GAUṆAPĀDA
A STUDY IN EARLY ADVAITA
GAUḌAPĀDA
A STUDY IN EARLY ADVAITA

by

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PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION

The present work is a study of Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya-kārikā. This classic occupies a high and important place in the history of Advaita. As the inspirer and predecessor of Śaṅkara, Gauḍapāda is justly famous for his dialectical skill and philosophical wisdom. There are a few editions and translations of the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā as well as stray papers on some of the problems connected with the work. What is here attempted is a comprehensive exposition of Gauḍapāda’s philosophy. In this task the extant commentaries on the Kārikā, especially the one attributed to Śaṅkara, were found to be very useful. It is interesting to note that in the teachings of Gauḍapāda we have full fledged Advaita expounded systematically on the strength of the three authorities, śrutī (revelation), yuktī (reason), and anubhava (experience). Consequently, the Kārikā offers, as no other work does, a fine opportunity for understanding the development of Advaita before Śaṅkara.

The first chapter deals with some of the vexed problems concerning the identity and date of Gauḍapāda and the constitution and character of the Kārikā. In the second, it is shown that the Upaniṣads are the source-books for Gauḍapāda’s philosophy. The third chapter discusses the place of reason in Vedānta vis-a-vis revelation and Gauḍapāda’s philosophical method in which they find their harmony. The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is unique in that it outlines the method of enquiring into the three states of experience as a means to Self-realization. Gauḍapāda, who makes of this Upaniṣad his starting-base, gives a lucid account of this method. Chapter four investigates the three states, waking, dream, and deep sleep, and arrives at the notion of the Reality (Turiya) which underlies these and also transcends them. The ultimate Reality, according to Advaita, is non-dual and eternal. The fifth chapter describes the concept of non-duality, and the sixth establishes dialectically the truth of non-origination. In the seventh chapter,
the illusory nature of the world and the non-difference of
the so-called individual soul from the absolute Reality are
expounded. In the eighth, the practical teaching of Advaita
as regards the way and the goal is set forth. The ninth chap-

ter is taken up with a rather highly controversial problem.
There are critics, both classical and modern, who maintain
that Advaita is nothing but a veiled form of Buddhism.
Many of them believe that Gauḍapāda was a pioneer in
orienting Vedānta towards Buddhism. It is here shown that
there are significant points of difference between Buddhism
and Advaita and that Gauḍapāda was a teacher of the
philosophy of the Upaniṣads and not an advocate of Bud-
dhism. In the final chapter, an estimate of Gauḍapāda's
philosophy is given, and his place among the pre-Śaṅkara
Vedāntins and in the history of Advaita is indicated.

To the Vice-Chancellor and the Syndicate of the
University of Madras I am indebted for sanctioning the
publication of this book under the auspices of the Univer-
sity. My thanks are due to Mr G. Harihara Sastrī, Research
Assistant, and Miss P. V. Sulochana, M.A., Research Student
in the Department of Philosophy, for their help in reading
through the proofs and in the preparation of the glossary
and the index.

University of Madras, } 
December 1, 1951. } MAHADEVAN

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

This was first published in 1952. It is gratifying to note
that a second edition has been called for, and that the book
now appears in better print and with a comelier format.
Apart from a few verbal changes, no substantial alterations
have been made in the present edition. It is hoped that this
study of Gauḍapāda will continue to receive the kindly
attention of scholars.

Madras, } 
May, 7, 1954. } MAHADEVAN
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<td>Ait. Ār</td>
<td>Aitareya Āraṇyaka</td>
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<tr>
<td>ĀŚ</td>
<td>Āgamasāstra of Gauḍapāda ed. by Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBV</td>
<td>Brhadāranyakopaniṣad-bhāsyavārtika of Sureśvarācārya</td>
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<tr>
<td>BORI</td>
<td>Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Bhāgavata-purāṇa</td>
</tr>
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<td>Brh</td>
<td>Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Brahma-sūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chānd</td>
<td>Chādogyopaniṣad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gītā</td>
<td>Bhagavad-gītā</td>
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<tr>
<td>GK</td>
<td>Gauḍapādiya-kārikā, Gauḍapāda-kārikā, or Māṇḍūkyaka-kārikā</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIP</td>
<td>History of Indian Philosophy by S. N. Das Gupta</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHQ</td>
<td>Indian Historical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iṣa</td>
<td>Iṣāvāsyopaniṣad</td>
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<td>JAOS</td>
<td>Journal of the American Oriental Society</td>
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<td>JORM</td>
<td>Journal of Oriental Research, Madras</td>
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<td>JRAS</td>
<td>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</td>
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<td>Kaṭha</td>
<td>Kaṭhopaniṣad</td>
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<td>Kauśi</td>
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<td>Khaṇḍana</td>
<td>Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā</td>
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<td>Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra</td>
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<td>Maitrī</td>
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<td>Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad</td>
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<td>Manu</td>
<td>Manu-smṛti</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Mālamadhyamaka-kārikā of Nāgārjuna</td>
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<td>Mund</td>
<td>Mundaka Upaniṣad</td>
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<td>MV</td>
<td>Māṭhara-vṛtti</td>
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<td>NUTU</td>
<td>Nṛsimhottarātāpanīya Upaniṣad</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>Pañcadaśī of Bhāratītirtha-Vidyāraṇya</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>Poona Orientalist</td>
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<td>Praśna</td>
<td>Praśnopaniṣad</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Paramārthasaśra</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPR</td>
<td>Review of Philosophy and Religion</td>
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<td>RV</td>
<td>Rg-veda</td>
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<td>Sarvasāra</td>
<td>Sarvasāropaniṣad</td>
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<td>Tait</td>
<td>Taittirīyopaniṣad</td>
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<td>YT</td>
<td>Yogatattvopaniṣad</td>
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<td>YS</td>
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CHAPTER I

GAUḌAPĀDA AND HIS KĀRĪKĀ

Gauḍapāda, like most of the classical Indian thinkers, lives in our memories solely through his work. His philosophy is his biography. While some temporal rulers have left behind them records in stone and metal wherewith their dates and doings may be construed with more or less precision, these rulers of eternity have been chary of giving clues regarding their lives on earth and those of their contemporaries, though they have transmitted to succeeding generations, through a not inconsiderable mass of literature, truths that are dateless and impersonal. In all the writings of Śaṅkara, for example—and they are extensive judged even by modern standards—there is not a single direct reference to any incident connected with the life of the great teacher. In the one isolated passage where there is any reference to personal experience at all, it is spiritual experience that is referred to.¹ Some authors do not even subscribe their names to their works; they pass them on under mythical names or under the names of their preceptors.² Under these circumstances any student of Indian thought must find it extremely difficult to settle the chronological order of the classical works or to study them in the light of their authors’ lives.³ And the work of an early thinker like Gauḍapāda—probably the earliest systematic Advaitin—must needs present knotty problems difficult to be solved with the help of our present knowledge. Any suggestions regarding his times and the influence of other systems of philosophy on his mental climate must therefore remain tentative till more light is available.

² See Kullūka-bhaṭṭa on Manu, I, 4; prāyaṇācaryānām iyaṃ śailī yat svābhiprayām api paropadesam iva varṇayanti.
³ What Cowell says of Udayana may be said of all the classical thinkers of India: “He shines like one of the fixed stars in India’s literary firmament, but no telescope can discover any appreciable diameter; his name is a point of light, but we can detect therein nothing that belongs to our earth or material existence.” See Introduction to the Kusūmānjali (E. T.), pp. v and vi.
The Identity of Gauḍapāda

Tradition regards Gauḍapāda as Śaṅkara’s parama-guru (preceptor’s preceptor). A verse which contains the succession list of the early teachers of Advaita gives the names of those teachers in the following order: Nārāyaṇa, the lotus-born Brahmā, Vasīṣṭha, Sakti, his son Parāśara, Vyāsa, Śuka, the great Gauḍapāda, Govinda-yogīṇḍra, his disciple Śaṅkarācārya, and then his four pupils Padmapāda, Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka and the Vārtikakāra (i.e., Suresvara). From this list we learn that Gauḍapāda was the preceptor of Govinda who was Śaṅkara’s guru. The first teacher is Nārāyaṇa the Lord himself; and the line of succession, which is from father to son upto Śuka, consists more or less of mythical persons. The first teacher of whose historicity we may be sure is Gauḍapāda; and from him onwards we have the rule of sannyāsins succeeding to the Advaita pontificate. With him commences, according to tradition, what may be called the mānava-sampradāya in the present age of Kali; he was the first human preceptor to receive the wisdom of the One and impart it to his pupils. Anandagiri, in his gloss (tīkā) on the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā-bhāṣya, says that the teacher Gauḍapāda in those old days spent his time in Badarikāśrama, the holy residence of Nara-Nārāyaṇa, in deep meditation on the Lord, and that the Lord, Nārāyaṇa, greatly pleased, revealed to him the Upaniṣadic wisdom. Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (17th

4. nārāyaṇaṁ padma-bhuvaṁ vasīṣṭhaṁ Śaktim ca
tat-putra-parāśaram ca,
vyāsaṁ śukaṁ gauḍapadaṁ mahāntaṁ
govinda-yogīndram athāsya siṣyaṁ,
Śrī-saṅkara-cāryam athāsya padmapadaṁ ca
hastāmalakaṁ ca siṣyaṁ,
tam troṭakaṁ vārtikakāram anyān asmad-gurūṁ santatam
ānatoṁsi.

5. Śuka, the son of Vyāsa, is stated to have renounced the world even as an infant; but nothing has come to light so far to prove his non-mythical nature.

6. The line of descent from Nārāyaṇa to Śuka is called vaṃśārṣi-param-paṛā and from Gauḍapāda onwards it is called siṣya-param-paṛā.

7. See Māṇḍūkya-paniṣad with Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya and Anandagiri’s tīkā (Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series, 10), pp. 2 and 157.
century A.D.) writes in his Śārīrakamāṁśābhāṣyavārtika that there was in the country of Kurukṣetra a river called Hirarāvati, on whose banks there were some Gauḍa people; that the pre-eminent of them, Gauḍapāda, was absorbed in deep meditation beginning from the Dvāpara age; and so, as his proper name is not known to the moderns, he is celebrated by the class-name of the Gauḍas.8

The view that there was an ācārya called Gauḍapāda before Śaṅkara is discountenanced by Dr Walleser in his Der Ältere Vedānta. He thinks that there was no individual teacher by name Gauḍapāda. Gauḍapādiyakārīkā is the name of the work which has come down to us in four prakaraṇas. No individual was the author thereof. It represents the view of the school of Advaita which was prevalent in Gauḍadesa, the modern North Bengal, in the century preceding Śaṅkara. This school for the first time put the doctrines of the Vedas and Upaniṣads in a systematic form, the form of a śāstra, and the result was the Gauḍapādiyakārīkā consisting of four pādas. The term ‘Gauḍapādiya’ then should be taken to mean only ‘summary verses consisting in pādas of the Gauḍa-school’. ‘Gauḍapāda’ is but a figment made out of the title and is not the proper name of an author; and hence the work is to be regarded as the anonymous hand-book of an early Advaita School. Not knowing the significance of the title of the book, later scholars postulated an individual author and named him Gauḍapāda. It is a case of a book evolving an author and not an author evolving a book. Dr Walleser seeks to substantiate his view by citing the evidence of teachers who quote verses of the Kārikā in their works, but are silent about any individual author called Gauḍapāda. In some of the Tibetan

translations of Baudhāyaṇa works verses from the Kārikā are quoted but they are referred to merely as belonging to a Vedānta-sūtra.Śaṅkara quotes the kārikās twice in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra and says that they constitute the sayings of those teachers who know the tradition of the Vedānta. Commenting on this statement made by Śaṅkara, Govinda-nandana in his Ratnaprabhā and Ānandagiri in his Nyāyanirnaya speak of it as citing ‘the approval of the old’ (vyuddha-sammati). Sureśvara quotes two kārikās in the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi and attributes them to the Gauḍa (gauḍaiḥ). These kārikās are described by Jñānottama, the commentator on the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, as gauḍapāḍiya-vākya. Vidyāranya refers to the Gauḍa teaching in his Pañcadaśī, and the commentator Rāmakṛṣṇa calls it ācārya-sammati. Sadānanda introduces two kārikās in his Vedāntasāra in the words tad uktam (it has been said), and one of the commentators, Nṛsimha Sarasvati, characterizes those verses as vyuddha-sammati ‘the opinion of the old’, while another, Rāmatirtha, contents himself by saying that they constitute a contemporary opinion. Kāśmiraka Sadānanda Yati does not seem to be aware, so far as we can gather from his Advaita-brahmasiddhi, of any single teacher as the author of the Gauḍapāḍa-kārikā. Vijñānabhairava quotes in his Sānkhyapravacanabhaṣya two kārikās in full and part of a third; but he does not attribute any of them to Gauḍapāda’s authorship. From these references Dr Walser concludes that there was no teacher by name Gauḍapāda who wrote the Kārikā and that the tradition about him is a

9. Śaṅtiraksita’s Madhyamakālaśākara-kārikā with its commentary by Kāmaśīla, and Bhāvaviveka’s Madhyamakāra-draya-kārikā and its commentary Tarkajñāla, by himself.
10. BS, I, iv, 14; GK, III, 15; tathā ca sampradāyayidyo vadaṇṭi. BS, II, i, 9; GK, I, 16; atroktam vedāntasampradāya-vidbhir ācāryaiḥ.
11. IV, 41, 42; GK, I, 11 and 15.
12. PD, II, 28.
13. III, 44 and 45.
14. GK, II, 32 is quoted twice, in the commentary on I, 45 and on I, 57; the verse is quoted as śruti. GK, III, 5 with a different reading of the fourth quarter is quoted in the commentary on I, 152, and is described as a verse from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. GK, III, 26 (the first four words) is quoted in the commentary on VI, 50, and is regarded as śruti.
pure myth fabricated by later thinkers who could not understand the proper meaning of the title of the work Gauḍapādiyakārikā.

Dr Walleser’s view does not seem to be sound. He has overlooked certain other pieces of evidence, and has read unintended meanings into those which he has noticed. As Prof. L. D. Barnett observes, the evidence adduced is very inconclusive. "Prima facie the name Gauḍapāda is exactly parallel to Dramidācārya; and the word pāda, properly an honorific ending, is often applied to form titles of individuals, e.g. Pūjyapāda. This seems to us to be the natural explanation of the name; and the quotations adduced by Dr Walleser do not prove his case."¹⁵ Let us begin with one of the authorities Dr Walleser has quoted, viz. Sureśvara’s Naiśkarmyasiddhi. In that work two kārikās of the Gauḍapādiya are quoted as also a verse from the Upadeśasāhasrī, and then the observation is made that the worshipful Gauḍas and the Drāviḍas expounded the same doctrine.¹⁶ There can be no doubt as to whom the term Drāviḍas refers. It is to the author of the Upadeśasāhasrī, Sureśvara’s guru, Śaṅkara. Dr Walleser thinks that the term signifies Śaṅkara, the representative of the Drāviḍa tradition. It is a needless assumption. The simple and direct meaning is that Śaṅkara was a Drāviḍa, i.e. he hailed from Kerala which is a part of the Drāviḍa country. And the term has been used to match the other word ‘Gauḍas’ which in this context must obviously mean the teacher who was the author of the kārikās. The plural in both cases is only for the purpose of respectful reference, i.e. Gauḍas means Gauḍācārya and Drāviḍas means Śaṅkarācārya. Since Gauḍapāda was known only by his place-name or class-name, he had to be referred to as Gauḍas. To match this word, as we have said, Sureśvara has referred to Śaṅkara by the name of the place of his birth. In the

¹⁵ JRAS, 1910, p. 1362.
¹⁶ evam gauḍair drāviḍair naḥ pūjyaḥ prabhāṣitab.
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika Suresvara has explicitly the name of Gauḍapāda. In one place he uses the words gauḍapādiya vacas; in another he refers to the teacher as Gauḍācārya; and in a third he speaks of the ślokas of Gauḍapāda. Turning now to the evidence of Śaṅkara, we must not fail to notice that the commentator on the Gauḍapādakārikā whom tradition regards as Śaṅkara refers to the author of the kārikā as his paramaguru. In Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad there is a reference to Gauḍapādācārya, the disciple of Śūka.

Even if we think that these two commentaries are not the genuine works of Śaṅkara, we cannot but admit that the Kārikā is known to the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya because he quotes its verses which he regards as expressing the view of the teacher who knew the Vedānta tradition (vedāntasampradāyavid). The use of the plural ‘sampradāyavidah’ and ‘sampradāyavidbhiḥ’ has, we should think, misled Dr Walleser. A venerable person is commonly referred to by using the plural form in Sanskrit as well as in the Indian languages. In the two places where Śaṅkara quotes the Kārikā, he refers not to the teachers but to the great teacher who knew the tradition of Vedānta. He does not refer to the ācārya by name because of his deep veneration for him. The terms ‘ṛddha’ and ‘ācārya’ used by other writers are evidently meant to refer to Gauḍapāda. A teacher like Sadānanda, quoting the kārikās, introduces them by merely saying ‘it has been stated’, either because it was well-known in his time that the kārikās were from Gauḍapāda’s work or because he did not think it necessary to mention the ācārya’s name. As regards Vijñānabhikṣu’s evidence, we must say it has little value in view of the fact

17. BBV, I, iv, 389.
18. Ibid, II, i, 386.
20. I. 8. tathā ca sukaśisyo gauḍapādācāryah.
21. maryādayān bahu-vacanam. See Rāmatīrtha’s Vidveṣamanaśājñi on Sadānanda’s Vedāntaśāra, introductory verse 2: gurūn ity ekasmin bahuvacanam pūjārham. See for a similar usage the commentary on Abhinavagupta’s Tantrālokā (1, 10) where Somānanda is referred to in the plural as tarkasya kartāro vyākhyātāraś ca.
that he quotes a verse (II, 32) from the second prakaraṇa twice and a verse (III, 26) from the third once and characterizes them as the statement of śrutī. Another verse (III, 5) of the third prakaraṇa he quotes, but he describes it as a statement of the Viṣṇupurāṇa in which work the verse is not to be found. The ascription of the kārikās to a Vedāntaśāstra by the Baudhāya writers, to whom a reference was made, does not necessarily imply that they were unaware of the name of the author of the Kārikā. It is quite likely that they thought it sufficient for their purpose to quote the kārikās as from a Vedāntaśāstra. Thus it is clear that Dr Walleser has not produced any conclusive evidence for his thesis that the Gaudapāda-kārikā is the work of a school and not of an individual author. One of the authorities he himself has quoted, Suresvara, refers to Gaudapāda by name more than once—a fact which has been overlooked by Dr Walleser.

As Professor V. Bhattacharya pertinently observes, we have a text before us known as the Āgamaśāstra or Gaudapāda-kārikā and there must be an author for it.22 True, more than one author might have produced different parts of it. But a school or a people as a whole cannot be the authors of a text. No material evidence has been adduced by Dr Walleser to disprove the traditional view that there was a teacher called Gaudapāda before Śaṅkara, who taught the Āgamaśāstra.

The teacher's name must have been Gauda; and the honorific, -pāda, -pada, -caraṇa, or ācārya was usually added to the name. He must have certainly had a proper name, the one assigned to him by his parents. But evidently he renounced it as a sannyāsin and did not take a new name. From the name Gauda by which he came to be known, we may infer that he belonged to Gaudadeśa, that as a teacher

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he was living in a part of India distant therefrom, and that the people of that locality called him after the name of his native place. It is also possible that other Gaudas had also settled in that part of India and that this great teacher was honoured by and among them. Probably the settlement was in the country of Kurukṣetra, as Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī says. That Gauḍapāda was absorbed in deep meditation most of the time we learn both from Ānandagiri and Bālakṛṣṇānanda. It is likely that the Ācārya visited Badarikāśrama and, there, was blessed with the intuitive wisdom of the Absolute. Then he must have taught those who gathered round him the truth he had discovered and embodied it in a work which came to be called the Āgamaśāstra or Gauḍapādakārikā.

II

The Date of Gauḍapāda

If difficulty is experienced even in determining the identity of Gauḍapāda, there must be greater difficulty in ascertaining his date. We shall begin with a legend to which a reference is made by Sadāśivabrahmendra in his Jagadgururatnamālāstava and by Ātmabodhendra in his commentary on the stava. In one of the verses of the stava, Sadāśivabrahmendra pays obeisance to Gauḍapāda whom he describes as one whose feet were adored by Ayārcya who

23. Brahmānanda, the author of the Laghucandrikā, has the prefix Gauḍa, though he was not born in Gaudadeśa. The prefix in such a case would only mean that the person had some connection with the Gauḍa country. The case of Gauḍapāda is different, since he had no other name by which he was known.


Prof. M. Hiriyanna translates the verse thus: 'I seek the help of Gauḍapāda who first spread a knowledge of the Bhaṣya of Patañjali, whose feet were adored by Ayārcya, once his opponent, and who was the preceptor of Niṣṭāka mystics like Apolonya.'
was the preceptor of such Niṣāka mystics as Apalūnya. Ātmabodhendra gives some more information in his commentary on this verse. He says that Gauḍapāda was in quest of the self under the guidance of Śuka on a peak of the Himalayas and that through his influence the erroneous views of Baudhāyas headed by Ayāryya who was being attended by such yogins of the Western border of India as Apalūnya and Damīṣa, as well as by Prāvṛti, the Śākya chief of Takṣaśilā, were made to disappear. If we are to believe this legend, Gauḍapāda must have been a contemporary of Apalūnya who is the same as Apollonius of Tyana, the Pythagorean mystic who lived in the first century A.D.

Philostratus, a sophist and rhetorician, wrote the Life of Apollonius and completed it about the year 217 A.D. He says that his own work was compiled from the memoirs which had been composed by a disciple and companion of Apollonius named Damis, a native of the City of Nineveh. The story of Apollonius so far as it is relevant to our purpose is as follows: Apollonius was born towards the beginning of the Christian era at Tyana. At the age of sixteen he chose to follow the way of Pythagoras and adopted the monastic rule of the school. When he was about forty he came to India through Persia with a view to contact the Brahmans and acquire their wisdom. He started on his journey with two attendants, and at Nineveh Damis joined him. At Taxila Apollonius was struck with the piety and philosophical wisdom of Phraotes, the native chief. With a letter from him and a guide to lead, Apollonius and his companions then proceeded to the place where the sages were. The leader of the Brahman sages was one Iarches, whom Phraotes addressed in his letter as his master. Apollonius conversed with Iarches and was convinced of the latter’s superior wisdom. To one of the questions put by the Greek, Iarches answered, "We know everything, just because we begin by knowing ourselves; for no one of us would be admitted to this philosophy unless he first knew himself". Apollob-
nious lived with the sages for four months and then returned to his country by the sea-route. In one of his later addresses to the Egyptians, Apollonius says, "I saw Indian Brahmans living upon the earth and yet not on it, and fortified without fortifications, and possessing nothing, yet having the riches of all men". 25

Some of the names occurring in this narrative can easily be recognized. Damis is Damīsa, and Phraotes is Prāvṛti; Iarches is Ayārcya who, according to Sadāśivabrahmendra, was once an opponent (Bauddha) of Gauḍapāda and was later converted to Advaita by the great teacher. Before we draw our conclusions from these identifications, let us have an estimate of the value of the Greek biography.

The whole story is rejected by Priaulx as a fabrication. 26 It seems to him "that Apollonius certainly pretended to have travelled through, and made some stay in India, but that very possibly he did not really visit it; and that if he did visit it, our Damis never accompanied him". From the wrong geography which reminds one 'of a fairy tale' and the impossible descriptions given of fauna and flora, the learned writer concludes that Damis or whoever was the author must have "fabricated this journal perhaps from books written upon India, and tales current about India, which he easily collected at that great mart for Indian commodities, and resort for Indian merchants—Alexandria". 27 Professor Bigg seems to have argued in his History of the Origins of Christianity that the work of Damis never really existed, and that he was a mere man of straw invented by Philostratus. Mr F. C. Conybeare, who has translated the work of Philostratus, thinks that Prof. Bigg is unnecessarily sceptical and says that while it is true that Philostratus

puts into the mouth of the sage, on the authority of Damis, conversation and ideas which as they recur in the Lives of the Sophists of Philostratus, can hardly have been reported by Damis, it by no means follows that all the episodes which he reports on the authority of Damis are fictitious, for, adds the translator, many of them possess great verisimilitude and can hardly have been invented as late as the year 217, when the life was completed and given to the literary world.28

Weighing the arguments that have been advanced on both the sides, it is difficult to say which of the two is true. Vincent Smith characterizes the work of Philostratus as ‘a philosophical romance’ and says, “although it is not certain that Apollonius visited India at all, he had access to correct information on certain points, which has been confirmed by modern researches”.29

Assuming that Apollonius did visit India and stayed for four months with the sages of whom Iarches was the head, what follows? That the visit is of no consequence for our present purpose is the view of Bhattacharya. “Supposing that the account is true”, he says, “it will be for a further creation of confusion in settling the date even of the great Śaṅkara, into which we do not enter here as useless”.30 The reason given by the Professor is not very convincing. In the first place, the date of Śaṅkara now accepted generally by scholars, viz. 788-820 A. D., can by no means be regarded as finally settled. And secondly, the confusion of which Professor Bhattacharya speaks will arise only if, accepting that date to be true, Śaṅkara is regarded as the spiritual grandson of Gaudapāda. Professor Bhattacharya is among

30. See As, p. lxxiv.
those who think that the commentary on the Kārikā ascribed by tradition to Śaṅkara is not a genuine one. If the ascription to Gauḍapāda of a date earlier than Bhāvaviveka (circa 500-550 A.D.) will not unsettle the current date of Śaṅkara, we do not see how the legend of Gauḍapāda’s contemporaneity with Apollonius will seriously affect Śaṅkara’s date. But the really material point—and this is noticed by Professor Bhattacharya—is that the Greek account of the travel of Apollonius nowhere mentions the name of Gauḍapāda. The only authority for associating the name of Apollonius with Gauḍapāda is the Jagadguru-ratnamālāstava. It is to be doubted if it is a genuine work of Sadāśivabrahmendra. Even if it is, wherefrom he received this tradition is not known. Ātmābodhendra in his commentary on the stava cites as authorities for the story Harimīśra’s Gauḍapādollāsa and the Patañjali-vijaya. The former work is not to be traced. And in the Patañjali-carita (which is the same as the vijaya) of Rāmabhadra-dikṣīta there is no mention made of the Apollonius episode. Hence the statement of Gururatnamālāstava cannot be taken seriously till other confirmatory evidences are available.

Turning to less objectionable sources, we find we get some clue as to the date of Gauḍapāda from Baudha writers who have quoted the Gauḍapāda-kārikā. Dr Walleser has drawn attention to three Baudha writers who seem to have quoted Gauḍapāda, viz. Bhāvaviveka (circa 500-550 A.D.), Śāntirakṣita (705-762 A.D.) and his disciple Kamalaśīla. In the Tarkajvālā which is a commentary written by Bhāvaviveka on his own work, the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, the author reviews the Vedānta-darśana and quotes passages from the Upaniṣads like the Chāndogya, Śvetāsvatara and Muṇḍaka and also other passages four of which would appear to have been taken from the Gauḍapāda-kārikā. Three of these passages of the Tarkajvālā (10-12) bear a very close resemblance to three kārikās of Gauḍapāda,
and the fourth has a still closer affinity to kārikā, III,5.\textsuperscript{31} Śāntirakṣita in his Madhyamakālankāra-kārikā cites not less than ten kārikās, while discussing the views of the Aupaniṣadas.\textsuperscript{32} Kamalaśīla in his commentary, the Pañjikā, refers to these kārikās, as an Upaniṣat śāstra. If Bhāvaviveka, Śāntirakṣita and Kamalaśīla were aware of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā—and it is fairly certain that they were—Gauḍapāda must be placed before them. The earliest of the three Baudhāyaṇa writers was Bhāvaviveka who lived somewhere about 500 A. D., probably a few years later.\textsuperscript{33} The lower limit for Gauḍapāda’s date should therefore be fixed at A. D. 500.

Can the upper limit be fixed? A close study of the Kārikā along with the works of some of the early Baudhāyaṇas like Nāgārjuna has revealed a striking parallelism between quite a number of the kārikās of Gauḍapāda and passages found in those Baudhāyaṇa works.

The first half of kārikā, IV, 22
svato vā parato vāpi na kiñcid vāstu jāyate,
is paralleled by Nāgārjuna’s words,
nv svato jāyate bhāvah parato naiva jāyate
(Mulamadhyamakakārikā xxxi, 13).
A line which appears in two verses of the Kārikā (IV, 7 & 29)
prakṛter anyathābhāvo na kathañcid bhaviṣyatī
is substantially the same as the following half-verse from the Madhyamakakārikā (xv, 8):
prakṛter anyathābhāvo nahi jātūpapadyate.
Parallel to the statement of Gauḍapāda
abhūtam naiva jāyate (IV, 4)
there are the words
nābhūto nāma jāyate
in the Catuhṣataka of Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna’s disciple.

31. Dr Belvalkar thinks that the parallelism between the Tarkajñālā and the Kārikā is not absolutely convincing, and suggests the possibility of there having been a common source for both. See Vedānta Philosophy, p. 183.
32. See Aś, p. lxxvi, n.
33. Ibid., p. lxxv, n.
The kārikā (III, 44)
laye sambodhayec cittam vikṣiptam śamayet punah
sakāśiyam vipāniyac chamapraśptam na cālayet
has a corresponding verse in Maitreyanātha or Asaṅga’s
Mahāyānasūtraśālaṅkāra (XIV, 9-10)
linam cittasya grhniyād uddhatam śamayet punah
śamapraśptam upekṣeta tasmin ālambane punah.
These striking resemblances between the Gaṇḍapādaṁakārikā
and the Baudhāyaṇa works from which we have quoted cannot
be accidental. Since Gaṇḍapāda is well acquainted with
the Mādhyamika thought, he must have lived later than
Nāgārjuna. And until a common original is discovered from
which both Nāgārjuna and Gaṇḍapāda might have borrowed
the passages cited, we must assume that Gaṇḍapāda
fashioned some of his kārikās after the passages found
in the works of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Asaṅga. These
Baudhāyaṇa writers flourished between A. D. 200 and 400.
Yaśomitra who lived in the fifth century A. D. writes in his
Abhidharmaśāristāvatā<yākhyā as follows:

utpannasya punar utpattau kalpyamānāyām ana-
vasthāprasāngaḥ.

There is a line in the Gaṇḍapādaṁakārikā carrying the same
meaning:

jātac ca jāyamānasya na-yyavasthā prasajyate.
If Gaṇḍapāda did really model this half-verse on the
words of Yaśomitra, then his date must fall somewhere
between Yaśomitra’s time and that of Bhāvaviveka, i. e.,
in the 5th century A.D. 34 If this date be accepted, it follows
that the legend about Gaṇḍapāda’s contemporaneity with
Apollonius must be discredited.

There is one other difficulty which we must notice here.
If Gaṇḍapāda is placed in the 5th century A. D., what is
to happen to his alleged relationship to Śaṅkara?

34. See Bhaṭṭaṭṭaṭṭaṭṭhara: Āś, pp. lxxvi-lxxviii.

Tradi-
tion has it that he was Śaṅkara’s preceptor’s preceptor, and that Śaṅkara wrote a commentary on the Kārikā in which he salutes Gauḍapāda as his paramaguru. The date of Śaṅkara which has found favour with many scholars is 788-820 A. D. Between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara there would seem to have lapsed at least two and a half centuries. How could the latter have been the spiritual grandson of Gauḍapāda? There are the following possible ways of surmounting the difficulty. The first is to discount the tradition and not accept the commentary on the Kārikā as a genuine work of Śaṅkara. The second is to recognize the bhāṣya as a work of Śaṅkara and assign an earlier date to him.  

35 Or, the term paramaguru may be taken to mean not ‘preceptor’s preceptor’ but ‘supreme preceptor’, in which case any number of years could separate Śaṅkara from Gauḍapāda. All these, however, are speculations, and we have not passed the stage of conjecture.

III

The Kārikā compared with some other Vedānta Works

The difficulty in fixing Gauḍapāda’s date will be found to be all the greater when we compare the Kārikā with some other Vedānta works which contain identical or parallel passages. When the writings of two authors bear a close resemblance, and neither of them acknowledges indebtedness to the other, it is really a hard problem to solve as to who was the earlier of the two thinkers.

There is an old manual of Advaita called Paramārthaśāra 36 which is attributed to the authorship of Bhagavān

35 Dr T. R. Chintamani suggests the date of Śaṅkara as 655-687 A.D. See his article, The date of Śri Śaṅkaraśārgya and Some of His Predecessors, JORM, Vol. III (1929), pp. 39-56. Even this would be late.

36 Dr K. C. Pandey wrongly calls it a Śāṅkhya work. See his Abhinavagupta, p. 56.

Prof. L. D. Barnett thought by mistake that it was a work which borrowed a number of verses from Abhinavagupta’s PS, and characterized it as a work being painted over with Vaishnava colours. See JRAS, 1910, p. 708.
Ādi Śeṣa. Who the author was and when he lived are questions which have not been settled. What can be asserted beyond doubt is that he must have lived before Abhinavagupta (11th century A.D.) who adapted and expanded Ādi Śeṣa’s work to form a handbook of the Pratyabhijñā system, and gave it the same name. Between the Paramārthasāra of Śeṣa and the Māndūkyakārikā there are some significant points of resemblance. Neither quotes verbatim from the other. This is probably because of the difference in metre. But the similarity in doctrines between the two works is unmistakable. The following doctrinal identities may be noted: (1) The three forms of self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña, belonging to the three states, waking, dream, and sleep, are but phenomenal. The fourth which transcends them, viz. Turiya is alone the real. 37 (2) Māyā is the power (śakti) or energy (vibhūti) of the Lord. It constitutes his nature (svabhāva). By māyā the Lord appears to delude himself as it were. The endless diverse forms such as prāṇa are illusorily posited. 38 (3) In truth, however, there is neither origination nor destruction, neither bondage nor release. 39 (4) The one who has realized the truth is free to live as he wills. The ethical standards do not apply to him, because he has transcended the realm of morals. In this respect he is comparable to non-conscious beings or ignoramuses. 40 (5) With no system of thought is Advaita in conflict. The different schools contradict one another. But they are not inconsistent with Advaita, since all of them proclaim the self of all. 41 Besides these doctrinal similarities, one who reads the two works closely will notice that many of the key terms and phrases are the same in both and that both make use of the rope-snake, shell-silver and the ether analogies.

37. GK, I, 11; PS, 31.
38. GK, I, 9; II, 12, 19; PS, 30, 32, 33, 56.
39. GK, II, 32; PS, 69.
40. GK, II, 36-37; PS, 76-79.
41. GK, III, 17; IV, 5; PS, 65.
On the ground of the points of resemblance set forth above, can any suggestion be made regarding the sequence of the two works? Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri has suggested that the Paramārthasāra may well be considered to be the original which was drawn upon by Gauḍapāda. The reasons given by Professor Sastri for his suggestion are as follows: (1) Ādi Śeṣa seems undecided as to the unity or plurality of jīvas, whereas Gauḍapāda seems more definitely against plurality. Hence it is that the latter characterizes analogies like those of clay and its products, fire and its sparks, as being purportful only as introducing the doctrine of non-difference, not as teaching difference. Since Gauḍapāda is more definitely inclined towards eka-jīva-vāda, the probability is that he came after Ādi Śeṣa. (2) In kārikā, III, 15, Gauḍapāda juxtaposes the illustrations of clay and fire. The first illustration occurs in the Chāndogya, and the second in the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Mundaka. The juxtaposition of these two illustrations in one kārikā is not by itself unintelligible. But it would be more plausible if conceived as referring to and rejecting a similar juxtaposition elsewhere. This is just what we find in the Paramārthasāra, where in one verse (46) there is reference to the clay-analogy, and in the very next (47) there is the illustration of the sparks issuing from the fire in a piece of heated metal. Probably Gauḍapāda had these two verses before him, when he juxtaposed the two illustrations only to refute them.

These reasons by themselves, we submit, cannot make plausible the suggestion that Gauḍapāda borrowed from Śeṣa’s work. (1) In the first place, Gauḍapāda does not seem to uphold eka-jīva-vāda. As Professor Sastri himself admits, Gauḍapāda does offer an explanation for the empirical plurality of jīvas on the analogy of the defilement of a single pot-

43. GK, III, 15.
G. 3
ether not affecting the ether in other pots; and this is identical with the explanation given by Śeṣa.\textsuperscript{44} What Gauḍapāda is concerned to maintain is ekātma-vāda, and that is the backbone of all forms of Advaita.\textsuperscript{45} In kārikā III, 3, for instance, the plural jīvaiḥ is used, and it is said that the Ātman appears in the forms of jivas. (2) In kārikā III, 15, there is a reference not only to two illustrations but to three which are explicitly mentioned, and to all other such illustrations which are implied by the words et cetera. The examples of clay (mṛta) and metal (loha) appear in the Chāndogya (VI, i, 4-5), and the illustration of sparks issuing from fire occurs in the Brhadāranyaka (II, i, 29), the Mundaka (II, i, 1) and the Maitri (vi, 26) Upaniṣads. Taking these illustrations as specimens, Gauḍapāda observes that scripture has non-difference for purport even when it teaches creation. It is but natural that he should have chosen his examples from different Upaniṣads in order to show that all of them have the same purport. There is no refutation of the illustrations, as Professor Sastri suggests. What Gauḍapāda does is only to bring out the implication of the illustrations. And it is possible for one who would like to place Ādi Śeṣa after Gauḍapāda to argue as follows: Śeṣa cites the analogy of clay and its products along with another (the body and its limbs) in verse 46, and says in the spirit of the Chāndogya and the Kārikā that the non-dual self appears as if different in the phenomenal manifold (advaitam dvaitavat bhāti). In the next verse (47) there is a jumble of two analogies into one, and the sparks are pictured as issuing out of a heated metal. In none of the three Upaniṣads (Brhadāranyaka, Mundaka and Maitri) where the fire-sparks illustration is found is there a mention of metal. Probably, Śeṣa had before him the kārikā of Gauḍapāda and understood the words loha-visphulīṇga to mean loha-gatād dahanād visphu-

\textsuperscript{44} Op. cit., p. ix; GK: III, 5; PS: v. 36.

\textsuperscript{45} See Śaṅkara’s commentary on Brh. IV, iv, 6: sarvopaniṣad-vivakṣitor-thaḥ ātmāṅkatvākhyaḥ.

\textsuperscript{46} Brh: agneḥ; Mund: sudiptāt pāvakāt; Maitri: vahneḥ.
lingaganāḥ iva. The interpretation, though not unintelligible, is a little ingenious. Abhinavagupta has only one verse in his Paramārthasāra corresponding to the two of Śeṣa’s work, and he omits the analogy of clay, and instead of heated metal and sparks, gives the illustration of ‘a radiant thing and its modes’. 47 (3) The view that Gauḍapāda was earlier than Śeṣa may be sought to be strengthened by comparing the verses in the two works that deal with the three forms of the self. In Verse 31, Śeṣa refers to Viśva, Taijasa and Prājñā, and says that they veil the fourth, viz. Turiya. If we look at the verses that precede and succeed verse 31, we will notice that there is some casualness about this verse. Verse 30 speaks of Vāsudeva who, as if desiring to sport, spreads himself out in endless diverse forms. Verse 32 says that the deva deludes himself, as it were, through his own māyā, and again realizes the Self, as it were. There is thus a natural connection between these two verses. The interposition of verse 31, referring as it does to the Turiya in the neuter gender, appears rather out of place. The discussion of the three states of waking, dream and sleep, and the three forms of the self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājñā, and the exposition of the Turiya as the reality underlying them are all in place in the Gauḍapādakārikā. The kārikās of the first prakaraṇa constitute, in fact, an explanation of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, and so could not have been modelled after a single verse of the Paramārthasāra. It would appear, therefore, that Śeṣa or whoever was the author of the verse in question should be considered the borrower in this case. Either on his own authority or on the ground of some tradition, Śeṣa adds the phrase ādīmadhya-nidhāna (beginning, middle and end) in apposition with viśva-taijasa-prājñā. And, Abhinavagupta paraphrases it as srṣṭi-sthiti-samhārāḥ

47. v. 49. aham eva viśva-rūpaḥ kara-caraṇādi-svabhāva iva dehah, sarvasmin aham eva sphūrāmi bhāveṣu bhāsvārāpayam iva. ‘It is I who take form as the universe, like a single body composed of hands, feet, etc. In the whole it is I who am revealed, as a radiant thing in its modes.’ (L. D. Barnett’s translation). See JRAI, 1910, p. 734.
(origination, sustentation and destruction).\textsuperscript{48} (4) Professor Bhattacharya thinks that Šeṣa must be dated even later than Bhāskara (9th Century A.D.), one of the post-Śaṅkara commentators of the Vedānta-sūtra, for he seems to be acquainted with the theory of creation held by Bhāskara. Šeṣa effects a synthesis of the Śaṅkhya and the Vedānta doctrines of creation and finds a place also for the theory of āṇḍa or cosmic germ which is found, for instance, in the Manusāṁhitā (I, 8, ff) and the Viṣṇupūrāṇa (I, 2, 58 ff). In his commentary on Manu, I, 8, Kullūkabhaṭṭa observes that the view of the Śaṅkhyaśas as regards the evolution of the non-intelligent prakṛti is not acceptable to Manu, and that in his view is reflected the doctrine of the tridāṇḍi-vedānta,\textsuperscript{49} viz., that Brahman itself is the cause of the world through avyakta which is its power.\textsuperscript{50} That the world is a transformation of Brahman through avyakta is the view of Bhāskara.\textsuperscript{51} Šeṣa seems to be aware of this view when he says that by Upendra (Viṣṇu) the world is created because of his own primal nature (mūla-prakṛti). He makes this statement as it is but proper under the seal of Advaita, viz., that the world is non-real and appears as if real.\textsuperscript{52}

Though the view sketched above seems to be attractive, there are difficulties in accepting it as plausible. In the Paramārthasāra the terminology of Advaita is not fixed and definite. The work appears to mark a stage in the development of the Advaita doctrine earlier than the one effected by Śaṅkara. So far as definiteness and fixity go, the Paramārthasāra is not even so advanced as the Gaudapāda-kārikā. It would appear that Šeṣa’s aim was to provide Vedānta with a short manual on the model of the Śaṅkhyakārikā. The approach to Advaita he makes is also through

\textsuperscript{48} Op. cit., v. 34.
\textsuperscript{49} The school of Bhāskara.
\textsuperscript{50} Manusmrī with Kullūkabhaṭṭa’s Manvartha-muktāvalī (Kaśi Sanskrit Series, No. 114, 1935), p. 6.
\textsuperscript{51} See Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāṇjali, Bibliotheca Indica, Part I, p. 332 brahma-parināmar iti bhāskara-gotre yujyate.
\textsuperscript{52} v. 9. See Aṣ: pp. bxxxi-bxxvii.
the Sāṅkhya. The style and language he employs bear the stamp of antiquity. Though it cannot be proved from internal evidence, which alone is available to us, that the Paramārthasāra was earlier than the Gaudapāda-kārikā, it can be said with a fair measure of certitude that it has come down to us from an age when the Advaita Vedānta had not attained its character as a well-defined system—a character which it acquired at the deft hands of Śaṅkara.

We may now turn to another work, viz., the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha. As to the identity of the author of this extensive work consisting of over twenty-three thousand verses, we know next to nothing. The mythical Vasiṣṭha is the spokesman of the author, and the Rāma of the Epic Rāmāyana is made the recipient of the teaching. Whether there was a short poem as the original to which additions were later on made we do not know. But the need for abridgement was felt quite early and there are now available several summaries of the work.

Between the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha and the Gaudapāda-kārikā there is much in common in thought and terminology, though there are to be found only a few identical lines word for word in the two works. The view that the ultimate reality is non-dual consciousness is common to both Gaudapāda and Vasiṣṭha. The supreme self is immutable, since it does not suffer modification. Both the thinkers characterize the world as an appearance, comparable to the imaginary world of dreams or the fata morgana. From the standpoint of the supreme truth there is no difference between the dream world and the universe of waking life. For both Gaudapāda and Vasiṣṭha, the world is māyā-mātra, an illusion, a fabri-

53. The YV says that it is a composition of thirty-two thousand verses (II, 17, 6); actually there are 23,734 v.v. to be found in the text.

54. For instance,

(1) ädāvante ca yan nāsti vartamānepi tat tathā
   -GK, II, 6; IV, 31; YV, IV, 45, 45.

(2) upadesād ayaṃ vādō jñāte dvaitam na vidyate
   -GK, I, 18; YV, III, 84, 27 The same appears in YV, III, 84, 25, with avibodhā instead of upadesāt.
cation. In reality, there is no creation whatever, none in bondage, none released or to be released. The very concept of causality is unintelligible. Ajāti is the truth. Both the authors believe in release as the nature of the self. When the truth is known, non-duality alone remains. The path of yoga is sketched in both the works, as the means leading to the goal; only the treatment is elaborate in the Vāsiṣṭha and not so extensive in the Kārikā. That liberation need not wait for the decease of the body is a view held by both the philosophers. Both appear well-acquainted with the Baudhāya views and make use of their terminology.

The close affinity in thought and language between Gauḍapāda and Vāsiṣṭha is only natural, since both of them teach Advaita. But from the affinity can anything definite be said as regards the relation of the two teachers in time? Who was indebted to whom? Or, was there a common original from which both of them drew material for their philosophical constructions?

Dr B. L. Atreya has attempted to show that Vāsiṣṭha was the earlier of the two philosophers and that Gauḍapāda was inspired greatly in his composition of the Kārikā by the teachings of the Vāsiṣṭha. His argument is based on the following grounds: (1) The Gauḍapādakārikā was not written as an independent work, as it was offered only as a sort of commentary on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad. Gauḍapāda does not claim originality for his views. He refers to previous thinkers by such terms as ‘vedānteṣu vicaksanāh’, ‘tattvavidah’, ‘nāyakāh’, and ‘buddhāh’. The views attributed to these thinkers and approved by Gauḍapāda are found in the Yogavāsiṣṭha. (2) Unlike Gauḍapāda, Vāsiṣṭha claims to have received his doctrines directly from Brahmā and to have realized their truth in his own experience. (3) The Kārikā must be taken to represent a later phase of the

55. By Vāsiṣṭha is meant here the author of the Yogavāsiṣṭha.
philosophy of Advaita, for there is found in it a tendency to become critical, hostile, and polemical towards other contemporary schools of thought. The Yogavāsiṣṭha, on the contrary, is free from polemics and looks at the rival schools from a higher point of view wherein all contradictions are harmonized.  

The reasons given by Dr Atreyā do not appear to prove his case or even make it probable. (1) The Kārikā is not a commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad in the literal sense of the word, though in the first prakaraṇa it seeks to explain the mantras of the Māṇḍūkya. It is a prakaraṇa treatise and not a bhaṣya. Even granting that it is a commentary, it does not follow that it must be dated later than the independent work on Advaita of another author. Gauḍapāda’s reference to earlier Vedāntins does not mean that among them should necessarily be included Vasiṣṭha. The Vasiṣṭha cannot be credited with originality for all its views, for the seeds of most of them could be traced in the Upaniṣads. Surely, there was not a philosophical vacuum between the age of the Upaniṣads and the times of Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha. There must have passed several generations of Upaniṣadic scholars. It is to some of these that Gauḍapāda refers. Vasiṣṭha also cites the views of earlier vedāntins.  

There is a possibility, therefore, of both Gauḍapāda and Vasiṣṭha having drawn from a common source. (2) That Vasiṣṭha claims to have received his doctrines directly from Brahmā is no proof to establish the priority of the Vasiṣṭha to the Kārikā. It must be remembered that, like Plato who makes Socrates his spokesman in the Dialogues, the author of the Vasiṣṭha puts his views into the mouth of the sage, Vasiṣṭha. That the sage learnt his philosophy from Brahmā is but a philosophical fiction; and

57. E.g., IV, 21, 26: vedāntinaḥ.
it is true only in the sense that all truth is divinely inspired. In this connection, we may also point out that there is a similar tradition concerning Gauḍapāda, viz. that he received his teaching through the grace of Nārāyaṇa in Badarikāśrama. (3) It is not correct to say that the Kārikā has a tendency to become critical, hostile and polemical towards other schools of thought. There are in the works criticisms of categories like the concept of cause. But there is not any hostility to other systems. On the contrary, Gauḍapāda expressly declares that Advaita is opposed to no school of thought. As for the reference to other views which are contradictory to one another and mutually conflicting, that is found in the Yogavāsiṣṭha too. Hence the reasons offered by Dr Atreyā are not conclusive to show that the Vāsiṣṭha was the earlier work and that it was composed probably before Bhartṛhari and after Kālidāsa. As against his view, it has been pointed out that the Yogavāsiṣṭha quotes not only from Kālidāsa but also from the works of many other poets and writers who came long after Śaṅkara. So considering the evidence that is available, there seems to be no case for assigning to the Yogavāsiṣṭha a date earlier than the Gauḍapādakārikā.

To one more text which has affinities with the Gauḍapādakārikā we shall here allude, viz., the Bhāgavata-purāṇa. Mr Amarnath Ray has traced some of the ideas that are similar in the two works. (1) The Kārikā says that what is neither in the beginning nor at the end is not also at present, and that things which are like the unreal (vitathā)
appear as not unreal. The Bhāgavata gives expression to the same idea in different places, and makes use of the word vitatha appearing in the Kārikā with reference to phenomena. (2) The Kārikā declares it as the supreme truth that there is no destruction, no origination, no one who strives for success, no one who desires release, no one who is released. In the same strain, the Bhāgavata says, "The description ‘one who was bound is released’ is on account of the guṇas; it does not relate to me in truth. Since guṇas have māyā for their cause, there is no release for me, no bondage." (3) Both the texts believe that the one who has realized the self behaves like a non-conscious being. (4) Corresponding to the Kārikā passage that by his own māyā, the deva is deluded as it were, the Bhāgavata says that the attainment of the distinction between the sublated and sublator is the result of the self having assumed its own māyā-guṇa. (5) Both the Kārikā and the Bhāgavata compare the jīva to ether enclosed in a pot, and declare that when the limiting adjunct is destroyed, the jīva becomes one with the Ātman or Brahman. (6) That the world of phenomena is a fabrication of mind is the view of both the texts. (7) In interpreting a verse of the Bhāgavata (XI, 24, 7), the commentator Śrīdhara quotes the kārikā III, 15. (8) The illustrations of rope-snake and gandharvanagara occur in both the works. (9) The three forms of the self, Viśva, Taijasa, and Prājña, and the fourth, Turiya, which is the Real, are named in the Bhāgavata in the same way as in the Kārikā.

63. BP, X, 37, 37, XI; 19, 7; XI, 28, 21.
64. GK, II, 32.
65. BP, XI, 11, 1.
67. GK, II, 19; BP, VII, 1, 6.
68. GK, III, 4; BP, XII, 5, 5.
69. GK, III, 31; BP, XII, 5, 6.
70. BP, VI, 9, 37; XI, 26, 17; GK, II, 17-18; BP, VI, 15, 23; GK, II, 31.
From these parallelisms, Mr Amarnath Ray argues that one of the two writers, Gauḍapāda and the author of the Bhāgavata, must have been influenced by the other, and suggests that the latter was the one who borrowed. The main grounds on which the suggestion is made are that the Bhāgavata looks like attempting to harmonize the Vedānta of the Kārikā with the Pāñcarātra Bhakti religion, without, at the same time, disowning the latter’s original allegiance to the Paurānic Sānkhya, and that, while the author of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa appears to be familiar with the Ajātivāda, he is not aware of the anirvacaniyatā doctrine of Śaṅkara—a fact which leads Mr Amarnath Ray to conclude that the author of the Purāṇa came between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara.

Mr B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma assigns to the Purāṇa a date earlier than Gauḍapāda on the strength of two pieces of evidence cited by him.  

1. There is a commentary on the Uttara-gītā which is ascribed to Gauḍapāda. In that commentary half a verse of the Bhāgavata is quoted. This would have been possible only if the Purāṇa had been in existence during the time of Gauḍapāda.  

2. Two verses of the Bhāgavata appear in the Māthara-vṛtti. Though they are not quoted as from the Purāṇa, and inspite of slight mutilation, their identity cannot be missed. The Māthara-vṛtti is regarded as the original of the commentary on the Sāṅkhya-kārikā of which Gauḍapāda is said to be the author. Now, if the Purāṇa is presupposed by Māṭhara, it must necessarily be presupposed by Gauḍapāda.

The validity of Mr Sarma’s argument depends on Gauḍapāda’s authorship of the two commentaries, one on the Uttara-gītā and the other on the Sāṅkhya-kārikā. As regards the attribution of the Uttara-gītā-vṛtti to Gauḍapāda, it has been stated that it “rests on the evidence of the
colophon in one or two manuscripts of the text”, and that “such colophons cannot form independent evidence, knowing as we do, that they often originated from ignorance or fraud”. 74 Even Dr Belvalkar, who says that the metaphysical position of the Vṛtti approaches closely that of the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, admits that the commentary on the Uttaragītā “is not marked by any brilliant flashes of intellect or exegetic skill”. 75 There is doubt regarding Gauḍapāda’s authorship of the other commentary also. Professors Keith and Deussen among others think that the ascription of a commentary on the Sānkhyakārikā to Gauḍapāda is not sound. As for the view that the Māṭhara-vṛtti was the original commentary on which Gauḍapāda’s bhāṣya on the Sānkhyakārikā was modelled, that too has been disputed. Dr Belvalkar it was that suggested that the original commentary on the Sānkhyakārikā, which was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha, a Buddhist monk who went and lived in China in the fifth century A.D., was none other than the Māṭhara-vṛtti, and that this Vṛtti was the original of Gauḍapāda’s bhāṣya too. 76 After close examination of the Māṭhara-vṛtti and the Chinese Suvarṇa-saptati, Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri has shown that the former could not have been the original of the latter because of several differences in fundamentals between the two. Since it is no longer certain that the Māṭhara-vṛtti was the original translated by Paramārtha, “there is no reason to be sure that it came before the fifth century A.D., or that it necessarily preceded even Gauḍapāda’s bhāṣya”. It is quite likely that both Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda drew from a common original—an original which served as the model for Paramārtha too. 77 The suggestion, then, that the Bhāgavata-

75. Basu Mallik Lectures (1925), p. 189. Mr. Amarnath Ray thinks that the Uttaragītā itself rather than the commentary should be ascribed to Gauḍapāda.
purāṇa came before Gauḍapāda, because it is quoted in the Uttaragītā-vṛtti and the Māthara-vṛtti, loses its probative value. It is true that it cannot be conclusively shown that the Vṛtti on the Uttaragītā and the bhāṣya on the Sāṅkhya-kārikā were not written by Gauḍapāda, the author of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā. But since the opposite view is not based on any stable ground, knowledge of the Purāṇa possessed by the authors of the two commentaries does not imply that the author of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā too must have known the Purāṇa. The evidence of the Māthara-vṛtti is of no use at all, since it is by no means settled that that Vṛtti was the original of Gauḍapāda’s Sāṅkhya-kārikā-bhāṣya, even supposing that the bhāṣya is rightly attributed to Gauḍapāda.

The result of our comparisons is this. The Gauḍapāda-kārikā bears doctrinal and terminological affinities to the Paramārthasāra of Ādi Śeṣa, the Yogavāsiṣṭha and the Bhāgavatapurāṇa. The Paramārthasāra belongs probably to the same age as that of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā. Of these two works, it is difficult to say which borrowed from which. The Yogavāsiṣṭha shows signs of lateness and is to be assigned to the post-Śaṅkara era. There is no case made out for dating the Bhāgavatapurāṇa before Gauḍapāda; and it is quite likely that it presupposes the Māṇḍūkyakārikā.

IV

The Māṇḍūkyya-kārikā

Besides the Māṇḍūkyakārikā, other works are also attributed to Gauḍapāda. Two of these we have noticed, viz. a vṛtti on the Uttaragītā and a bhāṣya on the Sāṅkhya-kārikā. The other works ascribed to Gauḍapāda are: a commentary on the Nṛsimhottara-tāpinyupaniṣad, a bhāṣya on the Dur-gāsaptasatī, and two independent Tāntric treatises, viz. Subhagodaya and Śrīvidyāratnasūtra. If all or any of these works were written by Gauḍapāda, the author of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā, it is very difficult to say. We have
already seen that Gauḍapāda’s authorship of the *Uttaragītā-vṛtti* and the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā-bhāṣya* is extremely doubtful. It is possible that there were more than one Gauḍapāda. And it is also possible that the works written by others were ascribed to Gauḍapāda for various reasons such as ignorance of the author’s identity, scribal error, desire to give the work concerned the seal of high authority, etc. Since nothing definite can be said regarding the authorship of these other works, we shall study the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* alone with a view to understand the philosophy of Gauḍapāda.

The *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* is also known by the names *Gauḍapāda*- or *Gauḍapādiya-kārikā* and *Āgamaśāstra*. It is said to be an exposition of a short but important Upaniṣad called the *Māṇḍūkya*. This Upaniṣad is counted as one of the principal Upaniṣads by all the schools of Vedānta. The *Muktikopaniṣad* says that for the liberation of those who desire release the *Māṇḍūkya* alone is enough.

Gauḍapāda’s work is not a commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya* in the usual sense of the term. It is a *Kārikā* and not a *Bhāṣya*. The *kārikās* are memorial verses whose purpose is to expound in a metrical form an aspect of a subject or a particular doctrine so that it would be easy to memorize it. Their object is the same as that of the sūtras. But while the sūtras are in prose and aim at condensation to the extremest degree, omitting all unnecessary words, even those required by syntax, the *kārikās* which are verses

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78. In his paper on *Maṭharavṛtti* contributed to the Commemorative Essays presented to Sir R. G. Bhandarkar (1917), Dr S. K. Belvalkar wrote thus: “We must now be prepared to admit the existence of two Gauḍapādas, one the celebrated teacher’s teacher of Śāṅkarācārya and the other a name-sake of his and the author of the so-called Gauḍapādabhāṣya and perhaps also of the commentary on the Utara-gīta” (p. 174). In his Basu Malik Lectures (1925), Dr Belvalkar has stated that ‘there is nothing so far discovered in these two commentaries that necessarily militates the traditional identification of their author with the author of the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*” (p. 189).

79. I, 26, māṇḍūkyam ekam evālaṃ mumukṣuṇāṁ vimuktyaye.

80. Patañjali, the grammarian, remarks: “A sūtra-writer rejoiced as much over the saving of half a short vowel as over the birth of a son.”
are not so brief and cryptic. The sūtras have necessarily to be short because they have to cover an entire system, whereas the kārikās ordinarily expound only an aspect or a single phase of a subject. Hemacandra defines the Kārikā as that which indicates profound meaning in a few words.

The Kārikā of Gauḍapāda consists of four chapters or prakaraṇas. They are named Āgama-prakaraṇa, Vaitathya-prakaraṇa, Advaita-prakaraṇa and Alātasānti-prakaraṇa, containing 29, 38, 48 and 100 verses respectively. It is only in the first chapter that the mantras of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad are expounded. The other three prakaraṇas follow the lead of the Upaniṣad and seek to establish the Advaita doctrine adopting different modes of reasoning.

The structure of the Kārikā and the topics dealt with in the four prakaraṇas have given rise to many interesting, if vexed, problems. Some of these are the following:

1. The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad does not consist of the 12 prose passages alone but also of the 29 kārikās.
2. There is no Upaniṣad by name Māṇḍūkya. Gauḍapāda was the author not only of the kārikās of the first prakaraṇa but of the prose passages as well.
3. The kārikās do not constitute an exposition of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. It is the Upaniṣad that is based on the kārikās. Hence it is later than the latter.
4. The Māṇḍūkya-kārikā is not a single work consisting of four chapters. The four prakaraṇas are independent treatises on Vedānta, later compiled into one volume. These different contentions we shall here examine.

82. kārikā tu svalpa-vṛttau bahor arthasya sūcanī.
83. Śrī Bālakṛṣṇānanda Sarasvati in his Saṁrakṣaṇa-mimāṁsā-bhāṣya-vārtika calls it śrutī-vivaraṇa. See p. 6. Ānandgīrī has another name for it, viz., omkāra-prakaraṇa.
Do the Kārikās of the Āgama-prakaraṇa form part of the Upaniṣad?

The traditional Advaita view is that the first prakaraṇa significantly called Āgama is a commentary in verse on the Māṇḍūkyya Upaniṣad which consists of twelve prose passages beginning with “om ity etad akṣaram”, etc. and ending with “ātmānām ya evam veda.” The prakaraṇa contains twenty-nine verses distributed as follows: kārikās 1—9 after the sixth mantra, kārikās 10—18 after the seventh mantra, kārikās 19—13 after the eleventh, and kārikās 24—29 after the twelfth mantra. Each set of kārikās is introduced with the words ‘atraite ślokā bhavanti’ (Here are these verses). That is, Gauḍapāda divides the twelve mantras of the Upaniṣad into four sections, and after reciting the passages of each section, explains their meaning in the kārikās of his composition. This is the recognized view of Advaitins as regards the Āgama-prakaraṇa.

The rival tradition sponsored mainly by non-Advaitins is that the Māṇḍūkyya Upaniṣad covers not only the twelve mantras but also the twenty-nine ślokas. According to Madhvācārya (1199-1274 A.D.) and his followers, Vyāsa-tīrtha and Śrīnivāsa, both the prose passages and the kārikās of the first prakaraṇa were handed down by Varuṇa in the form of a frog (maṇḍūka). The rṣi (seer) of the Upaniṣad is Varuṇa and the devatā is Nārāyaṇa. Madhva quotes as his authorities the Padmapurāṇa, the Harivamśa and the Garuḍapurāṇa, to show that Varuṇa in the form of a frog saw the Šrutī through the grace of Nārāyaṇa, and added to the mantras seen by him those others (viz., the kārikās)

84. See Ānandagiri’s tīkā, p. 25. ācāryair māṇḍūkyopaniṣadām paṭhitvā tadvyākhyāna-ślokā-vaṭāraṇām atretyādīnā krītam, etc.
85. Śrīnīvāsa, p. 2: rṣi-devate śāh bhagavān bhāṣyakāraḥ: maṇḍūkārūpinā varuṇena caṭūrūpo nārāyaṇaḥ atra stūyate.
seen earlier by the creator Brahmā, with the words ‘Here are these ślokas.’  
86 Rāmānuja (1055-1137 A.D.) quotes in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra (I, i, 1) a kārikā of the first prakaraṇa (I, 16) as śruti, along with a passage from the Śvetāsvatara.  
87 Kūranārāyaṇa, a Viśiṣṭādvaita commentator of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, says definitely that the Upaniṣad, though self-evidentiary, cites mantras implying the same sense in order to reinforce the meaning taught by it.  

An attempt has been made to show that even Advaitins, barring the moderns dating from the 18th century or thereabout and including Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, are of the view that the kārikās of the Āgama-prakaraṇa form part of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. Contexts have been cited from works on Advaita where kārikās from the Āgama-prakaraṇa are found quoted as from śruti.  
88 We shall here state and examine the evidences of support for the Upaniṣadic theory that are alleged to be present in the works of Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and Ānandagiri. As regards the reference to the kārikās of the first prakaraṇa as śruti by other Advaitins who came later, it is possible to main-

86. See the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad by Madhvācārya with Śrīnivāsa (Kumbakonam) pp. 2-3. The verse from the Padmapurāṇa is:  
dhyāyanān nārāyanam devam prapavena samāḥitaḥ  
manḍūkārūpi varuṇaḥ tuṣṭvā hārim avyayam.  
The passage from the Hariyamāna is:  
itī manḍūkārūpi san dādāraḥ varuṇaḥ śrutim.  
These passages are not found in the printed editions of the works cited.  
The verse quoted from the Garuḍapuruṣa which is also not found in the printed editions is:  
brāhma-dṛṣṭān ato mantrān pramāṇaṁ sallileśvarah,  
atra ślokā bhavantītī cakārānām prthak prthak.  
See Śrīnivāsa, p. 11. atra madukte ājāgāraṁsthāna  
itāyā arthe, ete vaksyāmaṁ brāhma-dṛṣṭā  
mantarā pramāṇatayā bhavantī itī arthah.  
87. Śrī-bhāṣya (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. LXVIII) Part I, p. 102:  
jīvaśayāva hi māyāya nirodhah śrūyate, ‘tasmāṁ cānyo māyāya  
saṁniruddhah’ iti; ‘anādīmāyaṁ supto yādā jīvaḥ prabudhyate’  
itī ca.  
88. upaniṣat svayam-pramāṇatvē ’pi svokārtha-dārdhāyāya svokārthām  
mantrān udāharati ····· mantradraśṭā bhagavād rūpānām etesam ekatvam  
smṛtām iti.  
89. See Mr B. N. Krishnamurthi Sarma’s articles in RPR, Vol. II pp. 35-  
tain that either they derived their view from current opinion or they gave to the kārikās of Āgama-prakarana a status equal to that of Śruti.

(1) Śaṅkara in several of his works, it is said, quotes verses from the first prakarana and characterizes them as statements of Scripture. (a) The passage ‘jñāte dvaitam na vidyate’ (I, 18) is quoted by him thrice in his commentary on the Māṇḍūkyakārikā. (i) While explaining the prose-passage 7, Śaṅkara says that simultaneously with the removal of the attributes of being inwardly conscious, etc., there is the removal of the distinction of knower, etc., and adds, ‘Thus it will be said later on: jñāte dvaitam na vidyate’. (ii) Referring to the same passage at the commencement of the second prakarana, the commentator says, ‘āgamamātram tat’. (iii) at the beginning of the third prakarana, again, he quotes the same passage in company with an Upaniṣadic passage (Māṇḍūkya 7). (b) In his bhāṣya on the Vedānta-sūtra (II, i, 33) Śaṅkara argues that there is no purpose for God to achieve in creating the universe, that creation is but his līlā, and cites as the evidence the āptakāma-śruti. We find in the Āgmaprakarana the passage,

devasyaiṣa svabhāvo 'yam āptakāmasya kā sprāhā.

Śaṅkara is evidently referring to this passage; and he calls it ‘śruti’. (c) In his commentary on the Nṛsimhapūrva-tāpinyupaniṣad (IV, 1) Śaṅkara speaks of difference in readings between the Māṇḍūkya and the Tāpaniṣya, and says that while in the former there are ślokas before the prose passage dealing with the Turiya, in the latter the text about the Turiya follows the first six passages without the intervention of the ślokas. The ślokas, then, would appear to form part of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad, in the view of the commentator.90 (d) In the Vivekacūḍāmanī there is the following verse:


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māyāmātram idam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ
iti brūte śrutiḥ sākṣat susūptāv-anubhūyate.

The first line of this couplet occurs as the second line in kārikā, I, 17. According to Śaṅkara, the author of the Vivekacūḍāmāni, it is a direct statement of scripture.91 (e) In the Viṣṇusahasranāmabhāṣya the last four kārikās of the first prakaraṇa are quoted along with other śruti passages, and they are referred to as such.92

(2-3) Sureśvara in his Brhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārtika quotes kārikā I, 14 (ab) and calls it vedānтокti (statement of Vedānta). Ānandagiri who comments on this calls the passage śruti.93 Kārikā I, 11 is quoted fully in the Vārtika and Ānandagiri characterizes it as māna (evidence).94 Kārikā I, 3 (abc) appears as Vārtika I, iv, 744, and Sureśvara speaks of it as āgamasāsana (teaching of Āgama). In his gloss on the verse Ānandagiri identifies the passage as śruti.

(3) At the commencement of his gloss on the Māṇḍūkyakārikābhasya, Ānandagiri says: 'śri-gaudapādācāryasya nārāyaṇa-prasādatah pratipannān māṇḍūkyopaniṣad-artha-viśkaraṇaparāṇ āpi ślokān ācāryapraṇītān vyācīkhyāsur bhagavān bhāṣyakāraśa cikirṣitasā bhāṣyasyā 'vighnāparisamāptyādi - Siddhaye paradevata - tattvānusmaranāpūrvvakaḥ tan - namaskāra-rūpam maṅgalācaraṇam mukha-taḥ samācaraṇ arthād apektitam abhidheyādy anubandham āpi sūcayati.' Here it would appear that the glossator himself was in two minds about the status of the kārikās of the first prakaraṇa, for he makes a distinction between the portion of the kārikās received by Gaudapāda through the grace of Nārāyaṇa (nārāyaṇa-prasādataḥ pratipannān) and the portion composed by himself (ācārya-praṇītān). Thus

92. Ibid, Vol. 13, p. 34.
93. BBV, p. 556, Vārtika, I, iv, 615.
94. BBV, p. 576, Vārtika I, iv, 712.
it has been argued that Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and Ānandagiri—not to speak of later Advaitins—were themselves believers in the Upaniṣadic character of the kārikās of the Āgama-prakaraṇa.

As against this contention it has been pointed out that Śaṅkara and Sureśvara have referred to the kārikās of the first prakaraṇa and stated that they are the utterances of Gauḍapāda. In his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra II, i, 9, Śaṅkara quotes kārikā, I, 16, and says that it was stated by the teacher who knew the Vedānta tradition. The mode in which he refers to Gauḍapāda here is the same as the one he employs in another place in the bhāṣya (I, iv, 14) where he cites a kārikā from the third prakaraṇa (III, 15) which is admittedly the work of Gauḍapāda. In his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi Sureśvara quotes two kārikās from the Āgama-prakaraṇa (11 & 15) and explicitly says that they were uttered by the revered Gauḍa.

In the light of these declarations made by Śaṅkara and Sureśvara we proceed to explain the evidences cited above—evidences which are alleged to go against the view that regards the kārikās of the Āgama-prakaraṇa to form part of Gauḍapāda’s work. (1) (a) Of the three places where Śaṅkara quotes the passage ‘jñāte dvaitam na vidyate’, in the first he introduces it with the words ‘Thus it will be said later on’ (tathā ca vakṣyati) which need not necessarily mean ‘it will be stated by the śruti’ but may also mean ‘it will be stated by the author of the Kārikā.’ The second place where the quotation occurs is at the commencement of the second prakaraṇa. After quoting the passage and the

95. See Mr Y. Subrahmanya Sarma’s article: The Upaniṣadic Theory of the Gaudapada-kārikās, RPR, Vol. IV, pp. 196-204; and Prof. V. Bhattacharya’s Āsā: p. xxxiv.
98. Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, iv, 41-44.
scriptural text ‘one only without a second’ (Chānd, VI, ii, 1) the commentator makes the remark ‘āgama-mātram tat.’ The word ‘āgama’ here means ‘premise’ or ‘dogmatic statement.’ Both Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri say in different contexts that the first prakaraṇa abounds in such statements. While quoting the passage ‘jñāte dvaitam na vidyate’ in the third place, i.e., at the beginning of the third chapter, the commentator characterizes it as ‘pratijñā’ (premise). In his gloss Ānandagiri writes: ‘In the first prakaraṇa the non-existence of duality was declared as a mere premise in the words ‘When the real is seen, there is no duality.’ And that was expounded through logic in the second prakaraṇa.’ (b) The āptakāmaśruti cited by Śaṅkara in his Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya (II, i. 33) may well be the Brhad-āranyaka passage IV, iv, 6, wherein the word āptakāma occurs. After stating that the man who is attracted to the fruit of his actions transmigrates, the Upaniṣad declares that he who has no desires, whose desires have been fulfilled, to whom the object of desire is the Self, does not depart, and that being Brahman, he attains Brahman. In the course of his commentary on this passage Śaṅkara observes: ‘That man of realization who has attained all the objects of his desire, since they are but the Self to him, has become Brahman in this very life, for as an illustration of the infinite Brahman the following form was pointed out: ‘That is his form—in which all objects of desire have been attained and are but the self, and which is free from desires’ (IV, iii, 21). Now that of which the above is an illustration is being concluded in the words, ‘But the man who does not desire,’ etc.’ Here the āptakāmatva of Brahman is the illustration, and the āptakāmatva of the man who is liberated is the

100. For a similar use of the term ‘āgama’ see Śaṅkara’s commentary on Chānd, viii, x, 4: yadadhyāyādau āgama mātreṇopanyastam, ‘nāsya jarayaitaj jīryati’ ityādi, tad iha nyāyopapādayītum upanyastam.
101. omkāra-nirñaye uktah pratijñāmātrena, jñāte dvaitam na vidyate iti ca. Ibid, p. 144.
GAUḌAPĀDA AND HIS KĀRIKĀ

illustrated. The purport of the śruti is to show the non-difference between the adhidaiva and adhyātma forms. There is nothing improper in citing the Bhadāranyaka passage while explaining the Vedānta-sūtra (lokavat tu lilā-kaivalyam. II, i, 33), for, according to Śaṅkara, the ultimate purport of even creation-texts is to establish Brahmatmabhāva, the non-difference of the self from Brahmān.103 The term āptakāma appears in the Bhadāranyaka earlier also (IV, iii, 21). This passage is quoted by Śaṅkara himself in his commentary on the subsequent āptakāma-text. The object of the section in which the passage occurs is to explain the nature of Brahmān through an inquiry into the states of waking, dream and sleep. After giving an account of the states of waking and dream, the Bhadāranyaka says: ‘As a hawk, or a falcon flying in the sky becomes tired, folding its wings, and is borne down to its nest, so does this infinite being hasten to that state, where falling asleep it craves no desires and sees no dreams’ (IV, iii, 19). It is in this context that the āptakamatva of the self is declared. The object of the declaration is to teach the identity of Prājñā withĪśvara. Now, if we turn to the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad 6 and the kārikās that follow, we will find that the teaching there also is the same. Māṇḍūkya 5 speaks of Prājñā, the self of the state of sleep; Māṇḍūkya 6 describes that self as the lord of all; and then follow the kārikās. The passage,

devasyaiṣa svabhāvayam āptakāmasya kā sprhā, occurs in the last verse of the present set of kārikās, i.e., just before the Upaniṣad text dealing with the Turīya. It is clear, then, that the kārikā containing the word āptakāma has the same purport as the Bhadāranyaka passage cited above. And so, we would like to suggest that not only did Śaṅkara have the Bhadāranyaka text in mind when he wrote his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra II, i, 33, but Gauḍapāda too bore the same text in mind when he composed kārikā, I, 9. (c-e) Evidences were cited

from the Nṛsimha-pūrvatāpinyupaniṣad-bhāṣya, Viveka-
ciudāmāni and Visnusahasranāma-bhāṣya to prove that, ac-
cording to Śaṅkara, kārikās of the Āgамaprakaraṇa consti-
tute part of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. But it is greatly to be
doubted if these works are rightly attributed to Śaṅkara. In
the Nṛsimhatāpini (IV, i) the mantras of the Māṇḍūkya
1—7 are repeated with slight variations. The writer of the
commentary thereon seems to have almost copied the bhāṣya
on the Māṇḍūkya, and in so doing he has unwittingly intro-
duced irrelevant passages. For instance, he repeats there
the sentence, ‘tathā ca vakṣyati—pāda mātrā mātraś ca
pāda iti.’

This is intelligible in the commentary on
Māṇḍūkya 2 because Māṇḍūkya 8 contains the passage. But
in the Tāpanīya-bhāṣya it has no place because the passage is
not repeated in the Upaṇiṣad. It has also been shown that
the Tāpanīya-bhāṣya is faulty in other respects. For instance,
the explanations of yajatrāh and mṛgam na bhīmam offered
by the commentator are grossly mistaken.

We may point
out one more instance of clumsy craftsmanship. In his
bhāṣya on Tāpanīya 1 where passages which are almost
identical with the mantras of the Māṇḍūkya occur, the com-
mentator says: “Though the reading is for the major part
the same in both the places (i.e., the two Upaṇiṣads), some
variants in reading also are to be seen. In the context of
explaining the fourth (turiya) mātrā, the reading in the
Māṇḍūkya is ‘eso ’ntaryāmy eṣa īśāna eṣa prabhuh.’ But
in the Tāpanīya the reading is ‘eso ’ntaryāmy eṣa yoniḥ’,
leaving out the two words īśāna and prabhuh.”

Now with
reference to this passage, it is to be noted that the com-
mentator is wrong first in stating that the text ‘eso
’ntaryāmi, etc.’ relates to the fourth mātrā, for it actually
belongs to the third pāda and is meant to describe Prājña;
and secondly, the difference in reading between the
Tāpanīya and the Māṇḍūkya which the commentator speaks

of is not actually there,¹⁰⁷ the passage being the same word for word in the two texts. So there is sufficient ground to think that Śaṅkara is not the author of the Tāpanīya-bhāṣya. For similar reasons the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi and the Viṣṇusahasranāma-bhāṣya are not to be ascribed to him. And what their author or authors say is no evidence to decide the character of the kārikās of the Āgama-prakaraṇa.

(2) As regards Sureśvara, we have already shown that in his Naiṣkarmyāsiddhi he recognizes Gauḍapāda as the author of the disputed kārikās. Even in the Bhadavārtika where he quotes some of these kārikās he does not say that they are scriptural statements. The expressions vedāntokti and āgama-śāsana should be taken to mean respectively the statement made in the treatise on Vedānta-viz., the Gauḍapāda-kārikā, and the teaching of the Āgama-śāstra which is another name for the Kārikā.

(3) So far as Ānandagiri's deliverances are concerned, we must say they are not consistent. In his gloss on the Bhadavārtika he seems to hold the view that the disputed kārikās are śruti. But this is not the view of the author of the tīkā on Māndūkya-kārikā. Probably the Ānandagiri who wrote the tīkā on the Kārikā was different from the one who wrote the gloss on the Bhadavārtika. The former is very definite about Gauḍapāda's authorship of the kārikās of the first prakaraṇa. The words 'nārāyaṇa-prāśadataḥ prati-paṇnān api ślokān ācārya-pranitān' do not import a difference between the verses seen by the grace of Nārāyaṇa and those composed by the Ācārya. They only mean that the entire work consisting of ślokas, was written by Gauḍapāda through the Lord's grace. Ānandagiri is even more explicit when he says that the Āgama-prakaraṇa is of the nature of a commentary on the Māndūkya Upaniṣad (māndūkyopaniṣad-vyākhyānārūpam).¹⁰⁸ Still further on,

¹⁰⁷. The two words 'iśāna' and 'prabhu' occur in kārikā, I, 10.
¹⁰⁸. See his tīkā, p. 8; and p. 46. śrutiukte 'rthe tad-vivaraṇa-rūpān ślokān avatārayati; p. 57: pādaṇāṁ mātrāṇāṁ ca yad-ekatvam sanimmattam śrutyopanyastaṁ tatra śrutyartha-vivaraṇa-rūpān ślokān avatārayati.
explaining the prefatory statement ‘atraite ślokā bhavanti,’
the glossator says, ‘After reciting the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
the Ācārya (i.e., Gauḍapāda) introduces the explanatory
verses with the words atra, etc.’ He makes similar observa-
tions in his gloss on kārikās I, 10 and 19. Commenting
on Śaṅkara’s observation ‘As before’ (pūrvavat) prefatory
to kārikā 1, 24, Ānandagiri declares as follows: ‘Just as
previously the Ācārya composed the ślokas which explain
the sense of āsruti, so also in what follows there are ślokas
covering the sense of āsruti.” Thus Ānandagiri, the author
of the gloss on the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā-bhāṣya is of the same
view as Śaṅkara and Sureśvara regarding the character of
the kārikās of the Āgama-prakaraṇa. According to all the
three, the kārikās form part of Gauḍapāda’s work.

Certain structural and doctrinal difficulties, it has been
said, make it impossible to ascribe the kārikās of the first
prakaraṇa to Gauḍapāda. (1) The position of the kārikās
as kārikās is highly suspicious. Gauḍapāda was but a
commentator, and he ought not to have mixed his composi-
tions with the passages of āsruti. The great teacher knew
the sacred usage, and so he could not have introduced his
verses in the first prakaraṇa. The four sets of kārikās there
are prefaced with the words ‘atraite ślokā bhavanti.’ Now,
this formula or one similar to it is found in the other
Upaniṣads at places where ślokas or rks are introduced.
So, it is quite reasonable to say that the Māṇḍūkya itself
quotes the ślokas which therefore form part of the Upani-
ṣad. (2) Doctrinally, the kārikās of the Āgama-prakaraṇa
are opposed to the view of the non-reality of the world.
How could Gauḍapāda, who was the paramaguru of Śaṅkara,
have been their author?

(a) The first line of kārikā I, 17 is

111. E.g., tad esa śloko bhavati (Bṛh, IV, ii, 3); tad etad rcābhhyuktam
(Ibid, IV, vi, 23); tad esa ślokaḥ (Praśna, i, 10).
prapañcō yadi vidyeta nivarteta na samśayaḥ. This is evidently meant to be anukūlatarka. The universe does not exist. If it existed, it would disappear. It does not so disappear. Therefore, it does not exist.' But the proposition 'It does not disappear' is against the faith of the Advaitin. So, the tarka, instead of helping the Advaitin, would only harm him. (b) The first half of the next kārikā (I, 18) reads thus:

vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenacit.
This is again a tarka: 'If the universe were a phantasy, it would be removed at some time. It is not so removed. Therefore it is not a phantasy.' Now, this reasoning establishes the reality of the universe—a conclusion which the Advaitin will not touch even with a pair of tongs. (c) Kārikās I, 7—9, set forth several views on creation and conclude with the view acceptable to the author—whatever he was. Among the views regarded as prima facie is found the Advaita doctrine that creation is an illusion and a myth.

svapna-māyā-sarūpeti srṣṭir anyair vikalpitaḥ (I, 7). As opposed to this view, the author expresses his doctrine of creation in two lines:

icchā-mātram prabhoh srṣṭir iti srṣṭau viniścitāḥ (I, 8).

devasyaiṣa svabhāvo 'yam āpta kāmasya kā sprhā (I, 9). The purport of these two lines is that creation is real and that its agent is God. It is in the light of these passages that Madhva interprets the word māyā-mātram in the hemistic 'māyā-mātram idam dvaitam' to mean icchā-mātram; and this is absolutely correct. The philosophical position of

112. See Śrīnīvāsaśīra. p. 8: svapnasaya ajjñānakāryatvād bhagavataś ca sārvajñānā na svapnave śrṣṭiḥ idamca duṣaṇāṁ svapnamāyā-sarūpete anūdita-māyā-paksasyetī draṣṭavyam; p. 12: anyāḥ prachhanna-bauddhaṁ māyibhir esā śrṣṭiḥ svapna-māyāsarūpā svapnapādārtha-srṣṭi-sadrśī aindrajālikamāyā-sadrśī va na yathārthā iti vikalpā niscitā ity arthāḥ.

113. See Śrīnīvāsaśīra, p. 12: siddhāntam nīrūpayati, iccheti.
114. Ibid., p. 12: tatrāpi siddhāntam āha devasyeti.

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the kārikās of the āgama-prakaraṇa, thus, is antithetical to Advaita; and hence no Advaitin—and least of all Gauḍapāda could have composed those kārikās.

The objections seem formidable but are not really so. (1) Gauḍapāda’s work is not of the usual type of commentary explaining the words of the original. Dividing the text of the Upaniṣad into four convenient sections, he expounds its teaching in his kārikās. The formula ‘atraite ślokā bhavanti’ is not to be found in the Upaniṣads alone. Even in works of human authorship it is used, e.g., in Vātsyāyana’s Kāmasūtra, Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra and the Carakasamhitā.115 (2) As regards doctrine there is no disparity between the teaching of the Āgama-prakaraṇa and that of the other three chapters. (a) The argument of kārikā, I, 17, is this: if the universe did really exist, it would be removed, no doubt. It does not exist in reality; for duality is mere illusion, and non-duality alone is real. To admit that the removal of the universe is not real is not in any way inconsistent with the final position of Advaita. The antecedent of the proposition ‘There is no removal’ is not ‘Because the universe exists’ but ‘Because it does not exist in reality’. The illusoriness of the universe is also illusory. That does not make the universe by any means real. Therefore the existence and removal of the universe are not real; they are only apparent. “There is no disappearance, nor origination”, says Gauḍapāda in the second prakaraṇa. Kārikā I, 17, expresses the same truth.116 (b) The next kārikā (I, 18) says: ‘The world of plurality would cease if any one had created it. The distinctions are but apparent; they are not real. When Reality is known, there is no duality.’ Here again we find that there is nothing which an

116. Śaṅkara in his commentary says: tasmān na kaścit prapañchā pravṛttto na vṛttto vā ‘stily abhiprayāḥ.
See his bhāṣya on Brh. IV, iv, 6; Mem. Edn., Vol. 9, p. 661; na hi vāstuto muktāmuktātva-viśeṣo ‘sti, ātmano nityākārūpātva.
Advaitin would take objection to. The last pāda of the verse is very conclusive in proclaiming the truth of Advaita, 'jñāte dvaitaṁ na vidyate'. (c) Kārikā I, 7, sets forth some of the prima facie views of creation. Two of these are that the world is like dream and that it is like māyā. Ānandagiri takes them to be realistic views, the former holding that dreams are real and the latter maintaining that māyā which is of the nature of magic consisting in the use of gems, etc., is real. Whether his explanation is plausible or not this much seems to be certain, viz., that the author of the kārikās distinguishes between the view which characterizes srṣṭi (creation) as svapna-māyā-sarūpā and his own view which regards the universe as māyā-mātra. The passage

icchā-mātram prabhoḥ srṣṭir iti srṣṭau viniścitāḥ
cannot be the one which states the siddhānta of the author, for it occurs in the midst of other passages which describe the prima facie views. The word viniścitāḥ does not indicate the author’s acceptance of the view. What is stated in the passage is that ‘icchā-mātram probhoḥ srṣṭih’ is the view of those who are assured about creation (srṣṭau viniścitāḥ). The author cannot agree with them because he is a paramārtha-cintaka (one who contemplates the supreme reality) and not a srṣṭi-cintaka (one who holds a theory of creation). He expresses his view in the passage:

devasyaisa svabhāvo 'yam, āpta kāmasya kā spṛhā,
which means that, since creation is unintelligible, we can only say that it is the very nature of the Lord, no motive being possible in his case.

We have now shown that the early teachers of Advaita, and in particular Śaṅkara and Suresvara, considered the kārikās of the Āgama-prakarana to form part of Gauḍapāda’s work, and that there is nothing in the prakarana which

117. See BS, III, ii, 1. Śaṅkara regards this sūtra as referring to a prima facie view, according to which the contents of dream are absolutely real, tathā-yarūpaṁva sandhye srṣṭir iti.

118. The use of the word viniścitāḥ is no indication of a siddhānta. See BBV (IV, iv, 562). śuklāṁ brahmāṁśaṁśuddham iti kecid viniścitāḥ, śaradi yvomavan nilam ity āhir apare janāḥ.
would militate against its ascription to Gauḍapāda. The rival view which includes the twenty-nine kārikās in the Upaniṣad has been there since a long time, but the earliest to advocate it, so far as we can trace, were not Advaitins. Wherefrom did they receive this tradition? Here we can only guess. Probably, the name of the first prakaraṇa was responsible in a measure for making some of those who were hostile to the Advaita tradition think that the Upaniṣad included the twenty-nine kārikās. The old teachers employed the terms Upaniṣad and śruti in a broad sense sometimes.  

For instance, the Bhagavad-gītā is called ‘Upaniṣads’. In some of the manuscripts of the Māndūkya-kārikā it is found that all the four prakaraṇas are called ‘Upaniṣads’. Kamalāśīla, a disciple of Śāntiraksita (705-763 A.D.), quotes in his Pañjikā some verses from the Vaitathya — and Advaita-prakaraṇas and speaks of them as belonging to an Upaniṣat-śāstra. The reference to the kārikās as śruti must have been, to start with, in the secondary sense of the term śruti, i.e., in the sense that the kārikās were composed after the Māndūkya-śruti. Gradually, through a process of mutation in usages the tradition of regarding the kārikās of the Āgama-prakaraṇa as śruti, in the primary sense, must have come into being.

VI

Did Gauḍapāda compose the Twelve Mantras also?

The view proffered by Professor Deussen in his work The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads is that, according to Śaṅkara, the prose-passages and the 215 verses together constitute a single work. This is what he writes: “The

119. See Abhinava’s Bhagavad-gītārtha-saṅgraha (vii, 7) where a verse of Śesa’s Paramārthaśāra is quoted as from śruti.

120. Nārāyanāsramin begins his commentary thus: om ity etad aksaram idam sarvam ity adya māndūkyaopaniṣat ca tuḥ khaṇḍā, tām khaṇḍasāḥ pataḥitvā ‘traite śloka bhavatiti ca tuḥ-paryāyair gaudapādacāryaḥ nārāyanānugrahaḥ ślokaracanaya vyācaakṣire, tena śruti-tad-vyākhyā-gaḥitaṃ pratha- maṃ prakaraṇam śruti-prāyaṃ eva tatra chāndrānām upaniṣad-vyavahāraḥ pravṛttatāḥ.

See Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss. in Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library, No. 1556, p. 1054. The passage is quoted in The Indian Antiquary, Vol. LXII, p. 188.
commentary on the Māndūkyya which is extant under the name of Śaṅkara treats this and Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā as one, and seems to regard the whole as in no sense an Upaniṣad (Vedānta-artha-sāra-saṅgraha-bhūtam-idaṁ-prakaraṇa-catuṣṭayam ‘om iti etad akṣaram’ ityādi ārabhyate); and with this would agree the fact that the Māndūkyya is not quoted either in the Brahmasūtras or in Śaṅkara’s commentary on them, while two verses from the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda are cited by Śaṅkara with the words, atra uktam vedānta-artha-sampradāyavidbhirācāryaiḥ.”121 Professor Deussen thinks, therefore, that in the judgment of Śaṅkara the so-called Māndūkyya Upaniṣad had no claim to the position of an Upaniṣad.122 Following his lead, and mainly on the strength of the passage from Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Māndūkyakārikā quoted by him, Dr A. Venkatasubbiah has argued that all the four prakaraṇas were written by the same author and that the first prakaraṇa includes the twelve prose passages known as the Māndūkyya Upaniṣad.123 Śaṅkara speaks of the entire work as a prakaraṇa treatise in four chapters; and he expressly says that it begins with the words ‘om ity etad askṣaram’. A prakaraṇa is the work of a human author. Though later Advaitins mistook the prose passages as belonging to an Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara did not make that mistake. In none of his genuine works has he quoted a passage of the Māndūkyya. This shows quite plainly that he did not look upon the Māndūkyya as a śruti text.

The view of Drs Deussen and Venkatasubbiah does not seem to be acceptable for the following reasons: Sureśvara, Śaṅkara’s immediate disciple, is aware of the Māndūkyya-śruti. In the Brhad-vārtika he says:
eśo ’ntaryāmy eśa yonih sarvasya prabhavāpyayau māndūkeya-śrutivaca iti spaṣṭam ādhiyate.124

122. Ibid, see p. 34.
123. See his article ‘The Māndūkyopaniṣad and Gauḍapāda’ in the Indian Antiquary, LXII, pp. 181-193.
The passage quoted in this verse is the sixth mantra of the Māṇḍūkya, and Sureśvāra explicitly calls the śruti by its name. Māṇḍana Mīśra, who was a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, quotes as śruti the words ‘sarvajñā and sarveśvāra’ which occur in the same passage. Assuming that the Māṇḍūkya has not been quoted by Śaṅkara in his works, it does not follow that the Upaniṣad was not extant in his time. The Upaniṣads which he has quoted were not the only ones that were current then. Mr Amarnath Ray has cited contexts from the bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara, where it is legitimate to think that Śaṅkara refers to the Māṇḍūkya-śruti. In his bhāṣya on the Brhadāranyaka (IV, ii, 324) Śaṅkara seems to refer to the Māṇḍūkya without expressly naming it. And in his commentary on the Vedāntasūtra (I, i, 9) he has used the expression prabhavāpyayau, probably having in mind the Māṇḍūkya passage. The opening sentence of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā-bhāṣya on which Dr Deussen relies for his view does not mean, as he thinks, that the prose passages too constitute the work of Gauḍapāda. It is true that the Kārikā is a four-chaptered work. It is also true that it begins with the passage ‘om ity etad aksaram’, etc. But it is not true to say that the twelve mantras which form the basis of the first prakarāṇa were composed by Gauḍapāda. The teacher seems to have incorporated the mantras in his first chapter in the appropriate places. Together with the kārikās they form an integral whole. But still they must be treated as constituting the Māṇḍūkya-śruti. Otherwise the name Āgama-prakarāṇa would be unintelligible, and Sureśvāra’s reference to the Māṇḍūkya-śruti baseless.

VII

Did the Upaniṣad come after the Kārikās?

We turn now to the view of Professor V. Bhattacharyya that the twelve prose passages of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad

125. Brahmasiddhi, p. 127.
are based on the kārikās of the first prakāraṇa and not the latter on the former. The reasons offered for his view by the Professor are these:

(1) After the 6th, 7th, 11th, and 12th mantras of what is called the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, the kārikās are introduced in the words ‘atraite ślokā bhavanti’. In other Upaniṣads like the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya similar expressions are employed to introduce ślokas in support of the prose passages that precede them. It follows, therefore, that the prose portions must have come into existence after the verses, and not vice versa.

(2) A comparison of the contents of the prose passages with those of the corresponding verses bears out this view. If the kārikās were really explanations of the prose passages, they should throw light on those portions of the latter which are difficult or obscure and should not leave the most important words of the original unexplained. But what are the actual facts? (a) The kārikās, 1-5, which are supposed to explain the prose passages, 3-5, omit altogether the words ‘saptāṅgaḥ’ and ‘ekonavimśatimukhaḥ’, the most difficult ones that require explanation. (b) In the prose passages 3 and 9 we have the word vaiśvānera; but in the corresponding kārikās the word viśva is used. The business of a commentator is to explain the original word and not to introduce a word which is not identical or synonymous with it. (c) The terms jāgaritasthāna, svapnasthāna, and suṣuptasthāna of the prose passages 3, 4 and 5 respectively are not found in the kārikās. (d) That the so-called Upaniṣad, instead of being the original, is really a commentary on the verses will be evident from the fact that taking a word or two from the kārikās it expands and explains the idea contained therein. For instance, the term ghanaprajña (in kārikā, 1), and ānandabhuṣ (in 3) or ānanda (in 4) are explained in prose passage, 5. (e) The kārikā I, 19, says that Viśva is identical

with a the first mātrā of Om, because each of them is the first (ādi) in its series and each is pervasive (āpti). The corresponding Upaniṣad text clearly says that the identity is either because of each being the first or because of each being pervasive (āptī ādimattvād vā). This option seems to be a later development. (f) There is divergence as regards two words between kārikā I, 21, and Upaniṣad, 11. In the former there are the word māna ‘measure’ from √ mā ‘to measure’ and the word apīti ‘disappearance’, from api-√i, while in the latter there are miti ‘measure’ from √ mī and laya ‘disappearance’. (g) The kārikās I, 10-15, make a distinction between Turiya and the other three, viz. Viśva, Taijasa and Prājñā, but no such distinction is found in the Upaniṣad. (b) The Upaniṣad, 2, says that Brahman or Ātman has four quarters (catuspād); but there is no such mention in the kārikās.

(3) Lastly, there is the view of teachers like Madhva that the 29 verses of the Āgama-prakaraṇa form part of the Upanishad, and that the verses are older than the prose passages. On these grounds Professor Bhattacharya maintains that the kārikās of the first chapter are not a commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, that the Upaniṣad is mainly based on the kārikās, and that it must have been composed later ‘with a tinge of the language used in the Brāhmaṇas’.

We shall examine the points raised by Prof. Bhattacharya seriatim.

(1) There is nothing unintelligible in the procedure adopted by the author of the Kārikā in introducing his own explanatory verses in the words ‘atraite ślokā bhavanti’. We have already pointed out that others have adopted a similar procedure. In some manuscripts of the Māṇḍūkya-kārikā these are said to be the words of the Vārtikakāra.128

The Vārtikakāra here referred to is Gauḍapāda, for the Kārikā is also known by the name Māṇḍukya-vārtika. 129

(2) Before answering the next set of questions, it may be useful to repeat what we said earlier regarding the kind of commentary that the Āgama-prakaraṇa is. The twenty-nine verses of the prakaraṇa do not seek to provide a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣad passages. They re-arrange the concepts found in the Upaniṣad in a more logical manner with a view to show that the Turiya is the absolute non-dual reality; and this again is only a foundation for the succeeding three chapters. Those expressions in the Upaniṣad which are not materially useful are passed over, and certain implications which are not expressly stated in the Upaniṣad are explained because they are regarded as important by the author of the Kārikā for the development of his thesis. A case in point is the mention and criticism of the several creationistic theories. Without departing from the spirit of what is declared in the Upaniṣad, the Kārikā-kāra prepares his own précis of the passages and makes it the nucleus of his subsequent philosophical construction. Now we may proceed to consider the objections urged by Professor Bhattacharya against regarding the Upaniṣad as the earlier text. (a) Since the object of the first five verses is to analyse the three manifestations of the self, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājñā, and to show that Reality is one in the three states though the contents and types of enjoyment vary, the verses leave out expressions which are not useful for this purpose. Viśva and Taijasa being endowed with seven limbs and nineteen mouths is of no metaphysical consequence subserving the purpose Gauḍapāda has in view. It is points of contrast that are important; for the philosopher wants to show that in spite of apparent differences there is underlying unity. Hence it is that to the differences in objects of consciousness and modes of enjoyment mentioned in the Upaniṣad, Gauḍapāda adds the

129. Rāmakṛṣṇa Paṇḍita in his commentary on PD (II, 29) refers to the kārikā III, 39, as Vārtika.

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differences in principal locations and types of satisfaction. The reason we have just given will also explain why the author of the Kārikā has nothing to comment on the first two mantras of the Upaniṣad, though at a later stage and in its proper place he refers to Oṃkāra and its mātrās. (b) The term ‘Viśva’ and ‘Vaiśvānara’, whatever be their etymological significance, have come to mean the same in Advaita usage. Probably, Gauḍapāda’s intention is to show the identity of the self of the waking state with the all-consciousness which has the manifest universe for its object, the identity, in short, of the adhyātma and adhidaiva forms of the self. Hence it is that he describes ‘Viśva’ as all-pervading (vibhu). The suggestion, however, comes from the Śruti itself. The Upaniṣadic passage 6 describes Prājña, the self in sleep, as the lord of all, the knower of all, the controller of all, etc. Since it is the same self that persists in and through the changing states, the Kārikā-kāra identifies the individual soul that is awake with the self of the universe. (c) The terms jāgaritasthāna, svapnasthāna and suṣuptasthāna need not be repeated in the Kārikā, because the verses, as we said, present only a summary of the Upaniṣadic passages for a set purpose which their author has in view. They are not, however, unnoticed, for the fifth verse refers to them together in the words ‘in the three states’ (triṣu dhāmasu). (d) That a prose passage is longer than the corresponding verse or verses can be no argument for its subsequent composition. In the Upaniṣad 5, the state of sleep is explained and the self of that state is described. In fact, we have an independent passage for each of the three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña. Gauḍapāda adopts a different method. The first four kārikās speak of all the three, and the trio are compared in respect of their objects of consciousness, types of enjoyment, locations and kinds of satisfaction. Viewed in this light, it may be seen that Gauḍapāda has incorporated in his verses all the terms that are necessary from the Upaniṣadic passage 5. (e) Kārikā I, 19, identifies Viśva and a because each is the
first in its series and each is pervasive. The Upaniṣad calls them identical for either of the two reasons. From this alleged difference between the Kārikā and the Upaniṣad Professor Bhattacharya concludes that the latter must have been composed later. But what is the force of ‘or’ (va) in the Upaniṣadic text? Is it used in the sense of a disjunction either of ignorance or of exclusion? We do not think that the Upaniṣad means to say that Viśva and a are to be identified either only because each is the first or only because each is pervasive. Both are equally valid reasons for identification. And it is this meaning that is expressed by the word ‘and’ (ca) in kārikā 19.130 (f) We have already said that the verses of the first prakaraṇa do not constitute a word-by-word gloss on the Upaniṣadic passages. And so, it does not matter from which root a particular word is formed in the Kārikā provided it expresses the same idea. Professor Bhattacharya himself admits that there is no difference in meaning between māna and miti, and between apīti and laya. (g) Kārikās, 10-15, make a distinction between the Turiya and the other three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña. The Turiya is the all-pervading shining one, changeless and non-dual; it is unconditioned eternal consciousness; in it there is neither the veiling of the true nor the projection of the untrue. Professor Bhattacharya holds that there is nothing corresponding to this idea in the Upaniṣad. But what do the two Upaniṣadic passages, 7 and 12, which set forth the nature of the Turiya mean? Do they not declare that the Turiya is trans-phenomenal (prapañcopaśama) and thereby distinguish it from the three, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña? (h) There is no mention in the Kārikā, says Professor Bhattacharya, of the four quarters of Brahman or Atman declared in the Upaniṣad. This, however, is not the case. Kārikā 24 makes mention of the pādas (quarters); and that they are four will be evident from the account of Viśva, Taijasa, Prājña, and Turiya, given in the preceding verses.

130. See Śaṅkara’s Commentary on the Gītā (vi. 32) where he says, va means ca in that context (vā śabdas ca ‘rthe).
(3) The rival tradition which regards the prose passages and the twenty-nine verses of the first prakaraṇa as constituting the Upaniṣad, and in which Professor Bhattacharya finds support for his view, we have examined already. We have shown that the Advaita tradition is an old one—at least as old as Śaṅkara and much older than its rival so far as we know—and that it is not either implausible or unjustifiable.

The language of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad is admittedly of a piece with that of the other prose Upaniṣads. Some of the terms used therein, e.g. Vaiśvānara and Turiya, are older than their corresponding expressions, Viśva and Turya, in the verses of the Kārikā. And so, there seems to be no cause for discarding the traditional view that the twelve prose passages constitute the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad which was made the basic text by Gauḍapāda for his work.

**VIII**

*The Inter-relation of the Four Prakaraṇas*

The Āgama-prakaraṇa, the nature of which we have been discussing so far, is the first chapter in the four-chaptered work of Gauḍapāda. Its aim is to set forth the teaching of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad according to a well-thought out plan. Scripture, viz., the Māṇḍūkya, occupies the central place in it. Hence the chapter has been given the title Āgama-prakarana. The other three chapters seek to establish the illusoriness of duality and the truth of nonduality—topics which constitute the subject-matter of the Upaniṣad—through such reasoning as may be found in support of Śruti. Such is the way in which the teachers of Advaita down the ages have understood the inter-relation of the four chapters.

With this traditional view Professor Bhattacharya does not agree. He is not prepared to believe that the Kārikā is a single work in four chapters. He is of the view that the
four prakaraṇas are independent treatises, put together in a volume bearing the title Āgamaśāstra. According to him, the attempt of the commentator, whom tradition identifies with Śaṅkara, to show the interconnection of the chapters is a miserable failure. Introducing the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara says that though it is declared in the first chapter that there is no duality, yet as it is merely an expression of āgama, the second chapter is written to support it by reasons. Professor Bhattacharyya does not approve of this statement, because though the second chapter advances various arguments, the first is not devoid of them. He asks, "If the connexion between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Śaṅkara to be, then why is it that the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning though he could do so easily." At the commencement of the third chapter Śaṅkara says that non-duality can be understood not only by āgama, but by reasoning (tarka) as well, and that consequently to exhibit the reasoning the third chapter is required. The Professor's objection to this is that if Śaṅkara were right, the object of the second and third chapters must be the same, viz. to formulate the arguments for non-duality. But, then, why should there be two chapters at all? Cannot all the arguments be included in one? The fact, according to Professor Bhattacharyya, is that non-duality is mentioned only incidentally in the third chapter, and as such is not discussed. The purpose of the fourth chapter, as stated by Śaṅkara, is the establishment of the system of Advaita through pointing out the contradictions in the schools that are opposed to it, viz. those of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas. As against this, Professor Bhattacharyya contends that there is no detailed criticism of the Dvaitin's view in this chapter, that there is no allusion to the Vaināśikas, and that the view of the Vaināśikas are accepted and endorsed by Gauḍapāda, who cannot therefore criticize them. As regards each succeeding

chapter Professor Bhattacharya would ask these questions: Does it presuppose the preceding chapter somehow or other? What do we lose if we take it as an independent work on the Advaita Vedānta? Do we find in reading it in that light anything improper, non-sensical or unintelligible without assuming its connection with the preceding chapter? The Professor’s answer to these questions is in the negative; and he regards the four prakaraṇas as independent manuals of Advaita.\textsuperscript{132}

Before examining Professor Bhattacharya’s view, let us gather together Śaṅkara’s statements about the nature of the work as a whole and about the purpose of each chapter. The commentator speaks of the nature of the topics dealt with in the Kārikā and their inter-relation at the head of each chapter. In his introduction to the Āgama-prakaraṇa, he describes the argument of the four-chaptered Kārikā thus: ‘For the purpose of determining (the sense of) Oṃkāra is (written) the first prakaraṇa which abounds in Scriptural passages (āgama-pradhānam) and which is the means for knowing the true nature of the self. When the world of duality is resolved, the non-dual is known, as when the serpent, etc., imagined in the rope are resolved, the rope which is real is cognized. In order to explain through reasoning the illusoriness of (the world of) duality there is the second prakaraṇa. When there occurs the contingency that duality too may likewise be illusory, the third prakaraṇa shows through reasoning that non-duality is not so. There are views which are avaidika and opposed to non-duality being absolutely real. For the purpose of refuting them on rational grounds, by showing that those views cannot be true as they are mutually contradictory, is commenced the fourth prakaraṇa.’\textsuperscript{133} At the beginning of the second prakaraṇa Śaṅkara says: “It was said, ‘When (Reality is) known, there is no duality’ (I, 18), and this is supported

\textsuperscript{132} Āś, pp. xlvii-Ixvii.
\textsuperscript{133} Mem. Edn., Vol. 5, p. 89.
by such śruti passages as 'One only, without a second'. That is only Scripture (āgama-mātram). It is possible to determine even through reasoning the illusoriness of duality. For this purpose the second prakaraṇa is commenced.\[134\]

At the beginning of the third prakaraṇa Śaṅkara remarks, "While discussing the nature of Omkāra it was stated 'The self is the cessation of the world, blissful, without a second': and 'When (Reality is) known there is no duality.' That was only as a premise. Of these (i.e. the two propositions 'the self is' and 'the world is not'), the non-existence of the world was explained in the Vaitathya-prakaraṇa by the illustrations of dream, magical show, fata morgana, etc., and through reasoning based on probans such as 'because it is seen', 'because it has beginning and end', etc. Is non-duality to be known through Scripture alone or through reasoning also? The teacher replies: it is possible to know through reasoning also. To show how this is possible the Advaita-prakaraṇa is commenced.\[135\] Explaining the connection of the fourth prakaraṇa with the preceding ones Śaṅkara observes, "By way of determining Omkāra non-duality was stated (in the first prakaraṇa) as a premise known from Scripture. The same was established (in the second prakaraṇa) on the ground that the external world of objects is illusory. Again (in the third prakaraṇa) of the non-duality which was ascertained directly from Scripture and through reasoning, it was conclusively stated, 'This is the supreme truth'. At the end (of that prakaraṇa) it was indicated that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas which are opposed to the view of non-duality, the sense of Scripture, are wrong because of their mutual opposition and because they give rise to passions like attachment and aversion. Non-dualism is praised as the right view on the ground that it does not give rise to passions. Now, the Alātasānti-prakaraṇa is commenced for showing in detail the falsity of those views which are opposed to one another,

\[134\] Ibid, p. 122.
\[135\] Mem, Edn., Vol. 5, p. 144.
and for establishing finally through negative reasoning non-dualism."

Now let us return to Professor Bhattacharya's questions. The relation between the first and the second prakarana, according to Śaṅkara, is that while the first chapter states as a premise the non-reality of the world of duality, supported by Scripture, the second chapter establishes the illusoriness of the world through reasoning. The first objection raised by Professor Bhattacharya is that the first chapter is not devoid of arguments. He cites kārikās, 16-18, to show that arguments are advanced for proving the illusoriness of the world even in the first chapter. But a comparison of the method and contents of the first chapter with those of the second will clearly reveal that, while in the former Scripture is the main source of evidence, in the latter various reasons are given for establishing the illusory nature of the world. This is all that the commentator means when he says, 'āgama-mātram tat'. The word 'mātra' here has the sense of 'pradhānya', as Ānandagiri interprets it. It means 'āgampṛāya' as Nārāyaṇāśrama observes. Śaṅkara himself says in his general introduction at the head of the first chapter: 'prathamam prakaraṇam āgama-pradhānam'. To the next objection that if the relation between the first chapter and the second were as it is declared by Śaṅkara, why does the author himself not say so at the beginning of the second chapter, we need only reply that is not necessary. What we should consider is whether Śaṅkara has correctly understood the teachings in the two chapters and their connection, if there be any. Let us analyse the contents of the chapters themselves to find an answer. The Āgama-prakarana begins with a summary of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña are described; different theories of creation are mentioned with a view to show that they are all unsatisfactory, as the world is in truth the very nature of the Deva; in the Turiya

which is the absolute non-dual reality, there is neither cause nor effect; Prājñā, the self in sleep, is conditioned by the cause of world-manifestation, viz., nescience; Viśva and Taijasa, the self of the waking state and the self of dream respectively, are conditioned by both cause and effect, i.e., nescience and its product; the Turiya is not to be confused with Prājñā, for while Prājñā is associated with dreamless sleep, in the Turiya there is neither sleep nor dream; as a corollary from this it is said that the universe does not really exist; the non-dual self (Turiya) is the sole reality; the world of duality is illusory (māyā-mātra); then, following the Upaniṣad Viśva, Taijasa and Prājñā are identified with the three mātrās of Om, ə, u and m, and the Turiya with the soundless culmination of Om; lastly, meditation on Praṇava is prescribed, as it leads to the supreme. From this brief outline of the contents of the Āgama-prakaraṇa it will be evident that the main subject of study here is the teaching of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. No doubt it is declared there that the world is non-real. But that declaration is based on such words of the śruti as ‘prapañcōpaśamam’ and ‘advaitam’. Thus it is clear that Śankara is not wrong in characterizing the first prakaraṇa as ‘āgama-pradhāna’. The second chapter, Vaitathya-prakaraṇa begins with the statement that the wise declare all the objects seen in dream to be illusory; and then it is argued that the objects perceived in waking also must be illusory because of similarity with those seen in dream. Now, does not this line of reasoning presuppose the discussion of avasthās in the previous chapter? Is it not an elaboration through logic of what was premised on the authority of śruti in the Āgama-prakaraṇa? After showing in detail how there is parity between waking and dream, the author of the Kārikā proceeds to say that the entire world is a mistaken reading of the non-dual self. As when the rope is seen the snake-illusion is removed, so when the self is known, the world of plurality disappears; then follows a catalogue of different views about the self; but the truth is
there is nothing other than the self; a few more illustrations are given to prove the illusoriness of the world; the final truth is proclaimed as the non-dual reality which knows neither dissolution nor origination, neither bondage nor release; and lastly, how the yati could know the truth and after knowing how he should live in the world are declared. Here again Śaṅkara seems to be substantially correct in his statement that the purpose of the second chapter is to establish through reasoning the illusoriness of the world of duality.

As regards the relation between the second and the third chapter, Professor Bhattacharya’s objection, as we have already seen, is that if the object of the third chapter were what Śaṅkara regards it to be, then there should be no need for this chapter at all, as all the arguments for non-duality could be included in one. As a preliminary observation we may point out that the treatment of the same topic in two successive chapters is not uncommon even in modern books. But that apart, does Śaṅkara say or means to say that the object of the second and third chapters is the same? Is it not his view that while the Vaitathya-prakarana establishes through reasoning the illusoriness of duality, the Advaita-prakarana seeks to show the non-illusoriness of non-duality? The two are related topics, no doubt; but they are not identical. The contention of Professor Bhattacharya is that non-duality, though mentioned in the third chapter, is not its main topic, but something else. And this will be clear, he says, if one examines the contents with some amount of care. The following is his own account of the contents of the third chapter, ‘Here at the beginning (III, 1-2) the author tells us about ‘non-origination’ (ajāti) and having established it concludes in the end (III, 48) that it is the highest truth (uttama satya). In doing so he discusses the Vedānta and in that connexion the absence of difference between jīva and Brahman. He treats also of a samādhi ‘intense abstract concentration’ called asparśayoga meant
for the realization of the Truth'.

We have no quarrel with this analysis. But what does it show? How is ajāti a topic different from Advaita? Why is non-origination the truth? Is it not because the truth is non-duality alone? Professor Bhattancharya admits that Gaudapāda asserts in this chapter the absence of difference between jiva and Brahman. If this is not advaita, what else is it? And what is asparśayoga if it is not the path to the realization of non-duality?

The fourth chapter, in the opinion of Śaṅkara, points out the mutual contradictions that are to be found in the systems opposed to Advaita and establishes non-duality by a process of negative reasoning. Where, in this chapter, is a detailed discussion, asks Professor Bhattacharya, of the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas, assuming that they are wrong because of their mutual contradiction? And secondly, where is the allusion to Vaināśikas as opponents, whose views Gaudapāda accepts by implication throughout the book? Before we make an attempt to answer these questions we may note in passing the argument that the Alātasanti-prakaraṇa must be regarded as an independent treatise as it commences with a maṅgalācarana. Professor Bhattacharya himself dismisses this argument as not carrying much weight. In a Baudhāya work, the Pañjikā of Prajñākaramati on the Bodhicaryāvatāra which consists of nine chapters, there is maṅgalācarana in the first and the last chapters, and not in others. But where is maṅgalācarana in the first prakaraṇa of the Kārikā? It has been answered by the commentators that Om with which the Upanisad begins is itself the maṅgalācarana. Not only at the beginning of the fourth chapter, but also at the end there is maṅgalācarana in the form of obeisance. Does it not imply, asks Professor Bhattacharya, that the prakaraṇa is an independent work and complete by itself? We do not, however, see the implication, because there is

137. Āṭ, p. lxi.
nothing unintelligible in a book ending with an obeisance. Now about the other questions. The Ālātaśānti-prakarāna just immediately after the maṅgalācarāna refers to the disputants who uphold the reality of origination and quarrel among themselves. Then there is an elaborate and detailed criticism of the category of origination, the concept of cause. Is not the notion of cause one of the cardinal doctrines of the pluralists (dvaitinah), and in criticizing it in detail, is not the author of the Kārikā examining the view of those who are opposed to Advaita? The next question is about the reference to Vaināśikas. In his notes on Kārikā III, 3, Professor Bhattacharya says that among the Buddhists the Vaibhāśikas maintain satkāryavāda, and the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras hold asatkāryavāda. The verse in question says that the two views regarding the causal relation are mutually contradictory, and in the subsequent verses Gauḍapāda provides a critique of the causal category and rejects it finally. Is this not an implicit criticism of the Vaināśika views, at any rate of the three schools of Buddhism mentioned above? There is one more question raised by Professor Bhattacharya. A number of kārikās from the second and third chapters are repeated in the fourth; the ajātivāda discussed already in the third chapter is discussed again in the fourth. Why is this repetition? Is it not useless? In reply it need only be pointed out that repetition is not a defect in an upadeśa-grantha. That the Māndūkya-kārikā was considered to be an upadeśa-grantha is evident from the colophons in some of the manuscripts.

IX

The Scope of the Kārikā

From the analysis of the four prakarānas given above, the scope of the Māndūkya-kārikā would have become clear by now. In this manual of Advaita Gauḍapāda sets forth the essentials of non-dualism. In the Āgama-prakarāna

138. We shall examine the question of Baudhāya influence later.
which is the first chapter, he makes the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* his basic text and analyses the three *avasthās* for the purpose of showing that the self which is referred to as the Turiya underlies and transcends the changing states of experience. In the second chapter, Vaitathya-prakarāṇa, he seeks to establish the illusoriness of the world of plurality on the analogy of dreams, and through a criticism of creationistic hypotheses. In the third chapter, Advaita-prakarāṇa, he details the arguments for the truth of non-dualism, gives citations from Scripture in support thereof, and discusses the path to the realization of non-duality, called *Asparśa-yoga*. And in the last chapter, Alātasānti-prakarāṇa, he repeats some of the arguments of the earlier chapters, shows the unintelligibility of the concept of causality through dialectic, explains the illusoriness of the phenomenal world, comparing it to the non-real designs produced by waving a fire-brand (alāta) and pressing into service modes of Baudhā reasoning, and establishes the supreme truth of non-duality which is unoriginated, eternal, self-luminous bliss.
CHAPTER II

THE UPANIŚADIC BASIS OF THE
GAUDAPĀDA-KĀRIKĀ

I

The Unique Place of the Māṇḍūkya in Advaita

That the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad forms the operational base for the philosophic flights of Gauḍapāda, we have already seen. We found that there was no reasonable ground to reject the tradition regarding the relationship between the Upaniṣad and the first prakarana of the Kārikā. The very name of the prakarana ‘Āgama’ signifies that it is based on a scriptural text. The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad has a unique place in Advaita literature because, though brief, it contains what may be considered the key-passages of non-dualism. One of the major texts (mahāvākyas), ‘This Self is Brahman’ (ayam ātmā brahma) occurs in it.1 The acosmic view is expressed in a beautiful passage which points to the ultimate non-dual reality through a negation of all that is finite and limited.2 No wonder, then, that Gauḍapāda chose this Upaniṣad as his primary text.

II

The Brhadāranyaka as the Main Source of Gauḍapāda’s Thought

Passages from some of the other Upaniṣads are either cited or referred to by Gauḍapāda. Many of these are from the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, which constitutes the main source of Gauḍapāda’s thought. The principal sage who teaches in the Upaniṣad is Yājñavalkya, the greatest of the seers of old and the first Absolutist in all the world so far known to us. A scholar without par, skilled in the art of philosophical debate, Yājñavalkya had as his patron and

1. This occurs in the Brhadāranyaka also (II, v, 19).
2. Passage 7.
pupil Janaka, king of Videha. One of his two wives, Maitreyi, was a meet companion of this master of metaphysics; and she is responsible for eliciting from her lord some rare passages declaring the nature of Self.

Of the six chapters which the Brhadaranyaka contains, the second, third and fourth alone are of high philosophical value. In II, iv, is recorded Yajnavalkya's teaching to Maitreyi. At the end of a full and prosperous life as a householder, the great philosopher informed his younger wife, Maitreyi, that he had decided to renounce the world and that he wished to divide his properties between her and Kātyāyanī. Maitreyi was not sorry for her husband's decision to renounce; but only she did not relish the idea of enjoying his wealth after him. Of what use is wealth to one who seeks real happiness? She asked Yajñavalkya: "Sir, if this entire earth filled with wealth were mine, would I become immortal by that?" Yajñavalkya confessed that there was no hope of immortality through wealth. Then Maitreyi said: "What shall I do with that through which I cannot become immortal? Tell me, Sir, what you know." The sage, in response to her request, gave her the highest teaching about the Self. Nothing is dear for its own sake. The husband is dear to the wife, not for the sake of the husband, but for the sake of the self. The same is true of all other things. The self is dearer than the son, as the Upaniṣad declares in another context, dearer than wealth, dearer than everything else and is innermost (I, iv, 8). It is the self that should be seen, heard, thought about and meditated on. Since the self is all, there can be nothing left unknown, after the self has been known. Self-knowledge, however, is not to be confused with objective knowledge. The self cannot be known as objects are known. "Where there is duality as it were, there one knows another. Where indeed for one everything has become the self, there through whom and whom is one to know?" Him through whom one

3. This episode is repeated in IV, v, with a few more details.
knows all this, through whom is one to know? Lo, through whom is one to know the knower?" The essence of Yajnavalkya's teaching to Maitreyi is that the self is non-dual, and of the nature of happiness and knowledge.

There is a description of a full-dress philosophical debate with Yajnavalkya as the central figure at King Janaka's court in Chapter III. Janaka once performed a sacrifice to which he had invited learned men from far and near. Desiring to know as to who among them was the most learned, he caused a thousand cows to be brought to the court with ten pieces of gold tied to the horns of each, and addressed the assembly thus: "O venerable Brahmins, whoever among you is the best learned in the lore of Brahman may lead these cows home". Yajnavalkya, who was in the assembly, rose up and ordered a pupil of his to lead the cows to his house. But the other learned men would not let Yajnavalkya's claim go unchallenged. They put him several test questions, some of them bearing on ritual and the others on metaphysics. One of the scholars, Ushasta by name, asked Yajnavalkya to explain the nature of Brahman which is immediate and direct, and the self within all. Yajnavalkya replied that the Brahman-self which is within all is the life of life. When pressed to be more definite, he said, "You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot know the knower of knowing. This is the self of yours which is within all. What is other than this is mutable". Another and by far the most formidable examiner of Yajnavalkya was a woman, Gargi by name. She started asking about the support of all things. Yajnavalkya in a series of replies traced all things to deeper and deeper foundations and went as far as words could go. Then Uddalaka questioned him about the inner ruler of all beings. In a set of beautiful passages Yajnavalkya explained that the principle that lies behind all things, cosmic as well as individual, the principle which these do not know but which controls them from within is the inner ruler;
and this ruler, said Yājñavalkya, is your own immortal self. Gārgī stood up again and pursued her old enquiry about the final support of all things. “Across what is that woven warp and woof”, she asked, “that which is above the sky, that which is beneath the earth, that which is between these two, that which is past, present and future?” Yājñavalkya replied: “It is woven across space”. But across what is space woven warp and woof? The final answer given by the sage was that the immutable across which space is woven can be indicated only by negative terms. Empirical categories like magnitude, colour, etc., are inapplicable to it. It is not an object of experience, nor even the subject of experience. “Not does that anything eat; nor does that eat anything.” The immutable is not a void, an airy nothing. It is the basis of all things. Under its mighty rule the planets keep to their places, seasons change, time is regulated and rivers flow along fixed courses. It cannot be seen, for it is the seer, or rather sight. Similarly, it cannot be heard, thought or known. Other than it there is no seer, thinker or knower. The immutable is the support of all-that-is, even of ether. Gārgī was fully satisfied with Yājñavalkya’s teaching, and, thoroughly convinced of his superior wisdom, addressed the assembly saying, “Never shall any of you beat him in rendering an account of Brahman”. Not heeding her words, one Śākalya cross-examined him further. In the course of his replies, Yājñavalkya said: “The self is to be described as ‘Not this, not this’. It is imperceptible, for it is never perceived; undecaying, for it never decays; unattached, for it is never attached; unfettered—it never feels pain, and never suffers injury.”

The fourth chapter of the Brhadāranyaka begins with a meeting between Yājñavalkya and Janaka. The king had heard from several scholars partial truths about Brahman. One of them had declared that speech is Brahman; another had identified Brahman with life; a third had said sight is Brahman; a fourth, hearing; a fifth, mind; a sixth,
heart. Yājñavalkya characterized these views as inadequate and Brahman thus known as but ‘one-footed’ (eka-pād). Then he proceeded to give the king an analysis of the three states of experience, waking, dream and sleep, with a view to show that the self which underlies them is constant and self-luminous. Section 2 of chapter IV which deals with this doctrine, and the next section in which Yājñavalkya explains in detail the concept of self-luminosity are important for us, because they provide the material for the Māndūkya Upaniṣad and the Āgama-prakaraṇa of the Kārikā. In IV, ii, Yājñavalkya speaks of Indha-Indra who is the person in the right eye. The person in the left eye, Virāj, is his wife. Their meeting-place is the space of the heart. The soul consisting of Indha and Virāj is the eater of finer food than is the bodily self. The prāṇas are his quarters. But the real self is not this, not that. It is ungraspable, indestructible, and unattached. Śaṅkara sees in this section of the Brhadāraṇyaka a reference to the four pādas of the self, the first three which are the non-absolute forms in the three states of experience, and the fourth which is the real self, the turiya-ātman. Indha or Śārīra ātman is what is called Viśva by Gauḍapāda and Vaiśvānara by the Māndūkya Upaniṣad. The soul which eats the finer food (praviviktāhāratarah) is Taijasa. The soul whose quarters are the prāṇas (sarve prāṇāḥ) is Prājña. What is referred to as Caturtha or Turiya in the Māndūkya is here indicated by the words ‘not this, not that’ (se eṣa neti neti).5

In IV, iii, Janaka puts the question: “What light does a person have here?” The sun, moon, fire and speech serve as lights, no doubt. But they are not constant, nor

4. Indra is the cryptic name of Indha, which means the shining one. The gods are fond of the cryptic as it were, says the Upaniṣad, and dislike the evident, parokṣapriyā īva hi devāḥ, pratyakṣadviṣaḥ. See also Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, ix, 1, 1, 2, parokṣa-kāmā hi devāḥ.

5. See Śaṅkara’s Commentary on the Brhadāraṇyaka; Mem. Edn., Vol. 8, p. 513. atra ca jāgrat-svapna-āsūpta-turiyāni upanyastāni anya-prasaṅgena indhaḥ praviviktāhāratarah, sarve prāṇāḥ, sa eṣa neti neti.
self-luminous. Yājñavalkya’s final answer is that the self is the never-failing light. ‘The self, indeed, is his light’; he says, ‘for with the self, indeed, as his light one sits, moves around, does his work, and returns’. The king pursues his inquiry and asks: ‘Which is the self?’ The sage, then, gives an account of the intelligence-self which is unattached and self-luminous in all the changing phases of experience. Waking (buddhānta), dream (svapnānta) and sleep (samprasāda) change and pass. But the self is constant and unchanging. Yājñavalkya gives a vivid description of the states of experience, waking, dream and sleep, for the purpose of teaching the unattached nature of the self. When a person dreams, he has no use for the external sense-organs. There are no chariots there, no spans, no roads. The dreamer takes with him impressions from the world of waking, and fashions for himself chariots, spans, roads. He creates a world of his own. The soul goes as it were, out of its nest, the physical body, and returns to itself; while the prāṇa preserves the body. The objects and enjoyments in dream are all of the soul’s own making. The self there is its own light. The illustration of dream shows,’ says Śaṅkara, that there is the self-luminous Ātman which transcends the forms of death. It is distinct from this world and the next, from the worlds of waking and dream. As a great fish (mahāmatsya) goes along both banks of a river alternately, just so the self goes along both these conditions, viz. dream and waking. The infinite being is unattached (asaṅga). That the Ātman is self-luminous and unattached will be clearer still when the significance of sleep is understood. As a hawk, or a falcon, having flown around here and there in space, becomes weary, folds its wings, and is borne down to its nest, so the soul hastens to that state where, asleep, it desires no desires and sees no dream. All distinctions are lost in sleep. One

6. IV, iii, 6: ātmaivāsyā jyotir bhavatī.
7. Mem. Edn., Vol. 9, p. 553; svayam jyotih ātmā astithi svapna-nidarsa-
   nena pradarṣītam.
knows neither what is without nor what is within. Though there are no objects in sleep, consciousness is never lost: for it is indestructible. The self sees nothing in sleep because it alone is. Where there is another, as it were, there one might see the other, smell it, taste, touch or hear it, think or know it. There is nothing, however, besides the self. The Ātman is infinite bliss, one without a second. It is Brahman. The self’s identity with all (sarvātma-bhāva) is realized in sleep. He who knows thus the significance of the experience of sleep knows the truth.

The object of Yājñavalkya’s analysis of the states of experience is to exhibit the true nature of the self. The Ātman is not to be identified with the body and the sense-organs, for these are not found in dream; nor is it to be confused with the mind, for in sleep the mind and its objects do not exist. The Māṇḍūkya and Gauḍapāda make use of this analysis and declare that the Turiya is the true self.

Several passages of the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad are quoted by Gauḍapāda in support of his views—a fact which proves beyond doubt that he was greatly influenced by this old Vedānta text. (1) Kārikā, II, 3, says “The non-existence of chariots, etc., is declared by Śruti, giving reasons therefor.” This refers to Bṛhadāranyaka, IV, iii, 10. (2) In kārikā III, 12, Gauḍapāda expressly mentions a section of the Bṛhadāranyaka by name. He says, “In the madhujñāna (i.e., the madhubrahmaṇa II, v) the supreme Brahman is made manifest in each of the pairs (adhidaiva and adhyātma), as is made manifest the ether in the earth and in the stomach.” The purport of the section of the Upaniṣad under reference is that the essence of all things is the self, here called madhu or honey. That which is in the macrocosm is in the microcosm also. The effulgent, immortal puruṣa is the sole reality. The self which is Brahman is the all. This Ātman is honey for all things, and all

8. tejomayo 'mṛtamayah purṣab.'
things are honey for this Ātman.\(^9\) It is the overlord of all beings, the king of all beings. As all the spokes are held together in the hub and felly of a wheel, so in this self all things, all gods, all worlds, all living beings, all these selves are held together.\(^10\) (3) In kārikā III, 13, Gauḍapāda refers to the praise of non-difference and denunciation of plurality found in Scripture. He says, ‘Manyness is censured (nānātvaṁ nindyate)’. The Brhadāraṇyaka (IV, iv, 19) declares, ‘There is no diversity whatsoever here’ (nha nānā ’sti kiñcana). (4) Kārikā III, 15, makes use of the illustration of sparks issuing from fire to explain creation. This example is found in the Brhadāraṇyaka, II, i, 20. (5) The first line of kārikā III, 24, contains two quotations from the Brhadāraṇyaka ‘nha nānā ’sti kiñcana’ (IV, iv, 19), and ‘indro māyābhiḥ puru-rūpa īyate’ (The lord on account of his māyā is seen as manifold) (II, v, 19).”\(^11\) (6) Kārikā, III, 25, asks “Who indeed would produce him (the self)?” This is from the Brhadāraṇyaka, III, lx, 28. (7) The passage ‘This (self) is not this, not that’ is quoted in kārikā III, 26. This occurs in several places of the Brhadāraṇyaka.\(^12\)

Besides the direct references to and quotations from the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad enumerated above, many are the thoughts of the Upaniṣad expressed in the Kārikā in the author’s own words.

III

Other Upaniṣads referred to in the Kārikā

We shall now turn to some of the other Upaniṣads references to which may be traced in the Kārikā.

\(^9\) ayam ātmā sarveśaṁ bhūtānāṁ madhu, asyātmanaḥ sarvāni bhūtāni madhu, II, v, 14.
\(^10\) II, v, 15.
\(^11\) The passage occurs also in RV, VI, 47, 18.
\(^12\) sa eṣa neti nety ātmā; III, ix, 26; IV, ii, 4; iv, 22; v, 15.
(1) In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VIII, vii-xii) there is the teaching about the three states and the self that is free from their blemishes, taught in the form of a myth wherein Prajāpati figures as the preceptor and Indra and Virocana are the pupils. Prajāpati, the lord of creatures, said: "The self which is free from sin, free from old age, free from death and sorrow, hunger and thirst, that should be sought, that should be known." The gods (devas) and the demons (asuras) heard this, and they desired to know more about the self. Indra, the king of the gods, and Virocana, chief of the demons, went to Prajāpati independently as envoys on the mission of learning from him knowledge of the self. For thirty-two years they lived with Prajāpati, observing brahmacarya, and at the end of the period they asked their teacher for instruction about the self. Prajāpati said, "The Person who is seen in the eye he is the self of whom I spoke. That is the immortal, the fearless. That is Brahman". The implication of this statement is that the principle which is responsible for seeing and knowledge is the self. But the two disciples could not understand the true meaning; and they thought that the image of a person who is seen, formed in the eye of the one who sees is the self. From this they drew the corollary that the reflection of the body which is seen in media like water and mirror is the self. When they informed Prajāpati of what they had inferred from his teaching, Prajāpati said, "Look at yourself in a pan of water; and then come and tell me what you do not understand of the self." Indra and Virocana did as they were told, and reported that they had seen themselves in the water 'to the very hairs and nails'. Prajāpati directed them to look again in the water-pan after adorning themselves, putting on their best clothes and cleansing themselves. The disciples followed the instruction, beautified themselves, looked at their charming reflections, and went away satisfied, thinking that the reflection and the body which was reflected constituted the self. Prajāpati did not correct them at that stage, for he wanted to test
them and give the true doctrine only to him that had proved his fitness. Virocana went back to his people and expounded to them the philosophy which he thought he had learnt from Prajāpati. "The body is the self", he declared, "It alone is to be worshipped, it alone is to be served." Though at first this doctrine seemed to satisfy Indra, very soon he realized its serious defect. When the body is well-adorned, dressed and cleaned, the reflection appears well-adorned, well-dressed and cleaned. But how would the reflection be if the body is blind, lame or crippled? It too would certainly be blind, lame or crippled. And if that were the self, it would perish when the body perishes. Indra saw no good in such a doctrine. Without returning to the gods, he went again to Prajāpati and apprised him of his difficulty. After an apprenticeship for another thirty-two years, Indra was led a step higher. Prajāpati declared to him, "He who moves about happy in dreams, he is the self. That is the immortal, the fearless. That is Brahman." On his way back again Indra pondered over the implications of this teaching. It is true that the self of the dream-state is not affected by the defects of the body. Yet it is not happiness alone that is experienced in dream. There are bad dreams and sorrowful dreams, nightmares in which the self appears afflicted, is chased, becomes conscious of pain, and sheds tears. Indra found no consolation in such an idea of the self. And so, for the third time, he went to Prajāpati and had to be with him for a further period of thirty-two years, at the end of which he was told, "When a man, being asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, sees no dream—that is the self. That is the immortal, the fearless. That is Brahman." In sleep the self is not afflicted, there is no sorrow. But there is ignorance, annihilation of consciousness as it were, in so far as one does not know oneself. So Indra approached Prajāpati once more and was asked to wait for five years, at the end of which period Prajāpati taught Indra the final truth. He said that the self must be distinguished from the body which is its temporary abode.
So long as one identifies oneself with the body, one is tossed between pleasure and pain. When one is freed from this false identity, there is neither pleasure nor pain. When the supreme light (knowledge) is regained, the self realizes itself as bliss and consciousness. Indra was given this knowledge which he conveyed to the gods.

The purpose of Prajāpati's teaching in the Chāndogya, as of Yājñavalkya's analysis of the three avasthās, in the Brhadāraṇyaka, is to exhibit the true nature of the self, as free from the defects due to the association with the states of waking, dream and sleep. The names of the self in the three states employed in the Māṇḍūkya and the Kārikā are not found here; but the idea is the same. The Chāndogya calls the self of the waking state aksipuruṣa or cāksusā-puruṣa, meaning eye-person. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Chāndogya refers to it by the terms chāyā-puruṣa and chāyātman (shadow-self) as well. For Taijas he assigns the name svapnātman (dream-self); and for Prājña the name susuptastha. The real self is the same in these three states. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad describes it as uttama-puruṣa, the supreme self. This is the Caturtha or Turiya of the Māṇḍūkya. Its nature may be well-understood by realizing the significance of sleep-experience. As the Chāndogya puts it, everyday we have this precious experience, without knowing its meaning, even as one might walk over a place, without being aware of the treasure buried under-ground.

15. VIII, xii, 4.
16. VIII, xii, 4.
17. VIII, vii, 2.
18. VIII, x, 1.
20. VIII, iii, 2.
Besides the section of the Chāndogya where there is an inquiry into the three avasthās, there are others which, it may be presumed, are drawn upon by Gauḍapāda. Among the illustrations employed by kārikā III, 15, are clay (mṛt) and metal (loha). These are taken from Chāndogya VI, i, 4 and 5. The non-difference between jīva and Ātman (Brahman) of which kārikā III, 13, speaks is declared several times in the Chāndogya; it is the theme, for instance, of Uddālaka’s teaching to Śvetaketu.21

Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, Prājña and Caturtha (i.e., Turiya) are, according to the Māndūkya Upaniṣad, the four pādas of the self. The fourth is the real, while the first three stand respectively for the self in waking, dream and sleep. Taken together, the self is said to have four quarters (catuspād). Though Gauḍapāda does not use the term ‘catuspād’ in his Kārikā, he discusses the nature of the four pādas, and speaks of the pādas in general. In the Chāndogya too there is the teaching of the four pādas of Brahman or Ātman. Here each pāda is said to consist of four factors (kalās); and there are on the whole sixteen kalās. The teaching itself is known by the name sōdaśakaḷāvidyā (knowledge of the sixteen kalās).22 Satyakāma Jābala is the recipient of this doctrine from four non-human teachers (anye manusyaṁebyah).23 The first to instruct him was a bull which declared24 that the first pāda of Brahman consists of the four cardinal directions, east, west, south, and north. The name of this pāda is Prakāśavat (the shining one). The second teacher was Fire (i.e., Agni) who said, “The earth, interspace, heaven and ocean are parts of Brahman.” These constitute the second pāda which is called Anantavat (the endless). The nature of the third pāda was taught by a swan.25 It said, “Fire, sun, moon and lightning are parts of Brahman.”

22. IV, iv–ix.
23. IV, ix, 2.
24. According to Śaṅkara, Vāyudevāt teaches this, having entered the body of the bull.
25. The swan is Āditya, according to Śaṅkara.
The name of this pāda is Jyotismat (the luminous). The last to teach Satyakāma was a diver-bird. It declared that the breath, eye, ear and mind constitute the last pāda of Brahman with the name Āyatanavat (having-a-support). This is the doctrine of the four pādas in the Chāndogya. The approach made here is objective, as contrasted with the subjective approach of the Māṇḍūkya. But the purpose of both the enquiries is the same, viz., to sketch a method of meditation whereby the aspirant could pierce through the grosser manifestations of the self and realize progressively the subtler ones. The Chāndogya starts with such cosmic phenomena as space and earth and ends with the mind. The Māṇḍūkya begins with the world of waking and reaches the self in sleep and the Turīya which is the basis of all manifestations. At each stage in both the meditations, the aim of the aspirant is to become one with the object meditated upon.

Another point of identity between the two Upaniṣads may be noted. Both of them begin with the words: ‘Oṃity etad aksaram.’ The Chāndogya as well as the Māṇḍūkya stresses the importance of the meditation on Praṇava.

(2) Kārikā, III, 25, says: ‘By the denial of sambhūti, origination (sambhava) is negatived (in the śruti).’ The śruti referred to here is the Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad (12).

(3) The closing words of kārikā, I, 28, ‘matvā dhīro no śocatī’ (having understood the wise one does not grieve) occur thrice in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. The opening words of kārikā III, 24, are ‘neha nāneti’ (there is no plurality here). We said that these are from a passage of the Brhadāraṇyaka (IV, iv, 19). The denunciation of plurality is to be found in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad also in words which might be taken as the original for the kārikā under reference.

26. This is Prāṇa, says Śaṅkara, because of its association with water.
27. I, ii, 22; i, 4; iii, 6.
28. IV, 10: mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nānevā paśyati.
(4) Gauḍapāda mentions the Taittirīya Upaniṣad by name in kārikā, III, 11. The section of the Upaniṣad which is referred to here is that in which there is an inquiry into the five sheaths (kośas) that cover the soul, viz., annarasmaya, prānamaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya, and ānandamaya (sheaths of food-essence, life, mind, intellect and bliss). The object of the inquiry is to distinguish the self from the sheaths.

(5) There are two quotations in the Kārikā whose identity we may deal with here in brief. Kārikā, III, 24, reads:

neha nāneti cāmnāyād indro māyābhīr ity api,
ajāyamāno bahudhā māyayā jáyate tu saḥ.

Here the first line refers to two passages ‘neha nānāsti kiṃcana’ and ‘indro māyābhīḥ pururūpa iyate.’ The second line refers to a third passage ‘ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate.’ Of these, the first is from the Brhadāranyaka (IV, iv, 19). But wherefrom are the other two? ‘Indro māyābhīḥ pururūpa iyate’ occurs, we have seen, in the Brhadāranyaka (IV, v, 19). It forms part of a verse in the Rg-veda too (VI, 47, 18). The other passage is from the Vājasaneyi-samhitā (XXXI, 19). The fact that Gauḍapāda has quoted not only from the Upaniṣads but also from the Samhitās shows that he was an exponent of the Vedic philosophy. He himself claims that he only follows the footsteps of his predecessors who were knowers of the Veda and Vedānta.

IV

Alātasānti and Upaniṣads

The Alātasāntiprakaraṇa which is the fourth chapter of the Kārikā presents a problem which we must notice here in brief. Gauḍapāda employs in the chapter Baudhdha

29. Tait., II.

30. In view of this it is surprising that statements such as the following should have ever been made: ‘The doctrine of Māyā which Gauḍapāda develops could never have been taken from the older Upaniṣads, to which he does not make even a passing reference..........To do Gauḍapāda justice, he never pretends to explain the doctrine of Atman or Brahman in the light of what is to be found in the Upaniṣads’. Sures Chandra Chakravarthi in The Philosophy of the Upaniṣhads, (Calcutta University, 1933), p. 298.

31. See II, 55: vedapāragaṁ;

II, 3: vedeṇteṣu vīcakṣaṇaiḥ.
terminology to a great extent. This has led some scholars to conclude that the Advaita teacher commends to his followers Bauddha Idealism. It has also been urged that in writing his fourth chapter Gauḍapāda does not in the least depend on Upaniṣadic texts. "It will be seen," says Professor V. Bhattacharya, "that no Upaniṣad is quoted or referred to by our author in his last Book, Alāta- śānti. There is absolutely nothing of the kind." Postponing a detailed examination of the criticism that Gauḍapāda was a Bauddha in disguise to a later stage, we shall here only remark that to say that there is no reference to Upaniṣadic passages in the fourth chapter is not true. As Dr Belvalkar has pointed out, familiar Upaniṣadic expressions are employed in IV, 78, 80, 85 and 92. That these expressions are used by Bauddha writers also can only show that they were borrowed by them from the Upaniṣads. And it is significant that Gauḍapāda should have used such expressions as 'brāhmaṇyam padam' and 'amaratvata' in the concluding portion of his work, and that he should have stated at the end 'naitad buddhena bhāṣitam' (this was not declared by the Buddha). It is evident, then, that Gauḍapāda's Kārikā is essentially a work on Vedānta inspired by the Upaniṣads. Not only does it proceed from what is taught in the Māṇḍūkya; it utilizes also some of the leading ideas of the major Upaniṣads. Gauḍapāda draws freely from the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya whose teachings constitute, as it were, the two aspects of Vedānta, the negative and the positive. The Isa, Kaṭha, and Taïttiṛiya Upaniṣads as well as the Bhagavadgītā find their echoes in the verses of the Kārikā. The earliest interpretation we have of some of the Upaniṣadic texts like the Isāvāsyā on sambhūti is Gauḍapāda's. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Gauḍapāda is an Aupaniṣada teacher whose sole purpose in writing the Kārikā is to expound the central teaching of the Upaniṣads.

32. AS, p. lxxxixii.
33. See chapter ix.
CHAPTER III

REASON AND REVELATION

I

A Rational Approach to Vedānta

A unique feature about the Kārikā is that its author, while keeping Scripture in the background as the final court of appeal, makes a rational approach to Vedānta. In quoting passages from the Upaniṣads he is judicious, and mostly selects those texts where śruti itself gives reasons. After explaining the import of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad in the first prakaraṇa, he sets forth in the rest of his work the philosophy of Advaita through various arguments. According to Śaṅkara, in the second prakaraṇa the illusoriness of the world of duality is explained through reasoning (hetutāḥ); in the third the non-illusoriness of non-duality is established on rational grounds (yuktītāḥ); and in the fourth pluralistic views are shown to be mutually contradictory through several modes of argumentation (upapattibhiṣṭ).

II

The Limits of Reason and the Need for Śruti

The prominent role assigned to reason in philosophical inquiry by such an early thinker as Gauḍapāda gives the lie direct to the unfounded criticism that philosophy in India is dogmatic and uncritical. It is true that Scripture is appealed to as the ultimate authority in matters spiritual by the teachers of Vedānta. But the appeal itself is for a reason; and reason comes in as an aid at every stage in the process of selection and interpretation of scriptural passages.

The reason for appealing to Scripture is reasoning’s inability to comprehend the ultimate reality. Thought must needs create division where there is unity in order
that it may function. If a distinction is not made between the 'that' and the 'what', existence and content, subject and predicate, there can be no judgment. What thought does is to sunder the 'what' from the 'that' and re-unite it therewith by a sort of homeopathic treatment. But in this attempt at unification, discursive thinking can never wholly succeed; for it has to grow on differentiation. It must distinguish; otherwise it will find its occupation gone. It cannot, therefore, be a competent instrument for the comprehension of the plenary reality which is distinctionless.

Moreover, thought or reason is but a secondary means of knowledge, as indubitable certitude cannot result therefrom alone. The knowledge that reason gives is mediate and mediate knowledge is that which depends for its validation on the validity of some other knowledge which is its ground. If this other knowledge is also mediate, we shall be led on to a regressus ad infinitum without arriving at certitude. So, the proper ground of rational knowledge is immediate experience. That is why the Western Idealists like Bosanquet say that the mind comes into contact with reality through a peep-hole in sense-perception, and then constructs its thought-system.\(^1\) The Indian theory of Inference also recognizes the perceptual basis of anumāṇa. If one had not seen the co-presence of smoke and fire in a place like the hearth, one would not be able to infer the presence of fire on the hill from the perceived presence of smoke thereon. It is true that in an ordinary knowledge the pure perceptual element cannot be separated from the element of thought. That is because even perception can be called immediate knowledge only by sufferance. In so far as perceptual knowledge depends on sense-activity, it cannot be independent knowledge nor indubitable. The detected

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1. See B. Bosanquet: Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge (Second edition) p. 72: Reality is given for me in sensuous perception, and in the immediate feeling of my own sentient existence that goes with it. The real world, as a definite organized system, is for me an extension of this present sensation and self feeling by means of judgment, and it is the essence of judgment to effect and sustain such an extension,
illusions in perception are too many to be ignored. If perception is known to betray us in some cases, the spectre of a doubt that it may betray everywhere can never be exorcized. The immediacy of perception, therefore, is not true immediacy; and the reasoning which relies on perception cannot rise to certitude.

The only knowledge which is immediate and indubitable is self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of, or more properly, knowledge which is the self. For lack of a better term we shall call this intuitive experience, ātmasāksātkāra or anusvabhūti. It is experience which is not split up into experiencer, experienced object and experiencing. It is consciousness per se which is the sole reality, according to Advaita. A glimpse of this we do have in rare moments of introspection and exaltation of spirit. Without our own knowing, we pass into it in sleep. But to realize it in eternity is the aim of Vedānta. The Upaniṣads which are the end of Veda (Vedānta) or the crown of śruti (śruti-śiras) contain the discoveries made by the ancient seers in the realm of the spirit; they are a record of the declarations made by the sages and are designed to initiate the votary into the secrets of the intuitive or mystic experience. Even as in the sphere of physical science an investigator cannot afford to neglect the researches already made by others in the field, in the realm of the super-physical also a seeker of the truth must take into account the realizations of the sages. The appeal to the authority of śruti means no more and no less. The deliverances of Scripture may appear dogmatic to those whose inner eye has not been opened; but they constitute the testimony of the most real experience to those who are awake in the Spirit. The students of Vedānta are required to place faith in śruti, even as the learners of science must begin with a sense of confidence in the scientific theories formulated by the master-minds in the field. The final test in Vedānta, however, is experience, just as in science the

arbiters of theory are said to be facts. The end or goal of brahma-vijnāna, inquiry into the nature of reality, says Śaṅkara, is experience (anubhava). Šruti, to start with, is others’ experience; and the knowledge one derives therefrom is but mediate (parokṣa). Unless this becomes immediate (aparokṣa), the goal of Vedānta which is self-realization will not be reached. Hence the faith in Scripture insisted on in Vedānta has but a methodological value, and has as its sole purpose the realization of intuitive experience. The knowledge that is revealed by Scripture must become a matter of experience; only then revelation would have fulfilled its mission. And for one who has realized the integral experience, there is no need to depend on any external authority in the form of šruti or to subscribe to a formal dogma. His wisdom is self-certifying and self-revealed. To him the Vedas are no Vedas.

We have explained for what reason and in what sense šruti is regarded as supreme pramāṇa in the system of Vedānta. We shall now proceed to show the part that reason plays in understanding the purport of Scripture. It is well to remember that a scriptural passage as such is not a pramāṇa; only purportful Scripture is authoritative. Those who accept šruti as the supreme pramāṇa, viz., the Mimāṁsakas and the Vedāntins, are agreed upon certain canons of interpretation such as the harmony of initial and concluding passages, etc. One of these canons, and by no means the least important, is upapatti or intelligibility in the light of reasoning. Revelation exceeds the grasp of reasoning; and on that account it is not to be regarded as irrational. Even if a thousand scriptural texts were to proclaim something which is nonsensical and absurd, one is not bound to accept it as true. Therefore it is that in
unravelling the meaning of Scripture the greatest exercise of one's judgment-ability is called for. As Śaṅkara observes, that which is accepted or believed in without proper inquiry prevents one from reaching the final good and results in evil consequences.\(^6\) Reason, then, has to function—and function vigorously—in the interpretation of Scripture. Though it is only one among the six canons of interpretation, on a deeper examination it will be found that on it depends the application of some of the other canons. For instance, the application of the first canon which we have mentioned above, viz., the harmony of initial and concluding passages, is possible only after it has been determined which the initial and concluding passages of a topic are. And for this determination the services of reason are required. There are scriptural texts which would be nonsensical if the primary sense of the words that constitute them is taken. In such cases one must get behind the words and know their secondary implication (lakṣaṇā). There are again several modes of implication. It is reason that has to decide where the primary sense of words becomes absurd and what mode of implication is to be resorted to. There are passages where words are employed in a figurative sense and where the purport of Scripture is not to be found. Such are eulogistic and condemnatory passages. In detecting and understanding them reason must play an effective role. Thus it is evident that reason has to come in as a powerful aid at every stage in the selection and interpretation of scriptural texts.\(^7\)

It is significant that the first sūtra of Bādarāyana speaks of jijñāsā or inquiry into the nature of Brahman.\(^8\) And the method of inquiry is the same here as in science. It consists in posing problems or doubts and seeking solutions for them. The problem here at the outset is about the knowledge of Brahman. Is Brahman something which we know

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6. Com. on BS, I, i, 1: tatrā'vicārya yat kīkṣit pratiṣṭhāyamāno niḥśreyasāt pratiḥanyeta anarthāṁ ce'yāt.
7. See the present writer's Philosophy of Advaita, pp. 44-60.
8. BS, I, i, 1: lit. desire to know Brahman.
already or do not know? If it is known, there is no need for inquiry; if it is not known, there can be no inquiry, for no one can possibly inquire into something of which he is not aware. The way out of this dilemma is to be found by escaping between its horns. The alternatives are not exhaustive, for there is a middle one between the two, viz., partial knowledge. As Brahman is the same as the self, everyone knows it, but knows it only superficially. Prior to inquiry into the Vedānta there is not specific or determinate knowledge of Brahman. Hence the conflicting views of the disputants about the nature of the self. The purpose of inquiry, then, is to arrive at a settled knowledge of Brahman. As a sample of the method, we selected almost the first question that is asked and answered in Vedānta-study. There are many such cobwebs of ignorance and prejudice that must be swept by the broom of doubt, before one becomes fit to receive the final knowledge. What is worthy of note here is that inquiry is essential for progress in the knowledge of Vedānta. The inquiry is to be made till the onset of Brahman-intuition. That is the meaning, says Śaṅkara, of the word jījñāsā, 'desire to know'. Without inquiry, declares Ānandagiri, śāstra does not generate Brahman-knowledge.

The exercise of reason has to start even earlier, according to Śaṅkara, than the inquiry into the Vedānta. We stated above that unless there is a superficial knowledge at least of the Brahman-self there is no possibility of inquiring into its nature. This, however, is possessed by all, and is not enough qualification for a study of Vedānta. Something more is needed; and that is discriminatory knowledge between what is eternal and what is non-eternal (nityā-nityavastuviveka). This is one of the four-fold means

9. Com. on BS, I, i, 1: yadi loke brahmātmatvena prasiddham asti tat jñātam evēty aśrīñāsyatvam punar āpnam na; tad-visēṣam prati viprati-patēḥ.
10. Ibid. avagatiparyantam jñānam san-vācyayā iechāyāḥ karma.
12. Ibid. sarvo hi ātmāstītvam pratyeti na nāham asmītī.
of eligibility prescribed for the students of Vedānta. It does not mean that there should be at that stage a clear and distinct knowledge of the eternal self as contrasted with the non-eternal things that constitute the world. It is for the sake of this knowledge that Vedānta is to be studied. What is required on the part of the student is that he should not be the dupe of appearance. He must have a metaphysical bent of mind, a discerning intellect. There is no admittance into the shrine of Vedānta for those who are intellectually indolent, and cannot or would not think.

Śruti itself prescribes manana or critical reflection as an auxiliary to śravana or hearing the Vedānta texts. 'The self, verily, is to be seen, heard, reflected upon and contemplated', says Yājñavalkya to Maitreyi. Mere śravana will not take the student far. What he has heard he must reflect upon, look at it from different angles and resolve the doubts that might assail him, till conviction is generated. The policy of ipse dixit will not pay in the end. The good teacher is he who does not ask his pupil to believe blindly what he says but opens to him the way by taking which he would himself see the truth. Similarly, the ideal student is one who would not rest till he is convinced of the truth of what he has learnt. He has to see the truth by using his sharp intellect. What he learns on the authority of Scripture must be mediated in thought before it could become a matter of experience with him. It is manana that ushers in the new awakening. Through reflection lies the way to sākṣātkāra.

15. See A. E. Taylor: Elements of Metaphysics, pp. 152-3: "It seems indeed as if the function of the mere intellect were always that of a necessary and valuable intermediary between a lower and a higher level of immediate apprehension. It breaks up, by the relations and distinctions it introduces, the original union of the what and the that of simple feeling, and proceeds to make the what, which it deals with in its isolation, even more and more complex. But the ultimate issue of the process is only reached and its ultimate aim only satisfied so far as it conducts us at a higher stage of mental development to the direct intuition of a richer and more comprehensive whole in the immediate unity of its that and its what."
We are now ready to answer the question: in what relation does reason (yukti) stand to revelation (śruti)? Revelation is no doubt the principal pramāṇa. But what is revealed by Scripture has to be mediated in thought before it could get transformed into one’s own experience. Śruti is what is helped; yukti or tarka is what helps. As an aid to revelation, reason is of inestimable value; and it should be regarded as subsidiary to śruti and anubhūti.  

III

The Use of Śruti, Yukti and Anubhava in the Kārikā

We shall now turn to the Kārikā and see how Gauḍapāda has employed the triple factors, śruti, yukti and anubhava, in a harmonious manner, and has succeeded in making Advaita a faith that enquires.

After what was stated in the last chapter it must be evident that Gauḍapāda expounds the philosophy of the Upaniṣads in his Kārikā. It is but natural, therefore, that he should quote from these Scriptures. But in his selection and interpretation of the texts he makes the fullest use of reason. He states explicitly that śruti must be accepted as authoritative when it is compatible with reason (yukti yukta) and not otherwise. Where the primary sense of a text is unintelligible, he prefers the secondary implication or explains it as having a figurative meaning. Citing the Brhadāranyaka passage where the non-existence in dream

16. Com. on B.S., I, i, 2: śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhhyupeyatyāt; II, i, 6: śrutyanugrhitā eva hy atra tarko 'nubhavāṅgatvena āśriyate.

See Anandagiri on GK, III, 1: svatantra-tarkāpraveśo'pi tasmin āgamika-tarkasya sahakāritayā saṁbhāvanāhetuvāti, tarkenāpi jāatum śakyam.

D. Elton Trueblood, The Trustworthiness of Religious Experience, p. 29: 'The task of reason is the humble one of the refiner, not the bold one of the prospector.'

Charles A. Bennett, A. Philosophical Study of Mysticism, p. 110: 'Reason may establish our certainties; it does not initiate them.'

17. GK, II, 23.

18. GK. III, 14.
of chariots, etc., is declared, Gauḍāpāda observes that the śruti says so on grounds of reason (nyāyapūrvakam). When he refers to a topic discussed in Scripture, he uses such expressions as prakāśita (it has been made clear), samprakāśita (made very clear), vedānta niścaya (the settled conclusion arrived at in Vedānta), and samañjasa (it is reasonable). Very often in the course of his Kārikā Gauḍāpāda cites approvingly the views of elders; and the terms he employs to designate them show that, according to him, they were not blind believers in dogma but intelligent interpreters of Scripture. He calls them munis (sages), maniśins (the wise), vicakṣaṇas (subtle seers), tattvavids (knowers of truth), veda-pāragas (those who have reached the other shore of the Vedas), buddhas (the enlightened), vipras (the wise), vidvāns (the learned), mahādhīś (of great intellect) and mahājñānas (great knowers). Significant, again, are the expressions by which Gauḍāpāda denotes the ignorant. He calls them abuddhas (unenlightened), bāliṣas (childish), and avipaścids (unwise). From the foregoing it is easy to draw the

19. GK, II, 8.
20. GK, II, 3; III, 12.
22. GK, II, 12.
23. GK, III, 13; Śaṅkara gives the meaning, pṛṇavabodham nyāyam.
24. GK, I, 29; Śaṅkara says, manana munih; II, 35: munibhiḥ; II, 35: munibhiḥ manana śilaiḥ vivekibhiḥ.
25. GK, II, 1; Śaṅkara: pramānakusalaḥ; II, 5: vivekinaḥ; GK, IV, 54.
27. GK, II, 34; Śaṅkara: paramārthatattvam ātmavido brāhmaṇaḥ viduh.
29. GK, IV, 19; Śaṅkara: buddhaiḥ paṇḍitaiḥ; GK, IV, 88.
30. GK, IV, 86.
31. GK, IV, 86.
32. GK, IV, 89; Śaṅkara: mahādhīyaiḥ mahā-buddheḥ.
33. GK, IV, 95; Śaṅkara: niratiṣaya-tattvaviṣaya-jñānaiḥ.

The Mitakṣara says: mahājñānaḥ, mahati niratiṣayatattva-viśaye asambhā-vanādi-rahita-niścita-jñānavattvāt mahānubhavaḥ bhavantīty arthaḥ.

34. GK, III, 8; Śaṅkara: abuddhānāṁ pratyaṣaṭāṁ viveka-rahitānāṁ.
35. GK, IV, 83; Śaṅkara: bāliṣaiḥ avivekai.
36. GK, IV, 97; Śaṅkara: avipaścitaḥ avivekinaḥ.
inference that the authorities on which Gauḍapāda depends are those śruti texts which are intelligible in the light of reasoning and the views of those elders who had been great thinkers and seers of the truth, besides, of course, his own reason and experience.

Even a cursory perusal of the Kārikā will reveal the keen intellectual acumen and the great argumentative skill of its author. The various arguments advanced by Gauḍapāda will be explained in the following chapters in their proper contexts. Here we shall only give evidence of the deep insight into the tarka-śāstra which the great teacher possessed. The Buddhist logic he seems to have mastered and used against the Baudhās themselves. The four pronged dialectic (catuskoti) he employs in the fourth chapter with advantage to his siddhānta. The favourite form of argument with him is the syllogistic. Śaṅkara puts one of the arguments into the form of a five-membered syllogism. Most of the reasonings are formulated in the syllogistic mode by Ānandagiri. It is thus clearly seen that Gauḍapāda bases the conclusion of each argument on the strength of probans (hetu) which is the soul of inferential reasoning. The anvaya-vyatireki mode of reasoning is made use of in several places. The method of argumentation known as tarka in the technical sense (reductio ad absurdum) is also employed by Gauḍapāda. What is known in Western logic as analogical reasoning is handled by our author with dexterity to prove the illusoriness of the waking world on the ground of its similarity with the world of dream. Other comparisons are also given such as those between the universe on the one hand and fata morgana, magic-elephant, rope-snake, illusory designs created by the waving of a fire-brand, etc., on the other. Gauḍapāda points out the following fallacies among others in the

37. See GK, IV, 22, 40, 83 & 84.
38. Com on GK, II, 4.
40. GK, I, 17-18.
arguments of his opponents: na-vyavasthā (i.e., anavasthā, infinite regress), aprasiddha-hetu (unestablished reason), aśakti (inability to reply), aparijñāna (ignorance about the topic), kramakopa (impossibility of stating the sequence between cause and effect), sādhyasama (the illustration being on a par with the porbandum, i.e. itself requiring to be proved, and lakṣanāśūnya (devoid of characteristic marks).

In view of what has now been shown, the appositeness of the commentator’s observation at the head of each chapter will be appreciated. For instance, introducing the second chapter (Vaitathya-prakarana), Śaṅkara says: “It is possible to determine even through reasoning the illusoriness of duality. For this purpose the second prakarana is commenced.” At the beginning of the third chapter he observes, “Is non-duality to be known through Scripture alone or through reasoning also? The teacher replies: it is possible to know through reasoning also. To show how this is possible the Advaita-prakarana is commenced.” The two main aspects of the Advaita doctrine are the sole reality of the non-dual self and the illusoriness of the pluralistic universe. The point that is to be noted here is that Gaṇḍapāda establishes these two aspects of Advaita not only on the authority of Scripture but also on grounds of reason. “Because it is determined through śāstra and reasoning,” says Śaṅkara, “the system expounding the non-dual self is true.” Not a little of the credit of having provided the system of Advaita with such solid foundations goes to Gaṇḍapāda.

41. GK, IV, 13.
42. GK, IV, 17.
43. GK, IV, 19.
44. GK, IV, 20.
45. GK, IV, 67.
46. tatra ‘papattyā’pi dvaitasya vaitathyaṁ sakyate ‘vadhārayitum iti dvītītvam prakaranaṁ ārabhyate.
47. advaitaṁ kim āgamamātrena pratīpatvayam āhosiṁ tarkaṇāpyaṁ ata āha sakyate tarkaṇāpyaṁ jñātum, tat katham ity advaitapraṣṭiṣṭam ārabhyate.
The great teacher does not reason abstractly nor depend for the truth of his doctrine on barren logic. On the contrary, he uses logic to confirm experience. The discerning analysis of experience which he gives in the first chapter following the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* forms, in fact, the basis of the further elaboration he subsequently makes of the Advaita doctrine. The comparison he institutes between waking and dream and the way he meets the various objections go to show that he has a penetrating insight into the deep recesses of experience. A mastery of Scripture, logical skill and rich spiritual experience he combines in a harmonious way when he expounds his philosophy in the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā*. An observation made by Ānandagiri in the course of his gloss may well be applied to Gauḍapāda. This is what he says. "Such an enlightened person does not become a bondslove of the Veda. The meaning that he gives of the Veda, that alone becomes the meaning of the Veda."\(^{49}\)

CHAPTER IV

THE TRIPLE STREAM OF EXPERIENCE

I

The Māṇḍūkya on the Three States of Experience

The Māṇḍūkya which constitutes the basic text for Gauḍapāda, is an important, though brief, Upaniṣad; for in it is to be found the quintessence of Vedānta. The words of the Mukti-kā Upaniṣad we have already quoted to the effect that for those who desire release the Māṇḍūkya by itself is enough to liberate them. Upaniṣad-brahmayogin, a commentator on the one-hundred-and-eight Upaniṣads, characterizes the Māṇḍūkya as sarva-vedāntasāriṣṭha (the essence of the entire Vedānta). The excellence of the Upaniṣad lies in its direct and simple approach to the problem of Reality. As a master-artist would produce a beautiful picture with a few strokes of his brush, the Māṇḍūkya gives us in a few sentences a comprehensive or whole view of the non-dual self.

The Upaniṣad begins by identifying the mystic sound ‘Om’ with all-that-which-is. Om is all this—what was, what is, and what will be. It is also the unmanifest cause of the manifest universe. All this is Brahman, of which Om is the symbol. The self is Brahman. Corresponding to the three morae (mātrās) of Om and the fourth mora-less (a-mātrā) part, there are the three forms in which the self appears in the states of waking, dream and sleep respectively, and the fourth which is the natural estate of the self, the unchanging Turiya. Then the Upaniṣad proceeds to describe the three states of experience. In the state of waking the self consorts with the objects of sense which are external, and its enjoyments are gross. In dreams it revels in a world of images, and its experience is subtle. In sleep

G. 12
there are no desires nor dreams; the self becomes one, without the distinction of seer and seen; it is then a mass of sentience and remains as bliss enjoying bliss. The self of the three states is designated respectively as Vaiśvānara, Taijasa and Prājña. The fourth, Turiya which is the real self, is beyond the changing modes of existence. It is not caught in the triple stream of waking, dream and sleep, though it is their underlying substrate. It is invisible; it is not the content of empirical usage; it cannot be grasped; it does not have identifying marks; it is unthinkable and unnameable; it is the one self which is the essence of consciousness; it is that into which the universe gets resolved; it is tranquil bliss which is non-dual. Thus through a series of negations supplemented by their positive implications, the Māndūkya teaches the real nature of the self.

II

The Māndūkya Account Compared with Similar Teaching in the other Upaniṣads

The unique method adopted by the Māndūkya is that of inquiry into the nature of the three states of experience with a view to show the non-duality of the self. Most of the philosophical systems, both realistic and idealistic, take into cognizance only the waking experience. They seek to explain the ego and the non-ego of the world of waking. The phenomena of dreams are dismissed as having no consequence in arriving at metaphysical conclusions. They are studied, by a contemporary school of psychologists, only as certain abnormal expressions of the psyche, expressions of the repressed desires in unguarded moments, when the conscious censor takes a holiday. As for the state of sleep, it comes nowhere in the picture. Sleep is cessation of consciousness, and it is thought that it could have no bearing on metaphysics.
THE TRIPLE STREAM OF EXPERIENCE

The method chosen by Vedānta is different. It takes life as a whole and studies all its expressions. What are considered to be the older Upaniṣads—Upaniṣads like the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya—give elaborate descriptions of the three states. The Māṇḍūkya contains the essence of them all in sūtra-like form. And it employs the knowledge which results from such descriptions to indicate the nature of the ultimate Reality.

'Vaiśvānara', which is the name given by the Māṇḍūkya to the self of the state of waking, is described at length in the Chāndogya. The story is told in the fifth chapter of five great householders who along with Uddālaka Āruṇi went to king Aśvapati, desiring to learn from him the nature of the Vaiśvānara-self. Each seeker had but a partial knowledge of the self. In reply to Aśvapati's question 'What is the self on which you meditate?' each gave a different answer, identifying the Vaiśvānara with some particular cosmic phenomenon or other. After hearing the various views, king Aśvapati said that they were all one-sided, like the conceptions of the elephant, adds Śaṅkara in his commentary, formed by men who are born blind. Then the king gave his disciples the true teaching. The Vaiśvānara is to be meditated upon as a whole composed of parts, as the cosmic being whose limbs are the different parts of the universe. The heaven is his head, the sun his eye, the air his breath, the ether his trunk, water his bladder, the earth his two feet and the Āhavanīya his mouth. Thus the Chāndogya teaches that the Viśvānara is the self of all, the cosmic soul.²

The self of the waking individual is the same Vaiśvānara. The Sarvasāropaniṣad says: "The self is awake when it cognizes the gross objects, sound, etc., through the fourteen instruments, mind, etc. (i.e. manas, buddhi, citta, aṅkāra, and the organs of knowledge and action) fully

² V, xii-xviii: also BS, I, ii, 24-32.
developed and helped by the sun, etc. In the states of waking, the self is conscious of what is without. The external world is its field of knowledge and enjoyment. The out-turned sense-organs are the channels of experience. The ego is set over against the non-ego. The former enjoys the latter; and the enjoyment is gross in nature because it is of the objects of the outer world. The individual soul which thus resides in the physical body and uses the mind and the organs of sense as its instruments is identical with the world-soul. It is to teach this truth that the Māndūkya juxtaposes the words ‘saptāṅgah’ and ‘ekonavimśatimukhaḥ’, ‘endowed with seven limbs and nineteen mouths’. The seven limbs are the seven parts of the universe described in the Chāndogya as phases of the Vaiśvānara-self. The nineteen mouths are the fourteen instruments of which the Sarvasāra speaks plus the five vital airs. These nineteen factors constitute the subtle body (sūkṣma-śarira) of the individual soul. The seven-limbed cosmic-soul is in essence non-different from the nineteen-mouthed individual. This is the meaning that one must learn by an analysis of the waking experience.

The Brhadāranyaka gives a detailed account of the dream state. The person who dreams creates a world of his own from his impressions of waking experience. It is a universe of his images, fashioned out of the memory of past experiences. “There are no chariots there, no spans, no roads. But he projects from himself blisses, pleasures, delights. There are no tanks there, no lotus pools, no streams. But he projects from himself tanks, lotus pools, streams. For he is a creator.” Having put the body aside, he moves about in dream without the help of sense-organs. These have gone to rest, but he is awake. No need is there for him to depend on external lights, for in dream he is self-illuminated.

4. Brh., IV, iii, 10 (Hume’s translation).
5. Brh., IV, iii, 14: atrāyaṁ puruṣaḥ svayanjyotir bhavati.
The object of explaining the state of dream is to show that the self does not really act and is unattached. In
dream it appears to roam far and wide and consort with
wierd objects. But on waking it is realized that there were
no objects in dream, no roamings-about. Similarly, it is
possible to conceive that even in waking it is so. The
agency and enjoyership of the self are but apparent, and
not real. They are to be attributed to the limiting adjuncts,
viz. body, sense-organs, and mind. Due to ignorance, they
are wrongly superposed on the self.

The Māṇḍūkya indicates that there are no objects in
dream by saying that the Taijasa is conscious of what is
within (anahtraprajñāh) and enjoys what is subtle (prā-
viviktabhuj). And as in the case of Vaiśvānara, even here
the Upaniṣad teaches the non-difference of the cosmic and
the individual forms by juxtaposing the words ‘saptāṅgaḥ’
and ‘ekonaṃvīṃsatimukhaḥ’.

Dream passes into deep sleep which is its end (svapnā-
nta), where there are no distinctions whatsoever of know-
ing subject and known object, and the sleeper attains
temporary union with the prājñā ātman, the pure witness-
self. In sleep one is not conscious of what is without or
what is within. The very notions of ‘without’ and ‘within’
have no meaning then. The self is beyond desires, free from
evil, and fearless. All empirical distinctions vanish in the
state of sleep. The self is realized to be relationless.

8. The reason why Taijasa is assigned the same number of limbs and
mouths as Vaiśvānara is explained thus by René Guénon; “.... the ideal
world with which we are concerned is conceived by faculties analogically cor-
respondent with those by which the sensible world is perceived, or, if pre-
ferred, which are in principle the same faculties (since they are always the
individual faculties), but considered in another mode of existence and at
another grade of development, their activity being employed in a different
sphere. This is why Ātmā, in this state of dream, that is, as Taijasa, has the
same number of members and of mouths (or instruments of knowledge) as in
the waking state, viewed as Vaiśhvaṇa." (See Men and His Becoming,
pp. 142–3).
9. According to an alternative interpretation of the word, suggested by
Saṅkara. Chānd, VI, viii, I.
"There a father becomes not a father; a mother, not a mother; the worlds, not the worlds; the gods, not the gods; the Vedas, not the Vedas. There a thief becomes not a thief; the destroyer of an embryo, not the destroyer of an embryo; a Čaṇḍāla is not a Čaṇḍāla; a Paulkasa is not a Paulkasa; a mendicant is not a mendicant; an ascetic is not an ascetic. He is not accompanied by good; he is not accompanied by evil, for then he has crossed all sorrows of the heart."  

In that state the self sees and yet does not see. There is no seeing of objects, but sight remains. The 'sight' of the seer is never lost because it is imperishable. Just as the presence of objects is revealed by the self, their absence too is revealed by it. When it is said that in sleep there is loss of consciousness, what is meant is loss of objective consciousness. Consciousness per se neither rises nor sets. It is ever self-luminous. That the self is non-dual consciousness is evident from the experience of sleep. There is then no other besides it which it could see.

The Chāndogya gives a similar account of sleep. When a man has been completely lulled to rest, he sees no dreams, no evil troubles him, for he has become one with the luminous self (tejas)—the self which is the immortal, fearless Brahman. The Praśnopaniṣad too says that in sleep one is overpowered by tejas and so one does not see dreams, but enjoys bliss. The Kauśitaki holds that the sleeper attains union with the pāṇa. Therein speech enters with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the manas with all thoughts. All these passages agree that in sleep there is no duality. There is one undivided consciousness which is of the nature of bliss.

10. Bhā, IV, iii, 22.
11. Ibid., IV, iii, 23: na hi draṣṭa drṣṭer vipariślopi vidyate 'vināśitvāt.  
12. Ibid., na tu tād-dvitiyam asti, tato 'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyat.  
13. Chānd., VIII, vi, 3 & xi, 1.  
14. IV, 6.  
15. III, 8.  
16. Taoist doctrine: "All is one during sleep, the soul, undisturbed, is absorbed into this unity; in the waking state, diverted, it distinguishes various beings." See René Guénon, op. cit., p. 144.
The Māṇḍūkya teaches the same doctrine about the self of the sleep-state, and identifies it with Iśvara, the lord of the universe. "This is the lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the inner ruler of all. This is the source of all, the origin and end, indeed, of beings."\(^{17}\)

The three states alternate and differ from one another. But the self that underlies them is unaffected and unattached; it is one and pure. The experiences of the three states radically differ from one another. Yet one who goes through them has the intuition of sameness. One knows, "It is the same 'I' that was asleep and dreamt is now awake".\(^{18}\) As a great fish swims between the two banks of a river without touching them and not allowing itself to be swayed by the current, so does the self move between the states of waking and dream unaffected.\(^{19}\) From waking it hastens to dream, and from dream back again to the waking state. But by nothing which it sees therein is it affected. Unattached, verily, it is.\(^{20}\)

The Māṇḍūkya goes one step further than the other Upaniṣads and calls the absolute self Caturtha which is the same as Turiya in order to distinguish it from the changing states. The term 'Turiya' meaning 'fourth'\(^{21}\) is highly significant, as it serves to distinguish the self from Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, and Prajña. Vaiśvānara is the self that is all or the self that leads all creatures of the universe in diverse ways to the enjoyment of the different objects; it pertains, as we saw, to the state of waking.\(^{22}\) Taijasa is the name

20. Brh., IV, iii, 16.
21. Brh., V, xiv, 3: yad vai caturtham tat turiyam. In a verse of the Rgveda (IX, 96, 19) the phrase turiyam dhāma is used with reference to a fourth region which, according to Sāyana, is the sphere of the Moon situated above the Śūryaloka. The word 'turiya' is really short for 'caturiya.' See Vārtika on Pāṇini, vii, 51.
of the self that dreams. It is so called because in the absence of external objects, it functions as the subject, for it is of the nature of light.\textsuperscript{23} Prājña is the self of the sleep-state, which is consciousness devoid of distinctions.\textsuperscript{24} But even here ignorance persists. The conception which indicates the absolute self untouched by ignorance and its products is the Turiya. No word can express the self, and so it is indicated in a negative way by the term “the fourth” (caturtha or turiya).\textsuperscript{25} The non-absolute forms of the self, Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, and Prājña, have their own names, but not the absolute Reality which is therefore referred to as the Turiya. The Turiya is different from Vaiśvānara, etc., in the same sense in which the rope is different from the illusory snake, etc. There is no real difference, because there is no plurality. Through the negation of the appearances Scripture teaches the truth. The Turiya is not Vaiśvānara, which is conscious of external objects (na bahihprajña); it is not Taijasa which is inwardly conscious (nā 'nthaḥprajña); it is not a form of self which is aware of a state between waking and dream (no 'bhayataḥprajña); it is not the massed consciousness of the state of sleep (na prajñānaghana); it is not the cognizer of all things at the same time (na prajña); nor non-cognitive as what is inert (nā'prajña). It is unseen (adṛṣṭa), and not amenable to empirical usage (avyavahārya). It is ungraspable (agrāhya), and has no distinctive mark (ālakṣana). It is beyond the reach of thought and word (acintya, avyapadeśya). The states of experience change, but the self remains unchanging as the one essence of knowledge (ekātmapratyayasāra). In it there is no duality; it is the cessation of the pluralistic universe (prapañcopaśama). It is peaceful (śānta), auspicious (śiva), non-dual (advaita). Thus is the Turiya to be known.

\textsuperscript{23} Mem. Edn., Vol. 5, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 96.
\textsuperscript{25} The Mandūkya uses the word Caturtha and not Turiya. But since both words mean the same they are used here as synonyms.
Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, Prājña and the Turiya are described in the Manḍūkya as the four pādas of the self. There is a possibility here of misconceiving the Turiya as one of the four. So the commentator says that the four pādas are to be understood not on the analogy of the four feet of an animal but as we would understand the four parts of a coin (kārṣāpana), each lower being subsumed under the higher; and the highest would be the whole, and not any part in the proper sense of the term. The word pāda, we are told, should be interpreted in two senses. As applied to the first three non-absolute forms of self it is used in the sense of ‘instrument’. Through them the fourth is realized; hence they are called pādas. As referring to the Turiya, the term is used in the sense of ‘object’. The Turiya is what is realized or reached (padyate). 26 An analysis of the three states of experience, waking, dream, and sleep, serves to exhibit the non-duality of the Self.

III

Gauḍapāda’s Teaching in the Āgama-prakaraṇa

Gauḍapāda, who makes the Manḍūkya teaching his starting base, adds a few more details to the account of the avasthās rendered by the Upaniṣad and gives a new interpretation of the significance of the three states.

We have seen that the Manḍūkya makes a distinction in the modes of consciousness that obtain in the three states. To the three forms of Self, Viśva, 27 Taijasa and Prājña, which are different expressions of the one identical consciousness, Gauḍapāda assigns localities in the body. Viśva has its seat in the right eye. Taijasa in the mind, and Prājña in the ether of the heart. 28 The Brhadāraṇyaka names the person in the right eye Indha indirectly called Indra. 29 Śaṅkara, in his commentary, identifies this as

27. This term is substituted for Vaiśvānara in the Kārikā.
28. Gī, 1, 2.
Vaiśvānara-Ātman. It is on the authority of the Brhadāranyaka then that Gauḍapāda locates Viśva in the right eye. Though pervasive of the entire body, a special place is assigned to Viśva to facilitate meditation. The commentator says that there is excellence of perception (upalabdhipātava) through the right eye, and hence the designation of the right eye as the seat of the waking-self. The place assigned to Taijasa, the dream-self, is manas; for dreams are evolved out of impressions gathered in waking experience, and it is manas that is the recorder of impressions. When memory also ceases and sleep supervenes, the self is said to retire into the ether of the heart. The Brhadāranyaka says, “When this person full of consciousness is asleep, at that time he absorbs the functions of the organs through his consciousness and lies in the other which is in the heart”.  

Here the term ‘ether’ (ākāśa) stands for the supreme self. The meaning is that in sleep one returns to oneself. The assignment of the heart, again, is for the purpose of meditation.

The idea behind locating Viśva in the right eye, Taijasa in manas and Prājñā in the ether of the heart, is to show that all the three are to be found in the state of waking itself and also to teach their fundamental oneness. The one self is observed as three in the one body; the one alone is known as threefold.

The statement of Gauḍapāda that in the same body, Viśva, Taijasa and Prājñā are located is only a prelude to his metaphysical interpretation of the three states, jāgrat (waking), svapna (dream), and suṣupti (sleep). From the metaphysical standpoint the real wakefulness is spiritual awakening (prabodha), the so-called state of waking which is empirical is on a par with dream, and sleep is

31. GK, I, 2. tridhā dehe vyavasthitab.
32. GK, I, 1.
33. GK, I, 16.
ignorance of the self. What is as night to the ignorant is as day to the wise; and what is as day to the ignorant is as night to the wise. To the knowers of the self the world is non-real; to those who are deluded by nescience the self appears as if non-real. The latter do not see the self; they see the not-self. In later Advaita the two phrases of avidyā came to be called āvaraṇa (veiling) and vikṣepa (projecting). Due to māyā or avidyā the real self is veiled as it were and the non-real world is projected. Gauḍapāda calls these two phases tattvājñāna (non-apprehension of the real) and anyathāgrahāna (apprehension otherwise). The former, according to him, is nidrā or sleep (suṣupti), and the latter is svapna or dream. Non-apprehension of the real is the cause (kāraṇa) and misapprehension is the effect (kārya). Just as one sees the snake because the rope is not seen, the pluralistic universe is cognized because the self is not realized. Since wrong knowledge consisting in the apprehension of plurality is present in waking too, it is made of the same stuff as dream. Viśva and Taijasa are bound with both cause and effect, i.e. they are under the sway of ajñāna and its illusory projection. In the case of Prājña there is ajñāna alone. If we now correlate the three avasthās as they are commonly understood and the metaphysical sleep and dream, we shall find that in the state of waking there are both dream and sleep, viz. misapprehension and non-apprehension of the real, in the state of dream there is sleep also, and in the state of sleep there is sleep alone. The metaphysical sleep continues throughout transmigratory life. Its spell is broken only at the onset of knowledge. “When the jīva who sleeps on account of the beginningless māyā wakes up, he realizes the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-dual (Turiya)”.

The Turiya or Turya which has been explained in the words of the Māṇḍūkya is not to be confused with Prājña.

34. Gitā, II, 69.
35. GK, I, 15.
36. GK, I, 11.
37. GK, I, 16.
In the case of both there is not present the illusory manifestation of the universe. As in the Turiya, so in Prājñā there is not the distinction of ego and non-ego. But for Prājñā there is the veil of ajñāna; in the Turiya there is not. Prājñā knows neither itself nor what is other than itself, neither the true nor the untrue. In the Turiya there is no trace of ignorance; it is the light of intelligence that never fails. In it there is neither dream nor sleep; neither false knowledge nor non-knowledge. It is pure consciousness which is the non-dual and self-luminous reality.

Śaṅkara explains the illusoriness of the three states and of the manifestations of the Self therein by the illustration of the rope-trick. The magician throws up the rope in the sky, climbs up by it armed with weapons, reaches so high that he disappears from sight, and then all on a sudden he is seen to engage himself in a fight, and with his limbs severed falls to the ground and rises up again. The onlooker, though witnessing the trick, does not believe in the reality of what he sees, for he knows that it was all a mere magical show and that the magician was all the while on the ground. The manifestation of waking, dream and sleep is analogous to the rope that appears to rise up, thrown by the magician. The appearance of Viśva, Taijasa and Prājñā is like the magician’s climbing up the rope to the skies. But the real self (Turiya) has not moved nor changed, even as the trickster has not left the ground. The self is unchanging, immutable.

IV

The Teaching about the three Avasthās in the Alātasānti-prakarāṇa

Gauḍapāda teaches the same theory of the three avasthās and their transcendence in “the fourth” (Turiya)

38. GK, I, 12.
39. GK, I, 12.
40. GK, I, 14.
again in the fourth chapter, Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa, employing Bauddha terminology. Waking, dream and sleep are there called laukika, śuddha-laukika and lokottara respectively. The difference between the first two is that while in the former there are external objects (savastu), in the latter there are none (avastu); but in both there is consciousness of duality (sopalambha). In the lokottara there is neither the external world of things nor the internal world of ideas; and consequently there is no apprehension of duality. But ignorance persists. The truth is realized only when these three states are known to be non-real. By a negation of the three, the Turiya which is the non-dual reality is known.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{V}

\textit{Amplification of the Doctrine in later Advaita}

The theory of avasthās was amplified in later Advaita through a process of combinations. The \textit{Nṛsimhottaratāpānīya} Upaniṣad, for instance, distinguishes four degrees of the Turiya, viz. ota, anujñātr, anujña and avikalpa. It characterizes the states of waking, dream and sleep as gross (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma) and causal (bija) respectively, and the Turiya as the witness (sākṣi). The Turiya proper, however, is the avikalpa-Turiya. The earlier three degrees mentioned above are affected by sleep, dream and delusion,\textsuperscript{43} and hence are not the absolutely real. Ota or pervasion is the witness’s pervasion of the cause, viz. Avyākṛta or Īśvara by its nature which is saccidānanda. Anujñātr or permitter is the self in relation to Avyākṛta (cause) as its substrate. Anujñā which is permission or cognition means the realization that since the superimposed (cause) is non-different from the substrate, it is of the nature of intelligence alone.\textsuperscript{44} The avikalpa is devoid of even the least distinction. It has no substrativeness too, for there is no superimposition. It is this which is the Turiya of the \textit{Māṇḍūkyya}.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{GK}, IV, 87-89.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{NUTU}, I: susuptam svapnam māyāmātram.
\textsuperscript{44} See Vidyārānya’s Dipikā on \textit{NUTU}, Anandāśrama Edn., pp. 80-81; 86-87.
GAUDA PA 

Upaniṣadbrahmayogin takes his cue from Nṛsimhottaratāpanīya and gives four sub-divisions under each state of experience. There are thus sixteen pādas altogether of which the sixteenth alone is the absolutely real. The scheme given by him is as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jāgrat—</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>jāgrat</th>
<th>Waking—</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>waking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>svapna</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>dream</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>suṣupti</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>sleep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>turiya</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>turiya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svapna—</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>jāgrat</td>
<td>Dream—</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>waking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>svapna</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>dream</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>suṣupti</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>sleep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>turiya</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>turiya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suṣupti—</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>jāgrat</td>
<td>Sleep—</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>waking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>svapna</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>dream</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>suṣupti</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>sleep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>turiya</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>turiya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turiya—</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>jāgrat</td>
<td>Turiya—</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>waking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>svapna</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>dream</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>suṣupti</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>sleep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>turiya</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>turiya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be seen that in the above list the last alone is untainted by waking, dream or sleep. It is the Turiya-turiya, 'the fourth of the fourth' or avikalpa turiya, which is the distinctionless reality.

VI

Vyaṣṭi Samaṣṭi Correlations

The object of the inquiry into the three avaṣṭhas is to realize the nature of the Self which is constant and unchanging. This, however, will be fulfilled only when the apparent distinction between the cosmic and individual forms of the self is broken. The aim of Advaita is not to teach a doctrine of subjectivism. Reality, according to this system, is not the subject as over against objects; it is what underlies and transcends both subject and object,
The Brahman-nature of the self is to be realized, for that is the implication of the mahāvākyā ‘tat tvam asi’. As an aid to this realization the non-difference between the individual and cosmic forms of self at each level of experience is taught.

We saw that the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad juxtaposes the words ‘saptāṅgah’ and ‘ekonavimśatimukhaḥ’ in its description of Vaiśvānara and Taijasa, the self in waking and dream respectively; and it characterizes the Prājñā-self as the lord of all (sarveśvara). With a view to teach the same doctrine of identity as between the cosmic (samaṣṭi or adhidaiva) and the individual (vyaṣṭi or adhyātma) manifestations of the self, Gauḍapāda attributes all-pervasive-ness (vibhutva) to Viśva which is his name for the waking-self, and discusses different theories of creation in connection with the nature of Prājñā. When the Turiya is reached, there is no need for an equation because there the distinction between the individual and the cosmic being disappears.

The following table gives an account of the equations found in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Kārikā:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mātrās Of Om</th>
<th>Pādas of Self (individual)</th>
<th>Pādas of Self (cosmic)</th>
<th>State (avasthā)</th>
<th>Consciousness (prājñā)</th>
<th>Enjoyment (bhoga)</th>
<th>Contentment (trṛti)</th>
<th>Place for meditation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Vaiśvānara-Viśva (with 19 mouths)</td>
<td>Vaiśvānara-Viśva (with 7 limbs)</td>
<td>waking</td>
<td>outer</td>
<td>gross</td>
<td>gross</td>
<td>right eye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Taijasa (with 19 mouths)</td>
<td>Taijasa (with 7 limbs)</td>
<td>dream</td>
<td>inner</td>
<td>subtle</td>
<td>subtle</td>
<td>manas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Prājñā (with intelligence as mouth)</td>
<td>Sarveśvara</td>
<td>sleep</td>
<td>enmassed consciousness</td>
<td>happiness</td>
<td>happiness</td>
<td>ether of the heart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amātra-Turiya-Ātman-Brahman

There is some vagueness about the terms used in the Māṇḍūkya and by Gauḍapāda. ‘Vaiśvānara’ and ‘Viśva’ are used to signify both the cosmic and the individual manifes-
tations of the self. Similarly 'Taijasa'. In later Advaita a fixed terminology was evolved. The individual forms of the self are called: Viśva (waking), Taijasa (dream), and Prājña (sleep); the cosmic forms are called: Vaiśvānara (gross), Sūtrātman (subtle) and Īśvara (cause). The bodies that serve as the limiting adjuncts of the three individual forms are: gross (sthūla), subtle (sūkṣma) and causal (kāraṇa-jñāna); the corresponding adjuncts of the cosmic forms are: Virāj (gross universe), Hīranyaagarbha (subtle-universe), and Avyākṛta (the unmanifest cause māyā). The equations that are struck in later Advaita are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Cosmic Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jāgrat-Jāgrat:</td>
<td>Viśva-Viśva:</td>
<td>Virāj-Virāj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jagrāt-Svapna:</td>
<td>Viśva-Taijasa:</td>
<td>Virāj-Hīranyaagarbha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jāgrat-Suṣupti:</td>
<td>Viśva-Prājña:</td>
<td>Virāj-Avyākṛta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jāgrat-Turiya:</td>
<td>Viśva-Turiya:</td>
<td>Virāj-Turiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svapna-Jāgrat:</td>
<td>Taijasa-Viśva:</td>
<td>Hīranyaagarbha-Virāj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svapna-Svapna:</td>
<td>Taijasa-Taijasa:</td>
<td>Hīranyaagarbha-Hīranyaagarbha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svapna-Suṣupti:</td>
<td>Taijasa-Prājña:</td>
<td>Hīranyaagarbha-Avyākṛta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svapna-Turiya:</td>
<td>Taijasa-Turiya:</td>
<td>Hīranyaagarbha-Turiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suṣupti-Jāgrat:</td>
<td>Prājña-Viśva:</td>
<td>Avyākṛta-Virāj</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In keeping with his scheme of sixteen pādas, Upaniṣad-brahmayogin has a longer list of equations: —
THE TRIPLE STREAM OF EXPERIENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Cosmic Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(10) Susupti-Svapna</td>
<td>Prajna-Taijasa</td>
<td>Avyakrta-Hiranya-garbha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Susupti-Susupti</td>
<td>Prajna-Prajna:</td>
<td>Avyakrta-Avyakrta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Susupti-Turiya</td>
<td>Prajna-Turiya:</td>
<td>Avyakrta-Turiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) Turiya-Jagarat</td>
<td>Turiya-Visha:</td>
<td>Turiya-Viraj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Turiya-svapna</td>
<td>Turiya-Taijasa:</td>
<td>Turiya-Hiranya-garbha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) Turiya-Susupti</td>
<td>Turiya-Prajna:</td>
<td>Turiya-Avyakrta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16) Turiya-Turiya</td>
<td>Turiya-Turiya:</td>
<td>Turiya-Turiya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Be the list longer or shorter, the meaning is the same. It is this. An analysis of the three states through which we pass and re-pass reveals that we are the self which alone is constant while the appearances vary; and the knowledge that results from the Vedanta is that the self is Brahman (ayam atmabrahma). The purport of the Mandukya and the Agama-prakarana is beautifully expressed in the first invocatory verse which reads: "I bow to that supreme, immortal, unborn Brahman, which after having enjoyed gross objects by pervading the worlds by the expansive rays of intelligence which are capable of pervading the collocation of the stationary and moving things, and again (after enjoying) what are born of desire and manifested by the intellect, sleeps having drunk all particulars (i.e. having resolved within itself the gross and subtle objects) and enjoying what is sweet (i.e., happiness), makes us enjoy (the same) through maya, and which is (called) the 'fourth' in terms of the category of number which is (also) maya."45 The Turiya is the non-dual Brahman. On ac-

45. Anandagiri attributes this verse to the commentator, Saṅkara. But he observes that according to some this sloka was written by Gaudapada himself.

G. 14
count of māyā it appears as the experient in the states of waking and dream and as the blissful experience of sleep. These latter alternate and pass away, while the Turiya remains constant. It is the changeless in the midst of change, the still point of the turning world.

46. In a different context Sir James Baillie observes, "It would be generally agreed that in religious experience the Reality of which the religious consciousness is aware and to which it stands in relation is the changeless in all change, the permanent in all transitoriness, the eternal in the temporal." Spiritual Religion (George Allen & Unwin, 1940), p. 9.

47. See T. S. Elliot, Burnt Norton.

'After the kingfisher's wing
Has answered light to light, and is silent,
the light is still
At the still point of the turning world.'
CHAPTER V

NON-DUALITY

I

The Turiya is non-dual Reality

An analysis of the three avasthās has revealed the non-dual, unchanging Reality (Turiya) which underlies the changing states of experience. The Mandukya Upanishad calls it ‘the fourth’ (Caturtha). As we said, it is not one in addition to or over and above the three forms of self that appear in waking, dream, and sleep. It is the one reality of which they are appearances. Since it is not a finite entity or one of the eaches, it cannot be designated or described in positive terms. Words for the most part have to be contented with indicating the real indirectly, by saying what it is not. It is the cessation of the world, quiescent, blissful and non-dual. It is the self which is Brahman. Scripture refers to it by the mystic sound ‘Om’.

In the Āgama-prakaraṇa, Gauḍapāda expounds the doctrine of the Turiya, as we saw, closely following the teaching of the Upaniṣad. The one alone is known as three, says Gauḍapāda.1 Viśva, Taijasa, and Prajña appear as different from one another. But the self of which they are illusory manifestations is one and the same. In it these triple forms which are responsible for misery cease. Of all things it is without a second, the shining one, the all-pervading Turiya.2 It is the unborn non-dual self, unsmitten by sleep and dream.3 The world of duality is mere illusion; in absolute truth there is but non-duality.

1. I. I, 1; eka eva tridhā smṛtaḥ.
2. I. 10; advaitah sarva-bhāvānam devas turyo vibhuh smṛtaḥ.
3. I. 16; ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam.
If there is only one reality without a second, it may be urged, how can it be taught or understood, for teaching requires the distinction between the teacher and the taught? The reply is: it is true, without the said distinction there cannot be any teaching. But this distinction, as all distinction, is not real, and is within the sphere of māyā. When the reality is known, however, there is no duality. The Turiya-Ātman which is the non-dual reality is called pranava, i.e., Oṃkāra. It is Brahman, the fearless. Fear arises only where there is another. Where there is no other, fear cannot be. So, advaita is abhaya; non-duality is fearlessness. There is neither a before nor an after to the supreme Brahman. There is nothing different from it, and none whatever outside it. It is the beginning, middle, and end of all. It is imperishable bliss, eternal light.

II

Non-duality: the Evidence of Scripture

That non-duality alone is real and duality non-real or illusory, Gauḍapāda, seeks to show by quoting or referring to scriptural passages. Non-difference is praised by Scripture, says Gauḍapāda, and plurality is denounced. In this context Śaṅkara, the commentator, cites the following passages: “But, then, there is no second, nothing else different from it (the seer-self) that it could see”; “Verily, fear arises only from a second”; “When, indeed, he makes but the smallest distinction in it (the self), there is fear for him”; “All this is verily the self”; “He who sees any difference here goes from death to death.” From the praise

5. I, 25—27.
8. Ibid, I, iv, 2.
11. Katha, IV, 10; Brh. IV, iv, 19.
of non-difference and the denunciation of plurality, we learn, as Ānandagiri observes, that, while the former is the purport of Scripture, the latter is not acceptable to it.12

In kārikā III. 12, Gauḍapāda makes mention of a section of the Brhadāranyaka (II, v), viṣ, madhu-brāhmaṇa or madhu-vidyā, and says that in it the supreme Brahman is taught. The purport of this section, as we saw, is to analyse the world within and the world without and to show that the same effulgent, immortal puruṣa pervades all things. Each phenomenon of the objective universe has its counterpart in the individual. For instance, corresponding to the earth, there is the body or stomach.13 Though these adjuncts differ, the self is the same, according to the Upaniṣad. The things, both cosmic and individual, are to be resolved in the non-dual self. These are illusorily posited by avidyā, as Śankara observes, like the reflections of the single moon in water (jalacandrabat).14 Gauḍapāda’s object in citing the madhu-vidyā, then, is to teach that the purport of Scripture is non-duality. Among the texts condemning plurality quoted by him is to be found the well-known Brhadāranyaka passage, “There is no plurality whatever here.”15

Not all scriptural texts, however, are declarative of non-duality. In several passages of Scripture the creation of the universe is taught as also the existence of a plurality of things. Scripture, therefore, speaks with a double voice as it were. But which voice are we to listen to—the one which denies difference or that which affirms it? In the sections dealing with ritual (karma-kāṇḍa) the Veda

13. It is interesting to note that in the place of the word ‘śarira’ (body) of the original, Gauḍapāda has ‘udāram’ (stomach). He also speaks of ‘ākāśa’ (ether) in the verse, as the example.
assumes the pluralistic universe. Even in the final portions of the Veda known as the Upaniṣads (jñāna-kāṇḍa) there are passages which describe the creation of the world alongside those texts which speak of the non-dual Brahman. How is one to determine the true import of Scripture?

The answer given by the teachers of Advaita is that the bheda-vākyas (texts declaring difference) are to be interpreted in a figurative sense. "The difference of jīva and Ātman before creation (prāg utpatteḥ), which is declared (in texts)," says Gauḍapāda, "is figurative (gaṇa), having regard to what is to come (bhaviṣyadvṛttyā); its primary sense does not, indeed, stand to reason." Śaṅkara interprets Gaudapāda’s words just quoted as follows: The objector might say that śruti itself declares the separateness of the jīva and the supreme self in the karma-kāṇḍa which precedes the Upaniṣadic texts declarative of creation. When thus there is conflict between the passages of the karma-kāṇḍa and those of the jñāna-kāṇḍa, what is the rationale, he might ask, of accepting only the oneness which is the sense of the latter? The reply of the siddhāntin is that the separateness declared in the karma-kāṇḍa is not finally true. It is only figurative like the difference of ether at large and pot-ether, etc. This is as we say 'he cooks food', having regard to what is to result. In the Upaniṣads, however, in the text declarative of creation, resolution, etc., the oneness alone of the jīva and the supreme self is sought to be maintained. Hence in view of what is to be declared in the Upaniṣads by Śruti, viz., oneness, the re-statement of the pluralistic point of view is but figurative. Or, says Śaṅkara, the meaning of the kārikā may be construed as follows: In the Upaniṣads there are certain texts dealing with creation: 'It thought', 'It created light', etc. Prior to these texts, oneness is declared in 'One only without a second', etc; and afterwards also oneness is proclaimed in

'That is the true, that is the self, that thou art.' In view of this, the separateness which is understood from some stray texts in the middle should be regarded as figurative, like the statement 'he cooks food.'

The difference between the two interpretations offered by Śaṅkara is this. According to the first, the conflict is between karma-kāṇḍa and jñāna-kāṇḍa. According to the second, it is between different portions of the jñāna-kāṇḍa itself. The solution suggested, however, is the same, i.e., the texts that speak of difference should not be understood in the literal sense; they are figurative statements. The primary sense of difference for the bheda vākyas does not stand to reason, observes Śaṅkara, for those vākyas are but re-statements of the pluralistic view of creatures that are under the natural spell of avidyā.17 The final purport, then, belongs only to the non-dual texts. Lower than these in value are the creation-texts of the Upaniṣads; and still lower is the karma-kāṇḍa.

Śaṅkara gives in his commentary, as we have seen, two illustrations of figurative usage—the difference of ether at large and pot-ether, etc., and the statement 'He cooks food.' There is no real difference in ether which is the same all over. The difference is conditioned by adjuncts like pot, etc. Hence it is figurative. In the statement 'He cooks food', the word 'food' does not mean food in the primary sense, but the rice-grains which are cooked and become food when cooked. So the rice-grains are called food, figuratively. Similarly, the preliminary declaration18 of the difference of the jīva and the supreme self made by Scripture is also


18. 'prāg-utpatteḥ' is understood to mean 'in the karma-kāṇḍa' by Śaṅkara. It means, according to him, 'prior to the creation-texts of the Upaniṣads,' i.e., karma-kāṇḍa. Ānandagiri takes 'utpatti' to mean 'vyutpatti', i.e., true knowledge (sanyag-jñāna), and arrives at the same meaning: prior to the Upaniṣads which teach true knowledge.
figurative, because of the subsequent declaration of non-difference. The point of the analogy is this: the difference of jīva and self is figurative even as the difference of ether is or the usage of the word 'food' to mean rice-grains is.\textsuperscript{19}

The scriptural declaration of difference is figurative because it is not novel, being repetitive of what is found in ordinary experience, and it is not what is desired as human end. The words that declare a sense that is neither novel nor fruitful cannot be purportful. As between sentences which are purportful and those which are not, the former are of superior value. The texts which teach non-duality are purportful because non-duality is novel, not being attainable through any other pramāṇa, and it is the supreme human goal as well.

Even the creation-texts become purportful only as indicating non-duality indirectly, and not as teaching creation. Says Gauḍapāda, "The creation which is urged in different modes with the illustrations of clay, metal, sparks, etc., is only a means of introducing (the truth of non-difference). In no way is there any difference.\textsuperscript{20}"

Commenting on this kārikā, Śaṅkara cites the Upaniṣadic story of the demons piercing speech, etc., with evil, as an example of a figurative statement. This story is related in the \textit{Brhadāraṇyaka}\textsuperscript{21} and in the \textit{Chāndogya}\textsuperscript{22} with some variations. According to the former account, there was rivalry between the devas and asuras, the two sets of descendants of Prajāpati. The gods who were fewer than the demons sought to overcome their adversaries by means of the \textit{udgītha}. They first asked speech\textsuperscript{23} (vāk) to sing the

\textsuperscript{19} To read more into the analogy does not seem to be proper here. For a discussion of the difficulty in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Kārikā in question, see \textit{JORM}, Vol. XIII, pt. II, pp. 105-6.

\textsuperscript{20} III, 15.

\textsuperscript{21} I, iii.

\textsuperscript{22} I, ii.

\textsuperscript{23} Here the deity which presides over speech. The same is the case with the other sense organs.
udgītha for them. Speech sang, but in doing so it was not free from selfishness. Hence it easily fell a prey to the demons who pierced it with evil. The result was that the gods were foiled in their attempt to excel their rivals. The nose was the next to be asked to sing. The same thing happened with regard to it also. The eye, the ear, and the mind were tried in sequence; and all of them were pierced with evil by the demons. At last came the turn of the breath in the mouth (āsanya prāṇa). 24 ‘Do thou sing for us’, said the gods. ‘Yes’, said the breath, and sang. The asuras rushed at it and wanted to pierce it with evil. But as a clod of earth, striking against a rock, will be shattered, so were the demons shattered, flung in all directions. Hence the devas rose and the asuras fell. In the Chāndogya the same story appears, but with some changes, the important of them being that here the sense-organs (their deities) are meditated upon as the udgītha by the gods, and not asked to sing the udgītha. The point which Śaṅkara urges with reference to this story is that it should not be literally understood. It is not a narrative of what actually happened. If it were, the difference between the Brāhāranyaka and the Chāndogya accounts of the story is unintelligible. Moreover, when the Brāhāranyaka says that speech sang, the nose sang, and so on, the statements cannot be literally true. The story is an allegory intended to teach that Prāṇa (breath) is to be meditated on because it is pure (unsmitten by evil), while speech, etc., which are impure are not fit objects of mediation. 25

Reference to another episode concerning Prāṇa may be noticed in the word ‘prāṇasamvāda’ used by Śaṅkara in his commentary on kārikā, III. 15. In several texts of Scripture this episode is narrated. The five senses, viz., speech, the eye, the ear, the mind and Prāṇa, quarrelled among themselves as to who was superior. They went to Prajāpati,

24. This is called ‘mukhya prāṇa’ in the Chāndogya, I, ii, 7.
their father, and asked him to settle their dispute. They said, "Sir, who is the best of us?" Prajāpati replied, "He by whose departure the body seems worse than worst, he is the best of you." Then the senses experimented by each departing at a time. When speech went out, nothing happened to the body except that it remained speechless. Similarly, when the eye, the ear and the mind departed, the body suffered only to the extent that the absence of the particular functionary concerned entailed. But when Prāṇa was about to depart, it tore up the other senses, as a horse, going to start, might tear up the pegs to which he is tethered. At this, the other senses got alarmed, gathered round Prāṇa and said, "You are the best among us. Do not depart from us!" The purpose of the present episode is the same as that of the story already narrated. The conversation among the senses is purely imaginary, its object being to teach the superiority of Prāṇa to the other sense-organs. And so, to read a literal meaning into scriptural texts is not reasonable.

The creation-texts are in the same category as the parables cited above. They are figurative, being re-statements of what we believe in as a result of avidyā. And they also serve the purpose of introducing the texts which declare non-duality. Thus there is no real conflict between the passages that speak of difference and those that proclaim non-difference. The purport of Scripture is abheda or advaita.

III

The Illusoriness of the World on the Analogy of Dream

Non-duality has the support not only of Scripture but also of logic. The apparent stumbling block in the way of recognizing the ultimate reality of the non-dual spirit is the

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26. The episode here related is as it is found in the Chāndogya, V, i. The Brhadāranyaka, IV, i, 1-14, gives also an identical account. For other versions see Kauṭitaki, II, 14, Praśna, II, 4, and Ait. Ar. II, 1, 4.
pluralistic universe that confronts us in our waking life. Most people would agree that from the standpoint of waking the objects seen in a dream are illusory. But when they are told that the things of the waking world are in the same predicament as those of dream, they naturally recoil because they are habituated to a mono-basic view of life, i.e., measuring life by the sole standard of waking experience. The task of the philosopher, however, is not to play to the gallery, and provide a justification for the common man’s point of view. His mission is to see the truth and make others see it. When this is borne in mind, the Advaitin’s position will be appreciated. He does not deny the fact that we who are under the sway of avidyā take the world of waking to be real. But this view is wrong, according to him. And his aim is to make us realize that the world which we regard as all too real is only ‘such stuff as dreams are made on’, and that the non-dual spirit alone is real.

In the Vaitathya and Alātasānti-prakaranaś Gauḍapāda establishes the non-reality of our pluralistic universe on the analogy of the dream-world. He starts with the premise that the objects seen in dream are illusory. The dreamer sees things like the mountain and the elephant in his phantasy. But judged by the measure of waking space, these, had they been real, must have been present within the body, which is impossible. How could the huge objects seen in dream be contained within the confined space of the body? If any location could be assigned to the dream-contents from the standpoint of waking, it must be the body. But the absurdity in assigning a limited space to things that cannot be contained in it is too patent to require any explanation.27 It may be held that the dreamer sees things not within the body but in their respective places as he would see them in waking. But such a contention will not bear a moment’s scrutiny. In a trice of waking time one may

27. GK, II, 1: IV, 33.
travel far and wide in dream. If one were really to go to those places, it would take a long time. And moreover if the dreamer actually goes to the place of which he dreamed, he must wake up there and not at the place where he had been sleeping.\textsuperscript{28} The dreams do not conform to the laws of space and time which govern the waking world. In a dream that lasts but for a few moments, one might imagine to have lived through centuries or gone round the world many times over. The things experienced in dream are not real for the reason that they are not seen on waking. One might dream of friends and talking with them; but when the dream spell is broken one does not find them. The things that the dreamer might receive in his dream he does not see to remain in his possession when he wakes.\textsuperscript{29} The body which appears to roam about in dream is unreal, because distinct from it there is another body seen in the place where the dreamer lies. The dream-body is really a figment of the mind. As is the body, so are all the objects perceived in dream illusory. It may be laid down as a rule, then, that whatever is seen by the mind is void of reality.\textsuperscript{30} "There are no chariots there, no spans, no roads," says the Brhadāraṇyaka; the dreamer projects these and experiences them. Therefore, it stands to reason that they should be characterized as illusory.\textsuperscript{31} The dream-objects are on a par with the contents of erroneous experience in waking life. One might mistake a rope for a snake. So long as the error lasts, one imagines that the snake is real. But when right knowledge supervenes, the illusoriness of the snake that appeared is realized. Similar is the case with the world of dreams. As long as one is in it, one does not doubt its reality. But when one comes out of the charmed circle, its non-reality is easily recognized.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{28} GK, II, 2; IV, 34.
\textsuperscript{29} GK, IV, 35.
\textsuperscript{30} GK, IV, 36: sarvam citta-dṛṣyaṃ avastukam.
\textsuperscript{31} GK, II, 3: Brh., IV, iii, 10.
\textsuperscript{32} GK, IV, 41.
In several respects the world of waking is similar to that of dream. The objects of waking are perceived as the dream-contents are; and whatever is perceived is illusory. Śaṅkara puts the argument in the form of a five-membered syllogism: the things seen in waking are illusory (pratijñā); because they are seen (hetu); like the things seen in dream (drṣṭānta); as in dream there is illusoriness for the things seen, so even in waking the characteristic of being seen is the same (hetūpanaya); therefore, even in waking the illusoriness of things is declared (nigamana). Another reason for classing the world of waking with the contents of dream is that it is also evanescent. What is non-existent in the beginning and at the end, is so even in the present. That is real which is not conditioned by time. Per contra that which is conditioned by time cannot be real. Just as the dream-objects are experienced in dream alone, neither before nor after, even so the objects of waking are experienced in the state of waking alone.

A difference between the two states cannot be made out on the ground that, while the objects experienced in waking are practically efficient, those seen in dream are not; for even the objects of waking experience are fruitful in practice only in that state and not in dream; and the dream-objects are useful in their own way in the state of dream. It is true that the dream-water cannot quench actual thirst. But it is equally true that the so-called actual water cannot quench the dream-thirst. A man may eat and drink and feel quite satisfied in his waking state. But at the next moment he may go to sleep and dream that he is racked with hunger and thirst and feel as if he had not had food and drink for days and nights. The contrary may also happen. A man satiated with food and drink in dream may find

33. Commentary on GK, II, 4.
34. GK, II, 6; IV, 31: ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne'pi tat tathā.
35. Anandagiri puts the argument thus: What is in dispute (viz., the world of waking) is illusory, because it has a beginning and an end, like dream, etc. What has a beginning and an end is illusory, like mirage etc.
himself, on waking, extremely hungry and thirsty. Thus it cannot be said that the things of the waking world alone are fruitful or practically efficient. If they 'work' in waking the dream-contents 'work' in dream.  

It may be argued that, since the contents of dream are quite different from the objects of waking, they cannot constitute the illustration for proving the illusoriness of the waking world. The dream-contents are strange and abnormal, and are not the replica of what are experienced in waking. One may dream, for instance, as a person endowed with eight arms and seated on a elephant with four tusks. Even stranger things are not uncommon in dream. With perfect equanimity the dreamer may watch the dismemberment of his own head. Such wierd phenomena are nowhere to be found in the waking world. Hence, it is unsound, so the argument concludes, to compare the objects of waking with the contents of dream and say that both are unreal. The objection, however, is not a valid one. It has been said that the things seen in dream are strange and abnormal. But when and to whom do they appear abnormal? To him who has returned to waking after a dream. In the dream state itself the contents are not realized to be strange. It is from the side of waking that the dream-contents seem abnormal; but in themselves they are quite normal. The denizens of heaven are said to be endowed 

36. Prof. V. Bhattacharya reads: saprayojanat ā teśam svāpne'pi pratipadyate instead of svāpne viprati-padyate, and translates the passage thus: 'that the things have some purpose also in dream is known.'

See Āś, pp. 19-20; GK, II, 7; IV, 32.

37. See J. A. C. Murray, B.D.: An Introduction to a Christian Psycho-Therapy (T. & T. Clark), p. 252: Waking consciousness is, after all, a limited affair, narrowed by the immediacies of the five senses, and concentrated at every moment on but one moving point. In dreams, we seem to enter a wider kingdom freed from the fears and restraints of normal life, a field where earthly forces and laws are set at naught, and where the whole immensity of the sub-conscious can have freer speech, and like a rising tide, submerge the petty logics of our daily life.
with peculiar features which to us are all abnormal. Indra, for example, is supposed to have a thousand eyes. Such characteristics belong to individuals by virtue of the positions they occupy. The strangeness of the contents of dream is to be explained in the same way. Just as a traveller who is well-instructed goes to a place and sees there strange things which are but natural to that place, so the dreamer transported as he is to the dream-world experiences strange things. Each state or circumstance has its own peculiarity. But that cannot prevent comparison of the waking-world with the contents of dream.  

That there is an essential similarity between the contents of dream and the objects of waking may be shown by a closer scrutiny of the two states. In the state of dream, the dreamer imagines certain ideas within himself and sees certain things outside; and he believes that, while the former are unreal, the latter are real. But as soon as he wakes from the dream, he realizes the unreality of even the things which he saw in dream as if outside. Similarly in waking, we have our fancies which we know to be unreal, and we experience facts which we take to be real. But when the delusion of duality is dispelled, the so-called facts of the external world will turn out to be illusory appearances. In dream as well as in waking it is the mind that moves impelled by māyā, and creates the appearance of plurality. As identical with the self the mind is non-dual; but owing to nescience duality is figured and there is the consequent samsāra.

The empirical difference between waking and dream is not denied by Gauḍapāda. From the standpoint of waking

38. GK, II, 8; and Śāṅkara’s commentary.
39. See F. H. Bradley’s Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 46: “In madness or drunkenness we have the distinction of imaginary from real, and the distinction seems here to be as good as elsewhere. Nay even in dream I may construct another world which is the environment of my dream-body and may oppose to this reality a mere imaginary world.”
40. GK, II, 9–10.
the dream occurrences seem to take place within the body in the small confined space, while the objects of waking experience appear to belong to the external world.\textsuperscript{42} The contents of dream, being related to the mind alone, are unmanifest (avyakta); while the objects of waking, which are related to the outer sense-organs also, are manifest (sphuta). The difference between the two is that while in the experience of the former the external senses are inactive, in the cognition of the latter they function.\textsuperscript{43} A further distinction is that while the dream-contents last only till the mind of the dreamer imagines them (cittakālāḥ), the objects of the external world extend to two points in time (dvayakālāḥ), i.e., they are recognized by the man who has woken up from a dream or sleep as the same as what he had experienced before.\textsuperscript{44}

Though there is the aforesaid difference between dream and waking, from the metaphysical point of view both are the same.\textsuperscript{45} The states of dream and waking are one, say

\textsuperscript{42} Śaṅkara writes in the commentary on G\textsuperscript{K}, II, 4: antahsthānāt samyrtat-vena ca svapnadṛśyānām bhāvānām jāgrat-drāyebhya bhedāḥ.

Prof. V. Bhattacharya reads samyṛtātvena na bhidyate instead of samyṛtātvena bhidyate, and translates the second line of the kārikā thus: as there (i.e., in waking) so in a dream the state of being enclosed does not differ. See ĀŚ, p. 17. This rendering may be all right if we assume, as Prof. Bhattacharya does, that Gaudapāda advocates a form of Viśṇuavāda.

\textsuperscript{43} G\textsuperscript{K}, II, 15: viśeṣastvindriyāntare.

\textsuperscript{44} G\textsuperscript{K}, II, 14 Aṇandagīrī calls the dream-contents kalpanākālābhāvino bhāvāḥ, and the objects of waking pratyabhijñāyamāṇatvena pūrvoparākālābhāvino.

'Here we are all by day; by night we're hurl'd
By dreams each one into a sev'ral world.'

—Robert Herrick.

\textsuperscript{45} Read in this connection F. H. Bradley's \textit{Essays on Truth and Reality}, Ch. XVI, On My Real World. He writes:

"In what sense then (we may ask once more), and how far are we justified when we regard such states as dream and madness irrational and take their deliverance as unreal We believe in the first place their content to be more narrow and less consistent; and within our actual knowledge that belief (we have seen) is, to speak in general, correct. Such a conclusion on the other hand, even so far as it goes, we must remember, is ex parte. It rests on the mere assumption that our waking world has a sole or superior reality. Again what we call 'abnormal' states lead in general, we find, to isolation and destruction. Between dream bodies, for example, we can discover no cooperation, and these bodies seem in relation with no common environment. Now that, to speak in general, they have no working connexion with our environment must be admitted. On the other hand to conclude
the wise. 46 The objects of waking as well as the contents of dream are posited through māyā. 47 So the characteristic of being perceived and non-reality are common to both. 48 Since the experience of dream is like that of waking, the latter is considered to be the cause of dream. Now, dream which is the effect is illusory; and it must logically follow that waking, the cause, is of the same nature as the effect. It is only to the dreamer, i.e., to the one who is under the spell of illusion that waking appears to be real. In the state of waking one sees what is unreal, and being absorbed in it, sees the same in dream also. In dream too one sees what is unreal, but on waking does not see it. The state of waking is said to be the cause of dream only in the sense that to it may be traced the contents of dream. There is no absolute causality for waking. In both the states what is seen is unreal. 49

If the things seen in dream and those experienced in waking are unreal, what else is real? Is there anyone that sees them? Is that one real or not? Is there any reality

that these bodies have no world of their own and are everywhere isolated, each from all others, goes (we saw) beyond our knowledge. But judgment once more here is simply ex parte. We are resting throughout on the assumption that our real world of fact is the one reality.

Read also the following footnote in the same work on p. 48: "It is useless to insist that my real world is real because it is the world where we all meet really through the real connexions of our real bodies. For, as was remarked above, in my dreams my own dream-body possesses its world of things and of other persons; and this order of things, while I dream, is real to myself. Nay an indefinite number of persons might, for all we know, dream a world of identical contexts, in which each with a difference occupied his proper place. And if you ask for the criterion by which to decide between my dreamt and my waking worlds, something more is required than mere arbitrary choice. You are led in the end to find that the superiority of my waking world lies in its character, in the greater order and system which it possesses and effects. But, with this, the hard division has turned into a question of degree, and this question once raised will tend to carry us still further."

46. GK, II, 5:
svapna-jāgaritē sthāne hy ekam āhur manāśināh
An ancient Chinese sage said: "Last night I dreamt that I was a butterfly and now I do not know whether I am a man dreaming that he is a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he is a man."

47. GK, II, 14–15:
kalpitā eva te sarve.

48. See Śāṅkara’s Commentary on GK, II, 4: dṛṣṭayataṁ asatyataṁ ca vāśiṣṭam ubhayatra.

49. GK, IV, 37–39.

G. 16
at all? Or is there none whatsoever? The reply to these questions is that the substrate of delusion, the self, cannot be unreal. The denial of self is impossible, for the one who denies is of the very nature of the self. It is the self that posits through māyā the dream-contents as well as the external world. The things created in the mind within and those posited in the world without—both these are the illusory imaginations of the Ātman. This is the settled view of Vedānta, declares Gauḍapāda. The dreamer moves about in dream in various directions and sees beings of all kinds which are really non-different from the dreamer’s mind. So also in waking, the different things that are experienced are non-different from the mind that is awake. The variety that is seen in these states is illusory, as it is conditioned by māyā. The non-dual self alone is real.

IV

Other Illustrations

So far we have been dealing with the analogy of dream-experience with a view to show that the world of waking also is non-real or illusory. But illustrations of illusoriness are to be found even in the state of waking. Just as in the dark a rope which is not determinately known is imagined to be a snake or a streak of water, the self is imagined to be the world through nescience. And, as when the rope is known as rope, the posited snake, etc., vanish, so also when the self is known as the non-dual reality, the pluralistic world disappears. Like the Palace City of Fairy Morgana

50. GK, II, 11.
51. See Anandagiri’s tīkā on GK, II, 111.
   ātma-nirākaraṇasya duśkaratvān nirākartur evā 'tmatvād ity arthaḥ.
52. GK, II, 12.
53. GK, IV, 63—66.
54. GK, II, 17—18.
(gandharvanagara), with its realistic mansions and markets, busy streets and hurrying citizens, the universe is seen in all its variety but is not real. The things of the world are believed to exist because they are perceived (upalam-bhāt) and because they answer to certain practical needs (samācārāt). But these two reasons cannot make them real; for even the objects like the elephant conjured up by the necromancer are observed and are pracitcally efficient but are not real. One more illustration Gauḍapāda gives in the fourth chapter, viz., the alāta or fire-brand. When a fire-brand is moved, it appears to be straight or crooked, and so on; and when the movement stops, the appearances vanish. They do not really come from the fire-brand in motion, nor do they enter into it when it comes to rest. The patterns of fire that appear with the movement of the fire-brand are illusory; they have no substance whatsoever. Similarly, consciousness appears in manifold forms due to māyā. These do not come out of it, in reality, nor do they return to it; for they are naught. The sole reality is the non-moving or unchanging (acala) pure-consciousness (śuddha-vijñaptimātra).

V

Various Views of Reality

There are several ontological notions prevalent among the followers of the different systems of thought. Gauḍapāda mentions some of them without entering into any discussion. Thirty-five views are on the whole noticed. But not all of them are philosophical views, as popular notions

55. See The Mirage of Life by W. Haig Miller, p. 4:
   'In particular climates, at certain seasons of the year, there are seen in the ocean and the sky representations of cities, groves, mountains, rivers, spacious plains, castles, arches, and rows of superb pilasters. Like some splendid phantasmagoria, they fill the spectator with astonishment and delight, then vanish into air, or assume, with the rapidity of a kaleidoscope, new combinations, even more astonishing and beautiful than those which preceded them.'

56. GK, II, 31.
57. GK, IV, 44.
58. GK, IV, 47—52.
have also been included in the list. There is not any single *fundamentum divisionis* followed. Gauḍapāda does not seem to be interested either in any exhaustive enumeration of the erroneous views or in arranging them according to some intelligible order. He mentions them as they occur to him and as perhaps the exigencies of versification would allow, only to show that they are all rooted in nescience. We shall notice these views below and identify them with the help of Ānandagiri’s gloss.59

(1) The Lokāyatas who are Materialists consider the elements (bhūtas) to be the ultimate realities. According to them, there are four elements, earth, water, fire and air; these alone are real. (2) In the view of Vātsyāyana and others, the final realities are the objects (viṣayās,) sound, etc., which are experiencibles. (3) The cooks (sūpakāras) think that reality is what is enjoyed (bhojya). (4) The Paurāṇikas believe that reality consists of the three worlds (lokas: bhūḥ, bhuvah and svāḥ). (5) Those who know the cosmos say that there are fourteen worlds (bhuvanas). (6) The worldly people think that pleasing the world (lokānurañjana) is the only thing that counts. (7) Some Paurāṇikas assert that creation (sṛṣṭi) is reality. (8) Others declare that sustentation (sthiti) is real. (9) Still others, dissolution (laya). (10) A section of Lokāyatas believes that the gross body (sthūla) is the self. (11) Some are of the view that reality is subtle (sūkṣma), of the size of an atom. (12) Time, according to the astronomers, is the ultimate. (13) The *svarodayavids*, i.e., those who discern omens by voices of birds, etc., characterize the cardinal directions (dik) as real. (14) According to the Sāṅkhyaś, the three guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas, which are the

59. As is usual with Śaṅkara to pass over unimportant passages, he does not comment on the kārikās which give the list of the views.

60. The order in which the theories are noticed here is different from the one found in the Kārikā.

61. Ānandagiri calls them bhuvanakośavids, and Upaniṣad-brahma-yogin calls them bhūgolavids.
Non-Duality

The constituents of Prakṛti, form the stuff of the universe. (15) The Puruṣa (soul), they say, is not an agent (kartr) but only an enjoyer (bhoktr). (16) They also hold that the principles or tattvas are twenty five in number: 1. prakṛti, 2. mahat or buddhi, 3. ahaṅkāra, 4—8. five tanmātras (subtle elements), 9. manas, 10—14. five jñānendriyas (cognitive senses), 15—19. five karmendriyas (conative senses), 20-24. five mahābhūtas (gross elements) and 25. puruṣa.

(17) The followers of the Yoga system add Īśvara to the principles enumerated by Sāṅkhya and make the number twenty-six. (18) The view held by the Pāśupatas is that there are thirty-one tattvas. The recognized number, however, is thirty six. The tattvas are: 1. Śiva, 2. Śakti, 3. Sadāśiva, 4. Śiva, 5. vidyā, 6. puruṣa, 7. māyā, 8. kāla, 9. nityati, 10. kalā, 11. avidyā, 12. rāga, 13. prakṛti or avyakta, 14. mahat, 15. ahaṅkāra, 16. manas, 17—21. five jñānendriyas, 22—26. five karmendriyas, 27—31. five tanmātras, and 32—36. five bhūtas. The number thirty-one given in the Kārikā may be obtained by omitting kāla, nityati, kalā, avidyā, and rāga (8—12) which are but manifestations of māyā. (19) A simpler classification of the tattvas offered by the Śaivas is: pati, paśu, pāśa.62 (22) According to some, it is not possible to enumerate the categories, as they are infinite (ananta). (21) A group of Lokāyatas say that manas is the self. (22) The Bauddhas maintain that the intellect (buddhi) is the self. (23) The Yogācāras who constitute a section of Bauddhas consider citta or vijñāna to be the self. (24) The Hairanḍas and Vaiśeṣikas believe that Prāṇa or Hiranyagarbhā is the fundamental reality. (25) The knowers of the Vedas imagine that the Vedas are the only reality. (26) Those who are versed in sacrificial lore, Bauḍhayana and others, declare that there is nothing higher than yajña. (27) Those who follow the Devatākānda of the Veda declare that the gods (devas) like Agni and Indra are the final realities. (28) The Mimāṃsakas

62. Anandagiri calls them, śiva, ātmā, avidyā. The thirty-six principles are to be grouped thus: 1-5, pati; 6-12, paśu; 13-36, pāśa.
hold that dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit) as made known by the injunctions and prohibitions of the Veda constitute reality. (29) Those who are adepts in alchemy and magic think that these arts (vādas) are of the essence of reality. (30) Those who believe in āśramas (stages in life), Dakṣa and others, regard them as absolutely real. (31) The grammarians say that the ultimate categories are the three genders, masculine, feminine, and neuter. (32) Those who know the pādas, Viśva, etc., think that the pādas constitute the self. (33) The followers of the Āgamas look upon reality as having some definite form (mūrta), such as Maheśvara holding the trident or Viṣṇu bearing the discus. (34) The nihilists think of it as void (amūrta). (35) Finally, there are some Vedāntins who say that there are two Brahmans, the higher and the lower.

Each one of these views, says Gauḍapāda, is based on the imagination of the respective advocates. It is the non-dual self that is mistaken in so many ways on account of māyā. The ignorant think that the things which they perceive and believe to be real are different from the self. But the wise know that there is nothing apart from the distinctionless Ātman. When one mistakes a piece of rope for a snake, there is, in fact, no snake apart from the rope; there is only the rope; and the snake is imposed thereon. Similarly, there is only the self; all other things are merely imagined.

The non-real things are all superposed on the self which is the substrate; for substrateless delusion is impossible. The plurality that is thus assumed is responsible for all misery and evil (aśiva). The non-dual self alone is bliss (śiva). Separate from this there is nothing real in which case there would be plurality. Plurality is not a feature of the self; nor has it any independent reality. It is not

63. Upaniṣad-brahma-yogin calls them śākārādvaitins.
64. GK, II, 29–30.
65. Śaṅkara on GK, II, 33: na hi nirāspādā kācit kalpano ’palabhyate.
different nor non-different from the self. 66 Hence it is māyā-mātra, mere illusion; while non-duality is the sole reality. 67

Following the Upaniṣads, Gauḍapāda refers to the non-dual reality by the well-known terms, Ātman and Brahman. It is the Turiya, the ‘fourth’, the immutable reality whose nature is consciousness-bliss. No conditions can set a limit to it; for it is adjunctless (nirupādhika). It is not a particular, say, like a cow, falling within a genus; for being non-dual, there is not for it the distinction of generality and particularity. Nor is it an agent of action like the cook; for it is immutable. Nor is it endowed with qualities like blue; for it is attributeless (nirguna). It is inexpressible, therefore, by words. Scripture can only indicate its nature, and that too via negativa. 68 As the rope is seen by negating the appearances, snake, etc., the self is to be realized by removing what are illusorily superposed thereon.

66. GK, II, 34.
67. GK, I, 17: māyā-mātram idam paramārthataḥ.
68. See Śaṅkara’s commentary on Māṇḍ., 7.
CHAPTER VI

NON-ORIGINATION

I

Nothing is ever born

The central theme of Gauḍapāda's philosophy is that nothing is ever born, not because 'nothing' is the ultimate truth, as in Sūnya-vāda, but because the Self is the only reality. 'No jīva is born; there is no cause for it; this is the supreme truth: nothing whatever is born.' From the standpoint of the Absolute, it has been shown in the last chapter, there is no duality, there is nothing finite or non-eternal. The Absolute alone is; all else is appearance, illusory and non-real. They are deluded who take the pluralistic universe to be real. Empirical distinctions of knower and object known, mind and matter, are the result of māyā. One cannot explain how they arise. But on enquiry they will be found to be void of reality. If one sees them, it is like seeing the foot-prints of birds in the sky. The Self is unborn; there is nothing else to be born. Origination is mere illusion; non-origination is the supreme truth.

II

Scripture on Non-Origination

Gauḍapāda expounds his philosophy of non-origination or non-birth (ajāti) in several ways and through many an argument. We shall first cite the scriptural authorities quoted by the teacher and then proceed to his arguments. A preliminary objection to seeking support in Scripture is

1. GK, III, 48; IV, 71:
   na kaścit jāyate jīvaḥ saṁbhavo 'syā na vidyate,
   etat tad uttamam satyam yatra kīcīcin na jāyate.

2. GK, IV, 28: khe vai paśyanti te padam.
first answered to by Gauḍapāda. It may be urged that śruti, instead of countenancing the Advaita doctrine of non-origination, is against it in so far as it teaches creation (sṛṣṭi) in many places. The line of answer to this objection that the Advaitin would adopt has already been indicated in the last chapter while explaining the meaning of the bheda-vākyas. It is not denied that Scripture teaches creation. But Scripture does not declare that creation is real. The non-duality of the Self and the illusory nature of plurality are also taught in Scripture. If creation were real, this latter teaching would be void of meaning. The real purport of Scripture, however, is to be found here. And so, the creation which is spoken of must be an illusory one (māyāmaya). Then alone the teaching of Scripture will be intelligible, not otherwise. The sense which is to be taken as the purport of Scripture must be the one which is ascertained through inquiry (niścita) and is intelligible in the light of reasoning (yuuktiyukta).\(^3\) The real purpose for which Scripture speaks of creation we have already explained. The creation-texts are but a device (upāya) to introduce the true teaching which relates to the non-dual reality.\(^4\)

The Bhādāranyaka denies plurality in the text that has been quoted before: "There is no plurality whatever here."\(^5\) It also says: "Indra through māyā assumes diverse forms,"\(^6\) meaning thereby that the appearance of diversity is due to māyā. The Vājasaneyi Samhitā declares: "Though unborn he appears variously born."\(^7\) Prima facie there is a contradiction in this declaration. How can the unborn be variously born? The only way to remove the contradiction is to regard the birth as illusory. The intention of śruti,

G. 17
evidently, is to negate the plurality which appears and teach
the un-originated nature of the Self and its non-duality.8

The *Isāvāsya* expressly denies *sambhūti* or birth in the
text: ‘They who are attached to *sambhūti* enter even
greater darkness’.9 According to Śaṅkara, the word
‘sambhūti’ in this passage denotes Hiranyagarbha or Kārya-
brahman, the germ of the cosmic evolution, the first to be
created. The text deprecates meditation on Hiranyagarbha.
When even the best in creation, the foremost among the
finites or *primus inter pares*, is denounced, *a fortiori* it fol-
 lows that the rest of creation is rejected.10 It is impossible
to predicate birth of the Self; and so, the *Brhadāraṇyaka*
says: ‘Who, indeed, can generate him?’11 There is no cause
prior to the Self from which it could be said it takes its birth.
The Self is uncaused, uncreated.12

Adopting the method of *adhyāropa* (superimposition)
and *apavāda* (subsequent removal), śruti denies all attri-
butes in respect of the Self by the well-known statement
‘It is not this, not that.’13 The attributeless Brahman, i.e.,
Brahman-in-itself, is incomprehensible (agrāhyā). So what
śruti does is to superpose at first on Brahman-self illusory
attributes such as causality in respect of the world, in order
to facilitate meditation. But here one ought not to stop.
When one is ready for the final teaching, Scripture pursues
the negative method of denying what it had earlier super-
imposed on Brahman. The *saprapānca* is only a means;
the *nisprapānca* is the end.14

10. See Ānandagiri on *GK*, III, 25: *samyagbhūtir aśvaryaṁ yasyāḥ sā
sambhūtir-devatā hiranyagarbhākhyā tasāś ca kāryamadhye śreṣṭhāyā
ninditavāt pradhāna-malla-nibarhaṇa-nyāyena sambhava-sabdītam kāryam
eva nisidhyate.
13. *Brh*, III, ix, 26; IV, ii, 4; v, 15.
Thus Scripture teaches the un-originated nature of the Self which is not the cause of origination, for there is nothing else besides it. The Ātma-tattva is āja (unborn) and advaya (non-dual); it has no internal distinctions; nor are there things outside it.  

III

Arguments for Non-origination

Now we turn to the arguments. Those who believe in the transformation (parināma) of the original Being into the world subscribe, in effect, to the view of the unborn being born. But it is a blatant contradiction to say that the unborn is born. When a thing is born it ceases to be birthless. So, what the disputants should say is: what is born is born as something else. This, however, is unsatisfactory because one would then be launched on an endless process of seeking causes. Therefore, of what is real, birth through māyā alone is intelligible, and not in reality. 

The nihilist (asad-vādin) maintains that the world which appears is produced out of the unreal (asat); that the non-existent is born. But this view does not stand to reason, because what is non-existent cannot be born either really (tattvataḥ) or illusorily (māyayā). The son of a barren woman (vandhyā-putra) is nowhere seen to take his birth either in reality or through māyā.

Thus it is evident that the real alone may be said to be born, and that too not in reality but through māyā. As to how this is so we explained in the last chapter by the analogy of the dream-world. Just as in dream a world is

15. See Śaṅkara on GK, III, 27. evam hi āruttivākya-ṣataḥ sabāhyābhyan-taram ajam ātmatavatvam advayaṁ na tato'nyad astīti niścītam etat.
17. GK, III, 27: satō hi māyayā janma yuṣyate na tu tattvataḥ.
18. GK, III, 28.
created illusorily, so also in waking a similar thing happens. It is mind that moves through māyā\(^{20}\) and creates the illusion of a world involving the distinctions of seer and seen, cause and effect, etc. The pluralistic universe which is thus made to appear through māyā is non-real. The absolute reality is the Ātma-tattva which is unborn and non-dual.\(^{21}\)

IV

_Dialectic on Causality_

That the Self is unborn and that nothing else there is which is born, Gaṇḍapāda seeks to demonstrate through a dialectical criticism of the causal category in the fourth prakaraṇa. Causation, like all other relations, falls within the realm of nescience, because on analysis it turns out to be unintelligible. This is the verdict on causation passed by the Absolutist. We shall proceed to see how it is so.

The classical rivals in Indian philosophy in the contest over the notion of cause are the Sāṅkhyas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The Sāṅkhya view is known as sat-kārya-vāda or parināma-vāda. It is the doctrine that the effect is pre-existent in the cause before its actual production. Nothing is produced _de novo_. If the effect did not exist in the cause potentially, it would not come out of it. The cause contains the effect in its subtle form. And what is called causation is the manifestation as effect of what is in a latent condition in the cause. Causation is transformation (parināma) of the cause in a different form. For example, clay is fashioned into a pot. The form of pot is obscured (tirohita) in the clay because of the form which clay, the cause, has. The causal operation (kāraka-vyāpāra) removes that obscuration and renders the form of pot manifest. If this is not

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20. GK, III, 29: spandate māyāyā manah.
admitted, says the Sāṅkhya, and if, on the contrary, it is maintained that the effect comes into being de novo, there would be no restriction of particular effects to particular causes. One may gather figs from thistles or press sand to get oil. But the fact that a particular cause generates only a determinate effect shows that cause and effect are identical in essence. So, the Sāṅkhya maintains that the effect exists in the cause even before it is produced, but only in a subtle or unmanifest way.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is quite the opposite of the Sāṅkhya view. It is called asat-kārya-vāda or ārambhavāda. The effect is not pre-existent in the cause. If it is existent in the cause there is no need for its production. If it be said that the causal operation is required for manifesting what is unmanifest in the cause, then what is the difference between creating a pot out of clay and manifesting a pot that is already there by means of a lamp? The Sāṅkhyaśas, no doubt, make a difference between two kinds of manifestation. An object may be there in its proper form; but its cognition by a person may be obstructed. To remove this obstruction, the causes of cognition are required. The other kind of obstruction pertains to the form of the object. In the clay the form of pot is obstructed. To remove this the causal operation of a potter is needed. When the Sāṅkhyaśas say that the effect is unmanifest in the cause, it is the latter kind of obstruction that they mean. But with this much the Sāṅkhya theory is not made intelligible. They maintain that what is unmanifest is made manifest. Now, the manifestation which is also an effect, is it pre-existent or not? If it is, there is no need for fresh manifestation, i.e., causation. If it is not, at least in the case of manifestation the theory of satkārya breaks down. There is a contradiction, say the Naiyāyikas, in the very formulation of the Sāṅkhya view. According to the theory, the cause and effect are identical and at the same time the effect is held to be a
transformation (parināma) of the cause. This is like saying that A and B are non-different and different. To believe in the Sānkhya theory of identity-in-difference is to swallow a contradiction. And so, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold the effect to be entirely different from the cause. The effect begins to exist only when it is produced. One of the essential factors among the causal aggregate that is required for the production of an effect is antecedent non-existence of the effect. If the cause and effect are entirely different, it may be asked, what restricts a particular effect to a particular cause? The answer of the Naiyāyika is that the cause and effect are related by way of inheritance. The effect inheres in the cause, and inheritance is an inseparable relation. Thus, according to the Nyāya theory, the effect is not pre-existent in the cause; it is produced de novo, and yet is connected with the cause by the relation of samavāya.

The real difficulty about asat-kārya-vāda is that, if cause and effect are entirely different, we cannot say that the same cause produces the same effect, for anything may come out of anything. The Naiyāyika seeks to get over this difficulty by suggesting that there is a relation of samavāya between cause and effect. But what is this samavāya relation? Is it identical with the terms which it relates, or different from them? It cannot be identical with the terms, for, then, there would be nothing which relates nor different terms to be related. Nor can it be different from the terms, for, if it were, there would be required two fresh relations, one to relate the samavāya with the cause and the other with the effect. And here the process would not stop. To relate these new relations other relations would be needed, thus resulting in an infinite regress. Even if the difficulty (just pointed out) be waived, there is another problem which the Naiyāyika will have to face but cannot solve. It is this: how can there be any relation—not to speak of an eternal relation like samavāya—between the existent cause and the non-existent effect. Relation, indeed, is possible
between existents, and not between the existent and the non-existent nor between non-existent. Thus the Nyāya theory of asat-kārya too fails to satisfy the demands of intelligibility.

We have set forth the case for and against each of the two theories of causation in order that Gauḍapāda’s statement about them may be understood in all its implication. This is what the venerable teacher says: some disputants (i.e., the Sānkhyas) maintain that jāti or origination is of a thing which is already existent (bhūta), while there are others (i.e., Nyāya-Vaiśeśikas) who think that it is of a thing which is non-existent. These dispute with each other and destroy each other’s position. If the effect is already existing, there is no need for any causal operation; it is meaningless to say that what is existent is born. If the effect is non-existent, it can never be produced: what is non-existent like the barren woman’s son is not at any time born. Thus on either alternative there is non-birth or non-origination; and the disputants who are ostensibly advocates of dualism (dvayā) make known, in truth and without their own knowing, ajāti. The truth of non-origination that is thus made known we heartily endorse. We do not quarrel with them. We leave the quarrelling to themselves.

22. Com. on BS, II, 18: sator hi sambandhaḥ sambhavati; na sad-asatoḥ, asator vā.

23. Prof. V. Bhattacharya observes that among the Buddhists the Vaiśeśikas maintain satkāryavāda, and the Yogācāras asatkāryavāda. See ĀŚ, p. 101.

24. GK, IV, 3.

25. GK, IV, 4. Professor V. Bhattacharya reads advayāḥ instead of dvayāḥ and takes the word to mean the Buddhists. According to him, it is the Baudhā view of ajāti that is referred to by Gauḍapāda in the present kārikā. See ĀŚ, p. 102. Sāṅkara, we think, rightly interprets the verse to mean that the dualists by disputing with each other re-inforce indirectly the truth of ajāti. This is what he says: vivadanto viruddham vadanto dvayā dvaitino ‘py ete ‘nyonyasya pakṣau sad-asato janmanī pratisedhanto’jātiṁ anutpattim arthāt khyāpayanti prakāśayanti te.

26. GK, IV, 5. Consistent with his theory, Prof. Bhattacharya says that in this kārikā Gauḍapāda accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advayavādins or Buddhists expressing his approval.
Of what is unborn the disputants predicate birth, for the illogicality of the other alternative they are able to see. If what is born is said to be born, there would be infinite regress. But the proposition of the disputants is equally illogical. What is unborn (ajāta) must be immortal (amṛta). To say that the unborn is born is to attribute mortality to it, which is a flagrant violation of the law of contradiction. How is it possible for the immortal to become mortal? The immortal cannot become mortal, nor the mortal immortal; for it is impossible for a thing to change its nature. If what is immortal by nature were to become mortal, then it would cease to be changeless, and attain artificiality and impermanence. But this is impossible for what is immortal by nature. Why speak of the immortal? Change of nature is not possible even for ordinary things. There is what is called sāṃsiddhikī prakṛti, nature that is well acquired, and after acquisition does not leave. For example, the yogins obtain certain super-normal powers which abide with them always. Then there is svābhāvikī prakṛti, that which is natural to a thing, like heat or light to fire. This also does not leave its locus at any time or in any place. Sahajā prakṛti is what is in-born or innate, like the power to fly in birds. Akṛtā prakṛti is that which is not artificial like the downward flow of water. And then there is the general nature of prakṛti, viz., the class-nature which a thing can never give up, e.g., potness of pot and clothness of cloth. In the things of the world, each of which has a prakṛti of one or the other of the types mentioned above, change of nature is impossible; for a thing cannot change its nature and yet be what it is. If this is so even with empirical objects, how could it be held that the immortal goes in for its opposite nature? The immortal (self) is free from all changes. It knows no decay and death.

27. GK, IV, 6–8; VII, 20–22.
28. GK, IV, 9.
29. GK, IV, 19.
The Sāṅkhya thinks that the unborn and beginningless prakṛti evolves itself into the manifold evolutes that constitute the universe; and the theory of causation which he advocates is, as already explained, sat-kārya-vāda, according to which cause and effect are identical. Now, he is to be asked in what manner does he construe this identity. Does he mean that the cause is identical with the effect, or that the effect is identical with the cause? If the cause is identical with the effect, then since the effect is born, the cause also must be said to be born. The primal cause which is prakṛti cannot be exempt from this rule. And so, it also should be regarded as subject to birth. It cannot be aja and nitya, as the Sāṅkhya contends. To avoid this undesirable consequence, he may adopt the other alternative, viz., that the effect is identical with the cause. Since the effect is now said to be non-different from the cause which is aja it also would be aja, and the contingency of the cause ceasing to be aja will not arise. Ingenious as the explanation is, it cannot afford any relief to the Sāṅkhya. If the effect also is aja, then it is not born, i.e., is not produced. If it is not what is produced, it cannot be called the effect. To say that the effect is aja is the same as saying that it is not an effect—a statement which is on the face of it self-contradictory. If to avoid contradiction it is held that the effect is born, then the old difficulty of the cause ceasing to be unoriginated will re-appear. To maintain that the cause is identical with the effect which is born and yet itself remains unborn is analogous to the procedure of the man who cooked one half of his hen and kept the other half by for laying eggs. Further, there is no illustration which could prove the premise that from what is unborn a thing is produced. Indeed, in the absence of illustration, no inference is possible. Nor could the contrary of the premise, viz., that a thing is born from what is born, be supported; for

30. Śaṅkara on GK, IV, 12: na hi kukkutya ekadesaḥ pacyate ekadesaḥ prasavāya kalpyate.
that would lead us, as we have already observed, to an infinite regress.

The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the cause and the effect are reciprocally dependent. Merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) are responsible for producing the body; and the body in its turn occasions merit and demerit. The chain of causes and effects is without beginning, each alternating with the other, like the seed and the sprout. Here again we meet with insuperable difficulties. If the antecedent of a cause is its effect and the antecedent of an effect is its cause, then both cause and effect are begun. How then can they be beginningless? Moreover, there is a paradox in the very thesis that is proposed. To say that the effect is the antecedent of its cause is like saying that the son begets his father.\textsuperscript{32} There must be some definite sequence recognized as between cause and effect. It is no use asserting that the two are reciprocally dependent. If the cause and effect can be indifferently antecedent or consequent, there would be no distinction whatever between them, and to call one a 'cause and the other an effect would be entirely arbitrary and void of meaning. Now, there are three possible ways of stating the sequence. It may be said that first there is the cause and subsequently the effect takes place (pūrva-krama); or it may be held that the effect is followed by the cause (apara-krama); or it may be thought that the cause and the effect are simultaneous (saha-krama). None of these alternatives is intelligible. That the cause cannot produce the effect we have shown already. If the cause is unborn, it cannot change and therefore cannot produce; if it is born, there is infinite regress. The reverse order too is impossible; for, as we said, it is just like making the son antecedent to the father. The effect by definition is that which is produced by the cause;\textsuperscript{33} and if the cause is not there before the effect, how can the effect be produced?

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{GK, IV, 15: putrāj janma pitur yathā.}
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Anandagiri on GK, IV, 16: niyata-pūrvabhave hetuh: niyatottarabhavī phalam.}
And from the unproduced effect how can the cause come into being? The third alternative also is untenable. If what are simultaneous be causally related, there must be such a relation as between the two horns of a cow. But as a matter of common knowledge the two horns are not so related. This, then, is the crux of the problem. Without settling the sequence, the distinction of cause and effect would be unintelligible. And it is impossible to settle the sequence. In despair, appeal might be made to the illustration of seed and sprout. But a little thought would reveal that these—seed and sprout—cannot serve as illustration. It is only when the causal sequence has been settled that the relation between seed and sprout would become intelligible. Since the latter is a particular falling under the wider relation of cause and effect, it cannot be used as an illustration. It is, in short, sādhyā-sāma, yet to be proved, and so is incapable of proving the probandum. To use it as a ground of proof is to be guilty of petitio principii.\(^{34}\)

It has now been shown that the advocates of causation are not able to offer any satisfactory explanation of the relation, that they are themselves ignorant about what precedes and what succeeds, and that they make a mess of the order of cause and effect. The utter hopelessness of the task they have undertaken itself proves the truth of non-origination.\(^{35}\) Otherwise, if there is birth of a thing, why should it not be possible to point out the antecedent and give an account of its relation to the thing that is born?\(^{36}\)

A thing is not produced either from itself or from another or from both. A pot is not made out of the self-same pot, nor out of a piece of cloth, nor out of both. But then, it may be asked: is not pot made out of clay? Is not

34. GK, IV, 14-18, 20.
35. GK, IV, 19.
36. GK, IV, 21. Prof. V Bhattacharya considers this kārikā to be the statement of an objection raised by the opponent. See AŚ, p. 126.
a son born to a father? True; there is the concept and the expression of the form ‘it is born’ current among those who are satisfied with the commonsense view of things. But when the concept and expression are examined, they turn out to be unintelligible. It is all a matter of words, and there is no meaning in such statements as ‘This is born from that’ or ‘that is the parent of this.’ This is how the inquiry is to be made: when it is said that a cause produces an effect, what exactly is the meaning? Is that which is existent produced, or that which is non-existent, or that which is both existent and non-existent? It cannot be the first, because it is meaningless to say that what exists is produced. Nor the second, because the non-existent cannot be produced for the simple reason that it is non-existent like sky-blossoms. Nor the third, because that alternative involves us in a contradiction. The disputant who holds that cause and effect are beginningless must necessarily admit their non-birth too. From the beginningless effect the cause cannot come into being. Nor can the effect emerge out of the beginningless cause. Since no cause can be demonstrated for anything, non-origination must be accepted as the truth. And since there is no birth of anything in truth, pure consciousness alone is the reality.

Now, the opponent who is a realist (bāhyārthavādī) may argue thus: there can be no consciousness (prajñāpti) without objects which are its cause (nimitta). The variety in cognitions would be unintelligible if there were no variety of objects. For example, the appearance of colours, like blue, green, etc., in a crystal must be due to coloured objects which it reflects. So also, cognition which is the same all through cannot produce variety out of itself. The variety

37. Śaṅkara on GK, IV, 22: nānu mṛdo ghaṭo jāyate pitūṣ ca putrāḥ. satyam asti jāyate iti pratyayaḥ śabdaḥ ca mūḍhānām. tāv eva śabda-pratyayaḥ vivekibhiḥ parikṣeyete kim satyam eva tāv uta mṛṣeti. yāvatā parikṣeyamāne śabdapratyaya-visayam vastu ghaṭaḥ-putrādi-laksanam śabda-mātraṃ.

38. Ānanda-giri on GK, IV, 24; vastuno vastuto janmāyogād ajam vijñānamātram tattvam.
is really conditioned by the manifold objects which it makes known. The lamp-light which illumines things does not, verily, produce them. Similarly, cognition whose business it is to manifest objects cannot be regarded as their parent. On the contrary, it is objects that determine cognitions. There is also another reason for postulating the existence of objects. That is the experience of misery (samkleśa). If there were no causes of misery, there would not be the experience thereof. If there existed pure consciousness alone, how could the fact of misery be accounted for? If there were no fire or other agencies of heat, there would be no burns and no pain. Thus, on these two grounds, viz., the variety in cognitions and the experience of misery, the reality of the objective universe must be admitted.\(^{39}\)

In reply to the realist’s contention, we say that so far as empirical reason (yukti-darśana) goes the fact of plurality is to be reckoned with. But from the standpoint of the Absolute (bhūta-darśana),\(^ {40}\) the pluralistic universe with all its variety and relations is illusory. The mind does not contact objects nor the appearances thereof; for the objects are unreal, and the appearances are not other than the mind (citta). Never in the three divisions of time (i.e., past, present, and future) does the mind relate itself to any object which causes cognition. If it did in reality contact an object at any time, then, as contrasted with that cognition, others may be called erroneous (viparyāsa). But there is no such viparyāsa too, for there is nothing which will serve as the cause thereof.\(^ {41}\)

The argument so far advanced as against the realist is from the standpoint of Vijñānavāda or subjective idealism. The commentator says that Gauḍapāda makes use of this

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40. *GK*, IV, 25. If the word is read as ‘abhūta-darśanā,’ it would mean according to Śaṅkara ‘because it is the content of delusion’, bhrānti-darśana-visayatvāt.

41. *GK*, IV, 27.
argument to refute realism. But that does not mean that the Advaita teacher endorses the conclusions of Vijñānavāda. According to this school of Buddhism, Vijñāna or consciousness is born every moment. This doctrine is not accepted by Advaita. Just as the origination of things is not real, the birth of consciousness too is not real. To predicate origination of consciousness is as absurd as ascribing reality to external objects. Therefore, says Gaudapāda, neither the mind nor the object is originated.

Those who believe that the self is really born and dies, that it is bound and released, would find themselves, if they would but think out the consequences of their belief, in difficulties which they cannot solve. A self that is a victim to birth and death, bondage and release, cannot be eternal and changeless; and that which is non-eternal and changeful cannot be self. It is held by the class of thinkers whose belief we are examining now that transmigration (sāṃsāra), though beginningless, comes to an end, and that release (mokṣa), though having a beginning, is endless. This, however, does not stand to reason. Anything that is beginningless must be endless as well; and anything that has a beginning must have an end also. If sāṃsāra is absolutely without beginning, then, there can be no release, because sāṃsāra will not in that case end. If release is what is brought about at a particular moment, then there is the liability of its termination at any moment. So, beginning and end, birth and death, bondage and release are but modes of empirical usage without any corresponding reality. The self is unborn and eternally free.

43. GK, IV, 28: tasmān na jāyate cittam cittā-dṛṣyaṁ na jāyate.
44. GK, IV, 30.
From the foregoing it is easy to draw the conclusion that all is _aja_ and that origination (_utpāda_) is unestablished. The main dialectical argument is that in no way could generation of anything be demonstrated. (i) The non-existent cannot have the non-existent for its cause; (ii) nor the existent have the non-existent for its cause; (iii) the existent cannot be the effect of the existent; (iv) nor can the existent be the effect of the non-existent. The cause-effect relation is thus seen to be riddled with contradictions when it is subjected to a searching inquiry.

A substance or a collocation of substances may be the cause of a substance; e.g., the potsherds which are parts are said to be the cause of pot which is the whole. The quality which is inherent in the parts is regarded as the non-inherent cause of the quality which inheres in the whole. The self is not a substance; nor does it belong to a category other than substance. Hence it cannot be a cause at all. Neither are things born of mind, nor is mind born of things. The self is neither cause nor effect. It is only as long as there is false adherence to the notion of cause that there appears to be origination of things, one from another; but when this wrong notion is got rid of, there is neither cause nor effect. It is the false adherence referred to above that is responsible for _samsāra_; and when that goes, _samsāra_ too does not exist.

If the self is all and if there is nothing other than it, how is _samsāra_, which undoubtedly appears, to be accounted for? The reply is that it is on account of _avidyā_ that things constituting the empirical universe are said to be born. Their apparent birth is the consequence of the veiling of the truth by nescience. Therefore, the things are not eternal, nor are they real from the standpoint of the Absolute. The _paramārtha_ is that all is the unborn self; and since the things are not even born, there is not their

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45. _GK_, IV, 38 & 40.
46. _GK_, IV, 53—56.
removal either. 47 When the things are not even born, expressions like ‘eternal’ and ‘non-eternal’ have no meaning at all as applied to them. Where words do not reach, no discrimination can be made. 48 When it is said that things are born, it does not mean that they are really born; their birth is the same as birth through māyā, and māyā is that which does not exist; it is a name of the non-real. 49 Just as from an illusive seed comes forth an illusive sprout, and what is thus seen is neither eternal nor is destroyed, all things appear through māyā. They have no real birth or destruction. 50

Mind and objects are inter-dependent; they are correlates. No object can be perceived without the cognition of the object; and there cannot be the cognition of an object without the existence of the object. The two, mind and object, are determinative of each other; both are drṣya (what are cognized). And when they are enquired into, they will be found to be non-real. There is no pramāṇa which can validate their cognition. But, then, it may be asked: are they not related as means of knowledge (mind) and content of knowledge (object)? The reply is: no. Such distinct designations are given to them only from the empirical point of view. The truth, however, is that it is not possible to make a difference between them as pramāṇa and prameya. In respect of pot, for instance, cognition per se cannot be the pramāṇa, for that would be too wide; nor pot-cognition, for then, there would be reciprocal dependence (anyonyāśraya) as between pot and pot-cognition. 51 Thus there is not established the relation of pramāṇa and prameya as between mind and object.

47. GK, IV, 47.
48. GK, IV, 60.
49. GK, IV, 58. janma māyopamaṁ teṣāṁ sā ca māyā na vidyate. Śaṅkara māyety avidyamāṇasyākhyā.
50. GK, IV, 59.
The world of duality consisting of minds and objects is but a projection of cittā (mind). In itself the cittā is without object; it is eternal and unattached. As has been observed already, the universe exists only in empirical (saṃvṛti) and not in absolute (paramārtha) truth. The belief in the pluralistic universe is the result of false attachment to what is non-real. It is this false attachment that puts up the show of origination. It is on account of this that the self which is bliss is veiled and the world whose nature is misery is unfolded. The false belief which is responsible for attachment and the consequent misery takes the form of one of the propositions constituting the four-pronged dialectic: (i) it is, (ii) it is not, (iii) it is and is not, (iv) it neither is nor is not. These assertions are based on the apparent permanence, impermanence, both and neither of things. The Ātman is not bound by them. It is untouched by the dialectical quadruped (catuskoti).

In the last chapter several illustrations were given in order to show that reality is non-dual (advaita). The same may be used for teaching the truth of non-origination (ajāti) also. On the analogy of dreams, it was demonstrated that the world of waking is non-real. If it is non-real, it is unoriginated. And what is left behind as the inalienable reality, viz., the self, is by its very nature unborn. Just as the snake is not at any time born of the rope, just as the gandharvanagara does not come into existence, being duly created by an architect, just as the māyā-elephant is not really generated, and just as the fiery designs are not truly formed from the moving firebrand, the things of the world are not, in truth, created. The apparent birth and death of beings are illusory like the appearance and disappearance of the creatures that are formed of dream, or

52. GK, IV, 72–73.
53. GK, IV, 75.
54. GK, IV, 82–84.
55. See supra, p. 123.
G. 19
made through magic (māyāmaya) or super-normal power
(nirmitaka).\footnote{GK, 68—70.}

It is true that jāti or birth of things is taught in some
texts of Scripture. And that is only to provide comfort to
those who are afraid of the doctrine of non-origination and
believe that things exist in reality because they are per-
ceived and because they are practically efficient. The evil
that might arise from such a teaching is very insignificant,
as the purpose thereof is to lift those who are deluded from
where they stand. Provided they follow the right path, they
too will rise and reach the region of the light of truth which
is ajāti.\footnote{GK, IV, 42—43.}

Properly speaking, even to say that the truth is ajāti
would be ultra vires; for ajāti is meaningful only so long as
jāti carries a meaning. And that is so in the empirical
world alone.\footnote{GK, IV, 74: ajah kalpitasamvṛtyā paramārthena nāpy ajah.}
The absolute truth is that no word can design-
nate or describe the self. Just as it is called ‘the fourth’
caturtha or turiya) only after super-imposing on it the
category of number for the purpose of indicating that it
is not to be identified with the non-real appearances of the
three states, so also it is spoken of as ajāti in order to make
us understand that it is not what appears to be born.

V

The Nature of Reality

Now, so far as words and concepts go, it may be asked,
what are we to understand about the self which is the
supreme truth? The self, as we have seen earlier, is of the
nature of pure consciousness and bliss such as is realized in
deep sleep. It is the unborn and eternal Brahman which is
the object of spiritual quest.\footnote{GK, III, 33: brahma jāneyam ajaṁ nityam.} It is the non-dual peace
(śāntam advayam)\(^{60}\) which is the same throughout (sama-
tām gatam).\(^{61}\) It is self-established (svastha)\(^{62}\) tranquil
and pure (viśārada).\(^{63}\) It is sleepless (anidra) and dream-
less (asvapna), and ever luminous (sakṛd-vibhāta), all-
knowledge (sarvajña),\(^{64}\) shining by itself requiring no other
light.\(^{65}\) It is of the nature of supreme happiness (sukham-
anuttamam) and release (sanirvāṇam).\(^{66}\) It is really indes-
cribable, for it is without name and form (anāmakaṁ, arūpakaṁ).\(^{67}\)

The self, such as we have tried to indicate through halting words, is the sole reality. It is not born; nor is there anything else that is born. Origination (jāti), move-
ment (cala) and objectivity (vastutva) are all appear-
ances.\(^{68}\) There is no dissolution, no origination, none in bond-
age, none striving for success, no seeker after release, no one
who is released. All these expressions have meaning only in the relative world of experience. Sub specie aeternitatis they are void of sense. Birth and death, bondage and release, strife and success have no place in the Absolute. This, according to Gauḍaṇḍa, is the supreme truth.\(^{69}\)

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60. GK, IV, 45.
61. GK, III, 2, 38.
62. GK, III, 47.
63. GK, IV, 93.
64. GK, III, 36. Śaṅkara: sarvaṁ ca taj-jñāsvarūpam ceti sarvajñaṁ.
65. GK, IV, 81: prabhātāṁ bhavati sva阎.\(^{31}\)
66. GK, III, 47.
67. GK, II, 36.
68. GK, IV, 45.
69. GK, II, 32:

na nirodho na cōtpattir na baddho na ca sādhakaṁ,
na mumukṣur na vai mukta ity esā paramāthaṁ.
CHAPTER VII

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL

I

The Illusoriness of the World

That the non-dual Spirit is the sole reality and that the world of plurality is an illusory appearance induced by māyā is the view of Gauḍapāda. ‘All this, indeed, is Brahman’, says the Upaniṣad. On this supreme truth is grounded the great Teacher’s philosophy of the world with its variegated things and unique individuals. He rejects the theory of the Naiyāyika, according to whom there is a real plurality of things, each of which is a concatenation of primal atoms, and who believes in āraṇbhavāda or the doctrine of new beginnings. As we saw in the last chapter, the Nyāya-view of asat-kārya (or the prior non-existence of effect in the cause) is not acceptable to Gauḍapāda. The rival view of causation and creation known as satkāryavāda (the doctrine of pre-existence of effect in the cause) and parināmavāda (the theory of transformation) is also unacceptable to the Advaitin. The theory of parināma as applied to the origination of the world has been held in one of two forms, prakṛti-parināma-vāda and brahma-parināma-vāda. According to the former of these views, the universe is a transformation of primal nature called prakṛti which is composed of the three guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas. This view is held by the Sāṅkhyaśas. According to the latter view which is sponsored by some Vedāntins, the world is a transformation of Brahman. Neither of these forms of parināma-vāda finds favour with Gauḍapāda. His theory is that there is no world in reality; and hence there could be no question as to the mode of its origination.

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The real is _prapañcāpaśama_, the quiescence of the manifold universe. If the universe appears, it is only as an illusory manifestation. This view came to be called _vivarta-vāda_, in later Advaita.

Gauḍapāda makes his position clear even in the first prakaraṇa, where through _tarka_ he establishes that the universe does not really exist. The pluralistic world would be removed if it existed. There is no removal thereof because it has no reality. From the standpoint of the Absolute, existence and reality coincide. Existence can be ascribed to the real alone, and not to the non-real. Even during the time of the delusion of rope-snake, the snake does not exist in the rope; nor is it really removed when the error is corrected. So also the world, though it appears, does not truly exist. It is _māyā-mātra_, merest illusion.

Gauḍapāda employs several expressions to indicate the illusory nature of the world and its things: _māyā_, _vaitathya_, _mithyā_, _kalpita_, _ābhāsa_, _viparyaya_, _saṃsvṛti_, etc. _Māyā_ is that which is responsible for the world-illusion. It covers the real Self and projects the non-real world. To the one who has Brahman-intuition, however, _māyā_ is that which is not. The second prakaraṇa whose object is to establish the illusoriness of the world of plurality is significantly called _vaitathya_. Upaniṣadbrahmayogin interprets the meaning of the word ‘vaitathya’ thus: Brahman _per se_ is _tatha_ because it ever exists in its nature without anything opposed to it. What is not thus, viz. the world, is unreal (asat), _vitathā_. The nature of being _vitathā_ is ‘vaitathya’ unreality. The same meaning is connoted by the term _mithyā_. The world is illusory, being erroneously cognized;

2. _Mānd_. 7 and 12; _GK_, I, 29: _dvaitasyopāsamah_; II, 35: _prapañcēpaśamaḥ_ (Śanākara: _prapañcāḥ_ _dvaitabhedavistārāḥ_, _tasyopāsāmāḥ_ _abhāvo_ _yasmin_ _sa_ _ātmā_ _prapañcēpaśamaḥ_).

3. _Gītā_, II, 16: _nāsato_ _vidyate_ _bhāvo_ _nābhāvo_ _vidyate_ _sataḥ._


5. Com. on _GK_, II, 1: Śanākara: _vitathasyo_ _bhāvo_ _vaitathymam_ _asatyātvam_ _ity_ _arthaḥ_.


hence it is characterized as mithyā. It is what is wrongly imagined (kalpita), an appearance (ābhāsa); the perception thereof is an error (viparyaya). As contrasted with the absolute reality (paramārtha-satya) which is Brahman, the reality which belongs to the universe is relative or empirical (saṁvṛti or vyāvahārika). The world appears real only so long as we do not look beyond or deeper. Narrow and shallow is its truth.  

II

Māyā as the Principle of Creation

Now, it may be asked: what is the agency that brings about the illusory appearance of the world? Three answers are given which taken together indicate the Advaita view. 
(i) The self imagines the self by the self.  
(ii) The nondual reality becomes different through māyā. 
(iii) The world is a vibration of the mind; it is perceived by the mind. Thus the self, māyā and the mind are stated to be responsible for the manifestation of the world. But the self is unchanging and eternal; and it cannot by itself be the cause of or manifest anything. Hence it is said to be the ground of the apparent manifestation of the world through māyā. "The self, the shining one, imagines the self by the self through its own māyā," says Gauḍapāda. "Though unborn he (the self) seems variously born through māyā. "Of what is sat birth is intelligible only through māyā, and not in reality." Thus it is the self as conditioned by māyā that is the cause of the world. Brahman or the self which is thus conditioned is called Ṣāvāra or God.

6. See Śaṅkara’s com. on GK, IV, 47: saṁvṛtyā saṁvaranāṁ saṁvṛtih, avidyā-viṣayo laukiko vyavahāraḥ, tayā saṁvṛtyā. 
7. GK, II, 1: kalpayaty ātmanātmānam ātmā. 
11. GK, II, 12. 
13. GK, III, 27.
Reality-in-itself is no cause at all. The very concept of cause is riddled with contradictions, as we saw in the last chapter. God-in-relation-to-the-world is the cause. He is both the efficient and material cause of the universe. He is referred to as the lower Brahman (aparam brahma). In words that are reminiscent of those of the Bhagavadgītā Gaudāpāda says that Īśvara is resident in the heart of all, and that he is all-pervasive. It is this supreme Lord (prabhuḥ) that creates the external things and the internal modes. The entire universe is a product of his māyā by which he is deluded as it were.

There is the third factor mentioned above, viz., mind (manas or citta), whose part in world-creation is yet to be explained. In some places the word ‘mind’ is used to signify the self. Mind in this sense is the ground of the world, as conditioned by māyā. It will not, then, be the third factor; it will be the same as the first. The other sense, which is the primary and hence the more common, in which the word ‘mind’ is used is the antaḥkaraṇa or the internal organ which is the adjunct (upādhi) of the jīva. What constitutes jīvatva (jīvahood) is the conditioning of the self by mind; and it is this conditioning or limitation that brings about the apparent perception and enjoyment of the world by the individual soul. In later Advaita while the cosmic creation was assigned to Īśvara, the creation of the individual world of transmigration was ascribed to the jīva. But whatever be the details, the Advaita theory regarding the creation of the universe is that it is not real, being only an illusory manifestation due to māyā.

There are rival views of creation. Some of them are noticed by Gaudāpāda in the first prakaraṇa. A distinc-

14. **GK, I, 26.** In later Advaita the term ‘saguṇa-Brahman’ gained currency.
15. **GK, I, 28.**
16. **GK, II, 13.**
17. **GK, II, 19: māyaisa tasya devasya yayā saṃmohitaḥ svayam.**
18. **E.g., in GK, IV, 72, where citta means, according to Śaṅkara, Atman.**
19. **See PD, VII, 4, and the present writer’s The Philosophy of Advaita, p. 194.**
20. **GK, I, 7-9.**
tion is to be made at the outset between the paramārtha
cintakas, i.e., those who proclaim the supreme truth of non-
creation or the illusoriness of creation, and the srṣṭicintakas,
who theorize about creation, believing it to be real. Among
the latter various views are prevalent. The theories men-
tioned by Gauḍapāda are analysed by Ānandagiri as follows:
(1) According to the first view, creation is the expression
ofĪśvara’s lordly power; the world is the manifestation of
his prowess. (2) The second theory is that creation is simi-
lar to dream (svapna-sarūpā). The glossator remarks that
dream here is taken as real. Since the objects that consti-
tute the waking world themselves appear in dream, it is
contended, the dream-contents are real. Similar to the pro-
duction of such dreams is the creation of the world. (3) The
third view is that creation is like a magical show. Here,
again, the glossator observes that according to this view
magic and its products are real.21 (4) There are those who
hold that creation is the mere volition of the Lord whose
resolves always come true (satyasaṃkalpa). (5) Some
thinkers who find no use for God in their scheme of creation
urge that the world proceeds from Time. The last two views
concern the purpose of creation.22 (6) Some believe that
the creation is for the sake ofĪśvara’s enjoyment, (7) while
others are of the view that it is for the sake of his sport.

Gauḍapāda disposes of these theories by saying that
creation is God’s nature or māyā. The self cannot in reality
become the universe. It has no motives and purposes, for
these would import imperfection into it. An unintelligent
principle like Time cannot be the cause of the intelligently
ordered world. In our ignorance we must content ourselves
by saying that it is through māyā that the one appears as
the many.

21. It is to be noted that the expression ‘svapna-māyā-sarūpā’ employed
by Gauḍapāda in connection with the statement of prima facie views is rather
unhappy, as there is the danger of those views being fathered on the Advaitin
himself. Hence it is that Ānandagiri explains them in the way shown above
in order to distinguish them from the siddhānta.
22. Ānandagiri: phalagatam ca vikalpa-dvayam.
Māyā is described in later Advaita as beginningless, indeterminable, and of the nature of the existent (anādi, anirvacaniya, bhāvarūpa). Though Gauḍapāda does not use this neat expression in characterizing māyā, he is not unaware of its implication. In one place he says that the jiva sleeps on account of the beginningless māyā. Māyā is said to be beginningless because, if a beginning is predicated of it, there should be something antecedent to it, and this would lead to infinite regress. But māyā or samsāra is not beginningless in the sense in which the self or Brahman is. If it were really beginningless there would be no end for it. So the beginninglessness of samsāra is like that of a perennial stream (pravāhato 'nādi). Time itself with its distinctions of beginning, end and middle, is within māyā; and so there cannot be a beginning of māyā in time. To the questioning intellect māyā is a riddle. Hence it is called indeterminable. Gauḍapāda characterizes the things of the world put up by māyā as unthinkable (acintya). Māyā is considered to be of the nature of an existent (bhāvarūpa), because non-existence cannot be the ground of even illusion or appearance.

Māyā of the nature described above is responsible, according to the Advaitin, for the creation of the world. The world, we repeat, is not really created. It is a transfiguration, an illusory appearance of the one as many. The objects that constitute the universe are non-real; but they appear as real. Their origination, sustentation and dissolution are all imagined. They appear to be manifold, each with its distinctive features, but are not really so. They are not identical with the self; nor are they different there-

23. GK, I, 16.
24. GK, IV, 30.
25. GK, IV, 41 and 52.
27. GK, II, 20.
G. 20
from. They are not by themselves many; nor do they keep themselves as many in the self. Like the illusory rope-snake or the fiery circle they appear, and are not real.

III

The Process of Creation

To a system which regards creation as illusory, the order of the evolution of the world and the types of evolutes that compose it are of no importance whatsoever. That is why in the Upaniṣads different accounts of the coming into being of the elements are found. In some places three elements alone are listed, in some others five. According to one text, the elements appeared in an order, one from the other, the grosser element proceeding from the subtler. There is also the other view that the five elements are coordinate. A realistic system like the Sāṅkhya cannot afford to be so neglectful of the order in which evolution takes place and the number of categories. Hence it fixes the order with infinite care and specifies also the types of evolutes.

Gauḍapāda who sets models for later Advaitins to follow is utterly indifferent about the way in which creation is sketched. In an infinite number of modes, says he, the one has been imagined to express itself in and as the world. The Ācārya mentions several views of creation without either arranging them in an order or discussing them, and concludes by saying that in whatever way the self is imagined it is seen in that manner.

There are only two places in the Kārikā where Gauḍapāda gives some thought to a few details concerning creation. In a verse of the first prakaraṇa he says ‘Prāṇa creates all;

28. GK, II, 34.
29. GK, II, 19.
the Purusa generates the rays of consciousness, differently. It is to be noted here that a distinction is made between the general creation of all things and the special manifestation of the jivas. Reality as conditioned by maya in what we may call its 'vital aspect' generates all things. Hence it is referred to by the significant term 'Prana.' The same Reality in its 'consciousness-aspect', viz. the Purusa, is responsible for the apparent fragmentation of consciousness in the form of jivas. The other context where Gaudapada speaks of the process of the illusory manifestation (kalpana) occurs in the second prakaraṇa. He says there that first the jiva is posited and thereafter all things, both external and internal. This is because, as the commentator remarks, the imagination or appearance of the jiva is the root of all other imaginations.

IV

The Doctrine of Self

If the Upanisadic text 'All this, indeed, is Brahman' provides the basis for the Advaita view of the world, the passage 'This self is Brahman' supplies the theme of the Advaita doctrine of the soul. There is absolute non-difference between the so-called individual soul and the Absolute (jivatmanor ananyatvam). The true Individual is the Absolute. The apparent finitude of the individual soul is due to maya or nescience. In itself it is infinite and eternal. The rising and setting of souls are but the figments of imagination. Just as the creatures formed of dream, or by magic or through super-natural power, seem to take

31. GK, I, 6.
32. GK, II, 16.
34. Madh., 2: aayam atmā brahma.
35. GK, III, 13.
36. See F. H. Bradley's Appearance and Reality, p. 246: "There is nothing which, to speak properly, is individual or perfect except only the Absolute." And Bosanquet's Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 68: 'There can only be one individual and that the individual, the Absolute.'
their birth and die, so do all the jīvas appear to exist and pass away. Their birth and death are illusory. It is because the self is wrongly identified with the perishing things that constitute the sphere of the not-self that it is mistaken to be many and finite.

Layer after layer of the not-self covers the self. In order to know the true nature of the self one must pierce through the coverings which are called kośas and discard them. In the Taittriya Upaniṣad there is an inquiry into the five kośas or sheaths that are said to encase the self. The five sheaths are: annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya, vijñānamaya and ānandamaya. The first is the kośa which is made of food, viz., the physical body. It is the outermost casket which encloses the soul as it were. It is the locus of action and enjoyment. The soul’s birth and death are conditioned by the appearance and disappearance of the physical body. The second kośa is the vital sheath which is manifest in the form of breath. It is the principle of animation and energy, and is subtler than the annamayakośa. The third sheath is made of mind or manas, and consists of desires (saṅkalpa). The psychoses that compose the mind are more subtle than the breath and are therefore, said to be inner. Still subtler is the sheath of intellect (vijñānamayakośa) which is responsible for all empirical knowledge both in waking and in dream. The last kośa is ānandamaya, i.e., made of bliss. This is not the bliss which is Brahman but an illusory appearance thereof in nescience. It is psuedo-bliss, joy veiled in ignorance such as is experienced in sleep. These are the five garments in which the self is apparently muffled. Though the distinction between the self and the sheaths ought to be clear to everyone and it ought not to be possible for identifying the self with any or all of its

37. GK, IV, 68—70.
38. The vijñānamaya, having the power of cognition, is of the nature of agent (kārtṛ); the manomaya, having the power of desire, is of the nature of instrument (karaṇa); the prāṇamaya, having the power of conation, is of the nature of action (kārya). See Vedāntasāra, p. 5.
illusory vestures, in empirical usage they are coupled wrongly and there is erroneous identification.\textsuperscript{39} The purpose of inquiry is to disentangle the self from the non-real kośas and to realize its non-dual and eternal nature. Referring to this inquiry, Gauḍapāda says, “The sheaths such as the one consisting of the essence (of food) are verily explained in the \textit{Taittirīyaka}; their self which is the supreme soul is shown clearly with the help of the ether-analogy.”\textsuperscript{40}

The five sheaths may be regrouped into three bodies. The sheath made of food (annamaya) is the gross body (sthūla-śarīra). The sheaths of prāṇa, manas, and vijñāna constitute the subtle body (sūkṣma-śarīra) which is also called liṅga-śarīra, meaning that it stands as the sign of the soul. The sheath of ānanda which is enfolded in avidyā is the causal body (kāraṇa-śarīra). In the state of waking the soul has conceit in the gross body; and, as we have seen, it is known by the name Viśva. In the dream-state the soul’s conceit is in the subtle body; the name that is given to the soul then is Taijasa. In sleep, the gross body with the external world and the subtle body with the inner world are resolved in the cause, viz., nescience. There is ignorance, which serves as the single veil hiding the self and as the seed of the reappearance of the universe. The real as thus conditioned is called Prājña. We have already shown that the true Self is not to be identified with the non-real forms appearing in the three states. The self is Brahman which is the witness of the three states of experience (avasthātryayasākṣi), distinct from the three bodies (dehatrayavilakṣaṇa), and other than the five sheaths (pañcakośavyatirikta).

\textsuperscript{40} GK, III, 11.
Pratibimba and Avaccheda

We have seen that the finite individuality of the jiva is due to avidyā or nescience, and that in reality the jiva is non-different from Brahman. While subscribing to the fundamental doctrine of non-difference, the teachers of Advaita after Śaṅkara have differed among themselves over the mode in which the non-difference is to be explained. The followers of the Vivaraṇa view advocate the pratibimba-vāda or reflection-theory, while those who adhere to the Bhāmatī school adopt the avacchedavāda or limitation-theory.

According to the Vivaraṇa view, the jiva is a reflection of intelligence (caitanya) present in egoity (ahaṅkāra) which is a mode of avidyā. Since there is no difference between the reflection and the prototype, the jiva is non-different from Brahman-caitanya. The reflected face in a mirror, for example, is not different from the original face. It appears different because certain traits such as facing oneself, being located in a mirror, etc., are superimposed on it. Similarly, the distinguishing features that appear in the jiva are due to its being a reflection (pratibimba).

The Bhāmatī view is that the jiva is intelligence defined by nescience, even as pot-ether is ether defined by pot. The ether is the same both in and outside the pot. It does not admit of any real division. The form of pot introduces an apparent limitation which gives rise to the empirical usage, ‘This is pot-ether which is different from that which is, say, hall-ether.’ Similar is the distinction of the jiva from Brahman and other jivas. The distinction is brought about by avidyā which limits.

The difference between the two views, pratibimbavāda and avaccheda-vāda, is the result of stretching the illustrations beyond their legitimate point. In Śaṅkara’s writings
both the illustrations are found. The point in the analogy of reflection as well as in that of pot-defined ether is that jīvatva is adventitious. There need be no discrepancy between regarding the jīva as a reflection and considering it to be nescience-defined intelligence. The illustration of ether is worked out in detail by Gauḍapāda. But on that account it is not right to say that he preferred the avaccheda view to the pratibimba-vāda. Such a problem did not arise in his time. He employs the term ‘ābhāsa’ too which means reflection or appearance. All that he is intent on teaching is that, shorn of the adjuncts, the jīva is non-different from Brahman.\(^1\)

VI

Soul: One or Many

In the Advaitaprakāraṇa Gauḍapāda explains the apparent origination of jīvas with the help of the analogy of the limitation of ether by pots, pitchers, etc. The self is compared to ether, because, of material elements, the ether is the nearest approach to what is subtle, partless and all-pervasive. Moreover, the appearance of the distinctionless Ātman in the form of a plurality of jīvas may be explained on the analogy of the apparent limitation of ether by things like pots, etc. If the jīvas are said to be born, it is only in the sense in which pot-ether may be regarded as having origination. If it is said that the jīvas die, it is only in the sense in which pot-ether disappears when the pot is broken. Just as the production and destruction of pot are wrongly transferred to ether, so also the coming together and disintegration of material elements are superposed on the self.\(^2\)

If the self is the same in all bodies, it might be asked, should there not be simultaneous birth and death of all; and will there not be confusion of the actions and enjoyments

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1. See the present writer’s The Philosophy of Advaita, pp. 204–211.
of individuals? Now, these objections may have some force when urged against the view of the eka-jīva-vādīn. Though some Advaitins have held the view that there is only one jīva, their number is small. And without any doubt, Gaṇḍapāda is not among them. As we have already remarked, his view is ekātma-vāda and not eka-jīva-vāda. The empirical plurality of jīvas is recognized by him. So far as the Self per se is concerned, there is neither birth nor death for it, neither action nor enjoyment. These refer only to the jīvas which are many; and their manyness along with their varied nature and conditions are due to the psychophysical complexes that limit them. Just as when one pot is produced, all pots are not produced, and when one is broken all are not broken, when one soul is born all souls are not born and when one dies all do not die. And just as the defilement of a single pot-ether by dust, smoke, etc., does not affect the others, the actions and enjoyments of one soul do not belong to the others. Since the empirical plurality of jīvas is admitted, the defects pointed out above do not arise. There is neither the contingency of the simultaneous birth and death of all souls, nor that of the illegitimate transference of the actions and enjoyments of one soul to another.\textsuperscript{43}

Here there is an interesting discussion in Śaṅkara’s commentary where some of the pluralistic views are examined and refuted. To the Advaitin’s line of answer sketched above, it may be objected, “Is not the Self (Ātman) single for the Advaitin? If there be only one Self, will it not be either happy or miserable everywhere?” Before replying to this objection the Advaitin would like to ask “By whom is this objection raised?” It cannot be the Śaṅkhya who thus objects, for in his view pleasure, pain, etc., inhere not in the self but in the intellect (buddhi). And since he considers the self or puruṣa to be of the nature of consciousness or awareness, it is not proper to assume

\textsuperscript{43} GK, III, 5.
difference therein. It may be stated by the Sāṅkhya that if there be no plurality of puruṣas, prakṛti’s nature of being for the sake of another (pārārthya) would be contradicted. According to him, prakṛti evolves into the universe not for its own sake, but for the sake of providing enjoyment (bhoga) to the puruṣas and ultimately to release them. This view too will not stand the test of reasoning: for what is produced by prakṛti, viz., enjoyment or release, cannot inhere in the self. Even according to the Sāṅkhya, the puruṣa is pure consciousness; to it do not belong bondage and release. The mere existence of the puruṣa, in his view, is what prompts prakṛti to activity; for this a plurality of puruṣas is not required. Nor is there any other mode in which the Sāṅkhya could account for the plurality. Prakṛti is itself bound and is itself released; the proximity or otherwise of puruṣa is only the occasioning cause. The postulation of a plurality of selves serves no purpose whatever; and there is no pramāṇa for it.44

The followers of the Vaiśeṣika system believe that the self is a substance (dravya) having as its distinctive qualities (viśeṣa-guṇas) cognition (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha) desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), effort (prayaṇa), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma) and residual impression (saṃskāra). These qualities, they say, inhere in the self. Since the qualities are found to be of different grades in the various individuals, they presume that the self of each body is different. Now we should like to ask the Vaiśeṣikas: do these guṇas, cognition, etc., pervade the entire self, as colour, etc., are pervasive of substances in which they inhere; or do they remain in a part only, like conjunction (saṃyoga), etc? The first alternative is impossible, for if a quality like cognition is pervasive of the self—and the self is vibhu (all-pervading) in the Vaiśeṣika system—there is the contingency of the perception of all

44. Ānandagiri: na kevalaṁ pramāṇaśūnyā puruṣa-bheda-kalpanā, kim tu prayojana-śūnyā ca.
G. 21
things at the same time. If the second alternative, viz., that the qualities inhere in a part of the self, be favoured, it should be stated whether the parts distinguished in the self are real or illusory. If the self is a whole-of-parts, it would be a product like the pot, a contingency which is not acceptable even to the Vaiśeṣika. If the parts are adventitious, then cognition, etc., as qualities would belong only to the parts and not to the self. There are other difficulties which the Vaiśeṣika will have to face. According to him, the non-inherent cause of the rise of cognition, etc., is the conjunction (saṃyoga) of the self with the mind. If this be so, then he cannot at the same time subscribe to the rule that at the moment of the cognition of a thing its memory is not possible; it could well be that the memory is generated by the same conjunction which is the cause of cognition. Further, when from the conjunction between the self and mind there is the rise at one time of the memory of a certain thing, there is the contingency of the memory of other things as well; for there is no difference in the non-inherent cause. We have now been criticizing the Vaiśeṣika theory accepting, for the sake of argument, the view that the non-inherent cause of cognition, etc., is the conjunction between the self and mind. But this conjunction itself is unintelligible. Conjunction is possible between things which belong to the same class and which possess such qualities like touch, etc. The self and mind do not belong to the same class; nor are they endowed with the qualities of touch, etc. The Vaiśeṣika may attempt a reply as follows: just as quality, etc., are related to substance (dravya) even though there is no parity of class-nature nor the nature of being endowed with touch, so also the self and mind may well be related. The Advaitin’s answer to this is that so far as he is concerned the example cited is not established. In his view, what is signified by the word ‘substance’ is the independent pure sat (being); and as different from that there is nothing like quality, etc. He maintains that the substance alone in this
sense appears in different forms. If, without accepting this position, one were to say that quality, etc., are absolutely different from substance, and so also desire, etc., from the self, then, as between what are absolutely different, and therefore independent, no relation is possible. It may be said that as between what are inseparable (ayutasiddha) the relation of inherence (samavāya) is possible. But how could there be inseparability as between desire, etc., which are non-eternal and the self which is eternal? If desire, etc., were inseparable from the self, then, they would eternally reside in the self and there would be no release—consequences which are not acceptable even to the Vaiśeṣika. If we push our inquiry a stage further, it will be seen that the very concept of inherence (samavāya) is unintelligible. Is inherence identical with the substance or different therewith? If identical, there would be left no relation to relate; if different, there must be another relation to relate inherence to the substance, and this would lead to infinite regress. Moreover, the Vaiśeṣika holds that inherence is an eternal relation (nitya-sambandha). If that be so, the relata which are related by way of inherence would be eternally related, and at no time and in no place would they be separate. This again, is not a welcome result. Thus, since the relation of inherence itself is not established, it is not reasonable to say that in the self the qualities of cognition, etc., reside through the relation of inherence. Desire, etc. come into being and perish. If such perishable qualities are attributed to the self, there is the contingency of the self being non-eternal; and it would also have to be said that the self is a whole-of-parts and subject to mutation. Hence, the Advaitin rejects the views of the pluralists and maintains that qualities and changes do not in reality belong to the self, and that these are appearances due to avidyā.

As Gauḍapāda says, the distinctions are analogous to those that are seen in ether. Form, purpose, and name vary in accordance with the limiting conditions. We make
a difference, for instance, between a pot and a basin. They serve different ends, and the ether in them is called differently as pot-ether and basin-ether. But, in truth, there is no difference in ether. Similar is the case with the self. Further still, the pot-ether is not a modification of ether, nor a part thereof. So also, the jīva is neither a mode nor a portion of the Ātman. Just as children wrongly think that the impurities which are seen in the sky do really belong to it, the ignorant believe that the self gets soiled and is caught in samsāra, that it takes birth, and dies, is bound and released. But the truth is that in death and in birth, in departing and coming back, the self exists unaffected in all bodies, like ether. In a word, the self is the non-dual, eternal and immutable Absolute. Ayam ātmā brahma.

45. GK, III, 6–9.
CHAPTER VIII

THE WAY AND THE GOAL

I

Jñāna and Upāsanā

True to its character as upadeśa-sāstra, the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda contains practical teaching at the end of each prakaraṇa. The purpose of sāstra is to enable the aspirant to cross the sea of samsāra and reach the shore of blessedness which is the highest human goal (parama-puruṣārtha). Samsāra which means transmigration consists of repeated births and deaths. These pertain, as we have seen, not to the self but to the psychophysical complexes (saṅghātas) that make for finitude and limitation. The self is not particularized or individualized in truth. It is deluded, as it were, by its own māyā. The real bliss which is self is veiled and the non-real sorrow which is samsāra is projected on account of the perception of the illusory plurality of things which are related as causes and effects. The vicious circle of empirical life dependent on the law of cause and effect is evil (anartha). As long as there is an obstinate faith in causality which is illusory (āvidyaka), the chain of birth and death will not cease. When that false belief is destroyed through knowledge, samsāra is removed. The cause of birth and death is ignorance as regards the ultimate truth which is causeless. When this truth is realized, there is no further ground for metempsychosis, and one attains release which is freedom from sorrow, desire and fear.

1. See René Guénon, op. cit., p. 25: "The "Self", as such, is never individualized and cannot be so, for since it must always be considered under the aspect of the eternity and immutability which are the necessary attributes of pure Being, it is obviously insusceptible of any particularization, which would cause it to be "other than itself."
2. GK, II, 19.
3. GK, IV, 82.
4. GK, IV, 56.
Attachment to the non-real is responsible for the wanderings in the wilderness of samsāra. When one becomes non-attached through knowledge, one turns back from the false pursuit of the non-real, and reaches the non-dual reality which is homogeneous and unborn.\(^5\)

Since ignorance is the cause of bondage, the removal thereof is the means to release. And the removal is accomplished through the realization of the self which is the sole reality (ātmasyānubodha).\(^6\) We hasten, however, to remark that even this talk of bondage and release is from the standpoint of the relative. The self did never get bound really; and so there is no question of its release to be attained at a particular point of time. It is ever free; it is freedom itself. Ānandagiri gives an apt illustration.\(^7\) From the standpoint of the sun there are no night and day; it is for us who imagine the sun to rise and set that day and night have meaning. Similarly, the absolute truth is that there is neither samsāra nor mokṣa. The self is ever free; it is of the nature of eternal release (nitya-muktasvabhāva). Only, this truth is somehow obscured by māyā. When the obscuration is removed through knowledge, release is said to be attained. Here attainment is in the figurative sense. It is attainment of the already attained (prāptasya prāptih). And when it is stated that samsāra is removed at the onset of knowledge, what is meant is that there is removal of that which is already removed (nivṛttasya nivṛttih).\(^8\) Thus release signifies the realization of what is eternal, and not the accomplishment of anything new. Hence it is declared by Gauḍapāda that there is nothing to be done with reference to Brahman. The Absolute is not the fruit of activity.\(^9\) All that is required is the removal of ignorance through knowledge.

8. This seems to be the true meaning of the scriptural passage, ‘vimukt-taṣ ca vimucyate.’
The knowledge which is said to be the path to perfection is not any and every piece of knowledge. It is knowledge which is derived from a study of the Vedānta. Even this would be ineffective if it remains as a mere theoretical comprehension; it must become a matter of direct experience. When the final goal is realized, there is no knowledge apart from the self. Knowledge and the object of knowledge, then, are non-different (jñeyābhinna-jñāna). It is a sea of non-dual consciousness where there is no difference whatsoever.

One who devoutly wishes for such a consummation must prepare oneself for it. Study of scripture, ethical discipline, detachment from objects of sense and intense longing for release—these are declared to be essential for realizing the self. The aspirant should learn the purport of the Veda and get convinced of its truth through deep reflection. He should acquire freedom from passions like attachment, fear and anger (vīta-rāga-bhaya-krodhaḥ). Since these serve as obstacles in the way, unless they are removed, no progress towards the truth is possible. Having known that the Veda has for its purport the non-dual Self, and getting rid of the defects that obstruct the path, the sādhaka should fix his thoughts on the ultimate reality. Thus it is that the realization 'I am Brahman’ comes to him who has renounced the world and who is steadfast in his quest of the Self.

The path of knowledge is not an easy one. It is as hard to tread as the edge of a sharp razor. All cannot at once enter upon the steep and narrow road that leads to the goal. Gauḍapāda observes that men are at different stages of life (āśrama). There are some whose vision is well integrated and are capable of perceiving the truth.

10. GK, III, 33; IV, 1.
11. GK, II, 35-36.
13. GK, III, 16.
There are others who are middlings, of average attainments, and torn between loyalties as it were. Still others there are who are very low in spiritual grade and whose inner eye has not yet opened. For the benefit of those who belong to the second and third groups various meditations (upāsanā) are taught by scripture out of compassion for them (anukaṃpayā). Those who are at the top have no need of upāsanā because they are competent to vision the non-dual Brahman. The others need must meditate and acquire thereby the required competence. According to Ānandagiri, the men of low vision are those who meditate on the kārya-Brahman (Brahman as effect, viz., Viṛā), and the middlings are those who worship the kāraṇa-Brahman (Brahman as cause, viz., Iśvara).\(^4\) It is true that those who betake themselves to meditation (upāsanāśrita) are of poor wit (kṛpaṇa) as compared to those who have seen the eternal and unoriginated Brahman.\(^5\) But that cannot be helped, as difference in competence is of the very essence of plurality. There is, however, no cause for despondency, as all must reach the end; only some take a much longer time than others, judged by the standards of the relational world. Those who have resorted to meditation have entered the path; and their defects will not amount to much\(^6\) provided they are loyal to their resolve and march forward without turning back.

\(^2\) Meditation on Om

In the Āgama-prakaraṇa Gauḍapāda explains the method of contemplation on the significance of Praṇava or Oṃkāra, as it is set forth in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad. ‘Om’ is the sound which is indicative of the Brahman-self. It is

\(^4\) See gloss on GK, III, 16: kāryabrahmapāsakā hinaḍṛṣṭayab, kārana-brahmapāsakā madhyama drṣṭayah advitiya-brahmadarśanaśilās tūttamas-dṛṣṭayah.

\(^5\) GK, III, 1.

\(^6\) GK, IV, 48: doṣo'py alpo bhavisyati.
inclusive of all sounds; and hence it is the support of the world of speech (vāk-prapañca). And of all that is denoted by sound, the ground is Brahman. So, for the purposes of meditation the sound ‘Om’ is made to stand for the Self or Brahman. Of all the symbols, the sound ‘Om’ has come to be regarded as the most important and fruitful.¹⁷ The Kathopanisad says, “The word (or goal) which all the Vedas declare, that which all penances proclaim, and desiring which people lead an austere life, that word (or goal) I tell thee in brief: it is Om”.¹⁸ The Mundakopanisad compares the Prañava (the syllable Om) to the bow, the individual soul to the arrow, and Brahman to the target, and says that the target is to be unerringly hit: thus is union with Brahman attained.¹⁹ The fifth question of the Prāśnopanisad relates to the meditation on Om as a means to the realization of the higher and lower Brahman, i.e., the unconditioned Brahman and Brahman as conditioned. It is stated there that by means of Omkāra the wise one arrives at the Highest which is quiescent, and free from decay, death and fear.²⁰

The use of Prañava-dhyāna or meditation on Om is, thus, well-recognized in the Upanisads. In fact, the Māndūkyya starts by saying that its object is to expound the significance of Omkāra, and sketches the method of identifying the components of the sound ‘Om’ with the aspects of the Self, and thereby realizing the truth of non-duality. There are four mātrās or morae of Om corresponding to the four pādas of the Self. The four mātrās are a, u, m, and the fourth which is really amātra or moraless part which is represented by the point (bindu) of the anusvāra. The pādas of the Self, as we have seen already, are Viśva,

¹⁷. See Śaṅkara’s com. on Prāṇa V, 2. nediṣṭham hy ālambanam omkāro brahmaṇaḥ. The nearest stay of Brahman is omkāra.
¹⁹. II, ii, 3.
²⁰. V, 7.
Taijasa, Prājña, and the Turīya; the first three stand for the self in waking, dream and sleep respectively, and the fourth is the self per se. The principle of the meditation on Om is to equate the mātrās with the pādas.21 Gauḍapāda calls the knowledge or equation mātrāsampratipatti (i.e., knowing the mātrās to be identical with the pādas) and omkārasyapādāsavidyā (knowledge of the morae of Om as the pādas of the Self). Now, if two things are to be identified or compared, there must be some similarity between them. The Māṇḍūkya and, following it, the Kārikā give reasons in each case for the identification of the pādas with the mātrās. And the reasons, it is well to remember, are intended only for helping concentration on the significance of Om.

The first of the mātrās is a and the first of the pādas is Viśva. These too are to be regarded as identical because of the common quality of being the first (ādi) as well as that of pervading (āpti).22 Of the sound-components of Om, a is the first; so also of the aspects of the Self, Viśva is the first. And just as a is pervasive of all speech,23 Viśva is pervasive of the universe. In the case of the second mātrā u, and the second pāda, Taijasa, the common qualities are exaltation (utkarṣa) and intermediateness (ubhayatva). The exaltation of u is due to its being subsequent to a. Similarly, Taijasa is exalted over Viśva, because of its superior order. U is intermediate between a and m; and Taijasa is between Viśva and Prājña.24 The common features that constitute the basis for the identification of m and Prājña are being the measure (miti or māna) and the locus of emergence (apāti or laya).25 In pronouncing Om repeatedly, a and u merge into and emerge from m, as it were. Hence m is said to be the measure of the other two

22. Māṇḍ 9; GK, I, 19.
23. akāra vai sarvā vak. The sound a is all speech.
mātrās. Prājña is the measure of Viśva and Taijasa because these two evolve out of it in creation and enter into it in dissolution; the worlds of waking and dream get resolved in sleep, and from sleep they emerge again. The second common quality is laya or disappearance; just as a and u end in m, Viśva and Taijasa disappear in Prājña. It will be clear that the letters, a, u, and m are employed in this meditation as mnemonics. Each letter stands for the first letter of the words signifying certain feature of the Self in its manifestations as Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña. The second quality of Prājña is the only exception. Thus a stands for ādi and āpti; u for utkarsa and ubhayatva; m for miti or māna.²⁶

The fourth mātrā is, as we said, really amātra. It is the silence into which the sound Om culminates. It is the Om without the distinction of parts. It has not even a name, and therefore it does not come under the purview of empirical usage. It is the Turiya Self or pure consciousness which transcends the distinctions involved in the forms of Viśva and Taijasa, and the seed of plurality implicit in Prājñā.²⁷

The Māndūkya Upaniṣad eulogizes the meditation on the identity of the mātrās and the pādas by specifying the fruit which each stage in the meditation yields. He who knows Vaiśvānara (i.e., Viśva) as a, says the Upaniṣad, obtains all desires and becomes first among the great. He who knows the identity of Taijasa with u exalts or increases the continuity of knowledge and becomes equal or of the same attitude towards all; and in his family

²⁶. See René Guénon, op. cit., p. 166n. ‘....the geometrical forms which respectively correspond to the three mātrās are a straight line, a semi-circle (or rather a spiral element) and a point; the first symbolizes the complete unfoldment or manifestation; the second, a state of relative envelopment as compared with this unfoldment but still developed or manifested; the third the formless state, “without dimensions” or special limitative conditions, that is to say the unmanifested. It will also be noticed that the point is the primordial principle of all geometrical figures, as the unmanifested is of all the states of manifestation, and that it is in its degree, the true and indivisible unity, which makes it a natural symbol of pure Being.’

none who does not know Brahman is born. He who knows
the oneness of Prājña and m measures the whole world
(i.e., knows its true nature) and becomes the place of its
mergence (i.e., he becomes the self which is the cause of
the universe). He who knows the moraless Oṃkāra in its
fulness as signifying the Turiya realizes the Self and does
not return to empirical life. 28

There is a similar eulogy of the meditation on the
mātrās of Om in the Praśnopaniṣad. If a person meditates
on Om as of one mātrā, says the Praśna, he, enlightened
by that, attains the earthly world soon (i.e., he returns
to this world after death without delay); the rks lead him
to the world of men; there, becoming rich in penance,
austerity and faith, he enjoys supremacy. If he meditates
on Om as of two mātrās, he attains the mind (i.e., gains
self-possession through concentration), he is led by yajus
to the interspace, the world of moon; after enjoying
supernatural powers there, he returns to this world. But
if he meditates on the supreme Self with the sacred
syllable Om with three mātrās, he becomes one with the
light which is the sun. Just as a snake casts off its
slough, he sheds all sin and is led upward by the sāma-
chants to the world of Brahman; he sees there the supreme
Puruṣa, living in the heart-city and superior to Hiranya-
garbhā. 29 The implication of the eulogy is that the
sādhaka should understand the significance of Om and
meditate on it; the deeper the comprehenson, the greater
will be the benefit. That is why the Praśna says that
meditation on Om as of one, two, and three mātrās re-
spectively leads to the world of men, the path of the manes
(pitṛyāna), and the path of the gods (devayāna).

To the three mātrās of which mention is made in the
Praśna, the Māṇḍūkya adds a fourth which is amātra
signifying the supreme non-dual reality. It is this amātra

THE WAY AND THE GOAL

(moraless part) or ardhamātrā (half-mora, as it is otherwise called) that is described as the crown of the syllable Om. It is this which leads to the final goal.

Leaving the eulogistic part of the Māṇḍūkyya passages unexplained, for it requires no explanation, Gauḍapāda points out what is of real value in the meditation on Om. He says that a leads to Viśva, u to Taijasa, m to Prājñā, and that there is no leading to or attainment of anything in the amātra. Anandagiri explains Gauḍapāda’s statement thus: he who meditates on Omkāra as being predominantly of the form of a attains Viśva-Vaiśvānara. He who meditates on Om as being predominantly of the form of u attains Taijasa-Hiranyagarbha. And he who meditates on Om as being predominantly of the form of m attains Prājñā-Avyakta. The gross universe, waking state and Viśva—these three are a; the subtle universe, dream state and Taijasa—these three are u; the cause of the two worlds, deep sleep and Prājñā—these three are m. Here also each earlier factor attains the nature of that which succeeds it. The purpose of this meditation is to lead the aspirant from the grosser to the subtler, till that stage is reached where all duality is removed and the journey comes to an end. In the Turiya-self there is not the distinction of attainer, object-to-be-attained, and attainment. That is why Ācārya-Gauḍapāda says that there is no movement or process in the amātra.

Upāsanā or meditation is defined thus by Śaṅkara: the process of taking hold of some stay or ālambana, established as such in the śāstra, and directing a continuous flow of even psychoses towards it, without the intervention of any other cognition contrary to it, is upāsanā. There must be some point of attention for concentration. This is

30. Maitri, vi, 23.
31. YT, 7.
32. GK, I, 23.
33. GK, I, 23: nāmātre vidyate gatiḥ.
34. Introduction to Chānd, I, i, 1.
the ālambana. It is of service in steadying the thought-current and making it flow in one direction. The pratīkās or images are useful in this way. The centrifugal tendency of the mind is arrested, and it becomes unflickering and one-pointed like the flame of the lamp kept in a still place.\(^{35}\) The images which are mis-called idols have a place in spiritual discipline because they help to turn the mind of the aspirant Godward.

That Praṇava or Ōṁkāra has the pride of place among the symbols of the invisible Spirit, we have already stated. Its significance and the method of meditation thereon have also been explained. Gauḍapāda concludes his exposition of Praṇava-yoga by praising it and those who practise it. The mind should be yoked to Praṇava, for Praṇava is Brahman in which there is no fear. For him who is ever united with Praṇava there is no fear anywhere. Praṇava is the lower Brahman; it is the higher as well. It has no cause; there is nothing besides it, nothing outside it. Nor is there anything that follows from it. Praṇava is the immutable. It is the beginning, middle and end of all. He who knows Praṇava thus attains the Self. Om is to be known as the Lord present in the heart of all. Having understood the all-pervading Om, the wise one does not grieve. Ōṁkāra is without measure (amāтра), and its measure is limitless (anantamātra); it is that in which all duality ceases; it is bliss. He who knows it thus is a saint, and no other.

III

Asparśa-yoga

In the Advaita-prakaraṇa Gauḍapāda prescribes for the sādhaka a course of discipline which he calls asparśa-yoga, and refers to it again in the Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa. Asparśa-yoga, is the yoga of transcendence, whereby one realizes the supra-relational reality. ‘Sparśa’ means touch; and as a transferred epithet it stands here for the sensibilia.\(^{36}\)

\(^{35}\) Śaṅkara’s com. on Praśna, V, 1.
\(^{36}\) For a similar use of the term, see the Gitā, II, 14, and V, 27.
'Asparśa' which is the negative of 'sparśa' would, then, mean the super-sensible or metaphysical reality. And asparśa-yoga is the path to the realization of that Reality. Śaṅkara says that the asparśa-yoga is so called because it is devoid of sparśa, a term which indicates all relations.\textsuperscript{37} Ānandagīrī gives the meaning advaitānubhava (non-dual experience) to the term 'asparśa' on the ground that when there is that experience, there is no contact with the characteristics of castes (varṇas) and stations in life (āśramas) or with the defects like demerit (pāpa), etc.\textsuperscript{38}

The purpose for which this yoga is to be resorted to is the same as that which is set forth in the Pātañjala-sūtra as the goal of yoga, viz., to stem the tide of the surging psychoses of mind and gradually attain thereby a state of mindlessness. The pluralistic universe is what is imagined and moved by the mind (manodṛṣya, manaspandita). Through the imagination or saṅkalpa of the mind the soul gets bound, as it were. The mind contemplates objects and becomes distracted and shattered with the result there is no peace or happiness. It moves towards things the acceptance of which it fancies would yield pleasure and desists from modes of activity which it thinks would end in painful consequences. But both acceptance and desistance are motivated by the centrifugal tendency of the mind, and lead to the reinforcement of the bonds of samsāra. So, the out-going mind should be called back and controlled; that is, the desires must be quelled, and the mind emptied of all content. If the mind becomes free from desires, it itself will cease to be, even as fire gets quenched in the absence of fuel.\textsuperscript{39} This is what is called amanībhāva or amanastā, the state of non-mind.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} Com. on GK, III, 39. sarva-sambandhākhyā-sparśa-varjitātvaḥ asparśayogah.
\textsuperscript{38} Gloss on GK, III, 39.
\textsuperscript{39} Śaṅkara on GK, III, 34: bāhyavisayābhāve nirindhanāgrīvat prasāntam nīgrhaṁ niruddham mano bhavati. See also Ānandagīrī’s gloss: nirviṣayaṁ manah śāmyati.
\textsuperscript{40} GK, III, 31-32. It is also called unmanībhāva. See Brahmabindu Upaniṣad, 4.
The control of mind (manonigraha) is essential for the sadhaka as the means to reach the end he has in view, viz., the absence of fear, destruction of misery, spiritual awakening, eternal peace.\(^{41}\) It is, no doubt, not easy to still the stormy mind. Controlling the mind is as laborious and difficult as emptying the ocean drop by drop with the tip of a blade of grass. But it is not an impossible task; and one can accomplish it provided one puts forth relentless effort backed by a steady resolve, even as the bird in the story is said to have succeeded in draining the ocean through constancy of purpose and a zeal which knows no defeat.\(^ {42}\)

The obstacles that confront a practicant of yoga are mainly four. They are: \textit{laya} (lapse), \textit{vikṣepa} (distraction), \textit{kasāya} (passion), and \textit{rasāsvāda} (satisfaction). Of these, \textit{laya} is the lapsing of the mind into sleep, without resting on the impartite Reality; \textit{vikṣepa} is the dwelling of the mind on what is other than the non-dual Absolute; \textit{kasāya} is not resting on the impartite Reality, owing to a stiffening of the mind as a result of the residual impression of defects like attachment, even though there be no lapse into sleep or distraction by contrary psychoses; and \textit{rasāsvāda} is the tasting of satisfaction at the last stages in yoga, without resting the mind on the ultimate Reality. It will be seen that what is common about these obstacles is that they put

\(^{41}\) \textit{GK, III, 40.}  
\(^{42}\) \textit{GK, III, 41.} This kārikā is quoted by Bhāratītīrtha–Vidyāranya in his \textit{Paścadaśi} (XI, 109), and by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his commentary on the \textit{Gītā} (VI, 2). According to Rāmakṛṣṇa, the commentator on the \textit{Paścadaśi} and Madhusūdana, the first half of the kārikā refers to the Tīṭhībopākhyāna of the Hitopadeśa. Upaniṣadbrahmayogin also gives the story in his commentary on the kārikā. The story runs thus: Once upon a time the eggs laid on the shore by a bird were washed away by the waves of the sea. The bird thought that it could drain the sea, and began to remove the water drop by drop with its beak. The other birds tried to convince it of the foolishness of its resolve and exhorted it to desist from pursuing a futile course of action—but all to no purpose. Nārada happened to pass that way; and he advised the bird to stop exerting itself unnecessarily. But the bird replied that it would not, and that, on the contrary, it would continue till the sea was drained either in that life or in the next. Nārada took pity on the bird and sent Garuda to its aid. Garuda flapped his wings fiercely with a view to produce a strong wind which would dry up the sea. At this, the sea got frightened and gave back the eggs to the bird.
a break on the mind and prevent it from resting on the non-dual Reality. The yogin must cross the hurdles and march resolutely onward to truth.

When the mind shows a tendency to lapse into sleep, says Gauḍapāda, it must be roused and made vigilant. It may be asked: is not quiescence the end of yoga, and does not the mind become quiescent in slumber? Why, then, should it be roused from sleep? The answer is that sleep is not the end sought by man, because it contains the seed of evil. It is inertia caused by tiresomeness. The mind does not become non-mind there; it is only temporarily resolved in its cause, avidyā. Hence the mind should not be allowed to lapse into torpidity. The extremes seem alike. But wisdom lies in not mistaking the one for the other. Sleep is not sāṁādhi. The second obstacle, as stated above, is vikṣepa or distraction. This is the normal state of the mind when it is active. The desires (kāma) and enjoyments (bhoga) make it flow out towards objects. The mind gets transformed into the one or the other of the psychoses of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), erroneous cognition (viparyaya), imagination (vikalpa), and memory (smṛti). Deluding itself with the thought that its good lies in the objects of enjoyment, the mind goes out in the form of its psychoses, and as a consequence gets enmeshed in misery. The yogin must cry halt to such a dissipating process and withdraw the mind from its objects. The method by which this is to be done is twofold: non-attachment to sense-objects (vairāgya) and repeated contemplation of the truth of the non-dual self (jñānābhyāsa). Non-attachment comes to the

43. See the Vedāntasūtra of Sadānanda, edited by Prof. M. Hiriyanna, pp. 13 and 60.
44. See YS, I, i, 10. abhāva-pratyayātmanā vṛttil nir ā. Sleep is a fluctuation (of mind-stuff) supported by the cause (pratyaya, that is tamaś) of the (transient) negation (of the waking and the dreaming fluctuations). Tr. Woods, p. 29. The laya state of the mind corresponds to what is called mūḍha in the system of yoga. See Vyāsa-bhāṣya on I, i, i.
45. See YS, I, i, 6.
46. See Śāṅkara’s Com. on GK, III, 44; and also YS, I, i, 6. abhyāsa-vairāgyābhāsa tan-nirūdhaḥ.

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yogin when he ponders over the nature of the sense-objects and realizes that they are nescience-born, finite, fleeting and productive of misery. Whenever he is conscious of the pluralistic universe, the sādhaka must practise the aforesaid mode of meditation. His aim, however, should be to reach a stage when the world does not even appear. This is to be accomplished by reflecting on the non-duality of Brahman as taught in Scripture and by the wise teachers. The yogin must constantly think of the truth that the unborn Brahman is all and that there is nothing else which is real. Thus the distracted mind should be brought to unity. But obstructing the attempt at unification lies the great obstacle which we have termed kasāya. Due to long association with the passions like affection (rāga), aversion (dveṣa) and delusion (moha), the mind is not pliant and does not lend itself easily to reformation. These passions envelop it and hold it stiff like starch, so that it seems to be unbendable. The yogin must know this condition of the mind and rectify it. And after a good deal of struggle when his mind reaches the state of equanimity, he should not cause it to deviate from that state. Even then he is not free from danger. The yogic trance may itself prove to be a trap, if the sādhaka is not on his guard. In the thrill of quietitude and the calmness which he enjoys, he should not forget that his goal is still ahead; he should not mistake the inn for his destination. Anything that is enjoyed must belong to duality; it cannot be unlimited or lasting happiness. Whatever is perceived by the mind as happiness must necessarily be pseudo-happiness, a deposit of avidyā. The happiness that is enjoyed in the savikalpa-samādhi is not the ultimate bliss which is Brahman; for Brahman is not what is enjoyed. The pilgrim must march on without resting satisfied at his achievement and deriving

47. This is also called samprajñātā-samādhi. It is a state where the mind is conscious of the object of meditation. Of this there are four types: savitaraka or deliberative, savicāra or of reflection, sānanda or of joy, and sāsmīti or egoistic. It will be seen thus that joy is one of the forms in which the mind here is cognitive of its object. See YS, I, i, 17.
pleasure therefrom (rasāsvāda or sukhāsvāda). Hence the great emphasis placed in the Advaita system on viveka or discriminative knowledge. Even at the commencement of the topic of yoga, Gauḍapāda takes care to point out that the mind is to be made non-mind through the knowledge of the sole reality of the Self (Ātmasatyānubodha).

When thus the obstacles are overcome, the mind does not lapse into a state of torpor, nor is it distracted again. It becomes motionless like a lamp in a windless place and rests concentrated on the non-dual Brahman. This state corresponds to the nirvikalpa-samādhi in the system of yoga. It is called asparśa-yoga by Gauḍapāda.

The average yogin, says the great teacher, is afraid of this consummation in non-dual experience. He sees fear where, in fact, there is no fear. The lack of knowledge of the Vedānta is what makes him shrink from the Absolute. Non-attachment and concentration of the mind cannot by themselves lead one to the goal; they must be backed by viveka or knowledge. In so far as most practicants of yoga pay no heed to this, they go astray. Bhāratītīrtha says in the Pañcadaśī that, in the view of Gauḍapāda, the other yogins, i.e., those who are devoted to the conditioned Brahman, are greatly afraid of nirvikalpa-samādhi, which is devoid of the triple forms consisting in knower, object known, and process of knowing.

The asparśayoga is the true samādhi, where speech and mind terminate. It is beyond all expression, and above all thoughts. The outer organs do not function there, nor the internal organ, viz. the mind. It is all calm in samādhi which is eternal consciousness, unwavering and with-

48. GK, III, 42—46. See Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's com. on the Gītā VI, 26 where these kārikās are quoted and explained.
49. GK, III, 32.
50. GK, III, 46. See the Gītā, vi, 19.
51. PD, II, 28; GK, III, 39.
out fear. There is no grasping there nor abandonment of objects, since thought does not function there. The Self alone exists, established in itself, as unswerving knowledge, the same all over.\textsuperscript{52} The samādhi is of the nature of the cessation of all evil. Since it is centred in the Self, it is, verily, release. It is bliss that passeth understanding, perfection which is not a product.\textsuperscript{53} The asparśayoga is the \textit{sumnum bonum} of beings; it is beyond dispute and contradiction.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{IV}

\textit{Mokṣa}

Several expressions, positive and negative, are employed by Gauḍapāda to indicate the nature of the goal. The end that is sought by man is sorrowlessness and everlasting bliss. Hence the goal is described as duḥkha-ksaya (destruction of misery)\textsuperscript{55} and uttama-sukha (supreme happiness).\textsuperscript{56} It is a state where there is no fear (abhaya),\textsuperscript{57} no narrowness (akārpanya),\textsuperscript{58} no sorrow and no desire (vita-śokam tathā kāmam),\textsuperscript{59} no movement (niścalā sthitih),\textsuperscript{60} and no plurality (anānātva).\textsuperscript{61} There is sameness (sāmya)\textsuperscript{62} there, purity (vaiśāradya),\textsuperscript{63} omniscience (sarvajñatā),\textsuperscript{64} awakening (prabodha) and eternal peace (akṣayā-śānti).\textsuperscript{65} The root cause of misery, viz., avidyā vanishes. Hence the veil

\textsuperscript{52} GK, III, 37—38.
\textsuperscript{53} GK, III, 47.
\textsuperscript{54} GK, IV, 2.
\textsuperscript{55} GK, III, 40.
\textsuperscript{56} GK, III, 47.
\textsuperscript{57} GK, III, 39.
\textsuperscript{58} GK, III, 2.
\textsuperscript{59} GK, IV, 78.
\textsuperscript{60} GK, IV, 80.
\textsuperscript{61} GK, IV, 100.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} GK, IV, 94.
\textsuperscript{64} GK, IV, 85.
\textsuperscript{65} GK, III, 40.
that covered the truth falls off (āvaranacyuti).\textsuperscript{66} Along with avidyā the world of plurality disappears (dvaitasyopasāma, prapañcopsāma),\textsuperscript{67} and the mind becomes non-mind (amanibhāva, amanastā).\textsuperscript{68} One realizes in that state the non-difference of the jīva from the self (jīvātmanor ananyatvam),\textsuperscript{69} attains non-duality (advaita prāpti),\textsuperscript{70} becomes the Truth (tattvī- bhūta).\textsuperscript{71} There is no death in that state, nor return to empirical modes of existence. One realizes immortality (amṛtatva),\textsuperscript{72} freedom (mokṣa),\textsuperscript{73} perfection (nirvāṇa).\textsuperscript{74} The end has arrived for one, when through knowledge nescience has been dispelled. It is the end which is final and complete. It is transcendence of all finitude; hence it is designated turīyam or brāhmaṇyam padam (the fourth or Brahman-state).\textsuperscript{75}

Mokṣa or release which is the supreme goal of man is not a post mortem state. It can be realized even here (iha), while in embodiment.\textsuperscript{76} We have freely used with reference to mokṣa such words as ‘attainment’ and ‘realization’. These expressions, however, should be understood in the figurative sense. Mokṣa is the eternal and inalienable nature of the self. It is not something in the future, as what-is-to-be-accomplished. It is already there; it has always been there; it alone is real. He who knows this is said to be released; he is a jīvanmukta.\textsuperscript{77} Because he has attained full omniscience and is free from the delusion of duality, there is nothing which he can desire to possess and

\textsuperscript{66} GK, IV, 97.
\textsuperscript{67} GK, I, 39; II, 35.
\textsuperscript{68} GK, III, 31–32.
\textsuperscript{69} GK, III, 13.
\textsuperscript{70} GK, II, 38.
\textsuperscript{71} GK, II, 38.
\textsuperscript{72} GK, IV, 92.
\textsuperscript{73} GK, IV, 30.
\textsuperscript{74} GK, III, 47.
\textsuperscript{75} GK, I, 15: IV. 85.
\textsuperscript{76} GK, IV, 89.
\textsuperscript{77} Though the term is not employed by Gauḍapāda, he expresses the idea in other words.
enjoy. He is not elated by praise nor depressed by blame. He does not offer obeisance to any, nor does he perform any rite. He has no fixed home, and subsists on what comes his way. He is like a non-conscious being, and lives as he likes. Since he has attained self-sovereignty, he is a law unto himself. But his conduct can never be immoral though he has no obligations. Virtues like humility, equanimity, calmness, and self-control are natural to him. His is the immortal state which is deep and unfathomable, unborn, ever the same, and free from fear. He sees the truth everywhere. He delights in the truth and does not swerve from it, for he is himself the truth.

78. *GK*, II, 36–37. This does not mean libertinism, for that is impossible for such a perfect man.
79. *GK*, IV, 86.
80. *GK*, IV, 100.
CHAPTER IX
GAUḌAPĀDA AND BUDDHISM

There has been a persistent charge levelled against Advaita that it is pseudo-Buddhism, and its leaders have been characterized by their critics as propagandists for Baudhāya views under the guise of orthodoxy. The great Śankara who consolidated the Advaita system by writing extensive commentaries on the three prasthānas as well as independent works both in prose and verse has been accused of preaching the Baudhāya doctrine under the false name of māyāvāda. In the Padma-purāṇa Śiva is said to have declared to Pārvatī:

māyāvādam asac chāstraṁ prachannam bauddham ucyate,
mayaiṁa kathitam devi, kalau brāhmaṇarūpīṇā.

‘The doctrine of māyā which is a false teaching and is said to be a disguised form of Buddhism was taught by me alone, O devi, having assumed the form of a Brahmin in the Kali age.’¹ The device which is employed in this verse is nothing new. It is the time-honoured method of rejecting the doctrine without appearing to insult the teacher. The Cārvāka system, for instance, is unorthodox, anti-Vedic, and ungodly. But the promulgator thereof is no mean a person. He is Brhaspati, the wise preceptor of the gods, according to the epics and the Purāṇas. He is said to have spread this doctrine among the Asuras, with a view to send them to their doom. Buddhā himself has been received into later Hinduism as an avatāra of Viṣṇu. But the philosophy which he taught was not for the orthodox; it was designed

¹. See the Padmapurāṇa (uttarakhaṇḍa, ch. 263). Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Vol. 4, pp. 1834–5. Advaita is included among the tāmasa śāstras.

Here are a few more lines from the same work:
parātmajīvayor alkyam mamātra pratipādyate
brahmaṇo 'syā svayaṁ rūpam nirgumam vakṣyate māyā,
sarvasya jagato'py atra mohanārtham kalau yuge
vedārthavan mahāśastram māyaya yad-avaidikam.
to delude the wicked and the fallen. So there is nothing surprising in the accusation that is brought against Śaṅkara and other teachers of Advaita that they are pseudo-Bauddhas. Śaṅkara himself may be honoured, and yet his teaching may be rejected by those who are opposed to Advaita.

I

Alleged Borrowings from Buddhism

One of the main grounds on which Śaṅkara is branded as a veiled Bauddha is that his philosophical progenitor, Gauḍapāda, was en rapport with Buddhism. Louis De La Vallee Poussin writes, "One cannot read the Gauḍapādakārikās without being struck by the Buddhist character of the leading ideas and of the wording itself. The author seems to have used Buddhist works or sayings, and to have adjusted them to his Vedāntic design; nay more, he finds pleasure in double entendre. As Gauḍapāda is the spiritual grandfather of Śaṅkara, this fact is not insignificant." Especially in the Alātaśānti-prakarāṇa the critics find Gauḍapāda making use approvingly of Bauddha arguments, and they believe that he accepts the conclusions of Buddhism. Max Walleser says that the fourth book of the Gauḍapādiya attacks the realistic doctrines of both the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣikas and asserts its doctrines of monism, illusion and negativism in language strongly reminiscent of the Buddhist schools. Hermann Jacobi holds

2. See J. E. Carpenter: Theism in Mediaeval India, p. 246: "It is not a little curious that the Southern recension (of the Mahābhārata) in adding an avatāra as the Buddha, should explain that in this impersonation, clothed in yellow and with shaven head, his object would be to confuse men and lead them astray."

See also the Padmapurāṇa (uttarakanda, ch. 263:)
dhiṣanena tathā proktam cārvākamatigarhitam,
daiyānām nāsanārthāya viṣṇunā buddha-rūpinā.

See Thessalonians II (ii, 11, 12):
"God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be dammed who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."

that Gaudapāda has used the very same arguments as the Buddhists to prove the unreality of the external objects of our perceptions, and that there is a near relation, amounting almost to identity, between the epistemology of the Śūnyavādins or Vijñānavādins on one side and Gaudapāda’s māyāvāda on the other. 

Surendranath Dasgupta believes that there is sufficient evidence in the kārikās for thinking that Gaudapāda was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of Buddha. He writes, “Gaudapāda assimilated all the Buddhist Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upaniṣads.”

By far the most searching and detailed examination of the question of Gaudapāda’s indebtedness to Buddhism has been made by Professor V. Bhattacharya in the Introduction to the Kārikā which he has edited and in his annotations especially of the verses of the fourth prakaraṇa. It is his view that Gaudapāda has accepted or approved of the Baudhāṇa doctrines and advocated them throughout the Kārikā. The first evidence that is adduced by Professor Bhattacharya to prove that Gaudapāda has borrowed from the Baudhāṇa writers is that the Ācārya ‘has quoted almost fully, partially or substantially from works of some celebrated Buddhist teachers who flourished between 200 A.D. and 400 A.D.’ Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maitreyanātha or Asaṅga, and possibly Yaśomitra, would seem not only to have supplied Gaudapāda with philosophic thoughts to adopt, but also with model verses to follow in his composition of the Kārikā. The quotations from the works of the

5. JAOS (1913), pp. 52 & 54.
7. Ibid., p. 429.
8. See AS, p. liv.
9. Ibid., p. lxxvi-lxxvii.
10. GK, IV, 22 a-b; Mulaṃadhyamakakārikā, XXI, 13 a-b. GK, IV, 7 c-d and 29 c-d; Mulaṃadhyamakakārikā, XV, 8 c-d. GK, IV, 4b; Catuḥkāta, 373d. GK, IV, 44; Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, XIV, 9 c-d-10 a-b. GK, IV, 13; Abhidharmakośavyākhyā quoted in Madhyamakavrtti, p. 13.
Buddha writers are by no means accidental or out of the way, since they fit so well into the thought-scheme of Gaudapada. The idealistic schools of Buddhism, Vijñana-vada and Madhyamika, must have appealed to him as sponsoring views very much like his own, and so without any hesitation or scruple he has made use of the arguments advanced by these Buddha schools to prove his conclusions. The two main doctrines he teaches in the Karika are the unreality (vaitathya) of the world and its absolute non-origination (ajati). The former doctrine is advocated by the Vijñanaavadins, and the latter is proved by the Madhyamikas. Gaudapada has fully utilized their lines of thought and has expressed his complete agreement with their views.

The doctrine that there is no external reality is common, says Professor Bhattacharyya, to both Gaudapada and the Vijñanaavadins. The world, according to both, is a figment of the imagination (kalpita). Reading the fourth quarter of karika, II, 4, as samvrtatvatva na bhidyate (instead of samvrtatvena bhidyate), the Professor argues that for Gaudapada, as for the Vijñanaavadins, there is no difference whatever between the world of waking and the world of dreams. Both are samvrti, enclosed within the body. Just as the things imagined in dream are seen inside the body, the objects of the waking world also are really observed only within the body, for they are equally the products of imagination. Their appearance outside of us is but an illusion. As Dhinnaga says, that which is of the nature of an object of cognition within appears as if outside.11 The position of Gaudapada is substantially the same.

The illustrations used by him for establishing the illusoriness of the world are the same as those found in Vijñanavada works. We have seen above that he makes use of the dream analogy. And this, in the view of Prof.

Bhattacharya, is a usage borrowed from Vijñānavāda. The reasons given by Gauḍapāda for characterizing the worlds of dream and waking as unreal are the same as those of Buddhist subjectivism. He compares the universe to gandharva-nagara; and the word gandharva-nagara ‘is not pre-Buddhist and is frequently used in Buddhist works.’ The example of magic-elephant (māyā-hastin) is to be found in Buddhist literature. The simile of the fire-brand (alāta) which Gauḍapāda employs in the fourth prakaraṇa is a favourite one with the Baudhāyas. The arguments which he puts forward in this connection are all drawn from Baudhāya writings.

Both Gauḍapāda and the Vijñānavādins believe that the external world is citta-spandita, a vibration of the mind. Even as regards the procedure, there seems to be agreement between them. In kārikā II, 16, Gauḍapāda says that the jīva is first imagined, and then the various things are posited. Prof. Bhattacharya identifies this jīva-kalpanā with what the Baudhāyas call satkāyadṛṣṭi.

Citta, manas, or vijñāna is the sole reality, according to the Vijñāna-vādins. Gauḍapāda calls it jñāna, which, as the commentator explains, is jñānaptimātra. The ātmasamstha-jñāna of which Gauḍapāda speaks in kārikā III, 38, is the same, says Prof. Bhattacharya, as the vijñānaptimātra or vijñānamātra of the Buddhist Vijñānavādins. The Advaita teacher agrees with the Vijñānavāda in its view that there is nothing real but the citta or vijñāna, and that the so-called external world is only a manifestation of the mind. Since there are no real objects with which

12. See AŚ, p. 38.
13. GK, IV, 44.
17. Gk, III, 33; AŚ, p. 18.
18. AŚ, p. 73.
19. AŚ, p. 165.
the mind could come into contact, jñāna is said to be, like the sky, unattached (asaṅga); and for the same reason jñāna is non-different from the object known (jñeyābhinnajñāna).

Gauḍapāda makes extensive use, it is urged, of the Mādhyamika modes of reasoning to prove that there is nothing which originates. The doctrine of non-origination (ajāti) which Gauḍapāda advocates is essentially a Mādhyamika view. Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakakārikā begins with the words ‘aniruddham anutpādam’ (there is neither suppression nor origination). This anutpāda, observes Prof. Battacharya, is thoroughly discussed and established in that work as in others. And what Gauḍapāda does is to accept the doctrine and commend it to his followers. The Professor says, ‘It is to be noted here that Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntist, and yet he accepts the doctrine of non-origination of the Advayavādins or Buddhists expressing his approval. He does not see any use disputing with them and invites apparently his Vedāntist followers to listen to him as to why this view cannot be disputed.’ Like the Āniruddhavādins, Naiyāyikas, and the Vaishēśikas, the Vedāntins were also originally believers in the doctrine of origination, according to Prof. Bhattacharya. It was only after Gauḍapāda’s advocacy of ajāti which is a Buddhist concept that his followers beginning with Śaṅkara adopted it as an integral part of the Advaita system. Most of the kārikās of the fourth prakāraṇa are taken up with a justification of the doctrine of ajāti. And the methods of reasoning employed there are much the same as those of Nāgārjuna. Special mention may be made of the four-pronged dialectic known as Catuskoṭi, and of the thorough-going criticism of the concept of cause. If there is to be origination, it must be of the existent from the existent, or of the existent from

20. See GK, IV, 1; AŚ, pp. 84–85.
22. See GK, IV, 40; 83–84.
the non-existent, or of the non-existent from the existent, or of the non-existent from the non-existent. Nāgārjuna shows how none of these alternatives is intelligible.²³ Gauḍapāda agrees with him and makes use of his dialectic. He attacks the theory of origination in different ways through arguments gathered from Buddhist sources and arrives at the conclusion that non-origination is the highest truth.²⁴

The Baudhāyas reject the two extreme theories of eternality (sāśvatavāda) and annihilation (ucchedavāda), and adopt what is known as the Middle Path (madhyamā pratipad). Gauḍapāda too says in kārikā IV, 57, that there is nothing eternal, and no annihilation.²⁵

The Baudhāyas say that there are two truths, sanvṛti satya (practical or empirical truth), and paramārtha satya (absolute, supreme, or transcendentental truth). In the Madhyamika system, the sanvṛti is also called vyavahāra or vyāvahārika satya. While the sanvṛti is the means (upāya), the paramārtha is the end (upeya). Now, it is well-known that in Advaita-Vedānta the doctrine of the two kinds of reality plays an important role. Gauḍapāda speaks of the birth of things through sanvṛti, and declares that non-birth or non-origination is the supreme truth.²⁶ Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that the theory of the two truths was accepted by Śaṅkara 'from the Buddhists through Gauḍapāda.'²⁷

Sometimes a threefold distinction of truth or reality is made in the Advaita system: (1) prātibhāsika-satya (apparent reality), (2) vyāvahārika-satya (empirical reality), and (3) paramārthika-satya (supreme reality). A similar distinction is found in Buddhist works. There are three

²³ Madhyamakakārikā XXI, 12.
²⁴ AŚ, p. cxxiii.
²⁵ AŚ, p. 162.
²⁶ GK, IV, 57.
²⁷ AŚ, p. 163.
characteristics (lakṣaṇā) or natures (svabhāva) of a thing, according to the Baudhīyas, viz., (i) parikalpita ‘imagined’, (ii) paratantra ‘dependent,’ and (iii) parinīṣpanna ‘perfect.’ Vasubandhu explains the threefold characteristics by means of an example. The magician conjures up an elephant by his magical power. The elephant appears, but it is devoid of content. There is no elephant in reality; there is only an empty form. ‘Here the elephant is parikalpita; the form of the elephant is paratantra, and the absence of the elephant is parinīṣpanna.’ “Of these three lakṣaṇās or svabhāvas,” says Prof. Bhattacharya, “the first, parikalpita, may roughly be compared in the system of the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara with prātibhāsika satya ‘the truth that exists only in appearance;’ as for example, mirage, or the appearance of a snake on a piece of string; paratantra with vyāvahārika satya ‘the practical truth’, the phenomena in the waking state are its examples; and parinīṣpanna with pāramārthika satya ‘supreme or transcendental truth,’ e.g., Brahman of the Vedāntins.”

Gauḍapāda refers to three kinds of jñāna (knowledge) in kārikās, IV, 87-88: (i) laukika (mundane), (ii) suddha laukika (pure mundane), and (iii) lokottara (supramundane). The first is the ordinary experience where there are both the object and its perception. In the second type of jñāna, the unreality of the object is realized and the knowledge is with perception alone. In the third variety which is the highest there is neither the object nor the perception, as the mind rests in itself alone, being completely suppressed. These kinds of knowledge are discussed thoroughly in Yogācāra texts. And Prof. Bhattacharya thinks that, as such a division of jñāna is not to be found in the Upaniṣads, Gauḍapāda must have copied it from Buddhism.

28. AŚ, pp. 176—78.
29. AŚ, pp. 197—98.
As regards the means and the goal also, Prof. Bhattacharya believes that Gauḍapāda was greatly influenced by Baudhāya views. In kārikā III, 36, the Professor sees a reference to the stage in samādhi known in Buddhism as arpanā which is above the stage of upacāra. In the upacāra samādhi the mind is concentrated on its object, but not uninterruptedly; in the arpanā samādhi, the mind attains one-pointedness. In the next kārikā III, 37 there is a reference to acala-samādhi which is also recognized in Buddhism.

At the end of the third prakaraṇa and at the beginning of the fourth, Gauḍapāda speaks of asparśayoga. This word, says Prof. Bhattacharya, does not occur in the Upaniṣads, despite Śaṅkara’s assurance to the contrary. The literal meaning of the word is ‘the yoga in which there is no contact, or the faculty of perception by touch’. Though this state corresponds to the asamprajñāta samādhi of the yoga system, it is not called asparśa-yoga anywhere in that system. Therefore the Professor is inclined to think that ‘it refers to the ninth or the last of nine dhyānas or meditations called anupūrvavaiḥāra (Pali anupubbavihāra) or the successive states of dhyāna which the Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts. The ninth dhyāna is called samjñāveditanirodha or the cessation or complete suppression of consciousness and sensation. This is what is said to happen in asparśayoga. Taking the cue from Gauḍapāda’s statement in kārikā III, 39, that asparśa-yoga is very difficult to realize, Professor Bhattacharya gives the meaning asukhayoga to asparśayoga. This is how he derives it: The word asparśavihāra is used frequently in Buddhist works. Sparśa means sukha, ‘joy, content, ease, comfort’; sparśavihāra is a state with it; and asparśavihāra is its opposite. It is in this sense that asparśayoga is to be understood. Though this yoga is difficult to attain, it is stated to be conducive to the happiness of all beings.

31. AS, pp. 94–95.
(sarvasattvasukha). This idea is also to be found in Buddhist writings.\textsuperscript{32} Though the word asparśayoga may be interpreted in several ways, the best interpretation is to be had, observes Prof. Bhattacharya, in Asaṅga’s Yogācārabhūmi. “We know from it that in the stage of nirodhasamāpatti the citta or mind is completely suppressed, hence there is no experience whatsoever. But in this stage called vyutthāna ‘rising up’ one has three kinds of sparśa ‘experience’ known as āniṇjya, ākiṇcanya, and animitta. The word sparśa in such cases means ‘experience’ or ‘that which is experienced’, sprā meaning here ‘to experience’. Now, because in the yoga called nirodhasamāpatti there is no sparśa of anything, it is rightly named asparśayoga.”\textsuperscript{33}

The state of mind which is called nirodha or nirvāṇa by the Baudhāyas is known as Brahman in Vedānta. This is the summum bonum of both the Baudhāyas and the Vedāntins. The Baudhāyas aspire to attain it, where a revolution or change of the recipient (i.e., ālayavijñāna) is said to take place. The Yogācāra texts describe it as āśrayaparārvtti. It is also called dharma dhatu (the essence of reality), which is illumined for all. Gauḍapāda renders an account of this end in the fourth prakāraṇa.\textsuperscript{34} He calls it also sarvajñatā (omniscience) which, according to Prof. Bhattacharya, is more in keeping with the Buddhist point of view than with the Vedāntist;\textsuperscript{35} for the omniscience that is referred to here is Buddhahood (buddhatva).\textsuperscript{36}

In the opinion of Prof. Bhattacharya, the tenor of the entire fourth prakāraṇa is Buddhist. ‘In Book IV Gauḍapāda has discussed nothing directly of the Vedānta,’ says the Professor, ‘as nothing Vedāntic will be found therein.’\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{32} AŚ, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{33} AŚ, p. 99.
\textsuperscript{34} GK, IV, 77 ff.
\textsuperscript{35} AŚ, p. 195.
\textsuperscript{36} AŚ, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{37} AŚ, p. cxliv.
At the very outset Gauḍapāda pays homage to the dvipadāṃ vara (the foremost among men) who is no other than the Buddha. The author of the asparśayoga to whom the Ācārya renders homage in kārikā IV, 2, is also the Buddha. Towards the end of the prakaraṇa he declares 'naitad buddhena bhāsitam' (this was not said by the Buddha). That the Buddha said nothing is stated in the Buddhist works themselves. The grounds for such a statement are two: (i) pratyātmadharmata, i.e., the nature (of the highest truth) which is realized in one's own self, and (ii) purāṇaṣthitidharmata, i.e., the nature of the elements of existence that remains from the past. The first of these means that the final truth has to be realized by each for himself, as it cannot be attained through instruction from another. The paramārtha is inexpressible by words. The Buddha, therefore, did not say anything in fact, though people according to their own disposition think that he taught particular doctrines. The second ground for declaring that the Buddha said nothing is this: 'What he is reported to have said was from the past. Nothing depends on the birth or absence of birth of the Tathāgatas, the true nature of elements of existence remains always the same.' Gauḍapāda agrees with the Baudhas in their belief that the Buddha did not say anything. Besides these references to Gautama the Buddha, at several places in the fourth prakaraṇa the Advaita teacher cites the views of the Baudhas and approves of them.

We have already referred to the fact that Gauḍapāda makes use of the arguments of the Mādhyamika view in the Alātasāntiprakaraṇa, and that he cites illustrations for the unreality of the world gathered from the Buddhist writings. Here it may be added that he employs in the fourth prakaraṇa certain important terms in their specifically Buddhistic meanings: e.g., dharma (element of existence), saṅghāta (aggregate), advaya (free from the perceptible object and the percipient, or neither of the two extreme
views), adhvan (time), kṛtaka (artificial), prajñāpti (practical denomination), samkleśa (impurity), samvṛti (practical or empirical truth), nirmitaka (a thing made of illusion or supernatural power), nimitta (specific appearance which is the cause of attachment, aversion, and delusion), dharma-dhātu (the essence of reality), śuddha laukika (pure mundane), lokottara (supra-mundane), ksānti (patience), nirvāna (quiescence), and tāyin (he who shows the way).

Gauḍapāda explicitly refers to the Mahāyāna by its synonym Agrayāna in kārikā IV, 90. He says there that from the standpoint of the Agrayāna are to be understood that which is to be abandoned (heya), that which is to be known (jñeya), that which is to be attained (āpya), and that which is to be matured (pākyo). Prof. Bhattacharya observes that, according to Asanga, the first two, viz., heyā and jñeya are paratanka and parikalpita svabhāvas respectively, āpya is the dharma-dhātu which is parināspanna, and pākyo refers to the act of maturing by discipline for the attainment of the Absolute. The Professor’s opinion is that it is of these that Gauḍapāda speaks in the kārikā under reference. 38

In the last verse of the Kārikā Gauḍapāda offers his salutations to that state (pada) which is difficult to be seen, very deep, equal, fearless, and free from variety. Prof. Bhattacharya identifies the state which is the object of adoration here as the Buddhist nirvāṇa.

It is worth remembering at this stage that there is a difference in approach to the problem we are at present discussing as between the classical critics of Advaita and some of the modern interpreters of the system like Prof. Bhattacharya. While for the classical critics Advaita was suspect because of its doctrinal similarity to Buddhism to the modern interpreters the similarity appears

38. AŚ, pp. 199—200.
to be but natural because both Advaita and Buddhism draw from the same source, viz., the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. According to the former, the connection of Advaita with Buddhism is a case of misalliance; and by this unholy association the system of Advaita has itself become unorthodox. In the view of the latter, however, to characterize Buddhism as unorthodox is wrong, for there is nothing in it which is revolting to the teachings of the Upaniṣads. Prof. Bhattacharya, for instance, says that a very large number of passages in the Upaniṣads may easily be explained from the Vijñānavāda point of view.\(^{39}\)

It is against such a background that we should understand the conclusion at which the Professor arrives regarding the Buddhist character of Gauḍapāda’s teachings. He readily grants that Gauḍapāda is a Vedāntin whose main purpose in the Kārikā is to expound the Vedānta. And among the Vedāntins Gauḍapāda is an Advaitin, the highest truth to him being advaita, non-duality.\(^{40}\) Prof. Bhattacharya even goes to the extent of saying that Gauḍapāda, though much influenced by the Buddhist thoughts, maintains his position as a Vedāntin.\(^{41}\) He believes that there are “two schools of Vijñānavādins (1) Vedāntists headed by Gauḍapāda, and (2) Buddhists with Maitreya at the head.”\(^{42}\) In both the schools the external world is the creation or transformation of the mind. And Gauḍapāda agrees with the Mādhyamika conclusion also, viz., that ajāti is the highest truth. All this is possible because the difference between Vedānta and Buddhism is very slight, and Buddhism itself owes much to the Upaniṣads.\(^{43}\) Such is the view of Professor Bhattacharya.

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41. *ĀŚ*, p. cxxiii.
42. Ibid.
We shall now turn to a critical examination of the view set forth above. At the outset it must be pointed out that, when the critics hurl the charge of pseudo-Buddhism against Advaita, they use the word 'Buddhism' rather in a vague and general sense. Surely, it cannot be their intention to derive Advaita from the realistic schools of Buddhism. What they do mean is that the early teachers of Advaita, especially Gauḍapāda and following him Śaṅkara, have borrowed largely from the Baudhāṇa writers belonging to the idealistic schools of Vijñānavāda or Yogācāra and Mādhyamika or Śūnyavāda. In this respect both the classical critics and the modern interpreters referred to above agree. The doctrine of the unreality of the world, and the theory of non-origination are found to be common as between the idealistic schools of Buddhism and Advaita. Most of the critics believe that these are not Upaniṣadic doctrines, and so, their conclusion is that Advaita must have borrowed them from the Mahāyāna schools. And the earliest teacher who effected this borrowing, in their view, is Gauḍapāda.

Now, it is true that certain passages and phrases in Gauḍapāda's Kārikā, especially in the Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa, resemble parallel ones in the works of Buddhist writers like Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. It is also to be admitted that Gauḍapāda makes use of the idealistic arguments of the Mahāyāna schools, while refuting the position of the realists. It is a fact too that he employs expressions borrowed from Baudhāṇa terminology. But the question is: can it be said on the ground of these that Gauḍapāda agreed with the conclusions of the Baudhāṇa idealists and that he commended them to the followers of the Vedānta? Our answer is in the negative, and we proceed to state the reasons.
The doctrine of the unreality of the world is, no doubt, common to Gauḍapāda and Vijñānavāda. And the Advaita teacher, like the Vijñānavādin, establishes the unreality by comparing the external universe to the world of dreams. But he does not ignore the empirical difference between the things of the waking world and the contents of dream. Prof. Bhattacharya’s emendation of kārikā II, 4, therefore, is unnecessary and without any sound basis. As we have shown in an earlier chapter, Gauḍapāda concedes to the world of waking relative objectivity and universality which do not belong to the world of dreams. Diṅgāga may well say that what is really within appears as if outside, because he is a subjectivist. But to the Advaitin the concept of ‘inside’ is as much a product of illusion as the notion of ‘outside.’ Reality, in his view, is not the subject as distinguished from the object.

The argument that Gauḍapāda’s philosophy and Vijñānavāda must be identical, because in both the same illustrations are used for establishing the unreality of the world, will not bear scrutiny. In the first place, there is a difference in the use of the illustrations. As we have pointed out above, Gauḍapāda’s purpose in employing the analogy of the dream-world is not the same as that of the Vijñānavādin. Secondly, the illustrations do by no means constitute an original contribution of Vijñānavāda to philosophical literature. The example of the magic-elephant (māyā-hastin) is derived from the well-known episode in the life of King Udayana, which has been dramatized by Bhāsa. The simile of the fire-brand circle occurs in the Maitrāyaṇi Upaniṣad, iv, 24: “He beholds Brahman flashing like the circle of a whirling torch, in colour like the sun.”

It is true that the Upaniṣad employs the term alātacakra in a context different from that in which it is used by Gauḍapāda and the Baudhāṇa writers. But this much is clear that the simile has a pre-

44. See supra, p. 120.
Buddhist origin. As Dr Carpenter says with reference to Gauḍapāda's use of the simile, "It was a familiar game of little boys in the evening to whirl a burning stick swiftly through the air, and produce the impression of a circle of light. The figure and its lesson are approached through an exposition of the contradictions involved in the conception of causality on the assumption of an eternal and all-inclusive Ātman."\(^{46}\)

We have already admitted that Gauḍapāda presses into service the Vijñānavāda arguments for establishing the illusoriness of the world. Śaṅkara the commentator himself says that the kārikās IV, 25-27 employ the arguments of the Vijñānavādins for the purpose of refuting the views of those who maintain the reality of external objects.\(^{47}\) And kārikā IV, 28, according to him, is directed against the Vijñānavāda itself.\(^{48}\) The procedure followed by Gauḍapāda, then, is exactly similar to that adopted by the Absolute Idealists in the West in their criticism of the Realistic doctrines. Subjectivist arguments are advanced only to overthrow Realism. And when this is accomplished, Subjectivism itself is subjected to unsparring criticism, and is finally discarded. So, the adoption of the arguments of Subjectivism as a procedural or methodological device does not mean that either Advaita or Absolutism is identical with Subjectivism.\(^{49}\)

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46. Theism in Medieval India, p. 306.
48. See Hermann Jacobi’s art. on Māyāvāda; JAOS, Vol. 33, p. 53: That the statement of the commentator is right, is evident from the nature of the argument itself, and becomes still more so from the next verse (28), which furnishes the final decision of the Vedāntins: "Therefore the idea (citta) does not originate; those who pretend to recognize the originating of ideas, may as well recognize the trace (of birds) in the air." For here the fundamental doctrine of the Vijñānavādins, which admits only a continuous flow of momentary ideas is clearly referred to and confuted.
49. B. Bosanquet: The Essentials of Logic, p. 20: ‘It is necessary to be wholly dissatisfied with common-sense theory, and with the notion of a ready-made world set up for us to copy in the mind, before the logical analysis of intellectual construction can have interest or meaning for us. And to produce this dissatisfaction is the value of subjective Idealism.’
Using the terminology of Vijñānavāda, Gauḍapāda says that the world is the result of the vibration of citta (cittaspadita). But what he means by citta in this context is not the content-less mind which is the reality, according to the Vijñānavādin, but the Self (Ātman). That the self posits itself in the form of a plurality through māyā is clearly stated by him in kārikā II, 12. As regards the statement of Gauḍapāda in kārikā II, 16 that the jīva is posited first and thereafter the various kinds of things appear, there is no need to think that it is inspired by the Baudhāya conception of satkāyadrśti. Ānandagiri, in his gloss on the kārikā, quotes the Taittirīya text which says, ‘Having created it, he entered it.’ Brahman, according to the Upaniṣad, is sat or reality; it thought ‘May I become many’ and performed tapas; having performed tapas, it created all this; having created, it entered all this, and became what is with form and what is without form. In the Chāndogya there is a passage which reads: ‘That shining Being (i.e., that which had produced fire, water, and earth), thought, ‘Let me now enter those three beings (fire, water and earth) with this living self (jīva ātman), and let me reveal names and forms.’’ Here, again, we have a reference to the entry of the primal Being in the form of the jīva into what it created. And so, there is sufficient authority in the Upaniṣads themselves for Gauḍapāda’s statement that the jīva was posited first.

See M. Hiriyanna’s Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 206:……the Yogācāra reasoning has a negative force which cannot be easily thrust aside. They point to the indemonstrability of the opposite view maintained in realism.

Also S. Radhakrishnan’s Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, pp. 625-6: The task of the Yogācāra was like that of Berkeley, to expose the baseless and self-contradictory character of the unknown absolute matter of the Sautrāntika and persuade us to drop all ideas of such an external existence.

50. GK, IV, 72.

51. See Śaṅkara’s com. on IV, 72: cittah paramārthata ātmaiva.


53. VI, iii, 2.
There is only an apparent similarity between the metaphysical doctrines of Advaita and Vijñānavāda. The Advaitin's conception of the Self is that it is of the nature of consciousness (cit or caitanya). He refers to the Self by such terms as jñāna, prajñāna, and vijñāna. Sometimes, he even calls it citta. But what he means by these expressions is not the same as the void mind which is the sole reality, according to the Vijñānavādin. While for the Vijñānavādin only a succession of ideas is true, the entire external world being a creation of the mind, for the Advaitin the eternal consciousness which is changeless and immutable is the ultimate reality.

This is admitted by Prof. Bhattacharya himself. He says that the real difference between Vedānta and Vijñānavāda is 'with regard to the intervention of the Ātman with whom maya is connected in the first, and his denial in the second where the vāsanā is with the citta.' In the system of Advaita the eternal Ātman is the sole reality and the substrate of illusion, and māyā is the power of illusion. In the Vijñānavāda, on the contrary, the mind creates the objects, impelled by the impressions (vāsanā) left behind by past experiences in a beginningless series. The Professor makes the distinction between the two schools even clearer elsewhere. The Ātman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is nitya or sāsvata (eternal), while the vijñāna of the Baudhāyas is momentary (kṣaṇika), as it changes every moment. The vijñāna 'does not, therefore, move forward as one and the same (ekam abhinam), but continues in an uninterrupted stream (santati) as the flood with its currents (srotasā oghavat). This continuity has no beginning, nor has it an end (anādi-nidhana) till nirvāṇa. Now as through all the moments the Ālayavijñāna continues it is dhruva and not nitya.' While the Self is eternal and

54. AŚ, p. cxxxiiii.
55. AŚ, p. cxll.
ever the same, in the view of the Advaitin, the citta or vijñāna of the Banddha idealist is a series of momentary cognitions. 56

Another difference between Advaita and Vijnānavāda follows as a corollary from the distinction just explained. The Self, according to the Advaitin, is the non-dual Reality; there is nothing else besides it which is real. The citta of the Vijnānavādin, on the contrary, is not a single reality; it is a cognitional series; and there is an unlimited number of such vijnāna—series. Hence the doctrine of the Yogācāra-Bauddha, though idealistic, is pluralistic. 57

It is true that some exponents of Vijnānavāda speak of a cosmic or absolute consciousness (ālayavijñāna), besides the continuously changing stream of individual consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna). The ālayavijñāna is even conceived as the absolute background of all phenomena, technically called tathatā or suchness. The author of the Nyāyamañjarī, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, describes this view as Vijnānādvaita. 58 Outside India it was developed to such an extent that it could scarcely be distinguished from Absolutism. But it must be remembered that the transformation of Vijnānavāda into a type of Advaita was effected under the influence of Upaniṣadic thought 59 and that it is not consistent with the theories of momentariness and unsubstantiality of things that are the common heritage of all schools of Buddhism. Hence it is that the Laṅkāvatāra sounds a note of warning against the heresy of thinking that the concep-

56. In view of this vital difference admitted by Prof. Bhattacharya himself, it seems to us that he is not justified in concluding 'that Gaudapāda's Brahman and the citta in viśṇaptimātratā of the Yogācāras are in fact the same thing with the only one difference that while the former is nitya the latter is dhruta.' See AS, p. cxlii.

57. See M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 219.

58. Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, pp. 526 and 537.

59. See S. Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 635: ......the philosophical impulse led the Yogācāras to the Upaniṣadic theory while their Buddhist presuppositions made them halting in their acceptance of it.
tion of *tathatā* is parallel to the Brahman or Absolute of the Vedānta. The Upāniṣadic Brahman is Being, whereas the ultimate vijnāna of the Yogācāra is only Becoming.

It has been urged by Prof. Bhattacharya that the doctrine of non-origination (ajāti) is accepted by Gauḍapāda from the Mādhyamika, and that the doctrine was unknown to Vedānta before him. This assertion, however, is not warranted by the facts. It is to be noted, first, that Gauḍapāda establishes the doctrine of non-origination in the Advaita-prakaraṇa on the ground of Scriptural texts; and it is to support his conclusion by independent reasoning that he adopts in the fourth prakaraṇa the prāsaṅgika method and criticizes the concept of causality. The *māyāvāda* or *vivartavāda* is implicit in the teachings of the Upāniṣads. Of the Upāniṣadic seers, we see in Yājñavalkya a doughty champion of the trans-phenomenal (nisprapaṇca) view. Gauḍapāda is only a continuator of Yājñavalkya’s thought, and not an innovator who introduced alien ideas into Vedānta. Secondly, it is to be borne in mind that, while for the Mādhyamika nothing is born because there is nothing real, for Gauḍapāda the self which is the sole reality is unborn, because it is eternal. This is admitted by even such a relentless critic as Faddegon. He is of the view that ‘the Vedānta of the Gauḍapādiya Kārikā and of Saṅkara are indeed more closely connected with Nāgarjuna’s Mādhyamika school than with the Vijñānavāda’, and says that ‘the fact that Mādhyamikas were detested by the Advaita-Vedāntins can only illustrate the blindness of sectarianism, but cannot mislead an objective historian with reference to the real historical connection of facts.’ But he is candid enough to add: ‘Mādhyamikas and Advaitavādins agree in methods, in as far as they both accept the prāsaṅgika argumentation or research of antinomies in

60. *Laṅkāvatāra*, pp. 80.
human thought, but whereas the Mādhyaṃkās conclude that the world and all existence is nothing but a meaningless chaos of momentary sensations, the Vedāntins think that these antinomies show exclusive existence of Absolute Being.⁶² Thus there is an essential point of difference between the Mādhyaṃkika view and the doctrine of Advaita which the critics, while feeling constrained to admit, seek either to minimize or explain away without any justification whatsoever.

The author of the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā puts the difference between the two schools thus: this is the difference between the Baudhāyas and the Brahmavādins—while the former declare the indeterminability of all, the latter hold that the entire universe, with the exception of consciousness (vijñāna), is other than either what is real or what is unreal. Thus in Advaita-Vedānta the Self which is of the nature of pure consciousness is recognized as the sole reality.⁶³ And Gauḍapāda as a staunch Vedāntin holds steadfastly to the doctrine of the non-dual Absolute, and does not subscribe to the Mādhyaṃkika view of total unreality. Although the entire Kārikā is witness to this truth, we shall cite here a significant passage. Kārikā II, 38, runs thus:

tattvam ādhyātmikam drṣṭvā tattvam drṣṭvā tu bāhyataḥ,
tāttvibhūtās tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet.

‘Having seen the truth which is inside, and having seen the truth which is outside as well, one becomes the truth itself, revelling therein; and being such, one should not fall away from the truth.’

⁶² See The Vaiśeṣika System, p. 65.
Also JRAS, 1910, p. 1363: Nāgārjuna developed the dialectical method of prasaṅga for establishing negation, which led in the hands of his school to absolute negativism. Vedāntins use it for establishing the Upaniṣadic monism.
⁶³ Khaṇḍana (Chowkhamba Edn.) p. 125: saugata-brahmavādinor ayam viśeṣo yadādīmaḥ sarvam evānirvacanīyaṁ varṇayati.........vijñāna-vyāsti- riktam punar idām viśvāṁ sad-asadbhyāṁ vilakṣaṇam brahmavādinah saṅgirante.
A parallel to this kārikā may be found in the following verse which is quoted as a saying of the Bhagavat in the Madhyamakavṛtti:

śūnyam ādhyātmikam paśya paśya śūnyam bahirgatam, 
na vidyate so’pi kaścid yo bhāvayati śūnyatām.

‘See the void which is within, and see the void which is without. He too does not exist who contemplates the void.’

A comparison of these two passages will clearly bring out the contrast between Gauḍapāda’s view and the Mādhyamika doctrine. To the Advaita teacher the tattva is all, whereas to the Mādhyamika all is śūnya (void, i.e., nistattva), and there is no one even to witness the void.

It has been argued that the śūnyatā of the Mādhyamika is not ‘nothingness’ but the same as the Brahman of the Upaniṣads; it is called śūnya because it appears as nothing from the empirical standpoint. The reason advanced in such an argument is that śūnya in the sense of an absolute void is inconceivable, and that a total denial of all things without the implication of a positive ground is impossible. Now, this is precisely the criticism of the thinkers of the orthodox schools passed on the Mādhyamika. In their view, the Mādhyamika is a nihilist and occupies, therefore, a self-stultifying position.

Nor may it be said that these thinkers have misconstrued the content of the Mādhyamika metaphysics; for some eminent leaders of that system have explicitly stated that they believe in no reality whatsoever. Candrakīrti, for instance, mocks at the critic who is incapable of conceiving an absolute negation, “by comparing him to a person who, when told that he would get nothing, expected that ‘nothing’ would actually be given to him.”

64. p. 348.
65. It is not the Hindu philosophers alone that bring this charge against the Mādhyamika; others also, such as the Yogācāras, argue thus: ‘If all is nothing, then nothing itself becomes the criterion of truth, and the Mādhyamika has no right to discuss with others of a different way of thinking. He who accepts nothing as real can neither prove his position nor disprove his opponent’s case.’ Sarvasiddhānta-sārasāṅgṛaha, iii, 3–4, quoted in IP, Vol. I, p. 628.
66. M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 221; see com. on Nāgārjuna’s Kārikā xiii, 8.
When the charge of nihilism is levelled against his view, Candrakīrti does not refute it. On the contrary, he admits that his view is philosophical nihilism as distinguished from the common or vulgar nihilism. The difference between the two types of nihilism is not in the conclusion, but only in the method of reaching it. While the nihilism of the vulgar is dogmatic, that of the Mādhyamika is reasoned, since it is the result of a logical analysis of experience. The difference is illustrated by comparing the Mādhyamika to a witness who speaks in a court of law against a thief, fully knowing that he has committed the theft; and the common nihilist, to one who also speaks against the thief and who, though not uttering a falsehood, is speaking not from knowledge, but through some bias or other. Thus it is evident that the Mādhyamika does not favour the conception of a positive ultimate. And as Poussin observes, 'The claim of the Buddhists to be śūnyatāvādins, "doctors of the voidness," not brahmavadins, cannot be set aside: philosophers must be credited with the opinions they profess to cherish.'

The Mādhyamika system derives its name from the fact that it professes to occupy a position midway between extreme affirmation and extreme negation. The heresies of existence and non-existence are sought to be avoided. But unfortunately not a few of the Mādhyamika texts offend against the Middle Path by sponsoring the view of non-existence. They hold that nothing is eternal and nothing is annihilated because there is, in fact, nothing. When Gauḍapāda says in kārikā IV, 57, that there is no eternity for things nor annihilation, he does not mean that there is

67. Ibid., p. 222.
68. JRAS, 1910, p. 133.

Even Tamil tradition is unanimous in regarding the Baudhā as an atheist. E.g., at the end of a discussion with the Baudhā teachers at Čidambaram, Saint Mānjākavācakar is reported to have made this appeal to Sarasvatī, the goddess of speech: 'How canst thou, who dwellest on the tongue of Brahmā, allow these men by use of speech to revile the Eternal?' See G. U. Pope's Introduction to the Tiruvācaṣṭam, p. xxxi.
no reality whatsoever. He declares here, in effect, that the origination of all things is but apparent, as it is conditioned by saṃvṛti or avidyā, and so nothing that is of the empirical world is eternal; and that since all things are, in truth, the supreme reality,69 the Self, and so unborn, there is no annihilation. The Self alone is real; and as the empirical things are illusory, there is neither eternality nor destruction for them. This is Vedānta and not the Mādhyānikā view.

Nāgārjuna, it is true, speaks of two kinds of truth. He says that the Buddha employed in his discourses two forms of instruction, the one conforming to absolute truth (para-mārtha satya), and the other to practical or empirical truth (lokasaṃvṛti satya).70 But this is a distinction without a difference for the Śūnyavādin. Appearance would have a meaning only if Reality is admitted. The Śūnyavādin, however, does not believe in any reality. Hence, where is the criterion which could effect the distinction between absolute reality and phenomenal reality? As Keith observes, 'If we accept the strict doctrine of Nāgārjuna, as interpreted by Buddhāpālita and Candrakīrti, and accepted by Śāntideva, we must admit that the phenomenal world has not merely no existence in absolute truth, but has even no phenomenal existence, difficult as this conception is, and numerous as are the failures of its holders exactly to express it.'71

In the system of Advaita there is legitimate room for the distinction between paramārtha and vyavahāra, because, according to it, Brahman or the Self is the supreme reality of which the world is an appearance. There is no need for the Advaitin to depend on the Baudhā for the theory of two truths, as the doctrine may well be derived from the

69. Prof. V. Bhattacharya reads svabhāvena instead of sadbhāvena in IV, 57, c but there seems to be no need for this emendation.
70. MK, XXIV, 8:
\[ \text{dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṁ dharmadeśānā, lokasaṃvṛitisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ.} \]
Upaniṣads. The *Mundaka Upaniṣad*⁷² speaks of two kinds of knowledge, the higher and the lower, parā vidyā and aparā vidyā. The lower knowledge is of the phenomenal, whereas the higher is of the trans-phenomenal. Under the former are to be included the four Vedas and their auxiliary studies. The latter is that by which the Immutable is known. The aparā vidyā is really avidyā, nescience.⁷³ The parā vidyā is the wisdom of the Upaniṣads which are not to be confused with collocations of words.⁷⁴ The trans-phenomenal reality which is the supreme truth (paramārtha satya), in the terminology of the later Vedānta, and which is the content of the parā vidyā, is described by the the *Mundaka* almost on the model of Yājñavalkya’s teachings in the *Brhadāranyaka*. It is that which cannot be seen, nor seized, which has no origin nor properties, no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet, the eternal, the all-pervading, extremely subtle, the imperishable; it is that which the wise regard as the source of all beings. Here, in these passages of the *Mundaka*, we have the germinal thoughts which should have naturally led to the formulation of the two levels of truth, the empirical and the absolute.⁷⁵

All talk of two kinds or levels of truth should be understood properly in the system of Advaita. There are not two independent or distinct truths, even as there are not two Brahmans. There is only one truth, the pāramārtha, of which the vyāvahārika is a semblance, or appearance. The appearance has no substance of its own; its reality comes from and is reducible to the Absolute. Once this position is granted, it will not be difficult to admit that there may be grades in the vyāvahārika. While the relative experience as a whole is called

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⁷². I, 4–5.
⁷³. Śāṅkara’s com. on I, 4: aparā hi vidyā avidyā.
⁷⁴. Śāṅkara’s com. on I, 5: no’pi niṣaṇcaḥ abdarāśih, veda-śabdəna tu śabdaraśir vivakṣitaḥ.
⁷⁵. For the doctrine of the two views of Brahman, see *Prāśna*, v. 2; and *Maitri*, vi, 5 p. 22.
vyāvahārika, a section of it which has less degree of reality than the so-called normal waking life is the prātibhāsika. Dreams and psychological delusions like mistaking a rope for a snake or the perception of nacre-silver fall under the latter category. These are sublated even in relative experience, whereas the metaphysical delusion or samsāra is removed only when there arises Brahman-intuition.

A parallel doctrine is found in the Vijñānavāda which recognizes three distinct forms of knowledge. The highest is the absolute or perfect knowledge (parinīṣpanna), which “admits only the final purification of thought which means the disappearance of consciousness, the complete destruction of the last thought element on which ensues Nirvāṇa.”

Lower than this is the realm of relative knowledge (paratantra) embracing the entire series of momentary ideas into which Vijñānavāda resolves the world of experience. The third class of knowledge is called imaginary (parikalpita); and it comprises the ordinary delusions like mistaking the mirage for water or the dream objects for real things. But a little scrutiny will reveal how baseless is the Vijñānavāda distinction between the paratantra and parikalpita. According to the system, there is nothing external. How, then, could a distinction be made between the contents of ordinary experience and the objects seen in dream or delusion? If the latter are parikalpita or imagined, the former are equally so. Hence, it is unintelligible how the Vijñānavādin could subscribe to the doctrine of the threefoldness of knowledge.

77. Keith, op. cit., p. 243: "But a strict criterion between the relative and the imaginary is not available; in the case of sense perceptions, however, we can correct one by the other; the water of the mirage cannot be drunk or touched; the visions of a dream cannot be realized. But the Vijñānavāda, as little as the Mādhyamika, faces the problem of the fact that these imaginary experiences are caused, and have effects, so that in reality it is impossible to dismiss them as imaginary on the ground that they do not possess causal activity (arthakriyākāritaś), though this activity is of a different kind from the normal. In both schools in fact the classification of knowledge is essentially based on metaphysical conclusions, and is not derived from any serious epistemological investigation."
In kārikas IV, 87-88, Gauḍapāda refers to three kinds of knowledge, laukika, sūdha-laukika and lokottara. These terms are, no doubt, used by the Yogācāra writers. In the Lankāvatāra the three jñānas are called, laukika, lokottara and lokottaratama respectively. But as we have already explained, Gauḍapāda uses the terms to teach the Upaniṣadic doctrine of three avasthās. That the terms employed by a particular set of thinkers may be borrowed by another set and used in senses slightly different from the original ones is proved by the history of Buddhism itself. Many of the terms that the Baudhhas use are taken from older literature; but they are made to convey new meanings. So also, Gauḍapāda purposely employs Baudhha terminology in the fourth prakarāṇa to express his Vedāntic thoughts.

The argument based on the term asparśayoga and the meditation that it signifies is not conclusive. The critic identifies asparśayoga with the ninth dhyāna in Buddhism called samjñāveditanirodha or nirodhasamāpatti where there is complete suppression of the mind. But there seems to be no need for a search in Buddhist literature for an analogue to the yoga which is taught by Gauḍapāda. The conception of yoga is pre-Buddhistic and can be traced to the Upaniṣads. In the Kathopaniṣad it is said, 'When the five-fold (sense-)knowledge, along with the mind, comes to cessation, and when the intellect too does not wander, that is called the highest attainment: this they regard as the yoga the steady holding up of the senses. Then one becomes free from distraction. Yoga indeed is the source and the end'. Attachment of the mind to perishable objects is the cause of misery. To be free from misery, the flow of the mind towards the objects should be arrested. This is the purpose of yoga. Bhagavad-gītā defines yoga as the separation of the mind from its contact with misery. Śaṅkara says in his commentary

78. See supra, p. 101.
79. vi, 10—11. See the Upaniṣads (Selections), pp. 56—57.
on the *Katha* that the state of the yogins is characterized by separation from contact with all evil. This is the negative aspect of yoga. The positive nature of yoga is that it helps self-realization. This is made clear by the Hindu Scriptures when they deal with yoga. *Gaudapāda* evidently draws from these sources, when he speaks of asparśayoga. Even for the purely negative side of yoga, the *nirūdha* of the Buddhist is not the only model, for in the yoga system the goal which is asamprajñāta samādhi is conceived as a state of cessation of all mental activity.

It is also to be noted that the term *asparśayoga* is not found in the Baudhāya works. From the sense of the verses which describe this yoga, the critic draws the conclusion that it is the same as the *samjñāveditanirodha* of the Baudhāyas. *Gaudapāda* says that this yoga is a samādhi or profound concentration and that it is very difficult to realize. From this Prof. Bhattacharya infers that the asparśa-yoga of *Gaudapāda* is the asukhayoga of the Baudhāyas, 'a yoga which is not one that can be attained with ease.' But it would not be difficult to see that not only the yoga of the Baudhāyas but also the yoga of the Vedāntins (and, in fact, all yoga) is attained only after prolonged effort and striving. With reference to the asparśa-yoga, *Gaudapāda* says that ordinary yogins-shrink back from it, imagining fear where in reality there is no fear.

Concerning this statement, Prof. Bhattacharya remarks: 'But what is the cause of their fear? Śaṅkara rightly says that the so-called yogins think that it will annihilate the very self. Indeed, there is hardly any difference between a yogin in this state and a dead person, their respiration being completely stopped. So when the Blessed One entered that state, i.e., *saññā-vedayitanirodha* before his *parinirvāna*, Ānanda took him to be dead. But the venera-

82. *ĀŚ*, p. 97.
83. *GK*, III, 39.
ble Aniruddha said to him that that was not the case, the Blessed One having entered the stage of the dhyāna called saññāvedayitanirodha. After a short time, however, he passed away. It is therefore quite natural that an untrained yogin should be afraid of it, as of death. Subhuti, here it must be pointed out that there is a real difference between Ānanda’s fear and the fear of the yogins of whom Gaudapāda speaks. The yogins who are devoid of the knowledge of Vedānta are not afraid of physical death, but of losing their individuality in the Absolute; therefore it is that they recoil from the asparśayoga.

Though the term asparśayoga is not found in the Upaniṣads and the Gītā, the topic is dealt with by them. And it is conceivable that Gaudapāda coined the word to express the Vedāntic teaching about yoga. The Bhagavad-gītā uses the word sparśa to mean sense-objects. From this it is easy to understand the sense in which Gaudapāda employs the term asparśayoga. While sparśayoga or contact with sense-objects is the cause of misery, asparśayoga or turning the mind away from them leads to happiness. The interpretation which Śankara puts on the word asparśayoga is quite intelligible. The yoga is so called because it is devoid of all sparśa consisting of relations.

As for Prof. Bhattacharya’s remark that in kārikās, III, 36 and 37 there are references to the arpaṇā samādhī and acala samādhī, we would only say that freedom from interruption and movement is a characteristic of samādhī as such, no matter in what system it is taught.

Now about nirvāṇa. The word sanirvāṇa occurs only once in the Kārikā, and that too as an epithet of the highest happiness (sukham uttamam). And so, the goal,

84. Āś, p. 99.
85. V, 21, 22 and 27.
86. See Com. on GK, III, 39.
87. III, 47.
according to Gaู่apāda, is brahmanirvāṇa and not śūnyatā. It is true that in some of the Mādhyamika writings the śūnyatā is described as a positive Absolute. But that, we submit, is as a result of the Upaniṣadic influence on Buddhism. Speaking of Nāgārjuna’s philosophical position, Professor Radhakrishnan says, ‘His philosophy is nearer now to scepticism; now to mysticism. His scepticism is due to his realizing the essential relativity of thought. Yet he has faith in an absolute standard of reality. His scepticism is Buddhistic, while his absolutism derives from the Upaniṣads.’

Prof. Bhattacharya believes that Gauḍapāda’s description of the goal as sarvajñatā is more in keeping with the Baudhāya point of view than with the Vedānta. But he does not give any reason for this belief. There is no reason why the Advaitin’s mokṣa should not be called sarvajñatā. One realizes on release one’s non-difference from all and one’s essential nature as knowledge. Hence that state is called sarvajñatā. It is of the nature of the Self. Even if the word be understood in its ordinary sense of omniscience, there is no unintelligibility whatsoever in regard to the goal as sarvajñatā, because what is attained in krama-mukti is Īśvaratva, and omniscience is an attribute of God.

The bulk of evidence on which the critics depend for their view that Gauḍapāda was a Baudhāya in disguise is drawn from the fourth prakaraṇa. We have already admitted that Buddhist phraseology and dialectic are used by Gauḍapāda in the Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa. But what we have been attempting to show is that Gauḍapāda’s purpose in so doing is not to commend Buddhism to his followers, but to establish the conclusions of Vedānta as indisputable truths. The critic, however, who is not satisfied

89. See śāṅkara’s com. on IV, 89: sarvaścāsa jñāśca sarvajñāh tad-bhāvah sarvajñatā.
with such a view, cites as points in his favour certain specific features about the fourth prakaraṇa which, according to him, prove its Buddhistic character. These points we proceed now to examine.

The first contention is that the prakaraṇa begins with an invocation to the Buddha. At the commencement of the Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa, Gauḍapāda renders obeisance to the best among bipeds (dvipadāṃ vara) who has perfectly understood the dharmas which are comparable to ether through knowledge which is also like ether, and is non-different from the object known.90 Now, who is the object of adoration in this kārikā? Prof. Bhattacharya’s answer is that it is the Buddha that is saluted in the kārikā. His reasons are two: (1) first, the kārikā, compares jñāna to the sky and says that it is not different from the jñeya. (2) secondly, the dharmas or elements of existence are also stated to be like the sky. Both these conceptions are Buddhistic; and he who taught them was the Buddha. Therefore, it is the originator of Buddhism that is celebrated in this kārikā.91 As against such a view, the following considerations may be of interest: (i) the ether-analogy is not particularly Buddhistic. Even in the Advaita-prakaraṇa, Gauḍapāda employs it to establish the non-duality of the Self. The non-difference of jñāna and jñeya is a doctrine to which the Advaitin subscribes, though not in the same sense in which the Vijñānavādin holds it. (ii) The Advaitin also may well compare the dharmas to ether, not to prove their nīhsvabhāva or śūnyatā as in Buddhism but to indicate their real nature as the distinctionless Self. It is to be noted here that while for the Baudhafa the sky is nothing or void, it is not so for the Vedāntin. The sense of the

90. jñānenākāśakalpena dharmān yo gaganopamān, jñeyābhinnena sambuddhas tāṃ vande dvipadāṃ varam.
This seems to be almost a parody of the following kārikā of Nāgārjuna:
anirōdham anutpannam anucachedam āsāsvatam, desayāmāsa sambuddhas tāṃ vande vadatāṃ varam.

91. AS, pp. 83f.
kārikā, therefore, is not incompatible with the teaching of the Vedānta. Śaṅkara says, in his commentary, that Gauḍapāda makes obeisance in this kārikā to Nārāyaṇa who is the best of persons, Puruṣottama. There is nothing inherently wrong or absurd in such a view. If it be maintained still that Nārāyaṇa could not be the person adored, then the one—whoever it was—that taught the Vedānta to Gauḍapāda could well be the Ācārya that is described in this kārikā as the best of bipeds (dvipadāṁ vara).  

The second kārikā of the Alātasānti-prakaraṇa is, according to Prof. Bhattacharya, a salutation to the teacher of the asparśa-yoga who is no other than the Buddha. But we have shown already that there is nothing about the asparśayoga, as taught by Gauḍapāda, which is distinctively Buddhistic in character. If the yoga is the practical teaching of the Vedānta itself, as we have reasons to believe, then the instructor of the asparśayoga who is saluted in the kārikā is not the Buddha. Here, it may be added, that, in the opinion of Śaṅkara, it is not the teacher that is bowed to in the kārikā, but the yoga itself.

Towards the close of the Alātasānti-prakaraṇa Gauḍapāda declares, ‘naitad buddhena bhāṣitam’ (not this was spoken by the Buddha). This statement has been interpreted in several ways.

The manner in which Prof. Bhattacharya understands it has already been explained. In this view, Gauḍapāda endorses the declaration made in the Buddhistic works that the Buddha taught nothing. It is stated by the Buddhist writers that the Buddha never uttered a word. Between the night on which he acquired enlightenment and the night on which he attained parinirvāṇa not even a single

92. Upaniṣad-brahma-yogin says that the Ācārya is Śuka, an avatāra of Nārāyaṇa.
93. IV, 99.
94. MK, XX, 25:
   sarvopalambhopasamaḥ prapafcopesamaḥ śivah,
   na kvacit kasyācit kaścid dharma buddhena desitaḥ.
syllable the Tathāgata spoke. The speech of the Buddha is no speech (avacanam buddha-vacanam).\textsuperscript{95} The dharma which is without a syllable—how can it be heard, and how can it be taught? If it is heard or taught, it is only after superimposing words on what is without words.\textsuperscript{96}

Now, why do the Baudhāya writers, say that the Buddha taught nothing? We have set forth already the two reasons which Prof. Bhattacharya gives on the authority of the Baudhāya texts: (i) pratyātmadharma, i.e., the supreme truth has to be realized by each one intuitively, and not through instruction from another, and (ii) paurāṇasthitidharma, i.e., the true nature of the elements of existence remains ever the same, and does not depend on the appearance or disappearance of the Tathāgata. So, it is declared, that the Buddha did not utter even a single word. And Prof. Bhattacharya’s conclusion is that Gauḍapāda states approvingly the view of the Baudhāyas in the words ‘nainīt buddhena bhāṣitam.’

Before we give the interpretation of Gauḍapāda’s statement which appears most reasonable, let us understand what the Baudhāya writers mean when they say that the Buddha taught nothing. Two ways of understanding their statements are possible, the absolutistic and the nihilistic. The absolutistic interpretation is that silence is the genuine teaching about the ultimate Reality, because the Absolute is beyond the reach of speech and thought. This is indistinguishable from the Upanishadic conception; and Mahāyānaism received it from the Upainśadins. The other interpretation is that since nothing is real, the Buddha and what he said are also unreal. This is the logic of nihilism carried to its conclusion. Nihilism itself is śūnya.

\textsuperscript{95} Tathāgataguhyaśūtra quoted in Madhyamaka-vṛtti on MK, XX, 25; and LA, pp. 142–3.

\textsuperscript{96} Bhagavat quoted in Madhyamaka-vṛtti, p. 264.
Now according to both the interpretations the Buddha did not say anything; his speech was non-speech. But Gaṇḍapāda's statement is not to that effect. He does not say that the Buddha did not declare *anything*, but only that this was not spoken by him. By the *this* he means the supra-relational state of the wise one which is celebrated in the penultimate verse of the prakaraṇa, as also the general teaching of the Kārikā taken as a whole. He has purposely employed Buddhist terminology in the Alātasāntiprakaraṇā, and there is every chance of the unwary student mistaking what is taught there for the Baudhāya doctrine. And so, to safeguard himself against such a possible misconception, Gaṇḍapāda says ‘Not *this* was spoken by the Buddha.’

Commenting on these words, Śaṅkara observes, “This supreme non-dual Reality which is devoid of the distinctions of knowledge, object known, and knower, was not taught by the Buddha, though the denial (by him) of external objects and the postulation of pure knowledge seem to be close to the non-dual Reality. This supreme non-dual Reality, however, is to be known from the Vedāntas alone.” Ānandagāgīrī explains this further in his gloss thus: “The truth here propounded is the pure consciousness (jñāptimātra) which is free from all difference, is all full and devoid of beginning and end, and is to be understood solely through the Upaniṣads. In the other school (viz. Vijñānavāda), however, it is not thus. Hence, how can there be the doubt of confusion between the two schools of thought?”

97. Dr S. Radhakrishnan says, ‘He (Gaṇḍapāda) seems to have been conscious of the similarity of his system to some phases of Buddhist thought. He therefore protests rather overmuch—that his view is not Buddhism.’ *IP*, Vol. II, p. 463.

See Prof. N. B. Purohit’s art. ‘The Gaṇḍapāda-kārikās and Buddhism’ in *Proceedings and Transactions of the Eighth All-India Oriental Conference*, Mysore, 1935, p. 389: The straight meaning of the words, naitad Buddhena bhāṣītam, in IV, 99, would be that Buddha never taught that the Absolute was the final reality, though such a teaching verging on Advaita conception of the absolute Brahman or Ātman, is ascribed to him by the different Mahāyāna Schools of Buddhism.
Upaniṣadbrahmayogin gives a different interpretation of Gauḍapāda’s statement which is not very convincing, although it has the merit of rendering the word ‘buddha’ uniformly with the other instances where it occurs as meaning the enlightened in general, and not Gautama, the Buddha. This is what he says: “The knowledge which was taught by the buddha, viz., the knower of the supreme truth, is not this which consists of the triple factors (knower, object known, and process of knowing). It was shown by him that jñāna is pure consciousness which is established to be free from the triple factors”.

The term ‘buddha’ both in the singular and the plural is used by Gauḍapāda in the fourth prakaraṇa. Prof. Bhattacharya understands by the term in each case where it is used either the Buddha or his followers. But, Gauḍapāda seems to use ‘buddhas’ in the plural to mean the knowers of truth in general. The expression means the same as the terms like maniśins, tattvavids, vedapāragas, and vedānta-vicakṣaṇas, used in the earlier prakaraṇas. In kārikā IV, 99, the word ‘buddha’ appears twice in the singular. In the first half of the kārikā, it means the knower of truth, and in the second Gautama, the Buddha.

As regards the Buddhistic terms that occur in the fourth prakaraṇa, we have already observed that their usage does not alter the fundamental thoughts of Gauḍapāda which are Vedāntic. As evidence for this view, we may cite the instances of passages which are repeated in the fourth prakaraṇa from the earlier ones with a slight change in terminology. In the following, the word ‘dharma’ replaces ‘bhāva’ in the fourth prakaraṇa:

(i) ajātasyaiva bhāvasya (III, 20a);
ajātasyaiva dharmasya (IV, 6a).

98. Gk. IV, 19, 42, 80, 83, 98, 99.
99. Dr S. K. Belvalkar says: ‘In spite of a difference of terminology the ultimate philosophical view-point of the last prakarana does not materially differ from that of the earlier prakaranas and from even the Māṇḍūkya Upanisad itself, for the matter of that.’ Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta, 1925, p. 192.
(ii) ajāto hy amṛto bhāvaḥ (III, 20c); ajāto hy amṛto dharmaḥ (IV, 6c).

(iii) svabhāvenāmṛto yasya bhāvaḥ (III, 22c-d); svabhāvenāmṛto yasya dharmaḥ (IV, 8c-d).

In the following instance citta changes place with manas:
advayam ca dvayābhāsam manah (III, 30c-b); advayam ca dvayābhāsam cittam (IV, 62c-b).

It will be in place here to point out that though the fourth prakaraṇa makes a free use of Buddhistic terminology, some of the terms occur in the earlier prakaraṇas also. Nor is the Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa void of Upaniṣadic expressions, for they can be seen in IV, 78, 80, 85 and 92. And while we are on the question of terminology, it would be well to make it clear that the Bauddhas themselves borrowed most of their terms from the earlier orthodox writers. Some of the terms, for instance, which have acquired specifically Buddhistic meanings can all be traced to the Upaniṣads: nāmarūpa, karmavipāka, avidyā, upādāna, arhat, śramaṇa, buddha, nirvāṇa, prakṛti, ātman, nivṛtti, etc.

When the exponents of rival schools of thought have to speak the same language and employ the same canons of reasoning, mutual loans of words are but natural and inevitable.

In kārikā IV, 90, the word ‘agrayāṇa’ occurs; and Prof. Bhattacharya understands the verse to mean that, from the standpoint of the Mahāyāna, the heya, jñeya, āpya, and pākya are to be known. Śaṅkara, however, gives a meaning which is in consonance with the drift of the passage and in agreement with the Vedāntic teaching. The three states of experience are what are to be avoided (heya); the absolute Reality is what is to be known (jñeya); wisdom, childlike innocence and silence are what are to be attained (āpya); and the latent impressions like attach-

100. E.g., saṅghāta in III, 3 & 10; saṁvṛti in II, 1 and 4; dharma in III, 1; nirvāṇa in III, 47.
102. See Brh., III, v, 1: bālyam ca pāṇḍityam ca nirvidya, atha muniḥ.
ment, aversion, delusion, etc. are the passions which veil the real nature of the soul and which in due course attain maturity (pākya). These four, says Gaudapāda, are to be first (agrayāntaḥ) known. Of these, heya, and pākya are mere imaginations: the jñeya alone is the reality. 103

The last point raised by the critic is about the concluding verse of the Kārikā in which Gaudapāda pays obeisance to that pada (state) which is difficult to be seen, very deep, unoriginated, ever the same, fearless and free from variety. According to the critic the pada which is celebrated here is the Buddhist nirvāṇa. The answer to this criticism was already given when we said that the goal, according to Gaudapāda, is brahma-nirvāṇa and not śūnyatā. The pada that is saluted in the last kārikā is the state of Brahman (brāhmaṁyam padam). 104 Professor Bhattacharya contends that epithets like durdarśa and atigambhīra belong to the Buddhist nirvāṇa. But one should not forget that such terms are found used in the Upaniṣads in similar contexts. One of the texts of the Kathopaniṣad, for instance, reads:—

tam durdarśaṁ gūḍham anupraviśtaṁ guhāhitam
gahvareṣṭhaṁ puraṇam,

adhyātma-yogādhigamena devaṁ matvā dhīro harṣa-śokau jahāti. 105

Our object in criticizing the view of those who hold Gaudapāda to be an advocate of Baudhāyaṇa doctrines in his Kārikā is to show that the main aim of the teacher is to expound the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, and that he does not deviate from his purpose even when he adopts the arguments of the Baudhāyaṇa Idealists and dresses his thought in Buddhist terminology. This is recognized by those teachers

103. Instead of heya-jñeyaṁ ślokasāṁ Upaniṣad-brahma-yogin reads heya-

jñeyaṁ ślokasāṁ.

104. See GK, IV, 85.

105. I, ii, 12.
of Buddhism who came after Gauḍapāda and who, while referring to his Kārikā do not regard him as a Baudhā or as having been influenced by Buddhism. Śāntiraksīta quotes in his Madhyamakālaṅkāra Kārikā verses from Gauḍapāda’s work, while discussing the views of the Apaniṣad das. Kamalaśīla refers to the Kārikā in the Pañjikā as an Upaniṣat śāstra. So, it is clear that the Baudhās themselves consider the Kārikā to be a work on Vedānta. Gauḍapāda is faithful throughout to the Upaniṣads. Even in the Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa where he employs Baudhā terminology to a great extent, he does not cut himself away (as we have seen) from the Upaniṣadic moorings.

Why, then, it may be asked, should he have adopted Buddhistic expressions at all? The answer is that the exigencies of his time must have made him use Baudhā terminology, even as the Hindu monks who preach Vedānta in the countries of the West to-day feel the necessity of clothing their thoughts in Christian expressions.

III

The Influence of Upaniṣads on Buddhism

The accusation that a system is not what it professes to be but something else in disguise is a stock offensive weapon in the armoury of philosophical warfare. If the theistic Vedāntin brings the charge of pseudo-Vijñānavāda or Śūnyavāda against Advaita, it is not impossible for the Advaitin to return the compliment by saying that Vedāntic theism resembles Sāṅkhya or even some form of Buddhism. Keith, for instance, says that while the doctrine of Nāgarjuna, as interpreted by Buddhāpālita and Candrakīrti, resembles the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, Bhāvaviveka’s exposition of Nāgarjuna shows ‘traces of realism comparable to the more directly realistic attitude of Rāmānuja.’

ring to Yāmunācārya’s remark that the “avowed Buddhists” (prakāṭaḥ saugatāḥ) and the “Buddhists in disguise” (Advaitins) resemble in their view of Reality, Poussin observes, “It is only just to say that Rāmānuja could hardly avoid the reproach of dualism, and may be styled Śāṅkhya in disguise.” Vijñānabhikṣu argues in his Śāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya that Advaita is not Vedānta, that it is covert Buddhism or neo-illusionism, and that the followers of this system should properly be classed with the nāṣikas. But it will be interesting to note that Śāṅkhya itself is not free from liason with the realistic schools of Buddhism. Vyāsa, the commentator on the Yoga-sūtra, is stated to have been strongly influenced by the Abhidharmaists. The reality of the past and the future is proved by Patañjali and Vyāsa in almost the same expressions that are used by the Sarvāstivādins. And when accused of drifting into Śāṅkhya, the Sarvāstivādins justify themselves by saying that while they believe in the momentary forces (samskrta-lakṣaṇāni) of production and destruction, the advocates of Śāṅkhya-yoga do not. Similarly, when the Vijñānavādins are charged with leaning on the side of Vedānta, they answer that they do not believe in a permanent Self as the Vedāntins do. In the Majjhima-nikāya, Vijñānavāda-Vedānta is condemned by Śākyamuni. So, there is nothing surprising in such charges and counter-charges.

The inception and growth of Buddhism in India were not effected in a vacuum. Eminent scholars passed from the orthodox folds into Buddhism and vice versa. Buddhism owed a great deal to Upaniṣadic thought, and influenced in

107. JRAS, 1910, p. 132.
108. See the Śāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya edited by Richard Garbe (1895), p. 16.
109. See Th. Stecherbatsky’s Central Conception of Buddhism (1923), p. 27.
110. Ibid., p. 45.
111. Majjhima, i, p. 329: viññānam anidassanam anantam sabbotapaham.
112. See J. E. Carpenter: Theism in Mediaeval India, p. 303: ‘That Buddhists and Brāhmans should be affected by the same tendencies of speculation can occasion no surprise. They constantly met each other in debate; converts passed from one school into another; they used the same language, if they did not always employ the same terms with precisely the same meanings.’
its turn the later Vedāntic schools. That the Buddhistic thinkers freely borrowed from Brāhmaṇic literature will be evident from the following episode in the Mattavilāsaprahasana, a farce written by the Pallava King Mahendra-vikramavarman I of Kāñci in the 7th Century A.D. One of the characters of the play, a Baudhā Bhikṣu who is unjustly suspected by a Kāpālika of having stolen the latter’s alms-bowl says, ‘Namo Buddhāya.’ The Kāpālika, proposes an amendment that the Buddhist monk should salute not the Buddha but Kharapaṭa, the promulgator of the Coraśāstra or science of theft; but immediately the Kāpālika corrects himself by saying that in the matter of thieving the Buddha was a greater hand than Kharapaṭa, as he had built his Piṭakas or Kośas with the things stolen from the Upaniṣads and the Mahābhārata. Though the Kāpālika’s accusation is grossly exaggerated, it contains a measure of truth. That is, Buddhism did benefit by and adapt some of the doctrines contained in the Upaniṣads and other Hindu scriptures. And so, it is but natural that there should be resemblances in some respects between the schools of Buddhism and the orthodox systems based on the Upaniṣads. As Prof. Hiriyanna remarks, ‘All the different shades of philosophic theory—realistic and idealistic—are found within Buddhism itself; and we have, so to speak, philosophy repeated twice over in India—once in the several Hindu systems and again in the different schools of Buddhism.’ It is no wonder, therefore, that a system of Hindu Idealism and a school of Baudhā Idealism should have doctrinal similarities. But two points are worthy of note in this connection, viz. (1) that Advaita-Vedānta develops its

113. The present writer’s attention to this work was drawn by Dr V. Raghavan.
114. See the Mattavilāsaprahasana (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 55), p. 55: vedāntebhyo gṛhitvārtheṇ yo mahābhāratadāpi viprānām miṣatām eva kṛtyavān kośasāñcayam.
116. See Charles Elliot’s Hinduism and Buddhism (1921), Vol. II, p. 135: ‘In many epochs the same mythological and metaphysical ideas appear in a double form, Brahmanic and Buddhist, and it is hard to say which form is the earlier.’
doctrines from the teachings of the Upaniṣads and not from the conceptions of Buddhism which are also in a way influenced by the Upaniṣads, and (2) that notwithstanding similarities, the conclusions of Advaita differ from what are peculiarly Buddhistic teachings. (i) While for Advaita, the Absolute, Brahman or Ātman, is the sole reality, for Viṣṇu-nāvāda the real consists of several series of momentary ideas devoid of content, and for Śūnyavāda there is no reality whatsoever. (ii) For Viṣṇu-nāvāda, viṣṇāna is ‘self-conscious’ in the sense of ‘knowing itself’ (i.e., svasamvedya), whereas for Advaita, the Self is self-luminous, sva-prakāśa in the sense that it does not require to be revealed.117 (iii) Further, while Advaita grants objectivity (though of a type called prātibhāsika) even to illusory objects like nacre-silver, Viṣṇu-nāvāda which regards external things as but aspects of viṣṇāna, denies all objectivity to them. (iv) And lastly, while in Advaita māyā is a cosmic power accounting for the transphenomenal Brahman appearing as the phenomenal world, avidyā in Buddhism is the cause of individual existence, being the first in the chain of causation, and stands for the ignorance of the Four Noble Truths taught by the Buddha.118

Thus it will be seen that there are significant differences between Mahāyāna Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta. Gauḍapāda who was an illustrious predecessor of Śaṅkara and an eminent Vedāntin has taken all the care to bring out these differences clearly in his Kārikā. Since what he accomplishes in his work is a lucid and systematic exposition of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads like the Māṇḍūkya and the Brhadāranyaka, he is to be regarded as a lineal descendant of sages like Yaśñavalkya, and not of Bauddha teachers like Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga.

117. My attention to this difference was drawn by Professor M. Hiriyanna.
118. If the ālayavijñāna be admitted, then, of course, there would have to be recognized a cosmic avidyā much the same as in Advaita. But how the conception of an absolute consciousness would be disruptive of the Viṣṇu-nāvāda Idealism we have already seen.
CHAPTER X

AN ESTIMATE

I

Some Pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntins

Gauḍapāda occupies an important place in the history of Advaita Vedānta, as he is, so far as we know, its first systematic exponent. Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Vedānta-sūtra which is one of the three prasthānas (basic texts) of Vedānta, must have lived much earlier. But his work is more a theological digest of the Upaniṣads than systematic philosophy.¹ And moreover, since it consists of aphorisms, it cannot serve as an independent treatise on Vedānta, self-explanatory and self-sufficient.

The names of several teachers of old are mentioned, and their opinions are cited by Bādarāyaṇa in his work. They are: Jaimini,² Āśmaratya,³ Bādari,⁴ Auḍulomi,⁵ Kaśakṛtsna,⁶ Kārṣṇājini,⁷ and Ātreya.⁸ Of these, Kaśakṛtsna would seem to have favoured the Advaita view. According to Śaṅkara, Kaśakṛtsna held that the non-modified supreme Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. The jīva is not a product of the Supreme; it is non-different therefrom. At death the soul is not destroyed; nor is it born with the body. It is eternal, unchanging consciousness; there is no possibility of its destruction. The elements and the sense organs are the products of nescience. It is these that import illusory difference of the soul and

2. I, ii, 28; 31; I, iii, 31; I, iv, 18, 11; 40: III, iv, 2: 18: 40: IV iii 12:
3. IV, iv, 5; 11.
5. I, ii, 30; III, iv, 11; IV, iii, 7 IV iv 10.
6. I, iv, 21; III, iv, 45; IV, iv, 6.
7. I, iv, 22.
8. III, i, 9.
9. III, iv, 44.
the supreme Self. When right knowledge dawns, the illusion disappears, and the non-difference is realized. Such is the view of Kaśakṛtsna, as expounded by Śaṅkara. It is a non-dualism of the type which was taught by Śaṅkara himself. But we have no means of determining either the date of Kaśakṛtsna or any detail regarding his writings.

We come across the views of other old Vedāntsins in the works of later thinkers. Ānandagiri identifies a quotation in Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Māndūkyakārikā (II, 32) as from the writings of one Draviḍācārya (or Draiḍācārya) ⁹ And in his gloss on the Chāndogyopanishad-bhasya, he speaks of a commentary on the Chāndogya by Draviḍācārya. ¹⁰ At another place in the same gloss he says that Śaṅkara relies on Draviḍācārya’s statement for resolving the conflict between the Śruti and the Purāṇas as regards the time of sunrise and sunset in the different regions of the world of the gods. ¹¹ In the Saṁkṣepaśārīraka Sarvajñātman refers to two eminent teachers of Advaita, the Vākyakāra born in the family of the Atris and the Bhāsyakāra. The commentaries on the work identify the latter as Draviḍācārya, and the former as Brahmanandin, known as Ṭāṅka, the Vākyakāra in the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition. It is believed that Draviḍācārya wrote an extensive commentary on the Chāndogyopanishad-vārtika, consisting probably of the aphoristic vākyas of Brahmanandin. ¹² If Ānandagiri and the commentators on the Saṁkṣepaśārīraka are right in what they say, Draviḍācārya must have been a leading Advaitin of the pre-Śaṅkara era, upholding the niṣprapañcha-

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⁹. Śaṅkara: siddhāṃ tu nivartatvāḥ ity āgamanīdām sūtrām. Ānandagiri: ukterthe draviḍācārya–sammatiṃ āha.

¹⁰. atha pāṭhakramam āśrityāpi draviḍāṃ bhāsyāṃ prāṇitam tat kim anenety āsāṅkyā ’ha–ālpa-prāṇitam itī. (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series No. 14, p. 1.)

¹¹. yadyāpi śrutivirodhe śmṛtir apramāṇaṃ tathā ’pi yathākathāmaścid virodhapaṭhāram draviḍācāryoktam upapādayati (Ibid., p. 146).


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or nirguṇavastu-vāda. The Viśiṣṭādvaits, however, claim Dramiḍācārya for themselves. Rāmānujaścārya refers in his Siddhītraya to a Bhāṣya-kṛt who, it is believed, is the same as Dramiḍācārya. Several references to Dramiḍācārya are to be found in the Vedārtha-saṁgraha and the Śrī-bhāṣya of Rāmānuja, and in the Tattvāṭikā of Vedāntadeśika. As no work of Dramiḍācārya is extant, we cannot say what his philosophical position really was. Nor is there any definiteness about his date beyond the fact that he preceded Śaṅkara.

Another old Vedāntin pre-supposed by Śaṅkara is Bhartṛprapañca. Anandajñāna says in his gloss on Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad that a more extensive commentary on the same Upaniṣad was written by Bhartṛprapañca, and that the recension chosen by this teacher was the Mādhyandina, and not the Kāṇḍa which was commented upon by Śaṅkara. From the same authority we know that Bhartṛprapañca was also the author of a commentary on the Isāvāsya. The Siddhītraya of Yāmunaścārya includes the name of Bhartṛprapañca in the list of those who expounded the Vedānta-sūtra. A glossator on the Kathopaniṣad says that Bhartṛprapañca wrote a commentary on that Upaniṣad as well. Several references to Bhartṛprapañca’s writings are to be traced in Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad and in Sureśvara’s Vārtika thereon. Professor Hiriyanna has reconstructed the philosophy of Bhartṛprapañca from these references. It would

14. An account of his philosophy is given by Prof. M. Hiriyanna in The Indian Antiquary, Vol. LIII, pp. 77-86.
15. Same as Anandagiri.
17. Gopāla-yatindra.
appear that this old Vedāntin was a bhedābhedavādin, an advocate of the view of identity-in-difference. True, he recognized, like Śaṅkara, the distinction between a para or higher and an aparā or lower Brahman. But the lower Brahman is not, in his view, an appearance (vivarta) of the higher, as in Śaṅkara’s system. He seems to have taught that the two are equally real, being related by way of identity-in-difference. God, soul and matter are all real. But they do not constitute a plurality of independent reals. Matter and souls are transformations (parīnāma) of God who is related to them as a whole to its parts or as a substance to its modes. As regards the practical teaching Bhartṛprapañca was a samuccayavādin, as he appears to have recommended a combination of jñāna with karma for attaining release. In Śaṅkara’s Advaita, karma is but a remote auxiliary and not a means to mokṣa which is to be realized by unaided jñāna. Bhartṛprapañca, however, felt that there is a need for upāsanā or meditation even after the acquisition of jñāna. Scriptural texts like ‘That thou art’ can give only mediate knowledge. It is constant meditation that can transform this knowledge into immediate experience. From this short account of Bhartṛprapañca’s philosophy it will be evident that though Bhartṛprapañca was a monist, he was not an Advaitin, and that between his thought and Śaṅkara’s there are significant points of difference.

I-tsing, a Buddhist pilgrim from China, who visited India in the seventh century A.D., records in his journal that about forty years earlier than he wrote, i.e., c. 651 A.D., there died in India a grammarian named Bhartṛhari. ¹⁸ This is the author of the Vākyapadīya, which is a great contribution to the philosophy of grammar. The view that Bhartṛhari was a Bauddha is now generally dis-

18. Dr C. Kunhan Raja argues that the date of Bhartṛhari has to be fixed in the fifth century. A. D. See his paper I-tsing and Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya in Dr Krishnaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, pp. 293-298.
credited because there is unmistakable evidence, both internal and external, to show that he was a great Advaitin. The writers on Kashmir Śaivism, like Somānanda and Utpala quote Bhartṛhari while criticizing the sphoṭavāda and characterizes him as an Advaitin.⁹ Pratyag-
rūpa, the commentator on Citsukha’s Tattvapradīpikā, calls Bhartṛhari brahmavit-prakāṇḍa.¹⁰ A study of the Vākyapadiya itself reveals that Bhartṛhari was a śabdādvai-
tavādin. He subscribes to the central doctrine of Advaita that ultimate Reality is non-dual, and that the world of phenomena is a transfiguration (vivarta) thereof. Like all the teachers of Mimāṃsā and Vedānta, he regards āgama as the sole authority in matters relating to dharma. Tarka, in his view, must be used as an auxiliary to āgama, and not as an independent pramāṇa. Though Bhartṛhari was an Advaitin supporting the theory of vivarta, there are certain features of his teaching which distinguish it from the system of Advaita as taught by Śaṅkara. While for Śaṅkara the non-dual Reality is the nirguna-Brahman, for Bhartṛhari it is Śabda-brahman. According to Bhartṛhari, the world of phenomena is a transfiguration of the Śabdatattva effected through kālaśakti. In the system of Śaṅkara, māyā-avidyā is the principle of illusion. The sphoṭavāda sponsored by Bhartṛhari is not accepted by Śaṅkara. While Śaṅkara’s Advaita recognizes Īśvara as the saguna aspect of Brahman, in Bhartṛhari’s philosophy there is no Īśvara apart from Śabda. The Vākyapadiya is mainly a work on the philosophy of grammar. Therefore, like the other grammarians. Bhartṛhari holds that the study of grammar (vyākaraṇa) leads to mokṣa which consists in the realization of the Śabda-brahman which alone is real. For Śaṅkara, however, knowledge of the sense of the mahāvākyas is the sole means to release. Inspite of these differences

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20. See V. A. Ramaswami Sastrī’s art. ‘Bhartṛhari a Baudhā?’ in The Journal of the Annamalai University, Vol. VI, No. 1, p. 66.
Bhartṛhari’s claim to rank as a great pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin is not to be denied. The Vākyapadiya bears him out to be as uncompromising an Advaitin as any other.

The name of one Brahmadatta is included in the list of those who of old interpreted the Vedānta-sūtra, given in the Siddhītraya by its author, Yāmunācārya.21 When Brahmadatta lived and what works he wrote it is difficult to say.22 All that we know about his date is that he could not have been later than Śaṅkara, for allusions to his views are found in the works of Suresvara. From these references as also from others made by writers like Vedāntadeśika, a few details regarding Brahmadatta’s philosophical position could be gathered. His was a Monism based on the Upaniṣadic teaching, approximating to Śaṅkara’s Advaita, but not identical therewith. One of the doctrines held by Brahmadatta was that the individual soul (jīva) is non-eternal; that it originates and perishes—a view which is not endorsed by any extant school of Vedānta. Another point which is worthy of note is that while according to Śaṅkara the knowledge that arises from the mahāvākyas like ‘That thou art’ is the primary means to release, according to Brahmadatta this is not enough and must be supplemented by continued meditation which alone is capable of culminating in Brahman-intuition at the decease of the body. In the view of Śaṅkara the purport of the Upaniṣads is to be found in the texts which teach the non-difference of the individual soul from Brahman; in the view of Brahmadatta, the main purpose of the Upaniṣads is to prescribe upāsanā in texts like ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ.’ Brahmadatta seems to think that the identity of the soul with Brahman is not a fiction but a fact. But a mere knowledge of this truth learnt from Scripture will not do, according to him, for dispelling ajñāna. The knowledge by description thus gained ‘has to be dwelt

upon almost constantly until it is transformed into knowledge by acquaintance. Even then release is not attained. One must wait till physical death, when alone it is possible for the individual soul to merge in Brahman. Brahmadatta is an advocate of what is termed the dhyāna-niyoga-vāda, a view according to which the import of the Upaniṣadic texts prescribing meditation should be understood, not as bhāvanā (following the way of the Bhaṭṭas), but as niyoga (after the Prabhākaras). Mokṣa for him is, therefore, an adṛṣṭaphala and not a dṛṣṭaphala as for Śaṅkara. That is why Brahmadatta insists on the continuance of meditation till the end of life. And as no one could become perfect so long as one lives in the body, it is not possible for any one to renounce karma completely. Thus Brahmadatta seems to have taught jñāna-karma-samuccaya. Nevertheless he was a māyāvādin who believed in the essential identity of the Ātman and Brahman, and regarded the distinction between them as the result of māyā.

In his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra (I, i, 4) Śaṅkara quotes three verses whose author has been identified as Sundara Pāṇḍya. Since Kumārila too quotes Sundara Pāṇḍya, the latter must have been an authority not only on Vedānta but on Pūrva-mīmāṁsā as well, and must have flourished before Kumārila and Śaṅkara. It appears that Sundara Pāṇḍya wrote a Vṛtti, following probably the lead of an old Vṛtti, on the sūtras of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa. It is possible that he lived in the Pāṇḍya country and was well-known for his mastery of the two Mīmāṁsās. From the verses quoted by Śaṅkara we learn that, according to Sundara Pāṇḍya, when one realizes the supreme Brahman, the Scriptural injunctions and pramāṇas cease to exist and function as such—a view with which Śaṅkara concurs.

23. Ibid, p. 5.
AN ESTIMATE

II

Analysis of Gaudapāda's Philosophy

All the Vedāntins we have noticed above should have lived before Śaṅkara. But not all of them taught Advaita Vedānta, and particularly that shade of Advaita which is expounded by Śaṅkara in his works. Bhartṛprapañca was definitely a teacher of bhedābheda-vāda, a doctrine which comes in for a great deal of criticism at the hands of Śaṅkara. Sureśvara, no doubt, says that Bhartṛprapañca was a vivarta-vādin like Śaṅkara and not a pariṇāma-vādin, and that the pariṇāma-view which he taught was only provisional and not final. But Śaṅkara cites Bhartṛprapañca only as an exponent of bhedābheda and subjects him to severe criticism.25 Draviḍācārya was probably an Advaitin. But what type of Advaita he taught is not clear, especially as he is quoted with approval by both Advaitins and Viśiṣṭādvaītins. Bhartṛhari and Bhramadatta were also teachers of Advaita. But the former with his theory of the sphaṭa and the latter with his insistence on the need for continued meditation even after the acquisition of knowledge are doctrinally closer to Maṇḍana Miśra the author of the Brahma-siddhi than to Śaṅkara. Sundara Pāṇḍya and Kāśakṛtsna were, in all probability, teachers of that school of Advaita which Śaṅkara has made famous. But unfortunately their contribution to the development of early Advaita cannot be assessed, as their works are not extant. The case of Gaudapāda, however, is unique in that his Māṇḍūkyakārikā has come down to us and Śaṅkara himself wrote a commentary thereon.26 Doctrinally, there is no difference

25. Sureśvara's explanation is that Śaṅkara refutes not Bhartṛprapañca's view but his view as expounded by some of his followers. See M. Hiriyanna, Op. cit., p. 84.

26. The genuineness of this commentary has been questioned. But for the view that tradition is right in ascribing the commentary on the Kārikā to Śaṅkara, the author of the Śāriraka-bhāṣya, see T. R. Chintamani's art. 'Śaṅkara—the Commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā' in The Proceedings and Transactions of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras, 1924; pp. 419-425.
whatsoever between what is taught by Gauḍapāda in the Kārikā and what is expounded by Śaṅkara in his extensive works. Not only did Gauḍapāda teach that the ultimate Reality is the non-dual Spirit and that the world of plurality is an appearance thereof, but also, as did Śaṅkara later on, that the principal means to release is jñāna or knowledge.

It is clear, then, that Gauḍapāda was a great teacher of Advaita-Vedānta who set the model for Śaṅkara to follow. One who reads the Kārikā will not fail to be struck by the unflinching loyalty of its author to Absolutism and the confidence and conviction born of the highest spiritual experience which are at the back of his lucid exposition of the doctrine. We have given in the pages of this work an account of the philosophy of Advaita as expounded by Gauḍapāda, and shall here, in conclusion, summarize the main points of the great Ācārya’s teaching.

(1) The ultimate reality, according to Gauḍapāda, is Brahman. The Upaniṣads adopt a two-fold way of indicating the nature of Brahman viz., the affirmative (vidhīmukhena) and the negative (nīṣedha-mukhena). As illustrative of these two modes of presentation, the following texts one from the Chāndogya and the other from the Brhadāranyaka may be considered. A section of the Chāndogya called Śaṅḍilya-vidyā identifies Brahman with all and defines it cryptically as tājjalān which means ‘that which generates (ja) the universe, reabsorbs (li) it, and sustains (an) it.’ Then, Brahman is described as ‘including all activities, all desires, all odours, all tastes, pervading all, speechless and unperturbed;’ and it is identified with the individual self: ‘This is my self within the heart, smaller than rice, or barley corn, or mustard seed or grain of millet or the kernel of a grain of millet; this is my self within the

27. See Anubhūtisvarūpācārya’s Gaudapādiyabhāṣya-ṭippana (Govt. Oriental Mss Library, Madras), R-2911, p. 2: vidhīmukhena nīṣedhamukhena ca brahmāpratipādāyam iti prakriyādvaśādhyānam.
28. III, XIV.
heart, greater than the earth, greater than the mid-region, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds. This is Brahman. The other text which is from the Brhadāraṇa-yāka, illustrating the language of negation in which Brahman is taught, is the passage where Yājñavalkya gives his final answer to the persistent question about the basis of the universe put to him by the learned lady, Gārgī. As we saw in an earlier chapter, Gārgī was not satisfied with the answer that space is the support of all things; and enquired Yājñavalkya about the support of space. The sage could no longer withhold the final doctrine from her, and he said: 'This is the imperishable, O Gārgī, which wise people adore—not gross, not subtle, not short, not long, not red, not adhesive, without shadow, without darkness, without air, without space, unattached, without taste, without smell, without sight, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without mouth, without form, and without either inside or outside. Not that does anything eat; nor that does eat anything.' The Reality which is thus described negatively is not a void. In order to teach this, Yājñavalkya immediately adds that it is at the behests of Brahman that all beings are what they are and do what they do.

Gauḍapāda follows the way of the Upaniṣads and teaches the nature of Brahman both affirmatively and negatively. As related to and inclusive of the world, Brahman is Ṣvāra. It is what is called the lower (apara) Brahman. As Ṣvāra, it is seated in the hearts of all. It is the all-pervasive lord, impelling all beings to activity. It is the beginning, middle, and end of all things. It remains the same in the three states of experience, viz. waking,

29. M. Hiriyanna: *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 60.
30. See p. 65.
34. *GK*, I, 10.

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dream and sleep. The higher Brahman (paramābrahma), i.e., Brahman per se, however, is not related to the world, because there is no world in reality. It cannot be even expressed in words, for it is trans-phenomenal. The best way of indicating its nature is through a series of negations; for that is how the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad characterizes it, as 'not this, not that.' There is nothing prior to it, nor anything after it. It has neither an inside nor an outside. It has no name and no form. It has no contents and no movement. It is devoid of sleep and dream; it transcends the three states of experience, and hence is called the fourth. Because Brahman is described in negative terms, it is not to be inferred that it is a blank or non-entity. In order to warn the student against the view which regards the void as ultimate, Gauḍapāda indicates the positive implication of the negative description. Brahman is eternal (nitya). It is all-light, pure consciousness. It is self-luminous, ever the same. It is infinite bliss, unsullied peace. In short, it is sat, cit, and ānanda.

(2) The Brahman whose nature has been expressed above in halting words is non-dual (advaita). The nonduality of the supreme spirit is, in fact, the central teaching of Advaita Vedānta. Gauḍapāda expounds this doctrine through citing important scriptural passages, and through reasoning. In the Advaita-prakaraṇa, he quotes well-known passages from the Upaniṣads with a view to show that

36. GK, I, 22.
37. GK, I, 26 & III, 12.
38. GK, IV, 75: dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate.
39. GK, IV, 60: yatra varṣā na varṣante.
40. GK, III, 26.
41. GK, I, 26.
42. GK, III, 36.
43. GK, IV, 45.
44. GK, I, 14; 16; III, 36; IV, 81.
45. GK, III, 33.
46. GK, I, 12, III, 36; IV, 81.
47. GK, I, 29; IV, 93.
Scripture teaches the non-duality of Brahman. The creation-texts, he says, should not be interpreted literally; they are to be understood in a figurative sense, and should be regarded as providing an introduction to the texts which teach non-duality. In the Āgama-prakaraṇa, Gauḍapāda gives an analysis of the three states of experience, following the Māṇḍūkya and concludes as a result thereof that the real Self is not affected by the changing states, and that it is the constant unvarying non-dual reality. In the third and the fourth prakaraṇas, the doctrine of ajāti is set forth, which, again, is intended to show that non-duality is the supreme truth. By means of dialectical arguments it is shown that the concept of origination is unintelligible. That we believe in the origination of things, it is not the purpose of the dialectic to deny. But what it seeks to demonstrate is that the belief is such that it leads to contradictions when critically examined. The category of cause itself, which is the ground of the notion of origination, is unintelligible. Gauḍapāda gives a critique of causality in the Alātaśānti-prakaraṇa. Nothing could come out of nothing; nor could anything issue out of anything else. Asatkārya-vāda and satkārya-vāda perish through mutual conflict, and point to the truth of non-origination, the truth that nothing whatsoever is born. Brahman, which is the eternal reality and is immutable, is neither an effect nor a cause. There is nothing other than it, either to produce it or to be produced by it.

(3) If the non-dual Brahman is the sole reality, the world of plurality must be an appearance, an illusion. Dvaita or duality is māyāmātra; advaita or non-duality is the supreme truth. The one Self seems to be many through its own māyā. The world with its things is an illusory

48. GK, I, 17.
49. GK, II, 12.
projection of Ātma-māyā.\textsuperscript{50} It is not a transformation either of an independent Primal Nature (Prakṛti) or of Brahman. It is a transfiguration (vivarta) of the Absolute.

Gauḍapāda teaches the vivarta-vāda—or, to use his terminology, the vaitathya of the world—in various ways. In the second prakaraṇa, the world of waking is characterized to be illusory on the strength of its similarity to the dream-world. Just as the contents of dream are objects of consciousness and are found to be inconstant, so are the things of the waking world. It is to be noted here that unlike the subjectivist, Gauḍapāda recognizes the relative difference between waking and dream. Even the dream-contents have a measure of reality; they are unreal, judged from the standpoint of waking experience. The waking world has a greater degree of reality than the realm of dream; but from the standpoint of absolute experience, it is unreal.

Gauḍapāda explains the illusoriness of the world with the help of other illustrations also in the Kārikā. The well-known rope-snake analogy is employed by him. Just as a rope may appear as a snake in the dark, Brahman appears as the world due to māyā. The point to be noted in this and similar analogies is that even during the period of delusion there is no change in the substrate. The rope remains a rope even when it is mistaken for a snake. The world is compared also to gandharva-nagara or \textit{fata morgana} and things created by magic.

Māyā which is the principle of illusion has not an independent ontological status. It is not an entity or reality having a subsistence of its own. As we have said several times, there is no reality other than Brahman. To the inquiring intellect māyā is a riddle. When the Absolute is realized, there is no māyā to be explained. As Gauḍapāda says, māyā is that which does not really exist.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{GK}, III, 10.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{GK}, IV, 58.
(4) The individuality of the individual soul is part of the show put up by māyā. Shorn of the adjuncts such as the body and the mind, the jīva is non-different from Brahman. The Mahāvākyas proclaim the truth of non-difference. There are, no doubt, Upaniṣadic texts which speak of difference. But they have not the primary purport; they have only a secondary sense; for, without superimposing on the self the attributes of the not-self, it is not possible to regard the self as finite and as many.

In the Advaita-prakarana, Gauḍapāda explains the apparent finitude and plurality of souls on the analogy of pot-ether etc. There are no real distinctions in ether. They are created by things like pots and pitchers. Because of the adjuncts we speak of pot-ether, pitcher-ether, and so on. But in reality there is nothing like pot-ether as distinct from pitcher-ether, for ether is the same all over. Similarly, Brahman or the Self which is pure consciousness is undivided and indivisible. The distinctions that are imported into it are all due to avidyā. The empirical usage relating to the birth and death of souls, their agency and enjoyership, is conditioned by the avidyā-generated bodies and minds. The Self per se is unlimited and eternal.

The truth, according to Gauḍapāda, is that no jīva is ever born. There is neither destruction nor origination, neither the bound souls nor those who seek the means for release, neither mumukṣu nor mukta. As the empirical usage based on the world is included in māyā, so is the empirical usage based on Scripture. Just as birth and death are māyika, so are bondage and release. The supreme Self undergoes no change; it is ever pure and free.

(5) Since the goal as envisaged in the Advaita system is not something to be newly acquired or accomplished, karma cannot be the means to its attainment. In fact mokṣa

52. Gk, III, 48; II, 32.
is not what is attained (sādhyā). It is said to be attained only in a figurative sense. What is called release is really the attainment of what is already attained. The path thereto is jñāna. Gauḍapāda defines it as ātmasatyānubodha, realization of the truth of the Self. 53 It is through the unborn knowledge that the unborn Self is realized. 54

Upāsanā or meditation is not the direct means to release. It is prescribed for the sake of those who are either dull-witted or middlings. The Upāsaka reaches only the lower Brahman and not the higher. 55

In the highest experience there is no grasping and no leaving, there is no thought and no object. 56 All distinctions disappear. The Self which is consciousness-bliss alone is. The samādhi of which Gauḍapāda speaks is Self-realization which is the culmination of knowledge or jñāna.

(6) The Advaita-darśana, in the view of Gauḍapāda, has no quarrel with any system of philosophy. While the pluralistic world-views are in conflict with one another, Advaita is not opposed to any of them. It recognizes that there is truth in each of them, but, only that truth is not the whole. Hostility arises out of partial vision. When the whole truth is known, there could be no hostility. Gauḍapāda pleads for a philosophical peace when he says: 'avivādam nibhodhata'. 57

53. GK, III, 32.
54. GK, III, 33.
55. GK, III, 16; III, 1.
56. GK, III, 38.
57. GK, III, 17; 18; IV, 5.
The place of Gauḍapāda in Advaita

From the account of Gauḍapāda's teachings given in the preceding chapters and from the analysis of his thought given above, it should be evident that he is rightly regarded by tradition as the philosophical progenitor of Śaṅkara. It is true that the Paramārthasāra of Ādi Śeṣa is also an early Advaita work between which and the Māṇḍūkyakārikā there are, as we saw, significant points of identity. But there is no conclusive evidence to show that the Paramārthasāra is an earlier work than the Kārikā. Nor is there any evidence of Śaṅkara having been influenced by Ādi Śeṣa's work. It is even possible that the Paramārthasāra leans towards the view of prasāṅkhya, as it stresses the need for abhyāsa and bhāvanā. As it has been suggested, the Paramārthasāra was perhaps written on the analogy ofĪsvara-kṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya-kārikā to perform for Advaita the same function as the latter's work for Sāṅkhya. It makes use, in a large measure, of Sāṅkhya concepts and terminology in its presentation of Advaita. The Māṇḍūkyakārikā, it is interesting to note, presents Advaita in a different mode. The concepts and terminology used here are in some measure borrowed from Baudhāyaṇism. It will not be wrong, therefore, to suggest that probably Gauḍapāda wrote his work on the analogy of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with a view to make it occupy a position in Advaita similar to that of the latter in the Madhyamika system.

Gauḍapāda lived and taught in an age when Mahāyānaism was having a great hold on the minds of people. The task of a teacher of Vedānta at such a time would naturally be twofold—to convince the followers of the Upaniṣads that their path was sound, and to spread the knowledge of the Vedānta among the Baudhāyas themselves. To secure this

58. PS, p. vii.
two fold objective, it would seem, Gauḍapāda adopted the logical method of expounding the Vedānta and the Baudhāya modes of expression and argumentation. The texts of the Upaniṣads are no doubt invoked. But it is well to remember that they are cited not too often, nor in a dogmatic manner. For the most part the appeal that Gauḍapāda makes is to reason, and, what is more, to experience. He speaks with a voice of authority derived from the intuitive experience of the Absolute; and he utilizes his logical discipline in expounding the truth of Vedānta. It is no wonder, then, that Ācārya Śaṅkara was drawn to his teachings and found in them the spring of eternal life. No reader of the Kārikā will go unimpressed by the genius of its author for spirituality. In the history of Advaita his name will ever remain as that of a great pioneer who combined in himself a deep mysticism with a penetrating philosophy, and a poetic vision with a logical mind.
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GLOSSARY

Abhāsa : reflection; appearance; phenomenon.
Abhaya : fearlessness.
Abheda : non-difference.
Abhidharma : the collection of discourses on metaphysics and doctrines; Abhidharma-piṭaka is the third part of the Tripiṭaka; Abhidharmists are members of a Buddhist school.
Abhyāsa : repeated practice of spiritual discipline.
Acala-samādhi: the fixed super-conscious state where there is complete absorption of thought into the one object of meditation.
Acārya : teacher; preceptor.
Adharma : demerit.
Adhidaiva : cosmic; pertaining to gods.
Advaita : non-dualism.
Adhyāropa-apavāda : superimposition and subsequent removal as a method leading to the knowledge of the true self.
Adhyātma : personal, individual.
Adrṣṭa-phala : unseen potency generated by rites for helping to bring about their fruit in a hereafter; also called apūrva.
Advayavāda : the doctrine which says there are no perceptible objects and no percipient subjects; or the doctrine which avoids the two extreme views; a name of the Mādhyamika school.
Āgama : scripture, tradition; premise.
Ahaṅkāra : egoity.
Ahavaniya : one of the three consecrated sacrificial fires; as a general rule, all offerings are to be made in this fire alone.
Aja, Ajāta: unborn.
Ajātivāda: doctrine of non-origination.
Ajñāna: ignorance.
Aksipuruṣa: eye-person, the self of the waking state; same as Viśva.
Ālambana: support, cause.
Alātacakra: fire-brand.
Amātra: without any quantity of sound.
Anda: egg; cosmic germ.
Anirvacaniyatā: indeterminability.
Anubhava: experience.
Anubhūti: intuitive experience.
Anukūlatarka: favourable argument.
Antahkarana: internal organ.
Anumāna: inference.
Anupūrva-vihāra (Pāli: anupubba-vihāra): the successive states of dhyaṇa taught by the Buddha.
Anusvāra: the nasal sound marked by a dot.
Anvaya-vyatirekī: inference based on co-presence and co-absence of the probans and the probandum.
Āptakāmatva: the state of having attained one's desires.
Āraṃbha-vāda: creationistic theory of causation.
Ardha-mātrā: the quantity of sound of half a syllable.
Arpanā (samādhi): a state where the mind attains one-pointedness.
Asamprajñāta-samādhi: superconscious samādhi, the state of concentration where both the consciousness of the object and self-consciousness disappear.
Asatkāryavāda: the doctrine that the effect is non-existent in the cause prior to its production.
Asparśa-yoga: the yoga of transcendence whereby one realizes the supra-relational reality. This is the same as the goal of Pātañjala yoga which consists in stemming the tide of the surging psychoses of the mind and gradually attaining thereby a state of mindlessness.

Āśrayaparāvṛtti: the turning back of āśraya (ālayavijñāna) to its natural state in the form of advaya-jñāna (knowledge free from subject and object) owing to elimination of obscuration (āvarana) and passion (kleśa).

Asura: a demon.
Atigambhira: very deep.
Ātma-sāksātkāra: self-realization; same as anubhūti.
Ātma-tattva: the truth of self.
Aupaniṣada: follower of, or taught in, the Upaniṣads.
Avaccheda-vāda: the view that the jīva is the appearance of Brahman as defined by avidyā.
Avaidika: opposed to the Vedas; unorthodox; heterodox.
Āvaraṇa: veiling.
Avasthā: state of experience; condition.
Avatāra: an incarnation of God.
Avidyā: nescience.
Avyakta: unmanifest.
Ayutasiddha: inseparable.
Badarikāśrama: a hermitage at Badarika in the Himalayas.
Bauddha: pertaining to, or follower of, the Buddha.
Bhagavat: possessor of six great qualities, the supreme Lord; in Buddhist works, the term refers to the Buddha.
Bhakti: devotion.
Bhāmati: a commentary on the Sūtrabhāṣya of Śaṅkara by Vācaspati; also the name of a school of Advaita after Vācaspati.
Bhāsyā : commentary.
Bhāsyā-kṛt : author of a Bhāsyā.
Bhāvanā : reminiscent impression; injunctive power; continued meditation.
Bhedā : difference; plurality.
Bhedābheda-vāda : the doctrine of identity-in-difference.
Bhedā-vākyā : text (of scripture) declaring difference.
Bindu : a dot over a letter representing anusvāra.
Brahmacarya : the student’s order of life.
Brahman : the supreme reality; God as creator.
Brahma-nirvāṇa : absorption into the supreme spirit; one of the expressions for the final goal, according to Vedānta.
Brahmavit-prakāṇḍa : the highest among those who have realized the supreme reality.
Brahma-vijñāna : science of Brahman, i.e., inquiry into the nature of ultimate reality.
Buddhi : intellect.
Caitanya : pure consciousness.
Cāksuṣa-puruṣa : see akṣipuruṣa.
Candāla : an outcaste.
Cārvāka : Indian materialism; means probably ‘sweet-tongued’ (cāru-vāka) from the pleasure-philosophy it teaches; the classic authority to whom the system is traced is Brhaspati; hence also called Bārhaspatya doctrine; another name is Lokāyata.
Caturtha : the fourth, i.e., the ultimate reality; same as turiya.
Catuskoti : the Buddhist theory that the truth is free from four koṭis or antas, namely, (i) existent, (ii) non-existent, (iii) both and (iv) not both.
Chāyā-puruṣa, or ātman : the shadow-self; see akṣipuruṣa.
Citta : mind; sometimes it means ‘Self’.
Darśana: lit. sight or view; system of philosophy.
Deva: God; deity; shining one.
Devatā: God; deity.
Devatākānda: the four sections of the Mīmāṃsā śāstra treating of the deities, etc., of the mantras.
Devayāna: the path of the gods beginning with light, etc.
Dharma: merit; as a Buddhist term, it means 'element of existence'.
Dharma-dhātu: the essence of reality.
Dhyāna: meditation.
Drāvida: one who belongs to the Dravida country.
Drṣṭa-phala: seen or visible fruit.
Drṣṭya: object of perception.
Durdarśa: difficult to be seen.
Dvaitin: lit. dualist; also pluralist.
Dvāpara: name of the third yuga.
Eka-jīva-vāda: the theory that there is only one soul.
Ekātma-vāda: the doctrine that there is only one absolute self.
Gandharva-nagara: an imaginary city in the sky.
Gauḍa: one who hails from the Gauḍa (Bengal) country.
Guṇa: quality; cosmic constituent, according to Sāṅkhya.
Guru: preceptor; spiritual teacher.
Hetu: probans; middle term; reason.
Hiranyagarbha: the cosmic form of the self creating the subtle universe; also called Śūtrātman.
Hirarāvati: a river said to be flowing in the Kurukṣetra.
Indha-Indra: also called Śaṅkra-ātman; the person in the right eye.
Īśvara: God; Lord.
Jāgrat: state of waking.
Jāti: birth, origination.
Jñāsā: desire to know; inquiry.
Jīva: the empirical self.
Jīva-kalpanā: fabrication of jīva.
Jīvan-mukta: liberated while still in the body.
Jīvatva: the state of being the finite self.
Jñāna: cognition, knowledge, consciousness.
Jñāna-kāṇḍa: sections of the Veda in which knowledge of
the self is taught, i.e., the Upaniṣads.
Jñāna-karma-samuccaya: the combination of knowledge
and action.
Jñeya: that which is to be known; object of knowledge.
Kalā: factor, aspect.
Kālaśakti: power of time.
Kali: name of the last and worst of the four yugas;
quarrel, etc.
Kāpālika: a sect of Śaivas who carry a human skull and
use it as a receptacle for their food.
Kāraṇa-Brahman: Brahman as the cause of the universe.
Kāraṇa-śarīra: causal body.
Kārikā: memorial verses expounding in a metrical form
an aspect of a subject or a doctrine; a work consisting
of kārikās.
Kārikā-kāra: author of a kārikā; here usually Gauḍapāda.
Karma: rite; activity; the accumulated effect of deeds in
lives past and present.
Karma-kāṇḍa: sections of the Veda in which ritual is
taught.
Kārṣāpana: a coin or weight of different values; money.
Kārya-Brahman: the effect-Brahman; same as Hiraṇya-
garbha.
Kerala: name of the country in the south-west of India
and its inhabitant.
Kośa: sheath.

Kurukṣetra: name of an extensive plain near Delhi, the scene of the great war between the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas.

Lakṣaṇā: secondary implication.

Lokāyata: materialism, same as Cārvāka.

Mahāvākyā: major text of the Upaniṣads like 'that thou art' declarative of non-difference as between Brahman and self.

Manana: reflection (on the Vedānta texts).

Manas: mind.

Mānava-sampradāya: traditional handing down of instruction by human agents.

Maṅgalacarana: invocation.

Mantra: Vedic text.

Mātrā: the time required to pronounce a short vowel.

Māyā: the indeterminable principle that brings about the illusory manifestation of the world.

Māyā-guṇa: constituent of māyā.

Māyā-mātra: mere illusion.

Māyā-maya: of the nature of illusion.

Māyika: illusory.

Mīmāṁsā: literally inquiry; short for Pūrva-mīmāṁsā school of philosophy.

Mokṣa: release.

Mukta: the released one.

Mūla-prakṛti: primal nature; see Prakṛti.

Mumukṣu: one who longs for release.

Naiyāyika: follower of the Nyāya system.

Nara-Nārāyana: said to be two sages practising austerities in the Himalayas.

Nāstika: an unbeliever; adherent of an unorthodox school.
Nirodha: sublation, destruction.
Nirodhasamāpatti: cessation of consciousness.
Nirvāṇa: complete extinction of individual existence, eternal bliss.
Nirvikalpa-samādhi: an exclusive concentration upon the one entity without distinct and separate consciousness of the knower, the known, and the knowing, and without even self-consciousness; same as asaṃprajñātasaṃādhi.
Nisprapañca: trans-phenomenal.
Nitya: eternal.
Niyoga: injunction.
Om: the mystic syllable, composed of the three sounds of A, U, and M; treated in the Māndukya as the cause of and thus identical with the whole universe; the symbol of Brahman.
Omkāra: the mystic syllable ‘Om’.
Pada: state; goal.
Pāda: a quarter; aspect; part.
Pāñcarātra: a monotheistic faith with an Āgamic basis; same as the ekānta, bhāgavata; sātvata or ekāyana system.
Parama-guru: lit. supreme preceptor; usually preceptor’s preceptor.
Paramārtha: absolute truth.
Paratantra: that which is true only in a relative sense.
Parikalpita: that which is apparently real; same as prātibhāsika-satya.
Parināma: transformation or evolution.
Parināma-vāda: theory of transformation or evolution.
Parinirvāṇa: “quite extinguished, quite brought to an end; the final extinction of the individual”; the death of the Buddha,
Parinispanna: that which is perfect from an absolute point of view; the absolute; same as paramārtha.

Pāśupata: a sect of the followers of Śiva (Paśupati).

Paulkasa: the son of a niṣāda father by a Kṣatriya mother.

Paurāṇika: follower of the Purāṇas.

Pitṛyāṇa: the path leading to pitṛs (manes).

Piṭaka: a collection of Buddhist writings.

Prajāpati: lord of creatures, creator.

Prājña: consciousness; name of the self in the state of sleep.

Prakaraṇa: chapter; section.

Prakṛti: prius of creation, according to the Sāṅkhya; primal nature.

Pramāṇa: means of valid knowledge; evidence.

Prameya: object of cognition.

Prāṇa: the vital air, life.

Praṇava: the mystic syllable Om.

Prāśaṅgika: the Mādhyimika Buddhist according to whom, one should not adhere to any proposition of his own, but may refute those of others, reducing them to absurdity; prāśaṅga means reductio ad absurdum.

Prāśaṅkhyana: continued meditation; the instrument of the intuitive experience of Brahman, according to the view of Maṇḍana and the Bhāmati school.

Prasthāna: method, system; basic text.

Prātibhāsika-satya: apparent reality.

Pratibimba-vāda: the view that the jīva is the appearance of Brahman as reflected in nescience; this is held by the followers of the Vivarṇa school of Advaita.

Pratīka: an image, symbol.

Pratyabhijñā: recognition; name of Kashmir Śaivism.

Pūjyapāda: the worshipful one.
Purāṇa: myths and legends narrated to expand, explain and illustrate the truths in the scriptures; hence called upabhramana.

Puruṣa: soul; self.

Rajas: one of the constituents of primal nature, marked by agitation, passion, activity, etc.

Ṛk: a stanza of the Ṛg-veda.

Ṛṣi: seer, sage.

Śabda-Brahman: the Veda considered as revealed sound and identical with the supreme.

Śabda-tattva: the principle of sound.

Śabdādvaita-vāda: the doctrine propounded by Bhartrhari that thought and language are two manifestations of one noumenon, śabda, and that the world evolved from it.

Saccidānanda: existence-consciousness-bliss; one of the expressions for Brahman.

Śādhaka: one who practises spiritual discipline.

Śaiva: follower of the school in which Śiva is considered to be the supreme God.

Śākṣātkāra: intuitive realization (of the ultimate reality).

Śakti: power.

Śaṃsa: a metrical hymn or song of praise; a text of the Śāma-veda.

Samādhi: the super-conscious state where there is complete absorption of thought into the one object of meditation.

Samaṣṭi: collective; cosmic.

Samavāya: inherence.

Saṃbhūti: birth.

Samhitā: any systematically arranged collection of texts; the continuous text of the Vedas.
Samjñāvedayitanirodha: the last state of Buddha before his parinirvāṇa or passing away when the heat of the body is not lost, the life does not come to an end and the organs of sense are not destroyed.

Śaṁsāra: transmigration.

Samvṛti: practical or empirical truth.

Samuccayavāda: the doctrine of the combination of knowledge and action bringing about release.

Samyoga: conjunction.

Saṅghāta: an aggregate organism.

Saṅkalpa: imagination.

Sāṅkhya: one of the six systems; ascribed to Kapila; exhaustive enumeration and philosophical reflection are the meanings suggested for the name.

Sannyāsin: one who has renounced worldliness; one who belongs to the fourth stage or station in life.

Saprapaṅca: connected with the universe.

Sarvajñatā: omniscience.

Sarvāstivāda: the system of Buddhism which maintains the reality of everything.

Śāstra: scripture; sacred teaching.

Sat: existence; reality.

Satkāryavāda: the doctrine that the effect is pre-existent in the cause.

Satkāya-dṛṣṭi: the theory of individuality in Buddhism. There are two ways in which one comes to conceive the real existence of an ego: one is the subjective imagination and the other the objective conception of relativity.

Sattva: one of the constituents of primal nature; marked by goodness, purity, etc.
Savikalpa-samādhi: a state where the mind is conscious of the object of meditation; same as samprajñātasaṃādhi.

Siddhānta: final position; settled conclusion.

Śloka: verse.

Sparśavihāra: a state with ease and comfort.

Sphoṭavāda: the relation between idea and word is no mere external conventional one but originally inner and organic. The word as a whole, its sense, is a sphoṭa (an outbursting) which, after the percipient has received the seed of the impression through the apprehension of the single letters and has brought it to ripeness by means of the apprehension of the last letter, flashes before him suddenly in its unity as a single conception which is eternal.

Śravaṇa: hearing or study (of the Vedānta texts).

Srṣṭi: creation.

Śruti: revealed scripture.

Sthūla-śarīra: the gross body consisting of the elements.

Śūkṣma-śarīra: subtle body consisting of the internal organ, organs of knowledge and action, and the vital airs.

Śūnyatā: nullity, voidness.

Susuptastha: same as Prājña.

Susupti: state of deep sleep.

Sūtra: aphorism.

Sūtrātmāna: same as Hiranyagarbha.

Svabhāva: nature.

Svapna: state of dream.

Svapnātman: same as Taijasa.
Taijasa: the self having a conceit in an individual subtle body in dream-experience.

Tamas: darkness; one of the constituents of primal nature; marked by inertia, stupidity, etc.

Tapas: penance, asceticism.

Tarka: reductio ad absurdum, indirect argument.

Tathāgata: a name of Buddha.

Tattva: truth, category.

Tejas: light; fire.

Tīkā: gloss.

Turiya: the fourth state beyond waking, dream and sleep; also the absolute self.

Turya: same as Turiya.

Tridanḍi-vedānta: Bhāskara’s school of Vedānta.

Udgītha: a part of the Śāma mantras.

Upacāra (samādhi): a state where the mind is concentrated on its object, but not uninterruptedly.

Upadeśa-grantha: a work whose main purpose is to teach adherents, and not to argue with adversaries; also Upādeśa-śāstra.

Upaniṣad: philosophical treatises which developed after the mainly ritualistic portion of the Vedas.

Upapatti: explanation, evidence.

Upāsaka: one who worships or meditates.

Upāsanā: meditation.

Upendra (Viṣṇu): name of Viṣṇu as the younger brother of Indra in his dwarf incarnation.

Uttama-puruṣa: same as Turiya.

Vaibhāṣika: one of the Baudhāyaṇa schools of the Hinayāna; which believed that the external world was both perceptible and inferrable, whereas the Sautrāntika regarded it as only inferrable.

Vaināśika: nihilist; follower of Buddhism.
Vaiśvānara: the supreme spirit located in the collective aggregate of gross bodies.

Vākya: sentence; text.

Vārtika: a critical annotation.

Vārtikakāra: author of a Vārtika; generally Suresvara is referred to as Vārtikakāra.

Varuṇa: one of the oldest and greatest of the Vedic gods; the presiding deity of waters.

Vāsanā: residual impression; also called samskāra.

Vāsudeva: patronymic of Kṛṣṇa.

Vedānta: lit. end of Veda; Upaniṣads; and systems based on the Upaniṣads.

Vibhūti: energy.

Vijñāpti-mātra: (also jñaptimātra, vijñāna-mātra): pure consciousness; a term used for reality in the Vijñāna-vāda school of Buddhism.

Vikṣepa: projection.

Viparyāsa: error.

Virāj: the person in the left eye; the world-man, macrocosm.

Viśiṣṭādvaita: the system of qualified non-duality proclaimed by Rāmānuja.

Viśva: the individual form of the self having a conceit in a gross body while awake.

Vitathā, vaitathya: unreal, unreality.

Vivarana: the name of school of Advaita starting from the Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda and its commentary Vivaraṇa of Prakāśātmayati, advocating the pratibimbavāda or the reflection theory.

Vivarta-vāda: the Advaita theory that the world is an illusory appearance superimposed by māyā on Brahman.

Viveka: discrimination, distinction, the power of separating spirit from matter, truth from untruth, etc.
**GLOSSARY**

**Vṛtti:** commentary.

**Vyāṣṭi:** individual.

**Vyutthāna:** state of return from samādhi.

**Yajña:** sacrifice.

**Yajus:** sacrificial prayer or formula as distinguished from ṛk and sāman.

**Yati:** an ascetic who has restrained his passions.

**Yoga:** path; discipline; one of the six systems which while taking over Sāṅkhya psychology and metaphysics admitted the existence of God and prescribed a course of discipline of the mind.

**Yogācāra:** a sect of Buddhist Philosophy which maintains that consciousness alone is real; Buddhist subjective idealism.

**Yukti:** logical reasoning; see also *tarka.*
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