he thought that the weakness of the Rana of Gohud warranted the abrogation of the treaty with him. This is a subject that has already been discussed at length, which renders it unnecessary to resume the topic here. It is remarkable that one who thought and felt so justly on other points of a similar description, should on this have failed to reach a conclusion consistent with that at which he arrived in other cases. He was satisfied, he affirmed, that nothing less than "the direct operation of British authority" would ever place Gohud in a situation "to meet those expectations which were formed at the conclusion of the treaty with its present ruler." This language is so vague, that it is impossible to determine whether the commander-in-chief was prepared in this instance to defend a violation of faith or not. The treaty itself was the standard of the Rana's obligations, not any expectations that might have been formed at the time of
its conclusion. If the direct operation of British authority were necessary to compel the Rana to fulfil his obligations, only one reason can be suggested for its refusal—that irreconcilable prejudice which dictated that nothing within India should be done by British authority which it were possible to avoid. Independently of this single error relating to the Rana of Gohud, the letter of Lord Lake is alike sound in its political views and admirable for the high and honourable feeling by which it is pervaded. Putting out of view the brilliant military services of Lord Lake, and calling to mind only his endeavours to save the British character in India from the shame which was about to fall upon it, his name should ever be held by his countrymen in grateful and honourable remembrance.

The letter of the commander-in-chief bore date the 6th of October, the day following that on which the Marquis Cornwallis died. The task of deciding on its arguments and suggestions consequently devolved on Sir George Barlow, whose answer to the representations of Lord Lake is dated the 20th of the same month. It avowed his resolution "to maintain the general principles of policy by which the late governor-general deemed it proper to accomplish a general plan of arrangement with respect to the chieftains and the territories on the west of the Jumna." It might have been doubted whether the course of the new governor-general were not the result of regard for the views of his predecessor, or for the judgment of some.
higher authority; but he was careful to divest his motives of all ambiguity, and to vindicate his claim to a portion of the glory which was to result from a persevering disregard to the obligations of treaties. "This resolution," said he—the resolution just quoted—"is founded, not only upon my knowledge of the entire conformity of those general principles to the provisions of the legislature and to the orders of the honourable Court of Directors, but also upon my conviction of their expediency with a view to the permanent establishment of the British interests in India." From the enunciation of his own views, Sir George Barlow proceeded, through some intermediate discussion, to impugn those of Lord Lake, which appeared to him "to involve the necessity of maintaining the principal part of our territorial possessions on the west of the Jumna, and of establishing our control over the several states of Hindostan, with a view to preclude the occurrence of those disorders and contentions which" the commander-in-chief "considered to be calculated to endanger the tranquillity and security of" the British territory "in the Doab. Such a system of control," argued Sir George Barlow, "must in its nature be progressive, and must ultimately tend to a system of universal dominion." Had Sir George Barlow here been stopped by a direct question as to the apprehended evils of such a result—a course which has often been fatal to the progress of vague declamation—had he been asked, granting this, what follows—where would be the evil if all India were actu-
ally rescued from the frightful misgovernment under which it has for ages laboured, and placed in a train of moral, social, and political improvement? he would probably have found it difficult to furnish a plausible answer. "I am of opinion," he continued, "that we must derive our security either from the establishment of a controlling power and influence over all the states of India, or from the certain operation of contending and irreconcilable interests among the states whose independence will admit of the prosecution of their individual views of rapine, encroachment, and ambition, combined with a systematic plan of internal defence, such as has been uniformly contemplated by this government." This last mode, which Sir George Barlow preferred, it will be recollected, had occurred to the mind of his predecessor, by whom it had been favourably entertained. There is so little to commend in this exposition of the provisional governor-general's views, that it is gratifying to be able to select even one of its characteristics for praise. It is impossible to deny to Sir George Barlow the merit of extraordinary frankness, and of a most heroic indifference to the judgment of others more scrupulous than himself. The Marquis Cornwallis had professed to look with hope to the occurrence of "interminable contests" among the neighbours of the British frontier: his successor goes further, and exposes in all its naked deformity the policy which he, as well as the Marquis Cornwallis, upheld. He freely admits that the instruments to which he looked for the safety of
the British government were "rapine, encroach-
ment, and ambition;" thus manifesting a degree of
moral hardihood commanding admiration, if from
no other cause, at least from its extreme rarity. It
is to be remarked, however, that this vile system
was not what a distinguished orator and statesman*
affirmed the principles of chivalry to be—a "cheap
defence of nations;" it was to be aided by a sys-
tematic plan for securing the British frontier, which
Sir George Barlow afterwards explains to be the
establishment of a connected chain of forts along the
Jumna. He then returns to the favourite feature of
his system, and expresses a hope that Lord Lake will
probably concur with him in thinking that, with
such a barrier, "the British possessions in the Doab
will derive additional security from the contests of
the neighbouring states."

Having thus laid down the general principles of
his policy, Sir George Barlow enters upon a discus-
sion of the claims of the parties to the west of
the Jumna, whom it was intended to abandon;
and here, in conformity with a practice previously
adopted, of allowing the advantage of explaining
their own views to those whose policy it is im-
possible to refrain from condemning, the words of
the governor-general shall be quoted: — "With
regard to the engagements which your lordship
has stated as subsisting between the British go-
vernment and the several descriptions of persons
enumerated in your lordship's despatch of the 6th

* Burke.
of October, it appears to me that the obligation of a considerable proportion of those engagements necessarily depends upon the supposition, that it was the intention of the British government to maintain its authority and control over the bulk of the territories on the west of the Jumna, ceded by Dowlut Rao Scindia. If the British government is at liberty to surrender its possessions to the west of the Jumna, the obligation to protect the zemindars and jaghireddars established within those possessions, or immediately dependent upon them, can be considered to exist no longer than while the British government deems it expedient to maintain its authority over those territories. As far, therefore, as regards that description of persons, the true question appears to be, whether we are compelled by the nature of our engagements to maintain possession of the territories in question.” Such is the casuistry by which Sir George Barlow arrived at the conclusion which it was his object to reach. He admitted, however, that he did not intend it to apply to chiefs to whom the British government was pledged to make pecuniary or territorial assignments; and these persons he proposed to provide for by jaghires in a portion of the territory on the west of the Jumna which was to be retained. Returning to the governor-general’s reasoning, it will be found to amount to this—that a powerful government, formally undertaking to extend its protection and support to the chiefs of a country which the chances of war have thrown into its pos-
session, is not bound to adhere to its engagements, if at the time of concluding them it has not an intention of maintaining its "authority and control over the bulk of the territories" in question—that the absence of such intention, although not avowed, is an excuse for the abrogation of the engagements—that, consequently, it is just and blameless to entrap men into acts which make them objects of unmitigated hatred to others who have the power to crush them, and then to abandon them to the mercy of their enemies. But even this apology, whatever it may be worth, will not avail. When the territory beyond the Jumna was acquired there was no latent intention of relinquishing it; the engagements with the native chiefs were made without any portion of that mental reservation which would have been convenient to Sir George Barlow's argument; the artifices of jesuitical diplomacy were not in use by either the Marquis Wellesley or Lord Lake. But further, Sir George Barlow alleges that, by surrendering its possessions, the British government could put an end to the obligation of protecting the zemindars and jaghiredars within their possessions or dependent upon them. Thus, then, the British government could, it seems, surrender, not only its own rights, but those of others, without their consent. When an individual parts with his property, he parts with it subject to the maintenance of all existing rights connected with it, except his own. When a nation alienates its possessions, the same conditions attach. It cannot in reason or justice
abrogate the rights of other parties. In this case, the rights had arisen out of the free act of the British government, and one of those rights was that of receiving protection from that government. It could not, therefore, in good faith, transfer the authority which it possessed, without guaranteeing the parties with whom it had engagements against injury arising from the transfer. The governor-general, however, contemplated no such guarantee; and, indeed, such a course would have been open to more and stronger objections than even the most prejudiced enemy to the extension of British influence would ascribe to the retention of a direct authority. The true question was not, as Sir George Barlow represented, whether the British government was compelled to maintain possession of the territories in question; but whether, by abandoning possession, it could at the same time formally abandon to ruin those who, under a reliance on its power and character, had committed themselves to its protection.

It is no agreeable task to pursue the sophistry of expediency through its entangled course—it is not more grateful to record the acts which presumed convenience dictated at the expense of justice and honour. The British government being prepared to indulge Scindia to the utmost extent of his demands, no impediment could exist to the establishment of what was to be called peace. Colonel Malcolm was entrusted with the duty of negotiating a treaty with Scindia, and on the 23rd of November his labours
were successfully brought to a close. The defensive alliance was not renewed—the Marquis Cornwallis, in conformity with the general tenour of his policy, had expressed his determination to be rid of it—but every part of the former treaty of peace, with the exception of such parts as might be altered by the new treaty, was to remain in force. Gwalior and Gohud were transferred to Scindia out of "considerations of friendship." Scindia, on his part, relinquished all claims to the pensions previously granted to different officers of his court, from the 31st of December, up to which period the Company undertook to pay them, subject to deduction on various grounds, and among them the plunder of the British residency. The Company also agreed to pay to Scindia a personal allowance of four lacs annually, and to assign, within their territories in Hindostan, a jaghire of two lacs per annum to the chieftain's wife, and another of one lac to his daughter. The Chumbul was to be the general boundary between the territories of the contracting parties; and the Company engaged to form no treaties with the Rajahs of Oudepore and Joudpore, and other chiefs tributary to Scindia in Malwa, Mewar, or Merwar, and in no instance to interfere with the settlement which Scindia might make with those chiefs. The Company were not to return to Holkar any of his family possessions in the province of Malwa which might have been taken by Scindia. The two chiefs were to arrange as they pleased the claims of Holkar to tribute or territory north of the Taptee and south
of the Chumbul, and the British government was not to interfere. The most extraordinary article of the treaty was one by which Scindia agreed never to admit Shirzee Rao to his councils, or to any public employment under his government. The British constitution regards the sovereign as irresponsible, and visits all delinquency in the conduct of public affairs upon the minister; but the application of such a principle between states was probably made for the first time in this instance. By a formal article in a treaty to proscribe the employment of any particular individual might be thought unworthy of any government—it was especially unworthy of such a government as that of Great Britain in India. At this time, however, all the acts of that government were characterized by pettiness. With all its concessions the treaty did not go quite far enough to please Sir George Barlow, and, in transmitting his ratification, he annexed certain declaratory articles, intended to carry out his favourite object of releasing the British government from the obligation of keeping faith with its weak allies, some of whom might have been saved by the operation of the boundary article without explanation. Lord Lake deferred the transmission of the declaratory articles to Scindia, and remonstrated, but in vain. The governor-general replied, that great attention was due to the long experience of Lord Lake, and evinced his respect for it by immediately forwarding to Scindia the articles against which Lord Lake had appealed.

While the negotiation with Scindia was in pro-
gess, Lord Lake had been engaged in following the flight of Holkar into the Punjab; where, disappointed in the hope of obtaining assistance from the Seiks, and reduced to the last extremity, the eager desire of the British government for peace worked most opportunely to his rescue from entire destruction. A treaty was concluded, by which Holkar renounced all right to the districts of Tonk Rampoor, Bhoondee, and places north of the Chumbul. The Company agreed not to interfere south of that river, and to restore at the end of a specified term certain forts and districts belonging to Holkar in the Deccan. Holkar was not to entertain any Europeans in his service, and he was further restricted from employing Shirzee Rao, whose name seems to have been a constant source of terror to the British government of that period. Here, again, the policy of Sir George Barlow received additional illustration. He had been desirous of transferring the districts of Tonk Rampoor to Scindia, in place of the pension of four lacs secured to that chieftain by the late treaty. One motive to the intended cession originated in the circumstance of the district having belonged to Holkar, and the consequent expectation of the governor-general that an additional cause of dispute between the two chieftains would thus be furnished, tending to promote his favourite object of keeping native states at war for the benefit of the English government.* But the hope of obtaining

* This is not an inference—the design was avowed by Sir George Barlow.
Scindia's consent failed, and the governor-general was in a state of pitiable anxiety as to the disposal of the troublesome acquisitions. No state or chief, he apprehended, would take them as a free gift without a guarantee from the British government, and there appeared no choice but to give such a guarantee or to keep them. Neither of these courses suited the policy of Sir George Barlow; and not knowing what to do with the surrendered districts, he determined to give them back to Holkar without any kind of consideration in return. This was effected by a declaratory article, reciting—not that Sir George Barlow had in vain sought to transfer the districts to Scindia, and that no one else would take them without a guarantee, but that it was understood that the maharajah attached great value to them, and that the relations of amity being happily restored, the British government was desirous of gratifying the wishes of the maharajah to the greatest practicable extent consistent with equity—a word most infelicitously chosen with reference to the policy then pursued. Lord Lake again remonstrated, and with the same success that had attended his former representations.

Among the persons sacrificed by the "equity" of Sir George Barlow were the Rajahs of Bhoondee and Jeypore. The conduct of the former, from the commencement of his connection with the British government, had been undeviatingly friendly and faithful. His fidelity had been tested during the retreat of Colonel Monson, and he had on that unfortunate occasion rendered aid that was both timely and
By this conduct he had incurred the implacable hatred of Holkar. Lord Lake justly considered that the services and the dangers of this faithful ally merited more consideration than Sir George Barlow was disposed to give them, and he repeatedly and pressingly urged the claims of the Rajah to protection. But the governor-general, who, it is clear, thought that political affairs are excepted from the obligations of ordinary morality, was not to be moved by so visionary a feeling as regard to past services, and the Rajah of Bhoondee received sentence accordingly. The case of the Rajah of Jeypore was not precisely similar. Under the influence of terror, produced by the approach of Holkar, he had swerved from fidelity; but he had returned to his duty, had rendered good service to the army of General Jones, and had received the most solemn assurances that his failure would be forgotten, and the protection of the British government continued. In favour of this prince Lord Lake laboured with the zeal which he invariably displayed in endeavouring to save the British government from the disgrace which a timid and unprincipled policy was bringing upon it. But Sir George Barlow resolved, not only that the alliance with the Rajah of Jeypore should be dissolved, but that the dissolution should be immediate, and for this characteristic reason: the territories of the Rajah of Jeypore lay on Holkar's returning route; the governor-general thought, with much reason, that the freebooter might be tempted to commit some excess in passing them. If the alliance continued,
the British government would be obliged to take notice of any outrage; if it were previously dissolved, the obligation was at an end. Well might an agent of the Rajah, in a conference with Lord Lake, indignantly exclaim, that the English government, in this instance, made its faith subservient to its convenience. *

Sir George Barlow had now effected nearly all that had been contemplated by his predecessor and himself, in the way of diminishing the power and influence of the British government in India. The defensive alliances with Bhurtpore and Machery remained to be dealt with, and Lord Lake was instructed to open a negotiation for the purpose of detaching them from their British ally. In conformity with the plan of the Marquis Cornwallis, these princes were to be tempted to renounce their British connection by the offer of a considerable accession of territory. Lord Lake, not dispirited by former repulses, once more resorted to expostulations, and for the first time his remonstrances produced some effect. The governor-general, in his conversion from the creed of the Marquis Wellesley to that of the Marquis Cornwallis, had displayed great aptitude for transition; but in adhering to the views which he professed at any particular moment, he invariably manifested a degree of doggedness not less remarkable. In this spirit he did not admit that the representations of the commander-in-chief had changed his opinion, but he consented to postpone acting upon it till a future period. The motives to this step are

* This is related by Sir John Malcolm.
not easily discoverable; nor, indeed, can any valid
reason be assigned for the great delicacy shewn to
the claims of the Rajahs of Bhurtpore and Machery
in comparison with those of the Rajahs of Bhoondee
and Jeypore. Why were the engagements of the
British with the latter two princes dissolved with-
out ceremony, while the abrogation of similar en-
gagements with the former two were to be the sub-
ject of negotiation? Only one solution presents
itself: the Rajahs of Bhoondee and Jeypore were
weak; those of Bhurtpore and Machery compar-
atively strong.

Thus did Sir George Barlow tranquillize India.
Lord Lake spent the year 1805 in completing the
negotiations with which he had been entrusted, and
in making various necessary military arrangements.
Early in the following year he quitted India, leaving
behind him a reputation for adventurous valour and
high feeling which will not be forgotten.* It would
not be proper to anticipate results by any observa-
tions in this place on the effects of the policy which
that gallant officer so strenuously, though, for the
most part, so unsuccessfully opposed: this will be
displayed hereafter. The aspect of the period under
review is sufficiently dark to need no aggravation

* After Lord Lake's return to England he was raised to the
rank of a viscount; but he did not long survive this accession of
honour. He died in February, 1808, in circumstances that
called forth a further manifestation of royal and public approba-
tion. Parliament responded to a recommendation from the
Crown by passing an act annexing an annuity of £2,000 per an-
um, for three lives, to the title of Viscount Lake, to enable
those to whom it might descend to support the dignity earned
for them by their distinguished ancestor.
from a premature view of the future. Under the Madras presidency events occurred soon after Sir George Barlow's pacification, which, though unimportant if regarded with reference merely to their extent, derived consequence from the alarm which they were calculated to create, in relation to the instrument by which Great Britain had subjected a great part of India to its sway, and by which its conquests were to be maintained.

The extraordinary fact, that England maintains her empire in the East principally by means of a native army, renders the connection between the ruling powers and the military one of extreme delicacy. One great point of reliance, which is afforded by almost every other army, is wanting in that of India. The pride of country offers one of the best securities for the fidelity of the soldier, and all judicious commanders are well aware of the importance of preserving it unimpaired. In India the case is different. The national feeling of the troops can afford no ground of confidence; whatever portion of this quality they may happen to possess, must operate to the prejudice of their rulers. The men who govern India are not natives of India; strangers to the soil command the obedience of its sons, and if national pride entered largely into the character of the natives, that obedience, if yielded at all, would be yielded reluctantly. Generally, in India, this feeling is any thing but strong; and its place is supplied by a sense of the benefits derived by the individual from the maintenance of the European supremacy, and by a powerful instinct of
obedience, combined with a somewhat indefinite, and perhaps almost superstitious feeling of respect for the people who, within the compass of a very brief period, have, as if by enchantment, become masters of an empire splendid beyond comparison with any other ever held in a condition of dependency by a foreign state. Yet, with all the allowances that must be made on the grounds of selfishness, habit, admiration, and fear, it must not be supposed that natives always look on the existing state of things with entire satisfaction. It is not easy for the Mahometan to forget that, very recently, men of his own race and creed wielded the sceptre which is now transferred to Christian hands; and though the passive character of the Hindoo, and the estrangement from political power consequent upon the previous subjugation of his country, may generally be sufficient to preclude him from meditating schemes of conquest and reprisal, he is under the influence of other feelings little calculated to promote military subordination or to secure military fidelity. The pride of caste, and the bigoted attachment with which the Hindoo clings to an unsocial superstition, which interferes with almost every action of daily life, have a direct tendency to foster habits which in Europe must be regarded as altogether inconsistent with the character of a soldier. Between an army composed of Hindoos and Mahometans, and the Europeans who command them, there can be but little community of feeling. Differing as they do in country, in religious belief, in habits of life, in form and complexion, they have not even the bond of a common
tongue; the European officers generally possessing but a slender knowledge of the languages of the men under their command, and the men no knowledge at all of the language of their officers. The elements of discontent are, therefore, sufficiently powerful, while the means of allaying it are small; and it is obvious that, in an army so constituted, vigilance must never for a moment be permitted to slumber. This important truth can never be lost sight of without endangering the safety of the British dominion in India, and, by consequence, the well-being of the people committed to its care.

These reflections are suggested by the facts which it is now necessary to relate; facts which at the time excited no inconsiderable alarm both in India and at home, and which are recorded in characters of blood.

In the spring of 1806, symptoms of insubordination were manifested by a part of the troops under the presidency. They seem scarcely to have excited the degree of attention which they called for; and at the very moment when the authorities were congratulating themselves upon their entire suppression, the fortress of Vellore became a scene of open mutiny and ferocious massacre.

The ostensible cause of the disturbance was a partial change in the dress of the troops. The old turban had been thought inconvenient, and it was proposed to replace it by one lighter, and better adapted to the military character. The alteration was recommended by two officers of long experience in the Company's service, was sanctioned by the com-
march-in-chief, Sir John Cradock, and finally was submitted to the governor, Lord William Bentinck,—that nobleman having succeeded Lord Clive, who had retired under feelings of disgust.* The governor not only approved, but ordered the new turban to be adopted by a corps of fencibles under his own especial command. The use of this turban, however, either actually violated the prejudices of the men, or was seized upon by designing agitators as affording the means of exciting disaffection to the European authorities. Acts of insubordination occurred, connected with an alleged reluctance to the adoption of the new turban. Neglected for a time, it at length became impossible to avoid noticing them. They were confined principally to two battalions of different regiments—one of them stationed at Vellore, the other at Wallajahbad. The irregularities were more general, as well as more marked, in the battalion stationed in the former place; and when they attracted attention, it was deemed inexpedient to suffer the battalion to remain there. It was accordingly ordered to proceed to the presidency, where a court-martial was assembled for the trial of two men, whose conduct had been especially reprehensible. They were convicted, and sentenced to corporal punishment. At Wallajahbad, a native soubahdar, who had been guilty of apparent connivance at the disorderly proceedings which had

* Occasioned by orders from home relative to the appointment and removal of certain officers, which Lord Clive, not without reason, regarded as unduly interfering with the details of the local administration.
taken place, was summarily dismissed from the service, and, on the recommendation of the commander at that station, three companies of European troops were marched thither from Poonamallee. The intimations of disorder now appeared to subside at both places. The commanding officer of the battalion stationed at Vellore reported it to be in as perfect a state of discipline as any other native corps on the establishment. At Wallajahbad subordination appeared to be entirely restored. A general order had been prepared, for the purpose of removing any apprehensions which the native troops might entertain as to future interference with their religious prejudices; but the apparent calm lulled the authorities into a persuasion of security, and it was deemed judicious to suspend the publication of the order.

The seeming tranquillity was deceitful. The assurance of the re-establishment of discipline at Vellore, conveyed from that station to the commander-in-chief, and by him forwarded to the government, reached the presidency on the 10th of July, and, on the same day, the smouldering embers of sedition and mutiny burst into a flame. Early in the morning of that day, the native troops rose against the European part of the garrison, consisting of two companies of his Majesty's 69th regiment, whom, with every other European within their reach, they doomed to indiscriminate slaughter. The attack was totally unexpected, and consequently no preparations had been made for resisting it. The hour chosen by the conspirators, two o'clock in the
morning, was well adapted to their murderous intentions, the execution of them being aided by darkness, and by the fact of a considerable portion of their destined victims being asleep. But, notwithstanding all these unfavourable circumstances, the British troops did not dishonour their country. For a considerable time they maintained possession of the barracks, exposed to a heavy fire from their assailants. When this position became no longer tenable, a part of the garrison effected their escape to the ramparts of the fortress, where they established themselves, and of which they retained possession for several hours after all the officers of the corps had been killed or disabled, and after their ammunition had been entirely exhausted.

About four hours after the commencement of the attack, intelligence of it was received by Colonel Gillespie, at the cantonment of Arcot, a distance of about sixteen miles, and that officer immediately put in motion the greater part of the troops at his disposal, consisting of the 19th regiment of dragoons and some native cavalry, of the strength of about four hundred and fifty men. Putting himself at the head of one squadron of dragoons and a troop of native cavalry, he proceeded with the greatest celerity to Vellore, leaving the remainder of the troops to follow with the guns under Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy. On his arrival, Colonel Gillespie effected a junction with the gallant residue of the 69th; but it was found impracticable to obtain any decisive advantage over the insurgents until the arrival of the remainder of the detachment, which
reached Vellore about ten o'clock. The main object then was to reduce the fort. The mutineers directed their powerful force to the defence of the interior gate, and, on the arrival of the guns, it was resolved that they should be directed to blowing it open, preparatory to a charge of the cavalry, to be aided by a charge of the remnant of the 69th, under the personal command of Colonel Gillespie. These measures were executed with great precision and bravery. The gate was forced open by the fire of the guns; a combined attack by the European troops and the native cavalry followed, which, though made in the face of a severe fire, ended in the complete dispersion of the insurgents, and the restoration of the fort to the legitimate authorities. About three hundred and fifty of the mutineers fell in the attack, and about five hundred were made prisoners in Vellore and in various other places to which they had fled.

The number of Europeans massacred by the insurgents amounted to one hundred and thirteen. Among them were Colonel Fancourt and thirteen other officers. Vellore was the only station disgraced by open revolt and massacre; the symptoms of disaffection manifested at Wallajahbad, Hyderabad, and other places, were by seasonable and salutary precautions suppressed. In some instances, the murderous proceedings at Vellore impressed the commanding officers at other stations with such an undue degree of apprehension, as to lead them to disarm their native troops without sufficient
cause—an unreasonable suspicion thus succeeding to an unreasonable confidence. Indeed, the European officers seem generally to have taken but small pains to inform themselves of the feelings and dispositions of the native troops. Looking at the events which preceded the unhappy affair at Vellore, it seems impossible to avoid feeling surprise at the unconsciousness and security displayed by the European authorities up to the moment of the frightful explosion. No apprehension appears to have been entertained, although the massacre was preceded by circumstances abundantly sufficient to justify the feeling, and though the approaching danger was not left to be inferred from circumstances. Positive testimony as to the treacherous intentions of the native troops was tendered, but, unfortunately, treated with disregard and contempt.

Amidst the disgusting exhibition of almost universal treachery, a solitary instance of fidelity to the ruling powers occurred, and the name of Mustapha Beg deserves on this account to be recorded. This man, who had become acquainted with a part, if not the whole, of the designs of the conspirators, proceeded on the night of the 16th of June to the house of one of the officers of the garrison, and there stated that the Mussulmans of the battalion had united to attack the barracks, and kill all the Europeans, on account of the turban. The course taken upon this occasion by the officer to whom the communication was made, was certainly, under the circumstances, an extraordinary one: he referred
the matter to the native officers, and they reported that no objection existed to the use of the turban. One of the parties implicated admitted having used certain expressions attributed to him, but gave them an interpretation which rendered them harmless; and the evidence of the informant was alleged to be unworthy of credit—first, on the ground of general bad character; and secondly, because he laboured under the infirmity of madness. The charge of habitual drunkenness, which was brought against Mustapha Beg, was certainly not sufficient to warrant the rejection of his evidence without further inquiry; and the imputation of madness appears never to have been thought of before, but to have been fabricated at the moment for the especial purpose of destroying the force of his testimony. That it should have obtained the implicit belief and acquiescence of the European officer in command is inexplicable upon any reasonable grounds. The men who made the charge had a direct interest in establishing it—something more, therefore, than mere assertion was requisite before it could reasonably be credited; yet no evidence that Mustapha Beg had ever previously displayed symptoms of insanity seems to have been afforded, or even required. His story was at once rejected as the effusion of a distempered mind, and thus success was ensured to the atrocious design, which a reasonable caution might have frustrated. The degree of information possessed by Mustapha Beg has been the subject of question. It has been said that he knew much
more than he avowed; that he was, in fact, acquainted with the entire plans and objects of the conspirators, and studiously concealed a part of them. This may be true, inasmuch as, in most cases, it is nearly impossible for any degree of labour or ingenuity to draw from a native witness "the whole truth;" but it must be remembered that this charge rests upon testimony in no way preferable to that of Mustapha Beg himself; and, if well founded, the fact of the informer concealing a part of what he knew, cannot justify the unaccountable inattention displayed towards that which he revealed.

The communication made by Mustapha Beg was disregarded, and the massacre of Vellore followed. This event, in connection with the insubordination displayed at other stations, demanded careful and minute inquiry as to the cause. The greatest confidence had been reposed in the native troops; that confidence had been continued even after much had occurred which ought to have shaken it; but the disaffection of a part of the troops was no longer matter of mere report or mere suspicion—it had been manifested too plainly and too terribly to admit of denial or of doubt. The government, therefore, now commenced the business of inquiry in earnest.

From the national characteristics of the native troops, it must be always a work of some difficulty to trace their actions and impressions to their genuine origin. The obnoxious turban was put forward as the main ground of dissatisfaction, com-
bined with some orders which had been recently issued, by which the men, when on duty, were forbidden to wear on their faces certain marks of caste, and were required to trim their beards in a uniform manner. It appears that the latter regulations were not altogether new: they had been enforced in certain regiments and neglected in others, and the orders only required a general conformity to practices which had for some time been partially adopted. The objection to the new turban (as far as any sincere objection was felt at all) lay principally with the Mahometans, who thought themselves degraded by being required to wear any thing approaching in appearance to an European hat. The restrictions in regard to marks of caste were applicable to the Hindoos; but the regulations relating to the beard seem to have been obnoxious to both classes. As the two officers, by whose recommendation the regulations were adopted, had been long in the Company's service, it may seem that they ought to have been better acquainted with the feelings and prejudices of the native troops than to have risked the affections of the army, and the consequent safety of the British dominion, upon a point so perfectly trifling as a change of dress. As far, however, as the turban is concerned, it is but justice to those officers to state, that they appear to have had little reason to apprehend any opposition to its introduction, and still less to anticipate the criminal excesses for which it afforded a pretext. The proposed change was long a matter of publicity. In the
first instance, three turbans were made, and three men—one of them a Mahometan—wore them at the presidency for inspection. These men declared that they preferred them to the old ones. The pattern turbans were afterwards publicly exhibited at the adjutant-general's office, where they were seen by officers and men of all ranks and classes. The new turban bore a near resemblance to that which had been long worn by one of the battalions of native infantry; in another regiment, one of the battalions wore a turban little differing from a Scottish bonnet, and turbans not very dissimilar were in use in various regiments. With such precedents, it might have been presumed that no resistance would have been offered to an innovation calculated materially to promote the comfort of the men. On the other points, it is not perhaps easy to acquit the framers of the regulation of having somewhat rashly impaired the real efficiency of the army, from an over-anxious desire to improve its appearance. The Hindoos are, of all people upon the earth, the most alive to any interference with their superstitious observances. This fact must have been familiar to officers of so much experience as those who proposed the offensive orders, and to outrage the feelings of the troops for no better purpose than to render their appearance more agreeable to the eye of military taste, was ill-advised and imprudent. Yet, though this gave considerable offence—and, if the prejudices of the Hindoos are to be respected, the feeling of offence was not unwar-
ranted—it was not the main cause of the mutiny; chap. xx. for it appears that few of the Hindoos joined in it except by the instigation of the Mahometans. The latter class were everywhere the promoters of the disturbances, and it remains to be seen by what motives they were actuated.

The Mahometans objected to the new turban, and this led the Hindoos to dwell upon their own grievances; but the turban itself was but a pretext, artfully used by the emissaries of those hostile to the British sway, to excite discontent and rebellion. The native officers, both before and after the occurrences at Vellore, declared that there was nothing in the new turban inconsistent with the laws and usages of their religion, or in any way degrading to those who were required to wear it; and the chief conspirator at Vellore, a few days previously to the insurrection, being questioned by his commanding officer as to the existence of dissatisfaction, offered, in the presence of the other native officers, to place the Koran on his head and swear that there was none, and that the whole corps were prepared to wear the turban. The feeling against it was certainly far from universal; for, in many instances, much alacrity was shewn in adopting it; and, after the mutiny, some corps requested permission to wear it as a testimony of their unshaken fidelity. Something, indeed, must be allowed for the habitual dissimulation which is one of the national characteristics; but all the evidence tends to shew that, had no political causes intervened, the change would
have been effected as quietly as others had been, which in themselves were more likely to give offence. But Vellore was, at that time, the seat of deep and dark intrigues, directed to the destruction of the British government, and the elevation of a Mahometan sovereignty upon its ruins. The fortress of Vellore was the residence of the sons of Tippoo Sultan, and the whole neighbourhood swarmed with the creatures of the deposed family. The choice of this place for their abode was an injudicious one, and the circumstances under which they were permitted to reside there enhanced the dangers arising from their situation. An extravagant revenue had been placed at their disposal, which enabled them to purchase the services of a host of retainers—an advantage which they did not neglect. Many were to be found who, from old associations, possessed a feeling of attachment to the family of Tippoo; many more who, from religious bigotry, were willing to engage in any scheme having for its object the destruction of a European and Christian power; and a still greater number ready to sell themselves to the best bidder, and to lend their assistance to any cause in the prosperity of which they hoped to participate. The Mahometan power had declined with extraordinary rapidity, and the number of those whose fortunes had declined with it was considerable. Many of these persons had entered the army of the conquerors; and our own ranks thus comprehended a body of men, whose feelings and whose interests were arrayed against us.
Over every class of those who cherished sentiments of discontent, or hopes of advantage from change, the sons of Tippoo were imprudently allowed the means of establishing and retaining unbounded influence. The place chosen for their residence was in the immediate neighbourhood of their former grandeur—the restraint under which they were placed, of the mildest character—the accommodation provided for them, of the most splendid description—their allowances on a scale of Oriental magnificence. The imprudent bounty of the British government thus furnished them with an almost unlimited command of the means of corruption, and enabled them to add to the stimulus of hope, the more powerful temptation of immediate benefit. These opportunities and advantages they abundantly improved, and the consequence was, that, in the town and garrison of Vellore, their numerical strength was greater than that of the government which held them in captivity.

It appears that no fewer than three thousand Mysoreans settled in Vellore and its vicinity subsequently to its becoming the abode of the princes; that the number of their servants and adherents in the pettah amounted to about one thousand eight hundred; that the general population of the place had astonishingly increased, and that some hundreds of persons were destitute of any visible means of subsistence. These were circumstances which ought to have excited suspicion—which ought to have called forth vigour: unfortunately they were re-
garded with apathy. Instead of the strict and vigilant superintendence which ought to have been exercised over such a population, in such a place, there is the strongest ground for concluding that the utmost laxity prevailed. It is clear that, for the purposes of security, the military power ought to have been paramount; but authority was at Vellore so much divided as to destroy all unity of purpose, all energy, and nearly all responsibility. The commanding officer, of course, controlled the troops; the collector was charged with the care of the police; and the paymaster of stipends with the custody of the princes. This was a departure from the original plan, by which the whole of those duties had been entrusted to the military commander, and the change was far from judicious.

With so many chances in their favour, the sons of Tippoo were not likely to be very scrupulous in availing themselves of the opportunities which fortune had thrown in their way; and that, at least, two of them were implicated in the atrocities of Vellore, is beyond question. The connection of those events with simultaneous disturbances at Hyderabad and other places was not distinctly traced; but there can be little doubt of their having originated in the same cause, and little danger of error in treating them all as ramifications of the same conspiracy. The means resorted to of exciting disaffection were invariably the same. The changes of dress, which, but for the sinister arts employed to pervert them, would have attracted no more attention than matters so trivial
demanded, were declared to be part of an organized plan for forcing Christianity on the troops and the people. The turban was held up to their hatred as a Christian hat, as the turn-screw attached to the forepart of the uniform was converted into a cross, the symbol of the Christian faith. Even the practice of vaccination, which had been for some time introduced, was represented as intended to advance the cause of Christianity. The reports circulated for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the people, differed only in the greater or less extent of their demands upon popular credulity. At Hyderabad, the most outrageous rumours were propagated and believed. Among other extravagances, it was currently reported that the Europeans were about to make a human sacrifice, in the person of a native; that a hundred bodies without heads were lying along the banks of the Moose river; that the Europeans had built a church, which it required a sacrifice of human heads to sanctify; and that they designed to massacre all the natives except those who should erect the sign of the cross on the doors of their dwellings. Superstitious feeling was assailed in every practicable way. Fanatical mendicants prowled about, scattering the seeds of sedition and revolt, and astrology was called in to predict the downfall of the Christian and the ascendancy of Mussulman power.

Such means could not fail to operate powerfully upon the minds of an ignorant and bigoted people, accessible to the belief of any reports, however im-
probable or absurd, if addressed to their religious prejudices: and the effects of the poison attested the skill with which it had been prepared. To an European, the very imputation of an intention on the part of the government to interfere with the religion of the people of India, excluding all consideration of the means by which it was to be effected, can appear only ridiculous. No government has ever exercised such perfect toleration, or displayed so much tenderness towards religions differing from those of the governors, as that of the British in India. Indulgence has been pushed even to excess—the most horrible atrocities were long allowed to be perpetrated with impunity, from a fear of giving offence to the votaries of the gloomy creed in which they originated. Impartial observers have sometimes complained of the indifference of the ruling powers to the cause of Christianity; but never has there been a shadow of reason for ascribing to them an indiscreet zeal to accelerate its progress. Towards the native troops, especially, the greatest forbearance has been uniformly manifested, and the strictness of military discipline has been in various points relaxed, in order to avoid offence to the prevailing superstitions. The European servants of the Company have rigidly pursued the course prescribed by the supreme authority. Their own religious observances, when attended to, have been unmarked by ostentation, and unmixed with any spirit of proselytism. At the time of the unfortunate disturbances, no missionary of the English nation had
exercised his office in that part of India where they occurred. In the interior there was no provision whatever for Christian worship; and the commander-in-chief stated it to be a melancholy truth, that so unfrequent were the religious observances of the officers doing duty with battalions, that the sepoys had but recently discovered the nature of the religion professed by the English. These circumstances did not, however, secure the government from a suspicion of intending to force the profession of Christianity upon the natives; for, though the originators and leaders of the conspiracy well knew the falsehood of the imputation, it was, no doubt, believed by many who were induced to unite with them. The undeviating policy of the government ought to have exempted it from such suspicion—the absurdity of the means by which it was alleged to be intended to effect the object was sufficient to discredit the charge, had it been sanctioned by probability; but fanaticism does not reason: any report that falls in with its prejudices is eagerly received and implicitly credited.

The mutiny at Vellore may be regarded, indeed, as conveying a lesson of caution as to the adoption of any measures that may be construed by the people as an invasion of their religious feelings. But the means by which it was produced offer a lesson of another kind—they prove that it is utterly impossible for a government, however scrupulous, to escape calumny—that bigots and designing men, who appeal to the bigotry of others in behalf of
personal objects, will misrepresent and pervert the most harmless and best-intentioned acts—that all undue concession, all surrender of principle, is as useless as it is weak and humiliating—that the proper course to pursue is to "be just and fear not"—to do what is right, and trust with confidence to the result.

The mutineers were quickly overcome, and order was re-established in the fortress. But the difficulties of government did not end with the suppression of the external indications of dissatisfaction. The regulations which had furnished a pretext for the perpetration of so much crime and mischief were still in force, and it was a matter of some delicacy to determine how to deal with them. Every course that could be suggested was open to serious objections, and great calmness and great sagacity were required in making a selection. To discuss at length the wisdom of the chosen line of policy would occupy too much space. It may suffice to say, that conciliation being thought expedient, the regulations were abandoned; and though it may be urged that this was almost a matter of necessity, under the circumstances which existed, still it was not unattended with danger, from the evil precedent which it afforded of a concession extorted by mutiny and massacre. Mutiny is a crime which, by the severity of military law, is deemed deserving of death; but the insurrection of Vellore was not an ordinary case of mutiny, grave as is that offence in itself. The baseness, treachery, and murderous cruelty with
which it was marked, gives it a frightful pre-emi-
nence over the generality of military revolts, and it
is painful to think that so detestable a project should
have been so far attended with success as to procure
the abolition of the orders which had been made
the pretext for it. The fatal regulations being dis-
posed of, another question arose as to the manner
of disposing of the culprits—and conciliation again
triumphed.

On this subject great difference of opinion existed,
and much discussion took place. The governor,
Lord William Bentinck, advised a very mild course;
Sir John Cradock, the commander-in-chief, recom-
mended one somewhat more severe. The other
members of council coincided in opinion with the
governor; while the governor-general in council,
who interfered on the occasion, adopted the views
of Sir John Cradock. Ultimately, the greater part
of the disaffected troops escaped with very slight
punishment, and some may almost be said to have
been rewarded for their crimes. A few only of the
most culpable suffered the punishment of death;
the remainder were merely dismissed the service,
and declared incapable of being re-admitted to it;
and some of the officers, whose guilt was thought to
be attended by circumstances of extenuation, re-
ceived small pensions. The propriety of this last
favour is something more than questionable. To
confine within very narrow limits the instances of
great severity, might be wise as well as humane;
but where was either the justice or the policy of
placing men, like the conspirators of Vellore, upon a level with the worn-out but faithful veteran? What claim had they on the bounty of the government? The only apparent one consists in their having either actively promoted, or quietly connived at, the progress of a conspiracy intended to destroy the power which they served, and to which they were under the most solemn obligations of fidelity. If they were morally unfit to remain in the service, they were unfit objects of even the smallest favour. It was said that their condition, if dismissed without some provision, would be desperate; but it would not be worse than the condition of many men of unimpeachable honour and propriety of conduct. What right has disgraced treachery to demand a provision for future subsistence? To break down, in any degree, the distinctions between guilt and innocence, is one of the greatest errors into which any government can fall, and this error was certainly committed, when the faithless officers of the insurgent battalions at Vellore were deemed proper objects for the exercise of the generosity of the state. To the army, the example was any thing but salutary. By the people at large, whom this act of liberality was doubtless meant to conciliate, it was in danger of being misunderstood, and was quite as likely to be attributed to the operation of fear as to the spirit of magnanimous forgiveness. It was a proceeding which can on no ground be justified, and which, it is to be hoped, will never furnish a rule for the guidance of any future government.
On another point a collision of opinion took place. Sir John Cradock advised that the regiments which were implicated in the mutiny should be expunged from the list of the army; Lord William Bentinck took a different view: but on this question the other members in council agreed with the commander-in-chief. The former, however, attached so much importance to his own view of the question, as to determine to act on his own judgment and responsibility, in opposition to the opinion of the majority in council. It would appear incredible that a question regarding no higher or more momentous matter than the retention of the names of two regiments upon the army list, or their expulsion from it, could have been regarded as justifying the exercise of that extraordinary power vested in the governor for extraordinary occasions, and for extraordinary occasions only, were not the fact authenticated beyond the possibility of doubt. On his own responsibility Lord William Bentinck set aside the decision of the majority of the council, and determined that the regiments in which the mutiny had occurred should remain on the list. In turn, the act by which the governor of Fort St. George had set aside the opinion of his council was as unceremoniously annulled by the supreme government, who directed that the names of the guilty regiments should be struck out. The conduct of the governor, in thus indiscreetly exercising the extraordinary power vested in him, was also disapproved at home. On some former occasion his policy had not commanded the entire
approbation of the Court of Directors, and this act was followed by his lordship's recall. It was at the same time deemed no longer advisable that Sir John Cradock should retain the command of the army, and he was accordingly removed from it. A calm inquiry into the course pursued by Sir John Cradock will perhaps lead to the conclusion that he did not merit very severe reprehension. He seems, in the commencement of the disturbances, to have been guided by the opinions of others whom he thought better informed than himself. On finding that the line of conduct which he had been advised to pursue was fomenting discontent among the troops, he stated the fact to the governor, by whose encouragement he was led to persevere. The disastrous results, however, which followed, shewed but too plainly the impolicy of doing so; and the commander-in-chief must, undoubtedly, be held responsible for the conduct of the army; but the errors into which Sir John Cradock was led admit of the extenuation arising from the fact of his being nearly a stranger at the presidency. It was thought, however, and perhaps justly, that, after what had occurred, there was little hope of his being able to exercise his authority beneficially to the army or the British government. Still, the case of Sir John Cradock appears to have been attended with some hardship; and it is to be lamented that a course could not have been devised which might have spared the feelings of the gallant officer, without compromising the interests of his country, or the
spirit and efficiency of the army of Madras. The adjutant-general and deputy adjutant-general were ordered to return to Europe, but the former officer was subsequently restored. These two officers were better acquainted with India than the commander-in-chief, but there was much to extenuate their error; and few men, perhaps, in their circumstances would have acted with more discretion.

One change, consequent upon the mutiny of Vellore, was a very proper and necessary one: the family of Tippoo Sultan was removed to Bengal, and thus separated from the spot where they could most effectually intrigue against British power and influence. The extravagant allowances, also, which they had previously enjoyed, were subjected to judicious retrenchment.

One of the most remarkable and lamentable circumstances brought to light by the transactions which have been narrated was, the want of cordiality and confidence between the British and native officers. A spirit of estrangement seems to have existed between them, altogether inconsistent with the interests of the service to which both belonged. Whether any thing in the conduct or deportment of one class was calculated to give reasonable cause of offence to the other, it might not be easy now to determine; but certain it is, that the interests of the government imperiously require that courtesy and urbanity should invariably mark the habits and demeanour of the British towards the native officers and troops. These virtues must not, indeed, be
carried to such an excess as to lead to the sacrifice of any moral principle, or to the surrender of one tittle of the great duty of military obedience; but, short of these, it is impossible they can be carried too far, and a systematic neglect of them by any British officer is, in fact, a breach of his duty to his country.

The clamour raised against the new turban was instigated in a great degree by political emissaries, assuming the guise of religious devotees, and who thus were enabled to exercise a powerful influence over a bigoted and superstitious people. But the mischievous labours of these persons were by no means distasteful to the native officers, though a majority of them were convinced that there was nothing in the turban inconsistent with the dictates of their religious belief, and that the reports of the designs of the British to make a forcible change in the religion of the people were ridiculous and unfounded. The conduct of the native officers at Vellore needs neither illustration nor remark. At other places they were found not exempt from the taint of sedition which had affected the privates. At Nandedroog an inquiry was instituted, and it was proved that very offensive expressions had been uttered, and various attempts had been made to excite insubordination. Seventeen persons were dismissed the service, and among them several officers. No doubt was entertained as to the existence of a similar spirit at Bangalore, but the fact could not be established by legal evidence. At Palmacotta,
where a body of Mussulman troops had been disarmed somewhat abruptly by the commanding officer, it was deemed expedient, on re-arming them, to except some of the native commissioned officers, and after an inquiry several were dismissed. There, as at Nandedroog, language had been used sufficiently significant and highly reprehensible. Criminality of a similar character was established against several persons at Wallajahbad, and some dismissals took place there. At Bellary, a soubahdar was convicted, on the clearest evidence, of having, in company with two sepoys, aided two religious mendicants in propagating doctrines of the most atrocious description, and he was in consequence dismissed. So striking and conspicuous was this unworthy conduct in the native officers, and so alarming their abuse of the influence which they naturally possessed over the minds of the men, that it was deemed necessary to publish a general order especially addressed to them, calling to their recollection the principles upon which they had been employed in the Company's service, and warning them of the consequences which would attend a departure from their duty.

The storm happily passed over, but it affords abundant materials for speculation as to futurity. The safety of the empire demands that the bond of connection between the native army and their British officers should be confirmed and strengthened. For this purpose, the more the means of intercourse between the several classes are facilitated the better.
CHAP. XXI. A common language is a great instrument for avoiding misunderstanding and promoting good-will; and it is to be feared that the native tongues have not always received that degree of attention from British officers to which they are entitled. Some additional encouragements to their study seem requisite, as the mastering of them so materially tends to promote that harmony and mutual good understanding which it is so important to establish. A mere smattering of a language may be sufficient for conveying and understanding the dry details of regimental duty, but is not sufficient for establishing and maintaining that degree of influence over the natives which every well-wisher to the permanence of the British dominion must be desirous should exist.

Another point of vital importance will be to raise the character of the native troops, and especially of the native officers, as far as may be, to a British standard; to imbue them with a portion of those noble principles which the European world derives from the age of chivalry, and to give them the habits and the feeling of gentlemen. The principle of honour, which feels "a stain like a wound," should be sedulously inculcated and encouraged. By advancing the character of the native soldiery in the scale of moral dignity, we are adding to the security of our own dominion in the East; by degrading it, or suffering it to sink—nay, by permitting it to remain stationary, we are co-operating with the designs of our enemies, and undermining the safety of our
government. Where the soldier is actuated exclu-
sively by the lower and more selfish motives, his
services will always be at the command of him who
can hold out the strongest temptations to his ambi-
tion or cupidity. The many affecting instances of
fidelity which the native troops have shewn, prove
that they are open to the influence of higher and
better feelings, and no pains should be spared to
cherish and encourage them.
CHAPTER XXII.

In the course of more than half a century, during which India has been governed through the instrumentality of two independent bodies, collision has very rarely taken place; it has been generally averted by discretion and mutual forbearance. Still, it has sometimes arisen, and the vacancy caused by the death of the Marquis Cornwallis gave occasion for an instance. The ministry which had signified the approbation of the Crown to the appointment of that nobleman was no longer in being. It had been dispersed by the death of its chief, Mr. Pitt. The Whigs, having formed a coalition with the party of which Lord Grenville was the head, had returned to office after a long exclusion from it—an exclusion originating in the plan which they had proposed and endeavoured to carry through parliament, for the administration of the affairs of India, in 1784. Intelligence of the death of the Marquis Cornwallis arrived in England almost simultaneously with the accession of the new ministers to office. It was deemed expedient to make immediate provision for the exercise of the full powers of the governor-general, and Sir George Barlow, at that time pos-
sensing the entire confidence of the Court of Directors, was appointed with the approbation of the new President of the Board of Commissioners, Lord Minto. That functionary, indeed, stated that the appointment must be regarded as temporary; but he added, that no immediate change was in contemplation.

After such an announcement, it must have been concluded that the new governor-general would be permitted to enjoy his appointment for a period of some moderate duration; and few speculators upon political probabilities would have assigned to Sir George Barlow's tenure of office a shorter existence than that of a few months. No one, at least, could have expected that the acquiescence of his Majesty's ministers was to expire in ten days, and that, at the end of that period, a communication would be made of their desire that the appointment which they had so recently sanctioned should be superseded, and another governor-general named—yet such was the fact.

The person selected for this high office by the servants of the Crown was the Earl of Lauderdale; but it being found that the claims of this nobleman were very unfavourably regarded by the Court, the proposal was withdrawn; not, however, without an intimation that it would be revived at a future period. The first correspondence on the subject took place in March. In May the subject was again brought forward by ministers, but without
CHAP. XXII. SUCCESS. The Court of Directors refused to revoke the appointment of Sir George Barlow, and, of course, unless their resolution could be changed or their authority overcome, the case of the nominee of ministers was hopeless. But the cabinet was not prepared to yield. The death of Mr. Pitt had shattered the administration, of which he was the head, into fragments, which no one appeared to have either the capacity or the confidence to reunite. The coadjutors of the deceased statesman had, in the language of Mr. Tierney, "stultified themselves" by the tender of their resignations on the death of their leader. The new ministers, in consequence, felt strong in the weakness of their opponents.

It was at that period almost universally held to be impossible to form any other administration than that which, under Lord Grenville, swayed the councils of the state; and though a very few months dissipated this illusion, the ministry of 1806 claimed possession of "all the talents" of the country, and on this ground placed opposition at defiance. Flushed with confidence in their own strength, the ministers were not inclined to be very delicate as to the means by which they accomplished their object; and, finding their recommendation without weight, they resolved to call into exercise an extraordinary power vested in the Crown by the act of 1784, but which had never been exerted. That act enabled the Sovereign, by an instrument under his sign manual, to vacate any appointment in British India without
the consent of the Court of Directors. The right was unquestionable—so is the right to withhold the assent of the Crown from bills which have passed both Houses of Parliament—and the exercise of the latter prerogative was almost as much to be expected as that of the former, after it had been allowed for so many years to sleep. But, unprecedented as was its exercise, ministers did not shrink from advising it; and the commission by which Sir George Barlow had been appointed governor-general was vacated by the royal authority.

So remarkable an exercise of prerogative did not, of course, pass without notice. On the 8th of July, the subject was brought before the Upper House of Parliament by Lord Melville, formerly Mr. Henry Dundas, and during many years President of the Board of Commissioners. After adverting to the principal facts connected with the transaction, his lordship called the attention of the House to the act of 1784, by which the power of recal was given to the Crown; and contended that the clause in question, if construed so as to warrant the proceedings of his Majesty's ministers with regard to Sir George Barlow, would be altogether at variance with the spirit and intent of the act of which it formed part. Referring to the period when the act was passed, he said that the whole country was then convulsed with conflicting opinions on the best mode of governing India, and that the two principal plans were embodied in two bills, which were known by the names of the leaders of the two parties by whom
they were respectively introduced; one being called Mr. Fox's bill—the other, Mr. Pitt's. He reminded the house that these two bills were universally understood to be framed in accordance with the different views of the two parties in the great struggle upon the question, whether the patronage of India should be vested in the hands of the Crown or of the Company. The bill of Mr. Pitt, which passed into a law, disclaimed the patronage on the part of the Crown, and was based on the assumption that it might be more beneficially exercised by the Company; it could not be supposed, therefore, that the legislature intended that the bill should convey a power inconsistent with the spirit in which it was framed and passed: it could not be supposed that it intended to enable his Majesty's ministers, at any future time, by exercising at pleasure the power of recal, to appropriate to themselves the patronage of India. The design of the clause was obvious. It was intended as a check upon the Court of Directors, in the event of their being led by partiality to make an improper appointment: it also enabled government to interfere in differences between the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors—a case, not merely hypothetical, a remarkable instance having occurred not long before the passing of the act, where the Court of Proprietors refused to acquiesce in the recal of Mr. Hastings, when proposed by the Court of Directors. He urged that the power thus entrusted to the Crown would be grossly abused if applied to any other purposes than those contem-
plated by the law—if exercised merely with a view to enforce the appointment of a particular individual whom his Majesty’s ministers wished to see governor-general. This was the first instance in which the power had been exercised, and those who advised its exercise were bound to shew good cause for it. Lord Melville pronounced a high panegyric upon the character and public services of Sir George Barlow, and animadverted with great severity upon the conduct of the ministers, which, he said, if the result of mere caprice, was highly blameable, but if originating in an intention to seize the patronage of India, was a direct violation of the spirit and meaning of an act of parliament. After dwelling upon the inconveniences likely to arise to the public service from the extraordinary course pursued by ministers, Lord Melville concluded by moving for certain papers connected with the removal of Sir George Barlow, and for others relating to the financial affairs of the Company.

The exercise of the royal prerogative was defended by the premier, Lord Grenville, who contended that the law must be taken in its plain meaning, not according to any fanciful interpretation, and that the act of 1784 clearly gave a power of recall. That power had been objected to, at the time of passing the act, on one of the grounds now taken by Lord Melville, namely, that it might virtually give to ministers the patronage of India; but it was answered then, as it might be answered now, that because the Crown had the power of nega-
tiving an act of parliament, it could not be said that it had the power of directing the legislature; and, by parity of reasoning, it could not reasonably be contended that, because a particular appointment in India was reversed, the whole of the appointments must fall under the control of his Majesty’s ministers. He admitted, however, that if it could be shewn that the power had been exercised merely for the purpose of procuring the appointment of a particular person, it would be a violation of the law; but he called upon Lord Melville to recollect, that, from the passing of the act in 1784 to 1801, there had not been a single governor appointed who had not been recommended by that nobleman himself; and as the same system had prevailed from 1801 downward, there did not appear much to justify the surprise expressed on this occasion. His lordship then reminded the house, that Sir George Barlow had been appointed to succeed the Marquis Wellesley, and had almost immediately been superseded in favour of the Marquis Cornwallis. In connection with the latter appointment, Lord Grenville passed a censure upon the late administration, for a neglect which had placed their successors in some difficulty. Possessed, he admitted, of every other qualification for the high office to which he was called, the Marquis Cornwallis wanted youth and health. It was generally supposed in London that he would be unable to bear the voyage, and that if he arrived in India he would survive only a short time; yet his Majesty’s late advisers made no provision for an event which
must have been expected, and from their criminal neglect, his Majesty's present ministers were called upon, within twenty-four hours of their acceptance of office, to provide for the government of India, in consequence of the communication of the death of the Marquis Cornwallis. In this emergency, they approved of the appointment of Sir George Barlow; but they never regarded this appointment as being any thing more than temporary. For these reasons, and on the grounds of the inconvenience that would result from acceding to the motion, he opposed the production of the correspondence.

Several other peers took part in the discussion: among them Lord Hawkesbury, who, as a member of the late government, denied that it was necessary to take more than ordinary precaution against the decease of the Marquis Cornwallis. Considering the advanced age of the marquis, he had never known a man more likely to live; and such was the opinion of his friends who had last seen him at Portsmouth. The arguments used by the other speakers were little more than repetitions of those brought forward by Lords Melville and Grenville, and, on the question being put, both motions were lost without a division.

Three days afterwards, the subject underwent some discussion in the House of Commons. In a committee of the whole house on the India budget, Mr. Johnstone, after taking a review of the conduct
CHAP. XXII. of Sir George Barlow, and passing on it a high eulogy, condemned the conduct of ministers in nullifying their original appointment. He said he had heard that Sir George Barlow was recalled because he did not possess the confidence of ministers; but he believed that two noble lords, under whose administrations the British interests in India had flourished in an extraordinary degree—he meant Lord Macartney and Lord Cornwallis (the latter as governor-general and the former as the head of one of the other presidencies)—he believed that those noble persons possessed little of the confidence of those who, during the period of their respective administrations, held the reins of government in England. Lord Castlereagh joined in reprehending the conduct of ministers; the chancellor of the exchequer, Lord Henry Petty, defended it; and Mr. Francis, who disclaimed offering an opinion of his own, alleged that, on former occasions, Sir George Barlow had incurred the displeasure of the Court of Directors, who now supported him. On the 15th of July, when the committee sat again, Mr. Grant, an influential director of the East-India Company, and the chairman of the preceding year, defended the conduct of Sir George Barlow throughout the negotiations for peace. Mr. Paull justified the removal of Sir George Barlow; he maintained that, to secure the respect of the native courts, the governor-general should be a man of high rank; and that, though Sir George Barlow was an excellent
revenue officer, he had none of the qualities necessary for a governor-general.

The ministerial speakers in the House of Commons seem rather to have evaded discussion; either because no specific motion was made on the subject, or from a conviction that the course which they had advised was an unpopular one. The ministry had, however, one advantage, which probably most cabinets value more than any powers of reason or eloquence:—they had majorities in parliament, and these enabled them to submit with philosophic calmness to charges which it might have been troublesome to answer. The knowledge that the ministry had the means of triumphing in the division, though they might be vanquished in the argument, probably withheld most of the members of the House of Commons who especially represented East-Indian interests, from the steps which might have been expected from them. The novelty of their situation might also have some effect in diminishing the vigour of their efforts. The Company had enjoyed the countenance and protection of the late ministers (to whom they regarded themselves as mainly indebted for the preservation of their chartered rights) during a period of twenty-two years, with the exception of the short administration of Lord Sidmoutth; and the policy of his administration differed, indeed, little from that of Mr. Pitt, whom he had succeeded, and by whom he was supplanted. Accustomed for so long a time to act in concert with the ministers of the Crown,
those directors who had seats in parliament seem to have felt as though there would be something indecorous in any very decided public opposition, even when the former enemies of the privileges of the Company had obtained the reins of power. This feeling, combined with a conviction of the hopelessness of struggling in a contest where the victory was already adjudged, may account for the feebleness of the efforts made within the walls of parliament to justify the conduct of the Court of Directors in opposition to that of the ministers of the Crown. But, though apparently declining any public appeal against the dictation to which it was sought to subject them, they steadily persevered in resisting it; and it being ultimately found impossible to overcome the objections of the Court of Directors to the Earl of Lauderdale, that nobleman withdrew his claim to the office of governor-general; the Court consented to nominate the President of the Board of Control, Lord Minto, and thus the differences between the Court of Directors and his Majesty’s government were terminated.

The dispute opens a variety of questions, all of them possessing a certain degree of interest. The first that naturally occurs relates to the character of the person who for ten days enjoyed the full sunshine of ministerial favour; at the end of which time, with a fickleness unusual even in courts and cabinets, it was deemed expedient to relieve him from the greatness which had been so suddenly thrust upon him, and to provide at his expense for
some adherent of the ruling party. But the merits of Sir George Barlow seem to have formed but a small part of the subject. He was certainly not removed by the ministers of the day because he was unfit for the station to which they had appointed him, but because, when they found leisure to survey the circle of their noble friends, they met with many to whom a splendid provision in the East was an object of desire, and one of these they determined should be governor-general. Their political opponents might be tempted to go so far as to say that, in the desire to grasp at patronage, the fitness or unfitness of the person to be appointed was evidently regarded as of little importance, and even the unprejudiced observer must feel a suspicion that the fitness or unfitness of the person to be removed was deemed of no importance at all.

If, separate from all party considerations, we inquire whether Sir George Barlow were altogether fitted for the high office of governor-general, the answer must depend upon the standard of qualification that is set up. If the office demand a mind of the highest order, enlarged by extensive information and refined by the influence of liberal studies, the claims of Sir George Barlow are at once negativethat there be no higher qualification required than those of a careful and industrious man of business, the advocates of Sir George Barlow need not to shrink from bringing him to the test. If a total indifference to all political principle be a recommendation—if a chief qualification for office be aptitude for
CHAP. XXII. supporting one line of policy with a zeal apparently originating in a conviction of its rectitude and then suddenly veering to the support of another directly opposed to it with equal zeal and equal appearance of sincerity—then might Sir George Barlow's friends safely and triumphantly defy competition. But the merits or demerits of the acting governor-general had no influence in the decision of the cabinet of 1806, nor upon the voices of those majorities which that cabinet was able to command in the two houses of Parliament. India was in a state of peace, and the ministers no less than the Court of Directors professed to believe that peace secure. If Sir George Barlow wanted that commanding character of intellect called for by extraordinary times, he was at least equal to the comparatively tranquil state of affairs which all parties at home pleased themselves by contemplating. The Court of Directors had disapproved of the policy of the Marquis Wellesley—Sir George Barlow, though he had cordially concurred in that policy, was now ready to denounce it and to destroy its effects—as far as was practicable, he had destroyed them. The Court were naturally satisfied with one who pursued the course which they wished to be followed, and whatever judgment may be formed upon that course, it cannot be denied that those who approved it acted consistently in supporting Sir George Barlow in the chief seat of the government of India. But what shall be said of their ministerial opponents? They had no objection to Sir George Barlow's latest policy—it was
precisely that which they affected to approve—yet his removal was decreed, and so much importance was attached to it, that the avowed champions of popular rights resorted to the violent and unprecedented exercise of a long dormant prerogative rather than be disappointed of their object. The real motive to such a proceeding could not be acknowledged, it was therefore necessary to invent others for parade duty. One of them was no less absurd in itself than insulting to the entire service of India, civil and military.

It was asserted to be necessary, in order to support the character of the British nation at the native courts, that the governor-general should be a man of high rank in this country. This assertion was made by some who ought to have known better, and who must have known better. Among the Mahometans, hereditary rank does not exist, unless the respect which has been sometimes yielded to the family of the Prophet may be regarded as forming an exception. All rank is merely official. Those distinctions which in the Western world have operated so powerfully, and which, in our own country, are so highly esteemed, are utterly valueless in the eyes of the Mahometan, and a governor in whose veins circulated the blood of a thousand years of pure nobility would not on that account receive one iota of respect. But, in truth, if the feeling of the followers of the Prophet of Mecca were different—if they were disposed to yield to birth and rank all the homage accorded to them by a cheva-
CHAP. XXII.—lier of the age of Louis the Fourteenth, what degree of knowledge is an Indian potentate likely to possess of the British peerage? Although, however, on this subject he is as ignorant as is an English labourer of the constitution and government of China—although a Mahometan has no sympathy with our notions of nobility, and neither Mahometan nor Hindoo can have any skill in British coronets, the authority and influence resulting from high office are perfectly intelligible to all; and the immense power of a governor-general, by whomsoever wielded, cannot fail to be respected in a country where, from time immemorial, the people of all gradations have ever been the supple slaves of power. If the minister of the day could succeed in procuring one of his household servants to be appointed governor-general of India, the appointment might and would give disgust to the European population—and as the studies of the new functionary would have lain in a widely different line, it is probable that he might shew a very meagre acquaintance with the science of government—but the native population, and the native governments with whom he would have to maintain the accustomed relations, would receive no shock. When invested with the pomp, and state, and power of his office, their feelings towards him would be just the same as if he could trace his pedigree to the days of Charlemagne. Actual power and actual wealth they can understand; but their imaginations are too cold, as well as too coarse, to have any reverence for those ideal sources
of distinction which, among a more refined and imaginative people, are of such high value. The opponents of Sir George Barlow must have been hardly pushed for an argument, when they stumbled upon one so untenable as this; and it is most remarkable that it should have been taken up by such a person as the notorious James Paull, the libeller of the Marquis Wellesley, and the ultra-democratic candidate for the city of Westminster.

But what must be thought of the policy or the equity of a rule, which should utterly and peremptorily exclude the regular servants of the Company from all chance of arriving at the highest reward which the Company has to bestow? What must be thought of the wisdom which should place under a ban of prohibition the highest intellect and the most extensive knowledge if found in the service of the Company, that intellect, too, having been exercised, and that knowledge matured, in the very place and under the very circumstances most likely to fit the possessor for the office to which he is forbidden to aspire? What an outrage would it be to the feelings of those whose lives have been devoted to the promotion of the welfare of India and its preservation to this country, if they were to be told that under no circumstances should they be permitted to attain the highest place in the government—that the merest idler that haunts the saloons of fashion shall be preferred before them, because they do not possess a recommendation, which, in India, is perfectly useless!
It is true that the admission of the servants of the Company to competition for the prize may be regarded as a very small boon. Even if it were always bestowed upon one of them, the number who could attain it would be small; and as such an arrangement is not to be expected, nor, with reference to all circumstances, desired, the chance of any individual servant must be trifling indeed. But this affects not the question. The advantage given by admission may be little, but the insult conveyed by exclusion is great; and slender as must be the hope which any one can cherish of gaining this bright object of ambitious desire, who shall say that it will be ineffective? In every profession, the great prizes can fall to the lot of only a very small number of those who engage in it—few clergymen can hope to attain the primacy, and few lawyers the custody of the great seal—but it would justly be regarded as a great discouragement to rising talent, as a withering blight upon honest exertion, as a gross affront to merit of humble origin, if, either by rule or practice, the enjoyment of those high stations were confined exclusively to men of rank.

It is held to be at once creditable to our country, and beneficial to its interests, that the highest offices, both in the church and the state, may be attained independently of any claims derived from rank—that they are open to the competition of all who can shew the necessary qualifications. Why should that which is so beneficial in England be injurious in India?
No one has ever proposed to exclude the aristocracy of Great Britain from the field—they may and ought to be fairly admitted to it. For the purpose of binding India more closely to the British Government, it may be desirable that the representative of the Crown in India should frequently be chosen from the nobility of the protecting country. Among other good results, this may have the effect of attracting some small degree of attention to interests which have been almost systematically neglected by British statesmen and legislators. But the occasional elevation of a servant of the Company, distinguished by talents and acquirements, would be likely to operate most beneficially, both on the members of the Company's services and on the interests of India. The ministry of 1806 had the merit of first setting up the principle of systematically excluding servants of the Company from any but subordinate situations in the government of India. Hastings, though owing his original appointment to the Company alone, was confirmed in it by Parliament. In later times, Lord Teignmouth had been selected for the office of governor-general, with the approbation of the ministers of the Crown, although, in the language of Mr. Paull, he was "but an excellent revenue officer." For the party, or rather the coalition of parties, dominant in 1806, was reserved the honour of discovering that the office of governor-general of India existed but for the sake of making provision for some friend of
the ruling power, whose rent-roll did not harmonize with his position in the state.

Another ground taken by the ministers of 1806 and their advocates was somewhat more plausible—the alleged necessity for the governor-general of India possessing the confidence of the advisers of the Crown: but even this plea cannot be admitted without considerable qualifications. That confidence which results from the character of the individual holding this high office for talent, integrity, discretion, and devotedness to the duties of his station, cannot, indeed, be dispensed with; but the confidence depending upon conformity of political opinion is, under the circumstances, unnecessary, and has, in practice, been almost constantly disregarded. To the instances which were adduced at the time of the discussion, the experience of the last thirty years has made several additions. Lord Minto, the choice of the Whig administration of 1806, was permitted to retain his office during the successive Tory administrations of the Duke of Portland, Mr. Perceval, and the Earl of Liverpool. The Marquis of Hastings was actually recommended to office by the political party of which he had all his life been the steady opponent; and the appointment of Lord William Bentinck, made under an administration composed of his own personal and political friends, was sanctioned by a subsequent one with which he had no connection.

The principle that the governor-general of India
must be a political friend of the ministers of the day will, indeed, find few defenders, except among those who have an interest in maintaining it. Removed altogether from the influence of most of the questions which here divide men into factions, can there be any valid reason why India and its government should be involved in the vortex of European politics? The inconveniences of such a course are obvious; and they are so great that a single glance at them will be sufficient to shew, that if the happiness of India, or her retention by this country, be worth a thought, we must have the forbearance to exempt her from the influence of our own party disputes. If it be necessary, in any one instance, that the governor-general of India should be a member of that political party which happens at a given time to direct the counsels of the state, it must be necessary in every other instance. If one party may demand this, it must be conceded to all parties. Grant the principle, then, that there must be a perfect sympathy of feeling on all points between the government of India and the cabinet at home, and it follows that the governor-general of India, like the lord-lieutenant of Ireland, must be changed with every change of administration. Let this principle be once recognized and acted upon to its full extent, and all hope of effecting improvement in the vast and important empire subjected to our rule will be at an end.

But, in truth, on this point we need give ourselves
CHAP. XXII. little concern, for we should soon be altogether relieved from the trouble of governing India; nor could such an event be regretted by any friend to justice, seeing how grossly we should have betrayed a sacred trust, by prostituting it to the purposes of party. Our position in India, though on the whole a subject of pride and congratulation, is not such as to permit us to despise ordinary precautions. Not only have we active and insidious enemies around, but even within our own territories, and with a government veering about with every change in the political atmosphere, what would the chance for the continuance of our dominion be worth? All hope of a vigorous government—of such a government as India demands, and must possess—would be at an end. Hesitation and uncertainty would characterize all the proceeding of those who would still be called the governors of India, though they would be only the puppets of political gamblers at home.

Without the means of being informed of what was passing in the protecting country until long after the occurrence of the events which would determine the destinies of India as well as of England, no rational opinion could be formed of the probable stability of the existing state of things. In this uncertainty, a governor-general, unless he happened to be of a remarkably active temperament, would most probably do nothing but receive his magnificent income, and on the receipt of every instalment congratulate himself on his continued good fortune: or if, im-
peled by that restless spirit which leads some men into perpetual action without adequate end or object, he should endeavour to carry out his own opinions or that of his party into actual practice, he would have the satisfaction of knowing, that whatever he might do, his successor would amuse himself with undoing. How soon that successor might arrive, it would be utterly impossible to guess. At the moment when a governor-general was debarking at Calcutta, the instrument of his recall might be signed, and on its way to put an end to his authority. Nay, before he reached his destination—while on his voyage, luxuriating in the visions of a protracted and happy rule, his successor might be on the sea in full chase of him, with a supersedeas in his pocket.

Between January 1782 and January 1784, England was under the government of five administrations: that of Lord North—that of the Marquis of Rockingham—that of the Earl of Shelburn—the coalition ministry, and the ministry of which Mr. Pitt was the head. Within twelve months, between January 1827 and January 1828, England was subjected to nearly as many changes; the illness of the Earl of Liverpool having broken up the ministry of which he was chief, and those of Mr. Canning, Lord Goderich, and the Duke of Wellington having followed in rapid succession. In 1834 we find the ministry of Lord Melbourne suddenly displaced in favour of Sir Robert Peel, and he, after a very brief possession of office, giving way to Lord Melbourne again.
Let us suppose a case when, from the nicely balanced state of parties, or from any other cause, changes take place with the like rapidity. During the rule of a Whig ministry, it becomes necessary to provide for an approaching vacancy in the office of governor-general, and the Court of Directors, with the approbation of the advisers of the Crown, make an appointment. The successful and happy candidate sails: but before he has gained any experience of a southern latitude, the ever-shifting elements of political change at home have displaced his patrons, and given to Tory rulers possession of the councils of the state. If the principle be established that the governor-general must agree in the political opinions of those who rule at home, one of the first acts of the new ministry will of course be to insist on the appointment of a new governor-general, who, it may be presumed, will proceed to his destination with the least possible delay. But the new administration are beaten in Parliament—the Whigs are again in office, and they immediately procure the recal of the last-named governor-general, who may, perhaps, be at Madeira or Mocha, and the restoration of their own nominee, who, if his voyage have been fortunate, may be just receiving his first impressions of the City of Palaces. Those impressions being interrupted by the arrival of his successor, the displaced functionary departs. If, by great good fortune, he should encounter the vessel which bears his reprieve, he may turn back if he think it worth while, though, if he be a man of sense, he most likely will
not; but the probable chance is that the old gover-nor and his new commission will cross each other, and that the former will arrive in England, either to be bandied back again, or sullenly to decline the proffered honour.

Would not this be an admirable method of governing a great empire? How stable must be our sway under such a system! how conducive to the happiness of the people of India! how well calculated to uphold the honour of the British nation! But such rapid changes, it might be said, are not of constant occurrence—a ministry in ordinary circumstances may be expected to endure more than two or three months. Let it be conceded that a ministry may generally calculate upon a longer duration than was enjoyed by some of those which have been referred to—let us allow an average of three years, and if we look at the administrations of the last century, with the exception of that of Mr. Pitt, this will not be found an unfair allowance—then every three years there will not only be a change of the man who holds the highest place in the government of India, but, it must be presumed, a corresponding change of measures.

We need not suppose that British statesmen are actuated by factious or selfish motives—we may give them the credit of seeking the appointment of their own friends solely for the sake of extending the influence of those opinions and principles which they believe to be right. Still it may be confidently asked, what must be the effect upon India of a rapid
CHAP. XXII. succession of rulers, selected under the influence of every varying shade of party opinion? What but an unsteady and vacillating policy—a series of experiments, immature and ill-executed, succeeding each other like a phantasmagoria, and leaving as few traces behind them?

India is not in a condition to be suffered to remain stationary, but still less is she in a condition to be made the subject of indiscreet experiment. To accelerate her career of improvement is at once our interest and our duty; but our plans of improvement must be well devised and steadily pursued, or they will end in our expulsion, and the surrender of the people of India to a long and dreary night of barbarism and misrule. If Englishmen should ever learn to feel justly the value of our Indian possessions—and they have never yet felt it—they will become sensible that they form too precious a deposit to be tampered with, or to be thrown heedlessly into the scramble of party.

But the evils of eternal change would not be confined to the entail upon India of a weak and wavering policy, injurious to the people governed and dishonourable to those who govern them—the general character of the individuals who would fill the office of governor-general would be lower than it has hitherto been. High-minded men would hesitate to accept an appointment which, with all its splendour, is attended with many inconveniences and privations, if the tenure were understood to depend upon a point so utterly beyond calculation, as the
continuance in office of a particular party. And who would occupy the place which has hitherto been filled by those who, whatever their pretensions in other respects, were at least gentlemen and men of honour? For the most part, persons of desperate fortunes, who would speculate on the enjoyment of the salary of the governor-general for a few months —men without character or property, obsequiously waiting upon the party to which they happened to be attached, for any casual donation which it might have to bestow, and ready for an eleemosynary fee to run on any errand, although it should carry them half across the globe. Now and then, the monotony might be relieved by the despatch of some political quack—some legislative nostrum-monger, panting for an opportunity of trying the effects of his grand state panacea, and delighted to find in India a field where he might freely practise without much fear of consequences. If any man of better class could be prevailed upon to accept the office, it would not be until by pension or sinecure of adequate value he had secured the means of falling back in comfort.

These evils are not, indeed, likely to result from the occasional supersession of an Indian functionary by the ministers of the Crown, for an insufficient reason or for no reason at all; but they are consequences resulting from carrying out to its full extent the principle that the governor-general of India must possess the full confidence of the existing ministry. Unless, therefore, any one set of ministers can convert their cabinet appointments
into patent situations, or unless any one political party can shew that the privilege of removing a governor-general who is displeasing to the ministry is one to be exercised only by themselves, those consequences must ensue, or the principle must be given up. It is certainly not that upon which the laws regulating the government of India have been framed. The legislature which, amid so many changes, has steadily adhered to the principle of vesting the patronage of India in the Company, evidently intended to disconnect that country as much as possible from the turmoil of party contentions at home. The minister, therefore, who grasps at the patronage of India, though he may not violate the letter of the law, evidently outrages its spirit. He seeks to acquire that which the legislature has determined he ought not to possess.

The act of 1784 undoubtedly gives to the Crown the power of recall, without imposing any conditions upon its exercise. It would, indeed, be extraordinary if such a power had been withheld, but it is quite clear that it was not intended to be used as an instrument for enabling the ministers of the Crown to force into the government of India any particular individual. The patronage of India may be presumed to be vested in the East-India Company, partly from the consideration that the local and peculiar information which they possess would enable them to estimate the wants of the country more accurately, and to provide for them more judiciously than a ministry whose attention was dis-
tracted by a variety of subjects; partly because the Court of Directors being comparatively a permanent body, the delicate connection between India and Great Britain would, while the government was in their hands, be in a great measure secured from the shocks which it would be liable to encounter in the fierce struggles of political party; and partly from a reluctance to increase the influence of the Crown. On all these grounds, the Court of Directors should be permitted to exercise the power delegated to them by the legislature, as freely and independently as possible, subject to no control but such as is absolutely necessary to the safety of the state. It was certainly not intended to give to the ministry the right of nomination to official station in India, and the power of governing that country in the name of the Court of Directors, who were merely to register the decisions of the cabinet. Extraordinary powers should be reserved for extraordinary occasions, and it seems quite impossible for any impartial person to consider the difference of opinion between the Court of Directors and his Majesty's ministers in 1806, as one of those extraordinary occasions in contemplation of which the power was granted, and the actual occurrence of which can alone justify its exercise.*

* Since the period to which the text refers another instance of the exercise of the same prerogative has occurred in the supersession of Lord Heytesbury by the cabinet of Lord Melbourne on returning to power in 1835, after the administration of Sir Robert Peel, under which Lord Heytesbury had received his appointment. In this case there is one point of difference from
The causes which led to the capricious course pursued by the ministers of the Crown prove the inconvenience of interfering with Indian patronage beyond their duty; and that duty is simply to protect the interests of the two countries from the injury that might result from the occupation of office by an improper person.

When the change of ministry was in progress, the vacancy occasioned by the death of the Marquis Cornwallis was not expected, and the new servants of the Crown were not prepared to recommend any one in his place. A few days were sufficient to remove this impediment, and it would have evinced more respect to the Court of Directors, and more regard to the feelings of the provisional occupant of the office of governor-general, as well as more consistency and dignity in their own conduct, had the ministers determined to suspend proceeding for those few days, instead of hastily ratifying an appointment almost immediately to be revoked.

the former: Lord Heytesbury had been appointed and sworn into office, but had not departed for his government. It is obvious, however, that such a circumstance ought to have no weight in deciding the question. If admitted, it would reduce the whole to a matter of convenience. It is understood that, on this occasion, the principle contended for was not that the governor-general should always be of the same politics with the existing cabinet, but that the ministers were responsible for the governor-general who went out under their administration. This is surely making a very idle distinction. If the person appointed under a previous administration be fit for his office, he ought not to be deprived of it merely because he has not made sufficient haste to get out of the country; if unfit, he ought not to be continued merely because he has been more active or more fortunate.
When they had decided upon the person whose pretensions to the office they intended to support, they communicated their wishes to the Directors, who were naturally surprised by a communication so unlooked-for. They were unwilling to participate in the levity displayed by ministers with regard to Sir George Barlow, whom moreover a majority among them regarded as a fitting person for the office; and they had insuperable objections to the nobleman recommended as his successor.

Into the nature of those objections it is unnecessary at this distance of time to inquire very minutely; but there were undoubtedly some circumstances in the early political career of the Earl of Lauderdale that might lead prudent men to hesitate as to the propriety of selecting him to wield the mighty, and, in indiscriminate hands, the dangerous power of governor-general of India.* Whether, however, the objections of the Directors were well or ill founded, the ministry had no right to judge; and when they perceived the little probability which existed of overcoming them, both duty and policy should have forbidden them to persevere.

By calling into exercise, for the first time, the prerogative of the Crown, and revoking the appointment of Sir George Barlow, not because he was

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* The enthusiastic admiration of his lordship for the French Revolution, and his personal intimacy with some of the chief actors in that appalling movement, were calculated to excite some misgivings. Citizen Tippoo had been conquered, but the Court might yet distrust citizen Maitland.
unfit to retain it—for the ministry approved of his policy—but solely to make way for their own nominee, they shewed an extraordinary disregard to the rights of the Court of Directors, as well as to the welfare of India, and a reprehensible desire of engrossing the patronage of the most valuable appointments there. Had the Directors been actuated by similar motives, the government of India would have been placed in abeyance, and a contest must have resulted, as little calculated to advance the dignity of the contending parties, as to promote the interests of the two divisions of the empire. But the Court, though firm, were not factious; they steadily resisted the appointment of the Earl of Lauderdale, but they did not retaliate upon ministers, by naming for the office a person disagreeable to the cabinet and hostile to its policy. When a nobleman was suggested in whose appointment they could conscientiously acquiesce, no remains of ill-feeling prompted them to keep alive differences between two bodies which the best interests of the state require to agree, and they cheerfully consented to appoint Lord Minto as the successor to Sir George Barlow. It would be well if their example were more generally followed by the ministers of the Crown; if party connection were less regarded, and personal qualification somewhat more. India is not, like Ireland, essentially mixed up with party opinion and feelings; she has no natural connection with them, and to drag her into conflicts which do not and cannot concern her, is doing gross wrong, and frustrating, to a great ex-
tent, the intention of the legislature in bestowing chap. xxii. the patronage on a body of men who, for the most part, are not likely to be actuated by party motives. India should be governed with a strict regard to her own benefit, as well as to that of England, and should not be unnaturally converted into a stage for the gladiatorial combats of political partizans.

Lord Minto arrived at Calcutta and took his seat in Council on the 31st July, 1807. He found the country in that state of torpor which Sir George Barlow and his friends regarded as tranquillity, and during several months of the earlier period of the new governor-general's administration little occurred of sufficient importance to demand an historical record. The close of the year 1808 opened a scene in Travancore which fearfully disturbed the preceding calm, and the circumstances of this extraordinary outbreak will now require detail.

The connection between Travancore and the East-India Company has been of considerable duration, and the government of the latter had, on various occasions, rendered good service to the former. It will be recollected that, in 1790, Tippoo Saib attacked Travancore, and penetrated to Virapelly; and that Lord Cornwallis promptly interposed to rescue the country from an invader who threatened in a very brief period to overrun it. In 1795, a subsidiary treaty was concluded between the British Government and the Rajah of Travancore; and ten years after, in 1805, a second treaty. By the former treaty, the rajah engaged to assist the East-India
Company in time of war with troops to the extent of his ability. By a clause in the latter, this aid was commuted for an annual tribute.

Travancore was among the most scandalously misgoverned of Indian states. Retrenchment and reform were indispensably necessary, and the treaty provided for their being commenced and conducted under the auspices of the British government. To afford time for effecting the necessary changes, the payment of half the additional subsidy stipulated for by the second treaty was remitted for two years, but the end of that period found the rajah no better disposed to pay the entire amount of subsidy than the beginning. One heavy source of his expense was a military body, called the Carnatic Brigade, which, though unnecessary as well as burthensome, the rajah insisted upon retaining, in spite of the remonstrances of the British representative at his court. This gave rise to much angry feeling. The resident, Colonel Macaulay, pressed for the required payment of subsidy, and after a while a part of the amount was liquidated, but a very large portion still remained undischarged.

The resident having to perform a most ungracious duty in urging the demands of his government, became an object of aversion to the dewan, in whose hands the Rajah had suffered the whole power of the state to fall. That officer, while ruling his master, was himself under influence unfavourable to the interests of the British government. His conduct had long been evasive and unsatisfactory, and
towards the close of the year 1808, it became suspected that he entertained views of direct hostility. It had been ascertained that communications had taken place between the dewan and some Americans, who had recently arrived from Persia. The nature of these communications was kept secret, but they were followed by overtures from an agent of the dewan to the Rajah of Cochin, for entering into joint measures in opposition to the British power. It was reported that a French force would land on the coast of Malabar in the course of January, and in anticipation of this event, the dewan urged the Rajah of Cochin to prepare to unite himself with the Travancorians and French, for the purpose of expelling the English from the country.

The dewan was not one of those who content themselves with merely giving advice—he enforced his recommendation by example. Extensive military preparations were entered into; the people were trained to warlike exercises, and large supplies of arms were obtained. The object of these proceedings was all but avowed, and it was currently reported that emissaries had been sent to the Isle of France to solicit a reinforcement of artillery. These circumstances attracted the attention of the government of Fort St. George, then administered under the presidency of Sir George Barlow, he having been thus consoled for his disappointment in regard to the office of governor-general. By that government immediate and active measures were deemed necessary. Troops were
ordered to march from Trichinopoly, and others were embarked from Malabar for Quilon; but these movements were suddenly countermanded, and a determination taken to try further the effects of a conciliatory policy.

The experiment met with that species of success which usually attends attempts at conciliation under such circumstances. The dewan professed great alarm at the military preparations which had been made by the British government, and entreated permission to throw himself upon the generosity of the power which he had provoked. A succession of messages followed, and this portion of the drama ended in the dewan, on the ground that his person was not safe in Travancore, expressing a desire to resign his office and retire within the territories of the Company. The resident agreed to indulge him, and on the 28th of December, every thing was prepared for his journey from Allepi to Calicut; a sum of money was advanced for his expenses, and as the alleged fears of the dewan led him to demand a large escort of troops, the force attached to the residency was weakened for the purpose of affording it.

A little after midnight the sleep of the resident was broken by a loud noise in the vicinity of his house. He arose and proceeded to the window, whence he perceived that the building was apparently surrounded by armed men. Hearing his own name mentioned, he opened the lattice and demanded who was there; upon which several voices
exclaimed at once that it was the colonel, and several pieces were simultaneously discharged at the window, but happily without producing the intended effect. The object of the assailants being now manifest, the resident seized his sword, and was rushing down stairs to oppose the entrance of the assassins, when he was interrupted by a clerk in his service, who, pointing out the hopelessness of contending with a numerous body of armed men, suggested that his master and himself should conceal themselves in a recess in a lower apartment, the door of which was scarcely discernible from the wainscot in which it was inserted. This retreat Colonel Macaulay was reluctantly induced to enter just at the moment when the assailants, having disarmed the guard, were forcing their way into the house. Having succeeded, every part of it, except the concealed recess, was carefully searched for the intended victim. Disappointed of finding him, they spent the night in plundering the house. At daybreak a vessel, with British troops traversing the deck, appeared in sight, and the ruffians becoming alarmed, made a precipitate retreat. This afforded the resident the opportunity of escape; a boat was procured, and he was shortly on board a British ship.

The vessel that had appeared in sight so opportunely for the resident was one of several which were conveying reinforcements to the British strength in Travancore. All of these arrived in safety except one, having on board a surgeon and thirty-three privates of his Majesty's 12th regiment.
This vessel, being detained by some accidents, put into Aleppi for a supply of water and other necessities. Two or three of the soldiers landing immediately on the vessel arriving at her anchorage, were told by some servants of the Rajah, that a large body of British troops were in the neighbourhood, and that if they were disposed to join them every requisite aid would be afforded for the purpose. The whole party were thus induced to disembark, when they were surrounded and overpowered, tied in couples back to back, and in that state, with a heavy stone fastened to their necks, thrown into the back-water of the port. The ferocity of this deed would almost seem to justify the opinion avowed by some Europeans who have enjoyed the best means of judging of the state of Travancore, that in turpitude and moral degradation its people transcend every nation upon the face of the earth.

Two days after the outrage on the resident’s house, the officer commanding the subsidiary force at Quilon received intelligence, that a large body of armed men had assembled in the enclosure round the dewan’s abode. This being an unusual occurrence, Colonel Chalmers ordered his men to rest that night on their arms. Immediately afterwards he was informed, that a body of armed nairs had been collected at Paroor, a few miles to the southward of the cantonment, for the purpose of advancing upon his force. To avert an attack of two bodies of troops at the same time, a party, under Captain Clapham, was dispatched with a gun, to take post
on a height commanding the dewan's house, so as to keep the troops collected there in check. The detachment had scarcely arrived at the point assigned for it, when it was discovered that a small hill, immediately on the flank of the post, was occupied by the Travancore troops, whose numbers appeared to be rapidly augmenting. The eminence on which Captain Clapham's party was posted was evidently a military object to the enemy, and it became necessary to prepare to defend it. A column of nairs was soon seen advancing, which was challenged and requested to halt. The challenge and request were disregarded, and the column continued to advance, obviously for the purpose of charging the British detachment. When within ten paces, Captain Clapham gave orders to fire. The fire was returned, but it was followed up, on the part of the British force, with so much quickness and precision, that after several ineffectual attempts to gain the height, the enemy was obliged to retire.

On the following morning, Major Hamilton proceeded, at the head of a body of British troops, to take possession of the battery at the dewan's house, a service which was effected without loss, and the guns conveyed within the British lines. These guns had been ordinarily used for firing salutes, but on examination, after they came into the hands of Colonel Chalmers, they were all found loaded and double-shotted; and it is also worthy of remark, that they were taken not in the situation where they were usually placed, but on a spot having the
CHAPTER XXII. The command of the only road leading to the dewan's house.

Before Major Hamilton could return to his position he was required to push on with his party to Anjuvicha, to intercept the enemy, who, in great numbers, were crossing the river in that direction. He arrived just as a numerous body were crossing in boats, while another party was drawn up on shore to cover their landing. The British commander immediately attacked the party on shore, who were dispersed forthwith, pursued to the bar, and driven into the water. A battalion, on the opposite side, witnessed the defeat and destruction of their countrymen, without attempting to assist them, further than by a few discharges of small arms at a distance, from which they could do no execution. On the dispersion of the enemy on the nearer side of the river, Major Hamilton directed his artillery to open on the battalion on the opposite shore, and almost the first shot put them to flight. They subsequently returned with reinforcements, and an attempt was made to surround Major Hamilton's force, but prevented by his retiring within the lines of the cantonment.

Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the news of these events at Fort St. George, the government of that presidency received from the collector in Malabar the translation of a letter addressed by the Dewan of Travancore to the Zamorin Rajah in Malabar, and which had been confidentially communicated by the Zamorin's minister. It was an
extraordinary composition, appealing to the attachment felt by the natives to their ancient superstitions, and expressing violent apprehension of the extension of the Christian faith. To resist this, the Zamorin was exhorted to rise against the British, who were to be forthwith expelled, and no amity thenceforward maintained with them. The Zamorin was informed that hostilities had begun, and that within eight days the Company’s battalions should be compelled to evacuate Quilon.

Some further communication with the Zamorin’s minister took place, through a confidential agent, whom the dewan deputed to hold a conference with him, and it was not undeserving of notice. On the Zamorin’s minister suggesting the imprudence of a small state rising in hostility against so vast a power as the British, the dewan’s agent, after advertling to the application made to the Isle of France for assistance, said that it was well known that the greater proportion of the Company’s forces would soon be engaged in a Mahratta war, and in the defence of their northern frontier against an invasion of the French. Thus did the accessibility to invasion of our northern frontier give confidence to those hostile to our power, and thus early were our enemies aware of the existence of that Mahratta combination, which it took several years to mature for action. Yet then, as under similar circumstances before and since, there were many who saw nothing but uninterrupted peace and unassailable security.

Further projects of conciliation had been medi-
tated, even after the attempt upon the life of the
British resident; and, to gratify the parties by whom
that atrocity was contrived and executed, the tem-
porary suspension of Colonel Macaulay was deter-
mined on. The news of the attack upon the troops
at Quilon, however, put an end to these conciliatory
movements, and negotiation was abandoned for arms.
It was now thought important to secure the con-
tinued services of Colonel Macaulay, and that officer
was requested, in language almost apologetic, to
resume the duties of resident, until the contem-
plated proceedings connected with the station should
have been carried into complete effect. A letter
was addressed to the Rajah of Travancore, explain-
ing the circumstances under which the advance of
troops into his country had become necessary; and
a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants, assur-
ing them that the peaceable and well-affected had
no cause for apprehension, was issued with similar
views.

The troops destined for service in Travancore
were to advance in various directions. Lieutenant-
Colonel Arthur St. Leger, of the Madras cavalry,
was appointed to conduct the operations on the
eastern side; Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage, with
another body of troops, was to enter by the northern
frontier; while Colonel Wilkinson commanded a
detachment assembled in the south country for the
preservation of tranquillity in that quarter, and for
the purpose of reinforcing the army in Travancore,
if found necessary. The troops assembled at Quilon
remained under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers.

The last-named officer was soon required to employ the force at his disposal. At six o'clock on the morning of the 15th January, he was informed that the dewan's troops were advancing in different directions. On reconnoitering, in front of the British lines to the left, a large body of infantry drawn up with guns were perceived, on which Colonel Chalmers, without delay, ordered his line to advance in two columns to receive the enemy. The action that ensued lasted five hours, and ended in the flight of the dewan's troops and the capture of several of their guns by the British force. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was great, that of the British very trifling. Ten days afterwards, an attack made by three columns of the enemy on three different points of a detachment in Cochin, commanded by Major Hewitt, was repulsed with the most decisive success, although the British force were greatly inferior, in point of numbers, to their assailants, and were unprotected by either walls or batteries.

The share in the operations intrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger was conducted with remarkable spirit and brilliancy. The corps forming his detachment reached Palamcottah, after a very rapid march from Trichinopoly, and proceeded from thence to the lines of Arumbooly, which they reached on the 3rd of February. These lines were of great natural and artificial strength, but, after some short
time spent in reconnoitering, it was determined to attack them by storm. The storming party, under Major Welsh, left the British encampment on the evening of the 9th, and, after encountering all the difficulties presented by thick jungles, abrupt ascents, rocky fissures, and deep ravines, arrived at the foot of the walls on the top of the hill, which they immediately surprised and carried, driving the enemy down the hill before them. The batteries in their possession were now opened and directed against the main line of the enemy's defences. A reinforcement arriving, at break of day Major Welsh proceeded to storm the main lines, and these also were carried, in spite of a more severe resistance than had previously been offered. The enemy, appalled by the approach of the main body of the troops, to maintain the advantages which had thus been gained, precipitately fled; and, at an early hour of the day, Colonel St. Leger had the happiness of reporting to his government that the British flag was flying on every part of the Arumbooly lines, as well as on the commanding redoubts to the north and south.

Having established a secure post within the lines, Colonel St. Leger pursued his success. A large body of the enemy had taken post in the villages of Colar and Nagrecoil, and the task of dislodging them was intrusted to a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod, of the King's service. The country through which the detachment had to march was unfavourable, and the position which the
enemy had chosen strong and advantageous. Protected in front by a battery commanding the only point by which an assailant could approach, this defence was aided by a river, while in the rear were thick, impassable woods. These advantages, however, were unavailing. The lines were attacked and carried after a sharp action, and the enemy forced to retreat in great confusion.

At this place the enemy had intended to make a determined stand. The dewan himself had taken refuge there, and only fled on the approach of the British troops, whose proximity he naturally regarded with dislike, and whose extraordinary success had impressed with terror all opposed to them. The forts of Woodagherry and Papanaveram (the latter one of the strongest places in Travancore) surrendered without the firing of a shot.

The fatal blow thus struck at the power of the dewan was aided by the western division of the British troops. On the 20th of February a detachment from this force assailed and most gallantly carried some batteries erected by the enemy at Killianore, captured seven guns, and defeated a body of troops, consisting of about five thousand men. In the beginning of March Colonel Chalmers advanced with the western division, to effect a junction with Colonel St. Leger, and encamped about twelve miles north of the Rajah's capital. About the same period the force on the northern frontier, under Colonel Cuppage, entered without opposition, and took up the strong position of Paroor.
CHAP. XXII. while the troops from the southern division of the army, under the command of Colonel Wilkinson, took possession of the defile of Armagawal, and proceeded to occupy the passes of Shincottee and Achincoil. The dewan now fled towards the mountains on the northern frontier, and being abandoned by his master, whom he had misled, parties were dispatched in all directions to endeavour to apprehend him. Negotiations commenced for the restoration of relations of amity between Travancore and the Company, and in a very short period affairs returned to their former state. The dewan wandered in the mountains, till compelled to retire by the difficulty of procuring food among rocks and jungles—a difficulty increased by the seizure of some of his followers, by whom he had been previously supplied. In this situation he came to the resolution of repairing to a pagoda, named Bhagwady, where he put an end to his life, by stabbing himself in various places. His brother was apprehended, and as he had participated in the atrocious murder of the thirty-four unhappy persons belonging to his Majesty's 12th regiment, he was, by the orders of the Rajah, most justly executed in sight of that regiment.

The occurrences which have been related illustrate a state of things common in India—a sovereign abandoning himself and his territories to the guidance of a favourite minister, who soon becomes more powerful than the sovereign himself. In former times the mayor of the palace in certain European
states reduced the king to a cipher, and while ruling Chap. xxii. without check or control, suffered the odium of his bad government to attach to the unfortunate person who bore the royal dignity. In India that system is still in active operation; the indolence and the vices of native princes, aided sometimes by their peculiar circumstances, throw them into the custody of the bold or the designing; and from the thraldom which thus involves them they rarely escape, but by the death of their keeper. Their people, in the meantime, are generally exposed to the most dreadful oppression, and king and country have alike cause to rue the lamentable weakness which has invested a subject with the power of sovereignty divested of the name.

The event which next calls for notice is the return of an expedition fitted out against the Portuguese settlement of Macao. The dispatch of the expedition was suggested by the state of affairs in Europe, where the French Emperor meditated and was endeavouring to effect the subjection of Portugal as well as Spain to his power. The object proposed by the Indian government was attained: Macao was occupied without difficulty, but the Chinese authorities immediately stopped the British trade. The force dispatched against Macao thereupon abandoned their acquisition, and returned to India, having twice traversed the distance between Bengal and Macao, with no other result than that of affording, at considerable expense, fresh occasion for the manifestation of the jealousy of the Chinese. The
measure which was suggested by the committee of supracargoes at Canton gave great displeasure at home. The Court of Directors passed a resolution condemning in severe terms the conduct of the committee in proceeding, "upon unaccredited rumours, without any permission of the government of China or previous communication with it," to encourage "the Bengal government to send a military force to take possession of Macao," and concluding with a declaration that a change in the leading members of the committee had thereby become necessary—which change was immediately commenced by the appointment of a new president.*

A.D. 1809.

In this year the British government first became connected by treaty with the sovereign of Lahore, Runjeet Singh. This extraordinary person had afforded some ground for apprehension; but a negotiation, conducted by Mr. Metcalf,† assisted by a military force, ended in the conclusion of a treaty, by which the British government engaged not to interfere with the territories or subjects of the Seik chief north of the Sutlej, he on his part binding himself not to maintain within his territories on the left bank of that river more troops than might be necessary for carrying on the ordinary functions of government, and to abstain from encroaching on the rights of the chiefs in the vicinity.

The untoward result of the expedition to Macao was not the only misfortune of the period imme-

* Proceedings of Court of Directors, 14th March, 1810.
† Now Sir Charles Metcalf, G.C.B.
diately under notice. Circumstances occurred in Chap. XXII. the army of Madras calculated to excite far more regret and far greater apprehension for the interests of Great Britain in the East.

From a variety of causes, the army of India was slow in attaining that perfect system of subordination which is alike required by military duty and essential to military efficiency. The fact of its officers living, in so many instances, apart from all society but their own, while it tended to cherish habits of exclusiveness and assumption, afforded opportunity also for the excitement and encouragement of discontent. Where men have no employment for their leisure but the discussion of their grievances, real grievances will not fail to be magnified and imaginary ones to be invented. The anxiety felt by most officers to obtain the means of returning home, tended to make them peculiarly sensitive in regard to pecuniary affairs; and the inequalities existing at the different presidencies with respect to allowances, afforded to portions of the army specious reasons for dissatisfaction. Insubordination had also been cherished by the undue indulgence shewn by the authorities at home to persons whose offences called for severe punishment, more especially in the case of Sir Robert Fletcher, who, after having, as commander of a brigade, fomented and abetted mutiny in the army of Bengal, was appointed commander-in-chief of the army at Madras. From these and other causes the Indian army remained long in a state of unhealthy irrita-
bility, capable of being thrown into confusion by
the occurrence of the slightest circumstance calcu-
lated to afford ground for discontent. Such exciting
cause could never be long wanting, and the effect of
any that might occur could not fail to derive addi-
tional strength from the appearance—perhaps in
some cases more than the mere appearance—of un-
due favour towards the King's officers in comparison
with those of the Company.

In the Madras army discontent had for some time
been gradually increasing in extent and gaining in
intensity. Those who should have checked it—
officers of high standing and long experience—un-
fortunately lent their aid to increase the feeling.
Among them Colonel Arthur St. Leger, a brave
officer but an intemperate man, stood conspicuous.
So early as March, 1807, the government of Madras,
in addressing the Court of Directors, felt called
upon thus to advert to his conduct, and to the feel-
ing prevailing in the army:—"We have already
stated that a very dangerous spirit of cabal has
shewn itself among several officers in your army.
The feeling has been greatly influenced by the im-
punity with which the Honourable Lieutenant-Co-
lonel St. Leger has been hitherto able to brave and
insult the authority of this government; for it is
with concern that we observe, in addition to the
explanations which we have already given regarding
the conduct of that officer, that every means of the
most public nature have been taken at most of the
principal military stations to hold up Lieutenant-
Colonel St. Leger as the champion of the rights of the Company's army, and as one whose example calls for imitation."

Colonel St. Leger was far from being the only officer of high rank who engaged in this unworthy course. On the removal of Sir John Cradock, General McDowall, of his Majesty's service, had been appointed to the office of commander-in-chief. That officer had a grievance of his own which he threw into the common stock, and forthwith applied himself vigorously to aggravate and extend the ill-feeling which he found existing. The Court of Directors had departed from established precedent by not appointing the new commander-in-chief to a seat in council. This was not intended as a personal slight to General McDowall, the Court having adopted on general grounds the principle of excluding provincial commanders-in-chief from council. While, however, it is impossible to excuse the conduct of General McDowall in perverting the influence of his authority to uses most disgraceful to himself and most dangerous to the interests which it was his duty to uphold, it is equally impossible to discern the wisdom or propriety of the course taken by the Court. It is not easy to discover even a plausible reason for excluding the commander-in-chief from council, while the convenience and advantage of admitting him to a place there are obvious. Unhappily the person on whom, in this instance, the penalty of exclusion fell was a man reckless of his own honour and of that of his country

* Military Letter from Fort St. George, 6th March, 1807.
in pursuit of revenge. He assumed the command a short time before the arrival of Sir George Barlow, who thus found the army arrayed in opposition to the government by the man whose duty it was to hold it in subordination. Sir George Barlow had other difficulties. Mr. Petrie, a member of council, had held the government provisionally from the supersession of Lord William Bentinck, and, judging from his subsequent conduct, he appears to have been dissatisfied with the brief tenure of his authority. From the time of Sir George Barlow’s arrival he was found in unceasing opposition to the governor, even to the extent of the abandonment of his own recorded opinions. The new and the old governor thus became engaged in disputes, in the course of which it must in candour be admitted that there were times when neither of them appeared to much advantage.

While Lord William Bentinck had exercised the functions of government, and Sir John Cradock retained the command of the army, it had been determined to abolish a system of tent contract of no long standing, and the continuance of which was believed to be injurious to the public interests. On Sir George Barlow devolved the duty of giving effect to the determination, and as the measure was offensive to the commanding officers of corps, fresh ground for dissatisfaction with the government generally, and with Sir George Barlow especially, was afforded.

The officers of the Madras army were preparing
an address to the governor-general on their griev-
ances. The commander-in-chief, in accordance with
his duty, issued a circular letter disowning the
measure; but he destroyed its effect by encour-
gaging, in his personal and private intercourse with
his officers, the proceedings which he officially de-
nounced. He did not, indeed, confine his attempts
to excite discontent within the limits of private com-
munication. Some of them were made publicly; and
one remarkable instance was furnished in an address
made by the commander-in-chief on reviewing an
European regiment in the northern circars.*

Having scattered widely and abundantly the seeds
of disaffection, General McDowall determined to
leave it to time and circumstance to bring them to
maturity. He resolved to quit the country, an in-
tention indeed which he appears to have entertained
long before, but which he probably postponed in the
hope, too well grounded, of preparing the elements of
extensive mischief. His conduct now became more
violent and more open. He placed under arrest
the quarter-master-general, Colonel Monro, upon a
charge of casting imputations on the character of
the army in an official report drawn up many months
previously. The judge-advocate-general had given
his opinion that no legal matter of charge
existed against Colonel Munro, and thereupon

* A single brief extract from this address will shew its charac-
ter, as well as the spirit in which the commander-in-chief acted:
"From many circumstances this regiment has been overlooked,
and, I may say, neglected."
CHAP. XXII. the government released him. General McDowall now embarked for Europe, leaving behind him an offensive and inflammatory general order, which was published after his departure by the deputy adjutant-general. Upon its appearance the government formally removed General McDowall from the office of commander-in-chief, and gave further evidence of displeasure by suspending both the officer by whom the offensive order had been published and his principal.

These expressions of the opinion of government seem to have produced little effect upon the officers of the army, a portion of whom manifested their sympathy with the parties thus visited with punishment, by preparing and circulating for signatures a memorial to the governor-general, and an address to the displaced deputy adjutant-general. These proceedings being regarded as inconsistent with military subordination, an order of government appeared on the 1st of May, severely animadverting on the conduct of the officers most active in the circulation of the offensive papers, suspending several officers, including Colonel St. Leger, from the service, and removing others from particular commands.

The more marked indications of ill-feeling towards the government had hitherto been exhibited by that portion of the army serving in Travancore. The publication of the order of the 1st of May led to acts of insubordination, not only more violent than any which had previously taken place, but more
general. At Hyderabad, Masulipatam, Seringapatam, and other places, discontent, previously ill suppressed, burst into open mutiny; in one lamentable instance blood was shed, in consequence of the resistance offered to the passage of a revolted battalion from Chittledroog to join the disaffected in Seringapatam.

Widely however as the seeds of discontent were spread, and rapidly as they had sprung into life, there was no principle of permanence in the resistance to authority thus suddenly called forth. That which had been done under the influence of excited feeling was not of a nature to bear the calm reflection which time could not fail to suggest. The dissatisfied could not but perceive that, while they were placing the interests of their country in peril, they were in all human probability involving themselves in ruin, while the inconsistency and dishonour of the course into which they had been seduced were not less evident than its folly. The first manifestation of a returning sense of duty was at Hyderabad; the example was speedily followed at other places: and thus ended a movement which in its commencement and progress seemed to threaten the very existence of the British government in the part of India in which it occurred. Lord Minto, on learning the nature and extent of the disaffection, had proceeded without delay to Madras; but the crisis had passed before he arrived.

Few remarks are requisite on such a subject as the conduct of the Madras army. It cannot be
necessary to inquire whether mutiny be in any case justifiable or not; but the judgments of popular opinion, not less than those of law, should be framed with due regard to circumstances. Many of those concerned in the unhappy proceedings under notice were young men, led to take part in them by the criminal advice and criminal example of those to whom, as their senior and superior officers, they looked with respect and deference. This extenuating circumstance was permitted to have its just effect; and though the number of those who had participated, in a greater or less degree, in the outbreak was large, the punishments were few. The great criminal—he for whom no punishment that it becomes a civilized government to inflict could be regarded as too severe—lived not to receive retribution. The ship in which General McDowall took his passage to Europe was lost, and in the waste of waters he found that impunity which he could scarcely have expected had he survived.

The conduct of Sir George Barlow was violently attacked at home, but a majority in the Court of Directors approved it. His coadjutor, Mr. Petrie, who had differed from the governor on almost every point on which difference was possible, was less fortunate. He was removed from council, and the Court repaired their former error by appointing the new commander-in-chief, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, to the vacant seat.

The administration of Lord Minto was marked
by brighter incidents than the misconduct of the army of Madras: to some of these it is satisfactory to turn.

During the wars which followed the French Revolution, the injuries sustained by our commerce, from the enemy's settlements in the Indian seas, were severely felt. The principal seats of annoyance were the Mascarenha Isles, comprising the Isle of Bourbon, or Mascarenha, properly so called; Mauritius, or the Isle of France; the small Island of Rodriguez; and others of inferior note. Such a group, lying on the very highway of the commerce between India and England, could not be left in the hands of an active and insidious foe with impunity, and the actual results fully realized all that might have been anticipated. From the Mauritius especially, French cruisers issued in vast numbers to prowl over the Indian seas, and the consequent loss was immense. It has been said that, previously to the fall of this island, the insurance offices of Bengal alone were losers to the amount of three millions sterling from captures. The amount may be exaggerated, but there can be no doubt of its having been very great.

That such a course of things should have been allowed to proceed so long uncontrolled, argues little either for the wisdom or the activity of the British government; but its toleration was in perfect harmony with the indifference usually manifested on such occasions. A persuasion had indeed long prevailed, that the Mauritius could not be successfully
assailed by a hostile force, and this persuasion the French naturally used their best endeavours to encourage. A plausible error, once established, is hard to be shaken, and the currency of a belief that the island was impregnable, combined with the imperturbable apathy with which British statesmen have generally regarded the interests of our Indian possessions, must account for the supineness which so long left a valuable branch of commerce at the mercy of the enemy. The Marquis Wellesley had been well aware of the evil, and meditated measures for the reduction of the settlements which gave the enemy the power of inflicting it; but circumstances prevented his carrying his views into effect.

The enormous extent of loss at length roused the British cabinet to some exertions. Admiral Bertie, who commanded on the Cape of Good Hope station, was ordered to enforce a rigorous blockade. The service was intrusted to Captain Rowley; and, to assist the contemplated operations, Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Keating, of his Majesty's 56th foot, was, in 1809, dispatched from India, with a small force, to occupy the Island of Rodriguez, about one hundred miles distant from the Mauritius.

On his arrival he found only two families on the island, and of course took possession of it without difficulty. After some time spent in acquiring a perfect knowledge of the coast, Commodore Rowley resolved to make an attack upon the town of St. Paul's, the chief port of the Isle of Bourbon, and
for this purpose requested the co-operation of Colonel Keating. A detachment was forthwith embarked from Rodriguez to join Commodore Rowley off Port Louis, the capital of the Mauritius.

On the evening of the 19th of September, the force destined for the attack stood for the Isle of Bourbon, and, on the following morning, disembarked to the southward of Pont de Gallotte, seven miles from St. Paul's. The landing was effected with great dexterity, and the troops immediately commenced a forced march, in order, if possible, to cross the causeways extending over the lake or pond of St. Paul's before the enemy discovered their disembarkation. In this they succeeded; and they had the further good fortune of passing the strongest position of the enemy before the French had time to form in sufficient force. By seven o'clock, the assailants were in possession of the first two batteries, Lambousiere and la Centiere, and the guns were forthwith turned against the enemy's shipping, whose well-directed fire of grape, from within pistol-shot of the shore, had greatly annoyed the British force.

A detachment, consisting of the second column, under Captain Imlack, of the Bombay infantry, was now dispatched to take possession of the third battery, La Neuve, which the enemy had abandoned; but, on its way, it fell in with the main force of the enemy, strongly posted within stone walls, with eight six-pounders on its flanks. They were charged in gallant
style, but without driving them from their position. Captain Harvey, with the third column, then moved to support Captain Imlack, and succeeded in taking two of the enemy's guns. The action now became warm and general. The French were reinforced from the hills and from the ships in the harbour—the British by the advance of the reserve, which had previously covered the batteries. The guns of the first and second batteries were spiked, and the third was occupied by seamen under the command of Captain Willoughby, who soon opened its fire upon the shipping. The enemy now gave way, the fourth and fifth batteries were won without resistance, and at half-past eight the town of St. Paul's was in the possession of the British.

Till this period the naval force had been compelled to remain inactive, as they could not venture to attack the enemy's ships, lest they should annoy the British troops, who were within range. They now stood in, Captain Pym taking the lead, and opened their fire upon the enemy's ships, all of which cut their cables and drifted on shore. The seamen, however, succeeded in heaving them off without any material injury.

The force by which this brilliant exploit was achieved was inconsiderable. The detachment embarked from Rodriguez consisted of only three hundred and sixty-eight officers and men. It was strengthened by one hundred seamen and one hundred and thirty-six marines from the blockading squadron; thus making a total of six hundred and
four. The victory was gained with the comparatively trifling loss of fifteen killed, fifty-eight wounded, and three missing.

The success which attended the attempt seems to have paralyzed the enemy. General Des Brusles, the commander of the island, marched from the capital, St. Denis, to repel the invaders, and on the evening of the 22nd of September appeared with considerable force on the hills above St. Paul's; but, either from overrating the numbers of the British, or from some other cause, at which it were vain to guess, he retreated, and terminated his career by shooting himself. He left behind him a paper, which sufficiently illustrates the state of his feelings, though it but imperfectly accounts for his despair of success. It was to this effect: "I will not be a traitor to my country. I will not, in consequence of what I foresee from the hatred and ambition of some individuals, who are attached to a revolutionary sect, sacrifice the inhabitants in the useless defence of an open colony. Death awaits me on the scaffold. I prefer giving it myself; and I recommend my wife and children to Providence, and to those who can feel for them."

Judging from the temper with which Buonaparte was accustomed to regard unsuccessful commanders, the apprehensions of General Des Brusles cannot be considered unreasonable. It is gratifying to know that his wishes with regard to his family were not disappointed; they found in the British commander
those humane and generous feelings which their deceased protector had invoked on their behalf. The widow of the general having expressed a wish to go to her own family at the Mauritius, Commodore Rowley immediately appointed a vessel, with a cartel flag, to convey her thither, with her children, servants, and effects.

The career of the small British force had been highly brilliant, and, in addition to its actual achievements, it had obviously inspired a degree of terror altogether disproportioned to its extent; but it was quite unequal to undertake the conquest of the island; and this result formed no part of the plan of those who projected the attack. In the destruction of the batteries and the capture of the shipping in the harbour, a part of which were prizes which had been recently taken by the enemy, all that was sought for was attained. As much public property as could be carried away was embarked, the remainder was destroyed, and the island for a while abandoned; the squadron resuming its usual occupation, and Colonel Keating, with his troops, returning to Rodriguez.

In the following year, preparations were made for a serious attempt to annihilate the French power in the Indian seas; an attempt encouraged by the success of a desultory but brilliant exploit achieved by Captain Willoughby, who, at the head of about a hundred of the crew of the Nereide, which he commanded, landed at Jacolet in the Mauritius.
The landing was effected under the fire of two batteries, and, as the assailants formed on the beach, they became exposed to a heavy discharge of musketry; but in ten minutes the first battery was in their possession, and having spiked the guns, they marched to the guard-house, which was protected by ten field-pieces, some regular troops, and a strong detachment of artillery. They were charged by Captain Willoughby and his little band, and immediately gave way, abandoning their guns and their commanding officer, who was made prisoner in the act of spiking them.

The British then pushed on to the second and stronger battery, to gain which they had to pass the river Le Goulet, swollen and greatly increased in rapidity by heavy rains. The difficulty of crossing the river having been conquered, the battery was immediately carried and the commander taken. Here, as before, the guns were spiked, and the party were about to return to their first ship, when the troops which had fled from the battery again appeared, strongly reinforced by militia and irregulars. Captain Willoughby advanced towards them, and on his coming within musket-shot they opened their fire. Suspecting that they would again have recourse to flight, the British commander made an oblique movement, with the intention of getting into their rear; but the moment this was discovered by the militia they fled, followed by the regulars, with a celerity that defied pursuit. Finally, Captain Wil-
loughby burnt the signal-house and flag-staff, and, carrying with him some field-pieces and stores, re-embarked with all his men except one, who was killed.

The organized system of operations against the French islands was not acted upon until later in the year. The first step was to renew the attempt against the Isle of Bourbon, with sufficient strength to take and retain possession of that colony. For this purpose, the force at Rodriguez, under command of Colonel Keating, was augmented from the three presidencies to the number of three thousand six hundred and fifty rank and file, of whom about one-half were Europeans. Colonel Keating had been long occupied in training his troops, at Rodriguez, to the service to which they were destined, accustoming them to a country intersected with ravines and precipices, like that in which they were about to act. The transports, which conveyed the reinforcements, arrived off Rodriguez on the 20th of June; but the unfavourable state of the weather detained the expedition from proceeding until the 3rd of July. Before it sailed, Colonel Keating communicated to the commanders of brigades the information he had acquired as to the enemy's strength and position, and his own determination as to the mode of operations. This, in his own words, was "to strike the first blow at the heart of the enemy," to gain possession of the capital, and let further proceedings be guided by circumstances. Every thing during the night, or before
daylight, was to be carried by the bayonet, Colonel Keating judiciously concluding that the French island force, trained in a system of firing from behind walls and houses, and from the opposite side of impassable ravines, would never be brought to stand against English bayonets.

On the 6th of July, the whole of the expedition came to a rendezvous about fifty miles to the windward of the Isle of Bourbon, when part of the troops were removed from the transports on board his Majesty’s squadron, consisting of the Boadicea, the Sirius, the Iphigenia, the Magicienne, and the Nereide, under the command of Commodore Rowley, which immediately stood for the different points of debarkation. On the afternoon of the 7th, most of the ships had arrived at their destined stations off the island, and preparations were made for landing the troops. This was effected to some extent. Captain Pym landed the whole of the troops on board his frigate, the Sirius, at Grande Chaloupe, a part of the beach about six miles to the westward of St. Denis, the capital of the island; and Lieutenant Watling, of that frigate, with his men, took possession of a neighbouring height, thereby preventing reinforcements being sent to St. Denis from the neighbouring town of St. Paul’s.

The other point of descent was the Rivière de Pluies, about three miles to the eastward of St. Denis. The beach on that side of the island is composed of large shingle, steep and difficult of access, and the wind, which is very uncertain in these latitudes,
suddenly and violently increasing, the surf rose to an unexpected height. Captain Willoughby, ever the first at the post of danger, pushed off, with a party of seamen and a detachment of troops, in the Estafette, prize schooner. A few boats followed, and the men were landed with the loss of only four; but the schooner and several of the boats were dashed to pieces in the surf. Another small body of troops effected a landing somewhat more to the right, under Lieutenant-Colonel William Macleod, of his Majesty's 69th Foot. A small transport was placed upon the beach to act as a breakwater, in the hope that the men might be enabled to land over her stern or under her lee: this was ably performed by Lieutenant Lloyd, of the Boudicea; but the violence of the weather, and the natural difficulties of the situation, frustrated the success of the attempt, and it was found impossible to land any more troops that evening. Those who had succeeded in landing had lost a considerable part of their arms, and all their ammunition was damaged.

It now became an object of importance to communicate with the detachment on shore, but all hope of doing so seemed cut off by the circumstances which suspended the landing of the troops. In this emergency the desired means of communication were furnished by that unconquerable spirit which our countrymen have so often displayed under circumstances which almost justify despair. Lieutenant Foulstone, of the 69th regiment, volunteered to swim to shore: his offer was accepted;
he made the attempt, and succeeded, by diving under the surf, from whence he was dragged by a boat-hook. By the gallantry of this high-spirited officer, orders were conveyed to Colonel Macleod, the senior officer of the detachment on shore, to take possession of St. Marie for the night. That officer immediately marched with his slender force, and carried the fort at the point of the bayonet.

The impracticability of disembarking any more troops to the windward, during the existing state of the weather, being apparent, it was resolved to dispatch the remainder to Grande Chaloupe, where the landing was successfully effected.

In the meantime, the brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Hastings Fraser, 86th Foot, which had previously landed at Grande Chaloupe, had pushed forward a party, the commanding officer leading the way, to dislodge a body of riflemen who occupied the heights and kept up a harassing fire. This was soon accomplished, and the brigade moved rapidly over the mountains towards St. Denis. They halted there during the night, then began to descend at four o'clock.

* St. Pierre, who visited this spot in 1770, says, “We descended and came to the Grande Chaloupe. It is a frightful valley, formed by two mountains that are very steep. We walked part of the way, which the rain had rendered dangerous, and at the bottom we found ourselves between the two mountains in the strangest solitude I had ever seen; we were, in a manner, between two walls, the heavens only hanging over our heads; we crossed the rivulet, and came at length to the shore opposite the Chaloupe. At the bottom of this abyss there reigns an eternal calm, however the winds blow on the mountains.”
on the following morning, having in the interval been joined by sepoys, pioneers, and artillery. They found the enemy drawn up on the plain in two columns, each with a field-piece at its head, supported by some heavy cannon on the redoubt. A severe fire of ordnance and musketry was opened upon the British force, who, however, advanced in admirable order. On reaching the plain, orders were given to charge. The French remained steadily at their guns until the British grenadiers came in contact with them, when, finding that the thunder of their ordnance was to be met with the silent but deadly thrust of the bayonet, they retired and attempted to form behind the parapet of the redoubt. From this they were speedily driven by the weapon they so much dreaded; the British colours were hoisted on the top of the redoubt, two guns which had been spiked were rendered serviceable and turned against the enemy, and the batteries to the west of the river St. Denis were stormed and demolished. Thus the main force of the island was totally defeated by a body of troops not amounting to six hundred men. The commandant, Colonel St. Susanne, escaped with difficulty, and the officer second in command was wounded and made prisoner.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, a brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Drummond, of the King's 86th, which had been landed that morning at Grande Chaloupe, arrived in sight of St. Denis, after a severe march over the mountains, harassed by
the enemy's chasseurs, who hung upon their flanks. *Chap. XXII.*
As they approached, they were exposed to a heavy fire of cannon, grape, shells, and musketry from the town, without a possibility of either returning or avoiding it. Colonel Fraser, however, kept up a brisk fire upon the town from the redoubt. About four o'clock, he was joined by Colonel Drummond's brigade; and Colonel Keating, who had landed at noon with the rest of the troops, appeared on the heights. Preparations were now made for a simultaneous attack upon the place, when, at the very moment of advance, a flag of truce arrived to treat for the surrender of the island, Colonel Fraser having refused to negotiate on any other terms.

The articles of capitulation stipulated for the immediate evacuation of all the military posts and the surrender of all public stores; the troops of the line and Garde Nationale to march out with the honours of war; the former to surrender as prisoners, the officers being allowed to retain their swords and military decorations, and embarked, as well as the troops, either for England or the Cape, with the exception of the commandant, St. Susanne, who was to be allowed to depart either to France or the Mauritius on his parole of honour. To these a provision was added, that funeral honours should be paid to the French officers who had fallen, according to their respective rank. The laws, customs, and religion of the inhabitants, as well as their private property, were to be respected.
The ordnance found at St. Paul's and St. Denis amounted to one hundred and forty-five pieces of heavy artillery. The loss sustained in making the conquest was slight; eighteen killed, seventy-nine wounded, and four drowned in landing. That of the enemy was never precisely ascertained, but it was very considerable.

The capture of the Island of Bourbon was principally desired as a preliminary to that of the still more important settlement of the Mauritius; and in anticipation of our attempts upon that island, Mr. Farquhar, the English governor of the Isle of Bourbon, published an address to the inhabitants of the Mauritius, the distribution of which he found means of effecting from the Ile du Passe, which had been taken possession of by a party from his Majesty's cruisers. This acquisition was made in a very brilliant manner. Five boats from the Sirius and the Iphigenia proceeded on the night of the 13th August to the landing-place on the north-west side of the island, which was defended by a chevaux-de-frise and two howitzers. To gain this spot, it was necessary to pass a battery of several guns, and fortunately the attempt was favoured by a heavy cloud suddenly obscuring the moon, which had previously been shining with great brightness. Before, however, the boats reached the landing-place, the enemy discovered and commenced firing upon them: two men were killed and several wounded, but, nothing daunted, the assailants advanced and landed. Lieutenant Norman, in attempting to scale the
works, was shot through the heart by a sentinel above: he was immediately shot by one of the seamen, who, headed by Lieutenant Watling, speedily ascended the walls. A brief but warm encounter followed, in which the British had seven men killed and eighteen wounded; but they succeeded in obtaining possession of the walls. Lieutenant Watling then proceeded to attack the batteries on the south-east side, where he was met by Lieutenant Chads, who had landed at another point and stormed and carried the works there, without the loss of a man. The two parties being united, the French commandant offered no further resistance, but surrendered at discretion.

The island was intrusted to the charge of Captain Willoughby, who availed himself of its proximity to the Mauritius to pay visits to the coasts of the latter. His first attack was upon Pont du Diable, which was stormed and carried; the French commander and three of his men killed, and three gunners made prisoners. The guns were spiked, the carriages burnt, and the magazine blown up; after which Captain Willoughby moved on to Grand Port, a distance of twelve miles. He remained on the island until sunset, and a strong party of the enemy, which attacked him, were put to the rout with the loss of six men. On another occasion he destroyed the signal-house and staff at Grand Rivière, blew up the remaining works at Pont du Diable, and retired without molestation.

The British arms had hitherto been eminently
successful, but the flattering hopes which their success had called forth now sustained a severe check by a series of disasters, which for a time gave the enemy the dominion of the Indian seas. Among other prizes they succeeded in capturing the Windham and Ceylon, East-Indiamen. These ships, with another Company's ship, the Astell, were sailing for Madras, when they were attacked by a French squadron under Commodore Duperre. The Indiamen maintained a very gallant and hard-fought contest with a very superior force for several hours; when the Windham and the Ceylon, having sustained serious loss in killed and wounded, and much injury in their hulls, masts, and rigging, were compelled to strike. The Astell, after taking its share in the unequal struggle, effected its escape under cover of the darkness of the night. The French account of this transaction was marked with that bad faith which has too often characterized the official statements of our neighbours, and which was almost universal during the reign of Buonaparte: it asserted that the Astell had struck her colours previously to her escape—an accusation which the captain and his officers publicly refuted.

The success of the enemy was not restricted to encounters with merchant ships. The French squadron, with the two Indiamen, their prizes, ran for Port Sud-Est, in the Mauritius, at the entrance of which lay the Ile du Passe, which the English had occupied and garrisoned. Four British frigates were also cruizing off the station, and in the attempt
to make the port, the *Windham* East-Indiaman was captured and recaptured by the *Sirius*, Captain Pym. Having dispatched his prize to Bourbon, that officer formed the design of attacking the French squadron in the harbour; but, not being sufficiently aware of the difficulties of the navigation, the attempt terminated in defeat and serious loss. Three of the ships took the ground, and the fourth was prevented from closing with the enemy. These unfortunate occurrences enabled the foe to open all their guns upon a single vessel, the *Nereide*, commanded by Captain Willoughby. The fortitude and courage displayed by this officer and his crew were beyond all praise, and probably have never been surpassed. Deprived of all efficient assistance from the other frigates, the *Nereide* singly maintained the contest for the almost incredible space of ten hours. Captain Willoughby lost an eye, and was otherwise dreadfully injured in the head. A boat was sent from the *Sirius* to bring him off, but he declared he would neither abandon his men, nor strike the British flag while there was a single man on board able to support it. He kept his word—he fought the ship till every man of her whole crew, consisting of two hundred and eighty, was either killed or wounded; and when the enemy took possession of their dearly purchased prize, they found only a miserable wreck, peopled with the maimed, the dying, and the dead.

Of the remaining vessels, two, the *Sirius* and *Magicienne*, were so situated that their abandonment became necessary, and after setting fire to
them, their respective crews were landed on the Ile du Passe; the fourth, the Iphigenia, was, with some difficulty, warped up to that anchorage, the enemy making no attempt to prevent her. In this situation she lay, without the power of removing from it, while the state of the little garrison at the isle became every day more forlorn; their stock, both of provisions and water, was low, and they had no prospect of receiving succour. To complete their distress, they were blockaded by a French force; and as their means of subsistence were almost at an end, and escape was impossible, they were compelled to surrender.

No one object of this unfortunate attempt was achieved; its disastrous issue was complete: all the vessels engaged in it were either destroyed, or fell into the hands of the enemy. But though, as it subsequently appeared, the undertaking was ill-judged, the conduct of those engaged in it was such as to enable their countrymen to call up the recollection, even of discomfiture, without a blush. Heroism like that displayed by Captain Willoughby and his intrepid comrades sheds over defeat the lustre of victory. Amid scenes of blood and suffering far surpassing the ordinary horrors of warfare, these gallant spirits were insensible to every thing but their own duty and their country's honour. Never was duty more devotedly performed, never was honour more completely sustained.

The record of disaster, though drawing to a close, is not yet entirely complete. The Africaine frigate
was taken by the enemy, after a severe action, in Chap. XXII. which her commander fell; and another frigate, the Ceylon, shared the same fate. This vessel, having on board General Abercrombie, appointed by the governor-general to take the command of the troops destined for the reduction of the Mauritius, fell in with some French cruisers off the Island of Bourbon. An action ensued, which was gallantly maintained for five hours, when the Ceylon, being dismasted and rendered ungovernable by this and other causes, was compelled to yield to adverse fortune and overwhelming force. It is said that the French commander observed, that he should have the honour of introducing General Abercrombie to the governor of the Isle of France sooner than he had expected. But this honour he was not destined to enjoy. In a few hours the Ceylon was retaken by the English, when the general, thanking M. Hame-len for his kind intention, said he felt extremely happy in being able to return the compliment, by introducing him to Commodore Rowley.

The necessity of wresting the Mauritius from the enemy now became more than ever apparent, and preparations for the attempt were carried on with renewed vigour. On the 14th of October, Commodore Rowley sailed with a gallant squadron from the harbour of St. Paul's, to resume the blockade of the Mauritius, taking with him Major-General Aber-crombie, to reconnoitre the situation of the French colony and concert the necessary measures for its reduction. He arrived off Port Louis on the 19th,
CHAP. XXII. where he found the whole of the enemy's naval force at anchor in the port, two only of the ships being in a state of apparent readiness for sea.

Having left a sufficient force to watch the enemy's movements and blockade the port, he proceeded to Rodriguez, where the different divisions destined for the attack on the Mauritius were appointed to assemble. He found that the troops from Bombay had already reached their destination. They were soon followed by those from Madras: but the non-arrival of the divisions from Bengal and the Cape at the expected time was a source of great disappointment and anxiety, as the stormy season was approaching, and in the event of unfavourable weather the danger to the fleet would be extreme. He therefore suggested to the general the propriety of standing out to sea with the troops already assembled, and cruising to the windward of the French island, to await the junction of one or both of the divisions so anxiously looked for. To this suggestion the general assented, and the 22nd November was fixed for the departure of the fleet from Rodriguez. Every thing was in readiness on the previous evening, when the welcome intelligence was received that the Bengal division was seen in the offing.

That not a moment might be lost, it was resolved that the convoys just arrived should be supplied with the requisite provisions from the beach and shipping, and, without dropping anchor, be ordered to accompany the fleet then getting under weigh; and soon after the fleet, consisting of nearly seventy
sail, stood from the anchorage of Rodriguez to the selected point of debarkation.

The coasts of the Mauritius are beset by dangerous reefs, and the island has only two good harbours. That called Port Sud-Est, which was principally used by the Dutch, is the more capacious, and being on the windward side of the island, it is the easier of entrance, as well as the more healthy; but the wind almost perpetually blowing in, the difficulty of getting ships out counterbalances the advantage offered by the facility with which they can enter. For this reason, Port Nord-Ouest was preferred by the French when the Mauritius came into their possession, and there, during the administration of Mahé de la Bourdonnais, who was governor from 1734 to 1766, the only town in the island was erected, in a narrow valley at the head of the harbour. This henceforward was the seat of government, and the port and town were denominates Port Louis.

The Portuguese, by whom the island was discovered, do not appear ever to have taken possession of it. It was first occupied by the Dutch, in the seventeenth century, who gave it the name of Mauritius, in honour of Prince Maurice of Nassau. These indefatigable traders are said to have been driven out of the island by the swarms of rats with which it was infested, and it is certain that they abandoned it about the year 1710. Whether the French had less dread of the disagreeable quadrupeds which had conquered their predecessors, or
possessed better means of contending with them, is not recorded; but they took possession of the island after it was forsaken by the Dutch, and always attached great importance to it. Raynal dwells enthusiastically upon its political and commercial advantages, and especially on its value as the means of upholding French dominion in the East.* The statesmen of France had participated in this feeling, and much labour had been employed to place Port Louis in a posture of defence. They seem, however, to have relied too implicitly upon the reef which surrounds the island, and to have concluded too hastily, that the town would only be attacked by sea. To guard against such an attack works of considerable strength were constructed. As the

* This writer, after adverting to certain plans for securing the resources of the Mauritius, exclaims, "Then this island will be what it should, the bulwark of all the settlements which France possesses, or may one day acquire, in the Indies; the centre of all military operations, offensive or defensive, which her interest will oblige her to undertake or to sustain in those distant regions. It is situated in the African seas, just at the entrance of the Indian Ocean. Though raised as high as arid or burning coasts, it is temperate and wholesome. As it lies a little out of the common track, its expeditions can be carried on with greater secrecy. Those who wish it was nearer to our continent do not consider that, if it were so, it would be impossible to pass in so short a time from its roads to the gulfs in the most distant of those regions, which is an invaluable advantage to a nation that has no sea-port in India. Great Britain sees with a jealous eye her rivals possessed of a settlement where the ruin of her property in Asia may be prepared. At the breaking out of a war, her utmost efforts will certainly be exerted against a colony which threatens her richest treasure. What a misfortune for France, should she suffer herself basely to be deprived of it!"
approach of the English was not unexpected, addi-
tional means of defence were resorted to, and the
fortifications on the sea-side placed in such a state
as to render an attack an act of extreme temerity;
but the means of defence on the land side seem to
have been, in a great degree, neglected.

The advantages of superior knowledge of the
cost were now manifest. The French had sup-
pposed that the reefs which surround the island ren-
dered it impregnable, and that the depth of water
without the reef rendered it impossible for a fleet of
transports to find anchorage. These impressions
were not unknown to the British commanders; but,
instead of supinely acquiescing in the popular belief,
they took measures for ascertaining its accuracy.
Every part of the leeward side was examined, and
sounded with the most minute and scrupulous atten-
tion. This service was performed by Captain Pat-
son, of his Majesty's ship *Hesper*, and Lieutenant
Street, commanding the government armed ship
*Emma*. The soundings were taken in the night, to
avoid observation, and it was by these means dis-
covered that a fleet might safely anchor in a narrow
strait, between an islet called the Gunner's Coin
and the main land, and that there were also open-
ings in the reef there, through which several boats
might enter abreast. The only objection to this
place of debarkation was its distance from Port
Louis; but this was not to be placed in competition
with its manifold advantages.

On the morning of the 29th, the English fleet A.D. 1810.

M 2
came to anchor in the strait. Two brigs, which drew but little water, anchored on the reef, within a hundred yards of the beech, to cover the landing; the conduct of which was intrusted to Captain Philip Beaver, of the Nisus frigate. Soon after one o'clock the debarkation commenced, and in three hours, ten thousand men, with their guns, stores, ammunition, and three days' provisions, were landed, without the slightest loss, or even a single accident. The enemy appear to have been astonished by the boldness and novelty of the attempt. On the first appearance of the British fleet they abandoned a fort called Malastrie, the only fortified place in the vicinity. The landing having been thus happily effected, no time was lost in following up the success which had attended it. The troops were instantly put in motion, to prevent the enemy from gaining possession of a thick wood which lay on the road, and using the means which it afforded of harassing the flanks of the invading army. On reaching it, the advanced guard fell in with a picquet of the retreating corps, which, after a feeble attempt to dispute the passage, was driven from its position. This was the only opposition encountered till the columns reached the more open country. About midnight they halted, and before daybreak resumed their march. It was the intention of General Abercrombie not to halt again till he was before Port Louis, but the march of the preceding day, though short, had been so extremely harassing, that his intention could not be persevered in. The men
were greatly exhausted by their previous exertions, their way having lain for four miles among thick brushwood, through which the artillery and stores had to be dragged, with a degree of labour almost intolerable.

The inconvenience arising from the heat of the weather was increased by a deficiency of water. Several men and two officers had sunk under their exertions, and were left dead on the march. It was fortunate that these harassing circumstances were not aggravated by any operations of the enemy; but the condition of the troops rendered it obviously imprudent to attempt to reach Port Louis without rest. About noon, therefore, a position was taken up at Moulin-à-Poudre, on a gentle elevation, a wood stretching along its front and extending with some intervals to Port Louis, five miles distant. In the afternoon, the French General de Caen, with a party of cavalry and riflemen, approached the British lines to reconnoitre, and surprised a small picquet. They were driven back and pursued by some light companies. A few men were killed, and the general himself received a contusion from a ball.

Before daylight on the following day, a brigade, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel William Macleod, was detached to attack some batteries, the possession of which was necessary to enable the troops to draw their supplies from the fleet. Some of the batteries had already yielded to our seamen; the remainder were evacuated as the troops approached. At five o'clock, the main body of the troops was put
in motion. It shortly afterwards encountered a corps of the enemy, who, with several field-pieces, had taken up a strong position, very favourable for making an attack on the head of the column. The march of the British troops lay along a narrow road with a thick wood on each flank. On meeting the enemy, the European flank battalion, which composed the advanced guard, formed with as much regularity as the bad and broken ground would admit, and charged the enemy with such spirit, as compelled them to retire with the loss of their guns, and many killed and wounded; but this advantage was obtained by the fall of Colonel John Campbell, of the King’s 33rd, and Major O’Keefe, of the Royals, two officers of distinguished ability. There was a signal-post on a hill, called the Vivebôt, from whence every movement of the enemy could be discerned. The French being driven from their position, a corps ascended this eminence, removed the enemy’s flag, and hoisted the British ensign in its place; which was then, for the first time, planted in the Mauritius.

The weather still continued oppressive, and the troops were greatly exhausted. These circumstances, combined with the lateness of the day, rendered desirable a suspension of active operations until the morning, when a general attack was determined upon. During the night a mistake occurred which was productive of unfortunate results. A party of marines arrived to join the British force; they were dressed, as customary in India, in white
and blue, and in the darkness were unhappily mis-

taken for French soldiers. An alarm was given,
several corps stood to their arms, some gave fire,
and the consequence was that many were wounded,
and a few killed. But misapprehension was not
confined to the British: the enemy were likewise
disturbed by a false alarm, during which, it has been
said, the National Guards betrayed such a degree of
irresolution as had considerable effect in determin-
ing the events of the following day.

On the approach of morning preparations were
made for the intended attack; but they were inter-
rupted by the arrival of a flag of truce from Gene-
ral de Caen, offering to capitulate upon conditions.
Three of the conditions were, that the troops and
seamen should be sent to France; that the four
frigates and two corvettes in the harbour should be
retained by the French; and that inventories should
be taken of all the articles belonging to the French
empéror, and such articles restored to him at the
conclusion of peace. General de Caen did not
foresee that this last article, had it been complied
with, would produce no benefit to the individual in
whose favour it was framed; it was not then anti-
cipated that peace never would be made with the
French emperor, nor that he was to end his days on
an island in the Southern Ocean, immeasurably in-
ferior in every respect to that for the surrender of
which General de Caen was negotiating; that even
over that narrow and barren rock he should hold no
sovereignty, but should sojourn there a prisoner to
the power from whose victorious forces such insolent terms were now demanded.

The articles which stipulated for the restoration of the shipping and the property of the French emperor were rejected; that which claimed for the enemy's troops and seamen immunity from the ordinary fate of the vanquished, was assented to;—a fact which could not fail to create surprise in all acquainted with the relative situations of the invading and defending forces; while it was equally calculated to excite regret, not unmixed with indignation, in all who valued the honour of the British arms. That such a condition should have been demanded was nothing remarkable; it was but a fresh instance of that insolent pride, which, in modern times, had invariably marked the conduct and demeanour of the "great nation," and which, under Napoleon and his captains, attained its climax; but that a British officer should have been found to yield to the demand, is one of those rare instances in the military history of his country, which call up on the cheek of an Englishman the hue of shame. There was not the slightest pretext for the indulgence thus unreasonably asked, and thus unreasonably conceded. We were in a condition to dictate our own terms. We had reduced the enemy to an offer of surrender, with only a part of the army destined to the undertaking; and, during the progress of the negotiation, the Cape squadron arrived with the remaining force, amounting to two thousand men.
To the British army, without this addition, the French could have offered no effectual resistance; thus re-inforced, all pretext for hesitation was removed: the duty of the British general was clear, and his compliance with a demand quite unusual, and almost unprecedented, cannot be regarded otherwise than as a surrender of a portion of the national honour, and consequently of national interest—for the loss of the one involves that of the other. At this time it was more important than at any previous period, that no portion of either should be sacrificed. The French were masters of the entire continent, and England stood alone in arms against the people who had enslaved all Europe. The superiority of the French over other nations in the arts of war had been loudly proclaimed by themselves, and implicitly admitted by almost all the world; and to this universal belief in the omnipotence of French tactics, and the immutability of French fortune, much of their success was to be attributed. It was, therefore, of immeasurable importance to break the charm which hung over these alleged invincibles, and to exhibit them as ordinary men. To beat them, and then, as if alarmed at what we had done—as if glad to be rid of them at any terms—to give them safe-conduct to their own shores, was to confirm the prejudices from which such fearful consequences had flowed—to sign and seal a certificate of our own weakness and the enemy's strength, and to send him forth, bearing, under the hand of the British commanders, a testimonial
of the homage of England to the great idol before whom all Europe bowed.

The pretence for such acts of discretable submission is always that of humanity—a desire to curtail the horrors of war; but here the hope of offering successful resistance to the invaders was beyond the reach of even the sanguine mind of a French general; and there is no reason for believing that, had the British commanders been steadfast in rejecting the obnoxious article, the negotiation would have come to an end, or even that its progress would have been greatly impeded. But, if it had—if the insane confidence of the French commander in the good star of his country had led him to protract the surrender of the island, and if hostile operations had thereupon been renewed, on his head would have rested the consequences. The British general would only have discharged his duty, in refusing to assent to terms unsanctioned by the usages of war.

With the enemy prostrate and powerless at his feet, there was but one safe and honourable course, and, in departing from it, he committed an error, which, judged upon military and national principles, must be pronounced unpardonable. His own feelings doubtless prompted him to treat a vanquished enemy humanely and generously, and the honour of his country demanded this; but those estimable feelings were indulged to an undue extent, when he forgot the distinction between a victorious and a beaten army, and suffered the one to usurp the pri-
vileges of the other. Conventions were in fashion about the time of the capture of the Mauritius, and this may, in some degree, account for the course taken there, though it cannot excuse it. Such temporizing expedients cannot be too severely reprobated; they are, in truth, no more beneficial to the general interests of humanity, than they are creditable to the nation which submits to them. War is a fertile source of evil and misery, but no rational man expects to see the necessity for it banished from the world. While the nature of man remains unchanged, war will occasionally be inevitable; and, if it must arise, to pursue it with vigour and decision is the most effectual way to shorten its duration, and thus to diminish the mischief of which it is the cause. To cripple the resources of an enemy is to lead him to desire peace—to restore to him the men we have vanquished, to be again employed in active hostility against those whose weakness has released them, is but to feed the flames of war, and to assist in perpetuating their ravages.

The prize was gained at a comparatively small cost. Our loss amounted to only twenty-nine killed, ninety-nine wounded, and forty-five missing. The conquest placed in our possession a large quantity of ordnance and shipping—some of the latter of great value, the island having long been the depot for the prizes made by the French privateers in the Indian seas. At home, the island was justly regarded as a most valuable acquisition, but the terms upon which it was obtained excited general
disgust, and became the subject both of private and public reprobation.

The Mauritius is still ours, but the Island of Bourbon was, at the peace of 1814, restored to the French. This has been the usual course of events — what we have gained by our arms, we have lost by our diplomacy; our soldiers and seamen having poured out their blood in the purchase of conquests, to be calmly yielded up by the liberality or the incompetence of our statesmen. The Island of Bourbon is, from its position, of less importance than the Mauritius, but the possession of both is necessary to the security of our Eastern possessions and commerce; and, by surrendering one, we have compromised our power of retaining the other. In the event of a war it will be a question, whether the French shall recover the Mauritius, or the English the Isle of Bourbon. The dominion of the Indian seas we ought never to have surrendered; it is an essential appendage to our commercial greatness and to the safety of our Asiatic empire. Never was a more mistaken policy, than to settle a probable enemy upon the road to our most valuable possessions, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the colony which is the key, as it were, to them.

It is creditable to Lord Minto that, while he held the office of governor-general, his attention was directed, with laudable perseverance, to the reduction of the power of the enemy in the East. He understood the value of our Indian possessions, and he felt the necessity of securing them. But before
recording other instances of his wise and vigorous policy with regard to the territorial possessions of the European enemies of Great Britain, it will be necessary to make brief reference to some minor incidents of his administration.

The pirates in the Persian Gulf had, from time immemorial, pursued their avocations greatly to the injury of the country trade. An outrage committed on the crew and passengers of an English ship, named the Minerva, at length roused the attention of the British government to the evil, and called forth measures for its suppression. In the case of the Minerva, the piratical captors, not content with plundering the ship and crew, had compelled their male prisoners to submit to be initiated into the Mahometan religion, while some females who were on board were subjected to the last extremity of brutal outrage. To chastise the ruffianly perpetrators of these enormities a small expedition was dispatched from Bombay. The first object of attack was the fort of Mallia, situate within the tributary dependencies of the Guicowar, an ally of the British government, but who was unable to restrain the predatory propensities of those who found refuge and protection within its walls. Mallia, in common with a multiplicity of forts in India, enjoyed the reputation of being impregnable. Here, as in numerous other instances, the charm was broken by the success of a small English force, who, after carrying the outer fort by storm, were admitted to possession of the inner fort by the flight of the
enemy. Subsequently, Rus-ul-kima, the port and arsenal of the pirates, was attacked, the enemy driven from the town, and kept out of possession for a sufficient period to allow the assailants to spike the guns, blow up the magazines, and set fire to the vessels in the harbour, great and small, amounting to about seventy in number. After visiting some of the inferior stations of the pirates, the British, in conjunction with a force dispatched by the Imaum of Muscat, attacked the fort of Scheenaas, and, after overcoming a desperate resistance, carried it by storm. The labours of the expedition were now at an end, for at the remaining stations the pirates saved their chastisers all trouble by burning their craft and taking flight.

In the interior of India some alarm was excited by the movements of Ameer Khan. After the conclusion of peace Holkar had no further occasion for the services of this adventurer, but the desire for separation was not reciprocal. Ameer Khan, whether employed or not, required the means of subsisting his troops, and, to relieve himself from the burthen, Holkar permitted the Patan chief to levy contributions in his name upon such states as were too weak to resist the demand. Holkar became insane, and this increased the power and audacity of Ameer Khan, who advanced to the frontier of the Rajah of Berar, under pretence of an old claim to jewels, alleged to have been taken by the Rajah from Holkar. The British government deemed it necessary to dispatch troops, under Colonel Close and Colonel Martindell, to repel probable danger, and Ameer
Khan retreated. The movements of the British forces were marked by much military judgment but no striking incident, and the retreat of the enemy against whom they had marched deprived them of the opportunity of action. Notwithstanding the course which events had taken, it was, however, deemed advisable to station a force permanently on the Nerudda.

We now turn to affairs of greater dignity than the suppression of pirates or the holding freebooters in check. The subjection of the republic of the United Provinces to the dominion of France had placed the colonial possessions of the Dutch in the hands of England’s most inveterate foe. Among the more important of these were the Molucca Islands and the settlements in Java. The British cabinet suggested the blockading of those places; the more vigorous policy of Lord Minto planned and directed their conquest. They were in succession attacked with the same spirit that was displayed in the movements against the French islands, and with similar results.

The first attack was on the Island of Amboyna, a place which has attained an infamous celebrity, from the atrocities of which it was once the scene. The island had been taken by the British during the first war with revolutionary France, but was restored at the peace of Amiens: since that period, it was understood that the means of defence had been greatly augmented, and that several additional works had been raised at considerable labour and
The principal fortress had, however, the radical defect of being overlooked and commanded by eminences of superior height. The naval part of the expedition designed for the reduction of Amboyna consisted of the Dover, Captain Tucker, the Cornwallis, Captain Montague, and a sloop commanded by Captain Spence: the chief command was intrusted to the first-named officer. The military force, composed of a part of the Company's Madras European regiment and a small body of artillery, was placed under the command of Captain Court.

On the morning of the 16th February, 1810, the plan of attack was arranged by the commanders, and on the afternoon of that day the expedition was in motion. By a series of very skilful and well-executed manoeuvres, the attack was kept concealed from the enemy till it was too late to offer any successful resistance to the landing of the British force. When the vessels got under weigh they stood across the bay, as if intending to work out to sea; but, by a dexterous management of the sails, they were kept drifting towards the landing-place: the boats in the meantime were all out, with the men in them, but were kept on that side of the ships which was out of the enemy's sight. On approaching within a short distance of the shore, the ships, according to signal, bore up together; and when within about a cable's length of the landing-place, the boats were all slipped at the same moment: the ships immediately opened their fire upon the batteries, and the
party in the boats proceeded to land without opposition. The entire force of the British did not much exceed four hundred men. It was immediately on its landing formed into two divisions; the first, under Captain Phillips, proceeded to attack one of the batteries, which, though defended with obstinate bravery, was finally carried, and three of the guns brought to bear upon the enemy in his retreat.

With the other division of the British force, Captain Court had advanced to dislodge the enemy from the principal fort. It being inexpedient to make the attack in front, it was necessary to take a circuitous and most fatiguing line of march. Vast steeps had to be ascended and descended successively, for five hours, and it was frequently necessary for the men to use their hands to assist their progress, and to trust for safety to the hold which they were able to gain upon the slight and thinly scattered shrubs. These difficulties being surmounted, the British reached an eminence which commanded the enemy's position. The perseverance which had been displayed seems to have struck the garrison with panic, for they immediately spiked their guns and retreated. On the following day the island was surrendered to the British force, the number of which has already been mentioned. That of the enemy amounted to about thirteen hundred men, and was supported by two hundred and thirty pieces of ordnance. The sur-
render of Amboyna was followed by that of the subordinate islands, five in number.

Another brilliant exploit was the capture of Banda Neira, the principal of the spice islands: this took place in August of the same year. The service was performed by Captain Cole, who had been dispatched from India with the Caroline, Piedmontaise, and Baracouta, to the support of the division off Amboyna. Captain Cole had requested from Admiral Drury permission to attack some of the enemy's settlements which lay in his way, and it was granted; but not without a cautionary intimation of the disproportionate strength of Banda Neira to the means at his disposal. Not dismayed by this warning, Captain Cole departed on his course, and, having obtained from the government of Penang twenty artillery-men, two field-pieces, and some scaling-ladders, he proceeded into the Java sea, against the southeast monsoon. During the passage, which occupied six weeks, the ship's company were daily exercised in the use of the pike, sword, and small arms, and in mounting the scaling-ladders placed against the masts, as a preparatory exercise for any attempt at escalade. On the evening of the 8th of August the Banda Islands became visible, and preparations were made for an attack. It was intended to run the ships into the harbour before daylight in the morning, but, about ten o'clock, they were suddenly fired upon from the Island of Rosigen; an occurrence perfectly unexpected, as the British commander was not aware that the island was fortified. The at-
tempt to take Banda Neira by surprise was thus for the time frustrated; but, on the following night, it was renewed with signal courage and good fortune.

The party destined for the service was about three hundred and ninety strong, but those actually engaged did not exceed two hundred. While the ships were standing towards the land the men rested with their arms by their sides. At eleven o'clock they were ordered into their boats, and directed to rendezvous close under the lee of the point of Great Banda. The night, however, was dark and stormy, and at three o'clock only a few boats had reached the place appointed, the rest having been driven to leeward. As the success of the attack depended upon its taking place under cover of darkness, Captain Cole determined not to wait for the arrival of the remainder of the boats, but to make the attempt without delay. They accordingly pulled for the shore, but within a short distance of it the boats grounded on a coral reef; and, after labouring through a boisterous night, the men had to wade up to their waists in water. The landing was effected close to a battery of ten guns. This was immediately attacked and carried by the pikemen, the officer and his guard being made prisoners, without the firing of a single shot, although the enemy were at their guns with matches lighted.

Though success had crowned their daring, the situation of the British force was now most critical. Daylight was approaching, and the bugles of the
enemy were spreading alarm throughout the island. A rapid movement was made towards Fort Belgica, and in twenty minutes the scaling-ladders were placed against the walls. So silent was the march of the British, that the garrison were not aware of their approach till they were within a hundred yards of them. The out-works were speedily carried, and the ladders hauled up, under a sharp fire from the garrison; but they were found too short for the escalade of the inner walls. A rush was then made for the gateway, which, at that instant, was opened to admit the colonel-commandant and three other officers, who lived in houses at the foot of the hill. The enemy fired a few guns and kept up a discharge of musketry for about ten or fifteen minutes; they then fled in all directions. A few were killed, and among them the colonel-commandant, who refused to receive quarter, and fell in the gateway sword in hand: some threw themselves from the walls, but the greater part escaped.

A flag of truce was forthwith dispatched to Fort Nassau, demanding its surrender. It was answered by the verbal submission of the governor; but the Dutch colours continuing hoisted, Captain Cole dispatched a second flag, announcing his determination to lay the place in ashes if they were not immediately struck. This threat, aided by a well-placed shot from Fort Belgica, produced the desired effect, and the handful of Englishmen who had been engaged in this gallant enterprise were then undisputed masters of the island, with its two forts and
various batteries, mounting nearly one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and which had been defended by seven hundred disciplined troops, besides the militia.

The only possessions now remaining to the enemy, in the East, were the Island of Java and its dependencies. An extraordinary value had been placed upon these settlements by the Dutch, who used to call Java the most precious jewel in the diadem of the Company, and its capital, Batavia, the Queen of the East. Unfortunately, like most other Eastern potentates, Batavia was regardless of the lives of her people; for though, soon after its foundation, this settlement had been pronounced as healthy as any part of the Indies, experience has shewn that it is, beyond all places in the world, destructive to the lives of Europeans.* This circumstance was regarded by the Dutch as an advantage, the terror of the climate affording, as they supposed, a sufficient defence against any hostile attempt. But such a defence was no longer relied on when its sovereignty was transferred from the Dutch to the French. The skill which the latter people so eminently possessed in the art of war was called into operation at Batavia, and a considerable body of

* The Dutch, there is the best reason to believe, are themselves accountable for the inauspicious character of the place in this respect. Batavia has been rendered unhealthy by directing the water of the Groot Riviere into a multitude of canals, an unhappy misapplication of labour undertaken for the purpose of rendering the country like Holland.
French troops, officers, and engineers, were sent out for its defence.

The reduction of the Dutch settlements was first suggested to Lord Minto by Mr. Raffles, and his lordship was induced, by the information brought to his notice, to determine on the attempt upon his own responsibility. This was previous to the capture of the French islands. In the meantime the governor-general received from home a qualified approval of his meditated operations against Batavia. The views of the home authorities, however, extended no further than to the expulsion of the Dutch, the destruction of their fortifications, and the distribution of their arms and stores; after which it was proposed that we should evacuate the island, resigning possession to the natives. Such a termination of the expedition would have been singularly ill-judged and mischievous. There is not, perhaps, a more dissolute place in the world than Batavia, nor one which contains a larger proportion of the elements of crime and disorder. The Malays are sufficiently notorious for perfidy and cruelty. The Chinese, forming another large proportion of the population, less ferocious and blood-thirsty, are generally distinguished by dishonesty and want of principle, and could scarcely be expected to have forgotten the atrocious murder of their countrymen by the Dutch, in 1740. The number of slaves, too, was enormous; many of them having been reduced to captivity by violence and fraud, and almost all treated with great cruelty. These,
maddened by their wrongs and sufferings, would eagerly have embraced any opportunity that might have offered for revenge. To withdraw from such a population the European control, by which they had been so long coerced, without substituting in its place any other, would have been to abandon the colony to all the horrors of insurrection and massacre; to invite, in another quarter of the world, a repetition of the scenes which had been acted at St. Domingo, or, if possible, something still more frightful and appalling. Lord Minto, therefore, declined acting upon these instructions, and determined, in the event of success, upon establishing such a government as should be sufficient for the preservation of public order.

The preparations for the reduction of this last relic of the colonial dominion of the Hollanders were upon a scale commensurate with the object to be attained. The armament sailed from Malacca, and the governor-general himself accompanied it. It had been objected, that so much time had been consumed in preparation, that the favourable season for its departure had been suffered to pass, and that it would have to contend against the adverse monsoon. This danger was obviated by the route chosen for the expedition. On leaving the straits of Singapore it stood across to the western coast of Borneo; then, under the shelter of the land, and with the assistance of the land wind, made good its course to Puloamber, and from thence striking across to Java, made the coast of Point Indermago. The
CHAP. XXII. merit of ascertaining the practicability of this passage is attributable to Captain Greig. On the 4th of August, 1811, the expedition arrived in the Batavia roads. The army, which was under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, was divided into four brigades, one forming the advance, two the line, and one the reserve. Nominally, the force employed on this expedition amounted to twelve thousand, of which number nearly one half were Europeans; but so many of the troops were disabled by sickness, that the number capable of service was reduced in a very unusual proportion to the apparent strength.*

The place of landing was a spot similar, in some respects, to that selected for the purpose at Mauritius; the natural obstacles which it presented having been considered sufficient to deter an invading army. In consequence of this belief it was left unguarded, and the debarkation of the troops took place without resistance. The different corps had ground allotted to them, as they landed, on which to form, and as soon as the principal part of each battalion was on shore it proceeded to the position which it was to occupy. The advanced posts were pushed on, and the troops were formed in two lines, one fronting Batavia, and the other Meester Corselis. In the course of the night, a patrol of the enemy's cavalry, accompanied by an aide-de-camp of General Janssens, the governor, galloped into the advanced posts on the Batavia road, where they

* The number of sick fluctuated; but, according to a private statement, there were at one period five thousand in hospital.
received the fire of two six-pounders, and that of a CHAP. XXII.
picquet of infantry, and retired with the loss of an officer and two or three men.

On the following day, the 5th August, the horse-
artillery and cavalry were landed, and the position
of the army was advanced towards Batavia. On
the 6th, the roads to the city, and the country all
along the coast, were reconnoitered. From some
symptoms manifested in Batavia, the general judged
it to be the intention of the enemy to evacuate the
city. On the 7th the infantry attached to the ad-
ance pushed forward, the only serious impediment
to their progress arising from the destruction of the
bridge over the river Anjol. A bridge of boats
was constructed, by which a passage was effected
late at night; but, as the troops could only pass
over in single file, considerable delay took place.
On the following day the burghers of Batavia sur-
rendered the city without opposition, the garrison
having retreated to Weltevreden. Though the
enemy had declined an engagement, he had made
ample preparations for what may be called passive
resistance. The houses were deserted, the bridges
broken down, and the conduits which supplied the
city with water destroyed. The public storehouses
had been burned, and considerable efforts had been
made to destroy every species of public property.
Happily, some public granaries were preserved, and
provisions were abundant.

Only a small part of the British force entered the
town in the first instance. Their arrival afforded a
timely check to the system of depredation and destruction which the Malays had commenced, and they succeeded in rescuing several large stores of colonial goods from plunder.

Many circumstances combined to excite in the mind of the British authorities a suspicion that the enemy meditated an attack, and this was confirmed by the report of Captain W. Robinson, of the 24th foot, aide-de-camp to Lord Minto, who had been dispatched with a summons to General Janssens to surrender the island. He was conducted blindfolded through the lines, but, as he passed along, he heard a considerable movement of men, horses, and artillery-carriages. The answer which he brought back was in the style of gasconade which characterized the military school of revolutionary France. It was to the effect, that the governor was a French general, and would defend his charge to the last extremity. Soon after the receipt of the French governor's answer the troops were silently called out, and ordered to lie on their arms in the great square in front of the town-house. They had scarcely reached it when the head of the enemy's column appeared and opened a fire of musketry. Colonel Gillespie sallied out, at the head of a party, from a gateway on the west side of the city, with the intention of charging the assailants in flank. The firing immediately ceased, and no more was seen or heard of the enemy during the night. It appears that they had calculated upon the British force in the city being less numerous than it really
was, and they had also relied on the expectation of disabling our men by means not recognized among the ordinary instruments of warfare. A large quantity of deleterious spirit was stored up in the town, and this the Chinese, in compliance, it was understood, with instructions from the enemy, pressed upon our soldiers instead of water, which was extremely scarce—a proclamation having been issued by the French general, forbidding any family to possess more than one jar of water for their own use. By the judicious and decisive measures of Colonel Gillespie their designs were frustrated, and the British force was preserved from surprise and destruction.

Early on the morning of the 10th of August, the troops, together with the inhabitants, had a narrow escape. A Malay was discovered, with a firebrand in his hand, in the act of setting light to some wooden magazines containing a considerable quantity of gunpowder. He was taken, and, on the following day, in a spirit of summary justice, hanged. These were not the only acts of similar character which occurred. The commanding officer's quarters were kept by a Frenchman, and, as an honourable way of serving his country, this man poisoned the coffee prepared for the breakfast of Colonel Gillespie and his staff: the atrocious attempt was unsuccessful, the effects of the poison having manifested themselves before sufficient of the adulterated beverage had been taken to produce the intended effect. In the hurry of the moment, it is to be
lamented that the author of this abominable act escaped.

On the 10th Colonel Gillespie advanced with his corps towards the enemy's cantonment at Wellevreden, supported by two flank battalions of infantry. They found the cantonment abandoned, but the enemy was in force at a short distance beyond. Their position was strongly defended by an *abbatis*, occupied by three thousand of their best troops and four guns, horse artillery. It was promptly attacked by Colonel Gillespie, and, after an obstinate resistance, carried at the point of the bayonet, the enemy's force driven to the shelter of their batteries, and their guns taken.

But, though vanquished, the enemy were not entirely subdued. They were greatly superior in numbers to the invading force, and they entrenched themselves in a strong position between a large river and a broad and deep canal, neither of which was fordable. Their position was further defended by a deep trench strongly palisaded, seven redoubts, and many batteries. The fort of Meester Corselis was in the centre, and the whole of the works were defended by a numerous and well-organized artillery.* The season was far advanced and the heat violent; and these reasons, combined with the insufficient number of the British troops, determined the general to decline attempting the reduction of

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* The works round the little fort had been constructed and armed a few months before by Marshal Daendels, the commander of the French forces.
the position by regular approaches, and to endeavour to carry the works by assault. Some batteries were erected, with a view of disabling the principal redoubts: from these a heavy fire was kept up for two days with great effect; and, though answered by a far more numerous artillery, it succeeded in silencing the nearer batteries of the enemy, and considerably disturbing their entire position.*

At dawn of day, on the 26th, the assault was made. It was proposed to surprise one of the redoubts constructed by the enemy beyond the canal, to endeavour to cross the bridge over that water with the fugitives, and then to assault the redoubts within the lines. The enemy was under arms and prepared for the combat, and General Janssens was in the advanced redoubt when the attack commenced.

Colonel Gillespie, after a long detour through a close and intricate country, came on their advance, which he routed almost instantly, and with extraordinary rapidity proceeded, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry, to the advanced redoubt, of which he was soon in possession. He then, in accordance with the proposed plan, passed the bridge, and, after an obstinate resistance, carried with the bayonet a second redoubt. The operations of other columns were directed with equal success against different parts of the works; but the explosion,

* The official reports of the proceedings before Fort Corselis are obscure, and apparently imperfect. There seems to have been severe loss on the 22nd and 24th of August, which is not accounted for.
either by accident or design, of the magazine of one of the redoubts destroyed a number of brave officers and men, who were crowded on its ramparts, which the enemy had just abandoned. The park of artillery was attacked and carried in a masterly manner, and a body of cavalry, which had formed to defend it, speedily put to flight. A strong body of the enemy, which had taken their position in the lines in front of Fort Corseilis, were attacked and driven from them, and the fort taken. The enemy was now completely put to flight; a vigorous pursuit followed, and the whole of the flying army was either killed, taken, or dispersed. So close was the combat, that in the course of the day almost every officer was engaged hand to hand. Colonel Gillespie in person took prisoners two generals and a colonel, and another colonel fell by his hand. General Janssens succeeded with some difficulty in reaching Buitenzorg, a distance of thirty miles, with a few cavalry, the sole remains of an army of ten thousand men.

The loss on the part of the British was severe, that of the enemy still more so. About a thousand bodies were buried in the works,* many perished in the river, and many in the flight. Nearly five thousand were made prisoners, among whom were three general officers, thirty-four field officers, seventy captains, and one hundred and fifty subalterns.

* According to a private statement, the bodies of not less than one thousand seven hundred and fifty of the enemy were buried by the English pioneers.
In the British army, about one hundred and fifty men, European and Native, were killed or missing, and upwards of seven hundred wounded.

The conquest of the island might now be considered as achieved: but as General Janssens shewed no intention of giving up the contest, Sir Samuel Auchmuty prepared to push his success with vigour. Captain Beaver, of the Nisus frigate, was dispatched with a detachment to Cheribon, and, on arriving there, proceeded in the exercise of his duty with great spirit, by summoning the French commander to surrender, allowing him five minutes for decision. The terms he proposed were, that the garrison should be prisoners of war, all public property surrendered, but all private property respected. Immediately after the flag of truce had been dispatched, Captain Beaver stood in with the frigate towards the fort. The result was, that the terms were submitted to, the French colours hauled down, the British marines landed, and placed in possession of the fort.

At this moment the French general, Jumelle, and two other officers, one of them an aide-de-camp of the commander-in-chief, arrived with tidings that detachments to succour Cheribon were on their way, and that three hundred infantry and two hundred and fifty cavalry might be hourly expected. But it was too late—the officers were made prisoners, and Captain Beaver, who had not waited for the ship which had the troops on board, landed one hundred and fifty seamen to garrison the fort, leaving the marines to act offensively in the field if requisite.
The prisoners being all natives, except one or two officers, were dismissed to their homes, with an intimation that if afterwards found acting against the British they would be hanged. It was said that this caution did not appear at all to diminish their gratitude for their deliverance.

The marines were then marched to Carong Sambar, thirty-five miles inland, where nine waggon-loads of silver and copper money, with stores to a great amount, were deposited. Seven hundred prisoners, including a very large proportion of officers, were taken, without the loss of a single man, killed or wounded, during these operations.

Sir Samuel Auchmuty having proceeded to Samarang, and being joined there by Admiral Stopford and a few of the troop ships, called upon General Janssens to surrender the island on terms of capitulation. This was refused, and the French general succeeded in making such a show of strength as led Sir Samuel Auchmuty to conclude that it was not advisable to assault the fort until further reinforced. Some fishermen, however, having reported that Janssens was withdrawing his troops into the interior, and had fortified a position a few miles on the road towards Karta Soora, Sir Samuel Auchmuty prepared to attack the town, when it was immediately surrendered.

Janssens had retired to the position which he had chosen at Serondel, three miles from Samarang, where he was completing batteries and entrenchments, and where he had succeeded, with the as-
sistance of the native princes, in drawing together a large force. The British commander, having waited in vain for reinforcements, determined upon hazarding an attack, which he intrusted to Colonel Gibbs. In the course of the night one ship arrived, which enabled the European garrison from the fort to join the field force, which was further strengthened by a company of sepoys. But with these additions it only amounted to about eleven hundred infantry, was totally deficient in cavalry, and almost without artillery.

At two in the morning, on the 16th of September, the troops marched from Samarang; and, after advancing about six miles, discovered the enemy's force. They were attacked without delay, their flank soon turned, and they took to flight in the utmost disorder, pursued by the British force to Onorang, a distance of seven or eight miles. Here it was found that the enemy had halted, and collected in irregular masses. Some cannon from the fort and village opened on the British line as it advanced; but on the advance of Colonel Gibbs to assault the fort, it was evacuated, and the enemy again fled in confusion. General Janssens retired to Saltiaga, twelve miles south of Onorang, where, abandoned by his native allies, no course was left for him but submission. The negotiation was conducted on the part of Sir Samuel Auchmuty with much firmness, and ended in the surrender of the island, as well as that of the French general, with all that remained of his army, as prisoners of war.

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The naval operations were conducted with equal success. Captains George Harris and Fleetwood Pellew, in the Sir Francis Drake and Phaeton frigates, succeeded in reducing the French fortress in the island of Madura, and detaching the sultan from the interests of the enemy. This service was performed with extraordinary brilliancy. Leaving their ships at anchor under the isle of Pondok, these officers landed about two miles from Fort Sumanap, and forming their men into columns of sixty bayonets and thirty pikemen each, flanked by two or three pieces of artillery, and with a body of marines for their reserve, they marched with such perfect silence towards the fort, that, though the boats had been seen standing in for shore, the men were not discovered till they were through the outer gate. In ten minutes the fort was carried by storm, and several hundred Madura pikemen were made prisoners. At daybreak the natives began to assemble in great numbers, when Captain Harris called on the governor to surrender in ten minutes. In reply, he was required to evacuate the fort within three hours, on peril of having it stormed.

The governor commanded three thousand muskets, sixty artillery-men, and about fifteen hundred armed with pike and pistol, and he had four field-pieces planted on a bridge, commanding a straight road of a quarter of a mile in length, along which the British must pass before they could reach the bridge. Captain Harris, however, determined to attack them. Leaving about fifty men in the fort, he
led a body of ninety to turn the left flank of the enemy, and to make a diversion in favour of Captain Pellalw's party, which was to advance as soon as this column should fire the first gun. This bold attempt was entirely successful. Some sharp firing took place while the British columns were advancing; but as soon as they were near enough to charge, the contest was at an end. The governor was made prisoner, and the colours and guns taken.* Friendship always follows success: the Sultan of Madura forthwith joined the conquerors, and offered four thousand men to assist in attacking Sourabaya; but this aid was not needed, in consequence of the surrender of the whole island. The appointment of lieutenant-governor was conferred by Lord Minto upon Mr. Raffles, who had preceded the expedition for the purpose of collecting information, and to whose judicious advice its success may in a great degree be attributed.

The fall of Batavia was followed by an event so remarkable as to deserve notice.

The Sultan of Palimbang, a chief in the southeastern part of Sumatra, no sooner received intelligence of the success of the British arms, than he formed the atrocious resolution of destroying the Dutch resident, and every male person belonging to the factory at Palimbang, not excepting even children, and of razing the fort to the ground. This

* Although the force who achieved this conquest did not consist entirely of seamen, the chief command was intrusted to Captain Harris, in consequence of his local knowledge.
horrible scheme he executed, in spite of the remonstrances of some Malay agents of the British government, who represented that the destruction of the fort would be an act of hostility against those to whom the Dutch establishments had been transferred by right of conquest. The number of persons thus wantonly massacred was nearly a hundred, thirty of whom were European-born.

The motives which led to this barbarous policy were probably twofold. The Dutch are regarded throughout the Malay states with inveterate hatred, and the feeling is not altogether without cause. The sultan perhaps rejoiced in an opportunity of taking signal revenge upon a people towards whom the feeling of hostility was universal and long cherished. He might further think that the circumstances which had occurred presented a favourable opportunity for dissolving all connections with European powers. The entire proceeding appears to have been marked by that sinister policy unfortunately so common among the chieftains of the East. The Malay agents alleged that, in the first instance, the sultan compelled them to sign a false report of the transactions, and afterwards, with a view of preventing a disclosure of the real facts, endeavoured to add them to the number of his victims.

Previously to these facts becoming known to the government of Java, a mission had been dispatched for the purpose of taking charge of the factory at Palimbang, and of making arrangements for the
preservation to the British of a monopoly of tin, produced in the island of Banca, but on terms far more advantageous to the sultan than those existing under the Dutch government. The mission was received in the most contemptuous manner; the claims of the English to succeed to the rights and privileges of the Dutch were denied, and the sultan even ventured to assert, that he had completed his hostile proceedings against the Dutch before the conquest of Java had been achieved. The real character of those proceedings he did not avow; but represented them to be confined to the destruction of the fort and the expulsion of the garrison. This mission, therefore, returned without accomplishing its object. Its arrival was soon followed by that of ambassadors from the sultan, who repeated the statements of their master; but by this time the truth was known, and vigorous measures were determined on, to assert the rights of the British government and punish the faithlessness and cruelties of the sultan.

For this purpose, a force, consisting of nearly a thousand men, was put in motion, under the command of Colonel Gillespie: it sailed from Batavia on the 20th March, 1812, but its progress was considerably retarded by contrary winds and currents. On the 3rd of April the fleet reached Hawk’s Island, and continued a week at anchor. Tents were pitched on shore, and a number of artificers employed in the completion of the boats intended for the passage of the Palimbang river, in constructing platforms for the field-pieces, and in providing shel-
ter for the troops from the oppressive heat of the day and the noxious air of the night. On the 10th of April the fleet got under weigh, and came to anchor on the 15th, opposite the west channel of the Palimbang river. On the arrival of the British force the sultan attempted to negotiate, transmitting messages to the commander, filled with expressions of the most profound respect and the warmest attachment to the English nation; but his treacherous character was too well known to allow of any one being deceived by such professions. Colonel Gillespie refused to treat except with the sultan in person at Palimbang. The expedition accordingly advanced and took possession of the works at Borang; on learning which the sultan fled, leaving the fort, palace, and city, in a state of inconceivable disorder. He had previously removed his treasures and his women into the interior.

After the occupation of the works at Borang the troops had been re-embarked; but, on learning the state of the capital, Colonel Gillespie determined to push on with the light boats, and endeavour to stop the scenes of confusion and carnage which were taking place there. The city, which stretched along the banks of the river for upwards of seven miles, presented to the view of the British an awful scene of murder and pillage. The most dreadful shrieks and yells were heard in all directions, and conflagrations appeared in various places. An eye-witness declares, that "romance never described any thing half so hideous, nor has the invention of the imagination ever given representations equally appalling."
Amid these horrors, Colonel Gillespie stepped on the shore, accompanied by only seven grenadiers, and proceeded into the city, surrounded by the glittering weapons of ferocious Arabs and treacherous Malays. One of the latter nation pressed through the crowd, approached the colonel, and was walking by his side, when a large double-edged knife was silently put into his hands by one of his countrymen. He received the instrument, and was in the act of concealing it in his long loose sleeve, when a sudden flash of lightning discovered it. The man was instantly disarmed, and his murderous design thus frustrated; but, amid the confusion that prevailed at the moment, he found means to mix in the crowd and escape.

On approaching the palace the horrors of the spectacle were aggravated. The apartments had been ransacked; the pavements and floors were flowing with blood; the flames were rapidly consuming all that plunder had spared, and while they were pursuing their devastating career, the crackling of the bamboos is said to have resembled the discharge of musquetry. At intervals, the roofs of the various buildings fell with tremendous crash, and notwithstanding the descent of torrents of rain, the fire continued to spread, and threatened even that part of the palace where the British forces were compelled to take up their temporary abode. This force consisted only of a few grenadiers and seamen, and they were surrounded on all sides by hordes of assassins. The best means of defence were adopted
by the little band. At midnight they were joined by a small reinforcement, under Major French, of the King’s 89th Foot, and in the morning by another, under Colonel Alexander M‘Leod, of the King’s 59th. Resistance was now no longer thought of, and the resolution of Colonel Gillespie had thus, without the loss of a man, placed in the possession of the British the city, fort, and batteries, defended by two hundred and forty-two pieces of cannon.

Notwithstanding the subjugation of the Dutch and French power, parts of Java remained in a disturbed state. The Sultan of Djoejoearta, one of the most turbulent and intriguing of the native princes, manifested a hostile disposition to the British government; in consequence of which, Mr. Raffles, the lieutenant-governor, had proceeded in person to his court, soon after the conquest of the island, with the hope of definitively fixing by treaty the relations between the two governments. The sultan received Mr. Raffles surrounded by several thousands of his armed followers, whose deportment was marked by extraordinary violence. Creesses were unsheathed, and it was plain that those who brandished them only waited for the command to use them against their English visitors. The command did not issue, and the lieutenant-governor and his retinue retired in safety.*

* Different opinions appear to be entertained as to the degree of danger to which the English were exposed. The author of the Memoirs of Sir Thomas Raffles says, “The service was one of immediate peril; the whole retinue were at one time in danger of
A treaty was concluded, by which the sovereignty of the British over the island of Java was acknowledged by the sultan, and the English East-India Company were confirmed in all the privileges, advantages, and prerogatives which had been possessed by the Dutch and French governments. To the Company also were transferred the sole regulation of the duties and the collection of tribute within the dominions of the sultan, as well as the general administration of justice in all cases where the British interests were concerned.

This treaty was concluded before the expedition against Palimbang. The occupation of the troops which had been dispatched thither seemed to afford the Sultan of Djoejocarta a favourable opportunity of evading the engagements into which he had recently entered, and this, in the true spirit of native policy, he eagerly embraced. By his agency, a confederacy was formed of all the native courts, the object of which was to expel all European settlers, of every country, and to sweep from the island every vestige of European power. As soon as the design became being murdered;" and, after relating the circumstance recorded in the text, adds that, had the command of the sultan been given, "from the manner in which the English were surrounded, not a man could have escaped." On the other hand, it is represented by a private authority, to whom the writer is much indebted, that from the strength of the lieutenant-governor's escort, consisting of the garrison of Bengal sepoys in the fort (amounting to at least 1,000), a troop of the 22nd light dragoons, a troop of the Madras horse artillery, and half the 14th foot, no danger was to be apprehended.
apparent, preparations were made for resisting it by such means as were at the disposal of government; and in the emergency Colonel Gillespie opportunely arrived from Palimbang. The lieutenant-governor and the commander of the forces immediately proceeded to Djoejocarta with such military force as could be collected, and hostilities were precipitated by Colonel Gillespie, arriving with a reconnoitering party, unexpectedly falling in with a large body of the sultan's horse.

As offensive measures had not been determined on, Colonel Gillespie refrained from attacking them, and endeavoured, through Mr. Crawfurd, the resident, to prevail upon them to return to the palace. They for a while refused, and some stones were thrown at the English party. This outrage was not repelled, and at length the sultan's troops consented to retire; but, taking advantage of the growing darkness, they again threw stones at our men, and a sergeant and four dragoons were wounded. This attack was followed by several others, and the British dragoons were ultimately obliged to cut their way out sword in hand.

On the following day an attempt was made to negotiate, but without success, and it was clear that nothing was left but an appeal to force. The residence of the sultan was about three miles in circumference, surrounded by a broad ditch with drawbridges, possessing a strong high rampart with bastions, and defended by nearly one hundred pieces of cannon. In the interior were numerous squares and court-
yards, enclosed with high walls, and all defensible. **chap. xxii.**
The principal entrance or square, in front, had a
double row of cannon facing the gate, and was
flanked with newly-erected batteries, right and left.
Seventeen thousand regular troops manned the
works, and an armed population of more than a
hundred thousand surrounded the palace for miles,
and occupied the walls and fastnesses along the
sides of the various roads. The Dutch had erected
a fort close to the palace, and this was now occupied
by the British. Their force was small, not exceed-
ing a thousand firelocks; but what was wanting in
number was made up by intrepidity. They forth-
with commenced cannonading the palace; the fire
was immediately returned, and in the evening the
sultan sent a message demanding an unconditional
surrender.

In the course of the night, Major Dalton, who,
with a party of the Bengal light infantry, occupied
part of the Dutch town, between the fort and the
palace, was attacked four times in succession, but
on every occasion repulsed the enemy with great
steadiness. Various skirmishing took place between
parties of the enemy and others of our dragoons, in
which the latter displayed remarkable gallantry.
The day after, a detachment under Colonel Alex-
ander M'Leod, whose arrival had been anxiously
expected, reached head-quarters, but their long
march and exposure to a burning sun rendered
some repose necessary. In the evening, Colonel
Gillespie ordered all the troops, both cavalry and
infantry, into the fort, and this measure fully persuaded the sultan that he had struck the British commander with terror.

He was mistaken. No symptom of concession having been evinced by the enemy, Colonel Gillespie had determined on an assault. Two hours before day the leaders of columns received their orders, and instantly proceeded to execute them. The assault was made by escalade, and was completely successful. The British force quickly occupied the ramparts, and turned the guns of the enemy upon themselves. The sultan was taken in his stronghold. He was subsequently deposed, and the hereditary prince raised to the throne. The other confederated princes readily acceded to the terms proposed to them. The conquest of Java was thus complete, and the British power was paramount throughout the island.*

The establishment of the British power in the East, without an European rival, was the crowning act of Lord Minto's administration, and it was one of which he had reason to be proud. To the incidents which have been already related little need be added, beyond a very brief notice of some of the various diplomatic affairs in which Lord Minto engaged. His attention, as far as his situation would admit, was zealously directed towards the wise policy of

* The official accounts of the proceedings of the British in Java being unusually brief, their deficiency has been supplied by reference to the interesting Memoirs of Sir Thomas Raffles, published by his widow, as well as to other printed works, and to private sources of information.
keeping all enemies at a distance. He effected the conclusion of a treaty with the amirs of Scinde, by which those chiefs bound themselves not to "allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in" their country. He opened a communication with Caubul; and Mr. Elphinstone, on the part of the government of India, concluded a treaty with the reigning sovereign, by which the latter undertook to resist any attempt of the French and Persians to pass through his dominions into those of the British government, which government engaged, in return to provide, to the extent of its ability, for the expense of such resistance. The King of Caubul was also restrained from permitting any Frenchman to enter his territories. With the same object which suggested the mission to Caubul, Lord Minto dispatched Sir John Malcolm to Persia, where the French were endeavouring to establish their influence with great probability of success. Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the governor-general's envoy, Sir Harford Jones* reached Persia, in the character of a plenipotentiary of the British Crown. By him a treaty was concluded binding the sovereign of Persia to resist the passage of any European force through his country towards India, and his Britannic Majesty to furnish aid in case Persia should be invaded from Europe. In consequence of this arrangement the emissaries of the French in Persia were dismissed. With some minor states engagements were concluded by Lord Minto, greatly at variance

* Now Sir Harford Jones Bridges.
CHAP. XXII. with the then fashionable doctrine of non-interference, but the expediency of which was forced on the mind of the governor-general by the results of his personal experience.

Having completed the usual period of residence, Lord Minto resigned his office, and late in the year 1813 proceeded to England. But he was not destined to a long enjoyment of that repose to which men look as the termination and reward of public services, his death having taken place within a few weeks after his arrival in this country. Before his departure from India, his services had been honourably acknowledged by his elevation to an earldom.

The administration of the Earl of Minto was distinguished by great moderation, but it was marked also by very considerable ability and energy. The line of policy incessantly pressed upon him from home was that of peace, and he laboured assiduously to preserve it. But he was not insensible to the peculiarities of our situation in India, surrounded by those who regarded us as hostile intruders: he perceived that adherence to neutrality might be carried too far for national interest no less than for national honour; and his views on subjects which, soon after his retirement, became of vital importance, were apparently not very dissimilar from those of his successor. In England he had been deeply impressed with the views and principles of those who trembled lest their country should be too powerful in the East, and its beneficial influence be too widely extended there. The solid good sense, of which he
possessed so large a portion, enabled him subsequently to perceive the impracticability of maintaining these views and at the same time maintaining the integrity of the British empire. He became fully conscious of the inapplicability to our situation in India, of that timid and indecisive policy which was prevalent in England; he had the candour to avow his convictions, and the expression of his opinions was not without effect in the most influential quarters. His mistakes and failures may fairly be attributed less to himself than to public opinion in England, which overawed and controlled him. The outrages of the Pindaries, the encroachments of the Ghookas, and the insolence of the Burmese, attracted his attention; but he waited for encouragement from home to determine him to grapple with them. This, the most exceptional part of his policy, must be attributed to constitutional caution. The most brilliant, as well as valuable, acts of his government were the well-planned and successful expeditions against the enemy's possessions in the East. He here shewed that he understood his country's interests, and he acted upon his convictions with vigour and decision. Upon the whole, though one or two of those who have occupied the same high station with himself have left behind them a reputation more brilliant and dazzling, that of the Earl of Minto rests on a basis of substantial service, and he well deserves to be held in remembrance as one of the eminent statesmen of India.
CHAPTER XXIII.

It has been seen that, from a feeble and obscure association of traders, the East-India Company had, in the eighteenth century, become the lords of a vast territory, and the dominant power in the field of Indian politics. They had attained this high position under the license of the British Crown; but beyond this, their obligations to the government of their country were few. It was to the talents and intrepidity of their own servants that they were indebted for the commanding situation which they held; and the extraordinary ability displayed by men educated upon ordinary principles and taken from the ordinary walks of life may be received as evidence, that the native vigour of the English character will manifest itself under any circumstances which afford room for its display.

The struggles of the Company in Parliament and by private negotiation, to preserve a portion of the power and influence which they had achieved and to counteract the growing appetite of the ministers of the Crown to appropriate them, have been detailed with some degree of minuteness to the year 1784, when that peculiar form of carrying on the
government of India which has ever since prevailed. In 1793, the approaching expiration of the term fixed for the duration of the Company's government and exclusive trade rendered necessary some legislative provision to meet the event; and an act was accordingly passed continuing both the government and trade to the Company for a further term of twenty years, commencing from the 1st of March, 1794. The plan of government adopted in 1784 was substantially re-enacted; but the ministry, which nine years before had ostentatiously professed to renounce patronage in connection with the government of India, now evinced an inclination to abate somewhat of the sternness of their resolve. The members of the Board of Commissioners had previously been unsalaried.* A portion of them, on whom it may be presumed the main weight of business was to devolve, were no longer to remain in so unsatisfactory a position. Some additional restraint was laid on the power of the Court of Directors to make pecuniary grants, and the Company were required to reserve a specified amount of tonnage, at regulated rates of freight, for the use of private merchants, to whom the right of trading with India was now for the first time conceded; the amount to be increased, if necessary, under the orders of the Board of Commissioners. The trade with China was continued to the Company without

* That is, they received no salary as members of the Board. They were usually in the receipt of official salaries from other sources.
invasion. This state of things continued undisturbed till the session of 1813, when the battle for the retention of the government of India and of exclusive privileges of trade had again to be fought.

The renewal of the bargain between the Crown and the Company, always a subject of great interest and keen contention, was at this time unusually so, from the progress which the principles of free trade had made, and the influence which they possessed in the high quarters where the matter was ultimately to be decided. Those principles had made their way languidly and slowly; but still they had gained ground. The reputation of having first maintained them is usually bestowed on Adam Smith: they are, however, to be found in earlier writers; and whatever be the degree of estimation in which they are entitled to be held—whether they are to be received as fixed and perfect rules, never to be departed from on any occasion, or whether they are to be admitted in a more guarded form—to be qualified by reference to what a modern political economist * has not infelicitously called "disturbing forces," and to the peculiar circumstances of the state to which it is proposed to apply them—the honour of their discovery, be it what it may, does not belong to Adam Smith—they had been enunciated by writers who long preceded him. Nor can this be allowed to detract very greatly from his fame; for the principles themselves lying at the very surface of inquiry, little

* The Reverend Richard Jones, M.A., Professor of History and Political Economy in the college at Haileybury.
honour can be gained by their discovery; and the merit of having given a clear and lucid exposition of such opinions is almost equal to that of having been the first to propound them.

Previously to the time when the Scottish professor converted a chair of moral philosophy into one of political economy, the advocates of free trade were few; and among practical men of business they made scarcely any converts. Statesmen and legislators, even in despotic states, are, to a certain extent, guided by the popular will. In a free country, those who undertake to be the exponents of that will, if persevering and unresisted, must ultimately be victorious. In such a country, whatever men possess, they hold by the tenure of the public voice, and they grossly and foolishly betray their own interests if they neglect the use of any of the means which they command for shewing to the public that their claims to retain what they have acquired are reasonable and right. They should be active and unremitting in rendering themselves this justice—they should also be early. When the flood of opinion has been suffered to roll on and gather strength, it will require increased efforts to turn it, if even any efforts should be availing. The majority of men decline the trouble of judging for themselves. They follow with their neighbours the prevailing opinions of the day, and those who wish to keep possession of their influence over the public mind must commence early, and proceed vigorously in their exertions, to give it the desired direction.
On every occasion, when the East-India Company had sought a renewal of their privileges, their claims had been resisted; but the grounds of resistance were not always the same with those taken in 1813. Men will always be anxious to participate in a trade which they believe to be profitable, and they will never be unable to suggest plausible reasons for acceding to their wishes. But the principles of which Adam Smith, though not the author, was the great disseminator, furnished new weapons for combating all exclusive privileges of trade, and afforded the means of concealing the interested motives of the opponents under the guise of science.

This new sign of the times ought to have been carefully watched by all who were desirous of retaining such privileges; but such precaution was neglected, and the very slow progress of the free trade doctrines afforded a ready, though an insufficient, excuse for the neglect. While the promulgation of these doctrines was confined to the moral philosophy class at Glasgow, those who were hostile to them might suppose that there was little cause for alarm. But they ought to have recollected that these opinions were propounded in

* So late as 1793, the cotton manufacturers of Manchester and Glasgow exhibited as an article of charge against the East-India Company, the injury inflicted on the home trade by the importation of piece goods from India, and the minister was even solicited to introduce a clause in the new act prohibiting the exportation of cotton machinery to India, or its employment within that country.—Auber's Rise and Progress of British Power in India, vol. ii. p. 136.
the heart of a great commercial city, by a man of acknowledged talent, and that no inconsiderable number of young men annually quitte the university imbued with the principles of their teacher. The last fact was especially important. No error can be more fatal than to disregard what are contemptuously called the opinions of boys. It is true that the real value of such opinions is small—they are the result of circumstances—they are taken up on trust, without any exercise of the judgment, and at a time, indeed, when the judgment is altogether uninformed; but they enable us to cast the horoscope of the coming age: from the minds of the youth of the present generation are to be traced the spirit and destiny of the next. In the disregard of this truth lay a great error, and it was not the only one. The appearance of the book, on which the great advocate of free trade expended his strength, ought to have called forth from those who opposed him, either a manly defence of their opinions or a candid renunciation of them. It produced neither: the advocates of regulated trade seemed to shrink from the discussion of their own principles; and though what is called the mercantile system, for a while, retained the influence which habit had given it, and it was the creed alike of the counting-house and the cabinet, intelligent observers could not fail to see that it was undermined, and that the period was rapidly advancing when the influence of the school of Adam Smith would predominate, both in the commercial world and in the councils of the nation. One party slept while the
other was at work, and the result was the slow, but gradual and steady, advance of opinions, which have now attained such an ascendancy that few have the hardihood to impugn them. Every new battle, therefore, in behalf of regulated trade, was fought under increased disadvantages, and, at last, there was little left for its advocates but to yield to the "pressure from without," and surrender a portion of what they possessed, as the price of a temporary retention of the remainder. Those interested in maintaining it had despised public opinion, and they paid the penalty. They preferred relying on the ministers of the day, and those ministers invariably deserted them whenever it suited their purposes.

The terms upon which the government and trade of India were to be continued in the Company gave rise to inquiry and discussion for several years before the expiration of the old act. In 1808 some correspondence took place on the subject between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors; and very early in the following year it was intimated that his Majesty's ministers were not prepared to concur in an application to Parliament for a renewal of those restrictions by which the trade with India had been hitherto limited. This intimation was, of course, little agreeable to the Company. A variety of arguments were adduced in opposition to the proposed innovation; and it was alleged, that "the loss of the Indian monopoly, such as it was left by the act of 1793, would lead, by no slow process, to the entire subversion of the Company both in their commercial and political capacity, and of that sys-
tem which the legislature had appointed for the government of India: of which system the Company formed an integral and essential part."

During these discussions, a parliamentary committee was engaged in an elaborate investigation of all the great branches of the Company's affairs; and upon the ground that it was desirable that the reports of the committee should be submitted to Parliament before the question of renewal was brought forward, the correspondence on the subject was suspended for a considerable period. At the close of the year 1811 it was resumed. The opening of the trade with India, generally, to British merchants and British ships, was again laid down by ministers, as the only ground upon which the negotiation for continuing to the Company any portion of its powers could be conducted. The clamour from without excused, in the judgment of trading politicians, the pertinacity of ministers; a large proportion of the mercantile and manufacturing world appeared to look upon the East in the light in which it had been represented by the writers of fable, and to regard an introduction to it as a passport to the possession of unmeasured wealth. Though the sober habits of men of business would lead us to a different belief, experience shews that no class of men are more open to the influence of such delusions.*

* For instance, in the case of South America, where the mercantile world believed they had found El Dorado indeed.

A petition presented from Sheffield against the renewal of the
CHAP. XXIII. The denunciation of monopoly formed the principal ground of attack upon the commercial privileges of the Company; and on this point no defence was offered. Monopolies generally were given up; but Company’s exclusive trade, after the term expiring in 1814, was so remarkably eloquent, that it is impossible to resist the temptation to transcribe part of it. Among other things, the petitioners declared themselves to be “fully persuaded,” that “if the trade to the East-Indies were thrown open to all his Majesty’s subjects, such new and abundant markets would be discovered and established, as would enable them to set at defiance every effort to injure them by that sworn enemy to their prosperity and the peace of Europe, the present unprincipled ruler of France; and that the petitioners doubt not, if the trade of this United Kingdom were permitted to flow, unimpeded, over those extensive, luxuriant, and opulent regions, though it might, in the outset, like a torrent repressed and swoln by obstructions, when its sluices were first opened, break forth with uncontrollable impetuosity, deluging, instead of supplying, the district before it; yet that very violence which, at the beginning, might be partially injurious, would, in the issue, prove highly and permanently beneficial: no part being unvisited, the waters of commerce, that spread over the face of the land, as they subsided, would wear themselves channels, through which they might continue to flow ever afterwards, in regular and fertilizing streams; and that, to the wealthy, enterprising, honourable, and indefatigable British merchant, conducting in person his own concerns, no obstacle would prove insurmountable, no prejudice invincible, no difficulty disheartening; wants, where he found them, he would supply; where they did not exist, he would create them, by affording the means of gratification.”

Such was the glowing picture presented to parliament by the active imaginations of the good people of Sheffield. Unfortunately, their prophecies, like those of Johanna Southcote, remain unfulfilled. Though the trade with India has been open for nearly thirty years, and the “unprincipled ruler of France,” for almost as many, has ceased to vex the peace of nations, England has, during that time, passed through periods of commercial distress altogether
some attempts were made to shew that they might be tolerated under certain circumstances, and for definite periods of time; and further, that, as the trade with India was then carried on, the monopoly of the Company was not a very close one. On the part of the assailants, the principle that all monopolies are injurious was fortified by allegations of particular evils, supposed to result from that of the East-India Company. Manufacturers of various articles declared themselves, as well as the country, wronged, by being restrained from pouring an unlimited supply of their various commodities into India; and such restraint being pronounced "humiliating to individuals, and degrading to the national character," there could be no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion, that it was "a national grievance."*

But one of the most remarkable, not to say one of the most amusing, charges against the monopoly was, that "it cooled the ardour of generous and liberal competition."† Self-interest has a wonderful effect upon the mental powers, and enables men to discern generosity and liberality where those not enlightened by the same influence can perceive nothing but selfishness and baseness, and reckless dis-

without parallel, while to India "the waters of commerce" have not altogether operated as "fertilizing streams"—to that country they have in some instances been the "waters of Marah"—her manufactures have perished, and a large portion of her people in consequence been thereby subjected to intense suffering.

* Papers respecting the Negotiation for a Renewal of the East-India Company's Exclusive Privileges.
† Ibid.
regard of right. The generosity and liberality of commercial competition gave rise to those sanguinary scenes in the East in which the Portuguese and Dutch were such distinguished actors. The generosity and liberality of commercial competition, as manifested in the slave-trade, deluged Africa with blood and covered Europe with guilt. And the generosity and liberality of commercial competition are now strikingly set forth in the factory system of England, under which the happiness of myriads of human beings, through time and eternity, is sacrificed to the Moloch of manufactures; the wages doled out to the wretched victims, during their brief career of life, being, in fact, not the reward of labour, but the price of blood. Such are a few of the triumphs of a generous and liberal commercial competition.

The Company replied by affirming, that the paramount object of any new arrangement for India ought not to be commercial, but political; and that the commercial monopoly was to be regarded as an instrument in the hands of the Company for the government of India; that the Company's territorial rights could only be enjoyed through the medium of commercial privileges; and that no provision made for securing them could be compatible with the entire opening of the Eastern trade. These assertions were clearly erroneous: the territorial claims of the Company were quite distinct from their commercial privileges; and there could be nothing to prevent the retention of the one after
the other had been relinquished. Experience, too, chap.xxiii.
has shewn, that the commercial privileges of the
Company are not indispensable to the maintenance
of its authority in India.

The earnestness with which the Company pressed
the necessity of retaining their trade as an instru-
ment for exercising their functions of government,
was the result of a conviction long cherished, though
proved by the test of experiment to be unwarranted.
The trade of the Company was regarded by them
as indispensable to the support of the financial ope-
ration required by the relative circumstances of
Great Britain and India. They viewed it not only
as the best, but the only practicable channel of re-
mitance, and without it they apprehended that the
means of conveying from India the funds required to
be provided in this country would fail.

They were more fortunate in referring to their
own exertions to effect the introduction and con-
sumption of European commodities—exertions made
through a long series of years, with great perseve-
rance and extraordinary zeal; to their labours in
upholding the interests of Great Britain in India,
against European rivalship and native jealousy; to
the magnificent empire which they had added to the
British dominions; and to the great wealth which
flowed into this country, in consequence of their
spirited and judicious policy. After enumerating
some of these advantages in one of their official pa-
pers, they emphatically and justly added, with re-
ference to the charges of their opponents—"Such
are the injuries, the grievances, the evils—such the degradation, which the East-India Company have brought on the country."

The debts and embarrassments of the Company afforded a ground of accusation peculiarly calculated to render them unpopular, and of course they were not forgotten. The answer of the Company was to the effect, that they had never had occasion to apply to parliament for aid to support their own establishments; but that their applications had been in consequence of levies made by government, on the score of a right to participate in the territorial revenues; or for the purpose of obtaining reimbursement of immense sums, disbursed for the state in military expeditions—sums very tardily acknowledged, and not then fully paid; or to enable the Company to meet the transfer to this country of Indian territorial debt, the increase of which was not to be attributed to the Company, but to his Majesty's government and to parliament. There was much in these statements that deserved consideration; but there is no novelty in the truth, that when either individuals or societies expend their funds for the public benefit, they rarely meet with much gratitude in return.

Political economy did not furnish the whole of the arguments by which the privileges of the Company were assailed: the higher science of natural law was invoked to the same end. A full and free right to trade with all countries and people in amity with the British crown was asserted to be "the natural birth-
right and inheritance of the people of this empire, of chap.xxxiii. every subject of it, and of every port in it."* What may be "the natural birthright and inheritance" of a "port," it would not be very easy to determine; and if the assertion be taken in the sense in which it was probably meant, it may reasonably be doubted whether a position so wild merited any answer at all. If it did, the Company gave it a very proper one by observing, that men living in society must submit to the laws of society, and to restraints upon what is called their natural liberty, when, in the opinion of the legislature, the public interest demands it; that the Indian monopoly was established because it was thought beneficial; that it had been continued on the same principle, and that its abolition, or further retention, must be a question purely prudential. In urging their plea of natural right, some of the opponents of the Company endeavoured to make a special case. Their principle, it was alleged, became strengthened by its application to countries acquired and maintained by the efforts and valour of the forces of his Majesty. The countries, however, with which they wished to trade, had been, for the most part, acquired and maintained by the efforts of the Company and the valour of their servants, and altogether under the exclusive powers and privileges which it was now desired to abrogate.

A plausible, and not altogether an unreasonable, objection to the continuance of the Company's pri-

* Papers ut supra.
vileges was founded on the fact, that the existing system gave advantages to foreigners which were denied to British merchants, and that the Americans especially had availed themselves of these advantages to secure the markets of Europe, South America, and the West Indies. From this latter circumstance, also, an inference was drawn in favour of general freedom of trade. The Company answered, that the connection of the Americans with the Indian seas was formed under peculiar circumstances, and that their success in the market of Europe was to be ascribed to the political state of that part of the world. *

The necessity for the claimants finding new channels of enterprise; the misery of the manufacturers, occasioned by their exclusion from the continent of Europe; the certainty of finding a remedy in the unbounded field which the trade to the East would open to manufacturing and mercantile industry—these, and similar topics, furnished another class of arguments, which were pressed with extraordinary pertinacity by those who conceived they had interests hostile to those of the Company. It was answered, with much calmness and moderation, that any great extension of the trade with India must take place very gradually; that, consequently, the benefits to be derived from it must be very distant;

* In the course of the parliamentary discussion, Mr. R. Thornton observed, that the advantages enjoyed by America were the result of a treaty, in which the interests of the East-India Company were too little regarded, and that the Company ought not to be sacrificed on that account.
and that, though it might be very easy to send out chap.xxiii.
to India large quantities of goods, it might not be equally easy to obtain returns.

Experience has shewn that these opinions were, in a great measure, correct.* The trade which succeeded the act of 1813 has been little beneficial to England, while to India it has, to a certain extent, been positively injurious. The petitioners for an open trade had, however, made up their minds to its advantages, and, further, that they were destined to enjoy them; for it was urged, as a reason for extending the trade to the outports, that at Bristol and Liverpool the docks had been enlarged in anticipation of the concession. This specimen of commercial confidence is, perhaps, without parallel.

Such were the principal arguments by which the advocates of free and of regulated trade, respectively, supported their opinions. But the question was virtually decided before the discussion commenced. The principles of free trade had made too great progress for ministers to venture to resist

* The difficulty of obtaining returns from India is still a clog upon the commerce with that country. A great increase of exports to India undoubtedly followed the opening of the trade, and, upon the principle, post hoc, ergo propter hoc, the increase was ascribed to the change in the state of the law. Calm inquirers, however, will hesitate to attribute it entirely, or even principally, to this cause, when they recollect the great development of the powers of machinery which was in progress at the time the change took place, and the subsequent extension of its employment. This, and the impetus given to trade generally by the settled state of the social and political relations of the world, secured by the battle of Waterloo, will account for much of the increase.
them without exercising a degree of magnanimity seldom acquired or retained amid the haunts of office.

A.D. 1813. On the 22nd of March, 1813, the House of Commons resolved itself into a committee of the whole house, to consider of the affairs of the East-India Company; and the various petitions which had been presented having been ordered to be referred to the committee, Lord Castlereagh proceeded to expound the plan which he had to propose on the part of the ministers of the Crown. The term for which the charter was to be renewed was twenty years. The Company were to retain for that term the exclusive trade to China, but the trade with India was to be thrown open on certain conditions. It was to be confined to ships of a certain amount of tonnage; the trade outward was to be open to all the ports of the empire, but the homeward-bound trade to be restricted to certain ports, to be hereafter named. The Company were to be left in full possession of the power of deportation, to enable them to remove from India individuals whose conduct or intentions they might find or suspect to be dangerous; and this power his lordship held to be sufficient to calm any apprehension that might be excited by the facility of commercial intercourse about to be established. It was also proposed to continue to them the command of the native army, as, after mature consideration, ministers were of opinion, that to separate the command of the army from the civil administration of India would be to sap the foundations of the government. The question, it might
have been thought, could scarcely require mature consideration, or, indeed, any consideration at all.

At every successive arrangement, the Company had been called upon to sacrifice some portion of their authority to the ministers of the Crown, and of course the present could not be suffered to form an exception. The Crown previously possessed the power of recall; but, under the pretence that this was an invidious exercise of prerogative, it was proposed to render the sign-manual of the Crown necessary to the validity of certain appointments. One of the most important and most beneficial of the contemplated changes applied to the defects of the ecclesiastical establishment. The members of the Church of England in India had hitherto been deprived of those rites of the church, the administration of which appertain exclusively to the episcopal function, and the clergy had been left without superintendence or control. To remedy these evils, it was proposed to appoint a bishop for India, and three archdeacons to superintend the chaplains of the different settlements. Lord Castlereagh embodied the principal points of his speech in a series of resolutions, and concluded by moving them.

The ministry, in accordance with the practice of all ministries who feel or think themselves strong, was disposed to carry the question with a high hand. Some members suggested that, in so important a matter, it might be desirable to hear the evidence of persons whose opinions, on the grounds of ac-
knowned ability and intimate acquaintance with India, were entitled to attention. Lord Castlereagh objected, and Mr. Canning, whose zeal for the success of the ministerial measure was quickened by the fact of his holding a brief for the great commercial town of Liverpool, which he represented, was surprised that any one should think it necessary to hear evidence, when the question was one of free trade. The sense of the house, however, was strongly in favour of hearing evidence, and the ministers acquiesced, fearing that they were unable successfully to oppose.

A.D. 1813. On the 30th of March the committee was resumed and evidence called. The first witness was a man rendered eminent by his career in India, and no less so by the long and harassing judicial proceedings which awaited him at home. It was Warren Hastings, then in the eightieth year of his age. His examination was of some length, and related to various subjects—the settlement of Europeans, the demand for British commodities, and the propagation of the Christian religion. To the first he expressed himself strongly opposed: he apprehended great injury and oppression to the natives, and regarded the indiscriminate admission of Europeans as fraught with danger to the peace of the country and the safety of the Company. This opinion, he averred, he had long maintained, and he expressed himself anxious to vindicate himself from the suspicion of being biassed by his obligations to the Company. With this view, he stated that, twenty
years before, when the privileges of the East-India Company were under discussion, he spontaneously addressed a letter to the chairman of the Court of Directors, in which he strongly urged the necessity of providing against the irruption of British adventurers into India. A clause having been inserted in the act, permitting strangers to reside by license, he addressed a second letter to the Chairs, remonstrating against it, as likely to produce greater mischiefs than even the permission of indiscriminate residence; because the favoured parties would appear to have the sanction of the Company, and would thereby possess an influence which no man would dare to resist; while a body of adventurers without privilege would be under the jealous eye of government, and naturally excite its attention. In a still more recent letter he had repeated these opinions.

On the question as to the probable demand for British commodities, Mr. Hastings was less decided, but he thought it would be inconsiderable. It was his opinion, that the trade between India and England, as then regulated, was far more beneficial to both countries than if perfectly free. Being reminded that, in a review of the state of Bengal, which he had written some years before, he had said, "that although we had been so long in possession of the sovereignty of Bengal, yet we had not been able so far to change our ideas with our situation as to quit the contracted views of monopolists," and that in the same work he had insisted
of the

upon it, as a fixed and incontrovertible principle, that commerce could only flourish when free and equal, he professed not to recollect the words alluded to, but to have no doubt of their being correctly quoted; and added, that he did not come there to defend his own inconsistencies—that if he had ever expressed such opinions, he then abjured them—that his present sentiments were widely different—and that he could not say when he changed them.

On the subject of the propagation of Christianity in India, the opinions delivered by Mr. Hastings were singularly vague and undecided. On the proposed episcopal establishment he expressed himself with an equal degree of oracular darkness; and, for the son and grandson of a clergyman, he certainly evinced a most philosophic indifference, both to the general interests of Christianity and the welfare of the Protestant episcopal church. On the whole, he did little for the elucidation of the various questions before the house, and his answers were distinguished by nothing so much as the pompous and inflated language in which they were conveyed. Age had probably clouded his faculties, and the failings of a man of fourscore years claim indulgence. But in the vigour of his mental strength, Warren Hastings was a man of expedients, not of principles. His last public exhibition, though feeble, was not uncharacteristic. To himself, at least, the occasion must have been gratifying, from its having called forth a spontaneous and almost unanimous indication of respect from the house.
Lord Teignmouth, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir John Malcolm, and other witnesses of distinguished character, were examined; and their evidence, on the whole, tended rather to support the views of the Company than those of the ministers. After being persevered in for some days, the mode of investigation originally adopted was suddenly abandoned. Ministers either found, as they alleged, that the time of the house was too much occupied, or the affair was taking a tendency opposed to that which they desired. On the 13th of April Lord Castle- reagh, after complaining of delay and inconvenience, and referring to a precedent to authorize the course he was about to recommend, moved for the appointment of a select committee, to examine witnesses, and report the minutes to the house. Mr. Robert Thornton opposed the motion, on behalf of the Company, as did also Mr. Grant and Mr. Astell, the last-named gentleman denouncing the proposal as an attempt to smother the remainder of the Company's case. Mr. Canning, the representative of one of the towns most interested in destroying the Company's privileges, supported the motion. It was resisted by Mr. Tierney and Mr. Ponsonby, leading members of the opposition; the former of whom insinuated a charge of unfairness against the ministry. On a division, the motion was carried, and the select committee met on the 15th, and continued to sit, notwithstanding the house adjourned for the Easter holidays.

In the meantime, the question of an arrangement
with the Company had been introduced into the
Upper House. On the 30th of March the Earl of
Buckinghamshire, President of the Board of Com-
missioners, announced, that though a different course
had formerly been adopted, it had been deemed ad-
visable, in the present instance, that the resolutions
which had been laid before the Commons should
also be presented to their lordships, and that a com-
mittee of the whole house should, with all the do-
cuments before it, proceed to the hearing of any
evidence which might be offered. Lord Grenville
having suggested a select committee as more advis-
able, Lord Liverpool, the premier, immediately as-
serted, and a motion for the appointment of such
committee having been made, it was carried without
a division. On the 5th, the select committee of the
Lords met, and proceeded to hear evidence. As in
the Commons, the first witness called was Warren
Hastings. His answers to the questions put to him
were of extraordinary length, but added little or
nothing in substance to the evidence which he had
given before the Lower House. Some further evi-
dence was heard, and on the 9th, an animated de-
bate took place, on a motion made by the Marquis
Wellesley for the production of certain papers con-
ected with the inquiry in which the house was en-
gaged. The noble marquis introduced the motion
by a very long and elaborate speech, decidedly in
favour of re-establishing the power of the Company,
not only with regard to the government of India,
but to the exclusive privileges of trade which they
enjoyed. He supported his opinion by appealing to the Company had done—to their banishment of foreign influence and intrigue—to the consolidation of institutions and authorities—to the amelioration of the condition of the natives, and especially to the state of tranquillity in which those countries had been placed—the Deccan, for instance, and the provinces north of Mysore—which, in all previous times, had been constantly exposed to war and devastation. This testimony was important, because it could not but be the result of cool and deliberate conviction. Personally, the Marquis of Wellesley had at that time little cause for bestowing panegyric on the Company.

After Lord Buckinghamshire had spoken in defence of the conduct of ministers, Lord Grenville delivered his opinions at great length. He considered all former arrangements relating to the government and commerce of India only as experiments, and not always successful ones; at best only calculated for a limited duration, never permanent, nor even meant for permanence. He wished not to perpetuate these anomalous and imperfect arrangements, but he believed the time had not arrived when any final regulation could be safely established. Whatever was now done should be temporary, and he objected to the part of the ministerial plan which proposed that the arrangements now entered into should be for so long a period as twenty years. He regarded the claims of the
CHAP. XXIII. East-India Company as nothing, and argued that the first duty of the British parliament was to consult the welfare of the country for which it was called upon to legislate. Next to this object in importance was the interest of our own country, which was deeply implicated in the discussion. Taking his stand upon these principles, he considered both the plan of the Marquis Wellesley for re-investing the Company with all their privileges, and that of ministers for divesting them of a portion, as highly questionable. He was friendly to a free trade, but he could not hope that a competition, in which the whole influence of the government, territory, and revenue of India would be arrayed against the unprotected enterprise of individual adventurers, could either deserve the name of free trade or ensure its advantages.

His lordship reproved the union of the characters of merchant and sovereign, which he alleged to be opposed to all authority, and condemned by all experience. He would not admit that the improved condition of India was to be attributed to the Company, but claimed the praise for the wisdom and justice of the public councils of the state. For twenty years after the Company acquired the dewanee, India, he said, was so constantly ill-governed as to compel the forcible interposition of parliament; and good government commenced only in the year 1784, when the power of controlling the Company was vested in commissioners appointed by the Crown.
It is observable, that this was the precise period at chap.xxiii. which Lord Grenville and the party with which he then acted commenced a long official career.

His lordship proceeded to say, that he was for transferring the government to the Crown altogether. He thought that arrangements might easily be made with regard to the patronage, by which all danger of unduly increasing the influence of ministers might be avoided; but he did not state that he had not thought so in 1784, when he opposed and, with his colleagues, succeeded in throwing out the far-famed India Bill of the coalition ministry, because it deprived the Company of its patronage. The plan of which his lordship was the advocate went to put up the civil appointments for competition among certain public schools, and to appropriate the military appointments to the sons of deceased officers. Lord Grenville, adverting to the China trade, condemned the intention of ministers to continue the monopoly to the Company. He apprehended that when the India trade was thrown open it would be, in fact, impracticable to preserve the Chinese monopoly, as the productions of China would be brought down in country vessels to any of the ports of the Eastern Archipelago that our merchants might choose.

Lord Grenville made some observations on minor topics connected with the renewal of the charter, and the debate was closed by Lord Liverpool, who briefly defended the line taken by ministers. The motion for papers not being resisted was, of course,
carried without a division; and it seems, indeed, only to have been made for the purpose of enabling the peers to deliver their opinions on the principal question.

The speech of Lord Grenville was, undoubtedly, the most remarkable that was made. The sweeping doctrines which he avowed were, perhaps, at that time, little to be expected from any member of the House of Peers; but, of all men, they were least to be expected from the noble baron who gave them the weight of his authority. Lord Grenville had been long on the political stage, and his conduct on this occasion must alike have astonished his friends and his foes. His political course had hitherto been guided by expediency, not by abstract principle. No one had ever suspected him of being a theorist, and the robe of the philosopher was assumed too late in life to be worn with either ease or grace. It was an incongruous covering for a man who had become grey in habits of official intrigue, and whose political life and liberal doctrines were bitter satires on each other.

Independently of his general character, there were some particular incidents in Lord Grenville's career which certainly did not lend any weight to his advocacy of the destruction of the East-India Company. He had, as has already been mentioned, been one of the most active and zealous of that party which, with Mr. Pitt at their head, had succeeded, in 1784, in displacing the coalition ministry.
solely on the ground of their contemplated violation of the chartered rights of the East-India Company. Some years afterwards he had, as a cabinet minister, given his consent to an act which continued to the Company that monopoly and that power which he now professed to regard as so dangerous. It was unfortunate that political philosophy should have deferred her visit to this statesman until a period when both his mind and body were enfeebled by age, and his moral vision clouded by those feelings which must attend a man who, after passing a long life in office, finds himself doomed to linger out his declining years in the cold atmosphere of the opposition benches.

In the House of Commons, the select committee continued the examination of witnesses which had been commenced in the committee of the whole house. This labour lasted much longer than had been expected; but, having been at length concluded, the Commons, on the 31st of May, once more resolved themselves into a committee of the whole house, in which Lord Castlereagh proceeded to submit an amended series of resolutions. The first, declaring that the privileges of the East-India Company should continue for a limited period, with the exception of such as might be subsequently modified or repealed, having been moved, Mr. Bruce, historiographer of the Company, entered into a long and laboured review of its progress from its incorporation by Elizabeth, and condemned any deviation
from the existing system as replete with danger. He was followed, on the same side, by a far more brilliant speaker—Mr. Charles Grant, junior.* That gentleman glanced at the speech of Lord Grenville in the Upper House, and argued that the improvement, which was admitted on all hands to have taken place in India, was attributable to the Company. He denied that the year 1784 constituted the epoch of the commencement of a new order of things. The foundations of improvement were laid earlier; and it was not until much had been done that the legislature interfered. The King's government had, indeed, subsequently co-operated with the Company; but it did not follow, that, because certain results were produced by the operation of a complex system, the same results would follow if one part of the system were removed. Mr. Grant's opinion of Lord Grenville's plan for the distribution of the patronage of India was delivered with much freedom. He viewed it as altogether inefficient; and contended that, if adopted, it would ultimately be the means of effecting that which it professed to guard against, by placing the patronage at the disposal of the minister of the Crown. He maintained, that the efficiency of the existing system for the government of India consisted, in a great degree, in its publicity—every man engaged in it acted on a conspicuous theatre. He could hardly hope that the rules of the service

* Since created Lord Glenelg.
would survive the existence of the Company; and if they did, their vigour and efficiency might be entirely superseded. He objected, further, to the suggested plan of patronage, on the ground of its exclusiveness; and thought it remarkable, that a plan professing to proceed upon hostility to all exclusion should in itself involve a system of exclusion the most cruel and unjust. To confine the civil services of India to the highest classes of the public schools, and the military service to the sons of officers who had fallen in battle, was cutting off the larger portion of the British community from a wide and honourable field of exertion.

Proceeding to the question of the union of the political and commercial functions, Mr. Grant said, the objection to the union rested upon the authority of a great master of political economy, Adam Smith. But it was curious to observe how the charge had shifted its ground since it was first made. Dr. Smith objected to the union, because he thought the interests of the Company, as merchants, would interfere with their duty as sovereigns; his disciples took precisely the opposite ground. The merits of the Company, as rulers, were admitted; but it was alleged that they sacrificed their interests, as merchants, to their duties, as sovereigns.* After all, the charge rested upon assumption. It pronounced the

* It was alleged by speakers in both Houses, that the Company sustained loss by their India trade, and that they carried on their trade generally in too expensive a manner.
junction of the sovereign and mercantile capacities
to be ruinous; but the only instance upon record of
such a junction was that of the East-India Com-
pany, and it seemed like begging the question to
begin with laying down a theory, and then to reason
from this theory, and pronounce à priori upon the
only fact in history to which it could be applied. To
argue that such a mixture of functions must upon
theory be bad—that the system of the East-India
Company is an example of such a mixture, and
therefore is a pernicious system—such a mode of
arguing was assuming the very point to be ascer-
tained. "Political science," said Mr. Grant, "de-
pends upon an induction of facts. In no case, there-
fore, can it be allowed to close the series of experi-
ments, and to declare definitively that for the future
no practical results whatever shall shake an estab-
lished doctrine. Least of all is this allowable,
when the doctrine can by possibility refer only to a
single fact, and when that single fact is at war with
the doctrine."

The expectation of a great increase of commerce,
flowing from an unrestrained intercourse with India,
Mr. Grant considered a delusion—a delusion, how-
ever, which the evidence that had been heard
ought to be sufficient to dissipate. The manufactur-
ers had been duped by misrepresentations which had
been industriously circulated among them, in some
degree, he believed, from ignorance, but in some
degree also, he feared, from motives less excusable.
To the happiness of the people of India, Mr. Grant apprehended great danger from the influx of Europeans. With the solitary exception of Asia, British adventure had not been favourable to the happiness of the countries visited. He appealed to our intercourse with the native tribes of North America, and especially to the effects of free trade in Africa. In speaking to this part of the subject, Mr. Grant expressed himself with great severity respecting those who, having participated largely in the slave-trade as long as it existed, were now the advocates of free trade in India. These remarks were especially directed against Liverpool.

The peroration of Mr. Grant’s speech was remarkably bold and striking. Having announced himself the advocate of the natives of India, he thus continued:—“On their behalf, in their name, I venture to intrude myself upon the house. Through me they give utterance to their prayers. It is not my voice which you hear, it is the voice of sixty millions of your fellow-creatures, abandoned to your disposal and imploring your commiseration. They conjure you by every sacred consideration to compassionate their condition; to pay due regard to their situation and your own; to remember what contingencies are suspended on the issue of your vote. They conjure you not to make them the objects of perilous speculation, nor to barter away their happiness for the sake of some insignificant local interests. It is a noble position in which this
house is now placed. There is something irresistibly imposing in the idea, that, at so vast a distance, and across a waste of ocean, we are assembled to decide upon the fate of so many millions of human beings; that we are to them as another Providence; that our sentence is to stamp the colour of their future years, and spread over the face of ages to come either misery or happiness. This is, indeed, a glorious destiny for this country; but it is one of overwhelming responsibility. I trust that the question will be decided, not upon party principles, not upon trust, not upon vague theories, but upon sound practical policy, and with a view to the prosperity and preservation of our Indian empire.” After some remarks on the danger of a system of speculation and experiment, and the impolicy of breaking down ramparts which could never be reconstructed, Mr. Grant concluded with the following sentence:—

“In maintaining the system which has been the parent of so many blessings to India, we shall find our recompense in the gratitude of the people; and if that recompense should be denied us, yet, when we look on the moral cultivation and progressive felicity of those regions, and when we reflect that these are the fruits of our wise and disinterested policy, we shall enjoy a triumph still more glorious and elevated, a delight infinitely surpassing the golden dreams of commercial profit, or the wildest elysium ever struck out by the ravings of distempered avarice.” Such were the views of free trade,
of experimental legislation, and of the interests of India, then avowed by this eloquent champion of the East-India Company.

On the 2nd of June the matter was again resumed in committee. The third resolution was in favour of free trade to India, subject to certain regulations. This provoked a discussion, in which various members took part; among them Mr. Tierney, some of whose observations evinced a perfect acquaintance with the objects of those seeking the abolition of the Company's privileges. He had not heard, he said, that the persons who talked so much of the happiness of India had ever proposed to allow its manufactures to be freely imported into this country. The general principle was to be, that England was to force all her manufactures upon India, and not to take a single manufacture of India in return. It was true, they would allow cotton to be brought; but then, having found out that they could weave, by means of machinery, cheaper than the people of India, they would say, Leave off weaving—supply us with the raw material, and we will weave for you. This might be a very natural principle for merchants and manufacturers to go upon; but it was rather too much to talk of the philosophy of it, or to rank the supporters of it as in a peculiar degree the friends of India. If, instead of calling themselves the friends of India, they had professed themselves its enemies, what more could they do than advise the destruction of all Indian manufactures? It appeared that these alterations had been
proposed for no other purpose but to appease the clamour of the merchants; and no man could point out any thing like the good of India as being the object of any of the resolutions.

On the following day the proceedings in committee were continued, and the speakers were numerous; but the arguments were for the most part the same that had been previously urged. The house then resumed, and the chairman reported the resolutions. On the 11th of June they were taken into consideration. On this occasion, Sir John Newport recommended delay, for the purpose of framing a more comprehensive measure of freedom, and he therefore moved that the consideration of the report be postponed to that day three months. The amendment was lost by a majority of above eight to one, and the report was ordered to be again taken into consideration on the 14th. On that day a declaratory resolution, asserting the sovereignty of the Crown, and affirming that the first duty of parliament in legislating for India was to promote its happiness, was proposed and lost. The next point of discussion was raised with regard to the term for which the arrangement with the Company should be renewed. Lord Castlereagh proposed twenty years; Mr. Ponsonby moved as an amendment, that the term should be only ten. Two divisions followed—one on the amendment, and a second on the original resolution, which gave a vast majority in favour of the longer term. Another amendment was proposed, limiting the China monopoly to ten
years; on this also a division took place, when it was lost. On the 16th, the house having again resumed the committee, Mr. Baring moved an amendment, confining the return of vessels from India to the port of London for a limited period. This motion was warmly opposed by the members for the outports. It was supported by Mr. Grant and Sir William Curtis. Mr. Astell, in taking the same side, remarked with much acuteness, that, however those who opposed the Company might exclaim against monopoly, the question was only as to the extent to which monopoly should be carried. The plan supported by ministers recognized the principle of monopoly, as the trade was to be thrown open only to a few favoured ports.* On a division, the amendment shared the fate of previous ones, being lost by a large majority. Another amendment, moved by Sir John Newport, to the effect that the outports to be hereafter admitted to the privileges of the trade should be determined by parliament, was negatived without a division. Lord Castlereagh then proposed that, with respect to places not immediately within the Company's charter, applications should be made for licences only to the Board of Control, who might consult the Court of Directors if they thought proper. This motion, after some

* This remark deserves attention, as opening a view of the discordancy between the theory and practice of free trade advocates which is rarely adverted to. The principles of free trade are not fully carried out in any country in the world, and never will be. Where any custom-house regulations are established, free trade cannot in strictness be said to exist.
discussion and a division, was carried. An amend-
ment proposed by Mr. Baring, taking from the
Board of Control the power of obliging the Com-
pany to grant licences to persons going to India, was
negatived without a division; and, after a desultory
conversation, the whole of the resolutions were
agreed to, except one, asserting the duty of this
country to extend to India useful knowledge, and
moral and religious improvement, and recommend-
ing facilities to be given to persons desirous of
going to or remaining in India for the purpose of
accomplishing such objects. This it was determined
to postpone, and transmit the other resolutions to
the Lords.

A.D. 1813. On the 18th of June some conversation took
place on the resolutions; and on the 21st their
Lordships went into committee on them. They
were agreed to almost unanimously; the Earl of
Lauderdale alone saying "not content" to the first,
and stating generally that he objected to them
all, but declined at that time discussing them.
On the motion that the report should be received
on the following day, the Marquis of Lansdowne
moved that it be received that day three months.
The amendment gave rise to some debate. Lord
Melville supported the views of ministers. The Earl
of Lauderdale made a violent speech on the other
side. He condemned the conduct of the Court of
Directors in the severest terms, and declared them
unfit for the civil and military control of India. He
alleged, that to say that the Court of Directors
afforded the best form of government for India, was chap.xxiii. to give the lie to all experience. If the position were just, the British constitution of King, Lords, and Commons ought to give way to a similarly constituted body; for if twenty-four directors residing in England formed the best government for India, twenty-four directors residing in India would be the best government for Great Britain. This position of the noble lord's it is, perhaps, unnecessary to discuss; but it is remarkable that Lord Lauderdale was, a few years earlier, very desirous of becoming the instrument through which the twenty-four directors, whom he now denounced, were to exercise the powers of government. Lord Grenville repeated some of his former arguments as reasons for delay; and two or three of the ministerial peers having spoken on the opposite side, the amendment was lost on a division, by a majority of thirty-five. The bringing up the report, on the following day, gave rise to scarcely any observation.

On the 22nd of June an important discussion took place in the Commons on the resolution which had been postponed. Lord Castlereagh delivered a guarded speech in favour of a regulated toleration of missionary exertions. Sir Henry Montgomery opposed it. He was answered by Mr. Wilberforce, in a speech which was throughout able, eloquent, and convincing." It must be hoped that a large portion

* Sir H. Montgomery having thrown out some insinuations on the character and labours of Swartz, who, he said, was a politician as well as a preacher, Mr. Wilberforce, in reply, said: "I thank the honourable baronet for reminding me of it. Swartz
of it would, in the present day, be unnecessary. The resolution was carried.

A.D. 1813. On the 28th of June the house resolved itself into a committee upon the bill. An extended discussion took place, but little additional light was thrown upon the various questions.* Finally, the report was received, and ordered to be taken into further consideration on the 1st of July. On that day various amendments were proposed and lost. Among them was one against the clause respecting the propagation of Christianity in India. Mr. Marsh made a violent speech against the missionaries, and was answered by Mr. Wilberforce. On the following day the committee was resumed, and some discussion took place, but proceeded languidly. A motion for an establishment of the Scottish church in India was lost.† On the 12th the report was was a politician, but not a volunteer in that service. He became a politician at the earnest and importunate entreaty of the East-India government; because, having to negotiate with Hyder Ally, they could find no one on whose integrity and veracity that chief-tain would confide but Swartz, the missionary. He therefore became a politician and an accredited envoy; because, as a missionary, he had secured to himself the universal confidence both of the Mahometans and the Hindoos."

* The progress of Christianity in India formed one of the topics of discussion. On this subject Mr. William Smith said: "If I did not believe one iota of the divine origin of the Christian religion, yet, as a philosopher, I should admire it for the pure principles of morality which it inculcates, and I should be anxious to introduce it among the Hindoos, for the purpose of driving from the shores of India that cruel and bloody superstition that disgraces them."

† Though no provision for maintaining the Scottish Church in India was admitted into the Act, the Court of Directors, on the
brought up, when Mr. Howarth opposed its recep-
tion, in a speech of much power. In the course of
it he said: "The monopoly of the Company was
originally granted them for the public benefit, and
it is but fair to ask whether it has produced it.
Through all the varied vicissitudes of two cen-
turies, they were, undoubtedly, monopolists; nobody
was found to claim a participation with them in the
drenchings at Amboyna; they were left in undis-
turbed possession of the Black Hole in Calcutta;
they had the exclusive privilege of fighting, single-
handed, against all the powers of Europe who had
got a footing on the peninsula of India. But now
that they have, with a valour almost unexampled,
driven every hostile European from the continent of
India; now that they have acquired an extent of ter-
ritory of nearly four thousand square miles; brought
under the government and control of this country a
population of sixty millions; realized a revenue of six-
teen millions; raised an army of a hundred and fifty
thousand men; erected fortresses; established facto-
ries; swept the Indian seas of every hostile flag, and
possessed themselves of a sea-coast of three thousand
miles in extent, with all the facilities of commerce;

24th of September, 1813 (almost immediately after the Bill be-
came law), spontaneously supplied the deficiency by resolving to
appoint a Scottish chaplain at each of the presidencies, with a
salary equal to that of the junior Presidency chaplain of the
English Church,—an amount far exceeding the emoluments of
the great majority of ecclesiastical preferments in Scotland, if
indeed it be reached by any. The subsequent extension of the
Scottish Establishment in India will be noticed in its proper place.
CHAPTER XXIII. Now it is that the liberality of the British merchant claims an unqualified participation of a free trade to India; now the wisdom of the legislature interferes, to render inefficient that instrument by which these acquisitions have been attained; and its equity is now about to refuse to secure even the dividends of that capital stock which has been sunk in the public service. Now it is discovered that twenty-four merchants are very unfit persons—not to manage the government—for that they are admitted to be eminently qualified—but to manage the commerce of their dominions."

There was certainly much truth in this; but it was of little avail to press the former services of the Company against the claims of numbers, urged on by an impetuous desire to participate in the presumed advantages of Oriental commerce, and fortified, as they now were, by the doctrines of modern political economy. It could scarcely have been expected, indeed, that the exclusive right to the trade of so vast a territory as British India had become under the government of the Company, should endure for ever. The question was rather one of time and circumstance than of principle. But it is just to exhibit the motives of men as they are; and if the Company had interested views in upholding the monopoly, it is certain that those who called for its abolition had no regard to any thing but their own advantage. It were idle now to discuss the means of reconciling the just expectations of those who had gained and secured a mighty
empire, with the interests of other classes of their countrymen. The fashion of carrying great questions by clamour—of overawing the legislature by agitation—of getting up meetings of interested or fanatical partisans, and calling their resolutions the expression of public opinion—this system was just beginning to prevail. Ninety-nine hundredths of the people of Great Britain were perfectly indifferent to the questions connected with the trade and government of India, which were agitated so warmly in parliament. Those who raised the outcry for open trade claimed to have their demand regarded as that of the country. The ministers, possessing neither the information necessary to enable them to judge how far the claim was well founded, nor the moral courage to resist any claim supported by a sufficient array of noisy agitation, yielded to importunate clamour that which it was quite certain no reasoning, even though it amounted to demonstration, would have extorted from them. They had no love of change for its own sake. They were never suspected of possessing any deep acquaintance with political science, nor of any affection for what is understood by the phrase "liberal policy." They were disciples of expediency—they opened the trade with India because this course was the least troublesome that presented itself, and appeared the most safe, with reference to the retention, by the ruling party, of power and place. Whether the time had arrived for taking this step—whether, with reference to all circumstances, it were better
to throw open the vast empire of India to unrestrained commercial competition, to uphold the monopoly as it stood, or to admit a more general participation in the trade, under regulations adapted to the state of things then existing, are questions which cannot be discussed satisfactorily except at greater length than the occasion will justify. Very many honest and enlightened men will maintain that the opening of the Indian trade in 1813 was right; but, in proportion as they are honest and enlightened, will be their promptitude to admit that those by whom the act was promoted were right only by accident—that they gave, because they thought they could not withhold—and that they would have been not less ready to maintain the privileges of the East-India Company than to destroy them, had as many interested or expectant partisans called for their preservation as then yelled for their abolition.

A.D. 1813. On the 13th of July the bill was read a third time in the House of Commons, and passed. In the House of Lords it passed almost sub silentio, it being opposed only by the Earl of Lauderdale, because it did not go far enough; and the hostility of that disappointed aspirant to the office of governor-general evaporated in an angry protest.

Thus was inserted the narrow end of the wedge which was to shatter the fabric of commercial grandeur reared by the East-India Company by the labours of more than two hundred years.
CHAPTER XXIV.

The person selected as the successor of the Earl of Minto was the Earl of Moira. This nobleman possessed considerable military reputation, in addition to which he had acquired the character of an accomplished statesman. He was a man of mature age and great experience: he moreover enjoyed the personal friendship of the Prince Regent, and was universally regarded as under the guidance of the best and most honourable feelings. A wise and high-minded course of policy was, therefore, expected from him, and India was esteemed fortunate in having received from Britain such a ruler. He arrived at Calcutta in October, 1814.

According to his own statement, the prospect of affairs, on Lord Moira's arrival in Calcutta, was far from gratifying. He represented the finances as in a dilapidated condition, and the military force inefficient and discontented, in consequence of the severe and unremitting duty, rendered necessary by the reductions which financial embarrassment had

* Summary of the operations in India, with their results, printed in General Appendix to Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1832.
pressed upon the government. He found also the external relations of the country in an unsettled and precarious condition. The new governor-general succeeded to not less than six hostile discussions with different native powers, and to the necessity of devising measures for curbing the Pindarees, who had long committed the most horrible ravages with impunity. The difficulties of the new governor-general are not in fairness to be ascribed to his predecessor. The colonial wars, which it had been necessary to prosecute, had been attended with considerable expense; and the distracted state of the relations of the British government with its neighbours was the natural result of that tame policy—moderate, it was the fashion to call it—which the Earl of Minto, contrary to his better judgment, had felt constrained to follow. Among the more important and urgent of the disputes on hand was that with the state of Nepaul, where the Goorkha tribe had, in a comparatively short period, established a very formidable power.

The origin and early history of this tribe does not fall within the province of this history: it will be sufficient to say that, for a series of years, the Goorkhas had pursued an aggressive course of policy, and with no inconsiderable success. The dissensions of the rajahs afforded ample opportunities for its prosecution, and there was no deficiency of promptitude in embracing them. In every quarrel, the Goorkha prince appeared as umpire and mediator, and these functions he invariably rendered sub-
sidiary to the aggrandizement of the house of which he was chief. The Goorkhas thus acquired an extent of dominion and a degree of power which, combined with the disposition they had manifested, rendered them dangerous neighbours to the British government, whose frontier they bordered for about eight hundred miles.

Some attempts had been made to establish relations of amity with Nepaul; but the overtures for this purpose were not met, by the ruling party in that state, in the spirit which had led the British authorities to make them. A treaty was indeed concluded, but the conduct of the Nepalese government, after a very short period, compelled the governor-general in council to declare the treaty dissolved. This occurred during the administration of the Marquis Wellesley; and, from that period, no intercourse took place between the two governments, until the encroachments of the Nepalese compelled the British to renew it.

These encroachments were extended into almost every district of the Company's dominions which abutted on the frontier, as well as into the territories of native rulers under the protection of the British government. Among their victims was Perthee Saul Sing, the hereditary Rajah of Palpa and zemindar of Bootwul. Driven from the hills, he retained possession of the zemindary, for which he engaged to pay to the British the same annual assessment he had formerly paid to the Oude government, to whom they had succeeded. He
had thus become entitled to the special protec-
tion of the Company: this arrangement, however,
conduced nothing to his safety; for the Goorkhas,
shortly afterwards, found means to entice him to
Katmandoo, where they first imprisoned, and finally
put him to death. The family of the murdered
rajah, despairing of preserving their remaining pos-
sessions from the grasp of the enemy, surrendered
the lands to the Company, and retired into Goruck-
pore, where they subsisted on a provision allowed
them by the British government. But this did not
deter the Nepaulese sovereign from prosecuting his
course of aggression. He subsequently claimed the
management of Bootwul, as the representative of
the Rajah of Palpa: the establishment of his au-
thority was formally proclaimed, and his pretensions
were supported by the assemblage of a considerable
body of troops on the frontier. The proper mode
of noticing these acts would have been by the de-
spatch of a British force sufficient to compel the
retirement of the invaders; but negotiation was
preferred to arms, and the result of the preference
was, that the Goorkhas succeeded in occupying
two-thirds of the district of Bootwul, west of the
Terraie, the revenues of which they collected and
appropriated.

On the accession of Sir George Barlow to the
government, he deemed it necessary to rescue the
question from the oblivion into which it had fallen;
but the temporizing course which he adopted was
little calculated to sustain either the honour or in-
terests of the British, in a dispute with antagonists bold, acute, and enterprising as the Goorkhas. He required them, indeed, to evacuate Bootwul; but the demand was coupled with an offer of relinquishing, on the part of the British authorities, all claims to the sovereignty of Sheoraj. Sheoraj was included in the territory ceded by Oude to the Company, but it had previously to the cession been subjugated by the Goorkhas. This was assumed as the justification of the concession, but very unreasonably so. The right set up, on the part of Nepaul, was founded in usurpation, and, though exercised for a somewhat longer period of time, was in no respect better than that which they asserted to Bootwul. The proposed surrender was, however, without effect. The Goorkha prince rejected the offer, and refused any concession beyond that of farming Bootwul as a zemindary. Sir George Barlow shortly afterwards went to Madras, and, after his departure, the matter for a time rested in such perfect tranquillity as might almost warrant a suspicion that it was forgotten.

At length Lord Minto directed the magistrate of Goruckpore to report on the Nepaulese encroachments; and, soon afterwards, he addressed a letter to the rajah, requiring him to withdraw from Bootwul, and acquiesce in the re-establishment of the British authority. So far from complying, the rajah asserted his right to a further extension of territory, and alleged his respect for the British government as the cause of his for-
bearing to take possession of it. He proposed, however, an investigation by officers appointed by the two governments, with a view to the settlement of the differences between them. Here the negotiation again rested for a considerable period, till the rajah's respect for the British became so weakened, as to prove insufficient to restrain him any longer from the occupation of the districts on which he had previously set his desire. The Nepaulese crossed the Terraie, which had hitherto been their limit, into the districts of Palee, and at the same time extended their inroads from Sheoraj into the adjoining tuppah of Debrooah.

These new aggressions it was impossible to bear with the philosophical indifference which the British authorities had hitherto displayed with regard to the encroachments of the Nepaulese. They were roused, not indeed to action, but to threats, qualified, as usual, by the display of a spirit of concession. It was intimated that the rajah's proposal of an inquiry by commissioners would be accepted; Colonel Bradshaw was accordingly appointed by the British government, and proceeded to Bootwul, where he was met by the Nepaulese commissioners. The appointment of a commissioner to inquire into rights which were perfectly clear cannot be regarded as either a wise or a dignified proceeding. Lord Minto, indeed, seems to have felt that to such a course of policy it was necessary to fix a limit; and although he had previously been willing to adhere to the proposal of Sir George Barlow, and
sacrifice Sheoraj to gain possession of Bootwul, he determined, on the appointment of the commissioner, to insist on the restitution of both, if the right to them should be established by the investigation. It was established; and then, as might have been anticipated, the Nepalese commissioners turned their minds to the discovery of expedients for procrastination. An offer of compromise was made, and referred by Major Bradshaw to the governor-general, by whom it was very properly rejected, and the Rajah of Nepaul was called upon to surrender that which he had clearly no right to retain. This was the state of things when the Earl of Minto resigned the government to the Earl of Moira.

The encroachments already related, though they may be regarded as the more important, were by no means the only acts of aggression perpetrated by the Nepalese against the British and the chiefs under their protection. In Sarun, some serious disturbances had taken place from the same cause. A Nepalese soubahdar, having passed the frontier, seized, plundered, and burnt some villages. At the very time when an inquiry into the transaction was pending, under the sanction of both governments, the Nepalese took possession of the remaining villages of the tuppah; the total number seized being twenty-two. These villages had been in the possession of the British for thirty years, and the attack was made without any previous demand or notice. When Colonel Bradshaw had concluded the Bootwul investigation, he was instructed to pro-
ceed to the Sarun frontier, for the purpose of adjusting the differences existing there. This appears to have been both unnecessary and injudicious: the Nepalese had not the shadow of right, and there was consequently nothing to discuss.

The government appears to have subsequently found itself embarrassed by the character in which it had permitted Colonel Bradshaw to proceed to the Sarun frontier. The villages had been restored, subject to the result of the investigation: with this investigation the British government declined to proceed. They would have been perfectly justified in this had they taken the determination earlier; but, having permitted the Nepalese diplomatists to lead them thus far, it is not easy to defend their sudden departure from a course to which the other party must have considered them pledged. It is true that the proceedings at Bootwul were not calculated to inspire the British with much confidence in the good faith of their opponents: this, it may be presumed, was the impression of the government; and Colonel Bradshaw was accordingly instructed to invite the Nepalese commissioners to meet him, for the purpose of reviewing the proceedings already taken, and, nothing appearing to give a different complexion to the transactions, to demand a renunciation of all pretensions to the twenty-two villages, and a surrender of the lands on the Sarun frontier which were still withheld.

In pursuance of these instructions Colonel Bradshaw addressed a note to the commissioners, pro-
posing a meeting. To this the commissioners replied by a very long letter, declaring that they would not meet Colonel Bradshaw, nor hold any communication with him, revoking the conditional transfer of the twenty-two villages, and requiring the British commissioner instantly to quit the frontier. It is to be lamented that any pretext was afforded to the Nepaulese for thus abruptly terminating the negotiations; but it is admitted that the communications of Colonel Bradshaw with the commissioners had countenanced the belief, that an investigation similar to that in Bootwul was to be instituted in Sarun. It has been alleged, that Colonel Bradshaw was not authorized to give any positive assurances to that effect. A faithless government may always avail itself of this excuse to disavow the acts of its agents: and it is unfortunate when an upright and honourable one is compelled to have recourse to it. But while the position in which the British government was thus placed was somewhat embarrassing, and its decision, perhaps, rather hasty, two points are perfectly clear—that its claims were founded on substantial justice, and that the objects of the Nepaulese were only evasion and delay. Although, therefore, we cannot but wish, either that no such expectations had been held out, or that they had been gratified, it is because the course taken seems to cast some slight shadow on the honour of the British nation, and not because the territorial rights of the Nepaulese were in any degree disregarded. Their claims they knew to be
CHAP. XXIV. untenable, and chicanery afforded the only means of defending them; but it would have been better to submit to some further delay, than to place the character of the British government in a questionable light.

The Earl of Moira now addressed a letter to the Rajah of Nepaul, threatening immediate resort to hostile measures, unless the rights of the British were conceded; and, not resting on idle threats, Colonel Bradshaw was instructed, in the event of refusal or evasion on the part of the rajah, to resume possession of the usurped lands. The answer of the rajah being unsatisfactory, Colonel Bradshaw proceeded to execute the orders which he had received, and the resumption of the disputed lands was effected without opposition.

A similar course was adopted with regard to Bootwul and Sheoraj. Their restitution was demanded within a given time, and on failure, the magistrate of Goruckpore was ordered to take possession of them. The period having expired without any intimation, on the part of the Nepaulese, of a disposition to comply with the dictates of justice, the magistrate directed his police officers to advance and establish stations at certain fixed places. Being resisted by the Nepaulese officers, they retired, when a body of troops marched in, and occupied the disputed lands without impediment.

But the course of events was not to continue thus smooth. In consequence of the approach of the sickly season, it was deemed necessary to with-
draw the troops from the Terraie, and their departure was the signal for the revival of aggression on the part of the Nepaulese, attended, too, by circumstances of peculiar atrocity. On the morning of the 29th of May, 1814, three of the police stations in Bootwul were attacked by a large force, the officers driven out, and eighteen of them killed. Among the slain was the tannahdar of Chilwan, who, after having surrendered himself prisoner, was murdered, in cold blood, by the Nepaulese commander. The whole of the lands at Bootwul were forthwith reoccupied by the usurping power; and Sheoraj, from the want of regular troops to defend it, was abandoned. The insalubrity of the season, which had dictated the withdrawal of the troops, precluded their return, except at great risk. The government, therefore, confined its measures to the defence of the existing frontier, and the prohibition of all commercial intercourse between the British provinces and Nepaul.

The last outrage committed by the Nepaulese government might have been expected to put an end to negotiation; but the Earl of Moira made one further attempt to effect a settlement of the existing differences without an appeal to the sword. A letter addressed by him to the Rajah of Nepaul, complaining especially of the treacherous attack upon Bootwul and the murder of the police officers, was answered by one in which no notice whatever was taken of those subjects, but which was filled with repetitions of refuted claims, groundless accu-
CHAP. XXIV. \sions of the agents of the British government, and menaces of hostility, if events should render it necessary. With the receipt of this letter the system of fruitless communication came to an end, the governor-general very properly suffering it to pass without reply.

War being inevitable, the Earl of Moira took immediate measures for commencing it with activity and vigour; and a plan was laid down for invading the Nepalese territory at four different points. For this purpose, four separate divisions of troops were assembled: one to act directly against the enemy's capital, by the route of Mucwanpore; a second, intended to resume the usurped lands of Bootwul and Sheoraj, and afterwards menace the province of Palpa; a third, with the design of penetrating the passes of the Deyra Dhoon, occupying that valley and other positions in Gurhwal, and seizing the passes of the Jumna and Ganges; and a fourth, to act against the western provinces and the western army of the Goorkhas, which was understood to be composed of the flower of their troops. The last division, which was placed under the command of Colonel Ochterlony, consisted originally of about six thousand men, with sixteen pieces of ordnance. Its strength was subsequently increased to seven thousand men, and the number of pieces of ordnance to twenty-two. Attached to this division was a body of irregular troops, which, in the course of the campaign, amounted to about four thousand five hundred men. Part of these
were auxiliaries furnished by the Seikh chiefs and the expelled Rajah of Hindore. In the progress of the operations a corps was also formed of deserters from the Goorkha army.

The Earl of Moira proposed, in aid of his military operations, a series of political arrangements, the object of which was to engage in the British cause the chieftains of the ancient hill principalities, who had been driven out by the Goorkhas; and through them to draw over their former subjects, who were represented as retaining a strong attachment to the families of their exiled rulers, and holding their conquerors in the greatest detestation. The expediency of this plan seems to have been doubted by Colonel Ochterlony, who urged that embarrassment, inconvenience, and expense were likely to result from the restoration of the hill chieftains under the protection and guarantee of the British government, and especially pointed out the necessity which would constantly arise for its interposition to settle the differences which, it might be foreseen, would occur among them. This obligation, however, Lord Moira did not appear to contemplate as necessarily falling within the province of the protecting power, and his opinion of the military and political advantages of the plan remained unshaken. Colonel Ochterlony was, therefore, furnished with a draft of a proclamation, declaring the intention of the British government to expel the Goorkhas and restore the ancient chiefs; disclaiming all pecuniary indemnification,
and requiring only a zealous and cordial co-operation against the Ghoorkas, then, or at any future period when it might again be necessary. The time for issuing this proclamation was left to the discretion of Colonel Ochterlony; and that officer, having completed his preparations, proceeded to Roopoor, where he was to commence his march into the hills.

The third division, destined for Gurhwal, was placed under the command of Major-General Gillespie, who had quitted Java in consequence of disputes with the lieutenant-governor of that settlement. Its original strength, of three thousand five hundred men and fourteen pieces of ordnance, was afterwards augmented to about ten thousand five hundred men and twenty pieces of ordnance. Attached to this division were between six and seven thousand irregulars, of various descriptions, raised by Mr. William Fraser, first assistant to the resident at Delhi, and, when embodied, placed under the command of Lieutenant Frederick Young, to whose peculiar fitness for the charge the governor-general afforded his personal testimony. To Major Stevenson was allotted the duty of obtaining intelligence and guides. The force under the command of Major-General Gillespie was assembled at Seharunpore by the middle of October, and marched towards the Dhoon shortly after. The movements of this division, as well as those of the last, were intended to be assisted by a course of negotiations, which were intrusted to Mr. Fraser, above mentioned, and the Honourable Edward Gardner.
The second division, which was destined to clear the Terraie and re-establish the British authority in the usurped lands, consisted of nearly five thousand troops, with a body of irregulars amounting to nine hundred. Twelve pieces of ordnance were originally allotted to it, but, by after arrangements, some of them were replaced by others of superior power, and the number was increased to fifteen. This division was placed under the command of Major-General John Sullivan Wood, to whom was also committed the management of the political negotiations that were to be combined with the operations of his division. He arrived at Goruckpore on the 15th of November, the climate of the Terraie, antecedently to that period, being regarded as unfavourable to the health of the troops.

The division which was intended to advance directly against Katmandoo remains to be noticed. Of the operations of this division the highest expectations were formed, and the commander-in-chief was anxious to place it in the very highest state of efficiency. It comprehended eight thousand troops and twenty-six pieces of ordnance, which were placed under the command of Major-General Marley. The political arrangements connected with this division were intrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw.

Subsidiary, in some degree, to the duties assigned to this division of the invading army, was a force placed under the command of Captain Barré Lat-ter, designed to act principally, though not exclu-
sively, on the defensive. To that officer was intrusted the defence of the British frontier, from the river Koosi, eastward, to Juggigobath, on the Burhampooter; and his attention was more especially called to that part comprehended between the Koosi and the Seistah, which latter river formed the eastern limit to the Nepaulose territories. The force, regular and irregular, placed at the disposal of Captain Barré Latter, amounted to about two thousand seven hundred men.

While these preparations were in progress, the Nepaulose continued to repeat those mock overtures for an amicable adjustment of the pending differences in which they had so long persevered. Frequent communications were made to Colonel Ochterlony by Ummer Sing Thappa, who commanded the western force of the Goorkhas; but these appear to have been ascribed to motives less honourable to that officer than those which he avowed. Some information which had reached the British government induced a belief that Ummer Sing Thappa, notwithstanding his apparent attachment to the Goorkha cause, was secretly disaffected to the Nepaulose government, and might be induced to betray the army he commanded, and the country he occupied, into the hands of the English, in consideration of his personal interests being adequately provided for. Acting upon this information, the British government gave secret instructions to Colonel Ochterlony and to the resident at Delhi, to meet with encouragement any advance which
Ummer Sing Thappa might make towards effecting chap.xxiv. such a bargain.

Before the result of these instructions could be known, the governor-general's agent at Benares announced that a brahmin, who declared himself authorized by Runjore Sing Thappa, son of Ummer Sing Thappa, had proposed, on behalf of that functionary and his father, to put the British troops in possession of Nepaul, on conditions, the objects of which were to confirm the rajah in the government, and secure to the negotiators certain advantages as the reward of their services. A favourable answer was returned, and Runjore Sing Thappa was recommended to put himself in communication with Colonel Bradshaw, to whom, as well as to Colonel Ochterlony, notice of the proposal, and instructions as to their own course, were forthwith transmitted. The brahmin returned to Katmandoo, avowedly to communicate to his employers the result of his mission, and not long afterwards reappeared at Benares, with another person of the same order with himself. But the new mission professed different objects from the old one. The two brahmins were the bearers of letters from the rajah and his ministers, intimating a desire to open a negotiation for peace, and the prospect of overcoming the Nepaulese by intrigue, instead of force, was in this quarter at an end.

It seems not improbable that the overture was only a piece of that tortuous policy which characterizes all the proceedings of Eastern statesmen.
CHAP. XXIV. That policy appears, on this occasion, to have attracted the favour and excited the imitation of their rivals, who were determined, if possible, to shake the integrity of Ummer Sing Thappa. But the coyness of the Nepaulese general surprised and disappointed them, and Colonel Ochterlony was instructed to spare him the confusion of an unsolicited confession of attachment, by hinting that his advances would be entirely agreeable. The British commander accordingly took advantage of some partial successes on his own part to address a letter to Ummer Sing Thappa, intimating that he had received the authority of the governor-general to communicate with him on any proposal that he might have to offer. But though thus assiduously wooed, the Gorkha chief was not won. His answer was a decided and somewhat scornful rejection of the suit. This, however, did not prevent its renewal. Fresh communications with Ummer Sing were subsequently opened, and kept on foot through his son, in the hope that the private interests of the minister and the general might be made the instruments of overcoming their public duty; but they ended like the former. Either the honesty of these officers was impregnable, or their expectations of the ultimate success of the British arms were not high.

The endeavours made to corrupt the fidelity of the servants of the Nepaulese government are not unsanctioned by precedent; but it is certain that such practices cannot be reconciled with the great moral principles by which states, no less than indi-
viduals, ought to be governed. If it were right for the British authorities to tempt the Nepalese general into the course they desired, it could not be wrong for him to yield to their overtures; and if Ummer Sing might innocently have surrendered the army intrusted to him, and the country which it defended, then might Colonel Ochterlony, with equal innocence, have gone over with his division to the Nepalese, or the Earl of Moira have made his bargain with the numerous parties who look with envy on the British possessions in India, for partitioning among them the golden empire committed to his care. But the rule of morals is too clear to need the support of either reasoning or illustration. To procure by a bribe the commission of an atrocious crime is obviously to participate in the guilt of it. No casuistry can evade this conclusion: yet high-minded men will deliberately and zealously seek to tempt others into the perpetration of acts of the grossest treachery—acts from which, if proposed to themselves, they would recoil with equal indignation and horror, and to the performance of which they would unhesitatingly prefer to encounter death. Upon what principles they establish for others a standard of morals lower than their own, or by what sophistry they persuade themselves that treachery is a fair subject of purchase, it were vain to inquire; but it may be hoped that the time will arrive when civilized nations shall no longer recognize as legitimate any mode of warfare from which honour is excluded. The attempt to shake the allegiance of
Ummer Sing happily failed, and the British nation escaped the discredit of a triumph which, as it would have been owing neither to valour nor to military skill, but to the operation of the basest motives upon the basest natures, would have detracted far more from the national honour than it would have added to the national power.

The progress of events has been somewhat anticipated, in order to throw together all the incidents connected with this process of Machiavellian policy. It will now be necessary to take up the detail of the military operations. The campaign commenced by the seizure of the Tinley Pass, in the Deyra Dhoon, on the 20th of October, by Lieutenant-Colonel George Carpenter, of the 17th Native Infantry, who had been detached for that purpose by Major-General Gillespie. The latter officer entered the Dhoon on the 24th, by the Kerree Pass, and immediately marched upon Kalunga, while detachments occupied the passes and ferries of the Jumna. On the 29th, preparations were made for an attack upon Kalunga; the army under General Gillespie being formed into four columns, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter, Captain J. W. Fast, of the 17th Native Infantry, Major Bartlet Kelly, of the Light Infantry Battalion, and Captain William Campbell, of the 6th Native Infantry, with a column of reserve under Major John Ludlow, of the 6th. At half-past three o'clock on the afternoon of the 30th, the columns under Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow marched from their encampment,
without any resistance from the enemy, and took possession of the table-land, where they established themselves so as to cover the working party which was to be employed during the night in constructing batteries. The three remaining columns moved at an early hour the next morning, to be in readiness to attack simultaneously with that from the table-land; Major Kelly, on Kursulle, by the Jagherkeena road; Captain Fast, towards the stockade, by the village of Luckhound; and Captain Campbell, by the village of Ustall. Shortly after daylight the batteries opened on the fort with ten pieces of ordnance.

The signal for the columns moving to the assault was to be given from the batteries two hours previously to the moment of attack, and repeated from the camp below; but the arrangements appear to have been ill concerted; at all events, they were inefficient. The signal was fired about eight o'clock, but it was not heard by Major Kelly, Captain Fast, or Captain Campbell; and, consequently, only the columns under Colonel Carpenter and Major Ludlow moved. These advanced and carried the stockade thrown across the road leading to the fort; they then pushed on close under the walls, which were stockaded all round. Here their progress was stopped. The fire of the batteries had been ineffective; a small opening only was visible, and that was defended by stockades within stockades. The British force was consequently obliged to retire, after sustaining a frightful loss in officers and men.
CHAP. XXIV. Soon after the columns moved three additional companies had been ordered from the camp; but, by the time they arrived on the table-land, the columns in advance had been forced to fall back. An attack by so small a force had obviously little chance of success; but General Gillespie was, no doubt, apprehensive of the unhappy effects likely to follow a repulse at so early a period of the war, and this, in addition to the impulses of his personal bravery, probably induced him to head an assault made by this little band, assisted by two six-pounders. The assault was made and failed; a second met with no better success; a third was still more unfortunate in its results, for, when within thirty yards of the gateway, the gallant general was mortally wounded while in the act of cheering on his men. Thus terminated the proceedings of this ill-fated day, with the loss of an officer who had rendered good service to his country in the East, and whose career had been marked by a courage which deserves the epithet of heroic. The memory of General Gillespie received from the public authorities the honours which it so well deserved.

Kalunga was yet to be the scene of fresh misfortune and discomfort to the British force. The failure of the former attack had suggested the necessity of procuring a battering-train. It arrived, and was forthwith brought into operation. At one o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th of November, the breach was reported to be completely practicable, and the command having, by the death of
General Gillespie, devolved on Colonel Sebright Mawbey, of His Majesty's 53rd Foot, that officer ordered a storming-party to advance. But this renewed attempt to gain possession of the fort was not more fortunate than the preceding one. The enemy defended the place with desperate valour, and, after a contest of two hours, Colonel Mawbey withdrew his troops with severe loss. The storming-party had succeeded in gaining the top of the breach, when a momentary hesitation proved fatal to them, and a large proportion was swept away. The failure was ascribed, by Colonel Mawbey, partly to the bold resistance of the enemy, who, in spite of repeated discharges from all the guns, mortars, and howitzers, of the battery covering the advance, persisted in manning the breach and bidding defiance to the assailants; and partly to the difficulties of the service which the British troops were called upon to perform. The descent from the top of the breach is represented as having been so deep and rapid that the most daring of the assailants would not venture to leap down; and it is added, that, had they done so, the attempt would have involved the certain destruction of those who made it, from a number of pointed stakes and bamboos which had been placed at the bottom, and which it would have been impossible to avoid. Such was the representation of the officer in command. But the explanation was by no means satisfactory to the Earl of Moira, who expressed some discontent and surprise at this second failure to carry a place (to use his own words)
CHAP. XXIV. "certainly of no great strength or extent, destitute of a ditch, and defended by a garrison whose only means of resistance consisted in their personal gallantry." While some weight must be allowed to the circumstances enumerated by Lord Moira, candour must attribute a portion of his implied censure to the feeling of disappointment at the repeated reverses which thus marked the commencement of a campaign, on the plan of which he had bestowed so much thought, and in the success of which his own reputation was essentially committed.

But the repeated assaults upon Kalunga, though unsuccessful when made, were not without effect. Though retaining possession of the fort, the garrison had suffered dreadfully from the fire of the British artillery; and, greatly reduced in numbers, deprived of their officers, in want of provisions and water, and in danger of pestilence from the accumulation of the dead, they, on the morning of the 30th of November, evacuated the place, which was immediately taken possession of by Colonel Mawbey. The scene within the fort was of the most appalling description, and bore ample testimony to the desperate spirit which had animated its defenders. Their fortune without the walls was not happier than it had been within, their flight being intercepted by detachments of the British force, and the greater part of the fugitives either killed, wounded, or made prisoners. In this service Major Ludlow greatly distinguished himself, especially by attacking and dislodging from a very advantageous position a
force composed of the few followers who had accom-
panied the killadar, Bulbudder Sing, in his escape,
strengthened by a body of about three hundred
Goorkhas, who had been dispatched to reinforce the
garrison of Kalunga, but had vainly hovered about
the hills, waiting an opportunity to enter the place.
The fort was ordered to be destroyed.

The fall of Kalunga was followed by some other
advantages, which, though trifling in themselves,
were necessary to the success of the general plan
of operations. A strongly stockaded position, which
the enemy occupied on the heights above the town
of Calsie, was abandoned after a feeble resistance;
and the strong fort of Baraut, situated in the moun-
tains forming the north-eastern boundary of the
valley of Deyra, was evacuated by the garrison and
forthwith occupied by the British. The precipitate
abandonment of this place was occasioned by the
defection of the chief zemindars and inhabitants,
whose zeal for the British cause appears, however,
to have been stimulated by the promise of a native
officer, that their services should be requited by a
small gratuity. In addition to these acquisitions,
the post of Luckergaut, on the Ganges, where it
forms the eastern limit of the Dhoon, was in the
possession of a British detachment; thus complet-
ing the occupation of the valley and of the principal
passes leading to it. But Gurhwal, to the east of
the Bageruttee, still remained in the possession of
the enemy; and this tract included several strong
and commanding positions.
A force deemed sufficient for the occupation of the Dhoon having been left under the command of Colonel Carpenter, the rest of the division marched for Nahun; and, during its progress, the command was assumed by Major-General Martindell, who had been appointed to succeed General Gillespie. Nahun fell without an effort, the enemy abandoning it on the approach of the invading force, and withdrawing to Jyetuck, a fort erected on the summit of a mountain of great elevation, bearing the same name. Upon this point a force was concentrated, amounting to about two thousand two hundred men, commanded by Runjore Sing.

The operations for the reduction of Jyetuck were multiform and long protracted, and their commencement was marked by misfortune and defeat. With the double view of dispossessing the enemy of a strong position and cutting off the supply of water, a combined attack was planned upon a stockade, about a mile west of the fort, and on the morning of the 27th of December was put into execution. One column, a thousand strong, was commanded by Major Ludlow, who was directed to proceed to the left of the fort of Jumpta, while Major William Richards, with another column comprising about seven hundred men, was to make a detour to the right, and take up a position on the other side. It was calculated that both columns would reach the respective points of attack before daybreak; but, unfortunately, Major Ludlow did not arrive till long after. He was, of course, perceived, and the anti-
cipated advantage was lost. Notwithstanding this unfavourable circumstance, the first encounter was encouraging to the hopes of the assailants, the enemy being driven from his advanced position, and compelled to retire into his stockade. But here the tide of success turned. A gallant, but, under the circumstances, an inconsiderate and imprudent charge, made by a part of the King's 53rd, in opposition to the judgment of the commander, was repulsed, and the assailants were driven back in confusion. The ground, thus rashly lost, might, perhaps, yet have been recovered, had the rest of the detachment performed its duty; but the native infantry appeared panic-struck, and all efforts to form them proved ineffectual.* The column under Major Richards displayed a better spirit and met with better fortune. They carried the position which they had been dispatched to occupy, and maintained it against repeated and vigorous assaults of the enemy, who, after Major Ludlow's defeat, were enabled to turn their whole force against them.

Their mode of attack was peculiarly harassing: entrenching themselves behind jutting points of rock and other situations affording shelter, they kept up an irregular fire, charging occasionally and then retiring to their coverts. From the nature of

* From the character of the Bengal army this defection was unlooked for. It has been alleged to have arisen from the fact of the native detachment being broken by the rush of the 53rd in returning.
the ground, it was almost impossible to dislodge them from their retreats, and the British troops were, therefore, compelled to sustain their attacks without the advantage of shelter enjoyed by their opponents; they, however, nobly maintained their post through the whole day, and with but small loss, until they were withdrawn from their arduous duty by orders from General Martindell to return to camp. These orders did not arrive until the whole of the ammunition was expended, and the troops had been compelled to employ stones in their defence. The retreat was far more disastrous than the conflict. It was effected under cover of a very gallant charge made by Lieutenant Thackeray, with the light company of the 2nd battalion of the 26th Native Infantry, in which that officer and nearly his whole company fell. The sacrifice of these brave men probably saved the entire detachment from destruction. Still a retreat by night through a country beset by difficulties, and in the possession of an enemy, active by nature and habit, and elated by success, was not to be effected without confusion and serious loss.

The unfortunate result of this attack seems to have been produced by the operation of various errors on the part of the British, all combining to ensure the success of the enemy. The delay, which deprived Major Ludlow's division of the advantage of approaching the enemy under cover of darkness, and the unfortunate impetuosity of a part of the
troops, have been already mentioned. In addition, chap.xxiv. Major Ludlow was embarrassed by the non-arrival of his artillery. He was instructed, on attaining the summit of the hill, to fire shot and shells into the stockade, and, having succeeded in driving the enemy out, to make a lodgement there; but he was unprovided with the means of acting upon these instructions, the guns having been left much in the rear; and it appears that neither they nor the spare ammunition were ready to move at the appointed hour. Of this circumstance General Martindell was not apprized, and he subsequently alleged that the knowledge of it would have led him to countermand the march of the troops. It seems extraordinary that no report of so serious an impediment to the success of his plan should have reached him, and there must undoubtedly have been neglect somewhere.

The continued ill-success of the operations of this division was a source of great disappointment to the governor-general, and he regarded the conduct of the officer in command with much dissatisfaction. Approving the project of seizing two points, each important to the conduct of a siege, he condemned the withdrawal of Major Richards, who had succeeded, for no better reason than because the attack under Major Ludlow had failed. He argued that the unfavourable issue of the enterprise in the one quarter furnished additional cause for improving our success in the other; and that the despatch of a reinforcement, with due supplies of
provisions and ammunition, would have been a far more judicious proceeding than that which was adopted, of ordering the detachment to retreat, without knowing the extent of peril to which such an operation might expose it. The opinion of the governor-general appears sound; but General Martindell must not be blamed with too great severity, for his situation was far from being easy or enviable. The necessity of caution had been impressed upon him from the highest quarter, and the commander-in-chief had expressed an especial desire, upon the general assuming the command, that, while the spirit of the troops was depressed by their recent misfortunes, an assault upon Nahun should be avoided, and more patient measures adopted for its reduction. Nahun fell into our hands without an effort; as far, therefore, as that place was concerned, the advice was not needed, and the different circumstances of Jyetuck rendered it there in a great degree inapplicable. This was felt by Major-General Martindell, and he consequently resorted to a more daring course than that which had been prescribed to him at Nahun. The partial failure of his attempt led him, somewhat too hastily, to despair of it altogether, and to abandon the success which was within his grasp. The fatal consequences which, before Kalunga, had resulted from indiscreet daring, probably occurred to his mind, and led him into the opposite extreme of overmuch caution. This effect would be aided by the instructions which he had received, and the consequent
apprehension that unsuccessful enterprise would be regarded as a violation of them. It is possible also that, looking at the unhappy and unexpected failure of a part of the native troops in Major Ludlow's division, he might have been apprehensive of similar occurrences in that of Major Richards. It is true that nothing of the kind took place, the whole of that division having manifested the most perfect steadiness and intrepidity; but of this General Martindell could not have been aware when he dispatched the orders for retreating, nor perhaps was he very accurately informed of all the circumstances under which the failure had occurred. The orders were certainly injudicious; but sufficient allowance seems scarcely to have been made for the difficulties under which they were dictated.

It will now be proper to advert to the movements of the other divisions of the army destined for the invasion of the Nepalese territories.

That under Colonel Ochterlony penetrated the hills, in the direction of Nalagurh, within a few days after General Gillespie entered the Dhoon; and the commencement of its operations was not inauspicious. Batteries were opened against Nalagurh, and, on the 5th of November, 1814, the fort surrendered. The capture of Taragurh, a small hill-fort in the neighbourhood, followed. The two places were garrisoned by small parties of troops, and a dépôt was established at Nalagurh, which thus afforded the means of an undisturbed communication with the plains.
An apprehension appears to have existed, in certain quarters, of a design, on the part of Ummer Sing, to retreat with his army to the eastward, and the necessity of precautionary measures for frustrating such an attempt was impressed upon the commanders within the field of whose operations the movement, if made, would have fallen. Colonel Ochterlony maintained that the expectation was utterly unwarranted by probability, and, further, that if Ummer Sing did retreat, as he would without a contest relinquish the country he had occupied to the protection of the British government, that alone would be an honourable issue of the war in one quarter, while his great distance from the eastern districts, compared with that of our attacking forces, rendered the chance but small of his coming in sufficient time to have much influence there. The result proved that the judgment of Colonel Ochterlony was correct; and it further attested the soundness of the opinions entertained and expressed by that officer, at a very early period after the commencement of hostilities, as to the nature and character of the war in which the British had become involved. He predicted that the Goorkhas would defend to the utmost every place which they thought defensible, and resist as long as possible in those they thought the weakest. This opinion, however, was not that which prevailed at head-quarters, where a very insufficient estimate appears to have been formed of the courage and determination of the troops by whom the British force was to be op-
posed. Their warlike qualities were greatly under-rated, and the victory was anticipated upon terms as easy as those on which it had been attained over tribes of less hardihood and activity. The stockades of the Goorkhas had been universally regarded with contempt. Colonel Ochterlony viewed them with very different feelings. He pronounced them extremely formidable, and the experience of British troops on several occasions afforded but too convincing evidence that he was right. We learned, at length, that we were contending with an enemy who was not to be despised; but the lesson was not acquired without severe suffering and loss.

Instead of retiring on the Eastern Provinces, Ummer Sing, leaving garrisons in Irkee, Subbatoo, and other forts in the interior, concentrated his force on the heights of Ramgurh, to the number of three thousand. The ridge on which he was posted was defended by several forts of considerable strength. In the rear of it and running in a direction nearly parallel was another range of lofty and rugged hills, defended, like the former, by forts. Between the two ridges flowed the river Gumber, in its progress to the Sutleje. Here Ummer Sing was enabled to draw supplies from the Rajah of Belaspore, a prince devotedly attached to him, who had lands on both sides of the Sutleje; and this advantage was peculiarly valuable at a time when his communication with other quarters was cut off.

Colonel Ochterlony, having established his depôts in Nalagurh, advanced on the enemy, and from the
The heights of Golah gained a full view of his stockade. The position which Ummer Sing had taken up was of extraordinary strength. His right was covered and commanded by the fort of Ramgurh, his left by a high and nearly inaccessible hill, called Kote, on which a strong party was posted. On a first view, however, the left stockade appeared to Colonel Ochterlony to be assailable, and in the hope of being able to turn it, and take the enemy in flank, he made preparations for an attack. Better information induced him to hesitate, and it was deemed necessary to reconnoitre more particularly. This duty was committed to Lieutenant Peter Lawtie, of the Bengal Engineers, by whom it was performed with extraordinary zeal and ability, and the result was a conviction that a successful attack on the enemy’s front was almost impossible, and that the attempt would involve a loss of men both certain and severe. The reports of the country people induced a belief that the hills were more accessible in the rear of the enemy, and these were confirmed by the observations of Lieut. Lawtie; but the road, by which alone the rear could be gained, was declared impassable for the guns. This difficulty was overcome by efforts, to which no warfare but that carried on by Europeans in the East can furnish a parallel. The docility of the elephant was relied upon for effecting a passage impracticable by other means, and six of these animals became the bearers of as many pieces of ordnance, while seven hundred coolies, or porters, were put in requisition, to carry
the necessary ammunition and equipments. In this manner, a road, characterized by Colonel Ochterlony as "indescribably bad," was successfully traversed, the wild and rugged hills passed in safety, and a descent effected into the plain in the enemy's rear.

A battery was immediately erected, and began to play at an early hour in the morning of the 26th November; but it was found to be too distant, and that the elevation of the work against which it was directed was too great to admit of its producing any material effect. The firing was in consequence discontinued, and Lieutenant Lawtie was instructed to reconnoitre the ground, with a view to the choice of a more favourable position. While in the performance of this duty, the officer and his escort were suddenly attacked by a party of the enemy, whom, however, they drove back towards his stockade, and, pushing their advantage, took up a post within three hundred yards of the work. As soon as their situation was perceived at the battery, the whole of the men there were dispatched to their assistance; but the enemy threw out from the different stockades and from Ramgurh such numbers, that the party was compelled to relinquish the ground they had gained before the reinforcement could arrive. The affair was altogether a trifling one, but it was injurious to the British cause, by sustaining the hope of the Goorkhas and dispiriting those who were opposed to them. No blame can be attached to any party in the transaction; but it cast over the com-
mencement of operations by this division of the army a portion of the gloom, in which the unfortunate events before Kalunga had involved those intrusted to General Gillespie.

The establishment of a battery at a more advanced point was still the object to which the commander of the division directed his attention. One position only presented itself where the artillery could be used with any prospect of success; and to gain this, a considerable space of ground was to be traversed by the column of attack, exposed to the fire of the enemy from the other stockades, as well as from that against which their operations were directed. On the expediency of risking this, Colonel Ochterlony consulted the field-officers with the detachment. The general impression appeared to be unfavourable, and it was observed, that it was an acknowledged principle, that all attacks of such a nature should be sustained by great superiority of numbers; whereas, in the instance under discussion, the force of the enemy far exceeded that of the whole detachment opposed to them. The intelligence of the disastrous result of the second attack upon Kalunga seems to have determined Colonel Ochterlony not to make an attempt attended by so many chances of failure; and he forthwith avowed his conviction, that the enemy's rear was unassailable with his present means. In fact, the force at the disposal of Colonel Ochterlony was inadequate to the purpose for which it was destined; he therefore determined to wait for reinforcements, and not
to risk the efficiency and safety of the army at his disposal by precipitate and ill-judged movements. This determination could scarcely be acceptable to his superiors, but it incurred no reproach. The experience and character of Colonel Ochterlony probably averted the censure which would have been bestowed upon an officer who had numbered fewer years, and whose reputation was less firmly established. Conscious that he did all that he ought, Colonel Ochterlony appears, at the same time, to have been aware that he did not attempt all that was expected from him. In a letter to the adjutant-general, dated the 2nd December, he wrote that he "did not blush to acknowledge that he felt his mind inadequate to a command requiring great powers of genius, and so novel in its nature and in all its circumstances."

It was about this period that the large irregular force in aid of Colonel Ochterlony's division was raised and embodied. The division was also strengthened by the accession of an additional battalion of Native Infantry and some artillery. These arrived on the 27th December; and on the evening of that day, as soon as it was dark, the reserve, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Thompson, of the 3rd Native Infantry, moved to attack a chosen point of the enemy, with the view of cutting off his communication with Belaspore, the principal source of his supplies. The march was one of great fatigue and difficulty; but Colonel Thompson succeeded in reaching the point of attack in the morning. The
field-pieces were forthwith brought into operation against the enemy's position, and continued firing through the day, but with little effect. A very bold and spirited attack upon the British position, made on the following morning, was repulsed with great gallantry, and the enemy driven to a distance. Perceiving the purpose with which the movements of the reserve had been made, the enemy now suddenly abandoned all his positions on the left of Ramgurh, and took up a new one on the opposite side of the fort, which, by a change of his front, he still kept on his right. The object of the movement was thus defeated, yet the attempt was not unattended by beneficial consequences. The enemy was compelled to contract his limits. By the establishment of the reserve on the ridge, some advantage was secured for further operations; and what was, perhaps, not of less importance, the repulse of the enemy was calculated alike to diminish the confidence of the Goorkha troops, and to remove the despondency which repeated reverses had diffused among our own.

Disappointed in the immediate attainment of his object, Colonel Ochterlony continued to pursue it with exemplary perseverance, and a series of operations followed, distinguished alike for the judgment with which they were planned, and the energy and precision with which they were executed. Their object was to compel Ummer Sing either to quit his position or to risk an engagement. A considerable body of irregulars, under Lieutenant Ross, was
dispatched by a circuitous route to take up a position on the heights above Belaspore; and on the 16th of January, 1815, Colonel Ochterlony passed the river Gumber to a position on the road to Irkee, near the southern extremity of the Malown range of mountains, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel George Cooper, of the 1st Native Infantry, with a battalion and the battering-guns, at the former position at Nehr, strongly stockaded. It had been anticipated that this movement would cause Ummer Sing to quit his position, and move in a direction to cover his supplies, and the result corresponded with the expectation. Ummer Sing marched to Malown, leaving small garrisons in Ramgurh and the other forts in that range. The principal stockades evacuated by the enemy were immediately occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel John Arnold, of the 19th Native Infantry, who was ordered, after performing this duty, to follow the march of the enemy, and take up a position in the vicinity of Belaspore. This was not effected without some delay and considerable difficulty, occasioned by the inclemency of the weather and the mountainous nature of the country. It was, however, at length successfully accomplished. Colonel Arnold took up a very advantageous position at Ruttengurh, directly between Malown and Belaspore, and commanding the principal line of communication. The irregulars, under Lieutenant Ross, had previously gained possession of the heights above Belaspore, after defeating a considerable body of Kuhloora troops, who attempted to maintain them.
These movements being completed, Colonel Ochterlony, with the reserve, took up a position on the right bank of the Gumrora, which at once afforded means for watching the movements of the enemy and facilities for cutting off his communications.

The progress of the British arms in this quarter was now steady and satisfactory. On the 11th of February the heights of Ramgurh were taken possession of without opposition. The surrender of the fort of Ramgurh followed, after a resistance rendered brief by the opening upon the place of some eighteen-pounders, which had been carried up to the ridge with almost incredible labour. The garrison of Jhoo-jooroo surrendered to a detachment of irregulars. Taragurh was evacuated by the enemy on the 11th of March. The fort of Chumbull subsequently surrendered, and the garrison were made prisoners of war. These services were performed by Colonel Cooper, and the force left at Nehr. They occupied a period of about six weeks of unremitted exertion. When completed, Ramgurh was converted into a principal dépôt, and Colonel Cooper's detachment became at liberty to aid in investing the enemy's position.

In the meantime a negotiation had been opened with the Rajah of Belaspore, whose territory had been left entirely at our mercy by the retirement of Ummer Sing, which ended in the transfer of the rajah's allegiance from the Goorkha to the British government, and on this condition his possessions on the left bank of the Sutlej were guaranteed to
him without tribute or pecuniary payment of any kind.

The proceedings of the division of the invading army under General Wood now require to be noticed. Its march was, in the first instance, retarded by the want of means for transporting the stores and supplies. This difficulty was removed by obtaining bearers from Lucknow, as well as a number of elephants furnished by the nabob vizier; but, in consequence of the delay thus occasioned, General Wood was not prepared to move till the middle of December. He at length advanced, and occupied the Terraie; but his operations were still impeded by delays in the commissariat department. As the obstacles arising from this cause were removed, the hesitation of the general in the choice of a route interposed fresh ones. His information as to the country, the force of the enemy, and every other point by which his determination was to be influenced, appears to have been miserably defective; and, harassed by a multiplicity of discordant reports, the movements of this division were, from the first, characterized by feebleness and indecision.

The first intention appears to have been to leave Bootwul on the right, and attack Nyacote, a fort situated on the hills to the west of the town. Various plans of operation were in succession adopted and abandoned. At last, the general was led by the advice of a brahmin, named Knuckunuddee Sewaree, into a course singularly imprudent and unfortunate. This man was a native of the hills, but for many
CHAP. XXIV. years resident in Goruckpore, attached to the rajah. Having obtained the confidence of General Wood, he proceeded to insist upon the difficulties presented by the Mahapore hills, which it had been proposed to pass, and suggested that the detachment should cross the Tenavee, occupy Bussuntpore, about ten miles from Simla, and leaving there the supplies and baggage, push on to Palpa, where an abundance of provisions might be secured, and from whence Nyacote might be attacked on the side where the well that supplied the garrison was situated; but, preparatory to this movement, he recommended that a redoubt at Jeetgurh, which had been thrown up across the foot of the hill of Mucote, one mile west of Bootwul, should be carried, and the deserted town of Bootwul burnt. The success of this scheme was represented as certain, and the advantages of possessing the fort to be first attacked, as of the highest importance. The brahmin professed to be well acquainted with the country: in recommending the proposed plan of operations, he felt, or counterfeited, the greatest enthusiasm—a feeling which he succeeded in communicating to the general, who, at once captivated by its apparent practicability and advantage, resolved to carry it into effect without delay.

A.D. 1815.

The morning of January the 3rd was fixed for the attack upon Jeetgurh, in front of which, according to the brahmin’s report, was an open plain. The morning came, and the movement to attack took place. Between the British camp and the redoubt lay the Sal forest; but, instead of debouching upon
an open plain, as was expected, General Wood, with his staff and the foremost of the advanced guard, on approaching to reconnoitre, found themselves, greatly to their astonishment, within fifty paces of the work. A heavy fire was immediately commenced from the redoubt, which for some time could be returned only by the few men who had accompanied the general and his staff. On the arrival of the troops forming the head of the column, they advanced, under Colonel Hardyman, to attack the work, while a party led by Captain Croker, of his Majesty's 17th foot, driving the enemy before them up a hill on the right of the redoubt, succeeded in gaining its summit. The post seemed now in the power of the British troops; but, deterred by the apparent force of the enemy on the hill behind it, the possession of which was necessary to the retention of Jeetgurh, General Wood refrained from pushing his advantage, and ordered a retreat. Considerable loss was sustained on both sides, but that of the enemy was the more severe. The brahmin who was the cause of the mischief disappeared as soon as the fort was in sight. General Wood closed his despatch, giving an account of this affair, by observing with great naïveté of his deceitful guide, "if he is with the enemy, I can have no doubt of his treachery:" a conclusion from which few will be found to dissent.

The proceedings before Jeetgurh seem to have been marked throughout by no inconsiderable degree of levity,—to have been undertaken and
abandoned alike inconsiderately. The information upon which the general acted was not merely imperfect, but false, and it is strange that no attempt was made to test the correctness of the brahmin’s report before advancing. Undertaken, as circumstances shewed, in perfect ignorance of the ground, the attack was yet, to a certain extent, successful, and it was the apprehensions alone of the commander that kept the fort out of his hands. But his astonishment and distrust at finding the height covered with troops was a clear indication that he was not better informed as to the force of the enemy than he had been as to the nature of their position. He advanced upon the foe, ignorant whither he was going: this was a great error; but his good fortune saved him from its probable consequence, and he was on the point of achieving the very object so imprudently sought. He then first began to doubt his power of retaining that for which he had incurred such risk, and, deterred by circumstances which he ought previously to have known and weighed, he retired, consigning the men under his command to the dispiriting consequences of defeat, after paying, in killed and wounded, the price of victory. Measures more ill-judged and dangerous have rarely occurred in any course of warfare.

Little more was attempted by this division, and nothing important effected. After disposing of his wounded, and making some provision for the defence of the eastern part of the district, General Wood proceeded in a westerly direction, with the view of
effecting one of the objects assigned to his division, that of creating a diversion of the enemy's force, as well as with the intention of penetrating, if possible, into the hills by the passes of Toolsepoor. But his progress was arrested by the movements of the enemy, who, encouraged by the failure at Jeetgurh, and being, it was alleged, reinforced from Katmandoo, advanced into the country, burning the villages and committing horrible devastations in their route. On the 24th of January General Wood, in communicating these facts, avowed his utter inability, with the small force at his disposal, to carry on any offensive operations, and solicited instructions for his guidance. The answer, dated the 30th of the same month, attributes the embarrassed situation of General Wood to the delays which occurred in the advance of his detachment, and to his having pursued a system purely defensive. The impracticability of furnishing precise instructions for the guidance of an officer holding a distant command, under circumstances liable to daily change, was pointed out; but some suggestions were offered, and a more active system of operation strongly urged.

Towards the close of the season General Wood again marched upon Bootwul, but without producing any effect. The approach of the rainy season now indicated the necessity of suspending all offensive operations, and General Wood retired towards Goruckpore, and proceeded to make the necessary arrangements for the defence of the frontier. These measures were in accordance with the views enter-
tained at head-quarters; but the division being attacked by sickness to an alarming extent (twelve hundred men being at one time in the hospital), it became expedient to break up before the final orders for that purpose arrived. The division separated without attaining a single object for which it had been brought together, and the corps not destined to the defence of the frontier returned to their ordinary cantonments.

Previously to this it was deemed necessary to incapacitate the Terraie of Bootwul and Shiraz from furnishing supplies to the enemy in a future campaign, by destroying the crops on the ground, and preventing the cultivation of the country for the following season. Such a mode of warfare is repugnant to the better feelings of our nature—it has the appearance of wanton and vindictive violence. War is here stripped of all the brilliant colouring shed over it by the masterly combination of means to attain a given end—the penetration which discerns the intentions of an enemy through the veil in which chance and design enwrap them, the patient endurance which no labour can weary, and the daring courage which no danger can appal: it stands forth in all its horrors, unrelieved by any of the circumstances which give it dignity or interest. Lord Moira declared that he adopted this policy with reluctance; and it is but justice to add, that nothing was neglected that could soften such an infliction. The inhabitants were not abandoned to famine. They were invited to remove to a more
southern tract, where lands were assigned to those who accepted the offer.

The operations of the division of the army destined to march through Muckwanpore, direct upon the Nepalese capital, yet remain to be noticed. It was that upon which the governor-general had fixed his strongest hopes, and on the equipment of which the greatest care and expense had been bestowed. The corps had assembled at Dinapore, and had crossed the Ganges before the end of November. Six companies had previously been dispatched, under Major Edward Roughsedge, to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw. The former officer moved forward with his detachment to occupy the Terraie of Tirthoot, while the latter proceeded, with the troops under his immediate command, to attack a position at Burhurwa, occupied by Pursaram Thappa, the Nepalese sobahdar of the Terraie, with about four hundred men. This enterprise was successfully executed. The enemy was taken by surprise, and, after a short conflict, put to the rout. Being cut off from a retreat to the north, the fugitives fled southward, to Kurrur-bunna Gurhee, three miles from the scene of attack. Being pursued to that place, they abandoned it, and were chased across the Baugmutty, where many were drowned, and those who escaped death threw down their arms. Two standards fell into the hands of the victors, and Pursaram Thappa himself was killed in a personal encounter with Lieutenant Boileau, of the Native Infantry. This brilliant affair, which took place on the 25th of November, secured the
immediate possession of the Terrai of Sarun. About
the same time Major Roughsedge, commanding the
Rangurh local battalion, occupied the Terrai of
Tirhoot without opposition, the enemy withdrawing
as he advanced.

General Marley, who had been appointed to the
command of the division, did not arrive on the fron-
tier until the 11th of December, and by this delay the
opportunity of depressing the spirits of the enemy and
sustaining those of his own troops, by immediately
and vigorously following up the success of Colonel
Bradshaw, was lost. This loss was not repaired by
any subsequent activity. General Marley deemed
it necessary to wait for a battering-train, which could
not arrive for a considerable time, and this postpone-
ment of all offensive operations on the part of the
British seems to have emboldened the Goorkhas,
and led to the assumption by them of the course
which their adversaries declined. The torpor of
this division of the British force was, on the 1st of
January, very inauspiciously disturbed by a simul-
taneous attack on two of their advanced posts situ-
ated at Pursah and summundapore. These posts
were about forty miles asunder, and about twenty-
five miles from the position which General Marley
had taken up at Lowtun. They had been estab-
lished by Colonel Bradshaw, together with a third,
at Barra Gurry, nearly equidistant from the two, but
somewhat more retired. The Goorkhas were so
greatly superior in numbers, that the British force
was compelled, in each instance, to retire with
severe loss, including that of the two commanding officers, Captains Sibley and Blackney, both of the Native Infantry. The positions, however, were not yielded without hard fighting. At Pursah, Lieutenant Matheson, of the artillery, remained at his post, and continued to work a gun after every man under his command was either killed or wounded.

But, though relieved by this and other instances of individual bravery, the tendency of these events was to cast a gloom over the prospects of the campaign. They occasioned great anxiety in the highest quarters, and drew from the Earl of Moira expressions of marked displeasure. The governor-general condemned the disposition of these posts; but the disposition was that of Colonel Bradshaw, not of General Marley. A charge, bearing more directly against the latter officer, was grounded on the fact that, although reports of the intended attacks had been prevalent, no effectual means had been taken to strengthen the posts against which they were directed. These reports do not, indeed, appear to have called forth all the vigilance that was to be expected; but a party of two hundred men had been dispatched to Pursah, and might have arrived in time to change the fortune of the day at that post; unfortunately, they halted at a distance of several miles. It must be acknowledged, however, that they were not aware of the urgent necessity for their advance, and so little was this felt by Captain Sibley, who commanded at Pursah, that, though informed, the day before, of the approach of
CHAP. XXIV. the party, he took no steps to hasten their movement, and did not even think it requisite to reply to the communication. These circumstances shew that the feeling of security was not confined to General Marley, but extended to other officers of his division.

It was, indeed, as urged by the governor-general, an obvious and indispensable precaution, not to continue the posts advanced and exposed during a period of inactivity, which allowed the enemy ample leisure to contrive and mature plans of attack. General Marley was persuaded that he was not in a condition to advance with safety, and in this belief a concentration of his force would undoubtedly have been more judicious than the continuance of the arrangement adopted by his predecessor. But he was placed in circumstances where a man must possess extraordinary firmness to act resolutely upon his own convictions. He knew that he was expected to advance, and he felt that this expectation could not be fulfilled: he knew also, that, by withdrawing the parties in advance, he should occasion great disappointment to the distinguished projector of the campaign, and draw down no ordinary degree of censure upon himself. A lover of reckless enterprise would have executed his orders, or at least would have tried to execute them: a man of high confidence in his own judgment would have shaped his course according to its suggestion. General Marley did neither; hesitating between his instructions and the conclusions of his own mind, he
followed neither completely or vigorously, and his chap.xxiv.
proceedings exhibited the usual characteristic of middle courses—uniting the disadvantages and excluding the probable benefits of both extremes.

With regard to the advanced posts, further blame was cast upon General Marley for not protecting them by stockades. Such a proceeding, however, was altogether new in Indian warfare. It was adopted by Colonel Ochterlony, much to the credit of his sagacity and discrimination. That able commander saw that the war with Nepaul was altogether different from any in which the British had previously engaged, and that the peculiarities of the country and the character of the enemy called for important changes in our modes of operation. But it would be unfair to pass sentence of reprehension upon any commander upon grounds merely comparative, and to condemn him, not for absolute deficiency, but because he manifested less skill than another officer.

But whether attributable, according to the view of General Marley, to the inadequacy of the force at his disposal, or, according to that of the governor-general, to the incompetence of the commander, it is certain that the course of events was productive of the most lamentable consequences to the interests of the British government. General Marley, on the 6th of January, made a forward movement towards Pursah, and encamped about a mile and a half to the south of that place. But this position he almost immediately abandoned, alarmed by
reports of the designs of the enemy, and by some very unpleasant symptoms manifested by a part of the native troops. The dissatisfaction displayed itself only in words and in a number of desertions; but these were indications that could not with safety be disregarded. General Marley, under the circumstances, deemed it advisable to retrograde, for the purpose of covering the depot at Betteah, and favouring the junction of the long-expected battering-train. This being effected, some other movements were made, but without effecting any thing for the British cause.

In the meantime the enemy ravaged the Terraie, the whole of which, with the exception of the country immediately protected by our posts, again fell into their hands: their incursions were extended even beyond it. Their confidence attained a most extravagant height, and they threatened to attack Barra Gurry, though a thousand men were there in garrison. They actually threw up a stockade at Sooffre, a short distance from that post. The prudence of the Nepaulese commander, Bhagut Singh, withheld him, however, from attacking it; but his caution did not find greater favour in the eyes of his government than that of some of the British commanders had met from theirs. Being the subject of a semi-barbarous state, his fate was even worse. He was not only recalled, but disgraced by being publicly exhibited in woman's attire, as one unworthy to wear the habiliments of man.
Some attempts were made, by hasty levies of irregulars, to provide for the protection of the frontier, and restrain the aggressions of the Goorkhas; but they were attended with little success. The despondency of General Marley appeared to increase, as did also the dissatisfaction of the commander-in-chief at his inactivity. The conviction of the general, that his means were inadequate to the fulfilment of his instructions, not only remained unaltered, but seemed to gather strength, and that conviction was sanctioned by the judgment of Lieutenant-Colonel George Dick, of the 9th Native Infantry, and Lieutenant-Colonel William Chamberlain, of his Majesty's 24th. The opinions of those officers, together with his own, having been transmitted by General Marley to the commander-in-chief, the representation was answered by his recall, and the appointment of Major-General George Wood to succeed him.

In a communication from the adjutant-general, a few days afterwards, General Marley was accused of misconstruing his instructions with regard to the defence of the frontier. It is remarkable, however, that Colonel Dick and Colonel Chamberlain appear to have put the same interpretation upon the instructions as General Marley. The question was, what part of the force should be devoted to the protection of the frontier, and the commander-in-chief contended that it was specifically determined in General Marley's instructions. This, however, is not perfectly clear. A certain part of the force is re-
CHAP. XXIV. referred to, as being "exclusively reserved" for the defence of the country—by which, of course, it must be understood, that General Marley was not to employ this portion in any other duty; but it may be doubted whether the words precluded him from employing other parts of his force in the same duty. The exclusion of a particular battalion, or parts of a battalion, from all service but one, does not of necessity exclude the rest of the army from that specific service. The exclusion might be inferred from other parts of the paragraph, but a matter so important should not have been left to mere inference. General Marley's view was countenanced by the necessity, which every one must have perceived, of effectually providing for the safety of the territory in some way. The risk of incursion was obvious, and though it was subsequently stated that this risk was foreseen and determinately incurred, no such communication appears to have been made to General Marley until it was too late to profit by it. The general of a division, too, must be left, in a great degree, to the exercise of his own discretion, because circumstances are continually varying. This principle was repeatedly enunciated by the commander-in-chief when advice was solicited. General Marley exercised his discretion, and he might be on some points wrong; but in the belief that his force was unequal to the execution of his orders, there is no reason for supposing that he was not in the right.

The embarrassments of his situation, acting upon
a mind perhaps little adapted to encounter them, led at length to a most extraordinary proceeding on the part of the general. On the 10th of February (his successor not having arrived) he quitted the camp, before daylight in the morning, without any previous intimation of his intention, and without making any provision for the command after his departure. Such a step is of a nature to forbid comment. It indicates the existence of a state of nervous excitement under which the ill-fated officer was not master of his own actions, and which consequently shields them from remark.

The interval that elapsed between the departure of General Marley and the arrival of his successor was distinguished by an affair of some brilliancy, which tended, in no inconsiderable degree, to abate the presumptuous confidence of the Goorkhas and revive the exhausted hopes of the British force. Lieutenant Pickersgill, while reconnoitring, discovered, at no great distance from the camp, a party of the enemy about five hundred strong. The discovery was immediately communicated to Colonel Dick, who, as the officer next in seniority, had, on the departure of General Marley, assumed the command. A party of irregular horse was, in consequence, dispatched to strengthen Lieutenant Pickersgill, and Colonel Dick followed with all the picquets. The Goorkhas, encouraged by the small number of Lieutenant Pickersgill's force, resolved to attack him; but, on emerging from a hollow where they were posted, they perceived
the force that was advancing to his assistance. This discovery appears to have struck them with panic, and they made an immediate and precipitate retreat, pursued by Lieutenant Pickersgill, who had waited only for the junction of the cavalry. The entire detachment was cut to pieces, and so great was the terror inspired by this encounter, that the Goorkhas hastily retreated into the hills, abandoning every position which they had established in the forest and Terraie.

Major-General George Wood joined the division to the command of which he had been appointed, on the 20th of February, ten days after the departure of his predecessor. The force at his disposal had been greatly augmented, and he found himself at the head of upwards of thirteen thousand regular troops. He had, in every respect, the advantage of his predecessor in the command: his force was not only considerably larger, but the tone of their spirits was greatly raised by the successful affair which took place only the day before his arrival. Nevertheless, the new commander determined that he could do nothing to redeem the alleged errors of General Marley: he apprehended that the efficiency of his army might be impaired by sickness, if he attempted to penetrate into the forest, and, after a long march eastward to Goruckpore and back again, which was performed without seeing an enemy, and the object of which is not very clear, all operations were suspended for the season. The change of generals thus failed of accomplishing the
object which the commander-in-chief most ardently desired. The division did not march to Katmandoo, nor make an attempt to do so.

The occupation of Kumaon was an object highly desirable, but, owing to the unpropitious progress of the campaign, apparently little likely to be attained by any portion of the regular force. A correspondence had, however, been opened with the leading men of the country, and their wishes were ascertained to be decidedly favourable to the British, whose success they promised to promote by all the means in their power, if they would invade the territory and rescue it from the rule of the Goorkhas; but they expressly stipulated, that their ancient rajahs should not be restored, and desired that the country should be placed under the direct government of the Company. The way was thus prepared for a successful irruption into Kumaon, but the means of effecting it were wanting. The army under General Martindell remained before Jyetuck, and no portion of it could be spared for any other service. The season of operation was rapidly passing away, and the British party in Kumaon becoming alarmed lest their correspondence should be discovered, were pressing in their representations of the necessity of immediate action. In this emergency it was determined to try what could be effected by a body of irregulars, accompanied by a few guns and aided by the co-operation of the inhabitants. The duty of raising this force was assigned to Lieutenant-Colonel Gardner, to whom also was in-
trusted its subsequent command. It amounted, in the first instance, to about three thousand men: it was increased by a corps raised and formed by Captain Hearsey. Four six-pounders were placed at the disposal of Colonel Gardner, and he was ordered to act under the direction of his relative, the Honourable Edward Gardner, who was to proceed to Kumaon in a political character.

The levying of this force was, however, a work of time, and after it was ready a succession of bad weather prevented its being put in motion. By these causes its advance into the hill country was delayed until the 17th of February. Having occupied the Chilkeeah Pass, Colonel Gardner proceeded by a route lying chiefly along the bed of the Cosillas river. This route, not the most direct one to Almorah, was chosen as offering the fewest impediments to an invading force, as being in a great degree unguarded, and likely to afford opportunities for turning the positions of the enemy. The Goorkhas withdrew as the British force approached, and Colonel Gardner's movements were characterized by an energy and rapidity which suffered no advantage to be lost. Having anticipated the Goorkhas in the occupation of an important post, he availed himself of it to collect his force and bring up his guns and baggage, which, by the rapidity of his progress, had been left in the rear. He then pursued his march, and took up a commanding position on a hill called Kompore, in front of which the enemy's force, reinforced by a large proportion of
the garrison from Almorah, was strongly stockaded. \textit{chap.xxiv.}

In the course of the march several skirmishes took place, the results of which were invariably favourable to the British.

The success which had marked the progress of Colonel Gardner was most encouraging, but it did not seduce him into attempts which might not only have thrown away the advantages already gained, but have frustrated the objects of the enterprise altogether. The enemy were too strongly posted to justify an attack in front by a force composed entirely of hastily-levied and irregular troops, and Colonel Gardner, therefore, judiciously determined to turn his position, and by the sudden movement of a part of his corps, combined with a demonstration of attack, either to place himself between the enemy and his capital, or compel him to retire to prevent it. But even for the performance of this manœuvre Colonel Gardner felt that he was not yet sufficiently strong. He, accordingly, waited the junction of an additional body of irregulars, amounting to one thousand, which had been raised in the Dooab, and were proceeding to Kumaon. On the arrival of this reinforcement he executed his intention almost without opposition. The enemy withdrew with so much precipitation as to leave part of his arms and baggage behind him, and, being closely followed by the force under Colonel Gardner, he abandoned the position in front of Almorah, to which he had retired, and posted himself on the ridge on which the town stands. On the 28th of March the A.D. 1815.
British force occupied the position which the enemy had deserted.

While Colonel Gardner was thus triumphantly advancing, Captain Hearsey with his followers was endeavouring to create a diversion in another quarter, but with very different success. Having secured the Timley Pass and the forts which commanded it, he had advanced and occupied Chumpawut, the capital of Kali Kumaon, and laid siege to a strong fortress near it called Kutoolgurh. While thus engaged a Goorkha force crossed the Sardah and attacked one of his posts, but it was forced to recross the river with some loss. The attack was speedily succeeded by another. On this occasion the enemy appeared with increased strength, and crossed the river at a point somewhat above Captain Hearsey's division. On learning this movement the British commander advanced to attack the enemy with all the force that could be collected, leaving his adjutant to prosecute the siege of Kutoolgurh. The issue was disastrous. The troops under Captain Hearsey shrunk from their duty, and he was wounded and taken prisoner. The Goorkha commander then attacked the party left before Kutoolgurh, whom he quickly dispersed. The remainder of Captain Hearsey's battalion unceremoniously abandoned their posts and fled into the plains.

Though Colonel Gardner's success was very flattering, it was a matter of great doubt whether, with a force altogether irregular, he would be able to
reduce Almorah. Some attempts had been made to tamper with the Nepaulese commander who held possession of it, by suggesting to him that an arrangement might be made for his benefit if he would retire with his troops across the Kali. This mode of crippling an enemy, by corrupting his officers, appears, from its frequent recurrence, to have been a favourite engine in the policy of Lord Moira. On this occasion, as on others, however, it failed; the Nepaulese commander giving no encouragement to a proposal which implied a belief that he was a miscreant of the lowest description. As, therefore, his fidelity was not to be shaken, and it was deemed imprudent to rely entirely upon an irregular force, a detachment of regular troops, two thousand strong, was devoted to the operations in Kumaon, and the entire force was placed under the command of Colonel Nicolls.* That officer arrived at Kattar Mull on the 8th of April, and as soon as his regular force was assembled, sent a detachment, under Major Robert Patton, of the 5th Native Infantry, to a position to the north-west of Almorah, in which direction a body of the enemy had proceeded. They were attacked by Major Patton and completely routed. The Goorkha commander was killed, as was also the second in command, and several other officers. This success was gained on the 23rd of April. On the 25th Colonel Nicolls proceeded to attack the heights and town of Almorah.

* Now General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B., commander-in-chief of the army in India.
with a success more rapid, if not more decisive, than he had anticipated. Two of the enemy's breastworks on the Sittoolee ridge were carried by a part of the regular infantry, led by Captain W. C. Faithful, of the 4th Native Infantry, while the irregular troops, ever the devout worshippers of fortune, were worked upon, by the auspicious appearance of events and the energy of Colonel Gardner, to attack and carry the remaining three. The enemy retreated by five roads, on each of which they were pursued; some important positions were taken, and the British gained possession of about one-third of the town.

During the night an attempt was made to dispossess the victors of their advantage; but it was met with judgment and gallantry, and defeated. In the morning measures were taken for attacking the fort, and at nine o'clock in the evening a flag of truce arrived, bearing a letter from the Goorkha commander requesting a suspension of arms, preparatory to a termination of hostilities in the province. Another letter to the same effect was written by Captain Hearsey, then a prisoner in the fort. On the following day a convention was framed, by virtue of which all the forts were to be surrendered to the British, and the whole province of Kumaon evacuated in their favour, the Goorkhas being permitted to retire unmolested across the Kali with their public and private property and arms. A proclamation was forthwith issued declaring the province to be permanently annexed to the British dominions.
During the progress of events in Kumaon Major-General Ochterlony was prosecuting a career of success at once substantial and brilliant. His operations against Ummer Sing sustained, indeed, a momentary interruption in the result of a sally made by the enemy upon a party of irregulars occupying a stockaded post. This party, being taken off its guard, suffered severely, but no permanent advantage was secured, or apparently sought, by the enemy, as, after destroying the stockade, they returned to their position.

The wary progress of General Ochterlony had enabled him, by the middle of April, to obtain an accurate knowledge of the ground occupied by the enemy, and to ascertain the points at which their positions could be more easily penetrated. Of this information he availed himself, by forming and carrying into effect a plan of combined attack, distinguished not less by its masterly contrivance than by its fortunate results.

The movements of the British force commenced on the night of the 14th. A detachment, destined to occupy a post between Doob and the first Deonthul, gained it without opposition. Columns, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Thompson, of the 3rd Native Infantry, and Major Thomas Lawrie, of the 7th, attained the heights of the second Deonthul almost at the same moment, and were proceeding along the ridge to possess themselves of an advanced post, when the head of the column, consisting of light infantry, received a check by a charge
from the enemy sword in hand, which compelled them to fall back on the main body, by this time posted in the second Deonthul. Here they were greatly annoyed by their opponents, from the cover afforded by the jungle and the rocks. In the course of the night they were further harassed by false alarms; and at the first dawn of day a daring attack was made by nearly two thousand of the enemy, who almost surrounded the post. A desperate conflict ensued, and continued for above two hours. The Nepaulese fought with a courage at once steady and impetuous; but they were encountered with at least equal courage and with better fortune. They were finally repulsed and totally defeated with very severe loss, Bughtee Thappa, who led the attack, being left among the dead. This action was distinguished by some splendid instances of individual exertion and bravery, as well as by the intrepidity displayed generally by the troops engaged. The result was, that the enemy's continuous chain of posts was broken, and the Nepaulese commander was compelled to withdraw, concentrating his force in Malown and its immediate outworks; and from this time General Ochterlony pushed his success vigorously, seeing now that the time had arrived when it could be pursued with effect. A series of positions were taken up for the purpose of completely investing the enemy, and a battery was erected against one of his redoubts. The spirits of the enemy fell with their fortunes; their distress, for want of provisions, became extreme; desertions, both of individuals and
of small parties, were of daily occurrence, and these were facilitated by the fondness which seems to have prevailed throughout the Indian army for advancing the operations of war by the refinements of diplomatic intrigue. It is no pleasing task to relate the adoption of such a mode of warfare by British officers, but the first duty of an historical writer is to speak the truth, regardless of consequences. Lieutenant Ross, who had taken up a post with special reference to this amongst other objects, made proposals to three sirdars commanding in and near the battered redoubt. Other communications followed, and when Lieutenant Ross determined to ascend the heights, it was in the conviction that he should meet with no resistance. The event justified his confidence: he attained the summit without opposition, the enemy retiring and remaining on a spot to their rearward. The redoubt being occupied, Lieutenant Ross invited the enemy's troops to pass into his rear, intimating that they would be unmolested. After a little hesitation the movement recommended by the English commander was performed; other parties of the enemy followed this example, and the second redoubt was gained with as little difficulty as the first.

It appears that the sirdars in a body had waited upon the Goorkha commander, insisting that he should either give them and their men food from the fort or adopt some decisive line of conduct. It is said that he refused either, but urged them to endure a short time longer and wait the progress of
events. Such advice was calculated to have little effect upon men not influenced by any rigid principles of duty or any refined sense of honour, and who, pressed by famine on the one hand and allured by promises on the other, were already more than wavering in their fidelity. The result was, that the whole of the outworks were abandoned to the British troops, and those of the enemy came over almost universally to General Ochterlony's camp, leaving Ummer Sing shut up in the body of the fort with a garrison reduced to about two hundred men. Escape and the receipt of succour were alike impossible, and on the 8th of May the Goorkha commander wrote to General Ochterlony, desiring to be informed of his wishes. The general's reply was, that, agreeably to usage, proposals must come from the other side. Up to the 10th no farther communication was made. The interval was employed by the British commander in forming batteries and making other preparations for attack: these being completed, firing commenced, and continued during the greater part of the 10th. On the morning of the 11th Ram Dos, son of the Goorkha general, came out and intimated his father's desire to negotiate: the firing was consequently discontinued, but the blockade was rigidly kept up.

From the 11th to the 15th was occupied in negotiations, which were protracted in consequence of their being extended to other objects, as well as the surrender of Malown. A convention was finally signed, by which it was agreed that all the forts
between the Jumna and the Sutleje should be delivered up to the British; that all the troops, except those granted to the personal honour of Ummer Sing and Runjore Sing, should be at liberty to enter the British service, and that those not employed should be maintained by the British government, on a specific allowance, till the conclusion of peace; that Gurhwal should be forthwith evacuated, the garrison having permission to return to Nepaul by the Kumaon route, carrying with them all public and private property, including warlike stores: Ummer Sing was to be permitted to retire across the Kali with the remaining garrison of Malown, retaining their arms, accoutrements, baggage, and waggons; and Runjore Sing, the commander of Jyetuck, in the same manner, with two hundred men of that garrison, three hundred unarmed followers, and one gun. All private property was to be respected, and eighty-three persons in the various garrisons, who were related by blood or marriage to Ummer Sing, were to retain their arms and accoutrements.

Of these arrangements neither party had much reason to feel proud. The Goorkhas made great sacrifices, and they received great indulgence. General Ochterlony spoke of the terms granted with the modesty which usually marked his official communications; regarding the arrangement not as positively good, but as the best that could be made under the circumstances existing. The rainy season was approaching, and the campaign could not have
been protracted much longer. During the period of inaction it would have been necessary to maintain expensive establishments, a burden which was averted by the convention; and this circumstance, combined with the possession of the strongholds of the enemy, sufficed to attest its expediency. In concluding it, as well as in all his military operations, General Ochterlony displayed sound judgment.

It will now be necessary to return to the division under General Martindell. After the unfortunate termination of the double attack upon Jyetuck that officer determined to attempt nothing farther until the arrival of reinforcements. These were not granted in the most gracious manner, and the communications addressed at this period to General Martindell, from the department of the commander-in-chief, were couched in the language of blame and reproach. On General Martindell instituting a comparison between his force and that of the enemy, he was told that "hitherto it had not been the habit of the Company's officers to calculate whether they had a numerical superiority to the enemy," and the introduction of such a principle was pronounced to be "novel, and infallibly destructive to our empire." This lofty language is, no doubt, very imposing; but the number of an enemy's force is, after all, an element that cannot be excluded from the calculations of a prudent general, and the war with the Nepaulese certainly did not form an exception to the general rule. It may be
admitted that General Martindell was somewhat over anxious with regard to numbers, and it is undeniable that British officers had been accustomed to gain easy victories over vastly superior numbers of the feeble troops by which they had heretofore been opposed; but in the Goorkhas they had an enemy surpassing in energy, as well as in military skill, any with which they had previously contended in India, and a corresponding degree of caution was called for: the want of it had been severely felt in more instances than one. The irregular troops, to whom so much importance was attached, proved very generally worthless. It has been seen how Captain Harsey's irregulars behaved in Kumaon, and those attached to General Martindell's division appear to have been little better. Intelligence having been received that a reinforcement was on its way to join the garrison of Jyetuck, Lieutenant Young marched with one thousand four hundred irregulars to intercept them. He was joined by several hundreds more, forming altogether a very considerable force: it is stated, in one report, to have amounted to nearly three thousand men, and it certainly very considerably exceeded two thousand. A party of these being attacked and put to flight by the enemy, the whole body fell under the operation of panic, and were completely routed by a force which did not exceed five hundred fighting men. Such was the value of the irregular troops though commanded by an excellent officer, whose personal exertions were strenuously but vainly used
CHAP. XXIV. to induce them to keep their ground against an enemy. greatly inferior in numbers.

The defeat materially abated the taste of the irregulars for a military life. Many deserted; many applied for their discharge; and the strength of the corps was reduced from between two and three thousand to about twelve hundred, exclusive of those on detached duty. This defection increased the difficulties of General Martindell. He had to contend, also, with weather of extreme inclemency, which his troops were ill calculated to support. He complained heavily of the want of correct intelligence, and, oppressed by all these difficulties, he signified a wish to be relieved from a command which he could no longer exercise with pleasure to himself or satisfaction to his superiors. This need excite little surprise: General Marley had been unable to contend with the difficulties of his situation, and General Ochterlony had expressed a diffidence of the adequacy of his own powers to meet the exigencies of the mountain warfare. But the commander-in-chief was impressed with a belief that Jyetuck might be reduced, and with the force under General Martindell's command. After a long-continued and somewhat angry communication of opinion, General Ochterlony was ordered, immediately on the fall of Malown, to take the command of the division before Jyetuck; but this arrangement was rendered unnecessary by the convention concluded with Ummer Sing, Jyetuck being one of the
fortresses which were by that instrument surrendered to the British.

On the reduction of Almorah the Goorkha commander, Bum Sah, expressed a wish to become an agent for the restoration of peace, and proposed to address letters to Ummer Sing Thappa and Runjore Sing, recommending them to withdraw their troops across the Kali, preparatory to the commencement of negotiations. The proposal was assented to by Colonel Nicolls and Mr. Gardner; the letters were written and forwarded: the success of General Ochterlony had, however, precluded their necessity. That addressed to Ummer Sing Thappa was received by him as he was on the point of executing the capitulation; and though too late to have any effect on his decision, it was in time to afford him an apology for the course which he had previously determined to pursue. With true Oriental finesse, he availed himself of its arrival to insert an article stating that he had surrendered at the instance of Bum Sah and the other chiefs of Kumaon; thus throwing on them the odium and the danger which he apprehended to himself.

Bum Sah and Ummer Sing belonged to opposite factions, and the former had no sooner transmitted his recommendation of retreat than he became alarmed at the probable consequences of what he had done. Though nearly related to the rajah, who was also much attached to him, the influence of his enemies preponderated at court. The situation of Bum Sah was, therefore, extremely critical: his
chap. xxiv. character was timid and vacillating, and being apprehensive that his head would pay the forfeit of the discretion which he had exercised, he solicited from Colonel Gardner, who had accompanied him on his march homeward, permission to remain in Kumaon till the arrival of the communication from Nepaul. This could not be permitted; but Bum Sah throwing himself upon the confidence of the British officer, declaring that his sole dependence was upon the government to which that gentleman belonged, and imploring at his hands counsel and instruction, Colonel Gardner, after apprising him that, as a servant of the British government, his authority extended no further than to seeing the terms of the convention fulfilled, suggested, as a private individual, that he should forthwith take possession of the province of Dootee, garrison the forts and places of strength with troops upon whom he could rely, dismissing all the rest, and, having established himself there in independence, assume a high tone and insist upon the adoption of the measures which he thought necessary for the good of his country.

After some deliberation Bum Sah acquiesced, and an astrologer having been consulted, a fortunate day was chosen for crossing the river. It was clearly for the interest of Bum Sah to procure, if possible, the power of negotiating with the British government, and it was equally to be desired by the latter. The general views of Bum Sah and his party were far more favourable to the maintenance of peace and good understanding than those of their
then committed a breach of faith, the difficulty, however, very properly arose himself; read to incur rather occasioned some inconvenience, which Lord Moira properly of occupying a branch might, however, have another turn in the presence of Sir William in the instance as the course of the negotiations took with relation to the existing state of affairs. There can be no doubt as to either unnecessary: there seems to have arrived the questions of the intentions, seems to have arrived the questions of the need would tend to the promotion of his interest. The expression, he would be satisfied that such a procedure part of the British government, it on nature con-seize of Dooree, when that was assured of the sup-port and the British government, when referred to the promote the object sought in common by himself done, the right use it in any manner higher to guard to him alone, accompanied by an intimation, made in serious difficulties, the expression, the expression, and probably have involved Sir William, and this part of such a wish would have frustrated its humiliation, hands of Sir William; but as an indirect of publication the conduct of the negotiations should be placed in the general, therefore, we are patiently desirous that the party by which they were opposed. The Governor, since a course of policy different from that of the assurance, again, being dependent upon their part-sources of their recent conduct depended upon their hopes of escaping the probable chara-

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was removed by Bum Sah subsequently declining the occupation of Dootee, from apprehensions for the safety of his family in Nepaul.

 Whilst these matters were in progress, an attempt was made to open a negotiation through Gooroo Gujraj Misser. This person had already been concerned in negotiations with the British government. He had resided some time at Benares, and was believed to be friendly to the British interests; he was also understood to entertain a strong personal attachment to the Rajah of Nepaul, and to be anxious to save him from the evils which might be apprehended from the protraction of the war. Having solicited permission to go to the frontier, he placed himself in communication with the rajah; and the result was an earnest invitation to proceed to Katmandoo. On the point of his departure the overtures of Bum Sah became known to the governor-general; but it not being deemed advisable, on that account, to discourage this mission of Gujraj Misser, he was permitted to proceed without interruption.

 He returned with a paper under the rajah's red seal, empowering him to bring to an adjustment all matters in difference between the two states, and declaring that whatever he engaged for should be confirmed: he brought, also, letters from the rajah to the governor-general and to Colonel Bradshaw. The powers with which Gujraj Misser was invested appeared sufficiently ample, but his language, as well as that of the letters, was vague and indefinite.
He declared that he had no instructions to propose anything, but that the rajah relied on the generosity of the British government. The wisdom of negotiating with a person whose commission appeared thus unsatisfactory may, perhaps, be doubted; but the governor-general determined upon the attempt, and instructions were forwarded to Colonel Bradshaw for his guidance. On receiving them Colonel Bradshaw proceeded to open the subject of compensation for the expenses of the war; and having intimated, in general terms, the extent of the demand on this ground, he was informed by Gujraj Misser that he had no authority to make such sacrifices, and that they were not contemplated by any party at Katmandoo. The attempt to treat was consequently suspended; but Gujraj Misser remained in Colonel Bradshaw's camp.

Negotiations were now renewed with Bum Sah and his brother, Roodber Beer Sah, but with the same success which had attended the proceedings with Gujraj Misser. The result of these endeavours was little calculated to invite a perseverance in them. In every instance the conduct of the enemy was marked by that evasion and duplicity which so eminently distinguish Nepaulese diplomacy. The governor-general, however, was weary of the war, and not without cause: another effort to restore the relations of peace was, therefore, resolved on. Availing himself of the opportunity afforded of communicating with the rajah, by addressing a letter in reply to that transmitted from him to the
governor-general by Gujraj Misser, the Earl of Moira determined to honour it with an answer. This communication differed little in substance from those made to the rajah at an earlier period. Its transmission to Katmandoo was intrusted to Gujraj Misser, who was apprized of its contents, and upon whose mind Colonel Bradshaw was instructed to impress the fearful consequences which must ensue to the Goorkha state if the communication were disregarded. The result was, an enlargement of the Gooroo's powers and a renewal of the negotiation with him; which, after several fruitless conferences, ended, like the former, in an avowal, on the part of the Goorkha agent, that he had no authority to make such sacrifices of territory as the British minister required.

The governor-general's disappointment at the miscarriage of this attempt appears to have been extreme, and to have rendered him inaccessible to every other feeling. He ascribed the failure, in a great degree, to a deficiency of address on the part of the British agent, and an inattention to the spirit and principles of his instructions. There seems, however, little ground for such an imputation. The universal character of Goorkha diplomacy is quite sufficient to account for the miscarriage of the negotiation, and may supersede the necessity of seeking for any other cause; nor is the failure of Colonel Bradshaw more remarkable than that of others, who also failed under similar circumstances.
The governor-general objected to Colonel Bradshaw, that his conduct towards the Goorkha negotiator was deficient in frankness. Frankness rarely is and rarely can be exercised by diplomatists. In the petty negotiations of ordinary life caution and some degree of reserve are found necessary; how much more necessary must they be in treating for objects of great public importance, with such persons as the Goorkha agents. The attempt to fix upon Colonel Bradshaw the blame of having frustrated the success of the negotiation by the want of frankness, appears indeed rather the angry emanation of disappointment than the dictate of a sound and statesman-like judgment. The Earl of Moira had repeatedly dwelt, in his communications to the authorities at home, on the insincere and deceitful character of the proceedings of the Nepaulese. With what justice, then, could he reasonably condemn a political agent for being, in some degree, on his guard against a people thus invariably deceitful, or how could he consider frankness an indispensable ingredient for a successful negotiation with them? Lord Moira's course of policy, moreover, was not always characterized by a profusion of that quality which now stood so high in his esteem; nor can much of frank and straightforward bearing be discovered in his numerous schemes for vanquishing his opponents by corrupting their servants.*

* It is impossible to bring within the compass of a note many proofs of the governor-general's attachment to such a mode of warfare, but it would not be right to leave the charge to rest
His lordship was, in truth, at this time suffering great mortification. On arriving in India, he appears merely on a general reference to the records of his administration. No evidence on such a point can be so unobjectionable as that of the governor-general himself, and he has furnished it, not only very amply but somewhat boastfully and ostentatiously, in his own narrative of the war, framed with great care, and, it must be presumed, with an especial view to his lordship's reputation. In this he details, with much complacency, his designs against the honesty of Ummer Sing Thappa from the moment when he had cause to suspect that it could be successfully assailed. This narrative will be found among the "Papers regarding the administration of the Marquis of Hastings in India, printed in conformity to the resolution of the proprietors of East-India stock, of the 3rd of March, 1824." Ummer Sing Thappa disappointed the hopes formed of him, but disappointment seems only to have strengthened the governor-general's desire for his conversion to the British interests. In par. 206 of the narrative he says: "I still felt disposed to think that, notwithstanding the confident style of Ummer Sing's language, he must consider his situation to be one of some peril, and that he would be disposed, especially if it should be rendered more difficult by the success of Major-General Ochterlony's operations, to make terms for himself." Before proceeding with the quotation, it is but just to observe, that General Ochterlony seems to have been quite as well disposed as his superior to this crooked mode of exercising hostility. His lordship continues: "I therefore adopted a suggestion of Major-General Ochterlony's for eventually placing him (Ummer Sing) in possession of the remote district of Bussahur, lying between the Sutleje and the borders of Gurhwall, under the Snowy Mountains, with some adjacent tracts of land; and I furnished Major-General Ochterlony with instructions accordingly. There seemed reason to suppose that, although Ummer Sing had not availed himself of the openings given him to bring forward any proposition relating to personal objects, he would not scruple to accept an offer made distinctly to him; and adverting to the importance of bringing this service to a conclusion, I might, perhaps, have authorized such an offer, had I not been deterred by the apprehension that it might be attributed by him to a con-
to have pictured to himself a career of extraordinary brilliancy. Its commencement was shadowed by clouds which he had not anticipated. Disappointed, in a great degree, in the result of the Nepaulese campaign, fresh disappointment awaited him in the failure of the negotiations; and this seems to have given rise to ebullitions of ill-temper not warranted by any thing that had occurred. Lord Moira, however, having convinced himself that a want of frankness was the great impediment to peace, determined to remove it by a distinct and explicit communication of the terms to which he was ready to agree. A project of a treaty was prepared, and

sciouness, on our part, of inability to continue the contest, and to the dispiriting effect of our recent disasters both at Jyetuck and on the frontier of Sarun, the latter of which he would have just learned, and with great exaggeration. *I did, however, authorize Major-General Ochterlony to avail himself of any opportunity which his success might afford of making an overture to Ummer Sing without the risk of it being imputed to such motives.* In the volume above referred to the series of intrigues directed against the fidelity of Ummer Sing may be found related at large. Their promoter concludes with a passage which implies a confident belief that he had entitled himself to the approbation of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, to whom the narrative was addressed:—*"I have thought it necessary to submit the foregoing statement to your honourable committee, although the correspondence and transactions which form the subject of it terminated in no practical result, in order to shew that no opportunity was suffered to pass by of enabling the enemy, if so disposed, to put an end to the war by making the necessary concessions, or of effecting the early conclusion of the service in the western division of the Goorkha dominions without bloodshed."—this was a good object, but how was it proposed to be attained? *"by meeting the supposed personal objects and interests of the enemy’s commanders in that quarter."*
transmitted to Colonel Bradshaw, together with the
draft of a note, to be signed by the British agent,
and delivered, with the former document, to Gujraj
Misser. To aid the effect of these proceedings,
Lord Moira, who appears to have thought extremely
well of his own powers of persuasion and concilia-
tion, addressed another letter to the Rajah of Ne-
paul. The tone of the letter was somewhat subdued
from that of former ones, and the conditions of the
proposed treaty somewhat relaxed in favour of the
Nepaulese. Altogether, the confidence of the go-
vernor-general seems to have been greatly shaken;
and the experience of one campaign had disposed
him to make some sacrifices to avoid another.

The proceedings which have just been related
were widely different from those which might have
been expected, and indicate a remarkable change
of purpose in the course of a few weeks. On the
5th of August the governor-general, in a despatch
addressed to the Secret Commitee of the Court of
Directors, declared his intention not to make any
attempt to renew negotiations, and his determination
that any fresh overtures for that purpose should
come from the enemy. On the 23rd of September
we find him instructing his agent to re-open a nego-
tiation, which was suspended, though not absolutely
terminated; for Gujraj Misser had proposed to refer
the question of territorial cession to Katmandoo,
and promised an answer in twenty-one days; but so
impatient had the governor-general become for a
conclusion of hostilities, that he could not prevail
upon himself to wait the result of the reference to Chap. xxiv. Katmandoo, but voluntarily made an offer of concessions, which his previous tone had given the enemy no reason to expect. The answer did not arrive within the stipulated time, and when the new project was communicated to the Goorkha negotiators, they declared, as they had previously declared with regard to former proposals, that to assent to such terms was beyond their power. The frankness of the governor-general succeeded no better than the reserve of Colonel Bradshaw: the Goorkha agents again made their favourite offer of a reference to their court, promising, on this occasion, an answer in fifteen days, and apologizing for the delay in answering the former reference. Before the expiration of the fifteen days an answer to the first reference arrived, couched in the most vague and indefinite language (the unvarying style of Nepaulese state papers), and referring to more detailed advices to follow. The period fixed for an answer to the second reference expired, and none was received. At the solicitation of Gujraj Misser, Colonel Bradshaw consented to wait a few days longer. An answer at length arrived, but it was neither favourable nor explicit: the Goorkha negotiators were not empowered to sign a treaty on the terms proposed. A further delay requested by them was refused by the British agent, and the Goorkha diplomats then departed, expressing a belief that they should return in a few days authorized to execute the treaty.
CHAP. XXIV. The anxiety for peace felt by the governor-general amounted almost to weakness, and permission was conveyed to Colonel Bradshaw to make still further relaxations in his terms, if the Goorkha negotiators should return. But the permission was unnecessary: at the expiration of a month Gujraj Misser reappeared, alleging that he had been detained at Katmandoo by illness. This might be true; but a far more probable cause for his detention may be found in the struggles of contending parties at the Goorkha court. The negotiation was forthwith resumed, and, after some delay, a treaty was signed, corresponding entirely with the project delivered on the part of the British government.

By this treaty it was stipulated, that the Rajah of Nepaul should renounce all claim to the lands which had been the subject of dispute, and should further cede the whole of the low-lands between the rivers Kali and Rapti, those between the Rapti and the Gunduck, with the exception of Bootwul Khass, those between the Gunduck and the Koosi, in which the authority of the British government had been introduced or was in the course of introduction, and those between the Mitchie and the Teistah, together with all the territories within the hills eastward of the Mitchie, including the fort and lands at Naggree, the Pass of Naggarcote, leading from Morung into the hills, and the territory lying between that pass and Naggree. The chieftains whose interests would suffer by these cessions were to be remunerated by pensions to the aggregate
amount of two lacs of rupees; the chiefs to be named and the proportions fixed by the Nepalese government. By other articles the Rajah of Nepal was bound not to interfere with the countries west of the Kali; not to disturb the Rajah of Sikkim in his possessions, but, in the event of any differences arising with that prince, to submit them to the arbitration of the British government, and abide by its award; and not to take into his service any subject of any European or American state without the consent of the British government. To secure and improve the relations of amity, accredited ministers from each state were to reside at the court of the other.

The treaty was ratified as soon as received at Fort William, and this event was distinguished by some very remarkable circumstances. At the very moment of ratification, the British authorities prepared to make the concessions which they had previously contemplated, but which the unlooked-for facility of the Nepalese minister had rendered apparently unnecessary. So extraordinary a circumstance as that of a government deliberating how much of territory shall be surrendered to a hostile state which asks nothing, is, perhaps, without parallel. These concessions were, it was alleged, intended to mark the liberal spirit of the British government. Liberality may be an admirable quality in individuals, but it would be difficult to shew that a nation is ever likely to be benefited by acting upon the principles avowed by the British government of
India at this period. At all events, that government was without any extensive experience to justify such a policy; for, from the creation of the world until the time of the Nepaulese negotiations, it was probably never exercised by any state in even a single instance. A treaty had been signed by the agents of the two powers—the ratification of one had been affixed to the instrument, and that of the other was expected; in the meantime, the power which had been goaded into hostile measures by a long succession of insult and injury—the power which, after a harassing and expensive war, stood upon the vantage ground, having driven the enemy from some of his own provinces and taken military occupation of them—the power which had dictated its own terms of peace and found its terms accepted—the power which finally had affixed its solemn ratification to a treaty constructed upon those terms, suddenly, and seemingly without cause, turned round upon its own measures, and proposed to cancel some of the conditions of the treaty! Why? Because they were not sufficiently favourable to itself?—Not so. Though dishonourable, this would have been intelligible; but the reason for this capricious course was, that the treaty was not sufficiently favourable to the enemy!

If the fact of any concession being meditated under such circumstances be calculated to excite surprise, an explanation of the nature of the concession which the British government resolved upon making must raise that feeling almost to bewilder-
ment. The most romantic imagination could not have conceived that, among the points to be conceded, was the possession of those very portions of territory which had given rise to the war; yet so it was: the British government expressed itself willing to yield a part, or even the whole, of the lands of Bootwul and Sheoraj which before the war had been usurped by the Nepaulese. In reference to this decision, it is impossible to avoid asking, why was the war undertaken?

It was said, in extenuation of the sacrifice, that those territories were unhealthy, and of small value in point of revenue. But they were as unhealthy and as valueless before as after the war; and if it were desirable to relinquish the claim of the British government to the possession of them, that object might certainly have been effected in a less costly manner. The vast expenditure of blood and treasure which had been incurred, the peril in which the honour of the British nation and the safety of its Eastern dominions had been placed by a war commenced without adequate preparation—all might have been spared. Some accession of territory had indeed been gained, but this was not the purpose for which the war was avowedly undertaken. We drew the sword ostensibly for our own protection, not to commit aggressions upon our neighbours: we were justified, indeed, in availing ourselves of the advantages we had gained, and the portions of territory annexed to our former possessions contributed to the security of our frontier; but the
CHAP. XXIV. attainment of incidental advantages could not afford a valid reason for relinquishing the main object of the war.

At the close of his own narrative the Earl of Moira distinctly lays down that which it was one main object of the paper to shew, that the war with the Goorkhas was unavoidable. The soundness of that opinion may be readily admitted, but the conduct of the Earl of Moira, at the close of the negotiations, was altogether inconsistent with a sincere belief in it. If the possession of the disputed lands, so far from being valuable, was actually inconvenient, the war was not unavoidable. Our claims might have been withdrawn, or they might have been suffered to slumber, as they had been for so many years; or, if it had been deemed dangerous to acquiesce in usurpation, some decent means might have been devised for transferring the lands in question, without making war to wrest them from the usurping power for the sole purpose of giving them back again. If the intention of restoring them had not been recorded in the official despatches of the government, it could not have been believed that it had been entertained. States are often obliged to surrender that which they would fain possess; but here, a voluntary tender of the thing in dispute was proposed to be made by the victorious party to the defeated one. If the disputed lands were so worthless as, at the end of the campaign, they were represented to be, but one opinion can exist as to the expediency of commencing it—that the gover-
nor-general, being anxious to display his military talents, stood in need of a pretext for war, and that the disputed districts afforded that which he wanted.

The extraordinary spectacle of a state, after engaging in an expensive war for the defence of certain possessions, voluntarily relinquishing those possessions to the enemy, was, however, lost to the world by a fresh instance of obstinacy and bad faith of the court of Katmandoo, in refusing to ratify the treaty which its agent had been empowered to conclude. The usual exhibition of delay and chicanery took place; restitutions were required which could not be granted, and, finally, negotiations gave place to a renewal of hostilities.

The new campaign commenced by the advance of a portion of the force under Sir David Ochterlony, whose services had been rewarded with the grand cross of the order of the Bath. Colonel Bradshaw, who appears to have been little in favour with his superiors, was divested of his diplomatic functions, which were transferred to Sir David Ochterlony, and that officer thus united with his military command the entire political authority. In the exercise of the latter function he held some communication with Gujraj Misser, but it led to no satisfactory result.

On the 9th of February, 1816, Sir David Ochterlony advanced through the great Sal forest towards the passes leading into the valley of Muckwanpore. The road was a mere pathway through an excess-
sively thick jungle; but, though the enemy possessed ample means of annoying the British force and disputing its progress, it was permitted to advance unmolested. On the 14th the general was informed that there was a pass over the Cheereah Gautie range of mountains, unguarded and practicable; and on the 17th, after a harassing march and very severe labour, the passage was effected.

Sir David Ochterlony continued to advance, and encamped near Muckwanpore. The enemy occupied two positions on a ridge near that place, one of which they abandoned on the approach of the British force, who immediately took possession of it. They shortly, however, returned in great numbers, and a severe conflict ensued. The positions of the British force were repeatedly assaulted; but they were gallantly defended, and the enemy finally retired in confusion, abandoning a gun and a large quantity of ammunition.

A few days afterwards Colonel Kelly dispossessed the enemy of a position on the Hurryharpore hills. Two days after the latter event negotiation was renewed, in consequence of a letter addressed to Sir David Ochterlony by a Goorkha vakeel named Burtawar Sing, stating that he was in possession of the ratification of the treaty formerly concluded, and intended to depute a person, whom he named, to convey it to the British government. This individual accordingly repaired to the British camp with the treaty duly ratified, and after some discussion, Sir David Ochterlony agreed to accept it, on the execution, by
the vakeel, of a declaration that the Rajah of Nepaul relin
quished all expectation of that relaxation of the con
ditions of the treaty which Colonel Brad-
shaw had been instructed to hold out to him. This stipula-
tion was readily agreed to; the required decl-
ARATION was given by the vakeel, and afterwards explicitly confirmed by the raja.

After so prosperous a commencement of the second campaign, better terms might, perhaps, have been insisted on; but the sickly season was approaching—the British commissariat was in an impaired state, and the difficulty of getting supplies would have been considerable. These considerations suggested the inexpediency of perseverance in hostilities, and if the treaty, as originally ratified by the British authorities, satisfied the claims of justice and secured the safety of the British dominions, it would have been neither right nor reputable to demand more. It may be concluded, therefore, that Sir David Ochterlony made a right choice in determining in favour of peace upon the original basis.

In looking back to the origin and operations of the war with Nepaul, it is impossible to avoid being struck by the very remarkable features which it discloses. The aggressive spirit of the Nepalese, the jealousy entertained by the Goorkhas of British ascendancy, and their aversion to the establishment of any relations of amity with the British government, though manifested through a long series of years, failed of exciting that vigilance which the
exhibition of such feelings by a powerful neighbour ought to have called forth. It has been said, that the attention of the rulers of India was so entirely occupied by other and more pressing matters that no portion of it could be spared to our relations with the Nepalese. This is a very insufficient apology: if the rulers of a state have not time to secure their frontier, there must be some great defect either in the constitution or the administration of the government. It is creditable to the Earl of Moira that he not only found time to assert the rights of the state which he represented, but that he had the spirit to maintain them in the only way likely to be effectual with such a neighbour as the Goorkha. It has been shewn that the frontier was, for a long period, the theatre of a course of encroachment on the one hand, and of almost passive submission on the other. Had this been suffered to continue, it is impossible to say how large a portion of the British territory might have become absorbed in the Goorkha dominions. The war then was necessary, unless we are to abandon our Indian possessions to any encroaching neighbour who may choose to intrude upon them; and Lord Moira consulted his country’s honour and his own in determining on an appeal to arms. His conduct was variously judged at the time; and it may be true that it was greatly influenced by personal ambition; but, whatever the motive, he took the right course. An acquiescence in the supine policy of some of his predecessors could have tended only to fritter away our
empire in India, until we had been reduced to the condition in which we first appeared in that country—that of humble traders, enjoying, by the permission of the native princes, a few obscure factories, if, indeed, we should have been so fortunate as to retain even this privilege.

In speaking of the manner in which Lord Moira conducted the war, the praise must be far more qualified than that which is awarded to his policy in commencing it. The plan of the campaign, though it might present a very imposing appearance in the office of the adjutant-general, was evidently formed in almost entire ignorance of the nature of the country and the character of the enemy. The force was, in every instance, inadequate to the duties assigned to it; and the arrangements altogether were such as might have been supposed to emanate from the rashness of impetuous youth rather than from the well-matured experience of a veteran soldier. His lordship's sanguine temperament led him into expectations which could not be sanctioned by a cool view of the difficulties with which he had to contend; and on one occasion he hazarded an opinion in which, perhaps, no other military man could be found to agree: he affirmed, that a mountainous country is more readily attacked than defended. If this were his serious opinion, it is impossible to acquit him of want of judgment.

The fatal mistakes which characterized the commencement of the war, and the very imperfect preparation which had been made for carrying it on
successfully, were fertile in embarrassment and mortification; and it must be admitted, even by his warmest friends, that Lord Moira bore his disappointments with little either of equanimity or of dignity. The blame of failure, a large portion of which was due to his own arrangements, was cast altogether upon the officers who commanded the unfortunate divisions of the army; and the expression of his feelings was marked by much both of pettiness and ill-temper. The commanders who incurred his censure had certainly not, in all cases, displayed as much activity and decision as was desirable; but they were embarrassed by the vast disproportion between their means and the expectations of the governor-general, and consequently, as frequently occurs where men know not how to do anything effectually, they attempted little or nothing. General Gillespie had taken a more daring course, and he perished with no inconsiderable portion of his troops; thus furnishing a warning, rather than an example for imitation. In Sir David Ochterlony, indeed, the governor-general found a man whose talents and judgment enabled him to effect his objects with means apparently disproportioned to their attainment; but to expect all men thus to act and thus to succeed, is to look for that which neither the ordinary measure of human ability nor the ordinary fortune of military operations will realize. The brilliant success of Sir David Ochterlony saved the credit of Lord Moira's plans, and relieved him from the censure which he would undoubtedly have in-
curred had the campaign ended in total failure; but that success was altogether extraordinary, and even Sir David Ochterlony did not venture to anticipate it.

In the conduct of the negotiations the same deficiency of sound judgment seems to have been displayed. The eager confidence in which Lord Moira commenced the war was succeeded by a nervous anxiety for the conclusion of peace. His previous lofty bearing gave way to a demeanour scarcely consistent with the character of the representative of Great Britain in India; and if the Goorkha prince could have prevailed upon himself to make so precious a sacrifice as that of his duplicity to his interest, he might, to all appearance, have obtained more favourable terms. Lord Moira was not a man to contend with difficulties; and when they arose, he neither met them firmly nor yielded to them gracefully. The failure of some of his diplomatic agents in bringing the Goorkha negotiators to terms as easily as he wished produced explosions of irritated feeling, similar to those which had been called forth by the ill success of some of his military commanders. His numerous attempts to corrupt the servants of his opponent indicate a miserable laxity of moral principle; and another failing is too prominent to be passed over. Without wishing to deal severely with a character gifted with many estimable qualities, it cannot fail to be observed, that Lord Moira wotd reputation somewhat more fervently than was consistent with its lasting adherence to
him. He was not a man who reposed in proud tranquillity upon his own consciousness of desert, and suffered fame to follow him or not, according to the pleasure of the multitude. He was anxious to leave behind him in India a high military reputation: he was as anxious to shew that, with the sterner qualities of the warrior, he united the more graceful attribute of clemency. Vanity was the original source of all the errors of Lord Moira in connection with the Nepaul war: it caused him to rush into it without due preparation; and it most characteristically re-appeared, at the close of the campaign, in his notable project of giving the disputed lands back to the Nepaulese: by which act, though it set at nought all the principles of common sense, and converted the war into an idle but dismal farce, he hoped to secure the reputation of being magnanimous and liberal. Another motive might indeed co-operate with his undue anxiety for admiration. The early successes of the Nepaulese had aroused, in various quarters, the hopes of those enemies of the British government whose hostile feelings, though they had slumbered, had never been destroyed. These feelings required only a convenient opportunity to awaken them into active development. Lord Moira perceived that a storm was gathering around him; he was naturally anxious to escape from one combination of difficulties before he encountered another, and, if possible, to come forth with some sort and some measure of reputation: but waving all reference to his earlier errors,
a soldier and a statesman of so much experience should have known, that the manifestation of over eagerness for peace was calculated but to defeat the object which he had in view, and that unreasonable concession to such an enemy as the Nepaulese would be ascribed to any motive rather than to generosity.

Of this feeling, for the possession of which he was so anxious to have credit, his conduct towards his officers frequently exhibited an obvious deficiency. Amiable and good-natured as Lord Moira undoubtedly was in private life, his public career was marked by much of a contrary character. His overweening confidence in his own plans, and oversanguine anticipations of their success, led him not only to endanger the safety of that which he had at heart, but also frequently to act unjustly towards those intrusted with military and diplomatic duties. It is always painful to advert to the errors of an eminent man; but, in the present instance, it would be unfair to pass them over in silence: for much of the blame which he cast on others was due to himself.*

* A noble contrast is afforded to this conduct in that of the Marquis Wellesley on the retreat of General Monson, an occurrence which might have excused very strong expressions of disappointment and dissatisfaction. General Monson's bravery was unquestionable, and he was, to a certain extent, the victim of the errors of others as well as of his own. But the course of his retreat was marked by singular deficiency of judgment, and for the difficulties by which he was surrounded the governor-general was in no degree answerable. Yet, writing to Lord Lake while the fatal retreat was in progress, and when the safety of any portion of General Monson's force was a matter of doubt, the Marquis Wel-
The errors of Lord Moira must not, however, render us insensible to the propriety of the great principle of his policy with regard to Nepaul. The war was undertaken without sufficient preparation, but it was not only justifiable, but positively necessary. Its progress was clouded by reverses, but its termination happily did not dishonour the British name, while it conferred security on the British frontier.

During the discussions which preceded the Nepaul war, and the progress of the war itself, events took place in other parts of the East connected with Great Britain, which, though not of sufficient importance to justify the interruption of the narrative, must not be passed over without notice. In Java, the British authorities inherited from their Dutch and French predecessors a series of quarrels with the surrounding princes, which afforded them abundant employment, in addition to that furnished by the necessity of taking active and efficient steps for the suppression of the standing opprobrium of East-

lesley, under the bitter feelings with which he could not but be oppressed, thus delivered himself:—"Grievous and disastrous as the events are, the extent of the calamity does not exceed my expectation. From the first moment of General Monson's retreat I have always anguird the ruin of that detachment. I fear my poor friend Monson is gone. Whatever may be his fate, or whatever the result of his misfortune to my own fame, I will endeavour to shield his character from obloquy, nor will I attempt the mean purpose of sacrificing his reputation to save mine. His former services and his zeal entitle him to indulgence; and however I may lament or suffer from his errors, I will not reproach his memory if he be lost, or his character if he survive."
ern commerce—piracy. A detail of the occurrences chap.xxiv.
which sprung from these causes would exhibit most
interesting evidence of patient and persevering de-
termination on the part of those on whom the main-
tenance of the authority and interests of the British
government devolved; and in a history devoted ex-
clusively to Java and the adjacent islands such de-
tail would properly find place: in a work of a more
general character, only the more prominent events
can be noticed.

The Rajah of Bielling, in the island of Balli,
and the Rajah of Boni, in that of Celebes, having
manifested hostile dispositions towards the British
government, an expedition for their correction was
dispatched from Java, under the command of Major-
General Nightingall, who had succeeded General
Gillespie. At Balli the troops occupied, without
difficulty, the capital of the offending rajah, and
this step was followed by his immediate submis-
sion, as well as that of several of his neighbours.
At Boni severer labours awaited the British force.
On arriving before the place, early in June, 1814,
General Nightingall addressed a letter to the rajah,
reciting the wrongs of the British government and
demanding reparation. An answer was required
within a specified time, and none being returned,
the column which had been previously formed for
attack was put in motion. The town and palace
were assailed, and within an hour carried in the
most gallant style, though not without loss. The
rajah with difficulty effected his escape, attended by
His palace was destroyed, being deliberately set on fire after the capture of the place—an act of violence which, not being dictated by necessity nor calculated to advance the legitimate objects of the expedition, it seems not easy to defend. Ultimately the rajah was deposed. Though the attack on Boni was the most striking and important event that occurred in Celebes during the time that the English were in possession of Java, and has, for that reason, been selected for especial notice, it must not be inferred that, with this exception, the island remained in a state of peace: it was far otherwise. To Captain Phillips, of the Madras Native Infantry, and Major D. H. Dalton, of the Bengal Light Infantry Volunteers, to whom the charge of the British interest in the island was successively allotted, and to the few troops placed under their command, the period was one of almost unremitting anxiety, labour, and privation. All these, together with the blood and treasure expended in the capture of the Dutch settlements, were ultimately thrown away. By the arrangements consequent on the general pacification of Europe these settlements were restored—an additional illustration of that levity and disregard to consequences which seem to be inherent in British diplomacy. The maintenance of Java and its dependencies was necessary to the safety and integrity of our Eastern empire, and they ought never to have been surrendered.

In another settlement acquired from the Dutch,
the English, in 1815, became involved in hostilities. For about ten years the king's government in Ceylon had permitted the crimes of the usurping ruler of Candy to remain unrequited and even unnoticed. Some new outrages, perpetrated by his servants on British subjects, at length roused the long-slumbering feeling of national honour; and happily the discontent of the principal subjects of the Candian prince at this period had attained a height, which seemed to warrant reliance upon their acquiescence in the necessary measures for divesting the tyrant of the power which he ought never to have possessed. The feeling was not misplaced. A British force entered the Candian dominions, and proceeded, almost without resistance, to occupy them. The king was made prisoner and deposed, and in the palace of Candy, on the 2nd of March, 1815, Sir Charles Brownrigg, the British governor and commander-in-chief, met in solemn conference the adigurs, dessauves, and powerful men of the country, for the purpose of laying before them the plan upon which it was proposed to settle the government. By this it was declared that the dominion of the Candian provinces was vested in the sovereign of the British empire, to be exercised through the governor or lieutenant-governor of Ceylon for the time being. The race of the deposed king were for ever excluded from the throne, and their claim and title pronounced to be abolished and extinguished. All males belonging to the family, or pretending to belong to it, were declared enemies of
the new government, and were prohibited, under the penalties of martial law, from entering the Candian provinces without written permission. Thus the British authority became established throughout the whole of the island of Ceylon.

A.D. 1815. Late in the same year a considerable force, under the command of Colonel East, was dispatched from Bombay into Cutch. This movement was occasioned by the depredations committed by the Foujdar of Wagur, a district subject to the Rao of Cutch, on the subjects of some of the allies of the Company's government. An atrocious attempt to destroy the British force by poisoning the wells was happily detected and defeated. Colonel East had intended to advance directly upon Bhooj, but this discovery induced him to change his course and attack the fort of Anjar, which he captured. This success led to the conclusion of a treaty, by which the fort of Anjar, together with certain villages, was surrendered to the British government, and the Rao agreed to a series of necessary measures for the suppression of the depredations which had called the British troops into his dominions.

There were other occurrences contemporary with the Nepaul war which deserve, and must receive, ample notice; but they were so intimately connected with an important series of events, hereafter to be related, that their proper place will be in a subsequent chapter: the present may close with a narrative of a serious insurrection at Bareilly, in the north-western provinces, which, from reasons which
will appear in the course of the relation, deserves more attention than is ordinarily due to events of a similar character.

The part of India in which Bareilly is situated had been once occupied exclusively by a Hindoo population. Early in the eighteenth century, the country was reduced to subjection by an immigration of Affghan adventurers. Some years afterwards, during the administration of Warren Hastings, it was conquered for the vizier by a British force.* At a still later period, its cession to the British government took place, under the arrangement concluded with the vizier by the Marquis Wellesley.†

Though divested of political power, the descendants of the Affghans continued numerous, and the proportion of Mahometans to Hindoos was greater then than that found existing in most parts of India. They had not forgotten their recently lost power and distinction; they were high-spirited, sanguinary, and revengeful—strongly attached to a military life, but impatient of the restraints of European discipline. Great numbers of them had served under Holkar, and, at the period under consideration, many found a refuge in the service of their countryman Ameer Khan. A numerous body, however, remained unemployed and in distress; they consequently were ready to embrace any chance that appeared to promise subsistence and distinction, and

* See vol. ii. page 46.

† See chapter xvii. in vol. iii. passim.
CHAP. XXIV, even to accelerate the tardy career of fortune by fomenting discontent and disturbance.

Some curious particulars of the state of society existing in Rohilcund are related in two papers submitted to the Court of Nizamut Adawlut by Mr. Strachey, a distinguished civil servant of the Company. These papers were drawn up eleven years before the occurrence of the transactions about to be related, but the changes wrought in the intermediate period were not sufficient to render Mr. Strachey's statements inapplicable. It appears that robberies were much less frequent throughout the ceded provinces than in the lower provinces, and the reason assigned by Mr. Strachey for this fact is, not the supremacy of the law, but the reliance of the natives upon their own prowess, and their habit of standing by each other in the event of being attacked. "The grand object of law and police," says the writer—"security of person and property—is better accomplished here by the spirit of the people than in Bengal by the Regulations." The number of crimes reported, it appears, was small, and the number of offenders taken and brought to justice, when compared with the number of cases reported, was larger than might have been expected.

One remarkable and characteristic feature in the criminal statistics of Rohilcund was, that, while offences against property were few, cases of homicide, in all its gradations of guilt, were comparatively of frequent occurrence. They were mostly
the acts of individuals proceeding upon their own impulses without concert or confederacy with others. They rarely originated in a desire for plunder; they generally had their rise in revenge, jealousy, wounded pride, or the sudden impulse of anger; but there was an exception of an extraordinary character, and which was not less detestable than anomalous. The murder of children, for the sake of the ornaments which they wore, was one of the most common crimes, and this horrible fact tends very much to lower our estimation of a people who, with many of the vices of half-civilized nations, were supposed to possess many of the sterner and ruder virtues. That the really brave should, under any circumstances, imbue their hands in the blood of childhood, seems almost impossible: the fact that this cowardly crime was perpetrated in furtherance of petty robbery, is calculated to increase the disgust with which it must be regarded by all who retain the slightest tinge of humanity; and the alleged security of property in Rohilcund loses half its value in the well-constituted mind, when it thus appears to have arisen from no better motive than fear. Property was safe in the hands of those who had the strength to protect it; but weakness afforded lawful prey: the property which had no better guardian than infant innocence was seized without scruple, and the blood of its bearer shed without remorse. It is the disclosure of facts like these which reduces uncivilized and semi-civilized life to their true dimensions; and it is the concealment of
them which has led, in a few instances, to the absurd belief of the superior excellence of the savage and the gradual deterioration of man by civilization. If any virtue is of such hardy nature as to flourish best when deprived of the fostering hand of cultivation—a point more than doubtful—it is certain that, in a state of lawlessness, all the vices shoot out and fructify in wild and rank luxuriance. Man, untaught and unrestrained, may, for a time and under favourable circumstances, manifest certain attractive qualities, and exhibit the appearance of a noble and generous nature; but the appearance is fallacious: when his passions are roused and his fears at rest, his real character will become apparent, to the confusion of those theories which place the excellence of human nature in the nearest possible approach to the state of the brutes which prowl the jungle.*

The crimes by which Rohileund was distinguished found a ready excuse in the prevalence among the Mahometans of the doctrine of fatalism; and the same convenient belief afforded consolation under the consequent punishment. Mr. Strachey represents the following confession as a fair sample of those which were usually made: "I was provoked—I was impelled by fate to kill the deceased—all must die at the hour appointed—no one can struggle

* These theories, perhaps, find but little favour in the present day, but about the middle of the last century they were propagated with some industry and some success by certain soi-disant philosophers on the continent.
against destiny—it was written, his time was come.” CHAP.XXIV.

Thus the assassin convinced himself that he was but a cog in the wheel of fate, performing his appointed part in the revolution of human events; and in the sentiments he avowed, he spoke those of his countrymen generally. Exertions, they said, were ineffectual to contend with a power in whose hands man is but a mere instrument—it was the part of mortals to resign themselves, and abstain from useless attempts to alter the established course of things. It is plain that, where the doctrines of fatalism are received, a door is opened for the wildest indulgence of the passions. The restraints of prudence, as well as those of principle, are removed, the fatalist arguing, "If it is decreed that I am to suffer, suffer I must; on the other hand, if fate has awarded me impunity, nothing can assail me or endanger my safety." It is a common and a dangerous error to suppose that men's religious opinions exercise little influence over their actions. If, unfortunately, they are too often unavailing for good, it is beyond doubt that they are found powerfully efficient for evil.

Among such a people, neither the British government nor any regular government could be popular. A few years only had elapsed since the country had been separated from the dominion of Oude, one of the worst governed states in the world. Its zamindars had been accustomed to exercise a degree of power which, under the British government, it was found necessary to control by subjecting all
classes to the operation of fixed law.* This was regarded as an insufferable grievance by the zamindars, and though the condition of the ryots was decidedly improved, the feeling of habitual dependance upon their chief was so strong, that it was difficult either to shake it, or to excite a counteracting feeling among the people in favour of their own rights. This state of things is depicted by Mr. Strachey with some force. He says, “Deprive the ryots of a necessary of life, and they sit silent; nobody cares for them, and they cannot help themselves. But take from their chief the management of the police, which he exercised only to oppress them; restrain him from disturbing the peace of the country, and he will prevail upon them to take up arms in his cause, and contend in a hopeless desperate enterprise against all the powers of government, civil and military. Such are our subjects: they resist authority without pretence of right or hope of success.”

The upper classes disliked the regular administration of law, and when the cause of their dislike is traced, it will increase the surprise felt at their having been able to induce the inferior classes to support them. According to Mr. Strachey, when

* Among the charges brought against the Marquis Wellesley by the miserable James Paull, was one relative to the alleged discontent prevailing in the districts ceded by the Vizier. The evidence adduced, however, shewed distinctly that the discontent was confined to the chiefs, and that the only cause of it was the diminution of their power of doing evil.
a native of rank was asked what part of the established system was obnoxious to him, he would answer, "That which reduces me to a level with my domestics and labourers." By the same authority it is stated, that "a man of high caste and wealth, conceiving that he possesses superior rights and privileges, thinks himself disgraced by being called into court on any occasion." Such a man was averse to being examined publicly as a witness. "Is my testimony," said he, "rated no higher than that of my servants and coolies, and am I to stand on an equality with them, and reply as a criminal to their petty complaints for an assault or abusive language?" The dissatisfaction, therefore, originated in that which has generally been esteemed the perfection and glory of law—its impartiality and non-respect for persons.

Some auxiliary grounds of complaint were resorted to, as is usual in such cases, and the never-failing ones of the expense and delay of judicial proceedings were not forgotten. Upon this part of the subject the observations of Mr. Strachey appear very just. "Supposing it," he says, "to be true that these evils exist to a great degree, such evils should not be charged to the introduction of our system as its most characteristic marks. Let not the present be compared to a state of things never known here, when justice was cheap and expeditious, but with that which certainly did heretofore exist, viz. one in which there was no justice at all to be got; where the important sacred duty of redressing
injuries and punishing crimes depended upon the tyranny and caprices of a revenue officer, who either entirely disregarded the duty, or by corruption and abuse made it a source of profit." After thus pointing out the real objects to be compared, Mr. Strachey might well say: "It is, indeed, extraordinary that it should, with any one, ever become doubtful whether the country actually derives benefit from such a change as has taken place." From this opinion few persons of sound judgment will differ, nor from the mode in which Mr. Strachey accounts for the hostility of some of the zemindars. "They seem," he says, "to forget or to value not the advantages they derive from our system of justice and general security. They remember only the power which most of them made a bad use of."

The views of Mr. Strachey are, to a certain extent, confirmed by the report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into the disturbances at Bareilly in 1816. They represent our courts of justice to be viewed as a grievance by the upper classes and not as a blessing by the lower. With regard to the majority of the latter, the commissioners add, that the expense of our courts rendered them scarcely accessible, and their delay, nearly useless. This charge had been answered by anticipation by Mr. Strachey. In comparing the previous state of Rohilcund with that which then existed, the comparison was not between a good system of law and a bad one, or between two systems of law both good or both bad—it was between law and no law. The
habits of the people of Rohilcund might lead them to prefer the latter branch of the alternative; but it does not follow that their preference was just, nor that it was a choice worthy of encouragement or even of indulgence: and when it is stated, that the personal punishments to which men were liable in the criminal courts rendered them more an object of terror than of gratitude for the protection of life and property, it cannot fail to be asked, to whom were the criminal courts objects of terror? If to evil-doers, this was precisely what was intended, and the system worked well: if to the people at large, may not a further question be put? May it not be asked whether the opinions of a large proportion of the population on the subject of government were not rather loose, and their estimate of the value of human life but low? By such persons all restraint is felt as a grievance. An institution for the promotion of chastity would be unpopular in a community of debauchees: an institution for the preservation of life and property must also be unpopular with a people who regard both as the lawful prize of the stronger. The freebooter and the pirate thank you not for the best system of law that can be devised: exactly in proportion to the degree in which it approaches perfection will be their hatred of it. True, that they are protected in their lawful rights as well as others; but they will readily forego this boon for the pleasure of preying upon their neighbours. To such men, a court of justice is a trap, and a judge a common enemy.
chap.xxiv. Even with regard to better disposed persons, the ex-
pectation entertained by the commissioners, of find-
ing gratitude the return of good government, was
somewhat utopian. Gratitude towards individuals is
not so common as the lover of our species could
wish; gratitude to the state is still less frequent;
the share which falls even to the wisest and most
beneficent governors is small indeed.

Some minor sources of complaint adverted to by
the commissioners might rest on a more solid basis
of grievance. The indiscriminate and officious zeal
of the officers of the courts, the agency of common
informers, the practice of summary arrests and of
domiciliary visits, were alleged to have produced an
injurious effect upon the public mind, extending far
beyond the sphere of their occurrence. In all these
reprehensible transactions, however, it may be ob-
served that the instruments were natives, and the
practices complained of were clearly also of native
origin. The law retainers of the courts, the inform-
ers and barrators, were the countrymen of those
whom they injured or annoyed; and summary arrests
and domiciliary visitations are certainly not processes
of English growth. The European functionaries may
have consented to adopt them, but there can be little
doubt that the modes of proceeding, as well as the
accusations, were suggested by those who hoped to
profit by them. This will not, indeed, excuse the
English authorities who incautiously lent themselves
to such acts and such agents, but it removes from
them the infamy of having planned the one or cre-
ated the other. The tools of despotism were ready to their hands, and they can only be charged with a deficiency of moral determination in not having indignantly cast them away. Under the native rule, tyranny, extortion, and outrage were universal. A better system was introduced by the British, but those who administered it had recourse to such agency as native materials afforded. If this were not of the best description—and it would perhaps be no exaggeration to affirm that it was of the very worst—the misfortune was great, but the British government is not to be condemned for it. In countries which stand the highest in civilization and morals, and under the purest administration of law, the lower emissaries of the courts are among the dregs and refuse of society: in India this class of persons has always been pre-eminent in all that is base and vile, and it would be strange indeed if Rohileund had formed an exception.

Upon the whole, the truth will be found to be, that there was some small share of grievance and a very large amount of discontent—that discontent arising from the lawless propensities of the people generally, from the mortified ambition of the upper classes, and the miserable poverty of the lower. Previously to its cession to the British, the country had, by misgovernment, been reduced to a state almost of desolation; and though it had subsequently improved, yet it must be remembered, that fourteen years is but a short period for raising a country from ruin. The misery of the people
and the turbulence of their leaders were elements fearfully adapted to coalesce in the production of an explosion. The privations and sufferings of the lower classes were borne by them with sullen indifference, if not with patience, and little danger to the state might have arisen from this source; but the people of Rohilcund were actuated by a fanatical attachment to their chiefs, which induced them to follow wherever their superior would lead them. This feeling was altogether independent of the popularity of the chieftain, or of any claim which he might have upon the affections of his followers: it had nothing to do with the justice of his cause, and was even uninfluenced by his good or ill fortune. Men are always found in abundance to gather round the standard of a tyrant so long as his career is one of victory; but the adherence of the people of Rohilcund to their oppressors seems to have had no reference to their success. The followers of a proscribed robber remained attached to him when misfortune had deprived him of all power of rewarding their services, and when hope itself was lost. Their fidelity was the effect of mere habit; but it afforded the chiefs a powerful instrument for thwarting and annoying the government, whenever their caprice or calculation led them to employ it. The country was prepared for change of any sort, and by applying a very small portion of the principle of fermentation, the entire mass might be put in motion.

In the district of Bareilly this was found in
the attempt to introduce some police regulations, chap. xxiv. which had been carried into effect without difficulty through the greater part of the territories subject to the presidency of Bengal. These arrangements, however, involved certain fiscal changes, which were eagerly seized at Bareilly as a ground for dissatisfaction and resistance. A new tax is not a very popular thing anywhere: in India the amount of reluctance which most men feel at parting with their money is increased by the rooted aversion to change. In the East the land has been regarded as the legitimate object of taxation, almost as exclusively and scrupulously as by that class of writers known as the French economists.* However oppressive the burdens imposed upon the soil may be, they but rarely give rise to resistance; but any thing resembling a personal tax has always been regarded by the people of India with great dislike, and the attempt to levy an impost of such a nature has generally been unsuccessful, often dangerous. There was, in the present instance, some encouragement to resistance afforded by the success which had attended earlier experiments in the art of agitation: a police tax and a house tax, previously imposed, had both been surrendered to popular disapprobation, and the people were, it appears, sufficiently versed in philosophy to expect the recurrence of similar effects from the operation of similar causes.

A sort of police establishment had previously existed, the expense of which was defrayed by

* Turgot and his followers.
voluntary contributions. The persons retained on this service received generally the allowance of one rupee per month, and in no case more than two. The number of these well-paid supporters of the social system was determined by the amount of contributions which could be obtained from any particular street or portion of a street; and in making the new arrangements, the government consulted the Indian love of unchanging continuity, by making the assessment with reference to the number of chokeedars formerly retained by voluntary contributions. As, however, the new chokeedars were to have a salary of three rupees per month, the amount of contribution was increased, as well as its character changed from a voluntary to a compulsory payment.

The wish of government, of course, was to carry its object quietly and securely, and the magistrate appears to have been desirous, in this respect, of forwarding the views of his superiors; but no one acquainted with Indian affairs can be ignorant how frequently the good intentions of the European authorities have been frustrated by the perverseness or treachery of native servants; and a fresh example was here afforded.

A native officer, called the kotwal, to whom fell the duty of collecting the assessment, discharged his duty in a manner the most overbearing and offensive. The official insolence of a functionary of humble rank, and of very low origin, could not fail to provoke the higher classes of a people like those
of Rohilcund. It was said, moreover, that the kot-wal had demanded in some instances rates far exceeding those which his authority warranted him to receive. It was currently reported, also, that he connived at the first indications of tumult, and even assisted in the councils which led to them; that, like many patriots everywhere, and all disturbers in the East, he had a nice perception of the propriety of an alliance between the public good and his own private interest; that he caused a communication to be made to the shopkeepers, that if they would raise a sum of money for his benefit, the tax should be relinquished; that, in consequence, a douceur of four thousand rupees was tendered, and that the consideration for this fee afforded by the kotwal was, his advice to the subscribers to pursue a plan which had been tried in other places, that of deserting their houses and encamping round the magistrate's residence.

It seems, for various reasons, extraordinary that this person should have been selected for the discharge of duties requiring, under the circumstances, no small portion of address, and the efficient performance of which would have been materially aided by the employment of a popular agent. Previously to the occurrence of the disturbances the kotwal was highly unpopular, and there is reason to believe most deservedly so. He was accused of various acts of extortion and oppression: the truth of these charges was not, indeed, inquired into, but
the evil reputation of the man would have well justified the selection of an agent more acceptable to the community. To the upper classes he was peculiarly offensive. It is admitted that he was a vulgar and ignorant villager, of overbearing temper and coarse manners. His claims to the confidence of government appear to have been small: he might have rendered some service in the lower and muddier details of fiscal operation, but he was himself in the position of a violator of the law, and a defaulter with regard to the just claims of the state. It was stated, that the records of the Board of Revenue shewed many instances of his official authority having been exerted to the detriment of government, both directly, in the assessment of the estates belonging to his own family, and indirectly, by encroachments on the estates of his neighbours. The latter system of operations was facilitated by the summary powers vested in his office, every department of which he had taken care to fill with his own relations and connections. The consequence was, that no aggrieved person would venture to prosecute him, and no vakeel would take part against him. His own estates he had managed to exonerate altogether from the payment of rent or assessment. Confiscation he despised, for no one dared to make an offer for the property which was protected by his name: he was thus enabled for four years to set the collectors at defiance, and to hold his property free
from the demands of the state. Such was the man who was the prime agent in producing the mischief at Bareilly.

What effect might have been produced by the presence of a larger number of the Company's European servants, it is impossible to conjecture; but it happened, at the period of the insurrection, that few were in the town. The senior and third judges of the court of appeal were absent on circuit; the fourth judge had proceeded to Benares, and the collector of the revenue was engaged in the interior of the district; the entire weight of responsibility, therefore, rested on the magistrate.

Among those who played the most conspicuous parts in the drama acted at Bareilly was Mooftee Mahomed Ewery, a person of great influence among the Mahometans. His first public appearance on the scene was on the 27th of March, when he became the channel of transmitting to the magistrate a petition, alleged to emanate from the inhabitants at large. The petition was confined to generalities. The exactions and extortions which were believed to have been committed in carrying the new measure into operation were not even noticed. The tax was simply denounced as a public grievance, and the same tone was preserved in numerous placards published in the town. The resistance to the tax was one of those movements not altogether unknown in more western countries, but little expected in the East. A common spirit pervaded the whole people. As in similar movements in countries boasting a
higher degree of knowledge and civilization, the larger portion of those engaged knew not why they resisted; it was sufficient for them that their neighbours set the example. Every man was ready to submit, if submission became general; but every man was determined to resist so long as resistance was the fashion. They were embarked in a common struggle, for a common object; and though the sense of individual grievance might refresh the energy of some, it was the force of habit and association which gave to their opposition coherence and steadiness.

The period of the presentation of the petition was marked by a tumultuous assemblage of the people, in consequence of which some of the parties engaged in it were apprehended; but it was not until the 16th of April that the insurrection assumed the formidable character which it ultimately bore. On that day the kotwalee peons were actively engaged in enforcing the levy of the chokeedaree assessment, and in the course of their progress they broke forcibly into the house of a woman, for the purpose of distraining property, to realize her proportion of the assessment. A scuffle ensued, in which the owner of the house was wounded: this was a fortunate circumstance for the cause of the opposers of the tax. The suffering female was a martyr in the cause of the people, and was treated with all the honours due to such a character. She was placed upon a bed, and carried to the mooftee; the mooftee advised the bearers to take her to the
magistrate, which they did, and the magistrate referred the woman for redress to the Adawlut.* This advice was as little acceptable to the people as might be expected. Disappointed in obtaining summary justice, the procession returned to the mooftee and declared the result of their application. If the conduct of the magistrate was marked by indifference, that of the mooftee was certainly characterized by an ample degree of warmth. The story of the populace not only roused his indignation and awoke all the energy of his patriotism, but, according to his own representation, excited his personal fears. On hearing the relation of what had passed

* This course was certainly injudicious. Whenever it is necessary to enforce the law by extreme measures, the greatest caution and forbearance should be employed. Both prudence and good-feeling call for these qualities; and as they are seldom possessed by the lower emissaries of the law, it is the especial duty of their superiors to enforce them. This is, however, a duty rarely attended to in any country. The lower class of legal functionaries—persons, with few exceptions, deficient in all the better qualities of man—are almost invariably left to riot uncontrolled in the display of vulgar insolence and brutal inhumanity. Since such is the case in countries where rational law and well-defined liberty have long been established, we need not be surprised if it was the same in Rohilcund; yet, though it is impossible to approve the conduct of the magistrate in this instance, we must not condemn him too severely, recollecting that he is kept in countenance by the practice of his brethren throughout the world. A petty officer of the law is always to be suspected. Unfortunately, magistrates and judges too frequently act upon the opposite presumption, that he is always to be trusted. It is a fatal mistake for the well-being of society, for the cause of public morality, and for the character of the law.
before the magistrate, he exclaimed that, if such were that functionary's justice, no person's life or honour was safe within the town, and that, therefore, it was high time for him to leave it. It is not likely that the moofttee then felt any apprehension for his personal safety; but a circumstance which occurred immediately afterwards might perhaps give rise to a feeling which previously he thought it expedient to simulate. The continuance of the tumult necessarily called for the interposition of the magistrate. He proceeded in person, with a lieutenant and a party of sepoys, for the purpose of putting an end to the tumult and dispersing the mob. The moofttee had quitted his house, either under the influence of the impressions which he had avowed or from some other cause, and the fact of his meeting the magistrate with an armed force was calculated to strengthen any fears he might previously have entertained, or to excite apprehension if it had not before existed. Conscious of the part he had acted, he might not unnaturally suppose that the magistrate meditated his arrest. It is true that the force was small, but it was sufficient for this purpose, and consequently not to be despised.

In cases of petty riot the sight of troops generally operates as a complete sedative: in the instance before us this was not the case. The government force, being assailed by the mob and by the servants of the moofttee, was compelled to act in its own defence. It has been questioned whether the attacks were made in a serious spirit of resist-
ance, or whether they were only intended to facilitate the escape of the mooftee. Whatever the motive, the result was lamentable, for several of the rioters were killed. Among those who fell were two persons connected with the mooftee. This sacrifice of human life was rendered unavoidable by the proceedings of the insurgents, and neither the magistrate nor the military can be blamed for it. It was, however, little calculated to calm the irritation which existed, or to render the new levy popular. The life of man, indeed, is not highly estimated in the East, and the people of Rohilcund were by no means remarkable for tenderness with regard to it. But it must be remembered, that two of the slain were adherents of the mooftee — this was a heinous scandal; but what was still worse, it unfortunately happened that, in the confusion, the eyebrow of the mooftee himself received the indignity of a scratch. This outrage was more than Mahometan patience could bear. Sacrilege appeared to be added to exaction, and the enthusiasm of the votaries of the prophet was raised to boiling heat. The old tale — threadbare and ridiculous as it was — of the intention of the British to force Christianity on India, was revived; and since fanaticism sees all that it chooses to see, and nothing besides, it need not be doubted that the charge was believed. The never-extinguished hope of once more beholding the standard of the prophet wave in triumph over every spot formerly subjected to Mahometan rule, revived, as it never fails to revive, whenever circumstances present
the slightest symptoms of encouragement. The object was no longer resistance to an unpopular tax, nor contention for a civil right; the dispute had assumed the lofty character and the deadly hue of a religious quarrel. The faith was in danger, and all good Mussulmans were bound to defend it.

The moostee, notwithstanding the accident to his eyebrow, effected his escape; and his subsequent conduct was well calculated to keep alive the fanatical spirit of the people. He repaired to a mosque on the skirts of the town, and hoisted the green or holy flag, with the declared view of assembling his friends and followers to protect him from the presumed violence of the magistrate. This was obviously a course which the European authorities could not view without apprehension, nor pass over without precaution; and on the morning after the moostee had taken his post at the mosque, a detachment of two companies of sepoys, with a brigade of six-pounders, was placed immediately in front of him.

The moostee was not idle in his retirement, and he shewed himself no unworthy follower of the prophet, who claimed the right to propagate his religion by the sword. He appears to have forwarded communications to the principal Mussulman towns in Rohilcund, calling on the followers of Mahomet to stand forth in the defence of their insulted religion. The greater part of them, like the actors in another religious tumult, "knew not wherefore they were brought together;" but as the craftsmen were not
the less ready on that account to cry "Great is 
Diana of the Ephesians!" so the Mussulmans of 
Rohilcund, knowing nothing but that the moostee 
had raised the holy flag, were fully prepared to 
shout, "Blessed be the prophet!" and to second 
their exclamations by the sword. How their religion 
was endangered by the tax they felt it no part of 
their duty to inquire; they were told that it was 
endangered, and that was enough. It is in this way 
that the objects of riot are completely and rapidly 
changed, as the progress of insurrection rolls on. A 
tax of a few miserable annas gave rise to the dis- 
turbances at Bareilly; but they soon acquired a 
more elevated character. The superstition which 
holds so large a portion of the human race in 
chains came in aid of fiscal grievance: it quickly 
absorbed every other consideration, and the police 
tax was forgotten in the danger which was supposed 
to threaten the religion of the warrior prophet. 
Reluctant to proceed to extremities, the magis-
trate attempted to negotiate, and Major Hearsay 
and Lieutenant Roberts were dispatched to confer 
with the moostee: the nazir of the collector was 
also commanded by that officer to perform the same 
duty. The fanatical spirit of the people was strongly 
manifested during these conferences. They were 
constantly interrupted by persons who declared that 
they had come in express search of martyrdom, and 
as negotiation, if successful, would deprive them of 
the anticipated pleasure, they viewed the process
CHAP. XXIV. which was going forward with great fear and the most unrestrained disapprobation.

Such were the feelings of a portion of the people. Their leader had evidently no appetite for martyrdom, and he had taken considerable pains to avert such a fate from himself. In the conferences with him religion seems to have occupied a very small share of attention: it was well to parade it before the people, but in meetings of business the mooftee was willing to let it sleep, and confine the discussion to temporalities. The chief complaint related to the conduct of the kotwal, which, without doubt, had been bad enough. His dismissal from office, and the surrender of his person to the mercy of the insurgents, were declared the first conditions of their returning obedience to the law. The further points contended for were, the abolition of the tax, the pardon of the mooftee—a matter too interesting to the chief negotiator to be overlooked—and a provision for the families of the persons killed in the previous affray.

The negotiations did not, however, advance satisfactorily. The mooftee probably thought that resistance had gone far enough, but this was by no means the belief of his adherents. The interruptions which the negotiations received from the burning zeal of the people to enjoy the company of the houris have been already mentioned. The invitations to arms which had been forwarded by the mooftee now too began to manifest their full effect.
Hordes of fanatical and armed Mussulmans, anxious for the blood of the infidel, flocked in from other towns of Rohilcund. A more temperate zeal would have better suited the purposes of the mooltee; but he had now no power of controlling the monster he had called into existence. If he declined extreme measures, there were others prepared to undertake them. The timidity of age might paralyze his resolution, but in a person named Mahomed Esa the mob found an unscrupulous and vigorous leader. He was young and reckless; he had obtained great influence over the insurgents, and he availed himself to the full of the state of circumstances to inflame the popular phrenzy.

The anxiety of the malecontents for action became almost uncontrollable: one party proposed an attack by night upon the small force which the magistrate had placed to watch the movements of the mooltee. Happily, this was opposed, or its destruction would have been almost inevitable. The intention, however, was only postponed; and on the morning of the 25th of April, after murdering an English gentleman under circumstances of wanton atrocity, the attack was made. The insurgents were met by the British detachment, which was commanded by Captain Boscowen, with firmness. Its number was small, and the circumstances in which it was placed difficult; but its spirit was good. The insurgents were defeated with considerable loss, and this result led necessarily to their dispersion, and to the re-establishment of order. Resistance to authority is sel-
CHAP. XXIV. dom long protracted, if attended by ill-success: the motley materials of which an insurrectionary force is composed can with difficulty be kept together for an up-hill contest; the stimulus of success being wanting, the mass falls to pieces of itself. So it proved with the disturbers of the peace at Bareilly; the leaders were appalled, and the populace, on this as on all other occasions, scrupulously conformed to their example.

Riots like these, when they meet with such a termination, are usually regarded by historical writers as of small importance; but this is an error: they afford an index to the state of public feeling, and, if maturely considered, are replete with important lessons on rulers and statesmen. From occurrences not more important than those at Bareilly, mighty empires have had to date their ruin and new dynasties their accession to power. Such transactions shew the tendency of public feeling; they disclose the possible sources of danger, and teach the legislator what he may do—what he should refrain from doing. The instruction, indeed, is lost upon mere closet-politicians—upon those who sit and frame constitutions and laws for all the nations of the earth, without any reference to the peculiar habits, feelings, and opinions prevailing among those who are to be governed by them; but upon minds of sounder quality it is not thrown away.

The tax imposed at Bareilly was of small amount, and it had been introduced without much difficulty throughout a considerable portion of India; but
it was at variance with the habits of the people upon whom it was attempted to be levied, and it offended many prejudices. The unpopularity of the impost was undoubtedly increased by the ill-conduct of those engaged in the collection of it; but there can be no doubt that it was greatly disliked, independently of all aggravating circumstances. It was a change—this in India is always regarded as an evil. It might be a beneficial change, but it is useless and dangerous to insist upon benefiting men against their will.  

In India no subject is of greater delicacy than that of revenue. The people have submitted to many changes in the laws by which they have been governed, but the main features of the revenue system have always been the same. The land has ever been the great resource of the exchequer, and almost every impost has been connected with the land in some way or other. Assessments have frequently been oppressive, and although it would be too much to affirm that they have been paid cheerfully, it is certain that they usually have been paid quietly, so

* The Emperor Joseph thought to gratify the peasants of Hungary by depriving the nobles of the power of inflicting corporal punishment upon their serfs. This, to common observers, looks like a boon. By those for whose benefit it was intended it was regarded as a grievance. The Hungarian peasantry stood up to a man for the liberty of the lash, and were ready to make war to the knife in defence of the privilege of being whipt. The sovereign who attempted this innovation, and whose whole reign was an unsuccessful struggle for unattainable improvement, affords a warning to all rash and bigoted reformers, which they would do well to study.
long as there was the power of paying them at all. The land must, for a long period to come, be the main dependence of those who rule over India; new taxes, though less burdensome than the old, will not be submitted to; and he must be very far gone in the fanaticism of economical science, who would risk an empire for a fiscal experiment.*

* The disturbances at Bareilly may suggest matter for curious consideration with regard to our own country. The police arrangements at that place were taken out of the hands of the people themselves and assumed by the government. By this change a small additional charge was incurred. This took place in a state of society not far advanced either in knowledge or freedom, and where whatever of government existed had always partaken of an arbitrary character. In England, which has the reputation of being the most enlightened country in the world, and which has long boasted of being one of the most free,—at a period which some believe to be the most enlightened which even England ever saw,—a measure precisely similar in all its parts was introduced by the government. The police of a large part of the metropolis, where, from various causes, the spirit of resistance is more alive than in the provinces, was withdrawn from the management of the citizens, and undertaken by the government. The change not only invaded the right of self-government, of which in these days so much is said and written, but, as in the former case, it was attended by increased expense. At Bareilly the experiment gave rise to insurrection and bloodshed; in London it was effected, not, indeed, without murmurs, but with resistance so feeble as scarcely to deserve the name. Here is a problem for solution by political philosophy; but one which, perhaps, like many others, political philosophy will find too hard for its powers.
CHAPTER XXV.

The complicated drama which is about to open requires that attention should be carried back to a period antecedent to the occurrence of some of the events which formed the subject of the last chapter. When Lord Moira undertook the reins of government in India, the elements of commotion were almost everywhere prepared, and some favourable opportunity, or casual act of provocation, was only wanting to call them into operation. Among the causes which were likely to disturb the peace of the country were certain differences between the Peishwa and the Guicowar, for the settlement of which the former prince manifested a most extraordinary anxiety. This, however, was in perfect correspondence with the usual practices of native courts, of taking advantage of any change in the British government to press, with unwonted earnestness and pertinacity, every claim which they possess, or pretend to possess, either upon that government or upon the states under its protection.

The discussions between the Peishwa and the Guicowar arose partly out of the former connection
CHAP. XXV. between those princes; and the British government, by the treaties concluded with both, was bound to arbitrate upon their claims. A further ground of dispute was furnished by the circumstances of Ahmedabad. This district was divided between the Peishwa and the Guicowar; the former prince had granted a lease of his share to the latter, and arrangements had been made, under the sanction and influence of the British government, calculated to promote the advancement of the country in prosperity and happiness. The success of those arrangements was, however, endangered by a desire expressed by the Peishwa to resume his portion of the territory. This was a result alike to be deprecated by the Guicowar, the British government, and the inhabitants of the district in question; and it became necessary that endeavours should be made to avert it. With these questions were mixed up others, connected with the Peishwa's interest in Kattywar; and altogether, the disputes were involved in much intricacy, while the objects to which they related were of great delicacy and importance.

Although the British government possessed the power of arbitration, it was obviously desirable that this authority should not be exercised except in case of absolute necessity; and that, before calling it into operation, every opportunity should be afforded to the native powers of settling their differences by negotiation between themselves. Some attempts to effect this object were made by the Guicowar's vakeel at Poona, but they were counteracted by the
intrigues of a person named Trimbuckjee Dainglia, who enjoyed the confidence of the Peishwa, and had a personal interest in the determination of one of the questions at issue,—the resumption of the Peishwa's direct authority in Ahmedabad.

Trimbuckjee Dainglia was one of those intriguing and fortunate adventurers naturally generated in the atmosphere of a despotic court. His origin was low, and his earliest employment under the Peishwa was that of a menial servant. His disposition, however, led him to watch for opportunities of raising his fortune, and he found them. On some occasions the means fell in his way of rendering services desired by his master, and he was not slow to improve the advantages he thus gained. He rose rapidly in his sovereign's favour, and so successfully advanced his own influence, that at length, though the office of first minister was nominally held by another, all substantial power was actually in the hands of Trimbuckjee Dainglia. The British resident at Poona at this time was the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone.* He formed and expressed a most unfavourable opinion of this man, and the progress of events proved that it was just.

The efforts of the Guicowar's agent at Poona to effect an amicable arrangement being constantly frustrated by the machinations of the Peishwa's unprincipled favourite, it was deemed advisable to make a change in the person by whom the negotiation was

* Afterwards Governor of Bombay—distinguished alike by his political talents and his literary acquirements.
CHAP. XXV. to be conducted. Gungadhor Shastry, the Guicowar's principal minister, was a man of extraordinary talent and judgment. The services which he had rendered to the Guicowar state were pre-eminent. He had laboured strenuously to eradicate abuse from every part of the government, and to his exertions the rescue of the state from bankruptcy and ruin was mainly attributable. The talents, rank, and character of this individual seemed to point him out as the fittest person to conduct the negotiations with the Peishwa, and by the advice of Captain Carnac,* who discerned and duly appreciated his merits, he was nominated to the performance of that duty.

His appointment was regarded by the prevailing party at Poona with dislike and apprehension, and, previously to his arrival, some frivolous objections were raised by the Peishwa to receiving him. These were removed by the British resident, and Gungadhor Shastry proceeded to the seat of his mission. Here intrigue and counteraction awaited his proceedings. A servant of a former dewan of the Guicowar government, named Bundojee, was engaged in active attempts to frustrate the Shastry's endeavours: he had frequent interviews with the minister, and even went so far as to produce a letter, purporting to be from Futteh Sing, the ruler of the Guicowar state, disavowing the mission.

* Now Sir James Rivett Carnac, Bart., during many years a Director of the East-India Company, and late Governor of Bombay.
These proceedings being communicated to Captain Carnac, were by him laid before Futteh Sing. The Guicowar prince explicitly and entirely disavowed them, and, in proof of his sincerity, entreated that an application might be made by the resident at Poona for the surrender of the person of the individual who had thus abused his name. The application, however, was not made; the principal reason for refraining being the difficulty of adducing sufficient evidence to justify such a demand.

Another active agent of intrigue was Bhugwunt Row Guicowar, a relation of the sovereign whom Gungadhrur Shastry represented. He had visited the Peishwa's territories under pretence of a pilgrimage, and, being there, sought an interview with the sovereign, on the ground of being the bearer of letters to him. Against this the British resident remonstrated, and at length obtained a promise from the Peishwa, that he would not see Bhugwunt Row without a previous communication of his intention.

The designs of this promoter of intrigue and division had been penetrated by Captain Carnac, who forthwith was commissioned by Futteh Sing Guicowar to request that the British government would take effectual means of averting the mischievous consequences to be apprehended. In the meantime, however, the Peishwa had violated the promise which he had given to the British resident, by receiving Bhugwunt Row at a very full durbar, in the presence of the accredited ministers of the
CHAP. XXV. Guicowar. This breach of his word he endeavoured to excuse by alleging that the appearance of Bhugwunt Row at durbar had not been sanctioned by him; the habitual conduct and feelings of the Peishwa, however, render it almost certain that this statement was false.

With the view of testing the sincerity of the Guicowar prince, and at the same time of enabling the British resident at Poona to encounter, with better effect, the mass of intrigue with which he was surrounded, Captain Carnac had been instructed to communicate to Futteh Sing the facts reported from Poona by the resident, and to submit to his highness the propriety of meeting the proceedings, in which his name had been surreptitiously used, by a disclaimer, framed in such a formal and authoritative manner that it could be officially used at the durbar of Poona. Some reluctance was at first manifested to this; but the objections of the prince were ultimately overcome by the address of the resident: the required document was given, and forwarded by the Bombay government to Poona.

Gungadhur Shastry had hitherto received few marks of favour from the Peishwa or his minister, and his endeavours to arrange the matters in dispute had been abortive. The Peishwa refused to renew the lease of Ahmedabad—on this point he was explicit: on others, every sort of evasion, chicanery, and delay was employed to postpone the conclusion of the negotiation. Gungadhur Shastry was at length about to take his departure from Poona,
relinquishing to the British government the task which he had laboured assiduously, but vainly, to perform, when a sudden change took place in the conduct of the Peishwa and his minister, which induced him to suspend the execution of his intention. Both the master and the servant began to make an ostentatious display of kindly feelings towards the Shastry, and to appear anxious to atone for their former hostility by the most extraordinary marks of esteem and confidence. Prospects of a settlement of the disputed questions, upon terms consistent with the interest of the Guicowar, were held out, and the greatest apparent cordiality was established between the Shastry and his former enemy, Trimbuckjee. As a crowning mark of the Peishwa's favour, he actually proposed a marriage between a female of his own family and the Shastry's son, and preparations were made for its celebration.

The Peishwa and his minister proceeded on a pilgrimage to Nassuck, and the Shastry accompanied them. During the journey, reports that the Shastry had been seized by Trimbuckjee were extensively circulated at Poona. They were disbelieved by the British resident, but so much pains were taken to convince him that they had no foundation, as to excite in his mind considerable surprise. It has been stated that, at the period when Gungadhur Shastry and Trimbuckjee were associated on friendly terms, the latter avowed to the former that, before their reconciliation, he had been engaged in plans
for his assassination. This avowal seems scarcely credible, and if made, it is not easily to be traced to any rational motive. If intended as a parade of entire confidence, it was certainly a clumsy expedient, and would seem quite as likely to put the Shastry on his guard as to command his dependence on the good faith of one who did not hesitate to acknowledge having entertained such abominable designs.

The Shastry, though he had formerly felt some apprehensions of treachery and violence, appears to have been divested, by the smoothness of the minister, of every relic of such feelings: they were again indeed roused, but it was when too late. Another devotional journey was proposed, and the Shastry invited to accompany the Peishwa and the minister to Punderpore. On this occasion, the Shastry's colleague, Bappoo Mryaul, a man of wary and circumspect character, was not permitted to accompany him, and his exclusion was attributed to the influence of Trimbuckjee. At his desire, also, the Shastry consented to leave most of his attendants at Poona.

A.D. 1815. The visit to Punderpore took place in July, 1815. On the 14th of that month the Shastry went to an entertainment; on his return he complained of fever, and desired that if any persons came to request his presence at the temple, they might be told that he was ill. In about half an hour after his return, a messenger from Trimbuckjee came to request him to join that person in his devotions; but was told that the Shastry was unwell, and would
not go out. A second messenger arrived, shortly after, to acquaint the Shastry that the Peishwa was to go to the temple the next morning, and that he ought to take advantage of the interval and attend prayers; but not to bring many attendants with him. He still declined. Soon after the receipt of the second message, two of his friends left him and proceeded to the great temple. Here they met Trimbuckjee, who lamented the refusal of the Shastry to come to prayers, and entreated them to use their influence to change his determination. One of them returned, and told the Shastry what had occurred; but he still pleaded illness as a reason for non-compliance. Reflecting, however, that his refusal to join in the devotions of the temple, after these various messages, might appear strange in the eyes of Trimbuckjee, he at length agreed to go.

As he passed along, one of his attendants heard a man in the crowd ask, "Which is the Shastry?" and another reply, "He who wears the necklace;" but not thinking the inquiry of any importance, he paid no attention either to the person asking the question, or to him who made the answer. The Shastry entered the temple, performed his devotions, and after remaining a few minutes in conversation with Trimbuckjee Dainglia, returned towards the house which he occupied. He advanced but a short distance from the temple, when three men came running behind him, and as if clearing the road for some person of distinction, calling out, "Make way!"
make way!" Their left hands were folded up in cloths, and each of them, in his right hand, bore what seemed to be a twisted cloth, such as appears to be commonly used for striking persons in a crowd, to make them stand aside. One of them struck the Shastry a violent blow with the cloth, and it was then discovered that he had a sword in his hand; another seized him by the hair and threw him down; and, whilst in the act of falling, a third ruffian cut him on the head. Three of the Shastry's attendants remained with their master; but two more assassins rushing from the front, the whole of them were wounded and disabled. The rest of the Shastry's friends and followers, who do not appear to have been blest with any large share of personal intrepidity, ran away, leaving him in the hands of his murderers. Being thus at liberty to complete their bloody work, they mangled the unhappy man in a dreadful manner, and then departed; one of them exclaiming, in the Mahratta language, "We have now finished him."

Three of the Shastry's people had remained at the temple, in attendance upon one of his suite. As they approached the spot where the murder had been committed, they saw five men, with naked swords, running towards the temple. This alarmed them, but not being aware of what had happened, they made their way as quietly as possible to the Shastry's house; not finding him there, they returned to the road, where they discovered his body cut to pieces.
The British resident had accompanied the Peishwa to Nassuck, but, understanding that his attendance at Punderpore would not be acceptable, he had, on the departure of the devotees for that place, proceeded to Ellora. There he learned the horrible events which had marked the devotional expedition of the Peishwa, to whom he forthwith communicated his intention of immediately returning to Poona, calling on him, at the same time, to take measures for discovering and bringing to justice the murderers of the Shastry. Captain Pottinger, the assistant, who had been left at Poona, was instructed to provide for the safety of the surviving parties connected with the Baroda mission; and in case of necessity, he was to invite them to encamp in the neighbourhood of the British residency.

The demands of Mr. Elphinstone were unheeded; and the representations of the Shastry's followers, of course, met with no better success. The day after the murder some of the Shastry's attendants waited on Trimbuckjee, and urged that it behoved him, alike as the friend of the deceased and minister of the Peishwa, to institute an active inquiry. He received them with great civility, but said that he had no clue to guide him in tracing the criminals, and that the Shastry was wrong to venture abroad without fifty or a hundred attendants. It was answered, that the Shastry considered himself among friends; that it was not usual to bring many people on such occasions; and, with regard to the want of marks by which to trace the perpetrators of
CHAP. XXV. the crime, they observed, that the assassins wore the dress of the Carnatic, and that Trimbuckjee well knew who were the Shastry's enemies. To this the minister replied by an appeal to that power, whose agency is so universally recognized in the East. He asked, "How could I avert what fate has decreed?" And, having thus removed the transaction beyond the sphere of human responsibility, he consoled the Shastry's followers by assuring them that, now their protector was gone, they must depend upon themselves; graciously adding, however, that he would do what he could for them. On the following day the Shastry's followers obtained permission to return to Poona; but it was intimated to them, that they need not trouble themselves to attend any more, either upon Trimbuckjee or the Peishwa.

Although the remonstrances of the British resident did not produce any serious investigation into the circumstances of the murder, they were sufficient to induce Trimbuckjee and his sovereign to take extraordinary measures for their own safety. Before the murder, indeed, the Peishwa had adopted some unusual precautions. New troops were raised, additional guards were posted round his house, and, contrary to his usual practice, his progress was attended by a large body of armed men. After the murder these precautions were redoubled.

The Peishwa returned to Poona, but his entry was marked by symptoms of anxiety and fear. His approach was not preceded by any notice; he
arrived in a close palanquin, and was not met by any of his chiefs. The day of his arrival was a great festival, on which thousands of brahmins were accustomed to attend, to receive his alms. He never before failed to be present at the dispensation; but, on this occasion, he did not appear. At night strong guards were posted, not only at the palace, but at the house of Trimbuckjee. Subsequently, the levies of new troops, and the concentration of military force in the vicinity of Poona, continued; and every movement manifested distrust and alarm.

Soon after the Peishwa’s return the British resident requested an audience; this, on various pretexts, was evaded. After much difficulty, Mr. Elphinstone succeeded in conveying to the Peishwa a paper, containing a direct charge against Trimbuckjee, and demanding his arrest, as well as that of Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, the two persons who had so anxiously endeavoured to undermine and counteract the labours of Gungadhur Shastry. In this paper, the resident, after stating the anxiety he had felt for an interview, expressed his surprise that no inquiry had been made into the circumstances of the Shastry’s assassination. The Peishwa’s pride and feelings were, however, respected, by averting the imputation of neglect and guilt from him, and casting it upon those whose duty it was to have informed his highness of the facts; a duty which, it was assumed, they had omitted to perform; and to this omission was attributed the forbearance of the prince from those measures,
which were necessary to uphold the character of
his government, and which, the resident took for
granted, were in accordance not less with his incli-
nations than with his duty. The Peishwa was in-
formed that the public voice had been unanimous in
accusing Trimbuckjee as the instigator of the crime;
the facts of the murder, and of the minister's con-
duct after its perpetration, were recapitulated; the
necessity of the arrest of Trimbuckjee, in order that
witnesses might not be deterred from coming for-
ward by the terror of his power and influence, was
urged; and the paper terminated by distinctly ap-
prizing the Peishwa, that all communication with
the British government must be suspended until its
demand upon this point should be satisfied.

The propriety of this remonstrance, and of the
tone which it assumed, is unquestionable. An atro-
cious crime had been committed, and its victim was
the chief minister of a state in alliance with the
British government; he had, moreover, entered the
Peishwa's dominions at the request of that govern-
ment, and under the shield of its protection and
guarantee. This circumstance rendered it impera-
tive upon the British authorities to take the most
decisive measures to secure the detection and
punishment of the criminals. It was demanded in
vindication of the national honour, which would
have been tarnished by abstinence from the per-
formance of so obvious a duty, or even by delay or
hesitation in undertaking it.

The Peishwa now felt that, to preserve appear-
ances, it was necessary to do something; but appearance being his only object, he resolved that it should be as little as possible. A day or two after the delivery of the paper, the resident received a message, assuring him that it had been perused with the fullest attention, and that the Peishwa had taken certain proceedings in consequence. These steps were, however, very unsatisfactory. The two minor agents, Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, had been placed under restraint, but the grand conspirator, Trimbuckjee, remained at large, and had actually the custody of his alleged coadjutors in crime; the guards placed over their houses belonged to Trimbuckjee. Further evidence was afforded of the insincere and deceptive character of these proceedings, by the fact of an interview having taken place between Trimbuckjee and Bundojee on the preceding night.

The charge against Trimbuckjee could not be altogether passed over in the Peishwa's message; but nothing explicit was stated with regard to it; an explanation being promised through a certain native agent of the British residency, whom the minister requested to be sent to him. This agent was incapacitated by age and infirmities, and another was consequently sent. To him a long message was delivered, compounded of professions of attachment to the British government, and a denial of the guilt of Trimbuckjee; the latter being accompanied by an offer to arrest him immediately if his guilt were proved (which, while he remained at large,
to consider the establishment of the truth of his having sent invitations to the Shastry to come to the temple with a few attendants, as sufficient evidence of guilt. To this Mr. Elphinstone replied, by repeating that he was prepared to make good his charges; by reiterating his call for the arrest of Trimbuckjee; and by warning the Peishwa of the danger in which he placed his alliance with the British government, by a perseverance in the course which he had hitherto adopted.

The grounds of suspicion against Trimbuckjee were, indeed, too strong to be overlooked. His anxiety for the Shastry's attendance in the temple on the night of the murder, and the pains he took to induce him to overcome the reluctance which he felt to leaving his house—his expressed desire that the Shastry should be accompanied by few attendants, and the blame which, after the murder, he cast upon him, for not being provided with a greater number—the impunity of the murderers, in a place surrounded by the Peishwa's guards, and the omission of all endeavours to trace them, or to ascertain their persons and motives—the fact, of no measures being taken to arrest Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, on whom strong suspicion alighted, till pressed by the British resident—these, with many other minor circumstances, combined with the profligate character of Trimbuckjee, and his former notorious hostility to the Shastry, tended to fix upon the minister the guilt of the
atrocious crime, by which the Peishwa's territories had been disgraced and the British government insulted. The suspicion, indeed, extended further and higher; it ascended through the servant to the sovereign: but as it was impossible to reach the latter without measures of positive hostility, the effect of which might not be confined to Poona, but might possibly light up the flames of war through a large portion of India, it was deemed advisable, on the principles of expediency, to suffer the guilty sovereign to escape the doom he merited, and to be content with the surrender of his instrument.

The Peishwa, however, continued to refuse this act of justice. He required the arrest of Trimbuckjee to be preceded by an investigation into the charges; a mode of proceeding nowhere adopted, where the grounds of suspicion are so strong and the imputed crime of so deep a dye, and one which he knew must be ineffectual, from the ample means which the minister of a despotic sovereign must possess, while he continues in the enjoyment of freedom and power, to silence the voices of all who may be disposed to accuse him. The arrest of Trimbuckjee was, therefore, an indispensable preliminary to a fair or effectual investigation; and by consenting to enter on an inquiry without it, the resident would only have ensured to an atrocious criminal the benefit of a public exculpation. The Peishwa would not admit this; he appeared deter-
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mined to make common cause with his favourite, and to stand or fall with him.

Trimbuckjee had not only been a supple agent in the political intrigues of the Peishwa, but also the active and ready promoter of the licentious and degrading pleasures in which a large portion of that prince's life was spent. He had been found a useful instrument for effecting any purpose, however base or wicked, to which his master called him. Nothing disgusted him by its vileness; nothing deterred him by its atrocity. Whether as the experienced purveyor to sensual indulgence; the adept in intrigue and chicanery; or, lastly, the unscrupulous villain, to whom murder was but one among various means of accomplishing a desired end, he could not be spared; and the Peishwa might, moreover, apprehend danger to himself, from the discoveries which hope or fear might induce Trimbuckjee to make. The wildest and most dangerous schemes were, therefore, sought to secure impunity to the favourite. It was even proposed that he should quit Poona and excite a feigned rebellion, in which, while ostensibly assailing the authority of the Peishwa, he was to receive his secret support. Insane as was this scheme, some preparations were made for carrying it into effect. At other times, various modes of compromise were offered; but all these the resident, with proper firmness, and a just sense of what was due to his country, rejected.

Some commotions at Hyderabad inspired the au-
authorities at Poona with still greater confidence. Subterfuge and compromise then gave way to language and conduct approaching to defiance. It was determined that no concession should be made to the representations of the British resident; that Trimbuckjee should remain at liberty, at court, and in office, and that all demands for his punishment should be resisted. The tone assumed was that of menace and hostility, and the proceedings of the court corresponded with its language.

The resident had some time previously remonstrated against the concentration of the troops at Poona; but the sole effect was, to remove the rendezvous to twenty or twenty-five miles from the city. Recruiting still went on, and the assemblage of troops, combined with the altered tone of the durbar, at length rendered it necessary for the resident to take corresponding measures. The sanction of the governor-general to the course to which his own conviction led enabled him to pursue it with the greater confidence. He once more warned the Peishwa of the precipice on which he stood, and, pointing out the inevitable consequences of the continuance of his blind protection of his guilty minister, assured him that the British government would not desist from demanding his surrender. The firm and decisive conduct of the resident diffused some alarm among those opposed to him. A long consultation ensued between the Peishwa and some of his more powerful followers, and the result was communicated in a message to Mr. Elphinstone.
The proposal which emanated from the deliberations of this conclave was, that Trimbuckjee should be imprisoned, on certain conditions. These conditions were three in number:—the British government was not to demand the capital punishment of Trimbuckjee, nor his surrender to its own officers, nor any further inquiry into the transaction. In the meantime, Trimbuckjee, after an interview with the Peishwa, said to be of a very friendly character, was sent off to Wassuntghur, a hill-fort near Sattarah.

The conditions attempted to be forced on the resident were of course rejected, and an unqualified surrender of Trimbuckjee to the British government insisted on; but a private intimation was conveyed to the acting minister of the Peishwa that, after the prisoner was in British custody, no further inquiry would take place. The propriety of this promise seems open to question. It had the appearance of a relaxation in the terms which the British resident had laid down, and to which he professed tenaciously to adhere. If the British government, satisfied with the possession of the person of Trimbuckjee, were willing to forego inquiry, still it could scarcely be prudent to bind itself to this course by a promise. The dread of such an inquiry might have had a salutary effect upon the councils and conduct of the Peishwa, if it were lawful in such a case to abstain from following out the demands of justice; but it may be doubted, whether it was either right or expedient to suffer so atrocious a criminal to escape with no severer punishment than
personal restraint. The fear of inculpating the Peishwa, whom it was thought advisable to excuse, might be one motive for refraining from inquiry; but it is not likely that any very decisive marks of guilt would have been affixed to the person of a powerful prince; and, at all events, the common rule, which exempts sovereigns from personal responsibility, but punishes their agents and instruments, might have been his protection. The Gicowar prince, too, had, under the circumstances, an undoubted right to expect inquiry, and, on conviction, the severest punishment of the criminal. Public justice and public decency urged the same demands. If Trimbuckjee were innocent, he ought not to have been condemned to perpetual confinement; he ought not to have been subjected to restraint for any longer period than was necessary to establish the fact of his innocence. On the other hand, if he were guilty, he had no claim to escape the fearful sentence which heaven, and natural feeling, and human law, have alike passed upon the shedder of innocent blood. Such a compromise bore the character of a sacrifice of right to expediency—the expediency itself being doubtful.

Passing over this error, the conduct of the resident was most firm and judicious. He continued to enforce the claims of the British government to the custody of Trimbuckjee, and the fears of the Peishwa at length yielded what the sense of justice would never have extorted from him. The prisoner was removed from Wassuntghur to Poona, and there
delivered over to a detachment of British troops; from thence he was conducted to Bombay, with Bhugwunt Row and Bundojee, who were to be given up to the Guicowar government. On his arrival, Trimbuckjee was placed in strict confinement in the fort of Tannah.*

* The art of government, as practised in the native states of the East, consists of little more than a series of efforts to compass selfish schemes of aggrandizement, and to evade the satisfaction of just claims—intrigue and artifice for the most part furnishing the means, varied, however, when deemed necessary, by acts of open violence. Native rulers rarely appear to esteem the fulfilment of a contract as a thing even to be thought of, except as a reluctant concession to stern necessity: obligations are annulled, by those who have consented to incur them, with a levity altogether astonishing to those accustomed only to European modes of thought. The limits of power are regarded as the limits alike of demand and of retention. Nowhere is more universally prevalent that standard of morality, as convenient as it is venerable, which declares,

"That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."

Whatever is coveted is taken, if the means of capture be sufficient; whatever is possessed is parted with only to superior force or superior cunning; and it seems a recognized principle, that contracts are to be observed but just so long as the observance is convenient. The family of Gungadhir Shastry were destined to afford an exemplification of this, as well as of the evanescent character of courtly gratitude. In consideration of the services of Gungadhir Shastry, services recognized alike by British and native testimony, a nemnook, or provision, was made for his family, to the amount of sixty thousand rupees annually. This was the act of the durbar of Baroda, and it was successively approved by the British resident, by the Bombay government, and by the authorities at home. It was beyond all doubt that the Company's government intended to guarantee this allowance; but, from some cause, this intention was not ratified by any for-
The murder of Gungadhur Shastry was not an isolated act of villany, atrocious in its character, but unimportant in its effects; on the contrary, it was the source and origin of some of the greatest political changes which the modern history of India
presents to notice. It will hereafter appear, that the perfidious conduct of the Peishwa was the opening of the fountains of strife and bitterness, the waters of which flowed forth in a deluge of ruin over his own dominions and those of his associates: but the exposition of these effects must be deferred, to make way for the relation of other events which claim precedence in order of time.

Mention has been incidentally made of persons called Pindarries, occasionally found in the service of belligerent chiefs; and, as they are now about to occupy a more important place in the field of Indian politics than has hitherto been assigned to them, it becomes necessary to make some reference to their character and origin. In every country, at whatever point of civilization it may have arrived, some are found who, impelled either by want or depravity, seek a subsistence from sources less painful and less honourable than labour. In every country, at some period of its history, a vast number of persons have supported themselves by open plunder—have followed no other occupation, and have not even pretended to follow any other. The time during which this state of things prevails may be longer or shorter, and its duration will be determined by a great variety of circumstances; but, in a certain stage of society,
it will as inevitably occur as storms or earthquakes under certain conditions of the natural elements.
A great deal of wonder has been spent upon the character and conduct of the Pindarries: there seems, however, little ground for any very copious display of such a feeling, and a large portion of it is probably to be ascribed to the unusual name by which these adventurers are described.*

They were, in truth, except on account of their numbers, a very contemptible set of miscreants. Active and enterprising almost beyond belief, and wicked to the full measure which the most ardent lover of horror can desire, their adventures and their crimes were undignified by any of those nobler characteristics of our nature, which have sometimes shed a deceptive glory over actions of great atrocity, and averted from their perpetrators the penalty of unmitigated disgust. No redeeming virtue marked the character of the Pindarrie. Even animal courage, often the sole ennobling quality of his profession, he possessed not. The Pindarrie marched, or rather darted, upon his victims with a rapidity

* Much of the wonder commonly exhibited upon Indian subjects may be traced to our want of familiarity with the terms used in speaking of them. Those who would hear of the cultivators of the soil without any extraordinary sensation, imagine that there is something mysterious in the character of persons designated *Ryots*; and *Durbar* and *Musnad* seem to indicate something far more magnificent than is expressed by our humbler monosyllables *Court* and *Throne*. From the same cause, the Pindarries have in the eyes of English readers, and perhaps sometimes of English statesmen, acquired a grandeur to which they had but slender claims.
CHAP. XXV. certainly never equalled by any regular force; but, unfortunately for the romantic colouring of his character, he manifested equal or even greater alacrity in flight. No troops in the history of the world ever displayed such proficiency in the art of running away; and to this, their strong point, they invariably resorted if attacked. "They avoid fighting," said one who had carefully studied their character and habits,* "for they come to plunder, not to fight." Other combatants seek to overcome their adversary; the Pindarries were only anxious to get out of his way. Call these persons freebooters, banditti, or by any name to which the ear is accustomed, and the mystery which has been attached to them vanishes. They were mean and cowardly thieves, engendered by a vicious and diseased state of society. To repress them was a duty imperative upon the British government, and it was no less so to take effectual measures to guard against a new race of robbers being called forth in their place.

The etymology of the term *Pindarrie* has given rise to much and fruitless discussion. By some it has been traced to an ancient Hindoo word, meaning 'plunder;' and if this be not a just derivation, it is at least a very appropriate one. The first mention of these persons in history has been sometimes said to occur in the latter part of the seventeenth century; at others, in the beginning of the eighteenth; a point of little moment, since it relates merely to

* Captain Sydenham, in a Memorandum on the Pindarries, drawn up in 1809.
a name, as it cannot be doubted that India con-
tained within its ample boundaries a very plentiful
supply of robbers, even at periods much earlier than
either of the dates which have been mentioned.

The native princes of India have never been very
scrupulous as to the means of accomplishing their
purposes, and though not only high feeling but even
sound policy would have led to the rejection of the
services of the Pindarries, they were, in various in-
tances, retained by what were regarded as regular
governments. The services which they rendered
were all of one description—they consisted in
crippling the enemy of their employers by plunder-
ing his baggage or his convoys—driving off cattle
from the vicinity of his camp, and desolating the
country from which his supplies were to be drawn.
The terms upon which their assistance was afforded
are not so easily ascertainable. It is probable that
they varied; perhaps they were rarely fixed with
much precision, and it may be safely believed that
the measure of Pindarrie remuneration was decided
by the degree of ability to acquire and to retain.
In some cases a trifling sum might be allowed by
the government under which they served for each
horseman employed, but plunder invariably formed
the chief, if not the sole, source of their reward.
But whatever the engagements between the Pin-
darries and the governments by whom they were
retained, it is stated on competent authority, that
they were observed with just such a measure of
good faith as might have been expected. It was
not uncommon, according to Captain Sydenham, for
the Pindarries to rob the government which they
served; "and, on the other hand," he adds, "the
government seldom loses an opportunity of extorting
from them money under false pretences."* This is
precisely the state of things which those acquainted
with the character of the Pindarries and their mas-
ters would have anticipated.

These marauders received especial marks of
favour and encouragement from Holkar and Scin-
dia. Holkar bestowed upon one of their chiefs a
golden flag. This gave the Pindarries a sort of
rank among the Mahrattas, but effected no change
in their habits or character. Gurdee Khan, the
fortunate receiver of this distinction, remained
during his life attached to the armies of his pa-
tron: and notwithstanding the command subse-
quently passed from his family, that body of Pin-
darries continued faithful to Holkar. But, though
entertained and encouraged, they were regarded
with contempt. Community of feeling and of pur-
pose did not secure the respect of the Mahrattas
for those who were but one grade below themselves
in the moral scale. The Pindarries always encamped
apart from the rest of the army, and their chiefs
were never allowed to sit in the presence of the
prince.

A younger brother of Gurdee Khan, named Shah
Bay Khan, attached himself to the service of Scin-
dia. He left two sons, Hera and Burrun, "each of

* Letter accompanying Memorandum, ut supra.
whom attained as much celebrity as can be supposed to surround the character of a robber chief-tain. Quitting the service of Scindia, these adventurous persons proceeded to Malwa, and, having encamped at Berniah, with about five thousand followers, they made an overture to the government of Bhopal to invade and lay waste the territories of Nagpore, with which state it was at war. The offer was declined, an act of forbearance which has been ascribed to fear. Nothing disheartened by the refusal, the Pindarrie leaders proceeded to Nagpore, where they were graciously received. Their visit was a matter of business. Their offer, to accommodate the state of Bhopal by the plunder of Nagpore, having been rejected, they now made to Nagpore a like tender of their services for ravaging Bhopal. They found the ruler of Nagpore nothing loath; and, being able and experienced workmen, they executed his order so effectually, that, at the distance of twenty-five years, Sir John Malcolm represents Bhopal as not then recovered from the effects of their visitation. Their zeal and efficiency, however, met with a most ungrateful return. The Rajah of Nagpore, though glad of an opportunity of inflicting a vital injury upon an enemy, was too conscientious to allow such unprincipled persons as the Pindarries to retain the fruits of their labours. On the return of these faithful instruments of his will to his capital, he very unceremoniously surrounded their camp, plundered them of all the moveables of which they had plundered the unhappy inhabitants
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chap. xxv. of Bhopal, and seized Burrun, one of their chiefs: Hera, the other commander, fled.

A noted leader among the Pindarries was Kurreem Khan. He was, at one period, an humble follower of Burrun and Hera, with a force of five or six hundred men. On the apprehension of Burrun, he fled from Nagpore and joined Dowlut Row Scindia, who was then preparing to attack the Nizam. In the campaign which followed he gained an immense booty, and his experience at Nagpore warned him to take care of it. To secure this end, a retreat appeared to him advisable: he, accordingly, abandoned Scindia's army in the Deccan, and went to Central India, to offer his services to Jeswunt Row Holkar. This prince shewed no reluctance to receive and employ the fugitive: but the mind of the latter was still uneasy on account of his much-valued wealth; and not feeling it quite safe in the custody of Jeswunt Row, he at once withdrew his followers and himself, and opened a double negotiation with his former master, Scindia, and with Ameer Khan, whose character was about on a level with his own in point of respectability, while his place in society was little less questionable. Both negotiations succeeded. Ameer Khan offered him an asylum, and when that adventurer was afterwards engaged in hostilities with Scindia, Kurreem Khan repaid the kindness by making himself master of certain districts at the expense of his benefactor, and obtaining a confirmation of his possession of them from Scindia. By that prince Kurreem
Khan was created a Nawab, and his ambition was further gratified by a marriage with a lady of rank.

The contemporaneous absence of Scindia and Holkar tempted this indefatigable person to make further additions to his territory. He now evidently contemplated the establishment of a regular state, and the jealousy of Scindia was excited. Scindia advanced from his capital, with the full determination of destroying a man who was becoming far too formidable for a dependant, but he was withheld by policy from resorting to force. Kurreem Khan, being invited to attend him, proceeded with a degree of ostentations splendour scarcely inferior to that of the chief to whom he professed allegiance. On occasion of receiving a visit from Scindia, Kurreem Khan prepared a musnud of extraordinary materials. It was composed of one hundred and twenty-five thousand rupees, covered with a rich cloth. On this Scindia was seated, and the whole formed a present from the vassal to his liege lord.

The success of Kurreem Khan seemed worthy of his munificence. Scindia appeared enchanted by the extraordinary talents of Kurreem, both as a soldier and a statesman. His compliments far exceeded the usual extent of eastern hyperbole, and Kurreem had reason to rejoice in having secured the favour of a chief whose enmity he had reason to apprehend. He had still further reason to be pleased, that the flattering attentions of his patron promised some better results than empty praise.
The Pindarrie chief was emboldened to solicit the transfer of several valuable districts, and tendered security for making an advance of four lacs and a half of rupees, if his desire were granted. The superior seemed as ready to bestow as the dependant was bold to ask. Every boon was graciously accorded. No prince ever appeared more sensible of the merits of a servant; no servant more enthusiastically attached to his prince. The transfer of the districts was ordered to take place forthwith, and a rich dress of investiture to be prepared.

In the midst of this seeming cordiality, some of the elder and more wary of the Pindarrie followers entertained doubts. They had before witnessed scenes somewhat resembling that which they now beheld, and they recollected how they had terminated. Kurreem himself was not a novice in these matters, and heretofore he had rather exceeded than fallen short of a due measure of caution. His temper, his experience, and the warnings of his followers, might have been deemed sufficient to excite some degree of suspicion as to the probable termination of the superabundant grace and condescension of Scindia; but such was not the case: Kurreem saw nothing but his own good fortune, and already in idea possessed all that was promised.

The interchange of compliments and presents having continued as long as was thought expedient, the day arrived for making the final arrangements for the transfer of the coveted districts, and formally installing Kurreem in the possession of them.
He was then, after taking leave of his chieftain and benefactor, to proceed immediately to the exercise of his new authority.

Every thing bore the most auspicious appearance. Kurreem advanced to receive his expected donation, with but a slender train of attendants, probably from a desire to shew respect to his superior, and in the belief that, now his ends were gained, it was more politic to flatter the pride of his chief than to appeal to his fears. Scindia received his visitor with the same benignity which he had manifested throughout—to exhibit more was impossible. The summuds were called for—the dresses were produced, and Kurreem could see nothing between himself and the fulfilment of his hopes. Scindia, however, made some pretext for retiring, not thinking it proper to give his personal countenance to the scene which was to follow. This was an act of decorum very creditable to the taste of the Mahratta chief, for his continued presence could hardly have been reconciled with his previous bearing, and his departure rendered explanation impracticable, though probably in the opinion of Kurreem not unnecessary.

The expectant Pindarrie was not kept long in the pangs of anxious hope. Scindia had scarcely quitted the tent, when armed men rushed from the sides, and seized Kurreem, with some of his principal adherents. A cannon was now fired as a signal that this feat had been accomplished; and the troops which had been drawn out to do honour to
Kurreem carried the compliment so far as to extend their care to all his followers, by advancing upon the Pindarrie camp. Suspicion is one of the strongest characteristics of the Pindarrie; this was soon excited in the camp, and as many as were able hastily declined the proffered attentions of Scindia's troops. A few only were killed, but, though the loss of life was small, the loss of that which, in Oriental estimation, is scarcely of less value, was considerable. The army of Scindia obtained an immense booty, a conclusion in itself sufficiently gratifying. But the value of the triumph was greatly enhanced in the eyes of the soldiery by the means which had led to it. It was the result neither of valour, nor of military talent, nor of far-seeing wisdom; but solely of that sinister art, in which the natives of the East are generally such adepts, and which, in the eyes of a Mahratta especially, is the first and most venerated of all human accomplishments.

Kurreem was four years a captive. The treasure which he had lost through the prudent arrangements of Scindia, though not inconsiderable, formed but a small part of what he could command, the mass of which was deposited at Shujahalpoor. On the news of his arrest reaching that place, his mother packed up all that was portable, and fled towards the jungles of Baglee, from which place the fear of Scindia subsequently drove her further to the westward.

In the meantime Kurreem was not idle. He
found opportunities of corresponding with his followers, and he enjoined them, with paternal authority, to plunder everywhere, but especially the territories of Scindia. These commands were too agreeable to their feelings to be neglected, and Kurreem had the high satisfaction of knowing that he was implicitly obeyed.

While the professional duties of the Pindarries were thus discharged, without suspension or impediment, some attempts were made to effect a negotiation for the release of Kurreem. These were long resisted by Scindia; but a door was at last opened for the exercise of his clemency, by an appeal to one of the passions most predominant in the heart of an Eastern potentate. Six lacs of rupees to the sovereign was regarded as a tempting offer, and the proposed distribution of one lac more among the officers of the court, by whom the treaty was negotiated, had a vast effect in facilitating their perception, both of the advantages of the plan to the interests of their master, and of the claims of Kurreem to the indulgence which he sought. Security was given for the payment of these sums, and the prisoner was released. His former keepers were, however, not quite satisfied of the safety of the experiment, and endeavours were made to conciliate him by the accumulation of presents and marks of honour. But Kurreem had bitter experience of the value of such blandishments. He determined, therefore, to trust to his own resources, and assembling his Pindarries from every quarter, he
was soon in possession of territories more extensive than he had enjoyed before his misfortune.

Under these circumstances he was joined by another Pindarrie chief, named Cheetoo, who, it is said, had in early life been much indebted to him. This man was considered one of the ablest of the Pindarrie leaders, and his junction with Kurreem was therefore regarded with apprehension. It was, however, of brief duration. The excesses which revenge led Kurreem to perpetrate in the territories of Scindia caused that prince bitterly to repent the bargain which his avarice had led him to conclude; and he resolved to make every effort to annihilate the power of Kurreem. In this labour he found a willing ally in the faithful Cheetoo, whose obligations to Kurreem offered no obstacle to his engaging in the destruction of his friend and patron. The result was, that Kurreem's camp was attacked and dispersed, and himself obliged to seek safety in flight.

He now sought the protection of Ameer Khan, and this worthy person, under pretence of recommending him to the good graces of Toolsee Bhye, the profligate favourite of Jeswunt Row Holkar, transferred him to the care of Ghuffoor Khan, a near relation of Ameer Khan, and his representative and creature at the court of Holkar. By him Kurreem was placed under restraint. This durance lasted three years, during which his followers were actively and vigorously occupied. At last, he effected his escape and joined his adherents at Ber-
niah, encouraged to take this step, it has been said, by the overtures of Scindia to forgive the past and provide for the future. A man rarely needs much encouragement to escape from captivity, if he thinks the object can be effected; and Kurreem could hardly attach much value to the promises of Scindia. He did, however, escape, and prepared to act under Scindia's orders.

Cheetoo, who has already been honourably mentioned, first as the friend, and, secondly, as the betrayer of Kurreem, profited by the captivity of the latter so far as to gain the rank of chief leader among the Pindarries. The value of this distinction may be differently estimated by different minds; but whatever it might be, Cheetoo sought and obtained it. He fixed his abode amid the hills and forests situated between the north bank of the Nerbudda and the Vindyha mountains. His cantonments were near the village of Nimar, and he resided either there or at Sattrass. During the latter part of his career he seldom made long excursions, but his troops were dispersed on duty at various points, and patrolled the country in every direction. He acknowledged a sort of allegiance to Scindia; but this did not restrain his followers from occasional inroads upon the territories of that prince, as evidences of their independence and impartiality.

Movements were sometimes made, with the ostensible purpose of putting the marauders down,
but nothing was effected. A treaty was at length entered into, by which the Pindarries agreed to exempt the territories of Scindia from plunder, on condition of his bestowing on them certain lands. There were, however, some difficulties in the way of carrying this treaty into effect. Some of the lands conveyed belonged not to Scindia, but to other states, and though he had not the smallest objection to bestowing on the Pindarries the property of Holkar and the Peishwa, it was not perfectly convenient to assume the power of making such donations. The alleged necessity, however, of protecting his territories finally led him to comply. Sunnuds were granted to different chiefs, and Cheetoo received five districts. Here again was a foundation laid for the conversion of a robber confederacy into a regular state.

Such were the characters of some of the leaders of the Pindarrie hordes; and though it would be unjust to say that they were much worse than those of most of their neighbours, the unsettled and predatory habits of their followers rendered it impossible for them to be recognized by any European government which had the slightest value for its reputation.

The settlements of these persons being to the north of the Nerbudda, their practice was to cross the river as soon as it was fordable, generally in November, and indiscriminately plunder friends and foes. Before the year 1812, though they continually
visited the Company's allies, they respected the British dominions. Subsequently, the latter partook of their visitations, and shared in all the horrors with which their progress was attended.

The Pindarries were not composed of any peculiar people or tribe, but of a variety—of the refuse of all tribes, denominations, and creeds. The ancestors of their chiefs are regarded as of Patan extraction; their followers were a motley multitude, brought together by the common impulse of necessity. "Every horseman," said Captain Sydenham, "who is discharged from the service of a regular government, or who wants employment and subsistence, joins one of the durrahs* of the Pindarries; so that no vagabond who has a horse and a sword at his command can be at a loss for employment. Thus the Pindarries are continually receiving an accession of associates from the most desperate and profligate of mankind. Every villain who escapes from his creditors, who is expelled from the community for some flagrant crime, who has been discarded from employment, or who is disgusted with an honest and peaceful life, flies to Hindostan, and enrolls himself among the Pindarries."†

The Pindarries were generally armed with spears, in the use of which they were very expert; a proportion of them were provided with matchlocks, and all were mounted. The mode of warfare adopted by these bandits, if warfare it may be called, was distinguished by the precision with

* Principal divisions. † Memorandum ut supra.
CHAP. XXV. which it was directed to one object—plunder; they brought little with them, and their only object was to carry as much as possible away. A party consisted of one, two, three, or even four thousand. Each man provided himself with a few cakes for his subsistence, and a few feeds of grain for his horse, trusting much to the chance of plunder for the means of supplying the wants of both. They frequently marched thirty or forty miles a day, and, in cases of extraordinary emergency, they were capable of accomplishing fifty miles in that period. To effect these extraordinary exertions, they were accustomed to sustain the vigour of their horses by spices and stimulants.

The celerity of their marches was not more remarkable than their secrecy. It was scarcely possible to gain information of their movements till they had completed them. They proceeded at once to the place of their destination, and unencumbered with tents and baggage, they soon reached it. Here they divided into smaller parties, and commenced their career of plunder and devastation. Articles of the greatest value were disposed about their persons; cattle afforded the means of their own transport. But the atrocious propensities of these ruffians were not to be satisfied by what they could carry away. What was not removed they destroyed, and wherever they marched, villages were seen in flames, with the houseless and often wounded inhabitants flying in dismay to seek a shelter, which not unfrequently they were unable
to attain. When the ruffian visitors had laid the country completely waste, they approached a point of the frontier distant from that by which they had entered, and uniting again into a compact body, returned home.

The horrors attending these visitations were such as could not be credited, were the evidence less complete and conclusive. Despatch being indispensable, every variety of torture was resorted to for the purpose of extracting from the unhappy victims information of the treasures they were supposed to have concealed. Red-hot irons were applied to the soles of their feet; a bag filled with hot ashes was tied over the mouth and nostrils of the victim, who was then beaten on the back, to make him inhale the ingredients; large stones were placed on the head or chest, or the sufferer being laid on his back, a plank or beam was placed across his chest, on which two men pressed with their whole weight; oil was thrown on the clothes, which were then set on fire—these, with many other modes of torture equally frightful, were resorted to. Neither sex nor age afforded immunity. The hands of children would frequently be cut off, as the shortest way of obtaining the bracelets which adorned them; while women were subjected to outrages, compared with which torture and death were mercy. To escape these, numbers rushed upon self-destruction. It is not one of the least revolting features in the economy of these murderous adventurers, that their women
frequently accompanied their male associates in their excursions. They were mounted on small horses or camels, and are said to have exceeded the other sex in rapacity and cruelty. This may readily be believed, for when woman has once overcome the restraints which nature and universal feeling have imposed upon her, her progress downward is made with fearful rapidity.

When the work of ruin was completed, the Pindarries withdrew like wild beasts to their lairs. Then a change of scene took place; the operation of plunder was exchanged for that of huckstering. The claim of the government under which they served had first to be satisfied; or if they were pursuing their vocation independently, that of their chief; but it is not very clear how far either claim extended. By some, the share of each has been fixed at a fourth part of the entire booty. By others, it has been alleged that the mode of apportionment was uncertain, but that elephants, palanquins, and some other articles, were heriots appertaining to the highest authority recognized by the captors. After the claim of the government or the chief, came that of the actual leader of the expedition; then the payment of advances made by merchants—for, like more civilized nations, these people occasionally contracted public debts. The fact of such a confederacy being able to borrow money would be regarded as remarkable anywhere but in India.

These preliminaries being disposed of, the scene
that followed resembled a fair. Every man's share of the plunder was exposed for sale; purchasers flocked from all quarters, proximate and remote, the business of sale being principally conducted by the women. Whether this arose from the indolence of the men, or that the women had the reputation of making better bargains, does not appear, but such was the custom. In the mean time, the men gave themselves up to amusement, of which intoxication constituted a considerable portion. The remainder was worthy of the association in which it was found. This lasted until the produce of the expedition was exhausted, and it became necessary to seek in fresh outrages renewed means of gratification. Thus passed the life of the Pindarrie robber, in an alternation of brutal exertion and sensual abandonment.*

The Marquess of Hastings, at an early period of his government, manifested a desire to put an end to the ravages of these marauders; but it was deemed fitting to refrain from any offensive operations until the receipt of orders from home.† During

* The particulars related in the text of the habits of the Pindarries, and of the lives of some of their principal leaders, have been collected partly from official sources, partly from the publication of Sir John Malcolm, Captain Duff, the Earl of Munster, and others.

† The merit of directing attention to the necessity of suppressing the Pindarries belongs, in a great degree, to Sir Richard Jenkins, who, during the administration of Lord Minto, addressed several communications to government on the subject, distinguished alike by the fulness of their information and the soundness of their political views.
CHAP. XXV. the season of 1816-17, however, the ravages of the Pindarries extended over a wider expanse of territory than had ever before been attempted. But these enlarged operations were not carried on without considerable checks. On the 25th of December, 1816, Major Lushington,* who was at Preputwaree, with the 4th Madras Native Cavalry, received intelligence that a party of these plunderers had entered the Peishwa's territories by the Wauklee pass, and were engaged in plundering to the southeast of Poona. The news arrived at ten o'clock at night, and three hours afterwards, the regiment, with two gallopper guns, moved in the direction in which the plunderers were reputed to be employed. The carriages of both guns broke down, and they were consequently left on the road, the regiment pursuing its way to Sogaum, where they arrived at seven o'clock on the morning of the 26th, having marched a distance of twenty-two miles. Here they learned that a large body of Pindarries had, on the preceding day, attacked the place, but being beaten off had moved in an easterly direction. Leaving at Sogaum the sick, recruits, heavy baggage, and camp followers, Major Lushington, with three hundred and fifty men, again marched, after a pause of only half-an-hour, and at noon, having performed a further distance of twenty miles, arrived at Kame. At this place he found that the Pindarries had halted on the previous night: they had departed

at day-break; had occupied the morning in firing and plundering several villages in the neighbourhood, and it was believed that they were then at no great distance. The short space of three-quarters of an hour was allotted for refreshment, on the expiration of which the indefatigable band resumed its march in the direction which it was understood the Pindarries had taken. At Pepree, seven miles from Kame, Major Lushington learned with much satisfaction that his labours and those of his men were likely to be soon rewarded by a sight of the enemy; it being stated that their whole body were halted at Cowah, about three miles further, for the purpose of taking a meal. He immediately pushed forward at a brisk pace, and on ascending a rising ground beheld those of whom he was in search busily occupied in cooking and eating. The surprise was complete, and the success proportionate. The Pindarries were mounted and in flight with their usual celerity, but it happened that the ground was favourable for pursuit, which was kept up by various parties for several miles. The killed and wounded of the enemy were estimated at between seven and eight hundred, and many who escaped without personal injury were incapacitated from further pursuing their avocation by the loss of their horses. Captain Thomas Darke, a valuable officer of the regiment engaged in this gallant service, fell by the thrust of a spear soon after the commencement of the pursuit, and this was the only casualty which the English had to lament. Not a man besides was either killed
The distance traversed by Major Lushington and his regiment, including the march, the pursuit, and the return to Cowah, was about seventy miles, and this was performed in seventeen hours, the whole affair being over by six o’clock on the evening of the day on which the troops had taken their departure from Preputwarree.

About the same time a party, which had proceeded to ravage Ganjam, was dispersed with heavy loss by Lieutenant Borthwick. The fugitives subsequently suffered severely from falling in with a party of British troops under Captain J. Caulfield, by whom about four hundred were killed; the English losing only one man. The discomfiture would have been more complete had not the progress of the British party been impeded by two deep nullas, and the pursuit abruptly terminated by the arrival of night. Another large body of Pindarries was surprised about thirty miles west of Bidur, by a light force detached from Hyderabad under Major M‘Dowall, the approach of which was so sudden that the infantry were close upon the tents of the chiefs before they were discovered, and scarcely a man of the party was mounted when the first volley was fired. The surprised party of course fled, and the greater part of their horses and booty was abandoned.

At the close of the year 1816, it was the unanimous opinion of the governor-general and members of council, that the adoption of vigorous measures for the early suppression of the Pindarries had become an indispensable obligation of public duty. But it
was a question whether the attempt should be made during the current season or suspended till the ensuing year, the interval being devoted to making such arrangements as might enable the government to act with greater effect. The preparations which were to be made during the period of postponement it was necessary to conduct with as much privacy as possible, in order to avoid giving alarm to those against whom they were directed, or to other powers who, from various motives, might be expected to make common cause with the Pindarries, and to be inclined to offer obstructions to any measures designed for their suppression. Before the preparations were complete, the determination of the government was fortified by the receipt of a dispatch from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, conveying a qualified approval of such measures as might be necessary for pursuing and chastising the Pindarries, in case of actual invasion of the British territories. "Such an invasion," it was observed, "obviously constitutes a case in which we have a right to call for the co-operation of our allies."

This admission was something gained, for previously the home authorities had "discouraged plans of general confederacy and offensive operations against the Pindarries, with a view to their utter extinction, in anticipation of an apprehended danger;" although

* Secret letter to Bengal, 26th September, 1816. See Papers relating to the Pindarrie and Mahratta wars, printed in conformity to the resolution of the Court of Proprietors of East-India Stock, on the 3rd of March, 1824.
it was now thought fit to explain these intimations, as not intended to restrain the governor-general in the exercise of his judgment and discretion, upon any occasion where actual war upon the British territories "might be commenced by any body of marauders, and where the lives and properties of British subjects might call for efficient protection."

But the interval devoted to preparation for suppressing the ruffian force which had so long, with comparative impunity, desolated and disgraced India was not in other respects a period of repose. Among other sources of disquiet was that arising from the conduct of some turbulent chiefs in the north, who, having possession of the fortresses of Hattrass and Moorsaum, defied the British authority and committed innumerable acts of disorder and violence. A force under Major General D. Marshal was employed to reduce the offending parties to subordination; and succeeded, though not without subjecting Hattrass to a regular siege. The progress of the siege was interrupted by some attempts at negotiation; but it being ascertained that on the part of the enemy no sincere desire for a peaceable adjustment existed, the operations of the siege were renewed with vigour, and prosecuted to a successful issue. Possession of Moorsaum was obtained without difficulty, and the place was dismantled. These events took place early in the year 1817.

It was not, however, exclusively in contests with petty chieftains that the British government was occupied during that eventful year. In that which
preceded it the foundation had been laid for a long and frightful series of warfare and bloodshed. Twelve months after Trimbuckjee Dainglia had been committed to the fortress of Tannah, he found means to escape from it, to become again an engine of disorder and mischief. There appears to have been some deficiency of vigilance in the custody of the prisoner. Little attention was paid to his personal movements, and in fact little was known of them. A habit, which it was subsequently ascertained he had for some time practised, of resorting every evening after dusk to a particular part of the fort, excited neither suspicion nor increased watchfulness, and natives were suffered to pass the gate without examination at hours when peculiar circumspection was called for. As soon as the escape was discovered, the different ferries were secured, with a view to prevent any person quitting the island: but the precaution was too late; Trimbuckjee Dainglia was beyond the reach of his pursuers.*

* Bishop Heber gives the following version of the circumstances of Trimbuckjee Dainglia’s escape, which he received in his progress through some of the upper provinces of India:

"He was kept in custody at Tannah, near Bombay, and while there, a common looking Mahratta groom, with a good character in his hand, came to offer his services to the commanding officer. He was accepted, and had to keep his horse under the window of Trimbuckjee’s prison. Nothing remarkable was observed, except a more than usual attention to his horse, and a habit, while currying and cleaning him, of singing verses from Mahratta songs, all apparently relating to his trade. At length, Trim-
The escape of the miscreant was believed to have been contrived and carried into effect with the full concurrence of the Peishwa, but no substantial proof of this existed. That the prince, after the escape of his unworthy favourite, concealed and protected him, was also a belief sanctioned by the strongest presumption, although the sovereign gave the most solemn assurances to the contrary. In the absence of proof, there was no course for the British government to pursue, but to yield apparent credence to the protestations of the Peishwa, and keep a vigilant eye on his future proceedings.

There was, indeed, abundant reason to be convinced that the Peishwa was exercising, and had long been employing, all his influence to undermine the British power in India. His intrigues extended far and wide, and the malignity of his hostile feelings was attested by his activity in diffusing them. From Baroda, the government were apprized by buckjee disappeared, and the groom followed him; on which it was recollected that his singing had been made up of verses like the following:—

* Behind the bush the bowmen hide,
  The horse beneath the tree,
  Where shall I find a knight will ride
  The jungle paths with me.

* There are five and fifty coursers there,
  And four and fifty men,
  When the fifty-fifth shall mount his steed,
  The Deccan thrives again.'"

_Heber's Narrative_, vol. i. page 585.

This, the bishop remarks, might have been the stratagem of a Scottish borderer.
Captain Carnac of some proceedings on the part of the Peishwa and his agents, sufficiently indicative of that prince's insincerity and hostility. Similar information was communicated from other quarters: every circumstance was calculated to inspire the British government with distrust, and there can be no doubt that this was their feeling.

There was reason for concluding that Trimbuckjee was concealed at no great distance from Poona; and suspicion was excited by intelligence of the assemblage of small parties of armed men in the neighbourhood of Mahadeo, about fifty miles distant from the former place. It was subsequently ascertained that considerable bodies of horse and foot were collecting in the same direction; that recruiting was actively going on throughout the Peishwa's dominions, and that even in the city of Poona, under the very eye of the sovereign, the process was in full operation. Public opinion unanimously pointed out Trimbuckjee as the prime agent in these proceedings, and there was scarcely more hesitation in attributing to him the direct countenance and support of the Peishwa.

The resident, of course, remonstrated. He urged the importance of adopting vigorous measures for dispersing the armed parties, and thus crushing the insurrection in its commencement: a contrary line of conduct, it was pointed out, would lead to the most unfavourable impressions as to the intentions of the Peishwa; and the necessity of prompt and active measures, to relieve himself from the imputation of
participating in the designs of Trimbuckjee, was enforced by the fact, that it was commonly believed and reported throughout the country that the Peishwa approved and sanctioned them. The suppression of the rebel movements, and the capture and surrender of their guilty contriver, were represented as being the only means by which the British government could be convinced of the falsehood of such reports and the fidelity of the Peishwa to his engagements.

The Peishwa, however, was not to be roused; and, in addition to this apathy to military preparations, which, if not sanctioned by his authority, were calculated to place that authority in danger, there were circumstances in his conduct still more suspicious. It was indeed reported that he was in constant communication with Trimbuckjee; that he had even had more than one secret interview with the arch-conspirator himself; and that he had provided considerable sums in gold, as if for some expected emergency. These were but rumours; but there were facts beyond all doubt, which placed the Peishwa’s character for sincerity in a most unfavourable position. He affected ignorance of proceedings to which no one in the country was or could be a stranger. Trimbuckjee’s friends and family remained in high favour, and constantly made excursions into the country, said (and probably with truth) to be for the purpose of consulting with their chief; one of Trimbuckjee’s principal officers, after repeated visits of this kind, finally disappeared, and
the Peishwa declared himself unable to account for him. Some changes took place in the prince's habits so extraordinary as to excite general surprise. He made a journey to Joonere, while Trimbuckjee was supposed to be in that part of the country, which was alleged to be in discharge of an obligation of piety. He stated that, when in prison, he had made a vow of an annual pilgrimage to Joonere; but it was remarkable that for twenty years he had neglected to perform it—a fact exceedingly discreditable either to the activity of his memory or the steadfastness of his devotion. He chose also to seclude himself from observation at Phoolosehr, taking great pains to induce the British resident to believe that he was detained there much against his desire by an injury to his arm, the injury being only a slight bruise, and the distance which he had to travel but sixteen miles. He had been accustomed, from the time of his restoration, to make annual journeys to Goagur and Copergaum; but these places not possessing the attraction of Joonere, were now neglected, even when the state of his arm no longer afforded an excuse.

The suspicious conduct of the Peishwa, in other respects, was corroborated by the warlike preparations which were evidently in progress. Troops were raised, forts repaired, and every thing seemed to announce impending hostility. Finding it useless to persevere in his former course, Mr. Elphinstone at length assumed a higher tone, and resolved upon more decisive measures. The British troops
at Poona were put in motion, and by them the insurgents were driven from their haunts, near Mahadeo, to the northern part of the Peishwa's territories. This being performed, and the Peishwa's preparations continuing, Mr. Elphinstone determined on drawing the light division of the troops at his disposal to Poona, to be there ready for any emergency that might arise. The impressions which the Peishwa's conduct had made on the resident were distinctly announced, and it was intimated that the latter abstained from measures even more active, only till he received the instructions of his own government.

By the time the proposed disposition of the British troops was completed, Mr. Elphinstone received such an intimation of the views of the Bengal government, as enabled him to go on without hesitation. His first intention was to surround the city, demand from the Peishwa hostages for the surrender of Trimbuckjee within a given time, and in the event of non-compliance, to force the palace and seize the person of the sovereign. The justice of such a proceeding could scarcely be dubious, considering the provocation that had been received and the reasonable nature of that demand; but it was abandoned from two motives, highly creditable to the resident—a nice sense of honour, and a laudable feeling of humanity. Notwithstanding his repeated declarations, that decided measures would be resorted to if the conduct of the Peishwa continued to render them necessary, after the arrival of the sanc-
tion of the British government, it was thought that, as intercourse with the resident had never been entirely broken off, the Peishwa had some reason to expect a more formal notice before proceeding to extremities. The nature of the connection existing between the states, and the means by which the British government had obtained a footing in the Peishwa's territory, were also justly regarded by Mr. Elphinstone as entitling that prince to be treated with more delicacy than an ordinary belligerent. The second ground of forbearance was a consideration of the probable fate of the city. The people had been accustomed to regard the British force as a friendly one: its approach and subsequent preparations had excited no more alarm among the inhabitants than the arrival of so many fellow-subjects. It was felt by the resident to be cruel to expose the people to injury from those whom they regarded as their friends; and, as the prince had upwards of seven thousand infantry in Poona, besides a body of cavalry, and a fortified palace in the centre of the city, it was obvious that he could not be expected to yield without a struggle, and that, in the event of a contest, it was impossible but that the inhabitants should suffer severely. From the influence of these considerations, Mr. Elphinstone was withheld from acting on his first feelings, and a further season of repentance was afforded to the Peishwa, if he were disposed to embrace it.

In the meantime the insurgents continued their progress, began to unite their forces from distant
chap.xxv. places, and took possession of one of the Peishwa's forts. They were represented as having obtained entrance by personating countrymen carrying bundles of grass, in which they had concealed arms. This stratagem had been sometimes practised in towns where there was a considerable influx of country people carrying their goods to the market, and under such circumstances the disguised persons might pass unsuspected; but it was little adapted to a hill fort, where there was only a small garrison, no market, and no great consumption of grass. The gross improbability of the story was pointed out to the person who related it to Mr. Elphinstone, and he was very clearly given to understand that the resident was not imposed upon by the idle tale with which it had been attempted to abuse his judgment.

The stoppage of the post by the insurgents in a.d. 1817. Cuttack, in the early part of May, 1817, rendered the receipt of the further instructions from his government, for which Mr. Elphinstone was looking, a matter of great uncertainty. He was thus left in a great degree to the uncontrolled exercise of his own judgment. Every thing seemed to call for prompt and vigorous action. It was impossible to suppose that the British government would be satisfied without the surrender of Trimbuckjee, and it was the universal opinion that the Peishwa would not give him up: in an extreme emergency, the probability was, that the Peishwa would fly to Rye-ghur, in the Concan, where it would be impossible to carry on operations after the setting in of the
monsoon, which might be expected to take place early in June. A lengthened contest was above all things to be avoided; the position of the Peishwa, as the nominal head of the Mahrattas, rendering a junction of all the Mahratta states against the British highly probable.

Feeling the pressure of these circumstances, Mr. Elphinstone sent a message to the minister, to the effect that he had a communication to make which must bring the question of peace or war to a decision, and that he should forward it on the following morning. The actual transmission of the communication referred to was delayed by a message from the Peishwa, inviting the resident to a conference, which accordingly took place. Mr. Elphinstone then demanded the surrender of Trimbuckjee, as an indispensable condition of adjustment. The Peishwa, though informed that the consequence would be immediate war, still sought to evade compliance, and refused to be bound by any engagement. On the following day the threatened communication was made to the Peishwa's minister. Its purport was, to demand that the Peishwa should, within twenty-four hours, engage to deliver up Trimbuckjee within a month from that day, and should give up his forts of Singhur, Poorandur, and Ryeghur, as pledges for the fulfilment of his engagement.

The minister received the paper with extraordinary indifference. Before the expiration of the prescribed time, however, some attempts were made
to procure a mitigation of the terms. This was refused, and the city was ultimately surrounded by the British forces. The people now manifested some alarm, but it was speedily allayed by the withdrawal of the troops, in consequence of a communication to the resident, accepting the proffered conditions. The forts were forthwith placed in possession of the British.

But, though the Peishwa yielded to difficulties which he was not in a condition to overcome, he was still anxious to find some means of escaping the consequences of his engagement. He appears to have courted the advice of counsellors of the most opposite sentiments, and to have vacillated between their conflicting opinions as his inclinations or his fears preponderated. Terrified at the prospect of the precipice upon which he stood, and swayed in some degree by the judgment of the more moderate part of his advisers, he at length issued a proclamation, offering a large reward for the apprehension of Trimbuckjee, dead or alive, and smaller rewards for any information concerning his adherents; a pardon was at the same time promised to all who should desert him, with the exception of twelve individuals, and those who should still refuse to come in, against whom severe penalties were denounced: the property of the twelve excepted persons, as well as that of Trimbuckjee, was confiscated. Negotiations then commenced for the purpose of fixing the future relations of the Peishwa with the British govern-
ment, and a treaty was finally concluded on the 13th of June, containing some provisions of great importance.

By the first article of this treaty, the guilt of Trimbuckjee Dainglia, and the obligation to punish him, were admitted; the Peishwa engaged to use his utmost efforts to seize and deliver him up to the East-India Company; the family of the criminal were to remain as hostages with the British government, and all who sided in his rebellion, and who had not surrendered to the proclamation, were to be punished. The second article confirmed the treaty of Bassein in all points not varied by the new treaty. The third article extended one in the treaty of Bassein, by which the Peishwa engaged to dismiss all Europeans, natives of states at war with Great Britain. He was now bound never to admit into his territories any subject of either European or American powers, without the consent of the British government. By the fourth, the Peishwa bound himself not to open a negotiation with any other power, except in concert with the Company's government, nor to admit the residence of vakeels or agents at his court. The great Mahratta confederacy was by this article dissolved, the Peishwa renouncing all connection with the other Mahratta powers, and consequently his station, as their head, with certain exceptions.

The fifth article related to the matters in dispute between the Peishwa and the Guicowar; the former renouncing all right of supremacy over the latter,
but with a reserve for his existing pecuniary claims, which, in accordance with the treaty of Bassein, were to be referred to the arbitration of the Company, unless the Guicowar should consent to the annual payment of four lacs of rupees, in which case the reference was not to take place. The sixth article annulled one of the articles of the treaty of Bassein, by which the Peishwa consented to furnish to the British government, in time of war, a certain number of troops, with a due proportion of ordnance and military stores, and substituted in its place one, by which he was required to provide funds for the payment of a force of similar strength, to place the British government in possession of the means of providing this contingent.

The seventh article transferred to the British government, in perpetuity, certain territories and rights, which were enumerated in an accompanying schedule. The eighth article provided for the convenient execution of the seventh; and the ninth, tenth, and eleventh had the same object. By the twelfth, the fort of Ahmednugger was surrendered to the Company. The thirteenth and fourteenth extinguished the Peishwa's rights in Bundlecund and Hindostan. The fifteenth provided for an object very desirable to the British government and the Guicowar state, the renewal of the lease of the farm of Ahmedabad. The sixteenth article related to the settlement of the southern jaghireadors, and the seventeenth to the evacuation of the fort and territory of Mailgaut. The eighteenth related to
the authentication and confirmation of the treaty. CHAP. XXV.

With the efforts of Mr. Elphinstone, in conducting the negotiation to such a conclusion, the British authorities had every reason to be satisfied; and the treaty, while it provided for the just expectations of the more powerful party, was not inequitable nor unnecessarily harsh as concerned the vanquished.

The Peishwa, however, was dissatisfied, and though unreasonably, not unnaturally. It was impossible that he could forbear contrasting his present humiliated condition with his former lofty pretensions, as the head of a people who had spread the terror of their arms over a large portion of India. It had now been shewn to him that he held his dominions at the mercy of the British government—the discovery was unavoidable, but it was necessarily far from pleasing. The obstinacy of the Peishwa had accelerated a crisis which the prudence of the Company's government would have postponed indefinitely; and notwithstanding they were blameless, he was indignant.

A few months only elapsed before it became evident that the Peishwa was again preparing for some hostile proceedings. Levies of troops took place unremittingly throughout his dominions, and by the 1st of October (the treaty having been concluded on the 13th of June previously), there was not a single horseman in the country out of employ. The quality neither of the horses nor men was regarded; number seemed the only thing kept in view. The ostensible motive for these preparations was a desire to
comply with the wish of the British government for co-operation against the Pindarries. This disguise was, however, worn too loosely to deceive. In an interview with the British resident, in which the intended movements of the armies against the Pindarries were explained, the Peishwa did not think it necessary even to affect any interest in the suppression of the marauders; his conversation being entirely confined to complaints of his own degradation. From various circumstances it was inferred that he was about to aim a blow at the British power, and though an appearance of confidence was maintained on both sides, it was formal and hollow.

Among other indications of the spirit by which the government of the Peishwa was actuated, were numerous attempts to corrupt the native troops in the British service. It was in consequence deemed necessary to remove them from the town to a new position. The Peishwa then, as if in defiance, pushed forward his own troops, and it was announced that he intended to form a camp between the old cantonments of the British army and the new. At last, on the 5th November, hostilities actually commenced, by the Peishwa’s troops moving so as to cut off the residency from the British camp. The residency was forthwith plundered and burned, but by the prompt advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Burr, the enemy, after a severe action, was repulsed, and retired. The resident was on the field throughout the action, animating the zeal of the troops, and
aiding the commanding officer by the suggestions which his local knowledge enabled him to offer. The strength of the British force was about two thousand eight hundred; the Peishwa's army was composed of not less than twenty-five thousand men.

It now became necessary to obtain possession of Poona; but this could not be effected by the small force in the neighbourhood. On the indication of approaching hostilities, Brigadier-General Lionel Smith, with the force under his command, had been summoned by Mr. Elphinstone from the south bank of the Godavery. That officer arrived at Poona on the evening of the 13th of November. On the 14th, arrangements were made for attacking the enemy, who were encamped on the opposite side of the river; but the design was abandoned, in consequence of the occurrence of unexpected difficulties. On the 16th, all the disposable corps, after providing for the camp and for the position of Kirtling, were formed in divisions of attack. The passage of one of the divisions over the ford was obstinately resisted by the Peishwa's troops, but the ill success of this resistance seems to have perfected the panic to which the previous defeat received from Colonel Burr had given rise. At two o'clock on the morning of the 17th the Peishwa fled, and the enemy having thus disappeared, the British force recrossed the river to take the most favourable ground for bombardment, the city; but this dreadful measure was happily unnecessary, the defence of the place having
been left to a few hundred Arabs, who were prevailed upon to withdraw.

The state of affairs at Poona had rendered it necessary to combine with the measures in preparation for the suppression of the Pindarries, such other movements as might be requisite to counteract the treacherous hostility of the Peishwa. The arrangements of the governor-general were accordingly framed with reference to both these objects, and they were conceived upon a large scale. The force on which he relied was partly to be furnished from the army in the Deccan, and partly from that of Bengal. Sir Thomas Hislop, commander-in-chief of the army of Madras, was intrusted with the command of the military force, as well as with a controlling authority over all political affairs in the Deccan. An illness, by which he was attacked, and which detained him for some time at Hyderabad, together with the unusual violence of the monsoon, delayed the advance of this portion of the British force, and consequently of that proceeding from Bengal, it being inexpedient to place the latter in circumstances which would deprive it of those advantages of combined operation and support, which it had been a chief object of the governor-general to secure. The Bengal army consisted of three principal divisions and a reserve. On the 16th of October, 1817, the governor-general commenced his march from Cawnpore, and having joined the central division of the Bengal army at Secundra, crossed the Jumna on the 26th, and
reached his destined position, on the Scind, on the 6th November. The left division had previously assembled in Bundelcund, and was prepared to advance towards Saugor, with a view to co-operate with the right of Sir Thomas Hislop's army against the Pindarrie posts. The right division assembled at the same period, ready to advance to Dholpore, on the Chumbul, as soon as circumstances should render it necessary; while the reserve, commanded by Sir David Ochterlony, was assembled near Rewaree. This part of the British force was destined to cover Delhi, to support our negotiations with the Rajpoot states (for in the East a negotiator never succeeds so well as when he has an army at his back), to perform the same office with regard to Ameer Khan, and eventually to attack the latter, or interpose between him and Holkar, if they should manifest any perverse or hostile feeling.

Besides these principal divisions of the Bengal force destined for active operations, two detachments were formed, designed principally for purposes of defence, but capable of acting offensively if necessary. One of these, under Brigadier-General Toone, was posted near Ooutaree, on the frontier of Behar. The other, under Brigadier-General Hardyman, was formed at Mirzapore, and thence advanced to Rewa, for the purpose of securing the passes in that country, and the adjacent districts, in order to defeat any attempt of the Pindarries to penetrate into the British territories in that direction; while the principal part of the force was in
advance. A force was also stationed in Cuttack, sufficient to guard that frontier from the entrance of the Pindarries through Nagpore.

The troops from the Deccan were distributed in five chief divisions and a reserve. The first was commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop in person, and this was to have crossed the Nerudda in the direction of Hindia, in conjunction with the third division under Sir John Malcolm. But this arrangement was frustrated by the detention of Sir Thomas Hislop at Hyderabad. The division of Sir John Malcolm consequently crossed alone, about the middle of November, and that of Sir Thomas Hislop at a later date. The fifth division, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. Adams, was to cross the river at Hoosingabad, at the same time with the other divisions destined to act in advance. Two divisions, the second and fourth, still remain to be accounted for. Of these, the former, under Brigadier-General Doveton, had a position assigned to it in the neighbourhood of Akolee, on the Nizam’s frontier, to protect that line from attack, to support, if required, the troops in advance, and to sustain the British interests at Nagpore; the latter, under Brigadier-General Lionel Smith, was intended to perform the like service with regard to the Peishwa’s territory, and at the same time to keep Holkar in check. Considerable bodies of troops were also maintained at Hyderabad, at Poona, and at Nagpore, as at none of those places could tranquillity be relied upon. The corps of reserve was assembled on the frontier of
the ceded districts, and was subsequently advanced to a position on the Krishna, from which point it could support the troops either at Hyderabad or at Poona: a separate detachment occupied the southern country recently ceded by the Peishwa. The Guzerat field force, under Sir William Keir, was also assembled in advance of Baroda, ready to move into Malwa.*

* The distribution of the two armies into divisions was as follows:

THE ARMY OF BENGAL.

FIRST OR CENTRE DIVISION.
Major-General Brown commanding.

First Brigade of Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Philpot, 24th Light Dragoons, to command.
3rd Regiment Native Cavalry.
His Majesty's 24th Light Dragoons.
7th Regiment Native Cavalry.

First Brigade Infantry.
Brigadier-General d'Auvergne, to command.
2nd Battalion 25th Native Infantry.
His Majesty's 87th Regiment of Foot.
1st Battalion 29th Native Infantry.

Third Brigade of Infantry.
Colonel Burrell, 13th Native Infantry, to command.
2nd Battalion 11th Native Infantry.
1st ditto 24th ditto.
2nd ditto 13th ditto.

Second Brigade of Infantry.
Colonel Dick, 9th Native Infantry, to command.
2nd Battalion 1st Native Infantry.
Flank Battalion.
1st Battalion 8th Native Infantry.
CHAP. XXV. The advance of the troops from the Deccan of course excited some attention, but in a degree quite

THE SECOND OR RIGHT DIVISION.
Major-General R. S. Donkin commanding.

Second Brigade of Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Westerna, 8th Light Dragoons, commanding.
1st Regiment Native Cavalry.
His Majesty's 8th Light Dragoons.
Colonel Gardiner's Irregulars.

Fourth Brigade of Infantry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Vamennon, 12th Native Infantry, commanding.
2nd Battalion 12th Native Infantry.
His Majesty's 14th Foot.
1st Battalion 27th Native Infantry.
1st ditto 25th ditto.

THE THIRD, OR LEFT DIVISION.
Major-General D. Marshall commanding.

Third Brigade of Cavalry.
Colonel Newberry, 24th Light Dragoons, commanding.
4th Regiment Native Cavalry.
2nd Rohillah Horse.
Four Russalahs 3rd Rohillah Horse.

Fifth Brigade of Infantry.
Brigadier-General Watson to command.
1st Battalion 1st Native Infantry.
1st ditto 26th ditto.
1st ditto 7th ditto.

Sixth Brigade of Infantry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Price, 28th Native Infantry, commanding.
1st Battalion 14th Native Infantry.
2nd ditto 28th ditto.

THE RESERVE DIVISION.
disproportioned to the importance of the movement. CHAP.XXV.
Scindia was especially interested in the matter, and

Fourth Brigade of Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Knox, 2nd Native Cavalry, commanding.
2nd Regiment Native Cavalry.
Two Corps of Colonel Skinner’s Horse.

Seventh Brigade of Infantry.
Colonel Huskisson, His Majesty’s 67th, to command.
2nd Battalion 5th Native Infantry.
His Majesty’s 67th Regiment of Foot.
1st Battalion 6th Native Infantry.

Eighth Brigade of Infantry.
Brigadier-General Arnold commanding.
2nd Battalion 7th Native Infantry.
1st ditto 28th ditto.
Detachment Simroor Battalion.
2nd Battalion 19th Native Infantry.

THE ARMY OF THE DECCAN.

THE FIRST OR ADVANCED DIVISION,
under the personal command of
His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, Bart.,
Commander-in-Chief.

Light Artillery Brigade.
Captain-Lieutenant H. Rudyerd commanding.
The Troop of Horse-Artillery, and the Cavalry Gallopers incorporated with it.
The Rocket Troop.

Cavalry Brigade.
Major Lushington commanding.
4th Regiment Light Cavalry.
Detachment of His Majesty’s 22nd Light Dragoons.
8th Regiment Light Cavalry.
the passage of a division of the army of the Deccan through his territories rendered it necessary to in-

Light Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Deacon commanding.
The Rifle Corps.
1st Battalion 3rd or Palamcottah Light Infantry.
1st ditto 16th or Trichinopoly ditto.
2nd ditto 17th or Chicacole ditto.

First Infantry Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson commanding.
Flank Companies His Majesty's Royal Scots.
1st Battalion 7th Regiment Native Infantry.
Madras European Regiment.

Second Infantry Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Scott commanding.
1st Battalion 14th Regiment Native Infantry.
2nd ditto 6th ditto.

The second, or Hyderabad Division.
Brigadier-General J. Doveton commanding.

Cavalry Brigade.
Major H. Hunt commanding.
Three Brigades Horse-Artillery.
6th Regiment Light Cavalry.

First Brigade of Infantry.
Lieutenant-Colonel N. Macleod commanding.
His Majesty's Royal Scots.
2nd Battalion 13th Regiment Native Infantry.
2nd ditto 24th ditto.

Second Brigade of Infantry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Mackellar commanding.
1st Battalion 11th Regiment Native Infantry.
2nd ditto 14th ditto.
1st ditto 12th, or Wallajahbad Light Infantry.
1st ditto 2nd Regiment Native Infantry.
form him of the purpose of its being put in motion. **CHAP. XXV.**
The requisite communication was made by the resi-

*Berar Brigade.*
Major Pitman commanding.
Four Battalions Native Infantry.
Detail of Artillery, Eight Guns.
Reformed Horse.
*Hyderabad Brigade.*
Colonel Sir Augustus Floyer, K.C.B., commanding.
1st Battalion 22nd Regiment Native Infantry.
1st ditto 21st ditto.
Five Companies Madras European Regiment.
Detail of Artillery.
1st Battalion 8th Regiment Native Infantry.

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**THE THIRD DIVISION.**
Colonel Patrick Walker, Brigadier.
One Brigade Horse Artillery.
3rd Regiment Light Cavalry.
Five Companies 1st Battalion 3rd or Palamcottah Light Infantry.
Russell Brigade—1st Regiment.
2nd Regiment.
Ellichapoor Contingent, Two Battalions and Four Guns.
4000 Mysore Horse.

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**THE FOURTH, OR POONAH DIVISION.**
Brigadier-General Smith, C.B., commanding.
*Cavalry Brigade.*
Lieutenant-Colonel Colebrooke commanding.
Three Brigades Horse Artillery.
2nd Regiment Madras Light Cavalry.
Light Battalion.
*First Infantry Brigade.*
Lieutenant-Colonel Milnes commanding.
1st Battalion 2nd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.
His Majesty's 65th Regiment Foot.
CHAP. XXV. dent, Captain Close, and was met, as every thing is met at a native durbar, by an attempt to gain time.

Second Infantry Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzsimons commanding.
1st Battalion 3rd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.
2nd ditto 15th ditto Madras ditto.

Third Infantry Brigade.
2nd Battalion 9th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry.
2nd ditto 1st ditto.

THE FIFTH, OR NAGPOOR DIVISION.

First Infantry Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel M. Morin commanding.
1st Battalion 10th Regiment Native Infantry.
2nd ditto 23rd ditto.
1st ditto 19th ditto.

Second Infantry Brigade.
Major Popham commanding.
2nd Battalion 10th Regiment Native Infantry.
1st ditto 23rd ditto.
1st ditto 19th ditto.

Reserve Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Gahan commanding.
Three troops Native Horse-Artillery.
5th Regiment Native Cavalry.
6th ditto.
1st Rohillah Cavalry.
Light Infantry Battalion.

THE RESERVE DIVISION.
Brigadier-General Munro commanding.
Brigadier-General Pritzler, second in command.

Artillery.
Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple commanding.
Detachment Madras Artillery.
This being resisted, a tardy, and without doubt a reluctant, assent was given to the passage of the troops.

This, however, was not sufficient. It was necessary to obtain either Scindia’s active co-operation against the Pindarries, or at least his neutrality, and the exertions of the resident were directed accordingly. While the negotiations were pending, an extraordinary circumstance occurred, illustrative of the feeling entertained by Scindia. This was the

**Cavalry Brigade.**

Major Doveton, 7th Light Cavalry, commanding.

His Majesty’s 22nd Light Dragoons.

7th Regiment Madras Cavalry.

**Infantry Brigade.**

Colonel Hewitt, C.B., commanding.

European Flank Battalion.

Four Companies Madras Rifle Corps.

2nd Battalion 4th Regiment Native Infantry.

2nd ditto 12th ditto.

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**THE GOOZERAT DIVISION.**

Major-General Sir William Grant Keir, K.M.T.

**Cavalry Brigade.**

Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable L. Stanhope commanding.

His Majesty’s 17th Dragoons.

Flank Battalion.

**First Infantry Brigade.**

Lieutenant-Colonel Elrington commanding.

His Majesty’s 47th Regiment.

2nd Battalion 7th Regiment.

**Second Infantry Brigade.**

Lieutenant-Colonel Corsellis commanding.

Grenadier Battalion.

1st Battalion 8th Regiment.
CHAP. XXV. Arrest of two messengers conveying letters from Scindia's court to Catmandoo. As there was no customary intercourse between the two courts, its occurrence could not fail to excite strong suspicion. A part of the letters were open and part sealed. The former were read, and though the language was obscure, they evidently related to some project for a combination against the British government. The sealed letters were delivered to Scindia by the resident in the state in which they were found. Scindia made no attempt to explain his conduct, but the discovery was not without effect upon the progress of the negotiation.

A treaty, comprising twelve articles, was forthwith concluded with Scindia; by the first of which, the contracting parties engaged to employ the forces of their respective governments, and of their allies and dependents, in prosecuting operations against the Pindarries, and other hordes of associated free-booters, to expel them from their haunts, and to adopt the most effectual measures to disperse and prevent them from re-assembling. The forces of the two governments and their allies were immediately to attack the robbers and their associates, according to a concerted plan of operations, and not to desist until the objects of their engagement were entirely accomplished; and Scindia, on his part, promised his utmost efforts to seize the persons of the Pindarrie leaders and their families, and to deliver them up to the British government.

The second article referred to the settlements
which the Pindarries had gained in the territories of Scindia, and in those of other states. With regard to the former, the lands were to be immediately secured by the maharajah, who engaged never again to admit the plunderers to possession. The other lands were to be restored to their respective owners, provided they exerted themselves to the required extent in expelling the Pindarries, and entered into similar engagements never to re-admit them, or to become concerned with them in any way whatever. In default of these conditions being complied with, the lands were to be delivered to Scindia, and held by him on the stipulated terms.

The third article extended and completed the first, and the former part of the second. By it Scindia engaged never to admit the Pindarries, or any other predatory bodies, into his territories, to give them the smallest countenance or support, or to permit his officers to do so. On the contrary, he promised to issue the most positive orders to all his officers, civil and military, enforced by the severest penalties, to employ their utmost efforts to expel or destroy any body of plunderers who might attempt to take refuge in his territories; and all officers disregarding these orders were to be dealt with as rebels to the maharajah, and enemies to the British government.

The fourth article commenced by formally announcing, that the Maharajah Dowlut Row Scindia was the undisputed master of his own troops and resources. This sounding overture was precursory
to a stipulation for placing the troops and resources, of which he was the undoubted master, at the disposal of the British government, for which he certainly entertained no warm affection. The article proceeds to declare, that for the more effectual accomplishment of the objects of the treaty, the divisions of the maharajah's troops (amounting to five thousand horse), employed in active operations against the Pindaries or other freebooters, should act in concert with the British troops, and in conformity to the plan that might be counselled by the officer commanding the British divisions with which they might be appointed to act—that a British officer should be stationed with each division of the maharajah's troops, to be the channel of communication between them and the British commanding officer: and in order farther to forward the purposes of their conjoint operations, the maharajah engaged that all his officers, civil and military, should afford every degree of support and assistance in their power to the British, in procuring supplies or otherwise to the British troops operating in his territories; and all who should neglect this duty were subject to the same appalling denunciation with which the third article closed.

The fifth article commenced with a very important stipulation—that the divisions of Scindia's army appointed to act with the British troops should be marched in a state of complete equipment, both men and horses, and regularly paid. To make provision for these vital objects, and, as the
framers of the treaty considerately express it, to prevent all future discussions or disputes," Scindia consented to renounce for three years the payments made by the British government to him, to certain members of his family, and to ministers of his government. These sums were to be appropriated to the payment of his troops, through the British officers stationed with them, the British government engaging that, at the termination of the war, and after the satisfaction of the claims of the troops, any balance that might remain due should be paid to the maharajah. For the same purpose as that for which the above payments were relinquished, Scindia agreed to surrender for two years the tribute to which he was entitled from the states of Joudpore, Bhoondee, and Kotah. These two articles, as well as the succeeding one, were directed to the removal of a difficulty which the Marquess of Hastings had foreseen, and was anxious to guard against. "It was manifest," he observes, in one of his despatches, "that no active or useful aid was to be expected from Scindia's troops, if left to the direction of his own officers."

By the sixth article it was agreed that the troops of Scindia, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, should during the war occupy such positions as might be assigned by the British government, and should not change them without the express concurrence of that government. The necessity of giving a reason for this stipulation, rather than for any other in the treaty, is not apparent; but one is given,
namely, that unconnected movements are calculated to derange the joint operations of the two states, and to give undue advantage to the enemy. For the due execution of the stipulation in this article, the British government was to be at liberty to station an officer in each division of the maharajah's army.

The seventh article assumes that the force to be put in motion by the British government, combined with that actually in the service of India, would be fully sufficient to chastise the Pindaries, and effect the objects of the treaty; and, in consequence, proceeds to provide that, to prevent the possibility of collusion between the maharajah's officers and the Pindaries, the forces of the former should not be increased during the war without the approval of the British government. His officers were also prohibited from admitting into the ranks of his army, or otherwise harbouring or protecting, any of the Pindaries, or other freebooters. This article, like two former ones, concludes by denouncing those who may break it, as rebels to Scindia and enemies of the British government.

The eighth article was not an unimportant one. It declares that, with a view to the more effectual prosecution of the joint operations of the two governments, and to the facility and security of the communication of the British troops with their supplies, the maharajah, reposing entire confidence in the friendship and good faith of the British government (which was assuredly far more than the British
government could repose in his), agrees that British garrisons should be admitted into the forts of Hindia and Asseergurh, and should be charged with the care and defence of them during the war, with the liberty of establishing dépôts in them. The flag of Scindia was, however, to continue to fly at Asseergurh, and he was at liberty to station a killadar, with a personal guard of fifty men, there; but the actual command of the place, as well as of Hindia, and the disposal of the warlike stores in both, were to be exclusively in the British. Some minor regulations followed with respect to stores and the movements of the garrisons; and it was stipulated that the territories dependent on the forts should continue to be managed by the officers of the maharajah, who were to receive every support from the British government and its officers. The whole of the resources, or such part as might be necessary, were to be appropriated to the payment of the troops, as stipulated in the fifth article: an account to be rendered at the conclusion of the war. At the same period the forts were to be restored in the condition in which they had been received—all private property was to be respected, and the inhabitants of the dependent towns and villages were to enjoy the protection of the British government, and to be permitted to depart with their property, if they should think proper.

The ninth article provided for an object which the Marquis of Hastings deemed necessary for
the attainment of the purposes which he had in view. By a former treaty the British government was restrained from entering into any treaty with the rajas of Oudepore, Joudpore, and Kotah, or other chief tributaries of Dowlut Row Scindia, situated in Malwa, Mewar, or Marwar. Of this provision the governor-general was desirous to procure the abrogation, an alliance with those states being indispensable to the contemplated arrangements for preventing the renewal of the predatory system: it was accordingly abrogated by the ninth article of the new treaty, upon the ground that the main object of the contracting parties was to prevent for ever the revival of the predatory system in any form, and that both governments were satisfied that to accomplish this wise and just end, it might be necessary for the British government to form engagements of friendship and alliance with the several states of Hindostan. Full liberty was therefore given to form engagements with the states of Oudepore, Joudpore, and Kotah, with the state of Bhoondee, and with other substantive states on the left bank of the Chumbul. But the article was not to be construed as giving that government any right to interfere with states or chiefs in Malwa or Guzerat, clearly and indisputably dependent on or tributary to the maharajah, whose authority over those states or chiefs was to continue on the same footing as before. The British government bound itself, in the event of concluding any engagements
with the states of Oudepore, Joudpore, Kotah, chap. xxv. Bhoondee, or any others on the left bank of the Chumbul, to secure to Scindia his ascertained tribute, and to guarantee its payment in perpetuity; Scindia engaging on no account or pretence to interfere, in any shape, in the affairs of those states without the concurrence of the British government.

The tenth article referred to a contingency not very improbable, the occurrence of which is deprecated with a degree of solemnity which charity must hope to have been sincere. This article is too edifying to be abstracted or abridged; it must be given at length, and in its original energy, without alteration or dilution. It runs thus:—"If (which God forbid!) the British government and the maharajah shall be compelled to wage war with any other state, on account of such state attacking either of the contracting parties, or aiding or protecting the Pindarries, or other freebooters, the British government, having at heart the welfare of Dowlut Row Scindia, will, in the event of success, and of his highness's zealous performance of his engagements, make the most liberal arrangements for the consolidation and increase of his territories." This display of piety and moderation is very remarkable, when it is remembered that one of the contracting parties was Dowlut Row Scindia. The terms of the treaty were, without doubt, dictated by the British government, and
neither Scindia nor his servants were accountable for this effusion of virtuous feeling; but to whomsoever it is to be attributed, it is most unhappily out of place with reference to the character of the Mahratta chief, as well as to the total want of community of religious belief between the parties who joined in it.

After so rich a display of pious elevation, the descent to ordinary language is somewhat painful. It is proper, however, to mention, that the eleventh article provides for the continuance of such objects of the treaty of 1805 as were not affected by the new one, and the twelfth engages for the exchange of ratifications.

Such was the treaty concluded with Scindia by Captain Close, and which provided for all the objects which the governor-general had in view. It was ratified early in November, 1817, and shortly afterwards the ninth article was rendered operative by the conclusion of treaties with the Rajpoot states. A treaty with Ameer Khan was also concluded. This person, who has been characterized, and, it is believed, not unjustly, as "one of the most atrocious villains that India ever produced," was, on the whole, fortunate. The British government agreed to protect him in his possessions, on condition of his disbanding his army, surrendering his guns, relinquishing his Pindarrie habits, dissolving his connection with those plunderers, and keeping better company. Seeing that he had no better
claims to indulgence than those whom the English chap.xxv. sought to extirpate, Ameer Khan had certainly reason to felicitate himself upon his good luck.*

* Frequent mention has been made of Ameer Khan, and a few particulars of his life, in addition to those adverted to in the progress of the narrative, may not be uninteresting. He was the son of a man called Mohummud Hyat Khan, and the following record of his nativity is found in a work, not compiled by himself, for the literary acquirements of the Ameer were insufficient for such a task, but written by his moonshee from his dictation, and presented by the adventurer to Lord William Bentinck as his own history of his own life:—" In the Hegira year 1182 (A.D. 1768-69), a star of the constellation of glory and a sun in the heaven of renown was given to the hopes and wishes of Mohummud Hyat Khan at a happy hour, through the propitious birth of the Ameer. He came forth like a constellation in the zodiac of honour, and enlightened the night of his parents' hopes by the effulgence of his beauty and perfections. The voice of joy and of congratulation rose high in the arch of heaven's vault, and the budding branch of the hopes of mankind blossomed with the promise of the fruits of their aspirations." This paragon of beauty and perfection, on approaching to man's estate, began to be influenced by that propensity for a life of violence and plunder which is common to so many of his countrymen. "No sooner," says he, "had the shoot of his years come to bear the fruit of youth, and his lip sprouted with the crop of manhood's prime, than the leaven of his ambition fermented within him, and the desire of trying his fortune in the wide world became unconquerable. Truly the high-spirited falcon cannot be kept to the nest when its wings and talons are full grown, neither can the lion of noble courage be confined to a corner of its den after it has attained full strength." Accordingly, this "high-spirited falcon" left his father's house in search of employment, and though little scrupulous as to its character, returned disappointed. At a later period he again departed, "and with a few associates took the road of adventure." He was now somewhat more fortunate. In an incredibly short time he served a multitude of masters, after which series of experiments he fell in
with some chieftains who, having been expelled from their pos-
sessions, had taken to a life of promiscuous plunder in Malwa.
"The Ameer," as his scribe very composedly states, "joined
them, and was party to most of their enterprises." The affairs
of his patrons being retrieved, the Ameer was again in the
market, and after some further exploits of very questionable cha-
acter, he transferred to Jeswunt Rao Holkar the services of him-
self and his followers, over whom it has been said that he retained
so limited a measure of authority, that during half the year he
was usually the prisoner of his mutinous troops. Ameer Khan
is next found in the service of the Rajah of Jeypore, then engaged
in hostilities with the Rajah of Joudpore. The circumstances
were the following. The daughter of the Rana of Oudepore,
represented as being distinguished by her beauty still more than
by her high birth, was betrothed to a Rajah of Joudpore, who
died before the celebration of the nuptials. His cousin, by
whom he was succeeded, and the Rajah of Jeypore then became
competitors for the hand of the beautiful princess, and the result
was war. About this time the Ameer suspected Holkar of a
design to take him off by treachery, and he ascribes the defeat
of the project to his having been prevented from meeting Holkar
at a specified time by a tumult raised by some unpaid troops, an
event by no means uncommon. A meeting between the two
friends took place afterwards, and the Ameer, who declares his
own "conduct and character, within and without," to have been
"clear as the spotless sun," gave Holkar some very character-
istic advice. It was, that while an understanding should be
maintained between Holkar and himself the former should join
the Rajah of Joudpore, and the latter continue in the employ-
ment of the Rajah of Jeypore. "We should by that means,"
said this rival of the spotless sun, "turn the conflict to our own
purposes,

* Now Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalf, G.C.B., formerly
lieutenant-governor of the north-western provinces, subsequently
governor of Jamaica, and since his return from that colony ap-
pointed governor of Canada.
While new engagements of amity were in course of formation, the relations of peace previously sub-

purposes, spinning it out at pleasure till the resources of both were exhausted and till both were in our power." Holkar, however, declined the advice, and proceeded to Indore, while the Ameer marched with the Rajah of Jeypore against Joudpore, which country was speedily overrun. But a coolness arose between the victorious leaders. According to Ameer Khan, the stipulated reward of his services was withheld, and in consequence his troops became mutinous, placed him under dhurna, and even pelted him with stones till he was bruised from head to foot. This affair being arranged, Ameer Khan joined the Rajah of Joudpore, against whom his arms had so recently been employed. To this person the Ameer rendered essential service. The possession of the musnud of Joudpore was contested on the part of a child, alleged to be the son of the deceased rajah, and whose pretensions, if just, would consequently be fatal to those of the reigning prince, who was only the cousin of his predecessor. The validity of the infant's claim it is unnecessary to discuss, but the circumstances of his reputed birth and concealment are suspicious, and it is said that his alleged mother disowned him. His cause, however, was espoused by a chief named Sevai Singh, whom on this account the rival candidate for the throne was anxious to remove. In executing this design he found a fit instrument in Ameer Khan. Having received a present gratuity, and large promises of future reward for himself and his officers in money and jaghires, Ameer Khan undertook the desired service, and pretending to be dissatisfied with the ally he had so lately joined, he made overtures of friendship to the minister and protector of the pretender to the throne of Joudpore. The latter was distrustful, and required from the negotiator employed by Ameer Khan a guarantee on oath. The servant hesitated, and returned to his master to inquire what he should do. The account given by Ameer Khan of what followed is highly interesting. On hearing the doubts of his follower, he said, "Determine for yourself what is best for my service and for the cause of the army of the faith. Although," the narrative continues, "the known perfidy of Sevai Singh, and the many attempts he
had made to undermine and ruin the Ameer, were quite sufficient to justify the getting rid of him by treachery, and indeed to make any means employed against him meritorious; still, in order to gratify certain doubts and scruples which the Nawab Mooktaood-Dowla [the agent] had conceived on the score of morality, all the officers united in declaring that to shed the blood of an enemy to the faith by treachery, when necessary for the general cause of the faith and its army, or for the service of one's chief, was lawful." These officers were certainly worthy of their master; their decree removed the scruples of their brother; he returned and took the oath. Still the proposed victim was not at ease; he required that Ameer Khan should set his own hand to the compact, and the Ameer consented. A visit from Sevai Singh to Ameer Khan was arranged, but as the time for fulfilling it approached the fears of the former revived. Ameer Khan, upon learning this, mounted his horse, and proceeded with a few followers to the shrine of a Mahometan saint, close to the walls of Nagpore, where Sevai Singh resided. He was here joined by his intended victim, whom he mildly chid for want of confidence, appealing to the smallness of his retinue as evidence of the honesty of his intentions. Sevai Singh acknowledged himself in error—pledges of friendship and good faith were exchanged, and Ameer Khan, at the tomb of the saint, swore fidelity to his new ally. The next day Sevai Singh visited his friend, by whom he was magnificently received, and with his principal adherents, to the number of two hundred, placed under the shelter of a large tent. At a given signal the tent fell, and showers of grape and musketry from every direction were poured on those beneath it. Numbers of Nautch girls and other persons, unconnected with Sevai Singh, were in the tent, and shared the common destruction. Seven hundred horsemen had accompanied Sevai Singh, and remained mounted near the tent. They were attacked, and not more than two hundred escaped. This service was so acceptable to the party for whose benefit it was undertaken, that it is said he actually performed his previous promises to Ameer Khan—a remarkable event in the history of Oriental politics.

After invading Nagpore, and executing a series of plundering
The Rajah of Berar, Rughoojee Bhonsley, had invariably resisted the attempts that had been made by the British government to establish with that state a subsidiary alliance. On his death his only son, Pursajee Bhooslah, succeeded to the throne; but he being of weak mind, a cousin, known as Appa Sahib, exercised the functions of sovereignty under the title of regent. To secure the assistance of the British government in maintaining him in the power which he had thus obtained, and in promoting his ultimate advance to the higher rank and authority to which he aspired, the regent consented to form the long denied engagement. Early in the year 1817 the imbecile occupant of the throne died, and Appa Sahib attained the final object of his ambitious hopes.

expeditions into various territories, Ameer Khan returned to the court of Holkar, which he assisted in relieving of a man whose ambition threatened to be fatal to the authority of those who, on the insanity of Jeswunt Row, had obtained the reins of power. He then returned to take part in a reconciliation which had been effected between the rival candidates for the hand of the beautiful Princess of Oudepore, to complete which it was necessary that the unfortunate cause of the war should cease to live. Ameer Khan urged upon her father the necessity of putting her to death, but in vain. Her aunt was less scrupulous. She presented to the victim a poisoned chalice, which was received and the contents swallowed. Ameer Khan gives a somewhat different account of the circumstances attending the death of the unhappy beauty, but he admits that he advised her father to poison her, and threatened to carry her off by force if he persisted in refusing. In giving vent to his virtuous admiration of her magnanimity in voluntarily accepting the poisoned cup, he becomes elevated to enthusiasm. "She drank off the poison," says he through the agency of his scribe, "and so gave up her precious life, earning the perpetual praise and admiration of mankind."
Although a subsidiary treaty had been concluded, the arrangements had not been brought into a condition to work properly. There had been considerable irregularity as to the organization and maintenance of the stipulated contingent, by which the British government had been subjected to expense which it was not obliged to bear. Discussion of course arose, but native evasion continued for a while to postpone the fulfilment of engagements which could not be denied. Procrastination is of too common occurrence in Oriental courts to excite much surprise, and the disposition of Appa Sahib was regarded as not unfriendly to the English. Circumstances, however, soon occurred, and especially a change with regard to his ministers, which convinced the British authorities that his professions of friendship were hollow and insincere.

At this period, indeed, the seeds of hatred to British influence were scattered throughout India with an unsparing hand, and the Peishwa was the prime instigator and fomenter of the hostile feeling. Habits of ancient standing gave him considerable influence with the native princes. The Mahratta states might also be supposed to feel their pride in some degree wounded by the humiliation of their chief, and some suspicion may be supposed to have existed as to the probable aim of the British government, and the extent to which it proposed to carry its acquisitions. There might be an apprehension that England was looking to the entire dominion of India; and though this consummation would be
devoutly wished by the people, if they understood their own welfare, the prospect of it could, under no circumstances, be very acceptable to those whose thrones were to fall before the march of the victors.

It is certain that the plans of the governor-general for the extirpation of the Pindarries were regarded with great suspicion. This must, in most instances, have arisen from the apprehension of ulterior measures, for, with the exception of Scindia and Holkar, who entertained bodies of the Pindarries in a sort of feudal dependence, no prince would appear to have had any interest in supporting them. The interest of the Rajah of Nagpore, indeed, lay quite the other way; for his dominions had suffered most severely from the devastations of these marauding adventurers; and by an express article of the subsidiary treaty, the British government was required to defend the state of Nagpore against their incursions.

It was probably to some of the causes which have been mentioned, or to a combination of them, that the mad hostility of the Rajah of Nagpore to the British is to be ascribed, aided, no doubt, by that uneasy feeling which must ever operate upon the mind of a prince fettered by such engagements as are imposed by the subsidiary treaties of the East. Unless, like many of his brethren, he is content to forget that a ruler has any thing to do but to collect treasure and dissipate it in a career of sensual indulgence, he must be annoyed by the consciousness that, though he enjoys the name of sovereign, his
office is but a pageant, all substantial power resting with another. He who promises deliverance from this thralldom generally, therefore, finds an advocate in the party whom he seeks to win to his purposes. Fear will frequently impose a restraint: "I dare not" will wait upon "I would;" but the heart of the person assailed will generally be with the tempter; and if he resist effectually, it will seldom be without a struggle.

The motives by which the Rajah of Nagpore might have been actuated have been suggested, and this is all that is now possible. Perhaps, even at the time, the most sagacious and best informed observer could not have satisfactorily determined by which, or by how many, of them he was really impelled, nor to what extent they respectively operated. His conduct seemed to partake in an extraordinary degree of blind wilfulness; he followed the example of the Peishwa, and he shared his fate. He affected to owe a certain homage to that sovereign—the Rajah of Nagpore enjoying hereditarily the nominal office of commander-in-chief of the forces of the Mahratta empire, as the Peishwa held the nominal viceroyalty. What degree of importance he attached to the connection may admit of question, but it is certain that he most dutifully followed his leader to ruin.

The peculiar nature of a subsidiary alliance renders imperative the greatest circumspection in selecting the representatives of the British government at the courts of princes thus connected with it. The resi-
dent at Nagpore, at this time, was fortunately a gentleman whose sagacity and prudence were not to be overcome even by Mahratta dissimulation. Mr. Jenkins* distinctly perceived the tendency which events were taking, and if the British connection could have been preserved by judgment, firmness, and caution, combined with suavity, that connection would not have been severed.

The resident was apprized that the Rajah was engaged in intrigues with the Peishwa. Conferences were held with an agent of that sovereign, who received letters almost daily from Poona, which he immediately carried to the Rajah. Such proceedings, especially at such a period, were calculated to excite suspicion and alarm. Mr. Jenkins accordingly remonstrated against them, reminding the Rajah that all communications similar to those with the Peishwa ought, in conformity with the treaty, to be immediately communicated to the British government, and that the observance of this provision, at all times incumbent, was of peculiar importance at a time when it was notorious that measures of hostility were in progress at the court of Poona. The reply of the Rajah was unsatisfactory. He admitted that he had received overtures from Poona, but observed, that it did not consist with his dignity to repeat them; and this, with general expressions of unceasing attachment to his English connection, constituted his answer. The objectionable commu-

* Formerly acting resident with Scindia. See vol. iii. page 498, etc.
nications continued, and the renewed representations of the resident on the subject produced no change of conduct.

The period was evidently approaching when the Rajah was to throw off the mask of friendship: in anticipation of it, Mr. Jenkins apprized the military authorities of the prospect of their being speedily called into action, and urged the march of troops towards Nagpore, to uphold the British interests. The Rajah had dismissed the Peishwa's vakeel, but he still retained at his court the brother of that functionary, and through him, as well as other channels, the intercourse with Poona continued to be carried on. The assemblage of troops at Poona was accompanied by a simultaneous collection of force at Nagpore. The completion of the contingent was delayed, and when troops were assigned for the purpose, they consisted mostly of new levies, evidencing that the Rajah had no mind to part with his good troops. In addition to their being raw and undisciplined, the fidelity of the recruits to the British cause was more than suspected. The levies extended beyond Nagpore, and were conducted with great secrecy. This infatuated prince even entered into negotiations with the Pindarries, who were invited to bring down a force to attack the British. The Pindarries were also made useful in another way, by assigning the fact of their ravages as an excuse for keeping up an extraordinary number of troops.

In the midst of these warning circumstances a
khelaut arrived from the Peishwa, and the Rajah sent to inform the resident of his intention to receive it with all the usual ceremonies indicative of his being invested with the character of commander-in-chief of the Mahratta armies. The principal ceremony consisted in going out to his camp, and remaining three days at the head of his troops. The communication was accompanied by a request that the resident, or some gentleman in the British service, would attend the ceremony, and that a salute might be ordered. As the British government was then in a state of actual warfare with the Peishwa, it was quite obvious that such a request could not be complied with; and this public acknowledgment by Appa Sahib of a community of interest with the declared enemy of his protectors would seem to amount almost to insanity. Mr. Jenkins, of course, refused any participation in the ceremony. On the following day all communication between the residency and the city was interdicted. The palaces were stripped of every thing of value, and the families of the Rajah and of his principal ministers left the city. These movements were followed by an order for the contingent to remove to the city, the old cry of the Pindarries being set up as a pretext. Upon this Mr. Jenkins lost no time in sending for the troops from their cantonments.

A pretence was now made, on the part of the Rajah, to open a negotiation; but the hostile manifestations which were contemporaneous shewed it to be altogether delusive. The 26th of November A.D. 1817.
placed the matter beyond question, by a repetition of the treacheries of Poona. An interview between the British resident and two of the Rajah’s ministers was interrupted by the commencement of firing. The strife of words was now to give way to the combat of more deadly weapons. The conference was dissolved abruptly, and Mr. Jenkins repaired to the scene of action.

Reinforcements had been sent for, but they had not arrived; the duty of repelling the attack consequently devolved upon a very small body of troops. The whole British force at Nagpore consisted of a brigade of two battalions of Madras Native Infantry, the first of the 20th regiment, and the first of the 24th, both considerably reduced by sickness; the resident’s escort of two companies of Native Infantry, three troops of the 6th regiment of Bengal Native Cavalry, and four six-pounders, manned by Europeans of the Madras Artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Hopetoun Scott was the senior officer, and with this force, which did not comprise fourteen hundred men fit for duty, had to resist an army of about eight thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry, supported by thirty-five guns.

When these troops had, at the request of the resident, marched from their cantonments, they took post on the hill of Seetabuldee, overlooking the residency and the city; at the same time taking possession of another hill, about three hundred yards distant, the occupation of which was necessary to their retention of the former. In the course of the
day, large bodies of Arabs, with five guns, were observed to enter a village at the foot of the hill, where a strong body of the Rajah's infantry had previously been posted; and at six o'clock in the evening, while Colonel Scott was engaged with Captain Bayley in posting sentries on the face of the hill, the Arabs in the village opened a fire. This was entirely unexpected, as no overt act of hostility had yet taken place on either side, and the Rajah's troops were aware that the posting of the sentries by the British was only a customary act of military precaution, and that no intention existed of attacking them. The small party of British troops, who found themselves thus suddenly engaged in action, returned a volley upon their assailants, and then retreated to the top of the hill, under the fire of all the troops in the village.

The action now became general, and continued without intermission for eighteen hours. A part of the troops being entirely exhausted, it was found necessary to confine the defence of the inferior hill to its summit. At eight o'clock on the morning of the 27th a body of Arabs, by charging up the face of the hill with an overwhelming force, succeeded in gaining possession of the British post. The vast disproportion between the numbers of the contending bodies now appeared to give a fearful preponderance to the Rajah's party, when the current of fortune was turned by one of those acts of romantic valour, which have so often changed the face of the battle-field, struck panic into the hearts of a powerful
CHAP. XXV. enemy, and secured the victory to the weaker side.

At the moment when there seemed most cause for despondency, Captain Fitzgerald, commanding a detachment of Bengal cavalry, reinforced by a native officer and about twenty-five troopers of the Madras body-guard, charged an immense body of the enemy's best horse, and having taken their guns and turned them against their late possessors, stood master of the plain, which was covered in every direction by the flying foe. Accident aided the advantage which daring courage had secured. While preparations were making for an attack upon the Arabs, who had obtained possession of the smaller hill, an explosion was observed to take place in the midst of them. No sooner was this perceived than the British troops made a rush towards the spot, and it was with great difficulty that Colonel Scott could prevent the hill which he occupied from being deserted, or even prevail upon the infantry to wait the arrival of the cavalry who were to support them. Their impatience for action would doubtlessly have been justified by their bearing through its dangers; but the trial was not afforded: on their approach the enemy abandoned their guns and fled. Shortly after, the Arabs beginning to collect in considerable numbers in front of the hill, a troop of cavalry, led by Cornet Smith, charged round its base, and numbers of the enemy were cut to pieces. All hope now seemed to be extinct with the defeated party; the attack slackened in every quarter, and by noon it had entirely ceased.
Courage and military conduct, like other meritorious qualities, are not always appreciated according to their deserts. The magnitude of the stake contended for, the proximity or distance of the scene of action, the numbers engaged, and various other accidents, influence the judgment of mankind with regard to them. Little is recollected of the heroic band who, on this occasion, illustrated the triumphant supremacy of living burning courage over the dead force of mere numbers. Yet the prodigies of valour which they performed have rarely been equalled, either in ancient or modern times. If glory were to be proportioned to difficulty and danger, the memory of such men would be imperishable. The noble spirit by which they were animated extended to the civil servants of the Company. The resident, Mr. Jenkins, was present throughout the action, and, on the testimony of Colonel Scott, it is established, that his animated conduct tended, in a very considerable degree, to excite the troops to their duty. His first assistant, Mr. Sotheby, exhibited the same contempt of danger, and the same generous ardour, not merely to satisfy the claims of duty, but to surpass them. The latter gentleman met an honourable death on the field which he contributed to win. Such are the men which the Company's service has from its commencement never ceased to produce, and their best eulogium is to be found in the magnificent empire acquired by their exertions.

Dismayed by the result of his first attempt in
hostility, Appa Sahib sought refuge in negotiation, and the resident consented to a suspension of arms, on condition of the Rajah's troops being withdrawn from the positions which they then held to those which they had formerly occupied. Any final arrangements he professed himself unable to make until he received further instructions from his government. Appa Sahib, in the meantime, remained still, but continued to increase his army and render his artillery more efficient; and as no instructions arrived for the guidance of the resident, that gentleman determined, on the 14th of December, to offer terms for the Rajah's acceptance. Terms were accordingly tendered, and four o'clock on the morning of the 16th fixed as the latest period for accepting them. If the Rajah then consented to the proposal made by the British resident, the troops of the former were to be withdrawn from their positions, and the city occupied by British troops, not later than seven o'clock on the same morning. The Rajah was to repair to the British camp, and to remain there until every thing was settled.

On these terms being submitted, the Rajah at first required further time to consider of them, and to suggest some modification. This being refused, he sent a message on the evening of the 15th, signifying his assent to the terms, but requesting their execution to be deferred till noon on the following day. Subsequently he sent another message, intimating that he would proceed to the residency either that night or early in the morning.
The morning brought to the residency, not the Rajah, but a message announcing that the Arabs would not allow him to come in. The resident, however, was prepared for this; reinforcements having a few days before arrived, and among them the division under the command of Brigadier-General Doveton. The troops were now drawn out, and three hours allowed to the Rajah to come in; his refusal or neglect involving an immediate attack by the British force. This demonstration was successful, and the Rajah proceeded to the residency.

The British authorities were thus relieved from further anxiety on that head; but the surrender of the guns, and the evacuation of the city by the Rajah's troops, which were also among the stipulated conditions, still remained to be carried into effect. An agent from the Rajah, with instructions for the surrender of the whole of the artillery, proceeded according to promise to General Doveton's camp, and, accompanied by him, the whole force moved forward to take possession of it.

On reaching the first battery symptoms of resistance were manifested; but the approach of the British force being rather unexpected, the enemy quitted the guns and retired. Having taken possession of them, and left them in charge of a division, General Doveton advanced, when a heavy fire was opened upon him from a large body of troops, which was followed by a general discharge from the batteries. The infantry, however, continued to advance until the ground admitted of formation in line, when
the batteries in front were carried in a gallant manner at the point of the bayonet. The horse artillery and cavalry, supported by a reserve, having made a détour, charged, and carried the remainder of the batteries with equal gallantry, driving, at the same time, before them an immense mass of the enemy's cavalry, which having routed, they pursued as long as a chance remained of doing them any mischief. A few of the enemy's guns which had been charged by the British cavalry, but had been re-opened upon that body when it advanced in pursuit of the cavalry of the enemy, were again charged and again carried; and the whole of the enemy's artillery and camp equipage fell into the hands of the victors, together with upwards of forty elephants.

The two succeeding days were fixed for the evacuation of the city by the Arabs; but difficulty attended every step taken towards carrying the terms of the surrender into execution. Though all arrears had been paid, these troops refused to depart, and an attack upon the part of the city which they occupied became unavoidable. It was conducted by General Doveton, who having occupied a commanding position within two hundred and fifty yards of one of the gates of the town, erected a battery, which was opened on the morning of the 21st of December, with the view of effecting a breach in the old palace wall. This, however, being found unattainable, the firing was directed to another point; and on the 23rd it was reported, that such an effect had been produced as would render an ad-
vance practicable with little or no loss. An attack on three different points was determined; and at half-past eight o'clock the troops, on a pre-concerted signal, rushed to their various destinations. The principal attack was conducted by General Doveton, but the breach not being sufficiently wide to admit of a section entering at once, and the troops being exposed to the fire of the Arabs sheltered within the houses, it failed. The other attacks, which were conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott and Major Pittman, were more fortunate; but the failure of the main attack rendered it necessary, in the opinion of General Doveton, that both officers should resume their original positions. These attempts, though unsuccessful, were sufficient to deter the Arabs from offering a protracted resistance, and on the following day they signified their desire to surrender on conditions. Among the conditions demanded were personal immunity, and the protection of a British officer, with a small escort, to give them and their families safe conduct to Mulkapore. Immediate possession being highly desirable, and, if possible, without injury to the city, the request was granted, and on the morning of the 30th of December the Arabs marched out.

The evacuation of the city was followed by the conclusion of a provisional engagement, under which the Rajah returned to the palace. The conditions were, that certain territory should be ceded to the British government in place of the former subsidiary and contingent aid; that the civil and military
affairs of the government of Nagpore should be conducted by ministers in the confidence of the British authorities, and according to the advice of the resident; that the Rajah and his family should reside in the palace of Nagpore, under the protection of the British troops; that the arrears of subsidy should be paid up, and the subsidy itself continue to be paid until the final transfer of the territory stipulated to be surrendered; that any forts in the territory which it might be necessary for the British to occupy should immediately be given up; that the persons alleged to have been concerned in originating the recent disturbances should be discountenanced, and, if possible, delivered up; and that the two hills of Seetabuldee, with the bazaars, and an adequate portion of land adjoining, should be ceded to the British government, which should be at liberty to erect upon them such military works as might be requisite.

Brigadier-General Hardyman, commanding one of the divisions of the Deccan army destined to act against the Pindarries, was in the Rewah territory when the outbreak at Nagpore took place. On the menacing posture of affairs there becoming known to the governor-general, General Hardyman was ordered to move down to the Nerbudda, to be in readiness to act in any way that might be required by the resident at Nagpore; and in the event of his learning that hostilities had actually commenced, he was directed to push on with his reinforcement with all expedition. He accordingly pressed forward with a
regiment of cavalry and his Majesty's 17th foot and four guns to Jubbulpore, from which place a small British force had previously been compelled to withdraw, in consequence of hostile demonstrations with which it was thought unable to cope. At Jubbulpore Brigadier-General Hardyman found the enemy drawn up and strongly posted to oppose his possession of the place. They were in number about three thousand, of whom one thousand were horse, stationed on their left: their right was on a rocky eminence, and they had four brass guns. General Hardyman placed his guns in the centre, with three companies of the 17th foot on each side of them and two companies in the rear. Two squadrons of cavalry, under Major O'Brien, were sent round the left of the enemy, another squadron masked the British guns, and a squadron in the rear was held as a reserve. On arriving near enough to the enemy's centre, the guns being unmasked, opened with shrapnel shells, and were immediately answered. After about a quarter of an hour's firing, the enemy's infantry evinced symptoms of indecision, on which the reserve squadron was ordered to charge the battery. This service was gallantly and successfully performed. By this time the enemy's infantry had descended from an eminence which they had occupied into the plain, but on an attempt being made by the advance squadron to charge them, they re-ascended the eminence, and compelled the assailants to retire under a heavy fire. One wing of the 17th foot was then brought up to storm the height,
from which the enemy were bravely driven with severe loss, those who fled down the opposite side of the hill being partially intercepted by the advance squadron, which had made a détour round their right, as the British infantry ascended. In this affair the loss of the British amounted to only twelve men.

The success of the British arms at Nagpore and in the dependent territories, following immediately upon the previous success at Poona, determined, in a great degree, the issue of the war. Had the result at either place been different, the treaties by which many of the hollow allies of the British government had bound themselves would have been given to the winds, and the greater part of the Deccan have been arrayed against the power whose success held them in awe. Scindia had undertaken to co-operate in the suppression of the Pindarries much against his inclination, and he would have rejoiced in an opportunity of withdrawing from his engagement. The governor-general, indeed, was sanguine enough to believe, or at least he professed to believe, that "former estrangement had given place to entire cordiality and friendship." The "entire cordiality and friendship" entertained by Scindia must have been qualities very different from those usually indicated by the terms. He was not capable of such feelings towards any state or any individual, and least of all could he entertain them with regard to the British, whom he hated as much as he feared them.
Great difficulties attended the formation of the contingent to be produced by Scindia in aid of the common cause. These difficulties the governor-general attributed "to the dilatory habits of the durbar and the bad quality of the force, combined with a desire to turn this arrangement to the personal benefit of individuals." He might have added, that while all these causes might be in operation, there was another, far more potent and influential than any of them—the reluctance entertained by the chief for the service which his situation compelled him to undertake. It at length became necessary to reduce the numbers to be furnished by Scindia himself to less than one-half of the stipulated quota, and to supply the deficiency by troops raised directly for the British government, but to be paid by Scindia. In this manner the number was at length completed. Such indirect indications of hostile feeling were not all. Scindia was in collusion with several of the Pindarrie leaders; he warned them of his inability longer to afford them any open assistance, and pointed out the best modes of effecting their escape from the British forces assembled for their destruction. In this occupation he was but too successful—the attempts of the various divisions of the British army to overtake the retreating freebooters being thus for the most part rendered fruitless.

It is now necessary to advert to a power once of some importance, but at this period sunk almost beneath contempt. This was the government of Hol-
CHAP. XXV. kar. The chief of that name, whose hostility to the British government has already formed the subject of narration, subsequently to the conclusion of the peace became insane, and the administration of the affairs of the state fell into the hands of a female named Toolsee Bhye. This personage was the pupil of a sectarian priest, whose reputed sanctity obtained him a local celebrity; and but that the priesthood of the sect to which the holy father belonged were subjected to the obligation of celibacy, she would have been believed to be his daughter. She was possessed of extraordinary beauty, and a Mahratta adventurer, named Shamrow Madik, conceived the design of advancing his own fortunes by bringing her to the notice of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. It is true that the lady was already married, but this was regarded as a very slight impediment to the plan. Toolsee Bhye was thrown in the way of Holkar, who was instantly captivated; in a few days she was conducted to his zenana, and her liege lord to a prison. The lingering tenderness of the wife, however, was exercised to obtain the release of the husband, and he was dismissed with a horse, a dress, and a small sum of money, to console him for his loss. Toolsee Bhye henceforward ruled the fate of Holkar, and on that chief becoming insane she succeeded to the regency. On his death, Toolsee Bhye, having no child, adopted Mulhar Rao Holkar, the son of Jeswunt Rao by another woman. An infant prince and an unpopular regent required some powerful support, and the latter by a secret message
expressed a desire to place the young Holkar, his family and court, under British protection. In consequence, Captain Tod, under instructions from Mr. Metcalf, took measures for opening a negotiation. But a great change had taken place in the spirit and temper of Holkar's durbar, in the interval that had elapsed since the overture was forwarded. During that interval the position of the British government towards the Peishwa had changed from one of outward friendliness to that of open hostility. The influence of the name and authority of that potentate was sufficient to rouse the spirit of Mahratta partisanship to avenge his wrongs and retrieve his power, while the Patans, who formed the larger portion of Holkar's army, though not open to the operation of such feeling, were eager for war and its expected advantages, without the slightest reference to the grounds of quarrel. The army of Holkar had been in a state of great disorganization, arising chiefly from their pay being in arrear. The Peishwa promised the means of removing this difficulty, and a large force was rapidly assembled near Oojein. Thither, too, Sir Thomas Hislop, with the first division of the Deccan army, directed his march. Sir John Malcolm, with the third division, had been engaged in a series of operations, principally directed against Chetoo, whose name and character have been already brought to notice. But Chetoo had no desire to encounter a British force, and he fled with Pindarrie precipitation. The English commander was
preparing for battle, but in running he was no match for the agile freebooters, who consequently escaped. The active and persevering efforts of Colonel Adams and other officers met with similar success.

In almost every instance, indeed, where an attempt was made to strike a blow at the Pindaries, they were able to defeat it by the promptitude of their movements in retreat; their aptitude for flying rendered conflict impossible and pursuit ineffectual. The adopted son of Chetoo was, however, taken with the garrison of a fort named Talyne, which was attacked and captured by a body of cavalry, under Captain James Grant, after a march of thirty-two miles, performed with such rapidity as enabled the assailants to take the foe by surprise; and though attempts to overtake the enemy usually ended in disappointment, one important object was attained in clearing the country. This operation having been effectually performed in Southern Malwa, Sir John Malcolm was recalled, and ordered, with reference to the state of affairs in Holkar's court and camp, to proceed towards Oojeein. Near that place he effected a junction with Sir Thomas Hislop, and on the 12th of December the first and third divisions of the army of the Deccan having marched past the city, crossed the Seepra at a ford opposite to its north-west angle, and encamped on the left bank of the river. On the 14th the army marched by the high road towards Mahidpore, and re-crossing the Seepra, took up a position at a place about four miles dis-
tant from a town called Paun-Bahar. The approach of the British troops gave rise to some apprehension at Holkar's durbar, and negotiations, which had for some time been broken off, were resumed. Five days were thus occupied, during which Sir John Malcolm, by whom the negotiation was conducted on the part of the British government, urged the various grounds of complaint which that government had to allege; more especially the negotiations carried on with the Peishwa subsequently to his treacherous conduct towards his European ally, and the assemblage of a large army to proceed towards Poona at a time when Holkar was not professedly at war with any state. Articles were submitted for the acceptance of the vakeels conducting the negotiation on the part of the Mahratta chief. These were discussed with seeming interest, and with an apparent desire to bring affairs to a satisfactory conclusion. Many references were made to camp, distant about twenty miles; but it is probable that all their proceedings were but feints designed to lull the British authorities into security and to gain time, procrastination being always a favourite object with diplomatists of this cast. The English negotiator in some degree yielded to the Mahratta agents the enjoyment of this precious privilege. The period at which the discussion was either to be brought to a successful issue or regarded as at an end was repeatedly fixed and postponed. At last it was wisely determined to close the door on indulgence; a decision the pro-
priety of which was enforced by the systematic plunder carried on during the negotiation by flying parties of Holkar's horse. It was also to be apprehended, as a writer on the subject judiciously observes, "that any further tolerance of the delays artfully brought forward would be construed into doubts on the side of the British commander of his own strength. This could not fail to embolden the party of Holkar, and to encourage the re-assembling in Malwa of all those elements of disorder which had been already dispersed or deterred. A native power can never account for the forbearance of another, except on the supposition of weakness."* On the 19th of December, the makeels were dismissed from the British camp, and on the same day that of the Mahrattas witnessed the opening of a fearful scene, which on the following was consummated. Toolsee Bhye had given offence to the party clamorous for war by her desire to secure the protection of the English. This desire she had subsequently sacrificed, partly to the violence of her opponents and partly to the influence of a favourite paramour, named Gunput Rao, who, though originally friendly to the English, had been gained over to the cause of the Peishwa. The sincerity of her conversion was, however, doubted, and he who had been most instrumental in effecting it did not escape suspicion. The youthful Holkar was enticed from a tent

* Colonel Blacker's Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India, during the Mahratta Wars of 1817, 1818, and 1819, page 142.
where he was engaged in amusement, and possession of his person secured by the party hostile to the regency. Toolsee Bhye and Gunput Rao were at the same time arrested, and all access to the former strictly prohibited. The unhappy woman was not destined long to endure the torment of suspense as to her fate. The dawn of the following day was the last she was permitted to witness. As the light broke she was brought from her prison to be conducted to the bank of the river, where she was beheaded, and her body thrown into the water. Her piercing cries awakened many from their sleep, but none moved a hand or raised a voice to save her. Her career of power had been marked not less by vindictive cruelty than by the most scandalous licentiousness, and the beauty which had held captive the chieftain of the people among whom she perished, failed at her latest moments to call forth any sign of commiseration for her fate. When thus violently deprived of life Toolsee Bhye had not numbered thirty years.

So great was the gratification felt by the war party at the revolution which had taken place, that it is said the battalions proposed to sign an acquittance-roll for the whole of the arrears of pay due to them. So extraordinary a manifestation of delight is scarcely credible, but all prospect of keeping down the warlike propensities of the more powerful faction in Holkar's camp was now at an end. On the 20th of December the British army moved a short distance in advance, and on the
CHAP. XXV. 21st was again in motion at break of day. Its march was pursued for about eight miles without sight of an enemy. The tameness of this undisputed progress was then slightly relieved by the appearance of a courier, bearing a letter couched in the vague and ambiguous language usual in Oriental diplomacy. An answer was returned, inviting the young Holkar to join the British army, as the only means of saving and establishing his government. Another communication from the enemy followed, intimating that, in consequence of the advance of the British, the Sirdar had resolved on war, and significantly adding, that the troops which the British would have to encounter were those of Holkar. To this no answer was sent. This interchange of communication had not been permitted to interfere with the advance of the British force. The march continued, and about nine o'clock an eminence was gained, whence was a commanding view of the valley in which was situate the town of Mahidpore; the fore-ground filled with the enemy's horse, some in large bodies, some in detached parties for skirmishing. The main position of the enemy was masked by a plantation. From an adjacent hill a more complete view was obtained of the disposition of the enemy's troops. They appeared behind the river in two lines, of which the infantry and heavy batteries formed the first, and the cavalry the second. The first question for the consideration of the British general was how to pass the river. There were fords both above and below the enemy's
position; but that below was unapproachable for guns. To render it passable would have been a work of time, could it have been effected, which was matter of doubt, as those engaged in it must have been exposed to a tremendous fire from the enemy's batteries. The ford above was difficult of access on both banks. It was approachable only by by-paths, through a rugged country; and to reach the enemy in this way would have required a détour of many miles. This objection applied also to the ford previously noticed. With reference to these difficulties, it was resolved to abstain from any attempt to turn either flank of the enemy; and as the bed of the river afforded considerable cover for the troops during their formation, it was arranged that the attack should be on the enemy's front, and that the passage should be made by a single ford.* Some light troops first passed, followed by the horse artillery, which opened their guns; a battery of foot artillery playing from

* There was another ford in front of the enemy's position: but it is stated by Captain Blacker that there only one man at a time could descend the bank; that the water was breast-high, and the bottom composed of large slippery stones. Its inconveniences were conjectured from observing that it was avoided by the enemy; and Captain Blacker states, that "subsequent experience verified the conclusion formed respecting it;" in proof of which, he refers to the unavailing efforts of the pioneers to get guns across it after the battle. The various objections to the fords above and below the enemy's position have been stated in the text, in order to give a complete view of the circumstances; but judging from the official report of Sir Thomas Hislop, he chose his course principally with a view to avoiding a long détour.
the right bank of the river, and enfilading some cannon on the enemy's left, which had opened a heavy and well-directed fire on the ford. The troops, as they crossed, were successively formed in the bed of the river, and took up their respective positions; the cavalry ascending the bank to the left, where they were partially screened from the enemy by some rising ground, the horse artillery forming batteries in front of the ford. The light brigade had taken possession of two ravines which opened into the river, the object being to keep it clear for the passage of the remaining brigades, who, on crossing, were directed by a counter march to bring their right in front. As soon as this manœuvre was performed by the first brigade, Sir Thomas Hislop gave orders for the attack of the enemy along the whole front by the troops that had crossed, leaving the second brigade of infantry to follow as a reserve.

The first brigade accordingly ascended the bank, leaving sufficient ground to the right for its formation into line, while the light brigade rose from the ravines and formed battalion companies on its left. This operation was performed under a galling fire of round shot and grape from several batteries. The fire of the enemy's batteries was likewise very destructive to the British horse artillery, whose guns were all silenced or dismounted. The light pieces of the latter, though admirably served, were quite unequal to the heavy guns in their front. The British cavalry also suffered from the same source
of annoyance, as well as from a party of the enemy which came down a ravine. The two brigades of infantry advanced to the attack of the enemy's left, under the immediate command of Sir John Malcolm.* Their ranks were fearfully thinned by the grape of the enemy; but pushing forward, they succeeded in carrying a ruined village which was regarded as the key of the enemy's position, and in gaining the batteries from which they had suffered so severely. The latter were defended with great determination, the men standing to their guns till killed or disabled by the bayonets of the British infantry. The two brigades of cavalry, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Russell, of the 3rd regiment, and Major Lushington, of the 4th, were to assail the enemy's right simultaneously with the attack of the infantry on his left. This service was performed by the two brigades, accompanied by the Mysore horse, with extraordinary brilliancy, the assailants pushing to the rear of the batteries opposed to them with a decisive rapidity, which overcame every obstacle and spread dismay through the enemy's ranks.

The enemy's camp was standing, and the attention of the cavalry and of the commander-in-chief was almost simultaneously directed to it. It was, however, found deserted. Some feeble attempts at a stand were made by parties of the foe, but they were only for the purpose of covering the

* The commanders of the brigades were Major Brown and Lieutenant-Colonel R. Scott.
CHAP. XXV. retreat of the remainder. The fortune of the day was decided. The British were masters of the field, and of the whole of the enemy's artillery, amounting to above sixty pieces. The loss of the enemy in men was estimated at three thousand. That of the English, though considerably less, was still lamentably heavy. The killed and wounded amounted to seven hundred and seventy-eight, including thirty-eight European and twenty-seven native officers.

As soon as practicable, a light detachment was formed for pursuit, but there was little opportunity for its employment. The prostrate enemy sued for peace, and after a discussion, not distinguished by the usual characteristics of Oriental diplomacy, but of unusual brevity, a treaty was concluded. By this instrument, the Company's government engaged not to allow impunity to any state or freebooter that should commit any outrage or hostility against the territory of Holkar, he lending his utmost assistance in any manner that might be requisite; and his dominions were to receive at all times the same protection as those of the British government. Holkar confirmed the engagements made with Ameer Khan, and ceded in perpetuity certain pengunnahs to the Rajah of Kotah; to the British government he ceded all his claims for tribute or revenue upon the Rajpoot princes; he renounced all right and title to places within the Bhoondee hills, or lying to the northward of them, and ceded to the
Company all his territories and claims within the Sautpoorah hills, or to the southward of them, including the fort of Sundewah, all his possessions in the province of Candeish, and in the districts in which they were intermixed with the territories of the Nizam and the Peishwa. In consideration of these cessions, the British government was bound to support a field force of adequate strength to maintain the internal tranquillity of Holkar's territories, and to defend them from foreign enemies, the station of such force to be determined by the power by whom it was raised and maintained. The purchase of articles for the use of any force acting in defence of Holkar's territories was to be made exempt from duties. The stipulation which followed the last was of a very comprehensive character: Holkar engaged never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any of the Company's allies or dependents, "or against any other power or state whatever,"—a hard condition for a Mahratta. The Company were to adjust whatever differences might arise, and Holkar was not to receive vakeels from any other state, nor to have communication with any other state except with the knowledge and consent of the British resident. The absolute authority of the chief over his children, relatives, dependents, subjects, and servants, was acknowledged by a subsequent article, in which his new ally renounced all concern with them. By another article, Holkar agreed to dismiss his superfluous troops, and "not
CHAP. XXV. to keep a larger force than his revenues would aff

ord"—a prudent provision, regard to which would have saved many a native prince from embarrass-
ment and ruin. Holkar was, however, to retain in reserve, ready to co-operate with the British troops, a body of not less than a thousand horse, for whose regular payment it was somewhat emphatically stated, a "suitable arrangement must be made."

A provision followed for securing a jaghore to Ghuffoor Khan, a Patan adventurer, who had attained great influence in the camp of Holkar, and this was succeeded by stipulations restricting the Mahratta chieftain from employing Europeans or Americans without the knowledge and consent of the British government; providing for the residence of a minister of that government with Holkar, and permitting the latter to send a vakeel to the governor-general. All cessions made under the treaty to the British government or its allies were to take effect from the date of the treaty, and the possessions recently conquered from Holkar were to be restored. Finally, the English government engaged never to permit the Peishwa, nor any of his heirs and descendants, to claim and exercise any sovereignty over Holkar, or his heirs and descendants. Such a treaty forms a remarkable supplement to the warlike demonstrations which had so recently prevailed in Holkar's camp. Comment would be superfluous: the articles speak for themselves, and shew how fully those who assumed the management of Holkar's interests and their own must have been con
vinced that they were completely at the mercy of their conquerors, and had no resource but in entire submission. The treaty is not less remarkable in another point of view, as illustrating the change that had taken place in the policy of the British government of India from the time when that government was administered by Sir George Barlow, when it was regarded as a point of sound statesmanship to surrender the allies of the Company to the mercies of an infuriated Mahratta plunderer, and the reputation of the British nation for good faith to universal scorn. If anywhere can be found a striking illustration of the power of truth ultimately to dispel prejudice and overcome error, it is in the change of the policy of the British government in India—in the adoption of the principles which alone can maintain that government by men who were originally among their most active and most bitter opponents. In the number of such converts must be reckoned the nobleman who at the period under notice exercised the high functions of governor-general of India. His lordship's views were, it must be presumed, shared, to a considerable extent at least, by those with whom then rested the duty of advising the crown in the distribution of honours and rewards, for the governor-general received an advanced step in the peerage, being created Marquis of Hastings.*

* In the course of a debate in the House of Lords, April 11th, 1791, on the war with Tippoo Sultan, the Marquis of Hastings.
It has been seen that Holkar had been compelled to cede to the British government all claims upon the Rajpoot princes. In connection with this subject, it may here be convenient to state that, on the same day on which the treaty with Holkar was signed (the 6th of January, 1818), a treaty was concluded with the Rajah of Joudpore, and a few days afterwards a similar engagement was made with the Rajah of Oudepore. By these treaties the British government took the two states under its protection, while their chiefs engaged to act in "subordinate co-operation" with it—to acknowledge its supremacy, and to have no connection with

then Lord Rawden, denounced in the most unmeasured terms the establishment of a British government in India. "That government," his lordship said, "was founded in injustice, and had originally been established by force." He added that "war must be the inevitable consequence of our situation in that country [India], since we had provoked by our injuries the resentment of every prince who lived within the atmosphere of our power. Was it ever intended," he asked, "that any part of India should be under the government of Great Britain?" It may appear somewhat strange that his lordship should have wished to be at the head of a government thus founded and maintained in wrong. Referring to the subject more immediately before the House, Lord Rawden said, "The war which now subsisted [that with Tippoo Sultan] was a serious calamity. Whether favourable or adverse, it was no less the subject of depreciation and regret. It was attended with an enormous expense, which could only be raised by means the most disadvantageous. If successful, he did not see what benefit could result; if otherwise, the certain consequence was ruin." The passages quoted will be found in Hansard. They exhibit curious matter for comparison with the elaborate expositions of the policy of the Marquis of Hastings, put forth by himself at a later period.
other chiefs or states. Several succeeding articles were of the description common in similar compacts; others were framed with reference to the peculiar circumstances of the states to which they were applied. Treaties of like character had previously been concluded with the Rajahs of Kerrowlah and Kota, and at later periods treaties, nearly corresponding in their terms, were formed with the Rajahs of Bhoondee, Jyepoor, and other petty states. Thus was the non-interference system abandoned as completely as had been the unhappy allies of the British government at a former period; but here the abandonment was consistent with justice, while it was dictated by reason and sound policy.

It is now time to return to the movements of the discomfited Peishwa. After his defeat at Poona, his flight was in the first instance directed to the southward. The advance of the force under Brigadier-General Pritzler obliged him to change his course, and he took an easterly direction to Punderpore, whence he struck off to the north-west, followed by General Smith, who had by this time been able to make the necessary arrangements for pursuit. Passing between Poona and Seroor, the Peishwa then advanced as far as Wuttoor, having been joined on his route by Trimbuckjee Dainglia with a considerable reinforcement. Finding that General Smith, who had moved to the northward, on a line east of that taken by the Peishwa, was in a position to intercept his retreat in that direction, he suddenly
CHAP. XXV. turned again to the south, taking the straight route for Poona, and still pursued.

A.D. 1818. On new-year’s day, 1818, he encountered a British detachment, consisting of about six hundred infantry, with about three hundred auxiliary horse, and a detail of artillery, commanded by Captain Staunton. The detachment had marched on the previous day from Seroor, and were proceeding to Poona. On reaching the heights overlooking Corygaum, they discovered in the plain the whole of the Peishwa’s army, estimated at twenty thousand horse and eight thousand foot. Captain Staunton immediately moved upon the village of Corygaum, and on reaching it was attacked by three divisions of the Peishwa’s choicest infantry, consisting of about a thousand men each, supported by immense bodies of horse and two pieces of artillery. The enemy obtained immediate possession of the strongest post of the village; the possession of the remaining part was most obstinately contested from noon till nine at night. During this period almost every building in the place was repeatedly taken and retaken; nearly the whole of the British artillerymen were either killed or wounded, and about one-third of the infantry and auxiliary horse. Nearly all the officers were killed or disabled: those who survived suffered dreadfully from want of water, amidst the unparalleled exertions which they had been called upon to make after a fatiguing march of twenty-eight miles. The result, however, was most honourable to the British
arms, the enemy being compelled to abandon the village after sustaining an immense loss in killed and wounded.

On the following day, the enemy, though in sight, did not renew the attack, and in the evening Captain Staunton returned to Seroor, carrying away his numerous wounded; and the noble band entered that place as became them, with drums beating and colours flying. The detachment had then suffered under an almost total privation of refreshment for two days.* In this brilliant affair, the medical officers, having no opportunity for the exercise of their proper duties, aided their brother officers in leading on the sepoys to charges with the bayonet, and one of them was killed.† In such a struggle, the example of even one European was of almost incalculable importance, from the confidence with which it inspired the native soldiers. The loss sustained was, as might be expected, severe. Of twenty-six artillerymen, twelve were killed and eight wounded. Of the native infantry, there were fifty killed and a hundred and five wounded. Of the auxiliary horse, ninety-six killed, wounded, and missing. Among the killed was Lieutenant Chisholm, of the Madras Artillery; Lieutenant

* The services of Captain Staunton were acknowledged by a grant from the East-India Company of £500 per annum, in addition to his pay, till he should attain the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and become entitled to its advantages. On his death a pension was granted to his widow.

† Assistant-Surgeon Wingate. Another medical officer, Mr. Wylie, took a leading part in the conflict with the Peishwa's troops on this occasion.
Patterson, of the Bombay Native Infantry, was carried mortally wounded to Seroor, where he died. Two other officers, Lieutenant Connellian and Lieutenant Swainston, were badly wounded. The loss of the enemy was estimated at from six to seven hundred. Its extent may be attributed in a great degree to the situation in which most of their attacks were made—in avenues raked by the guns of the British party.*

The Peishwa continued to vary his course as the approach of his pursuers warned him to escape them. After many changes of route he arrived at Sholupore; but instead of following him in that direction, General Smith resolved upon reducing Sattara, and effecting a junction with General Pritzler. These objects were accomplished. Sattara surrendered on the opening of the mortar batteries, and the desired junction of the forces under General Smith and General Pritzler was effected. Its object was to enable the entire force at disposal for field service to be formed into two divisions: one to be composed wholly of cavalry and light troops, to keep up an active pursuit of the enemy; the other of infantry, with an ample battering train, to reduce forts, and gradually occupy the country. These arrangements being made, General Smith resumed the pursuit of the Peishwa, and General

* On one occasion, "an artilleryman serving his gun, half filled it with grape, and let 'the enemy' approach within a dozen yards of the muzzle before he applied the match; nor did it miss fire to disappoint his coolness, but discharged the unusual contents where no effect could be lost."—Colonel Blacker.
Pritzler proceeded to reduce the forts and strongholds in the neighbourhood of Poona. On the 19th of February, the former officer surprised the Peishwa's army at Ashtee, and completely defeated it. The Rajah of Sattara and part of his family, who were in the Peishwa's camp, fell into the hands of the victors; and Gokla, the Peishwa's ablest general, as well as his chief counsellor, was killed.

In the meantime General Pritzler proceeded with the reduction of the forts south of Poona. Singhur alone offered very strong resistance, and there it was not protracted. Lieutenant-Colonel Deacon was equally successful in the same species of service in the north. Other detachments were employed in the Concan, and Brigadier-General Munro was occupied in the reduction of the country south of the Kistna.

The Pindarries continued to follow their invariable practice of flying when a British force approached them. "Were it possible," says Colonel Blacker, "to trace the several routes of the Pindarries during the time of their flight, such particulars would, perhaps, give but little additional interest to this account of the operations against them. When pressed, they fled collectively, if possible; otherwise they broke into parts again to unite. In some instances, from inability to proceed, or under the apprehension of suddenly falling in with British troops from an opposite quarter, parties of them lurked in small numbers about remote villages, or lay in the thickest jungles, exposed to the most severe hardships, till
On the 12th of January Colonel Adams detached the 3rd Bengal Cavalry, under Major Clarke, with instructions to march on the village of Ambee, where it was understood a party of Pindarries were about to plunder. Major Clarke was met on his way by a report of the exact position of the enemy, and continuing his march till night, halted within a few miles of them. At five o'clock he moved, and came upon them with his force in two divisions, just as they were preparing to march. One division immediately cut in among the enemy, and a large body, flying from the attack, encountered the other division, from which they suffered severely. The number of the Pindarries was estimated at fifteen hundred. Accounts vary as to the number of the slain, but by Major Clarke, whose estimate was formed on a comparison of the reports of the pursuers, it was computed at a thousand.

After the conclusion of the treaty with Scindia, British officers, in conformity with one of its provisions, were dispatched to reside with those of Scindia at his principal station. Two of them, Jeswunt Rao Bhow and Bappojee Scindia, were known to be ill-affected to the English and friendly to the Pindarries. The former was placed under the care of Captain Caulfield, the latter under that of Major Ludlow. Nothing very remarkable occurred at Ajmere, where Bappojee Scindia managed Scindia's interests; but at Jadud, the seat of the head-quar-

ters of Jeswunt Rao Bhow, it soon became evident that the duties of the British resident would not be light. In the face of Captain Caulfield's constant and urgent remonstrances, Jeswunt Rao Bhow continued to maintain an intimate intercourse with the Pindarries, and refused to move a man against them. At Jadud, Cheetoo met a friendly reception, and obtained such advice and information as was calculated to facilitate his objects; and there Kurreen found an asylum when flying from the British detachments employed against him. Much of this treacherous conduct of Scindia's officers was concealed at the time from the representative of the British government; but Captain Caulfield saw enough to convince him of the necessity of employing some stronger means of effecting the objects of his mission than remonstrances. In consequence, General Brown moved, in order to support Captain Caulfield's representations by the presence of an overawing force, and arrived at Jadud on the 23rd of January.

The first step taken was to demand the surrender of two of the Bhow's officers, who had been most actively instrumental in executing his plans for the protection of the Pindarries. Some days having been spent in fruitless communications, the British authorities learned on the 29th that one of the offending officers was, with his followers, preparing for flight. Jeswunt Rao Bhow had been previously informed that the movement, without the consent of the British commander, of any part of his forces, pre-
CHAP. XXV. viously to the adjustment of the points of difference, could not be permitted; and on the projected flight becoming known, a squadron of cavalry was sent down to prevent it. On the approach of the squadron it was fired upon. General Brown thereupon lost no time in making the necessary dispositions for attack. He sent two guns to reinforce the pickets, and ordered two squadrons of regular cavalry and some Rohilla horse round the town to gain the rear of the detached camp of the officer who had taken the lead in the movement. Before the line could be formed for attack, the fire of two twelve-pounders with shrapnell shells drove the enemy from the position which they had taken, the infantry flying into the town and the horse galloping off. The latter were pursued by the British cavalry; but these having just returned from a forced march of considerable length, in fruitless search of a party of Pindarries, were exhausted, and the pursuit was soon relinquished: the cavalry returned to destroy a remnant of the enemy which still lingered behind. In the meantime General Brown had proceeded to the gate of the town and demanded its surrender. The messenger was fired on; whereupon a twelve-pounder was run up to the gate, while the remaining ordnance swept away the defences about it. Jeswunt Rao Bhow now thought it time to provide for his own safety. He fled with a few followers at the gate opposite to that attacked, through which the British triumphantly entered, bearing down all attempts at opposition. The loss of the enemy was great: it was com-
puted at a thousand. The British lost only thirty-
six men.

The servants of Holkar, like those of Scindia, did
not in all cases yield implicit respect to the treaties
concluded by their superiors. The killadar of Tal-
neir, a fort on the Taptee, determined to disobey
the summons of Sir Thomas Hislop to surrender,
and in consequence it became necessary to reduce
it by force. On the 27th of February some guns
were opened against the fort, and preparations
were made for storming. Henceforward the cir-
cumstances of the affair are involved in ambiguity
and confusion. In Sir Thomas Hislop's report to
the governor-general it is stated, that though pre-
parations were made for blowing open the outer
gate, they were found unnecessary, as the troops
were able to enter at the side by single files.
Similar testimony is given by Colonel Blacker. The
words of Colonel Conway, adjutant-general, however,
when subsequently called upon to state the circum-
stances of the case, are, "We had forced the outer
gate." According to all authorities, the second gate
was forced open. At a third, a number of persons,
apparently not military, came out on the approach
of the British party, and were made prisoners:
among these was the killadar. Sir Thomas Hislop,
in his despatch, stated that the killadar here sur-
rendered himself to Colonel Conway. According
to Colonel Conway, however, no communication
took place between them, and the presence of the
killadar among the prisoners was not known. Ac-
cording to Sir Thomas Hislop and Colonel Blacker,
the party passed through a fourth gate without opposition, but were stopped at a fifth, which was also the last. Colonel Conway makes no mention of a fourth gate, but his statement coincides with theirs as to the stoppage of the party at the last gate of the series. Here a parley took place, but after a time the wicket was opened. Sir Thomas Hislop says, it "was opened from within;" Colonel Conway, "at last they consented to open the wicket, but in doing so there was much opposition, and evidently two opinions prevailed in the fort." Colonel Macgregor Murray, who was present (and whose name will shortly appear in a more distinguished character than that of a witness), after quoting, apparently with approval, the statement of Sir Thomas Hislop, thus continues: "The Arabs still insisted upon terms. It remained doubtful whether the storming party, on reaching the last gate, were to receive the submission or to encounter the resistance of the enemy; and in this state of uncertainty, resulting from the equivocal conduct of the garrison, it became obviously requisite that the assailants should prepare for the latter alternative by effecting a lodgement within the gateway, as their position in the passage leading to it would have been absolutely untenable under fire."

Whatever were the circumstances of the case, whatever the expectations of the assailants or the intentions of those within, the wicket was opened. "On our entrance," says the witness last quoted, "the garrison received us with the most furious
gesticulations, raising their matchlocks and calling chap.xxv.
out 'mar!' or kill! Colonel Macgregor Murray, Major Gordon, and one or two privates had passed
through the wicket when an attempt was made to close it. This was resisted by Colonel M'Intosh
and Captain M'Crarth, who succeeded in keeping it open till a grenadier of the Royal Scots thrust
his firelock through the aperture. The remainder of the storming party were thus enabled to force
their way. All those who had previously entered were killed, excepting Colonel Macgregor Murray,
who was rescued covered with wounds. Captain Mcgregor, who was at the head of those who
entered after the attempt to close the gate upon those who had first passed, also fell, but the
fort was carried. The garrison, consisting of about three hundred Arabs, sheltered themselves for a
time in the houses, but were ultimately all put to the sword, a proceeding manifesting a degree of
ferocity not usual with British victors. It may not, however, be just to scrutinize too nicely the conduct
of men in the heat of action, when inflamed by the belief that treachery has been employed against
them. The worst part of the transaction remains to be told. Immediately after the place fell, the
killadar was hanged by order of the general in command, who, in the despatch in which he reported
the occurrences at Talneir, uses language which implies a doubt as to the participation of the officer
in the alleged treachery of part of the garrison. The general, indeed, drew consolation from the con-
chap. xxv. elusion that, if innocent of the treachery, the killadar nevertheless deserved to be hanged for his resistance in the first instance, more especially as he had been warned, that if he persisted, severe punishment would await him. "Whether," says Sir Thomas Hislop, "he was accessory or not to the subsequent treachery of his men, his execution was a punishment justly due to his rebellion in the first instance, particularly after the warning he had received in the morning." This position requires some examination, and the transaction to which it relates is altogether so extraordinary as to invite a pause, for the purpose of endeavouring more accurately to estimate its character and merits. It excited a great sensation in England at the time when it first became known there, and the general impression of the conduct of the British general was far from favourable. The Secret Committee, the Court of Directors, and the General Court of the East-India Company, were alike of opinion that it required explanation; and in a similar spirit the subject was brought to the notice of parliament. The Marquis of Hastings volunteered a minute in defence of Sir Thomas Hislop, a course to which he was, in fact, pledged, having long previously expressed his approbation, not only of the means taken for the reduction of Talneir, but also of the severity with which the conquest was followed.* Sir Thomas Hislop called

* "Painful as it was to your excellency to exercise severity in such a case, you have the consolation of being satisfied that you
upon various officers present at the capture to afford such information as they possessed, and in transmitting their communications, he addressed to the government a long and laboured defence of his conduct.* Both these papers abound so much in have, by such an example, diminished the probability of such wanton waste of blood in future."—Letter of Marquis of Hastings to Sir Thomas Hislop, 29th March, 1818.

* As the charge against the British general is of a very serious nature, his letter of explanation, as well as the governor-general's minute, are, for the sake of fairness, extracted at length. The latter document, bearing the earlier date, has precedence.

"Minute by the Governor-General, dated July 7th, 1819.

"In obedience to the orders of the Honourable Secret Committee, respecting occurrences at Talneir, we have written to Sir Thomas Hislop for a minute statement relative to the execution of the killadar: till that explanation shall arrive, I can only represent what was my impression from the particulars which did come before me; but as even that degree of information may be desirable for the Honourable Committee, I lose no time in explaining it.

"The Honourable Committee would seem to have adopted a conception that the killadar had surrendered on some implied engagement for his safety, and that he even facilitated the entrance of the British troops into the fortress. The letter of Sir Thomas Hislop, evidently written in great haste, might possibly have led me to a similar misapprehension, had not other letters, which had been dispatched by officers present at Talneir, arrived at the same time. All those concurring accounts negatived the supposition that any plea, even constructive, existed to exempt the killadar from the known consequences of unsuccessfully standing an assault. It appeared to me that the killadar was thoroughly apprized of his situation; first, by the promulgation of the article of treaty assigning the territory to the Honourable Company; and secondly, by the special order of Halkar for the surrender of the force; notwithstanding which he forced Sir Thomas Hislop to the risk of carrying the place by storm. It was undeniable that
the fortress was taken by assault, the defenders of the outer works having been driven from the rampart by our fire, and entrance being gained through a breach made by our cannonade against the jambs of the gate. The killadar then advancing to supplicate mercy, after having resisted till the place was actually carried, and opposition was no longer practicable, could not take him out of the fatal predicament in which he had wilfully and knowingly placed himself. The application of the penalty lay with Sir Thomas Hislop; and the humanity of his excellency's character claimed for him credit that nothing but what he deemed most serious exigency could urge him to the infliction. The forfeiture of pretension to quarter when troops stand an assault has been established by the laws of war, to prevent garrisons from wantonly subjecting besiegers to the heavy loss likely to be suffered by troops exposed in advancing to breach; a slaughter in which a garrison would, from false points of honour, always be tempted to indulge, if impunity could be obtained by throwing down their arms when defence proved ineffectual. It is to preclude unnecessary bloodshed that the rigorous rule is acknowledged by universal military consent. When what has passed appeared to be strictly within the letter of the law, the Honourable Committee will probably think it would have been unadvisable for the governor-general to throw a taint on the reputation of Sir Thomas Hislop, by raising a question as to the real amount of necessity for the severity. The greater or the lesser urgency of the considerations which constituted that necessity, must at least have been disputable. A decision on that head was the immediate province of the officer who had the awful responsibility of effecting the submission of the districts with the least possible expenditure of his own troops; and it would have been an injurious return to an individual who had just rendered eminent services, to fix an apparent blot upon his conduct, by setting afoot investigations which might be expected to prove causeless, and which in that case would entail on the superior the charge of proceeding with indelicacy, if not with more essential injustice.
in justification of the act so unanimously impugned in England. As far as they can be collected, those argu-

"This exposition is professedly from incomplete materials, yet I may say that I have no reason to imagine more particular insight would alter the tenor of the reasoning which I have taken the liberty to submit.

(Signed) "Hastings."

The following is Sir Thomas Hislop's revised and deliberate account of the transaction:

"Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, Bart., G.C.B., to the Governor-General in Council, dated September 10, 1819.

"My Lord.—1. I have had the honour to receive, through Mr. Chief Secretary Metcalfe, a copy of a despatch addressed by the Honourable Court of Directors to your lordship in council, under date the 24th of February last, by some of the resolutions contained in which, their thanks, together with those of the General Court of the United Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, conformably with the unanimous votes of those bodies respectively, have been communicated to me, in testimony of their approbation of my services during the late war in this country, and particularly in the action fought at Mahidpore on the 21st December, 1817, by the force under my personal command.

"2. So distinguished a mark of approval as above signified, calls upon me individually, in this place, respectfully to request that your lordship in council will do me the favour to transmit to the Honourable Court of Directors, and to the General Court of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, the expression of my most grateful acknowledgments for the high honour thus conferred upon me, which I shall never cease most warmly to appreciate; at the same time I must beg leave to solicit your lordship in council to add thereto my assurances, that to the high state of discipline, combined with the undaunted valour of the officers and soldiers of the 1st and 3rd divisions of the army of the Deckan, which composed the force employed on this par-
ments appear to be the following:—That Talneir was taken by assault, and that by the laws of war a
ticular occasion, is solely to be ascribed the victory of Mahidpore, of which such distinguished notice has been separately taken. The only merit to which on that occasion I venture to lay claim, rests on the great good fortune which enabled me to seize the opportunity of personally leading such a gallant body of troops against the enemy. It no less behoves me here to repeat my admiration of the famed achievements of every division which composed the army placed by the Supreme Government under my special command, and thereby to do justice to the gallantry, abilities, and zeal of the several officers to whose immediate guidance their services were entrusted.

"3. The despatch above acknowledged having been referred to me by your lordship in council, for such explanation and elucidations as I may wish to submit to the Honourable Court, the points to which my attention has obviously been drawn, is the qualification with which the vote of thanks of the General Court to me was accompanied, viz., 'That this Court wishes it to be understood as not giving any opinion relative to the circumstances attendant upon the capture of Talneir, until further information respecting it, than is afforded by the papers now before the Court, shall be furnished,' and to the remarks of the Court of Directors on the subject of the execution of the killadar; I shall, therefore, proceed to afford your lordship in council, for the information of those Honourable Courts, a detail of all the circumstances which led to the measure.

"4. I must here premise by observing, that a very erroneous view of the case in question has been taken at home, and that the misconceptions are imputable altogether, I am free to confess, to my despatch to your lordship of the 28th February, 1818, written at Talneir immediately after the assault of that fort, when I was most pressingly engaged in forming arrangements for the earliest possible prosecution of further operations, the more essentially demanded by the information which at that moment reached me of the advance of the ex-Peshwa towards the Godavery. It had become of the highest importance, critically situated as Candeish then was, that the utmost promptitude
garrison standing an assault are not entitled to quarter; that the killadar never surrendered, and made should be observed by me towards intercepting Bajee Row, and that object calling for my sole attention, I was of necessity obliged to leave the drafting of the despatch to other hands. The capture of the place being only of a secondary class of operation, did not seem to require that I should have occupied myself individually at that moment with a report of it; and as your lordship was intimately acquainted with the disturbed condition of Candeish, and the obstacles which presented themselves to my occupation of that province, it appeared equally unnecessary for me, at such a season, to address your lordship on those points. My directions, therefore, were simply that the despatch should be concise as to the reduction of the place; and I have since regretted to find, that it was signed and forwarded without receiving that attention which, under a less urgent state of affairs, it would undoubtedly have had. My regret is the more acute, because the conduct of the killadar has been so represented as to produce a wrong impression; and I rejoice in the opportunity now afforded me of submitting facts, collected from the most authentic sources, which will place the whole transaction in its true light, and must remove every idea that may have prevailed prejudicial to the correctness and justness of the proceedings my public duty imperiously called on me to adopt.

"5. I have not thought it proper, on such an occasion, to confine the information which the Honourable Court has called for, to my own personal explanation alone; but, confident that the more the transaction is examined, the more clear the imperious call for it will appear to the conviction of every impartial man, I have required from those public officers who were prominently employed during the service in question, statements, founded on the best of their recollection and solemn belief, of the circumstances alluded to in the despatch, which may have come to their knowledge, or under their observation; and one of these officers being now in Candeish, a very considerable distance from hence, has occasioned the transmission of this address to your lordship being delayed till the present date.

"6. The statements above alluded to, and accompanying, are
from Lieutenant-Colonel Blacker, the quarter-master-general of the army; Captain Briggs, the political agent of your lordship with my head quarters in Candeish; Lieutenant-Colonel Conway, the adjutant-general of the army; and Lieutenant-Colonel Macgregor Murray, the deputy adjutant-general of his Majesty's forces, who accompanied the storming party. I beg the Honourable Court may be referred to these documents, as containing a mass of information which cannot fail to make them thoroughly acquainted with every particular connected with the reduction of Talneir, and which will shew that the killadar did not surrender himself to Colonel Conway, as has been inadvertently stated, and that he never made any condition of surrendering the fort whatever; that a fair time was allowed him to discontinue his unlawful hostilities; that he did not avail himself of it, but carried on the utmost resistance in his power to the last, to the serious injury of my troops, and ultimately reduced me to the necessity of taking his fort by storm; that in the heat of that operation he fell into our possession, when he was fully aware his life had been forfeited, and when no expectation whatever was held out to him that it would be spared.

"7. The Honourable Court will probably before now have become possessed of a full knowledge of the spirit of opposition and rebellion which prevailed in Candeish at the period in question. That province, as your lordship is aware, was disturbed by chieftains in possession of its forts and strongholds, inimical to the new state of things, determined not to abide by the treaty of Mundissoor, but to throw off their allegiance to their sovereign, by refusing obedience to his mandates; and in this same spirit the killadar of Talneir would not recognize the order I possessed from Holkar to assume the occupation of that fort.

"8. Your lordship's political agent at my head quarters, from his official station, had made himself acquainted with the feelings, plans, and objects of these chiefs. It appeared that they were attached and allied to the former government of Holkar, which had been entirely changed after the battle of Mahidpoor, and were in determined hostility to the existing government; that the
it; that the killadar of Talneir, and the killadars of other forts in Candeish, were in the interest of
sovereign and his ministers had lost all authority over them; that the object of these killadars was to keep possession of Candeish, to which Holkar had relinquished all claim by his cession of that province to the British, for the assumption of which I possessed his warrants; that they had the support of our enemy the ex-
Peishwa, who was in the vicinity of Candeish with a large force; and that Ram Deen, a chief who had also withdrawn himself from his sovereign, Holkar, was in full march to join them with 4,000 horse and 2,000 infantry, and some guns, for the purpose of aiding them in their lawless proceedings, and of violating the treaty which had been formed with the British power.

“9. It is thus evident that these killadars, among whom was that of Talneir, were in a direct state of open rebellion; were actuated by their own personal views of keeping to themselves a country which belonged to us; that they acknowledged no authority whatever; and having placed themselves at the head of bodies of Arabs in opposition to all government, in a province which was at the time overrun with predatory horse, plunderers, and marauders, they could come under no other denomination than as the leaders of banditti, and were punishable as such.

“10. Such was the state of affairs on my reaching Candeish. The inhabitants of the country, however, were aware of the cession of which I had come to take possession, and acknowledged the British authority. On my arrival at Sindwh, the killadar of that fort, who was not of the confederacy, satisfied himself of my powers, and yielded up his fort; but, shortly after this, it was reported to me by the zemindar of the country I was then passing through, that the killadar of Talneir, which was the next fort on my route, was determined to resist the orders for him to give up his fort, which he understood I had from Holkar; and on proceeding further the accuracy of this report was proved, for the sick with the advanced guard of my army, whose line of march unavoidably lay under the fire of the place, were actually fired upon. On inquiry, I found that the killadar had known of the cession some time before, but had made every preparation to commit hostilities. The public functionaries and inhabitants of
the administration which had been superseded by
the battle of Mahidpore; that their sovereign and
the town met me on the road a few miles from the place, and
gave this information, stating at the same time their own entire
submission to the British authority.

"11. Notwithstanding this unwarrantable attack on my troops,
at a period of entire peace with Holkar, when the detachment
was peaceably proceeding on its march with the sick of the army,
and afterwards on the main body with my head quarters when it
came up, every opportunity was given to the killadar to withdraw
himself from the criminal league into which he had entered, and
to obey the orders of Holkar which had been recognized at Sind-
wah, and were acknowledged by the people of the town and
country. A letter was prepared by my orders to his address,
and entrusted to the care of one of my public hircarrahs, drawing
his attention to the peace of the British with Holkar, and of the
cession made by it, informing him that Holkar's order for the
surrender of the fort of Talnier was in my possession, and calling
on him to send out some person to examine and recognize it be-
fore noon, and then to obey it; and being myself sensible, as
before stated, of the plans of the killadar, and the confederacy
he had entered into, he was further expressly apprized, that if he
refused obedience to his sovereign's order and resisted, he and
his garrison would be considered as rebels, and treated as such.

"12. The well-ascertained rebellion of the killadar, the small
body of troops then composing the British force under my per-
sonal command not exceeding 2,000 regulars of every arm and
as many irregular horse, and the formidable opposition it might
have to encounter from the combination of the several killadars,
if not checked, as well as from the ex-Prishwa and his army, and
Ram Deen and his force before noticed, and eventually from other
disaffected chiefs who had deserted Holkar's government, and
were then plundering his dominions in Hindoostan, rendered this
threat at that moment a measure of expediency; and to provide
against any ill-treatment the deputation might receive, as pre-
venting the delivery of the letter, another man, an inhabitant of
the town, voluntarily accompanied the bearer of it, to whom the
contents were twice read, and who was made to understand them
his new advisers had no control over them; and that though acting in accordance with the wishes of well, with directions from me, in the event of the hircarrah not being allowed by the killadar to deliver the letter, he was to present himself to the killadar, as officially deputed by me, and clearly to give to him a message corresponding with the letter, and to inform him, that the letter he had refused to receive was precisely to that effect, and to require his answer.

"13. The only return to this communication from the killadar was the continuance of his fire, and the detention in his fort of the persons who had been deputed by me.

"14. Some hours afterwards, and just before the place was finally carried by assault, the hircarrah returned, stripped of his clothes and robbed, and stated that he had escaped from the fort when the garrison were retiring from the outer works, and that the killadar would not receive his letter. It subsequently appeared, that his companion had been successful in fulfilling his duty, and had delivered distinctly the message corresponding with the contents of the letter, and executed his commission perfectly.

"15. It was at between seven and eight o'clock in the morning when these persons were sent into the fort by me, and when the killadar received my communication requiring him to cause his own people to examine and recognize the order from Holkar before noon; that time expiring, and receiving no answer, or any return but his fire, it was evident that he intended to continue his resistance.

"16. At about twelve o'clock, by which time four hours had been allowed to the killadar to consider and desist from his lawless proceedings, our batteries opened for the first time. The determination on my part then was, to carry the fort by assault, if necessary. The enemy's fire had done considerable injury to my troops, some of whom were killed and wounded by it, and there was every prospect that more casualties must occur before the day was over, the whole of which resulting, not from an action with a public enemy, but from the unprovoked and criminal fire from a person who had placed himself at the head of a body of Arab foreigners, not contending for his country's rights, or having any legal end
the party then lately dominant in Holkar's camp, they were acting in opposition to the orders of those who to gain, but acting in violation of every law, and of the treaty of his sovereign, against whom he was rebelling.

"17. The killadar had now subjected himself to all the severity of the laws of war; he had disregarded the ample time and warning given him, and he had done my troops irreparable injury; therefore the adjutant-general, to whom my orders were then furnished, was instructed that nothing less than unconditional surrender would be received; that the lives of the garrison should be guaranteed; that no promise whatever could be given to the killadar for his, but that he would be held personally answerable for his acts.

"18. It appeared from the adjutant-general's report, that a man came out from the fort at about three o'clock, and inquired whether terms would be given, and that the reply of the adjutant-general corresponded with his orders; and there being no appearance of surrender for upwards of an hour afterwards, the detachments selected for the assault, commanded by Major Gordon, of his Majesty's Royal Scots, moved forward. After they had got through two of the gates, and were advancing through the wicket of the third, several people, who were supposed to be banians escaping, came out of it at the same time; the storming party did not pause in its progress, and these people it appeared were subsequently placed under a guard.

"19. The fort was very soon carried after the horrid treachery at the last gate, by which Major Gordon and Captain Macgregor, both of his Majesty's Royal Scots, were murdered, and Lieutenaint-Colonel Macgregor Murray most desperately wounded with daggers and spears, as well as some other officers and men killed and wounded. It was only now found by the adjutant-general that the killadar had left the fort, and discovered that he was among the people above alluded to; and so far from any surrender having been made at the time that those persons came out, the impression on the adjutant-general, who was passing by, was, that they were some banians endeavouring to avert the consequences of the storm by an escape, and which seemed not improbable was the intention; for had the killadar, at such a late mo-
had succeeded to that party, and that in this point of view the killadar and his associates were rebels;

ment, when the troops were rapidly pressing forward, intended to surrender, he would have come out openly, and made himself and his intentions known, instead of concealing himself in the way he did. He is represented at this time to have had no distinguishing marks of dress whatever about him.

"20. The circumstances to which I have just alluded could not, of course, have come under my own personal observation; my final orders were given, as above stated, to the adjutant-general, on ordering the assault, after which the troops advanced to the attack, and my information as to what passed during it could only have been gained, subsequently, by the reports officially made to me. The adjutant-general, as well as the other officers, reported at the time what they have now committed to paper, and therefore the Honourable Court must be referred to Colonel Conway's statement for the detail of the circumstances relative to the killadar for which it has applied. The Honourable Court will also find in Lieutenant-Colonel Murray's statement a full account of what occurred at the last gate; from which it will be seen that the garrison showed no disposition to surrender, and brought on themselves the dreadful consequences which followed their treachery, and, however much they are to be lamented, were inevitable. Deprived of their officers, I may say by assassination, the soldiers were without any authority over them to control their furious exasperation and thirst for revenge. The killadar was, however, not charged with having been directly accessory to this treachery, though he was fairly responsible for all the acts of his garrison whom he had instigated to resistance; and his separating himself from them just at the instant of imminent danger did not lessen his own personal responsibility.

"21. I have endeavoured to place the Honourable Court in possession of the circumstances connected with the capture of Tainier, and I trust that I shall have been successful in demonstrating that the resistance of the killadar of that fort was quite unjustifiable in every point of view, and that all possible indulgence was shown to his lawless measures, indeed more than justice should have permitted. He subjected himself by the laws of
CHAP. XXV. that though not chargeable with being directly accessory to the alleged treachery perpetrated against

war, in standing an assault, after the patience observed towards him for many hours, to a refusal of quarter, and he might have been instantly proceeded with accordingly; but an opportunity was given him of being heard, and a summary investigation was held on him in his presence, as provided for in less extreme cases involving capital punishment; he also was answerable with his life for the lives he had taken among my troops, viewing him in a state of rebellion to his sovereign, and violating the treaty he was bound to respect; his infraction of it could not be imputed to his sovereign, because Holkar was at peace with us, and had commanded him to obey it; he had committed hostilities without any commission from his sovereign, and was a public marauder, and the consequences he entailed on himself thereby were similar to those to which a pirate would be exposed. The injury done to my troops under these circumstances I had a right, by the laws of war, to do myself and them justice for, by my own power, on the spot, when his person was secured: the killadar was acting altogether independently of Holkar, whom he would not recognize, and was pursuing his own schemes. To the whole of these grounds I request your lordship will refer the Honourable Court, in reply to the 10th paragraph of their despatch.

"22. The Honourable Court, in the preceding paragraph of their letter, having alluded to the case of Mundella as one similar, it behoves me to explain, with due deference, for their information, that never were two cases less analogous: the killadar of Mundella was acting in persevering obedience to his sovereign's orders, and, in strict allegiance to him and his government, was defending his fort; he also was under the immediate restraint and coercion of chiefs sent by his master; but the killadar of Talneir was actuated by very different motives; he was opposing, not obeying, Holkar's orders, and had entered the fort for that express purpose only fifteen days before it was taken, with all the artificers he could collect, at a time when it was generally known in the town of Talneir, that Holkar had made peace with the British, and had by treaty ceded the fort; and I will submit, that as the inhabitants acted on this information, it cannot be supposed that
part of the British troops, the killadar was responsible for all the acts of his garrison, inasmuch as he

the killadar was ignorant of it. There was not, therefore, the most distant evidence, or the most remote ground for surmise, that he was acting like the killadar of Mundella, under private orders from Holkar, or under the immediate restraint of any chief sent by him; on the contrary, the very reverse was positively proved.

"23. At the investigation I attended, and was assisted by your lordship's political agent and the adjutant-general. Evidence was taken in the killadar's presence, by which it appeared that my communication sent to him in the morning had been delivered, and understood by him and several others in the fort; that he was perfectly aware of the cession of Holkar, and that it was publicly known; that he was entreated by several persons not to resist in such a cause, but that he was resolved to do so till death; his resistance, and exposing himself to an assault, was, therefore, regulated by his own free will: he was sensible of his guilt, and had nothing to urge in his favour. The result of the inquiry was, the unanimous opinion (after the witnesses had been heard, and the killadar had been asked what he had to say in his defence, to which he replied, nothing) the whole of his proceedings became subject to capital punishment, which every consideration of humanity and justice urgently demanded should be inflicted on the spot.

"24. But although the deluded man had so completely forfeited his life, and justice to the menes of my brother officers and men, who had fallen victims to his lawless hostility, called for some atonement, still my anxious desire was to save him from execution; for it is ever the most painful part of an officer's duty to be driven to an act of severity. Impelled with these feelings of mercy to a reduced being in my possession, a struggle supported them for a time, but they were overpowered by considerations of humanity due to others, which it must have been deemed unpardonable in me to have neglected. The hostile combination in Candeish against the British authority, already described, was daily increasing in strength, and required an immediate check; the small force at the time with me was totally inadequate to re-
had instigated them to resistance; that he had done much mischief to the army under Sir Thomas Hislop,

duce the several rebellious fortresses; a continuance of the plans of resistance, assisted by the ex-Peishwa’s army then in the neighbourhood, and bodies of troops commanded by other chiefs expected, must have occasioned the loss of many lives, and the most disastrous consequence might have occurred to the British force; a timely and just example of one of the confederacy was consequently indispensable, and the killadar of Talneir having been proved to be a fit subject for it, I had no alternative but to make a painful sacrifice of my private feelings to the cause of humanity and my country; and the necessity of example being the concurrent opinion of the officers with whom I consulted, the execution was reluctantly ordered.

"25. The punishment decreed against the killadar was prescribed by the laws of war and of nations; its infliction was adopted because mercy could not, under the circumstances of the case, be extended; and the good effect the example produced, in the cause of humanity and to the public interests, became, as it were, instantly apparent. The confederacy of opposition to our lawful possession of Candeish was dissolved; the several killadars, till now in resistance, yielded to Holkar’s order, and, in obedience to it, delivered up the formidable posts in their possession; the Peishwa betook himself to flight; Ram Deen disappeared, and not another life was lost in the assumption of the cessions of Holkar; whereas, had not an example been made at the critical juncture that it was, incalculable bloodshed would indubitably have ensued; and, criminal as the killadar of Talneir was in every way, an omission of example might justly have been ascribed, by an authority familiar as your lordship was with the state of public affairs, to a want of that judgment and decision which they required should be exerted on such an emergency.

"26. In my hands your lordship has been pleased to place the entire charge of the rights and interests of the British government in Candeish; the adoption of the measures which were necessary to secure and maintain them consequently devolved on me. Your lordship is fully sensible of the peculiarly difficult and delicate situation in which I was placed with the very small force then
and that the latter consequently acquired a right "to do" himself "and them justice, by his own power, on the spot," by hanging the author of such mischief; lastly, that the hostile combination existing in Candeish against the British authority was daily increasing in strength, and required immediate check; that the small force at Sir Thomas Hislop's disposal was inadequate to the reduction of the fortresses in that province which threatened to hold out; that had the malcontents obtained such aid as might not improbably be expected, disastrous consequences to the British cause would have resulted; and that, therefore, it was fitting to execute the killadar of Talneir by way of example. Such appears to be a fair summary of the defence of Sir Thomas Hislop—a defence distinguished by its weakness not less than by its wordiness.

The fortress was taken by assault, and according to the laws of war, as they still exist even in civilized and Christian Europe, the garrison of a place thus taken is not entitled to quarter. It is time, in-

accompanying my head quarters; and as the whole of my proceedings during that service, immediately preceding the relinquishment of my command in the Deccan, whereby the province of Candeish, formidable from its obstacles to our possession, was reduced to the British power within a very short space of time, have been honoured with your lordship's unqualified approbation, I rest satisfied that the same consideration will not be denied them by the Honourable Court and the authorities in England.

"I have the honour to remain, with the greatest respect, my lord, your lordship's most obedient and

"Most humble servant,

(Signed) "T. HISLOP, Lieut.-Gen."
deed, that those laws should be freed from so savage and disgraceful a provision. "The forfeiture of pretensions to quarter," says the Marquis of Hastings, "when troops stand an assault, is established by the laws of war, to prevent garrisons from wantonly subjecting besiegers to the heavy loss likely to be suffered by troops exposed in advancing to a breach; a slaughter in which a garrison would, from false points of honour, always be tempted to indulge, if impunity could be obtained by throwing down their arms when defence proved ineffectual." It might have been expected that the Marquis of Hastings, himself a soldier, would have spoken with more respect of that feeling of honour which prompts the brave to maintain themselves at the post of danger and of duty to the last extremity. It might have been thought that to the mind of the governor-general of India the recollection of the numerous instances, from Clive downwards, in which British troops in that country had held out when hope itself appeared to be lost, and had found their perseverance rewarded by ultimate success, would have enjoined some limit on the general approbation with which his lordship speaks of the sanguinary law under his notice. But greatly as it is to be deplored that in an age which boasts itself pre-eminent in humanity and civilization, such a law should still be permitted to dishonour the code of honourable warfare, it is not to be denied that at the fall of Talneir it did exist, and that even up to the present time it remains a foul blot on the character of military
jurisprudence. The question therefore is, can Sir CHAP. XXV. Thomas Hislop claim impunity under this provision? In a place taken by storm, the infuriated warrior who seeks only death on the walls which he has aided in defending, and the prostrate suppliant who throws down his arms in token of submission, are, by the remorseless sentence of the military code, alike destined to slaughter. In which of these predicaments was the killadar of Talneir found? In neither. When the troops gained possession of the place, he was unable either to resist or to submit. He was a prisoner in the hands of the English, having, with several other persons, been intercepted in an attempt to escape at the third gate—the conflict which terminated in giving possession of the place to the assailants having taken place at the fifth. The question is, not whether the killadar, if found within the place with his sword raised to strike, or his hands uplifted for mercy, might, in either case, have been unhesitatingly cut down; but whether it be lawful to put to death a prisoner whose submission has already been accepted. It is said that the killadar never surrendered. He never surrendered the fort, but he certainly surrendered his own person into the hands of the conquerors—not willingly, indeed—he would have escaped had escape been practicable; and this is so frequent a case, that if it were established that mercy should not be extended where escape had been meditated, few would be entitled to it. He made no conditions, and therefore had a right to none. He was in the
ordinary position of a prisoner of war; but a right to put prisoners to death is not recognized by any civilized state, and whenever such an atrocity has been perpetrated or suspected, it has called forth a loud and indignant burst of condemnation. It is urged that the killadar was not known when he was made prisoner; that he had no apparent distinguishing marks of dignity about him; but known or unknown, distinguished or undistinguished, his life was spared when it might have been taken, and by the favour then shewn him, the honour of the British government was pledged for his safety in the condition of a prisoner. It was intended, it appears, to except the killadar from any amnesty that might be granted to the garrison: upon what grounds such an exception could be justified is not evident; but whether it could be justified or not, it is clear that it could not be acted upon after the admission of the proscribed party to the impunity from which it was intended to exclude him.

The strongest argument for the execution of the killadar—that founded on the laws of war—being disposed of, the weaker will not require to be discussed at great length. The charge of rebellion is idle. One set of ministers had been displaced from Holkar’s durbar and another introduced. The killadar held with the former, but he professed to be the servant of Holkar; and it is ridiculous to magnify into rebellion his want of respect for the party which the prevailing current of events had floated into power. The authority of the sove-
reign, when at a distance, is held so lightly in the East, that if this were rebellion, it may be affirmed that no native state, of any extent, except when under British protection, is ever free from rebellion. Even the Mogul emperors, in the zenith of their power, were unable to hold their dependents in obedience, or to enforce their demand for tribute, except by occasional recourse to arms; and under such a government as that of Holkar to expect that prompt and implicit obedience should be paid to the orders of ministers who were even yet wondering at the events to which they owed their elevation, would be to indulge visions which all Indian experience shews to be absurd. The nominal head of the state was a child and virtually a prisoner: his years and his situation alike precluded on his part any exercise of the will in political affairs. Further, if the killadar were a rebel, his guilt should have been established by solemn judicial inquiry. The consultation of two or three British officers taking place under circumstances of powerful excitement, and occupying only a few minutes, cannot be so called. That the killadar did not participate in the unhappy occurrences at the fifth gate is proved by the fact that he was at the time in British custody as a prisoner; indeed, it is not pretended that he had any thing to do with this part of the proceedings, beyond having originally instigated the garrison to resist, and thus having made himself responsible for all that might follow. This refined attempt to introduce constructive responsibility could scarcely have been looked

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for from a military casuist, and the charge certainly merits no answer. That the killadar and his troops had done much mischief to the British troops was quite true. When men engage in deadly strife, they must and do bring much mischief upon each other: mischief is the very instrument by which they seek to accomplish their purposes; and though those who suffer cannot but lament their misfortunes, they seldom think of founding on them matter of criminal charge against those by whom they are caused. The soldier knows that to encounter hard blows is the lot of his profession; and he does not deem those by whom they are dealt worthy, on that account, of suffering an ignominious death. The last class of arguments, those founded on the threatening posture of affairs, on the insufficiency of Sir Thomas Hislop's force to reduce the fortresses that held out, and on the disaffection and obstinacy of the killadars by whom they were defended, are arguments of mere expediency, and before their validity can be admitted, the justice of the measure in question must be proved. It might be very convenient to hang the killadar of Talneir, by way of lesson to his brethren; but if not warranted by justice, the execution must be placed in the list of crimes of the most atrocious dye. It was probably a regard to expediency, a desire to make an example, and thus to frighten other killadars into submission, that mainly prompted the violent act, the memory of which stains the capture of Talneir. It would be a sacrifice of truth to deny that act to have been a violation of the laws of war, and
of the sacred principles of right. It is one of the few instances in which British conquest has been stained with cruelty or injustice.

With respect to the occurrences at the fifth gate, although the British officers were loud in denouncing the treachery of the Arab garrison, it is not clear that their behaviour deserves to be characterized by so odious a name. The Arabs had asked for terms, but none had been granted or offered, and there is no evidence to shew that they intended to surrender unconditionally. The fact of opening of the gate under circumstances which, from the confusion that prevailed, it is impossible distinctly to understand, cannot be regarded as implying a promise of unconditional surrender. It might be a mere ruse, intended to entrap a few of the assailants; but the testimony of Colonel Conway, alluded to in Sir Thomas Hislop's defence, furnishes the more probable mode of accounting for what happened. The Arab party were divided as to what was to be done. One portion was in favour of unconditional surrender, another was opposed to it. The gate was opened by the former, and closed by the latter. Such a state of feeling and of action very naturally resulted from the condition in which the garrison were placed, abandoned by their commander and without any acknowledged leader. This solution removes the charge of deliberate treachery, and renders the language used on the occasion altogether inappropriate.*

* That of Colonel Conway is, "I cannot say that the few individuals who were within the wicket were killed; they were
CHAP. XXV. It is gratifying to turn from such a scene as that at Talneir; and the narrative of the progress of events at Nagpore must now be resumed. The engagement provisionally concluded with Appa Sahib, after the evacuation of his capital, was confirmed by the governor-general, and the resident was authorized to frame a definitive treaty on its basis. This was suspended by a proposal from Appa Sahib, to transfer to the British government the whole of the possessions of the state of Nagpore, he retaining only the name and form of sovereignty, and receiving a certain share of the revenues. The proposal was rejected by the governor-general, and the original plan ordered to be carried into effect. But before the despatch conveying the final instructions of the government was received by the resident, the state of circumstances again forced him to act upon the dictates of his own sound and vigorous judgment.

The delivery of certain fortresses stipulated to be surrendered was refused or evaded. Mundela was murdered. Sir Thomas Hislop says, "deprived of their officers, I may say by assassination, the soldiers were without any authority over them to control their furious exasperation and thirst for revenge." It is remarkable that these words immediately succeed the following: "The Honourable Court will also find in Lieutenant-Colonel Murray's statement a full account of what occurred at the last gate, from which it will be seen that the garrison shewed no disposition to surrender, and brought on themselves the dreadful consequences which followed their treachery, and [which], however much they are to be lamented, were inevitable." "If the garrison shewed no disposition to surrender," there was "no treachery," and no "assassination."
one of these. When the order for its surrender arrived from Nagpore, the rajah's ministers requested that a little time might be allowed for the evacuation of the fort, in order that persons might be sent to settle with the garrison, and thus prevent any demur to the delivery of the fort, under the pretence of arrears being due. A person deputed from Nagpore ostensibly for this purpose arrived at Mundela; but the surrender was still deferred, under the plea that an order had been received to make the collections for the year from the pergunnahs dependent upon Mundela, and to pay the garrison with the produce. The resident having brought the subject to the notice of the rajah's ministers, they stated the order in question to be, that payment should be made from the revenue already collected, and sufficient for the purpose. As a part of the territory from which the revenue was to be drawn was actually occupied by the British troops, and nothing could be obtained from the remainder but by gross extortion and oppression, the resident authorized the payment of the garrison from the British treasury, and Major O'Brien proceeded with a small escort to Mundela to make the necessary arrangements. On the arrival of this officer, various communications passed between him, the killadar of the fort, and the person deputed from Nagpore, professedly for the purpose of settling the arrears. These communications appeared to promise a satisfactory adjustment, and Major O'Brien was in expectation of being put in immediate possession of
the fort. Instead of this result, the British commander, on the third morning after his arrival, while riding near the place, found that the garrison during the night had sent over the Nerudda about four hundred cavalry, with four thousand infantry, and four guns. The cavalry advanced upon him, and the guns opened; but he was enabled, with his small escort, to reach his camp in safety; the enemy, whenever they approached, being successfully repelled.

In consequence of this treacherous proceeding on the part of the killadar of the fort, Major-General Marshall, with a considerable force, was ordered to advance upon Mundela; but before this could be effected Nagpore became the scene of a bloodless revolution. The retention of the fortresses in defiance of the provisions under which they were to be surrendered, and notwithstanding public orders had been given for their delivery, was traced to secret orders of a contrary purport—a fact suspected at an early period by the resident, and ultimately placed beyond the possibility of doubt. In addition to these circumstances, Mr. Jenkins received information that an intercourse was kept up with the Peishwa, and that the rajah held secret conferences with persons hostile to the influence of the British government, while those who entertained friendly feelings towards it were regarded with aversion. Rumours of the rajah meditating an escape were general; it was understood that one of the disaffected chiefs had received a sum of money for the levy of
troops; and attempts were made to intercept the progress of supplies intended for the British force. Every thing conspired to shew that Appa Sahib was irretrievably leagued with the enemies of the British power. New and incontestable proofs of the rajah's treachery continually occurred, and were multiplied, till it became evident that extreme measures could no longer be postponed without compromising the honour and safety of the British government. The resident now acted with his usual vigour, and arrested both the rajah and his confidential ministers. This bold step was accelerated by the discovery of facts which impressed Mr. Jenkins with a conviction that Appa Sahib had been the murderer of his kinsman and sovereign, Pursagee Bhooslay, formerly Rajah of Nagapore. At the time of Pursagee's death Mr. Jenkins had been led to suspect this; but circumstances having induced him in some degree to moderate his suspicions, and the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory proof of the suspected fact being apparently insurmountable, no measures were taken in consequence. Such additional information was now acquired as led to a conviction of Appa Sahib's guilt. His arrest took place on the 15th of March. Subsequently he was declared to be dethroned, and this step was followed by the elevation to the musnud of a descendant of a former rajah by the female line. As soon as a sufficient escort could be obtained, Appa Sahib was sent off to the British provinces, and provision was made at Allahabad for his reception and custody.
CHAP. XXV. General Marshall having arrived before Mandela, proceeded to erect batteries, which being completed were opened by daylight on the 26th of April. They were answered by a spirited fire from the whole of the enemy's works. After several hours' battering, Lieutenant Pickersgill, with great gallantry, proceeded to ascertain by personal inspection the effect produced, mounting, with the assistance of his hircarrals, to the top of the breach; from which, after making his observations, he returned with so favourable a report, as induced General Marshall to make immediate preparations for storming the works. The necessary dispositions having been made, Captain Tickell, field engineer, examined the breach, and at half-past five o'clock the signal was given to advance. The storming and supporting columns, both under the direction of Brigadier-General Watson, moved forward, the breach was instantly mounted and carried, and in a very short time the town was in the possession of the assailants. The troops were immediately pushed forward to the fort, and at daybreak on the 27th the garrison came out unarmed, and quietly surrendered themselves. At midnight a small boat had been observed crossing the river, with four persons: by good management on the part of one of the advanced posts they were secured on landing, and one of them turned out to be the killadar of the fort. The governor-general had given orders that, if taken, the killadar and other principal officers should be immediately brought to a drum-head
court-martial, and that any punishment that might be awarded by such tribunal, whether death or imprisonment with hard labour, might immediately be carried into effect.

It would be difficult to shew that these orders were consistent either with discretion or with a regard to the usages of war. They appear to have been an ebullition of that infirmity of temper which shadowed the high character of the Marquis of Hastings.* The orders were so far followed, that the killadar was brought to a court-martial, charged with rebellion and treachery. He was acquitted of the charge of rebellion, on the proper ground of his having acted under the orders of the Nagpore government. The charge of treachery arose out of the attack on Major O'Brien. Of this the killadar was also acquitted, the major declaring his belief that the prisoner was not concerned in the attack upon him. This appears a somewhat refined view of the matter. If the attack were an offence against military law, it could be of little importance whether the killadar were personally engaged in it or not, as it must be quite certain that the move-

* The marquis seems to have regarded the hanging of contumacious killadars as a very laudable proceeding whenever it could be resorted to. The case of the killadar of Mundela was referred to in the correspondence on the proceedings at Talneir; but Sir Thomas Hislop, instead of repaying the governor-general's support of himself, declared that the cases were not parallel—that the killadar of Mundela acted under the orders of his government, while the killadar of Talneir was in rebellion; thus passing sentence of condemnation on the governor-general's proposal to hang the former personage.
ment of the garrison must have taken place with his cognizance and sanction; but the court must have been aware that they had no proper jurisdiction in the case, and that conviction and punishment under such circumstances could not be justified. Another officer was put on trial, charged with abetting his superior; but he, of course, shared the impunity of his principal.

The surrender of Chouragurh, another fortress which was to be ceded to the British government, was postponed by the same bad faith which had delayed the delivery of Mundela, and the pretence was the same—time was asked to settle the arrears of pay due to the garrison; but the killadar soon assumed a posture of direct hostility. A body of men armed with matchlocks sallied from the fort to attack a British force under Colonel MacMorine, and the garrison systematically plundered the villages which had been placed under the British government. A body of about five hundred, employed in the latter occupation, were attacked and put to flight by a small detachment under Major Richards. After the reduction of Mundela, the division under General Watson was ordered to march to Chouragurh, but before their arrival the fort and adjoining town were evacuated, and possession taken by Colonel MacMorine.

The continued disturbances in Nagpore had induced the resident to call for the advance of Colonel Adams's force from Hoosingabad, where it had arrived in the beginning of March, after being em-
ployed beyond the Nerudda. He accordingly marched for the city of Nagpore, which he reached on the 5th of April; and having halted there on the following day, resumed his march on the 7th for Hinghunghut, where he arrived on the 9th. There he was joined on the 14th by a party which he had detached under Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, to intercept an apprehended attempt of Bajee Rao to enter Chanda. Little has been said of the movements of Bajee Rao, for it would have been alike tedious and unprofitable to follow minutely his tortuous flight. After the battle of Ashtee he wandered in almost every direction, in continual dread of some portion of the British force. On the 13th of April he became aware of the position of Colonel Adams's force, and to avoid him moved to Soondee. On the 16th he was alarmed by intelligence of the approach of General Doveton, and made preparations for flying. On the 17th Colonel Adams came suddenly upon him, after a fatiguing march over a most difficult country. An action ensued, in which the Peishwa was completely routed, with the loss of several hundred men, four brass guns, three elephants, nearly two hundred camels, and a variety of valuable property. The Peishwa himself had a narrow escape, the palanquin in which he had been borne having been taken immediately after he had left it to seek safety by flight on horseback. Hotly pursued by General Doveton, the Peishwa fled to Ormekâi, where, overcome by fatigue, privation,
and terror, his army broke up, and the fugitive prince was abandoned by most of his sirdars.

After dispersing the army of the Peishwa at Soon-dee, Colonel Adams returned to Hinghunghut, to prepare for laying siege to Chanda, a strongly fortified city in the Nagpore territory, said to be equal in size to the capital. He appeared before it on the 9th of May, with a thousand native cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, one-half being Europeans of the Madras establishment, the remainder natives, of the Bengal establishment, a complete company of European foot artillery, partly provided by Bengal, partly by Madras, three thousand native infantry, two companies of pioneers, one from the Bengal, one from the Madras establishment, and two thousand irregular horse, with three eighteen-pounders, four brass twelve-pounders, six howitzers, and twelve six-pounders.

Chanda is situate between two small rivers, which unite at a distance of about half a mile from its southern extremity. On the north is a deep and extensive tank, beyond which are some hills, commanding the place, at a distance of nine hundred yards. Between them and the fort are thick groves of trees. On the east face are suburbs interspersed with trees and separated from the town by one of the rivers, and opposite to the south-east angle, distant about seven hundred and fifty yards, are other hills, beyond which the British encampment was fixed. Within the place, equidistant from the north
and south faces, but nearer the eastern than the western wall, is situated a citadel: the rest of the interior consists of straggling streets, detached houses, and gardens. The walls are of cut stone, well cemented, and from fifteen to twenty feet high, and six miles round. They are flanked by round towers, capacious enough for the largest guns; and as the direction of the walls is frequently broken, and they are surmounted by a high parapet, an effectual enfilade of them is not practicable. Eighty guns of large calibre were mounted, and the garrison consisted of two thousand men.

At night, on the 13th of April, the first battery was completed. It was erected on the southern hill, and admitted one eighteen-pounder, two howitzers, and one six-pounder. The chief point of attack had not at this time been selected, and this battery was intended, says Colonel Blacker, "to amuse the enemy, while the necessary collection of materials for the siege was in progress."* Shells and red-hot shot were thenceforth thrown into the town, but with little effect, while the fire was returned by the garrison with no greater. Coincident with the opening of the battery, a force, consisting of a battalion of Bengal light infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Captain Doveton, was established in a suburb lying south-east of the city. Four days were spent in reconnoitering, and the south-east angle being finally selected for breaching, on the

* Memoir; from which work the minute description of Chanda is derived.
night of the 17th of April a battery of four twelve-pounders was constructed within four hundred yards of that point. In addition to this, a howitzer battery was erected on the capital of the south-east angle, at a distance of six hundred yards, and a battery of three six-pounders on the prolongation of the eastern face, distant four hundred yards. Three of the enemy's guns were dismounted, but beyond this the effect of these batteries seems to have been unimportant. During the night of the 18th the breaching battery of three eighteen-pounders was completed, within two hundred and fifty yards of the angle attacked, and at daybreak on the following morning it opened. At four in the afternoon the breach was practicable, but the assault was delayed till the following morning. During the night, however, an incessant fire was kept up, in order to defeat any attempt made by the garrison to form a retrenchment. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott was appointed to command the storming-party, which consisted of two columns. The right column was composed of four companies of Bengal grenadiers, followed by pioneers with ladders, and the first battalion of the 19th regiment of Bengal Native Infantry. It was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Popham. The left column, under Captain Brook, consisted of four flank companies, followed by pioneers with ladders, and the first battalion of the 1st regiment of Madras Native Infantry. The first battalion of the 23rd Bengal, and the first of the 11th Madras Native Infantry followed; while with the ad-
vanced sections was a detail of artillerymen, provided with materials for either turning the enemy's guns or spiking them. A reserve, consisting of the Bengal light infantry battalion, four troops of the 5th Cavalry dismounted, and two horse artillery guns, was commanded by Major Clarke.

At break of day on the 20th of April the storming party marched from camp, the heads of the two columns being equally advanced. They arrived at the breach without much annoyance, a tremendous fire from all the guns that could be brought to bear on the breach and defences having been previously poured in for half an hour. The garrison, however, were found prepared, and the heads of the columns were assailed by a warm discharge of small arms. The columns separated, according to a preconcerted arrangement, and took different directions. The right met with considerable resistance from bodies of the garrison, who, being driven back, appeared to cross over and fall into the route of the left column. That column, however, pursued its way, driving the enemy back as it advanced, and within an hour from the breach being passed the place was entirely occupied by the English. The killadar, with about two hundred of his men, were killed, and about a hundred were made prisoners. The rest escaped without the walls; some of them were intercepted and destroyed by the British cavalry, but from the great extent of the place, and the cover afforded by a thick jungle to the northward, most of the fugitives succeeded in eluding pursuit. The loss of the Eng-
lish was small, amounting only to twelve killed and something more than fifty wounded.

The circumstances attending the capture of Chanda exhibit nothing very remarkable or striking. But the occupation of the place was of vast importance, inasmuch as it was the great citadel of the principality in which it was situated, and its possession was associated in public opinion with the existence of the Nagpore state. On this account, its fall to the force under Colonel Adams was an event highly favourable to British interests in Nagpore. A large amount of property was found in the city, having been deposited there for safety. Nine lacs of rupees, which had been buried in the purlieus of a single palace, were discovered and dug out, a few days after the storm.* The taste of the natives of India for articles of European luxury was proved by the discovery of many such in the captured city, and among them some of the elegancies and embellishments which, however highly valued in a more cultivated state of society, might be supposed to have but few attractions for Asiatic taste. Some pictures, of European production, formed part of the spoil of Chanda.

The operations of the British arms in other quarters were marked by much that would deserve recital, did space permit. A few only can be noticed without extending this part of the narrative to a disproportionate length. A detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel MacDowell, occupied in the

* Colonel Blacker's Memoir.
reduction of various refractory garrisons in Can-
deish, after obtaining possession of Trimbuck and
various other places, partly by force, and partly
through the influence of the terror imposed by
their success.* arrived, on the 16th of May, before
Malligaum, the strongest place in the valley of
Candeish.

The following professional description of this fort
will convey a lively impression of it.† "The plan
of the fort is quadrangular, having on one face and
on half of the two adjoining, the river Moassum,
which at this place forms a convenient curve. On
the opposite side is the town, which nearly en-
compases the remainder of the fort, by approach-
ing the river at its two extremities. The fort
consists of two lines of works, the interior of which,
a square of about three hundred feet, is built of
superior masonry, and surrounded by a faussé-braye,
seven feet high, and a dry ditch, twenty-five feet
depth by sixteen wide. The outer line is built of
mud and stone, having flanking towers, and it ap-
proaches within a few yards of the town on one
side, and of the river on the other. It is only of
moderate elevation; but the inner fort is sixty
feet high, with a terre-pleine, sixteen feet wide, to
which there are no means of ascent except through
narrow covered staircases of difficult access." In
this place a large body of Arabs had established

* The fall of Trimbuck was followed by that of seventeen
other hill forts without resistance.
† Taken from the Memoir of Colonel Blacker.
CHAP. XXV. themselves, actuated by a determined spirit of resistance to the British. Their means of inflicting injury on the force opposed to them were not equal to the advantages of their position. Their guns were not numerous, and those they had were badly mounted; but they had matchlocks, and these, says Colonel Blacker, "in the hands of the Arabs, were sure of hitting their mark."

The British army was, in the first instance, formed at an angle of the town, with its left on the junction of the river Moassum with another river named the Gheerna, the point of junction being distant something more than three hundred yards from the nearest parts of the town and of the citadel; but was on the following day moved to the right bank of the Moassum, that river, then low in water, being thus interposed between the British encampment and the fort. As soon as the materials were collected, an enfilading battery of two eighteen-pounders, one eight-inch mortar, and two eight-inch howitzers, was constructed for the south face, and another of two twelve-pounders for the west face. Each of these batteries was distant four hundred yards from the works, and at the same distance was marked out a place of arms in the centre of a grove of trees, situate between the camp and the river. At eight o'clock on the evening of the 18th of May the garrison made a sally on the covering party at the place of arms, and directed their guns against the two batteries. A reinforcement arriving from the camp, the attack
was repelled and the assailants driven back; but the British had to lament the loss of Lieutenant Davis, the commanding engineer. On the 19th the two batteries opened, and were immediately answered from the fort by seven guns. A corps of infantry from Lieutenant Macdowell's camp on that day took possession of a breastwork in the rear of a village lying a little higher up the river, and at night repulsed a second sortie of the garrison. On the following day another attempt was made to dislodge the British party posted in the rear of the village already mentioned, the village itself having been deserted by the inhabitants and occupied by the Arabs; but the post had been strengthened by the accession of two field-pieces, and the attempt of the enemy failed. The fire from the enfilading batteries continued, but with little vigour from the scarcity of shot; and some smaller guns were brought forward to make up, in some degree, for the slackening fire from the larger, previously in battery. The approaches were, in the meantime, advanced, and on the 21st a parallel was completed along the bank of the Moassum, containing a battery at each extremity: that on the left for three guns, raking the bed of the river; the other designed for breaching the opposed angle of the fort. On the 22nd the breaching battery opened against the towers, but with little effect; it was therefore afterwards directed against the intermediate curtain. One of the enfilading batteries first erected was converted into a mortar battery, and the other dis-
CHAP. XXV. mantled. An additional post was established on
the bank of the river, to confine the garrison, and
some field-pieces were attached to it, with a view to
their being brought to bear on the gate on that side
of the fort. On the same day it became necessary to
withdraw the British camp four hundred yards, in
consequence of the guns of the fort having found
its range.

For several successive days little occurred worthy
of note, except repeated sallies by the garrison,
which were invariably repulsed with spirit, an ex-
plosion within the fort caused by the fire of the
howitzers, and the arrival at the British camp of
some seasonable reinforcements. But though an
accession of troops was very desirable, the be-
sieging force were even in greater want of artil-
ler y and ammunition. On the 26th of May
the breach was carried through the wall of the
inner fort; but by this time the twelve-pounder
shots were all expended, and every heavy gun was
run at the vent. The advancement of the breach
consequently depended on the eighteen-pounders,
and for the supply of them a very small share of
ammunition remained. Every endeavour was now
used to effect a slope on the flanks of the breach, to
facilitate the ascent of the terre-pleine, and shells
were thrown at intervals to prevent the enemy
constructing a retrenchment. These objects having
been pursued through two days, it was thought that
an attempt to storm might be made on the 29th
with a probability of success.
The parties for the attack having been told off on the preceding evening, took up in the morning the positions assigned to them. The column for the attack of the breach was commanded by Major Greenhill, of the 17th Madras Native Infantry. It consisted of one hundred Europeans and eight hundred sepoys, who remained in the parallel on the bank of the river. The column destined to storm the pettah was composed of five hundred sepoys under Lieutenant-Colonel Mathew Stewart, of the Madras Native Infantry. This column crossed the river lower down to a point on the left bank, eight hundred yards from the walls. The third column, which was commanded by Major Macbean, of the Madras Native Infantry, had for its object the escalade of the outer wall near the river gate. This column took post near the six-pounder battery up the right bank. It consisted of fifty Europeans and three hundred sepoys. Each column was headed by a party of pioneers, with tools and ladders, and led by an engineer officer; and that of Major Greenhill was provided with bundles of long grass, to be applied as might be necessary in filling up trenches. These preparations, however, proved unavailing. After a warm fire of two hours from the breaching and mortar batteries against the point of attack, Major Greenhill's column moved forward. As it approached the outer wall, Lieutenant Nattes, the senior engineer since the death of Lieutenant Davis, ascended the breach in front, and had no sooner attained its summit than he discovered insuperable obstacles, the
existence of which was previously unsuspected. He was in the act of pronouncing the word "impracticable," and warning back those behind him, when he fell, pierced by several balls: the storming party not having noticed his signal, continued to advance under a fire of small arms, by which their commander, Major Greenhill, was wounded. All doubt as to the result of the attack was soon removed by the unwelcome discovery that the ladders of the assailants were too short to be of use. Colonel Macdowell consequently ordered the party to retire, which they did in exemplary order under a harassing fire from the enemy. The attack under Colonel Stewart was more fortunate. He had gained a considerable portion of the pettah when he was joined by Major Maeben, the object of that officer's attack having been found unattainable, and the united force quickly succeeded in obtaining possession of the entire town.*

* The causes of the failure of the main attack are investigated with some minuteness by Colonel Blacker, who also criticises freely the engineering arrangements. On a subject so purely technical, the opinion of this officer should be stated in his own words. He says—"The breach in the outer wall, as has been seen, was only practicable in its direct ascent; but though the descent on the other side was impracticable, the height of nine feet would by no means have accounted for the disappearance of the ladders, had not there been a trench excavated within to deprive them of a footing. The enemy had likewise cut off the breach by a retrenchment, flanked by two guns, which would have been sufficient to destroy the head of the column had it attempted to descend; and the numerous matchlocks, of unerring aim, placed behind this work to pour a concentrated fire on the summit of the breach, could not miss whoever exposed himself under such dis-
After the failure of the attack on the 29th of May, it was resolved to direct the next upon a new point. On the 1st of June the camp was removed across the Moassum to the vicinity of the Gheerna, which was close to its rear. In addition to other reasons, the expediency of this measure was urged by regard to the season of the year, and to the probable filling up of the Moassum by the approaching rains, the effect of which would be to separate the besiegers from the fort. Various preparations, unnecessary to be related in detail, were carried on while the British commander awaited the arrival of a battering-train from Ahmednuggur, which arrived on advantages. A proof of this was seen in the fate of the engineer, who alone received seven balls, and will account for the precipitancy with which the ladders were dropt out of hand. No progress was made in filling up the moat beyond the small quantity of rubbish which fell from the fausse-braye, and, indeed, its respectability, as well as its distance from the outer wall, was now, for the first time, fully ascertained. Of the inner line, nothing but the upper part had been yet seen; and though the breach was a good one if it could have been approached, there was no way to get from it on the terre-pleine to the right and left, and the descent on the other side was still more difficult than that of the outer wall. Under all these circumstances, it was esteemed fortunate that no lodgement was attempted between the two lines, as it would have been attended with very severe loss, and ultimately useless; for the guns were unserviceable, the ammunition was expended, the soil so mixed with rock as to preclude mining, and the access through the bed of the river so exposed as to render all communication from the parallel insecure. Why this side, indisputably the strongest, was selected for the attack, remains unexplained with the death of the engineer. No reason has been suggested, except the existence of the tope of large trees on the bank of the river, which afforded convenient materials for the siege."—Memoir, pp. 327, 328.
the 10th of June. On that night the mortars were brought into battery, and on the following morning they opened a discharge, one effect of which was to fire a store of powder within the fort. The explosion threw down from twenty to thirty yards of the curtain of the inner line. A breaching battery was soon ready to follow up the work of destruction, and was forthwith put into operation. The enemy were now alarmed, and tendered submission upon terms. They were answered that nothing but unconditional surrender could be accepted. The Arabs, however, were from some cause apprehensive for their personal safety after surrender, and hesitated to trust the faith of those in whose power they were required to place themselves. "Finding," says Colonel Macdowell, "that treachery on our part was suspected, and wishing to do away a report all over Candeish so prejudicial to our character, I did not hesitate in signing a paper, declaring, in the name of my government, that the garrison should not be put to death after they surrendered." Nothing, under the circumstances, could be more judicious than the conduct of Colonel Macdowell; but the concession necessary to remove the distrust of the garrison led to subsequent dispute. The native scribe who drew up the paper employed words, either by mistake, inadvertence, or design, which promised indulgences never intended. These, of course, were claimed; and the question of yielding or refusing them being referred to Mr. Elphinstone, he, in a spirit as wise as it was liberal and ho-
nourable, decided that the Arabs must be admitted to the advantages which they had been led to expect.*

Before the fall of Malligaum, the once haughty, but now humbled, Peishwa, had ceased even to pretend to the exercise of sovereign power. He had wandered in every direction, and in every direction had met with disappointment and defeat. "His flight," says Colonel Blacker, "seemed restricted within a magic circle, from which he appeared destined never to be emancipated. He fled twice to the northward and twice to the southward. To the westward was the ocean, and to the eastward, where the land was wide and contained well-wishers to his cause, he had met with one of his severest defeats. Again he sought the north; and after a flight of several hundred miles, he found himself on the borders of Candeish, not far distant from the extreme point of a previous visit, but more closely beset by enemies than on the former occasion." The sudden dispersion of the several sirdars and their followers in various directions, after the signal defeat of the Peishwa by Colonel Adams, had rendered it difficult to ascertain the course of the

* The unusual suspicion of the garrison on this occasion naturally excites curiosity as to its cause. Could it derive its origin from what had occurred at Talneir? The language of Colonel Macdowell is somewhat remarkable. It seems to imply that the suspicion extended beyond the garrison whose fears he was desirous of allaying: "Wishing to do away a report all over Candeish so prejudicial to our character." Talneir, it will be recollected, was in Candeish.
CHAP. XXV. Peishwa himself, and both General Smith and General Doveton were led into wrong tracks. But the meshes were closely drawn around the fugitive, and escape being impossible, he ultimately made overtures of submission to Sir John Malcolm. That officer, having asked the vakeel by whom the message was conveyed whether he thought the Peishwa was sincere in the proceeding, received an answer highly expressive of the opinion entertained of the fallen prince by one who may be supposed to have enjoyed opportunities of knowing him well. "I should imagine," said the discreet officer, "that he must be sincere, for I cannot guess what possible illusive project he can now have left." His situation was indeed desperate, and was so felt by himself. In an interview with Sir John Malcolm, which followed, the Peishwa exclaimed, "How can I resist now? I am surrounded! General Doveton is at Borhampore; you are at Metowla; Colonel Russell at Boorgham. I am enclosed." After some ineffectual attempts to obtain delay, in the hope of making better terms, he yielded to the force of the circumstances in which he was placed, and surrendered to the British government.

Long before this event it had been determined to deprive him of all sovereignty, and of this he was apprized by Sir John Malcolm previously to his surrender. The determination was just and wise. The perfidy which had marked his conduct, and the inveterate hatred which he had displayed towards the British power, rendered this course the only one
consistent with prudence. If, indeed, additional grounds of justification were required, they would be found in the atrocious proceedings in which he had been implicated subsequently to his attack upon the British residency. His flight had been a career of crime, as well as of misfortune and suffering. He had put to death two British travellers in cold blood, and committed other acts at variance with the usages of even semi-civilized nations. None but himself and his coadjutors in crime could lament his fall.

The governor-general had resolved upon restoring the house of Sattara to sovereignty. The motive to this proceeding was, that the Sattara Rajah was the descendant and representative of Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire, of which Sattara was regarded as the capital. The Peishwa was nominally but the vicegerent of the Rajah of Sattara; he received the dress of investiture from his hands, and rendered some other acknowledgments of dependency; though practically the superior had been the slave and prisoner of his lieutenant.* A portion of territory was assigned for the new, or rather revived, state of Sattara, and prior to the surrender of the Peishwa the prince had been publicly enthroned with much ceremony. With the exception of the tract of land thus appropriated, the Peishwa's dominions were annexed to the British territories, and he became a pensioner upon the British government. In these few words is recounted the end of a state

* See vol. i. page 71.
and dynasty which had been regarded as the keystone of Mahratta power.

The life of Bajee Rao, its last head, had been eventful. On the death of his father, his brother and himself were alternately raised to the musnud and dethroned, as rival parties gained or lost the ascendancy. Bajee Rao was at last apparently fixed on the throne by the assistance of Scindia; but, shortly afterwards, he and his ally were defeated by Holkar, and Bajee Rao arrived at Bassein a fugitive and a wanderer. Here he formed an alliance with the British government, by whose assistance he was restored to a throne of somewhat diminished splendour but of increased security.* The magnitude of the favour might have been expected to attach him to the interests of the power by whom it was bestowed. The general characteristic of Oriental potentates is, however, intense and unalloyed selfishness, and the Peishwa’s afforded an instance, not an exception. His character was marked by timidity, his habits were those of the grossest sensuality, and he manifested an utter destitution of all honourable principle. His cowardice probably led him to suspect the intentions of the British government to be less friendly towards him than they originally were; his debasing sensuality led to the encouragement of despicable parasites, who at once flattered and ministered to his vices; and his total insensibility to those principles which impose restraint on better natures, made him unscrupulous.

* See vol. iii. page 277.
as to the means employed for accomplishing his ends. From the time of the murder of Gungadthur Shastry, his course was that of a man rushing headlong to destruction. In addition to the qualities already mentioned, he possessed an unusual portion of blind obstinacy, which was eminently displayed in the tenacity with which he clung to his wretched favourite, Trimbuckjee Dainglia, in the hope of rendering him as serviceable a minister to his ambition and revenge, as he had already been to vices of a different character. By this mad adhesion to a connection as dishonourable as its object was hopeless, he involved himself in a dispute with the British government, from which he escaped, not indeed unharmed, but still in a better condition than he had reason to expect. Although the result of this attempt might have shewn him the folly of his course, he repeated the error which had deprived his throne of a portion both of solidity and splendour, and he lost all. He descended from the rank of a sovereign to that of a dependent on the bounty of foreigners. The justifiability of his deprivation can be questioned by none but those who are resolved to see nothing but injustice in the conduct of the British government in India, nothing but suffering innocence in native princes. If men have a right to repel wrong by an appeal to arms, and to deprive their enemy of the means of inflicting injury, the moral part of the question, as regards the Peishwa, is decided. The expediency of the proceeding is equally clear, and all that remains questionable is the propriety of
CHAP. XXV. annexing the forfeited dominions to the British territories.

There are persons who entertain great apprehensions of the evils likely to result from the extension of our empire in the East; but those evils are never very clearly defined. If the territory be tolerably compact, it is not easy to perceive why a dominion extending through twenty or thirty degrees may not be as secure and as well governed as one of a hundred miles. The probability, indeed, is that it will be better governed, for all small settlements, at a distance from the parent country, are notoriously seats of the most scandalous abuses. When the peace of India, and the safety of the British empire there, rendered it necessary that the Peishwa should cease to reign, three courses were open to the victors:—to place on the throne one of the royal blood,—to place a stranger there,—or to incorporate the territories of the dethroned prince with those of the state by whom he had been conquered. In making a choice among them, the conquerors could not fairly be expected to lose sight altogether of their own interest; at the same time they were bound to pay due attention to a subject rarely thought of by native sovereigns,—the interests of the people to be governed. Had the British elevated to the musnud some member of the subdued Peishwa's family, all the evils of the Mahratta confederacy would have been perpetuated, and Poona would always have been a focus of anti-British intrigue. "We have had full and most
serious proof," said the Marquis of Hastings, "that no distinctness of obligation will prevent a Peishwa from secretly claiming the allegiance of the other Mahratta sovereigns; and irrefragable evidence has shewn that the implicit obedience recognized as due to the mandates of such a head of the Mahratta empire will operate in violation of every solemnity of pledge to us—nay, in despite of the individual's feelings of attachment to us. There must, then, be no Peishwa. But our abrogation of the title would be nugatory, were we to raise to the musnud a person whose indefeasible right by blood to claim the prerogatives of the Peishwaship would be acknowledged by every Mahratta."

Such were the views of the Marquis of Hastings, and they were sound and just. The gratitude to be expected from a prince elevated to the throne by the favour of the British government was exemplified in the case of Bajee Rao. Had the second course been taken, and a stranger been installed in the sovereignty, he must have been maintained there by British force, and the only difference between this and the actual assumption of dominion would have been, that in the former case the government would be much weaker and infinitely more corrupt. To the third course no objection appears but the vague one, which is derived from the belief that all increase of territory is an evil. This may suffice to settle the question with regard

* Letter from the Marquis of Hastings to the Court of Directors, 20th of April, 1818.
to the interests of the conquerors. As to the interests of the people to be governed, the question is still more easy of answer. Whoever knows what even the best native government is, must be aware that an exchange for British rule must ever be for the benefit of the people. Abuses may be perpetrated under the British government, but they are mostly traceable to the native officers employed; and if they take place under all the checks imposed by European principles, what must be their extent when the higher functionaries of the state are as ready as the lower to participate in and profit by them? The truth is, that in a native state the government itself is but one vast abuse from the monarch to the pettiest retainer of office—no one even supposes that it exists for the public benefit—it is regarded as an engine to enable those who can get possession of it to gratify their own avarice and ambition. It will require a long period to establish sounder views, and for years to come, no native government can be a good government. The elements of good government do not exist.

Two points in the arrangement connected with the fall of the Peishwa and his territory appear open to serious blame. The provision made for his support was exorbitant;* and with reference to the example afforded by the sons of Tippoo Sul-

* Sir John Malcolm engaged that it should not be less than eight lacs, besides provisions for principal Jaghiredars, old adherents, Brahmans of venerable character, and religious establishments founded and supported by the Peishwa’s family.
tan most unwise. This was the error of Sir John Malcolm. The governor-general's views on the subject of provision for the deposed prince were far more moderate. On learning that overtures had been received from Bajee Rao, he addressed a series of instructions to Sir John Malcolm, one of which prescribed that the amount of stipend for the Peishwa's maintenance should either be left open for the decision of government, or fixed at the lowest sum adequate to support him in comfort and respectability. These instructions did not arrive till after Bajee Rao had surrendered, when Sir John Malcolm, having acted on his own responsibility, was no longer able to obey the orders of the governor-general, and when the latter could not, with a regard to good faith, refuse to confirm the promises of his officer. Sir John Malcolm warmly defended his own arrangement, urging that Bajee Rao's submission, and the consequent termination of the war, might be regarded as cheaply purchased by the sacrifices which he had consented to make; that the Peishwa might still have succeeded in eluding the British detachments by which he was hemmed in, maintaining a desultory contest, and keeping alive the flames of war; that the surrender of the prince in the manner in which it took place, and his public renunciation of sovereignty, followed by his march through the country in the apparent condition of a prisoner, was a more desirable result of the war, and more calculated to make a useful
impression on the public mind, and on the Peishwa's late subjects, than his capture or fall in the field, supposing either of those issues probable. In regard to the large pecuniary provision, Sir John Malcolm referred to precedent, represented the improbability of a smaller sum being accepted, and contended that it was not more than a suitable maintenance for the Peishwa, nor likely to be employed in creating combinations against British interests. The governor-general, however, was not convinced. Recurring to the subject after a lapse of four years, he said, "To none of these propositions could I give my assent; but, as already stated, I did not hesitate to ratify the terms actually made, however unconcordant to my own expectations."*

The governor-general was not answerable for the error committed in this respect, and he acted in a spirit of honour and good faith in surrendering his own views, under the circumstances that had taken place without his knowledge or concurrence. For the error remaining to be noticed he must be held accountable. He was fully aware of the tenacity of the Mahratta confederacy, so long as a rallying-point remained, round which association threw its mystic interest. He saw that there must be no Peishwa, either in name or in fact; for if there were, there would be no peace for India. He wisely determined, therefore, that there should be none; but while thus

* Letter from Marquis of Hastings to Secret Committee. 17th of October, 1822.
depriving Mahratta intrigue of one nucleus, he raised from oblivion and neglect another. All the reasons which counselled that there should be no Peshwa pressed with equal cogency against the revival of the claims of the Rajah of Sattara. To sever the usurping arm, and at the same time to elevate the long drooping head of the Mahratta body, was not a consistent course of policy, the object being to destroy. The master was now freed from the domination of his ambitious servant, and restored, in imagination at least, to the place which, according to the theory of the Mahratta league, was his right. It is not desirable, on general principles, to disregard the claims of rank in India, even in cases where they might be annihilated without injustice. For the sake of preserving some useful gradations in society, as well as to cast over its framework a covering of grace and dignity, it is expedient to uphold the distinctions of rank and birth, where they can be upheld without producing private injury or public mischief. But the re-organization of the sovereignty of the Rajah of Sattara, the investment of that personage with territorial dominion and power, was not of this harmless character. The extent of territory assigned to him was indeed small, and the political power very strictly limited; but there was enough to afford stimulus to the wild visions of Mahratta fancy. The throne of Sevajee was restored, and though it could boast little of either power or splendour, it was to the Mahratta what Mecca is to the Mussulman—a source of enthusiasm and hope.
The wretched person whose guilty subservience to a profligate master had reduced that master from a sovereign to a captive was rendered too important, by the extensive mischief which he caused, for his fate to be a matter of indifference. When the army of the Peishwa broke up, Trimbuckjee Dainglia retired to the neighbourhood of Nassick, where he for some time remained concealed. After an attempt to make terms through Sir John Malcolm, which ended in nothing, a body of horse under Captain Swanston was detached from a distant station, the selection being made with a view to avert suspicion. The detachment marched with so much rapidity that no intelligence of their approach preceded them, and they were, consequently, enabled to surround the village where the fugitive lay. Trimbuckjee was reclining on a cot when the gates of the house were forced, and the British troops entered. He had just time to fly to the upper part of the house and conceal himself among some straw. From this covert he was taken without any resistance, and sent to Tannah, the place of his former confinement. He was shortly afterwards sent round to Bengal, and lodged in the fort of Chunar.*

The Peishwa subdued and under restraint, his army dispersed, and his minion and evil genius, Trimbuckjee Dainglia, once more a prisoner to the British government, the fearful course of events, which had their origin in the treachery of the court

* It was here that he was visited by Bishop Heber, whose account of his escape is quoted in a note on pages 425, 426.
of Poona, might be regarded as brought to a happy termination. At Nagpore there still remained much to be effected. On the 25th of June the new Rajah, a child only ten years of age, was solemnly placed on the masnud.* But his place was not uncontested; for Appa Sahib had some time before effected his escape. As in most instances of the like nature, there appears to have been considerable deficiency of vigilance in those whose duty it was to keep the prisoner in security. Appa Sahib soon found himself surrounded by a band of adherents, who had anticipated his escape.

* The country remained, until the year 1826, entirely under the British government, and during the intervening period its prosperity rapidly advanced under the able management of the British resident, Mr. Jenkins. The precise nature of the relation subsisting at the time between the two states it might not be easy to fix with any degree of precision. In May, 1816, a subsidiary treaty had been concluded during the regency of Appa Sahib, but that treaty was dissolved by his almost immediate treachery and hostility. For this reason its articles have not been noticed in the text. The provisional arrangement which followed was in like manner terminated by the continued want of faith manifested by Appa Sahib. Independently of these circumstances, as the successor of Appa Sahib did not derive his claim from that prince, but owed his elevation to the choice of the British government, it is obvious that he could claim nothing under engagements made with a party with whom he had no political connection. In 1826 a treaty was concluded with the Rajah, in which it is formally recited that the treaty of 1816 was dissolved by the attack on the British resident and troops. It must be taken, therefore, that for eight years the relations of the British government and the government of Nagpore were not regulated by any formal engagement, but merely by an implied understanding. The provisions of the treaty of 1826 are obviously not entitled to be noticed here.
Flying to the Mahadeo till fresh numbers continued to flock to his standard, and relying, not without reason, upon finding a party in Nagpore waiting to support him, he, after a time, proceeded to Chouragurh, and took possession of the fort without resistance. He had at this time an agent at Borham-pore engaged in obtaining Arab soldiers, an employment at which Scindia's governor in that city, as might be expected, connived. The desire of Appa Sahib to collect an army was opportunely favoured by the dissolution of that of the Peishwa. In addition to his exertions to this end in other places, he maintained a correspondence with his connections in the capital of his former dominions. These laboured indefatigably to enrol and organize bodies of armed adherents in the interior, while they supplied Appa Sahib with money for the collection and payment of troops on the frontier. Their endeavours were further directed to undermine the fidelity of the British troops, and to a certain extent they were successful. So alarming were the various indications of active hostility, that the resident felt it to be necessary to apply to General Doveton and Colonel Adams for reinforcements. Towards the latter end of October, a combined irruption of different columns into the Mahadeo hills, for the purpose of surrounding Appa Sahib, was projected, and they moved accordingly. Appa Sahib then fled, escorted by a body of horse under Chetoo, the Pindarry chief, but closely pursued. He was overtaken near Asseergurh, a fortress belonging to Scindia, and would
probably have been captured, had not a part of the garrison sallied out to his assistance.

Asseergurh was one of the fortresses of which, as a precautionary measure, temporary possession was to be given to the British government, under the provisions of the treaty concluded with Scindia in 1817. The troops, however, destined for its occupation were wanted in another quarter, and subsequently the course of events rendering it, in the judgment of the governor-general, unnecessary to enforce the claim, he determined to relinquish it.* Before this determination was communicated to Scindia, Jeswunt Rao Lar, the officer commanding at Asseergurh, had committed a direct act of hostility by firing on a detachment of the Company's troops which had occasion to pass the fort in

* In an elaborate narrative of the transactions of this war, the Marquis of Hastings says, "Rejoiced at being able to take a conciliatory step towards Scindia by a relaxation of the conditions, I directed that the claim upon Asseergurh should be given up." Why his lordship rejoiced in such an opportunity it is difficult to imagine, unless it were for the reasons which appear in the following passage in the paragraph immediately preceding that from which the above quotation is taken. "That his highness [Scindia] had subscribed to the terms only through inability to resist was unquestionable. No disposition to fulfil practically any of the provisions of that treaty which he could evade was to be expected; and the fact of his having a secret compact with Bajee Rao, necessarily hostile to us, and thence prompting a counter-action of our purposes, was clear from a variety of indications allowing no other conclusion." These two passages taken in connection afford a fine illustration of the habit of the Marquis of Hastings of affecting policy which seemed to challenge the praise of being generous and magnanimous. They occur in a letter to the Secret Committee, dated the 17th of October, 1822.
CHAPTER XXV. moving to intercept the Peishwa. This was not allowed to interfere with the fulfilment of the governor-general's intention. The Marquis of Hastings was magnanimously disposed, and he caused an intimation to be given to Scindia, that if another commandant were appointed to Asseergurh, and Jeswunt Rao Lar should refuse to deliver the fortress, the place should then be reduced by the Company's troops and restored to Scindia without any charge for the expense of the siege. At this time the governor-general was aware that Scindia was in friendly correspondence with the Peishwa, and that such correspondence was not even denied. But, in his own language, "no more austere tone" was adopted than had previously marked the intercourse of the British government with its perfidious ally. "My solicitude," said the Marquis of Hastings, "to bring into confidential reliance upon us a prince whose sovereignty I meant to uphold stood upon its original principle of policy. Conformably to those sentiments, the punishment of Jeswunt Rao Lar was left to Scindia's own discretion." The "discretion" of the treacherous chief was exercised in forwarding orders for the recall of Jeswunt Rao Lar from his command, which orders even the governor-general qualifies by the word "ostensible." Jeswunt Rao Lar well knew the precise degree of obedience that was expected to these orders, and he was prepared with a never-failing supply of excuses for disregarding them. The commandant was aware that he was wanted at his post to ensure the pro-
tection which he had constantly afforded to the Pindarries when harassed by the British forces, and to gratify his master by the exercise of such other acts of hostility to the British government as might be practicable. His sally for the benefit of Appa Sahib was one of those acts of apparent insubordination but real obedience. His conduct in this instance was brought to the notice of Scindia, who did not hesitate to issue out such orders as his connection with the Company's government required. He directed that Appa Sahib should be given up, and he repeated his command for the immediate appearance of Jeswunt Rao Lar at Gwalior to account for his contumacy. But the commandant did not obey, and the governor-general's good opinion of Scindia began at length to give way before the invincible perverseness of that chieftain's servant. "His shuffling," says the Marquis of Hastings, "combined with other endeavours of Scindia at this juncture, awakened the surmise that there was more of active duplicity on the part of the Maharajah than we had been willing to believe." Admirable as is the simple-minded credulity which reposed in easy confidence on Mahratta assurances, though contradicted by acts as plainly as acts could contradict them, it may be questioned whether (if it existed) there were not more of such a quality than became the position of the governor-general of India. If it did not exist, the profession of it was scarcely less inconsistent with that position.* Under the

* It is to be recollected that the professions of confidence ad-
influence of a light that had just broken in upon the governor-general, or at least had but just been acknowledged, different corps of British troops were ordered to close upon Asseergurh for the purpose of reducing it. Scindia pressed strongly that means should be taken for the punishment of the commandant without reducing the fortress; and his conduct in this respect tended to confirm the suspicion now entertained by the governor-general as to his sincerity. The course proposed was, in the view of his lordship, and it may be added must have been regarded by all other men, as so obviously impracticable, "that it betrayed an interest in what was going forward beyond what could be accounted for by the simple repugnance to have the notion of the fort's impregnability exploded." This experiment upon the credulity or the moderation of the British government was unsuccessful. The siege of Asseergurh was determined on, and Scindia was required to furnish a body of troops to aid in the work. This he could not refuse without an open breach of his engagements, and the required aid was consequently furnished. The Mahratta, however, had the satis-

verted to were not made to Scindia. In political intercourse it is occasionally necessary to maintain an appearance of amity where suspicion, or more than suspicion, is entertained. Nor in truth is there any deception in this: the appearance is known by the opposite party to be only an appearance, and to indicate no more than a desire to avoid or to postpone a quarrel. But the avowal of the Marquis of Hastings's confidence in Scindia is quoted from a letter addressed to the authorities at home, to whom he was responsible. The letter is that of the 17th of October, 1822, already referred to.
faction of knowing that his troops, being cavalry, could be of little service in the conduct of a siege.

The force assembled against Asseergurh was under the command of Brigadier-General Doveton, who arrived in the vicinity about the middle of February, 1819. He was reinforced from various quarters, and on the 17th of March was prepared to undertake an attack upon the pettah. Towards a just understanding of the movements for the reduction of the place, the following description of it by Colonel Blacker will be found serviceable:—“The upper fort, in its greatest length from west to east, is about eleven hundred yards, and in its extreme breadth from north to south about six hundred; but owing to the irregularity of its shape, the area will not be found to be more than three hundred thousand square yards. It crowns the top of a detached hill seven hundred and fifty feet in height, and round the foot of the wall enclosing the area is a bluff precipice, from eighty to one hundred and twenty feet in perpendicular depth, so well scarped as to leave no avenues of ascent except at two places. To fortify these has therefore been the principal care in constructing the upper fort, for the wall which skirts the precipice is no more than a low curtain, except where the guns are placed in battery. This is one of the few hill forts possessing an abundant supply of water which is not commanded within common range; but it fully participates in the common disadvantage attending similar places of strength, by
affording cover in every direction to the approaches of an enemy, through the numerous ravines by which its inferior ramifications are separated. In one of these, which terminates within the upper fort, is the northern avenue, where the hill is highest; and to bar the access to the place at that point, an outer rampart, containing four casemates with embrasures, eighteen feet high, as many thick, and one hundred and ninety feet long, crosses it from one part of the interior wall to another, where a re-entering angle is formed by the works. A sallyport of extraordinary construction descends through the rock at the south-eastern extremity, and is easily blocked on necessity by dropping down materials at certain stages which are open to the top. The principal avenue to the fort is on the south-west side, where there is consequently a double line of works above; the lower of which, twenty-five feet in height, runs along the foot of the bluff precipice, and the entrance passes through five gateways by a steep ascent of stone steps. The masonry here is uncommonly fine, as the natural impediments are on this side least difficult; and on this account a third line of works, called the lower fort, embraces an inferior branch of the hill immediately above the pettah. The wall is about thirty feet in height, with towers; and at its northern and southern extremities it ascends, to connect itself with the upper works. The pettah, which is by no means large, has a partial wall on the southern side, where there is a gate: but in
quarters it is open, and surrounded by ravines and deep hollows extending far in every direction.”

The force assigned to the attack on the pettah were ordered to assemble at midnight on the 17th of March, and to move a short time afterwards. The column of attack, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, of the Royal Scots, consisted of five companies of that regiment, the flank companies of his Majesty’s 30th and 67th foot and of the Madras European regiment, five companies of the first battalion of the 12th Madras Native Infantry, and a detail of sappers and miners. The reserve, under Major Dalrymple, of his Majesty’s 30th, was composed of the companies of that regiment not employed in the column of attack, one company of the King’s 67th, one of the Madras European regiment, and nine companies of native infantry from the first battalion of the 7th regiment, the first battalion of the 12th and the 2nd battalion of the 17th, with detachments from the 2nd and 7th Madras Native Cavalry, and four horse-artillery guns. The attacking column advanced along a nulla running parallel to the works on the southern side, till, arriving within a convenient distance of the pettah, they made a rush for the gate, and succeeded in gaining it. The reserve, in the meantime, in two parties, occupied points in the nulla by which the column of attack advanced, and in another running parallel sufficiently near to allow of them rendering eventual support. Sir John Malcolm had been directed to

* Memoir, pp. 414, 415.
distract the enemy's attention by operations on the northern side, and the duty was performed by a force composed of the 3rd cavalry, the second battalion of the 6th regiment Madras Native Infantry, and the first battalion of the 14th, the first battalion of the 8th regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, six howitzers, and two horse-artillery guns. The town was carried very expeditiously, and with small loss, the troops finding immediate cover in the streets.

In course of the day a battery for six light howitzers was completed on the pettah, and directed against the lower fort. On the night of the 19th of March, the enemy made a sally upon one of the British posts, which was considerably advanced, but were soon repulsed. In the course of the same night a battery for eight heavy guns was completed. On the 20th at daybreak its fire opened, and by the evening had effected a formidable breach in the lower fort, besides inflicting serious injury on some of the upper works. On that evening the enemy made another sally into the pettah, and gained the main street. They were repulsed, but the success was accompanied by the loss of Colonel Fraser, who fell in the act of rallying his men. On the morning of the 21st an accidental explosion in the rear of the breaching battery proved fatal to two native officers and about a hundred men. The disaster did not extend to the battery, which continued firing with good effect. In the afternoon a mortar battery was completed, and some shells thrown from
it. For several days little occurred deserving report, except the erection, on the night of the 24th, of another battery, three hundred and fifty yards to the left of the breaching battery. Two other batteries were subsequently erected, one on the south side, to breach in a second place the lower fort; the other designed to silence a large gun on the north-east bastion of the upper fort. On the 29th two batteries were constructed for an attack on the eastern side of the fort.

On the following morning the enemy abandoned the lower fort, which was immediately occupied by the British troops. The batteries which had been solely directed against the lower fort were now disarmed, and the guns removed from the pettah into the place which their fire had reduced. In the situation which had been gained, the firing against the upper fort was speedily resumed from various batteries, aided by others below. This continued for several days, and so many shot had been fired that a deficiency began to be feared, and a reward was offered by the besiegers, for bringing back to the camp the shot previously expended. This expedient stimulating the activity of the hordes of followers which hover about an eastern camp, succeeded in producing an abundant and seasonable supply. The operations of the siege were vigorously pursued till the 5th of April, when Jeswunt Rao Lar expressed a wish to negotiate. Some intercourse took place, but the efforts of the besiegers, so far from being slackened, were increased. On
the 8th Jeswunt Rao Lar repaired to General Doveton's head-quarters, to endeavour to procure terms, but in vain; and on the morning of the 9th a British party took possession of the upper fort, the garrison descending into the pettah, and grounding their matchlocks in a square of British troops formed for their reception.

Thus terminated a siege, occupying much time, occasioning a vast expenditure of materials, attended with severe loss to the besiegers, and which, when conquered, was not to be retained by the government under which they fought, but to be given up to Scindia. The deceitful chieftain was not, however, destined to enjoy the prize. It was known that Bajee Rao had deposited in Asseergurh jewels of great value, and the commandant was required to produce them. He averred that they had been returned to the depositor; but this being disbelieved, he was compelled, by a threat of sequestrating his own property till the jewels were produced, to exhibit the Peishwa's receipt acknowledging their return. This document was contained in a casket, in which an officer who stood by discerned a paper in Scindia's handwriting. The recognition of it excited such visible confusion in the commandant, that it was deemed expedient to seize the casket and examine its contents. From the examination, and from the subsequent admission of Jeswunt Rao Lar, it appeared that Scindia had not only directed the commandant to afford all the assistance in his power to Bajee Rao, but had also instructed him not to
surrender the fortress in accordance with the public orders issued, but to maintain possession of it as long as practicable. Upon this discovery, the governor-general determined most properly to punish Scindia's duplicity by retaining Asseergurh. This was notified to the chief by the British resident, who placed in his highness's hands the documentary evidence obtained in Asseergurh of his perfidy. The communication was accompanied by an assurance that, in consideration of more upright conduct in future, the past would be buried in oblivion. This assurance was properly given, seeing that no hostile measures were meditated. But on this, as on so many other occasions, the unbounded confidence in men's good intentions which the Marquis of Hastings entertained, or affected to entertain, broke forth. "Since that period," said his lordship, "he has experienced a continued series of benefits and services, which I believe him to have appreciated justly!"*

With the fall of Asseerghur ends the Mahratta war. The elements of combustion had been long in preparation, but they exploded, to the total ruin of some of those who had aided in collecting the materials or in firing the trains, and to the disappointment and discomfiture of all. The Mahratta confederacy was dissolved, and while some of its members were permitted to retain a contracted power, two main limbs had been ruthlessly lopped away; the Peishwa was a prisoner, and the Rajah

* Letter to Secret Committee, 17th October, 1822.
chap.xxv. of Nagpore a homeless fugitive. The latter escaped from Asseerghur, in the disguise of a fakeer, to Berhampore. From thence he proceeded to Lahore, where he took up his residence, receiving a trifling allowance from Runjeet Singh.

The Pindarries, whose ravages were the original cause of the military preparations undertaken by the Marquis of Hastings, and who, with the various members of the Mahratta confederacy, had divided the attention of the government and its army, have made little figure in the narrative of the war. They were, in truth, despicable enemies, and afforded little room to their conquerors for exhibiting their higher qualifications of the military art. Rapidity of movement was all that was required in the contest with them. Wherever the British arms were turned they were successful; and the miserable adventurers, who had received protection principally from Scindia and Holkar, were left without resource. Driven from the lands which they had acquired, either by force or concession, they sought in vain for a place of security for their families and effects. Pressed on every quarter by the British detachments, a large portion abandoned themselves to despair; numbers reliniquished their homes, fled into the jungles, and there perished miserably. Many died by the hands of the village population, whose vengeance was everywhere roused by the remembrance of their former cruelties. Others fell in rencontres with regular troops. Some of the leaders sought the mercy of the conquerors, and among them Kurreem
Khan. Cheetoo's horde survived rather longer than the rest, but it suffered severely in several abortive attempts to enter Guzzerat, and was completely broken up in trying to gain its old lodgement on the Nerbudda. Cheetoo and his son then went to Bhopal, with the intention of submitting; but, from some unexplained cause, abandoned their design, and, as has been seen, fled to the Mahadeo hills, where they joined Appa Sahib. At Asseerghur they parted, and, soon after separating, Cheetoo met a most appropriate end, being slain in the jungles by a tiger. His son fell into the hands of the British government, and was indebted to its bounty for the means of life. The annihilation of these miscreants, as a distinct and recognized body, was complete. A large portion perished, and those who preserved life settled down into more lawful occupations. The sound policy of their suppression is unquestionable, and the Marquis of Hastings deserves eminent praise for having performed a duty which had been neglected by former rulers.

The termination of the Mahratta and Pindarrie war closed the more glorious and more brilliant portion of the administration of the Marquis of Hastings. A few events, however, some of them occurring anterior to the re-establishment of peace, and some of them at a subsequent period, call for brief notice. With Oude the Marquis of Hastings had various transactions, principally financial. He borrowed large sums of the Vizier, and extinguished part of the debt by a transfer of some of the terri-
tories acquired by the results of the war with Nepaul. On the death of Saadut Ali, which occurred while the Marquis of Hastings administered the British government, his lordship advised the new Vizier to assume the title, without reference to the confirmation of the Mogul Emperor; and a few years afterwards the ruler of Oude completed his renunciation of dependence, by assuming, on the like advice, the title of King.

Ceylon was not at this time under the government of the East-India Company, but its history cannot with propriety be separated from that of British India. Whilst the government of the continental possessions of Great Britain in the East were engaged in the wars which have occupied so large a part of the present chapter, the Governor of Ceylon had to contend with disaffection in the conquered kingdom of Candy. The disturbances there possess no features of interest to warrant a detailed relation. It is enough to notice their occurrence, and to state that they were suppressed.

Returning to the government of the Marquis of Hastings, it is to be lamented that an affair of very questionable character cannot, without a violation of fidelity, be passed over. A mercantile house, trading under the firm of William Palmer and Co., had engaged in pecuniary transactions with the government of the Nizam. A large part of the alleged transactions were involved in mystery, and the claims of the house were distributed in a variety of accounts which no human ingenuity could ren-
der intelligible. Unfortunately, an intimate connection of the governor-general became a partner in this firm, and through his influence the sanction of government was obtained to the establishment, by Messrs. Palmer and Co., of a commercial house at Hyderabad, and to its engaging in transactions which without such sanction would have been contrary to law. The transactions which took place under the authority of government were mixed up with others, which, if they ever had any real existence, were undoubtedly illegal; and by the aid of mercantile charges, and charges for interest at enormous rates, a vast balance was shewn to be due to Messrs. Palmer and Co. This, upon the strength of the permission granted them, they expected to recover through the interposition of the British government, notwithstanding a part of the transactions out of which the alleged balance arose took place at a period antecedent to the grant of such permission.

The Marquis of Hastings was not personally interested in this attack upon the treasury of the Nizam. No human power could possibly have prevailed upon him to countenance such transactions for his own benefit. In his character the sordid vices had no place. No man could be more free from the desire

* Sir William Rumbold, who married a ward of the Marquis of Hastings, whom he had brought up from childhood, towards whom his lordship declared that he entertained the feelings of a father. Those who desire to peruse the entire history of the transactions under notice may resort to a huge volume on the subject, printed by order of the General Court, 3rd March, 1824.
CHAP. XXV. of employing the influence of his high station in advancing his own fortune. Unhappily there were persons around him whose appetite for wealth was greater, and their moral taste less scrupulous. Over the Marquis of Hastings the feelings of domestic and social attachment exercised an influence unbounded even by a regard to his own honour, and, to gratify the cupidity of others, he lent himself to schemes of acquisition which he would have spurned with indignant contempt if proposed for his own advantage. He defended the transactions of the house of Palmer and Co. when successful defence was obviously impracticable, and so zealously, that he even forgot his own dignity by descending to insult the authorities at home, who expressed a decided and becoming disapprobation of his conduct in this respect.* Greedy of distinction, far beyond the ordinary measure of desire, the Marquis of Hastings, in this unhappy affair, sacrificed his reputation, which he valued beyond all things, to the passion of others for amassing wealth—a passion in which he did not participate, and by the indulgence of which he was to gain nothing. “The transaction,” says a writer by whom it has been recorded, “recalls the early crusades which had been made against the coffers of Asiatic princes, and tarnishes the administration of a distinguished nobleman, who appears to have been made the dupe of designing men, in the

* A most intemperate and extraordinary letter from his lordship to the Chairman of the East-India Company will be found in the volume of papers already referred to.
prosecution of unsanctioned, if not unlawful, specula-
lations."

The history of the administration of the Marquis of Hastings ought not to close with such a trans-
action as this. Happily, by once more recurring to
the early part of it, an event is presented for no-
tice on which the mind may dwell with unmixed
gratification. The Marquis of Hastings was not its
author or mover, but its occurrence sheds grace
and splendour on the period of his government.
Immediately after the extension of the Order of
the Bath by the Prince Regent, it was authorita-
tively announced that his Royal Highness, "having
taken into consideration the eminent services which
have been rendered to the empire by the officers in
the service of the Honourable East-India Company,
had been pleased to order that fifteen of the most

*Auber's Rise and Progress of the British Power in India,
vol. ii. page 566. The Board of Commissioners for the Affairs
of India was established for the purpose of ensuring not only a wise
but a just and pure administration of the government of that
country. Unhappily, a few instances have occurred in which its
authority has been employed to uphold transactions of a nefarious
character in opposition to the wishes of the Court of Directors.
Thus, soon after its establishment, political influence secured it
on behalf of the scandalous claims of the Nabob of Arcot's
creditors; and, in 1833, the Board applied to the Court of
King's Bench for a mandamus, requiring the Court of Directors
to send out a despatch favourable to the claims of Messrs. Palmer
and Co., to an extent opposed to the deliberate judgment of the
Court. This step probably would not have been taken, had not
the ministry at the time possessed so overwhelming a majority in
the House of Commons as rendered them altogether indifferent to
opposition.
CHAP. XXV. distinguished officers of the said service, holding commissions from his Majesty not below the rank of lieutenant-colonel, may be raised to the dignity of Knights Commanders," in addition to the number belonging to his Majesty's sea and land forces previously nominated. In the event of future wars, the number of fifteen was to be subject to increase. At the same time it was declared, that certain officers of the East-India Company should be eligible to be appointed Knights Companions, in consideration of eminent services.

The measure of royal favour announced in the ordinance was subsequently exceeded by the elevation of Sir David Ochterlony to the dignity of a Knight Grand Cross, the first class of the order. He was invested by the Marquis of Hastings at Terwah, during the Mahratta war, with great pomp, and his lordship's words on the occasion well deserve to be remembered:—"You have obliterated a distinction painful for the officers of the Honourable Company, and you have opened the door for your brothers in arms to a reward which their recent display of exalted spirit and invincible intrepidity proves could not be more deservedly extended to the officers of any army on earth." Many instances have since occurred of the attainment of the like honour by officers of the East-India Company's service.

The Marquis of Hastings quitted the government of India on the 9th of January, 1823, after an administration distinguished by its unusual length,
but far more by the brilliant success of the extensive military operations which had been undertaken, and brought to a prosperous conclusion,—by the additions made to the strength and solidity of the British empire in the East,—the increased respect secured to its authority,—and the benefits conferred on the people of India, in dispersing the hordes of marauders and murderers by whom the country was overrun, and strengthening the bonds of peace, order, and good government. Notwithstanding the multiplied and difficult military affairs which engaged his mind, his lordship had directed his attention with success to various questions connected with the civil administration of the empire, more especially the complicated subject of revenue.

In narrating the more prominent acts of the Marquis of Hastings, his errors have neither been concealed nor palliated; but it has been shewn that in the great and momentous questions of state policy which circumstances pressed upon him, he well understood the interests of his country, and was not slow to pursue them. He followed the policy of his great predecessor, the Marquis Wellesley—higher praise cannot be awarded to an occupant of the same elevated station—and it may be affirmed without hesitation, that, excepting the Marquis Wellesley, no governor-general of India ever did so much for the consolidation of the British empire, or for the glory of the British name there. His greatest failing was excessive vanity, and to this he too frequently sacrificed real dignity of character. In the
CHAP. XXV. private relations of life he was generous and confiding, and from this cause sprung some of his greatest errors. But lamentable as were the failings and weaknesses which in him marred a noble nature—painful as it is to witness their constant recurrence to darken the brightest moments of his career, the desire at its close is to forget them, and to fix the mind exclusively on the great and glorious recollections which surround his name. His services must ever be remembered with gratitude—his achievements recorded with pride.*

* While the glories of the Mahratta war were yet fresh, the East-India Company made a grant of £60,000 for the purchase of an estate, to be settled in such manner as might perpetuate the memory of the governor-general's services. At his lordship's death, in 1827, a further sum of £20,000 was voted, to be placed in the hands of trustees for the benefit of the Marquis's son.

END OF VOLUME IV.
CHAPTER XXII.

News of the Death of the Marquis Cornwallis arrives in England almost simultaneously with a Change of Ministry — New President of the Board of Commissioners approves the appointment of Sir George Barlow — Desire of Ministers that the Earl of Lauderdale should be appointed Governor-General — Suggestion withdrawn — Revived — Court of Directors refuse to revoke the appointment of Sir George Barlow — Office vacated by Royal Authority — Discussions in Parliament — Court still opposed to the Earl of Lauderdale — Lord Minto, President of the Board, appointed Governor-General — Questions arising out of the dispute — Qualifications of Sir George Barlow — Inquiry whether Governor-General should in all cases be a man of high rank — Whether necessary that his Political Opinions should invariably accord with those of the Ministry at home — Inconvenience of requiring it — Observations on conduct of Ministry in 1806 — Arrival of Lord Minto at Calcutta — Affairs of Travancore — Disputes with the Rajah — Suspicious Conduct of the Dewan — His Overtures to the Rajah of Cochin — Military Preparations in Travancore — Measures of Government of Fort St. George in consequence
—Projected Movements from that Presidency countermanded—Dewan permitted, at his own request, to retire—Attack on the British Residency, and attempt to Assassinate the Resident—His Escape—Murder of a party of British Soldiers—Advance of Troops on the British Subsidiary Force at Quilon—Attack frustrated—Subsequent Proceedings—Communication of Dewan of Travancore to Zamorin Rajah in Malabar—Advance of British Troops into Travancore—Various Military Proceedings—Dewan flies—Destroys himself—Apprehension and Execution of his Brother—Effects of Ministerial Domination in India—British Expedition against Macao, and occupation of that place—Stoppage of Trade by Chinese Authorities—Abandonment of the place, and return of the Expedition—Proceedings condemned by the Court of Directors—Treaty concluded with Runjeet Singh—Disturbances in the Army of Madras, fomented by Officers of high standing and experience—General M'Dowall, Commander-in-Chief at Madras, takes the same course on hearing of his exclusion from a seat in Council—Disputes between Sir George Barlow and Mr. Petrie—Abolition of Tent Contracts—Reprehensible conduct of General M'Dowall—He resolves to quit the Country—His violent Proceedings previously to his departure—His formal Removal from the Command of the Army by the Government—Suspension, by the same Authority, of an Officer engaged in the Publication of an offensive Order—Further suspension of Officers and removal of others from particular Commands—Mutiny breaks out at various places—Speedily subsides—Remarks—General M'Dowall lost on his passage to Europe—Proceedings at home—New Commander-in-Chief at Madras appointed to a seat in Council—Annoyances arising from French Settlements in Indian Seas—Blockade ordered—Occupation of Island of Rodriguez—Successful Attack on Island of Bourbon—French Commander destroys himself—His family protected by the British Commander—Destruction of Batteries and