THE SACRED BOOKS
OF THE
HINDUS
TRANSLATED BY
VARIOUS SANSKRIT SCHOLARS
EDITED BY
Major B. D. Basu, I. M. S. (Retired).
EXTRA VOLUME NO. 5.
PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHINGS IN THE UPANISATS
16058
BY
Pandit Mohan Lal Sandal, M. A., LL. B.

PUBLISHED BY
Major B. D. Basu, I. M. S. (Retired), at the Panini Office,
Bhuvaneswari Asrama, Bahadurganj, Allahabad.

PRINTED BY M. Mansur Ahmad at the Modern Printing Works, Allahabad.

MUNSHI RAM MANOHAR LAL
Oriental & Foreign Book-Sellers
P.B. 1165, Nai Sarak, DELHI-6
THE
SACRED BOOKS
OF THE
HINDUS
TRANSLATED
FROM VARIOUS SANSKRIT SOURCES
EDITED
BY
M. W. JOHNSTON
EXTRA VOLUME
IN THE OLYMPIC TEACHINGS OF THE URMATAS

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FOREWORD.

In this series, we have brought out translations of the thirteen Canonical Upaniṣads, viz., Isa, Kena, Kaṭha, Mṇḍaka, Mṇḍākya, Prāśna, Aitereya, Taśāṅkṣu, Chhāndogya and Brihadāraṇyaka, S’vētāṣṭrā, Kaṇḍiṣṭhā, and Maitrāyaṇi. The philosophical teachings scattered in the Upaniṣads have been given in the form of an introduction to the study of the Upaniṣads. Both the orthodox and heterodox schools of philosophy are derived from them. An attempt is herein made to trace the different schools of philosophy to them. A student of Hindu philosophy cannot ignore the Upaniṣads which have become imbedded in the religious systems of India.

EDITOR,
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PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHINGS IN THE UPANISATS:

1. What is 'upaniṣaṭ'?

The Vedas are the most ancient books in the Aryan world according to all modern scholars. They are divided into three portions viz. (1) the Samhitā which contains four books called the Rīk, Yajus, Sāma and Atharva consisting of the hymns. It may be considered Upāsanā Kāṇḍa of the Veda. (2) The Brāhmaṇas which are many and belong to each Samhitā treat of the applicability of the Vedic mantras to the various ceremonies both (Grahaṇa) Vedic and (grihya) domestic. This portion is the Karma Kāṇḍa. (3) The Āraṇayaka which form the supplementary portion of the Brāhmaṇas are the treatises to be used and studied in the third and fourth stages of one’s life. They treat of the spiritual science (Brahma vidyā).

We know that in ancient India, the life was divided into four stages; the first was the life of a religious student commencing after the ceremony of the initiation or wearing of the sacred thread; he was required to perform daily Agnihotra twice, to lead a life of celibacy and to study the Veda of his family by residing with his spiritual preceptor. Different duties imposed upon a student are given at length in the Taṣṭārīya Upaniṣat. After finishing the Vedic study at the residence of the preceptor and offering something as hōnorum called gurudakṣiṇā, he was to become a householder by marrying a wife; this generally happened at the age of twenty-five. He was to perform all the religious duties such as Śaṅdhya, Agnihotra etc., called nitya karma and occasional ceremonies on birth, death or similar occurrences called Naimittikā karma. The desire accomplishing ceremonies called Kāmya Karma fall under the occasional ceremonies and were performed with certain objects in view as Putreṣṭi, Parjanyeṣṭi etc. A Brāhmaṇa was considered under the text of Taṣṭārīya Samhitā to be born with three debts, viz. Deva ṛīṇa, Pitrirīṇa and Bīśirīṇa; the first debt was discharged by the performance of the Agnihotra; the second by begat-ing children and bringing them up and the third was paid off by imparting knowledge of the Vedas to others. A householder was required to perform the big sacrifices, such as Soma Yajña, Paśu Yajña etc. After completing the religious duties and discharging the debts, he retired to the forest with
his wife or alone as the case might be at a time when his hair turned grey.

This was the third stage of his life called (Vanaprastha) forest life; he was to
remain celibate and perform the Agnihotra daily; he was to study the
Aranyaka (forest) portion of the Veda so called by reason of its being gener-
ally studied in the forest at an advanced stage of life. After realising 'Self'
had to renounce all the worldly connections, the various religious ceremo-
\n\ni
\n\ni
\ni
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\n\nies, the sacred thread and cluster of hair on the head; he had to betake
himself to the life of a religious mendicant, teaching the truth of the
religion at which he had arrived after a life-long study. This was the last
stage called Sannyastha or the life of relinquishment.

These treatises dealing with the spiritual science and extracted from
the Aranyaka portion of the Veda are called Upanishads. Max Muller derives
the word from up + ni + sad = to sit down and thinks it to mean "session or
assembly of pupils sitting down near their teacher to listen to his instruc-
tion"; Sāyaṇa in the introduction to the Taittiriya Aranyaka says "The word
Upaniṣad denotes Brahma Vidyā or theosophy in as much as its etymology
is applicable to nothing else. The prefix 'up' means near and nothing
can be nearer to one than one's own inner self. The three meanings of
the root 'sad', namely, to decay, to go or know, to destroy, are applicable to
Theosophy, as the blessed Sures-varāchārya has distinctly shown. Thus,
Theosophy is called Upaniṣad (1) because it leads Ātman, the self very near
Brahma who, in himself, is devoid of duality and thereby brings about the
decay of Avidyā or unwisdom and its effects; or (2) because it destroys
that avidyā or ignorance of the true nature of one's own self which is the
root of all evil and gives one to understand that the supreme being who is
devoid of all duality is none other than one's own inner Self; or (3) because
it destroys altogether all germs of outward activity by way of cutting up
their root (avidyā). As means of acquiring the knowledge of Theosophy,
the treatise is identified with Theosophy and is itself called Upaniṣad as the
plough is sometimes spoken as living" (Mahādeva Śastri's translation,
P. 1.)

Without entering into further discussion as to the meaning of the
word 'upaniṣad', I may here say that it is not used in its derivative sense,
but conventional sense of 'secret' or 'mystery'. It is in this very sense
that the term is used in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad.

Deussen says "According to Śankara, the Upaniṣads were so named
because they "destroy" inborn ignorance or because they "conduct" to
Brahman. Apart from these interpretations justifiable neither on grounds
of philology nor of fact, the word Upaniṣad is usually explained by Indian writers by rakṣyas (i.e. "secret"). Anquetil's secretum legendum." See the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, P. 10.

A vast literature of the Upaniṣads has grown up amounting to 108 collections. The Canonical Upaniṣads are ten in number: they are Īśa, Kena, Kaṭha, Prasna Māṇḍaka, Māndukya, Aitareya, Taittireya, Čhāṇdogyā and Brihadāraṇyaka. Besides these, Sāṅkara has commented upon S'vētāwat'ar; he has cited passages from Kaśyatiś and Jābala in his commentary on the Śārīrika Sūtras. They are also genuine Upaniṣads; the Maitrīy-paniṣhad being a part of Mātrayāṇi Samhitā is also a canonical upaniṣad. A curious reader will find an interesting discussion in Deussen’s philosophy of the Upaniṣads.

All these thirteen Upaniṣads have been published in the Sacred books of the Hindus. Besides these, we have the following apocryphal upaniṣads:

1. Brahma vīndu.
2. Kāivalya.
5. Āruṇika.
8. Paramahamsa.
10. Amritananda.
11. Atharvas'īras.
15. Mātrīyī.
17. Kaṇḍikā.
18. Maṇtriika.
19. Sarva Śāra.
21. Śuka rasāya.
22. Vajra Suchikā.
23. Tejobindu.
25. Dhyānabindu.
27. Yogatattva.
28. Ātma bodha.
29. Nāradaparivrājaka.
30. Tris'ikha brāhmaṇa.
31. Sītā.
32. Yogachudāmani.
33. Nirvāṇa.
34. Maṇḍala Brāhmaṇa.
35. Dakṣinā murti.
36. Śrāvaṇa.
37. Skanda.
38. Tripādbibhūti Mahānārāyaṇa.
39. Adwayatāraka.
40. Rāma Rasāya.
41. Rāmapurva tāpini.
42. Rāmottara tāpini.
43. Vasudeva.
44. Mudgala.
45. Śāndilya.
46. Paingala.
47. Bhikṣuṇa.
48. Mahopniṣat.
49. Śāriraka.
50. Yogas'ikhā.
The above total comes to 109; the Maitreyi Upaniṣad which is numbered 15 in the above list is included in the Maitrāyaṇyopaniṣat or Maitriyopaniṣat. These are sectarian Upaniṣats and glorify, as for example, the Bhasma or tripundra marks on the forehead or wearing of the Rudrakṣa beads in the neck or on the chest. They appear to have been composed from time to time as occasion required. There is Allopaniṣat which is not included in the above list and which was most probably written in the reign of Akbar or Shah Jahan under the patronage of Dara Shikoh, the eldest son of the last named king. The account of it is given in the catalogue of the Adyar Library Vol. I. P. 136. “The curious work as is well-known has been composed to serve Akbar’s idea of a world religion. In the south of India, it is not recognised in spite of (or perhaps, because of?) the widely spread opinion that the Muḥammadans are skilled in the Atharva Veda, but in the north, it is not only reckoned to the Atharva Veda, but actually recited by the Brahmans at the Vasantotsava or any occasion when selected texts have to be read in the house of a Dwija Of
course, it is not admitted that Allah is the Mohomedan god, but the word is believed, to be a synonym of Varuna. The Upaniṣad is also said to be the standard work of a certain class of Sannyāsins. Swami Dayānanda Saraswati has given ten verses of Allopaniṣad in his Satyārtha Prakāśa’s Chapter XIV. By reading them we find that very few words are Sanscrit but most of them are Arabic as for example.

अढ़ो ॠतुमहादेव रक्षवर्ष्य अहो अहाम् १३
आदवत्ल ॠूक मेककम् अहात्रुक निष्कातकम् १४।

The reader will at once see the Arabic words; it was perhaps to please the Mohomedan patrons that the Allopaniṣad was composed in a jargon mixed up with Arabic words declined according to Sanscrit grammar. We shall accordingly confine the teaching of the upaniṣats to the canonical scriptures which are ten or thirteen as published in the S. B. E. and S. B. H. series. We, therefore, apply the word ‘Upaniṣad’ to the canonical scripture but not the apocryphal upaniṣads.

2. Translation of the Upaniṣad in other foreign languages.

The first translation of the Upaniṣad of which we are aware was during the reign of Shah Jehan under the patronage of Sultan Muhammad Dara Shikoh into Persian under the designation of Oupnehk’at in 1657. The prince was very liberal, far ahead of the people of his time and followed the religious tenets of Akbar, his great grandfather. He is said to have written a book with a view to reconcile the tenets of Hinduism and Muhammadanism. Under the name of Oupnehk’at, there are 50 Upaniṣads included. The word Oupnehk’at is a corrupted form of ‘upaniṣat’ as cerebral ṣ was in those days pronounced as guttural KH and is still pronounced as such by some pandits of the old school.

This naturally leads us to Anquetil du Perron, the discoverer of the Avesta or Zend Avesta, the holy scripture of the Parsis. The young French man was very eager to study the sacred book of the Parsis and started to India in 1754 by enlisting as a soldier in the French army as he had no other available means to accomplish his object. He reached Surat, got himself discharged from the army and studied the Parsi scripture with the Parsi priests. He stayed there for 7 years and started for his home in 1761. In 1771, he published the translation of the Avesta in three volumes.

In 1775, Anquetil Duperron received a copy of the Oupnehk’at from M. Gentil the French resident at the court of Shuja-uddaula through Bernier. On receiving another copy of the same and comparing both of them
he translated it into Latin and French. The former translation was published in 1801-1802 under the title of Upaniṣhad.

When the Upaniṣhad was first published in Europe, it so enraptured the German philosopher, Schopenhauer that he burst into ecstasy of joy: "For how entirely does the Upaniṣhad breathe throughout the holy spirit of the Vedas! How is every one who by a diligent study of its Persian Latin has become familiar with the incomparable book stirred by that spirit to the very depth of his soul? How does every line display its firm definiteness throughout harmonious meaning? From every sentence, deep, original and sublime thoughts arise and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit. Indian air surrounds us and original thoughts of kindred spirits. And Oh, how thoroughly is the mind here washed clean of all early engrained Jewish superstitions and of philosophy that clings before those superstitions? In the whole world, there is no study, except that of the originals so beautiful and so elevating as that of the Upaniṣhad. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death." Quotation from Welt als Wille und Vorstellung given in Vol. I of S. B. E. at P. LXI. Schopenhauer's philosophy according to Max Muller is powerfully impregnated by the fundamental doctrines of the Upaniṣads.

In commenting upon the passage quoted above, Max Muller says "This may seem strong language and in some respects too strong. But I thought it right to quote it here because whatever may be urged against Schopenhauer, he was a thoroughly honest thinker and honest speaker and no one would suspect him of any predestination for what has been so readily called Indian mysticism. That Schelling and his school should use rapturous language about the Upaniṣads, might carry little weight with that large class of philosophers by whom every thing beyond the clouds of their own horizon is labelled as mysticism. But that Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upaniṣads as 'products of the highest wisdom', that he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Eriugena as brought to light again at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their favour." Max Muller's Introduction LXII, Vol. I S. B. E.

What appeared 'products of highest wisdom' to Schopenhauer are the mere babblings of the primitive race to A. E. Gough, the great educationalist in Upper India in the last century. He says on the last page
of the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, "Such as they are, and have been shown to be, the Upaniṣads are the loftiest utterances of Indian intelligence. They are the work of a rude age, a deteriorated race and barbarous and unprogressive community. Whatever value the reader may assign to the ideas they present, they are the highest produce of the ancient Indian mind and almost the only elements of interest in Indian literature which is at every stage replete with them to saturation."

It is useless for me to comment on the views of two eminent scholars; it is for the reader to judge for himself and to follow either of these two extreme views.

Now we come to our own countryman Rāja Ram Mohun Roy, the great social reformer, scholar and founder of the Brāhma Sañjī in Calcutta. He based his theism on the Upaniṣads and translated many of them into English, Bengali and Hindi. He was born in 1776 at Burdwan and died at Bristol in 1833. He was instrumental in getting the practice of Sati stopped and English education introduced in the public schools. He wrote several works in English, Persian and Bengali.

As the learning of Sanskrit has spread in India and Europe and as the books have been placed within the reach of the learned public by means of the printing press, the study of the Upaniṣads has become very popular and most of them have been translated into most of the languages of Europe and India. It is useless and impossible to enumerate these translations.

3. The names of the Upaniṣads attached to each Veda.

All the names of the Upaniṣads given at pages 3 and 4 are mentioned in the Mukti-kopaniṣad with the respective Vedas to which they are attached. I append the names of only those Upaniṣads which have been published in the S. B. H. series and which alone we consider genuine.

I. Rigveda.
   1. Aitereya.
   2. Kaṇḍitaki.

II. White Yajurveda.
   1. Isa ṅvasya.
   2. Brihadāraṇyaka.

III. Black Yajurveda.
   1. Kaṭhavali.
   2. Taitirīya.

IV. Svetāṣṭarav.
   1. Kena.
   2. Chhândogya.
   3. Maitrâyapi.

V. Atharva veda.
   1. Prasna.
   3. Mûndukya.

4. Commentaries on the Upaniṣad according to different schools.

The Upaniṣads form a vast Vedic literature and constitute its ājñāna Kâpda as said above. We also know that the orthodox religious systems
of India are all based on the teachings of the Upaniṇīads. They are pure monism (S'uddhā'ltwaita), qualified monism (Viś'istādwaita) and dualism (Divaita). Sāṅkara represents the pure non-dualism; according to him Brahma alone is reality and everything else besides him is illusion. The second school is represented by Rāmānuja who holds that everything whether animate or inanimate other than one's self is Brahma. The third religious system is represented by Ānanda Tīrtha. He holds that as Brahma and the universe are related to each other as the protector and the protected, both of them are real. Just as the soul and body of a person are radically different but for all worldly purposes they are considered as one and called as Deva Duttā &c, similarly Brahma with the universe consisting of the animate and inanimate objects, is one.

Sāṅkarāchārya who was a born philosopher really grasped the real teaching of the Upaniṇīads. The last named two schools of religion are Viś'ntītes and therefore strive to establish the reality of the individual soul and the universe. Rāmānuja's view as to the existence of the individual soul is like Cartesian Coget ergo sum. According to him, the soul's emancipation consists in obtaining heaven by devotion and faith. Ānanda Tīrtha went one step further; he however holds the universe to be real and the soul by meditation and devotion to Vāsudeva, Sankaraṇa, Aniruddha and Pradyumna, the various manifestations of the Lord obtains redemption. He properly belongs to the devotional school of Philosophy started by Nārāda and Śaṅḍilya.

We have published the translation of the Upaniṇīads according to Ānanda Tīrtha whose system is called Mādhva. There is a large number of Viś'ntītes, who belong to the cult of Mādhva.

Different commentaries on the Upaniṇīads which are not many belong to one of these above-mentioned founders of the religious sects known after their names.

**Philosophical Systems.**

Different philosophical schools arose from the teachings in the Upaniṇīads. This naturally leads us to explain the various schools and trace their teachings to the Upaniṇīads, the fountain head of the philosophical teachings which grew into various schools of philosophy. The Rīgis of the Upaniṇīads were great thinkers and treated the various problems concerning life and creation in their work. Deussen has rightly divided the subjects dealt with in the Upaniṇīads into four heads, viz.: (1) Theology treating of Brahma (2) Cosmology treating of the creation (3) Psychology dealing with the individual or corporate soul and (4) Eschatology.
and ethics dealing with future life and the manner of life which is required to be led here in the present world.

The different philosophical systems are arranged as follows:

A. Orthodox

I. (1) Vais'ēṣika.
   1. Kṣaṇika vāda.

   (2) Nyāya.
   2. Viśṇu vāda.

II. (3) Sāńkhya.
   3. Śūnya vāda.

   (4) Yoga.

III. (5) Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

   (6) Uttar Mīmāṃsā.

There is no doubt that the different systems of philosophy had existed side by side at one time before Buddhism or Jainism grew into religious systems, each borrowing and criticising the views of the other. They were certainly on that account not like the growth of Jona's gourd but were the results of several centuries, one being anterior to the other. An individual or a group of individuals advance a theory or theories which another embodies in his system or school which becomes founded after him. Take for example the Śāṅkiraka Sūtras which have freely incorporated the views of the previous philosophers such as Aśmyaratha, Oṇḍiomi, Kāś'akritsna, Bādari, Jaimini, etc. Some of them may be contemporaries of Bādarāyana. We know nothing about the old philosophers but we know only Bādarāyana who has made them immortal by referring to the views of these great men. We cannot, therefore, hold that a certain founder of the school was the originator of a particular view or views which he has incorporated into his system. Such a view or views are the results achieved by several generations of thinkers extending over several centuries. Take for instance the Yoga practice called Brahma Yoga described in the Yoga Siddhānta Chandrikā at P. P. 35 and 36 of the Chaukhambhā Sanscrit series. It is also described in Hamsopanisat. It consists in closing the eyes and ears and seeing the light and hearing the sound; it is said that by constant practice, light is visible and sound is audible; there are ten kinds of sounds; the first is 'chin' the second is 'chin' 'chin'; the third is the sound of ringing of a bell; the fourth is that of a conch shell; the fifth is that of lyre; the sixth is that of clapping with hands; the seventh is that of a lute; the eighth is that of a drum; the ninth is that of a trumpet; the tenth is that of a cloud. According to Hamsopanisat, one should concentrate his attention on the tenth by omitting the ninth. It is a practice of the Haṭha Yoga and considered only an elementary practice; but it is so much praised by the
Santamat in general and Radhâ Svâmî sect in particular that Svâmî Dyal Singh, the founder of the sect is considered to be the divine incarnation and the first promulgator of it. When such things happen in our own time what wonder that the different views of the philosophers which were talked of and discussed at one time became fossilised in the form of a system or school founded by a great man. We find a discourse in the Maitryupaniṣat about the heterodox school of Āsura of Bṛhaspati; we find reference to the idealism and voidism. We should not on that account jump to the conclusion that the Maitryupaniṣat was written after Nāgârjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu, just as one would like to hold that Hamsopaniṣat was written after the promulgation of the Radhâ Svâmî sect of our own time. On स्वामिधर्मानीम: in the Maitryupaniṣat in the 7th Prapâthaka, Anuvâka 8, there is a note by Max Muller. “This refers to people who claim the privileges and licence of sannyâsins without having passed through the discipline of the preceding Āsramas. As this was one of the chief complaints made against the followers of Sâkyamuni, it might refer to Buddhists, but it ought to be borne in mind that there were Buddhists before Buddha.” Again in the same Upaniṣat, in the 9th Anuvâka where the doctrine of Bṛhaspati is referred to, Max Muller has appended a note. “All this may refer to Buddhists, but not by necessity for there were heretics such as Bṛhaspati long before Sâkya Muni.”

Having shown that the views of the Agnostic or Atheistic schools had prevailed long before they became fossilised in Buddhism or Jainism, the two great religious systems of India, we are confronted with the Sânkhya and Vedânta Sûtras wherein according to the well known commentators the Buddhist and Aryan views of philosophy have been criticised. In the sûtras no where Buddhism or Jainism is referred to by names; it is the fertile mind of the commentators who made the Sûtras a weapon of attack against the hostile religions which they as reformers wanted to uproot.

The next question is very interesting from the antiquarian point of view; it is whether the Hindus borrowed their philosophy from the Greeks or not. There are three views on the point in issue; the first is that the Hindus borrowed it from the Greeks; the second is that the Greeks borrowed it from the Hindus and the last is that both nations cultivated their philosophy independently of each other. The similarity between the philosophies of two nations is so very remarkable that one is inclined to believe that one nation must have certainly learnt at the feet of the other.

There are Europeans and Indians of the new school who are of opinion that the Indians borrowed everything from the Greeks. Max Muller and Monier Williams are of opinion that both the nations developed their sy-
tems of philosophy independently. John William Draper, M. D., LL. D., late professor in the University of New York says in his History of the conflict between Religion and Science 21st edition at P. P. 121, 122 "Ideas respecting the nature of God necessarily influence ideas respecting the nature of the soul. The eastern Asiatics had adopted the conception of an impersonal God and as regards the soul, its necessary consequence, the doctrine of emanation and absorption.

"Thus the Vedic theology is based on the acknowledgment of a Universal spirit pervading all things. "There is in truth but one deity, the supreme Spirit; he is of the same nature as the soul of man." Both the Vedas and the Institute of Manu affirm that the soul is an emanation of the all pervading Intellect and that it is necessarily destined to be re-absorbed. They consider it to be without form and that visible Nature with all its beauties and harmonies, is only the shadow of God.

"Vedism developed itself into Buddhism which has become the faith of a majority of the human race. This system acknowledges that there is a supreme power, but denies that there is a suprem Being. It contemplates the existence of Force, giving rise as its manifestation to matter. It adopts the theory of emanation and absorption. In a burning taper it sees an effigy of man—an embodiment of matter, and an evolution of matter. If we interrogate it respecting the destiny of the soul, it demands of us what has become of the flame when it is blown out, and in what condition it was before the taper was lighted. Was it a non-entity? Has it been annihilated? It admits that the idea of personality which has deluded us through life may not be instantaneously extinguished at death, but may be lost by slow degrees. On this is founded the doctrine of transmigration. But at length re-union with the Universal Intellect takes place, Nirvāṇa is reached, oblivion is attained, a state that has no relation to matter, space or time, the state into which the departed flame of the extinguished taper has gone, the state in which we were before we were born. This is the end that we ought to hope for; it is re-absorption in the Universal Force—supreme bliss, eternal rest.

"Through Aristotle these doctrines were first introduced into Eastern Europe; indeed eventually, as we shall see he was regarded as the author of them. They exerted a dominating influence in the later period of the Alexandrian school."

This is the view of an unbiased scientific man. M. Louis Jecalliots, a French writer and lover of India says in the Bible in India at pages 22, 23 of the Pāṇini Office publication. "At the epoch of Alexander, India
had already passed the period of splendour and was sinking into decay; her great achievements in philosophy, morals, literature and legislation already counting more than two thousand years of existence; and further I defy, whoever he may be, to show in India the faintest trace, the most insignificant vestige, whether in their different idioms, their usages, their literature, their ceremonies or their religion, to indicate the presence of the Greek.

"The presence of Alexander was but a brutal fact-isolated, circumscribed, exaggerated by Hellenic tradition, which the Hindoos have not even deigned to record in their history.... ..."

"To pretend today—in the absence of all proof and while we find not in the annals of Hindostan even the Hellenicised name of the conquered Porus—that Athens inspired Hindoo genius as she gave life to European art is to ignore the history of India—to make the parent the pupil of the child, in fact, it is to forget Sanscrit.

"The Sanscrit is itself the most irrefutable and most simple proof of the Indian origin of the races of Europe and of India's maternity."

There is no need of accumulating, quotations; it is certain that after Alexander's invasion of India, there was free intercourse between Greece and India. What wonder if Aristotle the tutor of Alexander borrowed or learnt Indian philosophy and taught it as his own in Greece? Alexander, Ptolemy and Aristotle were friends and after the death of Alexander Ptolemy completed Alexandria founded by the great conquerer and the Aristotelian philosophy was taught there. Draper at P. 19 of the Conflict between Religion and Science says "Alexandria was not merely the capital of Egypt, it was the intellectual metropolis of the world. There it was truly said the genius of the East met the genius of the West and this Paris of antiquity became a focus of fashionable dissipation and universal scepticism."

It is a fact that Kālyāna, a Brahman was taken to Europe by Alexander but he burnt himself soon after at Pasarguda. It is also a fact that a Brahman reached Europe in ancient times but he burnt himself at Athens to the astonishment of the Greeks, who erected a tomb to him with the inscription "Here lies the Indian Sarman Cheyn (Sarman Ācharya ?) from Barygaza, who sought immortality after the old custom of the Indians." History of the ancient Sanscrit Literature by Max Muller at P. 16 of the Pāṇini Office reprint.

Max Muller further says in his six systems of Indian philosophy P. 63 "Alexandria was known by name as Alasando to the author.
of the Mahavamsa. On the other hand, the name of King Gondaphoros, who is mentioned in the legend of St. Thomas' travels to India has been authenticated on Indo-parthian coins as Gondaphoras, likewise the name of his nephew Abdayas and possibly, according to M. S. Levi that of Vasudeva as Misdeos. All this is true and shows that the way between Alexandria and Benares was wide open in the first century A.C. Nor should it have been forgotten that in the Dialogues between Milinda and Nagasena we have a well authenticated case of the Greek King (Menandros) and of a Buddhist philosopher, discussing together some of the highest problems of philosophy and religion. All this is true and yet we are as far as ever from having discovered a Greek or Indian go-between in flagrante delicto." With due deference to Max Muller, I would like to dissent very strongly from him. What was the object of taking the Brahmans from India? The Greeks speak highly of the Indians of that time; they do not consider them barbarians; on the other hand Indians could not help despising the Greeks as barbarians.

According to Damascius we find Brahmans living at Alexandria in the fifth century of the Christian Era; all these admitted historical facts extending over several centuries commencing from the pre-Alexandrian time down to the burning of the Alexandrian Library show that the learned Indians were invited to the foreign lands presumably to expound their learning. Even as late as 786 A.D. in the court of Huroun al-Raschid at Bagdad, the learned Indians were kept for translating many Sanscrit works into Arabic.

The doctrine of sphoṭa which was fully developed long before the Christian Era in India and the prototype of which we do not find in the Greek philosophy, found its way to Alexandria in the neo-Platonic school of philosophy. We cannot say that the doctrine of Logos is of spontaneous growth there; we find no previous trace of it in the Greek philosophy. I have no space to write on the much perplexed and unpleasant subject here; I ask the learned reader to choose any of the three above-mentioned views on the subject or to study it independently and form his own opinion by comparison of the Greek and Indian philosophies.

Vais'ēśika

I take up Vais'ēśika first as it is the oldest of all. I consider the Vais'ēśika philosophy first in order of time because (1) its views are criticised by the Sāṅkhya Pravachana śāstras which are called after the name of Kapila; (2) its atomic theory appears to be more ancient than the theory of evolution set forth by Kapila and (3) physics and metaphysics have been
combined together in the system. From all these facts, I come to the conclusion that the Vais'ēśika system of philosophy is oldest and therefore deserves, to be treated first in the chronological order. The word 'Vais'ēśika' is derived from Vāśēśa meaning particular or species and is so called because one of the categories treated by the school is species.

The founder of the school or the reputed author of the Sūtras is called Kaṇāda, Kāśyapa or Ulūka. He is also called Kaṇabhuk or Kaṇabhakṣa by reason of his subsisting on the minute particles of grains left in the fields or by reason of starting the atomic theory of creation. Be that as it may, we know very little about this ancient sage; this is another reason of Kaṇāda's system being the oldest.

He has dealt with six categories (Padārtha) in his Sūtras, viz., substance; quality, action, genus, species and affinity. Take for instance man; he is substance and possesses certain qualities; he acts, belongs to the genus of animal and is one of the species thereof. He is made up of the bodily organs which all combined together, make up the concept 'man.' The close connection of the bodily organs which all put together make up a man is called affinity, inhesion, cooinherence or intimate relation.

The first category, viz., substance is of nine kinds as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Substance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earth</td>
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</table>

The five elements as shown in the above table may be classified as solid, liquid or fluid, luminous, gaseous and etheric bodies; the other substances are too well-known to the students of philosophy to require explanation.

The second category of qualities consists of colour, taste, smell, touch, number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition according to Kaṇāda but the scholastics have added gravity, fluidity, viscosity, association, merit, demerit and sound thus making up the total of twenty-four.

The third category consists of action such as throwing up, throwing down, contracting, expanding and going.

The genus is the class to which the species belong and the species have individuals under them. When we use the term 'man' we have at once before our mind a certain figure made up of flesh, bones and soul; subjectively it is called concept, form, idea or akṣara. The corresponding object existing in the outside world is the substance. It further
denotes the different kinds of a class coming under the term 'man' such as the English, the Germans, the French, the Africans etc. The higher class which includes the lower is genus and the latter is called species. The term 'man' connotes certain qualities such as rationality, mortality etc., which characterise the whole species and which are its differentiae. The objective man as he exists in the external world is active and performs a certain action. Similarly he is made up of certain component parts which cannot be separated subjectively from the idea of man. This inseparable connection of the whole with its parts is called sama-vāya (affinity).

To the six categories given by Kaṇāda, the later school added Abhāva as the seventh. It is non-existence; it is of four kinds as shown in the following table.

| Prāgabhāva | Pradvānabhāva | Anyonyābhāva | Atyantabhāva |

They are explained in Chapter IX and Āhnikā 1 of the Vais'ēsika Sūtras.

Prāgabhāva is the antecedent non-existence, just as a pot does not exist before it is made from clay by a potter. Pradvānabhāva is the subsequent non-existence just as a pot does not exist when it is broken into pieces. Anyonyābhāva is the reciprocal non-existence; for example, a pot does not exist in a cloth or a cloth does not exist in a pot. Atyantabhāva is the absolute non-existence as the hare's born.

This leads me to explain the doctrine of saccavāda and abhasavāda; before doing so, I should explain the doctrine of causality according to the Vais'ēsika school of philosophy. When there is a succession of events, the anterior is called the cause and the posterior is called the effect. As for example you produce fire by friction; there is a succession of two phenomena; the first is friction, the second is the production of fire. The first is the cause and the last is its effect. In this view, the effect (fire) did not exist before the cause (friction). The view upholding the non-existence of effect before cause is called Asatkāryavāda. On the other hand, the other view is that the effect exists in the cause but is brought into manifestation; the effect according to this view is not different from its cause. This view is called saccavādā (satkāryavāda).

The cause according to the Vais'ēsika school is of three kinds, viz (1) Samudāya or intimate, (2) asamudāya or non-intimate and (3) nimitta or
or operative. They are explained in Chap X and Âhnika 2; samvâyâyi
cause is one which is intimately connected with the production of an
object, as for instance thread is the intimate cause (samvâyâyi) of
cloth. Asamvâyâyi is the non-intimate cause; it does not form the
essential part of the production; it is conjunction or disjunction by
which a thing is produced or destroyed; the form of the object
also comes under this head, as for example, weaving and giving a
form to a piece of cloth is called non-intimate cause. Any other besides
these is called the nimitta or operative cause; it includes both the
instrumental and active causes as for example, shuttle, stick and the
weaver.

The views of the different schools as to the creation proceeding from
the difference of their views as to causality are called Arambhavrâda or
atomic theory of the Nyâya-Vais'eskâ and parinâmavrâda or evolution theory
of the Sânkhya-Yoga. The Vedântic view is entirely different from them;
it is called vicartavrâda. It is satkâryavâda, but it holds that the cause
appears to be the effect under a misapprehension; for example in the dark
a rope appears to be a serpent; similarly, Brahma appears to be the univerre
under the influence of ignorance or Avidyâ. We shall have an occasion
to deal with the subject at its proper place.

We have already seen that Kañâda was the first philosopher who
started the atomic theory of creation. What is atom (ãnu)? It is the
minutest particle of a material substance beyond which you cannot proceed,
otherwise it will involve you in regres'sus ad infinitum. It is therefore,
the extremest minute particle. To those who are suffering from Greek
mania and see in everything a Greek origin, the remarks of Max Muller are
pertinent. "It is no doubt very tempting to ascribe a Greek origin to
Kañâda's theory of atoms. But suppose that the atomic theory had really
been borrowed from a Greek source, would it not be strange that Kañâda's
atoms are supposed never to assume visible dimensions till there is a
combination of three double atoms (Tryanukâ), neither the simple nor
the double atoms being supposed to be visible by themselves. I do not
remember anything like this in Epicurean authors and it seems to me to
give quite an independent character to Kañâda's view of the nature
of an atom." Max Muller's six systems of Indian philosophy p. 446.

Lower down on the same page, he says, "But though we may discover
the same thought in the philosophies of Kañâda and Empedocles the form
which it takes in India is characteristically different from its Greek
form."
This leads us to the qualities produced in a substance by the artificial means, as for example, a potter produces a pot from the clay which is originally dark in colour but by the action of heat it becomes red. There are two views about this change which is wrought in the pot. The first view is that each atom of the pot is baked; the whole pot is destroyed by the action of fire and by the same action of fire, the whole pot is reconstructed atom by atom. It is called Pūrṇapākavāda (पूर्णपाकवाद). The other view is that the change is produced by the action of heat in the pot without any dissolution and restoration of the atoms. The latter view is called Pīṭharapākavāda (पिठरपाकवाद). See Chapter VII. Āhni 1 and Sūtra 6.

Now let us come to the logical side of the Vaisēṣika which Gautama developed into a scientific system. It is dealt with by Kapāla in a crude form in Chapter IX. Āhni 2 Sūtras 1, 2. I give the verbatim translation in my own language with the help of Gautama’s logic to show that the Logical system as developed by Gautama is indigenous.

1. The inferential knowledge consists in the facts that it is its cause, effect, associate, opposite or co-inherent.

We have in the sūtra, the symbolical or inferential knowledge explained; (1) we infer an effect from its cause; as by seeing the floods in a river we infer the rainfall on the upper part of the country. It is called Śekavat (शेकवत) by Gautama; (2) inference of effect from the cause consists in foretelling certain result by seeing certain signs, as for example, by seeing black clouds, you at once predict the future rainfall; it is called Pārvavat (पार्ववत) by Gautama. (3) The inference arises from seeing one pair of a thing as to the similarity of the other; as for instance, by seeing a golden key, you infer that the lock is also golden or from iron pestle, you infer that the mortar is also made of iron. (4) From seeing one hostile pair, you infer the existence of another, as for example, when you see an angry serpent, you infer that there must be lurking an ichneumon in some hiding place. (5) We make an inference of a thing from seeing one part of it, as for example, by touching hot water, we infer that it must have been heated by fire or sun, the essential part of which is heat. The last three illustrations come under samānyato drīṣṭam of Gautama.

We now come to the second sūtra which runs thus: “‘It is its’ and relation of cause and effect proceed from syllogism.” In the sūtra, ‘its’ means the proposition to be proved; ‘it’ means the instrument (middle term) by which the conclusion is arrived at. Take for example
The mountain is fiery.

.: It is smoky.

The syllogism is expressed in the form of an enthymeme. Here in the above illustration the fire is the cause of smoke or smoke is pervaded by fire but not vice versa. The fire is, therefore, called vyāpaka or sādhya corresponding to the major term of the Aristotelian Logic; the smoke is vyāpya or sādhana or middle term of the Aristotelian Logic. The Pākṣa is the minor term; let us now put the above enthymeme in the syllogistic form.

1. The mountain is fiery.
2. Because it is smoky.
3. Where there is smoke, there is fire; as for example, kitchen.
4. This mountain has smoke;
5. Therefore this mountain has fire;

The first member of the syllogism is called pratiṣṇya or enunciation; the second member is called apades'a, hetu linga, pramāṇa and karana (Sec. IX. 2-4). The third member is called nidars'ana by Kāṇḍa's school and udāharaṇa by Gantama; it is the major premise in the Aristotelian Logic. The fourth member is called anuṣandhāna by the Vais'ēśika school and upaṇya by Gautama. It is a minor premise in the modern Logic. The fifth member of the syllogism is called pratyāmudya by the Vais'ēśika school and nigamana by Gautama.

The invariable concomitance of the smoke and fire (Vyāpya and Vyāpaka) is called prasiddhi by Kāṇḍa (see III. 1. 14) and Vyāpti by Gautama. It plays the most important part in the Indian system of Logic; but in the Greek system of Logic on which the modern European system is based, the figures and moods are very important; by means of them, the modern Logic is made very simple and mechanical and does not require much thinking as you have to do in determining the invariable concomitance of the pervader and the pervaded. An error leads to a fallacy which is called anapdes'a by Kāṇḍa and hetuva-bhāsa by Goutama. The invariable concomitance of the pervader and the pervaded is such that the circle of the former is larger than that of the latter and therefore contains it.
In the annexed figure the larger circle A B C is of the fire and the smaller one is that of the smoke.

In other words the smoke is contained in the fire and its circle is smaller than that of the fire. The smoke is called *linga* and the fire is the *lingi*. If the circle of the *linga* is fully covered by that of the *lingi* i.e., it falls within that of the *lingi*, the conclusion will be valid and there will be no fallacy. If the circle of the *linga* falls outside the circle of the *lingi* or a portion of it falls inside the circle of the *lingi* and another portion falls inside another circle, there will be fallacies. Kapâda has classified them under three heads (see III. 1. 15); they are; (1) *aprasiddha*; (2) *asa*; (3) *sandigdha*. When the circles of the *lingi* and the *linga* are totally outside, the fallacy of *aprasiddha* (major premise) arises. As for example:

1. **Where there is smoke, there is an ass.**
2. **Here is smoke.**
   .. **Here is an ass.**

Here in the present example, the fallacy arises by reason of there being no concomitance between the *ling* (smoke) and the *lingi* (ass).

When the circle of the *linga* is outside the circle of the minor term, the fallacy is called *asa* or the fallacy of the minor premise. Take for example,

- All those who have wings fly.
- An ass has wings.
- Therefore an ass flies.

In the above instance we see that an ass does not possess wings; the *linga* does not exist in the *paksa*. The result is that the conclusion arrived at is erroneous.

If the circle of the *linga* is larger than that of the *lingi* there will be a fallacy called *sandigdha* or *anukântika*. Kapâda himself has explained it by an illustration (see III.1.17.)
Animals that have horns are cows.
It has horns.
It is, therefore, a buffalo.

(1) You can equally argue,
Animals that have horns are buffaloes,
It has horns,
It is, therefore, a buffalo.

Here in the present illustration, we see that the linga which inevitably accompanies the lingi is found to exist elsewhere also. The result is inconclusive. It violates the rule that the circle of the linga should fall entirely within the circle of the lingi and not even a portion of it should fall outside of it.

We shall have a further occasion to deal with the fallacies when we come to treat Gautama's system of Logic where he has fully developed them. We have dealt with the Logical portion of Vaisis'eka at great length to show that Gautama borrowed the materials for his superstructure from the indigenous source.

Kanada has not separately dealt with the means of proof; he gives the division of cognition or knowledge as follows:

Vidyā, knowledge, cognition.

- Perception
- Inference
- Memory
- Super-natural

Sensual Extra-Sensual

Recollection in the dream
Waking state.

5 modes mentioned above
Verbal testimony
Comparison.

From this chaotic state of division of cognition, it was for Gautama to develop his four means of proof with which we shall deal later on.

Kanada has composed an extensive work embracing both mental and natural philosophies in the sūtra style in ten books; the whole work does not seem to be the work of one man. It is highly probable that the followers of the Vaisis'eka school added the sūtras from time to time as occasion arose. The whole work had existed before Buddhism flourished in India. The school of the former is called Ardhaivasīka and that of the latter is called Vaisīka by Šankaračārya.
The number of sūtras, the Ānikas and chapters appears from the following table:

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<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Ānika I</th>
<th>Ānika II</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
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<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>IX</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>370</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

It is a very small treatise containing only 370 sūtras. After Kaṇāda many works dealing with both Nyāya Vais'ērika systems of philosophy were written; it is useless to enumerate them here in this short treatise.

We have three commentaries on the Vais'ērika sūtras which are very popular. (1) Upśkāra by Śankara Mis'īa (2) Vivriti by Jaya Nārāyaṇa Tarka Pañcānana Bhattāchārya (3) Bhāṣya by Chandra Kānta Bhattāchārya.

Besides the above, there are many minor works dealing with the tenets of the Vais'ērika school of philosophy.
Before closing the discourse on the Vais'esika system I may mention the translation of Das'apadArtha S'atra from the Chinese text by Prof. H. Ui of Soteshu College, Tokyo. The Das'apadArtha s'atra belongs to the Vais'esika philosophy and has increased the number of the six categories of Ka?ada to ten. The Sanscrit original of the Chinese text has not yet been traced.

Let us see how far we find the view of Ka?ada supported by Upaini-?ad. We find in Maitropanishat the word asu used as an adjective of wind (see VI. 35); there it means the smallest particle of wind. We again come across in Chapter VII. II, the words 'monad', 'dyad' and triad.' It is not certain that these words were used in the same sense which Ka?ada subsequently attached to them. Again in Chapter VI. 14, we find "an object to be proved cannot be investigated without the means of proof." The words used in the original are pramada and prameya which have become fixed in meaning in the schools of philosophy. It is useless to multiply such examples; a reader of the Upainisats will find many such examples in them. They are really the origin of the different systems in which their authority is paramount (See I. 13; X. 2-9 of the Vais'es?i ka s'utra),

Ny?ya.

This school of philosophy was founded by Ak?apada or Goutama. We know nothing about him with certainty; we cannot say whether he is the same as the mythical sage of the Ramayana. He is described as a cuckold and the husband of Ahalya. The whole story of Indra and Ahalya as described in the Ramayana is a myth according to Kumariila Bh?ta. See the Introduction to the study of Mimansa at P. CLIII of vol. XXVIII of S. B. H. Goutama alias Ak?apada is totally a different person. In this connection, I may mention the history of Indian Logic by the late Dr. Sat?a Chandra Vidyabh?sa an eminent scholar of his time. The work brought out by the Calcutta University after the death of the great scholar is a valuable contribution to the Indian system of logic and a monument of learning. With great respect to the learning and erudition of the deceased scholar, I may be permitted to say that he was so much biased with the pro-Hellenic and pro-Buddhistic notions that he saw everywhere in the Ny?ya sutras the Hellenic and Buddhistic influence. The dates given by him are imaginary and his view that Ak?apada and Goutama are two different persons has no basis. In a word, he has drawn much on his imagination; this fact detracts from the value of the book which is otherwise very useful. He starts from certain assumptions and plausible
theories which he considers to be facts. As I am writing a small treatise, I shall have no occasion to refer to his views in detail and criticise them. I therefore leave alone the learned scholar with the above remark to the students of Indian logic to form their own independant opinion about him.

The Indian view is that the founder of the system is Goutama aśīs Akṣapāda and no one will endorse the startling proposition that Akṣapāda is different from Goutama.

Goutama's sūtras as they exist at present are in five chapters as shown in the following table:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Āhnikā I</th>
<th>Āhnikā II</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>531</td>
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</table>

I have given the number of the sūtras from the Vizianagram Sanscrit series, Benares edition; but in other editions the number varies. The most reliable and ancient commentary is that of Vatsāyana about whose time we know nothing. All guesses about him are like a blind man groping in the dark.

A vast literature has grown round the sūtras of Gotama in the form of the commentaries and original treatises which it is useless to enumerate in the present thesis; but only few of them are given below:—

1. Udyotkara's Vārtika.
2. Vāchaspati Mis'rāś Nyāya Vārtika tātparya ṭikā.
3. Udayanāchāryā's Tātparya paris'uddhi.
The object of all the systems of philosophy is the attainment of *nis'reyasa*, the highest bliss. Dharma, according to Kapāla, leads to the attainment of the worldly prosperity and perpetual bliss hereafter. The same is claimed by Goutāma for his sixteen categories. "By understanding the real nature of the sixteen categories," says Goutama, "one attains the highest bliss." What are they? He enumerates them in the opening *sūtra* of the Nyāya *Sūtras*; they are as the following in Max Müller's language:—

1. Pramāṇa, means of knowledge. (proof)
2. Prameya, objects of knowledge. (proof)
3. Samēś'aya, doubt.
4. Prayojana, purpose.
5. Drīṣṭānta, instance.
7. Avayava, premises (syllogism)
8. Tarka, reasoning. (*Reductio per deductionem ad impossibile*)
9. Nirṇaya, conclusion (decision or final judgment).
12. Vītaṇḍā, wrangling, cavilling.
13. Hetwabhāsa, fallacies.
15. Jāti, false analogies.

I have given my own translations in brackets wherever I thought necessary.

The first category, namely, pramāṇa is divided into four (1) Pratyakṣa (perception) (2) Anumāna (inference) (3) Upamāna (comparison) and Śabda (verbal testimony). Pratyakṣa (perception) is defined in Sūtra 4 as "cognition arising from the contact of the sense organs with their objects but not that arising from the word of mouth, and being invariable and certain." According to Goutama perception is caused by the contact of the sense organs, viz: the eye, the ear, the tongue, the nose and touch with their different objects; he further particularises it as not caused by the words of mouth without seeing
the objects. The third requisite of perception is its invariability. As for example, perception of mirage, igsis stānas, will-o'-the-wisp, fata morgana do not come under Gautama’s definition. The fourth requisite is that there should not be any doubt about it as for instance, you should not have any uncertainty as to a pillar being a pillar or a man. Vātsyāyana explains it by saying that the soul in contact with the manas comes in contact with the sense organs which in their turn come in contact with the objects. It is certainly an improvement on the uncertain definition of Kaṇāda in Chapter IX. Ānukā I. It was the belief of the ancients that the rays from the eye travelled to the object and caused perception. Gautama’s definition of perception embraces sensations received by all the sense organs; according to him seeing a man in a pillar in darkness or mirage in the desert does not come under the definition of perception.

Second means of knowledge according to him is inference; it is of three kinds (1) pārvavat, (2) s’egavat, (3) sām ānyato drīṣṭam. (1) Inference about the effect arising from seeing the cause, as, for instance, seeing the black clouds, one predicts the future rainfall. (2) Inference about the cause arising from seeing the effect, as for example, from the flood in a river, one infers the rainfall on the upper bank of the river. (3) Common experience, as for example, at Cawnpore I see a man whom I saw a few days ago at Allahabad; I make an inference that he must have come from there.

The third mode of acquiring knowledge is comparison; if I under an impression that a bos gaeas is a quadruped resembling a domestic cow, happen to be in a jungle and see a bos gaeas corresponding to the description given to me, I recognise it at once as bos gaeas. This means of proof or knowledge is what is called comparison.

The fourth means of proof is called verbal testimony. It is defined as the statement of a reliable person who, according to Vātsyāyana, is one who has himself perceived a thing and explains it in its true light. Such a person can be both among the Āryas and barbarians (mlechchhas). It is of two kinds; (1) drīṣṭārtha (2) adrīṣṭārtha. The former is the statement which enjoins something, the effect of which is visible here at once; as for example the direction to take bath every day to avoid uncleanness. The latter is the statement which enjoins something the effect of which is produced in the life hereafter; as for example, the direction to perform an Āgnistoma to attain heaven. In chapter II Ānukā 2, Gautama has discussed other means of proof, such as, tradition, presumption, probability and non-existence which he says are included in the verbal testimony and infer-
ence. As they do not bear on the present discussion, I need not enter into
details about them.

We now come to the second category called prameya, the objects of
knowledge or proof. They are the following:—

1. Ātma, the soul; (2) s'arira, the body; (3) indriya, the sense organs;
(4) artha, objects of sense; (5) buddhi, knowledge; (6) manas, the mind; (7)
pravriti, activity; (8) doṣa, failing; (9) pretyabhāva, metempsychosis; (10)
phala, fruit; (11) duḥkha, misery; (12) apavarga, salvation.

The soul, the first object of knowledge is explained as being possessed of
desire, hatred, effort, happiness, misery and knowledge. According to
Gautama, there are certain signs or marks from which you can infer the
existence of the soul. They are volition, hatred, effort, happiness, misery and
knowledge. It is the soul which wills, hates, shows activity, feels happy
or unhappy and is conscious. It is certainly an improvement on the
definition of Kaṇḍāda and much simpler. (See chap III. Āhnika 2,
sūtra 4.) Cartesian Cogito ergo sum limits it to human soul only; in the
present definition animal and vegetable lives are also included.

The second object of knowledge is the human body; it is defined as
being the habitation of activity, sense organs and objects. You cannot
show activity without the machinery which is the corporeal body; second-
ly, all the sense organs reside in the body; thirdly, it is the habitation of
sensations, in other words without the corporeal body, you cannot perceive
external objects or be conscious of any internal feelings.

The third object of knowledge is the sense organ, five in number, made
of five elements as shown in the following table with the objects of sense
and the constituent elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sense organs</th>
<th>Objects</th>
<th>Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nose</td>
<td>Smell</td>
<td>Earth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongue</td>
<td>Taste</td>
<td>Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eye</td>
<td>Colour</td>
<td>Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin</td>
<td>Touch</td>
<td>Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ear</td>
<td>Sound</td>
<td>Ether</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the ancient Hindu philosophy, there are five elements as shown in the above table which may be classified as solid, liquid, luminous, gaseous and etheric substances.

The objects of senses as shown in the above table constitute the 4th object of knowledge.

We come to the 5th object of proof called knowledge or cognition. The author does not define it but gives its synonyms as sensation and knowledge; but in the Sāṅkya philosophy it is an internal organ called mādat by which you make discrimination. Here in the Nyāya and Vaisēṣika schools, the word is used for the act itself but not the organ.

We come to the sixth object of proof called manas or mind. It is an internal organ which receives the impressions of the external objects consecutively but not simultaneously. Here is no such thing as mana in the European philosophy; it is a medium (tabula rasa) on which impressions of external objects are made. The soul or ego becomes conscious of these impressions when made upon this organ; in order to make the soul conscious of the impressions they should be made consecutively but not simultaneously.

If my mana is engaged in reading an interesting novel, I do not hear the sound of the clock in my library; this fact proves the existence of manas. In European philosophy we have ego and non-ego but not this medium. The former is called the mind or soul; the latter is called matter. The existence of manas as an independent object of proof strengthens the belief that the philosophical system of India is indigenous.

We come next to the seventh head, viz., activity consisting of the action of speech, mind and body which may be either for good or bad. The following table will explain it fully:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organs</th>
<th>Bad actions</th>
<th>Good actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Body</td>
<td>Killing, stealing, fornication.</td>
<td>Good conduct, protection, gift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>Falsehood, slander, harshness,</td>
<td>Truth, study and speaking courteously.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mind</td>
<td>Jealousy, atheism, desire to possess the wealth of another</td>
<td>Mercy, faith and non-desire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We now come to the eighth head viz., the human failing or weakness. It is an inclination to do good or evil; like or dislike are the failings of a man.

We now come to metempsychosis, the ninth object of knowledge. In the original sutra, the word used is pretyabhadra which literally means the state of death; Gautama has discussed the subject very fully in Chap IV. Åhnikā I. sutra 10 and Chapter 111, Åhnikā I Sūtras 19-27. The whole Sanscrit Literature from the Vedas down to the Purānas and Tantras is permeated with the idea of re-birth; even Sākya Muni believed in it and gave it prominence in his karma doctrine. It is now admitted by the European scholars that the doctrine of transmigration of soul was known to the Vedic rishis. It is useless to cite quotations here, when there is no dissenting voice. In the Greek philosophy before Pythagoras, we do not find any reference to the transmigration of soul; it is believed by many that this doctrine of metempsychosis was imported into Greece by Pythagoras. With the exception of the Semitic people, all the nations of the world believe in re-incarnation or re-birth. As this subject is very important and big volumes have been written on it, we leave it for the study of the students of philosophy.

The tenth head is fruit or result; it is an object arising from the failings produced by activity in the language of Gautama. When one is inclined to do good or evil, he would be naturally moved to like or dislike a person or thing. This activity will produce a result which is called phala or consequence and is either desirable or undesirable, acceptable or unacceptable.

Eleventh in order is misery which is pain. Whatever is painful is misery. The total eradication of it is salvation which is the 12th head. The definition of salvation is not different from what is given in sutra 1, of Chapter I of the Sānkhyā Pravachana Sūtra.

After describing the various sub-divisions of the second category, we now come to samsāya or doubt which is the third category. Gautama says in sutra 23 “Doubt arises from the conflicting judgment with reference to the differentia by virtue of the appearance of the common and numerous qualities, contradictions and the irregularity of perception and non-perception.” I have translated it according to the view of Vātsyāyana. The author analyses doubt and divides it into five parts. (1) द्वाराचार्यां. च विशेषावेषे विवर्णः: It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the peculiar characteristic of the species arising from the appearance of general or common qualities of the genus. As for example, we see a wooden pillar at night; a doubt arises whether it is a human being or
a pillar. It possesses the general quality of length and breadth in common with man; in such a conflicting state, one desires to enquire into the special quality of the object about which there is a doubt.

(2) अनेक विपरीतेऽ: विविधार्थो विवर्णः: It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special characteristic of the species arising from the appearance of the numerous qualities, as for example, the differentia of sound is its being produced by concussion. A doubt arises whether sound is a substance, quality or action as the above said differentiating mark exists in all of them.

(3) विविधोऽनेकः विविधार्थो विवर्णः: It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality arising from contradictions; as for example, the soul. Its existence can be proved by advancing certain arguments; on the other hand, its non-existence can be proved, by advancing equally strong arguments. In such a state of conflicting arguments, a doubt naturally arises.

(4) यवविविधोऽनेकः विविधार्थो विवर्णः: It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality arising from the irregularity or defect in perception. As for instance, one sees water in a tank ordinarily; the same is reflected by the sun's rays in summer in a sandy desert as in a mirage. A doubt arises as to whether there is water or not by reason of the optical illusion or defect.

5. अनेकविविधार्थोऽनेकः विविधार्थो विवर्णः: It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality arising from the irregularity of non-perception; as for instance, a radish which cannot be presumed to have water inside it by its appearance. A doubt arises whether there is water in it or not.

Other commentators have reduced the above five elements to three only. According to them, the reading will be as follows:

1. अनेकस्वलेखार्थोऽनेकः विविधार्थोऽनेकः: विविधार्थोऽनेकः: It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality on account of the irregularity or defect in perception or non-perception due to the appearance of the common qualities.

2. अनेकस्वलेखार्थोऽनेकः विविधार्थोऽनेकः: विविधार्थोऽनेकः: It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality by reason of the irregularity or defect in perception or non-perception due to the appearance of the numerous qualities.

3. अनेकस्वलेखार्थोऽनेकः विविधार्थोऽनेकः: विविधार्थोऽनेकः: It is a conflicting judgment with reference to the special quality by reason of the irregularity or defect in the perception or non-perception due to contradictions.
We now come to the fifth category called prayojana or purpose. It is defined as the object, the aim or end of one's activity. It is the object which one tries to obtain or avoid. Every one in this world acts with some object in view. As is well said.

"प्रेयोजनणमुपयोगः विवर्णव्यवहारानि समावृते""

Even a man of weak intellect will not act without an end in view.

The fifth category is drishtānta or instance. It is defined by Goutama in sūtra 25. "The object in which there is subjective parallelism of the people and critics is an instance." It requires explanation. Instance is a familiar thing by showing which an ignorant person and a person who is disposed to examine everything with scrutiny, can understand an unknown thing easily. In form it resembles upādana or analogy and by reason of its being a means of proving an unknown thing, it resembles umākāraṇa or major premise.

We now come to the sixth category called the established truth or siddhānta. It is in the language of Goutama a rule of a school, hypothesis and implication. There is a difference of opinion amongst the commentators as to whether the sūtra is by way of definition or division. It in reality embodies the definition but also suggests the method or principle of division of the established truth. According to Vatsyayana, the established truth is a rule laid down by a school or a rule based on a hypothesis or a theory or a rule which follows by implication. According to the commentator of the Nyāyavārttika, the sūtra of Goutama means "established truth is the rule of ascertainment of a school or a proposition."

The siddhānta also means an ascertained view of a school or the final conclusion in the premises, which according to the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy are subject, do ubt, objector's view, reply and conclusion. (See the introduction to the study of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (pp. XII and XIII of vol. XXVIII of S. B. H.)..

The author has divided the Siddhānta into 4 heads as will appear from the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Siddhānta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarvatāntra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratītāntra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adhiśīrṣya Adhikāraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhyupagama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first is Saraṭāntra Siddhānta. It is the principle which though allowed in a particular school is not opposed to that of any other school. It is, therefore, an established truth which is not against any school and on which all the schools are agreed but which is a special tenet of a particular school. As for example, the eyes etc. are sense organs, colour etc. are the objects of sense and the earth etc. are the elements.
The second is *pratitāntra siddhānta*; it is the principle proved from the common school but not provable from another school. It requires further elucidation. The Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya are common schools of philosophy; while the Pūrva mīmāṃsā and Uttaraṃmāṃsā together constitute another school. According to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy sound is not eternal; on the contrary, according to the Mīmāṃsā school it is eternal. Though Sāukhya and Yoga are common schools of philosophy, yet *inter se* they are at variance on many points. Vātsyāyana has enumerated their points of difference. Any principle or established truth which is accepted by one school but not by another and on which there is a difference of opinion is called *pratitāntra siddhānta*.

This third is Adhikaraṇa Siddhānta. It is defined as that on the proof of which the other ancillary subject is proved. When a general proposition is proved, the particular proposition under it is thereby proved. As for instance when the existence of the soul is proved, the ancillary subjects such as the existence of the sense organs and their objects are thereby proved. The sense organs and the objects are dependent on the soul for their existence.

The fourth kind of Siddhānta is called *Abhyupagama siddhānta*. Is is defined as examination of the special topic though not dealt with yet inferred. When a special topic is not laid down anywhere, but inferred from the general tenour of the school, it is called *Abhyupagama Siddhānta*. As for example, there is a general proposition "sound is a substance." When it is an existing substance, the discussion as to its eternality or non-eternality comes under *Abhyupagama Siddhānta*.

We now come to the 7th category which is very important: it is syllogism or more properly the members of a syllogism; it is nowhere defined but its division is given in sūtra 32. There are, according to Goutama, five members known *avayava* or limbs. The first one is called *pratijñā* enunciation or proposition; the second is *kṛtya*, reason; the third is *dṛśānta* example or more properly a major premise with an example; the fourth is *upavayā* or minor premise and the fifth and the last is called *nigamana* or conclusion. The first two constitute an enthymeme in the modern Logie and the other three are the premises and conclusion of the Aristotelian syllogism.

Socrates is mortal  
Because he is a man  
All men are mortal, as James,  
John & C.  
Socrates is a man.  
Therefore Socrates is mortal.  

{ Socrates is mortal  
Enunciation  
Because he is a man  
Reason  
All men are mortal, as James,  
} Major premise

{ John & C.  
Socrates is a man.  
Minor premise  
Therefore Socrates is mortal.  
} Aristotelian syllogism
The Vedânta school of philosophy has accepted only the last three which constitute the Aristotelian syllogism; the Arhat school has increased the member to ten.

The first member of the Goutamian syllogism called Pratijñā or enunciation is defined as the pointing of the thing to be proved. It is the proposition which is to be proved, as for example 'sound is non-eternal.'

We now come to the second member of syllogism called hâtu or reason. It is a means of proof by reason of it: similarity or dissimilarity with the example (major premise). If it is similar or homogenous with the example it is called Thompson or affirmative; and if it is dissimilar or heterogenous, it is called negative or विविधता. It requires an explanation. There are three terms in a syllogistic reasoning. The major term is called sâdhyâ, the middle term is hâtu or sâdahana and the minor term is called paksa.

In the Goutamian Logic, the major premise contains an example which is on all fours with it either in the affirmative or negative form. In this system of logic, vyāpti (pervasion) plays an important part. The concomitant relation between the sâdhyâ and sâdhanâ or hâtu is called vyāpti. As for instance, smoke is invariably accompanied by fire. In other words, the relationship of vyāpya (contained i.e. smoke) and vyāpaka (container i.e. fire) is vyāpti; because the circle of fire is greater than that of smoke. (See at P. 19) As for instance, when we say "Where there is smoke, there is fire", we see the invariable concomitance or accompaniment of smoke with fire. It is an affirmative instance (anvaya). The opposite of this is not true; we cannot say "where there is no smoke, there is no fire", because we see no smoke in a red hot iron. On the other hand the proposition 'where there is no fire, there is no smoke' is true and is a negative example (Vyatireka). According to Goutama, the Vyāpti can therefore, be both in the affirmative or negative forms.

Take the examples of hâtu or sâdahana in both affirmative and negative forms.

I. Affirmation (Anvaya).

Sound is non-eternal (enunciation).

.: it is produced (hâtu).

II. Negation (Vyatireka).

Sound is non-eternal.

.: it is not non-produced.

We now come to the third member of a syllogism called example (major premise). Its definition given by Goutama is embodied in sūtras 36 and 37 "by reason of the similarity or dissimilarity with the proposition
to be proved, an instance on account of its partaking of its nature is called major premise or example.

The illustrations both affirmative and negative will fully explain the above definition.

I.—Affirmative (anvaya).

The mountain is fiery.

:\* It is smoky.

Where there is smoke, there is fire, as kitchen, fire hearth etc.,

II.—Negative (Vyatireka).

The mountain is fiery.

:\* It is not non-smoky.

A non-fiery is non-smoky, as a tank or a lake etc.

Vyatireka (negative) major premise is obtained by obversion and conversion of the anvaya (affirmative) major premise as explained by the illustrations given below.

Where there is smoke, there is fire (affirmative).
Where there is smoke, there is not non-fire (obversion).
By conversion we get
Where there is not non-fire, there is smoke. Negative (Vyatireka).

In order to get a (Vyatireka) negative form, obvert the affirmative (anvaya) major premise; then convert it as illustrated above. The vyatireka, therefore, involves a double process of first obversion and then conversion of the affirmative major premise, called contraposition.

We now come to deal with the fourth member of a syllogism called upanaya or minor premise. It is also of two kinds: (1) affirmative or negative as will be better explained from the following illustrations:

A. Affirmative.

The mountain is fiery.

:\* It is smoky.

A smoky, is fiery as kitchen.
This mountain is smoky.

B.—Negative.

The mountain is fiery.

:\* It is not non-smoky.

A non-fiery, is non-smoky. (as a tank)
This mountain is not non-smoky.

The first is Barbara of the first figure of the Aristotelian Logic; the second is camestres of the 2nd figure of Aristotelian Logic. The
reasoning in the Gotamian and Aristotelian Logic is the same. The former is in its rudimentary form, while the latter is more improved and advanced. In the former, we have only two moods, *viz.* *Barbara* in the *svaya* form and *camestres* in the *vyatireta* form. We have to reduce all the syllogistic reasonings to either of these forms. We have practically two moods only from the first and second figures. In the Aristotelian Logic, we have three figures with fourteen moods. The fourth figure with five moods as we find in the modern Logic was added by Galen.

We now come to the *nigamana* or conclusion. It is the repetition of the enunciation; we have two forms of conclusions either affirmative or negative.

A. Affirmative.

The mountain is fiery (Enunciation)  
**: It is smoky (Reason)  
(A) A smoky is fiery as kitchen or hearth (major premiss)  
(A) This mountain is smoky (minor premiss)  
(A) ** This mountain is fiery (conclusion)

B. Negative.

The mountain is fiery (Enunciation)  
**: It is not non-smoky (Reason)  
(A) A non-fiery is non-smoky as a tank or a lake (major premise)  
(E) This mountain is not non-smoky (minor premiss)  
(E) This mountain is not non-fiery (conclusion)  
By obversion, we get  
This mountain is fiery.

From the above illustrations, we clearly see that minor premiss the fourth member of the syllogism is the reason, the second member and the conclusion which is the fifth member is the enunciation—the first member.

Having dealt with the syllogism, we come to the 8th category called *Tarka* or reasoning. It is defined by Goutama in *sutra* 41. "In an object the reality of which is not known, the determination of the reality from the appropriateness of its cause is reasoning." When the reality of a thing is to be ascertained from its cause, it is called *tarka*. When we do not admit the truth of a proposition alleged, the conclusion will necessarily be absurd. It is called *reductio ad absurdum* as employed by Euclid in proving some of his propositions. Aristotle has also employed
it and called it *reductio per deductionem ad impossibile* or indirect reduction. Aristotle regarded the first figure as perfect and did not consider any syllogism in any other figure valid unless it could be changed into any of the moods of the first figure. This change is called reduction. It is either direct or ostensive reduction or the indirect or *reductio per deductionem ad impossibile* (reduction by deduction to impossibility).

Let us explain the above with the aid of the following illustrations:—

Where there is smoke, there is fire.

It is a proposition the validity of which is not admitted by the opponent; the contradictory proposition must necessarily be true.

O. Some smoky objects are not fiery.

A. All smoky objects are burning wet fuels.

O. ∴ Some burning wet fuels are not fiery.

The conclusion is absurd. It is *Bokardo* of the 3rd figure. There being a fallacy in the major premise, the conclusion must necessarily be false. The result is that you will have to accept the proposition, *viz.* "Where there is smoke, there is fire."

We now come to the ninth category called *nirnaya* or conclusion. It is a decision or final judgment after examining the arguments of the propounder of a proposition and the opponent.

We now come to the Kathā which includes (10) *vāda* argumentation, (11) *Jūlpā* sophistry and (12) *Vītandā* wrangling, cavilling. The argumentation is the acceptance of the *pro* or the *con* of a proposition ascertained by proof and reasoning, not contradictory to the established truth and arrived at by five premises. The argumentation according to the definition of Goutama has four essential elements. The first is the acceptance of the view of either the proposer or the opposer. There are two sides of a question; one in favour and the other against it. The second condition is that the view that you accept must have been arrived at by means of direct and indirect modes of reasoning. The direct mode of reasoning includes the four means of proof, the subject of the first category and the indirect mode is *reductio ad absurdum* the subject of the 8th category. The third peculiar characteristic of argumentation is that it should not contravene the established truth which is the subject of the 6th category. The 4th and the last proviso is that the view that you accept should have been formed after a syllogistic reasoning consisting of the five premises, the subject of the 7th category.
This kind of reasoning called argumentation is employed in an investigation of truth or in an enquiry from a teacher with a view to acquire knowledge.

Sophistry is the 11th category; it is an argumentation with quibbles, false analogies and unfitness for arguing. Sophistry is argumentation plus the employment of quibbles, false analogies and unfitness for arguing which are the false modes of reasoning. In sophistry and wrangling, the object is not the ascertainment of truth but a victory over an adversary. Sophistry, therefore, possesses all the four elements of argumentation in addition to the employment of quibbles, false analogies and unfitness for arguing.

The 12th category is vitanda or wrangling. Sophistry becomes wrangling when it refutes the position of the opponent. In a sophistry, a propounder establishes his position by means of argumentation and false reasoning, his main object being to win his position by employment of true and false modes of reasoning. Sophistry becomes wrangling, if the propounder assails the position of the opponent and thus establishes his own position. In the former, the propounder establishes his proposition, while in the latter he refutes the proposition propounded by the opponent. In both of them the object of the propounder is to obtain victory; in one by establishing his proposition and in the other by assailing that of the opposer.

We now come to the 13th category which is very important. It is called hetwabhāsa or fallacy. Goutama has not defined it but has classified it in sūtra 4 of Āniika I, chap I. Hetwabhāsa literally means false reason or one which has the semblance of a reason. It is of five kinds according to Goutama: (1) savyabhichāra, (2) viruddha, (3) prakaranasama, (4) sādhyasama and (5) kālātita are the five varieties of the fallacies. Kanāda calls hetwabhāsa by the word anapadesa as we have already seen. It is of three varieties according to him; (see at p. 19). Annambhaṭṭa, the author of Tarka sangraha has also divided it into five as savyabhichāra, viruddha, satpratipakṣa, asidha and vadhita.

We take up the first variety called savyabhichāra or discrepancy. In it, the reason or hetu is such that it exists with the thing to be proved and with its absence. We have seen that the reason or mark must co-exist with the major term (sādya) in order to make the pervasion (vyāpti) valid. If the circle of the pervader (vyāpya or hetu) is larger than that of the pervader (vyāpaka or sādhyā) and applies to the sādhyā and its negation,
there will arise the fallacy called śavyabhichāra or discrepancy. It is identical with the samādhyā of the Vaisēṣika school.

Take the following illustrations for explanation:—

Word is eternal

*: It is untouchable.

I. Affirmative (Barbara)
Whatever is intangible is eternal
Word is intangible.

*: Word is eternal.

II. Negative (Camestres)
Whatever is non-eternal is tangible
Word is not tangible.

*: Word is not non-eternal.

There in the above illustrations, there is a fallacy in the major premise by reason of the circle of the vyāpya being wider than that of the vyāptaka. Take for instance, buddhi cognition) which is both intangible and non-eternal.

Annambhatta, the author of Tarka saṃgraha has divided savyabhichāra into three heads, viz.: (1) sādhāraṇa (2) asādhāraṇa (3) anupāmānti. We have seen that in a valid vyāpti, the circle of the hetu is smaller than that of the sādhya and is, therefore, included in it. When the circle of the hetu (reason) is so wide that it partially covers the sādhya and its negation, it is called sādhāraṇa as in the above illustration; but when the circle of the reason (hetu) covers the entire circle of the sādhya or its negation, it is called asādhāraṇa.

Sound is eternal,

*: It is sound.

When the circle of the hetu (reason) is so wide as to cover the circle of the sādhya and its negation, it is called anupāmānti. In that case one cannot have an avaya or vyatireka major premise. See Tarka Samgraha by Bodas at P. 44. Bombay edition.

We now come to the second kind of fallacy called viruddha by Goutama. When the reason (hetu) is contradictory of the proposition to be proved (sādhya), it is called viruddha; take for instance:—

Sound is eternal,

*: it is created.

Whatever is created is eternal.
Sound is created.

*: Sound is eternal.
Here in the above illustration, the vyapti (pervasion) exists in the negation (vipaka). There cannot be the invariable concomitance in the case of eternity and created things, but there can be in the case of eternity and non-created things, as for example:

Whatever is non-created is eternal, as the soul.

The viruddha of Goutama comes under asanapadesa of the Vaisesika school of philosophy (see at P. 19.)

We now come to Prakaranasama the third kind of fallacy. When two reasons equally strong are given so that one yields one conclusion and the other yields another contradictory conclusion, the fallacy is of the prakaranasama or the equally balanced reason. The following illustrations will explain it better:

Sound is eternal.
.: It is audible.
Whatever is audible is eternal.
Sound is eternal.
.: It is eternal

Sound is non-eternal.
.: It is a product.
Whatever is a product is non-eternal.
Sound is a product.
.: Sound is non-eternal.

In a syllogism when two reasons are advanced and thereby two contradictory inferences are deduced, the fallacy is called that of the prakaranasama. It is, therefore, inconclusive; it is called satpratipalsa by the author of Tarkasamgraha. The difference between viruddha and prakaranasama is that in the former, the reason is quite contradictory to the Sadhya but in conformity with its negation. While in the latter, there are two reasons advanced leading to two different conclusions which leave the proposition to be proved inconclusive on account of the equally balanced hetus (reasons). It is well explained by the author of Tarkasamgraha; if in proving an affirmative proposition by assigning one reason, there is equally strong reason to prove the negative proposition, the fallacy is that of the prakaranasama.

We now come to 4th fallacy called sadhyasama. In it, the reason given is such that it requires proof; both the reason and the proposition to be proved stand in need of proofs: As for example:

Shadow is a substance.
.: it is moveable.
Whatever is moveable is a substance.
Shadow is moveable.
.: Shadow is a substance.
In this illustration, both the major and minor premises require to be proved; it is doubtful whether shadow is moveable and it is also doubtful whether shadow is a substance. This kind of fallacy is called asiddha by the author of Tarkasamgraha. The fallacy arises in three ways and is therefore, of three kinds. (1) Where the thing in which vyāpti resides (pakṣa) is a non-existing object, it is called asrayasiddha: As for example:—

A sky flower emits odour.
:: It is a lotus.
A lotus emits odour.
A sky flower is a lotus.
:: A sky flower emits odour.

Here in the above illustration, the pakṣa where the vyāpti resides does not exist; so the fallacy is that of the as'rayasiddha.

The second kind of asiddha according to Ānambhaṭṭa is swarupasiddha; it is a fallacy of the hetu or reason. As for example:—

Sound is a quality.
:: It is perceivable by sight.
Whatever is perceivable by sight is a quality.
Sound is perceivable by sight.
:: Sound is a quality.

In the above illustration, there is a fallacy of the reason, because sound is not perceivable by sight. The reason is simply absurd and the fallacy is that of swarupasiddha. The third kind of asiddha is vyāpatisiddha; it is a fallacy arising from the erroneous vyāpti (pervasion). As for example:—

Where there is fire, there is smoke.

The vyāpti is inaccurate; it can be true, if there is any qualifying condition attached to fire i.e. if the larger circle of fire be circumscribed with some qualifying condition, as for instance, where there is fire in a wet fuel, there is smoke. See Tarka Samgraha at 56 of the Bombay edition of Bodas. Kaṇḍāda calls it aprasiddha. (See at P. 19.)

We now come to the 5th and the last fallacy which is called kālātīta, ‘time-worn’ or ‘antiquated.’ In it, the reason is such that it is only a waste of time to prove a proposition. As for instance,

Fire is cold,
:: It is a substance.
All substances are cold
Fire is a substance
:: Fire is cold,
Here in the above illustration, we know by experience that fire is never cold; it is therefore mere waste of time to prove such an absurd proposition. Tarka Samgraha has explained it better under the head of Badhita. According to him, proving a proposition, the contrary of which is an axiomatic truth or is well known without any doubt is badhita. The reason assigned is all right but the proposition in support of which it is advanced is so obviously absurd that its employment is only a waste of time and energy. Kalātita has been explained by Gautama in sūtra 9, Åhnikā 2, chapter 1; the well known commentator, Vatsyāyana has very ingeniously illustrated the meaning as follows:

Sound is eternal.

it is manifested by conjunction like colour.

Just as a pre-existing colour is shown by light, so is the pre-existing sound manifested by beating of a drum or cutting of a branch of a tree. The reason that sound is manifested by conjunction (saññyoga) to prove its eternality is by the lapse of time. Colour can be seen, even if the light is removed and does not, therefore, cease to exist with the extinction of light; but in the case of sound, it ceases with the cessation of the beating of the drum or the cutting of the branch. The two instances are, therefore, dissimilar and the reason assigned is no reason in Logic.

We now come to the 14th category called ēkaḷa or quibble. It consists in the refutation of the adversary's arguments by putting an alternative interpretation. It is a kind of fraud; it is an attempt to refute the argument advanced by an adversary, by putting a different interpretation on the words used. It is of three kinds: (1) Vākchhala, (2) Sāmānyā cēkaḷa and (3) Upachāra cēkaḷa.

The first is the verbal quibble which consists in using a word in a different sense from that of the speaker, when not employed in a special sense. It is a play on a word as for instance, नवकर्षणीय ज्ञेयतयः (this man has new blankets); but the opponent says by playing upon the word nava, how can this man have nine blankets?

The second kind of quibble called general quibble consists in attributing of an impossible meaning by reason of the possible meaning being associated with the higher genus. It is a play on a word meaning genus. A propounder uses a word in a special sense but the adversary plays on it by using it in a general sense and making the meaning absurd. Take the word 'Brāhmaṇa, which denotes a class and connotes a quality. A propounder says, "the Brāhmaṇa is learned"; the opponent says 'how can
he be learned when young children of his community are illiterate'? Here in the above sentence the speaker uses the word 'Brahmana' for an individual but the opponent by playing upon it uses it for a class or genus. The third kind, called metaphorical quibble or upachara chhala, is the denial of the current meaning of a word stating its alternative sense. It, therefore, consists in the denial of the real meaning of a word when it is used metaphorically. A word has a primary and a secondary sense; when a proposer uses a word in its metaphorical or secondary sense, his adversary makes the meaning absurd by playing upon it and using it in its primary sense. Take for example, 'A Bench held John guilty'; the adversary says 'how can a bench, an inanimate object hold John guilty?' The propounder uses the word 'bench' in the secondary sense i.e the Judges or magistrates but the opponent plays upon it and uses it in the primary sense. The point of resemblance between the verbal and the metaphorical quibbles is that in both of them, there is a play upon the word, the propounder using it in one sense and the opposer in another. The point of dissimilarity is that in the verbal quibble the word is not used in the metaphorical sense but in the primary sense, but the adversary takes advantage of its double sense.

We now proceed with the fifteenth category called jati or false analogy. It consists in refutation of the propounder's proposition by advancing the counter-proposition. If the propounder advances a syllogism in an affirmative form, the opponent refutes it by giving the negative form and vice versa. Take the following examples:

I. Affirmative.

The soul is inactive.

\[ \because \text{It is all pervading.} \]

Whatever is all-pervading is inactive (as ether).

The soul is all-pervading.

\[ \therefore \text{The soul is inactive.} \]

II. Negative.

The soul is not inactive.

\[ \therefore \text{It is a seat of union.} \]

Whatever is a seat of union is not inactive.

The soul is a seat of union.

\[ \therefore \text{The soul is not inactive.} \]

In the above illustrations, we see that the argument of the propounder is in the figure called *Barbara* and the major premise is in a correct form, i.e there is an invariable concomitance between inactivity and all-pervading.
ness. On the contrary, the argument of the opponent is in the figure celarent, but the major premise is false, i.e. there is no total disconnection between the seat of union and inactivity. Take another illustration.

I. Negative.

Sound is not eternal.

:\ It is a product.

Whatever is a product is not eternal.

Sound is a product.

:\ Sound is not eternal.

II. Affirmative.

Sound is eternal.

:\ It is an object of auditory perception.

Whatever is an object of auditory perception is eternal.

Sound is an object of auditory perception.

:\ Sound is eternal.

In the above illustration, in the negative form the propounuer's argument is in the celarent figure, and there is universal disconnection between eternity and a product. On the other hand though the argument of the opponent in the affirmative form is in the figure Barbara, yet as there is no invariable concomitance of eternity and the object of auditory perception, there is a fallacy of the major premise. This kind of argument is called jati or false analogy. The above explanation is according to the reading of Vatsyayana's commentary as printed in the Benares Vizianagaram Sanscrit series; but Viśwa n'atha Bhattācharya, the writer of the Vṛtti reads the commentary of Vatsyayana differently. He is opinion that the refutation of the propounder's argument in the affirmative or negative form by the opponent in the same form is jati or false analogy.

For example,

I. Affirmative.

(a) Propounder.

The soul is inactive.

:\ It is all pervading.

Whatever is all pervading, is inactive.

The soul is all pervading.

:\ The soul is inactive.

(b) Opponent.

The soul is active.

:\ It is a seat of union.

Whatever is a seat of union is active.
The soul is a seat of union.
∴ The soul is active.

- Here in the above illustration in the opponent's argument, we see that there is no invariable concomitance with activity and the seat of union.

II. Negative.

(a) Propounder.

Sound is not eternal.
∴ It is a product.
Whatever is eternal is not a product.
Sound is a product.
∴ Sound is not eternal.

(b) Opponent.

Sound is not non-eternal.
∴ It is not a non-object of an auditory perception.
Whatever is a non-object of auditory perception is not-eternal.
Sound is not a non-object of auditory perception.
∴ Sound is not non-eternal.

In the above illustrations, we see that there is universal disconnection between the product and eternity in the propounder's argument, but we do not find universal disconnection between non-eternity and the non-object of auditory perception.

There are 24 kinds of \textit{jati} or false analogy and they have been fully described in chapter V. \textit{Añika} I. As their description is beyond the scope of this treatise, we do not enter into it and ask the reader to study the subject himself.

We now come to the 18th or the last category called \textit{nigravasthāna} or unfitness for arguing; literally it means 'the place of confinement.' It is defined by Goutama as a bad reasoning or no reasoning. When in the course of an argument, an opponent is driven to such a position that he advances contradictory arguments or no arguments, he is said to be defeated, like the king in a chess when he is checkmated. \textit{Vatsayana}, the well-known Scholiast explains bad reasoning and no reasoning. The former consists in advancing contradictory or untenable arguments; while the latter consists in advancing no arguments at all, or in not refuting the position established by your opponent or in not saving your position from the attack of your adversary.

The distinguishing feature of the false analogy and unfitness for arguing, is that in the former the opponent takes up a contradictory position and puts up his arguments in a syllogistic form either affirmative or nega,
tive but in the latter the opponent advances erroneous or contradictory arguments or no arguments at all. The twenty-two varieties of the latter arising from bad arguments or no arguments are described in detail in chapter V. ahnika 2.

This is the theme of Goutama's Nyāya chapter I; and in the remaining chapters he has discussed them at length philosophically. The description of Goutama's Nyāya will be incomplete, if his doctrine of 'word' is not described here.

Before doing this, it will be much better to explain the doctrine of śphota which the Indian philosophers have very elaborately discussed. In the commentary on Anuvaka II of chapter VII of the Maitripaniṣat (S. B. H. Vol. XXXI), is shown how sound is produced. Sound while coming out from the mouth called Nāda strikes against the atmosphere outside and produces waves there which are carried to the ear. "About an inch within the human ear is placed a membrane like the head of a drum which receives the vibrations of sound. With this tympanum is an air chamber connected by a tube, the eustachian with the mouth, the three small bones joined to each other and in carrying the atmospheric impulses to the labyrinth or internal ear which is the real organ of hearing, where the auditory nerve fills three semi-circular canals and a very curiously formed cochlea or shell-like spiral chamber, where its fibres may be seen spread out and gradually shortening like the strings of a harp or pianoforte, as if each sound from lowest pitch to highest had a separate nerve fibre to convey it to the sensorium; where atmospheric vibrations are finally converted into all the wonderful modulations of music and speech. This true ear the organ of hearing is embedded in the bones of the skull, and receives vibrations through the air in the inner chamber, through the small bones and through the bone of the skull. The semi-circular canals placed in three directions are supposed to show us the direction of sounds and the nerves of the spiral cochlea the pitch, of which we can distinguish from the lowest note of the organ to the sharpest insect one, nine octaves; but there must be sounds on either side beyond the reach of our sense of hearing." (Dr. T. L Nichols' Human physiology pp. 188 and 189).

When sound currents thus produced are carried to the ear of a hearer it is the second stage of sound called Dhvani. When the sound is carried by the auditory nerve to the sensorium, it produces a picture of an object meant by the articulate voice composed of variety of letters or Pārna. This last stage is called śphota manifested in the form of 'word'; what is idea or thought on the subjective side, is the object or the existing thing
in the objective or external word; the same is word on the linguistic side. How does it convey the meaning? In the beginning it is an inarticulate sound produced by the vocal organs of the speaker; then in the form of articulate sound it is conveyed by the air current to the auditory canal of the hearer and then by striking against the tympanum the impression is made on the brain. The manifestation of the idea by means of the sound, is what is called *śphota*. There are two views about it; (1) that it is the articulate sound pronounced in the form of the *Vāṇī* or letters of which a word is composed that the image or picture thereof is created on the sensorium; (2) The other view is that it is the letters pronounced in a particular order, that constitute a word or name; there is no such thing as *śphota* apart from the letter or *Vāṇa*.

The subject has been fully dealt with by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarsana Samgraha* in the chapter on Pāṇini. I cannot help quoting a passage from P. 116 of the Ānandārava edition.

> तथाहि अभिम्बजाकारपि प्रथमम् ध्वनिः स्फोटम् स्फुटस्फुटमभिमृद्वधिकः। उत्तरात्ताराभिम्बन्त्रकमेण स्फुटस्फुटात्तरं स्फुटात्तरं यथा स्वाधियाः। सततपपवमातः नावचायते। अस्यास्तु स्फुटात्तरे यथाविकल्प्तम् प्रथम प्रतीति स्फुटे चकाति चरमे वेति ति यथाविषयस्वयते।
> नादै राहितवीजाया मूनयेन ध्वनिना सह।
> आद्र्षिपिपीपाकायं नुदि शल्लोध्यायते॥

"Just as a lesson learnt once is not remembered but on constant repetition becomes complete, or as truth does not shine itself distinctly first but becomes clear in the intellect ultimately, similarly though the first sound is significant, yet it manifests the word (śphota) indistinctly but gradually it makes it distinct, more distinct and most distinct. A word the seed of which is sown by the sound, being accompanied by the last articulate sound (of letters) and being perfected by repetition, is retained in the intellect (memory)".

The conventional sense of a word pronounced in a particular order of letters was known to the ancient Indian thinkers. A word produces an idea and an idea produces a word; there is a reciprocal relationship between the language and thought. There cannot be a language without previously having a thought in your brain and you cannot convey your thought without a language. It is a philosophical axiom the truth of which was known early in India.

The next question is, 'what does a word convey'? Does it mean an individual, form or genus? When the word 'goat' is uttered, you have at
once before your mind a figure of a quadruped of a peculiar structure and colour. It is a concept, idea, figure or form (Akriti); the corresponding object in the external world is an individual goat. A class consisting of such individuals forms a species, and the species make up a genus until the highest genus called sumnum genus is reached. The lowest species or the individual is called infima species and intermediate genera and species are called subaltern genera and species.

"If the word 'goat' conveyed an akriti," argues Goutama "a goat made of clay will suffice in a sacrifice; similarly if it meant an individual goat, it is then impossible to replace another in its place". In his opinion, the word 'goat' signifies a class, form and individual. He sums up the whole discussion in sūtra 63 of chap. II Âhnika 2. A word denotes an individual, a form, and a genus.

The next question for determination is whether a word (or more properly) sound is eternal or non-eternal. The view of Goutama is embodied in sūtra 13 of chapter II. Âhnika 2. He says that sound is non-eternal and assigns three reasons for it: (1) a sound has a beginning; whatever has a beginning has an end. (2) It is an object of sense organ namely the ear; (3) it is treated in common life as artificial: you can raise or lower your voice according to your wish. All these reasons show that a sound is produced like any other manufactured articles and is therefore perishable and non-eternal.

It is a common experience that a sound is produced by our effort and after having manifested itself for a short time, it vanishes. It cannot be according to Goutama, eternal.

It is useless to discuss the subject here; I may refer the curious reader to study from sūtras 14 to 55 chap. II Âhnika 2 of Goutama's Nyāya Sūtras (Vizianagaram Sanscrit series).

Goutama in spite of the non-eternity of word believes in the infallibility and eternity of the Vedas. He says in sūtra 63 of chap II. Âhnika 1 "And by reason of the authority of a reliable person, its authoritativeness is like the authority of spell (incantation) and medicine." To Goutama, the Holy Veda is an authority in itself, because the word of an âpta or a reliable person is always an authority. Who is an âpta? Vatsāyana has dealt with it fully in his commentary. There are three qualifications of an âpta: (1) he must have realised his ideas, (2) he must be a philanthropist and (3) he must tell the truth and explain the true nature of a thing. All these qualifications apply to the Supreme Being. The sum and substance of the whole sūtra is that the Holy Veda, being of divine origin is of
paramount authority. The scholiast further says that it is not authori-
tative simply by reason of its being eternal; though a word is not eternal
yet the Holy Veda being of divine origin is eternal. He gives two
examples in support of his view; just as a spell or charm produces its
effect in removing serpent’s poison and people believe in its infallibility,
so is the Holy Veda infallible; just as a medicine produces its effect in
eradicating a disease and people believe in its efficacy, so is the Holy Veda
infallible. The medicine (Ayurveda) and spell (mantra) are the parts of the
Holy Veda; the infallibility is, therefore, established beyond any doubt.

There are doctrines of idealism (vijnāna vāda), voidism (śūnya vāda) and
impermanence (Kṣaṇikavāda) referred to in the 4th chapter. Subsequently
these doctrines became the peculiar property of the Yogāchāra, a school
founded by Asanga and Vasubandhu and the Mādhyamika school founded by
Nāgārjuna. I have said over and over again that these views had been in
existence long before they became the accepted tenets of any school.
From criticising such views, no valid inference can be made as to the
priority of the various Buddhist schools which subsequently accepted
such views as their tenets. A futile attempt has been made recently
to compare Goutama’s sūtras and Vātsyāyana’s commentary with the
Lankāvatāra-sūtra of the Yogāchāra school. I need not dilate on the
subject as there is an obvious anachronism which a student of Indian
history can very well appreciate.

The study of Goutama’s Nyāya is very popular in India especially
in Bengal. It is still studied in Nadia (Navadvipa); there the subject is
studied in the old way of learning in toto. I am informed that there are
good nāyādītās or logicians of the old type.

Having done with the description of Goutama’s Nyāya, let us see
whether we find any trace of his philosophy in the Upaniṣats. The word
‘Goutama’ occurs very often in the Upaniṣats; it is in Kaśitaki, Chhāndogya,
Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Katha. (See for the details in Jacob’s concordance
at P. 340). No help can be obtained from them as to the identity of the
founder of the Nyāya school. The word in the Upaniṣats is a patronymic
of certain Rishi.

We find most of the objects of proof (Prameyas) and the five elements
mentioned in the Nyāya, in the Upaniṣats. Take the passage ‘विवेकः सनातन
भेद स्वयं विद्वान्’ in Maitriupanisad VI. 14. “An object of proof
cannot be perceived without a means of proof.” This axiomatic truth
finds its place in Goutama’s Nyāya. It is probable that there the
pramāṇa and the prameya may not have been used in the same sense as in the Nyāya.

We find tarka in Kathopanisāt II. 9 “विद्यात्स्वयमविद्यायताओद्गतया” It can not be obtained by means of reasoning.” The word again occurs twice in Maitriupaniṣad in VI. 20, VII. 8. It is doubtful whether the word is used in the same sense as in the Nyāya. We have in Maitriupaniṣad kāhaka (quibble), driṣṭānta (instance) and hetu (reason). We also find nairaimyavāda (atheistic doctrine) side by side with these terms which subsequently became the peculiar terminology of the Nyāya school of philosophy.

At the time of the Upaniṣat, people were acquainted with some sort of reasoning. It was a rationalistic period; people being tired of the ceremonial practices of the Veda, naturally took to thinking and expressed their thoughts in the writings of the Upaniṣat. Nyāya is, therefore, no-hostile to the Vedic teaching but has its seed in the Upaniṣats the knowleudge section of the Veda called jñānakāṇḍa.

Sānkhyā.

We now come to the second group of philosophy called Sānkhyā-yoga. The Sānkhyā school is anterior to the Yoga school. The founder of the former school is Kapila, a mythical saint who is described in the Śrimadbhāgavat Purāṇa; his life is so much surrounded by a halo of sanctity that it is very difficult to make out any thing like history. It is therefore, a futile attempt to find out the time and place of the saint. Let us leave him in the mystery in which he is enveloped. Kapila like Śākyamuni and Riṣabha is considered as one of the twenty-four incarnations of Viṣṇu. He is said to be the same Kapila who reduced the hundred sons of Sāgara to ashes while searching for the lost horse of the As’wamedha sacrifice; while others say, he is a different sage.

His name occurs in S’vetā s’vātara Upaniṣat chapter V. 2.

“सुचिं विद्ययुपकृति विद्ययुपकृति विद्ययुपकृति विद्ययुपकृति” : “He brings up the Rīghi Kapila born in the beginning with knowledge and looked at him when born.” Some of the commentators of the verse have taken the word ‘Kapila’ in its derivative sense meaning Hiranyagarbha; but Sankara-chārṣya in his learned commentary of the Vedanta Sūtra chapter II. 1. thinks that by Kapila the founder of the Sānkhyā system of philosophy is meant. According to many, he is considered anterior to Kapāda; but the Pravachana sūtras as they exist in the present form are admittedly posterior to the Vaisēṣika sūtras. Whoever Kapila may be, he certainly wrote after Kapāda as fully discussed by me in the preceding pages.
The Sāṅkhya literature is very limited; the books in the Sāṅkhya school can be counted on one’s fingers’ ends. They are: (1) Pravachana sūtras, (2) Tattwa samāsa (3) Sāṅkhya kārikā and (4) Panchas’ikha sūtram.

Tattwa samāsa was at one time considered to be the original work of Kapila, but now the present view is that it is a spurious work containing the summary of the original Sāṅkhya sūtras. See Keith’s Sāṅkhya system (Heritage of India series). Panchas’ikha sūtras are embodied in the commentary of Vyāsa on the Yoga sūtras of Patanjali. We need not, therefore, bother ourselves with these two works in the Sāṅkhya literature. Let us then take up the Sāṅkhya Pravachana Sūtra which I consider to be the original work for reasons to be given later on. I cannot determine the age of the Pravachana sūtras, but I think them to be existing in the present form before the rise of Buddhism. Buddha owes a great deal to Sāṅkhya and many other sages of the pre-Buddhist heretic schools such as Brihaspati, Chārvaka and Jābali. It is like groping in the dark to make an attempt to ascertain the age of these mysterious sages whom we know only by name.

There is a limited number of commentaries on the Pravachana sūtras; (1) Sāṅkhya sūtra vritti by Aniruddha; (2) Sāṅkhya Pravachana Sūtra vritti sāra by Mahadeva Saraswati; (3) Sāṅkhya Pravachana Bhāṣyam by Vijnāna Bhikṣu. The first and the third are available and are studied. The commentary of Vijnāna Bhikṣu is most excellent and helpful in correctly understanding the Sāṅkhya Sūtras. The vritti of Mahādeva Saraswati was published by Garbe in the Bibliotheca Indica series.

Swāmi Dayānanda Saraswati, the great Sanskrit scholar and reformer of our time has mentioned Bhāguri’s commentary on Sāṅkhya sūtra in the introduction to his commentary on the Rigveda and the Satyārtha Prakāśa; but I have neither seen it nor read of it in any other work.

The present Sāṅkhya Pravachana Sūtra, as we have, consists of six chapters containing 526 sūtras as will appear from the following table:

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<th>Chapter</th>
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<th>II.</th>
<th>III.</th>
<th>IV.</th>
<th>V.</th>
<th>VI.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sutras</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>129*</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>526</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

We now come to Sāṅkhya Kārikā which is the most important work in the whole Sāṅkhya literature and is considered older than the Pravachana sūtras.

* According to Aniruddha, there are 130 sūtras.
chana śūtras by scholars. It was written by Ḫaṃśa Kṛṣṇa in the Ārāya metre. The number of the stanzas varies according to the commentators. In the commentary of Goudapāda only 69 stanzas are commented upon. In the commentary of Māṭhara which is older than that of Goudapāda, we find 73 stanzas. In the commentary of Vāchaspati Mis'ra, called Sāṃkhyaśāttva Kaumādi we have 72 stanzas. According to P. Tanusukha Rāma S'armā, the editor of Māṭhara vṛtti in the Chou-khambhā Sanscrit series, the number of stanzas varies from 69 to 105.

The Kārikā with the Māṭhara vṛtti was translated into Chinese by "Kan-ti" who is called Parmārtha by the Indians. "He was a Tripitaka law teacher of the Khan dynasty A. C. 557-589. Parmārtha came to China in about 547 in the reign of the emperor Wa-ti of the Lian dynasty which ruled in Southern China from 502-557 A. C. and was followed by the Khan dynasty. He lived till 582 A. C., and there are no less than twenty-eight of his translations now in existence, that of Suvarṇa-saptatī Sāstra being the twenty-seventh (No 1300 in B. Nanjo's Catalogue). The name given to it in Chinese, "the Golden seventy discourse" is supposed to refer to the number of the verses in the Kārikā." (Max Muller's six systems of Indian philosophy P. 222.) According to P. Tanusukha Rāma S'armā, in the Chinese translation the 63rd. stanza being omitted, there are only 71 stanzas. Though there are 72 stanzas in the present authorised edition, the book itself is called 'saptatī' by the Kārikā itself. In the Chinese translation, the name of the vṛtti writer is not given. Bālaśāstrin, as appears from the six systems of Indian philosophy by Max Muller held that the Pravachana śūtras were written in the 16th century by Vijnāna Bhikṣu and commented upon by him. I cannot do better than quote another Pāṇḍit of Benares, P. Vindyeśvar Prasāda Dwivedin, the librarian Government Sanscrit College, and the editor of Sāṃkhya Samgraha in the Chou-khambhā Sanscrit series from his preface to the Sāṃkhya Samgraha:

अन्तर्विश्वासस्म मात्रेय सृजामानहेविकाकित्व प्रणीतम संस्कृतम् साहित्यानि यथावच्चत् यो हृदिवाग्म संस्कृतवैशिक ग्रंथद्वयायि।तत्त्वदृढ्यम् विश्वासार्थम् समायान। जैलमें प्रेमसृजीत्य धैर्यायित्वद साधुतात्वका विश्वासार्थम्।विश्वासार्थम्।

Here some say that Samāsa Sūtra alone was composed by the great sage Kapila, while the Sāṃkhya Sastra containing the sūtras and six chapters were composed by Vijnāna Bhikṣu. It is foolish, because Bhojraj long before the time of Vijnāna Bhikṣu had explained the six chapters. Full details may be seen in the preface to Nyāya vārtika." The editor ends his preface by uttering a blessing. Certainly the view
that Vijñāna Bhikṣu palm ed off the Pravachana sūtras as the work of Kapila cannot hold water even for a minute when we find the sūtras commented upon by Aniruddha who is anterior to Vijñāna Bhikṣu. See Pramathanātha Tarkabhadra’s preface to Aniruddha’s commentary as published by Jivānanda Vidyāsāgara.

The view of those who hold the Pravachana Sūtras to be spurious is based on what is called argumentum ex silentio. As far as can be gathered from their writings, their argument is that Sankarāchārya who has criticised the Sāṅkhya view in his commentary on the Vedanta Sūtras has not referred to the Pravachana Sūtras but to the Sāṅkhya Kārikā; that Madhavāchārya, the writer of the Sārvadarsana samgraha has not, while describing the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy, referred to the Pravachana Sūtras but to Is’wara Kṛṣna’s Kārikā and Vāchaspāti Mis’ra’s Sāṅkhya tattva Kaumādi; that even so late a writer as Vāchaspāti Mis’ra, has not referred to the Pravachana Sūtras. From this negative evidence they conclude that they had not been in existence in their time. The argument is very weak and is based on a fallacy which we all very know is that of argumentum ex silentio. There are several very important facts which these learned critics in their zeal have overlooked; the Sāṅkhya philosophy was rightly or wrongly believed to be the root cause of the atheistic schools of Buddhism and Jainism, and the followers of the Sāṅkhya school were nicknamed as Prachōkhamma Baudhās (crypto-buddhists). In the Pravachana Sūtras, as will be seen later on, the existence of Is’wara is denied; this accounts for their unpopularity and their study, therefore, fell into desuetude. The Kārikā being a short epitome of the Sāṅkhya principles in a metrical language by combining the sūtras of the Sāṅkhya and eliminating all atheistic and controversial points, became popular in the study of Sāṅkhya school of philosophy. This is the reason why the Sāṅkhya Kārikā alone was studied and referred to by the conservative Brāhmaṇas. There is another fact, viz. that in ancient India there were no facilities in the use of libraries as we have at present. The libraries, it appears, were attached to the temples and were the exclusive properties of the priests who perhaps allowed them rather to be eaten by worms than exposed to the public gaze. Some time iconoclastic instinct prevailed, under the influence of which they destroyed those books which were not in conformity with their own. The Bāhaspātya sūtras of the heretic school, the existence of which is proved from the quotations here and there, are not available. The works of Chārvāka have vanished, and many of the important Buddhistic works have been recovered.
in the Pāli translations outside India. In addition to these facts, considering the climate of India, it is not strange that the Pravachana sūtras became very rare and a sealed book to the general public. The learned scholars were not omniscient, and could not know them by intuition if they were shut up in the libraries of the temples not accessible to all.

Sankarāchārya who was a born enemy of Buddhism and Jainism, could not have any sympathy with Kapila, the forerunner of these two well-known religious systems of the heterodox school, and would not therefore stoop so low as to quote from Kapila's Pravachana sūtras. Sankarāchārya has mentioned the name of Kapila in his Sārīryika Bhāṣya more than once with great respect, but in his commentary on sūtra 1 pāda 1 chapter II, he says,

अतः सिद्धमात्रमेव कल्ययपि कपिलस्य संवादमेव' बेदार्थसारि
मनुवतनविद्यं च, न केवल स्तम्भ प्रकृति कल्यययैवेदि

"It is, therefore, proved not only from the assumption of the independent existence of matter but from the plurality of the souls also, that the system (tantra) of Kapila is contrary to the Veda and the teaching of its follower, Manu." In this view of Kapila's system, it is no wonder if S'ankarāchārya, while commenting on sūtra 11 of chapter I Pāda 4, quoted stanza 3 from Sānkhya kārikā.

Whenever S'ankarāchārya quotes from the Sānkhya, he does not mention whether he quotes the passage from the Kārikā or the Sūtras; he leaves it to the imagination of his readers. Excepting stanza 3 quoted above, all quotations may be from the Kārikā or the sūtras. As for example, in his commentary on sūtra 9 of chapter II, Pāda 4, we have—

सामान्य करण दृष्टि: प्राणाद्वा बायवः पंचः। सान्क्ष्य PI. 31

The above quotation is also the last line of stanza 29 of the Kārikā. What is the authority to support the allegation that the quotation is from the Kārikā but not from the sūtras?

There are certain words and sentences which the learned scholiast unconsciously borrowed from the sūtras. Thus S'ankara's commentary (Nirmaya Sagar big edition) and Sānkhya sūtras side by side show parallelism.

Commentary.

1. अस्मी गार्यः पुष्पः (बुध 8.3.16) इत्येवमात्रिष्ठ तिप्रतिद्ध मेव पुष्पस्य
विशिष्ट त्व निर्गुणं पुष्प निर्द्धपणं
सांवेद स्वपनस्वते। P. 439
S'ankarâchârya quotes ‘अर्थजी हर्मवर्तमान' from the Brihadâranyaka upanisât and Kapila has put this verse into a sâtra in his system and numbered it as sâtra 15 of chapter I. Both of them derive it from the same source, but the parallelism in the course of the criticism of the Sânkhya philosophy of Kapila is very striking.

Commentary.

Sâtra.

2. प्रति नियतवचन विन्यास मने कर्म पतालु सवाधिभानीं...........
   P. 489

3. सुवादनुरालिनं संसर्ग पूर्वकतवं हुष्ठा..............
   492

4. हुष्ठा च व हुष्ठस्तिचि:
   493

While commenting on sâtra 3 of chapter II. Pâda 2, the learned commentator says;

Commentary.

Sâtra.

वयासङ्गेतन भवाभे नेपि अनेतन वधिक्षारभेष द्वित प्रवाहान-रूप 3.५५
वर्तावलय २ ढूः.

Compare stanza 57 of the Kârikâ as well. I say, it is an unconscious imitation of words and phrases from the Sânkhya system of philosophy. The learned commentator on the Vedânta sâtra has, while criticising the doctrines of the Sânkhya system unconsciously borrowed phrases and sentences from the sâtras. For these reasons, I have not the least doubt as to S'ankarâchârya's knowledge of the sutras, when he criticised the view of Kapila. He could have never criticised the system from such a meagre compendium as the epitomised Kârikâ, where the agnostic views as set forth in detail in the sâtras, are totally absent. The Tattvacasadâya, if it existed, cannot afford materials for the learned scholiast's criticism.

There is no doubt that Kapila's sâtras were not mentioned by any commentator of the Vedanta excepting Appaya Dikshita in his commentary called Vedânta kalpataru parimala. (See the excellent edition of Nirnaya Sagar 1917 at P. 372 chapter I Pâda 4, sâtra 1.) My view is that the sâtras were not known as Pravachana Sâtras before Vijñâna Bhikku or Aniruddha; they were known as Kapila's tantra or Sàsthitantra. I shall discuss the point later on.

As to Mâdhavâchârya, the voluminous writer of the Renaissance period, I may frankly admit that nowhere the Sânkhya sâtras of
Kapila are referred to by him in the Sarvadars'ana Sangraha, but he has mentioned Vâchaspati Mis'ra and his Sânkhya Tattwa Kaumadi. The quotations are mainly from the Kârikâ, but not from the sūtras. The omission means nothing. The account of Sânkhya as given by him is very meagre, and does not contain the names of the other commentators of the Kârikâ who admittedly flourished before his time. He says nothing about the number of the stanzas of the Kârikâ. Under these circumstances the non-quotation from the Sânkhya sūtra is not at all surprising.

Sâyañâchârya, the brother of Madhavâchârya and the commentator of the Vedio works, in commenting on Anuvâka II of Prapâthaka VIII. of the Taitireyârañyaka at P. 565 of the Anândâs'rama edition says while discussing the various views of the creation according to the different schools of philosophy,

"यथा मृदूर्वि कारिणा देह ब्यतिरिक्त खर्म प्रातिवैद्यं कर्तात्मान्तः बोधवयं नौतस्येवोदयोगतथा महा माध्यिकः कारिणा। ब्रह्मवैद्यवैद्यत: कर्तृ तब्रह्मित साक्षिणेन चिन्द्रात्मानसोऽछ्रो बोधवयं ते कपिठ महार्थे: साक्ष्याख्य निम्मम्।"

"Just as the attempt of Goutama was to instruct the creating Self fit to secure heaven apart from the body to the people of very low understanding, so did the great sage Kapila write Sânkhya sastra to instruct self who is devoid of action, looker on, intelligent and unattached, to the people of average understanding". Sâyañâchârya has everywhere spoken of Sânkhya but not of the epitome which plays an important part in his brother's description of the Sânkhya in the Sarvadars'ana samgraha. Again at P. 596 of the same edition he quotes from Sânkhya without mentioning the name of the book.


In view of the discussion in the ârañyaka, the inevitable conclusion is that the quotation is from the Sânkhya Sâstra. One cannot, therefore, infer from the non-mention of the verse and chapter of the book in the presence of the quotation, that the existence of the Sânkhya S'âstra was not known to Sâyañâchârya or Madhavâchârya, or that it did not exist. The non-mention thereof shows the unpopularity of the Sânkhya system at the time as shown in the preceding pages.

Let us examine Vâchaspati Mis'ra's Sânkhya Tattwa Kaumadi. There is not the least doubt that he knew Kapila, the founder of the Sânkhya system, as he salutes him in the beginning in stanza 2 of his commentary.
Though the learned scholiast did not refer to the śūtras, yet he cannot be considered to be ignorant of them in face of his commentary on stanza 72 of the Kārikā. As it is very important in determining the existence of śūtras at the time the Kārikā was written, I must give it verbatim.

सतत्वं किलवेय? कल्प्यं पद्भित्त्रधय।
आश्चर्यार्थकः विविधता गर्वाद् विविधिता धारि॥

"All the subjects which are in the seventy (stanzas) are from the entire Śaṣṭītāntara (a book dealing with 60 topics) with the exception of parables and hostile attacks on others (systems)". Vāchaspāti mis'ra while commenting on the term śaṣṭi tantra, says that there are 60 topics according to Rāja Vartika and quotes verses from it. They are as follow:—

(1) The existence of matter, (2) unity, (3) objectivity, (4) separate entity, (5) dependence, (6) plurality, (7) disjunction, (8) conjunction, (9) future existence, (10) inactivity. These ten topics vary according to the different commentators; as they are not relevant in the present discussion, they need not be described. Besides these, there are 5 kinds of errors mentioned in III. 37, nine kinds of contentment mentioned in III. 39, twenty-eight kinds of incapacities of the organs mentioned in III-38 and eight kinds of powers mentioned in III-40 (See stanza 47 also). The author of the kārika says that he has taken the topic from the entire saṣṭi tantra minus the parables (mentioned in chapter IV and the criticisms on other systems (chapters V. and VI.) Is there any doubt left about the identity of the śaṣṭītāntara as qualified by so many adjectives? The description given in the 72nd stanza fully applies to the present Sāṇkhya Śūtras. Can we imagine that a commentator who comments on stanza 72 was ignorant of the Sāṇkhya śūtras which are called Sāṇkhya Sūtra by Aniruddha and Sāṇkhya Pravacāhā sūtra by Viṣṇāna Bhikṣu? Vāchaspāti Mis'ra is said to have lived in the 9th century (born in A. V. 898).

Alberuni who came to India in the beginning of the 11th century says, "Besides, the Hindus have books about the jurisprudence of their religion, on theosophy, on ascetics, on the process of becoming God and seeking liberation from the world as e.g. the book composed by Gouda, the anchorite, which goes by his name; the book Sāṇkhya composed by Kapila on divine subjects; the book of Patanjali on the search for liberation and for the union of the soul with the object for its meditation; the book Nyāya bhāṣā composed by Kapila on the Veda and its interpretation, also showing that it has been created, and distinguishing within the Veda between such injunctions as are obligatory only in certain cases and those which are obligatory in general; further the book Mīmanāsā
composed by Jaimini on the same subject; the book *Laukāyata* composed by Brihaspati treating of the subject that in all investigations, we must exclusively rely upon the apperception of the senses; the book Agastya-mata composed by Agastya treating of the subject that in all investigations we must use the apperception of the senses as well as tradition; and the book Vishnudharma*. Sachau’s translation, Trubner’s edition vol. I. 192.

The above quotation is remarkable; we must take into consideration the fact that Alberuni was a foreigner, and there were many difficulties in his way in arriving at the correct information of a people who were strangers to him in language and religion. He mentions Gouḍa as an author; he probably refers to the Gouḍapādiya Kārīkā which forms part of the Māṇḍukya upaniṣad and on which there is a learned commentary of S’ankarāchārya. He perhaps does not mean his commentary which is on the S’ānkhyā Kārīkā. He further mentions Kapila as the author of the S’ānkhyā Sūtras and Nyāya-bhāṣā. We have no such work as Nyāya-bhāṣā available; it may be an error.

He further says at P. 8 of Sachau’s edition in the preface, “I have already translated two books into Arabic one about the *origines* and a description of all created beings called S’ānkhyā, and another about the emanicipation of the soul from the fetters of the body called *Patanjali* (Patanjala ?). These two books contain most of the elements of the belief of the Hindus, but not all the single rules derived therefrom”. It could be of great service to consult the Arabic translation of the S’ānkhyā.

The reference made by Alberuni to the S’ānkhyā teachings at pp. 62 and 63 of Sachau’s edition is to V-83 and V-103. The word Åṭivāhika’ is nowhere to be found in the Kārīkā or in the commentary of Gouḍa on it, but is in the Pravachana sūtra V-103. The reference at p. 89 may be compared with chap. III. 48, 49, 50 of the Sūtras, stanzas 53 and 54 of the Kārīkā and chap. IV. 18 of the Bhagwadgītā. The reference at P. 92 appears to be to Sūtra 46 of chapter III. or stanza 53 of the Kārīka. There is no need to multiply references, as they are quite sufficient to show that the information that Alberuni derived about the S’ānkhyā teaching is from the S’ānkhyā sūtras. In this view of the matter I cannot believe that Vāchaspati Mis’ra was ignorant of S’ānkhyā sūtras. If a man does not call a ‘spade’ a ‘spade’ but gives its description, can he be called ignorant of it? It is only a difference of language. We have seen that S’ānkara calls Kapila’s work *tantra*, Sāyaṇa calls it S’ānkhyā and Kārīka’ calls it *eṣṭi-tantra*. This change of nomenclature will not affect the thing itself,
The idea is in the brain and the description of the object exactly corresponds with the Pravachana Sūtra.

Let us see what Abul Fazl the learned writer of the Ayesn-i-Akber says about Sāṇkhya. According to Gladwin he says in the beginning "The first teacher of this science was Keepel (Kapila) the philosopher." Then follows a meagre description of the doctrine of the Sāṇkhya philosophy without any reference to either the Sūtra or Kārikā. At the end he says "The doctrices of this sect are contained in sixty books which they call Tunter (Tantra)." The learned prime minister probably means the sāṣṭi tantra of the Kārikā.

Vāchaspati Mis'ra has no doubt made the matter a little difficult by the use of the unhappy and ambiguous language. If the Kārikā alone were there, it leaves no doubt that the sāṣṭi tantra referred to in stanza 72 is no other than the sūtras which go under the name of Pravachana sūtra. We have a quotation in the commentary of Vyāsa on Patanjali IV-13 to the following effect:—

"गुणानांपरं रूपं न्यासिमप्यन्वयति"

"The minutest form of the guṇas does not come within the range of sight".

Vāchaspati Mis'ra on commenting on the passage says "यज्ञविविधयाः कार्योविविधाः। "Here is the instruction of the sāṣṭi tantra sāstra." The quotation in Vyāsa's commentary reads like a metrical verse and does not find in Kapila Sūtra. The language is not archaic and does not appear to be from any other anterior work; be that as it may, the learned commentator of Vyāsa thinks it from the sāṣṭi tantra sāstra. The idea of this may be compared to Sāṇkya sūtra V. 26.

Further, Vāchaspati Mis'ra in commenting on sūtra 8 of chap II. Pada 1 of the Vedāntasūtra says,

अतिक्र वेदांशास्त्रं तथुत्यविविधतानां मयावान्त, नार्थनागणं गुणानांपरं रूपं न इष्टिव्रतसुचिति। यदुद्विषपथं प्रास्तं तत्मायेयेव छुङ्खकरं"

Therefore his holiness, Vārsaganyā, the expounder of the Yoga Sāstra said. The minutest form of the guṇas does not come within the range of the eye; that which comes within the range of sight is mere illusion and tricking". On the authority of Balārāma and others, Keith is of opinion that the author of the sāṣṭi tantra is Vārsaganyā. With great respect to Keith, I am of opinion that Vāchaspati Misra forgot what he wrote in the commentary on the Yoga and made a confusion.
Again we have in Māthara vṛtti on the commentary on stanza 17, "वत्रास्ततः वर्तितम् मयां मयां" "Also it is said in the गाृःतितान्त्रा "the matter acts under the influence of the ego." We again find the same quotation in Gouda's commentary on the same stanza; "तत्त्वाधिकारं वर्तितम् "दुष्कर्षिणयः मयां मयां". Similarly it is said in the गाृःतितान्त्रा, "the matter acts under the influence of the ego." The passage quoted is like a sutra and is probably an amplification of 1-142 of the Sāṅkhya sūtras. Though the language quoted may differ from that of the present sūtras, yet the learned commentators certainly meant Kapila's sūtras which were then known as साति तान्त्रा by reason of their laying down sixty topics mentioned in the preceding pages.

Let us now proceed to examine the language and the idea of the कृत्रिका and the sūtras which clearly show that the sūtras have been put into the Āryā metre verbatim or their sentiments expressed in a different language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kārikā.</th>
<th>Sūtra.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. अतुरूतस्मादीशङ्कश्रवङ्गश्रीयां तान्त्रिका नवस्वामितानात्। ॥ ॥</td>
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<td>2. सोश्यासुतस्यतुपलिताः साबालकार्य तात्तुलिताः। ॥ ॥</td>
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<td>3. अयम् करणं हुपदानं महानं सब संस्कर्मार्यं। ॥ ॥</td>
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<td>सत्त्वस्य शाक्त्यकार्याय भवान्य सत्त्वयाय। ॥ ॥</td>
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<td>4. हेतु मद्यन्त्व मयापी सरिद्यमनेन मार्गित लिङ्गम। ॥ ॥</td>
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<td>5. निरुत्साय विवेकं विप्रयय: सामान्य मन्तेन्तं प्रवचनं। ॥ ॥</td>
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<td>6. प्रत्येक प्रति विद्यात्मकाः...</td>
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अन्येऽपि जनसहायत्वम् मिथुन वृत्तया गुणः। ॥ ॥
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Sūtra.</th>
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<td>7. सत्यं लघु प्रकाशकं.............. १३।</td>
<td>लघ्वादिघं: साधारं वैचार्यं चमुन्न नाम। १। १२६</td>
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<td>कार्यांत् कारणात् मांनात्तासहि ल्वत्। १। १३५</td>
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<td>9. भेदानां परिमाणात्मक्षमात्व च कितं प्रबुद्धेश्च १३।</td>
<td>१. परिमाणात् । १। १३६</td>
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<td>१. साक्षात्स्ववधात्तास्वक्तिः । । १। १३१</td>
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</tbody>
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<td>*33. शान्तेनचापवेगों विपर्ययायदिय्ये वंचं</td>
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<td>*34. पंचविपर्ययमेत्र अमत्यशक्तित्व करणवैकल्यात्। अध्यायविशिष्टि जीतं तिरितव्यवहाराच्छाद्या सिद्धि:</td>
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<td>36. एकादशनिधिन्द्रवचा: सहु बुद्धि वेष्ठन्नशक्ति हाइत्या। सतदश बधा सुदेशविधिघुर्ण्यि सिद्धिं</td>
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<td>39. आध्यायविशिष्ट्याध्यात्मकं .......</td>
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<td>40. उःशब्दश्रवणं दुःखविधाता... सहु बुद्धात्मकं। दासिक च सिद्धि योगस्थित्...</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Vijñāna Bhikṣu,
[Netraśrībhāvanakīna] || 3. 45
[वैशादिप्रभेदः] || 3. 46
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Karikā</th>
<th>Sūtra</th>
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The passages of the Kārikā marked by me with asterisks are verbatim reproductions from the Pravachana sūtra; the other stanzas without the asterisks embody the idea of the sūtras. Reading the parallelisms in language and thought in conjunction with the concluding stanza of the Kārikā, one cannot come to any conclusion other than that the Kārikā is an epitome of the Ist three chapters of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras. The remaining three chapters of the Sāṅkhya Sūtras are expressly excluded.

Further, the Sāṅkhya sūtras are in the archaic Sūtra style, but the Kārikā has been written in the Aryā Jāti metre which belongs to the post-Vedic period. All these facts conclusively show that the present Pravachana sūtras are genuine but not spurious.

The next question for determination is, at what age of the philosophical period these sūtras of Kapila were written. I have already said in the preceding pages that the whole philosophical literature of the orthodox school was in its fully developed state before Buddhism and Jainism flourished in India. It took several centuries in its development, one borrowing or criticising the thoughts of another. In spite of this, there was a sequence, one following the other; in my view, the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy was founded after the systems of Vaisēśika and Nyāya as described in the preceding pages. Kapila has referred to those systems in an express language, but has not left any thing on that point for our imagination.

नक्यं पदं पदार्थं वाचिनं वैशेषिकार्यितव्यं || २ २॥

We are not supporters of the six categories like the system of philosophy of Vaisēśika" etc.

नयं पदयं नियमस्तं द्वारात्मकं: || ५ ५॥

"Nor is the salvation from the rule of the six categories and knowledge thereof."

वीशालदिशे व्येचम् ५ ५॥

"Nor is it from the sixteen principles."

This alludes to the Nyāya system of philosophy of Goutama. It appears that the Pravachana sūtra borrowed the definition of S'abda from Nyāya; cf. Sāmkhya 1-101 with Nyāya 1-1-7.

When the author of the Sāmkhya sūtras tauntingly speaks of the six categories of the Vaisēśika school of philosophy, he certainly refers to the old school of Kaṇāda, who was either anterior to him, or his contemporary, but not to the neo-Vaisēśika school which flourished in the post-Buddhistic period and in which there were added seven categories. (See Anna Bhatta's
Tarka Samgraha). Had the sūtras been written in the sixteenth century A.C., the author would have called the Vais'ēṣika system as the system of seven categories (सम्बन्धार्थ वाचिन्त).

Tarka samgraha and Bhāṣāparichcheda are the treatises of the Neo-Vais'ēṣika school; in them we have seven categories instead of the six categories of Kaṇāda. Abhāva, non-unity or non-existence, has been treated as the 7th category in addition to the already mentioned six categories of Kaṇāda.

In śūtra 28 of chapter I of the Pravachana sūtras, we find the names of two countries, namely, Pāṭali putra and Srughna. The former is the name of ‘polikothra’ of the Greeks now known as Patna. Srughna is mentioned by Hiuen Tsang as 400 li from Thaneswar. According to the Gazeteer of Dehra Dun, it includes Dehra Dun, Saharanpur and Ambala. These names were known in the śūtra period of the Sanscrit Literature and subsequent to it. Had the sūtras been written in the 16th century of the Christian era, these places would have been called after their new nomenclature. I am strongly of opinion that the Pravachana sūtras were written before the pre-Buddhistic period.

They were written before Patañjali, the founder of the yoga system of philosophy. We have yoga in its rudimentary form in the Pravachana sūtras, and there are sūtras, which are verbatim reproductions from the Sāmkhya in the Yoga sūtras, as appears from the comparative table given below:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sāmkhya.</th>
<th>Yoga.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. तत्त्व: पंचतत्त्व: क्रिष्टाक्रिष्टा: II</td>
<td>तत्त्व: पंचतत्त्व: क्रिष्टाक्रिष्टा: II 143.</td>
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<td>2. लिङ्कुशमास्मातम</td>
<td>2. 128.</td>
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<td>3. बौद्धस्त्रत्स्मासासम्ब</td>
<td>3. 36.</td>
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<tr>
<td>अर्थांय महावान मशा दुतिङ्ग मया च</td>
<td>बौद्धस्त्रत्स्मासासम्ब गिता, VI 35.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now the question is whether the Sāmkhya borrowed the sūtras from the Yoga or the latter borrowed them from the former. As said in the preceding pages, the Sāmkhya and Yoga constitute one group, one being the supplementary of the other. The Sāmkhya is the theoretical and the Yoga is the practical side of the same philosophy.

The sceptical school of Sāmkhya as appears from chapter I. sūtra 92, V. 2-12, doubts the existence of Is'wara; but the yoga sūtras have taken
a special care to describe Is'wara in I-24-28. The Yoga is, therefore, an improvement on the Sāmkhya; the 25 elements of Sāmkhya become 26 in Yoga.

"Is'wara is a kind of Purusha untonched by troubles, action, fruit and desires." The word puruṣā is a peculiar phraseology of Sāmkhya. It leaves no doubt that it is to meet the argument of Pravachana śūtras that Is'wara is described and defined in the śūtra. When Yoga explains Samādhi, it says in chapter 1.23 how to obtain it; it is by means of devotion to Is'wara. This view of Patanjali as to the devotion to God was subsequently developed by the Bhakti school founded in the names of Nārada and Sāndilya. We do not find the idea of devotion to God in the Sāmkhya Śūtras. It is in order to reconcile the Sāmkhya and Yoga schools, that the Bhagawadgītā says,

"I spoke of two kinds of practices formerly in this world, O sinless; that of the Sāmkhya by knowledge (jñāna Yoga) and that of Yoga by action (karma yoga).

The ignorant but not the learned men speak differently of the Sāmkhya and Yoga; one who practises one thoroughly obtains the fruit of both. Whatever position one secures by the Sāmkhya, is also obtained by the Yoga. One who sees the harmony in Sāmkhya and Yoga sees (in reality)." Some are of opinion that the terms 'Sāmkhya' and 'Yoga' are used in a different sense and do not allude to the two systems of philosophy. Be that as it may, it is admitted on all hands that these two systems of philosophy are supplements of each other and are clasped under one group. The Yoga is an improvement on the Sāmkhya and later in date. In support of the view that the Yoga system is subsequent to the Sāmkhya, we refer to the commentary of Vyāsa where the following words occur at the end of each chapter:—

"इति श्री पात्रजने सांख्यप्रवचने योगशाखे ।
The above quotation leaves no doubt that the Yoga is a branch of Śāṅkhyā Pravachana. Let us see how Madhavāchārya calls the Śāṅkhyā system in his Sarvadars'ana. In the concluding part of the summary of the doctrines of the Śāṅkhyā school at P. 124 of Sarvadars'ana samgraha, Anandās'rama edition, it is said:—

"पद्यः निर्मितः वस्त्रां कल्पितानुसारिणों मत्सुपप्पल्लभम्" ।

With this object, the view of Kapila, the founder of the atheistic school of Śāṅkhyā has been set forth." This last sentence of Sarvadars'ana samgraha clearly refers to the following śāṅkhyā sutras though not cited by him:—

ईश्वरा सिद्ध: । १। ६२।

"On account of the non-proof of Iś'wara."

The author of the Śāṅkhyā school says that the definition of perception as embodied in sutra 89, does not apply to the existence of Iś'wara. The buddhi as animated by the reflection of the purusa, cannot come into contact with him. No harm is done thereby, nor is the definition faulty, because Iś'wara is not an object of perception.

नेश्वराविशिष्टेकल्पितचः कर्मणा तत्सिद्ध: । २। ३।

"Under the superintendence of Iśwara, no fruit can be obtained, as that is achieved by action." The objector is supposed to allege—"You say that the existence of the Lord cannot be proved by means of perception as laid down in Sūtra 92 of chapter I; but the awarding of the fruit of one's action is due to the superintendence of the Lord." To this objection of the objector, the reply of the author is embodied in the present sūtra. He says that the rewards depend on one's own action.

सौपकाराविधिपन्न लोकवत् । ४। ३।

"The superintendence is for one's own benefit just as in ordinary life." The author further develops his argument thus: "We see in ordinary life that superintendence is for one's own benefit; if you hold that the Lord is supervising the awards of fruits, you will have to admit his superintendence for his self-interest; but the Lord is not selfish."

लोकःश्वरविष्टिरथा || ५। ८।

"Otherwise he would be like the lord of the people."

The author proceeds further and says—"If you hold Him to be selfish as said in the preceding sūtra, there will be no difference between Him and a worldly king immersed in miseries with limited knowledge."
'Or He may be in name'

The author's argument is, that if you say that it is a mere creative force which manifests itself in the beginning of the creation, it is not eternal, but will be only for the purpose of a definition.

नरागाह्ने तत्त्वस्थित: महतिनियत्कारणस्वादः पौराणिकमणिकमणि

"Without attachment it cannot happen, because of the fixed cause of each."

The author argues, that every effect has invariably a cause, so the Lord's superintendence cannot be without a motive.

प्रयोजनमनुदिश्य न मंदिरिप्रवत्तेः।
जगत्सुतस्तत्वेष्य किनामनहूँ मनवेन्॥

"Even a fool does not act without an object; is it that the Creator of the universe acts without it?"

तत्त्वात्मकर्तवेन्नित्यस्थः॥५॥७॥

"In conjunction with it also, He is not always free."

The author says in the present sūtra, that if you hold that the Lord is actuated by a motive, He cannot be free (nityamukta); you thereby commit a fallacy of shifting of ground (siddhânta hâni). There are two alternatives left; either the Lord acts in conjunction with nature or by His proximity to matter. His action is like that of magnet and iron, and activity is produced. He proceeds to refute both the views in the following two sūtras:

प्रहाणशिक्षितायाम्बनु संग्रामपतिः॥५॥

"If (you say that) by reason of the conjunction with the power of the matter, then there will arise the defect of association."

The author says that if you hold the first view, viz., that the Lord manifests himself in conjunction with nature, you attribute to Him the association of things which is contrary to the Vedic text "जात्मगो हर्ष पुर्वः" (Puruṣa is attached or associated with none) See chapter 1. 15.

सत्यामार्थायामेवश्वंवरम्॥६॥

"If (you say that) it is mere existence, then all worldliness."

If you hold the last view, viz., that by virtue of the proximity to nature, the intelligence is produced like the magnetic power attracting a piece of iron, in that case all persons will be Lords and your position that there is one God will not be tenable.

प्रमाणमार्थासिद्धं॥६॥

"For want of the means of proof His existence cannot be proved."
The author says that the existence of God cannot be proved by any of the means of proof accepted by him in chapter I. He has already spoken in chapter I. 92 of the perception by which you cannot prove the existence of God.

संवंधामाधानाज्ञानानम् II 111

"There is no inference for want of relationship."

The author says, that as there is no relationship of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the container (vyāpaka) and the contained (vyāpya); there can be no inference. In order to have the applicability of anumāna under the Nyāya system, there must be a concomitance (vyāpti); but as there is no perception of God giving rise to experience, there can be no relation of concomitance. It will be clear from the following example.

The mountain is fiery.

∴ It smokes.

This knowledge of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire is based on the past experience, because we perceive that smoke cannot exist without fire. As no one has seen God, one cannot predicate such in variable concomitance in the case of God. So the second means of proof does not apply in proving the existence of God.

एतर्षिर्रिप प्रत्यात्मार्थ्यत् III 121

"The Scripture also refers to the effect of nature."

The author now proceeds to show that the S'rutis texts, while referring to the primordial cause, mean nature or matter. On this sūtra, Aniruddha quotes "प्रवानात्रदेवपु यथात्" 'the universe proceeds from matter', but Vijñāna Bhikṣu has quoted the fifth verse from chap. IV of the S'vetas'vatara upanisad.

अन्तोधिकरितशुद्धिर्युच्छ: प्रवान सुव्रमान्यां सुकृत:।
अन्तोधिते कार्यप्रायोगिते शैवेत जहास्योत्सुकेनामात्माय:॥

"One unborn (Puruṣa) being served, enjoys another unborn (prakṛti) of red, white and black colours, creating many uniform created things. Another unborn relinquishes it after enjoyment." Compare it with III. 69 and III. 70 of the Sāmkhya and 59 and 61 stanzas of the kārikā. Vijñāna Bhikṣu has tried to reconcile the passage with the doctrines of the Veda; while Sankarachārya has commented on it differently.

The author of the Sāmkhya says, that you cannot prove the existence of God by means of the pramānas (means of knowledge) which are only
three according to him, (perception, inference and verbal testimony). The position is very clear; Madhavacharya had clearly these sutras in his mind when he called the Samkhya system as the atheistic school of philosophy. You may in vain search in the Kārikā for the expression of such views.

Let us see what Madhavacharya says at the outset of the description of the Yoga of Patanjali.

"सांतं शेषशर्तीं व्यवत्तापरं विभृति मुनिसत मनुस्मरणानांभांतः
सुमुखशयनेतः तब्यायानांविनिर्देशाय वेदान्तां पत्रिद्विप्रणोऽपि वाच
वन्दुष्यात्मकम्"।

"Now the view of the followers of the system of Patanjali &c., the founder of the theistic school of Sāmkhya is herein set forth. There is the Yoga sūstra composed by Patanjali, also named Sāmkhya Pravachana, and possessed of four chapters." This quotation supports me in my view that the Yoga system of philosophy was founded subsequently to the Sāmkhya system in order to check the agnostic tendencies produced by it.

See also the introduction to the Pravachana sūtras by Vijñana Bhikṣu in his learned commentary:—

नन्दवत्त्वसमाणायस्याये: सहायस्य: पदयायस्य: पीततय मिति चेस्ये
चन्द्रुः संस्कृतं श्रृंगावेः पेरोम्योरापेय॥

"If it be said that the book with six chapters is a mere repetition of the Tattwa Samāsa, it is not so. One is brief and the other is in detail; in that sense, it is a repetition. The six chapters of the work with Yoga are called Sāmkhya Pravachana. In the Tattwa saṃāsa, there is a brief summary of the Sāmkhya system of philosophy that has been well discussed herein. Further, in the six chapters the subjects, of the Tattwa saṃāsa have been given in details. In the Yoga system of philosophy by describing Is'wara denied by implication in these (two works), the deficiency is made up.

It is now satisfactorily proved that the Yoga system of philosophy is supplementary to the Sāmkhya system from the evidence of the eminent authorities like Mādhavachārya and Vijñāna Bhikṣu."
There is a sūtra in chapter IV. 3 in the Pravachana sūtra which is reproduced word for word in the Vedānta sūtra chapter IV, Pada IV sūtra 1. Is there any explanation for the parallelism? In view of the facts as stated above there is not the least doubt that the Vedānta sūtra is a repetition of the Sāmkhya Sūtra.

The Mahābhārata is a voluminous work. According to the European and Indian scholars, its compilation lasted for several centuries extending to the 8th century of the Christian Era when it assumed its present form. At several places, it has given the Sāmkhya view of three Gunas and 25 elements. It has attempted to reconcile both the Sāmkhya and Yoga systems of philosophy. The view of the Mahābhārata is that the Yoga system of philosophy treats of the 26th element, viz., Is'wara. We also find therein that Kapila was the founder of the Sāmkhya system of philosophy, that his pupil was Āsuri, and that Āsuri’s pupil was Pañahas’īthā. The philosophical Sāmkhya is converted into a religious system. We also find that the Purānic literature is very much influenced by the teachings of the Sāmkhya. The same thing is in the Tantras, which are rightly or wrongly believed to be the results of the Sāmkhya teachings.

Chānapaṇya who lived in the time of Chandra Gupta wrote Artha Sāstra which is called Kautiliyam Artha Sāstram. He recommends the study of Anvikṣaki ; the definition of Anvikṣaki is given at p. 16 of the Mysore edition of the book.

शास्त्र में रोम्यायत चेत्यान्विद्याः ||

Anvikṣaki means or includes Sāmkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata schools of philosophy. The passage quoted shows that the Sāmkhya system of philosophy was studied at the time of Chandra Gupta. If Lalitavistara is to be relied on, the Sāmkhya, Yoga and Vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy were included in the curriculum of the Budha’s study (see chapter XII. at p. 179 Bibliotheca edition 1877). From all these authorities, it is clear that the Sāmkhya sūtras are very old and belong to the pre-Buddhistic period in the Indian history.

We now come to the modern time; Madhusudana Saraswati has written Prasthānabheda. In it he has given an account of the most important works of Sanscrit literature. At p. 9 of the Anandārama edition of the series, No. 51, he says:—

तथा साम्यशाखा भगवता कपिदेन दशीतम्। अवधिविध हुसास्यंतनिक- ववरस्यंपरस्य प्रद्यायम्। तत्र प्रथमेद्यथे विपया निरुपिता:।
Similarly the Sāmkhya Sāstra was composed by the venerable Kapila. The *sūnum bōsum* or the highest effort consists in the removal of three kinds of miseries*, (I. 1) and the rest are in six chapters. In the first chapter, the subjects have been described; in the second chapter, the effect of nature; in the third chapter, the disaffection from the worldly objects; in the 4th chapter there is a parable of the disaffected, such as Pingalā (IV. 11) and falcon (IV. 5). In the fifth chapter, there is a criticism on the adversary's position; in the sixth there is a summary of the whole subject. The end of the Sāmkhya philosophy is the correct knowledge of the object (prakṛti) and subject (puruṣa)." See Max Muller also at pp. 80 and 81 of the Six Systems of Indian philosophy.

This leaves no doubt that the Pravachana sutras existed at the time of Madhu sūdana Saraswati, who is also a commentator on the Bhagavadgītā. I have not been able to ascertain his exact date. He certainly lived after Śāṅkarāchārya, as he expressly refers to him at page 7 of the Pra thānabheda while treating of the Vedānta system of philosophy. He like Rāmānuja divided the Bhagavadgīta into three śātkas viz., Karma, Bhakti and Jñāna.

I am not unmindful of the reference made to Panchas'ikhā in the Pravachana sutras (VI. 68). Panchas'ikhā was the disciple of Āsuri, the disciple of Kapila. He might have been a contemporary of Kapila. He certainly lived at the time when the Sāmkhya system fully developed by Kapila, was studied; and the sutra VI. 68 might have been subsequently added at the time when Panchas'ikha's view was accepted. He belonged to the Sāmkhya school of philosophy; the fact that the names of the prominent followers are mentioned in the Pravachana sutra does not detract from its antiquity. It very often occurs in both the Mīmāṃsā schools of philosophy. For these reasons, I am strongly in favour of the antiquity of the Pravachana Sutras, and with due deference to the learning of Fitz Edward Hall, Max Muller and Bālas'astrin, I would dissent from their views.

In the first chapter of the Pravachana sutras, the author has criticised certain views which subsequently became the special tenets of Māyāvāda of Sankarāchārya, Kṣanikavāda of Kalyāṇarakṣita, Vijñānavāda of Asanga and Vasubandha, and S'uniyavāda of Nāgārjuna. All the atheistic
schools enumerated above, are not mentioned by names; but the criticisms expressed in the sūtras according to the scholiasts, relate to the tenets of the above-said different heterodox schools. The tenets of the atheistic school of philosophy were subsequently embodied in the books. It appears that there were critics who raised the objections to the view expressed by the author, and he meets them in his sūtras. This kind of practice we find in all systems of philosophy, as said repeatedly. Brihaspati and Chārvāka who were the forerunners of Sākyamuni and Rishabha, perhaps existed at the time when the philosophical system came to be written or learnt in the sūtra form. By criticising the atheistic view which was not the special property of any school at that time, one cannot necessarily come to the conclusion that the Pravachana sūtras have been written after Buddhism or Vedantism came into existence.

It may be that the author was discussing the possible or imaginary objections which subsequently became fossilised in the doctrines of the heterodox schools of philosophy named after their founders. The discussion of these imaginary objections can not, therefore, help us under the circumstances of the case in determining the date of the Pravachana sūtras; and any attempt to fix the date on such discussion is, in my opinion, highly misleading.

The Pravachana sūtras are certainly older than Buddhism and Jainism, but later than the Vaisēṣika sūtras of Kapāda. The Tattva samāsa was subsequently composed and it is a mere summary or enumeration of different categories. It was written with a view to help a student of the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy in committing the different heads enumerated in the Pravachana sūtras to memory. The Sāṃkhya Kārikā was written after the Tattva Samāsa, for it follows the latter in the enumeration of the twenty-five elements mentioned in Sutra I. 61.

Sāṃkhya Kārikā seems to have been written at the time when Buddhism was flourishing in India. The stanza no 2 refers to the Vedic rites which, as it describes, are “impure and full of slaughter;” but nowhere do we find such a strong language against the Vedic ceremonies in the Pravachana sūtras excepting the sūtra 6 of chapter I which has been interpreted by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in consonance with the view of Iswara Krīṣṇa. According to him the Vedic rites also fall short of removing the three-fold pain and obtaining redemption. The author of the Pravachana sūtras had a regard for the Vedas which he considered to be of divine origin (apaurāṇeya).
The substance of what has been stated above is, that nowhere in the existing Śāmkhya literature we find the sceptical view expounded; except in the Śāmkhya Pravachana sūtras, the antiquity of which is clearly proved from the concluding stanza of the Śāmkhya Kārikā. The sūtras, therefore, represent the ancient view of the atheistic school of philosophy. Owing to this, they became so much unpopular, that their study was neglected in favour of the Kārikā. They are even now nowhere studied in the universities, and have become a matter of ancient history; as to their antiquity and authenticity, there can be no doubt from what we have seen above.

As to the teachings of the philosophy of Śāmkhya, we have already seen that Kapila believes in the existence of ego and non-ego. The ego of Śāmkhya is the purusā, an intelligent substance, not affected by the guṇas of the non-ego, and tries to shake off the bondage of ignorance in order to achieve redemption which consists in the total eradication of three sorts of the miseries natural to human flesh. The non-ego is the prakṛiti or pradhāna, (nature or matter). It is inanimate and inactive, but appears active and intelligent in contact with the puruṣa. According to Kapila, the prakṛiti is the equilibrium of three guṇas called Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas. They are not like qualities of the Vais’ēśika school of philosophy, but real entities not visible or coming within the range of sight. “The Satva is characterised with smoothness, conformability, lightness and illumination. Rajas is characterised with fierceness, opposition, production and instability. Tamas is characterised with pervasion, heaviness, stability and ignorance. Happiness preponderates in Satva, misery in Rajas and ignorance in Tamas.” See Siddhānta Dars’anam Vol. XXIX of the series at P. 9. When the equilibrium of these guṇas is disturbed, mahat alias buddhi is produced from the prakṛiti as shown in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prakṛiti (equipoise of satva, rajas and tamas)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mahat alias Buddhi (Intelect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahamkāra. (I-maker)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensory and motor organs and manas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 subtle elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 gross elements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table, we see that the prakṛiti is the root cause (mūla-prakṛiti) but not an effect of any other cause; but on the other hand, mahat, ahāmkāra and the five subtle elements are both causes and effects, and are called by the author of the Kārikā the seven prakṛiti-vikṛitis as
being both producers and products. The eleven sense organs and the five gross elements are mere products and called Viśrūti or modifications. They produce nothing in their turn. This view of the Sāmkhya philosophy is philosophically known as parināmavāda or the doctrine of evolution. The ego or puruṣa is neither preārūti nor viśrūti; he is unaffected, and all the activities of nature are for his sake. He neither acts nor enjoys and is, therefore, called asanga or unaffected, just as a transparent crystal appears red in contact with a red china lily, so does puruṣa appear to be affected in conjunction with the prakṛiti. When the puruṣa comes to realise that he is pure, intelligent, inactive and unaffected, by constant practice of meditation on his real self, the prakṛiti, ashamed of being recognised by him like a wedded woman of a good family, disappears from his sight and releases him from her shackles.

The philosophy of Sāmkhya is European Realism and has found favour with the Europeans. The study of sāmkhya which fell in disfavour amongst the Indians, has been popularised by the Europeans. It is a common-sense view of philosophy, and is distinguishable from Idealism and Transcendentalism of the Vedanta School of philosophy.

There are according to Kapila many 'egos'; they are as many as there are individuals, because they are governed separately by birth and death.

According to Sāmkhya there are only two eternal entities; one puruṣa and the other prakṛiti. The latter lasts as long as there is ignorance (Avidya). Upon these two entities, the fabric of the whole cosmos containing both the animate and the inanimate is based. There is no other creator. We have seen in the preceding pages, while discussing the atheistic view of Kapila, that he does not believe in I'swara.

We now come to the important doctrine of perception according to Sāmkhya. The puruṣa as said above is asanga (entirely unaffected); the buddhi or intellect becomes animated by the reflection of the puruṣa, goes to the objects through the channel of senses, meets them and gets converted into objects. Thus results perception or consciousness. He gives an illustration of a transparent crystal; it is pure and white: but when a red flower is placed in its proximity, it appears red. Similarly the puruṣa appears to be affected in contact with the prakṛiti but in reality he is unaffected. This doctrine of Sāmkhya is called ābhāsa. When the red flower is removed, the transparent crystal regains its pure white colour; similarly the puruṣa on the disappearance of the prakṛiti remains pure and unaffected as he is in reality. Vijnāna Bhikṣu has explained the doctrine of Ābhāsa thoroughly in his commentary on sūtra 87 of chapter 1.
If examined minutely the view of Śāmkhya does not conflict with that of the Vedānta philosophy. As it is not the occasion to discuss the points at present, I leave it to be dealt with at its proper time.

Keith in "Śāmkhya system" in the "Heritage of India" series while comparing the teachings of Śāmkhya with those of the Greek philosophers, says "ἀνεξαρτήτων Anaximander had been compared with the nature of the Śāmkhya and the doctrines of the constant flow of things and of the innumerable destructions and renewals of the world found in Heraclitus are no doubt similar to tenets of the Indian system. Empedocles like the Śāmkhya asserts the doctrine of the pre-existence of the product in the cause. Anaxagoras is a dualist, Democritus agrees with Empedocles in his doctrine of causality and believes in the purely temporary existence and mortality of the gods. Epicurus uses in support of his atheism the argument of the Śāmkhya, that otherwise the divine nature must be accorded attributes which are inconsistent with its supposed character and often emphasizes the doctrine of infinite possibilities of production."

"Garbe adds to these parallels which he admits not to be conclusive evidence of borrowing, the fact that Persia was a perfectly possible place in which Greek thinkers, of whom travels are often recorded, should acquire knowledge of the Indian views, and supports his opinion that borrowing is probable by the case of Pythagoras, who is supposed to have borrowed from India his theory of transmigration, his conception of a religious community, his distinction of a fine and gross body of the soul, his distinction of a sensitive organ, θυμός and of the unperishable soul, φρύς, his doctrine of an intermediate world between earth and sky filled by demons, the doctrine of five elements including ether, the Pythagorean problem, the irrational and other things."

"It is further not necessary seriously to consider the possibilities of borrowing on the part of Plato or of Aristotle, though the influence of the Śāmkhya has been seen in the case of both. More plausible is the effort to find proof of Śāmkhya doctrines in Gnosticism, an attempt to which there is not a priori any reason to take exception."

"Plotinus held that his object was to free men from misery through his philosophy, that spirit and matter are essentially different, that spirit is really unaffected by misery which is truly the lot of matter; he compares the soul to light and even to a mirror in which objects are reflected; he admits that in sleep as the soul remains awake, man can enjoy happiness; he insists on the realisation of God in a condition of ecstasy brought about by.
profound mental concentration. Porphyry teaches the leadership of spirit over matter, the omnipresence of the soul when freed from matter, and the doctrine that the world has no beginning. He also forbids the slaying of animals and rejects sacrifice. Abammon, a later contemporary mentions the wonderful powers obtained by the exercise of contemplative ecstasy. But there is nothing here that can possibly be considered as necessarily derived from India. The opposition of matter and spirit, the removal of spirit from the world of reality, and the view that the only power to approach to it is through ecstasy are the outcome of the Greek endeavour to grasp the problem brought into prominence by Plato of the contrast of spirit and matter, and the views of Plotinus are the logical and indeed inevitable outcome of that development. The protest against sacrifice is as old as Greek philosophy, the winning of supernatural powers by ecstasy is a popular conception which appears in Pythagoras and beyond all others in the Babeic religion. On the other hand, the real extent of knowledge of Indian philosophy available to Plotinus and Porphyry alike seems to have been most severely limited.” (PP. 65. 67)

The whole chapter VI. is worth reading. I have quoted the passages to show the parallelism between the Greek and Indian philosophies. The view of the learned author is that as there is no direct channel through which the ideas from India passed to Greece, he is, therefore, in doubt as to the Greeks borrowing their philosophy from the Indians. What about Pythagoras who admittedly borrowed the doctrine of metampsychosis from India and Egypt?

Kapila does not believe in the doctrine of śrāvaka as explained in the preceding pages (V. 57), nor does he believe in the eternality of sound (V. 58. 60). Though he does not believe in the eternality of the Vedas (V. 45) following as a corollary from the non-eternality of sound, yet he believes in their infallibility. (V. 46). Kapila thinks his teachings to be in consonance with those of the Vedas. Let us now examine the source of the philosophical teachings, viz, the Úpaniṣats. There is a well known passage in Swetāśwataropanisad chap. V. 2 referred to at P. 48 about Kapila. The question is whether it refers to the author of Sāmkhya or not. S’ankarāchārya while commenting on it in the Śvetāswatara upaniṣat takes it in the derivative sense meaning ‘golden coloured ‘Hiranyakartha’. Sankarananda, another commentator, thinks Kapila to be an incarnation of Vishnu and destroyer of Sāgara’s sons, but not the founder of Sāmkhya school. Narāyaṇa and Vijnāna Bhagawata, the commentators, have taken the word
Kapila as a common noun used in a derivative sense. Reading the context, it does not seem that Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya is meant, for he is not the first man like Manu or Adam. Sankarāchārya in commenting on chapter II. 1·1 of the Vedānta sūtras puts into the mouth of the objector supporting the authority of Sāṃkhya on the verse by virtue of the system founded by Kapila mentioned in Śvetāśveta. In conformity with the views of the learned commentators coupled with common sense, we can say that Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya system, is nowhere mentioned in the canonical Upaniṣats.

The passage of the Śvetāśveta in chapter IV. 5, as explained at 68 clearly refers to the Sāṃkhya teaching. Sankarāchārya, though very hostile to the Sāṃkhya has taken the word ‘ajā’ to mean prakṛiti but explains ‘lohitā s’ukla kriśnām’ to mean fire, water and food. Then in the same chapter there is the 10th verse which is very often quoted.

मायांतु प्रकृति विद्यामायित्वमहेश्वरस्य
तत्तत्त्ववृत्तत्त्व वात्सर्व मनेर्जन्मतः

"Know illusio to be matter and the player of trick to be the Great Lord; the whole universe is pervaded by the parts of his body." See Siddhanta Darsana, P. 2. From these quotations, we see that we have the idea of prakṛiti in the Upaniṣats; we also find it three-coloured i. e., consisting of Satwa, Rajas and Tamas. Again we find in Brahadāraṇyaka in IV. 3. 16—

असंगीत्य गुढ़यः

"The Puruṣa is unaffected" The idea of Puruṣa which is embodied in sūtra I-15 is also borrowed from the Upaniṣats.

We find the guṇas in Maitriupaniṣad III. 2. (P. 24); the names in V. 2. (P. 42 of S. B. H. Vol. XXXI.) The five vital airs with their names are mentioned in II. 6 of the Upaniṣad P. 18 of Vol. XXXI. By reason of these teachings and references to the teachings which subsequently became the Buddhistic doctrines, some of the scholars are against the antiquity of the Maitriupaniṣad or Maitrāyaniupaniṣad.

My sympathies are with them, but the late Professor Max Muller for very cogent reasons holds it to belong to the ante-Paninean period. He says at pp. L and LI of vol. XV of the S. B. E. series. "We shall hardly be persuaded to change this opinion on account of supposed references to Vaiṣṇava or to Buddhist doctrines which some scholars have tried to discover in it.

"As to the worship of Viṣṇu, and as to the many manifestations of the Highest Spirit, we have seen it alluded to in other Upaniṣads
and we know from the Brāhmaṇas that the name of Viṣṇu was connected with many of the earliest Vedic sacrifices."

"As to Buddhist doctrines, including the very name of Nirvāṇa, we must remember that there were Buddhas before the Buddha. Brihaspati who is frequently quoted in their later philosophical writings as the author of an heretical philosophy, denying the authority of the Vedas is mentioned by name in our Upaniṣad (VII. 9), but we are told that this Brihaspati, having become Sukra promulgated his erroneous doctrines in order to mislead the Asuras and thus to ensure the safety of Indra i.e. of the old faith."

"The fact that the teacher of King Brihadratha in our Upaniṣad is called Sākāyanya, can never be used in support of the idea that, being a descendant of Sāka, he must have been, like Sākyamuni, a teacher of Buddhist doctrines. He is the very opposite in our Upaniṣad and warns his hearers against such doctrines as we should identify with the doctrines of Buddha. As I have pointed out on several occasions, the breaking through the law of the Āśramas is the chief complaint which orthodox Brāhmaṇas make against Buddhists and their predecessors and this is what Sākāyanya condemns. A Brāhmaṇ may become a Sannyāsin, which is much the same as a Buddhist Bhikṣu, if he has first passed through the three stages of a student, a house-holder, and a vānaprastha. But to become a Bhikṣu without that previous discipline, was heresy in the eyes of the Brāhmaṇs and it was exactly that heresy which the Buddhas preached and practised. That this social laxity was gaining ground at the time when our Upaniṣad was written is clear (See VII. 8.). We hear of people who wear red dresses (like the Buddhists) without having a right to them; we even hear of books, different from the Vedas against which the true Brāhmaṇs are warned. All this points to times when what we call Buddhism was in the air, say the sixth century B.C. the very time to which I have always assigned origin of the genuine and classical Upaniṣads."

"The Upaniṣads are to my mind the germ of Buddhism while Buddhism is in many respects the doctrine of the Upaniṣads carried out to its last consequences, and what is important, employed as the foundation of a new social system. In doctrine the highest goal of the Vedānta, the knowledge of the true self is no more than the Buddhist Samyakṣambodhi, in practice, the Sannyāsin is the Bhikṣu, the friar, only emancipated alike from the tedious discipline of the Brāhmaṇic student, the duties of the Brāhmaṇic house-holder and the yoke of
useless penances on the Brahmanic dweller in the forest. The spiritual freedom of the Sanyāsīn becomes in Buddhism the common property of the Sangha the fraternity, and that Fraternity is open alike to the young and the old, to the Brāhman and the Śūdra, to the rich and the poor, to the wise and the foolish. In fact, there is no break between the India of the Veda and the India of the Tripitaka, but there is an historical continuity between the two and the connecting link between extremes that seem widely separated must be sought in the Upaniṣads".

We have in the Brihadāranyakopanisad:"  

यथायासहिनर्वन्यनी शर्मके सुना प्रस्थला शायोतिरमेवेद शरीरं शेते। IV. 4.7  
"Just as the slough of a serpent lies on an anthill dead and abandoned, so does this body lie."

In the Pravachana sūtra we have

आहिनिर्द्र्यनीवन। IV. 6.  
"Like the slough of a serpent."

We have again in VI. 10 of the Maitriopanisat at p. 63 of vol. XXXI of S. B. H. all the twenty five elements mentioned in I. 61 of the Sāmkhya Pravachana sūtras. They are fully explained in my commentary thereon. I need not accumulate the texts as to the source of the Sāmkhya teachings in the canonical Upaniṣads. A curious reader will find many there.

The Apocryphal Upaniṣats contain many allusions to the Sāmkhya teachings and illustrations; as for example in the Tripāḍvibhuti Mahā nārāyanopanisat we have,

"यथायासहिनर्वन्यनी शर्मके सुना प्रस्थला शायोतिरमेवेद शरीरं शेते।\) (P. 479 of Bombay Theosophical Society's edition.)
"Just like a red crystal in contact with a china lily, appears red and again appears transparent crystal on its removal... ..."

Compare this idea with that expressed in sūtra 35 of chapter II and 26 of chapter VI. of the Pravachana sūtra.

In Nārada Parivrājakopaniṣat we have,

"कर्मणुसङ्गायन विनिर्दितानाथस्त्रायस्त्राया शयं पुनः कृपा द्वियो न येय धर्म प्रवृत्तिन सांक्षेप्यांत्यस्त्राया तमसांत्याध्यायार।\) (P. 418 of Bombay Theosophical society's edition)
"It is a useless labour to study other sāstras which do not enquire into one's self like a camel bearing a load of saffron; there is no reading of the Yogā Sāstra, no study of the Sāmkhya Sāstra, and no practice of
"I salute the lord of the serpent who is the remover of the defects of mind, speech and body by Yogasāstra, Mahābhāṣya and the Commentary on Charaka." By the 'lord of the serpent', is meant Pāṇini, another name of Patañjali.

Dr. Girindra Nath Mukhopadhyāya of Calcutta in the surgical instruments of the Hindus says at page 7 of volume I, "Patañjali wrote a commentary on Charaka. He flourished during the second century B.C. Both Chakrapani Dutta and Bhoja allude to him as the redactor of Charaka Sambita." At P. 10 he says that the commentary of Patañjali on Charaka is not available. Then again at P. 62 he refers to Śivadāsa's
commentary on Chakrapâni Dutta alluding to Patanjali. From all these authorities, it is clear that Patanjali wrote yoga as an original work and commentaries on Pâñini and Charaka. We know nothing further than this.*

His work on yoga called yoga Sāstra, yoga sutras or Pātanjalam, is divided into four chapters containing 194 sutras as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutras</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Bombay Sanscrit Series edition there are 54 sutras in the third pāda, but in the Anandâsrâma and other editions there are 55. In our edition of the Sacred Books of the Hindus, we have 54.

The first chapter of the yoga is called Samâdhi Pâda, the second chapter is Sâdhanâ Pâda; the third is Vibhûti pâda and the fourth and the last one is Kaivalya Pâda.

We have many commentaries on the Sūtras. The first and the foremost is that of Vyâsa.

Next is Vâchaspati Misra, the well-known commentator on the philosophical work; he wrote a commentary on Vyâsa. We have Bhoja Deva's vritti, Nârâyanâ Tirthâ's Sidhânta Chandrika and Vijñâna Bhikṣu's commentary called Yoga vârtika. Many original works have been written on Yoga, and a decent literature has grown round Patanjali's sutras. A religious system has been formed by many subsequently; the Sauta Mata of the present generation owes it origin to the mystic and crude forms of elementary practices of Hatha yoga.

There are some scholars who think that the Patanjali of the Mahâbhaṣya is a different person from the Pātanjali of the Yoga sāstra. I differ from them. Though the yoga is written in the sūtra style and the commentary in prose, yet the philosophical discussion on the eternity of sound, the connotation and denotation of a word in the introduction to his commentary on Pâñini shows that the writer of the commentary cannot be

*From the introductory verses of Bhoja Deva's vritti, we know that the commentary on Charaka was called Râja Mrigânika vritti. See Anandâsrâma edition P. 1 vol. 47.
other than a philosopher. I am of opinion that the tradition connecting our author with the Mahābāṣya is reliable and cannot be easily discarded. There is a great doubt as to the identity of Vyāsa, the scholiast; Bādarāyana the reputed author of the Vedānta sutras cannot be the commentator as he is referred to by Panini in

पाराशरेष्ठाशिल्पकल्यात्मिकिमिश्युनस्यरुपेः | २. ३. १२० |

"After Pārāśarya and Śīlāli in the work of an ascetic and juggler." The sūtra means that शिल्पि is added to पाराशर and शिल्पकल्यात्मिकिस्य in connection with the ascetic and a juggler's work respectively in the sense of 'said by him'; as for example पाराशरणास्यो भिषावरः; शिल्पकल्यात्माः; otherwise the forms will be पाराशर, शिल्पकल्यात्म.

It is considered by all that the reference is to the Sāririka Sūtras of the son of Parāśara. Bhattoji Dikṣita in the Siddhānta Kaumudi in his chapter on Taddālīta while commenting on the sūtra, gives an illustration "पाराशरणास्यो भिषावरः मिश्युनस्यरुपेः" He reads the Bhikṣu sūtra composed by the son of Parāśara".

Max Muller at P. 97 of his Six Systems of Indian philosophy says "As Pārāśarya is a name of Vyāsa, the son of Parāśara, it has been supposed that Pāṇini meant by Bhikṣu sūtras, the Brahma Sutras sometimes ascribed to Vyāsa which we still possess," He again says at P. 117 "we should remember next that Vyāsa is called Pārāśarya, the son of Parāśara and Satyavati (truthful) and that Pāṇini mentions one Pārāśarya, as the author of the Bhikṣu sutras, while Vāchaspatī Mīra declares that the Bhikṣu Sutras are the same as the Vedānta sūtras and that the followers of Pārāśarya were in consequence called Pārāśarins (Pan. IV. 3. 110)."

When Bādarāyana has criticised both Sāmkhya and Yoga in his Brahma Sūtras in chapter 11. 1. 3, it is highly improbable that he was a commentator of Patanjali's Yoga.

Patanjali commences his yogasūtras with—

अथ ये गायत्रियास्यस्यनम् |

"Now is the science of yoga."

Patañjali again commences his commentary on Panini with—

अथ शास्त्रार्थस्यस्यनम् |

"Now is the science of language."

From the similarity of language and thought one cannot but come to the conclusion that the author of Yoga sūtras and the commentary on
Pâñini is the same person, and Vyâsa the scholiast is different from Bâdarâyana the founder of the Vedânta School of philosophy.

Let us now proceed to understand what Yoga is. It is defined as the control of the state of the Chitta. Chitta according to Patanjali is the set of the internal organs (antaḥ kāraṇa) consisting of buddhi or cognitive or discriminating faculty, manas mind or attentive faculty and ahaṁkāra, I-maker or the faculty of self-consciousness. If the functions of these faculties which are objective, i.e. generally directed towards external world, are allowed unchecked to go on in their own way, the subject or ego becomes their victim; but if their function is directed internally i.e. to one's own self, the subject or the devotee becomes merged in his own self. This last stage is what is called Yoga; the word is derived from युज, to join; for in this state, there is the union in the self.

These vrittis are primarily pleasant and unpleasant; they both are five as shown below:

\[\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c}
\text{Vrittis} & \text{Pramâna} & \text{Viparyaya} & \text{Vikalpa} & \text{Nidrâ} & \text{Smṛiti} \\
\end{array}\]

Perception | Inference | Scripture

Pramânas, means of knowledge have already been explained while dealing with the Nyâya in the preceding pages (at 24 and 25). We may here mention that the Yoga like the sāmkhya accepts only three means of knowledge, viz.: perception, inference and the holy scripture.

Viparyaya is the ignorant state of the chitta under which one perceives just the reverse of what is there in reality. A man suffering from diplopia sees two moons in place of one; in the dark, one sees a serpent in a rope or a human figure in a pillar.

It is also called klesha and is therefore of five kinds. We shall deal with them at the proper place.

Vikalpa is chimerical knowledge conveyed by a word and its sense without any real corresponding existence of the object meant by it in the external world, as for instance chimera, centaur etc.

Nidrâ is the quiescent state or the absence of the dreaming and waking states. It is a state of repose.

Smṛiti is the association of ideas; it is a state of the chitta in which there is no forgetfulness of the past experience. It corresponds to memory or the retentive power.
Having explained the various trittis, the author describes the methods by which they can be controlled. There are two ways; (1) practice and (2) non-attachment.

According to Patañjali the practice consists in an attempt to concentrate the mind in the supreme soul or the concentration of the mind deprived of rajas and tamaś by means of yema and nīśama. It can be achieved by a constant practice for a length of time.

Kriśṇa in the Bhagavadgītā VI. 35 also says the same thing to Arjuna. The verse there, is a verbatim reproduction of the sūtra I. 12.

Now attachment according to our author is also a state called Vas'ikāra and consists in an antipathy for the worldly and heavenly pleasures. The former are already experienced in the present life and the enjoyment of the latter is promised in future by the holy scripture for virtuous men. There are four stages of this state of mind. The first is called Yatmāna samjñā; it consists in turning one's mind from the worldly pleasures after experiencing their evil effects. The second stage is called vyatireka samjñā; it is an enjoyment of pleasures by discrimination or selection. The third stage is ekendriya Samjñā; it is a mental craving after the worldly pleasures without enjoyment by reason of the weakness of the organs. The fourth stage is vas'ikāra samjñā consisting of the total cessation of the mental cravings after the worldly pleasures.

Having explained vas'ikāra stage which the authors calls non-attachment, he proceeds to describe the higher stage called Paravairāgya. When a devotee has realised Puruṣa i. e. made a discrimination between prakriti and Puruṣa by means of a trance called Samparajñāta and turned his mind from satvā, rajas and tamaś he is said to have reached the paravairagya stage, i. e. the highest stage of non-attachment.

The next question for solution is ‘what is Samparajñāta samādhi? ’ It is a state in a trance in which a practitioner knows his own self without any doubt or false knowledge. When one has controlled the various modifications of the mind by means of constant practice and non-attachment to pleasures and reached the Paravairagya stage, it is called samparajñāta samādhi. In it there are four grades: (1) the first is the perception of the gross objects with the aid of words and their sense after relinquishing them one after the other; this stage is called sāvitarka. The perception without such aid is called nīvitarka; it is the second stage.

The meditation of the minute things internally with reference to time and space and the guṇas is called sāvichāra; but when the meditation is
without such reference, it is called nirvichāra. These last two stages are called grahyasamādhipatti.

When the mind is affected by the rajas and tāmas but by reason of the preponderance of the satwa, there is excess of happiness, it is called satnanda. In this state, if a practitioner is not conscious of his body though he does not see Puruṣa, he is called vīdeha. This stage is called grahaṇapatti.

When there is the presence of the satwa in the mind without any mixture of the rajas and tāmas, it is called Sasmita, because in this state a practitioner is conscious of his 'self'. In this stage when a practitioner is absorbed in his nature without realising Puruṣa, he is called Prakritilaya; but when he realises Puruṣa, he is called vivekākhyaṭī. This last stage is called grihitrasamādhipatti.

The other samādhi is called asamprajñata, in which there are only impressions left on the mind without any modification or change therein. This state of the trance is of two kinds (1) bhāvaprātyaya (2) and upāyapratyaya. The former is of those Yogis who are called ‘prakritilaya’ and ‘vīdeha’ as explained above. It is so called because a practitioner is again reborn in the world. The latter is produced by faith which engenders strength. From strength arises recollection; from it concentration; from the latter, the true knowledge. Bhojadeva has not accepted this division as it is a cross division overlapping the samprajñata samādhi.

There are nine classes of the practitioners of upāyapratyaya. They are of three kinds, mridu, madhya and adhimātra; and they are again subdivided into mriduvega, madhyavega and tibrasamvega. They are thus nine in number:


The author proceeds to ascribe the result of the Samādhi by means of devotion to the Lord. Here we find the traces of bhakti upon which the devotional school of philosophy was founded in the names of Nārada and Sāndilya. It is irrelevant to discuss the question whether the devotional school known after Nārada and Sāndilya existed before Patanjali or came into existence subsequent to him. In my opinion, the school came into existence after the teachings of the Vedānta school which were too abstruse for the common people to understand. It is very old and existed in the sūtra period before the Christian era.
The author now proceeds to explain the term 'Is'wara' which he has used. It was highly necessary for him to explain it by reason of the denial of Is'wara by the Sāmkhya, the senior school of the Pravachana śūtras of which Yoga is an offshoot.

Is'wara, according to Patanjali, is Puruṣa unaffected by miseries actions, fruition and association. We have already seen while dealing with the sāmkhya system of philosophy that there are two eternal entities, namely Prakṛiti and Puruṣa, corresponding to the non-ego and ego of the western school of philosophy. Is'wara is the universal ego or self, differentiated from the individual ego or self by being devoid of miseries, actions, the fruit thereof and their reminiscences. He is omniscient and from him all knowledge has proceeded. The linguistic symbol which stands for him is 'Om', the repetition of which is his contemplation. By constant practice, one realises his individual 'self' and the obstacles that stand in the way of contemplation disappear. There are nine obstacles according to Patanjali; they are (1) disease, (2) aversion to work, (3) doubt, (4) negligence, (5) laziness, (6) affection for worldly objects, (7) false knowledge, (8) non-attainment of samādhi and (9) fickleness. There are help-mates of the obstacles which are pain, despair, trembling, inspiration and expiration. Pain is further classified as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Mental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ādhyātmika</td>
<td>Ādhibhautika</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ādhyātmic pain is the trouble arising from one's own self. It is either physical or mental. The diseases fall under the former and cupidity and anger under the latter. The Ādhibhautika pain arises from lions, wolves and serpents, and the Ādidaivika is produced by the planetary influence. All these nine obstacles with these companions contribute to the distraction of mind.

In order to remove it, one should fix his mind on one desired object; in order to obtain tranquility of mind one should be friendly disposed towards the successful people in life, show mercy to the miserable, be pleased with the virtuous and hate the vicious. One can also concentrate his mind by the practice of the prāṇāyāma which shall be explained at its proper place. The author then describes Laksya Yoga consisting in the fixation of attention on the tip of the nose or the tongue, the palate, the
middle or the root of the tongue and perceiving smell, taste, form, touch, or sound respectively. These objects of sense perceived by imagination on the different parts of the sense organs lead to concentration. There is another mode of concentration. Down the cardiac region, there is a lotus of eight leaves turned downwards. It is perhaps the heart which resembles a betel-leaf. By throwing the foul air (carbonic acid gas) outside the lungs, you turn this imaginary lotus upwards. This region is called solar region, waking state and ‘a’. Above it is the lunar region, dreaming state and ‘u’; further up is the fiery region, sleeping state and ‘m’. The last and the fourth is the Nāda region where the supreme soul is realised. It is called Brahma Yoga where a Yogi hears anāhata sound of ten kinds (1) chini (2) chinchini (3) the sound of a bell (4) the conch sound, (5) the sound of a lyre (6) the sound of clapping, (7) the sound of a lute (8) the sound of a drum (9) the sound of a kettledrum (10) the sound of a thunder. Let him fix his attention on the 10th. There is another way of concentration; let one close, his eyes and perceive internal light; it is called S’iva-Yoga or Śambhavi mudrā. The above practices called Brahma Yoga and S’iva Yoga are in vogue in the Santamata religion of the present day, and are attached an undue importance to by the followers.

The author proceeds to explain Vasnā Yoga, another mode of concentration. One should endeavour to have a mind not attached to any object of affection, or a mind like one after sound sleep or a delightful dream. After a sound sleep or a pleasant vision one feels very happy, and the state of mind is calm, quiet and tranquil.

There is another mode of concentration called Dhyāna Yoga technically. It consists in fixing one’s mind on something which attracts him and causes his attention to be stuck to it. In Yoga siddhānta chandrikā many such objects are mentioned such as tirthabhāvana, devabhāvana etc. at P.P. 38-43 of the Chaukhambhā Sanscrit series.

The author then proceeds to explain the siddhi Yoga. When a practitioner has attained the concentration of mind by any of the modes mentioned above, his mind becomes purified and can enter into the minutest and the highest things. This is a great success which he can achieve. In such a state of attainment when his mind becomes steady by constant practice, it becomes identified with any thing with which it comes into contact like a pure crystal that becomes tinged with the colour of the object placed in contact with it. It is called saṃpattī technically and is laya yoga. It is a subject of Samprajuāta samādhi.
The author having digressed comes back to the description of the samādhi or samāpatti. He has, as we have seen above, divided it into
1. Savitarke, 2. Nirvitarka 3. Savichāra and 4. Nirvichāra. When a word is heard, an idea is created in the mind which is concept on the subjective side; it denotes the genus and species. We have all these three things before our mind when a certain word denoting any external object is uttered. The connection of the language with the idea which it produces on the mind, is what is called sphota. This kind of knowledge derived with the aid of the language is what is called savitarka samāpatti. If we acquire knowledge without such external help, it is nirvitarka samāpatti. The external symbols which constitute the language are dispensed with in this stage. We are also conscious of the existence of the minute objects as for instance adhāmkāra and pancha tanmātras. If we acquire knowledge of these minute objects with the aid of words, it is called savichāra samāpatti; if we are so much advanced as to do away with the external symbols, and acquire knowledge of the minute objects without their help, it is called nirvichāra samāpatti.

The author now proceeds to explain the subtle objects. They are of four kinds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subtle objects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visiṣṭa linga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avisiṣṭa linga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linga Mātra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alinga</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Vijnāna Bhiksu, there is a gradation of the subtlety. We have first visiṣṭalinga, the atoms of the five gross elements; then we have still subtler called avasiṣṭalinga as shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ahāmkāra</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>five subtle elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eleven organs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Buddhi or intellect is lingamātra and pradhāna is alinga.

According, to Bhoja deva also visiṣṭalinga consists of five gross elements; the avisiṣṭa linga consists of the five subtle elements and the external and internal organs. The intelligence is lingamātra and the matter is alinga.

The samāpatti described above relating to gross and minute objects constitutes, saūja samādhi by reason of the germ of bondage in it. When a practitioner obtains the nirvichāra samāpatti as explained above,
his mind becomes purified, happy and disposed to truth. This cultivated faculty of liking truth is called Ritambhara. It is a special cognitive faculty contradistinguished from the scriptural and inferential knowledge. When a Yogi has reached the stage of nirvichara samappatti and has cultivated the Ritambhara faculty, all other associations are replaced by those of the stage; but when no associations are left, it is called nirvija samadhi and a practitioner becomes free from bondage.

After describing the samadhi in the first chapter which the author calls samadhipada, he proceeds to describe the means to attain it. The first is called kriyayoga; it consists of the penance, study and meditation. The penance consists in reduction of the body by fasting; the study consists in the constant repetition of ‘Om’ and reading of the holy scriptures. The result achieved by the kriyayoga is the attainment of Samadhi and removal of miseries (kleyas). They are five in number as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Klesa (misery)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avidya (ignorance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Avidya which is nescience is the source of all the troubles which are classed as miseries. The miseries exist in four states; (1) their dormant state is when there is no exciting cause to arouse their activity as in childhood; their attenuated state is when they are reduced to the state of mere associations by the adverse power as that of a Yogi; (3) the separated state is when one is overcome by the other as the passion of love can not exist side by side with the passion of anger; (4) the active state is when they are in full operation. In all these states, the nescience plays an important part.

The following sloka given in Yoga Chaudrikā very well explains the four states of the miseries.

प्रसुतास्तत्तवःतीनां तत्ववस्त्वादुयोगिनां विविधंनीकरणपश्च वेश्यापवयंसिनिनां।

The state of miseries in the practitioners called the prakritiṣaṇa and videha, is dormant, in the perfect Yogi attenuated, and in those who are addicted to sensual pleasures separated and active. Asmita is egoism and is derived from √asmi = am or I. It is a confusion of the ‘see’ with the means of seeing. The soul is the perceiver and the buddhi is the organ by which it perceives. The enjoyer and the
organ of enjoyment are confounded. As for example in a sentence when we say the 'eye sees,' there is a confusion of the seer with the organ of seeing, because it is the soul but not the eye that sees the objects.

The third source of misery is affection. It consists in the remembrance of certain pleasures which one endeavours to obtain; while its opposite called aversion is the remembrance of certain pain connected with certain objects which one endeavours to avoid. The last source of trouble is fear of death which is a natural instinct in all living beings from an ant to a learned man. It is an instinct of self-preservation which is deep-rooted in all beings from the lowest species of insects to the highest rational being. There is a natural fear of death which leads one to infer that it arises from the past experience of troubles undergone in the course of dying. It is an argument, according to the Indian philosophy, in support of the doctrine of metempsychosis.

These five classes of miseries are of two forms, viz. the minute and gross forms. In their minute or elementary form, i.e. when they are associations or ideas and have not developed into strong activities, they should be checked by the counter-action, viz. the merging of them in one's own nature, egoism of the purified mind. When they are in their gross or active form, they should be controlled by concentration. The actions, whether righteous or unrighteous, are performed under the influence of these five miseries. They are the cause of all actions; their fruit is reaped in the present or future life. As for instance, Nandiswara at once became a god from a man; Nahuṣa on the other hand at once became a serpent from Indra. The hellish people have no fruit in this life, and those who have uprooted these miseries have no fruit in future life. If all these miseries exist in their rudimentary form, they cause different classes of birth such as of vegetables and animals, life and the organs for enjoyment. By the actions which are caused by the miseries (kleśas), the birth, life and enjoyment are, therefore, regulated. The birth, life and enjoyment have pleasure and sorrow as the fruit arising from righteous and unrighteous actions. As for example, good or bad birth depends on good or bad actions; similarly good or bad life and the enjoyment of the good or evil depend on good or bad actions. To a perfect yogin, all pleasures or means of enjoyment are sources of sorrow, because the consequence is evil. (1) There is no satisfaction from enjoyment, for it sharpens the desire for further enjoyment; (2) there is heart breaking, if the enjoyment is obstructed; (3) there is remembrance of enjoyment when the object is lost or has become incapable of enjoyment;
(4) there is conflict that arises from the various feelings of pleasure, pain and dullness.

The author proceeds to explain the four subjects of the miseries. Just as in the science of medicine there are four heads namely, (1) Diagnosis, (2) Prognosis (3) Etiology and (4) Treatment, similarly in the science which deals with salvation there are four heads viz, hēya, the avoidable (2) hāna, avoidance thereof (3) hēya hetu, the cause of the avoidable, and (4) hānopāya, the mode of avoidance. The author proceeds to deal with the above subjects seriatim. (1) The pain that has not yet come is to be avoided. The troubles or calamities that have already been suffered and are being suffered are not avoidable, but those that are to befall, are to be avoided by all means. (2) The confusion of the percceiver with the object perceived or the enjoyer with the object enjoyed, is the cause of troubles (avoidable). This arises from nescience.

The perceived (dris’ya) is the object or non-ego. (1) It is characterised by three guṇas, viz. satwa, rajas and tamas which are light, activity and stability; (2) it includes elements both gross and subtle and organs of three kinds, viz.: sensory, motor and internal; (3) it has either enjoyment here, or salvation in the next world as its ultimate aim. This leads the author to describe, the four states of the above-mentioned guṇas viz.: viseṣa, aviseṣa, linga mātra and alinga. (1) The viseṣas of the yoga philosophy correspond with the vikritis of Sāmkhya Kārikā, and are five gross elements, five sensory organs, five motor organs and manas (2) the aviseṣas are the six out of seven prakriti vikritis of the Sāmkhya Kārikā; they are five subtle elements (panchatanmātras) and I-maker ahamkāra) (3) The linga mātra is the mahat or the 7th prakriti vikriti of Sāmkhya Kārika (4) the alinga is the mu’ā prakriti of Sāmkhya Kārikā which is the state of equipoise of the satwa, rajas and tamas. See Sāmkhya I. 61. Sāmkhya Kārikā, 38; Sāmkhya III. 1.; p. P. 88, of the preceding pages.

The percceiver or soul or ego according to Patanjali is the real seer; he is reflected in intelligence (buddhi): he perceives everything but is apart from the object perceived. He is pure like the moon in heaven though she is reflected in dirty or pure water. The buddhi (intelligence) being animated by the soul, perceives the object of sight, sound smell, touch and taste.

The percceiver (dṛṣṭa) and the perceived (dris’ya) are puruṣa and prakriti of the Sāmkhya philosophy. The dris’ya or prakriti is for the
enjoyment of the drīṣṭā or puruṣa; Cf. Kārikā 56, 57 and 58 and Śāmkhya III. 57, 59 and II. 87. Though the drīṣya (prakṛti) disappears before a perfect yoga who is released from its bondage after the performance of its object, yet it is not totally destroyed because other unadvanced individuals are entangled in its meshes. Cf. Kārikā 59, 61 and Śāmkhya III. 69, 70.

There is the union of the drīṣṭā (perceiver) and the drīṣya (perceived), when the former is attached to the latter and the cause of this union is nescience as said in the opening part of the present topic under discussion.

The author takes up the third head called avoidance (hāna). When nescience (avidyā) is removed by correct knowledge about the drīṣṭā and drīṣya, there is no union of the perceiver with the perceived. This constitutes the cure of the soul called redemption or absorption in one’s own self. This leads up to the fourth stage of vivekākyāti where the distinction between the puruṣa on one hand and the prakṛti on the other is realised, pure knowledge of self is attained and there is no relapse into ignorance; it is a means of avoidance (banopāya). It is the highest stage of spiritual knowledge when a practitioner becomes conscious that (1) he has known all that he wanted to know and there is no further knowledge to acquire, (2) that all his miseries have been removed and there is none left to be remedied, (3) that he has obtained the kaivalya (absolutism) and has nothing further to obtain; (4) that he has achieved all that he wanted to do and has nothing further to achieve; (5) that his intelligence (buddhi) has borne its fruits and all the gunas are vanishing; (6) that they have become defunct and there is no chance of their germinating; (7) that he has become united with his own self. Of these seven, the first four are for the cessation of work and the last three for the release of the mind. When the impurities of the mind are removed by the practice of the parts of yoga (yogānga), there is a rise of spiritual knowledge up to the vivekākyāti. The Yoga Sidhānta Chandrika understands the śatkarma and mudrā by the parts of Yoga (Yogānga). They are as given below:


II. Mudrā (1) Mahāmudrā, (2) Mahābandha, (3) Mahāvedha (4) Khechari (5) S’aktichālānanam, (6) Mulabandha, (7) Uddiyānam, (8) Jālandharam, (9) Viparitikriti. These are the practices of the haṭha Yoga and are, therefore, not referred to by Patanjali as they pertain to the bodily
or physical attainments. They are more in the nature of the gymnastic exercises than psychic attainments.

According to our author there are eight parts of Yoga, viz (1) yama (restraint) (2) niyama (observance), (3) āsana (posture), (4) prāṇāyama (regulation of breath), (5) pratyāhāra (abstraction), (6) dhāraṇā (concentration), (7) dhyāna (meditation) and (8) samādhi (trance).

The author of Yoga explains them fully; the Yamas are five in number; they are (1) abstinence from slaughter, (2) truthfulness, (3) abstinence from theft, (4) celibacy or continence, (5) abstinence from greediness. These are the first five principles of ethics for the guidance in life; they are a priori truths innate in the human nature and are universally binding. It is ahimsa which literally means abstinence from slaughter or injury in any form. It has now become a pet word with certain school of politicians in India; it is a common cry 'ahimsa paramodharmah' ahimsa or universal love is the highest righteousness or virtue. Ahimsā is then defined thus:

कर्मणामयस्व वाचः सर्वभूतिः सम्बंधः।
अहिम्स राजनामेव प्रीक्षा अहिंसा परमार्थिः।

"Not causing injury to any created being in any state by deed, thought and speech, is said by the great sages to be abstinence from slaughter."

(2) Truthfulness consists in acting upon what one sees, hears and thinks. It is both of speech and conduct. (3) Asteya is the non-removal of the property from the lawful custody of another without his consent or by force. It, therefore, includes both theft and robbery of the Indian Penal Code.

(4) Celibacy is abstinence from sexual pleasure. It is defined by Yoga vārtika as—

कर्मणामृष्ठिः माया सर्वभूतिः सम्बंधः।
सर्वभूतंत्रयायां विवाहयृत्र च चाचाय प्रचारे।

Avoidance of sexual pleasure by means of action, thought and speech in all conditions, at all times and all places, is called celibacy. (5) Abstinence from greediness consists in the non-acceptance of any luxury with the exception of bare necessity. It is non-acceptance of any gratuitous sum even in distress and includes humility and unselfishness.

These five intuitive truths are such that they are universally recognised, irrespective of caste, creed, colour and country. The author proceeds to describe (2) the rules of observance; they are: (1) purity (2) contentment (3) penance (4) self-study (5) and devotion to the Lord.
1. Purity is of both body and mind; the former is performed by bathing with water, the latter is the purity of heart, achieved by eradicating the feelings of jealousy, hatred and enmity.

(2) contentment is defined by Yoga Chandrika as

यदृच्छालाभेर नित्यः अठूँ पुस्तेन भविष्यति।
तात निघात राजियो प्राण्यः वैविध्यं विश्वस्य प्रथम्॥

If a person feels satisfied at every time with what he gets without any conscious effort, the sages call such a state of mind to be contentment conducive to happiness.

(3) Penance consists in the worship of the gods, Brahmans, and the preceptor and in the observance of fasts.

(4) Self-study consists of the repetition of ‘Om’ and reading of the Vedânta and Upaniṣat.

(5) Devotion to the Lord is the resignation of one’s self and actions to the will of God and the practice of Brahma Yoga, Śiva Yoga, Mantra Yoga, Juana Yoga, Advaita Yoga and Bhakti Yoga, as described in the preceding pages at 87.

The author says that during the practice of these axiomatic truths of universal applicability, strong temptations leading one in the wrong path arise. In order to put a check to their operations, one should divert his attention from them by thinking over the evil consequences to which they lead, if one is under their control. As for example, one is tempted to commit theft; but one can turn his thoughts from the strong temptation by the fear of the worldly and future punishments awaiting him on the commission of the prohibited act.

The author proceeds to describe the fruits that accrue from the practice of yama and niyama. Universal love follows from the practice of non-slaughter; from truthfulness arises the effectiveness of the speech on others’ action and its result; abstinence from stealing leads to the present of wealth by others. Celibacy leads to manly vigour; abstinence from greediness produces the memory of the past and future life.

The purity of body leads one to think it loathsome and the purity of mind leads to tranquility; from it follows concentration, from concentration the control of senses which makes one fit to perceive his ‘self’. From contentment proceeds happiness. From the practice of austerities, impurities are destroyed; thence proceeds miraculous power such as levity, gravity etc. mentioned in III. 45. From the study of the Vedânta and
Upaniṣat, the gods and sages become visible. From the devotion to the Lord and resignation to His will follows samādhi or trance as explained in the first pāda.

After describing Yama and Niyama and their divisions, the author proceeds to deal with posture or seat. The question is, "what posture should one maintain when practising Yoga? How should he sit to practise it?" The reply of the author is, that it should be both easy and fixed. "विनयमुपल नायकतवः". The commentators have, however, described various postures amounting to eighty-four; one of them is called 'sthira sukha'; See Yoga Siddhānta Chandrika where nearly 88 of them are fully described. The author, however, recommends the posture in which the mind and the body of the devoted can be kept steady without effort. If one succeeds in the practice of posture, he is not affected by heat or cold, pleasure or pain etc.

The fourth part of Yoga is Prānayāma. When a devotee has succeeded in maintaining a particular posture for the practice, the stoppage of breathing-in and breathing out is called Prānayāma. The act of throwing out of the foul air (carbonic acid gas) from the lungs is called rechāka (emptying of the lungs) and filling up the lungs with pure air (oxygen) of the atmosphere is called purāka. Ceasing to breathe-in-and-out for a while, so that the foul air thrown-out from the lungs may vanish afar in the atmosphere is called Kumbhaka.

The practice of Prānayāma is however regulated by time, space and number; as for example the practice for a certain time, at a distance of so many inches from the tip of the nose or for so many times. It is called Dirgha sukṣama by reason of the long practice and the invisible nature of the ingress and egress of the air.

When the Prānayāma is practised with all the constituent parts, viz. rechāka, purāka and Kumbhaka, it is called Sahita Kumbhaka; but when it is practised with Kumbhaka alone, it is called Kevala Kumbhaka. There are several varieties of these two kinds of Kumbhaka for which a curious reader is referred to the Yoga Siddhānta Chandrika. The continual practice of the Prānayāma removes the veil which hangs before the mind and obstructs the light from coming, eradicates all miseries and makes the practitioner's mind fit for concentration.

The fifth part of Yoga is called pratyāhāra (abstraction). It is the control of the organs of sense and keeping them under the guidance of the mind. When the mind is purified by the above-mentioned practices and the senses no longer run after their external objects, but accept the
guidance of the mind just as the bees follow the guidance of the queen bee, it is called pratyâhâra (abstraction). The result achieved by the practice of abstraction, is a complete control of the senses.

III.

Patañjali having explained the external means of Yoga practice describes in the third pāda the internal means which are Dhārayā (concentration), Dhyāna (meditation) and Samâdhi (trance). Dhārayā is the concentration of the mind on certain locality either internal such as the heart, the navel, the head etc. or external such as a mountain river etc. It is said to be of five kinds: (1) Stambhâni (2) Plavâni (3) Dahanâ (4) Bhâdramâni (5) S'amanâ; as for details, see Yoga siddhânta Chandrikâ. In Dhārayâ the mind is fixed on some object in a particular locality; in it the locality and the object become merged; but when the Lord, the object, is concentrated upon at the localities, such as cerebral, cardiac or umbilical regions, it becomes Dhyâna (meditation). It is of two kinds: (1) Saguna and (2) nirguna. When one meditates on the Lord with His positive qualities as omniscient, omnipotent etc. it is Saguna Dhyâna; but when one meditates on Him with His negative qualities as immortal, undecaying etc. it is called Nirguna Dhyâna. The Samâdhi is a meditation where the object meditated upon manifests itself as if without any form. It is of two kinds (1) Samprajñâta and (2) asamprajñâta as explained in the preceding pages at 34 and 85.

All the above-mentioned three practices, viz. abstraction, meditation and trance are technically called Samyama in the Yoga literature. The practice of the Samyama leads to the manifestation of the object meditated upon. A practitioner should rise gradually from the lowest rung of the ladder in the practice of Yoga to the highest top; there are eight parts of the Yoga practice, the first five of which are external and the last three are internal as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yogânga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abstraction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meditation</td>
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</table>
The Samyamas, the triad of the internal parts constitute the external part of the nirviṇa Sāmādhi. The result achieved from their practice is that the preliminary stage of the mind’s changes called vyuṭhāna declines and the highest stage called nirodha rises. At that time, the devotee's mind becomes calm and is completely controlled. The fall of the Samprajñāta is the rise of the asamprajñāta which leads to the tranquility of mind and continual flow of peace. It is called nirodha pariṇāma of the chitta. When from the devotees' chitta, the distraction or mind’s modification in contact with the external objects, is removed, and concentration or the fixing of it on one object is obtained, the state of mind is called samādhi pariṇāma of the chitta. When a practitioner has totally eradicated distraction and reached the stage of Samādhi where the vanishing and rising modifications of the mind do not appear different and merge into one, it is called the ekāgrata pariṇāma of the chitta.

There are cases of Samādhi (suspended animation) in our own time; there is one case mentioned by Lyon “Yogi’s ecstatic trance.—In Delhi in 1889, Dr. H. C. Sen and his brother, Mr. Chandra Sen, Municipal secretary, examined a well-known Yogi devotee in a self induced trance in which he appears to have been seated cross-legged in Buddha fashion. They found that the pulse had ceased to beat altogether, nor could the slightest heart beat be detected by the stethoscope. The Yogi was placed in a small subterraneous masonry cell and the door locked and sealed by the city Magistrate. At the expiration of thirty three days the cell was opened and the devotee was found just where he was placed but with a death-like appearance, the limbs having become stiff as in rigor mortis. He was brought from the vault and the mouth rubbed with honey and milk and the body massaged with oil. In the evening manifestations of life returned. He was fed with a spoonful of milk and in three days was able to eat his normal diet, and was alive seven years after. W. Tebb, Premature burial, 1896 pp. 44-45”.

Lyon and Waddell’s Medical Jurisprudence, 5th edition pp. 75-76.

Hari Das, a Yogi of Raja Ranjit Singh of Lahore used to perform Samadhis for a period of six months. His extraordinary performances were witnessed by the British Residents of the court of Raja Ranjit Singh and were certified by them. See S. B. H. vol. XV part IV. p. 64.

The author having explained the nirodha pariṇāma, samadhi pariṇāma and ekāgrata pariṇāma explains the changes of the gross and subtle
elements and the organs of the senses. We have seen in the preceding pages at 16 that the Sànkhya school of philosophy of which Yoga is a branch has started the theory of evolution (parinàma válsa). There are three kinds of parinàma according to Patanjali; (1) dharma parinàma, lakṣana parinàma, and avasthā parinàma. The change of a substance from one form into another is called dharma parinàma; it is only a change of appearance; as for example, clay becoming a pot. Lakṣana parinàma is the same change looked from the point of view of time. The present is the past manifested, the future is the present which shall be manifested; the past has the present in embryo. Birth and death and rise and fall come under this head of evolution. Lakṣana parinàma is, therefore, the succession of events in course of time; what is present is the unfolding of the past and what is future is the unfolding of the present. The same change looked from another point of view of state is avasthā parinàma; a change from one state to another comes under this head, as for example the change from childhood to manhood and from manhood to old age.

We have seen the different kinds of changes looked from different standpoints. The change takes place in the substance or substratum called dharma. The substratum remains the same in all changes; they are the past, present and future. Take for instance clay; it exists first in the shape of particles of dust, then it is converted into a clod or lump of clay; then a pot. This is then the past history of a pot which exists in the present. Then follows its future change. It becomes potsherd, broken pieces, and then particles of the pieces. The substratum which undergoes past, present and future changes, exists in all of them. This view of evolution is consistent with the Satkāryavāda of the Sànkhya school.

The author now enumerates the miraculous powers by the Yoga practices. We have seen that in all the various changes which have been dharma, lakṣana, and avasthā, the substratum remains the same. It is the clay which undergoes changes; as far as the substratum is concerned, there is no tense. It was clay before the construction of a pot; it is clay when a pot is constructed; it will be clay when a pot is broken into pieces. If a practitioner realises this trinity of changes as explained above by the practice of samyama, he obtains the power of knowing the past and the future. There will be no time, but it will be all present before his mind’s eye.

The next occult power is understanding the language of the beings. This leads the author to explain the theory of sphota which Kapila rejects
as seen in the preceding pages at 44 and 76. We have three stages: (1) word, (2) meaning and (3) idea; we also know that when we utter a word 'cow', the subjective and objective aspects are simultaneously present before us. On realising the different component parts distinctly by the practice of samyama, a practitioner obtains the knowledge of the language of all the beings.

The third mysterious power which a practitioner can obtain is the knowledge of the previous births. There are two kinds of associations (sāmskāras) (1) impressions on the memory of the past events and miseries, (2) reward in the present life in the form of birth, life and enjoyment. If a devotee realises all these associations by the practice of samyama, he obtains the knowledge of his previous births.

The fourth mysterious power is thought-reading or telepathy. If one practises samyama on the various modifications of his own chitta such as affection and hatred, he acquires the power of thought-reading. It cannot be acquired if the mind is fixed upon some object but when it has no object before it.

The fifth occult power is of disappearance. The theory of perception according to the ancient philosophers is, that the rays of the eye travel to the object perceived and come in contact with it. According to the sāmkhya school, the object is reflected on the buddhi animated by the puruṣa. Thus there is perception. If a Yogi practises samyama on the form of his body, he can cut off the rays coming from the observer's eye to his body with the result that he disappears from the observer's gaze.

The sixth mysterious power is that of knowing one's own death. The fruits of our past actions are of two kinds; either they are reaped soon or late and are called sopakrama or asrupakrama respectively. If a devotee practises sanyama and realises them distinctly, he can know his end.

He can also know it from certain troubles which are of three kinds; (1) adhyātmika (2) adhibhautika and (3) adhidaivika, as for example, not hearing the anāhata sound on closing the ears, not seeing light on closing the eyes, seeing the angel of death and the souls of the departed relatives or seeing the heaven. For other examples, see Yoga Siddhānta Chandrika.

The seventh miraculous power is strength. If a practitioner cultivates the habit of friendship, pity and joy, he becomes strong. It he is friendly disposed to the fortunate, shows pity to the miserable, and joy with the righteous, others become friends of such a person. The result is that he becomes powerful; but if he practises sanyama in the strength of an
elephant, eagle or wind, he thereby obtains such strength. In our own time, Professor Rāmanūrī of Madras showed such physical exploits, which he attributed to the practice of Yoga.

The eighth mysterious power is to see hidden things and subtle and minute atoms with the naked eyes. It can be obtained by the practice of Shiva Yoga mentioned in the preceding pages at 87.

Then follow various mysterious powers which can be obtained by practising samyama on the heavenly objects. If a devotee practises Samyama on the solar disc, he obtains the knowledge of the entire universe; if he practises it on the lunar disc, he obtains the knowledge of the stars. By practising samyama on the polar star, he obtains the knowledge of the planetary motion and the rising and setting of the stars.

The author now proceeds to enumerate the miraculous power attainable by the practice of Samyama on the bodily organs. By the practice of samyama in the umblical-region, the esophagus, the cardiac and the cerebral regions, a devotee obtains a knowledge of anatomy and physiology, removes hunger and thirst, obtains mental stability and vision of invisible beings respectively.

Just as dawn precedes the morning, so does dim appearance of spiritual knowledge precede the attainment of perfect knowledge called viveka-khyāti. This preliminary dawning of the spiritual knowledge is called Pratibhā. If one practises samyama in the pratibhā, he becomes omniscient. If a practitioner practises samyama in the heart, he attains the power of knowing his mind and that of another.

The enjoyment of worldly things takes place by making a confusion between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. At that time, a false notion arises that there is no difference between the puruṣa (ego) and prakriti (non-ego). This is due to ignorance; but when one realises that the prakriti is for the enjoyment of the puruṣa and constantly keeps this difference between them in view, he acquires the knowledge of puruṣa. When a practitioner has obtained the power of discrimination between the puruṣa and the prakriti, he attains a particular supernatural insight called pratibhā by which he can see, hear, smell, taste and touch objects which are divine. These psychic attainments which are considered successes by worldly men and tyros, are really obstacles in the way of samadhi. They are mere performances like those of an athlete, rope-dancer or necromancer. A sincere devotee desirous of Kaivalya (absolutism) does not care for them.
Patañjali explains another miraculous power by which a Yogi can enter into another body. The mind is very fickle and has no limit for its activity. By virtue of the merits and demerits of the former birth, it is confined in the body. If one slackens the bondage arising from the merits and demerits and understands the power of the mind, he can achieve this miraculous power.

There is a case of souls' transference from one body to another mentioned by P. Lekha Ram, Arya Musafir in his "Sabûte Tanâsukh" 1st. edition, p. 260 on the authority of the philosophical enquirer and "Arya Magazine" for October 1884 p.p. 159-162.

There is a town by the name of Orenburg in Russia on the border of Asia Minor near the Ural mountains. Abraham Charcot, an uneducated Jew, fell ill and apparently died; but he subsequently revived and could not recognise his wife, children and parents He began to speak English instead of Hebrew which was his mother tongue. There was another man by name of Abraham Durham, an Englishman, resident of New Westminster in British Columbia, who died on the same night of 22nd September 1874 on which Abraham Charcot died. The man of New Westminster similarly revived and began to show the same strange symptoms like Abraham Charcot. The doctor who treated Abraham Charcot in the Government hospital at St. Peters burg and Abraham Charcot himself happened to be in New Westminster; a great sensation was created by this mysterious change in these two persons. One was speaking English and the other was speaking Hebrew; both of them did not recognise their own relatives but claimed those of the other as their own. At last the doctor of the St. Petersburg Hospital who happened to be there on behalf of the Russian Government, came to the conclusion that the case was one of the transference of the two souls to the different bodies. Orenburg and New Westminster are both situate on the antipodes.

There is another miraculous power which consists in a practitioner's becoming light like carded cotton and thereby becoming unaffected by water, mire or thorn and passing the soul through the cerebral region at any time he likes. There are two sorts of activities of the organs. The external activity consists of seeing, hearing etc., the internal activity is respiration etc. The vital airs which regulate the activity of the internal organs are five in number; the activity of the prâna extends from the nasal region down to the cardiac region, (2) that
the apôna extends from the umbilical region down to the feet; (3) the function of the samâna which pervades the umbilical region is to assist the digestion of food; (4) the activity of the vyâna extends throughout the body, (5) and that of the udâna extends from the nasal region up to the cerebral region. If a devotee practises samyama in the udâna, he attains the psychic power described above.

Ibn Batuta, an Arab traveller who came to India in the reign of Muhammad Shah Tughlaq (1325-1351) and who vowed to write in his travels nothing but what he saw with his own eyes or what he found to be true on inquiry (see the Urdu Translation of the Travels by Moulvie Muhammad Hussain, M. A. District Judge Firozapore and Fellow of the Punjab University at P. 91 of Vol. II.) says that in the court of the King, he was shown a performance of two Indian Yogis who were preceptor and disciple; the latter by sitting in a particular posture rose in the air and remained suspended for some time; the former struck a pair of sandals against the ground in anger and made them climb in the air. They struck the neck of the disciple who was in the air; he began to descend slowly. This performance so amazed Ibn Batuta that he fell into a swoon and recovered by taking some medicine supplied by the king. Only reaching home he became delirious but on drinking some sherbet sent by the king, gradually recovered (at PP. 259 and 261).

There is a note by the learned translator (at P. 260), about the Indian Yogis quoting from Kaikhusro-bir-Asr Kewan, the author of Dabistan, a Persian by extraction and a contemporary of Dârâ Shikoh. He describes the Yoga and Samkhya systems on hearsay information and narrates the wonderful powers of the Yogis such as aerial flight and trance. Take the information of Kaikhusro for what it is worth, but the strong evidence of Batuta who was an eye-witness in face of the solemn oath of God, the Prophet and the angels, cannot be passed over without serious consideration. There can be no doubt as to the veracity of the statement of Batuta; and it cannot be said that a fraud was practised on him by the king. These Yogis of the court of Mohammad Tughlaq must have been like Hari Das of Ranjit Singh’s court.

Let us revert to our subject. If a devotee practises samyama in samâna he obtains the supernatural power of appearing brilliant and radiant to others; if one practises samyama in the connection that exists between the ear and the ether, he obtains the supernatural power of
hearing; by practising samyama in the connection of the body with the ether, he can obtain the power to fly in the air by becoming light like carded cotton.

While feeling pride in one's own body the modifications of the mind externally are called kalpita; but without the feeling of pride, the independent modifications of the mind are called akalpita. If a practitioner practises samyama in the a kalpita, he succeeds in lifting the veil of miseries, actions, and fruits from the buddhi, and can enter into another body. If a Yogi practises samyama in the gross form of the five elements, their quality, such as fluidity, gaseousness etc., their subtle form in the panchatāmātras, their affinity and the object i.e. enjoyment and redemption, he obtains conquest over the nature and elements.

By controlling the gross form of the elements, one attains subtlety, levity, sublimity, gravity and power of touching distant objects such as the moon; by controlling their quality, one obtains non-obstruction of will; by controlling their subtle form, conquest over the elements; by controlling affinity, lordliness; by controlling purpose, power of accomplishment of desires without any obstruction. They are called eight siddhis. He also obtains physical attainments, and the power of keeping his body intact and unaffected in fire and water. The physical attainments are comeliness, beauty, strength, and iron frames of the body like that of Hanumāna.

If a practitioner practises samyama in the objects of senses, their nature, egotism, their affinity and their purpose, he obtains conquest over the senses. By the control of senses, a practitioner obtains the psychic power called madhupratīka by which he can shorten distances by passing to any country in a twinkling of an eye, perceive all objects of sense without the aid of the senses and obtain conquest over nature.

If a practitioner realises 'self' by discriminating it from the buddhi, in which there is a preponderance of Sātuṣ, he becomes omnipotent and omniscient. This psychic power is called visoka siddhi. On its attainment, the practitioner by eradicating the nescience, the cause of miseries obtains Kaivalya (absolutism). It is called Samskāra s'eṣākhyā siddhi.

In the attainment of kaivalyaism, there are many obstacles in the way of a Yogi, as for example the invitation of the gods to accept certain heavenly sensual pleasures. These are the various temptations thrown in his way; if he is led away by them the whole practice becomes
ruined. There are four kinds of practitioners; (1) a Prathama Kalpika is a beginner, a neophyte (2) a madhubhūmikā is a Yogi who has obtained rītabharā prajñā as explained in the preceding pages at 89; (3) Prajñā jyoti or bhūtendriya jayā is a Yogi who has obtained conquest over the elements and senses; (4) atīkrāntabhāvniya is one who has achieved all that he wanted to achieve and reached the zenith or the topmost rung of the ladder in the practice. There are seven grades in it. When a practitioner reaches the madhumati grade while he is in the 4th stage of his practice, these temptations are offered by the gods. A practitioner should not, therefore, accept the offers made and feel proud of his achievements because of the fear of being again involved in the miserable of which he wants to be free.

The lowest limit of time is kṣaṇa (moment); by practising sanyama in the order of its succession i.e. by understanding the minute changes by large of moments, one obtains the highest differentiating power called vītekajam jñānam with the aid of which one can distinguish similar things by their genus, differentia and situation. It is self-taught, all-embracing and simultaneous without past, present and future. When the intellect (buddhi) and soul of the practitioner are purified by the practices, he attains kāivalyaism (reabsorption or absolutism).

IV.

The psychic attainments mentioned in the preceding pages are either natural in some created beings as flying in birds, or produced by medicine such as olīsīr vīta, by the power of mantra as in the case of Vatsarāja and Nandiswara, by penance as in the case of Viswāmitra, or by trance as in the case of Yājñavalkya, Dattātreya etc.

A Yogi can assume the shape of any being such as an animal or a god by uniting the different forces of nature, as for example, a small spark of fire is sufficient to ignite a large heap of combustible or inflammable substance. The virtue and vice are not the exciting causes of uniting the forces of nature, but are only helpmates or the predisposing causes. Just as a farmer by constructing a water course in his field and removing any obstacles that may be there allows a free flow of water therein so does nature itself with the aid of virtue remove the obstacles caused by the vice in the way of spiritual attainments.

When a Yogi by his attainments can create different bodies for himself the question is whether he creates many minds. The reply is in the affirmative, but all these minds are under the control of one principal mind.
When a devotee (Yogi) has purified his mind by the practice of samādhi, it becomes devoid of all associations of action and miseries. The actions are of four kinds (1) black, the fruit of which is bitter; (2) white, the fruit of which is sweet; (3) the black-and-white, the fruit of which is both bitter and sweet; (4) the non-black and non-white which bear no fruit. The actions of a perfect Yogi are of the fourth class. By virtue of the first three kinds of actions, the associations arising from the previous birth continue in the present birth, as for example, if a soul was in the body of an angel in the previous birth, it will show the angelic tendencies in the present birth. These associations though lie dormant by reason of the class, time and space, manifest themselves on occasions arising, as for instance, the feline nature of a cat may not appear in several births, periods or countries but shall manifest itself again in the body of a cat when it happens to be born again.

These associations are eternal, because the hopes are everlasting. As for example, every one is afraid of death and wishes to live; this fact shows that there have been several previous births, the impressions of which are left on one's sub-consciousness. As the hope of life is permanently deep-rooted in the animal world, the associations of the past actions and their fruit are, therefore, eternal. They owe their existence to nescience, fruit of the actions and intellect (buddhi) the receptacle. When by the spiritual knowledge, a Yogi eradicates nescience and actions and purifies his buddhi, the associations disappear.

According to the doctrine of parināma (evolution) which characterises the Sāṃkhya school of philosophy, what exists cannot be destroyed, and what does not exist cannot be created. The substratum, therefore, remains the same; but it is the qualities that undergo changes and have the past, present and future states. The present is being enjoyed; the past is the cause and the future is the effect of the present. Accordingly the chitta remains intact, and the associations which are its qualities pass away into the region of the past and no longer trouble a Yogi. The non-existence of the associations is only a transformation, because anything existent cannot be destroyed.

The varying qualities which are two-fold as gross and subtle are the gunas, viz: satwa, rajas and tamas; but the substance is one in which all these gunas exist in varying proportions. Owing to the variety of the chittas of different persons, there arises a variety of feelings in connec.
tion with one object of perception. As for example, a beautiful girl causes pleasure to her lover, enmity in the mind of her co-wife and hatred in the mind of a Yogi.

The substratum in which the guṇas reside is nothing according to the idealistic school of philosophy, because when the mind perceives a pot, it is not conscious of any other object besides it; but when the pot is removed and cloth is brought before it, it is conscious of it and there is no longer perception of the pot. It is only the fleeting ideas but not the substratum of which we are conscious. The reply of Patanjali is that the mind (chitta) perceives a thing when it is attracted to it but does not perceive it when it is not attracted to it. The perception or non-perception of an object, therefore, depends upon the application or non-application of the mind towards it. The theory of perception according to the Sāmkhya school of philosophy of which the Yoga is a branch as explained at page 74 is that the antahkaraṇa or chitta becomes animated by the reflection of the puruṣa. The modifications in the chitta caused by the presence of the object are converted into the object itself and carry the impressions of the object to the puruṣa who is then said to perceive it. The puruṣa is unchangeable, and it is only the chitta vṛttis that become converted into the object itself. As seen, the mind (chitta) is not self-illuminating; it is inanimate. As said above, it becomes animated by the soul (puruṣa) and perceives with its aid but not with the aid of another mind, because the supposition of another mind leads one to regressus in infinitum and confusion of different impressions. We shall, therefore, have to admit the existence of the intelligent being (puruṣa) who animates the chitta which, through the instrumentality of the sense organs, comes into contact with the object outside and becomes identical with it.

The mind (chitta) thus acts for the puruṣa and is said to perceive the object metaphorically. When a Yogi has realised the real nature of the puruṣa, the object and the chitta, he does not consider the chitta to be the actor, knower, and enjoyer. His ‘self’ is entirely different from the chitta. When he reaches this stage of discrimination, he becomes absorbed in the true spiritual knowledge and burdened with the sole idea of Kaivalyāsmin (absolutism). Even at this stage obstacles arise, because the impressions of the past actions are not totally eradicated. They should be remedied by keeping the difference between the purusa and the prakriti before the mind’s eye.

When the obstacles are removed, as mentioned above, the Yogi reaches the stage called the Dharma-maṇḍaḥ where he realises the puruṣa
constantly by reason of having no desire left to reap the fruit of the highest knowledge of discrimination. The miseries and actions, with the exception of the non-white and non-black as explained above disappear. When the impurities of the Yogi's mind are removed and infinite knowledge is reached there is very little left for him to know. The succession of the guṇas, viz.: satwa, rajus and tamas which have accomplished their object disappears. This succession is regulated by time, the lowest limit of which is Kṣaṇa; the changes go on in this course of time. There are two kinds of eternal substance; one is called Kuṭṭha nityātā which belongs to puruṣa who remains unchanged throughout eternity. The other is called pariṇāmi nityātā which belongs to the guṇas which undergo changes every moment, leave a person who has reached the highest stage in his practice, but still keep hold of another who is ignorant; this process or change is repeated throughout eternity. When this stage is reached the Yogi becomes united to his self devoid of all guṇas. This stage is called Kaivalyaism.

Having given the teachings of the Yoga philosophy in detail, let us see how far they are supported by the Upaniṣads. We find the Yoga doctrines in the Upaniṣads in their elementary form. The Yoga system has been developed from the elementary teachings we find in the Upaniṣads. Let us take Maitriyopaniṣat published in the S. B. H. XXXI, VI. 10. p. 67.

"The puruṣa is, therefore, the eater; the prakriti is food, being seated in it, he eats. The food consisting of pratiti by reason of its resulting in the difference of three guṇas is characterised by Mahat as first and particular as last." See the commentary on it in English in the same series at p. 68 of XXXI.

In VI. 18, it is said "Similarly there is a rule of practice such as prāṇāyāma (breath exercise), pratyāhāra (withdrawal of sense organs from their objects), dhyāna (meditation) dhāraṇā (concentration), tarka (contemplation) and samādhi (trance). They are called the six limbs of Yoga . . . . . . ." See the commentary on it in the S. B. H. XXXI series at pp. 82 and 83.

In VI. 20 "Now it is said elsewhere, there is a greater practice called Dārśana (concentration by pressing the tongue against the palate and restraining the speech, mind and breath; he sees Brahma by tarka (contemplation). When he sees by the self his own self, the minutest of the minute and shining, on cessation of the mind, then by seeing his self by the self, he becomes selfless . . . . . . ." p. 85 of XXXI.

In VI. 21 "Again it is said elsewhere; the ascending blood vessel called
carrying life, is bifurcated in the palate; let him by it which is full of life-breath, omkāra and mind ascend up. Turning the tip of the tongue on the upper part of the palate and joining the organs, let glory see glory; one thereby becomes self-less: by reason of being self-less, he does not partake of pleasure and pain but obtains redemption. It is said that having placed the first by the restrained breath on the palate, let him then crossing the shore unite with the Infinite in the cerebral region”. p. 87 of XXXI.

In VI. 22 “On the other hand, those who follow the word by closing the ears with the thumbs, hear the sound of the ether in the heart. It resembles seven kinds, (of sounds) as for example that of the rivers, bells, bell-metal, wheel, croaking of frogs, rainfall and (the voice of one when) he speaks in a lonely place. Having passed beyond it (the sound) of different kinds, they vanish in the Supreme, non-word and non-manifest Brahman......” See the commentary on it in the S. B. H. XXXI. p. 95.

Not only do we find the doctrines of the Yoga philosophy, but the word ‘Yoga’ is also defined. See VI. 25. “It is said because one joins in this way the breath, Om and all in its mainfold forms or they join with him, it is, therefore, called Yoga. The union of breath and mind and similarly of the organs and the relinquishment of all existence, is called Yoga.” p. 95 of XXXI.

In VI. 31 (9) at p. 121 of XXXI, samādhi is praised “The pleasure felt by one whose mind is purified of the impurities by the trance and is placed in the self cannot be described by the speech but can be felt by him with the internal organ”.

It is useless to accumulate quotations from the Upaniṣads; the quotations given above are quite sufficient to show that the Yoga system of philosophy both theoretical and practical is based on the teachings scattered here and there in the Upaniṣads. It is needless to refer to the apocryphal Upaniṣads which were surely written after the Yoga sūtras had come into existence.

V. Mīmāṃsā.

In view of the separate volume entitled Introduction to the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras, in S. B. H. XXVIII, it is unnecessary to write anything in connection with it. The Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy is not based on the teachings of the Upaniṣads but on the Taittiriya Samhitā. It relates to the sacrificial rites which are deprecated by the Upaniṣads. See Mundaka 1.2.10-11. These sacrificial rites are only external ceremonies.
to secure heaven; without spiritual knowledge which alone is entitled to be called ādīya, final redemption or reabsorption cannot be secured. These external rites in the shape of the sacrifices constitute śāaddya, because they do not secure immortality or immunity from the transmigration of soul.

VI. Vedānta.

Now we come to the Uttara Mīmāṃsā which is also called Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā or the Vedānta school of philosophy. It embraces idealism and transcendentalism. We find its counterpart in the philosophy of Plato, Kant and Spinoza.

We have examined the Sāṁkhya system of philosophy which is realism of the European system of philosophy. It is a common sense view and it prepared the way for the establishment of the atheistic school of philosophy. The Vedāntic school of philosophy started by Bādarāyaṇa was mainly intended to criticise the Sāṁkhya view and was based on the teachings of the Upaniṣads. The Śārīrika sūtras are generally short passages culled from the text of the Upaniṣads or their substance reproduced in a different language. The creation of the material world from matter and the multiplicity of the puruṣā is repulsive to the teaching of the Upaniṣads. The non-existence of Is'wara is also against the canons of the scripture. It was chiefly with a view to combat the doctrines of Sāṁkhya that Bādarāyaṇa raised the standard of revolt. If the Sāṁkhya is dualism advocating the existence and eternity of mind and matter, the Vedānta is monism affirming the existence and eternity of one intelligent substance called Brahma and denying the creation of the universe by nature or Pradhāna. A vast literature in the shape of original writings and commentaries has sprung up round Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras; the real meaning of Bādarāyaṇa amidst this heterogenous mass of writings is lost sight of and remains shrouded in an apparent mystery.

Different schools have naturally sprung up. Those who are extremists say that there is absolutely nothing besides one intelligent substance called Brahma in this Vedānta. This school of extremists is called here advaśtism or monism. The greatest philosopher who stands out prominently in this school is Śankarācharya, and there were many who preceded him and followed him. This school has, therefore, become synonymous with Śankarism or Māyāvāda or Illusionism. According to the Māyāvāda doctrine, the phenomenal existence of the cosmos is illusion. It, therefore, follows that the individual soul and the supreme soul are not different. They are one and the same thing; it is only nescience under the influence of which we
see the variety. When nescience is radically removed by the spiritual knowledge acquired, the apparent difference disappears and pure Brahmahood is reached. As for example the universal ether is all pervading, it is also in a pot; there is only an apparent difference between the universal ether and that in the pot where it is confined: but if the pot which is called upādhi (environment) is broken, the universal ether alone is left.

Against this view there is the dualistic school of Vaiṣṇavas, according to which the individual souls and the universe are real entities and different from Brahmā. Ananda Tirtha, Nimbārka and Vallabhāchārya belong to this school. They are Vaiṣṇavas and believe in the chatur vyuha doctrine; according to them there are Vasudeva, Samkarṣaṇa, Aniruddha and Pradyumna, the different manifestations of one deity. This school further advocates devotion to the Lord (bhakti). The Bhāgavata school which believes in the chatur vyuha doctrine as explained above is older than Śankarāchārya, as the latter criticised it in his commentary on the Vedānta sūtra. Baudhāyana who is said to be the oldest commentator on the Vedānta sūtras appears to belong to the dualistic school of Vedānta as Rāmānuja says in his introduction to his commentary on the sūtra that he based it on the Brahma sūtras critī by the revered Baudhāyana. Nimbārka, Ballabha-chārya, Mādhava aliṣā Ananda Tirtha were Vaiṣṇavites and have their sects in Mathura, Brindaban and Southern India. They are distinguishable from one another from their peculiar trident marks made of chalk and red powder on their foreheads. The Gosains or the heads of the sects who are priests are very exclusive people and consider themselves polluted even by the shadow of an untouchable.

Though Rāmānuja belongs to the dualistic school, yet his dualism borders on the non-dualism. According to him there is a difference between the supreme and the individual souls and the creation, if looked individually (vyāṣṭi rūpena); but if looked as a whole (samaṣṭi rupena) there is no difference. As for example, there are different portions in a human body which when looked on separately are different but when looked on as constituting the whole, there is only one human body. This kind of non-dualism or dualism is called qualified monism (visiṣṭādwaita). He is also a Vaiṣṇava and a founder of an important sect of Vaiṣṇavism prevalent in southern India and Mathura and Brindaban in upper India. He was born at Trichnopoly in the family of the Brahmans of the Hārīta gotra in 1127 A. C. His father was Kesāva Bhaṭṭa. He is believed to be an incarnation of Śeṣa by his followers.
The followers of the Rāmānuja sect also put on a trident mark of white chalk and red perpendicular line made of some red powder in the middle. They are exclusive people and shun the untouchable as other Viṣṇu priests do.

The common people belonging to the different sects understand nothing of the philosophical side of the Vedānta, but believe in it and follow the different tenets of the religion founded by their masters. We have Chaitanyaism founded by Chaitanya in Bengal.

Having given the different schools of the Vedānta, let us see what the word means. It occurs in the Upaniṣads both canonical and uncanonical. In the Muṇḍakopaniṣat III.2-8.

चेदांत विश्वासनितिशिल्पात्मा: सन्त्यास गोगाधरय: शूकलत्वा: |

"Those whose object is fully ascertained by the knowledge of the Vedānta and those ascetics whose mind is purified by sannyāsa and Yoga......"

In the Śvetasvataropaniṣad VI. 22.

"वेदांति परभवुब्रु पुराकल्पे प्रवीर्धितिः"

"The most hidden secret of the Vedānta revealed in the previous creation......"

The 'word vedānta' occurs in Mahānārayanopaniṣad, Kaivalyopaniṣad, Kṣurakopaniṣat and Muktikopaniṣat.

It is derived from वेद + anta = the end of the Veda. The Veda as said in the previous pages at 1 is divided into three parts (khaṇḍas) according to the nature of the subject; the first is Karma Kāṇḍa which is ritualistic the second is upāsanā kāṇḍa which is devotional, and the third is Juñāna kāṇḍa which consists of the spiritual knowledge. The spiritual knowledge is the highest end without which no one can obtain salvation; it is neither the religious ceremonies nor the blind faith in God that can save the soul from the transmigration. It is the true knowledge of self (Ātmavidyā) which leads one to cross the ocean of darkness and attain immortality.

The Vedānta has become so much popular in India that the people, both learned and illiterate profess it. In words they assert the non-dualism by calling their individual self as Brahma and in action they consider themselves above virtue and vice. Rightly has some poet
said in parody of the Vedānta:—

बहू वस्त्रथमबिल नहि किंविद्विति।
तथापक मेशनी परावर सेवुति:॥
जारि तथा निजमय शुद्धशुभ्रागो।
सन्धियविकार सङ्कीतित कर्थयौरि॥

"Forsooth the whole cosmos is Brahma in reality, there is nothing besides him; O! friend, I therefore make no difference between another and myself. I show equal regard to my paramour and husband. Why should people uselessly call me 'unchaste?'"

The sublime and high teaching of the Vedānta philosophy has been thus misunderstood and abused by the common people in their own self-interest. There is another example of Vāma Mārga or the Śakti worship which has degenerated into Bacchanalianism and filthy and obscene rites. Woodroffe has tried to save the Śaktism from the above charge by writing several works and translating some of the Tantras. His 'Śākta and Śakti worship' is a valuable contribution.

The word 'Vedānta' applies to the Upanisads in general and the sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa in particular. The monism of Śankarāchārya is included in it. The Upanisads, the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa and the Bhagavadgītā are included in the term and are called Prastāna trayi. All the schools of the Vedānta enumerated above have commented upon the Prastāna trayi according to the view of their school and have, therefore, twisted the text to suit their view. We have in the translation of the Upanisads followed the Mādhwa school which is, as said repeatedly, dualistic.

After having described the Vedānta and its different schools, let us turn to the theory of creation or cosmology. According to the accepted view, it is called Vivartvādā; and before this doctrine is explained, let us explain satya or existence. It is of three kinds: (1) Pāramārthika, real or true which remains unmodified in all states and at all times. Under this definition, the existence of Brahma alone is pāramārthika or real; (2) Vyāvahārika is the phenomenal existence which is true for the time being under the influence of the inborn nescience; as all ignorant people not acquainted with astro-mone accept the geocentric doctrine, or people in a dream believe in the existence of the scenes that pass one after the other before their eye for that time, but on awakening find that they were all false. Similarly the creation which we see around us is all imaginary but true as long as nescience lasts; but when the true nature of Brahma is realised by the constant study, repetition, and meditation, the phenomenal
existence which is true in the state of ignorance disappears. (3) Parabhásika satta is the apparent existence which, by some defect in an individual, the objects appear to be different from what they really are; as for example, a person suffering from diplopia sees two moons, a person in dark sees a serpent in a rope or an ignorant person sees silver in a naacre. All optical illusions such as mirage, fata morgana, ignus fatus etc. come under apparent existence.

From the above explanation of the existence, it appears that the phenomenal and apparent existence are one and the same; but it is not so. The phenomenal existence is true to a class by inherent defect, for ever but apparent existence is true to an individual by reason of some optical illusion or constitutional defect under certain circumstances only.

Having now explained the nature and varieties of the existence, it is now not difficult to understand visarga doctrine; we have seen that Brahma alone is truly existent and appears to be changed into the phenomenal existence of the universe under the influence of nescience or illusion. The whole universe is the emanation from the true essence or existent who is called Brahma and its ultimate re-absorption in him. Just as there are inspiration and expiration in a person, so are the emanation and absorption of the entire universe from and into the primeval source, viz., Brahma. In this view, the universe is true for the time being and is said to exist phenomenally but not really. Brahma is the soul and the universe around us is his body; the individuals are like the drops of water returning to the original source, viz., the ocean. The appropriate simile which is very familiar with the Vedánta school is that the universal ether is not different from the ether that pervades a pot; and on the latter being broken, the ether of the pot which was confined by the surrounding environments reverts to the universal ether. Similarly, the individual souls are confined by the surrounding environments called upādhi in the Vedántic terminology and on the upādhi being removed by the spiritual knowledge acquired by constant study, repetition and meditation, the souls return to the primeval cause which is Brahma.

According to the Vedánta school we have three states, namely, sleeping, waking and dreaming, besides swoon and death. The Vyāvahārīka existence of the scenes in a dream where one has sons, daughters and other relations, lasts till the dreaming state is over; but the Vyāvahārīka existence
of the world continued not only for one's life but also for several lives, till
nescience lasts. This naturally leads to the doctrine of metempsychosis.

According to the Chhandogypopniṣad, Chapter V as interpreted by Vyāsa
in Chapter III of his Vedānta śūtras the departed souls go either by
the devayāna (the path of the gods) or pitriyāna (the path of the manes.)
The passage of the soul by the former way is first through the region of
fire, the sun, the moon and lightning and ultimately leading to Brahma who
is perfect light. When a soul attains the region of Brahma, it does not
come back. The souls that go by the pitriyāna have to come back after
the enjoyment of the fruit of their good actions to the world in the
following order; rain, vegetables (including herbs and cereals), food, semen
and womb. These are, as it were, the five steps of the ladder that is
between the heaven and earth for ascent and descent. The passage of
the soul in the order of descent through the vegetable kingdom is temporary
and should not be confounded with the rebirth of a soul in the vegetable
kingdom by virtue of its actions.

This transmigration or descent and ascent of a soul lasts for several
births till Brahmahood is reached by the light of the spiritual science
(Brahmavidyā). It cannot be obtained by the performance of the
sacrifices or blind faith. It is the true knowledge of ‘Self’ which can
save one from the series of births called samsāra in the Vedantic language.

In my opinion, the teaching of the Upaniṣads leans greatly towards
advaitism or monism of Śaṅkarāchārya. I shall now proceed to cite
passages from the Upaniṣats as translated by Max Müllar in the Sacred
Books of the East; our translation being based on the view of the
Mādwa school is, therefore, not cited. Sanscrit texts are not quoted as
a curious reader can refer to the original in our series.

“And he who beholds all beings in the ‘Self’ and the ‘Self’ in all beings
he never turns away from it.” Ís’a. 6.

“When to a man who understands, the ‘Self’ has become all things,
what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that
unity.” (Ibid 7.)

“... ... I am what He is.” (Ibid 16.)

“... ... He who sees any difference here, goes from death to
death.” Kaṭha Chapter II. 4.10.

“... ... He goes from death to death who sees any
difference here.” (Ibid, Chapter II. 4.11.)
"As the one fire, after it has entered the world, though one, becomes different according to whatever it burns, thus the one 'Self' within all things becomes different, according to what it enters and exists also without." (Ibid, Chapter II. 5. 9.)

"As the one air, after it has entered the world though one, becomes different according to whatever it enters, thus the one self within all things becomes different according to whatever it enters and exists also without." (Ibid, 10.)

"As the sun, the eye of the whole world is not contaminated by the external impurities seen by the eyes, thus the one Self within all things is never contaminated by the misery of the world, being himself without." (Ibid, 11.)

"As these flowing rivers that go towards the ocean, when they have reached the ocean, sink into it, their name and form are broken and people speak of the ocean only, exactly thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the puruṣa, when they have reached the puruṣa, sink into him, their name and form are broken and people speak of the puruṣa only, and he becomes without parts and immortal ... ... " (Praśna VI. 5.)

"... ... Sir, what is that through which, if it is known, everything else becomes known?" (Mundaka I. 1. 3.)

"As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from every man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus does everything arise here from the Indestructible." (Ibid 7.)

"This is the truth. As from the blazing fire sparks being like unto fire, fly forth thousand-fold, thus are various beings brought forth from the imperishable, my friend, and return thither also." (Ibid, II. 1. 1.)

"As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their form, thus a wise man, freed from name and form goes to the divine person, who is greater than the great." (Ibid, III. 2. 8.)

"... ... That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman." (Taittiriya III. 1.)

"After that, the Gārhapatya fire taught him: Earth, fire, food and the sun (these are my forms, or forms of Brahman). The person that is seen in the sun, I am he, I am he indeed." (Chhāndogya IV. 11.)
"Then the Anvâhârya fire taught him, 'water, the quarters, the stars, the moon (these are my forms). The person that is seen in the moon, I am he, I am he indeed.' (Ibid, 12.)

"Then the Abhavanîya fire taught him: Breath, ether, heaven and lightning (these are my forms). The person that is seen in the lightening I am he and I am he indeed." (Ibid 13.)

"He said: the person that is seen in the eye, that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman ... 

"... My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech but the truth being that all is clay." (Ibid VI. 14.)

"And as my dear, by one nugget of gold, all that is made of gold is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is gold." (Ibid 5.)

"And as my dear, by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is iron,—thus my dear, is that instruction." (Ibid 6.)

"In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is (To ov) one only, without a second. Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not (To µν ov), one only, without a second; and from that which is not, that which is, was born." (Ibid VI. 2. 1.)

"But how could it be thus, my dear? the father continued. 'How could that which is, be born of that which is not? No my dear, only that which is, was in the beginning, one only without a second.'" (Ibid 2.)

"Uddâlaka Aruni said to his son Śveta Ketu: learn from me the true nature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, then, my dear son, he becomes united with the True, he is gone to his own (self). Therefore they say 'he sleeps'—because he is gone to his own (self)." (Ibid 8. 1.)

"As the bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of distant trees and reduce the juices into one form, and as these juices have no discrimination, so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that, in the same manner, my son all these creatures, when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the true. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf or
a bear or a worm or a midge or a gnat or a musquito, that they become again and again. Now that which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self and thou, O! Svetaketu, art it.” (Ibid 9. 1. 4.)

“These rivers, my son, run the eastern toward the east, the western toward the west. They go from sea to sea. They become indeed sea. And as those rivers, when they are in the sea, do not know, I am this or that river, in the same manner, my son all these creatures, when they have come back from the True know not that they have come back from the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf or a bear or a worm or a midge or a gnat or a musquito, that they become again and again. That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O! Svetaketu, art it.” (Ibid 10. 1—3.)

“If some one were to strike at the root of this large tree here, it would bleed, but live. If he were to strike at its stem, it would bleed but live. If he were to strike at its top, it would bleed but live. Pervaded by the living Self that tree stands firm, drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing; but if the life leaves one of its branches, that branch withers; if it leaves third, that branch withers. If it leaves the whole tree, the whole tree withers. In exactly the same manner my son, know this. Then he spoke this (body) indeed withers and dies when the living Self has left it; the living Self dies not. That which is subtle essence in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, Svetaketu, art it.” (Ibid 11. 1—3.)

“Fetch me from thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree.
Here is one, sir.
Break it.
It is broken, sir.
What do you see there?
These seeds, almost infinitesimal.
Break one of them.
It is broken, sir.
What do you see there?
Not anything, sir.

The father said: my son that subtle essence which you do not perceive there, of that very essence this great Nyagrodha tree exists,
Believe it, my son, that which is the subtile essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O! S'veta Ketu, art it." (Ibid 12. 1—3.

"Place this salt in water and then wait on me in the morning. The son did as he was commanded. The father said to him, bring me the salt which you placed in the water last night. The son having looked for it, found it not, for, of course, it was melted. The father said: taste it from the surface of the water. How is it? The son replied: it is salt.

Taste it from the middle. How is it?
The son replied: it is salt.
Taste it from the middle. How is it?
The son replied: it is salt.
Taste it from the bottom. How is it?
The son replied: it is salt.

The father said: "throw it away and then wait on me." He did so; but salt exists forever. Then the father said: here also in this body, forsooth, you do not perceive the True, my son; but there indeed it is. That which subtile essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the self, O, thou, Śveta Ketu, art it." (Ibid 13. 1—3.)

"As one might lead a person with his eyes covered away from the Gandhāras and leave him then in a place where there are no human beings; and as that person would turn towards the east, or the north or the west and shout. "I have been brought here with my eyes covered, I have been left here with my eyes covered"; and as thereupon some one might loose his bandage and say to him "go in that direction, it is Gandhāra, go in that direction"; and as thereupon having been informed and being able to judge for himself he would by asking his way from village to village, arrive at last at Gandhāra, in exactly the same manner does a man, who meets with a teacher to inform him, obtain the true knowledge. For him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered (from the body); then be will be perfect. That which is the subtile essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the self, and thou, O! Śveta Ketu, art it." (Ibid 14. 1—3.)

If a man is ill, his relatives assemble round him and ask: "dost thou know me?" Now as long as his speech is not merged in his mind, his mind in breath, breath in heat (fire), heat in the Highest Being, he knows them. But when his speech is merged in his mind, his mind in breath,
breath in heat (fire), heat in the Highest Being, then he knows them not. That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the self and thou, O! Śvetā Ketu, art it."

(Ibid 15. 1-2.)

"My child, they bring a man hither whom they have taken by the hand, and they say: ‘he has taken something, he has committed a theft. Heat the hatchet for him.’ If he committed the theft, then he makes himself to be what he is not. Then the false-minded having covered his true Self by a falsehood, grasp the heated hatchet, he is burnt and he is killed. But if he did not commit the theft, then he makes himself to be what he is. Then the true-minded, having covered his true Self by truth, grasp the heated hatchet—he is not burnt and he is delivered. And that man is not burnt, thus has all that exists its Self in That. It is the True. It is the Self and thou, O! Śvetā Ketu, art it."

(Ibid 61. 1-2.)

"Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the infinite. When one sees something else, that is the finite. The infinite is immortal, the finite is mortal."

(Ibid VII. 24-1.)

"The infinite indeed is below, above, behind, before, right and left—it is indeed all this. Now follows the explanation of the Infinite as the I: I am below I am above, I am behind, before, right and left—I am all this. Next follows the explanation of the Infinite as the Self; Self is below, above, behind, before, right and left—Self is all this."

(Ibid 25, 1-2.)

"To him who sees, perceives and understands this, the spirit springs from the self, hope springs from the self, memory springs from the self. So do ether, fire, water, appearance and disappearance, food, power, understanding, reflection, consideration, will, mind, speech, names, sacred hymns and sacrifices—aye all this springs from the self. There is the verse. "He who sees this, does not see death, nor illness, nor pain; he who sees this, sees everything, and obtains everything everywhere. He is one, he becomes three, he becomes five, he becomes seven, he becomes nine; then he is called the eleventh and hundred and ten and one thousand and twenty.” (Ibid 26, 1-2.)

"Now that serene being which, after having risen from out this earthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form, that is the Self, thus he spake. This is the immortal, the fearless,
this is Brahman. And of that Brahman the name is the True, (Satyaṃ). This name Sattvaṃ consists of three syllables sat-ti-yam. Sat signifies immortal, t, the mortal and with yam he binds both. Because he binds both the immortal and the mortal, therefore it is yam." (Ibid. VII. 3, 4-5.)

"Verily in the beginning this was Brahman, that Brahma knew Self, saying, I am Brahma. From it all this sprang. Thus whatever Deva was awakened, he indeed become that; and the same with Rishi’s and men. The riṣi Vāma’Deva saw and understood it, singing, I was Manu, I was the sun. Therefore now also he who thus knows that he is Brahma becomes all this and even the Devas can not prevent it, for he himself is their Self. Now if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know. He is like a beast for the Devas. For verily, as many beasts nourish a man, thus does every man nourish the Devas. If only one beast is taken away, it is not pleasant; how much more when many are taken! Therefore it is not pleasant to Devas that men should know this." (Brihadāraṇyaka I. 4.10.)

"In the beginning this was self alone, one only." (Ibid 17.)

"As the spider comes out with its thread, or as small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all senses, all words, all Devas, all beings come forth from that self. The Upaniṣad of that self is the True of the True. Verily the senses are the true and he is the true of the true (Ibid II. 1-20.)

"Verily, the self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O! Maitreyi. When we see, hear, perceive and know the self, then all this is known." (Ibid 4-5.)

"As a lump of salt, when thrown into water becomes dissolved into water and could not be taken out again, but wherever we taste (water), it is salt— thus verily, O! Maitreyi, does this great Being, endless, unlimited consisting of nothing, but knowledge rise from out these elements and vanish again in them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge, I say, O! Maitreyi. Thus spoke Yājñavalkya. (Ibid. 12.)

"For when there is as it were duality then one sees the other, one salutes the other one perceives the other, one knows the other; but when the self only is all this, how should he smell another, how should be see another, how should be hear another, how should be salute another, how
should he perceive another how should he know another? How should he know Him by whom he knows all this? How, O! beloved, should he know the knower?”. *Ibid* 13.

“This Self is the honey of all beings, and all beings are the honey of this Self. Likewise this bright, immortal person in this Self and that bright immortal person the Self (both are madhu). He indeed is the same as that Self, that immortal, that Brahma, that all. And verily this Self is the Lord of all beings, the king of all beings. And as all spokes are contained in the axle and in the felly of a wheel, all beings, and all those selves are contained in that Self.” *Ibid* 5—14-15.

“Then Us'asta Châkrâyana asked; ‘Yâjñavalkya’. he said, tell me the Brahma which is visible, not visible, the Self within all; Yâjñavalkya replied, ‘This, thy Self who is within all. Which Self, O! Yâjñavalkya, is within all?’ Yâjñavalkya replied: ‘he who breathes in the up—breathing, he is thy Self, and within all. He who breathes in the down—breathing, he is thy Self, and within all. He who breathes in the on breathing he is thy Self, and within all. He who breathes in the out-breathing, he is thy Self and within all. This is thy Self who is within all; Us’asta Châkrâyana said: “as one might say this is a cow, this is a horse, thus has this been explained by thee. Tell me the Brahma which is visible, not visible, the Self who is within all”. Yâjñavalkya replied: ‘this thy Self who is within all.’

“Which Self, O! Yâjñavalkya, is within all?” Yâjñavalkya replied ‘thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive perceivers the of perception, nor know the knower of knowledge. This is thy Self who is within all. Every thing else is of evil. After that Us’asta Châkrâyana held his peace”. *Ibid* III-4, 1-2.

“He who dwells in all beings, and within all beings, whom all beings do not know, whose body all beings are and who rules all beings within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal”; “unseen, but seeing; unheard, but hearing; unperceived but perceiving; unknown, but knowing. There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other knower but he. This is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal”......*Ibid* 7—15,23.

“He said, O! Gârgi, the Brâhmanas call this the imperishable (Aksara). It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, neither
red nor fluid; it is without shadow, without darkness, without air, without ether, without attachment, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without a mouth, without a measure, having no within and no without, it devours nothing and no one devours it. By the command of that imperishable, O! Gārgi, sun and moon stand apart. By the command of that imperishable, O! Gārgi, what are called moments, hours, days and nights, half-months, months, seasons, years, all stand apart. By the command of that imperishable, O! Gārgi, some rivers flow to the east from the white mountains, others to the west, or to any other quarter. By the command of that imperishable, O! Gārgi, men praise those who give, the gods follow the sacrificer, the fathers (pitris) the darvi offerings. Whosoever, O! Gārgi, without knowing that imperishable, offers oblations in this world, sacrifices and performs penance for a thousand years, his work will have an end. Whosoever, O! Gārgi without knowing this imperishable, departs this world, he is miserable. But he, O! Gārgi, who departs this world, knowing this imperishable, he is Brahma. That Brahma, O! Gārgi, is unseen, but seeing, unheard, but hearing, unperceived, but perceiving; unknown, but knowing. There is nothing but sees it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it. In that imperishable then O! Gārgi, the ether is woven like warp and woof'. Ibid. 8-8.11.

"Janaka Vaideha said 'who is that Self'?"

Yajñavalkya replied; he who is within the heart surrounded by the Prānas the person of light, consisting of knowledge. He remaining, the same, wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as if moving. During sleep (in dream) he transcends this world and all the forms of death..........." Ibid. iv. 3-7.

"When there he does not see, yet he is seeing, though he does not see. For sight is inseparable from the see, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could see. Ibid. 23.

"An ocean is that one see, without any duality; this is the Brahma world, O! King". Ibid. 32.

"That Self is indeed Brahma consisting of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing, earth, water, wind, ether, light and no light, desire and no desire, anger and no anger, right and wrong and all things. Now as a man is like this or that, according as he acts and according as he
behaves, so will he be:—A man of good acts will become good; a man of bad acts, bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by bad deeds. There they say that a person consists of desires. And as is his desire, so is his will and as is his will, so is his deed; and whatever deed he does, that he will reap". *Ibid* 4-5.

"On this there is this verse: when all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahma. And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant hill dead and cast away, thus lies the body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahma only, is only light". *Ibid*. 7.

"If a man understands the Self saying 'I am he' what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body" *Ibid*. 12.

"By the mind alone it is to be perceived, there is no diversity. He who perceives therein any diversity, goes from death to death". *Ibid*. 19.

"...........This eternal greatness of the Brahma does not grow larger by work nor does it grow smaller. Let man try to find its trace, for having found it, he is not sullied by any evil deed. He, therefore, that knows it, after having become quiet, subdued, satisfied, patient and collected, sees self in Self, sees all as Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn him, he burns all evil. Free from evil, free from spots, free from doubts, he becomes a true Brahma; this is the Brahma-world, O king........" *Ibid*. 23.

"This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahma. Fearless is Brahma and he who knows this, becomes verily the fearless Brahma." *Ibid*. 25.

"........verily, everything is not dear, that you may love everything, but you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear. Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O Maitreyi. When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived and known, then all this is known" *Ibid*. 5—6.

"Whosoever looks for the Brahman-class elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the Brahman-class. Whosoever looks for the Kṣatra class elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the kṣatra class. Whosoever looks for the worlds elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the worlds. Whosoever looks for the Devas elsewhere than in the Self was abandoned by the Devas. Whosoever looks for
the Vedas elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the Vedas. Whosoever looks for the creature elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by the creatures. Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self, was abandoned by anything. This Brahman-class, this Kṣatriya class, these worlds, these Devas, these Vedas, all these beings, this everything, all is that Self." *Ibid. 7.*

"As clouds of smoke proceed by themselves out of lighted fire kindled with damp fuel, thus verily, O! Maitreyi, has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have as Rigveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda, Atharvāṅgirasas, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Vidyā, the Upaniṣads, Ślokas, Sūtras, Anuvākhanas, Vyākhyanas, what is sacrificed, what is poured out, food, drink, this world and other worlds, and all creatures. From him alone, all these were breathed forth." *Ibid. 11.*

"As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge; having risen from out these elements, vanishes again in them. When he has departed, there is no more knowledge, I say, O! Maitreyi." *Ibid. 13.*

"For when there is as it were duality, than one sees the other, one smells the other, one tastes the other, one salutes the other, one hears the other, one perceives the other, one touches the other, one knows the other, but when the Self, only is all this, how should he see another, how should he smell another, how should he taste another, how should he salute another, how should he hear another, how should he touch another, how should he know another? How should he know Him by whom he knows all this? That Self is to be described by ‘No’, ‘No’. He is incomprehensible for he cannot be comprehended; he is imperishable for he can not perish; he is unattached, for he does not attach himself; unfettered he does not suffer, he does not fail. How, O! beloved should he know the knower? Thus O! Maitreyi, thou hast been instructed. He fargoes immortality." *Ibid. 15.*

"He who, without stopping the out—breathing, proceeds upwards, and who, modified and yet not modified drives away the darkness, he is Self. Thus said the Saint Maitri. And Śākayana said to the king Bṛhadṛatha: he who in perfect rest rising from this body and reaching the highest light comes forth in his own form, he is Self; this is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahma." *Maitreyupuṇiṣat II. 2*
"He who in the Śruti is called, "standing above", like passionless ascetics amidst the objects of the world, he indeed the pure, clean, undeveloped, tranquil, breathless, bodiless, endless, imperishable, firm everlasting, unborn, independent one, stands in his own greatness, and by him has this body been made intelligent and he is also the driver of it." *Ibid.* 4.

".....Surerly the Self which is called immortal, is the thinker, the perceiver, the goer, the evacuator, the delighter, the doer, the speaker, the taster, the smellter, the seer, the hearer, and he touches. He is Vibhū who has entered into the body. And it is said, when the knowledge is two-fold, then he hears, sees, smells, tastes, touches, for it is the Self that knows everything. But when the knowledge is not two-fold, without effect, cause and action, without a name, without a comparison, without a predicate, what is that? It cannot be told." *Ibid.* VI. 7.

"And the same Self is also called Is'āna (lord) S'ambhu, Bhava, Rudra; Prajāpati, (lord of creatures), Vis'wāsrija (creator of all), Hiraṇya-garbha, Satyam (truth), Prāṇa (breath), Hamsa; Śāstri (ruler), Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa; Arka; Savitri, Dhātri (supporter), Vidhātri (creator) Samrāj (king), Indra, Indu (moon). He is also he who warms, the Sun, hidden by the thousand eyed golden egg as one fire by another. He is to be thought after, he is to be sought after. Having said farewell to all living beings, having gone to the forest, and having renounced all sensuous objects, let man perceive the Self from his own body....." *Ibid.* 8.

"I am like a season and the child of the seasons, sprung from the womb of endless space, from the light. The light, the origin of the year, which is the past, which is the present, which is all living things, and all elements, is the Self. Thou art the Self. What thou art, that I am. Brahma says to him: who am I? He shall answer: that which is the true (Sattyam). Brahma asks, what is the true? He says to him: 'what is different from the gods and from the senses that is Sat but the gods and the senses are Tyam. Therefore by that name Satyam (true) is called all this whatever there is. All this thou art". *Kauśi-tikā I.* 6.

"......And when he awakes, then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the prāṇas proceed, each towards its place, from the prāṇas the gods, from the gods, the worlds
And as a razor might be fitted in a razor-case, or as fire in the fireplace, even thus this conscious Self enters the self of the body to the very hairs and nails..." *Ibid. IV. 20.*

These are the few passages as samples of Adwaitism (monism) in the Upaniṣads; but I may not be understood to say that there are no passages in support of Dwaitism (dualism) in the Upaniṣads. I give those passages where Devaitism is referred to; they are, in my opinion, not many.

"There are the two, drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahma call them shade and light; likewise, those house holders who perform the Trināchiketa sacrifice". *Kaṭhā I. 3, 1.*

"Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating. On the same tree, man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence. But when he sees the other lord contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away. When the seer sees the brilliant maker and lord as the person who has his source in Brahma, then he is wise, and shaking off good and evil, he reaches the highest oneness, free from passions". *Māṇḍūkya III. 1-1-3.*

"There are two, one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, one strong, the other weak; there is she, the unborn, through whom each man receives the recompense of his works; and there is the infinite Self under all forms, but himself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is Brahma. That which is perishable is the Pradhāna; the immortal and imperishable is Hara. The one God rules the perishable and the self. From meditating on him, from joining him from becoming one with him, there is further cessation of all illusion in the end. When that god is known, all fetters fall off, sufferings are destroyed and birth and death cease. From meditating on him there arises, on the dissolution of the body, the third state that of universal lordship; but he only who is alone, is satisfied. This which rests eternally within the Self, should be known; and beyond this not anything has to be known. By knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the ruler, everything has been declared to be threefold and this is Brahma". *Śvetāsvatara I. 9-12.*

"As oil in seeds, as butter in cream, as water in river beds, as fire in wood, so is Self seized within the self, if a man looks for
him by truthfulness and penance; (if he looks) for the Self that pervades every thing, as butter is contained in milk, and the roots whereof are self-knowledge and penance. That is the Brahma taught by the Upaniṣat". *Ibid* 15-16.

"There is one unborn being (female) red, white and black, uniform, but producing manifold offspring. There is one unborn being (male) who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her, while she is eating what has to be eaten. Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating. On the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence. But when he sees the other lord contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away". *Ibid* iv. 5-7.

"That from which the maker (Māyi) sends forth all this—the sacred verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the penances, the past, the future and all that the Vedas declare—in that the other is bound up through that Māyā. Know then prakriti (nature) is Māyā, and the great Lord the Māyi (maker); the whole world is filled with what are his members". *Ibid* 9-10.

"But he who is endowed with qualities and performs works that are to bear fruit and enjoys the reward of whatever he has done migrates through his own works, the lord of life, assuming all forms, led by the three guṇas and following the three paths". *Ibid* v. 7.

"He who is eternal among eternals, the thinker among thinkers, who though one, fulfills the desire of many. He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Śāṅkhya and Yoga, he is freed from all fetters". *Ibid*, vi. 13

"...There is indeed that other different one, called the elemental Self who, overcome by bright and dark fruits of action, enters on a good or bad birth downward or upward in his course and overcome by the pairs he roams about. And this is his explanation: the five tanmātrās are called Bhūta; also the five Mahābhūtās (gross elements) are called Bhūta. Then the aggregate of all these is called Sarīra, body. And lastly he of whom it was said that he dwelt in the body he is called Bhūtātma, the elemental Self. Thus his immortal Self is like a drop of water on a lotus leaf and he himself is overcome by the qualities of nature. Then because he is thus overcome, he becomes bewildered, and because he is bewildered, he saw not the creator, the holy Lord, abiding within himself carried along
by the waves of the qualities, darkened in his imaginations, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating, he enters into belief believing, "I am he" "this is mine"; he binds his Self by his Self, as a bird with a net, and overcome afterwards by the fruit of what he has done, he enters on a good and bad birth; downward or upward is his course, and overcome by the pairs he roams about. They asked: which is it? And he answer them: this also has elsewhere been said; he who acts is the elemental Self; he who causes to act by means of the organs, is the inner man. Now as even a ball of iron pervaded by fire and hammered by smiths becomes manifold, thus the elemental Self pervaded by the inner man and hammered by the qualities becomes manifold and four tribes, the fourteen worlds with all the member of beings, multiplied eighty four times all this appears as manifoldsness. And those multiplied things are impelled by man as the wheel by the potter. And as the ball of iron is hammered, the fire is not overcome, so the (inner) man is not overcome, but the elemental Self is overcome, because it has united (with the elements).

Maitrtyupaniṣad III. 2-3.

These are the few verses in which dualism is expounded.

As said above the Upaniṣads advocate the monism or pure advaitism of Śankarāchārya.

European scholars and specially the Germans were so much surprised with the study of the Vedānta that they went into ecstasies. Max Muller says at p. 192 of the six systems of the Indian philosophy "I am well aware that the view of the world, of God, and the soul, as propounded by the Vedāntists, whether in the Upaniṣats or in the Sutras and their commentaries, has often been declared strange and fanciful and unworthy of the name of philosophy, at all events utterly unsuited to the West whatever may have been its value in the East. I have nothing to say against this criticism, nor have I ever tried to make propaganda for Vedāntism, least of all in England. But I maintain that it represents a phase of philosophic thought which no student of philosophy can afford to ignore, and which in no country can be studied to greater advantage than in India. And I go a step further. I quite admit that, as a popular philosophy, the Vedānta would have its dangers, that it would fail to call out and strengthen the manly qualities required for the practical side of life, and that it might raise the human mind to a height from which the most essential virtues of social and political life might dwindle away into
mere phantoms. At the same time, I make no secret that all my life I have been very fond of the Vedânta. Nay, I can fully agree with Schopenhauer, and quite understand what he meant when he said—

"In the whole world there is no study, except that of the original (of the Upanîṣads), so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupnekhât (Persian translation of the Upanîṣads.) It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death."

"Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random, or to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so called mystic and inarticulate thought. And I am neither afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm for the Vedânta and feel indebted to it for much that has been helpful to me in my passage through life."

In his three lectures on the Vedânta philosophy, the same scholar is not very enthusiastic of the Vedânta and delivers himself thus at P. 170 "I wish that you should carry away a clear idea of the Vedânta philosophy if not all its details that is impossible but at least in its general purpose. It is a very bad habit to say, 'Oh' philosophy is too deep for me' or to dispose of Eastern philosophy by saying that it is esoteric or mystic. Remember that all this Vedânta philosophy was never esoteric, but that it was open to all and was elaborated by men who, in culture and general knowledge, stood far below any one of us here present. Should we not be able to follow in their footsteps? Should the wisdom reached by the dark-skinned inhabitants of India two or three thousand years ago be too high or too deep for us? And as to their philosophy being called mystic, it really seems to me as if those who are so fond of using that name spell it, perhaps with an 'i' and not with a 'y'. They seem to imagine that mystic philosophy must be full of mist and clouds and vapour. True mystic philosophy however, is as clear as a summer sky, it is full of brightness and full of warmth. Mystic meant originally no more than what required preparation and initiation and mysteries were not dark things left dark, but dark things made bright and clear and intelligible."

VII. Bhakti school.

We now come to the devotional school of philosophy founded by Nârâyaṇa and Śaṅkiliya. We have already Nârâyaṇa and Śaṅkiliya's Sûtras translated into English and published in the Sacred Books of the Hindus. I need not dilate upon the subject, as a curious reader can find interest-
ing matter fully dealt with in the introduction to the volume VII. Śāṇḍilya's Śūtras in the original were first published in the Bibliotheca Indica series but now they have been reprinted in the Śyāmā Charaṇa Sanskrit Series No. IV. The Bhakṭi school is based on upāsanā kāṇḍa of the Veda and was founded before Christ.

Heterodox philosophy.

We have seen that there are sceptical teachings in the Upaniṣads; we have seen in the preceding pages how Virochana misconstrued the teaching of Prajāpati and founded Epicureanism. (See Chhāndogya VIII). We have in the Maityupaniṣat the mention of Brihaspati the founder of the atheistic school of philosophy; we have also seen that the Śūtras of Brihaspati are referred to in the works of the commentators on the philosophical works but they have not yet been discovered.

The Chārvāka school also exists only in the second hand quotations; we know the tenets of this school from Sārvadars'ana Samgraha of SāyanaŚāhārya. We have at present two religious systems, viz, Buddhism and Jainism which owe their origin to the teachings of the heterodox school of philosophy. They like Kapila deny the existence of a creator.

I Buddhism.

Buddhism was founded by Gautama, the son of Śudhodana, the king of Kapilavastu, the site of which has been recently discovered in the Nepal Terai, north of Gorakhpore. The religion of Buddha is professed by a large number of people in the world. The followers of Buddha are the largest of all the religions that exist at present. It is divided mainly into two schools, viz: Mahāyāna and Hinayāna. Their religious books are called Tripitaka (three baskets) consisting of Śūtra, Abhidharma and Vinaya. It is very strange that there are no followers of Buddha's religion in the country where it was born. It is professed in Ceylon, Tibet, Burma, China, Japan and Siam and by some aborigines in Nepal. There are various schools of philosophy in Buddhism such as Tathātā philosophy of As'vaghoṣa, Mādhyamika or Śuṇyavāda philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Vijnānavāda or Yogāchāra (idealism) of Asanga and Vasubandhu, Kṣaṇikavāda, Sutrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools. According to Pāṇchadas'i, we have four schools of Buddhistic philosophy viz: (1) Mādhyamika (2) Yogāchāra (3) Sauntrantika and (4) Vaibhāṣika. The first school denies the existence of the external objects and the internal ideas and is, therefore called Śuṇyavāda school (voidism). The second school denies the existence of the objects which according
to it exist internally as ideas and is, therefore, called Vijnānvāda (idealism.)
The third school admits the existence of the external objects which are
not perceptible but only inferrible. The last mentioned school holds that
the external objects are perceptible and, therefore, resembles the Realistic
school of philosophy. See the Introduction of the Sarvadars'ana
Samgraha just brought out by the Government Oriental Series Vol I.
(Poona) The philosophical and religious literature of Buddhism is so vast
that it cannot be dealt with here in connection with the teachings of the
Upaniads on which it has no bearing.

II Jainism.

It was founded by Mahāvira, one of the twenty four Tirthankaras
of the Jainas. It bears much resemblance with the teaching of the
Buddha; once it was believed by the scholars that Jainism was
an offshoot of Buddhism but Jacobi has conclusively shown that
it is an independent religion. It is professes by a microscopic
minority of the mercantile community scattered here and there
all over India. The followers are ignorant, superstitious and idolators.
They would not allow any book to be touched by profane hands lest
it be polluted. They are religious to the extreme and observe ahīmasa
to the very letter without understanding the real sense of it. Some of
the educated men of the Jaina community have published the works
of their religion.

This religion has two great divisions called S'wetāmbara and Digāmbara;
the idols of the former are clad in clothes, while those of the latter
are naked.

Their chief book in Sanserit which is accepted by both the schools
is called Tattwādhigama Mokṣa S'āstra in ten chapters. The stotra
which is read by them before their idols is Bhaktāmara stotra which
contains 44 beautiful verses.

The tenets of their religion are chiefly the denial of God, the creation
of the world from the atoms which they call Pudgala and salvation by
reaching the Siddhas'ila which is their heaven after following the
Tirthankaras who are twenty in the number. Their patronoster is

नमः अरिहत्यां, नमः सिद्धां, नमः आयरियां, नमः उद्भावायां, नमः
आपसकसाहुर्यं, एसापचनमुकारो सत्वभवायास्याम् ॥

"Salutation to the Arhats, salutation to the perfect saint, salutation to
the great teacher, salutation to the minor teacher, salutation to all
the religious mendicants in the world. These five salutations remove
all sins".
As to these there is, no difference of opinion between the S'watâmbara and Digâmbara sects. They are all agreed; their literature both religious and philosophical is vast and is generally in the Prâkrit languages of India as that of Buddhism is in Pali.

I can not do justice to the religion of my fellow-countrymen in such a small treatise as this. Both Buddhism and Jainism should be separately dealt with by the scholars who are well versed in Pâli and Prâkrit. As the subject has no bearing on the teachings of the Upaniṣads, I have touched upon it cursorily.
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