A Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism

BY

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Oriental scholars are unanimous that the works on Materialism and Sensationalism in their relation to the Hindu system of Philosophy are very rare, and that this dearth of literature stands in the way of properly understanding Hindu thoughts and ideas in regard to these subjects both in this country and in the West. In the following pages I have attempted to present before the public a bird’s eye view of the origin and development of Materialism and Sensationalism in India. I have been urged to make this humble effort not by the belief that my contributions to the knowledge on these subjects are likely to be of any considerable value, but by the hope that insignificant as they are they will serve to attract to the subject the attention of worthier scholars and call forth their energies. This short treatise has been designed to prepare the ground for a systematic study of Indian Materialism and I have spared no pains to make it as such. My labours will be amply rewarded if on the perusal of my humble work one single reader feels himself interested in the study of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism.

I have much pleasure in acknowledging here my indebtedness to Mahāmohopādhyāya Dr. Haraprasad Shastri, M.A., D.Litt., C.I.E., Mahāmohopādhyāya Dr. Bhāgabat Kumar Shāstri, M.A., Ph.D., and Principal Gopinath Kavirāj, M.A., whose very interesting articles
throw many new lights on the subject. I also express my gratitude to Dr. Mahendra Nath Sarkar, M.A., Ph.D., whose class room lectures on Psychology were of help to me. No less is my debt of gratitude to Professor Shyama Charan Mukherjee, M.A., and Srijut Ramsankar Dutt for their valuable help in seeing the book through the press. My thanks are also due to Srijut Upendra Kumar Bose, Librarian, Sanskrit College, and his assistant, who gave me every possible help I needed and to the authorities of the Book Company, Calcutta, for the interest they have taken in the publication of this little book.

I take this opportunity to express my heart felt thanks to Dr. Aditya Nath Mukherjee, M.A., P.R.S., Ph.D., I.E.S., Dars'ana-sägar, Principal Sanskrit College who induced me to take up this task, gave me many valuable suggestions.

Sanskrit College,  
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

It is well known to students of Indian philosophy that the original sūtra works of the materialists, sceptics and agnostics of India are now lost to us. To be compelled to rely exclusively for a certain doctrine or way of thought on its presentation by its avowed opponents are seldom found free from prejudices and personal predilections. Pūrvapakṣas or the opponent's views are almost invariably presented in an inadequate and unsympathetic manner, so that no sound judgment as their proper philosophical worth can be easily formed. If one notes how the doctrines of the Sarvāstivādin Buddhists, the Pāśupatins, and the Pāñcarātras have suffered at the hands of S'aṅkarācārya, it would be clear that the study of a certain system from its presentation by its opponents has to be undertaken with a proper appreciation of these difficulties. An attempt has been made here to collect from different sources fragments of actual statements by the founders and propounders of different schools of the materialists, sceptics and agnostics of India. [Kusumāñjali, Nyāyamañjari, Advaita-brahmasiddhi, Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, and numerous other works by orthodox writers, Hindu and Jain, Sanskrit and Prakrit works, and Buddhist Pali works, all contain a good deal of useful information on these schools. But these are only fragments of the original works of these schools now irrevocably lost to us. The pūrvapakṣas or views of opponents,
in which form they appear in subsequent literature, have been studied in the light of and interpreted consistently in the spirit of, the fragmentary texts yet preserved of the earliest exponents of the systems.

It is pointed out in this connection that the Oriental Institute of Baroda has published in the year 1940 "Tattvopaplavasimha" of Jayarasi Bhatta which is an interesting work of the Lokayata school of philosophy. Attempts have been made in the present edition to utilise Jayarasi’s work.

The first edition of this short history published in 1930 has completely been exhaust-ed long ago. Since then the book was almost lost to the interested readers who insisted on its re-publication from time to time. Inspite of the fact that I also felt some sort of responsibility to bring out its second edition, I failed to do so earlier due to my indisposition of health and other unavoidable short-comings. At length, the publication saw the light of the day being embodied with the results of my further study on the subject, the credit of which goes direct to my affectionate Sriman Banikantha Chakravarty B.Sc., C.A. and to the authorities of the Bookland Private Ltd. But for their juvenile enthusiasm the matter would have been delayed for unlimited time.

D. R. S.

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A Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism

INTRODUCTION

Indian materialism has passed through four logical stages of development. In its first stage it was a mere tendency of opposition. It called in question all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate and all evidence perception as well as inference. It denied the authority of even the Vedas. In that period, its name was Bārhaspatya. In its second stage, Svabhāvavāda, recognition of perception as a source of knowledge and the theory of the identification of body with the self, were incorporated into it. In that stage, it took the form of a system of philosophy. However low its position may be, in the rank of philosophical systems, it can by no means be denied that, at that remote period of Indian history, it was the only system of philosophy, worthy of its name. In that period flourished famous materialists like Ajīta Kesʿākambalin, Kambalāsʿvatara and Purāṇa Kāṣʿyapa. In that stage it came to be known as Lokāyata. In its third stage, an extreme form of Hedonism, which was due, perhaps, to the
corruption of freedom of thought—social, religious and political, formed the most important feature of this school. Gross sensual pleasure superseded bliss or contemplative joy and licentiousness replaced liberty. Devils occupied the seats of angels. As a consequence of this impact of corruption and misunderstanding, chārvākism originated. In that stage this school preached—'Eat, drink and be merry, for to-morrow we may die.' The reaction to this extreme form of licentiousness was destructive to the very vitality of this school. From that time this extreme form of materialistic school leaned towards spiritualism. So long it had maintained that the body was the self. In that period, being severely attacked by the spiritualists, it gave up the theory that there was no self apart from the body and tried, gradually, to identify the sense organs, breath, and the organ of thought with the self. Before that the materialists had affirmed that inference was not a means of knowledge. But in this stage they accepted at first Probability and then even Inference, though in a restricted form, as a source of true knowledge. Philosophers, like Purandara, were the advocates of this form of Indian materialism. In its fourth stage, it came to be at one with the Buddhists and the Jains in opposing the Vedicists and got the common designation Nāstika. A Nāstika is one who condemns the Vedas—Nāstiko Veda-nindakah. The texts, added in the appendix with evidences of their
genuineness, record some of the views of these different stages in a blended form. As the literature of this school is now entirely lost, except what has reached us in fragments, we are quite unable to give here, verbatim, all the original Sūtras of this school which represent its various aspects and phases. But there are passages both in Sūtra and sloka form which embody in substance these different stages of the Lokāyata school. We can have a complete systematic work of the materialists of India if we gather them together in a sympathetic manner.

Tradition ascribes to Brhaspati the first treatise of this school and there is no reason for rejecting this view. It is evident from the Sūtras extant and quoted under Brhaspati’s name that he was not a mythical figure. He was an historical personage. But it is very difficult to ascertain who this Brhaspati was. It is probable that the conception of this school first dawned on Brhaspati, the preceptor of the gods, who is regarded by scholars like Professor Belvālkar as the first founder of this Bārhaspatya system. If we be authorised to give the credit of founding this system to more men than one then we should like to mention the names of Ajita Kes’akambalin, Chārvāka and Purandara as the second, third and fourth founders respectively of the Lokāyata, Chārvāka and Nāstika systems. We know from the Mahābhāṣya of Patanjali that Bhāguri was one of the expounders of the Lokāyata dogmas. Not a single Sūtra attributed to Bhāguri of the
Lokāyata school having been recovered we cannot give him any position in these stages of development of Indian Materialism and Sensationalism. We shall deal, now, in the following pages, with these four distinct steps of evolution of Indian Materialism more elaborately.
EVOLUTION OF MATERIALISM AND SENSATIONALISM IN INDIA

In ancient India, the necessaries of life being abundantly provided for by nature, the struggle for existence was not very keen. The people's tastes were not nice. In order to escape from the heat of the tropical sun, they took up their abode in the shady groves or in the caves of mountain valleys. Their peace of mind was not disturbed by political strife. In the absence of the art of writing the people were a stranger to literary ambition, nor were their energies called forth by art or science. There was no literature except what could be retained in memory. The metaphysical and religious problems formed almost the only subjects of speculation. They meditated on how and why the world was in which they lived. What were they? Whence came they? Whither went they? What had they to do? They made an endeavour to answer these questions in their own way, and thus laid the foundation of philosophical enquiries in India. These queries are recorded in the Vedas, the oldest literature of mankind still extant. These earliest attempts cannot properly be called philosophical systems, rigidly consistent and calmly reasoned. They are mere tendencies scattered and unsystematic like landmarks in an ocean. After a long course of development, from the first hesitating and imperfect stage of tendencies, they became perfect. Amongst these re-arranged, systematic, consistent calmly reasoned, perfect systems of Indian
philosophy materialism can be counted as very old. Some go so far as to count it as the oldest and adduce, among others, the following reasons in support of their opinion. It is a fact that all other schools, in their respective systems, try to refute the truths established by this school, thus admitting its priority. It is also a fact that the word Dars'ana in its primary sense means perception. In its secondary sense it means the Śāstra which is as good an authority as perception. This emphasis on perception reminds us of the materialists and there are scholars who maintain that the word was first originated by the followers of Brhaspati. It was from them that the word was borrowed by other schools. This fact induces them to establish the priority of this Dars'ana to all other Dars'anas. Scholars are, also, bold enough to declare that the materialistic school is the only original school of philosophy. All other schools were originated, simply, for the sake of refuting and destroying this school whose teachings according to them were detrimental to the best interests of mankind. Others, again, do not go so far. It may be, say they, as old as other schools of philosophy, but not older. Materialism is preached nowhere as a doctrine of philosophy, except as a re-action against some perverted ideas or practices. The materialists of India, namely, Brhaspati and his followers, do not pretend to lay down a constructive system of philosophy of their own. They try to refute foolish orthodoxy of other schools. This, in their
opinion, proves that the system of Brāhaspati cannot be the first system. It is rather the last. It raises objections against the views of all other systems and pre-supposes the existence of all other schools, thereby.

But all systems of philosophy are the growth of years, nay, of centuries. The systems which we possess of the different schools of philosophy, each distinct from the other, are rather the last summing up of what had been growing up among many generations of isolated thinkers and cannot claim to represent the very first attempts at a systematic treatment. A large mass of philosophical thought must have existed in India long before there was any attempt at dividing it into well-defined departments of systematic philosophy or reducing it to writing. But such a growth must have required a great length of time. So it is probable that during that long period the views of one system were discussed in another. During that long period anything could be added and anything left out. Subsequently each system reached the form in which we possess it. It is not improbable that the Lokāyata school of philosophy, being developed as the first system of philosophy, raised objections against the views of other schools which were even then mere tendencies and which took shape as systems later on. Thus, although, as mere tendencies almost all philosophical thoughts are contemporaneous, as systems they belong to different ages. The school of Brāhaspati is regarded as the weakest
school of philosophy in comparison with other schools. The law of evolution or gradual development proves that the earliest school is the weakest and the latest the strongest. If the Materialistic school be the weakest, it is probable that it is the earliest also.

The First Stage.

Originally, this school of Brhaspati meant Vitarādā or casuistry and nothing else. In it Vitarādā was essential. With its impatience of all authority, it tried to refute the views of other schools. It was, in its original stage, without any constructive element and without any positive theory to propound. It was negative and destructive. The record of this period is kept by Jayarāśi Bhatta, author of Tattvopaplava Siśāha. This negative aspect of this doctrine finds expression in the Vedas themselves. From the earliest Vedic times, there were people who denied the existence of even the Vedic deities. The Vedic hymns pointedly refer to scoffers and unbelievers. Those hymns, which are traditionally ascribed to Brhaspati, son of Loka, contain the first germs of protest against a mere verbal study of the Veda and emphatically declare that a man, who tries to understand the Veda, is far superior to a mere sacerdotal priest. The Manḍūka hymn is a panegyric of frogs who are described as raising their voices together at the commencement of the rains like Brahmin pupils repeating the lessons of their teachers and this celebrated hymn on frogs is a satire, says Professor Maxmüller, upon the Vedic priesthood, or better upon the system of hymn
chanting. Yāska clearly tells us that those who merely memorise the texts, without knowing the meaning, do not see the real form of the Veda and that such people are deluded, in as much as the way to attain the sumnum bonum is not revealed to them. In various Brāhmaṇas mere knowledge of a performance has been mentioned as having the same effect as the performance itself. In the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad it is stated that a performance accompanied by knowledge, produces a better result than a performance without knowledge. Jaimini, in his Pūrva mīmāṃsā system, recording this opposition devotes an entire chapter to drawing the conclusion that study consists not only in learning by heart the letter of the Veda but also in clearly understanding its spirit. Traces of an opposition to the religion of the Vedas appear in the Vedas and in later works. In Aitareya Āraṇyaka we find—‘Why should we repeat the Veda or offer this kind of sacrifice?’ Later on the very authoritativeness of the Vedas was questioned by Kautsya. Opposition was the only duty of the followers of Bṛhaspati and they did it from the very beginning of their career. They opposed the Vedas and the practice of repeating them without understanding their meaning. But all these represent only the opposing, destructive or negative aspect of the Bṛhaspatya system. And it is well-known that a system ceases to have any great interest and even value without a constructive element, without a positive theory to
propound. So the doctrine of the followers of Brhaspati appeared to be incomplete without any positive element in it. It felt the necessity of a positive element. Everybody knows that necessity is the mother of invention. Bhraspatya in its very early stage found out the means of being complete. So long under the designation Bhraspatya it admitted no authority other than its own. Now, in its second stage, in explanation of the why of an event or product it accepted the doctrine of Svabhava. This doctrine of Svabhava maintains that 'the effects are self existent and are produced neither by different things as causes nor by themselves inasmuch as no cause can be found for the filament of the lotus or the eye-like marks on the peacock's tail. If it cannot be found it certainly does not exist. Such is the case with this diversified universe. Similarly, feelings like pleasure, pain, etc., have no causes, because they appear only at times'. This doctrine of Svabhava had been in vogue in independent forms. In course of centuries this doctrine, like many other doctrines, lost its independence altogether and came to be affiliated to the Bhraspatya system. The consequence of this gradual assimilation has been a blending of thoughts. The followers of Brhaspati became at one with, and the earliest representatives of, the extreme form of Svabhava vada. From this time, the rejection of causal principle, the rejection of good and evil consequences of actions, formed its most important feature. The
product comes into existence without any cause. This materialistic view was emphasised by Brhaspati in Vedic times. 'In the first age of the gods the existent was born of the non-existent—Asatah Sadajāyata. The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad contains a nominal enunciation of some of the most popular theories current in its times in explanation of the origin of the universe and Naturalism forms one of this number—Kālah Svabhāvo Niyatiryādīchhā, etc. Up till then it was an independent doctrine and the Bṛhaspatyas were merely the oppositionists. Bṛhaspati, with a lofty enthusiasm, flung away the fetters of religion that he might be righteous and noble. Some of the verses of the Vedic hymns ascribed to Bṛhaspati are very noble in thought. Whatever may be said of his followers, his own teachings were of an elevated character. Bṛhaspati had many followers and all of them were independent thinkers raising objections against the current superstitions. It is perhaps for his freedom of thought that he was regarded as the priest—the adviser,—the counsellor of India, the king of the gods.

But this state of things changed very soon. A re-action against the school of Bṛhaspati appeared on the stage. Perhaps the negative or destructive element of the doctrine was responsible for this reaction. The Vedic literature, posterior to the Mantras is disfigured by filthy story and anecdotes in which the pious sages poured out vials of their wrath on the devoted heads of those early oppositionists,
i.e., Bṛhaspati and his followers. The Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa relates an interesting anecdote which runs as follows. 'Once upon a time Bṛhaspati struck the goddess Gāyatrī on the head. The head smashed into pieces and the brain split. But Gāyatrī is immortal. She did not die. Every bit of her brain was alive'. Some scholars have found a very valuable truth behind this anecdote. They find an allegorical meaning here. Gāyatrī is the symbol of Hinduism. Bṛhaspati tried to destroy it by introducing opposition. But Hinduism is eternal. It was not destroyed. In Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad we find another anecdote—Bṛhaspati having assumed the shape of Sūkra brings forth false knowledge for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the Asuras. By it the Asuras show that good is evil and evil is good; and they say that this new law, which upsets the Vedas, should be studied. Here Bṛhaspati is painted as a deceiver—a hypocrite. The Mahābhārata records a story of this period relating how Bṛhaspati the sceptic had a long discussion with Manu, one of the founders of the sacrificial cult and was, in the end converted to the latter's view point. Another anecdote records—'The reason why I was born a jackal' says a character 'is that I was a blamer of the Vedas, a reviler and opposer of priests, an unbeliever and a doubter of all things'. In another place it records—'The ignorant and unbelieving man who has a soul of doubt is destroyed; neither this world nor the next exists, nor happiness for him who—
has a soul of doubt.' In another place of the Mahābhārata which records past events, an unbeliever is threatened with a sudden enlightenment hereafter—'the devil in hell will soon change your ideas on that subject.' The worst, that is said of Brhaspati's teaching, is that it is drawn from a study of the female intellect which is full of subtility and deceit. The Viṣṇupurāṇa records—that a number of Daityas one day, in ancient times, began to practise severe penances following the injunctions of the Vedas. This caused great apprehension to Indra. At his prayer Māyāmohā was created who preached to the demons the pernicious doctrines of Brhaspati not for their benefit but for their destruction. They having been gradually overpowered by that folly, became enemies to Brāhmaṇas, gave up their duties and were averse to the study of the Vedas. Then, as they had strayed from religious observances, Indra killed them. Almost similar is the account recorded in the Padmapurāṇa. All human institutions prosper through opposition. As a re-action against the opposition of Brhaspati and his followers, the Vedic schools were then more extensively engaged in popularising the Vedic creed of life by means of the most elaborate and thorough-going presentations and expositions of their Vedic doctrines. The result was the production of the six Vedāṅgas, the Smritis, the Epics and such other helping works. Never has The Vedāṅgas. religion flourished with such luxuriance and in such wide variety, from the purest to the
most abominable shapes, as in this period of Indian cultural history. A dark shadow fell upon the oppositionists—the independent thinkers. All independent line of thinking became for hundreds of years to come an impossibility through the powerful influence of various schools of the Vedicists.

The Second Stage.

The state of things turned, however, through the influence of Naturalism. Opposed by the strong advocates of the orthodox community the Lokāyatikas returned with the affiliation of naturalism or Svabhāvavāda. Neither of these two doctrines Lokāyata and Svabhāvavāda accepted the good or evil consequences of actions. The Lokāyata school, which was so long a mere tendency, with the incorporation of naturalism, formed a philosophical system. Thus originated the first Dars'ana or the Lokāyata Darsana. Perception was emphasised in the very name of this newly built-up system, i.e., Dars'ana. So long the Bārhaspatyas did not admit any authority whatsoever. Now, in its new shape, the school accepted the authority of perception. Perception became the only criterion of existence. Whatever was not perceived was held to have no existence at all. The causal principle was rejected, because, sensuous perception is not an evidence in support of its existence. For mere perception of two events, which stand isolated and self-contained, is not sufficient to establish between them a causal relation. ‘To ascertain whether a given antecedent condition has the-
character of a true cause it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of invariability and of relevancy involved in such a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at. The universal propositions cannot be established by our limited perceptions. Perception presupposes actual contact of the object with the perceiving organ and is thus necessarily confined to the present. It is a case of here and now. It does not extend to the past or the future and is thus unable to establish universal connection of things. In other words, sense perception can give us only particular truths. But knowledge of particular facts cannot give us knowledge which is universally true. Therefore perception cannot give us universal relation. Nor can universal relation be established by Inference alone. For, the inference, which yields a universal relation as its conclusion, cannot work unless it presupposes another universal connection as a necessary pre-condition of its possibility and that again another and so on. In other words, the process of reaching a universal conclusion is always like arguing in a circle. **Vyāpti** is derived from *Anumāṇa* and *Anumāṇa* again from **Vyāpti**. Thus even inference in itself is not sufficient to produce a universal proposition. Nor is the universal relation supplied by testimony. For, testimony involves inference. Comparison is equally unable to establish a universal relation. Comparison only establishes the relation of a name to something that bears that name. Now, such
relation of the name and of the named is a particular relation, whilst we are in search of an unconditional universal relation. Thus, the universal relation, which is indispensable to all inference, is not given by any of the so-called sources of knowledge. Therefore, universal relation cannot, by any means, be established. As inference is not possible without universal connection and universal connection is unattainable the Lokāyata as a system discarded, in its earlier stages, inference as a source of knowledge.

It rejected ether as an element, because, ether cannot be known by perception and it maintained that the four elements of earth, air, fire and water are the original principles of all things. The four elements, in their atomic condition,* when mixed together in a certain

* The theory that matter consists of "atoms", i.e. of little bits that cannot be divided, is very old. But in its old shape it was only a speculation. The evidence for what is called the atomic theory was derived from chemistry, and the theory itself, in its nineteenth-century form, was mainly due to Dalton in Europe. It was found that there were a number of 'elements' and that other substances were compounds of these elements. Compound substances were found to be composed of molecules, each molecule being composed of 'atoms' of one substance combined with atoms of another or of the same. A molecule of water consists of two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen; they can be separated by electrolysis. It was supposed, until radio-activity was discovered, that atoms were indestructible and unchangeable. Substances which were not compounds were called elements. The discovery of radio-activity led to the conclusion that what had been called 'atoms' were really complex structures, which could change into atoms of a different sort by losing a part. After various attempts at imagining the
proportion and according to a certain order, become transformed into an organism.

Consciousness is a function of the body. Evolution of consciousness.
For the manifestation of consciousness, body is an indispensable factor. Consciousness does not inhere in particles of matter. When these particles come to be arranged into a specific form, in a manner not yet scientifically explainable, they are found to show signs of life. Life and consciousness are identical. Our thinking power is destroyed with the dissolution of the elements from whose combination it

structure of an atom, physicists were led to accept the view of Sir Ernest Rutherford, which was further developed by Niels Bohr. In this theory, all matter is composed of two sorts of units, electrons and protons. All electrons are exactly alike, and all protons are exactly alike. All protons carry a certain amount of positive electricity, and all electrons carry an equal amount of negative electricity. Protons repel each other and electrons repel each other, but an electron and a proton attract each other. Every atom is a structure consisting of electrons and protons. The hydrogen atom, which is the simplest, consists of one proton with one electron going round it as a planet goes round the sun. The electron may be lost, and the proton left alone; the atom is then positively electrified. The great merit of Bohr's theory was that it explained why elements have the Spectra they do have, which had, before, been a complete mystery. According to this theory of atomic structure 'an atom' with its electrons is a system characterised by certain integers all small, and all capable of changing independently. The newer theory has been put forward in 1925, mainly by two German physicists, Heisenberg and Schrödinger, owing to them, the last vestiges of the old solid atom have melted away, and matter has become as ghostly as anything in a spiritualist séance. Broadly speaking, it describes the atom by means of the radiations that come out of it. This newer theory confines itself to what is empirically verifiable namely radiations; as to what there is where the radiations come from we cannot tell.
is evolved. Consciousness is produced from the body which is endowed with life and vital air. Without sensation no consciousness is possible. When the body perishes no consciousness can remain. It must perish also. So there is nothing to transmigrate. The body, consciousness and sense organs are momentary. Mind is merely the product of a combination of elements, just as, some acid eructations or wines are results of chemical combinations. The four elements when combined produce or manifest the mind. There is no other reality than the four Bhūtas. The instinctive movements and expressions of new-born babes are due to ‘external stimuli as much as the opening and closing of the lotus and other flowers at different hours of the day or night, or the movement of iron under the influence of load stone. In the same way the spontaneous generation of living organisms is frequently observed, e.g., the case of animalcules which develop in moisture or infusions, especially under the influence of gentle warmth or of the maggots or other worms which in the rainy season by reason of the atmospheric moisture, are developed in the constituent particles of curds and the like, which begin to live and move in so short a time’. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and perceptions can arise

and it is scientifically unnecessary to speculate. The mainpoint for the philosopher in the modern theory is the disappearance of matter as a “thing.” It has been replaced by emanations from a locality—the sort of influences that characterise haunted rooms in ghost stories.—Russell.
only in so far as they are conditioned by a bodily mechanism. But, it would not be so were not the body the receptacle of consciousness. The properties of particular preparations of food and drink, conducive to the development of the intellectual powers, afford another proof in favour of the fact that consciousness is a function of the body. Points and evidences of correspondence between mind and body—correspondence between the Psychical and Nervous processes—and correspondence between mind and brain, the seat of mind, are not rare. The most definite aspects of this correspondence are—correspondence in quantity—the correspondence in change, correspondence in growth and development, correspondence in inheritance and correspondence in quality. When communication is cut off between the brain and any other part of the body owing to the nerves of that part being diffused, there is no longer any feeling or sensation connected with that part. Psychological experiments prove measurable interval of time between the application of stimulus and the corresponding sensation. Prolonged thought and intense emotion produce the sensation of fatigue and exhaustion in the brain and if carried further produce pain and disorder. Increase of mental work is accompanied by an increase of brainwork. Intense mental activity is followed by a casting off of a kind of brain substance known as phosphorus. Comparison of the brains of different creatures and different races of men and of different
individuals shows that there is a connection between intelligence and the size, weight and complexity of the brain. Generally speaking the larger the brain, in relation to the rest of the body, the more the intelligence. So the Lokāyatas say that Mind is only a form or product of the body. The ultimate reality is matter. Consciousness is a function of the body. As contraction is the function of muscles, as the kidneys secrets urine, so and in the same way does the brain generate thoughts, movements and feelings. Mind, therefore, has no substantial reality of its own, but, springs out of the vibrations of the molecules of the brain. When the molecular activity of the brain sinks below a certain level generally known as the threshold of consciousness, consciousness disappears, mind ceases to exist as in sleep. When, again, it rises above a certain degree consciousness re-appears. Conscious life is not a life of continuity. It is coming out of and again going into nothing. The hypothesis of a continuous stream of consciousness is a myth of the Divines and the Theologians. This theory is some times known as the Theory of automatism—mind is merely Epiphenomenon or by-product. But there is a difficulty in establishing this theory. The spiritualists raised an objection against the newly built-up materialistic system. The objection is this. As the body is declared to be the agent of all actions it should be held responsible for their natural consequences. But this is impossible. The particles which form
the body are always in a state of flux and the body which performs an action at one moment does not persist at the next to feel its re-action. It is on the other hand undeniable that the body suffers change. Otherwise they could not have different sizes. To this, the reply of the Lokāyatikas is this. The Lokāyata system does not admit the existence of Karmaphala or the consequence of good or evil actions. The experience of pleasure and pain comes by chance. Nature is all powerful. Moreover, recognition proves the identity of the body through all its changing states. There is another difficulty. The spiritualists advance another objection against the materialists. The objection is put in the following manner. The theory of matter is unable to account for the facts of memory and recognition. Necessity of thought demands that memory and original experience which gives rise to it should be referred to one and the same conscious subject. But this identity of reference would be possible only when the subject is fundamentally an unchangeable unity. This difficulty is removed by the Lokāyatikas in the following manner. The traces left by previous experiences are capable of being transmitted from the material cause down to its direct product, an analogous instance being the transference of the odour of musk to the cloth in contact with it. But the general answer, of this school to every why is the doctrine of Svabhāva. Everything happens through the influence of Svabhāva which is all-powerful. It is Svabhāva or law
of nature that the consciousness is a function of the body and the body is the self. The Lokāyatikas refuted the theory of Paraloka—or previous and future births as there was no reality existing before birth or after death. The four ‘bhūtas’ or atoms of primary elements are the only realities. Mind is the production of these elements. So it cannot be maintained that the mind at death passes on to another body. Mind in different bodies must be different. The consciousness of a body which has already perished cannot be related to the body which comes into being. One mind cannot produce another mind after total annihilation. The theory that the foetus is endowed with consciousness cannot be asserted. Without sensation no consciousness is possible. All knowledge is derived from sense experience alone. All knowledge is posterior to and derived from experience. The sense organs cannot revive sensations when they are not in existence. Therefore the foetus cannot be endowed with consciousness. No power is possible without a recipient. When the body perishes consciousness cannot remain as there is no recipient of consciousness. With the destruction of the body consciousness, also, must perish. If you hold that the previous, present and future births are nothing but particular conditions of the stream of consciousness which according to you is eternal the Lokāyatikas would say that the chain of consciousness is not an entity and a condition that can be predicated only in respect of an entity cannot
therefore be proved. A future existence of an entity which is non-existent cannot be pre- ciated. With this line of argumentation the Lokāyatikas of that period rejected the existence of future or previous births. The Lokāyatikas of that stage also maintained that there was no soul apart from the body. If there be any soul it is only the living principle of all organisms. It exists so long as our body exists and ceases to exist when the body ceases to exist. It is the body that feels, sees, hears, remembers and thinks. In sayings like 'I am fat,' 'I am lean,' 'I am dark', by 'I' we evidently mean the body. Fatness, leanness or darkness reside only in the body. Such phrases as 'my body' are metaphorically used. Just as a knave might induce an innocent person to accept glass and such other worthless materials in exchange for precious stones so has the S'ruti misled the innocent devotee by making him believe that the soul is distinct from the body, displacing his inborn, and therefore the right belief that the body and the soul are identical. As nothing like soul exists after death to go to the next world there is no necessity of admitting the existence of such a place. With the denial of Karmaphala this school denied the existence of the universal mysterious agency called Fate or Adṛṣṭa or Daiva. It denied the existence of merits or demerits acquired in our previous existence. In answer to the objections that fate must be admitted as the cause of the differences and determinations of the phenomenal world Brhaspati's followers bring forward the doc-
trine of Svabhāva or spontaneous generation of things according to their respective natures. So there is no use practising virtue and avoiding sins. Religion is as harmful as opium intoxication. Prayer is the hope of men who are weak, without will power to do anything; worship is an insincere egoism to save oneself from the tortures of hell; prophets are the greatest liars among men. The Vedas are no authority. There are mantras in the Vedas which do not convey any meaning whatsoever; some mantras are ambiguous; some are absurd; some are contradictory; some repeat what is already known. As regards the other portions of the Vedas we always find discrepancies and contradictions among them. Cases are not rare where a line of action prescribed by one text is condemned by another. Again, they speak of results that are never realised. Some portions are rejected by the Vedicists themselves as interpolations. There are proper names and epithets as well as foolish statements like the ravings of a mad man. Hence the Vedas are not only human compositions but even worse. The buffoon, the knave, and the demon—these are the three authors of the Vedas. All the obscene rites commended for the queen in the horse sacrifice have been invented by knaves. So also the custom of giving presents to priests and that of eating flesh have been commended by night-prowling demons. If it were possible for the sacrifices to make one reach heaven after the performances have ceased, the performers themselves
have perished and the requisites have been used up, then the trees of a forest burnt down by fire might produce abundant fruit. The exercises of religion and the practices of asceticism are merely a means of livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness. Therefore the so-called sacred books, the three Vedas, have been composed by rogues and can command no authority. A Putrešti sacrifice performed for the birth of a child may yield either of the two results—positive and negative which is doubtful. When a child is born the knaves say that it is due to the power of their incantations uttered in performing the rites. When a child is not born they explain the event as being due to the rites being incomplete in some way or other. The priests say that a beast slain in a sacrifice will itself go to heaven. How is it that they do not kill their own old fathers in a sacrifice in order to send them directly to heaven? If the offerings in a funeral ceremony may produce gratification to beings who are dead, then in the case of travellers, when they start it is needless to give provisions for the journey. All these ceremonies were ordered by the Brahmins as a means of their livelihood. They are worth no better than that. Hence, our religious ceremonies our endeavour to propitiate the gods, to satisfy them by prayers and offerings are vain and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals desirous of deceiving their fellow men inorder to further their own selfish and ambitions motives. So let us eat, drink, be merry, for to-morrow we
die. As the consequence of this kind of thinking, Kāma or fulfilment of desire, became the summum bonum of human life. They were in search of the supreme bliss or contemplative joy, which was available in freedom only. They maintained that there is no particular place named heaven. Even the Vedas themselves doubt the existence of a world beyond. If a man may go to another world after death why may he not come back again perturbed by the love of his friends and relatives? When once the body is reduced to ashes how can it ever go to another world? When we die, everything ends there. We do not enter into a region of pain or of darkness unrelieved by a single ray of light. That God is the judge, does not stand to reason, because, in that case partiality and cruelty on the part of God will be indispensable. If God visits us with the evil consequences of our sins He becomes our enemy for nothing. Therefore it is better not to have a God than to have a cruel and partial God. So there is not even such a thing as God, the Supreme author and governor of the world, an omniscient spirit. The senses cannot reach Him, Adrśta, principle of causality, and inference itself have been denied. The Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility. How can we ascertain that an all-knowing, all-pervading and all-powerful spirit exists? Nature and not God, is the watch word of our School.

With this enlightened credo the Lokāyatikas laid aside the traditional life of religion and settled down to strain every fibre of their
being, so long frittered away for heaven's sake, for working out their immediate earthly welfare. The result of this movement was an aspiration for freedom. By freedom they meant all-round freedom—freedom for the individual as well as for society; freedom for man as well as for woman; freedom for the rich as well as for the poor; freedom for all individuals and for all classes. They exhorted all to cast off all the shackles which had bound them for ages and to march shoulder to shoulder towards freedom. The wonderful consequence of this struggle for freedom was the rise of Buddhistic culture. Buddha's views against the vedic sacrifices, the memorising of the vedic mantras and fruitless repetition to retain them in memory, the caste system, the authority of the Vedas and the worship of the deities, the magic practices and the mortifications and other ascetic practices—have their counterpart in the views of Lokāyata. It is perhaps for the reason that Buddhism was greatly influenced by the Lokāyata School that we find in later accounts of Lokāyata the doctrines of Buddha and Chārvāka almost amalgamated and the name Chārvāka sometimes applied to Buddha. India had been seething with free thinking and Buddha was the product of this freedom. No man ever lived so godless yet so god-like a life. But the people were not satisfied merely with social and religious freedom. Their aspiration was for political freedom also. This aspiration was realised in the rise of Politics. Chandra Gupta and his grand-son Asoka who
brought the jarring states of India under one rule and set up the Mournya Empire. Politics became incorporated with the Lokayata School, which ignored Anvikṣikī and Trayā, the sciences dealing with the supersensuous, and appreciated Daṇḍaniti and Vārtā Coercion and Economics, as the only branches of knowledge deserving special cultivation. The earthly king became the only god. So long, Kāma or pleasure was considered to be the only good of human life. Now Artha or material advantage, was added to it. As the Lokayatikas captured the hearts of the cultured and the common people, they became earnest in working out their immediate earthly welfare. The result of this movement was the generation and propagation of different arts and sciences. Vātsyāyana keeps records of some sixty-four names of Indian fine arts which flourished probably in this period of Indian materialism. Kambalās’vatara, Ajitakes’akambalin and many other materialists flourished and wrote their works on Indian materialism in this period. The Sāmānna phalasatta keeps the following records of Ajita’s view. There is no such duty as the giving of alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good and evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father nor mother nor beings springing into life without them. There are, in the world, no recluses or Brahmans who having understood, and realised by themselves alone both this world and the next make their wisdom.
known to others. A human being is built up of four elements. When he dies the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire and the Ajita's windy to the air. The four bearers take his dead body away; till they reach the burning ground men utter forth eulogies but there his bones are bleached and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, the talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk when men say there is prophet therein. Fools and the wise, alike, on the dissolution of the body are cut off, annihilated and after death they are not. This Ajita flourished during the life-time of Buddha. Up to that time Politics was not incorporated with the Lokāyatika. So there is no trace of politics noticeable in the teachings of Ajita. In later accounts, specially in the record preserved by Kṛṣṇa Mis'ra, it is mentioned very distinctly. Kṛṣṇa Mis'ra gives almost a perfect account of the doctrines of the Lokāyata School, formed in that period. His account contains almost all the elements belonging to the teachings of this School. "Lokāyata is always the only sāstra. In it, only perceptual evidence is authority. The elements are earth, water, fire and air. Wealth and enjoyment are the objects of human existence. Matter can think. There is no other world. Death is the end of all."*
The Third Stage.

This prosperity and success of the Lokāyata system ended in corruption and misunderstanding. Extreme form of freedom gave birth to licentiousness. Supreme bliss was transformed into sensual pleasure. Enjoyment of pleasure—gross sensual pleasure—became the only end of human life. Licentiousness became predominant in the country. India lost its previous supremacy—freedom of society, freedom of religion and freedom of polity. People became slaves of their senses. Elevated teachings of Bṛhaspati became absorbed into the eroticism of his wicked followers. Gratification of the senses became the only good of this School. Let us enjoy pleasure and pleasure alone. Pleasure is the only thing which is true and good. The only reasonable end of man is enjoyment. We know pleasure is never pure, never free from pain. How then can pleasure be the highest end of life? But because there is pain and because pleasure is mixed with pain should we therefore reject our life? Should we fling away sheaves of paddy rich with the finest white grains because they are covered with husk and dust? Should we refrain from plucking lotuses as there are thorns in them? Shall we not take fish because there are bones and scales? Should we exclude rice from our meal only for the trouble it will give in husking? Who will not soothe his mind and body in ambrosial moonlight though there are spots in the moon? Shall we not enjoy the pleasant breeze of summer, because, there is slight dust
in it? Shall we abstain from sowing in a ploughed land watered by rain, lest the water on its surface should become muddy? Should we not prepare food for fear of beggars? Unmixed happiness is not available in this world; yet we cannot overlook the least bit of it. In worldly life we smile on the weal of our dear ones and weep in their woes. If the laughing face of a son or the lustre of a delightful daughter can impart to us celestial happiness why will not their death or their attack with some fatal disease find us overwhelmed with grief? If the presence of a beloved wife makes a heaven of this earth, her departure will surely leave us in eternal darkness. Thus what gives you pleasure now will cause your pain another time. We cannot totally get rid of troubles even when we have no tie of affection in this wide world. The heart of a man who has none to call his own in this populous world, is but depressed, full of misery and dry as a desert. He must not be a common man, who even in such conditions can maintain peace of mind. But even a man who is quite aloof from all social ties cannot escape occasional mishaps, viz., disease and accidents. The sudden attack of an ailment can make a total change in our happy state of affairs. And, when health goes, it takes away pleasure with it. The loveliness of a moonlit night, the cool breeze at day break, the beauty and scent of flowers, the melodious songs of sweet birds—none of these can please a man when he is not in health. You may remain jolly even without
a friend. But bodily pain is sure to render you feeble and restless. Besides, we are in terrible distress by occasional appearance of cyclone and thunderstorm, sudden attack of a ferocious animal, or, the undesirable occurrence of famine, drought or deluge. Still we must say that this world of ours is not full of troubles. True, there is sorrow everywhere; in kings’ palaces and beggars’ huts, in the high souls of the learned and the superstitious minds of the illiterate, in the beautiful mansions of the luxurious and the dark caves of the sages. Sleep in your house or walk outside, enter the temple or hide in the forest, run to the burial place or wherever you like,—no where can you escape misery and pain. Still we must say that the amount of pleasure in this world is greater than that of pain. If such be not the case, why do people so earnestly desire to live and become frightened at the name of death? Tell them to renounce this world, and they will at once exhibit utter reluctance. For, how is it possible to bid adieu to this pleasant world which is the abode of joys and luxuries? How delicate are the green leaves of the spring, and how lovely is the rose! Is not the sunshine a glorious thing?

If sorrows were more frequent than delight, men would have escaped misery by suicide. Most men are unwilling to die; and hence it is evident that in human affairs pleasure has a larger sphere of influence than pain. It is also to be remembered that happiness is at its best only when experienced by contrast with misery;
and hence, it may be said that existence of troubles in the world has a certain necessity. Blessings of rest can be fully enjoyed only after hard labour. The ever healthy man cannot comprehend the ease and comfort of having a sound body and a sound mind. If you are to receive full satisfaction in your diet, suffer from hunger first. The more you sustain the agony of thirst, the greater will be your delight in drinking cool water. You fear a dreadful night with heavy rainfall and terrific thunderstorm when dark and dense clouds have covered the whole sky, and all the trees and houses have been blown away by the furious wind. But after such tedious hours, when the sun with celestial beauty appears for the first time on the eastern horizon of the bright sky dispersing the lingering darkness and unfolding all the lotuses of the earth will you not look more pleasant than ever? The same thing happens when two lovers meet after long separation. They have long been tormented by the heartrending affliction, and they have shed constant tears and breathed out many a long sigh. Now, their re-union will produce a heavenly bliss which an ever-happy couple cannot have any idea of. Perpetual happiness may be desirable, but it is practically unbearable. What pleases you now, will be disgusting after constant use. Even a palatable dish cannot but bring satiety if we are to take it daily. Variety of taste is needed, pungent, astringent, and bitter flavours should be interchanged with sweets. So, it is foolishness, no doubt, to overlook pleasure only
on the ground that it is not constant owing to the intervention of pain. Therefore, a man should do that which yields pleasure in the end. Even sages like Vyāsa tell you that one should fulfil the desire of a woman who is overcome with passion. The moon-god, the lord of the twice-born, enjoyed very eagerly the wife of his preceptor Bṛhaspati, the founder of our School. Everybody knows the story of Indra, the god of gods, and Ahalyā the wife of Gotama. Hence, there is no need of restraining sexual appetite. Enjoy all sorts of pleasure, according to your own desire. Where is unanimity among the great men in accepting the interpretations of the S'ruti and the Smṛtis? An intelligent interpretation should not be rejected if it favours the enjoyment of pleasure. The sage Pāṇini who says in 'Ṭṛtiyaḥ apavarge,' that the third sex will be engaged in finding out means of salvation is necessarily of opinion that the other two sexes should enjoy sensual pleasures. Carry out the commands of Kāma which even gods like Brahmā could not transgress. The Vedas, too, are nothing but the commands of the gods. Then why do you show more respect to the latter? Forbear from all disparaging and contemptuous remarks about women in order that you may hope to have the company of the most excellent of the deer-eyed beauties in heaven. Exert yourself for pleasing your beloved and indulge your own inclinations. These are the only roots of the tree of happiness. 'Pleasure is the good'—is the cry of nature. The animals know no other principle-
of action than pleasure. Children are sensitive to pleasure only. The grown up man, the apparently grave and sober, all seek and pursue pleasure; the virtuous man enjoys pleasure in the cultivation of virtue and even those who refute the statement that pleasure is the object of desire, find pleasure in such refutation.

"Whatever the motive, pleasure is the mark; For her the black assassin draws his sword; For her dark statesmen trim their midnight lamps; For her the saint abstains, the miser starves; The stoic proud for pleasure, pleasure scorns; For her affliction's daughter grief indulge; And find, or, hope, a luxury in tears; For her, guilt, shame, toil, danger we defy;"

Therefore, pleasure is the highest good of human life. The only good of life is the human life. The only good of life is the individual's own pleasure. We should fully enjoy the present. To sacrifice the present to the future, is unwarranted and perilous. The present is ours. The past is dead and gone. The future is doubtful. The present is all that we have. Let us make the most of it. With this credo the Lokāyatikas of that remote period of Indian history preached and practised the theory of the extreme form of hedonism, according to which sensual pleasure is the only end of human life. Here, in this stage of Indian Materialism, the School of the Lokāyatikas in addition to its old names Bārhaspatya and Lokāyata got the designation Chārvāka. The word means entertaining speech. It is derived
from charva, chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating, swallowing virtue and vice. "While you live drink, for once dead you never shall return." "As long as he lives let a man live happily; after borrowing money, let him drink ghee." The propagation of this eroticism was the first step towards downfall of the elevated system of Lokāyata which was considered so long as the only system of Philosophy in India. In this stage of Indian Materialism the Buddhists and the Jainas came to the field of philosophy to preach spiritualism. In their first appearance they pretended to be the successors of the old heretics, i.e., the followers of Bṛhaspati, by directing their attacks mainly against the doctrines of sacrifice as actually preached and practised in the Vedic School. They became, like the Lokāyatikas, very popular for the time being, as the minds of the people were still then captured by Materialistic doctrines. But as time went on the state of things began to change. The Chārvākas came to know what these new comers really were. They led their opposition against the orthodox Buddhists and Jains as they previously did against the Vedicists. The result of this opposition was that the Lokāyatikas met with opposition from the side of the Vedicists as well as from the side of the Buddhists and the Jains. By this simultaneous attack from various sides they were for the first time pushed to the corner. The philosophers of the Vedic Schools now became very strong being aided by the spiritualistic doctrines of the new heretics—
the Buddhists and the Jains, and took the field as successors of the sages of old and repelled the attacks on the permanent principles of spirituality. As time passed, these Vedicists appeared on the field one after another in order to oppose the heretics in general—both old and new—the Lokāyatikas, the Buddhists and the Jainas. They opposed the materialistic views of the old heretics and the anti-vedic doctrines of the new heretics. The pioneer of these advocates of the orthodox Vedic Schools was perhaps the sage Gotama, who adduced very strong arguments against the theory of Dehātma vādā or the theory, which preaches that the body is the Self, of the old heretics and established the theory that the body is different from the soul. Then came Kaṇāda who made an endeavour to refute the theory of Svabhāvavāda or Naturalism of the old heretics and propagated the theory that the diversity of creation is not possible for svabhāva which is unconscious. The diversity, according to Kaṇāda is produced from the atoms, which are unconscious, through the will of God in agreement with the doings of the previous births. After him Kapila, who is regarded by some as representing the oldest tendency of philosophy, came to the field and formulated his arguments in favour of Dualism for which the field had already been prepared by his predecessors. Then came Patanjali who propagated the theory of Yoga and tried to establish the theory of the existence of God. When, through the influence of these teachers the mass mind was almost
inclined towards spiritualism and belief in the transmigration and spiritual nature of soul took almost complete possession of the mass mind of India, Jaimini appeared and made an attempt to establish by argumentative discussions that the Vedas are infallible and authoritative, that Karma or action is more powerful than even God, if there be any, that for the sake of the purification of mind the performance of Karma is indispensable. When through the influence of Jaimini, the minds of the people became prepared, by performing duties, sanctioned by the Vedas, for conceiving the spiritualistic soul, and the influence of anti-Vedic doctrines and tendencies was, for the time being, almost removed from the mass mind, Vyāsa came to the field and preached Spiritualistic or idealistic philosophy. Lokāyata, being thus opposed by these strong enemies, grew impatient and leaned towards spiritualism. This stage may be called the second or the middle stage of its downfall. In this stage it admits, gradually, the identification of self with the sense-organs, the principle of life and with mind shaking off its old doctrine of Dehātmavāda or the doctrine of the identification of Self with the body. The first view or the doctrine of the identification of Self with the sense organs, is based on the facts that consciousness and bodily movements, follow from the initiation of the senses and that the judgments expressed in 'I am blind' showing the identity of the self with the sense-organs are universally accepted as valid. Still opposed by the spiritualists it maintains that the vital
principle itself is really the source of intelligence as the senses depend for existence and operation on it. When this view too was attacked its sponsors came to maintain that consciousness is a quality of the mind. The other organs are only the means of indeterminate sense-knowledge. It is mind alone that introduces the element of determinateness. Moreover, mind controls by its power of volition the outer-organs and may persist and function singly even when the latter happen to be absent. Therefore the mind is the true self. All these have been recorded by Sadānanda in his Advaita Brahma Siddhi. 'Sadānanda speaks of four different materialistic Schools. The chief point of dispute is about the conception of the soul. One School regards the soul as identical with the gross body, another of the senses, a third with breath, and the fourth with the organ of thought.' On the other hand, the Lokāyatikas had so long maintained that perception is the only source of knowledge. Now being severely attacked by its opponents, who maintained the authority of inference, it showed for the first time its leaning towards admitting inference as a source of knowledge. In the first step it said that for practical purposes probability was sufficient. At the sight of smoke rising from a certain place there arises in the mind a sense of the probability of fire and not of its certainty. This is enough for all practical purposes. For this end there is no need to assume the existence of a distinct kind of evidence, called Inference. When further
pushed to the corner this school said that the followers of this school were prepared to accept inference as a means of right knowledge as it was useful in our daily life. But the mechanical form of inference as proposed by the Buddhists and others can by no means be considered a medium of right knowledge as it is thoroughly impracticable for daily use. In other words, there are two classes of inference—one class inferring something restored in future and the other class inferring what has already taken place. The inference about what is past is accepted and the inference about what has not been perceived such as Paraloka, God, Soul is rejected. Purandara flourished, in this period, as an advocate of the Chārvāka school. S’ankara Kamalas’ila, Abhayadeva, Jayanta and the unknown author of Sarvamata Sangraha record his views. Being pushed, further, to the corner, this school accepted, in this stage, even ether as an element. Guṇaratna keeps its record.

**Fourth Stage.**

But every action has its reaction. The opposition of the Vedicists against the Materialists was not without its re-action. As they were supported by the Buddhists and the Jains in their attack on the Vedic sacrifices, the old heretic oppositionists became very powerful. They got their general name Nāstika, in this period. Vedic rites proper were gradually more or less pushed to the background. New scriptures were then in course of preparation, fully adapted to the needs,
tastes and tendencies of the changing times but not entirely divorced from all connection with the Vedas. Voluminous Tāntric and Purāṇic works grew up in this period and satisfied the needs of the times. As these Schools were originated for satisfying the needs of the people of different mentalities elements of different nature were expressly visible in them. As representatives of the old heretic School, whose influence was still then predominant in the country, they included and adopted the popular doctrines regarding indulgence of the senses, and as successors of the spiritualistic schools, they gave them an esoteric purpose and thus modified them to some extent. Since then, the period of the great Hindu revival after the fall of Buddhism, India has been popularly Vedic i.e. Purāṇic and Tāntric in her broad outlook. For this reason, perhaps, in the centuries after Christ we meet with very few names of Lokāyata Philosophers, though the system must have been in existence even so late as the time of Haribhadra; Guṇaratna; Sāntarakṣita; Kamalasūla; Siddhasena; Abhayadeva; Krishnamis'ra; Sriharṣa; Jayanta; Sadānanda; Mādhavachāryya etc. who have recorded and criticised its theories in their works. It was S'ankara and his school who did not even consider the Chārvāka school as a system of philosophy, although, in Sarva Siddhānta Sangraha he maintains that by adopting only those means which are seen such as agriculture, the tending of cattle, trade, politics and
administration etc. a wise man should always endeavour to enjoy pleasures, here, in this world. It was with Śaṅkara and his school, that the great reaction proceeded against Indian Materialism which in Mādhavāchāryya, who considered the Lokāyata system as the lowest system of philosophy, secured the most decided victory.

**Conclusion.**

Just as Plato, one of the spiritualistic thinkers of the west, in his fanatical zeal would have liked to buy up and burn all the works of Demokritos the father of western materialism, so it is probable that these advocates of the vedic orthodoxy, in their fanatical zeal collected and destroyed the original works of Bṛhaspati School of Philosophy, the extreme materialistic system of India. As the Buddhistic and the Jaina Schools were spiritualistic in essence they did not meet with total annihilation. Or, it may be, that for a considerable time, the views of this school became feeble and unpopular after which they lost their independent existence and became absorbed into other schools of spiritualistic philosophy. Although the works of Bṛhaspati were destroyed, the continuity of the influence of his school was at no period completely broken.

We have already seen that the Lokāyatikas got the designation Nāstika as they became at one with the Buddhists. Some of the sects of the degenerated Buddhists, in which laxity in sexual morals was one of the features, became gradually affiliated to the Lokāyata school. One
of these sects was the Kāpālika sect. The Kāpālikas are a very ancient sect. They drink wine, offer human sacrifices and enjoy women. They strive to attain their religious goal with the help of human corpses, wine and women. They are dreaded by all for inhuman cruelties. Bhavabhūti, Kṛṣṇa Miśra and Kavikarṇapūra refer to such Kāpālikas in their respective works the Malatīmādhavam, the Probodha-chandrodrayam and the Chaitanyachandrod-rayam. Bṛhaspati of Arthas'astra fame says that the Kāpālika is alone to be followed for the purpose of attaining pleasure.

Formerly, this Kāpālika sect flourished in an independent form. In course of time it became weak and lost its independence. Probably the inhuman cruelties or the dreadfulness of the sect brought about its ruin. As Kāma or the enjoyment of sensual pleasure was the goal of this sect it came gradually to be affiliated to the Nāstika form of the Lokāyata school according to which the summum bonum of human life is, as shown before, the enjoyment of gross sensual pleasure. Thus the Kāpālikas, like the Assassins, became the solitary historical example of a combination of materialistic philosophy with cruelty, lust of supernatural power and systematic crime. Or, it may be that the followers of orthodox schools, through bitter contempt, identified the Lokāyatikas with the fierce Kāpālikas, as in previous cases the Vedicists used freely the terms of abuse like 'Bastard' 'incest' and 'monster' with regard to the Lokāyatikas. At the time of Bṛhaspati, the
author of Arthaśāstra, these Kāpālikas were a distinct sect. In Guṇaratna’s time we find them identified with the Lokāyatika school which had already become a hated name in the country.

The Lokāyatikas were a creed of joy, all sunny. Through their influence, at that period of Indian history, the temple and the court, poetry and art, delighted in sensuousness. Eroticism prevailed all over the country. The Brahmin and the Chaṇḍāla, the king and the beggar, took part with equal enthusiasm in Madanotsava, in which Madana or Kāma was worshipped. References to this festival are not rare in works of poets like Kālidāsa, Bis’akha Datta and Sreeharṣa. ‘Dance and song, flower and the red powder fag, swinging and playing, all these created an atmosphere of light amusements from which all sterter laws of sexual ethics were dismissed for the time being and men and women mixed indiscriminately, the green trees wearing red apparel, as it were, owing to profuse fag that filled the whole atmosphere over which the April sun threw its gaudy purple rays.’ They assimilated the element of sexual romance from the Kāpālikas. The essential feature of this romance is—love for one, with whom one is not bound in wedlock.

As a reaction against this practice of sexual romance, Vaiṣṇavism made its appearance and the Madanotsava, the doctrine relating to sense-indulgence must have been favourably received by a large number of people. To counteract this evil, the orthodox school of the Vaiṣṇavas
included and adopted the popular doctrines regarding indulgence, but gave them an esoteric purpose and thus modified them to some extent. For this reason we find that the Dolotsava has retained the light pleasures and gay amusements of Madonotsava in many respects, and the Vaiśnavas have given these festivals a far more sober character in respect of sexual freedom.

But the ever flowing current of the Lokāyatikas did never remain suspended for a considerable period of time in Indian cultural history. It made its way in the teeth of all obstacles. After the great Brahmanic renaissance the Lokāyata sect took shelter under different forms in different parts of India. In Bengal, an old sect of the Buddhist Mahāyāna school chiefly concerned with sexual romance gave up its independent existence and like the Svabhāvavadinās and the Kāpālikas became at one with the Nāstika Lokāyatikas and the Lokāyatikas on their part incorporated themselves with that community. The old element of sensualism of the festival Madonotsava of the Nāstikas, a sanction for the gratification of grosser pleasures, is still found to linger in this sect. The name of this sect is the Sahajāja sect. The very name Sahajāja reminds us of the doctrine of Svabhāva of the old heretics. The three chief physical appetites of man are eating and drinking where by his body is sustained and sexual intercourse whereby human life is propagated. Considered in themselves they are natural and harmless. So the Sahajājas say
'there is no wrong in the eating of meat and drinking of wine nor in sexual intercourse for these are natural inclinations of men.'

In the meetings of the Sahajias men and women take their seats indiscriminately without any scruple and with full freedom. The Chaṇḍāla cooks the food and the Brahmans take it without hesitation. Unless hunger is appeased the Sahajias can not pray. Large plates full of eatables are brought on the bed spread before the members. Men and women sit there and eat them freely. In their joy women put food into the mouth of men and the latter are not slow in returning the attention, and the house rings with merry laughter. They consider the Vedas and other holy scriptures to have been manufactured by worldly men for their own selfish ends. They have no regard for the Brahmans. They entertain no respect for either the priestly class or for their elders. Women care nothing for their husbands. They revolt openly against the Brahmans, the Vedas and the Hindu society. Most of the songs of the Sahajias are about boats, trades, mortgages, farming and a hundred other topics of rustic interest of Lokayātrā. They set forth cannons and theories with a boldness which is really amazing. Caste, rank in society or orthodoxy of views are out of the question in their society. They entertain the utmost freedom in thought, in religious and social matters. They are absolutely beyond the prejudices and conventions of the ordinary people. The Sahajias allow the indiscriminate mixing of men and
women. The motto of a Sahajiā woman is—‘he who will capture our heart, we will belong to him.’ If the man of her love wants her body she must give it. She must give her all without reserve. The Sahajiās do not believe in the established ideals of womanhood represented by Sītā, Sāvitrī and the Suttees who burnt themselves with their dead husband in days gone by, as living examples of absolute devotion. These wives of Hindu scriptures and epics were actuated by hopes of getting rewards in the next life and praises from society in this for their chaste life. To the Sahajiās love is religion. They believe that Deha or material human body is all that should be cared for and their religious practices are concerned with the union of men and women. The famous Bengali poet Chandīdās was a follower of this cult. But Chaitanya apprehending its corruption and misuse declared himself in clear language against all sexual romance. The Sahajiās did not believe in human soul and in anything beyond the pleasures of the present moment. They believed in Deha and in nothing else. On one occasion some Brahmins of the orthodox community were performing tarpana in the river Ganges. This was the custom of taking handfuls of water from the river and throwing them down, by which acts they believed the thirst of their departed ancestors would be allayed. One of the founders of the Sahajiā cult saw this and taking handfuls of water like them threw them on the bank. This act attracted the attention of the Brahmins who
asked him the reason for doing so. The Sahajiā replied—'If your water will go to your departed forefathers who are far away mine ought to go to my vegetable garden which is only a mile from here and certainly not so remote as the land of the dead.' This sect raised objections against the superstitions and conventions of the orthodox schools. Extreme lawlessness characterised this sect.

All these views of the Sahajia Lokāyatikas remind us of the old heretics. Most of the views of the Nāstika Chārvāka or Lokāyatika of this form are recorded by Chiranjib Bhattacharyya of Bengal in his famous work Vidwanmodataranginī. In his account of the Nāstika school we find a blending of several independent doctrines like Bārhaspatya, Svabhāva, Bauddha, Jaina and Kāpālika. The orthodox community amongst the Buddhists the Jains and the Hindus were bitterly hostile to the supporters of these views of the Sahajia Lokāyatikas in every stage of their development. This is perhaps why its followers tried by all means to hide their societies from the public view. For this reason perhaps the Sahajias hold their meetings in secret. All their old books being destroyed by their opponents, the orthodox schools, they now have a particular language in circulation amongst themselves named the Sāndhyabhāṣā, a language which is not understood by people outside the pale of their own society. But thus hidden like owls at daylight, the Lokāyatikas
of the Sahajīā sect of Bengal could not fight long with the orthodox communities.

After the Brahmanic revival, in the age of Chaitanya they were seeking shelter, and, in Bengal, Būrabhadra, son of Nityānanda gave them a shelter and converted them to Vaiṣṇava faith. This conversion, however, does not mean much. They merely cried aloud the names of Chaitanya and Nityānanda and there ended all their connection with Vaiṣṇavism. They adopted the Vaiṣṇava creed merely for expediency's sake, in order to have some status in the society which had rejected them altogether. Although, with the revival of the Brahmanic form of Vaiṣṇavism, Vaishnavism, the Loyāyatikas became very weak and identified themselves with the Vaiṣṇavas, yet the school of free-thinking did not die out in India. It lives not amongst a few but amongst thousands to-day. They are not guided by the spirit of Hindu Renaissance. They have now included the Bible, the Koran and even the Grantha Saheb of Guru Nānak. A movement of absolute freedom is visible in every department of Indian life—social, political and religious. The advocates of free-thinking of this age are no doubt the successors of the old heretics—the Bārhaspatyas. They have now taken complete possession of the mass mind of India. They constitute the bulk of the cultured.
APPENDIX.

Some relevant notes:

Nāstika

(1) The word is as old as the Maitrī Upaniṣad III 5 Nāstikyam VII 10.
(2) Pāṇini gives its derivative meaning. Pāṇini IV. 4. 6.

According to Pāṇini a Nāstika is one who maintains the view that there is no other world.

(3) According to Manu a Nāstika is one who condemns the veda. II 11. It is mainly the veda which establishes ‘next world.’ If the authority of the veda is rejected ‘next world’ cannot stand. So, one who condemns the veda discards also the ‘next world’.

(4) The word has been used in the Mahābhārata in the same sense as suggested by Manu.

(5) According to Gita the Nāstikas are Godless people. XVI. 8. Kumārila in his sloka Vārtika maintains the same view. (Pratijnā-Sūtra, tenth verse).

(6) In the later works, the word has been used for vilification. The Mādhvas vilify the S’aivas and vice versa by using this term.

Lokāyata

(1) Old as Rāmāyana. The word means ‘dry arguments’ or ‘vitaṇḍa’ or ‘causistry’.
(2) It is often used in old Pāli text in the same sense.
(3) The word is available in Patanjali’s Mahābhāṣya. Mahābhāṣya VII. 3. 45.

(4) The name Lokāyata occurs in Pāṇini’s ukthadigaṇa. Pāṇini Ahstādhyāyi Sūtra IV. 2. 60.

(5) Lokāyata has been recognised by kautilya as Dars‘ana. Kautilya Artha Sāstra I. 1.

Chārvāka

Chārvāka is met with in the Mahābhārata. Later on, this is the only term by which Indian materialism is designated.

The word chārvāka is often taken as charu (beautiful) and bāka (speech). And it is interesting to find that chāru is also a synonym for Bṛhaspati. Thus it may be suggested that chārvāka stands for ‘the word of Bṛhaspati’.

Pāṣaṇḍa is also a term which is used in the same sense.

Materialists, Sceptics and Agnostics

Vis‘vakarman speaks of a class of thinkers who are enwрапt in misty cloud (nihārena prāvṛtah) and with lips that stammer (jalpya). The subsequent thinkers speak of avidya or ignorance and vicīkitsā or perplexity. Sams‘aya or doubt is another term which is met with in this connection in subsequent literature.¹ The Muṇḍakas and the vājasaneyas use the term avidyā in the sense of anything which is not transcendental knowledge (parā vidyā) or the

¹ Mu. Upaniṣad II. 2—8.

16936
knowledge of Brahman (Brahma vidyā) and anything which is not conducive to ideal self-realization. The word vicikitsā, according to Āsuri, means a mental state. In the kaṭha Upanisad (1. 20) the word has been used in the sense of philosophic doubt as to man’s existence after death: ‘some say he exists; others, he does not.’ These latter are no doubt the sceptics and agnostics of ancient India. Vis’vakarman had evidently in mind (1) those hymnchanters who doubted the existences of Indra. (2) Paramesṭhin, who saw no possibility of knowing any cause or reality beyond the original matter and (3) Dīrghatamas, who was ignorant of the nature of a first cause. In subsequent literature we find that the keīyas were of opinion that the know-all does not know at all, while the know-nothing knows everything.

And as stated above, some sages according to the kaṭha upaniṣad, doubt the existence of man after death (1. 20.). Scepticism and agonisticism are the expressions of a free mind that refuses to accept traditional wisdom without thorough criticism. In this respect the materialists of ancient India are very closely related to the present-day sceptics and agonistics. However minor their position may be in the field of philosophy, they are, no doubt,

2 Br. Upaniṣad I. 5.3.
3 R.V., VIII. 89. 3.
4 R.V., X. 129. 6—7.
5 R.V., I. 164. 6.
6 Ke. Upaniṣad II. 3.
the fathers of free and independent thinking in India.

Bṛhaspati Laukya or Brahmaṇaspati, who may be termed the founder of Indian materialism, first embodied his views about the origin of the world in the hypothesis that in the beginning being came out of non-being—astah Saddājāyata, that matter is the ultimate reality. Paramēṣṭhin treated matter as the ultimate reality as Bṛhaspati did, but disavowed all possibility of knowledge of the ultra-material substratum, if there were any. He refused to extent his metaphysical inquiry beyond matter. Bṛhaspati was a materialist. Paramēṣṭhin was a sceptic. But they were inter-related. Subsequently Mahāvīra speaks of the Āṇnāniyās, who pretend to be intelligent but are infact unfamiliar with truth and have got rid of perplexity or puzzlement. These Āṇnāviyās are ignorant teachers who teach ignorant pupils and speak untruth without proper investigation of knowledge (Sutракṛtānga, I. 12. 2). These ignorant teachers seem to be the agnostics of ancient India. Subsequently Bṛhaspati of the Chārvāka School is pictured as an agnostic of this type. The close relation between the agnostics of the Sūtrakṛtānga and the materialists of the Purāṇas cannot be ignored.

In the Buddhist records7 Sañjāya, who maintains a sort of indifferent or neutral attitude towards such problems of metaphysical

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7 Mahāvagga, I. 23. 24
speculation as those which are concerned with the first cause, the final cause, future life, retribution, and so forth is best known as a sceptic. According to Sañjaya, the same philosopher tends to be an agnostic and a sceptic. When he freely confesses his inability to know the ultimate beginning and end of things, which is virtually the same as admitting that these are unknown and unknowable, he is an agnostic. When he doubts or hesitates to admit the correctness of all bold assertions about matters beyond human cognition, he is a sceptic. What we find in the teachings of Dīrghatamas, Paṟameṣṭhin, the kenīyas and the kaṭhas is represented by the agnostics and sceptics.

Jayarāśi and Tattvopaplava śīṁha

The work of Jayarāśi is an important new chapter in the history of Indian philosophy. No work of the chārvāka school itself was known before. Jayarāśi’s treatment is clear from the very tittle of the book ‘tattvopaplava’ means ‘upsetting of all principles.’

There were different classes of Chārvākas. A particular division of school engaged themselves in rejecting all sorts of pramāṇas, Jayarāśi belonged to that group. This is in adition of what has been discussed in this book regarding the first stage of Indian materialism.

Jayarāśi has accepted Brhaspati as his Guru and with his permission demolishes the doctrines of other schools.
The method adopted by him may well be called as critical. To him there are no valid means of knowledge and to establish his thesis he with the help of surgical instruments has examined different schools of Indian philosophy.

The probable date of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa is the first half of Seventh Century A.D.

Some of the genuine Lokāyata Sūtras rescued from obscurity.

The following Sūtras are attributed to Brhaspati, the founder of the Lokāyata School, and in them we find the statements of the Chārvākas quoted verbatim.

(1) प्रथित्यपूतेजोवायुरिति तत्स्वानि
(2) तत्समुदाये शरीरेर्द्विविषय विषय संभा
(3) तेब्र्यक्ष्वेतन्यम्
(4) किङ्वाविश्वयोमदशक्तिवन्
(5) काम एवेक: पुरुषाथे:
(6) अनुमानमप्रभापाथम्
(7) वेतन्य विशिष्ट: काथ: पुरुषः
(8) भवणमेवापवर्गः:

Of these eight Sūtras the first four are quoted by Bhāskarāchāryya as the Sūtras of Brhaspati of the Lokāyata school of philosophy. The first three are also quoted by Kamalas’ila in his Commentary on the Tattva-saṃgraha and also by Guṇaratna in his
Tarkarahasyadiptika.* The third and second part of the fourth and the seventh are quoted by S'ankara in his commentary on the Vedânta Sûtra. The fifth, seventh and eighth are quoted by Sadânanda in the Advaita Brahma-siddhi as the sûtras of Brhaspati.*

The fifth Sûtra is quoted by Nilakantha (in his Commentary on the Gîta) as belonging to Brhaspati of the Lokâyata school.* The sixth Sûtra is collected from the Commentary on the Sammati Tarkaprakarana named Tattva-bodhavidhâyini of Abhayadevasuri.† The seventh aphorism is quoted (in the Commentary on the Gîta) by S'ridhara as belonging to Brhaspati of the Lokâyata school.‡

We know from the Panjikâ of Kamalas'ila on S'lôka 1864 of the Tattvasangraha* and from other similar sources that a S'lôka sometimes came to be called a Sûtra. We also

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* Vide Brahma Sûtra Bhâshyas of Bhâskarâchâryya and S'ankara (III. 3. 53.—तथाच बाह्स्पत्यानि सुत्राणि) and the Panjikâ of Kamalas'ila (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, p. 520 तथाच तेषां सूत्रम्. From the context it is clear that the pronoun तेषां refers to the Lokâyatikas.) Vide also the commentary of Gujаратna (on Sloka 84) of Saddars'ana Samuchchaya.

* तथाच बाह्स्पत्यानि सुत्राणि

* Vide XVI. ii.—तथाच बाह्स्पत्यम् सूत्रम्

† Vide Gujrat Puratattva series Vol. I., p. 70—

तथाहि ब्रह्स्पति सूत्रम्

‡ Vide XVI. ii.—तथाच बाह्स्पत्यं सूत्रम्

§ तथाच सूत्रं कायादेवति।
know that works in a mixed style of Sūtras and verses are not rare in the field of Sanskrit Literature. The existing editions of Vātsyāyana’s Kāmasūtra and Kautilya’s Artha S’astrā may be mentioned as instances to the point. They are written in a mixed style of Sūtras and S’lokas, the substance of the Sūtras being sometimes summarised in the S’lokas. Mādhava-chāryya in his Sarvadarṣ’anasangraha follows this mixed style of prose and verse when giving the Chārvāka view. In view of the facts, cited above, it will not be far from the truth to say that Bṛhaspati of the Lokāyata school also wrote his ‘sūtra-work’ in a mixed style of Sūtras and verses and that the verses quoted by Mādhava as belonging to Bṛhaspati are genuine i.e. they belong to the lost Sūtra-work of Bṛhaspati. These verses are quoted below.

ब्रह्मस्तिनात्युक्तम्

न स्वयं नायपवर्गोवा नैवात्मा पार्वतोपिकिः
नैववर्ण्यम्मृतमालिन्नि क्रियायत्व फळदायिकाः || १ ||
अभिधौरत् ययोविद्वारश्रिदेशः मत्स्यान्तत् ।
दुधिक्षोहाश्रिताः स्त्रिया काश्च्योविद्या कान्तिमवर्लिता || २ ||
पशुश्रवितेऽति: स्वं प्रयत्निन्दोगमन्च् ॥ || ३ ||
स्वपिता वत्ममानेन यद्र कस्माण अर्हितहस्ते || ४ ||
सुतानामयिः जन्तुइयो श्राद्धः संतुल्यंत्विन्धरकारणः
निर्माणमेव प्रदोपस्य खोहः संवभृत्येतिधर्मां || ५ ||
गृहतामिः जन्तुइयो त्वथं पादयं कदन्मम् ।
गृहस्य-कृत-श्राद्धेन पथिः दृष्टिकारिता || ६ ||
Mention may also be made here of some sūtras, ascribed to the Lokāyata school. They are not directly attributed to Bṛhaspati. On the other hand, there is no strong reason to prove that they do not belong to the work of Bṛhaspati. There are Sūtras quoted in some places as belonging simply to the Lokāyata or Chārvāka school, while in other places the same sūtras are attributed to Bṛhaspati.

Again, there is no ground for supposing that all these sūtras belong to Bṛhaspati; for we know the names of other sūtrakāras of the Lokāyata school, namely Chārvāka, Purandara, Kambalāsvatara and Bhāguri.

In any case, there is no reason to believe that they are not the Lokāyata-sūtras. They
may safely be collected as being the genuine Sūtras of the Lokāyata school.

The said Sūtras are the following:—

(1) न धर्मांतरचरेत्
(2) एष्ठत्तकठवात्
(3) सांशिकत्वाच
(4) कोद्वाभिषेक हि तत्त्वं परगतं कुत्वाँत्
(5) वरमय वेयतं: श्वो-मयुरात्
(6) वरं सांशिकालिप्कादरसांशिक: कार्यापन:
(7) शारोरेत्विय संधात एव चेतन: क्रोधः
(8) काम एव ब्राजनां कारणम्
(9) परेकिनोदभावात् परलोकाभा:
(10) इहतोष परलोक शारोरयोभिनितवात् ब्रह्मदर्पि

चित्तयोत्क: सत्तान:

(11) एतावानेव पुरुषो यावानन्त्रियगोचर:
(12) प्रत्यक्षेवेकं प्रमाण

The first six Sūtras are ascribed by Vātsāyana in his Kāmasūtra to the Lokāyata school.* The seventh Sūtra is a quotation by Madhusūdana in his Commentary on the Gīta, and it is stated to belong to the Lokāyata school.† The eighth Sūtra is found as a quotation by S'ankarāchāryya in his Commentary on the Gīta. There it is referred to as an extract from the work of the Lokāyata school.‡ The ninth Sūtra is quoted in the Commentary on

* Vide Kāmasūtra I., 2. 25—30.
† इति लोकायतिकाः
‡ इति लोकायतिकृत्तिरियम्
the Tattvasangraha as belonging to the Lokâyata school.§ This Sûtra is also quoted in the Commentary on the Sammati Tarkapra-karaṇa in the same form and as belonging to the same Lokâyata school.¶ The next two Sûtras are found quoted in the Commentary on the Tattvasangraha as an extract from the work of the Lokâyata school.* The last Sûtra stated above is quoted in the Commentary on the Sammati Tarkapra-karaṇa as belonging to the work of the Chârvâka school.† We are tempted to add here another Sûtra in S'loka form of the Svabhâvavâdins who are later on indentified with the Lokâyatikas and the Chârvâkas. This verse originally belonged to the standard work of the Lokâyata school. The verse is this:—

क् कपटकारां प्रकरोति तेष्क्षणं
विविद्धभावं सूपपक्षिवणांष
मालुय० मित्योऽ कङ्गतांच निम्बे
स्वभावत्: सब्बेमिंद्रं प्रबुद्धम्॥

In addition to the above, we find some other Sûtras of the Lokâyata school which are directly attributed to persons other than Brhaspati. This proves that Brhaspati was not the only worker of this school. After him there must have been many workers in the

§ तथांति तस्ठैत�्वृत्तम् From the context it is evident that the pronoun तस्य refers to the Lokâyata school.

¶ Gujrat Puratattva series, p. 71.
* Gaekwad's Oriental series, p. 528.
† Gujrat Puratattva series, p. 73.
field. There is, therefore, no strong evidence for the supposition that these Sūtras are not equally genuine. These Sūtras are—

(1) प्रमाणस्वागौणवावद्वादनामाथविनिश्चयेद्वृत्तमः

(2) कायादृश्व ततोब्जानं प्राणापवानाधिशििताद्वृत्तं

जायते

(3) सत्त्वं धर्मसात्यं पराणेव सुवृत्तिः ब्रह्मस्य

Of these three Sūtras the first is quoted in the Commentary on the Sammati Tarkapra-karana as belonging to a work of the Lokāyata school and is attributed to a philosopher of the name of Purandara.† Perhaps, this Purandara was the author of a later sūtra work of the Lokāyata school in which the views of Brhas-pati were expounded. The next sūtra is quoted in the Tattvasangraha—as belonging to Kambalāsvatara, one of the earliest writers of the Lokāyata system.* Perhaps, this Kambalāśvatara was another expounder of the system like Purandara. The last sūtra is quoted in

† Bhattotpala's commentary on Brḥatsamhitā, Saddars'ana Samuchchaya Vṛtti of Gunaratna, Dallana's commentary on Susrūta, Chapt. I.

§ Vide The Sammati Tarkaparakarana of the Gujrat Purāṭattva series Vol. I., p. 70—एतत् पार्द्वं सर्वम्

Most probably this Purandara is identical with Purandara mentioned in the Commentary of Kamalas'ila and referred to in the Tattvasangraha of Sāntarakṣhita. From the foot note of the page we know that this Purandara is mentioned also in the Syādbhādāratnākara.

* Vide p. 521—तथा सूत्रं—कायादृश्विति कम्भलास्वतरोऽदित

मिति।
the Commentary on the Sammati Tarkaprapakaraṇa—as a saying of the Chārvākas.†

Jayarāśi in his Tattvopaplava siṁha has quoted the following Śūtras:

(१) अथात् तत्त्वं व्याख्यास्यामः

(२) पथिव्यपत्तेजो वायुरितितत्वानि।
तत्त्वसुदाये शरीरेन्द्रिय विषय संज्ञा।

(३) वैकिको मागोऽनुसतः व्यः

(४) नम श्रमणक दुर्ब्रूढः कायक्रेता परायण।
जीविकायेन्द्रपि चारसमेचेष्यं स्मरस्यं शिष्यति।

Krishna-mis'ra the author of Probodha chandrodaya nātaka and the unknown author of Sarva-mata Samgraha quoted the following verse:

प्रत्यक्षादि प्रभासितं विरुद्धारोधिवचिनि।
वेदान्ता यदि शास्त्राणि वैद्यं किमपरायते॥

From what has been said above, we may reasonably believe that all these passages are the statements of the Chārvākas quoted verbatim and they are equally genuine although compared with the vast ocean of Bārhaspatya śūtras now lost, they are but a few drops.

† Vol. I., p. 69—इति चाच्यवकरशिष्टम्
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