

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA


DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY


**CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY**

AC. 16058

CALL NO. **181.41** *San*

D.G A. 79.





THE
SACRED BOOKS
OF THE
HINDUS

TRANSLATED BY
VARIOUS SANSKRIT SCHOLARS

EDITED BY

Major B. D. Basu, I. M. S. (Retired).

EXTRA VOLUME No. 5.

PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHINGS IN THE UPANISATS

16058 BY

Pandit Mohan Lal Sandal, M. A., LL. B.

181.41

San



PUBLISHED BY

Ref Sa2Vu
San

Major B. D. Basu, I. M. S. (Retired), at the Panini Office,

Bhuvaneswari Asrama, Bahadurganj, Allahabad.



Printed by M. Mansur Ahmad at the Modern Printing Works, Allahabad.

c. 1920.

MUNSHI RAM MANOHAR LAL
Oriental & Foreign Book-Sellers
P.B. 1165, Nai Sarak, DELHI-6

THE
SACRED BOOKS
OF THE
HINDUS

TRANSLATED BY
VARIOUS SANSKRIT SCHOLARS

EDITED BY
Major R. D. Banerji, M.A. (Retired)

EXTRA VOLUME NO. 2
THE COSMICAL TEACHINGS IN THE UPANISHADS
Pundit Mohan Lal Sanyal, M.A. (Litt.)

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY, NEW DELHI.

Acc. No. 16058.
Date 8/12/58.
Call No. 181.41/San.

Major R. D. Banerji, M.A. (Retired), of the British Office,

Government of India, Delhi.



Printed by the Government of India, New Delhi.

FOREWORD.

In this series, we have brought out translations of the thirteen Canonical Upaniṣads, viz, Is'a, Kena, Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya, Pras'na, Aitereya, Taittereya, Chhândogya and Brihadâraṇyaka, S'wetâs'vatara, Kauṣîtaki and Maitrâyaṇi. The philosophical teachings scattered in the Upaniṣads have been given in the form of an introduction to the study of the Upaniṣads. Both the orthodox and heterodox schools of philosophy are derived from them. An attempt is herein made to trace the different schools of philosophy to them. A student of Hindu philosophy cannot ignore the Upaniṣads which have become imbedded in the religious systems of India.

EDITOR.

CONTENTS.

Subject.	Page.
1. Foreword ?... ..	i
2. Contents	ii
3. What is Upaniṣat ?	1
4. Philosophical Systems	8
5. Vaiśeṣika	13
6. Nyāya	22
7. Sāṃkhya	48
8. Yoga	80
9. Mīmāṃsā	108
10. Vedānta	109
11. Bhakti School	129
12. Heterodox Philosophy	130
13. Buddhism	"
14. Jainism	131



PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHINGS IN THE UPANISATS.

1. What is 'upanisat' ?

The Vedas are the most ancient books in the Aryan world according to all modern scholars. They are divided into three portions viz. (1) the *Samhitā* which contains four books called the Rik, Yajus, Sāma and Atharva consisting of the hymns. It may be considered Upāsana Kāṇḍa of the Veda. (2) The Brāhmaṇas which are many and belong to each Samhitā treat of the applicability of the Vedic mantras to the various ceremonies both (Śraūta) Vedic and (grihya) domestic. This portion is the Karma Kāṇḍa. (3) The Āraṇyakas which form the supplementary portion of the Brāhmaṇas are the treatises to be used and studied in the third and fourth stages of one's life. They treat of the spiritual science (Brahma vidyā). We know that in ancient India, the life was divided into four stages; the first was the life of a religious student commencing after the ceremony of the initiation or wearing of the sacred thread; he was required to perform daily Agnihotra twice, to lead a life of celibacy and to study the Veda of his family by residing with his spiritual preceptor. Different duties imposed upon a student are given at length in the Taittiriya Upaniṣat. After finishing the Vedic study at the residence of the preceptor and offering something as *honorarium* called gurudakṣiṇā, he was to become a householder by marrying a wife; this generally happened at the age of twenty-five. He was to perform all the religious duties such as Sandhyā, Agnihotra etc., called *nitya karma* and occasional ceremonies on birth, death or similar occurrences called *Naimittika karma*. The desire accomplishing ceremonies called *Kāmya Karma* fall under the occasional ceremonies and were performed with certain objects in view as Patreṣṭi, Parjanyaṣṭi etc. A Brāhmaṇa was considered under the text of Taittiriya Samhitā to be born with three debts, viz. Deva ṛiṇa, Pitriṛiṇa and Ṛiṣiṛiṇa; the first debt was discharged by the performance of the Agnihotra; the second by begetting children and bringing them up and the third was paid off by imparting knowledge of the Vedas to others. A householder was required to perform the big sacrifices, such as Soma Yajña, Paśu Yajña etc. After completing the religious duties and discharging the debts, he retired to the forest with

his wife or alone as the case might be at a time when his hair turned gray. This was the third stage of his life called (Vānaprastha) forest life; he was to remain celibate and perform the Agnihotra daily; he was to study the Āraṇyaka (forest) portion of the Veda so called by reason of its being generally studied in the forest at an advanced stage of life. After realising 'Self' he had to renounce all the worldly connections, the various religious ceremonies, the sacred thread and cluster of hair on the head; he had to betake himself to the life of a religious mendicant, teaching the truth of the religion at which he had arrived after a life-long study. This was the last stage called Sannyastha or the life of relinquishment.

These treatises dealing with the spiritual science and extracted from the Āraṇyaka portion of the Veda are called Upaniṣat. Max Müller derives the word from $\sqrt{\text{up}} + \text{ni} + \text{sad}$ = to sit down and thinks it to mean "session or assembly of pupils sitting down near their teacher to listen to his instruction"; Sāyaṇa in the introduction to the Taittirīyāraṇyaka says "The word Upaniṣad denotes Brahma Vidyā or theosophy in as much as its etymology is applicable to nothing else. The prefix 'upa' means near and nothing can be nearer to one than one's own inner self. The three meanings of the root 'sad', namely, to decay, to go or know, to destroy, are applicable to Theosophy, as the blessed Sures'varāchārya has distinctly shown. Thus, Theosophy is called Upaniṣad (1) because it leads Ātman, the self very near Brahma who, in himself, is devoid of duality and thereby brings about the decay of Avidyā or unwisdom and its effects; or (2) because it destroys that avidyā or ignorance of the true nature of one's own self which is the root of all evil and gives one to understand that the supreme being who is devoid of all duality is none other than one's own inner Self; or (3) because it destroys altogether all germs of outward activity by way of cutting up their root (avidyā). As means of acquiring the knowledge of Theosophy, the treatise is identified with Theosophy and is itself called Upaniṣad as the plough is sometimes spoken as living" (Mahādeva Śāstri's translation, P. 1.)

Without entering into further discussion as to the meaning of the word 'upaniṣad', I may here say that it is not used in its derivative sense, but conventional sense of 'secret' or 'mystery'. It is in this very sense that the term is used in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad.

Deussen says "According to Śāṅkara, the Upaniṣads were so named because they "destroy" inborn ignorance or because they "conduct" to Brahman. Apart from these interpretations justifiable neither on grounds

of philology nor of fact, the word Upaniṣad is usually explained by Indian writers by *rahasyam* (i. e. "secret". Anquetil's *secretum legendum*)." See the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, P. 10.

A vast literature of the Upaniṣads has grown up amounting to 108 collections. The Canonical Upaniṣadas are ten in number : they are Īśa, Kena, Kaṭha, Prasna Muṇḍaka, Māndukya, Aitareya 'Taittiriya, Chhândogya and Brihadâraṇyaka. Besides these, Śāṅkara has commented upon S'wetâwatâr ; he has cited passages from Kauṣitiki and Jābala in his commentary on the Śāṅkara Sūtras. They are also genuine Upaniṣads ; the Maitryupaniṣad being a part of Maitrâyaṇi Samhitâ is also a canonical upaniṣad. A curious reader will find an interesting discussion in Deussen's philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

All these thirteen upaniṣads have been published in the Sacred books of the Hindus. Besides these, we have the following apocryphal upaniṣads :—

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Brahma vinda. | 26. Brahma Vidyâ. |
| 2. Kaivalya. | 27. Yogatattva. |
| 3. Jābala. | 28. Ātma bodhā. |
| 4. Hamsa. | 29. Nārada-parivrajaka. |
| 5. Āruṇika. | 30. Tris'ikha brāhmaṇa. |
| 6. Garbha. | 31. Sītā. |
| 7. Nārāyaṇa. | 32. Yoga-hudāmani. |
| 8. Paramahansa. | 33. Nirvāṇa. |
| 9. Brahma. | 34. Maṇḍala Brāhmaṇa. |
| 10. Amṛitanāda. | 35. Dakṣiṇā murti. |
| 11. Atharvas'iras. | 36. Śaraṇa. |
| 12. Brihadjābala. | 37. Skanda. |
| 13. Nṛsiṃha purvatāpini. | 38. Tripādbibhūti Mahānārāyaṇa. |
| 14. Kālaguṇi rudra. | 39. Adwayatāraka. |
| 15. Maitreyi. | 40. Rāma Rabasya. |
| 16. Subāla. | 41. Rāmapurva tāpini. |
| 17. Kaurikā. | 42. Rāmottara tāpini. |
| 18. Mantrika. | 43. Vasudeva. |
| 19. Sarba Sāra. | 44. Mudgala. |
| 20. Nirālamba. | 45. Śāṇḍilya. |
| 21. Śuka rahasya. | 46. Paingala. |
| 22. Vajra Suchikā. | 47. Bhikṣuka. |
| 23. Tejobindu. | 48. Mahopniṣat. |
| 24. Nāḍabindu. | 49. Śāriraka. |
| 25. Dhyānabindu. | 50. Yogas'ikhā. |

- | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 51. Turīyāttīāvadhūta. | 74. Bhasma jābāla. |
| 52. Saṇḍyāsa. | 75. Rudrakṣa jābāla. |
| 53. Paramahansa-parivrājaka. | 76. Gaṇapati. |
| 54. Akṣamalikā. | 77. Śrī jābāladars'ana. |
| 55. Apyakta. | 78. Tārasāra. |
| 56. Ekākṣara. | 79. Mahāvākya. |
| 57. Annapūrṇā. | 80. Pañcha Brahma. |
| 58. Sārya. | 81. Prāṇāgni hotra. |
| 59. Akṣi. | 82. Gopāla Purvatāpini. |
| 60. Adhyātma. | 83. Gopāla uttaratāpini. |
| 61. Kuṇḍikā. | 84. Kṛiṣṇa. |
| 62. Sāvitri. | 85. Yajñavalkya. |
| 63. Ātma. | 86. Varāha. |
| 64. Pāsupata Brahma. | 87. Śātyāyauīya. |
| 65. Parabrahma. | 88. Hayagrīva. |
| 66. Avadhūta. | 89. Dattātreyā. |
| 67. Tripurātāpini. | 90. Garuda. |
| 68. Devī. | 91. Kali Santāraṇa. |
| 69. Tripura. | 92. Jābāli. |
| 70. Kāṭha rudra. | 93. Saubhāgya Lakṣmī. |
| 71. Bhāvanā. | 94. Saraswatī Rahasya. |
| 72. Rudra hriḍaya. | 95. Vahvricha. |
| 73. Yoga Kuṇḍali. | 96. Muktika. |

The above total comes to 109; the Maitreyi Ūpaniṣad which is numbered 15 in the above list is included in the Maitrāyanyopniṣat or Maitryupniṣat. These are sectarian Upaniṣats and glorify, as for example, the *bhasma* or *tripuṇḍra* marks on the forehead or wearing of the Rudrakṣa beads in the neck or on the chest. They appear to have been composed from time to time as occasion required. There is Allopaniṣat which is not included in the above list and which was most probably written in the reign of Akbar or Shah Jahan under the patronage of Dara Shikoh, the eldest son of the last named king. The account of it is given in the catalogue of the Adyar Library Vol. I. P. 136. "The curious work as is well-known has been composed to serve Akbar's idea of a world religion. In the south of India, it is not recognised in spite of (or perhaps, because of?) the widely spread opinion that the Muhamadans are skilled in the Atharva Veda, but in the north, it is not only reckoned to the Atharva Veda, but actually recited by the Brahmans at the Vasantotsava or any occasion when selected texts have to be read in the house of a Dwija. Of

course, it is not admitted that Allah is the Mohomedan god, but the word is believed, to be a synonym of Varuna. The Upaniṣad is also said to be the standard work of a certain class of Sannyāsins". Swami Dayānanda Saraswatī has given ten verses of Allopaniṣad in his Satyārtha Prakāśa Chapter XIV. By reading them we find that very few words are Sanscrit but most of them are Arabic as for example.

अल्लो रसूलमहामद रकबरस्य अल्लो अल्लाम् ।३
आदल्ला वुक मेककम् अल्लावुक निखातकम् ।४।

The reader will at once see the Arabic words ; it was perhaps to please the Mohomedan patrons that the Allopaniṣat was composed in a jargon mixed up with Arabic words declined according to Sanscrit grammar. We shall accordingly confine the teaching of the upaniṣats to the canonical scriptures which are ten or thirteen as published in the S. B. E. and S. B. H. series. We, therefore, apply the word 'Upaniṣad' to the canonical scripture but not the apocryphal upaniṣads.

2. Translation of the Upaniṣad in other foreign languages.

The first translation of the Upaniṣad of which we are aware was during the reign of Shah Jehan under the patronage of Sultan Muhammad Dara Shikoh into Persian under the designation of Oupnekh'at in 1657. The prince was very liberal, far ahead of the people of his time and followed the religious tenets of Akbar, his great grandfather. He is said to have written a book with a view to reconcile the tenets of Hinduism and Muhammadanism. Under the name of Oupnekh'at, there are 50 Upaniṣads included. The word Oupnekh'at is a corrupted form of 'upaniṣat' as cerebral Ṣ was in those days pronounced as guttural KH and is still pronounced as such by some paṇḍits of the old school.

This naturally leads us to Anquetil du Perron, the discoverer of the Avesta or Zend Avesta, the holy scripture of the Parsis. The young French man was very eager to study the sacred book of the Parsis and started to India in 1754 by enlisting as a soldier in the French army as he had no other available means to accomplish his object. He reached Surat, got himself discharged from the army and studied the Parsi scripture with the Parsi priests. He stayed there for 7 years and started for his home in 1761. In 1771, he published the translation of the Avesta in three volumes.

In 1775, Anquetil Duperron received a copy of the Oupnekh'at from M. Gentil the French resident at the court of Shuja-uddaula through Bernier. On receiving another copy of the same and comparing both of them

he translated it into Latin and French. The former translation was published in 1801-1802 under the title of *Oupnekh'at*.

When the *Oupnekh'at* was first published in Europe, it so enraptured the German philosopher, Schopenhauer that he burst into ecstasy of joy "For how entirely does the *Oupnekh'at* breathe throughout the holy spirit of the Vedas! How is every one who by a diligent study of its Persian-Latin has become familiar with the incomparable book stirred by that spirit to the very depth of his soul? How does every line display its firm definite and throughout harmonious meaning? From every sentence, deep, original and sublime thoughts arise and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit. Indian air surrounds us and original thoughts of kindred spirits. And Oh, how thoroughly is the mind here washed clean of all early engrafted Jewish superstitions and of philosophy that cringes before those superstitions? In the whole world, there is no study, except that of the originals so beautiful and so elevating as that of the *Oupnekh'at*. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death." Quotation from *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* given in Vol. I of S. B. E. at P. LXI. Schopenhauer's philosophy according to Max Muller is powerfully impregnated by the fundamental doctrines of the Upanishad.

In commenting upon the passage quoted above, Max Muller says "This may seem strong language and in some respects too strong. But I thought it right to quote it here because whatever may be urged against Schopenhauer, he was a thoroughly honest thinker and honest speaker and no one would suspect him of any predilection for what has been so readily called Indian mysticism. That Schelling and his school should use rapturous language about the Upanishads, might carry little weight with that large class of philosophers by whom every thing beyond the clouds of their own horizon is labelled as mysticism. But that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upanishads as 'products of the highest wisdom', that he should have placed the panthiesm there taught high above the panthiesm of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena as brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their favour." Max Muller's Introduction LXII, Vol. I S. B. E.

What appeared 'products of highest wisdom' to Schopenhauer are the mere babblings of the primitive race to A. E. Gough, the great educationalist in Upper India in the last century. He says on the last page

of the Philosophy of the the Upaniṣads, "Such as they are, and have been shown to be, the Upaniṣads are the loftiest utterances of Indian intelligence. They are the work of a rude age, a deteriorated race and barbarous and unprogressive community. Whatever value the reader may assign to the ideas they present, they are the highest produce of the ancient Indian mind and almost the only elements of interest in Indian literature which is at every stage replete with them to saturation."

It is useless for me to comment on the views of two eminent scholars; it is for the reader to judge for himself and to follow either of these two extreme views.

Now we come to our own countryman Raja Rammohun Roy, the great social reformer, scholar and founder of the Brāhma Samaj in Calcutta. He based his theism on the Upaniṣads and translated many of them into English, Bengali and Hindi. He was born in 1776 at Burdwan and died at Bristol in 1833. He was instrumental in getting the practice of Sati stopped and English education introduced in the public schools. He wrote several works in English, Persian and Bengali.

As the learning of Sanskrit has spread in India and Europe and as the books have been placed within the reach of the learned public by means of the printing press, the study of the Upaniṣads has become very popular and most of them have been translated into most of the languages of Europe and India. It is useless and impossible to enumerate these translations.

3. The names of the Upaniṣads attached to each Veda.

All the names of the Upaniṣads given at pages 3 and 4 are mentioned in the Muktikopaniṣad with the respective Vedas to which they are attached. I append the names of only those Upaniṣads which have been published in the S. B. H. series and which alone we consider genuine.

I. Rigveda.

1. Aitareya.

2. Kauṣītaki.

II. White Yajurveda.

1. Īśa'vāsyā.

2. Brihadāraṇyaka.

III. Black Yajurveda.

1. Kaṭhāvalli.

2. Taittirīya.

3. S'wetās'watara.

IV. Sāmveda.

1. Kena.

2. Chhândogya.

3. Maitrāyaṇi.

V. Atharva veda.

1. Pras'na.

2. Muṇḍaka.

3. Māṇḍukya.

4. Commentaries on the Upaniṣad according to different schools.

The Upaniṣads form a vast Vedic literature and constitute its jñāna Kāṇḍa as said above. We also know that the orthodox religious systems

of India are all based on the teachings of the upaniṣads. They are pure monism (S'uddhādvaita), qualified monism (Viśiṣṭādvaita) and dualism (Dvaita). Śankara represents the pure non-dualism; according to him Brahma alone is reality and everything else besides him is illusion. The second school is represented by Rāmānuja who holds that everything whether animate or inanimate other than one's self is Brahma. The third religious system is represented by Ānanda Tīrtha. He holds that as Brahma and the universe are related to each other as the protector and the protected, both of them are real. Just as the soul and body of a person are radically different but for all worldly purposes they are considered as one and called as Deva Datta &c, similarly Brahma with the universe consisting of the animate and inanimate objects, is one.

S'ankarācārya who was a born philosopher really grasped the real teaching of the Upaniṣads. The last named two schools of religion are Viṣṇuites and therefore strive to establish the reality of the individual soul and the universe. Rāmānuja's view as to the existence of the individual soul is like Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*. According to him, the soul's emancipation consists in obtaining heaven by devotion and faith. Ānanda Tīrtha went one step further; he however holds the universe to be real and the soul by meditation and devotion to Vāsudeva, Sankarṣana, Aniruddha and Pradyumna, the various manifestations of the Lord obtains redemption. He properly belongs to the devotional school of Philosophy started by Nārada and Śaṇḍilya.

We have published the translation of the Upaniṣads according to Ānanda Tīrtha whose system is called Mādhwa. There is a large number of Viṣṇuites, who belong to the cult of Madhwa.

Different commentaries on the Upaniṣads which are not many belong to one of these above mentioned founders of the religious sects known after their names.

PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS.

Different philosophical schools arose from the teachings in the Upaniṣads. This naturally leads us to explain the various schools and trace their teachings to the Upaniṣads, the fountain head of the philosophical teachings which grew into various schools of philosophy. The Rṣis of the Upaniṣads were great thinkers and treated the various problems concerning life and creation in their work. Deussen has rightly divided the subjects dealt with in the Upaniṣads into four heads, viz: (1) Theology treating of Brahma (2) Cosmology treating of the creation (3) Psychology dealing with the individual or corporate soul and (4) Eschatology

and ethics dealing with future life and the manner of life which is required to be led here in the present world.

The different philosophical systems are arranged as follows :—

A. Orthodox

B. Heterodox school called the Lokāyata.

I. (1) Vaiśeṣika.

1. Kṣāṇika vāda.

(2) Nyāya.

2. Vijnāna vāda.

II. (3) Sāṅkhya.

3. S'ūnya vāda.

(4) Yoga.

III. (5) Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

(6) Uttara Mīmāṃsā.

There is no doubt that the different systems of philosophy had existed side by side at one time before Buddhism or Jainism grew into religious systems, each borrowing and criticising the views of the other. They were certainly on that account not like the growth of Jona's gourd but were the results of several centuries, one being anterior to the other. An individual or a group of individuals advance a theory or theories which another embodies in his system or school which becomes founded after him. Take for example the Śāṅkhya Sūtras which have freely incorporated the views of the previous philosophers such as Aśmyaratha, Oudlomi, Kāś'akritsna, Bādari, Jaimini, etc. Some of them may be contemporaries of Bādarāyana. We know nothing about the old philosophers but we know only Bādarāyana who has made them immortal by referring to the views of these great men. We cannot, therefore, hold that a certain founder of the school was the originator of a particular view or views which he has incorporated into his system. Such a view or views are the results achieved by several generations of thinkers extending over several centuries. Take for instance the Yoga practice called Brahma Yoga described in the Yoga Siddhānta Chandrikā at P. P. 35 and 36 of the Chaukhambhā Sanscrit series. It is also described in Haṃsopaniṣat. It consists in closing the eyes and ears and seeing the light and hearing the sound ; it is said that by constant practice, light is visible and sound is audible ; there are ten kinds of sounds ; the first is 'chin' the second is 'chin' 'chin' ; the third is the sound of ringing of a bell ; the fourth is that of a conch shell ; the fifth is that of lyre ; the sixth is that of clapping with hands ; the seventh is that of a lute ; the eighth is that of a drum ; the ninth is that of a trumpet ; the tenth is that of a cloud. According to Haṃsopaniṣat, one should concentrate his attention on the tenth by omitting the ninth. It is a practice of the Haṭha Yoga and considered only an elementary practice ; but it is so much praised by the

Santa-mat in general and Rādhā Swāmī sect in particular that Swāmī Dyal Singh, the founder of the sect is considered to be the divine incarnation and the first promulgator of it. When such things happen in our own time what wonder that the different views of the philosophers which were talked of and discussed at one time became fossilised in the form of a system or school founded by a great man. We find a discourse in the Maitryupaniṣat about the heterodox school of Āsura of Brihaspati ; we find reference to the idealism and voidism. We should not on that account jump to the conclusion that the Maitryupaniṣat was written after Nāgārjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu, just as one would like to hold that Hamsopaniṣat was written after the promulgation of the Rādhā Swāmī sect of our own time. On *अथर्वब्राह्मणम्* in the Maitryupaniṣat in the 7th Prapāthaka, Anuvāka 8, there is a note by Max Muller. "This refers to people who claim the privileges and licence of sannyāsins without having passed through the discipline of the preceding āśramas. As this was one of the chief complaints made against the followers of Śākyamuni, it might refer to Buddhists, but it ought to be borne in mind that there were Buddhists before Buddha." Again in the same Upaniṣat, in the 9th Anuvāka where the doctrine of Brihaspati is referred to, Max Muller has appended a note. "All this may refer to Buddhists, but not by necessity for there were heretics such as Brihaspati long before Śākyā Muni."

Having shown that the views of the Agnostic or Athiestic schools had prevailed long before they became fossilised in Buddhism or Jainism, the two great religious systems of India, we are confronted with the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta Sūtras wherein according to the well known commentators the Buddhistic and Arhatic views of philosophy have been criticised. In the sūtras no where Buddhism or Jainism is referred to by names; it is the fertile mind of the commentators who made the sūtras a weapon of attack against the hostile religions which they as reformers wanted to uproot.

The next question is very interesting from the antiquarian point of view ; it is whether the Hindus borrowed their philosophy from the Greeks or not. There are three views on the point in issue ; the first is that the Hindus borrowed it from the Greeks ; the second is that the Greeks borrowed it from the Hindus and the last is that both nations cultivated their philosophy independently of each other. The similarity between the philosophies of two nations is so very remarkable that one is inclined to believe that one nation must have certainly learnt at the feet of the other.

There are Europeans and Indians of the new school who are of opinion that the Indians borrowed everything from the Greeks. Max Muller and Monier Williams are of opinion that both the nations developed their sys-

terms of philosophy independently. John William Draper, M. D., LL. D., late professor in the University of New York says in his *History of the conflict between Religion and Science* 21st edition at P. P. 121, 122 "Ideas respecting the nature of God necessarily influence ideas respecting the nature of the soul. The eastern Asiatics had adopted the conception of an impersonal God and as regards the soul, its necessary consequence, the doctrine of emanation and absorption.

"Thus the Vedic theology is based on the acknowledgment of a Universal spirit pervading all things. "There is in truth but one deity, the supreme Spirit; he is of the same nature as the soul of man." Both the Vedas and the *Institute of Manu* affirm that the soul is an emanation of the all pervading Intellect and that it is necessarily destined to be re-absorbed. They consider it to be without form and that visible Nature with all its beauties and harmonies, is only the shadow of God.

"Vedaism developed itself into Buddhism which has become the faith of a majority of the human race. This system acknowledges that there is a supreme power, but denies that there is a suprem Being. It contemplates the existence of Force, giving rise as its manifestation to matter. It adopts the theory of emanation and absorption. In a burning taper it sees an effigy of man—an embodiment of matter, and an evolution of matter. If we interrogate it respecting the destiny of the soul, it demands of us what has become of the flame when it is blown out, and in what condition it was before the taper was lighted. Was it a non-entity? Has it been annihilated? It admits that the idea of personality which has deluded us through life may not be instantaneously extinguished at death, but may be lost by slow degrees. On this is founded the doctrine of transmigration. But at length re-union with the Universal Intellect takes place, Nirvāṇa is reached, oblivion is attained, a state that has no relation to matter, space or time, the state into which the departed flame of the extinguished taper has gone, the state in which we were before we were born. This is the end that we ought to hope for; it is re-absorption in the Universal Force—supreme bliss, eternal rest.

"Through Aristotle these doctrines were first introduced into Eastern Europe; indeed eventually, as we shall see he was regarded as the author of them. They exerted a dominating influence in the later period of the Alexandrian school."

This is the view of an unbiased scientific man. M. Louis Jacalliot, a French writer and lover of India says in the *Bible in India* at pages 22, 23 of the Pāṇini Office publication. "At the epoch of Alexander, India

had already passed the period of splendour and was sinking into decay; her great achievements in philosophy, morals, literature and legislation already counting more than two thousand years of existence; and further I defy, whoever he may be, to show in India the faintest trace, the most insignificant vestige, whether in their different idioms, their usages, their literature, their ceremonies or their religion, to indicate the presence of the Greek.

"The presence of Alexander was but a brutal fact-isolated, circumscribed, exaggerated by Hellenic tradition, which the Hindoos have not even deigned to record in their history... ..

"To pretend today—in the absence of all proof and while we find not in the annals of Hindostan even the Hellenicised name of the conquered Porus—that Athens inspired Hindoo genius as she gave life to European art is to ignore the history of India—to make the parent the pupil of the child, in fact, it is to forget Sanscrit.

"The Sanscrit is itself the most irrefutable and most simple proof of the Indian origin of the races of Europe and of India's maternity."

There is no need of accumulating quotations; it is certain that after Alexander's invasion of India, there was free intercourse between Greece and India. What wonder if Aristotle the tutor of Alexander borrowed or learnt Indian philosophy and taught it as his own in Greece? Alexander, Ptolemy and Aristotle were friends and after the death of Alexander Ptolemy completed Alexandria founded by the great conqueror and the Aristotelian philosophy was taught there. Draper at P. 19 of the Conflict between Religion and Science says "Alexandria was not merely the capital of Egypt, it was the intellectual metropolis of the world. There it was truly said the genius of the East met the genius of the West and this Paris of antiquity became a focus of fashionable dissipation and universal scepticism."

It is a fact that Kalyāna, a Brahman was taken to Europe by Alexander but he burnt himself soon after at Pasarguda. It is also a fact that a Brahman reached Europe in ancient times but he burnt himself at Athens to the astonishment of the Greeks, who erected a tomb to him with the inscription "Here lies the Indian Sarman Cheyn (Sarman Ācharya?) from Barygaza, who sought immortality after the old custom of the Indians." History of the ancient Sanscrit Literature by Max Muller at P. 16 of the Pāṇini Office reprint.

Max Muller further says in his six systems of Indian philosophy P. 63 "Alexandria was known by name as Alasando to the author

of the Mahavamsa. On the other hand, the name of King Gondaphoros, who is mentioned in the legend of St. Thomas' travels to India has been authenticated on Indo-parthian coins as Gondaphoros, likewise, the name of his nephew Abdayases and possibly, according to M. S. Levi that of Vasudeva as Misdeos. All this is true and shows that the way between Alexandria and Benares was wide open in the first century A. C. Nor should it have been forgotten that in the Dialogues between Milinda and Nāgasena we have a well authenticated case of the Greek King (Menandros) and of a Buddhist philosopher, discussing together some of the highest problems of philosophy and religion. All this is true and yet we are as far as ever from having discovered a Greek or Indian go-between in *flagrante delicto*." With due deference to Max Muller, I would like to dissent very strongly from him. What was the object of taking the Brahmans from India? The Greeks speak highly of the Indians of that time; they do not consider them barbarians; on the other hand Indians could not help despising the Greeks as barbarians.

According to Damascius we find Brahmans living at Alexandria in the fifth century of the Christian Era; all these admitted historical facts extending over several centuries commencing from the pre-Alexandrian time down to the burning of the Alexandrian Library show that the learned Indians were invited to the foreign lands presumably to expound their learning. Even as late as 786 A. C. in the court of Haroun al-Raschid at Bagdad, the learned Indians were kept for translating many Sanscrit works into Arabic.

The doctrine of *sphoṭa* which was fully developed long before the Christian Era in India and the prototype of which we do not find in the Greek philosophy, found its way to Alexandria in the neo-Platonic school of philosophy. We cannot say that the doctrine of *Logos* is of spontaneous growth there; we find no previous trace of it in the Greek philosophy. I have no space to write on the much perplexed and unpleasant subject here; I ask the learned reader to choose any of the three above-mentioned views on the subject or to study it independently and form his own opinion by comparison of the Greek and Indian philosophies.

Vaiśeṣika

I take up Vaiśeṣika first as it is the oldest of all. I consider the Vaiśeṣika philosophy first in order of time because (1) its views are criticised by the Sāṅkhya Pravachana sūtras which are called after the name of Kapila: (2) its atomic theory appears to be more ancient than the theory of evolution set forth by Kapila and (3) physics and metaphysics have been

combined together in the system. From all these facts, I come to the conclusion that the Vais'eṣika system of philosophy is oldest and therefore deserves, to be treated first in the chronological order. The word 'Vais'iṣika' is derived from *Vai'eṣa* meaning particular or species and is so called because one of the categories treated by the school is species.

The founder of the school or the reputed author of the *Sūtras* is called Kaṇāda, Kāśyapa or Ulūka. He is also called Kaṇabhuk or Kaṇabhakṣa by reason of his subsisting on the minute particles of grains left in the fields or by reason of starting the atomic theory of creation. Be that as it may, we know very little about this ancient sage ; this is another reason of Kaṇāda's system being the oldest.

He has dealt with six categories (*Padārtha*) in his *Sūtras*, viz, substance; quality, action, genus, species and affinity. Take for instance man ; he is substance and possesses certain qualities ; he acts, belongs to the genus of animal and is one of the species thereof. He is made up of the bodily organs which all combined together, make up the concept 'man'. The close connection of the bodily organs which all put together make up a man is called affinity, inhesion, coinherence or intimate relation.

The first category, viz, substance is of nine kinds as shown below :—

Substance								
Earth	Water	Fire	Air	Ether	Time	Space	Soul	Mind

The five elements as shown in the above table may be classified as solid, liquid or fluid, luminous, gaseous and etheric bodies ; the other substances are too well-known to the students of philosophy to require explanation.

The second category of qualities consists of colour, taste, smell, touch, number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition according to Kaṇāda but the scholiasts have added gravity, fluidity, viscosity, association, merit, demerit and sound thus making up the total of twenty-four.

The third category consists of action such as throwing up, throwing down, contracting, expanding and going.

The genus is the class to which the species belong and the species have individuals under them. When we use the term 'man' we have at once before our mind a certain figure made up of flesh, bones and soul ; subjectively it is called concept, form, idea or *ākṛiti*. The corresponding object existing in the outside world is the substance. It further

denotes the different kinds of a class coming under the term 'man' such as the English, the Germans, the French, the Africans etc. The higher class which includes the lower is genus and the latter is called species. The term 'man' connotes certain qualities such as rationality, mortality etc., which characterise the whole species and which are its *differentia*. The objective man as he exists in the external world is active and performs a certain action. Similarly he is made up of certain component parts which cannot be separated subjectively from the idea of man. This inseparable connection of the whole with its parts is called *sama-vāya* (affinity).

To the six categories given by Kaṇāda, the later school added *Abhāva* as the seventh. It is non-existence; it is of four kinds as shown in the following table.

Abhāva

Prāgabhāva	Pradwansābhāva	Anyonyābhāva	Atyantābhāva.
------------	----------------	--------------	---------------

They are explained in Chapter IX and Āhnika 1 of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*.

Prāgabhāva is the antecedent non-existence, just as a pot does not exist before it is made from clay by a potter. *Pradwansābhāva* is the subsequent non-existence just as a pot does not exist when it is broken into pieces. *Anyonyābhāva* is the reciprocal non-existence; for example, a pot does not exist in a cloth or a cloth does not exist in a pot. *Atyantābhāva* is the absolute non-existence as the hare's horn.

This leads me to explain the doctrine of *वत्कार्यवाद* and *अवत्कार्यवाद*; before doing so, I should explain the doctrine of causality according to the *Vaiśeṣika* school of philosophy. When there is a succession of events, the anterior is called the cause and the posterior is called the effect. As for example you produce fire by friction; there is a succession of two phenomena; the first is friction, the second is the production of fire. The first is the cause and the last is its effect. In this view, the effect (fire) did not exist before the cause (friction). The view upholding the non-existence of effect before cause is called *Asatkāryavāda*. On the other hand, the other view is that the effect exists in the cause but is brought into manifestation; the effect according to this view is not different from its cause. This view is called *वत्कार्यवाद* (*satkāryavāda*).

The cause according to the *vaiśeṣika* school is of three kinds, viz (1) *Samyagi* or intimate, (2) *asamyagi* or non-intimate and (3) *nimitta* or

or operative. They are explained in Chap X and Āhnika 2; *samvāyi* cause is one which is intimately connected with the production of an object, as for instance thread is the intimate cause (*samvāyi*) of cloth. *Asamvāyi* is the non-intimate cause; it does not form the essential part of the production; it is conjunction or disjunction by which a thing is produced or destroyed; the form of the object also comes under this head, as for example, weaving and giving a form to a piece of cloth is called non-intimate cause. Any other besides these is called the *nimitta* or operative cause; it includes both the instrumental and active causes as for example, shuttle, stick and the weaver.

The views of the different schools as to the creation proceeding from the difference of their views as to causality are called *Arambhavāda* or atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and *parināmavāda* or evolution theory of the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The Vedāntic view is entirely different from them; it is called *vivartavāda*. It is *satkāryavāda*, but it holds that the cause appears to be the effect under a misapprehension; as for example in the dark a rope appears to be a serpent; similarly, Brahma appears to be the universe under the influence of ignorance or *Avidyā*. We shall have an occasion to deal with the subject at its proper place.

We have already seen that Kaṇāda was the first philosopher who started the atomic theory of creation. What is atom (*anu*)? It is the minutest particle of a material substance beyond which you cannot proceed, otherwise it will involve you in *regressus ad infinitum*. It is therefore, the extremest minute particle. To those who are suffering from Greek mania and see in everything a Greek origin, the remarks of Max Muller are pertinent. "It is no doubt very tempting to ascribe a Greek origin to Kaṇāda's theory of atoms. But suppose that the atomic theory had really been borrowed from a Greek source, would it not be strange that Kaṇāda's atoms are supposed never to assume visible dimensions till there is a combination of three double atoms (*Tryanuka*), neither the simple nor the double atoms being supposed to be visible by themselves. I do not remember anything like this in Epicurean authors and it seems to me to give quite an independent character to Kaṇāda's view of the nature of an atom." Max Muller's six systems of Indian philosophy p. 446.

Lower down on the same page, he says. "But though we may discover the same thought in the philosophies of Kaṇāda and Empedocles the form which it takes in India is characteristically different from its Greek form."

This leads us to the qualities produced in a substance by the artificial means, as for example, a potter produces a pot from the clay which is originally dark in colour but by the action of heat it becomes red. There are two views about this change which is wrought in the pot. The first view is that each atom of the pot is baked; the whole pot is destroyed by the action of fire and by the same action of fire, the whole pot is reconstructed atom by atom. It is called *Piṇḍupākavāda* (पिण्डपक्ववादः). The other view is that the change is produced by the action of heat in the pot without any dissolution and restoration of the atoms. The latter view is called *Piṭharapākavāda* (पिट्टरपक्ववादः). See Chapter VII. *Āhnika* 1 and *Sūtra* 6.

Now let us come to the logical side of the *Vaiśeṣika* which *Gautama* developed into a scientific system. It is dealt with by *Kaṇāda* in a crude form in Chapter IX. *Āhnika* 2 *Sūtras* 1. 2. I give the verbatim translation in my own language with the help of *Gautama's* logic to show that the Logical system as developed by *Gautama* is indigenous.

1. The inferential knowledge consists in the facts that it is its cause, effect, associate, opposite or co-inherent.

We have in the *sūtra*, the symbolical or inferential knowledge explained; (1) we infer an effect from its cause; as by seeing the floods in a river we infer the rainfall on the upper part of the country. It is called *Śeṣavat* (शेषवत्) by *Gautama*; (2) inference of effect from the cause consists in foretelling certain result by seeing certain signs, as for example, by seeing black clouds, you at once predict the future rainfall; it is called *Pūrvavat* (पूर्ववत्) by *Gautama*. (3) The inference arises from seeing one pair of a thing as to the similarity of the other; as for instance, by seeing a golden key, you infer that the lock is also golden or from iron pestle, you infer that the mortar is also made of iron. (4) From seeing one hostile pair, you infer the existence of another, as for example, when you see an angry serpent, you infer that there must be lurking an ichneumon in some hiding place. (5) We make an inference of a thing from seeing one part of it, as for example, by touching hot water, we infer that it must have been heated by fire or sun, the essential part of which is heat. The last three illustrations come under *sāmānyato drisṭam* of *Gautama*.

We now come to the second *sūtra* which runs thus: " 'It is its' and relation of cause and effect proceed from syllogism." In the *sūtra*, 'its' means the proposition to be proved; 'it' means the instrument (middle term) by which the conclusion is arrived at. Take for example

The mountain is fiery.

∴ It is smoky.

The syllogism is expressed in the form of an enthymeme. Here in the above illustration the fire is the cause of smoke or smoke is pervaded by fire but not *vice versa*. The fire is, therefore, called *vyāpaka* or *sādhya* corresponding to the major term of the Aristotelian Logic; the smoke is *vyāpya* or *sādhana* or middle term of the Aristotelian Logic. The *Pakṣa* is the minor term; let us now put the above enthymeme in the syllogistic form.

1. The mountain is fiery.
2. Because it is smoky.
3. Where there is smoke, there is fire; as for example, kitchen.
4. This mountain has smoke;
5. Therefore this mountain has fire;

The first member of the syllogism is called *pratijñā* or enunciation; the second member is called *apades'a*, *hetu linga*, *pramāṇa* and *karāṇa* (See. IX. 2-4.) The third member is called *nidars'ana* by *Kaṇāda's* school and *udāharaṇa* by *Gautama*; it is the major premise in the Aristotelian Logic. The fourth member is called *anusandhāna* by the *Vaiśeṣika* school and *upnaya* by *Gautama*. It is a minor premise in the modern Logic. The fifth member of the syllogism is called *pratyāmnaya* by the *Vaiśeṣika* school and *nigamīna* by *Gautama*.

The invariable concomitance of the smoke and fire (*Vyāpya* and *Vyāpaka*) is called *prasiddhi* by *Kaṇāda* (see III. 1. 14.) and *Vyāpti* by *Gautama*. It plays the most important part in the Indian system of Logic; but in the Greek system of Logic on which the modern European system is based, the figures and moods are very important; by means of them, the modern Logic is made very simple and mechanical and does not require much thinking as you have to do in determining the invariable concomitance of the pervader and the pervaded. An error leads to a fallacy which is called *anapades'a* by *Kaṇāda* and *hetwa-bhāsa* by *Gautama*. The invariable concomitance of the pervader and the pervaded is such that the circle of the former is larger than that of the latter and therefore contains it.



In the annexed figure the larger circle A B C is of the fire and the smaller one is that of the smoke.

In other words the smoke is contained in the fire and its circle is smaller than that of the fire. The smoke is called *linga* and the fire is the *lingi*. If the circle of the *linga* is fully covered by that of the *lingi* i. e. it falls within that of the *lingi*, the conclusion will be valid and there will be no fallacy. If the circle of the *linga* falls outside the circle of the *lingi* or a portion of it falls inside the circle of the *lingi* and another portion falls inside another circle, there will be fallacies. Kapāda has classified them under three heads (see III. 1. 15); they are; (1) *aprasiddha*; (2) *asā*; (3) *sandigdha*. When the circles of the *lingi* and the *linga* are totally outside, the fallacy of *aprasiddha* (major premise) arises. As for example:—

1. Where there is smoke, there is an ass.
2. Here is smoke.
- ∴ Here is an ass.

Here in the present example, the fallacy arises by reason of there being no concomitance between the *ling* (smoke) and the *lingi* (ass).

When the circle of the *linga* is outside the circle of the minor term, the fallacy is called *asā* or the fallacy of the minor premise. Take for example.

All those who have wings fly.

An ass has wings.

Therefore an ass flies.

In the above instance we see that an ass does not possess wings; the *linga* does not exist in the *pakṣa*. The result is that the conclusion arrived at is erroneous.

If the circle of the *linga* is larger than that of the *lingi* there will be a fallacy called *sandigdha* or *anvikāntika*. Kapāda himself has explained it by an illustration (see III-1-17.)

Animals that have horns are cows.

It has horns.

It is, therefore, a buffalo.

(1) You can equally argue,

Animals that have horns are buffaloes,

It has horns,


It is, therefore, a buffalo.

Here in the present illustration, we see that the *linga* which inevitably accompanies the *lingi* is found to exist elsewhere also. The result is inconclusive. It violates the rule that the circle of the *linga* should fall entirely within the circle of the *lingi* and not even a portion of it should fall outside of it.

We shall have a further occasion to deal with the fallacies when we come to treat Gautama's system of Logic where he has fully developed them. We have dealt with the Logical portion of Vaisiṣ'ika at great length to show that Gautama borrowed the materials for his superstructure from the indigenous source.

Kaṇāda has not separately dealt with the means of proof ; he gives the division of cognition or knowledge as follows :—

Vidyā, knowledge, cognition.



From this chaotic state of division of cognition, it was for Gautama to develop his four means of proof with which we shall deal later on.

Kaṇāda has composed an extensive work embracing both mental and natural philosophies in the sūtra style in ten books ; the whole work does not seem to be the work of one man. It is highly probable that the followers of the Vaisiṣ'ika school added the sūtras from time to time as occasion arose. The whole work had existed before Buddhism flourished in India. The school of the former is called *Arthavāsinas'ika* and that of the latter is called *Vainas'ika* by Śaṅkarāchārya.

The number of sūtras, the Āhnikas and chapters appears from the following table :—

Chapters	Āhnikā I	Āhnikā II.	Total	Grand Total
I	31	17	48	
II	31	37	68	
III	19	21	40	
IV	13	11	24	
V	18	26	44	
VI	16	16	32	
VII	25	28	53	
VIII	11	6	17	
IX	15	13	28	
X	7	9	16	370

It is a very small treatise containing only 370 sūtras. After Kaṇāda many works dealing with both Nyāya Vais'eṣika systems of philosophy were written ; it is useless to enumerate them here in this short treatise.

We have three commentaries on the Vais'iṣika sūtras which are very popular. (1) Upakāra by Śankara Miśra (2) Vivritti by Jaya Nārāyaṇa Tarka Pañchānana Bhaṭṭāchārya (3) Bhāṣya by Chandra Kānta Bhaṭṭāchārya.

Besides the above, there are many minor works dealing with the tenets of the Vais'eṣika school of philosophy.

Before closing the discourse on the Vais'eṣika system I may mention the translation of Das'apadārtha S'āstra from the Chinese text by Prof. H. Ui of Settsu College, Tokyo. The Das'apadārtha s'āstra belongs to the Vais'eṣika philosophy and has increased the number of the six categories of Kaṇāda to ten. The Sanscrit original of the Chinese text has not yet been traced.

Let us see how far we find the view of Kaṇāda supported by Upaniṣad. We find in Maitropaniṣat the word *anu* used as an adjective of wind (see VI. 35); there it means the smallest particle of wind. We again come across in Chapter VII. 11, the words 'monad', 'dyad' and 'triad.' It is not certain that these words were used in the same sense which Kaṇāda subsequently attached to them. Again in Chapter VI. 14, we find "an object to be proved cannot be investigated without the means of proof." The words used in the original are *pramāṇa* and *prameya* which have become fixed in meaning in the schools of philosophy. It is useless to multiply such examples; a reader of the Upaniṣats will find many such examples in them. They are really the origin of the different systems in which their authority is paramount (See I. 1-3; X. 2-9 of the Vais'eṣika sūtra),

Nyāya.

This school of philosophy was founded by Akṣapāda or Goutama. We know nothing about him with certainty; we cannot say whether he is the same as the mythical sage of the Rāmāyaṇa. He is described as a cuckold and the husband of Ahalyā. The whole story of Indra and Ahalyā as described in the Rāmāyaṇa is a myth according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. See the Introduction to the study of Mīmāṃsā at P. CLIII of vol. XXVIII of S. B. H. Goutama alias Akṣapāda is totally a different person. In this connection, I may mention the history of Indian Logic by the late Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa an eminent scholar of his time. The work brought out by the Calcutta University after the death of the great scholar is a valuable contribution to the Indian system of Logic and a monument of learning. With great respect to the learning and erudition of the deceased scholar, I may be permitted to say that he was so much biassed with the pro-Hellenic and pro-Buddhistic notions that he saw everywhere in the Nyāya sūtras the Hellenic and Buddhistic influence. The dates given by him are imaginary and his view that Akṣapāda and Goutama are two different persons has no basis. In a word, he has drawn much on his imagination; this fact detracts from the value of the book which is otherwise very useful. He starts from certain assumptions and plausible

theories which he considers to be facts. As I am writing a small treatise, I shall have no occasion to refer to his views in detail and criticise them. I therefore leave alone the learned scholar with the above remark to the students of Indian logic to form their own independant opinion about him.

The Indian view is that the founder of the system is Goutama *ācārya* Akṣapāda and no one will endorse the startling proposition that Akṣapāda is different from Goutama.

Goutama's sūtras as they exist at present are in five chapters as shown in the following table :—

Sūtras.

Chapter.	Āhnika I	Āhnika II	Total	Grand Total
I	41	20	61	
II	68	66	134	
III	73	77	150	
IV	68	51	119	
V	43	24	67	531

I have given the number of the sūtras from the Vizianagram Sanscrit series, Benares edition; but in other editions the number varies. The most reliable and ancient commentary is that of Vātsāyana about whose time we know nothing. All guesses about him are like a blind man groping in the dark.

A vast literature has grown round the sūtras of Gotama in the form of the commentaries and original treatises which it is useless to enumerate in the present thesis; but only few of them are given below :—

1. Udyotkara's Vārtika.
2. Vāchaspati Miśra's Nyāya Vārtika tātparya ṭīkā.
3. Udayanācārya's Tātparya paris'uddhi.
4. Viśva Nātha Pañchānana's Goutam Sūtra vritti.

The object of all the systems of philosophy is the attainment of *nirvāṇa*, the highest bliss. Dharma, according to Kapāda, leads to the attainment of the worldly prosperity and perpetual bliss hereafter. The same is claimed by Goutama for his sixteen categories. "By understanding the real nature of the sixteen categories", says Goutama, "one attains the highest bliss." What are they? He enumerates them in the opening *sūtra* of the Nyāya Sūtras; they are as the following in Max Müller's language :—

1. Pramāṇa, means of knowledge. (proof)
2. Prameya, objects of knowledge. (proof)
3. Saṃśaya, doubt.
4. Prayojana, purpose.
5. Dṛṣṭānta, instances.
6. Siddhānta, established truth.
7. Avayava, premises (syllogism)
8. Tarka, reasoning. (*Reductio per deductionem ad impossibile*)
9. Nirṇaya, conclusion (decision or final judgment).
10. Vāda, argumentation.
11. Jalpa, sophistry.
12. Vitaṇḍā, wrangling, cavilling.
13. Hetvabhāsa, fallacies.
14. Chhala, quibbles.
15. Jāti, false analogies.
16. Nigrahasthāna, unfitness for arguing.

I have given my own translations in brackets wherever I thought necessary.

The first category, namely, pramāṇa is divided into four (1) Pratyakṣa (perception) (2) Anumāna (inference) (3) Upamāna (comparison) and Śabda (verbal testimony). Pratyakṣa (perception) is defined in Sūtra 4 as "cognition arising from the contact of the sense organs with their objects but not that arising from the word of mouth, and being invariable and certain." According to Goutama perception is caused by the contact of the sense organs, viz : the eye, the ear, the tongue, the nose and touch with their different objects; he further particularises it as not caused by the words of mouth without seeing

the objects. The third requisite of perception is its invariability. As for example, perception of mirage, *ignis fatuus*, will-o'-the-wisp, *fata morgana* do not come under Gautama's definition. The fourth requisite is that there should not be any doubt about it as for instance, you should not have any uncertainty as to a pillar being a pillar or a man. Vātsyāyana explains it by saying that the soul in contact with the *manas* comes in contact with the sense organs which in their turn come in contact with the objects. It is certainly an improvement on the uncertain definition of Kaṇāda in Chapter IX. Āhnika 1. It was the belief of the ancients that the rays from the eye travelled to the object and caused perception. Gautama's definition of perception embraces sensations received by all the sense organs; according to him seeing a man in a pillar in darkness or mirage in the desert does not come under the definition of perception.

Second means of knowledge according to him is inference; it is of three kinds (1) *pūrvavat*, (2) *s'eṣavat*, (3) *sām ānyato dṛṣṭam*. (1) Inference about the effect arising from seeing the cause, as, for instance, seeing the black clouds, one predicts the future rainfall. (2) Inference about the cause arising from seeing the effect, as for example, from the flood in a river, one infers the rainfall on the upper bank of the river. (3) Common experience, as for example, at Cawnpore I see a man whom I saw a few days ago at Allahabad; I make an inference that he must have come from there.

The third mode of acquiring knowledge is comparison; if I under an impression that a *bos gaurus* is a quadruped resembling a domestic cow, happen to be in a jungle and see a *bos gaurus* corresponding to the description given to me, I recognise it at once as *bos gaurus*. This means of proof or knowledge is what is called comparison.

The fourth means of proof is called verbal testimony. It is defined as the statement of a reliable person who, according to Vātsyāyana, is one who has himself perceived a thing and explains it in its true light. Such a person can be both among the Āryas and barbarians (*mlechchhas*). It is of two kinds; (1) *dṛṣṭārtha* (2) *adṛṣṭārtha*. The former is the statement which enjoins something, the effect of which is visible here at once; as for example the direction to take bath every day to avoid uncleanness. The latter is the statement which enjoins something the effect of which is produced in the life hereafter; as for example, the direction to perform an Āgnistoma to attain heaven. In chapter II Āhnika 2, Gautama has discussed other means of proof, such as, tradition, presumption, probability and non-existence which he says are included in the verbal testimony and infer-

ence. As they do not bear on the present discussion, I need not enter into details about them.

We now come to the second category called *prameya*, the objects of knowledge or proof. They are the following :—

1. *Ātmā*, the soul; (2) *s'arira*, the body; (3) *indriya*, the sense organs; (4) *artha*, objects of sense; (5) *buddhi*, knowledge; (6) *manas*, the mind; (7) *pravriti*, activity, (8) *doṣa*, failing; (9) *pretyabhāva*, metempsychosis. (10) *phala*, fruit; (11) *duḥkha*, misery; (12) *apavarga*, salvation.

The soul, the first object of knowledge is explained as being possessed of desire, hatred, effort, happiness, misery and knowledge. According to Gautama, there are certain signs or marks from which you can infer the existence of the soul. They are volition, hatred, effort, happiness, misery and knowledge. It is the soul which wills, hates, shows activity, feels happy or unhappy and is conscious. It is certainly an improvement on the definition of Kaṇāda and much simpler. (See chap III. *Āhnika* 2, sūtra 4.) Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum* limits it to human soul only; in the present definition animal and vegetable lives are also included.

The second object of knowledge is the human body; it is defined as being the habitation of activity, sense organs and objects. You cannot show activity without the machinery which is the corporeal body; secondly, all the sense organs reside in the body; thirdly, it is the habitation of sensations, in other words without the corporeal body, you cannot perceive external objects or be conscious of any internal feelings.

The third object of knowledge is the sense organ, five in number, made of five elements as shown in the following table with the objects of sense and the constituent elements.

Sense organs.	Objects.	Elements.
Nose	Smell	Earth.
Tongue	Taste	Water.
Eye	Colour	Fire.
Skin	Touch	Air.
Ear	Sound	Ether.

According to the ancient Hindu philosophy, there are five elements as shown in the above table which may be classified as solid, liquid, luminous, gaseous and etheric substances.

The objects of senses as shown in the above table constitute the 4th object of knowledge.

We come to the 5th object of proof called knowledge or cognition. The author does not define it but gives its synonyms as sensation and knowledge; but in the Sāṅkya philosophy it is an internal organ called *maṇas* by which you make discrimination. Here in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, the word is used for the act itself but not the organ.

We come to the sixth object of proof called *manas* or mind. "It is an internal organ which receives the impressions of the external objects *consecutively* but not *simultaneously*. Here is no such thing as *mana* in the European philosophy; it is a medium (*tabula rasa*) on which impressions of external objects are made. The soul or ego becomes conscious of these impressions when made upon this organ; in order to make the soul conscious of the impressions they should be made consecutively but not simultaneously. If my *mana* is engaged in reading an interesting novel, I do not hear the sound of the clock in my library; this fact proves the existence of *manas*. In European philosophy we have ego and non-ego but not this medium. The former is called the mind or soul; the latter is called matter. The existence of *manas* as an independent object of proof strengthens the belief that the philosophical system of India is indigenous.

We come next to the seventh head, viz., activity consisting of the action of speech, mind and body which may be either for good or bad. The following table will explain it fully:—

Organs	Bad actions	Good actions.
Body	Killing, stealing, fornication.	Good conduct, protection, gift.
Speech	Falsehood, slander, harshness.	Truth, study and speaking courteously.
Mind	Jealousy, atheism, desire to possess the wealth of another	Mercy, faith and non-desire.

We now come to the eighth head viz., the human failing or weakness. It is an inclination to do good or evil; like or dislike are the failings of a man.

We now come to metempsychosis, the ninth object of knowledge. In the original *sūtra*, the word used is *pretyabhava* which literally means 'the state of death'; Gautama has discussed the subject very fully in Chap IV. Āhnika I. *sūtra* 10 and Chapter 111, Āhnika 1 *Sūtras* 19-27. The whole Sanscrit Literature from the Vedas down to the Purāṇas and Tantras is permeated with the idea of re-birth; even S'ākya Muni believed in it and gave it prominence in his *karma* doctrine. It is now admitted by the European scholars that the doctrine of transmigration of soul was known to the Vedic *pigis*. It is useless to cite quotations here, when there is no dissenting voice. In the Greek philosophy before Pythagoras, we do not find any reference to the transmigration of soul; it is believed by many that this doctrine of metempsychosis was imported into Greece by Pythagoras. With the exception of the Semitic people, all the nations of the world believe in re-incarnation or re-birth. As this subject is very important and big volumes have been written on it, we leave it for the study of the students of philosophy.

The tenth head is fruit or result; it is an object arising from the failings produced by activity in the language of Goutama. When one is inclined to do good or evil, he would be naturally moved to like or dislike a person or thing. This activity will produce a result which is called *phala* or consequence and is either desirable or undesirable, acceptable or unacceptable.

Eleventh in order is misery which is pain. Whatever is painful is misery. The total eradication of it is salvation which is the 12th head. The definition of salvation is not different from what is given in *sūtra* 1, of Chapter I of the Sāṅkhya Pravachana *Sūtra*.

After describing the various sub-divisions of the second category, we now come to *samśaya* or doubt which is the third category. Goutama says in *sūtra* 23 "Doubt arises from the conflicting judgment with reference to the *differentia* by virtue of the appearance of the common and numerous qualities, contradictions and the irregularity of perception and non-perception." I have translated it according to the view of Vātsyāyana. The author analyses doubt and divides it into five parts. (1) *वस्तुवचो-वपत्तेः विवेकापेक्षो विचारः*. It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the peculiar characteristic of the species arising from the appearance of general or common qualities of the genus. As for example, we see a wooden pillar at night; a doubt arises whether it is a human being or

a pillar. It possesses the general quality of length and breadth in common with man ; in such a conflicting state, one desires to enquire into the special quality of the object about which there is a doubt.

(2) **अनेकधर्मोपपत्तेः विशेषादिदो विमर्शः** : It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special characteristic of the species arising from the appearance of the numerous qualities, as for example, the *differentia* of sound is its being produced by concussion. A doubt arises whether sound is a substance, quality or action as the above said differentiating mark exists in all of them.

(3) **विमतपक्षेः विशेषादिदो विमर्शः** : It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality arising from contradictions ; as for example, the soul. Its existence can be proved by advancing certain arguments ; on the other hand, its non-existence can be proved, by advancing equally strong arguments. In such a state of conflicting arguments, a doubt naturally arises.

(4) **उपलब्धव्यवस्थातः विशेषादिदो विमर्शः** : It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality arising from the irregularity or defect in perception. As for instance, one sees water in a tank ordinarily ; the same is reflected by the sun's rays in summer in a sandy desert as in a mirage. A doubt arises as to whether there is water or not by reason of the optical illusion or defect.

5. **अनुपलब्धव्यवस्थातः विशेषादिदो विमर्शः** : It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality arising from the irregularity of non-perception ; as for instance, a radish which cannot be presumed to have water inside it by its appearance. A doubt arises whether there is water in it or not.

Other commentators have reduced the above five elements to three only. According to them, the reading will be as follows :—

1. **समानधर्मोपपत्तेः उपलब्धव्यवस्थातः विशेषादिदो विमर्शः** :

It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality on account of the irregularity or defect in perception or non-perception due to the appearance of the common qualities.

2. **अनेकधर्मोपपत्तेः उपलब्धव्यवस्थातः विशेषादिदो विमर्शः** : It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality by reason of the irregularity or defect in perception or non-perception due to the appearance of the numerous qualities.

3. **विमतपक्षेः उपलब्धव्यवस्थातः विशेषादिदो विमर्शः** : It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality by reason of the irregularity or defect in the perception or non-perception due to contradictions.

We now come to the fifth category called *prayojana* or purpose. It is defined as the object, the aim or end of one's activity. It is the object which one tries to obtain or avoid. Every one in this world acts with some object in view. As is well said.

“प्रयोजनमनुवृत्तिरवगमनं दोऽपि प्रवर्तते”

Even a man of weak intellect will not act without an end in view.

The fifth category is *dṛṣṭānta* or instance. It is defined by Goutama in sūtra 25. “The object in which there is subjective parallelism of the people and critics is an instance” It requires explanation. Instance is a familiar thing by showing which an ignorant person and a person who is disposed to examine everything with scrutiny, can understand an unknown thing easily. In form it resembles *upmāna* or analogy and by reason of its being a means of proving an unknown thing, it resembles *udāharaṇa* or major premise.

We now come to the sixth category called the established truth or *siddhānta*. It is in the language of Goutama a rule of a school, hypothesis and implication. There is a difference of opinion amongst the commentators as to whether the sūtra is by way of definition or division. It in reality embodies the definition but also suggests the method or principle of division of the established truth. According to Vātsyāyana, the established truth is a rule laid down by a school or a rule based on a hypothesis or a theory or a rule which follows by implication. According to the commentator of the *Nyāyavārtika*, the sūtra of Goutama means “established truth is the rule of ascertainment of a school or a proposition.” The *siddhānta* also means an ascertained view of a school or the final conclusion in the premises, which according to the *Mīmāṃsā* school of philosophy are subject, do ubt, objector's view, reply and conclusion. (See the introduction to the study of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* (pp. XII and XIII of vol. XXVIII of S. B. H.,

The author has divided the *Siddhānta* into 4 heads as will appear from the following table :—

Siddhānta.

Sarvatantra	Pratitantra	Adhikaraṇa	Abhyupagama

The first is *Sarvatantra Siddhānta*. It is the principle which though allowed in a particular school is not opposed to that of any other school. It is, therefore, an established truth which is not against any school and on which all the schools are agreed but which is a special tenet of a particular school. As for example, the eyes etc. are sense organs, colour etc. are the objects of sense and the earth etc. are the elements.

The second is *pratītantra siddhānta*; it is the principle proved from the common school but not provable from another school. It requires further elucidation. The Vais'eṣika and Nyāya are common schools of philosophy; while the Pūrva mīmāṃsā and Uṭtaramīmāṃsā together constitute another school. According to the Nyāya-vais'eṣika schools of philosophy sound is not eternal; on the contrary, according to the Mīmāṃsā school it is eternal. Though Sāṅkhya and Yoga are common schools of philosophy, yet *inter se* they are at variance on many points. Vātsyāyana has enumerated their points of difference. Any principle or established truth which is accepted by one school but not by another and on which there is a difference of opinion is called *pratītantra siddhānta*.

This third is *Adhikaraṇa Siddhānta*. It is defined as that on the proof of which the other ancillary subject is proved. When a general proposition is proved, the particular proposition under it is thereby proved. As for instance when the existence of the soul is proved, the ancillary subjects such as the existence of the sense organs and their objects are thereby proved. The sense organs and the objects are dependent on the soul for their existence.

The fourth kind of *Siddhānta* is called *Abhyupagama siddhānta*. Is defined as examination of the special topic though not dealt with yet inferred. When a special topic is not laid down anywhere, but is inferred from the general tenour of the school, it is called *Abhyupagama Siddhānta*. As for example, there is a general proposition 'sound is a substance.' When it is an existing substance, the discussion as to its eternality or non-eternality comes under *Abhyupagama Siddhānta*.

We now come to the 7th category which is very important: it is syllogism or more properly the members of a syllogism; it is nowhere defined but its division is given in sūtra 32. There are, according to Goutama, five members known *avayava* or limbs. The first one is called *pratijñā* enunciation or proposition; the second is *hetu*, reason; the third is *dṛṣṭānta* example or more properly a major premise with an example; the fourth is *uparaya* or minor premise and the fifth and the last is called *niṣaṃāna* or conclusion. The first two constitute an enthymeme in the modern Logic and the other three are the premises and conclusion of the Aristotelian syllogism.

Socrates is mortal	Enunciation	} Enthymeme.
Because he is a man	Reason	

All men are mortal, as James,	} Major premise	} Aristotelian syllogism.
John & C.		
Socrates is a man.	Minor premise	
Therefore Socrates is mortal.	Conclusion.	

The Vedānta school of philosophy has accepted only the last three which constitute the Aristotelian syllogism; the Arhat school has increased the member to ten.

The first member of the Goutamian syllogism called Pratijñā or enunciation is defined as the pointing of the thing to be proved. It is the proposition which is to be proved, as for example 'sound is non-eternal.'

We now come to the second member of syllogism called *hetu* or reason. It is a means of proof by reason of its similarity or dissimilarity with the example (major premise). If it is similar or homogenous with the example it is called *सम्यक्* or affirmative; and if it is dissimilar or heterogenous, it is called negative or *सम्यक्*. It requires an explanation. There are three terms in a syllogistic reasoning. The major term is called *sādhya*, the middle term is *hetu* or *sādhana* and the minor term is called *pakṣa*. In the Goutamian Logic, the major premise contains an example which is on all fours with it either in the affirmative or negative form. In this system of logic, *vyāpti* (pervasion) plays an important part. The concomitant relation between the *sādhya* and *sādhana* or *hetu* is called *vyāpti*. As for instance, smoke is invariably accompanied by fire. In other words, the relationship of *vyāpya* (contained i. e. smoke) and *vyāpaka* (container i. e. fire) is *vyāpti*; because the circle of fire is greater than that of smoke. (See at P. 19) As for instance, when we say "Where there is smoke, there is fire", we see the invariable concomitance or accompaniment of smoke with fire. It is an affirmative instance (*anvaya*). The opposite of this is not true; we cannot say "where there is no smoke, there is no fire", because we see no smoke in a red hot iron. On the other hand the proposition 'where there is no fire, there is no smoke' is true and is a negative example (*Vyatireka*). According to Goutama, the *Vyāpti* can therefore, be both in the affirmative or negative forms.

Take the examples of *hetu* or *sādhana* in both affirmative and negative forms.

I. Affirmation (*Anvaya*).

Sound is non-eternal (enunciation).

∴ it is produced (*hetu*).

II. Negation (*Vyatireka*).

Sound is non-eternal.

∴ it is not non-produced.

We now come to the third member of a syllogism called example (major premise). Its definition given by Goutama is embodied in sūtras 36 and 37 "by reason of the similarity or dissimilarity with the proposition

to be proved, an instance on account of its partaking of its nature is called major premise or example¹.

The illustrations both affirmative and negative will fully explain the above definition.

I.—Affirmative (anvaya).

The mountain is fiery.

∴ It is smoky.

Where there is smoke, there is fire, as kitchen, fire hearth etc.,

II.—Negative (Vyatireka).

The mountain is fiery.

∴ It is not non-smoky.

A non-fiery is non-smoky, as a tank or a lake etc.

Vyatireka (negative) major premise is obtained by obversion and conversion of the anvaya (affirmative) major premise as explained by the illustrations given below.

Where there is smoke, there is fire (affirmative).

Where there is smoke, there is not non-fire (obversion).

By conversion we get

Where there is not non-fire, there is smoke. Negative (Vyatireka).

In order to get a (Vyatireka) negative form, obvert the affirmative (anvaya) major premise; then convert it as illustrated above. The vyatireka, therefore, involves a double process of first obversion and then conversion of the affirmative major premise, called contraposition.

We now come to deal with the fourth member of a syllogism called upanaya or minor premise. It is also of two kinds: (1) affirmative or negative as will be better explained from the following illustrations:—

A. Affirmative.

The mountain is fiery.

∴ It is smoky.

A smoky, is fiery as kitchen.

This mountain is smoky.

B.—Negative.

The mountain is fiery.

∴ It is not non-smoky.

A non-fiery, is non-smoky. (as a tank)

This mountain is not non-smoky.

The first is *Barbara* of the first figure of the Aristotelian Logic; the second is *camestres* of the 2nd figure of Aristotelian Logic. The

reasoning in the Gotamian and Aristotelian Logic is the same. The former is in its rudimentary form, while the latter is more improved and advanced. In the former, we have only two moods, viz, *Barbara* in the *anvaya* form and *camestres* in the *vyatireka* form. We have to reduce all the syllogistic reasonings to either of these forms. We have practically two moods only from the first and second figures. In the Aristotelian Logic, we have three figures with fourteen moods. The fourth figure with five moods as we find in the modern Logic was added by Galen.

We now come to the *nigamana* or conclusion. It is the repetition of the enunciation ; we have two forms of conclusions either affirmative or negative.

A. Affirmative.

The mountain is fiery (Enunciation)

∴ It is smoky (Reason)

(A) A smoky is fiery as kitchen or hearth (major premiss)

(A) This mountain is smoky (minor premiss)

(A) ∴ This mountain is fiery (conclusion)

B. Negative.

The mountain is fiery (Enunciation)

∴ It is not non-smoky (Reason)

(A) A non-fiery is non-smoky as a tank or a lake (major premiss)

(E) This mountain is not non-smoky (minor premiss)

(E) This mountain is not non-fiery (conclusion)

By obversion, we get

This mountain is fiery.

From the above illustrations, we clearly see that minor premiss the fourth member of the syllogism is the reason, the second member and the conclusion which is the fifth member is the enunciation—the first member.

Having dealt with the syllogism, we come to the 8th category called *Tarka* or reasoning. It is defined by Goutama in sūtra 41. "In an object the reality of which is not known, the determination of the reality from the appropriateness of its cause is reasoning." When the reality of a thing is to be ascertained from its cause, it is called *tarka*. When we do not admit the truth of a proposition alleged, the conclusion will necessarily be absurd. It is called *reductio ad absurdum* as employed by Euclid in proving some of his propositions. Aristotle has also employed

it and called it *reductio per deductionem ad impossibile* or indirect reduction. Aristotle regarded the first figure as perfect and did not consider any syllogism in any other figure valid unless it could be changed into any of the moods of the first figure. This change is called reduction. It is either direct or ostensive reduction or the indirect or *reductio per deductionem ad impossibile* (reduction by deduction to impossibility)

Let us explain the above with the aid of the following illustrations:—

Where there is smoke, there is fire.

It is a proposition the validity of which is not admitted by the opponent; the contradictory proposition must necessarily be true.

O. Some smoky objects are not fiery.

A. All smoky objects are burning wet fuels.

O. ∴ Some burning wet fuels are not fiery.

The conclusion is absurd. It is *Bokardo* of the 3rd figure. There being a fallacy in the major premise, the conclusion must necessarily be false. The result is that you will have to accept the proposition, viz. "Where there is smoke, there is fire."

We now come to the ninth category called *nirnaya* or conclusion. It is a decision or final judgment after examining the arguments of the propounder of a proposition and the opponent.

We now come to the *Kathā* which includes (10) *vāda* argumentation, (11) *Jalpa* sophistry and (12) *Vitandā* wrangling, cavilling. The argumentation is the acceptance of the *pro* or the *con* of a proposition ascertained by proof and reasoning, not contradictory to the established truth and arrived at by five premises. The argumentation according to the definition of Goutama has four essential elements. The first is the acceptance of the view of either the proposer or the opposer. There are two sides of a question; one in favour and the other against it. The second condition is that the view that you accept must have been arrived at by means of direct and indirect modes of reasoning. The direct mode of reasoning includes the four means of proof, the subject of the first category and the indirect mode is *reductio ad absurdum* the subject of the 8th category. The third peculiar characteristic of argumentation is that it should not contravene the established truth which is the subject of the 6th category. The 4th and the last proviso is that the view that you accept should have been formed after a syllogistic reasoning consisting of the five premises, the subject of the 7th category.

This kind of reasoning called argumentation is employed in an investigation of truth or in an enquiry from a teacher with a view to acquire knowledge.

Sophistry is the 11th category; it is an argumentation with quibbles, false analogies and unfitness for arguing. Sophistry is argumentation plus the employment of quibbles, false analogies and unfitness for arguing which are the false modes of reasoning. In sophistry and wrangling, the object is not the ascertainment of truth but a victory over an adversary. Sophistry, therefore, possesses all the four elements of argumentation in addition to the employment of quibbles, false analogies and unfitness for arguing.

The 12th category is *vitandā* or wrangling. Sophistry becomes wrangling when it refutes the position of the opponent. In a sophistry, a propounder establishes his position by means of argumentation and false reasoning, his main object being to win his position by employment of true and false modes of reasoning. Sophistry becomes wrangling, if the propounder assails the position of the opponent and thus establishes his own position. In the former, the propounder establishes his proposition, while in the latter he refutes the proposition propounded by the opponent. In both of them the object of the propounder is to obtain victory; in one by establishing his proposition and in the other by assailing that of the opposer.

We now come to the 13th category which is very important. It is called *hetvābhāsa* or fallacy. Goutama has not defined it but has classified it in sūtra 4 of Āhnikā 1, chap I. *Hetvābhāsa* literally means false reason or one which has the semblance of a reason. It is of five kinds according to Goutama: (1) *savyābhichāra*, (2) *viruddha*, (3) *prakaranasama*, (4) *sādhya*sama and (5) *kālātīta* are the five varieties of the fallacies. Kapāda calls *hetvābhāsa* by the word *anapades'a* as we have already seen. It is of three varieties according to him; (see at p. 19). Ananbhaṭṭa, the author of *Tarka samgraha* has also divided it into five as *savyābhichāra*, *viruddha*, *satpratipakṣa*, *asidha* and *vādhita*.

We take up the first variety called *savyābhichāra* or discrepancy. In it, the reason or *hetu* is such that it exists with the thing to be proved and with its absence. We have seen that the reason or mark must co-exist with the major term (*sāhya*) in order to make the pervasion (*vyāpti*) valid. If the circle of the pervaded (*vyāpya* or *hetu*) is larger than that of the pervader (*vyāpaka* or *sādhya*) and applies to the *sādhya* and its negation,

there will arise the fallacy called *savyabbichāra* or discrepancy. It is identical with the *samdigdha* of the Vais'eṣika school.

Take the following illustrations for explanation :—

Word is eternal

∴ It is untouchable.

I. Affirmative (Barbara)

Whatever is intangible is eternal

Word is intangible.

∴ Word is eternal.

II. Negative (Camestres)

Whatever is non-eternal is tangible

Word is not tangible.

∴ Word is not non-eternal.

There in the above illustrations, there is a fallacy in the major premiss by reason of the circle of the *vyāpya* being wider than that of the *vyāpaka*. Take for instance, *buddhi* (cognition) which is both intangible and non-eternal.

Annambhatta, the author of *Tarka samgraha* has divided *savyabbichāra* into three heads, viz : (1) *sādhāraṇa* (2) *asādhāraṇa* (3) *anupsamhāri*. We have seen that in a valid *vyāpti*, the circle of the *hetu* is smaller than that of the *sādhya* and is, therefore, included in it. When the circle of the *hetu* (reason) is so wide that it partially covers the *sādhya* and its negation, it is called *sādhāraṇa* as in the above illustration ; but when the circle of the reason (*hetu*) covers the entire circle of the *sādhya* or its negative, it is called *asādhāraṇa*.

Sound is eternal,

∴ It is sound.

When the circle of the *hetu* (reason) is so wide as to cover the circle of the *sādhya* and its negation, it is called *anupsamhāri*. In that case one cannot have an *anvaya* or *vyatireka* major premiss. See *Tarka Samgraha* by Bodas at P. 44. Bombay edition.

We now come to the second kind of fallacy called *viruddha* by Goutama. When the reason (*hetu*) is contradictory of the proposition to be proved (*sādhya*), it is called *viruddha* ; take for instance :—

Sound is eternal,

∴ it is created.

Whatever is created is eternal.

Sound is created,

∴ Sound is eternal.

Here in the above illustration, the *vyapti* (pervasion) exists in the negation (*vipakṣa*). There cannot be the invariable concomitance in the case of eternality and created things, but there can be in the case of eternality and non-created things, as for example

Whatever is non-created is eternal, as the soul.

The *viruddha* of Goutama comes under *asanapades'a* of the Vais'eṣika school of philosophy (see at P. 19.)

We now come to *Prakarāṇasama* the third kind of fallacy. When two reasons equally strong are given so that one yields one conclusion and the other yields another contradictory conclusion, the fallacy is of the *prakarāṇasama* or the equally balanced reason. The following illustrations will explain it better :—

Sound is eternal.

∴ It is audible.

Whatever is audible is eternal

Sound is eternal

∴ It is eternal

Sound is non-eternal.

∴ It is a product

Whatever is a product is non-eternal.

Sound is a product.

∴ Sound is non-eternal.

In a syllogism when two reasons are advanced and thereby two contradictory inferences are deduced, the fallacy is called that of the *prakarāṇasama*. It is, therefore, inconclusive ; it is called *satpratipakṣa* by the author of *Tarkasamgraha*. The difference between *viruddha* and *prakarāṇasama* is that in the former, the reason is quite contradictory to the *Sādhya* but in conformity with its negation. While in the latter, there are two reasons advanced leading to two different conclusions which leave the proposition to be proved inconclusive on account of the equally balanced *hetus* (reasons.) It is well explained by the author of *Tarkasamgraha* ; if in proving an affirmative proposition by assigning one reason, there is equally strong reason to prove the negative proposition, the fallacy is that of the *prakarāṇasama*.

We now come to 4th fallacy called *sādhyaśama*. In it, the reason given is such that it requires proof ; both the reason and the proposition to be proved stand in need of proofs : As for example :—

Shadow is a substance.

∴ it is moveable.

Whatever is moveable is a substance,

Shadow is moveable.

∴ Shadow is a substance.

In this illustration, both the major and minor premises require to be proved ; it is doubtful whether shadow is moveable and it is also doubtful whether shadow is a substance. This kind of fallacy is called *asiddha* by the author of Tarkasaṃgraha. The fallacy arises in three ways and is therefore, of three kinds. (1) Where the thing in which *vyāpti* resides (*pakṣa*) is a non-existing object, it is called *asrayāsiddha*: As for example:—

A sky flower emits odour.

∴ It is a lotus.

A lotus emits odour.

A sky flower is a lotus.

∴ A sky flower emits odour.

Here in the above illustration, the *pakṣa* where the *vyāpti* resides does not exist ; so the fallacy is that of the *as'rayāsiddha*.

The second kind of *asiddha* according to Annambhaṭṭa is *swarupāsiddha* ; it is a fallacy of the *hetu* or reason. As for example :—

Sound is a quality.

∴ It is perceivable by sight.

Whatever is perceivable by sight is a quality.

Sound is perceivable by sight.

∴ Sound is a quality.

In the above illustration, there is a fallacy of the reason, because sound is not perceivable by sight. The reason is simply absurd and the fallacy is that of *swarupāsiddha*. The third kind of *asiddha* is *vyāptwāsiddha* ; it is a fallacy arising from the erroneous *vyāpti* (pervasion). As for example :—

Where there is fire, there is smoke.

The *vyāpti* is inaccurate ; it can be true, if there is any qualifying condition attached to fire i.e. if the larger circle of fire be circumscribed with some qualifying condition, as for instance, where there is fire in a wet fuel, there is smoke. See Tarka Saṃgraha at 56 of the Bombay edition of Bodas. Kaṇāda calls it *aprasiddha*. (See at P. 19.)

We now come to the 5th and the last fallacy which is called *kālātita*, 'time-worn' or 'antiquated.' In it, the reason is such that it is only a waste of time to prove a proposition. As for instance.

Fire is cold,

∴ It is a substance.

All substances are cold

Fire is a substance

∴ Fire is cold,

Here in the above illustration, we know by experience that fire is never cold ; it is therefore mere waste of time to prove such an absurd proposition. Tarka Samgraha has explained it better under the head of Bādhitā. According to him, proving a proposition, the contrary of which is an axiomatic truth or is well known without any doubt is *bādhitā*. The reason assigned is all right but the proposition in support of which it is advanced is so obviously absurd that its employment is only a waste of time and energy. Kālātita has been explained by Gautama in sūtra 9, āhnika 2, chapter I ; the well known commentator, Vātsāyana has very ingeniously illustrated the meaning as follows :—

Sound is eternal.

∴ It is manifested by conjunction like colour.

Just as a pre-existing colour is shown by light, so is the pre-existing sound manifested by beating of a drum or cutting of a branch of a tree. The reason that sound is manifested by conjunction (*samyoga*) to prove its eternality is by the lapse of time. Colour can be seen, even if the light is removed and does not, therefore, cease to exist with the extinction of light ; but in the case of sound, it ceases with the cessation of the beating of the drum or the cutting of the branch. The two instances are, therefore, dissimilar and the reason assigned is no reason in Logic.

We now come to the 14th category called *chhala* or quibble. It consists in the refutation of the adversary's arguments by putting an alternative interpretation. It is a kind of fraud ; it is an attempt to refute the argument advanced by an adversary, by putting a different interpretation on the words used. It is of three kinds: (1) *Vākchhala*, (2) *Sāmānya chhala* and (3) *Upachāra chhala*.

The first is the verbal quibble which consists in using a word in a different sense from that of the speaker, when not employed in a special sense. It is a play on a word as for instance, नवक=नवो जगुवः (this man has new blankets) ; but the opponent says by playing upon the word *nava*, how can this man have nine blankets ?

The second kind of quibble called general quibble consists in attributing of an impossible meaning by reason of the possible meaning being associated with the higher genus. It is a play on a word meaning genus. A propounder uses a word in a special sense but the adversary plays on it by using it in a general sense and making the meaning absurd. Take the word 'Brāhmaṇa, which denotes a class and connotes a quality. A propounder says, "the Brāhman is learned"; the opponent says 'how can

he be learned when young children of his community are illiterate' ? Here in the above sentence the speaker uses the word 'Brāhmaṇa' for an individual but the opponent by playing upon it uses it for a class or genus. The third kind, called metaphorical quibble or *upachāra chhala*, is the denial of the current meaning of a word stating its alternative sense. It, therefore, consists in the denial of the real meaning of a word when it is used metaphorically. A word has a primary and a secondary sense ; when a proposer uses a word in its metaphorical or secondary sense, his adversary makes the meaning absurd by playing upon it and using it in its primary sense. Take for example, 'A Bench held John guilty' ; the adversary says 'how can a bench, an inanimate object hold John guilty ?' The propounder uses the word 'bench' in the secondary sense i.e. the Judges or magistrates but the opponent plays upon it and uses it in the primary sense. The point of resemblance between the verbal and the metaphorical quibbles is that in both of them, there is a play upon the word, the propounder using it in one sense and the opposer in another. The point of dissimilarity is that in the verbal quibble the word is not used in the metaphorical sense but in the primary sense, but the adversary takes advantage of its double sense.

We now proceed with the fifteenth category called *jati* or false analogy. It consists in refutation of the propounder's proposition by advancing the counter-proposition. If the propounder advances a syllogism in an affirmative form, the opponent refutes it by giving the negative form and *vice versa*. Take the following examples :—

I. Affirmative.

The soul is inactive.

∴ It is all pervading.

Whatever is all-pervading is inactive (as ether).

The soul is all-pervading.

∴ The soul is inactive.

II. Negative.

The soul is not inactive.

∴ It is a seat of union.

Whatever is a seat of union is not inactive.

The soul is a seat of union.

∴ The soul is not inactive.

In the above illustrations, we see that the argument of the propounder is in the figure called *Barbara* and the major premiss is in a correct form, i.e. there is an invariable concomitance between inactivity and all-pervading.

ness. On the contrary, the argument of the opponent is in the figure *celarent*, but the major premiss is false, i. e. there is no total disconnection between the seat of union and inactivity. Take another illustration.

I. Negative.

Sound is not eternal.

∴ It is a product.

Whatever is a product is not eternal.

Sound is a product.

∴ Sound is not eternal.

II. Affirmative.

Sound is eternal.

∴ It is an object of auditory perception.

Whatever is an object of auditory perception is eternal.

Sound is an object of auditory perception.

∴ Sound is eternal.

In the above illustration, in the negative form the propounder's argument is in the *celarent* figure, and there is universal disconnection between eternality and a product. On the other hand though the argument of the opponent in the affirmative form is in the figure *Barbara*, yet as there is no invariable concomitance of eternality and the object of auditory perception, there is a fallacy of the major premiss. This kind of argument is called *jati* or false analogy. The above explanation is according to the reading of Vātsyāyana's commentary as printed in the Benares Vizianagaram Sanskrit series; but Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya, the writer of the *Vṛtti* reads the commentary of Vātsyāyana differently. He is opinion that the refutation of the propounder's argument in the affirmative or negative form by the opponent in the same form is *jati* or false analogy. For example,

I. Affirmative.

(a) Propounder.

The soul is inactive.

∴ It is all pervading.

Whatever is all pervading, is inactive.

The soul is all pervading.

∴ The soul is inactive.

(b) Opponent.

The soul is active.

∴ It is a seat of union.

Whatever is a seat of union is active.

The soul is a seat of union.

∴ The soul is active.

Here in the above illustration in the opponent's argument, we see that there is no invariable concomitance with activity and the seat of union.

II. Negative.

(a) Propounder.

Sound is not eternal.

∴ It is a product.

Whatever is eternal is not a product.

Sound is a product.

∴ Sound is not eternal.

(b) Opponent.

Sound is not non-eternal.

∴ It is not a non-object of an auditory perception.

Whatever is a non-object of auditory perception is not-eternal.

Sound is not a non-object of auditory perception.

∴ Sound is not non-eternal.

In the above illustrations, we see that there is universal disconnection between the product and eternity in the propounder's argument, but we do not find universal disconnection between non-eternality and the non-object of auditory perception.

There are 24 kinds of *jāti* or false analogy and they have been fully described in chapter V. *Ahnika* 1. As their description is beyond the scope of this treatise, we do not enter into it and ask the reader to study the subject himself.

We now come to the 16th or the last category called *nigrahasthana* or unfitness for arguing; literally it means 'the place of confinement.' It is defined by Goutama as a bad reasoning or no reasoning. When in the course of an argument, an opponent is driven to such a position that he advances contradictory arguments or no arguments, he is said to be defeated, like the king in a chess when he is checkmated. *Vātsāyana*, the well-known Scholiast explains *bad reasoning* and *no reasoning*. The former consists in advancing contradictory or untenable arguments; while the latter consists in advancing no arguments at all, or in not refuting the position established by your opponent or in not saving your position from the attack of your adversary.

The distinguishing feature of the false analogy and unfitness for arguing, is that in the former the opponent takes up a contradictory position and puts up his arguments in a syllogistic form either affirmative or nega-

tive but in the latter the opponent advances erroneous or contradictory arguments or no arguments at all. The twenty-two varieties of the latter arising from bad arguments or no arguments are described in detail in chapter V. *ahnika* 2.

This is the theme of Goutama's *Nyāya* chapter I; and in the remaining chapters he has discussed them at length philosophically. The description of Goutama's *Nyāya* will be incomplete, if his doctrine of 'word' is not described here.

Before doing this, it will be much better to explain the doctrine of *śrōṭa* which the Indian philosophers have very elaborately discussed. In the commentary on Anuvāka 11 of chapter VII of the *Maitrīupanishat* (S. B. H. Vol. XXXI), is shown how sound is produced. Sound while coming out from the mouth called *Nada* strikes against the atmosphere outside and produces waves there which are carried to the ear. "About an inch within the human ear is placed a membrane like the head of a drum which receives the vibrations of sound. With this tympanum is an air chamber connected by a tube, the eustachian with the mouth, the three small bones joined to each other and in carrying the atmospheric impulses to the labyrinth or internal ear which is the real organ of hearing, where the auditory nerve fills three semi-circular canals and a very curiously formed cochlea or shell-like spiral chamber, where its fibres may be seen spread out and gradually shortening like the strings of a harp or pianoforte, as if each sound from lowest pitch to highest had a separate nerve fibre to convey it to the sensorium; where atmospheric vibrations are finally converted into all the wonderful modulations of music and speech. This true ear the organ of hearing is embedded in the bones of the skull, and receives vibrations through the air in the inner chamber, through the small bones and through the bone of the skull. The semi-circular canals placed in three directions are supposed to show us the direction of sounds and the nerves of the spiral cochlea the pitch, of which we can distinguish from the lowest note of the organ to the sharpest insect one, nine octaves; but there must be sounds on either side beyond the reach of our sense of hearing." (Dr. T. L. Nichols' *Human physiology* pp. 188 and 189).

When sound currents thus produced are carried to the ear of a hearer it is the second stage of sound called *Dhwani*. When the sound is carried by the auditory nerve to the sensorium, it produces a picture of an object meant by the articulate voice composed of variety of letters or *Varṇa*. This last stage is called *śrōṭa* manifested in the form of 'word'; what is idea or thought on the subjective side, is the object or the existing thing

in the objective or external word ; the same is word on the linguistic side. How does it convey the meaning ? In the beginning it is an inarticulate sound produced by the vocal organs of the speaker ; then in the form of articulate sound it is conveyed by the air current to the auditory canal of the hearer and then by striking against the tympanum the impression is made on the brain. The manifestation of the idea by means of the sound, is what is called *sphota*. There are two views about it ; (1) that it is the articulate sound pronounced in the form of the *Varnas* or letters of which a word is composed that the image or picture thereof is created on the sensorium : (2) The other view is that it is the letters pronounced in a particular order, that constitute a word or name ; there is no such thing as *sphota* apart from the letter or *Varna*.

The subject has been fully dealt with by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarśana Samgrah* in the chapter on Pāṇini. I cannot help quoting a passage from P. 116 of the *Ānandās'rama* edition.

तथाहि अभिव्यञ्जकोऽपि प्रथमो ध्वनिः स्फोटमस्फुटमभिव्यनक्ति । उत्तरोत्तराभिव्यञ्जक क्रमेण स्फुटंस्फुटतरं स्फुटतमं यथा स्वाध्यायः सहस्रपद्यमानो नावधार्यते । अभ्यासेन तु स्फुटावसायः यथावारञ्जतत्त्वं प्रथमं प्रतीतो स्फुटं न चकास्ति चरमे चेतसि यथावदभिव्यज्यते ।

नादै राहितबीजाया मय्येन ध्वनिना सह ।

आवृत्तिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोवधार्यते ॥

"Just as a lesson learnt once is not remembered but on constant repetition becomes complete, or as truth does not shine itself distinctly first but becomes clear in the intellect ultimately, similarly though the first sound is significant, yet it manifests the word (*sphota*) indistinctly but gradually it makes it distinct, more distinct and most distinct. A word the seed of which is sown by the sound, being accompanied by the last articulate sound (of letters) and being perfected by repetition, is retained in the intellect (memory)".

The conventional sense of a word pronounced in a particular order of letters was known to the ancient Indian thinkers. A word produces an idea and an idea produces a word ; there is a reciprocal relationship between the language and thought. There cannot be a language without previously having a thought in your brain and you cannot convey your thought without a language. It is a philosophical axiom the truth of which was known early in India.

The next question is, 'what does a word convey' ? Does it mean an individual, form or genus ? When the word 'goat' is uttered, you have at

once before your mind a figure of a quadruped of a peculiar structure and colour. It is a concept, idea, figure or form (*ākṛiti*); the corresponding object in the external world is an individual goat. A class consisting of such individuals forms a species, and the species make up a genus until the highest genus called *summum genus* is reached. The lowest species or the individual is called *infima species* and intermediate genera and species are called *subaltern genera* and *species*.

"If the word 'goat' conveyed an *ākṛiti*," argues Goutama "a goat made of clay will suffice in a sacrifice; similarly if it meant an individual goat, it is then impossible to replace another in its place". In his opinion, the word 'goat' signifies a class, form and individual. He sums up the whole discussion in sūtra 63 of chap. II Āhnikā 2. A word denotes an individual, a form, and a genus.

The next question for determination is whether a word (or more properly) sound is eternal or non-eternal. The view of Goutama is embodied in sūtra 13 of chapter II. Āhnikā 2. He says that sound is non-eternal and assigns three reasons for it; (1) a sound has a beginning; whatever has a beginning has an end. (2) It is an object of sense organ namely the ear; (3) it is treated in common life as artificial: you can raise or lower your voice according to your wish. All these reasons show that a sound is produced like any other manufactured articles and is therefore perishable and non-eternal.

It is a common experience that a sound is produced by our effort and after having manifested itself for a short time, it vanishes. It cannot be according to Goutama, eternal.

It is useless to discuss the subject here; I may refer the curious reader to study from sūtras 14 to 55 chap. II Āhnikā 2 of Goutama's Nyāya Sūtras (Vizianagaram Sanscrit series).

Goutama in spite of the non-eternality of word believes in the infallibility and eternality of the Vedas. He says in sūtra 68 of chap. II. Āhnikā 1 "And by reason of the authority of a reliable person, its authoritativeness is like the authority of spell (incantation) and medicine." To Goutama, the Holy Veda is an authority in itself, because the word of an *apta* or a reliable person is always an authority. Who is an *apta*? Vātsāyana has dealt with it fully in his commentary. There are three qualifications of an *apta*; (1) he must have realised his ideas, (2) he must be a philanthropist and (3) he must tell the truth and explain the true nature of a thing. All these qualifications apply to the Supreme Being. The sum and substance of the whole sūtra is that the Holy Veda, being of divine origin is of

paramount authority. The scholiast further says that it is not authoritative simply by reason of its being eternal; though a word is not eternal yet the Holy Veda being of divine origin is eternal. He gives two examples in support of his view; just as a spell or charm produces its effect in removing serpent's poison and people believe in its infallibility, so is the Holy Veda infallible; just as a medicine produces its effect in eradicating a disease and people believe in its efficacy, so is the Holy Veda infallible. The medicine (Āyurveda) and spell (mantra) are the parts of the Holy Veda; the infallibility is, therefore, established beyond any doubt.

There are doctrines of idealism (vijñāna vāda), voidism (śūnya vāda) and impermanence (Kṣāṇikavāda) referred to in the 4th chapter. Subsequently these doctrines became the peculiar property of the Yogācāra, a school founded by Asanga and Vasubandhu and the Mādhyamika school founded by Nāgārjuna. I have said over and over again that these views had been in existence long before they became the accepted tenets of any school. From criticising such views, no valid inference can be made as to the priority of the various Buddhist schools which subsequently accepted such views as their tenets. A futile attempt has been made recently to compare Goutama's sūtras and Vātsyāyana's commentary with the Lankāvatāra-sūtra of the Yogācāra school. I need not dilate on the subject as there is an obvious anachronism which a student of Indian history can very well appreciate.

The study of Goutama's Nyāya is very popular in India especially in Bengal. It is still studied in Nadia (Navadvipa); there the subject is studied in the old way of learning in *toles*. I am informed that there are good *naiyāyikas* or logicians of the old type.

Having done with the description of Goutama's Nyāya, let us see whether we find any trace of his philosophy in the Upaniṣat. The word 'Goutamā' occurs very often in the Upaniṣats; it is in Kauṣītaki, Chhāndogya, Bṛihadāraṇyaka and Katha. (See for the details in Jacob's concordance at P. 340). No help can be obtained from them as to the identity of the founder of the Nyāya school. The word in the Upaniṣats is a patronymic of certain Rishis.

We find most of the objects of proof (Prameyas) and the five elements mentioned in the Nyāya, in the Upaniṣats. Take the passage 'अविना मया ज्ञेयं स्वयंप्रकाशं त्विदं' in Maitriupaniṣad VI. 14. "An object of proof cannot be perceived without a means of proof." This axiomatic truth finds its place in Goutama's Nyāya. It is probable that there the

pramāna and the prameya may not have been used in the same sense as in the Nyāya.

We find *tarka* in Kathopaniṣat II. 9 “वेदादकैवमस्ति रापनेवा” It can not be obtained by means of reasoning.” The word again occurs twice in Maitriupaniṣad in VI. 20, VII. 8. It is doubtful whether the word is used in the same sense as in the Nyāya. We have in Maitriupaniṣat *kuhaka* (quibble), *dṛṣṭānta* (instance) and *hetu* (reason). We also find *nairatmyavāda* (athiestic doctrine) side by side with these terms which subsequently became the peculiar terminology of the Nyāya school of philosophy.

At the time of the Upaniṣat, people were acquainted with some sort of reasoning. It was a rationalistic period; people being tired of the ceremonial practices of the Veda, naturally took to thinking and expressed their thoughts in the writings of the Upaniṣat. Nyāya is, therefore, no-hostile to the Vedic teaching but has its seed in the Upaniṣats the knowt ledge section of the Veda called *jñānakāṇḍa*.

Sāṅkhya.

We now come to the second group of philosophy called Sāṅkhya-yoga. The Sāṅkhya school is anterior to the Yoga school. The founder of the former school is *Kapila*, a mythical saint who is described in the S'rimadbhāgavat Purāṇa; his life is so much surrounded by a halo of sanctity that it is very difficult to make out any thing like history. It is therefore, a futile attempt to find out the time and place of the saint. Let us leave him in the mystery in which he is enveloped. Kapila like S'ākyamuni and Rishabha is considered as one of the twenty-four incarnations of Viṣṇu. He is said to be the same Kapila who reduced the hundred sons of Sāgara to ashes while searching for the lost horse of the As'wamedha sacrifice; while others say, he is a different sage.

His name occurs in S'vetā s'vatara Upaniṣat chapter V. 2.

“सृष्टिं प्रकृतं कपिलं वस्तुनये दानैः विनतिं ज्ञानानं च परयेत्” : “He brings up the Rishi Kapila born in the beginning with knowledge and looked at him when born.” Some of the commentators of the verse have taken the word ‘Kapilā’ in its derivative sense meaning Hiraṇyagarbha; but Sankarāchārya in his learned commentary of the Vedānta Sūtra chapter II. 1. thinks that by Kapila the founder of the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy is meant. According to many, he is considered anterior to Kāṇāda; but the Pravaehana sūtras as they exist in the present form are admittedly posterior to the Vaiśeṣika sūtras. Whoever Kapila may be, he certainly wrote after Kāṇāda as fully discussed by me in the preceding pages

The Sāṅkhya literature is very limited ; the books in the Sāṅkhya school can be counted on one's fingers' ends. They are : (1) Pravachana sūtras, (2) Tattwa samāsa (3) Sāṅkhya kārīkā and (4) Panchas'ikha sūtram.

Tattwa samāsa was at one time considered to be the original work of *Kapila*, but now the present view is that it is a spurious work containing the summary of the original Sāṅkhya sūtras. See Keith's Samkhya system (Heritage of India series). Panchasikha sūtras are embodied in the commentary of Vyāsa on the Yoga sūtras of Patanjali. We need not, therefore, bother ourselves with these two works in the Sāṅkhya literature. Let us then take up the Sāṅkhya Pravachana Sūtra which I consider to be the original work for reasons to be given later on. I cannot determine the age of the Pravachana sūtras, but I think them to be existing in the present form before the rise of Buddhism. Buddha owes a great deal to Sāṅkhya and many other sages of the pre-Buddhist heretic schools such as Brihaspati, Chārvāka and Jābāli. It is like groping in the dark to make an attempt to ascertain the age of these mysterious sages whom we know only by name.

There is a limited number of commentaries on the Pravachana sūtras ; (1) Sāṅkhya sūtra vritti by Aniruddha ; (2) Sāṅkhya Pravachana Sūtra vritti sāra by Mahadeva Saraswati ; (3) Sāṅkhya Pravachana Bhāṣyam by Vijñāna Bhikṣu. The first and the third are available and are studied. The commentary of Vijñāna Bhikṣu is most excellent and helpful in correctly understanding the Sāṅkhya Sūtras. The vritti of Mahādeva Saraswati was published by Garbe in the Bibliotheca Indica series.

Swāmi Dayānanda Saraswati, the great Sanskrit scholar and reformer of our time has mentioned Bhāguri's commentary on Sāṅkhya sūtra in the introduction to his commentary on the Rigveda and the Satyārtha Prakāś'a ; but I have neither seen it nor read of it in any other work.

The present Sāṅkhya Pravachana Sūtra, as we have, consists of six chapters containing 526 sūtras as will appear from the following table :—

Chapter	I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	Grand Total
Sutras	164	47	84	32	129*	70	526

We now come to Sāṅkhya Kārīkā which is the most important work in the whole Sāṅkhya literature and is considered older than the Prava-

* According to Aniruddha, there are 130 sūtras.

chana sūtras by scholars. It was written by Īśwara Kṛiṣṇa in the Āryā metre. The number of the stanzas varies according to the commentators. In the commentary of Goudapāda only 69 stanzas are commented upon. In the commentary of Māṭhara which is older than that of Goudapāda, we find 73 stanzas. In the commentary of Vāchaspati Miśra, called Sāṅkhyatattwa Kaumādī we have 72 stanzas. According to P. Tanu-sukha Rāma Śarmā, the editor of Māṭhara vṛitti in the Choukhambhā Sanscrit series, the number of stanzas varies from 69 to 105.

The Kārikā with the Māṭhara vṛitti was translated into Chinese by "Kan-ti" who is called Parmārtha by the Indians. "He was a Tripitaka law teacher of the Khan dynasty A. C. 557-589. Paramārtha came to China in about 547 in the reign of the emperor Wa-ti of the Lian dynasty which ruled in Southern China from 502-557 A. C. and was followed by the Khan dynasty. He lived till 582 A. C., and there are no less than twenty-eight of his translations now in existence, that of Suvarṇa-saptati Sāstra being the twenty-seventh (No 1300 in B. Nanjo's Catalogue). The name given to it in Chinese, 'the Golden seventy discourse' is supposed to refer to the number of the verses in the Kārikā." (Max Muller's six systems of Indian philosophy P. 222.) According to P. Tanusukh Rāma Śarmā, in the Chinese translation the 63rd. stanza being omitted, there are only 71 stanzas. Though there are 72 stanzas in the present authorised edition, the book itself is called 'saptati' by the Kārikā itself. In the Chinese translation, the name of the vṛitti writer is not given. Bālasāstrin, as appears from the six systems of Indian philosophy by Max Muller held that the Pravachana sūtras were written in the 16th century by Vijñāna Bhikṣu and commented upon by him. I cannot do better than quote another Paṇḍit of Benares, P. Vindyes'varī Prasāda Dwivedin, the librarian Government Sanserit College, and the editor of Sāṅkhyā Samgraha in the Chowkhambhā Sanserit series from his preface to the Sāṅkhyā Samgraha :—

अत्रकेचि द्वेदंति समास सूत्रमेवमहर्षिकपिल प्रणीतम् सांख्यशास्त्रं सूत्रपट्ट्या-
यी तुविज्ञान मिश्रुणैव प्रणीतेति । तन्मदम् विज्ञानमिश्रु समयाद्बहु पूर्वं भेजराजेन
पट्ट्याय्याख्यातत्वेत् । विस्तरस्तु न्यायवार्तिकभू मिकायां दृष्टव्य इति शम्"

Here some say that Samāsa Sūtra alone was composed by the great sage Kapila, while the Sāṅkhyā Sastra containing the sūtras and six chapters were composed by Vijñāna Bhikṣu. It is foolish, because Bhojrāja long before the time of Vijñāna Bhikṣu had explained the six chapters. Full details may be seen in the preface to Nyāya vārtika." The editor ends his preface by uttering a blessing. Certainly the view

that Viṣṇu Bhikṣu palmed off the Pravachana sūtras as the work of Kapila cannot hold water even for a minute when we find the sūtras commented upon by Aniruddha who is anterior to Viṣṇu Bhikṣu. See Pramathanātha Tarkabhūṣana's preface to Aniruddha's commentary as published by Jivānanda Vidyāsāgara.

The view of those who hold the Pravachana Sūtras to be spurious is based on what is called *argumentum ex silentio*. As far as can be gathered from their writings, their argument is that Sankarāchārya who has criticised the Sāṅkhya view in his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras has not referred to the Pravachana Sūtras but to the Sāṅkhya Kārikā; that Madhavāchārya, the writer of the Sārvadarsana samgraha has not, while describing the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy, referred to the Pravachana Sūtras but to Is'wara Kṛṣṇa's Kārikā and Vāchaspati Miśra's Sāṅkhya tattva Kaumadi: that even so late a writer as Vāchaspati Miśra, has not referred to the Pravachana Sūtras. From this negative evidence they conclude that they had not been in existence in their time. The argument is very weak and is based on a fallacy which we all very know is that of *argumentum ex silentio*. There are several very important facts which these learned critics in their zeal have overlooked; the Sāṅkhya philosophy was rightly or wrongly believed to be the root cause of the atheistic schools of Buddhism and Jainism, and the followers of the Sāṅkhya school were nicknamed as *Prachchanna Bauddhas* (crypto-buddhists). In the Pravachana Sūtras, as will be seen later on, the existence of Is'wara is denied; this accounts for their unpopularity and their study, therefore, fell into desuetude. The Kārikā being a short epitome of the Sāṅkhya principles in a metrical language by combining the sūtras of the Sāṅkhya and eliminating all atheistic and controversial points, became popular in the study of Sāṅkhya school of philosophy. This is the reason why the Sāṅkhya Kārikā alone was studied and referred to by the conservative Brāhmaṇas. There is another fact, viz. that in ancient India there were no facilities in the use of libraries as we have at present. The libraries, it appears, were attached to the temples and were the exclusive properties of the priests who perhaps allowed them rather to be eaten by worms than exposed to the public gaze. Some time iconoclastic instinct prevailed, under the influence of which they destroyed those books which were not in conformity with their own. The Bārhaspatya sūtras of the heretic school, the existence of which is proved from the quotations here and there, are not available. The works of Chārvāka have vanished, and many of the important Buddhistic works have been recovered

in the Pāli translations outside India. In addition to these facts, considering the climate of India, it is not strange that the Pravachana sūtras became very rare and a sealed book to the general public. The learned scholars were not omniscient, and could not know them by intuition if they were shut up in the libraries of the temples not accessible to all.

Sankarāchārya who was a born enemy of Buddhism and Jainism, could not have any sympathy with Kapila, the forerunner of these two well-known religious systems of the heterodox school, and would not therefore stoop so low as to quote from Kapila's Pravachana sūtras. Sankarāchārya has mentioned the name of Kapila in his Sārīrika Bhāṣya more than once with great respect, but in his commentary on sūtra 1 pāda 1 chapter II, he says,

अतश्च सिद्धमात्मभेद कल्पनयापि कपिलस्यतत्र वेदविरुद्धं वेदानुसारि
मनुवचनविरुद्धं च, न केवलं स्वतंत्र प्रकृति कल्पनयैवेति ।

"It is, therefore, proved not only from the assumption of the independent existence of matter but from the plurality of the souls also, that the system (tantra) of Kapila is contrary to the Veda and the teaching of its follower, Manu." In this view of Kapila's system, it is no wonder if S'ankarāchārya, while commenting on sūtra 11 of chapter I Pāda 4, quoted stanza 3 from Sāṅkhya kārīkā.

Whenever S'ankarāchārya quotes from the Sāṅkhya, he does not mention whether he quotes the passage from the Kārīkā or the Sūtras; he leaves it to the imagination of his readers. Excepting stanza 3 quoted above, all quotations may be from the Kārīkā or the sūtras. As for example, in his commentary on sūtra 9 of chapter II, Pāda 4, we have—

सामान्य करण वृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पंचः । Sankhya II. 31

The above quotation is also the last line of stanza 29 of the Kārīkā. What is the authority to support the allegation that the quotation is from the Kārīkā but not from the sūtras?

There are certain words and sentences which the learned scholiast unconsciously borrowed from the sūtras. Thus S'ankara's commentary (Nirnaya Sagar big edition) and Sāṅkhya sūtras side by side show parallelism.

Commentary.

Sūtra.

1. असंगो ह्ययं पुरुषः (बृह० ४.३.१६)
इत्येवमादिश्रुति प्रसिद्धमेव पुरुषस्य
विशुद्धत्वं निर्गुणपुरुषनिरूपणेन
सांख्यैरभ्युपगम्यते । P. 439

असंगो ह्ययं पुरुषः १. १५.

S'ankarāchārya quotes 'अचिन्तो ह्यर्थात्' from the Brihadāranyaka upaniṣat and Kapila has put this verse into a sūtra in his system and numbered it as sūtra 15 of chapter I. Both of them derive it from the same source, but the parallelism in the course of the criticism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy of Kapila is very striking.

Commentary.

Sūtra.

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>2. प्रति नियतावयव विन्यास मनेक
कर्म फलानु भवाधिष्ठानं.....
P. 489
3. मूलान्कुरादिनां संसर्गं पूर्वकत्वं
दृष्ट्वा.....
492
4. दृष्ट्वा चा दृष्टसिद्धिः
493</p> | <p>2. नियत कारणात्तदुच्छतिध्वंशवत् ।
१.५.६
3. पारंपर्यतोऽन्वेषणावीजांकुरवत् ।
१.१२२
4. कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः १. ११०.</p> |
|--|--|

While commenting on sūtra 3 of chapter II. Pāda 2, the learned commentator says ;

Commentary.

Sūtra.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>यथाक्षोरमचेतनं स्वभावे नैव
वत्सविवृद्धयर्थं प्रवर्तते
.....495</p> | <p>अचेतन त्वेऽपि क्षोरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधान-
स्य । ३.५६
धेनुवत्साय २ ३५.</p> |
|---|---|

Compare stanza 57 of the Kārikā as well. I say, it is an unconscious imitation of words and phrases from the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy. The learned commentator on the Vedānta sūtra has, while criticising the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya system unconsciously borrowed phrases and sentences from the sūtras. For these reasons, I have not the least doubt as to S'ankarāchārya's knowledge of the sutras, when he criticised the view of Kapila. He could have never criticised the system from such a meagre compendium as the epitomised Kārikā, where the agnostic views as set forth in detail in the sūtras, are totally absent. The *Tattvasamśā*, if it existed, cannot afford materials for the learned scholiast's criticism.

There is no doubt that Kapila's sūtras were not mentioned by any commentator of the Vedānta excepting Appaya Dikṣita in his commentary called Vedānta kalpataruparimala. (See the excellent edition of Nirṇaya Sagar 1917 at P. 372 chapter I Pāda 4, sūtra 1.) My view is that the sūtras were not known as Pravachana Sūtras before Vijñāna Bhikṣu or Aniruddha ; they were known as Kapila's *tantra* or Śaṣṭitantra. I shall discuss the point later on.

As to Mādhavāchārya, the voluminous writer of the Renaissance period, I may frankly admit that nowhere the Sāṅkhya sūtras of

Kapila are referred to by him in the Sarvādars'ana Sangraha, but he has mentioned Vāchaspati Miśra and his Sāṅkhya. Tattwa Kaumadi. The quotations are mainly from the Kārikā, but not from the sūtras. The omission means nothing. The account of Sāṅkhya as given by him is very meagre, and does not contain the names of the other commentators of the Kārikā who admittedly flourished before his time. He says nothing about the number of the stanzas of the Kārikā. Under these circumstances the non-quotation from the Sāṅkhya sūtra is not at all surprising.

Sāyanāchārya, the brother of Madhavāchārya and the commentator of the Vedie works, in commenting on Anuvāka II of Prapāthaka VIII. of the Taitireyāranyaka at P. 565 of the Anāndās'rama edition says while discussing the various views of the creation according to the different schools of philosophy,

यथा मैदाधि कारिणे देह व्यतिरिक्तं स्वर्गं प्राप्तियोग्यं कर्त्तात्मनैर् बोधयितुं
शौतमस्योद्योगस्तथा मय्यमाधिकारिणे ब्रह्मबोधयोग्यतायै कर्तुं त्वरदितं साक्षिणं
चिदात्मानमसंगं बोधयितुं कपिल महर्षिः सांख्यशास्त्रं निबन्धे ॥

"Just as the attempt of Goutama was to instruct the creating Self fit to secure heaven apart from the body to the people of very low understanding, so did the great sage Kapila write Sāṅkhya sastra to instruct self who is devoid of action, looker on, intelligent and unattached, to the people of average understanding". Sāyanāchārya has everywhere spoken of Sāṅkhya but not of the epitome which plays an important part in his brother's description of the Sāṅkhya in the Sarvādars'ana samgraha. Again at P. 596 of the same edition he quotes from Sāṅkhya without mentioning the name of the book.

सामान्य करण वृत्तिः प्राणाद्यावायवः पंच ।

Sāṅkhya II. 31. S. C. Kārikā 29.

In view of the discussion in the Āraṇyaka, the inevitable conclusion is that the quotation is from the Sāṅkhya Sāstra. One cannot, therefore, infer from the non-mention of the verse and chapter of the book in the presence of the quotation, that the existence of the Sāṅkhya S'āstra was not known to Sāyanāchārya or Mādhavāchārya, or that it did not exist. The non-mention thereof shows the unpopularity of the Sāṅkhya system at the time as shown in the preceding pages.

Let us examine Vāchaspati Miśra's Sāṅkhya Tattwa Kaumadi. There is not the least doubt that he knew Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya system, as he salutes him in the beginning in stanza 2 of his commentary.

Though the learned scholiast did not refer to the sūtras, yet he cannot be considered to be ignorant of them in face of his commentary on stanza 72 of the Kārikā. As it is very important in determining the existence of sūtras at the time the Kārikā was written, I must give it *verbatim*.

सप्तत्यां किलयेऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टित्वस्य ॥

आख्यायिका विरहिताः परवाद विवर्जिता अपि ॥

"All the subjects which are in the seventy (stanzas) are from the entire Śaṣṭitantra (a book dealing with 60 topics) with the exception of parables and hostile attacks on others (systems)". Vāchaspati miśra while commenting on the term śaṣṭi tantra, says that there are 60 topics according to Rāja Vartika and quotes verses from it. They are as follow :—

(1) The existence of matter, (2) unity, (3) objectivity, (4) separate entity, (5) dependence, (6) plurality, (7) disjunction, (8) conjunction, (9) future existence, (10) inactivity. These ten topics vary according to the different commentators ; as they are not relevant in the present discussion, they need not be described. Besides these, there are 5 kinds of errors mentioned in III. 37, nine kinds of contentment mentioned in III. 39, twenty-eight kinds of incapacities of the organs mentioned in III-38 and eight kinds of powers mentioned in III-40 (See stanza 47 also). The author of the *Kārikā* says that he has taken the topic from the entire *śaṣṭi tantra* minus the parables (mentioned in chapter IV and the criticisms on other systems (chapters V. and VI.) Is there any doubt left about the identity of the śaṣṭitantra as qualified by so many adjectives ? The description given in the 72nd stanza fully applies to the present Sāṅkhya Sūtras. Can we imagine that a commentator who comments on stanza 72 was ignorant of the Sāṅkhya sūtras which are called *Sāṅkhya Sūtra* by Aniruddha and Sāṅkhya *Pravācāna sūtra* by Viśvaṇa Bhaṣu ? Vāchaspati Miśra is said to have lived in the 9th century (born in A. V. 898).

Alberuni who came to India in the beginning of the 11th century says, " Besides, the Hindus have books about the jurisprudence of their religion, on theosophy, on ascetics, on the process of becoming God and seeking liberation from the world as e. g. the book composed by Gouda, the anchorite, which goes by his name ; the book S'āṅkhya composed by Kapila on divine subjects ; the book of Patanjali on the search for liberation and for the union of the soul with the object for its meditation ; the book *Nyāya bhāṣā* composed by Kapila on the Veda and its interpretation, also showing that it has been created, and distinguishing within the Veda between such injunctions as are obligatory only in certain cases and those which are obligatory in general ; further the book *Mīmāṃsā*

composed by Jaimini on the same subject ; the book *Laukayata* composed by *Brihaspati* treating of the subject that in all investigations, we must exclusively rely upon the apperception of the senses ; the book *Agastya-mata* composed by *Agastya* treating of the subject that in all investigations we must use the apperception of the senses as well as tradition ; and the book *Vishnudharma* ". Sachau's translation, Trubner's edition vol. I. 132.

The above quotation is remarkable ; we must take into consideration the fact that Alberuni was a foreigner, and there were many difficulties in his way in arriving at the correct information of a people who were strangers to him in language and religion. He mentions *Gouda* as an author ; he probably refers to the *Gondapādiya Kārikā* which forms part of the *Māṇḍukya upaniṣat* and on which there is a learned commentary of *S'ankarāchārya*. He perhaps does not mean his commentary which is on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. He further mentions *Kapila* as the author of the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* and *Nyāyabhāṣā*. We have no such work as *Nyāyabhāṣā* available ; it may be an error.

He further says at P. 8 of Sachau's edition in the preface, "I have already translated two books into Arabic one about the *origines* and a description of all created beings called *Sāṅkhya*, and another about the emancipation of the soul from the fetters of the body called *Patanjali* (*Pātanjala* ?) These two books contain most of the elements of the belief of the Hindus, but not all the single rules derived therefrom". It could be of great service to consult the Arabic translation of the *Sāṅkhya*.

The reference made by Alberuni to the *Sāṅkhya* teachings at pp. 62 and 63 of Sachau's edition is to V-83 and V-103. The word *Ātivāhika* is nowhere to be found in the *Kārikā* or in the commentary of *Gouda* on it, but is in the *Pravachana sūtra* V-103. The reference at p. 89 may be compared with chap. III. 48, 49, 50 of the *Sūtras*, stanzas 53 and 54 of the *Kārikā* and chap. IV. 18 of the *Bhagwadgītā*. The reference at P. 92 appears to be to *Sūtra* 46 of chapter III. or stanza 53 of the *Kārika*. There is no need to multiply references, as they are quite sufficient to show that the information that Alberuni derived about the *Sāṅkhya* teaching is from the *Sāṅkhya sūtras*. In this view of the matter I cannot believe that *Vāchaspati* *Mis'ra* was ignorant of *Sāṅkhya sūtras*. If a man does not call a 'spade' a 'spade' but gives its description, can he be called ignorant of it ? It is only a difference of language. We have seen that *Śankara* calls *Kapila's* work *tantra*, *Sāyaṇa* calls it *Sāṅkhya* and *Kārika* calls it *sūpitantra*. This change of nomenclature will not affect the thing itself.

The idea is in the brain and the description of the object exactly corresponds with the Pravachana Sūtra.

Let us see what Abul Fazl the learned writer of the Ayeen-i-Akbery says about Sāṅkhya. According to Gladwin he says in the beginning "The first teacher of this science was Keepel (Kapila) the philosopher." Then follows a meagre description of the doctrine of the Sāṅkhya philosophy without any reference to either the Sūtra or Kārikā. At the end he says "The doctrines of this sect are contained in sixty books which they call Tunter (Tantra)". The learned prime minister probably means the *sasṭi tantra* of the Kārikā.

Vāchaspati Miśra has no doubt made the matter a little difficult by the use of the unhappy and ambiguous language. If the Kārikā alone were there, it leaves no doubt that the *sasṭi tantra* referred to in stanza 72 is no other than the sūtras which go under the name of Pravachana sūtra. We have a quotation in the commentary of Vyāsa on Patanjali IV-13 to the following effect :—

“गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमुच्छति”

“The minutest form of the *gunas* does not come within the range of sight”.

Vāchaspati Miśra on commenting on the passage says “अत्रैव दृष्टिपथमुच्छतिः” “Here is the instruction of the *sasṭi tantra sūtra*.” The quotation in Vyāsa’s commentary reads like a metrical verse and does not find in Kapila Sūtra. The language is not archaic and does not appear to be from any other anterior work; be that as it may, the learned commentator of Vyāsa thinks it from the *sasṭi tantra sūtra*. The idea of this may be compared to Sāṅkya sūtra V. 26.

Further, Vāchaspati Miśra in commenting on sūtra 8 of chap II. Pada 1 of the Vedāntasūtra says,

अतएव योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिताहस्म भगवान् चार्थगण्यः गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमुच्छति । यतु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायैव सुतुच्छकं”

Therefore his holiness, Vārsaganya, the expounder of the Yoga Sāstra said. The minutest form of the *gunas* does not come within the range of the eye; that which comes within the range of sight is mere illusion and trifling”. On the authority of Balarāma and others, Keith is of opinion that the author of the *sastitantra* is Vārsaganya. With great respect to Keith, I am of opinion that Vāchaspati Miśra forgot what he wrote in the commentary on the Yoga and made a confusion.

Again we have in Māthara vṛitti on the commentary on stanza 17. *अपिबोक्तं पटितं 'पुनराचिदितं प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तते'* "Also it is said in the *ṣaṣṭitantra* "the matter acts under the influence of the ego." We again find the same quotation in Gouda's commentary on the same stanza; *"तथाबोक्तं पटितं 'पुनराचिदितं प्रधानं प्रवर्त्तते'*". Similarly it is said in the *ṣaṣṭi tantra*, "the matter acts under the influence of the ego." The passage quoted is like a *sūtra* and is probably an amplification of I-142 of the *Sāṅkhya sūtras*. Though the language quoted may differ from that of the present *sūtras*, yet the learned commentators certainly meant Kapila's *sūtras* which were then known as *ṣaṣṭi tantra* by reason of their laying down sixty topics mentioned in the preceding pages.

Let us now proceed to examine the language and the idea of the *Kārikā* and the *sūtras* which clearly show that the *sūtras* have been put into the *Ārya* metre *verbatim* or their sentiments expressed in a different language.

Kārikā.	Sūtra.
*1. अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघा तान्म- नाऽनवस्थानात् । ७.	विषयोऽविषयोऽप्यतिदूरादेर्हानिपादा नाभ्यामिन्द्रियस्य । १. १०८
*2. सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्ना भावात्कार्यं तस्तदुपलब्धिः । ८।	{ 1. सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः । १. १०९ 2. कार्यं दर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः । १. ११०
*3. असद्व्यवस्थायां दुपादानं ग्रहणात् सर्व संभवा भावात् ।	{ 1. नासद्व्यवस्थायां नृष्टं गवत् । १. ११४ 2. उपादानं नियमात् । १. ११५
शक्तस्य शक्ताकरणात्कारण भावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥६॥ ^३	{ 3. सर्वत्रसर्वदा सर्वासंभवात् । १. ११६ 4. शक्तस्य शक्य करणात् । १. ११७ 5. कारण भावाच्च । १. ११८
*4. हेतुमदनित्यमपि सक्रियमनेक माश्रितं लिङ्गम् ॥१०॥	हेतुमद नित्यमपि सक्रियमनेकमा श्रितं लिङ्गम् । १. १२४
5. त्रिगुणमपि विवेकि विषयः सामान्य मचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ॥११॥	{ 1. अज्ञस्यादभेदतो वागुण सामान्या देस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधानं व्यपदेशाद्वा । १. १२५ 2. त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादिद्वयोः । १. १२६
*6. प्रीत्य प्रीति विषदात्मका..... ।	प्रीत्य प्रीति विषदाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योन्यं वैधर्म्यम् । १. १२७
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजनन मिथुन वृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥	

Kārikā.

Sūtra.

7. सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकं । १३।

8. कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य...
..... १४.

*9. भेदानां परिमाणात्समन्वयाच्छक्तिः प्रवृत्तेश्च १५

10. कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ॥ १६.

*11. संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् । पुरुषोऽस्तिभोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च । १७ ।

*12. जन्म मरण करणानां.....
..... । पुरुषबहुत्वंसिद्धं..... १८.

13. तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य । कैवल्यमाध्यस्थं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९

14. तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् । गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्त्तव्यं भवत्युदासिनः २०।

15. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य । पञ्चध्वजदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः । २१ ।

16. प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोहंकारस्तस्माद्वगणश्वपोऽङ्गशकः । तस्मादपिषोऽङ्गशकत्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्चभूतानि ॥ २२

लघ्वादिधर्मैः साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं चगुणनाम् । १। १२८

कार्यात् कारणानु मानंतत्साहि त्यात् ॥
१। १३५

{ 1. परिमाणात् । १. १३०
2. समन्वयात् । १. १३१
3. शक्तिश्चेति १. १३२
1. कार्यात्कारणानुमानं तत्साहि-
त्यात् १. १३५
2. अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणाह्निं गात् । १। १३६

{ 1. शरीरादि व्यतिरिक्तः पुमान् । १. १३६
2. संघतपरार्थत्वात् । १. १४०
3. त्रिगुणादि विपर्ययात् । १. १४१
4. अधिष्ठानाच्चेति १. १४२
5. भोक्तृभावात् । १. १४३
6. कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १. १४४

जन्मादि व्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वं
सिद्धं ॥ १. १४६

{ 1. साक्षात्सर्वं धात्साक्षित्वं । १. १६१
2. नित्यमुक्तत्वम् । १. १६२
3. औदासीन्यं चेति । १. १६३
उपरागात्कर्तृत्वं चित्तसानिध्याच्चित्त
साक्षिध्यात् ॥ १. १६४

{ प्रधानसृष्टि परार्थं स्वतोऽप्यभोक्तृ
त्वादुष्ट्रकुं कु मवहनवत् । ३. ५८
अनुपभोगेऽपि पुमर्थं सृष्टिः प्रधान-
स्योष्ट्रकुं कु मवहनवत् । ६. ५०

..... प्रकृतेर्महान् महतोहंकारोऽहंका-
रात् पञ्च तन्मात्राण्युभयमिन्द्रियं
तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष
इति पञ्चविंशतिर्गणः ॥ १. ६१

Kārikā.	Sūtra.
*17. अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मोऽज्ञानं विराग पेश्वर्यम् । सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपंतामस मस्माद्विपर्यस्तम् । २३.	{ 1. अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः । २. १३ 2. तत्कार्यं धर्मादि । २. १४ 3. महदुपरागाद्विपरीतम् । २. १५
*18. अभिमानोऽहंकारस्तस्माद् द्विवि- धः प्रवर्तते सर्गः । एकादशश्च गणस्तन्मात्रः पञ्चकश्चैव । २४	{ 1. अभिमानोऽहंकारः । २. १६ 2. एकादश पञ्चतन्मात्रयत्कार्यम् । २. १७
*19. सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वै कृतादहंकारात् । २५	सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहं- कारात् ॥ १. १८
20. बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि..... कर्मैन्द्रियाण्याहुः । २६ ।	कर्मैन्द्रियबुद्धीन्द्रियैरांतरमेकादशकम् ॥ २. १६
*21. उभयात्मक मन्त्रमनः..... । गुण परिणा मविशेषान्नानात्वं..... २७ ।	{ 1. उभयात्मकं मनः । २. २६ 2. गुणपरिणामभेदाद्विज्ञानात्वमवस्था- वत् । २. २७
22. रूपादिषु..... । वचना दानविहरणोत्सर्गानंदाश्च पंचा नाम् ॥ २८ ॥	रूपादिरसमलांत उभयोः । १. २८
*23. स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य ॥ सामान्य करण- वृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पंच ॥ २९	{ 1. त्रयाणां स्वालक्षण्यम् । २. ३० 2. सामान्य करण वृत्तिः प्राणाद्यावा- यवः पंच ॥ २. ३१
24. युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा ३० ॥	क्रमशोऽक्रमशश्चैन्द्रिय वृत्तिः २. ३२
25. स्वां स्वांप्रति पथंते.....कार्यते करणम् ३१	{ According to Vijñāna Bhikṣu. धेनुवद् त्साय ॥ २. ३०
26. करणं त्रयोदशविधं ३२	करणं त्रयोदशविधमवांतरभेदात् । २. ३८
27. सर्वप्रत्युपभोगं.....सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३३	समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धेः प्राधान्यम् लोकव- लोकवत् । २. ४७
28. तन्मात्राण्य विशेषास्तेभ्यो भूता- नि पंच पञ्चभ्यः । एते स्मृता विशेषाः ॥ ३८ ॥	अविशेषाद्विषेपारंभः ॥ ३. १

Kārikā.

Sūtra.

29. सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सहप्रभृतैः...
सूक्ष्मा स्तेषां नियता माता पितृ-
जा निर्वर्तते ॥ ३६ ।

30. पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं४० ॥

*31. चित्रं यथाभ्रयमृते स्थाएवादि
भ्यो विना यथाछाया.....४१

32. पुरुषार्थं हेतुकमिदं
नटबद्ध व्यवतिष्ठतेलिंगम् । ४२ ॥

*33. ज्ञानेनचापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते
बंधः ॥ ४४

*34. पंचविपर्ययभेदा भवंत्यशक्तिस्तु
करणवैकल्यात् । अष्टाविंशति
भेदानुष्ठिनंबंधाऽष्टधा सिद्धिः
॥ ४७ ॥

35. भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधोमेह स्यच
दशविधो महामेहः । तामिसोऽष्टा
दशधा तथाभवत्यंधतामिसः । ४८

36. एकादशेन्द्रियबन्धाः सह बुद्धि
बधैरशक्ति रुद्धिष्टा । सप्तदश बन्धा
बुद्धेर्विपर्ययानुष्टि सिद्धिनां ॥ ४९

39. आध्यात्मिक्यश्चतस्र॥
.....नवतुष्टयोभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

40. ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःख विघाता
खयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः । दानं च सिद्ध
योऽष्टौ५१ ॥

52. नभावैलिंगं नविनालिगेनभावनि-
वृत्तिः ॥ ॥ ५२ ॥

53. अष्टचिकित्सादैव स्तैर्यग्योनश्च
पंचधामवति ॥ ॥ ५३ ॥

मातापितृजं स्थूलं प्रायशद्विस्तरतया
॥ ३. ७

पूर्वोत्पत्ते स्तत्कार्यत्वंभोगादेकस्यने-
तरस्य ॥ ३. ८

नस्वातंत्र्यात्तद्वृत्तेछायावच्चित्रवच्च ॥ ३. ९

पुरुषार्थसंस्तुतिलिंगानांसूपकारवद्राजः
॥ ३. १०

{ 1. ज्ञानानुक्तिः । ३. २३
2. बंधो विपर्ययात् ॥ ३. २४

{ 1. विपर्ययभेदाः पंच । ३. ३७
2. तुष्टिर्नबंधा । ३. ३६
3. अशक्ति रष्टाविंशतिधा तु । ३. ३८
4. सिद्धि रष्टधा ॥ ३. ४०

अवांतरभेदाः पूर्ववत् ॥ ३. ४१

एवमितरस्याः । ३. ४२

आध्यात्मकादि भेदान्नबन्धा तुष्टिः ।
३. ४३

ऊहादिभिः सिद्धिः । ३. ४४

{ According to Vijñāna Bhikṣu.
{ नेतरादितरहानेनविना ॥ ३. ४५
देवादि प्रभेदा ॥ ३. ४६

Kārikā.

Sūtra.

*54. ऊर्ध्वं सत्वविशालस्तमो विशालश्च
मूलतः सर्गः । मध्ये रजोविशालो
ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्त ॥ ५४

Compare Bhagawadgita IV. 18.

55. तत्र जरामरणं कृतं ॥ ५५ ॥

56. इत्येष प्रकृतिं कृतो महदादि विशेष
भूत पर्यन्तः । प्रतिपुरुष विमोक्षार्थं
स्वार्थं इव परार्थं आरम्भः ॥ ५६

57. वृत्तं विवृद्धिं निमित्तं क्षोरस्य यथा
प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य । पुरुषविमोक्षं निमित्तं
तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

58. रंगस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्त्तते नर्तकी
यथानृत्यात् ॥ पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं
प्रकाशय निवर्त्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५८

59. नानाविधैरुपायै रकारिण्यनुप-
कारिणः पुंसः ६० ॥

60. प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरं न किञ्चिदस्ता-
तिमेमतिर्भवति ॥ यादृग्वास्मोति
पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

61. तरुणाञ्च वध्यते नापि मुच्यते ना-
पि संसरति कश्चित् ॥ संसरति
वध्यते मुच्यते च नानाशया प्रकृ-
तिः ॥ ६२

*62. रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु वधनात्यात्मान-
मात्मना प्रकृतिः । सैव च पुरुषार्थं
प्रतिविमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

*63. एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासाद्वास्मिन्मेनाह-
मित्यपरिशेषम् ॥ अविपर्ययाद्वि-
शुद्धं केवलं मुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

*64. ...चक्रभ्रमणं बहु धृतं शरीरः ॥ ६५

65. प्राप्ते शरीर भेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्र-
धानविनिवृत्ती ॥ ऐकांतिकमा-
त्यंतिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

{ 1. ऊर्ध्वं सत्व विशाला ॥ ३. ४८
2. तमो विशाला मूलतः ॥ ३. ४९
3. मध्ये रजोविशाला ॥ ३. ५०

समानं जरामरणादि दुःखं ॥ ३. ५३
कर्मवैचित्त्यात् प्रधानं चेष्टा गर्भं दास-
वत् ॥ ३. ५१

{ 1. अचेतनत्वेऽपि क्षोरवच्चेष्टितं
प्रधानस्य ॥ ३. ५६
2. धनुवद्धत्वाय ॥ २. ३७
नर्तकोद्यत्प्रवृत्तस्यापि निवृत्तिश्चारिता-
यात् ॥ ३. ६६

नैरपेक्षेऽपि प्रकृत्युपकारेऽविवेको
निमित्तम् ॥ ३. ६८
दोषबोधेऽपि नापसर्पणं प्रधानस्य
कुलव धूवत् ॥ ३. ७०

{ 1. नैकांतो बंध मोक्षो पुरुषस्या
विवेकादृते ॥ ३. ७१
2. प्रकृतेराज्ञस्यात् ससंगत्वात् पशु-
वत् ॥ ३. ७२

रूपैः सप्तभिरात्मानं वधनाति प्रधानं
कोशकारवद्विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥
३. ७२

तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नेति नेनोतित्यागागद्विवेक-
सिद्धिः ॥ ३. ७५

चक्रभ्रमणं बहु धृतं शरीरः ॥ ३. ८२
विवेकान्निः शेष दुःख निवृत्ती कृत-
कृत्यतान्ने तरानंतरात् ३. ८४ ॥

The passages of the Kārikā marked by me with asterisks are *verbatim* reproductions from the Pravachana sūtra; the other stanzas without the asterisks embody the idea of the sūtras. Reading the parallelisms in language and thought in conjunction with the concluding stanza of the Kārikā, one cannot come to any conclusion other than that the Kārikā is an epitome of the 1st three chapters of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras. The remaining three chapters of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras are expressly excluded.

Further, the Sāṅkhya sūtras are in the archaic Sūtra style, but the Kārikā has been written in the Aryā Jāti metre which belongs to the post-Vedic period. All these facts conclusively show that the present Pravachana sūtras are genuine but not spurious.

The next question for determination is, at what age of the philosophical period these sūtras of Kapila were written. I have already said in the preceding pages that the whole philosophical literature of the orthodox school was in its fully developed state before Buddhism and Jainism flourished in India. It took several centuries in its development, one borrowing or criticising the thoughts of another. In spite of this, there was a sequence, one following the other; in my view, the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy was founded after the systems of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya as described in the preceding pages. Kapila has referred to those systems in an express language, but has not left any thing on that point for our imagination.

नवयं षट् पदार्थं वादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत् । १ २५.

We are not supporters of the six categories like the system of philosophy of Vaiśeṣika" etc.

न षट् पदार्थं नियमस्त द्वोधात्मकः ॥ ५. ८५.

"Nor is the salvation from the rule of the six categories and knowledge thereof."

षोडशादिष्वप्येवम् ५. ८६.

"Nor is it from the sixteen principles."

This alludes to the Nyāya system of philosophy of Gaṇapati. It appears that the Pravachana sūtra borrowed the definition of Śabda from Nyāya; cf. Sāṅkhya 1-101 with Nyāya 1-1-7.

When the author of the Sāṅkhya sūtras tauntingly speaks of the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy, he certainly refers to the old school of Kapāda, who was either anterior to him, or his contemporary, but not to the neo-Vaiśeṣika school which flourished in the post-Buddhist period and in which there were added seven categories. (See Anna Bhatta's

Tarka Samgraha). Had the sūtras been written in the sixteenth century A.C, the author would have called the Vais'eṣika system as the system of seven categories (सप्तवर्गवादिनः).

Tarka samgraha and Bhāṣāparicheḍha are the treatises of the Neo-Vais'eṣika school; in them we have seven categories instead of the six categories of Kaṇāda. *Abhāva*, non-entity or non-existence, has been treated as the 7th category in addition to the already mentioned six categories of Kaṇāda.

In sūtra 28 of chapter I of the Pravachana sūtras, we find the names of two countries, namely, Pāṭali putra and Sruggha. The former is the name of 'patilothra' of the Greeks now known as Patna. Sruggha is mentioned by Hiuen Tsiang as 400 li from Thanewar. According to the Gazeteer of Dehra Dun, it includes Dehra Dun, Saharanpur and Ambala. These names were known in the sūtra period of the Sanscrit Literature and subsequent to it. Had the sūtras been written in the 16th. century of the Christian era, these places would have been called after their new nomenclature. I am strongly of opinion that the Pravachana sūtras were written before the pre-Buddhistic period.

They were written before Patañjali, the founder of the yoga system of philosophy. We have yoga in its rudimentary form in the Pravachana sūtras, and there are sūtras, which are *verbatim* reproductions from the Sāmkhya in the Yoga sūtras, as appears from the comparative table given below :—

Sāmkhya.	Yoga.
1. वृत्तयः पञ्चतयः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः। २. ३३.	वृत्तयः पञ्चतयः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ॥१५.
2. स्थिरसुखमासनम् । ३. ३४.	स्थिरसुखमासनम् २. ४६.
3. वैराग्या दम्यास्ताञ्च ॥ ३. ३६.	अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ॥१२.

असंशय महाबाहो मनो दुर्निग्रहं चरं ॥

अभ्यासेन तु कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च गृह्यते ॥ Gita, VI 35.

Now the question is whether the Sāmkhya borrowed the *sūtras* from the Yoga or the latter borrowed them from the former. As said in the preceding pages, the Sāmkhya and Yoga constitute one group, one being the supplementary of the other. The Sāmkhya is the theoretical and the Yoga is the practical side of the same philosophy.

The sceptical school of Samkhya as appears from chapter I. sūtra 92, V. 2-12, doubts the existence of *Is'wara*; but the yoga sūtras have taken

a special care to describe *Is'wara* in I-24-28. The Yoga is, therefore, an improvement on the Sāmkhya; the 25 elements of Sāmkhya become 26 in Yoga.

क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः । १. २५.

"*Is'wara* is a kind of *Parusha* untouched by troubles, action, fruit and desires." The word *purusha* is a peculiar phraseology of Sāmkhya. It leaves no doubt that it is to meet the argument of *Pravachana sūtras* that *Is'wara* is described and defined in the sūtra. When Yoga explains *Samādhi*, it says in chapter I, 23 how to obtain it; it is by means of devotion to *Is'wara*. This view of Patanjali as to the devotion to God was subsequently developed by the *Bhakti* school founded in the names of Nārada and Sāṇḍilya. We do not find the idea of devotion to God in the Sāmkhya Sūtras. It is in order to reconcile the Sāmkhya and Yoga schools, that the *Bhagawadgītā* says,

लोकेऽस्मिन् द्विविधानिष्ठपुराप्रोक्ता मयानघ ।

ज्ञानयोगेन सांख्यानं कर्म योगेन योगिनाम् ॥ ३. ३.

"I spoke of two kinds of practices formerly in this world, O ? sinless; that of the Sāmkhya by knowledge (*jñāna* Yoga) and that of Yoga by action (*karma* yoga).

सांख्ययोगौ पृथग्वाला प्रवदन्ति न पंडिताः ॥

एकमप्याखितं स्वस्म्यगुणभयो विंदते फलम् ॥ ३. ४.

यत्सांख्यैः प्राप्यतेत्थानं तद्योगैरपि गम्यते ।

एकं साख्यं च योगं च यः पश्यति स पश्यति ॥ ५.

"The ignorant but not the learned men speak differently of the Sāmkhya and Yoga; one who practises one thoroughly obtains the fruit of both. Whatever position one secures by the Sāmkhya, is also obtained by the Yoga. One who sees the harmony in Sāmkhya and Yoga sees (in reality)." Some are of opinion that the terms 'Sāmkhya' and 'Yoga' are used in a different sense and do not allude to the two systems of philosophy. Be that as it may, it is admitted on all hands that these two systems of philosophy are supplements of each other and are classed under one group. The Yoga is an improvement on the Sāmkhya and later in date. In support of the view that the Yoga system is subsequent to the Sāmkhya, we refer to the commentary of Vyāsa where the following words occur at the end of each chapter :—

"इति श्री पातंजले सांख्यप्रवचने योगशास्त्रे"

The above quotation leaves no doubt that the Yoga is a branch of Sāṅkhya Pravachana. Let us see how Mādhavāchārya calls the Sāṅkhya system in his Sarvadars'ana. In the concluding part of the summary of the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya school at P. 124 of Sarvadars'ana samgraha, Anandās'rama edition, it is said :—

“एतदर्थं निरोधरसांख्यशास्त्रं कपिलानुसारिणाम् मतमुपन्यस्तम्” ।

“With this object, the view of Kapila, the founder of the atheistic school of Sāṅkhya has been set forth.” This last sentence of Sarvadars'ana samgraha clearly refers to the following sāmkyha sūtras though not cited by him :—

ईश्वरा सिद्धे : । १. १२.

“On account of the non-proof of Is'wara.”

The author of the Sāṅkhya school says that the definition of perception as embodied in sūtra 89, does not apply to the existence of Is'wara. The *buddhi* as animated by the reflection of the *purusa*, cannot come into contact with him. No harm is done thereby, nor is the definition faulty, because Is'wara is not an object of perception.

नेश्वराधिष्ठितेफलनिष्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः । ५. ३.

“Under the superintendence of Iswara, no fruit can be obtained, as that is achieved by action.” The objector is supposed to allege—“You say that the existence of the Lord cannot be proved by means of perception as laid down in Sūtra 92 of chapter I ; but the awarding of the fruit of one's action is due to the superintendence of the Lord.” To this objection of the objector, the reply of the author is embodied in the present sūtra. He says that the rewards depend on one's own action.

स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत् । ५. ३.

“The superintendence is for one's own benefit just as in ordinary life.”

The author further develops his argument thus : “We see in ordinary life that superintendence is for one's own benefit ; if you hold that the Lord is supervising the awards of fruits, you will have to admit his superintendence for his self-interest ; but the Lord is not selfish.”

लोकेश्वरवदितरथा ॥ ५. ४.

“Otherwise he would be like the lord of the people.”

The author proceeds further and says—“If you hold Him to be selfish as said in the preceding sūtra, there will be no difference between Him and a worldly king immersed in miseries with limited knowledge.

पारिभाषिकोवा ॥ ५. ५.

“Or He may be in name’

The author's argument is, that if you say that it is a mere creative force which manifests itself in the beginning of the creation, it is not eternal, but will be only for the purpose of a definition.

नरागादृते तत्सिद्धिः प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात् । ५. ६.

“Without attachment it cannot happen, because of the fixed cause of each.”

The author argues, that every effect has invariably a cause, so the Lord's superintendence cannot be without a motive.

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मंदोपि प्रवर्त्तते ।

जगच्च सृजतस्तस्य किनामनकृतं भवेत् ॥

“Even a fool does not act without an object ; is it that the Creator of the universe acts without it” ?

तद्योगेऽपि नित्यमुक्तः ॥ ५. ७.

“In conjunction with it also, He is not always free.”

The author says in the present sūtra, that if you hold that the Lord is actuated by a motive, He can not be free (nityamukta); you thereby commit a fallacy of shifting of ground (siddhānta hāni). There are two alternatives left ; either the Lord acts in conjunction with nature or by His proximity to matter His action is like that of magnet and iron, and activity is produced. He proceeds to refute both the views in the following two sūtras :

प्रधानशक्तियोगश्चेत् संगापत्तिः ॥ ८.

“If (you say that) by reason of the conjunction with the power of the matter, then there will arise the defect of association.”

The author says that if you hold the first view, viz., that the Lord manifests himself in conjunction with nature, you attribute to Him the association of things which is contrary to the Vedic text “अवंगो ह्यवंपुत्रः” । (Puruṣa is attached or associated with none) See chapter I. 15.

सत्तामात्राच्चेत् सर्वैश्वर्यम् ॥ ९.

“If (you say that) it is mere existence, then all worldliness.”

If you hold the last view, viz., that by virtue of the proximity to nature, the intelligence is produced like the magnetic power attracting a piece of iron, in that case all persons will be Lords and your position that there is one God will not be tenable.

प्रमाणाभावाज्जतिसिद्धिः ॥ १०॥

“For want of the means of proof His existence cannot be proved.”

The author says that the existence of God cannot be proved by any of the means of proof accepted by him in chapter I. He has already spoken in chapter I. 92 of the perception by which you cannot prove the existence of God.

संबन्धाभावाच्चानुमानम् ॥११॥

"There is no inference for want of relationship."

The author says, that as there is no relationship of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the container (vyāpaka) and the contained (vyāpya); there can be no inference. In order to have the applicability of *anumāna* under the Nyāya system, there must be a concomitance (vyāpti); but as there is no perception of God giving rise to experience, there can be no relation of concomitance. It will be clear from the following example.

The mountain is fiery.

∴ It smokes.

This knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire is based on the past experience, because we perceive that smoke cannot exist without fire. As no one has seen God, one cannot predicate such invariable concomitance in the case of God. So the second means of proof does not apply in proving the existence of God.

श्रुतिरपि प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य ॥१२॥

"The Scripture also refers to the effect of nature."

The author now proceeds to show that the S'ruti texts, while referring to the primordial cause, mean nature or matter. On this sūtra, Aniruddha quotes "प्रचानादवगदु स्वदत्ते" 'the universe proceeds from matter', but Vijñāna Bhikṣu has quoted the fifth verse from chap. IV of the S'wetāś'watara upanishad.

अजोमेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णानां बह्वीः प्रजा सृजमानां सुरुपाः ।

अजो ह्येकोजुपमाणानु शेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोन्यः ॥

"One unborn (Paruṣa) being served, enjoys another unborn (prakṛiti) of red, white and black colours, creating many uniform created things. Another unborn relinquishes it after enjoyment". Compare it with III. 69 and III. 70 of the Sāṃkhya and 59 and 61 stanzas of the kārīkā. Vijñāna Bhikṣu has tried to reconcile the passage with the doctrines of the Vedānta; while Sankarāchārya has commented on it differently.

The author of the Sāṃkhya says, that you cannot prove the existence of God by means of the *pramānas* (means of knowledge) which are only

three according to him, (perception, inference and verbal testimony). The position is very clear; Mādhavāchārya had clearly these sūtras in his mind when he called the Sāṃkhya system as the atheistic school of philosophy. You may in vain search in the kārīkā for the expression of such views.

Let us see what Mādhavāchārya says at the outset of the description of the Yoga of Patanjali.

“सांप्रतं सेश्वरसांख्यं प्रवर्तकपञ्चन प्रभृति मुनिप्रत मनुवर्त्तमानानामत-
मुपन्यस्यते । तत्सांख्यप्रवचनारत्नामयेयं योगशास्त्रं पतञ्जलप्रणीतं पाद-
चतुष्टयात्मकम्” ।

“Now the view of the followers of the system of Patanjali &c, the founder of the theistic school of Sāṃkhya is herein set forth. There is the Yoga sūtra composed by Patanjali, also named Sāṃkhya Pravachana, and possessed of four chapters.” This quotation supports me in my view that the Yoga system of philosophy was founded subsequently to the Sāṃkhya system in order to check the agnostic tendencies produced by it.

See also the introduction to the Pravachana sūtras by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his learned commentary :—

नन्वेवंतत्त्वसमासाख्यसूत्रैः सहास्याः षडध्यायाः पौनरुक्त्य मिति चेन्मै-
वम् । संक्षेपविस्तर रूपेणामयोरप्यपौनरुक्त्यात् । अतएवास्याः षडध्यायायोग-
दर्शनस्यैव सांख्यप्रवचनं संज्ञा युक्ता । तत्त्वसमासाख्यैर्द्वयत्संक्षिप्तं सांख्य-
दर्शनंतस्यैव प्रकर्षेणास्यां निर्वचनमिति । विशेषस्त्वयं यत् षडध्यायायां तत्त्व-
समासाख्याकार्यविस्तरमात्रम् योगदर्शने त्वाभ्यामभ्युपगमवाद् प्रतिषेध-
स्यैवेश्वरस्य निरूपणेन न्यूनता परिहारोपीति ॥

“If it be said that the book with six chapters is a mere repetition of the Tattwa Samāsa, it is not so. One is brief and the other is in detail ; in that sense, it is a repetition. The six chapters of the work with Yoga are called Sāṃkhya Pravachana. In the Tattwa samāsa, there is a brief summary of the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy that has been well discussed herein. Further, in the six chapters the subjects, of the Tattwa samāsa have been given in details. In the Yoga system of philosophy by describing Is'wara denied by implication in these (two works), the deficiency is made up.

It is now satisfactorily proved that the yoga system of philosophy is supplementary to the Sāṃkhya system from the evidence of the eminent authorities like Mādhavāchārya and Vijñāna Bhikṣu.

There is a sūtra in chapter IV. 3 in the Pravaçhana sūtra which is reproduced word for word in the Vedānta sūtra chapter IV, Pada IV sūtra 1. Is there any explanation for the parallelism? In view of the facts as stated above there is not the least doubt that the Vedānta sūtra is a repetition of the Sāmkhya Sūtra.

The Mahābhārata is a voluminous work. According to the European and Indian scholars, its compilation lasted for several centuries extending to the 8th century of the Christian Era when it assumed its present form. At several places, it has given the Sāmkhya view of three *Gunas* and 25 elements. It has attempted to reconcile both the Sāmkhya and Yoga systems of philosophy. The view of the Mahābhārata is that the Yoga system of philosophy treats of the 26th element, *viz.*, Is'wara. We also find therein that Kapila was the founder of the Sāmkhya system of philosophy, that his pupil was Āsuri, and that Āsuri's pupil was Pāṇḍas'ikṣā. The philosophical Sāmkhya is converted into a religious system. We also find that the Purāṇic literature is very much influenced by the teachings of the Sāmkhya. The same thing is in the Tantras, which are rightly or wrongly believed to be the results of the Sāmkhya teachings.

Chāṇakya who lived in the time of Chandra Gupta wrote Artha S'āstra which is called Kautiliyam Artha Sāstram. He recommends the study of Anvikṣaki; the definition of anvikṣaki is given at p. 16 of the Mysore edition of the book.

साख्यं योगो लोकायतं चेत्यान्वीक्षकी ॥

Anvikṣaki means or includes Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata schools of philosophy. The passage quoted shows that the Sāmkhya system of philosophy was studied at the time of Chandra Gupta. If Lalitavistara is to be relied on, the Sāmkhya, Yoga and Vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy were included in the curriculum of the Budha's study (see chapter XII. at p. 179 Bibliotheca edition 1877). From all these authorities, it is clear that the Sāmkhya sūtras are very old and belong to the pre-Buddhistic period in the Indian history.

We now come to the modern time; Madhusudana Saraswati has written Prasthānabheda. In it he has given an account of the most important works of Sanscrit literature. At p. 9 of the Anandāsrama edition of the series, No. 51, he says :—

तथा सांख्य शास्त्रं भगवता कपिलेन प्रणीतम् । अथत्रिविधं दुःखात्यन्तनि-
वृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थं इत्यादि षडध्यायम् । तत्र प्रथमेऽध्याये विषया निरूपिताः ।

द्वितीयेऽध्याये प्रधानं कार्यणि । तृतीयेऽध्याये विषयेभ्यो वैराग्यम् । चतुर्थेऽध्या-
ये विरक्तानां पिंगला कुरवादीनां माध्यायिकाः । पञ्चमाध्याये परपक्षनिर्णयः ।
षष्ठे सर्वार्थतत्त्वयः । प्रकृतिपुरुष विवेकज्ञान सांख्यशास्त्रस्य प्रयोजनम् ॥

"Similarly the Sāmkhya Sāstra was composed by the venerable Kapila. 'The *summum bonum* or the highest effort consists in the removal of three kinds of miseries', (I. 1) and the rest are in six chapters. In the first chapter, the subjects have been described ; in the second chapter, the effect of nature ; in the third chapter, the disaffection from the worldly objects ; in the 4th chapter there is a parable of the disaffected, such as Pingalā (IV. 11) and falcon (IV. 5). In the fifth chapter, there is a criticism on the adversary's position ; in the sixth there is a summary of the whole subject. The end of the Sāmkhya philosophy is the correct knowledge of the object (*prakṛiti*) and subject (*puruṣa*).'' See Max Muller also at pp. 80 and 81 of the Six Systems of Indian philosophy.

This leaves no doubt that the Pravachana sūtras existed at the time of Madhu sūdana Saraswatī, who is also a commentator on the Bhagawadgītā. I have not been able to ascertain his exact date. He certainly lived after Śāṅkarāchārya, as he expressly refers to him at page 7 of the Pra thāna-bheda while treating of the Vedānta system of philosophy. He like Rāmānuja divided the Bhagwadgita into three *ṣaṭkas* viz., Karma, Bhakti and Jñāna.

I am not unmindful of the reference made to Panchas'ikhā in the Pravachana sūtras (VI. 68). Panchas'ikhā was the disciple of Āsuri, the disciple of Kapila. He might have been a contemporary of Kapila. He certainly lived at the time when the Sāmkhya system fully developed by Kapila, was studied ; and the sūtra VI. 68 might have been subsequently added at the time when Panchas'ikha's view was accepted. He belonged to the Sāmkhya school of philosophy ; the fact that the names of the prominent followers are mentioned in the Pravachana sūtra does not detract from its antiquity. It very often occurs in both the Mimāṃsa schools of philosophy. For these reasons, I am strongly in favour of the antiquity of the Pravachana Sūtras, and with due deference to the learning of Fitz Edward Hall, Max Muller and Bālas'āstrin, I would dissent from their views.

In the first chapter of the Pravachana sūtras, the author has criticised certain views which subsequently became the special tenets of Māyāvāda of Śāṅkarāchārya, Kṣāṇikavāda of Kalyāṇarakṣita, Vijñānavāda of Asaṅga and Vasubandha, and S'ūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna. All the atheistic

schools enumerated above, are not mentioned by names ; but the criticisms expressed in the sūtras according to the scholiasts, relate to the tenets of the above-said different heterodox schools. The tenets of the atheistic school of philosophy were subsequently embodied in the books. It appears that there were critics who raised the objections to the view expressed by the author, and he meets them in his sūtras. This kind of practice we find in all systems of philosophy, as said repeatedly. Brihaspati and Chārvāka who were the forerunners of Sākyamuni and Rishabha, perhaps existed at the time when the philosophical system came to be written or learnt in the sūtra form. By criticising the atheistic view which was not the special property of any school at that time, one cannot necessarily come to the conclusion that the Pravachana sūtras have been written after Buddhism or Vedantism came into existence.

It may be that the author was discussing the possible or imaginary objections which subsequently became fossilised in the doctrines of the heterodox schools of philosophy named after their founders. The discussion of these imaginary objections can not, therefore, help us under the circumstances of the case in determining the date of the Pravachana sūtras ; and any attempt to fix the date on such discussion is, in my opinion, highly misleading.

The Pravachana sūtras are certainly older than Buddhism and Jainism, but later than the Vaiśeṣika sūtras of Kaṇāda. The Tattwa samāsa was subsequently composed and it is a mere summary or enumeration of different categories. It was written with a view to help a student of the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy in committing the different heads enumerated in the Pravachana sūtras to memory. The Sāṅkhya Kārikā was written after the Tattwa Samāsa, for it follows the latter in the enumeration of the twenty-five elements mentioned in Sutra I, 61.

Sāṅkhya Kārikā seems to have been written at the time when Buddhism was flourishing in India. The stanza no 2 refers to the Vedic rites which, as it describes, are "impure and full of slaughter;" but nowhere do we find such a strong language against the Vedic ceremonies in the Pravachana sūtras excepting the sūtra 6 of chapter I which has been interpreted by Viṣṇāna Bhikṣu in consonance with the view of Īś'wara Kṛṣṇa. According to him the Vedic rites also fall short of removing the three-fold pain and obtaining redemption. The author of the Pravachana sūtras had a regard for the Vedas which he considered to be of divine origin (apauruṣeya).

The substance of what has been stated above is, that nowhere in the existing Sāmkhya literature we find the sceptical view expounded, except in the Sāmkhya Pravachana sūtras, the antiquity of which is clearly proved from the concluding stanza of the Sāmkhya Kārikā. The sūtras, therefore, represent the ancient view of the atheistic school of philosophy. Owing to this, they became so such unpopular, that their study was neglected in favour of the Kārikā. They are even now nowhere studied in the universities, and have become a matter of ancient history ; as to their antiquity and authenticity, there can be no doubt from what we have seen above.

As to the teachings of the philosophy of Sāmkhya, we have already seen that Kapila believes in the existence of *ego* and *non-ego*. The *ego* of Sāmkhya is the *puruṣa*, an intelligent substance, not affected by the *guṇas* of the non-ego, and tries to shake off the bondage of ignorance in order to achieve redemption which consists in the total eradication of three sorts of the miseries natural to human flesh. The non-ego is the *prakṛiti* or *pradhāna*, (nature or matter). It is inanimate and inactive, but appears active and intelligent in contact with the *puruṣa*. According to Kapila, the *prakṛiti* is the equilibrium of three *guṇas* called *Sattwa*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. They are not like qualities of the Vais'eṣika school of philosophy, but real entities not visible or coming within the range of sight. "The *Satva* is characterised with smoothness, conformability, lightness and illumination. *Rajas* is characterised with fierceness, opposition, production and unstability. *Tamas* is characterised with pervasion, heaviness, stability and ignorance. Happiness preponderates in *Satva*, misery in *Rajas* and ignorance in *Tamas*." See *Siddhānta Dars'anam* Vol. XXIX of the series at P. 9. When the equilibrium of these *guṇas* is disturbed, *mahat* alias *buddhi* is produced from the *prakṛiti* as shown in the table below :—

Prakṛiti (equipoise of *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*).

|
Mahat alias Buddhi (Intellect)

|
Ahaṁkāra. (I-maker)

|
Sensory and motor organs and *manas*

|
5 subtle elements

|
5 gross elements.

From the above table, we see that the *prakṛiti* is the root cause (*mūla-prakṛiti*) but not an effect of any other cause ; but on the other hand *mahat*, *ahāṁkāra* and the five subtle elements are both causes and effects, and are called by the author of the Kārikā the seven *prakṛiti-vikṛitis* as

being both producers and products. The eleven sense organs and the five gross elements are mere products and called *Vikritis* or modifications. They produce nothing in their turn. This view of the Sāṅkhya philosophy is philosophically known as *pariṇāmavāda* or the doctrine of evolution. The ego or *puruṣa* is neither *prakṛiti* nor *vikṛiti*; he is unaffected, and all the activities of nature are for his sake. He neither acts nor enjoys and is, therefore, called *asaṅga* or unaffected, just as a transparent crystal appears red in contact with a red china lily, so does *puruṣa* appear to be affected in conjunction with the *prakṛiti*. When the *puruṣa* comes to realise that he is pure, intelligent, inactive and unaffected, by constant practice of meditation on his real self, the *prakṛiti*, ashamed of being recognised by him like a wedded woman of a good family, disappears from his sight and releases him from her shackles.

The philosophy of Sāṅkhya is European Realism and has found favour with the Europeans. The study of sāmkhya which fell in disfavour amongst the Indians, has been popularised by the Europeans. It is a common-sense view of philosophy, and is distinguishable from Idealism and Transcendentalism of the Vedānta School of philosophy.

There are according to Kapila many 'egos'; they are as many as there are individuals, because they are governed separately by birth and death.

According to Sāṅkhya there are only two eternal entities; one *puruṣa* and the other *prakṛiti*. The latter lasts as long as there is ignorance (*Avidyā*). Upon these two entities, the fabric of the whole *cosmos* containing both the animate and the inanimate is based. There is no other creator. We have seen in the preceding pages, while discussing the atheistic view of Kapila, that he does not believe in *I'swara*.

We now come to the important doctrine of perception according to Sāṅkhya. The *puruṣa* as said above is *asaṅga* (entirely unaffected); the *buddhi* or intellect becomes animated by the reflection of the *puruṣa*, goes to the objects through the channel of senses, meets them and gets converted into objects. Thus results perception or consciousness. He gives an illustration of a transparent crystal; it is pure and white: but when a red flower is placed in its proximity, it appears red. Similarly the *puruṣa* appears to be affected in contact with the *prakṛiti* but in reality he is unaffected. This doctrine of Sāṅkhya is called *Ābhāsa*. When the red flower is removed, the transparent crystal regains its pure white colour; similarly the *puruṣa* on the disappearance of the *prakṛiti* remains pure and unaffected as he is in reality. *Vijñāna Bhikṣu* has explained the doctrine of *Ābhāsa* thoroughly in his commentary on sūtra 87 of chapter I.

If examined minutely the view of Sāṃkhya does not conflict with that of the Vedānta philosophy. As it is not the occasion to discuss the points at present, I leave it to be dealt with at its proper time.

Keith in "Sāṃkhya system" in the "Heritage of India" series while comparing the teachings of Sāṃkhya with those of the Greek philosophers, says "*απειρον* of Anaximander had been compared with the nature of the Sāṃkhya and the doctrines of the constant flow of things and of the innumerable destructions and renewals of the world found in Heraclitus are no doubt similar to tenets of the Indian system. Empedocles like the Sāṃkhya asserts the doctrine of the pre-existence of the product in the cause. Anaxagoras is a dualist, Democritus agrees with Empedocles in his doctrine of causality and believes in the purely temporary existence and mortality of the gods. Epicurus uses in support of his atheism the argument of the Sāṃkhya, that otherwise the divine nature must be accorded attributes which are inconsistent with its supposed character and often emphasises the doctrine of infinite possibilities of production."

"Garbe adds to these parallels which he admits not to be conclusive evidence of borrowing, the fact that Persia was a perfectly possible place in which Greek thinkers, of whom travels are often recorded, should acquire knowledge of the Indian views, and supports his opinion that borrowing is probable by the case of Pythagoras, who is supposed to have borrowed from India his theory of transmigration, his conception of a religious community, his distinction of a fine and gross body of the soul, his distinction of a sensitive organ, *θυμος* and of the unperishable soul, *φρην*, his doctrine of an intermediate world between earth and sky filled by demons, the doctrine of five elements including ether, the Pythagorean problem, the irrational and other things."

"It is further not necessary seriously to consider the possibilities of borrowing on the part of Plato or of Aristotle, though the influence of the Sāṃkhya has been seen in the case of both. More plausible is the effort to find proof of Sāṃkhya doctrines in Gnosticism, an attempt to which there is not *a priori* any reason to take exception."

"Plotinus held that his object was to free men from misery through his philosophy, that spirit and matter are essentially different, that spirit is really unaffected by misery which is truly the lot of matter; he compares the soul to light and even to a mirror in which objects are reflected; he admits that in sleep as the soul remains awake, man can enjoy happiness; he insists on the realisation of God in a condition of ecstasy brought about by

profound mental concentration. Porphyry teaches the leadership of spirit over matter, the omnipresence of the soul when freed from matter, and the doctrine that the world has no beginning. He also forbids the slaying of animals and rejects sacrifice. Abammon, a later contemporary mentions the wonderful powers obtained by the exercise of contemplative ecstasy. But there is nothing here that can possibly be considered as necessarily derived from India. The opposition of matter and spirit, the removal of spirit from the world of reality, and the view that the only power to approach to it is through ecstasy are the outcome of the Greek endeavour to grasp the problem brought into prominence by Plato of the contrast of spirit and matter, and the views of Plotinus are the logical and indeed inevitable outcome of that development. The protest against sacrifice is as old as Greek philosophy, the winning of supernatural powers by ecstasy is a popular conception which appears in Pythagoras and beyond all others in the Bacchic religion. On the other hand, the real extent of knowledge of Indian philosophy available to Plotinus and Porphyry alike seems to have been most severely limited." (PP. 65. 67)

The whole chapter VI. is worth reading. I have quoted the passages to show the parallelisms between the Greek and Indian philosophies. The view of the learned author is that as there is no direct channel through which the ideas from India passed to Greece, he is, therefore, in doubt as to the Greeks borrowing their philosophy from the Indians. What about Pythagoras who admittedly borrowed the doctrine of *metempsychosis* from India and Egypt?

Kapila does not believe in the doctrine of *spṛoṭa* as explained in the preceding pages (V. 57), nor does he believe in the eternality of sound (V. 58. 60). Though he does not believe in the eternality of the Vedas (V. 45) following as a corollary from the non-eternality of sound, yet he believes in their infallibility. (V. 46). Kapila thinks his teachings to be in consonance with those of the Vedas. Let us now examine the source of the philosophical teachings, viz, the *Ūpaniṣats*. There is a well known passage in *Śwetās'wataropaniṣad* chap. V. 2 referred to at P. 48 about Kapila. The question is whether it refers to the author of *Sāmkhya* or not. *S'ankarāchārya* while commenting on it in the *Śwetās'watara upaniṣat* takes it in the derivative sense meaning 'golden coloured 'Hiranyagarbha'. *Sankarānanda*, another commentator, thinks Kapila to be an incarnation of Vishnu and destroyer of *Sāgara's* sons, but not the founder of *Sāmkhya* school. *Narāyaṇa* and *Vijñāna Bhagawata*, the commentators, have taken the word

Kapila as a common noun used in a derivative sense. Reading the context, it does not seem that Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya is meant, for he is not the first man like Manu or Adam. Sankarācharya in commenting on chapter II. 1'1 of the Vedānta sūtras puts into the mouth of the objector supporting the authority of Sāṃkhya on the verse by virtue of the system founded by Kapila mentioned in Śvetāśvetara. In conformity with the views of the learned commentators coupled with common sense, we can say that Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya system, is nowhere mentioned in the canonical Upaniṣats.

The passage of the Śvetas'watara in chapter IV. 5. as explained at 68 clearly refers to the Sāṃkhya teaching. Sankarācharya, though very hostile to the Sāṃkhya has taken the word 'ajā' to mean *prakṛiti* but explains 'lobita s'ukla kṛiṣṇām' to mean fire, water and food. Then in the same chapter there is the 10th verse which is very often quoted.

मायांतु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनंतुमहेश्वरम् ।

तस्यावयवभूतैस्तु व्याप्तं सर्वं मिदं जगत् ॥

"Know illusion to be matter and the player of trick to be the Great Lord ; the whole universe is pervaded by the parts of his body." See Siddhanta Darsana, P. 2. From these quotations, we see that we have the idea of *prakṛiti* in the Upaniṣats ; we also find it three-coloured i. e., consisting of Satwa, Rajas and Tamas. Again we find in BṛihadĀraṇyaka in IV. 3. 16—

असंगो ह्ययं पुरुषः ।

'The Puruṣa is unaffected' The idea of Puruṣa which is embodied in sūtra I-15 is also borrowed from the Upaniṣats.

We find the *guṇas* in Maitriupaniṣad III. 2. (P. 24) ; the names in V. 2. (P. 42 of S. B. H. Vol. XXXI.) The five vital airs with their names are mentioned in II. 6 of the Upaniṣad P. 18 of Vol. XXXI. By reason of these teachings and references to the teachings which subsequently became the Buddhistic doctrines, some of the scholars are against the antiquity of the Maitriupaniṣad or Maitrāyaniupaniṣad. My sympathies are with them, but the late Professor Max Muller for very cogent reasons holds it to belong to the ante-Paninean period. He says at pp. L and LI of vol. XV of the S. B. E. series. "We shall hardly be persuaded to change this opinion on account of supposed references to Vaiṣṇava or to Bauddha doctrines which some scholars have tried to discover in it.

"As to the worship of Viṣṇu, and as to the many manifestations of the Highest Spirit, we have seen it alluded to in other Upaniṣads

and we know from the Brāhmaṇas that the name of Viṣṇu was connected with many of the earliest Vedic sacrifices."

"As to Bauddha doctrines, including the very name of Nirvāṇa, we must remember that there were Bauddhas before the Buddha. Brihaspati who is frequently quoted in their later philosophical writings as the author of an heretical philosophy, denying the authority of the Vedas is mentioned by name in our Upaniṣad (VII. 9), but we are told that this Brihaspati, having become Sukra promulgated his erroneous doctrines in order to mislead the Asuras and thus to ensure the safety of Indra i. e. of the old faith."

"The fact that the teacher of King Brihadratha in our Upaniṣad is called Sākāyanya, can never be used in support of the idea that, being a descendant of Sāka, he must have been, like Sākya-muni, a teacher of Buddhist doctrines. He is the very opposite in our Upaniṣad and warns his hearers against such doctrines as we should identify with the doctrines of Buddha. As I have pointed out on several occasions, the breaking through the law of the Āśramas is the chief complaint which orthodox Brāhmaṇas make against Buddhists and their predecessors and this is what Sākāyanya condemns. A Brāhmaṇ may become a Sannyāsin, which is much the same as a Buddhist Bhikṣu, if he has first passed through the three stages of a student, a house-holder, and a vānaprastha. But to become a Bhikṣu without that previous discipline, was heresy in the eyes of the Brāhmaṇas and it was exactly that heresy which the Bauddhas preached and practised. That this social laxity was gaining ground at the time when our Upaniṣad was written is clear (See VII. 8.). We hear of people who wear red dresses (like the Buddhists) without having a right to them; we even hear of books, different from the Vedas against which the true Brāhmaṇas are warned. All this points to times when what we call Buddhism was in the air, say the sixth century B. C. the very time to which I have always assigned origin of the genuine and classical Upaniṣads."

"The Upaniṣads are to my mind the germs of Buddhism while Buddhism is in many respects the doctrine of the Upaniṣads carried out to its last consequences, and what is important, employed as the foundation of a new social system. In doctrine the highest goal of the Vedānta, the knowledge of the true self is no more than the Buddhist Samyaksambodhi, in practice, the Sanyasin is the Bhikṣu, the friar, only emancipated alike from the tedious discipline of the Brāhmaṇic student, the duties of the Brahmanic house-holder and the yoke of

useless penances on the Brahmanic dweller in the forest. The spiritual freedom of the Sannyâsin becomes in Buddhism the common property of the Sangha the fraternity, and that Fraternity is open alike to the young and the old, to the Brâhman and the Śûdra, to the rich and the poor, to the wise and the foolish. In fact, there is no break between the India of the Veda and the India of the Tripitaka, but there is an historical continuity between the two and the connecting link between extremes that seem widely separated must be sought in the Upaniṣads".

We have in the Brihadâraṇyakopaniṣad "

यद्यथाहिनिर्लव्यनो वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयित्वमेवेदं शरीरं शेते । IV. 4-7

"Just as the slough of a serpent lies on an anthill dead and abandoned, so does this body lie."

In the Pravachana sūtra we have

अहिनिर्लव्यनोवत् । IV. 6.

"Like the slough of a serpent."

We have again in VI. 10 of the Maitriupaniṣat at p. 68 of vol. XXXI of S. B. H. all the twenty five elements mentioned in I. 61 of the Sâmkhya Pravachana sūtras. They are fully explained in my commentary thereon. I need not accumulate the texts as to the source of the Sâmkhya teachings in the canonical Upaniṣads. A curious reader will find many there.

The Apocryphal Upaniṣats contain many allusions to the Sâmkhya teachings and illustrations ; as for example in the Tripādvibhūti Mahā nārāyaṇopaniṣat we have,

"यथाजपाकुसुमसन्निधौद्रक्तस्फटिकप्रतीतिस्तदभावेयुद्धस्फटिकप्रतीतिः" ।

(P. 479 of Bombay Theosophical Society's edition.)

"Just like a red crystal in contact with a china lily, appears red and again appears transparent crystal on its removal... .."

Compare this idea with that expressed in sūtra 35 of chapter II and 26 of chapter VI. of the Pravachana sūtra.

In Nārada Parivrajakopaniṣat we have,

"स्वरूपानुसंधानव्यतिरिक्तान्प्रशास्त्राभ्यासैरुपकुंकुमभारवद् व्यर्थं न योगशास्त्रप्रवृत्तिर्न सारूप्यशास्त्राभ्यासो नमंजातं व्यापारः ।

(P. 416 of Bombay Theosophical society's edition)

"It is a useless labour to study other sāstras which do not enquire into one's self like a camel bearing a load of saffron ; there is no reading of the Yoga Sāstra, no study of the Sâmkhya Sāstra, and no practice of

mantra and Tantra." Compare this illustration with that given in chap. III. 58 and chap. VI. 40 of the Pravachana sutras.

There are many references and allusions to the Sāmkhya teachings in the apocryphal Upaniṣats. In a word, the whole religious literature in Sanskrit subsequent to the Sāmkhya, has been influenced by its teachings which were adapted to the exigencies of time.

YOGA.

The yoga system of philosophy, the later development of Sāmkhya was founded by Patanjali. His date can not be correctly determined, but Max Muller fixes it to be two centuries before Christ. We know nothing about his life. There is a verse.

योगेन चित्तस्य पदेन वाचस्पतलं शरीरस्य च वैद्यकेन ।

योऽपाकरोत्तं प्रवरं मुनीनां पतंजलिं प्राञ्जलिरानतोऽस्मि ।

"I with folded hands salute the greatest Rishi Patanjali who removed the impurities of the *citta* (mind) by yoga, the inaccuracies of the language by grammar and the diseases of the body by the science of medicine."

From the above stanza, we know that Patanjali was the author of three great works. The first and the foremost is the Yoga Sāstra the second is the work on grammar which is a commentary on Pāṇini and known as Mahābhāṣya. The third is a work on medicine which appears to be a commentary on Charaka Samhita known as Raja Mrigāṅka vritti from the following introductory sloka of Chākrapāṇi Datta's commentary on it:—

पातंजल महाभाष्य चरक प्रति संस्कृतैः ।

मनोवाक्याय दोषाणां हर्त्रेऽहिर्पतयेनमः ॥

(P. 1 of the Nirpaya Sagar edition)

"I salute the lord of the serpent who is the remover of the defects of mind, speech and body by Yogasāstra, Mahābhāṣya and the Commentary on Charaka." By the 'lord of the serpent', is meant Phanī, another name of Patanjali.

Dr. Girindra Nāth Mukhopādhyāya of Calcutta in the surgical instruments of the Hindus says at page 7 of volume I, "Patanjali wrote a commentary on Charaka. He flourished during the second century B. C. Both Chakrapani Dutta and Bhoja allude to him as the redactor of Charaka Samhita." At P. 10 he says that the commentary of Patanjali on Charaka is not available. Then again at P. 62 he refers to Śivadāsa's

commentary on Chakrapāni Dutta alluding to Patanjali. From all these authorities, it is clear that Patanjali wrote yoga as an original work and commentaries on Pāṇini and Charaka. We know nothing further than this.*

His work on yoga called yoga Śāstra, yoga sūtras or Pātanjalam, is divided into four chapters containing 194 sūtras as shown in the following table :—

Chapters	I	II	III	IV	Total
Sūtras	51	55	54	34	194

According to the Bombay Sanserit Series edition there are 54 sūtras in the third pāda, but in the Ānandāsrama and other editions there are 55. In our edition of the Sacred Books of the Hindus, we have 54.

The first chapter of the yoga is called Samādhi Pāda, the second chapter is Sādhana Pāda; the third is Vibhūti pāda and the fourth and the last one is Kaivalya Pāda.

We have many commentaries on the Sūtras. The first and the foremost is that of Vyāsa.

Next is Vāchaspati Misra, the well-known commentator on the philosophical work; he wrote a commentary on Vyāsa. We have Bhoja Deva's vritti, Nārāyana Tirthā's Sidhānta Chandrika and Vijñāna Bhikṣu's commentary called Yoga vārtika. Many original works have been written on Yoga, and a decent literature has grown round Patañjali's sūtras. A religious system has been formed by many subsequently; the *Santa Mata* of the present generation owes its origin to the mystic and crude forms of elementary practices of Hatha yoga.

There are some scholars who think that the Patanjali of the Mahābhāṣya is a different person from the Pātanjali of the Yoga śāstra. I differ from them. Though the yoga is written in the sūtra style and the commentary in prose, yet the philosophical discussion on the eternity of sound, the connotation and denotation of a word in the introduction to his commentary on Pāṇini shows that the writer of the commentary cannot be

*From the introductory verses of Bhoja Deva's vritti, we know that the commentary on Charaka was called Rāja Mrigāṅka vritti. See Ānandāsrama edition P. 1 vol. 47.

other than a philosopher. I am of opinion that the tradition connecting our author with the Mahābhāṣya is reliable and cannot be easily discarded. There is a great doubt as to the identity of Vyāsa, the scholiast; Bādarāyaṇa the reputed author of the Vedānta sūtras cannot be the commentator as he is referred to by Panini in

पाराशर्यशिलालिभ्यामिष्टुनटसूत्रयोः । ४. ३. ११०

"After Pārāsarya and Śilāli in the work of an ascetic and juggler." The sūtra means that लिनि is added to पाराशर्य and शिलालि in connection with the ascetic and a juggler's work respectively in the sense of 'said by him'; as for example पाराशरिणो निववाः; शैलालिनादटाः; otherwise the forms will be पाराशर्यच्, शैलालच्.

It is considered by all that the reference is to the Sāririka Sūtras of the son of Parāśara. Bhattoji Dikṣita in the Siddhānta Kaumudī in his chapter on *Taddhita* while commenting on the sūtra, gives an illustration 'पाराशर्येण मोक्षे मिष्टुनटसूत्रयोः' He reads the Bhikṣu sūtra composed by the son of Parāśara'.

Max Muller at P. 97 of his Six Systems of Indian philosophy says "As Pārāsarya is a name of Vyāsa, the son of Parāśara, it has been supposed that Pāṇini meant by Bhikṣu sūtras, the Brahma Sūtras sometimes ascribed to Vyāsa which we still possess," He again says at P. 117 "we should remember next that Vyāsa is called Pārāṣarya, the son of Parāś'ara and Satyavati (truthful) and that Pāṇini mentions one Pārāś'arya, as the author of the Bhikṣu sūtras, while Vāchaspati; Misra declares that the Bhikṣu Sūtras are the same as the Vedānta sūtras and that the followers of Pārāś'arya were in consequence called Pārāśarins (Pan. IV. 3. 110)."

When Bādarāyaṇa has criticised both Sāṃkhya and Yoga in his Brahma Sūtras in chapter II. 1. 3, it is highly improbable that he was a commentator of Patanjali's Yoga.

Patanjali commences his yogasūtras with—

अथ योगानुशासनम् ।

"Now is the science of yoga."

Patañjali again commences his commentary on Panini with—

अथ शब्दानुशासनम् ।


"Now is the science of language."

From the similarity of language and thought one cannot but come to the conclusion that the author of Yoga sūtras and the commentary on

Pāṇini is the same person, and Vyāsa the scholiast is different from Bādarāyaṇa the founder of the Vedānta School of philosophy.

Let us now proceed to understand what Yoga is. It is defined as the control of the state of the *Chitta*. *Chitta* according to Patanjali is the set of the internal organs (*antaḥ karaṇa*) consisting of *buddhi* or cognitive or discriminating faculty, *manas* mind or attentive faculty and *aḥamkāra*, I-maker or the faculty of self-consciousness. If the functions of these faculties which are objective, i. e. generally directed towards external world, are allowed unchecked to go on in their own way, the subject or ego becomes their victim; but if their function is directed internally i. e. to one's own self, the subject or the devotee becomes merged in his own self. This last stage is what is called Yoga; the word is derived from √Yuj, to join; for in this state, there is the union in the self.

These *vṛttis* are primarily pleasant and unpleasant; they both are five as shown below :—



Pramāṇas, means of knowledge have already been explained while dealing with the Nyāya in the preceding pages (at 24 and 25). We may here mention that the Yoga like the sāmkhya accepts only three means of knowledge, viz : perception, inference and the holy scripture.

Viparyaya is the ignorant state of the *chitta* under which one perceives just the reverse of what is there in reality. A man suffering from diplopia sees two moons in place of one; in the dark, one sees a serpent in a rope or a human figure in a pillar.

It is also called *klesha* and is therefore of five kinds. We shall deal with them at the proper place.

Vikalpa is chimerical knowledge conveyed by a word and its sense without any real corresponding existence of the object meant by it in the external world, as for instance chimera, centaur etc.

Nidrā is the quiescent state or the absence of the dreaming and waking states. It is a state of repose.

Smṛiti is the association of ideas; it is a state of the *chitta* in which there is no forgetfulness of the past experience. It corresponds to memory or the retentive power.

Having explained the various *vrittis*, the author describes the methods by which they can be controlled. There are two ways ; (1) practice and (2) non-attachment.

According to Patañjali the practice consists in an attempt to concentrate the mind in the supreme soul or the concentration of the mind deprived of *rajas* and *tamas* by means of *yama* and *niyama*. It can be achieved by a constant practice for a length of time.

Kriṣṇa in the Bhagawadgītā VI. 35 also says the same thing to Arjuna. The verse there, is a *verbatim* reproduction of the sūtra I. 12.

Now attachment according to our author is also a state called *Vas'ikāra* and consists in an antipathy for the worldly and heavenly pleasures. The former are already experienced in the present life and the enjoyment of the latter is promised in future by the holy scripture for virtuous men. There are four stages of this state of mind. The first is called *Yatmāna samjñā* ; it consists in turning one's mind from the worldly pleasures after experiencing their evil effects. The second stage is called *vyatireka samjñā* ; it is an enjoyment of pleasures by discrimination or selection. The third stage is *ekendriya Samjñā* ; it is a mental craving after the worldly pleasures without enjoyment by reason of the weakness of the organs. The fourth stage is *vas'ikāra samjñā* consisting of the total cessation of the mental cravings after the worldly pleasures.

Having explained *vas'ikāra* stage which the authors call non-attachment, he proceeds to describe the higher stage called *Paravairāgya*. When a devotee has realised *Puruṣa* i. e. made a discrimination between *prakṛiti* and *Puruṣ'a* by means of a trance called *Samprajñāta* and turned his mind from *satwa*, *rajas* and *tamas* he is said to have reached the *paravairāgya* stage, i. e. the highest stage of non-attachment.

The next question for solution is 'what is *Samprajñāta samādhi* ?' It is a state in a trance in which a practitioner knows his own self without any doubt or false knowledge. When one has controlled the various modifications of the mind by means of constant practice and non-attachment to pleasures and reached the *Paravairāgya* stage, it is called *samprajñāta samādhi*. In it there are four grades : (1) the first is the perception of the gross objects with the aid of words and their sense after relinquishing them one after the other ; this stage is called *savitarka*. The perception without such aid is called *nirvitarka* ; it is the second stage.

The meditation of the minute things internally with reference to time and space and the *guṇas* is called *svaichāra* ; but when the meditation is

without such reference, it is called *nirvichāra*. These last two stages are called *grāhyasamāpatti*.

When the mind is affected by the *rajas* and *tamas* but by reason of the preponderance of the *satwa*, there is excess of happiness, it is called *śānanda*. In this state, if a practitioner is not conscious of his body though he does not see *Puruṣa*, he is called *videha*. This stage is called *grahṇāpatti*.

When there is the presence of the *satwa* in the mind without any mixture of the *rajas* and *tamas*, it is called *Sasmitā*, because in this state a practitioner is conscious of his 'self'. In this stage when a practitioner is absorbed in his nature without realising *Puruṣa*, he is called *Prakritilaya*; but when he realises *Puruṣa*, he is called *vivekaśhyātī*. This last stage is called *grihitṛasamāpatti*.

The other samādhi is called *asamprajñāta*, in which there are only impressions left on the mind without any modification or change therein. This state of the trance is of two kinds (1) *bhāvapratyaya* (2) and *upāyapratyaya*. The former is of those Yogis who are called 'prakritilaya' and 'videha' as explained above. It is so called because a practitioner is again reborn in the world. The latter is produced by faith which engenders strength. From strength arises recollection ; from it concentration ; from the latter, the true knowledge. Bhojadeva has not accepted this division as it is a cross division overlapping the *samprajñāta* samādhi.


There are nine classes of the practitioners of *upāyapratyaya*. They are of three kinds, *mṛidu*, *madhya* and *adhimātra* ; and they are again subdivided into *mṛiduvega*, *madhyavega* and *tibrasamvega*. They are thus nine in number :—

(1) *Mṛidupāya mṛiduvega*. (2) *Mṛidupāya-madhyavega* (3) *Mṛidupāya tibrasamvega* (4) *Madhyopāya mṛiduvega* (5) *Madhyopayā madhya vega* (6) *Madhyopāya tibrasamvega* (7) *Adhimātropāya Mṛidu vega*, (8) *Adhimātropāya Madhyavega* 9. *Adhimātropāya tibrasamvega*.

The author proceeds to ascribe the result of the Samādhi by means of devotion to the Lord. Here we find the traces of *bhakti* upon which the devotional school of philosophy was founded in the names of *Nārada* and *Sāṇḍilya*. It is irrelevant to discuss the question whether the devotional school known after *Nārada* and *Sāṇḍilya* existed before *Patanjali* or came into existence subsequent to him. In my opinion, the school came into existence after the teachings of the *Vedānta* school which were too abstruse for the common people to understand. It is very old and existed in the *sūtra* period before the Christian era.

The author now proceeds to explain the term 'Is'wara' which he has used. It was highly necessary for him to explain it by reason of the denial of Is'wara by the Sāṃkhya, the senior school of the Pravachana sūtras of which Yoga is an offshoot.

Is'wara, according to Patañjali, is Puruṣa unaffected by miseries, actions, fruition and association. We have already seen while dealing with the sāmkhya system of philosophy that there are two eternal entities, namely Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, corresponding to the non-ego and ego of the western school of philosophy. Is'wara is the universal ego or self, differentiated from the individual ego or self by being devoid of miseries, actions, the fruit thereof and their reminiscences. He is omniscient and from him all knowledge has proceeded. The linguistic symbol which stands for him is 'Om', the repetition of which is his contemplation. By constant practice, one realises his individual 'self' and the obstacles that stand in the way of contemplation disappear. There are nine obstacles according to Patanjali; they are (1) disease, (2) aversion to work, (3) doubt, (4) negligence, (5) laziness, (6) affection for worldly objects, (7) false knowledge, (8) non-attainment of samādhi and (9) fickleness. There are help-mates of the obstacles which are pain, despair, trembling, inspiration and expiration. Pain is further classified as shown in the table below.



Ādhyātmic pain is the trouble arising from one's own self. It is either physical or mental. The diseases fall under the former and cupidity and anger under the latter. The ādhibhautika pain arises from lions, wolves and serpents, and the ādhidaivika is produced by the planetary influence. All these nine obstacles with these companions contribute to the distraction of mind.

In order to remove it, one should fix his mind on one desired object; in order to obtain tranquility of mind one should be friendly disposed towards the successful people in life, show mercy to the miserable, be pleased with the virtuous and hate the vicious. One can also concentrate his mind by the practice of the prāṇāyāma which shall be explained at its proper place. The author then describes *Lakṣya Yoga* consisting in the fixation of attention on the tip of the nose or the tongue, the palate, the

middle or the root of the tongue and perceiving smell, taste, form, touch, or sound respectively. These objects of sense perceived by imagination on the different parts of the sense organs lead to concentration. There is another mode of concentration. Down the cardiac region, there is a *lotus* of eight leaves turned downwards. It is perhaps the heart which resembles a betel-leaf. By throwing the foul air (carbonic acid gas) outside the lungs, you turn this imaginary lotus upwards. This region is called solar region, waking state and 'a'. Above it is the lunar region, dreaming state and 'u'; further up is the fiery region, sleeping state and 'm'. The last and the fourth is the Nāda region where the supreme soul is realised. It is called Brahma Yoga where a Yogi hears anāhata sound of ten kinds (1) ebini (2) ebinehini (3) the sound of a bell (4) the conch sound, (5) the sound of a lyre (6) the sound of clapping, (7) the sound of a lute (8) the sound of a drum (9) the sound of a kettledrum (10) the sound of a thunder. Let him fix his attention on the 10th. There is another way of concentration; let one close, his eyes and perceive internal light; it is called S'iva-Yoga or Śāmbhavī mudrā. The above practices called Brahma Yoga and S'iva Yoga are in vogue in the Santamata religion of the present day, and are attached an undue importance to by the followers.


The author proceeds to explain Vasnā Yoga, another mode of concentration. One should endeavour to have a mind not attached to any object of affection, or a mind like one after sound sleep or a delightful dream. After a sound sleep or a pleasant vision one feels very happy, and the state of mind is calm, quiet and tranquil.

There is another mode of concentration called Dhyāna Yoga technically. It consists in fixing one's mind on something which attracts him and causes his attention to be stuck to it. In Yoga siddhānta chandrikā many such objects are mentioned such as tirthabhāvana, devabhāvana etc. at P.P. 38.43 of the Chaukhambhā Sanscrit series.


The author then proceeds to explain the *siddhi* Yoga. When a practitioner has attained the concentration of mind by any of the modes mentioned above, his mind becomes purified and can enter into the minutest and the highest things. This is a great success which he can achieve. In such a state of attainment when his mind becomes steady by constant practice, it becomes identified with any thing with which it comes into contact like a pure crystal that becomes tinged with the colour of the object placed in contact with it. It is called samāpatti technically and is *laya yoga*. It is a subject of Samprajñāta samādhi.

The author having digressed comes back to the description of the *saṁādhi* or *saṁāpatti*. He has, as we have seen above, divided it into (1) *Savitarka*, (2) *Nirvitarka* (3) *Savichāra* and (4) *Nirvichāra*. When a word is heard, an idea is created in the mind which is concept on the subjective side; it denotes the genus and species. We have all these three things before our mind when a certain word denoting any external object is uttered. The connection of the language with the idea which it produces on the mind, is what is called *spṛṣṭa*. This kind of knowledge derived with the aid of the language is what is called *saṁāpatti*. If we acquire knowledge without such external help, it is *nirvitarka saṁāpatti*. The external symbols which constitute the language are dispensed with in this stage. We are also conscious of the existence of the minute objects as for instance *āhāmkāra* and *pañca tanmātras*. If we acquire knowledge of these minute objects with the aid of words, it is called *savichāra saṁāpatti*; if we are so much advanced as to do away with the external symbols, and acquire knowledge of the minute objects without their help, it is called *nirvichāra saṁāpatti*.

The author now proceeds to explain the subtle objects. They are of four kinds.



According to *Vijñāna Bhikṣu*, there is a gradation of the subtlety. We have first *visiṣṭalinga*, the atoms of the five gross elements; then we have still subtler called *avasistalinga* as shown in the following table.



The *Buddhi* or intellect is *lingamātra* and *pradhāna* is *alinga*.

According to *Bhoja deva* also *visiṣṭalinga* consists of five gross elements; the *avisīṣṭa linga* consists of the five subtle elements and the external and internal organs. The intelligence is *lingamātra* and the matter is *alinga*.

The *saṁāpatti* described above relating to gross and minute objects constitutes, *saṁāpatti* by reason of the germ of bondage in it. When a practitioner obtains the *nirvichāra saṁāpatti* as explained above,

his mind becomes purified, happy and disposed to truth. This cultivated faculty of liking truth is called *Ritambharā*. It is a special cognitive faculty contradistinguished from the scriptural and inferential knowledge. When a *Yogi* has reached the stage of *nirvichāra samāpatti* and has cultivated the *Ritambharā* faculty, all other associations are replaced by those of the stage; but when no associations are left, it is called *nirvija samadhi* and a practitioner becomes free from bondage.

II

After describing the *samādhī* in the first chapter which the author calls *samādhī-pāda*, he proceeds to describe the means to attain it. The first is called *kriyāyoga*; it consists of the penance, study and meditation. The penance consists in reduction of the body by fasting; the study consists in the constant repetition of 'Om' and reading of the holy scriptures. The result achieved by the *kriyāyoga* is the attainment of *Samādhī* and removal of miseries (*kles'as*). They are five in number as shown in the following table:—

Kles'a (misery)

Avidyā (ignorance)	Asmitā (egoism)	Rāga (affection)	Dweṣa (hatred)	Abhinives'a (fear of death.)
-----------------------	--------------------	---------------------	-------------------	---------------------------------

Avidhyā which is nescience is the source of all the troubles which are classed as miseries. The miseries exist in four states; (1) their dormant state is when there is no exciting cause to arouse their activity as in childhood; their attenuated state is when they are reduced to the state of mere associations by the adverse power as that of a *Yogi*; (3) the separated state is when one is overcome by the other as the passion of love can not exist side by side with the passion of anger; (4) the active state is when they are in full operation. In all these states, the nescience plays an important part.

The following *s'loka* given in *Yoga Chandrikā* very well explains the four states of the miseries.

प्रसुप्तास्तत्त्वलीनानां तन्ववस्थानुयोगिनां ।

विचिन्तन्नोदारूपाश्च क्लेशाविषयसंगिनाम् ॥

The state of miseries in the practitioners called the *prakṛitilaga* and *videha*, is dormant, in the perfect *Yogi* attenuated, and in those who are addicted to sensual pleasures separated and active.

Asmita is egoism and is derived from $\sqrt{\text{asmi}} = \text{am or I}$. It is a confusion of the 'seer' with the means of seeing. The soul is the perceiver and the *buddhi* is the organ by which it perceives. The enjoyer and the

organ of enjoyment are confounded. As for example in a sentence when we say the 'eye sees,' there is a confusion of the seer with the organ of seeing, because it is the soul but not the eye that sees the objects.

The third source of misery is affection. It consists in the remembrance of certain pleasures which one endeavours to obtain; while its opposite called aversion is the remembrance of certain pain connected with certain objects which one endeavours to avoid. The last source of trouble is fear of death which is a natural instinct in all living beings from an ant to a learned man. It is an instinct of self-preservation which is deep-rooted in all beings from the lowest species of insects to the highest rational being. There is a natural fear of death which leads one to infer that it arises from the past experience of troubles undergone in the course of dying. It is an argument, according to the Indian philosophy, in support of the doctrine of metempsychosis.

These five classes of miseries are of two forms, viz. the minute and gross forms. In their minute or elementary form, i. e. when they are associations or ideas and have not developed into strong activities, they should be checked by the counter-action, viz. the merging of them in one's own nature, egoism of the purified mind. When they are in their gross or active form, they should be controlled by concentration. The actions, whether righteous or unrighteous, are performed under the influence of these five miseries. They are the cause of all actions; their fruit is reaped in the present or future life. As for instance, Nandiswara at once became a god from a man; Nahuṣa on the other hand at once became a serpent from Indra. The hellish people have no fruit in this life, and those who have uprooted these miseries have no fruit in future life. If all these miseries exist in their rudimentary form, they cause different classes of birth such as of vegetables and animals, life and the organs for enjoyment. By the actions which are caused by the miseries (kleśas), the birth, life and enjoyment are, therefore, regulated. The birth, life and enjoyment have pleasure and sorrow as the fruit arising from righteous and unrighteous actions. As for example, good or bad birth depends on good or bad actions; similarly good or bad life and the enjoyment of the good or evil depend on good or bad actions. To a perfect yogin, all pleasures or means of enjoyment are sources of sorrow, because the consequence is evil. (1) There is no satisfaction from enjoyment, for it sharpens the desire for further enjoyment; (2) there is heart breaking, if the enjoyment is obstructed; (3) there is remembrance of enjoyment when the object is lost or has become incapable of enjoyment;

(4) there is conflict that arises from the various feelings of pleasure, pain and dullness.

The author proceeds to explain the four subjects of the miseries. Just as in the science of medicine there are four heads namely, (1) Diagnosis, (2) Prognosis (3) Etiology and (4) Treatment, similarly in the science which deals with salvation there are four heads viz. heyā, the avoidable (2) hāna, avoidance thereof (3) heyā hetu, the cause of the avoidable, and (4) hānopāya, the mode of avoidance. The author proceeds to deal with the above subjects *seriatim*. (1) The pain that has not yet come is to be avoided. The troubles or calamities that have already been suffered and are being suffered are not avoidable, but those that are to befall, are to be avoided by all means. (2) The confusion of the perceiver with the object perceived or the enjoyer with the object enjoyed, is the cause of troubles (avoidable). This arises from nescience.

The perceived (dris'ya) is the object or non-ego. (1) It is characterised by three *gunas*, viz. satwa, rajas and tamas which are light, activity and stability; (2) it includes elements both gross and subtle and organs of three kinds, viz: sensory, motor and internal; (3) it has either enjoyment here, or salvation in the next world as its ultimate aim. This leads the author to describe, the four states of the above-mentioned *gunas* viz: *viseṣa*, *aviseṣa*, *linga mātra* and *alinga*. (1) The *viseṣas* of the yoga philosophy correspond with the *vitritis* of Sāmkhya Kārikā, and are five gross elements, five sensory organs, five motor organs and *manas* (2) the *aviseṣas* are the six out of seven *prakṛiti vitritis* of the Sāmkhya Kārikā; they are five subtle elements (*pañchatanmātras*) and I-maker (*ahamkāra*) (3) The *linga mātra* is the *mahat* or the 7th *prakṛiti vikṛiti* of Sāmkhya Kārikā (4) the *alinga* is the *mu'la prakṛiti* of Sāmkhya Kārikā which is the state of equipoise of the satwa, rajas and tamas. See Sāmkhya I. 61. Sāmkhya Kārikā, 38; Sāmkhya III. 1.; p. P. 88, of the preceding pages.

The perceiver or soul or ego according to Patanjali is the real seer; he is reflected in intelligence (*buddhi*): he perceives everything but is apart from the object perceived. He is pure like the moon in heaven though she is reflected in dirty or pure water. The *buddhi* (intelligence) being animated by the soul, perceives the object of sight, sound, smell, touch and taste.

The perceiver (*dṛiṣṭa*) and the perceived (*dṛis'ya*) are *puruṣa* and *prakṛiti* of the Sāmkhya philosophy. The *dṛis'ya* or *prakṛiti* is for the

enjoyment of the *driṣṭā* or *puruṣa* ; Cf. *Kārikā* 56, 57 and 58 and *Sāmkhya* III. 57, 59 and II. 37. Though the *driṣya* (*prakṛiti*) disappears before a perfect *yogi* who is released from its bondage after the performance of its object, yet it is not totally destroyed because other unadvanced individuals are entangled in its meshes. Cf. *Kārikā* 59, 61 and *Sāmkhya* III. 69, 70.

There is the union of the *driṣṭā* (perceiver) and the *driś'ya* (perceived), when the former is attached to the latter and the cause of this union is nescience as said in the opening part of the present topic under discussion.

The author takes up the third head called avoidance (*bhāna*). When nescience (*avidyā*) is removed by correct knowledge about the *driṣṭā* and *driś'ya*, there is no union of the perceiver with the perceived. This constitutes the cure of the soul called redemption or absorption in one's own self. This leads up to the fourth stage of *vivekākhyāti* where the distinction between the *puruṣa* on one hand and the *prakṛiti* on the other is realised, pure knowledge of self is attained and there is no relapse into ignorance ; it is a means of avoidance (*banopāya*). It is the highest stage of spiritual knowledge when a practitioner becomes conscious that (1) he has known all that he wanted to know and there is no further knowledge to acquire, (2) that all his miseries have been removed and there is none left to be remedied, (3) that he has obtained the *kaivalya* (absolutism) and has nothing further to obtain ; (4) that he has achieved all that he wanted to do and has nothing further to achieve ; (5) that his intelligence (*buddhi*) has borne its fruits and all the *gunas* are vanishing ; (6) that they have become defunct and there is no chance of their germinating ; (7) that he has become united with his own self. Of these seven, the first four are for the cessation of work and the last three for the release of the mind. When the impurities of the mind are removed by the practice of the parts of *yoga* (*yogāṅga*), there is a rise of spiritual knowledge up to the *vivekakhyāti*. The *Yoga Sīdhānta Chandrika* understands the *ṣatkarma* and *mudrā* by the parts of *Yoga* (*Yogāṅga*). They are as given below :—

I. *Ṣatkarma* (1) *Dhanti*, (2) *Vasti*, (3) *Neti*, (4) *Trātaka*, (5) *Maulika* (6) *Kapalabhāti*.

II. *Mudrā* (1) *Mahāmudrā*, (2) *Mahābandha*, (3) *Mahāvedha* (4) *Khecharī* (5) *S'aktichālanam*, (6) *Mulabandha*, (7) *Uddiyānam*, (8) *Jālandharam*, (9) *Viparitikṛiti*. These are the practices of the *haṭha Yoga* and are, therefore, not referred to by *Patanjali* as they pertain to the bodily

or physical attainments. They are more in the nature of the gymnastic exercises than psychic attainments.

According to our author there are eight parts of Yoga, viz (1) yama (restraint) (2) niyama (observance), (3) āsana (posture), (4) prāṇāyama (regulation of breath), (5) pratyāhāra (abstraction), (6) dhāraṇā (concentration), (7) dhyāna (meditation) and (8) samādhi (trance).

The author of Yoga explains them fully; the Yamas are five in number; they are (1) abstinence from slaughter, (2) truthfulness, (3) abstinence from theft, (4) celibacy or continence, (5) abstinence from greediness. These are the first five principles of ethics for the guidance in life; they are *a priori* truths innate in the human nature and are universally binding. It is *ahiṃsa* which literally means abstinence from slaughter or injury in any form. It has now become a pet word with certain school of politicians in India; it is a common cry 'ahiṃsa paramodharmah' *ahiṃsa* or universal love is the highest righteousness or virtue. *Ahiṃsa* is then defined thus:

कर्मणामनसा वाचा सर्वभूतेषु सर्वदा ।

अहं शजननं प्रोक्ता अहिंसा परमार्थिभिः ।

"Not causing injury to any created beings in any state by deed, thought and speech, is said by the great sages to be abstinence from slaughter."

(2) Truthfulness consists in acting upon what one sees, hears and thinks. It is both of speech and conduct. (3) *Asteya* is the non-removal of the property from the lawful custody of another without his consent or by force. It, therefore, includes both theft and robbery of the Indian Penal Code.

(4) *Celibacy* is abstinence from sexual pleasure. It is defined by Yoga vārtika as—

कर्मणामनसा वाचा सर्वावस्थासु सर्वदा ।

सर्वत्रमैथुनत्यागं ब्रह्मचर्यं प्रचक्षते ॥

Avoidance of sexual pleasure by means of action, thought and speech in all conditions, at all times and all places, is called celibacy. (5) Abstinence from greediness consists in the non-acceptance of any luxury with the exception of bare necessity. It is non-acceptance of any gratuitous sum even in distress and includes humility and unselfishness.

These five intuitive truths are such that they are universally recognised, irrespective of caste, creed, colour and country. The author proceeds to describe (2) the rules of observance; they are: (1) purity (2) contentment (3) penance (4) self-study (5) and devotion to the Lord.

1. Purity is of both body and mind ; the former is performed by bathing with water, the latter is the purity of heart, achieved by eradicating the feelings of jealousy, hatred and enmity.

(2) contentment is defined by Yoga Chandrika as

यदृच्छालाभतो नित्यं अलं पुंसो भवेदिति ।

तां निष्ठां ऋषियो प्राहुः संतौषं सुखलक्षणम् ॥

If a person feels satisfied at every time with what he gets without any conscious effort, the sages call such a state of mind to be contentment conducive to happiness.

(3) Penance consists in the worship of the gods, Brahmins, and the preceptor and in the observance of fasts.

(4) Self-study consists of the repetition of 'Om' and reading of the Vedānta and Upaniṣat.

(5) Devotion to the Lord is the resignation of one's self and actions to the will of God and the practice of Brahma Yoga, Śiva Yoga, Mantra Yoga, Jñāna Yoga, Advaita Yoga and Bhakti Yoga, as described in the preceding pages at 87.

The author says that during the practice of these axiomatic truths of universal applicability, strong temptations leading one in the wrong path arise. In order to put a check to their operations, one should divert his attention from them by thinking over the evil consequences to which they lead, if one is under their control. As for example, one is tempted to commit theft ; but one can turn his thoughts from the strong temptation by the fear of the worldly and future punishments awaiting him on the commission of the prohibited act.

The author proceeds to describe the fruits that accrue from the practice of yama and niyama. Universal love follows from the practice of non-slaughter ; from truthfulness arises the effectiveness of the speech on others' action and its result ; abstinence from stealing leads to the present of wealth by others. Celibacy leads to manly vigour ; abstinence from greediness produces the memory of the past and future life.

The purity of body leads one to think it loathsome and the purity of mind leads to tranquility ; from it follows concentration, from concentration the control of senses which makes one fit to perceive his 'self'. From contentment proceeds happiness. From the practice of austerities, impurities are destroyed ; thence proceeds miraculous power such as levity, gravity etc, mentioned in III. 45. From the study of the Vedānta and

Upaniṣat, the gods and sages become visible. From the devotion to the Lord and resignation to His will follows samādhi or trance as explained in the first pāda.

After describing Yama and Niyama and their divisions, the author proceeds to deal with posture or seat. The question is, "what posture should one maintain when practising Yoga? How should he sit to practise it?" The reply of the author is, that it should be both easy and fixed. "स्थिरसुखमासनम्". The commentators have, however, described various postures amounting to eighty-four; one of them is called 'sthira sukha'; See Yoga Siddhānta Chandrikā where nearly 38 of them are fully described. The author, however, recommends the posture in which the mind and the body of the devoted can be kept steady without effort. If one succeeds in the practice of posture, he is not effected by heat or cold, pleasure or pain etc.

The fourth part of Yoga is Prāṇāyāma. When a devotee has succeeded in maintaining a particular posture for the practice, the stoppage of breathing-in and breathing out is called Prāṇāyāma. The act of throwing out of the foul air (carbonic acid gas) from the lungs is called *rechaka* (emptying of the lungs) and filling up the lungs with pure air (oxygen) of the atmosphere is called *puraka*. Ceasing to breathe-in-and-out for a while, so that the foul air thrown-out from the lungs may vanish afar in the atmosphere is called *Kumbhaka*.

The practice of Prāṇāyāma is however regulated by time, space and number; as for example the practice for a certain time, at a distance of so many inches from the tip of the nose or for so many times. It is called *Dirgha suksama* by reason of the long practice and the invisible nature of the ingress and egress of the air.

When the Prāṇāyāma is practised with all the constituent parts, viz. *rechaka*, *puraka* and *Kumbhaka*, it is called *Sahita Kumbhaka*; but when it is practised with *Kumbhaka* alone, it is called *Kevala Kumbhaka*. There are several varieties of these two kinds of *Kumbhaka* for which a curious reader is referred to the Yoga Siddhānta Chandrikā. The continual practice of the Prāṇāyāma removes the veil which hangs before the mind and obstructs the light from coming, eradicates all miseries and makes the practitioner's mind fit for concentration.


The fifth part of Yoga is called *pratyāhāra* (abstraction). It is the control of the organs of sense and keeping them under the guidance of the mind. When the mind is purified by the above-mentioned practices and the senses no longer run after their external objects, but accept the

guidance of the mind just as the bees follow the guidance of the queen bee, it is called *pratyāhāra* (abstraction). The result achieved by the practice of abstraction, is a complete control of the senses.

III.

Patañjali having explained the external means of Yoga practice describes in the third pāda the internal means which are *Dhāraṇā* (concentration), *Dhyāna* (meditation) and *Samādhi* (trance). *Dhāraṇā* is the concentration of the mind on certain locality either internal such as the heart, the navel, the head etc. or external such as a mountain river etc. It is said to be of five kinds : (1) *Stambhāni* (2) *Plāvāni* (3) *Dahanī* (4) *Bhrāmanī* (5) *S'amani*; as for details, see *Yoga siddhānta Chandrikā*. In *Dhāraṇā* the mind is fixed on some object in a particular locality; in it the locality and the object become merged : but when the Lord, the object, is concentrated upon at the localities, such as cerebral, cardiac or umbilical regions, it becomes *Dhyāna* (meditation). It is of two kinds : (1) *Saguṇa* and (2) *nirguṇa*. When one meditates on the Lord with His positive qualities as omniscient, omnipotent etc. it is *Saguṇa Dhyāna*; but when one meditates on Him with His negative qualities as immortal, undecaying etc. it is called *Nirguṇa Dhyāna*. The *Samādhi* is a meditation where the object meditated upon manifests itself as if without any form. It is of two kinds (1) *Samprajñāta* and (2) *asamprajñāta* as explained in the preceding pages at 34 and 85.

All the above-mentioned three practices, viz. abstraction, meditation and trance are technically called *Samyama* in the Yoga literature. The practice of the *Samyama* leads to the manifestation of the object meditated upon. A practitioner should rise gradually from the lowest rung of the ladder in the practice of Yoga to the highest top; there are eight parts of the Yoga practice, the first five of which are external and the last three are internal as shown in the following table :—



The *Samyamas*, the triad of the internal parts constitute the external part of the nirvija Sāmādhi. The result achieved from their practice is that the preliminary stage of the mind's changes called *vyutthāna* declines and the highest stage called *nīrodhā* rises. At that time, the devotee's mind becomes calm and is completely controlled. The fall of the *Samprajñāta* is the rise of the *asamprajñāta* which leads to the tranquility of mind and continual flow of peace. It is called *nīrodha pariṇāma* of the *chitta*. When from the devotees' *chitta*, the distraction or mind's modification in contact with the external objects, is removed, and concentration or the fixing of it on one object is obtained, the state of mind is called *samādhi pariṇāma* of the *chitta*. When a practitioner has totally eradicated distraction and reached the stage of *Samādhi* where the vanishing and rising modifications of the mind do not appear different and merge into one, it is called the *ekāgratā pariṇāma* of the *chitta*.

There are cases of *Samādhi* (suspended animation) in our own time; there is one case mentioned by Lyon "Yogi's ecstatic trance.—In Delhi in 1889, Dr. H. C. Sen and his brother, Mr. Chandra Sen, Municipal secretary, examined a well-known Yogi devotee in a self induced trance in which he appears to have been seated cross-legged in Buddha fashion. They found that the pulse had ceased to beat altogether, nor could the slightest heart beat be detected by the stethoscope. The Yogi was placed in a small subterraneous masonry cell and the door locked and sealed by the city Magistrate. At the expiration of thirty three days the cell was opened and the devotee was found just where he was placed but with a death-like appearance, the limbs having become stiff as in *rigor mortis*. He was brought from the vault and the mouth rubbed with honey and milk and the body massaged with oil. In the evening manifestations of life returned. He was fed with a spoonful of milk and in three days was able to eat his normal diet, and was alive seven years after. W. Tebb, *Premature burial*, 1896 pp. 44-45".

Lyon and Waddell's *Medical Jurisprudence*, 5th edition pp. 75-76.

Hari Das, a Yogi of Raja Ranjit Sing of Lahore used to perform *Samadhis* for a period of six months. His extraordinary performances were witnessed by the British Residents of the court of Raja Ranjit Singh and were certified by them. See S. B. H. vol. XV part IV. p. 64.

The author having explained the *nīrodha pariṇāma*, *samādhi pariṇāma* and *ekāgratā pariṇāma* explains the changes of the gross and subtle

elements and the organs of the senses. We have seen in the preceding pages at 16 that the Sāṅkhya school of philosophy of which Yoga is a branch has started the theory of evolution (*pariṇāma vāda*). There are three kinds of *pariṇāma* according to Patanjali; (1) *dharma pariṇāma*, *lakṣaṇa pariṇāma*, and *avasthā pariṇāma*. The change of a substance from one form into another is called *dharma pariṇāma*; it is only a change of appearance; as for example, clay becoming a pot. *Lakṣaṇa pariṇāma* is the same change looked from the point of view of time. The present is the past manifested, the future is the present which shall be manifested; the past has the present in embryo. Birth and death and rise and fall come under this head of evolution. *Lakṣaṇa pariṇāma* is, therefore, the succession of events in course of time; what is present is the unfolding of the past and what is future is the unfolding of the present. The same change looked from another point of view of state is *avasthā pariṇāma*; a change from one state to another comes under this head, as for example the change from childhood to manhood and from manhood to old age.

We have seen the different kinds of changes looked from different standpoints. The change takes place in the substance or substratum called *dharmi*. The substratum remains the same in all changes; they are the past, present and future. Take for instance clay; it exists first in the shape of particles of dust, then it is converted into a clod or lump of clay; then a pot. This is then the past history of a pot which exists in the present. Then follows its future change. It becomes potsherd, broken pieces, and then particles of the pieces. The substratum which undergoes past, present and future changes, exists in all of them. This view of evolution is consistent with the *Satkāryavāda* of the Sāṅkhya school.

The author now enumerates the miraculous powers by the Yoga practices. We have seen that in all the various changes which have been *dharma*, *lakṣaṇa*, and *avasthā*, the substratum remains the same. It is the clay which undergoes changes; as far as the substratum is concerned, there is no tense. It was clay before the construction of a pot; it is clay when a pot is constructed; it will be clay when a pot is broken into pieces. If a practitioner realises this trinity of changes as explained above by the practice of *śamyaṃ*, he obtains the power of knowing the past and the future. There will be no time, but it will be all present before his mind's eye.

The next occult power is understanding the language of the beings. This leads the author to explain the theory of *śrōta* which Kapila rejects

as seen in the preceding pages at 44 and 76. We have three stages : (1) word, (2) meaning and (3) idea ; we also know that when we utter a word 'cow', the subjective and objective aspects are simultaneously present before us. On realising the different component parts distinctly by the practice of *samyama*, a practitioner obtains the knowledge of the language of all the beings.

The third mysterious power which a practitioner can obtain is the knowledge of the previous births. There are two kinds of associations (*samskāras*) (1) impressions on the memory of the past events and miseries, (2) reward in the present life in the form of birth, life and enjoyment. If a devotee realises all these associations by the practice of *samyama* he obtains the knowledge of his previous births.

The fourth mysterious power is thought-reading or telepathy. If one practises *samyama* on the various modifications of his own *chitta* such as affection and hatred, he acquires the power of thought-reading. It cannot be acquired if the mind is fixed upon some object but when it has no object before it.

The fifth occult power is of disappearance. The theory of perception according to the ancient philosophers is, that the rays of the eye travel to the object perceived and come in contact with it. According to the *sāṃkhya* school, the object is reflected on the *buddhi* animated by the *puruṣa*. Thus there is perception. If a Yogi practises *samyama* on the form of his body, he can cut off the rays coming from the observer's eye to his body with the result that he disappears from the observer's gaze.

The sixth mysterious power is that of knowing one's own death. The fruits of our past actions are of two kinds ; either they are reaped soon or late and are called *sopākrama* or *nirupākrama* respectively. If a devotee practises *samyama* and realises them distinctly, he can know his end.

He can also know it from certain troubles which are of three kinds ; (1) *ādhyātmika* (2) *ādhibhautika* and (3) *ādhidaivika*, as for example, not hearing the *anāhata* sound on closing the ears, not seeing light on closing the eyes, seeing the angel of death and the souls of the departed relatives or seeing the heaven. For other examples, see *Yoga Siddhānta Chandrikā*.

The seventh miraculous power is strength. If a practitioner cultivates the habit of friendship, pity and joy, he becomes strong. If he is friendly disposed to the fortunate, shows pity to the miserable, and joy with the righteous, others become friends of such a person. The result is that he becomes powerful ; but if he practises *samyama* in the strength of an

elephant, eagle or wind, he thereby obtains such strength. In our own time, Professor Rāmamūrti of Madras showed such physical exploits, which he attributed to the practice of Yoga.

The eighth mysterious power is to see hidden things and subtle and minute atoms with the naked eyes. It can be obtained by the practice of Shiva Yoga mentioned in the preceding pages at 87.

Then follow various mysterious powers which can be obtained by practising samyama on the heavenly objects. If a devotee practises Samyama on the solar disc, he obtains the knowledge of the entire universe ; if he practises it on the lunar disc, he obtains the knowledge of the stars. By practising samyama on the polar star, he obtains the knowledge of the planetary motion and the rising and setting of the stars.

The author now proceeds to enumerate the miraculous power attainable by the practice of Samyama on the bodily organs. By the practice of samyama in the umbilical region, the oesophagus, the cardiac and the cerebral regions, a devotee obtains a knowledge of anatomy and physiology, removes hunger and thirst, obtains mental stability and vision of invisible beings respectively.

Just as dawn precedes the morning, so does dim appearance of spiritual knowledge precede the attainment of perfect knowledge called viveka-khyāti. This preliminary dawning of the spiritual knowledge is called Pratibhā. If one practises samyama in the pratibhā, he becomes omniscient. If a practitioner practises samyama in the heart, he attains the power of knowing his mind and that of another.

The enjoyment of wordly things takes place by making a confusion between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. At that time, a false notion arises that there is no difference between the puruṣa (ego) and prakṛiti (non-ego). This is due to ignorance ; but when one realises that the prakṛiti is for the enjoyment of the puruṣa and constantly keeps this difference between them in view, he acquires the knowledge of puruṣa. When a practitioner has obtained the power of discrimination between the puruṣa and the prakṛiti, he attains a particular supernatural insight called *pratiḥā* by which he can see, hear, smell, taste and touch objects which are divine. These psychic attainments which are considered successes by wordly men and tyros, are really obstacles in the way of *śamādhi*. They are mere performances like those of an athlete, rope-dancer or necromancer. A sincere devotee desirous of Kaivalya (absolutism) does not care for them.

Patañjali explains another miraculous power by which a Yogi can enter into another body. The mind is very fickle and has no limit for its activity. By virtue of the merits and demerits of the former birth, it is confined in the body. If one slackens the bondage arising from the merits and demerits and understands the power of the mind, he can achieve this miraculous power.

There is a case of souls' transference from one body to another mentioned by P. Lekha Ram, Arya Musafir in his "Sabāte Tanāsukh" 1st. edition, p. 260 on the authority of the philosophical enquirer and "Arya Magazine" for October 1884 p.p. 159-162.

There is a town by the name of Orenburg in Russia on the border of Asia Minor near the Ural mountains. Abraham Charcot, an uneducated Jew, fell ill and apparently died; but he subsequently revived and could not recognise his wife, children and parents. He began to speak English instead of Hebrew which was his mother tongue. There was another man by name of Abraham Durham, an Englishman, resident of New Westminster in British Columbia, who died on the same night of 22nd September 1874 on which Abraham Charcot died. The man of New Westminster similarly revived and began to show the same strange symptoms like Abraham Charcot. The doctor who treated Abraham Charcot in the Government hospital at St. Petersburg and Abraham Charcot himself happened to be in New Westminster; a great sensation was created by this mysterious change in these two persons. One was speaking English and the other was speaking Hebrew; both of them did not recognise their own relatives but claimed those of the other as their own. At last the doctor of the St. Petersburg Hospital who happened to be there on behalf of the Russian Government, came to the conclusion that the case was one of the transference of the two souls to the different bodies. Orenburg and New Westminster are both situate on the antipodes.

There is another miraculous power which consists in a practitioner's becoming light like carded cotton and thereby becoming unaffected by water, mire or thorn and passing the soul through the cerebral region at any time he likes. There are two sorts of activities of the organs. The external activity consists of seeing, hearing etc., the internal activity is respiration etc. The vital airs which regulate the activity of the internal organs are five in number; the activity of the prāna extends from the nasal region down to the cardiac region, (2) that

of the apāna extends from the umbilical region down to the feet ; (3) the function of the samāna which pervades the umbilical region is to assist the digestion of food ; (4) the activity of the vyāna extends throughout the body, (5) and that of the udāna extends from the nasal region up to the cerebral region. If a devotee practises samyama in the udāna, he attains the psychic power described above.

Ibn Batuta, an Arab traveller who came to India in the reign of Muhammad Shah Tughlaq (1325-1351) and who vowed to write in his travels nothing but what he saw with his own eyes or what he found to be true on enquiry (see the Urdu Translation of the Travels by Moulvie Muhammad Hussain, M. A. District Judge Ferozpur and Fellow of the Punjab University at P. 91 of Vol. II.) says that in the court of the King, he was shown a performance of two Indian Yogis who were preceptor and disciple; the latter by sitting in a particular posture rose in the air and remained suspended for some time; the former struck a pair of sandals against the ground in anger and made them climb in the air. They struck the neck of the disciple who was in the air; he began to descend slowly. This performance so amazed Ibn Batuta that he fell into a swoon and recovered by taking some medicine supplied by the king. Only reaching home he became delirious but on drinking some *sherbet* sent by the king, gradually recovered (at PP. 259 and 260).

There is a note by the learned translator (at P. 260), about the Indian Yogis quoting from Kaikhusro-bin-Azar Kewan, the author of *Dabistan*, a Persian by extraction and a contemporary of Dārā Shikoh. He describes the Yoga and Samkhya systems on hearsay information and narrates the wonderful powers of the Yogis such as aerial flight and trance. Take the information of Kaikhusro for what it is worth, but the strong evidence of Batuta who was an eye-witness in face of the solemn oath of God, the Prophet and the angels, cannot be passed over without serious consideration. There can be no doubt as to the veracity of the statement of Batuta; and it cannot be said that a fraud was practised on him by the king. These Yogis of the court of Mohammad Tughlaq must have been like Hari Das of Ranjit Singh's court.

Let us revert to our subject. If a devotee practises samyama in samāna he obtains the supernatural power of appearing brilliant and radiant to others; if one practises *samyama* in the connection that exists between the ear and the ether, he obtains the supernatural power of

hearing : by practising *samyama* in the connection of the body with the ether, he can obtain the power to fly in the air by becoming light like carded cotton.

While feeling pride in one's own body the modifications of the mind externally are called *kalpita* ; but without the feeling of pride, the independent modifications of the mind are called *akalpita*. If a practitioner practises *samyama* in the *akalpita*, he succeeds in lifting the veil of miseries, actions, and fruits from the *buddhi*, and can enter into another body. If a Yogi practises *samyama* in the gross form of the five elements, their quality, such as fluidity, gaseousness etc., their subtle form in the *panchatalmâtras*, their affinity and the object i. e. enjoyment and redemption, he obtains conquest over the nature and elements.

By controlling the gross form of the elements, one attains subtlety, levity, sublimity, gravity and power of touching distant objects such as the moon ; by controlling their quality, one obtains non-obstruction of will ; by controlling their subtle form, conquest over the elements ; by controlling affinity, lordliness ; by controlling purpose, power of accomplishment of desires without any obstruction. They are called eight *siddhis*. He also obtains physical attainments, and the power of keeping his body intact and unaffected in fire and water. The physical attainments are comeliness, beauty, strength, and iron frame of the body like that of *Hanumâna*.

If a practitioner practises *samyama* in the objects of senses, their nature, egotism, their affinity and their purpose, he obtains conquest over the senses. By the control of senses, a practitioner obtains the psychic power called *madhupratika* by which he can shorten distances by passing to any country in a twinkling of an eye, perceive all objects of sense without the aid of the senses and obtain conquest over nature.

If a practitioner realises 'self' by discriminating it from the *buddhi*, in which there is a preponderance of *Satwa*, he becomes omnipotent and omniscient. This psychic power is called *visoka siddhi*. On its attainment, the practitioner by eradicating the nescience, the cause of miseries obtains *Kaivalya* (absolutism). It is called *Samskâra s'eqâkhyâ siddhi*.

In the attainment of *kaivalyaism*, there are many obstacles in the way of a Yogi, as for example the invitation of the gods to accept certain heavenly sensual pleasures. These are the various temptations thrown in his way ; if he is led away by them the whole practice becomes

ruined. There are four kinds of practitioners; (1) a Prathama Kāpika is a beginner, a neophyte (2) a madhubhūmikā is a Yogi who has obtained ritambharā prajñā as explained in the preceding pages at 89; (3) Prajñā jyoti or bhūtendriya jayī is a Yogi who has obtained conquest over the elements and senses; (4) atikrāntabhāviya is one who has achieved all that he wanted to achieve and reached the zenith or the topmost rung of the ladder in the practice. There are seven grades in it. When a practitioner reaches the madhumati grade while he is in the 4th stage of his practice, these temptations are offered by the gods. A practitioner should not, therefore, accept the offers made and feel proud of his achievements because of the fear of being again involved in the miseries of which he wants to be free.

The lowest limit of time is kṣaṇa (moment); by practising sanyama in the order of its succession i. e. by understanding the minute changes by lapse of moments, one obtains the highest discriminating power called *vivekajam jñanam* with the aid of which one can distinguish similar things by their genus, differentia and situation. It is self-taught, all-embracing and simultaneous without past, present and future. When the intellect (buddhi) and soul of the practitioner are purified by the practices, he attains *kaivalyaism* (reabsorption or absolutism).

IV.

The psychic attainments mentioned in the preceding pages are either natural in some created beings as flying in birds, or produced by medicine such as *elīcīr vitā*, by the power of mantra as in the case of Vatsarāja and Nandiswara, by penance as in the case of Viśvāmitra, or by trance as in the case of Yājñavalkya, Dattātreya etc.

A Yogi can assume the shape of any being such as an animal or a god by uniting the different forces of nature, as for example, a small spark of fire is sufficient to ignite a large heap of combustible or inflammable substance. The virtue and vice are not the exciting causes of uniting the forces of nature, but are only helpmates or the predisposing causes. Just as a farmer by constructing a water course in his field and removing any obstacles that may be there allows a free flow of water therein so does nature itself with the aid of virtue remove the obstacles caused by the vice in the way of spiritual attainments.

When a Yogi by his attainments can create different bodies for himself the question is whether he creates many minds. The reply is in the affirmative, but all these minds are under the control of one principal mind.

When a devotee (Yogi) has purified his mind by the practice of *samādhi*, it becomes devoid of all associations of action and miseries. The actions are of four kinds (1) black, the fruit of which is bitter; (2) white, the fruit of which is sweet; (3) the black-and-white, the fruit of which is both bitter and sweet; (4) the non-black and non-white which bear no fruit. The actions of a perfect Yogi are of the fourth class. By virtue of the first three kinds of actions, the associations arising from the previous birth continue in the present birth, as for example, if a soul was in the body of an angel in the previous birth, it will show the angelic tendencies in the present birth. These associations though lie dormant by reason of the class, time and space, manifest themselves on occasions arising, as for instance, the feline nature of a cat may not appear in several births, periods or countries but shall manifest itself again in the body of a cat when it happens to be born again.

These associations are eternal, because the hopes are everlasting. As for example, every one is afraid of death and wishes to live; this fact shows that there have been several previous births, the impressions of which are left on one's sub-consciousness. As the hope of life is permanently deep-rooted in the animal world, the associations of the past actions and their fruit are, therefore, eternal. They owe their existence to nescience, fruit of the actions and intellect (*buddhi*) the receptacle. When by the spiritual knowledge, a Yogi eradicates nescience and actions and purifies his *buddhi*, the associations disappear.

According to the doctrine of *pariṇāma* (evolution) which characterises the Sāṃkhya school of philosophy, what exists cannot be destroyed, and what does not exist cannot be created. The substratum, therefore, remains the same; but it is the qualities that undergo changes and have the past, present and future states. The present is being enjoyed; the past is the cause and the future is the effect of the present. Accordingly the *chitta* remains intact, and the associations which are its qualities pass away into the region of the past and no longer trouble a Yogi. The non-existence of the associations is only a transformation, because anything existent cannot be destroyed.

The varying qualities which are two-fold as gross and subtle are the *guṇas*, viz : *satwa*, *rajas* and *taṃas*; but the substance is one in which all these *guṇas* exist in varying proportions. Owing to the variety of the *chittas* of different persons, there arises a variety of feelings in connec-

tion with one object of perception. As for example, a beautiful girl causes pleasure to her lover, enmity in the mind of her co-wife and hatred in the mind of a Yogi.

The *substratum* in which the *guṇas* reside is nothing according to the idealistic school of philosophy, because when the mind perceives a pot, it is not conscious of any other object besides it; but when the pot is removed and cloth is brought before it, it is conscious of it and there is no longer perception of the pot. It is only the fleeting ideas but not the substratum of which we are conscious. The reply of Patanjali is that the mind (*chitta*) perceives a thing when it is attracted to it but does not perceive it when it is not attracted to it. The perception or non-perception of an object, therefore, depends upon the application or non-application of the mind towards it. The theory of perception according to the Sāṃkhya school of philosophy of which the Yoga is a branch as explained at page 74 is that the *antahkaraṇa* or *chitta* becomes animated by the reflection of the *puruṣa*. The modifications in the *chitta* caused by the presence of the object are converted into the object itself and carry the impressions of the object to the *puruṣa* who is then said to perceive it. The *puruṣa* is unchangeable, and it is only the *chitta vrittis* that become converted into the object itself. As seen, the mind (*chitta*) is not self-illuminating; it is inanimate. As said above, it becomes animated by the soul (*puruṣa*) and perceives with its aid but not with the aid of another mind, because the supposition of another mind leads one to *regressus in infinitum* and confusion of different impressions. We shall, therefore, have to admit the existence of the intelligent being (*puruṣa*) who animates the *chitta* which, through the instrumentality of the sense organs, comes into contact with the object outside and becomes identical with it.

The mind (*chitta*) thus acts for the *puruṣa* and is said to perceive the object metaphorically. When a Yogi has realised the real nature of the *puruṣa*, the object and the *chitta*, he does not consider the *chitta* to be the actor, knower, and enjoyer. His 'self' is entirely different from the *chitta*. When he reaches this stage of discrimination, he becomes absorbed in the true spiritual knowledge and burdened with the sole idea of Kaivalyaism (absolutism). Even at this stage obstacles arise, because the impressions of the past actions are not totally eradicated. They should be remedied by keeping the difference between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* before the mind's eye.

When the obstacles are removed, as mentioned above, the Yogi reaches the stage called the *Dharma-megha samādhi* where he realises the *puruṣa*

constantly by reason of having no desire left to reap the fruit of the highest knowledge of di-erimination. The miseries and actions, with the exception of the non-white and non-black as explained above disappear. When the impurities of the Yogi's mind are removed and infinite knowledge is reached there is very little left for him to know. The succession of the guṇas, viz : satwa, rajas and tamās which have accomplished their object disappears. This succession is regulated by time, the lowest limit of which is Kṣāṇa ; the changes go on in this course of time. There are two kinds of eternal substance ; one is called *Kuṭṣtha nityatā* which belongs to puruṣa who remains unchanged throughout eternity. The other is called *pariṇāmi nityatā* which belongs to the guṇas which undergo changes every moment, leave a person who has reached the highest stage in his practice, but still keep hold of another who is ignorant ; this process or change is repeated throughout eternity. When this stage is reached the Yogi becomes united to his self devoid of all guṇas. This stage is called Kaivalyaism.

Having given the teachings of the Yoga philosophy in detail, let us see how far they are supported by the Upaniṣads. We find the Yoga doctrines in the Upaniṣads in their elementary form. The Yoga system has been developed from the elementary teachings we find in the *Upaniṣads*. Let us take Maitryopaniṣat published in the S. B. H. XXXI, VI, 10, p. 87.

"The puruṣa is, therefore, the eater ; the prakṛiti is food, being seated in it, he eats. The food consisting of *prakṛiti* by reason of its resulting in the difference of three guṇas is characterised by *Mahat* as first and particular as last." See the commentary on it in English in the same series at p. 68 of XXXI.

In VI. 18, it is said "Similarly there is a rule of practice such as prāṇāyāma (breath exercise), pratyāhāra (withdrawal of sense organs from their objects), dhyāna (meditation) dhāraṇā (concentration), tarka contemplation and samāhi (trance). They are called the six limbs of Yoga". See the commentary on it in the S. B. H. XXXI. series at pp. 82 and 83.

In VI. 20 "Now it is said elsewhere, there is a greater practice called *Dhāraṇā* (concentration by pressing the tongue against the palate and restraining the speech, mind and breath ; he sees Brahma by *tarka* (contemplation). When he sees by the self his own self, the minutest of the minute and shining, on cessation of the mind, then by seeing his self by the self, he becomes selfless....." p. 85 of XXXI.

In VI. 21 "Again it is said elsewhere ; the ascending blood vessel called

surround carrying life, is bifurcated in the palate : let him by it which is full of life-breath, omkāra and mind ascend up. Turning the tip of the tongue on the upper part of the palate and joining the organs, let glory see glory ; one thereby becomes self-less : by reason of being self-less, he does not partake of pleasure and pain but obtains redemption. It is said that having placed the first by the restrained breath on the palate, let him then crossing the shore unite with the Infinite in the cerebral region". p. 87 of XXXI.

In VI. 22 "On the other hand, those who follow the word by closing the ears with the thumbs, hear the sound of the ether in the heart. It resembles seven kinds, (of sounds) as for example that of the rivers, bells, bell-metal, wheel, croaking of frogs, rainfall and (the voice of one when) he speaks in a lonely place. Having passed beyond it (the sound) of different kinds, they vanish in the Supreme, non-word and non-manifest Brahma....." See the commentary on it in the S. B. H. XXXI. p. 95.

Not only do we find the doctrines of the Yoga philosophy, but the word 'Yoga' is also defined. See VI. 25. "It is said because one joins in this way the breath, Om and all in its manifold forms or they join with him, it is, therefore, called Yoga. The union of breath and mind and similarly of the organs and the relinquishment of all existence, is called Yoga." p. 95 of XXXI.

In VI. 34 (9) at p. 121 of XXXI, samādhi is praised " The pleasure felt by one whose mind is purified of the impurities by the trance and is placed in the self cannot be described by the speech but can be felt by him with the internal organ".

It is useless to accumulate quotations from the Upaniṣats ; the quotations given above are quite sufficient to show that the Yoga system of philosophy both theoretical and practical is based on the teachings scattered here and there in the Upaniṣats. It is needless to refer to the apocryphal Upaniṣats which were surely written after the Yoga sūtras had come into existence.

V. Mīmāṃsā.

In view of the separate volume entitled Introduction to the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, in S. B. H. XXVIII, it is unnecessary to write anything in connection with it. The Mīmāṃsa school of philosophy is not based on the teachings of the Upaniṣads but on the Taittirīya Samhitā. It relates to the sacrificial rites which are deprecated by the upaniṣads. See Muṇḍaka I.2-10-11. These sacrificial rites are only external ceremonies

to secure heaven; without spiritual knowledge which alone is entitled to be called *vidyā*, final redemption or reabsorption cannot be secured. These external rites in the shape of the sacrifices constitute *avidyā*, because they do not secure immortality or immunity from the transmigration of soul.

VI. Vedānta.

Now we come to the Uttara Mīmāṃsā which is also called Śāriraka Mīmāṃsā or the Vedānta school of philosophy. It embraces idealism and transcendentalism. We find its counterpart in the philosophy of Plato, Kant and Spinoza.

We have examined the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy which is realism of the European system of philosophy. It is a common sense view and it prepared the way for the establishment of the atheistic school of philosophy. The Vedāntic school of philosophy started by Bādarāyaṇa was mainly intended to criticise the Sāṃkhya view and was based on the teachings of the Upaniṣads. The Śāririka sūtras are generally short passages culled from the text of the Upaniṣads or their substance reproduced in a different language. The creation of the material world from matter and the multiplicity of the puruṣa is repulsive to the teaching of the Upaniṣads. The non-existence of Is'wara is also against the canons of the scripture. It was chiefly with a view to combat the doctrines of Sāṃkhya that Bādarāyaṇa raised the standard of revolt. If the Sāṃkhya is dualism advocating the existence and eternity of mind and matter, the Vedānta is monism affirming the existence and eternity of one intelligent substance called Brahma and denying the creation of the universe by nature or Pradhāna. A vast literature in the shape of original writings and commentaries has sprung up round Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras; the real meaning of Bādarāyaṇa amidst this heterogeneous mass of writings is lost sight of and remains shrouded in an apparent mystery.

Different schools have naturally sprung up. Those who are extremists say that there is absolutely nothing besides one intelligent substance called Brahma in the Vedānta. This school of extremists is called here *advaitism* or monism. The greatest philosopher who stands out prominently in this school is Śaṅkarācharya, and there were many who preceded him and followed him. This school has, therefore, become synonymous with Śaṅkarism or Māyāvāda or Illusionism. According to the Māyāvāda doctrine, the phenomenal existence of the *cosmos* is illusion. It, therefore, follows that the individual soul and the supreme soul are not different. They are one and the same thing; it is only nescience under the influence of which we

see the variety. When nescience is radically removed by the spiritual knowledge acquired, the apparent difference disappears and pure Brahmanhood is reached. As for example the universal ether is all pervading, it is also in a pot; there is only an apparent difference between the universal ether and that in the pot where it is confined: but if the pot which is called *upādhi* (environment) is broken, the universal ether alone is left.

Against this view there is the dualistic school of Vedānta, according to which the individual souls and the universe are real entities and different from Brahma. Ānanda Tīrtha, Nimbārka and Vallabhāchārya belong to this school. They are Vaiṣṇavas and believe in the *chatur vyūha* doctrine; according to them there are Vāsudeva, Saṁkarṣaṇa, Aniruddha and Pradyumna, the different manifestations of one deity. This school further advocates devotion to the Lord (*bhakti*). The Bhāgavata school which believes in the *chatur vyūha* doctrine as explained above is older than Śāṅkarāchārya, as the latter criticised it in his commentary on the Vedānta sūtra. Baudhāyana who is said to be the oldest commentator on the Vedānta sūtras appears to belong to the dualistic school of Vedānta as Rāmānuja says in his introduction to his commentary on the sūtra that he bases it on the *Brahma sūtra criti* by the revered Baudhāyana. Nimbārka, Ballabhāchārya, Mādhwa *alias* Ānanda Tīrtha were Vaiṣṇavites and have their sects in Mathura, Brindaban and Southern India. They are distinguishable from one another from their peculiar trident marks made of chalk and red powder on their foreheads. The Gosains or the heads of the sects who are priests are very exclusive people and consider themselves polluted even by the shadow of an untouchable.

Though Rāmānuja belongs to the dualistic school, yet his dualism borders on the non-dualism. According to him there is a difference between the supreme and the individual souls and the creation, if looked individually (*vyāpti rūpena*); but if looked as a whole (*samaṣṭi rūpena*) there is no difference. As for example, there are different portions in a human body which when looked on separately are different but when looked on as constituting the whole, there is only one human body. This kind of non-dualism or dualism is called qualified monism (*viśiṣṭādvaita*). He is also a Viṣṇuite and a founder of an important sect of Vaiṣṇavaism prevalent in southern India and Mathura and Brindaban in upper India. He was born at Trichnopoly in the family of the Brahmans of the Hārita gotra in 1127 A. C. His father was Keśava Bhaṭṭa. He is believed to be an incarnation of Śeṣa by his followers.

The followers of the Rāmānuja sect also put on a trident mark of white chalk and red perpendicular line made of some red powder in the middle. They are exclusive people and shun the untouchable as other Viṣṇuīte priests do.

The common people belonging to the different sects understand nothing of the philosophical side of the Vedānta, but believe in it and follow the different tenets of the religion founded by their masters. We have *Chaitanyaism* founded by Chaitanya in Bengal.

Having given the different schools of the Vedānta, let us see what the word means. It occurs in the Upaniṣads both canonical and uncanonical. In the Muṇḍakopaniṣat III-2-6.

वेदांतं विज्ञानमुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यास योगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।

“Those whose object is fully ascertained by the knowledge of the Vedānta and those ascetics whose mind is purified by saṁnyāsa and Yoga.....”

In the Śvetas'wataropaniṣad VI. 22.

“वेदांते परमं गुह्यं पुराकल्पे प्रचोदितं” ।

“The most hidden secret of the Vedānta revealed in the previous creation.....”

The 'word vedānta' occurs in Mahānarayanopaniṣad, Kaivalyopaniṣad, Kṣurakopaniṣat and Muktikopaniṣat.

It is derived from $\sqrt{\text{veda} + \text{anta}} =$ the end of the Veda. The Veda as said in the previous pages at 1 is divided into three parts (khaṇḍas) according to the nature of the subject; the first is Karma Kāṇḍa which is ritualistic the second is upāsanā kāṇḍa which is devotional, and the third is Jñāna kāṇḍa which consists of the spiritual knowledge. The spiritual knowledge is the highest end without which no one can obtain salvation; it is neither the religious ceremonies nor the blind faith in God that can save the soul from the transmigration. It is the true knowledge of self (Ātma-vidyā) which leads one to cross the ocean of darkness and attain immortality.

The Vedānta has become so much popular in India that the people, both learned and illiterate profess it. In words they assert the non-dualism by calling their individual self as Brahma and in action they consider themselves above virtue and vice. Rightly has some poet

said in parody of the Vedānta :—

ब्रह्मैवसत्यमखिलं नहि किंचिदस्ति ।
तस्मान्न मेसखि परावर भेदबुद्धिः ॥
जारे तथा निजवरे सदृशोऽनुरागो ।
व्यर्थैकमर्थं प्रसतीति कदर्थयति ॥

“ Forsooth the whole cosmos is Brahma in reality, there is nothing besides him ; O! friend, I therefore make no difference between another and myself. I show equal regard to my paramour and husband. Why should people uselessly call me ‘ unchaste ? ’ ”

The sublime and high teaching of the Vedānta philosophy has been thus misunderstood and abused by the common people in their own self-interest. There is another example of Vāma Mārga or the Śakti worship which has degenerated into Bacchanalianism and filthy and obscene rites. Woodroffe has tried to save the Śaktism from the above charge by writing several works and translating some of the Tantras. His ‘ Śākta and Śakti worship ’ is a valuable contribution.

The word ‘ Vedānta ’ applies to the Upanisads in general and the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa in particular. The monism of Śaṅkarāchārya is included in it. The Upanisads, the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa and the Bhagvadgītā are included in the term and are called *Prasthāna trayī*. All the schools of the Vedānta enumerated above have commented upon the *Prasthāna trayī* according to the view of their school and have, therefore, twisted the text to suit their view. We have in the translation of the Upanisads followed the Mādhwa school which is, as said repeatedly, dualistic.

After having described the Vedānta and its different schools, let us turn to the theory of creation or cosmology. According to the accepted view, it is called Vivartavāda ; and before this doctrine is explained, let us explain *satta* or existence. It is of three kinds ; (1) Pāramārthika, real or true which remains unmodified in all states and at all times. Under this definition, the existence of Brahma alone is pāramārthika or real ; (2) Vyāvahārika is the phenomenal existence which is true for the time being under the influence of the inborn nescience ; as all ignorant people not acquainted with astronomy accept the geocentric doctrine, or people in a dream believe in the existence of the scenes that pass one after the other before their eye for that time, but on awakening find that they were all false. Similarly the creation which we see around us is all imaginary but true as long as nescience lasts ; but when the true nature of Brahma is realised by the constant study, repetition, and meditation, the phenomenal

existence which is true in the state of ignorance disappears. (3) *Pārabhāsika* satta is the apparent existence which by some defect in an individual, the objects appear to be different from what they really are ; as for example, a person suffering from diplopia sees two moons, a person in dark sees a serpent in a rope or an ignorant person sees silver in a nacre. All optical illusions such as mirage, *fata morgana*, *ignis fatuus* etc. come under apparent existence.

From the above explanation of the existence, it appears that the phenomenal and apparent existence are one and the same ; but it is not so. The phenomenal existence is true to a class by inherent defect, for ever but apparent existence is true to an individual by reason of some optical illusion or constitutional defect under certain circumstances only.

Having now explained the nature and varieties of the existence, it is now not difficult to understand *vivarta* doctrine ; we have seen that Brahma alone is truly existent and appears to be changed into the phenomenal existence of the universe under the influence of nescience or illusion. The whole universe is the emanation from the true essence or existent who is called Brahma and its ultimate re-absorption in him. Just as there are inspiration and expiration in a person, so are the emanation and absorption of the entire universe from and into the primeval source, viz., Brahma. In this view, the universe is true for the time being and is said to exist phenomenally but not really. Brahma is the soul and the universe around us is his body ; the individuals are like the drops of water returning to the original source, viz., the ocean. The appropriate simile which is very familiar with the Vedānta school is that the universal ether is not different from the ether that pervades a pot ; and on the latter being broken, the ether of the pot which was confined by the surrounding environments reverts to the universal ether. Similarly, the individual souls are confined by the surrounding environments called *upādhi* in the Vedāntic terminology and on the *upādhi* being removed by the spiritual knowledge acquired by constant study, repetition and meditation, the souls return to the primeval cause which is Brahma.

According to the Vedānta school we have three states, namely, sleeping, waking and dreaming, besides swoon and death. The Vyāvahārika existence of the scenes in a dream where one has sons, daughters and other relations, lasts till the dreaming state is over ; but the Vyāvahārika existence

of the world continued not only for one's life but also for several lives, tillnescience lasts. This naturally leads to the doctrine of metempsychosis.

According to the Chhândogyaopniṣad, Chapter V as interpreted by Vyāsa in Chapter III of his Vedānta sūtras the departed souls go either by the devayāna (the path of the gods) or pitriyāna (the path of the manes.) The passage of the soul by the former way is first through the region of fire, the sun, the moon and lightning and ultimately leading to Brahma who is perfect light. When a soul attains the region of Brahma, it does not come back. The souls that go by the pitriyāna have to come back after the enjoyment of the fruit of their good actions to the world in the following order; rain, vegetables (including herbs and cereals), food, semen and womb. These are, as it were, the five steps of the ladder that is between the heaven and earth for ascent and descent. The passage of the soul in the order of descent through the vegetable kingdom is temporary and should not be confounded with the rebirth of a soul in the vegetable kingdom by virtue of its actions.

This transmigration or descent and ascent of a soul lasts for several births till Brahmahood is reached by the light of the spiritual science (Brahmavidyā). It cannot be obtained by the performance of the sacrifices or blind faith. It is the true knowledge of 'Self' which can save one from the series of births called saṃsāra in the Vedantic language.

In my opinion, the teaching of the Upaniṣads leans greatly towards advaitism or monism of Śaṅkarāchārya. I shall now proceed to cite passages from the Upaniṣats as translated by Max Müller in the Sacred Books of the East; our translation being based on the view of the Mādwa school is, therefore, not cited. Sanscrit texts are not quoted as a curious reader can refer to the original in our series.

"And he who beholds all beings in the 'Self' and the 'Self' in all beings he never turns away from it." *Is'a.* 6.

"When to a man who understands, the 'Self' has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity." (*Ibid* 7.)

"... .. I am what He is." (*Ibid* 16.)

"... .. He who sees any difference here, goes from death to death." *Kaṭha* Chapter II. 4.10.

"... .. He goes from death to death who sees any difference here." (*Ibid*, Chapter II. 4.11.)

"As the one fire, after it has entered the world, though one, becomes different according to whatever it burns, thus the one 'Self' within all things becomes different, according to what it enters and exists also without." (*Ibid*, Chapter II. 5. 9.)

"As the one air, after it has entered the world though one, becomes different according to whatever it enters, thus the one self within all things becomes different according to whatever it enters and exists also without." (*Ibid*, 10.)

"As the sun, the eye of the whole world is not contaminated by the external impurities seen by the eyes, thus the one Self within all things is never contaminated by the misery of the world, being himself without." (*Ibid*, 11.)

"As these flowing rivers that go towards the ocean, when they have reached the ocean, sink into it, their name and form are broken and people speak of the ocean only, exactly thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the puruṣa, when they have reached the puruṣa, sink into him, their name and form are broken and people speak of the puruṣa only, and he becomes without parts and immortal"
Pras'na VI. 5.

"... .. Sir, what is that through which, if it is known, everything else becomes known?" (*Muṇḍaka* I. 1. 3.)

"As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from every man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus does everything arise here from the Indestructible." (*Ibid* 7.)

"This is the truth. As from the blazing fire sparks being like unto fire, fly forth thousand-fold, thus are various beings brought forth from the imperishable, my friend, and return thither also." (*Ibid*, II. 1. 1.)

"As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their form, thus a wise man, freed from name and form goes to the divine person, who is greater than the great." (*Ibid*, III. 2. 8.)

"... .. That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman." (*Taittirīya* III. 1.)

"After that, the Gārhapatya fire taught him: Earth, fire, food and the sun (these are my forms, or forms of Brahman). The person that is seen in the sun, I am he, I am he indeed." (*Chhândogya* IV. 11.)

"Then the Anvāhārya fire taught him, 'water, the quarters, the stars, the moon (these are my forms). The person that is seen in the moon, I am he, I am he indeed.'" (*Ibid*, 12.)

"Then the Ahavanīya fire taught him : Breath, ether, heaven and lightning (these are my forms). The person that is seen in the lightening I am he and I am he indeed." (*Ibid* 13.)

"He said : the person that is seen in the eye, that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman" *Ibid* 15.

"... .. My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech but the truth being that all is clay." (*Ibid* VI. 14.)

"And as my dear, by one nugget of gold, all that is made of gold is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is gold." (*Ibid* 5.)

"And as my dear, by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is iron,—thus my dear, is that instruction." (*Ibid* 6.)

"In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is (To *ov*) one only, without a second. Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not (To *μη ov*), one only, without a second; and from that which is not, that which is, was born." (*Ibid* VI. 2. 1.)

"But how could it be thus, my dear ?' the father continued. 'How could that which is, be born of that which is not ? No my dear, only that which is, was in the beginning, one only without a second'." (*Ibid* 2.)

"Uddālaka Aruṇi said to his son Śveta Ketu : learn from me the true nature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, then, my dear son, he becomes united with the True, he is gone to his own (self). Therefore they say 'he sleeps' 'because he is gone to his own (self)'. " (*Ibid* 8. 1.)

"As the bees my son, make honey by collecting the juices of distant trees and reduce the juice into one form, and as these juices have no discrimination, so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that, in the same manner, my son all these creatures, when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the true. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf or

a boar or a worm or a midge or a gnat or a musquito, that they become again and again. Now that which is that subtile essence in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self and thou, O ! Śvetaketu, art it." (*Ibid* 9. 1. 4.)

"These rivers, my son, run the eastern toward the east, the western toward the west. They go from sea to sea. They become indeed sea. And as those rivers, when they are in the sea, do not know, I am this or that river, in the same manner, my son all these creatures, when they have come back from the True know not that they have come back from the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf or a bear or a worm or a midge or a gnat or a musquito, that they become again and again. That which is that subtile essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O ! S'veta Ketu, art it." (*Ibid* 10. 1—3.)

"If some one were to strike at the root of this large tree here, it would bleed, but live. If he were to strike at its stem, it would bleed, but live. If he were to strike at its top, it would bleed but live. Pervaded by the living Self that tree stands firm, drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing; but if the life leaves one of its branches, that branch withers; if it leaves third, that branch withers. If it leaves the whole tree, the whole tree withers. In exactly the same manner my son, know this. Then he spoke this (body) indeed withers and dies when the living Self has left it; the living Self dies not. That which is subtile essence in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, S'veta Ketu, art it." (*Ibid* 11. 1—3.)

"Fetch me from thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree.

Here is one, sir.

Break it.

It is broken, sir.

What do you see there ?

These seeds, almost infinitesimal.

Break one of them.

It is broken, sir.

What do you see there ?

Not anything, sir.

The father said : my son that subtile essence which you do not perceive there, of that very essence this great Nyagrodha tree exists.

Believe it, my son, that which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O ! Śveta Keta, art it." *Ibid* 12. 1—3.

"Place this salt in water and then wait on me in the morning. The son did as he was commanded. The father said to him, bring me the salt which you placed in the water last night. The son having looked for it, found it not, for, of course, it was melted. The father said : taste it from the surface of the water. How is it ? The son replied : it is salt.

Taste it from the middle. How is it ?

The son replied : it is salt.

Taste it from the middle. How is it ?

The son replied : it is salt.

Taste it from the bottom. How is it ?

The son replied : it is salt.

The father said : "throw it away and then wait on me." He did so ; but salt exists for ever. Then the father said : here also in this body, forsooth, you do not perceive the True, my son ; but there indeed it is. That which subtle essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the self, O, thou, Śveta Keta, art it." (*Ibid* 13. 1—3.)

"As one might lead a person with his eyes covered away from the Gandhāras and leave him then in a place where there are no human beings ; and as that person would turn towards the east, or the north or the west and shout. "I have been brought here with my eyes covered, I have been left here with my eyes covered"; and as thereupon some one might loose his bandage and say to him "go in that direction, it is Gandhāra, go in that direction"; and as thereupon having been informed and being able to judge for himself he would by asking his way from village to village, arrive at last at Gandhāra, in exactly the same manner does a man, who meets with a teacher to inform him, obtain the true knowledge. For him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered (from the body) ; then he will be perfect. That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the self, and thou, O ! Śveta Keta, art it." (*Ibid* 14. 1—3.)

If a man is ill, his relatives assemble round him and ask : "dost thou know me ?" Now as long as his speech is not merged in his mind, his mind in breath, breath in heat (fire), heat in the Highest Being, he knows them. But when his speech is merged in his mind, his mind in breath,

breath in heat (fire), heat in the Highest Being, then he knows them not. That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the self and thou, O! Śveta Ketu, art it." (*Ibid* 15. 1—2.)

"My child, they bring a man hither whom they have taken by the hand, and they say: "he has taken something, he has committed a theft. Heat the hatchet for him." If he committed the theft, then he makes himself to be what he is not. Then the false-minded having covered his true Self by a falsehood, grasp the heated hatchet, he is burnt and he is killed. But if he did not commit the theft, then he makes himself to be what he is. Then the true-minded, having covered his true Self by truth, grasp the heated hatchet—he is not burnt and he is delivered. And that man is not burnt, thus has all that exists its Self in That. It is the True. It is the Self and thou, O! Śveta Ketu, art it." (*Ibid* 61. 1—2.)

"Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the infinite. When one sees something else, that is the finite. The infinite is immortal, the finite is mortal." (*Ibid* VII. 24—1.)

"The infinite indeed is below, above, behind, before, right and left—it is indeed all this. Now follows the explanation of the Infinite as the I: I am below I am above, I am behind, before, right and left—I am all this. Next follows the explanation of the Infinite as the Self: Self is below, above, behind, before, right and left—Self is all this." (*Ibid* 25, 1—2.)

"To him who sees, perceives and understands this, the spirit springs from the self, hope springs from the self, memory springs from the self. So do ether, fire, water, appearance and disappearance, food, power, understanding, reflection, consideration, will, mind, speech, names, sacred hymns and sacrifices—aye all this springs from the self. There is the verse. "He who sees this, does not see death, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this, sees everything, and obtains everything everywhere. He is one, he becomes three, he becomes five, he becomes seven, he becomes nine; then he is called the eleventh and hundred and ten and one thousand and twenty." (*Ibid* 26, 1-2.)

"Now that serene being which, after having risen from out this earthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form, that is the Self, thus he spake. This is the immortal, the fearless,

this is Brahman. And of that Brahman the name is the True, (Satyam). This name Sattyam consists of three syllables sat-ti-yam. Sat signifies immortal, t, the mortal and with yam he binds both. Because he binds both the immortal and the mortal, therefore it is yam." (*Ibid.* VIII. 3, 4-5.)

"Verily in the beginning this was Brahman, that Brahma knew Self, saying, I am Brahma. From it all this sprang. Thus whatever Deva was awakened, he indeed become that; and the same with Rishis and men. The rishi Vāma Deva saw and understood it, singing, I was Manu, I was the sun. Therefore now also he who thus knows that he is Brahma becomes all this and even the Devas can not prevent it, for he himself is their Self. Now if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know. He is like a beast for the Devas. For verily, as many beasts nourish a man, thus does every man nourish the Devas. If only one beast is taken away, it is not pleasant; how much more when many are taken! Therefore it is not pleasant to Devas that men should know this." (*Bṛihadāraṇyake* I. 4-10.)

"In the beginning this was self alone, one only." (*Ibid* 17.)

"As the spider comes out with its thread, or as small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all senses, all words, all Devas, all beings come forth from that self. The Upaniṣad of that self is the True of the True. Verily the senses are the true and he is the true of the true (*Ibid* II. I--20.)

"Verily, the self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O! Maitreyi. When we see, hear, perceive and know the self, then all this is known." (*Ibid* 4--5.)

"As a lump of salt, when thrown into water becomes dissolved into water and could not be taken out again, but wherever we taste (water), it is salt--thus verily, O! Maitreyi, does this great Being, endless, unlimited consisting of nothing but knowledge rise from out these elements and vanish again in them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge, I say, O! Maitreyi. Thus spoke Yājñavalkya. (*Ibid* 12.)

"For when there is as it were duality then one sees the other, one salutes the other one perceives the other, one knows the other; but when the self only is all this, how should he smell another, how should he see another, how should he hear another, how should he salute another, how

should he perceive another how should he know another? How should he know Him by whom he knows all this? How, O! beloved, should he know the knower?". *Ibid* 13.

"This Self is the honey of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this Self. Likewise this bright, immortal person in this Self and that bright immortal person the Self (both are madhu). He indeed is the same as that Self, that immortal, that Brahma, that all. And verily this Self is the Lord of all beings, the king of all beings. And as all spokes are contained in the axle and in the felly of a wheel, all beings, and all those selfs are contained in that Self". *Ibid* 5—14-15.

"Then Uśasta Chākrāyana asked; 'Yājñavalkya'. he said, tell me the Brahma which is visible, not visible, the Self within all; Yājñavalkya replied. 'This, thy Self who is within all. Which Self, O! Yājñavalkya, is within all?' Yājñavalkya replied: 'he who breathes in the up—breathing, he is thy Self, and within all. He who breathes in the down—breathing, he is thy Self, and within all. He who breathes in the on breathing he is thy Self, and within all. He who breathes in the out-breathing, he is thy Self and within all. This is thy Self who is within all; Uśasta Chākrāyana said: "as one might say this is a cow, this is a horse, thus has this been explained by thee. Tell me the Brahma which is visible, not visible, the Self who is within all". Yājñavalkya replied: 'this thy Self who is within all.' " Which Self, O! Yājñavalkya, is within all?' Yājñavalkya replied 'thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive perceiver the of perception, nor know the knower of knowledge. This is thy Self who is within all. Every thing else is of evil. After that Uśasta Chākrāyana held his peace". *Ibid* III 4, 1-2.

"He who dwells in all beings, and within all beings, whom all beings do not know, whose body all beings are and who rules all beings within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal"; "unseen, but seeing; unheard, but hearing; unperceived but perceiving; unknown, but knowing. There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other knower but he. This is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal".....*Ibid* 7—15, 23.

"He said, O! Gārgi, the Brāhmanas call this the imperishable (Akṣara). It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, neither

red nor fluid; it is without shadow, without darkness, without air, without ether, without attachment, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without a mouth, without a measure, having no within and no without, it devours nothing and no one devours it. By the command of that imperishable, O! Gārgi, sun and moon stand apart. By the command of that imperishable, O! Gārgi, what are called moments, hours, days and nights, half-months, months, seasons, years, all stand apart. By the command of that imperishable, O! Gārgi, some rivers flow to the east from the white mountains, others to the west, or to any other quarter. By the command of that imperishable, O! Gārgi, men praise those who give, the gods follow the sacrificer, the fathers (pitris) the darvi offerings. Whosoever, O! Gārgi, without knowing that imperishable, offers oblations in this world, sacrifices and performs penance for a thousand years, his work will have an end. Whosoever, O! Gārgi without knowing this imperishable, departs this world, he is miserable. But he, O! Gārgi, who departs this world, knowing this imperishable, he is Brahma. That Brahma, O! Gārgi, is unseen, but seeing, unheard, but hearing, unperceived, but perceiving; unknown, but knowing. There is nothing but sees it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it. In that imperishable then O! Gārgi, the ether is woven like warp and woof". *Ibid.* 8-8-11.

"Janaka Vaideha said 'who is that Self'?

Yajñavalkya replied; he who is within the heart surrounded by the Prāṇas the person of light, consisting of knowledge. He remaining, the same, wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as if moving. During sleep (in dream) he transcends this world and all the forms of death....." *Ibid.* iv. 3-7.

"When there he does not see, yet he is seeing, though he does not see. For sight is inseparable from the seer, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could see. *Ibid.* 23.

"An ocean is that one seer, without any duality; this is the Brahma world, O! King". *Ibid.* 32.

"That Self is indeed Brahma consisting of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing, earth, water, wind, ether, light and no light, desire and no desire, anger and no anger, right and wrong and all things. Now as a man is like this or that, according as he acts and according as he

behaves, so will he be :— a man of good acts will become good, a man of bad acts, bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds. There they say that a person consists of desires. And as is his desire, so is his will and as is his will, so is his deed; and whatever deed he does, that he will reap'. *Ibid* 4-5.

"On this there is this verse: when all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahma. And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant hill dead and cast away, thus lies the body ; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahma only, is only light". *Ibid*. 7.

"If a man understands the Self saying 'I am he ' what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body " *Ibid*. 12.

" By the mind alone it is to be perceived, there is no diversity. He who perceives therein any diversity, goes from death to death". *Ibid*. 19.

".....This eternal greatness of the Brahma does not grow larger by work nor does it grow smaller. Let man try to find its trace, for having found it, he is not sullied by any evil deed. He, therefore, that knows it, after having become quiet, subdued, satisfied, patient and collected, sees self in Self, sees all as Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn him, he burns all evil. Free from evil, free from spots, free from doubts, he becomes a true Brahma ; this is the Brahma-world, O ! king....." *Ibid*. 23.

" This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahma. Fearless is Brahma and he who knows this, becomes verily the fearless Brahma. " *Ibid*. 25.

".....verily, everything is not dear, that you may love everything, but you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear. Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O ! Maitreyi. When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived and known, then all this is known" *Ibid*. 5—6.

" Whosoever looks for the Brahman-class elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the Brahman-class. Whosoever looks for the Kṣatra class elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the kṣatra class. Whosoever looks for the worlds elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the worlds. Whosoever looks for the Devas elsewhere than in the Self was abandoned by the Devas. Whosoever looks for

the Vedas elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the Vedas. Whosoever looks for the creature elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the creatures. Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by anything. This Brahman-class, this Kṣātra class, these worlds, these Devas, these Vedas, all these beings, this everything, all is that Self." *Ibid.* 7.

"As clouds of smoke proceed by themselves out of lighted fire kindled with damp fuel, thus verily, O ! Maitreyi, has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have as Rīgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda, Atharvāṅgīrasas, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Vidyā, the Upaniṣads, Ślokaś, Sūtraś, Anuvyākhaṇas, Vyākhyānaś, what is sacrificed, what is poured out, food, drink, this world and other worlds, and all creatures. From him alone, all these were breathed forth." *Ibid.* 11.

"As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge ; having risen from out these elements, vanishes again in them. When he has departed, there is no more knowledge, I say, O ! Maitreyi." *Ibid.* 13.

"For when there is as it were duality, than one sees the other, one smells the other, one tastes the other, one salutes the other, one hears the other, one perceives the other, one touches the other, one knows the other, but when the Self, only is all this, how should he see another, how should he smell another, how should he taste another, how should he salute another, how should he hear another, how should he touch another, how should he know another ? How should he know Him by whom he knows all this ? That Self is to be described by 'No', 'No'. He is incomprehensible for he cannot be comprehended ; he is imperishable for he can not perish ; he is unattached, for he does not attach himself ; unfettered he does not suffer, he does not fail. How, O ! beloved should he know the knower ? Thus 'O ! Maitreyi, thou hast been instructed. He fargoes immortality." *Ibid.* 15.

"He who, without stopping the out-breathing, proceeds upwards, and who, modified and yet not modified drives away the darkness, he is Self. Thus said the Saint Maitri. And Śākāyana said to the king Brihadratha : he who in perfect rest rising from this body and reaching the highest light comes forth in his own form, he is Self ; this is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahma." *Maitryupniṣat* II. 2.

"He who in the Śruti is called, "standing above", like passionless ascetics amidst the objects of the world, he indeed the pure, clean, undeveloped, tranquil, breathless, bodiless, endless, imperishable, firm everlasting, unborn, independent one, stands in his own greatness, and by him has this body been made intelligent and he is also the driver of it." *Ibid.* 4.

".....Suerly the Self which is called immortal, is the thinker, the perceiver, the goer, the evacuator, the delighter, the doer, the speaker, the taster, the smeller, the seer, the hearer, and he touches. He is Vibhu who has entered into the body. And it is said, when the knowledge is two-fold, then he hears, sees, smells, tastes, touches, for it is the Self that knows everything. But when the knowledge is not two-fold, without effect, cause and action, without a name, without a comparison, without a predicate, what is that ? It cannot be told." *Ibid.* VI. 7.

"And the same Self is also called Is'ana (lord) S'ambhu, Bhava, Rudra ; Prajāpati, (lord of creatures), Vis'wasrij (creator of all). Hiranya—garbha, Satyam (truth), Prāṇa (breath), Hamsa ; Śāstri (ruler), Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa ; Arka ; Savitri, Dhātṛi (supporter), Vidhātṛi (creator) Samrāj (king), Indra, Indu (moon). He is also he who warms, the Sun, hidden by the thousand eyed golden egg as one fire by another. He is to be thought after, he is to be sought after. Having said farewell to all living beings, having gone to the forest, and having renounced all sensuous objects, let man perceive the Self from his own body....." *Ibid.* 8.

"I am like a season and the child of the seasons, sprung from the womb of endless space, from the light. The light, the origin of the year, which is the past, which is the present, which is all living things, and all elements, is the Self. Thou art the Self. What thou art, that I am. Brahma says to him : who am I ? He shall answer : that which is the true (Sattyaṁ). Brahma asks, what is the true ? He says to him : ' what is different from the gods and from the senses that is Sat but the gods and the senses are Tyam. Therefore by that name Sattya (true) is called all this whatever there is. All this thou art". *Kaṇḍikā* I. 6.

".....And when he awakes, then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prāṇas proceed, each towards its place, from the prāṇas the gods, from the gods, the worlds

And as a razor might be fitted in a razor--case, or as fire in the fire place, even thus this conscious Self enters the self of the body to the very hairs and nails....." *Ibid.* IV. 20.

These are the few passages as samples of Adwaitism (monism) in the Upaniṣads; but I may not be understood to say that there are no passages in support of Dwaitism (dualism) in the Upaniṣads. I give those passages where Devaitism is referred to; they are, in my opinion, not many.

"There are the two, drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahma call them shade and light; likewise, those house holders who perform the Tīnāchiketa sacrifice". *Kaṭha* I. 3, 1.

"Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating. On the same tree, man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence. But when he sees the other lord contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away. When the seer sees the brilliant maker and lord as the person who has his source in Brahma, then he is wise, and shaking off good and evil, he reaches the highest oneness, free from passions". *Muṇḍaka* III. 1-1-3.

"There are two, one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, one strong, the other weak; there is she, the unborn, through whom each man receives the recompense of his works; and there is the infinite Self under all forms, but himself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is Brahma. That which is perishable is the Pradhāna; the immortal and imperishable is Hara. The one God rules the perishable and the self. From meditating on him, from joining him from becoming one with him, there is further cessation of all illusion in the end. When that god is known, all fetters fall off, sufferings are destroyed and birth and death cease. From meditating on him there arises, on the dissolution of the body, the third state that of universal lordship; but he only who is alone, is satisfied. This which rests eternally within the Self, should be known; and beyond this not anything has to be known. By knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the ruler, everything has been declared to be threefold and this is Brahma". *Svetāś'watara* I. 9-12.

"As oil in seeds, as butter in cream, as water in river beds, as fire in wood, so is Self seized within the self, if a man looks for

him by truthfulness and penance ; (if he looks) for the Self that pervades every thing, as butter is contained in milk, and the roots whereof are self-knowledge and penance. That is the Brahma taught by the Upaniṣat". *Ibid* 15-16.

"There is one unborn being (female) red, white and black, uniform, but producing manifold offspring. There is one unborn being (male) who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her, while she is eating what has to be eaten. Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating. On the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence. But when he sees the other lord contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away". *Ibid* iv. 5-7.

"That from which the maker (Māyī) sends forth all this—the sacred verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the penances, the past, the future and all that the Vedas declare—in that the other is bound up through that Māyā. Know then prakṛiti (nature) is Māyā, and the great Lord the Māyī (maker); the whole world is filled with what are his members". *Ibid* 9-10.

"But he who is endowed with qualities and performs works that are to bear fruit and enjoys the reward of whatever he has done migrates through his own works, the lord of life, assuming all forms, led by the three guṇas and following the three paths". *Ibid* v. 7.

"He who is eternal among eternal, the thinker among thinkers, who though one, fulfills the desire of many. He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāṅkhya and Yoga, he is freed from all fetters". *Ibid*, vi. 13

".....There is indeed that other different one, called the elemental Self who, overcome by bright and dark fruits of action, enters on a good or bad birth downward or upward in his course and overcome by the pairs he roams about. And this is his explanation: the five tanmātrās are called Bhūta; also the five Mahābhūtas (gross elements) are called Bhūta. Then the aggregate of all these is called Śarīra, body. And lastly he of whom it was said that he dwelt in the body he is called Bhūtātmā, the elemental Self. Thus his immortal Self is like a drop of water on a lotus leaf and he himself is overcome by the qualities of nature. Then because he is thus overcome, he becomes bewildered, and because he is bewildered, he saw not the creator, the holy Lord, abiding within himself carried along

by the waves of the qualities, darkened in his imaginations, unstable, feeble, crippled, full of desires, vacillating, he enters into belief believing "I am he" "this is mine"; he binds his Self by his Self, as a bird with a net, and overcome afterwards by the fruit of what he has done, he enters on a good and bad birth; downward or upward is his course, and overcome by the pairs he roams about. They asked: which is it? And he answered them: this also has elsewhere been said; he who acts is the elemental Self; he who causes to act by means of the organs, is the inner man. Now as even a ball of iron pervaded by fire and hammered by smiths becomes manifold, thus the elemental Self pervaded by the inner man and hammered by the qualities becomes manifold and four tribes, the fourteen worlds with all the member of beings, multiplied eighty four times all this appears as manifoldness. And those multiplied things are impelled by man as the wheel by the potter. And as the ball of iron is hammered, the fire is not overcome, so the (inner) man is not overcome, but the elemental Self is overcome, because it has united (with the elements)". Maitryupaniṣad III. 2-3.

These are the few verses in which dualism is expounded.

As said above the Upaniṣads advocate the monism or pure advaitism of Śaṅkarācārya.

European scholars and specially the Germans were so much surprised with the study of the Vedānta that they went into ecstasies. Max Muller says at p. 192 of the six systems of the Indian philosophy "I am well aware that the view of the world, of God, and the soul, as propounded by the Vedāntist, whether in the Upaniṣats or in the Sūtras and their commentaries, has often been declared strange and fanciful and unworthy of the name of philosophy, at all events utterly unsuited to the West whatever may have been its value in the East. I have nothing to say against this criticism, nor have I ever tried to make propaganda for Vedāntism, least of all in England. But I maintain that it represents a phase of philosophic thought which no student of philosophy can afford to ignore, and which in no country can be studied to greater advantage than in India. And I go a step further. I quite admit that, as a popular philosophy, the Vedānta would have its dangers, that it would fail to call out and strengthen the manly qualities required for the practical side of life, and that it might raise the human mind to a height from which the most essential virtues of social and political life might dwindle away into

mere phantoms. At the same time, I make no secret that all my life I have been very fond of the Vedānta. Nay, I can fully agree with Schopenhauer, and quite understand what he meant when he said—
 'In the whole world there is no study, except that of the original (of the Upaniṣads), so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (Persian translation of the Upaniṣads.) It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death.'

"Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random, or to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so called mystic and inarticulate thought. And I am neither afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm for the Vedānta and feel indebted to it for much that has been helpful to me in my passage through life."

In his three lectures on the Vedānta philosophy, the same scholar is not very enthusiastic of the Vedānta and delivers himself thus at P. 170 "I wish that you should carry away a clear idea of the Vedānta philosophy if not in all its details that is impossible but at least in its general purpose. It is a very bad habit to say, 'Oh' philosophy is too deep for me' or to dispose of Eastern philosophy by saying that it is esoteric or mystic. Remember that all this Vedānta philosophy was never esoteric, but that it was open to all and was elaborated by men who, in culture and general knowledge, stood far below any one of us here present. Should we not be able to follow in their foot steps? Should the wisdom reached by the dark-skinned inhabitants of India two or three thousand years ago be too high or too deep for us? And as to their philosophy being called *mystic*, it really seems to me as if those who are so fond of using that name spell it, perhaps with an 'i' and not with a 'y'. They seem to imagine that mystic philosophy must be full of mist and clouds and vapour. True mystic philosophy however, is as clear as a summer sky, it is full of brightness and full of warmth. Mystic meant originally no more than what required preparation and initiation and mysteries were not dark things left dark, but dark things made bright and clear and intelligible."

VII. Bhakti school.

We now come to the devotional school of philosophy founded by Nārada and Śaṇḍilya. We have already Nārada and Śaṇḍilya's Sūtras translated into English and published in the Sacred Books of the Hindus. I need not dilate upon the subject, as a curious reader can find interest-

ing matter fully dealt with in the introduction to the volume VII. Śāṇḍilya's Sūtras in the original were first published in the Bibliotheca Indica series but now they have been reprinted in the Śyāmā Charaṇa Sanscrit Series No. IV. The Bhakhti school is based on upāsana kāṇḍa of the Veda and was founded before Christ.

Heterodox philosophy.

We have seen that there are sceptical teachings in the Upaniṣads ; we have seen in the preceding pages how Virochana misconstrued the teaching of Prajāpati and founded Epicureanism. (See Chhāndogya VIII). We have in the Maitryupaniṣat the mention of Brihaspati the founder of the atheistic school of philosophy ; we have also seen that the Sūtras of Brihaspati are referred to in the works of the commentators on the philosophical works but they have not yet been discovered.

The Chārvāka school also exists only in the second hand quotations ; we know the tenets of this school from Sarvadars'ana Saṃgraha of Śāyanāchārya. We have at present two religious systems, viz, Buddhism and Jainism which owe their origin to the teachings of the heterodox school of philosophy. They like Kapila deny the existence of a creator.

I Buddhism.

Buddhism was founded by Gautama, the son of Śudhodana, the king of Kapilavastu, the site of which has been recently discovered in the Nepal Terai, north of Gorakhpore. The religion of Buddha is professed by a large number of people in the world. The followers of Buddha are the largest of all the religions that exist at present. It is divided mainly into two schools, viz : Mahāyāna and Hinayāna. Their religious books are called Tripitaks (three baskets) consisting of Sūtra, Abhidharma and Vinaya. It is very strange that there are no followers of Buddha's religion in the country where it was born. It is professed in Ceylon, Tibet, Burma, China, Japan and Siam and by some aboriginies in Nepal. There are various schools of philosophy in Buddhism such as Tathātā philosophy of As'vaghoṣa, Mādhyamika or Śūnyavāda philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Vijnānavāda or Yogāchāra (idealism) of Asanga and Vasubandhu, Kṣanikavāda, Sutrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools. According to Pāṇchadas'i, we have four schools of Buddhist philosophy viz : (1) Mādhyamika (2) Yogāchāra (3) Sauntranika and (4) Vaibhāṣika. The first school denies the existence of the external objects and the internal ideas and is, therefore called Śūnyavāda school (voidism.) The second school denies the existence of the objects which according

to it exist internally as ideas and is, therefore, called *Vijnānvāda* (idealism.) The third school admits the existence of the external objects which are not perceptible but only inferrible. The last mentioned school holds that the external objects are perceptible and, therefore, resembles the Realistic school of philosophy. See the Introduction of the *Sarvadars'ana Samgraha* just brought out by the Government Oriental Series Vol I. (Poona) The philosophical and religious literature of Buddhism is so vast that it can not be dealt with here in connection with the teachings of the Upaniads on which it has no bearing.

II Jainism.

It was founded by Mahāvira, one of the twenty four Tirthankaras of the Jainas. It bears much resemblance with the teaching of the Buddha; once it was believed by the scholars that Jainism was an offshoot of Buddhism but Jacobi has conclusively shown that it is an independent religion. It is professed by a microscopic minority of the mercantile community scattered here and there all over India. The followers are ignorant, superstitious and idolators. They would not allow any book to be touched by profane hands lest it be polluted. They are religious to the extreme and observe *ahimsa* to the very letter without understanding the real sense of it. Some of the educated men of the Jaina community have published the works of their religion.

This religion has two great divisions called *S'wetāmbara* and *Digāmbara*; the idols of the former are clad in clothes, while those of the latter are naked.

Their chief book in Sanscrit which is accepted by both the schools is called *Tattvādhigama Mokṣa S'āstra* in ten chapters. The stotra which is read by them before their idols is *Bhaktāmara* stotra which contains 44 beautiful verses.

The tenets of their religion are chiefly the denial of God, the creation of the world from the atoms which they call *Pudgala* and salvation by reaching the *Siddhas'ila* which is their heaven after following the Tirthankaras who are twenty in the number. Their *paternoster* is.

नमो अरिहताणं, नमो सिद्धाणं, नमो आयरियाणं, नमो उवञ्जकायाणं, नमो
लोएसस्वसाह्वणं, एसोपंचनमुकारो सव्व पावप्पणासणे ॥


"Salutation to the Arhats, salutation to the perfect saint, salutation to the great teacher, salutation to the minor teacher, salutation to all the religious mendicants in the world. These five salutations remove all sins".


As to these there is, no difference of opinion between the S'wetāmbara and Digāmbara sects. They are all agreed; their literature both religious and philosophical is vast and is generally in the Prākṛita languages of India as that of Buddhism is in Pāli.


I can not do justice to the religion of my fellow-countrymen in such a small treatise as this. Both Buddhism and Jainism should be separately dealt with by the scholars who are well versed in Pāli and Prākṛita. As the subject has no bearing on the teachings of the Upaniṣads, I have touched upon it cursorily.



Upaniṣads & Philosophy







✓

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY,
NEW DELHI

Catalogue No.

181.41/San-16058

Author—Sandal, Mohan Lal.

Title—Philosophical teachings
in the Upanisats.

Borrower No.

Date of Issue

"A book that is shut is but a block"

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY
GOVT. OF INDIA
Department of Archaeology
NEW DELHI.

Please help us to keep the book
clean and moving.