COMPREHENSIVE

HISTORY OF INDIA,

CIVIL, MILITARY AND SOCIAL.

THE FIRST LANDING OF THE ENGLISH,

TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SEPOY REVOLT;

INCLUDING

AN OUTLINE OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF HINDOOSTAN.

By Henry Beveridge, Esq.,

14024 advocate

ILLUSTRATED BY ABOVE FIVE HUNDRED ENGRAVINGS.

VOLUME III

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COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY OF INDIA.

BOOK VII.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE TRADE TO INDIA TO THE EXTINCTION
OF THE COMPANY AS A COMMERCIAL BODY.

CHAPTER I.

Renewal of the Company's charter by Act 53 George III. c. 155 — Its leading provisions — Earl Moira
governor-general — Hostilities with Nepaul — Repulses at Kalunga — Its capture — Combined attacks
defeated — The Ghorka lines at Ramghur turned — Capture of Ramghur — Subsequent operations
— Retreat of General Marley — Invasion of Kumaon — Malwa captured — Negotiations for peace
— Hostilities renewed — Peace concluded — Proceedings in Cutch — Disturbances at Hyderabad
and Bareilly — Capture of Hatras.

At the last renewal of the Company's charter in 1793, the con-
tinuance of their monopoly was strenuously opposed, par-
ticularly by the large commercial towns, which naturally desired
to share in the traffic to the East, and insisted that with
perfect safety it might, and therefore in justice ought to be,
thrown completely open. The concession made in 1793 was
very slight, and consisted only in requiring the Company to
allot a certain quantity of their tonnage annually for the ac-
commodation of the private trade. This paltry concession increased rather
than diminished the general discontent. Not merely the limited amount
of the allotted tonnage, but the heavy freight charged for it and the
inconvenient regulations by which the use of it was trammelled, formed
just subjects of popular complaint; and it was foreseen by all parties that, in
any new charter that might be granted to the Company, concessions at once more
extensive in their nature and more liberal in their spirit behoved to be made.
Prudence required that a discussion, which could not be avoided, and which
would of necessity be keen and protracted, should not be too long postponed;
and hence, as early as 1808, while the House of Commons appointed a select
committee to inquire into the state of the affairs of the East India Company,
Mr. Dundas, on the part of the Board of Control and the crown, suggested to

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the directors the propriety of endeavouring without delay to come to an understanding on the subject of a new charter, in order that it might be submitted to the early consideration of parliament.

The directors thus invited had no difficulty in approving of an early discussion, and, after an interview with Mr. Dundas, gave a written exposition of their views in a letter dated 10th December, 1808. They proposed a charter for twenty years, which should recognize their right to the territorial possessions, provide for increased dividends in proportion to the improved revenues of India, assist them in the liquidation of the Indian debt, relieve them from the portion of military expenditure incurred for objects purely British, and continue the present system of what was called "a regulated monopoly of the trade," as being "the most expedient both for the foreign and domestic interests of this country." In regard to this last point, which was rather suggested than stipulated, Mr. Dundas intimated that ministers would not consent to any charter that did not confine the Company’s monopoly of trade exclusively to China, and throw it open within all their other limits to his majesty's subjects at large in their own vessels. He also proposed the adoption of some method for consolidating the Company’s troops with those of the crown serving in India. These views were so diametrically opposed to those of the directors that they declared their determination not to acquiesce in them, and as there was not as yet any absolute necessity for immediate action, the conferences were in the meantime dropped.

In the end of 1811 the president of the Board of Control (now Lord Melville) again opened the discussion, by informing the directors that the admission of the ships as well as the goods of private merchants to the trade with India, under such restrictions as might be deemed necessary, was regarded by ministers as a settled point, and that no charter would be granted which did not concede it. The directors, now convinced that by yielding too little they might endanger the whole, contented themselves with reiterating their objections, and at the same time agreeing to lay the proposal of opening the trade before the proprietors. They took the precaution, however, to express their belief that ministers, while advocating a free export to India from British ports generally, did not mean to interfere with the present warehousing system, by which all imports from India were confined to the single port of London. In accordance with these views the court of proprietors, on the recommendation of the directors, presented a petition to the House of Commons on the 7th of April, 1812. This petition was the signal for many others of an opposite character, which poured in from almost all the ports and manufacturing towns of the kingdom. These petitions prayed generally for the entire abolition of the Company's monopoly, and were unanimous in protesting against the absurdity of a free export from all British ports, and an import confined only to the port of the metropolis.
It would seem that ministers, when they first invited the directors to a discussion of the subject, were not unwilling to have confined the import to London, and thus continued the Company in possession of all their warehousing advantages. Had the original terms which they offered been accepted, there is little doubt from the apathy existing in the public mind in regard to everything but the astounding events of which the continent of Europe was then the theatre, that a renewed charter might have been obtained, nearly on the very terms on which they were at length petitioning that it should be granted. It was now too late. They had lost their opportunity, and been outwitted by their own grasping spirit. A change of ministry had taken place, and several members of the new cabinet, influenced as much perhaps by political connection as by conviction, declared loudly in favour of commercial freedom. The Earl of Buckinghamshire, whom as Lord Hobart we have already seen governor of Madras, was now president of the Board of Control, and lost no time in informing the directors that the import as well as the export trade must be opened, though the former would necessarily be subjected to some restrictions, intended chiefly for the prevention of smuggling. All hopes of a successful compromise were in consequence abandoned by the proprietors, who, on the 5th of May, held a general court, in which they adopted a series of resolutions, and drew largely upon their imaginations in depicting the misery and ruin which must ensue by allowing any place but London to import directly from India. Ministers, so far from being alarmed at this gloomy picture, closed the discussion on the 4th of January, 1813, with a kind of menace to the effect that, if the Company thought themselves incapable of governing India under a system of free trade, it would remain for parliament to determine whether their future intervention in the government might not be dispensed with. The proprietors, equally resolute, not only repeated their former resolutions, but on the 22d of February presented a petition to parliament, deprecating any extension of the import trade from India to the outports of Great Britain, and praying for a renewal of the privileges granted by the charter of 1793.

Nothing now remained but to commence the struggle, and accordingly on the 22d of March, 1813, Lord Castlereagh submitted to the House of Commons a series of thirteen resolutions, containing the leading provisions which it was proposed to embody in an act renewing the Company's charter. Most of the questions discussed were then novel, and both the dangers apprehended by the one party, and the expectations entertained by the other, made it necessary for the legislature to proceed with the utmost caution. Information was sought from all quarters, and whole volumes of evidence were taken from those who were supposed most competent to give it. In the debates which afterwards ensued, there were few speakers of eminence in either house who did not deliver their sentiments, and deem them of so much importance as to justify the
subsequent revival and publication of their speeches. So great, however, has
been the progress of political economy as a science, and so strong the light
which has been thrown upon it by experience since this famous debate, that
many of the propositions most elaborately argued are now regarded as truisms,
and much of the alarm sounded is felt to be mere exaggeration. The result is
therefore the only thing which now possesses much historical interest, and
nothing more is necessary here than to give a very brief analysis of the
most important sections of the Act
53 Geo. III. c. 155, which, while
essentially modifying and curtailing
the privileges formerly possessed by
the Company, renewed their charter
for another period of twenty years,
to be computed from the 10th day of
April, 1814.

After declaring that the terri-
torial acquisitions now in possession
of the Company, are to remain with
them “without prejudice to the un-
doubted sovereignty of the crown of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, in and over the same,
or to any claim of the said United
Company to any rights, franchises,
or immunities,” the act proceeds, in
its first section, to declare it exp-
dedient that “the right of trading, trafficking in and adventuring in, to and
from all ports and places within the limits of the said United Company’s present
charter, save and except the dominions of the Emperor of China, should be
open to all his majesty’s subjects in common with the said United Company,
subject to certain regulations and provisions, but that the existing restraints
respecting the commercial intercourse with China should be continued, and the
exclusive trade in tea preserved to the said Company.” The principal “regula-
tions and provisions” enacted were that the trade thus opened should be carried
on in vessels of not less than 350 tons registered measurement, and that the
imports from India should be admitted only to such ports as should be certified
for that purpose by orders in council.

The above provisions for opening and regulating the trade with India con-
stitute the main features in the act, but there were others not of a commercial
nature which met with strenuous opposition, and were denounced by many as
dangerous in the extreme, if not absolutely incompatible with the existence of
the British power in India. After reading the earnest and virulent declama-
tion directed against the 13th resolution, proposed by Lord Castlereagh, one is
surprised, and at the same time relieved, on finding that, both as it was
originally expressed and as it now stands embodied in the 33d section of the
act, it pledged the legislature to nothing more than the following simple pro-
position: That "it is the duty of this country to promote the interest and
happiness of the native inhabitants of the British dominions in India, and such
measures ought to be adopted as may tend to the introduction among them of
useful knowledge, and of religious and moral improvement; and in further-
ance of the above objects, sufficient facilities ought to be afforded by law to
persons desirous of going to and remaining in India, for the purpose of accom-
plishing those benevolent designs, so as the authority of the local governments
respecting the intercourse of Europeans with the interior of the country be pre-
served, and the principles of the British government, on which the natives of
India have hitherto relied for the free exercise of their religion, be inviolably
maintained." In order to give effect to this declaration, the section proceeds
to enact that "persons desirous of going to and remaining in India for the
above purposes," or "for other lawful purposes," should apply for permission to
the court of directors, who should either grant it, or, in the event of refusal,
transmit the application, within one month of the receipt of it, to the Board of
Control, who were empowered finally to dispose of it. All persons obtaining
permission, whether from the court or from the board, were to be furnished by
the directors with certificates, entitling them, "so long as they shall properly
conduct themselves, to the countenance and protection of the several govern-
ments of the said Company in the East Indies, and parts aforesaid, in their
respective pursuits, subject to all such provisions and restrictions as are now in
force, or may hereafter be judged necessary with regard to persons residing in
India." The only pecuniary provision made in connection with this section,
was the allotment of a sum of not less than £10,000 annually for the "revival and
improvement of literature, and the encouragement of the learned natives of
India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences
among the inhabitants of the British territories in India." Such a sum, paltry
as it was, was not permitted to do the good which might have been expected
from it, and instead of being employed in instructing the natives generally,
continued for many years to be partly paid away to learned Mahometans and
Hindoos, for explaining and inculcating their respective dogmas, and partly
allowed to accumulate, as if expenditure for native education were impracticable
or useless.

The only sections of the act in which there was any distinct recognition of
the claims of Christianity were those in which provision was made "for the
maintenance and support of a church establishment" in the East Indies. By
section 49th, it was provided that, if his majesty should be pleased by his royal
letters-patent under the great seal, "to erect, found, and constitute one bishopric for the whole of the British territories in the East Indies," and one archdeaconry for each of the presidencies, the Company were to pay £5000 per annum to the bishop, and £2000 per annum to each of the archdeacons." While the question of an Episcopal church establishment was under discussion, a claim was put in for the Church of Scotland, on the very sufficient ground that a majority of the British residents in India were Scotch, and of the Presbyterian communion. The justice of the claim was not denied, but on some plea of expediency, more easily understood than vindicated, it was not recognized in the act, and the appointment of Scottish chaplains, which Presbyterian residents were entitled to demand from the legislature as a right, was only received as a boon from the court of directors.

The only other sections of the act which it is necessary to notice are the 80th, which increased the patronage of ministers, or rather removed the ambiguity which previously attached to it, by enacting that in future the appointments of governor-general, governors, and commanders-in-chief, should not be valid without the express approbation of the crown, signified by the sign-manual, countersigned by the president of the Board of Control—the 88th, which prohibited the directors and proprietors, without consent of the board, from granting a gratuity of more than £600—and the 90th, by which the originally gratuitous services of the board were to be paid by salaries, which, limited by the act of 1793 to an aggregate of £22,000, were henceforth not to exceed £26,000 per annum.

Earl Moira formally assumed the office of governor-general at Calcutta on the 4th of October, 1813, and found the position of affairs by no means flattering. The expense of the foreign embassies and foreign conquests had trenches deeply on the revenues, and a considerable amount of financial embarrassment had ensued. In order to meet the demands for retrenchment the army had been injudiciously reduced, and far more than a fair amount of service was required from it. The natural result was a degree of discontent, and in connection with it a laxity of discipline. These things were the more to be deplored, from its being obvious that the relations with neighbouring states were not satisfactory, and that, particularly with one of them, hostilities had already become all but inevitable. This was the state of Nepaul, with which the British arms had not hitherto come into direct collision.

The territories of Nepaul, according to the limits claimed for them at this period, skirted the northern British frontier, including that of Oude, for about 700 miles, in a direction from north-west to south-east, and extended backwards with an average breadth of 130 miles across the ascending ranges of the Himalaya, to its region of eternal snow. A more forbidding theatre on which to carry on an offensive warfare could not be imagined, and this may perhaps be one of the reasons which induced successive governors-general to submit to
insults and encroachments on the part of the Nepalese, and continued to negotiate, after it had become manifest that the points in dispute could not be settled without an appeal to arms. A brief recapitulation of the circumstances will be necessary.

Nepaul proper was originally confined to a single mountain valley, of no great extent, commencing on the edge of one of the lower ranges of the chain, and continued longitudinally through passes, practicable only during a few of the summer months, to the table-land of Tibet. The primeval inhabitants belong to the Tibetan family, but their origin is so remote that no authentic account of it can be given. Hindoo colonists, headed by Rajpoot chiefs, arrived and established a complete ascendency. Feuds among the chiefs were followed by the usual results. The weaker, unable to hold their ground, were gradually absorbed by the stronger, and after a long struggle a few of the more talented or more fortunate reduced all the others to subjection. As late as 1765 the valley of Nepaul was shared by the three Hindoo Rajahs of Khatmandoo, Lalita-patan, and Bhatgaon. Their disunion proved their ruin. Prithi Narayan, chief of the mountain tribe of Gheorka, seeing his advantage, overpowered them in detail, and made himself
sole master. The sovereignty thus won he transmitted to his descendants, and
the name of Ghoorkas, at first applied only to the members of his tribe, became
the common designation of all his subjects.

Priti Narayan was succeeded in 1771 by his son Pratap Sing, who sur-
vived him only four years, and left an infant son Rana Bahadur, under the
guardianship of his widow Rajendra Lakshmi, and his brother Bahadur Sah.
Though a regency could hardly have been in itself favourable to advancement,
the fact however is, that the career of conquest commenced by the founder of
the new dynasty was so vigorously followed up, that not only several rajahs to
the east and west, but the living type of Buddha residing at Lassa in Tibet
was obliged to profess allegiance to the Ghoorka rajah. This, however, was
too daring an insult to Buddhism to be overlooked. The Emperor of China
himself undertook to avenge it, and sent a large army which had advanced
triumphantly within a few miles of Khatmandoo, when the Ghoorka state was
only saved from destruction by agreeing to become tributary to China. As in
consequence of this discomfiture conquest to the north was no longer to be
dreamed of, the Ghoorkas confined their aggressions to their more immediate
neighbours, and were thus gradually brought to the British frontiers.

As early as 1767, when Priti Narayan was only laying the foundations of
his power, the Bengal government had rashly interfered with the affairs of
Nepal. The Rajah of Khatmandoo when driven from the open country, and
obliged to shut himself up in his capital, sent a pressing invitation to Calcutta
for assistance against the Ghoorka rajah. When the council agreed to grant it
they must have been taking a leap in the dark. They knew nothing of the
justice of the cause, nor of the relative strength of the contending parties, and
had nothing better to allege in justification of their interference, than that an
advantageous trade had been carried on between the rajah's country and that
of Berar, and a considerable quantity of gold imported into Bengal. A
military expedition, undertaken solely with such sordid views, experienced the
fate which it desired. Captain Kinloch, to whom the command was intrusted,
finding the task much more difficult than he had imagined, applied for rein-
forcements. The council, unable to grant them, because all the troops they
could muster were required to maintain the contest with Hyder, recalled the
expedition; but with the same disregard of justice which they had manifested
throughout, seized some rich and fertile lands of the Ghoorka rajah, bordering
on "the Bettera country, which was in quiet possession of the vizier" (Nabob of
Oude), in order "to indemnify the charge already incurred." In other words,
they first make war upon the Ghoorka rajah who had never offended them,
because they hoped it would prove profitable, and when they are repulsed,
they indemnify themselves for their own injustice by seizing a valuable portion
of his territory. It is rather singular that this expedition, though directly at
variance with the course of policy which the directors were constantly incul-
cating, received their marked approbation. Referring to it in their letter to Bengal, dated 11th November, 1768, they say:—"As we look with a favourable eye on every attempt for the extension of commerce, we do not disapprove the expedition to Nepaul, and are sorry it failed of success. You did right not to renew the expedition till the state of your forces would better admit of it, and to hold in your possession lands taken from the Ghoorka rajah as an indemnification for the expenses we had been put to; and they may be of use, should it hereafter be thought proper to renew the attempt, and we hope their amount has answered your expectations."

Intercourse with Nepaul, when next attempted by the Company, was of a pacific character. In 1792, apparently in consequence of the Chinese invasion, the Rajah of Nepaul, who must now have been the same as the Ghoorka rajah, though the Bengal government appears not to have been aware of the fact, applied for military aid. Captain Kirkpatrick was in consequence sent on a mission to Khatmandoo, and obtained much new and interesting information respecting the country. The political benefits contemplated were not, however, realized, and matters returned to their former footing. In 1795, Rana Bahadur having attained majority, assumed the government. One of his first acts was to put his uncle to death, as a punishment for the thruldom in which he had kept him during his guardianship. This might perhaps have been pardoned, but his whole life was so dissolute, and his cruelty so ferocious, that his subjects rose in arms against him, and compelled him to abdicate in favour of his son. He retired to Benares, and as it was hoped that his exile might have improved him, he was permitted after two years to return. His old habits returned with him, and provoked a conspiracy of his principal nobles, who murdered him in open council, and placed his half-brother, Shir Bahadur, upon the throne. A civil war ensued, during which the ascendancy was gained by a chief of the name of Bin Sah, who placed an illegitimate son of Rana Bahadur upon the throne, and conducted the government in his name with so much ability that the Ghoorka territories were greatly extended, reaching so far to the west as to threaten a collision with Runjeet Sing, and encroaching so much on the territories of the Company as to make longer forbearance impossible.

The encroachments of the Ghoorkas, when they first commenced, were justified by a plea which was probably not unfounded. We have already seen that in 1767, rich and fertile tracts belonging to the Ghoorka rajah were seized by the Company without the least semblance of justice, and therefore, when the Ghoorkas alleged that the tracts which they had occupied originally belonged to Nepaul, there cannot be a doubt that, in regard at least to some of them, the allegation was strictly true. In regard to others of them, again, there is just as little doubt that they were justly characterized as encroachments; and hence, as there was right and wrong on both sides, the points in dispute were
fair subjects for negotiation or compromise. This mode of settlement unfortunately failed, and at the time when Earl Moira entered upon the government, almost all hope of an amicable adjustment had disappeared. As a last effort, his lordship addressed a letter to the rajaah, in which he repeated the arguments and remonstrances that had been already employed, and urged him to acquiesce in the peaceable occupation of the disputed lands by the British government. This was positively refused, and they were therefore, without further parley, occupied by force. The Nepualese, as if their final determination had not yet been taken, retired without offering any resistance, but their proceedings, at the same time, showed that they were fully alive to the importance of the step which must now be taken. In an assembly of the principal chiefs the question of peace or war was formally discussed, and after long debate settled, but by no means unanimously, in favour of the latter. The peace party recommended a continuance of the procrastinating course which had hitherto been so successful, but did not hesitate to avow their readiness to yield the disputed territory rather than to fight for it. There was a danger, they argued, that some of the hill rajas might prove treacherous, and leave the passes open for the advance of an hostile force. They also adverted to the character of the enemy whom they would have to encounter: "We have hitherto but hunted deer; if we engage in this war we must prepare to fight tigers." The war party, on the other hand, appealed to their past successes. No enemy had hitherto been able to stand before them, whereas the British had been obliged to retire from the small fort of Bhurt-poor. That was but the work of man, and yet the British had failed in all their attempts against it. What likelihood, then, was there that they would be able to storm the mountain fastnesses, constructed by the hand of God? The decision of the rajaah to try the fortune of war was responded to without delay by the governor-general, who, being at this time on a tour to the northern provinces, issued a manifesto, dated Lucknow, 1st November, 1814. It was addressed to the friends and allies of the Company, and detailed the causes which made war inevitable.

The army assembled to carry on the war mustered about 34,000 men, of whom rather more than 12,000 were irregular troops and native contingents. The plan of campaign was not to advance in one combined force, but in four
distinct divisions. Selecting the river Kallee, which, though now the western boundary of Nepaul, was at the commencement of the war near its centre, as the common basis from which operations were to diverge to the west and to the east, Earl Moira made his arrangements as follows:—the first division, consisting of about 6000 men, under General Ochterlony, was to attack the Ghoorka positions at the western extremity of their line; the second division of 3500 men, under General Gillespie, was to occupy the valley of Dehra Doon, situated above the first range of hills, and lay siege to the fortress of Jytak, in the province of Gharwal; the third division, about 4500 strong, under General Hood, was to start from the Goruckpoor frontier, and advance through Bhotwal and Sheoraj to Palpa; the fourth division, mustering nearly 8000 men, under General Marley, was to march through Makwanpoor directly upon Khatmandoo, the capital. At various points at which the enemy might attempt to force their way into the British territories, local corps were stationed, while toward the eastern extremity of Nepaul, beyond the Coosy river, Captain Latter, with a local and a regular native battalion, was not only to defend the frontier, but, if opportunity offered, to assume the offensive. The whole Ghoorka force did not exceed 12,000 regular troops, scattered along the whole length of their frontier. Such a force, so inferior in every respect to that brought against it, could not, under ordinary circumstances, have made any effectual resistance; but the nature of the country furnished them with numerous almost impregnable fastnesses, and their native courage animated them to a defence which, though it could not ultimately avail, protracted the war, and inflicted repeated disasters on their invaders. In course of time the struggle became completely national, and bands of irregular troops sprung up in all parts of the country to aid in fighting the battle of independence. As the four divisions of the British force formed in fact so many distinct armies, it will be necessary to give a separate detail of the operations of each.

On the 19th of October, 1814, the advance of General Gillespie's division, which had assembled at Saharanpoor, started under command of Colonel Carpenter, and proceeded by the Timlee Pass into the valley of Dehra Doon. Three days after the main body followed under Colonel Mawbey, who occupied the town of Dehra, and continued to follow the retiring Ghoorkas in the direction of Kalunga, or Nalapani, situated about five miles to the north-east. This fort, which was of small dimensions, occupied one extremity of the flat summit of a detached hill, which was about 600 feet in height, and had its steep sides covered with jungle. The position was naturally strong, but little had been done for it by art, the whole fort consisting of a quadrangular stone building, to which access had been rendered difficult by means of stockades. It was garrisoned by 600 men, under Balhbadra Sing, a leader of tried ability and courage. Colonel Mawbey on arriving before the place, and receiving a defiance in answer to his summons, began to prepare for the siege, and having by very
great exertion succeeded in placing some guns in battery on the top of the hill, ventured on an attack. It proved abortive, and he suspended proceedings to wait for further orders. General Gillespie arrived on the 20th of October with the remainder of the force, and immediately caused a battery of heavier guns to be erected. So much progress was made that the assault was fixed for the 31st. The storming party consisted of four columns of attack and a reserve. Three of the columns, in order to reach their allotted stations, had to make a considerable circuit, and had not reached them when the signal gun for the attack was fired. It is said that they never heard it, or, if they did, did not believe it to be the signal, as the time originally fixed had not then arrived. Be this as it may, it would seem that the enemy, who were probably aware of the intended assault, disdained to wait for it, and taking advantage of the absence of the others, made a vigorous sortie on the remaining column. It was repulsed, and General Gillespie, in the hope that his men might be able to enter the entrenchments along with the fugitives, ordered them to rush forward and carry the place by escalade. It was a rash attempt. The batteries had made no impression on the works, and the assillants, when they arrived at the foot of the wall, were met by such a murderous fire as swept them off by whole files, and made it impossible to plant the ladders. When thus foiled they attempted to carry the gateway and an outwork which defended. In this they were equally unsuccessful, and had no alternative but to seek the cover of some huts in the vicinity. General Gillespie's impatience had already cost his men dear; it was now to prove fatal to himself. Irritated at the previous failure, nothing would satisfy him but a renewal of the attempt. At the head of three fresh companies of his majesty's 53d regiment, and a company of dismounted dragoons, he hastened again towards the gate, and being in advance of the men of the 53d, who hung back, was waving his sword, and calling upon them to follow, when a musket-ball pierced his heart. This disaster completed the second failure, and the assillants were again driven off with a heavy loss. All hope of taking the fort with the inadequate means provided was now abandoned, and Colonel Mawhewy, on whom the command had devolved, returned with the division to Dehra, to wait the arrival of a battering train from Delhi.

The battering train having arrived on the 24th of November, the division set out on the following day to resume the siege of Kalunga. By means of a battery of eighteen-pounders, a practicable breach was effected on the 27th, and
the storming party immediately advanced to the assault. Somewhat in a spirit of bravado, scarcely reconcileable with the previous repulses, the men were forbidden to load their muskets, and carry the breach by the bayonet alone. They reached it, not without considerable loss, but, on attempting to mount, were appalled at the sight which presented itself. Within the breach, at the bottom of a precipitous descent of about fourteen feet, part of the garrison stood ready to encounter them with spears and pikes, while the other part stood behind arined with matchlocks and other missiles. The assailants scarcely made an effort to overcome this resistance, and drew off to a short distance, where, from some unaccountable mismanagement, they remained for two hours, completely exposed to the enemy's fire. The loss was dreadful—exceeding in killed and wounded the whole number of the garrison. After all this loss and disgrace, a mode of attack which would have saved it was adopted, and the garrison, subjected to a bombardment from the effect of which the bare stone walls of their inclosure gave them no shelter, suffered so dreadfully, that in the course of three days not more than 70 of the original 600 survived. With such a feeble band, breathing an air which had been rendered pestilential by the number of unburied dead, a longer defence was impracticable, and the fort was evacuated. The besiegers, whom it had cost so dear, immediately demolished it.

This sad commencement of the war was more than ominous. Besides the actual loss sustained, the relative positions of the combatants were changed. The invaders, who, from their superiority both in numbers and in discipline, had promised themselves an early submission, or a comparatively easy conquest, began to doubt whether they had not undertaken a task which was beyond their strength, and in which, so far from reaping laurels, they might only be doomed to experience disaster after disaster. Such reflections naturally tended to produce a degree of timidity as irrational as the previous rashness, and conjured up difficulties which a bolder spirit of enterprise would have disregarded, or could have easily overcome. The Ghookas, on the other hand, were proportionally elated, and obtained a large augmentation of strength from the number of new adherents who had formerly kept aloof while the issue seemed doubtful, but were now eager to share in the honours and profits of a warfare of which the success was now regarded by them as almost certain. The effect of these opposite feelings undoubtedly was to give the war a new character, and protract it long beyond the period at which, if it had commenced more prosperously, it would have been brought to a close.

In the interval between the retreat from Kalunga and the return to it, Colonel Mawbey detached Colonel Carpenter with the division to a position on the Jumna, where, by commanding the fords, he might cut off the enemy's communications between the east and west, and at the same time encourage any of the hill chiefs who were disposed to throw off their allegiance to the
Ghurka rajah. The revolt of the people of Joumsar thus excited, caused so much alarm that the Ghoorkas, without waiting to be attacked, hastily evacuated the stronghold of Barat. After Colonel Carpenter's return, and the capture of Kalunga, Colonel Mawbey was ordered westward into the valley of Karda, with a view to co-operate with the division under General Ochterlony. On the 20th of December Colonel Mawbey was superseded in the command by General Martindale, who, after occupying Nahan, moved to the foot of the mountain range, on the highest summit of which Fort Jytak stands, at an elevation of 5000 feet above the level of the sea. At the town of Jytak, situated at a lower level to the south of the fort, Ranjor Sing Thapa, the son of Amar Sing, the regent or minister, commanding a considerable Ghurka force, had then his head-quarters. The fort of Jytak, strongly situated in the angle where two lofty ridges met, was approached by an abrupt and rugged ascent, occasionally interrupted by ravines. General Martindale, after reconnoitring, saw nothing more hopeful than to deprive the garrison of their supply of water, which appeared to be drawn from springs situated at some distance below the fort, by taking possession of a strongly stockaded post situated about a mile to the west. The attack was made by two distinct columns, both of which having failed to take the enemy by surprise, were defeated in succession with severe loss. General Martindale, in consequence of this new disaster, was obliged to suspend operations and wait for reinforcements.

The division of General Ochterlony, whose sphere of action was still farther to the west, encountered difficulties which were at least equally great, and would doubtless have proved equally disastrous, had not greater skill been displayed in surmounting them. The Sutlej, after a long course to the west, makes an abrupt turn to the south, and thus with its left bank forms, in
two directions, the boundary of a very rugged and mountainous country. The tract lying within the angle formed by the river in changing its course, became the scene of the military operations, in which General Ochterlony was opposed to Amar Sing Thapa, the ablest and most distinguished of the Ghoorka leaders. The division began to move in the end of October, 1814, and on the 2d of November arrived at the first and lowest of the mountain ranges. Before any further progress could be made, it was necessary to gain possession of the fort of Nalagerh, and the outwork of Taragerh, occupied by a Ghoorka garrison, and commanding the pass into the mountains. In two days, by almost incredible exertion, a battery was erected at a sufficient elevation, and opened with such effect, that on the 6th the fort was surrendered and the outwork abandoned.

The pass being now open, no difficulty was experienced in reaching its summit; but it was only to come in sight of another obstacle of a more formidable description. This was the fort of Ramghur, seated on a mountain summit 4600 feet above the sea. Amar Sing, who had his head-quarters at Arkee, thirty miles north-east of Malaun, on learning the British advance, hastened to Ramghur with about 3000 regular troops, and encamped upon its ridge, with his right resting on the fort, and his left on a strongly stockaded hill, while stockades placed at intervals protected his whole front. The position was too strong to be forced, and General Ochterlony therefore determined to turn it on the left and assail it from the rear. With this view he proceeded till he gained possession of a height seven miles north-east of Ramghur. As this position gave him a commanding view of the whole Ghoorka lines, and seemed to be the point from which it would be most easy to assail them, he determined on the erection of a battery. The labour of transporting heavy ordnance had again to be endured, and occupied twenty days. Much of it proved to be labour lost, for the battery was so distant that its fire when opened was unavailing. To remedy this blunder, Lieutenant Lawtie of the engineers was detached with a small party to select a nearer spot. He had found it, and was returning to camp, when the Ghoorkas, who had been observing his movements, descended in great force from their heights and placed themselves across his path. Fortunately a small stone inclosure was near. Here the lieutenant and his party gallantly maintained themselves, till a failure of ammunition compelled them to abandon the inclosure and run the gauntlet of the Ghoorka fire. A
reinforcement sent from the battery was obliged to share their flight, and a large proportion of the whole party had fallen before a strong detachment from the camp arrived, and effectually checked their pursuers. This affair, magnified by the enemy into a victory, tended to counteract the moral effect of the advantages which the division had previously gained.

General Ochterlony, though aware how much the difficulties with which he had to contend could now be increased, was preparing to carry out his plan for turning the Ghoorka lines, when he received intelligence of the second serious repulse at Kalunga. Afraid that a general rising of the whole country might ensue, he deemed it prudent to abandon the offensive till new reinforcements should enable him to resume it with more certainty of success. This period of inaction was not unprofitably spent. The country as far as practicable was explored, roads practicable both for troops and artillery were formed, and some degree of discipline was given to the irregular troops of some petty rajas, whom the presence of a British force had emboldened to throw off the Ghoorka yoke. On the 26th of December, after nearly a month had been devoted to these useful labours, the expected reinforcements arrived. They consisted of the 2d battalion of the 7th native infantry and a levy of Sikhs. General Ochterlony, feeling again strong enough, immediately resumed the offensive by sending off a detachment to spread along the enemy’s rear and threaten his communications with Arkee and Bilaspour, by occupying a low range of hills on the north-east of Ramghur. Amar Sing, alarmed at this movement, endeavoured to frustrate it by a daring attack on the detachment. The offensive, however, proved as adverse to him as it had done to the British in their encounters, and he sustained a repulse which obliged him to return to his position at Ramghur. The British general, still following out his plan, left Colonel Arnold with a division to watch the enemy’s movements, and proceeded with the main body towards a mountain ridge, the occupation of which would place him between the Sutlej and the Ghoorka fort of Malaun. At the same time he sent forward about 2000 troops belonging to the petty Rajah of Hindoor, who had early joined him and rendered valuable service. These troops, under the command of Captain Ross, took possession of the heights above Bilaspour, between whose rajah and that of Hindoor a deadly feud had long existed. The success of these combined movements soon appeared. Amar Sing, convinced that his position was no longer tenable, left a garrison in the fort of Ramghur, and hastened with his whole remaining force to the ridge on which Malaun stands. Colonel Arnold, thus left at liberty, moved round the opposite extremity of the ridge to co-operate with General Ochterlony, and during the march received the submission of the Rajah of Bilaspour, as well as gained possession of the fort of Ratangerh, situated opposite to Malaun, and only separated from it by a wide and deep ravine. A detachment under Colonel Cooper shortly after gained possession of Ramghur, and dispossessed the
Ghoorkas of all their other posts in the south. Thus, by a series of skilful movements, General Ochterlony, without a direct encounter with the enemy, had obliged them to retire before him till only one place of strength within the district remained in their possession. Even this was held by a very precarious tenure, for on the 1st of April, 1815, Malaun was completely invested. An account of the subsequent operations in this quarter must in the meantime be postponed, in order to attend to the proceedings of the other two divisions of the British army.

The division under General Wood was not able to take the field before the middle of December. Leaving Goruckpoor, he began his march northwards in the direction of Palpa, situated about 100 miles W.N.W. of Khatmandoo. In order to reach it by the most direct route, it was necessary to traverse a difficult mountain-pass, which was reported to be strongly stockaded, and therefore General Wood, understanding that it might be turned by following a different route, proceeded on the 3d of January, 1815, to attack the stockade of Jetpoor, at the foot of the Majkote Hills, about a mile west of Bhotwal, as in consequence of the new route which he meant to follow, it would be necessary to carry it. He accordingly advanced with twenty-one companies to attack the stockade in front, while Major Comyn was detached with seven companies to turn it on the left. As his information had been imperfect or erroneous, he encountered a determined resistance at points where he had not anticipated, and became so disheartened, that he despaired of success before there was any reasonable ground to doubt of it. He therefore not only ordered a retreat, but, assuming that his forces were inadequate to the task assigned him, abandoned all idea of offensive operations, and resolved to confine himself to the humbler task of preventing the Ghoorkas from making incursions across the frontier. Even in this he was not successful. The Ghoorkas found little difficulty in penetrating at many points and committing great devastation. Under these circumstances the best thing which occurred to him was to retaliate, and he was repeatedly seen vying with the Ghoorkas as to the amount of injury which they could mutually inflict on the unoffending inhabitants whose misfortune it was to dwell on either side of the boundary between British India and Nepaul. After persisting for a time in this petty and ignominious warfare, the insalubrity of the climate began to tell seriously on the health of the troops, and they were finally withdrawn into cantonments at Goruckpoor.

The division under General Marley, as it was the strongest of all the four, was also the one from which the most decisive results were expected. It was directed immediately against the capital, and it was therefore presumed that if it succeeded, the Ghoorka rajah would have no alternative but to sue for peace. It assembled at Dinapore, and on the 23d of November commenced its march in the direction of Bettia. To clear the way for its advance. Major Bridghshaw had been previously detached against the Ghoorka posts in the
frontier forests. While thus occupied, he succeeded, on the 24th of November, in completely surprising Parsuram Thapa, the governor of the district, who was encamped on the banks of the Bhagmate with 400 men. The governor himself was among the slain, and the whole force was so completely dispersed, that the other posts of the district fell without opposition; and the low swampy and unhealthy tract lying at the southern outskirts of the Himalaya, and known by the name of the Tirai, was formally annexed to the British dominions.

This first success, had it been properly followed up, would have been the prelude to others of still greater importance, but General Marley, though his instructions ordered him to leave his guns in the rear, till he had gained a position considerably in advance, chose to wait for them, and waste his time in other preliminary arrangements, till the advantage which might have been taken of the alarm caused by Parsuram Thapa's discomfiture was completely lost. The Ghorkas were not long in penetrating the character of the commander to whom this division of the British troops had been intrusted, and were in consequence emboldened to undertake an enterprise which had the effect at the very outset of hampering all the future operations of the British. To secure the Tirai against any attempt that might be made to recover it before the arrival of the main body, Major Bradshaw stationed three small bodies of troops about the distance of twenty miles apart from each other; the central one at Barangerhi, another at Samanpoor* on the right, and the third at Parsa on the left. General Marley encamped at Lautan, only two miles west of Barangerhi, but no precaution was taken for the safety of the outposts of Samanpoor and Parsa. The result which might have been anticipated was soon realized. Both posts were suddenly attacked on the 1st of January, 1815. The attack on Samanpoor was a complete surprise, and all the troops at the station were killed or dispersed. At Parsa an attack had been expected, and reinforcements which had been applied for were actually on the way, but they only arrived in time not to frustrate the attack, but merely to cover the retreat of the fugitives.

These losses, sufficiently great in themselves, were rendered disastrous by the course which they induced the commander to adopt. Alarmed at the number of desertions, and even doubtful of the fidelity of those who remained, while the terror of a Ghorka attack, which he would be unable to resist, continually haunted him, he saw no safety but in a retrograde movement, in order to save: the depot of Bettia from capture, and give protection to the Sarum frontier. His terrors preceded him, and nothing was talked of at Goruckpoor and Tihoot but the approaching invasion of an overwhelming Ghorka force. Nothing but the weakness of the enemy prevented the catastrophe which cowardice thus predicted. The effect however was to enable the Ghorkas to recover nearly the whole of the Tirai, and to carry their incursions once more into the British territories. General Marley's mode of conducting the war had
been severely condemned by the governor-general, and he had in consequence been deprived of the command. He was therefore only waiting for the arrival of his successor, General Wood, when he volunteered a stronger proof of imbecility than any he had yet furnished by suddenly disappearing from the camp before daylight, without giving the troops any notification of his intention, or even making any provision for the ordinary routine of command. The absence of such an officer could not cause any permanent inconvenience, and as the division had received reinforcements which raised it to the number of 13,000, it was now better prepared than ever for offensive operations. While the temporary command was held by Colonel Dick, an affair took place which threw the enemy into great alarm and inflicted on him considerable loss. Lieutenant Pickersgill, while engaged with a small escort in surveying, fell in with a party of 400 Ghoorkas, who in the eagerness of pursuit left the cover of the forest, and followed him in the direction of the British camp. Colonel Dick, on hearing the firing, sent forward a troop of 100 irregular horse, and followed in person with all the pickets. The Ghoorkas, totally unconscious of the snare into which they were running, no sooner saw how they had entangled themselves, than they were seized with panic, and made an ineffectual effort to escape. More than a hundred, including the commander, were killed, many in attempting to cross a stream were drowned, and the remainder were either taken prisoners or dispersed. The affair, though in itself comparatively insignificant, spread so much alarm among the Ghoorkas, that they hastily retired from their advanced posts, and allowed the Tirai to be again occupied by the British.

Considering the pusillanimous course which General Wood had followed at the head of his own division, one is at a loss to account for the infatuation which selected him for this new and more important command. When he arrived in the end of February, 1815, the unhealthy season was still a month distant, and there was therefore room for much active service. He thought otherwise, and after marching and countermarching as if for the mere purpose of assuring himself that the Ghoorkas had really abandoned the lowlands, and had no intention of disputing the possession of them, he returned to the frontier, and placed the army in cantonments. The advance on Khatmaddoo, the great object of the campaign, was thus abandoned without having been once seriously attempted. In other quarters greater activity was displayed, and better results were obtained. Captain (now Major) Latter, who, with his small detachment, was stationed on the banks of the Coosy, not only accomplished the defensive object primarily contemplated, but drove the Ghoorkas from all their positions, gained possession of the province of Moorang, and formed an important alliance with the Rajah of Sikhim. In the province of Kumaon, forming the very centre of the Ghoorka conquests, successes of still greater consequence were accomplished. The Rajah Chautra Bam Sak, who had been compelled to yield to the Ghoorka yoke, was with his people groaning under it, and ready to embrace any opportunity.
which promised the means of deliverance. The inhabitants of the adjoining province of Ghurwal were similarly affected. Dislike to the rule of the Rajah of Serinagur had induced them to countenance a Ghoorka invasion, but having soon found that in changing masters they had not improved their condition, they were again ready for a new revolution. It was resolved to turn these circumstances to account, and Colonel Gardner, after raising an irregular force of about 3000 men, began on the 15th of February, 1815, to ascend the hills in the direction of Almora. He was shortly after followed by another body of irregulars under Captain Hearsay. As Colonel Gardner advanced, the Ghoorkas were driven successively from all their posts, and obliged at last to concentrate on the ridge on which Almora stands. Captain Hearsay, after commencing with similar promise of success, and capturing Chumpawut, the capital of the district, was suddenly attacked while engaged in the siege of a hill-fort, defeated, and taken prisoner.

The importance of the operations in Kumaon having now been practically tested, Colonel Nicolls was sent thither with a body of about 2000 regular troops, and a proportion of field artillery. Having arrived on the 8th of April, and assumed the command, he detached Major Paton against Hastee Dal Chautra, the officer who had defeated Captain Hearsay, and who, after lodging his prisoner in Almora, had proceeded to the north-west to occupy a mountain pass. An encounter took place, and after a spirited struggle, in which the Ghoorkas lost their commander, they were put to flight. Before they were permitted to recover from the effects of their discomfiture, the stockades in front of Almora were attacked, and gallantly carried. Not a moment was lost in preparing to attack the fort, and the very next morning the mortars opened upon it with destructive effect. Bam Sak, who defended it, had not hitherto shown any symptoms of the dissatisfaction which he was supposed to entertain. He had even indignantly rejected the advantageous offers made to tempt his fidelity. The bombardment was more effectual. Shortly after it commenced, crowds of deserters began to flock into the British camp, and a flag of truce announced the readiness of the garrison to capitulate. The terms were that the Ghoorkas should be permitted to retire across the Kallee with their arms and personal effects, and that not only the fort of Almora, but the entire provinces of Kumaon and Ghurwal should be ceded to the British. This was unquestionably the most triumphant result which the Nepaulese war had yet yielded.

Still farther west, though General Martindale in the Dehra Doon still remained before Jytak, and had abandoned all hope of reducing it except by famine, General Ochterlony was continuing his more brilliant career. After seizing all the enemy's posts and confining them to the heights of Malaun, he determined to break through the line of their defences. These stretched along the summit of the mountain between Malaun on the right, and the fort of
Surajghur on the left. Still farther to the right, at not much less elevation
than Malaun, stood the fort of Ratanghur which had been captured by Colonel
Arnold. At some distance on the slope below Malaun lay the Ghoorka can-
tonments protected by strong stockades. In the line of stockades which stretched
along the ridge between Malaun and Surajghur, the British commander
detected two assailable points, Ryla and Deothul; the possession of which would
enable him to cut off Malaun from most of its dependent outworks. Ryla was
gallantly attacked and secured on the night of the 14th of April, 1815. At
daybreak of the following morning Deothul was likewise carried, but two other

operations which had been carried on simultaneously were less fortunate. To
divert the attention of the enemy during the attack on these posts, two
detachments were sent from opposite directions against the cantonments. The
one moved off from the column advancing to the attack of Deothul, while the
other proceeded from the fort of Ratanghur. Though nothing more than a
diversion was proposed, much more appears to have been attempted. The
detachment from Ratanghur was in consequence thrown into complete con-
fusion by a furious onset, and pursued by the Ghoorkas with great slaughter.
The other detachment made good its footing, so far as to be able to remain on
the defensive till the evening, when it was withdrawn. On the capture of
Deothul an attempt was made to seize a stockade within battering distance of
Malaun, but was so resolutely met, that the assailants were seized with panic
and driven back in the utmost confusion.

The possession of Deothul was so obviously fraught with danger to the
enemy that a fierce struggle was foreseen, and as far as possible provided
against, by strengthening it with reinforcements, protecting it with a species of
stockade, and planting two field-pieces upon it. The anticipated attack took
place on the 16th of April. It was headed by Bhakti Sing Thapa, a distin-
guished Ghoorka leader, and supported by Amar Sing in person. At daybreak
the enemy was seen advancing in a semicircle along the ridge and its two declivities, so as to envelope the position and turn both its flanks. The charge was fierce and resolute, the Ghorkas advancing to the very muzzle of the guns, and returning repeatedly to the charge in the face of showers of grape. The attack, after it had been persisted in for two hours, having slackened. Colonel Thompson, who commanded the post, seized the opportunity to order a charge with the bayonet. It was completely successful, and the Ghorkas, unable any longer to maintain the struggle, fled in disorder. Bhakti Sing lay dead on the field with 500 of his countrymen, and Amar Sing collecting his scattered troops retired into Malaun. He was now so completely crest-fallen that he offered scarcely any resistance to the subsequent operations for completely investing it.

On the 8th of May a battery of heavy guns began to play on the works, and preparations for the assault had become visible, when the great body of the garrison, unable either to induce Amar Sing to surrender or to endure the privations of a rigorous blockade, left the fort without arms, and gave themselves up to the nearest British post. As a show of resistance continued, the breaching battery again opened on the 10th. Its destructive effects convinced Amar Sing of the uselessness of further resistance, and he sent his son on the following morning to intimate his desire to negotiate. By the convention with him, it was stipulated that the Ghorkas should cede all their territories west of the Jumna, and that he himself, and all the members of the Thapa family, together with the garrison of Malaun and part of that of Jyotak, should be allowed to return to Nepal with their personal property and their arms. Many of the privates, instead of going to Nepal, preferred entering the British service, and were formed into battalions for duty in the highland districts.

The government of Nepal saw the necessity of suing for peace. With this view Bam Sak Chautra was employed to communicate with the British commissioner in Kumaon, and Gaj Raj Misr, the Gooroo or spiritual teacher of the late Rajah Rana Bahadur, was summoned from his retirement at Benares, and sent as envoy to Colonel Bradshaw, whom the governor-general had empowered to conclude a peace on the following conditions:—the cession of the hill country west of the Kalee or Gogra—the abandonment of all claims on the lands in dispute before the war commenced—the cession of the Tirai throughout its whole extent—the restoration of a tract which had been taken from the Rajah of Sikhim, now become a British ally—and the admission of a British resident at Khatmandoo. When these terms were made known to the Gooroo, he objected particularly to the cession of the Tirai, which, by stripping the nobles and ministers of their jaghires, would leave them without support, as well as deprive the country of the main source from which its supplies of grain were obtained, and the admission of a resident, who, it was feared, might repeat the course taken in Oude, and ultimately appropriate all the real powers of government. A long negotiation ensued, during which the Nepalese showed themselves
well acquainted with all the wiles of diplomacy. Ultimately, however, every point in dispute seemed to be arranged, and on the 2nd of December, 1815, the treaty was duly executed at Segoulee by the British agent and the Nepalese commissioners, the latter promising that the ratification would be returned from Khatmandoo in fifteen days. The governor-general, flattering himself that a war of which he had become heartily tired was now advantageously ended, ratified the treaty on the 9th of December. The Rajah of Nepaul took the matter more coolly, and instead of the ratification, the commissioners received a letter from the regent, informing them that through the influence of Amar Sing Thapa the war party was again in the ascendant. After such an evasion, it might have seemed that the only dignified course left was to declare the negotiation at an end and recommence hostilities. Strange to say, the governor-general was now of a spirit so different from that which he had displayed at the outset, that he allowed his agent almost to solicit the ratification, by holding out hopes that, if it were given, the terms of the treaty would not be rigorously enforced. It appears, in fact, that he was now willing not only to leave the Nepalese in possession of the Tirai, but to make them a present of the very districts which had been the whole cause of the war. The ground on which the governor-general justified this extraordinary concession was, that the districts, though worth fighting for as a point of honour, were otherwise of no real value, and therefore, after the Nepalese had yielded the point of honour by ceasing to claim them as a right, nothing was lost by allowing them to resume possession of them as a favour. Surely if the districts were so worthless, the point of honour supposed to be involved might, and ought to have been satisfied by some milder method than a bloody and protracted war.

The relaxation of demands by the governor-general at the very time when the prevaricating conduct of the Nepalese government made it more than ever imperative to insist upon them, produced the result which has almost invariably been realized when negotiating with native states. Moderation was mistaken for conscious weakness, and the court of Khatmandoo, which had previously been willing to purchase peace on any terms, began to question the propriety of even desiring it. The negotiation was indeed nominally continued, but every day made it more and more apparent that the real object was to spin out the time till the proper season for action had passed away. This conviction having at length forced itself on the governor-general, he ordered hostilities to be vigorously renewed. General (now Sir David) Ochterlony, having been vested with the chief command, political as well as military, took the field in the beginning of February, 1816, with an army of nearly 17,000 men, which he arranged in four brigades. One of these he detached by the right to penetrate by Harikurpoor, and another to the left to penetrate by Ramnuggur, while with the other two he set out on the 12th of February, and marched
through the forest to the foot of the Chiriaghati Pass. This pass, formed by the bed of a mountain torrent, was not only difficult in itself from natural obstacles, but was defended by successive tiers of stockades. It could hardly have been forced at all, and certainly not without a very serious loss. Fortunately another pass was discovered, which, though even more difficult than the other, presented the great advantage of being undefended. It was a deep ravine, with rugged and precipitous sides, covered with overhanging trees, which nearly excluded the light. At night on the 14th of February, Sir David

Ochterlony, leaving the fourth brigade at the mouth of the ravine, began to ascend it with the third brigade, he himself leading at the head of his majesty's 87th regiment, by a path so narrow as seldom to afford room for more than a single file. After proceeding thus for some distance, the ground became more open, till a water-course was entered, and found to lead to the base of a steep declivity about 300 feet high. With infinite difficulty, by laying hold of boughs and projecting rocks, the advance clambered up, and by eight in the morning had gained the summit. It was ten at night before the rest of the troops and two field-pieces were got up. The three following days were spent by the pioneers in making the ascent practicable for the conveyance of stores and ammunition, but the main difficulty had now been overcome, and the troops were able to advance without encountering any very serious obstacle. On the day after the ascent the general arrived at Hetaunda on the banks of the Raptee, and was delighted by the junction of the 4th brigade. The Ghoorkas on finding that the Chiriaghati Pass was turned, had abandoned their stockades, and allowed the brigade to ascend without opposition.

On the 27th of February Sir David Ochterlony arrived in the vicinity of Mukwanpoor, and encamped on a level about two miles to the south of its
fortified heights. A village on the left, which a strong detachment of the enemy had abandoned, was immediately occupied, but only to become the scene of a desperate struggle, for the enemy, apparently convinced that they had done wrong in retiring, no sooner saw the position occupied than they returned to attempt the recovery of it. As it was only held by three companies of native infantry and forty men of the 87th, the assailants probably anticipated an easy conquest, but reinforcements continued to pour in from both sides, till the engagement became almost general. The Ghoorkas sent down at least 2000 men from the heights. All their efforts, however, though made and maintained with their usual dauntless valour, proved unavailing, and they were finally repulsed with a very heavy loss. On the day after this affair the first brigade, under Colonel Nicolls, arrived. It had ascended by a pass to the north of Ramnuggur, and then marched without opposition up the valley of the Raptee. The second brigade, under Colonel Kelly, was also advancing. It had arrived at the fort of Harikurpoor by selecting a mountain pass which was not stockaded, and almost immediately gained a commanding position, from which the Ghoorkas endeavoured in vain to dislodge it. This failure so disheartened the garrison of the fort that it was forthwith evacuated without further struggle.

The successes with which the new campaign had opened had changed the views of the Nepalese chiefs, and the peace party once more predominated. Hence, as Sir David Ochterlony was preparing for the siege of Mukwanpoor, the commandant, who was a brother of the regent, sent a messenger to intimate to him that he had received the ratified treaty from Khatmandoo, and requested permission to send it to him in charge of an agent. On the 3d of March the agent arrived, and as the document was duly executed, hostilities of course ceased, but not till consent had been given to an additional article, which stipulated that the ceded territory should include the valley of the Raptee, and whatever had been conquered during the actual campaign. At the time when the cession of the Tirai was demanded by the British government, the objection that it would leave many of the principal chiefs without the means of support was met by a proposal from the governor-general to grant pensions to those whom the cession would deprive of their jaghires. This proposal was submitted to with great reluctance, because, as it was justly argued, the pensioned lords would be more likely to favour British interests than those of their own sovereign. Much gratification was therefore felt by the rajah when the Honourable Mr. Gardner, who had been appointed British resident at Khatmandoo, was authorized by the governor-general to propose that the pensions should be commuted for a grant of lands. The arrangement was at once entered into, and the Nepalese, who had previously been gratuitously reinstated in the Tirai, could henceforth boast that, after all the disasters which the war had caused them, they remained at the conclusion of it in possession of a portion of the very lands which it was the avowed object of the war to wrest from them.
It must still be admitted that after all these cessions, considerable territorial acquisitions remained with the Company. The magnificent provinces of Kumaon and Ghurwal had been formally annexed to the British dominions, and several hill rajahs, though left nominally independent, were placed under restrictions which made all their military resources available for British purposes. The treaty with the Rajah of Sikhim was also an excellent stroke of policy, as it interposed an insurmountable barrier between Nepaul and Bootan, and thus made it impossible for these two states to go to war with each other, as they ceased to be contiguous, and therefore could not engage in hostilities without violating territory which belonged to the Company, or which the Company was pledged to protect. There can scarcely be a doubt that, but for this interposition of Sikhim, the Ghoorkas, when deprived of their western conquests, would have endeavoured to compensate themselves by the subjugation of Bootan.

Though the war never extended beyond the territories belonging to or claimed by Nepaul, the Ghoorkas, when they commenced hostilities, were not without the hope of being joined by powerful allies. They had made application in every quarter which gave any promise of success. A correspondence between Scindia and the Ghoorka government was actually intercepted. The Pindarees were also applied to, and Runjeet Sing was tempted by the offer of a large sum, together with the fort of Malaum, in return for his assistance. During the early reverses which the British arms sustained, the Ghoorkas flattered themselves with the hope of a general rising among the native powers of Hindoostan. They did not even confine to India their applications for aid, but sent a mission to the court of Ava and endeavoured to engage the Emperor of China in their quarrel. They had, as already explained, acknowledged themselves to be the emperor’s tributaries, and partly on this ground, and still more on the false allegation that the English were making war upon them, merely because they had refused them a passage into the Chinese territory, they earnestly solicited him to assist them, either with money or with an army. The Chinese, though doubting the truth of this statement, indulged their naturally suspicious temper so far as to send an army to the frontier. It did not arrive, however, till hostilities were at an end, and the governor-general had, by explanation, convinced the Chinese authorities that the Ghoorka statement as to the cause of the war was unfounded. Their own shrewdness, indeed, had previously led them to the same conclusion. “Such absurd measures as those alluded to,” they observed, “appear quite inconsistent with the usual wisdom of the English,” and the Ghoorka statement was declared to be manifestly false, because the English, if they had wished to invade the Chinese dominions, could have found a nearer route than through Nepaul. The authorities in England, though doubtful at first of the necessity of the war, and of the wisdom of the plan adopted in conducting it, were delighted with the final result. The crown testified approbation by conferring on the governor-general the title of
Marquis of Hastings, and on the commander the baronetage already mentioned, while the courts of directors and proprietors not only concurred in unanimous votes of thanks to them and the officers and men engaged, but bestowed on Sir David Ochterlony a well-earned pension of £1000 a year.

During the war in Nepal, transactions of some importance took place in other quarters. The native state of Cutch, consisting of a kind of peninsula connected with Scinde on the north and with Gujerat on the east by a very extensive salt marsh called the Ran or Runn, and bounded on the south by the Gulf of Cutch, and on the west by the Indian Ocean, was nominally under the government of a ruler with the title of Row Raidhan, but had become really subject to two adventurers, the one Hans-raj, a Hindoo merchant, and the other Futtteh Mahomed, the commander of a body of Arab mercenaries. The two, in their struggle for supremacy, courted the interference of the British government, which, however, interposed only so far as seemed necessary to protect the territories of the Guicowar from Cutch depredation. The contest seemed terminated by the death of Hans-raj in 1809, and the consequent undisputed ascendancy of his competitor, but in 1813 the confusion became worse than ever. In that year, both Futtteh Mahomed and the Row died, and the succession was disputed. The Row, who had embraced Mahometanism, left a son, Bharmalji, by a Mahometan wife. The Jhaneja Rajpoot, of whom the Row was the head, refused to acknowledge his legitimacy, and gave their allegiance to Lakpati, the late Row's nephew. The civil war which ensued was partly of a religious character, and continued to rage with such alternations of success, that regular government almost ceased to exist. The chiefs therefore followed their natural bent, and not satisfied with the narrow limits of Cutch, crossed the Runn on foot and the gulf in boats, and carried their depredations over the whole of the adjoining territory, carrying off the cattle, burning the villages, and murdering the inhabitants. As the Guicowar, whose territory was thus ravaged, was an ally of the British and under their protection, it became necessary, after remonstrance had proved in vain, to send a body of troops against Bhooj, the capital of Cutch. Here both the competitors for the throne were resident. They had cemented their quarrel by a compromise which left Bharmalji in possession of the sovereignty; but the anarchy which previously prevailed was scarcely diminished, since the new sovereign, so far from suppressing the marauders, made common cause with them, and even
fomented disturbances in Kattiwar, the province of Gujerat immediately opposite to the Gulf of Cutch. His defiance, indeed, was so openly declared, that he ordered a native agent whom the British had stationed in Bhooj to withdraw, and had a large body of Arabs on the march to assist the rebels in Kattiwar, when they learned that the rebellion was suppressed.

Colonel East, by whose exertions a rebellion, which thus threatened to assume more formidable dimensions, had been nipped in the bud, was directed to advance into Cutch for the purpose of punishing this overt act of hostility, and taking such measures as might be necessary to prevent a repetition of it. In pursuance of these objects he crossed the Runn in December, 1815, and proceeded towards Anjar. It was held by a son of the late Kutteh Mahomed, who made friendly professions, and at the same time gave the lie to them, by ordering the wells on the British line of march to be poisoned. To punish his treachery, batteries were erected against his fort, and when a practicable breach was effected, he only saved himself from worse consequences by surrendering Anjar, and ceding along with it the small port of Juner, on the Gulf of Cutch. The Row, deterred by this first result of the campaign, prevented the capture of his capital by a timely submission, and entered into a treaty which bound him not only to defray the expenses of the war, and compensate for the devastations of his marauders, but to assist in putting them down, and acknowledge himself a British tributary by the annual payment of £7000. In return he was taken under British protection, and established in full possession of the districts which refractory chiefs had wrested from him. After the pacification of Cutch, Colonel East returned to Kattiwar, and took the most effectual method of suppressing the piracy for which the Gulf of Cutch had long been notorious, by dispossessing the chiefs along its southern shore, and subjecting their harbours and strongholds to British authority. Among the places captured on this occasion was Dwarnaka, situated near the north-west extremity of the Kattiwar peninsula, and famous throughout India for its great temple of Krishna.

The next scene of disturbance requiring notice is Hyderabad, the capital of the Nizam. Under the arrangement which had given the chief management of affairs to Chandu Lal, and rendered him at the same time completely subservient to the British resident, the Nizam, and his favourite minister Moonir-ul-Mooffk, had ceased to interfere in public business, and found more congenial employment in grovelling indulgences. The Nizam’s sons did not bear their exclusion from office so coolly, and compensated themselves by becoming the heads of riotous brawlers and contending factions. The two youngest sons in particular, surrounded by a band of profligate retainers, kept the city in constant alarm by their lawless proceedings. The Nizam would rather not have interfered, but the remonstrances of the resident obliged him to bestir himself, and he issued orders that the necessary steps should be taken to restrain them. The body of troops sent for this purpose found the task more difficult than had been
anticipated. On approaching the palace, the retainers of the princes opened a heavy fire, and killed a British officer of the resident's escort. In the struggle which ensued, the defence of the princes was so well maintained, that the British detachment, after blowing open the palace gates, were unable to advance, and deemed it prudent to retire for reinforcements. During the ensuing night the whole city was in commotion, and courtiers were not wanting to advise the Nizam that he could not do better than free himself at once from the British yoke, by overwhelming the troops at the residency before the reinforcements could arrive. He listened to better advice, and instead of taking a course by which he must inevitably have been ruined, by withdrawing all countenance from the princes, he made them aware of the gulf on which they stood, and convinced them that they had no alternative but to submit. They were obliged notwithstanding to pay the penalty of their misconduct, and were confined in the old fortress of Golconda.

Another disturbance, originating in more trivial causes, threatened to produce more serious results. The inhabitants of India dread nothing so much as innovation, and have an especial abhorrence of taxation, when it presents itself under a new form. This latter feeling receives an easy explanation, when it is remembered how much they have suffered from the extortions of their rulers, and how often occasion has been taken to convert some small assessment, imposed ostensibly for some distinct and temporary purpose, into a permanent, indefinite, and oppressive burden. The land had always been the main source of revenue, and the share of its produce demanded by government, though often oppressive in its amount, was seldom openly resisted. The payment of it was looked upon as a kind of law of nature, and, however much it might be grumbled at, excited neither disappointment nor indignation. With a new tax the case was entirely different, and hence, when the government of Bengal in 1813, during the administration of Lord Minto, endeavoured to increase the revenue
by a house tax, the opposition was so general and determined, that nothing but a repeal could quiet it. At Benares, in particular, the inhabitants desisted from their ordinary employments, shut their shops, and encamping in the open fields at a short distance from the city, sent a petition to the magistrate, in which they declared that they would never return to their homes till the tax was removed. This passive resistance was more effectual than any violent outbreak could have been in convincing the government of the necessity of yielding, and the idea of increasing the public revenue by a house tax was abandoned.

Government though defeated was very unwilling to acknowledge it, and in the following year endeavoured to establish the principle of a house assessment by confining it to police purposes, and giving it the form of a voluntary payment, by leaving it to the inhabitants to assess themselves in their different wards by means of committees of their own selection. At first, the only cities so assessed were Dacca, Patna, and Moorshedabad, but when the precedent was by this means secured, the sphere of its operation was largely extended, and embraced, in addition to the lower provinces, the districts of Benares and Bareilly. Though strong dissatisfaction with the assessment was generally felt, Benares was contented to rest satisfied with its former victory, and consented, not without manifest repugnance, to pay its quota of assessment. The opposition of Bareilly was not so easily overcome. This city, situated not far from the centre of the Rohilla country, contained among its inhabitants not a few families who had fallen from high rank and wealth into comparative insignificance, and could trace their sad reverse of fortune to the iniquitous bargain by which Warren Hastings sold them to the Nabob of Oude. The injustice which they had suffered on this and on other occasions still rankled in their hearts, and as it was impossible that they could feel any real attachment to a government which had so used them, they were ready to lay hold of any real or imaginary grievance which would enable them to give free vent to their dissatisfaction. The military and turbulent propensities of the population generally, easily induced them to take part in any commotion however occasioned, and there were besides several local causes of animosity. The kotwal, or head of the police, obnoxious to the Mahometans merely because he was a Hindoo, had made himself generally detested by his overbearing conduct, and the British magistrate, instead of conciliating good-will by frank and courteous manners, had acted as if he thought that his dignity could only be preserved by distant and haughty airs, which so offended the more respectable native families, that they kept aloof from all friendly intercourse with him. The materials being thus prepared, any spark was sufficient to excite the conflagration.

An assessment for municipal police was not an absolute novelty in Bareilly. In the principal thoroughfares the shopkeepers had been accustomed to provide for the security of their property by a moderate police rate. On their part, then, the only objection felt to the rate was its increased amount. This was
doubtless a grievance, but it was light compared with the grievance felt by those who, formerly exempted from the rate, were now for the first time to be subjected to it. The chief persons in this position were the reduced families already mentioned. In the midst of their poverty most of them managed to keep as many retainers as were quite sufficient for their own protection, and the effect of the new rate was therefore only to increase their burdens, without conferring upon them any benefit. No doubt they might dismiss retainers and leave it to the municipal police to protect them. This, however, was the very last step which they were disposed to take. To dismiss their retainers was to subject them to what they considered degradation; and a tax which threatened to compel them to do this was not only disliked as a burden, but repudiated as an insult.

The attempt to obtain a voluntary assessment by means of committees of the inhabitants having entirely failed in Bareilly, the magistrate ordered the kotwal to apportion and levy it at his own discretion. In performing this task, which must under any circumstances have been attended with much difficulty, he is said to have proceeded with the greatest harshness, threatening the lower orders with the stocks, and the higher with chains and imprisonment. While the whole city was thus in a ferment, and the popular indignation at its height, one of the police poons, when resisted in levying the tax, wounded a woman. The populace immediately placed her on a bed, and carried her to the mufti Mahomed Arwaz, whose sanctity was held in the highest reputation throughout Rohileund. He had early countenanced the popular excitement, and on being thus appealed to, advised that the woman should be forthwith taken to the magistrate's residence. The answer obtained there was, that the woman must lodge her complaint before the proper court in due form. The excitement and irritation were too great to be appeased by a regular process, and the mufti greatly increased both, by declaring that, if justice was to be so dispensed, no man's life or honour was safe. Mobs now began to assemble in the streets, and assumed so threatening an appearance near the mufti's house that it was deemed necessary to disperse them. On the appearance of the magistrate at the head of a few horsemen and sepoys, it was suspected that he meant to apprehend the mufti. This the multitude were determined not to permit, and an encounter took place, during which some lives were lost, and the mufti made his escape.

A general insurrection was now imminent. The green flag of Islam, hoisted on the shrine in which the mufti had taken refuge, announced to the faithful that their religion was in danger, and in addition to those in Bareilly itself, crowds of fanatics began to flock in from the neighbouring towns. In the course of two days about 6000 men appeared in arms. The officials on their part were not idle. The force at their immediate command amounted to 420 men, with two guns, while reinforcements were hastening forward by forced
marches from Moradabad. Meantime a parley with the insurgents took place, and the mufti would gladly have escaped from the storm which he had raised. It was beyond his power, and the insurgents, left to their own guidance, dictated as their only terms that the tax should be abolished—that the kotwal should be delivered up to punishment for the blood which had been shed—that the families of the sufferers should be provided for—and that a general amnesty should be proclaimed. As these terms were at once refused, the rioters lost not a moment in proceeding to extremes, by shooting down a youth, the son of one of the judges of the circuit court, as he was passing unarmed from one military post to another, and then making a sudden onset on the troops within the town before the expected reinforcements arrived. The result was not long doubtful. The insurgents, first resisted and then pursued, fled, leaving behind them about 400 dead, and a greater number of wounded and prisoners. The defeat was most opportune, as there cannot be a doubt that a first success on the part of the populace would have been followed by a general rising. No attempt was made to renew the conflict. The mufti and other ringleaders escaping beyond the Company's bounds were not sought after, and the few trials which took place terminated without conviction, either from want of evidence or because leniency seemed preferable to severity.

Before resuming the general narrative there is only one other disturbance which requires to be noticed at present. The locality was the Doab. The talookdars there had managed, during the anarchy which prevailed, to seize large tracts of property to which they had no legal claim, and to exercise powers of jurisdiction which converted them into petty sovereigns. Under the license thus permitted them they had multiplied the numbers of their military retainers, and erected forts which they held as their own in defiance of all authority. The confusion and oppression which ensued may easily be imagined. The people
appealed in vain to the paramount power, and it was soon seen that all efforts to
relieve them would be unavailing, unless the strongholds in which their oppres-
sors had entrenched themselves were dismantled. It was necessary to begin
with an example, and for this purpose Dyaram, as zeminadar or talookdar of
Hatras and various other districts, was selected as at once one of the largest and
most refractory. His capital of Hatras, situated in the district of Alighur, about
thirty miles north of Agra, consisted as usual of a town and a fort, the former
inclosed by a wall and a ditch, and the latter perched on an eminence, and so
fortified with walls, towers, and bastions, as to be regarded as a place of con-
siderable strength. Dyaram’s whole force was about 3500 cavalry and 4500
infantry. He made a ready profession of allegiance to the British government,
but on being called to give a proof of it by disbanding his troops and dis-
mantling his fort, gave an answer which showed that nothing short of com-
pulsion would suffice. A strong division under General Marshall accordingly
marched against Hatras, and completely invested it on the 12th of February,
1816. By the 23d the walls of the town were effectually breached, but the
garrison, on seeing preparations to storm, retreated into the fort. The siege of
it was immediately commenced by the erection of powerful batteries, which
opened their fire from numerous mortars and breaching-guns with such destruc-
tive effect, that Dyaram saw the uselessness of further defence. This conviction
was hastened by a tremendous explosion, caused by the falling of a shell upon
a powder magazine; and at midnight of the 2d of March he consulted his own
safety by quitting the fort with a small body of retainers, who, though discov-
ered, and attacked by a body of dragoons, fought their way, and made good
their retreat, after inflicting more loss than they received. This success was
attributed not more to their courage than to the completeness of their armour,
consisting partly of back and breast plates, and gauntlets of steel. After
Dyaram’s escape little resistance was offered, and the capture and demolition of
the fort produced such an effect on the other talookdars, that they hastened to
give in their submission.
CHAPTER II.

Determination to put down the predatory system—Relations between the Guicowar and the Peishwa—Mission of Gungadhur Sastree—His assassination—Trimubukjee Dainglia, the Peishwa’s favourite, accused and imprisoned at Tanna—Proposed alliance with the Nabobs of Bhopaul and Sagar—Subsidiary alliance with Nagpoor—The Pindarees—Their origin—Their leaders—Their system of plunder—The governor-general’s policy in regard to them—New treaty with Scindia—New alliances—Apa Sahib, Rajah of Berar—Trimubukjee Dainglia escapes from Tanna—Proceedings at Poonah—New treaty with the Peishwa.

At the time when the Nepalese war commenced it was foreseen that in various other quarters hostilities could not be distant. The policy of non-interference had accomplished the shortsighted and selfish views which had led to its adoption. It had indeed left the native states to carry on their quarrels in their own way, and thus involved them in inextricable intestine dissensions, but it had not thereby secured the territories of the Company from aggression, or enabled them to dispense with a large military establishment. While the strong were permitted with impunity to prey upon the weak, and none felt secure but those who were able to repel force by force, all idea of amicable and legal settlement was necessarily abandoned, and a species of general anarchy prevailed. As a necessary consequence the predatory system, which had always been one of the greatest curses of India, received a new development, and bands of armed marauders were rapidly spreading over the whole country. Wherever there was a hope of plunder, they were sure to be found adding to the general confusion and committing fearful devastation. For a time the awe which the Company’s arms had inspired deterred the marauders from venturing on incursions into their territories. It was impossible, however, that it could operate as a permanent restraint, and as soon as the means of plunder became deficient in the parts of Central India where the principal predatory hordes had established their head-quarters, the Company’s frontier was no longer held sacred, and both their allies and their immediate subjects were pillaged without mercy. The policy previously in fashion, when it became necessary to provide against these destructive inroads, gave the preference to defensive operations, and an attempt was made to establish a line of posts to guard the points where it seemed probable that the marauders would attempt to break through. The futility of this plan was soon demonstrated. It was impossible thus to guard the frontier, and had it been possible, the permanent expense which it entailed was far greater than would suffice to follow the marauders into their own haunts and com-
pletely extirpate them. The offensive, therefore, was the only plan which promised to be effectual; and the governor-general, convinced of its necessity, would at once have given effect to it, had he not deemed it prudent and becoming to obtain the previous sanction of the home authorities. In order to put down the predatory system it would be necessary to deprive it of the countenance and support which it received from some of the native princes, and this could only be done by taking measures which could not be reconciled with the policy of non-interference. The question, therefore, which the home authorities were called upon to decide was, whether this policy was to be persisted in, notwithstanding all the evils which it had engendered, or whether a return should be made to the more manly and vigorous policy which the Marquis of Wellesley had adopted, and which, if it had been followed out, would have made the British authority paramount throughout India. Before the answer of the home authorities to this important question was received, several important events occurred.

The relations between the Peishwa and the Guicowar had long been in an unsatisfactory state. The former had advanced claims upon the latter to the amount of nearly £3,000,000 sterling. By the treaties of alliance with the two courts, the British government had become bound to arbitrate in the settlement of these claims, and a most complicated accounting had taken place without producing any practical result. The Peishwa would fain have taken the matter into his own hands and made good his claims by force. This, however, he could not do without an open violation of the treaty of Bassein, and for this, though there was good ground to suspect that he had it in contemplation, he was not yet prepared. It was therefore necessary for him, while complaining loudly of the injustice which he suffered from delay, to allow the accounting to proceed. But though force was precluded, intrigue was still open to him, and he had secured a party which pleased him the more, from not only favouring his claims, but being decidedly adverse to British interests. In 1814 the Peishwa became extremely urgent for the settlement of his claims, and was able to give plausible reasons for his urgency. The district of Ahmedabad was shared between him and the Guicowar, but the whole was in possession of the latter on a ten years' lease, which was about to expire. A new arrangement was hence absolutely necessary, and the Peishwa had declared his determination not to relet, but to enter into actual possession.

The court of Baroda at this time gave full scope for intrigue. Anand Row, the nominal sovereign, was in a state bordering on idiocy, and a younger brother, Futteh Sing, administered the government as regent. For this position he was mainly indebted to British influence, and consequently felt the necessity of being in a great measure subservient to it. The party opposed to him naturally followed a different course, and thus gave rise to two factions who were constantly striving to thwart each other. Gungadhur Sastree, Futteh Sing's
prime minister, followed of course in the footsteps of his master, and was a strenuous supporter of the British alliance. On the other hand Sitaram, who had previously held the office of minister and been discarded for incapacity, headed the opposition party, and being strongly supported by female influence in the palace, continued to cherish the hope of regaining his lost position. With this view he paid great court to the Peishwa, and laboured to convince him that if he were restored to power he would at once satisfy all his claims. It was probably in consequence of these representations that the Peishwa became anxious for the removal of Gungadhir Sastree from the Guicowar’s court. The pretext employed was the slow progress made in the settlement of the claims. If, instead of corresponding by letter, the Sastree would come to Poonah and confer personally on the subject, there was ground to hope that many of the difficulties which now stood in the way would be easily removed. The proposal, when made by the Peishwa, seemed so plausible that the British government at once acquiesced. Gungadhir Sastree was more doubtful. He not only suspected an intrigue, but feared for his life, and therefore refused to set out until he obtained from the resident a guarantee of his personal safety.

Gungadhir Sastree’s fears were by no means unreasonable, for the Peishwa, Bajee Row, who had never before given his confidence to any man, had at last fallen under the ascendancy of an unprincipled adventurer. This was Trimbukjee Dainglia. He had commenced life as a courier and a spy, and after attracting the Peishwa’s notice, had risen rapidly in his favour by ministering to his licentious pleasures, and showing himself ready on all occasions to execute his orders without fear or scruple. When the Guicowar’s lease of the moiety of Ahmedabad expired, and the Peishwa refused to renew it, the administration was committed to Trimbukjee, who immediately sent some of his own creatures to levy it. This first step of promotion was soon followed by his appointment to the command of the Peishwa’s contingent, and his introduction by the Peishwa himself to the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, the resident at Poonah, as a person high in his confidence. Trimbukjee’s arrogance kept pace with his elevation, and he forthwith began to take such an active and prominent part in all public business, as showed that whatever his nominal position might be, he considered himself as virtually at the head of the government. Thus installed, he made no secret of the course of policy which he was resolved to pursue. The Peishwa must again resume his place as the head of the Mahratta confederacy; his claims, even to the extent of demanding chout from Bengal, were to be boldly maintained; and British influence, as the great obstacle to the realization of these schemes, must either be secretly undermined or forcibly overthrown. So little, indeed, was Trimbukjee at pains to disguise his intentions, that Mr. Elphinstone had no difficulty in predicting a rupture with the Peishwa, as the inevitable result of the schemes into which his favourite was hurrying him.
Shortly after the arrival of Gungadhur Sastree at Poonah, two individuals, known to be in the interest of his rival Sitaram, made their appearance there, and were openly and favourably received at the public audience. They claimed authority to act, and produced as their credentials a letter which the imbecile Guicowar had been induced to write in their favour. The resident lost no time in remonstrating against their reception, but his objections were overruled, and Sitaram’s intrigue continued to prosper. Under such circumstances the conference to which Gungadhur Sastree had been invited became a mere mockery, and he announced his desire to return to Baroda. Had he done so, the intrigue which had been commenced there simultaneously with that at Poonah, would in all probability have been frustrated, and it was therefore determined to detain him. This could only be effected by convincing him that the object of his visit might yet be accomplished. The obstacles he was assured were only temporary, and by the exercise of a little patience everything might be satisfactorily arranged. To give effect to this representation, the treatment of which he complained was reversed, the utmost deference was paid to his opinions; his vanity, said to have been his greatest failing, was flattered in every possible way; and the cold and distant manner both of Trimbukjee and his master was exchanged for one expressive of the fullest confidence and friendship.

The suddenness of the change justified suspicion, and Mr. Elphinstone was so little imposed upon that he refused any longer to countenance the negotiation. On Gungadhur Sastree himself the impression was very different, and he became so confident of a successful result, that after applying for recall, he actually petitioned for permission to remain. It was granted—and he continued the negotiation more on his own responsibility than with any concurrence on the part of the British government. In a short time he seemed to have sworn an eternal friendship with Trimbukjee. They were constantly in each other’s society, and so completely unbosomed their secrets that Trimbukjee, to show how much his feelings towards his friend had altered, could not refrain from confessing to him that he had at one time entertained designs upon his life. Such a confession, so far from opening the Sastree’s eyes to the danger of the new connections he had formed, only seemed to him to furnish additional evidence of the sincere friendship which was now felt for him. The Peishwa completed his delusion by courting affinity with him, and agreeing to give his wife’s sister in marriage to Gungadhur Sastree’s son.

It does not seem that all this flattery had shaken Gungadhur Sastree’s fidelity to his own master. He had indeed agreed to a settlement by which the Peishwa was to compromise all his claims on the Guicowar for the cession of as much territory as would yield seven lacs of revenue; but in this, so far from sacrificing the Guicowar’s interest, he had made a far better bargain for him than could have been anticipated. From some cause, however, not easily
explained, Futteh Sing, when the settlement was submitted to him, refused to ratify it, and declared his determination to make no cession of territory whatever. In this dilemma Gungadhur Sastree took the course which was the easiest at the time, but was sure to prove the most difficult in the end. He concealed the fact of Futteh Sing's refusal, and had recourse to a series of evasions for the purpose of accounting for the non-ratification. Nor was this all. The proposed marriage was understood to be so completely arranged that Bajee Row set out with his family for Nassik, a celebrated Hindoo pilgrimage, situated 100 miles north of Poonah, with the intention of preparing for its

celebration there. Though there does not seem to be any necessary connection between the marriage and the settlement, Gungadhur Sastree had determined that the one should not take place without the other, and he was thus by his evasions allowing the Peishwa to proceed with preparations for a marriage which was not to be celebrated. Accordingly, when the truth could no longer be concealed, and the necessary explanations took place, Bajee Row doubtless felt that he had been personally insulted. The resentment which he felt must have been greatly increased when Gungadhur Sastree had the manliness to tell the Peishwa that he could not allow his wife to visit at the palace of Poonah, in consequence of the notorious licentiousness which was permitted within it.

Thus become the object of resentment to a prince who was never known to forgive an injury, Gungadhur Sastree ought not to have lost a moment in hastening back to Baroda. He must have been aware of the deadly offence he had given, and yet he continued to linger on in the belief that the professions of friendship which continued to be lavished on him must be sincere. His intimacy with Trimbukjee continued apparently on the same footing as before,
and hence, after the pilgrimage to Nassik was completed, he at once accepted an invitation to accompany the Peishwa to Punderpoor, another celebrated place of pilgrimage, situated on the Beema, 112 miles south-east of Poonah. As if the circumstances which ought to have increased his caution had only increased his confidence, he left the greater part of his escort behind, and took only a few necessary attendants along with him. Proceeding thus in company with the Peishwa and Trimbukjee, he arrived with them at Punderpoor on the 14th of July, 1815. After an entertainment given on that day by Trimbukjee, he returned home somewhat indisposed, and left orders that if an invitation to the temple arrived, the answer should be given that he was unwell, and unable to attend. Shortly afterwards a messenger from Trimbukjee arrived with the invitation. When the excuse was made, the invitation was repeated, with the addition that, as the crowd had retired, he had better come immediately with a small retinue. He still refused, but sent two of his attendants more fully to explain the reason. On a third invitation, still more urgent, the fear of giving offence overcame his reluctance, and he set out with only seven unarmed attendants. This sealed his fate. After performing his devotions, and conversing for some time with Trimbukjee, he had just left the temple to return home when three men came running from behind, and calling out to clear the way. The moment they reached him one of them struck him with what seemed to be only a twisted cloth, but had concealed a sword. Others immediately followed up the blow, and in a few minutes he was a mangled corpse.

The circumstances under which this atrocious murder had been committed left no doubt as to the perpetrators of it. Trimbukjee Dainglia, acting with the knowledge, and probably by the express orders of the Peishwa, had arranged the whole plot, and carried it out to its horrid consummation. His repeated urgency had almost forced the Sastree to visit the temple; he had met him there as if for the express purpose of superintending the final arrangements; the murderers appear just to have left him when they issued from the temple to do the deed; and he was still there when they returned to it, with the bloody swords in their hands, to announce that it was done. Could there have been any doubt on the subject, it would have been removed by Trimbukjee's subsequent conduct. The actual assassins, though they might easily have been seized at the time, were permitted to escape: no search was made for them, and orders were even issued that the subject should not be publicly talked of. Mr. Elphinstone, who had accompanied the Peishwa to Nassik, and seen enough to satisfy him that his presence was no longer desired, had turned aside to visit the caves at Ellora, and was there when the news of the murder reached him. The necessity of immediate action being apparent, he at once addressed a letter to the Peishwa, demanding a rigorous investigation, and the speedy punishment of the murderers. Common justice required this—the Peishwa, for his own
vindication, could not do less, and nothing less would satisfy the British government, which would proceed to any extremes sooner than stain its honour by overlooking the barbarous murder of an ambassador whose personal safety it had guaranteed.

Mr. Elphinstone, after preparing for the worst by ordering the division of the Hyderabad force stationed at Jaulna to advance to Seroor, only forty miles north-east of Poonah, hastened towards this capital, and reached it on the 6th of August. Trimbukjee arrived on the following day from Punderpoor. The Peishwa followed on the 9th, but apparently so overcome by alarm and conscious guilt, that though it was the festival of the Dakshin, when thousands of Brahmns were assembled to receive a wonted largess from his hands, he entered the city by stealth, under cover of the night in a close palanquin. The resident's inquiries had in the meantime fully confirmed his worst suspicions, and there could be no doubt as to the accuracy of the universal belief, that Bajee Row had sanctioned and Trimbukjee directly superintended the assassination of the Sastree. It was however deemed politic to refrain from charging the Peishwa, and to accuse only Trimbukjee. On the 11th of August, Mr. Elphinstone demanded an audience, but being refused on various pretexts, he procured the delivery of a memorial, in which, after recapitulating the evidence he had obtained, he continued thus:—"On all these grounds I declare my conviction of Trimbukjee Dainglia's guilt, and I call upon your highness to apprehend him, as well as Govind Row Burdojee and Bhugwunt Row Gykwar (Sitaram's agents from Baroda, who were deeply implicated), and to deposit them in such custody as may be considered safe and trustworthy. Even if your highness is not fully convinced of the guilt of these persons, it must be admitted that there is sufficient ground for confining them; and I only ask of you to do so, until his excellency the governor-general and your highness shall have an opportunity of consulting on the subject. I have only to add my desire that this apprehension may be immediate. A foreign ambassador has been murdered in the midst of your highness's court; a Brahmin has been massacred almost in the temple during one of the greatest solemnities of your religion; and I must not conceal from your highness that the impunity of the perpetrators of this enormity has led to imputations not to be thought of against your highness's government. Nobody is more convinced of the falsehood of such insinuations than I am; but I think it my duty to state them, that your highness may see the necessity of refuting calumnies so injurious to your reputation."

The Peishwa, though pleased to find that the guilt of which he was conscious was only insinuated, and not directly charged against him, was apparently unable to summon up sufficient resolution for the adoption of any decided course, and was obliged to content himself with weaving pretexts for delay. He could not believe, he said, that Trimbukjee was guilty, but if sufficient proof were given, he was ready to arrest him. At the very time when he made
this profession, he was busily adding to the number of his troops, and seemed so bent on trying hostilities, that Mr. Elphinston was obliged to remonstrate and declare that if military preparations were continued, he would order the subsidiary force to advance upon Poonah. While Bajee Row was thus making common cause with Trimbukjee, the resident, who had hitherto been acting on his own responsibility, was confirmed in the course he had pursued, by a letter of instructions from the governor-general, who, though willing to gratify the Peishwa so far as to promise that if Trimbukjee's guilt were established by a fair trial, perpetual confinement would be his worst punishment, intimated his determination to hold him responsible for the consequences of continuing to screen him, or of allowing him to escape. Fortified by the governor-general's resolution, Mr. Elphinston presented another memorial, in which, instead of merely calling for the arrest of Trimbukjee, he insisted on his delivery to the British government in the course of twenty-four hours, and intimated that the only alternative of a refusal would be a suspension of all friendly communication between the two governments, and the calling in of the subsidiary force to Poonah. The Peishwa, whose cowardice was notorious, was intimidated by this menace, and yielded a reluctant compliance so far as to send off Trimbukjee to the hill-fort of Wusuntghur, situated considerably to the south. This, however, was considered as evasion, rather than performance, and Mr. Elphinston had actually ordered the march of the subsidiary force stationed at Seroor to Poonah, when the Peishwa yielded, and Trimbukjee, delivered up to the British government, was carried off as a prisoner to the fort of Tanna, situated on the east side of the island of Salsette, twenty-four miles north-east of Bombay. Sitaram's two agents, delivered at the same time, were ultimately placed at the disposal of the Guicowar. The Peishwa endeavoured to avenge himself for the humiliating surrender of his favourite, by entering more keenly than ever into the intrigues by which he hoped to place himself at the head of a new Mahratta confederacy.

The governor-general, before he resolved to put down the predatory system, by having recourse to offensive operations, endeavoured to make the defensive line as complete as possible. The most promising method would have been the establishment of a subsidiary alliance with the Rajah of Nagpoor. This, Earl Minto had laboured to accomplish, but the reluctance of the rajah, who saw that it would be equivalent to a renunciation of independence, could not be overcome, and his final refusal, delayed by a fruitless negotiation, arrived shortly after the new government commenced. Failing the Rajah of Nagpoor, the only other defensive line practicable was to be attained by forming an alliance with the Nabobs of Bhopaul and Saugur, whose territories furnished a continuous line of communication between Bundelcund and the Deccan, and might be so guarded as to make it difficult for devastating hordes to cross the Company's frontier, though it might not altogether suffice to exclude them.
In resolving to attempt such an alliance, the governor-general had also another important object in view. The Mahrattas were obviously aiming at the reconstitution of the Mahratta confederacy, for the scarcely disguised purpose of forming a counterbalance to British influence. It was therefore of importance to adopt means for the purpose of cutting off communication between the leading states, and thus preventing or impeding their mutual co-operation. For this purpose Bhopaul and Saugur were admirably situated. The former in particular was interposed between the territories of Scindia and Ragojee Bhonsla, and formed, so long as it retained its independence, an insuperable barrier between them. So much were they themselves alive to the obstacles thus thrown in their way, that they had recently united their armies for the purpose of conquering and partitioning Bhopaul. Nothing but the talents and desperate courage of the Nabob Vizier Mahomed had prevented them from effecting their object, and there was therefore every reason to apprehend that in the ensuing season they would again unite their forces and renew the campaign. And there was nothing to prevent them, since the non-interference policy of the Company left them in no fear of interruption.

Such was the state of matters in Bhopaul when, in consequence of the failure of the negotiation with Ragojee Bhonsla, the attention of the governor-general was directed to the importance of framing some new defensive line. In this no difficulty was anticipated from the nabob himself, as he had become sensible of his inability any longer to withstand the Mahratta combination, and had made urgent application to the British government for aid. In addition to the mutual benefits to be derived from the alliance, he could also point to the services which one of his predecessors had rendered to the Company during the celebrated overland route of a body of troops sent by Warren Hastings under Colonel Goddard from Calpee to Bombay. These services, which, when the non-intervention system prevailed, it was deemed politic to forget, it was now convenient to remember, and Mr. (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, to whom, as resident at Delhi, the nabob's application had been made, was instructed to conclude an alliance with him on the following basis:—“The British government to afford its protection against the present designs of Scindia and the Bhonsla, and a perpetual guarantee for the future; the nabob to be left in complete independence in the management of his internal administration; the British troops to have free ingress and egress through the Bhopaul territories, together with every facility in the provision of their supplies and necessaries; a fortress to be delivered as a present depot, and eventually a spot to be allotted for a cantonment or permanent station; the nabob to renounce all connection with the Pindarees, and not to negotiate with other powers except in concert with the British government, abiding by its arbitration in all differences with them.” As additional inducements to the nabob to enter into alliance on the above terms, all claim for the expense of defending him was to be waived, and
any of his territories now in possession of the Pindarees were to be recovered for him and restored. Terms nearly the same were proposed to the Nabob of Saugur, and were understood to be so nearly arranged that Mr. Strachey, the resident at Scindia's court, thought himself authorized formally to communicate the fact to that chief. In consequence of this communication, others to the same effect were made to the courts of Poonah and Nagpoor.

The Peishwa, who had no direct interest in the subject, professed to be rather pleased than otherwise that Bhopaul and Saugur were henceforth to be under British protection, as he hoped that thereby several of his dependants would be less exposed to marauders, who had repeatedly pillaged them. Ragojee Bhonsla did not take the intimation quite so coolly, and requested time to consider; but on being pressed for an answer, deemed it prudent to signify acquiescence, though he found it difficult to conceal his dissatisfaction. Scindia was more open, and did not hesitate to denounce the alliance with Bhopaul as a violation of subsisting treaties. Bhopaul was one of his dependencies, and it had been expressly stipulated between him and the Company that he should be at perfect liberty to deal with them as he thought fit without being interfered with. It was well known that he had been engaged in reducing Bhopaul to submission; he had no doubt of being able to effect it in a new campaign, and therefore for the Company to step in at such a time, and exclude him from his just rights by calling Bhopaul an ally, was tantamount to a declaration of war. He would not submit to this injustice, but would proceed with his preparations against Bhopaul, regardless of the intimation which had been made.

The governor-general had calculated on some such ebullition on the part both of Scindia and Ragojee Bhonsla, and had therefore been careful in commencing the negotiation, to provide against the possible, if not probable effects of their displeasure. He had reinforced the troops in Bundelcund, and held them ready to move on the shortest notice; he had ordered the Nizam's subsidiary force to move from Jaulna to Ellichpore, and the Peishwa's subsidiary force to prepare to support it by moving forward toward the station which it had quitted; and he had directed the whole troops of Gujerat to be concentrated at some point considerably to the east of its frontier. But for these precautions it is not unlikely that Scindia would have carried his threats into execution, and risked hostilities sooner than abandon the hope of making himself master of Bhopaul. As it was, he readily availed himself of the opportunity to recede from a position which he was not prepared to maintain, when the governor-general, after stating the grounds on which he conceived Bhopaul entitled to be dealt with as an independent state, called upon him, if he had evidence to the contrary, to produce it. The question was thus once more brought within the sphere of diplomacy, and Scindia, hopeless of being able as yet to gain anything by open rupture, was not unwilling to spin
out the time in labouring ineffectually to prove that the British government had no right to enter into alliance with Bhopaul. His objections were for the most part re-echoed by Ragojee Bhonsla. The most curious part of the whole is, that the alliance itself, which became the subject of so much argument and diplomacy, was not completed. The intimation made to the Mahrratta chiefs having secured Vizier Mahomed against actual invasion, that wily Patan nabob had no wish to commit himself any farther, and instead of completing the alliance on the basis proposed, entered into a correspondence with Jean Baptiste Filoze, Scindia’s general, who had hoped to conduct the campaign against Bhopaul, with the view of ascertaining whether he might not make better terms than those which the Company had offered him. The governor-general, on discovering this duplicity, was so indignant that he abruptly closed the negotiation, and instructed the resident at Gwalior to leave Scindia at full liberty to carry out any projects he might be contemplating against Bhopaul.

In consequence of the abrupt termination of the negotiation with Bhopaul, the joint attack upon it would probably have been renewed, had not two events occurred which greatly changed the position of political affairs. These were the deaths of Vizier Mahomed, Nabob of Bhopaul, and of Ragojee Bhonsla, Rajah of Nagpoo, which happened within a week of each other, the former on the 17th, and the latter on the 22d of March, 1816. In both cases a son succeeded, but while the new nabob, Nuzur Mahomed, possessed no less talent and more honesty than his father, the new rajah, Purswajee Bhonsla, was so weak, both in body and mind, as to be altogether incapable of conducting the government. The question of a regency was therefore immediately raised, and led to disputes, of which the governor-general did not scruple to avail himself, in order to effect the subsidiary alliance which had so long been desired. By supporting the claim of Modajee Bhonsla, better known as Apa Sahib, the nephew of the late rajah, he secured his elevation to the office of regent, and with it an influence, which, it was hoped, would be productive of great advantages. Apa Sahib accordingly, as soon as he was installed, felt that his only security against the powerful party which originally opposed, and was still able to thwart him, was to form a close alliance with the British government. The subsidiary alliance was no sooner proposed than he acceded to it, and concluded a treaty on the 27th of May, 1816, by which the Company undertook to protect the rajah against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and to maintain for that purpose a subsidiary force, consisting of a regiment of native cavalry, six regiments of infantry, and a complete company of European artillery, and the rajah engaged, besides paying seven and a half lacs as the annual expense of this force, to maintain an efficient contingent of not less than 3000 cavalry and 2000 infantry, to abstain from all encroachment on British allies, and to negotiate with foreign states only after consultation with the British government. About the same time when this treaty was concluded, the new Nabob of Bhopaul made
overtures for an alliance, on terms similar to those which had been offered to
his father, but the governor-general, either because his indignation had not yet
sufficiently cooled down, or because he thought that the Nagpoor alliance had
rendered one with Bhopaul unnecessary, met the overtures coldly, and gave the
nabob to understand that, in regard to his territories, it was his intention to
maintain the strictest neutrality and indifference.

The subsidiary alliance concluded with Nagpoor seemed so important, that
no time was lost in acting upon it. A body of troops, designed to form the
subsidiary force, had previously been assembled at Ellichpoor, and as soon as the
requisite notification was received from the resident, commenced their march
under the command of Colonel Walker. Starting on the 1st of June, they
crossed the Wurda on the 6th, and two days after arrived within a march of
Nagpoor. Here the main body halted, and two battalions moving forward,
made their entrance into the Bhonsla capital on the 10th. Great was the
surprise which had been produced by their arrival in the vicinity. The conclu-
sion of the treaty had been kept a profound secret, and was not even suspected,
till it was formally proclaimed only the day before the troops made their
appearance. It is natural to infer that there was good ground for this secrecy,
and that the treaty was concealed because it was foreseen that its terms would
not be relished. It was a virtual surrender of national independence, and
opposition to it, therefore, furnished a rallying point to all the disaffected, who
were now able, in opposing the government, to conceal their factious aims
under the disguise of an affected patriotism. Many even who had given in
their adhesion to Apa Sahib, complained loudly of his breach of faith in carry-
ing on and concluding so important a negotiation without consulting them.
The quarrels which ensued were so bitter, and his position became in consequence
so precarious, that he considered the two battalions which had arrived insuffi-
cient for his protection, and begged that the main body, whose destined station
was Hoshungabad, on the left bank of the Nerudda, should in the meantime
remain in the vicinity. The permanent cantonment selected for the two
battalions was situated about three miles west of Nagpoor. This seemed to
Apa Sahib too distant for his personal safety, and he therefore took the extra-
ordinary step of withdrawing from the seat of government, and fixing his
residence at a villa immediately adjoining the cantonment.

As the time for decisive measures to put down the predatory system had
now arrived, it will be proper, before proceeding further, to give some account
of the leading bands against which the military operations in contemplation
were to be directed. We begin with the Pindarees. The derivation of the
name is unknown, but the parties bearing it make some figure in the early
wars of the Deccan, previous to the extinction of the Mahometan dynasties
there by the Moguls. They formed large bodies of irregular horse, and were
chiefly distinguished from other troops of the same description, by serving with-
out pay, on condition of being permitted to compensate themselves by plunder. This permission was of course understood to apply only to enemies, but the Pindarees were not scrupulous, and when plunder was attainable, made little distinction between friend and foe. When the Moguls had established their ascendancy in the Deccan, the Pindarees transferred their services to the Maharrattas, and shared largely in the disaster at Paniput. Having thus been brought into Northern India, they established themselves chiefly in Malwah, and obtained settlements in the vicinity of the Nerbudda, taking the designations of Scindia Shahi and Holkar Shahi Pindarees, according as they adhered to the one or the other of these Maharratta chiefs. In following their fortunes, however, they never allowed their supposed allegiance to interfere with their interest, and were always ready to join any party whose expeditions promised to yield the largest amount of plunder.

The Scindia Shahi Pindarees, by far the most numerous, first obtained their assignments of land from Madhajee Scindia in 1794. They were then headed by two brothers, Heeroo and Burun, who raised their standard at the season of the Dussera or Dasahara, an annual festival, celebrated at the end of October or beginning of November; and having collected their own followers, and all vagabond adventurers who chose to join them, set out at the end of the rains on a lukaar or plundering expedition. The whole body were mounted, some so well as to form an efficient cavalry, but the far greater part very indifferently on small horses or ponies, and with arms of a miscellaneous description, including pikes, clubs, and sticks pointed with iron. Carrying no baggage, because they trusted to the expedition itself for the supply of their wants, they moved with great celerity towards some previously appointed rendezvous, from which as a centre they spread over the whole country, and made a thorough sweep of everything which was portable and possessed any value. As
they were not disposed to risk an encounter with regular troops, they endeavoured to fall by surprise on each district marked out for plunder, and to complete the work of devastation before there was any danger of being overtaken. In carrying out this plan, no time could be lost, and hence, as the speediest means of extortion, every species of torture and abomination was resorted to. Persons suspected of concealing property had a bag of hot ashes tied round their head, and were suffocated, by being thus compelled to inhale them; or, after being thrown on their back, had a heavy beam placed across their breast, while a Pindaree sat at each end pressing it down, and at the same time inflicting blows on the helpless victim. Boiling oil and burning straw were also common materials of torture, and not unfrequently children torn from their mothers' arms were dashed on the ground, or thrown into wells, or tossed into the air, and received on the point of a spear. It is almost unnecessary to add that the mothers themselves, and all other females who could tempt brutality, were subjected to treatment worse than death.

The two chiefs, Heeroo and Burun, died in 1800, and left sons who followed in their fathers' footsteps. It was impossible, however, that anything like hereditary succession could be followed out among the Pindarees. Individual talent was the true passport to leadership, and accordingly we find that in a few years, though the sons of the above leaders acquired considerable notoriety, the chief power had passed into other hands. Among the leaders of the Scindia Shahi Pindarees, two particularly distinguished themselves. These were Cheetoo and Kureem Khan. Cheetoo, by birth a Jat, was sold when a child during a famine to a Pindaree. As he grew up, he distinguished himself in the durre, or Pindaree company, to which his master belonged, and in 1804 stood so high in the estimation of Dowlut Row Scindia, that he gave him a jaghire and conferred upon him the title of Nabob. Two years after he fell into disgrace, and was imprisoned by Scindia, who did not restore him to liberty till he had been four years in prison, and purchased release by the payment of a heavy ransom. He afterwards returned to his jaghire, and again ingratiated himself so much with Scindia, that he gave him five additional districts lying on the east of Bhopaul. His cantonments were situated at Nimar, opposite to Hindia, on the Nerbudda, and his usual residence was Sutevas, in the vicinity. Latterly he seldom made distant excursions, though expeditions annually issued by his orders, and were said sometimes to muster 12,000 horse.

Kureem Khan, the other principal leader of the Pindarees, was by birth a Rohilla, and first attracted notice as the head of a band of Pindarees in the service of Dowlut Row Scindia, when that chief made war upon the Nizam, and compelled him to submit to the disgraceful convention of Kurdl. During that campaign, Kureem Khan enriched himself with plunder, and laid the foundation of his future fortune. His marriage with a lady belonging to a branch of the family of Bhopaul, while it added to his respectability, procured
him some assignments in that territory, and the value of his services induced Scindia to endeavour to secure them by creating him a nabob, and granting him several additional districts. If in these respects he resembled Cheetoo, he resembled him still more in the subsequent treatment which he received. In proportion as his power increased, Scindia, who had thought of him only as an useful dependant, began to suspect that he might one day prove a dangerous rival. There were certainly some grounds for this suspicion, since Kureem Khan had begun to act as if he contemplated the establishment of a regular sovereignty. Not contented like other Pindaree leaders with heading a body of predatory horse, he enlisted a number of infantry, possessed himself of several guns, and formed a pagah or establishment of household troops. All these things indicated an amount of ambition which Scindia was determined not to tolerate in any Pindaree, and he therefore contrived a plan for securing Kureem Khan's person, and annihilating his power. To effect this by open force would have been difficult; cunning furnished at once an easier and a surer process.

To put his scheme in execution, Scindia set out from Gwalior, and sent a message to Kureem Khan to meet him on important business. The Pindaree's vanity was flattered by the message, and he advanced to meet his acknowledged sovereign with a state scarcely inferior to his own. The interview took place in the vicinity of Bersiah, and Kureem Khan, who had vainly been attempting the capture of the fort of Suttunburee, was deluded into the belief that Scindia meant, after reducing the place by his more powerful artillery, to make him a present of it. Thus thrown off his guard, he was still more flattered when Scindia offered to visit him in his own camp. To show his high sense of the honour, he seated his visitor on a temporary throne, formed of a bag of rupees of the value of £12,500, which, according to a custom usual in India when a superior condescends to visit an inferior, was meant and accepted as a present. Scindia professed to be not only delighted with his reception, but filled with admiration of Kureem Khan’s abilities. He had found, he said, what he had long sought in vain—an individual combining the qualities of a soldier and a statesman, and there was scarcely anything he could ask that he was not inclined to grant. This hint was not lost on Kureem Khan, who applied for several important grants in addition to those that had previously been promised. Sunnuds, or deeds of grant, and a rich dress of investiture, were ordered to be prepared, and nothing remained but to complete the ceremony. Full of hope, he proceeded on the appointed day with a few attendants to the Mahatta camp. He was received with singular honour, and seemed on the eve of having all his wishes fulfilled, when Scindia on some pretext quitted the tent, and a body of armed men rushed in and made Kureem Khan their prisoner. The success of this first treachery being announced by a signal gun, Scindia’s troops instantly attacked the Pindaree camp, and dispersing all the persons who belonged to it, gained an immense booty. Still more was expected, as it was known that at
Shujahalpoor, where his family resided, Kureem Khan had deposited the greater part of his jewels and treasure. His mother, however, saved them by hurrying off with everything of value to the westward, and obtaining an asylum with Zalim Sing, Nabob of Kotah. Kureem Khan was carried off as a prisoner to Gwallior. His followers, naturally exasperated, were not slow in retaliating, and, divided into several bands, the largest of which was headed by his nephew Nandur Khan, plundered the territories of Scindia without mercy. The effect was to convince the treacherous Mahratta that he gained little by Kureem Khan's imprisonment, and he was therefore induced, at the end of four years, by the tempting offer of a payment of six lacs, to give him his liberty.

Before Kureem Khan was released, some attempt was made to obtain an oblivion of the past, and engage him once more in Scindia's interests. While in custody he made no scruple of promising everything that was asked of him, but the moment he saw himself again at the head of his Pindarees the work of vengeance commenced, and Scindia found that if he erred in seizing Kureem Khan at first, he had erred still more in selling him his freedom. Ere long his loss by depredations far exceeded the six lacs which had been paid him, and Kureem Khan could boast of more extensive territories than belonged to him before his captivity. In addition to the force which he could himself collect, he had the disposal of that of Cheetoo, who having formerly been under great obligations to him, and having moreover like himself wrongs to avenge on Scindia, was ready to take part in any incursion into his territories. The effect of this union was to increase the Pindaree force to an extent which made it really formidable. At the dussara of 1811, the number of Pindarees who assembled is stated by Sir John Malcolm to have been not less than 60,000. This is an exaggeration, and Prinsep is certainly nearer the truth, when he states them at “not less than 25,000 cavalry, of all descriptions, besides several battalions of infantry newly raised for the purpose.”

This great prosperity of Kureem Khan was destined not to be of long duration. He was anxious for an incursion into the territories of Ragojee Bhonsla, from which, owing to the notorious feebleness of the government, a rich booty with little risk was anticipated. Cheetoo, on whom Ragojee had recently conferred several jaghires, was unwilling to forfeit them by taking part in such an incursion, and the quarrel became so bitter that the union was broken up. While thus weakened, Kureem Khan was attacked by Jagoo Bapoo, a general whom Scindia had sent against him, and so completely defeated that his durra was dispersed, and he had great difficulty in saving himself by a precipitate flight. Though Cheetoo did not take an active part in this attack, he is said to have suggested it. At all events he managed to turn it to his advantage, and by the dispersion of his rival's durra added so largely to his own that he was now by far the most formidable of all the Pindaree leaders. Kureem Khan continued his flight to Kotah, where his family had found an asylum; but the
wary nabob, unwilling to commit himself further, advised him to seek the protection of Ameer Khan, who received him with many professions of friendship. They could not have been sincere, for he shortly after, under pretence of recommending him to Toolsah Bai, then regent of Holkar's dominions, handed him over to his agent Guffoor Khan, by whom he was detained as a prisoner for three years. During this interval his nephew Namdur Khan had exerted himself to keep up his durra, but on his return he found it so much diminished, that he consented to hold only a secondary place, by uniting it to the durra of Dost Mahomed, and Wasil Mahomed, the two sons of Heeroo. These, as successors to their father, had always claimed a place among the Pindaree leaders, but were mainly indebted for the prominent position which they had attained to Kureem Khan's overthrow. They held considerable jaghires in the neighbourhood of Bhiilsa, and were usually cantoned within the Bhopaul territory. In 1814 the relative strength of the principal Pindaree durras was supposed to be as follows:—Cheetoo's 15,000, Kureem Khan's 4000, and Dost and Wasil Mahomed's 7000. Adding to these 8000 under independent leaders of inferior note, the whole Pindaree force must have mustered about 34,000.

For many years the Pindarees confined their depredations to the neighbouring territories of the Peishwa, the Nizam, and the Rajah of Berar. Those of the rajah, as the weakest, suffered most severely, and he was more than once alarmed both for his own personal safety and for that of his capital. In proportion as their devastations impoverished the districts subjected to them, their expeditions began to prove unproductive, and it became necessary to extend them over a wider field. The British territories had hitherto escaped, but after a pusillanimous policy was adopted, the hope of impunity tempted aggression, and in January, 1812, a body of Pindarees belonging to Dost Mahomed's durra penetrated through Bundelcund and Rewa. After spreading devastation and terror on every side, burning numerous villages, and committing fearful atrocities on the inhabitants, they were advancing to the pillage of the large commercial town of Mirzapoor, when the approach of British troops from Benares and Allahabad compelled them to change their route, and make the best of their way home through a province of Nagpoor. The quantity of booty obtained made it certain that this was only the first of a series of forays, and while the inhabitants of the districts threatened were kept in a state of alarm which seriously interfered with their industrial occupations, government incurred great expense in stationing and maintaining troops in the various localities into which it seemed most probable that incursions would be made. In this way a line of posts was formed, stretching from the frontiers of Bundelcund to the Gulf of Cambay. It was impossible, however, that such a line could be effectually guarded, and the Pindarees repeatedly breaking through it, or turning it, carried on their ravages simultaneously in all the three presidencies.

One band about 5000 strong, headed by Cheetoo, penetrating westward, laid
waste the dependencies of Surat; while other bodies, carrying their depredations to the south and east, entered the Northern Circars, and carried off a rich booty from the district of Masulipatam. In March, 1816, the devastating hordes mustered in the greatest numbers they had yet displayed. In three divisions, one of them estimated at 10,000, and the others at 5000 each, they burst into the territories of the Nizam. One of the smaller divisions continuing onward, penetrated to Guntoor and Masulipatam, and for eight days kept moving about at the rate of thirty or forty miles a day, committing fearful devastation, and perpetrating horrible atrocities. From the report of a commission specially appointed to ascertain the amount of injury inflicted, it appeared that during the above eight days, 182 persons had been slain, 505 wounded, and 3633 tortured.

The comparative impunity with which the Pindarees had escaped in March, 1816, tempted them to return in December. The population, despairing of being able to offer any resistance, fled to the neighbouring hills and thickets, and left their villages and homes at the mercy of the marauders, who had partially plundered the town of Ganjam, and threatened the temple of Juggernaut, which no feeling of veneration would have induced them to spare, when the approach of troops hastened their departure. They were not allowed, however, to escape so easily as before. One British detachment hanging on their rear, repeatedly came so near as to inflict severe punishment on the main body; other detachments intercepted them in their retreat, and when at last they reached their cantonments it was with greatly reduced numbers, and the loss of much of their ill-gotten booty. These disasters, and others of a similar nature which befell the Pindarees in various quarters, gave some countenance to the efficacy of the defensive system, and parties were not wanting, both at home and in India, to oppose the adoption of more vigorous measures. These, however, were now decidedly in a minority, and the most competent judges concurred in recommending offensive operations. During the administration of Lord Minto the supreme government declared that “the arrangements and measures of defence which they had adopted were merely palliatives,” and that they “anticipated the necessity, at some future time, of undertaking a system of military and political operations calculated to strike at the root of this great and increasing evil.” Earl Moira had never had any doubt on the subject, and had from the very first urged the suppression of the predatory hordes as essential to the prosperity and permanent tranquillity of the country.

Notwithstanding the decided conviction expressed by two successive Indian administrations, the home authorities clung so strongly to the defensive, that a letter from the secret committee, dated 29th September, 1815, expressly prohibited the supreme government “from engaging in plans of general confederacy and offensive operations against the Pindarees, either with a view to their utter extirpation, or in anticipation of an apprehended danger.” The governor-gene-
ral continued to urge his views, but so unsuccessfully, that even Mr. Canning, who in 1816 had become president of the Board of Control, dictated instructions in which the following passages occur: "We are unwilling to incur the risk of a general war for the uncertain purpose of extirpating the Pindarees. Extended political and military combinations we cannot at present sanction or approve."

Again, after a reference to the "suspicious behaviour of certain of the Mahratta chieftains and the daring movements of the Pindarees," it is added: "We entertain a strong hope that the dangers which arise from both these causes, and which must, perhaps, always exist in a greater or less degree, may, by a judicious management of our existing relations, be prevented from coming upon us in any very formidable force; while, on the other hand, any attempt at this moment to establish a new system of policy tending to a wider diffusion of our power, must necessarily interfere with those economical regulations which it is more than ever incumbent on us to recommend as indispensable to the maintenance of our present ascendancy, and by exciting the jealousy and suspicion of other states, may too probably produce or mature those very projects of hostile confederacy which constitute the chief object of your apprehension."

These crude notions, and the pusillanimous policy which they recommended, were only carried to their legitimate consequences, when the secret committee, acting in obedience to Mr. Canning's dictation, suggested the practicability of taking advantage of the mutual dissensions of the Pindarees, and of neutralizing their mischievous activity by setting one leader against another. The indignant reply of the governor-general deserves to be quoted: "When the honourable committee suggest the expedient of engaging one portion of the Pindarees to destroy some other branch of the association, I am roused to the fear that we have been culpably deficient in pointing out to the authorities at home the brutal and atrocious qualities of those wretches. Had we not failed to describe sufficiently the horror and execration in which the Pindarees are justly held, I am satisfied that nothing could have been more repugnant to the feelings of the honourable committee than the notion that this government should be-soiled by a procedure which was to bear the colour of confidential intercourse—of a common cause with any of these gangs."

The atrocities of the Pindarees had at length been carried to such a height that the home authorities became convinced of the necessity of adopting a bolder course than they had hitherto enjoined, and so far modified their previous instructions, as to admit that, "they were not intended to restrain the governor-general in the exercise of his judgment and discretion upon any occasion when actual war upon the British territories might be commenced by any body of marauders, and where the lives and properties of British subjects might call for efficient protection." Any measures which he might have adopted for the purpose of repelling invasion and pursuing the invaders into their own haunts were approved by anticipation. The governor-general lost no time in acting...
upon the new policy thus indicated, and prepared to negotiate the new alliances which it would be necessary to form before any reasonable hope could be entertained of suppressing the predatory system. The Pindarees, though the most numerous and most atrocious, were by no means the only depredators. Depredation in some form entered largely into the military system of the Mahrattas, and many of the troops professedly belonging to Scindia and Holkar were marauding mercenaries, who trusted much more to plunder than to regular pay, and were ever ready when dissatisfied with the one or the other to change masters, or to assume independence and create disturbances merely for the purpose of profiting by them. The desertion of the alliances which the Marquis of Wellesley had formed was a virtual declaration in favour of predatory warfare, and bands of Patan mercenaries, sometimes in the name of Mahratta chiefs, but more frequently without thinking it necessary to employ any pretext, began to roam over the territories from which protection had been withdrawn, as if that withdrawal had declared them to be a common prey. Ameer Khan, whom we have already seen at the head of these marauders, having fixed upon Rajpootana as the principal sphere of his operations, kept the whole country in a state bordering on anarchy. The feuds existing among the Rajput chiefs made it easy for him to play the one against the other, and thus enrich and aggrandize himself at the expense of all. In order to show how much the general tranquillity was thus disturbed some detail will be necessary.

Rajasthan or Rajpootana, an extensive region stretching westward from the Jumna to Scinde, and southward from the Punjab to Malwah and Gujerat, derived its name from the principal tribes inhabiting it, who called themselves Rajpoots, or "Sons of Princes," because they claimed to represent the Cshatriya, or the original regal and military Hindoo caste. It is said that at an early period the whole territory was ruled by a single prince. Be this as it may, the primitive monarchy, if it ever existed, had been completely dissolved, and the country broken up into a number of independent principalities. Of these, by far the most important were Mewar, Marwar, and Dhoondar, better known by the names of their respective capitals, Odeypoor, Joudpoor, and Jeypoor. The chief, or, as he is called, the Rana of Odeypoor, claimed direct descent from Rama, and accordingly took precedence of all the other Rajpoot princes, who, when the succession opened to them, did not think themselves fully installed till he had recognized them by bestowing an ornament worn upon the forehead. This recognized pre-eminence of the Rana gave him much more political weight than he could have derived from his territory, which, situated in the south of Rajpootana, was throughout rugged, and, with a few exceptional spots, far from fertile. The Mogul, though he often tried, failed to make him tributary, and he maintained his independence to the last. Immediately to the west beyond the Aravali Mountains lay the territory of Marwar, or of the Rajah of Joudpoor, who belonged to the Rahtore tribe of Rajpoots, and derived his descent from a
family which reigned at Canouje about the time of the Mahometan conquest. He possessed some fertile tracts, particularly towards his south frontier, but all the rest of his territory was little better than a sandy desert. In the reign of Akbar the rajahs acknowledged the Mogul as their superior, and held high office at his court, till the bigotry of Aurungzebe compelled them to throw off the yoke. During a war of thirty years they maintained their independence and were never again subject to the Mogul. On the north-east, extending nearly to the banks of the Jumna, was the territory of the Rajah of Jeypoor, who claimed descent from Kasa, a younger son of Rama, and was the acknowledged head of the Kachwaka Rajpoots. Many parts of the territory, though sandy, had been brought by irrigation under profitable culture, and many other parts were so well adapted for grazing that a very considerable revenue was raised. The proximity to Agra and Delhi brought the rajahs into early antagonism with the Mogul emperors, and deprived them of independence. While the empire existed they endeavoured to compensate themselves for the loss by repeatedly gaining possession of the first offices in the state; when the empire became hopelessly dismembered, Jey Sing, the rajah then reigning, ceased to contest the Mahratta ascendancy, and making the best terms he could with them, continued till his death in 1743 to devote himself to internal improvements, and to the cultivation of his literary tastes, more especially the science of astronomy, his proficiency in which is attested by his astronomical tables drawn up for the reformation of the calendar, and the observatories which he erected at Jeypoor, Oojeein, Benares, and Delhi.

In 1803, at the close of the second Mahratta war, Bheem Sing was Rana of Odeypoof, Meer Sing Rajah of Joudpooor, and Jugat Sing Rajah of Jeypoor. Their only safety was in union, but their feuds made this impossible, and left them to become the prey of comparatively ignoble enemies. The original cause of quarrel is so singular and characteristic, as to be not undeserving of a short narrative. Bheem Sing had a beautiful daughter, Krishna Koomaree, who was sought in marriage by several Rajpoot princes: the Rajah of Joudpooor was the successful suitor, but died before the marriage was celebrated. The Rajah of Jeypoor was next preferred; and all the preliminary arrangements having been made, an escort of 3000 troops had actually proceeded to Odeypoof to bring the princess home, when Man Sing, now Rajah of Joudpooor, stepped in and claimed her as his wife, insisting that after she had been the affianced bride of his predecessor it would bring indelible disgrace upon him to allow her to be married into any other family. As no time was to be lost, Man Sing took the most effectual means to prevent the marriage with Jugat Sing, by attacking and routing the troops which he had sent to escort the princess from Odeypoof. A fierce war immediately ensued, and was so far in favour of Man Sing, that the Rana broke off the intended nuptials and agreed to accept him as his son-in-law. For this success he was mainly indebted to the Mah-
rattas, who, having during their conquests in Hindoostan established their claim of chout in Rajpootana, made it a ground for interfering in the internal concerns of its chiefs. Both Scindia and Holkar gave their support to the Rajah of Joudpoor, but notwithstanding this formidable combination, the Rajah of Jeypoor was still in hopes of being able to maintain his ground, as he had, in December, 1803, concluded a treaty with Lord Lake, by which the integrity of his territories was guaranteed by the Company. In this case, however, the guarantee of the Company proved a broken reed. Sir George Barlow, on finding that the treaty interfered with his pusillanimous policy, availed himself of some flimsy pretexts for cancelling it, and as if this injustice had not been sufficient, let the Mahrattas loose upon him by freeing them from some restrictions which prohibited them from interfering with his territory. The first effect of this desertion was to subject him to a visit from Holkar, whom he was obliged to buy off at the price of twenty lacs of rupees.

In consideration of this sum, Holkar undertook not to interfere in the war which the rival marriage had produced, and Man Sing, not only attacked by Jugat Sing, but opposed by a powerful body of his own subjects, who, disgusted by his tyranny, had risen in support of another claimant to the throne, was obliged to shut himself up in the citadel of Joudpoor. Scindia, who had been bought off by the Rana, had also agreed to remain neutral, but both he and Holkar, while keeping their engagements in the letter, laid no restraint on their marauding dependants. Ameer Khan in particular, considering it contrary to his interest that Man Sing's power should be annihilated, compelled Jugat Sing to raise the siege of Joudpoor, and hasten home to the defence of his own dominions. The Rana, though he took no part in the war between the two rajas, suffered so much from the exactions of Scindia and Ameer Khan, and felt so indignant at being obliged to treat them as equals, that he made an urgent application to the Company, and offered to purchase their protection by the cession of half his territory. The two rajas, also convinced that their hostilities were only making them the prey of a common enemy, offered to submit their quarrel to the arbitration of the British government, which having, as they justly argued, succeeded to the place of the Mogul emperor, ought not to decline his duties, one of the most obvious and important of which was to interpose authoritatively for the maintenance of the general tranquillity. The
policy now in favour was too selfish and cowardly to attach any weight to these representations, and the British government looked on with indifference, and kept boasting of its moderation in standing aloof, while whole provinces were falling into a state of anarchy. One effect of this policy was to seal the fate of the beautiful Krishna Koomaree, Princess of Odeypoor. The Rana, her father, deprived of all other support, was driven to enlist the services of Ameer Khan, and assigned to him a fourth of his revenues as the permanent hire of one of the Patan adventurer's brigades. Availing himself of the influence thus acquired, Ameer Khan, who had discovered in the Rana a character as heartless and unprincipled as his own, ventured to suggest, that as the marriage feud still continued to rage, the only effectual mode of terminating it would be to remove its cause by putting the princess to death. Strange to say, the inhuman proposal, instead of being rejected with horror, was listened to, and according to Ameer Khan's account, the Rana replied as follows:—"If you will pledge yourself to get for me Khalee Row (a coveted tract of territory), from Rajah Man Sing, I will in that case contrive to get rid of my daughter after you shall have gone, using such means as shall create as little odium as possible." The means adopted were to mix poison with his daughter's food. The quantity taken proved insufficient, but the princess, divining what had been intended, sent to her father to say that if her living longer was deemed inconsistent with the interest of his family, there was no necessity for going secretly to work. She accordingly dressed herself in gay attire, and procuring a bowl of poison, drank it off, exclaiming, "This is the marriage to which I was foredoomed." Her mother, unable to survive the tragical fate of her beloved daughter, died shortly after of a broken heart. The father continued to live and reap the full fruits of his infamy. According to the account given by Sir John Malcolm, the untimely death of the princess was no sooner known in Odeypoor, than "loud lamentations burst from every quarter, and expressions of pity at her fate were mingled with execrations on the weakness and cowardice of those who could purchase safety on such terms." The difficulty of finding any redeeming trait in this diabolical atrocity, will justify the insertion of Sir John's narrative of the conduct of "Sugwant Sing, chief of Karradur, who, the moment he heard of the proceedings in the palace, hastened from his residence to Odeypoor, and dismounting from a breathless horse, went unceremoniously into the presence of his prince, whom he found seated with several of his ministers in apparent affliction. 'Is the princess dead or alive?' was his impatient interrogation; to which, after a short pause, Adjeit Sing replied, by entreating him 'not to disturb the grief of a father for a lost child.' The old chief immediately unbuckled his sword, which, with his shield, he laid at the feet of the Maharana, saying, in a calm but resolute tone: 'My ancestors have served yours for more than thirty generations, and to you I cannot utter what I feel, but these arms shall never more be used in your service.'" Sugwant Sing kept his
word. Though he lived eight years longer, and did not actually renounce his allegiance, he did not again bear arms for the Rana.

It was impossible that permanent peace could be purchased by such inhuman means, and war and rapine, the effect partly of foreign aggression and partly of intestine dissension, prevailed in almost every part of Rajpootana which held out any hope of plunder. Besides the three Rajpoot principalities, of which some account has been given, there were many others, some of them like those of Bikaneer and Jessulmeer, though of great extent, situated so far to the north and west, and of so sterile a character, as to be almost beyond the reach of military operations; and others, like Kotah, Boondee, and Mackaree, of comparatively small extent, but from their immediate proximity to the eastern frontier, of considerable military and political importance. Mackaree was the only one of these which had a subsisting alliance with the Company; but it was perfectly obvious that until they were all brought into the same position, the predatory system could not be successfully combated. Such then was the first task to which the governor-general considered it necessary to address himself. It was not very difficult, for such was the state of insecurity and wretchedness to which most of the chiefs had been reduced, that nothing more than the intimation of a readiness to abandon the non-interference policy was required, in order to induce them to apply for the benefits of the better policy about to be resumed. The Rajah of Jeypoor, who, from the unjustifiable manner in which he had been thrown off, was considered as having a prior claim, made the first application, and the resident at Delhi, to whom it had been presented, was authorized in April, 1816, to negotiate an alliance. The Rana of Odeypoor and the Rajah of Joulpoor followed his example. So anxious was the Rajah of Kotah for protection, that he offered beforehand to submit to any terms which the governor-general might dictate. The Rajah of Boondee, taking a similar course, pleaded services which ought not to have been forgotten; while a number of petty chiefs on the frontiers of Bundelcund or Malwah prayed to be taken within the pale of protection. Even Ameer Khan, as if carried away by the current, or conscious that he would be unable to resist it, offered to desist from pillage if guaranteed in his actual possession, and to assist in dispersing the Pindareees. Nuzur Mahomed also, the Nabob of Bhopaul, notwithstanding the little encouragement formerly given, renewed his application with more success, and concluded a preliminary engagement.

Some doubt was felt as to the course which Scindia might take. The Pindarees had been accustomed to take part in all his expeditions, and deemed themselves so necessary to him, that Namdur Khan, on hearing of the projected crusade against them, addressed a letter to Scindia, in which he asked, "What, if we are destroyed, will become of you?" Nor was this question so extravagant as it may at first sight appear. Scindia himself was doubtful if he could dispense with their assistance, and several of his most distinguished officers.
not only patronized the Pindarees, but believed that, if duly supported, they might prove a match for the British, and be the means of re-establishing the mode of warfare which the Mahattas originally pursued, and to the abandonment of which not a few ascribed their more recent disasters. It was therefore not without alarm and deep mortification that Scindia, shrinking from a new contest, felt constrained to abandon the Pindarees to their fate, and even to profess his desire to assist in any measures that might be adopted for their extermination. While Scindia was thus afraid to show any countenance to the Pindaree, little was to be apprehended from the troops of Holkar, whose musnud was now occupied by a child, while an unprincipled woman acted as regent, and had difficulty in maintaining her position among contending factions.

In regard to the Peishwa, there was more room for doubt. He had long submitted with the utmost reluctance to the yoke which the subsidiary alliance had imposed upon him, and ever since he had been compelled to allow his favourite, Trimbukjee, to be carried off to an imprisonment which was apparently to be for life, his bitter animosity to the British had scarcely been disguised. Loud and incessant were his complaints of harshness and injustice. He had given up Trimbukjee, he alleged, only that he might be brought to trial, and in the belief that if found guilty he would be returned to him for punishment. He was also sustaining severe pecuniary loss, as Trimbukjee, who had been intrusted with his treasures, was the only person who could show where they were concealed. While daily importuning the resident on this subject, and enlarging on many other imaginary grievances, the startling intelligence arrived that Trimbukjee had made his escape on the 2d of September, 1816, from the Fort of Tannah. For greater security, the garrison of the fort consisted entirely of European soldiers, and this circumstance was proved to have aided the means used for setting him at liberty. He was allowed every afternoon to take exercise for an hour or two on the ramparts, and it was remembered when too late that a Mahratta groom who had the charge of an officer's horse, used about the same time to be busily employed immediately below in carrying and cleaning him. He was often singing snatches of Mahratta songs, the meaning of which the sentries did not understand, but which Bishop Heber, from the account given to him, has exhibited in the following verses:

"Behind the bush the bowmen hide,
The horse beneath the tree,
Where shall I find a knight will ride
The jungle paths with me?

There are five-and-fifty coursers there,
And four-and-fifty men;
When the fifty-fifth shall mount his steed,
The Deccan thrives again."

A hole cut in the wall of the stable where the Mahratta groom kept his
horse was easily reached from an outhouse of the fort, to which Trimbukjee was permitted to retire at a certain hour in the evening in charge of a sentry. In a dark and rainy night, while the sentry stood outside, the prisoner disappeared, and having changed his dress into that of a common labourer, with a basket on his head, passed the gateway of the fort unquestioned. The narrow channel of Salsette was all that separated him from the Mahratta territory. He waded over, and found a body of horsemen, who soon placed him beyond the reach of pursuit.

The Peishwa, on being informed by Mr. Elphinstone of Trimbukjee's escape, not only professed entire ignorance, but promised to adopt energetic measures for recapturing him. He soon gave cause to suspect his sincerity. Any information he gave was found only to mislead, and he began to collect troops even in the vicinity of Poonah, with so little attempt at concealment, that it seemed as if he cared not how soon open hostilities were commenced. Meanwhile, though Bajee Row pretended to have no idea of the place to which Trimbukjee had retired, and declared solemnly that he believed him to be dead, all his subjects were well aware that he had found an asylum among the Mahadeo Hills, to the south of the Neera, and placed himself at the head of considerable bodies of horse and foot. It was moreover ascertained, that interviews had actually taken place between Trimbukjee and his master, who had conveyed money to him, and acted in such a manner as to make his cause his own. The troops under Trimbukjee at last amounted to nearly 20,000. This seemed only the prelude to a much more formidable muster, since the Peishwa displayed augmented activity in raising new levies, in removing his treasures from Poonah to Raighur, and in improving the defences of his strongest forts.

It was now high time to bring the question of peace or war to a formal decision, and Mr. Elphinstone, while waiting for instructions from the governor-general, proceeded to prepare for the worst, by recalling to Poonah the principal part of the subsidiary force which had been stationed on the frontier to watch the Pendpees, and instructing the Hyderabad subsidiary force to advance into Candeish. Here a body of insurgents, about 5000 strong, had assembled under Godjpee Dainglia, Trimbukjee's nephew, while his brother-in-law, Jado Row, headed another body of about the same strength, in the south-east, in the vicinity of Punderpoor. Besides these, a number of smaller parties were preparing to join from various quarters. Had this been all, a short delay might still have been possible, but every step taken by the Peishwa showed plainly that the insurgents had his full sanction, and had good ground for believing that he would soon place himself at their head. One of his most overt acts was the collecting of gun bullocks for the artillery in his arsenal at Poonah. Thus distinctly warned, Mr. Elphinstone deemed it folly to leave matters longer in suspense, and addressed a note to the Peishwa, in which, after reproaching him with duplicity and wanton aggression, he notified to him that the friendly
CHAPTER III.


HAVING obtained from the home authorities a distinct though somewhat qualified assent to the necessity of suppression of the predatory system, the governor-general, who had previously formed his plans, lost no time in completing his general preparations. With this view, two powerful armies were provided to advance simultaneously from the north and south, so as not only to envelope the usual haunts of the Pindarees, but to overawe any of the native chiefs who might be disposed to countenance them. The army of Hindooostan was composed of four main divisions, each of them of sufficient strength to act independently should circumstances require it. The right division, assembled at Agra, and commanded by General Donkin, consisted of two regiments of cavalry, one of them his majesty's 8th dragoons, a regiment of European (his majesty's 14th) and three battalions of native infantry, with eighteen guns. The left division, stationed at Callinger in Bundelcund, and commanded by General Marshall, consisted of a regiment of native cavalry, two corps of irregular horse, and five battalions of native infantry, with twenty-four guns. The centre division, stationed at Secundra, on the left bank of the Jumna, about thirty miles W.S.W. of Cawnpore, and commanded by General Brown, consisted of three regiments of cavalry, one of them his majesty's 24th light dragoons, his majesty's 87th regiment, and eight battalions of native infantry, with fifty-four guns. This division, with which the governor-general as commander-in-chief established his head-quarters, mustered 12,500 fighting men of the regular army. The fourth was a reserve division, stationed under Sir David Ochterlony at Rewaree, about fifty miles south-west of Delhi, and composed of a regiment of native cavalry, two corps of Skinner's horse, his majesty's 67th regiment, and five battalions of native infantry, with twenty-two guns. To each division considerable bodies of irregulars were attached, while separate detachments were stationed in various localities to the east and west, so as to give support
as required, or intercept the marauders when attempting to escape. The whole
of the army of Hindoostan mustered 63,000 men.

The army of the Deccan, commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop, commander-in-
chief of the Madras presidency, was formed into five divisions. The first divi-
sion, with which Sir Thomas Hislop fixed his headquarters, was intended to pro-
cceed to Hindia, and consisted of a squadron of his majesty’s 22d light dragoons,
two regiments of native cavalry, flank companies of his majesty’s royal Scots,
and six battalions of native infantry, with field artillery. The second division,
commanded by Colonel Doveton, and designed to manœuvre in Berar, consisted
of a regiment of native cavalry, and of the remainder of his majesty’s royal
Scots, six battalions of native infantry, and the Berar and Hyderabad brigades.
The third division, commanded by Sir John Malcolm, who had also a commis-
sion to act as the governor-general’s political agent, was intended to proceed in
advance, and consisted of a regiment of native cavalry, and five companies of
native infantry, with the Russell brigade, the Ellichpooi brigade, and 4000
Mysore auxiliary horse. The fourth division, commanded by Colonel Smith
and intended to operate in Candeish, consisted of a regiment of native cavalry,
his majesty’s 65th regiment, six battalions of native infantry, and a body of
reformed Poonah horse under European officers. The fifth division, forming the
Nagpoor subsidiary force, commanded by Colonel Adams, consisted of two regi-
m ents of native cavalry, a body of Rohilla horse, the contingent of the Nabob
of Bhopaul, and six battalions of native infantry. A reserve division was
formed under Colonel Pritzler, and brigades were left at Poonah, Nagpoor, and
Hyderabad. A respectable force had also been assembled in Gujerat under Sir
W. G. Kerr. The two armies, nearly equal in number, amounted in the aggre-
gate to 113,000 men, with 300 pieces of ordnance.

The Marquis of Hastings embarked at Calcutta on the voyage up the
Ganges on the 8th of July, 1817, and after a short stay at Patna, to receive a
complimentary deputation from Khatmandoo, arrived at Cawnpoor in Septem-
ber. On the 16th of October he took the field in person, reached Secundra,
where the centre division had assembled, on the 20th, reviewed the troops on the
21st, and crossed the Jumna with them on the 26th. General Donkin
moved simultaneously from Agra, and both began their march upon Gwalior,
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right division by Dholpoor Barrie on the Chumbul. The object of these move-
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situation, to which it must be supposed the Maharajah had never adverted.
About twenty miles south of Gwalior a ridge of very abrupt hills, covered
with tangled wood peculiar to India, extends from the Little Sindh to the Chum-
relations between the two governments were at an end, that any attempt to leave Poonah would be regarded as a declaration of war, and that the subsidiary force would proceed forthwith to put down the insurrection. The last threat was immediately put in execution, and British troops moved forthwith against the principal bodies of insurgents. Colonel Smith, at the head of a detachment lightly equipped, hastened to the south, and endeavoured in vain to come up with a body of 4000, which seemed only anxious to avoid an encounter. Another detachment under Major Smith was more successful, and after a chase of 150 miles in four days, overtook the fugitives. They made little resistance, and were dispersed without suffering severely, as the detachment had no cavalry to continue the pursuit. The other main body of insurgents assembled in Candeish did not escape so easily; a detachment of the Hyderabad subsidiary force under Captain Davies having encountered them, and compelled them to a precipitate flight, leaving more than 400 dead upon the field.

Bajee Row, when he saw the extreme to which matters had been precipitated, became seriously alarmed, and seemed willing to make any concession that might be required of him for the re-establishment of amicable relations. Another short delay in consequence took place, but its only effect was to give him another opportunity of manifesting his insincerity. The moment the more immediate pressure was removed, all his promises were forgotten, and he resumed his former courses. Mr. Elphinstone, though still left without direct instructions from the governor-general, did not shrink from the responsibility in a manner forced upon him, and having on the 6th of May, 1817, obtained a private audience of the Peishwa, informed him that after what had passed, no accommodation with him could now be made except by his engaging to deliver Trimbukjee, and giving security for performance. This communication was received with great apparent coolness, and Mr. Elphinstone therefore thought it necessary on the following day to give a more definite form to his demands, by embodying them in a note which specifically required an obligation to deliver Trimbukjee within one month, and deliver the forts of Singhur, Poorunder, and Raighur, as interim pledges. The written demand was received with as much apparent indifference as the verbal communication, and the twenty-four hours allowed for answer had nearly expired when vakeels arrived to intimate that the Peishwa agreed to the terms, and would surrender the forts without delay. This unexpected result had been produced by the movement of the subsidiary force to positions which would have given them a complete command of Poonah.

On the 10th of May the instructions of the governor-general arrived. They approved by anticipation of all that Mr. Elphinstone had done, and made specific provision for three cases which, it was supposable, might have occurred. In the first case, assuming that the Peishwa had surrendered Trimbukjee, or made sincere efforts to seize him, the relations between the courts were to be
replaced on the same footing as when Trimbukjee was surrendered in 1815. In the second case, assuming that the Peishwa had not taken active steps of any kind, the delivery of Trimbukjee within a definite time, and of greater securities than furnished by the treaty of Bassein, were demanded. In the third case, which supposed that refusal or evasion continued after the receipt of the instructions, the securities were to be enhanced. The securities mentioned included cessions of territory to the amount of twenty-nine lacs, to meet the expense of an additional subsidiary force of 5000 horse and 3000 foot, to be substituted for the Peishwa’s contingent; the surrender of all claims on Gujerat, Bundelcund, and Hindoostan; and generally, a renunciation of all claim to be the head of a Mahratta confederacy. Should war have actually commenced, the Peishwa was to be seized, and a temporary arrangement made for the government of the country. The fact of instructions having been received from the governor-general was intimated to the Peishwa, but their precise contents were not explained to him till the 1st of June, when the resident waited upon him, and explained article by article the draft of a new treaty which he had prepared.

The Peishwa and his ministers laboured hard to obtain some abatement of the terms, but did nothing to justify it. On the contrary, the levy of troops continued as before, and the month allowed for the surrender of Trimbukjee was allowed to expire. There was now therefore no room for hesitation, and Mr. Elphinstone demanded that the treaty, in terms of the draft, which he had explained, should forthwith be executed. A short delay was gained by the discussion of the terms, but all evasions being at length exhausted, the treaty was signed and sealed by the Peishwa on the 13th of June, 1817. The stipulations would have deserved a minute detail had they been destined to regulate the relations of the two governments for any lengthened period, but as events shortly afterwards took place which entirely superseded them, it is necessary only to mention that the Peishwa was taken bound to cede territory yielding a revenue of thirty-four lacs; to renounce the character of supreme head of the Mahratta empire, and the right to communicate with other native powers, except through the British resident; to commute all past claims on the Guicowar for an annual payment of four lacs; to renew the lease of the moiety of Ahmedabad to the Guicowar, for four and a half lacs, and to surrender all rights in Bundelcund, Hindoostan, and Malwah. The terms were undoubtedly rigorous, and the Peishwa felt them to be so to such a degree, that at the very time of ratifying the treaty, he protested that it had been wrung from him, and that he acquiesced merely because he was unable to resist. It is impossible, however, to feel any sympathy for him. He had brought all his disasters upon himself by a cowardly, deceitful, and vindictive temper; and, as will soon be seen, the power left him, curtailed as it was, was still sufficient to tempt him to complete his ruin, by plunging once more into hostilities.
HAVING obtained from the home authorities a distinct though somewhat qualified assent to the necessity of suppression of the predatory system, the governor-general, who had previously formed his plans, lost no time in completing his general preparations. With this view, two powerful armies were provided to advance simultaneously from the north and south, so as not only to envelope the usual haunts of the Pindarees, but to overawe any of the native chiefs who might be disposed to countenance them. The army of Hindostan was composed of four main divisions, each of them of sufficient strength to act independently should circumstances require it. The right division, assembled at Agra, and commanded by General Donkin, consisted of two regiments of cavalry, one of them his majesty's 8th dragoons, a regiment of European (his majesty's 14th) and three battalions of native infantry, with eighteen guns. The left division, stationed at Callinger in Bundelcund, and commanded by General Marshall, consisted of a regiment of native cavalry, two corps of irregular horse, and five battalions of native infantry, with twenty-four guns. The centre division, stationed at Secundra, on the left bank of the Jamna, about thirty miles W.S.W. of Cawnpore, and commanded by General Brown, consisted of three regiments of cavalry, one of them his majesty's 24th light dragoons, his majesty's 87th regiment, and eight battalions of native infantry, with fifty-four guns. This division, with which the governor-general as commander-in-chief established his head-quarters, mustered 12,500 fighting men of the regular army. The fourth was a reserve division, stationed under Sir David Ochterlony at Rewaree, about fifty miles south-west of Delhi, and composed of a regiment of native cavalry, two corps of Skinner's horse, his majesty's 67th regiment, and five battalions of native infantry, with twenty-two guns. To each division considerable bodies of irregulars were attached, while separate detachments were stationed in various localities to the east and west, so as to give support
as required, or intercept the marauders when attempting to escape. The whole of the army of Hindoostan mustered 63,000 men.

The army of the Deccan, commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop, commander-in-chief of the Madras presidency, was formed into five divisions. The first division, with which Sir Thomas Hislop fixed his headquarters, was intended to proceed to Hindia, and consisted of a squadron of his majesty's 22d light dragoons, two regiments of native cavalry, flank companies of his majesty's royal Scots, and six battalions of native infantry, with field artillery. The second division, commanded by Colonel Doveton, and designed to manoeuvre in Berar, consisted of a regiment of native cavalry, and of the remainder of his majesty's royal Scots, six battalions of native infantry, and the Berar and Hyderabad brigades. The third division, commanded by Sir John Malcolm, who had also a commission to act as the governor-general's political agent, was intended to proceed in advance, and consisted of a regiment of native cavalry, and five companies of native infantry, with the Russell brigade, the Ellichpore brigade, and 4000 Mysore auxiliary horse. The fourth division, commanded by Colonel Smith and intended to operate in Candeish, consisted of a regiment of native cavalry; his majesty's 65th regiment, six battalions of native infantry, and a body of reformed Poonah horse under European officers. The fifth division, forming the Nagpoor subsidiary force, commanded by Colonel Adams, consisted of two regiments of native cavalry, a body of Rohilla horse, the contingent of the Nabob of Bhopaul, and six battalions of native infantry. A reserve division was formed under Colonel Pritzler, and brigades were left at Poonah, Nagpoor, and Hyderabad. A respectable force had also been assembled in Gujerat under Sir W. G. Kerr. The two armies, nearly equal in number, amounted in the aggregate to 113,000 men, with 300 pieces of ordnance.

The Marquis of Hastings embarked at Calcutta on the voyage up the Ganges on the 8th of July, 1817, and after a short stay at Patna, to receive a complimentary deputation from Khatmandoo, arrived at Cawnpoore in September. On the 16th of October he took the field in person, reached Secundra, where the centre division had assembled, on the 20th, reviewed the troops on the 21st, and crossed the Jumna with them on the 26th. General Donkin moved simultaneously from Agra, and both began their march upon Gwalior, the centre division by the route of Jaloun and Seonda on the Sindh, and the right division by Dholpoor Barre on the Chumbul. The object of these movements cannot be better explained than in the governor-general's own words: "Residing at Gwalior, he (Scindia) was in the heart of the richest part of his dominions; but independently of this objection that those territories were separated from our territory only by the Jumna, there was a military defect in the situation, to which it must be supposed the Maharajah had never adverted. About twenty miles south of Gwalior a ridge of very abrupt hills, covered with tangled wood peculiar to India, extends from the Little Sindh to the Chum-
bul, which rivers form the flank boundaries of the Gwalior district and its dependencies. There are but two routes by which carriages and perhaps cavalry can pass that chain, one along the Little Sindh and another not far from the Chumbul. By my seizing, with the centre, a position which would bar any movement along the Little Sindh, and placing Major-general Donkin's division at the back of the other pass, Scindia was reduced to the dilemma of subscribing the treaty which I offered him, or of crossing the hills through bye-paths, attended by a few followers who might be able to accompany him, sacrificing his splendid train of artillery (above 100 brass guns), with all its appendages, and abandoning at once to us his most valuable possessions.

How far it was justifiable to take advantage of the false position in which any one had placed himself, and impose upon him terms which, as the governor-general himself confesses, "were essentially unqualified submission, though so coloured as to avoid making him feel public humiliation," might well have been questioned, had not Scindia by repeated acts of perfidy forfeited all claim to more indulgent treatment. While professing a readiness to assist in the extermination of the Pindarees, he had not only promised them protection, but was suspected of sharing in their plunder. With his Mahratta confederates he had been incessantly intriguing for the formation of a league designed to destroy British supremacy, and had very recently been detected in a treacherous correspondence with the Nepaulese. This last act, which crowned all his other offences, had been discovered by mere accident. While two passengers were crossing the Ganges at Bithoor, a full-sized impression of Scindia's seal chanced to drop from the turban of one of them. Suspicion being excited, they were detained and searched. Besides several letters from Scindia himself, some open and some sealed, they were found to be in possession of a letter urging the Ghoorkas to make common cause with the other independent powers of India. For better concealment, this letter was neatly pasted between the leaves of a Sanscrit book of the Vedas which one of the passengers, who professed to be a travelling student, was carrying with him. The governor-general, as the most delicate and impressive mode of intimating to Scindia that the intrigue was known, sent the sealed letters to be delivered to him, unopened and without comment, in full durbar. This discovery undoubtedly had its weight in deter-
ing Scindia from disputing the terms which were dictated to him, and which he was well aware might easily be made still more rigorous and unpalatable.

By the treaty concluded on the 5th of November, 1817, he engaged to use his best efforts for the destruction of the Pindarees; to furnish and maintain in complete efficiency a specific contingent to act in concert with the British and under the direction of a British officer; to admit British garrisons into the forts of Hindia and Aserghur, and allow them to be used as depôts during the war; to remit for three years his claims upon the British government, in order that they might be applied to the equipment of the contingent; and to allow the
sums hitherto paid in pensions to his family and ministers to be applied to the regular payments of those of his troops co-operating with the British. With the exception of the troops so co-operating, all the others belonging to Scindia were to remain stationary at the posts assigned by the British government. By the eighth article of treaty of Surjee Argengau, concluded in November, 1805, the British government had engaged to confine its alliances with other native states within certain limits. This article, as interfering with the alliances necessary to be formed for the successful suppression of the predatory system, was superseded by a new article, which gave full liberty to conclude alliances with the Rajpoot states of Odeypoorm, Joudpoorm, Jeypoorm, and others on the left bank of the Chumbul, always, however, subject to the tribute which these states were bound to pay to Scindia, and the payment of which was guaranteed to him in consideration of his agreeing not to interfere in future with their affairs. This treaty with Scindia was immediately followed by another with Ameer Khan, who had sagacity enough to foresee the ruin which hostilities with the British would necessarily bring upon him, and therefore engaged, on their guaranteeing to him all the territories which he actually possessed under grants from Hokkar, to disband his Patans, and give up his artillery, on receiving five lacs of rupees as their estimated value. As an hostage for the fulfilment of this treaty, Ameer Khan's son and heir was to reside at Delhi.

In the midst of these negotiations a final rupture with Bajee Row took place, and actual hostilities commenced. When he signed the treaty he had, with more boldness and honesty than he usually evinced, protested that it was wrung from him by compulsion, and there could not therefore be a doubt that he would seize the first opportunity to shake himself free from it. As if by signing it he felt so degraded as to be ashamed to show himself to the inhabitants of his capital, he withdrew from it, and continuing absent under various pretences, did not return till the end of September. What he was meditating was very apparent, for the whole of October was spent by him in collecting troops from all quarters, and urging his jagirdars to prepare their contingents. It was the middle of the month before Mr. Elphinstone could obtain an audience, and when he demanded an explanation, he was merely told that the Peishwa was desirous to take part in the Pindaree war to the extent of his means. This pretence was too shallow to deceive. Meanwhile, other circumstances gave unequivocal proof of intended hostilities. Numerous attempts were made to tamper with the fidelity of the sepoys of the brigade, and the Maharatta troops, as they crowded into the capital, encamped so as to inclose the British cantonments. The site of these, on the north-east of the city, had been well chosen for the purpose of defending it against an attack from without, but became very insecure when an attack was threatened both from without and from within. The necessity of removing to a stronger position
became every day more and more apparent, and at last Mr. Elphinstone, though most reluctant to precipitate the open rupture which was seen to be impending, gave orders on the 31st of October that the stores of the brigade should be transported to Kirkee, and that the brigade itself should immediately follow.

The Moota from the south-west meeting the Moola from the north-east, forms with it the Moota-Moola, which takes an intermediate direction and flows east. On the right bank, in the angle made by the Moota and the Moota-Moola, lies the city of Poonah, inclosed by the rivers towards the west and north, but quite open towards the south and east, in which latter direction, as already mentioned, the subsidiary force had its cantonments. On the opposite or left bank of the Moota, at the point of junction with the Moola, stood the British residency, which had thus the disadvantage of being entirely separated from the cantonments, a river and the whole breadth of the city intervening between them. It was to get rid of this disadvantage, and escape from the danger of being surrounded by the troops which were pouring into the city, that the British brigade removed on the 1st of November to the village of Kirkee, situated rather more than two miles to the north, in an angle formed by an abrupt bend of the Moola, and affording peculiar advantages for defence. The brigade, consisting of a Bombay European regiment, which had just arrived, and three native battalions under Colonel Burr, seemed quite able to maintain its new position till succours should arrive, but it was deemed prudent to send to Seroor for a light battalion that had been left there to meet contingencies, and a corps of 1000 auxiliary horse that had just been raised in the same quarter.

This reinforcement started from Seroor on the 5th of November, and in the forenoon of that day, Bajee Row, informed of the fact, put his troops in motion. Gokla, a Mahratta chief, who had always been at the head of the war party, moved round a battalion, which took up a position between Kirkee and the residency, obviously with the view of cutting off the communication between the two. Mr. Elphinstone having immediately demanded an explanation, an officer arrived on the part of the Peishwa to say that he had heard of the approach of troops as well from Seroor as from Colonel Smith's army, and having twice before been the dupe of his own irresolution, he was now determined to be beforehand with his demands. These were that the recently arrived Europeans should be sent back to Bombay, and that the brigade must both be reduced to its usual amount, and cantonned wherever he should appoint. A categorical answer being required, Mr. Elphinstone could only reply, that if the Peishwa joined his army, he would join the brigade, and that if the Mahratta troops advanced towards the brigade, they would assuredly be attacked. Bajee Row seems to have been too impatient to wait for this reply, for the moment his message left the residency, he mounted his horse, and joined his army at the Parbutee Hill, a little south-west of Poonah. So quick were the subsequent movements, that Mr. Elphinstone and his suite had barely time
to ford the Moola, and hasten up its left bank, to cross it again by a bridge which led to Kirkee, when the residency was attacked, pillaged, and burned, with all Mr. Elphinstone's valuable books and papers.

Although the position at Kirkee could not have been successfully assailed, it was resolved to advance from it into the plain. The extent to which the fidelity of the native troops had been tampered with was not certainly known, and by keeping them cooped up, more might be lost than by assuming the offensive. Accordingly, Colonel Burr, leaving a detachment in charge of Kirkee, advanced and formed his line, placing the Europeans in the centre. Major Ford, who was cantoned at Dhapoora, a short distance to the west, with two battalions of the Poonah contingent, marched in to take his share in the danger, but was so much impeded by a party of horse sent to intercept him, that he was obliged to fight his way, and did not arrive before the action was hotly commenced. The Mahrattas opened a heavy but distant cannonade, and attempted to push bodies of horse round the British flanks. In this they partly succeeded, but were ultimately repulsed with considerable loss, and did not again attempt to come to close quarters. At nightfall the British returned to Kirkee, with a loss of only eighteen killed, and fifty-seven wounded; whereas the enemy, who had for some time kept at a respectful distance, retired leaving about 500 on the field.

Hostilities being now openly declared, the Mahrattas, as if for the purpose of making reconciliation impossible, proceeded to give a ferocious character to the war, by putting to death Captain Vaughan and his brother, who, having been surrounded while travelling with a small escort, had surrendered on promise of quarter; and inhumanly murdering or mutilating most of the women.
belonging to the brigade who had been found in the vicinity of the old cantonments. Meanwhile, a just retribution was in course of preparation. Colonel Smith, inferring the state of matters at Poonah, from the interruption of his communications, hastened southward. On the 8th of November he reached Ahmednugger, and though parties of the enemy's cavalry kept hovering around him, did not experience much annoyance till he had passed Seroor, when they appeared in such numbers as to surround him on every side. He forced his way, notwithstanding, and after a loss of part of his baggage, arrived at Poonah on the 13th. A combined attack on the enemy's camp was arranged, but at day-light on the 17th, when it was put in execution, it was found deserted, with the tents still standing. The Peishwa's courage had again failed him, and he had hastened off during the night to save himself by flight. Poonah surrendered in the course of the day, and a pursuit of the flying enemy was successful in capturing eighteen guns, with their tumbrils and ammunition, and a large quantity of baggage.

During the discussions with the Peishwa, a complete change had come over the policy of Apa Sahib. We left him so conscious of dependence on British protection, that he had withdrawn from Nagpoor and fixed his residence close to the cantonments of the subsidiary force. His naturally restless and intriguing disposition did not permit him long to remain quiet, and he soon became intimately connected with the very party which had most strenuously opposed his appointment to the regency. This change was speedily followed by indications of a desire to shake himself free of some of the obligations to which he had become bound by the treaty, and he began with complaining that the subsidiary force and the contingent absorbed far too large a proportion of the public revenue. This complaint was doubtless well founded, as the proportion exceeded a third of the whole, and measures were about to be taken to lighten the burden, when his own impatience and folly rendered an amicable adjustment impossible. The possession of the regency did not satisfy his ambition. He was anxious not only to wield the power, but to bear the name of rajah, and as there was no obstacle to his possession of the musnad except the imbecile Pursajee, the necessary means were taken to remove it. On the morning of the 1st of February, 1817, Pursajee was found dead in his bed. Though it was afterwards ascertained that he had been murdered, the vague rumours of violence which were whispered at the time passed unheeded, and Apa Sahib gained the object of his crime by being immediately proclaimed, without opposition, Rajah of Nagpoor. After this elevation he lost no time in effecting the changes which he had been meditating. Nerayun Punt, who had strongly advocated the subsidiary alliance, and had continued ever since to be the main channel of communication with the British government, was dismissed, and Purseram Row, a notorious intriguer in favour of an opposite policy, was appointed in his place. When remonstrated with by Mr. Jenkins, the resident,
on the incongruity of this appointment, he revoked it indeed, but only to make choice of the commander of his private troops, Ramchundur Waugh, who was in some respects still more objectionable. All his other appointments to important offices in the state were made in a similar spirit.

The British alliance, which Apa Sahib had previously professed to regard as the main prop of his power, was now regarded with undisguised aversion, and he plunged deep into the intrigues which were at this time carried on for the purpose of establishing a new Mahratta confederacy. When the Peishwa, after threatening an open rupture sooner than give up Trimbukjee, was frightenéo into submission, and concluded the humiliating treaty mentioned above, Apa Sahib, aware how far he had committed himself, endeavoured to obviate the consequences by retracing his steps. He ostensibly restored Nerayun Punt to favour, made a new arrangement respecting the contingent, with which he professed to be perfectly satisfied, and gave so many proofs of a friendly disposition, that the resident was partly imposed upon, and as late as the end of October, gave it as his opinion that no immediate rupture was to be apprehended. Very possibly, had affairs remained at Poonah on their former footing, this opinion might have proved correct, but no sooner was it known that the Peishwa had rushed into hostilities, than Apa Sahib resolved to make common cause with him. He did not, however, immediately declare himself, and only indicated his designs by the extent and activity of his military preparations. By the middle of November, appearances were so menacing that the resident requested that a brigade of Colonel Adam’s division should halt on the south of the Nerudda, and be ready to detach a battalion with three troops of cavalry, to reinforce the Nagpoor brigade, which had been much weakened by sickness. The result of the battle of Kirkee, and the arrival of Colonel Smith at Poonah, followed by the Peishwa’s flight, however much they might have disconcerted Apa Sahib, made no apparent change in his purposes, for his levies of troops continued as briskly as before. At the same time, it was known that the question of peace or war was frequently agitated in the privacy of his court, and that he alternated from the one to the other, according as prudent or desperate counsels swayed him.

The first overt declaration of Apa Sahib’s determination to throw in his lot with Bajee Row, was given on the night of the 24th of November, when the resident received a note from Ramchundur Waugh, intimating that the rajah had received a khelaut, or dress of honour from Poonah, and intended next day to go in state to his camp, to be invested with it, and also formally to assume the title of Senaputtee, or commander-in-chief, which had been conferred on him. Mr. Jenkins was invited to assist at the ceremony. Nothing could be more preposterous. Bajee Row was at this moment at open war with the British, and yet Apa Sahib, professedly their ally, was preparing in the most public manner to declare allegiance to him. Mr. Jenkins pointed out these
inconsistencies, and not only refused to take part in the ceremony, but remonstrated against it in the strongest terms. Apa Sahib was not to be thus deterred; but aware that the performance of the ceremony could only be regarded as an unequivocal declaration of hostility, he immediately showed how ready he was to proceed to extremes by stationing his troops in threatening positions. The means of defence were very limited, consisting only of two battalions of native infantry, considerably reduced by sickness, three troops of native cavalry, two companies forming the resident's escort, and a detachment of artillery with four six-pounders. Colonel Scott had the command.

The residency was situated to the west of Nagpoor, and separated from it by a low ridge extending from north to south, and terminated by two heights called the Settabaldee Hills, about 400 yards apart from each other, and with an elevation nowhere exceeding 100 feet. The south hill, the larger of the two, had a flat summit nearly 280 yards long from east to west, and was covered with tombs. The north hill, much less than the other, but rather more elevated, was of a conical shape, and at the top not more than thirty-three yards long by six broad. The slope of both hills was gentle, and the ascent easy, except at a few points where quarries had been opened. The buildings of the residency lay along the western base of the ridge overlooking a spacious plain; the base of the other three sides of the ridge was occupied by native huts irregularly grouped. Colonel Scott made his arrangements as follows. On the north hill he posted 300 men of one of the battalions, with two of the six-pounders, under command of Captain Sadleir. The remainder of this battalion, and the whole of the other, with part of the escort and the rest of the
artillery, were stationed on the south hill. The residency, hastily fitted for defence, was occupied by the other part of the escort, while the three troops of cavalry and some light infantry kept possession of the grounds in front of it. The whole force under Colonel Scott mustered about 1300; the Mahratta army, which lay to the east of the city, and stretched round from east to south at the distance of about three miles from the Seetabaldee Hills, was estimated at 12,000 horse and 8000 foot; of the latter 3000 were Arabs.

On the 26th of November, though the rajah's cavalry were proceeding in large masses towards the western plain fronting the residency, and his infantry and artillery were taking up positions which menaced the Seetabaldee Hills, he kept up the farce of sending pacific messages. At sunset two ministers, Nerayun Punt and Nerayunjee Nagria, the latter as notoriously hostile as the other was friendly to British interests, arrived, but before the object of their visit could be ascertained hostilities commenced with a smart fire of musketry, opened by the Arabs almost simultaneously on both hills. It was replied to with spirit, and the conflict continued to rage throughout the night. At two in the morning an intermission of some hours took place, and the British availed themselves of it to make up fresh cartridges, and strengthen their position by placing along the exposed brow of the hills sacks of flour and grain, and anything else that might serve for cover. The enemy had made no decided impression, and yet affairs had begun to wear a very gloomy appearance. On the northern hill, against which the attack had been specially directed, a heavy loss
had been sustained. Captain Sadleir was killed, Captain Charleworth the next in command was wounded, and the defenders were so thinned or exhausted that it was necessary to relieve them. It was therefore obvious that if the enemy chose to avail themselves of their vast superiority of numbers, and keep up the attack by bringing forward fresh assailants, the defenders must ultimately be overcome by mere exhaustion.

Such seemed to be the enemy's plan, and in the meanwhile their cavalry were closing round the residency on the south and west so as to prevent the possibility of escape, and take advantage of any opportunity of a sudden onset in that quarter. At daybreak the fire opened more furiously than ever, additional guns having been brought to bear during the night, and about ten o'clock the explosion of a tumbril on the summit of the northern hill caused so much confusion that the Arabs rushed forward with loud cries and carried it. Thus in possession of the key of the position, the Arabs opened a destructive fire from the gun which they had captured, and two others which they had brought up. The first shot killed Lieutenant Clarke and Dr. Neven the surgeon; the second, a round of grape, fatally wounded Mr. Sotheby, the resident's assistant, and disabled four soldiers; and it seemed as if the defenders were about to be completely overpowered, when a gallant exploit saved them. Captain Fitzgerald, who commanded the cavalry, under instructions to keep off the enemy's horse, but not to advance into the plain against them, remained at his post while the enemy closed round and hemmed him in on every side. At last they brought two guns to bear upon him, and caused such loss that he chose rather to forget his orders than submit to it. Rushing forth at the head of his troops, he drove the masses of horse in flight before him, captured the two guns, turned them upon the fugitives, and with so much effect that they allowed him to carry them back as trophies to his post. This unexpected and most successful charge so animated the defenders on the ridge that they attacked the Arabs, who had already planted their standards upon it, and forced them to give way. At this moment another tumbril exploded on the northern hill, and the sepoys pushing forward amid the confusion succeeded in recapturing it at the point of the bayonet. The tide of battle was now completely turned, and the Mahrattas gave way on every side. The Arabs, who still showed in some force, having been dispersed by another cavalry charge, the troops on the hills moved down, cleared the surrounding houses and villages of the enemy, and captured all the guns not previously carried off. The enemy, though aware that the British troops were worn out, and that their ammunition was nearly exhausted, had suffered too severely, and were too much intimidated, to try the issue of a second conflict. The victors had good reason to congratulate themselves on this cowardly conduct, since they had already lost about a fourth of their whole number in killed and wounded.

As soon as the battle was decided, Apa Sahib, as if he thought that his
double game had not yet been played out, sent a message to the resident to express his concern for the untoward event. His troops, he said, had acted without his sanction or knowledge, and he was most anxious to renew the former friendship. The resident replied that the final decision now rested with the governor-general, but consented, on the withdrawal of the rajah’s army to the east of the city, to a suspension of hostilities. This consent he gave the more readily because he was in daily expectation of reinforcements; and in fact, on the 29th, only two days after the battle, Colonel Gahan, by accelerating his advance, arrived with three additional troops of cavalry and a battalion of native infantry. Another detachment, under Major Pitman, arrived on the 5th of December; and on the 12th and 13th, Colonel Doveton encamped at Seetabaldee with the whole of the second division of the army of the Deccan. The resident was now in a position to dictate terms, and on the 15th made the following propositions to the rajah:—that he should acknowledge having, by his defection, placed his territories at the mercy of the British government—that he should give up all his artillery—that he should disband the Arabs and other mercenary troops, sending them off in certain specified directions, so as to leave Nagpoor and its fort in British occupation—and that he should himself come to the British residency, and remain there as an hostage for performance. On the acceptance of these terms former relations would be restored, and nothing more would be demanded than the cession of as much territory as would meet the expense of the subsidiary force, and a provision for such a degree of internal control as might suffice to prevent a repetition of similar aggression. He was allowed till four o’clock of the following morning to declare his acceptance, and told that in the event of refusing it he would forthwith be attacked.

Apa Sahib endeavoured to obtain a longer respite, and on representing that he was willing to accept the terms, but was prevented by his troops from coming to the residency, the time was prolonged till nine A.M. This hour having arrived without anything being done, Colonel Doveton put his army in order of battle and began to advance against the Mahratta camp. This movement thoroughly intimidated the rajah, who now, listening only to his fears, mounted his horse and hastened off with a few attendants to the residency. The whole difficulty was not yet overcome. The artillery remained to be delivered up. The rajah again pleaded for delay, but as the interval might have been used for the clandestine removal of the guns it was peremptorily refused. The arrangement made, therefore, was that the troops should be withdrawn and the artillery abandoned by twelve o’clock. A little before this time Ramchundur Waugh, who had been sent to expedite matters, returned to the residency and reported that all the necessary steps had been taken. When a message to this effect was sent to Colonel Doveton, he saw reason to suspect that some deception was intended, and therefore, instead of only sending a detachment, he resolved to advance his whole line. After taking posses-
sion of thirty-six guns in the arsenal south of the city, and leaving Colonel Scott with a brigade to take charge of them, he was proceeding south-east towards the Sakoo Duree Gardens, where he knew that there were several batteries, when a heavy cannonade suddenly opened on his front and right flank. Before this treacherous attack could be overcome, battery after battery belonged to be carried, and many lives were lost. Ultimately the whole of the artillery, amounting to seventy-five pieces of ordnance, and the Mahratta camp, with all its equipage, including forty elephants, were captured.

The above treacherous cannonade and the conflict following upon it, do not appear to have been at all sanctioned by the rajah. Indeed, the subsequent proceedings made it plain that the blame rested chiefly with the Arabs, who, determined to make the best bargain they could for themselves, expected to gain their object by showing how much mischief they were capable of producing. Accordingly, uniting with another body of mercenaries from Hindoo-istan, so as to muster nearly 5000 men, they retired into the city on the capture of the guns and the camp, gained possession of the fort, which was of considerable strength, and contained the rajah’s palace and other important public buildings, and declared their determination to defend themselves to extremity. As any attempt forcibly to dislodge them must have laid the city in ruins, it was deemed advisable to endeavour to bring them to terms. They were offered a safe conduct to the Nagpoor frontier, and must have been understood to have accepted of the offer, since, in the course of the negotiation, they received all their arrears of pay. This premature compliance with their demands appears to have convinced them that it would be possible to obtain still better terms, and they again announced their determination to hold out. There was thus no longer any alternative, and the siege of the fort was commenced. The means were very inadequate, for the besiegers had no battering train, and were obliged mainly to depend for breaching on such of the captured guns as seemed to be of sufficient calibre. The effect produced was not great, but the western gate, which had been selected as the point of attack, was supposed to be so materially injured as to justify an assault. The assailants had been too sanguine. On approaching the gate it was found to be completely commanded from inner walls, from which the defenders kept up a murderous fire, rendering further advance impossible. This unfortunate repulse cost the storming party a loss of 90 killed and 179 wounded. The gallantry displayed was not however wholly lost, for the Arabs, made aware of the fate which must sooner or later overtake them, became intimidated and offered to surrender if allowed to march out with their families, baggage, private property, and arms. These terms being granted, the fort was evacuated on the 30th of December, 1817.

The revolt in the capital had naturally been followed by manifestations of hostility in other parts of Nagpoor. These assumed so formidable an appearance in the eastern part of the valley of the Nerudda and in Gundwana, that
several small British detachments deemed it prudent to retire to the west and concentrate at Hoshungabad, where they united on the 20th of December. Meanwhile Colonel Hardyman, holding a defensive position in Rewa, had received orders from the governor-general to march immediately to the Nerbudda, and there be guided by the advices he might receive from Mr. Jenkins. In accordance with these orders he pushed forward at the head of a regiment of native cavalry, and a regiment of European infantry, with four guns, and arrived on the 19th of December at Jubulpore. Here the Mahratta governor was waiting to give him battle with a body of 1000 horse and 2000 foot. They were strongly posted between a rocky eminence on the right, and a large tank with Jubulpore on the left. Colonel Hardyman after a short cannonade charged the enemy’s left, broke it, and then following up his advantage completely cleared the field, inflicting a severe loss on the fugitives. His threatened bombardment of the town and fort was spared by the speedy surrender of both, and he was continuing his course southward, when an intimation from Mr. Jenkins that his services were no longer required, permitted him to return and establish his head-quarters at Jubulpore.

The hostilities throughout Nagpoor being thus happily terminated, it only remained to settle the future relations with the rajah. To a certain extent these had been already defined by the propositions which the resident had submitted to him, and on the faith of which he claimed to have surrendered. In strict truth he had not done so, for the time allowed had expired before he rode to the residency, and the troops had not been disbanded, nor the whole artillery obtained, until a battle had been fought. Still, as the rajah’s surrender had been received without remark, and his subsequent conduct had been satisfactory, to depose him and assume the government would scarcely have been reconcilable with good faith; Mr. Jenkins had therefore, on his own responsibility, prepared the draft of a treaty, by which the rajah, while permitted to occupy the musnud, was to make large cessions of territory, and submit to British control in regard to every branch of his administration, internal as well as external. On the 2d of January, 1818, before this treaty was definitively arranged, the instructions of the governor-general, which had been despatched some time before, but detained owing to the troubled state of the country, arrived. They differed very decidedly from the views on which the resident was proposing to act. Any reconciliation with Apa Sahib was peremptorily forbidden, and the rajahship was to be conferred on a grandson of Ragoojee Bhonsla by a daughter. As he was a mere child, a regency of British selection was to conduct the government. Feeling that he was too far committed to give full effect to these instructions, Mr. Jenkins followed out his original proposals, and entered into a treaty, subject, however, to the governor-general’s approbation, by which Apa Sahib resumed his seat on the musnud, but engaged to govern by a native ministry of British selection; to throw open all the forts
of the country to the discretionary introduction of British garrisons, besides giving up the Suttabaldee Hills and a portion of adjacent ground in perpetuity for the erection of fortresses and a bazaar; to pay all arrears of subsidy; to reside in Nagpoor under British protection; and to cede territories yielding revenue to the amount of twenty-four lacs for the payment of the subsidiary force. This treaty, which reduced the rajah to a mere pageant, sufficiently met the views of the governor-general, and was accordingly confirmed by him. Indeed, the plan of appointing Ragoojee Bhonsla's grandson rajah could not have been carried out, as the boy, then about ten years of age, together with his father Gooja Apa, had, previous to Colonel Doveton's arrival, been forcibly sent off to the strong fort of Chanda. The new arrangement proved short-lived, but before proceeding with the details, it will be proper to turn aside, and trace the events which were taking place in other quarters.

The court of Holkar, during the insanity, and still more after the death of Jeswunt Row, was distracted by numerous unprincipled factions, which made it impossible that any regular and consistent policy could be pursued. Toolasee Baeec, who from being a public singer had become Jeswunt Row's favourite mistress, and acquired a complete ascendency over him, was able after his death to secure the succession to a boy of the name of Mulhar Row. He was the son of Jeswunt Row, and as she, having no son of her own, had adopted him, she continued in possession of the regency. Possessed of great personal attractions, engaging manners, and no mean talents, she might have made her position secure, had she not excited general disgust and contempt by her profligacy, and provoked hatred by her vindictiveness and cruelty. With her dewan Gumput Row she carried on a criminal intercourse, which those who could easily have overlooked its immorality and shamelessness were not slow in turning to account for political purposes, and cabals among the chiefs, and mutinies among the troops, were of constant occurrence. At first the policy she pursued was accordant with that of her principal leaders, and she listened readily to the proposal of a new Mahratta confederacy, by which the British influence was to be overthrown. Her advisers, however, being doubtful of its success, were careful not finally to commit themselves, and sent an envoy to the resident at Delhi to assure him of the friendly dispositions of the regent. A treaty similar to that which had been concluded with Scindia was accordingly proposed. By this time it had almost become a necessity with Toolasee Baeec and her paramour, who had at last become convinced that without British protection it would be impossible for them longer to make head against disaffected chiefs and a mutinous army. Those opposed to her and to British interests, no sooner saw the course which the negotiation was taking, than they determined at all hazards to prevent it. On the morning of the 20th December, 1817, the young Mulhar Row, being enticed from an outer tent where he was playing, was carried off. At the same instant a guard was placed over Toolasee
She suspected the fate intended for her, and tried to anticipate it by refusing all sustenance. Her guards were too impatient to wait for so tardy a death, and hastened off with her in her palanquin to the banks of the Seepra, where they cut off her head and threw her body into the stream.

The party opposed to the British having now the whole power in their hands, lost no time in showing the use which they meant to make of it, by preparing to encounter the British divisions under Sir John Malcolm and Sir Thomas Hislop, which, with a view to further the negotiation with Toolasee Bae, had, after forming a junction and halting two days at Oojein, advanced on the 14th of December towards the camp of Holkar. On approaching Mahidpoor on the 21st of December, Sir Thomas Hislop, who was marching along the right bank of the Seepra, discovered the enemy drawn up in line on the opposite bank, as if for the purpose of disputing the passage of the only practicable ford in the vicinity. Their right was protected by a deep ravine, and their left by a slight bend of the river and a deserted village. This position might have been turned by making a considerable detour, but the British commander determined to take the shortest road, and succeeded without much difficulty in forcing the passage. No sooner, however, had they crossed and begun to emerge from the cover of the banks and a ravine which led to the top of the bank, than they were received with a tremendous cannonade from a double range of batteries mounting seventy guns in front. Advancing with unflinching steadiness in the face of this cannonade, they were immediately formed, and the first and light brigades under Sir John Malcolm attacked the enemy’s left, while the cavalry, supported by the second brigade, attacked the right. Both flanks gave way, but the centre stood firm till the second brigade wheeled round and dispersed it. The flight was now general, and the pursuit was continued till light failed. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was estimated at 3000; that of the British was also serious, amounting to 778.
Young Holkar, who was present at the battle of Mahidpore seated on an elephant, is said to have shed tears on seeing his troops defeated. After the action he was carried to Allote and placed under the guardianship of Kesaria Bae, his mother, as regent, who appointed Tantia Jog as her dewan. Notwithstanding the defeat some of Holkar's troops still kept the field, and a division under Sir John Malcolm was sent to disperse them. Meanwhile it became apparent that the struggle was hopeless, and overtures were made for peace. The negotiation was quickened by the concentration of the army of the Deccan, and the junction of Sir William Keir from Gujerat, and on the 6th of January, 1818, a definitive treaty was concluded. It confirmed Ameer Khan in the territories guaranteed to him by the British—ceded to Zalim Sing Raj, Rana of Kotah, in property, certain districts which he held from Holkar only on lease—renounced all right to lands within and north of the Boonda Hills—and ceded all claims to territory or revenue within and south of the Satpoora range, together with all claims of tribute on the Rajpoot princes. The territories of Holkar were guaranteed in their integrity as now curtailed, free from all claims of any kind on the part of the Peshwa, and the subsidiary force was to be kept up at the Company's expense, but a contingent fixed at 3000 horse was to be maintained by Holkar in a state of complete efficiency, so as to be ready at all times to co-operate with the British troops. It is scarcely necessary to observe that these stipulations deprived Holkar, whose father had recently contended with the British government for supremacy, of real sovereignty, and reduced him, like all the other native powers with whom subsidiary alliances had been formed, to a state of vassalage.

The sudden insurrections at Poonah and Nagpoor had necessarily interfered to some extent with the operations against the predatory hordes, and an enemy still more formidable than the Maharrattas had, shortly after the conclusion of the treaty with Scindia, made fearful havoc in the centre division of the grand army. Cholera, though known in India from time immemorial, had hitherto been confined to particular seasons and localities, without attracting much notice, but in the middle of 1817 it began to assume the form of a most destructive epidemic. Commencing in the eastern districts of Bengal, it proceeded up the right bank of the Ganges, crossed it near Ghazipoor, and passing through Rewa, made its appearance in the centre division in the beginning of November. At first it crept about insidiously, attacking chiefly the lower classes of camp followers. Its virulence, however, gradually increased, and by the 14th it was carrying on its ravages in every part of the camp. The followers and the native soldiers still continued to furnish its most numerous victims, but Europeans of every rank were attacked, and the governor-general deemed it necessary to guard against the consequences of his own possible death, by providing that, in order to conceal it both from the troops and the enemy, he should be buried secretly in his tent. In one week 764 fighting men
and 8000 followers perished. Death, and the desertions produced by terror, were depopulating the camp, when it was resolved to try the effect of a change of locality. The army accordingly moved south-east from the Sindh towards the Betwa, and crossing it, encamped on its dry and lofty banks at Ergich. Whether owing to the change of site, or because it had already exhausted its virulence, the disease disappeared, and the centre division was able again to resume active operations.

The Pindarees, aware of the offensive operations about to be made against them, cantoned, for the rains of 1817, in three durras or encampments. One, under Cheetoo, was situated near Ashta on the Parbutee, about forty miles south-west of Bhopaul; another, under Kureem Khan, due north of this town near Bairsea; and the third, under Wasil Mahomed, who by the death of his brother Dost Mahomed had succeeded to the sole command, near Garspoor, thirty-five miles west of Saugur. The enmity between Cheetoo and Kureem Khan was so rancorous as to prevent them from concerting any common course of action; and the native princes most disposed to favour them were so afraid of the consequences, that they confined themselves to general expressions of good-will, without even promising protection to their families and baggage. The Pindarees had thus been thrown entirely on their own resources when the rainy season closed. Meanwhile, General Marshall, commanding the left division of the main army, had moved from Callinger and advanced south-west to Huttah, on the Sonar, which was reached on the 28th of October. During this movement Wasil Mahomed suddenly quitted Garspoor, and penetrating a pass to the westward of General Marshall's route, made his appearance in Bundelcund, part of which he succeeded in plundering before the approach of an adequate force compelled him to retire. General Marshall, continuing his march, arrived at Rylee, to the east of Saugur, on the 8th of November, and opened a communication with Colonel Adams at Hoshungabad. The effect of these movements was to oblige Wasil Mahomed to decamp from Garspoor and hasten westward. Sir John Malcolm had previously arrived in the valley of the Nerbuuda; General Donkin was moving with the right division of the grand army in a south-west direction to guard the left bank of the Chumbul; and the governor-general, with the centre division, had taken up a position which prevented an escape to the north or east, so that there was every prospect of soon seeing the Pindarees completely enveloped.

The execution of this plan was momentarily endangered by a retrograde movement of Sir Thomas Hislop, who on hearing of the commencement of hostilities at Poonah, hastened off thither in the belief that there the chief danger lay, leaving only the third and fifth divisions of the Deccan army, under Sir John Malcolm and Colonel Adams respectively, to prosecute the Pindaree war. Sir Thomas Hislop was stopped in his retrograde movement by an order from the governor-general, who, believing, as the event afterwards justified,
that he had otherwise sufficiently provided against the Poonah hostilities, enjoined him to return and adhere to the original plan of campaign. Fortunately, the Pindarees had failed to profit by his absence, and by the united operations of General Marshall, Sir John Malcolm, and Colonel Adams, were driven entirely from their usual haunts, Kureem Khan and Wasiil Mahomed, after uniting near Seronge, retiring together in a northerly direction towards Gwalior, while Cheetoo moved westward towards Holkar's army, which had now taken the field.

The governor-general, when he learned the movement of the Pindarees upon Gwalior, was at Erich, to which the cholera had driven him for change of site, and determined immediately to retrace his steps to the Sindh. On arriving at the Sonaree ford, within twenty-eight miles S.S.E. of Gwalior, he sent the advanced guard under Colonel Philpot across the river. This movement, by cutting off the communication of the Pindarees with Gwalior, reduced them to the necessity of endeavouring to force a passage in some other direction, and at the same time convinced Scindia that, humiliating though the treaty was which he had recently been compelled to sign, his only safety consisted in adhering to its terms, and performing his part of them with more alacrity than he had hitherto manifested. For a short time the Pindarees halted in consternation at a considerable distance to the south-west, among the jungles and broken ground in the vicinity of Shahabad. To advance upon Gwalior was now impossible; to retrace their steps southward was equally impossible, as General Marshall and Colonel Adams had seized the points from which it would be easy to intercept them. The practicable openings still remaining seemed to be by the Chumbul into Jeypoor, or by Hurastee into Kotah. The latter was selected, probably because Zalim Sing, the Rajrana, had long been one of their greatest supporters. Now, however, his policy had undergone a change, and he deemed it necessary to give the British a proof of the sincerity with which he had entered into the recent alliance with them, by occupying all passes by which the Pindarees might attempt to force their way. Despair, however, appears to have armed them with extraordinary courage, and they succeeded in clearing a way for themselves in spite of the resistance offered by Zalim Sing's troops. But the respite which they thus obtained was only of short duration. On the 14th of December, General Marshall, who had been following on their track, found that they were encamped only a short distance beyond the pass which they had forced, and hastened forward in the hope of taking them completely by surprise. In this he failed, but the Pindarees, headed by Kureem Khan and Wasiil Mahomed, only escaped by throwing away their loads of grain and other baggage. In their next surprise they were still more unfortunate. General Donkin advanced so secretly upon them from the west, that they were not aware of his approach till he surprised their advanced guard in a night bivouac, about thirty miles north-east of Kotah. Kureem Khan's wife was
captured and all his state elephants, standards, and other insignia. The main body of the two durras being still six miles distant, had time after hearing of the surprise to burn their tents and baggage before dispersing. The greater part of the fugitives were afterwards cut up by the different detachments which had been closing around them, or murdered by the villagers in retaliation of the cruelties which they had so often suffered at their hands. The two leaders, taking with them nearly 4000 men all well mounted, hastened off to the south, and managed to pass to the left of Colonel Adams' division, while he was manœuvreuring on the right bank of the Parbutee.

The only formidable body of Pindarees now existing was the durrā headed by Cheetoo, who had retired into Mewar or Odeypoor. Sir John Malcolm, who had arrived at Tullain on the 26th of November, had determined to lose no time in following upon his track. With this view he had proceeded by Sarungpoor to Agur, where the hostile dispositions manifested by the camp of Holkar induced him to fall back upon Oojain, in order to form a junction there with Sir Thomas Hislop. The Pindarees had in the meantime been permitted to encamp close to Holkar's army, and in consequence a body of his followers, as well as of those of Kureem Khan and Wasil Mahomed, actually took part with it in the battle of Mahidpoor. Cheetoo himself however did not long remain in the vicinity, but moved to the country on the west bank, and near the sources of the Chumbul. He did not however remain long here, and removed north along with the other Pindaree leaders, and the remnants of their durras still kept together, to Jawud, where a chief of the name of Jeswunt Row Bhaô, nominally dependent on Scindia, but disposed to act as his own master, had offered them an asylum. In this direction therefore various British detachments proceeded, and Jeswunt Row Bhaô was so far intimidated that he compelled the Pindaree leaders to remove with their followers from his neighbourhood. They proceeded at first northwards to Chittoor and then separated: Cheetoo moving towards the frontiers of Gujarat, and Kureem Khan and Wasil Mahomed towards Malwah. After various doublings, and the endurance of great hardship, partly from the unproductiveness of the country and partly from the hostility of the Bheels and other mountaineers, the main body of Cheetoo's followers, finding the passes towards Gujarat too well guarded to leave any hope of penetrating them, endeavoured, as a last resource, to regain their original haunts in the upper valley of the Nerbudda. Taking a circuitous route, so as to avoid the various British detachments, Cheetoo arrived at Oonchoode, about fifty-five miles east of Indore, and on the 24th of January, 1818, ascended the pass of Kanode, which brought him within twenty-five miles of Hindia. Here a British detachment was stationed under Major Heath, who immediately set out in pursuit, and coming upon the Pindaree camp just as night set in, completely dispersed it. Cheetoo afterwards assembled some of his scattered followers, and continued for some time wandering about Malwah.
At last he took the resolution of endeavouring to make terms with the British government, and with this view suddenly made his appearance in the camp of the Nabob of Bhopaul, to request his intercession. The proposal he made was to enter the British service with a body of followers, and to receive a jaghire for their maintenance. Being offered nothing more than pardon for the past, and a provision for the future in some part of Hindoostan, he again set off, made his way into Candeish and the Deccan, and shared the fortunes of some of the disorganized bands which had belonged to the Peishwa. At a later period he endeavoured to profit by renewed troubles in Berar, where we shall again meet with him.

The durras of Kureem Khan and Wasil Mahomed had entered Malwah in three parties. The largest of the three, headed by Namdar Khan, Kureem Khan's nephew, after passing round the camp of Sir Thomas Hislop at Mundi-soor, crossed the Chumbul, and moved eastward to Kotree, a village on the banks of the Kalee Sindh. Here they bivouacked on the 12th of January, 1818, and had no idea of any immediate danger, when Colonel Adams detached a body of native cavalry under Major Clarke to beat up their quarters. Having arrived before daylight of the 18th, and found them either so lulled into security, or worn out by fatigue, that they were totally unconscious of his approach, he determined to make more sure of success by waiting till the dawn, and in the meantime so disposing his regiment in two bands, that while one made the attack, the other was waiting to intercept the fugitives at the point by which it was foreseen that on the first alarm they would attempt to make their escape. The stratagem completely succeeded, and of the whole body, estimated at 1500, not more than a third escaped. The other two parties were chased from place to place without intermission during nine days, and arrived on the confines of Bhopaul in a state bordering on despair. As the position of the Pindarees had become absolutely hopeless, it was presumed that they would now be ready for unqualified submission, and accordingly intimation was conveyed to them through the Nabob of Bhopaul, that if they threw themselves on the mercy of the British government the chiefs would be provided for in some districts remote from their old haunts, and the lives of their followers would be spared. Namdar Khan at once availed himself of this intimation, and was allowed to settle in Bhopaul, the nabob becoming responsible for his good behaviour. Wasil Mahomed sought refuge in Gwalior, and remained for a time concealed in Scindia's camp. The resident, on ascertaining the fact, called upon Scindia to apprehend him. He refused as a point of honour to do so, and wished the resident to undertake the ungrateful task, but was ultimately compelled to execute it, the governor-general insisting not only that he should do it himself, but do it in broad day, in order that all India might see that an enemy of the British government could nowhere find an asylum.

Kureem Khan, instead of accompanying his durra into Malwah, had remained
at Jawud, under the covert protection of Jeswunt Row Bhao. This chief was in charge of one division of Scindia's troops, which, in terms of the treaty, were to co-operate against the Pindarees, under the immediate direction of British officers. Captain Caulfield, sent to Jawud for that purpose, was received with the greatest external deference, but soon discovered that Jeswunt Row Bhao was much more disposed to co-operate with the Pindarees than against them, and still continued to harbour several of their leaders whom he had ostensibly dismissed. The governor-general was so indignant at this double-dealing that, on the 24th of January, 1818, he despatched instructions to proceed against Jeswunt Row Bhao as a public enemy. Before these instructions arrived, General Brown, by whose detachment they were to have been executed, had anticipated them. Captain Caulfield, after in vain demanding the surrender of

![Jain Temple in Fortress of Kumulner. From Todd's Annals of Rajasthan.](image)

the harbedored Pindarees, withdrew on the 28th of January to General Brown's camp. The very next day a squadron of cavalry, sent by the general to occupy a pass by which it was understood that the harbedored Pindarees were about to escape from Jawud, was fired upon both from this town and Jeswunt Row Bhao's camp. This overt act of hostility left no room for hesitation, and the whole British line was immediately ordered out for an assault on the enemy's posts. They were all forced with scarcely any loss, and the town itself was stormed, after blowing open the gate by a twelve-pounder. Jeswunt Row Bhao escaped by the fleetness of his horse with only a few attendants, and the places and districts which he had recently seized from Odeypoor returned to the Rana, now a British ally. Among the places thus restored was Kumulner, situated thirty-five miles N.N.W. of Odeypoor, and regarded as one of the strongest hill-forts in India. Kureem Khan, who was concealed in Jawud when it was stormed, succeeded with the utmost difficulty in getting off on foot. For some time he lived in the neighbouring jungles, and after various adven-
tures submitted to his fate by surrendering to Sir John Malcolm on the 14th of February. He was finally settled with his family in the Goruckpoor district, not far from the frontiers of Nepaul, on a property which yielded about £1600 a year, and spent the rest of his life as a peaceable and industrious farmer.

Wasil Mahomed, placed under surveillance at Ghzipoor, on the Ganges, thirty-five miles north-east of Benares, could not be reconciled to his lot, and after an ineffectual endeavour to escape, poisoned himself. The Pindaree war, though Cheetoow was still at large, might now be considered terminated. Another war, rather more worthy of the name, since the once formidable Peishwa was the enemy to be encountered, was about the same time brought to a conclusion. The remaining details must now be given.

The Peishwa, after his defeat at Poonah, on the 16th of November, 1817, fled southward pursued by General Smith. It was thought that he intended to shut himself up in one of his hill-forts to abide a siege. He had a very different object in view. Probably from having penetrated the governor-general's intention of supplanting his authority by that of the rajah, who had long been kept as a mere pageant in the hill-fort of Wusota, fifteen miles north-west of Sattarah, he had sent forward a party to carry him off with his family. This object having been accomplished, Bajee Row, now possessed of the persons of those whose legal title being better than his own might have become formidable rival claimants, turned eastward to Punderpoor. General Smith, after providing for the occupation of Poonah, commenced his pursuit, and on the 29th of November forced the Salpa Pass, leading to the table-land in which the Kistna has its source. He had not proceeded thus far undisturbed, for Gokla, with 5000 of the Peishwa's best horse, kept hovering on his line of march, ready to seize any advantage that might offer. Bajee Row managed in the meantime to keep two long marches in advance, and on leaving Punderpoor on the 6th of December, succeeded by getting round the pursuing force in advancing rapidly to the north-west. Passing about midway between Seroor and Poonah, he continued his flight northward to Wattoor, on the road to Nassik, and received a considerable addition to his force by the junction of his old favourite, Trimbukjee Dainglia. Nassik now seemed to be his object. If it was, he had lost the opportunity by loitering at Wattoor, for General Smith, who, in continuing the pursuit, took a route considerably to the east, had advanced so far that on the 26th of December, when the Peishwa was still at Wattoor, he was to the north-east of him, and moving in a line by which his further progress by the Nassik road would be inevitably intercepted. The Peishwa accordingly, after making a march to the north of Wattoor, returned to it, and on the 28th December hastened southward on the direct road to Poonah.

The advance of the Peishwa in the direction of Poonah naturally created alarm, and Colonel Burt, the officer in command, having no doubt that an attack was meditated, judged it necessary to solicit the reinforcement of a
battalion from Servoor. Captain Staunton of the Bombay establishment was accordingly detached at six in the evening of the 31st December, with the 2d battalion of the 1st regiment of Bombay native infantry, 600 strong, twenty-six European artillermen under Lieutenant Chisholm of the Madras artillery, and about 300 auxiliary horse under Lieutenant Swanston. At ten in the morning of New-year's Day, 1818, Captain Staunton, on reaching the heights above Korigaon, perceived the plain below covered with the Peishwa's army, estimated at 20,000 horse and 8000 foot, a large proportion Arabs, and therefore superior to the ordinary native Indian infantry. He immediately endeavoured to gain possession of the village, under cover of which, as it was surrounded by a wall, and rendered inaccessible to cavalry on the south by the bed of the Beema, he might be able to maintain himself, at least till he could be relieved. The enemy, aware of his design, endeavoured to frustrate it by pushing forward a body of infantry. The two parties arrived nearly at the same time, and each obtaining possession of part of the village a desperate struggle ensued. It continued without intermission from noon till sunset. At first the British were the assailants, and endeavoured to dislodge the Arabs. Having failed in this they were obliged in turn to defend their own post, the Arabs keeping up a galling fire from a small fort which they had seized, and from terraced roofs of the houses, and at the same time rushing on with desperate courage on the very points of the bayonets, in the face of murderous discharges from the two admirably served guns. During this protracted conflict the British soldiers, besides being exhausted by their previous march, and obliged to encounter the fresh parties which the enemy, from an overwhelming superiority of numbers, were able from time to time to bring forward, remained without either food or water. Towards evening their position became critical in the extreme. Of the eight officers, Lieutenant Chisholm had been killed, and Lieutenants Pattinson, Connellan, and Swanston, and Assistant-surgeon Wingate wounded, so that only Captain Staunton, Lieutenant Innes, and Assistant-surgeon Wylie remained effective. A large proportion of the artillery, too, had fallen or been disabled, and not a few of the other soldiers, besides being thinned by casualties, were sinking under fatigue. At this time the enemy succeeded in capturing one of the guns, and seizing a choultry in which many of the wounded had been deposited. The first use they made of this success was to commence a horrid butchery of the wounded. Assistant-surgeon Wingate was literally hewn to pieces, and a similar fate was prepared for Lieutenants Swanston and Connellan, when the choultry was recovered by a sudden onset, and the murdering Arabs within were bayoneted. The recapture of the gun took place under circumstances still more extraordinary. They are thus related by Captain Duff:—"Lieutenant Thomas Pattinson, adjutant of the battalion, lying mortally wounded, being shot through the body, no sooner heard that the gun was

taken, than getting up, he called to the grenadiers once more to follow him, and seizing a musket by the muzzle, rushed into the middle of the Arabs, striking them down right and left, until a second ball through his body completely disabled him. Lieutenant Pattinson had been nobly seconded; the sepoys thus led were irresistible, the gun was retaken, and the dead Arabs, literally lying above each other, proved how desperately it had been defended."

When the gun was recovered, the body of Lieutenant Chisholm was found beside it with the head cut off. Captain Staunton took advantage of this barbarous mutilation to point it out to his men, and tell that such was the treatment awaiting all who should fall dead or alive into the hands of the Maharrattas. Some had previously begun to talk of surrender, but all now declared their determination to maintain the fight to the last, and if necessary die to a man. While thus animated with new courage, they succeeded in obtaining a supply of water, and were also enabled in some measure to recruit their strength, as the enemy, now evidently discouraged, began to relax their efforts, and by nine at night completely evacuated the village. When the morning dawned the Maharrattas were still hovering around, but appeared to draw off in the direction of Poonah. They were in fact preparing for flight, in consequence of intelligence that General Smith was approaching. Captain Staunton, not aware of this fact, believed that they were taking up a position in order to intercept his advance to Poonah, and therefore determined on retracing his steps to Seroor. As soon as it was dark he commenced his retreat, and without knowing the cause, was agreeably surprised to find that no attempt was made to molest him. He had lost of the battalion, and of the artillery, in killed and wounded, 175 men; about a third of the auxiliary horse also were killed, wounded, and missing. Among the wounded whom he was able to bring along with him, was the gallant Lieutenant Pattinson, respecting whom the following additional particulars are furnished by Captain Duff:—

"Lieutenant Pattinson was a very powerful man, being six feet seven inches in height; nothing could exceed his heroic conduct on the memorable occasion when he received his wounds; he did not expire until the regiment reached Seroor, but unfortunately in his last moments he laboured under an impression that his corps had been defeated, which caused him great distress."

The loss of the Maharrattas at the battle of Korigaon was nearly 600. Both Gokha and Trimbukjee Dainglia were present directing the attacks, and the latter was at one time within the village. Bajee Row viewed the conflict from a rising ground on the opposite side of the river, about two miles distant, and frequently expressed his impatience, tauntingly asking his commanders, "where were now their boasts of defeating the English, when they could not overcome one battalion." The Rajah of Sattarah, who sat beside him, having put up an astabyeer or screen from the sun, the Peishwa begged him to put it down, "otherwise the English would send a cannon-ball through it." This incident,
not improbable in itself, is very characteristic of Bajee Row, whose cowardice was notorious. When the battle was lost, and General Smith’s approach became known, he started off for the south, and never halted till he reached the banks of the Gatpurba. To his surprise he found part of a country which he believed to be friendly already in possession of the British. General (afterwards Sir Thomas Monro), who had been sent from Madras to settle the districts of the Carnatic, ceded by the treaty of Poonah in 1817, had produced this change by collecting a few regulars in addition to his own escort, and taking advantage of the disaffection of the native population to the Mahratta rule. Alarmed at this state of matters, and also at the approach of General Pritzler, who had joined in the pursuit, the Peishwa turned round and pursued his flight northward to the vicinity of Meeruj. General Pritzler was now close upon his track, and Gokla sustained considerable loss by a smart action to which he was brought while endeavouring as usual to facilitate his escape. Meanwhile General Smith coming from the north, prevented the Peishwa’s further progress in that direction, and he again decamped for the south. General Smith’s and General Pritzler’s divisions being thus brought into communication, united their forces near Sattarah on the 8th of February. The fort on being summoned immediately surrendered, and the rajah’s flag being hoisted, a manifesto was published, declaring that the British government had determined to establish the Rajah of Sattarah in an independent sovereignty, and completely extinguish the rule of the Peishwa, by annexing his territories to those of the Company. The latter object had already been in a great measure accomplished, since Bajee Row, hunted about from post to post, could not be said to possess anything but the ground which he actually occupied.

The comparative ease with which the Peishwa had hitherto eluded his pursuers seemed to prove something defective in the mode of pursuit, and the two divisions of Generals Smith and Pritzler having been placed at the disposal of Mr. Elphinstone, who had been appointed commissioner with full powers for the settlement of the territory formerly belonging to the Peishwa, it was resolved to form a new distribution of the troops, by employing the artillery and most of the infantry in the reduction of the various forts in the southern Mahratta districts, and continuing the pursuit of the Peishwa with the cavalry and a light division, consisting of the horse artillery, two squadrons of his
majesty's 22d dragoons, the 2d and 7th regiments of Madras cavalry, 1200 auxiliary horse, and 2500 infantry. The former service was assigned to General Pritzler, who captured in succession the strongholds of Singhur, Vizierghur, and Poorundur. These important captures were followed by the surrender of a number of minor places as soon as the army appeared before them. The forts in the Southern Concan yielded with equal facility to Colonel Prother, who had been sent into it with an armament from Bombay; while General Monro, who had completely occupied the whole country to the south of the Malpurba, succeeded without much difficulty in reducing the forts of Badamy and Bhagulkote. In consequence of this uninterrupted chain of success many of the principal Mahratta jagirdars made their submission.

General Smith, to whom the pursuit of the Peishwa had been assigned, finding that he had fled eastward beyond the Beema, and its tributary Seena, as far as Sholapoor, set out on the 13th of February, and on the 19th arrived at Yellapoor. Here he learned that the Peishwa was again moving west, and might in all probability be met with about Punderpoor. A night march was accordingly made in that direction, but it was only to learn that the Peishwa had once more changed his route and proceeded twenty miles north to Ashtee, where he was reported to be totally unconscious of the vicinity of a British force. Encouraged by this information General Smith, taking only the cavalry and horse artillery, hastened across the Beema at Keroulee, and at half past eight on the morning of the 20th, had the satisfaction of hearing the Peishwa's kettle-drums beat in preparation for a march. It had been hastily resolved upon, for the general's approach, previously unsuspected, had just become known. Bajee Row, as usual, thought only of his personal safety, and set off followed by the main body of his army. Gokla, to whom he had previously sent a taunting message for having allowed the army to be thus surprised, only replied by promising that his rear would be well guarded. He kept his word. Detaining a body of about 4000 horse to support him, he took his station with 500 across the line by which the British cavalry were advancing. His friends advising him to fall back and return with a more adequate force, he simply answered, "Whatever is to be done must be done here." As soon as the British were within musket-shot the Mahrattas fired an ineffectual volley, and then, to the number of about 300, with Gokla at their head, made a charge by galloping down diagonally across the front, and suddenly wheeling round on the flank of the 7th regiment of cavalry as they were forming after crossing a ravine. The momentary confusion thus produced was soon repaired by Major Dawes, who, charging with his dragoons along the rear of the 7th regiment, dashed into the midst of the Mahrattas and dispersed them. No further resistance was attempted, and the fugitives were followed for about five miles. Though the loss of the enemy did not exceed 100 men, the results of the victory were most important. Gokla, on whose fidelity, courage, and military talents the Peishwa
mainly depended, was among the slain, and the Rajah of Sattarah, with his mother and brothers, who had been forced to accompany the Mahratta camp, were captured and released. The Peishwa continued his flight northwards to Kopergaon, on the north or left bank of the Godavery. While at Sholapoor he had obtained some addition to his force by the arrival of Gunput Row from Nagpoor with the remnants of the rajah's dispersed and disbanded army, and in his present flight he was joined by part of Holkar's broken army, whose fortunes were as desperate as his own. These reinforcements were, however, far from compensating for the daily thinning of his ranks by desertion, few of the Mahratta chiefs being willing to risk the loss of everything by adhering to a ruined cause. Before following the Peishwa in his flight some attention must be paid to the events which had taken place in Nagpoor.

The governor-general, more from a sense of honour than a conviction of its accordance with sound policy, had ratified the treaty which restored Apa Sahib to his seat on the musnad of Nagpoor. The narrow escape from deposition would, it was supposed, incline the rajah, if not from a sense of gratitude, at least from a regard to his own interest, to avoid any future collision with the British government. It was not long before he gave abundant proof of being actuated by a very different spirit. Not only had he never recalled the secret orders issued before the treaty to the mountain rajahs, to call out their followers and throw every possible impediment in the way of the British authorities; but after the treaty was concluded he had instructed the commanders of the various forts and districts which had been ceded, to refuse compliance with the calls which would be made upon them to surrender. On the 18th of January, 1818, only nine days after the rajah had returned to his palace, he instructed the commandant of Chanda to commence recruiting, and particularly, though in direct defiance of the treaty, to enlist Arabs. At a later period it was ascertained that when Gunput Row went off to join the Peishwa, he was accompanied by an agent authorized to make overtures for mutual co-operation against the British. The resident, when once his suspicions were aroused, had little difficulty in obtaining evidence that not merely the rajah's favourite ministers, Nagoo Punt and Ramchundur Waugh, but the rajah himself, partly through them, and partly in his own name, had solicited and were even expecting assistance from the Peishwa. Such an expectation was certainly a great delusion, but some movements of the Peishwa in the direction of Chanda, which was the rajah's principal stronghold, and to which it was suspected that he himself was preparing to escape, so alarmed Mr. Jenkins, that on the 15th of March he resolved to act on his own responsibility in arresting both Apa Sahib and his two implicated ministers. After the arrest, as happens almost invariably in India, the proofs of criminality rapidly increased, and it now first clearly appeared that Pursajee, the previous rajah, instead of dying a natural death as was pretended, had perished by Apa Sahib's hired assassins.
During these transactions at Nagpoor, the Peishwa was continuing his flight. On arriving at Kopergaon, the pursuit, in consequence of General Smith having turned aside to escort the Rajah of Sattarah to his new sovereignty, seemed so far abated, that he ventured to pay a visit to Nassik, and then proceeded northwards to the vicinity of Chandore, apparently in the hope of being able to pass through Candeish into Malwah. In this direction, however, his further progress was arrested by the first division of the army of the Deccan, which, in the beginning of March, had crossed the Taptee, on its return to the south. As he was at the same time threatened by General Smith from the west and General Doveton from the south-east, there was only one other direction open to him. This was due east. He immediately began to follow it, and not without the hope of being able in some measure to retrieve his fortunes. Gunput Row, and others in the interest of Apa Sahib, had laboured to convince him that his presence in Nagpoor would be followed by a general insurrection in favour of the Maharrattas, and his object therefore now was to join Apa Sahib, whom he expected to find at Chanda. This scheme had been frustrated by the precautions of Mr. Jenkins, who, besides arresting the rajah and his ministers, had despatched Colonel Scott with the greater part of the force then at Nagpoor towards Chanda, and had also particularly called the attention of Colonel Adams to the importance of attempting the immediate reduction of this fortress. The consequence was that the Peishwa found himself suddenly stopped short in his advance, and learned that Apa Sahib, instead of waiting for him at Chanda, was a prisoner within the British residency. For some days he seemed unable to decide what his next route should be, shifting his ground between the Wurda and the Payn Gunga, but not venturing to cross either of those rivers. Meanwhile, the divisions of General Doveton and Colonel Adams were hemming him in, and making escape almost impossible.
On the 17th of April, Colonel Adams set out from Pipalkote, and had scarcely marched five miles on the road to Seonee, not far from the junction of the Payn Gunga with the Wurda, where the enemy were understood to be encamped, when he came in sight of the van of the Peishwa's army, flying from General Doveton by the very road by which he (Colonel Adams) was advancing. The encounter was in consequence inevitable, but the Maharrattas, anxious only to escape, made no resistance, and were easily thrown into confusion. The nature of the ground unfortunately favoured their flight, and they disappeared through the jungle, leaving above 1000 on the field. The British loss was only two wounded. Five guns, all that the Peishwa possessed, were taken, together with three elephants and 200 camels. The elephants, known to be those on which his treasure usually was laden, were expected to yield a rich booty, but the whole had disappeared in the confusion except 11,000 rupees. Bajee Row had, as usual, on the first appearance of danger, mounted his horse and galloped off. General Doveton, who was only twelve miles distant when this action was fought, immediately took up the pursuit, and dividing his force into two bodies, continued close upon the heels of the Maharratta army during five successive days, during which famine and fatigue did as much execution on the enemy as the sword. A few days later, desertion left the Peishwa with little more than a third of the adherents who had encamped with him at Seonee.

The Peishwa, after his last discomfiture, fled south-west to Boree, on an affluent of the Godavery, and then turned northwards, intending to cross the Taptee and penetrate if possible into Hindoostan. Before following his future fortunes some incidents which occurred in the south may be mentioned. On the 31st of March a force prepared for the attack of Wusota, the stronghold in which the Rajah of Sattarah and his family had been kept, completely invested it. Though reputed one of the strongest places in India, it could only have been so before gunpowder was invented, as all its defences by nature and art were rendered unavailing by the proximity of a hill called Old Wusota, which commanded it. The breaching batteries, erected on this hill, opened with such destructive effect, that one day's fire sufficed to compel a surrender. Valuables to the amount of nearly three lacs were found within the place, and restored to the rajah, to whose family they belonged, the troops receiving a compensation. Two British officers, Lieutenants Morrison and Hunter, who were taken prisoners at the commencement of the Poonah hostilities, were confined in the dungeons of the fort. They "were found," says Captain Duff, "in a dress of coarse unbleached cotton, made into a form neither European nor Indian, but partaking of the nature of both; their beards had grown, and their appearance was, as may be imagined, extraordinary; but their health was perfectly good. They had been kept in ignorance of the advance of their countrymen, or the state of the war; the firing, in driving in the outposts, was represented by their guard as the attack of some insurgents.
in the neighbourhood; the bursting of the shells over their heads was the first intimation of approaching deliverance, and the most joyful sound that had reached their ears for five dreary months." To the honour of Gokla it should be mentioned that a letter was found in his own hand-writing, addressed to the kiledar, and desiring him to treat the two poor Europeans well.

On the 11th of April, shortly after the fall of Wusota, the Rajah of Sattarah was, with great pomp, seated on his throne by Mr. Elphinstone the commissioner. The policy of thus erecting what was virtually a new Mahratta sovereignty is very questionable. Had it been what it professed to be, a real sovereignty, it might have excited expectations which it was never meant to gratify, and kept alive recollections which it would have been safer to suppress. As it was only a nominal sovereignty, the rajah continued to be as formerly, little better than a pageant. Captain Duff, the author of the History of the Mahrattas, was the agent selected by Mr. Elphinstone to arrange the form, or rather to exercise the powers of the newly established government. He had thus the best opportunity of judging of the result, and though he speaks with some reserve, his language certainly indicates an unfavourable opinion. The Rajah Pertab Siew (or Sing), who was in his twenty-seventh year, was "naturally intelligent and well disposed; but bred amongst intrigue, surrounded by men of profligate character, and ignorant of everything except the etiquette and parade of a court. His whole family entertained the most extravagant ideas of their own consequence, and their expectations were proportionate, so that, for a time, the bounty which they experienced was not duly appreciated." Subsequently the rights of the rajah were defined by a formal treaty, which bound him to hold his territory "in subordinate co-operation with the British government;" and subject to this condition, he was invested with complete sovereign powers. On this arrangement Captain Duff simply remarks, that "the boon thus conferred by the British nation was certainly appreciated by the country generally, as well as by his relations and himself; but time must prove whether this liberal experiment, on the part of the authorities of the East India Company, will be attended with any lasting good effect to the governors or the governed." The territory bestowed upon the rajah extended between the Wurna and Neera, from the Syadree Mountains, a range of the Western Ghauts, on the west, to Punderpool, near the Nizam's frontier, on the east, and yielded directly to the rajah an estimated revenue of thirteen lacs, 75,000 rupees (£137,500), together with three lacs granted in jaghire, and three lacs permanently alienated, making the aggregate revenue of the whole territory about £200,000. Though anticipating the narrative, it may here be mentioned that the result, of which Captain Duff spoke so doubtfully, did not prove satisfactory, and that ultimately advantage was taken of a failure of direct heirs to extinguish the rajahship, by declaring the whole to be British territory.

On the 13th of April, General Pritzler, after detaching part of his division to
assist in the capture of the forts north of Poonah, proceeded southward with the remainder to place himself under the orders of General Monro, who, it will be remembered, had with very inadequate means reduced Badamy and secured other important advantages. Thus reinforced, he was able to accomplish a design which he had for some time contemplated. This was to attack the infantry and guns which the Peishwa, in order to facilitate his flight, had left behind at Sholapoor. Setting out on the 26th of April, he crossed the Beema on the 7th of May, and two days after arrived before Sholapoor, the town and fort of which was strongly garrisoned with Arabs, while the main body of the Peishwa’s infantry, with eleven guns of his field train, was encamped under its walls. On the 10th, when the pettah was attacked and carried by escalade, General Monro, perceiving that the enemy were moving off in small parties from the camp, detached General Pritzler in pursuit, with three troops of the 22nd dragoons, and about 400 irregular horse. When overtaken, a few miles from the town, the enemy were marching in pretty close column. The attack at once broke and dispersed them, the greater part throwing down their arms and saving themselves by flight. The Arabs, who disdained this cowardly mode of escape, paid dearly for their courage, and fell in great numbers. On the 15th of May, after a single day’s bombardment, the fort surrendered, and with it the whole of the Peishwa’s remaining artillery, amounting to thirty-seven guns. During these operations the British loss in killed and wounded was only ninety-seven, while that of the enemy in killed alone exceeded 800.

Almost simultaneously with these successes, the fort of Chanda, the chief stronghold of the Rajah of Nagpoor, was taken by Colonel Adams. On learning that both Generals Doveton and Smith were in hot pursuit of the Peishwa, with every prospect of success, he turned east and sat down before Chanda on the 9th of May. The poisoning of the wells in the line of his approach seemed to indicate the determination of the commandant to hold out to extremity, while the natural and artificial strength of the place, and a garrison of upwards of 3000 men, furnished him amply with the means. Influenced partly by these considerations, Colonel Adams endeavoured to avoid the necessity of a siege by an offer of favourable terms. These, however, were indignantly rejected, the commandant, as if determined to make capitulation impossible, having not only detained the messenger, but, it is alleged, barbarously blown him from a gun. There was now therefore no alternative, and the siege commenced.

Chanda, situated eighty-five miles south of Nagpoor, was about six miles in circuit, and inclosed by a stone wall, flanked at intervals with round towers of sufficient size and strength to carry the heaviest guns. Near its centre stood the citadel crowning a commanding height. Access to the place was rendered difficult, on the north by a large tank and dense jungle, and in other directions by the Eraee and Jurputi, two affluents of the Wurda, which running along its eastern and western faces, met at the distance of about 400 yards to
the south. Colonel Adams took up his position in this last direction, and selected the south-east angle for the point of attack. A breaching battery, erected only 250 yards from this point, opened on the morning of the 19th of May, and before evening had made a breach which was pronounced practicable. The storm took place on the 20th, and succeeded with little loss to the assailants, while at least 500 of the garrison were killed. The commandant was among the number, and the defenders of the citadel, dispirited in consequence, forthwith abandoned it. Colonel Adams, thus successful beyond expectation, was returning to the cantonment at Hoshungabad, when the cholera broke out among his troops, and in a few days carried off more men than he had lost during the whole of the military operations. The scourge indeed had now spread over the whole country, and no part of India, from the mountains of Nepaul to Cape Comorin, escaped.

Some other captures, either from their own importance or accompanying circumstances, are deserving of notice. In the Concan, and in the adjacent country, both below and above the Ghauts, Colonel Prother, who had been sent with a detachment from Bombay, succeeded in the reduction of several strongholds. One of these, Raighur, situated among the mountains, thirty-two miles south-west from Poonah, was regarded by the Mahrattas as impregnable, and had accordingly been selected by the Peishwas as the chief depository of their treasures. In April, 1818, when Colonel Prother appeared before it, it was the residence of Varanasee Bai, the wife of the Peishwa, who had selected it as the most secure asylum that could be found for her, and was defended by a picked garrison of 1000 men, mostly Arabs. On the 24th of April the pettah was gained, and shortly afterwards, mortars and howitzers being with great difficulty brought into position, the bombardment commenced. A safe-conduct had previously been offered to the Bai, but the officers of the garrison, determined on resistance, did not communicate it to her, and the shells continued to be thrown in for fourteen days with such destructive effect that most of the buildings were laid in ruins. At last, a shell having set fire to the residence of the Bai, she insisted on a surrender, and the garrison capitulated on being permitted to march out with their private property and arms.

Though the Peishwa was still at liberty, the great objects of the campaign had been accomplished, and the governor-general therefore determined to reduce his military establishments. The army of the Deccan was first dissolved, and accordingly, Sir Thomas Hislop began, in the middle of January, 1818, to march southwards with the first division, after reinforcing the third, which was still to remain with Sir John Malcolm in Malwah. Having traversed the country between the Nerbudda and the Taptee, he arrived on the 27th of February at Talneer, situated on the right or north bank of the latter river. As this was one of the places which Holkar had ceded by the late treaty, no difficulty was anticipated in obtaining the delivery of it, and the baggage pre-
ceeding the division advanced into the plain without any suspicion of danger. The first intimation of hostility was given by the firing of a round shot from the fort. A summons to surrender was immediately sent to the commandant, and he was distinctly warned that, if resistance was offered, he and his garrison, as acting contrary to the orders of his own sovereign who had ceded the place, and in defiance of the British government, to which it now rightfully belonged, would be treated as rebels. The commandant refused to receive the letter containing this warning, but its purport was verbally communicated to him. It is therefore to be presumed that when he determined to resist, and gave open proof of it by commencing a fire of musketry which proved fatal to several British soldiers, he had counted the cost, and was ready if unsuccessful to pay the penalty. The subsequent proceedings having led to much important discussion, must be given with some detail.

The message to the killedar or commandant was sent between seven and eight in the morning. It intimated to him that the order from Holkar to surrender the fort was in Sir Thomas Hislop's possession, called upon him to send out some person to examine and recognize its genuineness, in order that the surrender might take place before noon, and concluded with the above warning as to the consequences of refusal. The messenger was detained, and noon having arrived without any answer, the provisional batteries which had been hastily prepared against the place opened their fire. At the same time the commander-in-chief instructed the deputy adjutant-general, Colonel Macgregor Murray, "that nothing less than unconditional surrender would be received; that the lives of the garrison should be guaranteed; that no promise whatever could be given to the killedar for his, but that he would be held personally answerable for his acts." About three o'clock a person came out from the fort and inquired whether terms would be given. Colonel Murray answered as
above instructed, and another hour having elapsed without any appearance of surrender, the detachments selected for the assault moved forward. It had been intended to blow open the outer gate, and two six-pounders had been carried up for that purpose. It was unnecessary, however, to use them, as the wall of the gate had been so much injured as to give a ready passage to the storming party. They found the second gate open, and were rushing on to the third gate, when a number of unarmed persons, apparently intending to escape, came out from the wicket, and were placed under a guard. At the third and fourth gates the assailants met with no resistance. On arriving at the fifth they found the wicket open, or saw it opened from within, and the garrison, which consisted of 300 Arabs, standing behind it. Some parley took place, the Arabs demanding terms, and the assailants insisting on their unconditional surrender, with an assurance that their lives would be saved. It is very probable that the parties were unintelligible to each other, but Colonel Murray and Major Gordon, understanding that the surrender was acquiesced in, passed the wicket with a few grenadiers. No sooner had they entered than—from causes which have not been satisfactorily explained, some attributing it to treachery, others to misunderstanding, and others to a rash attempt to deprive several of the Arabs of their arms—Major Gordon and the grenadiers were shot or cut down, and Colonel Murray, after being dangerously stabbed, was only saved by being dragged back through the wicket, which had fortunately been kept open. The assailants now infuriated forced their passage, and put every man of the garrison to the sword.

This general massacre, though certainly much to be lamented, was inevitable under the circumstances. The storming party, having every reason to believe that their comrades had been treacherously murdered, followed the natural impulse of the moment, and took summary vengeance. It has been argued that there was no treachery, as there was no surrender, and that the Arabs in attacking those who had entered within the wicket, only understood that they were repelling force by force. If so, they brought their fate upon themselves, since, according to the rigorous but well-known laws of war, troops standing an assault are not entitled to quarter. The slaughter of the garrison, therefore, being either justifiable or inevitable, need not be further discussed. But a very important question still remains. Among the persons who issued from the wicket of the third gate and were placed under a guard was the killedar himself. This fact was not observed at the time, as there was nothing in his dress to distinguish him, and he did not make himself known. Afterwards when the assault was over, it was determined not to give him the benefit of any surrender, real or supposed. He was therefore tried on the spot, condemned, and in the course of the evening hanged on one of the bastions. Was this legal? Was it accordant with justice and humanity?

When the proceedings at Talneer became known in England they produced
a very strong sensation. The execution of the killedar in particular was severely animadverted upon, and not only the courts of directors and proprietors, but both Houses of Parliament, in passing votes of thanks to Sir Thomas Hislop and the army of the Deccan, specially excepted his execution of the killedar, as an act on which further explanation was required. This explanation was furnished by Sir Thomas Hislop in a very long despatch, addressed to the governor-general in council, on the 10th of September, 1819. The only part of it necessary to be quoted is his account of the evidence on which the sentence proceeded:—“At the investigation I attended, and was assisted by your lordship’s political agent (Captain Briggs) and the adjutant-general (Colonel Conway). Evidence was taken in the killedar’s presence, by which it appeared that my communication sent to him in the morning had been delivered, and understood by him and several others in the fort; that he was perfectly aware of the cession of Holkar, and that it was publicly known; that he was entertained by several persons not to resist in such a cause, but that he was resolved to do so till death; his resistance and exposing himself to an assault, was therefore regulated by his own free-will: he was sensible of his guilt, and had nothing to urge in his favour. The result of the inquiry was the unanimous opinion (after the witnesses had been heard, and the killedar had been asked what he had to say in his defence, to which he replied, Nothing), that the whole of his proceedings became subject to capital punishment, which every consideration of humanity and justice urgently demanded should be inflicted on the spot.”

This verbose account is by no means satisfactory. The killedar was not implicated in the supposed treachery of the garrison at the fifth gate, for he had previously surrendered or been made prisoner; nor could he be said in strict truth to have stood an assault, as he had laid aside his arms and become a prisoner before the storming party encountered any real opposition. The only grounds, therefore, on which the sentence admits of any plausible vindication, are that his original resistance was rebellion, and that in order to prevent the rebellion from spreading it was necessary to strike terror by making a signal example. Now it is not to be denied that the killedar in resisting the order of his sovereign to deliver up the fort was technically a rebel, but in order to fix the amount of guilt which he thus incurred, it is necessary to remember that at this period Holkar himself was merely a child, and the whole powers of government were in the hands of contending factions. The killedar, who was a man of rank, the uncle of Balaram Set, the late prime minister of Tulasi Bai, belonged to one of these factions, which had long possessed the ascendant, had only lately lost it, and was in hopes of being able to regain it. In these circumstances rebellion in the ordinary sense of the term was impossible. The order to surrender the fort, though it bore the name of Holkar, must have been viewed by the killedar as only the order of the faction to which he was opposed.
and it was therefore preposterous in the extreme for a third party to step in and inflict the punishment of rebellion on a leader of one of the factions, for refusing to recognize and yield implicit obedience to the orders issued by another. The sentence being thus unjust cannot have been politic, and hence the other ground of vindication—the expediency of making an example—hardly requires to be discussed. It may be true, as Sir Thomas Hislop alleges, that other killedars from whom resistance might have been anticipated immediately yielded up their forts; but any advantage thus obtained must have been more than counterbalanced by the opinion which prevailed among the native troops and people generally, that the killedar had suffered wrongfully, and that the British government, in sanctioning his execution, had stained their reputation for moderation and justice.

While the different divisions of the army of the Deccan had been employed in following on the track of the fleeing Peishwa, and reducing the provinces which had hitherto acknowledged his sway, the district of Candeish had in a great measure been overlooked. The bands of Arab mercenaries who belonged to the different native armies which had been broken up, had here congregated, and as it seemed vain to expect that they would ever forget their military habits and form a peaceable and industrious population, it was determined to offer them no better terms than payment of any arrears that might be due to them, and reconveyance to their native country. As there was no reason to believe that they would voluntarily accept of these terms, compulsory measures were resorted to, and Colonel Macdowall, who had been successful with a detachment of the Hyderabad division in the line of hills north of the Godavery, was ordered to proceed for the same purpose into Candeish. Leaving Chandore on the 13th of May he marched northward, and on the 15th arrived before Malligaum, a strong fortress situated in a circular bend of the Musan, a little above its junction with the Girna, an affluent of the Taptee. Here the Arabs had mainly concentrated their force and prepared for a determined resistance.

Malligaum consisted as usual of a fort and a pettah. The fort, in the form of a square, was protected by the river on the north and south, and inclosed by a triple wall, with a wide and deep ditch between the second wall and the first, which was lofty and built of solid masonry, with towers at the angles. The entrance to it was by intricate passages, leading through nine gates furnished with excellent bomb-proofs. The pettah, situated on the eastern side, was inclosed by a partly decayed rampart, and contained many buildings of sufficient strength and height to be used as points of defence. The means which Colonel Macdowall possessed for the siege of such a place were altogether inadequate, consisting of not more than 950 firelocks, 270 pioneers, and a small detail of European artillery; but Captain Briggs, who acted as agent under Mr. Elphinstone, was in hopes of a comparatively easy capture, from
having established an understanding with part of the garrison through Rajah Bahadur, who had held the place as jaghirdar, till he was dispossessed by the Arabs, and placed under a kind of thraldom. It was soon seen that nothing was to be expected from the rajah, and that the utmost courage and science would scarcely suffice to insure success.

The south-west having been selected as the point of attack, the engineers broke ground at nightfall of the 18th of May behind a mango grove near the bank of the river. Scarcely, however, were operations commenced when a vigorous sally from the fort was made, and not repulsed till the besiegers had lost twenty-one men in killed and wounded—a loss all the more serious that one of the killed was Lieutenant Davies, an officer of great ability, who commanded the engineers. Notwithstanding this interruption, two batteries were

thrown up in the course of the night at the distance of 500 yards, and progress continued to be made. By the 28th a breach had been effected which appeared to be practicable, and as reinforcements of 600 infantry and 500 irregular horse had in the meantime been received, and the ammunition was on the point of failing, it was resolved to risk an assault. It was made at daybreak of the 29th, and proved premature. The storming party, headed by Ensign Nattes, the surviving engineer officer, on arriving at the verge of an outwork beyond the ditch, found that the garrison had dug a trench so deep as to make it impossible to descend the glacis. Ensign Nattes, standing on the verge, was in the act of pronouncing the word "impracticable," when he was shot dead. After remaining for a short time exposed to a destructive fire, the storming party was recalled. Simultaneously with the assault an attack was made on the pettah, and an escalade of the outer wall of the fort attempted. The former was gallantly carried by Colonel Stewart, sword in hand, but the latter was abandoned in consequence of the failure at the breach. The inadequacy of the
force and the exhaustion of the ammunition having made the continuance of active operations impossible, Colonel Macdowall turned the siege into a blockade, and waited for reinforcements. These, consisting of a strong body of Europeans and a native battalion, with an additional train of artillery, and a supply of stores from the depot at Ahmednuggur, were sent off under the command of Major Watson, and arrived on the 9th of June.

The failure of the assault and the capture of the pettah had led to a change in the plan of attack. The intention now was to carry it on from the north and east. With this view the main body of the troops crossed the river, mines were commenced, and a battery of five heavy mortars and four howitzers was constructed. At daybreak of the 11th of June the battery opened its fire, and in the course of the day threw upwards of 300 shells in the direction where the principal magazine was known to be situated. This perseverance was crowned with success, and a tremendous explosion took place, blowing about thirty feet of the curtain outwards into the ditch, and killing and disabling many of the garrison. Preparations were again about to be made for the assault when the Arabs anticipated them by offering to capitulate. Colonel Macdowall insisted on an unconditional surrender. The garrison did not decline the terms, but dreading a repetition of what had happened at Talneer, urgently requested a written assurance that their lives would be spared. This the colonel at once conceded, and still further to allay their fears, engaged that they should be well treated.

On this occasion a striking and rather costly illustration was given of the importance of a knowledge of the native languages. The Mahratta moonshee, instructed to draw up the written engagement, used expressions which went far beyond what was intended, and instead of a promise of good treatment on unconditional surrender, made Colonel Macdowall engage that "whatever was most advantageous for the garrison" should be done; "that letters should be written concerning the pay; that the British government should be at the expense of feeding and recovering the sick, and that the Arabs should not want anything till they reached the places where they wished to go." These words, "where they wished to go," were a mistake for "where it was intended to send them." Abdool Kader, the principal Arab chief, with this letter in his pocket, marched out on the 14th of May at the head of his garrison, now reduced to 300 Arabs and sixty Hindostanees. The mistake was first discovered by Captain Briggs, the political agent, who, when Colonel Macdowall went to hand over the prisoners to him for the purpose of being transported to their own country, declined to receive them, on the ground that the written engagement did not warrant such treatment. Ultimately, on the whole matter being referred to Mr. Elphinstone, he never hesitated a moment to take the course which honour dictated, and the prisoners were treated with the utmost indulgence to which a liberal construction of the written engagement could entitle them. They
were immediately released, their whole arrears were paid to them from the government treasury, and they were furnished both with a safe conduct and with money to supply their wants till they should reach the residence of their own choice. This treatment doubtless did much to counteract the bad effects of the severity displayed at Talheer.

Apa Sahib and his two favourite ministers had been arrested in consequence of the multiplied proofs of their intrigues with the Peishwa, and the alarm excited by the approach of the former in the direction of Nagpoor. As a grandson of Ragojee Bhonsla by a daughter had, according to the governor-general’s original intention, been placed on the musnad, and government was henceforth to be administered in his name during his minority by the resident, it was necessary finally to dispose of Apa Sahib and his two associates. For the ex-rajah’s residence the old palace of the Mogul within the fort of Allahabad was fixed upon, and accordingly on the 3d of May Captain Browne, escorted by a wing of the 22d Bengal infantry, and three troops of the 8th native cavalry, started from Nagpoor with the three prisoners. He proceeded north-east in the direction of Jubulpooor, where his prisoners were to be handed over to a fresh escort, and he had arrived at Raichoor, within a march of it, when Apa Sahib made his escape. A Brahmin who accompanied the party from Nagpoor for a few marches, then left, and returned on the 12th of May, the very day before the escape took place, was supposed to have planned it. By representations of the merit of rescuing a Hindoo of the race of Sevajee, and large pecuniary bribes, several of the sepoys had been tempted from their fidelity. In consequence of a regular plot thus formed, a sepoy dress was introduced into the tent about two in the morning of the 13th; Apa Sahib having substituted it for his own joined the guard, and under semblance of a relief marched out of the camp without interruption. Six sepoys deserted at the same time, and others, together with a native officer, were deeply implicated. To postpone pursuit, precautions were taken to prevent an early discovery. Everything in the tent remained as usual; and when at four in the morning an officer as usual looked into the tent to ascertain the presence of the rajah, he found the two attendants whose duty it was to hand-rub (shampoo) their master apparently engaged in performing this office, and not suspecting that they were thus operating only on the cushions of the bed, reported that all was right. When the escape was discovered pursuit was attempted in vain. The very direction he had taken could not at first be ascertained, and after it was found that he had fled to Heraee, about forty miles to the south-west, and found an asylum with the Gonds among the recesses of the Mahadeo Hills, the offered reward of £10,000, subsequently increased to £20,000, and a jaghire of £1000 a year for life, could not tempt his protectors to betray him.

The long-continued pursuit of Bajee Row was meantime drawing to a close. He had turned northwards in the hope of either reaching the camp of Scindia,
who might perhaps be induced to make common cause with him, or of taking refuge in the strong fortress of Aserghur, held by Scindia's nominal dependant, Jeswunt Row Lar. He had however begun to talk of surrender, and had despatched messengers to tender it to the residents at both Nagpoor and Poonah. Having on the 5th of May crossed the Taptee just below its confluence with the Poorna, he proceeded along its right bank to Chupra, but finding this route closed against him, turned suddenly north-east, and arrived at Dholkote, about thirteen miles west of Aserghur. Here as he had gained considerably in advance of General Doveton, who had been pursuing him, he began to refresh his broken and dispirited troops. General Malcolm, who on the departure of Sir Thomas Hislop had been left in command of all the troops of the Madras army north of the Taptee, received this intelligence at Mhow, about twelve miles S.S.W. of Indore, and immediately sent off detachments to occupy the leading points on the line of the Nerbudda, and make it impossible for Bajee Row to penetrate into Malwah without being attacked. On the 16th of May, Anund Row Jeswunt and two other vakeels arrived in the camp at Mhow with a letter from the Peishwa desiring peace, and requesting that General Malcolm, whom he styled one of his best and oldest friends, would undertake the re-establishment of a good understanding between him and the British government. After a long conference, in which the vakeels urged the Peishwa's request that General Malcolm would visit him in his camp, and he declined, both because it might have an injurious tendency by indicating undue solicitude for peace, and might interfere with his direction of the necessary military operations, the vakeels, made aware that "their master must prepare himself to abandon his throne and quit the Deccan," set out on the 18th of May on their return, accompanied by Lieutenants Low and Macdonald, General Malcolm's first and second political assistants.

On the very night of their departure General Malcolm having received intelligence of Apa Sahib's escape, and feeling uncertain of the effect which it might have on the Peishwa's intentions, forwarded instructions to Lieutenant Low, directing him to allow the vakeels to proceed alone, and not to go to the Mahratta camp unless they returned in a short time with the Peishwa's special invitation to that effect. At the same time General Malcolm moved southward to Mundlesir, on the Nerbudda, where he arrived on the 22d of May, and General Doveton proceeding in an opposite direction reached Boorhanpoor, within fourteen miles of the Mahratta camp. The Peishwa, though now in great alarm, did not make any advance towards Mundlesir, and therefore General Malcolm, who had proposed to wait there for him, fearing some new evasion, crossed the Nerbudda on the morning of the 27th, and advanced by a forced march to Bekungong. The previous day the vakeels had returned with assurances of their master's sincerity, and an invitation to Lieutenant Low to proceed to his camp. That officer accordingly, made fully acquainted with the
only terms which could be granted, had an interview with the Peishwa on the 29th of May. The result was the arrangement of a meeting between the Peishwa and General Malcolm on the 1st of June at Khairee, immediately to the north of the mountain pass of that name.

At the meeting, which took place as appointed, the Peishwa was apparently unable to make up his mind to the terms which were offered, and which seemed to fall far short of his expectations. He thought he would have been permitted at least to retain the title of Peishwa and reside at Poonah, and on finding the contrary, proposed that they should meet again next day. This General Malcolm positively refused. He knew that the Peishwa had just sent the whole of his property into Aserghur, and suspecting that he was about to follow it in person, he determined, as he himself says, "that not a moment was to be lost in bringing matters to a close." He therefore no sooner returned to his tent after the termination of the interview than he sent the following schedule of agreement for the Peishwa's signature:—

1st, That Bajee Row shall resign for himself and his successors all right, title, and claim over the government of Poonah, or to any sovereign power whatever. 2d, That Bajee Row shall immediately come with his family, and a small number of his adherents and attendants, to the camp of Brigadier-general Malcolm, where he shall be received with honour and respect, and escorted safe to the city of Benares, or any other sacred place in Hindoostan that the governor-general may at his request fix for his residence. 3d, On account of the peace of the Deccan, and the advanced state of the season, Bajee Row must proceed to Hindoostan without one day's delay; but General Malcolm engages that any part of his family that may be left behind shall be sent to him as early as possible, and every facility given to render their journey speedy and convenient. 4th, That Bajee Row shall, on his voluntarily agreeing to this arrangement, receive a liberal pension from the Company's government for the support of himself and family. The amount of this pension will be fixed by the governor-general; but Brigadier-general Malcolm takes upon himself to engage that it shall not be less than eight lacs of rupees per annum. 5th, If Bajee Row, by a ready and complete fulfilment of this agreement, shows that he reposes entire confidence in the British government, his requests in favour of principal jaghirdars and old adherents, who have been ruined by;
their attachment to him, will meet with liberal attention. His representations also in favour of Brahmans of remarkable character, and of religious establishments founded or supported by his family, shall be treated with regard.

6th. The above propositions must not only be accepted by Bajee Row, but he must personally come into Brigadier-general Malcolm's camp within twenty-four hours of this period, or else hostilities will be recommenced, and no further negotiation will be entered into with him."

These propositions were sent to Bajee Row, with a message that they could not be altered, and that not more than twenty-four hours would be allowed for their acceptance. To quicken his decision, General Malcolm had recourse to the rather petty device of allowing one of his writers to give the vaakeels of the two leading Mahratta chiefs still adhering to Bajee Row a copy both of the letter sent and of the propositions submitted to him. The effect, as he was told, was, that "they perused them with eagerness, and the knowledge of the consideration meant to be given them, in the event of a settlement, appeared to quicken their zeal in no slight degree." Lest this should not prove sufficient, more active steps were taken. The main body of the British troops began to advance towards Khairze; further communication between the two camps was strictly prohibited; and Bajee Row was distinctly informed that if he did not immediately accept the terms, and encamp near the British force, he would throw away his last chance. At length Bajee Row, thoroughly intimidated, and seeing that nothing was to be gained by further evasion, began to approach the British camp, and arrived in its vicinity at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 3d of June. The force which accompanied him consisted of about 5000 horse and 3000 infantry. Of the latter nearly 2000 were Arabs.

The British and the Mahratta forces made several marches together towards the Nerbudda, General Malcolm repeatedly remonstrating with Bajee Row on the imprudence of keeping together so large a body of armed men, the greater proportion of whom must, from their situation, be discontented. Nothing, however, occurred till the 9th of June, when the Arabs demanded their arrears. They had been hired some months before by Trimbukjee Dainglia, but had only been a short time with Bajee Row. On this ground he offered to pay only for the time of their actual service with himself, whereas they insisted, with some show of reason, that they were entitled to pay from the time when they were hired. After a whole day spent in discussion no arrangement could be made, and Bajee Row, in the greatest alarm for his life, sent contradictory messages to the British camp, calling for relief, and at the same time praying that no movement towards him should be made, as he thought that the first appearance of it would be the signal for his murder. There was indeed good ground for alarm. The Arabs had completely surrounded his tent, and in all probability, had they proceeded to extremes, not only Bajee Row himself, but
all his family, including women and children, would have been sacrificed. By dexterous management on the part of General Malcolm, and great forbearance on the part of the troops under his command, the mutiny was happily quelled, and an award was pronounced which satisfied all parties. Subsequently to this event Bajee Row’s attendants were reduced to about 700 horse and 200 infantry, and he readily complied with every wish expressed, as to marching, encampments, and all other points.

The governor-general, when made acquainted with the terms on which the surrender of Bajee Row had been obtained, was considerably disappointed. He thought that General Malcolm erred, first in negotiating at all with Bajee Row, next in deputing an officer to his camp, and lastly, in the large amount assigned to him as a pension. The governor-general, in giving this opinion, was influenced by the belief, that “the troops with which Bajee Row had crossed the Taptee were completely surrounded. He found progress towards Gwalior impracticable, retreat as much so, and opposition to the British force altogether hopeless; so that any terms granted to him were purely gratuitous.” On the other hand, Sir John Malcolm, when reviewing the transaction in his *Political History of India*, says:—“But after all, the real fact was, that Bajee Row was not in our power. He had the means, by going into Aserghur, of protracting the war for five or six months, and keeping all India disturbed and unsettled during that period.” In support of this fact he produces a letter, in which General Doveton says, “that Bajee Row had the perfect power of going into Aserghur at any hour of the day or night, without its being possible for any efforts of ours to have prevented it at that time.” The question is not of much importance, but if it was possible, as here alleged, for Bajee Row to have protracted the war for other six months, the pension which induced him to terminate it at once was not extravagant. This was the opinion of the court of directors, who, in their general letter to Bengal, wrote as follows:—“It was also possible that he (Bajee Row) might have been compelled to surrender unconditionally, had no terms been offered to him; but it does appear to us that he still had some chance of escape, and that by throwing himself into Aserghur, he might, at all events for a considerable period of time, have deprived us of the important advantages which resulted from his early surrender; and, in this view of the subject, we are disposed to think that these advantages justified the terms which were granted to him.” The governor-general, though disapproving of the terms, did not for a moment question the validity of the engagement, and the residence of the ex-Peishwa was fixed at Bithoor, on the right bank of the Ganges—a residence recommended to him for its sanctity, as the place where Brahma is said to have offered an *asvamedha*, or sacrifice of a horse, on completing the act of creation, and recommended to the government from being only twelve miles north-west of Cawnpoor.

During the arrangements with Bajee Row, several of his leading adherents...
endeavoured to make terms for themselves. Among these were Trimbukjee Dainglia and the Pindaree Cheetoo. On finding that an unconditional surrender was demanded, and nothing more promised than that their lives should be spared, they disappeared. Trimbukjee concealed himself for some time in the vicinity of Nassik, but being discovered and captured, was first remanded to Tannah, his former prison, and afterwards sent off to Bengal, to end his days in the strong fort of Chunar, sixteen miles south-west of Benares. Cheetoo, after remaining for a time on the southern frontiers of Bhopaul, joined Apa Sahib, and shared his asylum among the Gonds of the Mahadeo Hills.

CHAPTER IV.

Barbarous races in India—Apa Sahib among the Gonds—His flight with Cheetoo—Cheetoo’s death—Capture of Aserghur—Settlements with native powers—Central India—Hindoostan—Rajpootana—Termination of the war—Affairs of Cutch—Treaty with the Amers of Scinde—Relations with the Guicowar, Oude, and Hyderabad—Connection with Palmer and Company—Close of the administration of the Marquis of Hastings—Its results, external and internal.

On both sides of the Nerubudda, and nearly parallel to its course, are two mountain ranges, the Vindhya on the north, and the Satpoora on the south. Near the centre, where they are lowest, they are traversed by the principal routes from the Deccan to Hindoostan; but rising gradually towards the east and the west, they form at each extremity a lofty mountain barrier, rendered almost impenetrable by the thickets and forests with which they are clothed. They are inhabited by semi-barbarous tribes, supposed to be the descendants of the aboriginal natives who took refuge among them, when driven from the lower grounds by their Brahminical conquerors. Towards the western extremity, where the mountains separate Malwah from Candeish and Gujerat, the inhabitants are designated by the name of Bheels, and are supposed by Sir John Malcolm, though probably on insufficient grounds, to be distinct from all other Indian tribes. He divides them into three distinct classes, of which he gives the following account:—”The first consists of a few who, from ancient residence or chance, have become inhabitants of villages on the plains (though usually near the hills), of which they are the watchmen, and are incorporated as a portion of the community; the cultivating Bheels are those who have continued in their peaceable occupations after their leaders were destroyed or driven by invaders to become desperate freebooters; and the wild or mountain Bheel

4 Central India, vol. i. pages 520, 521.
comprises all that part of the tribe who, preferring savage freedom and indolence to submission and industry, have continued to subsist by plunder." The name of Bheel, however, is no longer confined to those properly so called, but in consequence of intermixtures of foreign blood, and the adoption of their usages and modes of life by other classes of the community, is applied generally to all the plunderers dwelling in the mountains, and on the woody banks of rivers in the western parts of India. During the period of non-interference, the Beeels of the plains lost the little civilization which had been communicated to them, and uniting with the wild mountaineers almost annihilated cultivation and commerce by their depredations; but in completing the suppression of the predatory system successful efforts were made, particularly by Captain Briggs, the political agent in Candeish, and Sir John Malcolm in Malwa. Partly by severity, but far more by judicious measures of conciliation, a great proportion of the Beeels have been reduced to order, and a Beeel militia, disciplined and commanded by British officers, have made the most lawless districts secure both to the farmer and the traveller.

Towards the eastern extremity, where the ranges attain their greatest height, and separate Bengal and Orissa from Berar, the inhabitants, in some respects still more barbarous than the Beeels, consist of various tribes, of which the principal are the Koles, the Khonds, and the Gonds. Some of them lead an agricultural, and more a pastoral life, but a large proportion depend for subsistence on the wild fruits and wild animals of their almost impenetrable thickets. Their chief weapons are bows and arrows, and long knives; their only luxury is ardent spirits, in which they indulge to the greatest excess; and their sanguinary deities, before the British government put down the abomination, were often propitiated by human victims. The Gonds, by far the most numerous tribe, spread from the southern and western limits of Behar into Berar, and for some distance westward along the valley of the Nerbudda. Some of them consequently were the nominal subjects of the Rajah of Nagpoor, and hence it is easy to understand how the ex-rajah Apa Sahib sought and found an asylum among them. His protector was Chain Sah, who had usurped the rights of his nephew, the chief of Harai or Herye, and by extending his authority over several adjacent districts had the seat of his power among the Mahadeo Hills, situated on the east of the road leading between Nagpoor and Hoshungabad.

Apa Sahib's place of refuge was no sooner known than he was joined by various other Gond chiefs, as professed vassals of Berar, and by bands of Mahrattas, Pindarees, and Arabs, whom late events had thrown out of employment. The whole number of adventurers whom he thus gathered around him fell little short of 20,000, and acting in parties, amounting occasionally to 2000 or 3000, immediately commenced a war of posts on the British detachments. The season of the year did not admit of a regular campaign, but in order to confine the
The depredations of Apa Sahib’s followers within as narrow limits as possible, and check any general rising in his favour, detachments from Hoshungabad, Nagpoor, and Saugur were stationed in various parts of the valley contiguous to the hills. In the desultory warfare which ensued, the enemy’s better knowledge of the country gave him considerable advantages. A body of Arabs having assembled near the sources of the Taptee, advanced and gained possession of the town of Maisdi. With the view of dislodging these, Captain Sparkes was detached on the 18th of July, 1818, from Hoshungabad to Baitool, with two companies of the 10th Bengal native infantry. Stronger detachments followed on the 20th, but Captain Sparkes pushed on without waiting for them, and encountered a body of horse. When they retreated he rashly followed, and found himself brought suddenly face to face with a main body, consisting of 2000 horse and 1500 foot. He took post on the edge of a ravine, and notwithstanding the enormous disparity of numbers maintained his ground till he fell. Ultimately, the whole of the ammunition having been expended, the enemy rushed in and put all to the sword, with the exception of a few individuals who managed to escape.

To avert the natural consequences of this disaster, movements on a larger scale became necessary, and troops began to advance simultaneously from Hoshungabad, Nagpoor, Jubbulpore, and Jalna, but the inclemency of the weather and state of the roads so retarded their progress, that the enemy were able in the meantime to gain new successes. In the beginning of August they obtained possession of the town of Mooltaee by the connivance of the civil authorities, and still farther to the eastward, after capturing several places, advanced to within forty miles of Nagpoor. Here great alarm prevailed, and was much increased by the detection of a conspiracy against the young rajah. At length, when the difficulties of the march had been surmounted, and the troops began to act, the work of retaliation commenced, and all that the enemy had gained was soon wrested from them. Not only were they driven from all their posts in the plain, but they were followed into the hills, and made to pay dearly for all their aggressions. With the beginning of 1819 the campaign opened in more regular form, and parties penetrating into every recess of the hills took Chain Sahib prisoner, and beat up the head-quarters of Apa Sahib. He had anticipated their arrival, and fled, accompanied by Cheetoo and a few well-mounted horsemen, in the direction of Aseerghur, where they hoped to find an asylum. Attempts were made to intercept them, and well-nigh succeeded, for they only escaped by dashing into a deep ravine, into which, owing to the darkness of the night, cavalry could not follow them. The commandant Jeswunt Row Lar admitted Apa Sahib, but refused to admit Cheetoo and his followers, who remained in the vicinity till they were attacked by a detachment sent by Sir John Malcolm. They would in all probability have been captured, had not the matchlock-men in the fort opened on their pursuers, and given
them an opportunity of dispersing. Not thinking himself yet secure, or because Jeswunt Row was afraid to risk the consequences of harbouring him, Apa Sahib set out in the disguise of a religious mendicant to Boorhanpoor, and after a short concealment there, proceeded through Malwah towards Gwalior. Scindia though not indisposed was afraid to countenance him, and he found no resting-place till he entered the Punjab, and obtained a friendly reception from Runjeet Sing. At a later period the Rajah of Joudpoor, on becoming responsible for his conduct, was allowed to give him an asylum. A worse fate was reserved for Cheetoo. On the dispersion of his followers at Aseerghur he fled north with his son, crossed the Nerbudda, and attempted to penetrate into Malwah by traversing the Vindhya Mountains. On finding the Baglee Pass carefully guarded he parted from his son, and was not afterwards seen alive. A party of Holkar’s cavalry passing from Baglee to Kantapoor perceived a horse wandering alone. Having caught it and recognized it to be Cheetoo’s, they made a search in a neighbouring thicket notoriously infested by tigers. At first they found a sword, parts of a dress torn and stained with blood, some money, and some recent grants which Cheetoo had obtained from the ex-Rajah of Nagpoor, and part of a human body. There could now be little doubt that he had met a death not unbecitting the kind of life he had led, and been seized by a tiger. That there might remain no doubt of the fact the animal was traced to its den. It had just fled, leaving behind it a human head in so perfect a state, that when brought to Sir John Malcolm’s camp, it was at once recognized by Cheetoo’s son, who had been made prisoner, and given up to him for interment.

The design of Apa Sahib to seek an asylum in Aseerghur having been penetrated by the British government, Scindia, who had engaged previous to the war to yield it up for temporary occupation, was called upon to fulfil this engagement. He complied with apparent readiness, and sending orders to deliver it up to Sir John Malcolm, repaired to Gwalior. Jeswunt Row professed similar readiness, but spun out the time by evasive pleas, till Apa Sahib actually arrived and gained admittance as already mentioned. By this act, and still more by firing on the troops in pursuit of Cheetoo, Jeswunt Row had shown that nothing but force could compel him to yield up the fort, and therefore Sir John Malcolm and General Doveton were instructed to employ the forces at their disposal in reducing it. They accordingly arrived in its vicinity and took up their positions, Sir John Malcolm on the north, and General Doveton on the south.

Aseerghur consisted of an upper and a lower fort, and of a partially walled town, situated immediately to the west of the former. The upper fort crowned the summit of an isolated rock of the Satpoora range, about 750 feet in height, and occupied an area, which, though nearly 1100 yards in extreme length from east to west, and 600 yards in extreme width from north to south, was, owing
to the irregularity of its outline, not nearly so large as these figures might seem to indicate. Within the area were two depressions or basins, in which a sufficient supply of water for the garrison throughout the year could be collected, but this advantage, seldom enjoyed by a hill-fort, was partly counterbalanced by the numerous ravines which afforded cover to an enemy in making his approaches. The wall inclosing the area was only a low curtain, but nothing more was required, as the whole precipice was carefully scarped on all sides to the depth of 120 feet, so as to make access impossible except at two points, the one on the north, and the other on the south-west face. The principal task, therefore, which art had to accomplish was to fortify these avenues. The one on the north, naturally the more difficult of the two, was carried up a precipitous ravine, and was in its upper part defended by an outer rampart containing four casemates, with embrasures 18 feet both in height and thickness, and 190 feet in length across the approach. The easier and more used avenue, after ascending from the town to the lower fort, which was surrounded by a rampart 30 feet high, and flanked with towers, was continued by a steep flight of stone steps traversing five successive gateways, all constructed of solid masonry. The guns placed in battery on the summit of the rock were of enormous calibre. One of them carried a ball of 380 pounds weight, and was believed by the natives capable of lodging it at Boorhanpoor, a distance of fourteen miles.

Operations were commenced on the 18th of March, 1819, by the attack of the town, which was carried with little resistance, the garrison retiring into the lower fort. Batteries were immediately constructed notwithstanding a spirited sally, and by the 21st a practicable breach was effected. The garrison not venturing to stand an assault retired to the upper fort, but immediately after took advantage of the explosion of a powder magazine belonging to one of the batteries, to return and resume their fire. This however was soon silenced, and on the 30th, when preparations were again made for storming the lower fort, the assailants were allowed to take possession of it without a struggle. Meanwhile General Doveton had moved round with the principal part of the heavy ordnance to the east face, from which side it seemed that the upper fort could be most advantageously attacked. The progress, impeded by many obstacles, was necessarily slow, but by the 7th of April the defences were so ruined that Jeswunt Row consented to an unconditional surrender. The loss of the besiegers, amounting to 313 killed and wounded, was greater than that of the garrison.

According to agreement, Aserghur, of which the British were entitled only to temporary occupation, was to be restored to Scindia, but an unexpected discovery within the place itself rendered this unnecessary. It was known that Baijee Row had deposited valuable jewels in the fort. The commandant, on being ordered to produce them, declared that they had been
returned. This not being believed, he engaged to show Bajee Row's receipt. It was contained in a casket among other papers, one of which was observed by an officer who stood by to be in Scindia's handwriting. On mentioning the circumstance the commandant betrayed so much confusion that it was deemed proper to seize the casket, and examine its contents. The paper which had attracted observation proved to be a letter from Scindia instructing the commandant to obey whatever orders the Peishwa might give him, and refuse delivery of the fort to the English. When charged with this treachery Scindia and his ministers did not venture to deny it. They only attempted a kind of apology by alleging that any message sent to Jeswunt Row could only be considered as words of course, since it was well known that that officer would only do what was pleasing to himself. To give some colour to this apology, Scindia even admitted that he had invited Bajee Row to Gwalior merely because he knew that it was impossible for him to come. In justification of this double duplicity, he simply remarked how natural it was for a man seeing his friend struggling in the water and crying for help, to stretch out the hand and speak words of comfort, though aware that he could give him no assistance. The penalty inflicted by the governor-general was to retain permanent possession of Aseerghur and its district: Scindia, who had feared a heavier punishment, was glad to escape so easily.

As military operations terminated with the capture of Aseerghur, and the armies returned to their usual cantonments in time of peace, we are now in a position to form an estimate of the results of the war. At first sight the preparations seemed far greater than the occasion required. The ostensible object was to put down a number of predatory hordes, who, though they mustered their tens of thousands, were known to be incapable of carrying out a regular campaign, and never ventured to fight a pitched battle. But though the Pindarees were by no means formidable in themselves, they had powerful supporters who would gladly have come to the rescue if they had seen the least chance of success. As it was, three of the leading Mahratta powers did break out into open hostilities, and Scindia was only deterred from following their example by the judicious measures which had been taken to bring an overwhelming force to bear upon him. The danger was that a great Mahratta confederacy would be formed, and make it necessary to wage a new war for supremacy. The salutary fear inspired by the strong force maintained in action by the governor-general, induced each Mahratta power to keep aloof in order to consult its own safety, and thus made it easy, when hostilities did actually commence, to encounter them separately, and beat them in detail.

The powerful armies which the governor-general brought into the field, while they overawed the Mahrattas, were necessary in order to carry out the vigorous policy which it had been wisely resolved to substitute for that of non-interference. In the vain and selfish expectation that we might increase
our own security by leaving the native states to waste themselves in preying upon each other, we had allowed a kind of general anarchy to prevail, and could not be aroused to a sense of the true position we were called to maintain till we began to count the cost, and found that in order to prevent the anarchy from spreading into our own territories, we were incurring as much expense as would suffice to suppress it altogether, and bring back tranquility. For this purpose it was necessary not merely to convince the states to which we had refused protection that we were now disposed to grant it, but to show by the actual forces which we mustered that we were able and willing to make it good against all who might venture to call it in question. It was this which made the Rajpoot and other chiefs so eager to obtain our alliance, and induced them virtually to sacrifice their independence for the sake of the security which they knew we could afford them. From this period the British government was recognized as umpire in all disputes between sovereign native states, and an appeal to its decision has been happily substituted for the former invariable appeal to the sword.

In contemplating the vastness of the change one cannot help wondering at the comparative facility with which it was accomplished. Numerous encounters took place, and the superiority of British skill and courage was never more fully manifested; but no great battles were fought, and yet how vast the revolution which has been effected! Scindia so humbled that he dared not take a single step in favour of those to whom it was notorious that he had pledged his support; Holkar, who was at one time so formidable as, single-handed, to defy the whole British power, left in possession of little more than half his original territories, and these so intersected and dismembered as to be incapable of acting together for any common purpose; one Rajah of Nagpoor, after forfeiting a large portion of his territories, deposed, and unable to find an asylum without fleeing to one of the extremities of India, and another placed on the musnud solely by British influence; and last of all, the very name of Peishwa, the acknowledged head of the Mahratta confederacy, abolished, and the last individual who bore it exiled to Bengal, to live under British authority, and subsist as a pensioner on British bounty, while his extensive territories have been annexed to the British dominions, either absolutely or in effect. In various quarters, too, while important accessions of territory have been gained, an influence in some respects as valuable as territory has been acquired. Our alliances have been extended over all Rajpootana, including not only the leading states of Odeypoor, Joudpoor, and Jeypoor, but the extensive though remote and barren territories of Jessulmeer and Bikaneer, together with the minor states of Kotah, Boondee, Kerowlee, Siroki, Banswara, &c. In all these states the Mahratta influence, once paramount and used only for purposes of oppression, has been completely destroyed, while British ascendancy, besides being stipulated by treaty, has been further secured by the cession of
the central province of Ajmeer, formerly held in bondage by a nominal depend-ant of Scindia. In Bundelcund the reduction of refractory zemindars has put an end to the lawless exactions by which the cultivators were oppressed, and the whole country kept in constant alarm; and while the Nabob of Bhopaul has been rewarded for his fidelity to his engagements by considerable accessions of territory, and relief from indefinite Mahratta claims which were continually threatening his independence, the neighbouring chief of Saugur, for refusing to fulfil his engagements, has paid the penalty, and seen his territ-ory finally merged in that of the Company.

It is of importance to remember that the extensive acquisitions of territory made during, and in consequence of the war, were not originally contemplated. The suppression of the predatory system, as it was the ostensible, was also the real object for which the Marquis of Hastings brought the armies into the field, and hence all the districts from which the Pindarees were expelled, instead of being retained as lawful conquests, were at once restored to the states from which they had been dissevered. The same course would have been followed to the end, and the war, however much it might have added to British influ-ence, would have terminated without increasing the extent of British territory. The Mahrattas brought their fate upon themselves by their open hostilities or secret treachery; and the British, after being forced into such struggles as took place at Poonah, the Seetabaldee Hills, and Mahidpoor, had no alternative but to provide against their recurrence by deposing or curtailing the territories of the chiefs who, while professing friendship, had thus treacherously assailed them. Though it cannot be supposed that the humiliations thus experienced did not leave rankling feelings behind them, it has been satisfactorily proved that both Scindia and Holkar, by exchanging a condition bordering on anarchy for one of comparative tranquillity, gained more in revenue than they had lost in territory. Sir John Malcolm, contrasting Central India in 1817 and 1821, says:—"Dowlut Row Scindia has already derived a double benefit from the change in the reduction of his army, and the increase of his revenue." "The saving in actual expenditure, from reductions alone, cannot be less than twenty lacs of rupees per annum; and it is difficult to calculate the amount of money and tranquillity gained by the extinction of men like Bapoo Scindia and Jeswunt Row Bhaoo, and other leaders who commanded those bodies of his army which were at once the most useless and expensive. In 1817 there was not one district belonging to Scindia in Central India that was not more or less in a disturbed state; in 1821 there existed not one enemy to the public peace. The progress of improvement in his territories differs in every part; but it is general." "On the whole of Scindia's territories in this part of India, we may safely compute a rise of about 25 per cent. in the revenue, and a deduction of 15 in the expenses of its collection." Of Holkar's dominions he speaks in still more flattering terms:—"The revenues of Holkar from his possessions in
Malwah and Nemaur were in 1817, 441,679 rupees (£44,167); in 1819-20 they were 1,696,183 rupees (£169,618). The expenses of collection were four years ago from 35 to 40 per cent.; they do not now exceed 15 per cent.; there being in fact hardly any sebondy or revenue corps kept up. The proximity of the British troops, with the knowledge of the support and protection which that government affords to the Holkar territories, has hitherto continued to preserve them in tranquillity." In order to give a more complete idea of what he calls "the rapid resuscitation of this state," Sir John Malcolm has inserted in the appendix to his Central India, a table, showing that, of 3701 government villages belonging to Holkar, "there were in 1817 only 2038 inhabited; 1663 were deserted, or, as the natives emphatically term it, without lamp. In 1818, 269 villages were restored; in 1819, 343; and in 1820, 508, leaving only 543 deserted; and there can be no doubt that within three years, these will be re-populated." The progress of improvement was equally satisfactory in other quarters. The Puar states of Dhar and Dewass, which were nearly depopulated, had commenced a career of prosperity; Bhopaul, which in 1817 struggled for existence, was "in a state of rapid improvement;" the petty Rajpoot states had experienced "as great an improvement as any in Central India;" and this description applied, "with a little difference, to all the Rajpoot principalities east and west of the Chumbul." Some miscellaneous transactions for which no place in the narrative has yet been found may now be mentioned.

Row Barmaljee, the Rajah of Cutch, with whom, it will be remembered, the British government had concluded a treaty, had surrounded himself with dissolute companions, and indulged to such an extent in intemperate habits as to affect his intellect. His whole conduct was that of a cruel and capricious tyrant. The young prince Lakhpati or Ladhuba, who had competed with him for the sovereignty, was barbarously murdered by his orders; and Ladhuba's widow, who had been left pregnant and afterwards gave birth to a son, would have shared her husband's fate had not the British government thrown its shield around her. With such a brutal prince it was impossible that friendly relations could be durable, and he began almost openly to make military preparations. The British thus forewarned reinforced their station at Anjar with an additional battalion; and Barmaljee, now afraid to risk the encounter, turned his arms against Kallian Sing, the father of Ladhuba's widow, and one of the Jhareja chiefs under British protection. This infringement of the treaty was not allowed to pass unnoticed, and the approach of a British detachment,
combined with the little success which had attended his operations, compelled him to a hasty retreat. The detachment then advanced upon Bhooj on the 24th of March, 1819, and after repulsing large masses of horse and foot by which they were charged, carried the fort by surprise. As it completely commanded the town, Barmaljee saw the fruitlessness of further resistance, and surrendered at discretion. By concert with the Jhreja chiefs he was deposed, and the government was administered, in the name of his infant son Row Desal, by a native regency, under the direction of the resident and the guarantee of the British government. In the treaty concluded at this time clauses were inserted against the practice of female infanticide, which prevailed to a horrible extent among the Jhrejas. It is not unworthy of notice that Cutch, shortly after these political commotions, suffered dreadfully from an earthquake.

An enormous mound of earth and sand many miles in extent was heaved up, and at the same time an adjacent tract of country sunk down and was submerged. At Bhooj 7000 houses were thrown down, and 1140 persons buried among the ruins. At Anjar about 3000 houses were thrown down or rendered uninhabitable, and the fort became a pile of ruins. Many other towns were wholly or partially destroyed. The volcanic agency, though most tremendous in Cutch, was not confined to it, and simultaneous shocks were felt in many other parts of India.

The political arrangements in Cutch gave great umbrage to the Ameers of Scinde. They had long been bent on the conquest of it, and were mortified to find their designs anticipated. The feelings of enmity to the British government thus engendered were aggravated by other circumstances. The confines of Gujerat and Cutch had been pillaged by the Khosas and other marauding tribes on the borders of the desert of Scinde. In order to suppress these ravages the co-operation of the Ameers had been requested, and they had sent a body of
troops to act with a British detachment sent against the plunderers under Colonel Barclay, from Pulanpoor, near the northern confines of Gujerat. The Scindian auxiliaries, so far from aiding in the expulsion of the Khosas, allowed them to encamp without molestation in their vicinity, and when Colonel Barclay attacked the marauders and dispersed them, complained as if they themselves had been the direct object of attack. New ground of offence was given when the British troops, in pursuing the fugitives, crossed the Scinde frontier. The Ameers, without deigning to ask for explanation, or attempting an amicable arrangement, at once took redress into their own hands by invading Cutch with a body of troops, which advancing within fifty miles of Bhooj, took the town of Loona, and laid waste the adjacent country. On the advance of a British detachment they retired, but the Bombay government refused to overlook the aggression, and threatened to retaliate by sending a division into Scinde. The Ameers, not yet prepared for hostilities, disowned the proceedings of their troops, and sent apologies both to Bombay and Bhooj. The governor-general was not at this time disposed to risk a new war which did not seem to him to promise any profitable result; and therefore, accepting the disavowal as a sufficient apology, he authorized the conclusion of a treaty, which simply stipulated that the Ameers should procure the liberation of the prisoners and restrain the Khosas and other marauders from making inroads on the British or their allies. The reasons which induced the supreme government to adopt this pacific course were put on record, and are sufficiently curious to justify a quotation: "Few things would be more impolitic than a war with Scinde, as its successful prosecution would not only be unprofitable but an evil. The country was not worth possessing, and its occupation would involve us in all the intrigues and wars, and incalculable embarrassments of the countries beyond the Indus. Hostilities might become unavoidable hereafter, but it was wise to defer their occurrence as long as possible."

The state of affairs in the neighbouring territories of Gujerat has already been partly explained. The imbecile Guicowar, Anand Row, retained possession of the musnud, while the government was administered by his brother, Futteh Sing, in concert with the British resident. On Futteh Sing's death, in 1818, Syajee Row, a younger brother, of the age of nineteen, took his place, and with this exception, the arrangement continued as before. An important change, however, took place when Anand Row died in 1819. By this event Syajee Row became Guicowar. He was not disposed to forego any of his rights, and argued with much plausibility that since he had been considered fit to conduct the government as regent to his predecessor, he must surely be capable of conducting it, now that the sole right of sovereignty was legally vested in himself. There was therefore no longer any occasion for the control of the British resident. Though the claims of the new Guicowar to independent authority were acknowledged, it was foreseen that the uncontrolled exercise of
it would endanger both British interests and the prosperity of the country, and Mr. Elphinstone, now become governor of Bombay, judged it necessary to repair to Baroda for the purpose of placing the future intercourse of the two states on a proper basis. The deposition of the Peishwa had conferred many important advantages on the Guicowar. It had relieved him from large pecuniary claims, and procured for him important territorial acquisitions; and therefore, as the British government had undertaken the entire defence of the country, it was considered fair that the quantity of territory ceded for subsidy should be considerably increased. Still, however, it was supposed that the revenues had been brought into such a prosperous state as to be well able to bear the additional burden. Great was Mr. Elphinstone’s astonishment to learn that the finances were in a state of embarrassment. Above £1,000,000 sterling of debt remained undischarged; the expenditure of the two last years had exceeded the receipts; the troops were largely in arrears; and the tributaries, partly from bad seasons, but still more from oppressive exactions, were suffering severe distress. Under these circumstances the idea of abandoning all control over the internal administration was necessarily abandoned, and after providing for the discharge of the debt by means of loans raised at a reduced rate of interest, on the security of assignments of revenue and a British guarantee, a final arrangement was made to the following effect—The British government should have the exclusive management of foreign affairs, and the Guicowar, so long as he fulfilled the engagements which the British had guaranteed, should conduct the internal affairs, subject, however, to the following provisos—that he should consult with the British government in the appointment of his minister, and that the resident should have free access at all times to inspect the public account, be apprised of all proposed financial measures at the commencement of each year, and be consulted before any expense of magnitude was to be incurred.

Before leaving Gujerat some notice is due to an expedition undertaken in 1820 against the piratical tribes which continued to infest the north-western coast of the peninsula. Tempted by the withdrawal of the British troops for the Mahatta war, the Wagars of Okamandal rose in insurrection, surprised Dwaraka and Beyt, and meeting with no adequate force to oppose them, made themselves masters of the whole district. They had been in undisputed possession of it for several months when the Honourable Colonel Stanhope, who had
been sent by sea at the head of an expedition, consisting of his majesty's 65th regiment, two battalions of Bombay infantry with details of artillery, and the 1st regiment of native cavalry, arrived off Dwaraka. The troops were landed on the 26th of November, and after a short bombardment carried the town by escalade. The garrison, composed chiefly of Arabs and natives of Scinde, retired into the great temple, whose solid and lofty walls seemed to defy all ordinary means of attack. An entrance was however effected from the roof of an adjoining house, and of 500 men who had taken refuge within the temple and been driven out, not more than 100 escaped. This signal chastisement so intimidated the chiefs, who had taken up strong positions within the thicket, that they surrendered at discretion. The garrison of Beyt also capitulated, and the insurrection was completely suppressed.

Discussions which had been carried on between the Nabob of Oude and Major Baillie, the British resident at his court during the administration of Lord Minto, after being suppressed for a time, recommenced shortly after the arrival of his successor. The great subject of debate was the degree to which the resident was entitled to interfere with the internal administration of the nabob, the latter striving to limit, and the former to extend it as much as possible. Earl Minto had decided in favour of the resident, but quitted India before any steps had been taken in accordance with his decision. Meantime an event took place which promised to lead to an amicable adjustment. The nabob, Sadut Ali, whose ruling passion had been avarice, died on the 11th of July, 1814, leaving an accumulated treasure of £13,000,000 sterling. He was succeeded by his eldest son, by the title of Ghazee-u-din Hyder, who, aware how much he was indebted to Major Baillie for the ease with which he obtained the succession, showed his gratitude by consulting him in the choice of his ministers, and consenting to several of the reforms which had been urged in vain upon his father. This satisfactory state of matters did not last long. Some of the resident's reforms, not being in accordance with native prejudices, were very unpopular, and the nabob began to suspect that he would have acted more wisely if, instead of consulting him, he had taken his own way. While under this impression, he paid a visit to Earl Moira, who had arrived at Cawnpore to be near the scene of action during the Nepalese war, and shortly
afterwards returned with him to Lucknow. On this occasion the young nabob offered a crore of rupees (£1,000,000 sterling) as a free gift to the Company. It was accepted as a loan, and registered as a public debt, bearing interest at the government current rate of 6 per cent.

At the time when the nabob offered his present, he delivered a paper which, while professing personal regard for the resident, indicated a desire to be less subject to his control. The governor-general having learned privately that the nabob’s feelings on this subject were much stronger than he had ventured to express, took a questionable, and certainly a very undignified method of arriving at the truth, by not only holding personal conferences with the nabob, but allowing members both of his civil and military staff to hold them also, and then listening to the tales which they brought him. Little reliance could be placed on information thus obtained, more especially as the nabob never seemed to be of one mind, making complaints one day, and retracting them the next; but the governor-general satisfied himself that the nabob was not treated with all the deference which, according to his lordship’s notions, was due to regal state. He therefore instructed the resident to treat the nabob on all public occasions as an independent prince; to be strict in the observance of all established ceremonials; and to confine advice or remonstrance upon any mismanagement in the nabob’s administration to such occasions as might endanger British interests. Not long after receiving these instructions, the resident was desired to apply to the nabob for a second crore of rupees. They were obtained, and furnished another seasonable supply for the Nepalese war. It would seem however that the nabob parted with the money more by constraint than willingly, and felt more than ever dissatisfied with the resident as the instrument employed in exacting it. He displayed his resentment by becoming more hostile than ever to all kinds of reform, and removing from his counsels all the persons known to have the resident’s support. Major Baillie, attributing these proceedings of the nabob not so much to caprice or personal resentment as to factional intrigues encouraged by the course which the governor-general had pursued with regard to him, forwarded in September, 1815, a letter dated five months before, in which he gave free utterance to his feelings. The governor-general in replying did not hesitate to express his opinion that the resident had displayed a grasping and domineering spirit, which justified the jealousy and resentment of both the late and the present nabob. In consequence of this rupture, the governor-general in council removed Major Baillie, and thus freed the nabob from all control in his internal administration. This change was followed by great cordiality between the two governments, and to the satisfaction of both the loan of the second crore of rupees was discharged in May, 1816, by a treaty which commuted it for a tract of territory which belonged to the British government, and was situated to the north-west of Oude, on the frontiers of Nepaul. The governor-general, satisfied that the affairs of the country had
improved since the irritating interference with the internal administration had ceased, ventured to recommend another change, with the view of giving Oude still more the character of an independent sovereignty.

The Nabobs of Oude had hitherto been satisfied with the title of Nabob Vizier, intimating that they were the hereditary viziers or prime ministers of the Great Mogul. They were accordingly regarded not as the equals, but as the servants of the King of Delhi. So much was this distinction regarded in practice, that the governor-general, during a second visit to Lucknow, was witness to an act of humiliation imposed by it. Two brothers of the King of Delhi were living there on pensions furnished partly by the Company and partly by the nabob. Notwithstanding this subordinate position, etiquette gave them such decided precedence, that when the nabob met them in the streets of his own capital, his elephant was made to kneel in token of homage. The thing seemed to the governor-general so incongruous, that he suggested to the nabob the propriety of ridding himself of all such forms of servility. He had advised him on his accession to dispense with application to Delhi for confirmation or investiture, and he now advised him to assume a title which would declare him to be no longer the servant, but the equal of the Mogul. The only restriction was, that change of title should make no change in the nabob's relations with the British government. The governor-general seems to have been apprehensive that the throne of Delhi might be occupied by a prince hostile to British union, and he therefore deemed it good policy to convert the two heads of the Mahometans in India into rival sovereigns. The nabob, whose pride and ambition were thus flattered, hastened to act on the governor-general's suggestion, and in 1819, to the extreme indignation of the court of Delhi, and the dissatisfaction of Mahometans generally, issued a proclamation declaring his future designation to be Abu Muzaffar, Moiz-ud-din, Shah-i-Zaman, Ghazi-ud-din, Hyder Shah, Padshah-i-Awadh, "the Victorious—the Upholder of the Faith—the King of the Aga—Ghazi-ud-din, Hyder Shah—King of Oude." The soundness of the governor-general's judgment in this matter has been questioned; but the subject was too insignificant to deserve all the discussion which it provoked, and has already lost any little interest which once belonged to it. In regard to the condition of Oude, it is necessary only further to add, that it scarcely justified the flattering picture which the governor-general drew of the happy consequences resulting from the nabob's uncontrolled internal management. British troops were repeatedly called out to assist in reducing refractory zamindars; and in the beginning of 1822, in the vicinity of Sultanpoor alone, a British detachment dismantled above seventy of their forts. Bands of armed robbers, countenanced by the zamindars and connived at by the police, haunted the jungles, and not unfrequently passed the frontier to carry on their depredations within the British territory.

The relations with the Nizam did not undergo much change during the
administration of the Marquis of Hastings, but several events took place which on various accounts deserve more than a passing notice. The nominal administration of the government was vested in the Nizam's favourite Moonir-ul-Moolk, but the real power was exercised by the Hindoo Chandoo Lal in concert with the resident. The Nizam, indignant at not having the absolute control, allowed matters to take their course, and when asked for his opinion, sullenly answered that it was of no use to give it, as he had no interest. Chandoo Lal was able and active, but aware of his precarious position in consequence of the hostility felt to him at court, endeavoured to make friends there by a liberal distribution of money to all the courtiers or their retainers who possessed any influence, or could furnish him with information by acting as spies. So profuse were his bribes that part of them were said to find their way to the hoards of the Nizam himself, and Moonir-ul-Moolk, whose testimony, however, being that of an enemy, must be taken with qualification, said that the whole of the Nizam's family was bribed, every one of his own servants was in Chandoo Lal's pay, and even his own mother-in-law sent him a daily report of whatever occurred in the inmost recesses of his house. This system required an enormous expenditure, which the minister endeavoured to meet, partly by rapacious exactions, and partly by loans at exorbitant interest from the bankers of Hyderabad. The revenues were let to the highest bidders, and the contractors, intent only on profit, employed so much violence and extortion, that the cultivators abandoned their lands in despair, and both the revenue and the population rapidly diminished.

As British influence had placed and was maintaining Chandoo Lal in power, the supreme government felt responsible for his proceedings, and on the representations of the resident ordered a stringent control to be exercised over him. Among other sources of financial embarrassment was his connection with a mercantile house which had been established at Hyderabad under the firm of William Palmer and Co., and which, being recommended by Mr. Russell, then resident, had so far succeeded, in 1814, in obtaining not merely the permission, but the countenance of the governor-general in council, that he was instructed to show it every proper degree of encouragement consistent with the treaty with the Nizam. Chandoo Lal's pecuniary necessities soon brought him into intimate communication with the firm, and he obtained considerable advances from it. In 1816 William Palmer and Co. professed to doubt whether their dealings with the Nizam's government were not struck at by Act 37 Geo. III. c.142. The 28th section of this act, proceeding on the preamble that "the practice of British subjects lending money, or being concerned in the lending of the same, or in transactions for the borrowing money for, or lending money to the native princes in India, has been productive of much mischief, and is the source of much usury and extortion," enacts that from the 1st of December, 1797, "no British subject shall by himself, or by any other person directly
or indirectly employed by him, lend any money or other valuable thing to any
native prince in India, by whatever name or description such native prince shall
be called; nor shall any British subject be concerned either by himself, or by any
other person, either directly or indirectly, in raising or procuring any money
for such native prince, or as being security for such loan or money; nor shall
any British subject lend any money or other valuable thing to any other person
for the purpose of being lent to any such native prince; nor shall any British
subject by himself, or by any other person, either directly or indirectly, for his
use or benefit, take, receive, hold, enjoy, or be concerned in any bond, note, or
other security or assignment granted or to be granted after the 1st day of
December next, for the loan, or for the repayment of money or other valuable
thing." The violation of the law was to be treated as a misdemeanour, and
the security taken for the money lent, was "to be null and void to all intents
and purposes."

Notwithstanding the minuteness and stringency of the above prohibitions,
it was expressly declared that the things forbidden were unlawful, only
provided they were done "without the consent and approbation of the court of
directors of the East India Company, or the consent and approbation of the
governor in council of one of the said Company's governments in India, first had
and obtained in writing." If the previous dealings of William Palmer and
Co. were, as they themselves suspected, illegal, it is very questionable if any
subsequent consent would have cured them; but they were naturally anxious
to be in safety for the future, and succeeded on application in obtaining the
requisite consent of the governor-general in council, subject only to the reser-
vation that the resident should have full permission to satisfy himself at any
time as to the nature of the transactions in which the firm might engage in
consequence of the permission then granted. Backed by the countenance of
the supreme government they extended their pecuniary transactions with
Chandoo Lal, and in particular undertook with its full cognizance to provide the
pay of the reformed troops in Berar and Aurungabad. The regular payment
of the troops being indispensable to their efficiency, the sanction to this trans-
action was the more easily obtained, from its being asserted that the native
bankers would not advance the necessary funds at the same rate of interest, or
on the security of assignments of revenue.

William Palmer and Co. had as yet only been experimenting on the credulity
of the supreme government, and on finding how readily all their requests were
complied with, entered into a negotiation for a loan to Chandoo Lal of sixty
lacs of rupees (£600,000). Their application for the sanction of this loan was
forwarded to Calcutta by Mr. Russell, the resident, who recommended it on the
ground that equally advantageous terms could not be obtained through any other
agency. The loan, according to Chandoo Lal's statement, was to be employed
in reducing the arrears due to the public establishments, in paying off heavy
incumbrances held by native bankers and others, and in making advances to the ryots to enable them to cultivate their lands. The proposed mode of application was unexceptionable, but some degree of suspicion had been aroused, and the resolution to sanction the loan, opposed by two members of the supreme council, was carried only by the casting vote of the governor-general. This was particularly unfortunate, as one of the leading members of the firm of William Palmer and Co. had married a ward whom the governor-general had brought up in his family and loved like a daughter, and persons were uncharitable enough to suggest that the relation thus established had clouded his judgment, and gained his consent to an arrangement of which he would otherwise have been the first to perceive the impropriety.

In 1820, shortly after the sanction to the new loan had been granted, a despatch was received from the directors strongly disapproving of the whole of the transactions relating to the firm of Palmer and Co., and enjoining both that the consent which had been given with the view of legalizing their proceedings should be withdrawn, and that in the event of any discussion as to the claims of the firm on the Nizam, the British government should not interfere to enforce them. In consequence of these instructions the firm was interdicted from future pecuniary dealings with the Nizam's minister. Had William Palmer and Co. been acting in an honourable and straightforward manner, they might have complained with justice of the severity of this sudden interdict and the ruin in which it might involve them; but when the real state of the case was investigated, their explanations were considered shuffling and evasive, and the so-called loan of sixty lacs proved little better than a fiction and fraud. Like Chandoo
Lal they had represented the loan as an entirely new advance made for specific purposes, whereas Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had become resident at Hyderabad, had little difficulty in discovering, notwithstanding the mysterious manner in which the accounts were stated, that there had been no real advance, and that the loan of sixty lacs was nothing more than the transfer of a previous debt of that amount, claimed by the firm from the Nizam, to a new account. They had thus obtained the sanction of the supreme government by false pretences. As soon as the real facts were discovered, the governor-general became fully alive to the gross imposition which had been practised upon him, and characterized it as it deserved. For a moment imputations affecting the governor-general's personal integrity were whispered in some quarters, but another moment dissipated them, and the worst that could be said was, that from not exercising due caution he had allowed his confidence to be abused. This unfortunate affair is the more to be lamented from having brought the administration of the Marquis of Hastings to a close sooner than he intended. Mortified at the want of confidence which the instructions from the directors implied, and stung to the quick by the suspicion which some of their expressions seemed to insinuate, he tendered his resignation in 1821, and finally quitted India on the 1st of January, 1823.

The political changes effected by the Marquis of Hastings, though they constitute at once the leading feature and the highest merit of his administration, ought not to make us forget the important internal reforms which he introduced into the various branches of the public service. Several of these reforms cannot be said to have originated with himself. Some were pressed upon his notice by the home authorities, and others suggested by such eminent public servants as Sir Thomas Monro, Sir John Malcolm, the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Sir Charles Metcalfe, &c. Still to the Marquis of Hastings belongs the merit of singling out those which were most worthy of being adopted, and making the necessary arrangements for carrying them into practical effect. In the judicial department the accumulation of undecided cases had become a crying evil, and amounted in fact to a denial of justice. The causes were sufficiently obvious—the undue multiplication of forms, which, though meant to secure regularity of procedure, protracted litigation, while the number of judges was far too small for the business allotted to them. A considerable diminution of the evil was obtained by shortening and simplifying process in cases where quickness of dispatch was scarcely of less importance than accuracy of decision, and by increasing both the number and the emoluments of the native judges. At the same time the jurisdiction of these judges was greatly extended. Moonisfs, at first restricted to cases of the value of 50 rupees, were made competent to cases of 150; and sudder ameers, also limited at first to 50, were ultimately allowed to adjudge in cases of 500. Encouragement was also given to punchayets, a kind of courts where the judges acted as arbiters; and while both their constitution
and procedure were regulated, their decisions were declared unchallengeable on any ground but that of corruption. In criminal justice the chief alteration consisted in an abandonment of the rule laid down by Lord Cornwallis, that the offices of collector and judge, or magistrate, were never to be combined. The native rule was the very reverse of this, and by returning to it, while the duties of collector were not seriously interfered with, a great number of criminal cases were summarily disposed of by judges in whose impartiality confidence could be placed.

In no branch of the public service was improvement more wanted than that of revenue. In Bengal no fundamental alteration could be made. The permanent settlement had been finally and irrevocably adopted, and the utmost that could be done was to enact regulations for the correction of previous errors, or to provide for altered circumstances. Among the regulations thus adopted under the permanent settlement, notice is due to those which checked fraud and precipitancy in the sale of land for arrears of revenue, and still more to those which gave to the ryot a protection which he had never before enjoyed, at least under the permanent settlement of Bengal. By an extraordinary oversight or deliberate perpetration of injustice, the sale of a zemindary abolished all sub-tenures, and the purchaser was entitled if he chose to oust and order off every occupant whom he found upon it. Instead of this iniquitous and tyrannical law, it was now enacted that tenants and cultivators having a hereditary or prescriptive right of occupancy could not be dispossessed so long as they paid their customary rents, and that those rents could not be increased except in specified circumstances. It was indeed high time to take effectual measures for checking all the forms of injustice and oppression which had prevailed in the collection of the public revenues. In Cuttack, in particular, though belonging to the Bengal presidency, and at no great distance from its capital, the abuses had become so intolerable that the people were goaded into a rebellion, which spread over the greater part of the province, and continued to rage from 1817 to 1819. The revenue exacted from the province, owing to the erroneous principle on which it had been calculated, was excessive. Under the Maharrattas it had averaged little more than ten lacs, and these subject to numerous deductions. Under the British it amounted, without deduction, to nearly twelve lacs, afterwards so much increased by random augmentations as to amount, in 1816–17, to nearly fourteen lacs. Under this system of extortion arrears quickly accumulated, and many of the old zemindars, driven from their estates by sales not only forced but often fraudulent, were replaced by new men, who were hated alike for their rapacity and intrusion. After a kind of reign of terror had commenced, the people of Khoorda, who had been most mercilessly dealt with, found a leader in Jagbandoo, the principal military officer of the rajah. So general was the disaffection that in a few weeks he was heading above 3000 insurgents. The successes which he gained before a
sufficient force was collected to oppose him, were of course soon checked, but
his adherents continued to act in desultory bodies, and tranquillity was not
restored till effectual steps were taken to convince the people that their griev-
ances would be redressed. In accordance with the recommendations of a com-
mmissioner, specially appointed, large arrears were cancelled, sales of defaulting
estates in many instances suspended, and the amount of former assessments
considerably reduced. On inquiry, many instances of oppression and extortion
were established, not only against native officials, but their European superiors,
who, if not directly guilty, had incurred responsibility by connivance. The
former were justly punished, the latter displaced, and though Jagbandoo did
not surrender till several years later, so little of the insurrectionary spirit
remained that in August, 1819, a general amnesty was proclaimed. The lesson
of Cuttack was not lost upon the govern-
ment, and care was taken, by searching
out and correcting abuses, to prevent si-
milar risings in other quarters.

Though the estab-
ishment of the perma-
nent settlement in the
ancient provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa precluded the introduction of
fundamental changes in regard to them, a large field for experiment lay open in
the ceded and conquered provinces. The permanent settlement, once eulogized
as the perfection of wisdom, had fallen into disfavour, particularly with the home
authorities, who had peremptorily forbidden its extension. The proper sub-
stitute for it was not yet finally decided, and the Marquis of Hastings certainly
took the wisest course which could be adopted under such circumstances, by
leaving the question open, and in the meantime taking active and extensive
measures to acquire the knowledge which was necessary for its right decision.
Among the temporary arrangements by which the revenue was to be collected,
in the interval, the preference was given, particularly in the upper provinces, to
the system known by the name of village settlement, which fixes a certain
amount of assessment on each village or community, and levying the whole
from one or more individuals acting as the representatives of the villagers, leaves
it to them, subject to an appeal to the civil courts, to adjust the proportion due
by each individual cultivator. In the Madras presidency, though the zamindars'
settlement had been early introduced into the Northern Circars, the Company's
jaghire, and the districts of Madura and Tinnevelly, and the village settlement
had also been adopted in different quarters, a decided preference was given to
another system known by the name of the ryotwar settlement, which found a powerful advocate and able administrator in Sir Thomas Monro. The peculiarity of this settlement is that it dispenses with middlemen, and brings the ryots into immediate contact with government. An annual adjustment is made with each individual cultivator, by fixing a maximum money rent, according to the quantity, fertility, and estimated produce of the land he actually cultivates. Should the sum thus fixed eventually prove excessive, proportionable reductions are made. The great objections to this settlement are the amount of labour which it entails on the collectors, and the constant fluctuations which it causes in the amount of revenue. In answer to these objections the advocates of the settlement hold out the prospect of being able in course of years to obtain such a correct average of the actual capability of each field, as to allow the rent to be permanently fixed, and thus render an annual adjustment unnecessary. In the presidency of Bombay the zemindary settlement was prevented by the impossibility of finding individuals who could be considered as zemindars, and the revenue was collected on no very uniform principle, partly by the village and partly by the ryotwar settlements, either separate or combined. Perhaps too much importance has been attached to the mere mode of settlement. The great point of interest to the cultivator is the amount which he is required to pay, and provided this is kept sufficiently moderate, the particular system according to which it is levied gives him little concern.

During the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, the public revenue of India was augmented nearly £6,000,000 sterling, the amount in 1813–14, being £17,228,000, and in 1822–23, £23,120,000. Much of this increase was of a fluctuating character, and the only part which could be considered permanent was the land revenue derived from the newly acquired or the increased productiveness of the old territories. The receipts of 1822–23 exceeded the expenditure by nearly three millions and a half, but an addition of nearly two millions and a half was made to the public debt, the debt bearing interest being in 1813–14, £27,002,000, and in 1822–23, £29,382,000. The merits of the Marquis of Hastings were acknowledged immediately after the termination of the Nepaulese war, by the advance in the peerage already mentioned, and after the termination of the Pindaree war, by a grant from the Company of £60,000. In both these cases, however, it was his military merits only that were honoured and rewarded, but there had been no acknowledgment of the soundness and signal success of the policy which had made the British authority paramount in India, and conferred inestimable blessings on the whole country, by extirpating systematic plunderers, and putting an end to international wars. He did not receive this act of tardy justice till he had intimated his intention to resign. Then only the directors and proprietors concurred in a resolution expressing regret at his resignation, and thanking him for the unremitting zeal and eminent ability with which he had for nearly nine
years administered the Indian government. This resolution being deemed by the friends and admirers of the Marquis of Hastings a very inadequate recognition of his services, the subject was again brought under the notice of the proprietors on the 3d of March, 1824, by a motion recommending the court of directors to report on the mode of making such a pecuniary grant as should be worthy of his eminent services and of the Company's gratitude. This motion was met by another for the printing of all the correspondence, and other documents upon the public records, which regarded the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, and might enable the court to judge of the propriety of a further pecuniary reward. The second motion was carried, and some time having elapsed before the voluminous documents for which it called could be printed, the discussion was not revived till the 11th of February, 1825, when at a meeting of the general court it was moved that there was nothing in the papers relating to the transactions with William Palmer and Co., which in the slightest degree affected the personal character or integrity of the late governor-general. This motion was met by an amendment which, while admitting that the purity of his motives could not be impeached, approved of certain despatches sent to Bengal, in which the directors strongly censured the countenance given to the above firm. After a discussion, prolonged for seven days, a ballot was taken and proved in favour of the amendment. Here the matter rested, and a simple error of judgment (for it was now admitted on all hands to be nothing more) was held sufficient to justify the withholding of a pecuniary reward, which would otherwise have been bestowed without a dissentient voice, and which, if ever due to a governor-general, certainly ought not to have been denied to the Marquis of Hastings.

CHAPTER V.

Mr. Canning, appointed governor-general, resigns—Lord Amherst appointed—Mr. John Adam's interim administration—Lord Amherst installed—Misunderstandings with the Burmese—Commencement of hostilities—Expedition against Rangoon—Its capture—Subsequent military operations—Reverses—Sickness of the troops—Storming of stockades—Expeditions by water—the Burmese grand army dispersed—Operations in Assam and in Arakan—Mutiny at Barrackpoor—Operations in Pegu—Capture of Prome—Negotiations for peace—Termination of hostilities.

BRITISH politics, at the time when the Marquis of Hastings intimated his intended resignation, were in an unsettled state. Queen Caroline had returned to England, and ministers, urged on by George IV., had reluctantly committed themselves to that great scandal known by the name of the Queen's Trial. Mr. Canning, who was then president of the Board of Control, had publicly
intimated his determination not to take part in it, and therefore, on the 24th of June, 1820, when, in consequence of the queen’s refusal to submit to a compromise recommended by a large majority of the House of Commons, it was seen that the trial must proceed, he tendered his resignation. The king refused to receive it, and made it possible for him to continue in office, by leaving him at perfect liberty to follow his own inclinations with regard to the trial. Mr. Canning accordingly, though still retaining office, went abroad, and did not return until the bill of pains and penalties had been withdrawn. The unhappy questions connected with it still continued to be agitated, and Mr. Canning, feeling the incongruity of remaining in a ministry with which he could not act in a matter of the greatest moment, again tendered his resignation. This time it was accepted, and he once more went abroad. Being thus out of place when the Marquis of Hastings intimated his resignation, he readily consented, in March, 1822, to succeed him as governor-general. His preparations for the voyage were immediately commenced, and he had nearly completed them when the melancholy death of the Marquis of Londonderry threw open the doors of the ministry to him, and he resigned his Indian appointment to accept that of secretary of state for foreign affairs.

The office of governor-general having thus become once more vacant, two candidates were put forward—Lord Amherst, whose conduct during his embassy to China, though it had received the entire approbation of the directors, had not yet been rewarded; and Lord William Bentinck, whose summary dismissal from the government of Madras on grounds which had since been considered insufficient, gave him some claim to the still higher honour which the directors now had it in their power to bestow. Lord Amherst was preferred, but did not arrive till several months after the departure of his predecessor. In the interval the office of governor-general devolved on Mr. John Adam, as the senior member of council. It was not to be expected that during this short and uncertain interregnum Mr. Adam would venture on any new measure of importance. All he had to do was to carry on the government as before, to complete any transactions which remained unfinished, and to take the initiative only when delay would obviously have been mischievous. Though inclined thus to regulate his procedure, Mr. Adam felt constrained, particularly on two occasions, to act in a manner which subjected him to some degree of unpopularity.
Mr. Adam had from the first strenuously objected to the encouragement given to the house of William Palmer and Co., and therefore lost no time in following out the orders which the court of directors transmitted on the subject. The debt due to the firm by the Nizam was accordingly discharged by an advance of the Company on the security of the tribute which they were bound to pay to the Nizam for the Northern Circars, and to prevent the recurrence of similar entanglements, the order to interdict all future pecuniary dealings with the court of Hyderabad was strictly enforced. The measure proved fatal to the house of William Palmer and Co. Had they alone been the sufferers, no regret could have been felt for their downfall. Unfortunately many individuals who had no share in their misconduct were involved by it, and complained, not without some degree of plausibility, that had less precipitation been used, and the firm been allowed to wind up gradually, the eventual loss might have been greatly diminished. The answer, however, is that in the affair of William Palmer and Co., Mr. Adam acted ministerially, and had no option but to yield implicit obedience to the orders which he received. In the other measure he acted more on his own judgment, and, we are inclined to think, with less discretion.

The press, from the difficulty of leaving it free while the government was absolute, had engaged the attention of successive administrations, and been subjected from time to time to restrictions more or less stringent. A regular censorship had at last been established, and no newspaper was allowed to be printed without being “previously inspected by the secretary to the government, or by a person authorized by him for that purpose.” The penalty for offending was “immediate embarkation for Europe.” At first the censorship applied only to newspapers. Earl Minto, during the whole of whose government “there appears,” according to Sir John Malcolm, “to have been a very vigilant superintendence of the press,” placed religious publications under similar fetters, and in 1813 directed, “not only that the newspapers, notices, handbills, and all ephemeral publications, should be sent to the chief secretary for revision, but that the titles of all works intended for publication should be transmitted to the same officer, who had the option of requiring the work itself to be sent for his examination, if he deemed it necessary.” Sir John Malcolm, from whose Political India, vol. ii. p. 299, the above passage is quoted, lauds “these additional restrictions on the press” as evincing “the necessity of increased vigilance to check a growing evil,” and yet, as if for the very purpose of showing that the evil could not be “growing,” immediately bears the following testimony: “It is worthy of observation that from the time the office of censor was established, though there were never less than five newspapers published at Calcutta, in which every kind of European intelligence, and all matters of general and local interest, were inserted, there did not occur, from 1801 till 1820, a period of twenty years; one occasion on which government was compelled even
to threaten to send any individual to England.” In 1818 the Marquis of Hastings abolished the censorship. In reply to an address from the inhabitants of Madras, he thus stated his reasons: “My removal of restrictions from the press has been mentioned in laudatory language. I might easily have adopted that procedure without any length of cautious consideration, from my habit of regarding the freedom of publication as a natural right of my fellow-subjects, to be narrowed only by special and urgent cause assigned. The seeing no necessity for those invidious shackles might have sufficed to make me break them. I know myself, however, to have been guided in the step by a positive and well-weighed policy. If our motives of action are worthy, it must be wise to render them intelligible throughout an empire, our hold on which is opinion. Further, it is salutary for supreme authority, even when its intentions are most pure, to look to the control of public scrutiny; while conscious of rectitude that authority can lose nothing of its strength by its exposure to general comment. On the contrary, it requires incalculable addition of force.” These remarks, however true in themselves, were not applicable to the circumstances, since the governor-general, though he speaks of breaking “those invidious shackles,” and subjecting the “supreme authority” to “general comment,” showed that he meant nothing of the kind, by issuing the following regulations:—“The editors of newspapers are prohibited from publishing any matter coming under the following heads: 1. Animadversions on the measures and proceedings of the honourable court of directors, or other public authorities in England, connected with the government in India; or disquisitions on political transactions of the local administration; or offensive remarks levelled at the public conduct of the members of council, of the judges of the supreme court, or of the lord-bishop of Calcutta. 2. Discussions having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among the native population, of any intended interference with their religious opinions. 3. The republication from English or other newspapers of passages coming under any of the above heads, or otherwise calculated to affect the British power or reputation in India. 4. Private scandal and personal remarks on individuals tending to excite dissension in society.” Assuming that, in the actual condition of India, these regulations, or at least some modification of them, was indispensable, it was obviously absurd to speak of the abolition of the censorship as equivalent to the establishment of freedom, and Sir John Malcolm states the simple truth when he observes, “by this measure the name of an invidious office was abolished, and the responsibility of printing offensive matter was removed from a public functionary to the author or editor; but this change, so far from rescinding any of the restrictions upon the press, in reality imposed them in as strong, if not in a stronger degree, than any measure that had before been adopted.”

Shortly after the abolition of the censorship, a newspaper entitled the Calcutta Journal was established by Mr. James Silk Buckingham, as proprietor
and editor. It was conducted with much talent, but much less in accordance
with the governor-general's regulations than with the views which he was
understood to have sanctioned in his reply to the Madras address, and hence
Mr. Buckingham had been more than once warned that, unless he acted with
more circumspection, he would forfeit his license to remain in India, and be
shipped off for England. The governor-general, however, was unwilling to
take a step which it would be impossible to reconcile with his rather high-flown
sentiments on the advantages of free discussion, and therefore quitted India
without carrying his menaces into execution. Mr. Adam, who was not
restrained by any such scruples, signalized his short tenure of office by a kind
of crusade against the press. Without venturing to re-establish the censorship,
he obliged every printer to obtain a license before he could print a newspaper,
pamphlet, or any other work whatever, and gave a practical proof of his deter-
mination that the regulations of the Marquis of Hastings were no longer to
remain a dead letter by actually putting them in force against Mr. Buckingham
and shipping him off for England. By this decided step he incurred much
obloquy, as it was generally felt that the offence, which consisted merely in
the insertion of a paragraph ridiculing the appointment of one of the chaplains
of the Scotch church to the office of clerk to the committee of stationery, was
not of so grave a character as to justify the severe punishment with which he
visited it. The offence, at all events, was not of a kind which required to be
immediately put down by a strong hand, and Mr. Adam would have acted in a
more becoming manner had he refrained from using his short tenure of office
for the purpose of displaying his known hostility to freedom of the Indian press,
and left it to the new governor-general to deal with the offending proprietor of
the Calcutta Journal in his own way. Though Mr. Buckingham failed to
obtain redress either from the court of proprietors, before whom his case was
repeatedly brought, or from the privy-council, who refused an application to
rescind the press regulations, he never allowed the subject to be lost sight of,
and ultimately succeeded in procuring compensation for his loss in the form of
an annuity.

Lord Amherst arrived at Calcutta on the 1st of August, 1823, and was no
sooner installed in his office of governor-general, than he found himself involved
in hostilities with a new and untried enemy, beyond the proper bounds of
India. The countries immediately beyond the Company's eastern frontier, after
being long possessed by petty chiefs, from whom no great danger could be
apprehended, had gradually fallen under the dominion of the King of Ava, the
sovereign of the Burman empire, and a collision which had often been imminent
had at last become inevitable. Assam in the north-east, Kachar in the centre,
and Aracan in the south-east, along the eastern shores of Bengal, either formed
part of the Burman empire, or were in course of being incorporated with it;
and it was scarcely possible that a people so arrogant as the Burmese, and
unconscious of the extent of the British resources, after pushing their conquests to our Indian frontier; would be contented to remain there without attempting encroachment. Nor were plausible pretexts wanting. Aracan, though inhabited by a people identical in origin with the Burmese, formed an independent kingdom till 1784, when Minderagee Prahoo, King of Ava, taking advantage of some intestine dissensions, crossed the Yumadong Mountains, subdued it, annexed it to his empire, and placed it under the government of a viceroy. The new rule was so oppressive, that great numbers of the Aracanese or Mugs, as they were usually termed, fled from the tyranny which they despaired of being able to resist, and were allowed to settle on certain tracts of waste land within or bordering on Chittagong. Here many of them became

industrious cultivators, but more of them preferred to live as marauders, and retaliate, by means of plundering incursions, the injuries they had suffered.

In 1793, three chiefs, or, as they are sometimes described, leaders of banditti, fled across the border into Chittagong, and were followed across the Naaf by a body of Burmese, who had orders not to quit the pursuit, how far soever it might carry them, till they had captured the fugitives. The pursuers who thus crossed the Naaf were estimated at 5000, and to support them, if opposition should be offered, an army of 20,000 men began to assemble in Aracan. This violation of the British frontier at first only called forth a strong remonstrance, but the Burmese officer, while disclaiming hostile intentions, plainly intimated that he would not retire till the fugitives were given up, and to show that he was in earnest, stockaded his camp. Such a defiance aroused even the timid spirit of Sir John Shore, who was then governor-general, and a detachment was sent to compel the Burmese to retire. The beneficial effect of this decided step was neutralized by a promise that the British government, if satisfied of the guilt of the fugitives, would deliver them up. On this assurance, the Burmese officer withdrew, and of course was able to boast that he had
gained his point. This boast was fully confirmed when the fugitives, after undergoing the form of a trial, were pronounced guilty, and handed over to the tender mercies of their enemies. What these would be must have been foreseen, and therefore, however much we may be shocked at the dastardliness and inhumanity which consigned them to such a fate, we cannot be surprised to learn that two of them were shut up in closed cells and starved to death; the third contrived to escape. When the whole circumstances are considered, it must be admitted that the Burmese only drew a very natural inference, when they attributed the delivery of the fugitives to fear. At all events any doubts which they might have had on the subject must have been removed, when the governor-general, so far from insisting on any apology for the violation of the British territory, showed himself only anxious to conciliate the good-will of the King of Ava, and in 1795 despatched Captain Symes on a friendly mission to his court.

During 1797 and 1798, the continuance of oppression in Aracan was followed by a vast increase of emigrants into the Chittagong districts. To prevent the repetition of a Burmese incursion and consequent misunderstandings, orders were given to check the emigration. This, however, was found to be no easy task. One party, when ordered to retire, boldly replied:—"We will never return to the Aracan country; if you choose to slaughter us here, we are ready to die; if, by force, to drive us away, we will go and dwell in the jungles of the great mountains, which afford shelter for wild beasts." Fugitives, amounting in the aggregate to 40,000, are described as "flying through wilds and deserts, without any preconcerted plan, numbers perishing from want, sickness, and fatigue. The road to the Naaf (the river separating Aracan from Chittagong) was strewed with the bodies of the aged and decrepit, and of mothers with infants at the breast." It was impossible, without violating the dictates both of policy and humanity, to drive such multitudes to desperation by denying them an asylum, and the Marquis of Wellesley, now governor-general, appointed Captain Hiram Cox to superintend their location. Meanwhile the viceroy of Aracan had despatched a body of troops across the frontier in pursuit of the fugitives, and addressed a letter to the magistrate of Chittagong, in which he said: "If you, regarding former amity, will deliver us up all the refugees, friendship and concord will continue to subsist. If you keep in your country the slaves of our king, the broad path of intercourse between the states will be blocked up. Our disagreement is only about these refugees; we wrote to you to deliver them, and you have been offended thereat. We again write to you, who are in the province of Chittagong, on the part of the king of the Company, that we will take away the whole of the Aracanese; and further, in order to take them away, more troops are coming. If you will keep the Aracanese in your country, the cord of friendship will be broken." Mr. Stonehouse, the magistrate, replied that there could be no negotiation until the Burmese had
retired, and declared his determination, if compelled, to use force for that purpose. To this alternative he actually had recourse, but unfortunately without success, for the Burmese, who had erected a strong stockade, repulsed the attempt made to dislodge them. Further hostilities had become apparently inevitable, when the Burmese retired of their own accord, and the governor-general, who was fully occupied elsewhere, availed himself of their withdrawal to attempt an amicable settlement. With this view he deputed Lieutenant Hill on a mission to the viceroy of Aracan. The King of Ava, then occupied with schemes for the conquest of Assam, deemed it expedient to profess moderation, and sent an ambassador to Calcutta. The result was, that the ambassador departed apparently satisfied with the explanations and promises given to him. These were in effect, that all Mugs who could be proved guilty of crimes would be surrendered, and that in future no subjects of the Burman empire would be received as emigrants within the British territories.

The amicable settlement proved to be a delusion, for in 1800 the viceroy of Aracan demanded the unconditional surrender of the fugitives, and threatened invasion if the demand were not immediately complied with. Affairs of greater moment made it inexpedient to resent this menace, and therefore the governor-general, choosing to regard it as the unauthorized act of the viceroy, sent Colonel Symes on a second mission to Ava in 1802. According to the official despatch, he succeeded in impressing the Burmese court with full confidence in the good faith and friendly views of the British government, and received similar assurances in return, but subsequent information has proved this to be a gross misstatement. Colonel Symes was only admitted to a single and disdainful audience of the king, while the letter which he delivered from the governor-general was not even honoured with an answer, unless that name is given to a paper of questionable authenticity in which the subject-matter of the letter was passed unnoticed. Considering the circumstances under which the mission was sent, a better reception was scarcely deserved, and ought not to have been anticipated.

In 1809 it was ascertained that the Burmesë had long been meditating the conquest of the British provinces of Chittagong and Dacca, and it is hence easy to understand how readily, before they even prepared for an open rupture, they availed themselves of the proceedings of the Aracanese emigrants, to keep an open ground of quarrel. And it is not to be denied that their complaints were often too well founded. In 1811 an emigrant chief of the name of Khyen-bran, usually printed in English King-bearing, collecting a large body of his countrymen, burst suddenly into Aracan, overran the whole country, and compelled the capital itself to capitulate; Earl Minto immediately despatched Captain Canning, who had previously been employed on two missions to Ava, to disavow all connection with the insurgents, and declare the anxious desire of the British government for the continuance of friendly relations. On arriving at Rangoon,
Captain Canning found not only that a strong belief of British connection with the revolt prevailed, but that, in anticipation of hostilities, an embargo had been laid on the British vessels in the port. He succeeded in inducing the viceroy of Pegu to remove the embargo, but about the same time received a letter from Calcutta informing him of the invasion of the British territory by the viceroy of Arakan, and ordering his immediate return. This had now become a task of some difficulty, for orders had arrived from the Burman capital to send Captain Canning thither with his consent or without it, the intention obviously being to detain him as a hostage for the delivery of Khyen-bran. The envoy, by his own firmness, and the presence of two of the Company's armed vessels at Rangoon, defeated this project, and he succeeded in re-embarking for Calcutta.

The invasion of the British territory by the viceroy of Arakan had been the natural result of his successes over Khyen-bran, who, having encountered a large Burmese force, had sustained a complete defeat, and been driven back with his followers to their former haunts. Elated with victory, the viceroy, not satisfied with demanding the delivery of the rebels, intimated that if this were refused, he would invade the Company's territories with 60,000 men, and annex Chittagong and Dacca to the Burman empire. This menace having been met in a proper spirit, the court of Ava desisted from military demonstrations, and indicated a desire to negotiate.

While matters were in this state, a person arrived with a commission from the King of Ava to proceed to Benares, and purchase some of the sacred works of the Hindoos. This was the professed, but as had been suspected, it proved not to be the real object, for instead of purchasing books, he spent his time in intriguing against the British government. Shortly afterwards, another person
arrived with a commission to proceed to Delhi. The purchase of manuscripts was as before his professed object, but as it was discovered that he had no less an object in view than the formation of a general confederacy, for the purpose of expelling the British from India, the permission he asked was not granted, and an intimation was made to the Rajah of Aracan, through whom the application had been made, that on furnishing a list of the works and other articles wanted, they would be furnished without subjecting him to the trouble of deputing agents. Notwithstanding this somewhat ominous display of hostile designs, the form of negotiation was continued, and in 1813 a mission arrived at Calcutta from the viceroy of Pegu. The letter accompanying it was certainly not flattering in its terms. Among other things it informed the governor-general (Earl Minto) that, by surrendering the Mugs fugitives and sending them to Ava, he might obtain the royal pardon for the numerous falsehoods he had written.

Khyen-bran having in the meantime recovered from the effects of his discomfiture, had again collected a large number of adherents, and renewed his incursions into the Burmese territories. Earl Minto had hitherto treated the Aracanese refugees with great indulgence; but in September, 1813, having become possessed of a letter in which Khyen-bran avowed his intention to invade the Burmese territories, he deemed it necessary to put a check upon his movements, and issued a proclamation denouncing the proceedings of the insurgents, forbidding the subjects of the Company to give them any countenance, and offering rewards for the apprehension of their leaders. These measures were not very successful, and Khyen-bran continued his inroads with little interruption, till his death in the beginning of 1815. This event put an end to the border troubles, and to the consequent danger of an immediate collision between the two states, but the Burmese were by no means satisfied, and continued from time to time to reiterate their demand for the surrender of the insurgents. The deputies from the viceroy of Pegu had not left Calcutta when Earl Moira arrived to assume the government, but on finding that he was disposed to treat their application with no greater favour than his predecessor had done, they immediately returned to Rangoon.

After the death of Khyen-bran, the depredations of the Mugs were seldom carried into Aracan, and some surprise therefore was excited, when, in the beginning of 1817, Mr. Pechell, magistrate of Chittagong, received a letter from the Rajah of Ramree, governor of the four Burman frontier provinces, written in a very bombastic style, and plainly intimating that nothing but the immediate surrender of all the Mugs would prevent hostilities. "The Mugs of Aracan," observed the Rajah, "are the slaves of the King of Ava. The English government has assisted the Mugs of our four provinces, and given them a residence. There will be a quarrel between us and you like fire. Formerly the government of Aracan demanded the Mugs from the British government, which..."
promised to restore them, but at length did not do so. Again the Mugs escaped from your hands, came and despoiled the four provinces, and went and received protection in your country. If at this time you do not restore them, according to my demand, or make delays in doing so, the friendship now subsisting between us will be broken." This letter was delivered by the rajah's son, who told Mr. Pechell that its contents were dictated by the king; and that they therefore did not require arguments, but an answer. The governor-general, on being made acquainted with the rajah's letter, instructed Mr. Pechell to reply to it in a conciliatory but firm tone, and at the same time addressed a letter to the viceroy of Pegu, in which, after observing "that the British government could not without a violation of the principles of justice, on which it invariably acts, deliver up a body of people who had sought its protection, and some of whom had resided within its territories for thirty years," he declared his confidence "that the enlightened mind of his Burmese majesty would perceive the inability of agitating a question, the further discussion of which could lead to no result advantageous to either state."

The relations with the court of Ava had in the meantime engaged the attention of the home authorities, and instructions as to the course to be pursued towards the fugitives had been sent out to the supreme government. In a letter dated 6th January, 1815, they say: "We earnestly hope that you have not been driven to the necessity of delivering up Khyen-bran, because we observe that every Mug who is suspected of being a partizan of Khyen-bran is put to death, and that a whole village containing about two thousand five hundred souls was massacred on this account, when neither men, women, nor children were spared. If therefore, for the sake of avoiding hostilities with the King of Ava, you should have been compelled to the adoption of this measure, we trust that Khyen-bran has been the single person delivered, and that none of his infatuated followers have been included in such a surrender." In another letter dated 19th May of the same year, after approving of a proposal to unite the Burmese with the British troops in suppressing the insurgents, they add: "We are pleased to observe that the magistrate was cautioned to avoid using language which might be interpreted by the Rajah of Aracan into a promise, on the part of our government, to deliver the chiefs of the insurgents to the Burmese, in the event of their surrendering themselves to the British troops." It is to be regretted that the home authorities subsequently abandoned these humane sentiments, and in the vain hope of preventing hostilities which had obviously become inevitable, gave orders that in future all offending Mugs when apprehended should be delivered to the blood-thirsty Burmese.

In 1818 the son of the Rajah of Ramree arrived a second time at Chittagong, and desired to proceed to Calcutta, to deliver to the governor-general a letter, which he said his father had written by orders of the King of Ava. Its substance was as follows:—"The countries of Chittagong and Dacca, Moor-
shedadab and Cossimbazar do not belong to India. Those countries are ours. The British government is faithless. This was not formerly the case. It is not your right to receive the revenue of those countries; it is proper that you should pay the revenue of those countries to us; if you do not pay it, we will destroy your country." This letter appears to have been written under the impression that the British government was so engrossed or rather overwhelmed by the Pindaree war, as to be willing to make any sacrifice sooner than risk hostilities with so invincible a people as the Burmese imagined themselves to be. Before it was delivered, the Pindarees and Mahrattas, in whom the Burmese expected to find powerful allies, had been completely subdued, and they themselves had sustained a defeat from the Siamese. Under these altered circumstances, the Marquis of Hastings, who had apparently resolved to leave the Burmese war as a legacy to his successor, fell upon the device of treating the offensive letter as a forgery. "By this procedure," says his lordship, "I evaded the necessity of noticing an insolent step, foreseeing that his Burmese majesty would be thoroughly glad of the excuse to remain quiet, when he learned that his secret allies had been subdued."

The claim which the Burmese monarch made to the districts mentioned in his letter was probably founded on the recent conquests which he had made, and which may have been supposed to carry the adjacent territories enumerated as accessories. One of the most important of these conquests was Assam, situated to the north-east of Bengal, and consisting chiefly of an immense valley inclosed by mountains, and traversed longitudinally from east to west by the Brahmapootra. This territory, governed nominally by a rajah, but in reality by a council of three ministers termed Gohains, who claimed it as their hereditary right to appoint him and overrule all his proceedings, had fallen into a state bordering on anarchy. In 1809, the Rajah Chandra Kanta, in endeavouring to rid himself of the Boora Gohain, was worsted, and after applying without success to the British government, called in the aid of the Burmese, who furnished him with a force of 6000 men. The death of the Boora Gohain enabled the rajah to dispense with foreign aid, but the Burmese had no sooner returned home than their presence was again required. A son of the Boora Gohain had raised up a new claimant to the throne, and obliged the rajah to save himself by flight to the confines of Bhootan. The Burmese again reinstated him, but soon began to covet the territory for themselves. An open rupture hence ensued, and Chandra Kanta, unable to make head against the Burmese general, Mengyee Maha Bandoola, lost the sovereignty of Assam, which was henceforth regarded as a dependency of Ava. Misunderstandings similar to those which had prevailed in regard to Aracan and Chittagong were the consequences of this new conquest, the British authorities complaining of depredations on their district of Rungpoor, and the Burmese, without offering redress, insisting on the surrender of fugitives from Assam, and declaring their determination to
follow them beyond the frontier. The conquests of Kachar, which encompassed
the British district of Sylhet on the north and east, and of Munipoor, which had
been overrun by Alompra, the most celebrated of the Burmese sovereigns,
about the same time when he added Pegu and Aracan to his dominions, furn-
nished additional points of contact at which collision was to be apprehended.

For some years the vigilance of the British authorities in Chittagong had
prevented any serious inroads into Aracan by the emigrants. The Burmese,
however, were far from reciprocating this forbearance, and had in fact entirely
changed the position of affairs, by becoming themselves the aggressors. People
following their avocations within the British boundaries were slain, or car-
rried off and sold as slaves, and these outrages were so openly encouraged as to
make it plain that the Burmese, so far from desiring to prevent, were bent on
provoking hostilities. Their recent conquests had satisfied them that they
were invincible, and they believed that they had only to attempt the conquest
of Bengal in order to achieve it. Their celebrated general, Maha Bandoola, on
his return from Assam, is reported to have said, that if his sovereign wished for
Bengal he would engage to conquer it for him with no other troops than the
strangers dependent upon Ava; and according to another account, “from the
king to the beggar, the Burmese were hot for a war with the English.” Dr.
Judson, the American missionary, who had resided ten years in the country, rep-
resents the prevailing feeling as often expressed in such words as the following:
“The English are the inhabitants of a small and remote island. What business
have they to come in ships from so great a distance to dethrone kings, and
take possession of countries they have no right to? They contrive to conquer
and govern the black foreigners, the people of castes, who have puny frames
and no courage. They have never yet fought with so strong and brave a
people as the Burmese, skilled in the use of the sword and spear. If they
once fight with us, and we have an opportunity of manifesting our bravery,
it will be an example to the black nations, which are now slaves to the English,
and will encourage them to throw off the yoke.” This feeling could not fail to
manifest itself sooner or later in overt acts. There was no difficulty in finding
a pretext.

At the mouth of the Naaf was the small island of Shapooree, which had for
many years been possessed by the British as belonging to Chittagong. The
Burmese set up a claim to this island, and on the 24th of September, 1823, a
body of about 1000 men landing upon it, overpowered the British guard, and
after killing or wounding several individuals, obliged the rest to save them-
sew themselves by flight. The aggressors shortly afterwards retired, but as they had
escaped with impunity, and nothing but an unavailing expostulation from Cal-
cutta followed, the Burmese were confirmed in their belief that they had
nothing to apprehend from British resentment. It was not, however, in this
quarter that actual hostilities were to commence. In the north-east, a body of
4000 Burmese and Assamese, penetrating by the Bharteke Pass, encamped at Bikrampoor, about forty-five miles east of Sylhet, while a more considerable force advanced from Munipoor. A British detachment, which had been previously posted to guard the Sylhet frontier, advanced upon Bikrampoor, and finding the Burmese engaged in completing a stockade, attacked them and put them to rout. The detachment was too feeble to follow up this advantage; and on its retiring within the British boundary, the two bodies of Burmese, amounting in all to about 6000, effected a junction, advanced to Jatrapoor, constructed stockades on both sides of the Surma, and advanced along its north bank till within 1000 yards of a British post at Bhadrapoor. Captain Johnstone, the officer in command, immediately attacked them, and carried the stockades at the point of the bayonet. The division from Assam was driven back in disorder into that territory; the division from Manipoor managed better, and defended their stockade on the Surma so successfully that the British were obliged to retire.

While hostilities had thus actually commenced in the north, they were about to commence in Arakan. The rajah who governed there had received orders to expel the British from Shapooree, be the cost what it might, and Mah Bandoola, the most celebrated of the Burmese generals, was appointed to the chief command. The island was in consequence once more seized, and the governor-general, unable any longer to put off the evil day by additional procrastination, had no alternative but to publish a declaration of war. This document, published on the 24th of February, 1824, is far too long to admit of quotation or even analysis. After a full detail of the circumstances, it charges the court of Ava with having "grossly and wantonly violated the relations of friendship so long established between the two states," and with having "compelled the British government to take up arms, not less in self-defence than for the assertion of its rights and the vindication of its insulted dignity and honour," and concludes as follows: "Anxious, however, to avert the calamities of war, and retaining an unfeigned desire to avail itself of any proper opening which may arise for an accommodation of differences with the King of Ava, before hostilities shall have been pushed to an extreme length, the British government will be prepared even yet to listen to pacific overtures on the part of his Burmese majesty, provided that they are accompanied with the tender of an adequate apology, and involve the concession of such terms as are indispensable to the future security and tranquillity of the eastern frontier of Bengal."

In forming the plan of military operations it was necessary to take into consideration the nature of the country, and the mode of warfare practised by the enemy. The country was almost a continuous tract of forest and marsh, completely inundated at certain seasons, and at all times teeming with vapours which made the atmosphere almost pestilential; and so little was known of the geography that, with the exception of a few narrow belts of land along the
coast, or the banks of navigable rivers, it was entirely unexplored. To lead an
army through such a country, even if the population had been friendly, would
have been a task of no ordinary difficulty; but to force a passage through it,
where all the available routes were occupied by an enemy possessed both of
skill and courage, and prepared to meet their assailants with a murderous fire
from behind trenches and stockades, so strongly constructed as to form, in fact,
a continuous series of forts, was an enterprise, the difficulties of which afford
the best explanation of the reluctance of successive governors-general to engage
in it. It was a knowledge of these difficulties, and confidence in their peculiar
mode of warfare, that made the Burmese so anxious to provoke an encounter.
The Prince of Tharawadee, the brother of the King of Ava, when told that the
Burmese soldiers could not cope with the British, replied, "We are skilled in

making trenches and stockades, which the English do not understand;" and
there cannot be a doubt that to this skill they were mainly indebted for any
successes which they obtained in the course of the war. Every individual
soldier carried a spade or hoe as an essential part of his military equipment.
With this, as the line advanced, he dug a hole, from which he fired away under
cover till a nearer approach unearthed him. It was only, however, to retire
to much better protection within his stockades. These usually formed com-
plete inclosures of a square or oblong shape, varying in height from ten to
twenty feet, constructed sometimes of solid beams of timber, previously pre-
pared, and sometimes of bamboos and young wood in a green state. The whole
firmly and closely planted in the ground, and bound together at the top by
transverse beams, with no more openings than were necessary for embrasures
and loop-holes, formed a defensive work which did not yield readily to an
ordinary cannonade, and was most effectually assailed by shells and rockets.
Within the interior, platforms were fixed or embankments thrown up, on which gingals, or small guns, carrying a ball of six or twelve ounces, were planted, and occasionally, to increase the difficulty of access to the main work, it had the additional protection of outer and inner ditches, and of minor stockades, abattis, and similar outworks.

In arranging the plan of a campaign in a country presenting such physical features, and against troops pursuing such a system of military tactics, the most advisable course seemed to be to avoid, as much as possible, the difficulties and tediousness of land routes, and endeavour to reach the interior by water. No doubt was entertained as to the practicability of the latter plan. The capital and other chief cities of the Burman empire were situated on the Irawadi, which, if the proper season were chosen, might be ascended by a flotilla conveying troops for a distance of 500 miles in about six weeks. In this direction, therefore, it was determined that the main effort should be made; and that, in the meantime, little more should be attempted in other quarters than to keep the enemy at bay and check his further progress. This plan, though adopted by the supreme government in the absence of Sir Edward Paget, the commander-in-chief, was cordially approved by him before any actual steps were taken. The adjutant-general, writing in his name, says:—"The commander-in-chief can hardly persuade himself that if we place our frontier in even a tolerable state of defence, any serious attempt will be made by the Burmese to pass it; but should he be mistaken in this opinion, he is inclined to hope that our military operations on the eastern frontier will be confined to their expulsion from our territories, and to the re-establishment of those states along the line of frontier which have been overrun and captured by the Burmese. Any military attempt beyond this, upon the internal dominions of the King of Ava, he is inclined to deprecate, as in place of armies, fortresses, and cities, he is led to believe we should find nothing but jungle, pestilence, and famine. It appears to the commander-in-chief that the only effectual mode of punishing the insolence of this power is by maritime means."

In supplying troops to the maritime expedition, Bengal very imperfectly performed its part. The aversion of the sepoys to a sea voyage could only have been overcome by forcing their inclinations, and as this was judged inexpedient, this presidency furnished only his Majesty’s 13th and 38th regiments, two companies of artillery, and the 40th regiment of native infantry. Madras, where the sepoy objection did not exist to the same extent, and was perhaps in some degree overcome by the energy and popularity of Sir Thomas Monro the governor, furnished a much larger force, consisting of his Majesty’s 41st and 89th regiments, the Madras European regiment, and seven native regiments, with detachments of pioneers and artillery. The whole force, mustering upwards of 11,000 men, about one half Europeans, was placed under the command of Major-general Sir Archibald Campbell. Under him Colonel
M-Creagh commanded the Bengal, and Colonel Macbean the Madras division. The naval force consisted of the sloops of war Larne and Sophia, with several of the Company's cruisers, having the transports in convoy, a flotilla of twenty gun-brigs and twenty war-boats, each carrying a piece of heavy ordnance, and the Diana, a small steam-vessel, which, as she was the first of the kind seen on the east coast of the Bay of Bengal, was regarded by the natives with wonder and superstitious terror, when they saw her without sails or oars, moving against wind and tide by some mysterious agency. Captain Canning accompanied the expedition as political agent and joint-commissioner with the commander-in-chief. Port Cornwallis, situated near the north-east extremity of the Great Andaman Island, was the appointed place of rendezvous. The Bengal, and the first part of the Madras force, met here in the end of April, 1824, and having been joined by Commodore Grant, the chief naval officer in the Indian seas, in the Liffey frigate, sailed north-east on the 5th of May, and on the 9th, to the great astonishment and alarm of the Burmese, who appear never to have dreamed of an attack in this quarter, arrived off the mouths of the Irawadi.

The Irawadi rises near the eastern extremity of the Himalaya, on the frontiers of Assam, and after a southern course of about 1000 miles, falls into the Bay of Bengal. Like the Ganges, it has a large delta, at the upper extremity of which it divides into a number of branches. These opening into one another, form a kind of net-work across the delta, and carry off so much of the water that the main stream may be said to disappear. The two principal branches are the Bassein on the west, and the Rangoon on the east, each of them so called from an important town of the same name situated on its banks. Rangoon, the larger of the two towns, and the chief port of Burmah, stood on the left bank, about twenty-five miles from the sea, in a fork formed by two branches, the one of which flows eastward under the name of the Syriam, while the other, continuing the river of Rangoon, properly so called, flows south to the sea. Its width at Rangoon was nearly half a mile, and on its opposite bank stood a town of some extent called Dalla.

On the 11th of May, the expedition sailed up the river, and anchored opposite to Rangoon. Its defences, consisting only of a stockade about twelve feet high, which inclosed it on every side, and of a principal battery of twelve
guns, situated on a wharf at the river side, were far too feeble to offer any
effectual resistance. After a few shots from the battery, which the Liffey
instantly silenced, the troops landed and took possession of the town without
seeing an enemy. When the firing commenced, the governor sent an American
missionary to ask what the English wanted, and threatening, if the fire did not
cease, to put to death such Europeans as were in his hands. These so-called
Europeans were eight British traders and pilots, two American missionaries,
an Armenian, and a Greek. His fears prevented him from carrying out his
murderous threat, and he fled, leaving his prisoners behind him. These, to the
surprise and disappointment of the victors, proved to be the only inhabitants
remaining in Rangoon. The whole population had been ordered to retire into
the adjacent forests, and not a man had ventured to disobey.

This total desertion of the city was an event which the British had never
anticipated, and against which consequently they had made no provision.
Knowing that Pegu, the province in which Rangoon is situated, was a
comparatively recent conquest of the Burmese, and that the inhabitants were
by no means satisfied with their new masters, they had expected to be hailed
as deliverers, and to have all the resources of a productive country placed at
their disposal, whereas they now found that no assistance whatever would be
given to them, and that they must depend entirely upon themselves for supplies.
Under such circumstances, an advance into the interior was at once seen to be
impracticable. With the view of taking advantage of the augmented volume
of water in the river, they had arrived at the very commencement of the rainy
season, when the greater part of the country would become inundated, and
instead of carrying on a decisive campaign, it would be necessary to remain
shut up in Rangoon, or at least to confine military operations to its immediate
vicinity. Considerations which had been previously overlooked now forced
themselves into view, and it became impossible not to admit that in the
arrangement of the campaign serious blunders had been committed. The
attack by sea, if advisable at all, was ill-timed. An attempt to ascend the
river in incommodious boats during the tropical rains, without native boatmen
to guide them, and while both banks were in possession of the enemy, would
only be to invite destruction; and yet, to remain cooped up among the swamps
of the delta, was to expose the troops to a mortality which, while it gave none
of the triumphs of actual warfare, could hardly fail to be far more destructive.
No choice, however, remained, and it was resolved to place the troops under
cover, and use all despatch in obtaining the necessary provisions and supplies
from India.

The stockades of Rangoon, though a feeble defence against a British force, were
a sufficient protection against any sudden onset of the natives, and no new
works therefore were required for security. The more commodious and
substantial of the buildings were appropriated for the head-quarters and general
two six-pounders, and protected by a tank, at which a strong picket was stationed, and his rear protected by another tank, which was given in charge to the provincials and the Mug levy, he waited the encounter. After a short struggle, the provincials and Mugs gave way, and the Burmese, making their way into the rear, rendered the position untenable. Of necessity a retreat was ordered. At first it was conducted with some degree of regularity, but ultimately, as the enemy pressed on with increasing boldness, the men threw down their arms and rushed into the water. The loss was less than might have been expected. Only about 250 in all were missing, but not a few of these, carried off as prisoners to Ava, confirmed that court in the belief that its soldiers were irresistible; while an unmanly panic, communicated from Chittagong and Dacca, spread even to Calcutta, where, among other absurdities, it was deemed not incredible that a body of adventurous Burmese might penetrate through the Sunderbunds into the British Indian metropolis. Though the disaster was thus monstrously exaggerated, there cannot be a doubt that had the Burmese known how to improve their advantage, a considerable tract of British territory might have been overrun and pillaged. Fortunately they spent the time in idle exultation, till the rains opposed an effectual barrier to their further progress, and before the season for campaigning again commenced, a blunder which had left Chittagong almost undefended was repaired. The expedition to Rangoon had also produced its effect, and the King of Ava, alarmed for his capital, had given orders that all available troops should be concentrated for defensive warfare. The army of Aracan was consequently recalled, and the only occasion on which the Burmese could have inflicted a serious blow was lost.

The rains, while they rendered a regular campaign impossible, had not produced a cessation of hostilities at Rangoon. The Burmese, considerably reinforced, constructed stockades in every direction, in order to exclude access to the interior, and by sending parties through the jungle, incessantly harassed the pickets and cut off all stragglers. They also sent down fire-rafts for the purpose of burning the vessels and flotilla anchored off Rangoon. During these operations the British were not contented to remain on the defensive. On the 28th of May, Sir Archibald Campbell, taking 400 Europeans and 250 sepoys, with a gun and howitzer, proceeded to make a reconnaissance. The path, after leading through a tangled forest, where the natural obstacles were increased by artificial impediments, opened on rice fields and plains knee-deep in water. The difficulty of transporting the guns in consequence became so great, that it was judged necessary to send them back under the escort of the sepoys. The detachment, thus limited to Europeans alone, continued the route, and at the distance of about eight miles from Rangoon came in sight of a body of the enemy about 7000 strong. Part of them, entrenched behind strong stockades, were immediately attacked and routed with great slaughter. The main body, intimidated by this success, showed no inclination to avenge their comrades, and
the detachment returned unmolested to the cantonments. Two days after, another stockade not far from the great pagoda was stormed.

These successes, however much they may have discouraged the Burmese, did not deter them from prosecuting the plan they had evidently formed of hemming in the British troops within Rangoon, so as to leave them no alternative but surrender or destruction. At Kemendine, in particular, a series of extensive works had been constructed. These it was determined to attack both by land and water, and with this view three columns were detached against the northern and eastern faces of the stockades, while General Campbell, embarking 300 of his Majesty’s 41st regiment, ascended the Irawadi with three cruisers. The works proved stronger than had been supposed, and none of the columns having succeeded in penetrating them, a retreat became necessary. The Burmese, however, were not permitted long to exult in this success. On the 10th of June the attack was renewed with a more adequate force, consisting of 3000 men, with four eighteen-pounders and four howitzers. Before reaching Kemendine it was necessary to capture a strong stockade which had been erected between it and the great pagoda. Three of its sides were inclosed by the forest, and the fourth side had in its front a plain covered with water. This naturally strong position showed the importance which was attached to it by the number of troops collected to defend it. The attack commenced with a cannonade on the open face. After an hour a sufficient aperture was made, and the storming column rushed forward; and about the same time a second column managed to clamber over the palisades in the rear. The defenders thus attacked in opposite directions, and unable to escape, fought with desperation, while the bayonet made fearful havoc among them. This attack was expected to be only the prelude to one of greater difficulty, and batteries had begun to play on the works at Kemendine, when the unusual silence caused inquiry to be made, and they were found to be abandoned. The Burmese, after the severe lesson that had thus been taught them, became less confident, and withdrawing to a greater distance, began to concentrate their forces at Donabew, fifty miles above Rangoon.

Notwithstanding these successes, the British had not as yet made any decided progress, and were obliged to remain in a state of comparative inaction. One obvious cause of this was the state of the country in consequence of the rains, but there was unfortunately another cause of a more distressing nature. Disease, the effect partly of the climate, and partly of a deficiency of fresh and wholesome provisions, began to prevail to such an alarming extent, that scarcely 3000 men remained fit for active duty towards the end of the monsoon. Meanwhile the enemy, apparently aware how much their invaders were reduced and enfeebled, were encouraged to make new exertions. Towards the end of June, great numbers of troops were observed passing from Dalla on the right bank to the left above Kemendine, and on the 1st of July, while the forests in
staff, and for the stores and ammunition. About two miles to the north of Rangoon, on an artificial mound about thirty feet high, stood a famous Buddhist temple, called Shwe-da-gon, or the Golden Pagoda, solidly built of brick, on an octagonal base, coated with gilding, decorated with ornamental mouldings, and rising in the form of a cone gradually tapering to a spire to the height of above 300 feet. This temple being, like the town, entirely abandoned, was taken possession of by his Majesty's 69th regiment and the Madras artillery; the rest of the troops found convenient cantonments in a number of small temples and priests' residences, lining two roads which led from the northern gateway of the town to the pagoda. During the completion of these arrangements, detachments explored the neighbourhood, and parties proceeded up the river in boats for the purpose of reconnoitring and destroying any defences or fire-rafts which they might discover. One of these parties came upon an unfinished stockade at Kemendine, about sixty miles above Rangoon, and having landed, gallantly carried it, though not without some loss, against a very superior force. On the same day a considerable detachment, sent some distance into the interior, fell in with the governor of Rangoon, who, instead of risking an encounter, fled into the adjoining forest. While these successes gave reason to believe that Burmese courage was not of a high order, there were numerous indications of their activity in preparing for a future struggle, and of their determination not to allow their invaders to remain long at ease in their cantonments. About the middle of May the rains set in, and the whole of the country around Rangoon became one vast sheet of water.

While the expedition was preparing to proceed against Rangoon, a force collected under Brigadier-general M'Merine at Goalpara, on the Brahmapootra, near the frontiers of Assam, moved eastward on the 13th of March, 1824, to
Gowhatty, where the Burmese had thrown up stockades. They did not, however, venture to defend them, and retired as the British approached. The population, who had been cruelly treated by their Burmese masters, were eager to throw off the yoke, and manifested a most friendly disposition; but as they were too poor to furnish the necessary supplies, and the transport of these was, from the nature of the country, a work of the utmost difficulty, it was necessary, instead of advancing with the whole force, to send forward a detachment under Colonel Richards to Nowgong to meet Mr. Scott, the commissioner, who had arrived there with an escort. From Nowgong, Colonel Richards proceeded to Kaliabar, and thence eastward to Maura Mukh, where the governor of Assam was stockaded with a force of about 1000 men. The favourable opportunity of striking a blow which would probably have liberated the whole of Upper Assam, was abandoned from want of supplies, and Colonel Richards, thus obliged to renounce the advantage of his previous successes, returned to Gowhatty to pass the rainy season.

In June, the Burmese, who had in the beginning of the year retired from Kachar, returned with a force estimated at 8000 men, and began to make incursions from Munipoor, stockading themselves on the heights of Talain, Dudpatee, and Jatrapoor. The force left in Sylhet was far too feeble to offer any effectual opposition to them, and an attempt to dislodge them from a stockade at Talain proved a failure. A retreat followed, and the Burmese, elated with success, remained in undisputed possession of Kachar till the season should allow the campaign to be again opened.

In Aracan, the original seat of their aggression, the Burmese appear to have made their main effort; and in the beginning of May, when the British were surprising them at Rangoon, they were effecting an almost equal surprise by appearing on the frontiers of Chittagong with a force of more than 10,000 men, commanded by the renowned Maha Bandoola. The force prepared to resist this invasion was wholly inadequate, but the Bengal government, though made aware of the threatened danger, made no additional effort to avert it. Whatever may have been the cause of this great negligence, it was severely punished. Colonel Shapland, holding the command in Chittagong, had pushed forward to Ramoo a detachment under Captain Noton, consisting of five companies of the 45th native infantry, with two guns, and details from a Mugh levy and the Chittagong provincial battalion. Against this detachment, the Burmese, after crossing the Naaf, rapidly advanced with their whole concentrated force, and on the 13th of May arrived at a stream flowing past Ramoo. Captain Noton's two guns, well served, prevented their passage for some time, but they at last effected it, and hastened to attack him. His whole force consisted of about 1050 men, but of these 650 were irregulars, on whom no dependence could be placed. Having posted his troops behind a bank surrounding the encampment, with his right flanked by the river, his front formed by the regular sepoys with the
front were occupied with troops, three columns, each about 1000 strong, moved to
the right as if to interpose between part of the cantonments and Rangoon.
They were speedily checked and dispersed, but the very next day resumed
operations by marching a strong body upon Dalla. It was only to sustain a
second repulse; and Dalla itself, as it had been deserted by its inhabitants, and
might be used as a cover for other attempts, was destroyed.

The court of Ava had been hoping to hear of the annihilation of the
invaders, and being of course disappointed with the progress of events, had
superseded Thekia Wungyee in the command, and given it to Thamba Wungyee,
who, knowing what was expected of him, was naturally anxious not to fall short
of it. He accordingly made a great display of activity, and gave so much
annoyance that it became necessary to dislodge him. This was no easy task.
The Rangoon river, about six miles above the town, is joined by another branch
of the Irawadi, called the Lyne. Here Thamba Wungyee had erected four
stockades—one at the junction, another about half a mile below on the right
bank of the Rangoon, a third immediately opposite to it on the left bank, and
a fourth at Kamaroot, about a mile and a half above the junction, and at some
distance from the left bank of the Lyne. This last, the largest and strongest of
all, was connected with the others by entrenchments. These works were
defended by at least 10,000 men. On the 8th of July, Sir Archibald Campbell
ascended the river with a flotilla, consisting of the Larne, two of the Company's
cruisers, and some smaller vessels, having on board a considerable body of troops,
and having with little difficulty overpowered the enemy's fire by that of the
ships, carried the three stockades accessible from the river. The fourth stockade
could not be thus reached, and a strong detachment under Brigadier-general
Macbean marched against it from the Shwe-da-gon. The march proved so
difficult, that the heavy artillery was sent back, and only a few small howitzers
retained. On reaching Kamaroot it was found that the stockades to be
captured were no fewer than seven, and besides being strongly garrisoned,
were defended by thirty pieces of artillery. Within ten minutes after the
attack commenced, the first stockade was carried by escalade; the second after
a longer resistance yielded to the same mode of capture; the others scarcely
offered any resistance; and thus, without firing a shot, by the aid of the
bayonet alone, works which the Burmese regarded as almost impregnable were
wrested from them by a mere handful of assailants. Among the incidents at
Kamaroot, a single conflict between Major (afterwards Sir) Robert Sale, and a
Burman of rank who fell by his hand, is not unworthy of notice. About 800
of the enemy lay dead within the stockades; Thamba Wungyee, the com-
mander, died of his wounds. The defeat at Kamaroot struck terror into the
Burmese, and made them for the first time doubtful of the issue of a war
into which they had entered with the utmost confidence.

While waiting the return of the dry season, Sir Archibald Campbell was
necessarily restricted on land to a petty and desultory warfare. In the beginning of August he took Syriam, the ancient capital of Pegu, situated near the junction of the river of Pegu with that of Rangoon, and of some historical interest from the establishment of a factory in it by the Portuguese, when they were aspiring to extend their dominion over the whole East. In

this old factory the Burmese, when attacked by the British detachment, fortified themselves as if determined to stand a siege; but after opening a brisk fire their courage failed them, and they saved themselves from the consequences of an escalade, by a precipitate flight. The inhabitants of Rangoon, who had at first so universally obeyed the order to quit it, now began gradually to return, and the inhabitants of Pegu generally showed so much disaffection to their Burmese masters, that they might to all appearance have easily been induced to throw off the yoke which had for sixty years lain heavily upon them. As yet, however, it was not thought expedient to give any encouragement to their wishes for independence, as the effect might have been to place a chief upon the throne who was unable to maintain himself upon it without British assistance. The restraint thus exercised was at all events cautious, but it may be questioned if it was well judged, as it made the Peguers, if not jealous of our success, indifferent to it, and thus tended to protract the war. This seems to have been the view ultimately taken by the supreme government, as they afterwards gave the encouragement which they now refused, and offered to recognize the independence of any chief whom the Peguers might appoint to rule over them.

The obstacles to operations by land did not apply to those by sea. While the expedition was on its way the island of Cheduba had been reduced by a
A.D. 1824.

Subjugation of the Tenasserim provinces.

party detached for that purpose, and at the end of August a strong division sailed for the Tenasserim provinces, which, under the names of Ye, Tavoy, and Mergue, form a narrow but fertile maritime tract stretching along the east coast of the Bay of Bengal, through six degrees of latitude, from the mouths of the Irawadi to the frontiers of the Molucca peninsula. The towns of Tavoy and Mergue, and the provinces of which they are the capitals, were speedily reduced. The inhabitants of the former cordially assisted in the invasion, and after seizing the Burmese governor, made a voluntary surrender. At Mergue the resistance was more seeming than real; and after the troops had landed and stormed the first stockade, all opposition ceased, and the people who had at first fled soon returned, and were perfectly reconciled to their new masters. The resistance in Ye, or Amherst, as it has since been called, was confined chiefly to the important town of Martaban, situated in the north on a bay of the same name, and either on or within the frontiers of Pegu. As it possessed defences of some strength, and was garrisoned by a considerable number of Burmese, it was not taken without the combined exertions of, the naval and the land forces, and the storming of a series of stockades. The importance of these conquests was soon felt in more abundant supplies of fresh provisions to the troops at Rangoon, and the establishment of comparatively healthy stations for the recovery of invalids.

The Burmese meanwhile were not inactive, and besides keeping up a series of petty but harassing manœuvres, actually ventured on a night assault of the British post at the Golden Pagoda. In this attempt they had no ordinary encouragement, for they were headed by leaders, part of them said to be female, who had succeeded by means of charms and amulets in making themselves invulnerable. The loss of twenty of their number having satisfied them that the charm had somehow or other lost its efficacy, they decamped in confusion. On the opposite side of the river at Dalla, where a British post had been established, the Burmese made a bold attempt to cut off some gun-brigs which were anchored in the vicinity. For this purpose they brought down a flotilla, which on the first alarm was put to flight, and chased till five of its boats were captured. Higher up the river, where the Burmese were understood to be busily erecting stockades and preparing fire-rafts, a combined naval and
land force succeeded in dislodging them on the first onset. These encounters proved that the courage of the Burmese had greatly declined, but an event now occurred tending greatly to revive it.

Information having been received in the beginning of October that the Burmese had taken up a strong position at Kaikloo, about fourteen miles from Rangoon, it was determined to dislodge them, and as the Madras native infantry were mortified at the subordinate part they had borne in previous exploits, this important task was now assigned to them alone. Accordingly, Colonel Smith was detached on the 4th with a brigade of the 3d and 34th native infantry, mustering about 800 men, and two howitzers. In the course of the evening he arrived at a Burmese entrenchment, and after an ineffectual attempt to carry it by escalade, succeeded by means of the howitzers. The failure of the escalade was rather ominous, and Colonel Smith, on learning from the prisoners that the preparations of the Burmese at Kaikloo were more formidable than had been imagined, asked to be reinforced by a detachment of Europeans. The commander-in-chief, under the influence of feelings which are more easily explained than justified, refused Europeans, and sent only 300 Madras infantry, with two additional field-pieces. The whole set out for Kaikloo on the morning of the 7th of October. The first obstacles encountered were a succession of breastworks. From the time spent in carrying these by storm, it was five in the afternoon before the principal stockade was reached. Its right rested on a height crowned with a fortified pagoda. Colonel Smith arranged his troops in three columns—the first to attack the stockade in front, the second to diverge to the right and attack it in flank, and the third to form a reserve, while a party should make a dash at the pagoda. The first column was allowed to approach within sixty yards, and was then suddenly assailed with a murderous fire of grape and musketry. Major Wahab, who commanded, and the leading officers and men, soon fell killed or wounded, and the others, losing their presence of mind, lay down to avoid the fire. The assailants of the pagoda also failed, and were in their turn pursued. The second column, unable to penetrate the thicket, was in the meantime retracing its steps without having effected anything. Under these circumstances Colonel Smith saw no alternative but retreat. Fortunately the second column arrived in time to prevent the retreat from becoming a complete rout, and the whole fell back in tolerable order, after sustaining a loss of twenty-two killed and sixty-six wounded. This affair, magnified by the Burmese into a great victory, revived their spirits, and was exultingly celebrated at the court of Ava. No time, however, was lost in retrieving the disaster. On the 17th of October, a force of 420 Europeans and 350 native infantry, with three field-pieces, marched against Kaikloo, and had their indignation roused to the highest pitch on seeing the bodies of their comrades who fell on the 7th hanging from trees in horrid states of mutilation. They hastened forward resolved on a signal
vengeance, but found the works abandoned, and returned to Rangoon without seeing an enemy. At the very time when the repulse at Kaikloo was sustained, it was partly compensated by the signal defeat of Kye Wungyee, a leading member of the Ava ministry, who had taken post at Thantabain, on the Lyne. Besides fourteen war-boats, each carrying a gun, he was defended by three breastworks, behind which stood the principal stockade, constructed of solid timber, fifteen feet high, with an interior platform carrying small iron and wooden guns, and heavier ordnance placed in battery on the solid ground below. Formidable as these works appeared, a small naval and military force sent against them stormed part with scarcely any loss, and thereby struck such terror, that the other part was abandoned after one or two ineffective charges.

The season for opening the campaign was now approaching, and though the climate and unwholesome food had produced so much sickness that not more than 1300 Europeans remained fit for duty, and the native troops were similarly reduced, the prospect of active operations was hailed with enthusiasm, in the full conviction of coming triumphs. And yet the circumstances were such as might have appalled them. According to prevalent rumour, the King of Ava had at last mustered all his forces for a final effort, which was to drive the invaders into the sea, or send them off in chains to the interior, where ignominy and torture awaited them. Maha Bandoola, the greatest of the Burmese warriors, had arrived with his veterans from Aracan, and was advancing on Rangoon at the head of 60,000 men. Though much of this rumour was justly treated as mere gasconade, there was no room to doubt that it was partly true, as Maha Bandoola actually made his appearance in the vicinity of the British lines in the beginning of December. His army, supported on the right by a flotilla of war-boats and fire-rafts, extended, in a semicircle from the river opposite Dalla, past Kemendine and the Golden Pagoda, and rested with its left on Puzendoon creek, about half a mile east of Rangoon. His front, for the most part covered by dense jungle, was, where open, protected by breastworks and stockades. The Golden Pagoda, forming the key of the British position, was

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1 This suit, now in the Tower of London, consists of a mixture of plate and quilted armour—the former having a circular breast defence, and all the pieces ornamented with a rich gilded arabesque bordering; the latter composed of crimson velvet, with small stud of metal. The spear shaft is of chased silver.
occupied by 300 men of his Majesty's 38th, with twenty pieces of artillery, while the 28th Madras infantry were stationed immediately below. His Majesty's 13th were posted with some guns along the high ground leading from the pagoda to the town. An old Buddhist convent in front of the lines was held by 200 Madras European infantry and some sepoys; and the stockade of Kemendine, which covered the left rear of the position, by the 26th Madras native infantry and a few Madras Europeans. The remainder of the force was placed in communication with Rangoon, which, as well as Kemendine, derived important additional defence from the shipping.

During the first week of December, Maha Bandoola kept his army incessantly employed, both in advancing his works and making repeated attempts on the Kemendine stockade. Repulse seemed to have no effect in dislodging them, for the moment their assailants retired, they returned and resumed their labours. By this perseverance they made so much progress, and so annoyed the shipping by constant firing and the launching of fire-rafts, that something more than desultory efforts seemed necessary, and a general attack was resolved upon. Accordingly, while gun-boats sailed up Puzendoon creek to take the Burmese in flank, two columns, the one of 1100 men under Major Sale, and the other of 600 men under Major Walker, moved against their left. The operation was successful, and both columns breaking through the entrenchments drove the whole of the enemy's left from their position, with a heavy loss in men, guns, military equipments, and stores. Maha Bandoola seeming still disposed to maintain his right and centre, another and still greater effort became necessary. It was made on the 7th of December, in four columns, and resulted in the complete discomfiture of the whole Burmese army, which fled in complete disorder without waiting to be attacked in the entrenchments. No hostile force now remained in the vicinity of Rangoon, but it was not long before the Burmese again gave proof of their presence and their determination to omit no mode of warfare which gave any promise of success. On the 14th of December a conflagration, which, from breaking out in different places at once, was evidently intentional, laid a great part of Rangoon in ashes; and at the same time intelligence arrived that a force estimated at 20,000 had reached Kokein, only five miles to the north, and were busily employed in throwing up strong defences. Their presence at such a distance was no longer to be tolerated, and therefore, on the 15th, the commander-in-chief in person started off with two columns, the right mustering 600, and the left 800 men. Short as the time had been, the works at Kokein had been thrown up with such rapidity, that they embraced a circuit of three miles, and consisted of two large and strong stockades situated on the flanks, and connected by six circular entrenchments. The attack having been so arranged as to commence simultaneously in front and rear, the Burmese were completely hemmed in, and both within the stockades and in attempting to escape from them suffered a very heavy loss. During this operation the boats
of the men-of-war and gun-boats, towed by the Diana steamer, were employed in destroying the enemy's war-boats and fire-rafts. The grand army which came to Rangoon for the purpose of either slaughtering the invaders or carrying them off in chains, had vanished. Maha Bandoola, however, was not the man to despair prematurely. He had always strenuously advocated the war, and was not yet prepared to confess that the only effect of his advice had been to bring his country to the brink of ruin. Retiring to Donabew, he immediately began to organize a new army, and to entrench it within works stronger and more extensive than those from which he had previously been driven. While he is thus employed it will be proper to take a survey of the operations in other quarters.

The retirement of Colonel Richards from his advanced position in Assam to Gowhatty was immediately followed by the return of the Burmese and the renewal of their inroads into the adjacent districts. It was necessary therefore, as soon as he had obtained supplies and reinforcements, to resume the campaign. The state of the weather rendering it impossible to proceed at once with his whole force, which mustered about 3000 native troops, he was only able towards the end of October to send off two detachments by water for the purpose of checking the enemy's depredations. The one detachment under Major Waters, after routing a party of Burmese at Raha Chowki, proceeded to Nowgong, where the Boora Rajah and the governor of Assam had entrenched themselves with 1300 men. Notwithstanding their superior numbers, they declined the encounter, and left him to take undisputed possession of their works. The other detachment, under Major Cooper, proceeded to Caliabar, and found it abandoned. Colonel Richards having thus secured two advanced positions, commenced a tedious march with the remainder of his force along the banks, while his stores and baggage were dragged in boats against the current of the Brahmapootra, and on the 6th of January, 1825, reached Maura Mukh, about 120 miles beyond Gowhatty. On the 29th he arrived at Rangpoor, the capital of Upper Assam, situated on the Dikho, a feeder of the Brahmapootra. The fort, consisting of a square building of solid masonry, mounted 200 pieces of cannon, and was moreover rendered difficult of access by two swamps and a ditch. It was defended by a strong garrison of Burmese and Assamese, and seemed capable of making a vigorous defence. Fortunately violent dissensions prevailed among the leaders, and Colonel Richards had no sooner carried a stockade which had been erected across the road, and begun to plant a breaching battery, than he received proposals for surrender. The terms as ultimately arranged were that such of the garrison as chose might retire peaceably within the Burmese territories, and such as were willing to submit might remain in Assam. At first about 9000 persons, including women and children, began their departure for the Burmese frontiers, but many soon repented, and the number of emigrants was greatly diminished. With the surrender of Rangpoor, Assam ceased to be the scene of further hostilities, and became a British province.
When the obstacles which threatened the success of the expedition to Rangoon became known at Calcutta, it was determined to fit out two considerable armaments for an overland invasion of Ava, the one to penetrate through Kachar and Munipoor into the valley of the Ningtee, a tributary of the Irrawadi; and the other, starting from Chittagong, to cross the mountains between Aracan and Ava, and ultimately form a junction with the army from Rangoon. The Kachar division, mustering upwards of 7000 men, commanded by Colonel Shuldham, assembled on the Sylhet frontier toward the end of 1824. As the Burmese had retired from Kachar, and had full occupation in Pegu, there was no reason to apprehend any direct resistance. There were physical obstacles, however, of a very formidable nature, and these unfortunately, from the same ignorance and rashness which characterized all the initiatory movements in the Burmese war, had been in a great measure overlooked. The very first march could not be accomplished till a road had been made by the pioneers, with infinite labour, from Bhadrapoor to Banskandy. The distance to Munipoor was still ninety miles of one of the most rugged tracts that was ever travelled, presenting a succession of steep hills clothed with dense forests, water-courses with high and precipitous banks, and occasional flats of deep splashy mire. The pioneers succeeded in cutting a foot-way of about forty miles, but it was only labour in vain, as neither artillery nor loaded cattle could pass along it. After the month of February and March, 1825, had been spent in a vain endeavour to overcome these obstacles, they were pronounced insurmountable, and the prosecution of the invasion by Kachar was in consequence abandoned.

The Aracan armament, mustering about 11,000 men, under the command of Brigadier-general Morrison, assembled at Chittagong. The preparations for it had been dilatory, and accompanied with circumstances of an ominous description. The aversion of the sepoys, particularly those of Bengal, to a sea voyage has already been mentioned. As this aversion seemed not to be overcome, government yielded to it, and resolved to substitute a tedious and difficult march by land for the far cheaper and more expeditious sea route. For this purpose several sepoy regiments were ordered eastward from the north-western provinces. During their march a very unusual number of desertions took place, and it became obvious that the aversion of the sepoys was not merely to the sea voyage, but to employment at all in the Burmese war. They had heard of the disaster which had befallen Captain Noton's detachment at Ramoo, and they regarded the Burmese with terror, as a kind of magicians who could render themselves invulnerable. Thus overcome by superstitious and unmanly fears they were determined not to go to Aracan if they could possibly avoid it. All therefore that they wanted was a plausible pretext for refusing, and unfortunately, owing to mismanagement on the part of their superiors, they had no difficulty in finding it. Three native regiments, the 26th, 47th, and 62d, cantoned at Barrackpoor, were under orders for Aracan. They had received the intimation
with murmurs, complaining with some show of reason that they did not possess and were unable to procure the necessary means of transport. The sepoy carried his knapsack, containing his linen and various small articles, and sixty rounds of ammunition, but in addition to these, in order not to risk the loss of caste, he cumbered himself with various culinary articles, as a plate, a water-pot, a boiler, a frying pan, and a cup. These articles, all of brass, weighed about twenty-two lbs., and could only be conveyed by hiring or purchasing bullocks for the purpose. This expense, probably because it was considered to be one of his own creating, was thrown upon himself, and was usually borne without grumbling. In the present instance, however, the circumstances were of an exceptional nature, and he not unreasonably expected that allowance would be made for them. The commissariat, in supplying its own demands, had nearly swept Bengal of all its available cattle, and none could be obtained by the sepoys except at extravagant rates. When the fact was represented at head-quarters, on the part of the 47th regiment, which was to be the first to march, the answer returned was that the sepoys must provide themselves as usual. The mutinous spirit which previously existed now threw off restraint, and at private meetings held within the lines, the sepoys bound themselves by oath not to march unless their pay was increased and carriage supplied. To remove or allay the discontent, Colonel Cartwright, in command of the regiment, made some purchases of bullocks at his own expense, and government offered advances of money; but the men having been furnished with a real grievance, under cover of which they might disguise, and at the same time give effect to their cowardly fears of the Burmese, refused to part with it. In fact the grievance had been practically removed, for two days before the final orders to march were given, “the cattle for the baggage were reported to be efficient and ready,” and the only thing that can be said in justification or palliation of the continued insubordination is, that having been allowed to proceed so far it could not now be suppressed.

Colonel Cartwright, having in vain exerted himself to restore discipline, sought the advice of his superior officer General Dalzell, who proceeded to Calcutta to consult with Sir Edward Paget, the commander-in-chief. On his return General Dalzell gave orders that the 47th regiment should appear on parade in marching order on the 1st of November. About a third of the whole obeyed, but the rest assembling tumultuously in the adjacent lines, threatened to fire upon them if they stirred, while all the attempts made by General Dalzell and the other officers to bring the mutineers to a sense of duty were met with clamour and menace. They were, therefore, of necessity left to take their own course till effectual means of coercion could be provided. During the day and the following night they continued in the same excited and tumultuous state, and on being made acquainted with the arrival of the commander-in-chief, sent a petition to him. Captain Macan, who was employed to translate
it, appended to his translation the following note:—"The original of this petition is written in a most barbarous and unintelligible manner. No regard is paid to spelling, grammar, or idiom. I am therefore doubtful if I have expressed the sentiments of the petitioners in every paragraph, and I am convinced that they have themselves not done so. Those parts, however (such as the third paragraph), on which I have doubts are the least important." The petition certainly justifies Captain Macan's account of it, and requires a very wide interpretation, but it is scarcely possible to suppose that it does not contain any statement of what the mutineers really wanted. Now it is remarkable that the document, though long enough to have enumerated a large list of grievances, makes no mention whatever of those to which their conduct has usually been ascribed. It says nothing of irregular promotions, which are said to have offended them, nor of the difficulty of procuring bullocks for transport,

and confines itself almost entirely to one single topic. "The case," it says, is this:—"The soubahdar major and havildar major told the sepoys, &c., they were going to Rangoon, and would be embarked on board ship, and he told all the sepoys that when the Company went to war they ought not to shrink." To this, according to the petition, the sepoys replied "that they never could put their feet on board ship, and that no person would forfeit his caste. For this reason all the sepoys swore by the Ganges water and toolsee (sacred basil), that they would never put their feet in a ship; and every gentleman knows that when a Hindoo takes Ganges water and toolsee in his hand, he will sacrifice his life. In this way the regiment, &c., pledged themselves. This which is written is our representation." After complaining of the soubahdar and havildar for having stated to Colonel Cartwright that the regiment was ready to march, "whereas the sepoys knew nothing of this circumstance," the petition concludes thus:—"Now you are master of our lives; what you order we will do, but
we will not go on board ship, nor will we march for that purpose. Formerly
our name was good, but it has now become bad; our wish is therefore that our
names be effaced, and that every man may return to his home." From these
quotations it is obvious that what the petitioners really demanded was that
they should either be exempted from serving in the Burmese war or discharged.
The answer to the petition was that it had never been intended to send them
by sea, but that no regard could be had to soldiers in actual rebellion, and the
first and only thing they had to do was to lay down their arms without stipu-
lating for conditions.

As the other two native regiments were known to be infected, the suppress-
sion of the mutiny could not be expected from them, and therefore two of the
king's regiments—the royals and the 47th—with a detachment of horse
artillery, and a troop of the governor-general's body-guard, had been brought
to Barrackpoor for that purpose. Early on the morning of the 2d of
November, these troops were drawn up perpendicularly to the sepoys, the
artillery a little to the rear. The mutinous regiment, the native 47th, was
formed in front of the lines, and to the left, in the rear of them, the 26th and
62d, the two other native regiments which were under orders to march.
About twenty men of the 26th, and above 100 of the 62d, had joined the 47th,
and stood along with it to share its fate. Before the final step was taken Sir
Edward Paget deputed the quarter-master general, the adjutant-general, Colonel
Galloway, the commander of the rebellious regiment, and Captain Macan of the
16th lancers, as interpreter, to explain his answer to the petition, and make the
mutineers fully aware of the perilous position in which they stood. The
native officers had previously withdrawn, and left them to themselves. After
some expostulation, which they met only with clamour and symptoms of
increasing violence, they were told that their fate depended on obeying the
orders about to be given by the adjutant-general. His first was "order arms;" it
was instantly obeyed; the second was "ground arms;" it was met with loud
murmurs and vociferations, and obeyed, it is said, only by a single individual.
The artillery immediately opened fire, and the mutineers, though possessed
each of forty rounds of ammunition, instead of employing it in resistance, at
once broke, threw down their arms, and fled. In rushing across the parade-
ground, several were shot by the infantry, or cut down by a charge of the
body-guard, still more fell in the pursuit, or perished in the river which skirts
the plain of Barrackpoor on the north. At first the number of killed was
stated at nearly 200, but this appears to have been an exaggeration, as only
eleven bodies were found in the lines and on the parade-ground. Of the many
who were made prisoners, and afterwards tried by native courts-martial, some
ringleaders were hanged, and others condemned to hard labour in irons. A
more lenient course was ultimately adopted, and all those detained in custody
were liberated. The native officers, on the assumption that they must have
known of the mutiny, and perhaps encouraged it, were dismissed the service, and the name of the 47th Bengal native infantry was erased from the army list. The stern course adopted was successful, and the mutinous spirit, which had already infected two other regiments and might soon have been much more widely spread, disappeared.

From the account which has been given of this mutiny, it seems impossible to deny that part of the blame must be borne by the military authorities. When the difficulty of procuring the necessary bullocks for transport was represented to them, and not denied, it was, to say the least, harsh and inconsiderate, simply to reply in effect that they neither could nor would assist in obviating it. It is true, that they afterwards came forward and offered to advance the necessary funds, but by this very act they pronounced their own condemnation. If there was any propriety in the advance, it ought to have been offered at the time when assistance was requested, and not delayed till it could only be regarded as a concession made under pressure to mutineers. At the same time, it is perfectly plain that the refusal of assistance, however much it may have inflamed the mutinous spirit and forced it to a crisis, did not originate it. The sepoys were determined from the first not to go to Aracan unless under compulsion. They began accordingly with swearing "by the Ganges water and tool see that they would never put their feet in a ship." When this oath proved unavailing from its having been determined to send them by land, their reluctance took a different form, and they began to clamour for additional allowances and pay. Pretexts, in short, more or less plausible never would have been wanting, as the men, without having made up their minds to actual resistance, were bent on shunning a service which they both feared and detested. The court of inquiry, which afterwards reported on the mutiny, take a different, and we cannot help thinking, a very preposterous view of the subject. According to them, the mutiny was an "ebullition of despair at being compelled to march without the means of doing so," and they "do not hesitate to believe that, in spite of every other discouraging circumstance, if the means of carriage had been forthcoming at the proper period, and in proportion adequate to the necessities of men marching on such an arduous and trying service, none of the other points of complaint would have been heard, and the late 47th regiment would now have been contending against the enemies of the state." The court of inquiry, when they speak thus, entirely lose sight of the notorious aversion of the sepoys to the service on which they were ordered, and very absurdly represent the want of bullock transport as the cause of a mutinous spirit which existed, and had been manifested by the prevalence of desertion, before this want was known. The opinion of Sir Edward Paget, the commander-in-chief, though it was scouted at the time, will now, when it can be read by the light of subsequent events, be treated with more respect. Giving evidence before a committee of the House of Commons on the state of discipline in the native Indian army, he
A.D. 1825.

Insubordination in Bengal army.

Departure of the Aracan force.

Physical features of Aracan.

says: "It is impossible for me to conceal from the committee that there is a great spirit of insubordination in the army, at least in that I had the opportunity of more particularly seeing, which is the Bengal army. A sort of spirit of independence prevails amongst the officers, which is totally inconsistent with our ideas of military discipline. I had abundant opportunities of seeing it myself, and had the proofs before me of that spirit; and I have reason to think, from what I have subsequently heard, that it is by no means subsiding."

When the mutiny at Barrackpoor was suppressed, all the obstacles to the completion of the expedition against Aracan were removed. It consisted, as already mentioned, of a land army of about 11,000 men, commanded by General Morrison, and composed of his Majesty's 44th and 54th regiments, the 26th, 42d, 49th, and 62d Bengal native infantry, the 10th and 16th Madras native infantry, the Mug levy, and some local horse, with details of artillery and pioneers. For the conveyance of troops and supplies along the shore, and to co-operate in the reduction of maritime tracts and islands, it was accompanied by a flotilla commanded by Commodore Hayes, and consisting of the Vestal Bombay cruiser, the Company's surveying ships Research and Investigator, the armed steamer Pluto, five gun-brigs, with the ketch bomb-vessel, four gun-pinnaces, and eighty gun-boats, each carrying a twelve-pounder carronade, besides transports and country boats. In addition to the ordinary crews, the flotilla carried 600 marines. Owing to various causes of delay, General Morrison was unable to move from Chittagong till the beginning of January, 1825, but it was expected that he would soon be able to make up for lost time, as it was known that in consequence of the withdrawal of Maha Bandoola with his army, for the purpose of arresting the progress of Sir Archibald Campbell, there was now no Burmese force in Aracan capable of encountering him. The existence of an enemy far more formidable than the Burmese was again in a great measure overlooked.

Aracan stretches nearly 300 miles from north to south along the eastern shore of the Bay of Bengal. On the east, the Yumadong Mountains, which have an average height of 3000 to 4000 feet, separate it from Burmah and Pegu. These mountains, and the streams which flow from them, give it its peculiar physical features. In the north, where their distance from the coast is greatest, they leave a width of about ninety miles, but in proceeding southwards the space between them and the coast gradually narrows, till at last they leave no interval at all, and terminate on the shore in Cape Negrais. In the southern half of Aracan, the mountains come so close to the shore as to leave no room for the development of any streams exceeding mere mountain torrents; but in the northern half, above the twentieth degree of north latitude, the breadth is not only sufficient to furnish supplies to larger streams, but being intersected longitudinally by lower ridges parallel to the principal range, is divided by them into several long valleys, each of which forms the basin of a
considerable river. Of these rivers, which, in consequence of the configuration now described, necessarily flow southward, the principal are the Myoo, the Kaladyne or Aracan, and the Lemyo. They have each a course of about 150 miles, are on an average not more than twenty miles distant from each other, and approaching still nearer in the lower part of their course, have a common embouchure in Hunter’s Bay, where they communicate by various channels, and form numerous small islands. Most of the coast is in like manner skirted with islands, but of these, the only two whose magnitude entitles them to notice, are Ransee and Cheduba. From the Naaf, which forms the boundary between Chittagong and Aracan, the coast is lined by shoals, which sometimes stretch two or three miles from the shore; and indented by numerous bays and creeks, mostly formed by the torrents which, rushing down from the neighbouring mountains, take the nearest course to the sea. The interior is even more forbidding than the coast, presenting a succession of rugged heights, separated by deep ravines, or of marshy flats. In both cases, lofty forests or dense jungle render any routes that can be taken difficult in the extreme, and poison the atmosphere, particularly at the commencement and cessation of the rains, so as to make it absolutely pestilential.

General Morrison, in order to avoid the apparently insurmountable obstacles to his passage through the interior of the country, resolved to pursue a route as near as possible to the coast, hoping that he would thus be able to avail himself of the assistance of the flotilla in the conveyance of stores, and in facilitating the passage of troops across the mouths of rivers. Having, on the 1st of February, reached the estuary of the Naaf, he sent a detachment across it to take possession of Mangdoo, but was not able to transport the main body of the army before the 12th. As a great part of the cattle necessary for transport had not yet arrived, he was obliged to leave most of the baggage and stores at Mangdoo, under charge of a division, and continued his march southward to the estuary of the Myoo, or Tek Myoo. It was more than three miles in width, and, owing to various causes of delay, was not finally crossed till a whole month had elapsed. The army then encamped at Chankrain, situated on a branch of the Koladyne, which is navigable by loaded boats to within a few miles of Aracan, the capital. To effect its capture was now the great object of the expedition. At first it seems to have been intended to approach it by water, and Commodore Hayes having entered the mouth of the Koladyne with the flotilla toward the end of February, had ascended to a place called Kiung-pala. Here his further progress was obstructed by a stockade, which, after he had sustained some loss in an ineffectual attempt to force it, compelled him to return. The land attack was therefore necessarily adopted, and the army, on the 20th of March, began to move upwards, following the direction of the river. No enemy appeared, and even at Kiung-pala, the stockade which had baffled Commodore Hayes was found abandoned. On the 26th, and the
day following, some resistance was offered at two places where stockades had been erected, but it was easily overcome, and the army, advancing without opposition, arrived on the 29th at the foot of a range of hills about 400 feet high, which encircle and completely command the capital, situated in the plain below. Here it seemed that no further advance would be permitted, as the summit of the hills was strongly stockaded, and a Burmese force, estimated at 9000 men, stood ready to defend it. Formidable as the works appeared, it was determined at once to assault them. This rash resolution was punished by a repulse. The assailants in climbing the steep ascent, were met by a murderous fire, and volleys of heavy stones rolled down upon them, and after an ineffectual struggle, they were compelled to retire with considerable loss. After this severe lesson greater caution was used. On the 30th, the guns brought into position opened a brisk fire on the stockades, and on the evening of the 31st, a detachment succeeded, by a circuitous movement, in gaining the heights without being discovered. On the 1st of April, the Burmese, while assailed as before in front, lost all presence of mind on being attacked also in flank, and fled, leaving Aracan an easy capture. The subjugation of the rest of the country was easily accomplished.

According to the original plan, General Morrison's next object was to co-operate with the army on the Irawadi. Here again, owing to ignorance of the geography of the country, or rather to an infatuated neglect of information which had been communicated—and the truth or falsehood of which might easily have been verified—the perfectly practicable pass of Aeng, by which a very extensive trade between Burmah and Aracan was carried on, was overlooked, and one beset with insuperable difficulties selected. To reconnoitre, and if possible attempt this pass, Major Bucke, at the head of a detachment, proceeded to Talak, at the foot of the mountains, about seventy miles S.S.E. of Aracan. After four marches up the rugged ascent, the troops arrived in a state of complete exhaustion at Thantabain, on the Burman frontier, but it was only to learn that the enemy, posted in force, were waiting to dispute their further progress. Hitherto it had been almost impossible to advance unopposed. What, then, would it be to attempt it with an enemy in front? Major Bucke, influenced by this consideration, and the inefficient state to which fatigue and privation had reduced his detachment, immediately began to retrace his steps. Had he, instead of attempting the ascent at Talak, only continued his march about ten miles farther to the south-east, he would have found the pass of Aeng lying open and wide to receive him. The failure of the expedition was not the worst of the evils which could be traced to ignorance of the Aeng Pass. The main army, left in Aracan, made no other effort to co-operate with Sir Archibald Campbell, and remained only to pine away and perish by disease. Its ravages were indeed fearful. When the rainy season terminated, a fourth of the whole army had died, and more than half the survivors were in hospital. From such
an army nothing further was to be expected, and nothing remained but to avoid its total annihilation by withdrawing it from the pestilential atmosphere of the capital, and sending its scanty remnants to recruit at different stations on the coast which had proved comparatively healthy. It is now time to return to the army at Rangoon, on whose unaided exertions the success of the war seemed now to depend.

After the capture of the stockades at Kokein the condition of the British forces had greatly improved. The return of the healthy season had arrested the progress of disease, reinforcements had arrived, and the population, whose desertion of their houses had added greatly to the difficulties of the campaign, were rapidly returning. It has been already mentioned that some overtures which the Peguers made with a view to secure their future independence were not encouraged, because it was feared that the British government might be called upon for a guarantee, which might produce disagreeable entanglements. A new policy was now inaugurated, and in order to give additional confidence to the returning inhabitants, Sir Archibald Campbell issued a proclamation in which, after asking "What folly can actuate you to attempt any further opposition to the British arms?" and reminding them of the oppression and tyranny which they had for a long time endured "by the cruel and brutal conduct of the Burmese government," and contrasting their wretched position with the "comfort and happiness" of the Tenasserim provinces, "now under the protection of the English flag," he concluded thus: "Choose from among yourselves a chief and I will acknowledge him." There were obstacles, however, which made it difficult for the Peguers to take advantage of the pledge thus given them. Their ancient ruling dynasty was extinct, and before there was any prospect of a harmonious choice, British policy had assumed a new phase, and determined to renounce "the present benefit," in order to avoid "the eventual inconvenience" of encouraging the people to recover their independence.

Difficulty of conveyance and deficiency of supplies had at one time disposed Sir Archibald Campbell to meditate an entirely new line of operations. The alternative he proposed was, to proceed to Martaban and thence march on Ava through Old Pegu, or to re-embark the troops, and re-land them in Aracan, with the view of penetrating into the heart of the Burman empire through some pass of the Yumadong Mountains. Fortunately government discountenanced both proposals, and satisfied him that he ought to follow out the original design. Accordingly, as soon as his arrangements were completed, he left a garrison in Rangoon, and formed his army into three divisions:—the first, of 2400 men, under his own immediate command; the second, of 1200, under Brigadier-general Cotton; and the third, of 600, under Major Sale. The last division sailed to Cape Negrais, and after destroying some batteries which the Burmese had erected there, ascended the Bassein to the town of same name. The Burmese having set it on fire and abandoned it, Major Sale attempted to follow on
their track, till the failure of proper conveyance left him no alternative but to return to Bassein, re-embark, and sail back to Rangoon, without having effected any object of the least moment. The blame, however, rested not with him, but with those who had sent him on an expedition from which no adequate results could reasonably have been anticipated. The second division, accompanied by a flotilla of sixty-two gun-boats, and all the boats of the men-of-war, proceeded up the river, with instructions to carry the enemy's works at Panlang and Donabew by the way. General Cotton began to ascend the river on the 16th of February, and three days after arrived at Panlang. The stockades erected on both banks, and also in front, at the point where the channel divided, had a formidable appearance, but were quickly cleared by the shells and rockets of the flotilla, and captured without a struggle. Destroying all the stockades except one, in which a garrison was left to maintain the communication with Rangoon, General Cotton continued to ascend, and quitting the Rangoon for the Irawadi at the point where they branch off, came in sight of Donabew on the 28th. Here Maha Bandoola commanded in person, and had entrenched himself, with a garrison of 12,000 men, within works as strong as Burmese art could make them.

The principal stockade of Donabew extended for nearly a mile along the right bank of the river, and formed a parallelogram, varying in breadth, according to the nature of the ground, from 500 to 800 yards. The stockading, from fifteen to seventeen feet high, was composed of solid teak beams driven firmly into the earth, and as close as possible; immediately behind rose the old brick walls of Donabew, affording by means of cross-beams additional strength to the stockades, and a platform on which the defenders, while pouring a murderous fire on their assailants, were well sheltered. On this platform, and other parts of the works, 140 guns of various calibre, and a still greater number of gingals, were mounted. All round the stockade was an outer ditch of considerable depth and width, made difficult to cross by various contrivances, such as spikes, nails, holes, &c., and on every side except toward the river was an abattis thirty yards broad, and otherwise of a very formidable description. Beside the principal stockade there were other two of similar structure, but minor dimensions, situated lower down the river, and forming a kind of outworks.

To attack these formidable defences and their garrison of 12,000 men, headed
by the ablest and most renowned of the Burmese warriors, General Cotton could barely muster 600 bayonets. It was a gross blunder on the part of the commander-in-chief to send him on such an errand with such inadequate means, and it was a still grosser blunder on his part to attempt to execute it when he had ascertained by ocular inspection that it was scarcely possible for him to succeed. From some idea, however, that his instructions left him no option, he lost no time in making the necessary preparations. After sending a flag of truce with a summons to surrender, and receiving the defiance which he must have anticipated, he commenced his attack at sunrise on the 7th of March, by sending his troops in two columns, under cover of the fire of two field-pieces and a rocket battery, against the nearer of the two minor stockades. The defence, though maintained with more steadiness than the Burmese had recently displayed, was unavailing, and the assailants were quickly within the work, dealing death to all who had not previously escaped from it. As soon as the first stockade was captured a battery was erected in front of it, and began to play upon the second stockade. When a sufficient impression was supposed to have been made, 200 men advanced in two parties to storm. The destructive fire with which they were met caused them to diverge from the point of attack and betake themselves to a ditch. It gave them no shelter, for besides being filled with spikes, it had been scarped so as to expose it to the fire of the stockade, and Captain Rose, who though wounded was gallantly leading the storming party, having fallen by a second shot, it was deemed hopeless to persevere, and the flotilla, after re-embarking the troops, guns, and stores, dropped down the river to wait for new instructions.

The first division, under Sir Archibald Campbell, was meantime pursuing its march. It had started on the 13th of February, and proceeded up the country, keeping at a short distance from the left bank of the Lyne. On the 23d it reached the town of this name, and on the 1st of March, after fording the river, a march of fourteen miles brought it to Tharawa, on the Irawadi. After halting here for some days, for the purpose of receiving accounts of General Cotton, a cannonade heard in the direction of Donabew on the 7th, and some information obtained, led Sir Archibald Campbell to conclude that that stockade had been actually carried, and that he himself might now safely continue his march. A despatch from General Cotton undeceived him when he had made only two marches in advance, and he immediately began to retrace his steps, under a conviction of the necessity of not only restoring the reputation of the British arms, but of removing a hostile force, which now commanding the river in his rear, entirely destroyed his communication with Rangoon. On the 13th he returned to Tharawa, and began to make preparations for crossing the Irawadi. As the river is here nearly half a mile wide, and the actual means of transport consisted only of a few canoes, this was a work of no ordinary difficulty. At length, however, by constructing rafts for the more pon...
derous materials, the army with its equipments were safely landed on the right bank. On the 18th the retrograde movement was resumed, and on the 25th, after a march, during which it was necessary to cut a pathway through thickets of intricate jungle, Donabew was reached.

Sir Archibald Campbell having taken up his position above the works, while the flotilla which had brought up General Cotton’s division was below, it became necessary to open a communication. This was gallantly effected by the flotilla, which, taking advantage of a fair wind, sailed up the river and ran the gauntlet of all the guns which the enemy could bring to bear upon it, without sustaining any serious damage. During this achievement the Burmese, as if to show what they too were capable of, ventured on a vigorous sortie. It was headed by seventeen elephants, each carrying five or six men, armed with gingals and muskets, and supported by a small body of horse, and dense masses of infantry. It was a vain bravado on the part of the Burmese, and cost them dear. As they approached, a well-directed fire of artillery and musketry threw their ranks into confusion. The elephants becoming unmanageable, or deprived of their drivers, who had been shot down, fled into the adjoining thicket, the horse followed, and the foot made the best of their way back into the stockade. In the subsequent operations, so little courage and skill were displayed by the defenders, that the assailants had a comparatively easy task to perform. Maha Bandoola had been killed by a rocket or the bursting of a shell, and the Burmese troops, thus deprived of the only leader in whom they had confidence, refused to continue the struggle. On the 3d of April, when the guns and heavy mortars which had been placed in battery opened their fire, no answer was made from the stockade, and its defenders were discovered in full retreat through the adjoining jungle. No further explanation was necessary, and the whole works were taken possession of without more resistance.

The only obstacle to an advance into the interior being thus removed, Sir Archibald Campbell, now strengthened by his other divisions, and by additional reinforcements from Rangoon, resumed his march. The Prince of Tharawadi, the brother of the Burmese sovereign, who had assumed the command, had succeeded in collecting a considerable force, but was evidently determined to rest satisfied with the defensive, regularly retiring as the British advanced. Thus allowed to march without encountering any opposition, Sir Archibald Campbell had arrived within thirty miles of Prome, when a British soldier, who had been made prisoner by the Burmese, arrived in his camp, with a letter addressed to him by two of the atwen-wuns, or royal councillors. It attributed the war which had interrupted the ancient friendship of the two states to the conduct of a certain paltry chief, and proposed that a negotiation might be opened for the restoration of peace. The answer returned was, that the British army was advancing to Prome, and that its commander-in-chief, on arriving there,
would very willingly listen to any overtures that had peace for their object. The atwen-wuns had hoped that the proposal to negotiate would induce the British commander to desist from advancing, and on finding the contrary, ceased to make any further communication. On the 25th of April, Prome, which, in the judgment of Sir Archibald Campbell, was so strong by nature and art, that a garrison of 1000 men might have successfully defended it against ten times that number, was entered without opposition.

Though the Burmese, by their lame abandonment of Prome, seemed at first sight to have given up the contest in despair, they afterwards resumed new courage, and began to make large levies of troops. In this manner they collected a force of about 52,000 men. Of these about 20,000 were assembled at Meaday, on the Irawadi, forty miles due north of Prome, under Mimiaibo, a half brother of the king, and 12,000 at Tongho, eighty miles to the E.N.E., while the remaining 20,000 were stationed principally at Pagahm, Melloon, and Patanagoh. To oppose all these troops Sir Archibald Campbell had under his command only 5000 men, of whom nearly a half were Europeans. Notwithstanding the vast disparity of numbers, past experience justified him in feeling confident as to the result, and yet, for many reasons, of which the enormous expense was one of the strongest, the supreme government were urgent for an early termination of hostilities. Not long, therefore, after he had established his head-quarters at Prome, Sir Archibald Campbell took the initiative in negotiation, by addressing a letter to the Burmese ministers, stating that he was empowered to conclude a peace, and inviting them to save their country from the calamities which a continuance of the war would certainly bring upon it. A favourable answer was immediately returned, and the British commander, waiving the point of etiquette, which he would have shown more judgment in maintaining, sent a mission to the camp of Mimiaibo, when he might have insisted on receiving one. After some delay, an armistice

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1 From Snodgrass's *Narrative of the Burmese War, Cox's Residence in the Burman Empire, and Symes' Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava.*

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of one month was concluded, and a day was fixed on which Sir Archibald
Campbell and the Kye Wungyee, one of the principal of the Burmese ministers,
were to meet and arrange the definitive conditions of peace.

On the 2d of October, the day fixed for the meeting, the commissioners,
Sir Archibald Campbell and Sir James Brisbane, the British admiral in the
Indian seas, on the one side, and the Kye Wungyee and Lamain Wun on
the other, each party attended by a personal suite, and escorted by 1000
picked men, encamped on the plain of Naibenzik, about a mile asunder. About
midway between, a lotoo, or half of audience, on the model of that at Ava,
had been erected. In all the preliminary arrangements the utmost care had
been taken to maintain an appearance of perfect equality, and this was now
carried so far, that both parties, by previous agreement, started from their
encampments at the very same moment, and met together in front of the lotoo.
"Shaking of hands," says Major Snodgrass,¹ "and every demonstration of
amicable feeling having passed, the parties entered the house, and sat down
on two rows of chairs fronting each other; the wungyees and their suite, in
all fifteen chiefs, each bearing the chain of nobility, and dressed in their splendid
court dresses, evidently doing grievous penance in seats they were never accus-
tomed to, that no difference might appear, even in the most trifling particular
between the parties; and so observing and tenacious were they on this point,
that scarcely a movement could be made without a corresponding one on their
side." On proceeding to business, the terms proposed evidently disconcerted
them. Sir Archibald Campbell demanded that the King of Ava should cede
Aracan, abstain from interference with Assam, Kachar, and Munipoor, and pay
two crores of rupees (£2,000,000 sterling) as the expenses of the war, one half
immediately, and the remainder at an early date, Rangoon, Martaban, and the
Tenasserim provinces being in the meantime retained as security. The
Burmese commissioners declared that these rigorous demands had taken them
completely by surprise, and after arguing strenuously against them, as neither
just nor generous, proposed an extension of the armistice till the 2d of Novem-
ber, that they might have an opportunity of submitting them to the king.
It was evident from what passed, that the Burmese would not make the conces-
sions demanded without another struggle, but as the season for opening a
new campaign had not yet arrived, the extension of the armistice was readily
granted. A few days before it expired, a letter arrived from the Burmese
commissioners, intimating the final determination of the court of Ava, in the
following terms:—"If you sincerely want peace, and our former friendship
re-established according to Burman custom, empty your hands of what you
have, and then if you ask it, we will be on friendly terms with you, and send
our petition for the release of your English prisoners, and send them down to

¹ Narrative of the Burmese War, by Major Snodgrass, military secretary to the commander of the expedi-
tion, p. 215.
you. However, after the termination of the armistice between us, if you show any inclination to renew your demands for money for your expenses, or any territory from us, you are to consider our friendship at an end. This is Burman custom.”

The Burmese, as soon as they had indignantly rejected the terms proposed by Sir Archibald Campbell, lost no time in preparing for the resumption of hostilities, and began to advance upon Prome. A considerable body took post at Watigaon, about twenty miles distant, and by commanding the country on the right flank of the British army, threatened to give great annoyance. In order to dislodge them, Brigadier-general M'Dowall was detached on the evening of the 15th of November, with four regiments of Madras native infantry, disposed in three columns—the first under his own immediate command, to attack the position on the left, and the second to assail it in front, while the third moved to the eastward. The columns, from marching separately over ground covered with marsh and jungle, could not communicate, and lost sight of each other. The brigadier arrived first. Though he had no breaching-guns, and knew nothing of the other columns, he rushed on to force an entrance into the works. This precipitation cost him his life. After he had fallen, and most of the other officers were disabled by the murderous fire of the enemy, the assailants were compelled to retreat, pursued to within nine miles of Prome. The second column was not more fortunate, and after attacking a strong stockade, the fire from which nearly annihilated the advance, retired with so much precipitation that they were obliged to abandon their wounded. The third column escaped disaster by retreating as soon as there was reason to believe that the others had failed. The total loss in killed, wounded, and missing, exceeded 200.

The Burmese, greatly encouraged by this success, were confident that under
the leadership of an old retired veteran, of the name of Maha Nemyo, who had achieved it for them, they would yet compel the British to abandon Prome. To put this to the proof, they advanced nearer and nearer, till they were only a few miles distant. Sir Archibald Campbell was in hopes of turning their new confidence to account, and by throwing up earthworks and entrenchments, as if he were afraid of an attack, endeavoured to tempt them to become the assailants. The Burmese, however, were not to be allured from their usual mode of fighting, and continued to make their approaches with such an union of caution and perseverance, that it became necessary for the British once more to assume the offensive. Accordingly, on the 1st of December, Sir Archibald Campbell, leaving four native regiments in charge of Prome, marched out with the remainder of his force in two divisions, the one under himself, and the other under General Cotton. The second division arriving first, immediately stormed and carried the works which the enemy had constructed on the Nawain, a stream which runs past Prome before joining the Irawadi. Within the stockades were found 300 dead, including the veteran Maha Nemyo. This was by no means the whole of the Burmese loss, for the first division having arrived on the opposite bank of the Nawain, as they were abandoning the stockades, intercepted them in their flight, and added greatly to the slaughter. The enemy’s left having been thus destroyed, the next movement was directed against their centre at Napadi, where Kye Wungyee commanded, and had advantageously stockaded himself on a series of heights. These, after the flotilla had sailed up the river, and taken up a position which enabled it to throw shells and rockets into the stockades on either bank, were gallantly carried by a detachment under Colonel Sale, who, having gained the summit without firing a shot, drove the Burmese from their entrenchments, and pursued them from hill to hill, till the whole position, embracing an extent of two miles, was secured. The enemy’s right, which followed the Irawadi to Padong, was still entire, but General Cotton having crossed the river, succeeded, without much difficulty, in breaking it up, by carrying the works on the banks, and also a strong stockade at some distance in the interior.

During this campaign the Burmese had depended much on the aid of tributary tribes dwelling to the north of Ava, and known by the common name of Shans. These, so long as the cause seemed hopeful, had easily been induced to take an active part in the war. The late defeats, however, had completely altered their views, and they at once returned to their own country. The court of Ava, thus brought again to the brink of ruin, saw no hope of escape except in negotiation. On the 26th of December, when the British force had reached Meaday, and were preparing for a further advance, a flag of truce arrived, with a message from the Burmese commander. It stated that full powers had been received from the court to conclude a treaty, and proposed that deputies should be sent to arrange the conditions. The British commander
consented as before, but in the meantime continued his march in the direction of the capital. On the 28th, the Burmese commander sent another message, proposing that the commissioners should meet to conclude the treaty on the 26th of January. As the proposal of this distant day was accompanied with a request for an interim suspension of hostilities, it was evident that nothing but delay was contemplated, and therefore the utmost concession that could be obtained was, that hostilities should be momentarily suspended, to allow the commissioners to meet in a boat, which was for that purpose anchored in the middle of the river. The meeting took place on the 30th, and after a good deal of discussion, which resulted in a considerable modification of the terms originally proposed, the definitive treaty was formally executed on the 3d of January, 1826. The result was as before. To give time for ratification, and on a promise that the British prisoners would be immediately sent down from Ava, and a first instalment of the pecuniary compensation paid, a short armistice was agreed to. It was to terminate on the 18th of January, and on the day immediately preceding, a deputation arrived. They brought neither the ratified treaty, nor the money, nor the prisoners, and simply requested a prolongation of the time. This was at once declined, and on the 18th, a British deputation proceeded to the Burmese camp, to offer the option of either returning the ratified treaty, or of evacuating the entrenchments at Melloon, situated across the river, directly opposite to the British camp at Patanagoh, by sunrise on the 20th. As they could not or would not comply with either alternative, hostilities recommenced.

During the armistice the Burmese, while pretending strictly to observe its conditions, had secretly strengthened their works and obtained reinforcements, and they now stood ready with an army of nearly 20,000 men to contend once more for victory. On the 19th the British batteries opened their fire, and the troops having crossed under cover of it, in two divisions, the one above and the other below, the Burmese hardly waited to be attacked, and made off with such celerity that it was in vain attempted to intercept their retreat. Within the works were found a great number of guns, and large supplies of ammunition and grain. Though thus again defeated with an ease which must have convinced the Burmese of their utter inability to continue the contest, the terms demanded, and more especially the payment of money, was felt by them to be so humiliating, that when a military chief came forward and pledged himself to expel the invaders, he was eagerly listened to. The utmost force which could now be assembled did not exceed 16,000 men, but these seemed quite sufficient to the boasting chief Zay-ya-thuyan, alias Nuring Phuring, "Prince of Sunset," who, attributing all previous disasters to the incompetence of the commanders, assured the king that he might confidently calculate on very different results. His Burmese majesty must have felt somewhat doubtful on the subject, since, at the very time when the Prince of Sunset was invested with the chief command,
A.D. 1825.

New tactics of the Prince of Sunset.

an attempt was made to renew the negotiations, by employing as deputies for that purpose Mr. Price, an American missionary resident at Ava, and Mr. Snodgrass, the surgeon of the Royals, who had been taken prisoner.

The British army, continuing its advance, arrived on the 8th of February within five miles of Pagoahm, an ancient city, which boasted of having been the capital of the Burman empire during the period of its greatest prosperity. Behind its brick wall, though ruined, the Prince of Sunset might have found good cover, had he not disdained all tactics that savoured of timidity. Instead of entrenching himself within stockades, according to the Burmese mode of fighting, he had drawn up his army in the open field, and along the sides of a pathway leading through a thicket of prickly jungle. Indeed, what had he to fear if he was the consummate warrior he believed himself to be, while his force was at least tenfold more numerous than that opposed to him? Owing to the absence of two regiments employed in foraging, Sir Archibald Campbell could not muster more than 1300 fighting men. With this small body he moved to the attack on the morning of the 9th of February, and with very little difficulty cleared the field. Nuring Phuring hastened off with such rapidity that he was the first to bear to Ava the tidings of his own defeat. The object of all this haste was to solicit a new army, with which he would at once return and expel the invaders, but the court had had enough of him, and not satisfied with driving him contumeliously from the presence, put him to death that very evening.

The employment of the Prince of Sunset had been the last effort of despair, and it soon became evident that the resources of the Burmese empire were insufficient to prevent a mere handful of British soldiers from penetrating 500 miles into the interior of the country, and compelling the capital to surrender to them at discretion. After halting five days at Pagoahm, Sir Archibald Campbell resumed his march, and had arrived at Yandaboo, within sixty miles of Ava, when negotiators arrived in the persons of two Burmese ministers and the two American missionaries, Messrs. Price and Judson. As a proof of the sincerity of the court they were accompanied by a number of liberated prisoners, and brought with them twenty-five lacs of rupees (£250,000) as the first pecuniary instalment. The terms having been previously arranged, nothing remained but to give effect to them by a regular treaty. This was concluded, without giving rise to the least discussion, on the 24th of February, and ratified without any unnecessary delay. The treaty consisted of eleven articles, but after the incidental notice already taken of them, a full recapitulation would be superfluous. Aracan and the Tenasserim provinces were ceded in perpetuity to the British government, and the King of Ava renounced all right to interfere with Assam, Jyntra, and Kachar. The crore of rupees, declared to be not merely in indemnification of the expenses of the war, but "in proof of the sincere disposition of the Burmese government to maintain the relations of peace and amity
between the two nations," was to be paid by four equal instalments—the first immediately, the second in a hundred days, the third at the end of a year, and the fourth at the expiry of two years. On the first payment the British army was to retire to Rangoon, and on the second to quit the Burmese dominions. Each state was to receive an accredited minister from the other, and a commercial treaty was to be framed on principles of reciprocal advantage.

The Burmese war was never cordially sanctioned by the home authorities. The expense at which it was carried on was enormous, and the acquisitions of territory secured by it, though they have proved far more valuable than was at one time anticipated, must still be considered a dear purchase. The propriety of the war cannot be determined merely by counting the cost, and balancing the profit and loss. The Burmese were certainly bent on war, and every concession that could have been made to them would have been followed by some new demand. In point of fact they did ultimately lay claim to districts lying within the ancient recognized limits of Bengal, and nothing but the series of severe lessons which they received after hostilities commenced, sufficed to convince them that they were not the invincible warriors whom they had vainly imagined themselves to be. A Burmese war, therefore, however little to be desired on its own account, was sooner or later inevitable, and the Indian government which undertook it have a sufficient vindication in the fact that they only yielded to a necessity which was laid upon them. For the mode of conducting the war they and the commander to whom they intrusted it were strictly responsible, and it is here that the blame lies. They carried it on without any regular plan, committed gross blunders, from which careful inquiry, previously made, would have saved them, and incurred enormous expense and loss of life from scattering their forces instead of concentrating them, and engaging in wild expeditions without any reasonable prospect of an adequate result.
CHAPTER VI.


It was scarcely to be expected that when the predatory system was suppressed, India would at once subside into a state of complete tranquillity. The multitudes who had pursued rapine as a trade, though unable any longer to practise it in large and regularly organized bands, were ready to avail themselves of every source of disturbance; and not a few of the native princes, while they were pleased with the security which they enjoyed under British protection, were dissatisfied with the sacrifices of independence at which it had been purchased. To the larger states the loss of territory and the humiliation which they had suffered were still more galling, and nothing but the fear of subjecting themselves to more fatal disasters deterred them from once more hazarding a contest. British supremacy was thus recognized and submitted to from necessity, not choice; and any events which seemed to promise an opportunity of subverting it were hailed with delight. The Burmese war gave full scope for the indulgence of these feelings. The natives of India entertained the most extravagant ideas of the strength and prowess of the Burmese. Not only were they known to be capable of bringing powerful armies into the field, but they were also supposed to be in possession of magical arts by which they could render themselves invulnerable. The effect of these notions on the sepoys has already been seen. The order to prepare for marching to the seat of war became the signal for wholesale desertion, and in one case was followed by a mutiny, which, if it had not been speedily suppressed by force, would probably have spread over the whole of the native army of Bengal. It is hence easy to understand how a general feeling of restlessness and discontent gradually displayed itself in proportion as the country began to be bared of troops, in order to meet the demands of a foreign war, and how every rumour of disaster confirmed the belief that the British, in encountering the Burmese, were rushing blindly on their own destruction. Altogether apart from the Burmese war there were many causes of disturbance at work, and when to these this war was added, the only wonder is that the overt acts to which they led were not more numerous and of a more formidable description. Some of these which interrupted the internal tranquillity of India during Earl Amherst's administration will now be mentioned.
In the north-west, among the protected Sikh states, a religious mendicant announced his advent as Kali, the last of the Hindu avatars, for the purpose of putting an end to the reign of foreigners. The supposed desirableness of the event sufficed to produce a general expectation of it; and though the precaution had been taken to arrest the mendicant, and he was paying the penalty of his imposture in prison when the day appointed for the advent arrived, a riotous multitude assembled, and were not dispersed till military force was employed. In the same quarter a predatory leader having assembled a large band of followers made himself master of the fort of Kunjawa, at no great distance from Saharanpoor, assumed the title of rajah, and began to levy contributions on the surrounding districts. Numbers flocked to him from all quarters, and the insurrection was assuming a regularly organized form, when a body of troops, collected with some difficulty, marched against his stronghold, and succeeded in dislodging him after 150 of his followers had been slain. At some distance to the south-west, on the borders of Rajpootana, and even in the vicinity of Delhi, the Mewattes and Bhattees, and other bands of plunderers, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the troops which had overawed them, resumed their depredations, and carried them on to such an extent that for a short time the communication with Delhi was interrupted, and order was not restored till an increase of military force had been obtained. At Calpee on the Jumna, about fifty miles south-west of Cawnpoor, a refractory jaghirdar of the Rajah of Jaloum suddenly appeared with a considerable body of horse and foot, and after an unsuccessful attempt to seize the fort, containing an amount of public treasure, plundered and set fire to the town. In Malwah various sinister rumours were circulated, and it was even represented that owing to the difficulties of the Burmese war the British were about to retire altogether from Central India. It was probably owing in part to these absurd rumours that in one locality a rising was organized, and that in the vicinity of Boorhanpoor, among the jungles which extend to the north of the Taptee, between Aserghur and Ellichpoor, Sheikh Dalla, an old Pindaree leader, collected a strong body of horse and foot, and did serious mischief before he was effectually checked. The Bheels too began again to grow troublesome, and were with difficulty restrained from resuming their predatory habits.

Still farther to the south, in the Mahratta country, some serious disturbances occurred. Kittoor, situated to the east of the Portuguese territory of Goa, and to the north-west of Darwar, was, with the adjoining district, held under the Company. On the death of the chief without children, in September, 1824, the grant was understood to have lapsed, but the natives, who had previously been intrusted with the management of the district, being unwilling to relinquish it, endeavoured to secure its continuance, by alleging that the chief, previous to his death, authorized his wife and his mother to adopt a son for him. In accordance with this pretended injunction a boy very distantly related to his

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family was brought forward and recognized as his successor. The whole proceeding was informal. The adoption to be valid ought to have taken place during the chief's lifetime, and at all events no subsequent steps ought to have been taken without the sanction of the paramount power. On these grounds, and also because he believed that the real object of the proceedings was to favour the ambition of a faction, and carry off the accumulated treasure of the late chief, to the detriment of his widow, Mr. Thackeray, the British collector, refused to recognize the new arrangements, and in the meantime, while waiting instructions from Bombay, took possession of the treasure, and assumed the management of the district. No opposition was offered, and in order to prevent the treasure within the fort from being clandestinely carried off, it was sealed up and a guard placed over it. The collector, with his two assistants, was encamped without the fort with an escort consisting of a company of native horse-artillery and a company of native infantry, and on the 23rd of October, on sending as usual to relieve the guard over the treasure, was astonished to learn that the gates had been shut, and that all admission was refused. On the spur of the moment an attempt was made to force an entrance and issued in a lamentable disaster. The collector and the two officers commanding the escort were killed, another British officer was wounded, and the two assistants being taken prisoners, were carried into the fort and detained as a kind of hostages. This revolt, apparently trivial in itself, acquired importance from the general excitement which it produced, and the obvious sympathy of the surrounding population with the insurgents. It was necessary, therefore, to lose no time in arresting the insurrectionary spirit, and a large body of troops under Colonel Deacon was immediately despatched against Kittoor. Though the garrison must have seen from the first that their case was desperate, they refused to surrender, and only yielded at last after the batteries had opened and effected a practicable breach.

At Kolapoor, the capital of another Mahratta territory, situated among the Western Ghauts, the disturbance was of a still more serious character. The rajah, boasting a direct descent from Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire, had a high idea of his own importance, and where he imagined he had a right, thought himself entitled, without consulting any other power, to take his own mode of enforcing it. Acting on this view he made a claim of supremacy over the district of Kagal, in possession of Hindoo Row, a brother-in-law of Scindia, and when the claim was disputed marched a body of troops into the district and took forcible possession of it. Scindia, offended at this treatment of his near relative, applied to the British government on the subject, and complained with some show of justice, that while his own hands were tied up by a treaty which did not allow him to interfere, the Rajah of Kolapoor was allowed to deprive others of rights which were as good as his own, and thus virtually set the paramount power at defiance. This non-interference on the part of the government produced its usual fruits, and the rajah, finding his first encroach-
ments unchallenged, proceeded to make them on a more extensive scale. The next object of his attack was a zamindar, holding partly of the Rajah of Sattarah and partly of the Bombay presidency. Even this did not satisfy him, and he was soon seen at the head of a body of 6000 horse and foot, and a brigade of artillery, plundering and levying contributions. The Bombay government, who had hitherto shown the greatest reluctance to interfere, became convinced at last that it had become indispensable, and sent a detachment, before which the rajah retired to his capital. His cowardice appears to have been as great as his arrogance, and he at once professed submission. A treaty was accordingly made by which he renounced all claim to the territories which he had seized, agreed to pay compensation for the depredations he had committed, and became restricted to the employment of a limited number of troops. As soon as the withdrawal of the detachment relieved him from his more immediate alarm, he forgot all these stipulations, and began again to pursue a course which made it necessary to bind him by still more stringent obligations. The consequence was that British garrisons were stationed in his forts of Kolapoor and Panala, and he lost even the semblance of independence.

Some disturbances which took place in Cutch towards the end of 1824 derive importance chiefly from the encouragement given to them by the Ameers of Scinde, who were again feeling their way, and watching an opportunity of effecting a long-meditated conquest. The despatch of strong reinforcements from Bombay under Colonel Napier, and the successful termination of the Burmese war, convinced the Ameers that, at least for the present, their safest course was to keep the peace. In another quarter not yet mentioned the disturbance was not so easily suppressed, and led to results of greater historical importance than any that have yet been mentioned. The treaty which was made with the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, after Lord Lake had failed in four successive attempts to storm his capital, had been faithfully observed on both sides, and the relations between the two governments had long been of the most friendly description. In 1824 the reigning rajah, Baldeo Sing, feeling his own life to be precarious, was anxious to secure the succession to his son Bulwant Sing, who was then a minor. Under ordinary circumstances he could not have doubted that this son, whose legitimacy was undisputed and indisputable, would succeed, but he had a nephew, Durjan Sal, whose ambitious designs filled him with the greatest alarm, and it occurred to him that the most effectual method of frustrating these designs would be to place his son under the immediate protection of the British government. With this view he applied to Sir David Ochterlony, the British resident at Delhi, and induced him to invest Bulwant Sing with a khelat or honorary dress, in recognition of his being the apparent heir. This ceremony was performed in the beginning of 1824, and about twelve months after the succession opened by the death of Baldeo Sing.

Bulwant Sing, who was then only about six years of age, was immediately
recognized as rajah, while his maternal uncle Ram Ratan Sing, acting as his guardian, conducted the government. This arrangement had scarcely subsisted for a month, when Durjan Sal justified all the suspicions which the late rajah had entertained of him, by gaining over the soldiers, forcing his way into the citadel, slaying Ram Ratan Sing, and gaining possession of the person of the young rajah. Sir David Ochterlony, holding these proceedings to be equivalent to an usurpation of supreme authority, immediately issued a proclamation to the Jats, denouncing Durjan Sal as an usurper, and calling upon them to support their legitimate sovereign, in whose cause he would soon appear at the head of a British force. This decided step was so far effectual that Durjan Sal, who was suspected of a design of clearing his way to the throne by the murder of the rajah, professed to have no other intention than to act as regent during his minority. This office, according to his own account, he had accepted in accordance with the wishes of the whole tribe, whom Ram Ratan Sing's tyrannical conduct had disgusted. This explanation, though plausible, was not deemed satisfactory, and on his declining either to visit the British cantonments or intrust the young rajah to British custody, Sir David Ochterlony hastily assembled a considerable force, with the determination of at once marching against Bhurtpoor. These warlike preparations were suddenly arrested by a letter from the governor-general in council, condemning them in terms so unmeasured, that Sir David Ochterlony felt he had no alternative but to resign. The abrupt prohibition of an expedition which it seemed impossible to delay without a sacrifice both of honour and sound policy, cut him to the heart, and he died shortly after at Meerut, complaining loudly to the last of the harsh manner in which he had been virtually dismissed. He had served the Company faithfully and with distinguished ability for fifty years, and it is therefore impossible not to regret that his retirement, which, owing to his increasing infirmities, had doubtless become expedient, was effected by means which gave it all the appearance of an intended disgrace. The public immediately testified their sense of his merits by the erection of a monument to him in Calcutta, and government gave all the compensation which was now in their power, by issuing, on the 28th of July, 1825, a general order, highly eulogistic of his talents, diplomatic as well as military, and directing, "as an especial testimony" of high respect for his services, and "as a public demonstration of sorrow for his demise," that minute guns, to the number of sixty-eight, corresponding with his age, should be fired from the ramparts of Fort-William.

It is rather singular that the principle of non-interference, for the maintenance of which government had been so resolute when Sir David Ochterlony's military preparations called forth their censure, was afterwards expressly abandoned. The inconsistency, however, becomes less glaring on considering that the opposite decisions were given under different circumstances. When Sir David Ochterlony determined to use force, the means of negotiation were
not apparently exhausted. Durjan Sal was aspiring professedly to nothing more than the regency, and seemed willing to come under an engagement to retire as soon as the rajah should attain majority. This was probably mere pretence, but as he seemed to be counterbalanced by the leading chiefs among the Jats, it was not unreasonably considered impolitic, if not quixotic, to enter into a new war which threatened to be formidable, for the purpose of forcing a new government upon a people who were living in tolerable tranquillity under the one actually existing. But a very short time had sufficed to give the case an entirely new aspect. Durjan Sal, on learning that the British military preparations had been countermanded, had thrown off the mask, and intimated that instead of being satisfied with the regency he now claimed possession as legal heir. He had been adopted, he said, by a previous rajah, and had therefore a preferable title. At the same time that he put forth this new claim he showed that nothing but force would compel him to abandon it, and military adventurers began to flock from all quarters to Bhurtpoor, as a common rendezvous where they might hope to be soon actively employed. The apparent unanimity which at one time prevailed among the Jats themselves had also been destroyed. Madhoo Sing, a younger brother of Durjan Sal, after supporting him in all his proceedings, had suddenly separated from him and made himself master of Deeg, and it was becoming obvious that there would soon be no alternative between forcible interference and the toleration of a state of anarchy which could hardly fail to extend to other native states.

Under these circumstances the whole question was submitted to Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had been summoned from Hyderabad, where he was resident, to succeed Sir David Ochterlony at Delhi. He was one of a band of able diplomats who had received their first training under the Marquis of Wellesley, and had ever since been strenuous supporters of the Indian policy which that great statesman inaugurated. The view which the favourite pupil of such a master would give could hardly be doubtful. It is thus explained in a very able paper which he drew up on the occasion:—"We have, by degrees, become the paramount state of India. Although we exercised the powers of this supremacy in many instances before 1817, we have used and asserted them more generally since the existence of our influence by the events of that and the following year. It then became an established principle of our policy to maintain tranquillity among all the states of India, and to prevent the anarchy and misrule which were likely to disturb the general peace. Sir John Malcolm's proceedings in Malwah were governed by this principle, as well as those of Sir David Ochterlony. In the case of succession to a principality, it seems clearly incumbent on us, with reference to that principle, to refuse to acknowledge any but the lawful successor, as otherwise we should throw the weight of our power into the scale of usurpation and injustice. Our influence is too pervading to admit of neutrality, and sufferance would operate as
support." The application of these principles to the case in question was sufficiently obvious. "We are bound not by any positive engagement to the Bhurtpoor state, nor by any claim on her part, but by our duty as supreme guardians of general tranquillity, law, and right, to maintain the right of Rajah Bulwant Sing to the raj of Bhurtpoor, and we cannot acknowledge any other pretender. This duty seems to me so imperative that I do not attach any peculiar importance to the late investiture of the young rajah in the presence of Sir David Ochterlony. We should have been equally bound without that ceremony, which, if we had not been under a pre-existing obligation to maintain the rightful succession, would not have pledged us to anything beyond acknowledgment." With regard to the regency and the two brothers Durjan Sal and Madhoo Sing, the competing claimants for the office, Sir Charles Metcalfe did not think that any final decision was yet required, but his present conviction was thus expressed: "We are not called upon to support either brother; and if we must act by force it would seem to be desirable to banish both." Negotiation might yet prove effectual, and was undoubtedly the most desirable mode of settlement; but if recourse to arms should become necessary, there would "not be wanting sources of consolation," since "a display and rigorous exercise of our power, if rendered necessary, would be likely to bring back men's minds in that quarter to a proper tone, and the capture of Bhurtpoor, if effected in a glorious manner, would do us more honour throughout India, by the removal of the hitherto unfaded impressions caused by our former failure, than any other event that can be conceived."

The above extracts from the opinion given by Sir Charles Metcalfe, are the more important from their having practically decided the question, and made a convert of the governor-general. "I have hitherto," said Earl Amherst, "entertained the opinion that our interference with other states should be limited to cases of positive injury to the honourable Company, or of immediate danger thereof. In that opinion I have reason to believe that I am not supported by the servants of the honourable Company most competent to judge of its interests, and best acquainted with the circumstances of this country: I should therefore have hesitated in acting upon my own judgment in opposition to others; but I am further free to confess that my own opinion has undergone some change, and that I am disposed to think that a system of non-interference, which appears to have been tried and to have failed in 1806, would be tried with less probability of success, and would be exposed to more signal failure, after the events which have occurred, and the policy which has been pursued during the last nineteen or twenty years. A much greater degree of interference than was formerly called for, appears to have resulted from the situation in which we were placed by the pacification of 1818. It might be a hazardous experiment to relax in the exercise of that paramount authority which our extended influence in Malwah and Rajpootana specially has imposed
EXpedition Against Bhurtpoor.

upon us. Applying these general principles to the particular cases before us, and believing that without direct interference on our part, there is a probability of very extended disturbances in the Upper provinces, I am prepared, in the first place, to maintain, by force of arms if necessary, the succession of Bulwant Sing to the raj of Bhurtpoor.

As the members of the supreme council had previously been in favour of a decided policy, the above conversion of the governor-general removed the only obstacle to its immediate adoption, and the views of all the members were substantially embodied in the following resolution:—“Impressed with a full conviction that the existing disturbances at Bhurtpoor, if not speedily quieted, will produce general commotion and interruption of the public tranquillity in Upper India, and feeling convinced that it is our solemn duty, no less than our right, as the paramount power and conservators of the public peace, to interfere for the prevention of these evils, and that these evils will be best prevented by the maintenance of the succession of the rightful heir to the raj of Bhurtpoor, whilst such a course will be in strict consistency with the uniform practice and policy of the British government in all analogous cases, the governor-general in council resolves that authority be conveyed to Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe to accomplish the above object, if practicable, by expostulation and remonstrance, and should these fail, by a resort to measures of force.”

In accordance with this resolution, negotiation was first attempted, but as there was little probability of its success, military preparations were carried on with great activity, and after Sir Charles Metcalfe, despairing of an amicable settlement, had, on the 25th of November, 1825, issued a proclamation denouncing the pretensions of Durjan Sal, and declaring the determination of the British government to support the rightful prince, Lord Combermere, now commander-in-chief, prepared to move against Bhurtpoor at the head of an army of about 21,000 men, consisting of two regiments of European, and six of native cavalry, together with Skinner’s irregular horse, and of three regiments of European, and sixteen of native infantry, with strong detachments of horse and foot, artillery and pioneers, and a battering train of above a hundred pieces of heavy ordnance. The force of the garrison of Bhurtpoor was supposed to be numeri-
cally equal to that of the besiegers. The British army, marching in two divisions, which had assembled at Agra and Madura—the former under General Jasper Nicolls, and the latter under General Thomas Reynell—started on the 7th and 8th December, and were soon across the Bhurtpoor frontier. On the 10th, the Madura division moved toward the north-west, keeping considerably to the north of the fort, and screened from view by an intervening forest, and arrived in the vicinity of the Motee Jheel, from which the ditch which surrounded the fort derived its supply of water. At the former siege by Lord Lake, the failure of one of these attacks was attributed to a sudden and unexpected increase of the water, by opening the sluices of the Jheel. The possibility of such an occurrence was now happily prevented by sending forward a column, which, by gaining and retaining possession of the embankment and sluices of the Jheel, prevented the enemy from drawing any water from it. The consequence was, that throughout the siege the ditch continued almost dry, and thus relieved the besiegers from what might have proved one of their most serious difficulties.

An account of the situation and defences of Bhurtpoor having been given on the occasion of the former siege, it is only necessary here to repeat, that it stood in a plain somewhat rugged towards the west, covered an area of about five miles in circuit, and was inclosed by a broad and deep ditch, from the inner edge of which rose a thick and lofty wall of sun-burned clay, flanked by thirty-five turreted bastions. The citadel occupied a height towering above the rest of the town, and was inclosed by a ditch 150 feet wide and 50 deep.

As the extent of the fortifications made it impossible completely to invest the place, the first division took up a position which, resting on the Jheel on the north-west, extended along the northern face; the second division, connected with the left of the first, fronted the eastern face. The southern and western faces were thus left nearly open, but by means of posts gradually established beyond the southern and western faces, and in communication with each other, the admission of reinforcements as well as the escape of the garrison was in a great measure prevented. The points selected for attack were a ravelin a little to the east of a principal gateway on the north-eastern face, and a bastion on the eastern face, which, jutting out from the ramparts by a narrow neck, received the name of the Long-necked Bastion. On the 23d of December ground was broken for the purpose of making regular approaches towards these two points, and on the 24th the batteries which had been erected began to play upon them. At first a brisk fire was kept up by the garrison, and bodies of horse and foot made desultory attempts to interrupt the progress of the siege, but in proportion as the batteries were advanced and established an overpowering fire, the enemy’s guns were withdrawn from the outer works, and the besiegers suffered little interruption while they continued for several days a heavy fire of shot and shells from forty-eight battering guns and thirty-six mortars. The
effect produced, however, was not satisfactory. The clay ramparts stood the fire better than if they had been built of solid masonry, and though considerable breaches both to the right and left had been made, the engineers refused to report them practicable. The mode of attack was therefore changed, and after the trenches had been brought close to the counterscarp of the ditch, the process of breaching by mines instead of batteries was adopted. By the 8th of January four mines were sprung, one of them under the cavalier and curtain of the north-eastern angle; and though the effect produced was still short of what had been anticipated, the dilapidation produced was sufficient to show that perseverance in mining could hardly fail to succeed. On the 11th and 12th mines were carried across the ditch and beneath the ramparts, and on the 16th the mine beneath the Long-necked Bastion was sprung with complete success. The garrison made some attempts to countermine and also to repair the breaches. In the former they completely failed, and in the latter were exposed to such a tremendous fire from the batteries that their success was very partial. The assault was now at hand. It was fixed for the 18th, and was to commence on

![Image: Long-necked Bastion, Bhurtpoor. From Creighton’s Siege of Bhurtpoor.]

a very appropriate signal—the explosion of a mine which had been driven under the N.E.E. cavalier, and charged with nearly a ton weight of gunpowder. The effect was tremendous, and proved fatal even to some of the assailants as they stood ready in the trenches. After a momentary pause, produced by this accident, the storming party rushed forward in two columns, and were speedily on the summit of the main breaches on the right and left. Though the enemy made a resolute defence it soon proved vain, and the assailants, as soon as the first struggle was over, completed the capture with a loss of about 600 men. The loss of the garrison in killed and wounded was estimated at 14,000.

During the storm strong bodies of horse and foot attempted to escape by
the western gates. Most of them were cut down or captured by the cavalry. Among the prisoners thus taken was Durjan Sal, with his wife and two sons. He was forthwith sent off as a state prisoner to Allahabad. On the 19th of January, Lord Combermere and Sir Charles Metcalfe entered the citadel, and on the following day they performed the ceremony of placing the young rajah on the throne. The principal widow of the late rajah, appointed nominal regent, was intrusted with the custody of his person, while the government was committed to two ministers, who were to administer it under the control of a British resident specially appointed to Bhurtpoor. Madhoo Sing, the brother of Durjan Sal, immediately made his submission, and retired from Deeg to live within the British territories on a liberal pension. By the capture of Bhurtpoor a stain which had long rested on the British arms was removed, and the hopes of a future rising, which its supposed impregnability had fostered in several of the native states, were extinguished. As it was not impossible, however, that it might again have become a rallying point for the disaffected, its fortifications were dismantled. The expediency of this proceeding cannot be questioned; but since the British government were professedly acting, not for themselves, but for an ally, it sounds rather strange to hear that one of the first things they did after reinstating him in his capital, was to render it incapable of defence. In another respect the conduct of the captors was still less justifiable: “Our plundering here under the name of prize,” writes Sir Charles Metcalfe, “has been very disgraceful, and has tarnished our well-earned honour. Until I get rid of the prize agents I cannot re-establish the sovereignty of the young rajah, whom we came professedly to protect, and have been plundering to his last lotah since he fell into our hands.”

There was still one other quarter in which the paramount authority of the British government had been called in question. The Rajah of Macherry, or as he is usually called, the Rajah of Ulwar, from his capital, situated sixty miles W.N.W. of Bhurtpoor, having died, leaving an illegitimate son and a nephew, both in nonage, his succession was disputed by their respective partizans. Ulti-

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1 This is made of thin plates of silver, very beautifully wrought, fixed on the exterior of a wooden framework. The bottom of the howdah is of open cane-work, and the sides are covered with crimson silk, of which material also are made the cushions. The canopy is of extremely ungainly form, but is very curious from being in the shape of a crested bird with outstretched wings. The body, head, and outside of the wings are covered with silver, the underside of the latter being lined with crimson flowered silk.

mately, as neither had a decided ascendancy, a compromise was effected, by which Benee Sing, the nephew, became nominal rajah, and Bulwant Sing, the son, was to administer the government on attaining majority. Till then Ahmed Buksh Khan, the nabob of a neighbouring district under British protection, was to be his guardian. The peace produced by this compromise was not lasting. As soon as the youths grew up their mutual claims were revived, and a civil war began again to rage. In 1824, the nephew, Benee Sing, gained a decided ascendancy, and became real as well as nominal rajah, the son, Bulwant Sing, retiring upon a jaghire. Shortly after an attempt was made to assassinate Ahmed Buksh Khan, and the assassin being seized, confessed that he had been employed by Mulha, the rajah's minister and favourite, and some other leading members of his court. Ahmed Buksh Khan, being prohibited by treaty with the British from redressing himself, applied to them for protection, and a demand was therefore made upon the rajah to seize the persons accused, and send them to Delhi for trial. He at first made a show of compliance by placing the parties in nominal confinement, but soon threw off the mask, took Mulha into greater favour than before, and when remonstrated with by the resident at Delhi, maintained, not without plausibility, that as an independent prince he alone was entitled to try his subjects for any crimes alleged to have been committed by them. To give effect to this view, and show that nothing but force would compel him to abandon it, he strengthened the defences of his capital, began to collect troops, and entered into communications with disaffected parties, and more especially with Durjan Sal, at Bhurtpoor. The capture of this celebrated stronghold filled him with dismay, and he no sooner heard that the victorious army which achieved it was about to march against him than he hastened to make his submission, by sending off the parties accused as instigators of the attempted assassination of Ahmed Buksh Khan to take their trial at Delhi, releasing Bulwant Sing from the prison in which he had confined him, and, moreover, ceding to him one-half of the territory which Sir George Barlow, when he was foolishly squandering away the conquests of the Marquis of Wellesley, had bestowed on the Row Rajah of Macherry.

All open hostilities throughout India having now ceased, Earl Amherst, who had intimated his intention to resign, set out, in the beginning of August, 1826, on a tour through the Upper provinces. On his arrival at Cawnpoor, on the 16th of November, he was visited among other native princes by Ghazeeud-din Hyder, the King of Oude. To return the visit he proceeded to Lucknow. In the confidential intercourse which ensued, the subject of internal interference was again discussed, the king complaining of the extent to which his legitimate authority was appropriated by the resident, and insisting that there was nothing in the state of the country to justify it. On the borders, the turbulence of some refractory chiefs led to occasional disturbances, but the whole of the territory was, with a few exceptions, cultivated like a garden, and the people
were apparently contented. These representations, if well founded, derived much additional weight from the conduct of the king, who, though far too much under the influence of favourites, male and female, had not only faithfully fulfilled his engagements, but repeatedly relieved the embarrassments of the Calcutta treasury by liberal loans from the hoards of Sadut Ali. In addition to the large advances formerly mentioned he had, in the end of 1825, lent the Company in perpetuity the sum of £1,000,000 sterling at five per cent. interest, and a few months afterwards had increased it by another £500,000. Neither his remonstrances nor his loans had the effect of producing any essential change in the British policy, and his grievances, real or imaginary, remained unrepressed when he died in October, 1827, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Soliman Jah, under the title of Nasir-ud-din Hyder.

From Lucknow the governor-general proceeded to Agra, where he arrived in January, 1827. Here he was visited by the various chiefs of Malwah, and received missions from Holkar and Scindia. The former being still a minor was probably thought too young, and the latter was pining away under a mortal disease which made it impossible for him to be personally present. The territories of Holkar, under the able management of his minister Tantra Jog, and the almost absolute control of Mr. Wellesley, the British resident, had rapidly improved; those of Scindia now enjoyed a degree of tranquillity which had long been denied, but in their present extent and resources presented a humiliating contrast to what they were thirty years before, during the first period of Dowlut Row Scindia’s reign. He had sometimes dreamed that during a period of disaster to the British arms he might yet regain all he had lost, but latterly he had become more reconciled to his lot, and sought compensation for disappointed ambition in indulgence and luxurious indulgence. He died in March, 1827, without any heir of his own body, and without having appointed any successor; but in accordance with what was supposed to be his wish, a boy of eleven years of age, distantly related to his family, was, with the sanction of the British government, raised to the throne, and placed under the guardianship of his favourite wife, Baiza Bai, as regent.

After a visit to the young Rajah of Bhurtpoor Lord Amherst proceeded to Delhi, where he was met by envoys from the different Rajpoot states, and was compelled to discuss some questions of precedence with the Mogul, who would fain, in the midst of his humiliation, have received the governor-general as a vassal, and exacted the homage which he claimed as his superior. The time for such mummery had passed away, and before the visit terminated the King of Delhi was made perfectly aware that his existence as a territorial sovereign had ceased, and that he must henceforth be contented to regard himself as only a stipendiary of the Company. From Delhi, Lord Amherst continued his journey northward to Simla, which thus, for the first time, became a temporary residence for the Governors-general of India. While here, he interchanged
friendly missions with Runjeet Sing, and received intelligence of the hostilities which had again broken out between Persia and Russia, and, in consequence of the continued encroachments of the latter power, excited in certain quarters no small alarm for the future safety of our Indian empire. The governor-general quit Simla in the end of June on his return to Calcutta. About a week afterwards, on the 6th of July 1827, the government of India was deprived by death of one of its most distinguished servants, Sir Thomas Monro, governor of Madras. The length of his service and the state of his health had made him desirous to return home, and by a letter addressed to the directors on the 25th of September, 1823, he had requested permission to resign in January, 1825. The Burmese war compelled him to forego his intention, and he exerted his utmost energies in forwarding troops and furnishing supplies. When the war terminated, he renewed his request to be relieved at the earliest period possible. His letter was received in September, 1826, but unfortunately no immediate steps were taken, and it was only in January, 1827, after nearly four months had elapsed, that new governors were in one day appointed to the presidencies of Madras and Bombay—the Right Hon. S. R. Lushington to the former, as successor to Sir Thomas Monro, and Sir John Malcolm to the latter, as successor to the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone. More than four months elapsed before the new governors took their departure. So far as regarded Sir Thomas Monro it was too late. During a visit which he paid to the districts north of Mysore, in which he had long and successfully laboured, he was seized with cholina, and died at Futeecindah, not far from Gooty.

The internal administration of Lord Amherst does not require any lengthened notice. In Bengal, which was under his more immediate superintendence, the different public departments were left nearly as he found them; but both in
Madras and Bombay most important improvements, of which the chief merit belongs to Sir Thomas Monro and Mr. Elphinstone, were introduced. The leading object of both these distinguished men was to adapt their reforms to the feelings and habits of the population, and in particular, to employ native agency wherever it could be made available, rather as an auxiliary to European agency than as a substitute for it. The enormous expenditure of the Burmese war had greatly embarrassed the Indian finances. Above ten millions sterling had been permanently added to the debt. At the same time, while the charges had increased, the revenues had diminished, so as to leave in 1827–28 a local deficit of above a million. The account, comparing the close of Lord Amherst's administration with its commencement, stood as follows: In 1822–23, revenue, £23,118,000; charge, £18,406,000. In 1827–28, revenue, £22,863,000; charge, £21,974,000. In 1822–23, debt, £29,388,000; in 1827–28, debt, £39,606,000. The financial prospect was thus rather alarming, but as the increased expenditure had been occasioned by wars which were happily terminated, there was ground to hope that by careful economy the temporary embarrassment which had been produced, would soon disappear. In February, 1828, Earl Amherst, owing to the illness of a member of his family, sailed for England without waiting for the arrival of a successor. In the interval, the government was administered by Mr. Butterworth Bayley, who succeeded to it as senior member of council.

CHAPTER VII.


T last Lord William Bentinck had succeeded in obtaining the appointment of governor-general. He had been abruptly deprived in 1807 of the government of Madras by a resolution of the directors, which declared, "that although the zeal and integrity of the present governor, Lord William Bentinck, are deserving of the court's approbation; yet, when they consider the unhappy events which have taken place at Vellore, and also other parts of his lordship's administration which have come before them, the court are of opinion that it is expedient, for the restoration of confidence in the Company's
government, that Lord William Bentinck should be removed, and he is hereby removed accordingly." He complained loudly of the treatment, and in an appeal to the directors thus expressed himself: "The mutiny at Vellore cannot be imputed to me, directly or indirectly. I have been removed from my situation, and condemned as an accomplice in measures with which I had no further concern than to obviate their ill consequences; my dismissal was effected in a manner harsh and mortifying; and the forms which custom has prescribed to soften the severity of a misfortune, at all events sufficiently severe, were on this single occasion violated, as if for the express purpose of deepening my disgrace." He concluded thus: "I have been severely injured in my character and feelings. For these injuries I ask reparation, if, indeed, any reparation can atone for feelings so deeply aggrieved, and a character so unjustly compromised in the eyes of the world.

In complying with my demands, you will discharge, if I may venture to say so, what is due no less to your own honour than to mine." The court answered this appeal by long and verbose resolutions, in which, while admitting "the charges originally advanced against the conduct of the governor and commander-in-chief respecting the violations of caste, to have been, in the sense then attached to them, misapplied and defective," yet, "as the misfortunes which happened in their administration placed their fate under the government of public events and opinions which the court could not control, so it is not now in their power to alter the effects of them." In regard to Lord William Bentinck in particular, the apology was somewhat amplified by such expressions as the following: — "But in the abruptness of the order of removal the court meant no personal disrespect to Lord William Bentinck, and extremely regret that his feelings have been wounded by considering it in that light. They lament that it should have been his fate to have his public situation decided by a crisis of such difficulty and danger as it has been the lot of very few public men to encounter; a crisis which they have since been happy to find was not produced by intended or actual violations of caste, as they are now satisfied that Lord William Bentinck had no share in originating the orders which for a time bore that character, and by the machinations of enemies working upon the ignorance and prejudices of the sepoys, were by them believed to be such violations." Again: "But in all the measures of moderation, clemency, and consideration, recommended by Lord
William Bentinck after the mutiny, the court, though not exactly agreeing with him in the data from which he reasoned, give him unqualified praise; and though the unfortunate events which separated Lord William Bentinck from the service of the Company cannot be recalled, yet the court are happy to bear testimony to the uprightness, disinterestedness, zeal, respect to the system of the Company, and in many instances, success, with which he acted in the government of Fort St. George, and to express their best wishes that his valuable qualities and honourable character may be employed, as they deserve, for the benefit of his country.”

This apology was by no means satisfactory, and Lord William Bentinck was determined not to rest satisfied till he had wiped off the disgrace to which he conceived the directors had unjustly subjected him by their abrupt dismissal. For many years afterwards he was employed in the service of his country, both as a soldier and a diplomatist, but his thoughts were still turned to India, and his ambition was to return to it in possession of a higher appointment than that of which he had been deprived. Such an appointment would be the best of all modes of reparation, since it would at once reverse the sentence of incapacity which had been pronounced against him, and furnish him with an opportunity of practically demonstrating his abilities as an Indian administrator. Accordingly, as has been mentioned, he became, on the retirement of the Marquis of Hastings, a candidate for the office of governor-general. On that occasion Lord Amherst was preferred, but Lord William Bentinck did not allow his claims to be forgotten, and when the office again became vacant, succeeded in obtaining it. The appointment was in itself a great triumph to Lord William Bentinck, as it was impossible to resist the inference that if he was fit to be governor-general, he ought not to have been dismissed as unfit to be governor of Madras. For a time, however, it seemed doubtful if the appointment was to prove anything more than a barren honour. He received it in July, 1827, but the ministry which had sanctioned his nomination, sustained by the death of Mr. Canning in August a shock from which it never recovered, and though the same political party continued for a short time to retain office under Lord Goderich, the ministry of the Duke of Wellington displaced it before Lord William Bentinck had taken his departure. It thus became a question whether the longing for patronage might not prevail, and induce the new ministers to annul the appointment by putting in force the crown’s undoubted power of recall. To their honour they adopted a more becoming course, and Lord William Bentinck was permitted to depart. He set sail in February, 1828, and immediately on his arrival at Calcutta on the 4th of July, assumed the government.

As all hostilities had previously ceased and the country was generally tranquil, the first duty of the new administration was sufficiently obvious. A large addition had been made to the debt, and the revenue was more than a
million sterling short of the expenditure. It was impossible that such a state of matters could be allowed to continue, and accordingly before the actual arrival of the new governor-general, Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had been called from Delhi to a seat in the council board, only expressed the common resolution of himself and his colleagues when he said, "The government which allows this to go on in time of peace deserves any punishment. The government of which I am a part shall not allow it." Lord William Bentinck was animated by the same spirit, perhaps in a still more eminent degree, and during his interviews with the directors had the subject so strongly forced upon his notice, that he arrived with a determination to institute a rigid examination into every branch of the public expenditure, and carry economy to its utmost limits. The home authorities had assumed the scale of expenditure in 1823–24 as a fair standard, and Lord William Bentinck was prepared to give practical effect to their views. It must be admitted, however, that his first measure of economy was not wisely chosen, as the justice of it was questioned by high authority, and the clamour and discontent which it occasioned more than counterbalanced the paltry saving which it effected.

The subject of batta or batha, a word which merely signifies "extra pay or allowance," has been already mentioned. It consisted of a fixed addition which was made to the pay of the officers of the army when they were in the field within the territories of the Company. At an early period the allowance was doubled when the service was beyond these territories, or rendered to native princes, who took this way of testifying their gratitude to such valuable auxiliaries. It was thus paid by Meer Jaffier when he was made Nabob of Bengal, and the reduction of it by the Company, after the grant of the dewanee had thrown the burden of the payment upon themselves, led to mutinous proceedings, which it required all the energy of Clive to suppress. At that time double batta was abolished, but single batta still continued to be paid. Strictly speaking it was due only when the troops were in the field, and hence the original understanding was, that when they were in cantonments and provided with quarters at the public expense, only half batta was payable. By a subsequent arrangement in 1801, the expense of providing quarters in cantonments was thrown upon the officers themselves, and to compensate for this additional burden they were allowed full batta at all times, whether in the field or in quarters. This arrangement had never been approved by the home authorities, and in 1814 instructions were given to the government of Bengal to return to the original plan of allowing half batta only at those stations of the British army which had been established prior to the extension of the Company's territories in that presidency. The Marquis of Hastings was so strenuously opposed to these instructions, that instead of acting upon them he simply returned them to the court for re-consideration, and Lord Amherst had in this respect only followed his example. The time for enforcing them seemed
now to have arrived, and the orders of the court were so peremptory, that Lord William Bentinck had no alternative but to obey them or resign. He chose the former, and had, it is understood, pledged himself, before leaving England, that the issue of what was afterwards known as the "Half-batta Order," would be one of his first measures of retrenchment.

The half-batta order was issued on the 9th of November, 1828, under circumstances which must have made the governor-general doubtful of its expediency. Lord Combermere, the commander-in-chief, protested strongly against it, and resigned his office sooner than take any part in its execution. The two civil members of council, Mr. Bayley and Sir Charles Metcalfe, only consented because, as the latter expressed it, "The order was one which could not have been disobeyed, unless we could tell the court that we are supreme and they subordinate." So far was he, however, from approving the measure, that he recorded his sentiments on the subject "with a view, if possible, to get the order rescinded." In his minute, after giving it as his confirmed opinion, founded on twenty-eight years' observation, "that the allowances of officers on full batta are barely sufficient for their proper support in their several ranks, and do not admit of any reduction without great suffering," he concluded thus: "Had I conceived that this government possessed any discretionary authority on the subject, the execution of that measure would never have received my assent; for it appears to me, with every deference to the high authorities from which it has proceeded, to be extremely unwise and inexpedient, fraught with mischief, and unproductive of any essential good."

If this was the opinion of the most competent judges, we can easily understand how loud was the clamour and how violent the opposition of those whose incomes were curtailed by this retrenchment. The whole amount of the annual saving fell short of £20,000, and this was only to be obtained by trenching particularly on the incomes of junior officers, whose aggregate allowances were already insufficient for their support, and breaking what was called the compact of 1801, which gave whole batta as a compensation for the quarters which the officers had been obliged to procure at their own expense, and on the faith of which they had actually purchased what were previously public quarters at an open sale, and paid for them with their own money. These and similar representations were submitted to the government, in memorials presented through the commander-in-chief, and transmitted to the directors. The governor-general could only answer that he was acting in obedience to instructions, and that it would afford him sincere gratification to recall the half-batta order, should the court see fit to give him the necessary authority. The court took higher ground, and after denouncing the tone of the memorials as inconsistent with military subordination, closed all further discussion by declaring their determination to enforce the retrenchment. No one was so great a sufferer by it as the governor-general himself, since it subjected him at the very commencement
of his administration to a degree of unpopularity, of which he was never able afterwards completely to disencumber himself. The prejudice with which he had thus to struggle was not more unfortunate than it was unjust, since he had only acted ministerially in the matter, and rather in opposition to his own opinion than in accordance with it. This may fairly be inferred from a minute of a later date, in which, advertting to the subject, he says: "Trilling, however, as this deduction is upon the aggregate amount of the pay of the Bengal army, it has been severely felt by the few upon whom it has fallen, and has created in all an alarm of uncertainty as to their future condition, which has perhaps produced more discontent than the measure itself." The opposition made to the half-batta order appears to have made more impression on the directors than they themselves were willing to admit. The only stations to which it was at first made applicable were Dinapoor, Berhampoor, Barrackpoor, Dum-Dum, and Ghazipoor. A much wider application was doubtless intended, and the fact that it was not carried further is best explained by a change of opinion in the home authorities, who seem, though late, to have been at last convinced that any retrenchment which spread discontent throughout an army must be dearly purchased.

In order to carry out the retrenchments on which the home authorities were intent, for the purpose of reducing the expenditure to the standard of 1823–24, the governor-general shortly after his arrival appointed two committees, a civil and a military, each composed of three members, one from each presidency, to sit at Calcutta, and institute a full inquiry into all the branches of the public service, with a view to suggest such alterations as might secure the utmost degree of unity, efficiency, and economy in the management of affairs. The military committee found the work allotted them already in a great measure performed by the sweeping reductions which had been made both in the number of troops and in the amount of allowances, and by means of which the aggregate military expenditure was diminished to the extent of more than a million sterling. The civil committee entered upon a comparatively new field of labour, and succeeded after several years of assiduous labour in effecting reductions to the amount of nearly half a million. The total aggregate of reductions in both branches was £1,553,991. Part of these, however, were only prospective, as they depended on vacancies which had not yet taken place; and the whole sum, even if it could have been immediately realized, would have fallen short of the necessities of the case, as an Indian surplus of at least two millions was required to defray annual expenses incurred on territorial account in England. It was therefore still necessary, after every possible retrenchment had been made for the purpose of diminishing expenditure, to endeavour to obtain a positive increase of revenue. Some of the means employed with this view deserve notice.

Under native rule, individuals in public establishments often obtained
grants, exempting their lands or certain portions of them, from government assessment. In most of these grants the exemption was declared to be perpetual, but practically it was not so, as the grants of one sovereign were frequently recalled or arbitrarily disregarded by his successor. This was the case when the Mogul government was in full vigour, and there was no question as to the sufficiency of the authority by which each grant was made. At a later period, when misrule began to prevail and the Mogul empire was dismembered, not only did the chiefs who had previously been contented to hold a delegated authority from Delhi aspire to independence, but advantage was taken of the general confusion to obtain exemptions from government assessment, by the intervention of parties who had no right to grant them, and not unfrequently by the still more exceptional process of forged documents. In this way the revenue was seriously impaired, and numerous proprietors who claimed and enjoyed the protection of government bore no part of its burdens.

The British government, when it first began to levy territorial revenue in India being very much in the dark, and at the same time disposed to act with a liberality bordering on prodigality, laid it down as a general rule, to recognize the validity of all exemptions of an earlier date than the grant of the dewanee, provided the grantees were in actual possession. There cannot be a doubt that, in this way, many grants not supported by any sufficient title were sustained.

Nor was this the worst. As soon as the principle of recognition was announced, native dexterity was set to work, and the manufacture of forged documents was carried on by wholesale. Some easy means of testing their genuineness might have been devised, but, as if the government of the day had been afraid to detect the impositions which were practised upon them, they made it as difficult as possible, by requiring that every title of exemption not invalid on the very face of it should give the holder of it the full privilege of exemption till formally set aside by a court of law. The encouragement thus given to the concoction of fictitious titles soon became so apparent, that the collectors were at length empowered to investigate rent-free titles and pronounce upon their validity. If the decision was adverse and confirmed by the board of revenue, the land was forthwith assessed at the usual rate, reserving to the proprietor a right of appeal to the ordinary court. This enactment proved an imperfect remedy, and even caused some injustice. The accumulation of undecided cases in the courts of law led to almost interminable delay, while a percentage allowed to the collectors on every case of resumption converted them into interested parties, and so far deprived them of the character of impartial judges. To remedy these defects a new regulation was made shortly before the arrival of Lord William Bentinck, and afterwards carried into full effect with his concurrence. It empowered the governor-general to appoint special commissioners to decide on all cases of appeal from the decision of the collectors in regard to exemptions, and removed from the collectors themselves the tempta-
tion to partiality, by depriving them of the percentage on resumption. Under this last enactment a considerable addition was made to the public revenue by the assessment of lands which had previously escaped.

Another branch of revenue which at this time attracted much attention, both on political and financial grounds, was that derived from opium. In Bengal the production of this drug was a complete monopoly, no cultivator being permitted to raise it except on account of government, which made advances in anticipation of the crop, and received the whole produce at a certain fixed rate per lb. From the great difference between the price thus paid and that afterwards obtained at the government sales, a large amount of revenue was obtained. During the anarchy which prevailed in Central India before the predatory system was put down by the Marquis of Hastings, the Bengal monopoly was not subjected to any formidable competition from native states; but when, in

**Fort and Harbour of Kurrachee.—From Kennedy's Narrative of Campaign on the Indus.**

consequence of the restoration of tranquillity, it became practicable not only to cultivate the poppy successfully throughout Malwah for home consumption, but to realize a large profit by sending the surplus across Rajpootana to the port of Kurrachee in Scinde, and thence to the Portuguese settlements of Diu and Damaun for final shipment to China, the opium profits of the Company were seriously diminished, and various schemes were devised for the purpose of recovering them. The prohibition of the culture in all districts except those where the Company's monopoly was established, was at once seen to be the most effectual remedy; but the enforcement of such a prohibition was impossible, or, if not impossible, would have been a flagrant violation of the independent rights of native states. It was therefore mentioned only to be rejected; and the plan first adopted was to endeavour to secure a virtual monopoly of export by entering the opium market as purchasers, and buying so largely as to leave no more in the hands of native cultivators and dealers than was necessary for home con-
A.D. 1820.

Objections to mode of levying revenue from opium.

The absurdity of this arrangement, which might easily have been foreseen, was soon made apparent. Its only effect was to raise the price and thereby at once increase the demand and enlarge the area of cultivation. The cure thus proved worse than the evil which it was meant to remedy, and the native exporters, still obtaining a full supply, were able to carry on the traffic as extensively and as profitably as before. The next device was to give the rulers of native states an interest in the repression of the opium traffic. With this view the Company succeeded in binding most of them by treaty to restrict the culture of the poppy, and prohibit the transit of opium through their territories, in consideration of an annual sum to be paid to them as an equivalent for the estimated loss of revenue. These treaties, by their gross interference with the rights of industry, were unpopular in the extreme, and not only exhibited the British government in the odious light of adding to its revenue by means of tyrannical restrictions imposed on cultivators who were not its subjects, but fostered heart-burnings, and led to riots, by which the public tranquillity was disturbed, the opium smugglers often moving about in armed bands, and effectually resisting the attempts made to capture them. These opium treaties, while they thus proved a fruitful source of disturbance, and made British supremacy detested, failed to accomplish the object contemplated by them. Though Holkar, and most of the petty chiefs of Malwah, tempted by the annual equivalent, or afraid to give offence to the Company, concluded treaties, Scindia and the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor positively refused, and thus large tracts of country remained, in which the poppy was freely cultivated, and across which the opium dealers could carry on their traffic without interruption. The utter inefficacy of the restrictions was palpable from the fact, that the export of opium from Damaun, which in 1820-21 did not exceed 600 chests, amounted in 1827-28 to 4000.

It was impossible that treaties thus at once tyrannical and inoperative could be maintained. Lord Amherst had seen the necessity of rescinding them, and Mr. Bayley, during his short tenure of the government, had instituted inquiries with a view to their abandonment. To this there was no obstacle, as the treaties contained a clause which made it optional for the British authorities to abandon the restrictions at any future period, and hence all that remained for Lord William Bentinck after his arrival was to give effect to this option. The great difficulty was to provide against the anticipated defalcation of revenue, and the degree of perplexity which it occasioned may be inferred from a serious proposal to return to the old abortive plan of buying up the surplus produce. A far wiser plan, suggested apparently by Sir John Malcolm when governor of Bombay, was, after some hesitation, finally adopted by the governor-general in council, in July, 1830. The transit of Malwah opium to Kurrachee through a country, great part of which is absolutely a desert, was at once circuitous and expensive, whereas the transit to Bombay was short and easy. Founding on
this difference, the new plan simply was to leave the culture of the poppy in 
Malwhah free from all restrictions except those which the native princes might 
be pleased to impose for their own benefit, and allow the opium to be trans-
mitted for sale or export to Bombay, subject only to a payment per chest calcu-
lated not to exceed the additional expense which must have been incurred 
before it could have been conveyed to Kurrachee, and finally shipped at Damaun. 
This plan, which, if such a traffic is to be carried on at all, is the least objec-
tionable that could be devised, is still in force. The revenue obtained from 
opium passes in 1830–31 was only £16,642. The following year it rose to 
£123,230, and it has since continued to increase till it borders on £500,000 
sterling. This of course, being only the revenue derived from opium passes to 
Bombay, is but a fraction of that which the whole opium traffic, including that 
of Calcutta, yields to the British government in India.

The judicial reforms which took place during Lord William Bentinck's 
administration were chiefly characterized by an extended employment of native 
agency. The almost total exclusion of this agency by Marquis Cornwallis 
during his first administration had long been regarded as one of its greatest 
blemishes, and succeeding administrations had so far remedied the evil that in 
1827, nineteen-twentieths of the original suits in the civil courts were decided 
by native judges. The object now was, not so much to increase the number of 
these judges, as to enlarge their jurisdiction, and improve their position by 
augmenting their salaries, so as to add to their respectability and afford some 
guarantee for their integrity. It was the good fortune of Lord William Ben-
tinck to carry out these important improvements; but they did not originate 
with him, and the merit of them must at least be shared by him, both with 
distinguished servants of the Company in India, who had recognized their 
necessity, and with the home authorities, who had not only sanctioned them, 
but sent out instructions in conformity to which the most important regulation 
on the subject afterwards was drawn up and promulgated. In another arrange-
ment he incurred more responsibility, and is entitled to a greater degree of 
personal credit.

The court of directors had long been anxious for the abolition of Suttee, and in 
1824 had declared their conviction "of the practicability of abolishing the practice, 
or at least, of the safety with which it might be prohibited." Opinion, however, 
continued to be greatly divided on the subject, and the utmost length to which 
the highest Indian authorities were disposed to go was to make some experi-
ments in the conquered and ceded provinces, where the practice was compara-
tively rare, and in the meantime leave it untouched in Bengal, where it annually 
counted its victims by hundreds. Lord Amherst, while declaring that "nothing 
but apprehension of evils infinitely greater than those arising from the existence 
of the practice should induce us to tolerate it for a single day," could only "recom-
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among the natives, for the gradual suppression of this detestable superstition."

From adhering to these views Lord Amherst lost the honour which now belongs
to his successor, of having put down a crying abomination, regardless of all the
alarm and clamour which were employed to deter him from listening to the
voice of humanity. From what has already been said on the subject of Suttee
in a previous part of the work, it is necessary only to add that, by the regula-
tion passed by the governor-general in council, on the 4th of December, 1829,
it was expressly declared that, "after the promulgation of this regulation, all
persons convicted of aiding and abetting in the sacrifice of a Hindoo widow, by
burning or burying her alive, whether the sacrifice be voluntary on her part or
not, shall be deemed guilty of culpable homicide, and shall be liable to punish-
ment by fine or imprisonment, or by both fine and imprisonment, at the discre-
tion of the court of circuit, according to the nature and circumstances of the
case, and the degree of guilt established against the offender; nor shall it be
held to be any plea in justification that he or she was desired by the party
sacrificed to assist in putting her to death." Though none of the threatened
evils followed the promulgation of this enactment, it ought not to be forgotten
that, all things considered, it was and ought to be revered as an act of great
moral courage. Sir Charles Metcalfe, then a member of the Calcutta council,
while cordially approving of the proposed regulation, deemed it necessary to
add, "I do so, not without apprehension that the measure may possibly be used
by the disaffected, influential, and designing of our subjects, to inflame the
passions of the multitude, and produce a religious excitement, the conseque-
nces of which, if once set in action, cannot be foreseen." While the supporters
of the regulation were thus apprehensive, it is easy to understand how gloomy
the forebodings of its opponents must have been. It is only when all these things
are duly considered that full justice will be done to Lord William Bentinck for
the combined courage and wisdom displayed in the abolition of Suttee. The
prediction of opposition on the part of the Hindoos did not prove altogether
groundless, though it fortunately assumed a constitutional form. Petitions
to the governor-general were presented against the regulation, and when these
proved unavailing, the petitioners carried their complaint by appeal before the
privy council. Here the singular spectacle was presented of Hindoo natives
appearing as appellants, in support of an abominable superstition, while the
court of directors appeared as respondents. After a full discussion, the privy
council set the question as to the legality of the abolition of Suttee at rest by
dismissing the appeal. Some degree of excitement was inevitable, but it never
amounted to popular agitation, and ere long died away. Humanity thus gained
a decided victory over blind superstition, and a lesson was furnished which, if
succeeding Indian administrations had duly profited by it, would have been
followed by many similar triumphs.

The credit of another measure, which, in some respects, was more important
even than the abolition of Suttee, and which, though it trenchéd more directly on native superstitions, attracted comparatively little notice, belongs still more unequivocally to Lord William Bentinck's administration. By regulations promulgated in 1793 and 1803, it was provided that all questions of succession to property should be decided in conformity to the religion of the parties. The obvious intention was to give Mahometans and Hindoos the benefit of their respective codes, and nothing could be more equitable. Unfortunately the regulations were loosely and obscurely worded, and a case which was daily acquiring new importance was entirely overlooked. The efforts of Christian missionaries were beginning to bear fruit, but no provision had been made for the social position of their converts. As the regulations stood, there was ground for maintaining that by the mere fact of their conversion, they forfeited the rights of succession which would undoubtedly have belonged to them if they had continued Hindoos. This result, which had never been contemplated, and was, moreover, in itself absolutely intolerable, was remedied by a new regulation, which provided that the rules relating to succession, as affected by religion, should bind those only who were bona fide professors of Mahometanism or Hindooism at the time when the succession opened. The effect was to free Hindoo converts to Christianity from all the trammels of their former superstition, and secure them in the full possession of Christian freedom. In the account formerly given of the measures for the suppression of Thuggee and Dacoitee, it was mentioned that in the course of six years about 2000 Thugs were arrested. These were years in which the government was administered by Lord William Bentinck, and to him, therefore, much of the credit due for the extirpation of these murderous hordes belongs. His efforts on the subject of education are also deserving of honourable notice, though, from a mistaken idea that the natives might be educated through the medium of English alone, he unfortunately reserved his patronage mainly for it, and thus did unintentional injustice not merely to the native literary classes, but to the great bulk of the population. As one of the great events, not so much of his administration as of the period to which it belongs, may be mentioned the successful application of steam to the voyage between Europe and India, and the subsequent establishment of the regular route by Egypt. The first trial was made by a vessel called the Enterprise, which endeavoured to combine the advantages of steam and sails, and made the voyage by the Cape of Good Hope. The experiment was not satisfactory, as she sailed from Falmouth on the 16th of August, 1825, and did not reach Diamond harbour, in the Hooghly, till the 7th of December, an interval of nearly four months. A route by the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf was then attempted, but it was soon ascertained that the ancient line across the Isthmus of Suez from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea was entitled to the preference. The first steam voyage by this route was made by the Hugh Lindsay, which left Bombay on the 20th of March, 1830, and arrived at Suez on the 22d of
April, an interval of thirty-two days. In her next voyage she reduced the period to twenty-two days. In 1836 the government of Bombay congratulated the court of directors on the arrival of despatches from London in sixty-four days. Since then the distance has been performed in less than half that time.

The improvements introduced into the different branches of the public service in Bengal had been adopted or imitated at the other presidencies. In some respects, indeed, Bombay, placed under the excellent code of 1827, of which the chief merit is due to the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, had taken the lead in improvement. It was therefore learned with no less sorrow than surprise that, under the enlightened government of Sir John Malcolm, a determined attempt had been made, not to advance, but to retrograde. The blame, however, lay neither with him nor his council, but with the judges of the supreme court, who, entertaining extravagant views of their jurisdiction, endeavoured to stretch it in a manner similar to that of which the supreme court of Calcutta furnished an example in the days of Sir Elijah Impey. At Bombay the English law had long been administered to British subjects by a single judge designated recorder. He does not seem to have been overworked or to have performed the duties of his office inefficiently; but as the supreme courts at Calcutta and Madras had each three judges, it was thought, for the sake of uniformity, if not for any better reason, that Bombay was entitled to an equal number, and accordingly, in 1823, the court of recorder was abolished, in order to make way for a supreme court, composed of a chief-justice and two puisne justices. The jurisdiction conferred on this supreme court was exactly the same as that of the other two supreme courts, and was expressly restricted to British subjects resident at Bombay or in its provinces, or to natives who either were, at the time when the cause of action originated, in the service of the Company, or had agreed in writing, that in the event of dispute the supreme court should be competent to decide. Since the famous dispute in the time of Warren Hastings, when Sir Elijah Impey and his compeers at Calcutta endeavoured to extend their jurisdiction over all zemindars, by holding that their collection of public revenue made them servants of the Company, questions of jurisdiction had seldom been mooted, or at least persisted in so as to cause serious inconvenience. It was otherwise at Bombay. Sir Edward West, formerly recorder, having been made chief-justice, early manifested a determination to make the most of his new dignity, and with the concurrence of his colleagues, who appear unfortunately to have been animated by the same spirit, advanced claims to jurisdiction which the governor and council deemed it necessary to resist. While admitting the limitation of jurisdiction over natives prescribed by the charter, they managed to discover what one of them called an "other principle of a wider and more extensive influence." This was a clause in the charter which declared that the judges were "to have such jurisdiction and authority as our justices of our Court of King's Bench have, and may
lawfully exercise, within that part of Great Britain called England, as far as circumstances will admit;" and which they interpreted to mean that they were bound to watch over and protect the personal liberty of all the king's subjects, without distinction of native or British, and without reference to territorial limitation. Cases by which to test the validity of this interpretation soon occurred, and the result was a most unseemly collision between the court and the government.

Moro Ragonath, a young Mahratta of distinction, had been left by his parents under the guardianship of Pandurang Ramchunder, his grand-uncle, who resided at Poonah, and was related to Bajee Row, the ex-Peishwa. Young as he was, he was married, and the relations of his wife being desirous for purposes of their own to obtain possession of his person, presented a petition to the supreme court at Bombay, setting forth that he was kept in confinement to the danger of his life, and praying for a writ of *habeas corpus*. The judges on the Bombay bench at this time were Sir Edward West, formerly recorder, but now chief-justice, Sir Charles Harcourt Chambers, and Sir John Peter Grant. They at once found themselves competent to grant the prayer of the petition, and issued their writ accordingly for bringing up Moro Ragonath from Poonah to Bombay. In the course of the proceedings an extraordinary mortality occurred among the judges. Sir Edward West died on the 18th of August, 1828, and Sir Charles Harcourt on the 13th of October following. Sir John Peter Grant thus occupied the bench alone, and as he was the last judge who had taken his seat upon it, he might easily have pleaded the novelty and solitariness of his position as an excuse for not running headlong into collision with the government. All prudential considerations appear however to have been lost upon him, and so far from complying with a request of the governor in council to delay in the meantime from taking any further steps in the business, he denounced this request as a gross interference with the course of justice, and even made it the main ground of a petition to the king, praying him "to give such commands concerning the same, as to your majesty's royal wisdom shall seem meet, for the due vindication and protection of the dignity and lawful authority of your majesty's supreme court of judicature at Bombay."

The government had previously resisted the execution of the writ of *habeas corpus* at Poonah, on the ground that neither the grand-uncle nor the nephew was amenable to the supreme court at Bombay, and they had subsequently, on the 3d of October, 1828, addressed a letter to the two then surviving judges, in which, after justifying this extraordinary step by the necessity of the case, and intimating their determination not to allow any returns to be made "to any writs of *habeas corpus* of a similar nature to those recently issued, and directed to any officers of the provincial courts," they concluded thus: "The grounds upon which we act have exclusive reference to considerations of civil government and of state policy; but as our resolution cannot be altered until we
receive the commands of those high authorities to which we are subject, we inform you of them, and we do most anxiously hope that the considerations we have before stated may lead you to limit yourselves to those protests and appeals against our conduct in the cases specified that you may consider it your duty to make, as any other conduct must, for reasons already stated, prove deeply injurious to the public interests, and can, under the resolution taken and avowed by government, produce no result favourable either to the immediate or future establishment of the extended jurisdiction you have claimed. A very short period will elapse before an answer is received to the full and urgent reference we have made upon this subject; and we must again express our hope that even the obligations under which we are sensible you act, are not so imperative as to impel you to proceedings which the government has thus explicitly stated its resolution to oppose."

This letter, so far from effecting its object, appears only to have exasperated Sir John Peter Grant, who having now, by the demise of his colleagues, been left to the guidance of no better judgment than his own, took the very extraordinary step of closing the court, on the ground that it was useless to keep it open while he was prevented from enforcing his decisions. The governor in council immediately issued a proclamation declaring his determination to protect the persons and property of the inhabitants of Bombay, and calling upon all classes to assist in alleviating the evils which the closing of the court could not fail to produce. The judge seems now to have shrank from the consequences of his own rashness, and submitted to the humiliation of again opening the court, after he had kept it closed from the 21st of April to the 17th of June, 1829. Some attempt was made to obtain the interference of the supreme government, but as the point in dispute had been brought under the notice of the privy council by Sir John Peter Grant’s petition, it was deemed advisable in the meantime to let this appeal take its course. On the 14th of May, 1829, the points were argued before the privy council, and on the 10th of June, the lords reported their opinion to his majesty in the following terms: “That the writs of habeas corpus were improperly issued in the two cases referred to in the said petition. That the supreme court has no power or authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus, except when directed either to a person resident within those local limits wherein such a court has a general jurisdiction, or to a person out of such local limits, who is personally subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the supreme court. That the supreme court has no power or authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the jailer or officer of a native court as such officer, the supreme court having no power to discharge persons imprisoned under the authority of a native court. That the supreme court is bound to notice the jurisdiction of the native court, without having the same specially set forth in the return to a writ of habeas corpus.” It was thus authoritatively and finally determined that the supreme court of Bombay had entirely mistaken
the limits of their jurisdiction, and with equal rashness and ignorance endeavoured to substitute mere tyranny for law.

Though the general peace of India remained unbroken during Lord William Bentinck’s administration, disturbances more or less threatening took place in various localities. Calcutta itself was alarmed by a tumult in its immediate vicinity. It originated with some professed followers of a fanatical Mahometan of the name of Syed Ahmed, who from being a trooper in the service of Ameer Khan, assumed the character of a religious reformer, and declared his determination to purify Islamism from all the corruptions which had been engrafted upon it by the Shites or followers of Ali. Though himself illiterate, he managed to gain learned adherents, and soon mustered so strong in the Punjab as to become formidable to the Sikhs. Having added to his reputed sanctity by a pilgrimage to Mecca, and returned by way of Calcutta to the Upper provinces, he reappeared in the Punjab in 1826, and proclaimed a holy war. Numbers flocked to him from Delhi, Lucknow, and the other principal seats of Mahometanism in India, and he was able to take the field at the head of nearly 40,000 men. For a time enthusiasm supplied the want of discipline; but Runjeet Sing with his Sikhs ultimately prevailed, and the contest in the Punjab was terminated by the defeat and death of Syed Ahmed in 1831. His sect however had taken deep root, and having lost none of its fanaticism, had rendered itself extremely obnoxious both to Mahometans and Hindoos by violent opposition to various practices which it stigmatized as impure. Recrimination necessarily was provoked, and fierce quarrels, sometimes attended with bloodshed, ensued. One of these not undeserving of notice took place at Baraset, about fifteen miles northeast of Calcutta. A considerable body of the sect had here established themselves, and fallen into deadly feud with the rest of the inhabitants. As both parties were ready for an open rupture, an occasion soon occurred. In some petty quarrel the zamindars had taken part against the followers of Syed Ahmed, and were in consequence charged before the magistrate with partiality. Either thinking that justice was denied them, or being too impatient to wait for it, they took the remedy into their own hand, and in 1831, placing themselves under the leadership of a fakir of the name of Titoo Miya, they issued forth, and commenced a religious war against Hindooism. Having polluted a temple by besprinkling it with the blood of a cow which they had killed, and then destroyed the temple, they forthwith proceeded to what were considered still greater enormities, by maltreating Brahmans and forcing them to swallow beef. Thus once committed they set no limits to their audacity, pillaging and burning down villages, and putting to death without mercy all persons who resisted, or were in any way obnoxious to them. The civil power having in vain endeavoured to restore tranquillity, two native regiments and a party of horse marched against them, and came up with them in an open plain near Hooghly. Here they had constructed a stockade, behind which, after being
driven from the field, they retired, and defended themselves with desperate
courage, till about 100 of them were killed, and 250 taken prisoners. The rest
dispersed, and though they made several attempts to rally, were too much
intimidated to hazard a new conflict. They still however count numerous fol-
lowers among the more educated Mahometans of India, and having lost none
of their original fanaticism, are as ready as ever, should a favourable opportunity
occur, to propagate their tenets by the sword.

Along the eastern frontier in Assam, and the provinces recently wrested
from the Burmese, serious disturbances occurred. A body of mountaineers
of the name of Singphos, having crossed the mountains on the north-east,
entered Assam in the beginning of 1830 to the number of nearly 3000, and
before they could be checked committed great depredations. Their main objects
seemed to be to carry off the Assamese as slaves and enrich themselves with
plunder. When once encountered they were incapable of offering much resis-
tance, as they were mere hordes of savages, rudely armed, and totally undisciplined.
Their presence, however, gave encouragement to other disaffected tribes, and an
attempt was made to surprise the British station at Rungpoor. It did not succeed;
but the frequent repetition of incursions at last induced government to attempt a
more effectual remedy, by reinstating an ex-rajah in part of his sovereignty, on
condition of keeping down disturbance, and paying a certain amount of tribute.
Still further to the south, among the Kasya Hills, an insurrection accom-
panied with circumstances of great atrocity broke out. Nungklow, situated
about half-way between Sylhet and Assam, had been obtained by the
Company by amicable arrangement from Tirat Sing, who was supposed to
be the chief of the Kasyas, for the purpose of converting it into a sanatory
station, for which it seemed well adapted by its climate and its elevation
of 5000 feet above the level of the sea. With this view, and also to open up a
communication between Sylhet and Assam, a series of roads across the hills
had been commenced. These proceedings gave great offence to the mountaineers.
They feared for their independence, and they complained that Tirat
Sing, who was only one of a number of chiefs, had disposed of part of the
common territory without consulting the others. It was therefore determined
to recover by force the district which had thus been improperly alienated, and
in April, 1829, a large body of Kasyas, headed by Tirat Sing and other chiefs,
suddenly made their appearance before Nungklow. Lieutenant Bedingfield, who, with Lieutenant Burlton, Mr. Bowman, and four sepoys, were the only persons resident in the Company's service, having been invited to a conference, set out without suspicion, but the moment he arrived was barbarously murdered. The rest of his party, after gallantly defending themselves in the house which they occupied, shared his fate, with the exception of one sepoy who escaped. A desultory warfare ensued, and lasted with little interruption to the end of 1832, when the chiefs made their submission, and Tirat Sing was sent off as a state prisoner to Dacca. In Jyn-tea and Kachar several attempts by the native chiefs to throw off the British yoke only had the effect of riveting it more firmly. In the Tenasserim provinces some of the ousted Burmese governors, tempted by the smallness of the British force left for their protection, entered into a conspiracy to seize the towns of Tavoy and Mergui. At first it was successful. At Tavoy, Mung-da the former Burmese governor appeared at the head of 500 men, and compelling the small party of Madras infantry to whom it had been intrusted to retreat to the wharf, gained possession of the town. At Mergui, possession was gained still more easily, the British officer in charge of about 50 sepoys retiring without risking an encounter. These successes of the insurgents were short-lived, and they only waited the arrival of British reinforcements to resign the contest and make their submission. Tranquillity, however, was still doubtful, as it was well known that the ex-governor of Martaban was at the bottom of the conspiracy, and watching an opportunity to renew it. Fortunately his proceedings had rendered him obnoxious to the Burmese government, and he was murdered in the midst of his plots by order of the viceroy of Rangoon.

These insurrections were doubtless encouraged by the extent to which government, in its anxiety to meet the wishes of the directors on the subject of retrenchment, had carried the reduction of its military establishments. The same cause, of course, operated in various quarters, and produced its bitter fruits in other districts than those which had been recently conquered. Towards the end of 1829 the agricultural Koles inhabiting the district of Sumbulpoor, through which the Mahanuddy flows, being dissatisfied with the conduct of their ranee or queen, who had rendered herself obnoxious by dismissing all the relatives of her late husband from their offices and conferring them on her own immediate kindred, rose in rebellion, and were with difficulty prevented from marching on the capital. Peace was only restored by the interference of the British agent, and the deposition of the ranee, who had shown herself devoid of the prudence and vigour necessary for the government of her barbarous subjects. No sooner was this rebellion quelled than disturbances of a more formidable character broke out among a number of petty tributaries of the Company, occupying the wild tract situated between the sources of the Nerbudda on the west, and the Bengal districts of Burdwan and Midnapoor on the
east, and usually included under the general designation of Chota Nagpoor. Its aboriginal inhabitants consisted chiefly of wild tribes of Koles and Dangas, who lived like savages, and subsisted in great measure on the chase; but in the lower plains, and the districts directly under British authority, agriculture was generally practised both by the native inhabitants and a large number of new settlers, who had been induced by the zemindars to come from Bengal and Behar. These new settlers were not unnaturally regarded with jealousy by the aborigines, many of whom had been dispossessed of their lands to make way for them. The more regular form of government established by the Company was also very obnoxious to the chiefs, who found their wild freedom of action restrained by it, and thus, both chiefs and people having causes of discontent, an almost universal rising suddenly took place. Its fury was at first directed against the emigrants. Their fields were laid waste, their villages burned, and nearly a thousand of them were barbarously murdered. The interference of the British was tardier than it ought to have been, and the insurgents had mustered in thousands before any decided attempt was made to check them. This was the more to be lamented, as the feeble resistance which they afterwards made proved how easily they might have been put down at first by more rapid and energetic movements. Owing to the want of these, similar risings took place in various adjacent districts, and were not suppressed without serious bloodshed.

The presidency of Madras had also its full share of disturbance. The establishment of the ancient kingdom of Mysore by the Marquis of Wellesley had been regarded as a measure of very questionable policy, but the evils apprehended were not realized so long as the administration was conducted by Purnea, under whom the country attained a high degree of prosperity. On his retirement in 1811 a sudden change took place. The rajah, determined to be his own master, conferred the office of dewan on Linga Raj, one of his own creatures, who possessed neither talents nor influence; alienated large portions of his revenue to Brahmins, who took advantage of his superstitious veneration for them; and squandered the hoards which Purnea had accumulated, by lavishing them on unworthy favourites. Financial embarrassments necessarily followed, and the people, who had formerly been contented and happy, began to groan under the burden of immoderate exactions. To prevent the foreseen consequences of such a system, the Madras government repeatedly remonstrated with the rajah, and in 1825 Sir Thomas Monro made a visit to Mysore, for the purpose of enforcing the necessary measures of reform. He received abundance of promises, but as soon as he departed, all idea of performance was abandoned, and misgovernment in many of its worst forms began to produce its usual results. The collectors persisting in their exactions were resisted, and not unfrequently murdered by the ryots, and an insurrectionary spirit was excited, which, while the rajah looked on helplessly, threatened to carry disturbance
into the territories of the Company. The insurrection first assumed a distinct and organized form in the district of Bednore, where Ram Row, one of the raja's favourites, had been guilty of intolerable oppression. In 1830 a general rising took place, and after various attempts at accommodation, an appeal to arms became necessary. A considerable body of Mysore troops were marched into the insurgent district, and followed by three regiments of Madras infantry, with two companies of his Majesty's 62d, and a squadron of native cavalry. On a proclamation promising a redress of grievances, the ryots seemed disposed to return to their homes, but a new element of rebellion had been added by the appearance of a rival raja, who, though a mere impostor, pretended to be a lineal descendant of the former Rajahs of Bednore, and had at an earlier period been for a short time in actual possession of it. Thus encouraged, the insurrection had become so formidable that Colonel Evans, who commanded the troops sent to suppress it and was advancing to Bednore, sustained a check which obliged him to fall back on Sheemoga. A second advance was more successful, and by the remission of large arrears of revenue and other necessary concessions, tranquillity was at length restored. The extent of the danger, however, rendered it necessary to take precautions for the future; and under a clause in the treaty of 1799, which empowered the Company on certain emergencies to assume the government, the raja, deprived of all political power, was converted into a mere pensioner, and the administration, little changed in external form, was placed under the control of a British commissioner and four assistants.

Another revolution of a still more decided character was effected about the same time in Coorg. The actual raja, Vira Rajendra, was a very degenerate descendant of the former raja, whose heroic defence of his independence when it was assailed by Hyder and Tippoo has already been recorded. Unlike him in every respect, Vira Rajendra was a mere barbarian, ever and anon giving way to impulses of fury, during which he set no limits to his cruelty. Often without an apparent offence, the officers of his army and the inmates of his palace were ordered off to execution. His own kindred were not spared, and out of one pit in the jungle at a later period, when his atrocities were inquired into, the bodies of seventeen of his victims were disinterred, including among them those of his own aunt, the child of his sister, and the brother of her husband. This monstrous cruelty was of course accompanied by other abominable passions, and his sister Dewah Amajee with difficulty escaped from his brutality by taking refuge with her husband within the British territory. Previous to this the raja had manifested a decided hostility to the Company, and was augmenting the number of his troops, apparently with the intention of resisting any interference with his proceedings. On the escape of his sister and her husband he threw off all appearance of restraint, and positively refused to listen to any proposals for an amicable adjustment of the misunderstandings.
produced by his misconduct, unless the fugitives were sent back in order that he might wreak his vengeance on them. As this barbarous demand could not be complied with, it at once brought matters to a crisis, and a proclamation was issued in April, 1834, declaring that "the conduct of the rajah had rendered him unworthy of the friendship and protection of the British government; that he had been guilty of oppression and cruelty towards his subjects; and had assumed an attitude of defiance and hostility towards the British government; received and encouraged its proclaimed enemies; addressed letters to the government of Fort St. George and to the governor-general, replete with the most insulting expressions; and had placed under restraint an old and faithful servant of the Company, who had been deputed by the commissioner of Mysore to open a friendly negotiation: for which offences Vira Rajendra was no longer to be considered Rajah of Coorg. An army was about to march against him which would respect the persons and property of all who were peaceably disposed; and such a system of government would be established as might seem best calculated to secure the happiness of the people." Had the rajah, instead of being the most detested, been the most popular of princes, it would have been impossible for him to offer any effectual resistance. The British troops under Colonel Lindsay entered Coorg in separate divisions from the east, north, and west. The obstacles presented by the nature of the country were more formidable than the weapons of the enemy, and in more than one instance, where due advantage was taken of them, the invaders not only were unable to advance, but obliged to retreat. This was the case particularly with the divisions approaching from the north and west. Those from the east made better progress, and on the 6th of April Colonel Lindsay took possession of Mercara, the capital. Four days later the rajah surrendered unconditionally, and after a short detention in his palace, received far better terms than he deserved, by his removal to Benares in the possession of an ample pension. In establishing the future government, the heads of villages were assembled at Mercara and desired to give free utterance to their wishes. There could not have been any sincerity in this proceeding, since the annexation of Coorg to the British territories had been previously determined. The formal assent of the village chiefs to this determination was easily obtained, and Coorg has ever since formed an integral portion of the presidency of Madras.

In dealing with the allied states, the administration of Lord William Bentinck does not appear to advantage. The home authorities, even after they had seen the necessity of interference, and experienced its efficacy in maintaining tranquility, were constantly haunted by imaginary fears of the entanglements in which it might involve them, and issued a series of instructions directing that the residents and political agents in the different states should leave the native sovereigns uncontrolled in their internal management, and not interfere unless when it might become necessary to secure the tribute which
they had engaged to pay, or to prevent them from disturbing the general tranquillity by making open war upon each other. Lord William Bentinck’s own views appear to have accorded with the instructions thus transmitted for his guidance, and he early intimated a determination to make non-interference the rule of his policy. Henceforth the British government, when it interposed, was to be understood to be pursuing its own interests only. These satisfied, it disclaimed all right and all wish to exercise any paramount authority within individual states. No sooner was this rule of policy promulgated, than the usual results followed. The elements of confusion began to be largely developed, and the system of non-interference, while professed as a theory, was repeatedly abandoned in practice, in order that the evils which it had engendered might be effectually suppressed. The course thus pursued by the British government was neither uniform nor consistent, and native rulers often complained with good reason that they were neither permitted to manage in their own way, nor furnished with the assistance necessary to carry out the different reforms expected of them. Various instances of the justice of this complaint will appear while we take a brief survey of the condition of the leading native states during Lord William Bentinck’s administration. In this survey the states may, for convenience of arrangement, be classed under the heads of Mahometan, Mahratta, and Rajpoot states.

Beginning with the Mahometan, we naturally turn first to Delhi, where the pageant representative of the Great Mogul still endeavoured to maintain a kind of regal state, and to complain bitterly of the successive encroachments that had been made upon it. At the same time, while taking high ground on the subject of precedence, he was obliged to appear in the humble character of a petitioner for an increased maintenance. He claimed it, indeed, not as a favour, but as a right. The revenue of certain lands had been at one time reserved to him, and as in consequence of improvement the rent obtained from them had been increased, he insisted that a proportionate addition ought to be made to his income. The British government would have readily consented to the addition, but wished the king to receive it, and the whole of his maintenance, not as the produce of any reserved lands, but simply as a pensioner. Deeming this a new humiliation, he resisted, and on being refused redress by the governor-general in council, took the bold step of appealing from him to the home authorities. The agent he sent to England to advocate his cause was the celebrated Rammohun Roy, a Brahmin of the highest caste, who after throwing off the yoke of Hindoo superstition, had retired from public life in 1814, and exerted himself with some success in Calcutta in diffusing among his countrymen the knowledge of One God. Unfortunately he stopped short in his inquiries, and not advancing further than that bastard form of Christianity known by the name of Unitarianism, was never able to be a successful Christian teacher. Such was the agent employed by the King of Delhi. It is
rather difficult to account for Rammohun Roy's acceptance of the office. He was in no want of the salary attached to it, and was too shrewd not to have perceived that, independent of every other obstacle, the very manner in which the mission had been conferred upon him must render it abortive. It was a secret appointment, of which the government in India had been kept in studied ignorance; and hence on his arrival in England in 1831, he no sooner presented his credentials, than they were declared insufficient to justify any recognition of him as the King of Delhi's agent. Personally his reception was of the most flattering description, and full homage was paid to his talents and character. Much was expected from the enlarged views which he had acquired in this country, but he was not destined to return to India, an attack of fever having carried him off at Bristol in September, 1833. The King of Delhi, besides the expenditure which he incurred by sending an agent to England on a fruitless errand, was made to feel that so far from advancing his interest by the step he had taken, he had been guilty of irregularity, and given umbrage in high quarters, for Lord William Bentinck, in making a tour through Delhi to the Upper provinces, made the king aware of his displeasure by declining the usual interchange of complimentary visits. Delhi itself was shortly afterwards the scene of an atrocious crime. The Nabob of Ferozepoor, Ahmed Baksh Khan, at his death left the succession to his eldest son Shams-ud-din Khan, but set apart the district of Loharoo for two younger sons, and gave them the independent administration of it. Shams-ud-din objected to this curtailment of his hereditary territory, and as the district seemed to be mismanaged, the governor-general in council so far forgot his policy of non-interference as to decide that Loharoo should remain with the new nabob, on condition of his providing his brothers in a pension equal to its estimated revenue. Mr. Fraser, the British commissioner at Delhi, disapproved of this arrangement, and succeeded in obtaining a postponement of it. Shams-ud-din was indignant, and considering Mr. Fraser as the only obstacle in his way, hired an assassin, who shot him as he was returning from Delhi to his residence. The assassin and the nabob having been seized, were brought to trial, and as the guilt of both was fully established, no distinction was made in the punishment, and Shams-ud-din was hanged as a common malefactor. That they suffered deservedly there cannot be a doubt, and yet so strong was the disaffection to British rule already existing in Delhi, that they were venerated by the Mahometan population as if they had been martyrs.
In Oude the complaints of misgovernment were as loud as ever. In the time of the last nabob, Ghazee-ud-din Hyder, the favourite minister was Aga Mir, but in proportion to the influence which he possessed over the nabob, was the hatred borne him by the heir apparent. A deadly feud had thus arisen, and the nabob, foreseeing the ruin which could hardly fail to overtake Aga Mir in the event of his own death, endeavoured to provide against it, not only by effecting an apparent reconciliation between his son and his minister, but also by inducing the British government to guarantee the latter in his person and property. The matter was accomplished more easily than might have been supposed. By the opportune offer of a loan of a million sterling to the Company in perpetuity, at five per cent. interest, at a time of great financial embarrassment, the nabob obtained the desired guarantee, and at the same time arranged that the interest should be paid to his dependants, among whom Aga Mir, as holding the foremost place, was regularly to draw one half of the whole, or £25,000 per annum.

On the death of Ghazee-ud-din, his successor, Nasir-ud-din, seemed entirely to have forgotten his former enmity to Aga Mir, and besides continuing him in his office, treated him with kindness and liberality. It soon appeared, however, that his hatred had lost none of its virulence. He had merely been feeling his way, and preparing to shape his course according to what he should learn of the intentions of the British government. He was well aware of the guarantee, and not unnaturally inferred, that in consequence of it, he would not be allowed to take a single step to the prejudice of Aga Mir. On learning that the policy of non-interference had once more been inaugurated, and that he might calculate on being permitted to follow his own inclinations, he at once threw off the mask, and not contented with dismissing Aga Mir and demanding his accounts, threatened to make his property responsible for alleged frauds committed on the treasury. The ex-minister immediately fell back on his guarantee, and appealed to the British government for protection. It could not in decency be refused, and it was therefore intimated to the king that Aga Mir, having enjoyed the full confidence of his late master, was entitled to immunity for whatever he had done with his sanction, and was accountable only for his proceedings since the commencement of the new reign. This decision fell far short of the wishes of Nazir-ud-din, whose vindictive purposes it in a great measure frustrated; but after long discussion and loud complaints of the impolicy and injustice of allowing a great criminal to escape, he had the mortification to see Aga Mir placed beyond his reach, by being conducted in October, 1830, under charge of a British military escort, to Cawnpoor.

On the dismissal of Aga Mir, the king declared his determination to be his own minister. For this he was totally unfit by his ignorance of business and his dissolute habits, and the whole power of the state was monopolized by men whose elevation was mainly owing to their worthlessness. So notorious
indeed was their incompetency, that the resident was instructed not to recognize them, and to decline all intercourse of a friendly nature till a respectable minister was appointed. This step, though rather a curious exemplification of non-interference, was undoubtedly justified by the circumstances, and the king, aware of the danger of continuing a struggle in which he was sure to be worsted, recalled Hakim Mehdi Ali Khan, the minister whom Aga Mir had originally supplanted. He was then living in retirement at Furrackabad, and readily obeyed the summons which placed him once more at the helm of affairs. Mr. Maddock, the resident, believing him hostile to British interests, objected on this ground to his nomination, but the governor-general, in the hope that he might be able notwithstanding this objection to employ his acknowledged talents in introducing important reforms, consented to acknowledge him. His early measures justified this expectation. The sums squandered on favourites, male and female, were greatly reduced. Many corrupt practices were reformed, and the revenue, levied directly by collectors instead of being farmed out by extortioners, showed signs of improvement. These changes were not effected without encountering vehement opposition; and as the king himself had less sympathy with his subjects than with those who oppressed them, Hakim Mehdi was often successfully thwarted in his best measures. Under such circumstances amelioration was necessarily a slow process, and the resident, who appears to have been somewhat inclined to take the worst view of matters, continued from time to time to report on them so unfavourably, that the necessity of assuming the administration, at least for a season, began to be openly talked of. So thoroughly was Lord William Bentinck at last imbued with the belief that the ruin of the country was not otherwise to be averted, that in April, 1831, when making a tour through the Upper provinces, he visited the king at Lucknow, and plainly intimated to him, both orally and in writing, that if he did not immediately begin to govern on better principles, the course which had been followed in the cases of the Carnatic and of Tanjore would be followed in regard to Oude, and it would be necessary for him to exchange his position of king for that of pensioner.

The menace thus held out was too serious both in the substance and the manner of it not to produce considerable alarm, and not only the minister, who deserved some credit for the good he had already effected, promised to exert himself more energetically, but the king, who had too often declined to give him the necessary support, declared that in future nothing that could contribute to the cause of good government would be wanting on his part. There is no reason to suspect either the king or his minister of insincerity when they made these declarations. The extinction of Oude as an independent kingdom was threatened, and nothing could prevent the threat from being carried into execution except immediate compliance with the reforms demanded. There were numerous obstacles however to be surmounted, and it is easy to under-
stand how the same influence which had previously thwarted the minister was again vigorously exerted in opposing him. Under these circumstances what was the duty of the British government? Unquestionably to strengthen the hands of the minister, and more especially, when both he and his sovereign declared their inability to carry out the required reforms without extraneous aid, to furnish that aid liberally to any extent that might be necessary. Strange to say, the governor-general, after interfering so far with the internal management of Oude as to threaten its existence as an independent kingdom unless certain changes were introduced, refused when applied to to give the least assistance in carrying them into effect, and with singular inconsistency attempted to justify the refusal on the ground that the policy which he had adopted would not allow him to interfere. In vain did Hakim Mehdi argue that by the treaty made with the Marquis of Wellesley, the right of interference, at least so far as to give advice, was distinctly recognized; that the interference now asked was certainly not greater than that which the governor-general had just been exercising, and that the British government by standing aloof was making itself responsible for the future mal-administration of Oude, since “he who sees a blind man on the edge of a precipice, and will not put forth a hand to hold him back, is not innocent of his destruction.” Lord William Bentinck remained immovable, and while complaining loudly of the domestic policy of Oude, obstinately refused to assist in improving it. It would be unjust to suspect him of anything so Machiavellian as a design to hasten the crisis which he professed to deprecate; but the courtiers of Oude did not reason very illogically when they inferred, from the inconsistency and caprice which marked his conduct, that the object at which he was aiming was not so much to improve the government, as to find in prevailing abuses a plausible pretext for usurping it.

From his refusal to strengthen the hands of Hakim Mehdi, that minister found it impossible to maintain his position, and retired into private life, leaving Nazir-ud-din entirely in the hands of worthless favourites, under whom misgovernment advanced with accelerated pace. It deserves to be noticed as a remarkable proof of the progress which European ideas had made even in Oude, that Hakim Mehdi on his retirement published a defence of his conduct in a local newspaper, called the Mofussil Akhbar. “In appealing to the opinion of the public,” he says, “I profess that I am solely actuated by a desire to do myself justice, and I disclaim every intention of wishing to draw conclusions inimical to the character of any one; facts as they are here related will speak for themselves.” In another part of the statement, speaking of the two years over which his administration extended, he says: “I challenge any one to prove the existence of a defalcation of a single rupee during the whole period. I can, indeed, lay my hand upon my heart and solemnly declare before Heaven, that the whole of my conduct was actuated with the most disinterested views of serving his majesty and the state.” His chief difficulties appear to have proceeded from
the harem, and the cause is sufficiently explained when he mentions that five
of the inmates drew from the jaghires assigned to them an aggregate annual
income of £192,000.

In the Nizam’s dominions a considerable change was produced by the death
of Secunder Jah, and the succession of his eldest son under the title of Nazim-
ud-Dowlah. The new monarch immediately announced his intention to
manage his own affairs, and the British government, in accordance with the
professed system of non-interference, lost no time in assuring him that he was
at perfect liberty to select his ministers and frame his internal policy. The
immediate dismissal of Chandoo was in consequence considered certain, but he
had managed during his long tenure of office to give so many influential
persons an interest in his continued possession of it, that he kept his place,
and prodigal expenditure and tyrannical extortion continued to go hand in
hand as before. While declining to interfere directly for the suppression of
these evils, the governor-general was not indisposed to follow the course which
he had adopted in Oude, and menaced the government with extinction. Matters
however did not seem as yet fully ripe for extreme measures, and before any
decided steps were taken, the affairs of the Nizam under a different form had
begun to attract much attention both at home and in India.

When the true character of the transactions of William Palmer and Co.
with the Nizam’s government was detected and exposed by Sir Charles Metaille,
the directors, not satisfied with ordering that the countenance which had been
given to them should be immediately withdrawn, imprudently went further,
and publicly declared that the loans made by the house both to the state and
to individuals being usurious, the payment of them could not be legally
enforced. The directors, in causing this declaration to be made, had proceeded
on the belief that the loans were struck at by Act 13 Geo. III. c. 63, which
enacts in its 33d section that “no subject of his majesty” in the East Indies
shall, upon any contract which shall be made from and after the 1st day of
August, 1774, take directly or indirectly, for loan of any monies, wares, mer-
chandise, or other commodities whatsoever, above the value of twelve pounds
for the forbearance of one hundred pounds for a year; and so after that rate
for a greater or lesser sum, or for a longer or shorter time; and that all bonds,
contracts, and assurances whatsoever, made after the time aforesaid, for pay-
ment of any principal or money to be lent or covenanted to be performed upon,
or for any usury whereupon or whereby there shall be reserved or taken above
the rate of twelve pounds in the hundred, as aforesaid, shall be utterly void.”
The directors were in error in supposing that the loans of William Palmer
and Co. were in violation of this enactment, for the twelve judges of England
when consulted on the subject gave it as their opinion that the above limitation
of interest did not apply to loans made to the subjects of native independent
princes by British subjects domiciliated and residing within their dominions.
It could not be doubted that the directors, by declaring the loans illegal, had unintentionally but seriously compromised the interests of the creditors of William Palmer and Co. In proof of this we need only quote from a letter which Moonir-ul-Moolk, one of the principal debtors of the house, wrote to Chandoor Lal, in which he says: “If the order prohibiting any money transactions with them, and the proclamation describing the claims as void, had not arrived, my debt to them would have been completely and fully paid; but how could I, in defiance of the prohibition and of such a proclamation, pay them?”

The claims of the house against the Nizam had already been satisfied by the money which the Company advanced for that purpose on the security of the tribute payable for the Northern Circars, but large sums lent to private individuals remained unpaid, and though formerly supposed to be forfeited as usurious, might now, in consequence of the opinion of the twelve judges, be enforced before the native courts. The trustees for the creditors availed themselves of this right, and obtained various decisions in their favour. So imperfect however was the administration of justice, that payment was easily evaded, and could not at all be enforced where the debtors were in any way connected with the Nizam or his minister. Hence Moonir-ul-Moolk could not be reached unless the British government would consent to bring their influence to bear upon him. The trustees, considering the prejudice which their claims had sustained from having been denounced and stigmatized as usurious, thought themselves entitled to expect this amount of interference, and were seconded in this view by the Board of Control; while the directors considered that neither justice nor sound policy would permit them to go further than to allow the claims to be prosecuted as ordinary debts, without any interference on their part in order to secure payment. After considerable discussion the board and the court came to an open rupture on the subject.

In July, 1830, the court prepared the draft of a letter to Bengal, disapproving of the degree of countenance which the supreme government had given to Sir William Rumbold, who, as one of the leading partners in the firm of William Palmer and Co., had arrived in India for the purpose of assisting in winding up its affairs. The board, when the draft was submitted to them, altered it so as to change its character entirely, and authorized the resident at Hyderabad to support the claims of the firm. It was now the turn of the court to object, and they were so far successful that the subject was in the meantime left in abeyance. A final decision however was absolutely necessary, as the governor-general in council continued to call for it, and complained of the dilemma in which he was left from not having obtained it. Under these circumstances the board, allowing the former draft and the emendations which they had made upon it to drop, directed a new draft to be prepared. The new draft, drawn up by the court on the 20th of March, 1832, in compliance with this injunction, was as unfortunate as the other. It corresponded to some
extent with the views which had been expressed by the board, for it authorized the resident to intimate to the court of Hyderabad the wish of his government that the claims of William Palmer and Co. against Moonir-ul-Moolk should be settled by arbitration, the Nizam previously engaging to enforce the award. This did not seem to the board to go far enough, and therefore, suppressing the draft entirely, they substituted for it a despatch which, after declaring that the matter in dispute required the interposition of both governments, offered the Nizam the option of two modes of settlement—the one arbitration, and the other a commission. In the former case the umpire, and in the latter the members, were to be nominated by the governor-general; and to make sure that the proceedings would not prove abortive, the Nizam, in making his selection between the two modes, was to engage to give effect to the decision. When this communication should be made to the Nizam, the justice and expediency of a final settlement was to be urgently pressed upon him. The despatch subsequently underwent some verbal alterations, and it was added by way of explanation that nothing beyond earnest recommendation was contemplated, and that even this degree of interference would not have been adopted had the home authorities not felt that they had unintentionally prejudiced the claims by entertaining and promulgating an erroneous opinion of their illegality.

While admitting as a general rule that nothing can be more improper and impolitic than for the British government to use its influence with the native princes of India in order to enforce the payment of private debts contracted by themselves or their subjects, we are inclined to think that there were circumstances which made the claims of the creditors of William Palmer and Co. an exception to the rule, and that the amount of interference proposed in the despatch of the Board of Control did not go beyond the justice of the case. It seemed otherwise to the directors, who not only objected to it on principle, but determined to avail themselves of every means in their power to prevent the authoritative transmission of the despatch to India. With this view they rescinded the resolution under which they had prepared their original draft, and then declining to take any initiative step in the matter, denied the right of the board to originate any despatch in regard to it. The board, they argued, might, by 33 Geo. III. c. 52, modify to any extent any intended despatch which the directors submitted for approval, provided it related "to the civil or military government or revenues of the said territorial acquisitions in India," and might, moreover, when "the levying of war, or making peace, or treating or negotiating with any of the native states or princes in India" was "the subject matter of any of their deliberations," originate a despatch without consulting the directors, and insure secrecy by transmitting it at once through the secret committee specially appointed for that purpose. But the proposed despatch respecting the claims of William Palmer and Co. did not fall under any of these heads, and therefore, now the directors had resolved to take no further steps in
regard to the matter, it was incompetent for the Board of Control to inter-meddle. The subject was not one of those on which they might originate a despatch, and transmit it through the secret committee, without consulting the directors, and inasmuch as it did not relate "to the civil or military government or revenues," it was no longer under the cognizance of the board, even for modification, since the directors had formally withdrawn it. Brought to this point, the real question now raised was whether the court of directors, after submitting a proposed despatch to the Board of Control, could subsequently prevent them from adjudicating upon it, by simply withdrawing it and pleading that it did not relate to civil or military government or revenues. The solution of this question obviously depended on the interpretation of the statute, and since the court and the board were equally determined not to yield, it only remained to appeal to a legal tribunal. The board accordingly applied to the Court of King's Bench for a writ of mandamus, compelling the directors to transmit the contested despatch. After a full argument the board prevailed, and the issue of the writ on the 29th of January, 1833, left the directors no alternative but to obey, ten of their number however recording a strong protest against the despatch as a violation of treaties, of substantial justice, and of sound policy. The effect of this process was to establish the complete supremacy of the Board of Control, but the point raised must have been of some nicety, as it was deemed necessary in a subsequent statute to correct the vagueness of language used in 33 Geo. III. c. 52, by extending the control of the board to all public matters whatever.

In regard to the relations of the British government with the Mahratta states a few remarks will suffice. Nagpoor, placed under the almost absolute control of the resident Mr. (afterwards Sir Richard) Jenkins, had made rapid progress, and the best wish that could be formed for the country was that its actual administration should be continued. This, however, was not practicable. The rajah had attained his nineteenth year, and naturally longing to be his own master, no sooner gave utterance to the wish, than Lord William Bentinck, in accordance with his declared policy, at once complied with it. The native administration was certainly no improvement on that which preceded, but as important checks were still retained, and the native ministers whom the rajah appointed were contented to submit to the guidance of the resident, Nagpoor taken as a whole continued to be prosperous. On the opposite side of India, in the territories of the Guicowar, matters wore a less pleasing aspect. When Syajee Row succeeded to the imbecile prince in whose name he had previously governed, great hopes were entertained. He had always co-operated cordially with the resident, and now that all the restraints which his position as regent imposed upon him were removed, it was naturally expected that his increase of power would be followed by an increase of the general prosperity. It proved otherwise. Paying little regard to his own obligations, he soon began to disre-
gard those of which, with his own consent, the British government had become guarantees. A collision thus became inevitable, the Guicowar using every means to escape from his obligations, and the resident insisting on his fulfilment of them. One thing which made the Guicowar's conduct more provoking, was, that in refusing to pay his debts he could not plead poverty. On the contrary, he refused to pay, merely that he might be able to gratify a propensity for hoarding, and had managed in the course of five years to deposit in his coffers about £600,000 of surplus revenue, which, by express stipulation, belonged not to him, but to his creditors. The opposition of the resident to this dishonest course only exposed him to insult, and the Guicowar carried his hostility so far that Sir John Malcolm, the governor of Bombay, was obliged to interfere. As there could be no doubt that the guarantees of the British government had been bestowed too lavishly, it was deemed advisable, after Lord William Bentinck became governor-general, to try the effect of tranquillizing measures; and one great source of misunderstanding was removed by means of an arrangement which diminished the number of the guarantees, or restricted them to personal immunity, and restored to the Guicowar several districts, the revenues of which had been sequestrated in security. For a time the desired effect appeared to be produced, but the Guicowar ere long returned to his former practices, and at last the forbearance which had been exercised towards him was found only to have rendered interference and restraint absolutely necessary.

In Holkar's dominions the event of greatest importance during Lord William Bentinck's administration was a new succession, rendered necessary by the death of Mulhar Row Holkar at the age of twenty-seven, in October, 1833. As he left no children, his widow, with the consent of his mother Kesaree Bai, adopted a child of three years old, said to be descended from Tookjee Holkar, and placed him on the musnad under the title of Martand Row, Kesaree Bai acting as his guardian, and Madho Row Furnavese, the minister of the late rajah, continuing to conduct the administration as before. The validity of this succession was soon disputed by Haree Holkar, a nephew of Jeswunt Row Holkar, who, having escaped from Mahaswara, where he had been confined as a prisoner, appeared at the head of a powerful body of supporters and claimed to succeed as legal heir. Hitherto the British government, though the resident had attended Martand Row's installation, had otherwise kept aloof, and on being applied to for aid by Kesaree Bai refused to interfere. A civil war thus became imminent, but Haree Holkar's partizans increased so rapidly that the Bai, believing the contest to be hopeless, abandoned it and invited him to Indore. There being no longer any competition, the governor-general was now able, without violating his system of neutrality, to take part in the proceedings, and Haree Holkar entered Indore accompanied by a British escort. He possessed few qualifications for the elevation thus conferred upon him; and by placing himself entirely in the hands of a worthless and incompetent minister of the
name of Revajee Phansia, soon produced so much disturbance and distress, as to make it a serious question whether the British government ought not to undertake the administration and reduce Haree Holkar to the condition of a pensioner.

After the death of Dowlut Row Scindia in March, 1827, effect was given to what appeared to have been his intentions, by allowing his favourite wife, Baiza Bai, to adopt as his successor a boy of eleven years of age of the name of Janakajee, and continue in the meantime to govern as regent. In carrying out this arrangement Janakajee was affianced to her grand-daughter. Baiza Bai had consented to these arrangements with great reluctance. Her ambition was to retain the government for life, while she foresaw that Janakajee would in all probability insist in the course of a few years on taking it into his own hands. This actually proved the case, and Baiza Bai enraged began to form a scheme for setting Janakajee entirely aside. Her grand-daughter to whom he was affianced had died, and she had a married daughter, Chimna Bai, who was pregnant, and might produce an heir to the late Scindia in the direct line. These views received no countenance from the British government. The adoption of Janakajee had been sanctioned by all the leading persons in the court and camp at Gwalior, and any attempt to rescind it would be strenuously opposed. Baiza Bai, however, was not to be dissuaded, and commenced the execution of her scheme by placing Janakajee under strict supervision, and making him virtually a prisoner in her palace. He made his escape and took refuge with the resident, declaring that his life was in danger. After a time an apparent reconciliation was effected, but the views of the parties were openly declared, and Lord William Bentinck during a visit which he paid to Gwalior was importuned by both. A decided declaration on his part would undoubtedly have settled the dispute, but from being hampered as usual by his neutral system he refused to utter it, and left the factions to carry on the struggle in their own way, till actual disturbance and threatened anarchy should at last compel him to interfere. At present he only ventured to give an equivocal advice, which being interpreted by Baiza Bai to mean that she was, if possible, to keep her power, and by Janakajee that he was, if possible, to wrest it from her, rather hastened than protracted the crisis. On the 10th of July, 1833, some of the disciplined battalions of Gwalior, who had espoused the cause of Janakajee, having beset the palace, carried him off to the camp, and compelled Baiza Bai to save herself by flight. After taking refuge with her brother Hindoo Row, she was proceeding to the house of the resident, who had declined an invitation to visit her, when she was encountered by a strong body of Janakajee's troops. It was now too late to stand aloof any longer on the neutral system, and the resident succeeded, not without difficulty, in preventing the effusion of blood. Ultimately the Bai saw the necessity of resigning the contest, and retired with a liberal pension to a jaghure in the south of India. The government did not improve under Janakajee. He had owed his success in a great
measure to the military, who, thus conscious of their importance, lost no opportunity of turning it to account, frequently breaking out into mutiny, and producing disturbances, not only destructive of the prosperity of Scindia's territories, but dangerous to other states. The necessary result might have been foreseen, though it was not actually realized till a later period.

In the relations maintained with the Rajpoot states during Lord William Bentinck's administration, we see little more than a series of inconsistencies produced by the profession of non-interference, and the frequently recurring necessity of acting in direct violation of it. In Kotah a singular form of government existed. The offices both of rajah and of prime-minister, or as he was called, raj-rana, were hereditary. The effect was to establish two co-equal sovereigns, who if they chose to work together for the public good, might secure a high degree of prosperity, but were equally capable, and much more likely, by pursuing opposite counsels, of throwing the country into confusion. During the wise and vigorous administration of Zalim Sing as raj-rana, Kotah flourished, and even after his death, and the succession of his son Madhoo Sing to his hereditary office, owing to the mutual moderation practised by him and his nominal master, and also to the occasional mediation of Colonel Caulfield, the resident, misunderstandings seldom arose, or were removed before the public peace was disturbed. This favourable position of affairs could not long continue. New successions placed the powers of government in new hands, and collisions between the rajah and the raj-rana became the rule rather than the exception. A feverish excitement was thus constantly kept up, and the prosperity of the country began visibly to decline. The British government after standing aloof was obliged to interfere. The government however was so viciously constituted, that it seemed impossible to effect a remedy without changing it in its essential features, and an arrangement as equitable as the circumstances admitted was made, by conferring a third of the territories of Kotah on the raj-rana, as an independent sovereignty, and leaving the rajah in uncontrolled possession of the remaining two-thirds. This arrangement, though seen to be advisable, was not carried into effect till some years later.

The Rajpoot state of Boondee was about the same time seriously disturbed. The Rajah Ram Sing was a minor, and the ranee, his mother, desirous to retain the rule which she exercised as guardian, kept him in ignorance, and even encouraged him in vice in the hope that while thus unfit, he might cease to have any wish to govern. Young as he was, the rajah was married to a daughter of the Rajah of Joudpoor. The mother made it part of her policy to estrange him from his wife, and perhaps succeeded all the more easily that she was ten years his senior. The princess however, knowing her rights, resented the treatment to which she was subjected, and complained to her father. His first step in consequence was to represent the case to the British agent, and request him to interfere in his daughter's behalf. The agent acting according to his instruc-
tions declined the task, and the Rajah of Joudpoor, thus left to seek his own remedy, first remonstrated by an envoy, and then, when this proved unavailing, sent a deputation accompanied by a body of 300 troops to demand the princess, and escort her back to her father's house. The troops encamped outside the town, and the deputation entered. They were met by a number of their countrymen forming the princess's original suite, and sent a messenger to the durbar. The ostensible object was to ask when it would be convenient to receive them, but a murderous design lurked beneath. The messenger was in fact an assassin, who instead of waiting for an answer, drew his sword and plunged it into the heart of Deva Krishan Row, the Boondee minister. The assassin was immediately slain, and the whole deputation would undoubtedly have been massacred, had not Mr. Trevelyon, the political agent, hastened from Kotah, and succeeded in obtaining permission for the departure of all, except three, who being considered leaders, were detained and put to death. Man Sing, the Rajah of Joudpoor, appears to have been privy to the assassination, but it suited him to deny this in the most solemn manner, and to declare that he would be utterly disgraced if he did not signally revenge what he called the murder of his innocent servants at Boondee. In former times the feud which had been thus raised could not have been suppressed without an exterminating war, which would in all probability have spread over the whole of Rajpoootana. The governor-general fortunately met the danger with more than his usual promptitude, and after a long and acrimonious discussion a mutual oblivion of injuries was agreed to.

Bhim Sing, the Rana of Odeypoor, whose abominable conduct in consenting to the murder of his daughter for the purpose of relieving himself from political embarrassment has already been recorded, died in 1828, after a reign of more
than half a century. During his last years the peace of his territories had been greatly disturbed by wild tribes, particularly the Minas inhabiting the district of Chapan in the south-west, and the Grasias and Bheels of the south and east. They had ultimately been kept permanently in check by a strong body of the Company’s troops, but under the non-interference policy these had been withdrawn, and the rana and his minister were told that they must depend entirely upon themselves for the maintenance of internal tranquillity. This was a task to which they were altogether incompetent, and it was not long before marauders were carrying depredations to the very gates of Odeypoor. Jivan Sing, who succeeded his father as rana, had for some time taken an active share in the government, and displayed talents which were deemed capable of restoring tranquillity to his country. Such a prince was surely entitled to the utmost encouragement, and yet one of the first steps taken by the governor-general was to intimate to him, that henceforth he must not calculate on any assistance in maintaining internal tranquillity. The state of his hill districts, he was told, did not immediately concern British India. On this selfish and short-sighted policy, at the very time when the chiefs were openly declaring themselves unable to check the marauding propensities of their dependants, the regular troops of the Company were withdrawn, and the levy of irregulars was disbanded. At the same time the residency was abolished, and the communication between the two governments was transferred to the political agent stationed at Ajmere, as a subordinate of the resident at Delhi. It is right to add that the rajah, though thus suddenly involved in difficulties, managed in a great measure to surmount them. Partly, it may be, from a feeling of despondency he gave way at first to habits of dissipation, but he had the good sense and firmness afterwards to change his course, and discharge his proper duties with assiduity and success.

The relations of the British government about this period with Man Sing, the Rajah of Joudpoor, were so little of a friendly nature that open hostilities were at one time threatened. From a superstitious veneration for a sect of religious mendicants or yogis, he not only submitted to them as his spiritual guides, and allotted them about a fifth of his whole revenues, but intrusted them with the whole power of the state. Under the idea that he thus enjoyed supernatural protection, he did not deem it necessary to guard against giving offence, and when remonstrated with, returned sullen or insulting answers. When the governor-general made a visit to Ajmure in 1831, he excused himself on
frivolous grounds for declining the invitation which he received to meet him. It was also known, that so far from exerting himself to suppress the robber tribes of the desert of Parkar, he was in league with them, and had on one occasion, when they were suddenly dispersed, given a secret asylum to one of their chiefs. Complaints of depredations, either directly committed or instigated by him, were made from various other quarters, and, as remonstrance had no effect upon him, it was resolved at once to have recourse to decisive measures. Accordingly, at the end of the rains in 1834, a large force assembled at Ajmere under Brigadier-general Stevenson, and prepared to move against Joudpoor. This demonstration was of itself sufficient, and Man Sing hastened to avert the ruin which impended over him, by sending a deputation to Ajmere with full power to make every concession. "What occasion could there be," said his vakeels, "for the march of an army against the rajah? A single chuprai (a servant wearing a badge) sent to Joudpoor to communicate the governor-general's pleasure would suffice." These professions were taken at no more than they were worth, and a regular treaty was concluded, obliging the rajah to pay indemnity for past offences, and curtailing his power of future mischief.

In the Rajpoot state of Jeypoor, the reluctance of the governor-general to interfere with its internal administration let loose the elements of discord, and gave rise to a series of intrigues which issued at last in the perpetration of an atrocious crime. The ranee or mother of the young rajah, acting under the influence of a person of the name of Jota Ram, endeavoured to perpetuate her power, and was violently opposed by the leading thakoors or chiefs. A series of party struggles in consequence took place, and the contending factions appealed to the governor-general, each in the hope of obtaining a favourable decision. Early in 1834, while matters were thus in suspense, the ranee died, and an attempt was made to get quit of all competing claims for the regency, by dispensing with it altogether, and giving the personal administration to the rajah himself, who was now approaching maturity. Jota Ram meanwhile managed to maintain his authority, and the strife became still more bitter than before. A momentary cessation took place when the British army began to assemble at Ajmere. It was destined ostensibly against Joudpoor, but as it might easily embrace Jeypoor in its operations, the contending factions there deemed it prudent to suspend their intestine struggles. The submission of the Joudpoor rajah having rendered the expedition against him unnecessary, it was determined to employ part of the troops in an expedition against the robber
chiefs of Shekhawatee, a country situated between Jeypoor and Bikaneer, and nominally tributary to the former, but in fact independent, or rather utterly lawless. For a number of years the chiefs had carried on their depredations wholesale, without sparing the British territories, and it was strongly suspected that Jota Ram had not disdained to share in their plunder. His conduct certainly confirmed this suspicion. On first hearing of the expedition he repaired to Ajmere, and expostulated against it as unnecessary; and after it had taken place, and the country had in consequence been placed under British management, he had protested against this measure as a violation of the rights of Jeypoor. Shortly afterwards, the rajah died suddenly. Foul play was suspected, and the general belief was that Jota Ram, and Rupa, a female who was acting in concert with him, had murdered their prince in order that they might prolong their power by acting as the guardians of his infant son. In this they were disappointed. Major Alves, as political agent of the British government, undertook the guardianship, and in concert with the leading chiefs formed a new administration, from all connection with which Jota Ram and Rupa were excluded, the former being removed to Dessar, about thirty miles east of the capital, and the latter to a residence within it, where a guard of British sepoys was necessary to protect her against the public fury. Not to break the narrative, the events which followed this arrangement, though reaching a few months beyond the close of Lord William Bentinck’s administration, must here be briefly detailed.

On the 4th of June, 1835, Major Alves, while quitting the palace along with Mr. Blake his assistant, Lieutenant Ludlow, and Cornet Macnaghten, after an interview with the ranee mother and the thakoors, was attacked and wounded by one of the bystanders, who rushed upon him with a drawn sword. Fortunately, his wound though severe was not mortal, and he was conveyed without obstruction to the residency. The assassin had in the meanwhile been seized and placed under a guard at the palace. Mr. Blake, who had remained with the guard, prepared to return to the residency, and came out holding in his hand the bloody sword which had been taken from the assassin. An excited crowd had gathered round the palace, and he had no sooner started off on his elephant than a fierce attack was made upon him. Seeing escape impossible, he stopped at a temple. The doors were shut, but along with the elephant driver, and an attendant, he gained access by a window, and was secreted by two persons, who were within, in a small chamber. Here he had only a short respite, for the mob forcing their way, seized him as he was attempting to escape, murdered him, and threw his body into the street. The atrocity was attributed at first to some sudden and unaccountable outburst of popular fury, but subsequent investigation traced it to the partizans of Jota Ram. All who were proved to have been accessory to the conspiracy, or to have assisted in carrying it out, suffered death.
same sentence, though recorded against Jota Ram and his brother, was not executed, and was ultimately commuted into imprisonment for life within the British territory.

Another part of Lord William Bentinck’s administration, which must not be allowed to pass unnoticed, is that which relates to his intercourse with states, so remotely situated that they might be considered as lying beyond the ordinary sphere of Indian policy. The alarm felt for the safety of the Indian empire by the British ministry, was formerly caused by the proceedings of the French; but more recently it had taken a different direction, and the rapid encroachments made by the Russians in Persia were regarded as the prelude of an invasion of India from that quarter. It was therefore deemed good policy not to remain mere spectators of this approaching danger, but to anticipate it by forming alliances with the states through which an invading army must advance, and thus throw a formidable barrier in its way. At first the real design was not mentioned, and nothing more was ostensibly proposed, than the establishment of commercial intercourse, by opening the navigation of the Indus, and thus obtaining access to the heart of Central Asia. Communications with this view were accordingly opened with the Ameers of Scinde, who after manifesting great reluctance were induced to conclude a treaty, by which the merchants and traders of India were permitted to convey their goods along the Indus, free from vexatious delays, and subject only to moderate rates of duty.

In this treaty the Ameers, unable to conceal their suspicions, procured the insertion of a declaration that the contracting parties should never “look with a covetous eye on the possessions of each other.” Similar treaties were concluded with the Nabob of Bhaulpur and with Runjeet Sing. With the latter a closer connection than a mere commercial treaty could form seemed desirable,
and in order to conciliate his friendship, Lord Ellenborough, then president of the Board of Control, addressed a letter to him in the name and by command of his majesty William IV., with a present of some English horses of uncommon size, for which he was known to have a fancy. The letter and present were delivered by Lieutenant Alexander Burns at Lahore, in July, 1831, and in the following October a meeting took place at Roopur on the Sutlej, between Runjeet Sing and the governor-general. The only avowed object of the meeting was to strengthen the bonds of a friendship already existing, and a week passed away in the interchange of visits, gaudy ceremonials, and military evolutions, the governor-general having with him, in addition to his usual body guards, two squadrons of his Majesty’s 16th lancers, a troop of horse artillery, two risalas of Skinner’s horse, his Majesty’s 31st foot, and two regiments of native infantry, while Runjeet Sing had come escorted by 10,000 of his best horse, and 6000 of his best infantry. It was suspected that more serious matters mingled with these amusements, and there is now no room to doubt that the foundation was then laid of that alliance, the bitter fruits of which were afterwards reaped in the war with Afghanistan.

At this very time Shah Shujah, the ex-King of Cabool, who had been driven from his throne more than twenty years before, was living at Loodiana, a pensioner on the bounty of the British government. Previous to the above meeting at Roopur, the ex-king, with a view to his restoration, had been negotiating with Runjeet Sing, and the conditions had been all but definitely arranged. These conditions were known to the governor-general, and it is impossible to believe that Runjeet Sing allowed the week to pass away without sounding him on the subject, and ascertaining that in aiding the restoration of Shah Shujah he would at least have the acquiescence of the British government. It is true that Lord William Bentinck, when directly applied to by Shah Shujah, fell back on his neutral policy and declined to interfere; but it is known that the proceedings of Dost Mahomed, the actual ruler of Cabool, had already awakened suspicion, and that the governor-general, under instructions from England, was jealously watching his intercourse directly with Persia, and as it was therefore concluded indirectly with Russia. Hence the first attempt of Shah Shujah to recover his throne, as it was commenced in 1833, when Lord
William Bentinck was governor-general and had undoubtedly his best wishes, though it did not receive his actual co-operation, may not improperly be regarded as one of the important events connected with his administration.

When Shah Shujah started from Loodiana in January, 1833, he could only muster a few hundred followers; on his arrival at Shikarpoor they amounted to 30,000. The Ameers of Scinde gave him a most friendly reception, and continued for a time to furnish him with abundant supplies; but when he delayed his departure, and instead of being satisfied, continued daily to increase his demands, they became completely alienated, and determined to rid themselves of the burden at all hazards. They accordingly collected their forces. Shah Shujah on his part was not disinclined to an appeal to arms, and in January, 1834, a pitched battle was fought near Roree. Shah Shujah proved victorious, and the Ameers having purchased his departure by consenting to pay him an additional subsidy, and assist him with an auxiliary force, he commenced his advance on Kandahar. He encountered little resistance, and was in hopes of an easy capture, when the approach of Dost Mahomed from Cabool, at the head of a powerful force, completely changed the aspect of affairs. Shah Shujah retired to Abbasabad, where he was brought to bay, and ventured to risk a battle. Owing partly to the treachery, and partly to the cowardice of his followers, he was signally discomfited, and fled westward with a slender escort to the fort of Laush, the chief of which gave him an asylum. After a short delay he marched north to Furrah, expecting reinforcements from Herat, but being disappointed, and threatened by a party of horse under Rehim Khan, he fled across the desert of Seistan, and after great privations, reached Kelat. His pursuer had followed close upon his track, but the chief of Kelat having taken the ex-king under his protection, refused to surrender him. On this a characteristic bargain was struck, the chief of Kelat agreeing to withdraw his protection, and Rehim Khan agreeing to desist from pursuit. Shah Shujah, thus obliged once more to shift for himself, repaired to Hyderabad, where the Ameers treated him with more kindness than might have been anticipated after their late quarrel. From Hyderabad he proceeded north-east across the desert of Jessulmeer, and again fixed his residence at Loodiana. His second expedition furnishes a tale of disgrace and disaster which must be reserved for future narration.
CHAPTER VIII.

Approaching expiry of the Company's charter—Views of ministers and of the Company—Bill for renewing the charter introduced—The discussions produced by it—The act passed—Its leading provisions—Close of Lord William Bentinck's administration.

During the greater part of Lord William Bentinck's administration, India and its affairs engrossed a far larger share of the attention of the British public and legislature than had usually been allotted to them. The Company's existing charter was to expire in 1834. Ought it to be renewed at all, and if renewed, under what conditions? These were questions which it had become absolutely necessary to answer, and in which, it was well understood, the manufacturing and commercial interests of the country were deeply involved. The monopoly of trade to India had been advantageously abolished—why should that of the trade to China be retained? As early as 1829 the leading towns of the United Kingdom had begun to agitate the subject, and to load the tables of both Houses of Parliament with petitions against the renewal of the charter, and in February, 1830, select committees were appointed on the recommendation of ministers themselves, Lord Ellenborough making the motion in the lords, and Sir Robert Peel in the commons. Both movers carefully abstained from giving any indication of the views entertained by the cabinet, and the committees were simply appointed "to inquire into the present state of the affairs of the East India Company, and into the trade between Great Britain and China, and to report their observations thereupon to the house." The death of George IV., the dissolution of parliament, and the formation of a new ministry pledged to parliamentary reform, withdrew attention for a time from the concerns of India. The committees, however, re-appointed from session to session, had not been idle, and a vast body of evidence oral and written had been accumulated.

The expediency of throwing open the trade to China could scarcely admit of serious discussion. It was open to all the other trading nations of the world, and were the British alone to be excluded from it, in order that all the profit which it yielded might be monopolized by a company? As usual, however, both parties pushed their views to an extreme, the free traders maintaining that the Company had no interest to oppose the opening of the trade because it yielded them no profit, and the Company, on the other hand, maintaining that the profit which it yielded was so large and so necessary to meet the payment of their dividends, that they would be ruined if deprived of it. After a great
mass of conflicting evidence had been given on the subject, the result acquiesced in by the most competent judges was, that during the last fifteen years of the Company’s monopoly of the China trade, they had realized from it an aggregate profit of £15,414,000, or rather more than a million sterling annually. But when this fact was admitted, it carried little weight with it, because it was alleged that the profit was obtained by enhancing the price, and was, in fact, a tax levied upon the whole consumers of tea for the benefit of a particular corporation. Even admitting that the profit was legitimately gained by fair trade without taxing the consumers, the question still returned, Why should this profit go entirely into the pockets of one class of individuals, to the exclusion of all the other merchants of the kingdom? Behind this question there was still another. The Company made a million annually by the China trade. Was this the maximum profit that could be realized? The extinction of monopoly naturally extended commerce, and there was therefore every reason to expect, that if the trade were thrown open, it would rapidly extend, so as at once to add greatly to the amount of aggregate profit realized by individuals, and of revenue drawn by the public. To these views no solid objection could be stated.

After the question of monopoly was virtually decided, and the Company, if continuing to trade at all, could not expect to occupy any vantage ground, the next point was to settle the future government of India. Was the old machinery to be thrown aside as worn out and useless, or might it not be possible by means of alterations and repairs to render it more efficient than ever? The moment the monopoly of the Company was extinguished, its trade, exposed to general competition, ceased to be of any value. Nothing, therefore, could be lost by agreeing to abandon it. Acting on this view ministers proposed that the Company should entirely sink their commercial, and in future act only in a political character, their governing powers and relations to the Board of Control remaining, with slight modifications, the same as before. The directors, when this proposal was submitted to them, expressed great doubts of being able to carry on the government, when divested of their commercial character, but they were willing, if certain difficulties which they pointed out could be obviated, to recommend to the proprietors to close with the proposal. One important point, however, still remained to be explained. Whatever might be the view taken as to the territorial rights of the Company, they were certainly possessed of a large amount of capital, of which it never could be proposed to deprive them, and it was therefore necessary to ascertain how this capital was in future to be secured, and from what source the dividends payable on it were to be derived.

On this subject a serious difference of opinion arose. The proposal of ministers was, that the whole of the Company’s commercial assets should, so far as possible, be converted into money, and that with the sum thus obtained a portion of the Indian debt, bearing interest equal in amount to £630,000,
now annually payable in dividends, should be discharged. In future the dividends would be regarded as an annuity payable to the proprietors of India stock, and charged upon the territorial revenue of India. After a certain fixed term it would be in the option of parliament to redeem this annuity, by paying for every £5, 5s. of annuity, £100 of capital. The directors objected that these assets, if converted into cash, would suffice to purchase an investment in consols equal to the amount of their dividends, and that they were, therefore, entitled in fairness to demand that the assets should either be employed in making such an investment for the behoof of the proprietors, or at least so employed as to provide an effectual guarantee, both for the regular half-yearly payment of the dividends, and in the event of redemption, for the payment of such an amount of principal as would produce the dividends by investing it in the funds. According to the Company the value of their stock, including assets of every kind, amounted on the 1st of May, 1829, to £21,103,000, and they had also a random claim of £5,000,000 as the value of fixed property in India. This last claim, however, was very problematical, and even in making up the stock to twenty-one millions, one item of £4,632,000, as due from territory, was added, and another of £3,796,000, as chargeable to territory, omitted. The propriety both of the addition and the omission was strongly questioned, and if, as was not improbable, the one should fall to be deducted from the assets, and the other added to the debit of the Company, the effect would be to cut off nearly eight millions and a half from the aggregate capital, reducing its value at one stroke from £21,103,000 to £12,675,000. Nor was this all. Several of the items composing this lower value were subject to dispute, and it was therefore not impossible that in making a final adjustment, whether by arbitration or legal proceedings, other important deductions might be made. These considerations rendered a compromise desirable, and the original proposal of ministers was ultimately accepted, with this important addition, that two millions sterling of the commercial assets should be invested in the funds, and there accumulated to form a collateral security for the capital of the Company and its future redemption.

The next point to be considered was the term before which the power of redemption should not be exercised, and to which the government of India should be continued to the Company. Ministers were willing that the compulsory redemption should not be competent within forty years, but they refused to accede to the proposal of the directors, that the government should be continued to the Company till the annuity should be actually redeemed; ultimately, however, they conceded so far as to consent that the government should be continued to the Company for twenty years, and that at the end of this or any subsequent period they should not be deprived of it without a three years' notice, and the option of demanding payment of the capital, and employing the whole or any part of it in resuming their trade, should they see fit to
do so. Among the various other points discussed, the only one requiring particular notice at present, was the degree of power to be possessed respectively by the Board of Control and the Company. Ministers proposed that the absolute power which the Company now possessed of recalling the governors of the presidencies and the commander-in-chief should be restricted, by giving the board a veto on the recall. This proposal was strenuously objected to by the directors, who maintained that the natural tendency of the new arrangements was to diminish their influence, and that therefore they were entitled to expect, that if any change were to be made in the relative positions of the board and the Company, it would be by curtailing the overgrown authority of the former, and strengthening the impaired powers of the latter. Following out this view, they referred to the manner in which the directors had been coerced by the issue of the writ of mandamus, in regard to the claims of creditors in the Nizam’s dominions, and threatened with the issue of the same writ in regard to similar claims in Oude. Such proceedings might be repeated, and as their obvious effect was to weaken the hands of government, and even bring it into contempt, it seemed absolutely necessary either to give a right of appeal in the event of differences between the court and the board, or at all events to provide for their publicity by bringing them directly under the notice of parliament. Ministers gave way so far as to desist from pressing for a veto on the powers of recall already enjoyed by the court, but they peremptorily refused to give a right of repeal, and held that publicity was already sufficiently secured, by the right which the directors possessed, in common with all the other subjects of the realm, of approaching parliament by petition.

On the 25th of March, 1833, the correspondence between the directors and the Board of Control as representing the ministry was submitted to the court of proprietors, and on the 15th day of April, to which day the meeting had been adjourned, Sir John Malcolm moved a series of resolutions, embodying in substance the leading proposals above made by the directors, and signifying the assent of the Company “to conduct the government of India, at the sacrifices demanded, provided they were furnished with powers sufficient for the effective discharge of so important a duty, and their pecuniary rights and claims were adjusted upon the principle of fair and liberal compromise.” The resolutions gave rise to a debate which was spun out to seven days, and were finally carried by ballot by a majority of 477 to 52. As yet, however, all that had been done was only preliminary to the real battle which was to be fought in parliament. On the 13th of June, 1833, the subject was introduced to the House of Commons by Mr. Charles Grant (afterwards Lord Glenelg), the president of the Board of Control, who concluded a long explanatory speech by moving the three following resolutions:—“1. That it is expedient that all his majesty’s subjects shall be at liberty to repair to the ports of the empire of China, and to trade in tea and in all other productions of the said empire, subject
to such regulations as parliament shall enact for the protection of the commercial and political interests of this country. 2. That it is expedient that, in case the East India Company shall transfer to the crown, on behalf of the Indian territory, all assets and claims of every description belonging to the said Company, the crown on behalf of the Indian territory shall take on itself all the obligations of the said Company, of whatever description, and that the said Company shall receive from the revenues of the said territory such a sum, and paid in such a manner, and under such regulations, as parliament shall enact. 3. That it is expedient that the government of the British possessions in India be intrusted to the said Company, under such conditions and regulations as parliament shall enact, for the purpose of extending the commerce of this country, and of securing the good government, and promoting the religious and moral improvement of the people of India."

It is so remarkable as to be not undeserving of record, that these resolutions, though involving the future government of India, and the consequent condition of its myriads of inhabitants, were passed almost without discussion, and awakened so little interest that a very large majority of the members of the House of Commons did not even deign to be present. Adverting to the fact a few weeks afterwards, the late Lord Macaulay thus expressed himself: "The house has neither the time, nor the knowledge, nor the inclination to attend to an Indian budget, or to the statement of Indian extravagance, or to the discussion of Indian local grievances. A broken head in Coldbath Fields excites greater interest in this house than

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1 This apartment was formerly the tea sale-room. In niches were statues of Lord Clive, Warren Hastings, Sir Eyre Coote, General Stringer Lawrence, the Marquis Cornwallis and the Marquis of Wellesley, Sir George Pococke, and, subsequently to his death, the Duke of Wellington.
three pitched battles in India ever would excite. This is not a figure of speech but a literal description of fact, and were I called upon for proof of it, I would refer to a circumstance which must be still in the recollection of the house. When my right honourable friend Mr. Charles Grant brought forward his important propositions for the future government of India, there were not as many members present as generally attend upon an ordinary turnpike bill.”

The resolutions adopted by the House of Commons were, on the 5th of July, introduced to the House of Lords by the Marquis of Lansdowne. He could enter more fully than Mr. Grant had done into the particulars of the measure, as the bill, embodying all its provisions, had been laid on the table of the House of Commons, and read a first time on the 28th of June. The discussion which followed was remarkable chiefly for the opposition which the resolutions, and the government plan generally, received from the Duke of Wellington, and the contrary view taken by his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, who, though unable from indisposition to attend in his place, had authorized the Marquis of Lansdowne to express his entire concurrence in them. The first reading of the bill in the House of Commons had been merely formal, but on the 10th of July, when the second reading was moved, an attempt was made to delay further procedure by the following amendment:—“That the confiding the political administration of our East India possessions, with the interests of 100,000,000 of people, to the direction of a joint-stock company, and taxing the natives of those countries for the payment of the dividends of a mercantile concern to the constantly varying holders of East India stock, is a question involving too many important considerations to be hastily decided on, more especially for so long a term as twenty years; and that, as the other business of the session is already more than sufficient to occupy the whole time and attention of the legislature to bring it to a satisfactory completion, it is expedient that a short bill be passed for the opening of the trade with China in April, 1834, and that all the arrangements which may be thought desirable for the administration of India should be deferred till next session.” This amendment was feebly supported. While the bill was in committee motions were made to limit the term of the Company’s government to ten years, to prevent proposed changes in the constitution of the presidencies, to restrict the legislative power given to the governor-general in council, and to prohibit any extension of the ecclesiastical establishment; but these, with various others of minor moment, found little favour, and the bill came out of committee with its features almost unaltered. The third reading was fixed for the 26th of July, but three days previously the directors applied for a postponement. Several of their suggestions, particularly that of giving a right of appeal, or at least of publicity, in the event of a difference of opinion between the court and the board, had been unceremoniously rejected, and they had therefore summoned a court of proprietors for the purpose of considering whether they ought not to
A.D. 1833.

Bill embodying resolutions of House of Commons regarding East India Company.

present a petition to parliament stating their objections to the bill as it now stood. Ministers declined to postpone the third reading, but the proprietors agreed to a petition, objecting particularly to the absence of any provision for reporting differences between the board and the court to parliament, to the changes in the constitution of the subordinate governments, to the erection of a fourth presidency at Agra, to the extension of the ecclesiastical establishment, and to the expense needlessly incurred in the maintenance of the college at Haileybury. They prayed to be heard by counsel in support of these objections. This was refused, mainly on the ground that the application was too late, and the third reading passed.

The bill transmitted to the House of Lords was read a first time on the 29th of July, and a second time on the 2d of August. When about to be committed on the 5th, the proprietors again presented their petition, and prayed to be heard by counsel. The application was refused as before, but Lord Ellenborough, who led the opposition, and was seconded by the Duke of Wellington, moved, "that it be an instruction to the committee to omit all such clauses in the bill as relate to alterations in the constitution and powers of the governments of the several presidencies of India." This motion having been rejected, the bill made rapid progress in committee, and was reported on the 9th of August. Before the third reading was proceeded with, a short delay took place to allow the court of directors and proprietors to decide on the course which they were to pursue. They had made appearance in both houses as petitioners against the bill, and as their objections had not been obviated, it was possible that they might decline to part with their assets and accept of the government of India on the terms offered. On the 12th of August the court of directors adopted, in opposition to a strong dissent by both the chairman and deputy, the following resolution:—"That the East India bill having arrived at its last stage in the House of Lords, it becomes the duty of the court of directors to submit to their constituents a final opinion regarding the bill as it now stands; and while the court are still impressed with the belief that the cessation of the Company's trade will greatly weaken its position in this country, and consequently impair its efficiency in the administration of the government of India—whilst, also, they regard with much anxiety the increase of powers given by the said bill to the board of commissioners for the affairs of India, and greatly regret that parliament has not provided some rule of publicity to act as a salutary check both upon the board and the court; and whilst, further, the court entertain the most serious apprehensions of the injurious effect upon the finances of India, which must result from the loss of the trade as a source of direct profit, and as a safe and beneficial channel of remittance, and from the new charges which the bill imposes—yet, reviewing all the correspondence which has passed with his majesty's ministers on this subject, trusting that the extensive powers of the board will be exercised with
moderation, and so as not to interfere with the independence of the Company as a body acting intermediately between the king's government and the government of India, which independence all parties have admitted it to be of vital importance to maintain; and relying with confidence that parliament will interpose for the relief of any financial difficulties into which the Company may unavoidably be cast through the operation of extensive changes which the bill proposes to effect—the court of directors cannot do otherwise than recommend to the proprietors to defer to the pleasure expressed by both Houses of Parliament, and to consent to place their right to trade for their own profit in abeyance, in order that they may continue to exercise the government of India for the further term of twenty years, upon the conditions and under the arrangements embodied in the said bill." The opinion of the proprietors, ascertained by a ballot taken on the 16th of August, was in accordance with that of the directors. This seems to have been regarded so much as a matter of course, that a mere fraction of the proprietors recorded their votes, the numbers being 173 against 64. On the same day when this ballot was taken, the bill was read a third time, and on the 28th of August it received the royal assent. It ranks in the statute-book as 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 85, and is entitled, "An Act for effecting an arrangement with the East India Company, and for the better government of his Majesty's Indian territories, till the 30th day of April, 1854."

1 This apartment is an exact cube of thirty feet, and the wainscotting being rich dark brown, and much enriched with gilding, and there being several large looking-glasses, the general appearance of the room is very cosy. The marble mantelpiece, supported by caryatides, boldly sculptured, represents Britannia receiving offerings from India, along with typical figures of Asia, Africa, and the river Thames, and allegorical emblems of peace and commerce.
Though the general purport of this important act has already been explained, a brief analysis of its leading provisions seems still to be required. It consists of 117 sections; but as many of these merely recapitulate former arrangements, or relate to points of which it is unnecessary to take particular notice, the analysis may be made without entering much into detail. The first section, after a recital of the Act 53 Geo. III. c. 155, which renewed the charter now about to expire, enacts, that from and after the 2d of April, 1834, all "territories now in possession and under the government of the said Company, except the island of St. Helena, shall remain and continue under such government," and that all "real and personal estate whatsoever" belonging to the Company at the above date, shall be held "by the said Company, in trust for his majesty, his heirs and successors, for the service of the government of India, discharged of all claims of the said Company to any profit or advantage therefrom to their own use, except the dividend on their capital stock secured to them as hereinafter is mentioned." By section 2 all rights, powers, and privileges, "whether military or civil," heretofore granted and not repealed, nor repugnant to the present act, are to remain intact with the Company. Section 3 enacts that "the exclusive right of trading with the dominions of the Emperor of China," continued to the Company by 53 Geo. III. c. 155, "shall cease;" and section 4, that the Company "shall, with all convenient speed, after the said 22d April, 1834, close their commercial business, and make sale" of all their "property whatsoever, which may not be retained for the purposes of the government of the said territories." Sections 5-10 inclusive, regulate the mode of winding up the commercial business, provide for the granting of reasonable compensations and allowances to persons whose interests may be affected by the discontinuance of the Company's trade, and charge all the actual debts of the Company, as well as those which shall henceforth be lawfully contracted on account of the government of India, on its revenues, declaring "that neither any stock or effects which the said Company may hereafter have to their own use, nor the dividend by this act secured to them, nor the directors or proprietors of the said Company, shall be liable to or chargeable with any of the said debts, payments, or liabilities."

Section 11 fixed the rate and payment of dividend, by enacting that out of the territorial revenues there shall be paid to, or retained by the Company, to their own use, a yearly dividend, payable in Great Britain by equal half-yearly payments, "after the rate of £10, 10s. per cent. on the present amount of their capital stock." This "present amount," as originally subscribed and successively augmented by a series of statutes, was exactly £6,000,000 sterling, but as it bore interest at 10½ per cent., and was declared by section 12 not to be redeemable by parliament till the 30th of April, 1874, on payment of £200 for every £100 of stock, the real value as thus determined by the sum payable in the event of redemption was £12,000,000. This sum might by section 13 be
demanded on a year's notice any time after 1854, should the Company then "cease to retain," or "by the authority of parliament be deprived of the possession and government" of India. Sections 14 to 17 are occupied with providing additional security for the regular payment of the dividend, and the final redemption of the capital. For this purpose the sum of £2,000,000 sterling is to be invested in the funds and bear compound interest at the rate of 3½ per cent. It was to be placed in a separate account with the commissioners of the national debt, to be entitled "The Account of the Security Fund of the India Company;" and the dividends upon it were to be employed in the purchase of additional stock in the funds till the whole should amount to £12,000,000 sterling. In the event of any failure, or delay in remittances from India to meet the dividend, the security fund might be drawn upon to any amount necessary to make up the deficiency; and at all times the dividend was to form a preferable charge on any part of the territorial revenues of India which might be remitted to Great Britain. Section 18 may be passed over, as it only contains a saving clause, to the effect that nothing contained in the act shall prejudice the claims of the creditors of the Nabob of Arcot.

Sections 19 to 37 are almost entirely occupied in defining the powers of the Board of Control. The greater part of these differ little, if at all, from those previously existing, and it is therefore necessary to notice only a few of the more marked changes. As the law previously stood, the directors were prohibited from sending any "orders or instructions whatever, relating to the civil or military government or revenues" of the territorial acquisitions in India, "until the same shall have been submitted to the consideration of, and approved by" the board; and they were moreover required to pay obedience to "such orders and instructions as they shall from time to time receive from the said board of commissioners touching or concerning the civil and military government of the said territories and acquisitions, and the revenues of the same." When the court and the board quarrelled in regard to the interference which ought to be used in favour of the claims of William Palmer and Co., and the writ of mandamus was applied for, the directors argued that the despatch which they were required to send did not relate "to the civil or military government or revenues" of the territorial acquisitions in India, and that they were therefore entitled to decline to send it. Though the argument proved unavailing, and the writ was issued, it was deemed prudent to leave no room in future for such a captious interpretation, and therefore, in the present act, words at once more definite and more comprehensive are employed, and it is enacted "that no orders, instructions, despatches, official letters, or communications whatever, relating to the said territories or government thereof, or to the property or rights vested in the said Company in trust as aforesaid, or to any public matters whatever, shall be at any time sent or given by the said court of directors, or any committee of the said directors, until the same shall have been submitted for the con-
consideration of, and approved by the said board;" and, however much they may have been altered, the directors are "required forthwith to send the said orders, instructions, despatches, official letters, or communications, in the form approved by the said board, to their destinations." By section 32, indeed, the directors may within fourteen days make a written representation, containing "such remarks, observations, or explanations, as they shall think fit," and the board are "required to take every such representation, and the several matters therein contained or alleged, into their consideration," but their decision, whatever it may be, is to be "final and conclusive upon the directors," except in one single case, which is so special that it must be of very rare occurrence. The 33d section thus describes it: "If it shall appear to the said court of directors that any orders, instructions, despatches, official letters, or communications, except such as shall pass through the secret committee, upon which directions may be so given by the said board as aforesaid, are contrary to law, it shall be in the power of the said board, and the said court of directors, to send a special case, to be agreed upon by and between them, and to be signed by the president of the said board, and the chairman of the said Company, to three or more of the judges of his majesty's Court of King's Bench, for the opinion of the said judges; and the said judges are hereby required to certify their opinion upon any case so submitted to them, and to send a certificate thereof to the said president and chairman, which opinion shall be final and conclusive."

It was thus only when the board happened to blunder so egregiously as to issue orders which could not be legally obeyed, that the directors could resist them by calling in the aid of the judges of the King's Bench. Even the sorry privilege of making unavailing representations was in the most important matters denied them, since the power of transmitting despatches through the secret committee, which was always competent to the board, was enlarged by the present act, the 36th section of which, relating to this subject, is as follows:—

"Provided also and be it enacted, that if the said board shall be of opinion that the subject matter of any of their deliberations concerning the levying war, or making peace, or treating or negotiating with any of the native princes or states in India, or with any other princes or states, or touching the policy to be observed with regard to such princes or states, intended to be communicated in orders, despatches, official letters, or communications to any of the governments or presidencies in India, or to any officers or servants of the said Company, shall be of a nature to require secrecy, it shall and may be lawful for the said board to send their orders, despatches, official letters, or communications to the secret committee of the said court of directors, to be appointed as is by this act directed, who shall thereupon, without disclosing the same, transmit the same according to the tenor thereof, or pursuant to the directions of the said board, to the respective governments and presidencies, officers and servants; and that the said governments and presidencies, officers and servants, shall be
bound to pay a faithful obedience thereto, in like manner as if such orders and despatches, official letters, or communications, had been sent to them by the said court of directors." One might have supposed that these sections which empower the board, whenever secrecy was deemed expedient, to send despatches to India without even acquainting the directors as a body with their contents, and to modify to any extent the despatches originating with the directors themselves, might have sufficed, but in order that there might be no possible doubt as to the absolute supremacy conferred on the board, it was enacted by a subsequent section (109), "that every power, authority, and function, by this or any other act or acts given to and vested in the said court of directors, shall be deemed and taken to be subject to such control of the said board of commissioners as in this act is mentioned, unless there shall be something in the enactments conferring such powers, authorities, or functions inconsistent with such construction, and except as to any patronage or right of appointing to office vested in, or reserved to, the said court."

This exception in regard to patronage was now indeed the main inducement to the directors and proprietors to undertake the nominal government of India. Hitherto they had a direct interest. Their capital and dividends were at stake, and might have been endangered by any gross mismanagement; but by the provisions of the new act these were effectually secured, and henceforth neither the directors nor the proprietors ran any risk of pecuniary loss from negligence or error in the discharge of the duties intrusted to them. In their case, therefore, the government established was of a very anomalous description. Individuals, merely by investing money to a certain amount in India stock, purchased the privilege of voting for directors; and the directors sharing among them nearly the whole patronage of India, secured the continued possession of their seats, by dispensing it with a liberal hand among those who had voted, or were expected on some future occasion to vote for them. Whatever therefore may have been the theory of government now established, it was virtually the result of a compact by which the directors and their constituents agreed to submit to the dictation of the Board of Control, or in other words, of the ministry of the day, in consideration of the amount of patronage reserved to them. In all vacancies their power of appointment was absolute, except in regard to a few of the highest offices, which could not be filled up without the approbation of the crown; while even the persons thus approved, including the governor-general himself, held their offices only during the pleasure of the directors, who possessed to the same extent as the crown itself an absolute right of recall.

Having determined the nature and defined the powers of the home government, the act proceeds to settle the future government of India itself, and makes several important changes. The first of these, contained in section 38, divides Bengal into two presidencies, the one styled as before the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and the other the presidency of Agra. Section 39
enacts that "the superintendence, direction, and control of the whole civil and military government of all the said territories and revenues in India shall be, and is hereby vested in a governor-general and councillors, to be styled 'the Governor-general of India in Council.'" By section 40 the ordinary councillors are to be four—three of them appointed absolutely by the directors from actual or former servants who at the time of appointment shall have served at least ten years, and the fourth appointed also by the directors, but subject to the approbation of his majesty, and selected from persons not in the service of the Company. This fourth member was not "to sit or vote" in the council, except "at meetings thereof for making laws and regulations." The commander-in-chief in India, or if there be no such commander, or the office be conjoined with that of the governor-general, the commander-in-chief on the Bengal establishment, may be appointed by the directors an extraordinary member of council, and take rank next to the governor-general. Sections 48-52 are chiefly occupied in defining the powers of the council. Thus, it is enacted that the governor-general in council "shall have power to make laws and regulations for repealing, amending, or altering any laws or regulations whatever now in force, or hereafter to be in force, for the said territories, or any part thereof, and to make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or native, foreigners or others, and for all courts of justice, whether established by his majesty's charters or otherwise, and the jurisdiction thereof, and for all places and things whatsoever within and throughout the whole and every part of the said territories, and for all servants of the said Company within the dominions of princes and states in alliance with the said Company." This apparently unlimited power is however restricted by a salvo against its being employed to make "any laws or regulations which shall in any way repeal, vary, suspend, or affect any of the provisions of this act, or any of the provisions of the acts for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers and soldiers, whether in the service of his majesty or of the said Company, or any provisions of any act hereafter to be passed in any wise affecting the said Company, or the said territories or the inhabitants thereof, or any laws or regulations which shall in any way affect any prerogative of the crown, or the authority of parliament, or the constitution or rights of the said Company, or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, whereon may depend in any degree the allegiance of any person to the crown of the United Kingdom, or the sovereignty or dominion of the said crown over any of the said territories."

To make the above salvo still more explicit, it was provided by a subsequent section that nothing contained in the act "shall extend to affect in any way the right of parliament to make laws for the said territories, and for all the inhabitants thereof," and "expressly declared that a full, complete, and constantly existing right and power is intended to be reserved to parliament to control, supersede,
or prevent all proceedings and acts whatsoever of the said governor-general in
council, and to repeal and alter at any time any law or regulation whatsoever
made by the said governor-general in council, and in all respects to legislate
for the said territories and all the inhabitants thereof in as full and ample a
manner as if this act had not been passed; and the better to enable parliament
to exercise at all times such right and power, all laws and regulations made by
the said governor-general in council shall be transmitted to England," and laid
annually before both Houses of Parliament. Still, though an absolute power of
repeal was expressly reserved to the legislature, it was provided that "all laws
and regulations made as aforesaid, so long as they shall remain unrepealed,
shall be of the same force and effect within and throughout the said territories
as any act of parliament would or ought to be within the same territories, in
the same manner as any public act of parliament would and ought to be taken
notice of."

By section 48 the court of directors are enjoined forthwith to submit for the
approval of the Board of Control "such rules as they shall deem expedient
for the procedure of the governor-general in council in the discharge and
exercise of all powers, functions, and duties imposed on or vested in him by
virtue of this act;" and such rules, when approved, "shall be of the same force
as if they had been inserted in this act." In all ordinary cases the governor-
general and one ordinary member of council were to constitute a quorum, but
in making laws and regulations the governor-general and at least three ordinary
members behoved to be present. In cases of equality the governor-general was
to have a casting vote; and, should the majority happen to differ with him
with regard to any measure whereby, in his judgment, "the safety, tranquillity,
or interests of the British possessions in India or any part thereof" might be
"essentially affected," he and the members of council were forthwith "mutually
to exchange with and communicate to each other in writing, under their respective
hands, to be recorded on their secret consultations, the grounds and reasons
of their respective opinions." Should the governor-general, after considering
the same, continue to differ, he might then, "of his own authority, and on his
own responsibility," adopt the course which might seem to himself "fit and
expedient." The council might assemble at any place within the British territo-
ries in India; but, should that place happen to be within any of the other
presidencies, the governor of such presidency was to take his seat, and "act as
an extraordinary member."

The 53d section, as one of the most important of the act, deserves to be
quoted verbatim. "Whereas it is expedient that, subject to such special
arrangements as local circumstances may require, a general system of judicial
establishments and police, to which all persons whatsoever, as well Europeans
as natives, may be subject, should be established in the said territories at an
eyearly period, and that such laws as may be applicable in common to all classes
of inhabitants of the said territories, due regard being had to the rights, feelings, and peculiar usages of the people, should be enacted, and that all laws and customs having the force of law within the same territories should be ascertained and consolidated, and, as occasion may require, amended: be it therefore enacted that the said Governor-general of India in council shall, as soon as conveniently may be after the passing of this act, issue a commission, and from time to time commissions, to such persons as the said court of directors, with the approbation of the said board of commissioners, shall recommend for that purpose, and to such persons, if necessary, as the said governor-general in council shall think fit, such persons not exceeding in the whole at any one time five in number, and to be styled, 'The Indian Law Commissioners,' with all such powers as shall be necessary for the purposes hereinafter mentioned; and the said commissioners shall fully inquire into the jurisdiction, powers, and rules of the existing courts of justice and police establishments in the said territories, and all existing forms of judicial procedure, and into the nature and operation of all laws, whether civil or criminal, written or customary, prevailing and in force in any part of the said territories, and whereto any inhabitants of the said territories, whether Europeans or others, are now subject; and the said commissioners shall from time to time make reports, in which they shall fully set forth the result of these said inquiries, and shall from time to time suggest such alterations as may in their opinion be beneficially made in the said courts of justice and police establishments, forms of judicial procedure and laws, due regard being had to the distinction of castes, difference of religion, and the manners and opinions prevailing among different races, and in different parts of the said territories. The above commissioners were to follow such instructions as should be given them from time to time by the governor-general in council, to make special reports, and receive salaries "according to the highest scale of remuneration given to any of the officers or servants of the India Company below the rank of members of council."

By section 56 the executive government of each of the presidencies was to be administered by a governor and three councillors, the Governor-general of India for the time being acting as governor of the presidency of Fort William in Bengal; but the ultimate abolition of councils in the separate presidencies was contemplated, and it was therefore provided by section 57 "that it shall and may be lawful for the said court of directors, under such control as is by this act provided, to revoke and suspend, so often and for such periods as the said court shall in that behalf direct, the appointment of councils in all or any of the said presidencies, or to reduce the number of councillors in all or any of the said councils; and during such time as a council shall not be appointed in any such presidency, the executive government thereof shall be administered by a governor alone."

The only other sections of the act which seem to require special notice are
the 81st and 82d, which specify those parts of India where "any natural born subjects of his majesty" may, and where they may not, reside without a license; the 85th, which, assuming that "the removal of restrictions on the intercourse of Europeans with the said territories will render it necessary to provide against any mischiefs or dangers that may arise therefrom, requires" the governor-general in council, "by laws or regulations, to provide with all convenient speed for the protection of the natives of the said territories from insult and outrage in their persons, religions, or opinions;" the 86th, which makes it "lawful for any natural born subject of his majesty authorized to reside in the said territories to acquire and hold lands, or any right, interest, or profit, in or out of lands, for any term of years, in such part or parts of the said territories as he shall be so authorized to reside in;" the 87th, which enacts "that no native of the said territories, nor any natural born subject of his majesty resident therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the said Company;" the 88th, which requires the governor-general in council "forthwith to take into consideration the means of mitigating the state of slavery, and of ameliorating the condition of slaves, and of extinguishing slavery throughout the said territories, so soon as such extinction shall be practicable and safe;" and a series of sections which, after providing for the extension of the episcopal establishment by the erection of bishoprics at Madras and Bombay, and enacting that at each of the presidencies "two chaplains shall always be ministers of the Church of Scotland," conclude with declaring "that nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the governor-general in council from granting from time to time, with the sanction of the court of directors and of the commissioners for the affairs of India, to any sect, persuasion, or community of Christians, not being of the united Church of England and Ireland, or of the Church of Scotland, such sums of money as may be expedient for the purpose of instruction or for the maintenance of places of worship."

The last section provides that "this act shall commence and take effect from and after the passing thereof" (that is, from and after the 28th of August, 1833, when it received the royal assent), "so far as to authorize the appointment, or prospective or provisional appointment, of the Governor-general of India, governors, members of council, or other officers, under the provisions herein contained, and so far as hereinbefore in that behalf mentioned," but, "as to all other matters and things," it was only to commence and take effect from and after the 22d of April, 1834. In consequence of the different dates thus assigned for the commencement of the act, and some other unexpected coincidences, a curious dilemma was produced. By the 41st section it is enacted "that the person who shall be governor-general of the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, on the 22d day of April, 1834, shall be the first Governor-general of
India under this act, and such persons as shall be members of council of the same presidency on that day shall be respectively members of council constituted by this act." In virtue of this section Lord William Bentinck was governor-general, and Sir Charles Metcalfe, and Messrs. William Blunt and Alexander Ross were members of the first council of India. But the court of directors, taking advantage of the earlier date assigned for the commencement of the act, had, on the 27th of December, 1833, issued two commissions—the one appointing Lord William Bentinck to take upon himself the office of governor-general upon and from the 22d of April, 1834, and William Blunt, Alexander Ross, William Byam Martin, and Thomas Babington Macaulay, Esquires, "to be respectively the first, second, third, and fourth ordinary members of the said council;" and the other appointing Sir Charles Metcalfe to be governor of the presidency of Agra upon and from the said 22d of April. When the campaign against Coorg was opened the governor-general, who had gone to Madras to superintend different financial arrangements then in progress, repaired to Bangalore, and after the campaign was finished he took up his residence in the Neilgherry Hills for the recovery of his health, which had become so seriously affected that he had intimated his resignation to the directors. He was thus living at Ootacamund, and Sir Charles Metcalfe, as senior member of council, was acting as vice-president and deputy-governor of Bengal, at the time when the new act came into operation. This was unfortunate, because certain important steps had in consequence of the change of government become absolutely necessary, and yet it was difficult to perceive how these steps could be taken while the governor-general remained isolated among the Neilgherry Hills, and in a state of health which would not allow him to return to Calcutta. The course adopted was to summon the first council under the act to meet at Ootacamund. This was perfectly legal, since, as has been shown in the above analysis of the act, the governor-general was empowered to assemble the council at any
place within the British Indian territories, and, except in the case of making laws and regulations, required the assistance of only one ordinary member to constitute a quorum. Such a member was opportunely found in Mr. Macaulay, who, having been made aware that his presence was required, arrived at Ootacamund. Sir Frederick Adam, governor of Madras, arrived also about the same time, and in terms of an express provision in the act, took his seat in the council as an extraordinary member. The first act of the council was to issue a proclamation on the 16th of June, 1834, announcing the passing of the act, and the installation of the new form of government prescribed by it. Rather strangely, however, the governor-general in council, instead of carrying out the provisions of the act, ventured to place some of the most important of them in abeyance. Hence part of the proclamation proceeded in the following extraordinary terms: "Whereas it is impracticable to carry into immediate execution all the preliminary measures that shall be necessary before the duties of the government of Agra can be entered upon, or to adopt, without previous inquiry and mature deliberation, the different official and legislative proceedings which the separation of the two governments require; and whereas, for the aforesaid reasons, it is not expedient that the Honourable Sir Charles Metcalfe should assume the government of Agra before the return of the governor-general and council to Calcutta, the governor-general in council, therefore, has been pleased to resolve, and it is hereby notified accordingly, that the administration of the presidency of Bengal, as heretofore constituted, shall in the meantime continue to be carried on by the honourable the vice-president in council."

Sir Charles Metcalfe had, in consequence of his appointment as governor of Agra, ceased to be a member of the council, and that council itself, as formerly constituted, had been entirely abrogated, and yet the proclamation, with a singular mixture of simplicity and boldness, ignores both facts, and merely because the governor-general has been so "pleased to resolve," notifies accordingly, "that the administration of the presidency of Bengal as heretofore constituted" shall, in the meantime, continue to be carried on. The illegality of these proceedings is so palpable that it could not possibly have escaped the notice either of Lord William Bentinck, or his distinguished coadjutor, the late Lord Macaulay. Sir Charles Metcalfe, only ten days after the date
of the proclamation, writing his friend Mr. Tucker, then chairman of the
court of directors, says, "You know, I conclude, our present position. The
governor-general would endanger his life were he to quit the Neilgherry Hills
before September, as he proposes, or as I should say, before October. He
has, therefore, from necessity, summoned the council on the hills. He has also
suspended the formation of the Agra government, and the application of the
new act to Bengal. I am to remain vice-president here until his return. I fear
that several things in this arrangement are illegal." At the same time he makes
the best excuse which could be offered for it when he adds, "His lordship's
detention in the hills is quite unavoidable. He nearly lost his life in his last
attack, and every medical man predicted the most fatal consequences if he
should attempt to encounter the heat of the plains at this season. He is now
quite well where he is, but dare not move." Under these circumstances some
such arrangement as that actually made seems to have been absolutely neces-
sary to prevent the mischiefs which must have ensued from leaving the seat of
government without a regular administration. But no necessity, however
great, could cure the illegality of superseding or postponing the operation of an
act of parliament.

When the governor-general returned to Calcutta, on the 14th of November,
1834, one of the first subjects which engaged his intention was the Ootacamund
proclamation, and he endeavoured to legalize all that had been done under it
by an exercise of his legislative power. Accordingly, on the 20th of November,
the following act was passed, "Be it enacted that all acts done by the Governor-
general of India in council, or by the vice-president of Fort William in Bengal
in council, or in pursuance of any authority given by the said governor-general
in council, or by the said vice-president in council, between the 22d of April,
1834, and the 14th of November, 1834, shall be valid and effectual to all intents
and purposes, as if the said acts had been done before the said 22d day of April,
1834." It is almost needless to observe that the passing of this act, so far from
curing the illegality, was only a repetition of it. The governor-general in
council unintentionally, or from some real or supposed necessity, had violated
the law, and nothing short of the authority of the legislature itself could save
him, and those who had acted with and under him, from the penal consequences,
or give validity to their proceedings. The only effectual remedy, therefore, was
at length provided when, on the 13th of April, 1835, the Act 5 and 6 Wm. IV.
c. 6 was passed, which, after reciting the recent Act 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 85, and
explaining the circumstances under which the government of India "was admin-
istered for a time, otherwise than in accordance with the said recited act," indem-
nifies all the persons directly or indirectly implicated for all "acts, matters, and
things" that had been "done, ordered, directed or authorized, bona fide, in the
exercise of the administration of the British territories in the East Indies,"
between the 22d of April, 1834, and the 1st of January, 1835, and declares
that "all such acts, matters, and things shall be as valid and effectual, and shall be, and be deemed to be, of as much force, validity, and effect as if they had been expressly authorized by the said recited act."

In regard to the new presidency of Agra, which had been provided for by the act, it may here be mentioned that, though on the very day of the return of the governor-general to Calcutta from the Neillgherry Hills, it was formally notified that Sir Charles Metcalfe "had taken the prescribed oaths and assumed charge of the government of Agra," the plan of this fourth government, which the directors had always objected to as involving a large unnecessary expenditure, was never fully carried out. After its duties had been so restricted and frittered away that it had become a mere misnomer to call it a "government," an act was passed, on the 31st of August, 1835, making it lawful for the court of directors, under the control of the board of commissioners, "to suspend the execution of the provisions" of the Act 3 and 4 Wm. IV. c. 85 so far as relates to the division of the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, into two distinct presidencies, one of which was to be styled the presidency of Agra, and enacting that so long as the execution of these provisions shall remain suspended, the governor-general in council may "appoint, from time to time, any servant of the East India Company, who shall have been ten years in their service in India, to the office of lieutenant-governor of the North-western provinces, now under the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and from time to time to declare and limit the extent of the territories so placed under such lieutenant-governor, and the extent of the authority to be exercised by such lieutenant-governor, as to the said governor-general in council may seem fit." This permission to suspend was so completely in accordance with the views of the directors, that they immediately availed themselves of it, and all idea of erecting a separate presidency of Agra was abandoned.

After the return of Lord William Bentinck to Calcutta, no event of any importance occurred till his administration closed. He had intimated his resignation, and only waited the return of the sailing season to take his departure. On the 20th of March, 1835, he ceased to be governor-general, and set sail for Europe. His government had been eminently peaceful, and its merits consequently are founded not on new acquisitions of territory, or brilliant military achievements, but on the more solid ground of internal improvement—on reductions of expenditure, the correction of abuses, the extension of the means of education, the more adequate administration of justice by the liberal employment of native agency; and above all, the bold and successful inroad made on superstition by the suppression of one of its most abominable practices. In all these respects Lord William Bentinck proved himself an able, liberal, and conscientious administrator. The great defect of his policy was, as we have seen, the absurd extent to which he attempted to carry the system of non-interference. By standing aloof when disorder commenced, he too often allowed it to increase
till it became too alarming to be any longer tolerated, and thus laid himself open to the charge of dealing harshly with native states, by making the rulers responsible for disturbances which an earlier interference on his part might easily have prevented. Still, it must be admitted that non-interference, when steadily carried out as part of a general system, possessed several advantages, and in more than one instance, by throwing native rulers upon their own resources, compelled them to conciliate the good-will of their subjects, and to govern with a wisdom and moderation which they had never displayed before. Lord William Bentinck had longed for the appointment of governor-general, in order that he might remove the stigma of incapacity which he conceived to have been fixed upon him by his summary removal from the government of Madras. This object he certainly accomplished, since even those disposed to censure particular parts of his administration, freely admit that, taken as a whole, it entitles him to no mean place among Indian statesmen.
BOOK VIII.

FROM THE EXTINCTION OF THE TRADE OF THE COMPANY TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE GREAT SEPOY MUTINY.

CHAPTER I.

Sir Charles Metcalfe provisional governor-general—He removes the restrictions on the Indian press—Opposite views of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control in regard to the appointment of a successor to Lord William Bentinck—Lord Heytesbury's appointment revoked by the crown—Lord Auckland becomes governor-general—A new succession in Oude—Intrigues and deposition of the Rajah of Sattarah.

After the departure of Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe became governor-general, in virtue of a provisional appointment. By this appointment, the full powers of the office were undoubtedly conferred upon him; but as his tenure was precarious and temporary, it seems to have been expected, not unreasonably, that he would continue to carry on the government according to its ordinary routine, and not innovate, without absolute necessity, on the policy which had been previously pursued. He himself judged differently, and in April, within a month after his installation, had prepared the draft of an act by which all the restrictions to which the Indian press was previously subject, were to be repealed. The act itself, however, was not passed and promulgated till the following September. It does not appear whether there was any difference of opinion in the council on the subject, but if there was, there can be no doubt that Mr. Macaulay was one of the majority. In substance, the act simply repealed the press regulations of 1823 in the Bengal, and of 1825 and 1827 in the Bombay presidency, and ordained that every person having a printing press on his premises was to make declaration thereof; that every book or paper was thenceforth to bear the name of the printer and publisher; and that, within the Company's territories, the printer and publisher of all periodical works containing public news, or comments on public news, should appear, and declare when it was to be printed or published. The soundness of the repeal, in so far as regarded the European press, could hardly be questioned: but as it seemed impossible to give freedom to the European, without extending it to the native press, some of the ablest servants of the Company entertained grave doubts as to the right course of procedure.
The Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, when consulted on the subject in 1832, had written as follows:—"If all be free, we shall be in a predicament such as no state has yet experienced. In other countries the use of the press has gradually extended along with the improvement of the government and the intelligence of the people; but we shall have to contend at once with the most refined theories of Europe, and with the prejudices and fanaticism of Asia, both rendered doubly formidable by the imperfect education of those to whom every appeal will be addressed." Sir Charles Metcalfe attached little weight to this peculiarity, and in an elaborate reply to an address presented to him, declared the repeal justifiable on general principles. At the same time he thought that it had become "almost unavoidable" from circumstances. "The (Indian) press," he said, "had been practically free for many years, including the whole period of the administration of the late governor-general, Lord William Bentinck; and although laws of restriction existed in Bengal which gave awful power to the government, they had ceased to operate for any practical purpose. They were extremely odious. They gave to the government arbitrary power, which British subjects in any part of the world detest. No government could now have carried them into effect, without setting universal opinion at defiance. After the liberty given by Lord William Bentinck's forbearance, no government could have ventured to enforce those laws, unless it had been gifted with a most hardy insensibility to ridicule and obloquy. Even supposing them to be good, they were utterly useless, and as they brought unnecessary odium on the government, it would have been absurd longer to retain them."

So long as he argued on general principles, Sir Charles Metcalfe was certainly right, but his logic fails him when he seeks a justification in circumstances. The press regulations, he says, were practically obsolete. They were not and they could not be enforced. If so, where was the necessity for hastening to repeal them? They were virtually dead, and there could be no use to slay the slain. If, as he argues, "even supposing them to be good, they were utterly useless, because they could not be enforced," is it not obvious that for the very same reason they must have ceased to be mischievous, and that therefore a governor-general only provisionally appointed, and of course daily expected to be superseded, had no particular call to interfere. If the repeal would have been approved by his successor, why step in before him and thus snatch from him the
popularity which was to be acquired by adopting it? and if, on the contrary, the repeal would have been condemned by his successor, why place him in a false position, and embarrass him with an innovation that might be at variance with the general tenor of his policy? On these and similar grounds, the propriety of the conduct of Sir Charles Metcalfe in hastening to repeal the existing restrictions on the press may be questioned, and it is thus easy to understand how the measure was received in different quarters with very different feelings. Those whom it freed from all fear of restraint naturally hailed it with acclamation, while the public generally regarded it with favour, and testified their approbation, not merely by laudatory addresses, but by the erection of a handsome public building devoted to literary purposes, and designated the Metcalfe Hall, in order at once to celebrate the liberation of the press and perpetuate the name of the liberator. When the measure was first announced to the home authorities, it was as strongly condemned as it had been elsewhere applauded, and called forth a censure, which though not accompanied by an immediate withdrawal of confidence, laid the foundation of a serious misunderstanding. The directors, become as lukewarm as they had formerly been zealous in supporting Sir Charles Metcalfe, overlooked the prior claim which he had undoubtedly established to the first vacant governorship in their gift, and when he applied for explanation, returned through their secretary an answer so dry and laconic, that on the very day when he received it, he despatched a letter intimating his determination to retire from the service of the Company. He accordingly sailed for England on the 15th of February, 1838. The extent of the loss which India sustained by his departure was not fully known till after. As he had always been opposed to the policy which led to the disastrous war in Afghanistan, there is reason to presume that had he remained, as his influence would doubtless have been employed, so also it might have sufficed to prevent it. His services however were not lost to his country. As governor successively of Jamaica and of Canada in the most critical periods of their history, he gave new proofs of consummate statesmanship. Public gratitude was not wanting, but the peerage conferred upon him came too late to be anything more than a barren title. An excruciating disease was preying upon him, and he returned home only to die.

In narrating the emancipation of the Indian press, and tracing some of its consequences in the subsequent career of Lord Metcalfe, we were obliged to pass onward without referring to a series of transactions which took place about the same time in England, and which, while not properly belonging to the history of India, are too important to be omitted. When the court of directors received intimation of Lord William Bentinck's intended resignation, it was proposed to put either the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone or Sir Charles Metcalfe in nomination for the office of governor-general. Mr. Elphinstone, on the plea of indifferent health, declined, and the court, on the 28th of September, 1834, by a
majority of fifteen to two, adopted the two following resolutions:—"1. That this court deeply lament that the state of Lord William Bentinck's health should be such as to deprive the Company of his most valuable services, and this court deem it proper to record, on the occasion of his lordship's resignation of the office of governor-general, their high sense of the distinguished ability, energy, zeal, and integrity with which his lordship has discharged the arduous duties of his exalted station. 2. That referring to the appointment which has been conferred by the court, with the approbation of his majesty, on Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, provisionally, to act as Governor-general of India, upon the death, resignation, or coming away of Lord William Bentinck; and adverting also to the public character and services of Sir Charles Metcalfe, whose knowledge, experience, and talents eminently qualify him to prosecute successfully the various important measures consequent on the new charter act, this court are of opinion that it would be inexpedient at present to make any other arrangement for supplying the office of governor-general. And it is resolved accordingly that the chairs be authorized and instructed to communicate this opinion to his majesty's ministers, through the president of the board of commissioners for the affairs of India."

When the communication thus ordered was made, Mr. Charles Grant, who held the office of president of the Board of Control in the Melbourne ministry, not only refused to concur in the second resolution of the directors, but proceeded to give his reasons in the following terms: "With respect to the appointment to that office of any servant of the Company, however eminent his knowledge, talents, and experience may confessedly be, his majesty's ministers agree in the sentiments of Mr. Canning, expressed in a letter from him to the court, on the 25th of December, 1820, that the case can hardly be conceived in which it would be expedient that the highest office of the government in India should be filled otherwise than from England, and that that one main link at least between the systems of the Indian and the British governments ought, for the advantage of both, to be invariably maintained. On this principle it has usually been thought proper to act; and in the various important measures consequent on the new charter act, his majesty's ministers see much to enjoin the continuance of the general practice, but nothing to recommend a deviation from it."

The objection to the appointment of any servant of the Company to the office of governor-general, though here ascribed to Mr. Canning, was of an earlier date, and was first made by Lord Cornwallis. He did not, however, talk rhetorically like Mr. Canning of the necessity of maintaining a "main link," but distinctly placed his objection on the ground, that during the period of his first government it would scarcely have been possible to find any old and eminent servant of the Company, who had not in some period of his career practised or connived at the abuses and corruptions, which it would be one of his first duties as governor-general to suppress. If Lord Cornwallis was justi-
fled in making this sweeping accusation, there can be no doubt that he was right in objecting to the appointment of a servant of the Company to the office of governor-general, but owing in no small degree to the example of integrity set by Lord Cornwallis himself, the Indian service had been thoroughly reformed, and as indiscriminate charges of corruption could no longer be insinuated, the exclusion of the Company’s servants from the highest offices behoved to be placed on some other ground. Mr. Canning’s maxim was accordingly brought into practical operation, and ministers pronounced a sweeping sentence of disqualification which sounded very like a gratuitous insult to those against whom it was directed. It may be admitted that a practical acquaintance with European statesmanship was of the greatest consequence to the Governor-general of India, and that those, therefore, who could not have had any opportunity of acquiring it were not the most eligible candidates for this highest office; but Mr. Grant, though he may have meant no more than this, used language in which more was implied, and by seeming to cast a stigma on their service, furnished the directors with an opportunity of presenting an indignant remonstrance. In the correspondence which ensued there appears to have been little sincerity on either side. Under the mask of advocating general principles, both parties were pursuing objects of a personal nature. Ministers were desirous to procure the appointment for Mr Grant, and the directors, offended that he had not attended more to their suggestions in framing the new charter act, were unwilling to put him in nomination.

Mr. Grant in his letter had adverted to the disadvantages of a temporary appointment, and urged the necessity of forthwith appointing in regular form. The directors in their answer admitted the superiority of a permanent appointment, and declared their conviction that Sir Charles Metcalfe was a fit person to receive it. It was therefore “with deep regret” they had learned that he was considered by his majesty’s government “to be ineligible to the station of governor-general, and upon grounds which would exclude the whole service of India from that high office.” After referring in refutation of Mr. Canning’s maxim to “the whole course of our transactions in British India,” as “furnishing the most conclusive evidence that the servants of the Company, both civil and military, are eminently qualified for the highest public trust, and that the important office of governor-general has been held by several of them with the utmost advantage to the national interests,” they concluded with intimating that the arrangements for filling up the office of governor-general would be taken into consideration at “the proper time.” In strict law Lord William Bentinck had not resigned, but only intimated his intention to resign, and the directors were not unwilling to procure delay by taking advantage of a legal quibble. The design was transparent. The ministry was tottering, and the effect of the delay would probably be to allow the appointment to be made under the auspices of another political party. But the very circumstance which
recommended delay to the directors urged the Whigs to use all possible despatch, and Mr. Grant, holding that a vacancy in the office of governor-general had actually taken place, intimated to the directors that if they allowed the statutory two months from the date of the notification to elapse, the crown would forthwith exercise its reserved power of appointing. The legality of this course being more than questionable he subsequently modified his threat, and intimated that the crown would not appoint without giving the court a month’s notice. The result was, that the Whig ministry having broken down lost the envied appointment, and left it as a legacy to the Peel ministry who succeeded them.

The directors having thus gained their point were no longer disposed to quibble for delay, and soon came to an understanding with Lord Ellenborough, who had become president of the Board of Control. With his lordship’s concurrence they offered the office of governor-general to the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone. By this offer the stigma supposed to have been fixed on the servants of the Company by Mr. Canning’s dictum was removed. This, however, was all that was gained by the court or sacrificed by the board. It was well known to both that Mr. Elphinstone, having already declined the appointment, would in all probability decline it again, and it is therefore difficult to allow Lord Ellenborough all the credit which he claims for having outdone the Whigs in liberality by offering the appointment of governor-general to one of the most distinguished servants of the Company. A better proof of liberality, and of an enlightened use of patronage, might have been given by offering the appointment, not to Mr. Elphinstone, who, it might have been presumed, would decline, but to Sir Charles Metcalfe, who would certainly have been proud to accept of it, and to whose distinguished services it would, in the judgment or the directors themselves, have been an appropriate reward. He had, as we have seen, been proposed for the office, and rejected for a reason not more applicable to him than to Mr. Elphinstone. Surely, if Lord Ellenborough really meant to do the liberal thing for which he has since claimed credit, his choice must have fallen on Sir Charles Metcalfe. So far from this, he only waited for Mr. Elphinstone’s declinature when he hastened to procure the appointment of governor-general for Lord Heytesbury, who certainly possessed Mr. Canning’s qualification in perfection, as he had never served the Company and knew nothing of Indian affairs. So little, indeed, was Lord Ellenborough disposed to recognize the claims of eminent service in India, that, had he been left to follow his own course, he would have conferred the provisional appointment of governor-general on Sir Henry Fane, the newly appointed commander-in-chief, who had no qualification but that of being a good soldier, and refused it to Sir Charles Metcalfe, whose qualifications were universally recognized. This piece of folly Lord Ellenborough was not allowed to commit, and Sir Charles once more obtained the provisional appointment.
Everything seemed now to be settled. Lord Heytesbury had been sworn into office, had provided his outfit, taken out his passage, and completed all preliminary arrangements, but had not actually sailed, when the Peel ministry, who had endeavoured without success to strengthen themselves by a dissolution of parliament, were compelled to resign. The Whigs having resumed office under Lord Melbourne as premier, saw the appointment of governor-general, of which they had formerly been balked, once more in their power, and were not to be restrained by any feelings of delicacy from seizing it. Lord Heytesbury immediately received a communication from the new government desiring him to postpone his departure. Three days later he was distinctly informed that ministers had resolved to advise the crown to revoke his appointment. The propriety of this proceeding was keenly canvassed. The directors, conceiving that its tendency was to hold up the office of governor-general as a prize to be contended for by political parties, presented a strong remonstrance, while the opposition brought the subject under the notice of both Houses of Parliament, and denounced the revocation as grasping and unconstitutional. Ministers attempted to justify themselves by drawing a distinction between an appointment which was only about to be, and one which had actually been carried into effect. In the latter case they would not have interfered, but in the former, though there might be inconveniences in the cancelling of the appointment, they were not nearly so serious as those which would inevitably be produced by the want of confidence and cordiality between the Indian and the home government. Another reason for revoking the appointment, though it probably weighed more than all the others, was not mentioned. The vacancy had occurred while the Whigs were in office, and would have been supplied by them had not the directors prevented it by interposing a quibbling delay. The Tories had thus by a kind of trick obtained a valuable patronage which did not properly belong to them, and could hardly complain either of injustice or indelicacy, when it was once more taken out of their hands, and restored to the rightful owners.

The office of governor-general having thus again become vacant, some difficulty appears to have been felt in making the new appointment. Mr. Grant, now Lord Glenelg, having become colonial secretary, and been succeeded as president of the Board of Control by Sir John Hobhouse, afterwards Lord Broughton, might be considered as removed from the field, and as there was no other individual whose claims gave him a decided preference, some difficulty was felt. The consequence was that the same political party who had formerly insisted on an immediate appointment were now in favour of delay. The president of the board accordingly proposed to wait the arrival of Lord William Bentinck before appointing his successor, and engaged not to take any advantage of the failure of the directors to fill up the vacancy within the two months allowed them by statute. In the meantime the names of various individuals

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were put forward, and at last the public announcement was made that the office of governor-general had been conferred on Lord Auckland. Why he should have been selected in preference to some others who had been mentioned was not very apparent, as there was nothing in his antecedents to make it probable that the affairs of India had engaged much of his attention, or that his administrative talents were likely to prove of a high order. All that could be said to be known was that he was a nobleman of amiable manners and excellent character, free from any overweening confidence in his own judgment, and disposed to listen to advice from those whom he believed competent to give it. From this last feature in his character it was anticipated that he would do nothing rashly, and be able at least to avoid any serious blunder.

Lord Auckland arrived at Calcutta on the 3d of March, 1836, and immediately entered on the duties of his office. The whole country was tranquil, and there seemed reason to hope that he would be allowed, like Lord William Bentinck, to devote himself to the work of internal improvement. The recent charter act indeed had not left him in any doubt as to the measures which ought first to engage his attention, and had in particular declared it expedient that "a general system of judicial establishments and police, to which all persons whatsoever, as well Europeans as natives, may be subject, should be established in the said territories at an early period, and that such laws as may be applicable in common to all classes of the inhabitants of the said territories, due regard being had to the rights, feelings, and peculiar usages of the people, should be enacted, and that all laws and customs having the force of law within the same territories should be ascertained and consolidated, and as occasion may require, amended." While the great work of legal reform was brought prominently under the notice of the Indian government, provision had been made for its accomplishment by the appointment of a fourth member of council, usually designated the legislative member, to indicate the particular department in which he was expected to labour, and the establishment of a law commission, whose reports made from time to time were to furnish the grounds or materials for improved legislation. Thus instructed and provided with the necessary means, the governor-general was no sooner installed than the work of legislation was commenced. On the 28th of March, 1836, additional extent and import-
ance was given to the employment of uncovenanted judges by an enactment that “no person whatever shall by reason of place of birth, or by reason of descent, be incapable of being a principal sudder ameen, sudder ameen, or moonsif, within the territories subject to the presidency of Fort William in Bengal.” Originally the sudder ameen and the moonsif were the only classes of native judges, and had a very limited jurisdiction. Gradually the powers of both were extended, and in 1827 the sudder ameen, the superior of the two, was empowered to try suits to the amount of 1000 rupees. The necessities of the case were still imperfectly met, and an important improvement was made by Lord William Bentinck in 1831, by the institution of a third and higher class of judges called principal sudder ameens, whose jurisdiction, at first restricted, was afterwards extended to cases involving property to any amount. Under the above enactment, all barriers to the attainment of a judgeship in any of the three classes were broken down, and it was declared that no kind of descent, native, European, or mixed, should henceforth operate as an exclusion. This first step, as to the propriety of which there could be no doubt, was soon followed by another, which, from the opposition which it encountered, acquired some degree of historical importance.

On the 9th of May, 1836, the governor-general in council enacted that from the 1st of June following, the 107th clause of Act 53 Geo. III. c. 155, “shall cease to have effect within the territories of the East India Company,” and that “from the said day, and within the said territories, no person whatever shall by reason of place of birth, or by reason of descent, be in any civil proceeding whatever excepted from the jurisdiction” of the courts of sudder dewanny adawlut, of the zillah and city judges, of the principal sudder ameens, in the presidency of Fort William, or of the similar courts of the other presidencies. For explanation it is necessary to mention that by the above 107th section British subjects, at the distance of more than ten miles from the presidencies, were generally subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts, but instead of appealing to the sudder dewanny adawlut, or other courts exercising the highest appellate jurisdiction, it was competent for them, as defenders, to appeal to the supreme court of the presidency in which they were sued. The effect of the above enactment of the governor-general in council, therefore, was to deprive British born subjects of a privilege, real or supposed, which they previously possessed, and place them as defenders in the mofussil courts on the very same footing as the natives of India.

There cannot be a doubt that the appeal to the supreme court, given to British subjects only and denied to natives, was one of those invidious distinctions which was struck at by the late charter act, and to the removal of which the legislative council were specially required to direct their attention. It had accordingly, in 1835, while Sir Charles Metcalfe was provisional governor-general, been carefully considered, and Mr. Macaulay as president, as well
as the other members of the law commission, had in minutes expressed a
decided opinion that the appeal from the provincial to the supreme court ought
to be abolished. Such was the state of matters when Lord Auckland arrived,
and hence his lordship, in a minute on the subject, thus expressed himself, "I
may say that I have not had the same personal share in this measure as in others
which have for the first time been brought under discussion since I took my
seat in the government. I found, on my arrival, that this act had already been
some weeks before the public; my predecessor had cordially approved of it; the
council was unanimous in its favour; the governors and councils of Madras
and Bombay wished for its extension to their presidencies." It might have been
supposed that a measure which had thus united all the leading authorities in
its favour would not be violently opposed anywhere. It proved otherwise.
Not in the provincial districts, where alone the new enactment was to operate,
but in Calcutta, where not an individual was to be affected by it, an agitation
was got up, a public meeting was held, at which the speakers denounced the
measure as a violent and illegal encroachment on their rights as British sub-
jects, and different memorials were presented to the governor-general in council,
praying that the enactment should be rescinded.

In order to understand the nature of the objections taken by the memorial-
ists, the following passages from their first memorial may be quoted: "That by
the wise and considerate provisions of the supreme legislature of Great Britain,
the due administration of justice is secured to the Mahometan and the Hindoo,
according to the different codes they severally recognize; and your memorial-
ists venture to hope that, if trial by Hindoo law be secured to the Hindoo,
by the Mahometan law to the Mussulman, your memorialists are not asking
too much if they require in their own case an appeal from Hindoo or Mussul-
man law, or the law of the honourable Company's regulations, to the laws of
their country, a right already recognized and confirmed by act of parliament." 
Again, "That the proposed rescission of the 107th sec. of the Stat. 53 Geo. III.
c. 155, being made without any restriction or qualification whatever, it will
necessarily follow that suits or actions, or criminal trials wherein British born
subjects are plaintiffs and defendants, will be tried by laws to which they are
total strangers; that the whole proceeding will be in a language to them un-
known, and but partially known to these judges themselves, entailing, from
construction of the country courts, the certain occurrence of enormous bribery,
and the most corrupt proceedings, and exhibiting the unprecedented anomaly
of an English judge trying a suit in British territory, between English subjects,
in a language unintelligible to the suitors, and but imperfectly understood by
the judge, and such trial to be decided according to laws to which Englishmen
are strangers, with appeal only to a higher court of the same character."

Had these objections to the enactment been well founded, they would have
justified all the clamour raised against it, and proved it deserving of the title
of "the Black Act" usually applied to it by its opponents; but the truth is, that the objections were founded on a gross misrepresentation of the purpose and tendency of the measure—a misrepresentation so gross that it must to some extent have been wilful. The memorialists complain of the injury which the enactment would inflict on them in "criminal trials," and in suits in which they might be "plaintiffs," though it refers exclusively to civil suits and to suits in which they were only defendants. They speak, moreover, as if the appeal of which they were deprived was an appeal from Hindoo or Mahometan law; or the law of the Company's regulations, to the law of England, whereas, as the government justly remarked in the answer returned to the memorial—"You are mistaken in supposing that you ever possessed such an appeal. A judicial appeal is, by its own nature, an appeal, not from one law to another law, but from one tribunal to another tribunal. In every case which the Hindoo law, the Mahometan law, or the law of the Company's regulations is binding on the mofussil judge, the Hindoo law, the Mahometan law, or the law of the regulations is equally binding on the supreme court in its character of a court of appeal." This answer completely disposes of the objections of the memorialists; but, as it had no effect in diminishing their clamour, we are almost driven to the explanation unhesitatingly adopted by Mr. Macaulay, and thus broadly asserted by him:—"It may at first sight appear strange that a law which is not unwelcome to those who are to live under it, should excite such acrimonious feelings among people who are wholly exempted from its operation; but the explanation is simple. Though nobody will be sued in the mofussil courts, many people who reside at Calcutta have or wish to have practice in the supreme court. These appeals, indeed, have hitherto yielded but a very scanty harvest of fees; but hopes are entertained, and have indeed been publicly expressed that, as the number of British settlers in the mofussil increases, the number of appeals will increase also." In another minute he speaks still more plainly—"A small knot of people in Calcutta, a knot of people who are not to live under this law, who know nothing about the administration of justice in the mofussil, and who are interested in the question only as practitioners or officers in the supreme court, have kept up an incessant clamour against the government, and have done their best to conceal the smallness of their numbers and the weakness of their cause by the violence of their invectives and the audacity of their assertions." The governor-general took the very same view, and gave utterance to it, though in somewhat softer terms, when he wrote, "The change introduced is small indeed, for appeals to the supreme court have been so rare that section 107, 53 Geo. III. may be said to have been absolutely inoperative. Yet an unmeasured opposition to this act has been raised, prompted, it is impossible not to see, chiefly by persons interested in upholding the supreme court," an opposition, he adds, "which has derived support from some others who would resist every step towards equality between
European and native, and which has been adopted by others with sincere and perhaps natural, though mistaken feelings." Entertaining these views of the source and the object of the opposition to the enactment, the government had no alternative but to resist it and reject the memorials.

The memorialists, however, had not yet exhausted their opposition. With a resolution and perseverance which would have been praiseworthy in a better cause, they carried their complaint to England, and raised a fund which enabled them to send it by the hands of one of their own number, who, after heading the agitation, had consented to become its hired advocate. Petitions were accordingly presented, not only to the Board of Control and court of directors, but also to parliament. From the former the answer received was—"That they have not seen any reasons for withholding their sanction from the enactment complained of, and that a despatch communicating such sanction has, with their approbation, been addressed to the supreme government by the court of directors." In the House of Commons the subject, though not more than seventy members met to discuss it, was formally considered on the 22d of March, 1838, and gave rise to a spirited debate. Mr. Ward, the member for Sheffield, who had undertaken to plead the cause of the petitioners, concluded a long speech by moving for a select committee to inquire into their allegations, and "to report to the house in what manner and to what extent the act of the legislative council of India of 1836, No. xi., affected the constitutional rights of British born subjects in India, the prerogatives of the crown, and the general interests of the United Kingdom." The hired advocate from India had evidently done his best to cram Mr. Ward with all the allegations and misrepresentations which had furnished the staple of his own agitation in Calcutta, but it was in vain. The case completely broke down, and the clamour which it had raised became absolutely ludicrous, when Sir John Hobhouse made the undeniable statement that this right of appeal, which the petitioners had represented as the palladium of their liberties, had been only twice resorted to during the whole period of twenty years, from 1813 to 1833, and that in both cases the judges of the supreme court, unable to come to a decision, "were obliged to go to the judges of the sudder dewanny adawlut to interpret the law and give an answer to the appeal." Mr. Ward, seeing it hopeless to persevere in the face of such a statement, withdrew his motion for a select committee, and allowed Sir John Hobhouse to set the question at rest by simply moving "that the minutes of council on which was founded the legislative act (No. xi.) of 1836 be printed."

At the very time when the Calcutta agitators made their last effort, and sustained a signal parliamentary defeat, Mr. Macaulay, against whom their vituperation had been specially directed, resigned his seat in the council of India, and took his departure for England. By a singular provision of the new charter act, the legislative member was not permitted to vote, except in the making of laws and regulations, and thus, while he was excluded from the
ordinary administration of the government, he was expected to devote all his energies to the formation of a code which might be enforced, with slight modifications, throughout the whole length and breadth of British India. Mr. Macaulay must soon have perceived that the task which had been assigned to him and the law commission was far beyond their powers, and they must consequently have toiled on for years under the disheartening conviction, that whatever fame he had already acquired, or might be destined still to acquire in other fields of labour, he must forego the idea of descending to posterity as a great Indian legislator. His penal code, indeed, made some approach to completeness, but it was impossible to adopt it as a whole, and the utmost that can be said in its praise is, that it contains many valuable suggestions, which those who succeeded him were able to turn to good account.

In the midst of the discussions occasioned by the enactment of the government on the subject of appeals to the supreme court, important intelligence arrived from Oude. The king, Nasir-ud-din Hyder, after an illness which was not thought serious, had died suddenly on the night of the 7th of July, 1837, and an attempt to place a spurious successor on the throne had not been defeated without bloodshed. Nasir-ud-din left no children. At one time he had acknowledged or adopted two boys, but he had afterwards formally disavowed them. Being himself an only son, he had no brothers, and it therefore became necessary to seek his successor among ascendants. Here, however, a difficulty arose. His father was the eldest of the ten sons of Sadut Ali. The second of these sons had died, leaving children, but the third, Nasir-ud-Dowlah, was still alive. According to British law, the second son would have transmitted his right of succession to his descendant, but the Mahometan law follows a different rule, and prefers a younger surviving brother to the children of an elder brother, who had predeceased before the succession opened to him. According to this view, Nasir-ud-Dowlah was the legal heir, and Colonel Low, the British resident, immediately on hearing of the death, prepared to recognize him.

There was not a moment to be lost. The Padshah Begum, or queen-mother, who had been obliged to quit the palace in consequence of a quarrel with her son, was known to be intriguing for the succession of one of the boys whom he had formally disavowed, and the children of Sadut Ali’s second son were disputing the soundness of the interpretation of the Mahometan law by which they were excluded. Under these circumstances, Colonel Low proceeded as follows. Immediately on receiving intelligence that Nasir-ud-din was just dying, he wrote to the brigadier commanding in Oude to have 1000 men in readiness to march at a moment’s notice. He then hastened to the palace, and finding the king already dead, placed sentries at the inner doors, and sealed up the repositories. By a second order, the brigadier was desired to send off five companies in advance to the palace, and hasten with the remainder. Captain Paton, the resident’s first assistant, remained at the palace, and Lieutenant
Shakespear, his second assistant, was sent to the residence of Nasir-ud-Dowlah to obtain his signature to an obligation hastily prepared for that purpose, and thereafter escort him to the palace for the purpose of being enthroned.

The obligation which Nasir-ud-Dowlah was required to execute was in the following terms:—"Lieutenant-colonel John Low, the resident, has apprised me, through Lieutenant Shakespear, his second assistant, of the death of Nasir-ud-din Hyder, King of Oude. The resident has also communicated to me the substance of the orders of the government of India, respecting the necessity of new engagements on the part of the Company's government with the Oude state; and I hereby declare, that in the event of my being placed on the throne, I will agree to sign any new treaty that the governor-general may dictate."

The old man, suddenly roused in the dead of the night, and told that the possession of a kingdom depended on his consent, readily did as he was asked, and after writing a few words binding him to everything that the document contained, completed the execution of it by appending his seal. According to Lieutenant Shakespear's account, he appeared to be much debilitated from bad health. The necessity of his removal, however, seemed so urgent, that no delay could be allowed, and he was carried to the palace, where, after holding an interview with the resident at three o'clock in the morning, he was accommodated with a couch in an adjoining room, "to take an hour or two's sleep previous to his installation on the throne."

While thus endeavouring to secure the throne for Nasir-ud-Dowlah, Colonel Low was not unmindful of the machinations of the Padshah Begum, and having some suspicion that she "might probably make a movement with her armed followers towards the city," sent a messenger "to enjoin her strictly, on no account to think of leaving her own place of residence, which is situated about four miles from the palace." The messenger had barely returned with her answer, requesting "that she might, for God's sake, be allowed to see the corpse of the late Nasir-ud-din, as she had not been allowed to see him whilst living," when a large body of her armed followers were seen rapidly approaching. Captain Paton hastened to the outer gate to secure it, and found the insurgents standing before it in a dense mass and impatiently demanding admittance. When this was refused, they forced the gate by means of an elephant, which threw down one leaf of it, nearly crushing Captain Paton in its fall, and were soon absolute masters of the palace. Shortly afterwards, the Padshah Begum made her entrance, with her protégé, Moona Jaun, and lost not a moment in placing him on the musnud. The resident, who had managed to push his way through the crowd, only arrived to see the installation completed, and after vainly endeavouring to dissuade the Begum from the desperate course she was pursuing, was glad to effect his escape. Old Nasir-ud-Dowlah, thus rudely awakened from the sleep which he had retired to take, "previous to his installation on the throne," found himself a prisoner in the hands of his most inveterate
enemies. It is a wonder that they did not murder him on the spot, but fear of the consequences appears to have restrained them, and they contented themselves with heaping upon him all kinds of insults, and compelling him to witness the installation of his rival, at the very time when he had been expecting to receive his own.

The British troops having arrived, the resident sent a message to the Begum, allowing her only a quarter of an hour to make her submission. She returned an evasive answer, and as soon as the respite allowed her elapsed, he ordered hostilities to commence. A few discharges of grape having cleared the way, the soldiers rushed forward, and were soon in possession of the persons both of the Begum and Moona Jaun. Only three sepoys were wounded in the assault; the loss of the insurgents in killed and wounded was about forty. As soon as these were removed, Nasir-ud-Dowlah, whom it was found necessary "to soothe and encourage" after the agitating scenes of which he had been a most reluctant spectator, was brought forward and installed by the resident, who, placing the crown upon his head, declared him King of Oude. The Padshah Begum and her protégé were sent off as prisoners to Cawnpore. On the 20th of July, twelve days after the installation, the governor-general addressed a letter to the new sovereign, in which he says: "I have derived consolation for the death of his late majesty, your royal nephew, from the reflection that he has been succeeded in the government by a prince of whose experience, abilities, and virtue I have been led to form the most favourable opinion." In a subsequent paragraph he says: "My representative, Colonel Low, who possesses my fullest confidence, has been authorized by me to propose, for the consideration of your majesty, certain modifications of the treaty subsisting between the East India Company and the Oude state, and I feel assured that your majesty will recognize in those propositions the same moderate views and the same zeal for the welfare of the prince and people of Oude, as have invariably characterized the British government in its negotiations with its allies." After reading the above obligations imposed on his majesty, this reads like burlesque, and the governor-general must himself have felt it to be so, as he was by no means so thoroughly satisfied with the proceedings of Colonel Low as his words imply. In a minute recorded by him, when the intelligence first reached Calcutta, he had thus expressed himself: "For any criticism in detail on the measures adopted by Colonel Low, we must wait for further accounts, but I may now say that I should undoubtedly have been better pleased if he had not in this moment of exigency accepted the unconditional engagement of submissiveness which the new king has signed. This document may be liable to misconstruction, and it was not warranted by anything contained in the instructions issued to Colonel Low." To Colonel Low himself he wrote as follows:—"His lordship in council would not qualify, even by an expression of doubt, the high approbation which he is ready to express of your conduct on this trying occasion. The expediency of obtaining from his
majesty the signature of a previous agreement, binding himself to absolute submission, is the only point on which he feels that difference of opinion may be entertained; and if on the one hand, it may appear to secure the objects of government, and to be justified by precedent on the other, it seems open to misrepresentation, and, from the reliance which might be placed on the character and position of his majesty, superfluous. These quotations deserve attention, not merely on account of their own intrinsic soundness, but because they give for the first time some insight into the course of policy which Lord Auckland was disposed to pursue. For the same reason another quotation from his lordship’s minute may be here inserted. “It will be matter for our consideration, in what manner some modifications of the existing treaty shall be framed, under which the British government might have more power to prevent or remedy mal-administration, and by withdrawing from the obligation, still existing in terms, although it has long ceased to be recognized as binding in practice, of exercising a complete and minute interference, by means of its own troops, in defence of the Oude government, be less liable to responsibility for all its acts, and the ordinary course of its internal policy, and this with increase of advantage rather than injury, in rendering disposable our own military means, and without admitting on the other hand the formidable growth of an armed and unchecked independence.”

Though the Padshah Begum and Moona Jaun had been removed, the question of the Oude succession was not yet set at rest. Yameen-ud-Dowlah, calling himself the eldest son of Shum-ud-Dowlah, Sadut Ali’s second son, continued, though by peaceful means, to persist in his claim. He was residing at Benares when the succession opened, and immediately submitted his case to Sir Charles Metcalfe, who in reply simply informed him that “the oldest surviving uncle of the late King of Oude has succeeded to the throne by inheritance, according to the Mahometan law.” Immediately another brother, calling himself also the eldest son of Shum-ud-Dowlah, made his appearance, and on being at once rejected by the Indian government, showed how much he was in earnest by undertaking the voyage to England for the purpose of urging his title there. Besides producing a pedigree in which he seemed to prove that he and not his brother was the eldest son, he argued that the Mahometan law was misinterpreted. In cases of ordinary succession, the law doubtless was as the British government had understood it; but in the case of succession to a throne, the rule, he said, was different, and representation in the European sense of the term was recognized. This is not impossible, but it was now too late to argue the question, the vacant throne was again occupied, and endless confusion would have been produced by any attempted change. The court of directors therefore cut the matter short by the following letter from their secretary, dated 29th June, 1838: “I am commanded by the court of directors of the East India Company to acknowledge the receipt of your highness’s letter dated the 1st instant, and
to acquaint you in reply that a claim precisely similar to that which you have advanced having been preferred to the local authorities in India by Yemeen-ud-Dowlah Bahudur, eldest son of Nawant Shum-ud-Dowlah, that prince was informed that the eldest surviving uncle of the late King of Oude has succeeded to the throne by inheritance according to the Mahometan law.’

The decided interference of the British government had about the same time become necessary in another quarter. Pertaub Sing, the Rajah of Sattarah, had never shown much gratitude for the obligation conferred upon him when, under the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, he was rescued with his family from poverty and thralldom, and established in the possession of a considerable principality. At first indeed, as the actual administration was not to be conferred upon him till he should give proof of his ability to conduct it, his ambition urged him to unwonted exertion, and ‘he laboured,’ says Duff, ‘as assiduously as any carcoon under his government,’ but as soon as his object was gained, and the formal delivery to him of the entire powers of the state in April, 1822, made him his own master, his true character became fully developed. Shaking off the cares of government by committing them to worthless favourites, he gave himself up to indolence, or to pursuits so childish and eccentric, as to make his sanity more than questionable. Colonel Lodwick, the resident at his court, in a letter dated September, 1836, thus describes his conduct: ‘That the rajah’s mind has become weak to an extraordinary degree is but too evident in his actions. He has lately formed a company of women, arming them with muskets, and even drilling them to the management of guns, cast and mounted expressly for the purpose. Women are also taught to manage elephants, to act as chobdars, massals, &c. Every designing gossain or fakir offering his services to propitiate the gods in favour of his wishes is attended to; and at this time three sects of Brahmans are performing anaostan ceremonies, at a heavy expense, to procure the departure of a ghost supposed to haunt the palace, and for other objects equally absurd and contemptible’.

With all this childishness and superstition the Rajah of Sattarah had a mighty idea of his own consequence, and looked upon all that had been done for him as a mere instalment of what he was entitled to claim as the lineal descendant of Sevajee, the founder of the Mahratta empire. Adventurers, both native and European, knew how to turn this family pride to account, and as the most effectual means of gaining his good graces and stimulating his liberality, flattered him into the belief that he was destined to become the head of all the Hindoos. In a mind like his these extravagant ideas were not allowed to remain inoperative, and the eager desire to convert them into realities, had laid him open to the charge of having engaged in intrigues totally at variance with the relation in which he stood to the British government. This conduct naturally called forth remonstrance, and he was repeatedly warned of the perilous course which he was pursuing. He was not, however, to be either dissuaded or
deterred, and the threatened penalty at last overtook him. Considering the weakness of his character, and the suspicious nature of much of the evidence adduced to prove his guilt, some measure less severe than deposition might have fully answered the ends both of justice and policy. Sir James Carnac, the governor of Bombay, was at first disposed to pursue a lenient course, and held personal interviews with the rajah in the hope of inducing him to make the necessary concessions. He failed, and the result was announced in a proclamation issued by the resident at Sattarah, under the authority of the Bombay government, and dated September 5, 1839. This document, after detailing the generous manner in which the rajah had been treated, and enumerating the leading articles of the treaty made with him, continues thus: "Notwithstanding this solemn compact, it has been conclusively established to the conviction of the British government that the rajah, unmindful of his obligations, and of the generosity which restored him to liberty and conferred on him a throne, has, for a series of years, held clandestine communications contrary to the stipulations contained in the fifth article of the treaty; that he has cherished ambitious designs hostile to the British government; that he has advanced claims and pretensions incompatible with the letter and spirit of the treaty; and that he has conducted himself in a manner subversive of the alliance formed between the two states." The governor-general, when first made aware of these charges, and convinced of their truth, talked of annexation as the proper remedy. Ultimately more moderate counsels prevailed, and were thus intimated in the last paragraph of the proclamation: "The British government, however, having no view of advantage and aggrandizement, has resolved to invest the brother, and next in succession to the rajah, with the sovereignty of the Sattarah state, according to the limits fixed by the treaty of the 25th of September, 1819. He is therefore hereby declared Rajah of Sattarah, under the title of Shremunt Maharaj Shahee Rajey Chut Turputtee of Sattarah; and all persons residing within his territory are hereby required to render to him allegiance." The course thus adopted excited much discussion both in India and in this country, but it was ultimately sustained, and the ex-rajah was carried off to end his days at Benares as a pensioner.

Hitherto the policy pursued by Lord Auckland had been pacific, and seemed to indicate that his administration would, like that of his predecessor, run its course without any rupture of friendly relations with other states. It was otherwise destined. Connections, formed at first for the furtherance of commercial objects, produced political entanglements. The discovery of Russian intrigues, and the consequent apprehension of an invasion, suggested the necessity of providing against all possible danger by interposing new barriers on the western frontier, and Lord Auckland, listening only to his fears, and the counsels of rash advisers, was suddenly transformed into the most reckless and aggressive of all governors-general. Necessity, or something which he mistook
for it, became his only plea, and in utter disregard both of justice and prudence he rushed headlong into a series of measures which were to issue in disgrace and fearful disaster. Before giving the details it will be proper to take a brief survey of the leading states through whose territories, as bounding with those of British India on the west, the invasion, supposed to be threatened, would of course be made.

CHAPTER II.


On the north-west, British India was bounded at this period by the territories of the Sikhs, who, though at first only a religious sect, had, under skilful leadership, acquired political importance and become a powerful state. Their original seat was the upper part of the Punjab, the possession of which had often been keenly contested between the Moguls and the Afghans. By both of them the Sikhs were equally detested, and hence the alternate change of masters brought them no relief. The determination to extirpate them was openly avowed, and their only hope of escape was in their own prowess. Thus spurred by necessity they fought with the courage of despair. On various occasions they not only maintained their ground, but inflicted severe loss on their persecutors; and availing themselves of the confusion which prevailed during the last years of the Mogul empire, began to figure as conquerors. At first they existed as a confederacy composed of separate chieftainships, the heads of which claimed to be independent of each other, and were accustomed, when the common interest required it, to meet as equals in public diet at Amritser, where their principal shrine was situated. Towards the end of the last century the confederacy consisted of twelve associations or misals, which extended from the Indus eastward across the Sutlej as far as the Jumna. For a time, while it was felt that union was indispensable to their mutual security, they acted together with some degree of cordiality; but in proportion as external danger diminished, internal dissension increased, and the different misals, disregarding the public interest, began to aim at individual aggrandizement. The endless feuds thus engendered produced so much confusion that the necessity of a change of political system became apparent. If the Sikhs were to maintain their independence it could only be by submitting voluntarily or compulsorily to the ascendancy of some
one misal, which might then incorporate the others with itself, and form the nucleus of an undivided Sikh sovereignty. The manner in which this was accomplished must now be briefly traced.

Among the twelve original misals the one which appears to have been last formed, and to have been regarded, in respect of territory, income, and influence, as the least important, was the Sookur-Chukea, which had its capital at Goojeranwala, about fifty miles north of Lahore. Its founder, Churut Sing, the son of a Jat, who had thrown off his own faith and avowed himself a Sikh convert, had commenced life as a freebooter, and become possessed of a small garhi or mud-fort, which served as a retreat for his family and followers, and a receptacle for his plunder. The extent of his depredations, and the dangerous proximity of his fort to Lahore, induced the Afghan governor of this capital to march against him in 1762, at the head of a large body of troops. The expedition proved a failure. The leading Sikh confederates made common cause with Churut Sing; and the governor, alarmed at the extent to which disaffection and treachery prevailed in his camp, was glad to secure his personal safety by a precipitate flight, leaving all his baggage and camp equipage behind him. The celebrated Afghan monarch, Ahmed Shah, in the course of the same year, amply avenged this defeat by hastening from Cabool and gaining a pitched battle, in which the Sikhs lost more than 12,000 men in killed and wounded. The state of his affairs however did not allow him to follow up his advantage, and on his sudden recall to Cabool to meet a still more pressing danger, the Sikhs were able to take the field at the head of a more powerful army than they had ever mustered before. No effectual resistance could be offered to them, and they extended their conquests on every side. Churut Sing, now recognized as one of the ablest of their leaders, was not neglectful of his own interest, and became the head of a misal, which took its name from the lands of which his progenitors had been merely cultivators.

When no longer engaged in assisting to repel Afghan invasion, Churut Sing was ready for any enterprise from which additional territory or revenue might be acquired, and was therefore easily tempted to take part in a violent domestic quarrel between the hill-rajah of Jumoo and Brij-Raj his eldest son. The rajah wished a younger son to succeed, and Brij-Raj, as the most effectual means of frustrating this intention, had resolved to anticipate the succession by seizing it in his father's lifetime. With this view he applied to Churut Sing, and offered to reward his assistance, in the event of its proving successful, by the payment of a large annual tribute. Churut Sing at once consented, and, in league with Jye Sing, the head of the Dhunea misal, which could muster 8000 horse, while he had not more than 2500, proceeded northward to open the campaign. The rajah on his part had not been idle. In addition to several hill-chiefs, he had secured the aid of Jhunda Sing, the head of the Bhangee misal, which of itself could bring 10,000 horse into the field. While the hostile armies
lay encamped on the opposite sides of the Busuntur, a partial skirmish took place, and proved fatal to Churut Sing, who was killed by the bursting of his matchlock. This event, which happened in 1774, put an end to the campaign. The allies of Brij-Raj withdrew, after the dastardly act of murdering Jhunda Sing by the hands of a hired assassin; and the Bhangee misal, thus atrociously deprived of their chief, had no longer any desire to continue the contest.

Churut Sing was succeeded by his son Maha Sing, who was only ten years of age. For some years the government was conducted by his mother and the Ghunea chief, Jye Sing; but the young chief was too talented and ambitious to submit long to tutelage, and was only approaching the years of manhood when he took the reins of government into his own hands, and immediately commenced a series of aggressions on his neighbours. The object of his first attack was the strong fort of Ramnuggur, situated on the east bank of the Chenab, and held by a Jat Mussulman of the name of Peer Mahomed. The cause of quarrel was a celebrated gun which Churut Sing had captured from the Afghans and deposited with the Chutta tribe, of which Peer Mahomed was the chief, until he should be able to convey it across the Chenab and transport it to his own capital. The tribe, it was alleged, had violated the trust by giving up the gun to the Bhangee misal. On this pretext Maha Sing, in concert with Jye Sing, made his appearance before Ramnuggur, and after a siege of four months compelled it to surrender. The capture was in itself of less value than the reputation acquired by it; for many chiefs who had previously been attached to the Bhangee misal, believing that its fortunes were on the wane, abandoned it, and placed themselves under Maha Sing's protection. The success of this first enterprise naturally stimulated to a second, and Maha Sing turned his victorious arms in the direction of Jumoo. The rajah above
referred to had died, and been succeeded by Brij-Raj. From the friendly relations which had subsisted between the latter and Churut Sing, it might have been supposed that Jumoo was the last place which Maha Sing would have felt justified in attacking. With him however friendship was invariably sacrificed without scruple to what was considered policy; and he therefore no sooner learned that Brij-Raj's misgovernment was producing general discontent, than he first made claims upon him which he knew would be refused, and then made the refusal a pretext for ravaging his territory. Unprincipled though the proceeding was it proved successful, and Maha Sing returned from the pillage of Jumoo laden with spoil which, certainly not without great exaggeration, was estimated at £2,000,000 sterling.

These successes were not unaccompanied with disadvantages. The other misals began to take alarm at the sudden aggrandizement of the one which had hitherto been regarded as the most insignificant of their number, and even Jye Sing was so much offended with the expedition to Jumoo, that when Maha Sing waited upon him at Amritser, he not only received him with the greatest coolness, but treated him with insult. As usual Maha Sing thought only of the manner in which he might turn this contumelious treatment to his own advantage, and suddenly made his appearance at the head of a large force before Butala, the capital of Jye Sing's possessions. Here fortune again favoured him, and Jye Sing was compelled to accept of peace on humiliating terms, after his son Goor Buksh, a promising youth in whom all his hopes were set, had fallen in battle. Maha Sing's ascendancy among the Sikh chiefs was now established, but his ambition was not yet satisfied, and he proceeded once more to gratify it, without any scruple as to the means. In 1791 Sahib Sing, who had married Maha Sing's sister, became by the death of his father chief of Gujerat, situated in the Doab, between the Chenab and Jhelum. The disturbance occasioned by a new succession was too tempting an opportunity to be overlooked, and Maha Sing, totally regardless of the claims of affinity, determined to take an ungenerous advantage of his brother-in-law, by urging a claim of tribute which he knew to be groundless, and then making the refusal of it a pretext for hostilities. He accordingly collected his forces, and commenced operations by laying siege to one of his brother-in-law's forts. The attempt proved more difficult and dilatory than he had anticipated, as some of the other misals, now thoroughly alarmed at the unbounded ambition which he displayed, had come to the rescue. It is probable, however, that he would once more have triumphed, for he had driven the troops opposed to him from the field, and was prosecuting the siege with every prospect of success, when he was seized with an illness which obliged him to return to his own capital, and carried him off in the beginning of 1792, in the twenty-seventh year of his age.

The state of affairs at the time of Maha Sing's death was very alarming.
He had wantonly provoked the hostility of several of the leading misals, and suddenly disappeared from the scene, leaving the succession to be taken up by his only son Runjeet Sing, who was then only in his twelfth year. An honest and talented regency seemed alone capable of saving the country, but this was scarcely to be expected. The mother of the young prince, to whom the office naturally belonged, was notorious for her profligacy, and shared her power with a minister with whom she had formed a disgraceful connection. What but ruin was to be expected from a government administered by such unworthy hands! Nor was there much prospect that Runjeet Sing himself on arriving at manhood would be able to remedy the evils of previous misgovernment. When a mere infant an attack of the small-pox, which threatened his life, cost him the sight of one of his eyes, and had left its ravages strongly marked on his countenance. His education was almost entirely neglected, and instead of being trained to the duties which were expected to devolve upon him, means were actually and designedly taken to give him a disrelish, and unfit him for the discharge of them. His mother, anxious to retain the government in her own hands, sought to gain her object by indulging him in early familiarity with every form of vice. From such a youth, judging from appearance, nothing was to be expected, and therefore it is the more wonderful that he ultimately proved one of the ablest monarchs that ever reigned, united a number of disjointed federations into one compact and powerful kingdom, extended its limits by new conquests, raised it to a height of glory which it possessed only while he ruled it, and which it lost as soon as by his death the government passed into other hands.

According to the preposterous custom prevalent in the East, Runjeet Sing was already married at the time of his father's death. His wife was Mehtab Koonwur, the only child of Goor Buksh, whose death in battle has been mentioned above, and consequently the grand-daughter of Jye Sing, chief of
the Ghunea misal. After the death of his favourite son, Jye Sing had concentrated his affections on this only child, and fallen, in consequence, under the influence of her mother Suda Koonwur, Goor Buksh's widow, a woman of great talents and boundless ambition. Availing herself of her ascendency over the old chief, she had not only planned the marriage of her daughter with Runjeet Sing, but had also secured the succession to the Ghunea misal to herself. She accordingly succeeded on the death of Jye Sing in 1793, and was thus able while administering her own government to exert a very decided influence over that of her son-in-law. Through this interference and the ability with which it was exerted, Runjeet Sing's possessions were tolerably well managed during his minority, and many of the mischiefs which must have occurred had his profili-gate mother and her paramour been allowed to take their own course were happily prevented.

It was not long, however, before Runjeet Sing, in imitation of his father's example, threw off the restraints of tutelage. On attaining the age of seventeen he assumed the government, and effectually rid himself of all undue interference by procuring the deaths both of his mother and her minister. With Suda Koonwur, his mother-in-law, he still remained on friendly terms, deriving essential aid both from her counsels and the military assistance which her possession of the Ghunea misal enabled her to afford him. Shortly after Runjeet Sing began to rule for himself, the Afghan monarch Zemaun Shah invaded the Punjab, and caused that alarm in India of which some account has been given in a previous part of this work. The Sikhs did not venture to meet him in the open field, and on his advance retired beyond the Sutlej. Runjeet Sing was among the number of the chiefs who thus consulted for their safety, but while making common cause with them he was steadily pursuing his own interest by means of a treacherous intrigue. Zemaun Shah had taken possession of Lahore without opposition, and was about to complete his conquest of the Punjab when dissensions among his own troops, and a threatened invasion from Persia, compelled him hastily to retrace his steps. In his precipitate flight the Jhelum was found to be so much swollen that he could not transport his artillery across it. He therefore entered into a negotiation with Runjeet Sing, and engaged to give him a grant of Lahore if he would forward the guns to him. Runjeet Sing performed his part of the agreement, and having in return obtained the grant, proceeded to enforce it, though at the expense of those with whom he had lately been allied. With the aid of his mother-in-law he fitted out an expedition, to which the chiefs in possession of Lahore were unable to offer any effectual resistance. Thus possessed of the capital of the Punjab he prepared to make it the nucleus of new conquests, and become, instead of the chief of a misal, the sovereign of a great monarchy.

For several years after the commencement of the present century, Runjeet Sing continued to pursue an uninterrupted career of conquest, dexterously avail-
ing himself of every opportunity afforded by internal dissensions, and accomplishing as much by bribery and treachery as by force of arms. In 1802 the Bhangee misal, which had long offered the most determined resistance to his encroachments, was broken up and made tributary, and many of the districts to the south and east of Lahore were compelled to acknowledge his supremacy. In 1804 the dissensions which prevailed in Cabool, while the four sons of Timour Shah, Humayun, Mahmoud, Zemaun Shah, and Shah Shujah, were contending for the throne, determined him to make an expedition into those countries east of the Indus which were still nominally subject to Afghan rule. He accordingly proceeded across the Ravee and the Chenab, and found most of the chiefs more disposed to buy him off by presents and promises of tribute than to run the risk of hostilities. He was too politic not to accept of this mode of adjustment, which, while it gave him a nominal, that might afterwards be converted into a real supremacy, enriched his treasury, and thereby furnished him with the means of future conquests. In 1805, shortly after his return from this western expedition, Jeswunt Row Holkar made his appearance, closely followed by Lord Lake. Runjeet Sing was thus brought for the first time into immediate communication with the Mahrattas and the British, and fully alive to the importance of the crisis which had arrived, endeavoured at least to divide the responsibility with the other Sikh chiefs, by holding a gurumata or national council at Amritser. The ties which formerly bound the confederacy were now so loose that no united decision could be given, and the only thing left was to temporize and give friendly words to the two hostile armies without affording any real assistance to either. This mode of proceeding had the desired result, for Jeswunt Row Holkar, finding that he had nothing to hope from the Sikhs, was only too glad to accept of the extravagantly favourable terms which the timorous policy of Sir George Barlow the governor-general had offered him. On the peace which followed the two armies took their departure, and the Punjab escaped for the time from becoming a sanguinary battle-field.
While Lord Lake was in the Punjab friendly communications took place between him and Runjeet Sing, but the ambitious designs evidently entertained by the latter were not viewed without some degree of uneasiness, and it was even foreboded that a collision between him and the British government might not be distant. Hitherto Runjeet Sing had confined his conquests to the west of the Sutlej, but encouraged by the pusillanimous spirit which prevailed in the Calcutta council, he had been gradually feeling his way, and preparing to extend his sway over the misals which were situated beyond the left bank of that river. The dissensions prevailing among the Sikh chiefs soon furnished him with plausible pretexts, and he crossed the river, ostensibly for the purpose of acting as umpire and reconciling the contending parties. His mode of settlement making it obvious that his own aggrandizement was the only object he had in view, the Sikh chiefs became alarmed, and despatched a deputation to Delhi to claim the protection of the British government. The answer given was somewhat ambiguous, as what was called the non-interference policy was still in the ascendant, but some assurance of protection was ventured, and the deputation returned to announce that further encroachments from the west would not be permitted. It was now Runjeet Sing’s turn to feel alarmed, and he not only endeavoured to induce the Sikh chiefs voluntarily to renounce the British protection for which they had applied, but took immediate steps practically to test the degree and kind of protection which was to be afforded.

Lord Minto, who was now governor-general, was less disposed than his predecessor to submit to the encroachments of the native powers, and in 1808, when the successes of Napoleon I. had led to a belief that even India was in danger of a French invasion, endeavoured to provide against possible contingencies by despatching three embassies, one to Persia, another to Cabool, and the third to the Punjab. The last was intrusted to Mr. (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, who on this mission gave proof of the abilities which ultimately made him a distinguished statesman. Runjeet Sing, who was at this time bent on making himself master of all the territory between the Sutlej and the Jumna, was irritated and mortified when he learned from the letter of the governor-general that the Sikh states beyond the Sutlej were under British protection, and must not be interfered with. This intimation he loudly complained of as equivalent to a violent usurpation of his rights, and at first, as if he had determined to assert these at all hazards, hastened across the Sutlej, leaving Mr. Metcalfe behind because he had refused to follow him, and began to coerce the protected states. The firmness of the young British diplomatist, and the approach of a British force under the celebrated David Ochterlony, made Runjeet Sing aware of the dangerous game which he had begun to play, and he felt ultimately constrained to conclude a treaty, which, while it left him uncontrolled to the west of the Sutlej, and even recognized certain rights of supremacy over some districts situated on the east of it, obliged him to restore all
the conquests he had made from the protected states, after the fact of protection had been distinctly intimated to him.

Runjeet Sing’s career of conquest toward the east having been thus abruptly terminated, he naturally turned to the directions which were still open to him, and gradually succeeded by force or fraud in bringing nearly the whole of the Punjab under his sway. The faithlessness and treachery which marked his proceedings must have produced strong feelings of indignation and abhorrence among those who had suffered, or saw themselves threatened by them, but internal feuds made it impossible to form any general confederacy against him, while the regular discipline which he had introduced among his troops gave them such a decided superiority as seemed to render resistance hopeless. He was hence able to make the most of his successes, and by means of exaction and pillage used war as a means of replenishing, instead of exhausting his treasury. Meanwhile events were taking place in Afghanistan which tempted him to carry his views beyond the Punjab. In the contest for the crown between the sons of Timour Shah, Shah Mahmoud had proved victorious, and his two brothers, Zemaun Shah, whom he had barbarously deprived of sight, and Shah Shujah, had been compelled to seek a foreign asylum. In prosecuting his successes, Futtah Khan, the vizier of Shah Mahmoud, had resolved to punish the governors of Attock and Cashmere for the assistance which they had given to the fugitive princes. In this manner, from the proximity of the territories, Futtah Khan and Runjeet Sing were brought into close communication, and entered into an agreement, by which it was stipulated that the latter, in consideration of a share of the plunder, a present of nine lacs, and some prospective advantages, would not only allow the former a free passage through his territories, but furnish him with an auxiliary force of 12,000 Sikhs. As both parties were adepts in fraud, each endeavoured to turn the agreement to his own sole advantage. Futtah Sing having recovered Cashmere, refused to share the plunder, alleging that the Sikhs had not assisted him according to promise, and Runjeet Sing, by means of an intrigue, made himself master of Attock, and refused to part with it.

The Sikh auxiliaries on their return to Lahore were accompanied by Shah Shujah, who, having received a pressing invitation from Runjeet Sing, was in hopes of being aided by him in an attempt to recover the throne of Cabool. The invitation had been given with very different intentions. Shah Shujah was in possession of the celebrated diamond Koh-i-noor, now belonging to the British crown, and Runjeet Sing, who had set his heart upon it, was determined to effect his object, though it should be at the expense of a gross violation of all the rights of hospitality. The very second day after Shah Shujah’s arrival he sent an emissary to demand it, and on receiving an evasive answer, began to employ every species of duress. Sentinels were placed over the Shah’s dwelling, and by actually withholding from him and his family the necessaries
of life, he was at last starved into compliance. His own account of the matter is as follows:—When he had endured a month of privation, "Runjeet Sing came in person, and after friendly protestations he stained a paper with safflower, and swearing by the Granth of Baba Namuk and his own sword, he wrote the following security and compact: That he delivered over the provinces of Kota Cumalech, Jung Shawl, and Kullivan Noor to us and our heirs for ever, also offering assistance in troops and treasure for the purpose of again recovering our throne. We also agreed, if we should ever ascend the throne, to consider Runjeet Sing always in the light of an ally. He then proposed himself that we should exchange turbans, which is among the Sikhs a pledge of eternal friendship, and we then gave him the Koh-i-noor." The Shah soon found that Runjeet Sing's promises and oaths were equally worthless, and after being subjected for months to continued shameless extortion, he at last succeeded with difficulty in 1816 in making his escape in disguise, and obtaining a hospitable settlement at Loodiana, within the British territory immediately south of the Sutlej.

Meanwhile Runjeet Sing, who had succeeded in subduing most of the hill-chiefs on his northern frontiers, was meditating the conquest of Cashmere. At first, however, he underrated the difficulties, and after sustaining severe reverses, returned crest-fallen to Lahore. He was too cautious to attempt prematurely to retrieve the disgrace, and therefore, having so far satisfied his vengeance by punishing some of the hill-chiefs who had abandoned him, he turned his arms in an opposite direction. In the beginning of 1816, having again mustered his forces, he proceeded south-west in the direction of Mooltan, which he had long been endeavouring to annex to his dominions. His first expedition was unsuccessful, but a second, undertaken in 1818, was more fortunate, and the citadel, with an immense booty, fell into his hands. He was now in a condition to resume his designs on Cashmere, which he again invaded in 1819. He was greatly favoured by circumstances. Almost all the veteran Afghan troops were absent beyond the Indus, and he was opposed only by raw levies, which a single encounter sufficed to defeat and disperse. Cashmere with its celebrated valley thus became an integral portion of the Sikh monarchy. With his conquests his ambition increased, and he began to look southward into Scinde, and westward beyond the Indus. In the latter direction Attock, which secured the passage of the river, was already in his power, and gave him ready access to the territory of Peshawer. As the Afghans, with whom he was about to engage

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1 Runjeet Sing was accustomed to wear this diamond on his right arm, set, as we have engraved it, in gold, surrounded with small rubies.
in hostilities, were naturally brave, and had a high military reputation, Runjeet Sing saw the necessity of still further improving the discipline of his own troops, and therefore considered himself fortunate when two French officers, Ventura and Allard, unexpectedly made their appearance in his capital in quest of employment. They had both fought under Napoleon I. at Waterloo, the one as colonel of infantry, and the other as colonel of cavalry, and were thus well qualified to undertake the task which Runjeet Sing, after satisfying himself that they had no sinister objects in view, committed to them. Under their superintendence bodies of infantry and cavalry were fully initiated in the European discipline, and added greatly to the effective force of the Sikh army. It was not however till the end of 1823 that Runjeet Sing marched across the Indus with the avowed design of making himself master of Peshawar. The

detestation in which the Mahometans and Sikhs hold each other's tenets gave to the contest all the fury of a religious war, and though Runjeet Sing had chosen his time well, and taken his enemies at a disadvantage, his conquest was not effected without severe loss. Even after he had made a triumphant entry into Peshawer, his difficulties seemed to increase. Wherever he moved his troops marauding parties kept hovering about him, cutting off his supplies and endangering his communications, and he was glad at last to enter into a compromise, by which he left the country in possession of its former chiefs, on their engaging to acknowledge his supremacy and pay him tribute. On the whole he had little cause to plume himself on the results of the expedition. A Mahometan fanatic continued ever and anon to raise the religious war-cry, and during a series of struggles, only terminated by his death in 1831, made the possession of Peshawer by the Sikhs both expensive and precarious. Runjeet Sing had now extended his territories to the utmost limits which they were destined to attain. His ambition, it is true, was by no means satisfied. Often
A.D. 1831.

The basin of the Indus.

had he turned with longing eyes to the south-west, and thought of penetrating to the delta of the Indus. He had even undertaken expeditions which had that object in view, but his presence there had been anticipated by the British, and when made aware that his further progress in that quarter might endanger his alliance with them, he was too prudent not to desist. All the country between the Punjab and the sea, though not allowed to escape entirely from his encroachments, was thus considered independent, and must now be noticed as forming part of what was then the western boundary of British India.

The Indus, after receiving the Punjnud, laden with the accumulated waters of the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravee, and the Garra or Sutlej, continues its course southward to the ocean in a comparatively narrow valley, which in respect both of its fertility, where natural or artificial irrigation is afforded, and of the barren deserts which hem it in on either side, has been not inaptly compared to that of the Nile. This tract, though not of very great extent, furnishes more than one separate sovereignty. The upper part, commencing on the left bank of the Indus, and continued, on quitting it, along the left banks of the Punjnud and Garra, belongs in sovereignty to the Khan of Bhawulpur, who, alarmed like the Sikh chiefs on the left bank of the Sutlej at the progress of Runjeet Sing, gladly entered into an alliance with the British, which placed him beyond the reach of danger. All the tract to the south, forming what is properly called Scinde, after it had passed through the hands of various masters, was at last portioned out among a number of chiefs, known by the designation of the Ameers or rulers of Scinde. As early as the eighth century it had been overrun by the Mahometans, and continued thereafter to be regarded as a dependency of Persia. The celebrated Mahmoud of Ghuznee included it among his conquests, and made it an integral portion of his kingdom of Cabool. On the fall of his dynasty it passed successively to the Soomras, a race of Arab extraction who claimed absolute independence, and to the Soomas, a race of Hindoos who, less martial than their predecessors, bartered independence for security, and acknowledged the supremacy of the sovereigns of Delhi. During the reign of Akbar, Scinde, while nominally ruled by native princes, was to all intents a province of the Mogul empire. At a later period the Kaloras, a race of religious teachers who claimed descent from the Abasside caliphs, availed themselves of the influence which their supposed sanctity gave them, and usurped the government. Mahomed Shah of Delhi, as the only means of preserving their nominal dependence, recognized a Kalora of the name of Noor Mahomed as his vicegerent. The expedient, however, proved a failure, and the Kaloras had shaken off their allegiance when Nadir Shah made his celebrated expedition into India. For a short time they professed submission to the Persian conqueror. On his death they endeavoured to reassert their independence, but were only able to exchange the supremacy of Persia for that of Afghanistan.
The connection thus formed with Afghanistan, though it was seldom more than nominal, was never completely dissolved, and the rulers of Scinde did not consider their title complete till it was formally recognized by the sovereigns of Cabool. Meanwhile great internal dissension prevailed. Not only was the regular line of succession interrupted by competing claims among the Kaloras themselves, but various tribes from Beloochistan having obtained a permanent footing in the country, had begun to aspire to the government of it. After a long struggle, during which both parties were guilty of barbarous atrocities, the Belooches prevailed, and the Kaloras were supplanted by the Talpooras in 1786. Futteh Ali, the Talpoora chief by whom the revolution had been mainly effected, assumed the sovereignty, but was not long allowed to hold it undisputed. The chiefs who had assisted him thought themselves entitled to a larger share of power and territory than he was willing to allot them, and the dispute was on the point of being decided by the sword, when the counsels of the elders, and the tears and entreaties of the women, prevailed in procuring a peaceful arrangement, by which, though Futteh Ali was still recognized as the chief ruler, the whole country was divided into three independent districts. To Meer Sohral was assigned Khyrpoor in the north, and to his kinsman Meer Thara, Meerpoor in the south-east, while Futteh Ali seated himself at Hyderabad as the capital, and shared the sovereignty with his three brothers, Gholam Ali, Kureem Ali, and Moorad Ali.

The British government, attaching an importance to the navigation of the Indus which was deemed extravagant by some of the ablest Indian statesmen, but which subsequent events have fully justified, had repeatedly attempted to form friendly relations with the court of Hyderabad. At an early period a commercial agent of the Company was allowed to reside and trade at Tatta, but was so much obstructed by the ruling authorities, and even subjected to popular violence, for which no redress could be obtained, that the agency was withdrawn. This insulting and injurious treatment was owing to the jealousy which the Ameers entertained of the British power, and a suspicion that, under the pretext of commerce, ulterior designs of conquest might be concealed. No attempt, therefore, was made to renew friendly intercourse between the two governments till a greater fear than that of British encroachment induced the Ameers themselves to apply for it. When threatened with an invasion from Cabool they had sought succour from Persia. It was readily granted, and a Persian army had been ordered to march to their assistance. Meanwhile the Cabool invasion had proved abortive, and the Ameers, now less afraid of it than of their Persian auxiliaries, thought it a good stroke of policy to seek the friendship of the British government as a means of frustrating the ambitious designs of Persia. An agent was accordingly despatched by them to Bombay with a proposal to renew the commercial intercourse which had formerly existed. Nothing seemed more desirable, and Captain Seton proceeded as envoy to...
A.D. 1809. Hyderabad to complete the necessary arrangements. The negotiation soon assumed a more important form, and Captain Seton, instead of a commercial treaty, concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. In this he exceeded his powers, and his government, not prepared to risk the entanglements in which such a treaty might involve them, refused to ratify it. Ultimately, after many delays, Futteh Ali being now dead, a treaty was concluded with his three brothers above mentioned, on the 22d of August, 1809. It consisted only of four articles, which being very brief, may here be given entire:—

1. There shall be eternal friendship between the British government and that of Scinde.

2. Enmity shall never appear between the two states.

3. The mutual despatch of the vakeels of both governments shall always continue.

4. The government of Scinde will not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in Scinde."

The last article of this treaty reminds us that it was made at the time when a French invasion of India, by an army brought overland through Turkey and Persia, was believed to be not only practicable but probable. As this alarm soon passed away, the friendly relations which had been established with Scinde lost much of their supposed importance, and no further negotiations appear to have taken place till 1820, when the governor of Bombay, with the sanction of the supreme government, procured a renewal of the first treaty, with the addition of an article which bound the contracting parties to take vigorous measures to suppress the predatory hordes who were continually making inroads and disturbing the tranquillity of the frontiers. A few years later, public attention having again been drawn to the navigation of the Indus, Lord Ellenborough, then president of the Board of Control, resolved to take advantage of the transmission of a present of horses from the King of Great Britain to Runjeet Sing, to ascertain the navigable capabilities of the river. With this view the horses which had arrived at Bombay were to be conveyed to Lahore by water. This double task of conveying the present and making it at the same time subservient to a more important, though hidden purpose, was intrusted to one well qualified to perform it. This was Alexander Burnes, a Scotchman, who was born at Montrose in 1805, and entered the Bombay army as a cadet at the age of sixteen. Instead of resting satisfied with the ordinary routine of military duty, he was a diligent student of the native languages, and made so much proficiency that government employed him as a Persian translator and interpreter. To diligence as a student he added a great love of enterprise, and thus recommended himself to Sir John Malcolm, then governor of Bombay, as the best person who could be employed in conveying the present to Runjeet Sing. In fact he was already on the spot, having become political assistant to Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Pottinger, the resident in Cutch, where the mission was to have its rendezvous before starting for Lahore.

Though there was nothing in the treaty with the Ameers binding them to
permit such a mission to pass along the Indus, it was deemed politic to assume
that they would not object, or at all events to put it out of their power to
start objections till the voyage had actually commenced. Accordingly no
communication was made on the subject to the government of Scinde, and
Lieutenant Burnes, after entering the Indus with his fleet of boats, had reached
the first inhabited town on its banks, before he forwarded his despatches to
Hyderabad. It was no wonder that the
Ameers took alarm when thus super-
ciliously treated, and immediately sent
an officer, with a small party of soldiers,
to request Lieutenant Burnes to wait at
the mouth of the river for further orders.
He deemed it prudent to comply, and
spent nearly six weeks in negotiation
before he obtained permission to proceed
Even then so many obstacles were thrown
in his way, that though he sailed again
on the 10th of March, 1832, it was the
18th of April before he reached Hyder-
abad. All objections however had now
disappeared, and the Ameers, as if con-
scious that their previous opposition
might be interpreted to their disadvan-
tage, endeavoured to make amends by affording every requisite facility; the
navigation of the river itself presented few difficulties, and the flotilla con-
tinuing to ascend to the junction of the Punjnad successively entered that
river, the Jhelum, and the Ravee, and on the 17th of July arrived in safety
amid great rejoicings at Lahore.

The problem of the navigation of the Indus and its leading tributaries
having been in a manner solved, no time was lost in turning the knowledge
which had been acquired to account, and the Ameers appear to have thought
that their worst fears were about to be realized, when in the beginning of 1832,
the East India Company submitted to them a new treaty, containing clauses
very different from those to which they had previously consented. The article
to which the Company appeared to attach most importance, was that the river
and roads of Scinde should be open to “the merchants and traders of Hindoostan,”
on payment of “certain proper and moderate duties,” to be afterwards fixed.
The Ameers showed the greatest reluctance to conclude this treaty, and only
consented at last, after stipulating that “no military stores” and “no armed
vessels or boats shall come by the river,” and that “no Englishmen shall be
allowed to settle in Scinde.” They expressed their fears still more strongly and
characteristically in the second article, which is verbatim as follows: “The two
contracting parties bind themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.” The commercial part of this treaty was renewed and made more explicit by another treaty, concluded in 1834, but the prohibition of armed vessels and of the transport of military stores remained entire, and could not be violated without a gross breach of faith.

Though commercial interests only were ostensibly consulted in the treaties relating to the navigation of the Indus, there cannot be a doubt that political objects were also contemplated. The alarm of a French invasion of India had entirely passed away, but another alarm had arisen. Russia was now the great bugbear. In pursuing her conquests beyond the Caucasus she had provoked a collision with Persia, and, as might have been anticipated, gained a series of victories, which had at once added greatly to her dominions and given her diplomacy a decided ascendency at the Persian court. Persia previous to this change in her political relations had been regarded by the British government as the strongest barrier against the invasion of India by any European power; and under this conviction two treaties had been concluded, the one in 1809 and the other in 1814, both having it for their main object to secure India from European invasion. In the former treaty “his majesty the King of Persia judges it necessary to declare that from the date of these preliminary articles every treaty or agreement he may have made with any one of the powers of Europe becomes null and void, and that he will not permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia, either towards India or towards the ports of that country.” In the latter treaty the same object was steadily kept in view, though, to meet the change of circumstances, the terms were so far altered that the Persian government, while binding themselves as before “not to allow any European army to enter the Persian territory, nor to proceed towards India,” limit the former declaration of nullity to “all alliances contracted with European nations in a state of hostility with Great Britain.”

At the dates of these treaties Afghanistan, which, from its being interposed between Persia and India, was certainly the more natural barrier, appears to have been regarded as necessarily and irreconcileably opposed to British interests; and hence, as if any idea of an alliance with it were too absurd to be entertained, the event of hostilities only was provided for. In the second treaty articles eighth and ninth stand as follows:—“Should the Afghans be at war with the British nation, his Persian majesty engages to send an army against them in such manner and of such force as may be concerted with the English government. The expenses of such an army shall be defrayed by the British government in such manner as may be agreed upon at the period of its being required.” “If war should be declared between the Afghans and Persians, the English government shall not interfere with either party, unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties.” At this time there was an apprehension
that the Afghans might themselves become aggressors and aspire to the conquest of India; and the British government was so little aware of their utter inability to attempt or at least to succeed in such an enterprise, that it was not thought degrading to stipulate for foreign aid to assist them in repelling such an invasion. The Persian government, better informed as to the real state of the case, were contented with stipulating only for non-interference.

Not long after the second treaty with Persia was signed, British statesmen saw reason to change their views with regard to the relative importance of Persia and Afghanistan as barriers of defence to India. Persia, brought as has been told, into collision with Russia, proved totally incapable of maintaining her own ground, and was in consequence daily becoming more and more subject to Russian influence. So far was she therefore from having either the ability or the inclination to fulfil the conditions of the treaty and resist any European force which might threaten to march upon India, that she had been reduced to a kind of vassalage to the only power from which an attack on India could now be apprehended. Under these circumstances the idea of a Persian barrier of defence was necessarily abandoned, and no alternative remained but to fall back on Afghanistan. For such a purpose no country could be better adapted. It consists for the most part of a bleak and rugged table-land, inclosed and traversed by mountain ranges, and intersected by deep and precipitous ravines, through one or other of which an invading army from the west must force its way in order to reach the plains of the Indus. To such a march, even unopposed, the physical obstacles were all but insurmountable; but when to these was added the hostility of a population proud of freedom, full of courage, and accustomed to war and pillage as their daily occupation, the invasion of India by a forced passage through Afghanistan was an obvious impossibility. It is no doubt true that on more than one occasion conquering armies had marched from that quarter, but there is reason to believe that they never would have succeeded had they not previously purchased the aid or at least the forbearance of the mountain tribes commanding the passes.

Assuming then that it was necessary to provide a western barrier to India, there can hardly be a doubt that it was to be sought for in Afghanistan, and that the only thing necessary to render it effectual was to secure the friendship of its rulers. In this however the great difficulty lay. The country, once governed as a united monarchy, had been broken up into a number of rival independencies, the heads of which, jealous of each other and pursuing separate interests, were little inclined to concur in any common course of action. As early as 1809, when the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone proceeded on his celebrated embassy to Cabool, he found a civil war raging, and Shah Shujah, who was then nominal sovereign, engaged in a struggle which was to drive him into exile. Singular as were the circumstances, a treaty was concluded, one of its articles declaring that "friendship and union shall continue for ever
between the two states; the veil of separation shall be lifted up from between them, and they shall in no manner interfere in each other's countries; and the King of Cabool shall permit no individual of the French to enter his territories." This treaty proved a dead letter in so far as British interests were concerned; but was fortunate for Shah Shujah, as it was doubtless one main cause of the asylum which was afterwards given to him and his family within the British territory at Loodiana.

The throne of Cabool, when Shah Shujah was driven from it, was occupied by his brother Shah Mahmoud. The Dooranee tribe to which they belonged thus continued to be the ruling dynasty. In this respect, however, a change was about to take place. Shah Mahmoud had been mainly indebted for his success to the abilities of Futteh Khan, who stood at the head of the Barukzye tribe, only inferior in rank to the Doorance, and was one of a family of twenty brothers. Futteh Khan, well aware of the value of his services, did not allow them to be forgotten, and used his office of prime minister in such a manner as showed that he was not to be satisfied until all the power of the government was concentrated in his hands. Shah Mahmoud had no idea of allowing himself to be thus reduced to a cipher, and watched for an opportunity of escaping from the yoke which the Barukzye chief had imposed upon him. The violent proceedings of Futteh Khan during an expedition to the frontiers of Persia were made the pretext. The boundaries between the two countries were not well defined, and encroachments from either side, followed by mutual recriminations and retaliations, repeatedly took place. Towards the end of 1816, shortly after Shah Shujah had resigned the contest for the crown and joined his family at Loodiana, Futteh Khan marched an army into Khorasan to repel and punish an invasion directed, or at least encouraged, by the Persian government. Brought by the expedition to the vicinity of Herat, which was then held nominally for Afghanistan by Ferooz-oold-Deen, Shah Mahmoud's brother, he determined to seize it by treachery, and bring it completely under Barukzye influence. With this view he despatched his youngest brother Dost Mahomed, of whom more will be heard hereafter, to pay an apparently friendly visit to Herat, at the head of a small body of tried adherents. Meanwhile Futteh Khan arrived in the vicinity with his army, and was engaged in conference with the leading chiefs, who had left the city as a deputation to wait upon him, when Dost Mahomed seized the opportunity to effect his purpose. Overpowering those of the garrison whom he had not been able previously to gain by bribery, he made the governor his prisoner, pillaged the treasury, and not satisfied with massacring all who offered resistance, was guilty of wanton and unmanly atrocities.

It is not improbable that the attack on Herat was made with the sanction of Shah Mahmoud, who was anxious to displace his brother; but the general horror and disgust excited by the manner in which it had been effected made
him disavow all connection with it, and gave him the means of escaping from the thraldom of his minister. Dost Mahomed, the actual perpetrator, unable to maintain his ground in Herat, escaped to Cashmere. Futteh Khan, either too confident of his power, or conscious that he could clear himself from all share in the atrocities perpetrated by his brother, was thrown off his guard, and was only returning from the expedition when he found himself a prisoner in the hands of his most inveterate enemy. This was Prince Kamran, the heir-apparent to the throne, who lost no time in becoming himself the executioner of vengeance, by putting out Futteh Khan's eyes with the point of his dagger. This was only the first in the series of barbarities about to be inflicted on him. His brothers had all fled, and it was thought possible that as the loss of his eye-sight had terminated his own career, he might be induced to use his influence with them, and recommend their unqualified submission. His spirit, however, was unbroken, and he steadily refused everything that was asked of him. It now only remained for his enemies to do their worst, and he was brought into a tent, where, in presence of Shah Mahmoud and his son, he was literally cut to pieces, not by a sudden onset, but by successive mutilations, slowly and deliberately perpetrated by the most vindictive of his enemies, one cutting off his right ear, and at the same time taunting him with some real or imaginary offence, of which it was declared to be the punishment, another his left ear, another his nose. With the same horrid barbarity his arms and feet were severed from his body, till at last the finishing stroke was given by drawing a sabre across his throat.

It is almost needless to say that this frightful crime was not permitted to escape the vengeance which it provoked. The Barukzye brothers at once mustered their forces, and after a series of encounters, obliged Shah Mahmoud and Prince Kamran to abandon all their other territories and take refuge in Herat. This was now the only stronghold that remained to them, while the Barukzyes no longer making any profession of allegiance to the Sudozye dynasty, broke up the monarchy into fragments, and began to rule as independent sovereigns. Had they remained united they might have defied any force that could have been brought against them, but their mutual ambition soon gave rise to competing claims which could not be settled without an appeal to arms. In the division of the monarchy Azim Khan retained possession of Cashmere, of which he had for some time been governor; Shere Dil Khan seated himself at Candahar; and Dost Mahomed Khan, having as much by treachery as by skill and prowess captured Cabool, claimed it as his own by right of conquest. The division which circumstances rather than choice had thus made between the Barukzye brothers could scarcely be regarded as equitable. Azim Khan, who, as the eldest surviving brother, was the proper representative of the family, refused to rest satisfied with a disturbed province, while Dost Mahomed, who was not only the youngest of the family, but in consequence of the low birth
of his mother had with difficulty been recognized as a member of it, occupied the capital. In these circumstances there could be little unanimity between the brothers, though it was foresaid that their dissensions would make it almost impossible for them to maintain the ascendency which they had usurped. Indeed, they appear to have abandoned the idea of independence; for Dost Mahomed, when threatened with expulsion from the capital, endeavoured to secure himself by a nominal restoration of the Sudozye dynasty, in the person of Sultan Ali; and Azim Khan, when preparing to march from Cashmere, made an offer of the crown to Shah Shujah, who could not resist the temptation, and set out in 1818 to try his fortune once more in Afghanistan. In consequence of all these competing claims the country was thrown into a state of anarchy, and it was some time before anything like regular government could be re-established.

The usual bad fortune of Shah Shujah attended him. He had scarcely joined Azim Khan with such troops as he could raise, than a quarrel ensued, and he was again compelled to save himself by flight. Azim Khan immediately set up another puppet Sudozye sovereign in the person of Prince Ayoot, and continued his march on Cabool. Meanwhile, Dost Mahomed was threatened with a still more formidable danger from another quarter. The dissensions of the Barukzyes had not been lost upon Shah Mahmoud, who had left Herat at the head of an army, and was advancing in the hope of regaining the capital. To all appearance he was destined to succeed. Dost Mahomed, threatened by two armies, either of which was more than a match for all the troops he could muster, had abandoned all hope of resistance, and only waited the nearer approach of the enemy to commence his flight, when he was surprised and delighted to learn that it had become unnecessary. Shah Mahmoud when six miles off Cabool discovered or suspected an extensive conspiracy to betray him, and listening only to his fears hastened back to Herat. The Barukzye brothers, now convinced that their continued hostilities could only issue in their destruction, came to terms, and a new division was made, by which, under the nominal sovereignty of Ayoot, Azim Khan as his prime minister took possession of Cabool, Dost Mahomed retired to Ghuznee, Shere Dil Khan remained at Candahar, and Sultan Mahomed, another of the brothers, was put in possession of Peshawer.

During the apparent tranquillity obtained by this arrangement Azim Khan engaged in hostilities with the Sikhs. Runjeet Sing had made himself master of Cashmere, and entered into an arrangement by which, while he left it nominally independent, he became virtual sovereign of Peshawer. To repel and punish these aggressions Azim Khan mustered a large force and commenced his march. Had the issue depended on military prowess it is probable that he would have succeeded; but Runjeet Sing instead of fighting had recourse to a weapon which had seldom failed him, and so dexterously availed himself of the
jealousies and heart-burnings which he knew to be still at work in the breasts of the Barukzye confederates, that Azim Khan, when he was pluming himself with the hope of victory, saw his force suddenly melt away. The disappointment was greater than he was able to bear, and shortly afterwards, in 1823, he died of a broken heart.

Prince Ayoot was still the nominal sovereign of Cabool, but in the confusion occasioned by Azim Khan's death, he was easily set aside, and the contest for supremacy was once more renewed among the Barukzye chiefs. Habiboolah Khan, Azim Khan's eldest son, was at first acknowledged as his successor, but he had none of his father's talents, and soon made himself contemptible by a life of dissipation; and by tyranny and caprice alienated those who were best able and were most disposed to befriend him. Dost Mahomed, who had played a leading part in the treachery which proved fatal to Azim Khan, was the first to take advantage of the worthlessness of his son, and after succeeding in inducing his troops to abandon him in the open field, compelled him to shut himself up within the Bala Hissar or citadel of Cabool. Here his resistance must have been of short duration had Dost Mahomed been left to deal with him in his own way. This, however, the other Barukzye chiefs would not permit, and Dost Mahomed, at the very moment when he thought himself sure of the prize, not only saw it elude his grasp, but was obliged to save himself by flight. The Candahar and Peshawer chiefs, who had on this occasion made common cause, were now masters of Cabool, while Dost Mahomed was a fugitive in Kohistan.

After another season of anarchy a truce was agreed to, Shere Dil Khan and Dost Mahomed returning respectively to Candahar and Ghuznee, while Sultan Mahomed, resigning Peshawer to some other brothers who held it in common with him, became sovereign of Cabool. The truce had been hollow at first, and

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was ere long succeeded by another rupture. Shere Dil Khan died at Candahar, and the temporary arrangement which he had been mainly instrumental in effecting was immediately broken up. Dost Mahomed renewed his claims on Cabool, and Sultan Mahomed, afraid to encounter him, consented to resume his former position at Peshawar. This event, which took place in 1826, though it did not formally settle the question of supremacy between the Barukzye brothers, virtually gave it to Dost Mahomed. By leaving him in possession of the capital it procured for him a general recognition as sovereign of Afghanistan. For several years his title remained undisputed, and it rather appears that he proved himself by his conduct not unworthy of it. While endeavouring to establish order in the government he was not forgetful of his own personal deficiencies, and by diligence and perseverance both remedied his neglected education, and rid himself of not a few of the vicious habits which he had contracted in earlier life. As far as was practicable among a rude and turbulent population, justice was fairly administered, the weak were protected against the strong, and real grievances were carefully redressed. In following out this procedure it was often necessary to use the strong arm, and no small discontent was produced among those who, having been accustomed to practise oppression, thought themselves defrauded of their privileges when they were compelled to desist from it. The old Dooranee chiefs in particular, who, under the Sudozye dynasty, had in a great measure monopolized all the powers of government, were indignant at being curbed by an upstart ruler, and gave such decided evidence of their readiness to conspire against him, that they were not only regarded with disfavour, but not unfrequently treated with a severity which was neither necessary nor politic. The design obviously was to crush their spirit and curtail their power, so as to render them less capable of mischief. In this Dost Mahomed was not very successful, and hence he had always in the very heart of his dominions a powerful party ready to break out in rebellion the moment a hopeful leader should appear.

This state of feeling in Afghanistan was well known to Shah Shujah, and led him to cherish a hope that, notwithstanding his repeated failures, he would yet be able to recover the throne of Cabool. The treatment which he had received from Runjeet Sing must have left little inclination again to court an alliance with him, but his circumstances did not allow him to be fastidious, and he therefore opened a negotiation with the ruler of Lahore. His proposals were readily entertained, but when the terms came to be more fully discussed, the sacrifices demanded in return for promised assistance were so exorbitant that Shah Shujah, helpless as he was, positively rejected some of them, and hesitated long before consenting to the remainder. At last, in March, 1833, a treaty was concluded by which the Maharajah (Runjeet Sing), in return for a vague promise to “furnish the Shah, when required, with an auxiliary force composed of Mahometans, and commanded by one of his principal officers as
far as Cabool," was confirmed in the possession of Cashmere, Peshawer, and all the other territories lying on either bank of the Indus, which he had succeeded in wresting from the Afghans. After entering into this treaty Runjeet Sing showed no inclination to perform his obligation under it. Shah Shujah waited in vain for the auxiliary force, and being at last thrown entirely on his own resources, endeavoured to raise two or three lacs of rupees by pledging his jewels. Even this was attended with much difficulty, and he endeavoured to secure the co-operation of the British government. Here, however, from what he had previously learned, he had little to hope, and therefore, however much he may have been mortified, he could not have been greatly surprised when, in answer to his application, Lord William Bentinck, then governor-general, replied as follows: "My friend, I deem it my duty to apprise you distinctly that the British government religiously abstains from intermeddling with the affairs of its neighbours when this can be avoided. Your majesty is of course master of your own actions; but to afford you assistance for the purpose which you have in contemplation, would not consist with that neutrality which on such occasions is the rule of guidance adopted by the British government."

In the face of all these discouragements Shah Shujah determined to persevere. With a small body of troops, and a treasure chest, which would have been almost empty had it not been partially replenished with a sum which Lord William Bentinck, rather inconsistently with the above profession of neutrality, allowed him to draw as a four months' advance of his Loodiana pension, he proceeded southward in the direction of Shikarpoo, in order to profit by the assistance which the Ameers of Scinde had promised him. His subsequent adventures, how he quarrelled with the Ameers and defeated them, and how, after making his way to Candahar, he was himself defeated in 1834, and obliged to return as a fugitive to his asylum at Loodiana, having already been referred to among the memorable events which took place in India during Lord William Bentinck's administration, need not be again detailed. While Shah Shujah was making his attempt in Afghanistan, Runjeet Sing had despatched a body of 9000 men in the direction of Peshawer. As his treaty with Shah Shujah had been kept secret it was easy for him to disguise his real object, and Sultan Mahomed, the Barukzye chief, who had consented to hold Peshawer as a tributary of the Sikhs, on being assured that nothing more was intended than to levy the promised tribute, was thrown so completely off his guard, that the true character of his pretended friends was not made manifest to him till the city was in their hands, and he had no alternative but to save himself by an ignominious flight.

Dost Mahomed, equally exasperated by the mismanagement of his brother and the treachery of Runjeet Sing, had no sooner returned from the defeat of Shah Shujah than he prepared to attempt the reconquest of Peshawer. His hopes of success rested mainly on the fanatical spirit of his countrymen, who,
as Mahometans, held the Sikhs and the religion which they professed in utter detestation. To give effect to this feeling, a religious war was proclaimed, and thousands and tens of thousands, many of them from distant mountain tribes, flocked to the standard which Dost Mahomed had raised, under the assumed title of Commander of the Faithful. This host, estimated merely by its numbers, was overpowering, but besides its want of discipline, which would have made it incapable of resisting such regular troops as the Sikhs had now become under the training of French officers, it was headed by leaders who had no common interest, and were openly or secretly at enmity with each other. It was indeed the very kind of army which no man knew better than Runjeet Sing how to defeat without the necessity of fighting with it. Pretending a desire to negotiate, he despatched an envoy to the Afghan camp. The nature of the instructions he had received may be gathered from the account which he afterwards gave of his proceedings: "I was despatched by the prince as ambassador to the Ameer. I divided his brothers against him, exciting their jealousy of his growing power, and exasperating the family feuds with which, from my previous acquaintance, I was familiar, and stirred up the feudal lords of his durbar with the prospects of pecuniary advantages. I induced his brother Sultan Mahomed Khan, the lately deposed chief of Peshawer, with 10,000 retainers, to withdraw suddenly from his camp about nightfall. The chief accompanied me towards the Sikh camp, whilst his followers fled to their mountain fastnesses. So large a body retiring from the Ameer's control, in opposition to his will, and without previous intimation, threw the general camp into inextricable confusion, which terminated in the clandestine rout of his forces without beat of drum, or sound of bugle, or the trumpet's blast, in the quiet stillness of midnight."

The above account given by the envoy, an English adventurer of dubious antecedents, and evidently also of blunted moral perceptions, is probably too laboured and rhetorical to be strictly accurate, but there can be no doubt as to the result. On the previous evening the Afghan camp contained 50,000 men and 10,000 horse; at daybreak not a vestige of it was seen. Dost Mahomed made good his retreat to Cabool, and felt so disgusted and ashamed, both at the disaster which had befallen him and the mode of effecting it, that he seemed willing for a time to abandon war and devote himself to peaceful pursuits. But the choice was not given him. Sultan Mahomed, now openly leagued with the Sikhs, was meditating an attack on Cabool. As the most effectual means of frustrating this design, Dost Mahomed in 1837 despatched a force under the command of his two sons, Azizul Khan and Akbar Khan, to penetrate through the Khyber Pass, and take up a position so as to command the entrance to it from the east. In the execution of these orders they advanced as far as Jumrood, which is only about twelve miles west of Peshawer, and immediately laid siege to it. A Sikh force under Huree Sing, Runjeet Sing's favourite general, advanced to its relief, and an encounter took place. The result was that the
Sikhs, after losing their general, who was killed on the spot, and sustaining severe loss, were obliged to retire and encamp under the walls of Jumrood. The young Afghan chiefs, proud of their achievement, were for pushing on to Peshawer, but their impetuosity, which might have cost them dear, was checked by the caution of a veteran officer who had accompanied them, and they returned to Cabool to celebrate their success, which fame had magnified into a victory. Dost Mahomed, though gratified above measure by the success of his sons, was not blinded as to the increasing difficulties of his position. The Sikhs were evidently bent on new encroachments; the Sudozye dynasty, still in possession of Surat, was only watching an opportunity to march again upon Cabool; Shah Shujah, too, after all his discomfitures, was still sanguine enough to hope for success; and treachery from within was continually threatening new revolutions. How were all these dangers to be met? The only plausible answer which Dost Mahomed could give was that he ought to endeavour to secure himself by a foreign alliance. Here there was not much room for choice. The only governments which seemed capable of giving him effectual support were the Persian on the west, and the British on the east. It was doubtful however if either the one or the other would be willing to afford it. The Shah of Persia was actually threatening Herat, and so far might be regarded as making common cause with Dost Mahomed, by attacking one of his most formidable rivals; but it was well known that the Shah's ambition carried him far beyond Herat, and that he meditated the conquest of it merely as preliminary to that of the whole of Afghanistan. There was therefore more cause to fear than to court him. On the other hand, an application to the British government was far from hopeful. Shah Shujah was living as a pensioner within the British territory, and had lately received prepayment of his pension, and been permitted to depart at the head of a body of troops for the avowed purpose
of fighting his way to the crown of Cabool. What reason was there, then, to expect that any offer of alliance which Dost Mahomed could make would tempt the British government to pursue a different line of policy? Thus doubtful as to the success of any application for aid, he adopted the course which seemed to give him the best chance of success, and made friendly overtures to both governments.

By the subsisting treaties with Persia, the British government was bound, in the event of war arising between the Persians and Afghans, to maintain a strict neutrality, and not interfere in any way unless to mediate on the mutual request of both combatants. Subsequently when Russia had extended her conquests into Persia, and was threatening in fact to convert it into a Russian province, the policy which dictated the above neutrality ceased to be applicable to the actual circumstances. An extension of Persian was now considered to be only another name for an extension of Russian territory, and therefore, so far from being disposed to fulfil the obligation of neutrality, it had become a vital object with the British government to provide for the security of their Indian frontier by maintaining the integrity of Afghanistan. In consequence of this altered policy, a collision with Persia became imminent. Abbas Meerza, the heir-apparent to the Persian throne, after his disastrous campaigns against the Russians had convinced him of his utter inability to cope with them, was anxious to turn his arms in some other direction where he might be able with less risk to make new conquests that might in some measure compensate for recent losses. This ambition was naturally encouraged by Russian diplomats, who saw how it might be made subservient to the views of their own government. For a time his choice of a field of enterprise alternated between Khiva and Herat. The latter was at last preferred, and in 1833 Mahomed Meerza, Abbas Meerza's eldest son, set out at the head of an army intended to capture Herat, which was regarded as the key of India, and thereafter extend its conquests still farther to the eastward.

This attempt upon Herat gave great uneasiness to the British government, and was made the subject of strong remonstrance by its ambassador at the Persian court, but as Russian influence was now completely in the ascendant the expedition was persisted in, and the siege of Herat actually commenced. Before much progress was made, an event took place which brought it abruptly to a close. Abbas Meerza died at Meshed, and Mahomed Meerza, fearing that his prospects of succeeding to the throne might in consequence be endangered, hastened back with his army, and succeeded in obtaining his nomination as heir. He had not long to wait for the succession, for his grandfather Futteh Ali, the reigning sovereign, died in the autumn of 1834, and left him in undisputed possession of the throne, which he ascended under the title of Mahomed Shah. Though circumstances had obliged him to raise the siege of Herat, the hope of conquering it had never been abandoned, and therefore a new
expedition was soon meditated. The capture of Herat was only to pave the way for other conquests, and Candahar, Ghuznee, and Cabool were to be successively attacked. Of these ambitious designs the Shah made no secret. They were openly talked of in his council, and it was even hinted that Persian sway might again be extended as far eastward as Nadir Shah had carried it. It was well known that in the schemes of conquest which the Shah was thus meditating, he was encouraged by Russian diplomatists, and therefore the British government deemed it high time to interpose, both by remonstrance and menace. In 1835 Mr. Ellis, the British ambassador, was instructed by Lord Palmerston, "especially to warn the Persian government against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war against the Afghans." He obeyed his instructions, but was scarcely listened to. The Shah was determined to take his own way, and pointing to the terms of the subsisting treaty, had little difficulty in showing that the British were bound not to interfere with him. The intention to resume the expedition against Herat was distinctly avowed, and even the necessary preparations began to be made.

Such was the state of matters when Lord Auckland became governor-general. He had entered on his administration under a pledge, voluntarily given, that he would pursue a pacific policy, and there was as yet no reason to apprehend, notwithstanding some threatening appearances, that he would be tempted to abandon it. In 1836 Dost Mahomed, in addressing a letter of congratulation to the new governor-general, took occasion to express his earnest desire to enter into intimate relations with the British government. After referring to late transactions, and to the injuries which the Afghans had sustained from the treachery of the "reckless and misguided Sikhs," he continued thus: "Communicate to me whatever may suggest itself to your wisdom for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance;" adding, "I hope that your lordship will consider me and my country as your own." This language, though certainly not intended to be interpreted literally, strongly evinced the anxiety of Dost Mahomed for a British alliance, and his willingness to make great sacrifices in order to obtain it; but Lord Auckland, instead of listening to his overtures, replied nearly in the very terms used by Lord William Bentinck to Shah Shujah. "My friend, you are aware that it is not the practice of the British government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states." Turning aside therefore from politics, after simply expressing a wish that the Afghans "should be a flourishing and united nation," he spoke of the navigation of the Indus, and intimated his intention to depute some gentlemen to Cabool to confer on commercial topics.

Though Lord Auckland was not at this time prepared to make any political use of Dost Mahomed's overtures, he had begun to be apprehensive that his administration would not prove so peaceful as he had hoped. Writing Sir Charles Metcalfe in September, 1836, he says, "I share with you the apprehension of
our being at no distant date involved in political and possibly military operations upon our western frontier: and even since I have been here, more than one event has occurred, which has led me to think that the period of disturbance is nearer than I had either wished or expected. The constitutional restlessness of the old man of Lahore seems to increase with his age. His growing appetitie for the treasures and jungles of Scinde; the obvious impolicy of allowing him to extend his dominions in that direction; the importance which is attached to the free navigation of the Indus, most justly, I think, and yet perhaps with some exaggeration, from its value not having been tried; the advance of the Persians towards Herat, and the link which may in consequence be formed between Indian and European politics—all lead me to fear, that the wish which I have had to confine my administration to objects of commerce and finance, and improved institutions and domestic policy, will be far indeed from being accomplished. But, as you say, we must fulfil our destiny.” These apprehensions, however, were still too vague to have produced any decided change in his measures, and in a despatch dated as late as 20th September, 1837, the directors, who had never dreamed of his abandoning a pacific policy, thus complimented him: “With respect to the states west of the Indus, you have uniformly observed the proper course, which is to have no political connection with any state or party in those regions, to take no part in their quarrels, but to maintain as far as possible a friendly connection with all of them.” When this despatch was written, the policy which it lauded had been virtually, and was soon to be practically abandoned.

The commercial deputation, hinted at by Lord Auckland in his letter to Dost Mahomed, had not been forgotten. At its head was placed Alexander Burnes, who, subsequently to his arrival at Lahore with the present to Runjeet Sing, had earned new claims to the appointment. After repairing to Simla, and there reporting the result of his mission to Lord William Bentinck, he had made a long and perilous journey into Central Asia. Proceeding across the Punjab, and thence through Peshawer and Jelalabad to Cabool, where he spent a short time enjoying the hospitality of Dost Mahomed, he ascended the lofty mountain range of Hindoo-Koosh, entered the valley of the Oxus, and arrived at Bokhara. After remaining here two months he turned westward, passed the Persian frontier, visited the capital and several of the leading cities of that kingdom, and at last sailed from Bushire to Bombay. The governor-general having now returned to Calcutta, Burnes hastened thither to give the results of his observations. These seemed so important, that he was desired to embark for England, and communicate personally with the home authorities. The attention which he thus attracted was greatly increased by the book of travels which he published, and when the commercial mission began to be talked of, there was scarcely any doubt as to whom it ought to be intrusted.

Burnes returned to India in 1835, and while on a mission to the Ameers
of Scinde, he was informed of the intention of Lord Auckland to send him to Afghanistan, and directed to proceed to Bombay to make the necessary preparations. These being completed he again took the route by Scinde, pushed on to Peshawer, and proceeding through the Khyber Pass, reached Cabool towards the end of September, 1837. The instructions given him were entirely of a commercial character. He had been selected, as a letter from Mr. Macnaghten, then secretary to the government, informed him, "to conduct a commercial mission to the countries bordering on the Indus, with a view to complete the re-opening of the navigation of that river, on the basis of the treaties lately concluded with the powers possessing territory on its banks." With this view he was first to proceed to the court of the Ameers of Scinde, and having made the desired arrangements with them at Hyderabad, sail up the river, first to Khyrpoor, and then to Mittun-Kote. Here he was to be met by Captain Wade, Lieutenant Makison, and an agent from Runjeet Sing, and select with them the best place "for the establishment of a mart or entrepôt, with reference to all the branches of trade proceeding down or across the Indus, and the means best suited for the establishment of an annual fair." At Peshawer and Cabool he was to "make inquiry into the present state of the commerce of those countries," "inform the merchants of the measures concerted," encourage them by all means "to conduct their trade by the new route," and invite them "to resort to the contemplated entrepôt and fair." After quitting Cabool he was to visit Candahar, keeping the above objects still in view, and finally return to Hyderabad by the route of the Bolan Pass and Shikarpoo. In conclusion he was requested to "have a strict regard to economy" in all his arrangements, which he would easily be able to do, "as parade would be unsuitable to the character of a commercial mission." The commercial character thus studiously enforced in Mr. Macnaghten's instructions was also the only subject of the letter which Burnes was commissioned to deliver from the governor-general to Dost Mahomed, whom it thus indoctrinates in political economy:—"To your enlightened mind it cannot fail to be obvious that commerce is the basis of all national prosperity, and that it is commerce alone which enables the people of one country to exchange its superfluous commodities for those of another, to accumulate wealth, and to enjoy all the comforts and blessings of civilized life. The general diffusion of these blessings and comforts among neighbouring nations is the grand object of the British government. It seeks for itself no exclusive benefits; but it ardently desires to secure the establishment of peace and prosperity in all the countries of Asia."

Though nothing could be more palpable than the strictly commercial character given to the mission, it is very doubtful if either Dost Mahomed or Mr. Burnes understood that it was to be so interpreted. In a private letter explaining the object of his mission to a friend, the latter says:—"I came to look after commerce, to superintend surveys, and examine passes of mountains,
and likewise, certainly, to see into affairs, and judge of what was to be done hereafter." As there is nothing of this in the formal instructions given him, it is reasonable to presume that some latitude had been allowed him, and that the name of commerce was meant to cover much more than it truly signifies. But for some such understanding nothing could have been more preposterous than some expressions which occur in the very first letter which he addressed to the government secretary at Calcutta. It was written on the fourth day after his arrival, and concludes thus: — "Up to this time my communications with the Ameer have been confined to matters of compliment and ceremony, but I shall take an early opportunity of reporting on what transpires at this court, merely observing at present, from what I have seen and heard, that I have good reason to believe Dost Mahomed Khan will set forth no extravagant pretensions, and act in such a manner as will enable the British government to show its interest in its behalf, and at the same time preserve for us the valued friendship of the Sikh chief." The political diplomatist is here clearly revealed, while the reception given him by Dost Mahomed shows that he regarded him in the very same light. Had it been supposed that he had come merely to treat of commerce, would the Ameer's favourite son, Akbar Khan, been sent out to conduct him into the city "with great demonstrations of respect and joy?" and would the Ameer himself, when Burnes on the following day delivered his letter of credentials, have received the deputation "in a very flattering manner, with many expressions of his high sense of the great honour which had been conferred on him, and his at last having had the means of communication with an officer of the British government, for which he felt deeply grateful to the governor-general?" Such is the account given in the letter already mentioned, and it is impossible to read it without feeling convinced that both the Ameer and the British envoy were under the impression that they were about to discuss questions of a more interesting and vital nature than those of commerce.

The first interview, at which the Ameer allowed only Akbar Khan to be present, took place in the "interior of the harem," and "lasted till midnight." Burnes in accordance with the letter of his instructions opened with commerce, and dwelt on the advantages to be derived from throwing open the navigation of the Indus and the trade of Afghanistan. The Ameer listened with apparent
interest, but another subject was occupying his thoughts. Unshackled com-
merce might doubtless in the long run prove a great source of wealth, but how
was he to act in the meantime? The Sikhs had involved him in an expensive
war, and treacherously dismembered the Afghan monarchy by seizing upon
Peshawer. While thus involved in war, and crippled in his resources, he had
no alternative but to raise a revenue by any means, however injudicious in
themselves, which promised to be most effectual; and therefore it was impos-
sible for him, till placed in better circumstances, to lighten the burdens under
which commerce was said to be suffering. The object of the Ameer evidently
was to ascertain whether there was any hope that the British would assist him
in obtaining the restoration of Peshawer, or mediate between him and Runjeet
Sing, for the purpose of preventing future encroachments and securing a
lasting peace. In regard to the former alternative Burns could not hold out
any hopes. Runjeet Sing was an ancient and valued ally of the British gov-
ernment, and therefore, if anything was to be done in regard to Peshawer, it
could only be in the way of friendly advice. Such being the case, the true
policy of Dost Mahomed would be to abandon all idea of a conflict, to which
his resources were inadequate, and think only of a peaceful arrangement. The
Ameer at once assented, and went so far as to add, that "instead of renewing
the conflict it would be a source of real gratification, if the British government
would counsel me how to act; none of our other neighbours can avail me; and
in return I would pledge myself to forward its commercial and political views."

The political turn thus given to the mission it continued ever after to
retain, and apparently with the concurrence of all parties. At a subsequent
interview on the 4th of October, 1837, Dost Mahomed, returning to the sore
subject, the loss of Peshawer, assumed an appearance of humility which could
hardly have been sincere, and expressed his readiness, if so advised by the
British government, to apologize to Runjeet Sing for the past, and to receive
back Peshawer, not as his right, but as a free grant, to be held by him as tribu-
tary to Lahore. Burns had no instructions which would authorize him to give
this advice, and was, moreover, aware that it would have been useless, as
Runjeet Sing, who had begun to grudge the heavy expenditure to which the
possession of Peshawer subjected him, was disposed to restore it, if he restored
it at all, not to Dost Mahomed, but to his brother Sultan Mahomed, who was
in possession of it when it was seized by the Sikhs. Owing to the hostile
feelings with which the brothers regarded each other, Dost Mahomed considered
that he would gain nothing at all by such an arrangement, and the subject
was dropped.

Burnes seems now to have almost entirely lost sight of commerce, and filled
his letters to the government secretary with political details. One written on
the same day when the above interview took place begins thus: "I have now
the honour to report the result of my inquiries on the subject of Persian influ-
ence in Cabool, and the exact power which the Kuzzilbash, or Persian party resident in this city, exercise over the politics of Afghanistan," and after a lengthened disquisition thus concludes: "The Shah of Persia has not been slow in responding to Dost Mahomed Khan's desire for an alliance; an elchee has been sent with robes and presents in return, and is now at Candahar, but he has appeared at a time most unfavourable to his master, when the attention of the British government is directed to Afghanistan, which goes far to discredit him with all parties, and even to damp the hopes of the Kuzzilbash. It is even doubtful if he will advance to Cabool, and it is certain if he does so that any offers which he may make will never be placed in the balance against those of the British government. The King of Persia desires to add Herat to his dominions, and the chiefs of Candahar and Cabool might certainly aid him in his designs, but the probabilities of a return for such good offices are more than doubtful."

The Persian alliance referred to in the above extract was now attracting much attention. As it would have been equivalent to an alliance with Russia, it naturally excited considerable alarm in the British government, and Burns, aware of the anxiety felt in regard to it, was careful to ascertain exactly how it stood. Dost Mahomed Khan, when the subject was broached, "stated with considerable candour the whole circumstances regarding it; declared that he had sought with ardour the friendship of the British government, from its being his neighbour, but he had sought in vain, and hearing of the power of Persia and the designs towards Khorasan, he had addressed Mahomed Shah, and an elchee was now at Candahar bringing robes for him and his brother, with a valuable dagger, and a promise of assistance in a crore of rupees." The Ameer, notwithstanding the "considerable candour" for which Burns gives him credit, was evidently playing a double game, and endeavouring, by means of a proposed Persian alliance, to provoke the jealousy and awaken the fears of the British government. He accordingly recurred repeatedly to the subject, and showed how well he was acquainted with its bearings by putting questions concerning "the relations between the British government and Russia, the influence of Russia over the dominions of Turkey," and "the control which Russia exercised over the trade in Turkestan." At the same time he declared his decided preference for a British alliance, and urged his brothers at Candahar to unite with him in endeavouring to secure it. In a letter which he appears to have communicated to the British envoy, he thus explains his policy, and remonstrates against their desire to connect themselves more closely with Persia. "We have some hopes regarding Peshawer. It is well known to the world that the power of the Sikhs is nothing in comparison with that of the English, and if all our objects be obtained through that power so much the better." Again, "For these few days past no letter has come direct from you, but from the contents of letters from Mr. Burns and others I learn that on
the information of a Persian army coming to Herat, you are going to send your
son Mahomed Omar Khan along with the Persian elchee to the Shah. This
has astonished me very much, because you never did anything before without
my advice: and what fruits do you hope to reap by sending your son to Persia?
If the British would not be friendly, then you might make friendship with
others: the former are near to us, and famous for preserving their word; the
latter are nothing in power compared to them."

The letter from which the above extracts are given was in all probability
not only communicated to Burnes, but suggested, if not dictated by him. It
was written on the 25th October, 1837, and he had the very day before, in
replying to a letter addressed to him by Kohan Dil Khan, the Candahar chief,
used the following language: "It is known to you that I came to this quarter
with good intentions towards all parties, and particularly to converse with all
the members of your family; and I have received a very friendly reception at
Cabool. At this time I hear from various quarters that you are sending your
son to Iran (Persia). When I look to the contents of your letter, and to this
step, I do not understand matters, and believe that some person has been
deceiving me. It is not possible to hold two water-melons in one hand;
unanimity in families is a great source of power, family differences are the
certain cause of evil; and foreseeing as much as the feeble intellect of man can
do into futurity, I see no good in the step you now contemplate; even I see
that the fruit of the matter will be nothing but repentance and loss; and
wishing you well, I have thought it proper to warn you." Not satisfied with
thus denouncing an alliance with Persia, Burnes had at the same time ventured
to assure Dost Mahomed that "if he succeeded in preventing Kohan Dil Khan
from acting as he intended, it could not fail to be received as a strong mark of
his desire for our friendship."

Burnes, though apparently still unprovided with any other than his original
commercial instructions, had thus thrown himself into the very heart of a
political intrigue. The fact was known to his government, and so far from
being objected to, appears rather to have been regarded with approbation. The
mission had accordingly assumed a character entirely different from that originally
impressed upon it. This change was mainly owing to the discovery of
Russian intrigues in Afghanistan. Their influence at the Persian court was well known, but
the extent which it had acquired in Afghanistan was scarcely suspected.
The expedition against Herat by Mahomed Shah had again been actually
undertaken, and while this step gave umbrage to the British government,
from knowing that it was truly more a Russian than a Persian scheme of
aggrandizement, the startling discovery was made that a Russian agent was
journeying directly toward Cabool. On the 14th of October, 1837, a letter
was received from Colonel Stoddart, then with the Persian camp near Nisha-
poor, stating that "Captain Vikovich of the Russian service, an aide-de-camp
of the general of Orenburg, arrived here from Teheran and Resht on the 10th instant. He is gone on a mission to Cabool. Horsemen have been given to pass him to Toorbut, thence a change to Khain, thence again to Lash, from thence to Candahar. He left yesterday." The first movements of this mysterious agent were ascertained rather curiously. Major Rawlinson had set out with a small party to join the Persian army, now in full march upon Herat, and after accomplishing a distance of 700 miles, had set out on his last day's journey, when, to his astonishment, he came upon a party of horsemen in Cossack dresses, and among them one who was recognized to be a servant of the Russian mission. On reaching the next stage Major Rawlinson, whose curiosity was naturally excited, endeavoured to gratify it, but the Russian party, on arriving shortly after, and learning that a British officer was there, declined to enter the khan, and rode off. This desire of concealment added of course to the curiosity already felt, and the major, following as close as possible upon the track, came at length upon the party seated at breakfast beside a rivulet in a gorge of the hills. It was now impossible to avoid an interchange of civilities, but the officer at the head of the party dexterously avoided conversation by pretending ignorance of the different languages in which Major Rawlinson addressed him. He knew no French, no Persian, and answered only in Russian. At length a kind of conversation was kept up in Turcoman, but so broken that the major could learn nothing more than that he had fallen in with "a bona fide Russian officer carrying presents from the emperor to Mahomed Shah." Major Rawlinson continued his journey, and had been only two days in the camp when the Russian made his appearance, and was introduced to him by the Russian ambassador as Captain Vikovich or Viktavitch. He now spoke French fluently, and when rallied by the major on this sudden acquirement, only observed with a smile that "it would not do to be too familiar with strangers in the desert."

This Russian agent made his appearance in Cabool on the 19th of December, 1837. Burnes had previously received a notification of his approach from a correspondent at Candahar, and on the very day of his arrival was visited by Dost Mahomed, who "came over from the Bala Hisar with a letter from his son the governor of Ghuznee, reporting that the Russian agent had arrived at
that city on his way to Cabool." The Ameer, professing that he had come to Burnes for counsel, declared "that he wished to have nothing to do with any other power than the British; that he did not wish to receive any agent of any power whatever so long as he had a hope of sympathy from us; and that he would order the Russian agent to be turned out, detained on the road, or act in any way I desired him." Burnes gave judicious advice. After observing that he could not "advise him to refuse any one who declared himself duly accredited," he told the Ameer that he "had it in his power to show his feeling on the occasion by making a full disclosure to the British government of the errand on which the individual had come." He immediately agreed to this, and put Burnes in possession of the different documents that came into his hands. Two of these from native agents are so far interesting as showing the impression produced by the arrival of Vikovich, and the opinion formed of his character. The first communication, dated from Candahar, says, "An elchee arrived here from Russia. Leaving the rarities of that country in Teheran, he came to the camp of Mahomed Shah Kajar, and after seeing his majesty he passed through Birjird Jawer, Lash, and Seistan, on way to Ahmed Shahu (Candahar). He is a man of Moscow, and stands high in the favour of the emperor. The Russian ambassador at Teheran has sent a list of the presents, with his letter to the Sirdars, which this elchee left in his charge on account of the disorders of the road between Teheran and Candahar. As he looks a confidential person, I think he will do everything for the Sirdars." The second communication was sent direct to Dost Mahomed by Moolla Reshid, the counsellor of Kohan Dil Khan, chief of Candahar, and after intimating the arrival of Vikovich, and that he is "the bearer of letters from the Russian ambassador at Teheran," continues thus: "The Russian ambassador recommends this man to be a most trusty individual, and to possess full authority to make any negotiation. Captain Burnes will undoubtedly comprehend the real motives of this elchee. The conduct and appearance of this man seem to infer that he possesses no less dignity and honour than Captain Burnes, and whatever arrangements he may make will be agreeable to the Russian ambassador. You have now both the English and the Russian ambassadors at your court. Please to settle matters with any of them whom you think may do some good office hereafter."

The other documents furnished to Burnes by the Ameer were a letter which he had himself sent by his agent Hajee Hoosain Ali, to the Emperor of Russia, about the beginning of 1836, a letter or ruckum addressed to the Ameer by Mahomed Shah, and the letter which Vikovich delivered from the Russian ambassador at Teheran on arriving at Cabool. The Ameer's letter to the czar is not unworthy of quotation. It was as follows:—"There have been great differences and quarrels between myself and the royal house of the Sudozyes. The English government is disposed to support Shujah-ul-Mookl. The
whole of India is governed by them, and they are on friendly terms with Runjeet Sing, the lord of the Punjab, which lies in their neighbourhood. The British government exhibit no favourable opinions towards me. I with all my power have always been fighting with the Sikhs. Your imperial government has made friendship with the Persians; and if your majesty will be graciously pleased to arrange matters in the Afghan country, and assist this nation (which amounts to twenty lacs of families), you will place me under obligations. I hope your imperial majesty will do me the favour by allowing me to be received, like the Persians, under the protection of the government of Russia, under your royal protection. I can perform along with my Afghans various praiseworthy services." The Shah's letter proceeded thus:—"Agreeably to my affection and kindly feeling towards you, I wish to bestow great favours on you, and anxiously wait to hear from you. In these days the respectable Captain Vikovich having been appointed by my esteemed brother the Emperor of Russia to attend your court, paid his respects on his way, stating he had been honoured by his imperial majesty to deliver some messages to you; on this I thought it incumbent on me to remember you by the despatch of this ruckum, to convince you that your well-wishers are deeply engraven in my mind. Considering the favours of my majesty attached to you, let me hear occasionally from you, and by rendering good services you will obtain the protection of this royal house." The letter of Count Simonich, the Russian ambassador at Teheran, contained the following passages:—"The respectable P. Vikovich will wait upon you with this letter. Your agent, Hajee Hoosain Ali, has been attacked by a severe illness, and therefore he stopped at Moscow. When the intelligence of his bad health was conveyed to the emperor, a good physician was ordered to attend, and cure him as soon as possible. On his recovery I will not fail to facilitate him on his long journey back to Cabool. Knowing your anxiety to hear from this quarter I have hastened to despatch the bearer to you. He was ordered to accompany your agent to Cabool. I hope on his arrival at your court that you will treat him with consideration, and trust him with your secrets. I beg you will look upon him like myself, and take his words as if they were from me. In case of his detention at Cabool you will allow him often to be in your presence; and let my master know, through me, about your wishes, that anxiety may be removed." The letter concludes with an enumeration of "some Russian rarities," which the ambassador would take the first opportunity of forwarding, as the bearer, P. Vikovich, from being lightly equipped, was unable to take them with him.

Besides the above letter from the Russian ambassador, Vikovich is said to have been the bearer of a letter from the emperor himself, in which he expressed his great delight at receiving, and his high gratification on perusing the letter of the Ameer. Its contents "prove that you are my well-wisher, and have friendly opinions towards me; it flattered me very much, and I was
satisfied of your friendship to my everlasting government. In consequence of this, and preserving the terms of friendship (which are now commenced between you and myself), in my heart, I will feel always happy to assist the people of Cabool who may come to trade into my kingdom.” The genuineness of this letter is denied, and we are disposed to think on sufficient grounds; but whether genuine or not, there was certainly enough in the other documents to cause alarm and give umbrage to the British government. In January, 1837, Lord Palmerston, having received a number of despatches from the British minister at the court of Persia, in which it was again and again stated that the Russian minister there had urged the Shah to undertake a winter campaign against Herat, deemed it necessary to instruct the Earl of Durham, then ambassador at St. Petersburg, “to ask Count Nesselrode whether Count Simonich is acting according to his instructions, in thus urging the Shah to pursue a line of conduct so diametrically opposed to his Persian majesty’s real interests.” Should Count Nesselrode sanction Count Simonich’s proceedings, the Earl of Durham was then to represent “that these military expeditions of the Shah are in the highest degree unwise and injurious,” but as Count Simonich’s proceedings were “so contrary to all the professed principles and declared system of the Russian government,” it must be assumed that he was acting without instructions; and in that case it would simply be necessary to declare the full confidence of his majesty’s government, “that the Russian cabinet will put a stop to a course of conduct so much at variance with its own declared policy, and so adverse to the best interests of an ally for whom the Russian government professes friendship and good-will.” Count Nesselrode disclaimed the proceedings of Count Simonich, though doubting if they had been fairly represented, and further stated, that he entirely agreed with the English government as to the folly and impolicy of the course pursued by the Persian monarch.

The above disclaimer was given by Count Nesselrode in February, 1837, and it became impossible to reconcile it with the course which Count Simonich continued to pursue, and more especially with the new course of intrigue in which he seemed about to engage, by sending Vikoovich to Cabool. Burnes, who had the art of jumping somewhat hastily to a conclusion, addressed a long letter to the governor-general, in which, after dwelling on the “strong demonstrations on the part of Russia to interest herself” in the affairs of Afghanistan, he stated it to be his “most deliberate conviction, that much more rigorous proceedings than the government might wish or contemplate, are necessary to counteract Russian or Persian intrigue in this quarter, than have yet been exhibited.” Lord Auckland took the matter more coolly, and replied through Mr. Macnaghten, that he attached “little immediate importance to this mission of the Russian agent.” Burnes was therefore directed to suggest to the Ameer, that if Vikoovich had not already left Cabool, he should “be dismissed.
with courtesy, with a letter of compliments and thanks to the Emperor of Russia for his professed kindness to Cabool traders. His mission should be assumed to have been, as represented, entirely for commercial objects; and no notice need be taken of the messages with which he may profess to have been charged." The British ministry when the subject was reported to them viewed it in a more serious light, and Lord Palmerston transmitted to the Marquis of Clancaricarde, who had succeeded the Earl of Durham as ambassador at St. Petersburg, the draft of a note to be presented to Count Nesselrode.

This note, after stating "that events which have lately occurred in Persia and Afghanistan render it necessary for the British government to request from that of Russia, explanations with respect to certain circumstances which are connected with those events, and which have an important bearing upon the relations between Russia and Great Britain," dwells at some length on the common course of action which the two governments had agreed to pursue in regard to Persia, and the violation of this agreement by Count Simonich, who, while the British envoy at Teheran "was preaching moderation and peace," was on the contrary "inciting to war and conquest." Count Nesselrode, when applied to, had at once declared, that if Count Simonich's conduct was as represented, he was not acting in accordance with but directly in the face of his instructions, and in proof of this, an offer was made by M. Rodofinikin, the head of the eastern department in Count Nesselrode's office, to show the Earl of Durham the book in which all the instructions given were entered. At this time Count Nesselrode doubted the accuracy of the reports respecting Count Simonich's conduct, but these, the note proceeds to say, "have been fully confirmed by subsequent information. For not only did the prime minister of the Shah state that Count Simonich had urged his Persian majesty to undertake an expedition to Herat, but Count Simonich himself admitted to Mr. M'Neill that he had done so; though he added that in so doing he had disobeyed his instructions." Nor had be stopped here. He had during the last twelve months advanced to the Shah the sum of 30,000 tomans, to "enable him to prosecute with vigour the war against Herat," and had also announced to him, that "if his Persian majesty should succeed in taking Herat, the Russian government would release Persia from the payment of the balance of its debt to Russia." Subsequently when the siege of Herat was in progress, and both Mr. M'Neill the British minister and Count Simonich had arrived in the Persian camp, while the former, who had arrived first, was in hopes of terminating the war "in a manner satisfactory and honourable to both parties," the latter, "assuming a part the very reverse of that which the British minister had acted, appeared publicly as the military adviser of the Shah, employed a staff officer attached to the Russian mission to direct the construction of batteries, and to prosecute the offensive operations furnished a further sum of money for distribution to the Persian soldiers; and by his countenance, support, and advice, con-
firmed the Shah in his resolution to persevere in his hostilities." Passing from
this subject, the note proceeds to state, that the British government "possess a
copy of a treaty which has been concluded between Persia and the Afghan
ruled of Candahar, the execution of which has been guaranteed by Count
Simonich, and the stipulations of which are injurious and offensive to Great
Britain." The guarantee "contains a promise to compel Persia to defend the
ruulers of Candahar against attack from any quarter whatever," and though "in
this stipulation no specific allusion is made to England," yet the intention
might be inferred from the original draft of the treaty "which was less cautiously
worded, and in which specific allusion was made to England, as one of the
powers against whom assistance was to be given by Russia to the rulers of
Candahar." Still more recently, a Russian agent of the name of Vikovich,
"said to be attached to the staff of the general commanding at Orenburg, was
the bearer of letters from the emperor and Count Simonich to the ruler of
Cabool," and Count Simonich "announced to the Shah of Persia that this
Russian agent would counsel the ruler of Cabool to seek assistance of the
Persian government to support him in his hostilities with the ruler of the
Punjab; and the further reports which the British government have received of the
language held by this Russian agent at Candahar and at Cabool, can lead to no
other conclusion than that he strenuously exerted himself to detach the rulers
of those Afghan states from all connection with England, and to induce them
to place their reliance upon Persia in the first instance, and ultimately upon
Russia."

Notwithstanding the long extracts which have been already made from this
note, the conclusion is too spirited and important to be omitted. "The British
government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue, with respect to the
matters in question, whatever course may appear to the cabinet of St. Peters-
burg most conducive to the interests of Russia; and Great Britain is too con-
scious of her own strength, and too sensible of the extent and sufficiency of the
means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the
globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note
relates. But the British government considers itself entitled to ask of the
cabinet of St. Petersburg, whether the intentions and the policy of Russia
towards Persia and towards Great Britain are to be deduced from the declara-
tions of Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofinikin to the Earl of Durham, or from
the acts of Count Simonich and M. Vikovich; and the British government
thinks itself also justified in observing, that if from any cause whatever the
Russian government has, subsequently to the months of February and May,
1837, altered the opinions which were then expressed to the Earl of Durham,
then and in such case, the system of unreserved reciprocal communication upon
Persian affairs which of late years has been established between the two gov-
ernments, gave to the British cabinet a good right to expect that so entire a
change of policy on the part of Russia, together with the reasons on which it
was founded, would have been made known to her majesty's government by
the cabinet of St. Petersburg, instead of being left to be inferred from the acts
of Russian agents in Persia and Afghanistan. The undersigned (Marquis of
Cranricarde) in conclusion is instructed to say, that her majesty's government
is persuaded that the cabinet of St. Petersburg will see in this communication,
a fresh proof of the anxious desire of the British government to maintain
unimpaired the friendly relations which so happily subsist between the two
countries, and to which the British government justly attaches so great a
value; because explanations sought for with frankness, and in a friendly spirit,
tend to remove misunderstandings and to preserve harmony between nations.

Count Nesselrode lost no time in transmitting a despatch to Count Pozzo di
Borgo, the Russian ambassador at London, in which, after declaring that he
did “not hesitate a single instant to meet the English cabinet with a frank
and spontaneous explanation, in order completely to remove its apprehensions
as to the intentions and views of our government with regard to the affairs of
Asia,” he made a very lengthened statement. “The idea,” he said, “of assailing
the security and the tranquillity of the state of possession of Great Britain in
India has never presented itself and never will present itself to the mind of our
august master. He desires only what is just and what is possible. For this
twofold reason he cannot entertain any combination whatever directed against
the British power in India. It would not be just, because nothing would have
given cause for it. It would not be possible, by reason of the immense distance
which separates us, the sacrifices which must be made, the difficulties which
must be overcome, and all this to realize an adventurous scheme, which could
never be in accordance with sound and reasonable policy. A single glance at
the map ought to be sufficient to dissipate in this respect all prejudice, and
convince every impartial and enlightened man that no hostile design against
England can direct the policy of our cabinet in Asia.” While maintaining that
Mahomed Shah, “in determining to make war against Herat, was completely
within the limits of his rights as an independent sovereign,” he repeated the
assurance formerly given that instead of urging him to such an enterprise, which
in one view offered no chance of success, Russia had done all in her power to
divert him from it, and to induce him “to prefer an amicable arrangement with
the chief of Herat to a state of hostility indefinitely prolonged.” Count
Simonich had accordingly received a positive order “to employ all his credit
with the Shah to dispose him to a formal accommodation.” It was no doubt
true that “on his arrival in camp Count Simonich, witnessing the distress in
which the Persian army was, did not think he ought to refuse his assistance to
the Shah when that sovereign earnestly entreated him to examine the works of
the siege,” but “even if the city of Herat had been forced to open its gates,”
our minister had suggested a pacific arrangement, by which “Herat would have
been given over to Kohan Dil Khan, chief of Candahar"—an arrangement which, "if it had actually taken place, would have had for its basis the independence of Afghanistan, by imposing upon the Shah the formal obligation in no way to assail the integrity of the country of which the Sirdars are actually in possession, nor the tranquillity of the tribes of which they are the chiefs."

With regard to M. Witkewitsch (Vikovich), his mission to Cabool "was simply occasioned by the mission of an agent whom Dost Mahomed Khan sent to us in 1837 to St. Petersburg, with the intention of forming commercial relations with Russia." It had for its object "neither a treaty of commerce nor any political combination whatever which a third power could have reason to complain of or to take umbrage at. It has produced and was intended to produce but one result—that of making us acquainted with a country separated from our frontier by great distances, which oblige our government to increase our precautions, in order that the activity of our commerce should not run the risk of engaging there in ruinous enterprises without having been enlightened beforehand as to the chances to which it might be exposed."

The strict accuracy and sincerity of this explanation were questionable, but an important step towards conciliation was made by the recall of Count Simonich, who was succeeded by Colonel Duhamel. Vikovich's proceedings met with a severer condemnation, and led to a more lamentable result. On reporting himself after his return to St. Petersburg, Count Nesselrode refused to see him, and sent a message to the effect that he knew no Captain Vikovich, except an adventurer of that name, who, it was reported, had been lately engaged in some unauthorized intrigue at Cabool and Candahar. The poor man, who had been anticipating praise and promotion, hastened home in a fit of despair and shot himself. Lord Palmerston had good reason to be satisfied with the result of his note. Besides procuring the dismissal of the offending ambassador, it had drawn forth from the Russian cabinet the strongest assurances that it did not harbour any designs hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India, and had not changed the policy which in 1834 the two powers had agreed to adopt; and it therefore only remained to say that "if such shall continue to be the policy of Russia, and if her agents in the East shall faithfully obey their instructions, there seems every reason to hope that nothing can hereafter occur in those quarters that can be calculated to disturb the good understanding between the two countries."

In following out this correspondence between the two governments to its close, the order of time has been somewhat anticipated, and it will therefore be necessary to go back a little in order to resume the narrative of events in Afghanistan. Dost Mahomed had, as we have seen, given strong and unequivocal proofs of his preference for a British alliance. His hope at first was that he would be completely secured from foreign aggression, and that Peshawar, on which his heart was set, but which he had now no prospect of being able to
reconquer, would be restored to the Afghan monarchy by an amicable arrangement. In this hope he was about to be grievously disappointed. Lord Auckland, though sufficiently alive to the dangers with which India seemed to be threatened from the west, was not yet prepared for more than friendly interference for the purpose of repelling them, and was therefore determined to avoid all entanglements which might oblige him to resort to warlike measures. The utmost which he was prepared to offer was advice to the Afghan chiefs, and in return for this he seems to have thought it not unreasonable to expect that they would devote themselves exclusively to British interests, and refrain from forming any alliances that might be adverse to them. The unreasonableness of such an expectation was so obvious that Burnes thought he might take it upon himself to disregard it; and accordingly, on finding that the chiefs of Candahar, who had previously been on the point of forming an alliance with Mahomed Shah, might be tempted to break with him, he did not hesitate to promise the protection of the British government against any attack to which they might thus expose themselves. His own account of the matter in a letter to a private friend is as follows:—"The chiefs of Candahar had gone over to Persia. I have detached them, and offered them British protection and cash if they would recede, and Persia attacked them. I have no authority to do so; but am I to stand by and see us ruined at Candahar?" He adds—"If the Persians move on Candahar, I am off there with the Ameer and his forces, and mean to pay the piper myself."

This was certainly a very extraordinary step to take without authority, and it cannot therefore excite much surprise to find that it was immediately repudiated. Burnes' letter intimating that it had been taken, was written on the 25th of December, 1837, and on the 20th of January, 1838, Lord Auckland, who was then at Bareilly, on his way to Simla, intimated his displeasure by a letter from Mr. Macnaghten. "It is with great pain that his lordship must next proceed to advert to the subject of the promises which you have held out to the chiefs of Candahar. These promises were entirely unauthorized by any part of your instructions. They are most unnecessarily made in unqualified terms, and they would, if supported, commit the government on the gravest questions of policy. His lordship is compelled, therefore, most decidedly to disapprove them. He is only withheld from a direct disavowal of these engagements to the chiefs of Candahar, because such disavowal would carry with it the declaration of a difference between you and your government, and might weaken your personal influence, and because events might in this interval have occurred which would render such a course unnecessary. But the rulers of Candahar must not be allowed to rest in confidence upon promises so given, and should affairs continue in the same uncertainty as that which prevailed at your last despatches, you will endeavour to set yourself right with the chiefs, and will feel yourself bound in good faith to admit that you have exceeded
your instructions, and hold out hopes which you find upon communication with your government cannot be realized." Burnes thus admonished and censured had no alternative but to retract his promises, and the Candahar chiefs, throwing themselves once more into the arms of Persia, concluded a treaty, which Count Simonich guaranteed, and the stipulations of which are described by Lord Palmerston, in a passage above quoted from his note, as "injurious and offensive to Great Britain."

While the friendly ties by which Burnes hoped to have bound the Candahar chiefs were thus rudely snapped asunder, Lord Auckland pursued a course which almost looks as if it had been intended to produce a similar alienation in Dost Mahomed. In the very letter in which Burnes was rebuked, he instructs him to deal summarily with the Ameer, as if he were not an independent chief, but an humble dependant placed entirely at his mercy. "Should he," says his lordship, "seek to retain the agent (Vikovich), and to enter into any description of political intercourse with him, you will give him distinctly to understand that your mission will retire; that your good offices with the Sikhs will wholly cease; and that, indeed, the act will be considered a direct breach of friendship with the British government. It has been before at different times stated to you, that the continuance of our good offices must be entirely dependant on the relinquishment by the Ameer of alliances with any power to the westward." Nothing could be more dictatorial, and if it was really wished to conciliate the Ameer, nothing could be more preposterous than these instructions. For what were the good offices which his lordship was willing to undertake, and in return for which the Ameer was to bind himself indissolubly to British interests, to forego all alliances with neighbouring powers, and as a necessary consequence incur their displeasure, and risk their vengeance? Nothing more than to endeavour to persuade Runjeet Sing to refrain from making war on Cabool—a thing for which at the time he had neither the inclination nor the means. The Afghans themselves ridiculed the very idea, and when such good offices were talked of, could scarcely refrain from showing that they considered themselves insulted. What then must have been the feelings of Dost Mahomed, when the same messenger who brought Burnes his letter of rebuke, put into his hands a letter from the governor-general to himself, couched in such terms as the following?—"In regard to Peshawer, truth compels me to urge strongly on you to relinquish the idea of obtaining the government of that territory. From the generosity of his nature, and his regard for his old alliance with the British government, Maharajah Runjeet Sing has acceded to my wish, for the cessation of strife and the promotion of tranquillity, if you should behave in a less mistaken manner toward him. It becomes you to think earnestly on the mode in which you may effect a reconciliation with that powerful prince, to whom my nation is united by the direct bonds of friendship, and to abandon hopes which cannot be realized. The interference on your
A.D. 1838.

Lord Auckland's supercilious letter to Dost Mahomed.

behalf, which my regard to yourself and for the Afghan people has led me to exercise, has hitherto protected you from the continuance of a war which would have been ruinous to you; and if you can establish equitable terms of peace with the Maharajah, you will enjoy, in a security which has long been unknown to you, ample means of dignity and honour, and the territory which is actually under your government. To lead you to hope for more than this would be to deceive you; and even for this object, though my good offices would be readily employed for you, I would always be careful so to act, as to consult the interests and honour, and obtain the concurrence of the Sikh sovereign, who is the firm and ancient ally of my country. I need not state to you that the English nation is faithful to its engagements, and true to its word. It is on this account that I have written plainly to you, that you may understand correctly the assistance which you may expect from me. This assistance also cannot be granted if you form any connection with other powers unsanctioned by the government. If you wish for its countenance and friendship, you must repose confidence in its good offices alone. Should you be dissatisfied with the aid I have mentioned from this government, which is all I think can in justice be granted; or should you seek connection with other powers without my approbation; Captain Burnes, and gentlemen accompanying him, will retire from Cabool, where his further stay cannot be advantageous; and I shall regret my inability to continue my influence in your favour with the Maharajah. I am persuaded that you will recognize the friendly feeling which has led me to state the truth to you, as you can guide your actions as you may consider most proper for yourself."

Every line of the above letter must have been gall and wormwood to Dost Mahomed, and it would not have been surprising had he, on the spur of the moment, taken Lord Auckland's supercilious advice, and done what he must now have considered most proper for himself, by breaking off the negotiation with the British government. He acted with more moderation, and was cordially seconded by his brother Jubbar Khan, who continued to argue after Lord Auckland's letter had made argument all but hopeless, and proved most convincingly that there was no proportion between what the British government offered and what was demanded in return for it. The whole letter, he said, betrayed great ignorance of the actual state of Afghanistan. The offer to restrain Runjekt Sing was worthless, since, so far from his seeking to attack Cabool, hostilities had been commenced by the Afghans, who, conceiving they had just ground of complaint, assumed the offensive. The British altogether overrated the value of their offers, when they expected that in return for them the Afghans would form no friendly relations with Persia, Russia, Turkestan, &c. Were they in furtherance of British interests to make all these powers hostile, and yet receive no promise of protection against the hostility thus provoked? Well might he conclude, that "the value of the Afghans had indeed been depressed, and he did not wonder at the Ameer's disappointment."
Up to this time, though the Ameer had declined to dismiss Vikovich, he had refrained from giving him any public countenance. He had, however, distinctly intimated to the British envoy, that the delay on the part of the governor-general to declare himself fully was exhausting his patience, and that as the interest which Russia had taken in him deserved acknowledgment, he was unable to wait longer than the vernal equinox. When Lord Auckland’s letter was delivered, the disappointment which it produced could not be mistaken. The Ameer observed that “it was full of meaning;” that he would “reflect seriously on what best suited his interests, before he made any answer,” and “would send off an express to Candahar, to take the counsel of his brothers on what so vitally concerned their common interest.” The delivery of Lord Auckland’s letter took place on the 23d of February, 1838, and from that date

Mr. Burnes must have seen that the fate of his mission was sealed. His impressions on the subject are given in a letter to Mr. Macnaghten, dated 5th March: “From various quarters I have meanwhile heard that the ruler of Cabool is but ill disposed to meet government in its wishes; and the advice given to him by one of the first individuals whose counsel he sought was, that he should take the British government at their word, and dismiss their agent, since there was nothing now to be expected from his presence in Cabool. From the receipt of the governor-general’s letter to the present time nightly meetings have been held at the Bala Hissar; and the Ameer has on more than one occasion given vent to very strong expressions, both as to his future proceedings, and the disappointment at the slight degree of appreciation entertained by government regarding him. It seems very clear, though the final answer of Dost Mahomed Khan has not been received, that we have little hope of establishing a friendly connection with him on the terms wished by government.”

The above letter had only been despatched when Mr. Burnes was visited by Jubbar Khan, who came from the durbar with a string of proposi-
tions, embodying the terms on which, if then agreed to, the Ameer would decide in favour of a British connection. They consisted chiefly of a promise to protect Cabool and Candahar from Persia; of the surrender of Peshawer by Runjeet Sing; of the interference of our government to protect at that city those who might return to it from Cabool, supposing it to be restored to Sultan Mahomed Khan." The British envoy, as if he had now thoroughly imbibed the supercilius spirit of which Lord Auckland's letter had set him the example, took high ground. "I at once informed the Nawab that I would agree to none of the terms proposed; that I was astonished to hear a race as illustrous as the Dooranees, who had carried their sword to Ispahan and Delhi, implored protection against Persia; that as for Peshawer, it belonged to our ancient ally the ruler of Lahore, and he alone could surrender it; and that as for protecting those who returned from Cabool, supposing the Maharajah to make a settlement, it was an after concern which it was now useless to discuss, as well as the other matters stated, since the Ameer seemed so little disposed to attend to the views of the British government, and, what was of more importance, his own interests." Shortly after Jugbar Khan's departure, the envoy addressed a formal note to the Ameer, in which, after affirming that the only object originally proposed in the correspondence opened with the British government, was an arrangement with the Sikhs, whereas demands, "quite unconnected with the Sikhs" were now made, he stated that he "has no power or authority to speak on other matters, as is well known from his lordship's letter, and he would therefore be deceiving the Ameer by listening to them. Under these circumstances, as there is a Russian agent here, and he is detained by the Ameer's request, it is clearly evident that the Ameer does not approve of the offers of the British, but seeks the aid of others; Mr. Burnes feels it due to himself and his government, to ask leave in consequence to return to Hindoostan."

The Ameer, not yet prepared to relinquish the hope he had so long entertained of an advantageous British connection, sent two counsellors on the following day with proposals "somewhat modified," and "with many expressions of regret" at the resolute rejection of "all that had been urged." Ultimately after a long discussion, Captain Burnes accepted the Ameer's invitation to visit him at the Bala Hissar in the evening. In his account of the interview he says, "I lost no time in entering upon business, and said I was sorry to hear he had not taken the governor-general's letter in the spirit it was written, and that he had deemed it harsh, when the very fact of his lordship sending such a letter proved the interest taken in him, and that I had perused the document in English and Persian without finding a single expression to offend him. It was true it was a very explicit paper, but the Afghans were a nation famed for their straightforward proceedings, and it was most important to act toward him with a clear good faith, and let him know at once what might be expected of the British government." The Ameer's reply consisted chiefly of a reiteration
of his high admiration for the British government, and his willingness to make any sacrifice in order to secure its friendship. At last he even went so far as to say, "I throw myself upon the generosity of the Governor-general of India, and I rely on the sympathy which his lordship has expressed." "On this," says Burnes, "I congratulated the Ameer on his having seen his own interest better than to permit of friendship being interrupted between him and a nation so well disposed towards him; but that it was now my duty to tell him clearly what we expected of him, and what we could do in return. You must never receive agents from other powers, or have ought to do with them without our sanction; you must dismiss Captain Vikovich with courtesy; you must surrender all claim to Peshawer on your own account, as that chiefship belongs to Maharajah Runjeet Sing; you must live on friendly terms with that potentate; you must also respect the independence of Candahar and Peshawer; and co-operate in arrangements to unite your family. In return for this I promise to recommend to the government that it use its good offices with its ancient ally, Maharajah Runjeet Sing, to remove present and future causes of difference between the Sikhs and Afghans at Peshawer, but as that chiefship belongs to the Maharajah, he may confer it on Sultan Mahomed Khan or any other Afghan whom he chooses, on his own terms and tribute, it being understood that such arrangement is to preserve the credit and honour of all parties."

Empty as these professions of friendship on the part of the British government must have appeared to the Ameer, he had the policy to speak of them as important concessions, and to request that they might be immediately reduced to writing, in order that he might "fairly see what is expected, and what is to be done in return." No written document being given at the time, he sent two of his counsellors a few days after to renew his request for it. It is difficult to see what use he could have made of it, but his anxiety made the British envoy suspicious, and he refused to commit himself. It is scarcely necessary to follow the negotiations further. On the 21st of March the Ameer made apparently a last effort to gain over the governor-general to his views, by addressing him in a letter which, consisting chiefly of meaningless phrases and compliments, may be regarded as an Afghan mode of intimating that the negotiation was at an end. He says indeed, "To make known objects in the hope of profit to those personages who can do some good to the man in want, is consistent with propriety. Your lordship is the source of generosity and favour; therefore I take the liberty to repeat my grievances, expecting that your lordship will release the Afghans from distress, and enlarge their possessions;" and he concludes with saying, "As I rely on your lordship's favour, I have freely laid open my feelings in the hope of better fortune, since delays raise up fear of danger." How little these expressions conveyed his real sentiments was made apparent only two days afterwards, when he paid Captain Burnes a visit, and talked in a tone which he had never used to him before. "He stated that he had been received
by our government as no one; that his friendship was worth little; that he was told to consider himself fortunate at our preventing the Sikhs coming to Cabool, of which he himself had no fear; that he had applied to us for a cure of affairs in Peshawer, but our remedy was beyond his comprehension; and that though he felt honoured and grateful for the governor-general’s sending a mission to him, he had now lost every description of hope from us; that he saw little or no probable benefit to the Afghans as a people, and less to himself.” To all this Burnes could only reply “that our government had no desire to guide him, and if he did not approve of its offers, he need not accept of them.”

Though the crisis was now evidently approaching, the British mission lingered for another month, and on the 21st of April had the mortification of seeing the Russian agent in the ascendant. On that day “he was conducted through the streets of Cabool, and received a greater degree of respect than had hitherto been shown him.” On the following day, Burnes, still unwilling to believe that his mission was to terminate in failure, renewed his correspondence with the Ameer, not, he says, “from any hope that advantage could be derived from it in my negotiations, but to place as distinctly as possible before him how much he might have himself to blame for what followed.” The Ameer in his reply, which was returned on the following day, made no secret of his intention to secure himself by new alliances. “Mankind,” he observed, “have no patience without obtaining their objects, and as my hopes on your government are gone, I will be forced to have recourse to other governments. It will be for the protection of Afghanistan to save our honour, and, God forbid, not from any ill design towards the British.” He concluded thus: “In making friendship with any government my object will be to save and enlarge Afghanistan; and during these last seven months I have told you everything of note, and you know the good and bad. Now I have consigned myself to God, and in this no government can blame me. All the Afghans will be grateful to the government which obliges them. There is no more to say which is not said. If you like to speak in person, or examine all the correspondence that has passed between us, there will be no objection. I am very much obliged to you for the trouble you took to come so far. I expected very much from your government, and hoped for the protection and enlargement of Afghanistan; now I am disappointed, which I attribute not to the ill favour of the English, but my own bad fortune. Creatures must rely on the Creator.” Burnes understood this letter, as it was obviously meant to be, “a clear dismissal of the mission.” On the 25th of April, he had by the Ameer’s appointment his audience of leave; the following day he quitted Cabool, and by the 30th he had reached Jelalabad, from which he addressed a letter to Mr. Macnaghten, stating that he had received good information that the Ameer had been constantly with Vikovich since he himself left, and repeating as his “most deliberate conviction, founded on much reflection regarding the passing events.
in Central Asia, that consequences of the most serious nature must in the end flow from them, unless the British government applies a prompt, active, and decided counteraction." What this should be he does not venture to hint, but the subject was already engaging the earnest attention both of the Indian and the home governments. Their deliberations, almost unconsciously to themselves, gradually developed a gigantic scheme, which, neither founded in sound policy nor prosecuted with any due regard to the rights of other states, was justly punished by a disaster, to which the previous history of British India presents no parallel. Before entering on the details, some notice must be taken of the siege of Herat, and of the means by which that so-called key of India was prevented from falling into the hands of Persia.

CHAPTER III.


Encouraged by the Russian, and regardless of the remonstrances of the British ambassador, Persia had again resolved on the siege of Herat. Having made the necessary preparations, Mahomed Shah set out at the head of an army on the 23rd of July, 1837. The distance to be accomplished exceeded 600 miles, across a country of a difficult and forbidding character. His progress was therefore necessarily slow, and nearly three months elapsed before he reached Nishapoor, still more than 200 miles to the north-west of Herat. As the difficulties of the country were however his only obstruction, he continued to advance, and in the beginning of November, having crossed the Afghan frontier, arrived at the fort of Ghorian, belonging to the Heratee territory. This was considered a place of great strength, and having recently been garrisoned with a large body of picked troops, was expected to make a protracted resistance. Through cowardice or treachery it proved otherwise, and Ghorian fell almost without a struggle. Elated with this success the Shah hastened forward, and on the 22d of November took up a position before Herat on a plain at a short distance to the north-west.

The city now about to be subjected to a siege, stands in an elevated but beautiful and fertile valley, 370 miles nearly due west of Cabool. Its population was estimated at only 45,000, but its position near the point where the great routes from Persia, Turkestan, and India intersect each other, added greatly to its importance, both commercial and military. Its means of resist-
ance were not very formidable. The defences consisted chiefly of a broad and deep ditch, well supplied with water from springs, which being situated within the town itself, could not be cut off; a mound, formed out of the materials obtained in excavating the ditch; a lofty wall of unburned brick crowning the mound, and a citadel, sufficiently strong to be capable of defence even if the city were taken. The wall was pierced by five gates, four of them giving access to as many leading thoroughfares. These intersected each other at a common centre, and thus left a large space which had a domed roof, and formed the terminus of the principal bazaars. The streets were narrow and filthy in the extreme.

Prince Kamran, who had succeeded on the death of his father, was now sovereign of Herat. In early life he had repeatedly given proof of a cruel blood-thirsty temper, and as he advanced in years had added other vices, which made him still less capable of conducting the government. Indulgence in every species of debauchery had made him feeble and indolent, and thrown all real power into the hands of his prime minister. This was Yar Mahomed, a man of no mean talents, but utterly devoid of principle. His own interest was his only end, and his usual methods of promoting it were violence, oppression, and extortion. The inhabitants, while thus alienated from their rulers by misgovernment, were unhappily divided among themselves. Composed of different races, Afghans, Persians, Beloochees, &c., they had no common bond of union, and were even at deadly enmity on religious grounds, the two leading parties, though professed followers of Islamism, belonging to the hostile sects of Soonees and Sheeahs. In the quarrels and jealousies thus produced, the Afghans being the dominant race had greatly the advantage, and tyrannized without mercy.

Where so much misgovernment and division prevailed, there was little reason to expect that Herat would make a successful defence, and the general impression therefore was that it would prove a comparatively easy conquest. It could only be on this ground that the British envoy, acting on instructions from home, had exerted himself to the utmost to prevent the Persian expedition from being undertaken. Not only had he remonstrated with the Shah and his ministers in terms approaching to menace, but he had also entered into
communication with Kamran, and urged him to save himself by timely conces-
sions. The Heratee ruler, as if conscious of his inability to resist, had voluntarily
adopted this course, and seemed ready to sacrifice everything except the barren
name of independence. This however was the very thing which the Shah,
with a view apparently to the furtherance of other ambitious schemes he was
meditating, was determined to wrest from him, and the negotiation, after pro-
mising a peaceful issue, was abruptly terminated.

As soon as it became certain that the siege of Herat would be attempted,
Yar Mahomed began to bestir himself, and even assumed a tone of defiance.
In a letter addressed by him to Mr. M’Neill, now British envoy at Teheran,
he says, "Should the Persian government evince any great desire to come to
Herat, do not prevent the advance of the army, or take any trouble in the
matter. It is an affair of no consequence. Let them come, in order that they
may prove what they are able to do. May it please God the merciful, by the grace
and assistance of the Almighty, the steed of their wishes shall not accomplish
the journey of their design." Nor did he confine himself to mere boasting.
Foraging parties, sent out into the surrounding districts, brought home abund-
ant supplies of grain, and at the same time carried off or destroyed everything
that might have been of advantage to an invading army. Alliances were
formed with mountain tribes, and plans arranged for cutting off the Persian
communications. The defences, wherever they were dilapidated, were rapidly
repaired, and everything wore the appearance of a vigorous defence. Among
the circumstances which favoured it, one of the most important was the season
at which the siege was about to be undertaken. The climate of Herat, like
that of Afghanistan generally, was too severe to render a winter campaign
advisable, and yet the Shah had been so long detained on his march, that unless
he could succeed by a sudden onset, of which there was no probability, all his
siege operations were to be commenced and carried on amidst the frosts and
snows of a bleak and rugged mountain district. The obstacles with which the
besiegers would on this account have to contend, were made apparent to them-
selves several days before they actually reached Herat. Their condition, while
nine marches remained to be accomplished, is thus described by Mr. M’Neill,
in a letter to Lord Palmerston: "The whole of the provisions expected from the
rear, and from the districts on the right of the line of march, did not exceed four
days' consumption; and every mile the army advanced was carrying it so much
farther from the means of subsistence. The cold was already so great, that the
men had begun to suffer from it, and a Persian gentleman, in writing to his
father, states, that at night the cold was so intense, that in the morning people
could neither use their hands nor articulate distinctly."

Notwithstanding actual and still greater foreseen difficulties, the Shah
commenced operations with spirit. Having taken possession of all the gardens
and inclosures to the west of the city, and obtained good cover among a cluster
of ruins, from which the Afghans endeavoured in vain to dislodge them, the Persians broke ground, and by the 10th of December had advanced their trenches nearly to the edge of the ditch. Their artillery, however, the arm in which they were supposed to be most powerful, was productive rather of fear than of danger, and failed to make any impression which could be turned to account. After the first few days of terror, caused by the loud and constant firing and the frequent bursting of shells in the heart of the city, the inhabitants gradually laid aside their fears, and recovered the presence of mind which they appeared at first to have lost. The garrison made bold and often successful sorties, and felt so confident of their ability to repel an assault, that three of the five gates remained open, for communication with the surrounding country, and even the cattle were sent out to pasture. The confidence thus inspired was owing in no small degree to the presence and activity of a young English officer, Eldred Pottinger, who having been sent by his uncle, Colonel (afterwards

Sir Henry) Pottinger, then resident in Scinde, on an exploratory tour in Afghanistan, was fortunately in Herat when the Persians made their appearance before it. Having no official appointment, he had at first professed to be only a horse dealer, and had afterwards assumed the disguise of a Syed or Mussulman devotee. In Herat, less necessity was felt for concealing his real character, and he was permitted at his own request to pay a visit to Yar Mahomed, who, after giving him a cordial welcome, introduced him to his master. From that time he obtained a recognized footing in Herat, and determined to take an active part in the struggle in which it was about to be engaged. His courage and skill were immediately put in requisition, and it was not long before he had become, at least in regard to military matters, one of Yar Mahomed’s most influential advisers. As a lieutenant in the Bombay artillery, he had made himself well acquainted with siege operations, and was thus able to furnish the kind of information which the exigencies of the time required.

The siege proved very desultory, and furnished few incidents worthy of detail. In the beginning of January, 1838, some alarm was caused in the city by the mining operations of the besiegers, but after means had been taken to coun-
teract them the garrison took new courage, and even prepared to take the initiative. The first proposal was to venture on a night attack. Owing to some mismanagement, after every preparation had been made, the intention was abandoned. The next proposal was to venture out by day, and risk a regular battle. This time it did not prove a feint. On the 26th of January, both cavalry and infantry, to the number of at least 7000, marched out into the plain. The Persians at once accepted the challenge, and an encounter took place, which was continued with varying success throughout the day. No decisive result was gained, but as the Heratites obliged the enemy to abandon their outposts and remained in possession of the ground thus abandoned, they claimed, and had certainly the best title to claim the victory.

The above encounter, or rather series of skirmishes, had gone far to prove that besiegers and besieged were pretty equally matched, and that time, rather than prowess, would ultimately determine the result. The siege accordingly was continued in a very sluggish manner. The Shah indeed, who had previously spurned everything like fair accommodation, now betrayed an anxiety to treat, and made various overtures, which were rejected as inadmissible. Active operations again seemed to be the only alternative; and a considerable advantage had been gained by the besiegers by the capture of a fortified post not more than 300 yards from the north-east angle of the fort, when Mr. M'Neill, the British envoy, arrived in the Persian camp. His object was to make a last effort at negotiation by offering to mediate between the combatants. He had an audience of the Shah on the 13th of April. It lasted two hours, and was so satisfactory that Mr. M'Neill took his leave under the impression that the Shah was really disposed to accept of the proffered mediation. At a subsequent audience he actually accepted it, and it was publicly announced on the 16th of April that deputies were about to proceed from the Persian camp into Herat to arrange the terms. It is difficult to believe that the Shah was sincere, for only two days after, the Persians opened their batteries with more fury than ever.

This hostile proceeding, at the very time when friendly mediation was professedly accepted, must have made Mr. M'Neill very doubtful of ultimate success. He determined notwithstanding to persevere, and in the evening sent his deputy, Major Todd, to seek admission into Herat, for the purpose of explaining the proposed mediation. When the Persians from the trenches announced his approach, the Afghans replied with derision. Considering the circumstances, the hour was ill-timed, and almost justified the answer returned by Yar Mahomed, that at that hour he would not allow the Shah himself to enter, but that the English deputy, on presenting himself on the morrow at the south-east angle of the city, would be admitted. Very possibly there was a suspicion that the Persians wished to use the admission of Major Todd as a means of forcing an entrance for themselves, but Yar Mahomed himself gave
the real explanation to Pottinger, when referring to the offered mediation, he
said to him, "Don't be angry with me; I have thrown ashes on it and blackened
its face myself." His meaning he explained, by adding that he wished the
Persians to understand that the Afghans trusted to their good swords, and did
not want either Turks, Russians, or English to interfere. He was by no means
sincere in this declaration, though he regarded it as a piece of good policy, since
it might tend to make the Shah lower his terms.

Major Todd on the following morning made his appearance at the place indi-
cated, and being at once admitted, was ushered into the presence of Kamran,
who received him with the greatest cordiality, and sent him back fully author-
ized to declare that he accepted of the mediation of the British minister. No
sooner was Mr. M'Neil in possession of this authority than he deemed it neces-
sary to have a personal interview with Kamran and his minister. It took
place on the 21st of April, and was every way satisfactory, as the greatest readi-
ness was expressed to ratify any agreement which he might judge expedient.
Everything seemed now in proper train, when an unexpected visitor appeared
on the scene and completely changed the aspect of affairs. Just as Mr. M'Neil
left the Persian camp for Herat, Count Simonich arrived in it. The effect of his
presence was at once seen. The Shah, retracting his previous consent to medi-
ation, stated his ultimatum in such terms as the following:—"Either the whole
people of Herat shall make their submission, or I will take possession of the
fortress by force of arms, and make them obedient and submissive." Under
these circumstances, Mr. M'Neil contented himself with laying before the Shah
a full statement of all the complaints which the British government had against
him. Not only, though informed that it would be regarded as an act of hostility,
had he persisted in commencing and carrying on the siege of Herat, but he had
refused redress for gross insults which had been offered by his officers to
members of the British mission. One of these, a courier, bearing letters from
Herat to Teheran, addressed to Mr. M'Neil, had been seized, under pretext of
his being a native Persian, searched, pillaged, and threatened with summary
execution. These things, which the Shah had allowed to pass with impunity,
though the guilty perpetrators were well known to him and might easily
have been brought to justice, made it impossible that friendly relations could
any longer subsist between the two governments. The firmness of this language
intimidated the Shah, and he again professed a willingness to do all that was
asked of him; but after a course of vacillation, the Russians gained a complete
ascendancy, and Mr. M'Neil considered that he had no alternative but to put
his threat in execution. Accordingly, on the 7th of June, he declared the
British embassy to the Persian court at an end, and took his departure for the
frontier.

Meanwhile, under the auspices, and it is said also through the largesses of
Count Simonich, the siege was prosecuted with new vigour. The count himself
personally superintended the operations, and Russian engineers conducted them. The additional skill and energy thus brought to bear upon the beleaguered city greatly increased the miseries of its inhabitants, and the necessity of escaping from them by an acknowledgment of Russian supremacy as a preferable alternative to Persian domination, was openly discussed. Pottinger, whom Mr. M'Neill had authorized to act as British agent in Herat, having now an official position, had acquired an additional degree of influence, and showed as much political wisdom as courage in his manner of exercising it. The struggle however seemed daily becoming more hopeless. In fair fight the Afghans were seldom worsted, and they had gallantly repulsed the only two assaults which had yet been attempted, but the most dangerous enemies were within—disease, famine, and general despondency. Encouraged by new prospects of success, the besiegers had resolved on one great effort. It was made on the 24th of June, under the form of a general assault, embracing five points at once. Though sufficient warning had been given of its approach, no adequate effort had been made to meet it, and it had at first all the effect of a surprise. Ultimately, however, the garrison, roused to redoubled efforts, repulsed the assaults at all points but one. In the mound on which the wall was reared were two fausse braies, an upper and a lower, which, though not considered important enough to be enumerated among the defences of the place, formed its best security during an actual assault. At one of the points attacked, the assailants forced their way into the lower fausse braie, and then pushing up the slope, carried the upper fausse braie, immediately beyond which was a practicable breach. Some of the storming party reached it, and the capture was on the point of being effected when the Afghan reserve arrived, renewed the conflict which other defenders had abandoned in despair, and drove back the assailants in confusion. The chief merit of this repulse undoubtedly belongs to Eldred Pottinger. The first noise of the assault had brought him and Yar Mahomed to the scene of action. Pottinger saw the extent of the danger, and, retaining all his coolness and presence of mind, pointed out what was necessary in order to avert it. Yar Mahomed, on the other hand, though his personal courage was undoubted, became completely unmanned, and sat down as if in despair. Pottinger, seeing that all was otherwise lost, succeeded in rousing him, and when he again lost heart, actually laid hold of him, and moved forward with him to the breach. There his presence and recovered energy once more changed the fortune of the day, and the Persians, repulsed at every point, retreated to their camp, with a loss which was estimated by Mr. M'Neill, from the best information he could obtain, at not less than 1700 or 1800 men.

The Persians, though they had well nigh succeeded in the assault, had suffered too severely to have any inclination to repeat it; and the Afghans, as if more frightened at the danger they had run than elated at their success in repelling it, showed no inclination to assume the offensive. On both sides
therefore active operations ceased. When at last this tacit armistice terminated, there was a greater inclination than before to listen to terms of accommodation. Could the Shah have maintained his ground and persisted in the blockade into which the siege had been virtually converted, the whole contest would have been reduced to a question of time—Which of the two parties would first have failed to obtain the necessary supplies of food and ammunition? It may seem that the besieged, cooped up within their walls, and threatened both with famine and pestilence, must have been compelled to succumb. On the other hand, the Shah had suffered severely in carrying on the siege. One winter, necessarily entailing the severest privations, had been endured, and midsummer had arrived without bringing any prospect of a successful issue. Numerous losses had been sustained in actual conflict, a still greater number by desertion and disease, and the communications with Persia were daily becoming more and more difficult by the pillaging hordes interposed between it and the camp. The treasury too was exhausted, and the promises of Count Simonich to replenish it were too vague and uncertain to be trusted to. Under such circumstances, to continue the siege, even assuming it to be practicable, was little short of madness. Sooner or later, discomfiture, if not absolute ruin, would ensue. Though unable to conceal the truth from himself, the Shah was too obstinate to yield of his own accord, and incur the disgrace of raising the siege, but his anxiety for renewed negotiation proved how willing he would be of any decent pretext for withdrawing. With such a pretext he was now furnished.

Previous to the departure of Mr. M’Neill from the Persian camp, the attention of the Indian government had been earnestly directed to the siege of Herat, and to the supposed dangers to which its fall would expose our Indian empire. As early as the 1st of May, 1838, the governor-general in a letter addressed to Mr. M’Neill, after stating his belief "that the state of our relations with Persia is at the present moment exceedingly critical," suggested that it might prove of "very essential aid" to his negotiations, "were as many cruisers as can be saved for the service, together with a regiment of native infantry, despatched to the Persian Gulf to hold themselves in readiness for any service" on which it might be deemed expedient to employ them, "with a view to the maintenance of our interests in Persia." Without waiting for an answer, Lord Auckland had at once acted on this suggestion, by instructing the Bombay government to fit out and despatch the proposed expedition, "at the earliest practicable period." Little time was lost, and on the 19th of June the expedition arrived in the neighbourhood of Bushire, and landed the troops, amounting in all to 387, on the island of Karrak. No opposition was offered, the governor on being informed "that the British government had sent up a body of troops upon a special service, and that the island of Karrak, on account of the salubrity of its climate, had been chosen for their place of residence," simply replying, "that the island, its inhabitants, and everything it contained, were entirely at our disposal."
Some additional troops and stores were afterwards landed, but the so-called demonstration continued to be to the last a very paltry affair. Such however was not the opinion formed of it by those who only heard of it at a distance, and it was generally spoken of as a serious and formidable invasion, which had probably for its object the overthrow of the existing Persian dynasty.

The Shah, in one of the last interviews which Mr. M'Neill had with him before quitting the camp, had offered to raise the siege of Herat and conclude a treaty with its ruler, provided he was furnished "with such a reason for concluding that arrangement, as might enable him to relinquish with honour the enterprise in which he was engaged," and he himself proposed "that the British government should threaten him if he did not return," and "that this threat should be conveyed in writing, that he might have it in his power to show the document as an evidence that he had not lightly abandoned the expedition he had undertaken." The document furnished by Mr. M'Neill, in compliance with this request, was entitled, "Memorandum of the demands of the British government, presented to the Shah," and was in the following terms:—"1st, That the Persian government shall conclude an equitable arrangement with the government of Herat, and shall cease to weaken and disturb these countries. 2d, That the Persian government, according to the stipulations of the general treaty, shall conclude a commercial treaty with Great Britain, and that it shall place the commercial agents of Great Britain on the same footing with respect to privileges, &c., as the consuls of other powers. 3d, That the persons who seized and ill-treated Ali Mahomed Beg, a messenger of the British mission, shall be punished, and that a firman shall be issued, such as may prevent the recurrence of so flagrant a violation of the laws and customs of nations. 4th, That the Persian government shall publicly abandon the pretension it has advanced, to a right to seize and punish the Persian servants of the British mission, without reference to the British minister. 5th, That the governor of Bushir, who threatened the safety of the British resident there, shall be removed; that the other persons concerned in that transaction shall be punished, and that
measures shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of such proceedings." On receiving this document, the Shah at once, and with some reason, declared that it "was not what he wanted"—a variety of other matters had been introduced into it, whereas, "what he required was, a single statement on the subject of Herat, on a small bit of paper which he could carry about with him, and show to every one—not a great paper like that." The demonstration in the Persian Gulf being certainly much stronger than any written threat, might well supply its place, and the Shah's answer therefore was, "We consent to the whole of the demands of the British government. We will not go to war. Were it not for the sake of their friendship, we should not return from before Herat. Had we known that our coming here might risk the loss of their friendship, we certainly would not have come at all." This answer was given on the 14th of August, 1838, but hostilities were to some extent persisted in till the 9th of September, when the siege was finally raised, and the Persian army, baffled and dispirited, commenced its march homewards.

The demonstration in the Persian Gulf was only a first, and a comparatively insignificant step in the warlike policy which Lord Auckland was now prepared to pursue. In a minute dated 12th May, 1838, after referring to a letter to the secret committee, in which he had intimated his intention not to oppose the advance of Persia upon Candahar and Cabool, whether by arms or money, he virtually retracted the intimation. "Circumstances," he says, "have occurred which may materially modify my views, for Russian agents have now put themselves prominently forward in aid of the designs of Persia, and we could scarcely with prudence allow this new and more formidable element of disorder and intrigue to be established, without opposition, on our frontiers." In a letter to the secret committee only ten days later in date than the above minute, he tells them "that the emergency of affairs may compel me to act without awaiting any intimation of your views upon the events which have recently occurred in Persia and Afghanistan," and, moreover, that "in anticipation of the possibility of such a contingency, I have deemed it expedient to put matters in train by previous negotiation, in order to render whatever measures of direct interference I may be obliged to adopt as effective as possible."

The negotiation above referred to as intended "to put matters in train," was a mission by Mr. Macnaghten, the political secretary of government to Lahore. The instructions given to Mr. Macnaghten, composed apparently by Mr. Henry Torrens, who, as deputy-secretary, had remained with the governor-general, are in a style of unusual grandiloquence. In the extract printed by government by order of the House of Commons, they commence thus:—"In any discussion upon the present policy of the Indian government, you may remark that the governor-general has no appetite for wars and conquest; that the boundaries of the East Indian empire have seemed to him to be amply extensive; that he would rather conquer the jungle with the plough, plant
villages where tigers have possession, and spread commerce and navigation upon waters which have hitherto been barren, than take one inch of territory from his neighbours, or sanction the march of armies for the acquisition of kingdoms; yet that he feels strong in military means, and that with an army of 100,000 men under European officers in Bengal, and with 100,000 more whom he might call to his aid from Madras and Bombay, he can with ease repel every aggression and punish every enemy." Such being the case, it might have been supposed that the governor-general deemed it unnecessary to give himself any concern with what might be passing beyond his own frontier, and had therefore instructed Mr. Macnaghten to intimate to Runjeet Sing that he was determined not to interfere in any way with Afghanistan. The chiefs must settle their feuds in their own way, and the monarch of Lahore was welcome to conquer them if he could. In the extract of the instructions printed by government, there is nothing to show that this was not their purport, but in the additional extract given by Mr. Kaye from the MS. records, in his excellent History of the War in Afghanistan, more explicit information is afforded, and we gain an insight into the kind of policy which was about to be adopted. After listening to all the Maharajah "has to say," or "in the event of his showing no disposition to commence the conference," you can, continues Mr. Torrens, "state to him the views of your own government." These views embraced two alternative courses of proceeding. The one "that the treaty formerly executed between his highness and Shah Shujah should be recognized by the British government," and that "whilst the Sikhs advanced cautiously on Cabool, accompanied by British agents, a demonstration should be made by a division of the British army occupying Shikarpour, with Shah Shujah in their company, to whom the British government would advance money to enable him to levy troops and purchase arms." The other course was "to allow the Maharajah to take his own course against Dost Mahomed Khan, without any reference to us."

Runjeet Sing, when the two courses were submitted to him, had no difficulty in arriving at a decision. Independent action he would have nothing to do with, and the plan by which he was to act in concert with the British government was the only one which he could think of adopting. Notwithstanding this verbal acceptance, which was given on the 3d of June, 1838, the terms of the treaty, called tripartite, because Runjeet Sing, Shah Shujah, and the British government, represented by the governor-general, were parties to it, were not arranged without considerable difficulty. The Sikhs were constantly grasping at new advantages, and did not desist till a significant hint had been given that the British government might think it necessary to act independently. Even Shah Shujah, when the proposed arrangements were submitted to him, though he was naturally delighted at the prospect of regaining a throne, from which he had to all appearance been finally excluded, could not help remonstrating against the lion's share set apart for Runjeet Sing. Not only was he
to be guaranteed in Peshawer, and all the other districts which he had wrested from Afghanistan, but in the event of his assisting the Shah with an auxiliary force, he was to have an equal half of whatever booty might be acquired from the Barukzyes, and was moreover to receive an annual payment from Cabool of two lacs of rupees. The claim to booty was scarcely reasonable, as, on the assumption of Shah Shujah’s right to the throne, the Barukzyes were his subjects, and possessed no property which was not already at his sovereign disposal; the annual payment was still more objectionable, not so much on account of its amount as because it implied degradation. The King of Cabool had hitherto been an independent sovereign, but now this annual payment, though it purported to be made in consideration of a body of at least 5000 men being employed to reinstate the Shah, and afterwards kept ready for his service, would be regarded, and would be in fact to all intents and purposes, a payment of tribute. While thus curtailed by the encroachments of the Sikhs, the kingdom of Cabool was to be still farther diminished, as one of the new articles inserted in the tripartite treaty expressly stipulated that when Shah Shujah “shall have succeeded in establishing his authority in Afghanistan, he shall not attack or molest his nephew, the ruler of Herat, in possession of the territories now subject to his government.” On all these accounts the joy of Shah Shujah at the prospect which had unexpectedly opened upon him, was not without mixture, and he therefore submitted a written statement of the points on which he deemed it necessary to obtain satisfaction from the British government. A few concessions were in consequence made, and the treaty was formally concluded.

Negotiation being now terminated, it became necessary to prepare for action. Shah Shujah was naturally anxious that not a day should be lost. While a mere pensioner at Loodiana, and a mission was in Cabool conferring with Dost Mahomed, he had been interdicted from corresponding with those of his former subjects who might still be disposed to adhere to him. This interdict was now removed, and he began to circulate letters for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of support on which he might calculate. The answer was so favourable that he had little difficulty in flattering himself, and even inspiring others, with the hope that thousands were ready to flock to his standard. One fear only
haunted him, and it was that others would attempt to do the work for him, instead of allowing him to achieve it for himself. His countrymen were too proud and jealous of their independence to tolerate a foreign invader, and therefore it was essential, if not to his success, at least to the future stability of his government, that he should make his appearance in Afghanistan at the head of an army which he could call his own, because raised by him, paid by him, and commanded in his name. The first thing necessary therefore was to commence the formation of such an army. This was no easy task. Money being supplied in abundance, there was no lack of recruits, but the great difficulty was to make it appear that they were in any sense the troops of Shah Shujah. The work of raising and disciplining them was necessarily committed to British officers, who were alone capable of performing it, while the small proportion which the natives of Afghanistan bore to the whole mass collected, made it ludicrous to speak of it as an Afghan force. Shah Shujah, who was well aware, and had distinctly declared that "the fact of his being upheld by foreign force alone could not fail to detract, in a great degree, from his dignity and consequence," did his best to save appearances by taking an open and active part in whatever related to the organization of his army, by appearing often on parade, where the honours due to sovereignty were regularly paid to him, and by causing all proceedings of a military nature to be formally and ostentatiously reported to him. These semblances, however, imposed upon no one; the real fact was too apparent; and the new levies, having nothing of a national character belonging to them, continued to be regarded as his only by a misnomer. They would still therefore have been detested by the Afghans as foreign intruders, even if they had been able by themselves alone to carry him in triumph to Cabool. Of this, however, they were totally incapable, and it soon became manifest that success was hopeless, unless the British, instead of acting merely as auxiliaries, were prepared to bear the brunt of the contest.

The governor-general, when he gave the instructions to Mr. Macnaghten, did not seem to contemplate the employment of British troops further than to make a demonstration by occupying Shikarpoor. Sir Henry Fane, the commander-in-chief, who had a better knowledge of the nature of the hostilities about to be waged, insisted that the expedition should be on an adequate scale, and that for this purpose a complete and formidable army was absolutely required. His
opinion prevailed, and accordingly "the army of the Indus" began to be talked of. Shah Shujah and his levies were still to take the lead, but a British army, following close upon their steps, was to cross the Indus and direct its march upon Candahar. The preparations were accordingly commenced on this magnified scale, and in August, 1838, the different regiments intended to be employed were warned for field service. Both the Bengal and the Bombay presidencies were to furnish quotas. The army of the former, under the personal command of Sir Henry Fane, was to rendezvous at Kurnal, situated near the right bank of the Jumna, about seventy-eight miles north of Delhi. The Bombay army, under the command of Sir John Keane, was to be conveyed by sea to the coast of Scinde, and then proceed upwards along the Indus to effect a junction with the Bengal army.

Though these preparations had been begun, Lord Auckland had not yet communicated his intentions explicitly to the home authorities. This was now done in a letter to the secret committee, dated 13th August, 1838. Knowing generally the views entertained by the British ministry, he had good ground for anticipating their approval, but deemed it necessary notwithstanding to enter at some length into a justification of his new policy. "Of the course about to be pursued," he says, "there cannot exist a reasonable doubt. We owe it to our own safety to assist the lawful sovereign of Afghanistan in the recovery of his throne. The welfare of our possessions in the East requires that we should, in the present crisis of affairs, have a decidedly friendly power on our frontiers; and that we should have an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and establishing tranquillity, in place of a chief seeking to identify himself with those whose schemes of aggrandizement and conquest are not to be disguised. The Barukzye chiefs, from their disunion, weakness, and unpopularity, were ill-fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies, or to aid us in our just and necessary views of resisting encroachment from the westward." Referring afterwards to the great expense that will necessarily be incurred, he thinks this consideration must "be held comparatively light when contrasted with the magnitude of the object to be gained," and then speaks of his own responsibility. "I have acted in a crisis which has suddenly arisen, and at a period when appearances in every quarter were the most threatening to the tranquility of the British Indian empire, in the manner which has seemed to me essential to insure the safety, and to assert the power and dignity of our government. I have, in adopting this step, been deeply sensible of the responsibility which it places on me; but I have felt, after the most anxious deliberation, that I could not otherwise acquit myself of my trust." On this subject of responsibility it may suffice here to mention that the mind of the governor-general must soon have been set at rest. Sir John Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton, stated in the House of Commons, when the expediency and justice of the Afghan war were strongly questioned, that Lord Auckland "must not bear the blame of the
measure; it was the policy of the government; and he might mention that the despatch which he wrote (he was then president of the Board of Control), stating his opinion of the course that ought to be taken in order to meet expected emergencies, and that written by Lord Auckland, informing him that the expedition had already been undertaken, crossed each other on the way."

After the above communication to the British government, another of great importance still remained to be made. It was necessary that there should be no misapprehension in any quarter as to the grounds and objects of this new war. This could only be provided against by a full exposition made patent to all the world, and accordingly, on the 1st of October, 1838, a document, since designated the "Simla manifesto," was published under the more modest title of: "Declaration on the part of the right honourable the Governor-general of India." Its length will not allow us to give it in full, but its importance in itself, the discussion which it originated, and the historical interest which still attaches to it, will not allow it to be passed over slightly. Its object, as announced in its first paragraph, was publicly to expound the "reasons" which have led to the "important measure" of directing "the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus." After referring to the treaties made in 1832 with the rulers along the line of that river, and which had for their object, by opening its navigation, "to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British nation in Asia that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce," it proceeds to notice the mission of Captain Burnes to Cabool. The original objects of this mission were purely commercial, and contemplated nothing further than inviting "the aid of the de frito rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties."

Before the mission had reached its destination, intelligence arrived that "the troops of Dost Mahomed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally, Maharajah Runjeet Sing," and there was therefore reason to apprehend that "the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions in which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British government would be altogether frustrated." The governor-general, "to avert a result so calamitous," authorized an intimation to Dost Mahomed, that "if he would evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms," he would exert his good offices "for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers." The result was that the Maharajah, "with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation," consented that, "in the meantime, hostilities on his part should be suspended." Subsequently it became known to the governor-general that the Persians were besieging Herat, and that "intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond the Indus." Meanwhile, the mission to Cabool was spending much time
"in fruitless negotiation." Dost Mahomed, relying "upon Persian encouragement and assistance," urged "the most unreasonable pretensions" in regard to the Sikhs, "avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India, and "openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command," making it evident that "so long as Cabool remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian empire would be preserved inviolate." Returning to the siege of Herat, the governor-general's declaration proceeds as follows:— "The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British envoy at the court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause; and the governor-general would yet indulge the hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence until succours shall reach them from British India." While Persia has thus been evincing her hostility so as to compel the cessation of all friendly intercourse with her government, the chiefs of Candahar, brothers of Dost Mahomed, "have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy." In this crisis of affairs, while the governor-general "felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories," his attention was naturally drawn "to the position and claims of Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British government, and who, on his empire being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the British dominions." Though aware "that the Barikzaye chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies," yet, so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to our interests and security, the British government acknowledged and respected their authority. Now, however, a different policy is indispensable, and we must have on our western frontier "an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement." The governor-general therefore "was satisfied that a pressing necessity as well as every consideration of policy and justice warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk, "whose popularity throughout Afghanistan" has been proved "by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities." After this determination it seemed "just and proper, no less from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Sing than from his undeviating friendship towards the
British government, that his highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations," and the result has been "the conclusion of a triplicate treaty by the British government, the Maharajah, and Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk, whereby his highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors." The declaration next refers to various points which had been adjusted, and promises that "a guaranteed independence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Scinde," and that "the integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected." From all these measures, "completed or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted; that the name and just influence of the British government will gain their proper footing among the nations of Central Asia; that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier of India; and that a lasting barrier will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment." The concluding paragraph of the declaration is not unworthy of being quoted verbatim:—

"His majesty Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk will enter Afghanistan, surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factions opposition by a British army. The governor-general confidently hopes, that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn. The governor-general has been led to these measures by the duty which is imposed upon him, of providing for the security of the possessions of the British crown; but he rejoices that in the discharge of his duty he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Afghan people. Throughout the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile differences, to secure oblivion of injuries, and to put an end to the distractions by which for so many years the welfare and happiness of the Afghans have been impaired. Even to the chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treatment on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to the course of measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country."

To the declaration was appended a list of appointments, of which it is necessary only to notice that of Mr. Macnaghten, secretary to government, who was to "assume the functions of envoy and minister on the part of the government of India at the court of Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk," and that of Captain Burns, who was to "be employed, under Mr. Macnaghten's directions, as envoy to the chief of Kelat or other states." The former appointment must have been conferred in accordance with Mr. Macnaghten's wishes, and may be con-
considered as an instance of that vaulting ambition, which too often tempts men to quit the station for which they are best qualified, and grasp at another, for which they are totally unfitted by nature or experience. The second appointment was not accepted without some degree of reluctance, and was regarded as less an honour than a disappointment. Captain Burnes, in writing to a friend on the subject of the "grand campaign," which, on his return from Cabool, he had been invited to assist in planning, says, "What exact part I am to play I know not, but if full confidence and hourly consultation be any pledge I am to be chief. I can plainly tell them, it is aut Caesar aut nullus, and if I get not what I have a right to, you will soon see me en route to England." Of course the appointment he meant was that of political chief. Instead of this, to be gazetted as only a subordinate envoy to a comparatively insignificant khanat of Beloochistan, or "other states," so little known or thought of that a name could not be given to them, was such a descent, that he did not hesitate to express his dissatisfaction. Lord Auckland succeeded in soothing him by promises, which though vague were understood to mean, that after seating Shah Shujah at Cabool, Mr. Macnaghten would return to his former office, and be succeeded by him in the chieftainship. To such an arrangement Burnes was the more easily reconciled, because, as he himself expressed it, "I am not sorry to see Dost Mahomed ousted by another hand than mine." Why so? Obviously because he felt that Dost Mahomed did not deserve the treatment to which he was about to be subjected.

This opinion was shared by many besides Captain Burnes, and was one cause of the severe criticism which the Simla manifesto provoked, and which, it must be confessed, it was ill fitted to bear. According to the governor-general, the Sikhs, who had seized Peshawer as they had previously seized Cashmere, by gross treachery, were entirely in the right; the Afghans, in endeavouring to regain it, were wholly in the wrong; and the only thing wanting to insure peace was, that Dost Mahomed "should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maharajah." So far from evincing such a disposition, his troops "had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally," and he persisted "in urging the most unreasonable pretensions"—pretensions so unreasonable, that the governor-general could not, "consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, be the channel of submitting them to the consideration of his highness." These statements of the manifesto are absolutely preposterous. They are not only not in accordance with fact, but fly in the very face of it, and therefore in so far as the determination to oust Dost Mahomed was founded on them, they can only be viewed as false pretexts, framed for the purpose of perpetrating gross injustice. The next charge which the manifesto brings against Dost Mahomed is, if possible, still more unfounded. "He avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition," he "openly threatened, in furtherance
of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command," and
"ultimately, he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afgha-
nistan." Where does all this appear? Certainly not in any part of the cor-
respondence giving an account of the proceedings of the mission. He certainly
desired the restoration of Peshawer, but he was willing to accept it however
hampered it might be by conditions. He had no wish to go to war for it. On
the contrary, he confessed that he had no forces to cope with those of Runjeet
Sing, and therefore implored the friendly offices of the governor-general to pro-
cure it for him by amicable arrangement. What was the answer? Runjeet
Sing, having gained possession of Peshawer, means to keep it, and you must
cease to hope that it ever can become yours. There the matter rested. But he
threatened to call in every foreign aid he could command. Where again does
this appear? He courted an alliance with the British government, and was so
eager to obtain it, that so long as there was the least hope of success, he turned
a deaf ear to all the flattering promises of Persian and Russian agents. Only
give me a little encouragement, is his language to the governor-general. I wish
no friendship but yours; only assure me that if the Persians or any other
western power attack me, I may rely on your protection. Look again at the
answer. You should be ashamed to ask protection against the Persians, as you
should be able enough to protect yourself. At all events, the British govern-
ment will not promise to protect you. It will only promise to intercede with
Runjeet Sing not to resume hostilities, and in return for this act of friendship,
it expects that you will form no alliance without its sanction, and in particular
that you will forthwith dismiss the Russian agent, and reject all Persian ove-
tures. Were not all this contained in the published correspondence, it would
scarcely be possible to believe that these were the only terms which the
governor-general offered. Dost Mahomed, on being guaranteed from an attack
by Runjeet Sing, a favour which, as no such attack was apprehended, was
absolutely worthless, was to bind himself hand and foot to the British govern-
ment, and fight its battles single-handed, by interposing his territories as a
barrier between Persia and India. The hostility of Persia and of Russia he
would thus almost to a certainty provoke, but, be this as it may, he must
not expect the least assistance. Nothing can be more monstrous than the terms
thus offered to Dost Mahomed, unless it be the complaint of the manifesto,
that "ultimately," on finding himself dealt with in this grossly unfair and
niggardly spirit, "he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs."

The case which the manifesto sought to establish against Dost Mahomed
having completely broken down, the measures founded upon it admit of no
justification, and it is therefore the less necessary to enter into any detailed
examination of the other grounds on which the governor-general attempts to
justify his projected invasion of Afghanistan, and subversion of its existing
government. The only points deserving of notice are the assertions of the
manifesto respecting the siege of Herat, and the expediency of setting up Shah Shujah. The attack upon Herat is described as "a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression." The meaning must be that the ruler of Herat had done nothing to provoke it, and that on the part of the Persians it was "perpetrated and continued" in mere wantonness, without the shadow of an excuse. This view is by no means correct, and is totally at variance with numerous statements contained in the correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan presented to parliament, and ordered to be printed in 1839. In a memorandum submitted by Mr. Ellis to Lord Palmerston in the beginning of 1836, he acknowledges that the conduct of Kamran in violating his engagements with the Persian government "has given the Shah a full justification for commencing hostilities." So indisputable does he hold the fact to be, that in a letter to Kamran himself he tells him he "has learned with extreme sorrow that in consequence of failure in the performance of engagements," the Shah "intends to seek redress by force of arms, and to invade the territory of Herat," and he therefore, both as a friend and "as the representative of the British government," strongly advises him to avert the calamities of war, by sending a proper person to the Shah, "both to compliment his majesty on his succession, and to assure him that all the engagement which he has contracted shall without further delay be completely fulfilled." Mr. M'Neill, who succeeded Mr. Ellis, took the same view, and expressed it still more strongly. In a despatch to Lord Palmerston, dated 24th February, 1837, after mentioning that on the death of the Abbas Meerza "negotiations were entered into, which terminated in the conclusion of an agreement for the cessation of hostilities between the parties, and the demarcation of a line of boundary," he continues thus, "From that time up to the present moment Persia has committed no act of hostility against the Afghans; but on the death of the late Shah, the government of Herat made predatory incursions into the Persian territories, in concert with the Turcomans and Hazareks, and captured the subjects of Persia, for the purpose of selling them as slaves. This system of warfare has from that time been carried on without intermission by the Afghans of Herat, and Persia has not retaliated these acts of aggression by any hostile measure, unless the public annunciation of its intention to attack Herat should be regarded as such. Under these circumstances there cannot, I think, be a doubt that the Shah is fully justified in making war on Prince Kamran; and though the capture of Herat by Persia would certainly be an evil of great magnitude, we could not wonder if the Shah were to disregard our remonstrances, and to assert his right to make war on an enemy who has given him the greatest provocation, and whom he may regard himself as bound in duty to his subjects to punish, or even to put down." In the face of such documents, is it not strange that Lord Auckland and his advisers could commit themselves to the statement that the attack on Herat was "an unjustifiable and cruel aggression?" That it was impolitic, the event
proved, and that its success, more especially after Russia had begun to take the
lead in it, would have seriously compromised British interests, may be readily
conceded; but surely in order to justify the determination to march to the relief
of Herat, it could not be necessary to make assertions which were false, and
could so easily be disproved.

The only other point in the manifesto to which it may be proper to advert,
is the alleged popularity of Shah Shujah in Afghanistan. His popularity, it is
affirmed, "had been proved to his lordship by the strong and unanimous testi-
mony of the best authorities." Who were these? First and superior to all
testimony was the fact that Shah Shujah had repeatedly attempted to regain
his throne, but was so feebly supported, and so formidably opposed, that he only
saved himself by flight, to return an almost solitary fugitive to the asylum
granted him by British generosity at Loodiana. Against this fact, unless some
extraordinary change of public feeling had since taken place (and this was not
alleged), the testimony of the best authorities ought not to have prevailed.
Besides, unless the governor-general was in possession of testimony which he
did not deem it necessary or proper to communicate, the correspondence, in
which the best authorities might have been expected fully to disclose their senti-
ments, does anything but bear "strong and unanimous testimony" to Shah
Shujah's popularity. It is unnecessary, however, to discuss the point further,
as future events only too clearly proved that the idea of this popularity, on the
faith of which the manifesto expresses a confident hope "that the Shah will be
speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents," was mere
delusion.

It thus appears that the Simla manifesto is little better than a tissue of
unjust accusations, gross mis-statements, and vain imaginations, and that the
hostilities about to be commenced, however triumphant they might prove, could
not be justified on grounds either of justice or expediency. War engaged in
under such circumstances was at once a blunder and a crime, and a successful
result being at variance with the moral laws by which Providence governs the
world, could hardly be anticipated. At the same time there were other consider-
ations connected with the war itself which gave it a very ominous appearance.
The nature of the country in which it was to be carried on; the turbulence, fer-
city, and boldness of the semi-barbarous tribes which occupied it; its immense
distance, which made it impossible to reach it till after a long and toilsome
march over desert tracts, and through deep, narrow, and precipitous gorges,
which a band of resolute men might close against an army; the almost insur-
mountable difficulty of transporting supplies and keeping open the communica-
tion with the districts from which they must necessarily be drawn—all these
things made it very questionable if the invading army would ever reach Cabool.
But assuming that it did, what then? "If you send 27,000 men up the Durra-i-
Bolan to Candahar," wrote Mr. Elphinstone, "and can feed them, I have no
doubt you will take Candahar and Cabool, and set up Shujah; but for maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong, and remote country, among a turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless." And what said the Duke of Wellington?—"The consequence of crossing the Indus once to settle a government in Afghanistan will be a perennial march into that country." The die however had been cast; and so little were the difficulties appreciated even in high quarters that, according to the celebrated and lamented Sir Henry Havelock, who took part in the campaign and published an excellent account of its earlier stage, "a civil functionary distinguished for talent addressing an officer of rank assured him that our advance into Afghanistan would be no more than a promenade militaire."

The Bengal portion of the army of the Indus, than which, says Havelock, "a force has never been brought together in any country in a manner more creditable and soldier-like," after assembling at Kurnal, marched westward to Ferozepoor, situated on the Garra, about thirty miles S.S.E. of Lahore, in the end of November. The governor-general and Runjeet Sing arrived here by previous appointment at the same time, and relieved their more grave political discussions by what Havelock calls "showy pageants, gay doings, and feats of mimic war." Lord Auckland's camp was about four miles from the Garra, and consisted of a wide street of large tents, in the centre of which was the suite of lofty and spacious apartments of canvas used for the durbar. On the 28th of November he was visited by the Maharajah. The etiquette pursued on the occasion and the whole scene are thus described by Havelock:—"There is an established ceremonial on these occasions. An escort of all arms usually lines the space between the pavilions for some hundred yards, and the elephants of the British suwarree are drawn up in front of the durbar tent." On the approach of the Maharajah, announced by a salute of ordnance, "the British suwarree moved forward a few yards to pay the compliment of the istighal, as it is called, or initiative advance in meeting, both suwarrees having halted for a moment before this courteous concession was made. Lord Auckland, habited in a blue coat embroidered with gold, and wearing the ribbon of the Bath, his secretaries in the showy diplomatic costume of similar colour and richness, Sir Henry Fane in the uniform of a general officer covered with orders, the tallest and most stately person in the whole procession of both nations, the numerous staffs of the civil ruler and military chief in handsome uniforms, made altogether a gallant show, as their animals with a simultaneous rush, urged by the blows and voices of the mohauts, moved to the front. Forward to meet them, there came on a noisy and disorderly though gorgeous rabble of Sikh horse and footmen, shouting out the titles of their great Sirdar, some habited in glittering brocade, some in the busonete, or bright spring yellow dresses which command so much respect in the Punjab, some wearing chain armour. But behind these clamorous foot and cavaliers, were the elephants
of the Lord of Lahore; and seated on the foremost was seen an old man in an advanced stage of decrepitude, clothed in faded crimson, his head wrapped up in folds of cloth of the same colour. His single eye still lighted up with the fire of enterprise, his gray hair and beard, and countenance of calm design, assured the spectators that this could be no other than the old ‘Lion of the Punjab.’ The shock of elephants at the moment of meeting is really terrific. More than a hundred of these active and sagacious but enormous animals, goaded on by their drivers in contrary directions, are suddenly brought to a stand-still by the collision of opposing fronts and foreheads. This is the most interesting moment; for now the governor-general, rising up in his howdah, approaches that of Runjeet, returns his salam, embraces him, and taking him by the arm, and supporting his tottering frame, places him by his side on his own elephant. All this is managed amidst the roaring, trumpeting, pushing and crushing of impetuous and gigantic animals, and then the one-eyed monarch having cordially shaken hands with Sir Henry Fane, and every one of the two suites whom he recognized (as the parties to receive his lordly greeting leant over the railing of their lofty vehicles), the beast which bore the burden of the two rulers was with difficulty wheeled about in the crowd, and the whole of both suwarrees rushed tumultuously and pèle mêle after it towards the entrance of the durbar tent.”

A strange incident closed the scene. “In a retired part of the suite of tents, were placed two very handsome, well-cast howitzers, intended as complimentary gifts to the Sikh ruler. These he came forth from the council tent, supported by Sir Henry Fane, to see. The light in the recesses of these spacious pavilions was glimmering and crepuscular, and the aged Maharajah, heedless of the shells which were piled in pyramids below, was stepping up towards the muzzles of the guns, when his feet tripped amid the spherical missiles, and in a moment he lay prostrate on his face and at full length upon the floor in front of the cannon. The kind and prompt exertions of Sir Henry replaced him instantaneously on his legs: but the spectacle of the Lord of the Punjab extended in involuntary obeisance before the mouths of the British artillery, was regarded by the Sikhs as a picture of fearful omen.” In the death of Runjeet Sing shortly afterwards, and subsequent events which resulted in the extinction of Sikh independence, the omen must have seemed to them signally fulfilled.

1 This very interesting relic was brought from Lahore. It is made of thin plates of gold, beautifully ornamented with arabesques of flowers, fastened on to a framework of wood. The cushions and lining to the throne are of crimson and yellow velvet.
The counter-visit of the governor-general to the Maharajah, and the entertainments and amusements following upon it, need not be described. It would give little pleasure to tell how groups of kunchunees, whom Havelock does not hesitate to call "choral and dancing prostitutes," performed "in presence of the ladies of the family of a British governor-general," and how Runjeet Sing, who was "brutally pre-eminent among Punjabees in his vices," sat on his musnad jesting familiarly with all who approached him, and pressing, almost forcing upon his illustrious guests "potations from his own cup of the fiery distilled spirit, which he himself had quaffed with delight for some forty years," but which "the hardest drinker in the British camp could not with impunity indulge in" for six successive nights. Nor is it necessary to dwell on the grand reviews, in which "the tactics and warlike forces of both nations were displayed to the best advantage, on two several days of martial exercise." Suffice it to quote the observation with which Havelock concludes his account of the Ferozepoor festivities. "It was the policy of the hour to humour and caress the old ruler of the Punjab, who with all his faults was now to be regarded as a valuable ally; and since he had come from his capital down to the Garra to meet us, might in some sort be reckoned, either on the one bank or the other, as a visitor. But it was impossible not to feel that this complaisance was carried a little too far, when he was exhibited in the character of a Bacchus or Silenus urging others to take part in his orgies, in the presence of an assemblage of English gentlewomen, and when these notions of decency were further outraged by the introduction, to whatever extent sanctioned by culpable usage in other parts of India, of bands of singing and dancing courtesans."

The whole of the force which had been assembled for the invasion of Afghanistan was not destined to be actually employed. After all the preparations had been made, on the understanding that it would be necessary to march to the relief of Herat, and there encounter a Persian army, aided perhaps by Russian auxiliaries, intelligence arrived that the siege of Herat was raised. One main inducement to the commencement of hostilities had ceased to exist, and the question immediately arose, whether the whole expedition might not now be abandoned. The governor-general, who appears to have become as resolute as he was at first hesitating, lost no time in setting this question at rest, by publishing orders which commenced with an extract from the letter of Colonel Stoddart, announcing that the siege was raised, and then proceeded as follows:—

"In giving publicity to this important intelligence, the governor-general deems it proper at the same time to notify, that while he regards the relinquishment by the Shah of Persia of his hostile designs upon Herat as a just cause of congratulation to the government of British India and its allies, he will continue to prosecute with vigour the measures which have been announced, with a view to the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, and to the establishment of a permanent barrier upon our
north-west frontier." The orders conclude with the appointment of Eldred Pottinger as political agent, and a well-deserved compliment to him for the "fortitude, ability, and judgment" with which, "under circumstances of peculiar danger and difficulty," he had "honourably sustained the reputation and interests of his country." In a letter to the secret committee, Lord Auckland justifies his determination to persevere, on the ground that it "was required from us, alike in observance of the treaties into which I had entered with the Maharajah Ranjeet Sing, and his majesty Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk, and by paramount considerations of defensive policy."

The campaign, however, having been deprived of one of the most important objects originally contemplated by it, did not require to be conducted on the same extensive scale. The British army assembled at Ferozepoor amounted to about 13,000 men. It was now determined that of these only 7500 should be actually employed. Sir Henry Fane, whose health had begun to fail, resolved, in consequence of the altered state of affairs, to resign his command and return to England. Previous to his departure, it became part of his duty to select the troops which were to proceed on the expedition. As all the regiments were eager for active service, the task of selection appeared to him so delicate and invidious, that he shrank from it, and abandoning the exercise of his own judgment had recourse to the extraordinary device of deciding by lot. The process was completed in his Excellency's tent, and the result was announced to be that the 1st, 2d, and 4th brigades were to move forward, and the 3d and 5th remain near the Garra. On this subject Havelock justly remarks, "Sir Henry Fane need not thus have distrusted, nor paid so poor a compliment to his own sagacity and impartiality; the one had seldom been at fault in India or in Europe, and the other was above suspicion." As might have been anticipated, the hap-hazard plan proved as mischievous as it was irrational, for "it sent forward to the labours of the campaign the 13th light infantry (Havelock's own regiment), then, as ever, zealous indeed and full of alacrity, but even at Ferozepoor shattered by disease—the spirit of the soldiers willing, but their physical powers unequal to the task; whilst it doomed to inactivity the Buffs, one of the most effective European corps in India." The whole army about to be employed in the Afghanistan expedition was now composed as follows: the Bengal force, under Major-general Sir Willoughby Cotton, 9500 men; Shah Shujah's, 6000, and the Bombay force contingent under Sir John Keane, who was appointed to succeed Sir Henry Fane as commander-in-chief, 5600—amounting in all to 21,100. Besides these, a force of about 3000 men was to be stationed in Scinde; and in the north, the Shahzada, Shah Shujah's eldest son, was to head a force of 4800 men, commanded by British officers, under the immediate superintendence of Colonel Wade, and penetrate with it and a Sikh contingent of 6000 through the Khyber Pass to Cabool. This route would also have been the most accessible for the army assembled at Ferozepoor, but
it would have been difficult to obtain the consent of Runjeet Sing, who with all his professed confidence in the British had not entirely divested himself of suspicion, and it was moreover necessary to select the route by which the meditated junction with the Bombay division might be most easily effected. Shah Shujah’s army, in order to give it the precedence which he was so anxious to claim for it, took the lead and commenced the march southward in the direction of Bahawulpoor, in the first week of December, 1836. On the 10th, a few days later, it was followed by the Bengal army, consisting of the cavalry brigade commanded by Colonel Arnold, the artillery brigade commanded by Major Pew, and the 1st, 2d, and 4th brigades of infantry, commanded respectively by Colonel Sale, Major-general Nott, and Lieutenant-colonel Roberts. The order of march was as follows. The sappers and miners and engineer department were to precede the leading column by never fewer than two marches, improving the line of road as they moved on. Then came the cavalry brigade, followed by the infantry brigades, one after the other on successive days, and the siege train and park. Besides a certain quantity of supplies which each column carried with it, the commissariat supplies of all kinds were sufficient for thirty days; additional quantities of grain were sent down the Indus to Roree, and depôts were formed at Bahawulpoor, Shikarpoo, &c. A large reserve depôt was moreover established at Ferozepoor. The camp followers were about 38,000, and the number of camels employed for supplies only was 14,235. Including the other camels, public and private, the whole number accompanying the army could not be less than 30,000. On the 27th of December the army arrived at Bahawulpoor. Little difficulty had been experienced. Though the weather was cold, the air was clear and healthy, the roads good, the country open, and at every stage the supplies were abundant. “These,” says Havelock “were the haleyon days of the movements of this force.” The greatest inconvenience experienced was the desertion of followers, who carried off the hired camels, and left their masters without the means of transport. For a large share of this inconvenience the masters had themselves to blame. Though an order of precaution had been issued, most of the officers had too many camels, too large tents, and too much baggage. The consequence was that even in the most favourable part of the march, forage became so difficult that the camels fell off greatly in condition, and the deaths were numerous. Those who had hired out their camels, having thus obtained a slight foretaste of the greater evils awaiting them, took the alarm, and as the most effectual means of escaping danger, resolved not to face it. The propinquity of the desert made it easy for them to effect their purpose, and the utmost vigilance of patrolling parties appointed for the purpose had little effect in preventing desertion. Before six marches had been completed, much private baggage, bedding, and camp equipage, was unavoidably abandoned.

The Khan of Bahawulpoor had always been a faithful British ally, and on
this occasion appears to have exerted himself in providing for the comfort of the army, though his means were scarcely adequate to his wishes, and some complaints were unreasonably made against him for not obviating or mitigating evils, which under the circumstances were absolutely inevitable. On the 1st of January, 1839, the army again started, and prepared to enter the territory of the Ameers of Scinde. Treaties already existed, in which the Ameers were recognized as independent princes and the mutual rights of the two governments clearly defined, but Lord Auckland had acted from the first as if he imagined that he had no occasion to solicit wherever he was able to compel, and that a treaty with a weaker gave a right to the stronger party to disregard its stipulations as often as the observance of these was felt to be inconvenient. In defiance of one of the articles on which the Ameers had specially insisted, and in which they felt that their strongest security against any attack on their independence lay, Lord Auckland had addressed a despatch to the resident in Scinde, in which he coolly told him in effect, that he had resolved to commit a breach of faith, and therefore, "while the present exigency lasts, you may apprise the Ameers that the article of the treaty with them, prohibiting the using of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores, must necessarily be suspended during the course of the operations undertaken for the permanent establishment of security to all those who are a party to the treaty." Not satisfied with this arrogant violation of an obligation to which the British government stood solemnly and publicly pledged, he goes on to give a kind of insight into the arrogant and iniquitous course of policy which he was prepared to pursue. It is hardly necessary, he says, "to remind you that in the important crisis at which we are arrived, we cannot permit our enemies to occupy the seat of power; the interests at stake are too great to admit of hesitation in our proceedings; and not only they who have shown a disposition to favour our adversaries, but they who display an unwillingness to aid us in the just and necessary undertaking in which we are engaged, must be displaced, and give way to others on whose friendship and co-operation we may be able implicitly to rely." These menaces are evidently made under an impression that the Ameers were unfriendly, but up to this period at least no proof of hostility had been obtained, and the unfriendliness of their feelings must have been inferred from a consciousness of the unjustifiable treatment to which they had been or were about to be subjected. The above language had been the guide of Colonel Pottinger with the Ameers of Hyderabad, and Captain (now Sir Alexander) Burns, was dealing in similar style with the Ameers of Khyrpoor. The invading army had fixed upon Bukkur, as the point at which the passage might be most conveniently effected. When this resolution was taken, the sanction of the Ameers had neither been asked nor obtained. Sir Alexander Burns, however, by the kind of blustering which he well knew how to use when it seemed useful, and of which the governor-general had set a
full example, had little difficulty in obtaining a consent to the route which had been selected. "The Scindian who hoped to stop the approach of the British army, might as well seek to dam up the Indus at Bukkur." But though the Ameers thus intimidated gave way, they stipulated that the forts on either bank of the river were to remain untouched. This was agreed to, and the British diplomatist immediately began to meditate a piece of Jesuitry. Bukkur stood on an island in the bed of the river. Was it therefore covered by the stipulation, which only reserved entire possession of the forts on its banks? This was the question which Sir Alexander Burnes put to himself, but he was ashamed or disdained to avail himself of such a palpable quibble, while aware that a compulsory course was open. His object was to obtain the cession of

Bukkur as the exclusive possession of the British during the war. Meer Roostum, the leading Ameer, finding it hopeless to resist, allowed the cession to be entered in the treaty as a separate article, the knowledge of which he might in the meantime be able to conceal from the other Ameers. When the treaty was sent to him for final ratification, the separate article, to which he had shown the utmost repugnance, filled him anew with alarm. "Bukkur," he said, "was the heart of his country, his honour was centred in keeping it; his family and children would have no confidence if it were given up." He offered another fort in its stead, or to give security that the British treasure and munitions would be protected. Resistance was unavailing, and the old man had no alternative but to attach his signature, the other chiefs looking on, and with difficulty restraining their indignation. Having made this sacrifice, by which he declared that he was irretrievably disgraced, Meer Roostum, surely more in irony than in earnest, asked what he could now do to prove the
sincerity of his friendship to the British government. The answer, said the British diplomatist, was plain. It was "to give us orders for supplies, and to place all the country, as far as he could, at our command." After such a transaction, both parties must have been aware that though the name of friendship might be used, nothing but hostility could be meant, and that the rulers of Scinde would to a certainty avail themselves of the first favourable opportunity of revenge.

Notwithstanding this rankling enmity in the breast of the rulers of Upper Scinde, it was something to have gained the peaceable possession of a strong fort commanding the passage of the Indus and most conveniently situated for a depot; and therefore when the army resumed its march it was with prospects somewhat improved, because it could now calculate on obtaining a peaceful passage across the river, and thus escaping from what threatened at one time to be one of the serious difficulties of the campaign. Continuing its route to the south-west at no great distance from the left bank of the river, the army arrived on the 14th of January at Subzulcote, the first place lying immediately beyond the Scinde frontier. Here intelligence was received, which seemed to necessitate an alteration in the movements which had been previously concerted. Sir John Keane, who had arrived with his troops off the coast of Scinde in the end of November, 1838, had not been permitted to land without some opposition. With difficulty he made his way to Tattah. He had brought no means of transport with him, and the Ameers, on whose friendly aid he had ventured to calculate, were from feelings which may be easily understood intent only on throwing obstructions in his way. A seasonable though very limited supply of carriage from Cutch enabled him to make some progress, and he advanced up the left bank of the river to Jurrak, only twenty miles S.S.W. of Hyderabad. Here he was obliged to halt. The Ameers of Hyderabad had not yet consented to his passage through their territory, and the negotiations which had been commenced with that view were anything but promising. This was a dilemma for which, though it certainly might have been anticipated, no provision had been made, and the important point was to determine how the oversight was to be remedied. The Bengal army had arrived at Roe, opposite to Bukkur, and Shah Shujah with his contingent had actually crossed the river and made his way to Shikarpore, where he had been joined by Mr. Macnaghten and his suite. Both the Shah and the envoy were bent on pushing onward, but Sir Henry Fane, who, with the intention of afterwards descending the Indus and embarking for England, was still accompanying the army as commander-in-chief, was decidedly of opinion that, in order to stimulate the decision of the Ameers and give relief to Sir John Keane, the greater part of the army, instead of crossing the river, should march down towards Hyderabad, under Sir Willoughby Cotton. This change was immediately executed, and the propriety of it seemed shortly afterwards confirmed by a message from Sir...
John Keane requesting a troop of horse artillery, a detachment of cavalry, and a brigade of infantry.

The downward movement was hailed with acclamation by the troops. The siege of Hyderabad, of the capture of which no doubt was entertained, would be a glorious episode in the campaign, while the enormous treasures which the Ameers were reputed to possess would give the captors something more substantial than glory. Mr. Macnaghten's feelings were very different. The movement on Hyderabad was characterized by him as "a wild goose chase." If Sir John Keane required aid it was reasonable to expect he would obtain it before Sir Willoughby Cotton could join him, as the reserve destined to be stationary in Scinde was on its way from Bombay. Meanwhile, the main business of the campaign was at a stand, and a whole season might be lost. The consequences were not to be foreseen. Entertaining these views, and fortified in them by a despatch from the governor-general, who declared it to be his first wish that the Bengal army should push forward with all possible expedition for Candahar, Mr. Macnaghten made a formal and emphatic requisition for such a force as would render it possible forthwith to prosecute the campaign in Afghanistan. "I have already urged in the strongest terms your crossing over to this side of the river with your whole force. Of Sir John Keane's army there can be no apprehension." He concluded thus:—"Dangerous as the experiment might be, it would, in my opinion, be infinitely better that he should let loose fifteen or twenty thousand of Runjeet Sing's troops (who would march down upon Hyderabad in a very short time), than that the grand enterprise of restoring Shah Shujah to the throne of Cabool and Candahar should be postponed for an entire season. By such a postponement it might be frustrated altogether." The collision which had thus become imminent between the civil and military authorities was happily saved without the necessity of either continuing the march upon Hyderabad, or adopting Mr. Macnaghten's extraordinary substitute of letting loose 20,000 Sikhs. The Ameers of Hyderabad, thoroughly intimidated like those of Khyrpoor, followed their example by yielding to the pressure brought to bear upon them.

This pressure must have been extreme. According to the resident in Scinde, "a strong and universal impression" existed throughout the country "as to our grasping policy," and this impression was now fully confirmed, both by the arbitrary manner in which the obligations of existing treaties had been set aside, and by the proposal that the Ameers should agree to receive a permanent subsidiary force. Nor was this all. The fourth article of the tripartite treaty was couched as follows:—"Regarding Shikarpooer and the territory of Scinde lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade." This treaty was concluded on the 26th of June, 1838,
and the nature of the mediation proposed was not allowed to remain long in doubt, for on the 26th of July the political secretary to government, in a long letter to the resident, inclosing a copy of the tripartite treaty and other documents, to enable him to make the Ameers "fully and fairly acquainted with the motives and intentions of the British government," tells him that "the governor-general has not yet determined the amount which the Ameers may be fairly called upon to pay," but that "the minimum may fairly be taken at twenty lacs of rupees" (£200,000). His lordship, he adds, will endeavour to prevail on Shah Shujah to reduce his claim on the Ameers to "a reasonable amount," and trusts that the resident "will have no difficulty in convincing them of the magnitude of the benefits, from securing the undisturbed possession of the territories they now hold, and obtaining immunity for all future claims on this account by a moderate pecuniary sacrifice." In replying to this despatch, the resident expressed "considerable doubts as to their (the Ameers) acceding to the pecuniary proposals, or rendering other assistance." "I do not think," he says, "that the remote advantage (for such they will consider it), of being relieved from the future claims of the King of Cabool, will have any (or at least it will be very little) weight with these short-sighted and suspicious chiefs." "Many besides the Scindees will believe at the outset that we are making a mere use of Shah Shujah’s name," and therefore, as we are about to make a proposal which will strengthen the existing impression of "our grasping policy," and to "revive a claim to tribute which has long been esteemed obsolete," he intimates his intention "to request the governor of Bombay to take early steps to prepare a force for eventual service in Scinde."

The nature of the favour which Shah Shujah proposed to confer upon the Ameers, and the use which he intended to make of the money he expected them to pay in return, were expounded in the 16th article of the tripartite treaty, by which Shah Shujah agreed "to relinquish for himself, his heirs and successors, all claims of supremacy and arrears of tribute over the country now held by the Ameers of Scinde (which will continue to belong to the Ameers and their successors in perpetuity), on condition of payment to him by the Ameers of such a sum as may be determined under the mediation of the British government, fifteen lacs of rupees of such payment being made over by him to Maharajah Runjeet Sing." The wily Lahore prince had thus made sure of the lion’s share of the money about to be extorted by British mediation and the revival of an obsolete claim. The determination of the Ameers not to be thus fleeced for the enriching of a sovereign from whom they had received nothing but injuries, threatened to disarrange the whole of the governor-general’s plans, and therefore, after some declamation on "the deep duplicity displayed by the principal Ameer" in secretly communicating with the King of Persia on "the distracted state of the government of Scinde," and on "the feelings of unwarrantable enmity and jealousy with which, notwithstanding the recent measures
by which their authority was preserved from impending destruction, we appear to be regarded by some of the chiefs of that country," he intimates to the resident that he is prepared to go much further than he had proposed, and instead of trusting to the moral effect of a demonstration, he considers it "essential to the cause in which we have embarked, and no more than what is due to a just regard for our own interests, that a British force of not less than 5000 men should advance with the least practicable delay for the occupation of Shikarpur, or such parts of Scinde as may be deemed most eligible for facilitating our operations beyond the Indus, and for giving full effect to the provisions of the tripartite treaty."

The resident, subsequent to the date of this despatch, had made a discovery which ought to have set the pecuniary question at rest. In a letter, dated October 9, 1838, he says: "The question of a money payment by the Ameers of Scinde to Shah Shuja-ul-Moolk, is in my humble opinion rendered very puzzling, by two releases written in korans, and signed and sealed by his majesty, which they have produced. Their argument now is that they are sure the Governor-general of India does not intend to make them pay again for what they have already bought and obtained in the most binding form a receipt in full. I have procured copies of the releases, and will give them my early attention." After this statement, he proceeds, now very unnecessarily, one would think, if double payment was not to be insisted on, to discuss "the ability of the Ameers of Hyderbad to pay," and gives his decided opinion that they "cannot be so rich as they have been reported." In a subsequent letter, after he had objected the releases to a critical examination, he writes: "The one given to the late Moorad Ali Khan is drawn up with great skill and caution, and left the question of tribute, at least, exactly on the previous footing. That granted to the present Ameers is stronger; as will be observed, it contains: a formal renunciation in behalf of the king, of any sort of claim or pretensions in Scinde and Shikarpur, and their dependencies; and promises that none shall be made. How this is to be got over, I do not myself see, but I submit the documents with every deference for the consideration and decision of the Governor-general of India." The reply of the governor-general is curious. He was acting as a mediator between the Ameers and Shah Shuja, and had pledged himself to reduce the demands of the latter to a reasonable amount, and yet when releases are produced, showing that the alleged debt has been wholly paid and discharged, he refrains "from recording any opinion" relative to them, and writes as follows: "Admitting the documents produced to be genuine, and that they imply a relinquishment of all claim to tribute, they would hardly appear to be applicable to present circumstances, and it is not conceivable that his majesty should have foregone so valuable a claim without some equivalent, or that some counterpart agreement should not have been taken, the nonfulfillment of the terms of which may have rendered null and void his majesty's
engagements. Whatever may be the real facts of the case, the question is one which concerns the contracting parties." He afterwards gives it as his opinion "that it is not incumbent on the British government to enter into any formal investigation of the plea adduced by the Ameers." In other words, while professing to act as umpire between two parties, he does all he can to enforce the claim of the one, and refuses to look at the documents produced by the other to show that the claim was groundless. The whole proceeding is in fact disgraceful. Runjeet Singh has been bribed into a treaty by the promise of a large sum of money; Shah Shujah, besides having engaged to furnish the sum, needs in addition to it a large sum for his own purposes; and the governor-general allows himself to become the instrument of extorting both sums from a third party, who is under no obligations to pay it, and whom the British government was specially pledged to protect against all injustice. Such being the manner in which advantage was taken of the supposed weakness of the Ameers to extort money from them, it is easy to understand how suspicious they were of every proposal made to them, and how they had recourse to all possible forms of finesse and tergiversation, in order to evade the conclusion of a treaty which they regarded as equivalent to a renunciation of their independence. Ultimately, however, after their capital was threatened by the advance of Sir John Keane from the south, and Sir Willoughby Cotton from the north, they saw the necessity of yielding with as good a grace as possible, and signed a treaty conceding everything that had been asked of them.

The terms and the advantages secured by the treaty are thus summed up by the governor-general in a letter to the secret committee:—"I may be permitted to offer my congratulations to you upon this timely settlement of our relations with Scinde, by which our political and military ascendency in that province is now finally declared and confirmed. The main provisions of the proposed engagements are that the confederacy of the Ameers is virtually dissolved, each chief being upheld in his own possessions, and bound to refer his differences with the other chiefs to our arbitration; that Scinde is placed formally under British protection, and brought within the circle of our Indian relations; that a British force is to be fixed in Lower Scinde at Tattah, or such other point westward of the Indus as the British government may determine—a sum of three lacs of rupees per annum, in aid of the cost of this force, being paid in equal proportions by the three Ameers, Meer Noor Mahomed Khan, Meer Nusseer Mahomed Khan, and Mea Meer Mahomed Khan; and that the navigation of the Indus, from the sea to the most northern part of the Scinde territory, is rendered free of all toll. These are objects of high undoubted value, and especially so when acquired without bloodshed, as the first advance towards that consolidation of our influence, and extension of the general benefits of commerce throughout Afghanistan, which form the great end of our designs. It cannot be doubted that the complete submission of the Ameers will go far towards
diffusing in all quarters an impression of the futility of resistance to our arms. The command of the navigation of the Indus, up to the neighbourhood of the junction of the five rivers, will, by means of steam vessels, add incalculably to the value of our frontier; and the free transit of its waters, at a time when a considerable demand for merchandise of many kinds will be created by the mere onward movement of our forces, will give a spur to enterprise by this route, from which it may be hoped that permanent advantages will be derived. These are undoubtedly great advantages, but it is deeply to be regretted that when the governor-general congratulated the secret committee that they had been acquired "without bloodshed," he was not able to add that they had been acquired honourably, without fraud, extortion, and intimidation.

The treaty having been signed by the Ameers on the 5th of February, 1839, there was no longer any occasion for the downward movement on Hyderabad, nor any obstruction to the advance of the Bombay force. The Bengal army accordingly having crossed the Indus at Bukkur, reached Shikarpour on the 20th of February, and on the same day, the Bombay force continuing its march along the right bank of the Indus, arrived at Sehwan, situated on the Arrul, about four miles above its junction with the Indus. On the following day Sir Henry Fane, who had now quitted the army and was hastening down the river to embark for England, arrived, with his fleet of boats, at the point of junction, and after an interview with Sir John Keane, continued his voyage. At Shikarpour the plan of giving the lead to Shah Shujah's force was abandoned, and Sir Willoughby Cotton, leaving the 2d brigade behind, started at the head of the other two, on the 23d, after a halt of only three days, in the direction of Dadur, situated N.N.W., at the entrance to the celebrated Bolan Pass. The real difficulties of the march had now commenced. The route lay through a country which was almost desert, and the effect of excessive fatigue and deleterious forage on the carriage cattle became daily more and more manifest. Even the road between the Indus and Shikarpour had been literally strewn with dead and dying camels. What might now be expected when, in addition to other physical difficulties, a want of water began to be experienced? The roads which had been previously cut were tolerably good, but nothing could be more desolate than the tracts through which they led. The soil, if such it could be called, was merely a hard sand impregnated with salt, which crackled beneath the horses' feet, and where a few stunted thorny shrubs were almost the only signs of vegetable life. "From Rojhan," says Havelock, "to the town and mud-forts of Burshooree, extends an unbroken level of twenty-seven miles of sandy desert, in which there is not only neither well, spring, stream, nor puddle, but not a tree, and scarcely a bush, an herb, or a blade of grass." Over this dead monotonous flat, where delay was impossible, the army hastened as rapidly as it could, and at Burshooree, where numerous wells had been previously dug, obtained some refreshment, though the water still scantily supplied
was of very indifferent quality. Head-quarters were fixed at Bhaj on the 6th of March. Here, water being found in abundance, and grain in sufficient quantities to supply immediate wants, the remainder of the march to Dadur, where the Cutch Gundavya desert terminates, was accomplished with comparatively little difficulty, though with every step in advance the number, boldness, and dexterity of the marauders seemed to increase. Exactly three months had elapsed since the army moved from Ferozepoor. While the Bengal army had been thus advancing, Sir John Keane was toiling up the right bank of the Indus, much obstructed by the nature of the ground, but suffering little from insufficient supplies, as a fleet of boats was accompanying him. On the 4th of March he reached Lackhana, while his boats advanced as far as Roree. As part of the Bengal force was still stationed here, Sir John Keane proceeded formally to assume the command of the army of the Indus. Some new arrangements were at the same time made. The infantry formed two divisions—a Bengal and a Bombay, the former consisting of three brigades, denominated 1st, 2d, and 4th, commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton; and the latter, consisting of two brigades, a 1st and 2d, commanded by Major-general Wollard. The cavalry, formed into two brigades, designated by their presidencies, were commanded by Brigadiers Arnot and Scott. The command of the whole artillery was given to Brigadier Stevenson.

On the 14th of March, the leading column, consisting of the horse artillery, the 2d light cavalry, H.M. 13th light infantry, and the 48th native infantry, started from Dadur, and passed onwards to penetrate into the Bolan Pass, which gives the only practicable entrance into Afghanistan from the south-east. It is a deep continuous ravine about fifty-five miles in length, intersecting the Brahuiick Mountains, part of the range which, breaking off nearly at right angles from the Hindoo Koh, stretches, under different names, from north to south with little interruption, through nearly ten degrees of latitude. The pass is traversed by a river of the same name, the channel of which, covered with boulders and rounded pebbles, is the only road. On both sides, the mountains, which at their greatest elevation are nearly 5700 feet above the level of the
sea, alternately close and recede, sometimes leaving gaps of considerable width, but more frequently approaching within 400 to 500 yards, and presenting abrupt precipices of conglomerate of a dull and uniform brown colour, "as repulsive in appearance," says Outram, "as they are barren in reality." In some places the river is hemmed in between perpendicular rocks, which leave it a channel of sixty to eighty feet wide. This during the rainy season it completely fills, so that an army caught in it would inevitably perish. Nor is this the only danger to be apprehended in these narrow gorges. The mountaineers, concealing themselves within the caves on each side, lie in wait for plunder, and seizing the fit opportunity, rush forth and make an easy prey of their helpless victims in the channel below. Such was the pass through which the British army was now to penetrate. To smooth the way, money had been distributed with a liberal hand among the mountaineers, but little confidence could be placed in their pacific professions, and it was at all events to be apprehended that the Barukzye chiefs, now threatened with extinction, would, without waiting to be attacked, hasten to meet the invaders, when the very nature of the ground would almost to a certainty secure them the victory. Strange to say, though marauders were numerous, no hostile force appeared, and the army, which had entered the pass on the 16th of March, finally emerged on the 24th into the valley of Shawl, without an encounter. Three days afterwards it encamped in the immediate vicinity of Kwettah or Quettah, the capital of the district, and one of the dependencies of Mehrab Khan, the Beloochee ruler of the province of Khelat. His alleged failure to fulfil the conditions of a treaty made with him by Sir Alexander Burnes afterwards brought down the vengeance of the British government upon him, and cost him his life; but it is difficult to believe that if he had been as treacherous and hostile as he was said to be, he would not have manifested it when he might have caught our army among the entanglements of the Bolan Pass.

Sir Willoughby Cotton, now under the command of Sir John Keane, had been ordered to halt at Quettah. This seems a simple operation, but was, under the circumstances, one of serious difficulty. On leaving Dadur, his supplies were adequate to not more than a month's consumption. Half of that period had already elapsed, and the calculation now was, that were the march continuous and unopposed, only a few days' supplies would remain in store when Candahar should be reached. How much then must the threatened starvation be increased by the halt which had been ordered? Under these circumstances the only expedient that could be devised was to diminish consumption. "Accordingly," says Havelock, "from the 28th of March, the loaf of the European soldiers was diminished in weight, the native troops received only half, instead of a full seer of ottah per diem, and the camp-followers, who had

1 For illustration of a Barukzye, see p. 372
2 The seer weighs 2 lbs.; ottah is wheaten flour prepared in a particular way.
hitherto found it difficult to subsist on half a seer, were of necessity reduced to
the famine allowance of a quarter of a seer." Some prospect of relief was
obtained from the treaty which Sir Alexander Burnes had just concluded with
the Khan of Khelat, who, in return for a guarantee of his real independence by
the British government, had agreed to yield a nominal allegiance to Shah
Shujah, and to furnish supplies of grain and camels. These supplies were never
given, and there was reason to suspect that the khan was craftily endeavouring
to keep the peace with both sides, until he could see clearly which of the two
was to win. At the same time he made no secret of his opinion. Shah
Shujah "ought," he said, "to have trusted to the Afghans to restore him;
whereas he is essaying to deluge the land with Hindoostanees, an insult which

MUD-PORT AND TOWN OF QUETTAIN.—From Fane's Five Years in India.

his own people will never forgive him. This will never do. You English may
keep him by main force for a time on the musnud, but as soon as you leave the
kingdom, your Shah Shujah will be driven beyond its frontier. He will never
be able to resist the storm of national and religious animosity which is already
raised against him in the breasts of the Afghans." It is rather curious that
while Mehrab Khan, who was doubtless well informed on the subject, was thus
declaring the unpopularity of the sovereign who was about to be imposed on
Afghanistan, he was himself giving utterance to language which proves that
the hatred was mutual. Mr. Macnaghten, in a letter to the governor-general,
speaking of Shah Shujah, says, "His opinion of the Afghans as a nation is, I
regret to say, very low. He declares that they are a pack of dogs, one and all,
and as for the Barukzyes, it is utterly impossible that he can ever place the
slightest confidence in any one of that accursed race. We must try and bring
him gradually round to entertain a more favourable opinion of his subjects."
There was thus a double hatred to be overcome. Where, then, was the attach-
ment so loudly boasted in the Simla manifesto, and in which even yet both the
governor-general and the envoy professed to have implicit faith?

Vol. III.
Sir John Keane, made aware of the necessity of an immediate advance, was hastening forward with an escort to take the personal command, and fixed his head-quarters at Quettah on the 6th of April. The new arrangement, previously made, now took effect, and the two divisions of the army of the Indus, the Bengal and the Bombay, were placed under the immediate command respectively of Sir Willoughby Cotton and General Wellshire. The latter appointment produced some dissatisfaction. General Nott, who was an older major-general than General Wellshire, thought that he himself, as well as the Company's service, was slighted by the preference given to his junior, apparently, as he alleged, for no better reason than because he was a queen's officer, and remonstrated in as strong terms as the etiquette of the service would allow. It was in vain. The commander-in-chief adhered to his arrangement, and Nott, after he had even gone the length of tendering his resignation, quitted the divisional command which he had held under Sir Willoughby Cotton, to resume the command of the 2d Bengal brigade, with the additional mortification of knowing that it was to be left behind in garrison at Quettah, and consequently precluded from an active share in the coming struggle.

As the halt at Quettah had consumed eleven days, no time was to be lost, and the army again started the very next morning after Sir John Keane's arrival. It was now generally reported that the Candahar chiefs, after long and unaccountable delays, were at last mustering for the encounter. The very locality was named—the Kojuk Pass, almost as difficult as that of the Bolan. It proved a false alarm; and the next rumour was that Kohan Dil Khan, the principal chief of Candahar, while reserving the main body of his troops for the defence of his capital, had detached a large body of men, under two chiefs, on a secret expedition. One of the chiefs said to have been thus detached was Hajee Khan Kakur, and certainly, in so far as he was concerned, the rumour was soon falsified, for early on the morning of the 20th April that chief entered the British camp, at the head of about a hundred horsemen, and tendered his submission to the Shah. This was only one of a series of treacheries of which he had been guilty, and his new friends were destined to learn that it was not his last. His present defection, however, which it appears had been purchased by a bribe of 10,000 rupees (£1000), was important, and produced so much consternation among the Barukzye chiefs, who knew not how many others might have sold, or were prepared to sell themselves, that they abandoned all idea of defence, and prepared for flight. As soon as this was understood, Shah Shujah, who had been lagging in the rear, was again placed with his contingent in the van, and was thus enabled, in name at least, to reach Candahar at the head of his own troops. He made his entrance on the 25th of April, not only unopposed, but with some appearance of welcome, the sincerity of which, however, was very problematical. It is said indeed not to have been volunteered, but bought by a lavish distribution of money from the Calcutta treasury.
This was a resource in which the envoy appears to have had unbounded confidence, but Havelock doubtless takes a wiser view when, contrasting the results of success obtained by arms and by mercenary means, he says that "one hour of the former "outweighs the results of months of intrigue and negotiation," and that "the clash of steel for a few short moments will ever gain for the British, in the diffusion throughout Asia of an opinion of their strength, a greater advantage than all the gold in their coffers can purchase." The opposite views thus taken may account for the very different impressions produced by the Shah's reception. The envoy's account is, "We have, I think, been most fortunate every way. The Shah made a grand public entry into the city this morning, and was received with feelings nearly amounting to adoration."

Havelock speaking, not of the entrance into Candahar, but of a grand ceremony of public recognition which took place on the 8th of May, in the plains lying immediately to the north of it, says: "Unless I have been deceived, all the national enthusiasm of the scene was entirely confined to his majesty's immediate retainers; the people of Candahar are said to have viewed the whole affair with the most mortifying indifference. Few of them quitted the city to be present in the plains, and it was remarked with justice that the passage in the diplomatic programme, which prescribed a place behind the throne for 'the populace, restrained by the Shah's troops,' was very superfluous." Subsequent events go far to prove that Havelock's impression is the more correct, but it is fair to add that he was not personally present, and that many of those who were present participated in the envoy's delusion.

On the 4th of May, by the arrival of the Bombay division, the whole forces of the army of the Indus, with the exception of those left behind in garrison or for observation at Bukkur, Shikarpoo, Dadur, Sukkar, and Quettah, were
encamped under the walls of Candahar. The pleasantness of relaxing after
the fatigues of a most difficult and disastrous march, and the round of cere-
monies and parades kept up for the purpose of enabling Shah Shujah to feel him-
self, as he expressed it, "to be a king indeed," appear for a time to have banished
all thought of military operations, and not till the 12th of May, more than a
fortnight after the arrival at Candahar, was it deemed necessary to look after
its fugitive Barukzye chiefs. Brigadier Sale was then despatched in pursuit,
at the head of a large body of troops composed mainly of the Shah's contingent,
with a sprinkling of Europeans. It was obviously too late, and the only result
was to learn that had more despatch been used it would have been crowned
with success, since the chiefs with their families had been detained eight days
on the left bank of the Helmund, unable to cross it, and in daily fear of being
overtaken. Sale returned from his fruitless expedition on the 28th, the same
day on which a striking exemplification was given of the lawless state of the
country and the sanguinary spirit of its people. Several parties of officers had
gone out to enjoy a day's fishing in the Urghundab. All of them breaking up
in good time returned in safety, except Lieutenants Inverarity and Wilmer, who
lingered on the bank till after sunset. The appearance of armed men, sup-
posed to belong to predatory gangs in the vicinity, ought to have put them
on their guard, but with singular imprudence they had sent off their horses
with their servants, and were not even armed. Proceeding home in the clear
moon-light, Lieutenant Inverarity, who was considerably in advance of his
companion, was suddenly assailed in a defile by armed men, cut down and sav-
agely mutilated. Lieutenant Wilmer, totally unconscious of what had happened,
had no sooner reached the scene of the atrocity, than he was in like manner
attacked, but happily by parrying the first blows with his walking-stick was
able to flee and reach a detachment of the Shah's infantry. An armed party
sent to the spot found Lieutenant Inverarity still alive, but so dreadfully
mangled that he almost immediately expired. Shah Shujah, on being informed
of the atrocity, strongly expressed his abhorrence of it, and his determination to
search out and punish the perpetrators; at the same time, blaming the im-
prudence which gave them the opportunity of committing it, he showed what
he thought of his new subjects by repeatedly exclaiming to the English
officers around him, "O! gentlemen, you must be more cautious here: remem-
ber you are not now in Hindooistan."

On the 27th of June, the day on which Runjeet Sing breathed his last, the
army moved from Candahar, leaving garrisons there and at Girishk, a fort
immediately beyond the Helmund, which Brigadier Sale had captured on his
expedition. The guns and mortars of the siege train, after being dragged with
almost incredible difficulty through the Bolan and Kojak passes, were also left
behind. As yet there had been no occasion to use them, and it seems to have
been hence inferred that they might in future be dispensed with. This was
rather an extraordinary inference, seeing that the fortress of Ghuznee, deemed by the Afghans to be impregnable, lay in the very line of march, and must be captured previous to the advance on Cabool. It was hoped, however, that it would be abandoned like Candahar, or that its defences would prove far weaker than Afghan exaggeration represented. When it was reached, on the 21st of July, the appearance and the means of resistance were at once seen to be formidable. Ghuznee stood at the extremity of a range of hills which, sloping upwards, seemed to form the background to its fortifications. These cannot be better described than in the words of Captain Thomson, the chief engineer:—

“When we came before it, on the morning of the 21st of July, we were very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about thirty-five feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a faisce braie and a wet ditch. The irregular figure of the enceinte gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been enlarged; screen walls had been built before the gates; the ditch cleared out and filled with water (stated to be unfordable), and an outwork built on the right bank of the river so as to command the bed of it.” A nearer view having been obtained by clearing out some gardens in front, which the enemy had occupied, he observes, “This was not at all satisfactory; the works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to anticipate, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner with the means at our disposal. We had no battering train, and to attack Ghuznee in form a larger train would be required than the enemy ever possessed. The great height of the parapet above the plain (sixty or seventy feet), with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack merely by mining or escalading.”
The British army, brought thus recklessly in front of a fortress of a formidable character, and to the strength of which, according to Sir John Keane's official account, the Afghans had for the last thirty years been yearly adding, had evidently a very gloomy prospect before it. Without regular means of taking the place, it must yet either capture it or commence a disastrous retreat. The garrison was 3500 strong, a large reinforcement from Cabool was expected, and the Ghilijies, through whose rugged territory, studded with mountain forts, the retreat must have been conducted, were, so far from cordially welcoming Shah Shujah, disposed, like not a few of their countrymen, to take the first opportunity of convincing the invaders how much both he and they were detested by them. Most fortunately the engineers, on closely examining the works, in order to ascertain whether some irregular mode of attack might not be adopted, discovered what seemed to be a tangible point in the Cabool gateway. "The road up to the gate was clear; the bridge over the ditch was unbroken; there were good positions for the artillery within 350 yards of the walls on both sides of the road, and we had information that the gateway was not built up, a reinforcement from Cabool being expected." What a number of coincidences which the besiegers could not have anticipated, and the existence of which must be attributed solely to their good fortune—a clear road, an unbroken bridge, and out of many gates a single one not built up! On this discovery, the engineers reported to the commander-in-chief "that if he decided on the immediate attack of Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of attack, and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was a dash at the Cabool gateway, blowing the gate open by bags of powder." Sir John Keane, thus instructed, could not hesitate. He had in fact brought his army into a position where there was no choice, and in resolving to burst open the gate, he did not so much exercise his judgment as yield to necessity.

The resolution being formed, no time was lost in making the necessary preparations. As the Cabool gate was on the north-east side of the fort, the troops moved in two columns, and took up a position so as to command both the gate and the road to Cabool. The latter object had become important in consequence of a confident statement that Dost Mahomed in person was marching at the head of a considerable force to attempt the relief of Ghuznee. The orders for the attack were issued on the 22d of July, and were mainly as follows: "At twelve o'clock P.M., the artillery will commence moving toward the fort, and the batteries will follow each other in succession, at the discretion of the brigadier commanding. The guns must be placed in the most favourable positions, with the right above the village on the hill north-east of the fortress, and their left amongst the gardens on the Cabool road. They must all be in position before daylight." "The storming party will be under command of Brigadier Sale, C.B., and will be composed as follows—viz. the advance to consist of the light companies of H.M.'s 2d and 17th regiments; of the (47th) European
regiment, and of a flank company 13th light infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Dennie, C.B." "The main column will consist of H.M.'s 2d regiment of foot; of the (47th) European regiment, with the remainder of H.M.'s 13th light infantry formed as skirmishers on the flanks; the latter will push into the fort with the rear of the main column. H.M.'s 17th regiment will be formed in support, and will follow the storming party into the works." "The whole must quit their respective encampments in columns of companies at quarter distance, right in front, so as to insure their arrival at the place appointed for the rendezvous by two o'clock A.M." "At half-past twelve o'clock the companies of the 13th light infantry, intended to act as skirmishers, will move up to cover in front of the gateway, and be ready to keep down any fire on the party of engineers who proceed to blow it open; this last party will move up to the gateway before daybreak, followed slowly, and at some distance, by the assaulting column. On the chief engineer finding the opening practicable he will have the advance sounded for the column to push on; when the head of the column has passed the gateway, a signal must be made for the artillery to turn their fire from the walls of the town on the citadel." "At twelve o'clock P.M., three companies of native infantry (48th) will quit camp, and move round the gardens on the south of the town, where they will establish themselves, and about three A.M. open a fire upon the place for the purpose of distracting the attention of the garrison." The infantry of the division, not warned for duty, was to be formed as a reserve. These orders, which were to be considered strictly "confidential for this night," were to be communicated to the troops only in such portions "as might be absolutely necessary to secure compliance with their various provisions."

The explosion party, on whom, in the first instance, everything depended, consisted of Captain Peat of the Bombay, and Lieutenants Durand and Macleod of the Bengal army, three sergeants and eighteen sappers, carrying 300 lbs. of powder in twelve sand-bags, with a hose seventy-two feet long. Headed by Lieutenant Durand the party moved steadily on, laid the hose, fired the train, and in less than two minutes gained tolerable cover. The explosion did its work effectually, and Dennie, at the head of his stormers, pushed forward to the gap which it had made. As the garrison, having no idea of the kind of attack intended, were taken completely by surprise, access was gained without much difficulty, and announced to the camp without by three loud cheers. While Sale was hastening up with the main column he was arrested by the information of one of the officers of engineers, who, confused and shattered by the explosion, against which, in his eagerness to witness the effect, he had not sufficiently sheltered himself, told him that the falling masses of stone and timber had so choked up the gateway that the storming party had been unable to enter. Crediting this information the brigadier sounded the retreat, and a halt took place which well nigh proved fatal. The garrison, when once aware
of the real point of attack, rushed down to the gate, and Dennie and his party
must soon have been overpowered had not the bugle, still sounding the advance,
and the statement of another engineer convinced Sale that his first informant
was mistaken. "Forward!" therefore, was the order again given, and a
desperate struggle took place among the ruins of the gateway. Sale himself
made an almost miraculous escape, which we must permit Havelock to narrate.
"One of their number (the garrison) rushing over the fallen timbers, brought
down Brigadier Sale by a cut in the face with his sharp shansheer (sabre).
The Afghan repeated his blow as his opponent was falling; but the pummel,
not the edge of his sword this time took effect, though with stunning violence.
He lost his footing, however, in the effort, and Briton and Afghan rolled
together among the fractured timbers. Thus situated, the first care of the

brigadier was to master the weapon of his adversary. He snatched at it, but
one of his fingers met the edge of the trenchant blade. He quickly withdrew
his wounded hand and adroitly replaced it over that of his adversary, so as to
keep fast the hilt of his shansheer. But he had an active and powerful oppo-
ment, and was himself faint from the loss of blood. Captain Kershaw of the 13th,
aide-de-camp to Brigadier Baumgardt, happened, in the mêlée, to approach the
scene of conflict; the wounded leader recognized him and called to him for aid.
Kershaw passed his drawn sabre through the body of the Afghan; but still the
desperado continued to struggle with frantic violence. At length, in the fierce
grapple, the brigadier for a moment got uppermost. Still retaining the weapon
of his enemy in his left hand, he dealt him with his right a cut from his own
sabre which cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. The Mahometan
shouted Ne Ullah! (O God!) and never moved or spoke again."

As soon as an entrance was secured there could be no doubt as to the ulti-
mate capture, but the fight was manfully maintained by the Afghans till
more than 500 of their number had fallen sword in hand. Many more were cut down without the walls in attempting to escape. Among the 1600 prisoners taken, was the governor Hyder Khan, a brother of Dost Mahomed. In the hope of a protracted defence the place had been provided with immense stores of grain and flour. These, together with a large number of horses and arms, and a considerable sum in money, formed a very valuable booty.

The capture of Ghuznee, though good fortune had certainly a large share in achieving it, was most honourable to the British arms, not only on account of the valour and prowess displayed, but also of the moderation with which victory was used. Quarter was never asked in vain, and not a single female was outraged. This fact, so rare under similar circumstances, well deserves special record, both for its own sake, and for the important lesson which it teaches. No spirit rations had been served out to the soldiers during the preceding fortnight. On this Havelock remarks: "No candid man of any military experience will deny that the character of the scene in the fortress and the citadel would have been far different, if individual soldiers had entered the town primed with arack, or if spirituous liquors had been discovered in the Afghan depots." In proportion to the exultation of the British was the consternation produced among the followers of Dost Mahomed. His son Afzal Khan, who had been hovering in the vicinity with a large force, with which he hoped to fall upon the besiegers when baffled, dispirited, and exhausted by a protracted defence, took flight the moment he heard that Ghuznee had fallen, leaving his elephants and camp equipage behind him. His father was so enraged that he refused to receive him, and loudly professed his determination to maintain the struggle to the last. In this, however, he was not serious. His desperate position was manifest. In the early part of the campaign, supposing that the main attack would be made in concert with the Sikhs by the Khyber Pass, he had despatched his favourite son Akbar Khan in that direction, with the larger part of his forces, and had been obliged to recall him when made aware of the real quarter from which the greatest danger was to be apprehended. The Khyber Pass thus left unguarded made it comparatively easy for Colonel Wade to advance through it, with the force of which Prince Timour, Shah Shujah's son, was nominal commander. Cabool was thus about to be attacked from two opposite directions, and it was vain to hope that any effectual resistance could be offered. Negotiation therefore seemed to be his only resource, and his brother Jubbar Khan, after the sanction of a council of war had been obtained, was despatched to the British camp for the purpose of ascertaining the kind of terms that might be expected. His own proposal was to acknowledge Shah Shujah as his sovereign, provided he himself were guaranteed in the hereditary office of wuzeer or prime minister. This proposal seemed too extravagant to be listened to for a moment, and the only thing offered was what was called an honourable asylum within the British territories, on condition of immediate
surrender. When the views of the parties were so diametrically opposed, it was useless to keep up the appearance of negotiation, and Jubbart Khan took his departure.

Dost Mahomed began now to exhibit the energy of despair, and marched out at the head of his troops with a determination to give battle. It soon became apparent that he would be left entirely without the means. To whatever side he looked he saw only signs of lukewarmness and treachery. Entreaty, remonstrance, and reproach were equally in vain, and his ranks thinned so rapidly that only a handful of followers worthy of confidence remained. He therefore made a merit of necessity, and giving a formal discharge to all whom he knew to be longing for it, he followed the example of his Candahar brothers, and fled westward on the 2d of August in the direction of Bamian. On the following day the British army, now advancing from Ghuznee, were made acquainted with this important fact, and in order not to repeat the blunder by which the Candahar chiefs had been permitted to escape, it was resolved that no time should be lost in commencing the pursuit. The task was undertaken by Captain Outram, then acting as aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief. It could not have been in better hands, but very unwisely Hajee Khan Kakur, who was already suspected of being as treacherous to his new as he had been to his old friends, was associated with him, and having the command of the principal part of the troops employed, was able to throw so many obstacles in the way, that the pursuit again proved fruitless. The army meanwhile continued its march without interruption, and on the 7th of August Shah Shujah, mounted on a handsome and richly decorated Caboolee charger, and wearing a dress which glittered with diamonds, emeralds, and rubies, made a triumphant entry into his capital. "An ocean of heads," says Havelock, "was spread out in every direction," and though there were no noisy acclamations, "the expression of countenances indicated a ready acquiescence, or something more, in the new state of things." After making his way with difficulty through the dense files of people which choked the narrow streets, and reaching the Bala Hissar or palace, the Shah hastened up the great staircase, and ran with childish delight from apartment to apartment. The great object of his ambition had been at last secured. After thirty years of exile he was once more seated on the throne.

The governor-general, replying to the despatch in which Sir John Keane described the Shah's entry into Cabool, expressed his high gratification. "It is to be hoped," he said, "that the measure which has been accomplished of restoring this prince to the throne of his ancestors, will be productive of peace and prosperity over the country in which he rules, and will confirm the just influence of the British government in the regions of Central Asia." On this view further interference was unnecessary, and little more remained than to fulfil the promise of the Simla manifesto, by withdrawing the British troops. Unfor-
Unfortunately, the Shah's alleged popularity had proved delusive, and could no longer be regarded by the most sanguine as sufficient to insure the stability of the new order of things. While hedged round by British bayonets the restored throne might be safe, but were this security withdrawn it would fall as suddenly as it had been reared. In short, it was no longer possible to dispute the accuracy of the prediction attributed to the Duke of Wellington, that when Cabool was reached the most difficult part of the task which the British government had undertaken would only begin.

CHAPTER IV.


Shah Shujah, though he must have had many misgivings as to the future, professed to believe that the work of restoring him to the throne was accomplished, and therefore deemed it becoming to employ some method by which he could at once commemorate the event, and testify his gratitude to those by whose instrumentality it had been achieved. He accordingly addressed a letter to her majesty, which, after mentioning how he had, "by the favour of God and the exceeding kindness of the British government," ascended the throne of his ancestors, continued thus:—"I have been for some time considering by what means I could reward the gentlemen and troops who accompanied me, for all the troubles and dangers they have undergone for my sake. I have now fully resolved upon instituting an order, to be designated the Order of the Doorenan Empire (Nishan-Door-Dooran), to be divided into three classes." The first class he wished to confer on the governor-general, the commander-in-chief, the envoy, Sir Alexander Burnes, and Colonel Wade; the other two classes were to be conferred on the individuals named in an accompanying list; and he had, moreover, determined to have a medal struck, "commemorative of the battle of Ghuznee," and to confer it "on every officer and soldier present on that glorious occasion." "I have the fullest confidence," he concluded, "in the kind consideration for my wishes, which is felt by my royal sister; and I feel assured that she will be graciously pleased to permit the gentlemen and soldiers above mentioned to wear the decoration which I shall confer upon them, so that a memorial of me may be preserved, and that the fame of the glorious exploits achieved in this quarter may resound throughout the whole world."
While Shah Shujah was thus assuming the airs of a mighty potentate, and giving the name of empire to the comparatively limited portion of Afghanistan which nominally acknowledged his authority, his British allies were anxiously considering how far it might be possible to withdraw their troops and leave him to depend on his own resources. The hope held out by the Simla manifesto, that his own subjects and adherents would so rally around him as to render foreign aid unnecessary had been disappointed, but it was still thought that a single brigade, consisting of five or six regiments, might suffice. By this means the two capitals of Cabool and Candahar, and the important posts of Ghuznee, Quettah, and Jelalabad might be effectually secured, and the rest of the British army permitted to withdraw, the Bengal division by the Khyber, and the Bombay division by the Bolan Pass. It soon appeared that the force thus proposed to be left would be inadequate. Dost Mahomed, instead of continuing his flight, had found an asylum in the north, and was reported to be levying troops for the purpose of resuming the contest; the Ghiljies and several other mountain tribes were giving unequivocal signs of hostility; Shah Kamran, at Herat, forgetting the deliverance which had recently been procured for him mainly through British interference, was engaged with his unprincipled minister, Yar Mahomed, in intriguing with Persia; and Russia, so far from abandoning the aggressive schemes which she had verbally repudiated, seemed bent on giving practical effect to them by an expedition against the Khan of Khiva. All these things considered, it was resolved that instead of a single brigade, nearly the whole of the Bengal division of the army should continue in Afghanistan.

The Bombay division of the army, commanded as before by General Wellshire, commenced its march homewards on the 18th of September, 1839. Its movements were not intended to be wholly peaceful, for instruction had been given to pay a hostile visit by the way to Khelat, and punish Mehrab Khan for alleged infringements of the treaty which bound him to furnish the British army with supplies, and suppress the marauding parties which harassed it on its march. These obligations he had not performed, but he had endeavoured to justify himself by pleading that the state of the country rendered the performance of them impossible. The excuse was certainly not without foundation, and might perhaps have been accepted as sufficient, had it not been deemed necessary to inflict punishment by way of example. In the proceedings against Mehrab Khan there was therefore more severity than justice. A victim was wanted, and it was Mehrab Khan’s fate to furnish it. Accordingly, on arriving at Quettah, General Wellshire, directing the main body of his troops to continue their march by the Bolan Pass, proceeded, on the 4th of November, at the head of a detachment, mustering in all about 1000 bayonets, together with six light field-pieces, the engineer corps, and 150 irregular horse, and arrived on the 13th before Khelat, situated about eighty-
five miles to the S.S.W. It was a place of sufficient importance to be regarded as the capital of Beloochistan, and in addition to the natural defence of a commanding site, in a difficult and mountainous country, was well fortified and strongly garrisoned. General Wellshire indeed admits that, as in the case of Ghuznee, its strength had been underrated.

As Mehrab Khan, when first threatened, had been profuse in apologies and professions of friendship, it had been rather hastily concluded that he would prefer submission to the risks of resistance. It now appeared that he was actuated by a very different spirit. When the invading force was within two marches of his capital, a letter was received from him, which left no doubt as to his determination to resist. It spoke, indeed, of negotiation as still pending, and directed a halt of the British troops, that an opportunity might be given of completing it, but at the same time breathed defiance, by threatening them with the consequences should they presume to advance another stage. To show that this was no idle threat a body of Beloochee horse made their appearance shortly after the British had resumed their march, and without asking or waiting for explanation, galloped up to the head of the advancing column and discharged their matchlocks. When a nearer approach brought Khelat itself in sight, its adjoining heights were crowned with masses of soldiers, who apparently disdaining the protection which the walls would have given them, seemed preparing to try their strength in the open field. If they had any such intention it was soon abandoned. A few discharges of artillery compelled them to a precipitate flight, and allowed a small body of troops, who were rapidly advancing to storm the heights, to take possession of them without a struggle. This success was immediately followed by another of greater importance. The place had only two gates. One of these was seized before the fugitives, who
1839.

 Capture of Khielat.

 Though the Bombay division had, as already mentioned, commenced its march homewards on the 18th of September, the final arrangements with regard to the occupation of Afghanistan had not been announced. At length, however, on the 2d of October, it was intimated by a general order that "the whole of the 1st (Bengal) division of infantry, the 2d (Bengal) cavalry, and No. 6 light field battery, with a detachment of thirty sappers, were to remain under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton." The remainder of the troops were to move toward Hindoostan on a day to be afterwards fixed. By a subsequent order, issued on the 9th of October, the posts of the different portions of the army of occupation were definitely fixed as follows:—"Her Majesty's 13th light infantry, three guns of No. 6 light field battery, and the 35th native infantry to remain in Cabool, and to be accommodated in the Bala Hissar. The 48th native infantry, the 4th brigade and detachment of sappers and miners, with a ressalah of Skinner's horse, to be stationed at Jelalabad. Ghuznee to be garrisoned by the 16th native infantry, a ressalah of Skinner's horse, and such details of his majesty Shah Shujah's as are available. The whole to be under the command of Major Maclaren. Candahar will have for its garrison the 42d and 43d native infantry, 4th company, 2d battalion artillery, a ressalah of the 4th local horse, and such details of his majesty Shah Shujah's troops as may be available. Major-general Nott will command."

 The arrangements for the occupation of the country having thus been completed, the troops not deemed necessary started for India on the 15th of October, accompanied by Sir John Keane, and commenced their march in the direction of the Khyber Pass. Shah Shujah himself also abandoned his capital to escape the rigours of the approaching winter, by removing his court temporarily to Jelalabad, which possesses a much milder climate than Cabool. The envoy, as a matter of course, accompanied him, but Sir Alexander Burnes remained behind to act as his substitute. The native administration was left in less worthy hands, and the leading officials, both at Cabool and Candahar, instead of reconciling the people to the new order of things, only exasperated them by
extortion and general mismanagement. The interference of the British, restricted as it was to remonstrance, was totally inadequate to remedy the evils thus produced, the only effect often being to bring the two authorities into collision, and expose them to a common hatred and contempt. Meanwhile, the military successes were duly acknowledged at home. The army received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament, the governor-general, raised a step in the peerage, became Earl of Auckland, the commander-in-chief Baron Keane of Ghuznee, the envoy a baronet, Colonel Wade a knight, and various other distinctions and promotions were distributed with a liberal hand. Notwithstanding many warnings to the contrary, the general belief at this time undoubtedly was that the principal object of the Afghan expedition had been triumphantly accomplished, and that the effect would be to give Great Britain a decided and permanent ascendency in the countries immediately west of the Indus.

While this flattering prospect was sanguinely entertained at home, new causes of apprehension had arisen. The death of Runjeet Sing had endangered our friendly relations with the Sikhs. Not only had the obligations imposed on them by the tripartite treaty been evaded, but the new government, only nominally held by Runjeet Sing’s imbecile son Kuruk Sing, and really administered by his turbulent grandson Nao Nehal Sing, was suspected of fomenting disturbances in Afghanistan, and actually intriguing for the restoration of the Barukzyes. The failure of the Russian expedition against Khiva had not yet been ascertained, and Burnes, installed at Cabool, was writing letters, in one of which he says, “We have brought upon ourselves some additional half million of annual expenditure, and ere 1840 ends, I predict that our frontiers and those of Russia will touch—that is, the states dependent on either of us will—and that is the same thing.” The envoy participating in these alarms, did not hesitate to declare that “unless Lord Auckland act with vigour and promptitude to secure and open our rear, we shall soon be between two fires, if not under them. France and Russia are advancing with only the remote contingency of profit to stimulate them. We are supine, whilst our inactivity will probably be the cause of our ruin. France gratuitously supplies Persia with 30,000 muskets, at a time when Persia may be said to be at war with us. I cannot, though I have repeatedly and earnestly pressed my request.”

In explanation of the envoy’s complaint, it is necessary to mention that he had begun to dream of playing what he called a great game in Central Asia, and had failed in obtaining the governor-general’s countenance to it. He would have rushed into a war with the Sikhs for the purpose of compelling them to give a free passage at all times to the British troops across their frontiers. Such a passage, he alleged, was absolutely necessary in order to keep open the communications with India and Hindoostan. Not satisfied with thus “macadamizing” the Punjab, he would have punished Shah Kamran and Yar Mahomed at Herat, by wresting that territory from them, and making a
A.D. 1840.

Stoddart and Conolly in Bokhara.

present of it to Shah Shujah. Another part of his plan would have been to despatch a force to Bokhara, whose barbarous khan had commenced that series of outrages which he crowned at last by the atrocious murder of Stoddart and Conolly. By the expedition to Bokhara he wished not only to compel the release of Stoddart, who was then, by a gross violation of the law of nations, pining in a loathsome dungeon, but secure the important political object of severing the connection which had recently been formed between the khan and Dost Mahomed. The latter, after various adventures, had sought an asylum from the former, and been received with open arms, and there was therefore ground to apprehend that an effort would be made at the head of a formidable army to re-establish the Barukzye ascendancy in Afghanistan. The envoy would have anticipated this danger, and talked of an expedition to Bokhara as "conveniently feasible, if entered upon at the proper season of the year." He expected, as the result, to compel "the Shah of Bokhara to release Stoddart, to evacuate all the countries on this side of the Oxus, and to pay the expenses of the expedition." The execution of this wild scheme, never seriously entertained except by the envoy himself, was soon seen to be unnecessary, in so far at least as it was designed to destroy the influence of Dost Mahomed with the Khan of Bokhara. The friendship of the two chiefs dissolved of its own accord, an open rupture ensued, and Dost Mahomed, after being subjected to indignity as a prisoner, was glad to make his escape into the territory of the Wullee of Khooloom, under whose protection his own family were then residing, and by whose aid he hoped to gain over several Usbek chiefs to his interest.

Shah Shujah and his court, as soon as the winter was past, prepared to return to Cabool, and took their departure from Jelalabad in the latter part of April, 1840. The state of the country continued to be very unsatisfactory, and the envoy, unable any longer to shut his eyes to the fact, was obliged to confess that on looking at the future he anticipated "anything but a bed of roses." Dost Mahomed had, as we have seen, made his escape into the territories of the Wullee of Khooloom, and was thus in dangerous proximity to the Afghan frontiers on the north-west. It had been expected, indeed, that an event which had recently occurred would make him hesitate before recommencing hostilities. Before his arrival at Khooloom, his family, previously resident there under the charge of his brother Jubbar Khan, had, after some negotiation, been brought by the latter to the outpost at Bamian, and placed under British protection, or in other words surrendered as prisoners, without any other stipulation in their favour than that of honourable treatment. Under these circumstances Dost Mahomed was somewhat in the position of a party who had given hostages for his good behaviour. It soon appeared, however, that he was not to be thus restrained from once more attempting to regain his power. When reminded of the danger to which he was exposing his family, he only answered, "I have no family; I have buried my wives and children;" and continued in concert with
the Wullee to levy troops for the avowed purpose of once more trying his fortune in Afghanistan.

In other quarters the signs of approaching disturbance were equally manifest. The Ghiljies inhabiting the central portion of the mountainous districts which extend in a north-east direction between Candahar and Cabool, had from the first given unequivocal signs of hostility, and by the extent of their depredations inflicted such severe losses that it became necessary to send a detachment against them. It was headed by Captain Outram, who did the duty so effectually that many of the Ghiljie chiefs fled to the north and sought refuge among Dost Mahomed’s other adherents. After remaining here for a few months they ventured to return, and having re-occupied their forts resumed their former practices with even greater boldness than before. General Nott, in command at Candahar, was obliged in consequence, in the beginning of April, 1840, to adopt measures for their suppression. At first the force employed for this purpose consisted only of a party of her Majesty’s 2d cavalry, and a few of the 4th local horse, in all 210 men, under Captains Taylor and Walker, supported by a detachment of infantry, under Captain Codrington, and accompanied by a body of Afghans, forming part of the troops of Shah Shujah; but afterwards, when the extent of the resistance to be anticipated was better ascertained, it was deemed necessary to detach a reinforcement, consisting of her Majesty’s 5th regiment of infantry, and four guns of the 2d troop of horse artillery, under Captain Anderson. On the 16th of May the Ghiljie chiefs, now in open rebellion, were found in force at Tazee, in the vicinity of the Turnuk. When summoned to submit, they replied that they had 12,000 men at their command, and being fully satisfied of the justice of their cause, had no fear of the issue. Their real number was about 3000, strongly posted on adjoining heights. Notwithstanding his inferiority in numbers, Captain Anderson immediately prepared for the encounter. It was maintained by the Ghiljies for some time with great gallantry, but after they had made two charges and been repulsed, in the first instance by the destructive fire of the artillery and in the second at the point of the bayonet, their courage failed, and they fled to their mountain fastnesses.

Notwithstanding the severe chastisement thus inflicted, the rebellion seemed to gather strength, and so large a body of insurgents had concentrated in the vicinity of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, that it was deemed necessary to make preparations against it on a larger scale. Accordingly, Sir Willoughby Cotton, in a letter to General Nott, appointing him “to the command of the force to be employed in tranquillizing the Ghiljie country,” intimated his intention to send strong detachments from Cabool and Ghuznee, to unite with the troops which might accompany him from Candahar. Nott convinced that the insurrection was not so formidable as was supposed at head-quarters, and having, moreover, some apprehension of a rising in Candahar itself, took with him only a small portion.
of the 43d native infantry. The event proved the accuracy of his views.
The Ghiljies, after all their boastings, scarcely ventured to resist, and the chiefs
who headed them either submitted or fled. As it was hardly to be expected
that tribes so turbulent would, if again left to themselves, remain tranquil, it
was resolved to keep them in check by means of a permanent force, stationed
in the vicinity, at Hoolan Robart, commanding a mountain pass of that name.
The envoy, doubtful if tranquillity could be secured by this means, had
recourse to others, in which he had greater confidence, and agreed to pay the
Ghiljie chiefs 30,000 rupees (£3000) annually, on condition of their abstaining
from marauding, and giving free passage through the country.

General Nott, it has been mentioned, was apprehensive of a rising in Candahar, and for this reason among others restrained, when setting out for Khelat-i-Ghiljie, from taking with him any large body of troops. From letters found

in the possession of the prisoners taken at Tazee, he discovered that certain
chiefs residing at Candahar were in hopes that the garrison would be so weak-
ened in providing for the Ghiljie expedition as to give them a favourable oppor-
tunity of rising, and massacring every European and Hindoo within the city.
The fact that such a plot had been formed is a strong proof of the general
hatred with which Shah Shujah and his allies were regarded. Nor is it difficult
to find the explanation. According to Nott's account, which even supposing
it to be somewhat coloured, was doubtless substantially correct, nothing could
be more atrocious than the manner in which the government was conducted.
Prince Timour, the Shahzada, or heir-apparent of Shah Shujah, accompanied
by one of his brothers, was ruling at Candahar as his father's representative.
The mode in which he discharged this duty Nott thus describes: "The fact is
that the plunder, the robbery, and cruel oppression committed by the servants
and followers of his highness Prince Timour, have been such as to outrage the
feelings of the natives, and sure I am, that should opportunity offer, these cruel and shameful proceedings will be retaliated upon the troops left in this country. Never in all history have I read of such plunder, cruelty, and oppression as I witnessed in this camp." "The houses and corn-fields of the unfortunate inhabitants are entered, their property plundered, and the owners cut and wounded in the most cruel manner."

The cruel treatment above described took place at Hoolan Robart during the expedition to Khelat-i-Ghiljie, but as it was under the immediate eye of Prince Timour, who was personally present, he was undoubtedly responsible for it. General Nott, adopting this view, acted upon it with his usual decision. Having caused the plundered property and the plunderers to be seized, he intimated to the Shabzada and Captain Nicolson, the political resident, that he did not wish to interfere with his highness's servants, but as the plundered property had been brought into his camp, the inhabitants naturally looked to him for redress, and therefore, if those to whom the duty properly belonged did not punish the robbers, he himself would. The subsequent procedure is thus detailed in a letter to his daughters:—"The politicals blustered in the name of the prince. My answer was short: 'You are in possession of my determination, which I shall carry into effect at sunset unless you send your people to punish the marauders in my presence, and as an example to all.' Well, sunset came, when I had the fellows tied up and flogged, in presence of the poor inhabitants who had been plundered and robbed. I restored their property to them, and they went away rejoicing. I told the prince and politicals that unless a stop was put to such atrocious conduct, I would separate my camp from that of the prince. I fancy they have represented the whole to the Cabool authorities, who will not, I should think, dare to write to me on the subject. Yet they may, and how it will end I neither know nor care; I will never allow of such scenes in a camp under my command."

That General Nott was right in the course which he adopted can scarcely be questioned, but he judged too favourably of the "politicals" and the "Cabool authorities" when he thought that they would not dare to write him on the subject. Captain Nicolson, who had at first protested "most strongly" against General Nott's intention, and plainly told him that he would not allow the prince's people to be punished "upon inquiry made by others than the prince himself, or his responsible adviser myself," lost not a moment after the punishment was inflicted in forwarding a complaint to the envoy. "The prince," he assured him, "was evidently deeply hurt, and had said that 'though he had accompanied Sir C. Wade from Loodiana, and spent much of his time with British troops, this was the first time he had met with conduct which would doubtless produce a very bad effect on the Kuzzilbash's about his highness's person, and lower him in the estimation of all the subjects of the Shah.'" On receiving this complaint Sir William Macnaghten fired at once. The more the
reality of power was denied to the dynasty which he was labouring so earnestly to establish, the more tenaciously he clung to its shadow, and he was therefore always forward to resent any effront offered to the Shah or any of the members of his family. In accordance with these feelings, he laid the correspondence on the subject before Sir Willoughby Cotton as commander-in-chief, accompanying it with a letter, in which he said, "I need not dwell on the anxiety of the governor-general in council, that in the difficult and perilous position we occupy in this country, the greatest possible respect and tenderness should be shown for the honour and feelings of his majesty; and should you concur with me in thinking that, in the act which has proved so offensive to the prince, Major-general Nott has deviated from those principles, I have to request that you will be good enough to convey to him your opinion in such terms as may effectually prevent his falling into a similar error in future." Sir Willoughby applied to General Nott for explanation, and on receiving it gave his official opinion in very decided terms. "The system of plunder which appears to have been carried on in the camp by the followers of the Shahzada was atrocious; and although I regret that Major-general Nott was driven to the necessity of punishing the prince's servants, yet as the political agent, to whom he states that he fruitlessly applied on several occasions, would not check the prevailing disorders, it became General Nott's duty to take measures to arrest proceedings so disgraceful, and tending to alienate the feelings of the people both from the British troops and from his majesty's government." His concluding remarks deserve quotation: "I am sensible of the objects of the government in maintaining by all means the dignity of the Shah and his family, and of impressing upon the people of the country the proofs of his independence; but I presume that it is not intended to sacrifice the discipline and order of the army, or the credit of the nation for justice and moderation; and instead of being offended, I should humbly imagine that any prince, either European or Asiatic, would feel obliged to the general commanding for affording prompt justice to his ill-treated and oppressed peasantry." The question ought now to have been set at rest, but Sir William Macnaghten, describing the punishment inflicted by General Nott as "an unnecessary act of violence," urged the governor-general

1 For an account of the Barukays, see p. 332.
to prevent the repetition of it, "if for no other reason than that it cannot fail of being prejudicial to our interests, as proving to the people of Afghanistan the truth of the rumours so industriously circulated by our enemies to the effect that the government of the country has been assumed by us, and that Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk is a mere puppet in our hands." Lord Auckland was only too much disposed to maintain the Shah's dignity at all hazards, and to view any apparent encroachment upon it with "great regret and displeasure." Almost therefore as a matter of course, his views coincided with those of the envoy, and Sir Willoughby Cotton was instructed to inform General Nott that his conduct in arrogating to himself "the power of punishing the servants of the Shah's son and representative within his majesty's dominions, where the Shahzada was actually in the exercise of the vice-regal functions, had excited" extreme surprise "in the governor-general in council, and created" an impression unfavourable as to his "discretion and perfect fitness for delicate duties in such a country."

The triumph thus given to the envoy, by the censure of a distinguished officer for an alleged encroachment on the Shah's dignity must have been a poor compensation to him for the increasing difficulties of his position. His grand game in Asia, which would necessarily have led to new wars, and increased an expenditure already felt to be overwhelming, had met with no countenance, and it was every day becoming more doubtful if Shah Shujah's throne, hedged though it was with British bayonets, could long be maintained. So far from settling down into tranquillity, the country was becoming more disturbed. The revolt of the Ghiljies, and the threatened insurrection in Candahar, have been already mentioned, and in whatever direction we turn a similar spirit is found to prevail. When Khelat was captured and Mehrab Khan slain, it became necessary to provide for the future government of the territory. The plan adopted was to annex it as a dependency to Shah Shujah's dominions, and give the government of it to a new khan who was willing to accept it on this condition, and was also believed to be sincerely attached to British interests. Newaz Khan, the individual selected, belonged to a collateral branch of the ruling family, but this relationship, instead of conciliating his Beloochee countrymen, only made his acceptance of the title more odious to them. The youthful son of Mehrab Khan was not slow to avail himself of the strong feeling manifested in his favour, and no sooner made his appearance than the tribes hastened to rally around him. Though the danger must have been foreseen, no precautions were taken. The insurgents easily made themselves masters of the capital, and with the concurrence of Newaz Khan himself, who to avoid a worse fate was glad to abdicate, seated Mehrab Khan's son as the rightful heir upon the throne. Among the prisoners was Lieutenant Loveday, a British officer, who after some months of captivity was barbarously murdered.
During the various insurrections which accompanied or followed the revolution in Khelat, disaster on more than one occasion befell British troops. A detachment of 50 horse and 150 foot, under Lieutenant Clark of the 2d Bombay grenadiers, while proceeding from the fort of Kahun, situated in the southeast of Afghanistan, about twenty miles west of the Suliman Mountains, for the purpose of obtaining supplies, was suddenly attacked by a body of 2000 Beloochees, and after much unavailing gallantry, cut off to a man. Shortly afterwards the fort itself was attacked, and its small garrison, ably commanded by Captain Brown of the 50th native infantry, while making a valiant defence was in danger of being starved into surrender. Major Clibborn of the 1st Bombay grenadiers was therefore detached from Sukkur on the 12th of August with a convoy for its relief. The convoy consisted of 1200 camels and 600 bullocks; the escort mustered 464 bayonets, 34 rank and file of artillery, and three twelve-pounder howitzers. At Poolajee, a reinforcement of 200 Poonah and Scinde irregular horse was received, and the whole proceeded through a country presenting the most formidable difficulties. On the 31st of August, the pass of Nuffoosk came in sight, and presented an appearance by which the stoutest hearts were appalled. The road to be traversed led zig zag up the side of a precipitous mountain, the crest of which was crowned by a body of the enemy, who, as soon as the convoy appeared, gave notice to the surrounding country by setting fire to a beacon light. Though his troops were already exhausted by a long and toilsome march, and suffering dreadfully from thirst which there was no means of allaying, Major Clibborn immediately prepared to storm the pass. The result was disastrous. After the storming party had nearly gained the head of the pass, they were assailed by rocks and stones hurled down from the summit, and a murderous fire was opened upon them which they were unable to return with any effect. During the confusion produced
by this unequal conflict, the Beloochees, pouring down from the ridges sword in hand, bore all before them. Not satisfied with thus clearing the pass, they rushed into the plain and advanced to the very muzzles of the guns before they could be dispersed. Their loss must have been very great, but it could be borne far more easily than that of their victors, of whom 150 had fallen. Nor was this all. During the action most of the camel-men had absconded after plundering the commissariat, and the gun-horses were gone, so that both the guns and the convoy with the stores and camp equipage were necessarily abandoned. With the utmost difficulty, and the loss of many additional lives, a retreat to Poolajee, more than fifty miles distant, was effected.

The more immediate effect of Major Clibborn’s disaster was to leave the fort of Kahun without supplies and almost at the mercy of the enemy. Captain Brown, who held it with a garrison of only three companies of native infantry with one gun, was at last compelled to surrender, but succeeded by the gallantry of his defence in obtaining honourable terms. Simultaneous outbreaks took place over the whole country, and serious attacks were made on Quettah and other British posts. As these were repulsed without much difficulty, it is unnecessary to give the details; but in order to show that success was in most instances owing much more to good fortune and to the discipline and courage of our soldiers than to any wisdom in the arrangements of their superiors, it may be worth while to quote the following passage from a letter of General Nott to Sir Willoughby Cotton. After deprecating the withdrawal of any part of the 42d and 43d regiments garrisoning Candahar, and declaring that “if any accident should occur to these regiments by detaching parties from them before reinforcements shall arrive, the game in this part of the Shah’s dominions would be at an end,” he continues thus: “Captain Bean confines his ideas to that miserable dog-hole Quettah, and dictates the troops to be sent to that place from Candahar. ‘One regiment of regular infantry, four guns (out of six), and 300 horse;’ (all now at Candahar), without noting the object in view! I could earnestly wish the envoy and minister to impress upon these gentlemen (the political residents) the propriety of at all times confining their application to stating the object, and leaving the means to the officer in command. But they reverse the order of things by calling for and particularizing the number
of guns, infantry, and cavalry, without stating the object in view. Now no officer of common understanding would pay the least attention to such a call. The officer placed at Killah Abdoollah for the purpose of watching and keeping open the Kojuk Pass, quits his post, takes a trip to Quettah, from whence he is sent with others to beat the enemy (so report says) out of Moostung, without having the means of attacking 300 men. Away they gallop; and no sooner do they get sight of the place than they find it necessary to turn round, and gallop back again with the enemy at their heels! Even such a silly, paltry affair must have a ruinous effect among the half-savage, half-civilized, but brave mountaineers. Whose orders is this gentleman at the Kojuk under? The province of Shawl was, in general orders, placed under my command; yet a serious attack has been made on the post of Quettah, and other attacks foolishly provoked in its vicinity, and the officer commanding in Shawl never reports, never sends me a line on the subject, although the safety of the whole country from Ghuznee to the Bolan, and even to Sukkur, might have been compromised, and all this in consequence of the unmilitary and extraordinary orders issued to the Shah's troops. I repeat, that if this system is to be continued, disaster must follow.”

The revolution effected in Khelat, so serious in itself, and so dangerous as an example of successful resistance to the new order of things, could not be tolerated, and it was therefore determined either to oust Nusseer Khan, Mehrab Khan’s son, from the throne which his own sword and the affections of his countrymen had purchased for him, or at all events only to permit him to hold it, like his predecessor, as an acknowledged dependant of Shah Shujah. In this instance, the person appointed to conduct the military operations was wisely selected, and General Nott, in obedience to an official despatch from the envoy and the commander-in-chief, dated 3d September, 1840, proceeded to take the necessary steps for the recapture of Khelat. The leading article in his instructions was as follows:—“The terms to be offered to the rebels now in possession of Khelat are, first, unconditional surrender, and an assurance that the son of Mehrab Khan will be recognized by the British government and his majesty Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk as the lawful chief of Beloochistan, on his agreeing immediately to proceed to Cabool to pay personal homage to his majesty, and on his agreeing to subscribe to such other conditions as it may be thought proper to impose.” This instruction was very unpalatable to Nott, who, writing to his daughters, thus animadverted upon it: “I am disgusted. They most unjustly dethroned Mehrab Khan, and placed a tool of Shah Shujah’s in his place. Well, Mehrab Khan’s son assembles his father’s followers—retakes Khelat; our authorities talk big for a day or two, and then send me instructions to offer terms to the boy, declaring that they will place him on his father’s throne; and thus they disgrace the character of our country. Had they taken this boy by the hand when he was a wanderer in the land of his ancestors, there would have been a generous and honourable feeling; but to bend the knee to
him and his bloody chiefs now is disgraceful." Though thus disapproving of the terms, Nott knew his duty too well as a soldier not to do his utmost to give effect to them. The means at his disposal, however, seemed very inadequate. The young khan, after rejecting the terms offered him, and swearing that he would revenge his father's death, set out at the head of 5000 men, in the direction of Moostung, and on the 29th of September arrived within sixteen miles of the spot, on which, from the non-arrival of reinforcements on which he had been led to calculate, Nott was encamped with a force not exceeding in all 600 men. Nusser Khan, notwithstanding his vast superiority of numbers, did not venture to risk an encounter. After various movements Nott reached Moostung on the 25th of October, while the enemy moved rapidly on Dadur, situated about fifty miles to the south-east, near the eastern entrance of the Bolan Pass. Immediately on emerging from the pass, Nusser Khan made preparations for attacking the British post at Dadur, and on two successive days (the 30th and 31st) made ineffectual attempts to force it. He had not despaired of succeeding, when the approach of a considerable reinforcement, under Major Boscawen, compelled him to desist. So precipitate, indeed, was his departure, that several of his camels and tents were captured. It was on this occasion that the fate of Lieutenant Loveday, the political resident made captive at Khelat, was ascertained. A very handsome European officer's tent was seen standing in the deserted camp. On entering it the body of the unfortunate officer was discovered lying with the throat cut on a small piece of carpet, with no clothing except a pair of pajamas or cotton drawers, and fastened by a chain, the friction of which had lacerated the ankles. The atrocious murder had just been committed, as the body was still warm, and a Hinduostanee attendant, who was weeping over it, told that Gool Mahomed, contrary, it was said, to the wish of Nusser Khan, had ordered, that in the event of defeat, the last man quitting the camp should murder the English captive.

The terror produced by the defeat at Dadur sufficed to make an open passage to Khelat. As Nott advanced the enemy fled before him, and he regained possession of the Beloochee capital without opposition. This success was preceded by another, which was of still greater consequence, and which, if it had been duly improved, might have permanently secured the Dooranee dynasty in Afghanistan. The escape of Dost Mahomed from Bokhara had infused new spirit into his adherents, and a letter was intercepted, which according to the envoys' interpretation of it, "implicated many chiefs in meditated insurrection." The Dost himself was also actively employed in levying troops, which, united with those of the Wullee of Khooloom, amounted to no contemptible army. A descent into Afghanistan was now openly talked of, and spread so much alarm, that even the envoy ceased to be sanguine, and became desponding. "It is reported," he wrote, "that the whole country on this side the Oxus is up in favour of the Dost, who with the Wullee, is certainly advancing in great
strength, so much so that our troops have been obliged to fall back on Bamian, while we have a formidable band of conspirators in the city, and the Kohistan is ripe for revolt." A strong confirmation of this alarming statement was shortly after received. An attempt had been made to raise an Afghan force, whose fidelity to Shah Shujah might be confidently relied upon. The futility of the attempt was soon proved. The first regiment raised with this view, was no sooner brought into proximity with the enemy than a company went off with arms and accoutrements to join the Dost, and it became necessary to disarm the other companies, as the only effectual means of preventing them from following the example. In a letter to the governor-general, dated 12th September, Sir William Macnaghten pressed with additional urgency, that a request which he had repeatedly made for a large increase of the army of occupation should be complied with, supporting his application by the opinion of Sir Willoughby Cotton, who had recently given it to him in the following terms:—"I really think the time has now arrived for you and I to tell Lord Auckland, totidem verbis, that circumstances have proved incontestably that there is no Afghan army, and that unless the Bengal troops are greatly strengthened, we cannot hold the country." Such was the ominous aspect of affairs, when the important intelligence arrived that Dost Mahomed was defeated and his army dispersed. As soon as he was known to be advancing upon Bamian, Brigadier Dennie hastened forward to that post with strong reinforcements. He arrived on the 14th of September, but was unable to obtain certain intelligence of the enemy's movements till the 17th, when he learned that large bodies of cavalry were emerging from a defile into the valley, and were at the distance of only six miles from Bamian. These troops were supposed to be the
enemy's advanced guard, under the Dost's son Afzul Khan, and as they were reported to have attacked a village, it was resolved to expel them. Accordingly, on the morning of the 18th, the brigadier set out with a detachment, consisting of four companies of the 55th native infantry, four companies of the Ghorka corps, about 400 Afghan horse, and two horse-artillery guns. This comparatively small force, which expected to encounter only the enemy's advance, found itself in front of his whole army. It occupied a series of heights, crowned with forts, around which the troops were clustered in dense masses. Without hesitation Dennie, notwithstanding the immense disparity of numbers, determined to give battle. The guns immediately opened their fire, which told with dreadful effect, while no return could be made to it. The confusion thus produced in the enemy's ranks soon became apparent. While the guns following up their advantage drove them successively from height to height, the cavalry rushed forward, and coming up with the fugitives, now entangled in the defile, made fearful slaughter. So sudden and complete was the dispersion of the Dost's whole army, that he and his son only escaped by the fleetness of their horses.

This reverse so disconcerted the Wullee of Khooloom, that he gladly insured his own safety by accepting of terms which annexed part of his territories to those of Shah Shujah, and bound him neither to harbour nor give countenance of any kind to Dost Mahomed, or any of his family. Thus once more a wanderer, Dost Mahomed fled eastward into Kohistan, where his adherents, always numerous, had of late been much increased by the oppressive proceedings of Shah Shujah's officers in levying revenue. It was impossible for him to raise a force with which he could venture to take the field, and he continued to flit about from place to place. As there was no doubt, however, that, if not in Kohistan, he was intriguing with their chiefs and had received strong promises of support, Sir Robert Sale, accompanied by Sir Alexander Burnes, marched thither at the head of a considerable force, and on the 29th of September came up with a large body of insurgents, posted in the fortified village of Tootundurrah, situated near the entrance of the Ghorebund Pass. Little difficulty was felt in dislodging them, but the Dost still eluded pursuit, and caused great alarm by repeated reports of his dangerous proximity to Cabool. Sale's next encounter with the rebels was less fortunate, and a premature attempt, on the 3d of October, to storm the fort of Joolgah, met with a severe repulse. The fort was immediately after evacuated by the garrison, but the moral effect of the repulse was dreaded, and the envoy, in writing to the governor-general on the 12th of October, did not hesitate to represent both Cabool and the country as "ripe for revolt." The Dost's cause certainly seemed to gather strength. When he again raised his standard at Nyrow, many of the Shah's soldiers deserted to him, and he began to move in the direction of Cabool.
These movements of Dost Mahomed so alarmed and irritated the envoy, that as if he had despaired of overcoming him by honourable means, he puts the question to one of his correspondents, "Would it be justifiable to set a price on this fellow's head?" and then adds, "We have intercepted several letters from him, from all which it appears that he meditates fighting with us so long as the breath is in his body." It is lamentable to think that in putting the above question the envoy was in earnest. Not only was he meditating to rid himself of the Dost without any scruple as to the means, but he had even resolved in the event of his capture to show him no mercy. This clearly appears from a letter to the governor-general, in which, speaking of Sir Robert Sale's proceedings in Kohistan, he coolly remarks:—"Should he be so fortunate as to secure the person of Dost Mahomed, I shall request his majesty not to execute him till I can ascertain your lordship's sentiments." Fortunately for the envoy himself, and the honour of the British name, Dost Mahomed did not fall into his hands while these bloody thoughts were in his mind. On the 29th of October the British force, encamped at Bagh-i-Alum, about twenty-six miles N.N.E. of Cabool, having received intelligence of Dost Mahomed's approach from the north, at the head of a large body of troops, set out to meet him, and on the 2d of November found him posted in the valley of Purwan. Either desirous to evade the conflict, or perhaps not satisfied with his position, he was moving off to some higher ground in the rear, when the British cavalry moved forward to outflank him, and left him no alternative but to fight or flee. He preferred the former, and advanced to the encounter, at the head of a body of horse. Strange to say the British cavalry, native troopers, abandoning their officers, turned their backs, and Dost Mahomed following up his advantage, pursued them with great slaughter, almost within reach of the British guns, and then quietly withdrew. This success, however much it may have gratified his pride, did not blind him as to the hopelessness of the struggle in which he was engaged. Though he had put the cavalry to disgraceful rout, he did not venture to await the attack of the main body, and hastened to place himself out of reach. The effect produced by this affair of Purwan was singular. Sir Alexander Burnes, convinced that it must be followed by a general rising, had immediately written to urge a concentration of troops in Cabool, and meanwhile the Dost was wending his way thither to surrender himself a prisoner. He had ridden from the battle-field for this very purpose, and had been twenty-four hours in his saddle, when Sir William Macnaghten, returning from his ride on the evening of the 3d of November, was accosted by an attendant, who galloped up and informed him that the Ameer was at hand. "What Ameer?" asked the envoy. "Dost Mahomed Khan." And so it was. The ex-ruler of Cabool, dismounting from his horse, came forward, placed his sword in the envoy's hand, and claimed his protection.

Dost Mahomed, now a prisoner in the city where he had once reigned,
reconciled himself to his fate, and by his free and manly bearing, gained the respect and excited the sympathy of all who came in contact with him. Shah Shujah indeed still cherished thoughts of vengeance, but not being permitted to carry them into effect, was obliged to content himself with applying opprobrious epithets to his prisoner, and refusing to admit him into his presence, excusing himself on the plea that he would be unable to behave to him with common civility. By this conduct he at once disgraced himself and saved the Dost from an interview which he would have felt to be humiliating. The envoy, on the contrary, now returned to a better mind than when he talked of setting a price on the Dost’s head, treated him with the greatest kindness, and placed him under no more restraint than was absolutely necessary to secure his person.

This, however, was scarcely possible in Cabool, and therefore on the 12th of November, ten days after his surrender, Dost Mahomed was sent off under a strong escort to British India. The envoy, in a letter written after his departure, not only expressed his hope that he would be “treated with liberality,” but enforced it by an argument, which as coming from him must be admitted to be something singular. “His case,” he says, “has been compared to that of Shah Shujah; and I have seen it argued that he should not be treated more handsomely than his majesty was; but surely the cases are not parallel. The Shah had no claim upon us. We had no hand in depriving him of his kingdom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim!” It is doubtful if the governor-general concurred with the envoy in volunteering a sentence of condemnation on his own policy, but he at all events acted generously, and granted Dost Mahomed a pension of two lacs of rupees (£20,000).
A.D. 1841. The removal of Dost Mahomed rid Shah Shujah of the only rival who could have competed with him for the throne of Afghanistan with any prospect of success, and the envoy, become again sanguine, expressed his belief that the tranquillity of the country was now secured. On the 24th of November he wrote to a correspondent that his majesty, who at one time seemed doomed to endure the winter of Cabool, was to start in a few days for his more genial quarters at Jalalabad, and added, "We shall now have a little time to devote to the affairs of the country, and I trust its condition will be soon as flourishing as its poor resources will admit." A similar impression prevailed in other official quarters. Sir Willoughby Cotton, anxious to return to India, now saw nothing to prevent him from resigning his command, and the governor-general, as if satisfied that all real difficulties had at length been surmounted, conferred the appointment not on General Nott, whose talents and services gave him the best claim, but on General Elphinstone, who by his incompetency was destined to teach a dreadful lesson on the subject of the abuse of patronage.

When the year 1840 closed, the anticipated tranquillity was not fully realized. In Zemindawer, a district to the west of Candahar, a body of insurgents, headed by a chief of the name of Aktur Khan, attacked and dispersed a detachment of the Shah's troops, who were assisting the officers employed in the collection of the revenue. On the 3d of January, 1841, the insurrection was apparently suppressed by Captain Farrington, who having been detached from Candahar, encountered an enemy mustering nearly 1500 men, and after a sharp struggle completely defeated them. The worst feature in this insurrection was that it consisted of Doornnees, who as hereditary rivals of the Barukzyes, ought to have been strenuous supporters of the new dynasty. Unfortunately their expectations from Shah Shujah had been greatly disappointed, and they were ready to join in any hostile movement against him. An opportunity was not wanting. Yar Mahomed, exercising his ascendancy at Herat, had come to open rupture with the British resident, and threatened an expedition against Candahar. As a preliminary measure he had fostered the discontent of the Doornnees in Zemindawer, whose insurrection, comparatively insignificant in itself, became formidable by its ramifications, and the hostilities by which it might be followed. The envoy's remedy would have been to fit out an expedition at once against Herat, and annex it to Shah Shujah's dominions, but as this was part of the "grand game" which the governor-general had distinctly repudiated, it was necessary to act with more moderation. When Aktur Khan again appeared at the head of his insurgents, Lieutenant Elliot, intrusted with the settlement of the district, was instructed to conciliate rather than fight. Acting in this spirit he offered terms, which Aktur Khan was only too glad to accept. The effect of thus purchasing submission, instead of compelling it, might have been foreseen, and was foretold by Colonel Rawlinson, resident at Candahar, who writing to the envoy, expressed himself in the
following terms:—"I do not anticipate that by the conciliating treatment recommended by Lieutenant Elliot, we gain any other advantage than that of temporary tranquillity; and however prudent, therefore, it may be at present to induce the rebel chief of Zemindawer to abstain from disorders by the hope of obtaining, through his forbearance, substantial personal benefits, I still think that when the danger of foreign aggression is removed, and efficient means are at our disposal, the rights of his majesty's government should be asserted in that strong and dignified manner which can alone insure a due respect being paid to his authority." The accuracy of these views was soon confirmed. In the course of a few months Aktur Khan was again in arms at the head of a greater force than he had ever been able to muster before, threatening the important station of Ghiresk, on the west bank of the Helmund. These insurgents kept complete possession of the district till powerful reinforcements were forwarded, and even then they were not dispersed till they had tried their strength in a regular battle.

During this insurrection of the Dooranees, the Ghiljies were again in motion. Neither force nor money could wholly repress their native turbulence, and it had been resolved, as the most effectual means of keeping them in check, to hold their capital of Khelat-i-Ghiljie by a British force, and strengthen its fortifications. The commencement of the works at once aroused the fears of the Ghiljies for their boasted independence, and the attitude which they assumed made it almost certain that an open rupture was contemplated, and would not be long delayed.

While matters were in this critical position Lieutenant Lynch, who had political charge of the country around Khelat-i-Ghiljie, having been insulted and defied in riding past a small fort in the vicinity, thought it necessary to punish this insolence in a manner which would deter others from imitating it. He accordingly sent out a body of troops, who after a refusal to surrender, attacked the fort and captured it, but not without a conflict in which the chief and many of his followers were slain. While the gallantry of the achievement was justly commended, the conduct of Lynch in ordering it was severely censured. "Why," exclaimed the envoy, "should we go and knock our heads against mud-forts? Why should we not have waited till the Ghiljies chose to attack us?" The governor-general, viewing the matter in a similar light, removed the offending officer, but it is very questionable if any degree of forbearance could have prevented or even delayed the insurrection. Be this as it may, the loss of the fort and the slaughter of its garrison were immediately followed by a formidable outbreak. It became necessary in consequence to send a reinforcement from Candahar, under Colonel Wymer, who on arriving on the 29th of May at Eelman, near the banks of the Turnuk, received intelligence that a large body of insurgents, headed by two chiefs, were hastening forward to attack him. He had only time to bring his men into position when
the encounter took place. The Ghiljies, advancing with the greatest boldness, had arrived within 900 yards, when the guns opened upon them. Though suffering severely they still advanced, and apparently in execution of a previously concerted plan, separated into three distinct columns, for the purpose of making a simultaneous attack on the British flanks and centre. Colonel Wymer, comparatively weak in numbers, and encumbered with a large convoy, was obliged to remain on the defensive, and allowed the enemy to approach, sword in hand, to within a very short distance. The grape of the guns and volleys of the infantry then told with full effect, thinning and breaking the ranks of the Ghiljies, and driving them back with fearful loss. A first repulse, however, did not deter them from renewing the attack, and they maintained the conflict for five hours before they finally gave way. Their force was estimated at 5000 men, and it is said that several hundreds of these were inhabitants of Candahar, who went out to join in the attack, and coolly returned after their defeat, even bringing some of their wounded along with them.

The severe chastisement inflicted on the insurgents successively on the banks of the Turnuk and at the Helmund, had the effect of producing a degree of tranquillity, which though far more in semblance than in reality, was so satisfactory to the envoy that he considered the prospect "most cheering," and even ventured to describe the country as "perfectly quiet from Dan to Beersheba." While he was thus lulling himself and others into a fancied security, an expedition which he had sanctioned if not suggested, was being prepared against a district which was still in open rebellion. After the defeat at Ghiresk, Azmal Khan and Akram Khan, two of the insurgent chiefs, returned to their respective forts of Tireen and Derawut, situated about sixty miles north of Candahar. When summoned to submit, they answered with defiance, and began muster ing their followers for another struggle. The extent of the alarm thus excited, may be gathered from the fact that a large proportion of the troops in Candahar was withdrawn for the purposes of the expedition, and that General Nott, who had received instructions some time before, not "on any account to leave Candahar at present," and conceived them to be still binding, complained that so large a portion of the force under his command "should have been ordered on what may prove to be a difficult service," while he was not permitted to accompany it. The explanation returned having left him at liberty to act at his own discretion, he immediately set out to overtake the expedition. He reached the camp on the 29th of September, and on advancing into the insurgent districts had the satisfaction to find that the display of force had so overawed the insurgents as to render actual hostilities unnecessary. Chief after chief appeared in the camp to make his submission, and Nott, deeming his presence no longer necessary, returned to Candahar. Meanwhile, in another quarter an insurrection of a more formidable character had broken out. The enormous expenditure occasioned by the occupation of Afghanistan had drained
the Calcutta treasury, and every letter from the government urged the necessity of large retrenchment. The envoy, perplexed how to proceed, fixed on the department which of all others ought to have been left untouched, and commenced by sweeping reductions of the pensions and allowances which had been granted to native chiefs and their followers. An increase of disaffection was the immediate result, and a general confederacy was formed for the purpose of resisting the deductions, or compensating for them by means of plunder. The eastern Ghiljies in particular, occupying the mountainous districts lying between Cabool and Jelalabad, made no secret of their determination to take the remedy into their own hands. The sums allowed them had, they said, been fixed by regular compact, and the resolution to curtail them was therefore a breach of faith. The undertaking on their part had only been to become responsible for robberies committed in their own immediate districts, but the terms, they alleged, had been changed without their consent, and their responsibility had been made to extend to districts over which they had no control. Such were the grievances of which they complained, and they commenced at once to redress them in their own peculiar fashion. The communication with India by the north-east being thus rendered almost impracticable, it was determined to take advantage of the intended return of Sir Robert Sale's brigade to Hindoostan, to suppress the Ghiljie rising, and compel a re-opening of the passes. Previous attempts had indeed been made, but of so absurd a nature that nothing but failure should have been anticipated. Humza Khan, acting as Shah Shujah's representative among the Ghiljies, was sent out by his majesty with orders to bring them back to their allegiance, and executed the commission with characteristic duplicity, by fostering the insurrection instead of suppressing it. He was in fact one of the parties aggrieved, or as the envoy expressed it, "at the bottom of the whole conspiracy." The effect of negotiation was then attempted, and a treaty was actually framed, by which the Ghiljies obtained a concession of all their demands. This mode of patching up a peace was only a premium on insurrection, and soon proved its futility. While the chiefs professed submission, their followers continued in arms, and carrying on their predatory warfare, made it at length obvious that nothing but force would be effectual. On the 9th of October Sale's brigade started from Cabool, and proceeded about four miles south-east to Boothauk. On the 12th two regiments, her Majesty's 13th and the 35th native infantry, with two guns, moved forward to Khoord Cabool, and prepared to force the pass of that name, which consists of a narrow defile, hemmed in by high and rugged rocks. The enemy stood prepared to dispute the entrance. They were few in number, but so completely sheltered by their position, that they remained secure, while they coolly shot down all who came within range of their muskets. In this way they picked off sixty-seven men, and wounded Sale himself, by a ball which entered his left leg, near the ankle, shivering the small bone. The pass was

Expedition of Sale to suppress it.
however forced, and the 35th, under Colonel Monteath, took up an advanced position, while the 13th, as previously arranged, fell back again on Boothauk. While Sale waited here for reinforcements, Monteath reported that a night attack had been made on his position at Khoord Cabool. On this occasion the Ghiljies mustered far stronger than before, and maintained the contest with so much obstinacy and so many advantages in their favour, as to inflict a severe loss, aggravated by the treachery of the Shah's Afghan horse, who instead of defending their lines, admitted the enemy within them, and gave them an opportunity of carrying off a number of camels.

Sir Robert Sale when reinforced hastened forward from Boothauk, and again entering the Khoord Cabool Pass, proceeded without encountering serious opposition to Jugdulluk. The real struggle now commenced. The enemy, advantageously posted on the adjoining heights, opened a destructive fire, which could not be effectually returned, and in the face of which it would have been destruction to advance. The only alternative was to send out flanking parties, which clambered up the heights and dislodged the assailants, while a party under Captain Wilkinson, profiting by this diversion, pushed through the defile. Fortunately the enemy, though they had erected breastworks in many places, had, perhaps from over-confidence, left the main outlet unguarded. The march therefore was resumed, and Gundamuk was reached, though not without a severe loss of lives and the abandonment of much camp equipage. Among the killed was Captain Windham of the 35th native infantry, who lost his life in performing an act of humanity. The enemy, having broken in upon the rear-guard and thrown it into confusion, was in full pursuit, when Windham, already lame from a hurt, dismounted to give a place on his charger to a wounded soldier. By this delay, and the slackening of the animal's pace by a double load, he was unable to keep up with the other fugitives, and on seeing escape to be impossible, turned round, faced his pursuers, and fell fighting like a hero.

While war was thus raging, and disturbances had actually broken out or were threatened in other quarters, the envoy was still dreaming of tranquillity, and even expressed a hope that the formidable attack made on Sale's brigade was "the expiring effort of the rebels." He was not alone in his delusion. It was shared in both by Sir Alexander Burnes and General Elphinstone, though there can now be little doubt that they were less guided by their judgments than blinded by their wishes. General Elphinstone, broken down in constitution, and perhaps also not without misgivings as to his fitness for command, had resigned, and with his face turned anxiously homewards was longing for the arrival of General Nott, who, as senior officer, was to take his place. Sir William Macnaghten, as a reward for the services which he was supposed to have rendered, had been appointed governor of Bombay, and was fretted by every new occurrence which delayed his departure; and Sir Alexander Burnes, who had long been indignant at the kind of nondescript position assigned him at Cabool, had
gained the great object of his ambition, and was, immediately on Sir William Macnaghten's departure, to enter on the full and uncontrolled discharge of the duties of envoy and minister. To all these officials, therefore, the first thing necessary was a tranquillity which, though more apparent than real, might suffice to justify the completion of the new arrangements. Under these circumstances it is easy to understand how, when warning was given of a gathering storm, they continued to see only a few passing clouds. The departure of Sale's brigade, depriving Cabool of a large portion of its defenders, has been already noticed. With similar infatuation, orders had been given to General Nott to send off a considerable number of his troops to Hindoostan, and three native regiments, together with the Bengal artillery, had actually started, when alarming tidings from Cabool rendered it necessary to recall them. The revolution had now commenced in earnest, and the whole country had risen to retaliate on the invaders, who had according to the idea of the inhabitants polluted their soil, and were merely employing Shah Shujah as a tool to secure their own usurpation. Before proceeding with the details, it will be necessary to give a brief description of the city of Cabool, and of the British positions within it and in its vicinity.

Cabool stands at the western extremity of an extensive plain about 6000 feet above the level of the sea. Notwithstanding this elevation, the latitude, which is only 34° north, gives a most delightful climate in summer, and more especially in autumn, when heavy crops of grain are reaped, and all the fruits of the temperate zone obtained in an abundance and of an excellence not surpassed in any other quarter of the world. In proportion however to the genial, though sometimes oppressive heats of summer, are the rigours of winter, which extends from October to March, and during which storms are frequent and snow covers the ground to the depth of several feet. At all seasons earthquakes, sometimes of a very destructive character, occur. The river of Cabool, shallow, clear, and rapid, pursuing its course eastward to join the Indus, passes in front of the city, which is approached across it by three bridges; while a canal, which draws its water from the river and has a direction nearly parallel to it, furnishes the means of irrigation to numerous beautiful gardens and productive orchards. Though described as a plain, the ground in the vicinity of Cabool is very much broken. In particular two ranges of hills, converging till they leave only a narrow defile between them, form a kind of semicircle which incloses the city on three sides. Advantage has been taken of these heights to form a line of battlements, which are carried round so as to form a complete inclosure, but are so unsubstantially and injudiciously constructed as to furnish a very feeble defence. Better protection was given by the Bala Hissar, which was at once a royal palace and a citadel. Occupying the acclivity of a hill on the south-east extremity of the city, it completely overlooked it, and was thus equally well fitted to repel the attack of an enemy or put down internal insurrection. It formed
an irregular pentagon, and contained within its precincts, in addition to the buildings of the palace, about a thousand houses. It was thus ample enough to accommodate a considerable force, and from its elevation, wide ditch, and ramparts, strong enough, if suitably garrisoned, to resist any attack by troops unacquainted with siege operations. Hence Havelock, after briefly describing its advantages, and, it may be, from foreboding the kind of service in which the troops left in Afghanistan might be called to engage, exclaims—"Here then all depends, in a military point of view, on a firm hold of the Bala Hissar. It is the key of Cabool. The troops who hold it ought not to allow themselves to be dislodged but by a siege, and they must awe its population with their mortars and howitzers." Within the city itself there was little deserving of notice except the bazaars and markets, the former starting from a central square and extending at right angles in a series of arcades, and the latter deriving their chief attraction from the magnificent display of vegetables and fruits. The houses, for the most part of two or three stories and flat-roofed, consisted of a framework of wood interlacing and inclosing walls of mud; and the streets, many of them so narrow that two horsemen could not pass without difficulty, were badly paved, crooked, and dirty in the extreme. In thus huddling the streets together the only advantage gained was in the additional security it gave against a hostile assault, and the same object had undoubtedly been contemplated in the division of the whole town into districts, each occupied by its own particular tribe or division of inhabitants, and isolated from the other districts by its own inclosure and gates. The whole population was estimated at about 60,000.

The Bala Hissar was, as we have seen, the key of Cabool, and the secure
possession of it was therefore one of the first objects to which attention was turned in providing for the British occupation of the capital. Lieutenant Durand of the engineers being employed to select the proper station for locating the troops, at once fixed on the upper part or citadel of the Bala Hissar, but encountered an opposition which ultimately proved insurmountable. "The Bala Hissar," said Shah Shujah, "was his palace, and its privacy would be completely destroyed by allowing any portion of it to be occupied as British barracks." The envoy gave effect to these objections, and Durand was ordered to provide accommodation elsewhere. This however was no easy task, and the envoy, on its being represented to him that the winter would set in before it would be possible to execute the necessary erections, succeeded in obtaining the Shah's consent to the original proposal of accommodating the troops in the citadel. On the faith of this consent the necessary repairs were commenced, and the British troops had the prospect of soon occupying a position so strong by nature, and so much improved by art, that no Afghan force could have made any impression upon it. But this was too wise an arrangement to be carried out. No sooner was the execution of it seriously commenced than the Shah once more interfered, and in addition to his former objections declared that the occupation of any part of the Bala Hissar by a foreign force would make him unpopular with his subjects. This objection being the one to which all others the envoy was most sensible, prevailed. The barracks, so far as constructed within the citadel of the Bala Hissar, were appropriated by the Shah for the accommodation of his harem, while the British troops were obliged to content themselves with hastily prepared lodgings at its base. In this locality they passed the winter of 1839-40, while the Shah and his court were at Jelalabad. Though far inferior to the locality originally fixed upon, the position adopted was not without its advantages. It commanded the access to the Bala Hissar, and made it easy should any alarm occur to occupy it effectually. Unfortunately even this advantage was not to be retained, and finally, but at whose instigation it is difficult to say, it was resolved to erect cantonments on a spot now universally acknowledged to be the worst that could have been chosen. This was a flat situated about two miles and a half to the north of Cabool, and nearly equidistant from the Bala Hissar at its eastern, and the Kuzzilbash quarter at its western extremity. The cantonments, consisting of long ranges of buildings, formed a parallelogram about 1200 yards long from north to south, and 600 yards wide from east to west. On the west they were bounded by the Kohistan road, which leads nearly due south to one of the principal city gates. The east side of the parallelogram was about 250 yards from the canal already mentioned, while about 300 yards farther east ran the river of Cabool. The defences of the cantonments consisted of a shallow ditch and feeble ramparts, together with a round bastion at each of the angles. Immediately north of the cantonments were two considerable inclosures surrounded merely by a wall.
The larger and nearer of the two was the mission compound or residency; the other was chiefly occupied by the dwellings of officers, clerks, and other individuals attached to the mission. In the space allotted to the cantonments, there must have been ample accommodation not only for the troops but for the commissariat stores. But with an infatuation which looks like judicial blindness, the stores were excluded and placed in an isolated fort situated without the cantonments, about 300 yards north of their south-west angle, and separated from them by a garden or orchard, which in the case of an attack would give cover to the assailants. Nor was this the worst. The whole of the cantonments were commanded from various heights, several of them with forts, which had neither been made strong enough to furnish a kind of outworks for defence, nor dismantled so as to be unavailable to an enemy. Beside the cantonments, a small camp under the command of Brigadier Skelton, the second in command, had been established about two miles to the east, beyond a low range of heights called the Seeh Sung Hills; and for the purpose of keeping open the road to it bridges had been thrown across both the canal and the river. The only other posts which it is necessary to notice are the Bala Hissar, almost entirely occupied by the Shah's troops under the command of Brigadier Anquetil, and the residence of Sir Alexander Burnes, where a small body of sepoys acted as his escort and also guarded the treasury under the charge of Captain Johnson, the paymaster. At an earlier period the money had for safety been removed to the Bala Hissar, but the paymaster found the distance inconvenient, and on application was at once permitted to bring the treasure back into the town, and keep it as before at his own house, the envoy dashing off his permission, as if the subject had been beneath his cognizance, by a simple hurried remark:—"Johnson may, of course, put his treasure wherever he deems it most safe and convenient." The sum thus coolly banded about without any precaution for its security amounted at this time to seven lacs of rupees (£70,000).

The cantonments were completed in the autumn of 1840, and the British troops had passed the winter of 1840–41 in them in tolerable comfort. The sepoys indeed suffered severely from the intense cold, and the hospital soon became crowded with patients suffering from pulmonary affections. To the British, on the other hand, and more especially those of them who had long endured the scorching heats and deluging rains of India, nothing could be more grateful than the return of the seasons in the order to which they had been accustomed in their own native land, and though an excessive rise in prices necessarily curtailed them of many of their comforts and luxuries, they were able to pass their leisure pleasantly. Cricket, fishing, shooting, hunting, and horse-racing gave to the most active and robust their full share of bodily exertion; while the more sedate found endless sources of interest and instruction in acclimatizing plants, and trying how far it was possible to combine the luxuries of an Afghan with the more substantial productions of an European garden. It is not to be
denied that some, not satisfied with such pleasures, mingled with them or substituted for them others of a very different description. Licentiousness, instead of being confined to those unfortunates whom depraved custom regards as its legitimate victims, was too often emboldened to violate the domestic hearth and seek its indulgence within the very precincts of the harem. More than one chief, aware of having thus suffered in his happiness and honour, burned for revenge, and was not to be satisfied with anything short of the extermination of the infidel Feringhees. It would be wrong, however, to attach much importance to this feeling. Though it did exist, and not without a cause, it is to be hoped that licentiousness continued to the last to be a very partial exception to the generally good deportment of the British troops, and that when disaster did befall them, it was not in retribution for their own private vices but for the gross mismanagement of those to whom their welfare was intrusted, and the tyranny and injustice which lay at the foundation of the whole British policy in Afghanistan.

Though a crisis had long been foreseen by those who, looking below the surface, saw the causes which were working to produce it, all the leading authorities, civil and military, continued as if it were spell-bound. General Elphinstone looking fondly forward, saw himself proceeding quietly under escort for the British frontier; Sir William Macnaghten had nearly completed the packing preparatory to his departure; and Sir Alexander Burnes felt so satisfied with the higher position on which he was about to enter, that on the evening of the 1st of November he did not hesitate to congratulate the envoy on his "approaching departure at a season of such profound tranquillity." Could he be serious? Some days previously the moonshee Mohun Lal, of whose intelligence and fidelity there was no doubt, had informed him of a general confederacy among the Afghan chiefs, and emphatically warned him against the danger of disregarding the threatening indications of a coming storm; and again, on the evening of that very day when he congratulated the envoy, the same individual called upon him with new proofs of the plots which the chiefs were engaged in hatching. The impression produced upon Burnes is explained very vaguely, but the account is that "he stood up from his chair, sighed, and said that the time was not far when we must leave this country." Another part of the account is, "that he did not choose to ask the envoy for a strong
guard, as it would imply that he was afraid," and his determination, therefore, seems to have been to run all hazards. The notice of warnings seemed at last only to irritate him, and he actually turned out the son of Gholam Mahomed Khan, a leading Dooranee chief, who went by night to inform him of the plot, adding rudely and superciliously, that "we do not care for such things."

The plot, of which information was thus with strange infatuation rejected, was now approaching its execution. The Afghan chiefs had assembled, and were concerting measures for the destruction of the British troops. The course which seemed most hopeful, was to work upon the prejudices and passions of the people, by circulating among them extravagant rumours. "The principal rebels," wrote Sir William Macnaghten in a letter, of which a fragment only remains, "met on the night before, and relying on the inflammable disposition of the people of Cabool, they gave out that it was the order of his majesty to put all infidels to death, and this of course gained them a great accession of strength." The accuracy of this statement is questionable. It proceeds on the supposition that the Shah was popular in Cabool, and that his name was, to the party who fraudulently used it, a tower of strength. Independently of the extravagance of the rumour that he had issued orders for the destruction of those on whom the stability of his own throne entirely depended, it is impossible to believe that the circulation of it gave what the envoy calls "a great accession of strength" to the insurgents. They were playing, in fact, a very different game, and their great object was to rid themselves at once of foreign aggression and of the obnoxious ruler whom it had imposed upon them. But though a general confederacy having this object had undoubtedly been formed, it has been questioned whether the actual outbreak was the result of a previously concerted plan. The time was certainly ill chosen. By waiting for a few days a large portion of the troops in Afghanistan under orders for India would have departed and been beyond recall, whereas by premature action much additional risk of failure was incurred. The account of a meeting held by the chiefs, though somewhat meagre, seems to show that the outbreak, at least at its commencement, was dictated as much by private revenge as by public resentment.

Abdoollah Khan, who, on the restoration of the Shah, had been deprived of his chiefship, not satisfied with complaining loudly of the injustice, was at little pains to conceal his hostility, and lost no opportunity of intriguing against British interests. Burnes, made aware of his proceedings, sent him a blustering message, stuffed with opprobrious epithets, and threatening to deprive him of his ears. Abdoollah Khan, now complaining both of insult and injustice, threw off all restraint, and at a meeting of chiefs, held on the 1st of November at the house of Sydat Khan, took the lead in proposing an attack on the house of Burnes on the following day. The design undoubtedly was to assassinate every individual who should be found on the premises. While Burnes' fate was thus sealed, warnings which, duly improved, would have secured his escape
were again given him. A friendly native eager to save him called at his residence before daylight, but had the mortification to see his statement received with incredulity. Shortly afterwards, when the insurgents had begun to muster, and the stir of their movement was heard in the street, Oosman Khan, the Shah's prime minister, arrived with tidings which it was no longer possible to dispute, and urged Burnes either to return with him to the Bala Hissar, or take refuge in the cantonments. He refused to do either, but was so far moved to a sense of danger that he applied to the envoy for additional troops, and also tried to conciliate Abdoollah Khan by a message assuring him, that if he would in the meantime restrain popular violence, all grievances would be redressed. Both applications proved ineffectual, and Burnes, together with all the inmates of his residence, were left to their fate. They were not indeed entirely destitute of means of defence. Besides himself, his brother Lieutenant Charles Burnes, and Lieutenant William Broadfoot, who had just arrived to act as his military secretary, there was the small body of sepoys forming his escort, and guarding the treasure deposited in Captain Johnson's house, immediately adjoining. Fortunately for himself the paymaster passed that night in the cantonments.

After a furious mob thirsting for blood and plunder had filled the street in front of the house, and precluded all access to it, Burnes, instead of allowing his sepoys to use their muskets, imagined that he could calm the tumult by a speech; and kept haranguing from the upper part of the house. It was utterly unavailing, and he became fully awake to the danger, when Lieutenant Broadfoot fell pierced by a ball through his chest. Resistance, which used earlier might have been effectual, was now seen to be hopeless. The insurgents had set fire to the stables, made their way into the garden, and were evidently preparing to force an entrance into the house. As a last resort he offered large sums of money for his own and his brother's life, and was only answered with the cry, “Come down into the garden.” As this would have been to meet instant death, the sepoys opened their fire, and were resisting manfully, when a native of Cashmere, who had gained admission to the house, took an oath upon the Koran, that, if the firing was stopped, he would safely convey Burnes and his brother to the Kuzzilbash fort, situated about half a mile to the northwest, and then held by Captain Trevor, though with a very inadequate force. Distrustful though he must have been of this volunteered deliverance, it was a last chance, and Burnes disguised in native attire descended to the door. The moment he stepped beyond it, his treacherous guide gave the signal, by calling out, “This is Sekunder Burnes.” In a moment both the brothers were in the hands of the infuriated mob, who literally cut them to pieces with Afghan knives. The sepoys now left without a head made a fruitless defence, and were all murdered, and with them every man, woman, and child found on the premises. The paymaster's guard shared the same fate, and all his
treasure, now amounting, however, to only £17,000, fell into the hands of the insurgents.

While these atrocities were being perpetrated, how were the Shah's and the British troops employed? Sir Alexander Burnes had, as we have seen, applied to the envoy for a reinforcement, and it is now universally admitted that if it had been immediately despatched, the outbreak could have been suppressed without difficulty. The number of insurgents did not at first exceed 200 or 300, and their success was so doubtful, that the leading chiefs kept aloof, and refused to commit themselves by taking open part with them. It was indeed probable that the houses of Burnes and the paymaster would be forced and plundered, but the success would only be momentary, and would be followed on the arrival of the British troops by a signal vengeance. Such appears to have been the calculation both of the chiefs and of the actual insurgents, and it was not until to a thirst for blood and plunder a hope of impunity was added, that the insurrection assumed new dimensions and became truly formidable. Where, then, it must be again asked, were the British troops while their treasury was being plundered and their companions barbarously murdered, almost within hearing? To the credit of the Shah, it deserves to be recorded that the first movement against the rioters was made from the Bala Hissar by his own orders and by his own troops. As soon as the disturbed state of the city was communicated to him, he sent out his Hindoostanee regiment, with two guns, under the command of an able officer, an Indo-Briton of the name of Campbell. Unfortunately, instead of taking a road which would have led them to Burnes' house with little obstruction, they endeavoured to make their way through the heart of the city, and placed themselves almost at the mercy of the insurgents, by becoming entangled in narrow intricate streets. After an unequal conflict, during which they are said to have lost 200 men, they commenced a disorderly retreat, and would probably all have perished had they not obtained an unexpected relief. Brigadier Shelton had brought into the Bala Hissar three companies of the 54th native infantry, the Shah's 6th infantry, and four guns, the whole force which he then had in the small camp beyond the Secah Sung Hills; and on learning how the Hindoostanee regiment was situated, sent out a detachment which helped to extricate them, but did not succeed in saving the two guns. This movement having been made by orders received from the cantonments, we naturally turn thither to learn what consultations were held, and what steps taken as soon as intelligence of the insurrection was received.

The application by Sir Alexander Burnes for support was received by the envoy at latest by 7 A.M. His own account of the matter is:—"On the morning of the 21st November, I was informed that the town of Cabool was in a state of commotion; and shortly afterwards I received a note from Lieutenant-colonel Sir A. Burnes, to the effect that his house was besieged, and begging for assist-
ance. I immediately went to General Elphinstone." The general's account is:—— A.D. 1841.

"On the 2d of November, at half-past 7 A.M., I was told by Colonel Oliver that the city was in a great ferment, and shortly after the envoy came and told me that it was in a state of insurrection, but that he did not think much of it, and that it would shortly subside." It thus appears that the envoy and the general were in consultation on this subject about half-past 7 A.M. The former had been told "that the town of Cabool was in a state of commotion," and the latter "that the city was in a great ferment," and the common impression produced on the minds of both was that the insurrection "would shortly subside." This, to say the least, was taking the matter very coolly, and prepares us for what appears to have been their common conclusion, that there was no necessity for immediate despatch. The envoy indeed says, "I suggested that Brigadier Shelton's force should proceed to the Bala Hissar, thence to operate as might seem expedient; that the remaining troops should be concentrated in cantonments and placed in a state of defence, and assistance if possible sent to Sir A. Burnes." In this proposal the general appears to have readily acquiesced, but a long delay must have taken place, for he afterwards admits that Brigadier Shelton did not move into the Bala Hissar till "about 12 o'clock," and adds with the greatest coolness, as if he had thus done all that could reasonably be expected——"the rest of the troops were concentrated in cantonments, which arrangements occupied the rest of the day." He says nothing of the assistance requested by Sir Alexander Burnes, as if the life of a valuable public servant, the lives of the men who were sharing his danger, and the threatened plunder of the army chest, were matters too trivial to occupy his thoughts. But even assuming that the detachment of Brigadier Shelton was the only thing that promised to be of any immediate utility, how came it that though the distance between the Seeah
Sung camp and the Bala Hissar scarcely exceeded a mile it was not completed
till mid-day? In the emergency which had arisen despatch was everything,
and yet nearly four hours elapse between the resolution to send the troops and
their actual departure. General Elphinstone indeed hints at one cause of delay,
when he says that "the envoy sent his military secretary, Captain Lawrence, to
intimate his wishes and obtain the king's sanction to this measure," and a fuller
explanation is given by the brigadier. "Between nine and ten," he says, "I
got a note from General Elphinstone reporting a disturbance in the city, and
desiring me to prepare to march into the Bala Hissar . . . . I soon after got
another, telling me not to go as the king objected to it." The obvious reply to
this countermand was, that "if there was an insurrection in the city, it was
not a time for indecision, and that the measures adopted must be immediate."
Having thus urged despatch, the brigadier received a third note telling him to
march immediately into the Bala Hissar, when further instructions would be
given him by the envoy's military secretary. Believing everything to be now
arranged, he was just in the act of marching off when he received a note from
the secretary telling him to halt for further orders. Perplexed at this new
interruption, he despatched Lieutenant Sturt of the engineers, Sir Robert Sale's
son-in-law, to ascertain the cause; but that officer, on entering the precincts
of the palace, was attacked in the act of dismounting from his horse by an Afghan
youth, who inflicted three severe wounds with a dagger, and from the confusion
of the moment or through connivance was permitted to escape. Sturt's wounds
happily proved of a less deadly nature than was at first feared, and he was
carried back to the cantonments under a guard of fifty lancers, while the
military secretary himself brought his own answer, which was "to proceed."
As already mentioned, these repeated commands and countermands so frittered
away the time, that Shelton did not reach the Bala Hissar till mid-day, and
then only to see Campbell and his Hindoostanees fleeing in disorder before
infuriated and triumphant Afghans.

On perusing the above details, it is impossible to repress a feeling of indigna-
tion at the irresolute, we had almost said heartless, course adopted by the
envoy and the general. The city is in an uproar, and three British officers,
with a small body of troops, suddenly attacked by an infuriated mob, are fighting
for their lives. They implore assistance, and the application is received at
an hour sufficiently early to enable the authorities, civil and military, to take
the necessary steps for that purpose. At first the only question is, by what
route shall the troops be sent? and the answer is, from the Seerah Sung camp to
the Bala Hissar. But here a preliminary difficulty is started. Will Shah
Shujah give his consent? and should he refuse, would it not be a complete sub-
version of the Anilkand and Macnaghten policy to have recourse even to
friendly compulsion? On such frivolous grounds the order for the march of the
troops is delayed, in order that an attempt may be made upon the stubborn
will of a monarch, who had been placed upon his throne by British bayonets, and could not have continued to sit upon it a single day if they had been withdrawn. Negotiation is commenced, messages pass and repass between the palace and the cantonments, and according to their tenor, the troops in readiness to march for the suppression of the riot and the relief of their unhappy companions in arms, are tantalized by contradictory orders to halt or to proceed. At last they reach the Bala Hissar, but only to be most ungraciously received by the Shah, who, says Shelton, "asked me as well as I could understand, who

sent me, and what I came there for."

There was perhaps more meaning in this insolent question than it bears on the face of it, for of what use was it to send troops after the mischief was already done? Had they arrived several hours earlier, as but for the irresolution which prevailed at head-quarters they might easily have done, they might, instead of merely saving a remnant of the discomfited Hindooostanee regiment, have acted in concert with it, and penetrating to Burnes' residence, dispersed the mob before the work of rapine and murder had commenced. Still as the day was only half-spent when Shelton reached the Bala Bissar, how came it that he did little more than remain a passive spectator of the progress of the insurrection? The envoy's answer is, that it had then become impracticable for a body of troops to penetrate to the neighbourhood of Burnes' house. Why impracticable? Obviously because another
serious blunder had been committed in not sending a force adequate to the service required from it.

In the Seeh Sung camp on the morning of the outbreak, there was only a portion of the troops belonging to it. The rest were within the cantonments. Why, when Brigadier Shelton received the order to march, were not the absentees sent forward to join their comrades? They could not be required for the defence of the cantonments, which were not then threatened, and within which nearly 4000 men must then have been concentrated; and their addition to the force under Brigadier Shelton might have enabled him, instead of remaining passive, to make at least a bold effort to accomplish the task which had been assigned him. Such an effort could hardly have failed of success, had it been seconded, as to all appearance it might and ought to have been, by a diversion from another quarter. General Elphinstone says that "the route by Seeh Sung to the Bala Hissar was considered the fittest to enter the city, but it was not the only route, nor, as far as one can judge from the plan, was it either the shortest or most practicable. The Kohistan road, along the east side of which the cantonments were constructed, leads in a line almost due south to one of the city gates. Had a body of the surplus troops cooped up within the cantonments been sent along the road, they could have arrived at the gate without difficulty. Passing it and proceeding onwards for about 500 yards, a point is reached where the road branches off to the right and left. Taking the latter direction by a road which crosses the river by a bridge, the distance to Burnes' house is little more than half a mile. Where was the impracticability of accomplishing this distance? Supposing Brigadier Shelton to have been at the same time prepared to act, the effect would have been to place the insurgents between two fires. Would they in this case have ventured on continued resistance? The undisciplined mob, seeing themselves about to be hemmed in between two strong bodies of regular troops, would have listened only to their fears and dispersed. Even in a less favourable view, the diversion from the cantonments might have been made subservient to several important objects. On the banks of the river, a short distance above the bridge already mentioned, there was a tower occupied by Captain Trevor with a mere handful of men. It was of some importance to retain possession of it, because being situated in the Kuzzilbash quarter, it would have been the means of keeping up a friendly communication with the inhabitants, who were understood to be better affected towards the British than any other part of the Afghan population. Advantage might have been taken of its proximity to throw in a reinforcement sufficient to secure it from capture. Another object, of still more importance, might have been at the same time gained. On the right branch of the road, about 500 yards beyond the fort already mentioned, stood a fort of large dimensions, in which temporary magazines had been erected for the use of the Shah's commissariat. The place, though not well chosen, was defensible,
and the vital importance of defending it is apparent from the fact that on the 2d of November it contained about 8000 maunds of grain. Even admitting that no general diversion from the cantonments could have been attempted, surely the most strenuous efforts ought to have been made to save this fort from falling into the hands of the enemy. Yet nothing was done. Though it was well known that on the very morning of the outbreak it was furiously assailed by the inhabitants in its vicinity, and its few defenders, if unrelieved, must soon be overpowered, no steps were taken, or rather the only step taken was in an opposite direction. Captain Lawrence offered to lead two companies to its relief and was not permitted.

Other proofs of the utter incompetency of the civil and military authorities to meet the storm which had burst upon them crowd upon us, but enough has been detailed. The only active step that appears to have been taken in addition to the abortive detachment of Brigadier Shelton to the Bala Hissar, was to send a handful of troops into the commissariat fort, and thus make the number of its defenders amount in all to eighty. Why such a reinforcement? The subsistence of the troops depended on the preservation of the commissariat fort, and it could not but be foreseen that it would in all probability be the very first point against which the efforts of the enemy would be most strenuously directed, and yet, though there was a whole day during which free access to it was uninterrupted, and it might have been so strongly garrisoned as to defy assault, nothing worth mentioning was done. Not only was it allowed to remain isolated as before, with a garden and orchard intervening, from the cover of which the insurgents might open a murderous fire, but no attempt whatever was made to occupy and dismantle the adjoining forts by which it was commanded. Could it be alleged that the commissariat fort was, from its unfortunate position, indefensible, still there was surely an alternative. If it was practicable on the 2d of November to send a paltry reinforcement to it, it must also have been practicable, if such a course had been deemed expedient, to prepare for its abandonment, by emptying it of the whole, or at least the most valuable part of its stores and bringing them within the cantonments. The penalty due for the series of gross blunders committed on the first day of the insurrection was not long delayed.

While the envoy and general, with singular infatuation, frittered away the time, and apparently despaired of being able to effect anything with the large body of troops under their immediate control, no time was lost in sending importunate messages, recalling the troops, which during the delusive interval previous to the insurrection had been permitted to commence their march for India. By thus applying for distant aid, which owing to the state of the country could not possibly have arrived before the crisis was decided, the authorities only practised deception upon themselves, and found excuses for not exerting their own energies to the utmost. The note sent to Candahar, con-
sitting of a small scrap of paper inclosed in a quill, though dated the 3d of November, did not reach General Nott till the 14th. It required him to "immediately direct the whole of the troops under orders to return to Hindoostan, to march upon Cabool instead of Shikarpour," and to "instruct the officer who may command, to use the utmost practicable expedition." He was moreover required "to attach a troop of his majesty the Shah's horse artillery to the above service, and likewise half the 1st regiment of cavalry." Fortunately, as we have already seen, he had on his own responsibility, in consequence of alarming news from Cabool, recalled the troops which he had despatched under the command of Colonel Maclaren, after they had made only a single march. So far, therefore, as he was concerned, there was nothing to prevent his compliance with the peremptory order to send them off immediately to Cabool. There were, however, obstacles which he believed to be insurmountable, though the authorities at Cabool did not seem to have taken them into consideration, and he therefore declared that in sending the troops, he was obeying his superiors at the expense of his own judgment. His reasons are thus given in a letter to his daughters:—"First, I think at this time of the year, they (the troops) cannot get there (Cabool), as the snow will probably be four or five feet deep between that place and Ghuznee; besides which it is likely they will have to fight every foot of the ground, from the latter to the former place; at any rate they will arrive in so crippled a state as to be totally unfit for service; secondly, they will be five weeks in getting there, before which everything will be settled one way or other; thirdly, could I have kept the troops here which left this morning. I could ultimately have preserved the whole of Afghanistan, whatever the result at Cabool may be, and now these troops can be of no use there, and their removal will, I fear, ruin us here, for the people to-day openly talk of attacking us." "How strange," he adds, "that, from the time we entered this country up to the present moment, we have never had a man of common sense or energy at the head of affairs." Nott had only too good reason for his representation of the disordered state of the country, for a very short time before Captain Woodburn, who was proceeding on sick leave to Cabool, was attacked by a party of rebels after leaving Ghuznee, and barbarously murdered; only six out of his whole escort of 130 souls escaping the same fate. His account of the climate also proved correct, for Colonel Maclaren, after a few days' march, lost so many of his cattle by frost and snow, and found his difficulties accumulating so fast, that he was glad to retrace his steps. Accordingly, as might have been foreseen, Cabool could obtain no relief from Candahar.

An application to Sir Robert Sale to return with his brigade was equally unavailing. The 37th regiment, left to guard the western entrance of the Khoord Cabool Pass, at once obeyed the summons, and made their appearance on the morning of the 3d on the Seelah Sung Hills. They had been obliged to contest almost every inch of their ground, but notwithstanding, greatly to the
credit of Major Griffiths who commanded, "they came in," says Lady Sale, "with all their baggage in as perfect order as if it had been a mere parade movement." This, however, was all the aid obtained. Before receiving the summons of recall Sir Robert Sale had quitted Gundamuck, and was advancing on Jelalabad. The kind of difficulties encountered will be best explained in his own words. "Since leaving Cabool, they (the troops) have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks by night and day; from the time of their arrival at Tazeen they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labour, throwing up entrenchments, and very severe outpost duty; while each succeeding morning has brought its affair with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with jezails which have enabled them to annoy us at a range at which they could only be reached by our artillery." Anxious, therefore, though he must have been to return to Cabool, where his wife and daughter were sharing the common danger, he declared it to be impossible, for the following reasons:—"I beg to represent that the whole of my camp equipage has been destroyed; that the wounded and sick have increased to upwards of three hundred; that there is no longer a single dépôt of provisions on the route, and the carriage of the force is not sufficient to bring on one day's rations with it. I have at the same time positive information that the whole country is in arms and ready to oppose us in the defiles between this city and Cabool, while my ammunition is insufficient for more than two such contests, as I should assuredly have to sustain for six days at least. With my present means I could not force the passes of either Jugduluck or Khoord Cabool; and even if the débris of my brigade did reach Cabool, I am given to understand that I should find the troops now garrisoning it without the means of subsistence. Under these circumstances, a regard for the honour and interest of our government compels me to adhere to my plan already formed, of putting this place (Jelalabad) into a state of defence, and holding it if possible until the Cabool force falls back upon me, or succours arrive from Peshawer or India."

Having disposed of the applications for aid, and the answers, which from the length of time that intervened, have somewhat anticipated the narrative, we now return to Cabool, and begin with the insertion of a letter addressed to the envoy by General Elphinstone, on the evening of the 2d November, the very first day of the outbreak. "Since you left me I have been considering what can be done to-morrow. Our dilemma is a difficult one. Shelton, if reinforced to-morrow, might no doubt force in two columns on his way towards the Lahore gate, and we might from hence force in that gate and meet them. But if this were accomplished what shall we gain? It can be done, but not without very great loss, as our people will be exposed to the fire from the houses the whole way. Where is the point you said they were to fortify near
Burnes' house? If they could assemble there that would be a point of attack; but to march into the town, it seems, we should only have to come back again; and as to setting the city on fire, I fear from its construction that is almost impossible. We must see what morning brings, and then think what can be done. The occupation of all the houses near the gates might give us a command of the town, but we have not means of extended operations. If we could depend on the Kuzzilbashes, we might easily reduce the city." In this very characteristic letter the writer makes a series of proposals, which if practicable on the morrow when the insurrection had gained head, must have been still more so on the day previous; but instead of deciding on any one of them he merely plays at hide-and-seek with them, and then goes to bed with the sage resolution to trust to the chapter of accidents. "We must see what the morning brings, and then think what can be done." The morning came, and with it, as might have been anticipated, a vast increase of the insurgents. Thousands, whom excess of caution had previously kept aloof, now openly declared themselves, while multitudes, hearing of the plunder which had already been obtained, poured in from the neighbouring villages in the hope of obtaining a share. The Kohistan road, along which troops might have passed with little obstruction on the 2d, was now completely beset, and every step behoved to be taken in the face of infuriated and exulting foes. The interval of a night had brought no additional clearness of perception or energy of purpose to the general and the envoy, and instead of boldly fronting the difficulties which their own imbecility had mainly created, they cowered before them. It was not till three in the afternoon of the 3d that any attempt was made to penetrate from the cantonments into the city. It proceeded upon the plan, which had already proved abortive, of attempting to accomplish the most important objects by inadequate means, and resulted in a complete failure. The whole force employed consisted of one company of her Majesty's 44th regiment, two companies of the 5th native infantry, and two horse-artillery guns. Major Swayne, who commanded, encountering an opposition which convinced him that success was impossible, had no alternative but to retrace his steps. Besides the gross blunder of sending out so feeble a detachment, no care had been taken to secure co-operation and support from the Bala Hissar. There was still time after this first repulse to correct the blunders which led to it, and make a new attempt under more auspicious circumstances, but a feeling of despondency was already beginning to prevail, and General Elphinstone once more resolved to wait till he should "see what the morning brings, and then think what can be done." Meanwhile, though he was supine, the insurgents were not. Captain Trevor, obliged to abandon his tower, was indebted to some friendly natives for the means of removing his wife and seven children to the cantonments; and Captain Mackenzie, who commanded at the Shah's commissariat, after keeping the enemy at bay for two whole days, and sending importunate but unavailing
messages for support, was compelled to quit his post as untenable, and happily succeeded in making an almost miraculous escape. The fort, of course, with all its stores fell into the hands of the insurgents.

This was to be succeeded by a similar but still more serious disaster. The insurgents were now bent on capturing the British commissariat fort, and were pusillanimously allowed to avail themselves of every facility to insure success. The commissariat fort, situated about 300 yards south of the south-west bastion of the cantonments, was completely commanded by another called Mahomed Shureef's fort, which occupied a height on the opposite side of the Kohistanee road. This fort, which from its position could direct its fire equally against the commissariat fort and the cantonments, being not more than 300 yards north-west of the former, and 200 yards south-west of the latter, was crowded with the enemy, who were allowed to ply their jezails and matchlocks from its walls with deadly aim, while no attempt was made to dislodge them. Thus encouraged they ventured down into the lower ground and took undisputed possession of the intervening garden. Meanwhile that fort, thus beleaguered, and though containing the provisions and medical stores of the whole army, was held by a party which, according to Lady Sale, amounted only to fifty, and certainly fell far short of a hundred. Lieutenant Warren, the officer in command, wrote that he was reduced to extremity; that his men were deserting him; that the enemy were mining the walls and preparing for escalade; and that it would be impossible for him to hold out unless reinforced. On receiving this letter, what was General Elphinstone's resolution? One which nothing but dotage could have dictated. It was not to reinforce Lieutenant Warren, but to detach a party of infantry and cavalry, by whose aid he might be able to evacuate the place. On hearing of this insane proposal, Captains Boyd and Johnson, the respective heads of the British and the Shah's commissariat, waited upon the general, and pointed out that if the supplies were captured the destruction of the whole force would become almost inevitable. The remonstrance seemed to be effectual, and a vigorous attempt to reinforce the fort was promised. It was promised, but never performed. The general, who had no confidence in his own judgment, looked round helplessly for advice, and having found counsellors as ignorant or imbecile as himself, did nothing. In an earlier part of the day a paltry reinforcement of two companies of the 44th regiment had been driven back with serious loss, including that of Captains Swayne and Robinson, who were shot dead on the spot; in the afternoon a party of the 5th cavalry, designed to assist in the mad scheme of evacuation, suffered still more severely. Was not this proof that nothing more could be done, and that it only remained to do on the 4th as had been done on the 2d and 3d—"see what the morning brings, and then think what can be done?"

Such appears to have been General Elphinstone's final resolution, but the self-complacency with which he regarded it must have been somewhat disturbed
when the commissariat officers, seeing that the promise given them had not been kept, entered his presence and once more pointed out the absolute necessity of maintaining the commissariat fort at all hazards. He at once assented, and was even willing, as a preliminary measure, to take possession of Mahomed Shureef's fort. Captain Boyd, delighted at the result of the interview, volunteered to carry the powder to blow in the gate, and he and his commissariat colleague retired about midnight, under the impression that the capture of the one fort, and the relief of the other, would be immediately undertaken. This impression was all the stronger, because during the interview a new and most urgent application from Lieutenant Warren had been officially answered by a note, which assured him that he should receive reinforcements by two o'clock in the morning. Nay, as if to make it impossible to doubt that the promised aid would certainly be forthcoming, we learn from General Elphinstone's own report that tools were "sent overnight with a view to the introduction of reinforcements, and the withdrawal of supplies from the store." Though monstrous, it is true, that the general again changed his mind, and had nothing to say in justification, except that the proceeding involved too much risk. The garrison, deceived in their expectation of support, and in danger of being every moment overpowered by the enemy, who had actually attempted to fire the gate and escalade, used the tools which had been sent for a very different purpose—in digging a hole from the interior, and through it made their escape. The scene presented by the captured fort is thus described by Captain Johnson:—"The Godown fort was this day something similar to a large ant's nest. Ere noon thousands and thousands had assembled from far and wide, to participate in the booty of the English dogs, each man taking with him as much as he could carry—and to this we were all eye-witnesses." Even Shah Shujah, looking down from the battlements of the Bala Hissar in amazement and consternation at this extraordinary scene, could not help exclaiming, "Surely the English are mad!" The soldiers were of course indignant when their means both of subsistence and relief in distress were thus ignominiously carried off, and called to be led against the contemptible enemy, who were parading their spoils before their very faces. The general, however reluctant, was unable to resist the call thus made upon him, and within three hours of the loss was dreaming of repairing it by an attempt to storm Mahomed Shureef's fort. In a note to the envoy, dated 5th November, 5 A.M., he thus announced his intention:—"We will first try to breach the place, and shell it as well as we can. From information I have received respecting the interior of the fort, it seems the centre, like our old bazaar (another fort only about a hundred yards from the cantonments), is filled with buildings; therefore if we succeed in blowing open the gate, we should only be exposed to a destructive fire from the buildings, which from the state of preparation they evince, would no doubt be occupied in force, supported from the garden. Carrying powder bags up under fire
would have a chance of failure. Our men have been all night in the works, and tired and ill fed, but we must hope for the best." He thus conjures up a host of difficulties which seem to make the attempt almost desperate, and then when the moment of action arrives, instead of proportioning the force to the duty imposed upon it, sends out only fifty men of the 44th, and 200 native infantry. Apparently anticipating failure, he stands in the gateway of the cantonments as if to be the first to announce it, and takes advantage of the first blunder to recall the detachment. The attack must indeed have been forced upon him, for there is proof that he had already begun to meditate a very different mode of deliverance.

In the above letter of General Elphinstone, addressed to the envoy, early in the morning of the 5th November, the following passage occurs:—"It behoves us to look to the consequences of failure; in this case I know not how we are to subsist, or, from want of provisions, to retreat. You should therefore consider what chance there is of making terms, if we are driven to this extremity." If such was his language on the very third day of the insurrection, what was henceforth to be expected but disgrace and ruin in their most hideous forms? He had an army which, handled by such men as Sale and Nott, would have sufficed to clear the district of every rebel Afghan who dared to show his face, and he keeps it cooped up within cantonments, timidly whimpering about difficulties, till he has broken the spirit of his men, taught them to dread an enemy whom they previously despised, and thus prepared them for every species of humiliation. On the following day, writing as before to the envoy, he recurs to the subject which was now evidently uppermost in his mind, and as if the resolution to treat had been already taken, seems only anxious that the negotiations should not be protracted. This was the more inexcusable, as on this very day (the 6th) the prospect had improved. Captains Boyd and Johnson had exerted themselves to the utmost to compensate for the loss of the commissariat stores, and with so much success, by extensive purchases in the neighbouring villages, that the danger of starvation was no longer imminent. Nor was this the only success which crowned the labours of this day. Mahomed Shureen's fort, which had been the subject of so much discussion, and the scene even of some disgraceful repulses, was taken at last in a manner which showed that had a proper spirit been evinced at the outset, the insurrection might have been put down before it assumed the character of a great national movement. After Lieutenant Sturt had so far recovered from his wounds as to be again fit for duty, he obtained permission to open upon the fort with three nine-pounders, and two twenty-four pounder howitzers. By twelve o'clock an excellent breach was effected, and the assault was made with so much impetuosity that the enemy, after a short resistance, abandoned the place. Lieutenant Raban of the 44th, while waving his sword on the highest point of the breach, which he had been the first to mount, was unfortunately killed, and
with him other eighteen of the assailants, besides several wounded; but the troops had been so long strangers to success that general joy was diffused, and at the request of the envoy, who was anxious to show that valour would not go unrewarded, a sepoy private who had distinguished himself was immediately promoted to the rank of sergeant. Before the enemy recovered from their consternation, two gallant charges were made, the one by a party of Anderson’s horse, who rode straight up the ridge on the right, and the other by the 5th cavalry, who made a similar attack on the left. The effect was to hem the enemy in between the two corps, and give an opportunity of forcing them to a general action under circumstances so unfavourable that their defeat must have been almost certain. The idea of a victory, however, was so far beyond the highest aspirations of the general, that he once more sat down to address the envoy in language which could not have been more desponding if he had sustained another signal defeat. “We have temporarily, and I hope permanently, got over the difficulty of provisions. Our next consideration is ammunition; a very serious and indeed awful one. We have expended a great quantity; therefore it becomes worthy of thought on your part how desirable it is that our operations should not be protracted by anything in treating that might tend to a continuance of the present state of things. Do not suppose from this I wish to recommend, or am advocating humiliating terms, or such as would reflect disgrace on us; but this fact of ammunition must not be lost sight of.” At this time the ammunition in store was sufficient to last twelve months, and therefore alarm in regard to it was utterly groundless. Yet on this creation of his own brain he urges upon the envoy the hasty conclusion of a treaty which, though he disclaims it in words, he could not but be well aware must be “humiliating,” and “such as would reflect disgrace on us.” As if he had not made his fears sufficiently palpable, he added the following lugubrious postscript:—“Our case is not yet desperate; I do not mean to impress that; but it must be borne in mind that it goes very fast.” The words are so enigmatical that it is difficult to decipher their meaning. According to grammatical structure it is the “case” that was going very fast, but not improbably he was only calling the envoy’s attention once more to the alleged deficiency of ammunition. After all, whatever be the interpretation adopted, the gist of the warning was, “We are in a dilemma from which there is no hope of escape by honourable and manly means. Fighting is of no use. Try diplomacy, and do not stand upon punctilios, for if it fails our case is desperate.”

Sir William Macnaghten was only too much disposed to adopt the course thus recommended. He had often found money succeed when all other resources failed, and he therefore began to try what could be effected by distributing it with a liberal hand. He could not indeed hope to conciliate all the chiefs by this vulgar process, and he therefore resolved to employ it for the purpose of sowing dissension among them, and thus breaking up their confeder-
acy. It was well known that, though at present leagued in a common cause, mutual jealousies and suspicions abounded among them. In particular the Kuzzibilash or Persian party, separated as Shiites from the other inhabitants of Afghanistan, who were bigoted Soonees, dreaded the tyranny which the latter might exercise over them if the British were expelled, and thus furnished the envoy with an opportunity of giving his Machiavellian policy a full trial. The very agent fitted for the purpose had been accidentally provided. Mohun Lal, the moonshee of Sir Alexander Burnes, had saved his life when his master was murdered, by taking shelter under the garment of a Kuzzibilash chief of the name of Mahomed Zemaun Khan. Another still more influential chief of the same party, Khan Shereen Khan, had afterwards taken him under his protection, and he was residing with him on the 7th of November, when the envoy, following up a correspondence which had been previously commenced, wrote authorizing him to assure his friends Khan Shereen Khan and Mahomed Kumye, that if they performed the service, the payment would certainly be forthcoming, £10,000 to the former, and £5000 to the latter, "besides getting the present and everything else they require." In the same letter he added, "I hope that you will encourage Mahomed Yar Khan, the rival of Ameeroolah; assure him that he shall receive the chiefship, and all the assistance necessary to enable him to support it. You may give promises in my name to the extent of 500,000 rupees (£50,000)."

The nature of the service expected is not here explained, but light is thrown upon it by a letter, written two days before to Mohun Lal, by Lieutenant John Conolly, who, though then with the Shah in the Bala Hissar, was the envoy's nephew and assistant, and in constant communication with him. Conolly's letter contained the following passages:—"You can promise one lac of rupees to Khan Shereen, on the condition of his killing and seizing the rebels, and arming all the Seeahs, and immediately attacking all rebels." "Hold out promises of reward and money; write to me very frequently. Tell the chiefs who are well disposed to send respectable agents to the envoy. Try and spread 'nifak' (dissension) among the rebels." "P.S. I promise 10,000 rupees for the head of each of the principal rebel chiefs."

On comparing the above two letters, the envoy's is seen to be the complement and confirmation of his assistant's. Mohun Lal, though he had no scruples as to the kind of employment given him, naturally desired the written authority
of the envoy himself, and he received it in the form of a guarantee that the lac promised through Conolly to Shereen Khan, for "killing and seizing the rebels," would be paid as soon as the work was done. So far, there is no room for doubt that the envoy and assistant perfectly understood each other and were acting in concert. Even the postscript of Conolly’s letter, horrible though its purport undoubtedly is, is not so unlike some of the suggestions which the envoy was accustomed to throw out in moments of rage and despondency, as to make it improbable that he sanctioned Conolly’s atrocious offer of £1000 for the head of each of the principal rebel chiefs. We have already seen the envoy, when in alarm at the movements of Dost Mahomed, seriously asking, "Would it be justifiable to set a price on this fellow's head?" and between such a question, and the offer of blood-money, the difference is not so great as to make it incredible that the individual who proposed the one also sanctioned the other. What gives peculiar interest to the latter case is, that Conolly’s offer was acted upon. Within a month Abdoolah Khan and Meer Musjedee, two chiefs who had been specially marked out as the first victims of assassination, were both dead, and under circumstances so suspicious, that the blood-money was actually claimed by the wretches hired to assassinate them, and was only evaded by an abominable subterfuge. Abdoolah Khan was wounded in battle, not however by a British musket, but by an Afghan jezail in the hands of one of Mohun Lal’s hired assassins, who after dogging his steps aimed at him from behind a wall. The murderer, when it was thought the wound might not prove mortal, promised to complete the work by poison. So the story goes. However much its accuracy may be doubted, it is certain that the hired assassin Abdool Aziz claimed the price of blood, and Mohun Lal refused it on the ground that the head for which alone the money was to be paid, had not been brought him. The manner of Meer Musjedee’s death is more obscure, but in his case also the price of blood was claimed by a hired assassin, who swore that he suffocated him in his sleep, and was only refused by Mohun Lal on the same disgraceful nibble as before. One would fain keep the envoy free from all connection with these atrocious proceedings, and it has not only been suggested that Conolly made his inhuman offer at the suggestion of Shah Shujah alone, but a letter has been produced in which the envoy, writing to Mohun Lal a few days after the murder of the two chiefs, said, "I am sorry to find from your letter of last night that you should have supposed it was ever my object to encourage assassination. The rebels are very wicked men, but we must not take unlawful means to destroy them.” In passing judgment on the case, due weight should be given to this unequivocal disclaimer, for unfortunately the envoy had already too much to answer for, and he should not be burdened with an additional load of guilt, so long as it is possible to doubt whether he actually incurred it.

While General Elphinstone was counselling submission, and the envoy was
endeavouring to put off the evil day by a lavish distribution of money, the insurrection continued to spread rapidly over the whole country, and leave the British troops at the different stations little more than the ground which they actually occupied. In Kohistan, where the party of Dost Mohamed had always mustered strong, the Ghoorka regiment posted at Charikur was furiously assailed and threatened with annihilation. Fortunately Eldred Pottinger, the hero of Herat, who was acting as political agent on the Turkistan frontier, occupied the castle of Lughmanee, only two miles distant, and succeeded after a desperate struggle in uniting his handful of troops to the Ghoorkas commanded by Captain Codrington. The crisis, however, had only now arrived. Large bodies of the enemy immediately surrounded the fortified barracks of Charikur, and continued to press on with so much determination, that an effort to dislodge them became absolutely necessary. For this purpose Pottinger, once more in the character of an artillery officer, moved out with a field-piece, and was almost immediately disabled by a musket-shot in the leg. Codrington was still more unfortunate. While gallantly heading his little band against a torrent of the enemy who were sweeping everything before them, he fell and was carried back mortally wounded. Only one alternative remained. The ammunition was nearly exhausted, and the soldiers, reduced to 200 fighting men, having emptied their last pool of water, were perishing with thirst. It was therefore resolved to evacuate Charikur, and endeavour by a rapid unencumbered march to reach Cabool. This resolution, dictated by despair, could hardly have been expected to succeed. On the very first march, all order was lost. Pottinger and Haughton, suffering from wounds, and believing that they could be of no further service, put spurs to their horses, and after many hairbreadth escapes reached the cantonments at Cabool. The retreating party, thus left, was immediately headed by Ensign Rose and the medical officer Dr. Grant, and struggled on till it reached Kardurrah. Here it was overwhelmed by a furious onset of the enemy and cut to pieces. Ensign Rose, who was among the slain, sold his life dearly, having killed four of the enemy with his own hand. Dr. Grant's fate was still more melancholy. After escaping from Kardurrah, he had arrived within three miles of the cantonments, when he was seized by some wood-cutters and barbarously murdered.

General Elphinstone had repeatedly applied to be relieved from a position for which he felt that he was not qualified. It is said indeed that he was sent out to India with a view to this very appointment. If so, it must have been in all probability of his own seeking. It was at once an honourable and a lucrative post, and he doubtless thought himself a most fortunate man when he was made commander-in-chief of the army of occupation beyond the Indus. A short trial, however, seems to have satisfied him that he was not in his right place, and he had not only the honesty to confess it, but had obtained permission on medical certificate to return to India. He had, as he expressed
it, been "unlucky in the state of his health." Fever and rheumatic gout had made him almost a cripple, and on the 2d of November, the first day of the outbreak, he had, as he himself relates, "a very severe fall—the horse falling upon him." This unfortunate accident, added to his other infirmities, seems to have completely shattered him in mind as well as body. His personal courage never appears to have failed him, but any clearness of thought and energy of purpose which he may at any time have possessed were entirely gone. Successive resolutions flitted across his mind like mere phantoms, and not frequently after long hours of consultation he would change all his arrangements on the casual remark or frivolous objection of some one of the most forward and least qualified of his counsellors. These defects were only too apparent. Even the common soldiers saw them, and murmured when they saw themselves in danger of being sacrificed through the incompetency of their commander. It was necessary therefore that some steps should be taken, though it was a matter of some delicacy. So long as General Elphinstone found himself capable of acting at all, he felt bound to retain his command till either General Nott, for whom he had written, or some other regularly appointed officer, should arrive to supersede him. The utmost therefore to which his consent could be obtained was to call in Brigadier Shelton as the second in command, and allow the heaviest and most active duties to be performed by him, as a kind of deputy-commander.

Much being expected from this new arrangement, no time was lost in acting upon it, and Brigadier Shelton, about four on the morning of the 9th of November, received orders to quit the Bala Hissar and come into cantonments, with the Shah's 6th infantry and a six-pounder gun. He started in little more than two hours after, and as he himself says, "marched in broad daylight, without the enemy attempting to dispute my passage." This fact seems to indicate that it was necessary only to show a bold front in order to keep the enemy at bay, and clear the communication between the city and the cantonments. The brigadier's first impressions on arriving were anything but favourable. "I was cordially received," he says, "but could read anxiety in every countenance, and they had then only three days' provisions. I was sorry to find desponding conversations and remarks too generally indulged, and was more grieved to find the troops were dispirited." On going round the cantonments he "found them of frightful extent, with a rampart and ditch an Afghan could run over with the facility of a cat, with many other serious defects." The brigadier complains of the general indulgence of "desponding conversations and remarks," but it is to be feared that he was in this respect one of the principal offenders. He had seen much service, and was possessed of indomitable courage, but his harsh and ungracious manner made him unpopular with all classes, and his judgment was by no means so excellent as to justify the unbounded confidence which he himself placed in it.
A temper of a very different kind was required, and by the want of it, he in a manner neutralized all the good of which he might otherwise have been capable. General Elphinstone's vacillation was provoking in the extreme, but conciliation tempered with firmness might easily have overcome it, and we cannot read their statements without feeling that, though there were faults on both sides, the brigadier's conduct admits of least excuse.

On the 10th of November, the day after Brigadier Shelton's arrival, an offensive movement was resolved upon. It was to be directed principally against what was called Rikabashee's fort, which was situated so near the cantonments that the men in the bastions were shot down at their guns. The force allotted was in this instance commensurate with the supposed difficulties of the service, and the brigadier was occupied in telling off the 2000 men of all arms, when he heard General Elphinstone observe to his aide-de-camp, "I think we had better give it up." "Then," replied the aide-de-camp, "why not countermand it at once?" This was enough, and the countermand was given. By the intervention of the envoy the attack was again ordered, but unhappily two whole hours had been lost, during which the spirit of the assailants had been damped by forebodings of failure, and the enemy had strengthened their means of defence. The plan was to blow open the gate. Unfortunately the explosion only blew open a small wicket, through which the stormers found it extremely difficult to pass in the face of a hot and deadly fire. The few who succeeded having made their way into the interior, struck terror into the garrison, who hastened to escape by the other side. At this very time the cry of "cavalry," accompanied by a sudden charge of Afghan horse, had produced a similar panic among the stormers outside the wicket, and Europeans and sepoys in one confused mass turned their backs and fled. On this occasion the brigadier did good service. Disdaining flight, he more than once rallied the fugitives, and by the aid of the artillery, which now began to tell, compelled the Afghans to retire. During this conflict outside the fort, the small number of the assailants who had gained admission were in a most perilous position. The garrison, who had fled in the belief that the whole storming party had entered, soon discovered their mistake and hastened to return. To prevent this, the gate by which they escaped had been closed by securing its chain with a bayonet. This was but a feeble obstacle, and the enemy came once more into deadly conflict with the few individuals opposed to them. Colonel Mackrell fell by a wound which shortly after proved mortal; and Lieutenant Bird, with two sepoys of the 37th native infantry, took refuge in a stable, which they barricaded, and defended so heroically, that they shot down thirty of their assailants, and on the final capture of the fort were found unscathed. The fall of the Rikabashee compelled the enemy to abandon several neighbouring forts, in which a considerable quantity of grain was found.

The name of victory is always cheering, but there were so many drawbacks
to that of the 10th that the spirits of the troops were little revived by it, and
the envoy, as if despairing of more honourable means, became more active
than ever in plying his wily policy. The very next day John Conolly wrote
to Mohun Lal as follows:—"There is a man called Hajee Ali, who might
be induced by a bribe to try and bring in the heads of one or two of the
Musfids. Endeavour to let him know that 10,000 rupees (£1000) will be
given for each head, or even 15,000 rupees (£1500). I have written to him
two or three times." And that Mohun Lal might be urged to greater exer-
tion, the envoy himself again took pen in hand and wrote to him thus:—"You
are aware that I would give a reward of 10,000 rupees for the apprehension
of Ameer-oolah Khan, and such of the Dooranee rebel chiefs." Attempts have
been made to distinguish between the two commissions thus given to Mohun
Lal, and it has been said that the blood-money offered by the one was not con-
templated or sanctioned by the other. Be this as it may, it is quite cer-
tain that Mohun Lal had no idea of any such distinction, and therefore having some
doubts as to the mode of proceeding, he wrote directly to the envoy for explana-
tion, telling him that "he could not find out by Lieutenant Conolly's notes how
the rebels are to be assassinated, but the men now employed promise to go
into their houses and cut off their heads, when they may be without attendants."

On the 13th of November the enemy appeared in force on the Behmaroo
Hills, situated to the north-west of the cantonments, and opened an annoying
fire from two captured guns which they had placed in a commanding position.
On this occasion the envoy displayed more of the military spirit than either
the general or the brigadier, and insisting, in opposition to both, that a vigorous
attempt should be made to drive back the enemy and recapture the guns, carried
his point. At four P.M., the earlier part of the day having been wasted in idle
debate, Shelton proceeded on the service at the head of a strong detachment, with
two guns. The troops moved in three columns and in different directions. Un-
fortunately the more serviceable of the two guns stuck fast in a canal, and though
the other gun did good execution, the advanced column of infantry, brought into
collision with the Afghan cavalry sooner than was intended, appears to have lost
all presence of mind. When, at the distance of only ten yards they might have
poured in a destructive volley, they fired wildly without taking aim, and were
immediately enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry, who charged through and
through their ranks, and drove them in confusion down the slope. This omin-
ous and disastrous commencement did not, however, decide the fortune of the
day. At the foot of the hill they reformed behind the reserve, and in a new
attack regained the honour which they had lost. Aided by Eyre's guns, both
of which were now in full operation, and a gallant charge of Anderson's horse,
they carried the height, and with it the two guns which had been the great
object of contention. So far they were entitled to claim the victory, though it
must be admitted that they failed to reap the full fruits of it. As night was
beginning to fall, and the enemy began again to press forwards, only one of the guns could be brought into cantonments. The other was abandoned after being spiked, and some loss was sustained before the troops could effect their return. Shortly afterwards intelligence arrived which spread a gloom over the cantonments, and shut out almost the only remaining ray of hope. The envoy, who had received no distinct tidings of Sale's brigade, buoyed himself with the idea that it might be actually advancing to their relief, but on the 17th of November it became certain that no such aid was to be obtained. On ascertaining this he addressed a letter to General Elphinstone, in which he entered into a detail of the various alternatives which it might be possible to adopt. They might retreat in the direction of Jelalabad, or retire to the Bala Hissar, or attempt to negotiate, or continue to hold the cantonments. He declared his leaning to be in favour of the fourth. "Upon the whole I think it best to hold on where we are as long as possible, in the hope that something may turn up in our favour." "In eight or ten days more we shall be better able to judge whether there is any chance of an improvement in our position." It was most unfortunate that the envoy, instead of thus trusting to the chapter of accidents, did not at once decide in favour of the second alternative —retirement to the Bala Hissar. It was in fact the only remaining chance of escape from destruction. Once within it the troops would have had an impregnable position, and freed from the harassing labour which the defence of the cantonment incessantly entailed upon them, must have been able by means of the stock of provisions already stored in the citadel, and the addition which might have been made to it by suitable exertion, to pass the winter in security and tolerable comfort. The envoy doubted if the heavy guns could be brought into the Bala Hissar, and foresaw a deficiency both of food and firewood to cook it. The general and the brigadier, now apparently intent on retreat with or without capitulation, seconded these objections, and added others, of which the only one not absolutely frivolous was the alleged difficulty of transporting the sick and wounded.

The loss inflicted on the enemy on the 13th had curbed their audacity, and for some days they gave comparatively little annoyance. Latterly they began to resume their aggressive attitude, and by taking possession of the village of Behmaroo, situated at the north-east foot of the Behmaroo Hills, cut off one of the main sources from which the British had been drawing supplies. In order to dislodge them, it was resolved to send out a strong force before daybreak on the morning of the 23rd. The most remarkable fact in regard to the composition of the force is that it had only one gun. A general order, issued while Marquis Hastings was governor, enjoined that under no circumstances, unless where a second could not be obtained, were less than two guns to be taken into the field. The propriety of this rule, sufficiently obvious in itself, was destined this day to receive a striking confirmation.
Brigadier Shelton, at the head of the force, marched out of cantonments at two in the morning, and the solitary gun, having with some difficulty been brought into position on a knoll, opened with grape on an enclosure of the village, which seemed to be the enemy’s principal bivouac. Had the surprise and confusion thus produced been improved on the instant, there seems no doubt that the village might easily have been carried, but through some blunder the attack was delayed, and then through some other blunder so improperly made that it failed. Meanwhile the enemy had begun to ply their jezails, and thousands of the insurgents, made aware that a battle was raging, hastened from the city across the hills to take part in it. The advantage obtained from the darkness was now lost, and as the day dawned the parties opposed to each other became well defined, the British occupying one hill and the enemy another, only separated by a narrow gorge. The fire having become hot and galling, the brigadier left five companies on the extremity of the hill overhang-ing the village, and crossing the gorge with the remainder of the force and the one gun gained the brow of the enemy’s hill. Here he formed his infantry into two squares, and crowded his cavalry behind them. This arrangement, which has been strongly and justly censured, did not produce much mischief so long as the gun, nobly worked by Sergeant Mulhall, continued to tell upon the Afghan masses. At length, however, when incessant firing had made it unserviceable, a severe penalty was paid for the folly of not having provided another to supply its place. The Afghan jezails carrying much further than the British muskets, poured in a fire which could not be returned, and made dreadful havoc in the squares. Why these, and the cavalry in their rear, were thus kept in a position where they could not act with effect, and stood merely as marks to be shot at, has never been satisfactorily explained. The result was disastrous. The spirit of the troops was broken, and they became incapable of resisting any sudden impulse of terror. It was not long before the panic, for which they were thus prepared, seized them. A party of Afghans, headed by

1 The jezail is a long matchlock gun, with a forked rest enabling the marksman to take good aim. It is a formidable weapon in mountainous countries, the more so as its range far exceeds that of a musket.—Hart’s Character and Costume of Afghanistan.
some fanatical Ghazees, taking advantage of an eminence which concealed the movement, made a sudden rush from behind it. In an instant all was confusion in the British ranks, and both infantry and cavalry, when ordered to charge, shamefully turned their backs and fled. The brigadier and other officers, while the bullets were flying thick around them, vainly endeavoured to stop the fugitives. One of the first consequences was the capture of the solitary gun by the enemy. Their triumph, however, was short-lived. When everything seemed lost, the brigadier had the presence of mind to order the halt to be sounded. The men mechanically obeyed, reformed, and returned to the conflict. It was now the turn of the Ghazees to flee and leave the captured gun behind them. The conflict still continued with alternations of success, but as the capture of the village for which it was commenced had become impossible, it was suggested to the brigadier, that as the spirit of the troops could no longer be trusted, the wisest course would be “to return to cantonments while it was still possible to do so with credit.” “Oh no! we will hold the hill some time longer,” was his answer, and there he stood sacrificing valuable lives while no possible advantage could be gained by it. If this was mere bravado, it was dearly paid for. Another Ghazee rush was followed by a second panic, and the great body of the British troops were driven back in the utmost confusion. So completely indeed were fugitives and pursuers mingled, that the cantonments themselves must have fallen had the Afghans known how to improve their advantage.

Brigadier Shelton, in narrating the above events, coolly remarks, “This concluded all exterior operations.” The British troops pining with cold and hunger, exhausted by incessant fatigues, and broken in spirit, had refused to follow their officers, and been seen in dastardly flight before an enemy whom they had been accustomed to despise. What then could be expected from further conflict except additional disgrace and disaster? The question of retirement to the Bala Hissar was indeed still open, and the Shah, who had formerly refused to entertain it, being now fully alarmed for his personal safety and that of his family, urged its immediate occupation by the British troops, as the only remaining means of safety. The envoy, though strongly inclined to the same opinion, was haunted by so many apprehensions that he yielded without much difficulty to the objections of the military authorities.

When the proposal to move into the Bala Hissar was rejected, there must have been some mention of a resource deemed preferable to it, and we are not left long in doubt as to what it was. The envoy had resolved to attempt to obtain terms from the insurgents, and having ascertained their willingness to treat, called upon General Elphinstone for his opinion “as to whether, in a military point of view, it is feasible any longer to maintain our position in this country.” The opinion, which was previously well known, was given officially in the following terms: “I beg to state that having held our position here for
upwards of three weeks in a state of siege, from the want of provisions and forage, the reduced state of our troops, the large number of wounded and sick, the difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situated cantonment we occupy, the near approach of winter, our communications cut off, no prospect of relief, and the whole country in arms against us, I am of opinion that it is not feasible any longer to maintain our position in this country, and that you ought to avail yourself of the offer to negotiate which has been made to you." Thus sanctioned, the envoy immediately despatched a message to the Afghan chiefs, requesting them to appoint deputies to discuss the preliminaries of a treaty. The meeting was fixed for the following day (the 25th November), and was held at an intermediate spot, Sultan Mahomed Khan and Meerza Ahmad Ali representing the Afghans, and Captains Lawrence and Trevor the British. The former at once assumed a tone so arrogant, that after two hours' discussion no progress had been made. At last they asked to see the envoy himself, and had an interview with him in a guard-room in one of the gateways of the cantonments. It was unavailing. The Afghan chiefs demanded that the British should surrender as prisoners of war, and deliver up all their arms, ammunition, and treasure, and when these terms were indignantly rejected, departed, uttering menaces.

Negotiation having failed, both parties seemed resolved to wait the progress of events, and for some days no active measures were taken. But delay, while it improved the position of the enemy, was absolutely ruinous to the British. Their supplies were consumed much faster than they could replace them, and the obvious consequence was that they must ere long be absolutely starved out. The troops meanwhile were becoming disorganized, and disgraced themselves,
on more than one occasion, by despicable cowardice. Thus, on the 6th of December, Mahomed Shureef's fort, which it had cost so much to gain, was recaptured by the enemy without an effort. Its garrison of 100 men, on seeing some Afghans, who had mounted to the window by using their crooked sticks as scaling ladders, show their heads, abandoned their posts, and fled back pell-mell to the cantonments. Lady Sale says, "They all ran away as fast as they could. The 44th say that the 37th ran first, and as they were too weak they went too." But according to Lieutenant Hawtrey, who commanded, "There was not a pin to choose—all cowards alike." "Our troops," wrote Macnaghten, "are behaving like a pack of despicable cowards, and there is no spirit of enterprise left among us." In this dilemma, the envoy displayed a far more manly spirit than his military coadjutors. While the latter did nothing but croak and reiterate the humiliating word negotiate, he returned to the alternative of gaining the Bala Hissar as at once the safest and most honourable, urging that the sick and wounded might be sent off under the cover of night, and that then, after destroying all the ordnance and stores that could not be removed, they might fight their way. This was his proposal on the 6th of December, but the general discomfited it, and saw no possibility of relief except in what he was pleased to call "honourable terms." These, he thought, might still be obtained, but "after leaving cantonments, terms, I should suppose, are quite out of the question."

The envoy, most reluctant to announce a final decision, lingered on till the 11th, when there was just enough of food for the day's consumption of the fighting men, and then opened the negotiation. The conference took place on the banks of the Cabool, nearly a mile from the cantonments. It was attended by Akbar Khan and most of the other Afghan chiefs on the one part, and by the envoy, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, with a small escort, on the other. After the first salutations, the envoy produced and read the draft of a treaty which he had previously prepared. It consisted of a preamble, and eighteen separate articles. They were in substance, that the troops now at Cabool would repair to Peshawer, and thence to India with all practicable expedition, the Sirdars engaging to keep them unmolested, to treat them with all honour, and furnish "all possible assistance in arms and provisions;" that all the other British troops in Afghanistan should evacuate it as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made; that Shah Shujah should have the option of remaining in Afghanistan, on a maintenance of not less than a lac of rupees per annum, or of accompanying the British troops; that on the safe arrival of the British troops at Peshawer, arrangements should be made for the immediate return of Dost Mahomed and his family, with all other Afghans now detained in India, and that at the same time the family of the Shah, if his majesty elected to accompany the British troops, should be allowed to return towards India; that from the date on which these articles are agreed,
"the British troops shall be supplied with provisions, on tendering payment for the same;" that "the stores and property formerly belonging to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan shall be restored," and all the property of British officers left behind should be carefully preserved, and sent to India as opportunities may offer; and that, "notwithstanding the retirement of the British troops from Afghanistan, there will always be friendship between that nation and the English, so much so, that the Afghans will contract no alliance with any other foreign power without the consent of the English, for whose assistance they will look in the hour of need."

The treaty was read with only a single interruption from Akbar Khan, who showed already what he was meditating, by observing on the article which engaged the Sirdars to supply provisions, that there was no occasion for supplies, as the march from the cantonments might be commenced on the following day. The other chiefs checked his impetuousity, and after the reading was finished proceeded to discuss the articles separately, with some appearance of moderation. It is difficult indeed to discover anything to which they could seriously object. The treaty placed the British troops entirely at their mercy. It was in fact just what the chiefs had asked and the envoy indignantly spurned at the first interview—an unconditional surrender. He himself, no doubt, thought very different, and could see nothing worse in the transaction than that "by entering into terms, we are prevented from undertaking the entire conquest of the country." This, however, was now past hoping for, and he could therefore look at the treaty with some degree of self-complacency. "The terms I secured were the best obtainable, and the destruction of 15,000 human beings would little have benefited our country, whilst the government would have been almost compelled to avenge our fate at whatever cost. We shall part with the Afghans as friends, and I feel satisfied that any government which may be established hereafter, will always be disposed to cultivate a good understanding with us." Such was the flattering side of the picture. But it had also a dark side. The Afghans were notoriously avaricious, crafty, and vindictive, and where was the guarantee that after agreeing to the terms they would fulfil them? The British troops were to evacuate the cantonments in three days. This done they would be entirely at the mercy of foes, who would have the option of exterminating them, either by starvation or the sword.

The first measure adopted in fulfilment of the treaty was not of a kind to
inspire confidence. The British troops in the Bala Hissar, about 600 in number, were to evacuate it on the 13th of December, and proceed to the cantonments. It was most desirable that their store of grain, amounting to 1600 maunds, should not be left behind, and every exertion was made in preparing for its removal. Unfortunately, so much time was consumed in this operation that the day wore away and night had fallen before the troops were prepared to march. Akbar Khan, who had undertaken to be their guide and protector, had his men in waiting for that purpose. Part of these, as soon as the British emerged from the gate, made a rush at it, apparently for the purpose of forcing an entrance. The garrison within succeeded in closing it, and then having manned the walls commenced a destructive fire, without attempting to distinguish between friend and foe. After this untoward event Akbar Khan declared that he could not guarantee the safety of the troops if they persisted in marching at that late hour, as the Seelah Sung Hills, along which they must pass, were bristling with Ghiljies, whom it would be impossible to restrain. The result was that the British troops, most of them sepoys, were obliged to remain outside the walls, devoid both of food and shelter, and exposed to the rigours of a winter night, such as they had never endured before. Worse would have befallen them had Akbar Khan proved treacherous, but he kept his faith, and enabled them, though thoroughly exhausted, to reach the cantonments in safety on the following morning.

The third day, the one appointed for the evacuation of the cantonments, had now arrived, but this was at once acknowledged to be impossible. The chiefs, under the pretext that they had no security for the evacuation, declined to furnish the supplies which they had promised, while the British protested that they would not or could not move without them, and nearly a week of the time during which they ought to have been hastening home by rapid marches was lost. The effect of the delay was disastrous. On the 18th of December snow began to fall, and covering the whole country around to the depth of several inches, indicated that winter had fairly set in. While the difficulties of the retreat were thus indefinitely increased, the tenure of the cantonments was rendered far more precarious by giving up possession of the forts which commanded them. This was demanded by the Afghans as a pledge of sincerity, and the envoy and general, after a consultation, pusillanimously complied. It is but fair to confess, that though the Afghans clearly foresaw the advantage which they might derive from delay, the blame was not wholly theirs. The envoy, even after he had signed the treaty, ceased not to wish that something might turn up that would enable him to evade its obligations, and was not indisposed to employ means for this purpose which cannot be otherwise characterized than as unscrupulous and dishonourable. The return of Colonel Maclaren to Candahar, after a vain attempt to penetrate across the country, was not known at Cabool till the 19th of December, and therefore up
to that day he had postponed issuing any order in concert with the general for the evacuation of Ghuznee, Candahar, and Jelalabad. This was now done, but the envoy disappointed in one hope clung to another. The treaty provided for the abdication of the Shah. Who then was to be his successor? The answer was left indefinite, and revived the old jealousies of the Afghan tribes. The Barukzyes and their adherents claimed to be restored to their ancient ascendency, while the Ghiljies and Kuzzilbashies, dreading this as the worst event that could befall them, would willingly have retained Shah Shujah, in the expectation of being able to use him as their tool. The envoy, in order to profit by this dissension, did not hesitate to foment it, and began to scatter bribes on all hands. He thus entangled himself in a web of intrigue, which cost him his honour and his life. One is almost ashamed to relate how a high British functionary, after binding himself by treaty, could quibble upon its obligations.

Though the 22d of December had been fixed for the departure of the British troops, the envoy was engaged up to that very day, by means of his old agent Mohun Lal, in a treacherous correspondence with the Ghiljies and Kuzzilbashies. On the 20th he wrote, "You can tell the Ghiljies and Khan Shereen, that after they have declared for his majesty and us, and sent in 100 kurwars of grain to cantonments, I shall be glad to give them a bond of five lacs of rupees." On the 21st he explained himself more fully. "In conversing with anybody, you must say distinctly that I am ready to stand by my engagement with the Barukzyes and other chiefs associated with them, but that if any portion of the Afghans wish our troops to remain in the country, I shall think myself at liberty to break the engagement which I have made to go away, which engagement was made believing it to be in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan nation. If the Ghiljies and Kuzzilbashies wish us to stay, let them declare so openly in the course of to-morrow, and we will side with them. The best proof of their wish for us to stay is to send us a large quantity of grain this night—100 or 200 kurwars. If they do this and make their salaam to the Shah early to-morrow, giving his majesty to understand that we are along with them, I will write to the Barukzyes and tell them my agreement is at an end." In another letter, written in the course of the same day, he repeated the extraordinary doctrine that he should think himself at liberty to break his agreement, "because that agreement was made under the belief that all the Afghan people wished us to go away." He had the precaution, however, to add, "Do not let me appear in this matter." It is hardly necessary to give the reason. At this very time he was engaged in a similar intrigue with the Barukzyes, and had shown his friendship for Akbar Khan by making him a present of his carriage and horses.

1 The kurwar of grain was a measure weighing about 700 lbs., and consequently rather more than ten bushels.
The game which the envoy was playing could hardly have been expected, and certainly did not deserve to succeed. While he was pluming himself on his dexterity in keeping it secret, the Afghan chiefs knew it all, and proceeded as they were well entitled to counterwork him. He accordingly received new overtures from the Barukzyes, and was easily caught by them, as they promised more than he was anticipating from the rival intrigue. He therefore intimated to Mohun Lal that "the sending grain to us just now would do more harm than good to our cause, and it would lead the Barukzyes to suppose that I am intriguing with a view of breaking my agreement." This reads ludicrously after the specimens of double-dealing already given, but the envoy, as if totally unconscious of anything of the kind, thus concluded a letter to Mohun Lal:—"It would be very agreeable to stop here for a few months, instead of having to travel through the snow; but we must consider not what is agreeable but what is consistent with faith." If these words have any meaning it is that the envoy held himself bound by the treaty, and would be guilty of a breach of faith by breaking or evading it, and yet, at this very moment, he was deep in an intrigue with Akbar Khan with this very object.

On the evening of the 22d of December, the date of the letter last quoted, Captain Skinner came from the city into cantonments, accompanied by a first cousin of Akbar Khan and a Lohanee merchant, who was believed to be a friend of the British. They were the bearers of a new string of proposals, of such a nature that Captain Skinner remarked, half jocularly, to the envoy, that he felt like one loaded with combustibles. Their main purport was that the British troops, having been drawn up outside the cantonments, Akbar Khan and the Ghiljies would unite with them, and on a given signal attack the fort and seize the person of Ameen-oolah Khan, who was known to be the original contriver, and had throughout been a ringleader of the insurrection; that Shah Shujah should still be king; and that the British troops should remain till spring, and then to save their credit withdraw of their own accord. In return for his part in this plot, Akbar Khan should be recognized as Shah Shujah’s wuzeer or prime-minister, and should moreover be guaranteed by the British government in a present payment of thirty, and an annual pension of four lacs of rupees. One part of the proposal was to present Ameen-oolah’s head to the envoy for a fixed price. This he at once rejected, but he grasped at the other proposals, and assented to them by a writing under his own hand. The following morning, the 23d, was fixed for holding a conference with Akbar Khan, and completing the arrangements.

Often had the envoy been warned of the danger of intriguing with Akbar Khan, but he had apparently made up his mind to risk all on a single chance, rather than prolong the suspense and agony which were making existence intolerable. After breakfast he sent for Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, and told them to prepare to accompany him to a conference with Akbar Khan.
Mackenzie, who had found him alone, having for the first time learned his intentions, exclaimed "It is a trap." He abruptly answered, "Leave me to manage that; trust me for that." As yet General Elphinstone had been kept wholly in the dark, but the envoy, now on the point of setting out, sent for him and explained the nature of the intrigue. Startled, and far from satisfied with the explanation, the general asked what part the other Barukzye chiefs had taken in the negotiation, and was simply answered "they are not in the plot." "Do you not then apprehend treachery?" rejoined the general. "None whatever," was the reply; "I am certain the thing will succeed. What I want you to do is to have two regiments and guns got quickly ready, and without making any show, to be prepared the moment required to move towards Mahomed Khan's fort." With more good sense and greater firmness than he usually displayed,

About noon of the 23d the envoy passed out of cantonments, accompanied by Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, and escorted by a few horsemen. The place of meeting was about 600 yards east of the cantonments, not far from the banks of the river where it is crossed by a bridge. It was situated on a slope among some hillocks, and was marked out by a number of horse-cloths, which had been spread for the occasion. While passing along, the envoy remembered that a beautiful Arab horse, which he had purchased from the owner at a high price, with the intention of presenting it to Akbar Khan, who was known to have coveted it, had been left behind. He therefore desired Captain Mackenzie to return for it, and in the meantime conversed with the other two officers on the subject which was nearest his heart. He was playing, he admitted, for a heavy stake, but the prize was worth the risk. Unable, however, to suppress misgivings, he is said to have remarked, "Death is preferable to the life we..."
are leading now." After the usual salutations and some conversation on horseback, during which Akbar Khan was profuse in his thanks for the present of the Arab steed, and also for that of a handsome pair of double-barrelled pistols, which he had admired at a previous meeting, the parties repaired to the spot provided for their reception. The envoy reclined on the slope, and Trevor and Mackenzie seated themselves beside him, but Lawrence, whose suspicions were already awake, continued standing behind him, till, as the only means of avoiding the importunity of the chiefs, who urged him also to sit, he knelt on one knee ready to start in a moment. Akbar Khan opened the conference by an abrupt question. "Are you ready," he asked, "to carry out the proposals of the previous evening?" "Why not?" replied the envoy. Meanwhile, the Afghans crowding round, Lawrence called attention to the suspicious circumstance, by observing that if the conference was meant to be secret the intruders ought to be removed. Some of the chiefs made a show of clearing a circle with their whips, but Akbar Khan interposed, saying that their presence could do no harm, as they were all in the secret. What this secret was did not remain a moment in doubt. The envoy and his companions, suddenly seized from behind, were rendered incapable of any effectual resistance. The three officers were immediately dragged away and placed each behind a mounted Afghan chief, who rode off at full speed in the direction of Mahomed Khan's fort. Captain Trevor unfortunately lost his seat, and was cut to pieces by Ghazees; Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie were lodged in the fort. Meanwhile, the envoy had been seized by Akbar Khan, and was struggling desperately with him on the ground. It is said, probably with truth, that his antagonist meant only to drag him off like his companions, and that it was not till resistance had exasperated him, that he drew a pistol, one of those just presented to him, and shot him dead. During the struggle wonder and horror were strongly depicted on the envoy's upturned face. The only words he was heard to utter were "Az barae Khoda" (For God's sake). In the fearful tragedy which thus terminated the life of Sir William Macnaghten, the most melancholy circumstance is that, whether because misfortune had unhinged his mind or weakened his moral principles, he was engaged at the time of his death, not in the faithful discharge of his duty, but in a course of tortuous policy, which every honourable mind must repudiate.

The murder of the envoy completely changed the relations previously formed between the Afghans and the British, and left it optional for the latter to choose their own course, independent of the obligations previously contracted by treaty. The highest representative of the government, an ambassador whose very office hedged him round with a sacredness which all nations, not absolutely barbarous, recognize and revere, had been decoyed into an ambush and treacherously murdered. With a people capable of doing such a deed, and boasting of it after it was done, engagements, however solemnly made, were
useless, and all therefore that now remained for the British was to avenge their wrongs, or at all events, if that was beyond their power, to become once more their own protectors, and trust to nothing but Providence and their own stout hearts and swords. Such was evidently the course which was at once safest and most honourable, but it was not that which the military authorities prepared to adopt. At first they would not believe that the envoy had been murdered, and instead of taking the necessary means to dispel all doubt on such a subject, sent round an officer to calm the alarm which was generally felt, by intimating at the head of each regiment that though the conference had been interrupted by the Ghazees, and the envoy with the officers who accompanied him had been removed to the city, their immediate return to cantonments might be expected. The following day dissipated these delusions. A letter from Captain Lawrence made known the full extent of the atrocity, and at the same time, strange to say, contained overtures from the murderers for a renewal of negotiation. Instead of revolting at the very idea, the proposals were eagerly embraced. They differed little from the envoy's treaty, but when the chiefs found that they had only to ask in order to obtain, they immediately rose in their demands, and in returning the draft, appended to it four additional articles. "1st, Whatever coin there may be in the public treasury must be given up. 2d, All guns must be given up except six. 3d, The muskets in excess of those in use with the regiments must be left behind. 4th, General Sale, together with his wife and daughter, and the other gentlemen of rank who are married and have children, until the arrival of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and the other Afghans and their families, and Dooranees and Ghiljies from Hindoostan, shall remain as guests with us." These humiliating articles, after a fruitless attempt to modify them, were submitted to, except the last, and even it was not complied with merely because it could not be enforced.

On the 6th of January, 1842, the British troops, after waiting in vain for the safeguard which the Afghan chiefs had promised to provide, marched out without it through a large opening which had been made on the previous evening in the rampart of the cantonments, to facilitate their egress. The total number of those who thus quitted the cantonments amounted to about 4500 fighting men, and 12,000 followers. The march of such a body at such a season, through a rugged mountainous country, was in itself a most perilous undertaking, and there were other circumstances connected with it which made it all but desperate. The Newab Zemuau Khan, whom the Afghans had set up as their king, wrote Pottinger warning him of the danger of setting out without the promised safeguard, but it was too late to recede, and the unwieldy mass began to move. The same fatality which had hitherto frustrated all their operations was again manifest; and while time was everything, so many delays were interposed that the rearguard were not able to quit the cantonments till six o'clock p.m., and after a fierce conflict with Ghazees and plunderers, and did not
reach their encamping ground, on the right bank of the Cabool near Begramee, till two hours after midnight. This first march sufficed to reveal insuperable difficulties.

When the morning of the 7th dawned, a fearful scene was presented. Many of the Hindoo women and children, exhausted by fatigue and cold, had sunk down on the snow to die. Discipline was rapidly disappearing, and it was evident that ere long the whole force would become disorganized. Horses, camels, and baggage ponies, soldiers and camp followers, were huddled together in an inextricable mass. Meanwhile fanatic and marauding bands kept hovering on the flanks, and seized every opportunity of slaughter or plunder. The only chance of safety would have been a rapid march, by which the passes might have been cleared before the enemy could effectually obstruct them, but this was now impossible. Zemaun Khan having again promised to disperse the plunderers and send supplies of food and fuel, General Elphinstone was induced to order a halt at Boothauk. It was his intention to have continued the march during the night, had not the appearance of Akbar Khan on the scene caused him to abandon it. The Afghan chief was at the head of about 600 horsemen, and on being communicated with, announced that he had come to act as a safeguard, and at the same time to demand hostages for the evacuation of Jelalabad. Till these were given, and Sale's brigade should have actually retired, he was instructed to detain the retreating force, and furnish them in the interval with all necessary supplies. After this announcement, it could scarcely be doubted that the extermination of the whole force was intended. Another bivouac on the snow during a night of intense cold, would almost suffice for this purpose, and hence the only chance of escape was to push on at all hazards, without an hour's delay. Such, however, was not the resolution of General Elphinstone, who first ordered the halt, and then endeavoured to make terms. Ultimately, after another night of horror had been spent, Akbar Khan condescended to accept of Major Pottinger and Captains Lawrrence and Mackenzie as hostages, and to permit the continuance of the retreat to Tezeen. Could this place have been reached, one of the greatest difficulties of the route would have been surmounted, inasmuch as the Khoord Cabool Pass, stretching for about five miles through a narrow gorge, hemmed in by precipitous mountain ridges, would have been cleared. No sooner however was the gorge entered, than the mountaineers rushed down to the attack, and a fearful massacre commenced. Akbar Khan, who had promised protection, seemed willing to afford it, but it was beyond his power, and the British force, now a mere rabble of fugitives, were shot down by hundreds, almost without any attempt at resistance. About 3000 persons are said to have perished in this dreadful pass. The English ladies accompanying the advance, though exposed to the murderous fire of the Afghan marksmen, escaped unhurt, with the exception of Lady Sale, who was struck by a ball which lodged in her wrist.
The remnant of the force reached Khoord Cabool fort on the evening of the 8th, but it was not to obtain any mitigation of their sufferings. "We had ascended," says Lieutenant Eyre, "to a still colder climate than we had left behind, and were without tents, fuel, or food." The consequence was, that "an immense number of poor wounded wretches," whose groans of misery and distress assailed the ear from all quarters, "wandered about the camp destitute of shelter, and perished during the night." On the 9th, before sunrise, the camp was again in motion, and three-fourths of the fighting men, without waiting for orders, pushed on in advance with the camp followers. The remaining troops had afterwards marched and proceeded about a mile, when another of those fatal halts was ordered. It had been made as before at the suggestion of Akbar Khan, on a renewed assurance of protection and supplies, and was preliminary to a compliance with a startling proposal which accompanied it. During the negotiations at Cabool, the Afghan chiefs had demanded the delivery of the married gentlemen and their families as hostages. This was evaded at the time, but the demand had never been lost sight of, and was now renewed. The proceedings of the previous day furnished a plausible pretext, both to Akbar Khan for making the proposal, and to General Elphinstone for granting it. The latter indeed has removed all doubt as to the motives which influenced him, by a written statement, in which he justifies his compliance on two grounds: first, because he desired "to remove the ladies and children, after the horrors they had already witnessed, from the further dangers of our camp," and secondly, because he hoped "that as from the very commencement of the negotiations, the Sirdar had shown the greatest anxiety to have the married people as hostages, this mark of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him." Judging by the event, it is impossible to deny that the first reason was well founded. The ladies and children had passed unscathed through a shower of Afghan balls, but the repetition of such a miraculous escape was more than could be hoped for, and to expose them to the dangers of another murderous conflict would have been to throw away their last chance of safety. It was indeed a horrible alternative, and we can better conceive than express the feelings of Lady Macnaghten when told that she was to quit British protection, and become what was called the "guest" of the man who had murdered her husband. There was indeed some guarantee for their personal safety, in the fact that Akbar Khan's own family were in the hands of the British, and it therefore seems that the general's first reason ought to be sustained. On his second reason, a different judgment must be passed. After the experience he had had of Akbar Khan, it was mere fatuity to imagine that any "mark of trust might elicit a corresponding feeling in him." The necessity which justified the surrender of the ladies did not apply at all to their husbands, and one is puzzled to understand why they, instead of remaining at their posts to share the common danger, were also sent off to become the "guests" of Akbar Khan.
The command to halt on the morning of the 9th was disapproved by the whole force, and Shelton, in order to give effect to a personal remonstrance against it, declared that it would involve their entire destruction, whereas another day's march would carry them clear of the snow. The general listened, but refused to be convinced. The consequence was, that the native soldiers took what seemed the only remedy into their own hands, and prepared to desert. The example had previously been set by the Shah's cavalry, and they were not slow in following it. On the morning of the 10th, when the march was resumed, the native regiments had almost melted away. "The European soldiers," says Eyre, "were now almost the only efficient men left, the Hindoo-stances having all suffered more or less from the effects of the frost in their hands and feet; few were able even to hold a musket, much less to pull a trigger: in fact, the prolonged delay in the snow had paralyzed the mental and bodily powers of the strongest men, rendering them incapable of any useful exertion. Hope seemed to have died in every breast; the wildness of terror was exhibited in every countenance." The end was now fast approaching. The enemy hovering on the heights were watching their opportunity, while the inextricable mass below kept moving onward as if mechanically and unconsciously to inevitable destruction. At a narrow gorge between two precipitous hills, where the promiscuous crowd of disorganized sepoys and camp followers were so huddled together that they could neither recede nor advance, the slaughter was renewed, and barbarously continued till, of the 16,000 persons who started from Cabool, less than a fourth remained. The sepoys were entirely annihilated, and the Europeans were not able to muster of fighting men more than 250 soldiers of the 44th, 150 cavalry, and 50 horse artillerymen, with one gun. On observing the slaughter at the gorge, General Elphinston called upon Akbar Khan, who had stood aloof, to make good his promises of protection. The oft-repeated answer was returned that he could not, and along with the answer a new humiliating proposal: let the British lay down their arms, and he would undertake to save their lives. There was still spirit enough remaining to treat this proposal as it deserved, and the march was resumed. By a rapid movement the defile, where so many of the camp followers had already perished, was reached, but before it could be cleared the enemy opened a destructive fire on the rear. Shelton, who commanded there, gave another proof of his unflinching courage, and being seconded by a handful of men who stood by him, as he expresses it, "nobly and heroically," gained another short respite for the whole. Akbar Khan, when again appealed to, having only renewed his ignominious proposal, it was determined to move on Jugduluck by a rapid night march. This, under the most favourable circumstances, could only be effected by throwing off the camp followers and leaving them to their fate. The march was resumed with this view as quietly as possible, but the deception which stern necessity alone could justify did not succeed.
and the fighting men found themselves cumbered as before with an unmanageable rabble. Little molestation, however, was experienced for some miles, and the advanced guard after halting at Kuttur Sung for the arrival of the rearguard, pushed on for Jugduluck, still ten miles distant. It was reached at last by the advance guard, without much obstruction, but not without the greatest difficulty by the rearguard, who, commanded as before by Shelton, fought their way manfully, contesting every inch of ground.

At Jugduluck the survivors of the British force, now few in number and exhausted with fatigue, found a temporary shelter behind some ruined walls, and were endeavouring to snatch a little repose, when they were suddenly aroused by volley after volley poured from the adjoining heights into the heart of their bivouac. They were in consequence obliged to quit it, and make one bold effort to clear the ground before them. It succeeded, and the troops when night closed, were able again to seek the shelter of the ruined walls. Meanwhile Akbar Khan was preparing a new act of treachery. On being once more appealed to for protection, he sent a message inviting a conference with General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnstone. They went, and after being received with the greatest apparent kindness and hospitality, found themselves in his trap. Jelalabad was not yet evacuated in terms of the treaty, and he meant to detain them as hostages. The general, whose sense of honour notwithstanding all his blunders remained as keen as ever, endeavoured to procure his own return, by pleading that disappearance from the army at such a time would look like desertion, and disgrace him in the eyes of his countrymen; but Akbar Khan was not to be moved, and detained all the three officers. On the morning of the 12th the conference was resumed, and the troops prolonged their halt to await the issue. The only object of the detained British officers was to save the small remnant of the force still surviving, and they not only earnestly implored Akbar Khan's interposition, but engaged Mahomed Shah Khan, his father-in-law, and a Ghiljie chief of influence, to purchase the forbearance of his savage countrymen at the price of two lacs of rupees. After much discussion, during which it became manifest that the Ghiljies were thirsting as much for blood as for money, Mahomed Shah Khan arrived about dusk, and intimated that all was finally and amicably arranged for the safe conduct of the troops to Jelalabad. The announcement had scarcely escaped his lips, when the lie was given to it by a sound of firing. It came from the direction of the British bivouac, and told that the Ghiljies had resumed their murderous work.

The firing announced that the enemy were on the alert waiting to pounce upon their victims, but the soldiers displayed so much determination, and inflicted such severe chastisement on the most forward of the plunderers, that the first part of the march was effected without serious loss. A fearful struggle however awaited them. They had still to clear the pass of Jugduluck, up
which the road climbs by a steep ascent between lofty precipices. By incredible exertion the summit was nearly gained, when a sudden turn brought them in front of a barricade formed of shrubs and branches of trees. To penetrate it seemed impossible, and either to halt or recede was inevitable destruction, since the enemy, who had been lying in ambush, were already busy with their long knives and jezails. It was a most unequal struggle, and terminated in the almost total extinction of the force. Brigadier Anquetil, Colonel Chambers, and ten other officers, here met their deaths. During the conflict, about twenty officers and forty-five privates managed to clear the barricade and make their way to Gundamuck at daybreak of the 13th. The respite thus obtained was of short duration. The enemy began to pour in from all quarters, and their intended victims had become incapable of resistance, as not more than two rounds of ammunition to each man remained. What was to be done? Obviously the only alternatives were to make terms, or if these were refused, to sell their lives as dearly as possible. The former alternative seemed not unattainable, for shortly after their arrival a messenger arrived with overtures from the chief of the district. Major Griffiths, now the senior officer, set out to have an interview with the chief, and was only on the way, when the blood-thirsty mob broke in upon his little band and massacred every man of them, except Captain Souter of the 44th and a few privates, who were made prisoners. A few officers, who had quitted the column at Soorkhab and continued in advance of it, still survived. As they proceeded, one after another perished, and at Futteahbad their number was reduced to six. Being now only sixteen miles from Jelalabad, their final deliverance seemed at hand, but the measure of disaster was not yet complete. In the vicinity of Futteahbad a treacherous offer of kindness threw them off their guard. While snatching a hasty meal to strengthen them for their remaining fatigues, they were attacked by a party of armed
men. Two of their number were immediately cut down, and three, overtaken after an ineffectual flight, shared the same fate. Dr. Bryden, now the only survivor, having providentially escaped, pursued his journey. He rode a pony so jaded that it could scarcely carry him, and on which, as he was both wounded and faint, he was hardly able to keep his seat. At length, however, on coming within sight of Jelalabad, he was descried from the walls. The British garrison there, though without any certain information on the subject, knew as much as filled them with the most dismal forebodings as to the fate of the Cabool force. Colonel Dennie, who had ventured, one cannot help thinking, somewhat unadvisedly, to predict that only one man would escape to announce the destruction of all the rest, no sooner heard that a solitary and apparently exhausted rider, recognized by his dress and appearance to be a British officer, was approaching, than he exclaimed, says Mr. Gleig, in a voice which "sounded like the response of an oracle, 'Did I not say so? Here comes the messenger.'" A party of cavalry immediately hastened out to Dr. Bryden's relief. He was too much exhausted to be able to give any details, but told enough to confirm their worst fears. A British force had been completely exterminated, and the British arms had sustained a disgrace greater far than had ever befallen them in any previous Indian campaign. It was some small relief however to learn that Dennie's prophecy, if he ever uttered it, was not literally fulfilled. Instead of one, there were several survivors, and among them the very persons in whom the deepest interest was felt. The British ladies and children though captives were still alive, and might yet be recovered. They were so in fact, but as it was after a considerable delay, the details properly belong to a more advanced part of the narrative.

CHAPTER V.


THE formidable difficulties encountered by Sir Robert Sale in marching his brigade from Cabool to Jelalabad have already been referred to, with his consequent refusal to risk its entire loss by endeavouring to retrace his steps, in compliance with the urgent importunities of the envoy. When the first order to return was received on the 10th of November, the brigade was encamped in the valley of Gundamuck. Previously, however, it had been so
roughly handled, and was so imperfectly provided with the provisions and
military stores which would be absolutely required in marching back through
one of the most difficult countries in the world, and in the face of a population
understood to be almost universally hostile, that a council of war, summoned
to consider the important subject, decided, though not unanimously, that the
march on Jelalabad ought to be continued. Even this could not be effected
without sacrifice. In order to move as lightly as possible, it was necessary
to leave a large amount of valuable property in the cantonments at Gundamuck,
and in the absence of better custodiers to intrust it to the charge of a
body of the Shah's irregular cavalry. The result, which was probably not
unforeseen, immediately followed. The Janbaz, such being the name by which
these cavalry were designated, lost no time in fraternizing with the insurgents,
the cantonments were burned down, the property disappeared, and the insurrec-
tion itself spread wider and wider over all the surrounding districts.

The brigade resumed its march on the 11th of November, and the insur-
gents, probably not yet fully prepared for action, offered little obstruction.
On the morning of the 12th, it became obvious that a different course was to be
pursued. By day-break the adjoining hills were covered with armed men,
watching their opportunity to descend and sweep all before them. The task
of keeping them in check was intrusted to Colonel Dennie, who, after a kind
of running fight had for some time been kept up, had recourse to a manoeuvre.
Placing the cavalry in ambush, he led out the infantry to the attack, with
instructions suddenly to wheel round when about to come into actual collision
with the enemy, as if a panic had seized them. The enemy mistaking the feint
for a real flight, raised a wild shout, and to complete their victory rushed into
the low ground. A charge from the cavalry threw them into irretrievable
confusion, and they fled leaving the valley covered with their dead. After this
decided check, no further opposition was made to the march of the brigade,
which entered Jelalabad on the 13th of January, and took unchallenged
possession of it. Sale's intention was to hold it as an intermediate post, from
which reinforcements received from India by way of Peshawar might be
forwarded to Cabool, and where, should the retirement of the Cabool force
itself become necessary, it might find a haven of safety. The nature of the
task which he had thus undertaken cannot be better explained than in his own
words. "I found the walls of Jelalabad in a state which might have justified
despair as to the possibility of defending them. The enceinte was far too
extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of upwards of 2300
yards. Its tracing was vicious in the extreme. It had no parapet excepting
for a few hundred yards, which then was not more than two feet high. Earth
and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts, that there
were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There
was a space of 400 yards together, on which none of the garrison could show
themselves excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and
the whole enceinte was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and
gardens, from which a fire could be opened at twenty or thirty yards." After
the above description, it is almost superfluous to observe that the difficulty of
holding such a place was certainly not less than that of defending the British
cantonments at Cabool. Fortunately, however, a very different spirit prevailed,
and the very same circumstances which General Elphinstone mismanaged so as
to bring disgrace and ruin on the Cabool force, sufficed to make Sir Robert Sale
and his brigade a band of heroes.

As soon as Jelalabad was entered, it became a question whether the whole
city ought to be held, or whether it would not be more prudent to retire
into the citadel, which might be much more easily defended, and was ample
enough to afford sufficient accommodation. Strong reasons for the latter
course were not wanting, but the former and bolder course was preferred,
and it was determined not to yield up an inch of the city except under dire

compulsion. The state of the city when this resolution was formed has already
been described, and notice must now be taken of several circumstances by which
the difficulty of defence was greatly increased. When the brigade entered the
city, the provisions for men and horses fell short of two days' supply, and the
surrounding country, from which alone additional supplies could be looked for,
was so completely in the hands of the insurgents that not fewer than 5000 of
them were seen crowning the adjoining heights. It was in vain to think of pro-
ceeding with the defences, while the workmen would only have afforded a sure
aim for Afghan marksmen. The first thing necessary therefore was to give the
insurgents a lesson which would teach them to keep their distance. A general
attack was accordingly arranged, and on the 14th of November Colonel
Monteith of the 35th Bengal native infantry, moved out at day-break at the
head of 300 of her Majesty's 13th, 300 of the 35th native infantry, 100 sappers A.D. 1842.
and miners, 200 of the Khyber corps, a squadron of the 5th light cavalry, a few
irregular horse, and three guns, in all about 1100 fighting men, to give battle
to an enemy which outnumbered them fivefold. The boldness of the enterprise
was justified by its success. The enemy
gave way at every point, and suffered
so severely in their flight that a fort-
night elapsed before they again ven-
tured to show themselves in force.
The enemy having recovered from
the terror of their defeat, began again
to press so close upon the defences that
another chastisement was deemed ne-
cessary. The task was intrusted to
Colonel Dennie, who made a vigorous
sortie on the 1st of December, and put
the insurgents once more to disgraceful
rout and terrific slaughter. But while
Sale and his brigade were thus main-
taining the honour of the British arms, the tidings from Cabool were assuming a
darker hue, and on the 9th of January a letter arrived which disclosed the full
extent of the calamity. This letter, dated 29th December, 1841, was signed by
Eldred Pottinger, in charge of the Cabool mission, and W. K. Elphinstone, major-
genral, and addressed to Captain Macgregor. The bearer of it was an Afghan
horseman. It was in the following terms:—"It having been found necessary
to conclude an agreement founded on that of the late Sir W. H. Macnaughten,
for the evacuation of Afghanistan by our troops, we have the honour to request
that you will intimate to the officer commanding at Jelalabad, our wish that
the troops now at that place should return to India, commencing their march
immediately after the receipt of this letter, leaving all guns the property of
Dost Mahomed Khan with the new governor, as also such stores and baggage
as there may not be the means of carrying away, and the provisions in store for
our use on arriving at Jelalabad. Abdool Ghuffoor Khan, who is the bearer
of this letter, will render you all the assistance in his power. He has been
appointed governor of Jelalabad on the part of the existing government." This
letter certainly placed both Macgregor and Sale in a dilemma, but their mode
of extricating themselves, subsequently approved by government, will now be
condemned by none. The following was their joint answer, returned on the
same day:—"We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of the 29th ult., which you therein state was to be delivered to us by Abdool

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Ghuffoor Khan, appointed governor of this place by the existing powers at Cabool. That communication was not delivered to us by him, but by a messenger of his, and though dated 29th December, 1841, has only this moment reached us. We have at the same time positive information that Mahomed Akbar Khan has sent a proclamation to all the chiefs in the neighbourhood, urging them to raise their followers for the purpose of intercepting and destroying the forces now at Jelalabad. Under these circumstances, we have deemed it our duty to await a further communication from you, which we desire may point out the security which may be given for our safe march to Peshawer.” Only four days after this answer, the arrival of Dr. Bryden made it impossible to doubt the propriety of the course which had been adopted. The evacuation of Jelalabad would have procured no relief to the Cabool force, whose destruction had already been all but consummated, and would only have been a new triumph to Afghan treachery.

After the above refusal to retire voluntarily from Jelalabad, it became doubtful if it would be possible to retain it. The insurgents, afraid again to risk an encounter in the open field, endeavoured to shake the fidelity of the troops by insidious offers, which were so far successful that it was deemed necessary “as a measure of prudence, to get rid first of the corps of the Khyber rangers, and next of the detachment of jezailchees, and a few of the Afghan sappers, and a body of Hindoostanee gunners who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mahomed Khan.” This diminution of the garrison, though it doubtless added to its real strength by making treachery more difficult, had this obvious disadvantage, that it threw “additional labours on the remaining troops, who, reduced to half rations, were already tasked beyond their strength.”

At this very time the disheartening intelligence arrived that a prospect of succour which had cheered them amid their privations was not to be realized. Four regiments had been despatched from India, under the command of Brigadier Wyld, to the relief of Jelalabad. This force, which with some additions made to it amounted to 3500 men, arrived at Peshawer on the 27th of December, and shortly afterwards advanced to Jumrood, near the entrance of the Khyber Pass. The Khyberees having been previously gained by Akbar Khan, Brigadier Wyld had to force his way in spite of them. Accordingly on the 15th of January, 1842, he entered the pass, and succeeded so far as to carry the fort of Ali Musjid, which commands the most difficult portion of it. This however was the limit of success, and he was obliged, after sustaining severe loss both by casualty and desertion, to make a disastrous retreat. This serious disappointment to the defenders of Jelalabad was soon followed by a disaster which no human efforts could have averted. By unceasing labour they had destroyed an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, by demolishing forts and old walls, filling up ravines, cutting down groves, &c., had raised the parapets to six or seven feet high, repaired and widened the ramparts, extended the
bastions, retrenched three of the gates, covered the fourth with an outwork, and excavated a ditch ten feet in depth and twelve in width, and were congratulating themselves on being now secure against any Afghan attack. "But," to borrow again from Sir Robert Sale, "it pleased Providence on the 19th of February to remove in an instant this ground of confidence. A tremendous earthquake shook down all our parapets, built up with so much labour, injured several of our bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawer face, and reduced the Cabool gate to a shapeless mass of ruins. It savours of romance, but it is a sober fact, that the city was thrown into alarm within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrific phenomenon of nature."

The garrison of Jelalabad lost not a day in commencing to repair the damage done to the fortifications, but Akbar Khan, now no longer employed in the extermination of the Cabool force, was also on the alert, and made his appearance with a large body of troops at Murkail, about seven miles distant. The previous defeats sustained by his countrymen had taught him the danger of immediate approach, and he therefore contented himself at first with endeavouring to cut off the foraging parties of the garrison. After a short time, he ventured on a bolder course, and having formed two camps, one with his head-quarters two miles to the west, and the other about a mile to the east, invested the city and established a rigorous blockade. A series of skirmishes ensued, most harassing to the British, whose only object was to protect their parties, but invariably to their advantage, the Afghans never risking an encounter without paying dearly for their rashness. On the 10th of March, from a suspicion that the enemy had begun or were preparing to run a mine, a vigorous sortie was made on the following morning, and terminated as usual in the flight of the Afghans after considerable loss. This success freed the garrison from any danger of immediate attack, but did not otherwise improve their position, which was becoming more and more critical from a deficiency both of provisions and military stores. The former deficiency
was considerably relieved on the 1st of April, by a well-conducted sortie, which captured several large flocks of sheep; the prospect of supplying the latter was also brightening, as it was known that a large force which had assembled at Peshawer under General Pollock had already started.

Defeat of the Afghans.

On the 6th of April Akbar Khan fired a royal salute. On inquiring into the cause, different accounts were given. One was that it was in honour of a victory gained over General Pollock in the Khyber Pass; another that it was preparatory to Akbar Khan’s departure, who had resolved to break up his camp and hasten to Cabool, to take advantage of a new revolution which had taken place there. In either case, it seemed advisable that the Afghan camp should be attacked, and accordingly at daybreak of the 7th, a large force, formed into three columns, moved out from the western gate of the city. Akbar Khan prepared for the encounter by drawing up his troops, estimated at about 6000 men, in front of the camp, resting his right on a fort, and his left on the Cabool. The central column directed its efforts against the fort, which from the annoyance it had formerly given, it was deemed of primary importance to capture. The struggle was severe, and cost Colonel Dennie his life. He had led his column with his usual gallantry, and after passing the outer wall was endeavouring to penetrate to the interior, when he fell mortally wounded. Meanwhile Captain Havelock had penetrated the enemy’s extreme left, and was engaged in dubious conflict, when the recall of the 13th from the fort gave him a seasonable relief, and a combined attack was made on the camp. The result is thus told by Sir Robert Sale:—“We have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, recaptured four guns lost by the Cabool and Gundamuck forces, the restoration of which to our government is a matter of much honest exultation among our troops, seized and destroyed a great quantity of material and ordnance stores, and burned the whole of the enemy’s tents. In short, the defeat of Mahomed Akbar in open field, by the troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete and signal.” General Pollock was now at hand, and on the 16th of April, only nine days after the garrison had gained their last laurels, they had the happiness of receiving him and the ample succours he brought along with him within their gates. A few details of his march and the obstacles he successfully encountered, will form an appropriate appendix to the heroic defence of Jelalabad.

State of affairs at Peshawer.

General Pollock reached Peshawer on the 5th of February, 1842, and found the state of the troops there even worse than the sinister reports which met him on his journey had represented. Wyld’s defeat had filled them with dismay, and delegates from different regiments of his brigade were holding meetings by night for the purpose of resisting any order which might be given to advance. While this disaffection continued, no success was to be expected; and the question therefore was, whether he should wait for reinforcements which he knew to be on the march, or start with such materials as he had, at the
risk of "disaffection or cowardice." Prudence counselled him to wait, but Sale's urgency left him no alternative, and the march was commenced. His force was intended to amount in all to 12,000 men, but 4000 of these, chiefly Europeans, had not yet joined, while a considerable portion of the 8000 actually assembled were Sikhs, in whom little confidence could be placed.

Before starting, attempts had been made to gain the Khyberees, and part of a stipulated bribe had been paid in advance, but the maulauding habits of the mountaineers were too strong to be overcome, and it soon became obvious that force would be necessary. Accordingly after reaching Jumrood, General Pollock started about half-past three on the morning of the 5th of April, in dim twilight, and with all possible secrecy. Immediately at the entrance of the pass the Khyberees had erected a strong barricade. It might have been stormed, but the more effective plan was adopted of turning it, and two columns of infantry began to crown the heights on either side. The mountaineers, astonished at seeing themselves thus compelled to maintain a hand-to-hand fight on ground where, from deeming it inaccessible, they had never dreamed of being attacked, soon gave way. The barricade thus left without defenders was easily surmounted, and the main body of the force encumbered with its long string of baggage, began to move slowly along the defile. Before evening closed, Ali Musjid was reached, and found to be evacuated. The key of the pass being thus secured, no further difficulty of a serious nature was experienced, and the relief of the garrison, after its five months of severe privation and heroic daring, was triumphantly achieved. How different its fate from that of the wretched fugitives from Cabool!

While the honour of the British arms was maintained, and the disgrace of Cabool partly retrieved at Jelalabad, the tidings received from the south and south-west were of a mixed character. Nott was nobly doing his part at Candahar, but Ghuznee had fallen into the hands of the insurgents. Maclaren's brigade, which Nott against his better judgment had detached to Cabool, after a vain attempt to advance, retraced its steps, and reached Candahar on the 8th of December. The necessity of the return can scarcely be disputed, and yet it was in one respect most unfortunate. Ghuznee had been invested by the surrounding tribes as early as the 20th of November. It was ill provided either for a siege or a blockade, and the garrison therefore learned with no small delight that the enemy, alarmed at the advance of Maclaren, had suddenly retired. Colonel Palmer, the officer in command, availed himself of the respite to improve the works and lay in supplies, but had done little when the enemy, encouraged by Maclaren's retirement, reappeared. An act of humanity, praise-worthy in itself though injudicious under the circumstances, added greatly to the difficulty of the defence. The townspeople, instead of being turned out, were allowed to remain, and repaid the kindness thus shown them by admitting their countrymen outside through a hole which they had dug in the wall. The
consequence was that the garrison were compelled on the 17th of December to shut themselves up within the citadel. There they continued to maintain themselves with the utmost difficulty till a letter of similar import to that sent by Pottinger and Elphinstone to Jelalabad arrived. Under the circumstances the commandant could hardly have been expected to imitate the spirited refusal of Sale and Macgregor to comply with the letter. He therefore on the 1st of March entered into an agreement to evacuate the place. Ultimately the sepoys of the garrison, who had thrown discipline aside, perished almost to a man in an attempt to force their way across the country to Peshawer, which they ignorantly imagined to be only fifty or sixty miles distant; and their British officers, who had surrendered on the futile promise of "honourable treatment," remained in rigorous confinement.

At Candahar, though the British force mustered nearly 9000 men, under the command of an officer of indomitable spirit and distinguished ability, the state of affairs was very alarming. "The good people here," wrote General Nott, "are anxiously looking for the result of the affairs at Cabool, when, should they be against us, they will try their strength." It was not merely open hostility, but treachery also that was to be dreaded.

Of the latter a specimen was given on the 27th of December. Two corps of *janbaz* or Afghan cavalry in Shah Shujah's service, after murdering one British officer and mortally wounding another, moved off with a quantity of treasure which had been intrusted to them. This was the forerunner of more serious defections. Only two days after the mutiny of the *janbaz*, Prince Suffder Jung, a younger son of Shah Shujah, turned traitor, and joined Atta Mahomed, who, having been sent by the chiefs at Cabool into Western Afghanistan to raise the country, had encamped beyond the Urgandab, about forty miles north-west of Candahar.

In a previous part of the above letter Nott had pledged himself that if Suffder Jung and his rebels approached within twelve or fifteen miles of the city, he would move out and disperse them. The case supposed occurred much sooner than any had imagined. On the 12th of January, only four days afterwards, Suffder Jung and Atta Mahomed advanced within fifteen miles of Candahar at the head of a force estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 men, and took up a
strong position on the right bank of the Urgandab. Nott lost no time in redeeming his pledge. Starting at the head of a force consisting of five and a half regiments of infantry, the Shah’s 1st cavalry, a party of Skinner’s horse, and sixteen guns, he came in sight of the enemy after four hours’ march over a very difficult country. Without waiting to recruit their exhausted strength, the British troops immediately rushed to the encounter, by crossing the river. The enemy, scarcely waiting to receive them, broke and fled, but were not allowed to escape without severe chastisement.

The season for operations in the field was now past, and the two armies seemed not indisposed to suspend hostilities, the British troops holding the city, while the insurgents, now openly headed by Meerza Ahmed, a Dooranee chief, established their camp at no great distance. Intelligence of the envoy’s murder was received at Candahar for the first time on the 30th of January, and prepared the garrison for still more dismal tidings. During the suspension of hostilities Nott had been unremitting in his exertions, and not only improved the fortifications, but laid in a stock of provisions for five months. He had never despaired of being able to maintain his position, and from his recent victory had reason to be more sanguine than ever, when the letter of Pottinger and Elphinstone directing the immediate evacuation both of Candahar and of Khelat-i-Ghilie arrived. It was addressed to Major Rawlinson as political resident, and was similar in import to that sent to Jelalabad.

Major Rawlinson did not recognize the authority of the order to evacuate, but thought that, taking all circumstances into consideration, it would be desirable so far to act upon it as to make it the basis of a negotiation, the terms of which might enable the British government, even in the event of retiring from Afghanistan, to retain a certain degree of political influence. Nott had no patience with this temporizing policy, and in answer to Rawlinson’s official letter on the subject of evacuation wrote as follows:—“I have only to repeat that I will not treat with any person whatever for the retirement of the British troops from Afghanistan, until I shall have received instructions from the supreme government. The letter signed ‘Eldred Pottinger’ and ‘W. K. Elphinstone’ may or may not be a forgery. I conceive that these officers were not free agents at Cabool, and therefore their letter or order can have no weight with me.”

In order to hold Candahar and also attack the insurgents encamped in its vicinity, it became necessary as a preliminary measure to expel from the city all who were known or believed to be disaffected. In this predicament stood almost all the families of pure Afghan descent, and accordingly on the 3d of March an order was issued for the expulsion of about 1000 families, containing according to the ordinary calculation 5000 to 6000 individuals. No direct opposition was experienced, and the clearance was completely effected by the 6th. The very next day, the other part of the design was proceeded with, and
Nott, leaving only about 2600 men to garrison the city, marched out with the remainder of his force to attack the enemy. In proportion as he advanced they retired, first across the Turnuk, and then across the Urgandab, keeping always so far in front as to prevent our infantry from coming in contact with them. This they were the more easily enabled to do, as in their whole force of 12,000 they had upwards of 6000 well-mounted cavalry, while the British had only a single wing of the Shah's horse. At last however, on the 9th, the artillery came near enough to open with effect, and the enemy broke and fled. It soon appeared that this flight was part of a premeditated plan; for instead of removing to a greater distance, the Afghans made a circuit which brought them into the British rear, and hastened back to Candahar. The object was to carry it by assault while the greater part of the garrison was absent. Accordingly early on the 10th, large bodies of the enemy made their appearance, and began to occupy the cantonments and gardens in the vicinity. During the day their numbers continued to increase, and towards evening Sudler Jung and Meerza Ahmed arrived. There could now be no doubt that an immediate attack was intended, and the garrison exerted themselves to make everything secure. It would seem however that sufficient caution had not been used. After sunset, a villager, pretending to be from a great distance, came up to the Herat gate with a donkey-load of faggots, and asked to be admitted. As the gate had been previously closed for the night, he was refused, and threw down his load against the gate, muttering that he would leave it there till morning. His conduct under the circumstances ought certainly to have aroused suspicion, but no notice was taken of it, and the faggots were allowed to remain. Shortly afterwards a party of the enemy stole up and poured oil and ghee over them. A similar process at the citadel gate was only accidentally defeated. The officer in charge of this gate was proceeding to fasten it, when something inducing him to look outside, he perceived several faggots laid against it. It immediately struck him that they had been placed there for some bad purpose, and he ordered them to be brought within. About eight o'clock, the faggots placed at the Herat gate burst suddenly into a flame, and set fire to the gate itself, which burned like tinder. The enemy immediately rushed forward and attempted to force an entrance. In this they were frustrated, mainly by the presence of mind of the commissary-general, who seeing the danger threw open the stores and formed a barricade on the gateway by means of bags of flour. The enemy still persisted, and even gained the barricade, but were met with such a deadly fire that after repeated attempts to assault, they finally drew off. Had they been able, as they intended, to make simultaneous and equally determined attacks on the other gates, the result might have been different.

It will now be necessary to withdraw a little from the scene of military operations, and attend to the proceedings of the Indian government. The position of the governor-general, in consequence of the disasters in Afghanistan,
was rendered still more embarrassing by the state of political parties at home. The Whig ministry was tottering to its fall, and was about to be succeeded by a Conservative ministry, which having made political capital out of the blunders in Afghanistan, would be obliged in mere consistency, if not from conviction, to adopt a different line of policy. Lord Auckland was not the man to struggle successfully against the difficulties of such a position, and his former confidence was succeeded by diffidence and vacillation. He could not now hope that the government, on his resigning it, would be carried on in accordance with his views, and he seems to have resolved to conduct it in future in such a manner as would be least embarrassing to his successor. The outbreaks which were constantly occurring in Afghanistan, as if to belie the envoy's promises of tranquillity, destroyed all hope of a permanent settlement before his successor should arrive; and when to these was added the astounding intelligence that the whole country had risen in rebellion, and that the British army, so far from being able to occupy it effectually, would in all probability have to fight their way out of it, the governor-general and his council lost no time in announcing their determination to shun the conflict. Accordingly the only orders issued to Sir Jasper Nicolls, the commander-in-chief, were to forward troops to Peshawer for the purpose of assisting the army in its expected retirement. At first it was supposed that one brigade would suffice for this purpose, but ultimately, not without some demur on the part of the governor-general, it was deemed expedient to detach a second brigade. Major-general Pollock, appointed to the command, hastened forward to Peshawer, under the impression that the only task assigned him was to relieve Sale's brigade, then beleaguered in Jelalabad, and facilitate the immediate evacuation of Afghanistan. In the south General Nott's command was continued, and both officers, contrary to what had hitherto been the usual order of precedence, were no longer to be subordinate, but superior to the political residents within their respective commands. The expediency of this arrangement, in unsettled countries where the sword was the only arbiter, cannot be questioned, but it ran so counter to existing prejudices and interests, that some credit is due to Lord Auckland's government for having resolved to adopt it.
At the date of the resolution conferring new, and to some extent discretionary powers on the military commanders, the full extent of the Cabool disaster was not known at Calcutta, but on the 30th of January letters were received which destroyed all hope, and made the reality even worse than had been apprehended. Severe as the blow must have been felt, not a day was lost in officially publishing it to the world, and at the same time pledging the government to the adoption and steadfast prosecution of the most active measures "for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Afghan frontier, and for assisting such operations as may be required in that quarter for the maintenance of the honour and interests of the British government." A proclamation, issued from Fort William on the 31st, after making the above declaration, and adding that "the ample military means at the disposal of the British government will be strenuously applied to these objects, so as at once to support external operations and to cause efficient protection for its subjects and allies," continued thus, "a faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been able to overcome a body of British troops, in a country removed by distance and difficulties of season from the possibility of succour. But the governor-general in council, while he most deeply laments the loss of the brave officers and men, regards the partial reverse only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British Indian army."

The resolution displayed in the above proclamation was but feebly followed up, and the governor-general soon relapsed into a state of despondency and perplexity. There was no doubt much to embarrass him. He had no wish whatever to interfere with his successor's policy, and yet he would fain, before taking his departure, have achieved some success which might partially retrieve the honour of the British arms. Fortune however seemed to have entirely forsaken him, and the last military operation of importance undertaken during his government proved a disaster. Brigadier Wyld had entered the Khyber Pass, only to be ignominiously driven out of it. No wonder that Lord Auckland's heart sank within him, and that he now saw no alternative but immediate evacuation. In a letter dated 19th February, 1842, he wrote as follows:—

"Since we have heard of the misfortunes of the Khyber Pass, and have been convinced that from the difficulties at present opposed to us, and in the actual state of our preparations, we could not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the Jelalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our directions in regard to withdrawal from Jelalabad clear and positive, and we shall rejoice to learn that Major-general Pollock will have anticipated these more express orders, by confining his efforts to the same objects." In this desponding spirit Lord Auckland's administration closed, Lord Ellenborough, his successor, having arrived at Calcutta on the 28th of February.
The new governor-general, having previously held the office of president of the Board of Trade, was not ignorant of the nature of the duties on which he entered, and possessed both the talents and the information which should have enabled him to discharge them with success. Circumstances also were on the whole greatly in his favour. He was not at all responsible for the policy which had issued in disaster, and while every measure by which he might in any degree improve the position of affairs would redound to his credit, any want of success would be attributed to the blunders of his predecessor, rather than to any new blunders committed by himself. At first, however, he seems to have found some difficulty in coming to a decision, since a fortnight elapsed before even his council received any distinct intimation of the course which he meant to pursue. In a letter dated the 15th of March, and addressed by him as governor-general in council to the commander-in-chief, he took a rapid survey of previous events, and arrived at the conclusion that the tripartite treaty, in consequence of the suspicious conduct which Shah Shujah had been latterly pursuing, was no longer binding, and that therefore there was no obligation on the British government to "peril its armies, and with its armies the Indian empire," in endeavouring to carry out its provisions. "Whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely on military considerations, and hence, in the first instance, regard must be had to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jelalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i-Ghiljie, and Candahar; to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk; and finally to the re-establishment of our military reputation, by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it appear to them, and to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their faith; and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the king we have set up has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed."

Nothing could be clearer or more dignified than the course of policy indicated by this letter, and there was every reason to believe that it would forthwith be acted upon, as it was subscribed by all the members of council except the commander-in-chief, to whom it was addressed, and whose views were believed to be in accordance with it. On the part of the governor-general himself there was abundance of activity and apparent determination. To be nearer the scene of action he started from Calcutta on the 6th of April, and proceeded for the north-west. By leaving his council behind he broke loose from official trammels, and obtained what he seems to have eagerly desired, an opportunity of displaying the full extent of his own unaided abilities. On reaching Benares his independent activity commenced by the announcement of views which, to say the least, gave no great promise either of firmness or consistency.
At Calcutta he had, in concurrence with his council, declared it to be one of the main objects of government to re-establish "our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans;" at Benares he spoke a language and issued orders dictated by a very different spirit. It was now his "deliberate opinion" that it is "expedient to withdraw the troops under Major-general Pollock and those under Major-general Nott at the earliest practicable period, into positions wherein they may have certain and easy communication with India. That opinion is founded upon a general view of our military, political, and financial situation, and is not liable to be lightly changed." In accordance with this general view, the instructions given to the former general were to withdraw from Jalalabad and retire upon Peshawer, and to the latter to withdraw the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljie, evacuate Candahar, and "take up a position at Quettah until the season may enable you to retire upon Sukkur."

This sudden change of the governor-general's "deliberate opinion," can only be accounted for by new intelligence which he had received from Afghanistan, and which, by its chequered character, threw him into perplexity. While cheered by accounts of the triumphant defence of Jalalabad, the dispersion of Akbar Khan's camp, and the junction of Sale and Pollock, he learned that these successes in the north were counterbalanced by disasters in the south. Ghuznee had fallen, and though Khelat-i-Ghiljie, which was considered far less tenable, continued to make a gallant defence, a new defeat had been sustained by the British arms. Brigadier England, then commanding the Scinde field force, had been ordered, as formerly mentioned, to march from Dadur through the Bolan Pass towards Quettah, and thence penetrate through the Kojuk Pass for the purpose of reinforcing General Nott, and conveying to him supplies of treasure, ammunition, and medicines. He had with him only five companies of her Majesty's 41st, six companies of Bombay native infantry, a troop of Bombay cavalry, fifty Poonah horse, and four horse-artillery guns. On the 28th of March he arrived at the entrance of a defile leading to the village of Hykulzye, where he intended to halt for the remainder of his brigade, which was then advancing through the Bolan Pass. In the hope that General Nott would send two or three regiments to the Kojuk Pass, he had resolved to halt in the Pisheen valley till they should arrive; and it was only after learning that no such co-operation was to be expected that he had moved forward towards Hykulzye. This movement was made without due consideration. He had been distinctly warned that the enemy were preparing to dispute his passage; and yet, instead of waiting for the arrival of his whole brigade, he continued rashly to advance, in total ignorance of the country, and with so little precaution that he was not even aware of the presence of the enemy till he was almost in contact with them. The result was an unequal conflict, during which 100 out of his small party of 500 were killed or wounded, and he
was compelled to give way. On the following morning he ordered a retreat, and continued it as far as Quettah, where he began to entrench himself as if pursued by an overwhelming force. The moral effect of this defeat was far more damaging than the actual loss. Indeed the governor-general distinctly ascribed to it his change of policy. "The severe check experienced by Brigadier England's small corps on the 28th ultimo—an event disastrous as it was unexpected, and of which we have not yet information to enable us to calculate all the results—has a tendency so to cripple the before limited means of movement and of action which were possessed by General Nott, as to render it expedient to take immediate measures for the ultimate safety of that officer's corps, by withdrawing it at the earliest practicable period from its advanced position into nearer communication with India."

Both to Pollock and Nott the peremptory orders to withdraw were mortifying in the extreme, and neither of them was slow in giving utterance to his feelings. So anxious indeed was the former to retain his position, in the hope that the governor-general might yet adopt a more manly policy, that he dexterously availed himself of a deficiency of carriage, and declared that until it was supplied he had not the means of retiring to Peshawer. To Nott, who had repeatedly declared himself in similar terms, the order to withdraw must if possible have been still more mortifying. Brigadier England after his ignominious retreat seems to have settled it in his own mind that he was never more to attempt to penetrate the Kojuk Pass, and thus coolly addressed his superior officer:—"Whenever it so happens that you retire bodily in this direction, and that I am informed of it, I feel assured that I shall be able to make an advantageous diversion in your favour." This letter completely exhausted Nott's patience, and called forth a severe reply, in which he said—"I think it absolutely necessary that a strong brigade of 2500 men should be immediately pushed from Quettah to Candahar with the supplies noted in the foregoing paragraph. I therefore have to acquaint you that I will direct a brigade of three regiments of infantry and a troop of horse artillery, with a body of cavalry, to march from Candahar on the morning of the 25th instant. This force will certainly be at Chummum, at the northern foot of the Kojuk, on the morning of the 1st of May, and possibly on the 30th of this month. I shall therefore fully rely on your marching a brigade from Quettah, so that it may reach the southern side of the pass on the above-mentioned date." The brigadier, not daring to disobey this peremptory order, started again from Quettah on the 26th of April, and must have been almost as much mortified as gratified to find that the fears which haunted him were imaginary. At Hykulzey, which was reached on the 28th, the enemy occupied the same barricades, and in greater force than before; but it was only to show how utterly unable they were to cope with British troops properly handled, for after little more than a show of resistance they turned their backs and fled.
On the 30th he arrived at the southern entrance of the Kojuk Pass, and sending his advance-guard along the heights, had the satisfaction to find those in front already occupied by the Candahar troops. The united brigades continued their march without interruption, and reached Candahar on the 10th of May. It was at the very time when Nott had received the supplies, the want of which had kept him almost inactive, and was in hopes of being able to advance to the relief of Khelat-i-Ghiljje, and perhaps at the same time strike a blow which might in some measure retrieve the honour of the British arms, that he received official information of Lord Ellenborough's retrograde policy, which was in fact nothing more than a reiteration of the cuckoo note "Withdraw." His mortification appears to have been so great that he could not trust himself to give utterance to it, and he therefore simply replied on the 17th of May—"These measures shall be carried into effect, and the directions of his lordship accomplished in the best manner circumstances will admit of." His real feeling was doubtless expressed by Major Rawlinson, who on the following day wrote to Major Outram, "The peremptory order to retire has come upon us like a thunder clap. No one at Candahar is aware of such an order having been received except the general and myself, and we must preserve a profound secrecy as long as possible." He added the reason for this secrecy—"When our intended retirement is once known, we must expect to have the whole country up in arms, and to obtain no cattle except such as we can violently lay hands on. If the worst comes to the worst we must abandon all baggage and stores, and be content to march with sufficient food to convey us to Quetta." Notwithstanding these apprehensions, Nott, feeling that the peremptory orders of the governor-general deprived him of all discretionary power, proceeded to carry them into execution, and on the 19th of May despatched a brigade which he had prepared for the relief of the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljje to assist the garrison in evacuating the place after destroying its works. This was indeed a humiliating employment. Only two days before the garrison, which, under the command of Captain Halket Craigie, had made a most meritorious defence, had crowned all their previous achievements by the repulse of a formidable assault, during which 500 of the enemy are said to have fallen, and now the only result was something like an acknowledgment of defeat by an abandonment of the place as no longer tenable.

Lord Ellenborough, while he scarcely omitted an opportunity of repeating his unaltered "determination to withdraw," was not without misgivings as to its soundness. He was well aware that it was generally reprobated, and that the best Indian authorities, civil and military, were unanimous in condemning the evacuation of Afghanistan, at least until the English captives were released, and some blow struck which would show to all the world that the British government was perfectly able, had it so willed, to retain possession of the country. At first his lordship affected to despise public opinion, and refer-
ring to the opposition experienced from distinguished officials, expressed himself thus vauntingly:—"The danger is in the position of the army, almost without communication with India, too far off to return quickly at any season, unable from the season to return now, without adequate supplies of food or courage. This is the danger which all the great statesmen in India would perpetuate if they could, and while they maintain it, destroy the confidence of the sepoy and ruin our finances. If I save this country, I shall save it in spite of every man in it who ought to give me support, but I will save it in spite of them all." These were mere words. At the very time when his lordship used them, he was beginning to feel his position untenable, and preparing to back out of it, provided he could devise some means by which he could save or at least seem to save his dignity and consistency.

By the treaty concluded between the British authorities at Cabool and the Afghan chiefs, Shah Shujah had the option of returning to India or of continuing in temporary possession of the Bala Hissar. He chose the latter, because he had been flattered into the belief that the chiefs would still recognize him as their lawful monarch. The effect of this arrangement was only to make him a tool in their hands, and to place him in a dilemma, from which far more wisdom than he possessed would not have sufficed to extricate him. There was an irreconcilable enmity between the Afghans and their British invaders, and it was therefore impossible for him to retain the friendship of both. There is little reason to doubt that if he could have been sure of the fidelity of his countrymen, he would at once have given them the preference, and forgotten all the obligations which he owed to the British government. But as it was only too probable that he might be again compelled to apply to it for an asylum, his true policy seemed to be to avoid as far as possible coming to an open rupture with either the British or the Afghans. His own letters completely furnish signal proofs both of his cunning and his perplexity, but it is needless to give any details. He was totally unworthy of the support which the British government in an evil hour had resolved to give him, and he was now endeavouring to play a double game, in which it was hardly possible for him not to be a loser. He was safe only while he remained within the Bala Hissar, and therefore the chiefs who were bent on his destruction used every means in their power to allure him beyond its walls. This was no easy task, as he was aware of his danger, but they succeeded at last by throwing doubts on his sincerity, and insisting that he could only wipe off the suspicion by placing himself at the head of the Afghan troops, and accompanying them to Jelalabad, on a projected expedition to expel the British. A reluctant consent having been wrung from him, and his personal safety having been guaranteed by the most solemn oaths, he moved out of the Bala Hissar on the 4th of April, and in the course of the same day returned to it unharmed. The fact seemed to prove that his fears were groundless, and it was therefore announced that on
the following morning he would review his troops encamped at Sceah Sung, and forthwith start with them for Jalalabad. He kept his word, and having descended at an early hour from the Bala Hissar, under a salute and with all the insignia of royalty, was proceeding towards the camp, when a party of Afghan marksmen starting suddenly from an ambush levelled their pieces and fired a murderous volley. Shah Shujah’s death must have been instantaneous, as one of the balls had entered his brain. Shujah-ul-Dowlah, son of the Newab Zemaun Khan, who had plotted the assassination, hastened up to satisfy himself that the deed was done, and stood gazing at it while others of the assassins busied themselves in stripping the dead body of its jewels, and then threw it into a ditch. It would seem however that the assassins had miscalculated their strength, for before the night closed, Futteh Jung, the second son of Shah Shujah, was carried to the Bala Hissar and proclaimed king. He was able in consequence to rescue his father’s body from further indignity, and to bring it back to the palace, where all the honours of royal sepulture were bestowed upon it. The elevation of Futteh Jung was followed by a state of anarchy, during which the guns of the Bala Hissar were opened on the city, and rival factions met in deadly conflict in its streets. The details however are devoid of interest, and we therefore proceed to exhibit a new phase of the governor-general’s policy.

After leaving his council, as already seen, at Calcutta, Lord Ellenborough had taken the additional step of becoming his own commander-in-chief, and as if he had forgotten, or was disposed to ignore the fact that that office was still held by Sir Jasper Nicolls, began to communicate his orders directly to Generals Pollock and Nott. Lord Ellenborough, by his last instructions, had consented, at least by implication, that Pollock should not retire from Jalalabad till October, and on this ground had given Nott to understand that a similar delay on his part would not be objected to. While thus obviously changing his policy, he was most anxious to disguise the fact, because he appears to have dreaded nothing so much as a candid admission that he had receded from a resolution which he had once formed, and even declared to be immutable. Accordingly he continued to address letters to the two generals, in which he never failed to remind them that “withdraw” was still his watchword, and yet in these very letters express permission was given to the one to advance upon Cabool, and to the other to meet him there, after a march through the heart of the country, by way of Ghuzeeni. The inflexible resolution to withdraw, and the permission to advance, look very like a contradiction, but Lord Ellenborough had succeeded in reconciling them by a very extraordinary device. “Withdraw” was still the order of the day, but there were different modes of effecting it. General Nott, for instance, instead of taking the shortest road, and retiring into Scinde by the Bolan Pass, might prefer to go a thousand miles about, and after traversing Afghanistan from south to north, reach India
by the Khyber Pass and the Punjab. Some may say that to speak of such a
march as a "withdrawal," was a mere play upon words—in short, a despicable
quibble. The governor-general thought differently, and saw in this very quibble
the means of at once saving his own consistency, and retrieving the honour of
the British arms. As the device, whatever may be thought of it in other
respects, is original, his lordship must be permitted to explain it in his own
words. In a letter to General Nott, dated Allahabad, 4th July, 1842, he
wrote as follows:—"Nothing has occurred to induce me to change my first
opinion, that the measure commended by considerations of political and military
prudence, is to bring back the armies now in Afghanistan at the earliest period
at which their retirement can be effected, consistently with the health and
efficiency of the troops, into positions wherein they may have easy and certain
communication with India; and to this extent the instructions you have
received remain unaltered, but the improved position of your army, with suffi-
cient means of carriage for as large a force as it is necessary to move in
Afghanistan, induce me now to leave to your option the line by which you
shall withdraw your troops from that country." His lordship next proceeded
to canvass the merits of the only two lines supposed to be practicable—the one
by Quettah and Suckkur, and the other by Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jelalabad.
By the former, "there is no enemy to oppose you," and "the operation is one
admitting of no doubt as to its success." On the other hand, "if you determine
upon moving upon Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jelalabad, you will require for the
transport of provisions a much larger amount of carriage, and you will be
practically without communications from the time of your leaving Candahar,
dependent entirely upon the courage of your army for the opening of a new
communication by an ultimate junction with Major-general Pollock." After
adding more in the same strain, his lordship continued thus:—"I do not underv
value the aid which our government in India would receive from the successful
execution of a march through Ghuznee and Cabool, over the scenes of our late
disasters. I know all the effects which it would have on the minds of our
soldiers, of our allies, of our enemies in Asia, and of our countrymen, and of
all foreign nations in Europe. It is an object of just ambition, which no one
more than myself would rejoice to see effected; but I see that failure in the
attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin, and I would inspire you with the
necessary caution, and make you feel that, great as are the objects to be
obtained by success, the risk is great also." It was scarcely fair to blow hot
and cold in this manner, and instead of dictating the course to be adopted, to
throw the whole responsibility of selection on the military commander. It is
easy however to see that Lord Ellenborough, while professing to leave the
question open, had not only decided it in his own mind, but was perfectly
satisfied that on the part of Nott there would not be a moment's hesitation.
Accordingly, the greater part of his letter proceeds on the assumption that
the longer, but more honourable route, would certainly be chosen. "If you
should be enabled by a coup de main to get possession of Ghuznee and Cabool,
you will act as you see fit, and leave decisive proofs of the power of the British
army, without impeaching its humanity. You will bring away from the tomb
of Mahmood of Ghuznee his club which hangs over it, and you will bring away
the gates of his tomb, which are the gates of the Temple of Somnauth. These
will be just trophies of your successful march." Apparently as an additional
inducement to choose the Ghuznee route, Nott was informed that a copy of his
letter would be forwarded to Pollock, with instructions to make a forward
movement to facilitate his advance, and that the operations of the two armies
would be combined upon their approach, "so as to effect with the least possible
loss the occupation of Cabool, and to keep open the communication between
Cabool and Peshawer."

The original instructions of the governor-general to retire from Afghanistan
by the nearest practicable route having been virtually withdrawn, the two
generals did not hesitate for a moment to accept the responsibility which was
somewhat selfishly and ungenerously thrown upon them, and had no sooner
been made aware by correspondence of their mutual resolves than they began
to execute them. Nott, as having the longer march to perform, was the first
to move. Having despatched Brigadier England with five regiments and a
half, twelve guns, and some cavalry, for the purpose of returning by the Bolan
Pass, he himself prepared to take the much longer and more difficult route with
the remainder of his force. Candahar was finally evacuated on the 7th of
August, and on the 9th Nott made his first march northward in the direction
of Ghuznee. A proclamation by which he assured the population "of protec-
tion, and of payment for every article," was attended with the best effects,
and the march continued undisturbed as far as Mookur, 130 miles north-east
of Candahar, and 40 miles S.S.E. of Ghuznee. This place was reached on
the 27th of August. By this time the enemy had made their appearance in
some force, and there was very reason to believe that a conflict was at hand.
Shumsooden, the governor of Ghuznee, was in the field at the head of a con-
siderable force, and had taken up a position which is said to be the most
defensible on the entire road between Candahar and Cabool. On the 28th of
August the first actual skirmish took place, and with a result not at all
creditable to the British arms. The grass-cutters had been sent out for forage,
and were thus engaged when it was reported to the officer in charge of them
that the enemy had come suddenly upon them and were cutting them to pieces.
He at once moved out with all the cavalry at his disposal, and on finding that
it was a false alarm went forward to reconnoitre. When about three miles
from the camp he fell in with a small body of infantry, and having easily put
them to flight was tempted to follow in pursuit. He was thus brought to the
foot of a range of hills, and on winding round one of them was surprised to
find them crowned by a considerable number of jezailchees, who immediately opened a galling fire. There was nothing for it but retreat, which was made in good order, until a kind of panic was produced by a charge of about 150 of the enemy's horse, and the British troopers actually turned and fled. On seeing the approach of the British main body, the enemy, satisfied with what they had already achieved, moved off.

The effect of the affair of the 28th was to add greatly to the number of Shumsooden's troops, and at the same time to inspire him with so much confidence that he began to think of assuming the offensive. Accordingly on the 30th, while Nott was marching on Ghoeane, the Afghan governor moved parallel to him, and took up a position on the hills to the right. To tempt him to a fair trial of strength, Nott, about three in the afternoon, moved out with one half of his force. The challenge was at once accepted, and a battle was fought, which cannot be more briefly or fairly described than in the general's despatch. "The enemy advanced in the most bold and gallant manner, each division cheering as they came into position; their left being upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right along a low ridge, until their flank rested on a fort filled with men. They opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder horse-artillery guns, which were admirably served; our columns advanced upon the different points with great regularity and steadiness, and after a short and spirited contest, completely defeated the enemy, capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, &c., &c., and dispersing them in every direction; one hour more daylight would have enabled me to destroy the whole of their infantry. Shumsooden fled in the direction of Ghuznee, accompanied by about thirty horsemen."

This victory allowed the British force to advance without further interruption to Ghuznee. "On the morning of the 5th instant," says Nott, "I moved on to Ghuznee. I found the city full of men, and a range of mountains running north-east of the fortress covered by heavy bodies of cavalry and infantry; the gardens and ravines near the town were also occupied." "I at once determined on carrying the enemy's mountain positions before encamping my force. The troops ascended the height in gallant style, driving the enemy before them until every point was gained. The village of Bullool is situated about 600 yards from the walls of Ghuznee, upon the spur of the mountain to
A.D. 1842.

Recapture of Ghuznee.

...the north-east, and observing it to be a desirable spot for preparing a heavy battery, to be placed 300 paces in advance, I ordered it to be occupied by two regiments of infantry and some light guns, and retired the columns into camp. The engineer officers, sappers and miners, and infantry working parties, were employed under the direction of Major Sanders, during the night of the 5th, in erecting a battery for four eighteen-pounders. These guns were moved from the camp before daylight on the morning of the 6th, but before they had reached the position assigned them, it was ascertained that the enemy had evacuated the fortress." Possession of the place being thus obtained, what was called the work of retribution commenced by blowing up the fortifications, and setting fire to the principal buildings. The anxiety of the governor-general to obtain the club and shield of Mahmood of Ghuznee, and the gates of his tomb, said to be those of the ancient Hindoo temple of Somnauth, was not forgotten. In regard to the club and shield, his lordship could not be gratified, as they had disappeared some time before; but he was delighted above measure on learning that the gates were secured, and expressed his delight in a private letter to General Nott, abounding in minute and frivolous details as to the mode in which the gates were to be paraded on the march, and carried to their final destination.

After the capture of Ghuznee Nott continued his march and met with no opposition till the 14th of September, when on arriving at Maidan, only twenty miles south-west of Cabool, he found Shumsooden, Sultan Jan, and other Afghan chiefs, prepared to dispute his further progress. Their force, estimated at about 12,000 men, occupied a series of heights commanding the line of road. It was immediately attacked. The result is given in a single sentence of Nott's despatch on the subject: "Our troops beat them and dislodged them in gallant style, and their conduct afforded me the greatest satisfaction." This was the last affair of any consequence in which the Candahar force was engaged. The march of the 17th September brought it within five miles of the capital, which was already in the occupation of General Pollock, of whose triumphant march a brief account must now be given.

The force under General Pollock, mustering about 8000 men, made its first march from Jelalabad on the 20th of August, and reached Gundamuck on the 23d. Here, as the enemy appeared in some force, several days were spent in desultory operations not of sufficient importance to deserve detail, and it was not till the 7th of September that the march was resumed by the first division under Sir Robert Sale, while the second division under General M'Caskill prepared to follow next day. On the 8th when the advance reached Jugduluck, large bodies of the enemy were seen occupying the heights which formed an amphitheatre inclining to the left of the road. Without waiting the arrival of the second division Pollock immediately ordered the attack. It was for some time met with great firmness, the enemy steadily maintaining their posts.
while the shells of our howitzers were bursting among them, but the impetuous gallantry of the assailants, composed chiefly of the old Jelalabad garrison, was irresistible, and a complete victory was gained. The success of the first division materially facilitated the progress of the second, and both divisions again united at Tezeen on the 11th. The Afghan chiefs, having become convinced of their inability to offer any effectual resistance, held a conference, and resolved to endeavour to save themselves by submitting to terms. With this view Akbar Khan, who held Captain Troup as one of his prisoners or hostages, sent for him and told him that he was immediately to proceed to Gundamuck to General Pollock, and offer on the part of the Afghan chiefs submission to any terms he might be pleased to dictate, provided he would stay the advance of his army on Cabool. Troup knowing that the time for negotiation had passed, represented the utter uselessness of the proposed journey. Akbar Khan appears to have taken the same view, for immediately on learning that the British force was halting in the Jugduluck Pass, and might probably be entangled in it, he moved his camp from Boothauk to Khoord Cabool, and then hastened forward to Tezeen. Here the British position was by no means free from peril. It was in the bottom of a valley completely encircled by hills. Some of these had been prudently occupied, but many others remained, of which the enemy hastened to avail themselves by posting large bodies of jezailchees on them. Such was the state of matters on the 13th of September, and it became necessary to decide whether this valley, where the bones of one British force already lay bleaching, was again to become the scene of a similar disaster; or whether, on the contrary, it was to witness the retrieval of the honour of the British arms, and the signal punishment of Afghan perfidy and cruelty.

The circumstances in which this battle was about to be fought were sufficient to call forth the utmost energies of the combatants on both sides. The Afghans, elated with their previous success on the same spot, hoped that they were to achieve a second and still more glorious victory, while they also knew that defeat would involve the loss of their capital, and it might be the loss of their national independence. The British were animated by still stronger motives. Their companions in arms whose remains lay scattered around them were calling aloud for vengeance, and the only question now was, whether by victory they were to give a true response to this call, or by defeat to be in like manner exterminated. The battle began with a body of Afghan horse, who, tempted by the baggage in the plain, descended in the hope of plunder. Before they could effect their object they found themselves in a whirlwind of British cavalry, who at once threw them into confusion and put them to disastrous flight. In the meantime the British had climbed the heights, and trusting only to the bayonet were carrying everything before them. The enemy thus deprived of the double advantage which they expected to find in their elevated position and the long range of their jezails, made a very ineffectual resistance.
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As soon as they saw that the British had cleared the ascent they acknowledged their defeat and dispersed. Akbar Khan fled almost unattended to the Ghorebund valley, leaving his troops to seek their safety where they could; while General Pollock continued his march without further interruption through Khoord Cabool and Boothauk, and encamped on the 15th of September on the race-course at Cabool. On the following day he proceeded to the Bala Hissar and planted the British colours on its ramparts.

The Jelalabad and Candahar forces having now triumphantly effected a junction by means of a mutual advance, which according to the governor-general was not, and was never meant to be an advance at all, the principal thing now remaining was to commence the real withdrawal by evacuating Afghanistan and returning to India. There were still, however, several objects of importance to be accomplished, and to these it will be necessary to advert. The first undoubtedly was the release of the captives. The married families were, as has been already related, committed to the charge of Akbar Khan on the 9th of January, 1842. He was bound by express promise to protect them from harm and conduct them in safety to Jelalabad, which the unfortunate Cabool force was vainly endeavouring to reach. On the 11th they were conducted over ground thickly strewed with the mangled remains of their slaughtered countrymen, and lodged in the fort of Tezeen. On the 13th when they were taken to Jugduluck, they found General Elphinstone and Captain Johnson, who had been detained as hostages for the evacuation of Jelalabad. They were afterwards carried from place to place in Akbar Khan's train, and on the 17th were lodged in the fort of Budeebad, belonging to Mahomed Shah Khan, Akbar Khan's father-in-law. Here Akbar Khan left them, and they continued to reside for nearly three months, suffering many privations, but also enjoying some comforts, of which none were more highly prized than the privilege of meeting together every Sunday for religious service. Shortly after Sale's signal defeat of Akbar Khan, his father-in-law arrived with a large party of followers, and announced to the captives that they were immediately to depart from Budeebad. Of their new destination he said nothing, but like a mean-hearted wretch he busied himself in plundering them. Thus stripped of every-
thing of value, the whole of the captives were removed under a guard of fifty Afghans, and commenced a mysterious journey, no one knew whither. After various movements they were brought back to Tezeen on the 19th of April, and remained there till the 22d, when they were carried off towards the mountains and lodged in a place called Zandah. The only persons left behind were a few invalids, one of them General Elphinstone, who was completely broken down by disease and anxiety, and a few days after breathed his last.

On the 23d of May the captives were brought down from Zandah and lodged in a fort belonging to a chief of the name of Ali Mahomed, on the banks of the Loghur, only about three miles from Cabool. Here their privations were far fewer than they had been at any previous period of their captivity, and they were even permitted to exchange visits with the British hostages detained in the Bala Hissar. Ever and anon, however, they were alarmed by rumours that Akbar Khan was about to carry them off to Turkestan. These rumours were only too well founded, for on the 25th of August they were ordered to start for Bamian under an escort of 300 men. They reached it on the 3d of September. In the intention of Akbar Khan this was only the first stage of their journey to a hopeless captivity beyond the Hindoo Koosh, but the inhuman design was happily frustrated. Saleh Mahomed, the commander of the escort, was not inaccessible to a bribe, and on the 11th of September, after producing a letter from Akbar Khan, instructing him to convey his prisoners to Koooloom and deliver them to the Wullee, concluded by intimating that he had just received a message sent by Mohun Lal, through one Syud Moorteza Shah, promising that if he would release the prisoners, General Pollock would make him a present of 20,000 rupees, and guarantee him in a pension for life of 1000 rupees a month. "Now," continued Saleh Mahomed, "I know nothing of General Pollock, but if you three gentlemen (Pottinger, Lawrence, and Johnson) will swear by your Saviour to make good to me what Syud Moorteza Shah states that he is authorized to offer, I will deliver you over to your own people." It was not the first time that a similar proposal had been mooted, and as it was now made in earnest it was at once accepted. An agreement was accordingly drawn out in Persian, and signed by Messrs. Pottinger, Johnson, Mackenzie, and Lawrence. It was to the following effect:—"Whenever Saleh Mahomed shall free us from the power of Mahomed Akbar Khan, we agree to make him a present of 20,000 rupees, and to pay him monthly the sum of 1000 rupees; likewise to obtain for him the command of a regiment in the government service." The four officers having thus bound themselves personally, it was only fair that their responsibility should be shared by their fellow-captives. This was accordingly done by a regular agreement in the following terms, dated "In our prison at Bamian, 11th September, 1842: "We whose signatures are hereunto attached, do bind ourselves to pay into the hands of Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Johnson, on condition of our release being
effected by an arrangement with Saleh Mahomed Khan, such a number of month’s pay and allowances as they shall demand from us—such pay and allowances to be rated by the scale at which we shall find ourselves entitled to draw from the date of our release from captivity. We who are married do further agree to pay the same amount for our wives and families as for ourselves. We whose husbands are absent do pledge ourselves in proportion to our husbands’ allowances. We who are widows (Lady Macnaghten and Mrs. Sturt) do pledge ourselves to pay such sums as may be demanded from us by Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Johnson, in furtherance of the above scheme.”

No time was lost by Saleh Mahomed in carrying out his part of the agreement, for the British flag was immediately hoisted on the fort, and active preparations were made to put it in a state of defence, and furnish it with the necessary supplies. This happily proved to be a work of supererogation, for on the 15th of September a horseman arrived with the glad news of Akbar Khan’s defeat by General Pollock at Tezeen. The resolution, immediately taken, was to quit the fort and start for Cabool. They had made their first day’s journey, and were bivouacking in the clear moonlight, when another horseman arrived, to intimate that Sir Richmond Shakespere, General Pollock’s military secretary, at the head of 600 Kuzzilbash horse, was hastening to their relief. His arrival on the 17th put an end to all their fears, and made them feel that they were prisoners no longer. An agreeable surprise was still reserved for them. On the 20th, when nearing Urgundeh, a large body of British infantry and cavalry was perceived, and proved to be a portion of Sale’s brigade, with the hero himself at its head. The meeting may be better conceived than described.

Shortly after the reoccupation of Cabool, it was deemed expedient to send
General M'Caskill with a detachment against Istalif in the Kohistan, where Ameen-oollah Khan was reported to be collecting the remains of Akbar Khan’s defeated army. As the place, situated about twenty miles N.N.W. of Cabool, on a spur of the Hindoo Koosh, was supposed by the Afghans to be almost impregnable, and had in consequence been selected by them as a safe asylum for their families and deposit for their treasure, considerable resistance was anticipated, and the force employed was proportionally large. M'Caskill arrived within four miles of Istalif on the 28th of September, and found that its strength had apparently not been overrated. The town rose in terraces on the slope of a mountain, and besides being protected by numerous forts, was accessible only by surmounting heights separated by deep ravines, or threading narrow passages lined on each side by strong inclosure walls of vineyards and gardens. Fortunately the enemy, confident in the strength of their position, had not been very careful in making their arrangements for defence, and when the British troops advanced on the morning of the 29th to the attack with the greatest gallantry, they soon cleared the approaches. The assault immediately followed, and was completely successful. In the town much booty was found, and outrages must doubtless have been committed, but the victors appear to have conducted themselves with singular moderation, and were able indignantly to repel the calumnious charges of barbarity that were afterwards brought against them. After burning down about a third part of the town, General M'Caskill marched northward to Charikur, which was likewise burned down, as a kind of wild revenge for the annihilation of a British force in its vicinity.

Futteh Jung, who on the murder of his father had been set up as a puppet king, had soon been displaced, and after suffering imprisonment, had found his way in a state of utter destitution to General Pollock’s camp at Gundamuck. His reception was friendly, and he was even encouraged to hope that British influence would yet reinstate him. He accordingly accompanied the British force to Cabool, and formed a prominent object in the cavalcade which marched through the town to take possession of the Bala Hissar. When the British flag was hoisted on the ramparts, he had already seated himself on the musnad, and again performed a ceremony of installation, at which, not very wisely, the principal British officers assisted, Pollock sitting in a chair of state on the right and M'Caskill on the left of the throne. The countenance thus afforded him was of little avail, and when he saw himself about to be thrown on his own resources by the approaching departure of the British army, he announced his wish to return with it, rather than wear a crown which he knew would soon cost him his life. The throne was thus once more vacant, and it was deemed necessary to fill it. A candidate was found in the young prince Shahpoor, another of Shah Shujah’s sons, who, undeterred by the examples of his father and brother, had ambition enough to risk a similar fate. It was not long before he experienced it, for the British forces had not reached India when
the news of his dethronement arrived. One thing however his accession had
secured. The Bala Hissar, which had been doomed to destruction, was saved,
and the retribution which it had been judged necessary to inflict on the capital
of Afghanistan for the cruelty and treachery of its inhabitants, fell chiefly on
the Great Bazaar, one of the finest of its kind in the East, which, after an
ineffectual attempt to destroy it piece-meal by mechanical agency, was blown
up with gunpowder. There was something wanton in thus destroying a build-
ing solely devoted to purposes of trade and commerce. The only excuse for
selecting it was, that the mutilated remains of Sir William Macnaghten had
been exposed and ignominiously treated within its walls.

The British army finally quitted Cabool on the 12th of October, 1842. The
advance of both divisions had been a series of triumphs, and Lord Ellenborough
was all impatience to publish them to the world in official proclamations. When
intelligence of the re-occupation of Cabool reached him, he was residing at
Simla, and immediately prepared the necessary document. On the 1st of
October he submitted it to Sir Jasper Nicolls, and on the very same day he
signed it. In the date and place of execution there was a curious coincidence,
which his lordship doubtless perceived, and of which he was not unwilling to
take advantage. Exactly four years before, on the very same day, and from
the very same room, Lord Auckland had issued his manifesto explaining the
grounds on which he had undertaken the Afghan war. The contrast between
that document and the one now issued was very striking, and could not possi-
ably have been overlooked, though no special reference had been made to it; but
Lord Ellenborough deemed it necessary to be still more explicit, and without
exactly saying it in words, took care to let the world know that he was a far
wiser and more successful statesman than his predecessor. In no other way
can we account for the appearance of the proclamation with the date 1st October.
It was not issued for many days after, and had it not been antedated, might
have communicated the gratifying intelligence that the English captives, about
whose fate the public mind had been kept anxiously on the stretch, were at
length released. This fact which was not known to his lordship on the 1st of
October, was known to him when he issued his proclamation, but he could not
mention it without either committing an anachronism, or altering the original
date. The latter alternative his vanity would not permit him to adopt, and
therefore his proclamation when it appeared ignored the most interesting fact
which he could have inserted in it, and even left it to be inferred, as Nott
expressed it in his gruff way, that "the captives had been thrown overboard
by the government."

Having issued his proclamation, Lord Ellenborough might have felt that
his part in connection with the Afghan war was played out, and that nothing
more remained than to allow the troops to take up their different stations, and
then await the honours which the crown might be pleased to confer as rewards
for distinguished services. Unfortunately for himself, his lordship took a very different view of the course to be adopted. The gates of Somnauth, about which he had been so puerile and minute in his instructions, and to which he attached so much importance that he had required Nott to guard them as he would his colours, had been transported to the frontier. It was now necessary publicly to announce their arrival, and acquaint the world with the mode in which they were to be disposed of, and forthwith appeared an address in which, indulging in extravagant orientalisms, he sets himself at open variance with good taste, right feeling, and sound policy. As a specimen of this miserable effusion, and in justification of the censure passed upon it, it will suffice to quote its commencement.

"From the Governor-general to all the Princes, and Chiefs, and People of India.

"My Brothers and My Friends,—Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnauth in triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee. The insult of 800 years is at last avenged. The gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your humiliation, are become the proudest record of your national glory, the proof of your superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus. To you, princes and chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwarra, of Malwah, and of Gujerat, I shall commit this glorious trophy of successful war. You will yourselves with all honour transmit the gates of sandal wood through your respective territories, to the restored temple of Somnauth. The chiefs of Sirhind shall be informed at what time our victorious army will first deliver the gates of the temple into their guardianship, at the foot of the bridge of the Sutlej."

When the "proclamation of the gates" appeared, it was received with many doubts of its genuineness. These, however, were only too soon dispelled by the stubborn fact, and it only remained for his friends to blush, and his opponents to exult and laugh at the folly of which he had been guilty. The story of the gates would not be complete without mentioning that Lord Ellenborough, when he indited what the Duke of Wellington called his "song of triumph," was totally in error as to the point of fact. The gates were not those of Somnauth, and their date was much more recent than the time of Mahmood of Ghuznee.
CHAPTER VI.

Relations with Scinde—Lord Ellenborough's policy in regard to it—New treaty—Proceedings of Sir Charles Napier—Capture of Emaumghur—British residency at Hyderabad attacked—Battles of Meenec and Dubba—Subsequent proceedings—Annexation of Scinde—Relations with Scindia—Hostilities commenced—Victories of Maharajpoor and Puniar—New treaty with Scindia—Abrupt recall of Lord Ellenborough.

During the preparations for the final evacuation of Afghanistan, Lord Ellenborough's attention had been particularly drawn to Scinde. Though the nature of the government of this territory, and the relations established with its Ameers or rulers, were formerly explained, a brief recapitulation will not be unnecessary. The population consisted chiefly of Scindians proper, with a considerable intermixture of Hindoos and Beloochees. The last had long been the dominant race, but a change had at no distant period taken place in the ruling dynasty, by the substitution of the Talpoora tribe for that of the Kalloras. The government was a kind of family confederation. The Talpoora chiefs, when they first obtained supremacy, were four brothers, who portioned out the country into four separate independencies, one for each brother, though they still continued so closely related, that they might be said to govern in common. By the death of one of the brothers without issue, the number of reigning families was reduced to three, and on the death of Ali Moorad, the last surviving brother, in 1833, family dissensions broke out, and were not suppressed till the country had been subjected to the calamities of a civil war. By the ultimate arrangement, the government still remained vested in the three families, at the head of which respectively were Nusser Khan at Hyderabad, Roostum Khan at Khyrpoor, and Shere Mahomed Khan at Meerpoor. Between these Ameers, though they all claimed to be independent, degrees of preceidency were recognized, and Roostum Khan, perhaps because he was the oldest, and nearest to the original stock, was regarded as their head. These three Ameers, considered as the rulers of their respective families, were all independent princes, but each exercised his authority under considerable limitations, as he was not entitled to act without consulting with the other members of his own family. In this way, Roostum Khan had for his colleagues in the government at Khyrpoor Nusser Khan, Ali Moorad Khan, and Shakur Khan, and Nusser Khan at Hyderabad, Shahdad Khan, Hussein Ali Khan, Mahomed Khan, and Sobhdar Khan.

The importance of the commerce of Scinde had early engaged the attention
of the East India Company, and they had been permitted, though not without much hesitation on the part of the native authorities, to establish an agency at Tatta, near the mouths of the Indus. Owing to misunderstandings and occasional acts of caprice and violence, this agency never made much progress, and was at last withdrawn. The subject, however, was not lost sight of, and after several less important attempts to establish more extensive commercial relations with Scinde, Lord William Bentinck, then governor-general, despatched Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Pottinger on a special mission to Hyderabad. The main obstacle to be overcome was a suspicion on the part of the Ameers, that conquest rather than commerce was intended, and accordingly, when a treaty was at length concluded, special articles were introduced for the purpose of allaying the apprehensions thus not unnaturally entertained. Nothing could be more explicit than these articles, which, notwithstanding subsequent arrangements, remained intact, and were in full force in 1838, when Lord Auckland, having finally adopted his fatal Afghan policy, began to inaugurate it by doing wholesale injustice. The articles forbade the transport of troops and military stores by the Indus, but as this mode of transport seemed necessary, Lord Auckland, by his simple fiat, set the treaty aside, and intimated to the Ameers that, as he found it inconvenient to fulfil, he had resolved to violate its obligations. The Ameers, after struggling in vain against this injustice, were obliged to succumb, and then learned that much worse was in store for them. At the very time when the governor-general was openly violating solemn treaties because he could not conveniently observe them, he did not hesitate to station a body of reserve at Kurrachee, for the avowed purpose of keeping the Ameers in check. This was but a preliminary step to a forced treaty, by which they were not only deprived of their independence by the admission of a subsidiary force, but taken bound to pay for this force a sum of three lacs per annum. It was in vain that one of the Ameers, taking the previous treaties from a box, indignantly asked, "What is to become of all these?" and then observed that, "since the day that Scinde has been connected with the English there has always been something new; your government is never satisfied; we are anxious for your friendship, but we cannot be continually persecuted; we have given a road to your troops through our territories, and now you wish to remain." An army was at hand to impose the treaty, if it was not voluntarily accepted, and the Ameers had no alternative but to resign their independence, by agreeing to accept and pay for a subsidiary force, and at the same time deprive themselves of what they regarded as a main source of their revenue, by abolishing all tolls on boats navigating the Indus.

Lord Ellenborough was so well aware of the injustice with which the Ameers had been treated, that he had declared it "impossible to believe that they could entertain friendly feelings," and he might therefore have been expected to make some allowance for them, if, during the tragedy which was
acted in Afghanistan, they had manifested feelings of an opposite nature. This, however, was a degree of generosity for which he was not prepared, and hence, while he admitted that "we would not be justified in inflicting punish-
ment upon the thoughts," he issued his instructions on the subject to Sir Charles
Napier, who had been appointed to the chief command in Scinde, in the
following terms: "Should any Ameer or chief with whom we have a treaty of
alliance or friendship, have evinced hostile designs against us, during the late
events, which may have induced them to doubt the continuance of our power,
it is the present intention of the governor-general to inflict upon the treachery
of such ally and friend so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter others
from similar conduct." He was pleased, however, to add that "he would not
proceed in this course without the most ample and convincing evidence of the
guilt of the accused," and hence Sir Charles Napier considered it as his first
business to ascertain whether such evidence could be found. The result was
communicated in a paper entitled "Return of Complaints," in which the
delinquencies of every particular Ameer were carefully enumerated.

This return of complaints Sir Charles Napier accompanied with a lengthened
report, which commenced as follows: "It is not for me to note how we came
to occupy Scinde, but to consider the subject as it stands. We are here by
right of treaties entered into by the Ameers, and therefore stand on the same
footing as themselves; for rights held under treaty are as sacred as the right
which sanctions that treaty. There does not appear any public protest regis-
tered against the treaties by the Ameers; they are therefore to be considered as
free expressions of the will of the contracting parties." Having thus cleared
the way by promulgating a theory which he knew to be, in this instance at least,
totally at variance with fact, he proceeded to argue, that a rigid adherence to
treaty ought to be exacted from the Ameers, because the effect would be, "to
favour our Indian interests by abolishing barbarism and ameliorating the
condition of society," and in short, obliging the Ameers to do "that which
honourable civilized rulers would do of their own accord." But here an impor-
tant question arises. Would a rigid adherence to treaties suffice for the accompl-
ishment of the objects contemplated by them? The government of the
Ameers, "hated by its subjects, despotic, hostile alike to the interests of
England and of its own people, a government of low intrigue, and so constituted
that it must fall to pieces by the vices of its construction," will be constantly
coming into collision with us. The consequence may easily be foreseen. "The
more powerful government will at no distant period swallow up the weaker;
in other words, Scinde must sooner or later form part of British India. If so,
"would it not then be better to come to that result at once?" To this question,
proposed by himself, Sir Charles Napier gave the following answer: "I think
it would be better if it can be done with honesty," This point of honesty,
which at first sight looked formidable, was easily disposed of by the following
simple consideration "The refractory Ameers break the treaty to gratify their avarice, and we punish the breach. I perceive no injustice."

In the interval, while awaiting Lord Ellenborough's final answer, Sir Charles Napier saw plainly that the Ameers were mustering their forces, and would not submit to the terms about to be proposed to them, without making a trial of their strength. He made his preparations accordingly, and with full confidence in the issue, though he knew that in point of numbers his little force would be a mere handful compared to that of the enemy. On the 2d of December the treaty, as Lord Ellenborough had finally sanctioned it, was transmitted to Hyderabad, and on the 4th to Khyrpoor. Its terms were harsh in the extreme, and still more humiliating than harsh. In addition to the cessions of territory demanded, the Ameers were to be deprived of one of the most generally recognized privileges of sovereignty, that of coining money in their own name. In future the British government would appropriate this privilege to itself, and establish a currency in which the coins were to bear on one side "the effigy of the sovereign of England." In short every article in the treaty was worded as if the object had been to provoke a refusal, and then take advantage of it. We can easily understand that the Ameers received the treaty "with great apparent disgust," and that for a time nothing was talked of in their durbars but war, "open or concealed." Prudence, in the meantime, suggested the latter, and the unfailing resource of negotiation was resorted to. This deceived no one, and least of all Sir Charles Napier, who on the 9th of December sent a letter to the Ameers of Khyrpoor, in which he thus addressed them:—"Your submission to the orders of the governor-general, and your friendship for our nation, should be beyond doubt, because you have solemnly assured me of the same. We are friends. It is right, therefore, to inform you of strange rumours that reach me. Your subjects, it is said, propose to attack my camp in the night time. This would of course be without your knowledge, and would also be very foolish, because my soldiers would slay those who attacked them; and when day dawned I would march to Khyrpoor, transport
the inhabitants to Sukkur, and destroy your capital city—with exception of your highnesses' palace, which I would leave standing alone, as a mark of my respect for your highnesses, and of my conviction that you have no authority over your subjects. I should also entrench so far on your highnesses' treasury as to defray the expense of this operation; because it is just that governors should pay for the mischiefs their subjects inflict on their neighbours. I therefore advertise your highnesses of the destruction which such an attempt on my camp would inevitably draw down upon Khyrpoor, in order that you may warn your people against committing any act of hostility.'

These menaces, notwithstanding the jocular terms in which they are expressed, were not lost upon the Ameers, who at once redoubled their professions of submission and their preparations for hostilities. Sir Charles Napier therefore announced to them that he would proceed forthwith to occupy their territory, and with this view began on the 10th of December to convey his troops across the Indus from Sukkur. Meer Roostum, the turbaned Ameer, a feeble and imbecile old man, above eighty years of age, was in the greatest alarm. He knew that his brother Ali Moorad, by strong professions of submission, had gained the ear of the British commander, and was intriguing to supplant him. According to the form of government established in Scinde, Ali Moorad was entitled to be his successor, but even this Meer Roostum was not disposed to concede, and he had set his heart on securing the succession to the turban to his own son. After crossing to the left bank of the Indus, and encamping at Roree, Sir Charles Napier was within a march of Khyrpoor, which is only ten miles to the south-west. This brought matters to a crisis, and Meer Roostum wrote to say that, feeling himself powerless in the hands of his own family, he had resolved to escape to the British camp. As it was feared that his presence there might prove a source of embarrassment, the answer returned to his proposal was that he would find a more appropriate asylum in the camp of Ali Moorad. Either in consequence of this answer or some more private arrangement, Meer Roostum took refuge in his brother's fort of Dejeekote, about ten miles south of his capital. Meanwhile Meer Roostum's formal acceptance of the new treaty and all its rigorous and humiliating exactions having been obtained, he was henceforth to be regarded as a British ally, and the territory of Upper Scinde, of which Khyrpoor was the capital, became entitled to the benefit of British protection. A necessary consequence was that those chiefs who refused to follow in Meer Roostum's wake, and submit to the treaty, were held to be public enemies. The leading malcontents were Meer Roostum's son and nephew, who instead of submitting fled to their forts in the desert. The most important of these was Emaumghur, situated about eighty miles south-east of Khyrpoor, and nearly 100 north-east of Hyderabad. Here a considerable body of troops had assembled under these two leaders, who believing their position unassailable, in consequence of the difficulty of reaching it,
deemed it no longer necessary to conceal their hostile intentions. Sir Charles Napier determined to teach them that they were not so secure as they imagined, and immediately began to prepare an expedition against Emaumghur.

While preparing for the expedition the British commander was somewhat disconcerted by the escape of Meer Roostum, apparently with Ali Moorad’s connivance. The point is not of much consequence, but as Ali had previously

![Image](image_url)

*Mee Mahomed, Meer Noor Khan, and Meer Noor Mahoud, three principal Ambers of Scinde.*

From engraving in *Illustrated London News.*

induced or compelled his brother to resign the turban to him in the most formal manner, the probability is that he wished to make his possession more secure by frightening Meer Roostum into a flight which would leave him sole master. At first it was supposed that a change of plans would be necessary, as the enemy were reported to be mustering in great strength at a place called Dhinjee, but it was ultimately found that there was no necessity to deviate from the original plan, and the march into the desert was commenced. As the Duke of Wellington afterwards declared the march upon Emaumghur “one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life,” some details of it will naturally be expected. The plan adopted cannot be better described than in Sir Charles Napier’s own words:—“My plans are fixed to march to the edge of the desert; then encamp, select 500 of the strongest Europeans and natives, mount them on camels, and load all my other camels with water, except a few to carry rations. My camel battery also shall go, and as many irregular horse as it shall be prudent to take, and then slap upon Emaumghur in the heart of the desert; if it surrenders, good; if not, it shall have such a hammering as shall make the fire fly out of its eyes. While this is going on, my camels shall go back for provisions, and water is abundant at Emaumghur. My expectation is that four shells, out of the four hundred, with my battery, will produce a surrender, to say nothing of an escadale, for which I am prepared.”

Leaving Khyrpoor, Sir Charles Napier arrived on the 3d of January, 1843, at Khanpoor, and on the 4th at Deejeekote. On the following day he made his
final arrangements for crossing the desert. "On the night of the 5th we moved with 350 of the 22d regiment (queen's), all mounted on camels, two soldiers on each. We have two 24 lb. howitzers, with double teams of camels, and two hundred of the Scinde horse, and provisions for fifteen days; water for four." On the 7th Choonka, twenty-five miles from Deejeekote, was reached. Though the enemy had repeatedly shown himself, no opposition was encountered, and at last, on arriving on the 12th before Emaumghur, it was found to be evacuated. The fort, built of burned brick in the form of a square with round towers, from forty to fifty feet high, and inclosed by an exterior wall, was of great strength, and capable of resisting any force without artillery.

In this arm, however, Sir Charles was, as we have seen, well provided, and must therefore have made good the capture, though it might have been preceded by a perilous delay. Having halted only so long as was necessary to shatter Emaumghur to atoms, with 10,000 lbs. of gunpowder, the expeditionary force retraced its steps, and on the 21st of January arrived at Peer Abubekr, situated within Scinde proper, eight miles south of Deejeekote, on the road from Khyrpoor to Hyderabad.

Having been joined by the troops which he had left at Deejeekote, Sir Charles commenced his march southward in the direction of Hyderabad, hoping that the consternation produced by the capture and destruction of Emaumghur would smooth the way and render actual hostilities unnecessary. At the outset it seemed that this hope was about to be realized. The Ameers, afraid to commit themselves to a final rejection of the treaty, professed their willingness to accept it, and even fixed the day on which they were formally to sign it. Procrastination, however, was their object, and they managed to weave various pretexts for delay. Major Outram, who was conducting the negotiation on the part of the British government, gave them more credit for sincerity than they deserved, and even became so far their dupe as to propose that Sir Charles Napier should leave his army behind and come in person to Hyderabad.

"This," said the commissioner, "will remove all difficulties." "Yes," was the reply, "and my head from my shoulders." That in this instance the military had formed a more correct judgment than the political officer was soon made manifest. On the 12th of February, twenty-five Beloochee chiefs of the Murree tribe, with their followers, being taken in arms, were arrested. On Hyat Khan, who held the chief command, was found an order from Mahomed Khan, one of the Hyderabad Ameers, directing him to assemble every male able to wield a sword, and join his victorious Beloochee troops at Meane on the 9th. On the very day when this discovery was made, the Ameers met in full durbar, and with the exception of Nusseer Khan of Khyrpoor, signed what was justly styled a penal, and was to them a most obnoxious treaty. This, which ought to have been the conclusion of a peaceful arrangement, was only the consummation of a system of duplicity. The Ameers had only been endeavouring to gain
time to complete their military preparations. These, however, they were at
last obliged to precipitate, as Sir Charles Napier, too well aware of their real
intentions, refused to listen to their procrastinating pleas, and was rapidly
advancing on Hyderabad. On the 15th of February he reached New Halls,
about thirty miles north of Hyderabad, and there learned that instead of wait-
ning for his nearer approach the Ameers had commenced actual hostilities by a
formidable attack on the British residency in that capital. Fortunately the
few troops within the inclosure, though not exceeding in all 100 men, after
gallantly resisting all the attempts of an enemy, estimated at 8000, to force an
entrance, were able, when their ammunition was nearly expended, to embark
on board a steamer which lay in the river, and thus escaped the slaughter to
which the Beloochees had doomed them.

The sword being now the only arbiter, Sir Charles Napier moved his camp
first to Muttaree, and then to Me anne. The latter place, situated only six
miles north of Hyderabad, was reached on the 17th of February, and was
destined, ere that day closed, to become famous in the military annals of British
India. When at Halls, the British commander had a choice of two roads, one
by the river which would bring him directly in front of the enemy, leaving
their rear open; and the other by Jamhallaka Tanda, which would turn their
right, and force them to fight with their back to the Indus. His inclination
was to take the latter, because, to use his own words, "if victorious, I should
utterly extirpate the Beloochee army, and I am as sure of victory as a man
who knows that victory is an accident can be." Nothing can show more
clearly how happily his well-known hardihood was tempered with caution
than the conclusion at which he arrives. It must be given in his own words.
After mentioning the strong temptation to choose the Jamhallaka Tanda
road, he says: "It is dangerous—1. Because 2800 men will be opposed to
25,000 or 30,000, and these are stiff odds. 2. A reverse would cast me off from
the river and my supplies. 3. A repulse would add 20,000 men to the enemy;
for barbarians hold no faith with the beaten, and numbers are now abiding the
issue of the first fight. . . . All the doubtful would on a repulse turn upon
us, and certainly it is no over-estimate to say, that with a beaten force I should
have to fight a way to Sukkur through 50,000 men." In regard to the river
road, he says: "It is shorter, and my right flank is secure; if worsted, my
provisions are safe in the steamers; the nearer the river the more ditches, and
as the Ameers have most cavalry that suits me best. They have 20,000
horsemen; mine are but 800, and a victory will not therefore be so decisive;
still I can pursue them with vigour. Yes! I will march along the river and
trust to manoeuvring in the battle for turning their right, without losing the
river myself.”

The British force, mustering 2800 men of all arms, with twelve pieces of
artillery, started from Muttaree at four in the morning of the 17th, and after
a march of four hours, discovered the enemy strongly posted, having each of
their flanks covered with a wood, and in front the bed of a river, now dry, but
with a high bank. At 9 A.M. the British were formed in order of battle, and
began to advance from the right in echelons of battalions, the artillery and her
majesty's 22d regiment in line forming the leading echelon, the 25th native
infantry the second, the 12th native infantry the third, and the 1st grenadier
native infantry the fourth. The 9th Bengal light cavalry formed the reserve
in rear of the left wing, and the Poonah horse, together with four companies of
infantry, guarded the baggage. "In this order of battle," says Sir Charles
Napier, "we advanced as at a review, over a fine plain swept by the cannon of
the enemy." The distance between the two lines being not more than 1000
yards, was soon traversed, and the battle became general along the bank of the
river. The combatants coming at once to close quarters, "fought for three
hours or more with great fury, man to man. Then," continues the despatch,
"was seen the superiority of the musket and bayonet over the sword, and
shield, and matchlock. The brave Beloochees, first discharging their matchlocks
and pistols, dashed over the bank with desperate resolution, but down went
these bold and skilful swordsmen under the superior power of the musket and
bayonet." At one time the 22d, 25th, and 12th regiments were almost over-
borne by the courage and numbers of the enemy, but a brilliant charge by the
9th Bengal cavalry and the Scinde horse completely relieved them, by forcing
the right of the enemy's line, capturing a standard and several pieces of
artillery, and even driving a large body of horse beyond their own camp.
"This charge," says Sir Charles, "decided in my opinion the crisis of the action,
for, from the moment the cavalry were seen in rear of their right flank, the
resistance of the enemy slackened, the 22d regiment forced the bank, the 25th
and 12th did the same, the latter regiment capturing several guns, and the
victory was decided." The loss of the British was 256 killed and wounded;
that of the enemy was estimated at 5000. The results of the victory were the
capture of the whole of the enemy's artillery, ammunition, standards, and camp,
with considerable stores and some treasure, the personal submission of the
Ameers, who yielded themselves up as prisoners of war, and the surrender of
Hyderabad, on the great tower of which the British flag was hoisted on the
20th of February.

Notwithstanding the splendid victory of Meaneer, the war was not yet
terminated. Shere Mahomed of Meerpoor, the most talented of all the Ameers,
was on the way to join his confederates when he learned their signal defeat.
The British commander offered to accept his submission on the same terms as
the other Ameers, but he disdainfully refused to yield, and kept the field at the head of a
force which continued to accumulate till it amounted to about 20,000 men.
For some time after his victory, Sir Charles Napier was not able to muster a
disposable force of 2000 men, and therefore, instead of entering on a new cam-
...aign, prudently formed an entrenched camp on the left bank of the Indus, and also constructed a fort on the right bank, as a protection to the steamers which carried his supplies. Here he remained waiting for reinforcements, and consoling himself with the reflection: "If he (Shere Mahomed) assails my works, he will be beaten; if he does not, the delay will exhaust his money, seeing that the Beloochees are as rapacious as they are brave." He had not miscalculated. The Ameer gradually approached nearer and nearer, and seeing no appearance of being attacked, became so confident of success, that on the 15th of March, when only twelve miles distant, he sent a letter offering to allow the British to quit the country on liberating the Ameers, and restoring what they had taken. "Just as his messengers delivered this letter," says Sir Charles Napier, "the evening gun was fired. There, said I, do you hear that? Yes. Well, that is your answer."

On the 21st of March the expected reinforcements arrived, and the British force, increased to 5000 men, immediately prepared to assume the offensive. With this view it moved from Hyderabad at daybreak of the 24th, and after a march of four miles arrived at Dubba. Here the enemy, consisting of 20,000 men of all arms, were found strongly posted behind a kind of double nullah, formed by two deep parallel ditches, the first 8 feet deep and 22 feet wide, and the second 17 feet deep and 42 feet wide. Between the two was a bank 43 feet wide. The attack was immediately commenced, the whole of the British artillery opening on the enemy's position, while the line led by her majesty's 22d advanced in echelons from the left. In a short time the enemy were seen moving considerable bodies to their left, and apparently retreating, as if unable to stand the cross fire of the British artillery. This moment was chosen to order a charge, which was made with the greatest gallantry and success by the 3d cavalry under Captain Delamain, and the Scinde horse under Captain Jacob, who crossed the nullah and pursued the retreating enemy for several miles. While this was passing on the right, her majesty's 22d gallantly attacked the nullah and carried it, though not without considerable loss. The 22d were closely followed by the 25th, 21st, and 12th native infantry, and the victory...
was decided. On the 26th the British force was again in motion, and arrived on the 27th at Shere Mahomed's capital, Meerpoor, of which possession was immediately taken. Sir Charles Napier was afraid to advance farther, being obliged, as he says, "to watch the Indus, which will soon swell, and may cut me off by the inundation." Unwilling, however, not to reap the full fruits of his victory, he sent a squadron of cavalry, on the 28th of March, to reconnoitre Omerkote, a fort situated in the desert, about 100 miles east of Hyderabad, and on the following day detached Captain Whitlie, with his battery, to make progress so far as water could be found. The report of the reconnoitring party was, that Omerkote was defended by 4000 men, and, on the faith of it, an express was immediately sent after Whitlie ordering him to return. This was unfortunate, for the real fact was that Omerkote had been abandoned. As soon as this was known, a second express was sent off countermanding the first. By this time, however, Whitlie, who had received the first express, was acting upon it, and had only consented to halt at the urgent request of Captain Brown, who, feeling sure that the order to return had been given under misapprehension, volunteered to ride back to head-quarters and return with new instructions. This feat he successfully performed. The result was, that Major Woodburn, who had succeeded to the command, hastened forward to Omerkote, and found it without defenders. The importance which the British commander attached to this capture, appears not only from his having previously declared, "I will have it if it costs another battle;" but also from his speaking of it in such terms as the following: "Omerkote is ours. . . . This completes the conquest of Scinde; every place is in my possession, and, thank God! I have done with war. Never again am I likely to see a shot fired in anger." It will be afterwards seen that in these anticipations he was too sanguine, but in the meantime it will be necessary to give some explanation of the main ground on which he founded them.

The obnoxious treaty which the governor-general had sought to impose on the Ameers ceased to be applicable to the actual situation of affairs after the victory of Meaneer and the surrender of the Ameers as prisoners of war. By these events the old constitution of Scinde was virtually abolished, and it became necessary to provide a substitute for it. What this was to be was first publicly announced March 5, 1843, by a "notification" which concluded in the following terms:—"Thus has victory placed at the disposal of the British government the country on both banks of the Indus from Sukkur to the sea, with the exception of such portions thereof as may belong to Meer Ali Moorad of Khyrpoor, and to any other Ameer who may have remained faithful to his engagements." In other words, Scinde with the exception above mentioned was henceforth a province of British India.

Sir Charles Napier believing that with the capture of Omerkote the conquest of Scinde was completed, had said that he did not expect to be obliged to fire
another shot. In the course of a short time he was obliged to modify this expectation. Shere Mahomed, returning from the desert to which he had fled, once more raised his standard, and was able towards the end of April to take post with 8000 men at Khoonera, about sixty miles north-east of Hyderabad. Shah Mahomed his brother had also mustered a force of several thousands, with four guns, and gone down to Sehwan with the view of crossing the Indus and taking part in a preconcerted insurrection at Hyderabad. Meer Hossein, Meer Roostum's son, was in the desert at Shaghur with a body of 2000 men, and in concert with several refractory killedars was menacing Ali Moorad at Khyrpoor.

The delta of the Ganges was traversed by predatory roving Beloochees to the number of about 20,000; and to the east of the delta, beyond the Poorana branch of the river, a tribe mustering some 5000 was threatening to intercept the communications with Bombay. Instead of uninterrupted tranquillity, therefore, everything foreboded a new struggle, and called for the immediate adoption of decisive measures. Shere Mahomed was by far the most formidable of all these insurgent chiefs. His actual force was the largest, and there was reason to fear that he might be able to double or triple its numbers by penetrating into the delta of the Indus, which formed the principal part of his original territory, and where he had only to appear in order to rally all the predatory hordes around his standard.

The first actual encounter, however, was not with Shere Mahomed, but Shah Mahomed his brother. This chief, hearing of the arrival of Colonel Roberts at Sehwan and his preparations to cross the river, hastened forward at the head of 3000 men, in the hope of taking him at an advantage. In this he completely outwitted himself, for Roberts came upon him by surprise, and besides dispersing his force and burning his camp, took him prisoner and sent
him on to Hyderabad. His arrival here was most opportune, for the intended insurrection, of which he was to be one of the main supports, was immediately abandoned in despair. This success was soon followed by another of still greater consequence. Sir Charles, anxious to put down Shere Mahomed, had marched out of Hyderabad in the very middle of the hot season. His sufferings and those of his troops were dreadful, and on the 15th of June, he and forty-three other Europeans were struck down by sun strokes. Within three hours they were all dead except himself. Speaking of this wonderful escape, he attributes it to his temperate habits; "I do not drink, that is the secret; the sun had no ally in the liquor amongst my brains," but at the same time mentions another circumstance which he says "roused me from my lethargy as much as the bleeding." This was a message from Colonel Jacob, intimating that he had encountered Shere Mahomed, defeated him and dispersed his forces without the loss of a single man. Everything like open hostility was now at an end, and the British commander had at length the full opportunity which he had earnestly desired, to devote himself, as governor of Scinde, to the work of internal improvement. It is not too much to say that in this department he displayed administrative talents of the highest order. The powers conferred upon him by Lord Ellenborough were almost absolute, and he used them under circumstances of great difficulty, in repressing crime, encouraging industry, and developing the resources of the country by opening new channels of communication and irrigation, and bringing under cultivation fertile tracts, which the Ameers had converted into shikargahs or hunting grounds. His administration will again come under notice. Meanwhile it is necessary to attend to the proceedings of the governor-general in a different quarter.

Junkojee Row Scindia, who succeeded by adoption in 1827 to Dowlut Row Scindia, died childless on the 7th of February, 1843. Two years before, he had become subject to attacks of illness, which it was believed must ultimately prove fatal, and it therefore became necessary for the British government to provide for their interests at the court of Gwalior in the event of his demise. The maharajah was, like his predecessor, childless. His wife, the maharanee, was daughter of a person named Jeswunt Row Gooppurra, and only twelve years of age. While the illness of the sovereign and the youth of his wife thus left the government without a proper head, the administration was intrusted to a regency of five individuals. Among these the Mama Sahib, the maharajah's maternal uncle, who had at one time been sole regent, still possessed the greatest influence, but it was very doubtful if he would be able to retain it after his nephew's death, as all the persons composing the regency were notoriously at enmity with each other. Colonel Spiers, the resident at Gwalior, in communicating these facts to Lord Auckland, in February, 1841, suggested that he should be authorized, in the event of the maharajah's death, to recommend to his widow the adoption of the nearest heir of Scindia's family, and that on this adoption
"the mother and her adopted son should be supported by the British government from foreign and domestic enemies." The answer was, that in the event of the maharajah's death "without male issue, or the delegation of authority to his widow to adopt a son," the proper course for the resident would be to "make known the willingness of the British government to recognize an adoption from the family of Scindia, which may be made by his widow, with the consent of the leading chiefs of the durbar."

The day after the maharajah's death, the resident received two pressing messages, earnestly requesting his presence at the palace. On arriving there he found assembled the ministers and all the influential persons about the court, and was informed that the Tara Ranee (the late maharajah's widow, whom they acknowledged as their sovereign mistress), themselves, and also those then present, had selected as successor to the guddiee, Bhageerut Row, a boy about eight or nine years of age, and the nearest in blood in the family to the late maharajah. On the 9th of February the resident wrote as follows:—"The maharanee and the boy she has selected may be still considered as children; it may therefore appear to the governor-general requisite that a regency should be appointed; the present ministry certainly do not possess the confidence of the army or of the people. The Mama Sahib (the maternal uncle of the late maharajah) appears to me to possess the greatest influence of any person about this court, and seems to be attached to our interests; he would perhaps be the person best calculated to place at the head of the regency." In replying to this letter, Lord Ellenborough expressed great satisfaction that the Tara Ranee had "adopted, with the apparently general concurrence of the chiefs and people," the boy whom he "had himself deemed to be nearest in blood to the late maharajah," but added, "The adoption of a boy too young to administer the government necessarily creates anxiety as to the selection of the ministers by whom the government is to be carried on, and the governor-general awaits with much interest the communication he expects shortly to receive on that head." In another letter, dated only three days later, he entered more fully on the subject of the regency. He considered that "it would be most for the benefit of the Gwalior state, that the regency should be confided to one person, in whom, during the minority of the maharajah, may reside all the authority of the state. It would be for the regent to nominate the ministers, and they would be responsible to him." Having thus given his opinion in favour of a single regent, invested with all the authority of the state, the governor-general ventured on still more delicate ground, and declared he would "gladly see the regency conferred upon the Mama Sahib." This recommendation appears to have been effectual, and on the 23d of February, after the young maharajah had been placed on the guddiee, it was officially proclaimed by the ministers, with the full concurrence of the Ranee, that the Mama Sahib had been nominated regent.

On receiving notice of this appointment, the governor-general gave the
resident the following instruction:—"You will inform the Mama Sahib, that having understood from you that he has, in your presence, been nominated regent of the Gwalior state, I recognize him as the responsible head of that state, and am prepared to support his authority." At the time when Lord Ellenborough thus pledged himself to the regent, he was not unaware of the extent to which it might involve him in the internal affairs of Gwalior. Not only was the pay of the troops heavily in arrear, while the available funds were insufficient to meet it, but an infantry brigade of three battalions had manifested a mutinous spirit. One of these battalions, under a native commandant named Ishuree Sing, when proceeding into Malwah, had before quitting the Gwalior territory been guilty of several outrages. The resident advised that an example should be made of its commander, and the late maharajah gave orders that he should be recalled, and on his arrival at Gwalior, be not only dismissed the service, but confined in the fort. Ishuree Sing probably suspected what was intended, and therefore, instead of returning alone, as he had been peremptorily ordered to do, he brought his battalion along with him. Having committed himself by this bold step, he succeeded in gaining over the other two battalions of the brigade, and engaging the whole three to make common cause with him. The governor-general, fully alive to the danger of these proceedings, wrote a second letter to the resident, which referring to the former, concluded as follows:—"The governor-general did not acquaint you that he was prepared to support the authority of the regent, without taking at the same time the necessary preliminary steps to enable him to give at once the most effectual support if it should be desired. It is inconvenient that there should be protracted suspense on this point, and the governor-general is anxious to know, as soon as possible, whether the state of affairs at Gwalior is such as to render it improbable that his immediate aid will become necessary to support the regent's authority." The thing intended could not now be mistaken. The governor-general by "support" meant armed intervention, and was ready, at a moment's notice, to march an army into Scindia's territory, for the purpose of helping the newly appointed regent to inflict punishment on a mutinous brigade. Fortunately Lord Ellenborough's military ardour was neutralized by the prudence of the regent, who "hoped he might be pardoned for stating that he would prefer awaiting his own time for the punishment of Ishuree Sing," inasmuch as the calling in of British troops "might cause a serious disturbance throughout the whole army," and "lose him that popularity and confidence which the officers and troops of it certainly at present appear to repose in him." His lordship could hardly have been pleased with this rebuff, which by implication charged him with a readiness to hurry into hostilities, which might have set the whole state of Gwalior in a flame. He had however the good sense to abandon his design, though he had gone so far as to have actually taken several measures "for the purpose of concentrating a preponderating force."
Meanwhile the court of Gwalior was the scene of intrigues, which though paltry in themselves were paving the way for important changes. In these intrigues a woman of the name of Nurunjee took a leading part. She was in the confidence of the ranee, and had acquired such an ascendancy over her that the regent felt his own authority to be in danger, and was considering how he might be able to remove her and her faction from the palace. The governor-general, after being thwarted in an important military operation which he had contemplated, was in no humour to listen to the detail of petty intrigues, and therefore wrote as follows when they were communicated to him by the resident:—"The governor-general intended to advise and to approve the selection of a sole regent having all the authority which, according to our English understanding of the word, appertains to his office as the responsible head of the government; and he will still indulge the hope that no little views and interests will be permitted to intervene, and to deprive the state of Gwalior of the only sort of government which, during the minority of a young uneducated boy adopted by a girl, can maintain the dignity of the family of Scindia, and the efficiency of the administration of the state." The woman Nurunjee was induced to retire, after making an excellent bargain for herself, but it soon appeared that a still more formidable intriguer was resident in the palace. This was the Dada Khasjee Walla, who had originally aspired to the regency, and was labouring incessantly to undermine the Mama Sahib, whose position in consequence became untenable, and he was obliged not only to resign the regency, but to retire into the Deccan.

No new regent or minister having been appointed after the expulsion of Mama Sahib, the resident suggested, that as the maharanee held durbars daily, the best mode of conducting official intercourse would be by direct communication with herself. The governor-general caught at this suggestion, and was inclined to think that this direct mode of communication, while there was no ostensible minister, might be that which would practically give the resident "the most beneficial influence over the government." Having come to this conclusion he retracted the contemptuous opinion he had previously expressed, and declared it to be his impression "that the maharanee is a very sensitive and somewhat impetuous girl, but that she is by no means without a good disposition; and that with her character, anything may be made of her according to the manner in which she is approached and treated." Meanwhile the Dada Khasjee Walla, who continued in high favour with the maharanee, had not lost sight of Mama Sahib, and accordingly when the ex-regent halted in his journey southward at Seronge, the capital of a small native state, he meditated sending a body of troops into that territory to seize him. Hearing of this design the governor-general determined not to allow the rights of an ally to be infringed by an unprovoked aggression, and therefore instructed Colonel Spiers that if he had the least apprehension of any intention of the *de facto* government of Gwalior
to violate the territory of Seronge, he would "address the maharanee herself, and refer her highness to the concluding sentence of the governor-general's proclamation of the 1st of October, 1842, wherein his lordship made this declaration: 'Sincerely attached to peace for the sake of the benefits it confers upon the people, the governor-general is resolved that peace shall be maintained, and he will direct the whole power of the British government against the state by which it shall be infringed.'"

The Dada Khasjee Walla, thus interdicted from gratifying his vindictive temper on a personal rival, showed his rage and disappointment by exerting himself in opposition to British interests, and the governor-general in consequence became convinced that the tranquillity of Gwalior could only be secured by his removal. At first his lordship had expressed himself in such a way as seemed to imply that a simple removal would satisfy him, but ultimately on passing in review all the delinquencies of the court favourite, he declared his conviction that "the mere dismissal of the Dada Khasjee Walla, after all that has passed, would not be sufficient to afford security against similar intrigues to that in which he has been the mover, and to place the relations between the two governments upon a satisfactory footing." He therefore instructed the resident to demand, as the only condition of friendly intercourse with Gwalior, that the Dada should not only be dismissed, but banished for ever beyond the limits of the Gwalior territory.

On the very day preceding that on which the governor-general gave the above instruction to the resident, the Dada was a prisoner in the hands of the chiefs who had all along opposed him. Feeling convinced that while he was at the head of affairs, friendly relations with the British government would never be re-established, they had determined to keep no terms with him. His own fears and those of the ranee, whose favour for him had suffered no diminution, led to a kind of compromise, and he was given up after stipulating that he should not be maltreated. It was hoped that the next step would be to deliver him into British custody, but an unexpected obstacle arose. The troops who had been gained over to the Dada mustered in full force, and having surrounded the campoo where he was confined, threatened to take him away by force if he were not voluntarily given up. A collision thus became imminent, but the parties were so equally matched that they both deemed it prudent to temporize, and hence, as the resident reported, "during the whole of these disturbances not a sword has been drawn nor a drop of blood spilt." The result was that the Dada, though he still remained in custody, could not be delivered to the resident at Dholepore, as the chiefs who seized him wished and had intended. The ranee still stood by him, and even when warned that if he was not delivered the British troops would certainly advance, displayed considerable ability in arguing the case with a moonshee, whom the resident had sent to remonstrate with her.
On the 1st of November, the governor-general, who was about to leave Fort William for the north-western provinces, lodged an elaborate minute, in which he plainly showed that his designs in regard to Gwalior were of a more sweeping character than he had yet ventured to confess. After adverting to the fact that "the British government has now, for many years, assumed the rights and performed the obligations of the paramount power in India within the Sutlej," and that it was impossible therefore "to take a partial and insulated view of our relations with any state within that limit," he proceeded to show that "the state of Gwalior is altogether peculiar," and that in the event of disturbance within it, intervention was "not only justifiable, but absolutely necessary." Having laid down this principle, his lordship proceeded to apply it. "When the existing relations between the state of Gwalior and the British government are considered, it is impossible to view the expulsion of the Mama Sahib, and the elevation of the Dada Khasjee Walla to the ministry, otherwise than an affront of the gravest character offered to the British government, by that successful intriguer in the Zenana of Gwalior, and by the disorganized army by which he has been supported," still, "under ordinary circumstances, we might perhaps have waited upon time, and have abstained from the adoption of measures of coercion," but the circumstances were not ordinary. The Sikhs, no longer friendly, have within three marches of the Sutlej "an army of 70,000 men," and though "it may perhaps be expected that no hostile act on the part of this army will occur to produce a war," it would be "unpardonable" not to take every precaution against it, and "no precaution appears to be more necessary than that of rendering our rear and our communications secure by the re-establishment of a friendly government at Gwalior." The expulsion of the Dada was therefore only the first of a series of measures which are thus enumerated in the conclusion of the minute:—"To obtain reparation for an affront, which if left unpunished would affect our reputation and our influence at every durbar in India; to secure the tranquillity of our frontier and of that of our allies by the future cordial co-operation of the officers of the durbar of Gwalior in its preservation; and to diminish an army, which is the real master of the Gwalior state and placed within a few marches of our second capital—these appear to be the just and legitimate objects to be held in view; but the time and manner of their accomplishment must, as I have said, depend upon circumstances, and be governed by a general view of our position in every part of India." The governor-general arrived at Agra on the 11th of December, and immediately "decided upon moving forward the whole of the troops with as little delay as possible." On the following day he addressed the maharanee, and gave her the first distinct intimation that he had risen in his demands. "The British government can neither permit the existence, within the territories of Scindia, of an unfriendly government, nor that those territories should be without a government willing and able to maintain order, and to preserve the
relations of amity with its neighbours. The British government cannot permit any change in the relations between itself and the house of Scindia, which have for forty years contributed to the preservation of the peace of Central India. Compelled, by the conduct which your highness has been advised to adopt, to look to other means than those of friendly remonstrance for the purpose of maintaining those relations in their integrity and spirit, I have now directed the advance of the British armies, and I shall not arrest their move-

Gwalior.—From an original sketch in possession of Royal Asiatic Society.

ment until I have full security for the future tranquillity of the common frontier of the two states, for the maintenance of order within the territories of Scindia, and for the conducting of the government of those territories in accordance with the long-established relations of amity towards the British government.”

This letter, which produced the greatest consternation at Gwalior, was immediately followed by the actual surrender of the Dada, who was sent forward under charge of an escort, and brought on the 18th of December into the British camp. The maharanee seems to have expected that the delivery of the Dada would be accepted as a sufficient compliance with the demands of the British government, and therefore, in answering the governor-general’s letter, expressed her earnest wish that the march of the British army might be arrested, and official intercourse resumed by the return of the resident to Gwalior. At the same time she availed herself with some dexterity of a declaration of his lordship, to the effect “that he was fully determined in his proceedings, in regard to Gwalior, to maintain in all their integrity the conditions of the existing treaties between the two states.” This declaration, which the governor-general had volunteered only two days previously, certainly pledged him to all which the maharanee understood by it when she thus expressed herself:—“Your lord-
ship's purpose that the treaties and engagements which have been in force for forty years shall not be changed or interfered with, is gratifying. This purpose has its origin in the good feeling and integrity of your lordship. The parties to all these treaties and engagements felt the fullest confidence in them; for the good faith of the British government is well known." This home-thrust to
his lordship appears to have had some difficulty in parrying, for in a subsequent letter to the maharanee, after telling her that "the delivery of the Dada Khasjee Walla is the best indication of the sincerity of your highness's friendship," he veiled his future intentions under such vague expressions as these:—
"I have, myself, no more earnest wish than that of re-establishing the good understanding between the two states, and of giving it a firmer basis." To the resident, now Colonel Sleeman, who had succeeded Colonel Spiers, he was much more explicit. "He was gratified," he said, "by the delivery of the Dada, but was no longer disposed to accept it as sufficient atonement for the past, or security for the future. The British armies could not be arrested without a guarantee for the maintenance of tranquillity on the common frontier, and the establishment of a government willing and able to coerce its own subjects, and maintain the relations of amity."

As the governor-general professed to be advancing with no hostile intentions to the Gwalior state, it was proposed that the young maharajah, with the maharanee and chiefs, should come out to meet him, "in the manner usually observed on the occasion of a friendly visit to the governor-general by the ruler of the Scindia state," and that then the whole should proceed to Gwalior as if the governor-general were returning the visit. A meeting was accordingly held on the 20th of December, at Dholepore, in the governor-general's tent, for the purpose of making the necessary arrangements. The governor-general took part in the conference, which was attended on the part of Gwalior by the chiefs Ram Row Phalkeea and Sumbajee Angria, and the vakeel Bajee Row. The main point discussed was the place of meeting. The chiefs began by assuming that the meeting would take place on his lordship's present encamping ground at Dholepore. "This," they said, "was the usual place where all former governors-general had been met by the rajas, on occasion of their visits to Gwalior," and "any deviation from that established usage would detract from the honour of the maharajah." The governor-general having replied that as the maharajah was not here, and delay was impossible, his camp would move on as soon as the whole of the army had joined the head-quarters, and that his meeting with the maharajah might "take place at such spot as they should both arrive at on the same day." The chiefs showed the importance which they attached to the place of meeting, by urging "that if the governor-general, with the commander-in-chief and the British army, passed the Gwalior frontier before the maharajah had a meeting with his lordship, it would be a breach of all precedent, and eternally disgrace the maharajah and the government of Scindia." When his
lordship still refused to delay, the chiefs represented "that if the British army crossed the frontier before the meeting with the maharajah, the troops of Gwalior, who were already in a state of the utmost alarm, would believe that the governor-general was coming, not as a friend, but with a hostile purpose," and "they implored him with joined hands, to weigh well the step he was taking," since, in their opinion, "the most serious consequences depended on the passing of the British army across the frontier before the meeting." Finding that the resolution to move on was irrevocable, the chiefs asked "to know the longest time his lordship could give the maharajah to come out and meet him here." The answer was as follows:—"If the maharajah should meet the governor-general at this ground on the 23d instant, prepared to ratify a treaty drawn up in accordance with the principles laid down in the paper which had been placed in the hands of the chiefs, the details of which should be prepared to-morrow, and they would guarantee that his highness should do so, the army should not pass the river Chumbul (the boundary between the two states) till after that day; but that if his lordship were induced thus to delay the passing of the troops for two days, and the chiefs should fail to redeem their guarantee, a heavy fine, in addition to the account which was already to be charged to them, should be imposed." The governor-general says he offered these terms because he had "every disposition to meet any reasonable wish of the chiefs," but one cannot help thinking that if he had really had this "disposition," he would have taken a different way of proving it. As must have been anticipated, the terms were declined.

On the 21st of December, the first brigade of the British army crossed the Chumbul, and encamped about six miles to the south, beyond the defiles and ravines. The head-quarters, with the governor-general's camp, followed on the 22d, and by the 26th the whole of the right wing of the army, with the heavy guns, had crossed, and had been placed in position at Hingona. Up to the 27th, it was considered probable that the Gwalior troops, notwithstanding their vaunts and menaces, would not venture to oppose the British advance, though circumstances were not wanting to suggest and justify an opposite conclusion. On the 25th, Bapoo Setowlea, who had been appointed prime-minister, and professed his earnest desire for the restoration of friendly relations on the very terms which had been offered, suddenly quitted the British camp, in which he had arrived to conduct the negotiations on the part of the durbar. He proceeded to Dhunaila, and there, in an interview with Colonel Sleeman, attributed his departure to a summons from Gwalior, where he would, if possible, "defeat the machinations of ill advisers, and prevent hostilities." The fact, as proved by his subsequent conduct, was that the object of his journey was not to prevent hostilities, but to take a prominent part in them. On the 26th, it was ascertained that troops and guns were leaving Gwalior, in the direction both of Chandore and Hingona, in the former to encounter General Grey, who
was advancing with the left wing of the army through Bundeleund, and the latter to resist the further progress of the right wing under the commander-in-chief. On the same day, Sumbajee Angria, another of the Gwalior negotiators, imitated the example of his colleague Bapoo Setowlea, and suddenly disappeared from the British camp without giving any intimation of his intention. These facts seemed to indicate that both the chiefs and the troops had for the time forgotten their dissensions, to unite in resisting what they regarded as an unjustifiable invasion of their native soil, and that therefore the British army, instead of having only to chastise a mutinous section of the Gwalior troops, would be opposed by the whole military power of the state. Both the governor-general and the commander-in-chief, however, were reluctant to abandon the idea of a peaceful campaign, and continuing to hope for it, appear to have been to some extent taken by surprise when hostilities actually commenced.

On the 28th of December, when a small reconnoitring party were examining the ground at a short distance from Chounda, where the Mahratta army had taken up a strong position, the fire from the batteries was suddenly opened upon them. Whatever room there might have been for doubt before, there could be none now. The Gwalior troops, so far from succumbing without a struggle, had taken the initiative, and sent their defiance from the mouth of their guns. Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, was not slow to accept it, and both armies immediately prepared for battle. The inequality in point of numbers was not so great as usual in battles in India, the British troops mustering about 14,000, with 40 guns, and the Mahrattas 18,000, with 100 guns.

By eight o'clock on the morning of the 29th, the whole British troops, after passing over a country rendered extremely difficult by deep ravines, and crossing the Kohary in three columns, were in their appointed places about a mile in front of Maharajpoor. This place, contrary to expectation, was found occupied by the Mahrattas, who during the previous night had taken possession of it with seven regiments of infantry, each with four guns, which they had entrenched. These immediately opened on the British advances, and rendered necessary a change of plan, which is thus described by the commander-in-chief:

"Major-general Littler's column being exactly in front of Maharajpoor, I ordered it to advance direct, while Major-general Valiant's brigade took it in..."
reverse; both supported by Major-general Dennis’s column and the two light field batteries. Your lordship must have witnessed with the same pride and pleasure that I did, the brilliant advance of these columns under their respective leaders, the European and native soldiers appearing emulous to prove their loyalty and devotion; and here I must do justice to the gallantry of their opponents, who received the shock without flinching, their guns doing severe execution as we advanced; but nothing could withstand the rush of British soldiers. Her majesty’s 39th foot, with their accustomed dash, ably supported by the 56th regiment native infantry, drove the enemy from their guns into the village, bayoneting the gunners at their posts. Here a most sanguinary conflict ensued; the Mahratta troops, after discharging their matchlocks, fought sword in hand with the most determined courage. General Valiant’s brigade with equal enthusiasm took Maharajpooor in reverse, and twenty-eight guns were captured by this combined movement: so desperate was the resistance, that very few of the defenders of this very strong position escaped. During these operations, Brigadier Scott was opposed by a body of the enemy’s cavalry on the extreme left, and made some well-executed charges with the 10th light cavalry, most ably supported by Captain Grant’s troop of horse artillery, and the 4th lancers, capturing some guns and taking two standards, thus threatening the right flank of the enemy.” After the decisive success at Maharajpooor, the entrenched position of Chounda was carried, and the victory was complete, the enemy having dispersed and fled, with a loss of 3000 in killed and wounded, and of 56 pieces of ordnance, 43 of them of brass. The British loss also was severe, amounting in all to 797 in killed, wounded, and missing.

While the main body of the British army was gaining the victory of Maharajpooor, the left wing, under General Grey, which had crossed the frontier from the south-west, and pushed on rapidly to Punnyar, which is only twelve miles from Gwalior, was there achieving a similar success against another Mahratta force of 12,000 men, with forty guns.

After these victories all idea of further resistance was abandoned, and it only remained for the governor-general to give effect to his designs in regard to Scindia’s dominions. Hitherto he had always talked of Gwalior as an independent state, but he now acted as if he had conquered it, and not only set the rights of the maharanee aside, but changed the form of its government. In future she was to be only a pensioner with three lacs of revenue, and no political authority, and the administration was to be carried on during the maharajah’s minority by what was called a council of regency, in regard to which it was stipulated that it “should act in accordance with the advice of the British resident, and that its members should not be liable to be changed, or vacancies occasioned by the death of its members filled up, except with the sanction of the government of India.” This stipulation, which virtually converted Scindia’s dominions into a British dependency, was forthwith secured.
by a regular treaty, which was not so much negotiated as dictated and imposed by the governor-general at Gwalior. It consisted of twelve articles, of which, in addition to the above stipulation, the most important were those which limited the number of the Gwalior army to 9000 men, of whom not more than 3000 were to be infantry, with twelve field-guns and 200 gunners with twenty other guns; and supplied the place of the troops disbanded by a large increase of the contingent or subsidiary force, provided by the British, and paid for by the Gwalior government. The fort of Gwalior was in future to be garrisoned by the contingent, and Brigadier Stubbs, who commanded the contingent, was moreover appointed commandant of the maharajah's forces. Truly might the governor-general boast that the result of the victories gained over the Gwalior troops had been "the secure establishment of British supremacy," but truly also might it at the same time have been declared that this result had only been obtained by vigorously exercising all the rights of conquest while hypocritically disclaiming them.

While the governor-general was carrying matters with a high hand at the court of Gwalior, he was himself undergoing a severe ordeal in the court of directors. By his absurd proclamation of the gates, he had destroyed confidence in the soundness of his judgment, and the whole course of his administration so little accorded with the pacific policy to which he had pledged himself on leaving England, that serious doubts began to be entertained as to his fitness to govern India. His policy in regard to Scinde was particularly objected to. He had concocted a series of charges against the Ameers on insufficient evidence, and then made them the pretext for imposing a penal treaty, to which he might have foreseen that they never would submit without coercion. In this way, when the exhaustion of the Indian treasury by the disasters of Afghanistan made it most desirable that peace should be maintained, he provoked a war of the most formidable description, which, but for the singular ability of the military commander, might have proved ruinous, and which, after the most brilliant victories, had only added to our already overgrown Indian empire a tract of territory which for years to come would not pay the expense of governing it. His policy in Gwalior was of a similar description, and there
was reason to suspect, from hints which he had thrown out, that he was meditating a greater war than any he had yet carried on. Such were the leading public grounds on which Lord Ellenborough was assailed, but he might perhaps have passed unscathed through the ordeal to which they subjected him, had he not imprudently provoked jealousies and animosities between the two great branches of the public service, by the mode in which his patronage was distributed. Lord Auckland had set him the example of making the political subordinate to the military department, when special circumstances seemed to require it; but this, which had hitherto been the exception, was made by Lord Ellenborough the rule, so much so indeed, that he both spoke and acted as if he thought that the first qualification for office of any kind was to be a soldier. Conduct thus systematically pursued was naturally resented by the civil service, and his lordship arrayed against himself many of the ablest and most influential of Indian officials. The effect of this hostility soon became apparent at the India House, and the question of recalling the governor-general was seriously mooted among the directors. This power of recall they undoubtedly possessed, and though they had never before exercised it, they saw so much to disapprove in the mode in which the government of India was conducted, that nothing but the urgent remonstrance of the British cabinet prevented them from exercising it. At last, however, even remonstrance proved unavailing, and on the 21st of April, 1844, Sir Robert Peel, then prime-minister, announced, in answer to a question put to him by Mr. Macaulay, "that on Wednesday last her majesty's government received a communication from the court of directors that they had exercised the power which the law gives them to recall at their will and pleasure the Governor-general of India." This announcement is said to have been received with loud cheers from the opposition benches, though it could hardly be called a party triumph, as eighteen of the twenty-four directors were supporters of the ministry, and yet the vote of recall had been unanimous. This fact affords a strong presumption that it was not dictated by factional or improper motives, but as the papers which could have explained the whole matter were withheld, on the ground that they could not be made public without injury to the public service, we are necessarily left to conjecture. This is so far unfortunate for the directors, as it left them without the means of replying effectively to a speech made against them in the House of Lords by so high an authority as the Duke of Wellington, who stigmatized the recall as "an act of indiscretion at least," and as "the most indiscreet exercise of power" he had ever known.

The deep mortification felt by Lord Ellenborough at his abrupt recall, was allayed to some extent on finding that he was to be succeeded by his own brother-in-law, who would naturally be more tender of the reputation of his predecessor than could have been expected from a stranger, and would innovate as little as possible on the policy which he had pursued. That this was the
view taken by Lord Ellenborough himself appears from one of his letters to Sir Charles Napier. "You will have heard that the court of directors has done as I expected. I am recalled. Fortunately Sir Henry Hardinge is my successor, and he will carry out all my views with the advantage of having military experience." Military experience seems indeed to have been regarded by his lordship as the most essential qualification of the Governor-general of India, and hence, during his whole administration, he had done little more than endeavour to acquire it. Under the influence of this ruling passion he had turned his back on the seat of government at Calcutta, as if he had no civil duties to perform. It were vain therefore to search the annals of his government for any important internal reforms. For these he had little time, and, it is to be presumed, still less taste, since he took care, in the course of a speech delivered at a farewell entertainment, to make the following announcement: "The only regret I feel at leaving India is that of being separated from the army. The most agreeable, the most interesting period of my life has been that which I have passed here in cantonments and in camps."

CHAPTER VII.


In the 14th of July, 1844, Lord Ellenborough left Calcutta, and on the 23d of the same month, Sir Henry Hardinge arrived, and entered immediately on the duties of his office. The first months of his government were employed in making judicious arrangements for replacing the civil service in its proper position; in removing grievances, and at the same time maintaining strict discipline in the native army; in promoting education, and in opening up new sources of
prosperity by encouraging steam navigation and the construction of railways. While he was thus engaged in peaceful measures, it was daily becoming apparent that he would soon be obliged to abandon them for others of an opposite character. The Punjab had fallen into a state bordering on anarchy, and a large Sikh army, which defied all control, had assumed a menacing attitude on the British frontier.

After the death of Runjeet Sing in 1839, the friendly relations which he had always carefully maintained underwent a sudden change. His son Khurrruk Sing, who succeeded him, possessed none of his talent, and ruled only in name under his own son Nonehal Sing. This youth was unfortunately as hostile as his grandfather had been friendly to British interests, but before his hostility could be fully developed he was killed by a stone or beam which fell upon him as he was passing under a gate. This tragic event, though represented as an accident, was in fact a murder, which had been planned for the purpose of securing the throne for another claimant. This was Shere Sing, who was by repute one of Runjeet Sing's sons, but not acknowledged by him, because he suspected his wife's fidelity. Still, however, his status had been so far recognized that he was allowed to rank as one of the Lahore princes, and hence when both Khurrruk Sing, who had previously died, and Nonehal Sing were removed, he had no difficulty in finding numerous supporters. Among these, by far the most influential was Dhyan Sing, who had been prime-minister to Runjeet Sing, and hated Khurrruk Sing and his son for having dismissed him in order to make way for a worthless favourite. Notwithstanding this support Shere Sing failed at first to obtain the object of his ambition. His opponent was Chund Koonwur, Khurrruk Sing's widow, who having placed herself at the head of a powerful party, drove him from the capital, and was proclaimed queen. By the advice of Dhyan Sing he withdrew from the contest to wait his opportunity. He had not to wait long, for the ranee's government proved a failure, and the old wuzeez having persuaded the soldiers that they ought not to submit to a woman's rule, Shere Sing was recalled. The ranee, still in possession of the capital, prepared to resist his entrance, till the desertion of the troops convinced her that her cause was hopeless.

Shere Sing proved unworthy of the throne to which he had been raised. He had long been addicted to vicious indulgences, and shortly after his elevation, having thrown off all restraint, became a mere drunkard and debauchee. The pernicious consequences were not at first fully developed, as Dhyan Sing, in whom all power now centred, was an able administrator, but ultimately the intrigues of Shere Sing's boon companions began to prevail, and the wuzeez was not only threatened with disgrace, but furnished with evidence which convinced him that his life was in danger. Under the influence of these fears he sanctioned the assassination of the maharajah. This assassination was immediately followed by that of his son Pertaub Sing. Dhyan Sing himself
was not permitted to escape, and was shot dead by Ajeej Sing, the same chief who had murdered his master. After all these atrocities, and a short interval, during which a kind of anarchy prevailed, Dhuleep Sing, another son of Runjeet Sing, was placed upon the throne, and Heera Sing, the son of the murdered wuzeer, succeeded him as prime-minister. The army, now conscious from the part which they had played in effecting these changes that the whole power was in their hands, began to clamour for increased pay, and never hesitated, whenever their demands were refused, to take summary vengeance on the individuals obnoxious to them. In this way Heera Sing met his death, and his successor Juwaheer Sing, the uncle of the new maharajah, who was a mere boy, shared the same fate. By this last event the government of Lahore was left without any administrative head, and the ranee, Dhuleep Sing’s mother, in her capacity as guardian, assumed the direction of affairs. Her authority, however, was merely nominal, and all real power was usurped by the army, who exercised it by means of delegates called *punches*. These issued their imperious mandates, which the ranee and her advisers, however reluctant, durst not refuse to obey. The course which this military despotism could hardly fail to take had for some time been foreseen. The soldiers were sufficient in numbers to form a mighty host, and possessed inexhaustible supplies of military stores; but there was no field on which they could display their prowess and enrich themselves with plunder, unless they were to invade the British territories. The temptation was under the circumstances irresistible, and notwithstanding the aversion of the ranee she was obliged to give a formal assent to this unprovoked war. While this was the general resolution of the army, and in appearance at least that of the government also, Gholab Sing, the chief of Jummoo, and brother of the murdered wuzeer, Dhyan Sing, managed to keep aloof and dexterously play a double game, professing secret friendship to the British government, while externally complying with the demands of the army so as not to bring down its vengeance.

While these crimes and revolutions were taking place at Lahore, and a formidable army, subject to no control, was assembled on the frontiers, the British could not remain as unconcerned spectators, and run the risk of being overwhelmed by the bursting of a storm for which they had made no preparations. Lord Ellenborough had placed the threatening aspect of affairs in the Punjab in the foreground, when seeking to justify the coercion he was about to use towards Gwalior, and the force then employed had been pushed forward to take up centrical positions at Ferozepoor, Loodiana, and Umballa. So strong, however, was the known desire of the directors for a period of peace, that Sir Henry Hardinge proceeded with the utmost caution, and had barely completed the necessary measures of precaution when the time for action arrived. Having reached Umballa on the 21 of December, 1845, he moved with his camp on the 6th towards Loodiana, to fulfil his previously announced intention of visiting
the Sikh protected states, according to the usual custom of his predecessors. His movements were made in as peaceful a manner as possible, because he was not only anxious not to furnish the Sikhs with any pretext for hostilities, but had not ceased to hope for an amicable settlement. He only deemed it probable that some act of aggression might be committed by parties of plunderers, for the purpose of compelling the British government to interfere, and as nothing was further from his wish than to be thus involved in war, he resolved to carry his forbearance as far as possible. The wisdom of this resolution may be questioned. A more spirited conduct might have made the Sikhs pause, whereas forbearance, being only regarded by them as a symptom of fear, probably hastened the crisis. On the 13th of December information was received that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and was concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river within the British territory. On the same day Sir Henry Hardinge issued a proclamation which concluded thus:—"The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories. The governor-general must therefore take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of public peace. The governor-general hereby declares the possessions of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing on the left or British banks of the Sutlej confiscated or annexed to the British territories."

Ferozepoor was at this time held by a body of about 10,000 troops, with twenty-four guns, under command of General Sir John Littler. This place being only fifty miles S.S.E. of Lahore, and thrice as far north-west of Umballa, where on the 11th of December Sir Thomas Gough, the commander-in-chief, had his head-quarters, was seriously threatened the moment the Sikhs, headed by an able leader of the name of Tej Sing, had crossed the Sutlej. Their designs upon it were indeed at once manifested, for they immediately invested it on one side, while the remainder of their force proceeded ten miles in advance to Ferozeshah, evidently for the purpose of intercepting the forces now advancing for its relief from Umballa and Loodiana. On the 16th of December the two British divisions thus advancing formed a junction at Bussean, and continued their march in the direction of Moodkee, which is only twenty-five miles south-east of Ferozepoor. It was reached on the 18th, and as the few Sikh cavalry who occupied it retired as the British advance appeared, it was not supposed that an encounter was at hand. Under this impression the British troops took up their encamping ground, and were preparing refreshments after a fatiguing march of twenty-two miles, when scouts arrived with the intelligence that the enemy were hastening forward, and were only three miles distant. They had, it appeared, begun to entrench themselves at Ferozeshah, and on learning the arrival of the British at Moodkee, resolved at once to assume the aggressive, in the belief that they would not have to encounter
the whole British force, but only its advanced guard. The equality of numbers was much nearer than they supposed, for the British mustered 12,350 rank and file, and forty-two guns, while the Sikhs did not amount to more than 30,000, with only forty guns, most of the latter, however, of much heavier metal than those of the British, which were merely the six-pounders of the horse-artillery.

It was about three in the afternoon when the approach of the enemy was announced, and the British troops, already in a state of great exhaustion, had not more than sufficient time to get under arms and move to their positions, when they were ordered to advance to the attack. They had not proceeded above two miles when they found the enemy in position. The battle, which immediately commenced, is thus described in Sir Hugh Gough's despatch: "The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle, and such undulations as the ground afforded, and whilst our twelve battalions formed from echelon of brigade into line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse-artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field-batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyze that of the enemy; and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry, under Brigadiers White and Gough, to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry the 3d light dragoons, with the 2d brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body-guard and 5th light cavalry, with a portion of the 4th lancers, turned the left

1, From a suit of armour in the Tower of London. 2, An Akalee, from the Honourable Miss Eden's Portraits of the Prince and People of India. Vol. III. 3, A chief on horseback, from Soltykov's Habitations de l'Inde. 4 and 5, Soldiers, from the Hon. C. S. Hardinge's Recollections of India.
of the Sikh army, and sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th lancers, the 9th irregular cavalry, under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field-battery, to threaten their right. This manœuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect. When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked in echelon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours, but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, wherever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object." The victory though glorious was dearly purchased, the British loss amounting to 872, of whom 215 were killed and 657 wounded. Among the former were two officers, who had acquired distinction in Afghanistan—Sir John M'Caskill, who was shot dead while gallantly leading his division, and Sir Robert Sale, who was fatally wounded, and survived only a few days.

The British troops having returned to their camp at midnight, halted during the 19th and 20th. During this interval two heavy guns reached Moodkee, escorted by her majesty's 29th, the 1st European infantry, and the 11th and 41st native infantry, and an express was sent off to Sir John Littler, directing him to join with as many troops as he could safely bring, without compromising the safety of Ferozepoor. He immediately started with 5000 foot, two regiments of cavalry, and twenty-one field guns, and on the 21st succeeded in forming a junction with the main army, which, disencumbered of its baggage, which had been left with the wounded at Moodkee under sufficient protection, was now hastening to the attack of the entrenched camp at Ferozeshah. During the operations which followed, the governor-general, who had volunteered to act as second in command, had charge of the left wing of the army, while the commander-in-chief personally conducted the right. The British force
consisted of 16,700 men, and sixty-nine guns, chiefly horse-artillery; the Sikhs 
mustered about 50,000 men, with 108 pieces of cannon of heavy calibre. This 
superiority of numbers was not the only advantage of the enemy, for they 
occupied an entrenched camp, which extended in the form of a parallelogram, 
about a mile in length and half a mile in breadth, and included within its area 
the strong village of Ferozeshah. For a description of the operations we must 
again have recourse to the commander-in-chief's despatch. "A very heavy 
cannonade was opened by the enemy, who had dispersed over their position 
upwards of one hundred guns, more than forty of which were of battering calibre; 
these kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, which the practice of our far less 
numerous artillery, of much lighter metal, checked in some degree, but could not 
silence; finally, in the face of a storm of shot and shell, our infantry advanced 
and carried these formidable entrenchments; they threw themselves upon their 
guns, and with matchless gallantry wrested them from the enemy, but when the 
batteries were partially within our grasp, our soldiers had to face such a fire of 
musketry from the Sikh infantry, arrayed behind their guns, that in spite of 
the most heroic efforts, a portion only of the entrenchments could be carried. 
Night fell while the conflict was everywhere raging. Although I now brought 
up Major-general Sir Harry Smith's division, and he captured and long retained 
another point of the position, and her majesty's 3d light dragoons charged and 
took some of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in possess-
ion of a considerable portion of the great quadrangle, whilst our troops, inter-
mingled with theirs, kept possession of the remainder, and finally bivouacked 
upon it, exhausted by their gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and 
suffering extremely from thirst, yet animated by an indomitable spirit. In 
this state of things the long night wore away. Near the middle of it one of 
their heavy guns was advanced, and played with deadly effect upon our troops. 
Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Hardinge immediately formed her majesty's 
80th foot and the 1st European light infantry. They were led to the attack 
by their commanding officers, and animated in their exertions by Lieutenant-
colonel Wood (aide-de-camp to the lieutenant-general), who was wounded in 
the outset. The 80th captured the gun, and the enemy, dismayed by this 
counter-check, did not venture to press on further. During the whole night, 
however, they continued to harass our troops by fire of artillery, wherever 
moonlight discovered our position. But with daylight of the 22d came retribu-
tion. Our infantry formed line, supported on both flanks by horse-artillery, 
whilst a fire was opened from our centre by such of our heavy guns as 
remained effective, aided by a flight of rockets. A masked battery played 
with great effect upon this point, dismounting one piece and blowing up our 
tumbrils. At this moment Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Hardinge placed 
himself at the head of the left, whilst I rode at the head of the right wing. 
Our line advanced, and unchecked by the enemy's fire, drove them rapidly out
of the village of Ferozeshah and their encampment; then changing front to its left, on its centre, our force continued to sweep the camp, bearing down all opposition, and dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then halted, as if on a day of manoeuvre, receiving its two leaders as they rode along in front with a gratifying cheer, and displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. We had taken upwards of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the whole field. The force assumed a position on the ground which it had won, but even here its labours were not to cease. In the course of two hours, Sirdar Tej Sing, who had commanded in the last great battle, brought up from the vicinity of Ferozepoor fresh battalions, and a large field of artillery, supported by 30,000 Ghorepurras, hitherto encamped near the river. He drove in our cavalry parties, and made strenuous efforts to regain the position of Ferozeshah. This attempt was defeated; but its failure had scarcely become manifest when the sirdar renewed the contest with more troops and a large artillery. He commenced by a combination against our left flank, and when this was frustrated, made such a demonstration against the captured village as compelled us to change our whole front to the right. His guns during this manoeuvre maintained one incessant fire, while our artillery ammunition being completely expended in these protracted combats we were unable to answer him with a single shot. I now directed our almost exhausted cavalry to threaten both flanks at once, preparing the infantry to advance in support, which apparently caused him suddenly to cease his fire and to abandon the field."

It is obvious from the above despatch, and the inferences which though not mentioned may be legitimately drawn from it, that the British army was at one time in great peril, and that had the Sikhs displayed as much skill in taking advantage of their position as valour in defending it, the operations which terminated so honourably for the British arms on the 22d, might have had a very different termination on the 21st. On the evening of that day, the Sikhs not only retained possession of a large portion of their entrenched camp, but their cavalry and infantry kept moving about, harassing and firing on the British as they lay bivouacked, and feared to make any return lest it should only discover their position and increase their danger. "This," as Macgregor justly remarks in his History of the Sikhs (vol. ii. p. 105), "was a fearful position to be in, and from the intervals between the European infantry regiments and the native brigades with them being left vacant, there was no possibility of forming a line, or acting in concert; portions of one regiment got mixed up with more of another in the entrenchment, and in the darkness of the night could not regain their respective positions. If a regiment had attempted to move right or left in search of another, the Sikh guns were sure to be directed to the spot; and where the 50th bivouacked, Sir Harry Smith, with admirable prudence, forbade a shot to be fired in return for any that might be
directed against his position. The white covers were taken off the caps which served as marks for the enemy, and every means adopted for keeping the men out of the hostile fire. The gallant soldiers who had, at the point of the bayonet, captured the batteries of the Sikhs, were thus glad to actually conceal themselves under the darkness of night. It was not flight, but as near an approach to it as can well be conceived; and no wonder if, at this time, the Governor-general of India felt the precarious position of the troops. Never in the annals of warfare in India had matters attained such a threatening crisis."

A victory so obstinately contested was of necessity dearly purchased. The British loss amounted to 2415, of whom 694 were killed, and 1721 wounded; the loss of the Sikhs was roughly estimated at four times that of the British.

On their defeat at Ferozeshah the Sikhs had hastened to place the Sutlej between themselves and their conquerors. Their expectation was that they would be immediately pursued. This, however, was deemed impracticable, or at least imprudent, until Sir John Grey, who was advancing from Meerut with an auxiliary force and a powerful battering train, should arrive. Emboldened by this delay, which they mistook for fear or indecision, the Sikhs prepared to recross the river, and with this view began to construct a new bridge of boats a little below Hurreekee. Meanwhile, Sir Harry Smith had been detached with a single brigade of his division, and a light field-battery, against the town and fort of Durrumkote, situated on the road from Ferozepoor to Loodiana. No sooner had this task been successfully accomplished than it became necessary to march to the relief of Loodiana, which was held by only three battalions of native infantry under Brigadier Godby, and was threatened by Runjoo Sing at the head of a body of 10,000 Sikhs, who had crossed the Sutlej at Phillour, and entrenched themselves in the vicinity. Sir Harry started with his small force from Durrumkote, and proceeding along the direct road to Loodiana was encountered by Runjoo Sing, who, relying on his vast superiority of numbers, endeavoured to intercept his progress by moving in a line parallel to him, and at length opening upon him with a furious cannonade. The British commander, unable to reply effectually, was obliged to submit to the loss of a large portion of his baggage, but succeeded, by a series of dexterous manoeuvres, in effecting his communication with Loodiana. In addition to the reinforcement obtained from Brigadier Godby, he shortly after obtained another of still more conse-
quenced by the arrival of his second brigade, which had moved to his support under Brigadier Wheeler. It was now Sir Harry's turn to assume the offensive, and Runjoor Sing retired to his entrenched camp. Even at this time he had a great superiority of force, for the British only mustered about 10,000 men, with thirty-two guns, while the Sikhs had 15,000 men, with fifty-six guns. On the 26th of January, 1846, this disparity was still further increased by the arrival of 4000 regular troops, twelve pieces of artillery, and a large force of cavalry. Thus strengthened, Runjoor Sing was obliged to yield to the impatience of his troops, who imagining that the British retreat from the cannonade and submission to the loss of their baggage was equivalent to a confession of their inability to maintain the conflict, were confident of obtaining an easy victory. They accordingly began to advance, and on the 28th, when the British came in sight of them, stood drawn up close to the village of Aliwal, about eighteen miles west of Loodiana, their left resting upon their entrenched camp, and their right occupying a ridge. After some manoeuvres, "performed," says Sir Harry Smith, "with the celerity and precision of the most correct field-day," the British line advanced, but, continues the despatch, "scarcely had it moved forward 150 yards when, at ten o'clock, the enemy opened a fierce cannonade from his whole line. At first his balls fell short, but quickly reached us. Thus upon him, and capable of better ascertaining his position, I was compelled to halt the line, though under fire, for a few moments, until I ascertained that by bringing up my right, and carrying the village of Aliwal, I could with great effect precipitate myself upon his left and centre. I therefore quickly brought up Brigadier Godby's brigade, and with it and the 1st brigade, under Brigadier Hicks, made a rapid and noble charge, carried the village and two guns of large calibre. The line I ordered to advance, her majesty's 31st foot and the native regiments contending for the front, and the battle became general. The
enemy had a numerous body of cavalry on the heights to his left, and I ordered Brigadier Cureton to bring up the right brigade of cavalry, who in the most gallant manner dashed in among them, and drove them back upon their infantry. Meanwhile a second gallant charge to my right was made by the light cavalry and the body-guard. The Shikawatee brigade was moved well to the right in support of Brigadier Cureton. When I observed the enemy’s encampment, and saw it was full of infantry, I brought upon it Brigadier Godby’s brigade by changing front, and taking the enemy’s infantry in reverse. They drove them before them, and took some guns without a check. Brigadiers Wheeler and Wilson had in the meanwhile been equally successful on their side in driving back the troops, and capturing the guns of the enemy, and nothing remained but to dispossess them of the neighbouring village of Boondra, which they had strongly occupied in order to cover their retreat, and secure their passage across the river.” This service having been gallantly achieved, “the battle,” continues the despatch, “was won, our troops advancing with the most perfect order to the common focus, the passage of the river. The enemy completely hemmed in were fleeing from our fire, and precipitating themselves in disordered masses into the ford and boats in the utmost confusion and consternation. Our eight-inch howitzers soon began to play upon their boats, when the debris of the Sikh army appeared upon the opposite and high bank of the river, fleeing in every direction.”

The main body of the British army moving up by the left bank of the Sutlej, encamped on the 18th of January in the vicinity of Khodawala, nearly opposite to the point where the Sikhs had constructed their new bridge. Having been permitted to complete this work without molestation, they had greatly strengthened it by a tête de pont, thrown up with much military skill on the left bank, and then proceeded, under the direction, it is said, of a Spanish engineer named Hobron, to convert it into an entrenched camp of the most formidable description. The disasters which they had already experienced in the field left them no inclination to pursue that plan of warfare; but the stout resistance which they had been enabled to make under cover of their entrenchments at Ferozeshah, had convinced them that within the walls of a new camp of still stronger construction they would be able to repel any attack that could be made upon them. They had accordingly occupied it with 30,000 of their best troops, and lined its battlements with a numerous and powerful artillery. The British army, after waiting at Khodawala for the arrival of heavy ordnance and the junction of Sir Harry Smith with his victorious force, moved out of camp at three in the morning of the 10th of February. The Sikhs had concentrated their whole force within their entrenchments. It had been intended that the British battery and field artillery, which was arranged in an extended semicircle, so as to embrace all the Sikh works within its fire, should commence its cannonade at daybreak, but so heavy a mist hung over the plain and the
river that it became necessary to wait till the rays of the sun had cleared it away. Meanwhile the different corps had taken up the positions previously assigned to them. After describing these positions the despatch continues:

"About nine o'clock Brigadier Stacey's brigade, supported on either flank by Captains Horsford and Fordyce's batteries, and Lieutenant-colonel Lane's troop of horse-artillery, moved to the attack in admirable order. The infantry and guns aided each other correlatively. The former marched steadily on in line, which they halted only to correct when necessary. The latter took up successive positions at the gallop, until at length they were within 300 yards of the heavy batteries of the Sikhs; but notwithstanding the regularity, and coolness, and scientific character of this assault, which

Brigadier Wilkinson well supported, so hot was the fire of cannon, musketry, and zumboorucks (camel-swivels) kept up by the Khalsa troops, that it seemed for some moments impossible that the entrenchments could be won under it; but soon persevering gallantry triumphed, and the whole army had the satisfaction of seeing the gallant Brigadier Stacey's soldiers driving the Sikhs in confusion before them within the area of their encampment. The 10th foot, now for the first time brought into serious contact with the enemy, greatly distinguished themselves. This regiment never fired a shot till it got within the works of the enemy. The onset of her majesty's 53d foot was as gallant and effective. The 43d and 59th native infantry, brigaded with them, emulated both in cool determination. At the moment of this first success I directed Brigadier the Honourable T. Ashburnham's brigade to move on in support, and Major-general Gilbert's and Sir Harry Smith's divisions to throw out their light troops to threaten their works, aided by artillery. As these attacks of the right and centre commenced, the fire of our heavy guns had first to be directed to the right and then gradually to cease, but at one time the thunder of full 120 pieces of ordnance reverberated in this mighty combat through the valley of the Sutlej, and, as it was soon seen that the weight of the whole force within the Sikh camp was likely to be
thrown upon the two brigades that had passed its trenches, it became necessary
to convert into close and serious attacks the demonstrations with skirmishers
and artillery of the centre and right, and the battle raged with inconceivable
fury from right to left. The Sikhs, even when at particular points their
entrenchments were mastered with the bayonet, strove to regain them by the
fiercest conflict sword in hand. Nor was it until the cavalry of the left, under
Major-general Sir Joseph Thackwell, had moved forward and ridden through the
openings of the entrenchments made by our sappers in single file, and re-formed

as they passed them, and the 3d dragoons, whom no obstacle usually held formid-
able by horse appears to check, had on this day, as at Ferozeshah, galloped over
and cut down the obstinate defenders of batteries and field-works, and until the
full weight of three divisions of infantry, with every field-artillery gun which
could be sent to their aid, had been cast into the scale, that victory finally
declared for the British. The fire of the Sikhs first slackened, and then nearly
ceased, and the victors then pressing them on every side precipitated them in
masses over their bridge and into the Sutlej, which a sudden rise of seven inches
had rendered hardly fordable. In their efforts to reach the right bank through
the deepened water, they suffered from our horse-artillery a terrible carnage.
Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in
attempting the perilous passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay
were such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous
conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the early part of the action, sullied
their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously mutilating every wounded
soldier whom, in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortune of war left at their
mercy. I must pause in this narrative, especially to notice the determined
hardihood and bravery with which our two battalions of Ghoorkas, the Sirmoor
and Nusseree, met the Sikhs wherever they were opposed to them. Soldiers of

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small stature but indomitable spirit, they vied in ardent courage in the charge with the grenadiers of our own nation, and, armed with the short weapon of their mountains, were a terror to the Sikhs throughout this great combat. Sixty-seven pieces of cannon, upwards of 200 camel-swivels (zumboorucks), numerous standards, and vast munitions of war, captured by our troops, are the pledges and trophies of our victory." It was indeed a victory most honourable to the British arms, and was well described by the governor-general as one of the most daring exploits ever achieved; "by which in open day a triple line of breastworks, flanked by formidable redoubts bristling with artillery, manned by thirty-two regular regiments of infantry, was assaulted and carried." The British loss, which under the circumstances could not but be serious, amounted in killed and wounded to 2383; the Sikh loss in the action and in crossing the river was estimated at nearly 10,000 men.

Great was the consternation in the Lahore durbar when news of the complete overthrow at Sobran arrived. Further resistance was at once seen to be hopeless, and nothing remained but to try the effect of negotiation. Gholab Sing, who had been playing the double game formerly referred to, now endeavoured to profit by it, and on receiving full powers from the ranee and the durbar, proceeded to the British camp at the head of a deputation, in the hope of being able to act the part of mediator. He arrived on the 15th of February, while the governor-general was still at Kussoor, and was immediately put in possession of the terms which it had been resolved to enforce. He at once declared that he was empowered and prepared to accept them, but—when he expressed an earnest wish that the army would now halt, and not advance nearer to the capital, the governor-general, so far from assenting, distinctly told him that the treaty, if signed by him at all, would be signed only at Lahore.

On the 22d of February, after a brigade of British troops with the commander-in-chief at their head had taken military possession of the citadel, the governor-general issued a proclamation which commenced thus: "The British army has this day occupied the gateway of the citadel of Lahore, the Badshahoe Mosque, and the Hoozooree Bagh. The remaining part of the citadel is the residence of his highness the maharajah, and also that of the families of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing. for so many years the faithful ally of the British government. In consideration of these circumstances no troops will be posted within the precincts of the palace gate. The army of the Sutlej has now brought its operations in the field to a close by the dispersion of the Sikh army, and the military occupation of Lahore, preceded by a series of the most triumphant successes ever recorded in the military history of India. The British government, trusting to the faith of treaties, and to the long subsisting friendship between the two states, had limited military preparations to the defence of its own frontier. Compelled suddenly to assume the offensive by the unprovoked invasion of its territories, the British army under the command
of its distinguished leader has in sixty days defeated the Sikhs in four general actions, has captured 220 pieces of field-artillery; and is now at the capital, dictating to the Lahore durbar the terms of a treaty, the conditions of which will tend to secure the British provinces from the repetition of a similar outrage." On the following day at a public durbar, attended by the maharajah with his principal officers and a numerous suite, the new treaty was signed and ratified. Of its sixteen articles, the most important were those which confiscated all the Sikh territories on the left bank of the Sutlej, and also the whole of the fertile tract on the right bank, situated between the Sutlej and Beas; and known by the name of the Jalindar Doab; stipulated for an indemnity of a crore and a half of rupees (£1,500,000), the half or fifty lacs to be paid immediately, and the crore to be discharged by ceding as an equivalent for it "all the hill country between the Beas and the Indus, including Cashmere and Hazarah;" and while providing for the immediate disbandment of the mutinous troops, limited the Lahore army in future to twenty-five battalions of infantry, of 800 bayonets each, with 12,000 cavalry.
By the 12th and 13th article, Gholab Sing was to be recognized "as an independent sovereign over the territories which the British may make over to him," and "all disputes between Gholab Sing and the Lahore government were to be referred to the British." These articles rendered it necessary to enter into a treaty with Gholab Sing himself. It was concluded at Umritisur on the 16th of March, 1846, and consisted of ten articles, of which the most important were the 1st and 3d, by which the British government transferred to him and the heir male of his body, in independent possession, "all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of the river Ravee, including Chumba, and excluding Lahool, being part of the territory ceded to the British government by the Lahore state;" and he in consideration of this transfer agreed to pay to the British government "seventy-five lacs of rupees, fifty lacs to be paid on the ratification of this treaty, and twenty-five lacs on or before the 1st of October of the current year, A.D. 1846." The Lahore durbar, aware that the troops had hitherto been their masters, were afraid of the consequences of disbanding them, and petitioned the governor-general to leave a body of British troops in their capital. He consented, though not without some degree of hesitation, and a supplementary treaty was in consequence concluded on the 11th of March. It consisted of eight articles, of which only the first three deserve notice. By these it was agreed that the British government "shall leave at Lahore, till the close of the current year, A.D. 1846, such force as shall seem to the governor-general adequate for the purpose of protecting the person of the maharajah and the inhabitants of the city of Lahore during the reorganization of the Sikh army;" and that the force thus left "shall be placed in full possession of the fort and city of Lahore, and that the Lahore troops shall be removed from within the city." The Lahore government further engaged to pay all the extra expenses incurred by this arrangement, and "to apply itself immediately and earnestly to the reorganization of its army according to the prescribed condition."

The engrossing importance of the Sikh war has for the time withdrawn our attention from Scinde, where Sir Charles Napier was still displaying consummate skill both as an administrator and a warrior. The recall of Lord Ellenborough, who had treated him with the utmost confidence, and with whose policy he had openly identified himself, made him doubtful whether he ought not at once to resign a position from which the known disapproval of some of his
measures by the court of directors made it probable that he would sooner or later be driven; but he manfully and wisely resolved, though suffering severely from the climate, to remain at his post, and not willingly quit Scinde till he could truly say that his conquest of it was complete. As yet this could not be said, since among the Cutchee Hills, to the north of Shikarpoo, there were several hill tribes capable of mustering many thousands of marauders, and ever and anon carrying devastation within the frontiers of Scinde. Among these the Ameer Shere Mahommed after his defeat had sought an asylum, and it was therefore not impossible that while indulging their pillaging habits they might become the nucleus of a political confederacy, designed once more to revolutionize Scinde, and again subject it to the tyranny of the Ameers. Influenced at once by a desire to protect the peaceful inhabitants of his government from their half-savage invaders, and defeat the designs of those who fomented these frontier disturbances for political purposes, Sir Charles Napier drew up the plan of a Hill Campaign. The difficulties were of no ordinary kind, but he was the very man to surmount them, and mingled so much prudence with his daring that his plan was approved successively by Lord Ellenborough and Sir Henry Hardinge. When preparing for this expedition, which he deemed of sufficient importance to demand his personal presence, he proceeded to Sukkur, and was there delayed for some time by an endemic which made fearful ravages among the troops, and more especially among the 78th Highlanders, who had been recently brought up from Kurrachee, and were not at all inured to the climate. So great was the mortality that on the 19th December, 1844, he wrote as follows:—"I have lost the 78th. That beautiful regiment arrived here in high health, and every other part of Scinde was healthy; but the first week in November they began to grow sickly, and here they are bodily in hospital, about 200 dead, men, women, and children. I am sending them away as fast as I can to Hyderabad. As to any movement against the hill tribes at this moment, I have no men. This place is just a depot of fever—not a man has escaped." After a time spent in repairing the loss thus sustained by a visitation which no human sagacity could have foreseen or prevented, the final arrangements were completed.

Cutch Gundava, situated to the north-west of Scinde, and belonging to the Khan of Khelat, is connected with the lower Indus by a range of singularly rugged rocks called the Cutchee Hills, stretching nearly due west from the river towards the Bolan Pass. These hills were inhabited by numerous fierce predatory tribes, under the names of Muzarees, Bhoogtees, Jackranees, Doomkees, Kujucks, &c., who could bring about 18,000 warriors into the field, besides their armed servants, and made it their boast "that for 600 years no king had ever got beyond the first defiles in their land, though some had tried with 100,000 men." This immunity they owed chiefly to the rugged precipices which rendered their country impassable, and the surrounding deserts which
rendered it almost inaccessible. To the south, by which it was now to be approached, lay the desert of Khusmore, stretching between the Hala Mountains and the Indus in a north-east direction, with a breadth of about eighty miles. To an ordinary army, owing to the want of water or the erection of hill-forts wherever its few springs occurred, the passage of this desert presented the most formidable difficulties; but against these Sir Charles Napier had in some measure provided, by the formation of a fighting camel corps, on the model of the dromedary corps employed by the first Napoleon in Egypt. In this corps, intrusted to the command of Lieutenant Fitzgerald, each camel carried two men, the one armed with carbine and sword, the other with a musquetoon and bayonet. One man guided the animal and fought from its back, the other acted as an infantry soldier, because the robbers were accustomed to fire from the fissures and holes in the plains, where neither sword nor lance could reach them. If assailed by superior numbers the camels were to kneel in a ring, with their heads inwards, and pinned down so as to furnish a bulwark for the men. The camels, moreover, carried the men’s cooking utensils and packs, “and thus,” says Sir William Napier, from whose Administration of Scinde this account is taken, “a body of soldiers capable of acting as infantry when required, having no tents, commissariat, or baggage to embarrass them, could make marches of sixty miles in twenty-four hours, even with the bad camels at this time furnished by Scinde; but of eighty or even ninety miles with finer animals.”

Besides being favoured by the difficulties of their country, the hill-men were by no means contemptible as warriors. “Every man,” says Sir Charles Napier, “has his weapon ready, and every man is expert in the use of it. They cannot go through the manual and platoon like her majesty’s guards, but they shoot with unerring aim; they occupy a position well, strengthen it artificially with ingenuity, and their rush on a foe with sword and shield is very determined. They crouch as they run, cover themselves admirably with their protruded shields, thrust them in their adversaries’ faces, and with a sword like a razor give a cut that goes through everything.” The most noted of their chiefs, Beja Khan, had long been a terror to the frontier districts of Scinde by the number and success of his marauding expeditions, and had recently added greatly to
his renown among his countrymen by the repulse of an injudicious attempt to surprise him in his fort of Poolajee, situated near the western extremity of the Cutchee Hills. Fitzgerald of the camel corps, who had once resided at Poolajee, believed that his knowledge of the place would enable him to take Beja in his bed. With this view a detachment, consisting of 500 horsemen under Captain Tait, and 200 of the camel corps under Lieutenant Fitzgerald, was sent to make a forced march across the desert. The result was that they lost their way, and on arriving at eight in the morning exhausted with fatigue, found Beja, who had been fully apprised of their design, prepared to receive them with a garrison of several hundred matchlock-men. The surprise proved a complete failure, and after some loss a retreat became necessary, which must have terminated in disaster had not water been found at an abandoned post which had been fortunately overlooked by the enemy when filling up the other wells.

Shortly after this repulse the spies returned with intelligence that the tribes, elated by Beja's victory, were assembling in great numbers around Poolajee, and were talking of bringing back Shere Mahomed into Scinde. About the same time the Jackranes and Doomkees made a successful incursion; and, as if to complete the list of misfortunes, a mutinous spirit was manifested by the native troops at Shikarpooor. When ordered to proceed from the north-west provinces to Upper Scinde, they had insisted on higher allowances, on the ground that Scinde was no part of India, and that they would therefore when there be on foreign service. Accordingly, some time after reaching Shikarpooor, when the lower pay was offered, the 64th native infantry refused it, alleging; and as it turned out truly, that Colonel Mosley, their commanding officer, had promised them the higher rate. The danger was that the other Bengal regiments at Shikarpooor would follow the same course, but this was happily prevented by the decisive measures of Brigadier Hunter, who, on finding personal remonstrances vain, and being even assailed by missiles, brought out the whole garrison of Sukkur, to which place the mutinous regiment had been moved by his orders, seized thirty or forty of the mutineers, and having disarmed the rest, compelled them to cross to the left bank of the Indus.

The alarms produced by the mutiny, and the renewed ravages of the Cutchee Hill tribes, made it most desirable that the campaign should no longer be delayed; and accordingly, on the 13th of January, 1845, it was opened by an advanced guard of cavalry and guns, which marched under the general himself from Sukkur to Shikarpooor, and on the 15th arrived at Khangur. Jacob, who had started with the left wing from Larkhana, arrived on the same day at Rojan. The left wing and centre then proceeded northwards in parallel lines, at the average distance of about twenty miles from each other, the former to Shapoorn, where Beja Khan was reported to be in force, and the latter to Ooch. On the 18th the general arrived in the vicinity of Ooch, and was relieved from some anxiety which he had felt on account of a detachment
which had preceded him, by learning that Captain Salter, who commanded it, had on the previous night defeated 700 hill-men, led by the Jackranee chief, Deyra Khan. Intelligence equally gratifying was at the same time received from Captain Jacob, who had surprised and totally defeated a body of hill-men under Khan Beja's son. Wullee Chandia, a friendly chief, had also been successful at Poolajee; and thus at the very outset Beja Khan and his confederates had sustained a triple defeat, under the terror of which they at once abandoned the western and took refuge among the eastern hills. This movement necessitated a corresponding change in the plan of the campaign. Salter remained at Ooch; Jacob was detached to Poolajee and Lheree, to co-operate with Wullee Chandia in overawing the Khelat tribes; and the infantry, the artillery, and all the supplies were directed upon Shapoor, where a magazine for fourteen days' consumption was formed. In this position the army occupied two sides of a square, the one menacing the passes from the desert on the south, and the other commanding the western mouths of the long parallel valleys which run eastward toward the Indus. The real pursuit of Beja now commenced, and proved one of the most remarkable that was ever undertaken and successfully performed by disciplined troops. It had usually been taken for granted that such troops would have no chance in warring with hill-men among the rugged precipices and narrow ravines of their native hills, but it was now shown that under a skilful and energetic leader their superiority there was almost as decided as in the plains. It is impossible, however, to make the details intelligible without occupying far more space than their relative importance would justify, and it must therefore suffice to mention that Beja and his confederates, hemmed in on all sides and threatened with starvation, had no alternative but unconditional surrender. This event, which took place on the 9th of March, ended the war.

During the year 1847, though the intrigues of the ranee at Lahore for the purpose of dethroning the council of regency rendered it necessary to remove her to a distance from the capital, the general tranquillity of India was not disturbed, and the governor-general was permitted to give his almost undivided attention to internal improvements. Among the acts of his government none did him higher honour, or was in its effects, direct and indirect, more beneficial, than that by which he prohibited the Christian part of the population from labouring on Sunday. Education also received new encouragement, and the natives were made to feel that nothing but the want of qualifications, which it would be their own fault if they did not acquire, could henceforth exclude them from employment in the public service. The finances, previously distressed by the enormous sums which had been wasted in Afghanistan, and not improved by the military tastes and expensive shows of his predecessor, were again brought into order; while in the erection of public works, and particularly in the liberal patronage bestowed on railway companies, a solid foundation was
laid for general prosperity, and as its consequence a large and permanent increase of revenue. Through undue partialities, capriciously if not tyrannically indulged, jealousies and heart-burnings had been introduced into every branch of the public service. He threw oil upon the troubled waters, and merited the honourable title of Peace-maker. The termination of such an administration was indeed a calamity, and we cannot wonder at the general regret which was felt when, at the end of little more than three years from the date of his entrance upon office, he announced his intention to resign. It only remains to add that his services, as well as those of his gallant colleagues in the Punjab war, were duly acknowledged at home. The governor-general became Viscount Hardinge, the commander-in-chief Lord Gough, and the victor of Aliwal a baronet. These honours were doubtless well earned, but there was another whose merits were as great as theirs, and it would be difficult to give any satisfactory answer to the question, Why was not Sir Charles Napier also rewarded with a peerage?

CHAPTER VIII.

The Earl of Dalhousie governor-general.—Second Punjab war—Siege of Mooltan—Defection of Shere Sing; and consequent raising of the siege—Repulse at Rannogur—Siege of Mooltan resumed—Its capture—Subsequent military operations—Battle of Chillianwala—Victory of Gujerat—Annexation of the Punjab—Sir Charles Napier's return to India as commander-in-chief.

In the end of 1847, when Viscount Hardinge quitted India, and the Earl of Dalhousie arrived to assume the reins of government, the Punjab seemed to be settling down into a state of tranquillity. It was, however, only the lull before the storm, which at length suddenly broke out in the south-west, in the province of Mooltan. Here Sawun Mull, a chief of great ability, had been succeeded as dewan, in 1844, by his son Moolraj, who, following out the ambitious designs of his father, aspired almost openly at independence. His succession had been confirmed at Lahore, on the understanding that he would pay into the treasury a slump sum of thirty lacs of rupees. Taking advantage of the confusion which prevailed, he not only failed to pay this sum, but withheld the regular revenue. It was in consequence resolved to call him to account, and Lal Sing, the prime-minister, despatched a body of troops for this purpose. Moolraj resisted, and an encounter took place, in which the Lahore troops were defeated. Ultimately, through British mediation, an arrangement was made, by which Moolraj allowed the withdrawal of a considerable tract of territory previously included in his government, paid a large sum in name of arrears, and became bound for an
amount of revenue, which though derived from a diminished territory, exceeded that which had been previously paid for the whole. This latter obligation was restricted to the three years commencing with the autumn crop of 1847, and was in fact equivalent to an obligation on the part of Moolraj to farm the revenue for that period. Soon after undertaking the obligation he repented of it, and in November, 1847, during a visit to Lahore, expressed to Mr. John Lawrence, who had succeeded his brother Henry as resident, his desire to resign the charge of the Mooltan province. He was advised to reconsider the matter, but took his own way, and sent in a formal resignation to the durbar. This the resident would not allow them to accept, as it was accompanied with conditions which were deemed inadmissible. A few days later Moolraj again tendered his resignation to the resident, giving as his reasons—1st, That the new custom arrangements of the Punjab interfered seriously with his revenue; and 2d, That his power of coercing the people had become insufficient, in consequence of the right of appeal to Lahore, which had been recently conferred upon them. The latter was the principal reason, for under this right of appeal his exactions, which had before been unlimited, were restrained; and he even offered to withdraw his resignation, on a promise that in future no complaints from Mooltan would be received. This being of course refused, he declared his determination to resign, and asked only two things, the one a guarantee that, on his resignation, a jaghire would be given him, and the other that his resignation should in the meantime be a secret. Mr. Lawrence could not guarantee the jaghire, though he gave him to understand that it would be favourably considered; the promise of secrecy he gave in a written document, which, however, contained the reservation that he should inform his own government and his political subordinates.

On the 6th of March, 1848, Sir Frederick Currie arrived at Lahore to assume the office of resident. Before his arrival, Mr. Lawrence had written to Moolraj, telling him that if he repented his resignation he had now an opportunity of withdrawing it. His reply was that he had not changed his mind. The new resident having at once taken up the question of resignation, proposed to consult the durbar respecting it. Mr. Lawrence objected because of the promise of secrecy he had given, but the objection was overruled, and Sir Frederick, after Moolraj had repeated his wish to resign, laid the matter before the council of regency. The resignation was in consequence accepted, and
Khan Sing, the newly appointed dewan, set out for Mooltan. He was accompanied by two British officers—Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew of the civil service, and Lieutenant W. A. Anderson of the 1st Bombay fusiliers. Chiefly as an escort, but partly also to supply the place of a portion of the Mooltan troops, which were to come to Lahore, Mr. Agnew had with him the Ghoorka regiment, above 600 strong, 500 to 600 cavalry, regular and irregular, and a troop of horse-artillery. These troops marched by land, while the British officers proceeded by water. In this way the officers and the troops met for the first time on the 18th of April, at the Eedgah, a spacious Mahometan building within cannon-shot of the north face of Mooltan fort. In the course of the 18th Moolraj paid two visits to the Eedgah, and arranged that the fort should be given up to the new dewan. Accordingly on the following morning, Sirdar Khan Sing and the two British officers accompanied Moolraj into the fort, received the keys, put two of the Ghoorka companies in possession, placed their own sentries, and after endeavouring to allay the manifest discontent of the garrison at the change by promises of service, prepared to return. They had passed the gate and entered on the bridge over the ditch, when one of two of Moolraj's soldiers, who were standing on it, rushed at Mr. Agnew, knocked him off his horse with his spear, and then inflicted two severe wounds with his sword. Before he could complete the murder the assassin was tumbled into the ditch by a trooper of the escort. Moolraj, instead of interfering, forced his horse through the crowd, and rode off to his residence of Am Khus, situated outside the fort. Lieutenant Anderson, who had as yet escaped, was afterwards attacked by some of Moolraj's personal attendants, who wounded him so severely that he was left for dead, till some of the Ghoorkas found him, and carried him on a litter to the Eedgah. Thither, too, Mr. Agnew had been brought by the assistance of Khan Sing, and of Rung Ram, Moolraj's brother-in-law, particularly the latter, who placed him on his own elephant, and hurried off with him to the camp, rudely binding up his wounds as they rode along. Mr. Agnew was able to report these occurrences to the resident, and also to write off for immediate assistance to Lieutenant Edwardes, who was employed with a small force in settling the country and collecting the revenue in the vicinity of Leia. He also addressed a letter to Moolraj, calling upon him to prove his own innocence, by seizing the guilty parties and coming in person to the Eedgah. In his answer Moolraj denied his ability to do either. "All the garrison, Hindoo and Mahometan, wore," he said, "in rebellion, and the British officers had better see to their own safety." At this very time he was presiding over a council of his chiefs, while the garrison, composed indiscriminately of Afghans, Hindoos, and Sikhs, were taking the oath of allegiance to him in the forms prescribed by their different religions.

Whatever may have been Moolraj's original intentions, he was now in open rebellion. On the evening of the 19th, the whole of the carriage cattle
belonging to the escort were carried off. Escape being thus precluded, nothing remained but to put the Eedgah as far as possible into a state of defence. With this view all the soldiers and camp followers were called within the walls, and six guns, which had been brought from Lahore, were placed in battery. The case was almost desperate, but there was still a hope that if the place could be maintained for three or four days succour might arrive. Unfortunately the worst was not yet known. When on the morning of the 20th the guns of the fort opened on the Eedgah, the six guns stationed there replied with only a single round, and then ceased. The Lahore artillerymen had refused to act, and the efforts to seduce the troops from their fidelity were so successful, that when evening arrived the whole had deserted except Khan Sing, eight or ten troopers, and the moonshees and domestic servants of the British officers. All idea of resistance was now abandoned, and a message was sent to Moolraj to treat for surrender. The utmost that could be obtained from him was that the officers should quit the country, and the attack upon them should cease. It would seem that even before these terms could be communicated to the inmates of the Eedgah, the soldiers and mob had taken the decision into their own hands, and were not to be satisfied without blood. Rushing in with horrible shouts, they made Khan Sing prisoner, and barbarously murdered the two British officers. This atrocious crime Moolraj made his own by conferring rewards on those who had taken the lead in perpetrating it.

The resident at Lahore receiving intelligence of the attack on the British officers only two days after it occurred, and under the impression that the mutiny had no ramifications, and was in all probability not countenanced by Moolraj, immediately "put in motion upon Mooltan, from different points, seven battalions of infantry, two of regular cavalry, three troops and batteries of artillery, and 1200 irregular horse." On the 23d, when the full extent of the revolt was better understood, he saw that the above Sikh force would be altogether inadequate, not merely from the smallness of its numbers, but a more alarming cause—its doubtful fidelity.

To meet the emergency Sir Frederick Currie at first determined on moving the British moveable column from Lahore upon Mooltan. Immediately afterwards, on learning the barbarous murder of the two British officers, and the treachery of their native escort, he abandoned this determination, because he suspected that the other troops of the durbar might act a similar part, and that any British force sent for support and succour would find supposed friends as well as foes united against it. "I could not," he wrote, "consent under any circumstances to send a British force on such an expedition, whatever may be the result and consequences of the state of things which will follow to the continuance of the Sikh government." Notwithstanding this decided language, a declaration by the Sikh rulers of their inability without British aid to coerce Moolraj, and bring the perpetrators of the outrage to justice, sufficed to bring
the resident back to his original intention, and he accordingly addressed a letter to Lord Gough, the commander-in-chief, then at Simla, in which he said:—"In a political point of view, I am satisfied that it is of the utmost importance to the interests of British India that a force should move upon Mooltan, capable of reducing the fort and occupying the city, irrespective of the aid of the durbar troops, and, indeed, in the face of any opposition which those in that quarter might present in aid of the enemy. It is for your lordship to determine, in a military point of view, the possibility of such operations at this season of the year." The resident was evidently inclined to think them possible, but Lord Gough at once decided otherwise. "There can be no doubt that operations against Mooltan, at the present advanced period of the year, would be uncertain if not altogether impracticable; while a delay in attaining the object would entail a fearful loss of life to the troops engaged, most injurious in its moral effects, and highly detrimental to those future operations which must, I apprehend, be undertaken." The governor-general in council concurred in this opinion, and the proposed campaign was accordingly delayed. Meanwhile, however, military operations were actively carried on in another quarter.

Lieutenant Edwardes, who was at Dera Futteh Khan, on the left bank of the Indus, on the evening of the 22d April, when he received Mr. Agnew's note calling for assistance, instantly mustered his force, amounting in all to twelve infantry companies, and about 530 sowars, with two guns and twenty zoomboorucks, and prepared to cross the river at the ferry of Leia, intending to hurry on to Mooltan, a distance of ninety miles. At the same time he wrote to Lieutenant Taylor, who was with General Van Cortlandt, an officer in the Sikh service, in Bunnoo, for a regiment of infantry and four guns. Having crossed on the 24th, he moved on to Leia and took peaceful possession of it, Moolraj's governor retiring as he advanced. He had resolved to entrench himself at Leia, and await the approach of Moolraj, who was said to have crossed the Chenab for the purpose of opposing his further progress, when an important document fell into his hands. It was an address from the Sikh deserters in Mooltan to the Sikh regiment under his command, calling upon them to imitate their example. On receiving this document and learning that before it reached him it had probably been seen by every man in the regiment, the confidence of Lieutenant Edwardes in his Sikh soldiers was gone. He resolved, therefore, to delay advancing, and wait the arrival of General Cortlandt with reinforcements, while he also increased his own force by recruiting among the Afghans, who had no feelings in common with the Sikhs. He was thus employed when he received intelligence that Moolraj had actually crossed the Chenab with about 5000 men, and eight heavy guns, and would reach Leia by the 1st of May. Doubting the fidelity of two-thirds of his men, Lieutenant Edwardes deemed it prudent to avoid the encounter, and recross the Indus with the view of halting under cover of the fort of Girang. Here he was joined on
the 4th of May by General Cortlandt, with Soobdan Khan’s infantry regiment of Mahometans, and six horse-artillery guns.

By the 19th of May a British force assembled, mustering in all about 4000 men who were believed to be faithful, and about 800 Sikhs who were known to be disaffected. The artillery consisted of ten guns and twenty-nine zumbourucks. This force was far outnumbered by that of the enemy, but a strong diversion had already been or was about to be made by the Nawab of Bhawulpoor, who with his usual fidelity was advancing to cross the Sutlej and threaten Mooltan. So strong did Lieutenant Edwardes now feel, that on the 20th of May, he wrote to the resident, “I am prepared to undertake the blockade of that rebel (Moolraj) in Mooltan for the rest of the hot season and rains, if you should honour me with that commission, and order Bhawul Khan to assist me.” For the present, however, the main object was the capture of Dera Ghazee Khan, and this was happily effected in a mode as gratifying as unexpected. The country around Dera Ghazee Khan had been given by Moolraj to a native of the name of Julal Khan. Khowrah Khan, a powerful chief, who was his bitter enemy, immediately made his submission to the British, and sent his son Gholam Hyder Khan with a contingent. This youth, who was accompanying General Cortlandt, volunteered on the 20th to go on in advance, raise his father’s clan, and without any other assistance drive Lunga Mull across the Indus. The general, without attaching much importance to the offer, accepted it. Gholam Hyder Khan was as good as his word, and having with his father’s consent raised the clan, prepared for the encounter. Lunga Mull, Cheytun Mull, and Julal Khan, at the head of the Lugharee tribe, did not decline the challenge, and a bloody and obstinate conflict ensued. It commenced with a night attack on the 20th by Gholam Hyder Khan, but remained undecided till the following morning, when his clan attacked their enemies sword in hand and gained a complete victory, killing Cheytun Mull and making Lunga Mull prisoner. Some of the fugitives who had taken refuge in the fort capitulated, on condition of being permitted to cross the river, and the whole place was yielded up without further opposition.

After the defeat at Dera Ghazee Khan, the division of Moolraj’s force which had been higher up the Indus moved down towards that place, and took up a position on the left bank opposite to it at the village of Koreyshee. Their object had been to seize a fleet of boats which had been collected by Lunga Mull, and thus obtain means of effecting the passage. In this they were disappointed, and the two armies remained opposite to each other with the broad river rolling between them. This state of inaction was interrupted by the movements of Bhawul Khan, who in the beginning of June crossed the Sutlej, with the design of moving on Soojabad, which is only twenty-five miles south by west from Mooltan. The effect was to draw off the enemy from Koreyshee, and leave the passage of the river open to the British force, which had no lack
of means, in consequence of having secured the fleet of boats above mentioned. The main obstacle was a peremptory order of the resident not to quit the right bank, but this was removed at the earnest request of Bhawul Khan, who was now anxious for support. The Indus was accordingly crossed without delay, and the whole force proceeded south-east to Khangur on the right bank of the Chenab or Jhelum, the river after their junction being designated indiscriminately by either name. Meanwhile the Mooltan force had been concentrated, and was advancing on Soojabad, with positive orders from Moolraj to fight Bhawul Khan before the British could come to his aid.

The relative strength and position of the three armies are thus described by Lieutenant Edwardes, in his work entitled A Year in the Punjab (vol. ii. p. 376, 377):—"The rebel army, of from 8000 to 10,000 horse and foot, and ten guns, commanded by Moolraj’s brother-in-law Rung Ram, and the Daoodpotra (Bhawulpoor) army of about 8000 horse and foot, eleven guns and thirty zumboorucks, commanded by Futtah Mahomed Khan Ghoree, were on the left bank of the Chenab; and my force, consisting of two divisions (one of faithful regulars, foot and artillery of the Sikh service, about 1500 men and ten guns, under General Cortlandt, and another of about 5000 irregulars, horse and foot, and thirty zumboorucks under my own personal command), was on the right bank. Rung Ram’s camp was pitched across the highroad to Mooltan, three miles south of Soojabad; Futtah Mahomed’s at Goweyn, fifteen miles farther south; and mine at Gaggianwallah Ferry, about twelve miles south of Khangur. The three formed a triangle, in which the Daoodpotras were nearer to me than to the enemy, but nearer to the enemy than I was; while a river about three miles wide divided the allies.” Rung Ram’s plan should have been to attack the Bhawulpoor army with the least possible delay, for though the numbers were nearly equal, his troops were far better disciplined, and could hardly have failed to give him the victory. Instead of availing himself of this opportunity, he lost it by waiting till the evening, and then moving eight miles lower down the Chenab, to the village of Bukree, within an easy march of Kinereey, where he knew that the British force must cross. His object was to seize this ferry, and having thus prevented the passage, to deal with the Daoodpotras when left destitute of relief. He was fortunately anticipated by the rapid movements of the allies, the Daoodpotras having hastened down towards Kinereey, while a strong British division, consisting of 3000 Patan irregulars under Foujdar Khan, had crossed the river and moved forward in the direction by which their allies were expected. Scarcely had the junction been effected, on the morning of the 18th, when Lieutenant Edwardes, who had left General Cortlandt to bring over the rest of the force, and was crossing the Chenab, was startled by a cannonade, which announced that the conflict had commenced. Rung Ram hurrying on from Bukree before dawn to seize the ferry, and finding it occupied, took up a strong position on the salt-hills of Noonar, and opened his fire.
Lieutenant Edwardes arrived in the very nick of time. The Daoodpotras had rushed impetuously forward without waiting for an order, and were met by a fire so different from that of their own border warfare, that they fell back in confusion on a village in their rear. The first salutation that met Lieutenant Edwardes on our arrival, was from an European, who stepped out and exclaimed:—"Oh, sir, our army is disorganized." He asked for Fulture Mahomed Khan Ghoree, and was pointed to a large peepul tree, round which a crowd was gathered. "I galloped up," says Edwardes, "and looking over the shoulders of the people, saw a little old man in dirty clothes, and with nothing but a skull-cap on his head, sitting under the tree with a rosary in his hands, the beads of which he was rapidly telling, and muttering in a peevish, helpless manner, "Uthumdooolillah! Uthumdooolillah!" (God be praised! God be praised!) apparently quite abstracted from the scene around him, and utterly unconscious that six-pounders were going through the branches, that officers were imploring him for orders, and that 8000 or 9000 rebels were waiting to destroy an army of which he was general. He had to be shaken by his people before he could comprehend that I had arrived; and as he rose and tottered forward, looking vacantly in my face, I saw that excitement had completed the imbecility of his years, and that I might as well talk to a post." It only remained for the British officer to take the whole arrangements on himself. These were somewhat difficult. The Bhawulpoor artillery was overmatched by that of the Mooltanees, and it was impossible again to assume the offensive, until their place was supplied by British artillery, which had yet to be brought from the opposite bank of the river. The difficulty was to avoid defeat during the interval which must necessarily elapse. The plan adopted was to continue the cannonade with the Daoodpotra artillery, imperfect as it was, and keep their troops within the jungle, as much under cover as possible. With this the Daoodpotras were not dissatisfied, but it was not all relished by the British force, composed chiefly of Patans, who, placed on the left and exposed to fire which they could not return, were continually starting up and demanding to be led against the enemy. In this unsatisfactory state six long hours had been spent, when the British guns, six in number, arrived, and with them two regiments of regular infantry. When the new guns opened, the enemy, who supposed that they had silenced all the guns which could be brought against them, were taken by surprise, and made a very ineffectual resistance. After a successful charge by one of the new regiments which had arrived, the whole allied force began to advance over the contested ground, and the victory was decided. The rebel camp, all their ammunition, and eight out of their ten guns, were taken. The loss of men was not very serious on either side; that of the victors, in killed and wounded, was about 300; that of the enemy in killed alone, about 500 left on the field, and many more along the whole line of pursuit. The fugitives never halted till they reached Mooltan.
In consequence of the victory of Kinerey the killedar of Soojabad sent in his submission, others followed his example, and Lieutenant Edwardes felt so strong, that on the 22d of June he suggested to the resident that the siege of Mooltan should be immediately commenced. "We are enough of us in all conscience," he said, "and desire nothing better than to be honoured with the commission you designed for a British army. All we require are a few heavy guns, a mortar-battery, as many sappers and miners as you can spare, and Major Napier to plan our operations. That brave and able officer is, I believe, at Lahore; and the guns and mortars are doubtless ere this at Ferozepoor, and only require to be put into boats and floated down to Bhawulpooor." This was an over-sanguine estimate, for not only were ominous deserts constantly occurring among the Sikhs, but Moolraj was determined not to allow himself to be shut up in his fort without risking another general action. It was fought on the 1st of July near the village of Suddooam, where Moolraj, commanding in person, had taken up a strong and advantageous position with his whole force, estimated at about 12,000 men. The allied force considerably exceeded this, amounting in all to about 18,000 men. Of these, however, 4000, who had arrived in camp only three days before, and formed the converging column under Sheikh Emam-nd-Geen, could not be depended on, and in fact scarcely took any part in the action. On this occasion the enemy took the initiative, and about noon advancing in line were close at hand before the allies became convinced that they had really resolved to risk a battle. The issue was never doubtful, the allies being superior not only in numbers but in artillery, theirs amounting to twenty-two pieces, while that of the enemy did not exceed ten. The conflict, however, was maintained with considerable obstinacy till Moolraj put spurs to his horse and fled. His example was immediately followed, while the victors continued the pursuit till they were almost under the walls of Mooltan. This victory, which obliged Moolraj to take refuge within his fort, again raised the question as to the practicability of immediately laying siege to it. Lieutenant Edwardes had, as we have seen, offered to undertake it, and suggested a plan which he thought would "obviate the necessity of a British army taking the field at all." The resident was disposed to think that the addition of a single British brigade with ten guns, and twenty mortars and howitzers, would be sufficient." Lord Gough adhered to his former opinion, and the governor-general in council entirely concurred with him. The letter conveying this decision to the resident was despatched on the 11th of July, but on the 10th of the same month, and of course a day before it was written, he had taken the decision into his own hands, and directed General Whish, commanding the troops in the Punjab, to "take immediate measures for the despatch of a siege-train with its establishment, and a competent escort and force, for the reduction of the fort of Mooltan." This was certainly a bold step, but as the danger of abandoning it after it had been publicly announced seemed to the governor-
general greater than the danger of prosecuting it, he informed the resident that
since he had considered it necessary, in exercise of the powers conferred upon
him, "to assume this responsibility," the government being anxious to maintain
his authority, confirmed the orders he had issued, and therefore enjoined him
"to proceed with vigour to carry out at all hazards the policy which he had
now resolved upon."

The die being thus cast, the necessary preparations were made with all
possible expedition, and on the 24th of July General Whish started for Mooltan
with a force amounting to 8089 men, with thirty-two pieces of siege ordnance,
and twelve horse-artillery guns. It moved in two columns; the right with the
general's head-quarters marching from Lahore along the left bank of the Ravee.

and the left, commanded by Brigadier Salter, marching from Ferozepoor along
the right bank of the Sutlej. The native force previously assembled consisted
of 8415 cavalry, and 14,327 infantry, with forty-five horse-artillery guns, four
mortars, and 158 camel-swivels. Of this force, including that of General Cort-
landt, 7718 infantry and 4033 cavalry were commanded by Lieutenant Edwardes,
5700 infantry and 1900 cavalry formed the Bhawulpoor army commanded by
Lieutenant Lake, and 909 infantry and 3382 cavalry formed the Sikh army
commanded by Rajah Shere Sing. To this besieging force of nearly 32,000
men, Moolraj was not able to oppose more than a garrison of 12,000 men, with
an artillery of fifty-four guns and five mortars. This great disparity of numbers
was compensated by the strength of the works.

Mooltan, about three miles from the left bank of the Chenab, but within
reach of its inundations, is surrounded by groves of date trees and beautiful
gardens. These, however, fail to make it a pleasant residence, for its scorching
climate is proverbial even in India, and with its usual accompaniments is not
inaccurately described in the following doggerel couplet:—
"Churchyards, beggars, dust, and heat,
Are the four best things at Mooltan you'll meet."

It was a place of great antiquity, and had undergone so many vicissitudes that the mound on which it stands is said to be composed of the ruins of earlier cities which occupied the same site. When the battle of Suddoosam was fought in its vicinity Mooltan was only surrounded by an old brick wall; but Moolraj, on seeing that his whole forces were about to be shut up within this feeble inclosure, had by unremitting exertion lined it with an enormous rampart of mud, and thus converted it into a powerful means of defence. It was not so much to it, however, that Moolraj trusted, as to the citadel, which had long been renowned in Indian warfare, had stood many sieges, and was now stronger than ever, in consequence of the sums which Moolraj's father lavished upon it, when, with the view of asserting his independence, he withheld the revenue due to Lahore, and employed it in strengthening the citadel so as to make it, as he thought, impregnable. It had in consequence become one of the strongest and most regular of the Indian fortresses constructed by native engineers. Beyond its deep and wide ditch faced with masonry rose a rampart, externally forty feet in height, and surmounted by thirty towers. Within, everything had been done for its security, and its magazines were stored with all the materials requisite to enable it to stand a lengthened siege.

On the 4th of September, as soon as the siege train arrived, General Whish issued a proclamation addressed "to the inhabitants and garrison" of Mooltan, inviting them "to an unconditional surrender within twenty-four hours after the firing of a royal salute at sunrise to-morrow, in honour of her most gracious majesty the Queen of Great Britain, and her ally, his highness Maharajah Duleep Sing." In the event of non-compliance he would "commence hostilities on a scale that must insure early destruction to the rebel traitor and his adherents, who having begun their resistance to lawful authority with a most cowardly act of treachery and murder, seek to uphold their unrighteous cause by an appeal to religion, which every one must know to be sheer hypocrisy." The only notice taken of this proclamation was a shot from the citadel, which "pitched into the earth just behind General Whish and his staff from a distance much exceeding two miles." Moolraj, after making proposals for surrender, had recently received new confidence. At the very time when he was compelled to shut himself up in his capital, the general disaffection of the Sikhs became more manifest than ever, so that the resident, who in the beginning of July had been sanguine enough to expect "that the rebel Moolraj will either destroy himself or be destroyed by his troops before the next mail goes out," was obliged to confess on the last day of the same month, that "plans were forming, combinations were being made, and various interests were being enlisted, with a view to a grand struggle for our expulsion from the Punjab and all the territories west of Delhi." Shere Sing, though he had been ordered to halt at Tolumba,
had continued to advance on Mooltan. Various suspicious movements had taken place in other quarters, and a formidable outbreak headed by Chuttur Sing had broken out in the Hazareh country, in the north-west of the Punjab. This outbreak derived additional importance from the fact that Chuttur Sing was the father of Shere Sing, who, though now encamped with his troops before Mooltan as part of the besieging force, must have previously been made acquainted with his father's designs, and in all probability given his sanction to them.

The siege of Mooltan was opened at daylight of the 7th of September. The first parallel commenced at the unusual distance of 1600 yards, said to have been rendered necessary by the nature of the ground. On the night of the 9th an attempt to dislodge the enemy from some gardens and houses in front of the trenches failed, owing to the darkness and confusion of a hastily planned night attack. This repulse so much increased Moolraj's confidence that he began to strengthen the position which had been attacked, and thus besiegers and besieged continued for two days throwing up works within a few hundred yards of each other. On the 12th the general, having determined to clear his front, caused the irregulars to create a diversion on the left, while two British columns advanced to do the real business of the day. A fierce conflict ensued, during which Moolraj's troops, confident in the strength of their entrenchment, and elated by their success on the 9th, fought better than they had ever done before. British valour, however, prevailed, and the enemy, driven back from his position, left 500 dead upon the ground. The effect of this success was to
bring the besiegers about 800 yards nearer, and consequently within battering distance of the walls of the city. Its speedy capture was now confidently anticipated, but after the troops had nearly spent two days in securing the advance which they had gained, an event took place which disappointed all these expectations.

Ever since the rebellion of his father in Hazareh, Shere Sing had been loud in professions of continued loyalty, and did not desist till the morning of the 14th September, when his camp moved bodily off to Mooltan, he himself heading the movement, and ordering the dhurum kha dosa or religious drum to be beaten in the name of the Khalsa. On receiving this intelligence the general summoned a council of senior officers, who were unanimously of opinion that "the siege was no longer practicable." The besieging troops were in consequence immediately withdrawn from their advanced position within breaching distance of the walls of the town, to a new position at Tibbee, there to "await the arrival of such reinforcements as the commander-in-chief may think proper to send."

When Shere Sing arrived with his troops at Mooltan, Moolraj, though delighted with this accession of strength, was far from feeling perfect confidence in his new friends, and therefore, instead of admitting them into the fort, obliged them to remain under its guns, while he took the rajah and all his officers to a temple outside the city, and made them swear that they had no treacherous design. Even this oath proved insufficient, and after serious misunderstandings, Shere Sing volunteered to join his father in Hazareh if some pay were advanced to his soldiers. Moolraj grasped at the proposal, and on the 9th of October, Shere Sing departed to become the leader of a new Sikh war. Before following him, it will be necessary to tell all that remains to be told concerning Moolraj and Mooltan.

The siege, raised on the 14th of September, was not resumed till the 17th of December. The interval, however, was not one of entire inaction. The British troops were employed, partly in practising the erection of field-works and model batteries, and partly in preparing materials for siege purposes, so that when the time of action arrived, the enormous number of 15,000 gabions and 12,000 fascines had been provided. Moolraj on his part was equally active in strengthening the fortifications of the town and suburbs, and raising recruits to supply the place of those who had gone off with Shere Sing. Not satisfied, however, to remain dependent on his own resources, he looked round for allies. In the choice of these he displayed considerable political sagacity, making his first offers to Dost Mahomed of Cabool, and the chiefs of Candahar, whom he tempted with the offer of making the Indus their mutual boundary after they should, by their united exertions, have expelled the Feringhees.

The plan of siege now adopted was not to take the city as a preliminary, but to make a regular attack on the north-east angle of the citadel, and occupy
only so much of the suburbs as were required for actual operations. The portions of suburbs thus required were the tomb of Sawun Mull, Moolraj's father, called Wuzceerabad, and Moolraj's own residence of Am Khus, and as they were naturally the first objects to which the attention of the besiegers was directed, not a day was lost in effecting the capture of them. At the same time an attack, which had been intended only as a feint, proved so successful that the besiegers were brought almost close to the city walls. On the 30th of December, a considerable part of the citadel was laid in ruins by the explosion of the principal magazine. It was situated beneath the dome of the grand mosque, which was supposed to be bomb-proof till it was pierced by a shell from one of the British mortars. The extent of the catastrophe may be inferred from the fact that the magazine contained about 400,000 lbs. of gunpowder, and that about 500 of the garrison were killed by the explosion. On the 2d of January, one breach in the city wall was declared practicable, and another sufficient to allow of its being attacked as a diversion. The latter breach proved to be far more imperfect than had been imagined, for the storming party assigned to it, after passing under a heavy fire across a deep intervening hollow, "found to their surprise the city wall in front about thirty feet in height, unbreeched and totally impracticable, and were obliged to retire." The other breach, however, as to which there had been no mistake, was carried, and with it the city itself. Still the citadel remained, and there was every reason to presume that it would not be yielded without a desperate struggle, for Moolraj retired into it with 3000 picked men, as soon as he saw that the city was lost, and shutting the gates, left the rest of his troops to escape as they best could. On the 4th of January, a brigade of the Bombay division encamped on the north, and communicating with the Bengal division on the east, and the irregulars on the west, completed the investment of the fort. When Moolraj saw himself thus completely
hemmed in, his courage gave way, and he made an overture for surrender, by sending a letter to Major Edwards in the following terms:—“Having sundry representations to make before you, I write to say that, with your permission, I will send a confidential person of my own to wait on you, who will tell you all.” He was referred in answer to General Whish, who refused to receive any confidential person, unless he were sent simply to state, “My master wishes to come in, and will do so at such an hour, and will come out from the fort at such a gate, and by such a road.” Not yet prepared for unconditional surrender, Moolraj allowed some days to elapse, and then as if he had at last made up his mind to it, intimated on the 8th of January, that he meant to avail himself of the general’s permission to send a messenger. He was accordingly admitted on the following morning, but on being asked point blank whether he had authority to tender his master’s submission, and replying that he had not, was at once dismissed. Thus repulsed in his attempts to make terms, Moolraj continued his defence, and even on the night of the 12th of January ventured to make a sortie on the British trenches. The end was, however, evidently approaching. On the 14th the British sappers crowned the crest of the glacis at the north-east angle of the citadel, with a cavalier only fifteen feet from the edge of the ditch, and on the 19th two breaches, one on the north and the other on the south face, seemed so nearly practicable that the assault was fixed for the morning of the 22d. There could have been no doubt as to its success, but this was not put to the proof, as Moolraj at the last moment of respite allowed him came out and yielded himself a prisoner. The fort was immediately taken possession of without opposition. During the siege, which had lasted twenty-seven days, the British loss was 210 killed and 910 wounded. Moolraj was afterwards tried at Lahore, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged, but as his judges had recommended him to mercy as “the victim of circumstance,” the sentence was commuted into banishment beyond seas.

The insurrection of Chuttur Sing in Hazareh, after a slight check, assumed larger dimensions, and threatened to become still more formidable in consequence of the alliance which he had formed with the Afghans. On the 24th of October, the whole Sikh troops in Peshawer revolted, and Major George Lawrence, after endeavouring in vain to recall them to duty, was obliged to consult his personal safety by retiring with his assistant Lieutenant Bowie to Kohat, situated about thirty-six miles to the south. This place belonged to Sultan Mahomed Khan, the brother of Dost Mahomed of Cabool. His conduct during the Afghan war had proved him to be a mere compound of heartlessness and villany; but as the circumstances left no room for choice, Major Lawrence, who had previously learned that Mrs. Lawrence, whom he had sent off for Lahore at the commencement of the outbreak, had been carried to Kohat under the pretext of giving her a more secure asylum, had no alternative but to place himself and his assistant also in his power. The result was as might have been
anticipated: Sultan Mahomed, who had promised under the most solemn oaths to treat them as honoured guests, sold them as prisoners to Chuttur Sing in part payment of a promised grant of the city and district of Peshawer. Chuttur Sing's insurrection and the desertion of Shere Sing having made it impossible to doubt that the Sikhs, as a nation, had resolved on another struggle, the governor-general set out for the north-west provinces, after instructing the commander-in-chief to assemble an army at Ferozepoor. Lord Gough accordingly took the field, and marched towards the Chenab. Shere Sing had taken up his position in the vicinity of Ramnuggur, situated about a mile and a half from its left bank. Here the river in making a bend has formed an island, which divides it into two channels—the one on the left bank being, except in the rainy season, little more than a dry sandbed or nullah, with a small fordable stream, while the main channel on the right bank was of considerable depth and width. Though posted chiefly on this bank, the Sikhs also occupied the island, and were moreover reported to have both troops and guns on the left bank. These Lord Gough resolved to dislodge or capture, and therefore ordered Brigadier Campbell (now Lord Clyde) with an infantry brigade, accompanied by a cavalry division and three troops of horse-artillery under Brigadier Cureton, to move out from the camp for this purpose. After reaching Ramnuggur, from which the enemy had retired, they continued their march towards the river. From oversight or the impossibility of obtaining accurate information, the difficulty of the ground was not at all understood, and the artillery consulting only their courage and not their prudence, rushed impetuously forward till they found themselves within the range of twenty-eight guns, which opened upon them with deadly effect. These guns were placed in three batteries, two of which on the right bank crossed their fire so as completely to
command the nullah, while the third, on the island, fired into it point blank. The artillery thus suddenly checked in their career, were obliged to retire with the loss of one of their guns, which having tumbled over the high bank of the nullah along with two ammunition wagons, could not have been recovered without a fearful sacrifice of life. Nor was this the worst. When the enemy saw the confusion produced by their fire, they sent over from 3000 to 4000 of their cavalry under the cover of their guns. These, from some mistake, it is said, of an order given for a different purpose, were charged in the most gallant style by Colonel Havelock of the 14th dragoons and by the 5th cavalry, and on their giving way by retreating across the nullah, were followed down the bank till close upon the batteries. The murderous fire drove them back, but they re-formed a second and a third time, and were continuing the attack when Brigadier Cureton arrived with orders from Lord Gough to retire. He had scarcely uttered the word when he fell dead, struck by two matchlock-balls. Colonel Havelock was also killed, and Captain Fitzgerald mortally wounded.

Shere Sing still maintained his position on the right bank of the Chenab, with a force estimated at about 35,000 men, and as the unfortunate affair above related had shown how difficult it would be to dislodge him by an attack in front, it was resolved to attempt to turn his left flank. With this view General Sir Joseph Thackwell, who commanded the cavalry, was sent up the river with a detachment, consisting of three troops of cavalry, the horse artillery, and two light field batteries. He proceeded accordingly to Wuzeerabad, and there having succeeded, on the 2d of December, in effecting a passage, he began his downward march toward the Sikh camp. He was not allowed to proceed far when he was encountered by a large Sikh force, which Shere Sing had detached in the hope of overwhelming him. At first Sir Joseph was somewhat puzzled how to act, as his instructions were not to attack, but to content himself with repelling aggression, unless he found the enemy in retreat. He therefore ordered a halt, which the Sikhs as usual mistook for fear. Under this mistake they commenced a cannonade, at the same time attempting to turn the British flanks by numerous bodies of cavalry. On finding that their cannonade was not returned their confidence increased, and they were advancing as if to certain victory, when the British artillery opened a most destructive fire, which silenced their cannonade and frustrated all their operations. Meanwhile Lord Gough, as soon as he learned that Sir Joseph had crossed, opened a heavy cannonade on the enemy's encampment. Shere Sing thus attacked in front, and threatened not only by Sir Joseph Thackwell's detachment, but by a brigade of infantry under Brigadier Godby, who had also crossed only six miles above Rammuggur, saw that his position was untenable, and hastened off on the night of the 3d towards the Jhelum. As the retreat had been made precipitately, and in the utmost disorder, it was
confidently predicted that the whole Sikh force would immediately disperse. This prediction was far too sanguine. Shere Sing's strength was still unbroken, and by retreating to the north, where his father was still at the head of a formidable insurrection, he undoubtedly took the most effectual means of preparing for a more decisive struggle. His troops accordingly, so far from dispersing, rapidly increased in numbers, and he was ere long at the head of 40,000 men, with sixty-two guns.

Lord Gough having crossed with the whole of his army to the right bank of the Chenab, continued his march northwards in the direction which Shere Sing had taken, and on the 12th of January, 1849, on arriving at Dingeex, found the Sikh chief with his whole force encamped in its vicinity, with his right on the villages of Lukneewalla and Futteh Shakeshuck, the main body at the village of Lollianwalla, and his left at Russool on the Jhelum. In this position he occupied the southern extremity of a low range of hills intersected by ravines, and Lord Gough believing the ground "to be excessively difficult, and ill adapted to the advance of a regular army," determined to move on Russool with a view to reconnoitre. The subsequent operations on the 13th, we must allow Lord Gough himself to describe. After mentioning that the day was far advanced, the despatch continues thus:—"The engineer department had been ordered to examine the country before us, and the quartermaster-general was in the act of taking up ground for the encampment, when the enemy advanced some horse-artillery, and opened a fire on the skirmishers in front of the village. I immediately ordered them to be silenced by a few rounds from our heavy guns, which advanced to an open space in front of the village. The fire was instantly returned by that of nearly the whole of the enemy's field artillery, thus exposing the position of his guns, which the jungle had hitherto concealed. It was now evident that the enemy intended to fight, and would probably advance his guns so as to reach the encampment during the night. I therefore drew up in order of battle; Sir Walter Gilbert's division on the right, flanked by Brigadier Pope's brigade of cavalry, which I strengthened by the 14th light dragoons, well aware that the enemy was strong in cavalry upon his left. To this were attached three troops of horse-artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Grant. The heavy guns were in the centre. Brigadier-general Campbell's division formed the left, flanked by Brigadier White's brigade of cavalry, and three troops of horse-artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Brind. The field batteries were with the infantry divisions."

Before proceeding to quote further from Lord Gough's despatch, several reflections suggested by the portion already given will not be out of place. First, it is clear that his lordship, if he had any intention of fighting a battle on the 13th, had abandoned it. He thought the day too far advanced, and had therefore ordered ground to be taken up for encampment. Secondly, it is equally clear that the reconnaissance which had been made was understood to be
imperfect. This appears both from the order given to the engineers to "examine the country," and also from the fact that the actual position of the enemy's field artillery was unknown, till they themselves, at a later period of the day, divulged it by opening their fire. These two considerations—the advanced hour and imperfect knowledge of the ground—seem sufficient to justify the determination to defer the battle, and the question naturally arises, On what grounds were these considerations afterwards overruled? To this question the answer, in so far at least as Lord Gough has been pleased to give it, is neither explicit nor satisfactory. "It was now evident," he says, "that the enemy intended to fight." Does it therefore follow that his lordship was bound to allow the enemy to choose his own time, and force him to fight at a disadvantage? But then it was probable that the enemy "would advance his guns so as to reach the encampment during the night." This undoubtedly would have been both annoying and insulting, but surely, assuming that there was no means of preventing it, the evil would have been far more than compensated by the advantage of allowing the troops a night's repose after the fatiguing march they had already undergone, since this would not only have enabled them to commence the conflict with recruited strength, but given them a full day to decide it. On these and similar grounds it may be questioned whether his lordship gave sufficient reason for his change of purpose, when after narrating the enemy's movements he simply adds:—"I therefore drew up in order of battle."

The order of battle having been arranged as above, the troops were ordered to lie down, while the heavy guns opened a powerful and well-directed fire on the enemy's centre, and the light field batteries opened theirs on the flanks. After an hour of this cannonade seemed to have "sufficiently disabled" that of the enemy, the left division, which had to move over the larger extent of ground, began the advance, and was shortly afterwards followed by the right division, protected on its flank by Brigadier Pope's cavalry brigade. The advance of both divisions was ultimately successful, though not unattended with a very untoward occurrence in each. The two leading officers of the right brigade of the left division "waved their swords over their heads as they cheered on their gallant comrades." Somehow this act was mistaken for "the signal to move in double time." The consequence is thus described in the despatch: "This unhappy mistake led to the Europeans outstripping the native corps, who could not keep pace, and arriving completely blown at a belt of thicker jungle, where they got into some confusion, and Lieutenant-colonel Brookes, leading the 24th, was killed between the enemy's guns. At this moment a large body of infantry, which supported these guns, opened upon them so destructive a fire that the brigade was forced to retire, having lost their gallant and lamented leader Brigadier Pennycuick, and the three other field officers of the 24th, and nearly half the regiment, before it gave way; the
native regiment, when it came up, also suffering severely." At this crisis
Brigadier Penny's brigade, left in reserve, was ordered up, but its support
proved unnecessary, for, adds Lord Gough, "Brigadier-general Campbell, with
that steady coolness and military decision for which he is so remarkable,
having pushed on his left brigade and formed line to his right, carried every-
thing before him, and soon overthrew that portion of the enemy which had
obtained a temporary advantage over his right brigade." The untoward
occurrence in the right division was still more serious, and must like the other
be described in the words of Lord Gough, who after saying that "the right
attack of infantry was most praiseworthy and successful," and that "this divi-
sion nobly maintained the character of the Indian army, taking and spiking
the whole of the enemy's guns in their front, and dispersing the Sikhs wherever
they were seen," continues thus:—"The right brigade of cavalry, under
Brigadier Pope, was not, I regret to say, so successful. Either by some order,
or misapprehension of an order, they got into much confusion, hampered the
fine brigade of horse-artillery, which, while getting into action against a body
of the enemy's cavalry that was coming down upon them, had their horses
separated from their guns by the false movements of our cavalry; and notwith-
standing the heroic conduct of the gunners, four of their guns were disabled to
an extent which rendered their withdrawal at the moment impossible. The
moment the artillery was extricated, and the cavalry re-formed, a few rounds
put to flight the enemy that had occasioned this confusion." Lord Gough in
the above extract speaks only of the impossibility of withdrawing the guns "at
the moment," and spared himself the mortification of confessing that the enemy
carried them off as trophies, and along with them five stand of colours. It was
not indeed a victory to be boasted of, for the Sikhs, though they acknowledged
their defeat by retiring and allowing the British to encamp in advance of the
battle-field, were so little broken and dispirited that they managed to return
in the course of the night and carry off unobserved all the guns that had been
captured from them, except twelve which had been previously secured.

Nothing shows more clearly how indecisive the above battle of Chillianwala
had been, than the fact that the enemy, instead of being driven across the
Jhelum, kept possession of his entrenchments, while Lord Gough considered it
imprudent to attempt to force them. One good reason for this delay was that
General Whish with his victorious army had started from Mooltan, and might
soon be expected at head-quarters. His actual arrival was indeed most oppor-
tune. The Sikhs, pressed by the want of provisions, had quitted their entrench-
ments, and made a retrograde movement toward the Chenab by way of
Gujerat. Their intention is supposed to have been to cross over into the
Rechna Doab, and after ravaging it advance upon Lahore. General Whish,
who had now arrived at Wuzeerabad, was able to defeat this intention by
guarding the fords above and below this town, and also to effect his own
junction with the commander-in-chief by means of a bridge of boats. The British army now amounted to 25,000 men; that of the enemy had also gained a great accession of strength, and was estimated at 60,000, of whom 1500 were Afghan horse, under Akram Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, who had obtained possession of Peshawer, and openly become a Sikh ally. The vast inferiority of the British in point of numbers was compensated, both by the superior excellence of the troops, and by a most powerful artillery, consisting of 100 guns, while the Sikhs had only 59.

On the 21st of February the enemy's camp nearly encircled the town of Gujerat, lying between it and a deep watercourse, the dry bed of the Dwarra, which here bending very tortuously, passed nearly round two sides of the town, and then diverged to a considerable distance in a southerly direction, so as to intersect the British camp. The enemy's position on the right flank and centre was greatly strengthened by this nullah, and he had skilfully availed himself of it by placing his guns immediately behind it, and his infantry in front, under the cover of its banks; his left was in like manner covered by a deep though narrow stream, which running from the east of the town, turned south and fell into the Chenab, in the direction of Wuzeerabad. The interval between the two watercourses was an open space of nearly three miles, which presented no natural obstacle to military manoeuvres, and was therefore selected by Lord Gough as the direction of his principal attack. His plan, and the mode in which it was subsequently carried out, are thus detailed in his lordship's despatch: "On the extreme left I placed the Bombay column, commanded by the Honourable H. Dundas, supported by Brigadier White's brigade of cavalry, and the Scinde horse, under Sir Joseph Thackwell, to protect the left, and prevent large bodies of Sikh and Afghan cavalry from turning that flank; with this cavalry I placed Captains Duncan's and Hush's troop of horse-artillery, whilst the infantry was covered by the Bombay troop of horse-artillery, under Major Blood. On the right of the Bombay column, and with its right resting on the nullah, I placed Brigadier General Campbell's division of infantry, covered by No. 5 and No. 10 light field batteries, under Major Ludlow and Lieutenant Robertson, having Brigadier Hoggan's brigade of infantry in reserve. Upon the right of the nullah I placed the infantry division of Major-general Sir W. Gilbert; the heavy guns, eighteen in number, under Majors Day and Horsford, with Captain Shakespeare and Brevet-major Sir Richmond Shakespeare commanding batteries, being disposed in two divisions on the flanks of his left brigade. This line was prolonged by Major-general Whish's division of infantry, with one brigade of infantry under Brigadier Markham, in support in a second line; and the whole covered by three troops of artillery —Major Fordyce's, Captains Mackenzie's and Anderson's, and No. 17 light field battery under Captain Dawes, with Lieutenant-colonel Lane's and Captain Kinleside's troops of horse-artillery in a second line in reserve, under Lieutenant-
colonel Brind. My right flank was protected by Brigadiers Hearsey's and Lockwood's brigades of cavalry, with Captain Warner's troop of horse-artillery. The 5th and 6th light cavalry, with the Bombay light field battery, and the 45th and 69th regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Mercer, most effectually protected my rear and baggage. With my right wing I proposed penetrating the centre of the enemy's line, so as to turn the position of their force in rear of the nullah, and thus enable my left wing to cross it with little loss, and in co-operation with the right to double upon the centre the wing of the enemy's force opposed to them. At half-past seven the army advanced in the order described, with the precision of a parade movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery covered by skirmishers. The cannonade now opened upon the enemy was one of the most magnificent I ever witnessed, and as terrible in its effects. The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity, and the enemy well and resolutely maintained his position, but the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back. I then deployed the infantry, and directed a general advance, covering the movement with my artillery as before. The village of Burra Kalra, the left one of those of that name in which the enemy had concealed a large body of infantry, and which was apparently the key of their position, lay immediately in the line of Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert's advance, and was carried in the most brilliant style by a spirited attack of the 3d brigade under Brigadier Penny, consisting of the 2d Europeans, and the 31st and 70th regiments of native infantry, which drove the enemy from their cover with great slaughter. A very spirited and successful movement was also made about the same time, against a heavy body of the enemy's troops, in and about the second or Chota Kalra, by part of Brigadier Harvey's brigade, most gallantly led by Lieutenant-colonel Franks, of her majesty's 10th foot. The heavy artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had retired to, while the rapid advance and beautiful fire of the horse-artillery and light field batteries, which I strengthened by bringing to the front the two reserve troops of horse-artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence of the whole horse-artillery), broke the ranks of the enemy at all points. The whole infantry line now rapidly advanced, and drove the enemy before it; the nullah was cleared, several villages stormed, the guns that were in position carried, the camp captured, and the enemy routed in every direction, the right wing and Brigadier-general Campbell's division passing in pursuit to the eastward, the Bombay column to the westward of the town. The retreat of the Sikh army thus hotly pressed, soon became a perfect flight, all arms dispersing over the country, rapidly pursued by our troops for a distance of twelve miles,
their track strewn with the wounded, their arms and military equipments, which they threw away to conceal that they were soldiers."

There was no room to doubt, as at Chillianwalla, whether a victory had been gained. The enemy's army had been annihilated, fifty-three of their guns, being, except six, the whole they brought into action, had been captured, and the Sikh war was in fact ended. What made this signal success still more gratifying was the comparatively small cost at which it had been purchased, the total British loss being only ninety-two killed and 682 wounded. Well might the governor-general say in his letter to the secret committee, "Under Divine Providence the British arms have signally triumphed. On the 21st of February an action was fought which must ever be regarded as one of the memorable in the annals of British warfare in India; memorable alike from the greatness of the occasion, and from the brilliant and decisive issue of the encounter. For the first time Sikh and Afghan were banded together against the British power. It was an occasion which demanded the putting forth of all the means at our disposal, and so conspicuous a manifestation of the superiority of our arms as should appal each enemy, and dissolve at once their compact by fatal proof of its futility. The consequences of the victory which has been won equals the highest hopes entertained."

The day after the victory Major-general Gilbert, at the head of a force of about 15,000 men, with forty guns, resumed the pursuit of the fugitives in the direction of the Jhelum, but on reaching Noorungabab, on the left bank, found that Shere Sing had already crossed, and was encamped on the right bank with the relics of his army, estimated at about 8000 men. The Sikh leader, however, had no idea of continuing the contest, and employed the intervention of Major Lawrence, who had formerly been treacherously detained as a prisoner, to make his own submission together with that of the other rebel chiefs. Meanwhile, General Gilbert having crossed the Jhelum, directed his attention chiefly to the Afghans, who were now in full flight toward the Indus. He so nearly overtook them that he reached Attock, which they had just evacuated, before they had time entirely to destroy the bridge of boats, with the view of precluding further pursuit. He was therefore able to convey his troops across, and enter the territory of Afghanistan, but as there was now no hope of reaching the flying Afghans before they entered the fatal Khyber Pass, he prudently desisted from following them, and retraced his steps.

With regard to the future government of the Punjab, the governor-general had already decided, and therefore no time was lost in acquainting the Lahore council of regency that the Sikh dominion was at an end. The members, aware that resistance would be unavailing, contented themselves with endeavouring to obtain favourable terms, and on being assured that those of them who had not taken part in the rebellion would be liberally dealt with, gave their consent to a treaty, which, though made in the name of the maharajah, and signed by
him, could not be considered as his, since he was then a boy of only eleven years of age. By this so-called treaty, consisting of five articles, the maharajah for ever renounced all right of sovereignty in the Punjab, gave up all state property as confiscated to the British government; surrendered to the Queen of England "the gem called the Koh-i-noor, which was taken from Shah Shujah-ul-Moolk by Maharajah Runjeet Sing;" and agreed to reside at such place as the governor-general should select, only stipulating in return that he should be treated with respect and honour, retain the title of "Maharajah Dhuleep Sing Bahadoor," and receive a pension of not less than four, and not more than five lacs of rupees. It may here be mentioned as an interesting fact that this youthful prince has since embraced Christianity. On the 29th of March the governor-general issued a proclamation in which, after narrating the peace and friendship which prevailed in the time of Runjeet Sing, the subsequent gross violation of treaties by the Sikhs, the clemency extended to them after their discomfiture, and the most ungrateful return which they had recently made by waging "a fierce and bloody war for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their power," proceeded as follows:—"The government of India formerly declared that it desired no further conquest, and it proved by its acts the sincerity of its professions. The government of India has no desire for conquest now; but it is bound in its duty to provide fully for its own security, and to guard the interests of those committed to its charge. To that end, and as the only sure mode of protecting the state from the perpetual recurrence of unprovoked and wasting wars, the governor-general is compelled to resolve upon the entire subjection of a people whom their own government has long been unable to control, and whom (as events have now shown) no punishment can deter from violence, no acts of friendship can conciliate to peace. Wherefore the Governor-general of India has declared, and hereby proclaims, that the kingdom of the Punjab is at an end, and that all the territories of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing are now and henceforth a portion of the British empire in India."

The action of Chillianwalla, when the news of it reached this country, was generally regarded by the British public as equivalent to defeat and prognostic of future disaster, and all eyes were turned to Sir Charles Napier as the man best qualified to bring the war to a successful termination. The cry for his appointment became so loud and determined that the directors, though he was almost at open war with them, were compelled to yield, and the
conqueror of Scinde, who thought he had bidden a final farewell to India, sailed for it again as commander-in-chief, on the 24th of February, 1849. During the voyage, when off Ceylon, he received intelligence of the victory of Gujerat. As the circumstances under which his appointment had been made were thus entirely changed, and as he was himself by no means of a tractable temper, it is easy to understand that it was not long before he began to find himself in a false position. Others soon came to be of the same opinion, and not a few, who were smarting under his severe though probably not undeserved censures, began to wait for his halting. The governor-general was far above entertaining any such feeling himself, or of countenancing it in others, but he was jealous of his authority, and is said to have hinted to the new commander-in-chief, at their very first interview, that he must beware of encroaching on it. There was thus from the outset no great prospect of harmonious co-operation, and before a year elapsed a collision took place. Believing that a mutinous spirit prevailed among the sepoys serving in the Punjab, and that one main cause of it was a diminution of pay, produced by a government regulation affecting their allowance for purchasing food, Sir Charles Napier suspended the regulation on his own responsibility, without waiting to obtain the sanction of the governor-general, who was then at sea, or even consulting the supreme council. Subsequently he had not only disbanded the 66th native infantry, on the ground of mutiny, as he was entitled to do, but also by another stretch of authority had given its colours to a Ghooka battalion, which was henceforth to rank as the 66th instead of the regiment disbanded. This latter proceeding the governor-general simply disapproved of by letter, but the former proceeding was deemed too serious an encroachment to be thus quietly disposed of, and the decision in regard to it was communicated in a formal letter addressed by the government secretary to the adjutant-general of the army. This letter was a reprimand of the harshest description, both in form and in substance. Through it the commander-in-chief was told that the governor-general in council viewed the orders which he has issued to the officers in the Punjab "with regret and dissatisfaction"—and given to understand for his future guidance "that the governor-general in council will not again permit the commander-in-chief, under any circumstances, to issue orders which shall change the pay and allowances of the troops serving in India, and thus practically to exercise an authority which has been reserved, and most properly reserved, for the supreme government alone." After such a reprimand nothing but resignation could have been anticipated, and accordingly on the 22d May, it was transmitted through Lord Fitzroy Somerset to the Duke of Wellington, the commander-in-chief. His grace, who had always been a stanch friend of Sir Charles Napier, and had exerted himself in procuring his appointment, was greatly displeased with the manner in which he had thrown it up, and moreover declared his conviction that his conduct had been justly censured. Sir Charles Napier arrived in England in March, 1851, and it is
pleasing to add, that by none was he welcomed more heartily than by the Duke of Wellington. The interview is thus graphically described by himself: "I never was so kindly, so graciously received as just now by the duke; I thought he would have embraced me. Will your grace let me put your name on my card for the levee on Wednesday? Oh yes! yes! and I will go there, and take care to tell the queen that you are there; she will be glad to see you safe back, and so am I, so is everybody." As an appropriate supplement to this anecdote, it may be mentioned that Sir Charles was one of the pall-bearers at the duke's funeral, and caught a cold which accelerated his death. Disease had indeed long been preying upon him, but he was permitted to exceed the allotted span of life, and was in his seventy-second year when he expired on the morning of the 29th of August, 1853.

CHAPTER IX.


THE Sikh war was no sooner triumphantly terminated, than attention was called to an opposite quarter. Under the treaty with Burmah, British subjects trading to its ports were entitled to "the utmost protection and security." The governor of Rangoon was charged with grossly violating this obligation, and in addition to individual complaints, a formal memorial was presented to the council at Calcutta, by several merchants and commanders of trading vessels, in which they stated that they had "for a long time suffered from the tyranny and gross injustice of the Burmese authorities" at Rangoon, and that trade was "seriously obstructed and almost suppressed in consequence." Commodore Lambert, of her majesty's ship Fox, was therefore ordered to proceed with his ship and a small squadron to Rangoon, to demand reparation. In doing so, he was directed to use the utmost caution. He was first to address a letter to the governor of Rangoon, briefly setting forth the facts of each case. If compensation was granted, the matter was not to be carried any further; but as it seemed very probable that this amicable settlement would not be acceded to, he was furnished with a letter to the King of Ava, which was to be forwarded only in the event of a refusal by the governor of Rangoon, and recommended the removal of this officer as essential to a continuance of good understanding between the two governments.
Commodore Lambert arrived at Rangoon in the end of November, 1851, and on the 28th of this month addressed a letter to the council at Calcutta, explaining his reasons for "deviating" from part of their instructions as to the mode of demanding redress. The charges made against the governor, instead of being overcharged, fell, he said, far short of the truth, and therefore, since it must be as useless as it was unpleasant to attempt an arrangement with an official guilty of such gross misconduct, he had at once forwarded the letter to the King of Ava, and along with it a letter from himself to the prime-minister. In transmitting these letters through the governor of Rangoon, he addressed him in the following laconical terms:—"I shall expect that every despatch will be used for forwarding the same, and I hold you responsible for an answer being delivered in these waters within five weeks from this day." The governor-general was of opinion that Commodore Lambert had "exercised a sound discretion" in so far deviating from his instructions by "cutting off all discussion with the local governor," but he at the same time cautioned him "not to have recourse to the terrible extremity of war except in the last resort, and after every other method has been tried without success." On the supposition that the King of Ava might either decline to answer the letter, or refuse to comply with its demands, the governor-general concluded thus: "The only course we can pursue which would not on the one hand involve a dangerous submission to injury, or on the other hand precipitate us prematurely into a war which moderate counsels may yet enable us to avert, will be to establish a blockade of the two rivers at Moulmein, by which the great mass of the traffic of the Burmese empire is understood to pass."

On the 1st of January, 1852, the court of Ava returned an answer which seemed to leave no doubt of an amicable settlement, since it announced that the obnoxious governor had been recalled, and his successor instructed to make due compensation. The commodore, encouraged by this friendly proceeding, immediately endeavoured to open a communication with the new governor, and with this view having addressed a letter to him, sent Commander Fishbourne and two other officers ashore to deliver it. Their reception was the very opposite of what had
been anticipated. After being subjected to ignominious treatment they were obliged to return with the letter undelivered, and without seeing the governor, who, they were told, was asleep, and must not be awaked. This treatment was at once resented, by establishing a blockade. It would have been well if the commodore had stopped here, instead of taking a step which made hostilities all but inevitable. His own explanation is as follows:—"Having failed in carrying out the instructions of the government of India by the conduct of the governor of Rangoon, whom I considered as speaking the voice of the court of Ava, I could regard it as nothing but a national insult that had been offered to the British flag, and accordingly gave directions to Commander Fishbourne, of the Hermes to take possession of a ship belonging to the King of Ava by way of reprisal." Shortly after this exploit he set sail for the mouth of the river. The Fox met with no obstruction, but when the Hermes was seen towing behind her the vessel familiarly known in the port of Rangoon by the name of the Yellow Ship, and belonging to the king, the Burmese opened their fire upon her from a stockade. She of course returned it with shot and shell, and had little difficulty in silencing her opponents. Actual hostilities being thus commenced on the 10th of January, Commodore Lambert hastened off in the Hermes to Calcutta to report. Still anxious, if possible, to avert "the terrible extremity of war," the governor-general in council once more addressed a letter to the King of Ava, which, after a narrative of previous proceedings, made the following specific demands:—"1. Your majesty, disavowing the acts of the present governor of Rangoon, shall, by the hands of your ministers, express great regret that Captain Fishbourne and the British officers who accompanied him were exposed to insult at the hands of your servants at Rangoon on the 6th of January last. 2. In satisfaction of the claims of the two captains who suffered exactions from the late governor of Rangoon, in compensation for the loss of property which British merchants may have suffered in the burning of that city by the acts of the present governor, and in consideration of the expenses of preparation for war, your majesty will agree to pay, and will pay at once, ten lacs of rupees to the government of India. 3. Your majesty will direct that an accredited agent, to be appointed in conformity with the 7th article of the treaty of Yandaboo, and to reside at Rangoon, shall be received by your majesty's servants there, and shall at all times be treated with the respect due to the representative of the British government. 4. Your majesty will direct the removal of the present governor of Rangoon, whose conduct renders it impossible that the government of India should consent to any official intercourse with him." Immediate assent to these conditions, and their complete fulfilment on or before the 1st of April next, or immediate war, were the only alternatives that could now be offered. The Burmese by non-compliance with the former alternative virtually accepted the latter, and both governments prepared for war.
The British force consisted of two separate armaments, the one from Calcutta and the other from Madras. The former, under the command of General Godwin, who had served in the former Burmese war, and to whom the charge of the whole expedition was now intrusted, sailed from the Hooghly on the 28th of March, and arrived on the 2d of April off the mouth of that branch of the Irrawadi on which Rangoon stands. Here he found Admiral Austen, the naval commander-in-chief, who had come from Penang in H.M.S. Rattler. The Madras armament had not yet arrived, but delay being deemed inexpedient, it was resolved forthwith to attack Martaban, situated on the east coast near the mouth of the Salwein, opposite to Moulmein. The attack was made at daybreak of the 5th of April. The admiral, notwithstanding the numerous shoals and currents which obstructed his progress, moved up with five steamers, and placed the Rattler within 200 yards of the city wall. Under cover of the tremendous fire which he then opened, the troops landed, and effected an easy capture.

The Madras division having arrived, the admiral again moved up the river and anchored close off Rangoon. On the 11th of April the fire which the enemy had opened from both banks was silenced by the steam frigates, and on the 12th the troops, after landing, began to move forward. "They had not proceeded far," says General Godwin in his despatch, "when, on opening some rising ground to our right, guns opened on us, and shortly after skirmishers showed themselves in the jungle. This was a new mode of fighting with the Burmese, no instance having occurred last war of their attacking our flanks, or leaving their stockades, that I remember ever to have taken place. I make this remark, as they are now not only good shots, but bold in their operations, and clever in selecting their ground and covering themselves." Their new tactics, however, though they increased the number of casualties, proved unavailing, and they were driven back to the shelter of a strong stockade, from which they kept up a fire of musketry, so steady and effective, that it was not carried without "a very severe loss," and such a "complete exhaustion of
the storming party," that though it was only eleven o'clock A.M., the general resolved to halt where he was, after concentrating the force "in as strong a position as the country admitted of." This halt on the 12th was followed by another on the 13th, because the heavy guns could not be forwarded "before the middle of that day," and the troops therefore did not move again till the morning of the 14th. Before proceeding to detail the subsequent operations, it will be proper to mention that in 1850 the old city of Rangoon was almost entirely destroyed by fire, and that in consequence, instead of the old town which stood on the river bank, a new town had been formed about a mile and a quarter from it. "It is," says General Godwin, "nearly a square, with a bund or mud wall about sixteen feet high and eight broad; a ditch runs along each side of the square, and on the north side, where the pagoda stands, it has been very cleverly worked into the defences, to which it forms a sort of citadel. The distance from the pagoda to the south entrance of the town is about three-quarters of a mile, and it (the town) is something more than that breadth from east to west. The old road from the river to the pagoda comes up to the south gate, running through the new town, and it was by this road the Burmese had settled that we should attack it, and where they had made every preparation to receive us, having armed the defences with nearly 100 pieces of cannon and other missiles, and with a garrison of at least 10,000 men."

An assault made in the direction where the enemy expected would, in General Godwin's opinion, have cost him half his force, and his plan therefore was to force his way into the pagoda, by moving on a road which "entirely turned all the defences of this real stronghold." He accordingly marched to the north-west through thick jungle, passed the stockaded town, and got to the east side of the pagoda, the capture of which, as the key of the place, was his main object. A battery of heavy guns was forthwith erected, and opened with so much effect that the assault, which had been fixed for noon, took place an hour sooner, and was completely successful. The city and all the country around fell with the pagoda. The next capture was Bassein, situated about sixty miles above the mouth of the river of same name, forming the most westerly branch of the Irawadi. This place, standing in a deep re-entering angle of the river, was surrounded by an irregular fortification. It was captured on the 17th of May after a sharp contest, and the general, contenting himself with leaving a small garrison in it, returned with the remainder of his force to Rangoon.

Though the Burmese had already lost three of their most important towns, and sustained defeat in every encounter, they were so far from showing signs of submission, that on the 26th of May they made a bold attempt to recover Martaban, by suddenly attacking it with a force of about 1000 men. The small garrison, by signal gallantry, were able to maintain their ground, but so much confidence and daring were displayed by the enemy, as to show that
still more decisive measures would be necessary in order to humble them. It was therefore resolved to threaten the Burmese capital of Ava or Umerapoora, by moving up the main branch of the Irawadi, and making an attempt upon Prome. With this view Captain Tarleton was despatched with five steamers early in July, to examine its position and defences. On this occasion he did much more than was expected, for he not only forced his way up the river in the face of all the obstructions thrown in his way, but by choosing a navigable channel, different from that by which the Burmese, to the number of about 10,000, were waiting his approach, he reached Prome on the 9th of July, and found it without a garrison. This was indeed a prize had he been able to take advantage of it, but as he had not been furnished with the means, he could only carry off a few guns, spike others, destroy the stores, and return.

The apparent determination of the Burmese not to yield, having shown the necessity of carrying on operations on a more extensive scale than had been originally contemplated, the governor-general repaired in person to Rangoon, where he arrived on the 27th of July. During his stay, which lasted only about ten days, it was arranged that extensive reinforcements should be forwarded, so as to raise the whole force, henceforth dignified with the title of the army of Ava, to the number of nearly 20,000 men. Much time was spent in preparing reinforcements, and it was the 9th of October when the British army again came in sight of Prome.

The Burmese scarcely made a show of defence. "Upon our advanced guard reaching the pagoda," says General Godwin in his despatch, "it found that the enemy had abandoned that position, as well as the heights beyond it, leaving in our possession an entirely evacuated town, overgrown with thick and rank vegetation, and I regret to add abounding in swamps." The general appears to have been somewhat puzzled at the facility with which a place, on which he had so long hesitated to advance, had been yielded, but adds, as if in justification of his own dilatoriness, that he had been "for a long time aware of the assemblage of a large force about ten miles east of Prome," and that he had "ascertained, from very good authority, that they have now about 18,000 men well posted in two or more stockades." After this statement one naturally expects him to add that he was just preparing to encounter this host, and thus crown his hitherto comparatively tame campaign with a signal victory. Nothing, however, was further from his intention; and it is therefore with a feeling somewhat stronger than mere surprise, that we find him in the very next sentence of his despatch writing as follows:—"It is not my intention to disturb them at present in any way, as by their concentration at that place, the fine force now assembling here will have an opportunity of striking a blow which may put an end to much future opposition." From such tactics nothing was to be expected.

Early in June a small force had been detached to Pegu, situated on the
river of that name, about fifty miles above the junction of the Rangoon, and
effected its capture. Unfortunately, however, in accordance with the desultory
mode of warfare which General Godwin was too much accustomed to pursue,
the detachment was too small to leave a garrison in it, and as a natural con-
sequence, as soon as it departed the Burmese returned and resumed possession as
before. It thus became necessary to repeat the capture. For this purpose
four river steamers, having on board 300 of the Bengal fusiliers, 300 of the
Madras fusiliers, and 400 of the 5th Madras native infantry, with details of
artillery and sappers, and two guns, sailed from Rangoon on the 19th of
November, and having anchored on the evening of the 20th a little below
Pegu, disembarked the troops on the following morning. General Godwin's
despatch contains the following description of the locality: "The site of the
old city, wherein the enemy was posted, is formed by a square surrounded by a
high bund, each side of which is presumed to be about two miles in length.
The west side faces the river, and the square is surrounded by a wet moat,
between seventy and eighty paces wide. From the south-west angle there is
a causeway over the moat, close to and parallel with the river. This cause-
way the enemy had made exceedingly strong by traverses, and breaking it
down at various intervals to prevent our advance. On the whole of the south
face of the bund, fronting our position, they had bodies of troops stationed
extending for about a mile and a quarter. As the causeway on the right of
their position was so narrow that only a file of men could advance along it
against their numerous musketry and local impediments, I abandoned all idea
of attacking them there. It was therefore determined to force our way along
the moat, and to turn the left of their position on the south face of the square."
In carrying out this plan the troops had to struggle "through the almost
impenetrable grass and jungle along the outer moat," exposed to a warm fire.
At last, however, they reached a part of the moat which admitted a passage
beyond the enemy's left, and turned their position. Here, having gallantly
stormed a post which was defended by two guns, they halted for some time to
refresh themselves and collect the wounded, and then again advanced by an
excellent path in the direction of the great pagoda, which was occupied without
difficulty, and completed the capture of the place. After garrisoning it with
400 men under Major Hill, General Godwin, who had personally superintended
the capture, returned with the remainder of the force to Rangoon. In leaving
Pegu so feebly garrisoned, he furnished another instance of that desultory and
inefficient mode of warfare on which we have already animadverted. The
consequence was that the Burmese immediately re-appeared, and having without
opposition resumed possession of the town, made a daring attack on the pagoda,
which they completely invested so as to shut up the garrison within its
precincts. The first attack was vigorously repulsed, but in a few days after a
second attack of a still more formidable character was made, and Major Hill,
scarcely able to maintain his position, was obliged to make an urgent application for speedy reinforcements. The general now did what he ought to have done at first, and set out for Pegu with a force of about 1350 men. During his passage up the river he paid the penalty of his former negligence, by the state of fearful suspense in which he was kept, while scarcely venturing to hope that his small garrison had been able to hold out against their numerous and persevering foes. His intense anxiety was not relieved till he obtained a distant view of the pagoda, and ascertained by his telescope that a single individual observed upon it was a Madras lascar. The garrison had indeed made a most gallant defence, and were justly complimented in a general order expressing "admiration of the noble defence of the Pegu pagoda (against a host of enemies) made by Major Hill and the brave handful of officers and soldiers under his command, for so many days and anxious nights, cut off as they were from the succour of their comrades by the works of the enemy in the river, as well as by the distant communication with the head-quarters of the army." It seems not to have occurred to the general when penning this order, that he would be expected to explain why, when he had it in his power to provide an adequate garrison, he left only what he himself calls a "brave handful."

On the 20th of December, after receiving intelligence of the capture of Pegu, the governor-general issued the following proclamation:—"The court of Ava having refused to make amends for the injuries and insults which British subjects had suffered at the hands of its servants, the Governor-general of India in council resolved to exact reparation by force of arms. The forts and cities upon the coast were forthwith attacked and captured; the Burmese forces have been dispersed wherever they have been met; and the province of Pegu is now in the occupation of British troops. The just and moderate demands of the government of India have been rejected by the king; the ample opportunity that has been afforded him for repairing the injury that was done has been disregarded; and the timely submission which alone could have been effectual to prevent the dismemberment of his kingdom has been withheld. Wherefore, in compensation for the past, and for better security in the future, the governor-general in council has resolved, and hereby proclaims, that the province of Pegu is now, and shall be henceforth, a portion of the British territories in the East. Such Burman troops as may yet remain within the province shall be driven out; civil government shall immediately be established; and officers shall be appointed to administer the affairs of the several districts. The governor-general in council hereby calls on the inhabitants of Pegu to commit themselves to the authority and to confide securely in the protection of the British government, whose power they have seen to be irresistible, and whose rule is marked by justice and beneficence. The governor-general in council having exacted the reparation he deems sufficient, desires no further conquest in Burmah, and is willing to consent that hostilities should cease.
But if the King of Ava shall fail to renew his former relations of friendship with the British government, and if he shall recklessly seek to dispute its quiet possession of the province it has now declared to be its own, the governor-general in council will again put forth the power he holds, and will visit with full retribution aggressions which, if they be persisted in, must of necessity lead to the total subversion of the Burman state, and to the ruin and exile of the king and his race."

Owing to the strict blockade of the mouths of the Irawadi, trade with the interior was entirely stopped, and provisions rose to famine prices in the Burmese capital. The old king, to whose obstinacy the continuance of the war was attributable, became in consequence very unpopular, and was, after a struggle, ousted from the throne by his brother. Shortly afterwards overtures for peace were made, and on the 4th of April, 1853, British and Burmese commissioners met at Prome to arrange the terms. During the conference, which lasted nearly two hours, the Burmese commissioners seemed anxious for peace, and offered to sign a treaty in accordance with the proclamation annexing Pegu, provided the frontier was fixed not at Meeaday, as the British, who had taken possession of that place, proposed, but lower down in the vicinity of Prome. On application to the governor-general this point was conceded to them, but so far from having the desired effect, they receded from their previous declarations, and on the 9th of May returned with an answer, to the effect that the king could not "assent to any treaty by which a cession of territory should be made." They were of course immediately dismissed, and it seemed as if the war was about to rage more fiercely than ever. It happily proved otherwise. The objection, it afterwards appeared, was not so much to the cession of territory, as to the humiliation of doing it by formal treaty, and the king, who was aware of the ruin which awaited him should hostilities be recommenced, managed to avert them by addressing a letter to the governor-general, in which he virtually granted all that had been asked of him. The governor-general accepted this equivalent, and on the 30th of June, 1853, issued a notification, proclaiming the restoration of peace. Thus terminated a war which, though it proved comparatively barren of brilliant events, added to our empire in the East a province containing 40,000 square miles, and a population of at least 3,000,000.

The policy of annexation, which had long been discountenanced by the home authorities, on the ground that our Indian empire was already of unwieldy magnitude, was once more in the ascendant. It was alleged, indeed, that in the cases of the Punjab and Pegu, necessity overruled all questions of policy, and no alternative remained but to incorporate them with the British territories, since in no other way was it possible to obtain at once compensation for the past and security for the future. In both wars the British government, while anxiously desiring peace, had been forced to take up arms in order to repel
unprovoked aggression, and in inflicting punishment had not exceeded the due measure of retribution, by the extinction of the one kingdom and the dismemberment of the other. But there were annexations of a different kind, in regard to which the above pleas of necessity and just retribution could not be urged—annexations made in time of peace, without provocation, and on the simple ground that the territories annexed had lapsed to the British government, as the paramount power, by the failure of other heirs. The first case of importance in which this principle of annexation was fully avowed and acted upon was that of Sattara. In a previous part of this work it has been told how the Rajahs of Sattara, who were the original, and continued to be recognized as the nominal heads of the Marhatta confederacy, had been gradually deprived of all real power by their peishwas or prime-ministers, and at last reduced to the condition of state prisoners. When the rule of the peishwa was extinguished in 1818, the Marquis of Hastings deemed it expedient to reinvest the titular rajah Pertaub Sing with a real sovereignty, and for this purpose entered into a treaty with him, by which he himself, his heirs and successors, were guaranteed in possession of a territory yielding about £200,000 of revenue. Pertaub Sing, for alleged violations of the treaty, was deposed by the British government in 1839, and succeeded by his brother, who died in 1848. He left no issue, but a few hours before his death adopted a boy distantly related to him. This adoption having been made in regular form was recognized as binding, so far as to give the adopted son all the rights which his adoptive father could convey to him, but it was denied that the succession to the raj was one of those rights. Sattara, it was said, was a British dependency, and adoption could have no validity to carry the succession, until it was sanctioned by the paramount power. On this ground the adoption was so far set aside, and Sattara was incorporated with the British territories. The principle, to which effect was thus given, is laid down in the following terms in a letter of the home authorities, dated 24th January, 1849:—"That by the general law and custom of India, a dependent principality like that of Sattara cannot pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the paramount power; that we are under no pledge direct or constructive to give such consent, and that the general interests committed to our charge are best consulted by withholding it."

In the above case of Sattara two questions were considered. Had the British government a legal right to seize and appropriate Sattara as a lapsed principality? Was it expedient, all circumstances considered, to enforce this right? Both these questions were answered in the affirmative, and Sattara ceased to exist as a separate sovereignty. It is necessary, however, to remember that the questions of right and expediency are perfectly distinct, and that cases might occur when the one was answered in the affirmative, and the other without any inconsistency in the negative. In fact, the very next case which occurred was of this description. On the 10th of July, 1852, the Rajah of
A.D. 1853.

The governor-general thwarted in his proposed annexation of Kerowly.

Kerowly, a minor Rajpoot state, whose capital is situated about eighty miles south-west of Agra, died without issue, but though he was a mere youth he had adopted a son, without applying for the sanction of the British government. The governor-general, who appears to have adopted annexation as the keystone of his policy, was bent on carrying out the precedent established in the case of Sattara, and would have at once proceeded to extinguish the raj, as a dependency which had lapsed to the paramount power by the failure of heirs, though he at the same time freely admitted "that the continuance of the raj would be a measure calculated to reassure and conciliate the good-will of the states of Rajpootana." Fortunately, in this instance the directors took a safer and we think a far more equitable course, and on the 26th of January, 1853, announced their decision that the succession of the adopted son should be sustained. They had not, they said, abandoned the principle established in the case of Sattara, but they saw "a marked distinction between the cases," Sattara being "a creation and gift of the British government, whilst Kerowly is one of the oldest of the Rajpoot states, which has been under the rule of its native princes from a period long anterior to the British power in India. It stands to us only in the relation of a protected ally, and perhaps there is no part of India where it is less desirable, except on the strongest grounds, to substitute our government for that of the native rulers."

The next case in which the question was raised was that of Jhansi, a territory in the north-west of Bundelcund, with an area of about 2600 square miles, and a population exceeding 250,000. This small Bundela state was tributary to the peishwa, and of course, when all his rights were forfeited, became tributary to the British government. At this time it was held by Sheo Row Bhaob, with the title of soubhadar, but as he had claims to favour in return for important services which he had rendered during the Mahratta war, the inferior right implied by his title was overlooked, and a treaty was entered into, by which at his special request the right of succession was "confirmed in perpetuity" to Row Ram Chund his grandson. Accordingly, by the second article, the British government, with a view to confirm the fidelity and attachment of the government of Jhansi, "consents to acknowledge, and hereby constitutes Row Ram Chund, his heirs and successors, hereditary rulers of the territory," &c. Row Ram Chund, who succeeded under this treaty, was permitted in 1832 to exchange the title of soubhadar for that of rajah; and held the government till 1835, when he died without issue. A competition for the succession then arose, and was decided by the British government in favour of Row Rugonath, a son of Sheo Row Bhaob, and consequently uncle of the late rajah. Row Rugonath, who was a leper, and so incompetent to rule that the British agent in Bundelcund was obliged to assume the administration, died in 1838. Like his predecessor he left no issue, and after another competition his brother, Baba Gunghidar Row, now the only remaining male descendant of
Sheo Row Bhao, was preferred. For a time after his succession the British agent continued to administer the government, and the revenue, which previous misrule had greatly diminished, began to flourish. At last, in 1843, an arrangement was made which restored the native administration, and Baba Gunghadar Row continued to rule till his death, on the 21st of November, 1853. As he too left no issue, the question of succession was once more raised, though under a new form. The whole male line of Sheo Row Bhao was extinct, but Gunghadar Row had endeavoured to secure a nominal succession to his family, by adopting a distant relation the very day before he died. The principle adopted in the Sattara case was obviously applicable here, and the governor-general lodged a minute, in which he declared his opinion that the territory of Jhansi had lapsed to the British government, and "should be retained by it equally in accordance with right and with sound policy." His council having concurred in this opinion, he proceeded to act upon it, and on the 4th of March, 1854, announced the decision to the home authorities in the following terms:—

"The chief of the state of Jhansi, which was created by the British government a tributary and dependent principality, adopted a son the day before his death. We have decided in accordance with a precedent in the case of this same state, that this adoption should not be recognized as conferring any right to succeed to the rule of the principality, and that as the chief has left no descendants, and no descendants of any preceding chief of this state are in existence, the state has lapsed to the British government." These views were not allowed to pass without contradiction, for the widow of the late chief, who would have been entitled to the regency during the adopted son's minority, presented a khureeta or petition, in which she argued with some plausibility that the original Persian terms interpreted "heirs and successors," meant not merely "heirs of the body or collateral heirs," but "successors in general," and properly implied that "any party whom he (the chief) adopted as his son, to perform the funeral rites over his body, necessary to insure beatitude in a future world, would be acknowledged by the British government as his successor, and one through whom the name and interests of the family might be preserved." This reasoning proved unavailing, and as soon as the sanction of the home authorities was obtained, Jhansi shared the fate of Sattara, and was erased from the list of native states.

The principle of annexation through failure of heirs, thus sanctioned and practically acted upon for the second time, was now destined to be exemplified on a much more extensive scale, and to extinguish the largest of the then existing Mahratta states. Ragojee Bhonsla, the Rajah of Berar, or as he was frequently designated from his capital, Rajah of Nagpoor, died on the 11th of December, 1853. He left neither issue nor collateral heirs, and had not even attempted to supply their place by adoption, so that the question of lapsing was for the first time raised in its simplest and purest form. The succession
was regulated by a "treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance," entered into in 1826, by which the British government, after stipulating for various advantages, including a large tract of territory, guaranteed "the rest of the dominions of the Nagpoor state to Ragojee Bhonsla, his heirs and successors." At the date of this treaty Ragojee Bhonsla, who had just attained majority, assumed the actual administration, but he had been the recognized ruler since 1817, when, though only maternally descended from the Ragojee who originally founded the state, the British government conferred the sovereignty upon him instead of Appa Sahib, who had forfeited it by treachery and rebellion. In this case, therefore, the claim of the British government to the "paramount power" could not be questioned, and accordingly the governor-general, true to his annexation policy, recorded his opinion "that by the death of the Rajah of Nagpoor, without any heir whatever, the possession of his territories has reverted to the British government which gave them; and further, that the possessions thus regained should not again be given away, since their alienation a second time is called for by no obligation of justice or equity, and is forbidden by every consideration of sound policy." His lordship's language, though open to criticism, is moderate compared with that of a member of council, who, in his minute on the subject, is extravagant enough to defend the annexation policy, on the ground of its being divinely decreed. "So far as we can foresee the ultimate destiny of this great empire," says Mr. Dorrin, "its entire possession must infallibly be consolidated in the hands of Great Britain. Thoroughly believing in this dispensation of Providence, I cannot coincide in any view which shall have for its object the maintenance of native rule against the progress of events which throws undisputed power into our possession."

The last and crowning act of annexation was that of the kingdom of Oude. As it proceeded on grounds entirely different from those which have been already mentioned, and divided the opinions of the highest authorities, some applauding it as a master-stroke of policy, while others condemned it as a gross breach of public faith, it will be proper to consider it with some care. About 1760, when the Mogul empire was falling to ruins, Shujah-u-Dowlah, who was its hereditary vizier, and also held the soubah of Oude, seized upon the latter, and became, though still professing a nominal allegiance to the emperor, an independent sovereign. He shortly afterwards made common cause with Meer Cossim, the deposed Nabob of Bengal, but being signally defeated by the forces of the Company, was glad to submit to a treaty which only deprived him of the districts of Allahabad and Corah, and left him undisputed master of all his other territories. In 1768, the Company having reason to believe that he was meditating the recovery of what he had lost, bound him by another treaty not to maintain a larger number of troops than 35,000. In 1773 he entered into the arrangements which have left a stain on the memory of Warren Hastings, and succeeded by means of British troops, shamefully hired for the iniquitous purpose, in crush-
ing the Róhillas. On his death in 1775, Shujah-u-Dowlah was succeeded by Asoff-u-Dowlah, and the Company, taking advantage of his position, obtained the cession of several districts, and in return for these and the payment of a subsidiary force engaged "to defend the soubah of Oude at all times." By subsequent arrangements the sum payable as subsidy was fixed successively at £500,000, £555,000, and £700,000, and at last in 1801, Sadat Ali, then nabob, was induced or rather compelled to enter into a treaty by which he ceded one half of his whole territory in perpetuity as a substitute for the pecuniary subsidy, and the Company, in return for the territories thus ceded, yielding a revenue of more than £1,500,000, became bound to defend him from all foreign and domestic enemies. The ceded territories were declared to be in lieu of all former subsidies, and demands of every kind for the maintenance of troops in Oude, whether to repel foreign foes or to suppress occasional internal disturbances or rebellions; but in order somewhat to modify the extent of this obligation, the nabob, while guaranteed in the possession and sole administration of his dominions, engaged to limit his own troops to a fixed number, to administer the government in such a manner as would be conducive to the prosperity and calculated to secure the lives and property of his subjects, and moreover to consult and act in conformity with the advice of the British government. Sadat Ali availed himself to the full extent of the obligations undertaken by the Company, and so carefully husbanded his revenue, though now reduced to one half of its former amount, that at his death in 1814 the treasury, which was empty on his accession, contained the large sum of £14,000,000.

Though the government of Oude under Sadat Ali was ably administered, repeated instances occurred in which the obligation to employ British troops in the suppression of rebellion and disorder could not be performed without countenancing oppression and injustice, and the resident had therefore been instructed not to afford military aid until he was satisfied that the occasion justified it. The task thus thrown upon him was, however, of too vague and extensive a nature to be adequately performed, and mutual complaints disturbing the harmonious co-operation of the two governments ensued. These necessarily increased under Sadat Ali's son and successor, Ghazee-u-din, a mere imbecile and debauchee, who left the government to an unscrupulous minister, and squandered its revenues among worthless favourites. For a time indeed the British government was scarcely in a position to remonstrate with much effect. Its financial difficulties had made it draw largely on the accumulations of the late nabob, and becoming debtor to Ghazee-u-din by three successive loans of £1,000,000 each, of which only one had been repaid, not in money, but by the cession of a tract of country conquered from Nepaul, it could not well take high ground with its creditor. On the contrary, a new honour was conferred upon him in 1819, when at the suggestion of the governor-general, and with the sanction of the Company, he threw aside his nominal allegiance to
Delhi, and placed himself on a footing of equality with the Mogul, by assuming the title of king. But while instructing the resident that the British troops were to be actively and energetically employed in the Oude territory in cases of real internal commotion and disorder, the governor-general in council did not lose sight of the reciprocal obligation on the part of the king not to require their interference without a just cause, and therefore, on the 22d of July, 1825, wrote as follows:—"This principle which has often been declared and acted upon during successive governments, must still be firmly asserted, and resolutely adhered to; and the resident must consider it to be a positive and indispensable obligation of his public duty to refuse the aid of British troops until he shall have satisfied himself on good and sufficient grounds (to be reported in each case as soon as practicable, and when the exigency of the case may admit of it, before the troops are actually employed), that they are not to be employed but in support of just and legitimate demands." Ghazee-u-din and his minister, when thus precluded from employing British troops in the perpetration of injustice, took the matter into their own hands, and disregarding the obligations of the treaty added so largely to the native army that it amounted to 60,000 men of all arms.

Ghazee-u-din was succeeded in 1827 by his son Nuseer-u-din, who imitated his reckless course, and kept up his large army, of which nearly two-thirds were entirely without discipline, and the remaining third, though accounted regulars, were so only in name, being badly trained, paid, clothed, armed, and accoutred, and placed for the most part under idle, incompetent, and corrupt commanders. Abuses thus rose to such a height that in January, 1831, Lord William Bentinck, in a conference with the king, distinctly warned him of his determination to make a strong representation to the authorities in England, on the subject of the misrule prevailing in Oude, and solicit their sanction to the adoption of specific measures, even to the length of assuming the direct administration of the country, if the evils were not corrected in the interim. The personal warning having passed unheeded, the governor-general renewed it in the following year by a letter, in which he says:—"I do not use this language of strong remonstrance without manifest necessity. On former occasions the language of expostulation has been frequently used towards you with reference to the abuses of your government, and as yet nothing serious has befallen you. I beseech you however not to suffer yourself to be deceived into a false security. I might adduce sufficient proof that such security would be fallacious, but I am unwilling to wound your majesty's feelings." These warnings passed unheeded, but in 1837, when Nuseer-u-din died without issue, and was succeeded by his uncle Mahomed Ali, advantage was taken of a new reign to place the relations between the two governments on a more definite footing. With this view, a treaty was concluded, by which provision was made for an increased force to be placed more immediately under British control, and it was
expressly stipulated, not only that the king should exert himself in concert with the resident to remedy the existing defects of his government, but that in the event of his neglect to do so, and a consequent continuance of misrule, the British government would have right to appoint its own officers to the management of all portions of the Oude territory in which such misrule might have occurred, and to continue such management for so long a period as it might deem necessary. In this case a true and faithful account of the receipts and expenditure of the assumed territories was to be rendered to his majesty, any surplus remaining after defraying all charges was to be paid into his treasury, and native institutions and forms of administration were to be maintained so far as possible, so as to facilitate the restoration of the assumed territories to his majesty when the proper period for such restoration should arrive.

Owing to the Afghan war and the military operations subsequently undertaken or contemplated by Lord Ellenborough, the increase of troops, which the British government had undertaken by the above treaty to maintain in Oude at its own expense, to the estimated amount of sixteen lacs a year, did not take place. To this failure on our part, the misrule which continued to prevail in Oude was probably in some degree attributable; but the whole blame was thrown on the profligate court and equally profligate ministers, who certainly seemed determined by their gross misconduct to justify the harshest measures that could be adopted against them. Still no decisive steps were taken, and though the abuses became every day more clamant, the British government was so much occupied otherwise, or so reluctant to act, that the throne of Oude was twice vacated by death and reoccupied before the final crisis came. In 1842 Mahomed Ali was succeeded by his son Soorya Jah, and he again, in February, 1847, by his son Wajid Ali Shah. The latter was by no means deficient in natural talents, but his indolence and low tastes rendered them of no avail, and the government fell entirely into the hands of worthless favourites. In the very first year of his reign, before its iniquities were fully developed, the governor-general, Lord Hardinge, visited Lucknow, and in a conference with the king caused a memorandum, prepared for the occasion, to be read and carefully explained to him. This document, after recapitulating the treaties which had been made with his predecessors, and showing how the British government, being both entitled and bound by them “to interfere if necessary for the purpose of securing good government in Oude,” could not permit “the continuation of any flagrant system of mismanagement” without becoming a participator in it, concluded as follows:—“If his majesty cordially enters into the plan suggested by the governor-general for the improvement of his administration, he may have the satisfaction within the period specified of two years of checking and eradicating the worst abuses, and at the same time of maintaining his own sovereignty and the native institutions of his kingdom unimpaired; but if he does not, if he takes a vacillating course, and fail by refusing to act on the
governor-general’s advice, he is aware of the other alternative and the consequences. It must then be manifest to the whole world that, whatever may happen, the king has received a friendly and timely warning.”

In the above memorandum a respite of two years was allowed, and when these elapsed, though no symptom of improvement appeared, the governor-general (Lord Dalhousie) deemed it necessary, before taking the final and irrevocable step, that General Sir W. H. Sleeman, the resident, should make a tour throughout the country and ascertain its actual state by personal inspection. This tour, made in 1849 50, and since published, completely established the worst that had been alleged against the King of Oude and his creatures, and made it clear that the British government could not, without loss of character, refrain from interference. The substance of the resident’s report is thus given in a letter which he addressed to the governor-general in 1852:—“No part of the people of Oude are more anxious for the interposition of our government than the members of the royal family; for there is really no portion more helpless and oppressed; none of them can ever approach the king, who is surrounded exclusively by eunuchs, fiddlers, and poetsasters, worse than either, and the minister and his creatures, who are worse than all. They appropriate at least one half of the revenues of the country to themselves, and employ nothing but knaves of the very worst kind in the administration. The king is a crazy imbecile, who is led about by these people like a child, and made to do whatever they wish him to do, and to give whatever orders may best suit their private interests. At present the most powerful of the favourites are Decanu-od-Doula and Hussein-od-Doula, two eunuchs; Anees-od-Doula, and Mosahib-od-Doula, two fiddlers; two poetsasters, and the minister and his creatures. The minister could not stand a moment without the eunuchs, fiddlers, and poets, and he is obliged to acquiesce in all the orders given by the king for their benefit. The fiddlers have control over the administration of civil justice; the eunuchs over that of criminal justice, public buildings, &c. The minister has the land revenue; and all are making enormous fortunes.” After advertiring to what he conceived to be the proper remedy, Sir W. Sleeman continued thus:—“What the people want, and most earnestly pray for, is that our government should take upon itself the responsibility of governing them well and permanently. All classes, save the knaves who now surround and govern the king, earnestly pray for this—the educated classes, because they would then have a chance of respectable employment, which none of them now have; the middle classes, because they find no protection or encouragement, and no hope that their children will be permitted to inherit the property they may leave, not invested in our government securities; and the humbler classes, because they are now abandoned to the merciless rapacity of the starving troops and other public establishments, and of the landholders driven or invited into rebellion by the present state of misrule. There is not, I believe, another government
in India so entirely opposed to the best interests and most earnest wishes of the people as that of Oude now is; at least I have never seen or read of one. People of all classes have become utterly weary of it.”

Though the necessity of interference was allowed on all hands to be urgent, the attention of the government was so much engrossed by the protracted hostilities in Burmah, and preparations for a new war, in which an open rupture with Persia, originating in a diplomatic squabble, had involved us, that two years more were allowed to pass away before the final step was taken. The governor-general, whose term of office was about to expire, was well aware of the difficulties with which the question was beset, and might have evaded responsibility by leaving it as a legacy to his successor. He was far too manly to adopt such a course, and therefore intimated to the directors that though the state of his health made an early departure from India absolutely necessary, he would remain if they desired it, and give practical effect to their decision in regard to Oude. This offer was gladly accepted by the home authorities, who having decided on assuming the government of the country, left him a large discretionary power as to the mode of procedure. In this, we cannot help thinking, he was more than unfortunate. Annexation involving the absolute extinction of Oude as a native government, and the nullification of all subsisting treaties with it, was decreed by a simple fiat, and then announced to the world by a public proclamation. Neither in this document nor in the instructions given to Colonel Outram, the resident, can we discover anything but a series of laboured attempts to disguise a gross breach of national faith. According to the account given, all the relations and mutual obligations of the two governments were regulated by the treaties of 1801 and 1837. By the former treaty the British government obtained the perpetual cession of one half of the Oude territory, for undertaking to defend the other half from all foreign and domestic enemies, and the Oude government was taken bound to establish a reformed system of administration, and act in conformity to the counsel of the Company’s officers; by the latter treaty it was stipulated that in the event of a reformed administration not being established, the British government might enter into possession of disturbed districts, and continue to administer them till they could be satisfactorily restored, any surplus revenue arising being, in the meantime, paid into the Oude treasury. It is impossible to see how anything contained in either of these treaties could countenance annexation. The one bound the government of Oude to reform its administration, and the other defined and fixed the penalty to be inflicted in the event of its failing to do so. When the treaty of 1837 was framed, there was no idea of annexation, and an important point was understood to be gained when, by the insertion of a penalty, means were provided for giving gradual effect to the vague promise of the treaty of 1801. Now, however, when annexation was to be resorted to, the treaty of 1837 was found to present a
serious obstacle. Its very definiteness would not allow any other penalty than that which it prescribed to be exacted, and therefore if annexation was to be persisted in, it became absolutely necessary to hold that the treaty of 1837 was not binding. The means employed for this purpose were certainly very jesuitical. The King of Oude, on whom the treaty was in a manner forced, had subscribed it with great reluctance, the governor-general had ratified it, and nothing occurred to throw the least suspicion on its validity. On the contrary, Lord Auckland, under whose government it was concluded, referred to it in 1839, in a friendly letter addressed to the King of Oude, as “the recent treaty of 11th September, 1837,” and after complimenting him on having, “in comparison with times past, greatly improved the kingdom,” conveyed to him the gratifying intelligence that he had in consequence been authorized by the court of directors, if he thought it “advisable for the present,” to relieve his majesty “from part of the clause of the treaty alluded to, by which clause expense is laid upon your majesty.” This clause exacted from the king an annual payment of £160,000 for an additional subsidiary force, but the directors considering that one half of the territory of Oude had been ceded to them under the express condition that such force was to be maintained at their own sole expense, were ashamed to enforce the payment, and therefore remitted it. In all other respects, however, the treaty remained in full force, and even the extortionate clause demanding double payment having been remitted only “for the present,” might at any future period be revived. Such was evidently the understanding of Lord Auckland. It was also that of his two immediate successors. Lord Ellenborough, when the question was put to him, declared that the home authorities did “not disallow the whole of the treaty of 1837, but only that portion of it which related to the payment, by the King of Oude of £160,000 for a military establishment of British officers.” Lord Hardinge, when in 1847 he threatened the King of Oude with the penalty to which he should subject himself by failing to reform his administration, at once referred to and recognized the validity of the treaty of 1837, since in no other treaty is there any mention of the kind of penalty obviously intended. The thing is so clear that it is scarcely necessary to add the testimony of Lord Broughton, who as president of the Board of Control at the time must have known the fact. “My impression,” he says, “certainly is that the treaty of 1837 was ratified by government at home, after the disallowance referred to; the whole treaty was not disallowed, but only one portion of it.”

After reading the above cumulative evidence as to the validity of the treaty of 1837, one is startled on turning to the governor-general’s instructions to Colonel Outram, and finding such passages as the following:—“It is very probable that the king in the course of the discussions which will take place with the resident may refer to the treaty negotiated with his predecessor in the year 1837. The resident is aware that the treaty was not continued in force,
having been annulled by the court of directors as soon as it was received in
England. The resident is further aware, that, although the King of Oude was
informed at that time that certain provisions of the treaty of 1837 respecting
an increased military force would not be carried into effect, the entire abroga-
tion of the treaty by the court of directors was never communicated to his
majesty. The effect of this reserve and want of full communication is felt to
be embarrassing to-day. It is the more embarrassing that the cancelled instru-
ment was still included in a volume of treaties which was published in 1845
by the authority of government. There is no better way of encountering the
difficulty than by meeting it full in the face.” And how was this to be done?
Simply, we would say, by admitting that the government stood committed to
the treaty, and could not recede from it without a breach of faith. Unfortu-
nately the governor-general took a very different view, and wrote as follows:
“If the king should allude to the treaty of 1837, and should ask why, if
further measures are necessary in relation to the administration of Oude, the
large powers which are given to the British government by the said treaty
should not be put in force, his majesty must be informed that the treaty has
had no existence since it was communicated to the court of directors, by whom
it was wholly annulled. His majesty will be reminded that the court of
Lucknow was informed at the time that certain articles of the treaty of 1837,
by which the payment of an additional military force was imposed upon the
king, were to be set aside.” “It must be presumed that it was not thought
necessary at that time to make any communication to his majesty regarding
those articles of the treaty which were not of immediate operation, and that a
subsequent communication was inadvertently neglected. The resident will be
at liberty to state that the governor-general in council regrets that any such
neglect should have taken place even inadvertently.” Such was the mode in
which it was proposed to “meet the difficulty full in the face,” and we can now
only wonder how it could have been supposed possible to do so by a method so
unworthy.

Having managed more dexterously than honourably to escape from the
obligations of the treaty of 1837, it only remained to deal with that of 1801.
But here new difficulties arose. By that treaty the government of Oude, in
return for the cession of half its territories, obtained a guarantee free of expense
against all foreign and domestic enemies, and engaged to reform its adminis-
tration in accordance with the advice of the Company’s officers. This engage-
ment it certainly did not fulfil. It did not reform its administration, and so
far from listening to the advice of the Company’s officers, turned a deaf ear to
repeated and earnest remonstrances. This, as a palpable violation of the treaty,
gave the British government the option of either declaring the treaty itself at
an end, or of insisting on the faithful performance of its obligations. If the
former alternative were adopted, matters would return to their original footing,
the British government simply withdrawing its guarantee and giving back the territories obtained in return for it; if the latter alternative were adopted, the King of Oude might have been compelled by force of arms, if more peaceful means proved unavailing, to perform to the very letter everything to which the treaty bound him. This, however, was the utmost extent to which British interference could be legitimately carried, and gives no countenance at all to the extreme measure of annexation. After declaring the treaty of 1801 to be at an end, the British government had no right whatever to interfere with Oude any further than might be necessary in order to preserve tranquillity beyond its own frontier, and therefore, when instead of contenting itself with such precautions, it proceeded by a kind of coup de main to seize the kingdom of Oude and incorporate it with its own territories, it pursued a policy which wherever exemplified, whether in Europe or in Asia, cannot be too severely reprobed. It deserved not to prosper, and in this particular case, so far as subsequent events yet to be detailed entitle us to judge, it did not prosper. After annexation had been finally resolved, and all attempts to obtain the king’s consent to it had, as must have been foreseen, proved unavailing, the deed was executed in defiance of him, and published to the world by a proclamation which, like the deed itself, will not bear criticism.

The remarks already made render it unnecessary to dissect this proclamation, and show how, with all its boldness of assertion and special pleading, it completely failed to justify the extirpation of the kingdom of Oude. During fifty years its sovereigns had not only remained faithful to the British alliance, but had again and again come forward in periods of the greatest emergency, and by liberal loans replenished the exhausted treasury of the Company. To abandon such an ally might have been taxed as ingratitude, but to take advantage of his weakness to strip him of his territories was an act for which, unless it was dictated by stern necessity, there is no excuse. Despicable as the government of Oude undoubtedly was, its inhabitants, for whose behalf alone we professed to interfere, made no application to us for that purpose, and so far from welcoming us as deliverers, united almost as one man in regarding us as invaders and unprincipled spoliators. All our professed anxiety for their prosperity and happiness they scouted as mere pretence, and ascribed the loss of their native independence to an unbounded ambition to extend our already overgrown empire by any means, however unscrupulous. In course of time, when the full benefits of our rule shall have been experienced, they may arrive at a different conclusion, but certainly the first effects of the annexation of Oude was to gain us a province at a serious loss of national character. Were it necessary, therefore, to test the merits of Lord Dalhousie’s administration by his annexation policy, particularly as exemplified in its last and crowning act, it would be impossible to refrain from using strong terms of censure. Fortunately, he had merits of another kind which gave him a foremost place among
Indian administrators, and entitle him to the gratitude of his country. Even in regard to his annexations, it must be remembered that they were not all effected by questionable means. At least two of them—the Punjab and Pegu—were legitimate conquests made in wars which the unprovoked aggressions of the Sikhs and Burmese had rendered inevitable. The admirable administration of the former of these provinces, carried on under his lordship's auspices, is one of the greatest glories of his government. His other merits cannot be better summed up than in the following extract from an article in the Times:

"He could point to railways planned on an enormous scale, and partly commenced: to 4000 miles of electric telegraph spread over India, at an expense of little more than £50 a mile; to 2000 miles of road bridged and metalled, near the whole distance from Calcutta to Peshawer; to the opening of the Ganges canal, the largest of the kind in the world; to the progress of the Punjab canal, and of many other important works of irrigation all over India; as well as to the re-organization of an official department of public works. Keeping equal pace with these public works, he could refer to the postal system, which he introduced in imitation of that of Rowland Hill, whereby a letter from Peshawer to Cape Comorin, or from Assam to Kurachhee, is conveyed for 4½d., or 3/8th of the old charge; to the improved training ordained for the civil service, covenanted and uncovenanted; to the improvement of education and prison discipline; to the organization of the legislative council; to the reforms which it had decreed, such as permitting Hindoo widows to marry again, and relieving all persons from the risk of forfeiting property by a change of religion." As the Marquis of Dalhousie was only forty-four years of age when he quitted India, on the 6th of March, 1856, it was hoped that he had then only performed the first act of the brilliant career for which his talents and virtues so admirably fitted him.

He forebode otherwise, and in replying to a parting address from the inhabitants of Calcutta, thus gave utterance to his feelings: "I have played out my part; and while I feel that in my case the principal act in the drama of my life is ended, I shall be content if the curtain should drop now on my public career." The words were almost prophetic, for he only returned with a broken constitution to linger out a few years and die. This melancholy event took place on the 19th of December, 1860.

Before closing the narrative of Lord Dalhousie's administration, some account must be given of an important change which was made in the constitution of the Company. The act which regulated it being fixed to expire on the 30th of April, 1854, it was deemed necessary to anticipate that event by new legislation, and accordingly, on the 20th of August, 1853, an act (16 and 17 Vict. c. 95) was passed, by which, until parliament should otherwise provide, all the territories then in the possession and under the government of the East India Company were to continue under such government in trust for her majesty. As the act was avowedly temporary, and only remained in force for
a very short period, it will be sufficient, instead of giving an analysis of its contents, to mention its two most important provisions—the one by which the number of directors was reduced from twenty-four to eighteen, of whom twelve only were to be elected by the proprietors, and six to be nominated by her majesty—and the other by which the appointments to the civil service, and those of assistant-surgeon in India, were withdrawn from the directors and thrown open to public competition.
BOOK IX.
FROM THE SEPOY MUTINY TO THE PRESENT TIME

CHAPTER I.

Lord Canning governor-general—Mutinous spirit prevalent among the Bengal sepoys—Objection to greased cartridges—Mutiny at Berhampoor—Precautionary measures adopted by government—Disbandment of the 19th and 34th native regiments at Barrackpoor—Indications of a widespread conspiracy—Proclamation of the governor general—Massacres at Meerut and Delhi.

WHEN Lord Canning, on the 29th of February, 1856, commenced his administration, a period of tranquillity was confidently predicted. The Burmese and Sikh wars having been brought to a successful termination, no native power either within the limits or beyond the frontiers of India seemed able or disposed to involve it once more in open hostilities. There was, however, cause for serious apprehension. Mutiny had repeatedly broken out in the native army, and the measures of repression resorted to had rather evaded the danger than fairly met and extinguished it. During the first Burmese war disaffection was general among the sepoys of Bengal who were ordered to serve in it, and was not only indicated by numerous desertions, but openly manifested by positive and combined refusals to obey the order to embark. On this occasion one wholesome measure of severity overawed the disaffected, but the spirit which animated the mutineers was by no means exorcised. In 1850, when Sir Charles Napier was commander-in-chief, disaffection, produced by the rejection of a claim to increase of pay during service in the Punjab, was so widely spread that that distinguished officer did not hesitate to denounce a large portion of the Bengal native army as mutinous, and ever after took credit to himself for having, by the vigorous measures he adopted, prevented a sepoy revolt which might have proved fatal to our Indian empire. It is true that he was then defending himself against the charge of having by these very measures exceeded his powers, and there is hence ground to suspect that his language was somewhat exaggerated. Still, however, there cannot be a doubt that the danger which he apprehended was by no means imaginary, and that he had even succeeded in tracing it to its true cause. The sepoys of Bengal, consisting in a large proportion of Brahmins and Rajpoots, whose high caste enabled them to exercise a prepon-
derating influence over their comrades, had become convinced that their services could not be dispensed with, and that the fate of our Indian empire was consequently in their hands. They had only to combine and present a united front in order to intensify the government; and, if necessary, coerce it into compliance with their demands. Combination had accordingly become a kind of watchword among them, and every subject which affected their interests was discussed and agitated as a common cause. Hence, when the question of increased pay arose, the language of some of the sepoys of the 32nd native infantry is said to have been, "We shall wait till three or four regiments come up, and whatever they do we will do also." In a similar spirit a Brahmin soldier, when his commanding officer, disgusted with sepoys' grumblings, exclaimed, "For shame! you pretend to be soldiers: were I the general I would dismiss you from the army;" ventured to reply, "If you did, you would get no more; we would stop them; and where would you be then?" Sir Charles Napier met the danger with characteristic decision when he supplied the place of a sepoy regiment disbanded for mutiny by one of Ghorkas, and proposed to give the sepoys a practical proof that their services were not indispensable, by showing how easily their place could be supplied. Unfortunately he was not seconded either by the Indian or the home authorities, and matters remained on the same unsatisfactory footing as before. But though the fact of sepoys' disaffection was virtually ignored, its existence was not denied. Even Lord Dalhousie, while he declined to sanction the decisive measures which the commander-in-chief recommended, frankly admitted that "the sepoys have been overpetted and overpaid of late; and has been led on by the government itself into the entertainment of expectations, and the manifestation of a feeling which he never held in former times;" and used a language of still more ominous import, when, in replying on the eve of his departure from India to the address of the inhabitants of Calcutta, he reminded them "how cruel violence, worse than all the excesses of war, may be suddenly committed by men who, to the very day on which they broke out in their frenzy of blood, have been regarded as a simple, harmless, and timid race, not by the government alone, but even by those who knew them best, were dwelling among them, and were their earliest victims." The danger thus pointed out, and proved to exist, both by overt acts of mutiny and indications of wide-spread disaffection, though it must have suggested,
certainly did not produce new measures of precaution, and the Indian government continued to slumber on, and to receive the congratulations of the directors on the general tranquillity which prevailed even in Oude, where, if anywhere, disturbance and revolt might have been apprehended as natural results of the annexation policy. At the same time, from causes over which neither the directors nor the Indian authorities had any control, the number of European troops usually allotted to the Bengal presidency had been greatly diminished. Two regiments of horse, withdrawn to the Crimea during the Russian war, had not been replaced; four regiments of infantry, and the greater part of the 14th dragoons, had been called away to serve in the war which had suddenly broken out in Persia; and a large proportion of the remainder were stationed far in the north-west to maintain tranquillity in the Punjab, where it was not unreasonably, though, as it afterwards appeared, erroneously believed, that a large military force was necessary in order to curb and overawe the newly subjugated Sikhs. To this imaginary danger government had turned an anxious eye, and in providing against it had so bared the other stations of their proper complement of European troops, that Oude, swarming with discontented chiefs and disbanded soldiers, backed by a hostile population, was guarded only by a single regiment; while Delhi, notoriously the centre of Mahometan intrigue, was still more scantily provided, its immense magazine of military stores being committed entirely to the charge of native troops. Such a disregard of the plainest dictates of prudence looks almost like judicial blindness. For a long series of years almost every man who earned a name for himself in the civil or military service of the East India Company had lifted a warning voice, and called attention to the precarious tenure by which its possessions were held; subsequent events had shown that such fears were not unfounded, and that causes were at work which threatened to realize their worst forebodings; but, as if the frequency of alarm had weakened the impression produced by it, the crisis was permitted to approach, and when it actually arrived, found the government totally unprepared to meet it. The fearful disasters which followed must now be narrated. This, the latest portion of Indian history, is also in many respects the most eventful; and must therefore be given with some minuteness of detail, care, however, being taken to relieve the record of sepoy atrocities by placing them in contrast with deeds of British heroism, at once more numerous and more illustrious than were ever before exhibited on so large a field and within so short a time.

The British rule in India never has been, and, it is to be feared, never will be popular. Though far more beneficent than that of preceding conquerors and of the existing native princes, it is the rule of aliens in blood, in manners, and in religion; and is therefore submitted to as a galling yoke, to be endured so long as there is no hope of being able to shake it off, but not a day longer. Accordingly, when the native army had deluded itself into the belief that it
had obtained the mastery, and was in a condition to dictate terms to the government, revolt sooner or later became inevitable, and the only point that remained undetermined was the time. One of the most formidable obstacles in the way was the antipathy between the Hindoos and the Mahometans, the former composing the great bulk of the population, and the latter, while numerous enough to be formidable, deriving from their superior position as a once dominant class, a far greater degree of influence than was indicated by their numbers. The effect of this antipathy was to keep the two classes of religionists apart, and make it morally impossible for them to enter into a general combination for any common object. The British government, aware of this security against a united revolt, appear not to have underrated it, and yet from some strange fatality they, without intending it, destroyed this security, and enabled Hindoos and Mahometans to enter into a mutual league for the complete and final overthrow of our Indian empire. The cry raised was that their religion was in danger, and that henceforth Christianity alone was to be tolerated. It is difficult to understand how such a cry could carry any weight with it. The successive governors-general had vied with each other in carrying the principles of religious toleration to their utmost limits, and had even given so much countenance to native superstitions as to incur the charge of forgetting that they were themselves Christians and the representatives of a Christian government. It is almost needless, therefore, to say that there was no intention whatever to reverse this policy, and that the cry raised was unfounded. Unfortunately, however, the Bengal sepoys, now ripe for revolt, were not unwilling to give credit to any accusation, however monstrous, which might seem to justify their meditated treachery. The delusion spread like wildfire, and a circumstance so trivial in itself that one can hardly speak of it with gravity became, not perhaps the cause, but certainly the occasion, of a revolt not surpassed in magnitude and ferocity by any which history has yet recorded.

The improved rifle, now generally substituted for the old musket, is loaded with a greased cartridge, the end of which at the time of using it requires to be bitten off. In the beginning of 1857, after it had been resolved to arm the Bengal sepoys with this weapon, the manufacture of the necessary cartridges was commenced at the military depot of Dum dum, situated about eight miles north-east of Calcutta. It had never occurred to the officials that there was anything in these cartridges by which any religious prejudice could be offended, but it was not long before they were undeceived. As the story goes, a sepoy (a Brahmin) carrying his lotah filled with water, with which he was about to prepare his food, was met by a classie or workman of a low caste attached to the magazine, who asked him for a drink, and being refused on the ground that the lotah would thereby be defiled, observed, "You think much of your caste, but wait a little; the sahib-log (literally "gentleman-strangers") will make you
bite cartridges soaked in cow and pork fat, and then where will your caste be?" The mention of the two kinds of fat was as artful as it was malicious, the one being the abomination of Hindoos and the other that of Mahometans; and it is hence easy to understand how the subject once mooted was not allowed to drop, and being generally discussed produced much real, and probably more pretended alarm. Major Bontein, the officer commanding at Dumdum, when first made aware of it, paraded all the native troops stationed there, and called for any complaints. At least two-thirds of them, including all the native commissioned officers, immediately stepped to the front, and in a manner described as "perfectly respectful," stated their objection to the present method of preparing cartridges for the new rifle-musket. "The mixture employed for greasing the cartridges was," they said, "opposed to their religious feelings," and "they begged to suggest the employment of wax and oil in such proportion as, in their opinion, would answer the purpose required." The spirit of moderation thus manifested at the outset may have blinded the authorities as to the extent of the danger. At all events they seem not to have felt the necessity of instantaneous action in order to provide against it, and they contented themselves with issuing orders that the further manufacture of greased cartridges should cease, and that in future the men might purchase the ingredients at the bazaar, and "apply them with their own hands." Unfortunately the moderation exhibited at Dumdum proved to be the exception, and not the rule; and in several other quarters the excitement, instead of being allayed by the assurance that the cause which produced it had ceased to exist, continued to increase. At first only the grease employed had been objected to, but it was now discovered that there was something wrong with the paper. Unlike that formerly used, it had a glazed appearance, which, in the opinion of the sepoys, indicated the presence of grease, and accordingly on the 6th of February, General Hearsey, commanding the division of the Bengal troops, wrote from Barrackpoor, situated sixteen miles north from Calcutta, as follows:—"A most unreasonable and unfounded suspicion has unfortunately taken possession of the native officers and sepoys at this station, that grease or fat is used in the composition of this cartridge paper; and this foolish idea is now so rooted in them that it would, I am of opinion, be both idle and unwise to attempt its removal."

Hitherto the objections to the cartridges were believed to be sincere, and the prevailing excitement was treated as if no ulterior or criminal purpose was in contemplation. Indications to the contrary were now manifested. On the 5th of February, the day preceding that on which the above letter of General Hearsey was written, a jemadar, or native lieutenant, waited on Lieutenant Allen, one of the European officers of the 84th native infantry, then stationed at Barrackpoor, and informed him that the four native regiments in that cantonment were preparing to break out in open mutiny, and that he had been invited to attend a meeting which was to be held that very night for the
purpose of maturing the plot, and arranging the mode of execution. Lieutenant Allen, without attaching much credit to so extraordinary a statement, deemed it necessary to visit the lines when the alleged meeting was to be held, and felt reassured, on ascertaining by ocular inspection, that there was not the least appearance of it. The jemadar, however, persisted in his statement, explaining that the resolution to hold the meeting had been abandoned, in consequence of a suspicion that it had been detected. It ultimately appeared that the jemadar's information was substantially correct, for on the 11th of February a startling confirmation of it was received from General Hearsey. "We have at Barrackpoor been dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion. I have been watching the feeling of the sepoys here for some time. Their minds have been misled by some designing scoundrels." In order to counteract the impression thus produced, he had on the 9th paraded all the troops, and availed himself of the thorough knowledge which he possessed of their language, to disabuse their minds of the falsehoods which had been instilled into them. "I myself," he says, "energetically and explicitly explained, in a loud voice, to the whole of the men, the folly of the idea that possessed them, that the government, or that their officers, wished to interfere with their caste or religious prejudices, and impressed on them the absurdity of their for one moment believing that they were to be forced to become Christians. I told them the English were Christians of the Book, i.e. Protestants; that we admitted no proselytes but those who, being adults, could read and fully understand the precepts laid down therein; that if they came and threw themselves down at our feet, imploring to be made 'Book' Christians, it could not be done; they could not be baptized until they had been examined in the tracts of the Book, and proved themselves fully conversant in them, and then they must, of their own good-will and accord, desire to become Christians of the Book ere they could become so. I asked them if they perfectly understood what I said, especially the 2d grenadiers; they nodded assent; I then dismissed the brigade." Had explanation been all that was needed, General Hearsey's harangue might have sufficed, and government rather hastily indulged the hope that the excitement was about to die away. The general himself must have had a very different presentation when he wrote thus: "May I state my opinion in regard to the policy of having five or six regiments of native infantry assembled in brigade here, without any European corps of infantry, or artillery, or cavalry, as a point d'appui, in case of a mutiny occurring. You will perceive in all this business the native officers were of no use; in fact, they are afraid of their men, and dare not act; all they do is to hold themselves aloof, and expect by so doing they will escape censure, as not actively implicated. This has always occurred on such occasions, and will continue to the end of our sovereignty in India. Well might Sir Charles Metcalfe say, 'that he expected to awake some fine morning, and find India had been lost to the English crown.'"
The excitement among the native troops had now passed through two successive stages. First, its ostensible cause was the new cartridge, which could not be used without incurring the loss of caste; and next, it was a belief that a system of compulsory conversion to Christianity was about to be adopted. A third stage was at hand, in which the excitement was to pass into open mutiny. A small guard of the 34th native infantry, one of the regiments which had enjoyed the benefit of General Hearsey's harangue, having arrived on the 24th of February at Berhampoor, about 116 miles north from Calcutta, the men composing it were, as usual in such cases, feasted by their countrymen of the 19th native infantry stationed there. The subject of the greased cartridges, then the engrossing topic, was of course discussed, and probably along with it other grievances, real or imaginary. The result was soon disclosed. On the very next day, when the commanding officer, Colonel Mitchell, ordered blank ammunition to be distributed, with a view to a parade on the morning of the 26th, the men of the 19th refused to receive it, on the ground that there was some doubt as to how the cartridges were prepared. In this instance the refusal had not even a shadow of excuse, as the cartridges offered had been manufactured before the new rifle was thought of, and were the very same as those that had been used for years without objection. With some difficulty they were intimidated, and after receiving the ammunition in sullen silence, retired to their lines. Their determination, however, was taken. In the course of the evening, after a consultation, during which they worked themselves into a state of uncontrollable excitement, they rushed forth, and having broken into the bells, or small huts, where the native arms when not in use were deposited, seized them, and walked off, shouting defiance. Colonel Mitchell had the option of two courses, either to march out against the mutineers in the dark, or to remain on the defensive till morning. Neither course was free from serious objections. There were no European troops at the station, and no other native troops in addition to the mutinous regiment than a detachment of cavalry and a battery of artillery. Thus the whole work, whether of coercion or of defence, was of necessity to be intrusted to troops who in all probability sympathized with those against whom they were to act. All circumstances considered, delay was undoubtedly the more prudent course, but immediate action, as the more spirited and decisive, was preferred. The night was so dark that even with the aid of torches there was no small difficulty in finding the way. Nor was this the worst. The ground near the lines was interspersed with tanks, which must have greatly impeded the movements of cavalry, while the torchlight reflected from them, would, in the case of actual encounter, have enabled the mutineers, themselves unseen, to open a destructive fire. When fully aware of the difficulties of his position, Colonel Mitchell was not unwilling to avoid a bloody struggle of very doubtful issue, and a kind of negotiation ensued, which resulted in a compromise, he on his
part agreeing as a first step to withdraw his troops, and the mutineers on theirs agreeing, on this stipulation being complied with, to make their submission.

This arrangement, however necessary it may have been under the circumstances, was not the less to be deplored. A mutiny, which was visibly assuming larger dimensions, had only been suppressed by allowing the mutineers to dictate terms. A general invitation was thus virtually given to all the disaffected to lose no time in imitating a bad example. During these incipient disturbances, General Anson, the commander-in-chief, was unfortunately far away among the Simla Hills, to which he had gone for the benefit of his health. But government, previously somewhat lethargic, appeared at length to be fully awakened. The account of the Berhampoor mutiny reached Calcutta on the 4th of March, and only two days later the Oriental Company’s ship Bentinck was steaming to Rangoon with orders to bring up her majesty’s 84th foot with the utmost possible despatch. Meanwhile the 19th had been ordered down to Barrackpoor. Thither too, as a preparation for the steps which it might be necessary to take, were detached a wing of her majesty’s 53d, and two troops of artillery. Twelve pieces of cannon were also brought into the cantonment. The 84th regiment arrived at Calcutta on the 20th of March, and immediately proceeded to Chinsurah, to await the arrival of the 19th. The object of these preparations was too palpable not to be well understood by the disaffected, who no longer hesitated to give utterance to their feelings. The 34th native infantry in particular, throwing aside the moderation which they professed when General Hearsey addressed them, were now forward in expressing their sympathy with the 19th, who they thought merited not punishment but reward, for the stand which they had made in defence of their religion.

In India the native mind is so impulsive, that words once uttered soon pass into deeds. Hence the 34th, though they could not but be aware of the advantage of remaining quiescent till they should be reinforced by their countrymen from Berhampoor, were unable to refrain from previously giving an unequivocal manifestation of the mutinous spirit which animated them. On the 29th of March, two days before the 19th reached Barrackpoor, it was reported to Lieutenant Baugh, adjutant of the 34th, that a sepoy of the name of Mungul Pandy, belonging to that regiment, had intoxicated himself with bang, and was walking in front of the lines, armed with a sword and a musket, calling upon his comrades to rise, and declaring that he would shoot any European who came in his way. The lieutenant instantly mounted his horse, and rode off to the parade ground. As he approached, Mungul Pandy concealed himself behind a gun, and taking a deliberate aim fired. The shot took effect only on the horse, which fell, and brought down its rider. He, however, quickly disentangled himself, and seizing one of his pistols, hastened up and fired at the assassin. He had the misfortune to miss, and was unable to draw his sword before Mungul Pandy made a rush at him and cut him down. Happily the
blow was not mortal, and before it could be repeated, the sergeant-major of the regiment, who was a little behind Lieutenant Baugh, sprung forward, and by drawing the attack upon himself, saved the life of his superior officer by endangering his own, for he too in his attempt to seize the miscreant was severely wounded by him. Meanwhile a jemadar and twenty sepoys, though not more than thirty yards distant, refused to render any assistance, and the two Europeans would to a certainty have been murdered, had not a Mahometan orderly, who had followed Lieutenant Baugh, given a signal proof of fidelity by seizing Mungul Pandy, in the act of again levelling his reloaded musket. General Hearsey, with several other officers, aroused by the firing, was quickly on the spot, and by his boldness arrested what was on the eve of becoming a general mutiny. Riding up to the jemadar and his guard with a loaded pistol in his hand, and threatening to shoot the first man who showed any signs of disobedience, he ordered them back to their posts. They were at once overawed, and withdrew.

On the day after the above outrage, the 19th native infantry, on the way to Barrackpoor, arrived at Baraset, which is only about eight miles distant. The punishment intended for them had transpired. Lord Canning, in a minute dated the 27th of March, had thus expressed himself:—"The open refusal of the whole regiment to obey orders, the seizure of arms with violence, and a tumultuous but combined resistance of the authority of its officers, with arms loaded, is an offence for which any punishment, less than dismissal from the service, would be inadequate; mutiny so open and defiant cannot be excused by any sensitiveness of religion or caste, by fear of coercion, or by the seductions and deceptions of others. It must be met promptly and unhesitatingly, and without the delay of a day more than may be necessary." It may be questioned whether Lord Canning acted up to his own ideas of the enormity of the crime when he proposed simple dismissal as the severest punishment to be inflicted on it. At this time, however, it was almost universally believed that the sepoys were so much enamoured of the service and of the emoluments, present and prospective, derived from it, that they dreaded nothing so much as expulsion. It would seem that the 19th still partook so much of this feeling that the prospect of their disbandment overwhelmed them with grief, and they were endeavouring to avert it by expressions of repentance. This was certainly fortunate, for it afterwards appeared that they had been waited upon by a secret deputation from the 34th, and urged without effect to concert a new and more formidable rising. On the 31st of March, when they entered Barrackpoor, they found their arrival anticipated by her majesty's 84th, a wing of her majesty's 53d, two European batteries, and the governor-general's body-guard, of whose fidelity, though composed of natives, there was no doubt. The disbandment was immediately carried into effect. On one side of the parade ground stood the European troops and batteries, and the body-guard;
on the other side the 34th, and other native troops previously at the station; and in the middle, between them, the doomed 19th. It was a moment of great anxiety, for it was not impossible that all the native troops would make common cause. The 19th, however, when ordered to lay down their arms, obeyed without a murmur. Their peaceful and repentant demeanour, though it could not reverse the sentence, procured them some indulgences which they could hardly have anticipated, and they received payment, not only of their arrears to the uttermost farthing, but of the hire of cattle and boats employed in bringing down their families. "This gracious act," says General Hearsey, whose thorough knowledge of the native character did not on this occasion save him from being imposed upon, "was keenly felt, and they loudly bewailed their fate, many men saying the regiment had been misled."

Government, willing to believe that the question of the greased cartridges had been set at rest, and that the mere disbanding of a regiment would suffice to put down disaffection, began to speak of the danger as already past, and actually engaged a vessel to carry the 84th regiment back to Rangoon. It is difficult to understand how the governor-general and his council could have been betrayed into such a monstrous blunder. Not only were they aware that the 34th native infantry contained a number of men who had cheered on Mungul Pandy in his atrocious attempts at assassination; but incendiary fires, the invariable forerunners of general outrage, were constantly taking place in localities widely separated; general ferment, accompanied with a mysterious distribution, by flying messengers, of little unleavened cakes, called chupatties, was visible in many quarters, even among the general population; and distinct reports from various regiments proved the existence of so much bad feeling, as compelled General Hearsey to declare, as early as the 18th of April, that "the Hindoos generally are not at present trustworthy servants of the state." It is doubtful if any measures, however severe, could have averted or even retarded the general revolt, for which the whole of the Bengal sepoys were now ripe; but it is obvious that, under the circumstances, disbandment had ceased to be a punishment, and rather provoked than suppressed the crime against which it was directed. It in fact only anticipated the course which the men were about to take of their own accord, and must have been held by them in derision, while government were confidently trusting to it as an effectual means of working upon their fears and recalling them to a sense of duty.

On the 2d of May, the 7th Oude irregular cavalry, stationed about seven miles from the Lucknow cantonments, when ordered to bite the cartridge, a regulation which, notwithstanding its formal repeal by the government, seems still, from some unexplained oversight, to have been enforced, refused. The regiment was one of those which had belonged to the King of Oude, and both from this circumstance, and the local influence which had probably been brought to bear upon it, there could scarcely be a doubt that the disaffection,
though it took the name of a religious scruple, was of a very different and more criminal nature. Accordingly, it appeared on the very next day that the ringleaders in the regiment, not contented with the mutinous spirit which prevailed among themselves, were endeavouring to instil it into others, for they had sent a letter to the 48th native infantry, then stationed at Lucknow, in which it was said, "We are ready to obey the directions of our brothers of the 48th in the matter of cartridges, and to resist, either actively or passively." Fortunately, the administration of Oude was at this time intrusted to a man who was equal to the crisis. Sir Henry Lawrence, the moment the intelligence reached him, mustered his forces, and set out with a wing of her majesty's 32d, a field battery, and various detachments of native infantry and cavalry. Previous to his arrival, the mutiny had assumed a more aggravated form, and the European officers had been threatened with violence. As soon, however, as the approach of the troops became known, the mutineers lowered their tone, and even attempted to escape from the consequences of their crime by delivering two of the ringleaders as prisoners, and offering to give up forty more. So completely indeed had they yielded to their fears, that every symptom of violence had disappeared, and the whole regiment had become perfectly quiet. On being ordered, they at once formed into line, while Sir Henry Lawrence placed his guns, and disposed the European infantry, so as to be able to control the other native regiments till the work of disarming was quietly accomplished. The first act of overt mutiny in Oude being thus suppressed, the chief-commissioner did not delude himself into the belief that permanent tranquillity was secured. He knew that his decisive course had at most procured a respite, which ought to be employed in preparing for a more formidable outbreak. After a court of inquiry, which led to a discovery of the principal offenders, who were consequently seized and put in irons, he began to concentrate the troops which had hitherto been located in isolated positions. At the same time he did not disdain to try the effect of moral suasion. With this view he held a public durbar at his residence in cantonments, and in presence of all the native officers, after conferring suitable rewards on several individuals who had proved their fidelity by disclosing the attempts made to tamper with the regiments to which they belonged, delivered an address in Hindostanee, pointing out the advantages conferred on India by the British government, and the folly as well as the futility of any endeavour to overthrow it. The impression made is said to have been powerful, but of this some doubt may be entertained. The time for argument had passed, and there is good ground to suspect that every attempt at conciliation was regarded by the natives as an indication of fear. At first Sir Henry was disposed to disband the whole of the mutinous regiment, and thereafter allow those of the soldiers who might be found guiltless to be re-enlisted, but the governor-general in council, we think, acted more wisely when, approving generally of the prompt measures adopted, he resolved that
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"the disbandment, to whatever length it may be carried, should be real, and that the men whose innocence can be shown, and whose general character is irreproachable, or those by whom offenders have been denounced, and mutinous designs disclosed, should be retained in the ranks, the others being dismissed absolutely and finally," because there was "a fiction in discharging soldiers one day, to take them back the next, whatever may be their claims to mercy, which would greatly weaken the general effect of the measure of disbandment as an example." The idea of a general disbandment was in consequence abandoned, and only the native officers, with one or two exceptions, and about fifteen sepoys, were dismissed.

Almost simultaneously with the outbreak at Lucknow, another of a more atrocious character occurred at the important military station of Meerut, situated thirty-five miles N.N.E. of Delhi. Unfortunately the officer in military command of the district possessed none of the abilities which characterized the chief-commissioner at Lucknow, and the consequences were most disastrous. In the first week of May, the carabineers of the 3d regiment of Bengal light cavalry, when ordered to parade in order to learn the new regulation, which substituted tearing by the hand instead of biting the cartridges, declared their determination not to handle them. As the cartridges tendered were the same as those which they had been accustomed to use without objection, the refusal could only be regarded as mutinous, and accordingly the commander-in-chief, when the affair was reported to him, ordered that the eighty-five men who had refused, constituting in fact, with the exception of five, the whole men of the regiment armed with carabines, should be tried by a general native court-martial. The sentence pronounced on the 9th of May condemned the whole of the prisoners to ten years' confinement with hard labour, and effect was immediately given to it by parading the whole troops then in Meerut, consisting of her majesty's 60th rifles, her majesty's 6th dragoon guards (carabineers), and the Bengal artillery, all European; and the following native regiments—the 3d light cavalry, the 11th native infantry, and the 20th native infantry, and in their presence fastening the chains and marching off the convicts to the common jail, preparatory to their removal to some of the government central prisons. The jail previously contained above 1200 prisoners, most of them, as may well be supposed, of desperate character; but notwithstanding the addition thus made to the number, under circumstances which obviously called for the utmost precaution, the jail remained as before under the sole charge of a company of native soldiers. While the authorities, civil and military (for both must bear the blame), were thus neglecting the plainest dictates of prudence, the native troops in Meerut completed their plans, and made ready to take the initiative in a general revolt. In the course of the day ominous warnings were given by placards, which called upon the natives to rise and slaughter the hated Feringhees. Nothing, however, but an actual rising seemed capable of arousing the
authorities to a sense of their danger, and as the 9th had passed away without disturbance, it was hoped that the 10th, a Sunday, would also prove peaceful. At first this hope was realized, and soldiers and civilians crowded to the church, one of the largest in India, to take part in the morning service. There was no visible appearance of danger, and it was therefore imagined that the evening service would be equally tranquil. Many were actually preparing for it, and the bell had begun to ring, when the noise of shouting and firing announced that the catastrophe had arrived. The day had been allowed to pass because the conspirators were aware how much darkness would aid them in the perpetration of their still darker deeds. Their plan was to seize the arms of the troops after they had marched off to church, and thus render them powerless either to defend themselves or afford any protection to others. Before relief could arrive the work would be done, and at all events the approach of night would give an opportunity of escape. Most providentially, either hurried on by their thirst for blood and plunder, which had become too impatient to be any longer restrained, or deceived by the sound of the church bells into a belief that the service had already commenced, they broke out prematurely, and thus partially defeated their diabolical design.

At the commencement a party of the 3d light cavalry galloped over to the jail, and, besides rescuing the eighty-five convicts, liberated all the other prisoners. Meanwhile the remainder of the regiment had broken out in open mutiny. Their European officers endeavoured to reason them into a sense of their duty, and, it would seem, not wholly in vain, for the 20th, the only regiment which had yet seized their arms, returned to their lines. The impression, however, was only momentary, for they suddenly rushed out again and began to fire. The 11th showed more reluctance to carry matters to extremes, and yielded to their officers so far as not to touch their arms, and allow Colonel Finnis their commander to go out and reason with the 20th. It was a desperate attempt, and proved fatal to that gallant officer, who was received with a volley of musketry and fell riddled with balls. All restraint was now thrown aside, and the whole of the native regiments shouting defiance, continued their work of plunder, fire, and murder. "The mutineers," says General Hewitt, in a report written on the following day, "then fired nearly all the bungalows in rear of the centre lines south of the nullah, including Mr. Greathed’s the commissioner and my own, together with the government cattle-yard and commissariat officer’s house and office. In this they were assisted by the population of the bazaar, the city, and the neighbouring villages. Every European, man, woman, and child, fallen in with, was ruthlessly murdered." On reading this account the question naturally arises, How could all these atrocities be perpetrated, while a British force sufficient to have annihilated the mutineers and the miscreants associated with them, was in the immediate vicinity? To this question General Hewitt gives only the following unsatisfactory reply:
"As soon as the alarm was given, the artillery, carabineers, and 60th rifles were got under arms, but by the time we reached the native infantry parade ground, it was too dark to act with efficiency in that direction; consequently the troops retired to the north of the nullah, so as to cover the barracks and officers’ lines of the artillery, carabineers, and 60th rifles, which were, with the exception of one house, preserved." In other words, instead of advancing on the city he retired to a greater distance from it, and placing a nullah between himself and the insurgents, left them at full liberty to do their horrid work, and then escape without molestation. That there was the grossest mismanagement it is impossible to doubt, and we are therefore prepared to learn that the command which General Hewitt at this time held ought never to have been intrusted to him. Only two years before he had commanded on the Peshawer frontier, and, according to a statement of Colonel H. B. Edwardes, commissioner of the Peshawer division, had been removed because “physically unfit” for its “emergencies.” “During the time he commanded the Peshawer division,” adds the colonel, “it is believed he never once visited the outposts, and he used to inspect his troops in a buggy.” He was in fact worn out by age and nearly half a century of service in India. Such was the man whom official blundering placed in an important command after his physical unfitness had been acknowledged, as if to prove the irreparable mischief of which mere imbecility is capable.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the horrors of that Sunday night at Meerut, but in order to give some idea of them a few details by eye-witnesses seem necessary. A lady writes thus: “Bungalows began to blaze round us nearer and nearer till the frenzied mob reached that next our own. We saw a poor lady in the verandah, a Mrs. C., lately arrived. We bade the servants bring her over the low wall to us, but they were too confused to attend to me at first. The stables of that house were first burned. We heard the shrieks of the horses. Then came the mob to the house itself with awful shouts and curses. We heard the doors broken in, and many, many shots, and at the moment my servant said they had been to bring away Mrs. C., but had found her dead on the ground cut horribly, and she on the eve of her confinement.” Mr. Rotton the chaplain gives his testimony, in his work entitled The Chaplain’s Narrative, in the following terms:—“It was not until sunrise on Monday that any one knew, with anything like certainty, the extent of the atrocities committed by the savages within the cantonment of Meerut. What spectacles of terror met the eye almost simultaneously with the return of the day! The lifeless and mutilated corpses of men, women, and children, were here and there to be seen, some of them so frightfully disfigured, and so shamefully dishonoured in death, that the very recollection of such sights chills the blood.” After reading these accounts it is no small relief to find that in the midst of the massacre there were natives whose fidelity remained unshaken, and who heroically risked their own lives in saving others.
General Hewitt says in his report, "I am led to think the outbreak was not premeditated;" but this is only another of his egregious blunders. While he was satisfying himself with defending the barracks and taking credit for having driven the mutineers out of the station, they were carrying out their plans and hurrying along the highroad to Delhi, where they had by previous arrangement made sure of a welcome reception. Had General Hewitt despatched at least a portion of his troops in pursuit, the mutineers must to a certainty have been overtaken. Besides the length of the road, there were other obstacles that must have retarded them. There was a river to pass, and as it was more than half-way between the two places, the mutinous infantry, at least, could not have crossed before his dragoons came up with them. It is said that an officer of this regiment volunteered to undertake the duty with a small detachment, and was not permitted. Thus saved from the speedy vengeance which might have been inflicted, the mutineers hurried on without interruption, and on the morning of the 11th were descried approaching Delhi. So certain were they that the native regiments would not oppose them, that at first about seven o'clock a body of troopers, numbering not more than thirty or forty, on reaching the bridge of boats which here crosses the Jumna, galloped over without slacking bridle, rushed into the city, and made their appearance in front of the palace, calling clamorously for the king. On being asked what they wanted, they told at once that they had revolted, and come from Meerut resolved on fighting for their faith and killing the Europeans. Had there been no traitors in the palace this answer would have sealed their fate, but they knew better, and delayed not a moment to commence their murderous work. Captain Douglas, the commander of the palace guards, and Mr. Simon Fraser, commissioner at Delhi, were among the first victims. The latter after shooting a trooper who had fired his pistol at him, was cut down and despatched by a number of the king's servants, who, as soon as he fell, rushed out upon him, and kept cutting at him with their swords till he was dead. This first taste of blood having as it were sharpened their appetite, they forced the door of Captain Douglas's apartments. He was lying on bed suffering from severe injuries which he had received by leaping from a height to escape from some troopers who had surrounded him. Beside him stood the Rev. Mr. Jennings the chaplain, his daughter and another young lady. They were all ruthlessly murdered. After these horrible atrocities a general massacre of Europeans commenced. About thirty of them, who had barricaded themselves in the house of Mr. Aldwell, a government pensioner, made a resolute but unavailing defence, but the only persons who escaped were Mrs. Aldwell and her three children, who, by assuming the native dress, succeeded after several hairbreadth escapes in reaching the palace, and were there confined with about fifty other Europeans, whose lives the king was said to have guaranteed. In what way the guarantee was fulfilled will afterwards be seen.
Shortly after the first troopers had crossed the bridge and rushed to the palace, others took the direction of the cantonments, showing how well they were aware that the native troops there stationed, instead of encountering them as enemies, would at once fraternize with them, and take part in their atrocious designs. The British officers still hoped better things, and, indeed, even those who saw too clearly what the inevitable result would be had no alternative. There were no European troops, who, however outnumbered, might by deeds of heroism have defied the utmost fury of their assailants, and it therefore only remained to undertake the desperate task of attempting to put down a revolt by means of soldiers known to sympathize with it, and suspected of having pledged themselves to support it. The consequence was, that the Delhi regiments when brought face to face with the Meerut mutineers, not only refused to oppose them, but either stood by while their officers were shot down, or, with ineffable baseness, joined in the massacre. All idea of making head against the mutineers was now necessarily abandoned, but it was thought possible that the Flagstaff Tower, a work of some strength, might be held till relief should arrive from Meerut. Here, accordingly, the surviving officers and some European residents escaped from the city took refuge. The defence seemed practicable, for Brigadier Graves had posted himself there with two guns and about 300 sepoys, who were still apparently obeying orders. This exception to the general treachery was of short duration, and the handful of Europeans, almost entirely deserted, could only disperse and run for their lives. Meanwhile within the city the mutiny was assuming the form of an organized rebellion. The king either voluntarily in execution of a premeditated design, or, as he afterwards pretended, under the influence of intimidation, had assumed the sovereignty of India, and seated himself on the throne of the Mogul.

After this extraordinary usurpation, no time was lost in giving practical effect to it. The horrible massacres which accompanied it have been already mentioned. The next steps were, if possible, still more explicit. The magazine, situated only at a short distance from the palace, immediately attracted the attention of the mutineers, and between nine and ten on the morning of the 11th it was intimated to the native officer commanding outside, that the king had sent a guard to take possession of the magazine, and either carry up all the Europeans within it to the palace or prevent them from leaving. At this time the number of these Europeans was only nine—Lieutenant Willoughby, the officer in command, Lieutenants Forrest and Raynor, Conductors Buckley, Shaw, and Scully, Sub-conductor Crow, and Sergeants Edwards and Stewart. Had they at once on receiving the message attempted an escape it would have been impossible to blame them, as defence was evidently hopeless, but they were animated by a more heroic spirit, and prepared to meet death sooner than abandon their post. Their first measure accordingly was to close and barricade the gates, and to place guns double-charged with grape, so as to command the
points most likely to be attacked. Inside the gate leading to the park stood sub-conductor Crow and Sergeant Stewart with lighted matches in their hands, and with orders, if any attempt was made to force an entrance, to fire at once the two six-pounders under their charge, and then fall back on the part of the magazine where Lieutenants Willoughby and Forrest were posted; the principal gate was similarly defended by two guns, and at the same time within sixty yards of it were placed three six-pounder and one twenty-four pounder howitzers, which commanded two cross-roads, and could be managed so as to act upon any part of the magazine in the neighbourhood. The most important part of the arrangements still remains to be mentioned. The magazine was full of stores, and if once in possession of the mutineers would furnish them with almost inexhaustible resources. Lieutenant Willoughby calmly contemplating this contingency before it became imminent, had already provided against it by laying a train to the magazine, and preconcerting a signal to be given for firing it.

The message requiring delivery of the magazine had scarcely been received when a strong detachment of soldiers wearing the king’s uniform arrived to enforce it. They began with placing guards over each gate of the magazine, and superintending a number of labourers whom they had employed to carry off the whole of the government stores deposited on the outside. As Lieutenant Willoughby had disdained to return any answer to the first message, it was followed by a second, which threatened that if the gates of the magazine were not immediately thrown open the king would send down ladders and scale the walls. After a short delay the ladders arrived and were placed against the south-eastern turret. The natives within the establishment had previously given proofs of insubordination, and now showed their determination to desert by climbing over a sloped shed inside the wall, and thus gaining the ladders, which enabled them to descend on the other side. The mutineers then began to mount, and crowded into the inside of the turret, from which they kept up a fire of musketry. Meanwhile the handful of beleaguered Europeans were not idle. As soon as their assailants began to descend into the magazine they opened upon them with grape from four field pieces. The only persons that could be spared to man these guns were Lieutenant Forrest and Conductor Buckley, who did not cease to ply them till their last rounds of ammunition were expended. The crisis had now arrived. The assailants had entered the magazine at two points, and in another moment would possess themselves of the guns, which, indeed, even if the ammunition had not been exhausted, could not have been worked; as both Lieutenant Forrest and Conductor Buckley had been disabled, the former by two musket-balls which struck his left hand, and the other by a musket-ball which lodged in his arm above the elbow. At this moment, half-past three P.M., Lieutenant Willoughby gave the order, and Conductor Buckley repeating it by the preconcerted signal, Conductor Scully...
applied the match. By the explosion which instantly followed hundreds of the mutineers were blown into the air, and suffered the death they had so richly merited. Unfortunately none of the heroic defenders were permitted to escape without severe injury. "Conductor Scully," says Lieutenant Forrest, "was so dreadfully wounded that his escape was impossible. I saw him after the explosion, but his face and head were so burned and contused that I don't think life could have long remained in him." Among the others who perished were several European women and children, who had fled to the magazine at the commencement of the outbreak. Lieutenants Willoughby and Forrest succeeded in reaching the Main Guard at the Cashmere gate. The latter eventually escaped, but the former, probably retarded in his flight by the injuries he had received, fell into the hands of the mutineers on the road to Meerut and was barbarously murdered. Lieutenant Raynor and Conductor Bucklely, who had sought the same place by a different direction, were more fortunate in reaching it.

Delhi was now entirely in the hands of the mutineers, and the king, throwing off any disguise which he had previously worn, formally accepted the sovereignty which was tendered to him. On the very evening of the outbreak, a royal salute of twenty-one guns announced the fact, and on the following day, a silver throne, which had been in disuse since 1842, having been brought into the hall of audience, the king took his seat upon it, received the homage of the chiefs, and began to issue royal orders. His eldest son, Mirza Moghul, became commander-in-chief, and various other sons received appointments accordant with their assumed dignities. During the first tumultuous proceedings, there was some reason to allege that the massacres had received no countenance at court, and were entirely owing to the blood-thirsty rabble, which it was then impossible to restrain; but a deed of horror must now be related which completely destroys this excuse, and proves that the king and his sons were capable of repeating, in cool blood, the worst atrocities that had yet been perpetrated. Mention has already been made of some Europeans who fled to the palace in the hope of finding it an asylum. Others had been brought thither as prisoners, till the whole number exceeded fifty. The recesses of the palace were sufficiently large to have concealed them all, had they been ten times more numerous, and the king had only to give the order, which would by this means have secured their personal safety. The suggestion was actually made to him, but he declined to accede to it, and shut them up in a place, which Mrs. Aldwell thus describes: "We were all confined in one room, very dark, with only one door, and no window or other opening. It was not fit for the residence of any human being, much less for the number of us who were there. We were very much crowded together, and in consequence of the sepoys, and every one who took a fancy to do so, coming and frightening the children, we were frequently obliged to close the one door we had, which then
left us without light or air. The sepoys used to come with their muskets loaded and bayonets fixed, and ask us whether we would consent to become Mahometans, and also slaves, if the king granted us our lives; but the king's special armed retainers, from which the guard over us was always furnished, incited the sepoys to be content with nothing short of our lives, saying we should be cut up in small pieces and given as food to the kites and crows."

The agony in which the prisoners were thus kept was only preliminary to a horrid sacrifice. In the Court Diary, giving by authority an account of the daily occurrences at the palace, there is the following entry for the 16th of May: "The king held his court in the special hall of audience: forty-nine English were prisoners, and the army demanded that they should be given over to them for slaughter. The king delivered them up, saying, 'The army may do as they please.'" Although the infamous sanction thus appears not to have been formally given till the 16th, the fate destined for the prisoners was so well known that it was openly talked of in Delhi at least two days before. Accordingly, a native eye-witness of the whole proceedings bears the following testimony: "I heard of it two days before the occurrence; it was said the Europeans would be killed in two days, but I do not recollect what day it was. On the day fixed for the slaughter arriving, great crowds of people were flocking to the palace about ten A.M. I entered with them." What are we to think of a people who could thus crowd to witness a spectacle almost too horrible for description, and keep the day on which it was to be perpetrated as a holiday? Mrs. Aldwell and her three children were the only European prisoners who escaped. When taken, she and they were disguised as Mahometans, and she had afterwards managed to complete the disguise by learning and teaching them the Mahometan confession of faith. In this way they passed as Mussulmans from Cashmere, and were specially excepted, when the order arrived to bring out the other victims. "The women and children," says Mrs. Aldwell, "began crying, saying they knew they were going to be murdered, but the Mahometans swore on the Koran, and the Hindoos on the Jumna, that such was not the case; that they wanted to give them a better residence, and that the one they were in would be converted into a magazine. On this they went out, were counted, but I do not know the number; a rope was thrown round to encircle the whole group, the same as prisoners are usually kept together when on the move; and in this manner they were taken out of my sight." All the victims thus marched off were, with four exceptions, women and children. The subsequent massacre is thus narrated by a native eye-witness: — "On reaching the first court-yard, I saw the prisoners all standing together, surrounded on all sides by the king's special armed retainers, or what you may term his body-guard, and some of the infantry mutineers. I did not observe any signal orders given; but on a sudden the men just mentioned drew their swords, and all simultaneously attacked the prisoners, and continued cutting
at them till they had killed them all. There were at least 100 or 150 men employed in this work of slaughter." Shortly afterwards, "the bodies were laden on two carts and thrown into the river." Such was the nature and such were the first-fruits of the revolt in Delhi. Before proceeding to give an account of the retribution which awaited it, it will be necessary to mention the principal localities in which about the same time similar outbreaks occurred, and thus furnish a general idea of the extent to which rebellion was carried, before effectual measures could be taken to curb or suppress it.

CHAPTER II.

The progress of the mutiny—Vigorous measures of repression in the Punjab—Outbreaks in other quarters—The Doab—Neemuch and Nussersabad—Jhanji— Bareilly—Oude—Measures of government to meet the crisis—Reinforcements and proclamations—Siege of Delhi commenced.

THE outbreak at Meerut, and the entrance of the mutineers into Delhi, operated as a common signal to all the native regiments throughout Bengal, and accordingly, in many localities the intelligence was no sooner received than a determination was evinced to follow the same course. The utmost, therefore, that could be done by the British authorities while preparing for the worst, was to interpose obstacles to immediate action, and diminish the means of mischief which the sepoys possessed, by depriving them of their arms. Nowhere was this policy more quickly adopted and more vigorously carried out than in the Punjab. It must at the same time be admitted that the authorities there possessed peculiar advantages. The recent annexation of the country, and the warlike spirit of its inhabitants, dictated the necessity of keeping a firm grasp of it, and hence the troops within it amounted to 59,656. Of these 10,326 were Europeans, 13,430 Punjабees, and 35,900 Hindoostanee, chiefly sepoys. The last, though outnumbering the other two classes, were so situated as to be incapable of combined action, and were moreover aware that they could not carry the sympathy of the inhabitants along with them, as they might have hoped to do in Bengal. They were in what they regarded as a foreign country, and the probability therefore was, that if they did venture on mutiny, it would be not merely to encounter a European force, but to be hunted down by a hostile population. The advantages which government thus possessed in the Punjab were admirably turned to account by the authorities, and the province from which at one time danger was most apprehended, not only remained comparatively tranquil, but became mainly instrumental in the final suppression of the mutiny.
The Meerut outbreak and the possession of Delhi by the mutineers were made known at Lahore by telegraph on the 12th of May. Sir John Lawrence, the chief-commissioner, was then at Rawal Pindee, situated about 150 miles to the N.N.W., and owing to a stoppage of the telegraph could not be instantaneously communicated with. Immediate action was however felt to be necessary. General disaffection among the sepoys was notorious, and it could not be doubted that as soon as they should hear of the mutiny, they would seize the first opportunity to take part in it. Mr. Montgomery, the judicial commissioner, therefore, at once assumed the necessary responsibility, and having summoned a council of the leading authorities, civil and military, suggested the propriety of rendering the native troops comparatively innocuous by depriving them at least of their ammunition and percussion caps, if not by disarming them entirely. The latter, the bolder and more effectual course, was preferred, and on the following morning was carried into effect. The native regiments then in the large military cantonment of Mean Meer, situated about six miles from Lahore, were the 16th, 26th, and 49th, and the 8th light cavalry. To control and overawe all these regiments, the European force consisted only of her majesty's 81st, mustering about 850 men, and two troops of Company's horse-artillery. But only a portion of these could be employed in the important operation of disarming. In providing for the security of Lahore, which was itself a focus of mischief, and for the protection of the barracks, so many European troops were withdrawn, that the whole number brought to the parade-ground was not more than 300. When brought face to face with this small force, and the dozen guns of horse-artillery accompanying them, the sepoys, though mustering about 3500, did not venture to risk a combat, and at once obeyed the order to pile their arms. The security derived from this decisive act of disarming extended much further than the removal of the immediate danger. It dealt with the Asiatic mind in the manner which has always proved effectual, and while it confirmed the well-disposed, deterred many whose hearts were full of treachery from engaging in any overt act of rebellion. It was afterwards ascertained that the disarming was not effected an hour too soon. A plot had been formed for seizing the fort of Lahore and massacring all the Europeans there and at Mean Meer, and was on the very eve of execution, when it was thus most providentially frustrated.

On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, Mr. Montgomery sent off an express to Ferozepoor to intimate the event to Brigadier Innes. The intimation, which reached that officer on the morning of the 15th, seems not to have impressed him so deeply as might have been expected. The arsenal under his charge contained immense military stores, and he could not but feel the necessity of taking immediate steps for its security, but the native regiments, the 45th and 57th, were allowed to retain their arms, and immediately showed how little they deserved the confidence reposed in them. On this subject the
opinion given by Sir John Lawrence, in his report on the mutiny in the Punjab, is decisive:—"On the British side affairs were badly managed. It was fortunate that the European barracks were close to the arsenal, into which building a company of Europeans were introduced, just before it was assailed by the native infantry. But after the arsenals had been secured and the mutineers repulsed, they were allowed to return and burn buildings in the cantonment at their pleasure during the whole night of the 14th May. No adequate efforts were made to destroy or even to punish them. Even those who, in their flight from the station towards Delhi, had been seized by the police and the country people, were not brought to trial until reiterated orders to that effect had been issued. But unfortunately at Ferozepoor errors did not end here; for when, at a date subsequent to the above occurrences, the 10th light cavalry were disarmed, their horses were not taken away. When, however, the taking of the horses was insisted on at last, the troopers had a full opportunity of concocting their plans for an outbreak; for the order about the horses, instead of being kept secret, was formally copied and circulated in the regimental order-book." Happily, notwithstanding this tissue of blunders, no massacre of Europeans was perpetrated.

At Umballa the native troops had for some time given proofs of disaffection. As early as the 19th of April mysterious fires began to occur, and were generally believed to be the work of the sepoys. On the 8th of May a prediction was current in the 5th and 60th native infantry stationed there, "that in the following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Umballa, and that a general rising would take place;" and only two days afterwards, the 10th, the day of the fatal Meerut outbreak, as if they had feared that others might anticipate them in fulfilling the prediction, both of the above regiments rushed simultaneously to their bells of arms, and began loading their muskets. They were afterwards induced to desist, but the portion of the 60th stationed as a guard over the treasury persisted in retaining their arms during the whole day. Strange to say, this overt act of mutiny was unconditionally forgiven by the military authorities, and the result which might have been anticipated was, that large portions of these regiments afterwards joined the rebels at Delhi.

The above blunders committed in the Punjab and the Cis-Sutlej states were fortunately only exceptions to the judicious management generally evinced in the same quarters. The important fort and arsenal of Philour, on the frontier of the Jullunder Doab, was happily saved by throwing in a company of European infantry and some European artillerymen into the fort, and dispossessing
the native troops before they had time to give effect to the treachery which they had for some time been meditating. The same promptitude of action also saved the fort of Govindghur. This fort, besides being the most central and most important stronghold in the Punjab, completely commanded Amritsur, the religious capital of the Sikhs, and the possession of it was hence absolutely indispensable to the maintenance of tranquillity in that quarter. At the time of the outbreak it was occupied by a detachment of the 59th native infantry, and only seventy European artillerymen. The latter must have been overpowered had they not been reinforced by half a company of her majesty's 81st hurried over in ekas or native one-horse gigs from Lahore. What the former would have done may be inferred from the fact that it afterwards became necessary to disarm them.

On the 11th of May, when the telegraph announced the outbreak, the forces occupying the Peshawer valley consisted of about 2800 European and 8000 native soldiers, with 18 field guns and a mounted battery. Immediately on the receipt of the disastrous intelligence, it was resolved, on the suggestion of Colonel John Nicholson, then deputy-commissioner at Peshawer, to form a moveable column of picked troops. At the same time orders were issued for the rigid examination of all sepoy correspondence at the post-office. For some time the disaffection of the 64th native infantry forming part of the Peshawer contingent had been notorious, and therefore one of the first steps taken was to cripple it for intrigue, by breaking it up into detachments, and marching them off to isolated outposts. While thus providing for the safety of the district, the general interest was not forgotten; and on the 13th of May the guide corps, which has since so greatly distinguished itself, quitted its cantonment at Murdan six hours after it got the order, and the next morning had accomplished the distance of thirty miles to Attock, while hurrying on to assist in the recovery of Delhi. Meantime the news of the outbreak having become known to the sepoys, a rapid change took place in their demeanour, and their mutinous intentions could no longer be disguised. Precautions were accordingly taken. The treasure, amounting to nearly a quarter of a million sterling, was removed from the centre of cantonments to the fort outside, which was at the same time garrisoned by Europeans. The inspection of native correspondence, at the post-office, was now making ominous revelations. Letters addressed to soldiers of the 64th, revealed in descriptions of the atrocities perpetrated in Hindoostan on the men, women, and children of the Feringhees, and contained messages from their relatives, urging them to emulate the example. Another letter, which did not pass through the post-office, but fell into the hands of Brigadier Cotton, commanding at Peshawer, was a formal communication from part of the 51st native infantry stationed there to the 64th. After some preliminary salutations, it proceeded thus:—"The cartridge will have to be beaten on the 22d instant. Of this you are hereby informed. This is addressed to you by the
whole regiment. O brothers! the religion of Hindoos and Mahometans is all one. Therefore all you soldiers should know this. Here all the sepoys are at the bidding of the jemadar, soubaodar-major, and havildar-major. All are discontent with this business, whether small or great. What more need be written? Do as you think best. High and low send their obeisance, benediction, salutation, and service.” It was added by another hand. “The above is the state of affairs here. In whatever way you can manage it, come in to Peshawer on the 21st instant. Thoroughly understand that point. In fact eat there and drink here.” The authorities thus made aware of the plot, and the very day fixed for its execution, were able to counterwork it, though not entirely to prevent overt acts of mutiny. On the 21st, the day appointed, a part of the 55th, on duty at the Attock ferry, suddenly quitted their post and marched away towards Nowshera. On the way they were joined by a detachment of the 24th native infantry, who were escorting commissariat stores to Peshawer. Major Verner, commanding at Nowshera, informed by an express of their approach, was able to intercept and disarm them. This success, however, only proved the signal to a more serious outbreak, for the moment he re-entered Nowshera with his prisoners, three companies of the 55th stationed there came to the rescue, and having succeeded, broke open the regimental magazine, supplied themselves with ammunition, and having succeeded in crossing the Cabool, hastened off in the direction of Murdan, where the main body of the 55th was stationed. The whole immediately fraternized, and the mutiny of the regiment was complete.

After such overt acts a general disarming of the native troops could no longer be delayed. It began with the regiments stationed at Peshawer, consisting of the 5th light cavalry, and the 24th, 27th, and 51st native infantry. Another regiment, the 21st native infantry, was exempted, because an infantry regiment seemed indispensable to carry on the duties of the station, and this one had hitherto shown no sympathy with the mutineers. Besides the above there were two regiments of irregular cavalry, the 7th and 18th. These also were exempted for similar reasons, though not without considerable hesitation, as the fidelity of the former of the two was already shaken, and that of the latter was at least problematical. The case then stood thus. Four native regiments were to be disarmed, and three, who were to be spectators of the operation, were by no means free from the suspicion of being more inclined to oppose than to assist in it. The European regiments were the 70th and 87th, and these, with the artillery, on the morning of the 22d, took up positions at the two ends of the cantonment. The measure had been resolved, and was carried out with so much promptitude that the native troops, however much inclined to resist, were too faint-hearted to venture upon it, and laid down their arms. The next step necessary was to deal with the 55th native infantry, who had mutinied at Murdan. Near midnight of the 23d, a force of 300
European infantry, 250 irregular cavalry, horse-levies and police, and eight guns, left Peshawer under command of Colonel Chute of her majesty’s 70th, accompanied by Colonel Nicholson as political officer. At sunrise of the 25th, this force, increased by a detachment from Nowshera under Major Vaughan, was descried approaching Murdan. The mutineers no sooner heard the intelligence than they rushed from the fort and fled tumultuously towards the hills of Swat. They had got so far ahead before the pursuit commenced, and the ground was so rugged, that the guns of their pursuers were never brought within range. They were not, however, permitted to escape with impunity; for Colonel Nicholson, hurrying forward with a party of troopers, succeeded in overtaking them. Thus brought to bay the mutineers faced about, and a desperate encounter took place, but not with doubtful issue. Nicholson’s impetuous charge drove his enemies before him, and they fled, scattering themselves over the country in companies and sections. The pursuit was continued, and with so much success, that before the day closed 120 had been slain and 150 made prisoners.

While the mutiny was thus either anticipated by disarming, or curbed and punished by the vigorous measures adopted in the Punjab, it made rapid and alarming progress in other quarters. In the beginning of May the 9th native infantry was distributed in the Doab in four detachments—three companies being stationed at Alighur, three at Mynpoorie, three at Etawah, and one at Boolundshahur. Hitherto the confidence of the European officers in the fidelity of the regiment had been unbounded, and though they could not but feel some anxiety after they had been startled by the disastrous intelligence from Meerut and Delhi, their hope still was that, however faithless others might be, their men would prove an honourable exception. And there certainly seemed to be good grounds for this charitable judgment. At Alighur, where the head-quarters of the regiment were established, the soldiers, so far from sympathizing with the mutineers, had readily assisted in hunting down some troopers of the 3d cavalry, who, after taking part in the atrocities at Meerut, had wandered into their neighbourhood, probably in search of plunder. They had given a still stronger proof of fidelity, by not only refusing to listen to a Brahmin, who had come among them as a secret agent to incite them to mutiny, but by taking him prisoner and handing him over to their commander. It is difficult to believe that in thus acting they were only seeking a cover to their real designs. The probability rather is that up to this time, though they may have been shaken by the sinister influences brought to bear on them, they had not formed any decided resolution, but were waiting the course of events in that dubious vacillating state where any sudden impulse from either side is sufficient to turn the scale. We accordingly learn that it was an impulse of this nature which actually determined them. The Brahmin, for his attempt to seduce them, had been condemned to die, and they had stood
on the parade ground when the sentence was carried into execution, without betraying any particular emotion. Unfortunately, the lifeless body was still hanging on the gallows, when some soldiers who had been absent on duty arrived. Far from participating in the apparent apathy of their comrades, the sight filled them with indignation, and one of their number stepping from the ranks, and pointing to the gallows, exclaimed—"That man is a martyr." No sooner were the words uttered than the whole soldiers present, as if seized by a sudden frenzy, rushed forth shouting defiance, proceeded directly to the treasury, plundered it, burst open the jail, liberating all the prisoners, and then took the highroad to Delhi. As there were no European troops present, no resistance could be offered to their proceedings, but it is only fair to mention that no blood-thirstiness was manifested, and no lives were taken. This outbreak, which took place on the 20th of May, was forthwith responded to by the other three detachments—by that of Mynpoorie on the 22d, of Etawah on the 23d, and of Boolundshuhur on the 24th. It is unnecessary to give the details of each, though honourable notice is certainly due to a young officer, Lieutenant de Kantzow, who, undeterred either by threats or actual violence, kept his post at Mynpoorie, and actually succeeded in inducing the mutineers to depart without plundering the treasury.

After these revolts in the Doab, nearly a week elapsed without any other actual rising, and many were sanguine enough to imagine that the insurrectionary spirit had nearly expended itself. And there is some ground to believe that could Delhi have been at this time wrested from the mutineers by a sudden onset, and a signal retribution inflicted for the atrocities of which they had been guilty, the revolt would have received its death-blow. The recapture of Delhi, however, by any troops which could be hastily mustered for the purpose was impossible, and the continued possession of the old Mogul capital by the insurgents gave a new and irresistible stimulus to revolt. All at once, after a short and delusive interval, a simultaneous burst of insurrection took place, though in localities so widely distant that it could scarcely have been in consequence of previous concert. On this recommencement, the first display of open violence occurred in the towns of Hansi and Hissar, in the district of Hurreana, lying to the north-west of that of Delhi. There, on the 28th of May, the Hurreana battalion of light infantry and the 4th irregular cavalry breaking out into open mutiny, commenced an indiscriminate massacre of Europeans, and were guilty of deeds as atrocious as any that had yet been perpetrated. On the evening of the same day, in the remote locality of Nusseerabad, situated fifteen miles south-east of Ajmere, in the very centre of Rajpootana, two regiments of Bengal native infantry, the 15th and the 30th, together with a company of Bengal native artillery, proceeded to execute the mutinous designs of which they had previously given many indications. One of their first steps was to make themselves masters of the guns. They were
not, however, permitted to retain them without a struggle. The first Bombay
light cavalry (lancers), showing how little sympathy the army of that presidency
had with that of Bengal, hastened to the rescue, and repeatedly charged the
mutineers. It was unhappily without success. The disparity of numbers was
too great, and they were obliged to retire in the direction of Beawr, situated
about thirty miles to the south-west. During the struggle several of the
European officers had fallen, but the survivors, together with the other
European residents, protected by the lancers, were enabled to make their
escape. A still more formidable outbreak had, in the meantime, occurred at
Bareilly, the capital of Rohilcund. Having recounted the many wrongs which
the Rohillas suffered in consequence of the iniquitous compact made between
Warren Hastings and the Nabob of Oude, we can hardly deny that there was
something retributive in the vengeance which they took on this occasion,
though the parties who suffered were certainly not the wrong-doers. The
troops stationed here were the 18th and 68th Bengal native infantry, the 8th
irregular cavalry, and a company of native artillery. Their disaffection was
well known, and they had so little attempted to disguise it, that the European
women and children had been removed for safety to the hill station of Nynnee
Tal. The evil day was however postponed by dexterous management, and the
excitement which for some days threatened immediate violence, had so far
subsided that the danger seemed, at least for the present, to be passing away.
The sepoys themselves employed all the arts of Asiatic treachery in counten-
ancing this delusion. Professing deep contrition for having been misled by
evil counsel, they were now only anxious that the past should be forgotten,
and they requested, as a proof of restored confidence, that the women and
children who had been sent off to Nynnee Tal should return. With this
request the British authorities were not so infatuated as to comply; but
Brigadier Sibbald was so far imposed upon that he wrote to the government,
assuring them, in confident terms, of the fidelity of his troops, provided their
fears were set at rest by an assurance that they were not to be punished for
any previous irregularities. The brigadier's letter could scarcely have reached
its destination, when the sepoys proved the hollowness of all their professions,
and he himself became one of their first victims. Having, like their fellow-
traitors at Meerut, fixed on a Sunday, they rose by preconcerted signal on the
31st of May, and at once commenced the work of murder and devastation, by
opening on their officers both with grape and musketry, firing the bungalows,
plundering the treasury, and throwing open the jail, which contained nearly
3000 prisoners. These mingling with a populace notoriously one of the most
turbulent in India, had full scope to commit every form of outrage. The
insurrection being thus completely triumphant, soon found fitting representa-
tives, both of the military and the civil authority—of the former, in the person
of Ruktawar Khan, soubahdar of artillery, who, assuming the rank of general,
paraded the city in the carriage of the murdered brigadier, followed by a numerous staff; and of the latter, in the person of Khan Bahadur Khan, a retired native judge, who repaid his obligation to the British government, which had pensioned him, by turning traitor, and employing the forms of law to murder its officers. In this way two of the European judges, charged with imaginary crimes, were subjected to the mockery of a trial, condemned to death, and immediately executed. The example of Bareilly was speedily followed at Moradabad and Shahjahanpoor, the other principal military stations of Rohilcund. At Moradabad the 29th native infantry, more avaricious than blood-thirsty, were so intent on plunder that they allowed their officers to escape. It was otherwise at Shahjahanpoor, where the 28th native infantry, choosing the same Sunday as at Bareilly, shot one officer on the parade ground, and then sent a party of murderers into the church. Notwithstanding the suddenness and ferocity of this sacrilegious attack, the greater part of the European residents escaped into Oude. Here, however, instead of the asylum which they hoped to find, the whole party, men, women, and children, fell into the hands of savages, still worse than those from whom they had fled, and were barbarously massacred in the vicinity of Aurungabad.

The mention of Oude, as well as the sequence of events, would now naturally lead us to trace the course of the revolt in that province, but some advantage in respect of arrangement will be gained by previously noticing the disastrous outbreaks at some other localities. We begin with Neemuch, situated in an isolated portion of Scindia's dominions, near the south-east borders of Rajpootana, and, with Jhansi, long the capital of an independent native principality, but finally incorporated with British India, in accordance with the annexation policy, which refused to recognize an adopted heir. The troops stationed at Neemuch belonged to what was designated the Gwalior contingent, and therefore did not properly form part of our Indian army, but they were virtually included in it, because, though nominally belonging to Scindia, they were provided by the British government, in accordance with treaty, and commanded by British officers. Still the relations which they bore to a native prince gave additional importance to their movements, as from these an inference might be drawn as to the course which the prince himself might be disposed to take in the fearful struggle which had commenced, and the degree of control which he might be able to exercise, whether for good or evil. As to Scindia personally, there was indeed scarcely any room for doubt. At the very commencement of the outbreak he had come forward of his own accord to place his body-guard and all his other troops at the disposal of Mr. Colvin, the lieutenant-governor of the North-western Provinces, and his subsequent conduct had shown that the fidelity of the Gwalior contingent, if any efforts on his part could secure it, would remain unshaken. One more ominous feature was thus added to the revolt, when it appeared that the sepoys of the contingent fraternized with
those of Bengal, and would in all probability follow their example. The troops at Neemuch consisted of the 7th and 72d regiments of infantry, the 1st regiment of cavalry, and the 4th company of artillery. For some time symptoms of disaffection had been visibly manifested, and on the two last days of May, and the 1st of June, the whole troops were in such a state of excitement that an actual rising was hourly expected. From some cause, however, it suddenly subsided, and the 2d passed in comparative tranquillity. On the 3d another change took place, the disturbance became worse than ever, and at last, towards midnight, the discharge of a gun, the preconcerted signal, announced that the mutiny had commenced. The main body of the troops occupied the cantonments situated without the town, but the fort within it was garrisoned by the right wing of the 7th regiment, while the left wing was stationed at an hospital about a quarter of a mile distant. The moment the outbreak commenced, the whole of the troops in cantonments took part in it, but the 7th regiment seemed not to have fully made up their minds, and the left wing marched off in obedience to their officers, and joined the right wing in the fort, both making loud protestations of unshaken fidelity. Meantime the work of destruction went on below, and many barbarous murders were committed. The officers within the fort, looking down from its ramparts, saw the air lighted up with the flames of their burning bungalows, but, though held in a torture of suspense as to the fate of their fellow-officers, and the other European residents, gave so much credit to the loyal professions of the garrison, that they scarcely doubted their own individual safety. On this point, however, they were soon undeceived, for when the mutineers appeared before the fort, and threatened to open upon it with their artillery, a sousahdar, who had seen nearly fifty years' service, and to whom, from the confidence reposed in him, the command of the picket placed at the gate had been intrusted, coolly ordered it to be thrown open. When the officers attempted to resist this treacherous order, they were significantly reminded that they had better look to themselves, since the garrison, though disposed to favour their escape, never would nor could save them from the mutineers outside, of whose murderous intentions they were well aware. This intimation left the officers no alternative but flight, which they accomplished with the utmost difficulty.

The mutiny at Jhansi was of a still more atrocious character. At this place, situated 140 miles south of Agra, near the north-west extremity of Bundelcund, a strong feeling of discontent existed, particularly among those who had formerly been connected with the native court, and regretted the loss of their independence by a course of policy which seemed to them at once fraudulent and violent. The rancée, indeed, so far from concealing her resentment, had given utterance to it in the most unequivocal form, by spurning the pension allotted to her by the British government. Under such circumstances, it was not to be expected that when the revolt began to spread, Jhansi would
long refrain from taking a prominent part in it. The only troops in the place were the left wings of the 12th native and the 14th irregular infantry. From the first intelligence of the proceedings at Meerut and Delhi, an outbreak had been imminent, as the rannee and her advisers were suspected of tampering with the sepoy. But though the wish to break out into open violence was visibly manifest, the fear of being committed before success seemed certain sufficed to keep both the sepoy and their tempters in check, and the actual mutiny did not take place till the 4th of June. The Europeans, forewarned of their danger, had fixed upon the fort as their place of refuge. Accordingly, when the alarm was given, they rushed to it with one accord. The prospect before them was fearful. Their whole number, women and children included, amounted only to fifty-five, and how were these to withstand the hundreds of blood-thirsty wretches by whom they were beset? The struggle at once commenced, and the heroic band, fighting for life and all that was dear to them, made good their defence for four days. At last, when their resources had begun to fail, and their position was nearly desperate, a new and more formidable enemy appeared. The rannee sent her artillery and elephants, and the gates, though strongly barricaded, were forced. By retiring into some of the buildings, it might still have been possible to hold out a little longer, but as an unconditional surrender must speedily have been forced, we can easily understand how readily the terms were listened to, when the mutineers offered, on the delivery of the fort, to save the lives of all within it. This offer, after it had been confirmed by the most solemn oaths, was accepted, and all who had survived the miseries of the siege, having laid down their arms, were beginning to retire, when, in utter violation of all that had been stipulated and sworn, they were seized, carried off to a place of execution, and put to the sword, man, woman, and child, with a barbarity too horrible for description.

At the very commencement of the revolt, some anxiety was felt for Agra, once the capital of all India, and still the capital of the North-western Provinces. Fortunately, indeed, it had not, like Delhi, been left destitute of European troops, and it was therefore certain that, happen what might, it would not fall like that city without a struggle. The troops stationed in it at the time of the revolt were the 3d European fusiliers, a troop of European artillery, and two sepoy regiments, the 44th and 67th native infantry. Among the latter, when the first intelligence of the mutiny arrived, the excitement was extreme, and the mischief which they meditated was indicated by numerous incendiary fires. Their object in raising them apparently was to lure the European troops to their lines, for the purpose of extinguishing the flames, and take advantage of their absence while thus employed, to make themselves masters of the fort. If this was the plan, the judicious arrangements of the authorities defeated it. Knowing that everything depended on the possession of the fort, they made its security their first object, and never reduced the garrison so far as to give any
hope of attacking it with success. The lieutenant-governor at the same time exerted himself to the utmost to prevent or postpone the anticipated outbreak. As early as the 14th of May, he met the whole troops of the station on the parade ground, and harangued them in a manner which called forth the loudest protestations of inviolable fidelity. The sepoys in particular seemed unable to give sufficient utterance to their applause, and continued to make the air ring with their cheers long after he had retired. At this time the depth of native duplicity was so little understood, that Mr. Colvin himself did not hesitate to speak confidently of the effect which his address had produced, and he therefore naturally followed it up with a proclamation, in which he declared his belief that "European and native portions of the military forces now rapidly assembling, will honourably and eagerly vie with each other in the extirpation of the traitorous criminals who have endeavoured to sow utterly groundless distrust between the powerful and beneficent British government and its attached native soldiery." The two native regiments were on bad terms, and Mr. Colvin, well aware of the fact, endeavoured to turn it to account by employing them as a kind of mutual check upon each other. In accordance with this policy, when, in the end of May, it became desirable to bring in a quantity of treasure from Muttra, about thirty miles north-west of Agra, instead of sending Europeans, who could ill be spared for such a purpose, he selected for the service two native companies, one from each regiment, in the belief that their hatred would not allow them to be guilty of a common act of treachery. It proved otherwise. No sooner were they in possession of the treasure, than they forgot their own quarrels, broke out into open mutiny, and marched off with their plunder for Delhi. The incident was so far fortunate that it completely opened the eyes of the authorities, and by compelling them to disarm both regiments, as utterly unworthy of confidence, undoubtedly prevented a more serious catastrophe.

While Agra thus narrowly escaped, Allahabad, situated at the junction of the Jumna with the Ganges, was subjected to a still more fiery ordeal. This city, though justly regarded as the key of the lower provinces of Bengal, and containing an arsenal with 40,000 stand of arms, large numbers of cannon, and vast military stores, had been left entirely at the mercy of native troops. A few soldiers, forming the magazine staff, were Europeans, but the garrison within the fortress was composed of a regiment of Sikhs, about 400 strong, and a company of the 6th native infantry, while the remainder of the latter regiment occupied the cantonments. In this state of matters an assault by the sepoys must have been successful, and Allahabad, with its immense military stores, would, like Delhi, have become a stronghold of the mutineers. Fortunately the authorities were on the alert, and in the absence of any other means of reinforcement, a body of aged European invalids, about seventy in number, occupying the fort of Chunar, were despatched by steamer, and arrived in the
very nick of time. The company of the 6th native infantry, in charge of the principal gate of the fortress, had conspired to admit their comrades, when they found themselves suddenly displaced. They endeavoured, however, to make a merit of necessity, and as a cover to their treachery, the whole regiment made such professions of fidelity, that the thanks of the governor-general were publicly conveyed to them on the 6th of June. Their gratification seemed to know no bounds, and their cheers were still ringing in the ears of their deluded officers as they sat at mess, when they were startled by the intelligence that the mutiny had commenced. Several of them were shot down before they could leave the mess-room, and others were barbarously murdered as they hastened to the lines, in hope of quelling disturbance. The Europeans within the fort, though gallantly supported by the Sikhs, barely sufficed for its protection, and hence, both within the town and the cantonments, the work of plunder and devastation continued almost unchecked. Before the mutineers left, after plundering the treasury, throwing open the jail, which contained nearly 3000 prisoners, and burning down the cantonments, fifty Europeans had been massacred. The rest found refuge within the fort, and were obliged to remain there, as anarchy reigned within the city, and British authority had nearly ceased throughout the whole tract of country which skirts the Ganges from Allahabad up to Agra.

About sixty miles below Allahabad, and nearly due east from it, stood Benares, the great stronghold of Hindooism. If religion had anything to do with the revolt, it might have been anticipated that this was the place of all others where it would burst forth with the greatest fury. Its population exceeding 180,000 was notorious for turbulence, and the only troops in whom full confidence could be placed were 190 of her majesty's 10th foot, and a small detail of artillery, with three guns. The native troops consisted of a Sikh corps, the 37th native infantry, and the 13th irregular cavalry. It was hoped that both the Sikhs and the cavalry would remain faithful. The 57th, on the contrary, were known to be mutinous, and on the 1st of June it was resolved to deprive them of their arms. The resolution once taken ought to have been immediately executed, but was fixed only for the 5th. In the interval the sepoys, through some unknown channel became aware of what was intended; and to increase the difficulty intelligence arrived that at Azimgur, a place about fifty miles to the north of Benares, the 17th native infantry had mutinied on the 3d, and decamped after seizing treasure to the amount of £170,000. Not a moment could now be lost, and on the 4th the first step in the process of disarming was commenced by suddenly locking the bells or huts where the arms were kept. By this time the sepoys were equally on the alert, and having burst open the doors of the bells gained possession of their arms by open force. The struggle now commenced. On the one side stood the Europeans, mustering not more than 200, and on the other native troops to the number of about 2000.
This immense disparity was compensated to the former by the possession of three guns, while their opponents had none; by their indomitable courage, and by some reluctance on the part of many of the native troops finally to commit themselves. It is even said that the Sikhs, when they made common cause with the Bengal troops, acted rather under the influence of some unaccountable panic than from any premeditated design. Favoured by this combination of circumstances the Europeans gained a comparatively easy victory, only four, one of them the commander of the irregular cavalry, being killed, and twenty-one wounded. This first success had an excellent effect upon the populace, who, contrary to what had been feared, did not venture to rise.

We now hasten towards Oude, which had become and was destined long to be a main centre of revolt. Its first mutiny, and the suppression of it,

![Image of the Residency, Lucknow](https://example.com/residency_lucknow.png)

have already been described. As its recurrence sooner or later could hardly be doubted, Sir Henry Lawrence made diligent use of the respite which he had gained, and endeavoured to prepare for the worst. His head-quarters were at the residency of Lucknow, situated on the north side of the city, close to the right bank of the Goomtee. Beside it were the treasury and the hospital, and a number of buildings of solid masonry, occupied as dwelling-houses and public offices. About a mile and a half to the eastward was the Chowpeyrah Istubul, a cruciform building used as barracks by her majesty's 32d, the only European infantry then in the province. At some distance to the north of the barracks stood another building called the Kuddum Rasool, which had been converted into a powder magazine. In the same vicinity were the lines of the 3d regiment of military police. Immediately south of the barracks was the Tara Kotee or observatory, where all the law courts were concentrated. About a mile above the residency, and on the same side of the river, were the Dowlut Khana and Sheesh Muhul, forming part of an old palace of the Kings of Oude.
In the one were the head-quarters of the brigadier commanding the Oude irregular force, and in the other a magazine containing many stands of arms and native guns. Still farther up the river, and to the westward, was the palace of Moosa Bagh, occupied by the commanding officers of the 4th and 7th regiments of Oude irregular infantry, which were cantoned in its vicinity. About a quarter of a mile above the residency the Goomtee was crossed by an iron bridge, the road from which led almost in a straight line to the Muriaon and Moodkeeppoer cantonments. These, situated three miles north from Lucknow, were at this time occupied by the 13th, 48th, and 71st native infantry, a regiment of regular native cavalry, and two batteries of native and one of European artillery. The only other military station in the vicinity of Lucknow was that of the 2d Oude irregular cavalry at Chukkur Kotee, on the left bank of the river, nearly opposite to Kuddum Rasool, and nearly as far from the residency as the Muriaon cantonments. Sir Henry Lawrence, who obtained full military powers giving him the command of all the forces in Oude, at once saw the necessity of altering the above arrangement of the troops. Four guns were brought from the Muriaon cantonment to the lines of her majesty’s 32d, and 120 men of this regiment were intrusted with the protection of the treasury and residency, which had formerly been entirely at the mercy of native guards. At the same time, while the women and the sick were lodged in the residency, the rest of the regiment was removed from its isolated position and moved down to the cantonment, and stationed close to the European battery. These measures, excellent so far as they went, were not deemed sufficient. A place of strength where the military stores might be concentrated, and an asylum might be found in case of attack, was still wanted. For this purpose choice was made of the Muchee Bhowun, situated on the right bank of the river, about half-way between the residency and the Dowlut Khana. At the same time, though an attack on the residency was scarcely feared, some slight defensive works, chiefly as a precaution against any sudden insurrection of the populace, were begun. The treasury also was largely replenished, by sending out parties into the different districts, and bringing in the sums which had been previously collected.

During the above preparations the progress of the mutiny in other quarters had added greatly to the difficulty of maintaining tranquillity in Oude, where there was reason to apprehend that any rising would, in all probability, not only involve the whole province, but extend beyond its limits, particularly to the important town and district of Cawnpoor, only separated from it by the Ganges. Here General Sir Hugh Wheeler had only a mere handful of Europeans to oppose a large brigade of native troops, consisting of the 1st, 53d, and 56th native infantry, and the 2d light cavalry, and was obliged to rest satisfied with preparations which were palpably inadequate. In the hope that if the sepoys did rise they would march off for Delhi, he formed an entrenchment, which, however incapable of permanent defence, might
furnish a temporary asylum. Reinforcements had been promised by the government and were daily expected, but the case was so urgent that Sir Henry Lawrence could not refuse his application for aid, and detached to him on the 21st of May fifty men of the 32d, conveyed in post-carriages, and two squadrons of cavalry. In this emergency Sir Hugh received an offer which was too tempting to be refused. It consisted of "two guns and three hundred men, cavalry and infantry, furnished by the Maharajah of Bithoor," the infamous miscreant now only too well known as Nana Sahib. He was the adopted son of Bajee Row, the last of the peishwas, who, when reduced to extremity, had obtained by treaty a pension of £90,000 a year, and a residence at Bithoor, situated on the Ganges about twelve miles above Cawnpoor. At his death Nana Sahib succeeded to a large portion of his immense wealth, but his claim to a continuance of the pension was refused. Though he often complained of the refusal, and stigmatized it as a breach of public faith, it did not suit him to assume the airs of a malcontent, or subject himself to suspicion as an enemy to British interests. On the contrary he courted the society of our countrymen, and was regarded by them as a favourable specimen of the liberalized Hindoo. Sir Hugh Wheeler's long residence in India and intimate acquaintance with native manners perhaps only laid him more open to the influence of such a character, and hence, though specially warned to be on his guard against the Nana, he not only accepted his proffered aid, but showed how unbounded his confidence was by employing his troops to guard the treasury.

The Eed, a movable Mahometan festival which fell on the 24th of May, was generally believed to have been fixed upon for the outbreak in Oude. The crisis, however, somehow postponed, did not arrive till the 30th. That day had passed away quietly, and the evening gun had been fired as usual at nine o'clock, when the light company of the 71st native infantry suddenly turned out and began firing at random. At the same instant two parties, the one belonging to the same regiment, and the other to the 7th light cavalry, appeared at the opposite gates of the cantonment, and made directly for the mess-house, evidently with the diabolical design of placing the officers between two fires, and rendering their escape impossible. Fortunately the first shot had proved a sufficient warning. Sir Henry Lawrence, who was now residing in the cantonment, hastily proceeded with his staff to that part of it where the Europeans, mustering 300 men, with six guns, were stationed. Two of these guns were immediately posted on the road leading to Lucknow, so as to intercept the mutineers in the event of their attempting to reach it. The other guns swept the native parade ground, where the three native infantry regiments stood in the following order—first, the 71st, next the 13th, and last the 48th. The 71st, after shooting Brigadier Handsecomb, who had ventured too near them, advanced boldly and fired. They were answered with grape, which sent them back to their lines, where they took the cowardly revenge of murdering one of
their European officers, who was found pierced with bayonets and musket-balls. The 48th, whose position on the parade ground was so distant from the guns as to be beyond the reach of grape, did not at first take an active part in the mutiny. They refused, however, to aid in suppressing it; and while pretending to accept the proposal of their commanding officer to march to the residency, deserted by the way in such numbers, that when he reached the iron bridge he could not muster more than fifty-seven men around the colours. In the conflict which had taken place, the mutineers, though they had obtained a considerable amount of plunder, and gratified their savage natures by burning down the bungalows, and laying the cantonments in ruins, had sustained a defeat; but it still remained for them to show whether they had so much confidence in their superior numbers, as to risk an encounter with British discipline and courage. At first it seemed that they had made up their minds to this, for at daybreak of the 31st they were found in force occupying the lines at Moodkeepoor. Their courage, however, was not proof against a few discharges from the guns, and they fled precipitately in the direction of Seetapoor.

During the above proceedings great alarm was felt in the city. A company of the 71st, who had been removed from the Muchee Bhown for disaffection a few days before to another station, on being marched to the residency and ordered to pile their arms, refused to obey. From fear of precipitating an outbreak, it was deemed prudent not to coerce them. This indication of weakness was soon followed by its natural result. On the afternoon of the 31st the budmashes or mob of the city rose, and about 6000 of them, after crossing the Goomtee by a ford, moved towards Muriaon in order to join the mutineers, with whom they had a previous understanding. When this scheme was frustrated the budmashes returned to Lucknow, and commenced rioting in the quarter of Hoseynabad, near the Dowlut Khana. Fortunately the native
troops stationed there did not decline to act, and after an hour of heavy firing the insurrection was suppressed. Its occurrence, however, was a warning not to be neglected, and all the European women and children took refuge in the residency.

The mutiny at Lucknow operated as the signal for a rising in every leading station throughout the province. In giving a brief account of each, we take them as they occurred in the four divisions into which, for administrative purposes, Oude, after its incorporation with British India, had been distributed. Beginning with Khyrabad, or the north-west division, our attention is first called to its principal station Seetapoor, towards which, as has been mentioned, the fugitive mutineers of Lucknow had proceeded. At Seetapoor, the principal station of the Khyrabad, or north-west division of Oude, the outbreak which had long been feared took place on the 3d of June. On the morning of that day, a cry having been raised that the 10th irregulars were plundering the treasury, Colonel Birch, of the 41st, hastened with two companies to the rescue, and was shot dead. Two other officers immediately shared his fate, and the mutiny became general. Mr. Christian, the commissioner, anticipating the outbreak, had collected the civilians and their families at his house, and intrusted the defence of it to a strong guard of the military police. It was only to learn how utterly his confidence had been misplaced. His defenders, when called upon to act, only replied by firing upon him, and commenced an indiscriminate massacre of men, women, and children.

The European fugitives from Shahjehanpoor had arrived on the 1st of June at Mohumdee, another station of the Khyrabad division, then occupied by a company of the 9th Oude irregular infantry. By judicious management they were for a time restrained, but on the 4th, when fifty of their mutinous comrades came in from Seetapoor, they announced their determination to march to Seetapoor, at the same time promising that, if not opposed, they would not only spare the lives of all the Europeans at the station, but take them under their protection. With this promise, confirmed by a solemn oath, the Europeans were obliged to be contented, and the whole party, including eight women and four children, commenced the journey. The next morning, the 5th, the Europeans were abandoned by their escort, and told to go ahead wherever they liked. Fearing the worst they pushed on, but were overtaken within a mile of Aurungabad. "Then," says Captain Patrick Orr, one of the only two individuals whose lives were spared, "the most infernal carnage ever witnessed by man began." A sepoy rushing forward seized a gun, and shot down Lieutenant Sheils, an old officer on the veteran establishment. All the others collected under a tree, and were there, men, women, and children, ruthlessly butchered.

In Fyzabad, the south-eastern division, crimes equally hideous were perpetrated. The town, as the principal station, was occupied by a considerable body of troops, all native—the 22d native infantry, the 6th Oude irregular
infantry, and a regular light field battery. Shahgunge, in its vicinity, belonged to a talookdar of the name of Rajah Mansingh, who, in consequence of information received from Calcutta, had been arrested by order of Sir Henry Lawrence, and was in confinement. This man, when a mutiny of the troops was hourly threatened, offered, if released, to shelter the Europeans in his fort. Colonel Goldney, the commissioner, seeing no better alternative, accepted the offer, and Mansingh, set at liberty, began to prepare his fort. The mutinous troops, perhaps made aware of the agreement, resolved on immediate action, and began by demanding, on the plea of greater security, that the treasure should be placed under their charge. The authorities feeling themselves helpless were obliged to comply, and at the same time began to prepare for the worst, by sending their families to Shahgunge. The ladies in the cantonments, however, declined to quit them, because they were satisfied with the assurance of full protection given by the native officers, and solemnly sworn to by those of the 22d. Matters were in this precarious state on the 8th of June, when the 17th native infantry, who had mutinied at Azimghur, on the frontiers of Oude, and carried off a large amount of treasure, arrived at Begumgunge, within a march of Fyzabad. On this the troops at the station threw off all disguise, and told their officers to shift for themselves, adding that they might take the boats then lying at the cantonment ghat. The civilians preferred joining their families at Shahgunge, but the officers embarked in the boats and began to descend the stream. It was necessary to pass Begumgunge, and there, in accordance with the diabolical plan which had been concerted, the mutineers of the 17th were waiting to intercept them. Accordingly, when the officers approached, they were met by a volley of grape and musketry. Many immediately fell, and some who attempted to escape by swimming were either drowned or cut to pieces the moment they reached the bank. Colonel Goldney was seized in his boat and carried off to the rebel camp. "I am an old man," he said; "will you disgrace yourself by my murder?" The appeal was vain. The miscreants knew no pity, and shot him down. A few by almost superhuman exertions distanced their pursuers and escaped.

While mutiny thus spread itself at all the principal stations of Oude, the condition of its capital became daily more alarming, and the idea of a siege, which before had been generally scouted, began to be entertained. In the prospect of such an event it became necessary to dispose of the large number of native troops who, being notoriously disaffected, were more a source of weakness than of strength. After the suppression of the mutiny of the 30th and 31st of May, out of the four native regiments the whole number of men that mustered amounted only to 437. In a few days, however, nearly thrice that number had ranged under the native colours. The explanation was obvious. Many of them had come from detached posts, where their isolated position prevented them from taking actual part in the mutiny, though they
had been unable to disguise their sympathy with it, and several even of the mutineers after their defeat had crept back to the lines, in the hope of being able either to conceal their absence or give some plausible account of it. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it was strongly urged that the whole of the native troops, now amounting to 1200, or at least the most suspected portion of them, forming two-thirds of the whole, should be disarmed. Sir Henry Lawrence, perhaps because he thought that the measure might precipitate a crisis, refused his consent; but about a week later, when fatigue and anxiety had brought on such an alarming illness that he was interdicted from business by his medical attendants, the provisional council appointed to act for him took a step which, without the name, had all the effect of disarmament. The troops were paraded, and told that they were to take their leave and go to their homes till November. They objected at first, with a great show of zeal for the service, but ultimately all went off except 350, of whom a large proportion were Sikhs. Immediately after their departure the 3d regiment of military police, which furnished the jail guard, and took most of the civil duties at Lucknow, mutinied, and marched off on the road to Sultanpoor.

By the 12th of June Sir Henry Lawrence had so far recovered as to be able to resume his functions. The most important object which now engaged his attention was the fortification of the residency, and the provisioning of it so as to stand a siege. At the same time he ordered several leading persons, suspected of treason, to be arrested, and confined as state prisoners. Among them were a brother of the ex-king, and two Delhi princes, who had for some time been resident at Lucknow. New levies of troops were also raised, particularly a body of volunteer cavalry, consisting partly of cavalry and infantry officers of disbanded regiments. A large addition was also made to the native police, no fewer than 2000 having been enlisted, not so much with a view to permanent employment, or from much confidence in their trust-worthiness, as to relieve the other troops from routine duties, and leave them free for those of more importance.

Newabgunge Bara Bankee, eighteen miles north-east of Lucknow, had become the common rendezvous of the mutineers. On the 29th of June intelligence was received that their advanced guard of 500 foot and 100 horse had arrived at Chinhut, only eight miles east of the capital, and were collecting supplies for their main body, which was expected on the following day. In consequence of this intelligence the troops in cantonments were brought down and lodged in the residency and the Muchee Bhowun. This was only preparatory to a still more important step. At sunrise of the following morning there had assembled at the iron bridge a force consisting of 520 infantry, 300 of them belonging to her majesty’s 32d, 116 cavalry, of whom thirty-six were European volunteers and the rest Sikhs, and details of artillery, with eleven guns, four of them European, and one an eight-inch howitzer. Sir Henry
Lawrence, heading this force in person, set out to attack the mutineers. Some time was lost before the march commenced, and the heat became oppressive. The road, however, so far as the Kokrail, which is about half-way to Chinhut, was well metalled, and no difficulty was experienced. It was far otherwise beyond the Kokrail. After passing the bridge over it, instead of the metalled road, there was only a newly raised embankment of loose sandy soil, with occasional gaps, indicating the site of intended bridges. After a halt, during which apparently from some oversight no refreshment was served out, the force began to move sluggishly along this embankment, and the videttes had proceeded a mile and a half when they were fired upon from the village of Ismailgunge, on the left. The howitzer was ordered to the front, and was followed by the rest of the guns. The column still plodding along the embankment, was exposed to a fire of round shot, which though distant did some execution. The enemy was now seen posted in front of Chinhut, and the British line deployed, the 32d taking post on the left, between Ismailgunge and the line of road, and the native infantry crossing the road to the right, and drawing up in front of a small hamlet. After the distant firing had continued for about twenty minutes, the enemy appeared to be giving way, but they were only preparing to act more decidedly on the offensive, by advancing with their whole army, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in two large separate masses, one on each of the British flanks, evidently for the purpose of turning them. This attack was met by a fire of grape, which, however, had little effect in checking the advance, as parties of cavalry continued pushing forward, while the infantry made for Ismailgunge to cut off the 32d, who were posted beyond it, and lying on the ground to avoid the fire. At this crisis, four guns belonging to Alexander's Oude irregular battery were ordered from the right to the left in order to check the enemy's progress. The difficulty of the ground, and some reluctance on the part of the drivers, deprived this movement of the advantage expected from it, and the cavalry were ordered to charge. The volunteers did their part admirably. Not so the Sikhs, who turned their horses' heads and fled. Ismailgunge having in consequence fallen into the hands of the enemy, and a deadly fire been opened from it, it was absolutely necessary to dislodge them. The 32d advanced boldly for this purpose, but after losing several of their officers fell back in disorder. This repulse decided the battle, and a retreat was ordered. It could not but be disastrous. The enemy, taking advantage of every break in the ground, poured in a murderous fire. First the howitzer was abandoned, and then no fewer than six of the guns, with most of the ammunition waggons. The Europeans, who could least be spared, suffered severely, 112 being killed and 44 wounded; the loss in natives was also great, though far less by casualties than by shameful desertion. It seems that when Sir Henry Lawrence resolved on this ill-fated attack he was not aware of the vast superiority of the force which
he was about to encounter. It consisted, as was afterwards ascertained, of 5550 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 160 artillery, with twelve nine-pounder guns.

The Chinhut disaster was, almost as a matter of course, followed by the defection of many native soldiers, who had till then remained at least nominally faithful. The 4th and 7th, and four companies of the 1st irregular infantry, quartered at the Dowlut Khana, under Brigadier Gray, immediately mutinied, and were soon imitated by the police occupying the Imambara, a large building, situated on the road between the Dowlut Khana and the Muchee Bhown. Meanwhile, the exulting mutineers continued their pursuit unchecked till they reached the Goomtee, and attempted to force the brick bridge above the Muchee Bhown, and the iron bridge above the residency. When repulsed, they gained

![Imambara, or House of the Twelve Patriarchs, Lucknow.](image)

an entrance into the city, and by fording the river established themselves within it in such numbers, that before the day closed, both the Muchee Bhown and the residency were completely invested.

Three days before the disaster at Chinhut, a horrible massacre had been perpetrated at Cawnpoor. There the mutiny, which for some days had been hourly dreaded, broke out at last on the 5th of June. It began with the 2d light cavalry, and soon extended to the three infantry regiments, the 1st, 53d, and 56th. The whole, after setting fire to some bungalows, and committing other outrages, set off in the direction of Newabgunge, a village situated a little to the north-west. Three days before the rising, all the non-military Christian residents had removed into the entrenchment. This had been furnished with provisions, calculated to maintain 1000 persons for thirty days. Unfortunately, the entrenchment itself was totally unfitted to stand a siege of such a duration. It was completely commanded from different quarters, and

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if assailed with any degree of vigour, must at once have been forced, as the
bank inclosing it was barely breast-high. The selection of such a place was
certainly a fatal error, and it is difficult to explain how an officer of so much
experience and ability as Sir Hugh Wheeler could have fallen into it. He had a
choice of other places. His entrenchment was at the south-east extremity of the
cantonment, below the town of Cawnpoor, whereas, nearly at an equal distance
above it, at the north-west extremity, stood the magazine, amply supplied with
guns and military stores, and near it the treasury, which happened at the time
to be well replenished. Nor were these the only advantages possessed by this
locality. Ravines on the one side, and the proximity of the river on the other,
gave the magazine strong natural defences; while a high inclosing wall of
masonry, together with numerous substantial buildings, supplied at once the
means of resistance, and, what was equally wanted, adequate shelter. The
only plausible account of the preference given to the entrenchment is, that Sir
Hugh, after having so long served with sepoys, and found them faithful, still
dlung to the belief that either they would not mutiny at all, or would at the
worst, after temporary outrage, quit the station and hasten off to Delhi. The
latter was the course on which they had resolved, and they would have carried it
into effect, had they not been diverted from it by Nana Sahib, whose treachery
was now about to be consummated. His troops had been intrusted with the
charge of the treasury. The result was, that when the mutiny broke out, they
immediately plundered it. The possession of the magazine was their next
object. Sir Hugh, when he saw that he could not preserve it, had given orders
to blow it up, but the native guard interfered, and it fell with all its guns and
stores into the hands of the rebels. Nana Sahib had now full scope for his
execrable designs. When the revolted regiments were about to depart, he
tempted them to remain by taking them into his service, with the promise of
a large increase of pay, and led them back to Cawnpoor under the Mahratta
standard, which he had raised after proclaiming himself peishwa.

Sir Hugh Wheeler, as soon as he saw that the entrenchment which he had
intended only as a temporary asylum, was to become the scene of a protracted
and desperate struggle, looked about for aid, and turned once more to Lucknow.
His application, dated the 14th June, was in the following terms:—"We have
been besieged since the 6th by the Nana Sahib, joined by the whole of the
native troops who broke out on the morning of the 4th. The enemy have two
twenty-four pounders and several other guns. We have only eight nine-
pounders. The whole Christian population is with us in a temporary entrench-
ment, and our defence has been noble and wonderful, our loss heavy and cruel.
We want aid, aid, aid. P.S.—If we had 200 men we could punish the scoundrels
and aid you." Painful though it must have been to refuse such an application,
Sir Henry Lawrence found it impossible to comply with it. On the 18th of June,
two days after receiving Sir Henry's answer, Captain Moore of the 32d, who
was then at Cawnpore, wrote thus:—"Sir Hugh regrets you cannot send him the 200 men, as he believes with their assistance we could drive the insurgents from Cawnpore and capture their guns. Our troops, officers, and volunteers have acted most nobly, and on several occasions a handful of men have driven hundreds before them. Our loss has been chiefly from the sun and their heavy guns. Our rations will last a fortnight, and we are still well supplied with ammunition. Our guns are serviceable. Report says that troops are advancing from Allahabad, and any assistance might save our garrison. We of course are prepared to hold out to the last." In other two letters received at Lucknow, the language was more desponding. One dated the 21st June, says:—"We have been cannonaded for six hours a day by twelve guns. This evening, in three hours, upwards of thirty shells (mortars) were thrown into the entrenchment. This has occurred daily for the last eight days; an idea may be formed of our casualties, and how little protection the barracks afford to the women. Any aid to be effective must be immediate. In event of rain falling our position would be untenable." The other letter, dated the 24th June, after mentioning that the attack had commenced on the 6th, and been continued for eighteen days and nights, proceeds thus: "The condition of misery experienced by all is utterly beyond description in this place. Death and mutilation in all their forms of horror have been daily before us. The numerical amount of casualties has been frightful, caused both by sickness and the implements of war." In these letters the perilous condition of the garrison was not understated. The whole number of individuals crowded within the entrenchment was about 900. Of these, not more than 200 could be counted on as combatants, while more than a third of the whole (330) were women and children. In both of these classes, death was making fearful havoc, and the dead bodies could only be disposed of by waiting till night, when the enemy's fire usually slackened, and then throwing them into a well outside the entrenchment. On the 13th of June, the enemy's live shells, which had previously obliged the officers to strike their tents, set fire to the barrack which was used as an hospital for the wounded, and also lodged the soldiers' families. On seeing the conflagration, the rebels, endeavouring to profit by the confusion, so much increased their fire that scarcely any one could be spared from his post to give assistance, and the flames spread so rapidly, that about forty of the sick and wounded, who could not help themselves, were literally burned to ashes. The barrack being thus consumed, and most of the other buildings completely riddled with balls, most of the women and children sought shelter during the day in holes which had been dug in the ground, and were obliged to pass the night in the open air, beneath the bank of the entrenchment. It was impossible that this state of matters could last, and as every day, while it thinned the ranks of the garrison, was adding thousands to the number of their assailants, there could be no doubt that a dreadful issue was at hand. The first thought
was to assume the offensive, and by a desperate effort either seize and spike the enemy's guns, or perish in the attempt. Now that the event is known, it must be admitted that the boldest would have been the wisest course. We cannot wonder, however, that Sir Hugh Wheeler hesitated to incur the responsibility of sanctioning a step which nothing but absolute despair could justify, and chose rather to listen to the terms volunteered by Nana Sahib. On the 24th of June, Mrs. Greenaway, a very aged European lady, who, with her family, had been captured by the Nana, and only spared on the promise of paying a lac of rupees for their ransom, arrived at the entrenchment, bearing a note from him, the purport of which was, that all soldiers, and Europeans who had nothing to do with Lord Dalhousie's government, and would lay down their arms, should be sent to Allahabad. Sir Hugh Wheeler authorized Captain Moore to act in the matter as he should consider best, and on the following day an agreement was entered into, by which Sir Hugh, on the part of the British government, agreed to give up all the money, stores, and guns in the entrenchment, and the Nana on his part undertook, and solemnly swore, not only to allow all the inmates of the garrison to retire unmolested, but to provide means of conveyance for the wounded, and for the ladies and children. Hostilities immediately ceased, and the preparations for departure were commenced. These having been completed, on the 26th, the whole garrison, men, women, and children, quitted the entrenchment, and proceeded towards the boats. These they were permitted to enter without the least molestation, but no sooner had they embarked, than a horrid massacre began. Two guns, which had been concealed, were suddenly run out, and opened their fire. At the same time the sepoys, rushing in from all directions, began to ply their muskets. In the confusion, the men, instead of attempting to unmoor the boats, jumped into the water to swim for their lives. Three boats out of the whole number succeeded in reaching the opposite side; but it was only to encounter a new attack. In attempting to continue their flight, they were so closely pursued, that before they got a mile down the stream, two of them were swamped, and about a half of the whole party killed or wounded. The remaining boat, now crowded with wounded, and overloaded, was exposed during the whole day to a running fire of guns and musketry. Night brought some respite, but next morning the fugitives had again to run the gauntlet of a murderous fire from both banks. On the third day the boat stuck fast on a sandbank, and became a sure mark for the rebels, who by pouring in volley after volley, made it impossible to employ any effectual means of getting her off. In this extremity fourteen of the party undertook the desperate task of rushing to the bank and charging their savage assailants. The heroic deed was so far successful that they put the enemy to flight. Unfortunately, however, in pursuing their advantage, they lost their communication with the river, and only escaped from being surrounded by retiring in a direction parallel to the stream. After
proceeding in this way about a mile, they again reached the bank, but it was only to find their perils increased. Both banks were lined with troops, and escape seemed impossible. As a last resource they took refuge in a temple immediately in front of them. Here they defended themselves so manfully, that their cowardly foes, afraid to meet them in open fight, piled up wood around the temple and set it on fire. The smoke and heat soon became intolerable, and the small band, now reduced to twelve, one having been killed and one wounded, threw off their clothes, and charging through the fire, made for the water. Only seven succeeded in reaching it. Two of them were almost immediately shot, and the remaining five endeavoured to save themselves by swimming. Though followed by the rebels, who waded into the water and took aim at them at every available point, none of them was struck, and they had gone nearly three miles, when one of the party, an artilleryman, feeling exhausted, began to swim on his back. He thus lost the power of directing his course, and unconsciously floated to the bank, where he was seized and murdered. The four survivors ultimately escaped. The party left in the boat fell into the hands of a rebel zemindar near Futtehpore, who sent them back to Nana Sahib as prisoners. Their companions left behind at Cawnpoor when the carnage began had already been disposed of. Those shot down in the boats were the most fortunate. Of the remainder every man was shot, while the women and children were carried off to Nana Sahib's camp. In the evening he celebrated what he called his victory by a series of salutes, one of twenty-one guns to himself as peishwa, or Mahratta sovereign, another of nineteen to his brother, Bala Sahib, now designated governor-general, and a third to Jowalla Persbaud, a Brahmin, and rebel soubaalidar, whom he had appointed commander-in-chief. He concluded these ceremonies with a speech, in which he lauded his troops for their glorious achievement at Cawnpoor, and promised to reward it by a liberal largess. On the arrival of the fugitives from Futtehpore, on the 1st of July, all the men, like those at Cawnpoor, were immediately put to death. The women and children were carried off to join the others, already imprisoned in a building called the Subada Ke Kothee, where they were destined to endure another fortnight of misery, and then become the victims of one of the most inhuman massacres ever perpetrated.

Having taken a general survey of the progress of the sepoy revolt, and pointed out the leading localities in which the successive mutinies occurred, our next task must be to explain the measures employed by government to meet the crisis. For a time, as has been seen, the danger was greatly underrated, and in the belief that the disaffection was limited to a few regiments, and would either disappear of its own accord or be suppressed without difficulty, the interval which elapsed after the first notes of warning was not turned to due account. The European regiment which had been brought from Rangoon was on the point of returning, when the disastrous tidings from Meerut and
Delhi arrived. The authorities, now made aware that the passing cloud of which they were dreaming had been the gathering of a fearful storm, would fain have acted with vigour, but found themselves for a time almost destitute of the means. Large reinforcements of European troops were absolutely required, but though no time was lost in urging their immediate despatch from all the different quarters which seemed capable of furnishing them, several weeks must elapse before they could arrive, and the utmost that could be done in the interval was to concentrate the few European troops within the districts to which the mutiny was as yet confined, and endeavour meanwhile, not so much by force as by moral suasion, to prevent it from assuming more formidable dimensions. The orders issued on the subject of the greased cartridges, and the harangues made to different regiments when paraded for the purpose, have been already noticed. A wider publication of the views and intentions of government was now deemed expedient, and on the 16th of May the following proclamation was issued:—

"The Governor-general of India in council, has warned the army of Bengal that the tales by which the men of certain regiments have been led to suspect that offence to their religion or injury to their caste is mediated by the government of India, are malicious falsehoods. The governor-general in council has learned that this suspicion continues to be propagated by designing and evil-minded men, not only in the army, but among other classes of the people. He knows that endeavours are made to persuade Hindoos and Musalmans, soldiers and civil subjects, that their religion is threatened secretly as well as openly by the acts of the government, and that the government is seeking in various ways to entrap them into a loss of caste for purposes of its own. Some have been already deceived and led astray by these tales. Once more then the governor-general in council warns all classes against the deceptions that are practised on them. The government of India has invariably treated the religious feelings of all its subjects with careful respect. The governor-general in council has declared that it will never cease to do so. He now repeats that declaration, and he emphatically proclaims that the government of India entertains no desire to interfere with their religion or caste, and that nothing has been, or will be done by the government to affect the free exercise of the observances of religion or caste by every class of the people. The government of India has never deceived its subjects, therefore the governor-general in council now calls upon them to refuse their belief to seditions lies. This notice is addressed to those who hitherto by habitual loyalty and orderly conduct have shown their attachment to the government, and a well-founded faith in its protection and justice. The governor-general in council enjoins all such persons to pause before they listen to false guides and traitors who would lead them into danger and disgrace."

The above proclamation intimates that an unfounded alarm on the subject
of religion was the sole cause of the disaffection which prevailed, and of the
mutinies which had actually occurred, and yet at its date government knew of
the atrocities which whole regiments of sepoys had perpetrated at Meerut and
Delhi. It was surely too much to ignore these facts, instead of boldly de-
nouncing them, and publishing to all the world that, come what might, they
should certainly not go unpunished. Silence on such a subject was as unmanly
as impolitic, and must have been generally interpreted as a virtual confession
that punishment was not threatened, simply because government was either
afraid or felt itself powerless to inflict it. This obvious inference received a
strong confirmation from Mr. Colvin, lieutenant-governor of the North-western
Provinces, who, at the very time when he was in communication with the
governor-general on the subject, thought it unnecessary to wait for final instruc-
tions, and on his own responsibility issued a proclamation, which, by offering a
general pardon to all except the murderers of private persons, seemed to
promise immunity to those who had murdered their officers. The governor-
general, however averse to severity, could not sanction such a pardon, and Mr.
Colvin’s proclamation was superseded by another which corrected his mistake.
Fortunately the want of foresight which had been evinced in allowing India to
be so much denuded of European troops was remedied to some extent by two
most opportune contingencies. The Persian war having been brought to a
successful termination sooner than the most sanguine had anticipated, the
European regiments engaged in it were hastening back with the utmost expedi-
tion, while those which were prosecuting their voyage for the war in China
had not proceeded so far as to be beyond reach, and in consequence of a message
to that effect changed their destination to Calcutta. The result of these
arrangements, and of applications to Rangoon, Madras, and Ceylon, was, that
important reinforcements arrived before the end of May. At home also,
where the astounding intelligence from India had produced an almost unpar-
alleled amount of excitement and indignation, the general voice had proclaimed
that, be the cost what it might, the revolt must be suppressed, and embarkations
of troops on a scale adequate to the crisis accordingly commenced.

While large reinforcements from other quarters were thus secured, imme-
diate steps were taken to collect all the available troops within reach of Delhi,
and hurry them forward in order to attempt its recapture. As part of the force
to be thus employed, three European regiments, her majesty’s 75th foot, and
the 1st and 2d European fusiliers, who had been stationed among the hills
near Simla, where the Honourable George Anson, the commander-in-chief, was
then residing, started under his immediate directions, and arrived on the 23d
of May at Umballa. Here at that date the troops assembled included, in
addition to the above regiments, the 9th and a squadron of the 4th lancers, the
60th native infantry, and two troops of horse-artillery. He had formed them
into two small brigades, the one under Brigadier Halifax and the other under
Preparations for recovery of Delhi.

A.D. 1857.

Brigadier Jones, and was preparing to leave for Kurnaul, where he expected that the whole would arrive on the 30th, when he was seized with cholera, and died on the 27th. General Reid immediately succeeded as provincial commander-in-chief, but was in such wretched health as to be incapable of conducting the intended operations against Delhi, which were therefore intrusted to Sir Henry Barnard. To co-operate with the force thus advancing, a detachment from Meerut, consisting of a wing of her majesty's 60th rifles, two squadrons of 6th dragoon guards (carabineers), 50 troopers of the 4th irregulars, two companies of native sappers, and six guns, four of them belonging to Scott's battery, and two (eighteen-pounders) belonging to Tombs' troop of horse-artillery, started on the 27th of May, under the command of Brigadier Wilson; and encamped on the 30th near Ghazee-u-din, a small but well-fortified place on the Hindon, about ten miles from Delhi. A rumour that the mutineers, emboldened by their recent successes, meant to dispute the passage was generally regarded as unfounded, and hence a kind of surprise took place when, about four in the afternoon, a packet of irregulars who had been stationed beyond the bridge galloped into the camp to announce that the enemy was at hand. The rifles, who had scarcely formed when an eighteen-pounder shot bounded into the camp, hastened forward supported by the carabineers, and with their Enfields opened a deadly fire, which soon slackened that of the enemy's guns. Meanwhile the artillery having taken up effective positions, two companies of rifles which had been the first to cross the bridge made a gallant charge when not more than eighty yards from the enemy's guns. The movement was decisive, and the rebels, outnumbering their assailants at least sevenfold, were soon seen in disgraceful flight. Five guns, two of heavy calibre, were the trophies of the victory. The struggle, however, was not yet terminated. Trusting to the strength of the village in which they had entrenched themselves, the mutineers mustered courage for a second encounter, and the next morning, Sunday the 31st, once more made their appearance and commenced a sharp cannonade. The experience of the previous day had taught them a lesson by which they did not fail to profit, and they kept their guns at such a distance that no new captures could be made. This cowardly precaution, and the intense heat, which made pursuit all but impossible, favoured their escape, and enabled them to bear the tidings of their own defeat to their comrades at Delhi.

The Meerut brigade did not again start till the 4th of June, and proceeded in the direction of Bagpout, where it arrived on the 6th; on the 7th it reached Alipoor, and joined the two brigades from the north. The united force on quitting Alipoor on the 8th had the prospect of an immediate engagement, and therefore set out in three columns formed in order of battle. The enemy had strongly entrenched themselves at Badulee Ke Serai, so as to intercept the approach of the British troops to the cantonments, situated to the north-west of Delhi. It was here therefore that the encounter was about to take place.
Sir Henry's despatch gives the following account of it: "As soon as our advanced picket met the enemy, these brigades deployed leaving the main road clear. The enemy soon opened a very heavy fire upon us, and finding that our light field pieces did not silence their battery, and that we were losing men fast, I called upon the 75th regiment to make a dash, charging, and take the place at the point of the bayonet; this service was done with the most heroic gallantry, and to Lieutenant-colonel Herbert, and every officer, non-commissioned officer, and men of the 75th regiment, my thanks are most especially due; the 1st Europeans supported the attack, and on the second brigade coming up and threatening their right, and Brigadier-general Grant showing the head of his column and guns on their left rear, the enemy abandoned the position entirely, leaving his guns on the ground."

After all this success, the work of the day was not yet finished. Badulee Ke Serai is about five miles distant from Delhi, and Sir Henry Barnard was afraid that if he halted before reaching the position which he wished to occupy at the cantonments, the enemy might take advantage of the delay, and interpose more formidable obstacles than those he had just overcome. He resolved therefore, though aware that his men were much exhausted, to push on, and at once reap the full fruits of his victory. Accordingly, having divided his force into two columns, the one intrusted to Brigadier Wilson supported by Brigadier Shower's brigade, while he himself, supported by Brigadier Grave's brigade, led the other, he sent the former along the main trunk road, where it had to fight the whole way through gardens with high walls and other obstacles, while the latter diverging to the left proceeded straight through the cantonments. Both columns successfully accomplished the tasks assigned to them, though not till their skill and prowess had again been put fully to the test. The rebels were strongly posted on the ridge which overlooks the cantonments from the east, and stretches southwards till within a short distance of the north-west extremity of the city. The second column, as soon as it came within range of the guns in position on this ridge, was exposed to so destructive a fire that the design of forcing it by a direct attack in front was abandoned for a movement which would take it in flank. This movement, combined with that of the first column, which was now threatening the other flank, happily succeeded. The rebels abandoned their guns and retreated into the city, while the columns advancing from opposite directions swept the ridge, and finally met upon it at Hindoo Row's house, which thenceforward became the key of the British position.

On the 9th of June, the very day after the ridge was carried, the British force received a most valuable addition by the arrival of the guides, forming the first instalment of reinforcements from the Punjab. On the 12th of May, when they received orders to march, they were at Hotee Murdan in the vicinity of Peshawer. By the following morning they had made a march of thirty miles and arrived at Attock. Here they were still 580 miles from Delhi, and at the
ordinary rate of marching must have been two months in reaching it, but
forward had always been their watchword, and by one of the most rapid
marches on record, they accomplished the whole distance in twenty-four days.
Deducting three of these, during which they halted by special order, they had
pushed on continuously for three weeks, at the daily average rate of twenty-eight
miles. It is needless to say that the acclamations of the
British camp were long and loud when Captain H. Daly
marched into it, at the head of his three troops of cav-
alary, and six companies of infantry. After their long
march they were certainly entitled to repose, but it was
not asked, and could not have been granted, as a can-
nnonade which had continued all morning was followed in the afternoon
by a desperate attack on the British right flank. The guides, called out
to aid in repelling it, displayed a gallantry amounting to rashness, and fol-
lowed the fleeing rebels up to the walls of Delhi. Having thus exposed them-
sew to a murderous fire they suffered severely. Captains Daly and Hawes
were wounded, and Quintin Battye, a young officer of remarkable promise, who
commanded the cavalry, received his death-blow, and only survived till the
following day. This attack of the rebels was only the first of a series in which
the enemy persisted for several successive days. On the 9th, 10th, and 11th,
their endeavour was to turn our right flank by gaining possession of Hindoo
Row's house, where our heaviest guns had been placed in battery. Foiled in
this they turned to the left flank, and on the 12th assailed it with the utmost
fury. At this time the British left extended no farther north along the ridge
than the Flagstaff tower, immediately beyond which was a deep cut, through
which a steep road, leading from the city to the cantonments, had been carried.
A battery erected at the tower commanded this road, and made it impossible
for the rebels to approach by it; but to the north of the tower the ridge sloped
rapidly down toward the sandy bank of the Jumna, while another comparativa-
ively level road led circuitously round the extremity of the ridge towards the
cantonments. In order to avail themselves of the facilities of attack in this
direction, the rebels, after plundering the house of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, situ-
ated close to the river, about a mile and a half north of the city, and laying it in ruins, had placed a battery in the grounds, and made their position so strong, that a military council, held in the British camp on the 11th, had decided against any present attempt to dislodge them. The danger of allowing them to occupy it was fully manifested on the 12th. Early in the morning of that day, they had managed to bring a formidable array of guns, and a strong body of troops, within 400 yards of the Flagstaff, while another body was stealing round by the extremity of the ridge to gain the cantonments, and thus place themselves in the British rear. This alarming attack was only discovered when the day broke, and created so much confusion, that the Flagstaff battery was for a short time in imminent danger, and a lodgment was nearly effected in the cantonment itself. It was not long, however, before sufficient means of resistance were mustered, and the rebels, repulsed at every point, endeavoured to regain their original position. Even in this they failed, for in the pursuit which followed, they were completely driven from the Metcalfe grounds, which thereafter remained in British possession.

It was hoped that the 12th of June, which had opened thus auspiciously, would not close before a still more brilliant success had been achieved. The impossibility of wresting Delhi from the rebels by the weak force which had boldly taken up a position before it, had already become apparent. The magazine blown up by Lieutenant Willoughby was only that which contained the small arms, and the rebels consequently possessed an almost inexhaustible supply of guns and military stores. The short trial which had been made sufficed to show that with an artillery far inferior both in number and calibre to that of the enemy, and troops barely sufficient to maintain the position, and consequently incapable of furnishing working parties, the regular siege of Delhi
was impossible; and hence, as the importance of recovering it, in order to crush the mutiny before it had assumed still larger dimensions, had been strongly urged by government, it became a question whether it might not be practicable to carry it at once by a sudden assault. This question, without undergoing a thorough discussion, had been answered in the affirmative, and it had been resolved that at the dead of night, while the cavalry remained in charge of the camp, the whole of the infantry should move out, and after blowing in two of the gates by powder bags, rush in and seize possession of that part of the city where the palace stood. The execution of this plan had been actually commenced, when it was suddenly countermanded. Sir Henry Barnard had changed his mind, because it had been forcibly represented to him that he was endangering the safety of the camp by denuding it of European infantry, and would be unable to hold the city, even if he should succeed in surprising it. On this subject opinions are still conflicting, and we therefore content ourselves with simply remarking how unfortunate it was that the objections which ultimately prevailed had not been previously considered. The troops, it is true, retired without sustaining harm, but the alarm which had been given put the enemy upon their guard, and thus precluded any similar attempt at surprise, when it might have been made under more hopeful circumstances. Nothing therefore now remained but to strengthen the position on the ridge, and wait the arrival of a siege train with adequate reinforcements, in the meantime submitting to exchange conditions with the rebels, and become the besieged instead of the besiegers. This was indeed a great disappointment to the government, who had not only calculated on the early recapture of Delhi, but in the eagerness of their wishes allowed themselves to be imposed upon by unfounded rumours, which announced that it had actually fallen. As a regular siege was now inevitable, and would necessarily require months of preparation, this seems the proper place to give a more detailed account of Delhi and its vicinity, in order that the subsequent operations before it may be more easily understood.

Delhi, which in 1658 superseded Agra as the capital of the Mogul empire, stands on the right bank of a branch of the Jumna, which leaves the main stream about five miles above the city, and joins it ten miles below. Its site, about 800 feet above the level of the sea, is a comparatively barren tract, much broken by rocks, and made still more rugged in appearance by heaps of ruins, which, by the large space they cover, indicate the magnitude and importance which the city must have attained in very early times. The modern city, founded by the emperor Shah Jehan in 1631, is above seven miles in circuit, and contains, exclusive of the suburbs, a population of about 140,000, in which the number of Mahometans far exceeds the usual proportion found in the cities of India, being only a few thousands less than that of Hindoos. The wall on the east, facing the river, is nearly straight, but on the other three sides forms a
very irregular curve. As originally built, it had only a few weak towers, but since its possession by the British, its defences have been greatly strengthened by the excavation of a ditch, and the erection of large bastions, each mounting nine guns of large calibre. Of these bastions it is necessary to give the names only of those on the north and north-west sides, because, from fronting the British camp, mention will often be made of them as the siege proceeds. Beginning at the north-east extremity, and proceeding westward, they succeed each other in the following order—the Moira or Water, the Cashmere, the Shah or Moree, and the Burun bastions. The main gates are the Calcutta on the east, approached by the bridge of boats across the Jumna, the Cashmere on the north-east, the Moree and Cabool on the north-west, the Lahore on the west, the Ajmere on the south-west, and the Delhi on the south. The houses are in general substantially built, but almost all the streets are narrow; the only two which

Moore GATE. DELHI.—From a photograph.

can be described as spacious and handsome are the principal one, called the Chandei Chauk, running eastward from the palace to the Lahore gate, and another, leading also from the palace southward to the Delhi gate. The edifice surpassing all others, both in extent and structure, is the palace, situated on the east side, inclosed by a lofty turreted wall of red granite, a mile in circuit, and communicating at its north-east extremity with the old fort of Selinghur. The access to it is by two lofty and richly sculptured gateways, the one in its south, and the other in its west side. The principal one, called the Lahore gate, because leading to the city gate of the same name, contains the rooms in which the first murders, on the arrival of the mutineers from Meerut, were perpetrated, and is succeeded first by a noble arch, supporting the great tower, and then by a vaulted aisle, not unlike that of a Gothic cathedral. Beyond this aisle is the Dewani Khas, or council chamber, a splendid pavilion of white marble, and near it the open court, where, with the sanction, if not by the
express order of the king, a large number of unoffending women and children were cut to pieces by soldiers in his pay, while his sons and grandsons looked on and enjoyed the horrid spectacle. The only other edifice which need here be particularized, is the Jumma Musjid, or principal mosque, situated to the west of the palace, in a street leading from it to the Ajmere gate, and forming from its elevated site, and the marble domes and minarets which surmount it, the most conspicuous object which is seen when the city is approached. In addition to the city proper within the walls, Delhi has extensive suburbs, two of which, from the cover and means of annoyance which they gave to the rebels, became the scenes of frequent and sanguinary contests. The one, called Kissengunge, situated to the west of the Cabool gate, was skirted on the north, where it fronted the British position, by the Delhi canal; the other, called the Subzée Mundee, was situated considerably farther to the north-west, on the trunk road leading to Kurnaul, and in some degree enveloped the British position, as it extended beyond the southern extremity of the ridge, and to the rear of Hindoo Row's house.

The British position was certainly the most favourable which could have been selected for defensive purposes. The main body of the troops was encamped on the parade ground of the cantonments, which, having been burned by the mutineers, now existed only in name. On the west side it was protected by a canal, or rather outlet, from a large jheel or lake at Nujufghur, and on the east by the ridge, which in the course of a few days was rendered unassailable by any force which the rebels could bring against it. Besides the batteries at the Flagstaff tower and Hindoo Row's house, others were erected at several intermediate points, as the observatory and the mosque, while two, placed more in front, bore directly on the suburbs already mentioned. But though the strength of this position secured it against being forced, there were various circumstances which increased the difficulty of holding it. Cholera had made its appearance, and though not yet adding largely to the mortality, was creeping on insidiously, and might ere long rage like a pestilence. The rebels too, fully alive to the kind of tactics which their native cowardice as well as superiority of numbers suggested, seemed determined to give no respite from attack, thus occasioning losses which the British could ill spare, and threatening to overcome their means of resistance by mere exhaustion. It must also be remembered that the authority of the government had ceased in all the districts to the south and east, and that only from the north-west could supplies and reinforcements be obtained. The latter, collected chiefly in the Punjab, had a long march to accomplish, but by the aid of the Rajah of Pattiana and other friendly chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej protected states, were able to surmount all opposing obstacles. There was more doubt as to the supplies. Being required for daily use, and too bulky and perishable to admit of a distant conveyance, they had to be drawn chiefly from the neighbouring districts, and the danger
was that the rebels, by scouring the country and besetting all the routes leading to the cantonments, might to their other means of aggression add that of starvation. Happily this, the greatest danger of all, was not realized. To cut off the supplies either did not occur to the rebellious sepoys, or required more enterprise than they possessed, and from first to last, however great the privations endured in the British camp, a deficiency of provisions was not one of them.

The mutineers, notwithstanding successive repulses, did not abandon the hope of forcing the British lines, and on the 17th of June commenced a work which, if they had been permitted to complete it, would have enfiladed the position and seriously affected its security. This was the erection of a battery in the immediate vicinity of Kissengunge. To conceal their design and withdraw attention from the locality, they opened early in the day with a heavy cannonade, and continued it for some time without interruption, till the approach of a British detachment told them that they must either abandon the work, or contend manfully for the possession of it. The attacking party advanced in two columns, the one under Major Tombs, consisting of two companies of rifles, four companies of 1st fusiliers, thirty cavalry of the guides, twenty sappers and miners, and four guns; and the other under Major Reid, consisting of his own Sirmoor battalion of Ghoorkas, four companies of rifles, and four companies of 1st fusiliers. The rebels, expecting attack in front, were not a little disconcerted when the columns, by separate flank movements to the right and left, placed them between two fires. Their resistance, though by no means obstinate, cost them dear. Not only was the battery captured and the magazine established in its neighbourhood blown up, but a number of sepoys cut off from retreat paid the penalty of their crimes.

The 18th of June, a day memorable in British annals, passed quietly, perhaps because the enemy were engaged in extensive preparations, which were fully developed on the 19th, when about mid-day they were seen issuing in great numbers from the Lahore gate. An attack in the direction of Hindoo Row's house was expected, but it soon appeared that something different was intended, as they were observed passing through Kissengunge, and disappeared among the ruins and gardens beyond. After waiting for some hours, the British troops were recalled, in the belief that the attack had been abandoned. This proved to be a hasty conclusion. The rebels, after proceeding westward by a circuitous route, had turned round, and were within a mile and a half of the British rear. As soon as the alarm was given, Brigadier Hope Grant, commanding the cavalry, hastened out with all the cavalry he could muster, and twelve guns. This force, however, was very inadequate. It consisted of only 250 sabres, while the enemy were found strongly posted, to the number of about 3000. Against such odds little could be effected, and the British cavalry towards dusk were retiring in some degree of confusion, when the arrival of about 300 of the rifles and fusiliers, gave the rebels a
sudden check, recaptured two guns which had fallen into their hands, and compelled them to retreat. Either unconscious of defeat, or determined not to acknowledge it, the rebels again made their appearance on the following day, and advanced so boldly and rapidly, that they were pitching their round shot into the British camp before they could be effectually met. At last, by bringing into action every man that could possibly be spared from the British camp, the enemy were driven across the canal, and compelled once more to seek the shelter of the city.

These defeats, however much they must have damped the spirits of the rebels, had not the effect of diminishing their real force, which was on the contrary daily augmented by reinforcements of revolted regiments. The Nusseerabad mutineers, comprising the 15th and 30th native infantry, had already arrived, and on the 21st, no less than four regiments—the 6th light cavalry, and the 3d, 36th, and 61st native infantry—were seen pouring into the city. Elated by these new arrivals, and rendered still more confident of success by a prophecy which foretold the downfall of British rule in India exactly a hundred years after it was founded, they had fixed on the 23d of June, the centenary of the victory of Plassey, for a great effort. The Rut Jutra, a high Hindoo festival, which happened to fall on the same day, added to the general enthusiasm, while *beang* was liberally supplied in order to inspire artificial courage. On the other hand the admirable arrangements of Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab were now beginning to tell, and important additions were made to the British force before Delhi at the very moment when they were most wanted. On the morning of the 23d, 100 men of her majesty’s 75th, 100 of the 1st fusiliers, three companies of the 2d fusiliers, and the 4th Sikhs, 400 strong, marched into the camp. The struggle had already commenced. Under cover of a furious cannonade from all the bastions, and from the advanced batteries in the suburbs, large bodies were advanced through the Subzee Mundee, to assail Hindoo Row’s house from the rear, and at the same time a battery which had been erected at the Eedgah, situated to the west of the Lahore gate, opened a destructive enfilading fire. Repulse after repulse seemed unavailing. The enemy refused to retire, and kept up such a deadly fire of musketry from the Subzee Mundee, that the Hindoo Row battery could hardly be worked. It thus became necessary to obtain possession of the suburb by assuming the offensive, and attacking it at the point of the bayonet. The column formed for this purpose, consisting of the 1st and 2d fusiliers, supported by the 4th Sikhs, who had that very morning made a march of twenty-two miles, advanced through a shower of shot and shell, and pushed on for a small temple called the Sammy house, from which, under cover of its high inclosure, the enemy’s fire of musketry was most destructive. This hand-to-hand fight issued as it always does when Asiatics are brought into contact with British bayonets. After a short resistance and a fearful carnage, the rebels fled and the whole suburb was cleared out.
The advantage thus gained would have been lost had the enemy been allowed to return, and therefore permanent possession of the Subzée Mundee was secured, by establishing a strong European picket at the Sammy house, and at a serai opposite to it on the Kurnaul road. The British loss was less than might be inferred from the nature of the struggle. Only 39 were killed and 114 wounded. This however does not contain the whole list of casualties. So intense was the heat that, out of ten officers of the 2d fusiliers, five were struck down, and in the 1st fusiliers one was struck down and six were disabled by sun-stroke.

The centenary of Plassey, which, according to native prophecy, was to have witnessed the destruction of British rule in India, only witnessed the discomfiture of those who had treacherously rebelled against it—a discomfiture with which the only hope which the rebels had of forcing the British position at Delhi may be said to have expired. By the end of June the effective force of the British had been increased to 6000 men, and though much was still wanting to enable it to assume the offensive and prepare for the final assault, there was no longer any danger of being compelled to raise the siege, nor any reason to doubt that sooner or later the recapture would be effected. For this brightening prospect a large share of credit is undoubtedly due to Sir John Lawrence as chief commissioner, and the able men associated with him in the civil and military administration of the Punjab; and it is therefore not less due to them than essential to a full narrative of the mutiny, that before proceeding further some account should be given of their exertions.

In the beginning of June, when there was still some ground to hope that many of the sepoy regiments would pause before finally committing themselves...
A.D. 1857.

to mutiny, Sir John Lawrence issued an address to them, in which the following passage occurs: "Those regiments which now remain faithful will receive the rewards due to their constancy; those soldiers who fall away now, will lose their service for ever. It will be too late to lament hereafter when the time has passed by—now is the opportunity of proving your loyalty and good faith. The British government will never want for native soldiers. In a month it might raise 50,000 in the Punjab alone. If the 'Poorbeah' sepyo neglects the present day, it will never return. There is ample force in the Punjab to crush all mutineers. The chiefs and people are loyal and obedient, and the latter long to take your place in the army. All will unite to crush you." These words, which were doubtless regarded by the sepoys as a vain-gloryous boast, contained the simple statement of a fact of which it became the business of the chief commissioner, as soon as unlimited authority to levy troops was given him, to furnish ocular demonstration. The first object was to confirm the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs whose territories intervened between the Punjab and Delhi, and whose friendly aid was hence necessary in order to keep open the communications between them. Here happily no difficulty was experienced. The Rajah of Jheend, instead of waiting to be urged, had organized a force of 800 men, and was pressing forward with it to join the force about to be collected for the recovery of Delhi. Still farther north, and consequently nearer the Punjab, a still more valuable auxiliary was found in the Maharajah of Pattiala, who, resisting all the native influences brought to bear upon him, at once declared his determination to stand or fall with the British government. The loyalty thus evinced he maintained unshaken to the last, and rendered services of which it is not too much to say that they contributed essentially to the suppression of the mutiny in the north-west of India. His example was followed by other chiefs, among whom those of Nabha and Koperthalla deserve honourable mention. Some notice has already been taken of the vigorous measures adopted when intelligence of the first outbreak was received. Of these measures, one of the most important was the formation of a column which should be ready to move on every point where mutiny required to be put down. The command of this column was conferred on Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, who previously held that of the Punjab irregular force, and was acknowledged on all hands to be an officer of distinguished talents. The guides, which formed an important part of the original column, have already been seen pushing forward to Delhi, and performing excellent service on the very day of their arrival there, after completing a march of about 600 miles with almost unexampled rapidity. The rest of the column, after performing good service, was also moving southward to join the Delhi force, and on the 3d of June entered Lahore. After halting for a week it started again, intending to continue its progress southward, when intelligence arrived which obliged it to change its destination, and proceed eastward to Amritsar. That important place was still undisturbed, but it was
feared that a mutiny which had broken out at Julendur might prove infectious, more especially as the mutineers had been permitted through some mismanage-
ment to escape and were roaming the country. The moveable column after
this delay, which was employed in checking or suppressing disturbance, again started for Delhi, commanded no longer by Brigadier Chamberlain, who
had been appointed adjutant-general of the army, but by Brigadier Nicholson,
who after rendering essential aid on the western frontier in raising new levies,
and in maintaining tranquility while surrounded by all the elements of disturb-
ance, was destined to a more brilliant but unhappily a too short career. The
formation of the moveable column was only one of the many means employed
by the authorities of the Punjab to curb the mutiny and provide for its final
suppression. In the months of May and June, five new regiments had been
completed, and by the beginning of October the number had been augmented
to eighteen. At the same time irregular levies of 7000 horse and as many foot
had been raised, so that ultimately the total new force amounted to 34,000. It
is not too much to say that, but for these exertions in the Punjab, the siege of
Delhi must have been abandoned.

CHAPTER III.

Siege of Delhi continued—Repeated attempts on the British position by the rebels—Repulses—Death of
Sir Henry Barnard, and appointment of Brigadier-general Wilson to the command—Reinforcements
on both sides—Defeat of the rebels at Nujafghur—Preparations for the assault—Recapture of
Delhi.

WHEN the month of June closed, the British force before
Delhi had improved its position by the expulsion of the
rebels from the Subzee Mundee, and the permanent occupa-
tion of that important suburb. Still, however, there was
no immediate prospect of an assault which would seal the
fate of the city at once, and no prospect at all of establishing a blockade, which
could either exhaust its means of resistance or starve it into surrender. The
British batteries, placed nearly 1500 yards from the walls, were too distant to
make any serious impression on them; and moreover commanded only two gates,
those of Cashmere and Cabool, while all the others remained as free as ever to
send forth troops for attack, or to bring in reinforcements and supplies. These
considerations, which it was impossible to overlook, produced some degree of
despondency, and more than once the abandonment of the siege was gravely
mooted. The arrivals from the Punjab did little more than supply the waste
by casualty and disease, so that the effective force of all arms did not exceed 5800, while every successive mutiny was adding whole regiments to the rebels, and increasing the already too great disproportion between them and their assailants. There is reason to believe that Sir Henry Barnard was not indisposed to follow the advice of those who would have withdrawn from Delhi. Having no experience of Indian warfare, he had little expectation of bringing the siege to a triumphant termination, and agreed with those who saw a more hopeful field of action if the British army were moved more to the eastward, and concentrated so as to secure the safety of Agra, and the important districts connected with it. Though opinions were divided on this subject at the time, only one now exists, and it is admitted that a withdrawal from Delhi would have given such a triumph to the mutiny as to have made its final suppression all but impossible. While the question of abandoning or prosecuting the siege was under discussion, the idea of a sudden assault was revived. Sir Henry Barnard, it will be remembered, had sanctioned it when formerly proposed, and countermanded it when on the point of execution. The same irresolution was again to be repeated. The whole plan was arranged. One column was to effect an entrance by blowing in the iron grating of the canal near the Cabool gate; and another was to blow in the Cashmere gate, and have the double chance of entering by it and by an escalade of the adjoining bastion, while a party moving stealthily round to the river side was to endeavour to find an entrance from the east. The plan, in order to insure secrecy, was never whispered in the camp, and it was hence taken for granted that the enemy had not the least idea of it. This was a complete mistake. Not only were they on the alert, but they had formed a counter-plan, which if they had been permitted to carry it out, would in all probability have annihilated the British force. A large party, sent out by a circuitous route, had been posted about two miles in our rear, and there only waited the departure of the storming party to hasten forward and seize the camp while denuded of its usual defenders. Providentially this fact became known in the very nick of time, and the idea of a sudden assault was once more abandoned. Shortly afterwards the British army was for the second time deprived of its general. On the 5th of July, Sir Henry Barnard was seized with cholera, and died in the course of a few hours. The event produced a feeling of deep and universal regret, a regret rendered all the more poignant by the fact that he had been brought by no choice of his own into a position in which the excellent qualities which he undoubtedly possessed, both as a man and a commander, were not displayed to advantage. The command of the Delhi force now devolved on General Reid, the provisional commander-in-chief, and was formally assumed by him. It was however more in name than reality. The state of his health, which previously unfitted him for active duty, obliged him before a fortnight elapsed to decline the responsibilities of office, and the appointment was conferred on Brigadier Wilson.
In the beginning of July, a seasonable addition was made to the British force, by the arrival of about 450 men of her majesty's 51st foot, but as had almost invariably happened, the rebels could boast of having on the very same day been far more largely augmented. The Bareilly brigade, consisting of three whole regiments of infantry and some irregular cavalry, after mutinying, as has already been described, had arrived on the opposite bank of the Jumna. No attempt could be made to dispute their passage, and they entered the city, where their reception was all the more cordial from its being known that they were possessed of a considerable amount of treasure. In consequence of the new arrival, it was generally expected that a formidable attack would be made by the rebels to force our position, or at least to regain a footing in the Subzee Mundee. But it would seem that the punishment which had there been inflicted upon them induced them to turn their views in a different direction. The village of Alipoor, forming the first station to the westward on the Kurnaul road, was known to have furnished large supplies to the British camp, and had therefore been marked out by the rebels for vengeance. Accordingly, on the 3d of July, a considerable force moved out from the Lahore gate, and proceeded westward. Their destination being at the time unknown, the British could only send out a force on their track, and it was not known till the following morning that they had been wreaking their fury on the inhabitants of Alipoor. It was sad enough that the aid which they had given to us should have brought such a disaster upon them; but though on this ground alone it was most desirable that the rebels should not be allowed to return with impunity, there was another reason why a blow should be struck which might deter them from attempting to gain a footing in that part of the country. It lay in the direct line of communication between the camp and the Punjab. Only the day before the village was destroyed, a large number of sick sent from the camp had passed through it, and but for a most providential delay the plunder would have included, in addition to that obtained from the village, a valuable convoy of treasure and ammunition. The force sent out from the camp had the good fortune to accomplish both objects. By intercepting the rebels before they could regain the city, it took summary vengeance for the atrocities which had been perpetrated at Alipoor, while by clearing the road it secured the safety of the convoy.

Though the mutineers had as yet been foiled in all their attempts to estab-
lish themselves in the British rear, they had by no means abandoned that
mode of attack. Of this, after several days of comparative quiescence, striking
proof was given on the 9th of July, when a body of cavalry suddenly emerging
from cover, charged right into the camp, and were within it almost as soon as
the alarm could be given. A picket of carabineers, most of them young,
untrained soldiers, instead of opposing the enemy, lost all presence of mind, and
fled. Still dashing on, the rebel troopers made for the guns of the native troop
of horse-artillery, and called aloud on the men in charge of them to join them.
The men remained stanch, and the troopers, without accomplishing their
object, were obliged to decamp. The boldness of this attempt, and the little
resistance offered to it, gave rise to grave suspicions of treachery. A short
time previously, the few Bengal sepoys mingled with the irregulars had been
turned out of the camp, because they were believed to be in communication
with their comrades within the city. It now appeared that they were not the
only traitors, and recourse was had to the somewhat extreme remedy of sending
off the whole three corps of irregular cavalry, one of them to Umballa, and the
other two to the Punjab. While the sowars were assailing the camp, a furious
cannonade was kept up from the city, and volleys of musketry were directed
against the British station from every available point in the suburbs. After
the expulsion of the sowars, it became necessary to dislodge those who, with
the view of supporting them, had taken post in the gardens and other inclosures
of the vicinity. This task, after a sanguinary contest, was successfully accom-
plished. One result of the affair of the 9th was to make the rebels more chary
of exposing themselves to similar repulses, and they allowed nearly a week to
elapse before they again ventured out.

On the 16th, the mutineers from Jhansi, stained with the blood of an
atrocious massacre, arrived at Delhi. On this occasion, the usual custom was
not forgotten, and after a day’s rest, they were sent out to take the lead in a
new attack, in order at once to signalize their zeal and display their prowess.
As usual, the attack ended in a repulse. After desultory discharges of guns and
musketry, which, as both parties were under cover, produced few casualties, the
British became the assailants, and drove the rebels before them. On more
than one occasion the British, after repulsing the enemy, had in the ardour of
pursuit exposed themselves to a deadly fire from the city walls. The repetition
of such fatal mistakes was at length corrected by a distinct order that they
should in future act strictly on the defensive, and rest satisfied with repelling
an attack, without following it up with any pursuit of the fugitives. This
order, besides preventing an unnecessary waste of human life, had another
beneficial effect, which could hardly have been anticipated. It changed the tactics
of the rebels, who, on finding that they could no longer lure the British within
range of their fire, had less inducement to persist in their incessant attacks, and
allowed days to pass without renewing them. The respite was partly employed
in completing the breastwork on the ridge, so as to form an almost unbroken line from left to right, and enable the men to move from point to point as safely as under a regular covered way. Other changes, partly of a sanitary nature, were introduced, and the health, spirit, and discipline of the force visibly improved. Meanwhile the large increase of numbers obtained by the rebels had not added to their real strength. Mahometans and Hindoos, though they had combined, were by no means united, and intrigues, factions, and dissensions prevailed to such an extent that the king would gladly have saved himself by the sacrifice of his nominal supporters. "Only recognize him as titular king, and secure him in the enjoyment of his pension, and he will open the gate of the fort of Selimgur, and through it admit the British troops into the palace." Such were the terms. Inadmissible as they were, he could not have performed his part in them, and it is almost unnecessary to add that though Sir John Lawrence, when consulted on the subject, had replied, "Treat, but beware of treachery," the negotiation came to nothing. The position and prospects of the British force before Delhi at this time cannot be more briefly stated than in the following letter of General Wilson, dated 31st July:—"It is my firm determination to hold my present position, and to resist any attack to the last. The enemy are very numerous, and may possibly break through our entrenchments and overwhelm us, but the force will die at their post. Luckily, the enemy have no head and no method, and we bear dissensions are breaking out among them. Reinforcements are coming up under Nicholson. If we can hold on till they arrive, we shall be secure. I am making every possible arrangement to secure the safe defence of our position."

The moveable column under Nicholson, to which, as appears from the above letter of General Wilson, so much importance was attached, arrived on the 14th of August. At first some disappointment was felt when its strength was ascertained to be far less than rumour had assigned to it, but the importance of the addition which it made to the British force before Delhi will at once be seen when it is mentioned that it nearly doubled it. The previous force, though nominally about 5600 of all arms, had about a fifth of the whole in hospital, and could therefore muster for duty not more than 2700 Europeans and 1800 natives; the moveable column amounted to about 4200. One essential want, however, still remained to be supplied. The siege train brought to Delhi had been pronounced totally inadequate to make the necessary breaches for assault, and another of much weightier metal, and more complete equipment, had been procured from the arsenals of Philour and Ferozepoor. It was already on the way, but moving very slowly, as its line of gun carriages, tumbrils, and carts, extended over thirteen miles of road. Meanwhile the rebels lost much of their confidence. To violent dissensions, sometimes terminating in bloodshed, were added wholesale desertions by sepoys who, when denied permission to visit their homes, took the remedy into their own hands; and even the Delhi princes, some
of them the very miscreants who had ordered and exulted in the massacre of European women and children, had the effrontery to send letters into the British camp, in which they sought to escape the retribution about to overtake them, by declaring that "they have been all along fondly attached to us, and only want to know what they can do for us."

As everything depended on the safe arrival of the siege train, it was necessary to clear the route along which it was to pass of all mutineers and marauding parties. In this respect the districts of Paniput and Rohtuk required special attention. The Raughurs, a turbulent and predatory horde located there, taking advantage of the revolt, withheld their revenue, and when threatened answered with defiance. An attempt to coerce them had not been completely successful, and in the beginning of August intelligence was received that they were again collecting in force, and had been or were about to be joined by a considerable body of Delhi rebels. The safety of the train being thus endangered, Captain Hodson, whose services during the mutiny, both in the intelligence department in the camp at Delhi and as the chivalric leader of a body of irregular horse, invest his brilliant but brief career with peculiar interest, set out on the 16th of August at the head of a small force, and pushed on for Rohtuk, which had become a rallying point for the rebels. The task assigned him seemed beyond the means at his disposal. His detachment consisted almost entirely of cavalry, and how could he hope with them to overcome an enemy shut up within a walled town, and apparently resolved to make a vigorous defence? Too clear-sighted not to perceive the hopelessness of attempting an assault, and too resolute to despair of success without making an effort to secure it, he withdrew in the meantime to bivouac in an inclosure in the vicinity. In the course of the evening he was waited upon by a deputation from the city, "having grass in their mouths," in token of submission. It was merely a trick to throw him off his guard, for on going out on the following morning to reconnoitre, he saw the enemy hurrying forward at full tilt, and had barely time to form his men before they were upon him. After a short encounter, the rebels were driven back, but it was only to keep up a galling fire under cover of the trees and gardens surrounding the city. It was now Hodson's turn to try stratagem, and lure the enemy into the open ground by commencing a feigned retreat. Nothing more was required. The rebels, yelling and shouting as if secure of victory, followed close upon his track, and were nearly a mile beyond their inclosure, when he gave the order to face about. The fancied pursuit was at once converted into a disorderly flight, and on the following morning Rohtuk itself was found to be evacuated.

While Hodson was thus clearing the way in the direction of Rohtuk, another and larger detachment, having the same object in view, had proceeded from the camp. Mahomed Bukht Khan, an old sepoy soulbahdar, who had become commander-in-chief of the rebels, in order to wipe off the disgrace of
several recent repulses, set out from the city, swearing that he would either capture the siege train or die in the attempt. His force, amounting, according to the report of the spies, to 6000 men of all arms, with sixteen guns, started on the 24th. By an early hour of the following day, a British column commanded by Nicholson was marching in pursuit. Its progress was much retarded by torrents of rain, which had so flooded the roads and fields, that in seven hours the advance had only accomplished ten miles, and the main body was so far behind that a halt was necessary. That the time thus occupied might not be lost, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who was with the column as a volunteer, and had a good knowledge of the country, pushed on with two officers in search of the enemy. After proceeding about five miles and ascending a rising ground they found them encamped beyond a nullah, which here crosses the road, and was running deep and strong. A fatiguing march of two hours brought the column to the rising ground, from which the enemy were seen occupying a position well chosen both for defence and for retreat. It was situated in the vicinity of the village of Nujufghur, about fifteen miles south-west of Delhi, and formed a rectangular space open to the rear, but bounded on two adjacent sides by the nullah already mentioned, and the canal or outlet from the Nujufghur Jheel, meeting it at right angles. Within the area the rebels fronted the nullah, having on their right a village, where nine of their guns were placed, on their left a rising ground, and in the centre an old serai, which was defended by four guns, and formed the key of their position. Nicholson at once formed his plan of attack, but owing to detention in fording the nullah, it was five o’clock before he could put it in execution. His object was to force the enemy’s left centre, and then changing front to the left, to sweep down their line of guns towards the bridge. The enemy made little resistance, all their guns were captured, and the conflict seemed to be at an end, when it was reported that a village a few hundred yards in the rear was still occupied. Strange to say, it was here only that any serious resistance was experienced. The rebels, seeing their retreat cut off, and knowing the fate which awaited them, fought with extreme desperation, and were with difficulty overpowered. So many of the cavalry were employed in protecting the baggage which had been left on the other side of the nullah, and in escorting the guns, that pursuit was impracticable. The enemy’s loss was however severe, amounting, according to their own confession, to above 800.

On the 3d of September, before the rebels had recovered from the consternation produced by their defeat at Nujufghur, the siege train arrived, and the erection of heavy batteries within breaching distance was immediately commenced. At the same time a seasonable addition was made to the force by the arrival of reinforcements, including a contingent from Cashmere. The crisis being now at hand, General Wilson issued an address to the troops. It commenced thus:—“The force assembled before Delhi has had much hardship and
fatigue to undergo since its arrival in this camp, all of which has been most cheerfully borne by officers and men. The time is now drawing near when the major-general commanding the force trusts that their labours will be over, and they will be rewarded by the capture of the city for all their past exertions, and for a cheerful endurance of still greater fatigue and exposure.” It concluded with the expression of a confident trust “that all will exhibit a healthy and hearty spirit of emulation and zeal,” and thereby secure “the brilliant termination of all their labours.”

In regard to the direction from which the assault should be made, there was no room for choice. The north wall fronting the British position could alone be selected for that purpose, but the particular part of it to be selected for breaching was not so obvious, and some degree of stratagem was used to conceal it. Considerably in advance of Hindoo Row’s house the ridge terminates in a kind of plateau. Here, nearly on a line with the Sammy house, the first battery was run out on the 6th of September. It consisted of six nine-pounders

and two twenty-four pounders, and was commanded by Captain Remington. Near this battery a dry nullah descends the ridge towards the left, and forms a natural parallel. Advantage was accordingly taken of it, and on the night of the 7th, another battery (No. 1), mounting six guns on the right and four on the left, was erected within 700 yards of the walls, and placed under the command of Major Brind. These two batteries placed on the right flank, where most of the fighting had hitherto taken place, convinced the rebels that the assault would certainly be made from this quarter. Hence the next advance took them somewhat by surprise. It was made considerably to the east at Ludlow Castle, which, though they had a strong picket stationed at it, was wrested from them almost without a struggle, and became the site of battery No. 2,
mounting on its right division seven eight-inch howitzers and two eighteen-pounders, and on its left nine twenty-four pounders. It was commanded by Majors Kaye and Campbell, till the latter, disabled by a wound, resigned his part of the charge to Captain Johnson. The number and large calibre of the guns in this battery indicated that the real attack would be from the left, where two other batteries were forthwith planted, the one mounting ten mortars under Major Tombs, at the Koodsia Bagh, near the banks of the Jumna, and the other in front of it, at a building which had once been the custom-house. This building, though within 100 yards of the Water bastion, had, from oversight or overweening confidence in the rebels, been left unoccupied, and the battery was so nearly completed when they discovered their mistake, that they were unable to make any impression upon it. All these batteries had been erected in the course of a single week, and before the end of it had successively opened fire—Remington's on the 6th, Brind's on the 8th, that at Ludlow Castle on the 10th, and those of the Koodsia Bagh and old custom-house on the 11th. The effect was soon apparent. The Moree or north-west bastion, against which the fire from the right flank was chiefly directed, was easily silenced, and the Cashmere bastion towards the north-east, though it had been recently restored and strengthened at the expense of the British government, began to crumble away within an hour after the twenty-four pounders of Ludlow Castle began to play upon it. Nowhere however was the fire so destructive as at the Water or north-east bastion, where, from the proximity of the battery, almost every shot told, and a large breach was speedily effected. Meantime the rebels were not idle. Besides maintaining a heavy fire from the bastions not silenced, and from every spot in the vicinity within range of grape and musketry, they succeeded in placing two batteries, one at Kissengunge, which enfiladed those on the ridge, and another on the opposite side of the Jumna, which enfiladed those of the Koodsia Bagh and custom-house. These, though they could not postpone the day of retribution, produced many casualties.

The plan of attack as previously arranged, and the assault, fixed for three o'clock in the morning of the 14th, are thus succinctly described in General Wilson's official report:—"After six days of open trenches, during which the artillery and engineers, under their respective commanding officers Major Gaitskell and Lieutenant-colonel Baird Smith, vied with each other in pressing forward the work, two excellent and most practicable breaches were formed in the walls of the place, one in the curtain to the right of the Cashmere bastion, the other to the left of the Water bastion, the defences of those bastions, and the parapets giving musketry cover to the enemy commanding the breaches, having also been destroyed by the artillery. The assault was delivered on four points. The 1st column under Brigadier J. Nicholson, consisting of her majesty's 75th regiment (300 men), the 1st European Bengal fusiliers (200 men), and the 2d Punjab infantry (450 men), assaulted the main breach, their advance
being admirably covered by the 1st battalion of her majesty's 60th rifles, under Colonel J. Jones. The operation was crowned with brilliant success, the enemy after severe resistance being driven from the Cashmere bastion, the Main Guard, and its vicinity, in complete rout. The 2d column under Brigadier Jones of her majesty's 61st regiment, consisting of her majesty's 8th regiment (250 men), the 2d European Bengal fusiliers (250 men), and the 4th regiment of Sikhs (350 men), similarly covered by the 60th rifles, advanced on the Water bastion, carried the breach, and drove the enemy from his guns and position, with a determination and spirit which gave me the highest satisfaction. The 3d column under Colonel Campbell of her majesty's 52d light infantry, consisting of 250 of his own regiment, the Kumaon battalion (250 men), and the 1st Punjab infantry (500 men), was directed against the Cashmere gateway. This column was preceded by an explosion party under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld of the engineers, covered by the 60th rifles. The demolition of the gate having been accomplished, the column forced an entrance, overcoming a strenuous opposition from the enemy's infantry and heavy artillery, which had been brought to bear on the position. I cannot express too warmly my admiration of the gallantry of all concerned in this difficult operation. The reserve under Brigadier Longfield of her majesty's 8th regiment, composed of her majesty's 61st regiment (250 men), the 4th regiment rifles (450 men), the Belooch battalion (300 men), and 200 of her majesty's 60th rifles, who joined after the assault had been made, awaited the result of the attack, and on the columns entering the place, took possession of the posts I had previously assigned to it. This duty was ultimately performed to my entire satisfaction. The firm establishment of the reserve rendering the assaulting columns free to act in advance, Brigadier-general Nicholson, supported by Brigadier Jones, swept the ramparts of the place, from the Cashmere to the Cabool gates, occupying the bastions and defences, capturing the guns and driving the enemy before him. During the advance, Brigadier Nicholson was, to the grief of myself and the whole army, dangerously wounded; the command consequently devolved on Brigadier Jones, who finding the enemy in great force, occupying and pouring a destructive fire from the roofs of strong and commanding houses in the city on all sides, the ramparts themselves being enfiladed by guns, prudently resolved on retaining possession of the Cabool gate, which his troops had so gallantly won, in which he firmly established himself, awaiting the result of the operation of the other columns of occupation. Colonel Campbell, with the column under his command, advanced successfully from the Cashmere gate, by one of the main streets beyond the Chandei Chauk, the central and principal street of the city, towards the Jumma Musjid, with the intention of occupying that important post. The opposition, however, which he met from the great concentration of the enemy at the Jumma Musjid and the houses in the neighbourhood—he himself, I regret to state, being wounded—satisfied him that his most
prudent course was not to maintain so advanced a position with the comparatively limited force at his disposal, and he accordingly withdrew the head of his column, and placed himself in communication with the reserve, a measure which had my entire approval; I having previously determined that, in the event of serious opposition being encountered in the town itself, it would be most inexpedient to commit my small force to a succession of street fights, in which their gallantry, discipline, and organization could avail them so little."

After describing the position which had thus been gained, and mentioning his intention to use it as the base of "systematic operations for the complete possession of the city," General Wilson thus continues: "Simultaneously with the operations above detailed, an attack was made on the enemy’s strong position outside the city, in the suburbs of Kissengunge and Pahareepoor, with a view of driving in the rebels and supporting the main attack by effecting an entrance at the Cabool gate after it should be taken. The force employed in this difficult duty I intrusted to Major C. Reid, commanding the Sirmoor battalion, whose distinguished conduct I have already had occasion to bring prominently to the notice of superior authority, and who was, I much regret, severely wounded on this occasion. His column consisted of his own battalion, the guides, and the men on duty at Hindoo Row’s (the main picket), numbering in all about 1000, supported by the auxiliary troops of his highness the Maharajah Rumbeer Sing, under Captain R. Lawrence. The strength of the positions, however, and the desperate resistance offered by the enemy, withstood for a time the efforts of our troops, gallant though they were, and the combination was unable to be effected. The delay, I am happy to say, has been only temporary, for the enemy have subsequently abandoned their positions, leaving their guns in our hands. In this attack, I found it necessary to support Major Reid with cavalry and horse-artillery, both of which arms were admirably handled, respectively by Brigadier Hope Grant of her majesty's 9th lancers, commanding the cavalry brigade, and Major H. Tombs of the horse-artillery, who inflicted severe punishment on the enemy, though I regret their own loss was very heavy."

The above account, admirably clear so far as it goes, is too brief to enter into detail, and hence necessarily omits several points of interest which must not pass unnoticed. The rendezvous of the three assaulting columns was at Ludlow Castle. Shortly after three o'clock A.M., the 1st column moved into the Koosdia Bagh, ready to rush on the main breach immediately to the left of the Cashmere bastion; while the 2d column took up a still more advanced position at the old custom-house, in the immediate vicinity of the breach adjoining the Water bastion. The 3d column moved along the main road, having at its head the "exploding party," by whom at daybreak the signal for the assault was to be given. This party consisted of Lieutenants Salkeld and Home of the engineers, Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, Corporals Burgess and Smith of the Bengal sappers and miners, and Bugler Hawthorne of her majesty’s 52d, to sound the
advance. The signal was to be the explosion produced by blowing in the Cashmere gate. For this purpose the party were accompanied by twenty-four native sappers and miners, carrying bags of gunpowder. The subsequent operation is thus described by Colonel Baird Smith:—"The party advanced at the double towards the Cashmere gate, Lieutenant Home, with Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, and Havildar Mahore with all the sappers, leading and carrying the powder bags, followed by Lieutenant Salkeld and a portion of the remainder of the party. The advanced party reached the gateway unhurt, and found that part of the drawbridge had been destroyed, but passing along the precarious footway supplied by the remaining beams, they proceeded to lodge their powder bags against the gate. The wicket was open, and through it the enemy kept up a heavy fire upon them. Sergeant Carmichael was killed while laying his powder bag, Havildar Mahore being at the same time wounded. The powder being laid, the advanced party slipped down into the ditch to allow the firing party under Lieutenant Salkeld to perform its duty. While endeavouring to fire the charge, Lieutenant Salkeld was shot through the arm and leg, and handed over the slow match to Corporal Burgess, who fell mortally wounded just as he had accomplished the onerous duty. Havildar Tellah Sing of the Sikhs was wounded, and Ramloll, sepoy of the same corps, was killed during this part of the operation. The demolition being most successful, Lieutenant Home, happily not wounded, caused the bugler to sound the regimental call of the 52d as the signal for the advancing columns. Fearing that amid the noise of the assault the sounds might not be heard, he had the call repeated three times, when the troops advanced and carried the gateway with complete success. I feel certain that a simple statement of this devoted and glorious deed will suffice to stamp it as one of the noblest on record in military history." Lieutenant Home, Sergeant Smith, and Bugler Hawthorne escaped unhurt, and were duly rewarded for their heroism, but Salkeld died of his wounds after lingering only a few days.

The rush of the 3d column after the explosion was irresistible, and in a few minutes the Cashmere gate and the Main Guard adjoining it were carried. The 1st and 2d columns had been equally successful, though the rebels somewhat recovered from the consternation into which the explosion had thrown them, and beginning to have the advantage of day-light opened a deadly fire from every available point. Brigadier Nicholson, who had been the first to mount the breach assigned to his column, taking the right of the Cashmere gate led it along the Rampart road, clearing the ramparts without meeting much resistance, till the whole of them as far west as the Moree bastion, and then southward to the Cabool gate, were gained. Here, had the attack on the suburbs of Kissengunge succeeded, he would have been joined by the force there employed, but that attack having failed, Brigadier Nicholson was left entirely to his own resources. Unfortunately he attempted more than his
column, now thinned in numbers and fatigued by previous exertion, could accomplish, and was in the act of urging his men forward to seize the Lahore gate after a rather serious check had been received, when he was shot through the chest from an adjoining window, and fell back mortally wounded. After this lamentable event no further progress was made, and the Cabool gate became for the time the limit of advance in that direction. The same cause arrested the progress of the other columns. When General Nicholson on leaving the Main Guard turned to the right, Colonel Campbell took the left, and having cleared the Cutcherry, the English church, and Skinner's house, all in the immediate vicinity, forced his way first into the Chandei Chauk, and then into a narrow street leading to the Jumma Musjid. His object was to capture this celebrated mosque, but his means were totally inadequate. Its side arches had been bricked up, its massive gate closed and barricaded, and he had neither guns nor bags of gunpowder to attempt to force them. His only alternative was to retire under cover from the deadly fire which the rebels had opened, and rest satisfied with what had been already gained. Enough had been achieved for one day; enough too had been sacrificed, since the killed and wounded amounted to 66 officers and 1104 men, or nearly a third of the whole number engaged.

The next day passed without any new effort to advance. The reason, though discreetible, must be stated. During the assault, though no mercy was shown to the mutineers, whose atrocious barbarities could not be forgiven, the assailants did not forget their humanity, and gave full effect to the general's call to spare all women and children. Their natural love of justice and abhorrence of cruelty sufficed for this purpose, without requiring any great exercise of self-restraint, but there was another temptation which they were unable to resist, and in yielding to which they became so completely disorganized as to imperil their previous success. The rebels, well aware of what must still be regarded as the besetting sin of British soldiers, particularly when their passions have been roused, and their bodies exhausted by almost superhuman exertions under a burning sun, had taken care to place the means of unlimited indulgence within their reach, by piling up beer, wine, and brandy within the shops, and even outside along the pavement. The bait proved irresistible, and for a time discipline was lost in brutish intoxication. To such a height was it carried, that the necessity of vacating the city was forced on the general's consideration, and only avoided by ordering that all intoxicating liquors should be destroyed. The remedy thus applied allowed the advance to be resumed on the 16th, when the magazine was carried, and the position at Kissengunge so far turned that the rebels voluntarily abandoned it. Every successive day was now signalized by some new success. The nature and extent of it is thus described by General Wilson:—"During the 17th and 18th, we continued to take up advanced posts in the face of considerable opposition on the part of the rebels, and not without
loss to ourselves, three officers being killed, and a number of men killed and wounded. On the evening of the 19th, the Burun bastion, which had given us considerable annoyance, was surprised and captured. On the morning of the 20th, our troops pushed on and occupied the Lahore gate, from which an unopposed advance was made on the other bastions and gateways, until the whole of the defences of the city were in our hands. From the time of our entering the city, an uninterrupted and vigorous fire from our guns and mortars was kept up on the palace, Jumma Musjid, and other important posts in possession of the rebels; and as we took up our various positions in advance, our light guns and mortars were brought forward, and used with effect in the streets and houses in their neighbourhood. The result of this heavy and unceasing bombardment, and of the steady and persevering advance of our troops, has been the evacuation of the palace by the king, the entire desertion

of the city by the inhabitants, and the precipitate flight of the rebel troops—who abandoning their camp property, many of their sick and wounded, and the greater part of their field artillery, have fled in utter disorganization—some 4000 or 5000 across the bridge of boats into the Doab, the remainder down the right bank of the Jumna. The gates of the palace having been blown in, it was occupied by our troops about noon on the 20th, and my head-quarters established in it the same day."

The king appears to have at first accompanied the rebels in their flight, and it was feared that the influence of his name might still suffice to rally the fugitives, and keep alive the rebellion. Whatever his intentions may have been, he soon abandoned the idea of resistance, and took refuge in the tomb of Humayoon, situated a few miles to the south. As soon as the fact became known, Hodson, who was ever on the alert and ready for any enterprise,
CAPTURE OF DELHI

obtained permission to proceed with a party of his irregular horse to the tomb, and endeavour to obtain possession of the king's person. On his arrival, a negotiation commenced, and was protracted for above two hours, the king gradually lowering his terms, till he at last offered to surrender, if his own life and the lives of his favourite wife Zenan Makal and their son Jumma Bukht were guaranteed. Hodson having previously obtained the general's sanction gave the guarantee, and the king returned once more to Delhi, but only to occupy it as a prisoner till he should be transported beyond seas as a convict. Justice would have been defrauded had the members of his family, who were notoriously guilty of having sanctioned and witnessed the horrid massacre of women and children, been permitted to escape on the same terms. It is not improbable that, on the following day, when Hodson searched them out and obtained the unconditional surrender of two sons and a grandson of the king, they too hoped that their lives would be saved. It is certain, however, that no promise to this effect had been given, and Hodson only anticipated the doom which awaited them, and which they certainly deserved, when, on finding that an attempt at rescue was about to be made while he was conveying his prisoners to Delhi, he shot them dead on the spot with his own hand.

While vengeance was thus taking its course, an event of a very different description was visibly approaching. John Nicholson was on his deathbed. From the course which the ball had taken, there could scarcely be a doubt that vital parts had been injured, and therefore skill and friendship could at the utmost do nothing more than alleviate his sufferings, and minister comfort, till the fatal hour should arrive. His death took place on the 23d of September, and filled the British camp with mourning. He was only in his thirty-fifth year, but had already given proof of such talents, both as a diplomatist and a soldier, that all with whom he came in contact, whether countrymen or natives, looked up to him with admiration. Brief as his career was, it did not terminate till he had achieved a deathless fame.

The capture of Delhi, which government, from underrating the difficulties, had been expecting with some degree of impatience, was all the more welcome when it was officially announced, and the governor-general issued a notification, in which the language of exultation was freely used. "Delhi, the focus of the treason and revolt which for four months have harassed Hindoostan, and the stronghold in which the mutinous army of Bengal has sought to concentrate its power, has been wrested from the rebels. The king is a prisoner in the palace. The head-quarters of Major-general Wilson are established in the Dewani Khas. A strong column is in pursuit of the fugitives. Whatever may be the motives and passions by which the mutinous soldiery, and those who are leagued with them, have been instigated to faithlessness, rebellion, and crimes at which the heart sickens, it is certain that they have found encouragement in the delusive belief that India was weakly guarded by England, and
that before the government could gather its strength against them, their ends would be gained. They are now undeceived. Before a single soldier of the many thousands who are hastening from England to uphold the supremacy of the British power has set foot on these shores, the rebel force where it was strongest and most united, and where it had the command of unbounded military appliances, has been destroyed or scattered, by an army collected within the limits of the North-western Provinces and the Punjab alone. The work has been done before the support of those battalions which have been collected in Bengal, from the forces of the queen in China, and in her majesty's eastern colonies, could reach Major-general Wilson's army, and it is by the courage and endurance of that gallant army alone—by the skill, sound judgment, and steady resolution of its brave commander—and by the aid of some native chiefs, true to their allegiance, that, under the blessing of God, the head of rebellion has been crushed, and the cause of loyalty, humanity, and rightful authority vindicated.

Lord Canning, when he said in the above notification that "the head of rebellion has been crushed," gave utterance as much to his wishes and hopes as to his convictions. Though checked and virtually crushed in the north-west, it was maintaining a bold front in other quarters, and even threatening, particularly in Oude, to celebrate its triumph by the perpetration of another horrid massacre. To this part of the narrative, which was necessarily left untold, in order to give a continuous account of the siege of Delhi, we must now turn.

CHAPTER IV.


In answer to pressing applications from various places where mutiny had occurred, or was hourly threatened, government, though sadly hampered by a deficiency in the means of transport, had begun to forward detachments of her majesty's 84th. In this way some feeble relief had been given to Sir Hugh Wheeler, who had under him, when Nana Sahib perpetrated his horrid massacres, fifty men belonging to this regiment. Meanwhile another European regiment, the 1st Madras fusiliers, commanded by Colonel Neill, had arrived. At the moment of landing, the railway train from Calcutta to Raneegunge was on the point of starting, and
though it was now well known that not an hour was to be lost in pushing on troops, the railway officials would have started without them, because the time was up. Colonel Neill in this emergency gave proof of the energy and decision which characterized his subsequent proceedings, and by seizing the engineer and stoker, prevented the departure of the train till as many of his soldiers as it could carry had taken their seats. This decisive step is said to have saved Benares. On the 3d of June, when he reached it with only forty of his men, mutiny had already broken out. Feeble as the relief was in numbers, it sufficed under the conduct of its able commander to turn the scale, and before evening closed, the insurgents had paid the penalty of their crime in the loss of a hundred killed and twice as many wounded. This success, followed up vigorously by other measures of repression, so completely intimidated the mutineers, and the populace, who would willingly have made common cause with them, that Colonel Neill was able to leave Benares in tranquillity, and hasten westward to Allahabad, where his presence was still more urgently required. It has been told how its fort, and the immense military stores of its arsenal, were saved by the opportune arrival of seventy European invalids from Chunar. The rest of the city, however, was left at the mercy of the mutineers, whose unrestrained license had continued for five days, when Colonel Neill appeared with a wing of his fusiliers. Here as at Benares he put down the mutiny with a strong hand, and even pacified the surrounding country by the mere terror of his name. On reading the narrative of his doings, one cannot help wishing that he had been permitted to retain the command, in order to finish the work which he had so well begun; but all regret on this head must be suppressed on learning that the person about to supersede him was not only his superior officer, but one who in the course of a few months was to gain victory after victory, and be hailed with universal acclamation as one of the greatest heroes of modern times. But it will be necessary before bringing Havelock on the scene, to return to Oude, and take a survey of the British position at Lucknow after the disastrous affair of Chinhut.

Sir Henry Lawrence, though hopeful that the mutiny might be kept in check till the promised reinforcements should arrive, was too prudent to trust to a peradventure, and had been diligently preparing for the worst, by fortifying and provisioning both the Muchee Bhowun and the residency, so as to have the option, if driven to it, of standing a siege. These labours were considerably advanced, but by no means completed, when the repulse at Chinhut left him no alternative but to retire within his defences. He was at first disposed to hold both the residency and the Muchee Bhowun; or if this were deemed impracticable, to give the preference to the latter. On further consideration he took a different view, and the Muchee Bhowun was abandoned. The necessity of this step was only too apparent. The enemy had already isolated it so completely from the residency, that there could be no direct
communication between them, and the order to evacuate could not be given
till an old telegraph on the top of the residency was repaired, and made fit to
transmit the following brief message: "Spike the guns well, blow up the fort,
and retire at midnight." Colonel Palmer executed this order with perfect
success. The little garrison moved out with their treasure and two or three
of their guns, and reached the residency without being discovered. About half
an hour afterwards, the slow match which had been left burning took effect on
the magazine, containing 250 barrels of gunpowder, and blew the place into
the air.

The position occupied by the British force, and the large number of women
and children under their charge, consisted of a kind of plateau, which attained
its greatest height at the residency, and sunk down rapidly from it to the low
grounds on the right bank of the Goomtee. Towards the north, where it was
comparatively narrow, and terminated in a projection of very irregular shape,
it was inclosed by a ditch and bank of earth not above breast-high, but
heightened where most exposed by sandbags, with openings between them for
musketry; the other sides were bounded for the most part by the walls of
various buildings and inclosures, which, notwithstanding numerous zigzags,
gave to the remaining space somewhat of a square form. The access to the
inclosure was by two gates, the one the Water gate, immediately north of

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1. The broad black line 1, 1, 1, shows the ground occupied by the garrison previous to the arrival of Generals
   Outram and Havelock on September 25.
2. The space marked 2, 2, 2, indicates the position occupied by the relieving force subsequent to their arrival.
5. Treasury.  10. Sikhs' Square.  15. Redan battery.
18. Johannes' house, from which the enemy kept up a most destructive fire on the Cawnpore battery.
††† Shows the position of the enemy's guns, which was constantly changed during the siege.

Position of the British at Lucknow.
the residency, and the other the Bailey Guard gate, forming the principal
entrance to it from the east. These gates were defended by barricades, as
well as by guns placed on the streets which they terminated. The other
defences consisted of a series of batteries, thrown up on all the most com-
manding points. On the north-east, to the left of the Water gate, and above
the residency, were two batteries, called respectively Evans' and the Redan,
with a mortar battery between them; at the south extremity, the Cawnpoor
battery, and at the south-west Gubbin's battery. Owing to the suddenness
of the siege, two batteries which had been commenced on the west side could
not be finished, and were consequently left outside the inclosure.

The residency, an imposing pile of building of three stories, was very little
adapted for defence. Its numerous lofty windows gave free entrance to the
missiles of the enemy, and its roof, which was only edged round by an orna-
mental balustrade, was wholly exposed. The upper stories were necessarily
abandoned at the very commencement of the siege by all the ladies and
children; the ground floor was occupied by the soldiers, while their families
found good shelter in the tykhanas, or underground rooms. A little to the
east of the residency stood the banqueting hall, a building of two stories.
Having very large lofty rooms, it was converted into an hospital, for which it
would have been well adapted, had it not, like the residency, been too much
exposed. The defect was however partially remedied by closing the doors
and windows of the most exposed sides with any available materials. Still
farther east stood the treasury, close to the Bailey Guard gate. Immediately
on the opposite side of the street leading from this gate, was the house of
Dr. Fayrer, a large but not lofty building, with a flat roof, which, being well
protected by sandbags, afforded a good cover for musketry, and with a tykhana,
to which, when the firing became heavy, the female inmates were able to retire.
Being thus used for defence, the house and its inclosure or compound were
called Dr. Fayrer's garrison, a name which was for the same reason applied to
various other compounds. Thus proceeding south from Dr. Fayrer's, occurred
in succession the Financial garrison, Sago's, and the Judicial, overlooked from
the west by the Post-office garrison, Anderson's, and Duprat's, the latter
adjoining the Cawnpoor battery. On the west, with the battery at its
extremity already mentioned, was Gubbin's garrison, to which the judicial
commissioner of Oude has, both by his services during the siege and his work
on the subject, given some degree of celebrity. The above enumeration makes
the defences more formidable in name than they were in reality. The two
strongest batteries—the Redan and the Cawnpoor—mounted only three guns
each, and in many places the obstacles were so few and feeble, that nothing
but the necessary courage was wanting to have enabled the enemy to force
their way into the interior. One of the greatest disadvantages of the British
position was the number and proximity of the native buildings by which it
was on all sides surrounded. When a siege was not believed to be imminent, a proposal to clear away these buildings to a sufficient distance had been rejected from motives of humanity, and when the mistake became palpable, it was too late to remedy it effectually. In the vicinity of the Redan and of Mr. Gubbin's garrison some clearances had been made, but the ground remained covered with houses, from which the enemy's sharp-shooters kept up a ceaseless and destructive fire.

The siege had a very lamentable and ominous commencement. On the 1st of July an eight-inch shell entered the room occupied by Sir Henry Lawrence, in the first story of the north-east angle of the residency. It burst without injuring any one, but as the repetition of such a providential escape was not to be presumed, he was strongly urged, though unfortunately without effect, either to remove to a less exposed apartment, or to quit the residency altogether for safer quarters. The very next day a second shell entered the room and wounded him severely. Had his constitution been less impaired, it might have been possible to save his life by having recourse to amputation, but with his attenuated frame, the utmost that could be done was to apply the tourniquet in order to stop bleeding. The respite thus procured lasted only for two days, during which, though writhing with agony, he remained perfectly collected, and dictated a series of instructions, appointing Major Banks to the civil office of chief commissioner, Colonel Inglis to the command of the garrison, and Major Anderson to the subordinate command of the artillery and engineers. Alternately his thoughts turned to the perilous condition of the garrison and to the solemn change he was himself about to undergo. He often repeated, "Save the ladies;" at other times, addressing the sorrowing group around his bed, and referring to his own success in life, he asked, "What is it worth now?" The thought was not new to him. He had long acted upon it, and when he called upon all present to fix their affections on a better world, he only advised what he had steadily but unostentatiously practised. Never indeed was there a nobler spirit. Possessed of talents of the highest order, he was simple-hearted as a child, liberal almost beyond his means, and of so tender and affectionate a nature that it was impossible not to love him. His character may still be read in the modest epitaph which he ordered to be inscribed on his tomb: "Here lies Sir Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty. May
God have mercy on him." His services, particularly in the Punjab, of which he was one of the earliest and most successful administrators, entitle him to a foremost place among Indian statesmen; but even could these be forgotten, the noble institution which bears his name as its founder, and by which the children of European soldiers serving in India, instead of being left to grow up as outcasts, are duly cared for, would suffice to keep his memory in perpetual and honoured remembrance. The siege of the British garrison at Lucknow, and its gallant defence, furnish perhaps the most interesting episode in the history of the mutiny, but before proceeding further with the details, it will be necessary to give an account of the exertions which were being made by government to effect its relief.

A division of the troops employed in the Persian war was commanded by General Henry Havelock, who had thus for the first time, after a long period of service in subordinate positions, some adequate scope for his great talents. Something however was still wanting, and he naturally longed for an appointment which, giving him undivided responsibility, would enable him to form his own plans and execute them in his own way. Such an appointment, when he had little reason to expect it, was actually awaiting him. The hasty return of the European regiments from Persia having broken up the division under his command, he hastened back to India, intending to lose no time in joining General Anson, the commander-in-chief, his proper place as adjutant-general of the army being at head-quarters. On arriving at Bombay on the 29th of May, and there receiving the astounding intelligence of the events at Meerut and Delhi, his first impulse was to push on to the north-west by the nearest route across the country. On further inquiry this was found impracticable, and he therefore embarked, on the 1st of June, in the Erin steamer, for Point de Galle, where he hoped to meet the steamer proceeding from Suez to Calcutta. On the night of the 5th, when nearing the coast of Ceylon, in clear moonlight, the vessel struck upon a reef, and as the forepart immediately filled, seemed about to go down head foremost, but as he himself afterwards expressed it: "The madness of man threw us on shore; the mercy of God found us a soft place at Calutta," and though the vessel was lost, all the persons on board escaped. Proceeding by land to Galle, he found a vessel about to return to Calcutta, and immediately reembarked. He reached Madras on the 13th of June, and was surprised and grieved to learn that General Anson was dead. He had been hastening to join him—what should he now do? Expecting that Sir Henry Somerset, then at Bombay, would now, by virtue of his rank, become provisional commander-in-chief, he was thinking of returning thither to join him. Fortunately, a different arrangement took place. Sir Patrick Grant, commanding at Madras, became provisional successor to General Anson, and took him with him to Calcutta, where they arrived on the 17th of June. It had been resolved to organize a moveable column for Bengal, similar to that which had rendered
such essential service in the Punjab. The troops composing it were to include among others the 64th and 78th Highlanders. These distinguished regiments had formed part of Havelock’s division in Persia, and it was with no ordinary feelings of gratification that the command of the column, conferred upon him three days after his arrival, again placed him at their head. The instructions given him by government on his appointment were, that “after quelling all disturbances at Allahabad, he should not lose a moment in supporting Sir Henry Lawrence at Lucknow, and Sir Hugh Wheeler at Cawnpoor; and that he should take prompt measures for dispersing and utterly destroying all mutineers and insurgents.”

Havelock’s first object was to provide against any delay in the progress of the column from want of carriage. He knew that during the outbreak at Allahabad 1600 bullocks collected by the commissariat had disappeared, and he therefore proposed that the carts and bullocks on the grand trunk road should be employed in transporting ammunition and stores, while the troops, with their baggage and tents, should be conveyed by water. Having obtained the necessary sanction to these arrangements, and also to a liberal use of secret service-money, for the purpose of making the intelligence department as complete as possible, he started from Calcutta on the 25th of June, and reached Benares on the 28th. By this time, one of the most important objects which he had in view had been frustrated by the perpetration of the first Cawnpoor massacre, though the fact was not made known to him till the 3d of July, three days after his arrival at Allahabad. Here another disappointment awaited him. The European column was to have included four European regiments, but on the 7th of July, when he marched out to the re-capture of Cawnpoor, he could not muster more than 1400 European bayonets. The day before he reached Allahabad, the Cawnpoor massacre not being yet known, Colonel Neill had detached for its relief, under Major Renaud of the Madras fusiliers, 400 Europeans, 300 Ferozepoor Sikhs, 120 native irregular cavalry, and two nine-pounders. This movement, though made with caution, was perilous, for should the enemy bear down upon him, they would be able to overwhelm him by mere numbers, even if the whole of his detachment should prove faithful. Should part prove otherwise, as was strongly suspected, his destruction would be all but inevitable. In this emergency General Havelock
hastened forward by forced marches. The rebels on their part were equally active, and in the hope of having only the detachment to encounter, had pushed on to Futtehpore, near the right bank of the Ganges, about forty-five miles below Cawnpoor. On the same day he effected a junction with Major Renaud, and hence on the 12th of July, when the rebels, who had mistaken a reconnoitring party for the detachment, rushed on without any regular formation, in the full confidence of an easy victory, they found themselves brought suddenly in presence of the whole British force. The position and subsequent operations are thus described in the general’s despatch:—“Futtehpore constitutes a position of no small strength. The hard and dry trunk road subdivides it, and is the only means of convenient access, for the plains on both sides are covered at this season by heavy lodgments of water, to the depth of two, three, and four feet. It is surrounded by garden inclosures of great strength, with high walls, and has within it many houses of good masonry. In front of the swamps are hillocks, villages, and mango groves, which the enemy already occupied in force. I estimate his number at 3500, with twelve brass and iron guns. I made my dispositions. The guns, now eight in number, were formed on and close to the chausée, in the centre, under Captain Maude, R. A., protected and aided by one hundred Enfield riflemen of the 64th. The detachments of infantry were at the same moment thrown into line of quarter distance columns, at deploying distance, and thus advanced in support, covered at discretion by Enfield skirmishers. The small force of volunteers and irregular cavalry moved forward on the flanks on harder ground. I might say that in ten minutes the action was decided, for in that short space of time the spirit of the enemy was entirely subdued. The rifle fire reaching them at an unexpected distance, filled them with dismay; and when Captain Maude was enabled to push his guns through flanking swamps to point-blank range,
his surprisingly accurate fire demolished their little remaining confidence. In a moment three guns were abandoned to us on the chausée, and the force advanced steadily, driving the enemy before it at every point."

The merit of this victory was greatly enhanced by the circumstances under which it was fought. The British troops had previously marched twenty-four hours, and from the preceding afternoon had not tasted food. No wonder that after the battle, which, though decided as the despatch says in ten minutes, really lasted four hours, the men sank down exhausted on the ground about a mile beyond the spot where the enemy made their last stand, and did not attempt pursuit. On the 13th of July, the day following the battle, while the troops were enjoying a necessary and well-merited repose, the general issued the first of his orders of the day. It deserves quotation: "General Havelock thanks his soldiers for their arduous exertions of yesterday, which produced in four hours the strange result of a rebel army driven from a strong position, eleven guns captured and their whole force scattered to the winds, without the loss of a single British soldier. To what is this astounding effect to be attributed? To the fire of British artillery, exceeding in rapidity and precision all that the brigadier has ever witnessed in his not short career; to the power of the Enfield rifle in British hands; to British pluck, that great quality which has survived the vicissitudes of the hour, and gained intensity from the crisis; and to the blessing of Almighty God on a most righteous cause, the cause of justice, humanity, truth, and good government in India."

General Havelock resumed his march on the 14th, and next day, on arriving a little after daybreak in front of the village of Aong, nearly half-way between Futtehpour and Cawnpoor, ascertained that the enemy were encamped at a short distance beyond it, behind an entrenchment which they had thrown up across the road. Colonel Fraser Tytler, sent forward with about a third of the force, found the enemy strongly posted in gardens and inclosures. A short delay on the part of the British while their line was being formed, being mistaken by the enemy for hesitation, they advanced to the attack instead of waiting for it, and occupied a village about 200 yards in front of their entrenchment. The Madras fusiliers, ordered to dislodge them, effected it with the utmost gallantry, though unfortunately with the loss of Major Renauld, their intrepid commander, who was mortally wounded. After clearing the village, Colonel Tytler gave the enemy no respite, and continued to advance till they fled with precipitation. While the detachment was thus employed, the main body was assailed by large bodies of cavalry, who made repeated attempts to plunder the baggage, but in this they were completely foiled. The work of the day, however, was not yet over. As soon as the troops had breakfasted, the order to move was again given, and they pushed on for two hours under a vertical sun along the main road to Cawnpoor. The object of this extraordinary exertion was to gain the bridge which spans the Pandoo Nuddee,
before the enemy could destroy it. The stream, though usually fordable, was now flooded, and might have proved a serious obstacle to the advance, if the bridge had been removed. Fortunately the enemy were surprised in the very act of mining, and after a short but sharp contest, were compelled to retreat on Cawnpoor. This place was now only twenty-three miles distant, and every man was anxious to push on for it without the loss of a single hour. Above 200 European women and children, reserved by Nana Sahib when he perpetrated his two previous massacres, were reported to be still alive. What a glorious enterprise to rescue them, and at the same time take summary vengeance on their inhuman jailer!

Notwithstanding the universal eagerness to advance, some delay was unavoidable. Night had set in before the commissariat cattle had reached the encamping ground, and many of the men, before animal food could be prepared, had sunk down exhausted, after contenting themselves with porter and biscuit. In the morning when the men again started, a march of sixteen miles brought them to the village of Maharajpoor. Here during a halt and a hasty meal, which like that of the previous night was more stimulating than nutritive, the force and position of the rebels were ascertained. Nana Sahib in person had come out from Cawnpoor with 5000 men and eight guns, and was encamped about seven miles on this side of it, near the village of Aheerwa. Could anything have given genuine courage and confidence to this execrable miscreant, he might have found it in the strength of his position. His left, resting on the high ground which sloped to the Ganges about a mile below, was defended by four twenty-four pounders, his centre, posted in a hamlet where a horse six-pounder and a twenty-four pounder howitzer stood entrenched, was intersected by two roads—the one the grand trunk road passing immediately on the right, and the other, which branched off from it about half a mile in front and led directly to the Cawnpoor cantonments, passing at some distance to the left; the right, posted behind a village embosomed among mango groves, and inclosed by a mud wall, had the additional defence of two nine-pounders and the railway embankment at some distance beyond. The whole line was in the form of a crescent, with its concavity fronting the trunk road, by which it was assumed that the attack would be made. General Havelock resolved to make it from a different direction. Any attempt to carry the entrenchments in front would, even if successful, entail a loss of life which might be almost as fatal as defeat; and his determination therefore was to turn the left flank, where the dryness of the ground and the gradual ascent fully compensated for its greater elevation.

The British force began to advance along the trunk road in a column of sub-divisions—the volunteer cavalry taking the lead in front. A march of three miles having brought them to the point where the two roads diverged, the column wheeled to the right, and under cover of a line of thick groves,
advanced 1000 yards in that direction unseen by the enemy, who, when they
saw the volunteer cavalry pursuing the direct road, naturally supposed that
they were followed closely by the main body. At length an opening in the
trees having made the rebels aware that their left was the real object of attack,
they opened all their available guns on the flank of the advancing column, and
at the same time attempted to meet it by a change of front. It was too late.
Before they could recover from their surprise and consternation, the column
had emerged from the grove, and the companies wheeling into line were
advancing rapidly under cover of an effective fire from the artillery. To this
fire the rebels could not reply from their centre and right, without mowing
down their own left, and thus one of their most powerful arms was in some
measure paralyzed. Still, however, their twenty-four pounders on their left did
so much execution, that a speedy resort to the bayonet became necessary. The
mode in which this was done is thus described in the despatch: "The opportu-
nity had arrived for which I have long anxiously waited of developing the
prowess of the 78th Highlanders. Three guns of the enemy were strongly
posted behind a lofty hamlet well entrenched. I directed this regiment to
advance, and never have I witnessed conduct more admirable. They were led
by Colonel Hamilton, and followed him with surpassing steadiness and gallantry
under a heavy fire. As they approached the village, they cheered and charged
with the bayonet, the pipes sounding the pibroch. Need I add that the enemy
fled, and the village was taken, and the guns were captured?" When the
enemy's left was thus crushed, their infantry rushing to the rear, appeared to
break into two bodies, the one retiring a few hundred yards on the road to the
Cawnpoor cantonments, and the other rallying near the howitzer which
defended their centre. On this, the general calling again upon the 78th, exclaimed,
"Now, Highlanders, another charge like that wins the day." They answered
with a cheer and a rush, and aided by the 64th, who emulated their courage,
captured the howitzer, scattering the masses who had made it their rallying
point. During these operations the enemy's right had been driven in headlong
flight. Though victory had now declared itself, the fighting had not ceased.
From one of the villages where the fugitives had rallied, a heavy fire was kept
up, and not silenced till the general, who well knew how to excite and main-
tain a spirit of honourable rivalry among his troops, called aloud, "Come,
who'll take that village, the Highlanders or the 64th?" The appeal was
instantaneously answered, and the village effectually cleared.

One other effort was required. When the enemy seemed in full retreat,
a destructive fire was suddenly opened from two light guns and a twenty-four
pounder, which had been planted in reserve upon the road. The troops around
these guns consisted partly of reinforcements whom Nana Sahib had called to
his assistance from Cawnpoor, and who were consequently fresh, while our men
were exhausted. As our guns were a mile in the rear, the British troops while
waiting for them lay down for shelter from the fire which was carrying death into their ranks. This halt gave new courage to the enemy. Nana Sahib was seen riding among them, while the noise of their drums and trumpets indicated that another grand effort was about to be made. They accordingly prepared to advance, while their cavalry spreading out in the form of a crescent, threatened to envelope the British force, which did not now exceed 800 men. Matters once more looked serious. "My artillery cattle," says the general, "wearied by the length of the march, could not bring up the guns to my assistance, and the Madras fusiliers, the 64th, 84th, and 78th detachments formed in line, were exposed to a heavy fire from the twenty-four pounder on the road. I was resolved this state of things should not last; so calling upon my men who were lying down in line, to leap on their feet, I directed another steady advance. It was irresistible. The enemy sent round shot into our ranks until we were within 300 yards, and then poured in grape with such precision and determination as I have seldom witnessed. But the 64th, led by Major Stirling, and by my aide-de-camp (the general's own son, now Sir Henry Havelock), who had placed himself in their front, were not to be denied. Their rear showed the ground strewn with wounded, but on they steadily and silently came, then with a cheer charged and captured the unwieldy trophy of their valour. The enemy lost all heart, and after a hurried fire of musketry, gave way in total rout. Four of my guns came up, and completed their discomfiture by a heavy cannonade; and as it grew dark, the roofless barracks of our artillery were dimly descried in advance, and it was evident that Cawnpore was once more in our possession."

Tempting as the immediate occupation of Cawnpore must have been to General Havelock, it would have been hazardous to enter it in the dark, and the exhausted troops bivouacked for the night on the bare ground. Next morning before starting, spies returned with the dreadful intelligence that the fiendish Nana, to compensate for the successive defeats of his adherents, had on the 15th taken the revenge of which only such a nature as his was capable, by massacring the 210 helpless women and children, whom a previous act of gross treachery had placed in his power. When the troops entered the town, Sir Hugh Wheeler's encampment, and the prison-house where the recent butchery had been perpetrated, were naturally the first objects of interest. The scene which presented itself is too horrible to be dwelt upon, and we therefore simply borrow the brief description of it by Mr. Marshman in his Memoirs. "The pavement was swimming in blood, and fragments of ladies' and children's dresses were floating on it. They entered the apartments and found them empty and silent, but there also the blood lay deep on the floor, covered with bonnets, collars, combs, and children's frocks and frills. The walls were dotted with the marks of bullets, and on the wooden pillars were deep sword-cuts, from some of which hung tresses of hair. But neither the sabre-cuts nor the
bullets were sufficiently high above the floor to indicate that the weapons had been aimed at men defending their lives; they appear rather to have been levelled at crouching women and children begging for mercy. The soldiers proceeded in their search, when in crossing the court-yard they perceived human limbs bristling from a well, and on further examination found it to be choked up with the bodies of the victims, which appeared to have been thrown in promiscuously, the dead with the wounded, till it was full to the brim. The feelings of those who witnessed the spectacle it is easy to conceive, but impossible to describe. Men of iron nerve who, during the march from Allahabad, had rushed to the cannon’s mouth without flinching, and had seen unappalled their comrades mowed down around them, now lifted up their voices and wept."

The exultation produced by the victory at Cawnpour was followed by a certain degree of despondency. The British ranks had been thinned not only in fight, but by cholera, which carrying on its insidious ravages, scarcely allowed a day to pass without cutting short some valuable life which could ill be spared. While thus weakened, the magnitude of the task assigned to the force became more palpable, and it was impossible not to feel anxious when the question was asked, How will it be possible with a handful of men to clear the road of the myriads of rebels, and force the way to Lucknow? In answer to urgent applications for reinforcements, General Neill (such was now his rank) entered Cawnpour on the 20th of July, bringing with him only 227 men. More than these were necessary to garrison the town, and thus the force which remained available for action in the field was less than before. To aggravate the difficulty, discipline had begun to yield to the love of plunder, and the general was obliged to exchange laudatory terms in addressing his troops for such language as the following: “The marauding in this camp exceeds the disorders which supervened on the short-lived triumph of the miscreant Nana Sahib. A provost-marshal has been appointed with special instructions to hang up, in their uniform, all British soldiers that plunder. This shall not be an idle threat.”
While pondering the difficulties which lay before him, Havelock had been heard to exclaim, "If the worst comes to the worst, we can but die with swords in our hands." But this resource, which the brave man can always count upon, would be a very sorry excuse for the general who should bring matters to that desperate pass without absolute necessity. His very first step, therefore, after entering Cawnpoor, was to select a spot which he could fortify, so as at once to command the passage of the river and secure the safety of the garrison. Fortunately such a spot was easily found. It was situated on the bank of the river, and formed an elevated flat, about 200 yards in length and 100 in breadth. On this spot necessary operations for a field-work, capable of accommodating and of being defended by 300 men, were immediately commenced and carried on with the utmost vigour. Nearly 4000 native labourers from the town were set to work, and encouraged to punctuality by regular payment every evening. The irregular cavalry, who had been disarmed on the march for disaffection, were also made to labour, while British soldiers possessing mechanical skill were induced to exert it by a gratuity of sixpence a day. The work made so much progress, that it promised to be able to protect itself by the time the passage of the Ganges could be effected. This last was a work of no small difficulty. The Ganges, nearly a mile wide, was swollen to an impetuous torrent; the bridge of boats had been broken by the mutineers; and

![Well at Cawnpoor](image)

there were neither boats nor boatmen to supply its place. After considerable difficulty, on the morning of 21st July, by the aid of a small steamer, a detachment of Highlanders was sent across amid torrents of rain. They landed in a swamp, and had the enemy been on the alert, must have been in the greatest peril. Fortunately no opposition was offered. A second detachment followed in the evening, and at the end of a week the whole force had safely crossed.
On the 28th of July the whole British force, consisting of 1500 men, of whom 1200 were British, and ten guns, was assembled at Mungulwar, about five miles from the river, on the road to Lucknow, situated forty-five miles to the north-east. On the following morning a march of three miles was made to Onao. Here the enemy were found strongly posted. "His right," says the general, "was protected by a swamp which could neither be forced nor turned; his advance was drawn up in an inclosure, which in this warlike district had purposely or accidentally assumed the form of a bastion. The rest of his (advance) force was posted in and behind a village, the houses of which were loopholed. The passage between the village and the town of Onao is narrow. The town itself extended three quarters of a mile to our right. The flooded state of the country precluded the possibility of turning in this direction. The swamp shut us in on the left. Thus an attack in front became unavoidable." It was commenced by the 78th Highlanders and Madras fusiliers, who succeeded in carrying the bastioned inclosure, but were met by such a destructive fire on approaching the village, that they could not carry it till reinforced by the 64th. After it was forced, and the guns defending it were captured, the whole force debouched between the village and the town of Onao. Here, however, it was impossible to halt. The main body of the enemy were seen hastening down to the town with a numerous artillery, and if permitted to establish themselves within it, would effectually bar all farther progress. There was no alternative therefore but to endeavour to outstrip them, and gain a position beyond the town before they could reach it. In this, by pushing rapidly forward, the column easily succeeded, and stood posted on the Lucknow side, on a piece of dry ground about half a mile in extent, commanding the highroad, along which the enemy, still in hope of gaining the race, were hurrying in great confusion. It would have been easy to arrest their progress, but the general knew better. They were rushing to their own destruction. He allowed them therefore to come on till they were in front of his line, and then, before they could remedy their mistake, or recover from the consternation produced by it, opened with such a fire both of guns and musketry, that victory soon declared in his favour, with a loss to the enemy of 300 men and fifteen guns.

The troops at the end of three hours again started, and marched to Busserutgunge, a walled town, intersected by the highroad to Lucknow. The gate in front was defended by an earthwork, a trench, and four guns, and the walls, as well as two turrets flanking the gate, were loopholed. The road leading out from the farther gate was continued by a causeway across a sheet of water about 150 yards wide and 6 feet deep. Taking advantage of this circumstance, orders were given to the 64th to march round the town to the left, and interpose between the farther gate and the causeway, while the 78th Highlanders and the Madras fusiliers should storm in front. These combined movements
so alarmed the enemy, that after a short defence they abandoned the town and fled across the causeway. The flank movement ought to have cut off their retreat, but owing to an unfortunate delay, the opportunity of inflicting a more signal defeat was lost.

Once more two victories had been gained on a single day, but still the prospect was by no means cheering. During the action, a large body of troops, supposed to be those of Nana Sahib, had been seen hovering on the left, and new mutinies, particularly one at Dinapore, had given new strength and courage to the mutineers. Meanwhile the sick and wounded had become so numerous, that the whole carriage available for their use was already required. Strong reinforcements had been promised, and in particular the arrival of two regiments, the 5th fusiliers from the Mauritius, and the 90th foot, forming part of the troops originally destined for China, had been confidently expected, but it now appeared that these regiments had been diverted to another quarter, and that some weeks must elapse before the real strength of the column could be increased. Under these circumstances a retrograde movement had become imperative, in order to keep open the communication with Cawnpoor, and deposit the sick and wounded in its hospital. The order, equally painful to the general and odious to the troops, was accordingly given, and the column returned to Mungulwar. This place had the double advantage of being within an easy distance of Cawnpoor, and furnishing a site for the camp on an elevated ridge which, held by a British force, was impregnable.

Shortly after reaching Mungulwar, General Neill pushed forward from Cawnpoor 257 bayonets, and five guns belonging to Captain Olphert's battery. The column, thus imperfectly reinforced, was in fact no stronger than when it first crossed the Ganges, but it was now the month of August, and Havelock felt that another advance for the relief of Lucknow must be attempted at all hazards. He therefore moved out of Mungulwar on the evening of the 4th, and next morning, on approaching Bussurutunge, came in sight of the enemy. His plan of attack, nearly similar to that formerly adopted, was happily carried out with more success. While the 64th and 84th advanced in front, under cover of a thundering cannonade, the 78th Highlanders, the 1st fusiliers, and the Sikhs, with Captain Maud's battery, moved round by the right, which had been discovered to give easier access than by the left. The enemy, as before, rushed out from the farther gate, and made for the causeway, where they suffered severely from Captain Maud's guns, which were already in full play upon it. So complete was the rout, that they never halted till they reached Newabgunge, five miles beyond the battle-field. Notwithstanding this success, Havelock was obliged once more to pause. With the force at his command, was he not attempting an impossibility? The Gwalior contingent had recently mutinied, and the report was, that while the mutineers of Dinapore were advancing into Oude from the east, those of the
contingent, forming in itself a little army, complete in all its parts and well-disciplined, had arrived in the vicinity of Calpee, situated on the Jumna, only forty-five miles south-west of Cawnpore. The question raised was much more serious than before. Then it was simply a question of delay, and was decided under the conviction that the advance might still be resumed in time to effect the relief at Lucknow. Now, on the contrary, if another retrograde movement took place, the hapless garrison would be left to its fate—a fate which could be nothing but the repetition of the Cawnpoor massacre in an aggravated form. No wonder that "the mind of the general was," as Mr. Marshman says, "a prey to conflicting anxieties." Many commanders would in such a dilemma have had recourse to a council of war, but, "independently of his own spirit of self-reliance, his experience of the mischief which had attended these councils in Afghanistan was sufficient to deter him from any such attempt to divide the responsibilities of his post," and after consulting with the officers of his staff, who unanimously concurred with him in the opinion that to advance to Lucknow under present circumstances would be only the uncompensated loss of his own force, he gave the order to return to Mungulwar. That he was fully alive to the momentous consequences involved in this step appears from his letters relating to it. In one addressed to Colonel Inglis, now commanding at Lucknow, after stating that stern necessity had left him no option but to retire, he continued thus: "When further defence becomes impossible, do not negotiate or capitulate. Cut your way out to Cawnpoor. You will save the colours of the 32d and two-thirds of your British troops." In a letter to Sir Patrick Grant, he said: "It was with the deepest reluctance that I was compelled to relinquish as impracticable and hopeless the enterprise of the relief of Lucknow, but my force, diminished to 900 infantry, was daily lessened by the inroads of cholera. I should have had at least two battles to fight before I could have approached the Dilkoosha park, which is the direction in which I would have endeavoured to penetrate; and to win my way up to the residency through a fortified suburb would have been an effort beyond my strength. The issue would have been the destruction of this force, as well as of the gallant garrison; a second loss of Cawnpoor, and the abandonment of all this portion of the Doab to the insurgents."

While the column remained at Mungulwar, the communication across the Ganges was rendered complete by taking advantage of three islands in its channel, opposite to the entrenchment, and connecting them by boats or rafts, so as to form a continuous line of road. The value of this road was soon put to the test. On the 11th of August General Neill forwarded the following startling communication: "One of the Sikh scouts I can depend upon has just come in, and reports that 4000 men and five guns have assembled to-day at Bithoor, and threaten Cawnpoor. I cannot stand this; they will enter the town and our communications are gone; if I am not supported I can only hold
out here; I can do nothing beyond our entrenchments. All the country between this and Allahabad will be up, and our powder and ammunition on the way, if the steamer, as I feel assured, does not start, will fall into the hands of the enemy, and we will be in a bad way." In consequence of this communication, Havelock was about to recross the Ganges, when he learned that the enemy, mustering about 4000 men, with some guns, had arrived at Busserutgunge. To have effected the passage with such a force in his rear would have been difficult. The moral effect also would have been pernicious, as the rebels might have boasted with some plausibility that they had chased the British out of Oude. He therefore at once took the initiative, and marching to Boorhiya, about a mile and a half on this side of Busserutgunge, found the enemy strongly entrenched, their right resting on the village on the main road, and their left on a mound about 400 yards distant, both defended by artillery. In their front was a flat covered with green vegetation, which gave it the appearance of dry ground. It was in fact a morass, but was not discovered to be so till the right wing of the column, after a steady advance, arrived at its edge. The halt produced by this mistake was only of short duration. The 78th Highlanders, moving on to the main road, marched up to the enemy's guns, notwithstanding their well-served fire, and aided by a flank movement of the fusiliers, captured them at the point of the bayonet. No further resistance was offered, and the flight became general, the fugitives suffering severely, particularly from the captured guns, which the Highlanders had lost no time in turning upon them. After this exploit the column returned to Mungulwar, and the following day made an easy passage across the Ganges.

Though thus precluded for the present from further operations in Oude, the column was not permitted to indulge in repose, for 4000 rebels were posted in a menacing attitude at Bithoor, scarcely ten miles distant. To encounter this new foe the column set out on the morning of the 16th of August, and, after a most fatiguing march under a vertical sun, which burned with unwonted fierceness, found the enemy in one of the strongest positions they had yet taken up. The plain in front, covered with villages and dense plantations of sugar-cane and castor-oil plants, was watered by a stream which pursued its course towards the Ganges, and was at this season too deep to be fordable. The only access to the town across it was by a narrow stone bridge, defended by a breastwork on its flank, and commanded by some high ground and strong buildings. Fortunately, either from ignorance or excessive confidence, the enemy had failed to profit by this position, and instead of remaining behind the nullah, had placed themselves among the villages and plantations in its front, and thus left no escape in the event of discomfiture, except the narrow bridge. The attack was made by advancing in direct echelon from the right, the 78th Highlanders, the Madras fusiliers, and Maude's battery forming the right wing, and the 64th, the 84th, the Sikhs, and Olphert's battery the
left. Considering the superiority of the British artillery, an easy victory might have been anticipated, but the enemy, sheltered behind their entrenchments, stuck to their guns, and continued to pour forth volleys of musketry, which were only silenced at the point of the bayonet. When the flight became general, the want of cavalry was again grievously felt, and Havelock scarcely overstated the matter when he said that if he had possessed cavalry not a rebel would have escaped.

Active operations for the relief of Lucknow being suspended until adequate reinforcements should arrive, the campaign was virtually at an end, and we may therefore take advantage of the interval to give some account of important events which had occurred in other quarters, but have not yet been noticed.

CHAPTER V.

Mutiny at Dinapoor—Arrah besieged and relieved—Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell as commander-in-chief—Reinforcements from Europe—Havelock superseded in his command—Continued siege of the British garrison at Lucknow—Relief and subsequent blockade—Second relief—Sir Colin Campbell’s campaign—Havelock’s death.

The main cause of General Havelock’s determination to desist for a time from attempting the relief of Lucknow was the detention of reinforcements, on whose arrival he had confidently calculated. While on the way to join him, their further progress was arrested by a mutiny at Dinapoor. This place, situated on the Ganges a little above Patna, near the junction of the Soane, was one of the great military divisions, and was occupied by her majesty’s 10th, a wing of her majesty’s 37th, a field battery, and three native regiments, the 7th, 8th, and 40th native infantry. The disaffection of these last could scarcely be doubted, and the prudent course would have been to deprive them of the power of mischief by disarming them. Unfortunately the division was commanded by General Lloyd, an aged officer, who owed his appointment more to the length than to the merit of his services, and who had persuaded himself that whatever other sepoys might do, those whom he commanded were proof against seduction. Government, naturally anxious to take the most favourable view, lent a too willing ear to his flattering reports, and did not awake from the delusion till they were shaken out of it by the intelligence that, on the 25th of July, the three native regiments had not only mutinied, but been permitted to march off in the direction of the Soane. The general, as slow to act as he had been to believe that there could be any necessity for it, gave the mutineers a respite of four hours, in the absurd expectation that they might yet be induced to
return to their duty, and then retired to a steamer to take lunch and a siesta. Meanwhile the mutineers were filling their pouches with ammunition, and preparing for their departure. At the last hour the European troops were called out, but it was only to find that they were too late.

The mutineers having crossed the Soane unchecked, proceeded westward to Arrah, situated only eight miles beyond it, and after plundering the treasury and throwing open the jail, beset a house in which the Europeans, only sixteen in number and all civilians, and fifty of Rattray’s Sikh police, had taken refuge. The house in which this party took refuge was only a bungalow, but one of them was fortunately an engineer, who turned his professional skill to good account, and strengthened the post by all the means at his command. At best however the defence was desperate, and to all human appearance could not be successful, as the original mutineers had been augmented by the retainers of an insurgent chief, of the name of Koer Sing. Meanwhile a detachment of about 400 men, drawn chiefly from her majesty’s 10th and 37th, had left Dinapore by steam, to rescue the beleaguered garrison. Part of the route was necessarily to be performed by land, and the troops having disembarked, proceeded till they reached a bridge about a mile and a half from Arrah. As the day was about to close, a halt till next morning was suggested, but the officer in command, in his eagerness to accomplish the task committed to him, pushed on without even stopping to reconnoitre. This rash proceeding was severely punished. On the outskirts of the town, while the troops were passing along the edge of a mango grove, they were suddenly assailed by volleys of musketry by an unseen enemy, and were ultimately obliged to make the best of their way back to the steamer, with the loss of half of their original number in killed and wounded. The fate of the civilians in Arrah now seemed sealed. Still however their courage never failed them; some of them were excellent rifle shots, and struck terror into their cowardly assailants by their deadly aim. At the same time they were admirably supported by their native comrades, who, though heavy bribes were offered to them, treated every offer with derision. They must however have been overpowered, had not a British officer, animated by a spirit like their own, flown to their relief. Major Vincent Eyre, already known to
the reader by his services in the Afghan war, and his work on the subject, was proceeding to the common rendezvous at Allahabad with his horse field-battery, and providentially arrived at Dinapoor on the very day when the mutiny occurred. As both Buxar, where the Company had a valuable stud, and Ghazeepoor, a place of still greater importance, were reported to be in danger, he continued his voyage, and reached the one on the 28th and the other on the 29th of July. Finding no cause for immediate alarm at either, he returned to Buxar, with the intention of advancing to the relief of Arrah, with the aid of such infantry as he could pick up from the detachments proceeding by the river. Happily 160 men of her majesty's 5th fusiliers had just arrived. Having thus quickly organized a field force with three guns, he started from Buxar, and on the morning of the 2d of August had, on advancing about half a mile beyond Gujragunje, found the enemy in force occupying a wood in front, and moving large bodies to other woods on his flanks. The evident intention being to surround him, he at once offered battle, and opened fire with his guns. The enemy, screening themselves behind some broken ground, replied with volleys of musketry, but he succeeded notwithstanding in obtaining a clear passage for the baggage and the guns beyond the woods, the advance now becoming comparatively easy, as the road was formed by a causeway, with inundated rice-fields on either side, which kept the enemy at such a distance that their musketry could not tell. Having come to a stream which he could not cross, Major Eyre made a flank movement towards the line of railway, along which there was a direct road to Arrah. This movement, concealed for a time by a brisk cannonade, was no sooner discovered by the enemy than they hastened to defeat it, the raw levies of Koer Sing following close on his rear, while the disciplined mutineers of Dinapoor moved parallel to him on the opposite side of the stream, and took post in a wood which abutted on the railway. This post having been carried after a fierce struggle, no further resistance was offered, and early on the morning of the 3d of August, the gallant band at Arrah, after a defence which Eyre does not hesitate to characterize as "one of the most remarkable feats in Indian history," had the happiness to welcome their deliverers.

On the 13th of August Sir Colin Campbell arrived in Calcutta. As soon as the death of General Anson was known in England, he was appointed to succeed him: twenty-four hours after, he had embarked. There could not have been a more judicious appointment. His distinguished services in the Crimea had pointed him out as the man in whom, in the event of any great emergency, his country might repose the utmost confidence; and if there was any quarter of the globe for which he was more especially qualified, it was India, where he had spent many years of his life, and had thus the double advantage of being at once inured to its climate, and thoroughly acquainted with all that is peculiar in its mode of warfare. By taking the overland route he had outstripped most
of the reinforcements of which his army of deliverance was to be composed, but there was no reason to fear that the means placed at his disposal would prove inadequate, since the national spirit, completely roused, was no longer to be satisfied with desultory efforts, and troops to the number of 30,000 had already left, or were preparing to leave the British shores for India. Sir Colin’s arrival at Calcutta had been recently preceded by that of another officer of a similar stamp. This was Sir James Outram, who had held the chief command in the Persian war, and was now, in consequence of its early and successful termination, without any fixed appointment. He could not be left unemployed, and it was nothing more than might have been expected, and was generally approved, when he was gazetted to the military command of the united Dinapore and Cawnpoor divisions. The command of the former had been rendered vacant by the incompetency of General Lloyd; that of the latter, which had been held by the lamented Sir Hugh Wheeler, had not been formally filled up, but it would have been incongruous to confer it on any other than Sir James Outram, who having formerly been chief commissioner in Oude, had a natural claim to be reinstated in it with the full military powers which had been conferred on his distinguished predecessor. But while both professional routine and individual merit concurred in entitling him to the above command, the appointment had an effect which was probably overlooked at the time, or if perceived was considered unavoidable. It placed a superior officer in the district in which Havelock had achieved his glorious victories, and thus by reducing him to a subordinate position, really superseded him. The same thing took place, it will be remembered, in respect to General Neill, when Havelock himself was appointed, and if regret was then felt, it is impossible not to feel it still more when, returning with Havelock from his victory at Bithoor, we see him take up the Calcutta Gazette, and receive from it his first intelligence of the fact that the command which had already given and still promised to give him so many laurels, had passed into other hands.

Havelock’s mortification at being superseded could not have been lessened by the increasing difficulties of his position. So much indeed had his force been weakened, while the rebels were gathering strength in the surrounding districts, that he seriously meditated a retreat upon Allahabad. In a despatch, dated 21st August, he thus explained his position:—“I will frankly make known to your excellency my prospects for the future. If I can receive prompt reinforcements, so as to make up my force to 2000 or 2500 men, I can hold
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increasing difficulties of Havelock's position.

this place with a high hand, protect my communication with Allahabad, beat everything that comes against me, and be ready to take part in active operations on the cessation of the rains. I may be attacked from Gwalior by the mutinous contingent with 5000 men and thirty guns, or by the large forces which are assembling at Furruckabad, under its rebellious nawab, which has also a formidable artillery. But as they can hardly unite, I can defeat either or both in successive fights. But if reinforcements cannot be sent me, I see no alternative but abandoning for a time the advantages I have gained in this part of India, and retiring upon Allahabad, where everything can be organized for a triumphant advance in the cold season. It is painful to reflect that in this latter event, Cawnpoor and the surrounding country, in fact the whole Dodb, would be abandoned to rapine and misrule, and Agra will feel unsupported." The answer to this representation not only promised reinforcements, but communicated the pleasing intelligence that part of them were already far on their way. About seven companies of her majesty's 90th had left Dinapore on the 14th, and were to reach Allahabad on the 21st or 22d; a considerable portion of the 5th fusiliers, detained at Mirzapoor, had been telegraphed to push forward for the same place; and a battalion of Madras infantry, with six guns, had proceeded by rail to Raneegunge, and was to push on by land to Benares. After this assurance of reinforcements, Havelock laid aside all thoughts of retiring to Allahabad.

Sir James Outram arrived at Dinapore on the 17th of August, and two days afterwards wrote to the governor-general, suggesting a new line of operations for the relief of Lucknow. It was to organize a column to proceed westward from Benares through Juanpoor, between the Sye and the Goomtee. An alternative plan was to start from Dinapore and proceed by water, first by the Ganges, and then by the Gogra as far as Fyzabad. By either plan the passage of the Sye, which was assumed to have been the main obstacle to Havelock's advance, would be rendered unnecessary. On further consideration both plans were abandoned, and on the 28th of August, Sir James Outram, in his first communication to General Havelock, informing him of his intention to join him forthwith with adequate reinforcements, generously added: "But to you shall be left the glory of relieving Lucknow, for which you have already struggled so much. I shall accompany you only in my civil capacity as commissioner, placing my military service at your disposal should you please, serving under you as volunteer." The reinforcements promised suffered considerable deductions in their progress, particularly at Allahabad, which was threatened by Koer Sing, who had assumed the title of King of Shahabad, and began at the age of eighty to give proof of military talents, which it could hardly have been supposed that he possessed, after his disgraceful discomfiture at Arrah by Major Eyre. In consequence of the danger which thus threatened Allahabad, the effective force under Sir James Outram was reduced to 1449
men. Its comparative weakness tempted the enemy to endeavour to intercept it. With this view their advanced guard had actually crossed the Ganges from Oude at Dalamow, nearly opposite to Futtehpore, and were about to have been followed by the main body, when Major Eyre, now in command of the artillery, was pushed forward, and by a sudden attack nearly annihilated the whole of the rebels who had already crossed, and rendered the crossing of others impossible by seizing the boats collected for transport. The importance of this service may be gathered from the statement of Sir James Outram to the commander-in-chief, that had the main body of rebels succeeded in crossing, a general insurrection throughout the Doab would have ensued.

The last of the reinforcements reached Cawnpoor on the 15th of September, and next morning appeared a division order, in which Sir James carried out the generous intention he had already intimated. After a just eulogy on the brave troops and their distinguished commander, and the expression of a confident hope that the great end for which they "have so long and so gloriously fought, will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished," it concluded thus:—"The major-general, therefore, in gratitude for and admiration of the brilliant deeds in arms achieved by General Havelock and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank on the occasion; and will accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity as chief commissioner of Oude, tendering his military services to General Havelock as volunteer. On the relief of Lucknow, the major-general will resume his position at the head of the force." No time was lost in preparing for the advance upon Lucknow, but it will be proper, before giving the details, to return to the beleaguered garrison there, and ascertain the condition to which a siege of more than two months by an overwhelming force had reduced them.

On the 23d of August, Havelock had received a letter from Colonel Inglis, in which, after referring to one received from Colonel Tytler, and containing the following passage—"You must aid us in every way, even to cutting your way out, if we cannot force our way in," he continued thus:—"If you hope to save this force, no time must be lost in pushing forward. We are daily being attacked by the enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their mines have already weakened our post, and I have every reason to believe they are carrying on others. Their eighteen-pounders are within 150 yards of some of our batteries, and from their position, and our inability to form working parties, we cannot reply to them, and consequently the damage done hourly is very great. My strength now in Europeans is 350, and about 300 natives, and the men are dreadfully harassed, and owing to part of the residency having been brought down by round shot, many are without shelter. Our native force having been assured on Colonel Tytler's authority of your near approach some twenty-four days ago, are naturally losing confidence, and if they leave us, I do not see how the defences are to be manned."
letter, dated 1st September, Colonel Inglis explained that his position was
daily becoming more hopeless, but added that from the reduction of rations
and the diminution of numbers, he hoped to be able to hold on to the 21st
instant. There was thus still time to effect the relief, and certainly never did
a garrison better deserve it. In proof of this we cannot do better than quote
at length, from the brief but admirable account of the siege contained in
Colonel Inglis's despatch. After describing the imperfect means of defence,
and the incessant fire of the rebels, it continues thus:—

"The enemy contented themselves with keeping up this incessant fire of
cannon and musketry until the 20th of July, on which day at ten A.M. they
assembled in very great force all around
our position, and exploded a heavy mine
inside our outer line of defences at the
Water gate; the mine however, which was
close to the Redan, and apparently sprung
with the intention of destroying that bat-
tery, did no harm. But as soon as the
smoke had cleared away, the enemy boldly
advanced under cover of a tremendous fire
of cannon and musketry, with the object of
storming the Redan. But they were re-
ceived with such a heavy fire, that after a
short struggle they fell back with much
loss. A strong column advanced at the
same time to attack Innes's post, and
came on within ten yards of the palisades, affording to Lieutenant Loughnan,
13th native infantry, who commanded the position, and his brave garrison,
composed of gentlemen of the uncovenanted service, a few of her majesty's 32d
foot, and of the 13th native infantry, an opportunity of distinguishing them-
selves, which they were not slow to avail themselves of, and the enemy were
driven back with great slaughter. The insurgents made minor attacks at almost
every outpost, but were invariably defeated, and at two P.M. they ceased their
attempts to storm the place, although their musketry fire and cannonading con-
tinued to harass us unceasingly as usual. Matters proceeded in this manner
until the 10th of August, when the enemy made another assault, having pre-
viously sprung a mine close to the brigade mess, which entirely destroyed our
defences for the space of twenty feet, and blew in a great portion of the outside
wall of the house occupied by Mr. Schillig's garrison. On the dust clearing
away, a breach appeared through which a regiment could have advanced in
perfect order, and a few of the enemy came on with the utmost determination,
but were met with such a withering flank fire of musketry from the officers and
men holding the top of the brigade mess, that they beat a speedy retreat,
leaving the more adventurous of their number lying in the breach. While this operation was going on, another large body advanced on the Cawnpoor battery, and succeeded in locating themselves for a few minutes in the ditch. They were however dislodged by hand-grenades. At Captain Anderson's post they also came boldly forward with scaling-ladders, which they planted against the wall; but here as elsewhere they were met with the most indomitable resolution, and the leaders being slain, the rest fled, leaving the ladders, and retreated to their batteries and loopholed defences, from whence they kept up for the rest of the day an unusually heavy cannonade and musketry fire. On the 18th of August the enemy sprung another mine in front of the Sikh lines, with very fatal effect. Captain Orr (unattached), Lieutenants Mecham and Soplett, who commanded the small body of drummers composing the garrison, were blown into the air; but providentially returned to earth with no further injury than a severe shaking. The garrison, however, were not so fortunate. No less than eleven men were buried under the ruins, from whence it was impossible to extricate them, owing to the tremendous fire kept up by the enemy from houses situated not ten yards in front of the breach. The explosion was followed by a general assault of a less determined nature than the two former efforts, and the enemy were consequently repulsed without much difficulty; but they succeeded under cover of the breach in establishing themselves in one of the houses of our position, from which they were driven in the evening by the bayonets of her majesty's 32d and 84th foot. On the 5th of September the enemy made their last serious assault. Having exploded a large mine a few feet short of the bastion of the eighteen-pounder gun, in Major Athrop's post, they advanced with large, heavy scaling-ladders, which they planted against the wall, and mounted, thereby gaining for an instant the embrasure of a gun. They were, however, speedily driven back with loss by hand-grenades and musketry. A few minutes subsequently, they sprung another mine close to the brigade mess, and advanced boldly; but soon the corpses strewed in the garden in front of the post bore testimony to the fatal accuracy of the rifle and musketry fire of the gallant members of that garrison, and the enemy fled ignominiously, leaving their leader—a fine looking old native officer—among the slain. At other posts they made similar attacks, but with less resolution, and everywhere with the same want of success. Their loss upon this day must have been very heavy, as they came on with much determination, and at night they were seen bearing large numbers of their killed and wounded over the bridges, in the direction of the cantonments."

Such was the series of assaults made by the rebels, and such the heroic spirit in which the garrison repulsed them. At length, however, the day of deliverance was approaching. Leaving about 400 men under Colonel Wilson to garrison the entrenchment at Cawnpoor, the whole of the other troops began to cross the Ganges on the 19th. The force, mustering in all 3179 men, of
whom 2388 were European infantry, 109 European volunteer cavalry, and 282 European artillery, and 341 Sikh infantry, and 59 native irregular cavalry, was formed into two brigades, the 1st under General Neill, and the 2d under Colonel Hamilton of the 78th Highlanders. On the 21st, the enemy, found in position with six guns at Mungulwar, were instantly attacked and put to flight. This first discomfort cleared the road as far as Basserutgunge, where the force bivouacked amid torrents of rain. Next morning an advance was made to Bunnee on the Sye. The passage of this river was expected to prove a most formidable difficulty, but the rebels, pursued only by their fears, continued their headlong flight without even stopping to destroy the bridge, and were not again seen till the morning of the 23d, when they were found in force in the vicinity of the Alumbagh, a large palace belonging to one of the princes of Oude, about

four miles south of Lucknow. It stood in a beautiful park, inclosed by a lofty wall, with turrets at each angle, and in addition to the main building had an extensive range of offices for the accommodation of a numerous body of retainers. The enemy, evidently determined to risk a battle, stood drawn up in a line which extended nearly two miles, with their right and centre posted on some mounds, and their left resting on the Alumbagh. Their strength was estimated at 10,000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and six guns. The plan of attack was to turn their right flank, but as a morass intervened, it was necessary that the attacking force should make a considerable circuit. During this operation it was exposed to a withering fire, till the guns from which it proceeded were silenced by Eyre's heavy battery of four twenty-four pounders. At the same time the cavalry massed on the right were driven back, and the whole of the enemy's line was thrown into disorder. The only resistance worthy of the name was made at the Alumbagh, in the wall of which two embrasures had been hastily struck out after
the action commenced, and mounted with guns which immediately opened fire with some effect. The field artillery and the bayonets of the 5th fusiliers soon succeeded in disposing of this obstacle, and possession was obtained of the Alumbagh without further opposition. Five guns were the trophies of this victory; but neither these nor the victory itself produced such cheers as echoed through the camp when, as the troops were about to bivouac for the night, they learned through a message just received that Delhi had fallen. Another fact scarcely less gratifying had reached their ears during the battle. For some time there had been no communication with the beleaguered garrison, and their fate was doubtful. Now, however, all anxiety on this subject was happily relieved, for the guns of the residency answering those of its besiegers were distinctly heard, and made it certain that the approaching relief was still in time.

While halting on the 24th in the Alumbagh, the generals consulted as to the direction in which the attack should be made. Pickets had been pushed out towards the Charbagh bridge, spanning a canal about a mile and a half north of the Alumbagh. From this point the Cawnpore road led directly through the heart of the city to the residency. The rebels, anticipating that this route, being the shortest, would be selected, had dug deep trenches across it, loopholed the houses lining it, and filled them with musketeers. The approach by it was therefore at once abandoned, and it became a question whether it would not be advisable to make a long detour in an easterly direction, and thus avoid the most dangerous localities. To this course there was, however, one formidable objection. Three days of incessant rain had made the ground so swampy that even the light pieces could hardly have been conveyed across it. The resolution ultimately adopted was to proceed first across the Charbagh bridge, then eastward along a lane skirting the canal, and finally northwards to a cluster of strong buildings situated to the east of the residency.

Leaving the baggage and the sick and wounded in the Alumbagh, under a strong guard, the force started for Lucknow at eight A.M. of the 25th, the first and leading brigade headed by Sir James Outram, while General Havelock followed with the second. At the very outset the struggle commenced, and some loss was sustained before the Charbagh bridge was reached, from the enemy's sharpshooters, and from three guns which raked the road. At the bridge the resistance was still more formidable. It was defended by six guns, one of them a twenty-four pounder, and all the adjoining houses carefully loopholed were crowded with marksmen. The fire, as soon as the men became fully exposed to it, was so destructive that they were ordered to lie down under such cover as they could find, while Maude came forward with two guns, to reply to the enemy's six, his placed in the open road without cover, theirs showering grape from behind a breastwork. To terminate this unequal contest, it was necessary to use the bayonet, and the 1st Madras fusiliers were
ordered to advance. The moment the order was given, Lieutenant Arnold and ten of his men rushed forward without waiting for the rest, and received a discharge of grape, which struck down the lieutenant, shot through both legs, and swept off his followers almost to a man. This perilous rush had been shared by two mounted staff officers, Colonel Tytler and Lieutenant Havelock. The former had his horse shot under him, the latter reached the bridge, where he stood unscathed waving his sword till the fusiliers came up and drove the enemy before them.

After crossing the bridge, the main body of the relieving force followed the lane skirting the canal, and then proceeded in a northern direction as far as the Secunder Bagh, where they made a sharp turn west towards the residency, and arrived without much opposition within a short distance of the Mottee Munzil, situated on the right bank of the Goomtee. At this spot, still three-quarters of a mile east from the residency, the enemy had concentrated their strength, and a new struggle, in difficulty and fierceness resembling that of the Charbagh bridge, began. A battery, which the rebels had erected at the Kaiser Bagh or king’s palace, opened a fire which, with that of the musketry from the adjoining streets and inclosures, was so destructive as to make further advance all but impossible. Two of Major Eyre’s heavy guns succeeded twice in silencing the battery for a time, but the resistance was still formidable, when relief came from an unexpected quarter. A body of Highlanders who had been left at the Charbagh bridge, had been following in the track of the main body till they came to a point where all trace of it was lost, and providentially turned off to the left by a street which brought them to the gate of the Kaiser Bagh, and gave them an opportunity of capturing its battery. This accomplished, they succeeded in forming a junction with the rest of the force. The distance from the residency was still about 500 yards, and as night was setting in after a whole day spent in fighting, a halt was proposed. The troops however were too impatient to rest till the grand achievement was accomplished. The Highlanders and Sikhs having been called to the front for the purpose, pushed on through an incessant storm of shot. General Neill, after leading the Madras fusiliers as they followed in their wake, was unfortunately struck in the head by a musket-ball, and died almost instantaneously. The troops meanwhile continued their advance in the face of obstacles which, but for the noble spirit which animated them, must have proved insurmountable, and at last found their full reward when the gates of the residency were opened to receive them.

The scene within is thus described by a staff officer:—“Once fairly seen, all our doubts and fears regarding them were ended, and then the garrison’s long pent-up feelings of anxiety and suspense burst forth in a succession of deafening cheers. From every pit, trench, and battery—from behind the sandbags piled on shattered houses—from every post held by a few gallant spirits, rose
CHEER ON CHEER—EVEN FROM THE HOSPITAL MANY OF THE WOUNDED CRAWLED FORTH TO JOIN IN THAT GLAD SHOUT OF WELCOME, TO THOSE WHO HAD SO BRAVELY COME TO OUR ASSISTANCE. IT WAS A MOMENT NEVER TO BE FORGOTTEN. THE DELIGHT OF THE EVER GALANT HIGHLANDERS, WHO HAD Fought TWELVE BATTLES TO ENJOY THAT MOMENT OF ECTASY, AND IN THE LAST FOUR DAYS HAD LOST A THIRD OF THEIR NUMBER, SEEMED TO KNOW NO BOUNDS. THE GENERAL AND SIR JAMES OUTRAM HAD ENTERED DR. FAYRER'S HOUSE, AND THE LADIES IN THE GARRISON AND THEIR CHILDREN CROWDED WITH INTENSE EXCITEMENT INTO THE PORCH TO SEE THEIR DELIVERERS. THE HIGHLANDERS RUSHED FORWARD, THE ROUGH, BEARDED WARRIORS, AND SHOOK THE LADIES BY THE HAND WITH LOUD AND REPEATED GRATULATIONS. THEY TOOK THE CHILDREN UP IN THEIR ARMS, AND FONDLY CARESSING THEM, PASSED THEM FROM ONE TO ANOTHER IN TURN. THEN WHEN THE FIRST BURST OF ENTHUSIASM WAS OVER, THEY MOURNFULLY TURNED TO SPEAK AMONG THEMSELVES OF THE HEAVY LOSSES THEY HAD SUSTAINED, AND TO INQUIRE THE NAMES OF THE NUMEROUS COMRADES WHO HAD FALLEN IN THE WAY."

An account has already been given of the repeated assaults made by the rebels, and the manner in which they were repulsed by the heroic garrison; but in order to make the account complete, we must again borrow from Colonel Inglis’s despatch:—"If further proof be wanting of the desperate nature of the struggle which we have, under God’s blessing, so long and so successfully waged, I would point to the roofless and ruined houses, to the crumbled walls, to the exploded mines, to the open breaches, to the shattered and disabled guns and defences, and lastly, to the long and melancholy list of the brave and devoted officers and men who have fallen. These silent witnesses bear sad and solemn testimony to the way in which this feeble position has been defended."

In another part of the despatch, Colonel Inglis says:—"I cannot refrain from bringing to the prominent notice of his lordship in council, the patient endurance and the Christian resignation which have been evinced by the women of this garrison. They have animated us by their example. Many, alas! have been made widows, and their children fatherless, in this cruel struggle. But all such seem resigned to the will of Providence, and many, among whom may be mentioned the noble names of Birch, of Polehampton, of Barbor, and of Gall, have, after the example of Miss Nightingale, constituted themselves the tender and solicitous nurses of the wounded and dying soldiers in the hospital." Lest it should be supposed that the whole merit of the defence belonged to the British alone, Colonel Inglis has added a passage, which it would be ungenerous and unjust to withhold: "With respect to the native troops, I am of opinion that their loyalty has never been surpassed. They were indifferently fed, and worse housed. They were exposed, especially the 13th regiment, under the gallant Lieutenant Aitken, to a most galling fire of round shot and musketry, which most materially decreased their numbers. They were so near the enemy that conversation could be carried on between them; and every effort, persuasion, promise, and threat was alternately resorted to in vain, to seduce them from the handful of Europeans who, in all probability, would have been sacrificed by their desertion." This praise must of course be confined to those native troops who fell at their post during the siege, or were found at it when relief arrived, for it is an indubitable fact that nearly a third of the native troops shut up within the residency when it was first invested, were unable to resist the temptations which Colonel Inglis describes. The garrison, as it stood at the beginning and at the termination of the siege, is thus stated by Mr. Gubbins:—"The garrison of Lucknow originally was 1692 strong. Of these 927 were Europeans and 765 natives. We lost in killed, of Europeans 350 and 133 natives, and of the latter 230 deserted, making a total loss of 713. There remained of the original garrison, when relieved on the 25th of September by General Havelock, a total number of 979, in which both sick and wounded are included, of whom 577 were Europeans, and 402 natives."
It had been intended that the garrison and its deliverers should forthwith quit Lucknow for Cawnpore, and accordingly, while the baggage and military stores were left in the Alumbagh, the relieving column took with them only three days' food, and no change of clothing. The course of a few days sufficed to throw doubts on the expediency and even practicability of an early departure. The provisions of the garrison, so far from being exhausted, as had been supposed in consequence of some miscalculation, were found sufficient to feed the whole force for upwards of two months, and while the most urgent reason for retiring was thus unfounded, the impossibility of finding the necessary means of conveyance had become apparent. The determination therefore was to remain at the residency, and wait for reinforcements. The detachment left at the Alumbagh now caused much anxiety, and an attempt was made to open a communication with it by the Cawnpore road. The operation was commenced on the 3d of October, with crowbar and pickaxe, but was relinquished on the 6th, "it being found," says Sir James Outram in his despatch, "that a large mosque, strongly occupied by the enemy, required more extensive operations for its capture than were expedient." The enemy in fact, recovering from their first surprise, had again assumed the offensive, and placed the whole force in a state of blockade. Fortunately the detachment in the Alumbagh proved able to repel any hostile attempt, and by means of forays in the neighbourhood, and supplies brought under escort from Cawnpore, was freed from all risk of starvation. The area occupied by the garrison being barely sufficient for its own accommodation, a large addition was made to it on the north and east. By this means, while the mutineers were thrown back about 1000 yards, the defences were greatly strengthened, and all the points formerly most vulnerable were effectually secured. On the south and west sides also, though little additional space was inclosed, the damages were repaired and new works erected. The following quotation from a despatch by Sir James Outram, gives a sufficient idea of the nature and extent of the operations carried on on both sides:

"I am aware of no parallel to our series of mines in modern war; twenty-one shafts, aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3291 feet of gallery, have been executed. The enemy advanced twenty mines against the palaces and outposts; of these they exploded three which caused us loss of life, and three which did no injury; seven had been blown in; and out of seven others the enemy have been driven, and their galleries taken possession of by our miners—results of which the engineer department may well be proud."

Sir Colin Campbell, on learning that the intended retirement of the original garrison of Lucknow, and of the relieving column, was abandoned as impracticable, hastened to place himself at the head of a force more adequate than that which had previously been sent. Nor were the means wanting. Reinforcements had begun to pour in from Europe, and in addition to the usual land forces, another of a peculiar character, destined to render excellent
service, had been organized, under the name of the naval brigade, commanded by Captain Peel, a son of the late Sir Robert Peel, who promised to be no less distinguished as a naval officer than his father had been as a statesman. The brigade, consisting chiefly of the crew of the captain’s own ship, the Shannon, with a sprinkling of seamen from Calcutta, carried with them eight guns of the largest calibre, and before reaching Cawnpoor had given proof of what might be expected from them by encountering, in concert with a military force of about 700 men, a body of rebels, estimated at 4000, and utterly routing them. Among the other troops which had arrived at Cawnpoor, and passed over into Oude to form part of the new relieving force, was a moveable column which had been formed at Delhi immediately after its recapture, and sent in pursuit of the rebels who had escaped from it. This column, commanded by Colonel Greathed, consisting of her majesty’s 8th and 75th, the 2d and 4th Punjab infantry, the 9th lancers, 200 of Hodson’s horse, with some Punjab cavalry and horse-artillery, had marched south-east, and inflicted successive defeats on the rebels at Boolundshuhur and Alighur. A more important encounter still awaited it. Agra, the capital of the North-western Provinces, had already had its full share of disaster. On the 2d of August, a body of rebels, composed chiefly of the regiments which had mutinied at Nusseerabhad and Neemuch, and estimated at 10,000, encamped within four miles of Agra. The authorities there preferring a bold to a timid course, resolved to take the initiative, and sent out all the troops which they could muster to offer battle. Unfortunately, a large portion of them belonging to what was called the Kotah contingent went over in a body to the enemy. This untoward event was followed by another of a still more fatal character. After a long and obstinate struggle, the British ammunition failed, and it became necessary to retreat. As has almost invariably been the case in India, the rebels, who had previously been kept at bay, pressed on in the full confidence of victory, and with so much rapidity that the retreat became disastrous. In the course of the evening the British troops found themselves shut up within the fort with a crowd of fugitive non-combatants, amounting to several thousands, and had the mortification of beholding from the ramparts the devastation of the rebels flushed with victory, and undisputed masters of the city. This calamity, aggravated by previous anxiety and mortification, broke the heart of
Mr. Colvin, and thus deprived the Indian government of one of its best servants, at a time when, as the governor-general in council justly expressed it, “his ripe experience, his high ability, and his untiring energy would have been more than usually valuable to the state.” The rebels, after wreaking their vengeance and satiating themselves with plunder, had retired, but in the beginning of October the defenceless state of the city and weakness of the garrison tempted another body of them, amounting to about 7000, to repeat the visit. Providentially their arrival had been preceded a few hours by that of Greatheed’s column. Neither party, however, being aware of the proximity of the other, the result was a mutual surprise. At first the rebels had the advantage, but it did not long avail them. On finding that instead of the easy victory which they had anticipated, they were confronted by the whole Delhi column, they endeavoured to make off, and were closely pursued for nearly ten miles, with great slaughter. Immediately after this exploit the column crossed the Jumna and proceeded eastward. On the 14th of October

Colonel Greatheed resigned the command to Brigadier Hope Grant, who, after new successes at Mynpoorie and Canouje, entered Cawnpoor on the 28th of October, and two days after crossed the Ganges into Oude.

The commander-in-chief left Cawnpoor on the 9th of November, and after halting three days at Buntara to allow the detachments still on the road to come up, started on the 12th at the head of a force composed as follows:—Naval brigade, eight heavy guns; Bengal horse-artillery, ten guns; Bengal horse field battery, six guns; heavy field battery, royal artillery; detachments Bengal and Punjab sappers and miners; her majesty’s 9th lancers; detachments 1st, 2d, and 5th Punjab cavalry, and Hodson’s horse; her majesty’s 8th, 53d, 75th, and 93d regiments of infantry; 2d and 4th Punjab infantry. This
force, amounting to about 700 cavalry and 2700 foot, received reinforcements on the 14th, which made the whole number of men of all arms nearly 5000. On the 9th of November, after the approaching relief had become known to the garrison, Mr. T. H. Kavanagh of the uncovenanted service volunteered to go out and make his way to the British camp. It was a most perilous enterprise, as every outlet was strictly guarded by the enemy’s posts and pickets, and the way lay through the very heart of the city. Mr. Kavanagh’s task was not only to convey information as to the state of the garrison, but to make himself useful as a guide. Both objects he happily accomplished, and was rewarded by government with £2000 and admission to the regular civil service.

On the 14th of November the commander-in-chief began his advance on the city. On approaching the Dilkoosha park, the advance guard was met by a long line of musketry fire. Reinforcements were immediately pushed on, and after a running fight of about two hours, the rebels were driven across the grounds of the Martiniere, and beyond the canal to the north of them. The rear-guard, hung upon by the enemy, was unable to close up to the column till late on the 15th. On that day, therefore, no further progress was made, but early on the 16th, leaving every description of baggage at Dilkoosha, under charge of her majesty’s 8th, the column began to advance direct on the Secunder Bagh. “This place,” says Sir Colin Campbell in his despatch, “is a high-walled inclosure of strong masonry, of 120 yards square, and was carefully loopholed all round. Opposite to it was a village, at a distance of 100 yards, which was also loopholed, and filled with men. On the head of the column advancing up the lane to the left of the Secunder Bagh, fire was opened on us. The infantry of the advanced guard was quickly thrown in skirmishing order to line a bank to the right. The guns were pushed rapidly onwards, viz.: Captain Blunt’s troop, Bengal horse-artillery, and Captain Travers’ royal artillery heavy field battery. The troop passed at a gallop through a cross fire from the village and Secunder Bagh, and opened fire within easy musketry range in a most daring manner. As soon as they could be pitched up a stiff bank, two eighteen-pounder guns under Captain Travers were also brought to bear on the building. While this was being effected, the leading brigade of infantry, under Brigadier the Honourable Adrian Hope, coming rapidly into action, caused the loopholed village to be abandoned, the whole fire of the brigade being directed on the Secunder Bagh. After a time a large body of the enemy who were holding ground to the left of our advance were driven by parties of the 53d and 93d, two of Captain Blunt’s guns aiding the movement. The Highlanders pursued their advantage, and seized the barracks, and immediately converted it into a military post, the 53d stretching in a long line of skirmishers in the open plain, and driving the enemy before them. The attack on the Secunder Bagh had now been proceeding for about an hour and a half, when it was determined to take the place by
storm through a small opening which had been made. This was done in the most brilliant manner by the remainder of the Highlanders, and the 53d, and the 4th Punjab infantry, supported by a battalion of detachments under Major Barnston. There never was a bolder feat of arms, and the loss inflicted on the enemy, after the entrance of the Secunder Bagh was effected, was immense—more than 2000 of the enemy were afterwards carried out."

The next capture was the Shah Nujeef. It is thus described in the despatch:—“The Shah Nujeef is a domed mosque with a garden, of which the most had been made by the enemy. The wall of the inclosure of the mosque was loopholed with great care. The entrance to it had been covered by a regular work in masonry, and the top of the building was crowned with a parapet. From this and from the defences in the garden, an unceasing fire of musketry was kept up from the commencement of the attack. The position was defended with great resolution against a heavy cannonade of three hours. It was then stormed in the boldest manner by the 93d Highlanders, under Brigadier Hope, supported by a battalion of detachments under Major Barnston, who was, I regret to say, severely wounded, Captain Peel leading up his heavy guns with extraordinary gallantry within a few yards of the building, to batter the massive stone walls. The withering fire of the Highlanders covered the naval brigade from great loss, but it was an action almost unexampled in war. Captain Peel behaved very much as if he had been laying the Shannon alongside an enemy’s frigate.”

The garrison were not idle while the relieving column was engaged with the Shah Nujeef. This building was within a few hundred yards of a garden, in which a battery had been established to co-operate in the relief. This battery was screened from the view of the enemy on two sides by a high wall, and the intention was to throw down the wall by exploding a mine under it, as soon as the moment for opening the battery arrived. Orders to this effect were accordingly given during the fierce struggle at the Shah Nujeef, but the explosion in a great measure failed, because the powder with which the mine had been charged three days before had in the interval become damp. Some time was thus lost in battering down the wall with the guns, which, after this preliminary obstacle was removed, opened with good effect on the Hurzen Khana and the steam-engine house, the two strongest buildings, immediately in front. After practicable breaches had been effected, a storming party from the garrison rushed out and carried the buildings by assault.

On the morning of the 17th the struggle was resumed, and proved so obstinate, that it cost six hours to carry the mess-house. The operations are thus described in the commander-in-chief’s despatch:—“Captain Peel kept up a steady cannonade on the building called the mess-house. This building, of considerable size, was defended by a ditch about 12 feet broad, and scarped with masonry, and beyond that a loopholed mud wall. I determined to use
the guns as much as possible in taking it. About three P.M., when it was considered that men might be sent to storm it without much risk . . . (it) was carried immediately with a rush. The troops then pressed forward with great vigour, and lined the wall separating the mess-house from the Motee Munzil, which consists of a wide inclosure and many buildings. The enemy here made a last stand, which was overcome after an hour, openings having been broken in the wall, through which the troops poured with a body of sappers, and accomplished our communication with the residency." The contest was not yet over. The enemy kept up such a galling fire of musketry from the Tehru Kotee or observatory, and of artillery from the battery of the Kaiser Bagh, that much street fighting, as well as some skilful strategy, was still required. The plan of the commander-in-chief was not to retain present possession of Lucknow, but rest contented in the meantime with effecting the deliverance of the garrison, and conducting the women and children, together with the sick and wounded, in safety to Cawnpoor. The delicate operation of removing the women and children, and the careful manner in which it was conducted on the 19th, is thus described by Mr. Gubbin:—"Most of them were conveyed in carriages closely packed, every description of vehicle being pressed into service on the occasion. Many were seated on native carts, and not a few walked. They were conducted through the Bailey Guard gate, the Furhut Buksh and Chuttar Munzil palaces, and emerging near our advanced battery, crossed the line of fire from the Kaiser Bagh to Martin’s house. Thence they entered and passed through the court of the Motee Munzil, on the further side of which they gained the highroad leading to the Secunder Bagh. Here, and near Martin’s house, they were exposed to the fire of the enemy’s guns placed on the farther side of the
river. Screens formed of the canvas walls of tents, or doors placed on each side of the way they traversed, as far as the Motee Munzil, concealed the march of the fugitives from the enemy, and on one side of this a ditch or traverse had been dug, along which, dismounting from their carriages, they walked past all the exposed places. All most fortunately reached the Secunder Bagh in safety."

The garrison was yet to be extricated, and the commander-in-chief having resolved to effect this "without exposing it to the chance of even a stray musket-shot," thus explains his mode of procedure:—"Upon the 20th, fire was opened on the Kaiser Bagh, which gradually increased in importance, till it assumed the character of a regular breaching and bombardment. The Kaiser Bagh was breached in three places by Captain Peel, and I have been told that the enemy suffered much within its precincts. Having thus led the enemy to believe that immediate assault was contemplated, orders were issued for the retreat of the garrison through the lines of our pickets at midnight on the 22d. The ladies and families, the wounded, the treasure, the guns it was thought necessary to keep, the ordnance stores, the grain still possessed by the commissariat of the garrison, and the state prisoners, had all been previously removed (two Delhi princes, and some other leading natives arrested on suspicion). Sir James Outram had received orders to burst the guns which it was thought undesirable to take away; and he was finally directed silently to evacuate the residency at the hour indicated. The dispositions to cover the retreat and resist the enemy should he pursue were ably carried out by Brigadier the Honourable Adrian Hope; but I am happy to say the enemy was completely deceived, and he did not attempt to follow. On the contrary he began firing on our old positions many hours after we had left them. The movement of retreat was admirably executed, and was a perfect lesson in such combinations."

The whole force reached Dilkooosha at four in the morning of the 23d. The sick and wounded had left the residency on the 19th, and Lieutenant Havelock, who was included among the latter, in calling to take leave of his father, now Sir Henry Havelock, found him seated alone by his lamp, reading Macaulay's History of England. The very next morning the general was seized with diarrhoea. His constitution, shattered by past and recent exertions, was little able to contend with the formidable disease which, during the 21st, assumed so serious a form that it was deemed necessary to convey him at nightfall to the Dilkooosha. His own conviction, calmly conveyed to those around him, was that he should not recover. In the course of the 23d, when a fatal issue became only too probable, he met it not only without fear, but cheerfully. "I die happy and contented." "I have for forty years so ruled my life, that when death came I might face it without fear." On the morning of the 24th, after some slight revival, there was a sudden change, and at half-past nine he breathed his last, dying as he had lived, a Christian hero of the highest stamp. Immediately
after his death, the troops who had been selected as a moveable column to be left in Oude under the command of Sir James Outram, set out, bearing with them the mortal remains of their departed general, which on arriving at the Alumbagh, they laid in a humble grave. Sir Henry Havelock had attained the age of sixty-three, and can hardly be said to have died too soon. After long and patient waiting, full scope had been given him for the display of his extraordinary talents, and his country, which reaped the benefit of them in one of the most eventful periods of her history, has not been ungrateful.

CHAPTER VI.

Cawnpore attacked by the rebels—Victory of Cawnpore—Other successes in the Doab—The auxiliary force from Nepal—General Outram in Oude—Final march upon Lucknow—Its capture—Subsequent operations in Behar, Oude, and Rohilkund—The campaign in Central India.

THOUGH the defences of Lucknow had been forced for a second time, the place remained in the possession of the rebels, and the commander-in-chief commenced his return to Cawnpore. Meanwhile General Outram remained at the Alumbagh with a force of 4000 men, at once to keep open the communication across the Ganges and to keep the enemy in check should they attempt any hostile movement. On reaching Bunnee, encumbered with an immense train of waggons and other carriages employed in the conveyance of baggage, ammunition, commissariat stores, and nearly 2000 helpless non-combatants, the returning force was startled at the sound of a cannonade in the direction of Cawnpore. There could be little doubt as to the nature of it. That place had
long been threatened by the rebels, and they had at length actually attacked it. The commander-in-chief when he crossed the Ganges believed he had provided sufficiently for its safety by intrusting the command of it to General Windham, with a force of above 2000 men. All previous reports seemed to indicate that there was but little chance of an immediate attack, and hence the continued silence of General Windham for several days was naturally accounted for by assuming that he had nothing of importance to communicate. It was far otherwise. He had sent urgent messages which had not been delivered, and it was only next morning, when hastening on as rapidly as possible, that Sir Colin Campbell "received two or three notes in succession—first, announcing that Cawnpore had been attacked; secondly, that General Windham was hard pressed; thirdly, that he had been obliged to fall back from outside the city into his entrenchment."

At Calpee, situated forty miles south-west of Cawnpore, the mutineers of the Gwalior contingent had for some time fixed their head-quarters, and obtained complete command of the surrounding districts. Nana Sahib was also hovering about in the neighbourhood at the head of a considerable force. The whole had united, and on the morning of the 26th of November were in full march on Cawnpore. General Windham, on being made aware of their approach, sent to the commander-in-chief for instructions, but, in consequence of the miscarriage of his message, not having received any answer, felt obliged to act for himself. Had he remained on the defensive he could not have been successfully assailed, but he determined, with more spirit than prudence, to pursue a bolder course; and leaving part of his force to guard the entrenchment, hastened out to meet the coming foe with the remainder, consisting of about 1200 bayonets, 8 guns, and 100 mounted sowars. His object was to strike a blow at the enemy's advance, and thereby perhaps induce the whole body to retire. He did strike the blow, and with no small degree of success. "The enemy," he says in his despatch, "strongly posted on the other side of the dry bed of the Pandoo Nuddee, opened a heavy fire of artillery from siege and field guns; but such was the eagerness and courage of the troops, and so well were they led by their officers, that we carried the position with a rush, the men cheering as they went; and the village more than a mile and a half in its rear was rapidly cleared. The mutineers hastily took to flight, leaving in our possession two eight-inch iron howitzers and one six-pounder gun." General Windham must have made this advance under the impression that the main body of the enemy was still so distant as to leave him time to withdraw his small force to a safer position before it could be overpowered by overwhelming numbers. This miscalculation was productive of disaster. Observing from a height on the other side of the village that the enemy's main body was at hand, "I at once decided," says the general, "on retiring to protect Cawnpore, my entrenchments, and the bridge over the Ganges." This retreat, made in
the face of an enemy estimated at 20,000 men, with forty guns, was not effected without considerable difficulty. Next morning, the 27th, the contest was renewed, and General Windham was obliged, at the end of five hours, on finding himself "threatened on all sides," and "very seriously attacked" on his front and left flank, to make the best of his way to the entrenchments. It was high time, for they were already beset. Had they fallen, the safety of the force in Oude would have been seriously compromised.

The commander-in-chief, pushing on in advance of the column, reached the entrenchment on the evening of the 28th. During this day the fighting was very severe, and it had "become necessary to proceed with the utmost caution to secure the bridge" over the Ganges. This operation and its success are thus described in a despatch:—"All the heavy guns attached to General Grant's division, under Captain Peel, R.N., and Captain Travers, R.A., were placed in position on the left bank of the Ganges, and directed to open fire and keep down the fire of the enemy on the bridge. This was done very effectually, while Brigadier Hope's brigade, with some field artillery and cavalry, was ordered to cross the bridge and take position near the old dragoon lines. A cross fire was at the same time kept up from the entrenchment to cover the march of the troops. When darkness began to draw on, the artillery-parks, the wounded, and the families were ordered to file over the bridge, and it was not till six P.M., the day of the 30th, that the last cart had cleared the bridge." The passage of the force with its encumbrances over the Ganges had occupied thirty hours. As soon as the passage was effected, an earnest wish was felt to drive out the enemy, and make them pay dearly for their temporary triumph. By none could this wish be felt more strongly than by the commander-in-chief, but he justly felt that his first duty was to place the
helpless intrusted to his care beyond the reach of danger, and therefore was obliged, as he himself expresses it, "to submit to the hostile occupation of Cawnpoor, until the actual despatch of all my encumbrances towards Allahabad has been effected."

The safe removal of the families and the wounded having been completed on the 5th of December, the respite which had been given to the rebels in Cawnpoor, and which had greatly increased their confidence, immediately ceased, and the very next day was fixed for the attack. The position of the enemy and the plan of attack are thus described by Sir Collin Campbell's despatch:—"His left occupied the old cantonment, from which General Windham's post had been principally assailed. His centre was in the city of Cawnpoor, and lined the houses and bazaars overhanging the canal which separated it from Brigadier Greathed's position, the principal streets having been afterwards discovered to be barricaded. His right stretched some way beyond the angle formed by the grand trunk road and the canal, two miles in rear of which the camp of the Gwalior contingent was pitched, and so covered the Culpee road. This was the line of retreat of that body. In short, the canal, along which were placed his centre and right, was the main feature of his position, and could only be passed in the latter direction by two bridges. It appeared to me, if his right were vigorously attacked, that it would be driven from its position without assistance coming from other parts of his line, the wall of the town which gave cover to our attacking columns on our right being an effectual obstacle to the movement of any portion of his troops from his left to right. Thus the possibility became apparent of attacking his division in detail." After mentioning that the enemy mustered about 25,000 men, with thirty-six guns, the despatch continues thus:—"Orders were given to General Windham on the morning of the 6th to open a heavy bombardment at nine A.M. from the entrenchment of the old cantonment, and so induce the belief in the enemy that the attack was coming from the general's position. The camp was struck early, and all the baggage driven to the river side under a guard, to avoid the slightest risk of accident. Brigadier Greathed, reinforced by the 64th regiment, was desired to hold the same ground opposite the enemy which he had been occupying for some days past ... and at eleven A.M., the rest of the force ... was drawn up in contiguous columns in rear of some old cavalry lines, and effectually masked from observation of the enemy. The cannonade from the entrenchment having become slack at this time, the moment had arrived for the attack to commence. The cavalry and horse-artillery having been sent to make a detour on the left and across the canal by a bridge a mile and a half farther up, and threaten the enemy's rear, the infantry deployed in parallel lines fronting the canal. Brigadier Hope's brigade was in advance in one line, Brigadier Inglis's brigade being in rear of Brigadier Hope. At the same time Brigadier Walpole, assisted by Captain Smith's field battery, R.A., was
ordered to pass the bridge immediately to the left of Brigadier Greathed's position, and to drive the enemy from the brick-kilns, keeping the city wall for his guide. . . . The advance then continued with rapidity along the whole line, and I had the satisfaction of observing in the distance that Brigadier Walpole was making equal progress on the right. The canal bridge was quickly passed, Captain Peel leading over it with a heavy gun, accompanied by a soldier of her majesty's 53d, named Hannaford. The troops which had gathered together resumed their line of formation with great rapidity on either side, as soon as it was crossed, and continued to drive the enemy at all points, his camp being reached and taken at one P.M., and his rout being complete along the Calpee road. I must here draw attention to the manner in which the heavy twenty-four pounder guns were impelled and managed by Captain Peel and his gallant sailors. Through the extraordinary energy with which the latter have worked, their guns have been constantly in advance throughout our late operations, from the relief of Lucknow till now, as if they were light field pieces, and the service rendered by them in clearing our front has been incalculable. On this occasion there was the sight beheld of twenty-four pounder guns advancing with the first line of skirmishers. Without losing any time, the pursuit with cavalry, infantry, and light artillery was pressed with the greatest eagerness to the fourteenth milestone on the Calpee road, and I have reason to believe that every gun and cart of ammunition which had been in that part of the enemy's position which had been attacked, now fell into our possession." During these operations, General Mansfield was equally successful in gaining the rear of the enemy's left, and completely routing the troops of Nana Sahib, who were there posted. After a successful pursuit, the troops returned at midnight of the 6th. The following day the troops reposed, waiting for the arrival of the baggage, but early next morning Brigadier Grant started again in pursuit with the cavalry, some light artillery, and a brigade of infantry. After reaching the Nana's residence at Bithoor, and discovering a large quantity of treasure which had been concealed in a well, he hastened on to the Serai Ghaut, where he had the good fortune to overtake the fugitives in the very act of crossing over into Oude, and capturing fifteen guns. These, added to those previously taken, made the whole number thirty-two, thus nearly annihilating the whole artillery which the contingent possessed, and depriving them of the arm in which they had been most powerful. The whole British loss in this important victory was only ninety-nine in killed and wounded.

After the victory of Cawnpoor, the troops were compelled to remain inactive for several days, waiting the return of the means of conveyance from Allahabad. At length on the 24th of December, when they were prepared to start, the plan of the campaign was more fully developed. The more immediate object was to clear the Doab of rebels, and retain command of it, so as to keep open the line of communication by the great trunk road from Allahabad to
Delhi. The northern portion of this line had already been to some extent secured by Colonel Seton, who having set out from Delhi, at the head of a column consisting of the carabineers, Hodson’s horse, the 1st Bengal fusiliers, and a Sikh regiment, mustering in all about 1900 sabres and bayonets, was proceeding southwards with an immense convoy of tents, ammunition, carts, camels, and in short everything most wanted at head-quarters. He was now advancing towards Mynpoorie, and in order to co-operate with him, and finally join him at that place, Brigadier Walpole was detached with the rifles, and a strong body of cavalry and artillery, mustering about 2000 men of all arms, to sweep across the Lower Doab by proceeding westward in the direction of Etawah, and then turn northwards so as to be able, after the junction with Colonel Seton, to reach Furruckabad, situated on the Ganges about eighty miles N.N.W. of Cawnpoor. This place, the only one of which the rebels still had undisputed possession, it was of the utmost importance to wrest from them. as the fort of Futtehghur in its vicinity gave it the command of the eastern portion of the Doab, while its bridge of boats, forming the leading communication with both Oude and Rohilcund, furnished the mutineers with which they swarmed with full opportunity whether of annoyance or of retreat. The capture of this place, which the commander-in-chief had reserved for himself, was easy, for the enemy, instead of making the bold stand which had been anticipated, evacuated both the fort and town with such headlong haste, that a large amount of government property, which they doubtless meant to destroy, was found uninjured. The whole British army encamped at Furruckabad fell little short of 10,000 men.

While the commander-in-chief had thus the happiness of seeing himself at the head of a force more adequate to the task still before him than he had hitherto been able to muster, an important diversion in his favour was being made towards the eastern frontiers of Oude, by an auxiliary force of 10,000 Ghourkas, who had descended from Nepaul under the personal command of Jung Bahadoor, in name only the prime minister, but to all intents the actual sovereign of that country. These troops, possessing a high reputation for courage, and animated by an intense hatred of the sepoys, having crossed the Nepaul frontier, reached Segowlee on the 21st of December, and then marched westward to Gorruckpoor, clearing the country of mutineers as they passed, and preparing to enter Oude from the east, with the view of cutting off the retreat of the rebels in that direction, and then advancing to Lucknow, to take part in its final capture.

The commander-in-chief, though anxious for immediate action, remained for some time encamped at Futtehghur. The plan of campaign which he preferred was to cross the Ganges into Rohilcund, which was almost entirely in the hands of the rebels, and re-establish the authority of government, so as to make it impossible for the insurgents to find an asylum in it after they should be

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A. Ghoorka force from Nepaul.
A.D. 1857.

Plan of campaign.

driven out of Lucknow. The governor-general's plan was different. He thought that the time which would necessarily be occupied in the subjugation of Rohilcund would be more advantageously employed in Oude, where the rebellion still counted the largest number of adherents, and possessed its most important stronghold. This was the plan ultimately adopted, and Sir Colin Campbell, leaving a sufficient garrison in the fort of Futtehghur, broke up his camp on the 1st of February, and set out for Cawnpore. At this time the whole force under his personal command amounted to 18,277, composed as follows: infantry 12,498, cavalry 3169, artillery 1745, and engineers 865. These included the strong detachment under General Outram, who, besides gallantly holding his post at the Alumbagh, had on two different occasions put to rout large bodies of the enemy who had ventured to assail it. Another British force under General Franks, which had been organized at Benares, after defeating a body of rebels estimated at 25,000, was hastening forward to take part in the operations before Lucknow.

The first portion of the army crossed the Ganges on the 4th of February, but the whole did not cross till the 28th, on which day head-quarters were transferred to Buntara. On the 2d of March the Dilkoosha palace was seized, and occupied as an advanced picket, though not without opposition from the enemy, who opened a heavy fire from a series of strong entrenchments in the line of the canal, and kept it up with so much effect as to make it necessary to retire from the spot which had at first been selected for the camp, and carry it back as far as the nature of the ground would permit. On the 3d and 4th, after the last of the siege train was brought up, the right of the position rested on the Goomtee and Bibrapoor, situated within an angle formed by that river, while the left stretched in the direction of Alumbagh, which was about two miles distant. Hodson's horse, stationed in the interval between the two positions, kept the communication open. After these preliminary steps, the plan of attack began to be developed. The nature of it will be understood from the following explanation given in the commander-in-chief's despatch:—"Having received tolerably correct information with respect to the lines of works which had been constructed by the enemy for the defence of Lucknow, it appeared
evident to me that the necessity would arise for operating from both sides of the Goomtee, when the capture of the city should be seriously entertained. Two very important reasons concurred to show the expediency of such a course, the one that it would become possible to enfilade many of the enemy's new works; the other, that great avenues of supply would be closed against the town, though I could not hope to invest a city having a circumference of twenty miles."

In accordance with this plan, a bridge formed of casks which had been previously provided was hastily thrown across the river, and on the 6th a complete corps of infantry, cavalry, and guns, under Sir James Outram, who had been withdrawn from the Alumbagh to assume the command, passed over, with instructions to proceed northward in a line nearly parallel to the course of the river, and then endeavour to penetrate westward, so as to obtain command of the two bridges, the one of iron and the other of stone, giving access to the city from the north. The works which the first part of this movement was designed to turn are thus described in the despatch:—"The series of courts and buildings called the Kaiser Bagh, considered as a citadel by the rebels, was shut in by three lines of defence towards the Goomtee, of which the line of the canal was the outer one. The second line circled round the large building called the mess-house, and the Motee Mahul, and the first, or interior one, was the principal rampart of the Kaiser Bagh, the rear of the inclosures of the latter being closed in by the city, through which approach would have been dangerous to an assailant. These lines were flanked by numerous bastions, and rested at one end on the Goomtee, and the other on the great buildings of the street called the Huzratunge, all of which were strongly fortified, and flanked the street in every direction. Extraordinary care had been expended on the defence of the houses and bastions to enfilade the streets."

As soon as it became apparent that Sir James Outram had turned the first line of defence by pushing forward to the vicinity of the Chukkur Walla Kotse, all the batteries at the Dilkooisha opened their fire on the Martiniere, and with so much effect, that on the 9th it was successfully stormed by the 42d, 53d, and 90th regiments, under the direction of Brigadier Sir Edward Lugard and the Hon. Adrian Hope. This first success was immediately followed by one of still more consequence, when the 4th Punjab rifles, supported by the 42d Highlanders, climbed up the entrenchment abutting on the Goomtee, and swept down the whole line of works forming the outer defence as far as the building known as Banks's house, which was carried next day at sunrise, and secured as a strong military post. Sir James Outram had in the meantime been making rapid progress, having not only captured the Badshah Bagh, one of the finest of the King of Oude's summer palaces, but established himself strongly at the north extremity of the iron bridge. The continuance of the attack is thus described in the despatch:—"The second part of the plan of attack against
A.D. 1857. the Kaiser Bagh now came into operation, viz., to use the great blocks of houses and palaces extending from Banks’s house to the Kaiser Bagh as our approach, instead of sapping up towards the front of the second line of works. By these means I was enabled to turn towards our own left, at the same time that they were enfiladed on the right by Sir James Outram’s advance. The latter had already received orders to plant his guns with a view to raking the enemy’s position, to annoy the Kaiser Bagh with a vertical and direct fire, also to attack the suburbs in the vicinity of the iron and stone bridges shortly after daybreak, and to command the iron bridge from the left bank. All this was carried out by Sir James Outram with the most marked success. The enemy, however, still held pertinaciously to his own end of the iron bridge on the right bank, and there was heavy cannonading from both sides, till the bridge was afterwards taken in reverse.”

The front attack as continued from the 11th is thus described:—“The operation had now become one of an engineering character, and the most earnest endeavours were made to save the infantry from being hazarded before due preparation had been made. The chief engineer, Brigadier Napier, placed the batteries with a view to breaching and shelling a large block of the palaces called the Begum Kotee. The latter was stormed with great gallantry by the 93d Highlanders, supported by the 4th Punjab rifles, and 1000 Ghoorkas, led by Brigadier the Hon. Adrian Hope, under the direction of Brigadier-general Sir Edward Lugard, at four A.M. The troops secured the whole block of buildings, and inflicted a very heavy loss on the enemy, the attack having been one of a very desperate character. This was the sternest struggle which occurred during the siege. From thenceforward the chief engineer pushed his approach with the greatest judgment through the inclosures by the aid of the sappers and of heavy guns, the troops immediately occupying the ground as he advanced, and the mortars being moved from one position to another, as the ground was won on which they could be placed. The buildings to the right and the Secunder Bagh were taken in the early morning of the same day without opposition. During the night of the 12th, Sir James Outram was reinforced with a number of heavy guns and mortars, and directed to increase his fire on the Kaiser Bagh, while at the same time mortars placed in a position at the Begum’s house never ceased to play on the Imambarsa, the next large palace it was necessary to storm, between the Begum Kotee and the Kaiser Bagh.”

On the 11th, Jung Bahadoor, after long delays, arrived with a force of about 9000 men and twenty-four field guns, with which he took up a position close to the canal, where he was advantageously employed for several days in covering the left of the British force, whose whole available strength was then massed towards the right, in the joint attack carried along both banks of the Goomtee. The attack of the Imambara, under the direction of General Franks,
who had relieved Sir Edward Lugard, took place on the 14th, and not only succeeded, but was followed up in a manner which none had been sanguine enough to anticipate. After the Imambara had been forced by the column of attack led by Brigadier D. Russell, Brayser’s Sikhs pressing forward in pursuit entered the Kaiser Bagh, and made good their footing within it. The third line of defences having thus been turned without a single gun being fired from them, “supports,” continues the despatch, “were quickly thrown in, and all the well-known ground of former defence and attack, the mess-house, the Tara Kotee, the Motee Mahul, and the Chuttur Munzil, were rapidly occupied by the troops, while the engineers devoted their attention to securing the position towards the south and west. The day was one of continued exertion, and every one felt that although much remained to be done before the final expulsion of the rebels, the most difficult part of the work had been overcome.” How much had been achieved may be learned from the following brief descrip-

![Image of Chuttur Munzil Palace, Lucknow.](image-url)
active operations were resumed on the following day, when Sir James Outram, with the 5th brigade under Brigadier Douglas, supported by two other regiments, crossed the Goomtee by a bridge of casks, a little above the iron bridge, and was able not only to take the latter bridge in reverse, which was the chief object in view, but to advance more than a mile up the right bank of the river, and take possession both of the Muckee Bhowun and another building considerably beyond it, called the Great Imambara. At the same time, a portion of his force having turned eastward, passed through the Chuttur Munzul into the residency. The city was now won, but the far greater part of the rebels had made their escape. This was perhaps unavoidable, as the extent of the city made it impossible effectually to guard the leading outlets from it.

Two considerable bodies of rebels still remained to be disposed of. One of these, estimated at about 7000, occupied the Moosa Bagh, a large palace with gardens and enclosures, situated at some distance to the west, near the right bank of the Goomtee. It was under the immediate direction of the Begum Huzzrat-Mahul, the ex-queen of Oude, who had throughout been the very soul of the insurrection in that kingdom. She had with her her son Brijcis Kuddr, of whom, in the absence of her husband, then a prisoner at Calcutta, she had made a puppet king, and also her notorious paramour, Mumoo Khan, who had so long been permitted to usurp her husband's place, as to make the real paternity of Brijcis Kuddr more than doubtful. The other body of rebels occupied a stronghold in the heart of the city, and was headed by the Moulvie of Fyzabad, whose combined ability and fanaticism made him one of the most influential of the insurgent leaders. On the 19th Sir James Outram moved directly on the Moosa Bagh, by the right bank of the Goomtee, while Brigadier Hope Grant cannonaded it from the left bank, and Brigadier Campbell moved round from the Alumbagh to the west, for the purpose of preventing retreat in that direction. The result was a complete rout. The moulvie, after a stout resistance, was driven out on the 21st by Sir Edward Lugard, and pursued by the cavalry under Brigadier Campbell for six miles. Resistance being now at an end, the commander-in-chief deemed it "possible to invite the return of the inhabitants, and to rescue the city from the horrors of this prolonged contest." Notwithstanding the desperate fighting which had taken place, so much care had been taken not to expose the troops unnecessarily, that the capture was effected with a comparatively trifling numerical loss. In another respect the loss was serious, as it included two of the most promising officers in the service, Hodson and Peel. The former fell mortally wounded during the assault, and died almost immediately after; the latter, now become Sir William Peel, in just recompense for his distinguished services, was also severely wounded, but had given good hopes of an early and complete recovery, when an attack of small-pox, aggravated by his previous suffering, carried him off, after he had been removed to Cawnpoor.
When Lucknow was captured, it must have become apparent to the rebels that all hope of successful resistance was at an end. But they did not therefore at once abandon the struggle. On the contrary, with the exception of the capital and the small portion of country adjoining the road leading from it to Cawnpoor, the whole of Oude was still in their possession; while they mustered strong in Behar on the east, where Koer Sing still headed the revolt; in Rohilcund on the north-west, where Khan Bahadur, reinforced by insurgent fugitives from other quarters, had become so strong, as to make it a question whether a campaign against him ought not to have preceded that undertaken against Lucknow; and in the south and south-west, where, throughout the greater part of Central India, the authority not only of the British government, but of the two leading native princes, Scindia and Holkar, who remained in alliance with it, had for the time been completely extinguished. Much important work thus remained to be done, and though ultimate success could no longer be considered doubtful, there was little prospect of being able to achieve it before the rains would set in, and render campaigning all but impossible. Under these circumstances, all that the commander-in-chief could do was to provide for the security of Lucknow by intrusting the command of it to Sir Hope Grant, with a force adequate not only to garrison it, but to overawe the disturbed districts in its vicinity, to send out moveable columns to clear the way in those directions where his communications were endangered, and then prepare for the final suppression of the mutiny by moving against Rohilcund, effecting a junction with Sir Hugh Rose, who had been leading a large and victorious force northwards through Central India, and lastly return with augmented force into Oude, and drive the rebels before him into the pestilential morasses of the Terai of Nepal.

The Ghookkas, impatient to return to their homes laden with plunder, quitted the vicinity of Lucknow shortly after its capture, and proceeded eastward by way of Fyzabad. They were followed shortly afterwards by Sir Edward Lugard, at the head of a strong column, consisting of three regiments of infantry, three of Sikh horse, the military train, and three batteries, which started from Lucknow on the 29th of March, and proceeded south-east to Sultanpoor. The immediate destination of the column was Azimgur, which had for some time been held in a state of siege by Koer Sing, with the greater part of the Dinapoor mutineers, about 3000 levies, and three or four guns. On the 2d of April an attempt had been made by the rebels to intercept a large convoy of ammunition and supplies, sent out to the beleaguered garrison from Benares, with an escort of 460 men under Lord Mark Kerr. This attempt was successfully repulsed, but the garrison, though relieved and strengthened by the convoy and escort, was still in danger, and the column was therefore anxious to push forward. Unfortunately there were obstacles in the way. A temporary bridge which the Ghookkas had thrown over the Goomtee at Sultan-
poor had been broken down, and the column being in consequence obliged to
take a somewhat circuitous route, did not reach Junaopoor till the 9th of April.
Another detention, caused by the defeat and pursuit of a body of rebels, who
threw themselves across its path, prevented it from reaching Azimghur before
the 15th. Here the final encounter took place, and terminated as usual in the
discomfiture of the rebels, who broke up into three different parties, one of
which fled northward on the road to Gorruckpoor, and another back towards
Oude, while the third and main body, under Koer Sing himself, moved east-
ward towards his own zemindaree, in the vicinity of Arrah, where the wounds
which he had received in the action shortly afterwards terminated his career.

On the 10th of April another strong column, mustering nearly 6000 men of
all arms, and fully provided with light and heavy artillery, under General
Walpole, set out from Lucknow with the intention of clearing that part of the
country, and moving upward along the left bank of the Ganges toward
Rohulcund. No opposition was experienced till the 15th, when, on arriving at
Rhoodamow, fifty miles west of Lucknow, its fort was found in possession of a
body of rebels. Their number did not exceed 400, and the defences of the fort
consisted only of a high loopholed wall and a ditch. An easy capture was
consequently anticipated; and with strange disregard both of ordinary caution,
and of the special instructions of the commander-in-chief to risk no assault
until due preparation had been made for it by the use of artillery, an attacking
party, consisting of the 42d Highlanders, supported by the 4th Punjab rifles,
was ordered to advance to the attack. This was a serious and costly blunder.
The rebels, completely sheltered, kept up such a deadly fire, that the assailants,
after an unavailing display of gallantry, were obliged to retire with a loss of
nearly 100 in killed and wounded, including among the former four officers,
one of them Brigadier the Hon. Adrian Hope, almost adored by his own
regiment, the 93d, and described, with little exaggeration, as "the most gallant
and the best beloved soldier in the army." The folly of having risked this
repulse was demonstrated next morning, when it was found that the place had
been evacuated during the night.

The commander-in-chief having opened the campaign in Rohilcund by the
capture of Shajehanpoor, started again on the 2d of May, and began to advance
northwards on Bareilley, on which, at the same time, in consequence of a well-
managed combination, two other columns were moving—one under General
Jones from the north-west, by way of Moradabad, and the other under General
Penney from the south-west, by way of Budaon. This concentration of force,
provided for the suppression of the mutiny in Rohilcund, shows that a very
formidable resistance was anticipated. Khan Bahadur Khan, while allowed
to remain in undisturbed possession of his usurped authority, carried matters
with so high a hand, that the whole of the Rohillas, who had grievous wrongs
of their own to avenge, seemed to have rallied round his standard. The
result, however, showed that he was formidable only so long as he was unopposed. When the encounter took place he made little more than a show of resistance, and seeking safety in a precipitate flight, left the British to resume almost undisputed possession of Bareilly. More boldness and dexterity were displayed by the Moulvie of Lucknow, who, taking advantage of the departure of the British army for Bareilly, mustered a large promiscuous force, and by making a dash at Shajehanpoor, actually succeeded in seizing and plundering it. Some mistake must have been committed in intrusting it to a garrison so feeble that they were obliged to take refuge in the jail, and remain entirely on the defensive till they were again set free by General Jones, who had been detached from Bareilly for that purpose. With the capture of Bareilly the Rohilcund campaign virtually terminated. The rebels, unable to keep the field, only attempted a desultory warfare, while the approaching rains made the continuance of active operations on the part of the British in great measure impossible. In contemplation of this period of comparative quiescence, the commander-in-chief fixed his head-quarters at Futtelghur, there to wait till the return of the cold season should allow the campaign to be resumed. Meanwhile it will be necessary to turn to another quarter, to which due attention has not yet been paid, and give a brief account of the progress of events in Central India.

In the earlier stage of the mutiny no effort could be made to check its progress in Central India, and the mutineers, headed in some instances by native princes, were allowed to indulge a temporary triumph. It was not of long duration. The presidencies both of Bombay and Madras, after a short period of anxious suspense, gave satisfactory proof that they were not implicated in the treachery which prevailed in Bengal, and it in consequence became practicable to organize columns from their respective armies, which, entering Central India from the south-east and south-west, might afford effectual aid in restoring the authority of government. The former column, under General Whitlock, after quitting Nagpoor, proceeded northwards towards Jubbulpore; the latter, under General Roberts, coming from Rajpootana, proceeded in the direction of Kotah; both were intended to co-operate, and ultimately form a junction with a more central column, when the whole, under the command of Sir Hugh Rose, was to assume the name of the Central India field force.

At the outset the central column, consisting of about 6000 men, of whom 2500 were British, was formed into two brigades. One of them, commanded by Brigadier Stuart of the 14th light dragoons, having on the 2d of August, 1857, effected the relief of Mhow, which since the commencement of the mutiny had been kept in a state of siege, spent the remainder of the rainy season in repairing and strengthening the fort, erecting new batteries, and throwing up entrenchments, with the view of making the locality a basis for subsequent operations. On the 19th of October the brigade was again in
motion, and proceeded west to Dhar, the capital of a small principality, where a body of mutineers, collected from various quarters, had, contrary it was said to the wish of the native authorities, taken forcible possession. The actual rajah was a mere boy, and the probability is that his guardians were playing a double game, conciliating the rebels by complying with their demands, and at the same time proferring to the British government that they did so not voluntarily, but under compulsion. As the brigade approached the town, the rebels, quitting the fort, advanced to the attack, and opened a brisk fire from three brass guns which they had planted on an adjoining height. After a short encounter their courage failed, and they took refuge within the fort, leaving their guns behind them. A siege in consequence became necessary, and after the arrival of the siege train on the 24th of October, operations were immediately commenced. While from a position at some distance to the south shells continued to be thrown into the fort with little intermission, advantage was taken of the cover afforded by the huts and mud walls of the town to place a breaching battery, which began to play at the distance of 300 yards on the curtains and bastions of the fort, which were all substantially built of stone. Means were at the same time taken to invest the place so closely as to prevent the escape of the garrison, which was supposed to fall little short of 4000 men. By the 29th, after a considerable breach had been made, the garrison began to talk of terms, but on being told that nothing but an unconditional surrender would be accepted, declared their determination to hold out to the last. This was only a feint. They were already preparing their escape, and notwithstanding all the precautions which had been used, accomplished it with so much dexterity, that their flight was not known till the storming party entered the breach and found the place deserted.

After laying the fort in ruins so as to prevent the rebels from again using it as a stronghold, and receiving a considerable reinforcement by the arrival of the Hyderabad contingent under Major Orr, the column resumed its march in two divisions—the contingent starting on the 7th of November for Mahid-poor, where the Dhar rebels, greatly augmented by others from the neighbourhood, were reported to have committed great outrages; while the rest of the force did not set out till the following day. The contingent pushing forward, came up with the enemy at the village of Rawul, and by a gallant charge drove them from their guns, which were captured, together with large quantities of ammunition, and of bullocks and carts loaded with plunder. This success having cleared the road, no further encounter took place till Mundisore was reached on the morning of the 21st of November. Here the rebels had fixed their head-quarters, and felt so confident in their superior numbers, that instead of waiting to be attacked, they first attempted a surprise, and when it failed, advanced steadily with banners flying, threatening at once both British flanks and centre. After a short encounter they turned their backs, and were pursued
almost to the walls of the town. Meanwhile intelligence was received that a body of rebels, estimated at 5000, who had been laying siege to Neemuch, had set out to form a junction with those at Mundisore. As this junction would have given the enemy an overwhelming preponderance, Brigadier Stuart determined to frustrate it, by throwing himself between the two bodies, though at the risk of opposing himself to an attack both in front and rear. He accordingly set out on the morning of the 22d, and had an encounter with the enemy’s advance-guard without any very decisive result. On the following day, after advancing a short way along the road between Mundisore and Neemuch, he found the enemy in great force, strongly posted in and beyond the village of Goraria. This position was too strong to be forced, and when night closed, after a fierce struggle, still remained in possession of the enemy. While the battle was raging in front, a party of rebels from Mundisore had made an attack on the British rear, and attempted, though without success, to carry off the baggage. On the 24th the battle was renewed and maintained by the rebels with great obstinacy, till they were driven from the village at the point of the bayonet, and fled, scattering themselves over the country. Their loss was estimated at not less than 1500. The result was the relief of Neemuch, where a considerable number of Europeans, shut up within the fort, had for some time been maintaining a gallant but almost desperate defence, and the capture of Mundisore which, when the column returned to it the day after the battle, was found evacuated. Leaving Major Orr with the contingent in occupation of Mundisore, Brigadier Stuart retraced his steps, and on the 15th of December arrived at Indore, where Sir Hugh Rose assumed the command in person of the two brigades, composing what was henceforth designated the Central India field force.

From Indore, the capital of Holkar’s dominions, Sir Hugh Rose, in the beginning of January, 1858, marched north-east in the direction of Sehore, a town in the principality of Bhopal, ruled at this time by a princess or begum, who had remained faithful to the British alliance during the general disaffection, though most of the troops belonging to her contingent had joined the mutineers. After reaching Sehore, and executing summary vengeance on a number of mutineers, the force continued its march through Bhopal and Bhilsa to the fort of Rhatghur, situated about twenty-five miles W.S.W. of Saugor. This fort was one of the largest and strongest in Central India, and was then garrisoned by a large body of rebels, who had retired to it as a stronghold which could not be wrested from them. It stood on the spur of a lofty ridge, isolated on the east and south sides by scurped precipices, while the north side was inclosed by a deep ditch, and the west side, in which the gateway was placed, was flanked by several square and round bastions. With much labour and difficulty, a mortar and a breaching battery having been completed, fire was opened from them on the 27th January, at the distance of about 300 yards,
and kept up with so much vigour, that on the evening of the 28th the breach was pronounced practicable. It was however unnecessary to storm. The
garrison, descending by a precipice which, as it seemed to bar the possibility of egress, was carelessly guarded by a body of Bhopal troops, had made their escape. The next advance was to Saugor, where Sir Hugh Rose had the happiness of relieving a body of Europeans who had been cooped up for eight months within the fort. A few days afterwards, the Madras column, under General Whitlock, which had been advancing by way of Jubbulpore, made its appearance, after having successfully cleared the districts through which it passed.

At some distance to the east of Saugor stood the fort of Gurrukotta. It was occupied by a body of rebels, and was expected to give some trouble, but the garrison only made a show of resistance while preparing for flight, and

then moved off, leaving a large quantity of accumulated plunder behind them. Sir Hugh Rose now prepared for a long march to the north. His destination was Jhansi, where a hideous massacre had been perpetrated, and where the begum, resenting the questionable act which had incorporated the territory with British India, had headed the revolt, and given proof of talents which, but for her share in the Jhansi massacre, might have extorted admiration. The road led over some of the ridges of the Vindhy Mountains, and through several passes which, if properly defended, could not have been forced without great difficulty and sacrifice of life. Malthoor, the most difficult of these, was in the direct line, and the rebels, assuming that the British force would proceed by it, had blocked it up with boulders and barricades, and occupied it with a large body of troops, under the personal command of the rebel Rajah of Banpoor. Sir Hugh Rose having taken up a position from which he might move on any one of the passes which might eventually be selected, took means to confirm the enemy in the belief that he had fixed upon Malthoor, and then made a sudden
flank movement, which brought him to the pass of Mudanpoor. The resistance offered by the rebels only showed how much more effective it would have been if they had not been taken by surprise, and after a short struggle the pass was cleared. The level country having thus been gained, several places of some strength were captured, and the whole force continued its advance on Jhansi, where it arrived on the 21st of March.

The town of Jhansi, situated in the midst of extensive woods, covers an area of about four miles and a half in circuit, and is surrounded by a wall of solid masonry from six to twelve feet thick, and eighteen to thirty feet high, flanked with bastions for ordnance, and loopholed for musketry. Within the town, and inclosed by it on all sides except the west, where the rock on which it stands terminates in an abrupt and lofty precipice, rises the citadel, completely commanding both the town and the roads leading to it, and strongly fortified both by nature and art. Its walls, constructed of solid granite from sixteen to twenty feet thick, were flanked by elaborate outworks of the same solid construction; while the interior, partly occupied by the massive buildings of the palace, contained several lofty towers mounting heavy ordnance, and in some places pierced with five tiers of loopholes. The south side appearing to be the only one from which the fort could be successfully assailed, batteries were so placed as to bring a concentrated fire upon it, and immediately opened with great effect. Several of the enemy’s guns were silenced, and the battlements gave evident signs of crumbling away. The besiegers were in consequence indulging the hope of a speedy and successful assault when this cheering prospect became suddenly clouded. On the evening of the 31st March, a telegraph which Sir Hugh Rose had taken the precaution to establish on a commanding hill in the vicinity, signalled that “the enemy were coming in great force from the north.” There could be no doubt as to the enemy thus announced. The very day when the siege commenced it was rumoured that a whole army of rebels, composed chiefly of the gathered remnants of the Gwalior contingent, under a distinguished leader of the name of Tantia Topee, was about to advance to the ranees’s relief from Calpee, situated on the Chumbul, about ninety miles to the north-east. This, then, was the enemy; and the British force, which barely sufficed to carry on the siege, was suddenly called upon, while continuing to man its batteries and keep in check a garrison of 12,000 men, to encounter an army of nearly double that number in the open field. The odds were fearful, for all the troops that could be spared from the siege did not exceed 1200, and of these only 500 were British infantry. With these Sir Hugh Rose moved out with as little delay as possible, and found the enemy marching in masses, and taking up a position in front of the British camp, near the banks of the Betwa. The battle was deferred till the following morning (1st April), and furnished another signal example of the utter inability of a native to cope with a British force properly handled. After a cannonade which made

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havoc among the dense masses of the enemy, a charge of cavalry, directed simultaneously against both wings, increased the confusion, and made it comparatively easy for the infantry to push forward and complete the victory at the point of the bayonet. All the guns brought by the enemy from Calpee were captured, and nearly 1000 of their number lay dead upon the field. After this victory the siege was prosecuted with so much vigour, that an assault took place on the 3d of April. It was made in two columns—the one on the right, composed of the Madras and Bombay sappers, the 3d Europeans, and Hyderabad infantry, effecting an entrance by escalade, while that on the left, composed of the royal engineers and the 86th and 25th Bombay native infantry, stormed the breach. Both attacks succeeded, and the two columns, after clearing the way before them, met, and were concentrated at the palace. The fighting, however, was still continued in different parts both of the city and the fort, and did not finally cease till the 6th, when the capture was completed. Large numbers of the rebels were slain, but still larger numbers escaped, and among them the ranees, who, though seen in full flight, mounted on a gray horse, and attended only by a few followers, could not be overtaken.

While Sir Hugh Rose was pursuing his victorious career, the other two columns under Generals Roberts and Whitlock were also making a successful advance. The Bombay column under the former general, advancing through Rajpootana by way of Nussereabad, reached Kotah on the right bank of the Chumbul on the 22d of March. Here the position of affairs was somewhat singular. Immediately on the arrival of the British on the left bank of the Chumbul, the raja crossed over by one of the fords and entered the camp. He had all along been a faithful ally, and at the head of a body of troops, whose fidelity remained unshaken, was still in possession of the citadel and palace, situated in the southern division of the town. The northern division, however, was wholly in the power of the rebels, and thus Kotah was truly a city divided against itself. The arrival of General Roberts threw the balance so completely in the raja's favour, that little difficulty was found in expelling the rebels, though they managed as usual to distance their pursuers and escape. The Madras column, under General Whitlock, had been equally successful. After traversing a large extent of country, and clearing it of rebels, it arrived on the 19th of April in the vicinity of Banda, about ninety miles west of Allahabad. Here the native ruler or nabob was in open arms against the government, and advanced at the head of about 7000 men, of whom about 1000 were sepoys of the Bengal army, to offer battle. General Whitlock, though outnumbered nearly sevenfold, gladly accepted the challenge, and after a contest, which was obstinately maintained for four hours, gained a decisive victory.

After remaining some time in Jhansi to prepare for a movement on Calpee, where it was understood that the rebels, again augmented by fugitives from various quarters, had resolved to make a final stand, Sir Hugh Rose, somewhat
weakened in consequence of being obliged to deprive himself of a considerable portion of his troops who were to remain in garrison, started again on the 29th of April, and made several midnight marches, which were daily becoming more difficult from the oppressive heat. The first serious opposition was encountered in the vicinity of Koonch, where a body of rebels, headed by the Rancee of Jhansi, the Rajah of Baumpoor, the Nabob of Banda, Tantia Topee, and others, and estimated at 20,000, had assembled. It would seem however that the succession of disasters which had befallen the rebels had deterred them from risking a fair encounter, and after a distant cannonade, and some volleys from musketeers who remained under cover, the British advance became the signal for general flight. Calpee was now only forty miles distant, and was gradually approached by slow marches, the heat rendering rapid movement absolutely impossible, and daily producing heavier loss than the enemy were able to inflict. On the 22d of May, after Goloowlee, within six miles of Calpee, had been reached, and several days had been spent in a kind of desultory and harassing warfare, the enemy were seen advancing in force along the Calpee road, in order of battle. An immediate encounter took place, and was for some time maintained by the enemy with so much determination, and in such overwhelming numbers; that the issue looked doubtful, till the bayonet was resorted to, and proved as usual decisive. The enemy’s masses of infantry driven headlong, broke up in confusion, and fled panic-struck in all directions. The result of this victory was the capture of Calpee, with large quantities of ammunition, military stores, and the plunder of the different stations from which the mutineers had come. Assuming that the campaign was now virtually ended, Sir Hugh Rose, who was about to depart on sick certificate, issued the following order:—"Camp, Calpee, 1st June, 1858. The Central India field force being about to be dissolved, the major-general cannot allow the troops to leave his immediate command without expressing to them the gratification he has invariably experienced at their good conduct and discipline, and he requests that the following general order may be read at the head of every corps and detachment of the force: Soldiers: you have marched more than a thousand miles, and taken more than a hundred guns; you have forced your way through mountain passes, and intricate jungles, and over rivers; you have captured the strongest forts, and beat the enemy, no matter what the odds, wherever you met him; you have restored extensive districts to the government, and peace and order now reign where before, for twelve months, were tyranny and rebellion; you have done all this and you have never had a check. I thank you with all my sincerity for your bravery, your devotion, and your discipline. When you first marched I told you that you as British soldiers had more than enough of courage for the work which was before you, but that courage without discipline was of no avail, and I exhorted you to let discipline be your watchword; you have attended to my orders. In hardships, in temptations, and in
dangers, you have obeyed your general, and you have never left your ranks. You have fought against the strong, and you have protected the rights of the weak and defenceless, of foes as well as friends; I have seen you in the ardour of the combat preserve and place children out of harm’s way. This is the discipline of Christian soldiers, and this it is which has brought you triumphant from the shores of Western India to the waters of the Jumna, and establishes, without doubt, that you will find no place to equal the glory of your arms."

The above excellent order, considered as a parting address, was rather premature. The rebels rallying after their defeat, had carried their arms into another district, and achieved a success to which they had for some time been strangers. Most of them in their flight from Calpee had taken the direction of Gwalior, situated about 100 miles due west, and wreaked their vengeance on Scindia, for his refusal to share in their revolt. This native prince, who had hitherto offered only a passive resistance to their measures, was emboldened, on hearing of their approach toward his capital, to take more active steps, and mustering the troops still in his service, sent them out to offer battle. When the decisive moment arrived, a large proportion of them deserted, and returning with the other mutineers to Gwalior took forcible possession of it, while Scindia himself, unable to offer any effective resistance, fled northward and took refuge in Agra. His place was immediately supplied by Row Sahib, a nephew of Nana Sahib, who was placed upon the musnad, and received the homage of the rebels as the new sovereign. Sir Hugh Rose, on hearing of these events, once more buckled on his armour and set out for Gwalior, after sending instructions to different detachments to join him by the way. The rebels during the short respite which had been given them, had exerted themselves to strengthen their position, and conscious that they were playing their last stake, prepared for a determined resistance, by carefully occupying all the roads by which it was supposed that the British force might approach. In the absence of Tantia Topee and other leaders, who after their defeat at Calpee were probably convinced that they would be more safely, if not more usefully employed elsewhere, the command of the rebels was undertaken by the Ranee of Jhansi, who clad, it is said, in male attire, mounted on a noble steed, and attended by a picked and well armed staff, kept moving about wherever her presence was required, superintending all arrangements, and displaying a skill, energy, and courage worthy of a better cause. The first struggle was for the possession of the cantonment, out of which the rebels were driven with heavy loss. On the following day the battle was resumed, and raged with great fierceness, invariably to the disadvantage of the rebels. At last, on the afternoon of the 19th, after the greater part of the town had been occupied, all their courage failed them, and they thought only of saving themselves by flight, leaving the battle-field and the street covered with their dead. Among these the Ranee of Jhansi was known to be included, but her body, probably because it had been carried off
and burned by her attendants, was never discovered. Meanwhile Scindia, in the prospect of being reinstated in his sovereignty, had set out from Agra and was approaching his capital. He re-entered it on the 20th, and thus obtained the reward of a fidelity which, though it must have been sorely tried, seems never to have been shaken. The campaign being now virtually ended, the Central India field force was broken up, and Sir Hugh Rose, left at liberty to carry out his original intention, started for Bombay.

CHAPTER VII.

Proposed change in the government of India—Change of ministry—Lord Canning’s Oude proclamation—Lord Ellenborough’s despatch—Extinction of the East India Company—The Queen’s proclamation—Suppression of the mutiny—Conclusion.

INDIA, in consequence of the mutiny, had attracted, both from the country at large and from the legislature, a degree of attention which it had never been able to command before, and the result was a general conviction that a radical change in the mode of governing it was imperatively required. The subject had on several occasions been incidentally discussed in both Houses of Parliament, and the Company, made aware by communications with government, that their very existence as the rulers of India was seriously threatened, had presented a long and elaborate petition, in which, pleading the merits of their past services, and denying that the mutiny was owing to their mismanagement, they deprecated legislation of the kind which they understood to be in contemplation, as at once pernicious and unseasonable; pernicious, because it would substitute a bad form of government for one which had on the whole worked admirably; and unseasonable, because, proposed at a time when mutiny was raging, its natural effect would be to unsettle the native mind still more, and increase the existing confusion. This petition was presented to the House of Lords on the 11th of February, 1858. Next day Lord Palmerston introduced into the House of Commons a “Bill for the better government of India.” Leaving arrangements in India unchanged, it was intended to apply only to home management, and proposed that the functions of the Courts of Directors and Proprietors should cease; that for these bodies there should be substituted a president assisted by a council for the affairs of India; that the president should be a member of the government, and the organ of the cabinet in everything relating to Indian affairs; and that the council, named, like the president, by the crown, but restricted to individuals who had either been directors of the Company or had resided in India for a
certain period, with or without employment, should consist of eight members, elected for eight years, two retiring by rotation every second year, in order that successive administrations might have an opportunity of renewing the council from time to time, by the introduction of persons returning from India with fresh knowledge and ideas. The final decision was in all cases to remain with the president, because the cabinet of which he was the organ was henceforth to be solely responsible for his measures; but in the event of a difference of opinion, the members of council should have the power of recording that difference, together with the reasons of it, in the minutes. In regard to patronage, all the appointments hitherto made in India were to be made there as before; and at home, while the writerships remained as at present open to public competition, the appointments of cadets should be shared by the president and the council, in the same manner as they were previously shared by the president of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. When the usual motion for leave was made, Mr. Thomas Baring, who had presented the petition from the Company, moved as an amendment, “That it is not at present expedient to legislate for the government of India;” but after a debate continued during several successive nights, the amendment was negatived by 318 to 173. In this first trial of strength, the supporters of the bill so far outnumbered its opponents, that it was considered beyond the reach of danger, and yet, owing to a contingency which suddenly arose, and was not at all connected with Indian affairs, the bill was not destined to become law.

An attempt had recently been made to assassinate the French emperor, and as the assassins, though foreigners, were known to have come from England, violent tirades were made against this country for having afforded them an asylum. These might have been overlooked had they been confined to ordinary newspapers, or even to congratulatory addresses which were printed in the Moniteur, and in which blustering soldiers asked permission to cross the Channel, to root out the nest of hornets and those who fostered them; but the matter assumed a graver form when tirades were followed, not only by a speech in a somewhat similar spirit by M. Morny in the legislative body, but by an official despatch from Count Walewski, in which, after saying, at least by implication, that assassination was here "elevated to doctrine," and "preached openly," he indignantly asked, "Ought then the right of asylum to protect such a state of things? Is hospitality due to assassins? Ought the English legislature to contribute to favour their designs and their plans?" &c., and called upon her Britannic majesty's government for "a guarantee of security, which no state can refuse to a neighbouring state, and which we are authorized to expect from an ally." The only answer given by government to this despatch was the introduction of what was called a conspiracy bill, the object of which was, without trenching on the right of asylum given to foreigners, to amend the English law by making conspiracy to murder, instead of a misdemeanour
punishable only by fine and imprisonment, a felony punishable by penal servi-
tude, wherever the murder was intended to be committed, whether in this or
in a foreign country. After a debate continued for two successive nights, leave
was given to introduce the bill by a majority of 299 against 99. The conserva-
tives had voted generally in the majority, but on the 19th of February, when
the second reading was moved, a combination, encouraged by the general
unpopularity of the measure, had taken place, and the conservatives, now in
league with its opponents, succeeded in placing government in a minority of
nineteen, by supporting an amendment expressive of "regret that her majesty's
government, previously to inviting the house to amend the law of conspiracy
at the present time, had not felt it to be their duty to reply to the important
despatch received from the French government." In consequence of this vote
the Palmerston ministry resigned.

The new ministry formed by Lord Derby could hardly fail, both from its
general character and the particular appointment of Lord Ellenborough as
president of the Board of Control, to have a marked effect on Indian politics.
Not only had the conservatives supported Mr. Baring's amendment, declaring
that "it is not at present expedient to legislate for the government of India," but
their leaders in both houses, when votes of thanks were moved to the
Indian officials civil and military, "for the eminent skill, courage, and perse-
verance displayed by them" in the suppression of the mutiny, took special
exception to the name of Lord Canning, on the ground that the merits of his
administration during the crisis were very questionable, and at least ought not
to be recognized till they were better ascertained. There were thus two points
to which the new ministry stood committed, as far as previous expressions of
opinion could bind them—the one, the impolicy of introducing an India bill at
present, and the other, a determination not to recognize the merits of Lord
Canning's administration without further inquiry. The latter point, though
insignificant compared with the other, was perhaps felt to be the more pressing,
as it was of a party character, and we cannot therefore wonder that in the
vigorous hands of Lord Ellenborough, to whose department it officially belonged,
it soon gave rise to discussions which for a time absorbed all the interest which
was felt in the other.

With regard to the impolicy of introducing a bill for the government of
India, the new ministry could not but feel that they stood in a false position.
The vote in favour of a bill was overwhelming, and it was not to be supposed
that the very same house which carried that vote, would reverse it merely at
the bidding of a new cabinet. Under these circumstances, the ministry took
the only course which was open to them if they were to retain their places, by
bringing their opinions into harmony with those of the majority, and announc-
ing their intention to lose no time in introducing an India bill, which would
secure most of the objects of the bill of their predecessors, and at the same time
be free from the objections to which it was liable. The change of opinion thus implied was accounted for with some degree of plausibility, by adverting to the effect which the previous vote must have had in weakening the authority of the Company, and thereby rendering the transfer of it to the crown, which might otherwise have been inexpedient, absolutely necessary. Accordingly on the 26th of March, Mr. Disraeli, now chancellor of the exchequer, and leader of the House of Commons, introduced what was called "India bill No. 2," to distinguish it from the previous bill, which not having been abandoned, retained its precedence, and was called "India bill No. 1." The main object, the transfer of the government of India to the crown, was the same in both bills; but the mode of effecting it was very different, and in the case of "No. 2," called into existence a very novel and curious piece of political machinery. There was to be, as in No. 1, a president and a council, but the latter, instead of being limited to eight members all nominated by the crown, was to consist of eighteen, of whom half were to be nominated and half elected. In regard to the latter, the power of the crown would of course be entirely excluded; but in regard even to the former, though they were to be named by crown warrant, the qualifications necessary to eligibility would be such as to make them truly representatives not of the crown, but of distinct Indian interests. Four, representing the civil service, must have served in it ten years—one in Upper India, one in Bengal proper, one in the presidency of Madras, and one in that of Bombay. Of the four representing the military service, one a queen's officer, must have served five years in India, and each of the other three ten years in their respective presidencies. The remaining nominee was to be an individual whose employment in India as resident, or political agent at a native court, must be presumed to have made him well acquainted with native character. Of the elected half of the council, four were to be eligible only after ten years' employment, or fifteen years' residence without employment, in India. The electors, estimated at 5000, were to consist of all civil and military officers who had resided ten years in India, and of all persons still resident there possessed of shares in an Indian railway, or other public work, to the value of £2000, and of all proprietors of £1000 of India stock. The other five elected members must have resided ten years in India, or must have been engaged for five years in trading or exporting manufactures to India, and were to be elected respectively by the parliamentary constituencies of the five following towns—London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Belfast. This bill, though denounced by one member as "a sham," and by another as "clap-trap," was allowed to be introduced without a vote; but when during the Easter recess, which took place immediately afterward, its provisions had been fully canvassed, it began to appear in so ridiculous a light as to threaten the very existence of the ministry who had been so ill advised as to introduce it. In this emergency Lord John Russell, who had not formed part of the last ministry, came unexpectedly
to the rescue, by suggesting that the house should not proceed by bill, but by a series of resolutions on which a bill more acceptable than either of those yet proposed might afterwards be founded. Mr. Disraeli at once closed with the suggestion, and so heartily, that he was even willing to allow the resolutions to be proposed by Lord John Russell himself. This mode of resigning the proper business of government to a private member being however disapproved, Mr. Disraeli undertook the task, and proposed a series of fourteen propositions, to be discussed separately, in order that those rejected might be thrown aside, and those approved might form the groundwork of a third bill, combining all that was unobjectionable in the other two. After considerable debate, the two first resolutions, the one declaring the expediency of an immediate transfer of the government of India to the crown, and the other empowering her majesty to commit the home administration to one of her responsible ministers, were adopted without a division. Here however the discussion was arrested, and the whole attention both of parliament and the country was turned aside from the general question to a very subordinate one, to which Lord Ellenborough had, by an act of singular indiscretion, given an adventitious importance.

Lord Canning, in contemplation of the capture of Lucknow by the commander-in-chief, had prepared a proclamation, which he meant to issue as soon as that achievement should be effected. It was in the following terms:

"The army of his excellency the commander-in-chief is in possession of Lucknow, and the city lies at the mercy of the British government, whose authority it has for nine months rebelliously defied and resisted. This resistance, begun by a mutinous soldiery, has found support from the inhabitants of the city and of the province of Oude at large. Many who owed their prosperity to the British government, as well as those who believed themselves aggrieved by it, have joined in this bad cause, and have ranged themselves with the enemies of the state. They have been guilty of a great crime, and have subjected themselves to a just retribution. The capital of their country is now once more in the hands of the British troops. From this day it will be held by a force which nothing can withstand, and the authority of the government will be carried into every corner of the province. The time then has come at which the Right Honourable the Governor-general of India deems it right to make known the mode in which the British government will deal with the talookdars, chief land-owners of Oude, and their followers. The first care of the governor-general will be to reward those who have been steadfast in their allegiance, at a time when the authority of the government was partially overborne, and who have proved this by the support and assistance which they have given to British officers. Therefore, the Right Honourable the Governor-general hereby declares that Drigbiggei Sing, Rajah of Butrampoor; Koolwunt Sing, Rajah of Pudna; Row Hordea Buksh Sing, of Kutiar; Kashee Pershad, Talookdar of Sissaindie; Zabr Sing, Zemindar of Gopal Ghaier; and Chundee Lal, Zemindar..."
of Morson (Baiswarah)—are henceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the land which they held when Oude came under British rule, subject only to such moderate assessment as may be imposed upon them; and that these loyal men will be further rewarded in such manner and to such extent as upon consideration of their merits and their position the governor-general shall determine. A proportionate measure of reward and honour, according to their deserts, will be conferred upon others in whose favour like claims may be established to the satisfaction of the government. The governor-general further proclaims to the people of Oude, that with the above-mentioned exceptions the proprietary right in the soil of the province is confiscated to the British government, which will dispose of that right in such manner as it may seem fitting. To those talookdars, chiefs, and landowners, with their followers, who shall make immediate submission to the chief commissioner of Oude, surrendering their arms and obeying his orders, the Right Honourable the Governor-general promises that their lives and honour shall be safe, provided that their hands are not stained with English blood, murderously shed. But as regards any further indulgence which may be extended to them, and the condition in which they may hereafter be placed, they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British government. As participation in the murder of English women will exclude those who are guilty of it from all mercy, so will those who have protected English lives be entitled to consideration and leniency."

When Lord Canning drew up this proclamation he was ignorant of the change of ministry, and had not received a despatch which had been transmitted to him through the secret committee of the Court of Directors, and in which the views of the new government as to any amnesty which might be granted to those who had taken part in the revolt were fully explained. This despatch, dated 24th March, 1858, after expressing a hope that Lucknow had been captured, and that the Indian government might in consequence deem themselves "sufficiently strong to be enabled to act towards the people with the generosity as well as the justice which are congenial to the British character," proceeded as follows:—"Crimes have been committed against us which it would be a crime to forgive; and some large exceptions there must be of the persons guilty of such crimes from any act of amnesty which could be granted, but it must be as impossible as it would be abhorrent from our feelings to inflict the extreme penalty which the law might strictly award upon all who have swerved from their allegiance. To us it appears that whenever open resistance shall have ceased, it would be prudent, in awarding punishment, rather to follow the practice which prevails after the conquest of a country which has defended itself to the last by desperate war, than that which may perhaps be lawfully adopted after the suppression of mutiny and rebellion, such acts always being excepted from forgiveness or mitigation of punishment as have exceeded
the license of legitimate hostilities." After several other passages counselling leniency, the despatch concluded in the following terms:—"In carrying these views into execution you may meet with obstructions from those who, maddened by the scenes they have witnessed, may desire to substitute their own policy for that of the government; but persevere firmly in doing what you may think right; make those who would counteract you feel that you are resolved to rule, and that you will be served by none who will not obey. Acting in this spirit you may rely upon an unqualified support."

The account given in a previous part of our history certainly does not exhibit Lord Ellenborough during his brief tenure of the office of governor-general in the light of an indulgent ruler, disposed to humour the prejudices and deal lightly with the delinquencies of the natives of India. On the contrary, we have seen him hunting out treason in the Ameers of Scinde, in order that he might have a plausible pretext for confiscating their territories and treating Gwalior as imperiously as if he had conquered it, because its rulers had presumed to thwart his wishes. His lordship's moderation and leniency being thus new-born, he naturally fostered them with all the zeal of a young convert, and hence must have been in some degree shocked when, only a few weeks after sending off his despatch, he was furnished with a copy of Lord Canning's intended proclamation, accompanied with a letter of instructions addressed to Sir James Outram, as the chief commissioner of Oude, which plainly showed the confiscation of proprietary rights in that country was to be not an idle threat, but an actually inflicted penalty. There were some considerations which might have induced Lord Ellenborough to pause before sitting down to write a letter to Lord Canning animadverting on his proclamation in the severest terms. As yet, the fact of its having been issued was not known, and circumstances might occur to induce a change in its terms, or even prevent it from being issued at all. It was moreover obvious from the instructions that a large discretionary power was to be vested in the chief commissioner; and it might have been charitably inferred, that a governor-general whose chief error hitherto was alleged to be undue leniency, would be able to give some satisfactory reason for having apparently rushed into the opposite extreme. Either overlooking such considerations, or deeming them beneath his notice, the president of the Board of Control penned a new despatch, in which he not only denounced the proclamation in language so bitter and sarcastic as to be almost insulting, but spoke of the talookdars and other proprietors of Oude as if they were more sinned against than sinning, and were entitled to be treated rather as patriots than as rebels. This singular despatch, after briefly describing the contents of the proclamation, contains such passages as the following: "We cannot but express to you our apprehension that this decree pronouncing the disinheritson of a people, will throw difficulties almost unsurmountable in the way of the re-establishment of peace. We are under the impression
that the war in Oude has derived much of its popular character from the rigorous manner in which, without regard to what the landowners had become accustomed to consider as their rights, the summary settlement had in a large portion of the province been carried out by your officers. . . . We cannot but in justice consider that those who resist our authority in Oude are under very different circumstances from those who have acted against us in provinces which have been long under our government. We dethroned the King of Oude, and took possession of his kingdom, by virtue of a treaty which had been subsequently modified by another treaty, under which, had it been held to be in force, the course we adopted could not have been lawfully pursued; but we held that it was not in force, although the fact of its not having been ratified in England, as regarded the provision on which we rely for our justification, had not been previously made known to the King of Oude. That sovereign and his ancestors had been uniformly faithful to their treaty engagements with us, however ill they may have governed their subjects. They had more than once assisted us in our difficulties, and not a suspicion had ever been entertained of any hostile disposition on their part towards our government. Suddenly the people saw their king taken from amongst them, and our administration substituted for his, which, however bad, was at least native. . . . We must admit that under the circumstances, the hostilities which have been carried on in Oude have rather the character of legitimate war than that of rebellion, and that the people of Oude should rather be regarded with indulgent consideration than made the objects of a penalty exceeding in extent and in severity almost any which has been recorded in history as inflicted upon a subdued nation. Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted upon a different principle; you have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what they feel as the severest punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country. We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. We desire that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landowners of Oude. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people. There cannot be contentment when there is general confiscation."

From the account formerly given of the annexation of Oude, it will be seen that Lord Ellenborough is in the main correct in what he says on the subject, but even those who agree with him in opinion may be permitted to question the necessity or propriety of giving so much prominence to it after the act which it condemns was done beyond recall. In his description of the nature
and probable effects of the proclamation, there is some truth with much exaggeration. Fact is sacrificed to antithesis, and the confiscation directed against refractory talookdars, most of whom had acquired their lands by intrigue or violence, is converted into a blow struck at "the mass of the inhabitants of the country." But waiving all question as to the merit or demerit of this despatch, all must admit that nothing was more to be deprecated than its premature publication, inasmuch as its natural tendency was to weaken the hands of the governor-general at a most critical period, and encourage rebellion by the hope of impunity. At all events, as the despatch was transmitted through the secret committee, and was consequently known only to a few individuals, who had been sworn to secrecy, nothing can be conceived more preposterous than to place it in the hands of the public weeks before it could reach those of the governor-general himself. Yet this preposterous thing had taken place with the knowledge, and directly through the instrumentality of Lord Ellenborough. Great was the indignation felt by Lord Canning's friends, and strong the disapprobation expressed by men of all parties at this most discourteous and unstatesmanlike proceeding. The first effect was to put the ministry on their defence. Lord Ellenborough, as the member of the cabinet more immediately responsible, had nothing more to offer than the very lame excuse that, having sent a copy of the despatch to Lord Granville, as a friend of Lord Canning, and a leading member of the former ministry, he deemed it only fair to send another copy at the same time to Mr. Bright, as the leader of another political party. This explanation, which certainly justified the suspicion that the ministry, under a consciousness of numerical weakness in the House of Commons, had been endeavouring to make political capital out of their despatch, had to a certain extent been forestalled by Mr. Darnel, who, when consenting to lay the despatch on the table, volunteered the statement that her majesty's government "disapproved of the policy of the proclamation in every sense." Notice was immediately given by Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Cardwell of their intention to bring the subject before both Houses of Parliament, by motions which, amounting to a direct censure of ministers, would, if carried, compel them to resign. In this emergency, Lord Ellenborough endeavoured to save his colleagues by making a victim of himself, and retired from office, his official connection with the government of India thus coming a second time to an abrupt termination.

The Whig party, anxious to regain the places from which they thought that a political combination more skilful than honourable had driven them, refused to be satisfied with Lord Ellenborough's retirement, and the motions of which notice had been given were persisted in. It was a mere party struggle, and ended in a ministerial triumph, obtained principally by the opportune arrival of despatches from India at the very time when the debate was proceeding. From these despatches it appeared that the proclamation, before
being issued, had been modified in substance, and would be still more modified in practice, in consequence of a remonstrance by Sir James Outram, who, on acknowledging receipt of the proclamation, declared his “firm conviction that as soon as the chiefs and talookdars become acquainted with the determination of the government to confiscate their rights, they will betake themselves at once to their domains, and prepare for a desperate and prolonged resistance,” and the result would be “the commencement of a guerilla war for the extirpation, root and branch, of this class of men, which will involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure.” To this opinion the governor-general yielded so far as to introduce the following additional paragraph relative to the landowners:—“To those of them who shall promptly come forward, and give to the chief commissioner their support in the restoration of order, this indulgence will be large, and the governor-general will be ready to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights.” In consequence of the new information furnished by the despatches, the motions for censure could not be maintained, at least in the terms in which they were expressed. Lord Shaftesbury’s motion in the House of Lords had indeed been already defeated by a majority of nine, and that of Mr. Cardwell, which was still under discussion, was ultimately, at the earnest request of many of its pledged supporters, withdrawn. Ministers were thus at liberty once more to proceed with the India resolutions, which, after they had been thoroughly discussed and modified, were embodied in a bill, which became law on the 2d of August, 1858, and ranks in the statute book under the title of “An act for the better government of India” (21st and 22d Vict. c.106).

This act consists of eighty-five sections. Its main object is to transfer the government of India from the Company to the crown. For this purpose it enacts that India shall be governed by and in name of her majesty, through one of her principal secretaries of state, assisted by a council, to consist of fifteen members, and to be styled the Council of India. Of these fifteen councillors, who are all to hold their office “during good behaviour,” eight are to be nominated by her majesty, and seven to be elected, on the first election only, by the existing court of directors, and ever after, on the occasion of any vacancy, by the council, subject always to this proviso, that the major part of the council, whether nominated or elected, shall always, with the exception of those elected by the directors, be persons “who shall have served or resided in India for ten years at least,” and “shall not have left India more than ten years next preceding the date of their appointment.” The secretary of state for India, should he be a fifth one appointed by her majesty, in addition to the present four, shall have the same salary as they, and each member of council a salary of £1200, or in the event of resignation from infirmity after ten years’ service, a retiring pension of £500; all such salaries to be paid out of the revenues of India. Every order or communication sent to India shall be signed by one of the principal
secretaries of state, but the council shall, under the direction of the secretary of state acting for India, conduct the business transacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the government of India and the correspondence with India. In all cases where a difference of opinion may arise, the determination of the secretary of state shall be final, but each member may require that "his opinion, and the reasons for the same, be entered in the minutes of the proceedings." Wherever the secretary shall act in opposition to the opinions of the majority, he shall record his reasons. Communications with India, or despatches from it, which would formerly have been addressed to the secret committee, may still be marked "secret," and "not be communicated to the members of the council, unless the secretary of state shall so think fit and direct," but all other communications and despatches shall be submitted to them. In regard to patronage, all appointments hitherto made by the directors with the approbation of her majesty, shall henceforth be made by her majesty, by warrant, under her royal sign-manual. The appointments made in India continue as before. Appointments to the civil service, as well as cadetships in the engineers and artillery, shall be thrown open to public competition, and conferred on the successful candidates in the order of proficiency. "Except as aforesaid, all persons to be nominated for military cadetships shall be nominated by the secretary of state and members of council, so that out of seventeen nominations, the secretary of state shall have two, and each member of council shall have one," but each nomination shall take effect only if approved by the secretary of state, and "not less than one-tenth of the whole number of persons to be recommended in any year for military cadetships (other than cadetships in the engineers and artillery), shall be selected, according to such regulations as the secretary of state in council may from time to time make in this behalf, from among the sons of persons who have served in India in the military or civil services of her majesty or of the East India Company." The remaining sections, relating to transfer of property, revenues, existing establishments, &c., need not be specially noticed.

Shortly after the passing of the above act, her majesty in council caused a proclamation to be issued, for the purpose of notifying the important changes introduced by it, and the course of policy which it was her desire and intention to pursue. It was addressed to the princes, chiefs, and people of India, and was published with some degree of ceremony by the governor-general in person at Allahabad, on the 1st of November, 1858. Considered as the first act of government exercised directly by the crown in the British Indian empire, it forms, we trust, the commencement of a happier era than any yet recorded in Indian annals. For this reason, as well as on account of the sound and liberal views which the document promulgates, it will be necessary to quote from it at some length. After intimating that her majesty had, with the advice and consent of parliament, resolved "to take upon ourselves the government of the
territories of India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company," calling upon all subjects within said territories to bear true allegiance, constituting Viscount Canning "first viceroy and governor-general," to administer the government "in our name and on our behalf," and confirming all persons now employed in the Company's service in several offices, civil and military, the proclamation proceeds in the following terms: "We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them, by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company, are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the like observance on their part. We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government. We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil. Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us, that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure. And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity, duly to discharge. We know, and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the state, and we will that generally in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India. We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty."

On the subject of an amnesty, after approving and confirming all that Lord
Canning had promised in his Oude proclamation, her majesty declares as follows:—"Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy. To those who have willingly given an asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but in apportioning the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to any circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance; and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men. To all others in arms against the government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty and oblivion of all offence against ourselves, our crown, and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits. It is our royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with these conditions before the 1st day of January next. When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant to us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people."

This excellent proclamation could hardly fail to produce a strong impression, particularly on those who, having taken part in the mutiny merely because they imagined that it was destined to triumph, must have been anxious, now when they saw it doomed to failure, to escape from the consequences. On the other hand, those of the leaders who still held out, either because they could not stoop to the humiliation of accepting pardon, or because they had been guilty of atrocities which placed them beyond the reach of mercy, naturally employed every means in their power to throw discredit on the proclamation, and thus check the threatened desertion of their followers. The most singular attempt of this kind was made by the Begum of Oude, who, acting in the name of her son, whom she had induced the rebels of that province to recognize as their sovereign, issued a formal answer to the proclamation, and dissecting it paragraph by paragraph, laboured to show that no dependence could be placed on any of the promises contained in it. As a specimen of the kind of reasoning employed, and of the delusions and grievances which probably originated and certainly fostered the mutiny, the following criticism on the portion of the proclamation which refers to religion, is not unworthy of quotation:—"In the proclamation," says the begum, a bigoted Mahometan, "it is written that the Christian religion is true, but no other creed will suffer oppression, and that
the laws will be observed towards all. What has the administration of justice to do with the truth or falsehood of a religion? That religion is true which acknowledges one God and knows no other. Where there are three gods in a religion, neither Mussulmans nor Hindoos—nay, not even Jews, sun-worshippers or fire-worshippers—can believe it to be true. To eat pigs and drink wine, to bite greased cartridges, and to mix pigs' fat with flour and sweetmeats, to destroy Hindoo and Mussulman temples on pretence of making roads, to build churches, to send clergymen into the streets and alleys to preach the Christian religion, to institute English schools, and pay people a monthly stipend for learning the English sciences, while the places of worship of Hindoos and Mussulmans are to this day entirely neglected, with all this, how can the people believe that religion will not be interfered with? The rebellion began with religion, and for it millions of men have been killed. Let not our subjects be deceived; thousands were deprived of their religion in the north-west, and thousands were hanged rather than abandon their religion."

The commander-in-chief, now raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Clyde, after taking part in the ceremony of reading the queen's proclamation, crossed the Ganges at Allahabad on the 2d of November, 1858, and proceeded northward to join his head-quarters at Pertabghur, a town of Oude, about twenty-five miles distant. It would be a misnomer to speak of his subsequent operations as a campaign, for the rebels no longer kept the field, and were able to do no more than keep up a desultory warfare, confined mostly to the districts where refractory chiefs, trusting to the strength of their forts or the number of their retainers, still kept up a show of resistance. The nature of the task still to be performed may be inferred from a proclamation which had been issued on the 26th of October, in which the commander-in-chief announced to the inhabitants of Oude that he was coming "to enforce the law." "In order to effect this without danger to life and property, resistance must cease on the part of the people. The most exact discipline will be preserved in the camps and on the march, and where there is no resistance, houses and crops will be spared, and no plundering allowed in the towns and villages. But wherever there is resistance, or even a single shot fired against the troops, the inhabitants must expect to incur the fate they have brought on themselves. Their houses will be plundered and their villages burned. This proclamation includes all ranks of the people, from the talookdars to the poorest ryots. The commander-in-chief invites all the well-disposed to remain in their towns and villages, where they will be sure of his protection against all violence."

Preceded by this proclamation, and the far more important one issued by the queen, Lord Clyde commenced his first direct attempt at pacification with the Rajah of Amethie, who possessed, like most of the Oude chiefs, a mud fort in the midst of jungle, and was reported to be at the head of a force estimated at 20,000 men, with a large number of guns. There would not have
been much difficulty in knocking the place about his ears and putting his rabble force to flight, but as this might have cost many British lives, and pacification was now the order of the day, communications had been opened with the rajah, and a day had been fixed on which he was to declare for or against surrender. On the 9th of November, when the force was within three miles of Amethie, the outposts considerably in advance were fired upon, and the grass-cutters rushed back, shouting "The enemy!" It was a false alarm, for in the evening a messenger arrived from the rajah to express regret for the firing, and account for it by representing that it had been done without his orders by the sepoys, whom he was unable to control. He would willingly, he said, make his submission, and surrender all his guns, but his power over the troops was limited to his own infantry. Lord Clyde, not satisfied with the explanation, left the rajah the alternative of surrender or bombardment on the following day. This alternative at once decided the wily chief, who stole out of his fort during the night, and sent word that he would next morning enter the camp. He did so, and thus secured the safety of his person and his property, though there could be no doubt that he had played a trick. After his departure, doubtless by previous concert, the sepoys had marched off, and when the fort was entered, it was found to contain only about 3000 matchlock-men, the rajah's own retainers, and a few old guns, instead of the thirty which he was known to possess, and was bound to surrender. Several of those missing were afterwards found hidden in the jungle.

Having dismantled the fort and cleared the jungle as far as possible, Lord Clyde proceeded in the direction of Shunkerpoo, another mud fort of vaunted strength, belonging to a powerful chief of the name of Bene Madhoo, who was reported to have added to his troops by receiving the fugitive sepoys from Amethie. During the march a vakeel arrived from the chief, asking what terms would be given. The answer was, that his excellency would not treat with a rebel, but that clemency might be expected on surrender. Shortly afterwards a characteristic letter was received, not from Bene Madhoo himself, but his son, who wrote as follows:—"If the government will continue the settlement with me, I will turn out my father. He is on the part of Brijes Kuddr (the puppet-king), but I am loyal to the British government, and I do not wish to be ruined for my father's sake." The obvious design of this proposal, probably concocted between the father and the son, was to allow the former to continue in his rebellion, and at the same time elude the forfeiture, which would deprive the latter of the succession to his estates. No notice therefore was taken of it, and the march upon Shunkerpoo was continued. On the 15th the force with Lord Clyde arrived at Pechwarrayn, three miles south-east of Bene Madhoo's stronghold, while a separate detachment under Sir Hope Grant moved upon it from the north-west by the Roy Bareilly road. The wily
rebel chief, thus in danger of being hemmed in, outwitted his assailants, and moved off in the dark with all his troops, guns, treasure, and baggage. In the morning, when the fort and entrenched camp were entered, only a few old men, priests, and fakirs, some gun bullocks, and a mad elephant were found. Bene Madhoo, when next heard of, was at a place called Poorwa, from which, with strange effrontery, he sent a vakeel to ask what terms he might now expect.

After the evacuation of Shunkerpour, the force which had been combined for the purpose of moving upon it was broken up. Sir Hope Grant proceeded northwards across the Gogra into the Gorruckpoor district, and a detachment from Lucknow moved eastward in the direction of Fyzabad, while Colonel Eveleigh, at the head of another detachment, was instructed to follow Bene Madhoo, and not lose sight of him for a moment. Lord Clyde, keeping the same object in view, reached Roy Bareilly on the 20th of November, and starting again on the following day, crossed the Sye at Keenpoor. On the 22d Bene Madhoo was reported to be at Doundeakira, a place situated on the left bank of the Ganges, about twenty-eight miles S.S.E. of Cawnpoor, and belonging to a zamindar of the name of Ram Bux, who had acquired an infamous notoriety by the murder of several of the Cawnpoor fugitives. Here it was hoped that the arrangements for the attack were so complete as to bring the rebels to bay, and make their escape impossible, but though an encounter did take place, and Ram Bux's stronghold was captured, it proved a barren conquest, as Bene Madhoo had again disappeared with most of his troops and all his treasure. For some days nothing was heard of his movements, and Lord Clyde made several marches which brought him to the vicinity of Lucknow. Here Mr. Montgomery, whom we formerly saw doing good service in the Punjab, had become chief commissioner in the room of Sir James Outram, who had been called to a seat in the governor-general's council. Under him the pacification of the country was making satisfactory progress, numerous chiefs daily coming in to take advantage of the amnesty offered by the queen's proclamation.

After a halt of several days, during which the force had encamped at Bunnee, on the Cawnpoor road, Lord Clyde again took the field, and marched north-east about twenty miles to Newabgunge, on the road to Fyzabad. Here on the 6th of December tidings were obtained of Bene Madhoo, who was reported by the spies to be not more than twenty miles off, at a place on the Gogra, called Beyram Ghat. Thither accordingly a forced march was made, while Lord Clyde himself, leaving the infantry in charge of Brigadier Horseford, pushed on for the ghat at full gallop with a body of cavalry and four horse-artillery guns. It was only to experience the old disappointment. Bene Madhoo with his rebels had just crossed and taken all the boats along with him. After halting on the 7th for the infantry, and leaving a detachment at Beyram Ghat to protect the
engineers under Colonel Harms while forming a bridge of boats, the commander-in-chief again took the road to Fyzabad, and reached it on the 10th. His object was to avoid the delay which would have been necessary in waiting till a bridge was thrown over the Gogra. He accordingly crossed by the bridge at Fyzabad, and immediately proceeded to carry out the plan of a combined movement which had been previously arranged. Sir Hope Grant had crossed the Gogra on the 25th of November, and after encountering and defeating a large body of insurgents under the Rajah of Gonda, and occupying that place, had advanced to Secorora, which is only fifteen miles east of Beyram Ghat. He was thus in the rear of Bene Madhoo, and in co-operation with Lord Clyde, would have placed him between two fires, had not the wily chief scented out the danger and fled before he was entangled. An important object however had now been gained. The frontier of Rohilcund, from which the rebels had been driven into Oude, was carefully guarded, the most practicable passages of the Gogra were secured, and thus the west, south, and east being barred against the rebels, now massed together within a comparatively narrow space, nothing remained for them but to fight or retire by their only remaining outlet into the marshes of Nepaul. In either case their destruction seemed inevitable—in the former by the sword, in the latter by the malaria of the Terai, which at certain seasons rages like a pestilence. The subsequent movements, and the result, cannot be better described than in Lord Clyde's despatch:

"On the 23d (December) I left Bareytch, passed Nanpara on the 26th, and after marching twenty miles on that day, attacked a considerable body of rebels at Burgidia. Their left flank was turned. They fled after making a slight resistance, and were pursued until nightfall, leaving their guns in our hands. On the 27th the force marched on the fort of Musjidia. This place was taken after three hours of vertical fire from two mortars, and a cannonade from an eighteen-pounder and an eight-inch howitzer, the infantry being carefully laid out to command the enemy's embrasures and parapets. I have much satisfaction in dwelling on the manner in which the fort was captured, with a very trifling amount of loss to the troops engaged. The chief engineer, Colonel Harms, R.E., has reported it to be one of the strongest as respects artificial defences that he has seen in India. But, like all the others, it was without bomb-proof cover, and consequently fell easily into our hands after a few hours of well-directed fire. On the 29th the troops returned to Nanpara, made a forced march on the night of the 30th to the vicinity of Bankee, where the enemy had loitered under the Nana. He was surprised and attacked with great vigour, driven through a jungle which he attempted to defend, and finally into and across the Raptee, the 7th hussars entering that river with the fugitives. The next day it was reported that all the bodies of rebels which had been retreating before us from the day of our arrival at Beyram Ghat, had either surrendered or passed the Nepaul frontier. In these various affairs
eighteen guns fell into our hands. In the meantime, Brigadier Rowcroft attacked Tooloosepoor on the 23d December, driving Bala Row from that point to the foot of the mountains, and taking two guns. Sir Hope Grant was alarmed about his flank being turned to the eastward, and to the north of Gorruckpoor. Acting according to his instructions, and with great judgment, he made that point absolutely safe before renewing his attack on Bala Row. That being done, he advanced through the jungles on that leader, and took fifteen guns from him, almost without the show of resistance on the part of the rebels, the latter dispersing and seeking refuge in the adjacent hills, and Bala Row fleeing into the interior, as the Nana his brother had done before him. Thus has the contest in Oude been brought to an end, and the resistance of 150,000 armed men been subdued with a very moderate loss to her majesty’s troops, and the most merciful forbearance towards the misguided enemy."

The rebels of Oude having thus been forced to quit the field and hide themselves in the pestilent morasses of Nepaul, where a vengeance not less certain nor less fatal than that of the sword would inevitably overtake them, the mutiny was virtually at an end. It is true, indeed, that perfect tranquillity had not been restored. In several districts bands of rebels kept up at least a show of resistance, and by the rapidity and dexterity of their movements gave infinite trouble to the various detachments sent out against them. There could be no doubt, however, that the task of dispersing them, though difficult, would ere long be effectually accomplished, and it was therefore resolved by the authorities, both at home and in India, to assume the complete suppression of the mutiny as an accomplished fact, and attest it by some form of public acknowledgment. At home this acknowledgment was made in a manner becoming a Christian nation, by the appointment of a day of special "thanksgiving to Almighty God for the constant and signal successes obtained by the troops of her majesty, and by the whole of the force serving in India, whereby the late sanguinary mutiny and rebellion which had broken out in that country hath been effectually suppressed, and the blessings of tranquillity, order, and peace are restored to her majesty’s subjects in the East." In India, where the difference of circumstances made a similar mode of national acknowledgment impracticable, it was deemed expedient to adopt a less solemn and more ostentatious procedure, which, while it proclaimed leniency toward those who had incurred the guilt of rebellion, provided they returned forthwith to their allegiance, gave due honour and reward to those whose fidelity had remained unshaken. The King of Delhi, though he had, in consequence of the promise given, escaped the capital punishment which he deserved, was expiating his crimes as a transported convict; the Ranee of Jhansi, after the perpetration of a horrid massacre, had perished in battle; Tantia Topee, who had acted as the right-hand man of Nana Sahib, had paid the penalty of his treachery on the gallows, and a similar fate was awaiting Khan Bahadur Khan of Bareilly, the
wretch who, with a horrid mimicry of the forms of justice, had in cold blood put two European judges to death. Not only might justice now be tempered with mercy; but the time had arrived when those who had under trying circumstances proved their fidelity might fairly expect a reward. Accordingly the governor-general, starting from Calcutta on the 12th of October, 1859, commenced a tour through the provinces, very much in the style of a royal progress, holding durbars or levees at the principal stations through which he passed, assembling the chiefs, and with a display of magnificence well fitted to captivate the oriental mind, bestowing dresses of honour and other ornaments on those whose services during the mutiny were deemed worthy of such an acknowledgment. It would scarcely accord with the dignity of history to follow Lord Canning throughout this tour, and detail the proceedings at the different places where his levees were held. It will suffice to call attention to the splendid scene exhibited at Cawnpore on 3d November, 1859, where his lordship, when he had with his own hands hung a chain round the neck of the Rewah rajah,

1 Extract from letter of Times correspondent, dated Cawnpore, 4th November, 1859:—"The durbar yesterday was a sight worth seeing. The effect of the great variety of costumes and the brilliant colours ranged round the tent was very striking. The swell rajah of the day was he of Rewah. He had a chair on the right hand of the viceroy, and he fully came up in appearance to one's idea of a native rajah. He is a big, burly man, of tall stature, with a heavy, grossly sensual face and yellow complexion. His hands, fat and shapely, were covered with dazzling rings. He wore a light yellow tunic, with a black and white scarf, that looked at a distance like a boa-constrictor's skin. On his head was a handsome towering cap, composed entirely of gold and diamonds, which evidently made an inclination of the head difficult. On his right sat Mr. Cecil Beaton, the home and foreign secretary, who at a distance is very like Mr. Edmonstone. On his right sat the Benares rajah, who was very quietly dressed, having merely a neat white shawl turban; he is a very ordinary-looking baniah-like man. On his right sat the Chikaraj rajah, an elderly, but rather striking looking man, with a good face, and dressed generally in red garments. There were besides sixty to a hundred hydras, great and small, and their brothers or ministers, not two of whom were similarly dressed. The hour fixed for the durbar was two o'clock, and by that time all were in their seats; a passage tent, lined with the greasier company of the 35th regiment as a guard of honour, led to the durbar tent, which is simply a very fine double-poled tent lined with yellow. In the centre of the farther side from the entrance was Lord Canning’s chair, and on his right were all the rajahs; on his left was the chair of the commander-in-chief; on his left Sir Richmond Shakespear; then came Generals Birch and Mansfield, Colonels Becher and Stuart, and behind them the governor-general and chief's staff; then farther to the left was a flock of black coats, and on their left the military, of whom there must have been about 200. Very shortly after two o'clock the words 'Attention,' 'Shoulder arms,' and then 'Present arms,' announced that the viceroy was passing through the entrance tent, and presently, preceded by his chief secretaries of state and aides-de-camp, he entered, the round of guns outside announcing it. The assembly rose on his entrance, and remained standing till he sat down. Then came the presentations of the rajahs. Mr. Beaton took the big ones, and Mr. Simpson the small fry. Each rajah had evidently been thoroughly drilled how he was to make an obeisance, which act was accompanied in every case with a muzzur, and which was also in each case, after being touched by the vice-regal hand, taken from the officer by the people of the Tosha Khana department.

"Then came the presentation of khelatas. The principal rajahs had chains fastened on their necks, but only to one, the Rewah rajah, was this done by Lord Canning personally. To give him his chain his lordship rose and passed it round his neck. The others had their collars of honour put on by the secretaries, Lord Canning merely touching each chain when presented to him for that purpose. The Rewah rajah, the Benares rajah, and the Chikaraj rajah were each addressed by Lord Canning in English on their khelatas being given them, but to the Chikaraj rajah a great honour was paid, for, after saying a few words to him, Lord Canning, turning to the commander-in-chief, who on being addressed immediately stood up, the whole of the English officers present standing also, said, 'Lord Clyde, I wish to bring to your notice the conduct of this brave man, who showed marked devotion to the British cause by acting on the offensive against the rebels of his own accord, and when besiegéd in a fort, refused to give up a British officer, offering his own son as a hostage instead; and I trust,' said Lord Canning, 'that every officer of the queen now present will remember this, and should they ever come in contact with this rajah, act accordingly.'"
specially eulogized the Chikaree rajah for his marked devotion to the British cause, in having not only borne arms against the rebels, but offered his son as a hostage in order to save the life of a British officer.

In looking back upon the whole course of events recorded in these volumes, it is impossible not to be struck with wonder and admiration. At first a small body of merchant adventurers, with no higher ambition than to obtain a share in what was known to be a lucrative trade, contribute their capital and send out a few ships of moderate burden to the eastern seas by way of experiment. Some of the ships are wrecked, and others fall into the hands of enemies who plunder or destroy them. A few are more fortunate, and return laden with cargoes so valuable as to compensate for other losses and stimulate to new exertions. For a time the continent of India is in a great measure overlooked, and the main exertions are directed to the Persian Gulf and the spice islands of the Indian Archipelago. In the former direction the returns, though increased by the very discreditable practice of seizing and pillaging native ships, prove unsatisfactory; in the latter direction Dutch jealousy presents insuperable obstacles, and the long-cherished idea of a spice trade is all but abandoned. India now begins to attract more attention, and in addition to a few places on the Malabar coast, where pepper formed the staple article of export, other localities are selected, particularly on the Coromandel coast, and northwards towards the Bay of Bengal.

Hitherto all the factories established in India were held by the most precarious tenure. The property in the soil remained with the native princes, whose protection, though purchased by much fawning and many costly presents, was not unfrequently withdrawn, as often as the pillage of a factory promised to be more profitable than its tribute. In one quarter, however, the tenure was of a different and more satisfactory nature. The island of Bombay, possessing the best harbour in India, had passed to the British crown as part of the dowry of the Portuguese princess who became the wife of Charles II. At first there was room to doubt whether this acquisition was to promote or to damage the interests of the East India Company. Prerogative pushed to its utmost limits was then the favourite policy of government, which accordingly began to exercise its new sovereignty in the East in a manner which seemed to set the Company’s chartered privileges at nought. Complaint and recrimination of course ensued, and the results threatened to be disastrous, when government made the happy discovery that the possession of Bombay, instead of being a gain, was annually entailing a heavy loss. This was one of the last evils which a court so needy and avaricious as that of Charles II. could endure, and little difficulty therefore was felt in concluding an arrangement by which the Company entered into possession of Bombay with all its burdens. This was a new and important step in advance. Previously they were only traders existing by the sufferance of the native powers; now they too were
sovereigns, and laying aside the abject forms of address with which they had been accustomed to approach native princes, began to use a more dignified language, and act in a bolder spirit. The profits of trade had hitherto satisfied them, but they now talked of revenue from territory, and gave their servants to understand that they expected it to form an important item in their future returns. The idea was never after lost sight of, and the aims of the Company became visibly enlarged. They would no longer exist by sufferance, and began to familiarize their minds with the idea of conquest. It was not long before full scope was found for this warlike temperament. Not merely had they to repel aggression on the part of native rulers; but a great European power, which had settled on the east coast, had engaged in a vast scheme of ambition, which, if realized, would almost as a necessary consequence annihilate British interests in India. The collision with France thus rendered inevitable, led to a desperate struggle, in which, after various alternations of success, France was obliged to succumb. Meanwhile a war fraught with still more important consequences had commenced in another quarter. The atrocity of the Black Hole of Calcutta had been perpetrated, and Clive, who marched to avenge it, had, in return for dethroning one ruler and placing another upon the throne, obtained for the Company an absolute control over the revenues of the immense and populous provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, with full right to appropriate them to their own use, subject only to certain stipulated payments. This grant of the dewanee was properly, as its name implies, only one of revenue, but revenue generally suffices to make its possessor master of all the other rights of property, and accordingly the Company acted from the date of the grant as if the three provinces belonged to them in absolute sovereignty. The British Indian empire having been thus founded, continued to advance in the face of hostile combinations which interrupted its progress, and at times even threatened its existence, till every power hostile to it was overthrown, and its supremacy was completely established.

While pursuing the remarkable career which has just been slightly sketched, the constitution of the Company had been radically changed. Its connection with trade had been entirely dissolved, and its directors had been converted into a kind of middle men, through whom, but in immediate subservience to the British ministry, the government of the country was conducted. This anomalous form of administration, which was rather dictated by circumstances than deliberately adopted, was not entitled, and was indeed never meant to be permanent. The right of sovereignty had been declared by repeated acts of the legislature to be vested exclusively in the British crown, and it seemed necessarily to follow that the crown would sooner or later exercise this right in India in the same way as in its other dependencies. It was necessary, however, owing to the magnitude of the interests involved, to proceed with the utmost caution, and though the obvious tendency of all recent legislation...
on the subject had been to increase the direct authority of the British government and diminish that of the directors, the final step of annexation had not been taken, and was to all appearance at some distance, when it was precipitated by the Sepoy Mutiny.

It would be unfair to lay the whole blame of this fearful catastrophe on the Indian government, as then actually administered. The causes which led to it had long been in operation, and were so deeply seated, that even some of the ablest Indian statesmen, though they saw and lamented them, failed to discover or suggest any effectual remedy. Still it must be confessed that a government, which was not ignorant of the danger, but allowed itself to slumber over it till the crisis actually arrived, must have laboured under grave defects both in substance and form, and we therefore cannot wonder, that as soon as the horror and indignation produced by the atrocities of the mutineers had subsided so far as to leave room for reflection, a general desire was felt to rid the Indian government of its most striking anomalies, and assimilate its machinery as much as possible to that which has so long stood the test of experiment at home. The desired changes have accordingly been made. The queen now rules India in her own name, like all her other dependencies. Ministers, one of whom now bears the name and office of secretary of state for India, are strictly responsible for the mode in which it is administered. The jealousies and heartburnings produced by the maintenance of two European armies, have been set at rest by their amalgamation. The best talents of this country have been employed in reforming the Indian financial system, and the question of patronage has been happily solved, by substituting qualification for family or political influence, in appointing to the more important branches of the public service. The strange policy of discouraging European settlers has been completely reversed, and liberal measures have been devised for the purpose of attracting European capital to the country, as one of the most obvious and effectual means of developing its vast resources. Nor is it out of place to mention that under the new arrangements India will never again be placed at the mercy of pampered sepoy regiments. A native army cannot be dispensed with, but it will henceforth be kept in its proper place as an auxiliary force, capable of doing good service in subordinate departments, but too few in numbers, and composed of elements too heterogeneous, to admit of such formidable combinations as were witnessed during the late mutiny.

Such are a few of the important improvements which have been, or are in course of being introduced into the administration of our Indian empire, but it ought to be remembered, that in regard to still more important improvements, government is almost powerless. In the matter of education it is much doubtless to be able to open schools and to provide them with well-qualified teachers, but in selecting the subjects to be taught, government must stop
short and exclude the only topics by which the Hindoo mind and heart can be effectually reached. It may be fairly calculated that the teaching of the government schools is in a great measure lost upon three-fourths of those who attend them. The knowledge communicated cannot find a resting-place in the minds of persons whose previous beliefs consist of such monstrous dogmas as Hindooism inculcates, and whose religious observances, entwined with the ordinary business of life, have become to them a second nature. The case of the remaining fourth of the scholars is somewhat different. Their object probably is to obtain some of the government appointments for which the knowledge acquired in schools and colleges is an essential qualification. They accordingly pass through the whole curriculum, and will in due time be found seated at the desks of government offices. They have succeeded in their object, and are become public servants. So far so good. They have procured a livelihood, and owe it to the education provided for them at the public expense. But there is unfortunately another side to the picture, and when inquiry is made into the private character of those men, it is too often found that they have paid dear for their knowledge. They have cast away their early beliefs without substituting anything better, and belong to the class of liberalized Hindoos, who ape the manners and practise the worst vices, but are utter strangers to the virtues of European society. To this class, but with all its worst qualities exaggerated, the infamous miscreant Nana Sahib belonged.

When the question is asked, In what way can the affections of the Hindoo be gained, and his fidelity to British rule placed beyond jeopardy? the answer is, By making him a Christian. A common faith will give him a common interest, and form a bond of union which not even violence will be able to sever. During the late mutiny, those of the natives who had embraced Christianity are understood to have remained true to their allegiance, and it may reasonably be expected that in all similar cases the same course will be pursued. Here, however, the interference of government is precluded, simply because the suspicion which it would produce, would in all probability more than counterbalance any benefit that could be derived from it, and hence, a work on which, more than any other, the prosperity and happiness of India depend, must be carried on by private benevolence. It is pleasing to know that Christian missionaries, distinguished alike for talents and piety, have long been devoting them to this sacred task, and that the mutiny itself, by awakening attention to the real wants of India, has given a new impulse to efforts for christianizing it. The time is in some respects singularly propitious. Under a native dynasty, the suppression of the mutiny would have been followed by general massacre and devastation, and every province in which the mutineers had mustered in strength would have been converted into a desert. We have used our triumph with moderation, and the punishments have been few compared with the number
and enormity of the crimes. The natives cannot fail to have perceived this, and are acute enough to have inferred that the Christian religion, which teaches those who profess it to act thus generously, must be infinitely superior to their own barbarous and cruel superstitions. If such was the impression produced by our leniency in the hour of victory, how greatly must it have been deepened by the liberality displayed during the late famine, when, forgetting all their wrongs, and listening only to the cry of suffering humanity, the inhabitants of the United Kingdom were seen contributing their thousands and tens of thousands, in order to save millions of Hindoos from starvation. If the heart of that people be not incurably hardened, this noble return of good for evil must surely have softened it, and now therefore is the time to win them over, and induce them to exchange their monstrous and cruel superstitions, for the pure faith, which, while it prepares man for his final destiny, tames his savage nature, and effectually civilizes him. The task of conversion from heathenism is indeed the most difficult and delicate in which human agents are permitted to co-operate, and if we may judge by the past, nowhere encounters such formidable obstacles as in India. Hindooism has bound its votaries as with adamantine fetters, and it would almost seem as if every attempt made to break them only rivets them more firmly. Men eminent for piety and talents, after wearing out their lives in missionary labours, are obliged to confess that their converts are few and not always of a satisfactory description. However sanguine therefore, we may be, and however confident that the task will be ultimately accomplished, a long period may be expected to elapse before any visible impression will be made on the great bulk of the Hindoo population. Meanwhile the path of duty is plain, and no degree of difficulty can afford any valid excuse for not attempting to walk in it. A good cause must never be abandoned in despair; and though some may seek a pretext for indolence, by representing the conversion of the Hindoo as a work which the Almighty has reserved to himself, and will accomplish in his own time without human intervention; and others, disdaining even to use a cloak for their infidelity, may ridicule the very attempt as quixotic, or stigmatize it as intolerant—the Christian who is true to his vocation, and grateful for the many blessings which he derives from it, will be more stimulated than dispirited by the obstacles thrown in his way, and console himself with the assurance that his work of faith and labour of love, however limited the measure of success granted to it, will not be forgotten.

To the attempts made to christianize India, it has been objected that the inevitable result of their success would be to destroy the British rule. The inhabitants made aware of their natural rights, and become capable of self-government, would throw off our yoke, and declare their independence. Unquestionably they would. But what then? Is it meant that for the purpose of perpetuating our empire in the East, we must endeavour to keep our subjects there in a state of semi-barbarism, and discountenance all endeavours to raise
them to our level in respect of intelligence, religion, and general civilization? The time has been when such selfish and heartless policy would have been looked upon with favour, but a better spirit now prevails; and the determination, as announced in the queen’s proclamation, and cordially acquiesced in by all classes of society, is to do justice to India, and more than compensate her for all the wealth she has bestowed upon us, by furnishing her with the means of rising above her present degraded state, and attaining to the highest form of European civilization. Should the effect be to enable her to dispense with our tutelage, we shall have the satisfaction of feeling that we ourselves have been the willing instruments of her emancipation; while she, even in severing the political ties by which she is now bound to us, will not forget how much she shall then owe to us for the enlightened and generous policy which gradually prepared her for freedom. Should the day ever come that India, in consequence of the development of her resources by British capital, and the enlightenment of her people by British philanthropy, shall again take rank among the nations as an independent state, then it will not be too much to say, that the extinction of our Indian empire by such peaceful means sheds more lustre on the British name than all the other events recorded in its history.

Arms of the East India Company.
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