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
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
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TIBET
DISAPPEARS



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*A Documentary History of
Tibet's International Status
the Great Rebellion
and Its Aftermath*

Compiled and Edited by

CHANAKYA SEN



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To
Prof. S. K. Sen
my uncle



PREFACE

The old Tibet has disappeared—into the great landmass of China. The Tibet that was the Forbidden Land nestling on the lap of the mighty Himalayas, living its ancient life unmolested by science and civilisation, is gone for ever. The Tibet that was autonomous or semi-independent, always living under the suzerainty of China, but never really a part of it; the Tibet that was, for forty years, actually a vassal of Great Britain, about which Sir Charles Bell wrote, "We want Tibet as a buffer to India on the north. Now there are buffers and buffers; and some of them are of very little use. But Tibet is ideal in this respect"—that Tibet is no more. Even gone is the Tibet in which independent India had voluntarily surrendered her extraterritorial rights, hoping that, under the umbrella of Chinese sovereignty, Tibet would be allowed to retain its personality and absorb slowly the shocks of civilisation. After the Rebellion of March 1959 Tibet has become a part of China. Before long, it will be indistinguishable from the rest of the vast and swiftly-changing Chinese Republic.

The consequence of the disappearance of Tibet on Sino-Indian relations has been traumatic. China and India, two great Asian neighbours, have now a common frontier of some 2,500 miles, a frontier which has given rise to one of the most animated controversies of our time. Soon after quelling the rebellion in Tibet, the Chinese Government sent its forces to guard the new frontiers of China. Offended by India's legitimate sympathy for the Tibetans and ignoring the correct policies followed by the Prime Minister of India in refusing to interfere in the affairs of Tibet (which India recognised as an integral part of China in a treaty signed in 1954), the Chinese Government decided not to recognise the validity of the traditional border, and claimed large chunks of territory regarded by India as her own. China questioned the legality of the so-called McMahon Line drawn up at the 1914 Simla Convention which she had not ratified. Going a step further, she introduced force to the border dispute. The incidents which occurred on the Sino-Indian frontier aroused the patriotic passion of Indians. The age-old friendship of China and India snapped as Tibet disappeared as a buffer country. The entire Himalayan complex

of territory suddenly became a perplexing question mark.

Sino-Indian relations will be one of the foremost world questions for many years to come. And in that context the story of the disappearance of Tibet, the March Rebellion and its Aftermath will interest students of our time.

This volume offers a documentary account of the Tibet that disappeared in the fire and smoke of the March Rebellion and of the consequence of its disappearance. Beginning with the 8th century it tells the story of Tibet's international status: a vassal of China? a protectorate of Great Britain? a buffer to the north of India? an autonomous or semi-independent country allied to India by spiritual and sentimental bonds and nominally under Chinese sovereignty? or just, pure and simple, the "Tibetan region of China"?

The story is told in treaties, debates, discussions, resolutions, and statements by prominent men and organisations in India and China and at the United Nations. An Introduction and Editorial Notes have been provided.

The border controversy broke out when this volume had been already planned and mostly written. Some of the important Notes and Letters exchanged between India and China as well as resolutions adopted on this issue by the major political parties in India are included in the Appendix, together with late material relating more closely to Tibet.

Classified and edited documentation is not ordinarily undertaken in India, although the need for it is keenly felt. The author should regard his labour amply rewarded if this volume serves as a useful companion of statesmen, diplomats, political thinkers, experts on international law and newspapermen, whose business it is to get at the source material and not to be fed on padded interpretations by propagandists.

The author has liberally drawn upon the generous help offered by several friends in material, guidance and advice. None of them, however, wants the dubious honour of being mentioned in a Preface.

New Delhi
January 1, 1960

CHANAKYA SEN

Acknowledgements


The Treaties included in Part One are taken from *Tibet—Past and Present*, by Sir Charles Bell, former British Political Representative in Tibet, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924. The Sino-Tibetan Treaty signed in the 8th century was translated by Sir Charles Bell himself from stone pillars in Lhasa; it does not exist in the Chinese archives. Bell's book also includes two other rare documents, both stone-inscriptions, one relating to Tibetan conquests in Western China during A.D. 763, and the other to the defeat of the Gurkhas in 1792.

The alleged Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of 1913, the only international treaty recognising Tibet as an "independent country", is also taken from Bell's book. He had himself taken it from *With the Russians in Mongolia*, by Perry-Ayscough and Otter-Barry, John Lane, London, pp. 10-13. The existence of this treaty is not confirmed from any other source.

The Treaties relating to the British period in Part Two are from *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* (relating to India and neighbouring countries), compiled by C. U. Aitchison, Calcutta, 1929. Mr. Aitchison has been quoted in the Introduction also.

Several books on Tibet have been consulted. Two from which extracts have been quoted in the Introduction are *Tibet and the Tibetans*, by Tsung Lien-shen and Shen Chi-liu, and *Lost World—Tibet*, by Amaury de Reincourt.

Other sources which are gratefully acknowledged are official releases by the Governments of India and China; Indian newspapers, particularly *The Hindu* (Madras) and *The Times of India* (New Delhi); *Parliamentary Debates, India*; the *New Age* (New Delhi); and two releases by the Congress of Cultural Freedom, New Delhi.



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
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INTRODUCTION

A pre-historic sea, the Middle Ocean, once separated China and north-east Asia from the Deccan of India. In time a gigantic mountain range, the Himalayas, was built up by geological upheavals. On the northern side of this mountain range lies the plateau of Tibet, the roof of the world, a dry and barren land of Mongolian tribes who have always maintained their distinctive way of life and their sturdy spirit of independence.

In area, Tibet is 469,294 square miles, about a third of the total area of India. Its indigenous population is nearly four million. Although India's associations with Tibet, mostly religious and spiritual, are much older than China's—references to pilgrimage to the holy places in Tibet are found in the *Mahabharata*—it is the Chinese to whom the world has to turn for the first maps of Tibet as well as for its early recorded history. Thus, from the very beginning, Indian interest in Tibet has been largely spiritual and emotional, while Chinese interest has been more methodical and imperial.

Indian traditions vest the mighty rivers with holiness. Not only all the great rivers of India, but nearly all the great rivers of Asia, flow from Tibet. The mighty Ganga, the holiest of the Indian rivers, rises in Tibet and the Indian scriptures say that Shiva held the turbulent torrents of Mother Ganga on his head when she condescended to flow into the earth in reply to the prayers of Prince Bhagiratha. Other important Indian rivers rising in Tibet include the Indus and the Brahmaputra. "Fanning out from the Yellow river of China on the east to the sources of the Indus of India on the west, the Tibetan tableland contributes inexhaustively to the mightiest streams of the East." The first study of Tibet as the largest water reservoir in the world was made by a Chinese scholar, Chi Chao-nan, in 1762.

TIBET'S BOUNDARIES

The boundaries of Tibet, geographic, ethnic and political, raise problems of some complexity. Geological explorations have been conducted by Chinese as well as British scholars and also by the Survey of India. The Russians, too, took special interest in the north-eastern region. Tibet is a mass of mountains, all of which run from north-west to south-east. Between them are deep or shallow

valleys. Most of the country is completely barren. Geographically, Tibet borders on the Soviet Union, India, Burma and China.

The ethnical boundaries of Tibet, however, stretch beyond the political. Populations of the Tibetan race inhabit Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and along the Himalayas westward they are found in varying numbers in the Indian hill districts of Garhwal, Kulu, Spiti, Lahaul and Ladakh. The valleys east of the Karakoram range and Baltistan have Tibetan populations.

The question of political boundary is undoubtedly the most controversial. From his exile in Mussoorie, in India, the Dalai Lama has demanded the restoration of Greater Tibet. In 1914, the British negotiated an agreement with the Dalai Lama, the result of which was the division of Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet. In the course of history Russia claimed control over portions of Tibet lying across her own borders. The Chinese claim that Tibet is an integral part of the Chinese Republic is the crux of the present crisis. But factually the Tibetan administration in Lhasa has never been able to extend its effective control to more than half of geographical Tibet.

LEGEND AND HISTORY

The legendary stories about the creation of Tibet and about its early history link the country with India. Leaving aside the story of the Cosmic Egg or the Father Monkey, the history of a unified Tibet begins, in the legends, under a prince allegedly coming from India. Chinese historians have little to offer about the Tibetans before the 7th century A.D. Before the advent of Buddhism the religion prevailing in Tibet was Bon-Po which had abundant traces of Indian and Chinese influences. Buddhism came to Tibet from both India and China. Buddhism had to fight a grim battle with Bon-Po resulting ultimately in Lamaism, a mixture of both.

What we know as Tibet begins with the first great Tibetan King, Son-Tsan Gam-Po in the early 7th century. He came to the throne about 620 and ruled for 30 years. He married a Nepali princess, a devout Buddhist, who brought with her several Buddhist images. It was during his rule that Emperor T'ai-tsung of China came to know of the existence of a powerful kingdom in Tibet and sent a mission. The report which the mission brought back to the Imperial Court was unfavourable. So when Son-Tsan Gam-Po asked for a Chinese princess, he was refused. A war followed in which the

Tibetans mastered a huge Chinese force. Impressed by his military prowess the Emperor gave a Chinese princess to the King of Tibet. She, too, was a devout Buddhist who brought with her to Lhasa images of the Buddha. Thus, Buddhist streams began to flow into Tibet from both India and China from the 7th century of the Christian era.

INDIA'S CULTURAL INFLUENCE

In the cultural field, however, India's influence was more pronounced. Son-Tsan Gam-Po sent a great statesman to India to study and work out an alphabet for the Tibetan language. On his return to Lhasa this statesman, whose name was Tho-Mi Sam-Bho-Ta, and his sixteen companions invented a Tibetan alphabet which was based on the Brahmi characters then in vogue in Kashmir. He also wrote a Tibetan grammar which is to this day the standard grammar of the Tibetan language. In course of time, Chinese influences also came to be felt on the Tibetan language. At present the language of Tibet belongs to what is known as the Tibeto-Burman family, closely related to Chinese and T'ai.

Tibetan art is to a large extent a continuation of the medieval Buddhist art of Bihar and Orissa. Architecture shows a mixture of Indian and Chinese influences. Painting and sculpture are almost totally influenced by Indian traditions.

The first recorded treaty signed by Tibet with any country was with China. This came in the first half of the 8th century after a number of clashes between the two armies. This treaty describes China as the Maternal Uncle and Tibet as the Nephew and proclaims their agreement to "unite their Kingdoms".

After fighting a desperate battle with Buddhism for many years, Bon-Po began to decline in the 12th and 13th centuries. In the 13th century Tibet became for the first time a vassal of China. This was not a one-sided conquest, however. Kublai Khan, the Great Mongol, who unified China as well as Tibet in the world's largest-ever land empire, was conquered by the Lamaism of Tibet. When his forces took Lhasa, it was, thus, a two-sided conquest. Tibet's history as a unified country with a recorded chronicle of developments begins with the conquest of Kublai Khan.

THE INSTITUTION OF THE DALAI LAMA

The Chinese Empire was a loosely knit system with a large number

of dependencies and tributary states over which the Celestial Emperor exercised no effective control as far as internal affairs were concerned. Kublai ruled Tibet through the Ministry for the Spread of Government which governed both the administration and the Buddhist religion. This was the beginning of the ascendancy of the religious pontiffs of Tibet. The Chinese Court supported the most powerful of the religious sects through which it maintained its overall control. When the Manchus became rulers of China in the 15th century they chose a particular sect for royal patronage. This was the Ge-Lu-Pa sect, to which the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama belong. To this day this is the prevailing religious sect in Tibet. According to Tsung Lien-shen and Shen Chi-liu:

From the end of the 15th century to the middle of the 17th century, during the lifetime of the Second and the Third Dalai incarnations, the Ge-Lu-Pa sect led a precarious life, though silently gaining ground in Tibet, especially in U. The Pha-Mo-Dru family, comparatively friendly to the sect, was then tottering on its last legs, and the Tsang-Pa kings, who wielded authority between 1565 and 1642, extended patronage to the black-hatted and white-hatted Ka-Ma-Pa sect. From 1498 to 1518, the monks of Dre-Pung and Se-Ra, the two most flourishing monasteries of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect, were excluded from participating in the Grand Prayer at Lhasa on New Year days, an annual service said to have been started by Tson-Kha-Pa. Their position became worse from 1616 on, when the Tsang-Pa king extended his influence to the whole of the Chi-Ch'u valley.

Construction of the genealogy of the early Dalai incarnations has given rise to several different traditions. However, according to the official version of Lhasa, the first incarnation of the Dalai series was Gen-Tun Dry-Pa, who founded the Tra-Shi Lun-Po and Dre-Pung monasteries; and the third, So-Nam Gyam-Tsho, who made Dre-Pung his permanent seat. Up to then the Dalai series was considered just one of many incarnation series in the community of Dre-Pung monastery. It was So-Nam Gyam-Tsho who first laid the foundation of the secular power of the Ge-Lu-Pa sect and the Dalai incarnation series such as we know today.

So-Nam Gyam-Tsho (Ocean of Fortune) twice went to Mongolia, in 1578 and 1587. On his first visit he saw the king of the Ordo Mongols, Altan, who had been sent to Dre-Pung to invite him. The meeting took place at Koko Nor, and So-Nam Gyam-Tsho converted the king to the Ge-Lu-Pa sect. In return, So-Nam Gyam-Tsho was proclaimed *Vajradhara Dalai Lama* (Holder of the Thunder-Bolt, Ocean Lama) by the king. This was the first time that an incarnation of this series came to bear the name of Dalai, a Mongolian translation of *Gyam-Tsho* (the ocean) which was soon to gain popularity in China and throughout the world.¹

¹ Tsung Lien-shen and Shen Chi-liu, *Tibet and the Tibetans* (Stanford University Press, California), page 43.

The fifth Dalai Lama is, in a sense, the maker of Modern Tibet. To him Tibet owes its present secular and monastic institutions. In 1652 he paid a personal visit to Peking where he was received with the honour given to a sovereign monarch and was proclaimed by an Imperial Order as the Dalai Lama. A new relationship between Lhasa and Peking was established.

This relationship has been described as one between "the patron and chaplain". It could work only so long as the patron was capable of exercising effective patronage and the chaplain was content with his status. In the 19th century, this relationship between China and Tibet began to break down as the Chinese power weakened and as Tibet became aware of the emergence of two new imperial powers, Great Britain and Russia, competing for overlordship of the Himalayan region.

For the disintegration of the Chinese Empire and its division into spheres of interest, the powers most responsible were Great Britain and Imperial Russia, and soon they came to a clash at the point where the three Empires met—Tibet.

The Himalayas have always exercised a most profound influence on the Indian mind. Not only have they offered the Indian sub-continent unassailable protection on the entire northern frontier, they have also imparted to the Indian mind a kind of insularity from the rest of the world. Walled by the Himalayas on the north, north-west and north-east and washed by mighty oceans on the west, the south and the south-east, the Indian sub-continent remained for many centuries a distinctive geographical and cultural entity giving to the rest of the world much more than it was its wont to take.

BRITISH INDIA'S HIMALAYAN POLICY

The British in building up their Indian Empire in the 19th century realised the importance of the Himalayas and adopted the policy, not without opposition from the Home Government, of extending the imperial power all over the Himalayan area. By a series of adventures, manoeuvres, military actions and clever exploitation of internal conflicts, they extended their power to Burma, Nepal, Ladakh, Bhutan and Sikkim, all integral parts of the Chinese Empire when it was at the height of its glory. Bhutan, Sikkim and Ladakh were actually part of geographical Tibet and as the British extended their power over these territories, their relations with Tibet became estranged.

The second phase in the history of Tibet in modern times began towards the end of the 18th century as the British imperial power became firmly established in India. In 1788, a Gurkha army invaded Tibet and the Chinese believed that they had the support of the British Government in India. The Chinese Empire was then powerful and the intruders were completely defeated by the Chinese troops. As a result of this new manifestation of danger, the Chinese tightened up their control over Tibet and forced an agreement on the Tibetan Government that in future all foreign questions must be dealt with by the Ambans, Chinese representatives, in Tibet. Even in 1841, the Chinese were able to defeat completely an invading army of five thousand Dogras which had marched into Tibet from Kashmir. This adventure, the Chinese thought, had British inspiration behind it.

But within fifteen years the Chinese Empire declined. When in 1856 Nepal imposed a treaty on Tibet securing extraterritorial rights and an annual tribute of ten thousand rupees, China was unable to give Tibet effective protection. The treaty, however, was signed under the paramountcy of the Chinese Emperor. In 1876, China gave Britain the right to send an officer to Tibet on a scientific exploration. Ten years later, China recognised the British annexation of Burma. In 1890, after a military clash between the British and the Tibetans, China confirmed England's protectorate over Sikkim. A period of conflict between Tibet and the British power followed and the Tibetans even offered civil disobedience to paralyse all trade in Sikkim. Perturbed by the British penetration into the Himalayas and aware of China's inability to render effective help, the thirteenth Dalai Lama began to sound Czarist Russia for possible protection against the British. It was, at this time, that the Russo-Japanese War broke out.

LORD CURZON'S FORWARD POLICY

The British Government in India chose the year 1904 to send a military expedition to Lhasa. The Home Government was not enthusiastic about the expedition. But Lord Curzon, who was Viceroy, had been urging the British Government to adopt a forward policy in relation to Tibet. He recognised the complete collapse of Chinese influence in Tibet and called for an "altered policy" to fill the vacuum. With characteristic forthrightness, Curzon described Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as "a political affectation"

and a "constitutional fiction". The timing of the 1904 expedition was superbly chosen since both Russia and Japan, engaged in war, were unable to pay much attention to Tibet. The expedition was led by Francis Younghusband. It began as a mission and ended in "a triumphant march on Lhasa after sixteen engagements in which an unknown number of Tibetans were, as some foreign critics put it, 'shot down like partridges' ". The Dalai Lama fled to China. His representatives signed with Britain the Lhasa Convention of 1904. It was later modified in 1906 by a convention with China.

The British Government in London did not allow Lord Curzon to apply his policy with regard to Tibet. It accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, but made China agree to a provision that there must be no concessions in Tibet without Britain's consent. It was also agreed that Tibet would enjoy full local autonomy. These principles were later confirmed in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 under which both Britain and Russia agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet.

The following extracts from Aitchison's *Collection of Treaties* will give the reader an authentic British version of developments in relation to Tibet between 1841 and 1908:

In 1841, Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu, despatched an army under General Zorawar Singh, which marched up the valley of the Indus, plundered the monasteries of Hanle and Tashigong, and took possession of the provinces of Rudok and Garo. The Tibetans again turned to the Chinese, who sent an army to their assistance. The two armies met in December in the neighbourhood of the Manasarwar lakes. After an engagement which lasted three days, the Chinese succeeded in practically annihilating their foes. The following year the Chinese advanced into Ladakh and laid siege to Leh, but were compelled to retire to Rudok. A treaty was signed, whereby the former boundary was established.

In 1873 the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, Mr. (afterwards, Sir John) Edgar was deputed to enquire into the possibility of re-establishing Indian trade with Tibet, which had been in abeyance for nearly a century. A few years later a road was made by Sir Richard Temple through Sikkim to the Tibet frontier at the Jelap pass. In 1885 a serious effort was begun to open up intercourse with Tibet; Mr. Colman Macaulay was deputed on a commercial mission, and to ascertain whether a direct road could be opened up between Darjeeling and the province of Tsang, which was famed for its wool.

In 1885, he visited Peking to obtain a passport for the mission to Tibet, under the provisions of the convention between the British and Chinese Governments signed at Chefoo in 1876, which guaranteed the protection of a British mission. After some difficulty, the Tsungli Yamen granted the required passport. The mission was organised early in 1886 but was subsequently abandoned for various reasons. The Tibetans, who had been greatly disturbed by the prospect of the

mission, attributed its abandonment to pusillanimity, and, assuming an aggressive attitude, erected a stone-fort across the road at Lingtu, some 12 miles within the Sikkim frontier. The Chinese were requested to reason with the Tibetans; but, as their efforts to induce them to abandon Lingtu proved futile, a British force of 1,400 men and 2 guns was despatched, which drove the Tibetans from their fort into Chumbi.

On the 21st May, 1888, 3,000 Tibetans attacked the British camp at Gnatong, but were repulsed. On September 23rd they again advanced from Chumbi, and erected a stone wall 3 miles long above Gnatong. From this position they were easily driven by the British force under General Graham, and fled in confusion across the Jelap-La. The British troops then advanced to Rinchigong and Chumbi, returning to Gnatong a few days later.

On the conclusion of hostilities, the Chinese Resident, after some delay, came to Sikkim to negotiate a settlement and was met by Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Paul, ICS. Despite the extreme forbearance shown to the Tibetans, and the leniency of our terms, which merely required the recognition of the long established frontier between Sikkim and Tibet, the acknowledgement of the exclusive supremacy of the British with the Sikkim State, and a promise to abstain from further aggression, the Chinese refused for some time to come to terms, and it was not till 1890 that a convention was signed, by which the Chinese acknowledged British claims in Sikkim and agreed to the establishment of a trade mart at Yatung. The boundary between Sikkim and Tibet was also defined and provision was made for subsequent discussion of trade regulations.

An attempt at delimiting the frontier was made in 1895, but the pillars erected by the British and Chinese officers were removed by the Tibetans, and no further progress was made in the settlement of the frontier in the ensuing three years.

In 1899 Lord Curzon addressed the Chinese Resident at Yatung, stating that the Government of India were prepared to agree to a revision of the Tibetan frontier, so as to leave to Tibet the land which they claimed in the neighbourhood of Giagong, on condition that Phari should be thrown open to traders from British India, Yatung having proved unsuitable. The Chinese Resident replied that the frontier had been carelessly laid down in the treaty; that he was under the impression that the Tibetans would strongly object to having the mart placed at Phari; but that on his return to Lhasa he would communicate His Excellency's wishes to the Tibetans. This, however, he never did, and no further answer to this proposal was ever received, though the Tsungli Yamen, who had been addressed on the subject by the Minister at Peking in December 1899, stated that they had written to the Resident at Lhasa to enquire into the circumstances.

THE YOUNGHUSBAND EXPEDITION

On August 25th, Lord Curzon addressed the Chinese Resident, pointing out that neither the Chinese nor Tibetan representatives, deputed to the frontier, were of suitable rank corresponding with that of Colonel Younghusband, and that both had shown themselves unfit for diplomatic intercourse; and requesting that either the Amban himself, or his colleague, should participate in the negotiations. The attitude assumed by the Tibetans continued antagonistic and, as

Colonel Younghusband despaired of arriving at a peaceful solution until the Tibetans were convinced of the seriousness of the Government of India's intentions, sanction was accorded to the mission to proceed to Gyantse.

The advance began on December 13th. The military escort to the mission consisted of three infantry regiments, two companies of sappers and miners, four guns, and a maxim gun section, under the command of Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald. It proceeded through Phari to Tuna, meeting with no opposition. After a further halt and fruitless negotiations, an advance was made to Guru on the 31st March 1904. Here a force of about 2,000 armed Tibetans was found occupying an entrenched position blocking the road. An attempt to disarm them resulted in an attack by the Tibetans, which was easily repulsed. The mission reached Gyantse on April 11th, opposition being offered at the Dzam-trang gorge. On April 22nd a communication was received from the Amban stating that he would arrive at Gyantse in three weeks' time. On May 5th, the camp at Gyantse was attacked by the Tibetans, who were repulsed with great loss.

As the Chinese delegates did not arrive within the period allowed them, it was decided that the mission should proceed to Lhasa. On July 5th the Jong at Gyantse was captured and the mission arrived at Lhasa on August 3rd. The Dalai Lama had fled, leaving the Gaden-Ti-Rimpochi, a monk, as regent; but it was ascertained that a satisfactory agreement could be completed without him, by the consent of the National Assembly and the three great monasteries. The Amban was prepared to regard the Tashi Lama as head of the Buddhist Church in lieu of the Dalai Lama. On September 7th a treaty was signed at Lhasa, under which the Tibetans were to pay a fine of 75 lakhs in annual instalments of one lakh. The mission returned to India without molestation. The convention was ratified on the 11th November, but a Declaration was appended to it which reduced the indemnity from 75 to 25 lakhs, and declared that the British occupation of Chumbi should cease after payment of three instalments, provided that the marts had been effectively opened for three years and that the Tibetans faithfully fulfilled the other terms of the convention.¹

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

A new chapter began in Tibet's history with the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the fall of the imperial system and the proclamation of the Chinese Republic. The 13th Dalai Lama had realised that Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was more a fiction than a fact. The real power to reckon with now was Great Britain. The second important power was Russia. He and Tibetan leaders began to think in terms of an independent Tibet, treaty-bound with Great Britain and Russia. As soon as the news of the Chinese Revolution and the abdication of the Emperor reached the Tibetan capital, a mutiny broke out in the garrisons and a reign of terror

¹ *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, compiled by C. U. Aitchison (1929), pp. 15-19.

followed. The Dalai Lama had fled to Darjeeling and had been granted political asylum by the British. He had opportunities of important conversations with representatives of the British Government. In 1912 he returned to Lhasa and issued a declaration of independence. His chief grievance against China was that Peking was no longer in a position to protect Tibet from foreign aggression. All Chinese officers and soldiers were sent away to China by way of India. The Dalai Lama initiated for the first time a Tibetan policy which was pronouncedly anti-Chinese.

THE SIMLA CONVENTION

As soon as the Chinese Republic was able to settle down it turned its attention to Tibet and it blamed the British for the anti-Chinese turn of Tibetan policies. In 1913, however, the Republican Government recognised the 13th Dalai as the Dalai Lama. A sizable number of people in Tibet were anxious to restore normal relations between Lhasa and Peking. The Dalai Lama looked to Britain for support. But Britain was not prepared to recognise Tibet as an independent country. This would have provoked Russia to intervene and Britain was anxious to avoid a clash with Russia over Tibet and, at the same time, to fortify her position on the roof of the world. The British Government pressed for a conference between Britain, Tibet and China to arrive at a settlement. The result was the Simla Conference of 1913.

Here is Aitchison's version of the conference and its achievements:

In 1913, a conference of British, Chinese and Tibetan plenipotentiaries was convened in Simla in an attempt to negotiate an agreement as to the international status of Tibet with particular regard to the relations of the three Governments, and to the frontiers of Tibet both with China and India. After prolonged negotiations, the conference under the Chairmanship of Sir Henry McMahon drew up a Tripartite Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet, which was initialled in Simla in 1914 by the representatives of the three parties. The Chinese Government, however, refused to ratify the agreement, by their refusal depriving themselves of the benefits which they were to obtain thereunder, among which were a definite recognition that Tibet was under Chinese suzerainty, and an agreement to permit a Chinese official with a suitable escort not exceeding 300 men to be maintained at Lhasa. The Convention was, however, ratified by Great Britain and Tibet by means of a Declaration accepting its terms as binding as between themselves.

A new set of trade regulations between Great Britain and Tibet was concluded under this Convention to replace the earlier Regulations of 1893 and 1908.

The Convention included a definition of boundaries both on the Sino-Tibetan

and the Indo-Tibetan frontier. On the Sino-Tibetan frontier a double boundary was laid down, the portion between the two boundaries being spoken of as Inner Tibet and that part of Tibet lying west of the westerly boundary as Outer Tibet. Owing to the failure of the Chinese Government to ratify, these boundaries, however, remain fluid. The other frontier between India and Tibet on the Assam and Burma borders, which has been accepted by His Majesty's Government and the Tibetan Government, was laid down between the eastern border of Bhutan and the Isurazi Pass on the Irrawady-Salween water-parting. West of the Brahmaputra bend this frontier for the most part follows the main axis of the Himalayas, and east of that point includes all the tribal territory under the political control of the Assam and Burma Governments. This frontier throughout stands back some 100 miles from the plains of India and Burma.

PERIOD OF "INDEPENDENCE"

Since 1911 till 1949 Tibet enjoyed virtual independence. The Chinese Republic was weak and it was fighting a war of retreat with European and Japanese imperialism. Peking had no means of exercising its sovereignty over Tibet. This suzerainty existed only legalistically. Tibetan attempts to get rid of it did not find international encouragement. But for all practical purposes Tibet became more a vassal state of Great Britain than of China.

The Chinese Government, however, did not for a moment regard Tibet as anything but an integral part of the Empire. Not only was there in Tibet a powerful section of the Lamas who wanted to have cordial relations with China, the rivalry between the thirteenth Dalai Lama and the ninth Panchen Lama which came to a showdown in 1924 gave the Chinese munitions of interference. The Panchen fled with his court to China where he lived as an exile till his death in 1937. Since 1924 the Panchen Lama has been traditionally an ally of China and an instrument of China's Tibetan policy.

The National Government of General Chiang Kai-shek was able to bring about a more unified China in the early Thirties and this afforded Peking an opportunity for rapprochement with Lhasa. After the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, the Peking Government sent a mission to Lhasa in 1934 to restore relations and to offer condolences. An office of the National Government was set up in Lhasa which provoked the British power in India to demand the establishment of a similar British mission in the Tibetan capital. It should be noted that the Simla Convention of 1914 did not provide for a permanent British mission in Lhasa. Britain had two motives in asking for a permanent mission. First,

she wanted to check any further extension of Chinese influence in Tibet, and, secondly, by demanding the establishment of a permanent British mission at par with the Chinese mission, Britain actually sought to destroy the fiction of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Although Britain did not openly denounce this suzerainty, the international implication of the establishment of a permanent British mission in Lhasa was to give China, too, the status of a foreign power in Tibet. The Tibetan authorities accepted the British request in the hope that a British mission would fortify Tibet's case for independence.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE FIRST AMERICAN CONTACTS

The outbreak of the Second World War awakened General Chiang Kai-shek's interest in Tibet. In 1940, the new Dalai Lama was inaugurated to the throne of Tibet, receiving his official name: "The Holy One, the Gentle Glory, Powerful in Speech, Pure in Mind, of Divine Wisdom, Holding the Faith Wide as the Ocean." A Chinese mission attended the inauguration ceremony and although the Chinese representative was treated at the Dalai Lama's court on an equal footing with the British envoy, a deliberate action designed to convey the impression that both were representatives of foreign countries, the Chinese press and radio circulated reports which showed the Chinese envoy in the light of a High Commissioner functioning in a Chinese protectorate.

In September 1942, the Tibetan Government allowed an American mission to go to Lhasa from India and from there to China. The mission had two objects: first, to explore a new route through which supplies could be despatched to China from India and, secondly, to establish the first official contacts between Lhasa and the United States. When the mission arrived in Lhasa, its leader, Lt. Col. Tolstoy, handed to the Dalai Lama a personal communication from President Roosevelt. The mission left Lhasa in March 1943 and the impression it gave the United States Government about Tibet was that it was a virtually independent and well-ruled country with immense strategic importance in an age of expanding air power.

American interest in Tibet was resented by Chiang Kai-shek. Ever since 1934 he had been trying to bring about a military conquest of Tibet with the help of the Governors of Sikang and Tsinghai. The Governor of Tsinghai assembled a force on the Tibetan

border and there were a few clashes in which the Tibetans had the better of the Chinese troops. Thus Chiang Kai-shek's dream of military subjugation of Tibet remained unrealised. Before the Japanese surrender, however, he published a book entitled *China's Destiny* in which he revived the imperial dreams of the Manchus as the objectives of a resurgent China under his own leadership. "If only the Manchus could have done away with the boundaries that separated the Chinese, Manchus, Monghols, Mohammedans and Tibetans, and recognised that our five branches are, in fact, one unified body, it would have been hard to find fault with them." In other words, Chiang Kai-shek found fault with the loose structure of the Celestial Empire, branching out with vassal and tributary states. His own objective was to restore the Celestial Empire without recognising the existence of vassal or tributary territories.

Chiang's dreams remained unfulfilled and Tibet was not directly involved in the Second World War. The status it enjoyed was practically that of an independent country, although this had no international recognition. This status had more or less existed since 1911, but was now nearing its end.

In the year 1947, a Tibetan delegation attended the Chinese National Assembly and took part in the drafting of the constitution and the election of a President.

INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE

In that fateful year, a most remarkable thing happened in the Asian continent. On August 15 India became independent. The British power withdrew. A simple quiet ceremony took place in the British outpost in Tibet. The Indian Tri-Colour was hoisted and the Union Jack ceased to flutter. The trade agencies at Yatung and Gyantse, the temporary agency at Gartok and the permanent mission in Lhasa all became *Indian*.

The entire basis of Britain's Tibetan policies crumbled down. The leaders of New India had no inclination to shoulder any imperial burden, or to inherit any imperial legacy. They had more difficult immediate problems to handle, but they made it clear from the very beginning that they were anxious to place their relations with the Himalayan territories on a new footing.

Amaury de Reincourt, author of *Lost World—Tibet, Key to Asia*, was then in Lhasa. This is how he describes the impact of India's emergence into freedom on the Tibetan capital and

on the mosaic of Tibetan "independence" patiently built up by pro-British Tibetan elements ever since the Younghusband expedition:

Sipping my customary gin and lime during the moonlit nights of Dekyi Lingka, I listened to the radio broadcasts from Delhi. Those were the days when the British were pulling out and India was waking up to independence after a long slumber of almost two centuries.

What this meant for Tibet, I could easily imagine. Every official in Lhasa was preoccupied. Day after day, plans for the transfer of sovereignty unfolded themselves with more precision and increasing speed. To the Tibetans, just as much as to the rest of the world, the British withdrawal from the political complex of the Indian Ocean was an event of the first magnitude. Not only were India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma to become independent; Central Asia and the defence of the Himalayas was to be abandoned to India. Even here, in Dekyi Lingka, the British-Indian mission was becoming an Indian mission and being handed over to Delhi. Hugh Richardson was preparing to pack his bags, not knowing how long he would remain in Lhasa after the fifteenth of August. Even the powerful British consulate in Kashgar (Sinkiang), which had checked Russian imperialism and Soviet infiltration toward India for half a century, was to become a joint Indo-Pakistani consulate. The solid rear of Tibet was slowly crumbling and no longer offered the guarantees of protection and stability which it had in the past.

According to Reincourt, there were two sections of opinion in Lhasa, in those days, in relation to India. One section looked up to India to carry out "the old British-Indian policy and protect Tibet against Chinese nationalism or aggressive Communism". Another section felt that after the partition of the Indian sub-continent and the great communal riots, the new Government of India would be too weak and too unwilling to undertake any policy about Tibet which might get it into complications. This section hoped in vain that Britain and the United States would come to Tibet's rescue.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TIBET

Reincourt was one of the first Western observers to realise the strategic importance of Tibet in the world which was emerging from the Second World War. He said in his book:

Looking at this map [of Tibet] which I had brought down into my room so as to be able to study it better, I was struck by the strategic potentialities of the Roof of the World, of this colossal natural fortress standing in the heart of Asia and almost inaccessible by land. Behind the Cyclopean Himalayas and Kuen Lun mountain ranges, Tibet towers on all sides above the three most

populated countries in the world: China's five hundred million, India's four hundred and the USSR's two hundred. Any strong power based on the Chang Tang would control the heart of Asia—not only would such bases be but an hour's flight from India's Delhi and two or three hours from China's Chungking, but they would be only 800 miles from Tashkent and 600 from Alma Ata, thus controlling the booming industrial centres of Soviet Central Asia.

As I was looking at this map, the radio broadcast announced that Chinese Turkestan was being attacked by Soviet Outer Mongolian troops (July 1947). There was little doubt in my mind that Tibet was destined to become one of the borders of the expanding Soviet empire. And this was the time chosen by the British to withdraw from Tibet and from Central Asia!

Though I heard a great many confidential items of news in Lhasa to the effect that a certain amount of Communist infiltration was taking place in the Mongolian colleges of some large lamaseries, I could hardly believe that it was widespread and that it could endanger the safety of the Tibetan state. However, Communist infiltration has definitely taken place in Tibet since the end of the Second World War. I became convinced that if even Tibet was taken over by the Soviets or the Chinese Communists, the whole of India and of south-east Asia would become strategically untenable and left wide open to an invasion. Nestled in the stratospheric and hardly known valleys of the Roof of the World, as inexpugnable as if they were situated on the planet Mars, Communist armies and air force could forcibly dominate the largest part of Asia.

INDIA'S NEW POLICY

What received little appreciation in the outside world in 1947 was that the Congress Government of India under the leadership of Mr. Nehru was trying to extricate itself from a series of imperial legacies the British had left behind. During the British rule, the British Indian Government had obtained extraterritorial rights and claims to the Himalayan region including Tibet; while in countries of Africa Indian nationals had been subjected to a status of inferiority and humiliation. The Government of independent India was beginning to try to rectify both positions. For the first time since the October Revolution in Russia a newly liberated country was voluntarily pulling out of imperialistic and chauvinistic projections.

THE LAST PHASE

Two years later, a great upheaval shook China. The Kuomintang regime collapsed in the war with the Communists. The Communists proclaimed the inauguration of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Mr. Mao Tse-tung read the formal proclamation in the Square of the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Peking before a crowd of two hundred thousand.

CHINA GOES RED

With the British power withdrawn from the Indian sub-continent it became clear that Tibet's future lay between independent India and Communist China. While independent India was anxious to shake off every vestige of an imperial legacy, the Chinese Communists, from the very beginning, left no doubt that they were not prepared to concede to Tibet anything comparable to an independent status. In 1949 the Tibetan Government made the last desperate attempt to declare independence. The Kuomintang mission in Lhasa was pushed out and the Tibetan Government declared that Tibet was an independent and neutral country anxious to live in friendship and amity with China and India.

In his proclamation of October 1, 1949, Mr. Mao Tse-tung made no direct reference to Tibet. He declared that the "war of people's liberation" had been "fundamentally won", and that "the reactionary rule of the National Government had been overthrown". All foreign countries, he announced, would be informed that the Central Government of the People's Republic of China was the sole legal government of the country and that it was ready to establish diplomatic relations "with any foreign government willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect of integrity and sovereignty". Although Mr. Mao did not mention Tibet specifically, he declared that the Chinese People's Republic would wage "the war of liberation to the very end" and "liberate all the territory of China".

RED CHINA'S TIBETAN POLICY

The Chinese Communist Government initiated its Tibetan policy cautiously and cleverly. The first thing it did was to effect a complete split between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. Secondly, war-lordism in the north-west and south-west provinces of China was liquidated with astonishing swiftness. Tibet was thus exposed to the Chinese Communist power. The Chinese Revolution knocked at the gate of Tibet. The geographical barrier which had been in Tibet's favour all throughout history collapsed. "The mountainous tracts to the East, the un-inhabited highlands in the north, the rigorous climate and the lack of provisions and means of communication were [so long] all formidable barriers. The war-lords' private armies, the smuggling racketeers, and the

many semi-independent tribes from the borders of Yunnan to Chinghai were sure to offer strong resistance. The rapid advance of the Communist army and the easy fall of Kham disproved all calculations."

If the Tibetan leaders had expected Buddhist populations to rise against the Communist regime, that hope, too, was belied. The Chinese Communist leaders showed no inclination to suppress Buddhism. On the contrary, they gave repeated assurances to the people that their religious faiths and traditions would be fully respected. In the meantime, they built up the Panchen Lama with his great influence in Sinkiang and Mongolia as well as in considerable parts of Tibet as a counterblast to the Dalai Lama and the Lhasa Government.

On January 1, 1950, the Chinese Government laid down the "liberation" of Tibet during the year as the basic task of the People's Liberation Army.

QUESTION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Tibet's only hope now was in getting foreign assistance for its independence. Some newspapers in the United States briefly toyed with the idea of an independent Tibet. One of the brothers of the Dalai Lama who is a resident of the United States went to Formosa in 1949 for talks with General Chiang Kai-shek. Soon after the Communist victory in China, *The New York Times* in a report published on October 15, 1949, frankly discussed the possibility of recognition of Tibet as a separate country. It said, "Recognition of Tibet as a separate country would make it possible for this country to make available some of its funds to help foreign countries arm themselves against Communism."

There was, however, no evidence to show that the United States Government gave any serious thought to Tibet's demand for an independent status.

Discussing the prospects of foreign assistance for Tibet in the crucial year 1949, Mr. Tsung Lien-shen and Mr. Shen Chi-liu say in their above-mentioned book on Tibet:

Third, it was Lhasa's hope that once a clash with Peking became a fact, some form of foreign assistance would be forthcoming. But since the British have pulled out of India, their interest in Tibet has become mainly academic. Lhasa's hope naturally turned to India. Having inherited all the "special rights" in Tibet from England, India finds herself in a rather singular position. She knows

those special rights to be the outcome of an imperialist policy. Being once a victim of the same policy and now advocating a crusade in Asia against such a policy, she can hardly enjoy the fruits of one without infringing her political conscience. The real concern of India is about Ladakh, Sikkim, and Bhutan, now all lying within the framework of the Republic of India but having close historic, religious and ethnic ties with Tibet; and she has a long common boundary with south and south-west Tibet on which the last word is not yet said. She assumed those "special rights" in Tibet perhaps only with a view to future bargaining. Besides India, Nepal is the only country having direct relations with Tibet. Beset with serious internal problems of her own and having no vital stakes in Tibet, Nepal has neither the will nor the power to intervene. With no cooperation from India and Nepal, foreign assistance becomes an extremely remote possibility.

In April 1950, a seven-man mission appointed by the Dalai Lama's Government arrived in India to make preliminary contacts with representatives of the Chinese Government with the aim of establishing better relations and settling the differences. Members of the mission explained that the Tibetan Government preferred the talks to take place in neutral territory. After a visit to Calcutta, the mission set up its headquarters at Kalimpong, a town on the Bengal-Sikkim border. This was the place most easily accessible to the authorities in Lhasa.

"PEACEFUL LIBERATION"

On May 22, 1950, Peking Radio addressed an appeal to the Tibetan Government and people calling on them to achieve "the peaceful liberation of Tibet". The broadcast declared that Tibet was part of Chinese territory and that its geographical remoteness would constitute no obstacle to the Chinese Liberation Army. It advised the Tibetan Government not to count on British or American aid and not to be "misled by slanders of the British and American imperialistic bloc aimed at sowing discord between [Chinese] nationalities". It gave an assurance that the Chinese Government was "absolutely considerate of the interests and traditions of all component nationalities of the People's Republic of China and fully respects their freedom of religion". The broadcast ended with a call to the Tibetan Government to send plenipotentiaries "to conduct peace talks in Peking in order to save the Tibetan people from unnecessary losses".

The Tibetan mission in Kalimpong made arrangement in early June 1950 to fly to Hong Kong to meet representatives of the Chinese Government, but the British authorities refused to grant

visas to the mission on the ground that negotiations such as those projected by the mission might accentuate the present "delicate situation" in Hong Kong, that the diplomatic status of the mission was doubtful and that the Chinese People's Government had been recognised by both Britain and India. As a result the Tibetan mission remained in India throughout the summer and autumn, keeping in touch from Kalimpong with the Government in Lhasa. The Lhasa Government authorised the mission to hold conversations in New Delhi with General Yuan, the first Ambassador of the Chinese People's Government accredited to the Government of India, on the latter's arrival in the Indian capital.

On August 5 the *New China News Agency* circulated a statement by General Liu Po-chen, Chairman of the South-West China Military Affairs Commission and Commander of the Second Field Army, in which he declared that the Chinese forces would soon enter Tibet to liberate the territory to drive out "the aggressive influence of British and American imperialism", to bring Tibet back into the "motherland's big family", and to consolidate China's "line of national defence". The declaration also said that Tibet would be allowed "regional self-government and freedom of religion", that her institutions would be respected, but her army incorporated in "the national defence forces of the Chinese People's Republic".

CHINA MOVES INTO TIBET

Speaking in Peking on September 30, the first anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic, the Prime Minister of China, Mr. Chou En-lai, announced his Government's determination to "liberate the people of Tibet and stand on guard at the Chinese frontiers". He expressed the hope that the liberation of Tibet would be accompanied by peaceful means through negotiations with the Tibetan leaders.

Meanwhile, the first Ambassador of the Chinese People's Republic arrived in New Delhi in September and conversations between him and the Tibetan mission began during the second week of that month. The talks, however, ended inconclusively on October 1. A spokesman of the Tibetan mission said that the Chinese Ambassador had declined to commit himself on the question of future relations between China and Tibet. The mission would be sending a report to Lhasa, he added, and the matter would be considered

fully by the Dalai Lama's Government and the Tibetan National Assembly. At the suggestion of the Government of India, however, the mission subsequently agreed to proceed to Peking for direct negotiations with the Chinese Government. But, meanwhile, Chinese armies moved into Tibet in October and the projected visit to Peking was cancelled.

From August onwards it had been reported on various occasions in the Indian press and from Hong Kong that Chinese armies had invaded Tibet. These reports, however, lacked official confirmation. On October 24, the *New China News Agency* announced that "a political mobilisation directive had been issued ordering the Chinese liberation forces to advance into Tibet to liberate three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression, to complete the unification of the whole of China and to safeguard the frontier regions of the country". On October 28, it was announced in New Delhi that official confirmation had been received from Lhasa that Chinese troops had entered Tibet from the east. Two days later, the Tibetan Government asked for Indian diplomatic assistance in its dispute with China. It made no request for military help.

CHINESE ADVANCE TOWARDS LHASA

Few authentic details of the Chinese invasion were available. It was, however, authoritatively stated in New Delhi and also by the Tibetan mission in Kalimpong that Chinese troops had advanced into Tibet in several directions from the west Chinese provinces of Sikang and Tsinghai. They had taken a number of frontier posts and captured Chamdo, about three hundred miles west of Lhasa and the capital of Kham province. The Chinese advance was slow. The rugged terrain helped the Tibetans. From the Chinese side it was stated that the intention was not to effect a quick march to Lhasa but to convince the Tibetan Government of the military might of the Peking Government and to persuade it to negotiate.

SINO-INDIAN NOTES EXCHANGED

In October 1950 several notes were exchanged between New Delhi and Peking over Tibet. The first Indian note regretted China's military action and pleaded for "slower but more enduring methods of peaceful approach". In a quick retort, Peking declared: "Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet

is entirely a domestic problem of China" and accused India of working under foreign influence. That note was read in New Delhi "with amazement", and the Government of India was constrained to pronounce, "Tibetan autonomy is a fact".

The Chinese march into Tibet coincided with another disturbing development far away from the Himalayas. On October 8, 1950, the United Nations forces in Korea crossed the 38th Parallel against strong diplomatic advice from New Delhi. The Indian Prime Minister who was anxious to restrict the Korean War was perturbed lest Tibet should get mixed up with the cold war. He, therefore, firmly rejected a request by the Tibetan Government to raise the question of Tibet at the United Nations. Mr. Nehru's efforts were entirely directed towards securing a peaceful settlement of the Tibetan question.

Nevertheless, the Tibetan Government sent an appeal to the United Nations. On November 7, it cabled its complaint against the Chinese People's Republic, and it was more of a charter of independence than a complaint. "The attention of the world is riveted on Korea where aggression is being resisted by an international force", it declared. "Similar aggression in remote Tibet is passing without notice."

TIBET AT THE UN

The delegate of El Salvador formally called on the United Nations on November 18 to condemn the Chinese People's Republic for its "unprovoked aggression" against Tibet and proposed the creation of a special committee to study what measures could be taken by the United Nations General Assembly to assist Tibet. When the Steering Committee of the Assembly took up the matter, India advocated that the Tibetan question should not be considered at all. On the assurances of the Indian representative, the Steering Committee shelved the Tibetan complaint indefinitely. It should be noted that no other power came forward to press for consideration of the complaint. The British delegate passed the whole legacy of Britain's imperial rights to the successor Government of India. And in a few weeks a Tibetan mission, instead of arriving at Lake Success, repaired to Peking largely through Indian persuasions and signed a seventeen-point agreement in 1951 with the Chinese People's Government. Under this agreement, Tibet became an integral part of China and was, in return, assured full regional

autonomy. The Chinese Central Government undertook not to interfere with Tibet's political institutions and internal administration.

CONFLICT OF WILL

But soon began what Mr. Nehru aptly termed as a "conflict of will".

In granting Tibet regional autonomy, the Chinese Central Government only recognised that Tibet, on account of its cultural, linguistic and historical and social differences from China proper, deserved special treatment under the Chinese constitution. Tibet is not the only autonomous region in the Chinese People's Republic; autonomy has also been given to places like Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang. If anything, it only meant that in introducing radical social and economic changes, the Chinese Communist leaders would take into consideration special conditions prevailing in Tibet and would not force the pace of reforms. But the Communist revolution in China meant a great human upheaval affecting one-fourth of the entire mankind. For the first time in history, the whole of China was under the effective control of a powerful central government which was anxious to take up positions at the far-flung frontiers of the Chinese Republic. Along with the rest of China, Tibet was in for great changes.

The Chinese authorities began to prepare the ground carefully for introducing far-reaching political and economic changes in Tibet. In 1952, they took two important steps to integrate Tibet. First, they divided Tibet into three administrative zones and established a separate military area for Tibet. The central and western portions of Tibet were placed under the administration of the Dalai Lama, whereas the Shigatse area was placed under the Panchen Lama. The eastern region of Tibet came directly under a Chinese military commander. Secondly, the Chinese began to open up Tibet—to China. It no longer remained the Forbidden Land. New roads were built and these roads brought truck-loads of Chinese troops. Airfields were constructed. Hundreds of Tibetans were taken to China for education and many of them returned trained in technology and communism. A Tibetan branch of the Chinese Communist Party was set up. A network of schools and dispensaries was established; waste-lands were reclaimed and new agricultural techniques adopted. Simultaneously, the Chinese

authorities began to encourage the Chinese people to migrate to Tibet in large numbers. In 1952, Mr. Mao Tse-tung told a Tibetan delegation in Peking that Tibet's population must increase to six million in the first instance and then to ten million. This could only happen with large-scale Chinese migration.

In December 1955, the Chinese Communist Party decided to introduce land reforms in Tibet. The Tibetan land system is one of the most primitive in the world, with most of the arable land owned by a handful of lamas and the vast majority of the people leading the life of serfs. The Communists began to encourage farm cooperatives which threatened to disturb the very basis of Lamaism, a pastoral aristocracy. Temple lands were either confiscated or nationalised and the monasteries were left without their traditional incomes.

FIRST REVOLTS

It was the land reform measures which sparked off the first major revolt in Tibet during the spring of 1956. Reports of rebellions by various groups of people appeared in the Western press, but until August 1956 the Chinese authorities did not admit of the existence of any major organised discontent. In that month, however, the *New China News Agency* admitted for the first time that "military measures against the rebels were necessary". A second major revolt occurred during the spring of 1957.

The new situation was recognised in Peking. When the Chinese Parliament met in 1956 Mr. Mao announced that Tibet was not yet ripe for socialism and that no "democratic reform" would be introduced there for six years. When reforms would be taken up, he added, they would be executed with popular consent and by the local authorities. In the same year, both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama visited India and their visit was made to synchronise with that of Mr. Chou En-lai. The Chinese Prime Minister assured Mr. Nehru that it was Peking's intention to allow Tibet full internal autonomy. "Tibet is not Chinese", he said, "although it is part of China".

The Preparatory Committee which was set up in Lhasa in 1956 reflected the growing contradictions in Tibetan society. Of its 51 members, fifteen were nominated by the Dalai Lama, ten by the Panchen, ten came from the Chamdo area which was under the direct control of a Chinese General, five represented the Chinese

officials in Tibet and fifteen were chosen by the Tibetan aristocracy and lamasery. Thus, twenty-five members could always be counted upon to support whatever the Chinese wanted to be done. The Tibetan Assembly, therefore, became a forum of constant conflicts of will, and largely ineffective.

In the midst of this growing confusion and on-setting climate of conflict, the Chinese concentrated on three things: they began to open up all the inaccessible parts of Tibet and to unify the country; they trained up young Tibetans as Communist pioneers; and they introduced into the soporific Tibetan atmosphere the whizz of machines and the whack of tractors. In addition, they went on exciting, with the help of the Tibetan Communist Party, the poor serf-like population against the "upper strata".

By the end of 1957 the Chinese Communist leadership appeared to intensify the drive for reforms in Tibet. A five-man mission was sent to Lhasa for "weeding out reactionaries", who "come in the way of modernising Tibet on socialistic lines". From this time a certain stiffening of the Chinese attitude came to be noticed and it may be assumed that Tibetan resistance also intensified.

There is no doubt that discontent among large sections of the Tibetan population—most of them did probably belong to what the Chinese called "the upper strata"—began to take organised shape towards the end of 1957. But few reports of actual disturbances leaked to the outside world. In the territories neighbouring Tibet, however, there was considerable reaction. In 1958 it was reported that Mr. Nehru had expressed a wish to visit Tibet, but the Chinese Government asked him to postpone his visit indefinitely. On his return to Delhi after a seventeen-day visit to Bhutan in September 1958, Mr. Nehru observed that from such reports as he had heard, "obviously conditions in Tibet are not normal".

This turn of events was not unexpected to students of Tibetan affairs. When the Chinese People's Government established its sovereignty over Tibet, it became evident that radical changes would follow, and in Tibetan, or any society for that matter, these changes could not happen without social explosions. Messrs. Tsung Lien-shen and Shen Chi-liu, in their book on Tibet from which we have already quoted several times, saw the portents of these changes even when the 1951 agreement between Tibet and China was signed. Looking anxiously to the future they asked several agonising questions and gave the following forecast of events:

What will happen to the clergy, who are celibate and drawn mostly from among the lower strata of Tibetan society, and the various strata of their monastic organisations? They have all along been held up as the strongest bulwark of conservatism in Tibet. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the clergy has always been more enterprising than the aristocracy. They could be most conservative as well as ultra-radical; they are conservative when conservatism pays. Once the new social forces are unleashed, they are likely to break rank with the aristocrats, with whom there has always been keen rivalry. Already there is the rumour of Buddho-Marxism in the making. Such a movement will surely draw many ardent supporters from the younger and poorer clergy. And we shall not be surprised if serious dissension should break out in the near future among the conservative and radical elements, dissension which might spell the eventual dissolution of the time-honoured monastic organization in Tibet.

There will be some adjustments in Tibet's foreign relations. Trade and religious relations with Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan will probably be left unaffected. But with India and Nepal, while existing commercial and religious relations may remain, all the unequal treaty rights of India, based on the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the trade regulations of 1908, and those of Nepal, based on the treaty of 1856, will have to be revised in the context of the new developments. The undemarcated boundary between Tibet and India also demands a settlement. Thus, with the modification of economic and social patterns internally and the reorientation of external relations, although it is the avowed object of the Communist government of China to preserve Tibet's full autonomy, it seems unlikely that the Tibetans will remain for long the hermit nation desired by so many of their well-wishers. As to the exact role the new trend of events is drawing them to play, time will soon reveal.

THE ARMED UPRISING

From Bhutan in September 1958, Mr. Nehru learnt that conditions in Tibet were not normal. By the end of the year or the beginning of the present year, clashes began to occur in a more or less organised way between the war-like turbulent Khampas and the Chinese. Isolated fighting between them had been going on for several years. The Khampas ambushed Chinese convoys and with the arms thus captured made war on the Chinese. Somehow the Tibetan cabinet did not act as vigorously against the Khampas as the Chinese had expected it to do. The Chinese military authorities, therefore, began to take action on their own against the Khampas and there were cases of military excesses which infuriated other Tibetans.

It was at this time that the lamas, the leaders of the Tibetan army (strength 3,000, now disbanded), and others became convinced that they must support the growing spirit of revolt. This was perhaps a counsel of despair, rather than of confidence. They could hardly have expected to inflict a military defeat on the Chinese People's

Army. But they realised that time was against them, and that after a few years, even a revolt might not be possible. So they rose in arms. The great rebellion broke out on March 10, 1959.

The news of any large-scale armed uprising "broke" in the Western countries on March 21, 1959. Dispatches were datelined Kalimpong on the Bengal-Tibet border and Hong Kong and other places. The first report of an uprising broadcast by the Voice of America was on March 22. In the Indian press also reports of fighting in Tibet began to appear about that time. On March 22 *The Times of India* reported that news of the fighting in Lhasa "has been received with great concern in New Delhi and further information is likely to be sought from the Government by Members of Parliament". In his first report to the Indian Parliament on the Tibetan revolt on March 21, which was in the form of replies to questions asked by Members, Mr. Nehru was extremely cautious and described the clash in Tibet as a "conflict of minds".

The first Chinese announcement of the Tibetan uprising came on March 28 when the Chinese Government announced that it had "completely smashed" the revolt and had installed the Panchen Lama as the acting head of a new regime. The Dalai Lama had already left Lhasa.

Within a week or ten days since news of the Tibetan uprising broke on the world, the contradictions between the Indian and Chinese attitudes to the Tibetan happenings became painfully clear.

SINO-INDIAN SCHISM

As the architect of Sino-Indian friendship, the tragic events in Tibet presented Prime Minister Nehru with a delicate, perplexing and melancholy problem. Ever since the establishment of the Chinese People's Government, Mr. Nehru had been urging the nations of the world to accord it due recognition and to accept the tremendous fact of the revolutionary awakening of China. A student of history, he was fascinated by China's great ancient cultural heritage, and the ageless friendly relations between China and India had a powerful spell on his lofty vision of tomorrow's Asia. He was convinced that the future of peace and goodwill in Asia would depend upon durable understanding between India and China, separated by more than two thousand miles of common border, major portions of them still undefined. If India and China could not co-exist in friendship and amity and cooperate culturally

and economically, despite their different political institutions and economic systems, the future of Asia would be dark indeed. As far as Tibet was concerned, Mr. Nehru, true to the anti-imperialist traditions of the Indian National Congress, had voluntarily relinquished the legacy of extraterritorial rights and privileges which the British had secured in Tibet. In return, he thought he had secured an assurance from the Chinese that they would not seriously disturb too quickly Tibet's ancient way of life. This does not mean that Mr. Nehru was in any way opposed to changes in Tibet; he only wanted the changes to come in conditions of peace and order. The Tibetan military uprising and the Chinese suppression of it posed problems for Mr. Nehru which were not only political but also emotional.

The Chinese attitude was from the very beginning characteristically straight and rigid. Tibet was an integral part of China. Some sections of the Tibetan people had risen in revolt against the established government of China. A majority of the members of the Tibetan Government and of the Tibetan Assembly had joined them. The revolt had to be suppressed, at whatever cost. The Dalai Lama was forced to escape and he was under duress of his followers. It was not the intention of the Chinese Government to liquidate Tibetan autonomy within the framework of the Chinese constitution. But there was clearly no case for any outside country to interfere or even to get seriously concerned over the military measures taken by China in Tibet. China had scrupulously avoided interfering in any internal problems of India and she expected India to do the same. It was an unfriendly act on the part of the Government of India to allow Kalimpong to be used as "a centre of rebellion" in Tibet, to permit Tibetan refugees to cross into India, to tolerate or allow Indians who try to create sympathy for Tibet's independence or to condemn the Chinese action. The fact that in democratic India persons and newspapers had the freedom to speak and write what they wished or that in the Indian Parliament Members did not speak in that uniform voice to which the Chinese are accustomed in their own National People's Congress did not evidently register in the Chinese official mind.

KALIMPONG AS A BASE OF THE REBELLION

In its March 28 announcement the Chinese Government abolished the cabinet of the Dalai Lama as well as the Tibetan Assembly. An official news communique on the revolt in Tibet named Kalim-

pong as "the commanding centre of the rebellion". It added that the Chinese Government welcomed the statement of Mr. Nehru in Parliament on March 22 on "non-interference in China's internal affairs" and "considered this statement to be friendly". But it took exception to Members of the Indian Parliament discussing Tibet. It said that "on the part of China, there had never been interference in the internal affairs of India or discussion of the internal affairs of India at the sessions of the National People's Congress or its standing committee. It considers that discussion of the internal affairs of a friendly country to be impolite and improper."

Mr. Nehru, in a statement in the Lok Sabha on March 30, categorically repudiated the Chinese complaint that Kalimpong was the "commanding centre of the revolt in Tibet". In Parliament the general feeling against the Chinese action in Tibet ran very high and there was particular resentment against what Members considered to be an unwarranted interference by the Chinese Government with the sovereignty of the Indian Parliament.

On March 31, several adjournment motions were tabled protesting against what was described as Chinese interference with the sovereignty of the Indian Parliament, and Mr. Nehru declared that the Indian Parliament was not prepared to brook any interference in its activities by any outside power.

A statement issued by the Indian Communist Party, broadly upholding the Chinese contention that Kalimpong was a centre of rebellious activity, angered many Members of Parliament. The Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, described as "highly improper" certain material circulated by the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi repeating the allegation about Kalimpong. On the following day, however, Mr. Nehru admitted that Kalimpong was a "centre of spies" from various countries and of various colour, but he denied that anything serious had happened there in relation to the Tibetan revolt. He asked the Members not to be led away by minor matters but to devote their attention to "much bigger matters which we have to face today, tomorrow and the day after".

On April 3 the Indian decision to grant political asylum to the Dalai Lama was conveyed formally to the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi.

ASYLUM IN INDIA

On April 5, Mr. Nehru devoted the bulk of his monthly press

conference to answering questions about Tibet. He made it clear that India was deeply interested in the autonomy of Tibet and in its being allowed to function in its own way. At the same time he did not think that India could take up this question with the Chinese Government because it was an internal matter of China. He declared that "a difficult, delicate and embarrassing situation" had been created and India would have to deal with it in the light of three considerations: national security, her desire for continued friendship with China, and her strong feeling about developments in Tibet. These considerations would have to be "balanced and adjusted".

In the course of subsequent weeks, Mr. Nehru tried to place persistently these three factors before the Indian public. When he granted the Dalai Lama respectful residence in the hill station of Mussoorie and promised to give him the maximum amount of legitimate religious freedom, he made it quite clear that neither the Dalai Lama nor his followers would be allowed to indulge in political activities which might prejudice Sino-Indian relations.

It would appear from Mr. Nehru's statements and speeches that while he accepted as an unfortunate fact the Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt, he was still hopeful that the Chinese would not at once communise Tibet and that by persuasive diplomacy it might still be possible for the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa and exercise his sobering influence on Tibetan affairs. This hope withered somewhat after the Dalai's press conference on June 20.

While under Mr. Nehru's leadership the Government of India adopted this "tight-rope" walking line with regard to Tibet, a phrase used aptly by Mr. Rajagopalachari, the Congress Party went a step further in associating itself with Indian public opinion which was indignant and outraged by the Chinese action in Tibet. The Communist Party, of course, adopted the line that the revolt in Tibet was the action of a handful of reactionaries who were helped by countries hostile to China and that it was none of India's business to interfere in the affairs of Tibet. The Praja Socialist Party went much farther than the Congress Party in denouncing the Chinese action. Mr. Kripalani and Mr. Jai Prakash Narain described the revolt in Tibet as "a national uprising". The National Executive of the Party in a resolution adopted on April 16 urged Tibet's "right to self-determination", but, at the same time, expressed its "anxiety to maintain and strengthen friendly relations with

China". The resolution said that "reconciliation between Tibet and China is essential for the growth of trust and peaceful reconstruction in south, south-east Asia and east Asia".

The Chinese leaders, on their part, went on emphasising that the Tibetan revolt was actually the work of a "handful" of reactionaries, that the vast majority of the masses was with the Chinese Government, that the Dalai Lama continued to be under duress, that Tibet's autonomy remained unimpaired, that the Dalai Lama could return to Tibet if he repudiated his "abductors" and blessed the Chinese action, and that the rebellion was more or less over. As far as India was concerned the Chinese reacted violently to criticisms of their action in the Indian press and Parliament and by every Indian political party except the Communists.

The Chinese paid unusual importance to the utterances of Mr. Nehru which were reported in the Chinese press and were carefully refuted. At a slightly later stage the Chinese began to reply to Indian criticisms by ascribing to the critics what they chose to call "expansionist desires". This accusation further infuriated the critics in India.

The controversy which was quite high-pitched at times came to an end in the beginning of May. The editorial department of the *People's Daily* of Peking published a ten-thousand-word editorial entitled *The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy*. It sought to give a well-considered reply to Indian criticisms of China's policy and it was careful to avoid expressions like "expansionism" while referring to the critics in India.


As the controversy died out and the Chinese undertook a programme of vigorous reconstruction in Tibet, the Dalai Lama's position became rather precarious. He arrived in Mussoorie on April 21, 1959, and had a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister on April 24. Mr. Nehru had already stated that in granting political asylum to the Dalai Lama he expected that the Tibetan leader would refrain from political activity which might embarrass the host country. For several weeks, the Dalai Lama scrupulously maintained a correct non-political posture. He refused to meet foreign correspondents. In the Western newspapers there were even allegations of a "Nehru curtain" around the Dalai Lama. In the month of June, however, the Dalai Lama started giving interviews to newspaper correspondents.

The Dalai Lama and his followers obviously could not allow

the situation in Tibet to quieten down. The worst that could happen to them was to get the world reconciled to the Chinese military action in Tibet. Indian supporters of Tibet's independence organised a convention in Calcutta on May 30, 1959, over which the Socialist leader Mr. Jai Prakash Narain presided. The convention passed a resolution authorising Mr. Narain to set up an Afro-Asian Committee on Tibet to mobilise world opinion, particularly in Asian-African countries, in favour of Tibet's right to self-determination, and also to arrange for the appointment of an international commission of neutral countries with a view to reporting on the alleged violation of human rights in Tibet.

On June 20, the Dalai Lama held his first press conference in Mussoorie. In a statement issued to correspondents he declared that he and his cabinet members constituted the Government of Tibet wherever they were. He demanded the restoration of Tibet's pre-1949 boundaries; an independent status for Tibet pledged to neutrality and good neighbourly relations with India and China; and a negotiated settlement of the problem with China through the mediation of India. Soon afterwards the Dalai had prolonged talks with Mr. Jai Prakash Narain who later arrived in New Delhi and had exploratory discussions with the diplomatic representatives of several Asian-African countries with a view to mobilising Asian-African opinion in favour of Tibetan self-determination. Mr. Narain also had an interview with Mr. Nehru. Later he told correspondents that he thought that it was the Dalai Lama's intention to raise the Tibetan question at the 13th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

On the last day of June, an official spokesman of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement declaring: "The Government of India want to make it clear that they do not recognise any separate Government of Tibet and there is, therefore, no question of a Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama functioning in India."



Part One

TIBET'S INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS PRIOR TO GREAT BRITAIN'S "FORWARD POLICY" BASED ON INDIA

Till the 7th century, Tibetan history is wrapt in myth and legend, helped out from time to time by sidelights from contemporary Chinese history. In the 7th century the Tibetan ruler, Son-Tsan Gam-Po, asked for the hand of a Chinese princess in marriage, and was refused. Thereupon, he attacked China with a two-hundred-thousand-men army. After several battles, the request for a Chinese princess was renewed and was, this time, well received in the Chinese court. Son-Tsan Gam-Po married Princess Wen-Chen who brought with her Buddhism. In the first half of the 8th century was signed the first-ever treaty between Tibet and China. It is a unique document. China is the "Maternal Uncle", Tibet "the Nephew". They "have agreed to unite their kingdoms"—surely, a silken unity of minds and hearts, not a physical unity of boundaries. This is the first recorded document on Tibet's international relations.

Tibet's second international treaty was signed with Nepal in the year 1856. Both agreed to pay "respect as always before to the Emperor of China", and "to treat each other like brothers".

In between, in 1842, Tibet had signed a treaty of peace with the Dogra King of northern India, after the Tibetans with the help of the Chinese, had completely defeated an invading Dogra force. The main point of interest in this treaty is that Tibet agreed not to do anything either "at present" or "in future" with "the boundaries of Ladakh and its surroundings as fixed from ancient times". The treaty also ensured that Tibet "shall offer no hindrance to traders of Ladakh who visit our territories".



TREATY BETWEEN CHINA AND TIBET DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTH CENTURY A.D.

Recorded on the western face of
the stone pillar near the temple in Lhasa

The Sovereign of Tibet, the Divine King of Miracles and the Great King of China, Hwang Te, the Nephew and the Maternal Uncle, have agreed to unite their kingdoms. Having made this great Agreement, that it may be held faithfully and never be changed, all gods and men were invoked to bear witness to the oath. That it may remain from generation to generation, the sacred terms of the relationship have been duly inscribed on the pillar.

The King of Miracles Ti-de-tsen and the Chinese King Bun Pu He-u Tig Hwang Te, Nephew and Uncle, united their kingdoms, considering the mutual welfare of Tibet and China, and thus conferred great benefits upon the people of the inside and outside, making many and all happy and prosperous for a long time. They agreed to hold as sacred the respect of the old relationship and the happiness of the neighbours. Tibet and China shall guard the land and frontier, of which they have hitherto held possession. All to the east of the frontier is the country of Great China. All to the west is certainly the country of Great Tibet.

Henceforth there shall be no fighting as between enemies and neither side will carry war into the other's country. Should there be any suspected person, he can be arrested, questioned, and sent back. Thus the great Agreement has been made for uniting the kingdoms, and the Nephew and Uncle have become happy. In gratitude for this happiness it is necessary that travellers with good messages should go backwards and forwards. The messengers from both sides will also travel by the old road as before. According to the former custom ponies shall be exchanged at Chang-kun-yok, on the frontier between Tibet and China. At Che-shung-shek Chinese territory is met; below this China will show respect.¹ At Tsen-shu-hwan Tibetan territory is met; above this Tibet will show respect.

The Nephew and Uncle, having become intimate, will respect each other according to custom. No smoke or dust shall appear between the two countries. There shall be no sudden anger and the

¹ Supply transport and other necessary assistance.

word "enemy" shall not even be mentioned. Not even those guarding the frontier shall feel apprehension or take fright. Land is land, and bed is bed;² thus happiness will reign. Happiness will be established; prosperity will be gained for ten thousand generations. The sound of praise shall cover all the places reached by the Sun and Moon.

This Agreement that the Tibetans shall be happy in Tibet and the Chinese happy in China and the great kingdoms united, shall never be changed. The Three Precious Ones³, the Exalted Ones⁴, the Sun and Moon, the Planets and Stars have been invoked to bear witness. Solemn words were also uttered. Animals were sacrificed and oaths taken, and the Agreement was made.

Is this Agreement held to be binding? If this Agreement be violated, whether Tibet or China violates it first, that one has committed the sin. Whatever revenge is taken in retaliation shall not be considered a breach of the Agreement. In this way the Kings and Ministers of Tibet and China took oath and wrote this inscription of the Agreement in detail. The two great kings affixed their seals. The Ministers, considered as holding the Agreement, wrote with their hands. This inscribed Agreement shall be observed by both sides.

² An old Tibetan saying, which means that a man's land will remain unharmed, and he can sleep freely in his bed, without having to be constantly on the watch for enemies.

³ Buddha, the Buddhist scriptures and the Buddhist priesthood.

⁴ The Celestial Buddhas, Chen-re-zi etc.

TREATY BETWEEN TIBET AND NEPAL, 1856

Translation of the Tibetan text

The undermentioned gentlemen, monks and laymen, of the Gurkha and Tibetan Governments held a conference and mutually agreed upon and concluded a Treaty of ten Articles, and invoked the Supreme Being as their witness, and affixed their seals to it. They have agreed to regard the Chinese Emperor as heretofore with respect, in accordance with what has been written, and to keep both the States in agreement and to treat each other like brothers. If either of them violate the Treaty, may the Precious Ones not allow that State to prosper. Should either State violate the terms of the Treaty, the other State shall be exempt from all sin in making war upon it.

[Here follow the names of the signatories and their seals]

LIST OF ARTICLES OF THE TREATY

1. The Tibetan Government shall pay the sum of ten thousand rupees annually as a present to the Gurkha Government.

2. Gurkha and Tibet have been regarding the Great Emperor with respect. Tibet being the country of monasteries, hermits and celibates, devoted to religion, the Gurkha Government have agreed henceforth to afford help and protection to it as far as they can, if any foreign country attacks it.

3. Henceforth Tibet shall not levy taxes on trade or taxes on roads or taxes of any other kind on the merchants or other subjects of the Gurkha Government.

4. The Government of Tibet agrees to return to the Gurkha Government the Sikh soldiers captured by Tibet, and all the Gurkha soldiers, officers, servants, women and cannon captured in the war. The Gurkha Government agrees to return to the Tibetan Government the Tibetan troops, weapons, yaks, and whatever articles may have been left behind by the Tibetan subjects residing at Kyi-rong, Nya-nang, Dzong-ga, Pu-rang, and Rong-shar. And on the completion of the Treaty all the Gurkha troops in Pu-rang, Rong-shar, Kyi-rong, Dzong-ga, Nya-nang, Tar-ling, and La-tse will be withdrawn and the country evacuated.

5. Henceforth the Gurkha Government will keep a high officer, and not a Newar, to hold charge at Lhasa.

6. The Gurkha Government will open shops at Lhasa, where they can freely trade in gems, jewellery, clothing, food, and different articles.

7. The Gurkha officer is not allowed to try any case arising from quarrels amongst Lhasa subjects and merchants, and the Tibetan Government is not allowed to try any case arising from quarrels amongst the Gurkha subjects and traders and the Mahomedans of Khatmandu who may be residing in the jurisdiction of Lhasa. In the event of quarrels between Tibetan and Gurkha subjects the high officials of the two Governments will sit together and will jointly try the cases; the fines imposed upon the Tibetan subjects as punishments will be taken by the Tibetan official, and the fines imposed upon Gurkha subjects, merchants, and Mahomedans as punishments will be taken by the Gurkha official.

8. Should any Gurkha subject, after committing a murder, go to the country of Tibet, he shall be surrendered by Tibet to Gurkha; and should any Tibetan subject, after committing a murder, go to the country of Gurkha, he shall be surrendered by Gurkha to Tibet.

9. If the property of a Gurkha merchant or other subject be plundered by a Tibetan subject, the Tibetan officials after inquiry will compel the restoration of such property to the owner. Should the plunderer not be able to restore such property, he shall be compelled by the Tibetan official to draw up an agreement to make good such property within an extended time. If the property of a Tibetan merchant or other subject be plundered by a Gurkha subject, the Gurkha official after inquiry will compel the restoration of such property to the owner. Should the plunderer not be able to restore such property, he shall be compelled by the Gurkha official to draw up an agreement to make good such property within an extended time.

10. After the completion of the Treaty, neither Government will take vengeance (be angry with) on the persons or property of Tibetan subjects who may have joined the Gurkha Government during the recent war, or on the persons or property of Gurkha subjects who may have so joined the Tibetan Government.


Dated the 18th Day of the Second Month of the Fire Dragon Year
(A. D. 1856).

TREATY BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND THE DOGRAS SIGNED IN SEPTEMBER 1842

As on this auspicious day, the 2nd of Assuj, Sambat 1899 [16th or 17th September 1842 A.D.], we, the officers of the Lhasa [Government], Kalon of Soka, and Bakshi Shajpuh, Commander of the Forces and two officers on behalf of the most resplendent Shri Khalsaji Sahib, the asylum of the world, King Sher Singhji and Sri Maharaj Sahib Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singhji, i.e., the Muktar-ud-Daula Diwan Hari Chand and the asylum of the vizirs, Vizir Ratnun, in a meeting called together for the promotion of peace and unity, and by professions and vows of friendship, unity and sincerity of heart and by taking oaths like those of Kunjak Sahib, have arranged and agreed that relations of peace, friendship and unity between Sri Khalsaji and Sri Maharaj Sahib Bahadur Raja Gulab Singhji, and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa will henceforward remain firmly established for ever; and we declare in the presence of the Kunjak Sahib that on no account whatsoever will there be any deviation, difference or departure [from this agreement]. We shall neither at present nor in future have anything to do or interfere at all with the boundaries of Ladakh and its surroundings as fixed from ancient times and will allow the annual export of wool, shawls and tea by way of Ladakh according to the old established custom.

Should any of the opponents of Sri Sarkar Khalsaji and Sri Raja Sahib Bahadur at any time enter our territories, we shall not pay any heed to his words or allow him to remain in our country.

We shall offer no hindrance to traders of Ladakh who visit our territories. We shall not even to the extent of a hair's breadth act in contravention of the terms that we have agreed to above regarding firm friendship, unity, the fixed boundaries of Ladakh and the keeping open of the route for wool, shawls and tea. We call Kunjak Sahib, Kairi, Lassi, Zhoh Mahan, and Khushal Choh as witness to this treaty.



Part Two


"THE BRITISH PERIOD"

Towards the end of the 19th century, British power, based on India, began to extend its influence to the Himalayas. China, with a corrupt and tottering regime and harassed by foreign penetration and internal unrest, was no longer a potent force. On the other hand, Imperial Russia with its well-known desire to expand towards the Himalayas and then down to India, confronted Great Britain with a potential new threat. Lord Curzon, who as the Viceroy in India was a chief architect of the new British policy based on India, was in favour of a forward thrust; to him Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was a fiction unworthy of diplomatic recognition. The British Government, however, did not wish to go as far as Curzon would have liked them to do. Between 1890, when China, by a treaty, confirmed Britain's protectorate over Sikkim, and 1914, when the Simla Convention was signed, Britain developed what was to become the international status of Tibet for a long period.

The new pattern for Tibet was this: Chinese suzerainty was accepted, not only by Britain but also by Russia and the United States of America. Within this suzerainty, however, Tibet was to be completely autonomous. If there was to be a Chinese mission in Lhasa, so there was to be a British mission. Tibet was divided into Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. Chinese influence, whatever was left of it, was to be confined to Inner Tibet. China would not convert Tibet into a province. Great Britain would not annex it or any portion of it.

Although a Chinese plenipotentiary signed the Simla Convention of 1914 providing for this pattern, it was not ratified by the Chinese Government because of the clauses relating to the boundaries of Tibet.

The Simla Convention also laid down a boundary between Tibet and India, defined from the eastern borders of Bhutan to the borders of Burma by what is known as the McMahon Line.



CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA RELATING TO SIKKIM AND TIBET, 1890

Signed at Calcutta on 17 March 1890

Ratified at London on 27 August 1890

Whereas Her Majesty, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the said relations, and it is desirable to clearly define and permanently settle certain matters connected with the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject, and have, for this purpose, named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland:

His Excellency the Most Honourable Henry Charles Keith Petty Fitzmaurice, GMSI, GCMG, GMIE, Marquess of Lansdowne, Viceroy and Governor-General of India;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China:

His Excellency Sheng Tai, Imperial Associate Resident in Tibet, Military Deputy Lieutenant-Governor;

Who, having met and communicated to each other their full powers, and finding these to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following Convention in eight Articles:

1. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

2. It is admitted that the British Government, whose Protectorate over the Sikkim State is hereby recognised, has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of

that State, and except through and with the permission of the British Government, neither the Ruler of the State nor any of its officers shall have official relations of any kind, formal or informal, with any other country.

3. The Government of Great Britain and Ireland and the Government of China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary as defined in Article I, and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective sides of the frontier.

4. The question of providing increased facilities for trade across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier will hereafter be discussed with a view to a mutually satisfactory arrangement by the High Contracting Powers.

5. The question of pasturage on the Sikkim side of the frontier is reserved for further examination and future adjustment.

6. The High Contracting Powers reserve for discussion and arrangement the method in which official communications between the British authorities in India and the authorities in Tibet shall be conducted.

7. Two Joint Commissioners shall, within six months from the ratification of this Convention, be appointed, one by the British Government in India, the other by the Chinese Resident in Tibet. The said Commissioners shall meet and discuss the questions which, by the last three preceding articles, have been reserved.

8. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible after the date of the signature thereof.

In witness whereof the respective negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quadruplicate at Calcutta, this 17th day of March, in the year of our Lord 1890, corresponding with the Chinese date, the 27th day of the second moon of this 16th year of Kuang-hsu.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TIBET, 1904

Whereas doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Tibetan Government under these agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Tibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of the said Government, and Lo-Sand Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Tibet.

* * * *

ARTICLE IX.

The Government of Tibet engages that without the previous consent of the British Government

(a) no portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign power;

(b) no such power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs;

(c) no representatives or agents of any foreign power shall be admitted to Tibet;

(d) no concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights shall be granted to any foreign power, or the subject of any foreign power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(e) no Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign power, or the subject of any foreign power.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA, 1906

Signed at Peking on 27 April 1906

Ratified at London on 23 July 1906

Whereas His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China are sincerely desirous to maintain and perpetuate the relations of friendship and good understanding which now exist between their respective Empires;

And whereas the refusal of Tibet to recognise the validity of or to carry into full effect the provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 17th March 1890, and Regulations of 5th December 1893, placed the British Government under the necessity of taking steps to secure their rights and interests under the said Convention and Regulations;

And whereas a Convention of ten articles was signed at Lhasa on 7th September 1904, on behalf of Great Britain and Tibet, and was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India on behalf of Great Britain on 11th November 1904, a declaration on behalf of Great Britain modifying its terms under certain conditions being appended thereto;

His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of China have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have for this purpose named Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland:

Sir Ernest Mason Satow, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, His said Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China:

His Excellency Tong Shoa-yi, His said Majesty's High Commissioner Plenipotentiary and a Vice-President of the Board of Foreign Affairs;

Who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and due form have agreed

upon and concluded the following Convention in six articles:

1. The Convention concluded on 7th September, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet, the texts of which in English and Chinese are attached to the present Convention as an annexe, is hereby confirmed, subject to the modification stated in the declaration appended thereto, and both of the High Contracting Parties engage to take at all times such steps as may be necessary to secure the due fulfilment of the terms specified therein.

2. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet. The Government of China also undertakes not to permit any other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet.

3. The concessions which are mentioned in Article 9 (d) of the Convention concluded on 7th September, 1904, by Great Britain and Tibet are denied to any state or to the subject of any state other than China, but it has been arranged with China that at the trade marts specified in Article 2 of the aforesaid Convention, Great Britain shall be entitled to lay down telegraph lines connecting with India.

4. The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and Regulations of 1893 shall, subject to the terms of this present Convention and annexe thereto, remain in full force.

5. The English and Chinese texts of the present Convention have been carefully compared and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them, the English text shall be authoritative.

6. The Convention shall be ratified by the Sovereigns of both countries and ratifications shall be exchanged at London within three months after the date of signature by the Plenipotentiaries of both Powers.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, four copies in English and four in Chinese.

Done at Peking this twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand nine hundred and six, being the fourth day of the fourth month of the thirty-second year of the reign of Kuang-hsu.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA, 1907

Signed at St. Petersburg on
18 [31] August 1907

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agreements destined to prevent all causes of misunderstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, to wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

The Right Honourable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias:

The Master of His Court Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

* * * *

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING THIBET

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognising the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Thibet, have made the following arrangement:

ARTICLE I

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration.

ARTICLE II

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Thibetan authorities provided for in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet of the 7th September 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 27th April 1906; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangement.

ARTICLE III

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send representatives to Lhasa.

ARTICLE IV

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs and mines, or other rights in Thibet.

ARTICLE V

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

ANNEXE TO THE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN
AND RUSSIA CONCERNING THIBET

Great Britain reaffirms the declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and appended to the ratification of the Convention of the 7th September 1904, to the effect that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees, provided that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that Convention have been effectively opened for three years, and that in the meantime the Thibetan authorities have faithfully complied in all respects with the terms of the said Convention of 1904. It is clearly understood that if the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the British forces has, for any reason, not been terminated at the time anticipated in the above Declaration, the British and Russian Governments will enter upon a friendly exchange of views on this subject.

The present Convention shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburg as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at St. Petersburg, the 18th [31st] August 1907.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND BHUTAN, 1910

Signed at Punaka, Bhutan, on 8 January 1910

Ratified at Calcutta on 24 March 1910

Whereas it is desirable to amend Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty concluded at Sinchula on the 11th day of November 1865, corresponding with the Bhutia year Shing Lang, 24th day of the 9th month, between the British Government and the Government of Bhutan, the undermentioned amendments are agreed to on the one part by Mr. C. A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, in virtue of full powers to that effect vested in him by the Right Honourable Sir Gilbert John Elliot-Murray-Kynynmond, PC, GMSI, GMIE, GCMG, Earl of Minto, Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, and on the other part by His Highness Sir Ugyen Wangchuk, KCIE, Maharaja of Bhutan.

The following addition has been made to Article IV of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865:

The British Government has increased the annual allowance to the Government of Bhutan from fifty thousand rupees to one hundred thousand rupees with effect from the 10th January 1910.

Article VIII of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865 has been revised and the revised Article runs as follows:

The British Government undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations. In the event of disputes with or causes of complaint against the Maharajas of Sikkim and Cooch Behar, such matters will be referred for arbitration to the British Government, which will settle them in such manner as justice may require, and insist upon the observance of its decision by the Maharajas named.

17907

ALLEGED MONGOL-TIBETAN TREATY, 1913

Said to have been signed at Urga
in January 1913

Whereas Mongolia and Tibet, having freed themselves from the Manchu dynasty and separated themselves from China, have become independent States, and whereas the two States have always professed one and the same religion, and to the end that their ancient mutual friendships may be strengthened:

On the part of the Government of the Sovereign of the Mongolian people:

Nikta Biliktu-da-Lama Rabdan, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Assistant Minister-General and Manlai Caatyr-Bei-Tzu Damdinsurun;

On the part of the Dalai Lama, Ruler of Tibet:

Gujir Tsanshib Kanchen Lubsan-Agwan, domir Agwan Choinzin, Tshichamtso, manager of the bank, and Gendun-Galsan, secretary;

have agreed on the following:

1. The Dalai Lama, Sovereign of Tibet, approves of and acknowledges the formation of an independent Mongolian State, and the proclamation, on the 9th day of the 11th month of the year of the Swine, of the master of the Yellow Faith Je-tsun Dampa Lama as the sovereign of the land.

2. The Sovereign of the Mongolian people Je-tsun Dampa Lama approves and acknowledges the formation of an independent State and the proclamation of the Dalai Lama as sovereign of Tibet.

3. Both States shall take measures, after mutual consideration, for the prosperity of the Buddhist faith.

4. Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall henceforth, for all time, afford each other aid against dangers from without and from within.

5. Both States, each on its own territory, shall afford mutual aid to their subjects, travelling officially and privately on religious or on State business.

6. Both States, the Mongolian and the Tibetan, shall, as formerly carry on mutual trade in the produce of their lands—in goods, cattle, &c., and likewise open industrial institutions.

7. Henceforth transactions on credit shall be allowed only with the knowledge and permission of official institutions; without such permission no claims shall be examined by Government institutions.

Should such agreements have been entered into before the conclusion of the present treaty, and should the parties thereto be unable to settle matters amicably, while the loss suffered is great, the payment of such debts may be enforced by the said institutions, but in no case shall the debts concern the Shabinars and Hoshuns.

[Shabinars—people who depend on the Court of Hu-tuk-tu and pay taxes to the Court Department]

[Hoshun—principality]

8. Should it be necessary to supplement the Articles of this treaty, the Mongolian and Tibetan Governments shall appoint special Plenipotentiaries, who shall come to an Agreement according to the circumstances then existing.

9. The present treaty shall come into force on the date of the signature thereof.

Plenipotentiaries of the Mongolian Government:

Acting Ministers of Foreign Affairs Biliktu-da-Lama Rabdan and Assistant Minister-General and Manlai Caatyr-Bei-Tzu Damdinsurun

Plenipotentiaries of the Dalai Lama, Sovereign of Tibet:

Gujir Tsanshib Kanchen Lubsan-Agwan, Choinzin, Tshichamtso, manager of the Bank of Tibet, and Gendun-Galsan, secretary

According to the Mongolian chronology, on the 4th day of the 12th month of the second year of "Him who is exalted by all".

According to the chronology of Tibet, in the year of the Water-Mouse, on the same month and day.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA AND TIBET, 1914

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, being sincerely desirous to settle by mutual agreement, various questions concerning the interests of their several States on the continent of Asia, and further to regulate the relations of their several Governments, have resolved to conclude a Convention on this subject and have nominated for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, Companion of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department;

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China:

Monsieur Ivan Chen, Officer of the Order of the Chia, H. O.;

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet:

Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-Jor Dorje;

Who having communicated to each other their respective full powers and finding them to be in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Convention in eleven Articles:

ARTICLE I

The Conventions specified in the Schedule to the present Convention shall, except in so far as they may have been modified by, or may be inconsistent with or repugnant to, any of the provisions of the present Convention, continue to be binding upon the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 2

The Governments of Great Britain and China recognising that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognising also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.

The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.

ARTICLE 3

Recognising the special interest of Great Britain, in virtue of the geographical position of Tibet, in the existence of an effective Tibetan Government, and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, the Government of China engages, except as provided in Article 4 of this Convention, not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, not to establish Chinese colonies in the country. Should any such troops or officials remain in Outer Tibet at the date of the signature of this Convention, they shall be withdrawn within a period not exceeding three months.

The Government of Great Britain engages not to station military or civil officers in Tibet (except as provided in the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet) nor troops (except the Agents' escorts), nor to establish colonies in that country.

ARTICLE 4

The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.

ARTICLE 5

The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other power, excepting such negotiations and agreements between Great Britain and Tibet as are provided

for by the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet and the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China.

ARTICLE 6

Article III of the Convention of April 27, 1906, between Great Britain and China is hereby cancelled, and it is understood that in Article IX(d) of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet the term "Foreign Power" does not include China.

Not less favourable treatment shall be accorded to British commerce than to the commerce of China or the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE 7

(a) The Tibet Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 are hereby cancelled.

(b) The Tibetan Government engages to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet without delay; provided always that such Regulations shall in no way modify the present Convention except with the consent of the Chinese Government.

ARTICLE 8

The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

ARTICLE 9

For the purpose of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be as shown in red and blue respectively on the map* attached hereto.

Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint the high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.

* Not published.

ARTICLE 10

The English, Chinese and Tibetan texts of the present Convention have been carefully examined and found to correspond, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

ARTICLE 11

The present Convention will take effect from the date of signature.

In Token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this Convention, three copies in English, three in Chinese and three in Tibetan.

Done at Simla, this third day of July, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Chinese date, the third day of the seventh month of the third year of the Republic, and the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger Year.

Initial of the* LONCHEN SHATRA

(Initialed) A. H. M.

Seal of the
Lonchen Shatra

Seal of the
British Plenipotentiary

SCHEDULE

1. Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet, signed at Calcutta the 17th March 1890.
2. Convention between Great Britain and Tibet, signed at Lhasa the 7th September 1904.
3. Convention between Great Britain and China respecting Tibet, signed at Peking the 27th April 1906.

The notes exchanged are to the following effect:

1. It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.
2. After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government, whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.
3. It is also understood that the selection and appointment

* Owing to it not being possible to write initials in Tibetan, the mark of the Lonchen at this place is his signature.

of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.

4. Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

5. It is understood that the escorts attached to the British Trade Agencies in Tibet shall not exceed seventy five per centum of the escort of the Chinese Representative at Lhasa.

6. The Government of China is hereby released from its engagements under Article III of the Convention of March 17, 1890, between Great Britain and China to prevent acts of aggression from the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.

7. The Chinese high official referred to in Article 4 will be free to enter Tibet as soon as the terms of Article 3 have been fulfilled to the satisfaction of representatives of the three signatories to the Convention, who will investigate and report without delay.

Initial of the LONCHEN SHATRA

Seal of the
Lonchen Shatra

(Initialled) A. H. M.

Seal of the
British Plenipotentiary

NOTE

Whereas the Simla Convention itself after being initialled by the Chinese Plenipotentiary was not signed or ratified by the Chinese Government, it was accepted as binding by the two other parties as between themselves.

ANGLO-TIBET TRADE REGULATIONS, 1914

Whereas by Article 7 of the Convention concluded between the Governments of Great Britain, China and Tibet on the third day of July, A.D. 1914, the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 were cancelled and the Tibetan Government engaged to negotiate with the British Government new Trade Regulations for Outer Tibet to give effect to Articles II, IV and V of the Convention of 1904.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

Sir A. H. McMahon, GCVO, KCIE, CSI;

His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet:

Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje;

And whereas Sir A. H. McMahon and Lonchen Ga-den Shatra Pal-jor Dorje have communicated to each other since their respective full powers and have found them to be in good and true form, the following Regulations have been agreed upon:

I. The area falling within a radius of three miles from the British Trade Agency site will be considered as the area of such Trade Mart.

It is agreed that British subjects may lease lands for the building of houses and godowns at the Marts. This arrangement shall not be held to prejudice the right of British subjects to rent houses and godowns outside the Marts for their own accommodation and the storage of their goods. British subjects desiring to lease building sites shall apply through the British Trade Agent to the Tibetan Trade Agent. In consultation with the British Trade Agent the Tibetan Trade Agent will assign such or other suitable building sites without unnecessary delay. They shall fix the terms of the leases in conformity with the existing laws and rates.

II. The administration of the Trade Marts shall remain with the Tibetan authorities, with the exception of the British Trade

Agency sites and compounds of the rest-houses which will be under the exclusive control of the British Trade Agents.

The Trade Agents at the Marts and Frontier Officers shall be of suitable rank, and shall hold personal intercourse and correspondence with one another on terms of mutual respect and friendly treatment.

III. In the event of disputes arising at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts between British subjects and subjects of other nationalities, they shall be enquired into and settled in personal conference between the British and Tibetan Trade Agents at the nearest Mart. Where there is a divergence of view the law of the country to which the defendant belongs shall guide.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, arising between British subjects, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the British Authorities.

British subjects, who may commit any crime at the Marts or on the routes to the Marts, shall be handed over by the Local Authorities to the British Trade Agent at the Mart nearest to the scene of offence, to be tried and punished according to the laws of India, but such British subjects shall not be subjected by the Local Authorities to any ill-usage in excess of necessary restraint.

Tibetan subjects, who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects, shall be arrested and punished by the Tibetan Authorities according to law.

Should it happen that a Tibetan subject or subjects bring a criminal complaint against a British subject or subjects before the British Trade Agent, the Tibetan Authorities shall have the right to send a representative or representatives of suitable rank to attend the trial in the British Trade Agent's Court. Similarly in cases in which a British subject or subjects have reason to complain against a Tibetan subject or subjects, the British Trade Agent shall have the right to send a representative or representatives to the Tibetan Trade Agent's Court to attend the trial.

IV. The Government of India shall retain the right to maintain the telegraph lines from the Indian frontier to the Marts. Tibetan messages will be duly received and transmitted by these lines. The Tibetan Authorities shall be responsible for the due protection of the telegraph lines from the Marts to the Indian frontier, and it is agreed that all persons damaging the lines or interfering with them in any way or with the officials engaged in the inspection or maintenance thereof shall at once be severely punished.

V. The British Trade Agents at the various Trade Marts now or hereafter to be established in Tibet may make arrangements for the carriage and transport of their posts to and from the frontier of India. The couriers employed in conveying these posts shall receive all possible assistance from the Local Authorities, whose districts they traverse, and shall be accorded the same protection and facilities as the persons employed in carrying the dispatches of the Tibetan Government.

No restrictions whatever shall be placed on the employment by British officers and traders of Tibetan subjects in any lawful capacity. The persons so employed shall not be exposed to any kind of molestation or suffer any loss of civil rights, to which they may be entitled as Tibetan subjects, but they shall not be exempted from lawful taxation. If they be guilty of any criminal act, they shall be dealt with by the Local Authorities according to Law without any attempt on the part of their employer to screen them.

VI. No rights of monopoly as regards commerce or industry shall be granted to any official or private company, institution, or individual in Tibet. It is, of course, understood that companies and individuals, who have already received such monopolies from the Tibetan Government previous to the conclusion of this agreement, shall retain their rights and privileges until the expiry of the period fixed.

VII. British subjects shall be at liberty to deal in kind or in money, to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to hire transport of any kind, and to conduct in general their business transactions in conformity with local usage and without any vexations, restrictions or oppressive exactions whatever. The Tibetan Authorities will not hinder the British Trade Agents or other British subjects from holding personal intercourse or correspondence with the inhabitants of the country.

It being the duty of the Police and the Local Authorities to afford efficient protection at all times to the persons and property of the British subjects at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts, Tibet engages to arrange effective Police measures at the Marts and along the routes to the Marts.

VIII. Import and export in the following articles:

arms, ammunition, military stores, liquors and intoxicating or narcotic drugs

may at the option of either Government be entirely prohibited, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may think fit to impose.

IX. The present Regulations shall be in force for a period of ten years reckoned from the date of signature by the two Plenipotentiaries; but, if no demand for revision be made on either side within six months after the end of the first ten years, the Regulations shall remain in force for another ten years from the end of the first ten years; and so it shall be at the end of each successive ten years.

X. The English and Tibetan texts of the present Regulations have been carefully compared, but in the event of there being any difference of meaning between them the English text shall be authoritative.

XI. The present Regulations shall come into force from the date of signature.

Done at Simla this third day of July, A.D. one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the Tibetan date, the tenth day of the fifth month of the Wood-Tiger Year.

Seal of the
Dalai Lama

Signature of the
LONCHEN SHATRA

A. HENRY MCMAHON
British Plenipotentiary

Seal of the
Lonchen Shatra

Seal of the
British Plenipotentiary

Seal of the
Dre-pung Monastery

Seal of the
Se-ra Monastery

Seal of the
Ga-den Monastery

Seal of the
National Assembly

INDIA-TIBET FRONTIER, 1914

Exchange of notes
between the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries

To

LONCHEN SHATRA
Tibetan Plenipotentiary

In February last you accepted the India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map* (two sheets), of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the confirmation of your Government and the following conditions:

- (a) The Tibetan ownership in private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.
- (b) If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day's march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.

I understand that your Government have now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions. I shall be glad to learn definitely from you that this is the case.

You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsona Jong and in Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr. Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished to him the further information, which you have promised.

The final settlement of this India-Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of future dispute and thus cannot fail to be of great advantage to both Governments.

A. H. McMAHON
British Plenipotentiary

Delhi
24th March 1914

* Not published

[Translation]

To

SIR HENRY MCMAHON

British Plenipotentiary to the China-Tibet Conference

As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map* which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps* signed by you subject to the conditions, mentioned in your letter, dated the 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps*. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.

Sent on the 29th day of the 1st month of the Wood-Tiger Year (25th March 1914) by Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary

Seal of the
Lonchen Shatra

* Not published

Part Three

CHINA MARCHES INTO TIBET

On the afternoon of October 25, 1950, the Chinese People's Government issued a brief communique in Peking. It said: "People's army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet to free three million Tibetans from the imperialist oppression and to consolidate national defences on the western borders of China."

The marching order was, in fact, issued by the South-West China Bureau of the Communist Party and the Second Field Army Headquarters. In a "political mobilisation directive" it was also stated that "every effort must be made to enhance the economic and cultural development of Tibet as soon as hostilities came to an end".

The Peking announcement made no mention of the negotiations which were in progress between the Tibetan Government and China through the good offices of India.

On October 27, 1950, a Government press note issued in New Delhi said, "The Government of India have read with considerable concern the report that the Chinese Government have ordered units of the Chinese army to advance into Tibet. They have asked their Ambassador in Peking to convey to the Chinese Government their surprise and regret at this development. They have also communicated their views to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi."

The Hindu of Madras reported on October 28 that official circles in New Delhi, including the Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, were "extremely perplexed and disappointed at the Chinese Government's action without a word of explanation in advance".

On the same day, news of the Chinese advance into Tibet was confirmed in Lhasa. A request was received in New Delhi from the Tibetan Government for India's help. The Government of India, it was reported, was asked to bring the matter to the notice of the Security Council.

On October 29, the Indian Prime Minister gave an interview in Srinagar to *Reuter's* diplomatic correspondent. He was reported to have said "it was not clear what the Chinese Government's real intentions were. There were certain disputed areas in Eastern Tibet where China had been given the right to station

garrisons under the terms of former agreements. Pandit Nehru stressed that the apprehension in Peking that the United States was bent upon destruction of the new regime in China was rightly, or wrongly, very real. This fear, based on continued American support to Chiang Kai-shek, was aggravated by General MacArthur's Formosa statement and became acute when the United Nations forces under General MacArthur crossed the 38th parallel." Nehru considered these fears to be unjustified.

The Indian Prime Minister suggested that the current Chinese policy "was perhaps partly attributable to the fact that although Peking's policy might not be directed by Moscow, much of the information upon which this policy was based came through Soviet sources. For example, Moscow had repeatedly said that Anglo-US 'intrigues' in Tibet aimed at bringing that country into an Anti-Communist Bloc or sphere of influence. However unfounded these accusations might be, Pandit Nehru wondered whether they might not have influenced the Chinese decision to move into Tibet." Asked whether the Government of India were trying to "allay these fears", Pandit Nehru replied, "Yes, we have tried to do so, but I don't know with what success" (*The Hindu*, October 30, 1950).

On November 6, Mr. Ernest Davies, Foreign Under-Secretary to the British Government, said in a statement in the House of Commons that Great Britain deplored the "resort to force" by the Chinese Government in Tibet and "fully supported the stand taken by the Government of India."

Speaking in New Delhi on November 9, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs, said in a reference to Tibet that "to use the sword against the traditionally peace-loving Tibetan people was unjustified. No other country in the world is as peace-loving as Tibet. The Chinese Government did not follow India's advice to settle the Tibetan issue peacefully. They marched their armies into Tibet and explained this action by talking of foreign interests intriguing in Tibet against China. But this fear is unfounded."

On November 14, President Rajendra Prasad in an Address to the Indian Parliament said: "My Government have been consistently following a policy of friendship with our great neighbour country, China. It was a matter of deep regret to us, therefore, that the Chinese Government should have undertaken military operations in Tibet, when the way of peaceful negotiations was open to them. Tibet is not only a neighbour of India, but has had close cultural and other ties with us for ages past. India must, therefore, necessarily concern herself with what happens in Tibet and hope that the autonomy of this peaceful country will be preserved."

Several diplomatic notes were exchanged between the Governments of India and China.

On the night of November 10, Peking Radio announced that an agreement had been arrived at between China and Tibet and that "a cease-fire order had been given". Two days earlier, the news had come from Chinese sources that Chinese troops had entered Lhasa and that "hostilities have now ceased". It was also stated that the Tibetan National Assembly, the Kashag, had after a weeklong continuous session, "accepted the Chinese proposals".

On November 15, however, an official spokesman in New Delhi made the following statement: "Information received from the Indian Mission in Lhasa

today is that the report about an agreement between China and Tibet is entirely false. The report further says that the Chinese advance on Lhasa has slowed down"

This period in Tibet's history ended with the agreement signed in Peking on May 23, 1951, between a Tibetan delegation and the Chinese People's Government. In between, Tibet had sent a complaint to the United Nations which came for a brief hearing at the Political Committee of the General Assembly (see Part Four).

It should be noted that 1950 was a convulsive year for Asia. It was the year of the Korean War, of Chinese involvement in Korea, of American involvement in Formosa. In Indo-China, the French were losing heavily. Negotiations had started for a peace treaty with Japan. In Egypt, the Government was demanding the withdrawal of the British from Suez. A popular revolution broke out in Nepal and the King, with his sympathy for the democratic forces, fled to India. The first-ever delegation from the Chinese People's Government arrived at Flushing Meadows, the UN Headquarters. The Government of India were considerably worried over the progress of the Kashmir issue in the Security Council. At home, the Communists were waging a violent campaign in the Telangana area of Hyderabad State.

It was in this complex context of internal and external problems that the Tibetan crisis broke out.

The Government of India, therefore, was considerably relieved when the Tibetan problem was settled mutually between Tibet and China.

Till 1953, India's diplomacy was vigorously employed to secure a cease-fire and a political settlement in Korea. After the cease-fire was achieved, it was possible to take up the larger question of Sino-Indian relations and to place them on a wider perspective. Negotiations to define these relations began privately through diplomatic channels in 1953. The Chinese Government was now convinced of the value of India's friendship; or so was it thought in New Delhi. Since Tibet was the only issue between the two great neighbours, it was sought to rationalise the Tibetan question within the framework of a treaty between India and China. There is reason to believe that in 1953-54 there was a desire in both New Delhi and Peking that the two countries should jointly work out certain fundamental principles which would guide relations not only between them, but also between the countries of Asia and the world.

The result was the Preamble to the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet signed on April 29, 1954. The Preamble embodied the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, later termed Panch Sheel.



NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

I. Memorandum Received by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
from the Indian Ambassador on 21 October 1950

The Central People's Government are fully aware of the views of the Government of India on the adjustment of Sino-Tibetan relations. It is, therefore, not necessary to repeat that their interest is solely in a peaceful settlement of the issue. My Government are also aware that the Central People's Government have been following a policy of negotiations with the Tibetan authorities. It has, however, been reported that some military action has taken place or is about to take place, which may affect the peaceful outcome of these negotiations.

The Government of India would desire to point out that a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs. The Central People's Government must be aware that opinion in the United Nations has been steadily veering round the admission of China into that organisation before the close of the present session. The Government of India feel that military action on the eve of a decision by the Assembly will have serious consequences and will give powerful support to those who are opposed to the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations and the Security Council.

At the present time when the international situation is so delicate, any move that is likely to be interpreted as a disturbance of peace may prejudice the position of China in the eyes of the world. The Government of India's firm conviction is that one of the principal conditions for the restoration of a peaceful atmosphere is the recognition of the position of the People's Republic of China, and its association with the work of the United Nations. They feel that an incautious move at the present time even in a matter which is within its own sphere will be used by those who are unfriendly to China to prejudice China's case in the United Nations and generally before neutral opinion. The Government of India attach the highest importance to the earliest settlement of the

problem of Chinese representation in international organisations and have been doing everything in their power to bring it to a successful conclusion. They are convinced that the position of China will be weakened if through military action in Tibet those who are opposed to China's admission are now given a chance to misrepresent China's peaceful aims.

The Government of India feel that the time factor is extremely important. In Tibet there is not likely to be any serious military opposition and any delay in settling the matter will not therefore affect Chinese interests, or a suitable final solution. The Government of India's interest in this matter is, as we have explained before, only to see that the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations is not again postponed due to the causes which could be avoided, and further that, if possible, a peaceful solution is followed while military action may cause unrest and disturbance on her own borders.

2. Note from the Government of India to the Foreign Minister of China, 26 October 1950

We have seen with great regret the report in the newspapers of an official statement made in Peking to the effect that "the People's Army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet". We have received no intimation of this from our Ambassador in Peking. We have been repeatedly assured of the desire of the Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations. In an interview which India's Ambassador had recently with Vice-Foreign Minister, the latter, while reiterating the resolve of the Chinese Government to "liberate" Tibet, had expressed a continued desire to do so by peaceful means. We informed the Chinese Government through our Ambassador the decision of the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking immediately to start negotiations. This delegation actually left Delhi yesterday. In view of these facts, the decision to order the advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most surprising and regrettable.

We realise there has been a delay in the Tibetan delegation proceeding to Peking. This delay was caused in the first instance by the inability to obtain visas for Hong Kong for which the delegation was in no way responsible. Subsequently the delegation came

back to Delhi because of the wish of the Chinese Government that preliminary negotiations should first be conducted in Delhi with the Chinese Ambassador. Owing to the lack of knowledge on the part of the Tibetan delegation of dealing with other countries and the necessity of obtaining instructions from their government who in turn had to consult their assemblies, certain further delay took place. The Indian Government do not believe that any foreign influences hostile to China have been responsible for the delay in the delegation's departure.

Now that the invasion of Tibet has been ordered by the Chinese Government, peaceful negotiations can hardly be synchronised with it and there will naturally be fear on the part of the Tibetans that negotiations will be under duress. In the present context of world events, the invasion of Chinese troops in Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgment of the Indian Government, not in the interest of China or of peace. The Indian Government can only express their deep regret that in spite of friendly and disinterested advice repeatedly tendered by them, the Chinese Government should have decided to seek a solution to the problem of their relations with Tibet by force instead of by the slower and more enduring method of peaceful approach.

3. Reply of the People's Republic of China to the Memorandum and Note of the Government of India

On October 21, 1951, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China received from H. E. Ambassador Panikkar an *aide memoire* of the Government of India on the question of Tibet. On October 28, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chou En-lai further received a communication from the Government of India as conveyed by H. E. Ambassador Panikkar.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China would like to make it clear: Tibet is an integral part of the Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Central People's Government. The Central People's Government has repeatedly expressed

the hope that the problem of Tibet may be solved by peaceful negotiations, and it welcomes, therefore, the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peaceful negotiations. Yet the Tibetan delegation, under outside instigation, has intentionally delayed the date of its departure for Peking. The Central People's Government, however, has not abandoned its desire to proceed with peaceful negotiations. But regardless whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peaceful negotiations, and whatever results may be achieved by negotiations, the problem of Tibet is a domestic problem of the People's Republic of China and no foreign interference shall be tolerated.

In particular, the problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems. If those countries hostile to China attempt to utilise as an excuse the fact that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is exercising its sovereign rights in its territory Tibet, and threaten to obstruct the participation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations Organisation, it is then but another demonstration of the unfriendly and hostile attitude of such countries toward China.

Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence express its deep regret.

4. Note from the Government of India to the Foreign Minister of China, 31 October 1950

India's Ambassador in Peking has transmitted to the Indian Government a note handed to him by the Vice-Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China on October 30, 1950. The Indian Government have read with amazement the statement in the last paragraph of the Chinese Government's reply that the Indian Government's representation to them was affected by foreign influence hostile to China and categorically repudiate it. At no time has any foreign influence been brought to bear upon India in regard to Tibet. In this, as in other matters, the Indian Govern-

ment's policy has been entirely independent and directed solely towards a peaceful settlement of international disputes and avoidance of anything calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.

The Government of China are equally mistaken in thinking that the Tibetan delegation's departure to Peking was delayed by outside instigation. In their previous communications, the Indian Government have at some length explained the reasons why the Tibetan delegation could not proceed to Peking earlier. They are convinced that there has been no possibility of foreign instigation.

It is with no desire to interfere or to gain any advantage that the Indian Government have sought earnestly that a settlement of the Tibetan problem should be effected by peaceful negotiations adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. [The Chinese source, in publishing this document, consistently used the word "sovereignty" where the Indian original had "suzerainty"—Editor] Tibetan autonomy is a fact which, judging from reports that they have received from the Indian Ambassador in China and also from other sources, the Chinese Government were themselves willing to recognise and foster. The Indian Government's repeated suggestions that the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and Tibetan autonomy should be reconciled by peaceful negotiation was not, as the Chinese Government seem to suggest, unwarranted interference in China's internal affairs, but well-meant advice by a friendly government which has a natural interest in the solution of problems concerning its neighbours by peaceful methods.

Wedded as they are to ways of peace, the Indian Government have been gratified to learn that the Chinese Government were also desirous to effect the settlement in Tibet through peaceful negotiations. Because of this, the Indian Government advised the Tibetan Government to send their delegation to Peking and were glad this advice was accepted. In an interchange of communications which had been taking place between the Government of India and the Government of China, the former had received repeated assurances that a peaceful settlement was aimed at. In the circumstances, the surprise of the Government of India was all the greater when they learned that military operations had been undertaken by the Chinese Government against a peaceful people. There has been no allegation that there has been any provocation or any

resort to non-peaceful methods on the part of the Tibetans. Hence there is no justification whatever for such military operations against them. Such a step involving an attempt to impose a decision by force could not possibly be reconciled with a peaceful settlement. In view of these developments, the Indian Government are no longer in a position to advise the Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking unless the Chinese Government think it fit to order their troops to halt their advance into Tibet and thus give a chance for peaceful negotiations.

Every step that the Indian Government have taken in recent months has been to check the drift to war all over the world. In so doing, they have often been misunderstood and criticised. But they have adhered to their policy regardless of the displeasure of great nations. They cannot help thinking that military operations by the Chinese Government against Tibet have greatly added to the tensions of the world and to the drift towards a general war which they are sure the Government of China also wish to avoid.

The Indian Government have repeatedly made it clear that they have no political or territorial ambitions in Tibet and they do not seek any novel privileged position for themselves or for their nationals in Tibet. At the same time, they have pointed out, certain rights have grown out of usage and agreements which are natural among neighbours with close cultural and commercial relations. These relations have found expression in the presence of an agent of the Indian Government in Lhasa, existence of trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung and maintenance of post and telegraph offices at a trade route up to Gyantse. For the protection of this trade route, a small military escort has been sanctioned at Gyantse for over 40 years. The Indian Government are anxious that these establishments, which are to the mutual interest of India and Tibet and do not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, should continue. Personnel at Lhasa mission and agencies at Gyantse and Yatung have accordingly been instructed to stay at their posts.

It has been a basic policy of the Government of India to work for friendly relations between India and China, both countries recognising each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual interests. Recent developments in Tibet have affected these friendly relations and the interest of peace all over the world; this the Government of India deeply regret. In conclusion, the Indian Government can only express their earnest hope that the Chinese

Government will still prefer a method of peaceful negotiations and settlement to the solution under duress and by force.

5. Reaffirmation of Position by the People's Republic of China, 16 November 1950

On November 1, 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China received from H. E. Ambassador Panikkar a communication from the Government of the Republic of India on the problem of Tibet.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, in its past communications with the Government of the Republic of India on the problem of Tibet, has repeatedly made it clear that Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory. The problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the firm policy of the Chinese Government. According to the provisions of the Common Programme adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the regional autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to the national minorities inside the country is an autonomy within the confines of Chinese sovereignty. This point has been recognised by the Indian Government in its *aide memoire* to the Chinese Government dated August 26, 1950. However, when the Chinese Government actually exercised its sovereign rights, and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that the Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realise regional autonomy and religious freedom, the Indian Government attempted to influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government. This cannot but make the Chinese Government greatly surprised.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China sincerely hopes that the Chinese People's Liberation Army may enter Tibet peacefully to perform the sacred task of liberating the Tibetan people and defending the frontiers of China. It has, therefore, long since welcomed the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet, which has remained in India, to come to Peking at an early date to proceed with peace negotiations. Yet the said

delegation, obviously as a result of continued outside obstruction, has delayed its departure for Peking. Further, taking advantage of the delay of the negotiations, the local authorities of Tibet have deployed strong armed forces at Changtu in Sikang Province in the interior of China, in an attempt to prevent the Chinese People's Liberation Army from liberating Tibet. On August 31, 1950, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Indian Government through Ambassador Panikkar that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was going to take action soon in West Sikang according to set plans, and expressed the hope that the Indian Government would assist the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet so that it might arrive in Peking in mid-September to begin peace negotiations. In early and mid-September the Chinese Charge d'Affaires, Shen Chien, and later Ambassador Yuan Chung-hsien both in person told the said delegation that it was imperative that it should hasten to Peking within September, or that the said delegation should bear the responsibilities and be held responsible for all the consequences resulting from the delay. In mid-October, Chinese Ambassador Yuan again informed the Indian Government of this. Yet still owing to outside instigation, the delegation of the local authorities of Tibet fabricated various pretexts and remained in India. Although the Chinese Government has not given up its desire of settling the problem of Tibet peacefully it can no longer continue to put off the set plan of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to proceed to Tibet. And the liberation of Changtu further proved that through the instrument of Tibetan troops, foreign forces and influences were obstructing the peaceful settlement of the problem of Tibet. But regardless of whether the local authorities of Tibet wish to proceed with peace negotiations, no foreign intervention will be permitted. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the liberation of the Tibetan people are also decided.

In showing its friendship with the Government of the Republic of India, and in an understanding of the desire of the Indian Government to see the problem of Tibet settled peacefully, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has kept the Indian Government informed of its efforts in this direction. What the Chinese Government cannot but deeply regret is that the Indian Government, in disregard of the facts, has regarded a domestic problem of the Chinese Government—the exercise of

its sovereign rights in Tibet—as an international dispute calculated to increase the present deplorable tensions in the world.

The Government of the Republic of India has repeatedly expressed its desire of developing Sino-Indian friendship on the basis of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and of preventing the world from going to war. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is exactly aimed at the protection of the integrity of the territory and of the sovereignty of China. And it is on this question that all those countries who desire to respect the territory and the sovereignty of China should first of all indicate their real attitude toward China. In the meantime, we consider that what is now threatening the independence of nations and world peace is precisely the forces of those imperialist aggressors. For the sake of maintenance of national independence and defence of world peace, it is necessary to resist the forces of these imperialist aggressors. The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is thus an important measure to maintain Chinese independence, to prevent the imperialist aggressors from dragging the world toward war, and to defend world peace.

The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes the renewed declaration of the Indian Government that it has no political or territorial ambitions in China's Tibet and that it does not seek any new privileged position. As long as our two sides adhere strictly to the principle of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, we are convinced that the friendship between China and India should be developed in a normal way, and that the problems relating to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our mutual benefit through normal diplomatic channels.

THE AGREEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF TIBET
ON MEASURES FOR THE
PEACEFUL LIBERATION OF TIBET, 1951

Official Text of the Agreement signed in Peking on 23 May 1951,
in the former Imperial Palace

PREAMBLE

The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has performed its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of our great Motherland. But over the last one hundred years or more, imperialist forces penetrated into China, and in consequence also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary governments, the Kuomintang reactionary government continued to carry out a policy of oppressing and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. And the local government of Tibet did not oppose the imperialist deceptions and provocations, and adopted an unpatriotic attitude toward our great Motherland. Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering.

In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nationwide scale in the Chinese People's War of Liberation, the common domestic enemy of all nationalities—the Kuomintang reactionary government—was overthrown, and the common foreign enemy of all the nationalities—the aggressive imperialist forces—was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the People's Republic of China and of the Central People's Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's Government declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal, and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People's Republic of China will become a big fraternal and cooperative family, composed of all its nationalities, that within the big family of all nationalities of the People's Republic of China, national regional autonomy shall

be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated, and all national minorities shall have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, and religious beliefs, while the Central People's Government shall assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country, with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the direct leadership of higher levels of People's Government, all national minorities are fully enjoying the right of national equality and have established, or are establishing, national regional autonomy.

In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet might be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the People's Republic of China to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all the other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational work, the Central People's Government, when it ordered the People's Liberation Army to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

In the latter part of April 1951, the delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The Central People's Government appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with the delegates with full powers of the local government of Tibet. As a result of these talks, both parties agreed to conclude this agreement and guarantee that it will be carried into effect.

1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland—the People's Republic of China.

2. The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defence.

3. In accordance with the policy toward nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of

exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.

4. The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

5. The established status, functions, and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained.

6. By the established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni are meant the status, functions and powers of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and of the Ninth Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference shall be carried out. The religious beliefs, customs, and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will not effect a change in the income of the monasteries.

8. Tibetan troops shall be reorganised by stages into the People's Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defence forces of the People's Republic of China.

9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry, and commerce shall be developed step by step, and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they shall be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying

and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people.

14. The Central People's Government shall conduct the centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government, shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work.

Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts, and leading monasteries; the name list shall be drawn up after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central People's Government and the various quarters concerned, and shall be submitted to the Central People's Government for appointment.

16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters, and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall be provided by the Central People's Government. The local government of Tibet will assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchase and transport of food, fodder, and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by:

Delegates with full powers of the Central People's Government:

Chief delegate: LI WEI-HAN

Tibetan chief delegate:

KALOON NGABOU NGAWANG JIGME

Peking, May 23, 1951

SINO-INDIAN AGREEMENT ON TIBET SIGNED ON 29 APRIL 1954

PREAMBLE

Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India.

The Government of the Republic of India and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India, have resolved to enter into the present agreement based on the following principles:

- (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- (2) Mutual non-aggression;
- (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- (4) Equality and mutual benefit; and
- (5) Peaceful co-existence.

ARTICLE I

The high contracting parties mutually agree to establish trade agencies:

1. The Government of India agree that the Government of China may establish trade agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong.
2. The Government of China agree that the Government of India may establish trade agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok.

The trade agencies of both parties shall be accorded the same status and same treatment. The trade agents of both parties shall enjoy freedom from arrest while exercising their functions and shall enjoy in respect of themselves, their wives and children who are dependent on them for livelihood, freedom from search.

The trade agencies of both parties shall enjoy the privileges and immunities for couriers, mail bags and communications in code.

ARTICLE 2

The high contracting parties agree that traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between the Tibet Region of China and India may trade at the following places:

1. The Government of China agree to specify (1) Yatung, (2) Gyantse, and (3) Phari as markets for trade. The Government of India agree that trade may be carried on in India, including places like (1) Kalimpong, (2) Siliguri, and (3) Calcutta, according to customary practice.
2. The Government of China agree to specify (1) Gartok, (2) Pulanchung (Taklakot), (3) Gyanimakargo, (4) Gyantmachakra, (5) Ramura, (6) Dongbra, (7) Pulingsumdo, (8) Nabra, (9) Shangtse and (10) Tashigong as markets for trade.

The Government of India agree that in future, when in accordance with the development and need of trade between the Ari district of the Tibet Region of China and India, it has become necessary to specify markets for trade in the corresponding district in India adjacent to the Ari district of the Tibet Region of China, they will be prepared to consider on the basis of equality and reciprocity to do so.

ARTICLE 3

The high contracting parties agree that pilgrimages by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on in accordance with the following provisions:

1. Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhist faiths may visit Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam Tso (Manasarovar) in the Tibet Region of China in accordance with custom.
2. Pilgrims from the Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya, and Sanchi in India in accordance with custom.
3. Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE 4

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following

passes and route: (1) Shipki La, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Dharma pass and (6) Lipu Laku pass. Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

ARTICLE 5

For travelling across the border, the high contracting parties agree that diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other party except as provided in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.

1. Traders of both countries known to be customarily and specifically engaged in trade between the Tibet Region of China and India, their wives and children, who are dependent on them for livelihood and their attendants will be allowed entry for purposes of trade into India or the Tibet Region of China, as the case may be, in accordance with custom on the production of certificates duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and examined by the border checkpoints of the other party.
2. Inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries, who cross borders to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives, may proceed to the border districts of the other party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified in Article 4 above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.
3. Porters and mule-team drivers of the two countries who cross the border to perform necessary transportation services need not hold passports issued by their own country, but shall only hold certificates good for a definite period of time (three months, half a year or one year) duly issued by the local government of their own country or by its duly authorised agents and produce them for registration at the border checkpoints of the other party.
4. Pilgrims of both countries need not carry documents of certification but shall register at the border checkpoints of the other party and receive a permit for pilgrimage.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs of this Article, either Government may refuse entry to any particular person.
6. Persons who enter the territory of the other party in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs of this Article may stay within its territory only after complying with the procedures specified by the other party.

ARTICLE 6

The present Agreement shall come into effect upon ratification by both Governments and shall remain in force for eight years. Extension of the present Agreement may be negotiated by the two parties if either party requests for it six months prior to the expiry of the Agreement and the request is agreed to by the other party.

Done in duplicate in Peking on the 29th of April, 1954, in the Chinese, Hindi and English languages, all texts being equally valid.

Plenipotentiary of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China—

CHANG HAN-FU

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of India—

NEDYAM RAGHAVAN

TEXT OF IDENTICAL NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS OF INDIA AND CHINA

Your Excellency

In the course of our discussions regarding the agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India, which has happily concluded today, the delegations of the Government of the Republic of India and of the Government of the People's Republic of China agreed that certain matters be regulated by an exchange of notes. In pursuance of this understanding, it is hereby agreed between the two Governments as follows:

1. The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely within six months from the date of exchange of the present notes the military escort now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in the Tibet Region of China. The Government of China will tender facilities and assistance in such withdrawal.

2. The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph, and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in the Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes.

3. The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the 12 rest houses of the Government of India in the Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present notes. The Government of China agree that they shall continue as rest houses.

4. The Government of China agree that all buildings within the compound walls of the trade agencies of the Government of India at Yatung and Gyantse in the Tibet Region of China may be retained by the Government of India. The Government of India may continue to lease the land within its agency compound walls from the Chinese side. And, the Government of India agrees that

the trade agencies of the Government of China at Kalimpong and Calcutta may lease lands from the Indian side for the use of the agencies and construct buildings thereon. The Government of China will render every possible assistance for housing the Indian trade agency at Gartok. The Government of India will also render every possible assistance for housing the Chinese trade agency at New Delhi.

5. The Government of India will be pleased to return to the Government of China all lands used or occupied by the Government of India other than the lands within its trade agency compound walls at Yatung. If there are godowns and buildings on the above-mentioned lands used or occupied and to be returned by the Government of India and if Indian traders have stores, godowns or buildings on the above-mentioned lands so that there is a need to continue leasing lands, the Government of China agree to sign contracts with the Government of India or Indian traders, as the case may be, for leasing to them those parts of the land occupied by the said godowns, buildings or stores pertaining thereto.

6. The trade agents of both parties may, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the local governments, have access to their nationals involved in civil or criminal cases.

7. The trade agents and traders of both countries may hire employees in the locality.

8. The hospitals of the Indian trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung will continue to serve personnel of the Indian trade agencies.

9. Each Government shall protect the person and property of the traders and pilgrims of the other country.

10. The Government of China agree, so far as possible, to construct rest houses for the use of pilgrims along the route from Pulanchung (Taklakot) to Kang Rimpoche (Kailas) and Mavam-Tso (Manasarovar); and the Government of India agree to place all possible facilities in India at the disposal of pilgrims.

11. Traders and pilgrims of both countries shall have the facility of hiring means of transportation at normal and reasonable rates.

12. The three trade agencies of each party may function throughout the year.

13. Traders of each country may rent buildings and godowns in accordance with local regulations in places under the jurisdiction of the other party.

14. Traders of both countries may carry on normal trade in

accordance with local regulations at places as provided in Article 2 of the Agreement.

15. Disputes between traders of both countries over debts and claims shall be handled in accordance with local laws and regulations.

On behalf of (my Government) I hereby agree that the present note along with Your Excellency's reply shall become an agreement between our two Governments which shall come into force upon the exchange of the present notes.

Part Four

TIBET AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Tibet Government's complaint to the United Nations against the Chinese military action was dated November 11, 1950.

It had earlier been reported in the Indian press that the Tibetan Government had approached the Government of India, immediately after it received news of the Chinese march, to raise the matter in the Security Council and that the Government of India advised the Tibetan Government to approach the United Nations directly.

The Tibetan cable which was addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations was circulated to the Members of the Security Council as an unofficial note.

On November 15, *The Hindu* published the following dispatch from its United Nations correspondent: "Even though Tibet's appeal to the United Nations to intercede on its behalf to restrain Chinese aggression has been received here, it is extremely unlikely that the Security Council is going to do anything about it. Tibet's telegram has not been tabled as an official document, but has been distributed by the Secretary-General as an unofficial note. Almost all Security Council Members feel it is an entirely domestic issue and the Council has no jurisdiction to interfere.

"Mr. Kenneth Younger, the British delegate, said while they viewed the developments with grave concern, there was nothing they could do about it because China's suzerainty was recognised. Council members do not seem inclined to take seriously Tibet's contention that China had forfeited even her nominal suzerainty because of her non-signature of the 1914 Treaty The American press has been giving even more importance to the developments in Tibet than the Indian press, but its interest seems to centre on what effect these developments are going to have on relations between Red China and India"

The first official indication of India's attitude towards the Tibetan complaint came from Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Railway Minister and a Member of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of the Indian Cabinet. Speaking at the *Indian News Chronicle* Forum Foreign Policy debate in New Delhi, on which

he presided, Mr. Ayyangar said that Tibet had first approached India for sponsoring the case but India had told her that she could not do so but if Tibet so wished she could directly appeal to the United Nations. Mr. Ayyangar added, "According to our present judgement on the question and its merits, we are prepared to support Tibet's case to the extent that China should have solved this question by peaceful means and it was wrong of her to have marched her armies into Tibet for the purpose of settling the question."

On November 17, the delegate of El Salvador formally raised the Tibetan complaint in a letter to the Secretary-General.

On November 20, *The Hindu* published the following report from its United Nations correspondent: "Indian delegation here is cabling to New Delhi for instructions on the attitude it should adopt towards the demand of El Salvador that the Tibetan question be placed in the UN Assembly agenda.

"An El Salvadorian resolution asks the Assembly to condemn Communist China's aggression in Tibet and calls for the appointment of a committee to study what measures the UN could take. The Indian delegation was previously instructed to support the Tibetan case if it was brought before the Security Council. The new El Salvadorian move, however, was not covered by the instructions and would require a new directive from the Government."

On the basis of an El Salvadorian resolution, and the Tibetan cable, Tibet's case against China came for hearing before the Steering Committee of the General Assembly on November 24.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OFFICIAL RECORDS, AGENDA ITEM 8, ANNEXES,
FIFTH SESSION, NEW YORK, 1950

Document A/1534

*Request for the inclusion of an additional item of the fifth session:
letter dated 17 November 1950 from the chairman of the delegation
of El Salvador addressed to the President of the General
Assembly*

[Original Text: English]

New York, 17 November 1950

On 14 November, I sent you a telegram from Washington, D.C.,
reading as follows:

Acting under instructions received from my Government, I have the honour
to request that the following item be added to the agenda of the General As-
sembly for its present session: "Invasion of Tibet by foreign forces". I hope to
have an early opportunity at the next plenary meeting of the General Assembly
to press for a decision on this important matter.

(Signed) HECTOR DAVID CASTRO,
Chairman of the delegation of
El Salvador

On the same date I sent you a letter of confirmation of the text
of the telegram by special delivery.

Due to the urgency of the case, it was my hope that the General
Assembly could act on this matter without referring it to the General
Committee. However, if this procedure cannot be dispensed with
in this case, I shall be most willing to accept this fact and to see
that the matter is referred to the General Committee for action.
I shall be ready to appear before the Committee in order to explain
the purposes of my Government in presenting the case for the con-
sideration of the General Assembly.

I enclose herewith a supporting memorandum of facts and a set
of copies of the proposed draft resolution.

I request that this letter and enclosures should be circulated
as an official document.

I shall be most grateful for your co-operation in handling this matter in the most appropriate manner.

(Signed) HECTOR DAVID CASTRO,
Chairman of the delegation of
El Salvador

SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM

The press of the whole world has published the fact that the peaceful nation of Tibet has been invaded, without any provocation on its part, by foreign forces proceeding from the territory controlled by the Government established at Peiping.

The fact that such forces were going to be sent into the territory of Tibet was publicly announced at Peiping. The news was also given out that some plenipotentiaries from Tibet were being sent to Peiping in order to negotiate with the Government there for the purpose of settling the differences and avoiding an open conflict. In spite of this peaceful gesture, the forces were sent and have penetrated into the territory of the State of Tibet. The Government of Tibet has appealed to the United Nations to use its good offices in order to obtain a peaceful solution of the already existing conflict. This appeal cannot be ignored, unless the General Assembly of the United Nations is ready to ignore its primary responsibility "to maintain international peace and security" to which paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Charter refers. It is true that Tibet is not a Member of the United Nations, but it is also a clear fact that the responsibilities of this Organisation are not limited to the maintenance of international peace among the Member States but, on the contrary, that they are extended to the whole world.

The Government of El Salvador, in giving instructions to its delegation to request the General Assembly to include in the agenda for its present session the case of Tibet, has stated that it would be fatal to the credit of the United Nations before the eyes of the world if a case of international aggression, such as has taken place in the small country of Tibet, which has an autonomous government, were to be ignored by our Organisation.

It has been published in the press that in some quarters, unknown to me, there are some doubts concerning the independence of Tibet. It has even been suggested that Tibet is a province of China. However, anyone who takes the trouble to look at a map of Asia will

realise that Tibet is separate and entirely different from the territory of China. Tibet was a protectorate of China, but at least since 1912 it has enjoyed complete independence. It has an autonomous government which is chosen by the people. This government has not permitted interference of the Chinese Government in its internal affairs. The Chinese Government has been respectful and has not interfered in the political life of Tibet. In this manner, the independence of Tibet has been reaffirmed. It is only at the present time that the government established at Peiping wants to bring into subjection the free people of Tibet. Tibet cannot offer great resistance to the invading forces. It has resorted to the international organisation which has been established to "maintain international peace and security" only in order to obtain some assistance that might be of help to that nation to preserve its freedom. Such an appeal cannot be ignored. The delegation of El Salvador has requested that the case of Tibet should be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. In due time, this delegation will move that a special committee should be appointed by the Assembly to study the case with special reference to the plea of the Government of Tibet, and to suggest any appropriate measures that could be taken by the Assembly.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The General Assembly

Taking note that the peaceful nation of Tibet has been invaded, without any provocation on its part, by foreign forces proceeding from the territory controlled by the government established at Peiping

Decides

1. To condemn this act of unprovoked aggression against Tibet;
2. To establish a committee composed of . . . (names of nations) . . . which will be entrusted with the study of the appropriate measures that could be taken by the General Assembly on this matter;
3. To instruct the committee to undertake that study with special reference to the appeal made to the United Nations by the Government of Tibet, and to render its report to the General

Assembly, as early as possible, during the present session.

Document A/1549

Request by the delegation of El Salvador for the inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the fifth session: note by the Secretary-General

[Original Text : English]

24 November 1950

At the request of the delegation of El Salvador, the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the General Assembly the text of a cablegram dated 11 November 1950 received from the Tibetan delegation Shakabpa (House Kalimpong).

TIBET'S COMPLAINT TO THE UN

Kalimpong, 11 November 1950

The attention of the world is riveted on Korea where aggression is being resisted by an international force. Similar happenings in remote Tibet are passing without notice. It is in the belief that aggression will not go unchecked and freedom unprotected in any part of the world that we have assumed the responsibility of reporting to the United Nations Organisation, through you, recent happenings in the border area of Tibet.

As you are aware, the problem of Tibet has taken alarming proportions in recent times. This problem is not of Tibet's own making but is largely the outcome of unthwarted Chinese ambition to bring weaker nations on its periphery under its active domination. Tibetans have for long lived a cloistered life in their mountain fastnesses, remote and aloof from the rest of the world, except in so far as His Holiness the Dalai Lama, as the acknowledged head of the Buddhist Church, confers benediction and receives homage from followers in many countries.

In the years preceding 1912, there were indeed close friendly relations of a personal nature between the Emperor of China and His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The connexion was essentially born of belief in a common faith and may correctly be described

as the relationship between a spiritual guide and his lay followers; it had no political implication. As a people devoted to the tenets of Buddhism, Tibetans had long eschewed the art of warfare, practised peace and tolerance, and for the defence of their country relied on its geographical configuration and on non-involvement in the affairs of other nations. There were times when Tibet sought but seldom received the protection of the Chinese Emperor. The Chinese, however, in their natural urge for expansion, have wholly misconstrued the significance of the ties of friendship and inter-independence that existed between China and Tibet as between neighbours. To them China was suzerain and Tibet a vassal State. It is this which first aroused legitimate apprehension in the mind of Tibet regarding China's designs on its independent status.

The conduct of the Chinese during their expedition of 1910 completed the rupture between the two countries. In 1911-1912 Tibet, under the thirteenth Dalai Lama, declared its complete independence—even as Nepal simultaneously broke away from allegiance to China—while the Chinese revolution of 1911, which dethroned the last Manchurian Emperor, snapped the last of the sentimental and religious bonds that Tibet had with China. Tibet thereafter depended entirely on its isolation, its faith in the wisdom of the Lord Buddha, and occasionally on the support of the British in India for its protection. No doubt in these circumstances the latter could also claim suzerainty over Tibet. Tibet, notwithstanding Anglo-Chinese influence from time to time, maintained its separate existence, in justification of which it may be pointed out that it has been able to keep peace and order within the country and remain at peace with the world. It continued to maintain neighbourly goodwill and friendship with the people of China but never acceded to the Chinese claim of suzerainty in 1914.

It was British persuasion which led Tibet to sign a treaty which superimposed on it the nominal (non-interfering) suzerainty of China and by which China was accorded the right to maintain a mission in Lhasa, though it was strictly forbidden to meddle in the internal affairs of Tibet. Apart from that fact, even the nominal suzerainty which Tibet conceded to China is not enforceable because of the non-signature of the treaty of 1914 by the Chinese. It will be seen that Tibet maintained independent relations with other neighbouring countries, such as India and Nepal. Furthermore, despite friendly British overtures, it did not compromise its position by

throwing in its forces in the Second World War on the side of China. Thus it asserted and maintained its complete independence. The treaty of 1914 still guides relations between Tibet and India, and China not being a party to it may be taken to have renounced the benefits that would have otherwise accrued to it from the treaty. Tibet's independence thereby reassumed *de jure* status.

The slender tie that Tibet maintained with China after the 1911 revolution became less justifiable when China underwent a further revolution and turned into a full-fledged Communist State. There can be no kinship or sympathy between such divergent creeds as those espoused by China and Tibet. Forseeing future complications the Tibetan Government broke off diplomatic relations with China and made a Chinese representative in Lhasa depart from Tibet in July 1949. Since then Tibet has not even maintained formal relations with the Chinese Government and people. It desires to live apart, uncontaminated by the germ of a highly materialistic creed. But China is bent on not allowing Tibet to live in peace. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese have hurled threat of liberating Tibet and have used devious methods to intimidate and undermine the Government of Tibet. Tibet recognises that it is in no position to resist. It is thus that it agreed to negotiate on friendly terms with the Chinese Government.

It is unfortunate that the Tibetan mission to China was unable to leave India through no fault of its own but for want of British visas which were required for transit through Hong Kong. At the kind intervention of the Government of India, the Chinese People's Republic condescended to allow the Tibetan mission to have preliminary negotiation with the Chinese Ambassador to India, who arrived in New Delhi only in September. While these negotiations were proceeding in Delhi, Chinese troops, without warning or provocation, crossed the Dre Chu river, which has for long been the boundary of Tibetan territory, at a number of places on 7 October 1950. In quick succession places of strategic importance such as Demar, Kamto, Tunga, Tshame, Rimohegotyu, Yakalo and Markham, fell to the Chinese. Tibetan frontier garrisons in Kham, which were maintained not with any aggressive design, but as a nominal protective measure, were all wiped out. Communist troops converged in great force from five directions on Chamdo, the capital of Skham, which fell soon after. Nothing is known of the fate of a Minister of the Tibetan Government posted there.

Little is known in the outside world of this sneak invasion. Long after the invasion had taken place, China announced to the world that it had asked its armies to march into Tibet. This unwarranted act of aggression has not only disturbed the peace of Tibet, but it is also in complete disregard of a solemn assurance given by China to the Government of India and it has created a grave situation in Tibet and may eventually deprive Tibet of its long cherished independence. We can assure you, Mr. Secretary-General, that Tibet will not go down without a fight, though there is little hope that a nation dedicated to peace will be able to resist the brutal effort of men trained to war, but we understand that the United Nations has decided to stop aggression wherever it takes place.

The armed invasion of Tibet for the incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through sheer physical force is a clear case of aggression. As long as the people of Tibet are compelled by force to become a part of China against their will and consent, the present invasion of Tibet will be the grossest instance of the violation of the weak by the strong. We therefore appeal through you to the nations of the world to intercede in our behalf and restrain Chinese aggression.

The problem is simple. The Chinese claim Tibet as a part of China. Tibetans feel that racially, culturally, and geographically, they are far apart from the Chinese. If the Chinese find the reactions of the Tibetans to their unnatural claim not acceptable, there are other civilised methods by which they could ascertain the views of the people of Tibet, or, should the issue be purely juridical, they are open to seek redress in an international court of law. The conquest of Tibet by China will only enlarge the area of conflict and increase the threat to the independence and stability of other Asian countries.

We Ministers, with the approval of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, entrust the problem of Tibet in this emergency to the ultimate decision of the United Nations, hoping that the conscience of the world will not allow the disruption of our State by methods reminiscent of the jungle.

Dated Lhasa, the 27th day of the ninth Tibetan month of the Iron Tiger Year (7 November 1950).

The Kashag (Cabinet) and National Assembly of Tibet

Tibetan Delegation Shakabpa (House Kalimpong)

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIFTH SESSION
OFFICIAL RECORDS

General Committee 73rd Meeting,
Friday, 24 November 1950 at 2-30 p.m.
Lake Success, New York
Chairman: Nasrollah Entezam (Iran)

Document A/1534 (Contd.)

Request for the inclusion of an additional item: Invasion of Tibet by foreign forces; item submitted by the delegation of El Salvador

2. The Chairman said that he would first ask the representative of El Salvador to give the Committee any explanations he felt necessary in connexion with his delegation's proposal. He would then ask the members of the General Committee whether they had received any instructions from their respective governments and whether they were prepared to discuss the El Salvador proposal forthwith.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Castro (El Salvador) took his place at the Committee table.

3. *Mr. Castro* (El Salvador) thanked the General Committee for having permitted him to submit his country's proposal. He would point out that members of the General Committee in taking a decision on it would represent not only their own governments but all of the Member States of the United Nations.

4. Two weeks ago the El Salvador delegation had asked the Secretary-General for a copy of the appeal forwarded to the United Nations by the Government of Tibet. The Secretary-General had agreed to that request, but so far had taken no further action in the matter. In pursuing the aims of the Charter, however, the United Nations should be careful not to isolate itself and lose all touch with Governments which were not Members of the Organisation. Every important communication sent to the United Nations by the Governments of non-Member States should be made known to all Member States. He regretted that the Secretary-General had not distributed to delegations the appeal from the Government of Tibet. He asked the President of the General Assembly to do everything possible to see that communications and documents

sent by non-Member States, like those sent by Member States, were distributed to Members of the United Nations when those Members were called upon to take an important decision.

5. The invasion of Tibet by Chinese armed forces had been announced by the press of the whole world. As the Government of Tibet had refused to comply with the orders of the Government of the so-called People's Republic of China, the latter had decided to send a military expedition to Tibet. It should be borne in mind that the Government of Tibet had always shown readiness to enter into peaceful negotiations with the so-called People's Government of China. A delegation from the Government of Tibet had been on the point of proceeding to Peking when the invasion occurred.

6. Little information was available; it was known that Tibet had been invaded by a foreign army but the extent of the territory won by that army was not known.

7. Before submitting its proposal to the General Committee, the Salvadorean delegation had had rather peculiar questions put to it. It had been asked whether its government was not in the present case, acting under the influence of another government. The Government of El Salvador had always exhibited the fullest independence and the delegation of El Salvador had always complied with its government's instructions. No other government therefore could have influenced the government or the delegation of El Salvador.

8. He then recalled the terms of the telegram and the letter sent on 14 November 1950 to the President of the General Assembly by the chairman of the delegation of El Salvador (A/1534).

9. The delegation of El Salvador had hoped that General Assembly could take a decision on that question without referring it to the General Committee. This was a case of international aggression which the General Assembly could not overlook. Under the terms of Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Charter, the United Nations must "maintain international peace and security". Tibet of course was not a Member of the Organisation, but the United Nations must maintain peace not only between Member States, but throughout the whole world.

10. The aggression committed against Tibet should be of particular concern to the great Powers. He recalled that a permanent member of the Security Council had accused the other permanent members of dealing with questions only in so far as their own

political interests were concerned. There was no basis for the accusation, but, if the General Assembly refused to consider the proposal of El Salvador, some weight might attach to that charge.

11. Mr. Dulles had stated, in regard to threats to the independence and territorial integrity of China, that if the General Assembly took no action in that matter, it would disappoint the whole world. It would be equally disappointing if the General Assembly disregarded an act of international aggression on the pretext that consideration of that question would complicate still further the present situation. It might also be asked whether there was any basis for such an agreement. Representatives of Member States frequently made strong statements before the General Assembly and charged certain other governments with pursuing a dangerous policy. Such statements showed the complete freedom of expression of delegations, but were more likely to complicate the international situation than was consideration of the aggression committed against Tibet.

12. Some claimed that Tibet was not autonomous at all and that it was a province of China, so that its invasion by a Chinese army would be an internal affair which came within the competence only of the Chinese Government. He wished to submit certain information to members of the General Committee to show that that argument was unfounded.

13. He then read an extract from *Chambers's Encyclopaedia* (Vol. XIII) where it was stated that the Central Government of Tibet consisted of the Dalai Lama acting through a minister appointed by the chief lamas. That minister presided over a Grand Council or Cabinet of four members. The country was divided into 170 administrative districts, each in the charge of a district magistrate who was responsible for the collection of taxes, the administration of civil affairs and the working of a civil and criminal code of laws based on Buddhist teachings. The central government's authority decreased in proportion as the distance from Lhasa increased. The revenue, used largely to finance monasteries, religious festivals and the army, was raised by taxes levied on the lower classes, and on exports. There were no banking facilities and taxes were frequently paid in kind; barter was common although there was a local currency and Indian coinage and paper money were used. The army, about 10,000 strong, was recruited by conscription, and was

stationed mainly on the eastern borders. Many senior officers had been trained in India.

14. The representative of El Salvador also quoted an excerpt from the *Encyclopadia Universal Illustrada* (Volume X, appendix), which stated that imports from India in 1927 had totalled 1,186,800 Haikwan taels, and imports from and exports to China 1,939,000 taels and 737,000 taels respectively. During the First World War the Government of Tibet had proposed to send 1,000 soldiers to fight alongside the United Kingdom, a nation with which Tibet had excellent relations since 1910.

15. According to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Volume 22), the Government of Tibet had sent representatives to an international conference in which representatives of China, India and the United Kingdom had also participated.

16. Finally, it appeared from information published in a recent article in the *New York Times* that Tibet possessed very important mineral resources. For all those reasons it was easy to understand why some of its neighbours were interested in the country.

17. He did not think the General Assembly could disregard the aggression against Tibet on the mere pretext that that country was isolated and had but few means of communication with the outside world. Tibet was in a particularly important strategic position; the high plateaus of Tibet dominated India. Those were facts which the General Assembly could not disregard.

18. The representatives of the Tibetan Government were coming to New York to lay a complaint before the General Assembly or the Secretary-General. The General Assembly could not dismiss their case unheard.

19. The Government of El Salvador had done its duty by drawing the attention of the General Committee to the aggression against Tibet. If the General Assembly disregarded that aggression, it would be neglecting its responsibilities.

20. Finally, Mr. Castro read the draft resolution submitted by his delegation (A/1534) and concluded by saying that the General Assembly should at the very least condemn the unprovoked act of aggression against Tibet.

21. The Chairman endorsed the interpretation given by the representative of El Salvador of the functions of members of the General Committee. He pointed out, however, that the opinions of the various governments they represented were one of the grounds

for decision available to the members of the Committee. He had acceded to the wish expressed by certain delegations at the Committee's last meeting with that thought in mind.

22. *Mr. Younger* (United Kingdom) did not think that he could participate at that time in a general discussion on the question of Tibet. That did not mean that the United Kingdom delegation was attempting either to shirk its own responsibility or to prevent the United Nations from assuming its full responsibilities. The question before the Committee was one of procedure. The point was to decide what was the best way of considering the question of Tibet. Consideration of the question was not an end in itself but rather a way of trying to settle the problem.

23. The Committee did not know exactly what was happening in Tibet, nor was the legal position of the country very clear. Moreover, it could still be hoped that the existing difficulties in Tibet could be settled amicably by agreement between the parties concerned. In those circumstances, before taking a decision the members of the General Committee would be wise to wait until a better idea could be formed of the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. He proposed therefore that the Committee should defer decision on the request made by the delegation of El Salvador.

24. *The Jam Saheb of Nawanagar* (India) said his government had given careful study to the problems raised by the proposal of El Salvador to place the question of the invasion of Tibet by foreign forces on the General Assembly agenda. That was a matter of vital interest to both China and India. The Committee was aware that India, as a neighbour of both China and Tibet, with both of which it had friendly relations, was the country most interested in a settlement of the problem. That was why the Indian Government was particularly anxious that it should be settled peacefully.

25. He had no desire to express an opinion on the difficulties which had arisen between China and Tibet, but would point out that, in the latest note received by his government, the Peking Government had declared that it had not abandoned its intention to settle those difficulties by peaceful means. It would seem that the Chinese forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo, a town some 480 kilometres from Lhasa. The Indian Government was certain that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means, and that such a settlement could safeguard the

autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China.

26. His delegation considered that the best way of attaining that objective was to abandon, for the time being, the idea of including that question in the agenda of the General Assembly. That was why he supported the United Kingdom representative's proposal that consideration of the request for inclusion should be adjourned.

27. *Sir Keith Officer* (Australia) agreed with the representatives of the United Kingdom and India. In view of the statement made by the Indian representative, he would unreservedly support the United Kingdom proposal that consideration of the request for inclusion submitted by El Salvador should be adjourned.

28. *Mr. J. Malik* (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed with the United Kingdom proposal. However, he wished to explain his delegation's view on the substance of the question. It was an extremely simple question: Tibet was an inalienable part of China and its affairs were the exclusive concern of the Chinese Government.

29. The representative of El Salvador had referred to newspaper articles and encyclopaedias, but he had not cited any international instrument in support of the argument that Tibet was an independent country which had been invaded by Chinese troops. Chinese sovereignty over Tibet had been recognised for a long time by the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR.

30. The question was therefore one which came essentially within the national jurisdiction of China; the United Nations could not consider it. If it did so it would be guilty of unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of the Chinese people, who had been liberated after centuries of foreign domination. That being so, his delegation would vote for adjournment of consideration of the request submitted by the representative of El Salvador and even for its outright rejection.

31. The *Chairman* stated that, if the General Committee decided to adjourn consideration of the question, it should then state whether the question was adjourned *sine die* or whether consideration was deferred until a subsequent date to be decided upon.

32. *Mr. Liu* (China) paid tribute to the motives which had led the representative of El Salvador to request the inclusion of the Tibetan question in the agenda of the General Assembly. He saw no objection to adjourning consideration of that request,

and would merely supply certain general information to give the members of the General Committee a better understanding of what was going on in Tibet.

33. During the debate in the First Committee (400th and 404th meetings) on item 23 of the General Assembly agenda, concerning threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, the representative of China had emphasised that the invasion of Tibet was one aspect of the Soviet Union's aggression against China.

34. Tibet had been part of China for 700 years and all Chinese, whatever their party or religion, regarded it as such. The development of the Chinese system had been independent of political development in the western world, and the two systems were not always comparable or even compatible. The fact had been brought out in the reports drawn up by the mission sent to China in 1793 and 1812 by the British Government to establish relations with the Chinese Government of that time. Sun Yat-sen had made great efforts to modernise the Chinese system. He had proclaimed the equality of the five branches of the Chinese people and had stated that if disputes arose between those branches, they should never be settled by force. During the last twenty-five years the Chinese Government had faithfully observed the precepts of Sun Yat-sen in its relations with Tibet. Indeed, relations between Tibet and China had never been more cordial than during that period; representatives of Tibet had taken part in drafting the new Chinese Constitution in 1946 and in electing the President and Vice-President of the Republic in 1947.

35. The dispatch of an army to Tibet by the satellite regime of Peking was an event which shocked the Chinese people as much as other peace-loving peoples throughout the world. There could be no justification for that invasion, which was prejudicial to the interests of China, since it would leave a heritage of hatred between the Tibetan branch and the other branches of Chinese family and harm the good relations between India and China. Chinese policy consisted in maintaining the best possible relations with India, and the measures taken by the Chinese Communists had already had deplorable repercussions in India. That was a threat to the peace in Asia.

36. The Chinese Communists explained their incursion into Tibet by saying that it was liberation; they asserted that the econo-

mic and social system of Tibet was feudal. Mr. Liu realised that that system differed radically from the systems in force in the other parts of China. But the Chinese Government had thought it better not to impose reforms on Tibet by force. Tibet was the holy country of Buddhism; although that religion like Christianity was divided into several sects, the brotherly feelings uniting those various sects were an important factor in the life of millions of Buddhists in China and southern Asia. The result of the Communist invasion would be to turn Tibet into an instrument in the policy of world Communism.

37. Tibet was of considerable strategic importance. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century rival empires had sought to secure a predominant position there. Since the First World War, Tibet had played little part in international disputes, but the action recently taken by the Chinese Communists again made the Tibetan question a pressing one. An attempt was being made to turn Tibet into a base for carrying out the imperialistic plans of the Communists. In Tibet, as in China as a whole, foreign conquest was being presented as revolution or movement of liberation. That was the real meaning of the Communist invasion of Tibet.

38. His delegation was convinced that the Tibetan question should be regarded as part of item 23 of the agenda of the fifth session of the General Assembly. That question had been referred to the Interim Committee, and consequently the same decision could be taken on the Tibetan question. In any event, it should not form separate item in the agenda of the General Assembly.

39. *Mr. J. Malik* (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that once again a bankrupt government was attempting to place responsibility for its bankruptcy on the USSR.

40. The *Chairman* stated that the question of substance raised by the USSR representative was not within the province of the General Committee. He had previously allowed the representatives of the USSR and China to touch on the substance of the matter submitted to the General Committee, but had done so only because he thought that information provided by them might assist the General Committee in taking its decision.

It was unanimously decided to adjourn consideration of the inclusion of the item proposed by El Salvador in the agenda of the General Assembly.

41. *Mr. Gross* (United States of America) said that he had voted for adjournment in view of the fact that the Government of India, whose territory bordered on Tibet and which was therefore an interested party, had told the General Committee that it hoped that the Tibetan question would be peacefully and honourably settled.

In accordance with its traditional policy, the United States would in any other circumstances have noted for the inclusion of the item in the General Assembly agenda. His government had always supported any proposal to refer to the United Nations international disputes or complaints of aggression, which could thus be aired, considered and settled at international hearings. That was the principle applied by the United States Government even in the case of accusations made against the United States and despite the illogical and fraudulent nature of those accusations.

42. However, in the present case, the United States delegation wanted to support the proposal made by the States most directly concerned in the subject-matter of the request submitted by the delegation of El Salvador.

43. *Mr. Perez* (Venezuela) explained that his vote in no way prejudiced the competence of the General Assembly to consider the question.

44. *Mr. Castro* (El Salvador) referred to his first speech and thought it well to repeat that when he had asked for a copy of the text of the Tibetan Government appeal he had received a favourable reply. The appeal had therefore been effectively made and had also been published in the press. Consequently, the document should be distributed to all members of the General Assembly.

45. *Mr. Crodier* (Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General) thought that the representative of El Salvador was probably referring to a communication distributed unofficially to the members of the Security Council on 11 November.

46. The *Chairman* stated that he would have enquiries made and would ask that all documents of that type received by the Secretariat should be distributed.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.

Part Five

TIBET IN INDIAN PARLIAMENT (1950 AND 1954)

Every phase of the Tibetan question since the Chinese moved their armies into Tibet in 1950 has been fully and vigorously debated in the Indian Parliament.

In Part Three, we have already quoted the Indian President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad's reference to Tibet in his Address to the Indian Parliament on November 14, 1950.

In this Part are included extracts from speeches by Prime Minister Nehru and various party leaders in the debates held in 1950 and 1954.

Tibet fared in the Indian Parliament for the first time in a Foreign Affairs debate on December 6, 1950 when the fighting in Tibet had practically ceased and there were talks of negotiations between the Tibet Government and China.

Prime Minister Nehru who initiated the debate spoke on Tibet and Nepal towards the end of a one-hour speech.



DEBATE IN INDIAN PARLIAMENT,
DECEMBER 1950

Mr. Nehru's Statement

I should like to say a few words about two other neighbouring countries—Tibet and Nepal. Some questions were asked earlier this morning in regard to the advance of the Chinese forces into Tibet. I could not give much information then; nor can I do so now. The story of Tibet, so far as we are concerned, is very simple. I am not going into past history. Ever since the People's Government of China talked about the liberation of Tibet, our Ambassador told them, on behalf of the Government of India, how the latter felt about it. We expressed our earnest hope that the matter would be settled peacefully by China and Tibet. We also made it clear that we had no territorial or political ambitions in regard to Tibet and that our relations were cultural and commercial. We said that we would naturally like to preserve these relations and continue to trade with Tibet because it did not come in the way of either China or Tibet. We further said that we were anxious that Tibet should maintain the autonomy it has had for at least the last forty years. We did not challenge or deny the suzerainty of China over Tibet. We pointed all this out in a friendly way to the Chinese Government. In their replies, they always said that they would very much like to settle the question peacefully but that they were, in any event, going to liberate Tibet. From whom they were going to liberate Tibet is, however, not quite clear. They gave us to understand that a peaceful solution would be found, though I must say that they gave us no assurance or guarantee to the effect. On the one hand, they said they were prepared for a peaceful solution; on the other, they talked persistently of liberation.

We had come to believe that the matter would be settled by peaceful negotiations and were shocked when we heard that the Chinese armies were marching into Tibet. Indeed, one can hardly talk about war between China and Tibet. Tibet is not in a position to carry on war and, obviously, Tibet is no threat to China. It is said that other countries might intrigue in Tibet. I cannot say much about it because I do not know. It is certain, however, that there was no immediate threat. Violence might, perhaps, be justified in

the modern world but one should not resort to it unless there is no other way. There was another way in Tibet as we pointed out. That is why the action of China came to us as a surprise.

The House is aware of the correspondence that was exchanged between the Chinese Government and our Government. We have continued to press upon them that it would be desirable for them to halt their advance and settle matters with Tibetan representatives peacefully. There is no doubt that during the last few weeks they have checked their main advance. However, I cannot say for certain what their future intentions are. Some small groups may have continued to advance in some places, but so far as we know, there has been no advance towards Lhasa, where conditions are still normal. That, of course, does not mean that the problem is solved.

The Debate

The following extracts are from the debate which followed. Prof. Ranga belonged until recently to the Congress Party in Andhra; he is a peasant leader. Dr. S. P. Mukherjee, who died in detention in Kashmir, was Mr. Nehru's Cabinet colleague till he resigned in 1950. Acharya Kripalani, one-time Congress President, is now leader of the Praja Socialist Party in the Lok Sabha. Mr. M. R. Masani, once a Socialist, now champions "free enterprise". Mr. M. A. Ayyangar is now Speaker of the Lok Sabha. Mr. Frank Anthony is the representative in the Lok Sabha of the Anglo-Indian community. Mr. Joachim Alva, a Congress member from Bombay, is editor of *The Forum*, a weekly journal, and husband of Mrs. Violet Alva, at present Deputy Home Minister in the Indian Government. Mr. Brajeshwar Prasad, Congress, has been the lone champion in the Indian Parliament of a "United Front" between India, China and the Soviet Union.

PROF. N. G. RANGA

As the Foreign Minister was developing his subject this morning I began to wonder what his conception could possibly be in regard to the strategic importance of the things that are happening all around us. Could he be indifferent to the gathering clouds of threats of insecurity to our own safety in our own country, to our own country, to our much-prized liberties and freedom—threats which are all around us, especially in the north and north-east sides of our country and our borders? It is very easy indeed for us to grow sentimental as well as eloquent whenever anything concerning

Asia is mentioned to us. But can we be indifferent to the change that has been coming over the minds of large numbers of the leaders who are today in charge of great masses of geographical areas of the world, especially in the East? Can we be quite so confident that the China that we talk about is the same today as it used to be ten years ago, one hundred years ago, two thousand years ago, when Lord Buddha's teachings were being carried to China through our missionaries? Chinese people, we have all great respect for them; Chinese people, we like to love them. But at the same time we should also realise who today are the leaders of the Chinese people. Who is in charge of the Chinese Government today? Could we be indifferent to the fact that only the other day it was none else than the Chinese Government which had hinted that India was the foreign power in Tibet which was supposed to be queering the pitch? Could we be also indifferent to the fact that China, the modern China, the present-day China, was sending her own troops in order to assert the sovereignty over Tibet? And in the mind of people on that side of the world, sovereignty makes no other meaning than expansion of their own control, political, economic and social, over other people. Now, when we talk again and again on the sovereignty of the Chinese people over the Tibetan Government or country what is it that we are doing? Are we not giving a blank cheque to be signed on our behalf by somebody else in order to spread their own imperialist tentacles?

We should in all seriousness be prepared to realise the strength of the people who are there on that side in charge of that government. True, the United Nations troops are bearing the brunt of their attack in Korea. Millions of people are supposed to have poured into Korea. It is something like an avalanchic sweep. Is it impossible for those people, under more or less similar circumstances, to pour into India too under the same pressure of ideological and imperialistic urges? Should we not keep these things in our mind?

Instead of that, I found, to my utter surprise, our Government and their spokesman both in India as well as abroad, repeatedly professing their friendship not only to China's people, not only to the Chinese Government but to China's sovereignty over Tibet. This beats anybody and everybody. These are days when we would be ready with the aid of the United Nations and other factors to counter this menace of sovereignty of one country over another. Instead of that, we go about accepting it, admitting it and apologise-

ing for it. This is one criticism that I am obliged to make against our foreign policy.

DR. S. P. MUKHERJEE

Along with China, we have to take up the question of Tibet because both are interlinked. Now the Prime Minister naturally reminded the House of the part which India had played progressively in the matter of recognition of the legitimate rights of the present Chinese Government. How has China reciprocated? When it comes to the question of Tibet, there may or may not be some sort of loose suzerainty of China over Tibet, but historically this is not so easy a matter and yet, what is the reply that China sent to India, when India asked China not to proceed on the path of violence in the matter of Tibet? The reply that China has sent has shocked, surprised and has given sorrow to the Government of India. I do not know whether it has made any difference with regard to China's settled policy in respect of Tibet, but here again, what is the definite policy of the Government of India with regard to Tibet? The Prime Minister just glossed over it. He said: we have sent another request asking them to be peaceful, but has that made any difference? Just as in the case of Korea, each country for which this so-called liberation starts is the worst sufferer. It is like the old story of the operation being fully successful and the patient succumbing. The sufferings of the people themselves are indescribable.

Only in this morning's papers we had a graphic account of the last British correspondent who left the North Korean capital, stating how he found the whole place burning, reminding him of some performances of Sir Guy Fawkes. Similarly with regard to Tibet, we sent frantic appeals to China asking her not to be violent but did China listen? What is the policy behind China's action? It is no use our trying to gloss over things because these are matters which affect not only the people of Tibet but also the security of India. It is a fact that the boundary between India and Tibet is yet to be definitely defined. The Prime Minister said the other day that we stand by the McMahon Line but the maps of China which are in circulation even now include portions of Assam, Ladakh and Leh and territories in which India is vitally interested. The reply which China has sent to India on the question of Tibet definitely indicates that China will do everything necessary for the purpose

of keeping in tact what it considers to be China's border and when it refers to Chinese border, it includes Tibet as well and the undefined boundary of Tibet so far as it touches Indian border. Similarly with regard to Nepal. The Prime Minister spoke very calmly the whole time—he did not use strong words—a few strong sentences were, however, used by him, when he warmed up in connection with Nepal: we must follow a patient policy with regard to Pakistan; we must follow a friendly policy with regard to China; we must follow a surrendering policy with regard to Tibet but with regard to Nepal, we shall never allow any one not only to enter into Nepal—any foreign power—but also not allow anyone to go over to the other side of the Himalayas. It is perfectly true; we are interested in Nepal. It affects our security to a very considerable measure. Some solution will have to be found with regard to Nepal. Even with regard to Nepal, we have been too long undecisive. We do not know exactly what is it we want. We must have a strong and stable Government in Nepal and a Government which has the backing of the people at large. If by any chance civil war continues in Nepal, it is not India that will benefit, it is China through Tibet which may come and play havoc in that part of Asia.

ACHARYA J. B. KRIPALANI

To make a concrete example—China. It had a people's Government and that Government was in charge of the country—practically the whole of it. We, therefore, thought that it was right that it should not be denied the membership of the UNO and we advocated the cause of China. And why? Because we were thinking in terms of isolated action. This action was right. We said that this Government represents the people of China and is in possession of power, and so it should be allowed to be a member of the UNO. But, if we had waited a little, we would have been more cautious in our advocacy. Soon, this nation that was struggling for its own freedom, strangled the freedom of a neighbouring nation, in whose freedom we are intimately connected. I am not thinking about the theoretical right of China over Tibet. In spite of this theoretical claim of China on Tibet, many of our politicians feel that our advocacy of China for the membership of the UNO was premature. We may change our position, because we feel that Tibet is yet far off. But supposing what has happened in Tibet happens on our borders in Nepal? For the sake of argument, suppose the Chinese "liberation" forces

come to Nepal, then I am sure the House will agree with me that whether we are well prepared or ill-prepared, we will go to war with China, cost what it may. If that is so, at that time what becomes of our advocacy of China to the membership of the United Nations? We cannot be at war with a nation and also advocate its entry into the UNO. That would be an absurd position. . . . Nearer home, our policy should not only be just but it should be firm. Because with it is connected our very existence as an independent nation. This brings me to the question of Nepal. We could have and should have been more helpful to the forces of democracy. The Raja of Nepal who is our guest, his theoretical claim to the crown of Nepal is greater than the theoretical claim of China on Tibet. And moreover, today, every nation has a right to democratic rule. Anyway, whatever Prince or Princeling we recognise—and the Prime Minister was very vague about this matter, he merely talked about the recognition of a King, and we know the King never dies, whoever may be on the throne—let us, however, not talk in terms of reform or diarchy. I say today there is no middle path between tyranny and democracy, and there can be no middle path in Nepal. Today I say there is no place for fascist tyranny. That went with the last war. Now there are newer kinds of tyrannies that are possible, there are newer kinds of totalitarian regimes that are possible. Today, if you deny a people democracy, all that they will get will be communism, and if democratic forces are defeated in Nepal, the Communist forces are yet alive there and they are underground and soon we may find that People's China has sent an army of "liberation" in Kathmandu. It will be no time then to talk of the old line between Nepal and Tibet. So, I hold, nearer home our policy must not only be just but also firm.

MR. M. R. MASANI

May I remind the House that some months ago, after we had shown our friendliness to Communist China, a message was sent by Mao Tse-tung to Ranadive, the Secretary of the Communist Party, which was engaged in trying to overthrow our Government by force—a message of greetings, and good wishes "for the liberation" of India and their hope that India would soon go the Chinese way. When diplomatic relations are established between two Governments, to sympathise with a Fifth Column working in this country certainly does not constitute an act of friendship. Therefore, it

should not be a matter for surprise that we should also be attacked in the two notes that have been sent to us in the matter of Tibet. In fact, there is more than an insinuation in these notes. There is a suggestion that we have been responsible for instigating the Tibetans to resist Chinese suzerainty. We know that is entirely false. If anything, our Prime Minister was trying to persuade the Tibetan leaders to accommodate the Chinese claims to suzerainty. I read a statement of the *New China News Agency* a few months ago, that the "Anglo-American imperialists and their running dog, Pandit Nehru, were plotting a coup in Lhasa for the annexation of Tibet". (*Several Hon. Members: Shame!*) If this is the reward that comes to this country from one year's friendship and advocacy, surely the least that we can do is to reconsider our estimate of the Chinese Communist regime. What that estimate should be I leave it to Government of the day to decide. While we might maintain diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government on a basis of reciprocity, there can be no longer any illusions about friendship, about cordiality and about comradeship in Asia. By the one act of attacking Tibet and deceiving the Indian Government after their assurances given repeatedly, they have shown utter contempt for the idea that we embraced, namely, of a free and united Asia. They have cut Asia into two—Communist and non-Communist Asia. Those of us who are not prepared to go all the way with them must fall on the other side of the fence. In that setting and in the face of this remark which comes from the *New China News Agency* in the last few weeks, that "the Chinese People's Liberation Army will hoist the Red Flag over the Himalayas", what are we to think of the friendship that we may expect from them.

MR. M. A. AYYANGAR

So far as our defences are concerned, we ought not to bite but we at least must hiss sometimes. If we do not hiss even, we will be trodden. Sir, it appeared a saint advised a snake not to bite. It went on not biting and children threw stones at it and ultimately it was about to cost its very life. The serpent then went to the saint and asked, "What shall I do? It is costing me my life." The saint advised that it should at least hiss. The serpent was never advised not to hiss, but only not to bite. We found that with all our interest in China, with our recommendation that she ought to be taken into

the UNO, China has marched on Tibet. Tibet is one of the most peace-loving countries in the world. Both by tradition and religion, Tibetans never waged war. In the European continent they can have Switzerland. Can we not have a similar Switzerland in the form of Tibet to our north? What is this "liberation"? As our Prime Minister rightly pointed out, there is no question of liberation. It is all a myth, it is a hoax. China ought not to have marched on Tibet. Sir, as against the 450 millions of Chinese, if we with our 350 millions had armed ourselves and were ready for an offensive, if necessary, China would not have ventured on Tibet.

MR. FRANK ANTHONY

I beg to move: *That in the motion, after the word "thereto", insert the following:*

"Which is definite in its intention to resist any form of Communist aggression against the country."

I have given notice of this amendment to the motion moved by the hon. Leader of the House not in any spirit of criticism but merely to focus attention on and to underline what I feel is the paramount need of our foreign policy, and that is, to make it known that India intends very definitely to resist Communist aggression, whether overt or even covert, wherever that aggression may threaten our security or our frontiers. . . .

I feel that we have given every conceivable hostage to the good faith, the honesty and decency of Asian communism. India has espoused China's cause. She even violently supported her admission into the UNO. In fact, she did it so violently as to antagonise some of her friends in the democratic countries. We wanted to believe that Chinese communism would evolve according to the genius of China, and that it would not dance to the tune of the Kremlin. I say, let us not even consider Chinese intervention in Korea today. I am quite prepared to accept this proposition, that the Chinese Government has, and had, the right to be genuinely exercised about its Manchurian borders, and about the security of its power installations. Let us not even consider its action in Korea. But what excuse—unless it be an utterly unworthy and dishonest excuse—can anyone assign for the cynical, unprovoked attack on Tibet? India has assumed the treaty obligations and rights which existed between Britain on the one side and Tibet on the other. According to these treaty obligations while there

was some recognition of Chinese suzerainty there was definitely this condition that India recognised the complete autonomy of Tibet. I do not think this point has been brought sufficiently to the notice of the Chinese Government. We have not told them sufficiently that this cynical and unprovoked attack on Tibet has outraged the conscience of every self-respecting Indian. I do not think that this point has been sufficiently emphasised.

MR. JOACHIM ALVA

About China, Sir, I want to say this much. There has been a warning of history. China and Japan were the greatest friends in history. One of the cardinal aims of the great Sun Yat-sen was that China and Japan shall not fight and that they should live in peace for ever. But due to the intervention and manipulation of foreign powers both the countries were in a deadly combat for nearly half a century so much so that today they hate each other. That historic lesson China and India shall never forget. India will have to be patient and if ever strife enters our soil, it shall be the end of all the power and greatness of Asia. These powers have to live as neighbours in love and friendship and if that love is torn to bits, we shall be engaged in a deadly combat, more deadly than has been experienced for over forty years between China and Japan. Today let us not fight; let us have patience. Napoleon once described China as a sleeping Giant. Whilst the Giant was asleep, his ears were bitten by some flies. When he was awake, he just drove them away. That is the lesson of Tibet.

China took over Tibet only after the 38th Parallel was crossed and Pandit Nehru's warning in regard to the 38th Parallel has been proved true, that if they crossed the 38th Parallel it would bring untold hardship to everybody. That warning has become the warning of history. This warning will be remembered very long after you and I perhaps leave these benches. On account of America crossing that Parallel, there came untold dangers; if the Parallel had not been crossed you might not have witnessed the spectacle of China being obsessed with fear and hence Tibet was invaded. China might not have been in a jittery state and the people in Tibet would not have asked for help.

MR. BRAJESHWAR PRASAD

I hold the opinion that there will be no war if we ally ourselves

with China and Russia. There will be peace and stability in South-East Asia. From the point of view of both military strategy and geo-politics, it will be physically impossible for any alien power to land troops on South-East Asia. If we want peace, we must join hands with Russia and China. I am quite sure that whatever hon. Members of this House may feel now, events will justify the stand I have taken in this House today.

MR. NEHRU'S REPLY

On 7 December 1950, Mr Nehru replied to the debate. The following are the relevant extracts from his speech:

The House knows very well what the policy of the Government of India has been in regard to Communist activities in this country. It has not been a tender policy and it is not going to be a tender policy. We must look at the world as it is and recognise that mighty forces are at work and millions of people have come under their influence. We must try to understand them and try as far as we can to divert them into right channels and prevent them from going into wrong ones. That is our problem. Some hon. Members seem to think that I should issue an ultimatum to China, that I should warn them not to do this or that or that I should send them a letter saying that it is foolish to follow the doctrine of communism...

The point at issue is that China is a great nation which cannot be ignored, no matter what resolution you may pass. Nor can you ignore the United States of America. Some people talk of American imperialism and American dollars in a hostile fashion. You cannot condemn or ignore the whole nation just because you do not approve of some aspect of the myriad shapes of American life. We have to take facts as they are. . . .

I beg this House to consider Asia specially—Asia in a tremendous ferment of change. One does not know whether that change is good or bad. It may be bad but to my mind it does not concern Asia alone. Many things are taking place which I dislike intensely. I am not, for the moment, talking of war which is bad enough but rather about the temper of people as a whole and of all that one holds precious in life which gradually seems to be fading out, whichever country you may consider. People have become more brutal in thought, speech and action. All the graciousness and gentleness of life seems to have ebbed away. The human values seem to have suffered considerably. Of course, plenty of human

values still remain; I am not saying that everything worthwhile is completely destroyed but I do say that the process of coarsening is going on apace all over the world, including our own country. We are being coarsened and vulgarised all over the world because of many things, but chiefly because of violence and the succession of wars. If this process continues, I wonder whether anything of value in life will remain for sensitive individuals. . . .

I have spoken of China and, more particularly, of Tibet. Prof. Ranga seems to have been displeased at my occasional reference to Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Please note that I used the word suzerainty, not sovereignty. There is a slight difference, though not much. I was telling the House about a historical fact; I was not discussing the future. It is a historical fact and in the context of things it is perfectly true that we have repeatedly admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet just as we have laid stress on Tibet's autonomy. But apart from this historical or legal or constitutional argument or even the argument that Mr. Gautam raised about buffer states and the like which, if I may say so, is not much of an argument, though it may be his desire and my desire. The real point to be made is that it is not right for any country to talk about its sovereignty or suzerainty over an area outside its own immediate range. That is to say, since Tibet is not the same as China, it should ultimately be the wishes of the people of Tibet that should prevail and not any legal or constitutional arguments. That, I think, is a valid point. Whether the people of Tibet are strong enough to assert their rights or not, is another matter. Whether we are strong enough or any other country is strong enough to see that this is done is also another matter. But it is a right and proper thing to say and I see no difficulty in saying to the Chinese Government that whether they have suzerainty over Tibet or sovereignty over Tibet, surely, according to any principles, the principles they proclaim and the principles I uphold, the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else.

DEBATE IN INDIAN PARLIAMENT, MAY 1954

Nehru's Statement in Parliament regarding the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet

In opening a foreign policy debate on 15 May 1954, after reading the preamble to the agreement and commenting on its implications, Mr. Nehru continued:

So far as Tibet is concerned, it is a recognition of the existing situation there. In fact, that situation had been recognised by us two or three years ago. Some criticism has been made that this is a recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Apart from that fact, I am not aware of any time during the last few hundred years when Chinese sovereignty, or if you like suzerainty, was challenged by any outside country and all during this period whether China was weak or strong and whatever the Government of China was, China always maintained this claim to the sovereignty over Tibet. It is true that occasionally when China was weak, this sovereignty was not exercised in any large measure. When China was strong, it was exercised. Always there was a large measure of autonomy of Tibet, so that there was no great change in the theoretical approach to the Tibetan problem from the Chinese side. It has been throughout the last 200 or 300 years the same. The only country that had more intimate relations with Tibet was India, that is to say, British India in those days. Even then, when it was British policy to have some measure of influence over Tibet, even then they never denied the fact of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, although in practice it was hardly exercised and they laid stress on Tibetan autonomy. Recent events made some other changes, factual changes, because a strong Chinese State gave practical evidence of exercising that sovereignty. So that what we have done in this agreement is not to recognise any new thing, but merely to repeat what we have said previously, and what, in fact, inevitably follows from the circumstances, both historical and practical, today. The real importance, I repeat, of this agreement is because of its wider implications in regard to non-aggression, recognition of each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and non-interference with each other, external, internal or any other like interference. . . .

The Debate

ACHARYA J. B. KRIPALANI

Recently, we have entered—I do not say the Prime Minister has, I do not say the Government has, but I say India has entered—into a treaty with China. This treaty concerns the whole of India; it does not concern a party or a person. It affects us all and we have to say something about it. We feel that China, after it had gone Communist, committed an act of aggression in Tibet.

AN HON. MEMBER: Did you commit aggression in Hyderabad?

ACHARYA KRIPALANI: The plea is that China had the ancient right of suzerainty. This right was out of date, old and antiquated. It was theoretical; it was never exercised and even then theoretically. It had lapsed by the flux of time. Even if it had lapsed it is not right in these days of democracy by which our Communist friends swear, by which the Chinese swear, to talk of this ancient suzerainty and exercise it in a new shape in a country which has and had nothing to do with China. Tibet is culturally more akin to India than it is to China, at least Communist China, which has repudiated all its old culture. I consider this as much a colonial aggression on the part of China as any colonial aggression indulged in by Western nations. The definition of colonialism is this, that one nation by force of arms or fraud occupies the territory of another nation. In this age of democracy when we hold that all people should be free and equal, I say China's occupation of Tibet is a deliberate act of aggression.

Whether certain nations commit aggression or are peaceful does not always concern us. But I say this, in case of China and Tibet we are intimately concerned, because China has demolished what is called a buffer state. In international politics, when a buffer state is abolished by a powerful nation, that nation is considered to have aggressive designs on its neighbours.

It is also said that in the new map of China other border territories like Nepal, Sikkim, etc. figure. This gives us an idea of the aggressive designs of China. Now let us see what the Chinese themselves did in the Korean war. As soon as the UN troops—or more truly, the American troops—reached the border of China, China felt insecure and it immediately joined the Korean war. Even the mere approach of a foreign army to the borders of the country made China to participate in the Korean war. I refuse to believe that

China had sympathy with North Korea. If their borders had not been endangered, they would not have bothered themselves about this Korean business.

That is how they behave. I do not say that because China wanted to conquer Nepal we should have gone to war with it. It was possible. But we did well in not going to war. But this does not mean that we should recognise the claim of China on Tibet. We must know that it is an act of aggression against a foreign nation. It is as abominable as colonialism of any Western power.

MR. BRAJESHWAR PRASAD

At the outset, let me congratulate the Prime Minister on the conclusion of the pact with China. The preamble, as he has said—and I agree with him—is far more important than the articles. I regard this pact as a non-aggression pact in embryo. . . .

The Prime Minister has said that collective security is not possible unless it is transformed into collective peace. May I venture to suggest that collective peace can be achieved only by changing the status quo? The central problem of the age is how to change the status quo without resorting to war. This can be done in Asia by our coming together with China and Russia. A mutual Defence Pact with China and Russia is the urgent need of the hour.

MR. JOACHIM ALVA

The time is up and there are barely five minutes. I have a number of points and somehow or other I shall take the last point first and I hope you will extend the time on the next day. I would mention Acharya Kripalani's speech first. In a sense he went into the sublime and then descended unto the ridiculous. When he spoke of the national, fundamental and unanimous policy for our country, I thought he rose to the top. That is the only policy that has been followed in this country for the last seven years. The fundamentals of this policy had been laid down by our Prime Minister according to our best traditions and according to what we really possess. We possess no arms, no great Navy or Air Force. We are only acting on the moral forces and we cannot wage a conflict with our nearest neighbour, China. I have constantly pointed out on the floor of this House that we cannot afford to have a quarrel with China and that the historic conflict between China and Japan

cannot be repeated in this sub-continent. The day that is repeated will denote the downfall of the East. We ourselves will be enmeshed in a kind of international strife. We drove away the British with all the forces at our command under Mahatma Gandhi's able guidance and our freedom should not be frittered away by any strife with China. We shall find ourselves in a mess from which for hundreds of years we shall not be able to extricate ourselves. Let not our friends lend their ears to foreign propaganda. This is my humble warning to my hon. friend, Acharya Kripalani. When the Kuomintang representative came for the Asian conference [the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March 1947—Editor], they declared that they would not enter the pandal until the mark therein which showed that Tibet belonged neither to China nor to any other country was removed. Tibet belonged to China. What was good for the discredited Kuomintang is considered not good for Red China which is today a force to be counted with in the history of the world.

MR. NEHRU'S REPLY

Replying to the debate on 18 May 1954 Mr. Nehru said:

We have recently made an agreement with China. Several members did not like this agreement. They say that we have shown great weakness, that we have committed the mistake of admitting that China has full authority over Tibet or that China is controlling Tibet. If I had time, I would be prepared to go into the entire history of this, step by step. In my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since we became independent. I have no doubt about this. Often it happens that we weigh the bad points and good points on a scale and then arrive at a conclusion, because if there are more good points than bad we are forced sometimes to tolerate the bad points. It often happens like this in foreign policy and in fact on other occasions also. But this thing that we have done with respect to China, about this I have no doubts of any kind. I think we have not made any mistake. This does not mean that I like each and every thing that China has done, but the thing we have written and the relations we have established are right from every point of view. You may look at it from any point of view. In my opinion it is right. I think it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world.

Some persons criticised our policy without having understood the question. They criticised simply because an overturn took place without their leave. Now, I do not understand. There has been a revolution and that revolution has brought about many results whether you like them or not. If you do not want to see those results, you may put a bandage over your eyes, and thus blindfolded, you may sit in a corner. But by doing so, you do not get rid of the thing itself. It is said that we have very old ties with Tibet. These ties go back thousands of years. Who can deny this? There is no doubt about this. But along with this you should also see that the British Government established their influence there by force. You can see that Tibet might be a part of China or might be a separate country, but Indian troops were there. Now is it proper that troops of one country should be stationed in another independent country? The number of troops was not too large, barely three hundred, but what does it indicate? What right does India have to keep a part of her army in Tibet, whether Tibet is independent or a part of China? The British Empire, in the days of Lord Curzon, about fifty years ago, had expanded and made several types of arrangements in Tibet. Now it is impossible and improper for us to continue any such arrangements as the British Empire had established. . . .

I do not want to go into the historical details as to the relations of Tibet with China in the past. It is not clear cut; there is a long history. As to the treaties and maps which Dr. Satya Narayan Sinha has presented, let me tell him, after all, these treaties and maps were all prepared by British imperialists. These treaties and maps are intended to show that we must act as they did. Now, we must realise that this revolution that came in China is the biggest thing that has taken place in the world at present, whether you like it or not. It is entirely up to your own mind and heart, and you may make your own decisions, but this is the biggest thing that has taken place since the war. In a period of only a few years a country of the size of China has moved and arisen from slumber, and for the first time in several hundred years of history China now has a strong central government. This fact is a very important fact for Asia and the world.

I appeal to you to consider very carefully the agreement that we have made with China about Tibet. Dr. Satya Narayan Sinha said in his speech that some route had been blocked. I want to tell him

that a route is always a two-sided affair. If we want to have a route to go there, there is also a route to come. It must be a two-sided affair. When a new situation arises we also desire to specify which routes people must use and which they should not use. When we want to make some such provision, and the other party also wants to make some such provision, then it becomes slightly difficult, because then how can we say to the other party: we will have our say but you can't. In fact this would be the way of a Lord Curzon. Therefore, the routes for coming and going and for trade between them and us have been fixed. Now, if Dr. Satya Narayan Sinha wants to go there along some new route, then so far as we are concerned, we won't put any obstacles in his way. So far as we are concerned he may go, but I am not responsible as to what may be in store for him on the other side. So, the fact is that everything about trade etc. has been fixed by us and you know what these arrangements are.

Now what is the significance of all these arrangements? Well, in the beginning of the agreement there is a preamble. The preamble contains a few things that are very significant, because if these few things are accepted, not only with respect to India and China but also the other countries of Asia, then this atmosphere of fear which is haunting us will gradually go away. Fear will gradually diminish, because we must realise that in the world of today there are several things that you don't like, there are several things that I don't like, but the world does not move simply according to your or my likes or dislikes. Therefore, we must at least understand this: that if the Great Powers of the world which are opposed to one another nowadays, that if these Great Powers should make an attempt to destroy the other party, then they themselves would be destroyed in the world today. Therefore, it must be an agreed principle that both should co-exist: live and let live. No one should invade the other, no one should fight the other. As a matter of fact, both sides are afraid of each other, as if the other would eat them up. It is a strange situation. If there were more trust, then they must live as they like. This is what India wants; in Russia, there is the Communist system, let her continue with her system; let America carry on with her own system. But they should not fight each other, because if they fight, then both of them will be finished, neither of them would win. This is the basic principle which we have put in our treaty with China. You see, these are the

words which we have used: "recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference" and then we consider other things like "mutuality". Now territorial integrity and sovereignty mean that there should be no invasion. "Non-aggression" also means the same thing; and "non-interference" means that there should be no interference in domestic affairs, because some people are in the habit of interfering in other people's affairs. Now if these basic principles were accepted by every country and if every country were left free to progress as she likes, to follow any national or foreign policy she likes, no one else interfered, then gradually an atmosphere, a climate of peace would be established in the world. This is our policy and we try to act according to this policy.

DEBATE IN THE LOK SABHA ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, 29-30 SEPTEMBER 1954

The speakers selected are the same as in the previous debate, with the addition of Mr. Asoka Mehta, a PSP leader and a Socialist intellectual, and Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, a distinguished jurist, who represented the Hindu Mahasabha in the Lok Sabha in 1954.

MR. ASOKA MEHTA

Our Prime Minister has been emphasising the five principles of the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet. These principles are undoubtedly welcome, but when it is realised that Tibet, whose people are alien to the Chinese in race, language, culture and religion, and who have received their Buddhism from India, whose script was devised by Indian pandits and whose culture contacts with India spread over centuries, is described in that very Treaty as "the Tibet region of China", the valuable principles lose much of their motive power.

MR. N. C. CHATTERJEE

Then there is the melancholy chapter to which reference has already been made in one of his speeches by Shri Purushottam Das Tandon and by Acharya Kripalani—I refer to the betrayal of Tibet. That is a melancholy episode in Indian history. The Tibetan Delegation was invited to Delhi. While the Delegation was going back via Calcutta the Chinese Army invaded Tibet, and finally annexed it. Pandit Nehru was initially shocked and even sarcastically remarked: What is this liberation? Liberation from whom? In the end, India had not the courage even to support a resolution sponsored in the United Nations on Chinese aggression against Tibet. If I remember aright, the Leader of the Indian Delegation announced that India would support that resolution condemning Chinese aggression on Tibet. But, later on, he backed out and did not give any support to that resolution. I call this appeasement of aggression. This is really not an effort towards peace. The Sino-Indian Treaty marks another episode. Our Government has made a free gift of the telecommunication, even though China was prepared to pay for it. The Sino-Russian bloc is making today North Korea, Manchuria, Sinkiang and Tibet a strong military base and is thereby threatening the security of Asia and the world.

Sir, I am raising this Tibetan question because I feel that this betrayal of Tibet and the surrender to the aggression of China has led to disastrous results in Nepal. There is a feeling that our foreign policy is neither independent nor really dynamic. There is a feeling that India is steadily, slowly drifting towards the totalitarian bloc. There is a feeling that India's Prime Minister is a fellow-traveller. A definite bias in favour of the Communist groups would be barren. Our foreign policy has succeeded in making America greatly anti-Indian.

MR. JOACHIM ALVA

I find that my friend, Mr. Chatterjee made a reference to Nepal and Tibet. I am surprised that he is still flogging a dead horse. The joining of Tibet with China is a historic fact. No one can undo it. If the British Government in India were not capable of holding Tibet in the manner that they wanted to do, it is not anybody's fault. If we want to be perfectly good neighbours with China, we must realise this and not raise any voice of protest in regard to Tibet.

When Mr. Chatterjee referred to the Prime Minister of India as a fellow-traveller, I felt we were all fellow-travellers. Who is not a fellow-traveller, if he thinks of the economic improvement of his own country? If we have an inner urge for the economic development of India, if we have an impatience with what is happening elsewhere and want to do those similar good things in our own land, then everybody is a fellow-traveller, and I do not think he can find fault with the Prime Minister of India by dubbing him as a fellow-traveller.

ACHARYA KRIPALANI

We have failed in arresting the march of Communist China to our borders. A small buffer state there was deprived of its freedom and that state was swallowed up. When we made a feeble protest, we were told—not very politely—to shut up. Not only that, we were told that we were the stooges of the Western powers.

THE GREAT REBELLION: TIBETAN AND CHINESE ACCOUNTS

The Great Uprising in Tibet broke out on March 10, 1959. First reports appeared in the Indian and world press in the third week of March from Tibetan sources outside Tibet, especially from Kalimpong.

On March 28 the Chinese Government by a proclamation signed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai made the first official admission of the uprising, dismissed the Government and the Kashag in Lhasa and set up a new Preparatory Committee under the acting chairmanship of the Panchen Lama. The proclamation declared that the Dalai Lama had left Lhasa "under duress".

On the same day the *New China News Agency* in a news communique gave the Chinese version of the Tibetan revolt.

The first authentic Tibetan version came on April 18 when a statement was read to correspondents on behalf of the Dalai Lama at Tezpur, an Indian border post in Assam.

On April 21, Peking Radio broadcast the Chinese reply to the Dalai's statement.

On June 20, the Dalai Lama himself made a statement to an assembly of Indian and foreign correspondents at Birla House in Mussoorie, a hill station in Northern India, on the conditions leading to the Tibetan uprising.

An interesting episode in this melancholy chapter relates to the Dalai's letters to General Tan Kuan-san, the Military Representative of the Chinese Central Government in Lhasa.

The Chinese Government disclosed the contents of these letters in support of their contention that the Dalai had been "abducted" by his followers from Lhasa.

Mr. Nehru, in the course of a speech in the Lok Sabha on March 30, cast a doubt on the authenticity of the letters. "I should like to have a little greater confirmation about them", he said, "about what they are, in what circumstances they were written, whether they were written at all."

The Chinese press thereupon published photostat copies of the letters.

On April 24, Mr. Nehru had his first interview with the Dalai Lama at Mussoorie. Afterwards, he told newsmen that the Dalai had acknowledged the authenticity of the letters.

CHINA DISSOLVES TIBETAN GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The Chinese Prime Minister issued the following proclamation on 28 March 1959:

Most of the Kaloons of the Tibet Local Government and the upper strata reactionary clique colluded with imperialism, assembled rebellious bandits, carried out rebellion, ravaged the people, put the Dalai Lama under duress, tore up the 17-Article Agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet and, on the night of March 19, directed the Tibetan local army and rebellious elements to launch a general offensive against the People's Liberation Army garrison in Lhasa.

Such acts which betray the motherland and disrupt unification are not allowed by law. In order to safeguard the unification of the country and national unity, in addition to enjoining the Tibet Military Area Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to put down the rebellion thoroughly, the decision is that from this day the Tibet Local Government is dissolved and the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region shall exercise the functions and powers of the Tibet Local Government.

During the time when the Dalai Lama Dantzen-Jaliso, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, is under duress by the rebels, Panchen Erdeni Ghuji-Geltseng, Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, will act as the Chairman.

Pebala Choliehnjamje, member of the Standing Committee of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, is appointed Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee; Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, member of the Standing Committee and Secretary-General of the Preparatory Committee, is appointed Vice-Chairman and Secretary-General of the Preparatory Committee.

Eighteen traitorous elements, Surkong Wongching-Galei, Neusha Thubten-Tarpa, Hsinka Jigmedorje (Shasu), Yuto Chahsidongchu, Tsrijong Lozong-Yiehsi, Kachang Lozong-Rentzen, Dala Lozong-sung-din, Kheme Sonamwongdui, Rongnamse Thubtan-Norzong, Pala Thubtenwenten, Nongshi Thubtan-Zongchu, Namselin Panchunjigme, Menjelin Jalyanddelseng, Dariihpen Tsewong-Dorje, Pengchu, Weisegeltseng (Kundelinchasa) Gungalama, and Tsupu-

gamapa Ripeidorje, are relieved of their posts as members of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region and of all their other posts and are to be punished individually under law.

Sixteen persons, Teng Shao-tung, Chan Hua-yu, Hui Yi-jan, Liang Hsuan-hsin, Tsuiko Dongchutseren, Chantung Lozongnamje, Ghaden Tsripa Thubten Kunga, Chienpaitzuli, Ngapo Tsirtenchoga, Dorjestsirten, Chirous Dungchu, Geltsengpintso, Lozong Tzucheng, Chunnjue, Pintsowong-chiu and Wang Pei-sheng, are appointed members of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region.

It is to be hoped that the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region will lead all the people of Tibet, ecclesiastical and secular, to unite as one and make common efforts to assist the People's Liberation Army to put down the rebellion quickly, consolidate national defence, protect the interests of the people of all nationalities, secure social order and strive for the building of a new democratic and socialist Tibet.

CHOU EN-LAI

HOW THE REBELLION HAPPENED (CHINESE VERSION)

A news communique, released in Peking on March 28 by the *Hsinhua News Agency* on the rebellion in Tibet reads:

Violating the will of the Tibetan people and betraying the motherland, the Tibetan Local Government and the upper strata reactionary clique colluded with imperialism, assembled rebellious bandits and launched armed attacks against the People's Liberation Army garrison in Lhasa during the night of March 19.

Acting on orders to put the rebellion down, the valiant units of the People's Liberation Army stationed in Tibet completely smashed the rebellious bandits in the city of Lhasa on the 22nd. Now the units of the People's Liberation Army assisted by patriotic people of all sections, both ecclesiastic and temporal, are mopping up the rebellious bandits in some other places in Tibet.

In order to safeguard the unification of the motherland and national unity, Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council issued an order on March 28, which, apart from enjoining the Tibetan Military Area Command of the People's Liberation Army to stamp out the rebellion thoroughly, proclaimed the decision that from that day the Tibetan Local Government which instigated the rebellion be dissolved and the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region exercise the functions and powers of the Tibetan Local Government.

ARMED REBELLION

The armed rebellion of the Tibetan Local Government and the reactionary clique of the upper strata in Lhasa began on March 10. The Dalai Lama was originally scheduled to attend a theatrical performance in the auditorium of the Tibetan Military Area Command of the People's Liberation Army on March 10. The proposal was put forth by the Dalai Lama personally more than one month earlier and the date of March 10 was fixed by the Dalai Lama himself.

On that day, however, the rebellious Tibetan clique spread wild rumours alleging that the army units of the Tibetan Military Area Command would detain the Dalai Lama, and by using this rumour as a pretext, staged armed rebellion, put the Dalai Lama under

duress, raised such reactionary slogans as "Drive away the Han People" and "Independence for Tibet", and, at the same time, killed Kanchung Soanamchiatso, a Tibetan official of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, who opposed the rebellion, and wounded Sampo Tsewong-rentzen, the Tibetan Vice-Commander of the Tibetan Military Area, and others.

The armed rebels at the same time surrounded the Headquarters of the Tibetan Military Area Command of the People's Liberation Army and the offices of the Central Government agencies in Lhasa.

The rebellious activities of the Tibetan traitors have been of fairly long duration. These rebels represent imperialism and the most reactionary big serf-owners. Since the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered Tibet and the Central People's Government and the Tibetan Local Government concluded the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (namely, the 17-Article Agreement) in 1951, they have been plotting to tear up this agreement and preparing for armed rebellion.

But as the motherland is thriving and prospering day by day, the policy of the Central People's Government toward Tibet is correct and the garrison units of the People's Liberation Army in Tibet observe strict discipline, all of which enjoy the warm support and love of the people of all sections in Tibet, the rebellious conspiracy of this handful of reactionaries had no support from the Tibetan people. In accordance with the stipulations of the Constitution, the Central People's Government has always insisted on the solidarity of all the nationalities in the country and solidarity among the Tibetan people, and has carried out regional national autonomy in Tibet.

OBSTRUCTION TO PROGRESS

This is warmly welcomed by the Tibetan people. The Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region was established as early as April 1956. Yet, owing to obstruction by the reactionaries in the Local Government of Tibet, the preparatory work for the Autonomous Region has made little progress.

The 17-Article Agreement stipulates that the Tibetan army must be reorganised, and that Tibet's social system, that is serfdom, must be reformed in accordance with the wishes of the people. These two important tasks could not be carried out as the result of obstruction by the reactionaries. In order to wait for the reaction-

aries to wake up, the Central authorities at the end of 1956 told them that within six years, that is for the period of the second five-year plan, reform would not be carried out and the Tibetan army would not be reorganised.

The Local Government of Tibet is called Kasha in Tibetan and its six members are called Kaloons. Of the six Kaloons, two are patriots: Ngapo Ngawang Jigme and Sampo Tsewong-rentzen who was wounded by the rebels on March 10. One of the other four, Yuto Chahsidongchu, had already turned traitor in 1957 and fled to Kalimpong—the centre of the rebellious elements' activities abroad. The three others, Surkong Wongching-Galei, Neusha Thubten-Tarpa and Hsinka Jigmedorje (Shasu) came out into the open as traitors in the present rebellion.

Before this these traitors had used their legal status in the Kasha to muster the reactionary forces of the upper strata to collaborate with the external enemy and actually directed some of the most reactionary big serf-owners in Sikang and Tibet in organising armed rebel forces in certain regions east, north and south of the Tsangpo River to oppose the Central People's Government and betray the motherland.

Their rebellion was engineered by the imperialists, the Chiang Kai-shek bands and foreign reactionaries; the commanding centre of the rebellion was in Kalimpong; and their leader is the dismissed Silum Lokongwa Tsewongrouten. Many of their arms were brought in from abroad. The base of the rebellion to the south of the Tsangpo River received air-dropped supplies from the Chiang Kai-shek bands on a number of occasions, and radio stations were set up there by agents sent by the imperialists and the Chiang Kai-shek clique to further their intrigues.

Between May and June of last year, on the instructions of the Tibetan Local Government and the upper strata reactionary clique, the rebel bandits intruded into Chamdo, Dinching, Nagchuka and Loka, destroyed communications, ravaged the people by plunder, rape, arson and murder; and attacked agencies and army units of the Central People's Government there.

WHAT THEY EXPECTED

Guided by the spirit of national unity, the Central People's Government repeatedly enjoined the Local Government of Tibet to punish the rebel elements and maintain social order; but the

Local Government of Tibet and the upper strata reactionary clique took the Central People's Government's attitude of maximum magnanimity for a sign of weakness. Their talk was of this sort: The Han people can be frightened off; in the past nine years, the Han people have not had the courage to lay even a finger on our most wonderful and sacred system of serfdom; if we attack them, they can only defend and not hit back; they dare not suppress our rebellion; but only enjoin us to suppress the rebellion; if we bring a large group of rebel forces to Lhasa from other places to hit them with, they will surely run away; if not, we abduct the Dalai Buddha to Loka and gather forces for a counterattack to take Lhasa back; if we fail, we run to India; India has sympathy for us and may help us; there is the powerful United States which may also help us; President Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan has already given us active help; the Dalai is god, who dare not obey him? The Americans say that the People's Commune movement in China has caused discontent among the people who are ready to rebel; it is time to drive the Han people away and proclaim independence, and so on.

The spirit of these reactionaries soared to the clouds and they were ready to take over the whole universe. They refused to do their duty to stop the rebel bandits' ravages and instead stepped up their treacherous intrigues. After concentrating considerable counter-revolutionary forces in Lhasa, they started their armed rebellion on March 10, openly scrapping the 17-Article Agreement.

After the outbreak of the March tenth rebellion in Lhasa, the Dalai Lama wrote to the representative of the Central People's Government in Tibet on three occasions saying that he had been seized by the reactionaries and was making all possible efforts to deal with the illegal actions of the reactionary clique. In reply, the representative of the Central Government welcomed the attitude of the Dalai Lama and expressed the hope that the Local Government of Tibet would change its wrong attitude and do its duty to suppress the rebellion.

DALAI LAMA ABDUCTED

These reactionary elements, however, not only did not in the least repent but decided to extend the rebellion. They blatantly abducted the Dalai Lama from Lhasa and launched an all-out attack on the People's Liberation Army units stationed in Lhasa on the night of March 19. The hope of a peaceful settlement was

extinguished. The reactionary forces of Tibet finally chose the road to their own extinction.

At 10 a.m. on March 20, the troops of the Tibetan Military Area Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army were ordered to take punitive action against the clique of traitors who had committed monstrous crimes. With the aid of the patriotic Tibetan monks and laymen, the People's Liberation Army completely crushed the rebellion in the city of Lhasa after more than two days of fighting. A rough count shows that by the 23rd, more than four thousand rebel forces were taken prisoners, and eight thousand small arms of different kinds, eighty-one light and heavy machine guns, twenty-seven eighty-one-millimetre calibre mortars, six mountain guns and ten million bullets were captured. Encircled by our troops, many of the rebel troops surrendered in groups.

The rapid putting down of the rebellion in Lhasa showed that the Tibetan traitorous clique is certainly doomed and that the future of the Tibetan people is bright. Primarily this is because the Tibetan people are patriotic, support the Central People's Government, ardently love the People's Liberation Army and oppose the imperialists and traitors. Tibet, including the three areas of Chamdo, Chientsang (Yu), and Houtsang (Tsang) has a total population of one million two hundred thousand, while the rebellious bandits number only about twenty thousand people, mostly people who were deceived and intimidated to join. Included are some rebellious elements who fled to Tibet from areas east of Kingsha River, in what was formerly Sikang Province, and are known as the Kamba people.

PEOPLE ARE NOT WITH REBELS

The overwhelming majority of the Tibetan people are peasants and herdsmen who live in extreme poverty and they eagerly hope to free themselves from the darkest feudal serfdom in the world. There are also many patriotic progressive people in the upper and middle strata in Tibet. They support the Central People's Government, oppose the rebellion and advocate democratic reform of the unjust social system so as to turn Tibet step by step into a civilised, progressive area.

Tibet now already has a labouring class firmly aspiring for emancipation, and fairly large sections of patriotic progressive people who want reform in the upper and middle strata and also middle

elements. The task at present is first to put down the rebellion and establish peaceful order. In the course of this, the policy of the Central Government in dealing with the rebel elements is to punish without fail those guilty of major crimes, not to punish the intimidated followers and reward those who have performed meritorious services.

The Central Government has instructed the People's Liberation Army units in Tibet to unite broadly with all Tibetans who have not taken part in the rebellion, accept responsibility for protecting the lives and property of the peasants, herdsmen, and people of the industrial, business, political and religious circles in Tibet, respect the habits and customs of the local people and their religious beliefs, protect the lamaseries and cultural institutions and relics and safeguard the interests of the mass of the people and social order. As for those captured and enemies who have laid down their arms, it will not be permitted to retaliate against, injure or humiliate them.

The Chinese Government, for its part, considers that in the relations between China and the neighbouring countries to the south-west, primarily between China and the great friendly country of the Republic of India, the principles of peaceful coexistence are to be persistently applied. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were for the first time put forward in the agreement signed between China and India on April 29, 1954, on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. In the fundamental interests of the two countries, both parties have no reason at all not to adhere to these principles fully both at present and in the future.

Chinese Government quarters welcome the statement of the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Nehru on March 23 on non-intervention in China's internal affairs and consider this statement to be friendly. On the part of China, there has never been interference in the internal affairs of India or discussion of the internal affairs of India at the sessions of the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee. It considers such discussion of the internal affairs of a friendly country to be impolite and improper.

MILITARY CONTROL

In order to wipe out the rebel bandits thoroughly, the State Council has ordered the units of the Chinese People's Liberation

Army stationed in Tibet to assume military control in various places in Tibet. The tasks of the military control committees are: to suppress rebellion; to protect the people and the foreign nationals who observe the laws of China; with the authorisation from the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet and the Tibet Military Area Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, to set up administrative bodies at various levels of the Autonomous Region of Tibet, and organise self-defence armed forces of patriotic Tibetans to replace the old Tibetan army of only a little more than three thousand men who are rotten to the core, utterly useless in fighting and have turned rebel.

The Military Control Committee in Lhasa was formally set up on March 23. Military control committees will be set up in succession in other places except for Shigatse, the capital of Ho-tsang area which is under the leadership of Panchen Erdeni, where it is not necessary to set up one. All the military control committees in Lhasa and the other places consist of the representatives of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and representatives of local patriotic people.

Now important cities and areas including Ari, west of Lhasa, Gyantse, Phari, Yatung, southwest of Lhasa, Damshune and Nagchuka, north of Lhasa, Chetang, south of Lhasa, and Taichao, Licgtze, Tsamu, Dinching, Chamdo and Dza-i, east of Lhasa, are all under the firm control of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The overwhelming majority of the local people are cooperating closely with the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The rebel bandits are still carrying on only in some very remote places.

Since the Dalai Lama, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region, is still held under duress by the rebels, the State Council has decided that Panchen Erdeni, Vice-Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet, assume the post of Acting Chairman during the period of the Dalai Lama's abduction. The State Council has also appointed as Vice-Chairmen the Living Buddha Pebala Cholienamje and Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, Standing Committee members of Tibetan nationality of the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region. Ngapo is concurrently Secretary-General.

As soon as order has been restored, local administrative bodies of the Autonomous Region of Tibet at all levels will be set up one after another throughout Tibet and exercise the functions and powers

of autonomy. At present, autonomy and military control by the People's Liberation Army are simultaneously in force. Autonomy will gradually and completely replace military control when the rebellion is put down and peaceful order is established.

As the result of the rebellion by the reactionary forces in Tibet and the defeat of the rebellion a new page is unfolding in Tibet's history. The conclusion can now be drawn that the imperialists and Tibet's reactionary forces entirely miscalculated the situation in Tibet. Contrary to their wishes, the rebellion started by them in Tibet has not led to a split of the motherland and the retrogression of Tibet, but, instead, has strengthened the consolidation of national unification, accelerated the doom of the reactionary forces in Tibet, pushed forward democratisation in Tibet and promoted a new birth of the Tibetan people.

THE DALAI LAMA'S LETTERS

The letter sent to Dalai Lama on March 10 by
General Tan Kuan-san

Respected Dalai Lama, it is very good indeed that you wanted to come to the Military Area Command. You are heartily welcome. Since you have been put into very great difficulties due to the intrigues and provocations of the reactionaries, it may be advisable that you do not come for the time being.

Salutations and best regards

TAN KUAN-SAN

Dalai Lama's letter of March 11

Dear Comrade Political Commissar Tan,

I intended to go to the Military Command to see the theatrical performance yesterday, but I was unable to do so, owing to obstruction by people, ecclesiastical and secular, who were instigated by a few bad elements and who did not know the facts. This has put me to indescribable shame. I am greatly upset and worried and at a loss what to do. When your letter (of the 10th) appeared before me, I immediately became overjoyed, you do not mind at all.

Reactionary evil elements are carrying out activities endangering me under the pretext of protecting my safety. I am taking measures to calm things down. In a few days when the situation becomes stable, I will certainly meet you. If you have any internal directives for me, please tell me frankly through this messenger [this refers to Ngapo Ngawang Jigme].

DALAI LAMA

(Written by my own hand)

General Tan's of March 11

The reactionaries are now so audacious as to have openly and arrogantly carried out military provocations. They have erected fortifications and posted large numbers of machine-guns and armed reactionaries along the national defence highway (the highway

north of Norbu Lingka) thereby seriously disturbing the security of the national defence communications.

Many times in the past, we told Kasha that the People's Liberation Army is duty-bound to defend the country and to protect the security of communication lines related to national defence, and, therefore it certainly cannot remain indifferent to this serious act of military provocations. Therefore, the Tibet Military Area Command has sent letters to Surkong, Neusha, Shasu and Pala asking them to tell the reactionaries to remove all the fortifications they established and to withdraw from the highway immediately. Otherwise, they will bear responsibility themselves for all the serious consequences. I want to inform you of this. Please let me know what your views are at your earliest convenience.

Salutations and best regards

TAN

Dalai Lama's letter of March 12

Dear Comrade Political Commissar Tan,

I suppose you have received my letter of yesterday [referring to March 11] forwarded to you by Ngapo. I have had the letter you sent me this morning. The unlawful actions of the reactionary clique break my heart. Yesterday I told Kasha to order the immediate dissolution of the illegal People's Conference and the immediate withdrawal of the reactionaries who arrogantly moved into the Norbu Lingka under the pretext of protecting me. As to the incidents of yesterday and the day before, which were created under the pretext of protecting my safety and have seriously estranged the relations between the Central Government and the Local Government, I am making every possible effort to deal with them. At 8.30 Peking time this morning a few Tibetan army men suddenly fired several shots near the Chinghai-Tibet highway. Fortunately no serious disturbances occurred. As to the questions mentioned in your letter [referring to the letter of the 11th sent by General Tan to the Dalai Lama], I am planning to persuade my few subordinates and give them instructions. Please tell me frankly any instruction you have for me.

DALAI

Letter to Dalai Lama by General Tan

Respected Dalai Lama,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your two letters dated March 11 and March 12. The traitorous activities of the reactionary clique of the upper strata in Tibet have grown into intolerable proportions. These individuals, in collusion with foreigners, have engaged in reactionary, traitorous activities for quite some time. The Central People's Government has long adopted an attitude of magnanimity and enjoined the Local Government of Tibet to deal with them seriously, but the Local Government of Tibet has all along adopted an attitude of feigning compliance while actually helping them with their activities with the result that things now have come to such a grave pass. The Central People's Government still hopes that the Local Government of Tibet will change its erroneous attitude and immediately assume responsibility for putting down the rebellion and mete out severe punishment to the traitors. Otherwise the Central People's Government will have to act itself to safeguard the solidarity and unification of the motherland.

In your letter, you said: "As to the incidents which were created under the pretext of protecting my safety and have seriously estranged relations between the Central Government and the Local Government, I am making every possible effort to deal with them." We warmly welcome this correct attitude on your part.

We are very much concerned about your present position and safety. If you think it necessary and possible to extricate yourself from the present dangerous position of being abducted by the traitors, we cordially welcome you and your entourage to come and stay for a brief period in the Military Area Command. We are willing to assume full responsibility for your safety. As to what is the best course to follow, it is entirely up to you to decide.

In addition, I have much pleasure in informing you that the Second National People's Congress has decided to open its first session on April 17.

Salutations and my best wishes

TAN KUAN-SAN

Dalai Lama's letter dated March 16

Dear Comrade Political Commissar Tan,

Your letter dated the 15th has just been received at three o'clock. I am very glad that you are so concerned about my safety and hereby express my thanks.

The day before yesterday, the fifth day of the second month according to the Tibetan calendar [March 14, 1959] I made a speech to more than seventy representatives of the government officials, instructing them from various angles, calling on them to consider seriously present and long-term interests and to calm down, or my life would be in danger. After these severe reproaches, conditions took a slight turn for the better. Though the conditions in here and outside are still very difficult to deal with at present, I am trying skilfully to make a demarcation line between the progressive people and those opposing the revolution within the government officials. A few days from now when there are enough forces that I can trust, I shall make my way to the Military Area Command secretly. When that time comes, I shall first send you a letter. I request you to adopt reliable measures. What are your views? Please write to me often.

DALAI

THE STORY OF TIBET AS TOLD BY THE DALAI LAMA

The following statement, on behalf of the Dalai Lama, was read at Tezpur, in Assam, to a party of newspapermen and others on 18 April 1959:

It has always been accepted that Tibetan people are different from the Han people of China. There has always been a strong desire for independence on the part of the Tibetan people. Throughout history this has been asserted on numerous occasions. Sometimes the Chinese Government had imposed their suzerainty on Tibet and at other times Tibet has functioned as an independent country.

In any event, at all times, even when the suzerainty of China was imposed, Tibet remained autonomous in control of its internal affairs.

In 1951 under pressure of the Chinese Government a 17-point agreement was made between China and Tibet. In that agreement the suzerainty of China was accepted as there was no alternative left to the Tibetans. But even in the agreement it was stated that Tibet would enjoy full autonomy. Though the control of external events were to be in the hands of the Chinese Government, it was agreed that there would be no interference by the Chinese Government with the Tibetan religion and customs and her internal administration. In fact, after the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese armies the Tibetan Government did not enjoy any measure of autonomy even in internal matters and the Chinese Government exercised full powers in Tibetan affairs.

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

In 1956 a preparatory committee was set up for Tibet with the Dalai Lama as Chairman and the Panchen Lama as Vice-Chairman and General Chang Kuo-hua as the representative of the Chinese Government. In practice even this body had little power, and decisions in all important matters were taken by the Chinese authorities. The Dalai Lama and his Government tried their best to adhere to the 17-point agreement but the interference of the Chinese authorities persisted.

By the end of 1955 a struggle had started in the Kham province and this assumed serious proportions in 1956. In the consequential

struggle the Chinese armed forces destroyed a large number of monasteries.

Many lamas were killed and a large number of monks and officials were taken and employed on the construction of roads in China and the interference in exercise of religious freedom increased.

1959: STRAINED RELATIONS

The relation of Tibetans with China became openly strained from the early part of February 1959. The Dalai Lama had agreed a month in advance to attend a cultural show in the Chinese headquarters and the date was suddenly fixed for March 10. The people of Lhasa became apprehensive that some harm might be done to the Dalai Lama and as a result about 10,000 people gathered around the Dalai Lama's Summer Palace at Norbu Lingka and physically prevented the Dalai Lama from attending the function.

Thereafter the people themselves decided to raise a bodyguard for the protection of the Dalai Lama. Large crowds of Tibetans went about the streets of Lhasa demonstrating against the Chinese rule in Tibet. Two days later thousands of Tibetan women held demonstrations protesting against Chinese authority. In spite of this demonstration from the people the Dalai Lama and his Government endeavoured to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese and tried to carry out negotiations with the Chinese representatives as to how best to bring about peace in Tibet and assuage the people's anxiety.

While these negotiations were being carried out reinforcements arrived to strengthen the Chinese garrisons in Lhasa and Tibet. On March 17, two or three mortar shells were fired in the direction of the Norbu Lingka palace. Fortunately the shells fell in a nearby pond.

After this the advisers became alive to the danger to the person of the Dalai Lama and in those difficult circumstances it became imperative for the Dalai Lama, the members of his family and his high officials to leave Lhasa.

The Dalai Lama would like to state categorically that he left Lhasa in Tibet and came to India of his own free will and not under duress.

It was due to the loyalty and affectionate support of his people that the Dalai Lama was able to find his way through a route which is quite arduous. The route which the Dalai Lama took involved

crossing the Kyichu and Tsangpo rivers and making his way through Lhoka area, Yarlung Valley and Psona Dzong before reaching the Indian frontier at Kanzeymane near to Chuhamgu.

TWO EMISSARIES

On March 29, 1959, the Dalai Lama sent two emissaries to cross the Indo-Tibetan border requesting the Government of India's permission to enter India and seek asylum there. The Dalai Lama is extremely grateful to the people and Government of India for their spontaneous and generous welcome as well as the asylum granted to him and his followers.

India and Tibet have had religious, cultural and trade links for over a thousand years and for Tibetans it has always been the land of enlightenment, having given birth to the Lord Buddha. The Dalai Lama is deeply touched by the kind greetings extended to him on his safe arrival in India by the Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, and his colleagues in the Government of India. The Dalai Lama has already sent a reply to this message of greeting.

Ever since the Dalai Lama entered at Kanzeymane near Chuhamgu he has experienced in full measure the respect and hospitality extended to him by the people of the Kameng frontier division of the North-East Frontier Agency and the Dalai Lama would like to state how the Government of India's officers posted there had spared no effort in making his stay and journey through this extremely well administered part of India as comfortable as possible.

The Dalai Lama will now be proceeding to Mussoorie which he hopes to reach in the next few days. The Dalai Lama will give thought to his future plans and, if necessary, give expression to them as soon as he has had a chance to rest and reflect on recent events.

His country and people have passed through an extremely difficult period and all that the Dalai Lama wishes to say at the moment is to express his sincere regret at the tragedy which has overtaken Tibet and to hope fervently that these troubles will be over soon without any more bloodshed.

As the Dalai Lama and spiritual head of all the Buddhists in Tibet, his foremost concern is the wellbeing of his people and in ensuring perpetual flourishing of his sacred religion and freedom of his country.

While expressing once again thankfulness at his safe arrival in

India the Dalai Lama would like to take this opportunity to communicate to all his friends, wellwishers and devotees in India and abroad his sincere gratitude for the many messages of sympathy and concern with which they have flooded him.

CHINESE REPLY TO THE DALAI LAMA'S STATEMENT

On April 19, Peking Radio broadcast the Chinese reply to the Dalai Lama's statement. It came as a commentary and was later circulated by the *New China News Agency*. The following is an official summary:

The so-called Dalai Lama statement issued by Indian diplomatic officials on April 18th in Tezpur is a poorly composed document which contains constrained arguments and is fraught with lies and loopholes. Disregarding the fact that China is a unified country formed by the Han, Mongolian and dozens of other nationalities, the statement begins by clamouring about the so-called independence of the Tibetan people.

As a matter of fact the political and religious systems in Tibet were all instituted successively by the Central Government in Peking in the course of several hundred years from the 13th to the 18th century. Even the title, status and functions and powers of the Dalai Lama were not instituted by the Tibetans themselves. The so-called Tibetan independence in modern history has all along been the scheme of British imperialism for aggression against China and first of all against Tibet.

The fact that the statement begins with so-called Tibetan independence proves that its author reflects the will of the imperialist aggressors and has all along been fundamentally opposed to the 1951 agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

To start with, the 1951 agreement asserted that Tibet is a part of the People's Republic of China. There is not a single sentence in the statement which mentions this point. This fact in itself makes it utterly impossible to believe the statement's claim that the former Tibetan local government "tried their best to adhere to the 17-point agreement".

The statement alleges that the 17 articles of the 1951 agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet were brought about under the pressure of the Chinese Government; since the entry of the Chinese People's Liberation Army into Tibet, the Tibetan Government did not enjoy any measure of autonomy and that even the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region had little power; decisions on all important matters were taken by Chinese authorities. The truth is that the agreement was reached after prolonged talks and full consultations between the

representatives of the Central People's Government and the Tibet Local Government from late April to late May in 1951. After the signing of the agreement the Dalai Lama in his message to Chairman Mao Tse-tung in October 1951 said that the agreement had been reached between the representatives of the two parties on a friendly basis. The Dalai Lama also said that the Tibet Local Government and the people of Tibet, both ecclesiastic and secular, unanimously supported this agreement.

Since entering Tibet, the People's Liberation Army has adhered to the 17 articles of the agreement with complete faithfulness. No changes have been made in the existing political system in Tibet, nor in the original status and functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials at all levels, both ecclesiastic and secular, performed their duties as usual. Religious activities and the customs and habits of the local people have been respected and the Tibetan currency has continued to circulate. The stipulations in the agreement that the Tibet Local Government should carry out reforms on their own initiative and that the Tibet army should be incorporated step by step into the People's Liberation Army were not carried out by the Tibetan Local Government.

At the end of 1956 the Central People's Government informed the Tibet Local Government that democratic reforms need not be carried out before 1962. In short, during the past eight years the political, social and religious systems in the Tibet region have remained the same as before its peaceful liberation. Almost all the affairs within Tibet were handled by the former Tibet local government.

In order to carry out regional autonomy in the Tibet region, according to the constitution, the Central People's Government set up in April 1956 a Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region with the Dalai Lama as its head. The fact that the Preparatory Committee did not play much of a role was precisely due to obstruction by the former Tibet local government, because they did not want regional autonomy at all. What they wanted was the so-called independence of Tibet which was desired by the imperialists. They were bent on their plot for sabotaging the 17-article agreement and proceeded from directing the harassing activities of the Khampa rebels to the all-out armed rebellion which they themselves openly launched on March 10th.

The statement did not give a single instance of the efforts made

by the former Tibet local government to observe the 17-article agreement; nor did it give a single instance of violation of the agreement by the Central People's Government. The only fact it cited was the putting down of the rebellion by the Central People's Government in the former Sikang area in 1955. But the whole world knows the Sikang area does not belong to Tibet at all. Previously it used to be Sikang Province and was later incorporated into Szechwan Province. As is known it was precisely in the summer of 1956 when the Dalai Lama and his party were passing through Szechwan on their way back to Tibet after attending the National People's Congress that the upper strata of reactionary clique in Tibet hastily conspired to start a conflagration and directed the Khampas to stage a rebellion rightaway. They plotted to use the Khampa rebellion to cover up their plot for driving out the Hans and their so-called independence in Tibet proper. They overestimated the combat strength of the Khampas. Therefore, they made a quick decision. They believed that to incite the Khampas to stage a rebellion first was quite a wise step. The facts, however, were contrary to what they conceived. This rebellion was rapidly put down. In the battle to put down the rebellion there were of course some casualties, and some buildings were damaged. Apart from this there were no such alleged incidents in which many lamas were killed and many monasteries ruined.

The statement also distorts the facts when it speaks of the course which the rebellion took during the period from March 10th to the 19th. As everybody knows March 10th was the date on which the rebellion was launched. The rebellious clique chose this date because the Dalai Lama himself had decided to go to the auditorium of the Tibet Military Area Command of the People's Liberation Army to attend a theatrical performance on that day, and the request to attend this theatrical performance had been made by the Dalai Lama himself one month earlier. The statement does not dare to deny this fact outright but deliberately says in a vague way that the Dalai Lama agreed to attend the performance, and the date of March 10th was said to have been suddenly fixed. As to who fixed the date the statement does not dare to explain. In his letter dated March 11th to the Acting Representative of the Central People's Government in Tibet the Dalai Lama said quite clearly, "I intended to go to the Military Area Command to see the theatrical performance yesterday [meaning March 10th] but

I was unable to do so because of obstruction by people, lamas and laymen, who were instigated by some elements and who did not know the facts."

The statement avoids mention of the three letters sent by the Dalai Lama to the Central People's Government representative. This proves that the author of the statement dared not state the facts.

The statement alleges that the People's Liberation Army sent reinforcements to Lhasa and Tibet before March 17th and that on March 17th two or three mortar shells were fired in the direction of Norbu Lingka. This is out and out fabrication. Those responsible for the lie have opened the back-door for themselves saying that fortunately the shells fell in a nearby pond. But if the People's Liberation Army wanted to attack why did it fire only two or three mortar shells which, moreover, fell into a pond and why did it not fire more shells after that?

The way the statement speaks of the Dalai Lama's leaving Lhasa also calls for attention. It says the advisers became alive to the danger to the person of the Dalai Lama, and in these difficult circumstances it became imperative for the Dalai Lama, the members of his family and his high officials to leave Lhasa.

This paragraph shows that it was not the Dalai Lama himself but the so-called advisers that thought of leaving Lhasa. This is a naked revelation of the truth about the abduction of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa. The Dalai Lama said in his letter of March 11th to the Central People's Government Representative, "Reactionary evil elements are carrying out activities endangering me under the pretext of ensuring my safety." Again he said in his letter of March 12th, "Yesterday I told the Kashag to order the immediate withdrawal of the reactionaries who arrogantly moved into the Norbu Lingka under the pretext of protection." This shows that after March 10th the Dalai Lama was surrounded by armed rebels and was abducted on March 17th. The statement does not dare to deny these facts thus making it obvious that all the talk that the Dalai Lama would like to state categorically that he left Lhasa of his own free will and not under duress is a deceptive statement.

In the statement there are all kinds of signs which make one doubt whether after all it is a statement by the Dalai Lama himself. In the first place, the contents of the statement completely run counter to the many statements and articles by the Dalai Lama in the past

eight years right up to the three letters in the Dalai Lama's own handwriting dated after the occurrence of the rebellion on March 10th. Even in 1956 when the Dalai Lama was in India and was surrounded by the reactionaries he had certainly not expressed during his conversations with Premier Chou En-lai such viewpoints as catering to foreign aggressors, as those contained in the present statement.

Secondly, although the present statement was issued in the form of a statement by the Dalai Lama himself, yet one cannot find mention of the first person "I" throughout the whole statement. In fact the third person "he" is used throughout. This is not the Tibetan style of writing at all, but some European or some quasi-European style of writing. Certain phrases in the statement are likewise foreign. For instance, the so-called suzerainty of China was initiated by the British imperialists and British aggression against Tibet was carried out precisely under the cover of recognising what it called China's "suzerainty over Tibet". Such terms have never been used in the documents of the Chinese Central People's Government, nor in the documents of the Tibet Local Government. The present gang of Tibetan rebels has been completely fostered by the British. Indian expansionist elements have inherited this inglorious legacy from Britain. And that is why members of this gang were of a mind to join foreign forces from within our country with their faces turned towards India and their backs to their motherland. Some phrases in the statement sound very similar to those used recently by certain foreign publications and statements when referring to the rebellion in Tibet, such as, "The Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of the Buddhists" and so on.

From what has been said one has reason to suspect that the statement was not made by the Dalai Lama himself but was imposed on him by others.

THE DALAI SPEAKS ON HIS OWN BEHALF

At his first press conference in India, on 20 June 1959 at Mussoorie, the Dalai Lama told the story of the Tibetan rebellion in his own words. The following statement was issued to the newspapermen before the Dalai answered questions:

Ever since my arrival in India, I have been receiving almost every day sad and distressing news of the suffering and inhuman treatment of my people. I have heard almost daily, with a heavy heart, of their increasing agony and affliction, their harassment and persecution and of the terrible deportation and execution of innocent men. These have made me realise forcibly that the time has manifestly arrived when in the interests of my people and religion and to save them from the danger of near-annihilation, I must not keep silent any longer but must frankly and plainly tell the world the truth about Tibet and appeal to the conscience of all peace-loving and civilised nations.

THE TRAGIC HAPPENINGS

To understand and appreciate the significance and implication of the recent tragic happenings in Tibet, it is necessary to refer to the main events which have occurred in the country since 1950. It is recognised by every independent observer that Tibet had virtually been independent by enjoying and exercising all rights of sovereignty, whether internal or external. This has also been impliedly admitted by the Communist Government of China, for the very structure, terms and conditions of the so-called agreement of 1951 conclusively show that it was an agreement between two independent and sovereign States. It follows, therefore, that when the Chinese armies violated the territorial integrity of Tibet they were committing a flagrant act of aggression. The agreement which followed the invasion of Tibet was also thrust upon its people and government by the threat of arms. It was never accepted by them of their own free will. The consent of the government was secured under duress and at the point of the bayonet. My representatives were compelled to sign the agreement under threat of further military operations against Tibet by the invading armies of China leading to utter ravage and ruin of the country. Even the Tibetan seal which was affixed to the agreement was not the seal of my

representatives but a seal copied and fabricated by the Chinese authorities in Peking, and kept in their possession ever since.

"REIGN OF TERROR"

While I and my government did not voluntarily accept the agreement, we were obliged to acquiesce in it and decided to abide by the terms and conditions in order to save my people and country from the danger of total destruction. It was, however, clear from the very beginning that the Chinese had no intention of carrying out the agreement. Although they had solemnly undertaken to maintain my status and power as the Dalai Lama, they did not lose any opportunity to undermine my authority and sow dissensions among my people. In fact, they compelled me, situated as I was, to dismiss my Prime Ministers under threat of their execution without trial because they had in all honesty and sincerity resisted the unjustified usurpation of power by the representatives of the Chinese Government in Tibet. Far from carrying out the agreement, they began deliberately to pursue a course of policy which was diametrically opposed to the terms and conditions which they had themselves laid down. Thus commenced a reign of terror which finds few parallels in the history of Tibet. Forced labour and compulsory exactions, a systematic persecution of the people, plunder and confiscation of property belonging to individuals and monasteries, and execution of certain leading men in Tibet—these are the glorious achievements of the Chinese rule in Tibet. During all this time, patiently and sincerely I endeavoured to appease my people and to calm down their feelings and at the same time tried my best to persuade the Chinese authorities in Lhasa to adopt a policy of conciliation and friendliness. In spite of repeated failures, I persisted in this policy till the last day when it became impossible for me to render any useful service to my people by remaining in Tibet. It is in these circumstances that I was obliged to leave my country in order to save it from further danger and disaster.

NEUTRAL INVESTIGATION

I wish to make it clear that I have made these assertions against the Chinese officials in Tibet in the full knowledge of their gravity because I know them to be true. Perhaps the Peking Government are not fully aware of the facts of the situation, but if they are not

prepared to accept these statements, let them agree to an investigation on the point by an international commission. On our part, I and my government will readily agree to abide by the verdict of such an impartial body.

CHINESE BREAK PROMISES

It is necessary for me to add that before I visited India in 1956, it had become increasingly clear to me that my policy of amity and tolerance had totally failed to create any impression on the representatives of the Chinese Government in Tibet. Indeed, they had frustrated every measure adopted by me to remove the bitter resentment felt by my people and to bring about a peaceful atmosphere in the country for the purpose of carrying out the necessary reforms. As I was unable to do anything for the benefit of my people, I had practically made up my mind when I came to India not to return to Tibet until there was a manifest change in the attitude of the Chinese authorities. I, therefore, sought the advice of the Prime Minister of India, who has always shown me unfailing kindness and consideration. After his talk with the Chinese Prime Minister and on the strength of the assurances given by him on behalf of China, Mr. Nehru advised me to change my decision. I followed his advice and returned to Tibet in the hope that conditions would change substantially for the better, and I have no doubt that my hopes would have been realised if the Chinese authorities had on their part carried out the assurances which the Chinese Prime Minister had given to the Prime Minister of India. It was, however, painfully clear soon after my return that the representatives of the Chinese Government had no intention to adhere to their promises. The natural and inevitable result was that the situation steadily grew worse until it became impossible to control the spontaneous upsurge of my people against the tyranny and oppression of the Chinese authorities.

NOT OPPOSED TO REFORMS

At this point I wish to emphasise that I and my government have never been opposed to the reforms which are necessary in the social, economic and political systems prevailing in Tibet. We have no desire to disguise the fact that ours is an ancient society and that we must introduce immediate changes in the interests of the people of Tibet. In fact, during the last nine years several reforms were

proposed by me and my government, but every time these measures were strenuously opposed by the Chinese in spite of popular demand for them, with the result that nothing was done for the betterment of the social and economic conditions of the people. In particular, it was my earnest desire that the system of land tenure should be radically changed without further delay and the large landed estates acquired by the State on payment of compensation for distribution amongst the tillers of the soil. But the Chinese authorities deliberately put every obstacle in the way of carrying out this just and reasonable reform. I desire to lay stress on the fact that we, as firm believers in Buddhism, welcome change and progress consistent with the genius of our people and the rich traditions of our country, but the people of Tibet will stoutly resist any victimisation, sacrilege and plunder in the name of reforms, a policy which is now being enforced by the representatives of the Chinese Government in Lhasa.

"A CLEAR PICTURE"

I have attempted to present a clear and unvarnished picture of the situation in Tibet. I have endeavoured to tell the entire civilised world the real truth about Tibet, the truth which must ultimately prevail, however strong the forces of evil may appear to be today. I also wish to declare that we Buddhists firmly and steadfastly believe in peace and desire to live in peace with all the peoples and countries of the world. Although recent actions and policies of the Chinese authorities in Tibet have created strong feelings of bitterness and resentment against the Government of China, we, Tibetans, lay and monk alike, do not cherish any feelings of enmity and hatred against the great Chinese people. We wish to live in peace and ask for peace and goodwill from all the countries of the world. I and my government are, therefore, fully prepared to welcome a peaceful and amicable solution of the present tragic problem, provided that such a solution guarantees the preservation of the rights and powers which Tibet has enjoyed and exercised without any interference prior to 1950. We must also insist on the creation of a favourable climate by the immediate adoption of the essential measures as a condition precedent to negotiations for a peaceful settlement. We ask for peace and for a peaceful settlement, but we must also ask for the maintenance of the status and the rights of our State and people.

"To you, gentlemen of the press, I and my people owe a great debt of gratitude for all that you have done to assist us in our struggle for survival and freedom. Your sympathy and support have given us courage and strengthened our determination. I confidently hope that you will continue to lend the weight of your influence to the cause of peace and freedom which the people of Tibet are fighting today. Gentlemen, I thank you, one and all, on behalf of my people as well as on my own behalf.

Part Seven

MR. NEHRU'S SPEECHES ON TIBET IN THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT

The first statement on Tibet made by Mr. Nehru in the Indian Parliament was on March 23, in which he described the reported clashes in Tibet as "clash of wills". Later, a great debate developed in Parliament, and the Prime Minister made several statements, some of them in reply to debates.

The speeches included in this Part have to be read in the light of the extracts from the debates included in the following Part. Mr Nehru's speeches have been classified separately because they reveal an approach to Sino-Indian relations which is distinctively his own. Also, his speeches were all along characterised by a marked restraint which is almost altogether missed in the utterances of statesmen these days on any international controversy.

It should be added that although many members of the Indian Parliament spoke about China in terms much stronger than Mr. Nehru's, his main approach to the Tibetan question had the support of the Congress Party and of the broad masses of the Indian people. He was heard with respect in China, where several of his statements were published in full. The Chinese used strong language about other Indians, but with Mr. Nehru they all along tried to argue out their case in Tibet.



PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE LOK SABHA
ON 23 MARCH 1959

"A CLASH OF WILLS"

Recent reports about happenings in the Tibet region of China have naturally aroused a great deal of interest in the country. The sequence of events is not clear to us. But I should like to make a brief statement on the principal facts in so far as we know them. Last week, on the 17th March, in the course of the discussion on the Demands for the Ministry of External Affairs, I referred briefly to the tense situation there. I mentioned that there had been a clash of wills although no major violence had occurred recently.

We have since received fuller information from our Consul General in Lhasa. It appears that various rumours in regard to the Dalai Lama caused excitement in Lhasa. About two weeks ago, a large crowd of Tibetans entered the premises of the Indian Consulate General. They spoke to our Consul General about the rumours and their apprehensions. Three days later, a large number of Tibetan women came to our Consulate General and requested our Consul General to accompany them to the Chinese Foreign Bureau and be a witness to their presenting certain demands. The Consul General told them that this was not proper and he could not accompany them or associate himself with any demonstration. The Consul General brought these incidents to the notice of the Chinese Foreign Bureau at Lhasa. He had rightly decided not to interfere in these internal affairs.

On the 20th March, fighting suddenly broke out between the Chinese troops and Tibetan elements. There was firing in the vicinity of our Consulate General and some stray bullets hit our building. For some time it was not possible for the Consul General to go out of the premises. All our staff and their families are safe and no significant damage to property has been reported. Apparently, the situation in Lhasa has somewhat quietened down.

There are about thirty members of our staff in the Consulate General at Lhasa. Together with their families the number is about 100. There are about sixteen other nationals in the Lhasa region about whom we have no full information at present.

As soon as the fighting broke out in Lhasa, we requested the Chinese Government, through our Ambassador in Peking and the

Chinese Ambassador here, to ensure the fullest protection to our personnel and properties in Lhasa and they promised to do so. On the 21st March, a representative of the Chinese Foreign Bureau in Lhasa called on our Consul General and suggested to him that for the better protection of himself and his staff, they should move into the Foreign Bureau. We have instructed our Consul General to inform the Foreign Bureau that it will not be right or proper for our Consul General to leave the premises. A large number of Indian nationals are involved, including the families of our personnel, and there are valuable properties and records within our premises. In accordance with international law and usage, our Consul General and his staff and our records and properties are entitled to the fullest protection and we have no doubt that the Chinese Government will see the reasonableness of our request.

This outbreak of violence in Lhasa itself is a new development. Previously there had been conflicts in various parts of southern Tibet between the Khampas and the Chinese forces. But the Lhasa region had remained quiet.

The House will appreciate that this is a difficult and delicate situation and we should avoid doing anything which will worsen it. We have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China with whom we have friendly relations. In 1954 the Sino-Indian Agreement was concluded. It was in this that, for the first time, the principle of Panch Sheel was stated.

There is a long tradition of cultural and religious ties between India and the Tibet region of China. In this region lie many places of pilgrimage which are considered holy by both Hindus and Buddhists and large numbers of our people visit them every year. The Dalai Lama, whom we had the honour and pleasure of receiving in our country in 1956-57, is held in high veneration by our people and we hope he is safe. We earnestly trust that the present troubles will be resolved peacefully.

Our Consul General at Lhasa and his staff are in a difficult situation for reasons beyond their control. I have no doubt that the House will wish me to send our best wishes on this occasion to him and to our other representatives in the Tibet region.

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE LOK SABHA
ON 30 MARCH 1959

MR. SPEAKER: It is clear that there is no question of censure involved in this. All hon. Members are anxious to know as to what exactly is the matter.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: These adjournment motions as adjournment motions, if I may say so, can hardly arise. But so far as I am concerned, I do not wish to take shelter under any technical plea of not giving any information that I think ought to be given. Indeed subject to certain very broad considerations to which Shri Tyagi referred I wish to place all the information that we get before the House as it comes in and I propose to do so in the future too. It is not necessary for hon. Members to demand a statement from me but I shall do so whenever any important piece of information comes. I shall place it before the House.

At the present moment we have a mass of statements in the press, rumours, allegations, statements of the Chinese Government from which it is a little difficult to sort out exactly the truth of what is happening. We have one thing on which you can certainly say that there it is. There are press communiques issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China. I do not understand why hon. Members bring in the news agency in this matter. It is a Government communique and the news agency did a completely right thing in placing the official communique before us and before the public. You may not like the wording of the communique or the content of it. That is a different matter. But it is the duty of a news agency to deal with such an important matter and not to suppress it but to place it before the public.

MASSING OF TROOPS

May I also refer to what, for instance, hon. Member Shri Imam has talked about the massing of troops. Now, I am completely unaware of this. In fact, I have not heard a rumour to that effect, leave out the facts. And he wants an adjournment motion because there is massing of troops on the Indian border.

MR. NAUSHIR BHARUCHA: He said about fanning out of Chinese troops.

MR. MOHAMMED IMAM: That is the word I used in my adjournment motion.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: All kinds of things are appearing in the press which again are based sometimes presumably on reports not from within Tibet but from outside Tibet, whether it is Hong Kong or whether it is any other place. I do not say that any such rumour must necessarily be wrong. How can I say that? But, normally speaking, they are not correct. Any how, my information is that there are no massing of troops on the Indian border, so far as I know. How can I discuss it when I do not accept that fact?

But, the major things that we have to consider are, as I said on the last occasion, the contacts of India with Tibet are very old, geographical, of course, trade, of course, but much more so, cultural and religious. Vast numbers of pilgrims go from here there and some come from Tibet to India. So that, this contact, this relationship is something deeper than the changing political scene. Naturally we are affected by it. Apart from that, as I said on the last occasion, large numbers of people in India venerate the Dalai Lama, respect him very greatly and he was our guest, honoured guest some time ago. Because of these contacts our reaction to anything that happens in Tibet is bound to be very deep, as we see it. It is not for me to object to those reactions. But, we have to bear them in mind.

ASYLUM QUESTION

May I say that all these questions that have been recently put about giving political asylum are, probably, of no service at all to the people who might seek political asylum in India? It is no good. One has to see the difficult situation as it is and not merely create conditions which make it more difficult to deal with the situation or deal with the persons seeking political asylum. There it is. Whatever I say in regard to that will make it more difficult for these people, I say. So that, on the one side there is this feeling of a certain kinship, if I may use that word, cultural kinship between the people of India and the people of Tibet.

That, of course, does not mean that we interfere in Tibet, in any way. We did interfere, not we, I mean, but the previous Government of India took an expedition to Lhasa under Col. Younghusband, 55 years ago. It very much interfered, imperialist intervention. They sat down there and imposed the British Government's will, acting through the then Government of India, on Tibet and imposed

our troops there in Tibet, in Yatung, Gyantse. All kinds of extra-territorial privileges were imposed on Tibet because Tibet was weak and there was the British Empire. With some variations, we inherited these special extraterritorial privileges when India became independent.

Regardless of what happened in Tibet or China or anywhere, we could not, according to our own policy, maintain our forces in a foreign country, even if there had been no change in Tibet. That was a relic of British imperialism which we did not wish to continue. We had to withdraw them back. It so happened that soon after this change in the Government in China—about that time, soon after—their armies marched into Tibet. What I am venturing to say is that the policy we adopted towards Tibet would have been adopted regardless of what China did and we would have withdrawn our forces, etc. That was the main thing we did.

MR. BRAJ RAJ SINGH: There, everybody agrees.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Apparently people seem to imagine that we surrendered some privileges in Tibet. The privileges which we surrendered in Tibet were privileges which we do not seek to have in any other country in the world, Tibet or any other. It was patent from the strictly practical point of view, even apart from sentiment, that we could not do anything in Tibet either in law, constitutionally or practically.

TIBETAN AUTONOMY

Our attitude and historically, previously—I am not going to the past history of 500 years—the position of all previous Governments in India and elsewhere has been the recognition of some kind of suzerainty or sovereignty of China over Tibet and Tibetan autonomy. That was normally the basis of approach. The measure of the autonomy has varied, because the strength of China, or the weakness of China, the strength of Tibet, and the weakness of Tibet has varied in the course of the last hundreds of years. But, that is the position. Every Government in China has claimed that. Many Governments in Tibet have repudiated that. So, there it is. Anyhow, we could not become judges or interfere or intervene either in law, or in fact, or in the circumstances, we could do nothing. That is just past history.

May I say one thing to the House? When the Premier of the Chinese Government came here three or four years ago or two-and-a-

half years ago, he discussed this question of situation in Tibet with me at his own instance. I did not raise it so far as I remember. He told me then that Tibet had always been, according to him and according to the Chinese position, a part of the Chinese State; that is, they have always claimed it and they have had it, according to him; but yet, Tibet was not China. Tibet is not China; Tibet is not a province of China. Tibet is an autonomous region which has been a part of the Chinese State. That was, as far as I remember, his words. Therefore, we want to treat it as an autonomous region and give it full autonomy. That is how he explained the Chinese Government's attitude to Tibet. All I can say is that we had to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. But, I was glad to hear Mr. Chou En-lai laying such stress on Tibetan autonomy. I said, if this was fully acted upon and was well known to Tibetans, possibly the difficulties would be much less, because, I remember, difficulties had arisen already, three years ago.

For nearly three years, there has been what is called the Khampa revolt in China. Khampa region, although it consists of people of Tibetan origin, is not technically Tibet now. About 50 or 60 years ago, the Khampa region in eastern Tibet was incorporated in China. It was never really adequately controlled or ruled by any authority, Tibetan or Chinese, because Khampas are mountain people, rather tough people, not liking anybody ruling them.

KHAMPA REBELS

When the new Chinese Government came in, quite apart from Tibet proper, the Khampa region was in China proper. They started introducing their new reforms or changes, whatever they did in land or otherwise in the Khampa region. That brought them into trouble with the Khampas in Tibet—not actually in Tibet, but the Tibetans in China, you may say. That trouble started two or three years ago or more than that—about three years ago, locally confined there. Then it spread and it spread to the south and south-east chiefly. Naturally one does not have details. But, it was a kind of guerilla activities which went on causing much trouble to both the parties and damage and all that. That has been continuing. When the Premier Chou En-lai talked to me, this Khampa trouble had started. It is not a kind of trouble which is of great military importance to every Government: not that; it is a nuisance and it prevents things from settling down.

That has been continuing. Nothing new has happened except that in some border some convoy has been attacked or taken away or something has been happening. The new thing, what has happened in Lhasa, may I say, has not flown from that; it is really a completely new development. The very matter was mentioned by me in this House and to the press here the moment we heard of fighting there. Previous to that, only a few days previously, I had spoken in this House and talked about the conflict of wills there. I thought that expression was a good expression to describe what was happening there because there was no violence at that stage. Nobody had hit anybody. But, this conflict had come out in the open in the sense of people talking in the open. It lasted three, four or five days when actual firing began. I cannot say who began it, but it began. Normally, one would say that where it is a question of military might, the Chinese Government is much stronger than some kind of local recruits of the Tibetan army. It is obvious. So, that has been the background of it.

Now, it is unfortunate that all this damage is done. I do not know what damage has been done, but some considerable damage has been done to some of the old monasteries in Lhasa, and may be, some valued manuscripts have suffered thereby; and all that has happened, and our sympathies go out very much to the Tibetans . . .

MR. JAIPAL SINGH: Hear, hear.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: . . . quite apart from the actual incidents, what happened, who was to blame and who was not to blame.

In the press today, the Chinese news agency has published some letters, which, it is said, have been written by the Dalai Lama to the Chinese Governor, the Military Governor of Lhasa, just in this month. I would not like to say anything about those letters. I should like to have a little greater confirmation about them, about what they are, in what circumstances they were written, whether they were written at all. It is very difficult; because all these things are being said by various parties, it is exceedingly difficult to sift the truth out of this lot of chaff. And whatever I may say, whatever my Government may do, may have far-reaching consequences.

NO DICTATION

We talk about Tibet, and we want to have friendly relations

with the people of Tibet, and we want them to progress in freedom and all that. At the same time, it is important for us to have friendly relations with this great country of China. That does not mean that I or this Government or this Parliament or anyone else should submit to any kind of dictation from any country, however great or big it may be.

SOME HON. MEMBERS: Hear, hear.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is not the point. But it also does mean that in a difficult situation, we should exercise a certain measure of restraint and wisdom in dealing with her, and not in an excited moment do something which may lead our country into difficulties. (*Interruptions*)

Today is the 30th of this month. It was on the 20th, the early morning of the 20th, that firing began—it is now ten days—in a country from which no news comes, except rumour. The only news that has come to us or to the wide world—I am leaving out China; they might have some special ways of getting news—the only news that came was from our Consul General's telegrams to us. We got them pretty rapidly.

But what can the Consul General report? Remember that too. The Consul General reports by and large what he sees from the window of his consulate. Obviously, he cannot tell us what is happening all over Tibet. He does not know. He is in touch with Lhasa, and more or less Lhasa is what he can see from his consulate, just round about what buildings firing took place, and he can report it. He cannot even tell us what is happening in Lhasa itself. He cannot tell us precisely and definitely what has happened to our nationals who are spread out. He can tell us definitely that our staff in our consulate is safe. He can tell us also that so far as he knows our other Indian nationals are safe, but he is not certain, because he just cannot reach them, so that all news has been cut off, and it comes to us in extremely small dribblets, news that we can rely upon. And it becomes difficult for me to make statements or to say that we shall take some action, because of vague rumours which are obviously not always reliable.

Now, may I just say one word—I think I have answered it—about the people from Ladakh? It has been the old custom of people from Ladakh to go to Lhasa, and they do not take any travel papers or anything. They go for courses of instruction. Lhasa is in a sense their spiritual centre, their educational centre, from the

Buddhist point of view. So, plenty of people go there. At the present moment, I have been informed that four head abbots from Leh are there, as well as—I forget the number—about 30, or 40 or 50—or it may be somewhere about a hundred—monks and others who have gone there. We have not got them on our register there, because they simply come and go, and do not report to us. But as soon as I heard about this two days ago, we are making inquiries about them.

CHINESE STATEMENTS

Now, I come to the statements issued presumably by the Chinese Government. Now, these statements give a narrative of facts according to them, and I have nothing to say to that. I can neither confirm it nor deny it, because it is not in my knowledge to make a firm statement; if it was, I would make it.

As I said, so far as the letters which are said to have been written by the Dalai Lama are concerned, they are rather surprising letters. But more I cannot say; I should like to know more about them before I say.

There are two things mentioned in this statement of the Chinese authorities. One is about Kalimpong. About that, as soon as that appeared, the External Affairs Ministry, through a spokesman, contradicted that statement or corrected it. I suppose hon. Members have seen it, but I shall read it out or part of it, if they have not:

Asked for his comments on the description of Kalimpong as "the commanding centre of the rebellion" in the news communique released... an official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs emphatically repudiated the suggestion. He said that a number of people from Tibet have been residing in Kalimpong for many years...

—many years meaning twenty, thirty, forty, fifty and more—
... and among them are some who arrived during the last three or four years.

It is not many, it may be in dozens, perhaps.

The Government of India have repeatedly made it clear to them that they should not indulge in any propaganda activities against a friendly Government on Indian soil. The last warning was given about six months ago and since then these persons have remained quiet. There have been no unlawful activities in Kalimpong or elsewhere either by these people or others. It is, therefore, entirely incorrect to say that Kalimpong is the centre of any rebellious activities.

The check-posts on the India-Tibet border are adequately manned and the strictest watch is always maintained on movements between India and Tibet.

CHINESE COMPLAINT

Now, an hon. Member wanted precise information as to whether the Chinese Government had complained to us about Kalimpong. I shall tell him, so far as I can remember, in the last few months, maybe, a year, there has been no complaint; but there were on two occasions perhaps, two or maybe three in the last three or four years, references to Kalimpong, to some people in Kalimpong carrying on propaganda and like activities. Our position has always been, and we have made it quite clear to people who came from Tibet, important people, that "You are welcome to come here, but we cannot allow Indian soil to be used for subversive activities or even aggressively propagandist activities against friendly Governments." That general policy of ours applies to every Embassy that is here; maybe sometimes, they overstep the mark or we do not object when we might have objected. That applies to every Embassy here or every foreigner here. So that was the rule that we followed. And on two or three occasions, some leaflet came out in Kalimpong, which we thought was undesirable, and we drew the attention of the people who had brought it out, saying "You should not do this, this kind of thing from Indian soil." And our instructions and warnings had effect, so far as we know we are not aware, in fact, in the last many months, of any activity in Kalimpong; it may be in people's minds there; naturally, they may have feelings; they may have sentiments. But I am merely saying that it is wrong to say that Kalimpong was a kind of centre from which activities were organised.

MRS. RENU CHAKRAVARTY: Has the Prime Minister read Elizabeth Partridge's article which has come in one of the papers where she says that she has contacted the rebels? It has come out in the papers.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I have not read that particular article. I do not know to which article the hon. lady Member is referring. In one or two cases, foreign correspondents have gone and talked to people there in Kalimpong or wherever it is; I do not know where, it may be Kalimpong, or it may be elsewhere, but they have not mentioned names or the place or the individuals contacted. And they have given an account from the point of view, more or less,

of those people in Tibet, who were on the site of the revolt: That I cannot catch, I cannot get it, but broadly speaking, it is wrong to say that Kalimpong has been the centre. Certainly, we have very good control of our check-posts, of people coming and going from Tibet to India, and nobody in Kalimpong can easily come or go, and you cannot control something where the movement is not easy.

I am told that when we enquired about Elizabeth Partridge's article, we found she had not gone anywhere near the border; she had written it from far away.

DISCUSSION IN PARLIAMENT

The second point to which reference has been made by hon. Members is to what is said in those press statements about our discussions here. It is not necessary for me to say that it is open to this House, this Parliament, and it is completely free to say or do what it chooses, to discuss any matter it chooses, subject always to the necessities of good sense and wisdom of which you, Sir, are the best judge. Nobody else outside this House is going to judge.

Unfortunately, the methods of government and the way legislatures and organisations function in China are different from ours. Perhaps it is not quite realised there, the background or the way of our functioning. Quite apart from what we do, or whether what any hon. Member says is right or wrong, he has the right to say it; he has the right to say the wrong thing, as many hon. Members on the opposite side know very well.

MR. HEM BARUA: You enjoy that right equally!

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is, I suppose, a little difficult for people trained in a different tradition for a long time to understand the normal ways in which a parliamentary system of government functions, and we should not be over-eager to find fault with somebody who does not agree with us, who describes our system in a different way, but certainly it should be made perfectly clear to all concerned that this Parliament is not going to be limited in the exercise of its right of discussion, saying or action or anything, by any external or internal authority, whoever it may be. Having said that, obviously that right has to be exercised always with wisdom and always thinking of the consequences, and how that right should be exercised.

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE LOK SABHA
ON 2 APRIL 1959

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I must express my deep regret for my absence yesterday from the House as I had gone out of Delhi. Since my return this morning, I have tried to get myself acquainted with what happened in the House by reading the official reports. I have not read any newspaper yet. I do not know what the newspapers say. I think the official reports would naturally be more reliable. I must say, reading them, although I got a gist of what happened, I sensed that much of what happened yesterday was—shall I say—I wish to say nothing disrespectful but there was an exhibition of a certain lack of restraint, if I may say so, and certain strong feelings which came in the way of the consideration of the matter that was placed before you and before the House.

Now, the matter is important and I can very well understand the strong feelings and the matter is important not because of the one or two or more adjournment motions that were moved here but because of what lies behind those motions. It is that which has led to strong feelings in the House and in the country. The actual motions were perhaps not very important but the other thing is important. Because the other thing is important, it is all the more necessary that we should not be led away by relatively extraneous or minor matters into doing or saying things which affect the other major things at issue. They are big things at issue and in that matter I cannot say that every Member of this House is of identical opinion. But I do think that nearly all the Members of this House will broadly agree—I imagine so and anyhow whether large or not, we have to realise—the importance of what is happening and the consequences of what is happening. We have to shape our policy keeping full regard naturally, the first thing, for the honour and dignity and the interests of India; secondly, the honour and dignity of the causes for which we stand. Also, we must remember that when conflicts arise which lead to this certain degree of passion on various sides one has to be particularly careful, especially this Honourable House whose words go out to the ends of the earth. We have to be particularly careful at a moment of difficulty such as this, that we function and we say whatever we have to say with dignity and, as I ventured to say last time, wisdom. That does not mean

moderating any policy. We follow the policy which the House will ultimately agree to.

COMMUNIST PARTY STATEMENT

Now, Sir, the two matters, as far as I can gather, that were raised yesterday in two adjournment motions were a statement issued by the Communist Party of India and the circulation of an article in the *People's Daily* of Peking, circulation presumably by an agency attached to the Chinese Embassy here. These were the two matters, if I am not mistaken.

MR. SPEAKER: Yes, they are the two matters.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Before I deal with them, may I, Sir, mention one thing. Perhaps you have, Sir, another adjournment motion today. I have received notice of it and I do not know whether you have been pleased to consider it, but I might also deal with that adjournment motion. There is an adjournment motion—there are two in fact—asking me, first of all, as to whether there is any truth that the Chinese authorities have expressed a wish to search the premises of Indian missions in Tibet or asked us to vacate those premises. Now, here is an instance of every rumour, which are appearing in newspapers in great abundance, affecting the people being brought into the House by way of an adjournment motion or some other motion. There is no truth in this at all. Nobody has asked us to vacate our premises. Nobody has asked us to search our missions abroad. But everything comes in in the shape of an adjournment motion or asking me to make a statement. It is very difficult to keep pace with the amount of statements which are appearing in the press now, coming chiefly from Kalimpong or Hong Kong—those appear to be the two sources of information. Anyhow, there is no truth in that.

Then, again, there was another adjournment motion asking me whether it is true that the Chinese Embassy sent for a top leader of the Communist Party of India to discuss various matters, with them. Now, how am I to know, Sir? I do not. I have no information on the subject. I can say nothing.

TIBETANS' VISIT

Another matter—it is not the subject of an adjournment motion, I think I was asked to make a statement on it—is the visit, as it is said, of a group of Tibetans to me a day or two ago. Now, day

before yesterday a large number, about 125 people came to visit me. Normally speaking, Sir, every morning in my house a few hundred people come. It is an open door more or less. Large numbers of peasants, students and others come because, unfortunately, I am supposed to be one of the sights of Delhi.

Anyhow, about these 125 people, they said they had come to Delhi and wanted to pay their respects to me. I said, certainly come. The great majority of them were Indian nationals, chiefly from Darjeeling, Kalimpong and those northern areas. Some were from Calcutta, that is to say, Indian nationals of Tibetan origin representing some association in Calcutta, Banaras, Kalimpong and others. There were a few, I forget how many people from Tibet proper who had gathered here some days ago. They came. We had no discussion. They did give me a paper, a kind of a memorandum which I took, and then I bid good-bye to them. That is all that happened.

Coming to the two matters which were referred to yesterday, one was the statement of the Communist Party of India. Now, I have, naturally, endeavoured to get a copy of that statement and read it carefully. I presume that it is a correct copy that I have. I have no reason to doubt its correctness, but I cannot guarantee that.

MR. SPEAKER: I have been given an alternative copy. If there is any difference I will point out.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Well, I am not going to read it, Sir, but I take it that I have a correct copy. I have read it carefully and, if I may express my own opinion about it, the whole background of the statement is not one with which I would agree. I do not agree with it. There are certain slants with which I do not agree. But the question before us, I take it, is not whether we agree with the statement or not, slant given in that statement or not, but, rather, if any great impropriety has been committed by the issue of that statement. I am not myself quite clear how, normally speaking, if a statement is issued by a political party outside that statement becomes the subject matter of an adjournment motion in this House. It is not clear to me. Of course, each case depends upon the content but, broadly speaking—whether one agrees with the statement or disagrees is a completely different matter—political parties sometimes attack each other, criticise each other, or say something which another party may consider very objectionable. But, nevertheless, it is not clear to me how this matter can be raised by way of an adjournment motion.

Now, it has been stated that it was raised because this statement challenged the *bona fides* of what I had said two days before about Kalimpong. I have read the statement carefully. What I would say is this, that it does not precisely and explicitly do that. But it does certainly throw a hint that what I might have said, whether through misinformation or otherwise, might not be correct, so that I do not quite know what to do about it.

KALIMPONG

I shall repeat and, perhaps, a little more fully what I did previously, what I said about Kalimpong. You will remember, Sir, that in certain statements issued by the Chinese Government Kalimpong was referred to as the commanding centre of the Tibetan rebellion, and I said this is not true at all, and the External Affairs Ministry had also denied this. At the same time, I had said that I have often said that Kalimpong has been centre of trouble.

Kalimpong, Sir, has been often described as a nest of spies, spies of innumerable nationalities, not one, spies from Asia, spies from Europe, spies from America, spies of Communists, spies of anti-Communists, red spies, white spies, blue spies, pink spies and so on. Once a knowledgeable person who knew something about this matter and was in Kalimpong actually said to me, though no doubt it was a figure of speech, that there were probably more spies in Kalimpong than the rest of the inhabitants put together. That is an exaggeration. But it has become in the last few years, especially in the last seven or eight years. As Kalimpong is more or less perched near the borders of India, and since the developments in Tibet some years ago since a change took place there, it became of a great interest to all kinds of people outside India, and many people have come here in various guises, sometimes as technical people, sometimes as bird watchers, sometimes as geologists, sometimes as journalists and sometimes with some other purpose, just to admire the natural scenery, and so they all seem to find an interest; the main object of their interest, whether it is bird watching or something else, was round about Kalimpong.

UNDESIRABLE PERSONS

Naturally we have taken interest in this. We have to. While we cannot say that we know exactly everything that took place there, broadly we do know and we have repeatedly taken objection to

those persons concerned or to their Embassies. We have pointed this out and we have in the past even hinted that some people better remove themselves from there, and they have removed themselves. This has been going on for the last few years so there is no doubt that so far as Kalimpong is concerned there has been a deal of espionage and counter-espionage and a complicated game of chess by various nationalities and various numbers of spies and counter-spies there. No doubt a person with the ability to write fiction of this kind will find Kalimpong an interesting place for some novel of that type.

MR. NATH PAI: What is the Home Ministry doing about it? It seems to be absolutely ineffective.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The Home Ministry or the External Affairs Ministry are not at all worried about the situation.

MR. HEM BARUA: They allow the spies to espionage?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Absolutely yes, first of all, because when we suspect a person of espionage we keep a watch over him. If he does something patently wrong we take action, but there are certain limitations in the law, as the House very well knows, and we cannot function merely because we suspect somebody, and we have taken action in the past in regard to some people.

MR. P. N. SINGH: In how many cases action has been taken?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I cannot say that—actions of various types, as I said.

CHINESE STATEMENT

Now, about this particular matter, the statement by the Chinese Government, please remember the statement, "this was the commanding centre of Tibetan rebellion". I cannot say—how can I—that nobody in Kalimpong has indulged in espionage against the Chinese Government or against any other Government. I cannot say. Somebody whispers something to somebody else's ear. But I did repudiate and I repudiate today that to say Kalimpong has been the commanding centre gives it a place in this matter which is, I think, completely untrue.

Now, in the past several years—and I said so on the last occasion—the Chinese Government has drawn our attention to what they said were activities in the Kalimpong area, that is activities aimed against them. And repeatedly we have made enquiries; apart from our normal enquiries we have made special enquiries. I say this because

I find that in the Communist Party's statement we are asked to have an investigation. In so far as espionage activities are concerned we have investigated them several times. One cannot investigate these activities in any other way except through intelligence methods. That is being done. We have fairly full reports about it. I have got—I need not go into it—a fairly full note as to when the protest came from the Chinese Government. Three or four years ago it was mentioned to me and it was mentioned to our Ambassador some years ago, and we enquired and we took action. Sometimes we found that their protests or the facts that they stated did not have any particular basis. They would say, for instance, that an organisation in Kalimpong was doing something or other. We found there was no such organisation in Kalimpong at all. There were organisations there; there were of course people in Kalimpong. Everybody knows that. There are some emigrants from Tibet. There are old Tibetans, that is to say, who have been there for a generation or more, but whose feelings may be against the Chinese Government. That is so; there is no doubt about it, and we cannot do anything about it but we did make it perfectly clear to them in accordance with our normal policy that they must not indulge in any propagandist activities and much less, of course, in any subversive activities.

NO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY

In the nature of things they could not do much even if they wanted to intimate except perhaps—I cannot guarantee that—occasionally send a message or receive a message. It is very difficult to stop that but that is on a very small scale. They could not do very much in India except again to whisper something in somebody's ears. That I cannot stop. They may have whispered something here and there. But it is obvious to me that they could not do much and they did not. Once or twice a certain leaflet or certain document was issued; somebody issued it. The moment it was issued we took action. We tried to trace it and we told them that they must not have been done. This has happened on three or four occasions. Again I repeat—we were charged with—it was said that Kalimpong was a commanding centre of the Tibetan rebellion. I denied that statement and I further said that apart from the last few years when there has occasionally been a paper or a leaflet or occasionally somebody in Kalimpong has perhaps met somebody else, privately and not publicly—that can always take place—and more particularly

in the last five or six months, more particularly I might say since we received the last protest from the Chinese Government—I think the last was early in August last year—we took particular care to enquire again and we had no complaints since then. So, even if some activities took place there by some people there previously they were of a relatively small nature except of course contacts, and what can we say about contacts in a place which, as I said, is so full of spies—there may be contacts, somebody meeting somebody. But in the last six months, we have taken particular care, and we have had no cause to think that any such action or activities had taken place there. I cannot conceive that Kalimpong could be—it has been described by the Chinese Government as the commanding centre—a commanding centre with the Indian Government not knowing about it. It is quite inconceivable to me. Some odd message can go or come and that is possible, but it cannot be, and to imagine that the Tibetan rebellion was organised from Kalimpong does seem to me a statement which cannot be justified.

MR. TRIDIB KUMAR CHAUDHURI: Did the Chinese Government in August complain that somebody was organising a rebellion from there?

TALK WITH CHINESE PRIME MINISTER

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No, Sir. Not that. They did not talk about rebellion. But so far as our records go, the first mention of it was made informally to us in 1956-57, when Premier Chou En-lai came here and it was mentioned to me and I replied that our policy was that we did not wish our soil—Indian soil—to be used for any subversive activities against a friendly country. But I also pointed out that there were obvious limitations under our law to take action on the basis of suspicion, and I requested his Government to supply me with special cases and that we would immediately enquire and take action if necessary. Then a year and a half later, the same matter was mentioned to our Ambassador in Peking. At that time a photostat copy of a pamphlet which has been circulated in Kalimpong was sent to us. This was about fifteen or sixteen months ago, i.e. in January, 1938. There is no doubt about it that that pamphlet was anti-Chinese. But on enquiry and examination, we found that there was no such association as had been described in that pamphlet itself, as a matter of fact, was two years old and had been issued in autumn of 1956—some ancient pamphlet which they have

got. That pamphlet was a bad one from our point of view, too, but some bogus name was given and somebody had issued it there.

There were, in fact, two associations in Kalimpong—one Tibetan Association, which has been in existence for 25 years and odd and the other, the Indo-Tibetan Association brought into being in 1954. The office-bearers of either of these associations were prominent emigrants, but neither of these associations was supposed to be engaged in political activities. In July, 1958, the Foreign Office in Peking presented a memorandum protesting against the use of Kalimpong area as a base for subversive and disruptive activities and five points were mentioned. Some names of persons were given. We immediately enquired into the activities of all these persons and we made detailed reports. We found that no doubt these persons held views which might be said to be anti-Chinese, but we could not get any information of any activity, propagandist or subversive.

COLLUSION CHARGE

The charge was made that they were in collusion with the United States and with the Kuomintang authorities of Formosa or their representatives. Some of the prominent emigrants in Kalimpong had previously been in the United States and had lived there for sometime. And, no doubt, they had their contacts there. We had no doubt about their views about it. But we have made it clear to them, even when they settled down in India, that we do not want Indian soil to be used for any subversive activities. Once when some letter or something was sent, we particularly looked into it and all those six persons who had been named in the Chinese Government's note were given specific warnings on the 14th of August through the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling and to our knowledge, since that date, they have not done so. But as I said, I cannot guarantee any secret thing.

There are three organisations mentioned in the Chinese note, viz., the Tibetan Freedom League, the Kalimpong-Tibetan Welfare Conference and the Buddhist Association which were alleged to be engaged in collecting intelligence from Tibet. We could not trace any of these three organisations and so far as we know, they are not in existence. Two other ones which I have mentioned previously were in existence and so far as we know, engaged in non-political activities.

MR. M. P. MISHRA: How did the Chinese get the information?
(Interruptions).

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The third objection in the Chinese note was to the reactionary views of a monthly called the *Tibetan Mirror*, which is edited by an Indian national of Ladakhi origin. As a matter of fact, we issued a warning to the editor, but we pointed out to the Chinese that many newspapers in India were far more anti-Government, i.e. anti-Government of India, and we could not and did not take any legal action against them.

MR. TYAGI: Peking must be inspiring them. .

CHINESE NOTE

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: A statement was further made in the Chinese note that agents and saboteurs were sent into Tibet and arms were smuggled and dispatched to the rebels. But no evidence was given and we are not aware of a single case. It is not an easy matter to cross the border between India and Tibet. Nobody can guarantee an individual perhaps going across, but to take arms, etc., was exceedingly difficult, practically impossible, without our knowledge.

Then the Chinese Government protested against agents of the Kuomintang operating in Kalimpong, particularly one gentleman whose name was given. We enquired into this matter. . . .

MR. SURENDRANATH DWIVEDI: May I ask whether all these details are necessary?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I thought they were not necessary; I agree with the hon. Member. But this matter has been discussed at such considerable length and warmth. We found that this gentleman who had been named had been in Calcutta two years earlier and had presumably returned, because we could not trace him.

Another note was presented to us by the Chinese Ambassador on the 4th August—that was in July, the previous month—drawing our attention to the setting up of a committee in Kalimpong for giving support to resistance against violence by the Tibetan reactionaries and that this committee was forcing people into support of the signature campaign, and also drawing attention to the alleged meeting of fifteen aristocrats wanting to make an appeal for support for Tibet. We enquired into this matter and we gave him our reply that so far as the leaders were concerned, we had already warned them.

The House will see that all this took place in August and there has been to our knowledge nothing which we could have called

objectionable, except private expression of opinion—that we cannot guarantee—during this period. Therefore, I venture to say that, in spite of the presence of people in Kalimpong to whom the Chinese Government might object because they were opposed to Chinese Government's policy and all kinds could be made into the basis of a statement that Kalimpong was the commanding centre of the Tibetan rebellion.

MR. KHADILKAR: I would like to know one thing. We have heard so many notes that we have received regarding Kalimpong from Chinese Government. As he mentioned, in 1956, when Chou En-lai was here and when, fortunately or unfortunately, Dalai Lama was here, he was reluctant to leave this country and asked for a sanctuary. Through the intervention of our Prime Minister an assurance was given that no repressive measures would be taken by the local Chinese command and on that specific assurance, he returned. The Prime Minister promised that he would pay a visit soon to see that that assurance was carried out.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What the hon. Member has said is not at all correct, not at all. There is no question of my getting an assurance from Premier Chou En-lai or his giving it or my asking for it. No such question arose at all. There was a question whether Dalai Lama should visit Kalimpong or not. It was in that connection that that was said. Naturally, we were anxious about Dalai Lama's security when he went to Kalimpong or anywhere. We discussed this with Premier Chou En-lai and ultimately the Dalai Lama decided to go there. We had informed the people—the Tibetans and people of Tibetan origin—in Kalimpong that they will have to behave when the Dalai Lama went there. They did it when he went there. So, there is no question of assurance and all that. I do not know from where the hon. Member got all that.

MR. KHADILKAR: The second information is from *Thought*.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I would not say anything against that periodical but I can say this particular information is completely basically untrue. I cannot say about one or two sentences, as I have not seen it. But most of the rest of it is untrue.

MR. SADHAN GUPTA: It is only a thought.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Coming to the statement issued by the . . .

MR. MOHAMMED IMAM: I would like a clarification. Is it till August there were anti-Chinese activities at Kalimpong by the

spies? Were these things that provoked the Chinese to occupy Tibet? What was the immediate cause that provoked the Chinese Government to occupy Tibet?

MR. SPEAKER: That does not arise.

MR. TYAGI: It is another thought.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Presumably, the spies came afterwards.

About the article in the *Peoples' Daily* of Peking, first of all, it is not for us to object to any article that appears in a newspaper in Peking. Obviously, if we started objecting we may disagree with them; there are many articles in the world press with which we are not in agreement; some are even very censorious of India or Indian policy—we can answer them. The only point is whether the circulation of that article here was proper or improper. That is it. Now I should like to point out that article appeared in Peking well before they could have had any report of my statement here. It took two days to come across here. But when it appeared in Peking it had no relation to my statement. It appeared, I cannot say the exact time but probably sometime or a few hours before. They could not have had it. But even if they had it, they have every right to do what they like.

Now about the Embassy circulating papers, a question was raised here of, shall I say, breach of diplomatic privilege. There is no such thing. It depends, of course, on how it is done. But reproducing a newspaper article in their own country can certainly not be thought of in that light. It may be an impropriety, it may not be the right thing to do. It is very difficult to draw the line. We have throughout been trying to impress on the various Embassies here that we do not approve of the cold war being brought into India. That is, articles being circulated here, attacking apart from India other countries, in that sense. And, on the whole, I would say we have succeeded, not completely; but I must say the foreign Embassies here have been good enough to avoid doing many things which I find they are doing in other countries in regard to the cold war attitude. Now, I do not wish to mention countries, but I may mention one country. If the articles that have often appeared in the Pakistan newspapers were circulated here frequently, well, we would not approve of it, and in fact we have not in the past approved it, because sometimes we consider these articles very objectionable. We cannot stop them. But surely they should not be circulated by

an Embassy here. I have given one instance. I can give many other instances. This is an instance of the very regrettable cold war between Pakistan and India. But in the bigger sphere of the cold war in the world many articles appear which use the strongest language in attacking the other country. We try not to have them circulated here. Well, the foreign Embassies have been good enough to co-operate with us in this matter. In this particular matter, as I said, it is anybody's opinion whether this was a very proper thing to do or an improper thing to do, although I would like to draw attention to the actual phrase of it to which objection has perhaps been taken. It is slightly different from the phraseology in the Chinese Government's reference to Kalimpong. Here it says the reactionaries in Tibet etc. "utilising Kalimpong, which is in a foreign land, as a centre for collusion with imperialism", slightly different from saying that Kalimpong is the commanding centre of collusion. Maybe, that may be explained by saying that somebody met somebody and whispered and, as such, that is collusion certainly.

I am merely putting various aspects of this matter. It is an unsavoury matter altogether. But I want the House to deal with this matter with dignity and restraint, because behind all these minor matters lie much bigger matters which we have to face today, tomorrow and the day after, and we should not allow ourselves to be diverted from that major and difficult issue by relatively minor issues.

MR. H. N. MUKERJEE: The Prime Minister has made a statement which surely we appreciate, the tone of it and the details which he has given us. But I find that the material in regard to the investigation of our charges regarding espionage and allied activities concludes round about.

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN THE LOK SABHA
ON 27 APRIL 1959

I have made several statements in the House in regard to the developments in Tibet. The last statement was made on April 3, in which I informed the House that the Dalai Lama had entered the territory of the Indian Union with a large entourage. I should like to bring this information up to date and to place such additional facts as we have before the House.

A few days ago, the Dalai Lama and his party reached Mussoorie, where Government had made arrangements for their stay. I have had occasion to visit Mussoorie since then and have had a long talk with the Dalai Lama.

In the course of the last few days, reports have reached us that considerable numbers of Tibetans, numbering some thousands, have recently crossed into the Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency and some hundreds have also entered the territory of Bhutan. They sought asylum, and we have agreed to this. Such of them as carried arms were disarmed. We do not know the exact number yet. Temporary arrangements are being made in a camp for their maintenance until they can be dispersed in accordance with their wishes and the necessities governing such cases. We could not leave these refugees to their own resources. Apart from the humanitarian considerations involved, there was also the law and order problem to be considered. We are grateful to the Government of Assam for their help and cooperation in this matter.

SECURITY MEASURES

So far as the Dalai Lama and his party are concerned, we had to take adequate measures on grounds of security and also to protect them from large numbers of newspaper correspondents, both Indian and foreign, who, in their anxiety to obtain first-hand information in regard to a matter of world importance, were likely to harass and almost overwhelm the Dalai Lama and his party. While we were anxious to give protection to the Dalai Lama and his party, we were agreeable to giving these newspapermen suitable opportunities to see him. I had received an appeal from nearly 75 representatives of news agencies and newspapers from Tezpur requesting

me to give them such opportunities. A senior officer of the External Affairs Ministry was, therefore, deputed to proceed to Tezpur in advance to deal with the press representatives and photographers who had assembled in that small town of Assam. This officer made the necessary administrative arrangements to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the newspapermen to see the Dalai Lama and to photograph him. Soon after entering India, the Dalai Lama indicated his wish to make a statement. We were later informed that this statement would be released at Tezpur. Our officer made arrangements for the distribution of a translation of the statement to the newspaper correspondents.

IRRESPONSIBLE CHARGES

In view of certain irresponsible charges made, I should like to make it clear that the Dalai Lama was entirely responsible for this statement as well as a subsequent briefer statement that was made by him from Mussoorie. Our officers had nothing to do with the drafting or preparation of these statements.

I need not tell the House that the Dalai Lama entered India entirely of his own volition. At no time had we suggested that he should come to India. We had naturally given thought to the possibility of his seeking asylum in India and when such a request came, we readily granted it. His entry with a large party in a remote corner of our country created special problems of transport, organisation and security. We deputed an officer to meet the Dalai Lama and his party at Bomdila and to escort them to Mussoorie. The particular officer was selected because he had served as Consul General in Lhasa and therefore was to some extent known to the Dalai Lama and his officials. The selection of Mussoorie for the Dalai Lama's stay was not finalised till his own wishes were ascertained in the matter and he agreed to it. There was no desire on our part to put any undue restrictions on him, but in the special circumstances, certain arrangements had necessarily to be made to prevent any mishap. It should be remembered that the various events in Tibet, culminating in the Dalai Lama's departure from Lhasa and entry into India, had created tremendous interest among the people of India and in the world press. After arrival in Mussoorie, steps were taken to prevent the Dalai Lama from being harassed by crowds of people trying to see him as well as by newspapermen. Apart from this, no restrictions about movement were placed

on him. He has been told that he and his party can move about Mussoorie according to their wishes. It should be remembered that the Dalai Lama has recently not only had a long strenuous and dangerous journey, but has also had harrowing experiences which must affect the nerves of even a hardened person. He is only just 24 years of age.

SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS

These are some bare facts, but behind these facts lie serious developments which may have far-reaching consequences. Tragedy has been and is being enacted in Tibet, passions have been let loose, charges made and language used which cannot but worsen the situation and our relations with our northern neighbour. I am sure that the House will agree with me that in considering matters of such high import, we should exercise restraint and wisdom and use language which is moderate and precise. In these days of cold war, there has been a tendency to use unrestrained language and often to make wild charges without any justification. We have fortunately kept out of the cold war and I hope that on this, as on any other occasion, we shall not use the language of cold war. The matter is too serious to be dealt with in a trivial or excited way. I would, therefore, appeal to the press and the public to exercise restraint in language. I regret that occasionally there have been lapses from this on our side. In particular, I regret that grave discourtesy was shown some days ago to a picture of the head of the Chinese State, Chairman Mao Tse-tung. This was done by a small group of irresponsible people in Bombay. In the excitement of the moment, we cannot allow ourselves to be swept away into wrong courses.

COLD WAR LANGUAGE

It is not for me to make any similar appeal to the leaders, the press and the people of China. All I can say is that I have been greatly distressed at the tone of the comments and the charges made against India by responsible people in China. They have used the language of cold war regardless of truth and propriety. This is peculiarly distressing in a great nation with thousands of years of culture behind it, noted for its restrained and polite behaviour. The charges made against India are so fantastic that I find it difficult to deal with them. There is the charge of our keeping the Dalai

Lama under duress. The Chinese authorities should surely know how we function in this country and what our laws and Constitution are. Even if we were so inclined, we could not keep the Dalai Lama under some kind of detention against his will, and there can be no question of our wishing to do so. We can gain nothing by it except the burden of difficult problems. In any event, this matter can be easily cleared. It is open to the Dalai Lama at any time to go back to Tibet or wherever he wants to. As the Panchen Lama has made himself responsible specially for some strange statements, I have stated that we would welcome him to come to India and meet the Dalai Lama himself. Should he choose to do so, every courtesy will be extended to him. I have further said that the Chinese Ambassador or any other emissary of the Chinese Government can come to India for this purpose and meet the Dalai Lama. There is no barrier for anyone to come peacefully to India, and whether we agree with him or not, we shall treat him with courtesy due to a guest.

UNJUSTIFIED ADVENTURE

Another and an even stranger allegation has been made about "Indian expansionists" who, it is alleged, are inheritors of the British tradition of imperialism and expansion. It is perfectly true that British policy was one of expansion into Tibet and that they carried this out by force of arms early in this century. That was, in our opinion, an unjustified and cruel adventure which brought much harm to the Tibetans. As a result of that, the then British Government in India established certain extraterritorial rights in Tibet. When India became independent, we inherited some of these rights. Being entirely opposed to any such extraterritorial rights in another country, we did not wish to retain them. But in the early days after independence and partition, our hands were full, as this House well knows, and we had to face very difficult situations in our own country. We ignored, if I may say so, Tibet. Not being able to find a suitable person to act as our representative at Lhasa, we allowed for some time the existing British representative to continue at Lhasa. Later an Indian took his place. Soon after the Chinese armies entered Tibet, the question of these extraterritorial rights was raised and we readily agreed to give them up. We would have given them up anyhow, whatever developments might have taken place in Tibet. We withdrew our army detachments from some places in Tibet and handed over Indian postal and

telegraph installations and rest houses. We laid down the Five Principles of the Panch Sheel and placed our relationship with the Tibet region on a new footing. What we were anxious about was to preserve the traditional connections between India and Tibet in regard to pilgrim traffic and trade. Our action in this matter and whatever we have done subsequently in regard to Tibet is proof enough of our policy and that India had no political or ulterior ambitions in Tibet. Indeed, even from the narrowest practical point of view, any other policy would have been wrong and futile. Ever since then we have endeavoured not only to act up to the agreement we made, but to cultivate the friendship of the Chinese State and people.

MATTER OF REGRET

It is therefore a matter of the deepest regret and surprise to us that charges should be made which are both unbecoming and entirely void of substance. We have conveyed this deep feeling of regret to the Chinese Government, more especially at the speeches delivered recently in the current session of the National People's Congress in Peking.

FRIENDLY RELATIONS

I stated some time ago that our broad policy was governed by three factors: (1) the preservation of the security and integrity of India; (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and (3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. That policy we shall continue to follow, because we think that a correct policy not only for the present but even more so for the future. It would be a tragedy if the two great countries of Asia, India and China, which have been peaceful neighbours for ages past, should develop feelings of hostility against each other. We for our part will follow this policy, but we hope that China also will do likewise and that nothing will be said or done which endangers the friendly relations of the two countries which are so important from the wider point of view of the peace of Asia and the world. The Five Principles have laid down, *inter alia*, mutual respect for each other. Such mutual respect is gravely impaired if unfounded charges are made and the language of cold war used.

KALIMPONG

I have already made it clear previously that the charge, that

Kalimpong was a centre of the Tibetan rebellion, is wholly unjustified. We have a large number of people of Tibetan stock living in India as Indian nationals. We have also some Tibetan emigres in India. All of these deeply respect the Dalai Lama. Some of these have been exceedingly unhappy at developments in Tibet; some no doubt have anti-Chinese sentiments. We have made it clear to them that they will not be permitted to carry on any subversive activities from India and I should like to say that by and large they have acted in accordance with the directions of the Government of India. I cannot obviously say that someone has not done something secretly, but to imagine or say that a small group of persons sitting in Kalimpong organised a major upheaval in Tibet seems to me to make a large draft on imagination and to slur over obvious facts.

KHAMPA REVOLT

The Khampa revolt started in an area of China proper adjoining Tibet, more than three years ago. Is Kalimpong supposed to be responsible for that? This revolt gradually spread and no doubt created a powerful impression on the minds of large numbers of Tibetans, who had kept away from the revolt. Fears and apprehensions about their future gripped their minds and the nationalist upsurge swayed their feelings. Their fears may have been unjustified, but surely they cannot be denied. Such feelings can only be dealt with adequately by gentler methods than warfare.

TALKS WITH CHINESE PREMIER

When Premier Chou En-lai came here two or three years ago, he was good enough to discuss Tibet with me at considerable length. We had a frank and full talk. He told me that while Tibet had long been a part of the Chinese State, they did not consider Tibet as a province of China. The people were different from the people of China proper, just as in other autonomous regions of the Chinese State the people were different, even though they formed part of that State. Therefore, they considered Tibet an autonomous region which would enjoy autonomy. He told me further that it was absurd for anyone to imagine that China was going to force communism on Tibet. Communism could not be enforced in this way on a very backward country and they had no wish to do so even though they would like reforms to come in progressively. Even these reforms they proposed to postpone for a considerable time.

About that time, the Dalai Lama was also here and I had long talks with him then. I told him of Premier Chou En-lai's friendly approach and of his assurance that he would respect the autonomy of Tibet. I suggested to him that he should accept these assurances in good faith and cooperate in maintaining that autonomy and bringing about certain reforms in Tibet. The Dalai Lama agreed that his country, though, according to him, advanced spiritually, was very backward socially and economically and reforms were needed.

DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES

It is not for us to say how far these friendly intentions and approaches materialised. The circumstances were undoubtedly difficult. On the one side there was a dynamic, rapidly moving society; on the other, a static, unchanging society fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reforms. The distance between the two was great and there appeared to be hardly any meeting point. Meanwhile changes in some forms inevitably came to Tibet. Communications developed rapidly and the long isolation of Tibet was partly broken through. Though physical barriers were progressively removed, mental and emotional barriers increased. Apparently, the attempt to cross these mental and emotional barriers was either not made or did not succeed.

FEELING OF NATIONALISM

To say that a number of "upper strata reactionaries" in Tibet were solely responsible for this appears to be an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation. Even according to the accounts received through Chinese sources, the revolt in Tibet was of considerable magnitude and the basis of it must have been a strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only upper class people but others also. No doubt, vested interests joined it and sought to profit by it. The attempt to explain a situation by the use of rather worn-out words, phrases and slogans, is seldom helpful.

WIDESPREAD REACTION

When the news of these unhappy developments came to India, there was immediately a strong and widespread reaction. The Government did not bring about this reaction. Nor was this reaction

essentially political. It was largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons. Also on a certain feeling of kinship with the Tibetan people derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts. It was an instinctive reaction. It is true that some people in India sought to profit by it by turning it in an undesirable direction. But the fact of that reaction of the Indian people was there. If that was the reaction here, one may well imagine the reaction among the Tibetans themselves. Probably this reaction is shared in the other Buddhist countries of Asia. When there are such strong feelings, which are essentially not political, they cannot be dealt with by political methods alone, much less by military methods. We have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China; but at the same time we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their hapless plight. We hope still that the authorities of China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly cooperation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region. Above all, we hope that the present fighting and killing will cease.

MUSSOORIE MEETING

As I have said above, I had a long talk with the Dalai Lama three days ago at Mussoorie. He told me of the difficulties he had to face, of the growing resentment of his people at the conditions existing there and how he sought to restrain them, of his feelings that the religion of the Buddha, which was more to him than life itself, was being endangered. He said that up to the last moment he did not wish to leave Lhasa. It was only on the afternoon of the 17th March when, according to him, some shells were fired at his palace and fell in a pond nearby, that the sudden decision was taken to leave Lhasa. Within a few hours the same day he and his party left Lhasa, and took the perilous journey to the Indian frontier. The departure was so hurried that even an adequate supply of clothes etc. could not be brought. When I met the Dalai Lama, no member of his entourage was present. Even the interpreter was our own. The Dalai Lama told me that the two statements which had been issued were entirely his own and there was no question of anybody coercing him to make them. Even though he is young, I could not easily imagine that he could be coerced into

doing something he did not wish. All my sympathy goes out to this young man who at an early age has had to shoulder heavy burdens and to face tremendous responsibilities. During the last few weeks he has suffered great physical and mental strain. I advised him to rest for a while and not to take any hurried decisions. He felt very unhappy at conditions in Tibet and was especially anxious that fighting should stop.

PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THE DEBATE
IN THE RAJYA SABHA ON 4 MAY 1959

Mr. Chairman, the hon. Mover of this Motion spoke in such dignified and restrained language that I feel deeply beholden to him. He set a good example for all of us. In the course of this discussion this example has been more or less followed, not entirely; but I do not wish to object to anything that has been said or the manner of saying it. Unfortunately in some other countries, and in China more specially, the way we function in our Parliament here or outside is perhaps not fully appreciated; that is to say that it may not be quite appreciated that here everyone has a right to say—here in Parliament and indeed outside Parliament also and in the press—everyone has a right to say whatever he feels like subject to some very very broad limitations of libel or slander, and that what he or she may say may indeed be in condemnation of Government, as it often is; it does not represent Government's policy. I say this because objection is taken, has been taken in China to remarks made by hon. Members in Parliament or outside or the press. It is different here from what it is in China, and I am not saying that it is better or not here or it is different here. Here one can see even in the last few weeks an amazing unanimity and similarity of words, expressions and slogans coming from various quarters, which shows an amount of uniformity which is truly formidable, and it has its virtues no doubt but I am not criticising anything. But what I wish to say is that things said in Parliament sometimes convey a very different impression outside, and people do not realise that in such Parliaments as these are every viewpoint has the fullest expression and need not necessarily be right or wrong.

KNOWLEDGE ABOUT FACTS

In this connection—not by way of again criticism but because Mr. Bhupesh Gupta referred to a very unfortunate incident that happened in Bombay where Chairman Mao Tse-tung's picture was shown grave discourtesy—I should like to refer to that firstly to express my regret again for it and at the same time to say that the facts of this particular incident as we know them, and know them correctly—we are presumed to know them a little better than people sitting in Peking—nevertheless oddly enough our version

of the facts is not wholly accepted by the Peking Government on a small matter, which is surprising. We are sitting here, we ought to know better what takes place in our country, about facts, whatever other opinions may be. However, it is very regrettable incident with which obviously Government had nothing to do. The party which organised it, I believe, is not represented in this House even. But what is not realised is that in the city of Bombay pictures even of a leader of ours like Mahatma Gandhi have been burnt by some groups or others. Two and a half or three years ago my humble self also has been treated in that way in Bombay and elsewhere. Well, we take that in our stride and, as the hon. Member who spoke last mentioned, a few years back President Eisenhower's effigy had the honour of being burnt near the Ochterlony Monument. I regret all these cases, but what I am mentioning is that these things happen in a country like ours because of our laws, etc. They happen. Quite apart from law, I think it is a grave breach of decency to do this kind of thing or do anything else. We regret it. But people outside this country, some people, do not realise this and seem to imagine that somehow or other the Government or some Government officials must have connived at it, otherwise it could not have taken place, or they think that we should take the people who have done this by the scruff of the neck and throw in the dungeon.

AN HON. MEMBER: Let them do it themselves.

IMPORTANT ISSUES

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am saying that it is rather difficult because it produces misunderstandings as to the way of functioning, our parliamentary procedures and the like, and other procedures where a Government does not permit opposition of any kind.

Hon. Members have referred to a statement made by me a few days ago which was read out in this House also. So far as the major facts are concerned I have stated them there and I have really nothing to add, even though after that statement was made it was not accepted—the facts I mean; even the facts were not fully accepted by the Chinese authorities and the Chinese press, which is unfortunate because again I would say that as to what happens in India I would imagine that we could be better informed than the Chinese authorities who presumably can only be informed through certain intelligence agents that they may have at Kalimpong or

elsewhere. But I do not wish to enter into polemical argument about these minor matters because the issues before us are far more serious, far deeper, far deeper than Tibet, the whole of Tibet, although Tibet is important and we are discussing events which have cast their shadow round about Tibet too. That shows that they are really deeper than that, and therefore we have to be particularly careful as to what we say and what we do. Now I accept the limitations and also the responsibility of what one should say on such occasions.

First of all, we must be alive to what we are aiming at. We are not, I hope, merely aiming at denouncing somebody or some Government or some phrase. There has been too much of this denunciation and slogan-raising, I regret to say, in China recently, and some of the slogans have been quite extraordinary. But I do not think we should be so thin-skinned as to get upset by some slogans in the excitement of the moment. We must not be let off our main path because that is of very considerable consequence in the future.

I should like again to read a few lines of what I said in that previous statement to indicate what we aim at. I said this:

It would be a tragedy if the two great countries of Asia—India and China—which have been peaceful neighbours for ages past should develop feelings of hostility against each other. We for our part will follow this policy, but we hope that China also will do likewise and that nothing will be said or done which endangers the friendly relations of the two countries which are so important from the wider point of view of the peace of Asia and the world. The five principles have laid down, *inter alia*, mutual respect for each other. Such mutual respect is gravely impaired if unfounded charges are made and the language of cold war used.

PANCH SHEEL

Mr. Bhupesh Gupta asked rather rhetorically, "Do we stand by Panch Sheel?" Well, sometimes I wonder if the words we use are used in the same meaning or with some different meaning in our minds but—I have no claim to superiority—so far as India is concerned, we have earnestly striven to stand by these principles and I do not think we have offended any principle. It is not for me to stand up and criticise or justify other countries, but we have tried to do that not because of some temporary policy, not because these five principles have been declared in some agreement—that was merely a confirmation of what we thought, as to what

we said—but because we have felt that that is the only way to function in this world of ours. Some people say, “Oh! After all that has happened, you still hold by that.” It is a curious question. If these principles are right, we hold by them and we should hold by them, even though nobody in the wide world is holding by them. Naturally, we have to adapt our policies to what happens in the world; we cannot live in isolation. But a principle should be acted upon even though somebody else has not acted upon it. One tries. Anyway, we are imperfect beings in an imperfect world. So I should like to assure the hon. Member opposite that so far as the Government is concerned—I cannot speak for every ordinary individual in India—we hold by those principles and we shall endeavour to act up to them whatever other countries may or may not do. Some people certainly—as Mr. Bhupesh Gupta said—taking advantage of these occurrences in and relating to Tibet have raised a cry that India will now have to consider how far she can adhere to the policy of non-alignment. All that shows a strange misunderstanding of our ways of thinking in our policies. Non-alignment—although the word is itself a kind of negative word—nevertheless has a positive concept, and we do not propose to have a military alliance with any country come what may, and I want to be quite clear about it, because the moment we give up that idea of non-alignment, we lose every anchor that we hold on to and we simply drift. We may hang on to somebody or some country. But we lose our own self-respect, of the country’s. If one loses one’s self-respect, it is something very precious lost. Therefore this business of thinking always in terms of getting something from this country or the other country is not desirable. It is perhaps not very relevant. It is said often in Pakistan, let us have a common defence policy. Now I am all for settling our troubles with Pakistan and living a normal, friendly, neighbourly life. We try for that. But I do not understand when people say that we have a common defence policy. Against whom? Immediately the question comes up: “Against whom is this common defence policy?” Are we going to become members of the Baghdad Pact or the SEATO or some body? We do not want to have a common defence policy which is almost another meaning of some kind of a military alliance. The whole policy that we have pursued is opposed to this conception. We want friendly relations with Pakistan. We hope we shall get them. But we are not going to tie ourselves up, our conceptions,

our policies, with other countries involving military defence and attacking and all that.

PRESENT DIFFICULTIES

So the present difficulties that we have to face in relation to the happenings in Tibet will, I hope, gradually pass. But it is a tragedy not only for Tibet, but a deeper tragedy for many of us that something that we have laboured for for all these years, which may be said to be enshrined if you like in the Panch Sheel or in Bandung, has suffered very considerably in people's minds. I may say I shall hold on to it, but the fact is in people's minds there is that crack, there is that suffering, there is that uneasiness, that something they valued might slip away. These words like all other words—Bandung, Panch Sheel, it does not matter what word you use—begin to lose their shine and to be hurled about without meaning, and in fact, just like even the word "peace" becomes almost like a thunderbolt or a minor war the way it is used. Sometimes the manner of using it—it is the manner—that counts. I have come more and more to believe that means are even more important than ends. They show to us that the way one does things is even more important than what one does. And that is why I have been aggrieved beyond measure at these various recent developments and at what is being said in China—the charges made against India. Mr. Bhupesh Gupta did not say a word about all these, not a word. I can understand where these things lead to. Hon. Members of this House being seasoned public men and women may restrain themselves, may not allow themselves to be affected too much. But it is difficult for the general public not to be affected by such charges and they are charges, I do submit, which do not stand the slightest scrutiny. What have we done about this matter, about Tibet, apart from some speeches or things?

We have received the Dalai Lama and party, and subsequently we have received some thousands of refugees. We have given them asylum, and it is admitted—I don't think anybody denies it—that as a sovereign country we have every right to do so, and nobody else can be a judge of that except ourselves. Now is it suggested that we should have refused to give asylum to the Dalai Lama when he asked for it? Well, if it is suggested by someone outside India I can tell them—I do not know about the handful out of the four hundred millions of people of India; I doubt if even a few

thousands would have agreed with that policy—I can tell them this that the hundreds of millions of India would have become angry at that action of ours if we had refused asylum to the Dalai Lama and his party. Almost everybody in India—a few may not have—approved of our policy, and it would have been an impossible thing, an utterly wrong thing, for us to do otherwise from any point of view, political, humanitarian or whatever you like. So this is what we have done. Of course we are charged with as having connived at Kalimpong; of Kalimpong being the commanding centre—this is the word they used, I think—of this rebellion in Tibet. Now it is said that the commanding centre has shifted to Mussoorie—I know words have lost their meaning, because I find it very difficult to deal with these charges. And why has the commanding centre gone to Mussoorie? Because the Dalai Lama is there and because the brother of the Dalai Lama who normally lives in Darjeeling, I think, went to see him, and after seeing him went back to Darjeeling or Kalimpong. These are very serious charges against a country's leaders being made irresponsibly in this way by the leaders of a people whom we have not only honoured and respected but whom we have considered particularly advanced in culture and politeness and the gentler art of civilisation. It has been a shock to me beyond measure because, quite apart from everything else, I have looked up to the Chinese and I look up to them still because of their great accomplishments, because of their great culture and all that, and it has been a shock to me that this kind of thing should be said and done in the excitement of the moment. I hope that excitement will pass.

EARLIER DEVELOPMENT

Now, Sir, I want to tell the House exactly how these matters came into our ken. On the 11th of March, for the first time we got a message from our Consul General in Lhasa saying that there was some excitement in the town and that a large number of people had come and visited him consisting of representatives of the public and some Tibetan officials, monks, heads of monasteries, etc. They had come to him with a series of complaints about the Chinese authorities there and they said that they were very much in distress. Now our Consul General in Lhasa was naturally very embarrassed. What is he to do? He did not wish to interfere; it was none of his business to interfere and he told them: "Well, I cannot do anything

for you" and he reported to us. That was on the 11th—the message dated the 10th reached us on the 11th. That was the first information we had, that something was afoot there. After that the Consul General sent us brief reports about the general excitement in the town, the tense situation and people holding meetings, not public meetings but group meetings and all that. On the 14th he again sent us a message that a crowd of 5,000 Tibetan women had come to the Consulate General with the same kind of complaints and asked him to accompany them to the Chinese Foreign Office in Lhasa to bear witness to what they said. At that again the poor Consul General was exceedingly embarrassed. It was none of his business to do this and he said: "I cannot go", and he asked, "What do you mean by that?" Well, in short he said, "I just cannot go." Quite rightly. He reported it to us. We drafted a message—it was kept ready to be sent—to say: "Don't get entangled in what has happened and was happening in Lhasa." This was on the 14th. So this kind of thing went on. And it was at this time, when speaking, I think, in the Lok Sabha, I said that there was a clash of wills in Lhasa—whether that was a correct description, I do not know. The point was there was no actual fighting going on at this time; that came a few days later. On the 20th March when it started, how it started, I do not know, nor did our Consul General know sitting in the Consulate, and he could not be expected to know when it started. And as we now know, he did not know it then. On the 17th night the Dalai Lama and party left Lhasa, rather secretly. According to them, on the 17th afternoon at 4 o'clock, two shells or bombs, something like that, fell into a lake in the Summer Palace. Well, this made them think "Now this is the last moment, and now the Palace is going to be shelled and there is going to be war everywhere", and they left Lhasa. As far as I know—I am not sure—even then it was not fully his intention to leave Tibet. But as Lhasa was being shelled, subsequently that intention must have developed. Anyhow, in the course of a week, from the 11th to the 20th or the 21st, during these, say, ten days this was the news that came to us. We could do nothing about it and before the 10th or 11th we knew nothing about the situation except that we naturally knew that all kinds of cross-currents were at work at Lhasa and in Tibet. Then the question came before us, of the possibility of the Dalai Lama coming here, and we decided that we should receive him. He came. As the House might know I resisted and I was asked repeatedly:

"Are you going to throw your doors open to any number of refugees from Tibet?" I resisted that, although in my mind I knew that I could not very well refuse asylum to people who were in great difficulty; I could not; but I did not want to say it and invite people to roll into India from all over the place. So that is the short story of what has happened and what we have done. And now we are called expansionists and imperialists and what not, all kinds of phrases, which I suppose would not make any real difference to what we are; nevertheless coming from those whom we consider friends they do hurt us.

1950 MEMORANDA

Now I want just to give you a few facts. Again an extraordinary thing appeared in the newspapers in Peking. They go back now to what had happened in 1950, that is, to some memoranda that we had sent, when Chinese armies were entering Tibet. Very polite memoranda they were. The answers were not very polite, but the point now is that they refer to them, that what we wrote to them was after consultation with the British Government, that though we called ourselves independent we really acted as stooges or tools of the British Government.

It is, of course, completely wrong and untruthful. There was no question of our consulting the British Government. Our view on Tibet was different from that of the British Government.

PANCHEN LAMA'S STATEMENT

Now, one thing about the Panchen Lama's statement. I was rather distressed to read it, that a statement should be made, so lacking in generosity and dignity, by a person who had been our honoured guest. I do not know about the petty things he says that somewhere his staff was not given proper accommodation. I cannot answer that, whether at Aurangabad or some such place there was some difficulty because the entourage of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama was so big—hundreds of people with them. It was not quite so easy to make as much preparation as we wanted.

LATEST POSITION

About the refugees, now the latest position is that approximately 6,500 refugees are on their way down through the Kameng Division of NEFA, 1,500 are trekking through Bhutan and 700 have come

to Sikkim—round about 9,000. The Bhutan Government have asked us to receive the Tibetan refugees coming through their territories and we have agreed to do so. Thus we have about 9,000 refugees for whom we have made ourselves responsible for some kind of arrangements. A few of the refugees, when they entered India, were armed. They were disarmed on entry into India.

The refugees coming through NEFA will be accommodated temporarily in a camp at Mismari in Assam. Though the Assam Government are making arrangements for their shelter, medical relief, etc., the West Bengal Government have agreed to construct temporary camp somewhere in Cooch-Bihar for the refugees who are coming through Bhutan. We are grateful to these two State Governments.

Special officers to deal with the refugees have been appointed by the External Affairs Ministry. They are proceeding to Assam and West Bengal. It is not proposed to keep these refugees in these temporary camps for a long time and other arrangements will have to be devised for them. I cannot just say at present what or where, but it is obvious we are not going to keep them in camps.

One hon. Member—I think Dr. Kunzru, may be Mr. Shiva Rao—said something that we should allow these refugees to earn their own living and give them freedom to do many things. Broadly speaking, of course we intend that. We are not going to keep them as prisoners in camps. In fact, our instructions to our officers at the border were to tell them that we do not assume responsibility for their indefinite upkeep. For sometime we would help them. And naturally to some extent we are responsible when these people are coming in. We cannot let them loose on India. Again, there is the question that they cannot easily be kept anywhere except in cooler climates—and we cannot send them to the rest of India simply—in mountain regions.

UNITED NATIONS

I think Mr. Shiva Rao said something about China and the United Nations. I do not suppose it is necessary for me to say so, but obviously our policy in regard to the entry of the People's Government of China into the UN remains as it was. It is not that it is based on certain facts—by these things; it is not because we get angry with something that happens in China that we change our policy. That would mean that we have no firm policies, that we are deflected by temporary happenings in the world.

Just one thing more. Mr. Bhupesh Gupta talked about national uprising. Again it depends upon how you use that word. I do not know exactly what happened in Tibet. But, as I said in my previous statement, according to Chinese accounts this has been a fairly big affair, a very large-scale affair. Also looking at the surrounding circumstances as well as the past history of Tibet, one can very well imagine that apart from the so-called people representing vested interests—they would be there—it is a fact that large numbers of Tibetan people—I cannot say whether they are in a majority or a minority, but large numbers undoubtedly—went to the extent of taking this step which they did, which really meant a very dangerous step. Anyhow it is there and one feels strongly about it.

Now so far as we are concerned, we have not interfered either from Kalimpong or Mussoorie or otherwise. We have exercised our undoubted right to give asylum. I have said that Dalai Lama is perfectly a free agent to go where he likes in India or go back to Tibet.

BARBED WIRE CHARGE

Some people—some foreign pressmen—said about two days after he had come to Mussoorie that we are keeping him behind barbed wire. That sounds rather horrible. The fact was that the Mussoorie police, to lighten their burden, because of all kinds of curious people trying to go into the compound of the house, had put a little barbed wire on that compound before he came, to be able to protect him, for his security and general protection. But that was not to keep him in, and he goes, I believe, round about Mussoorie. He can go back to Tibet the moment he likes.

It is no use my going on repeating what I have said earlier that the Dalai Lama is not kept under duress here, that he did not enter India under any duress, excepting the duress of circumstances, if you like compulsion of events. And, certainly, I can speak from personal knowledge, having met him and talked to him, that he is staying there of his own free will in India and even at Mussoorie. With all respect, I would say that anyone who denies this fact, well, is totally ignorant of facts and speaks without knowing.

Further, hon. Members might have seen in the newspaper headlines—because odd remarks are given as headlines—that I said I would be happy if the Dalai Lama went back to Tibet. I did so. Somebody asked a question and I said, "Naturally I would be

happy if he went with dignity." But that did not mean at all that I am going to push the Dalai Lama out or put him in an embarrassing position. It is entirely for him to decide what to do, when to do it. The only advice I gave him when I was with him was: "You have had a very hard journey and very harassing experiences. If I may, as a person very much older than you, suggest it you might rest for a few days, and calmly think about the events and then do what you like."

SENSATIONAL REFERENCES

One more matter, if I may say so, specially to the press. I do not particularly fancy this constant sensational way of referring to the Dalai Lama as the God-King, and, in fact, I do not think he likes it either. This is not the Indian way; it is a foreign way of doing things. It sounds sensational no doubt. I hope that that word will not be used. It is good enough to refer to him as the Dalai Lama. Thank you, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Dr. Kunzru, would you like to say anything?

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: There is nothing to reply to. I thought my friend, Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, might raise some point but he has hardly spoken to the point.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Then we pass on to the next item.

PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THE DEBATE
IN THE LOK SABHA ON 8 MAY 1959

Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, this matter concerning the developments in Tibet has come up before this House as well as before the other House on several occasions in the course of the last few weeks and I have had occasion to make many statements on the situation arising from these developments. I should have thought that enough had been said for the time being about the basic facts. So those facts as known were challenged, in statements from China. Some of the statements from China, in so far as they related to India, were not accepted as facts by us. And I wondered sometimes whether it would serve any useful purpose for us to carry on this argument which could only mean really a repetition of what had been said. Nevertheless, it is perhaps a good thing for us to have this brief discussion here. But in the course of this discussion so many basic facts have been challenged, or basic ideas have been challenged, that it raises much wider issues than what has happened in Tibet.

The hon. Member who just spoke before me with warmth said many things which challenged all the basic assumptions of our policy which has been accepted by this House and I think by the country as a whole with remarkable unanimity. Nevertheless, he challenged all those basic assumptions. Either he has never believed in those basic assumptions or what has happened in Tibet has made him change his opinion.

Now, I do not propose in these few minutes to discuss all the basic assumptions of our policy. All I would like to say now is that I do not hold with what the hon. Member has spoken. I do not agree with much that he has said and so far as Government is concerned, we are not going to follow the policy that he has suggested that we should follow. I should like to make that perfectly clear.

DALAI LAMA'S MOVEMENTS

I may say in passing that we have laid no limitations on the Dalai Lama, except the limitation of good sense and propriety of which he himself is the judge. But for the hon. Member to suggest that we should allow him to do something which he has not himself suggested, that is, making India the headquarters of some kind of a campaign and that we should allow the hon.

Member and his party to join in this campaign is something which seems to be so odd, so remarkable of utterance that I cannot imagine how even he could have made it if he had thought about it. I need not say much about it, because it has no relation to what is happening in the world, or in India, or in Tibet, or in China or anywhere.

1954 AGREEMENT

He also laid stress on the 1954 Agreement, the agreement with China with regard to Tibet. He said we should never have done it. Again I do not quite understand what is meant by this kind of statement or this kind of viewpoint. What exactly he expects us to do is not clear except maybe perhaps to hold public meetings at Ramlila grounds and deliver speeches. That is not the way that foreign policy of a country is conducted, by public meetings held at various places in India. Public meetings are important no doubt. But we have to come up against not only basic policies and assumptions, but hard facts in regard to foreign policy.

I have no doubt in my mind that the agreement we made with China with regard to Tibet was a right agreement. It was a correct agreement and we shall stand by it and it is not correct even for him to say that that agreement has been broken. It may be said that he thinks that certain implications of that agreement have not been, according to him or according to anybody else, carried out. That is a different matter. But there is no question of that agreement having been broken. It lasts; it functions.

EMOTIONAL UPHEAVAL

I do not know how many people here know the background of all these problems. We have been moved naturally, we have had a kind of emotional upheaval, by recent happenings and it is quite understandable that that should be so because of certain intimate emotional and other bonds with Tibet, with the people of Tibet or the mountains of Tibet, or Kailash or Manasarowar and so on, a mixture. We can understand that. And we can respect this emotional response. Nevertheless any policy that we lay down or attempt to lay down cannot be based on an emotional upheaval. They have to bear some relation to facts.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

I do not know how many hon. Members here know the history,

the background of Tibet, of China, of Mongolia, of Bhutan and Sikkim and Nepal in the last few hundred years. I wonder how many have cared to look into them. I do not know whether the hon. Member who just spoke knows anything about it at all. I happen to know something about it and I have taken the trouble to read quite a number of books and histories, Chinese chronicles, Indian reports, etc. Here is the history of six or seven hundred years, or more, from the moment when Chengiz Khan invaded Tibet, when Kublai Khan also held Tibet in a peculiar way, considering the then Dalai Lama as a spiritual guru. It is a curious combination. Politically he was dominant, in Tibet, but Kublai Khan considered the Dalai Lama as his spiritual leader, so that you see a curious combination coming up. And in fact for a considerable period the relationship of Tibet with China was very peculiar; in a sense, I believe I am not wrong in saying, the Chinese rather looked down upon the Tibetans from the Mongol times. The Chinese rather look down upon every country other than their own. They consider themselves as the middle kingdom, as the celestial race, a great country, whether it was the Tang kingdom, or the Ming kingdom or ultimately the Manchus for a long period. The relations between China and Tibet varied from sovereignty or suzerainty, or half-sovereignty or semi-independence for long periods like this coming one after the other till the Manchu dynasty right up to the beginning of the twentieth century held full sway over Tibet, quite a considerable sway. Even in the last days of the Manchu dynasty, when it fell, it held some considerable influence in Tibet.

When the Manchu dynasty fell round about forty or fifty years ago it weakened. It weakened, but whoever held China, whether it was the Emperor, or whether it was President Yuan Shih-kai, whether it was the war lords after them or whether it was Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's regime, or whether it was the People's Government, they had one consistent policy from Emperor to the Communist of considering themselves as overlords of Tibet. No doubt, when Tibet was strong, it resisted that from time to time. There have been occasions when, twice at least, Tibetan armies reached the capital of China—it is rather old history—as the Chinese armies came repeatedly into Tibet. There have been occasions when Nepalese army went into Tibet and Tibetan army came into Nepal. There was one occasion at least when a certain General from Kashmir, Zorawar Singh, who carried out a brilliant campaign

across the Himalayas in Tibet only, of course, to meet a stouter enemy than Tibetan or anybody, the cold of Tibet. The temperature of Tibet put an end to him and his army there. All this is history, mixed history. There is no doubt that the countries with whom Tibet has been most intimately connected in the past have been Mongolia and China, naturally for historical and other reasons, religious reasons, cultural reasons.

PRESENT DAY SITUATION

But, all these do not count. In considering the present day situation, we have to take things as they are and have been recently. We cannot think of Chengiz Khan's time or Kublai Khan's time or the Manchu Emperors or Chiang Kai-shek or anybody else. In regard to the present situation, what exactly are we after? If we accept the hon. Member Shri Vajpayee's statement, we should, more or less, prepare for an armed conflict on this issue. We cannot pat somebody on the back and tell him to fight and say, we will cheer you from the background. That is an absurd situation. We must be clear in our mind what we are saying or aiming at. I take it that we aim at, whatever problems may arise, first of all, a peaceful solution of these problems. Peaceful solutions are not brought about by warlike speeches and warlike approaches. It is obvious that if some people in China think that by threats and strong speeches, they can frighten India, that is wrong. It is equally obvious that if some people in India think that by threats and warlike speeches, they can frighten China, that is equally wrong. Obviously not. Great countries, India or China, are not pushed about in this way. They react in the opposite direction.

So far as China is concerned—not with us, but with other countries, we know very well; with the USA, with other countries—China herself is a part of a military bloc system on the one side and China herself is intimately concerned with cold war. Not with us; but because of this bloc system. They have got used to ways of expressing their opinion which, personally, I find, is not the right way in international parlance.

COLD WAR TECHNIQUE

And now about the cold war technique, we have recently had some experience of that in regard to India. It is true, we have reacted against it. We did not like it. The question arises whether

we should adopt that technique or not. It is an important thing, because it concerns our policy too. I think that neither that policy nor that way of expression which may be called cold war expression is right for any country: certainly not for us, unless we want to change our policy completely. We do not want to change it. We think it would be harmful from every point of view to change this policy. We should pursue that policy. That policy is based not so much on what the other country does, but on its inherent rightness in so far as we can understand it. We may be swept away now and then. It is a different matter. We are human beings. But, if we think coolly and calmly, we must realise that we must adhere to that policy. If so, our expressions of opinions, our challenges, our threats, etc., should not be made if they do not fit in with that particular policy.

CALM DEMEANOUR

That, I would submit to this House, is not a sign of weakness. I do not think any country in the world thinks that India, in the past few years, has adopted a policy of weakness. Some have accused us of bending backwards and of siding with this side or that side. I think they have begun to realise that if we are sometimes soft of speech, friendly of speech, it does not denote weakness, but a certain conviction that that is the only right way to deal with international problems or, for the matter of that, national problems. Therefore, I submit that we must not talk about these warlike approaches and threats. We must not be overcome by anger even though, sometimes, we may feel a little angry about events that are happening. We must show by our firm policy, and calm demeanour that we will continue that friendly effort that we have always made even when it comes right up to our borders.

SYMPATHY FOR TIBET

There is a great deal of sympathy for the people of Tibet, undoubtedly. Certainly not because the people of Tibet have a feudal regime. They have been cut off and have had a static social system which may have existed in other parts of the world some hundreds of years ago, but has ceased to exist elsewhere. Nobody wants that here. As a matter of fact, I am quite sure, even the Dalai Lama does not want it in Tibet. Here, we see a strange thing, a society which had been isolated completely for hundreds of years suddenly coming

out into the open, events throwing it into the mad world of ours, cold wars and all kinds of things happening, dynamic policies and ferocious policies and authoritarian policies. Imagine the contrast in these two. It is a vast gulf. It is inevitable that painful consequences flow from this type of thing. You can lessen them. You can try to moderate the effect of that impact. You cannot simply wish it away. It was the policy, I believe, of the People's Government of China, who realised that a country like this cannot be treated in a sudden way, to go slowly about the so-called reforms or whatever it may be. Whether that policy has changed or not, I cannot say. Maybe, it has changed somewhat. That is quite possible. Whether other changes are taking place in China, I cannot say. It was definitely a policy and they stated it publicly and privately that they realised this.

DIFFERENT MEANING

There is another difficulty in my or our dealing with these matters, and that is, that the words we use have a different meaning for other people. For instance, we talk of the autonomy of Tibet. So do the Chinese. But, a doubt creeps into my mind as to whether the meaning I attach to it is the same as they attach to it. I do not think so. There are so many other words. I am not talking of any deliberate distortion. That apart. Quite apart from any distortion, the ways of thinking have changed. They have changed anyhow and the cold war methods have made them change even more. It is frightfully difficult really to talk the same language, the same language of the mind, I mean. That difficulty arises because of that also, and tremendous misunderstandings arise. However, I cannot go into all these matters.

One thing, I may say. Some reference was made, I think by Shri S. A. Dange, to some convention on Tibet by a certain Mazumdar. I have not heard of it except today. In fact, just when I came, I heard something about it. In so far as I have seen all the papers—I did see them—I think that whatever that convention appears to aim at or whatever it seems to represent, seem to be very wrong. It is a wrong approach, an approach which will do no good to anybody at all, and may do a good deal of harm if really it was the approach of any responsible people in India. For, we must realise first of all one thing. What do we want? What are we aiming at? How can we get there? What can we do about it?

PAINFUL PROCESS

I take it that we are sad, we are distressed at events in Tibet. Why are we distressed? Presumably because we feel that a certain people are being sat upon, are being oppressed: whether the certain people, according to Shri S. A. Dange, are certain feudal landlords or some people like that, or according to others, they are the common people of Tibet, or whatever it may be, there it is. I have no doubt in my mind that it is difficult to draw the line in such cases between the top feudal elements and the others. They all can be mixed together. And as a result, for the moment, they are all uprooted.

Now, where a society has existed for hundreds and hundreds of years—it may have outlasted its utility, but the fact is—uprooting it is a terribly painful process. It can be uprooted slowly, it can be changed even with rapidity, but with a measure of cooperation. But any kind of a forcible uprooting of that must necessarily be painful, whether it is a good society or a bad society. When we have to deal with such societies anywhere in the world, which as a social group may be called primitive, it is not an easy matter, how to deal with it. All these difficult things are happening. They should have happened; they would have happened, may be a little more slowly but with a greater measure of cooperation, because such a change can only take place effectively and with least harm to the fabric, to those people concerned, by themselves—they may be helped by others, may be advised by others, but by themselves. The moment a good thing is done by bad means that good thing becomes a bad thing. It produces different reactions. That is, I cannot judge of what is happening in Tibet. I do not have facts, neither does anybody in this House, except broadly some odd fact here and there. But I am merely venturing to say that all these complicated systems—not so easy to disentangle; anyhow, whatever it may be—have brought undoubtedly a great deal of suffering to the people of Tibet. And I should have liked to avoid it. But what can I do?

COMIC OPERA APPROACH

People talk in a strange way, of a number of representatives of countries being summoned and orders being issued, do this, and do that. I am surprised that they should think on these lines, as if this can be done.

Here is, after years of effort, going to be, I believe, what is called a summit conference somewhere in Europe, where the great ones of the earth, Russia, and America, and England and France, and may be somebody else, Italy or whatever it may be, would be summoned to decide the fate of the world; it has taken years and years. What they will decide, I do not know. I wish them well. I wish they will come to some understanding. But the way casually hon. Members here say that we should issue orders and decrees, get together and decide or it will be the worse for you, seems almost like a comic opera approach; it has no relation to reality.

INDO-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP

It is a basic fact that China is a great country, and India is a great country, great in extent, great in background, great in many things. I am not talking so much about military power, although, from the point of view of defence or offence, no doubt, their potentials or actuals are considerable.

Now, looking at the subject from any long perspective, or even in the short perspective, it is a matter of considerable consequence that China and India should be friends, should be cooperative. It does not mean that they should go the same path, but they should not come in each other's way; they should not be hostile to each other; it is neither good for India nor for China. And China may be a very strong country as it is, and is growing stronger, but even from the Chinese point of view, it is not a good thing to have a hostile India; it makes a great deal of difference to have that kind of thing—I am not talking in military terms, but otherwise. It is to the interest of both these countries, even though they function in different and in many ways, not to be hostile to each other. If China starts telling me what to do, I am likely to be irritated. If I go about telling China what to do, China is likely to be irritated, even more than I am, because, I am supposed to be a soft person and the Chinese are not supposed to be very soft about these matters; maybe. So there it is.

OUR DIGNITY

Now, maintaining our dignity, maintaining our rights, maintaining our self-respect, and yet not allowing ourselves to drift into wrong attitudes and hostile attitudes, and trying to help in removing or in solving each problem as they arise, we may help a little—

they cannot be solved quickly—that is the very utmost that one can do in the circumstances, or at any rate, creating an atmosphere which may help in doing this. How far it will go, I do not know.

So, I venture to say that this should be our broad approach in this matter. We cannot go any further. We might possibly help in that approach there.

After all, this House and the country have expressed in fairly effective language their reactions to Tibetan developments, to events in Tibet. Nobody doubts them. But I might say, that talking in fiery and hostile language will not carry conviction but in fact, it will only lead to greater gulf being created and less possibility of any help being rendered in understanding or in finding a solution.

Therefore, I would beg to suggest that we should not allow ourselves to be swept away in these matters.

QUESTION OF MAPS

One thing which was referred to by two or three Members was the question of maps. Now, there is no doubt about it that this continuance of what are called old maps of China, which show certainly fairly large areas of Indian territory, as if they belong to the Chinese State, has been a factor in creating continual irritation in the minds of people in this country. It is not some crisis that has arisen, but it has been difficult for our people, naturally, to understand why this kind of thing continues indefinitely, year after year. It is not, mind you, a question of some odd little pocket here and there which may be in dispute on which we can argue; there are two or three pockets about which we have had, and we are going to have, discussions—but this business of issuing these maps which are not true to fact, which are factually untrue, and which can hardly be justified on the ground of history, of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's regime or any previous regime.

NO SURVEILLANCE

I shall just say one word more. I think Shri S. A. Dange talked about the palace of the Dalai Lama and all that. I think that is an exaggeration. First of all, it is not his choice. It is our choice. And it is rather slightly bigger than a normal house in Mussoorie. We had to find a biggish house because of the number of people involved.

As I have said, there is no question of surveillance on him except

for security reasons, and we have not prevented him from meeting anybody if he wants to meet. He has met, in fact, large numbers of people; some people go for *darshan* to him, and some individuals, often Buddhist representatives from Ceylon and other places, are coming to see him; they all go there. Nobody prevents anyone. Certainly, as for the odd newspaper man, especially from foreign countries, who comes here in search of sensation, even him we do not prevent, but we do not welcome him, because such persons reduce everything to high sensationalism.

The other day, I said in the other place that all this business of God-King etc. is not to my liking. He is the Dalai Lama, referred to as the Dalai Lama; and if anyone creates sensation-mongering by saying God-King all the time; I may say that the Dalai Lama himself does not like this business.

Therefore, we do not want this whole occurrence to be reduced or kept up to the sensational level. That was why we were not at all anxious that so many correspondents should go there and besiege him; and then there will always be difficulties, interpreters and all that; and confusion will arise, and contradictions and all that.

ACHARYA KRIPALANI: You may allow some Communist friends to go and see him.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: We shall allow both our Communist friends and our PSP friends, both of them. It is not really a question of our allowing, we do not give permits. It is for him.

ACHARYA KRIPALANI: You may give them some extra facilities.

REFUGEE PROBLEM

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Now, we have to face the larger problem of these refugees. It is a difficult problem, and it has been thrust upon us.

If I may say just one word, before the 11th March—that is not so long ago, about seven weeks ago is it? —we had no inkling of what might happen in Tibet. On the 11th March was the first word we got of some demonstrations in Lhasa by Tibetans, and on the 17th, six days later, came this business of, so it is said, shelling the Dalai Lama's palace. Shri Dange said something about bad marksmanship. I am only saying what he said. It is not bad marksmanship, but deliberately they were sent there as a kind of warning. Anyhow, then the situation developed on the 20th, fighting took place there. The situation developed rapidly after that, and the House knows

what happened afterwards. The Dalai Lama left there on the 17th evening, and arrived here at the end of the month, so that we really were rather overtaken by events. We did not know that the Dalai Lama was coming here till about two days before he actually entered India. We had imagined when we knew he was travelling south that he might come, but it was only two days before that that we heard that he would like to come, so that we were overtaken by events.

We had decided to accept him; later, when others came, we decided to allow them to come too, and there they are, all these refugees, apart from the Dalai Lama. The present estimates are about 10,000—and all kinds of refugees, the old, the aged, some young people, some women, and it is obviously going to be a bit of a problem for us. We are not going to keep them in barbed wire enclosures for ever; for the present we are keeping them in two or three camps.

MR. M. P. MISHRA: Are all of them fed and lodged?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: But the sooner we spread them out the better. Maybe, some will have to remain for some time, I do not know.

MR. TRIDIB KUMAR CHAUDHURI: I have one question to ask, only one small question.

One thing has intrigued many observers greatly, that the Dalai Lama has been elected by the People's Congress in China as one of the Vice-Chairmen.

AN HON. MEMBER: The Panchen Lama.

MR. TRIDIB KUMAR CHAUDHURI: The Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama. I am sure of my facts. That is correct.

Because he is also a part of that State, has our Government received any request from the Chinese Embassy here that the Chinese Ambassador or any of his representatives should see the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No, Sir. We have received no such request. I stated, as you might remember, that the Chinese Ambassador would be welcome to see him if he so wishes.

DR. SUSHILA NAYAR: I want to ask the hon. Prime Minister if these 10,000 refugees that have come are all well-to-do feudal lords, or they are the common people of Tibet.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I cannot give any description of all of them. They have not reached, they are on the way, but it is hardly likely that Tibet will produce 10,000 lords.

Part Eight


THE DEBATE IN THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT

This part includes extracts from two debates on Tibet in the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha debate on May 4, 1959, and the Lok Sabha debate on May 8.

Extracts from the speeches of the Home Minister, Mr. Pant, and the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, during the April 1 debate in the Lok Sabha are also included.

It should be recalled that the April 1 debate was held on the basis of a motion for adjournment relating to a statement issued by the Indian Communist Party (see Part Ten) and a handout issued by the Chinese Embassy repeating the charge that Kalimpong was a commanding centre of the Tibetan rebellion. Mr. Nehru was away from New Delhi on that day. His statement of April 2 is included in Part Seven.

Brief notes about selected speakers: Dr. H. N. Kunzru, a nominated member of the Rajya Sabha, is President of the Indian Council of World Affairs, and is widely respected in India; Mr. B. Shiva Rao, a distinguished journalist, represented India at the UN as a delegate; Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, Bar-at-Law, is leader of the Communist Group in the Rajya Sabha; Mr. Khadilkar, Independent, is a prominent member of the Lok Sabha representing non-party opinion; Mr. S. A. Dange, a veteran trade unionist, is leader of the Communist Group in the Lok Sabha.



DEBATE IN THE RAJYA SABHA

On 4 May 1959, the Rajya Sabha debated Tibet on the basis of a Motion for Adjournment moved by Dr. H. N. Kunzru, Independent. Initially there was a brief discussion on the admissibility of the Motion which was however allowed to be moved.

MR. H. D. RAJAH: Sir, before Dr. Kunzru is allowed to move his Motion, I want to raise a point of order. This Motion is not consistent with the Constitution of our country. Presumably this Motion was admitted in the House under the Seventh Schedule, item 10, "Foreign Affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relation with any foreign country".

Now, Sir, Tibet is not a foreign country. It is a part of China. If this House is going to discuss a foreign country, it must be China, because Tibet is a part of China. If this dangerous precedent is accepted by us, I say in all humility, then Soviet Russia will have a right to discuss in their Parliament our Kerala affairs and and so many other matters. (*Interruptions*)

MR. CHAIRMAN: That will do, we understand.

MR. H. D. RAJAH: I, therefore, say that Tibet not being directly connected with our Constitution, and Tibet being a part of China, whose suzerainty over Tibet we have accepted . . .

MR. H. P. SAKSENA: According to you it may be a part of China.

MR. H. D. RAJAH: It will infringe the provisions of the Panch Sheel which we have accepted. The Prime Minister has also entered into a declaration with the Prime Minister of China that domestic affairs in another's country will not be interfered with and there will be non-intervention.

This country has accepted the Dalai Lama. It is a hospitable country. It has given asylum to so many people. All people are welcome to take asylum in our country. But to discuss the affairs of a part of another nation, to discuss the affairs pertaining to another country, will amount to our conceding the dangerous precedent of other foreign countries discussing our internal affairs.

MR. CHAIRMAN: All right.

MR. H. D. RAJAH: Therefore, I want a ruling from the Chair whether this Motion is in consonance with the Constitution of this country.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: Sir, in your wisdom you have allowed this

Motion to be discussed. I do not exactly know what will be discussed. But, I think, Sir, you should consider the constitutional point that has been raised, that if we allow this Motion, we would be creating dangerous precedents.

Our Constitution does not even allow us here in this House to discuss the State subjects concerning Bengal, Punjab and other States—sometimes exceptions are made with regard to Kerala, but that is beside the point; generally, we do not allow any such discussion. Now, Sir, obviously, we are discussing some other thing. I could have understood this point being discussed in the course of a Foreign Affairs debate. But a separate Motion to discuss the situation arising out of the recent events in Tibet has been admitted. I would like to know whether it would be permissible for us to concentrate on this discussion about the internal affairs of Tibet or whether, since in your wisdom you have admitted this Motion, we shall confine ourselves to the important subject of Indo-Chinese relations. That is a very important point, and I have no objection that way. But, here, I think, Sir, you should again reflect and give us direction as to how the discussion should proceed.

(The Chairman allowed the Motion to be moved.)

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: Mr. Chairman, I move: *That the situation arising out of the recent events in Tibet be taken into consideration.*

Sir, it is not easy to speak about a situation which has caused great uneasiness among the people of India; but it is, at the same time, not possible to be silent about it. The Prime Minister has dealt with some of the most important issues arising out of this situation with admirable restraint and dignity. He has set an example, which I trust, everyone in this House will follow in discussing this situation. Sir, the Prime Minister, in his statement of the 27th April has referred to many of the charges brought against India, because of the reaction in India, of what was happening in Tibet. It is not necessary for me, therefore, to deal with those things at any length. Apart from this, anyone who speaks on this question must realise that the two great countries of Asia—India and China—have to work together for the benefit of the world. We have had for two thousand years a frontier extending over 1,800 miles where unbroken peace has reigned. People talk of the Canadian-American frontier, but in this respect India and China have set an example which is more worthy of being imitated than the example of Canada and America, and I trust, Sir, that the cooperation that has been

the keynote of the relations of India and China for centuries will be observed in their actions even in future.

NATIONAL UPSURGE IN TIBET

Sir, no one can deny that the reaction in India to the situation arising out of the events in Tibet was strong and swift. Even in Parliament all parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, united in expressing their concern at what was happening and when the Prime Minister announced in the Lok Sabha that the Dalai Lama had entered Indian territory, the news was received with joy and enthusiasm in which most of the parties, except the Communist Party, shared. We have seen that various charges have been brought against us in connection with the recent events in Tibet. It has been said, for instance, that Kalimpong was the centre from which the revolt in Tibet was being organised, and this charge continues to be repeated in spite of the repeated denials of the Prime Minister. Again, Sir, it was said that the Dalai Lama had been abducted by the rebels from Tibet and was held in duress. No less a person than Mr. Chou En-lai, the Prime Minister of China, said as late as on the 14th or 15th of April that the Dalai Lama was held in duress. Again it was said that India was influenced by imperialist propaganda and intrigues. Further when it was seen that India continued to be concerned over what was happening in Tibet, India was told that she had skeletons in her cupboard and that she should be mindful of her own weaknesses when she tried to meddle in affairs not her own. Again, Sir, some Indians were attacked as being expansionists and a Peking newspaper whose article was reported by the *New China News Agency* said that the Indian expansionists were plotting to make Tibet a vassal state of India.

The revolt was attributed to a clique of the upper strata in Tibet. The Prime Minister has dealt with all these charges. It is not necessary for me, therefore, to go into them at all but I have to say that the responsibility for the recent events in Tibet has been placed on shoulders that cannot justifiably be expected to bear. I am reminded, Sir, in this connection, of the situation in connection with the Hungarian revolt when it was tried to be made out that the revolt was due to the action of capitalists and imperialists, anti-revolutionary elements and so on, but a little later it became clear that the revolt was a national revolt. I think, Sir, everybody will agree with the Prime Minister that the revolt in Tibet cannot be as easily explained as

the Chinese authorities have tried to explain it away. It is due to a national upsurge and it will be good for China and the whole world if that fact were frankly recognised.

REPLY TO CHINESE CHARGES

Sir, I want to deal with two charges that have been brought against India since the Prime Minister spoke in the Lok Sabha on the 27th April. The Panchen Lama has, in the course of a speech, accused the Indian authorities of having shown certain discrimination against him in arranging receptions. He has further said that when he saw the famous stupa at Sarnath—that was the monastery where the Buddha first preached—and quite a number of other monasteries, he felt that they were in a poor state and he wondered whether people who cared so little about Buddhist archaeological remains could care much for Buddhism. I am sorry to say, Sir, that we miss in this statement of the Panchen Lama that dignity which we have a right to associate with statements made by people in high positions like the Panchen Lama. Again, Sir, everyone knows how keenly interested the Government of India is in the preservation of the ancient monuments. The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama came to India in connection with the 2500th Jayanti of the Buddha. Shortly before the Jayanti was celebrated, special repairs had been undertaken in many places including Sarnath and Kusinara. I greatly regret, Sir, the words used by the Panchen Lama and the manner in which facts have been twisted in order to bring an accusation against India and, the charge of discrimination against the Panchen Lama has been brought nearly three years after the event. I am in a position to say, Sir, that he was treated with every mark of respect and that the hospitality shown to him could scarcely have been improved.

Another charge, Sir, is that several Tibetan leaders, including one of the Dalai Lama's brothers, had moved from Kalimpong to Mussoorie and that there is every reason to suspect that Mussoorie would become a new commanding centre of the Tibetan rebels. Sir, it is, I am sorry to say, clear that no accusation is too fantastic to be brought against India by interested parties but the Prime Minister has made it clear that the Government of India which has not allowed the Tibetans at Kalimpong to indulge in anti-Chinese activities will not permit anyone in Mussoorie to prejudice the relations between these two countries in this crisis. Statements like

these show how desperate the position of those is who want to accuse India directly or indirectly of complicity in the Tibetan revolt.

QUESTION OF INTERFERENCE

Now, Sir, leaving aside these things, we have to meet two criticisms of our policy. One is that our criticism of Chinese policy in Tibet amounts to interference in the internal affairs of China. Sir, we have before now criticised the policy of other countries in respect of the manner in which they dealt with some of their colonies. We have, for instance, criticised the French policy in Algeria and the British policy in Kenya and the Central African Federation.

MR. P. N. SAPRU: Cyprus.

DR. H. N. KUNZRU: We have never been told that we were going out of our province in expressing our opinion about the policies of those countries in respect of their colonies. If it cannot be said that our criticism was the result of the policies of France and England or the result of hostility to them, how can Indian disapproval or Indian concern over Chinese policy in Tibet be regarded as unfriendly to China? India has recognised Chinese suzerainty subject to regional autonomy. Mr. Chou En-lai said to the Prime Minister of India:

While Tibet had long been part of the Chinese State, they did not consider Tibet as a province of China.

He further said,

The people of Tibet are different from the people of China. Tibet is an autonomous region and it would enjoy autonomy.

The Prime Minister has further told us that he communicated this to the Dalai Lama in 1956 and asked him, in view of the assurance given by Mr. Chou En-lai, to accept them in good faith and cooperate in maintaining that autonomy in bringing about certain reforms in Tibet. Sir, in view of this, I think the Prime Minister would have failed in his duty had he not expressed his own feelings and that of the whole country with regard to the Tibetan upheaval.

THE QUESTION OF REFORMS

Sir, the second charge that has been brought against us is that we are siding with the reactionaries. In the resolution that was

passed the other day by the National People's Congress of China on Tibet, it has been said:

The existing social system in Tibet is an extremely backward system of serfdom. The degree of cruelty which characterises the exploitation, oppression and persecution of the labouring people by the serf-owners can hardly be paralleled in any other part of the world. Even those who have repeatedly expressed sympathy for the Tibetan rebels cannot explain why they are so enthusiastic in backing up such a backward system. The Tibetan people, for a long time, have firmly demanded the reform of their social system.

Sir, we realise the need for introducing social and economic reforms in backward and underdeveloped countries. The steps that we have taken to introduce social and economic reforms in our country during the last few years would have been regarded, only a few years ago, as revolutionary. Yet they have been introduced democratically, that is, with the support of the representatives and the leaders of the people. When we, therefore, express our concern at the situation arising out of the recent events in Tibet we should not be held to be supporting the cause of those who would like the existing social system in Tibet to be maintained. I venture to think that the method that we have used in our country can with advantage be employed by other countries. All colonial powers also claim to have the right to introduce reforms in their colonies and they claim to do so even against the wishes of their people. But these reforms, in order to be lasting and to have their full effects, should be carried out with the goodwill of the leaders of the people. Had our methods been followed, had the goodwill of the leaders been secured, I am sure that reforms could have been introduced into Tibet at no distant date and that these reforms would have created contentment throughout the country.

FRIENDSHIP WITH CHINA

Sir, it is no pleasure to me to appear to disagree with Chinese policy in regard to Tibet. But situated as we are, considering the centuries-old connection between India and Tibet, the ancient religious and cultural ties that bind the two countries, was it reasonable for anyone to expect that we would maintain silence at this juncture? Sir, notwithstanding what has happened, everyone in this House, I am sure, desires to strengthen the friendly relations that have prevailed for two thousand years between India and China. But these friendly relations can be based only on frankness

and free expression of opinion. No fruitful relations can be established if we suppress honest differences of opinion on our part. It would be tantamount to national cowardice. We have the right to stand up for the truth as we see it, without claiming to be always in the right. But though we may disagree with China occasionally, it is a fact—and the Chinese authorities, I believe, recognise it—that we realise the great value of continued friendship between these two great countries. Our frontier has been peaceful, as I have already said, for two thousand years, and no one would wish that anything should be said that would disturb these friendly relations to the smallest extent.

There are just one or two matters to which I should like to refer before I sit down. The Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai, addressing the Chinese National People's Congress, referred to the undetermined boundary lines between China and certain neighbouring south-eastern countries and said that these boundaries could be reasonably settled through peaceful negotiations. China's claim to any territory controlled by other countries raises a serious question, but in any case, I venture to think that the time chosen by him with regard to this question was scarcely opportune. I fervently hope that he did not want to make India aware of the existence of a new frontier, the north-east frontier. He himself is reported to have said recently that he hoped that the friendly relations between India and China could be improved after the quelling of the Tibetan rebellion. I trust, therefore, that the relations between India and China would continue to be warm and friendly and that the frontier between India and Tibet will continue to be as peaceful in future as it has been for more than two thousand years.

There is one more point in connection with the situation arising out of recent events in Tibet that I should like to lay stress on. We all realise the value of the cultural bonds that unite India and her neighbours, but we have recognised this value in a passive way. We have done hardly anything in recent years to bring about the further development of cultural relations between us and the neighbouring countries. I think that we should recognise more actively the value of the cultural ties that I have referred to and try to develop and strengthen them, so that the appreciation of India's motives and policies that existed in the past may continue in future also.

THE TIBETAN REFUGEES

Lastly, I should like to refer to the entry of a few thousand Tibetans recently into India. In giving the Dalai Lama and these Tibetans an asylum in India, the Prime Minister has acted in conformity with the strong feeling that prevails on this subject throughout the country. We are not happy that events have driven these people to seek refuge in India. We shall be happy if circumstances are created that would enable them to go back to their country. The wish of the Prime Minister that the present situation should come to a speedy end and that the refugees should be in a position to return to their homes in the near future would be echoed by every one not merely in this House but all over the country. While they are here, I have no doubt that they will be looked after carefully both by the Government and by the people of India. If they have to live here, I hope that they will be enabled to earn their own living so that they may lead self-respecting lives. I also hope that they would be given reasonable freedom to carry on any peaceful activities in which they may be interested including an expression of their opinion. We have never so far tried to stifle opinions different from ours, and even though the present situation is delicate and we cannot allow people to exploit it in order to create illwill and bitterness between India and China, yet I hope that we shall be actuated by that broad and liberal policy which actuated our country in the past and which a small country like England has followed for hundreds of years in regard to emigres. It is not, of course, binding on us in international law to allow an unlimited number of people to seek asylum in our country—but the situation at present is extraordinary, and I once again express the hope that the Prime Minister would deal with the matter that I have referred to with that regard for the feelings of the country and for the demands of fairness and human self-respect as he had done till now.

Sir, I have done.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Motion approved—That the situation arising out of the recent events in Tibet be taken into consideration.

Every other speaker will have just fifteen minutes, and the time limit will be strictly enforced except in respect of the Prime Minister.

Mr. Shiva Rao.

MR. B. SHIVA RAO: Mr. Chairman, in taking part in this

debate I shall, of course, bear in mind the exhortations with which my hon. friend, Dr. Kunzru, commenced his speech. I am also reminded Sir, of the wise advice which was given by a brother of mine when he was relinquishing his post as India's permanent delegate at the United Nations to take his seat on the International Court of Justice. [The reference is to the late Sir Benegal Narsingh Rao, for several years leader of Indian delegations to the UN—EDITOR] When his successor asked him what should be the main point he should pursue when representing India at the United Nations, my brother said: "Whatever may be the topic on which you speak in the United Nations, make your language soft but let your facts be deadly." Sir, in regard to the tragedy which has overtaken Tibet the facts seem to me to be so deadly that one can afford to make one's language soft.

THE 1951 AGREEMENT

So far as Government's policy in regard to Tibet is concerned, its basic features were explained last week very clearly and fully in the Prime Minister's admirable statement which was read out in this House by his able Deputy Minister. My hon. friend, Dr. Kunzru, referred to one passage in that statement in which certain conversations between our Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of China were summarised. Premier Chou En-lai gave the assurance that though Tibet had for a long time been a part of the Chinese State, they, that is, the Government and the people of China, did not regard Tibet as a province of China. He said that the people of Tibet were different and that the regional autonomy of Tibet would be respected. Sir, in making that statement to our Prime Minister in 1956, Premier Chou En-lai was only underlining the assurances which were given abundantly in the agreement which was entered into in 1951 between China and Tibet. The circumstances under which that agreement was signed I shall mention to the House a minute later; but I shall read out some of the relevant articles from that agreement to point out in what mood the Tibetan delegation was persuaded to sign that agreement. These articles are—in the language of the agreement:

All national minorities are fully enjoying the right of national equality and have established or are establishing national regional autonomy.

Freedom is guaranteed to all nationalities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational work.

The Central authorities of China will not alter the existing political system in Tibet nor will they alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama.

The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected and Lama Monasteries shall be protected.

Sir, those are some of the articles of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951.

The beginning of the present crisis in Tibet goes back to 1950. Sir, in that year it was my privilege to be on the Indian delegation to the United Nations. When in November of that year, reports came out of China of Chinese forces advancing towards Lhasa, the suggestion was made by one of the members at the United Nations to the Steering Committee, which was in charge of the Agenda of the General Assembly of that year, that Tibet be included on the Agenda.

TIBET IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The Leader of the Indian Delegation under instructions from the External Affairs Ministry here presumably on the basis of reports received from our Ambassador in Peking at that time—Sardar Panikkar—gave the assurance to the Steering Committee that the Chinese forces had halted at Chamdo, some three hundred miles from Lhasa, and that they had no intention of going further. And, Sir, it was on that assurance given by the Leader of the Indian Delegation to the Steering Committee that the proposal to discuss Tibet in that session was dropped. What happened subsequently? Only a few months later, in the spring of 1951, the Chinese forces resumed their advance towards Lhasa. A Tibetan Delegation was summoned to Peking. It went through New Delhi. There was, I think, some delay in the Tibetan Delegation leaving New Delhi for Peking because of certain transport or transit difficulties in Hong Kong en route. The Chinese Government, I regret to say, even on that occasion very readily attributed unworthy motives to the Government of India and suggested that the delay was due to foreign influences being at work in New Delhi. When the Delegation reached Peking, it was asked to sign an agreement which had already been drawn up. The Tibetan Delegation was reminded that there was already established in Lhasa Chinese Military Headquarters and the Delegation was asked to sign on the dotted line. After that, Sir, who are the people who keep other people under duress and make them sign statements?

THE CHARGE OF EXPANSIONISM

It seems to me a matter of very great distress that charges of intervention and of expansionism should be made against India, after the experience of China during the last ten years and after the most categorical statement by the Prime Minister last week that "we have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet, but we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet and we are greatly distressed at their hapless plight". China seems to forget that while she has been through a great revolution during the last ten years, we, too, on the southern side of the Himalayas have not been idle. Whatever excuse the Chinese might have had in the past to fear British imperialism when it was a vigorous institution in many parts of Asia, after 1947, British imperialism has ceased to exist. There are no interventionists and no expansionists, certainly not on the southern side of the Himalayas. That charge, Sir, is demonstrably untrue. We are not concerned only with Tibet's well-being here. We have our own anxieties and apprehensions in regard to this region. In 1950, I remember when I was a member of the other House, during a debate on foreign affairs, when someone from the Opposition mentioned Tibet, the Prime Minister said in the course of his reply at the end of the debate in very firm tones, "Maps or no maps, the McMahon Line is our boundary", and last week in that statement which he made, he said in more general terms that he gave first priority to the preservation of the security and the integrity of India. I am reluctant to say more on the subject because I realise that what we say in this House should not make the task of the Prime Minister, extremely difficult and delicate as it already is, more difficult.

Sir, there is a human aspect of this problem—the problem of the refugees—to which Dr. Kunzru has already referred. I heartily endorse his plea for measures being devised to enable these thousands of refugees who have come into India, in different parts of the country from Assam to Nepal, to live in terms of self-respect.

There are, I believe, suggestions for improving the roads and communications between India and Bhutan and Sikkim and I hope that plans will be devised which will not only enable the Tibetan refugees to live in terms of self-respect, but also lighten that burden which the Government of India have already undertaken in regard to these refugees.

May I, in passing, say a word about our representative in Gangtok, Shri Apa Pant? I think a word of praise is due to our representative for the remarkable success that he has achieved in the last two years in winning the confidence, the goodwill and the affection of the people of Bhutan and Sikkim.

Sir, one final word I would like to say before I sit down. I sincerely hope that the recent events in Tibet will not stand in the way of the Government of India continuing to press for the admission of China into the United Nations. What has happened in Tibet is an argument from my standpoint in favour of China's admission into the United Nations, because I feel that if she were in the United Nations, she would have realised much more clearly than she seems to do at the present moment that not only in India but in most parts of the world, at any rate, in those parts of the world where human dignity and interests are respected and valued, her action in Tibet is viewed with sharp disapproval. Sir, in 1948, when South Africa swallowed up South-West Africa, a mandated territory under the old League of Nations, India was the first to champion her cause. South Africa was very angry with us for taking up that case in the United Nations. But even South Africa did not go so far as to charge us with being interventionists and expansionists.

I would say, in conclusion, that no matter where human rights are trampled, our foreign policy should be such that there is no room for the charge that we observe different standards in different parts of the world.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: Mr. Chairman, it has been one of our interesting experiences to see the enemies of the Prime Minister's foreign policy having some kind words for him, at least for his foreign policy, but we never thought that we would live to see and to listen to such kind words overflowing in this manner from these quarters who thought that Panch Sheel was violated and so on, people who want this foreign policy to be completely reversed and who have not lost any opportunity to run his foreign policy down. Perhaps they are bound to say that in a situation like this, for it seems to some people that this has come as a godsend not only to attack some parties in this country but to strike at the foundation of Panch Sheel and disrupt the friendship between India and China for the building of which both Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Chou En-lai had played so remarkable and noble a part. But I should have liked them to at least mention

whether they stand by Panch Sheel or not. They have chosen to be discreet in this matter, because silence is considered to be golden in such propositions.

Mr. Chairman, sometimes emotions and sentiments do overpower us and tend to distort our vision. But they are temporary things and we do not allow ourselves to be guided by such things. After second thought and sober reflections we must judge what has happened in Tibet.

It is not our job here to go into the internal things there. But since this has been described as a national uprising and so on, I have to submit that what has happened in Tibet is an armed rebellion by some vested interests, reactionaries, who want to prevent the march of history, social reform and progress. It seems they profit by keeping the regime of bigotry, of obscurantism, of extreme backwardness and dark superstition. Now, I would like to mention in this connection, Sir, a book, and I would like hon. Members to refer to a book called *Seven Years in Tibet* by Henrich Harrer, who was teacher to the Dalai Lama. In one place the author says:

The Lamas often smear their patients with holy spittle Tsompa, butter and urine of some saintly man are made into a sort of gruel and administered to the sick.

Such quotations will appear in this particular book. Therefore, there is great backwardness and superstition.

TIBET BREAKS 1951 AGREEMENT

What happened there is clear from the newspaper reports, that the local government had violated the agreement signed between China and Tibet—the agreement of 1951—and it is clearly said that articles 1, 3 and 12 of that particular agreement had been clearly violated and this news was circulated by a number of newspapers in this country. On the 31st of March the *Hindustan Standard*, for example, says:

Tibet revoked her seventeen-point agreement with China, signed in 1951, and declared complete independence on March 12, according to Likhongwa, former Prime Minister of Tibet, now in New Delhi.

This is what the paper said; even before the incidents of the 17th March took place, this happened.

Now it has been said by the hon. Home Minister in the other

House that the Tibetan people are fond of prayers and all that. I do not deny that they are a religious people, that they are fond of prayers. But at the same time it was found in *The Statesman*, that monasteries had a good consignment of arms and many other papers said that arms had been piled up in the monasteries. I believe, these arms, machine guns, rifles and so on, are no part of divine worship. You being a philosopher, Sir, will be able to guide us in this matter.

Therefore, it is no use trying to tell this cock-and-bull story because every one knows that though the weapons may be religious, the hands that wield these weapons may be those of misled people. The weapons came from the KMT armed forces and other imperialist agencies. The whole thing should be understood in the proper perspective.

NOT A NATIONAL UPRISING

It has been made out as if it is a national uprising. Sometimes I feel upset when so learned a historian and scholar like the Prime Minister characterises such a thing in this manner. I have great respect for his learning and knowledge but am I to understand that this is a national uprising just because some people have taken to arms and go against their State? Have not we witnessed in our country how some backward and unenlightened people are liable to be swept away by the rabid communal reactionaries and others? Didn't we see how Kasim Razvi and the Razaakars roused the passions of some people and misled them to all sorts of actions necessitating police measures on the part of the Government? Are not Phizo and a handful of his followers even today carrying with them some sections of the people in these foreign and hostile activities suicidal to themselves and harmful to the country? Are we then to call all these things national uprisings, is the question that I put before the House and the country.

Now, Sir, let us judge it from another angle. Who welcomed this Tibetan uprising? The first to welcome this uprising was the great champion of freedom who lives in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek. What did he say? He said in a message:

Although I am in Taiwan, my heart has always been with you in your war against communism. With regard to the recent battle of Lhasa, I have been specially concerned with the heroic sacrifices made by the Tibetan brothers whose fate is constantly in my mind.

This comes from *Reuter*. Then came the reaction from the United States, State Department, which welcomed the statement of Chiang Kai-shek and US Secretary, Mr. Herter, said:

We see in the resistance efforts the heartening example of the indomitable resistant spirit.

Then, Sir, came the Wellington Conference of the SEATO Council of Ministers which put Tibet and Kashmir together—mind you, Tibet and Kashmir together were put there—for discussion. This was done. Then comes another regime, the South Vietnam regime, which offered 100 volunteers to fight for the cause of independence, and coming nearer here on his way from SEATO Ministerial Conference, after including Kashmir and Tibet in the same agenda, Mr. Qadir, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, said in Singapore:

Our sympathies are with the Tibetans. I am sure events in Tibet will make many countries review the international problems.

This was said in Singapore on the 17th April. Such are the reactions. Am I to understand that Chiang Kai-shek, the SEATO Council and Mr. Qadir and others are such people who would welcome such developments if it were for the cause of progress or am I to understand...

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: We are interested to hear your own reactions rather than the reactions of the whole world.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: In order to understand what the PSP leaders say and their policy I am going to give this and I hope he will understand.

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: There is no policy.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Sit down.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: He is touchy because that is how the PSP policy is.

You have given me only fifteen minutes, Sir, and so I cannot...

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: We should like to know your reaction.

MR. CHAIRMAN: When you were talking, he did not interrupt you. You give him a hearing.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: Well, Sir, this causes anxiety and irritation in hon. Members—at least in some hon. Members—but what can I do if facts sometimes hurt them. I should apologise to them and I

should be excused for that. The world press, the American press, the British press, the West German press—all have welcomed this.

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: The Indian press too.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: And you too.

Now, Sir, recall 1953 when it was found necessary to make a surprise arrest of Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah and then to put him under detention. As hon. Members will remember, some incidents followed and force had to be used in quelling what looked like a miniature rebellion or what contained elements of it. What did the imperialist circles in the Western press say then? I was in Europe at that time and I distinctly remember how India was called an aggressor and how the Prime Minister was painted in the darkest colours. Sheikh Abdullah was claimed as a liberator and the separatist elements and other pro-Pakistani elements were lauded to the sky. These attempts will go on and especially provocative declarations continue. See how they view this Naga rebellion. My hon. friend, Shri Sinha, may note; the *Daily Express* of February 9, 1959 said . . .

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: How are we concerned with all this? We are concerned with Tibet.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: The *Express* man reports as follows: "It is a jungle territory. . ." I would like him to note this, not the Prime Minister who knows this. "... I am surprised at Nehru's. . ."

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: What are the views of the hon. Member?

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: "... The situation is a blot on the Indian Army, disgrace to a government whose leader ceaselessly preaches non-violence and the evils of colonialism. Naga means naked."

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: How are we concerned with all these, Sir? We are concerned with Tibet now.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: Because I say that the PSP have not understood the point.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Go on.

MR. GUPTA: I know the agitation and there will be greater agitation if I were given a little more time to speak on the subject.

I know the Congress Party would not like to do it. As far as the PSP is concerned, its anti-communism has become so deep-seated that I am not a doctor to cure it. Now, that is the position. Why is it so? It is because the imperialists are interested in ridiculing Panch Sheel, undermining these principles as the guiding line for

international behaviour amongst nations for peaceful relations and a policy of coexistence. This situation has arisen to disrupt friendship between India and China. It has struck against the greatest bulwark of peace in this Asian region. This conforms to the imperialist interests and thus strikes against Afro-Asian solidarity. This is intended to break the Bandung principle and it is a regret that this simple thing is not seen by our PSP and Jan Sangh friends. They want to defeat peace-loving forces by methods of provocation and they are looking forward to a change in our foreign policy. For instance, the *Hindustan Times* wrote that Nehru's foreign policy called for a reassessment.

Now, Sir, I agree that there has taken place some deterioration in the situation. We should be interested in facing the situation realistically. There are two sets of people, one set, the majority of it, sits on this side and that side, and desires the restoration of normal relations between India and China and wants to prize and cherish that friendship. That set would naturally be interested in overcoming the difficulties, in setting matters right and in developing and strengthening our relations with China. On the other side, there are some people, a handful of them fortunately for the country, who always attack the principles of Panch Sheel, our foreign policy and demand a change in the foreign policy. They would naturally be interested in developing the crisis, in seeing that the dream of their dreams comes true. Sir, that is how we view this matter. We are interested in the overwhelming majority of the people, their thoughts and ideas.

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: The overwhelming majority is not with you.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: I do not know with whom you are. The only thing I find, as far as the PSP is concerned, is this. When they were saying something in the other House, the Taiwan Assembly or the Parliament was moving more or less a similar resolution. Well, I do not know with whom they are. Now, Sir. . .

MR. P. N. SAPRU: Let him speak on the subject of the Motion.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Please sit down, Mr. Sapru. Let him go on.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: Just two minutes. At least I have given some provocation to hon. friends, because the thoughts otherwise do not flow. The irritations have to be exhibited. Now, the Prime Minister has expressed his distress over certain expressions and statements in China. I can understand his position, but the feelings

of the Chinese people must be understood. Apart from throwing cowardung on Mao Tse-tung's portrait, with the police looking on, the Chinese Government and its leaders were subjected to an avalanche of insults in some quarters in this country. Secondly, about the enemies of India's foreign policy, expansionists and other things, I would like only to say that I do not understand what is meant by this, but I do not think that the Indian Government is meant. As far as the PSP is concerned, I am prepared to conclude that this may be an exaggeration, because the capacity of the PSP to expand is very limited indeed.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Diwan Chaman Lall.

MR. BHUPESH GUPTA: One minute Sir. Now, Sir, I want to make one point. Here I want to point out that we should be extremely careful. Only one point I would like to refer to. The Prime Minister has said that the Dalai Lama is a religious head. Besides, he occupies a high secular position. When he is already in India our sympathies naturally would go to him. But I think it is wrong to advertise it as a political asylum, for the international law is very clear on the subject of political asylum. It is given to one who is a fugitive from justice, to an offender. The Dalai Lama is a religious head. He has recently been elected as a Vice-Chairman of the Standing Council of the People's National Congress and the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee.

DEBATE IN THE LOK SABHA

On 8 May 1959, the Lok Sabha debated Tibet. The following are extracts from the proceedings:

MR. KHADILKAR

After listening to the statements given in a comprehensive manner and the developments that took place in Tibet, I expected that the Chinese Government would take note of it and would stop further campaign, in which we have been accused of interference, expansionism and several other charges levelled against us. Unfortunately, the same type of charges have been repeated in this country by the Communist Party organ and almost every point that was covered by the statement has been challenged in a signed article in the last issue of *New Age*. . . .

These charges were repeated by responsible persons. We have been painted in the same way as the Americans were painted in the campaign against them. We have been tarred with the same brush so far as the Chinese press is concerned. At Mussoorie, the Prime Minister suggested that let the Panchen Lama or any dignitary of the Chinese State come over to India and let him talk the matter over. I felt that it would have been proper and I fervently hoped that China would accept that, instead of talking it at this level of a propaganda of a vicious nature, it would be lifted up and taken on a diplomatic level. But unfortunately, it seems that the diplomatic channels are still blocked. I do not know why.

Chinese Propaganda against India

The propaganda that was carried on from the platform of the Chinese People's Congress is now being carried on through the columns of the *People's Daily* and the *Peking Daily*. Readers are ventilating their views and only yesterday, the *Peking Daily* has said, "We shall hit back in blunt terms." Not only that; I am really surprised that this propaganda is carried on at a lower level. There are workers' rallies and students' rallies all over China where the minds of the people and of the younger generation are being poisoned against our country.

I want to know what we have done concerning Tibet. Have we taken some new line? Had we not stated in 1949-50 what we are stating today, or, are we stating something else that we had not

communicated before? This is the question. Therefore, I would like to point out what we did before and what we are saying about the Tibetan uprising now. There are several charges; I do not want to repeat them here. They have been answered by our Prime Minister in a most dignified and restrained manner. The Prime Minister knows fully well that in our country, though Government can decide, and even the Prime Minister can say something, but, as it was said once upon a time by Roosevelt, we can remain neutral, but people cannot remain neutral. They make their decisions. It is a vital moral issue. All the minds cannot be just controlled. In this country, you cannot switch off and switch on the propaganda machine, as is being done in China. It is most unfortunate.

Question of Interference

For instance, take the case of interference. I was astounded to read it—a most fantastic charge—and I was reminded of a small incident in jail. While we were prisoners in 1932, in our neighbouring ward, behind a wall, a young prisoner was mercilessly caned. He was shrieking and we could not bear it. We rushed to the door of the ward and protested along with him. All the warders came; the superintendent arrived on the spot and said, "What is this?" We said, we have a right to protest. He ordered us to be locked up in the barracks. Later on, the jail superintendent had recorded in record books that for interference in the administration of the jail, our privileges were cut off. The charge of interference regarding the Tibetan affairs is of a similar nature.

Are we going to be silenced because it is our friendly country with whom we have tried to cultivate friendship despite certain issues hanging fire and because our foreign policy is being guided by certain basic fundamental human values? Are we not to test the events in Tibet on the same touchstone? Are we to be inhibited henceforward when we are dealing with our neighbour with a different system of Government, while we deal with the other problems like Algeria and the government-in-exile? Their Prime minister was here and he was received by our Prime Minister as well as our people here. Our relations with France are not in any way hostile. We have expressed our views about Central Africans and the sort of terror practised against the African people by the British imperialists. So far as Tibet is concerned, is it proposed that India should watch the events in Tibet considering that it is a

military problem and a domestic problem? As Robespierre, one of the French Revolution leaders, said, "China can send missionaries, though they are not welcome, with guns and settle that affair." Can we adopt that attitude? Is it consistent with our policy? What is our policy?

I would just not like to go over all the statements and communications that were exchanged between our Government and the Government of China. But I would just point out what we have stated there and what the people of Tibet feel about it. It is not a question of what we feel or what the Chinese feel; it is a question of what the Tibetan people feel about it. I would like to point out that in 1950, the Tibetans made a representation to the United Nations. What did they say in that representation? They have stated there that:

The Chinese claim Tibet as a part of China. The Tibetans feel that racially, culturally, geographically, they are far apart from the Chinese. If the Chinese find the reaction of the Tibetans to their unnatural claim not acceptable, there are other civilised methods by which they can ascertain the views of the people of Tibet.

We are also saying the same thing. And at that time, fortunately, when this statement was submitted to the United Nations, no suspicion was shown that there was in drafting it, some hidden hand under the influence of some foreign power, Indian hidden hand behind it. This was the voice of the Tibetan people as it was presented to the United Nations. Therefore, this we accepted, and while carrying on the negotiations, we stated in our note of the 26th October 1959:

In the present context of world events, invasion by Chinese troupes is deplorable and, in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace.

What have we told them today? Have we changed today? We are saying the same thing.

Of course, the Chinese reply was very curt. They said: it is entirely a domestic problem of China.

No Independent Tibet

Again, when it was a question of communication, trying to understand each other's problem, we stated and stated in a very

frank manner that the Government of India was convinced that the problem could be settled by peaceful negotiations, adjusting the legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty. This is very important. No section of responsible opinion, no party in this land, has advocated the independence of Tibet. But certainly we want Tibetan people assured freedom to shape their own lives and their own destiny. We do not want to create a new Himalayan cock-pit. If Tibet is declared independent, there is a possibility of lots of complications. We do realise that. We do not want that. But at the same time, we must realise that when we relinquish whatever rights we had acquired after the Britishers left and I must say we must feel proud about it; our Prime Minister said: "We do not want to have those extra-territorial rights"—when we relinquished them, we never claimed anything in return. It was a unilateral declaration. But I am confident that the Prime Minister would have felt, while making this moral gesture, that the Chinese would also try to respect the rights of the Tibetan people, instead of asserting from the old title deeds of doubtful value, title deeds which were imposed on the Tibetan people by the old feudal emperors.

Therefore, it is surprising and the charge is again repeated that we are influenced by some foreign power. With all the force at my command, I would appeal to this House to say this to the Chinese people; because, when we got freedom, if we take the gamut of experience of the last ten years of our relationship with China, in the early period their remarks about our Prime Minister and of our Government, to put it very mildly, were never flattering. They doubted whether we had achieved freedom. With all this background we have to consider this. And in this correspondence also I find this, namely, "you are being guided by some foreign influence"—in order to create the impression that because we were under foreign domination, we are suspicious about it. So the idea is to create a sort of inhibition in our mind while dealing with our neighbour with whom we want to maintain the most friendly relations. This is the position.

Indian Policy Consistent

Therefore, so far as the Tibetan rising is concerned, on this occasion, we must realise that it is the Tibetan people who have created the problem for China. Whether it is to be dealt with militarily and

we are to sit quiet, that is a different matter altogether. We cannot sit quiet. Of course, they have military might. They can send in divisions and say "We have restored peace"—as it is said that you can create a desert and call it peace and later on you can build up socialism there. Our idea of socialism is totally different. I am a Marxist, and Marxism means the highest type of humanism. If somebody is going to vulgarise Marxism and parade over the world a new type of slavery, I will never tolerate it.

Therefore, so far as Tibet is concerned, who in this country desires that the old relic of society should be preserved as a museum piece? I am told, I do not know, but I am prepared to believe it—that even the young Dalai Lama does not want to preserve that old society. He wants to change it. But he wants to change it and transform it with the consent of the people—that is the main difference—not with the military machine, not with the military strength, but with the consent of the people. That is a certainly different method. And, as we have said, our method is different.

So, our approach to Tibetan affairs is the same, has been very consistent. We have not changed it. Only, it is a question of how China is going to deal with Tibet and deal with a friendly country like India.

Suzerainty, Not Sovereignty

It is a great tragedy, because for the first time, when a friendly country like China is dealing with another friendly country which is not in the least imperialist and which tries to crystallise its relationship in a positive way, as it is based on Panch Sheel, we get this experience as to what we would feel about it. That must be clearly understood in this context, and if we ignore it in a certain cloudy, idealistic thinking, I do not think it would benefit the world, nor would it benefit or consolidate world peace.

Things have come to a pass where we have to face realities. Therefore, my first submission is that so far as our Prime Minister's statement is concerned and the Government of India policy is concerned, we are consistently following this policy; and though we have given up our extraterritorial rights, we have never accepted Chinese sovereignty—that distinction is there—we have only maintained Chinese suzerainty. We shall accept it in the larger interests.

Then there is another question. When I said we must take into

consideration the gamut of experience of our relationship within the last ten years, there are other factors also. When dealing with India, the Chinese Communist Government is a government necessarily inspired by certain nationalist feelings, nationalist sentiments. Indian Communists can afford to disregard Indian nationalist sentiments; that is their tradition; they have not grown up in our nationalist tradition which is the misfortune of Indian communism.

The Himalayas and the Indian Mind

Therefore, what I am going to say on the occasion need not be taken as something chauvinistic. Our civilisation is woven round the Himalayas, and all our culture, our thought has some imprint of the Himalayas from the ancient ages. If some power, with whatever military might, sits at the top of the Himalayas and says "we are the masters of the situation to deal with this problem", I feel they are not properly appreciating the Indian tradition, the Indian mind so far as the Himalayas and our traditional flow of civilisation in this land are concerned.

I would appeal to the Chinese to give more thought to this aspect of the problem.

When I mention the Himalayas, I also feel that after the consolidation of freedom in China there is an area of geographical indecision. We need not bring it over in this controversy. But one thing is certain. When they are saying every time, "Oh, you are still being influenced by some foreign power", we must also tell them that whatever the British did and whatever legacy they have left, we have shifted it. We do not want to encroach upon anybody's freedom, but at the same time from the point of view of security, as the Prime Minister said the other day, we will have to judge, issue to issue, what is to be done, what is not to be done. After repeated requests these cartographic errors, or mistakes as they are called, are not yet rectified. I am not sure because I have seen the map at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, dominated by my hon. friends on the right. They exhibited the same wrong map in Calcutta. They never raised any voice of objection. In that map, I have examined that map very carefully and I have a photograph of it. . . .

I have examined that map. All things that were of the old regime of Chiang Kai-shek have been rectified and only the border remains

to be rectified. Do we not know what happened as regards the indecision of the border, when the question with Burma came? When the question of two provinces, Kachins and Pao came, there was trouble. Therefore I would appeal to my Chinese friends in all humility, but in all earnestness, that they should try to settle the issues. As another big power in Asia, we cannot be subdued, we cannot be cowed down henceforward. Oh, you are under foreign influence and therefore you are not your own masters—this argument should not be bandied about by any Communist henceforward in this land. This is my humble submission.

There is another danger which my Communist friends ought to appreciate. What is that danger? After freedom we followed consistently the policy of non-alignment and non-commitment. Western protagonists of the cold war feel that this is a vacuum because there are no strategic bases. In such a situation if China, by her present policy, is going to push or pull us in this or in that direction and thus put us into the cold war conflict, we must guard against that. We are the masters or the makers of our policy. We have adopted it after a good deal of thought. Therefore, at this juncture I would appeal to the Chinese—it is no use appealing to my hon. friends here—that it is not in the interest of world peace.

I would appeal to the Chinese that it is not in the interest of world peace to weaken the hands of Shri Nehru. Why I say this is because he played a role, when the world is divided in two camps he supplied the bridge to avoid conflict.

In effect, the two ideologies are contending. I belong to that ideology, which is a new ideology emerging, by which there is a certain amount of synthesis, where we can sit together and discuss, debate and try to settle issues in a peaceful manner. That was Panch Sheel and that was the spirit of Bandung. We welcomed China at Bandung as an elder brother. We thought that with China, India and the Soviet Union we can certainly consolidate peace in Asia and Africa and can avoid the danger of war.

Let me remind my Chinese friends that people in India, Africa, Asia and everywhere—particularly in India—feel that after the second world war a force of liberation was freed. It has helped to demolish the old imperialist powers and strengthen freedom in the colonial regimes. Do you want to create an attitude of frustration, if not of resistance, in the minds of our people? You must give thought to it very patiently and very earnestly and appreciate

the spirit in which we are operating in this land and are appealing to the people of the world.

In conclusion, I would like to say one word. As it has been said—my Communist friends know it—by a great Communist leader, you should never get dizzy about success. I would appeal to the Chinese friends that in all sincerity we want their friendship. But we want their friendship with honour and with mutual trust. Otherwise with mutual suspicion, when there are issues, they are kept at the background. When these issues are placed before the public, immediately forgetting friendship if they are going to attack our *bona fides*, we must resist it—and resist it with all the might at our command.

We are being judged not because we have got a big army. We have been judged in the wide world by the peoples of the world because in international politics we have introduced a new element, that is my conviction, to judge events on certain basic human values, values of freedom, values of compassion and so many other things. I do not want to repeat them. Are we going to judge Tibetan events not according to the same values, not on the same touchstone? I feel that we must stick to it and whatever be the charges made in the heat of the controversy they should not deter us from this course.

With these words, I would appeal that we should not take seriously what that teenager Lama said in China. It was to my mind, impertinence. I could have excused it in a young man but how it was released by the friendly Chinese power, I cannot understand. To say that our monuments are not well kept, to say that we had given discriminatory treatment to him and at the same time to say that the Dalai Lama here is under duress is not all right. When there is an open invitation to come and meet and settle the issue, I hope the Chinese will appreciate the deep sentiment and the vital interest, not the political interest but a very vital interest, we have in Tibetan freedom and the whole Himalayan region, if I may say so.

ACHARYA KRIPALANI

The subject is important, the time allowed is very short and I will try to be as brief as possible. It is nothing unusual for countries to criticise each other in their internal and external policy. Nobody takes this criticism to be interference in the internal affairs of the country. If it were so the hard criticism that is being levelled by

China itself against Yugoslavia would be considered internal interference with that country. But in the Communist world there are two standards of judgement—one for themselves and the other for others with whom they think they are in opposition.

"The Rape of a Nation"

Recently, China has become supersensitive to any criticism. When a person is supersensitive, I am afraid, he has a bad conscience. Even the mildest remarks of the Congress President were denounced. Why?—because she said that Tibet was a country. I can understand the wrath against me because I have never believed in the *bona fides*, I have never believed in the professions or the promises of the Chinese. Mine has been the solitary voice in this House—almost solitary—raised against this rape of a nation. As early as 1950 I said in this House that the Communist Government in China was in charge of the country. The Government of India, therefore, thought it right that it should not be denied the membership of the UNO and we advocated the cause of China. But if we had waited a little, we would have been more cautious. Soon this nation, that had won its freedom so recently, strangled the freedom of a neighbouring nation with whose freedom we are intimately concerned. Our Government's attitude is understandable only on the assumption that Tibet is a far-off country and is none of our concern. But supposing what has happened in Tibet happens in Nepal, then I am sure we will, whether we are well prepared or not, go to war against China. In that case what would become of our advocacy of China to the membership of the United Nations?

Then, Sir, again in 1954, I said in this House:

Recently we have entered into a treaty with China. I feel that China, after it had gone Communist, committed an act of aggression against Tibet. The plea is that China had the ancient right of suzerainty. This right was out of date, old and antiquated. It was never exercised in fact. It had lapsed by the flux of time. Even if it had not lapsed, it is not right in these days of democracy, by which our Communist friends swear, by which the Chinese swear, to talk of this ancient suzerainty and exercise it in a new form in a country which had and has nothing to do with China. Tibet is culturally more akin to India than it is to China. I consider this as much colonial aggression on the part of China as any indulged in by the Western nations. Whether certain nations commit aggression against others does not always concern us. But in this case we are intimately concerned, because China has destroyed a buffer state. In international politics, when a buffer state is destroyed by a powerful nation, that nation is considered to have committed aggression against its neighbours.

England went to war with Germany not because Germany had invaded England, but because it had invaded Poland and Belgium. Sir, again, I said in this House:

It is also well known that in the new map of China other border territories like Nepal, Sikkim, etc. figure. This gives us an idea of the aggressive designs of China. Let us see what the Chinese themselves did in the Korean war. . . . I do not say that because China conquered Tibet we should have gone to war with it. But this does not mean that we should recognise the claim of China on Tibet. We must know that it is an act of aggression against a foreign nation.

Again, Sir, in the same year, I said:

A small buffer state on our borders was deprived of its freedom. When we made a feeble protest we were told that we were the stooges of the western powers. (If I remember aright we were called the "running dogs of imperialism".)

Again, Sir, in 1958, talking about Panch Sheel, I said:

This great doctrine was born in sin, because it was enunciated to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally.

Sir, at that time, some hon. Member intervened and asked: "Is that nation suffering?" My reply was: "Whether it is suffering or not is not the question. It was a nation which wanted to live its own life and it sought to have been allowed to live its own life. A good government is no substitute for self-government."

China and the United Nations

Sir, some of our friends in the Rajya Sabha have said that we should continue to plead the cause of China for the membership of the United Nations. I respect their opinion. They think that as a member of the United Nations China would be subject to some public opinion there. This is not a fact. There is South Africa; there is France; there is Russia and many other aggressive nations. Because they are members of the United Nations they have not ceased to be aggressive.

We are again told that though China might have broken Panch Sheel, we must stick to Panch Sheel. Sir, I do not consider that Panch Sheel is a moral imperative. Even moral imperatives cannot be stuck to unilaterally in the international world. Panch Sheel implies a mutuality of respect for each other's integrity and sover-

eighty. How can there be respect for these things unless there is mutuality?

Panch Sheel also implies peaceful coexistence. How can there be peaceful coexistence unless it is an idea that applies to more nations than one? You cannot have peaceful coexistence alone. It is an impossibility. Panch Sheel, therefore, implies mutuality and you cannot practise it if others violate it. And we have seen how nation after nation having sworn by Panch Sheel have been violating it.

China Not Friend of India

In the present case China has one better. It has not only violated them, but has accused us of violating them.

Sir, I feel even if we go on emphasising our friendship with China and saying Chini-Hindi Bhai Bhai (India and China are Brothers) to the end of days, I tell you that this nation will never be friendly to us. Why? Because a friendly nation does not go and howl at another nation in the public market. If they have to say that Kalimpong was—what do they call it—the command centre, then it was open to them to have brought it through diplomatic channels. And they did it six months back; the case was investigated and the charge was found unfounded and a report was sent to them. They had nothing further to say. Why was not this method of diplomatic approach on this occasion employed? Why this howling at a friendly nation in the market place? I cannot quite understand how it is possible to be friendly with this nation with this mentality.

Yet our efforts to save it will only result in this. They will not give us credit for good intentions. They will only give us credit for cowardice. It will never appear to a bully that you are doing things out of your goodness; it will only appear to him that you are being frightened.

China Does Not Care for Asia

Not only do they not care for us, but I say this Communist China does not care for the whole of Asia. It does not care even for the opinion of Asia. If it had cared, in its selfishness, it would have realised that it was alienating the whole of Asia, especially, South-East Asia. To whom will South-East Asia look for support? They will more and more look to America even as the more powerful nations of Europe are looking to America. If they are afraid of

China, fear makes strange bed fellows, and I have absolutely no doubt that they will look to America for support. They cannot look to Russia. Therefore, the Chinese have destroyed the very confidence of the Asian nations.

There is another thing also. The Asian nations know that there is Formosa, that there are the off-coast islands, there is Hong Kong. This is Chinese territory. It is populated by Chinese people. They do not go that side and conquer that territory and incorporate it with China to which it rightly belongs. But, they go to an alien nation and an alien people and they conquer them. Why do not they do that? The Asian nations are not stupid. They know that they do not do it not because Chiang Kai-shek has more power than Communist China, but because America is behind it. They know, if they attack them persistently, America would step in. They know that if America steps in, there will be the third world war of which they are mightily afraid. They are not ready for it. Even if Russia may be ready, China is not ready.

They are doing things which injure not only India, but their own case. Selfishness always works like that. When selfish and aggressive people take to violence, they defeat their own objects. Not only has China earned a bad name, it has made the Asiatic people to look towards directions from which they wanted to wean them. China has extended the area of cold war. It has made matters worse instead of bettering them. I do not think even the conquest of Tibet was an adequate price for what they have earned for themselves and the way in which they have done it.

Therefore, I am glad that at least in this, we are not involved and our Prime Minister in the Rajya Sabha made it clear, whatever may happen, in this cold war, we maintain our position of non-alignment. He has declared it. But, what do the Chinese say?

They say, by name, "Shri Nehru had been pushed by the West into an important role in their so-called sympathy with Tibetan movement." Whatever the Chinese may say, I believe our foreign policy is safe in the hands of our Prime Minister. I further go and say, that they should thank the stars that it is in the hands of our Prime Minister.

But, whatever the Chinese may say, we are not concerned with them. We are, as I said once before here, more concerned with our fellow countrymen. May I ask them a few questions; whether they approve of the wild, violent and not-true-to-facts propaganda

that is carried on from day to day in China? Do they believe that the Dalai Lama was really kidnapped.

MR. BAJAJ: Panchen Lama is in duress.

MR. KRIPALANI: After what our Prime Minister has repeatedly said, do they believe that the Dalai Lama issued these letters under duress? Do they believe that these letters had something to do with the officers of our Foreign Department? Do they believe that the Dalai Lama is under surveillance in India? If they believe, why do they get their information from Peking? Why don't they go to Mussoorie. I am sure, if they applied to the Prime Minister, or even without application, they will be allowed to go to Mussoorie and see things for themselves. But, they want to see things through Peking and from nowhere else. They will not take it even from the Prime Minister. They will not go there. They will take it from Peking blindly. May I ask, do they believe that India has expansionist designs on Tibet, or for the matter of that, on any other country? Above all, do they believe in the Chinese maps that have been published by China? That is the crucial question. Then, we will know where we stand and where they stand in this country. If they do not believe, have they advised their dear friends in China to suppress these maps? These are maps, we are told, that were published by Chiang Kai-shek. Do they want China to follow in the footsteps of Chiang Kai-shek, I ask my Communist friends. We are interested to know these things from them categorically. Their representatives are here. Let them answer all these questions. If they do not answer them, then, I say that they have got no case and China has got no case.

More Freedom for Dalai Lama

One thing more and I have done. I would draw the attention of the Prime Minister to what is said in China that the Dalai Lama and his companions are under surveillance. I know whatever restrictions are placed upon their liberty are for safety reasons. They are also for this that they may not say in India things that may be distasteful to China, they may not say things that might touch the sensitive soul of the Chinese.

AN HON. MEMBER: Have they a soul?

MR. KRIPALANI: We are putting these restrictions on their account, and those for whom we are doing all these things, do not want them. I see no reason why more freedom of expression

and more freedom of movement should not be allowed to the Dalai Lama and his companions when they do not appreciate our good offices and even when they find evil in our good also. When they suspect us of evil, let us allow the Dalai Lama and his companions to come out and meet the newspaper people and other people and political bodies and political people and give out their minds. Only then will my Communist friends be convinced. Even then they will not be convinced; none so blind as would not see.

MR. S. A. DANGE

The problem presented during this debate is a very complicated problem. It is not the problem of Tibet. It is the problem of our foreign policy. As far as that policy is concerned, it is well known that the Communist Party supports in general the foreign policy of the Government of India as enunciated by Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.

While we are supporting that policy, it does not mean that either the Prime Minister or the other countries whatever their governments are quite infallible. I do not attribute infallibility either to the Prime Minister here or to the Prime Minister of China or to the Prime Minister of Russia or to the Prime Minister of America.

AN HON. MEMBER: There is no Prime Minister in America.

MR. DANGE: Therefore, while supporting the general foreign policy of Government, we can have points where here and there we might have differences of opinion.

Crack in Sino-Indian Friendship

So, if it comes to a question of policy, our policy stands as it was. There is general support to the Prime Minister's policy of peace. Now, he himself has stated that on this question of Tibet, what ultimately has happened is not minor questions here and there but a little crack has taken place in the feelings of friendliness between China and India and that Panch Sheel has suffered a crack. Now when a crack takes place, naturally two sides there are always to a crack, and both the sides have to advise together to heal the crack. For us there is the Communist Party in India. It is our business to see how our side heals the crack. It is for the Chinese side to see how they advance their side to heal the crack. Therefore, I am looking at the question from that point of view only.

Some speakers have asked us many questions. Unfortunately,

I have not got the text of the questions here. Neither could I take them down as I am not a shorthand writer.

AN HON. MEMBER: You can remember them.

MR. DANGE: Well, my memory is not so sharp as yours, sorry. Even then, I do not mind answering those questions as far as I can remember them, here if there is time, outside on the rally, if you want it. Yes.

So, let us have a debate, and let us have a friendly debate, and I think this question should be resolved through a friendly debate.

It is a friendly debate as far as India and China are concerned. That is what I read in the press, and as far as the Prime Minister is concerned, he has taken his stand on that.

Nehru Has No Expansionism

I do not think he has been accused of expansionism as a part of his policy, nor do we maintain that Prime Minister Nehru's policy is a policy of expansionism. We do not maintain it, we do not say it, and we do not even think it. But the speech that was heard here, and some other speeches, reflect expansionism or not? That is the point.

So, do not some of the political parties, when they make their statements, have some suggestion of expansionism? But that suggestion is rather made culturally. Tibet and we have cultural links, therefore, we and Tibet are culturally one, so, culturally Tibet is ours, but politically Chinese. The Chinese have committed aggression against Tibet, therefore, we must defend it. Slightly it goes over to expansionism. This is where that logic leads us.

It is not that Acharya Kripalani is capable of expansionism or anything, that is not the suggestion at all, because to practise expansionism, two things are required: firstly, political guts, and secondly, real, hard guns.

MR. KRIPALANI: The Chinese have got.

MR. DANGE: Fortunately, the PSP has not got either of them. So, I am not accusing them of expansionism though they may like to bask in the idea of being a greater and greater party and all that.

So, I am not taking up the question that they are raising just now here. Firstly, I am dealing with the position as it has been stated by the Prime Minister, that he has no ideas of expansionism. I agree with that.

The question is: certain statements have been made by the Chi-

nese side, and certain statements of theirs have been denied by the Prime Minister, e.g. the Dalai Lama being held under duress. I do not think the first statement made was that the duress was practised by the Government of India. The Dalai Lama escaped under duress by the rebels, and in fact, when the Prime Minister—he will excuse me—sometimes mentions that the Chinese do not observe the truth, may I ask him one question? At one time it was suggested by him also that perhaps the Dalai Lama's letters were not his own at all. Later on the Dalai Lama himself acknowledged that the letters were his. Now, where was the propriety and the truth in this case?

Both Sides Are Hurt

Therefore, when the Prime Minister says that he feels hurt, I am sure he will also admit that the other side will also feel hurt. Therefore, the hurt is on either side, and, therefore, it should be healed only by friendship.

AN HON. MEMBER: On which side do you stand?

MR. DANGE: I stand here in the Parliament of India. I hope you understand that. So, when I am saying that I support the foreign policy of the Government of India and the Prime Minister particularly, I think you should know where I stand and where the party stands.

Therefore, the first part of the problem is like this. The Prime Minister, and even many of his supporters in the Congress Party want this thing to be decided peacefully without any cold war being imported, and by friendly discussions and talks. But on the Chinese side, of course, there is a difficulty. The difficulty is simply this.

If China is acknowledged by the Prime Minister as having the power of suzerainty over Tibet, and if Tibet is acknowledged to be an autonomous region of the Chinese Republic, then naturally, diplomatically or in terms of international politics, the question does not arise why we should discuss the Tibetan problem in India or anywhere else, in the UNO or some other place. It is certainly the right of every country to decide the question of its own autonomous region. That is the only position, and that position also will by and by be conceded even by the Prime Minister, that the problem of an autonomous region should certainly be the responsibility of the suzerain Republic of China.

But, if we then try to tell them that they must do this and that, and if they consider that as an interference, then what is wrong? They themselves have asked the question—it has appeared in the press already and I will repeat it for the benefit of the hon. Members. If they were to set up a committee on linguistic provinces, would that be right? Though these states are autonomous, they are within the Union of India. Therefore, the Chinese Government would not be correct in taking up the position that they should discuss and ask the Prime Minister as to what is happening in UP which has a common boundary with Tibet, or in Assam which has a common boundary with Tibet. Since they have shown that much restraint, I think it would be right and friendly for us also to show some restraint, though some of us may sympathise with the Tibetans.

Now, the question is: what is this sympathy for the Tibetans? If it is a question of the Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhist religion, and Panch Sheel is not concerned with Buddhism, nor is the Government of India concerned with Buddhism, because it is a secular State. It is concerned with Buddhism as it is concerned with Hinduism, Christianity, Islam and so on. If it feels very much attracted towards maintenance of the head of the Buddhist Panth in Mussoorie, it should equally feel interested in maintaining the heads of Islam or Hinduism or the other religions in India. If the poor among the Buddhists are to be maintained, to be helped—I have no objection—every religious group also may ask: what about our poor being maintained?

Question of Security

Now, the question may be raised that this is a question of law and order, defence and security and so on. If that much is the problem, I do not mind it. If ten thousand refugees got frightened in Tibet, and they crossed over, I do not challenge the honesty of the Government of India on that account, because they allowed asylum to certain refugees. Well, we are a very hospitable country since time immemorial, and we give hospitality to both guests and invaders and every one. So, hospitality is in our blood. I only want that these groups do not create new centres of friction between us and the Chinese. That is all that I want to see, and that is exactly what the others do not wish to see.

So far as the Government of India are concerned, so far as words and theory are concerned, they are taking up the attitude more or less

of maintenance of Panch Sheel, maintenance of friendliness and so on. I would plead that this bitterness and challenging each other's honesty and statement of facts should stop, because after all, the Prime Minister himself the other day in the Rajya Sabha, dealing with the Dalai Lama's coming here and so on, was not sure of his facts, because he cannot verify all the facts. Not that all the facts supplied to him by his officers are always wrong. No. But an officer can go wrong. Officers' facts can be wrong. Therefore, he said: "I believe it is so, I am not sure etc." That is certainly correct to say.

No Cold War

So I would say that the problem should be resolved on the basis of not importing cold war elements as far as the Prime Minister and his supporters are concerned. For example, his statement which was made on April 27, is very good; but what do I find? I do not think it was right to give currency to the idea in that statement that the Dalai Lama had fled—it was his statement that I am disputing, not that the Prime Minister is maintaining in that way—because Buddhism was in danger and his religion to him was more precious than his life. If that was so, he should not have fled. That is another matter. But then, if it is so, are we supporting that system of Buddhism? Are we officially going to lend support to it? That would be a problem, and that problem, as he stated in his statement, he has not resolved. Of course, there is a sort of sympathy towards him. In fact, in the statement he gave us the fact that the poor youngman is just 24 years old. Certainly a 70-year-old statesman ought to feel a fatherly interest in a young man of 24. Certainly he is inexperienced and all that, and I am sure he will advise him properly. But nobody charges the Prime Minister with holding the Dalai Lama in duress. But then if you go round and tell the Indian people that he thinks he is fighting for Buddhism and the protection of his religion by coming here, then I think that statement should be verified and the Prime Minister should later on make that position clear.

As regards the questions which have been asked by these political parties, I think I have answered one or two questions about duress, about expansionism and so many other things. But I am not prepared to believe that some of these gentlemen do not have expansionist words at least.

AN HON. MEMBER: What about the map?

MR. DANGE: If our territory is shown in the Chinese map as theirs, the Chinese should correct it.

AN HON. MEMBER: If?

MR. DANGE: I have not seen the map, because I did not attend that Afro-Asian Conference which Congressmen and other parties and especially Shri Khadilkar attended with a magnifying glass?

AN HON. MEMBER: How long will it take the Chinese to correct the map? (*Interruptions*)

MR. DANGE: The Prime Minister himself has made a statement that he is taking up the question with the Chinese Government and that they are going to settle it by peaceful means.

AN HON. MEMBER: But he has also said that the replies are very unsatisfactory.

MR. DANGE: We should be realistic enough to know that if a line in a map is moved, that part of the country does not go out of our hands. If the people believe it will, they have a poor idea about maps and their values and a poor idea about India's own integrity also.

My hon. friend, Kripalani, has given a very good advice to the Chinese. Of course, everyone of us has a right to give advice to everybody else. He asked: if they are so minded, instead of going over to Tibet, why did they not go over to conquer Formosa and Quemoy? May I ask a separate question? Instead of going over to Tibet, why not ask the Government of India to invade Goa first? (*Interruptions*) Advice is very simple. It is easier to liberate Goa than to liberate Tibet, if it is being enslaved by China. But you dare not offend American imperialism because it will intervene. You know that China will never go to war with India, whatever you do. Therefore, you have the guts to fight about it, but you have not the guts to fight about Goa.

So this advice about invading this territory and that territory is always useless. We know why we do not go to Goa, why we do not do it. Therefore, this question of Tibet, as it is being understood, by my hon. friends of the PSP is, I think, a question which they more or less look at as a handle to fight the Communist Party. (*Interruptions*) They are not worried about Tibet at all. They are not worried about anybody. Their whole problem is "How can we fight the Communist Party?" Gentlemen, you can fight us. We are here in our country. Let us fight.

I am told Acharya Kripalani made a statement and asked: If the Chinese armies invade India, where will be the Communists? Will they be with us?

I will reply now. Now the Communist Party is not in the habit of waiting for foreign armies to liberate India. We know these gentlemen who were waiting for Hitler to come through Stalingrad and to liberate them. We know that. They were waiting for the Japanese army to enter Calcutta. . . .

These were the dreams. But we have not got that habit of waiting for foreign armies to do our job, because we can do it ourselves. We can die fighting for that job. We can either accomplish it or we can fail to accomplish it. (*Interruptions*)

Now, it has been denied by some of these friends that they do not talk of expansionism. In that case, there is a statement. I was just told that Shri Majumdar, Chairman of the Tibetan Conference to be held in Calcutta—which is being inaugurated by Acharya Kripalani, which is being presided over by Shri Jaya Prakash Narain and the dear young lady who just now interrupted—said that they must fight for the independence of Tibet and end the suzerainty of China over Tibet. (*Interruptions*). . . .

Sympathy for Whom?

With regard to Tibet, there is one last point I want to make. What is the foundation of the whole thing? It is said that the Tibetan people have risen in revolt against imperialist invasion. On this point we should, at least to some extent, believe the facts given by China. Just as we expect them to believe facts inside our country as given by us—as the Prime Minister asks, “Why don’t you accept the facts as we give about our country?”—similarly they would ask, “Why don’t you believe facts as we give them for our country?” There should be mutual belief.

With regard to Tibet, it is well known that there is a serf system. There are 200,000 lamas attended by eight hundred thousand Tibetans. They have a system by which these eight hundred thousand give thousands of maunds of ghee and butter as khand or rent to the monasteries; the land is concentrated in the hands of the Bhikkus and there is a general feeling of revolt in the minds of the Tibetan peasantry. This is the relation that subsists, in Tibet, and naturally we, as a progressive country, ought to side with the Tibetans. We as a progressive country swearing by socialism,

trying to carry out land reforms, trying to liberate serfs in our country—that type of serfdom does not exist here—we should sympathise with those Tibetans who are trying to overthrow that system. Even the *Time* magazine, which represented the visit of Shri Morarji Desai so well in America, has written that this lama system, this monastic system in Tibet, is a system based on serfdom.

Now, these gentlemen want to continue that system. The Chinese and Tibetan peasantry want to do away with it. Naturally, there was bound to be a clash. I do not say there was no clash. There was clash. But then stories were told as if there was a misfiring of guns and that was why the Lama went away or was kidnapped, there was something of an uprising but the Chinese at first could not handle it—all these stories are funny stories. Will the Chinese who could put well-aimed shells at Quemoy which prevented the Seventh Fleet from coming nearer, will they misfire a shell on the Dalai Lama's palace?

AN HON. MEMBER: Why not?

Mr. DANGE. The Chinese guns were not manned by Acharya Kripalani. They would hit well; because they aim well.

It was not a war; it was not a national uprising. Therefore, when we sympathise with China, I will plead with the Prime Minister, please sympathise with the serfs first, with those who are rising against the lama system, next, with those who want to protect the serfs, that is, the Chinese system of government and its system of laws and constitution and, if we have any quarrel with them with regard to certain accusations, let us sit down and argue those accusations and settle them without bringing in the arguments of other political parties.

The Crack Must Be Healed

Therefore, I do make a distinction between the standpoint of the Prime Minister and the standpoint of the other parties, the use which the other parties are making of this happening and the way in which the Prime Minister wishes to resolve the deadlock. That deadlock should be resolved on the basis of Panch Sheel; that crack must be healed. But the crack cannot be healed by simply saying: "We sympathise with the Tibetans." The crack can be healed by saying: "Yes" as he himself said, "You have a right over Tibet; it is an autonomous region of yours and the Tibetan system of serfdom must be overthrown and you are trying to carry out the reforms."

Those who want to rebel against it, if they want to run away, let them run away. . . .

Tibetan Refugees

After all these refugees have come here. Well, if it is a problem of their disturbing your economy, if you wish to assist them for a time, do. But are we going to maintain them at State expense? Are they really refugees of our country, as we treated the refugees from Pakistan? In fact, the Pakistan refugees were treated worse than the refugees of Tibet are being treated in some respects. Surely, I want to know why there is so much love flowing towards these Tibetan refugees. The love for the other refugees is a little drying up and they are being thrown into Dandakaranya. Why are we very solicitous of the 7000-ft. temperature for these Tibetan refugees which they require, for their health would suffer if they come down to the plains?

I am not an expert on Buddhism but I thought that the Great Buddha did not live in the palace of the Birlas in his own days. Neither did he eat from their pattals? You know the story of the Buddha. When once a rich woman offered him rice in a gold plate, he ate the rice and threw the gold plate in the river.

But the present inheritors of Buddhism will eat the rice and sell the gold plate in the black market. This is not the way in which we ought to show our sympathy. . . . (*Interruptions*)

I am not referring to the Buddhists as such at all. I am referring to the monasteries we have built; I am referring to the Maths we have built. Even the Prime Minister and the Congress Party are moving a Bill in order to control the funds of Maths. Does it mean that these Maths have become bad and black-marketeers? But, a religion deteriorates from its pristine purity and becomes its own opposite when it tries to cultivate wealth, land and serfs, rights and so on. The system deteriorates. That is why I say this.

I am quite sure that the Dalai Lama is a good Buddhist. I am quite sure that ten thousand Buddhist refugees who have come are good Buddhists. Like good Buddhists let them go round and live according to what Buddha preached. They should not compel us and ask funds from the Government of India.

Dr. Ambedkar, when he wrote his book on Buddhist Sangha, said these things are necessary—three pieces of cloth, a needle and a thread and a bowl in order to take rice and drink water. They go

begging and live on alms given and, for the rainy season, take shelter in a cottage. This is the system. Therefore, I am just pleading that the really good democratic principles of Buddhism should be practised by the present inheritors of Buddhist traditions. That is what I am pleading for. I am not charging that they have gone into the black-market or anything like that. It is a misunderstanding which has been created. . . . (*Interruptions*)

Finally, I would appeal to the Prime Minister not to get under the pressure of certain political parties to hustle up the question in such a way that Panch Sheel is more or less blown up in action. Though preserved in theory it may be blown up in practice. That is what I would plead with him.

Certainly if there is a vendetta against the Communist Party let us fight it within the border; let us fight it out. But that is not the question. The question here is not of the Communist Party and other parties, the Communist Party of India or the PSP. The question here is of friendly relations between India and China.

I am quite sure that the Acharya is dead set that the Chinese can never be friendly with us. But, I do not think that is the attitude either of the Government of India or of the whole of the Congress Ministry. Therefore, I would again plead, let sober thoughts prevail and let this bitterness not increase. As far as I know the Chinese themselves have tried to be sober. (*Interruptions*) Let me cite one example. I may tell you from my own experience that in the Chinese press and in the Soviet press since friendly relations were established with India and the Panch Sheel declarations were signed, their press has refused scrupulously to publish news of firing and strikes in India. I raised this question. . . . They said it might hurt the feelings of the Prime Minister. It might hurt the feelings and disturb Panch Sheel. Therefore, we do not wish to publish the happening about these things. The press has scrupulously kept away the news even of a hundred people being shot dead in the streets of Bombay. Why have they done it? They have done it because they want to keep friendly relations with our country. If such a press is a little bitter on this Tibetan question, let us understand that there is ground for being bitter. Therefore, let us overcome it and state facts as they are. I hope the whole thing will be resolved by mutual negotiations and the Panch Sheel crack will be healed though it may be to the disliking of Acharya Kripalani who wants to lead the army into China.

MR. PANT ON TIBET

Report of a speech by Mr. Govind Ballabh Pant, India's Home Minister, during the Lok Sabha debate on Tibet on 1 April 1959:

"Here, we are in a delicate position. We want to maintain that friendliness with China which is a neighbour, a great country and with whom we have entered into an agreement also and with which our association goes back to many many hundreds of years. But at the same time Tibet is a closer neighbour, very weak neighbour which deserves compassion and pity if nothing else. It consists of almost disarmed people who give their time to prayer and devotion and who have hardly mundane interests. People like that, I think, should be viewed with sympathy by everyone. . . .

"And when they are in trouble and they are faced with a very trying ordeal I think we cannot but feel some sympathy for them. In fact, we have cultural ties, we have religious ties. Both of us belong to those communities which still have faith in religion and in God. So, there are many ties that bind us. In spite of that, so far as political relations go, we want to adhere to the policy which we have accepted in our relations with China. And both of us have agreed to the basic principles of 'Panch Sheel'. Well, after that clear enunciation of the policy one would have expected that his [Mr. Nehru's] words would not be disputed but the *People's Daily* has taken a different line. Perhaps, the Chinese Government may not have noticed what the Prime Minister has said. If they had, perhaps they would not have repeated what had been repudiated and denied categorically by the External Affairs Ministry and the remarks made by the spokesman of that Ministry had been endorsed by the Prime Minister. He had also referred to the matter in full detail.

"So, I quite understand how some of our colleagues should feel perturbed and concerned when a solemn statement made by the Prime Minister is in any way disputed by any section of our people in this country. The words used in the statement, I am told—I do not know whether I am right, I will stand corrected if I am wrong—are that Kalimpong was the commanding centre of the revolt. These are words which had appeared in the report that is published by the Chinese Communist agency and if these words have also been confirmed by the central office of the Communist

Party after they had an opportunity to listen to what the Prime Minister had said. . . ." (*Interruptions from Communist benches*)

MR. SPEAKER: "Order, Order. When I asked Members to give me an authoritative statement they could not give. Unless they gave an authoritative statement we will go by newspaper reports. Let there be no interruptions. At the end, if an explanation is necessary I will give them [Communist Members] an opportunity."

The Home Minister said that if what had been stated in the adjournment motion had been said he considered it not only unfortunate but extremely deplorable. That had appeared after the Prime Minister had made a statement in this House and the spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry had definitely stated that this charge was utterly unfounded and baseless. In the circumstance, said Pandit Pant, if Members here felt such statements were likely to give a wrong impression to people outside, "I think that feeling must be respected. It does give rise to some sort of misunderstanding." There was another statement which was equally important and worth noticing. That had accused the Indian Government of violating the Panch Sheel which enjoined strict neutrality and non-interference in each other's affairs.

Continuing, the Home Minister said it was far from his intention to cause any irritation to anybody. He would try to deal with the matter in a dispassionate and detached manner so far as he possibly could. "If there is any sort of allegation or insinuation or suggestion in the statement that the Government of India had failed in observing the principles of Panch Sheel, of which our Prime Minister is the father. . ."

MR. K. T. K. TANGAMANI : "Shadow father."

PANDIT PANT: "... The words [Panch Sheel] were ushered into existence really by him. Many of the sovereign States have now accepted it and have agreed to pay their homage and allegiance to it. It will be a matter of regret if the Prime Minister were to be repudiated by some of our own countrymen."

MR. NAGI REDDY: "It has not been done and why should he [the Home Minister] go on saying we have repudiated. He is a responsible Home Minister."

MR. SPEAKER: "He is entitled to read what has been made in the statement. I allowed Prof. Mukherjee to have his say and let the Home Minister explain his standpoint. I will decide what is to be ultimately done."

PANDIT PANT: "I am basing my remarks on what has been said in the text of the adjournment motion. I am not referring to anything extraneous. Everything I have said is germane to and arises out of the text of the adjournment motion itself. What I am saying is that, if it is correct, I take it that the mover has taken great care to see that the words he has used are really authentic and correct—and if anybody here in this country has said that the Indian Government has infringed the basic principles of Panch Sheel that will be a matter of deep regret for everyone of us here, because the Prime Minister has persuaded many other countries to accept this Panch Sheel and among other countries, China too. So, it would be a matter of real sorrow and even of anguish to some of us if it was said that the Government of India had failed to act up to their profession in regard to the solemn doctrine of Panch Sheel."

MRS. LAKSHMI MENON'S REMARKS

The following is an extract from a speech by Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, Deputy Minister for External Affairs, in the course of the April 1 debate. Mrs. Menon, rose to join issue with Mrs. Chakravartty (Communist):

The Member thinks that the Prime Minister has been making statements without making inquiries. I take very strong exception to that. Secondly, the matter had been brought to the notice of the Government by the Chinese Embassy last July and a thorough enquiry was made into all the allegations made by the Chinese Government. And, we have sent an "aide memoire" in August last repudiating all the charges. As a result of our inquiry not one of them [charges] had been found correct. There is no reason why we should make any inquiry just because the Communist Party wants it.

With regard to the second thing, whether there was any violation of diplomatic privileges, actually there is no violation as such but it is highly improper for any mission posted in any country to make any critical statement about the Government or the Government's activity. It is not the function of an embassy to make a critical estimate of that Government's policy or criticise the activities of that Government. In this case, the Prime Minister's integrity, his honesty, has been challenged. We take very strong exception to it.



Part Nine

MR. NEHRU'S PRESS CONFERENCES

TRANSCRIPT OF PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE
HELD ON 4 APRIL 1959 IN NEW DELHI

PRIME MINISTER: Well, we shall begin now. I await your wishes.

TIBET

QUESTION: How did the news of the arrival of the Dalai Lama come to be announced from Peking before it was announced here?

PRIME MINISTER: I am afraid I cannot answer that question. Of course, we could have announced it before and certainly a day before and possibly a day and a half before; but among other reasons, one reason of our not announcing it then was security. We wanted to make adequate arrangements for security before we announced it.

QUESTION: This question is important because it seems there are spy activities on our borders, otherwise how could they know it when even our own people did not know anything?

PRIME MINISTER: I cannot tell you because I do not know. I can guess if you like. I do not think any news could have got out of the border.

I don't think it is conceivable. I don't say anything is impossible but it is very unlikely.

QUESTION: Did it leak out from Delhi?

PRIME MINISTER: That too seems very very unlikely. As a matter of fact, in Delhi for that brief period, a little before too, the secret was very well kept.

QUESTION: It remained secret from Indians but the Chinese Embassy got it and the *Reuters* also sent a telegram quoting diplomatic sources. Only we people did not know anything about it.

PRIME MINISTER: No diplomatic sources. I think these are vague guesses based on an intelligent anticipation of what might happen. I believe the *Reuters* first message was that he had gone to Bhutan. It was obvious that he was coming in this direction. Where he would get through, they were guessing.

QUESTION: The first communication about Dalai Lama, was it made when the Chinese Ambassador met the Foreign Secretary or were there any earlier communications?

PRIME MINISTER: No. After the arrival of the Dalai Lama

and his entry into India and our reception to him, our Foreign Secretary sent for the Chinese Ambassador to inform him of this.

QUESTION: Will the Dalai Lama function as Dalai Lama from India too, as spiritual leader of Tibet? What are the implications of this?

PRIME MINISTER: There is nothing in, shall I say, our regulations, rules, conventions about spirituality and how a person functions spiritually. That is not supposed to be a political post or designation. If people acknowledge him as a spiritual leader, they acknowledge him. There the matter ends. How can he function in Tibet when he is in India?

QUESTION: You will ask him not to associate himself with any political activities while on Indian soil?

PRIME MINISTER: Well, it is natural that any person in India cannot, is not expected, to function on the political plane in this way.

QUESTION: It is presumed when political asylum is given that the man is free to operate politically at least as far as other countries are concerned.

PRIME MINISTER: I don't think that is the general assumption at all.

QUESTION: There are several instances in Europe. For example our own people went and got asylum, for example, Raja Mahendra Pratap gave his own case as an instance in Parliament. He was operating politically in all the countries where he was given asylum.

PRIME MINISTER: When?

QUESTION: He says all his life until India became free. He was a political person in all countries he went to.

PRIME MINISTER: It was the time of the First World War chiefly when he functioned abroad. I don't think he functioned much since then, after the First War ended.

QUESTION: You have said that political activity must be ruled out. Does it also mean that he will not be allowed to make a statement explaining the facts?

PRIME MINISTER: No; I cannot tell you exactly what the position might be. We shall have to consider it because, as you know, quite apart from political and other reasons, he is a person greatly revered in India and certainly among all Buddhists and even non-Buddhists in India and it is not our intention to put what might be called undesirable curbs on him but we shall have to discuss this matter with him and I am sure that he would not like to take any steps here which embarrass us and him.

QUESTION: Where is he likely to be kept? There is a rumour that he will be kept in Ooty?

PRIME MINISTER: I cannot tell you finally yet. But two things I can tell you—that he is not likely to stay anywhere near the frontier nor is he likely to go to Southern India.

QUESTION: Is there any correspondence with Mr. Chou En-lai on the subject of Tibet?

PRIME MINISTER: You mean recently.

QUESTION: Yes, within recent days.

PRIME MINISTER: No. We had no correspondence about Tibet at all. On one or two other matters some months ago we had correspondence—nothing to do with Tibet.

QUESTION: Will you tell us when and where you will meet the Dalai Lama?

PRIME MINISTER: I can't say that. I suppose I will meet him of course at some place sometime but we have not even given thought to that matter. We don't quite know when he will arrive. Of course there is no point in our rushing him. He had a hard journey, I suppose, and he comes slowly resting on the way.

QUESTION: When you spoke last in the Lok Sabha, you referred to letters from Dalai Lama and you said: "I should like to have a little greater confirmation about them, about what they are, in what circumstances they were written, whether they were written at all." I want to know have you any confirmation or any news about them and what was your basis that you doubted about their authenticity?

PRIME MINISTER: You see, the statement that the Dalai Lama was being compelled to do some thing, that the Dalai Lama in fact complaining of his own people, who revere him so much, seemed to me a very odd statement. Whoever else might be against the Dalai Lama, I should have thought that the great mass of the Tibetan people are not against him.

They are devoted to him. Therefore I could not understand that. Is that all?

QUESTION: Do you think that China has observed Panch Sheel scrupulously in regard to Tibet?

PRIME MINISTER: I don't think the question of Panch Sheel directly arises in this connection. We may disapprove of what one country has done or not. There is hardly a country which you cannot criticise on the ground that the principles of Panch Sheel

have not been observed but in this particular matter I don't quite see how that particular thing arises.

QUESTION: The Japanese Ambassador has written an article in a Japanese paper which was circulated here in press comments in which he says that this Panch Sheel agreement with China has been wearing out for some time and the uprising in Tibet shows that it has completely worn out.

PRIME MINISTER: I have not seen that article but the Panch Sheel lays down certain principles of international relations. Those principles, if they are good principles, they remain good whatever any individual or country might do. People seem to think that the so-called Panch Sheel is some temporary arrangement to meet a temporary set of circumstances. It is not. It is a basic approach to international affairs and life generally. It may have to be adapted because of changing circumstances. If we believe in Panch Sheel, we follow it, even if no country in the wide world follows it. Of course, it cannot be easily followed in a one-sided way, but that is a different matter. But our attitude will be to follow it. Our attempt will be to follow it, if we believe in it, as we do.

Now, what has happened in Tibet is related to the agreement between China and the authorities in Tibet, in 1950, I think. You will see that on both sides there, it is stated that that agreement has ended or broken up. There is no doubt about it and if both say so there is no doubt about it, and events also indicate that. Now, that is an important fact that it has broken down. That agreement was based on two factors—on the recognition of the sovereignty of China over Tibet and the autonomy of Tibet. These are two major factors. Well, that agreement has broken down; and it is not possible for me—because I don't want to speak irresponsibly and just refer to sentiments—it is not possible for me to give a precise account of what happened in Tibet. But it is well known that there have been conflicts and pulls there in various directions; and it is obvious that at present, since this uprising, there is no autonomy in Tibet. These are obvious facts whatever the background may be.

QUESTION: Do you think national autonomy is possible in a Communist State?

PRIME MINISTER: Surely, why not? I don't see any contradiction in that.

QUESTION: But it has never happened.

PRIME MINISTER: Well, you see, the difficulty is that we are gradually becoming conditioned, wrongly conditioned, by the cold war attitude in the world. If we have always to live with the cold war as our companion, well, many things happen which normally should not happen. But if the cold war was not there, we would all become a little more normal.

QUESTION: It is reported that you are having correspondence with the Dalai Lama. Is it about his wishes?

PRIME MINISTER: No, I don't know, except that I got a message from him which he sent to me on his arrival, and I sent him a very brief message of greetings.

QUESTION: To what extent would the Dalai Lama's personal safety be the Government of India's responsibility?

PRIME MINISTER: One hundred per cent.

QUESTION: You had said that since this conflict started, autonomy in Tibet has disappeared.

PRIME MINISTER: Tibet has disappeared?

QUESTION: Do you mean the conflicts started from 1953 or the recent conflict?

PRIME MINISTER: Tibet has not disappeared.

QUESTION: The autonomy of Tibet has disappeared.

PRIME MINISTER: Well, yes.

QUESTION: From which period do you date this breaking up of the agreement?

PRIME MINISTER: You might say the date when it officially ended is this date, say ten days ago. That is the official date. For the rest, there have been troubles over Eastern Tibet and a little in Southern Tibet. That means that there were troubles there but constitutionally it did not end. Actually, it may function or not because of these troubles.

QUESTION: In regard to the question of autonomy which we speak of, we also speak of autonomy in the case of the Centre and the States, where the Centre is autonomous in respect of certain subjects and the States are autonomous in respect of certain other subjects. In what respect was Tibet considered to be autonomous?

PRIME MINISTER: I am afraid I cannot spell that out, except to tell you my own interpretation of what Premier Chou En-lai said to me. I mentioned that in the Lok Sabha. He laid stress, first of all, that Tibet was and had always been, according to him, a part of the Chinese State, a part of the larger family of China. Then he said:

"But Tibet is not a province of China. It is different from China proper. We recognise that and, therefore, we consider it to be an autonomous region of the Chinese State. The Chinese people are called the Han people. The Tibetans are not Hans. The Tibetans are Tibetans." That is what he said. Therefore, if you compare it to India, here, first of all there is no question of any person or any part of India not being an Indian. He is an Indian whatever else he might be.

Secondly, the autonomy of an Indian State is laid down, the measure of it, in our Constitution. It is definitely a limited autonomy. There are lists of subjects where the States are autonomous and there are other lists where the Central Government's authority prevails. Normally speaking the Central Government cannot invade the autonomy of the States in India and certainly the States cannot do so in regard to the Central Government, but, abnormally the Constitution provides that the Central Government can take charge of a State under special circumstances. So, the type of autonomy here is different, I thought, from the type of autonomy in the autonomous region of Tibet. Of course, there are many other factors also. From the social, religious and economic points of view, there is considerable difference, I take it, between Tibet and many other parts of China proper. Tibet has been cut off from the world practically for ages. Economically speaking, it is very backward and this impact of vast changes which are taking place in China itself must produce tremendous reactions.

QUESTION: Sir, according to the Soviet Constitution an autonomous region is more backward constitutionally than the federating republic. Do you think the same provision is there in the Chinese Constitution, that is, like Inner Mongolia enjoying autonomous status like Tibet? What is the exact position? For example, in Russia, the Republics certainly have more powers such as a Foreign Minister, even a standing army and so on. Do you think that under the Chinese Constitution there is similar provision?

PRIME MINISTER: I am afraid I cannot answer this question precisely but I imagine that the various constituting units of the Soviet Union, including the autonomous regions, are all more or less wedded to a certain policy which might be called the Communist policy while Tibet was not and is not Communist.

And the mere fact of the Dalai Lama being the religious head and till recently the political head under, broadly the Chinese umbrella, itself shows that it was very different.

QUESTION: Would you like to give a broad definition of the term "suzerainty" as distinct from "sovereignty"?

PRIME MINISTER: No. I am afraid it requires a jurist to do that and probably two jurists might differ—except that "suzerainty" is obviously less than "sovereignty".

QUESTION: How far does this disappearance of the agreement over Tibet with China affect our agreement about Tibet?

PRIME MINISTER: The disappearance of that does not affect it—if you read it—but I do not know what the consequences of developments in Tibet might be. You see what was our agreement with China in regard to Tibet. Apart from our withdrawing certain small forces that we had there in old times, this agreement related to pilgrimage, to trade and trade routes, to certain passes over which these trade routes should pass. To that type of thing. And you know that thousands and thousands of pilgrims go to Tibet from India. Apart from Buddhists, vast numbers of Hindus go there to Kailash and the Manasarowar Lake and we wanted to make arrangements for them. That is one part of the treaty. The other was something about trade. The third was about the routes to be followed, the passes to be traversed. Then, there was something which was definitely mentioned in the treaty—not directly—but indirectly it was there, the close contact of the Buddhists in Ladakh, who used to go, for some kind of education and training in the Buddhist scripture, to Lhasa and other places, to the monasteries there. Hundreds of these people used to go and hundreds are supposed to be there who did not take the trouble to carry any normal papers and passports, etc. They carried on in the old way. Now, how far all these will be affected by these developments, I cannot say.

QUESTION: Perhaps you have answered the question. But how are we politically concerned or affected by the events in Tibet?

PRIME MINISTER: Well, we are obviously concerned and interested in what happens there, in what political developments take place there. We cannot ignore them, forget them or look away from them. What we do about them is another matter, to be considered in regard to circumstances. But I should like to put to you that apart from the purely political considerations, there are other considerations which move people powerfully. We have had no desire, certainly ever since we became independent, to interfere in the slightest degree in Tibetan affairs. But we could not give up our interest, call it if you like sentimental interest, apart from politics, and you

can observe for yourself the enormous feeling that has been aroused in India by these recent developments in Tibet and about the Dalai Lama and all those.

It shows that deep sentimental attachment which has little to do with politics which goes back hundreds of years. You saw—I was not present that day—but some of you might have been present in the Lok Sabha three or four days ago when Members of every group, every party in the Lok Sabha, except the Communist Party, were vastly exercised over this question. It brought out rather, well, very markedly and prominently how some matters are so deeply rooted in national sentiment that they override even party boundaries and they come up. They brought out also how the Communist Party in India has uprooted itself from those matters and feels quite differently—I am not talking about politics or economics—but just what is called national sentiment which has deep roots in a country. And we saw there that marked distinction of the people who however they differed among themselves, had that common bond of a strong national tradition and sentiment, call it nationalism for brief, while the Communist Party had no kinship with that sentiment, it had not its roots there. It had its roots in different thinking and that document or statement that they issued exhibited that entirely different approach from the point of view of national sentiment. And the strong reactions of Members of Parliament and those others outside to that was due to that. It had not much to do with any factual statement or no statement. It had nothing to do, to my thinking, with any parliamentary privilege, but it had to do basically with, that deep-rooted sentiment of the Indian people which was hurt by that statement. Therefore it reacted.

QUESTION: Are you aware of the dangers involved by the exploitation of this recent event in China by anti-Communist forces in India?

PRIME MINISTER: The situation is full of difficult aspects, naturally, and the worst of it is that it tends to bring in that atmosphere of cold war in India which we have tried to avoid. And when there is an atmosphere of cold war, parties to it do not consider matters dispassionately or in the cold light of reason but try to exploit the situation to the advantage of their thinking. There is that danger on every side, on both sides if you like, if you divide it, and that is, if I may introduce a slightly personal element, why when I spoke in the Lok Sabha two days ago rather deliberately, I suppressed

myself in order to avoid adding to this heat of the cold war. I felt strongly enough about some matters but I felt that one must try to be a little dispassionate.

QUESTION: Don't you feel disillusioned or disappointed about the development in Tibet particularly in view of the Panch Sheel agreement, when the first time it was propounded, you and Mr. Chou En-lai, went into night-long vigil to draft that agreement.

PRIME MINISTER: I do not think you are factually correct. Mr. Chou En-lai was not here when the draft agreement was made. He was in Peking, I was here.

QUESTION: After he came from the Geneva Conference?

PRIME MINISTER: There was no agreement; there was a brief press communique then. That had nothing to do with Tibet at all. I do not think there was any reference to it.

QUESTION: In view of the good relations between India and China, has China, at any time, written to you asking you to use your good offices, particularly in relation of Tibet and China, to the revolt among Khampas and others?

PRIME MINISTER: May I say that for a variety of reasons, historical, sentimental, practical and of the present day, I have thought and I think that it is of great importance for India and China to be on friendly terms with each other even though they might differ greatly in regard to their policies internally and further that neither country has any business to interfere in the other country because such interference does not produce any desirable results even from the point of view of the person who wants to interfere unless the result aimed at is just ill will and anger which is the essence of the cold war. The cold war does not convert the other party at all; it makes it more rigid. So that has been our basic policy, conditioned always of course by guarding, protecting the interests of India and the larger causes that we hold dear. Now, Tibet, as I told you, affects some deeper chords in our hearts. Tibet, culturally speaking, is an offshoot of India. That is to say of Buddhism not of India politically and we may be Hindus, we may be anything in India but Buddha is the greatest Indian that ever lived and we still in India are under the umbrella of this feeling for the Buddha. Tibet of course is far more so and there is this tremendous bond. We do not want Tibet to remain economically or socially backward. We want it to progress. Now, at no time during the last few years, last some years, has there been any correspondence, so far as I can remember, with

Chinese Government or Premier Chou En-lai about Tibet with us but when Premier Chou En-lai was here last time we discussed many matters and among them Tibet.

I have just told you a little while ago what he said about Tibet to me. As a matter of fact, he discussed this question at some length explaining the Chinese Government's attitude to Tibet and pointing out that they respected and wanted to respect the autonomy of Tibet, and that they had no desire to push communism in Tibet, for the major reason, he said, that Tibet was as far removed from communism as any country could be and that it could not be pushed and imposed in this way and it was for the people of Tibet themselves to grow up economically and socially.

QUESTION: A comparison was made in the Lok Sabha between the situation in Algeria and in Tibet. It was said that in Algeria the French people are settling there. In the same way in Tibet also the Chinese are settling in vast numbers. What are your views?

PRIME MINISTER: The question essentially was about the Chinese settling in Tibet just as the French people had previously settled in Algeria. I do not know, first of all—one hears reports about large numbers of Chinese settling in Tibet; I have no information about it, about numbers, I cannot say. There is no comparison. If people settle in some other country and a country which is different, they bring with them some problems. That is true.

QUESTION: Do you propose to take any steps to persuade China to restore Tibet's autonomy?

PRIME MINISTER: There is no question of my taking steps to that end. First of all, the Chinese Government, so far as I know, has not denied the fact that Tibet should be autonomous. What they have laid stress on is that this has broken down, according to them, by the action of the other party; but they have not denied the fact that Tibet should be autonomous, and this business of giving advice to others does not always lead to right results.

QUESTION: There are reports that you have been in correspondence with the British Prime Minister recently regarding Tibet.

PRIME MINISTER: Those reports are not correct, except that frequently, not frequently but sometimes, I have messages from Mr. Macmillan. I reply to those messages, but there has been no particular correspondence about Tibet.

QUESTION: Has the Chinese Government conveyed its reaction to you regarding your giving political asylum to the Dalai Lama?

PRIME MINISTER: No. But it is an acknowledged fact that any country has the right to give asylum if it chooses. I don't think that is denied anywhere.

QUESTION: Some people talk of the Naga trouble and Hyderabad when this question of the autonomy of Tibet comes. Will you please clarify the two positions?

PRIME MINISTER: Well, there is no comparison, of course. There is Hyderabad. I do not know what to say. The question does not arise at all in any shape or form, because the Nizam and some of his advisers there adopted a policy which was patently a policy against the Government of India, patently against his own people's wishes and all that. In regard to the Naga problem the position is different certainly from that of Hyderabad.

The Naga area, you know, is a small area on our border, an area which has in the past some times given a lot of trouble and according to our policy, we give these tribal areas the fullest autonomy. There is no policy that we wish to impose upon them. This trouble started because they declared—some of them declared, an organisation—independence there. We did not start a shooting war because they declared independence. Some of them came to me and said, "We want to be independent." Others said, "No. We want to have something else." We did not punish them for saying that. It was only when they rather brutally killed a number of our officers and men, when they started a violent campaign, that we took measures to meet this because they were just waylaying and killing important people—our own officers and men and important Nagas who were with us. We had to protect those people and put an end to this kind of reign of terror that the Naga National Council in the name of the Naga people was creating there. I think that any person who knows how we have functioned there will probably be amazed at the constant attempt on our part—an attempt which has largely succeeded, I won't say always—at the friendly approach, the lenient approach, the approach which has always kept in view non-interference in Naga customs and the rest, and we have always kept open the door to a considerable measure of autonomy for them which, by and large, a great majority of them have accepted in conventions and congresses and the rest.

QUESTION: You said earlier that it was very important for India and China to remain on friendly terms now and in the future and you said that this was our basic policy conditioned by the

interests of India and larger causes we hold dear. Do you consider that Tibet is among these larger causes or have we now by our agreement with Tibet put ourselves beyond taking up this matter?

PRIME MINISTER: Tibet or a country does not become a cause. It is a country. A country or the developments in the country may affect a cause. Certainly, we are deeply interested in the autonomy of Tibet and Tibet being allowed to carry on in its own way.

QUESTION: You said in the Lok Sabha that the rights renounced by India in Tibet were a relic of British imperialism. By the same token, does not the McMahon Line become a relic of British imperialism?

PRIME MINISTER: By the same token, you might go back a little when Asoka governed the whole of Central Asia and China governed at one time or other Burma and Indo-China, and Tibet at one time governed a bit of China. You cannot go back on history like this. At what period do we draw a line? There is a difference between certain extraterritorial rights in a country. Obviously, there is no question if we had 150 soldiers in Gyantse, or whatever the number was, no country would tolerate that kind of thing. That continued because they were there from the British times on the plea, mind you, of lack of law and order there, to protect our consulate or whatever it was. That is a completely different thing from conditions in a part of the country—border if you like—which had continued for generations and somebody comes and tells us that, "Oh! a hundred years ago this was different." There is no particular significance or meaning, unless that person wants to do mischief.

We have to accept certain things; we cannot historically trace back where the Indian frontier was. We accepted for a long time, for a hundred years or so, that the frontier is this and we have been in possession. We have functioned administratively and otherwise. There the matter ends so far as we are concerned, and as a matter of fact the McMahon Line was accepted by Tibet, and some parts of that McMahon agreement, by the then existing Chinese Government, were not settled, but this part was not objected to even then.

QUESTION: But, Sir, in view of the expansionist policy of communism and the policy of the CPI as had been witnessed in the Lok Sabha recently, do you not think that the security of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and even our country is threatened?

PRIME MINISTER: I do not think CPI's policy is expansionist. It is submissive. It is not expansionist.

QUESTION: Sir, in the latest issue of the Communist Party organ, the weekly *New Age*, they say that the spy ring is not only there in Kalimpong but it operates also in Calcutta, Bhutan and Sikkim. And they have also alleged that there was collusion between some of our political officers and the spies, and they have named Shri Apa Pant in this connection. It has come in the latest issue of the *New Age*.

PRIME MINISTER: I have not seen that. If the CPI goes about naming our principal officers, the CPI shows, even more than I suspected, a certain lack of balance in mind and a total absence of feeling of decency and nationality. What they are I do not know. They cease to be Indians if they talk in this way.

May I say about this matter? Of course I said in the Lok Sabha about Kalimpong being a nest of spies. Well, I indicated that there was every variety and every shade and colour of spies there. Probably you could even balance the anti-Communist spies with the Communist spies there. The whole place, it is a detective story unravelling itself there. In a great city like Calcutta no doubt you have all manner of people like that belonging to every shade and colour. To say that is one thing; for the matter of that in any great city in the world you will find these valiant representatives of the cold war.

By the way, may I mention one thing, which is horrifying to me? And this was a statement which appeared some little time ago and our External Affairs Ministry contradicted it yesterday, a statement by Prince Peter of Greece, who stayed in Kalimpong for a number of years. He made a statement—he is supposed to be and described as an international authority on Tibetan affairs—he said that the Indian Government had given assistance to the Chinese invasion of Tibet for fear that Tibet might fall under British or American influence. The Chinese armies were receiving supplies along the only road from the Indian border to Lhasa. He stated: "While I was still at Kalimpong I discovered for myself that truck convoys to Tibet, alleged by Indians to be loaded with rice, were full of military supplies!" Now, a more fantastic and despicable lie I have never heard and I say that by my knowledge. A person like Prince Peter of Greece, who had the hospitality of India for several years, dares to say that shows the atmosphere of Kalimpong, what it was.

Even a person thinking even slightly, cannot say that in 1950 thousands of trucks—how do trucks go, where do they go?—any supplies to Tibet had then and now to go through the Nathula pass. Now there is a road. We have built it. They had to go over mules, a most terrible journey on mule-back. In 1954-55, because there was a famine in Tibet, we agreed to send some rice—about, I forget now, may be ten to twenty thousand maunds, less than a thousand tons—and it was a terrible job to send this. You just calculate how many mules are required to carry it. It took seven or eight months for these mule caravans to carry this rice over the Nathula. And this was in 1954-55. This is physically impossible apart from the fact that it is inconceivable that we should send military supplies of all things to the Chinese authorities—by mules—who had far more military supplies than we possessed, and then that we should do that is quite an extraordinary statement.

QUESTION: There has been a report in the press that the Chinese have in the last recent two or three weeks drawn our attention to what they said, or expressed the hope that the Indian Consul at Lhasa would take an objective view of the situation. What have you to say about that?

PRIME MINISTER: We take a very objective view. The Consul sits at his window and looks at Lhasa. What I mean is I do not think he has been outside his Consulate during all these days. He has been sitting there taking this objective view.

QUESTION: Does it mean that his movements are restricted?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes, but of course, they are restricted for a few days. I can understand it because there was trouble in Lhasa, and even now, it is said, for the sake of security etc., people from our Consulate are not permitted to go out in Lhasa. They have said as soon as things are normal, they can go out. But for the moment, we have troubles even in such small matters—they are not very small—as in food supplies in going to the market.

QUESTION: There has been a lot of speculation that because of expression of sympathy with the Tibetans and the offer of asylum to the Dalai Lama the relations between India and China may deteriorate? Is this true?

PRIME MINISTER: Naturally conditions are such that difficult, delicate and embarrassing situations are created and may continue in various shapes and forms, and we have to keep the various factors in view, the major factor being, of course, our own security. After

all every Government's first duty is to protect its country in every way. The second factor, our desire to have and continue to have friendly relations with China. The third factor, our strong feeling about developments in Tibet. Now, sometimes there is certain contradiction in these. That is inevitable. One has, therefore, in so far as one can, to balance, adjust, and sometimes to make difficult choices.

QUESTION: Do you think the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and sought asylum in India of his own free will, or under Chinese duress?

PRIME MINISTER: I should imagine so, because I cannot conceive of the Dalai Lama being pushed about by his own people. I said that.

QUESTION: Have you any information about the extent of damage in Tibet?

PRIME MINISTER: None whatever in the rest of Tibet. I would say, none perhaps, a little here and there in some towns of Tibet. In Lhasa, we had some reports, not accurate reports, but like the report of an eye-witness who saw a house damaged but could not say how much. The Summer Palace of the Dalai Lama has been shelled, that famous palace full of art treasures and manuscripts. It will be a great tragedy if those treasures and manuscripts were destroyed. We cannot say that they have been destroyed but a part of the palace was shelled, some other buildings in Lhasa, important buildings, and somewhere else. For the rest, we have no information.

TRANSCRIPT OF PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE
HELD ON 14 MAY 1959 IN NEW DELHI

At the beginning, Mr. Nehru told the correspondents, "I will suggest that you might mention your name when you get up, not your name, the name of your paper. It just helps in keeping a record and helps me too." This was an innovation in the Prime Minister's press conferences.

TIBET

PRIME MINISTER: What about Tibet? The one thing I can tell you more or less definitely is the number of refugees that have come or are on the way, that have entered either the territory of India or Bhutan or Sikkim. Our present figures are 12,200. Of these, most of them have come through the NEFA Agency at Kameng and Subansiri. About 10,000 have come there. About 1,600 via Bhutan and about 300 via Sikkim. At present, we have organised two camps, one in Assam for about 5,000 persons, and one in north Bengal in Buxa for about a thousand or a little more. This Bengal camp is on the foothills, not right down the plains, a little higher up. Now, for the present, the immediate issue before us has been to provide some kind of accommodation for these people who are coming and, well, medical help etc., whatever may be needed because I am told a number of them require medical attention. But it is not our intention to keep large camps permanently.

I cannot say at present what other arrangements we might have to make, but for the able-bodied, the young persons, after a while we should like to give them opportunities of doing some work and earning their living. I cannot indicate how exactly. Possibly, in those hill areas, we might use them for road-making if they so agree. It is not very easy to bring these people down in the plains because the summer in the plains will be very difficult for them to bear.

QUESTION: Social strata of these people...

PRIME MINISTER: We have not stratified them in that way but it is obvious that if 12,000 persons come, a large number of them must belong to, well, must represent the common man in Tibet. No doubt there will be others there belonging to more or less what you might call upper strata. How many I cannot say.

QUESTION: Any indication about children and women?

PRIME MINISTER: No. I believe there may be some but I could not tell you how many.

QUESTION: Are there many Lamas?

PRIME MINISTER: There must be again some Lamas because a very large proportion of the population of Tibet is Lamas. Practically every family contributes one or more members to the monasteries. I take it there must be a good number of Lamas. There are a few persons who are called incarnate Lamas. How many I do not know.

QUESTION (Nilakantan—*PTI*): Have there been any diplomatic exchanges between India and China on Tibet about Dalai Lama going back or the Chinese Ambassador seeing him?

PRIME MINISTER: No. There have been no formal diplomatic exchanges. We told them when the Dalai Lama had sought refuge in India and just after his entering Indian territory. We had informed the Chinese Government officially of this—that he sought asylum and we had given it him and his party. After that there have been no formal exchanges.

QUESTION (Malhotra—*Statesman*): You said in Parliament that India is concerned over the use of cold war language by China without regard to truth or propriety. . . . Was it conveyed to them through the Chinese Ambassador here? Has any reply been received to that?

PRIME MINISTER: Yes. You are right. We did convey a message sometime back then, and soon after we received not a reply to it but an independent message complaining of something that has been said and done in India. So there are two independent messages crossing each other but there has been, so far as I can remember, no exchange and then again we sent an answer to their message. That is all as far as I can remember.

QUESTION (Sharma—*Assam Tribune*): Has it come to your notice that in China today, in their official publications, they have mentioned the Asian Relations Conference and the presence of the Tibetan delegation there and they have mentioned it in connection with the movement of independence for Tibet and they say that the Asian Relations Conference was organised by Britain? Could you throw some more light on the genesis of the Asian Relations Conference and why and how the Tibetan delegation was there and what they did?

PRIME MINISTER: The Asian Relations Conference was held in the beginning of 1947. If anyone has made a statement that it was organised by Britain he is totally ignorant of the facts. No-

thing to do with Britain or any outsider or any foreigner. It was organised by—I forget the name . . .

A CORRESPONDENT: Indian Council of World Affairs.

PRIME MINISTER: The one that preceded it, I think, out of which came the Indian Council of World Affairs—anyhow more or less the same body. And, it was organised before we came into Government—we came into Government for the first time in 1946 August. We discussed this matter and a committee was formed. Later, before the actual conference took place, we had become members of the Government, but it remained a non-governmental conference, convened not under Government's auspices, but non-official auspices. Government had nothing to do with it except sympathy and all that. In that Conference all kinds of people were invited. Normally, we wanted to invite non-official organisations to it. But we found this difficulty that in a number of countries in Asia we could not get hold of a non-official organisation to invite. So the Governments of those countries sent some representatives—usually educationists and the like. So it was a kind of a mixed conference, essentially non-official, but with an official element in it, from outside and from here in the sense that we had become a Government then.

I remember in the course of this [Conference] the people from Tibet had been invited. I do not quite remember how they were invited—I mean to say what organisation was addressed to send their representatives—but they did come. I remember of an incident on these days. There was a big roughly drawn map of Asia, drawn in chalk, and there were some dotted lines as between Tibet and China. Now, none of us had noticed it. It was some effort of some artist who had put it up there. Nobody knew about it, but the representatives from China, that is to say the Kuomintang representatives—at that time Marshal Chiang Kai-shek was the President of China—took objection to these dotted lines. He said: "You are showing Tibet as a separate country from China and they should not have separate representation." That incident arose. I am not quite sure, but I think the dots were removed then by someone. But the Tibetans who had come remained there. We told them it was not an official conference; it was more a cultural affair.

QUESTION (Sabarwal—*Press Syndicate of Japan*): I happened to see a Chinese paper yesterday. The headlines there were very uncomplimentary to India, on the lines that we had heard in

the speeches made in the People's Congress of China, viz. "Chinese will never allow foul hogs to poke their snouts in our beautiful garden." Such kinds of headlines you will see in the *People's Daily*.

PRIME MINISTER: What you have quoted presumably is something from somebody's speech. Whatever it may be, I am saying that it was not contained in the message that we got.

QUESTION: A complaint was sent to India . . .

PRIME MINISTER: What do you expect me to say, except that this is a kind of language which we do not use or like being used by others, that I call "cold war" language.

QUESTION: How do you react to the Communist Party's latest resolution which seems to be more or less a precis on what has already been written in the *People's Daily* of China on May the 6th?

PRIME MINISTER: I have not compared the two but broadly speaking, I suppose, it is a precis with an attempt slightly to tone it down for Indian purposes.

QUESTION (Roy—*Pakistan Times*): What is left of the Tibetan problem now?

PRIME MINISTER: To begin with, Tibet is left. And there are so many aspects of it. Problems like these do not disappear. They are in the habit of carrying on in spite of what happens. If you look at them in perspective, you see these ups and downs repeatedly. So far as we are concerned, at present, our main concern is those large number of refugees who have come here.

QUESTION: About the policy of neutrality there has been a lot of criticism by Mr. Khrushchev and China of Col. Nasser and Marshal Tito and you particularly, about this policy of neutrality. Do you think it represents some change of policy on their part or some sort of disbelief in the policy of neutrality or just it is a temporary passing phase?

PRIME MINISTER: I have not seen myself any criticism other than that appeared in China. Even there I do not know if any reference to neutrality has been made, reference to Panch Sheel has been made, any to the Bandung principles and all that. But I do not remember even any Chinese criticism about our policy of neutrality. It may have been there but certainly I have not seen anything in Russia about it.

QUESTION (Sharma—*Assam Tribune*): Col. Nasser had been attacked so many times and Marshal Tito also.

PRIME MINISTER: That is important as it is. But these are relatively local arguments.

QUESTION (Sharma—*Assam Tribune*): Col. Nasser has interpreted it as an attack on the policy of neutrality. So has Marshal Tito. I think more or less you might not like to say it but it is actually an attack on the policy of neutrality, after all, what is Panch Sheel.

PRIME MINISTER: The first thing is that nothing has been said about India, about these issues, at all; except in China in recent weeks or months, nobody else has referred to India in this connection, but there has been, as you say, a lot of hard words and bitter things said in Cairo and in Moscow about each other. It is so. I do not see how that comes in and can be considered as—apart from China—an attack on the policy of neutrality or Panch Sheel. I do not see it at all.

QUESTION (Toulmin—*London Times*): Do you think you will be making any approaches to China about helping the Dalai Lama to return on honourable terms? From your answers, it seems there was a kind of deadlock in communications between India and China.

PRIME MINISTER: There is no deadlock. We always send messages to each other but recently we have not sent any official formal communications. Informally to some extent we always deal with each other. Our Ambassador in China meets some high dignitary there. That is a different matter. I cannot say when we may decide to send some communication and the content of it. That I cannot say now. It depends on circumstances.

QUESTION (Toulmin—*London Times*): You have asked the Dalai Lama not to engage in political activity, haven't you?

PRIME MINISTER: I have told the Dalai Lama that he is perfectly free to say or do what he likes, to go back to Tibet, to remain here or to go anywhere else. But having said that, I pointed out that he will no doubt consider the circumstances and events leading up to his coming here and the present position and function wisely and with some restraint. It is a broad advice I have given him, no specific thing—I have told him to do or not to do. He is free to do that. In fact I have been advising him, in a small way, even while he is at Mussoorie, to come out of his house and wander about and go about and to meet people. Of course now he meets a fairly large number of people who come for what might be called "Darshan", for his blessings. Large numbers of people go there now. He has given interviews too, chiefly to Buddhist representatives

who have come sometimes from other countries. I say this because I have seen some comments, not here but in the foreign press, about his being kept under strict detention and all that. That is not true essentially. I think that as usual, the police have a way of throwing their weight about wherever they are concerned and we have told them to be careful about the Dalai Lama's security and their idea of looking after a person is to be very evident themselves all over the place. We have again made it clear to them not to interfere at all and that naturally we are anxious about the Dalai Lama's security. So far as other members of his party are concerned, they can just go and do what they like in Mussoorie or go away from Mussoorie. Nobody is compelling them.

QUESTION (Toulmin—*London Times*): You told us at Mussoorie that the Dalai Lama was anxious to go back to Tibet if it could be arranged. How this result is to be achieved?

PRIME MINISTER: What I said at Mussoorie, I don't remember my words but it is a natural thing. Nobody wants to come away or to be pushed out of one's country, one wants to go back. But the reasons which prompted him to come away, so long as those reasons persist, presumably there are some barriers to his going there.

QUESTION (Sabarwal—*P.S.J.*): The Mongols ruled over China for a few centuries. The Mongols made the whole country of China a province. Just like that the Manchus made Manchuria a part of China. But Tibet was never in that sense a part of China. Today Mongolia is an independent State. There is the Mongolian representative here. Even Siberia was a part of China once, hundred years ago it was. Would it not be wise and generous on the part of China to give the same status to Tibet as they have given to Outer Mongolia?

PRIME MINISTER: I don't think they have given any status to Outer Mongolia.

QUESTION: But they have agreed to give it independent status.

PRIME MINISTER: Outer Mongolia came into existence, well, in the twenties, long ago. After the commotion that followed all over northern Asia after the Soviet Revolution, various things happened which ultimately reached Outer Mongolia and other things happened. As for Tibet, I think it is a question of history or if you like, of international law such as it is. It is all mixed up and there is no such thing really as international law when there is a conflict. So what the international status of Tibet might be,

it is for lawyers and others to determine; but ultimately though minor questions are often decided either by negotiations or, may be, by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, major questions are not decided by anybody, except by the countries concerned either peacefully or by the force of arms. About the status of Tibet, it is obviously a distinct entity, a place with an individuality, a Tibetan individuality. It is true that through long periods of history, it has been connected with China in various degrees of intimacy, sometimes closely, sometimes remotely, but connected. And for the greater part of that period it has acknowledged various degrees of suzerainty of China; sometimes not, but for the greater part it has. For the present a jurist may give his opinion which will have no very great value except historically, and the question is really decided by the strength of the nation.

QUESTION (Sabarwal—*P.S.J.*): My question is this. China has accepted Outer Mongolia as an independent State, although it was an integral part of China till about a few years ago. So would it not be generous and magnanimous on the part of China to give Tibet the same status?

PRIME MINISTER: How can I answer this question about generosity and magnanimity?

QUESTION: Does it mean that China's claim which has been given in the Peking *People's Daily*, that China has full sovereignty over Tibet is accepted?

PRIME MINISTER: The Chinese claim has been the same "suzerainty" and "sovereignty", in the English language I know. But what it is in the Chinese language I do not know. I do not know their exact connotation. But the claim has been identical, more or less, through all the later historical periods, whether there has been an emperor in China or there have been war-lords in China or Chiang Kai-shek, or the present government in China. It has been an identical claim always. As for the measure of sovereignty etc., I have said that both practically and otherwise, there could not have been in the past any real intimate control of Tibet. It was physically not possible because of its remoteness, because of no communication and all that. Occasionally Chinese armies came to Tibet. Once or twice Tibetan armies went to China in the past. Occasionally a Chinese high official called the "Amban", sitting in Lhasa, rather in a control position, almost like the Resident, old-style British Resident in Indian States. So these varieties

of control had been there, and sometimes no control. You can draw any inference you like. But the fact is you have to view the situation as it is today.

QUESTION (Rangaswami—*Hindu*): Is it your impression that so long as the Dalai Lama stays in India, there is bound to be some kind of strain in the relations between India and China?

PRIME MINISTER: Well, it is rather difficult to look into the future, but possibly you are right that the presence of the Dalai Lama does involve a certain strain of that type.

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE ADDRESSED BY THE
PRIME MINISTER IN NEW DELHI ON 6 JUNE 1959

QUESTION: Tibet.

PRIME MINISTER: What about Tibet?

QUESTION: Has there been any response to what you said in Parliament on the question of Dalai Lama or it is just the same wall of silence between India and Peking over the Dalai Lama?

PRIME MINISTER: There has been broadly speaking no further contacts of that type. If I may describe it, it is a wall of silence with muffled whispers occasionally.

QUESTION: Except to pay some tributes in the papers.

PRIME MINISTER: It is not completely a wall of silence because we have sometimes given information, exchanged information or exchanged protests, as the case may be. This kind of thing has been going on on a relatively informal level.

QUESTION: Have you raised the question of McMahon Line?

PRIME MINISTER: No. It was mentioned previously many times. There is no question of raising it in connection with Tibet.

QUESTION: What are the Dalai Lama's plans? Is he staying on in India?

PRIME MINISTER: I imagine that his stay in India is going to be prolonged.

QUESTION: Can you say that the Chinese are beginning to accept our *bona fides* in this matter?

PRIME MINISTER: I cannot say. How can I what . . .

QUESTION: Is the Dalai Lama's statement correct that the situation in Tibet is still causing concern?

PRIME MINISTER: I have no doubt that it is causing him concern and causing others concern. To some extent it is causing us concern.

Part Ten

THE DEBATE OUTSIDE PARLIAMENT

Every Indian political party and every political figure joined the great debate on Tibet, which raged for months together within and outside the Indian Parliament.

Included here are resolutions on Tibet adopted by the Congress Party, the Praja Socialist Party and the Communist Party.

Also included is the statement issued by the Communist Party on March 31, 1959, which became the subject of an adjournment motion in the Lok Sabha on April 1 (see Part Eight).

Another important document included in this part is the text of the speech made by Mr. Jai Prakash Narain while presiding at the All-India Tibet Convention held in Calcutta on May 30, 1959. This Convention adopted a resolution authorising Mr. Jai Prakash Narain to take steps to mobilise Afro-Asian opinion in support of Tibet's independence and for the more immediate purpose of raising the Tibetan question at the United Nations. In pursuance of that resolution, Mr. Jai Prakash Narain conferred in New Delhi with diplomatic representatives of several Asian-African countries in June and July. He had also a meeting with the Prime Minister, which was preceded by three-day confabulations with the Dalai Lama at Mussoorie.

Mr. Jai Prakash Narain is one of the founders of the Socialist Movement in India. He has now retired from active politics.



THE CONGRESS PARTY ON TIBET

On 10 May 1959, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress adopted a resolution on Tibet. The resolution was, however, not submitted to the All-India Congress Committee which began a two-day session immediately afterwards. The AICC, thus, had no chance to debate the happenings in Tibet and to approve or disapprove the resolution adopted by the Working Committee. This was rather uncommon in the annals of the Congress Party.

The following is the text of the resolution :

Recent events in Tibet have evoked much concern and sympathy among large numbers of people in India. This is natural because of neighbourly relations and as many places in Tibet have from time immemorial been a part of the religious and cultural consciousness of the Indian people. Large numbers of pilgrims have gone there every year from India. Any happening there which leads to the suffering of the people of Tibet is, therefore, a matter of sorrow for people in India.

The Working Committee accord their full support to the policy of the Government of India as enunciated in the Prime Minister's statements in Parliament. They approve of the grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama, who is greatly respected in India, as also to a large number of refugees from Tibet. On humanitarian grounds, this was desirable and is justified by the principles of International Law.

The Committee reaffirm the basic policy of India which is one of friendly relations with all countries and non-alignment with any military grouping, and that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of other countries, which is one of the Five Principles of the Panch Sheel. The Committee are anxious that there should be friendly relations with China and earnestly hope that peaceful conditions will soon be established in Tibet.

PSP RESOLUTION ON TIBET

The National Executive of the Praja Socialist Party adopted the following resolution on Tibet on 17 April 1959 :

The National Executive of the Praja Socialist Party feels gravely concerned over the recent developments in Tibet. What was for the last four years simmering under the surface has suddenly erupted into a people's revolution against efforts to liquidate Tibet's distinctive personality—gentle, self-contained and non-aggressive. Between us and the people of Tibet, close ties have existed over centuries and it was but natural that tears should well up in our hearts when we saw Tibet wounded and bleeding.

Apart from this sorrow over a friend, the Executive looks upon the recent events in Tibet as a warning to all who cherish the right of a people to shape their own destiny. No people should be forced to choose between liberty and good relations with mighty neighbours.

The Executive extends respectful welcome to the Dalai Lama and assures through him the people of Tibet of our profound sympathy with the Tibetans struggling to safeguard their ancient heritage and their distinctive way of life. The Executive recognises the Tibetan's right to self-determination and extends to them its support.

The Executive is anxious to maintain and strengthen friendly relations between China and India. The Executive further realises that reconciliation between Tibet and China is essential for the growth of trust and peaceful reconstruction in the South, South-East and East Asia.

The Executive is confident that Tibetans needing asylum will be welcome in India, our traditional hospitality and friendliness being assured to them. The Executive hopes that the heroic determination of Tibetans and the deep sympathy evoked by them in Asia and the world will help to end their travail and restore to them the opportunity to shape their destiny.

NEPALI CONGRESS ON TIBET

The Working Committee of the Nepali Congress suggested on May 3, 1959, that China should accept Bandung powers' "good offices" to solve the Tibetan problem.

In a long statement after a day's debate on Tibet the Committee suggested:

1: Conditions must be created so that Tibet can exercise autonomy granted to her under the 1951 agreement with China.

2. If any dispute arose, as to whether Tibet was enjoying autonomy really, Tibetans must have the right to decide the issue by themselves.

3. "If this is not possible China should agree to mediation of a few of the Bandung countries to clear the differences over the question of internal autonomy of Tibet."

The Committee challenged the Chinese stand that no one must express concern over Tibet. It said: "To argue that Tibetan issue is China's internal problem and as such it cannot be a matter for moral consideration by other Asian countries is to weaken the voice of anti-imperialism."

It declared that Tibet had lived as an independent country at times in the past and had remained under the Chinese at other times. But this historical perspective was inadequate to determine the Tibetan solution in this age of new Asian resurgence following World War II.

The situation, the statement added, made reorientation of relations in Asia imperative. It was the responsibility of the greater Asian powers today that they help to establish such relations.

"Instead, if they follow the tradition of 19th century imperialists, not only national freedom but also world peace and welfare and the great ideals of socialism and their moral basis will be in jeopardy. Naturally it would be reactionary if China tries to establish and maintain her sovereignty over Tibet on the basis of old standards" which were used by the imperialists in the past.

The Committee urged the Chinese to take into consideration the emergence of Asian awakening.

—*The Times of India* (New Delhi), May 4, 1959

MR. JAYA PRAKASH NARAIN ON TIBET

At the All-India Convention on Tibet held in Calcutta on 30 May 1959, Mr. Jaya Prakash Narain delivered the Presidential Address. In it, he propounded a new line of argument for Tibet's self-determination. The following is the text of the speech:

I should like at the outset to emphasise the need of more intimate study of international questions on the part of the public. The Prime Minister is considered to be the sole authority on foreign affairs. But events like Hungary and Tibet show how such a situation results in most unfortunate mistakes. With a better informed and active public opinion, such mistakes could perhaps have been avoided. It has been found that after the event, the Government has on occasions responded to public criticism, but it would have been much better not to have committed the mistake at the outset. The role of the press cannot be over-emphasised in this respect. The Council of World Affairs, its branches and other similar institutions should receive greater attention from the educated section of the people. In the Lok Sabha both the opposition as well as the ruling party must produce more serious students of foreign affairs.

The broad policy of independence, sometimes miscalled neutralism, has no doubt overwhelming support of the people and, to my mind, is the only correct policy for us to follow. But the trouble is that this policy is not always strictly and impartially followed. This has cost us not only our good name and moral prestige but has made us acquiesce in the suppression of human and national freedom.

Let me now turn to Tibet. One of the great tragedies of history is being enacted in full view of the world. Tibet is being gobbled up by the Chinese dragon. A country of less than ten million souls is being crushed to death by a country of six hundred and fifty million people. Patriotism, courage, faith can perform miracles. The Tibetans love their country; they are brave; they are devoted to their religion and their Dalai Lama. Yet, one to sixty-five is an odd that even a nation of Herculeses will find it difficult to overcome.

A BENIGHTED LAND

The attention of the world is currently turned elsewhere. More-

over, Tibet for most countries in the world, except its immediate neighbours, is an obscure, distant, benighted land not worth bothering about. This makes the tragedy of Tibet deeper.

India, as an immediate neighbour of Tibet, and as a country regarded for its moral position, its detachment and freedom from power politics has a great responsibility in this matter. The world looks to India for a lead and India must not fail.

It is not only the question of the fate of ten million people. That of course is important and would be so whatever the number. But there is also the question—and this is of much greater importance—of the basis of international justice and peace. Is world peace possible if the strong are free to oppress the weak with impunity? Such a world would be dominated by a few powerful nations and peace would consist in an uneasy balance of power between them and the small nations would be at their mercy.

INTERNATIONAL MORALITY

This surely is not the picture of the future world order that India has in view. We believe that just as inside nations the rule of law must be established to secure human rights, so in the international community too must the rule of law be enforced so as to ensure the freedom and rights of nations. That rule of law can only be based on an international morality which is universally accepted. Even the strongest power then might find it difficult to go against the moral verdict of the world. From my point of view, the greatest virtue of our foreign policy of non-attachment and independence of judgement is that it enables us to contribute, because of that very non-attachment, to the developments of international morality.

India, therefore, must not shirk her responsibility at this testing moment. Her responsibility is far greater at this time than it was at the time of Hungary. This is so not only because Tibet is on our frontier and what happens there affects our security, not only because of our spiritual and cultural bonds with Tibet. The Panchen Lama, by the way, twitted us the other day for showing such solicitude for Buddhism abroad when we had not cared to preserve it at home. The learned Lama forgets that the Buddha's teachings have very largely become a part of Hindu life and thought and the Buddha himself is worshipped as our last *Avatar*. Howsobeit, our bonds with Tibet are there and they no doubt determine our attitude towards their present plight. But our concern for and responsibility

towards Tibet spring mainly from the fact that Tibet is a neighbour who has been wronged. The responsibility is increased when it is recalled that the neighbour had put trust in our assurances.

GLIB TALK OF WAR

In this connection, there has been some glib talk of war.² If you do this or that, it would mean war with China, it is said. It is amazing that people should talk of war in this loose manner. The whole world knows, and China more than them all, that India has no desire whatever to start a war with anyone. On the other hand, India has repeatedly reiterated her firm desire to continue her bonds of friendship with China. But if China seeks to exploit that desire for unjust purposes, India cannot be a party to it. Nor can India be browbeaten into doing something that she considers wrong nor prevented by threats from doing the right.

The main elements of the Tibet situation have been clear enough from the beginning.

TIBET A COUNTRY BY ITSELF

Tibet is not a region of China. It is a country by itself which has sometimes passed under Chinese suzerainty by virtue of conquest and never by free choice. Chinese suzerainty has always been of the most nominal kind and meant hardly more than some tribute paid to Peking by Lhasa. At other times Tibet was an independent sovereign country. For some time in the 8th century Peking paid an yearly tribute of fifty thousand yards of Chinese brocade to Tibet.

After the fall of Manchu empire in 1911, Tibet functioned as an independent country till 1951 when the Chinese Communist Government invaded it. In between there were attempts to re-impose Chinese suzerainty by the treaty in which the British Government took a leading hand. Pressed from both sides by two powerful forces, Tibet had little choice. Nevertheless, nothing came out of these attempts and till the Communist invasion, Tibet was a free country.

The British had their own selfish motives for agreeing to Chinese suzerain powers in Tibet. Being imperialists themselves they had, of course, no qualms in the matter. Their motive was to bribe the Chinese in recognising the monopoly of economic rights of Britain in Tibet.

POLICY BORN IN SIN

It was this policy born in imperialist sin that free India inherited. Very rightly India renounced all the rights she enjoyed in Tibet by virtue of that inheritance. But, curiously, she re-affirmed that part of the sinful policy that related to China. India gave her assent to China's suzerain position in Tibet.

That was a major mistake of our foreign policy. The mistake was two-fold. The first was that we accepted an imperialist formula. The very idea that one country may have suzerain powers over another is imperialist in conception. The second mistake was to believe that a powerful totalitarian state could be trusted to honour the autonomy of a weak country.

It is true that we could not have prevented the Chinese from annexing Tibet. But we could have saved ourselves from being party to a wrong. That would have been not only a matter of moral satisfaction, but it would have also set the record right, so that world opinion, particularly in the Afro-Asian part of the world, could have asserted itself. That might have even halted the Chinese. The Communists are anxious to present themselves as liberators, so when Afro-Asian opinion had condemned their Tibet action as aggression they would have found it immensely difficult to go on with it. India's acceptance of the suzerainty formula gave to the Chinese action a moral and legal sanction and prevented the formulation of Afro-Asian opinion on the question. It thus prevented the true aggressive character of Chinese communism from being realised by the backward peoples of Asia, aggravating the danger of their being enslaved in the name of liberation.

CONFLICT OF POLICIES INEVITABLE

It has been said, more in whisper than aloud, that non-recognition of China's claims of suzerainty would have earned for us the hostility of the Chinese Government. In the first place, issues of right and wrong cannot be decided on considerations of pleasure or displeasure of the parties concerned. In the second place, it should have been foreseen that sooner or later the Chinese would try to destroy the Tibetan autonomy and then a conflict of policies would become inevitable.

Furthermore, we could have made it clear that even though we were opposed to China's suzerainty over Tibet, we were, on our side,

keen and determined to pursue our policy of friendship. India had strongly opposed recent Anglo-French aggression in Egypt, but on that account she did not change her policy of friendship towards England and France. Nor was India's action construed by these powerful countries as hostile, nor did they themselves on that account become hostile to India.

There are some who say that facts of history must be taken into account and if Tibet has sometimes been under China, it is irrelevant to raise the question of Tibetan independence now. This is an amazing argument. Any one who believes in human freedom and the right of all nations to independence, should be ashamed to talk in this fashion. According to the logic of this viewpoint, Hungary, for example, having long been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, should never be entitled to independence. Would any sensible person agree with this view? Let us not therefore slip into the habits of lazy thought and give approval to wrongs of history.

"AN ILLUSION IN MAKING"

For years an illusion was in the making. It was said that China was different. It had an ancient civilisation. Therefore, Chinese communism was different from Russian. And so on and on. That illusion has been shattered—to the great good fortune of the peoples of Asia, who have been warned in time.

China rants incessantly about imperialists and expansionists. But China herself has been revealed as a cruel imperial power. If communism had been a truly liberating and anti-imperialist force, the Chinese Communists, on assumption of power, should themselves have proclaimed the independence of Tibet and foresworn the old imperialist notion of suzerainty and made a treaty with Tibet of equality and friendship. But communism under Russian and Chinese guidance has become expansionist and aggressive, just as nineteenth century capitalism under the leadership of Britain, France, Germany had become aggressive and expansionist. Somewhere or the other Marxism had gone wrong. Lenin wrote a famous thesis on imperialism as the last phase of capitalism. Some one should write another thesis on communism as the first phase of a new imperialism.

Here it may be well to cast a glance at the conduct of India which has been in such clear contrast with that of China. India

also had inherited certain rights in Tibet from the previous Indian Government. But she unilaterally renounced them all. During the British period, Nepal was prevented from having any direct foreign relations; that matter was in the hands of the Indian Government. After independence, India surrendered those rights too and now Nepal is a fully sovereign democratic state with the full concurrence and support of India. Other instances may be given of India's clean record. It may be said without fear of contradiction that there is not a single Indian who wants to annex a single inch of foreign territory.

To return to Tibet. As on previous occasions of imperialist pressure from China, the Dalai Lama had no option but to agree to Chinese suzerainty and be content only with autonomous powers. This was in fact what the Dalai Lama himself hinted at in that most dignified statement that he had issued from Tezpur.

"NOT A QUESTION OF REFORMS"

Having annexed Tibet by invoking an outworn, imperialist formula, the Chinese Communists were in no hurry to go on with their plans of subjugating the country. They also needed time to build roads and military establishments and to haul up arms to the roof of the world. When they had sufficiently entrenched themselves, they began to tighten the screws. It was not a question of reforms. The question plainly was that of subjugation of Tibet. The Chinese interfered in everything, in the matter of religion as well as administration. Revered Lamas were purposely ill-treated, humiliated, imprisoned, tortured. The sanctity of shrines and images was violated. Monasteries were demolished and their properties confiscated. A new system of administration was imposed in which Chinese were posted to all key points. The post and telegraph, the mint, the hydro-electric plant were taken over. Printing of Tibetan currency was prohibited. Chinese postal stamps were introduced. The powers and functions of the Dalai Lama were clipped. A vast scheme of colonisation by China was set on foot, so that large parts of Tibet should cease to be Tibetan and become Chinese. That was a process of stealing Tibet from the Tibetans that caused deep anxiety and aroused bitter resentment. Centuries-old granaries, some of them with grain reserves to last for years, were emptied and the grains seized by the Chinese. Reserves of gold and silver bullion were appropriated on the pretext of taking it on

loan. The so-called land reforms were introduced, softly at first, but later with the usual Communist disregard for popular feeling. Forced labour, so foreign to Tibetan tradition, was introduced on a big scale. The press and all other means of information were taken over by the Chinese.

All this was happening over a number of years and to some of the administrative and constitutional changes the Tibetans were forced to give their assent. The rest was done at the sweet will of the overlords.

Resistance to such a state of affairs was natural. Soon it took the form of a national resistance movement.

REBELLION NATIONAL, NOT CLASS

Marxism of Karl Marx was meant to be an objective science of society. But present-day communism is nothing if not a complete travesty of objectivity. Had it not been so, all the wild charges could never have been made against India and Indians. Had it not been so, again, the Tibetan upsurge could not have been represented by the Chinese as only a minor disturbance caused by a handful of reactionary Lamas and landlords. It is not that Communists do not know the truth. It is only that communism cannot bear the truth. Truth is communism's deadly enemy.

There is no doubt that the vested interests are also with the resistance, but its character is national rather than class. The Tibetans are fighting to win their national freedom and not to defend the feudal rights of a few nobles and monasteries. The leaders of the movement are not feudal reactionaries, but the most progressive element in Tibetan society who stand for reform and changes.

The true history of the Tibetan national movement has yet to be told. There are Tibetans now in India who can give the world an authentic account. But one does not know when they will consider the opportune moment to have arrived to tell their story. In spite of all that has happened they perhaps feel that a settlement with the Chinese might still be possible. One admires the faith of these brave religious people and prays that their faith may be vindicated. One necessary condition for that seems to be unambiguous expression and assertion of world opinion on the side of truth and justice.

There is a point of view that is not so much expressed publicly as privately canvassed. It is said that even if the Chinese are behav-

ing a little roughly in Tibet, why be so squeamish about it? Are they not forcibly rescuing the Tibetan masses from medieval backwardness and forcing them forward towards progress and civilisation?

THRUSTING PROGRESS DOWN THE THROAT

It is strange that as soon as some people put themselves outside their own country, they become screaming imperialists. If the right is conceded to nations to thrust progress forcibly down the throats of other nations, why were not the British welcomed as torch-bearers of progress in India? But the defenders of the Chinese civilisers of Tibet will be the first to disown any such sacrilegious thought. They might, however, be thrown into real confusion if the Russians or the Chinese were to take it into their heads to march upon India to save her from foreign imperialists and lead her to progress?

Secondly, the question may be asked what is progress. To some industrialisation, rising production statistics, communes, Sputniks might mean progress. There is another view that regards progress in terms of humanity—the growth of human freedom, the decline of selfishness and cruelty, the spread of tolerance and cooperation, and so on. For me Stalin was no improvement on the Czar and all the Sputniks of Russia leave me cold when I know that a sensitive and honest writer, Pasternak, the first literary genius in Russia since Gorki, is condemned raucously by so-called men of letters who have not even read the offending work. From the point of view of the Progress of Man, as distinct from the Progress of Things, Russia appears to me to be living in the Dark Ages.

It was hoped that China's ancient civilisation would prevent that great country from being plunged into the same darkness, but Tibet has shown that the sun of humanity is as much under eclipse in Peking as it is in Moscow.

Apart from the progress of things, importance is attached to change of institutions. Destruction of temporal and spiritual feudalism might be considered to be an advance, but when that is replaced by a still more severe feudalism of Party and Bureaucracy, I for one am not prepared to call it an advance, far less a revolution. The yoke of native medievalism was surely going to be thrown off sooner or later. But who can tell when the foreign yoke of Communist medievalism will be overthrown? Who can tell when Latvia,

Estonia and Lithuania will be free? And Hungary and the rest of them?

HOW CAN TIBET BE SAVED?

The question that I wish to consider finally is one that is on everyone's lips now: how can Tibet be saved? He would be a bold person who would venture to suggest a definite answer. A few considerations may, however, be advanced.

There is one thing of which I am absolutely clear: the need to create a powerful opinion on this question. The Tibet situation should be presented to the world in all its naked reality. No attempt should be made for reasons of diplomacy to play down, cover up, belittle or misrepresent what is happening in Tibet. Diplomacy has a vast deal to answer for in history, and I do fervently hope that diplomacy, like the cold war, is kept out of the issue. The broad facts of the Tibet situation are clear. Those facts must be broadcast, and on their basis a strong and united world opinion must be created—against Chinese Aggression and for Tibet's Independence.

Let no one cry "cold war" at this. This is not a part of Bloc politics. This is a fight for the Rights of Man. Did anyone think that the world-wide condemnation of the Anglo-French attack on Egypt was a part of the cold war?

A FORMULA IN RUINS

The Government of India is committed to the formula of Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. That formula is in ruins. So is the much-trumpeted Panch Sheel. But, nevertheless, this whole question will have to be reconsidered sooner rather than later. What happens when the autonomy of a country (or a region for that matter) is destroyed? What happens when that autonomy is not restored? What happens, in short, when aggression takes place and succeeds? It would not do to evade these questions. Till these questions are answered, there is no hope of the Government of India discovering the next step. Paralysis of action in a fast-developing situation may be dangerous. However, of one thing I feel certain: the Prime Minister will never do a shoddy deal and pass off subjugation as autonomy.

It will be recalled that when the Chinese aggression began in 1950, the Tibetan Government had moved the United Nations. The

Salvadorean delegate had formally called on the UN to condemn China for her unprovoked aggression against Tibet, and had proposed the creation of a special committee to study what measures could be taken by the General Assembly to assist Tibet. The matter went to the Assembly's Steering Committee which, on the strength of the assurances of India's representative, decided to shelve the Tibetan complaint indefinitely.

RAISING TIBET AT THE UN

The full facts of that affair and our part in it have not been made public and I cannot say where the matter stands now according to the workings of the United Nations. Nevertheless it seems to be utterly wrong that such an important event as the suppression of the freedom of a nation should take place and the world organisation should not even take notice of it. It is not that the mere raising of an issue in the United Nations means that a solution will be found. We have some experience of the working of that august body ourselves. But, after all is said and done, the UN is the only organisation the human family has that gives some guarantee that the world will not be converted into a jungle where the strong will eat up the weak. I have no doubt there will be many constitutional barriers and such things as vetoes in the way of the Tibet issue entering the portals of the UN. But if rules and procedures and technicalities stand in the way of international justice, it is not the latter but the former that should suffer. In whichever form the Tibet question is presented to the UN, I have no doubt that the Afro-Asian bloc must present a common front. This is the least that the countries of Asia and Africa must do to defend the right of small nations to freedom and also to assure against the danger to their own freedom from both the old and new imperialisms.

TIBET IS NOT LOST

It is not for me to advise the Tibetans. There is one thought, however, which I cannot help expressing. Tibet, being a devoutly Buddhist country, could perhaps have turned its moment of tragedy into one of profound victory if it could have turned to the Compassionate One and met hate with love, oppression with suffering, violence with non-violence. Maybe, even then Tibet would have been destroyed, but not the soul of Tibet, not the Religion of the Buddha.

Then, is Tibet lost for ever? No. A thousand times No. Tibet will not die because there is no death for the human spirit. Communism will not succeed because man will not be slave for ever. Tyrannies have come and gone and Caesars and Czars and dictators. But the spirit of man goes on for ever. Tibet will be Resurrected.

THE INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND TIBET

The attitude of the Indian Communist Party towards the Tibetan question became the subject of a controversy in India. On March 31, the Party Secretariat issued a statement on Tibet which led to an adjournment motion in the Lok Sabha on the following day. Later, on May 12, the Central Executive Committee of the Party issued a resolution on Tibet.

Statement on Tibet

The Secretariat of the National Council of the Communist Party of India issued the following statement to the press:

All honest men in our country have been extremely pained by recent events in Tibet. This ancient land, with which our people have long and abiding ties, has recently seen much loss of life and destruction of property. And it is but natural that it should attract the sympathy of all Indians who have always wished well to the people of Tibet. All Indians likewise sympathise with our friendly and great neighbour China, who is meeting this difficult situation with utmost regard for human considerations, of Tibetan autonomy and the unity of the Chinese nation.

The people who are responsible for this considerable and wanton suffering in Tibet are the same who cause it elsewhere. They are the reactionaries who do not want to move with times, the serf-owners who wish to prevent the dawn of modern enlightenment and equality in Tibet. Misusing the trust placed in them by the People's Democratic Government of China, exploiting the scrupulous regard shown by the Government of China towards Tibetan autonomy, these elements conspired with foreign imperialists to stage a revolt. They had opposed land reform and every progressive measure in the interests of the people. The Government of China decided to give them time, which they utilised to stage a reactionary rebellion.

These elements are neither fighting for democracy nor for freedom. The fact that they have the sympathy and support of Chiang Kai-shek and the American imperialists is sufficient to show that they stand for utter reaction. In fact, without active support from the imperialists, these elements would not have been able to stage their reactionary rebellion.

India herself suffers from imperialist intrigues against her safety whether in Goa, Kashmir or Pakistan border. The same kind of intrigue was organised in Tibet and we should be happy that our neighbour has successfully scotched the imperialist plot across our border.

India has always recognised Tibet as part of China and it is in our agreement over Tibet that the famous Panch Sheel principles were born. These enjoin on us strict neutrality and non-intervention in each other's affairs. This also means that we should not allow our territories to be used for hostile or prejudicial acts against each other.

The People's Government of China, with the full sense of responsibility, has drawn our attention to Kalimpong, which, according to it, has become the command centre of the rebels. We all know that many shady happenings are taking place at Kalimpong and that a lot of doubtful foreigners are visiting this place. In the interest of both countries as well as the inviolability of our national soil, our Government should immediately investigate the affairs in Kalimpong and place the truth before the people.

Everybody in this country will be glad to find that the Government and Mr. Nehru have taken a proper attitude on this question and refused to oblige the reactionaries. And yet a few reactionaries and political parties like the PSP and the Jan Sangh are attempting to whip up anti-Chinese feeling in this country. These champions of freedom and democracy remained silent when the US-Pak Pact which directly threatens India's security was signed. Their one aim is to sow discord between our two friendly peoples. They only bring grist to the mill of American imperialism.

The Communist Party of India sends its warm greetings to the Communist Party of China under whose wise guidance the People's Government of China is leading the people of Tibet from medieval darkness to prosperity and equality. The people of Tibet, firmly allied with the people of China, will not only defeat all imperialist plots but will rapidly progress to peace and happiness.

**Resolution Adopted by the Central Executive Committee
Meeting Held from 9 to 12 May 1959 in Delhi**

The close friendship between India and China that has grown

in recent years has been one of the greatest events of our time. It has played a major part in upholding peace and in the resurgence of the nations of Asia and Africa. It has served as a model of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between countries with different social systems.

This friendship has strengthened the independence and security of our two great countries and also Afro-Asian solidarity. It has stood as a bulwark of freedom and world peace against forces of colonialism and war. With the development of India-China friendship, imperialism has been progressively isolated and pushed back and Afro-Asian peoples have grown in dignity and stature. It was in this India-China friendship and understanding that the Panch Sheel found its world-historic significance.

FRIENDSHIP DAMAGED

It has to be admitted, however, that following the events in Tibet, this friendship has to a certain extent been damaged and disturbed. It is necessary, therefore, that the real significance of these events is grasped.

What happened in the Tibetan region of the Chinese People's Republic was a rebellion organised by a handful of serf-owners and bigoted lamas in order to block all reforms and thus perpetuate brutal oppression and tyranny. They wanted to deny the Tibetan people the light of modern civilisation so that they would remain sunk in the bottomless pit of backwardness, servitude and indescribable misery. In their rebellion, these reactionary circles were encouraged and even materially helped by the imperialists. It is at their instigation and with their help that the former local government in Tibet became a cockpit of intrigue and abused the wide powers of autonomy and prepared for the present rebellion in violation of the 1951 agreement between the central authorities of the Chinese People's Republic and the local government of its Tibetan region. It was no surprise, therefore, that not a moment was lost by the imperialists—the instigators of the US-Pak bilateral pact, the SEATO and the like—in acclaiming the Tibetan rebellion as a new opportunity for advancing their intrigues and aggressive plans against India-China friendship and Afro-Asian solidarity.

The Central Executive Committee emphatically states that this rebellion had nothing to do with the interests of the Tibetan people. It was designed to serve only the interests of a handful of reactionary

forces at home and imperialism abroad. To describe such a rebellion as a national uprising is incorrect and highly misleading.

CO-ARCHITECTS OF PANCH SHEEL

India's cultural ties with the Tibetan people will naturally be cherished by all Indian patriots but this cannot be done by showing sympathy towards the serf-owners and feudal oppressors. India of today can have no sympathy for the forces of serfdom and medieval oppression. India's cultural bonds with the Tibetan people can be developed only in the context of enlightenment and progress, of mutual respect and mutual understanding between the co-architects of the Panch Sheel—India and China.

But the Central Executive Committee notes that the developments in Tibet are being distorted and exploited by some people in our country not only to disturb India-China relations but also for undermining the Panch Sheel and India's foreign policy. They are openly advocating the independence of Tibet and instigating India's intervention in the internal affairs of the Chinese People's Republic in furtherance of this end. They demand that rebels who have fled their homeland and are now in India be given all freedom and opportunity to continue their political activities against the Chinese People's Republic. They demand that the instigators and organisers of the rebellion be allowed to function as the Government of Tibet from our soil and carry on what they call the struggle for independence. Their speeches are accompanied by a hate-campaign against the Chinese People's Republic.

VITRIOLIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST CHINA

Foremost among these forces are the Praja Socialist Party, Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and other avowed opponents of the Panch Sheel and India's foreign policy, including known pro-American elements. These parties have now joined their hands in their vitriolic campaign to provoke India against China. They played no part whatsoever in the making of India's foreign policy. On the contrary, they have always greeted Prime Minister Nehru with derision and ridicule and have systematically worked to undermine the foreign policy pursued by him.

The Central Executive Committee warns the country against the insidious manoeuvres of these elements whose pretended sympathies for Tibet can never conceal their ulterior designs. They

are guided not by any love or concern for the Tibetan people. They are guided by their hatred against Communists and fond dreams to see India's foreign policy weakened and wrecked. It is to be noted that even some prominent Congressmen also have joined hands with them and are striving to damage the cause which their leader Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru has advocated.

NEHRU'S OUTSTANDING ROLE

Prime Minister Nehru has played an outstanding role in shaping and guiding India's foreign policy and in building India-China friendship. It is a matter of deep regret, therefore, that on several occasions in recent weeks, he should have permitted himself to take positions and make utterances which cannot be reconciled with his own foreign policy and its guiding principle, the Panch Sheel, on whose basis alone India's relations with the Republic of China can be upheld and carried forward.

One of the fundamental principles of Panch Sheel is the principle of non-interference. Tibet is an integral part of China. Developments in Tibet are, therefore, an internal affair of the Chinese People's Republic. Any tendency to forget this basic fact or minimise the significance cannot but create grave complications giving rise to misunderstanding and weakening the bond of friendship between India and China.

The Central Executive Committee draws the attention of the people to the fact that some unfortunate and incorrect steps on the part of the Government of India are being assiduously exploited by the enemies of India's foreign policy, who would like to see it reversed. It will also be noted that the imperialists are working for a further deterioration of India-China relations and the collapse of the Bandung spirit. No doubt they and their friends will spare no efforts in the coming period to achieve this objective.

The Central Executive Committee fervently hopes that Prime Minister Nehru and all those who have been pursuing and supporting India's policy of peace and friendship among peace-loving nations will firmly oppose these efforts. The Committee is aware that the Government has been subjected to very powerful pressure from certain reactionary quarters which still dream of Tibet as a buffer state under their influence. But the Committee is confident that the supporters of India's foreign policy will know how to overcome this pressure.

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN FRIENDS

The controversy which has arisen between the Government of India and the People's Republic of China has sometimes been marked by sharp words. But the Committee looks upon it as a controversy between friends and is confident that this controversy will be easily resolved by strict adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence as embodied in the historic Panch Sheel.

In his speech in the Lok Sabha on May 8 Mr. Nehru has reiterated India's foreign policy based on Panch Sheel and non-alignment and categorically rejected the suggestion that that policy should be changed. The Central Executive Committee welcomes this declaration as a rebuff to the imperialists and to their allies and to the enemies of India's foreign policy. The Central Executive Committee welcomes the resolution passed at the National People's Congress of China, which re-emphasises friendly relations between the two countries.

The Central Executive Committee appeals to all national and patriotic forces to rise to the occasion and defend India-China friendship and our foreign policy in the interests not only of our two countries but of all Afro-Asian peoples and world peace. Today this has become all the more urgent in view of the US-Pak bilateral military pact and other aggressive machinations which threaten peace and security of our country and indeed of the entire Afro-Asian region.

The Central Executive Committee is confident that the damage done by recent events will be soon repaired and India-China friendship will grow ever stronger, helping the cause of peace in Asia and in the whole world.

Part Eleven

CHINA HITS BACK

As the debate in India on Tibet became more and more animated, China hit back.

Speaker after speaker in the National People's Congress rose to defend the Chinese action in Tibet and to refute Indian arguments. They accused some Indians of "expansionism" in Tibet.

On the Chinese side, the debate was rounded off by a ten-thousand-word editorial in the Peking *People's Daily* written by the editorial department of the paper.

The Manchester Guardian, commenting on this editorial, said: "This is the nearest approach that the *People's Daily* makes to an apology."

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SECOND
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TIBET, 28 APRIL 1959

Congress fully approves all the measures taken by the State Council after the former local government and upper class reactionary clique in Tibet started their rebellion on March 10, 1959. Congress greets the Chinese People's Liberation Army units stationed in Tibet which have quickly put down the rebellion, as well as the Tibetan lamas, laymen of all circles and patriotic people of all social strata who have actively helped the Liberation Army quell the rebellion; and expresses its appreciation of the services rendered by them.

CLASS CHARACTER OF THE REBELLION

The rebellion of the former local government and upper strata reactionary clique in Tibet was not fortuitous. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, when the British imperialists engaged in military, political and economic aggression against the Tibet region of our country with India as their base, an acute, long-term struggle has been waged between the patriotic Tibetan people who oppose aggression and a handful of Tibetan traitors who were bought over and made use of by the aggressive foreign forces. On the eve of the liberation of China, the pro-imperialist elements were dominant in the leading group of the former Tibet local government. After the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951, the Central People's Government, in order to give these pro-imperialist elements time to come to their senses, adopted a magnanimous attitude towards them, let them remain in their posts in the former Tibet local government, and would not look into their past misdeeds so long as they broke with the imperialists and other foreign interventionists and did not engage in disruptive activities. This policy of the Central People's Government was completely correct because it facilitated the Central People's Government and the People's Liberation Army in establishing ties with the broad mass of the Tibetan people and many people of the upper and middle social strata and enabled them to win the latter's confidence. The traitors in the former Tibet local government, however, while feigning compliance with the 17-Article Agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet, continued to conspire

with the imperialists and foreign interventionists, plotted to bring about the so-called "independence of Tibet" as called for by the imperialists and foreign interventionists, and finally launched the armed rebellion. It was only after the rebels attacked the People's Liberation Army units stationed in Lhasa that the Central People's Government directed the People's Liberation Army to put down the rebellion, and ordered the dissolution of the former Tibet local government. In this way, the crimes of these traitors were completely exposed before the Tibetan people of all strata as well as before the people of the whole world. All right is on the side of the Central People's Government and all those who support its policy. All those foreigners who express their "sympathy" with these treacherous and inhuman rebels, who have betrayed and tried to split their motherland and engaged in slaughter and arson, and who attempt to seize this opportunity to interfere in China's internal affairs, will only enable the people of all the nationalities of our country and the people throughout the world to see them in their true colours and to draw the necessary lessons.

REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR TIBET

National regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government should be resolutely implemented in Tibet as in other national minority areas of our country. The former local government and upper strata reactionary clique in Tibet, in making a vain attempt to bring about the so-called "independence of Tibet", were actively opposed to national regional autonomy. Following the dissolution of the former Tibet local government and the failure of the rebellion launched by the upper strata reactionary clique in Tibet, it is now already possible, while enforcing military control by the People's Liberation Army, to set up, step by step, local administrative organs of the Tibetan autonomous region at all levels and build up self-defence forces of the Tibetan people under the leadership of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and for the Preparatory Committee to begin to carry out the functions and exercise the powers of autonomy. Representatives of the broad mass of people and of patriots of all social strata should be invited to participate in the local administrative organs of the Tibetan autonomous region at all levels. All officers and men of the People's Liberation Army units in Tibet and all working personnel of the

Han and other nationalities in Tibet must establish the closest fraternal ties with the Tibetan people, work hard and make heroic endeavours in serving the interests of the Tibetan people.

SOCIAL REFORM IN TIBET

The existing social system in Tibet is an extremely backward system of serfdom. The degree of cruelty which characterised the exploitation, oppression and persecution of the labouring people by the serf-owners can hardly be paralleled in any other part of the world. Even those who have repeatedly expressed "sympathy" for the Tibetan rebels cannot explain why they are so enthusiastic in backing up such a backward system. The Tibetan people for a long time have firmly demanded the reform of their social system. Many open-minded people of the upper and middle social strata have also come to realise that without reform the Tibetan people will never get the chance to enjoy a prosperous life. With the putting down of the rebellion started by the reactionary elements of the former Tibet local government who are opposed to reform, conditions have been provided for the smooth realisation of the desire for reform of the broad mass of the Tibetan people. The Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region should, in accordance with the constitution, the aspirations of the broad mass of the Tibetan people and the social, economic and cultural characteristics of Tibet, carry out democratic reforms in Tibet, step by step, so as to free the Tibetan people from suffering and lay the foundations for the building of a prosperous, socialist new Tibet. In the course of reform, the patriotic people of all strata in Tibet, both lamas and laymen, should be closely united with, and distinctions should be made in dealing with those who were forced to join the rebellion but later surrendered quickly, and those who determinedly joined the rebellion. Attention should be paid to protecting the freedom of religious belief of all the Tibetan people and religious and cultural relics.

RELATIONS WITH INDIA

Tibet is an inalienable part of China. It belongs to the big family of the Chinese people, to the broad mass of the Tibetan people, not to the handful of reactionaries, much less to the imperialists and foreign interventionists. The rebellion of the handful of Tibetan reactionaries and its suppression are wholly internal affairs of

China which do not permit of any interference by foreigners.

It is the firm and unalterable policy of the People's Republic of China to implement national regional autonomy in the Tibet region under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and with the broad masses and patriotic people of all walks of life as the masters, to carry through democratic reforms under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and to build a prosperous, socialist new Tibet by relying on the fraternal unity and mutual assistance of the working people of all nationalities. The rebellion of the handful of Tibetan reactionaries is not only powerless to prevent realisation of this policy but will only accelerate the awakening of the Tibetan people and thus speed up its implementation. Similarly, no intervention by any foreign force, no matter under what pretext or form, can prevent the realisation of this policy of ours in Tibet; on the contrary, it can only rouse the Chinese people of all nationalities, including the Tibetan People, to wage a patriotic struggle against intervention. The People's Republic of China has consistently abided by the Five Principles, coexisting peacefully with its neighbours in the south-west, respecting their sovereignty and territorial integrity and not interfering in their internal affairs.

The National People's Congress notes with regret that certain people in Indian political circles have recently made extremely unfriendly statements and committed extremely unfriendly acts which interfere in China's internal affairs. These statements and acts do not conform to the common interests of the peoples of the two countries, they only conform to the interests of their common enemy, the imperialists. Congress hopes that this abnormal situation will quickly disappear and that through the joint efforts of both sides, the great and long-standing friendly relations between China and India will be further consolidated and developed.

"WE HAD TO RISE AND HIT BACK"

—*The People's Daily*

Between the close of March and 6 May 1959, the Chinese press and broadcasting networks treated Tibet as the main theme of discussion. Most of the comments were devoted to refuting pro-Tibetan opinions expressed in India by the people, by the leaders and in the press. Some Indian political parties and leaders and a number of Indian newspapers were accused of "expansionist ideas" with regard to Tibet. The controversy was rounded off by the lengthy May 6 editorial in the *People's Daily*.

The following extracts are from reports of Chinese comments published in the Indian press.

Commanding Centre of Rebellion

New Delhi, March 28

An official news communique on the revolt in Tibet issued tonight by the Chinese authorities here has named Kalimpong as "the commanding centre of the rebellion".

This statement implies that the Chinese Government will consider as unfriendly any attempt to discuss Tibetan developments in the Indian Parliament.

The reference to Kalimpong as "the centre of the rebellious elements' activities abroad" is not new. The charge has been made previously when the Government of India had said that it would be willing to investigate any particular instances that might be cited. No such instances have been quoted, according to available information.

—*The Times of India*, March 29, 1959

More about Kalimpong

New Delhi, March 31

Kalimpong has again been described as "a centre for collusion with imperialism" against Tibet in a lengthy editorial in the *People's Daily* of Peking dated March 31.

The *People's Daily* editorial refers to the "Tibetan Nationality" being "one with a long standing in China's territory". It goes on: "The Chinese policy towards Tibet was based on unity, equality and the gradual realisation of regional national autonomy and democratic reforms." Despite this, "what the clique of reactionaries

in Tibet worked for is not at all regional autonomy. What they want is the so-called independence of Tibet plotted for many years by the imperialist aggressors. Utilising their position in Kasha, utilising Kalimpong which is in a foreign land as a centre for collusion with imperialism, the Chiang Kai-shek bandits and foreign reactionaries, they actively [... words missing...] rebellious bandits, directed them in committing arson and in plundering, ravaging the people and attacking the garrisons and communication lines of the People's Liberation Army."

—*The Times of India*, April 1, 1959

Dalai under Duress

London, April 2

Peking Radio declared today that the Dalai Lama had taken refuge in India. The broadcast, quoting the *New China News Agency*, said the Dalai Lama had left Tibet "under duress by the rebellious elements".

It added that he and his party "arrived in India on March 31" and that by order of the Government of India police authorities had been sent to meet him.

—*The Times of India*, April 3, 1959

Betrayal of the Motherland

Tokyo, April 14

A Chinese language broadcast said Mr. Chou told his guests at a welcome reception for the Panchen Lama that the Dalai Lama, because of rebel elements, was being held outside the country.

The Panchen Lama, who arrived in Peking today to attend the National People's Congress opening on Friday, claimed that holding the Dalai Lama in duress was a "betrayal of the motherland", Peking Radio said.

—*The Times of India*, April 15, 1959

PSP's Stand Attacked

Tokyo, April 15

China reiterated today that Kalimpong was a base for the Tibetan rebellion.

"It is an open secret that the Tibetan traitors have Kalimpong as their base outside the country to work with imperialist elements and engineer rebellious activities," the *Peking People's Daily*, mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, declared.

The newspaper, which speaks for the Chinese Government, made its new accusation in an article denouncing the Indian Praja Socialist Party for expressing sympathy and concern for the Tibetan rebels. It said that Sino-Indian relations were endangered by statements made by Praja Socialist members in the Indian Parliament.

The *People's Daily* recalled that Mr. Nehru had stated, in denying Kalimpong had been a centre of Tibetan plotting, that he could not guarantee that secret activities of which he was unaware had not taken place.

"It is true", the newspaper said, "that the traitors' activities in Kalimpong are sometimes open and sometimes secret. Our Indian friends may not be aware of it, but this does not warrant the conclusion that we, too, are surely not aware of it."

The newspaper again insisted that the Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa on March 17, had been abducted by hostile tribesmen. Noting that the Dalai Lama had arrived in India, it said, "Those hostile to Sino-Indian friendship are taking advantage of this opportunity to carry out new provocations."

It added it was regrettable that "recently much was said in India which was extremely incompatible with Sino-Indian friendly relations. Some people openly described the suppression of a rebellion by the Chinese people in their own territory of Tibet as interference and aggression against others. It is as if Tibet were not Chinese territory but a part of India."

It said that "no one seems to have come out more outrageously than the Indian Praja Socialist Party" in this respect.

The paper said, "The allegation that putting down the rebellion in Tibet by China will threaten India's security is... groundless."

"It cannot be considered appropriate for any outsider to advocate vociferously this or that on the issue any more than it is appropriate of the Chinese Government in relation to one of India's States or one of India's national minorities."

—*The Times of India*, April 16, 1959

Chou's Olive Branch

Tokyo, April 18

The Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou En-lai, today reaffirmed that the Dalai Lama had been abducted to India by Tibetan rebels and expressed the hope that he would free himself from his captors and return to his sacred throne.

Extending the olive branch to India, Mr. Chou said:

"We are grateful to India and the great and friendly Premier Mr. Nehru for issuing a statement saying that his country will not interfere in China's internal affairs, and that India will strengthen friendly Chinese-Indian relations though the Dalai Lama has been taken there by revolutionary elements."

The Chinese Premier bitterly attacked the Praja Socialist Party for having expressed concern recently over the Tibetan situation.

Mr. Chou said those who had tried to disrupt friendly relations between the two countries had been defeated by Mr. Nehru's statement.

—*The Times of India*, April 19, 1959

Fabrication

Hong Kong, April 21

The Panchen Lama has described the Dalai Lama's Tezpur statement as "a sheer distortion of facts and a complete fabrication", the *New China News Agency* reported yesterday.

Speaking at a Peking banquet on Sunday night, he said the statement, "issued in the name of the Dalai Lama", turned things upside down and was obviously a result of coercion by the reactionaries, and certainly not of his own will.

"As to this, the people of Tibet and I express great wrath and firm opposition", he said.

The *Agency* added that Nagapo Ngawang Jigme, Deputy to the Panchen Lama in the Tibet Preparatory Committee said the statement was put out "under compulsion of the traitors who have abducted the Dalai Lama."

The *News Agency* also issued a commentary by a political reporter which said the "so-called statement" was issued "through an Indian diplomatic official in Tezpur".

—*The Times of India*, April 22, 1959

Dalai's Statement

Peking, April 23

A letter in the official Communist Party newspaper, *People's Daily* today accused "imperialists and some Indian expansionists" of writing the statement issued in the name of the Dalai Lama at Tezpur last Saturday.

It was noted that it was the first time Indians had been directly accused here by name of having a hand in drawing up this document although unidentified "foreigners" have already been blamed for it.

The fact that the letter appeared in the *People's Daily* was also noted as party sanction was obviously necessary to print it.

The letter from Chi-wu said: "When I read the so-called 'Dalai Lama's Statement' published in the *People's Daily*, I was very indignant indeed. This poorly worded statement, full of lies from beginning to end, has assumed the Dalai Lama's name and in fact written by some imperialists and some Indian expansionists."

People's Daily also gave prominence to speeches by deputies at yesterday's session of the National People's Congress [China's Parliament] criticising the attitude of Indian newspapers and politicians to the rebellion.

An article in the *People's Daily* said China was willing to do everything to keep friendly relations with India but it was India who was making the break and China's goodwill was misunderstood.

—*Hindustan Standard* (New Delhi), April 24, 1959

A Warning

Hong Kong, April 23

Deputies at the National People's Congress today again condemned "imperialists and foreign reactionaries in supporting the Tibetan rebellion", the *New China News Agency* reported.

The *Agency* said that deputies from all parts of the country "warned the imperialists and Indian expansionists not to meddle in China's internal affairs".

Sli Fu-din, Chairman of the People's Council of the Sinkiang Ulghur autonomous region, said: "I want to warn the imperialists and those people in our neighbouring country who are trying to meddle in the internal affairs of our motherland that all their evil intrigues against China will be of no avail."

—*Reuter*

Indian Foreign Office Charged

Tokyo, April 23

China's official newspaper, *The People's Daily*, charged today that the Sino-Indian friendship was "being destroyed from the Indian side", because of India's sympathy for the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan uprising.

It also charged the Dalai Lama's statement released at Tezpur was timed deliberately by Indian officials to coincide with a speech made by the Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou En-lai, before the Chinese People's Congress.

The Dalai Lama in his statement had refuted the Chinese contention that he had fled Tibet under duress. Mr. Chou repeated the claim that Tibetans had kidnapped the Dalai Lama.

The People's Daily said: "This statement distributed by Indian Foreign Office officials is a serious matter. It shows that some people with power in India mistakenly believe that this is the time to exert pressure on China by attacking China with the Tibetan independence scheme.

"The expansionists of India should know that the sovereignty of China cannot be violated. Interference in the internal affairs of China will not be tolerated. The people of China are not to be treated lightly."

It accused Indian newspapers and magazines of creating "storms of slander" against China.

—*The Times of India*, April 24, 1959

India's Ambition to Colonise Tibet

Hong Kong, April 23

Simultaneously with the occupation of the strategic points along the Himalayan frontier, Peking opened an unprecedented propaganda attack against India. Both Radio Peking and the *New China News Agency* have, in the last few days, carried on an intensive verbal offensive against India, designed—it would seem from its tone and content—to bring pressure to bear on New Delhi to compel the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet.

The propaganda was further intensified yesterday and today when Radio Peking devoted almost all of its English language broadcasts beamed to South-East Asia to quoting extracts from "speeches" delivered by Tibetan "deputies" to the current session

of the National People's Congress in Peking.

These were speeches replete with invective against "Indian expansionist elements" who were equated with Indian Government officials who are supposed to have collaborated with the Dalai Lama in drafting his statement condemning Chinese atrocities in Tibet.

Peking had hitherto been stating that the Dalai Lama was under duress by Tibetan rebels. But since yesterday, he has been reported by Peking to be just "under duress". Such assertions were coupled today with a news item that a strict security cordon had been thrown around the Dalai Lama's residence in Mussoorie.

The *New China News Agency* said that the statement issued by the Dalai Lama's entourage on Wednesday, which insisted that the Dalai Lama was the author of the April 18 declaration, was read "by Tibetan rebels who abducted the Dalai Lama to India".

"The new statement, striving to deny that the so-called 'statement of the Dalai Lama', issued through an Indian diplomatic official in Tezpur on April 18, was imposed on the Dalai Lama, only served to make the fact even more obvious", the *Agency* said.

The *Agency* said that Mr. P. N. Menon, the Indian Government liaison officer with the Dalai Lama's party, had "let the cat out of the bag" when, "to whitewash for himself", he declared that the Tezpur statement was made by the Dalai Lama and no one else. The *Agency* said Wednesday's declaration did not bear this out.

Deputy Chen Shu-tung, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, said China and India had initiated the five principles of coexistence. But by giving all kinds of support to the Tibetan rebels "the Indian expansionists are putting the friendly relations and the principles of peaceful coexistence in serious jeopardy. This is intolerable to the Chinese people."

Yesterday Mr. Li Chi-shen asked Parliament: "If the rebellion has no connection with Indian expansionists, why are certain Indian political figures so sympathetic to the traitorous crimes of the Tibetan reactionist clique?"

Mr. Li said: "Why has it been possible for Kalimpong for a long time to be the centre of activities of these rebels abroad? Why was it that the so-called statement of the Dalai Lama was distributed by officials of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs." Mr. Li declared that Indian expansionists want to "turn Tibet into their colony or protection".

Peking Radio said Mr. Li was accorded a stormy ovation.

Mr. Li Chi-shen is the Chairman of one of China's non-Communist "democratic" parties called the Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang.

—*The Times of India*, April 24, 1959

India Plotting to Make Tibet a Vassal

Hong Kong, April 25

The Peking newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao*, today published an article accusing Indian "expansionists" of plotting to make Tibet a vassal state of India.

The article—quoted by the *New China News Agency*—said schemes afoot in India could be summarised as seeking a fresh argument which should fully safeguard the autonomy of Tibet; that the relationship between Tibet and China should be the same as that between Bhutan and India; and that the arrangements for the new state of affairs should be made through consultations between Peking, New Delhi and Dalai Lama.

It said the plan in reality is to take Tibet out of Chinese territory and make it a vassal state of India. "This is the current working plan of the Indian expansionists for interfering in China's internal affairs and having a finger in Tibet."

The article quoted the *Delhi Hindustan Standard* as saying that China must understand that it could not very well ask India to relinquish completely its "interest" in Tibet's "autonomy" just because India "respected" China's sovereignty over Tibet.

Ta Kung Pao said there was an ulterior motive behind the "perverted interest" which was disclosed by the General-Secretary of the Indian Praja Socialist Party, Shri Asoka Mehta, when he said that the relationship between India and Tibet was that of mother and child.

Other Indian politicians had also claimed that the Tibetan region of China was a "country" and that the Tibetans were not Chinese.

The article also quoted the Dalai Lama's statement as further evidence revealing the schemes of the "Indian expansionists".

Behind the smokescreen of "autonomy for Tibet", it said, the real motive is of "Tibet's independence".

The article said: "Judging by the recent vociferations of the Indian expansionists, there is reason to believe that some new schemes are now afoot that would endanger the five principles of peaceful coexistence and intervene further in the internal affairs of China."

Other Peking newspapers today front-paged reports of "mass indignation" in the Chinese capital, Shanghai and Tientsin at the "provocations" against China by "Indian expansionists", the Agency said.

—*Hindustan Standard* (New Delhi), April 26, 1959

Indian Official Blamed

Tokyo, April 26

A high Chinese official yesterday charged that "British imperialists and Indian expansionists" instigated the Tibetan rebellion.

The charge was levelled at the second National People's Congress by Mr. Ulanfu, Vice-Premier of Inner Mongolia.

A Chinese newspaper accused Mr. P. N. Menon, of acting "outright as a spokesman for the Tibetan rebels in India".

The *Kwanming Daily* said: "It seems that the mission of this envoy was not to greet the Dalai Lama but act outright as spokesman for the Tibetan rebels in India.

"As a matter of fact he has made more utterances than the Tibetan rebels."

—*The Times of India*, April 27, 1959

Chinese Deputies Warn India

Hong Kong, April 27

Deputies of China's National People's Congress [Parliament], now meeting in Peking, today continued their criticism of "Indian expansionist interference" in China's internal affairs, the *New China News Agency* reported.

One, an international law expert, said: "The backing and encouragement given by certain Indian politicians to the rebellious clique in Tibet and the issuing of the so-called statement which was imposed on the Dalai Lama constitute a barbarous act of interference. . . . The Chinese people who value Sino-Indian friendship cannot keep silent over it."

Mr. Shao Li-tzu, member of the Standing Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, warned India: "You have made wrong calculations. Though they love peace and cherish friendship, over 600 million Chinese people are not at all weak.

"They will never allow foolish hogs to poke their snouts into our beautiful garden."

Another deputy alleged that "so-called independence for Tibet" was a British imperialist plot and another name for colonialism. "Now the Indian expansionists are playing the old tune of the British imperialists", he said. (*—Reuter*)

—The Times of India, April 28, 1959

Panchen Rejects Nehru's Invitation

Peking, April 19

The Panchen Lama said in a speech here today that "under the present circumstances" he saw no necessity to accept Mr. Nehru's invitation to go to India to meet the Dalai Lama.

"If the Indian Prime Minister meant that he hoped I would go to India to enter into talks on the so-called Tibet question, then I must point out that the Tibet question can be solved only in Tibet", he added.

The Panchen Lama was speaking at the closing session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

He said that Mr. Nehru's acknowledgement that the Dalai Lama had admitted the authenticity of his three letters to General Tan Kuan-san, the Chinese Commander in Lhasa, was alone convincing proof that the Dalai Lama was abducted.

[After seeing the Dalai Lama at Mussoorie, Mr. Nehru said, one of the reasons for writing these letters was, he supposed, that the Dalai Lama was passing through a highly troubled time. "On the other hand he was trying to avoid a break with the Chinese and hoping that something might come up, some settlement might come. The situation was worsening, so he was distracted, and there were pulls in different directions."]

It was said, the Panchen Lama added, that the intention of Mr. Nehru's invitation was to let him confirm that the Dalai Lama was not being held under duress.

The Panchen Lama, whose speech in the presence of Mr. Chou

En-lai was met by thunderous applause from members of the CPPCC, said his recent speech before the Congress had evoked hatred and revilement from certain Indian newspapers and journals.

"When the internal affairs of my motherland are being interfered with by foreigners, it is not only absolutely just for me but is also my duty to give solemn warning in the interests of upholding the unity of the motherland and in the interests of the friendship between India and China", he said.

The *New China News Agency* quoted the Panchen Lama as saying about his visit to India:

"During the visit, some Indian officials often showed a certain discrimination against me in arranging receptions. My entourage had to sleep on the train sometimes because they were not provided with housing.

"The Indian people, of course, did not know about this. I thought this might not be the arrangements made by the Indian Government, but this could not but make an impression on me."

The Panchen Lama also stated: "Mr. Nehru said that India's interest in Tibet was 'historical; sentimental and religious and not essentially political'. This statement cannot explain the recent words and deeds of certain political figures in India in intervening in our internal affairs."

"The people of the whole world clearly know that Kalimpong has, in the past few years, become a centre of intrigue and manoeuvres against the People's Republic of China by imperialists, Kuomintang bandits and rebellious elements of Tibet."

The *New China News Agency* also reported the Panchen Lama as saying that Buddhism once was popular in India, and there were many sacred Buddhist spots in that country, but during his visit to India in 1956, he saw for himself that the famous stupa at Sarnath (where the Buddha first preached) and quite a number of other monasteries were in a poor state.

"We are aware that there are now few followers of Buddhism in India", the Panchen Lama added, "but is it not strange those people who care so little for Buddhism in their own country yet talk so much about their concern for Tibetan Buddhism and culture?" (*—Reuter*)

—*The Statesman*, April 30, 1959;
Hindustan Standard (New Delhi), April 25, 1959

Legacy of British Imperialism

Tokyo, May 3

China continued today to hurl charges at what it said were "Indian expansionists", who had "instigated" rebellion in Tibet and had "openly shouted their support" of the rebels.

Peking Radio quoting Mr. Hu Yao-pang, First Secretary of the Communist Youth League of China's Central Committee, said: "This kind of wild clamouring was continuing up to the present moment."

Peking Radio said, Mr. Hu declared that "Indian expansionists were never in sympathy with the people of Tibet and not even in real sympathy with the Tibetan upper strata reactionaries."

"Their real interest", he charged, "was to attempt to use them as tools in territorial expansion aiming at splitting Tibet from the great motherland, recovering their privileges in Tibet and finally turning Tibet into their vassal."

Reuter adds: Mr. Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, today sharply condemned "Indian expansionists" for carrying on "the legacy of British imperialists of openly intervening in China's domestic affairs."

—*The Times of India*, May 4, 1959

Nehru Twisting Facts

Hong Kong, May 4

The *New China News Agency* yesterday quoted a number of letters written to the press saying Mr. Nehru was "turning the facts upside down" when he described as a tragedy "the suppression of a handful of Tibetan upper strata reactionaries".

The letters, published in the official Communist Party newspaper, *The People's Daily*, and the *Youth Daily*, followed the publication in full here of Mr. Nehru's statement accusing the Chinese of using "cold war language regardless of truth" against India over Tibet.

A group of Tibetan students had written that they would never allow "a handful of brutal and rabid traitors to be confused with the Tibetan people".

A demobilised Chinese armyman of Tibetan nationality had pointed out that any attempt to use the flag of nationalism to sow discord between the Tibetan people and the Central People's Government would certainly fail.

The *Agency* said a 30,000 strong rally in Peking today heard speakers condemn "Indian expansionists", for supporting the Tibetan rebels. (—*Reuter*)

—*The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), May 5, 1959

THE REVOLUTION IN TIBET AND NEHRU'S PHILOSOPHY

By the Editorial Department of
The People's Daily, 6 May 1959

The war of rebellion unleashed by the handful of traitors in Tibet has in the main been quelled. With the ignominious defeat of the rebels, the sanguinary conflict they created has ended over the overwhelming portion of Tibet. Now Tibet faces a peaceful revolution, that is, the democratic reforms in Tibet referred to in the resolution of the National People's Congress and which the broad masses of people in Tibet have long expected and urgently demanded. This is a revolution—the continuation in Tibet of the great people's revolution which swept the Chinese mainland around 1949. Because of obstruction by the former Tibet Local Government this revolution has been delayed in Tibet during the past eight years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet. The revolution to be carried out immediately after the putting down of the rebellion will be a peaceful one, that is to say, a revolution without bloodshed. The Tibetan people will pursue a policy of redemption toward those of the upper classes in Tibet who have not taken part in the rebellion—almost the same policy adopted in the Han areas towards the national bourgeoisie. Ample conditions exist for the Tibetan people to do so, because they are backed up by China's hundreds of millions of people, who have already completed democratic reforms and the socialist transformation.

"AN EXCELLENT THING"

At present, public opinion in many countries of the world is talking quite a lot about the question of Tibet. This is an excellent thing. The more than one million people living on the roof of the world, to whom no serious attention has ever been paid before, have every right to enjoy the honour of holding the attention of the whole world, and to be enlightened and steeled in the course of worldwide discussions. Some foreigners say that the rebellion of the handful of reactionaries in Tibet is a "revolution", a "nationalist", "anti-aggressive", "anti-colonialist" and "anti-imperialist" "revolution" and that these reactionaries are entitled to "full" and "inviolable" autonomy or "independence". On the other hand,

they describe the putting down of the rebellion by the People's Liberation Army with the active support of the Tibetan people as "armed intervention", "aggression", "colonialism" and "imperialism", an action of "Hitler". Talking like this are the western imperialists and the reactionaries of various countries, like Nobusuke Kishi, Syngman Rhee, Sarit Thanarat, Ngo Dinh Diem and Chiang Kai-shek in Asia (nevertheless Chiang Kai-shek does not favour independence for Tibet, but demands that Tibet belong to Taiwan). There are certain sections of the bourgeoisie in some capitalist countries, whose political attitude in general is different from that of the above-mentioned people, but who line up with imperialism on this question. Certain bourgeois elements in India are such an example. All these people are a minority in the world as well as in their own countries. But they control considerable propaganda machines and appear to be kicking up quite a big fuss for the time being. A greater number of people in the world say that the rebellion in Tibet is reactionary and that putting down the rebellion is a just action. The people of the socialist countries unanimously support the Chinese people's struggle against the rebels. Even in the capitalist world, the majority are on the side of the Chinese people. They include the working people of all lands, people who stand for justice and progress, and those national bourgeois who are fighting foreign aggression and foreign intervention. These national bourgeois understand that approving foreign interference in Tibet would mean approving foreign interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia, Ceylon, Cambodia, Nepal, Iraq, Cuba and many other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, or approving encroachment on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these countries. However, in some capitalist countries, this voice of righteousness for the time being does not sound so loud as the noisy clamour of the anti-Chinese propaganda machines. Some people feel sorry: here we have the fine People's Republic of China; here we have the fine Sino-Indian friendship; would it not be better if there had been no rebellion in Tibet! These people are well-intentioned, but they fail to see that as the rebellion in Tibet broke out and was rapidly stamped out, a bad thing has been turned to good account. The revolution in Tibet has been accelerated by this rebellion and with the democratisation of Tibet the history of foreign intervention in Tibet will finally come to an end. This is absolutely necessary for the true consolidation of Sino-Indian friendship. In short,

not only the people of Tibet and of China as a whole should carefully examine and draw lessons from these different opinions but the people of many capitalist countries, particularly those capitalist countries where there has been much ballyhoo on the Tibet question will also examine them and draw the lessons they need.

MR. NEHRU'S SPEECH QUOTED

Here we would like to talk about the statement made by Mr. Nehru in the Indian Lok Sabha on April 27. (*The Editorial Department's note: Since writing this commentary, we have read Prime Minister Nehru's May 4 speech in the Indian House of the States. The principal points contained in that speech did not go beyond the scope of his April 27 speech. Therefore, we have made no revisions or additions.*) This was the seventh time since March 17 up to the end of April that Mr. Nehru had spoken on the question of Tibet in the Parliament. Mr. Nehru has on many occasions expressed his sympathy with the so-called "aspirations of the Tibetans for autonomy" and his opposition to what he called "armed intervention" by China. His statement of April 27 is somewhat more systematic. And its full text appeared in our paper on April 30. For the convenience of our readers, we here again quote certain passages from this statement which, to a very large extent, can be taken as a summing up of his views on the rebellion in Tibet and on India's role:

The circumstances were undoubtedly difficult. On the one side there was a dynamic, rapidly moving society; on the other, a static, unchanging society fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reform. The distance between the two was great and there appeared to be hardly any meeting point. Meanwhile change in some forms inevitably came to Tibet. Communications developed rapidly and the long isolation of Tibet was partly broken through. Though physical barriers were progressively removed, mental and emotional barriers increased. Apparently, the attempt to cross these mental and emotional barriers was either not made or did not succeed.

To say that a number of "upper strata reactionaries" in Tibet were solely responsible for this appears to be an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation. Even according to the accounts received through Chinese sources, the revolt in Tibet was of considerable magnitude and the basis of it must have been a strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only the upper class people but others also. No doubt, vested interests joined it and sought to profit by it. The attempt to explain a situation by the use of rather worn-out words, phrases and slogans, is seldom helpful.

When the news of these unhappy developments came to India, there was immediately a strong and widespread reaction. The Government did not bring about this reaction. Nor was this reaction essentially political. It was

largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons. Also on a certain feeling of kinship with the Tibetan people derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts. It was an instinctive reaction. It is true that some people in India sought to profit by it by turning it in an undesirable direction. But the fact of that reaction of the Indian people was there. If that was the reaction here, one may well imagine the reaction among the Tibetans themselves. Probably this reaction is shared in other Buddhist countries of Asia. When there are such strong feelings, which are essentially not political, they cannot be dealt with by political methods alone, much less by military methods. We have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China; but at the same time we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their hapless plight. We hope still that the authorities of China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly cooperation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region. Above all, we hope that the present fighting and killing will cease.

THE BEGINNING OF OUR DISCUSSION

Nehru did not explain what kind of society in Tibet he referred to as a "static, unchanging society fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reform". But this is precisely the starting point of the whole question. Our discussion must and can only begin here.

Tibetan society is a serf society based on manorial estates. In Tibet, the main means of production—all the land and most of the cattle belong to three kinds of feudal estate holders or serf-owners, namely the officialdom (the feudal government), the monasteries and the nobles. These three kinds of serf-owners only account for approximately five per cent of the population, that is, about 60,000 of the 1,200,000 population of Tibet. All the peasants and most of the herdsmen have no land or cattle of their own, and can only toil for the serf-owners. Together with their children, they have for generation after generation belonged to different serf-owners. A part of the estate of the serf-owners is especially for service to the feudal government. The serfs that are assigned to cultivate such land have to do various kinds of corvee without pay for the feudal government. Military service is also borne by some of the serfs on such land. The rest of the estates are the so-called "self-managed land" of the serf-owner. On this kind of manorial land, the serfs have to cultivate all the land for the estate owners with their own draught-animals and farm implements (sometimes also having to bring their own food), while the lords only allot a small piece of inferior land (about three-tenths of the land of the lords) to the serfs

as payment. The serfs spend the great bulk of their time every year working on the land of the serf-owners, and also have to do all kinds of unpaid corvée for them. On the above-said two kinds of estates, more than 70 per cent of the income obtained from the toil of the serfs goes into the pockets of the serf-owners through exploitation. It is generally difficult for the serfs to live on their incomes and, therefore, they are forced to borrow on usurious terms from the serf-owners. A great many serfs are unable to repay the debts they have incurred, and there are even some debts hundreds of years old. The serfs not only have no political rights, they do not even have ordinary freedom of movement. They must get permission from the lord of the manor for even a short term of absence. The nobility in Tibet is hereditary. At present there are two or three hundred noble families in Tibet. Their positions vary according to the amount of their property. The big nobility make up around one-tenth of this number, or some twenty-odd families; they each own dozens of manorial estates and thousands of serfs. In the feudal government of Tibet, the power has always been in the hands of these big nobles. The distinctions of rank between serf-owners and serfs are extremely rigorous. On seeing nobles, the serfs have to avoid them or bow down and put out their tongues as an expression of awe. They have to follow a definite pattern of conversation with no slips. The nobles can use torture at will on serfs who run away and are recaptured or who are considered to have otherwise violated the law. Besides the commonest form, flogging, there are even such frightfully cruel tortures as gouging out the eyes, cutting off the nose and the hands, hamstringing and chopping off the knee caps.

REACTIONARY SOCIAL SYSTEM IN TIBET

Monasteries occupy an important place in Tibet's social life. The proper religious activities of the monasteries and the people's freedom of religious belief must at all times be protected and respected. But up to the present all rulers of the monasteries in Tibet are at the same time serf-owners. The exploitation of the serfs by the monasteries through usury and trade is even harsher than that by the officialdom or the nobles. The monasteries have an additional kind of exploitation of the serfs carried out under the name of religion. Distinctions of rank in the monasteries are also strict. The poor lamas that come from serf families and the small lamas

are also exploited in the monasteries. The monasteries also have various instruments of torture and prisons. They can punish the serfs and the lower ranking lamas at will. The cruelty of such punishment is not different from that imposed by other serf-owners.

Roughly speaking, the nobles and the monasteries each hold around 30 per cent of all the land in Tibet. The other approximately 40 per cent belongs to the feudal government.

It is natural that, based on such a reactionary, dark, cruel and barbarous serf system, the political and religious hub in Tibet was a tiny collection of the biggest serf-owners. All kinds of shocking corruption and internal strife inevitably arise among these biggest serf-owners. Countless cases of murder and poisoning have occurred among part of the high-ranking power-wielding officials surrounding the Dalai Lama, in their fight for power and gain. The Dalai Lama is by no means highly respected unconditionally by these people, as Nehru says. Quite to the contrary, they often make the Dalai Lama their puppet, impose their opinions on him and even do him to death when they deem it necessary. For example, it is well known that the 11th Dalai Lama met with sudden death in the Potala Palace in 1855 when he was only 18 years old. After that, in 1875, the 12th Dalai Lama also died a sudden death in the Potala Palace at the age of 20. After the British imperialists' invasion of Tibet, the upper strata reactionary rulers in Tibet resorted to even baser and crueller methods of squeezing out those not in their own gang. In 1923, the 9th Panchen was forced to flee Tibet to the interior of the country for the rest of his life. In 1947, the Rabchen Hutuktu, regent for the Dalai Lama for eight years, was arrested and strangled to death in prison. In the same year, the father of the present 14th Dalai Lama now in Mussoorie, because of his patriotic ideas, was poisoned by reactionaries who had connections with foreign countries, in order to facilitate their control over the Dalai Lama. In 1950, Living Buddha Geda who worked for the peaceful liberation of Tibet was poisoned in Chamdo and his body was burned in order to destroy the evidence. All these notorious crimes were committed by stooges of foreign interventionists within the Tibetan ruling clique.

This society has indeed been static in the past. Not only was the economy depressed and the culture backward, but even the population was unable to increase. However, the system of this society was not in the least "moderate" or "humane". It is a

thoroughly backward, reactionary, cruel and barbarous system.

FOR WHOM IS YOUR SYMPATHY?

May we ask all those vociferous self-styled sympathisers of the Tibetan people, just who are the "Tibetan people" you sympathise with? Whose autonomy or independence is the autonomy or "independence" of Tibet you propagandise? Whose defeat is the defeat of the rebellion in Tibet which you weep and mourn over? It seems that many of the so-called "sympathisers" are only usurping the name of the Tibetan people, the name of Tibetan autonomy and the name of humanitarianism. It is not the Tibetan people they sympathise with, but those who for generations oppressed, exploited and slaughtered the Tibetan people, those chiefs of the cannibalistic system in Tibet. When the big serf-owners in Tibet gouge out the eyes and hearts of the serfs, these specialists in sympathy did not feel it a tragedy and did not demand of these serf-owners moderation and humanitarianism. When these big serf-owners launched armed attacks on the People's Liberation Army stationed on the soil of their own country, when they used savage methods to slaughter captured PLA fighters and People's Government personnel, these sympathisers only cried "bravo", and blustered that these serf-owners could carry on a one-hundred-year guerrilla war; they did not demand of them moderation and humanitarianism. Only when the People's Liberation Army went over from the defensive to the offensive against those wolves who persisted in rebellion, that is to say, only when this cruelest and most savage serfdom in the world finally met with crisis as a result of the defeat of the rebellion of the armed bandits, only then did all the cries of tragedy, sympathy, humanitarianism, autonomy and independence flood forth like a torrent bursting through sluice gates. From this it can be seen that except for some who have misunderstood, those who uttered such cries are precisely the defenders of the most reactionary serfdom and the most barbarous big serf-owners, precisely the enemies of the freedom and liberation of the Tibetan people. And it is precisely for this reason that this counter-revolutionary "holy alliance" of the Metternich type has bound together the US State Department, British colonialists, Syngman Rhee of South Korea, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, Chiang Kai-shek of China and India's reactionary parties—the Praja Socialist Party and the Jan Sangh Party. There is nothing strange about all this.

NEHRU, A FRIEND OF CHINA

What surprises us is that the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Nehru, on the one hand, obviously has major contradictions with many disreputable characters in that alliance and understands that their plots and tricks are detrimental to India, to Sino-Indian friendship, and to Nehru himself; on the other hand, he has involuntarily been pushed by that alliance into an important role in their so-called sympathy-with-Tibet movement, enabling them to look on with glee like someone watching tigers fight from a hill-top. We feel much distressed at being forced now to argue with Mr. Nehru in our comment. Mr. Nehru, the respected Prime Minister of our friendly neighbour—India, is one of the statesmen who enjoy prestige in the world. In particular, we cannot forget that he is a friend to China and an opponent to the imperialist policy of war and aggression. Furthermore, he has also made a number of enlightened statements on social progress. For instance, in his “autobiography” written in prison between 1934 and 1935, although he showed many misconceptions and prejudices towards communism (he admits himself to be “a typical bourgeois”, “with all the prejudices” fostered in bourgeois surroundings) he admitted, nevertheless, that owing to the application of scientific methods to past history and current events, “the most revealing and keen analysis of the changes that are taking place in the world today come from Marxist writers”. He also wrote: “Economic interests shape the political views of groups and classes. Neither reason nor moral considerations override these interests. Individuals may be converted, they may surrender their special privileges, although this is rare enough, but classes and groups do not do so. The attempt to convert a governing and privileged class into forsaking power and giving up its unjust privileges has therefore always so far failed, and there seems to be no reason whatever to hold that it will succeed in the future.” Nehru put it quite right here. But what a different tune he was piping in his statement on April 27, 1959! Either he has completely cast away the views he once expressed, or else he really did not understand the scientific Marxist methods which he had thought he understood. Now he blames us for not having been able to convert the privileged ruling class in Tibet into forsaking power and giving up its privileges, and tries to write off at one stroke the class analysis of Tibetan society as “worn-out words, phrases and slogans”. Moreover, he

described the two extremely antagonistic classes of serfs and serf-owners as a single society "fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reform". Of course, we find it impossible to agree with this attempt of Nehru's. The class antagonism in Tibetan society is a living fact. It is by no means a matter of words, phrases or slogans, to say nothing of being worn-out. Reforms naturally call for action, and they should naturally be in the interests of the overwhelming majority who demand reforms and detrimental only to the tiny minority who stubbornly oppose reforms. As the situation stands in Tibet, reforms should benefit first of all the 1,140,000 people who account for 95 per cent of the population. As for the 60,000 who make up the other five per cent of the population, the situation with them also varies. Only a tiny minority of them resolutely oppose reform, to the extent of launching a rebellion and refusing to the last to repent. As we have said the majority of the 20,000 or so rebels are coerced or hoodwinked members of the labouring people, as is the case with all counter-revolutionary armies. If the Khampas who account for about one-third of the rebels are subtracted, the Tibetans who took part in the rebellion were only a little over one per cent of the 1,200,000 population of Tibet. To think that the entire upper class in Tibet rebelled is not correct. Furthermore, among these 60,000 there is quite a section of enlightened persons who approve of reforms. Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate among the members of the upper class too, and to give them appropriate treatment accordingly; we have always adhered to this policy. To say that all those in the varying circumstances we mentioned above have the same fear of reform and the same mental and emotional barriers to reform does not accord with the facts. As for the overwhelming majority who demand reforms, why should they be fearful of reforms and have mental and emotional barriers?

NEHRU'S "DEPLORABLE ERROR"

In discussing Tibetan society, although Nehru does not oppose reforms and does not deny the part vested interest played in the rebellion, still on the whole he not only fails to touch on its extremely cruel system of exploitation, but virtually lumps together the vast majority of the exploited with the tiny minority of the exploiters. On this basis, he denies that a handful of upper strata reactionaries are responsible for the rebellion in Tibet, describes the just action

of the Chinese people in putting down the rebellion as a "tragedy" and expresses sympathy for the rebellion. Thus, he commits a most deplorable error. As friends of India and as the people whose affairs Nehru is discussing, we deem it necessary to point out this error. If one agrees with Nehru's logic, not only the revolution in Tibet, but the whole Chinese revolution would be impermissible. It will be recalled that before liberation the area of China inhabited by the Han nationality had basically not emerged from the orbit of feudal society, although it was not serfdom. It, too, had always been called a static, unchanging, isolated society. Some people also sneered at us for proceeding from a worn-out, outdated, and extremely simplified imported ideology—Marxism-Leninism, which was said to be entirely unsuited to specific Chinese conditions. They asserted that our reform movement would meet with resistance from the entire society, the whole nation. They even declared that we split the nation, betrayed the motherland, and that we were agents of so-called "red imperialism" acting on orders from Moscow, and so on and so forth. Now, history has rendered its verdict: it is we who are right, not they. All the attacks and slanders against the Communists have gone completely bankrupt. Under the leadership of the proletariat, China, once static and unchanging, has all of a sudden become a China full of vitality and moving swiftly forward—a proof that Marxist-Leninist analysis is applicable anywhere on earth. The static state of the past was merely due to the fact that the development of the forces of production was shackled by the backward relations of production. Marxists-Leninists and Communists truly represent the interests of the nation and the motherland, while the handful of anti-Communist elements who claimed to represent the interests of the whole nation proved indeed to be agents of imperialism, although they temporarily hoodwinked a section of the masses. We believe that Prime Minister Nehru is not likely to oppose this conclusion from Chinese history. But according to Nehru's logic on the Tibet question, if his sympathy is not simply confined to the "Tibetan people" but is extended to the whole of the "Chinese people", then the whole Chinese revolution would become a many times more distressing and unprecedentedly great "tragedy". During the period of the Chinese people's liberation war, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and the Kuomintang troops greatly outnumbered the 20,000 Tibetan rebel bandits, there were many more "reasons" to say they were not merely "upper

strata reactionaries", and the war was on a much bigger scale. In a word, it should have warranted much stronger "sympathy". Yet, so far as we know, when Prime Minister Nehru sympathised with the whole of China he did not sympathise with the "big serf-owners" of the Han people; nevertheless, when he sympathises with Tibet which is a part of China, his sympathy goes to the "little Chiang Kai-sheks" in Tibet. How is this most glaring contradiction to be accounted for?

THE TIBETANS AND THE HANS

Perhaps Mr. Nehru will say that we are not doing him justice, because what he said was limited to Tibet and the Tibetans are different from the Hans. This is to say, the Han people, in leading the revolution among the Tibetan people, would inevitably meet with national barriers. The Tibetans are different from the Hans. That's perfectly true. And that is not all: the Mongolians, the Uighurs, the Chuangs, the Huis, the Miaos, the Koreans and many other minority nationalities of China are all different from the Hans. The Chinese Communists and the Chinese Government face the question of minority nationalities in the country. We have approached this question with extreme caution. For nearly ten years we have trained up indigenous cadres among the various national minorities, and have seriously carried out education against Han chauvinism among the Han people, especially among the Han cadres, the Han members of the Communist Party and the Han officers and men of the People's Liberation Army. We adopted a method unprecedented in the capitalist world: we persuaded the Han people in multi-national areas where they were in the majority to establish minority nationality autonomous regions. The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the Kwangsi Chuang National Autonomous Region, the Ningsia Hui National Autonomous Region and the autonomous *chou* and autonomous counties were established in this way. In Tibet, we displayed especially great patience in order to win the cooperation of Tibetan upper strata elements. For eight long years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet we maintained intact the former Tibet Local Government, its complete system, its army and even its currency and persuaded the people of Tibet not to carry out for the time being the reforms they urgently demand. If the Central People's Government had not given the former Tibet Local Government any right of autonomy

as alleged in the so-called statement of the Dalai Lama, then those reactionaries, whose treason had been established, would have been arrested and punished long ago and the democratic reforms in Tibet would not have been put off up to the present. The Central People's Government adopted an attitude of extreme magnanimity towards the reactionaries. Even after the outbreak of the rebellion in Lhasa, and after learning that the Dalai Lama had been abducted from Lhasa, the troops of the Tibet Military Area Command of the People's Liberation Army did not start the counter-attack until seven hours after the rebel bandits had launched a direct armed attack on the Military Area Command Headquarters. Quite clearly, by then the reactionaries had blocked all roads to peaceful settlement, and the only possible recourse left open was resolutely to launch a punitive expedition and put down the rebellion. Since the People's Liberation Army had the strength quickly to put down the rebellion in the Lhasa area, if it had chosen to make the first move, it could certainly have surrounded the Norbu Lingka in good time and prevented the rebel bandits from abducting the Dalai Lama. Any sensible person need only think for a moment and he will understand this, and will pay no attention to the fairy tales about two or three mortar shells fired in the direction of the palace and falling in a nearby pond. The policy adhered to by the Central People's Government and the People's Liberation Army from beginning to end not to fire the first shot in the face of such a serious situation precisely shows that the Communists have always dealt very carefully with the question of nationalities, and in particular have exerted the maximum efforts to win over the upper strata elements in Tibet. Such a policy can only be carried out in earnest by the revolutionary proletariat. The bourgeoisie or other exploiting classes could never carry it out, even if they wanted to.

THE MEANING OF NATIONAL, REGIONAL AUTONOMY

Here, in the relations between nationalities, the fundamental key point is still the method of class analysis. Mr. Nehru hopes that we "will win them to friendly cooperation". No doubt this is a good idea, though it was meant by Mr. Nehru as an indirect charge that we have not done so and are not doing so. In point of fact, only the revolutionary proletariat can find a thorough and correct solution to historical national problems. Disputes and barriers between nationalities are in the main created by the exploiting

classes and can never be eliminated by them. But under the correct leadership of the revolutionary proletariat, it is entirely possible for the working people of different nationalities to eliminate, through certain efforts, all the disputes and barriers left over from history and enter into a cordial, fraternal friendship. Chinese history has witnessed long-standing national oppression and national strife. Mongolian and Manchurian rulers once oppressed the Hans, Uighurs and Tibetans; Han rulers, too, have oppressed the Mongols, Manchus, Uighurs and Tibetans. This state of affairs has been radically changed since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic led by the proletariat. The Hans, who form the overwhelming majority of the population and the main revolutionary force, now still have to send personnel to Inner Mongolia, to Sinkiang and to Tibet, they no longer go there to oppress and exploit the national minorities there, but rather, together with the revolutionary cadres of the local nationalities, to help the working people there to win freedom and liberation from the oppressors and exploiters of their own nationalities and to achieve democracy and socialism, that is, to lay the foundation for the flourishing economy and culture of the national minorities. The Communist personnel of the Han nationality who work in those areas, including the Han officers and men of the People's Liberation Army, do not ride on the backs of the people of the national minorities there and lord it over them; on the contrary, they go there to work, together with the revolutionary cadres of the local nationalities, as the servants of the people of the national minorities. They share the weals and woes of the labouring people of the national minorities and fight for their rights and happiness in disregard of difficulties and perils. Thus, the working people of the national minorities and those upper and middle strata elements of the national minorities who are patriotic and favour reforms, have united with the working people of the Han nationality and overthrown, as the Han people did, the reactionary rule of the upper strata reactionaries of their own nationalities. Thus, the sources of national disputes and barriers disappeared and friendly cooperation among different nationalities was placed on a really solid foundation. This is the process which has been carried out in Inner Mongolia, in Sinkiang, in Ninghsia, Kansu and Chinghai of the Northwest and in Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan and Kwangsi of the Southwest. In the course of this process, the personnel who lead the reforms make every effort to unite with

people of various strata among the national minorities who approve of reforms, and maintain close cooperation with them before, during and after the reforms. True, it would be impossible not to have struggles and armed rebellion occurred in the Tibetan-inhabited areas in Szechwan, Kansu and Chinghai. But, as we have pointed out elsewhere, the rebellions in these Tibetan-inhabited areas were directed and instigated precisely by the reactionaries in Tibet, taking advantage of their special position.

WHY THE REBELLION COULD BE LAUNCHED

In Tibet, where the rule of the big serf-owners had not been changed in the course of the peaceful liberation, it was still possible for them to utilise their legal position to direct the old Tibetan army and the Khampa rebels and other reactionary political organs which defended the system of serfdom and continue to collude with foreign interventionists. It is for this reason that reforms have not been carried out there and it was even possible to launch this rebellion. But in spite of all this, the Tibetan people have time and again eagerly demanded reforms since the entry of the People's Liberation Army troops into Tibet. The long-suffering Tibetan people were not afraid of reforms; they were fearful lest the Central People's Government delay reforms year after year by being too accommodating to the big serf-owners of Tibet. Messrs. humanitarians of the world should know that the serfs in Tibet are also human beings. It is impossible to make them believe that the monsters who brutally exploit them, flog them and gouge out their eyes are their protectors. Nor is it possible to make them believe that the People's Liberation Army men who warm-heartedly and amiably help them in their labours and treat their diseases, who do not take from them so much as a needle or a piece of thread are their enemies. There lies the fundamental reason why the rebellion was entirely without support from the Tibetan people and was utterly routed in the twinkling of an eye, in spite of the national and religious sign-boards held up by the rebels, the difficult terrain with high mountains and precipitous valleys and the many different kinds of foreign aid they got. In putting down the rebellion, the People's Liberation Army confiscated the official seals of the feudal government, the arms of the rebel bandits and the court whips—serf-owners' instruments of torture. The Tibetan people everywhere greeted this with the joy of hailing rain after a long

drought. How they have suffered under the oppression of these three things! They volunteered to serve as guides for the People's Liberation Army troops, and of their own accord supplied them with information about the bandits, and helped them to round up remnant rebels and arms. The People's Court in Lhasa alone has received hundreds of rifles taken up by the people. In many villages of the Loka area, the people gathered together as soon as they learned that the People's Liberation Army men were coming, to present them with *hata* (ceremonial scarves), to bring them crimson peach blossoms and fresh willow wands and at the same time pouring out to them bitter tales of rape, plunder, murder and arson by the rebel bandits and enjoining the People's Liberation Army to avenge them. At Kung Ke-Tsong, the rebels had dug four ditches across the highway in an attempt to prevent the advance of the People's Liberation Army. But as soon as the rebels were gone, the local inhabitants filled the ditches up. When the PLA troops arrived at Lintze, the local inhabitants immediately organised a pack animal caravan of their own accord to help them carry ammunition and rations and move on with them as they mopped up the remnant bandits. Such moving stories are inexhaustible. When the rebellion was put down, the broad masses of people very quickly assisted the People's Government to restore order and, with the assistance of the People's Government, quickly went back to production. Spring ploughing in the Loka area, though delayed for half a month by the harassment of the rebel bandits, was finished with the assistance of the PLA troops without delaying the sowing. Large numbers of people there are now taking manure to the fields, sowing and repairing irrigation canals and ditches. They are singing long-forgotten songs of joy. The peasants are everywhere asking when the land will be distributed. After it was announced that whoevers could reap the crop this year on the land formerly belonging to the chief rebels, the serfs of the big serf-owner Surkong Wongching-Galei, one of the chief culprits in abducting the Dalai Lama, at Kaishuhsika immediately of their own accord organised the labour power into labour mutual-aid teams to cultivate all the land jointly to strive for a bumper harvest. It is very clear that the Tibetan peasants are confident that the day is fast approaching when they will stand on their feet and be their own masters on Tibetan soil. Excuse us for being so lengthy here. . . . However, let all well-intentioned people who care about

Tibet see for themselves how different all this is from the picture that met the old-type Chinese armies that entered Tibet from the Ching dynasty on! What a sharp contrast it presents to the picture met with by the British aggressive forces storming Lhasa from India! Therefore, how can one depict the just action of the People's Liberation Army, together with the Tibetan people, in suppression of the rebel bandits who committed murder, arson and all other manner of evil as national oppression and national aggression?

Mr. Nehru asserts that there appeared to be hardly any meeting point between the Han and Tibetan societies and that the attempt to break down the mutual mental and emotional barriers was either not made or did not succeed. So far as the Tibetan working people are concerned, this question has been answered by the facts and will be answered in greater quantity and more vividly in the future. Even for the upper strata people in Tibet, the mental and emotional barriers have undergone varying degrees of change for many of them. The three letters to General Tan Kuan-san written by the Dalai Lama secretly and entirely on his own volition when he was held under duress and the speeches of Panchen Erdeni, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, Shirob Jaltso, Ngawang Jaltso and Lozong Tsewang at the National People's Congress furnished a part of the obvious evidence in this respect. Standing on the side of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region are many patriotic members of the upper and middle social strata in Tibet. It can thus be seen that there is no ground to call the rebellion a national "revolution" and to describe the putting down of the rebellion as a national "tragedy". Lhasa middle and primary school pupils, a large number of whom are children of upper class families, went back to class as soon as the rebellion was quelled, and their number now is much greater than before the rebellion.

"FACTS SPEAK LOUDER THAN ELOQUENCE"

It is possible that some Indian friends who bear China no ill-will misunderstood, for a time, China's position and policy, owing to the long-time influence of biased propaganda, and to the fact that they have not seen the true conditions of life in Tibetan society and the activities of the People's Liberation Army first-hand, while their newspapers rarely publish full Chinese data. However, facts speak louder than eloquence and the truth will prevail in the end. We are fully confident that those Indian friends who labour

under misapprehensions for the time being and who still hesitate to believe us will ultimately arrive at an objective conclusion. We hope that Mr. Nehru will be among them. Of course, Mr. Nehru has great confidence in himself, and he has his own set of independent views on the question of Tibet. He is inclined to assume that the powerful group in the former Local Government of Tibet are a flock of milk-white lambs. So even after they had attacked us, he still held that we were to blame. We cannot demand that our foreign friends see the scene the way we do, much less can we demand that Mr. Nehru change his philosophical, historical and political viewpoints. Obviously, there exist contradictions in Mr. Nehru's thinking. But we do not propose to discuss how these contradictions are to be resolved. On such matters, we could engage in a friendly debate, or we need not debate at all. Both our households have plenty to do. We are busy enough minding our own business, and why should either of us poke his nose into the other's business? When Mr. Nehru was in Peking, he said with good reason: "Any attempt to impose the will of one nation on another or the ways of life of one people on another must necessarily produce conflict and endanger peace." However, the point now is that a group of Indians, unfortunately including Mr. Nehru, insist that we do things according to their opinions. We are very good friends and neighbours and can easily live in peace with each going his own way. If your way of doing things yields good results in India, there would still be time for us to learn from you. Where, indeed, is the need for this urgency, not even scrupling to take certain acts of interference which impair friendship? We have thought it over and over and still fail to understand.

Prime Minister Nehru denies that India has interfered in Tibet. He recalls the course of events before and after India's independence and partition to show that India has never had "political or ulterior ambitions in Tibet". We acknowledge that Nehru's remarks conform with reality in the sense that the Indian Government has no desire to annex Tibet or send its armed forces to intervene in Tibetan affairs. India has all along recognised Tibet as a part of China and that the Chinese Government enjoys sovereignty over Tibet. India concluded with China in April, 1954, the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India based on the Five Principles, and later withdrew its troops from Tibet and handed over its post and telegraphic installations. The

Chinese people view all this with satisfaction. However, interference by one country in the internal affairs of another may take diverse forms. To say that the Indian Government in the past and at present has not interfered in China's Tibet in any way does not sound convincing.

INDIA'S INTERVENTION IN TIBET

It may be recalled, as this newspaper reported, that the Indian Government intervened through diplomatic channels in October, 1950, when the Chinese Government ordered its troops to enter Tibet. At that time, the Chinese Government, while ordering its troops to enter Tibet, asked the Local Government of Tibet to send its representatives to Peking for negotiations. This was exclusively an internal affair under Chinese sovereignty. The Indian Government, however, delivered three notes to the Chinese Government, on October 21, October 28 and November 1, 1950, declaring that "the invasion of Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable" and with "no justification whatever" and that the Indian Government deemed it "most surprising and regrettable". It was further alleged in these notes that Chinese troops' entry into their own territory of Tibet "will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs", and, on the question of restoring Chinese representation in the United Nations, "will have serious consequences, and will give powerful support to those who are opposed to the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations and the Security Council", "may prejudice the position of China in the eyes of the world", while the "peaceful negotiations [between the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet] can hardly be synchronised with it", will not be "in the interests of China or of peace", "have greatly added to the tensions of the world and to a drift toward general war", and "have affected these friendly relations [between India and China] and the interests of peace all over the world". In this regard, the Chinese Government in its reply notes to the Indian Government pointed out that in entering Tibet, the People's Liberation Army was exercising the nation's sovereign rights, that the Tibet question was China's internal affair and that no foreign interference is to be tolerated. This had nothing to do with the Chinese People's Republic's right of represen-

tation in the United Nations. If those countries which were unfriendly to China went so far as to exploit the question of representation in the United Nations for the purpose of threatening China against exercising its sovereign rights on its own territory, that would only confirm once again their hostility towards China. Only after the Chinese Government had repeatedly made known this solemn attitude in resolute terms, and especially after the People's Liberation Army had scored an important victory in the Chamdo area, wiping out the main forces of the Tibetan army which attempted to bar its advance into Tibet, only then did the delegation of the Local Government of Tibet which remained in India arrive in Peking for negotiations in the latter part of April, 1951. After negotiations, the 17-article agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet was finally concluded in May of the same year.

It may not be pleasant to recall this episode. However, facts are facts. How can it be said that the Indian Government has never interfered in Tibet?

INTERFERENCE STILL CONTINUES

Unfortunately, such interference still continues in certain forms. Such interference is all the more regrettable since it has taken place after the Chinese and Indian Governments jointly declared that relations between their two countries should be guided by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Take Prime Minister Nehru himself for example. In his statements and remarks made since the rebellion in Tibet there are not a few friendly indications, but there are some utterances which, we feel, cannot be said to be conformable to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. For instance, he said: "The agreement between Tibet and China on the autonomous status of Tibet and the assurances given to India had not been kept by Peking. Armed intervention was taking place there" (April 13); "I do earnestly hope that the Tibetan people will be able to maintain and be able to enjoy their autonomy and not be oppressed and suppressed by others" (April 14). It may be asked, to describe China's putting down a rebellion in its own territory as "armed intervention" as "oppressing and suppressing" their "autonomy" and to say that "the assurances given to India" have not been kept—how can it be said that all this is not interference? The Indian Government insists that the Dalai Lama is not held under duress by the rebels but is the head of the rebels.

If this is so, did not the impressive welcome extended to the Dalai Lama by the Indian Government and the visit to Mussoorie by Prime Minister Nehru himself mean giving a welcome to and holding a meeting with the leader of a rebellion in a friendly country? Because the head of the Indian Government has never pursued a clear-cut hands-off policy, it is quite understandable why both Madame Indira Gandhi, President of the ruling National Congress Party, and Madame Sucheta Kripalani, General-Secretary of the Party, have declared that Tibet was a "country" or an "autonomous country" and why the "People's Committee in Support of Tibet" which was formed by most of the political parties in India including the National Congress Party openly demanded that the Tibet question be submitted to the United Nations, and why Indian papers openly slandered the Chinese Government as "practising banditry and imperialism", insulted China's head of state as an "abominable snowman" and demanded the convening of a so-called tripartite conference of India, Tibet and China on the pattern of the Simla conference to settle the Tibet question, which is purely China's internal affair. After the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet and even before, certain political figures and papers in India launched a smear campaign against China of a scope reminiscent of intervention by US political and press circles in the execution of counter-revolutionary criminals in Cuba. We must ask, applying political pressure to the internal affairs of a friendly country—can this be considered conformable to the Five Principles?

INDIA'S FEELING OF KINSHIP FOR TIBET

Prime Minister Nehru says that the Indian reaction on the question of Tibet is essentially not political but instinctive, largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons, also on a feeling of kinship derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts with the Tibetan people. We understand that the Indian people have a feeling of kinship for the people of China's Tibet. Not only that, the Indian people have a feeling of kinship for the whole of the Chinese people. When Premier Chou En-lai visited India, the ardent slogan "Indians and Chinese are brothers" was heard everywhere, and these scenes and sentiments seem like a matter of only yesterday. But how can feelings towards the people in Tibet be used as a pretext for impairing feelings towards the Chinese people and for interference in China's internal affairs?

This kind of logic is fraught with obvious danger, because if such logic can stand, then when Tibet has taken the road of democracy and socialism, the road of strength and prosperity, could not a "people's committee to support Assam" and a "committee for Uttar Pradesh affairs" be set up to interfere in the affairs of India's State of Assam or Uttar Pradesh under the pretext of ancient religious and cultural links? Could not the Government of the Autonomous Region of Tibet or the Government of China as a whole declare deep sympathy with the people of Assam or Uttar Pradesh as a basic policy and in pursuance of such a policy find fault with this and that in the affairs of these States? If the Indian Government can demand certain assurances from the Chinese Government on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with the Tibetan people, could it not on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with all the people of China make the outright demand for certain assurances from the Chinese Government as regards all its internal affairs? Similarly, could not the Chinese Government, also on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with the Indian people, demand certain assurances from the Indian Government as regards its internal affairs? Where would peaceful coexistence and the Five Principles be? Would not the world sink into the chaos of mutual interference? We believe that our friends in India would no more welcome or tolerate such an international order than we do.

INDIANS FOLLOW BRITISH POLICY

When India's interference in China's Tibet on these two occasions is taken into account, it is not difficult to see that although the Indian Government has no desire to occupy Tibet or make Tibet formally independent, it really strives to prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its own territory of Tibet. In this respect certain political figures in India have followed the tradition of the British Government of the past—they only recognise China's "suzerainty" over Tibet, like India's "suzerainty" over Bhutan and Sikkim. What they call "autonomy" for Tibet is different from national regional autonomy as laid down in clear terms in the Constitution of China, different from the national regional autonomy practised in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kwangsi and Ninghsia; rather it is a kind of semi-independent status. True, Tibet is not a province but an autonomous region of the People's Republic of

China, with greater powers and functions than a province as laid down in the Constitution and by law; but it is definitely no protectorate—neither a Chinese protectorate, nor an Indian protectorate nor a joint Chinese-Indian protectorate, nor a so-called buffer state between China and India. The People's Republic of China enjoys full sovereignty over the Tibet region just as it does over the regions of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Kwangsi and Ninghsia; there can be no doubt whatever about this, and no interference by any foreign country or by the United Nations under whatever pretext or in whatever form will be tolerated. Consequently, any question concerning Tibet can only be settled by China and in China, and not in any foreign country. Any status of semi-independence for Tibet would be detrimental to the Tibetan people, to the Chinese people, to the Indian people, to Sino-Indian friendship and to Asian peace. It would only serve the interest of the traitorous, reactionary big serf-owners of Tibet and their foreign interventionist backers, as well as of the expansionists and imperialist schemers who seek to sow discord between China and India. China and India are two peace-loving countries whose friendship is of long standing. Our two countries have every reason to live together in harmony, and refrain from aggression and interference, and have not a single reason for mutual conflict, or for wanting to set up any buffer zone; and if establishment of such a buffer zone were pressed for, it would indeed create a truly deplorable conflict where none existed before. In view of the attitude of the Indian Government on this question, in view of the statements by certain Indian figures who are by no means irresponsible, we think it vital for the consolidation of Sino-Indian friendship to make this point absolutely clear. In his April 27 statement, when Prime Minister Nehru referred to the Five Principles he mentioned only "mutual respect" (which is undoubtedly necessary), but did not mention "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty" (those are the original words from the Five Principles, and moreover are preconditions for any sort of mutual respect). We hope that this was only an oversight.

INDIA'S "LINKS WITH IMPERIALISM"

Interference in China's internal affairs by certain political figures in India is not fortuitous. It bears the sign of the time. India is a country that has gained independence after shaking off the colonial

rule of British imperialism. It desires to develop its national economy in a peaceful international environment and has profound contradictions with the imperialist and colonialist forces. This is one aspect of the picture. Another aspect is that the Indian big bourgeoisie maintains innumerable links with imperialism and is, to a certain extent, dependent on foreign capital. Moreover, by its class nature, the big bourgeoisie has a certain urge for outward expansion. This is why, while it opposes the imperialists' policy of intervention, it more or less reflects consciously or unconsciously, certain influences of imperialist policy of intervention. In international affairs, the Indian Government, headed by Prime Minister Nehru, has been reflecting generally the will of the Indian people and playing an important and praiseworthy role in opposing war and colonialism and safeguarding peace, in carrying out a foreign policy of friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and with other Socialist countries, of not joining in the military blocs of United States imperialism. But for historical reasons India's big bourgeoisie has inherited and is attempting to maintain, a certain legacy from the British colonialist rulers. Of course, the great Indian people are not in the least responsible for this dual character of the Indian bourgeoisie. We also believe that not only the Indian people, but all far-sighted and wise members in the Indian Government, acknowledge that the way for India lies in progress, in looking forward not backward. We, as they do, hold that for the authorities of a country which gained independence not long ago and is not still subjected to threats from imperialist interventionists to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbour is a deplorable phenomenon in contemporary international politics.

CHINA HAS NOT INTERFERED IN INDIA

We and Mr. Nehru may differ on this point or that, but there is not likely to be any difference of opinion on this: China has not interfered in India's internal affairs. It was only after a large volume of slanderous utterances had appeared in India that the Chinese people began to hit back. Prime Minister Nehru in his April 27 statement rightly censured certain Indians' statements and actions intended to undermine the friendly relations between China and India. Unfortunately, he followed this up with a concentrated attack on the Chinese declaration against interference. Nehru says that "the comments and the charges made against India

by responsible people in China" are "regardless of truth and propriety" and "used the language of cold war". But China's charge of Indian interference, as already stated, is well-founded. The suspicions voiced by Chinese public opinion about the authenticity of the so-called statement of the Dalai Lama are also based on facts. The numerous loopholes and signs of forgery in that statement are still there objectively. It is very obvious that those Tibetan reactionaries who abducted the Dalai Lama to India, together with those Tibetan reactionaries who have assembled in Kalimpong for a long period of time carrying on traitorous activities, are sparing no effort to make use of the so-called statement of the Dalai Lama to bar the way to the Dalai Lama's return to his motherland, and this does not conform with the desire repeatedly expressed by Prime Minister Nehru.

As to attaching importance to truth and propriety, we regret that much that was said by some political figures and publications in India in the past month and more can by no means be considered as showing regard for truth and propriety. The people of our country took note of the fact that Prime Minister Nehru more than once exerted a restraining influence in this respect. This is undoubtedly beneficial to Sino-Indian friendship. But when he accused the Central People's Government of China of violating the 17-article agreement and spoke about China's so-called "assurances" to India and so forth, we, after all, cannot say that his remarks showed regard for truth and propriety. Speaking of the language of cold war, some Indian political figures and publications have slandered China as "a new and sinister form of imperialism" and "expansionist imperialism" and attacked China's putting down the rebellion in Tibet as "military intervention", "colonisation" and "banditry". Is not all this precisely the "language of cold war"? Towards such "language of cold war", we, for quite a long time, exercised forbearance time and again, exercising the maximum self-restraint. Our papers maintained almost complete silence. It will be recalled that as late as April 18, Premier Chou En-lai issued an earnest appeal for upholding Sino-Indian friendship at the Second National People's Congress. But, sad to say, all it got in return was a great clamour about the so-called statement of the Dalai Lama and even more unbridled attacks on our Government and people. When it was impossible to retreat further, we had to rise and hit back. Some people try to use "freedom of

speech" to justify India's slander campaign against China. But why do they not think for a moment: cannot the Chinese people have freedom of speech too? Tibet is our territory. The question of Tibet is our internal affair. If even foreigners can have so-called instinctive responses on this question, how could the people of our country, on the contrary, have no instinctive responses? At present, it seems that the slander campaign against us in certain foreign lands is already ebbing, and reason is getting the upper hand; but there are still a tiny number of people trying to continue fanning the flames. We can tell these people plainly: "So long as you do not end your anti-Chinese slander campaign, we will not cease hitting back. We are prepared to expend as much time on this as you want to. We are prepared, too, if you should incite other countries to beleaguer us. We are also prepared to find all the imperialists in the world backing you up in clamour. But the attempt to interfere in China's internal affairs and to salvage the odious rule of the big serf-owners in Tibet by any pressure is utterly hopeless. The more violently all the anti-Communist, anti-Chinese elements in the world vilify us, the more clearly will they reveal their true colours, and the better lesson will they provide for the people of the whole world."

PRIME MINISTER NEHRU IS DIFFERENT

As we said before, a great many people in the world today are talking about the Tibet question, from a great many different standpoints. Prime Minister Nehru is different from many persons who obviously bear ill will towards China. He disagrees somewhat with us on the Tibet question. But in general he advocates Sino-Indian friendship. Of this we have no doubts whatsoever. We have made such a detailed reply to Prime Minister Nehru's reproaches (touching, of course, in not a few parts of the article also on those people who obviously bear us ill will) precisely because we are fully confident that differences can be reduced and the argument can be settled. The argument may have been a bit sharp, because the vital interests of our motherland and the Tibetan people are involved. But we still hope that in substance, our argument will benefit the mutual understanding between our two peoples and the friendship between our two peoples and two Governments and that, in the language used, there has been no failure to pay regard to friendship and propriety. We are in full agreement with

those friendly words to the Chinese people spoken so sincerely and seriously by Prime Minister Nehru: he said, "We have every desire to maintain friendship between India and China" and "it would be a tragedy if two great countries of Asia, India and China, which have been peaceful neighbours for ages past should develop feelings of hostility against each other." Sino-Indian friendship is of long duration and stands on a solid foundation. Our basic interests are the same and our main enemy is also the same; we will certainly not forget our common interests and fall into the trap of our common enemy. Although it is regrettable for this argument to have taken place, we firmly believe that it will not result in feelings of hostility, nor will it shake the friendship between our two countries. Prime Minister Nehru has announced that India has no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet. We warmly welcome this friendly statement. Once the Indian side stops its words and deeds of interference in Tibet, the present argument will end. China never has interfered and never will interfere in India. We would like solemnly to assure all Indian patriots who are concerned for the security of India that a democratic and prosperous Tibetan autonomous region as a member of the big family of the people of various nationalities of China is bound to be a factor for consolidating and strengthening friendship between China and India: it certainly will not be, nor can it possibly be, any sort of "menace" to the Republic of India. The peaceful, good-neighbour policy of Socialist China is for ever unshakable and the friendship of the nearly one thousand one hundred million people of our two countries is forever unshakable, just as the Himalayas are unshakable. All the drivel poured out by those slanderers is without any basis. When Prime Minister Nehru visited China in October 1954, he said: "China and India are great countries facing similar problems who have set out resolutely on the road to progress. To the extent that they will understand each other shall depend the well-being not only of Asia but of the whole world. The tensions in the world today demand that we should jointly work for peace." It is our desire that the peoples of our two countries forever remember the truth pointed out here by Prime Minister Nehru. Like the Chinese people, the great Indian people have always treasured Sino-Indian friendship. We are firmly convinced that the slanders poisoning Sino-Indian relations will be recognised as such and repudiated by the broad mass of the Indian people as the true

facts become known and common efforts are made by all personages concerned in both countries. China and India, and the peoples of the two countries, will continue their friendly cooperation in the cause of peaceful construction and will continue to join hands in their struggle for peace in Asia and the whole world.

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THE CURTAIN FALLS?

On June 20, 1959, the Dalai Lama, at his press conference in Mussoorie, demanded the restoration of the pre-1950 boundaries of Tibet and claimed that the Tibetan people still regarded his government as the real government of Tibet.

No official transcript of the Dalai's replies to the questions put by correspondents was available. The summary included is from *The Times of India*, Delhi.

The Chinese made no open comment on the Dalai's statement.

On June 30, an official statement issued in New Delhi made it clear that the Government of India was not prepared to recognise any separate government of Tibet.



THE DALAI LAMA'S PRESS CONFERENCE

*"The Times of India" News Service,
Mussoorie, June 20*

At a crowded two-hour conference this morning, the Dalai Lama made a number of pronouncements of far-reaching importance on the future of Tibet and her people. Obviously to avoid any further misunderstanding, each word uttered today was spoken by His Holiness in Tibetan rendered into English by an interpreter.

By far the most important observation made by the Dalai Lama was his commitment for restoration of the sovereign and independent status Tibet enjoyed before the Chinese invasion of 1950. He indirectly accepted the suggestion that he was now heading a Tibetan Government in exile; wherever he happened to be accompanied by his Ministers, the Tibetan people recognised him as the Government of the land.

He refused to commit himself on his future course of action though his reference to the possibility of an approach to the United Nations and of Tibet seeking UN membership constituted an important pointer.

In answer to a question the Dalai Lama said that he was in favour of a "summit" conference between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, on Tibet if it could be assured that the recent events in that country would be considered in their true perspective. He agreed the attention of the world needed to be focussed on the Tibet problem.

The Dalai Lama confirmed reports that during his 1956 visit here he had himself decided not to go back to Tibet. But he changed his mind after Mr. Nehru had conveyed Mr. Chou En-lai's assurance on the subject to him.

Today's press conference began delightfully on an informal note. Emerging from his room around 10 o'clock the Dalai Lama mixed freely with newspapermen gathered on the Birla House lawns. He greeted each correspondent in turn shaking hands with every one of them. Many autographs were taken during the half-hour preceding the question-answer session. Tea and biscuits were served on behalf of His Holiness. In all 92 questions were answered and the press conference was rounded off with a long 1,500-word statement reviewing the events in Tibet since the Chinese invasion of 1950.

Throughout his meeting with the press the Dalai Lama maintained his composure and indeed, despite strong denunciation of the Chinese policies and programmes, his serene expression was not disturbed for a moment.

PRE-1950 TIBET .

As regards the demand for the restoration of the pre-1950 status of Tibet, the Dalai Lama made it clear that all the territories taken away by the Chinese must be returned to the new greater Tibet. He defined the new territory as embracing all areas where people of Tibetan stock were resident.

Asked by *"The Times of India"* News Service correspondent whether to seek an independent Tibet at this stage did not constitute a rather "large demand", the Dalai Lama replied, "There is truth in what has been stated [by you], but if we make necessary endeavours it may not prove a large demand."

Recalling the circumstances under which the Sino-Tibetan agreement was signed, the Dalai Lama declared that they were forced to acquiesce under threat of military force and out of a desire to save the country from total destruction.

As an example of deception practised by the Chinese, he disclosed that the Tibetan seal affixed on the agreement was not genuine. It was forged and fabricated in Peking by the Chinese and "continues to be in their possession".

It was clear from the start, he said, that the Chinese had no intention of honouring the terms of the 1951 treaty. They began undermining the Dalai Lama's authority, and then followed a reign of terror which "finds few parallels in the history of Tibet".

The Dalai Lama said he was prepared to submit the charges of loot, plunder and murder by the Chinese to investigation by an international commission and to abide by its verdict.

He confirmed reports that large-scale slaughter of Tibetans had taken place, particularly during the revolt, and many more had been transported to China to be thrown into Chinese military jails.

Simultaneously, the Chinese were colonising vast areas with their own people. Some five million Chinese had already been settled in Tibet and about four million more were in the process of settlement. In addition about four lakh Chinese, civil and military officials, were at present in Tibet.

The Chinese game, the Dalai Lama said, was to exterminate the

Tibetan religion and culture and to absorb the entire Tibetan race into China. He had documentary proofs of the atrocities committed by the Chinese, who had also hurled abuses against Lord Buddha himself, describing him as a "reactionary element".

FIGHTING CONTINUES

Asked about the latest news of the fighting in Tibet, the Dalai Lama said in many areas fighting was still in progress. Several places around and near Lhasa continue to be under the control of the Khampas.

He said he and his Government were not carrying on any resistance movement from India. He intended to help the Tibetan "by all means of peaceful solution rather than by military force".

In another context, His Holiness expressed the hope that Tibet would receive at least the same support from the Government of India as had been extended by it to countries like Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

The Dalai Lama had no intention of staying on indefinitely in India or unnecessarily embarrassing the host Government.

RETURN TO LHASA

The Tibetan leader said he would return to Lhasa only when "I obtain the rights and powers which the Tibetans had enjoyed and exercised prior to 1950," added *Press Trust of India*.

The Dalai Lama said in reply to a question that he had not received any invitation from Buddhist countries for a visit, but he had received invitations from some Buddhist organisations.

He said the Chinese had looted the reserves of his Government and the properties of monasteries and the people.

About the working of the 1951 agreement, the Dalai Lama said: "While I and my Government did not voluntarily accept the agreement we were obliged to acquiesce in it and decided to abide by the terms and conditions in order to save my people and country from the danger of total destruction. It was, however, clear from the very beginning that the Chinese had no intention of carrying out the agreement.

"Forced labour and compulsory extractions, and systematic persecution of the people, plunder and confiscation of property, and the execution of certain leading men in Tibet are the glorious achievements of the Chinese rule in Tibet," he said.

He added he had tried his best to calm down the feelings of his people and persuade the Chinese to adopt a policy of conciliation and friendliness. It was only when he failed in this that he left his country.

OUTSIDE SUPPORT .

The Dalai Lama said the revolt in Tibet was still going on. The leaders of the rebellion were drawn from various sections of the people. They would welcome support from all countries in the world for the Tibetan cause.

The number of Tibetans killed in the fight with the Chinese occupation forces since 1956, the Dalai Lama said, was actually more than what the report filed before the International Commission of Jurists had mentioned, namely, 65,000.

He also described as correct what the report to the Jurists Commission had said about the "destruction of Buddhism". Over 1,000 monasteries in Tibet had been destroyed by the Chinese until 1958, countless lamas and monks were killed or imprisoned, extermination of religion was continuously adopted and from 1959 onwards a full-scale campaign was conducted in two provinces for the final extermination of the religion.

LETTERS TO ARMY CHIEF

The Tibetan leader admitted having written the three letters to the Chinese Military Commandant in Lhasa before leaving the Tibetan capital.

The Dalai Lama said that the present Government in Lhasa was nothing but "a deceptive Government with all powers in the hands of the Chinese. The people of Tibet will never recognise it."

Giving a brief account of recent events in Lhasa as reported to him by his people, the Dalai Lama said; "The people of Lhasa have been divided into three groups, the first group is deported to China where their fate is not known; the second group is imprisoned, interrogated and punished without limit in the various Chinese military headquarters in Lhasa."

ALL-OUT PROPAGANDA

"The third group is given the meanest food and driven to forced labour. In the streets of Lhasa, two Tibetans cannot converse with each other. The central cathedral and all other places of worship

are closed. In addition to the reserves of the Tibetan Government all properties of private individuals are being taken over by the Chinese who are conducting an all-out propaganda for the formation of people's communes."

On the question of reforms being introduced in Tibet, the Dalai Lama said that his Government was not opposed to reforms but these should be in accordance with international practice and the traditions and customs of Tibet and the wishes of the Tibetan people.

"I do not agree to such systems of reforms as the people's communes being imposed on the people."

Replying to a question regarding the allegations made by the Panchen Lama that due respect was not shown to him during his tour of India in 1956, the Dalai Lama said: "At that time the Government and people of India had extended both to him [Panchen Lama] and me the most cordial hospitality and respect but the Panchen Lama, having no freedom of will, had to make the statement he made.

"The Panchen Lama has been under Chinese influence ever since his boyhood and has never enjoyed any freedom."

In reply to another question, the Dalai Lama said that the Government of India had not placed any restraint on his movement.

"NO SEPARATE GOVERNMENT OF TIBET"

An official spokesman of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs made the following statement in New Delhi on 30 June 1959:

A number of statements, allegations and counter-allegations on Tibet have appeared in India during the last three months from various sources. Among these is a statement made by the Dalai Lama during a recent press conference at Mussoorie, in the course of which he sought to answer some of the criticisms made against him. The Government of India do not take responsibility for any of these various statements. So far as the Dalai Lama is concerned, the Prime Minister has made it clear on more than one occasion that, while the Government of India are glad to give asylum to the Dalai Lama and show him the respect due to his high position, they have no reason to believe that he will do anything which is contrary to international usage and embarrassing to the host country. The Government of India want to make it clear that they do not recognise any separate Government of Tibet and there is, therefore, no question of a Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama functioning in India.

BACK TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ON August 30, 1959, a special envoy of the Dalai Lama arrived in New Delhi from Mussoorie, called a hurried press conference, and opened a sealed cover in the presence of some 200 Indian and foreign newspapermen. It contained a statement signed by the Dalai Lama in which he announced his decision to refer the Tibet issue back to the United Nations.

In the first week of September, the Dalai Lama had his second meeting with Mr. Nehru in New Delhi since his arrival in India on March 30.

The Government of India's policy not to recognise a separate Government of Tibet and not to support the Dalai Lama's case at the UN, however, remained unchanged.

"NO ALTERNATIVE BUT UN"

The following is the text of the Dalai Lama's statement of 30 August 1959:

"On the 20th of June last, I was impelled by the steadily deteriorating conditions in Tibet to break my silence and to give to the world a glimpse of the dark and dismal tragedy of my people. I also made it clear at the same time that I and my Government were fully prepared to accept a just and peaceful solution of the entire problem.

"Since then, the picture of Tibet has become immeasurably darker and gloomier and the sufferings of my people are beyond description. On the other hand, there has been no response to my appeal for peace and justice.

"In these circumstances I have no other alternative than to appeal to the UN for the verdict of the peace-loving and conscientious nations of the world. I also take the opportunity to make a personal appeal to all civilised countries of the world to lend their fullest support to our cause of freedom and justice."



THE CONSEQUENCES OF TIBET

By the end of June, 1959, the rebellion in Tibet was suppressed by the Chinese armed forces.

In the first week of July the new Tibetan Preparatory Committee had a ten-day session in Lhasa. It adopted a comprehensive programme of reforms for Tibet, reforms which were designed to take the people of Tibet on to the road to socialism.

The Chinese army stood guard on the frontiers of Tibet. A century-old Chinese dream was fulfilled, and the People's Central Government realised after ten years the promise it made soon after the establishment of the Communist regime.

The consequences of Tibet quickly made themselves felt on the Himalayan complex of territories comprising the long frontiers between India and China stretching from Ladakh in Kashmir to the Indo-Burmese border, across the Brahmaputra in the North-East Frontier Agency.

Sikkim, a small Indian protectorate nestling in the Himalayan foothills, and Bhutan, a large but comparatively unproductive kingdom treaty-bound to India, became nervous. The Indian Prime Minister declared that India would defend their integrity.

Unconfirmed reports were published of Chinese "designs" on these two principalities which have close ethnic, cultural, economic and commercial as well as spiritual ties with Tibet.

Indian traders and nationals in Tibet were subjected to a variety of hardships, mostly arising out of the new reforms introduced by the Chinese. Mr. Nehru had to answer many anxious queries in the Indian Parliament.

Questions were asked about the reported Chinese-Tibetan "propaganda offensive" against Sikkim and Bhutan. Mr. Nehru did not appear to have given credence to such reports, but nevertheless, he came out with a categorical declaration committing his country to the defence of the Himalayan kingdoms.

On August 28, the Prime Minister had to face a volley of short-notice questions and adjournment motions in Parliament. Reports had appeared in the Indian

press of Chinese incursions in Indian territory. Mr. Nehru gave the first official information that India and China were involved in a border duel. The news captured world headlines, and, in subsequent days, even eclipsed President Eisenhower's historic visit to the United Kingdom.

Several clashes occurred. At a few points the Chinese entered Indian territory and took possession of an Indian outpost or built a road across territory claimed by India. Mr. Nehru disclosed that several diplomatic notes had been exchanged with Peking.

On September 4, Mr. Nehru offered to discuss and negotiate "minor points" of the McMahon Line with the Chinese Government, but firmly held to the Line as India's north-eastern border with Tibet-China.

He also disclosed for the first time that China had accused India of violating her own border and of incursions into Chinese-Tibetan territory.

In the first week of September, a Jan Sangh Member of the Lok Sabha introduced an unofficial resolution urging that India should sponsor Tibet's case at the United Nations. On September 5, Mr. Nehru categorically opposed this plea. The resolution was lost. (The Jan Sangh is a right-wing Indian political party, often described to be Hindu-communal in ideology.)

The Dalai Lama visited New Delhi at the beginning of September, had a meeting with Mr. Nehru (in which the Indian Prime Minister reportedly declined the Dalai's request to take Tibet to the UN) and confabulated with the envoys of several countries.

This Part includes official accounts of proceedings in the Indian Parliament relating to the Aftermath of Tibet, the text of Mr. Nehru's speech declaring that India would not sponsor the Tibetan complaint against China at the UN and offering limited negotiations with China on the border disputes, and summary of the treaties that bind Bhutan and Sikkim with India. Also included is the text of the report on Chinese genocide in Tibet prepared by the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva.

SIKKIM, BHUTAN AND INDO-TIBETAN TRADE

The following is the full text of the answers of the Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, during Question Hour in Rajya Sabha on 25 August 1959. He was replying to questions on alleged Chinese activities against Sikkim and Bhutan:

MR. J. C. CHATTERJI: Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:

(a) whether Government are aware of the Chinese plans regarding the neighbouring areas beyond Tibet such as Sikkim, Bhutan and border areas of Assam as recently reported by Mr. H. V. Kamath after extensive tour of those areas; and

(b) if so, what preventive measures are being adopted by Government in the matter?

MRS. LAKSHMI N. MENON:

(a) Government are not aware of any such plans and have no valid reason to think of their existence.

(b) Government are fully alive to their responsibility for the preservation of the security of India.

MR. V. K. DHAGE: Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:

(a) whether Government's attention has been drawn to the report which appeared in the *Hindustan Times* (Delhi Edition) of the 13th August, 1959, to the effect that the Chinese authorities in Tibet have begun a war of nerves against the people of the Himalayan region bordering on Tibet and, in particular, against the people of Bhutan and Sikkim;

(b) whether Government are aware that, in a pamphlet issued by the Chinese authorities, Indians have been described as inheritors of British regime, and that a cry has been raised for the "liberation" of the Bhutanese, Sikkimese and Ladakhis from their capitalistic oppressor, namely India; and

(c) if the answer to parts (a) and (b) above be in affirmative, what steps Government propose to take in the matter?

MRS. LAKSHMI N. MENON: (a), (b) & (c) Government have seen this report; they have however no information about the contents of the speech by the General referred to in this report. They have also no information about the pamphlet to which reference is made.

Instances of anti-Indian propaganda in the Tibetan region have however come to the attention of Government and Government have drawn the attention of the Chinese authorities to this.

MR. J. C. CHATTERJI: As a protest against the fact that our Lhasa Consulate office is being kept under restraint by the Chinese, are we also going to put the same sort of restrictions on the Chinese Consulate office at Kalimpong?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is not quite correct to say that our Consulate General is under restraint. There are some difficulties there in regard to people who want to visit the Consulate General. Sometimes they do not find easy access to it. Some of them, more especially those people who are Ladakhi/Muslims, who want to come there are not permitted to do so usually by the sentry. But the people in the Consulate can go about in Lhasa at any rate, not outside Lhasa; for that they require permit.

MR. J. C. CHATTERJI: Is there any truth in the newspaper reports that the Chinese are trying to extend their influence in Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh and the border areas of Nepal?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is the main question. It has been answered. There are some reports of these things. We have no information as to their validity or of any responsible person having said this. But the fact remains that so far as Bhutan and Sikkim are concerned, they are in treaty relations with us and we are responsible for their defence. I cannot imagine any foreign authority doing anything which is an infringement of their sovereignty. In any event any such infringement would be an infringement of our undertakings with Sikkim and Bhutan, and we shall certainly resist every such intrusion.

MR. J. C. CHATTERJI: Are the Government thinking of devising ways and means for encouraging our people particularly of the border areas so that they may not be cowed down by the aggressive moves of any foreign power?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not know what he means. Ways and means to what—shall I say, to raise the morale of the people there? I hope the morale of the people in the border areas is good.

MR. J. C. CHATTERJI: It has been reported in the papers recently that some Chinese gold bars were recovered from some Assam tribals. Has it anything to do with the Chinese aggressive moves?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What did they recover from the Assam people? Gold bars?

MR. J. C. CHATTERJI: Chinese gold bars were recovered from some tribals in Assam.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I know nothing about this. I hope no gold bars will come from outside to India.

MR. V. K. DHAGE: Is it a fact that on the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan military concentration is taking place by the Chinese?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: We do not know, Sir.

MR. V. K. DHAGE: Is it a fact that there is a certain sort of concern in the minds of the people in Bhutan and Sikkim with regard to the Chinese activities?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Yes, Sir, that is natural. Ever since the troubles in Tibet, as refugees are coming in, there has been a measure of anxiety in the minds of the people and the authorities in Bhutan and Sikkim.

MR. V. K. DHAGE: May I know whether there has been any proposal from the Prime Minister of Bhutan to interview our Prime Minister here?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It does not require any proposal. Whenever he comes here, he is our guest, and I see him frequently. There is no very great formality about these things, and I believe he is coming here soon.

Indo-Tibetan Trade

MR. MAHESWAR NAIK: Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:

(a) whether the Indo-Tibetan trade has been affected by the political disturbance in Tibet;

(b) what was the volume of trade between India and Tibet prior to the Tibetan upsurge; and

(c) what is the latest position?

MRS. LAKSHMI N. MENON:

(a) Yes, Sir. The Indo-Tibetan trade has suffered considerably during the last few months especially since the disturbances.

(b) & (c) The total volume of Indo-Tibetan trade during the quarter Jan-March, 1959, was Rs. 81.98 lakhs approximately. The figure, however, declined to Rs. 26.82 lakhs approximately during the quarter April-June, 1959.

MR. MAHESWAR NAIK: May I know whether Government have taken any measures for the restoration of normal trade between the two countries?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Well, Sir, I do not recall all the measures but we certainly want normal trade to be restored and we are pointing out to the Chinese authorities in Tibet the difficulties that have arisen in regard to it. For instance, one of the major difficulties is the question of payment and the currency. Many of our traders cannot deal in the goods there except in Chinese currency and they find it difficult to dispose of the goods there. All these difficulties have arisen and we are pointing out these things as much as we can because we cannot interfere in the internal trade arrangements otherwise.

MR. MAHESWAR NAIK: May I know whether it is a fact that all sorts of impediments are being put against the Indian trade being run smoothly and that particularly the Indian traders who are engaged in trading in Tibet are not allowed to even borrow money from the local moneylenders?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is what I said, Sir, that there are difficulties. I do not know whether one such relates to the question of borrowing money but I imagine it is difficult to borrow money.

MR. JASWANT SINGH: The question is not only of the Indian currency being made legal tender or not. The Indian traders who have been doing business in Tibet have had to completely suspend their business and I would like to know what the Government is doing either to restore normal conditions there or to rehabilitate the traders. This is a very serious matter because a very large number of people are affected by this.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I have just answered, Sir.

MR. JASWANT SINGH: There is a second part to my question, Sir.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: We cannot force trade on another country. If a country deliberately wants to stop it, it can do a hundred and one things over-hand and under-hand to make it difficult for the trader to function. We cannot deal with such a matter. If there is any breach of treaty regulations, then we can take up that matter.

MR. JASWANT SINGH: The main question was, Sir, . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: Did they suffer? Do you rehabilitate them? That is the second part of the question, is it not?

MR. JASWANT SINGH: Yes, Sir. I want to know whether Government is taking action to rehabilitate them.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Yes, have the Indian traders there suffered?

Are any measures taken to rehabilitate them? That is what he wants to know.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: None whatsoever. We have absolutely no such idea and we are not thinking of any such action. First of all, such a question does not arise and secondly these traders in the past have not done badly at all. It is only in the present that they are not well off.

MR. JASWANT SINGH: It is their misfortune to be Indian, Sir.

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: May I know whether the Government of India was consulted or at least was informed by the Chinese authorities of their intention to declare the Indian rupee as not legal tender in Tibet?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: There is no mention of this in the Treaty. All that the Treaty says is that customary rules will continue to prevail. You can interpret that as you will but there is no special reference in the Treaty to the rupee being legal tender or not.

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: The first part of my question has not been answered, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Were we consulted? That is number one.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No, Sir.

MR. CHAIRMAN: Was it unilateral? That is the second part of the question and the third part is, was it in the trade agreement? One question in three stages, is it?

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: Yes, Sir.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No, Sir, we were not consulted and we can hardly raise an objection to the fact we were not consulted by them before they made changes. The point is that where such changes are made, they must not, in the interests of the countries concerned, have an immediate upsetting effect on past transactions. It is open to any country to make a change for the future so that the traders and others know where they stand but making a change which applies to past transactions does create a tremendous amount of difficulty because after they have paid for some goods, then let us say, 50 per cent or 75 per cent of the value suddenly disappears. Therefore, normally it should not apply to past transactions.

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: But are they applying to past transactions?

(No reply)

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: I want the Prime Minister to inform us on this point. The Treaty obligation was that the custo-

mary rules and customs will prevail. One of the customary rules was that the Indian rupee will be the legal tender in Tibet. Now that unilateral action has been taken by the Chinese authorities to declare it as not legal tender, will the Government of India take up this matter with the Chinese authorities? That is number one. Number two is . . .

MR. CHAIRMAN: You are putting a series of questions.

MR. RAJENDRA PRATAP SINHA: Have the Government any information about the amount of Indian rupee involved in this, the extent to which the Indian traders there have suffered?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: We are constantly taking up this and like matters with the Chinese Government, putting to them whatever we think were the errors committed in regard to their obligations arising out of the Treaty. This is being constantly placed before them. I have no idea of the amount involved.

ALLEGED OCCUPATION OF LADAKHI TERRITORY BY CHINESE FORCES

The following is the full text of a statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, in Lok Sabha on 28 August 1959 in reply to a short-notice question as to whether it was a fact that a portion of the Ladakhi territory had been recently occupied by the Chinese forces, and what action had been taken in the matter:

There is a large area in eastern and north-eastern Ladakh which is practically uninhabited. It is mountainous, and even the valleys are at a high altitude generally exceeding 13,000 feet. To some extent, shepherds use it during the summer months for grazing purposes. The Government of India have some police check-posts in this area, but because of the difficulties of terrain most of these posts are at some distance from the international border.

Some reports reached us between October, 1957, and February, 1958, that a Chinese detachment had crossed the international frontier and visited Khurnak Fort, which is within Indian territory. The attention of the Chinese Government was drawn to this, and they were asked to desist from entering our territory. They were also informed of our intention to send a reconnaissance party in that area. It may be mentioned that there is no physical demarcation of the frontier in these mountainous passes, although our maps are quite clear on this subject.

Thereafter, at the end of July, 1959, that is last month, a small Indian reconnaissance police party was sent to this area. As this party consisting of an officer and five others was proceeding towards the Khurnak Fort, it was apprehended by a stronger Chinese detachment on July 28, some miles from the border inside our territory. It appeared that the Chinese had established a camp at a place called Spanggur well within Indian territory.

On learning of this, a protest was immediately lodged with the Chinese Government of the violation of our frontier and the release of our reconnaissance party was asked for. In their reply, the Chinese claimed that that part of the territory was theirs, but added that they would release the persons who had been apprehended. We sent a further note to them expressing surprise at this claim and giving them the exact delineation of the traditional international frontier in this sector. We urged once again that the Chinese party

well within our territory should be withdrawn. No reply has yet been received to this note. Our party was released on August 18.

DR. RAM SUBHAG SINGH: May I know whether this place is about 15 miles within our territory and also whether this is the only place which is under occupation by the Chinese troops or they have occupied some other areas also.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It is somewhat difficult to deal with this question as an adjunct to the main question. Of course, there have been some frontier troubles in two or three places widely separated; and it would be hardly correct to say that our area is under occupation of the Chinese, that is, under any kind of a fixed occupation. But their patrols have come within our territory two miles or three miles or thereabouts. That is our knowledge, so far as we know.

MR. P. C. BOROOAH: Has the attention of the Government been drawn to the news item published in the *Assam Tribune* of 26th instant that 1,000 Chinese troops equipped with the most modern weapons entered Indian territory in the NEFA, and the Chinese flag had been hoisted there?

MR. SPEAKER: The main question refers to Ladakh.

MR. GORAY: On this issue, there is an adjournment motion.

MR. SPEAKER: That is all right; but that does not refer to Ladakh. There is no meaning in expanding a particular question.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: May I say that there is likely to be very considerable confusion if we mix up these various areas?

MR. SPEAKER: I have got an adjournment motion here on that, and I shall presently be asking the hon. Prime Minister as to what he has to say on that.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: What the hon. Member has just referred to is an entirely different area, and the statement in the *Assam Tribune* is entirely wrong, if I may say so.

MR. SPEAKER: Hon. Members will kindly confine themselves to the occupation of the Ladakhi area. There are other questions with respect to the other areas, and we shall come to them.

MR. GORAY: May we know whether the Chinese had built a road across this territory joining Gartok with Yarkand and whether this road has been there for the last year or so? It passes through the Ladakhi territory.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Yes, that is in northern Ladakh, not exactly near this place but anyhow in the Ladakhi territory.

About a year or two ago, the Chinese had built a road from Gartok towards Yarkand, that is, Chinese Turkestan; and the report was that this road passed through a corner of our north-eastern Ladakhi territory.

The House will appreciate that these areas are extraordinarily remote, almost inaccessible, and even if they can be approached, it takes weeks and weeks to march and get there.

In that connection, a reconnaissance party was sent there. I cannot exactly say when, but I think it was a little over a year ago, some time last year; I could give the exact date, but that is immaterial here; this reconnaissance party was sent there. In fact, two parties were sent; one of them did not return and the other returned.

AN HON. MEMBER: What happened to them?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: When it did not return, we waited for it for two or three weeks, because these were remote areas. When it did not return, we suspected that it might have been apprehended or captured by Chinese authorities on the border.

So we addressed the Chinese authorities; this was more than a year ago; we addressed them about a month after this incident; and they said, yes, some of our people had violated their border and come into their territory, and they had been apprehended, but because of their relations with us etc. they were going to release them, and they did release them afterwards, that is, after they had been with them about a month or so.

That is concerning this road about which the hon. Member was enquiring. In all this area, there is no actual demarcation. So far as we are concerned, our maps are clear that this is within the territory of the Union of India. It may be that some of the parts are not clearly demarcated or anything like that. But obviously, if there is any dispute over any particular area, that is a matter to be discussed.

I may say that this area has nothing to do with the McMahon Line. The McMahon Line does not extend to the Ladakh area; it is only on the other side. This was the boundary of the old Kashmir State with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it. But after some kind of broad surveys, the then Government had laid down that border which we have been accepting and acknowledging.

MR. GORAY: Does it mean that in parts of our country which

are inaccessible, any nation can come and build roads and camp there? We just send our parties, they apprehend the parties and because of our good relations, they release them. Is that all? The road remains there, the occupation remains there and we do not do anything about it.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I do not know if the hon. Member expects me to reply to that. There are two or three types of cases here. These are border and frontier questions. In regard to some parts of the border, there can be no doubt from any side that it is our border. If anybody violates it, then it is a challenge to us. There are other parts regarding which it is rather difficult to say where the immediate border is, although broadly it may be known. But it is very difficult even in a map to indicate it; if a big line is drawn, that line itself covers three or four miles, one might say, in a major map. Then there are other parts still where there has been no demarcation in the past. Nobody was interested in that area. Therefore, it is a matter now—it should be a matter—for consideration of the data etc. by the two parties concerned and decision taken in a normal way, as and when there is some kind of a frontier dispute.

In this particular matter, we have been carrying on since then our correspondence, concerning this particular north-east area, and suggesting that this should be considered by the two Governments.

MR. VAJPAYEE: The hon. Prime Minister just now said that if anyone occupies our territory, it is a challenge. May I know what positive steps are being taken, or have been taken, to enforce security measures on this border area?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Which border area?

MR. SPEAKER: The Ladakh area. All the questions now will be confined to this area.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: There are thousands of miles of border. The hon. Member should be a little more specific in his question. If he is referring to this particular corner, the Achin area, that is an area about some parts of which, if I may say so, it is not quite clear what the position is. It is not at all that particular area. About other area, the position is quite clear. The difficulty comes in regarding some places where there is no absolute certainty about it; in other places, we are quite clear and certain about it. The border is, I believe, 2,500 miles long.

MRS. MAFIDA AHMED: May I know whether Government's

attention has been drawn to a statement of the President, "Azad" Kashmir, blaming India for the Chinese occupation of Ladakh and urging the Security Council to take over the responsibility of the frontiers of Jammu and Kashmir? If so, what is the reaction of Government to that?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I believe I did hear about it. I attach no importance to it.

DR. SUSHILA NAYAR: I would like to know if these troubles on the border are over the same areas of our territory which the Chinese had indicated as their territory in their maps, and if there is any implication connected with this.

MR. SPEAKER: Any further encroachments within the limits of the map?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: This particular question that I answered related to one area. There are other areas too where we have had, and we are, in fact, having, some trouble now. I do not want to mix it up with this. Then there will be confusion in one's mind. This is an area with a frontier of over 2,000 miles.

MR. VAJPAYEE: What is the use of repeating that it is a long frontier? Are we not in a position to defend it?

MR. SPEAKER: Order, order. No harsh words need be used.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I was only venturing to say that by putting two or three places together, there would be confusion in the Members' minds. Let us take them separately so that they may be separate compartments. There is no question of defence or not. For instance, take the *Assam Tribune's* statement. There is utter confusion in the *Assam Tribune's* mind about various territories which are thousands of miles apart which have nothing to do with each other. It has lumped them up and said—I believe in the statement in the *Assam Tribune*—that 1,000 Chinese came over the Nathula Pass in the Kameng Frontier Division. It shows utter confusion in the mind of the writer of this. He does not know his geography, although he lives in Assam. It has nothing to do with it. The Nathula Pass is between Sikkim and Tibet and nothing has happened there. Nobody has come across there. It is said that a thousand men came there and put up the Chinese flag. It is completely baseless—I am referring to the statement so far as Nathula Pass is concerned. So far as I know, I have not heard of a Chinese flag being hoisted anywhere there.

As I was saying, there have been cases, and there are continuing

cases in one or two places, of Chinese aggression. Therefore, I want to keep these separate so as not to produce confusion in the minds of hon. Members here. If this question is over, I shall proceed to the other question and deal with as they come.

MR. SPEAKER: I thought the hon. lady Member wanted to know if any portion of Ladakh is included in the map prepared by the Chinese Government and if this is beyond that line even with respect to Ladakh. That was what I thought when I allowed the supplementary.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: The Chinese Government's maps are on such a small scale and in broad splashes that some parts of Ladakh appear to be included in them. But they are not accurate enough. What we are discussing, and the question which I have answered, relates to about two or three miles. Two or three miles are not visible in these maps. But it is a fact that part of Ladakh is broadly covered by the wide sweep of their maps.

ALLEGED CHINESE INCURSION INTO NEFA AREA

The Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on 28 August 1959 in reply to an adjournment motion:

Sir, I can very well understand the anxiety of the House to have information as fully as possible about this situation on our border areas. It is rather difficult for me to deal with these various adjournment motions as they are often based on wrong names, wrong areas, wrong locations. So, instead of my endeavouring to deal with each adjournment motion, I shall give some specific information.

Mr. Hem Barua's motion is completely upside down—one place here, one place there—and has no connection with the events or anything. He has derived it from some paper. (*Interruption*) Sir, may I continue?

In the course of the last two or three years, sometimes, not very frequently, there have been cases of some kind of petty intrusion on our border areas by some platoon or something of the Chinese troops, which was nothing very extraordinary, because there is no demarcation at all and parties sometimes may cross. We drew the attention of the Chinese Government in 1957-58 to this and they withdrew, there the matter ended.

One instance I have already quoted, which was a more serious one. In Ladakh last year, a small police party was apprehended by them, and that matter is still under dispute or under correspondence. Now, in June this year, the Chinese Government protested to us that Indian troops had shelled and intruded into Chinese territory by occupying a place on the border of Migyitun, and some other place along the frontier—this is in Tibet-NEFA—and they accused us that our troops had entered into some kind of collusion with the Tibetan rebel forces or "bandits", as they call them, carrying on illegal activities against the People's Government of China. We replied that there is no truth in this allegation, and we expressed surprise that the Chinese Government should give credence to these wrong allegations. Ultimately nothing happened there. We stayed where we were, and there was some dispute about the line.

Now, there are two matters that I would particularly like to mention: one, of course, is of very considerable importance and it is topical now. I shall come to it later. The first one is that on the

7th August an armed Chinese patrol, approximately 200 strong, violated our border at Khinzemane north of Chuthangmu in the Kameng Frontier Division. When requested to withdraw, they pushed back, actually physically pushed back, our greatly outnumbered patrol to a bridge at Drokung Samba. Our people consisted of ten or a dozen policemen and they were about 200, about ten times us. They actually physically pushed our men back. There was no firing. Later on, the Chinese detachment withdrew and our forces again established themselves. All this was over a question of about two miles. I might say, according to us, there is an international border. Two miles on this side is this bridge and two miles on that side is our picket or the small force. So, our patrol party was pushed back to the bridge and two miles away they stood facing each other. Then both retired. It is not quite clear to me why they did so; it is a mountain and perhaps during night time both the forces retired. Whatever it was, later on the Chinese withdrew and our picket went back to the frontier and established a small picket there. The Chinese patrol arrived later and demanded immediate withdrawal of our picket and lowering of our flag there. This request was refused. Then there was some attempt by the Chinese forces to outflank our people, but so far as we know our people remained there and nothing further happened; that is, on the border itself. That is one instance which happened about two weeks ago.

The present incident I am talking about is a very recent one and, in fact, is a continuing one. On the 25th August, that is three days ago, a strong Chinese detachment crossed into our territory in the Subansiri Frontier Division at a place south of Migyitun and opened fire. Hon. Members will remember, I just mentioned Migyitun in connection with the Chinese protest that we had violated their territory and were in collusion with some Tibetan rebels. That was their protest made in June last, and there the matter ended. Now, round about that area, a little further away but not far from it, this Chinese detachment came and met, some distance away, our forward picket of about a dozen persons. It is said that they fired at our forward picket. They were much larger in numbers; it is difficult to say in what numbers, but they were in some hundreds, 200, 300 or, may be, even more. They surrounded this forward picket which consisted of 12 men—1 N.C.O. and 11 Riflemen of the Assam Rifles. They apparently apprehended this lot. Later,

apparently, 8 of these 11 Riflemen managed to escape. They came back to our outpost. The outpost is at a place called Longju. Longju is about three or four miles from our frontier between Tibet and India as we conceive it. Longju is five days' march from another post of ours in the interior, a bigger post called Limeking. Limeking is about 12 days' march from the next place behind it. So, in a way, this Longju is about three weeks' march from a road-head. I merely mention this to give the House some idea of communications, transport, distance and time taken. I was saying, on the 25th they captured this forward picket of ours, but 8 of them, having been captured, apparently, escaped and came back on the 26th the next day. The Chinese again came and opened fire and practically encircled this picket and the post. In fact, they came forward and encircled this post, Longju, and although there was firing for a considerable time, we had no account of any casualties. Our people apparently fired back too. When these people were more or less surrounded at Longju they left that picket and withdrew under this overwhelming pressure. This has happened only the day before yesterday evening. So, we have not been able to get any exact particulars of what has happened.

The moment this information came, we immediately protested to the Chinese Government about it and took certain other steps in that area to strengthen our various posts, Limeking and others, as we thought necessary and feasible. We have, in fact, placed all this border area of NEFA directly under our military authorities. That is to say, it was dealt with by the Assam Rifles under the Assam Rifles Directorate which was functioning under the Governor and the Governor was the agent of the Government of India in the External Affairs Ministry. The Assam Rifles will of course remain there and such other forces as will be necessary will be sent but they will function now under the army authorities and their headquarters.

All these have taken a little time. As I pointed out, it takes weeks. In this particular place, Longju, I imagine that this small picket of ours—it was probably altogether about 38—may have run short of ammunition because there was no supply coming in. We tried to send supplies by air. They were dropped but they missed them. It is a mountainous area; it is not easy. It is slightly risky to send paratroopers there, risky to the men in these mountainous areas. We do not think it was desirable or worthwhile to do so at that

place—dangerous. Anyhow, we have taken such steps as were feasible.

In fact, while I was sitting here, I have heard from our Ambassador from Peking. When he handed over this note to the Chinese authorities, the reply was that their information was different. The Director said that the information that the Chinese Government had received was contained in the note handed over to Kannampilly, one of our men there. Regarding the incident at Migyitun, according to their report, it was the Indians who fired first; the Chinese frontier guards had opened fire only in self-defence. They had received no information yet of the clash at Longju on the 26th August. This is the Chinese answer. The Director said that the situation in this sector of the border was tense because Indian troops were continuously pushing forward. We see here the same kind of language, a repetition of the reports we have, say, between India and Pakistan; that is, we make a statement and an exactly opposite, contrary statement is made by the other side, as to who started firing.

I confess that in these matters I give credence to our own reports and I believe it is true because I would rather believe my own men who are there and who are trained men, not used to exaggeration, and also because the circumstantial evidence also supports their account. In fact, our Ambassador pointed this out to the Chinese people. So, that is the position. I need not say that, while I do not wish to take an alarmist view of the situation, in itself these are minor incidents, but it is a little difficult to understand what lies behind these minor incidents. In any event, we have to be vigilant and protect our borders as best as we can.

MR. BRAJ RAJ SINGH: I think we must have a two hour discussion for this subject.

MR. GORAY: The point is this. It is not a question of taking any alarmist view of the position or anything like that. The real issue is about what is happening in Ladakh, Bhutan, Sikkim, and in NEFA. The Prime Minister said that these localities are separated from each other by hundreds of miles. It is true, but it seems that the guiding hand behind them is the same. Therefore, the question is what is our evaluation of the Chinese policy towards us. As I said, it is not a question of the effect it produces on us. If India fails to do its duty, I suppose the next will be Burma. After that, it will be Indonesia. It may then be Laos. All these

South-East Asian countries look to us for guidance, and if we fail to protect our borders, do you mean to say that smaller countries will derive encouragement? Therefore, I want this House to discuss this matter thoroughly and the House should be taken into confidence.

MR. KHADILKAR: Are all these incidents an indication that they are a Chinese design to determine the border as is shown in the map of theirs by saying that they have come under their occupation? If one studies all the incidents—I have tried to study them—it is an indication that this is part of such a design. Their maps show that all these portions are theirs—a transgression of the so-called McMahon Line. So, is it an indication of the Chinese design to occupy them and say, "This is the border between India and China"?

MR. B. DAS GUPTA: In view of the incidents off and on in Ladakh etc., may I ask whether any proposal has been sent to the Chinese Government for any talks regarding this matter between the two Governments?

DR. RAM SUBHAG SINGH: Regarding the check-post, the Prime Minister said that it is very difficult to drop paratroopers. May I know whether it is possible—I do not want to suggest that it should be done straightaway—to bomb that area in order to extricate it from Chinese hands?

MR. HEM BARUA: May I know whether this incursion into NEFA which has been repeated in quick succession is due to the cartographic inaccuracy in the maps about which we have complained to the Chinese Government and the Chinese Government have told us that this is the handiwork of the Chiang Kai-shek regime?

MR. SPEAKER: That is the same as Shri Khadilkar's point.

MR. GOVIND MALAVIYA: Our Prime Minister has clearly indicated the general attitude of the Government in this matter. We are in a delicate situation where, on the one hand, China is a friend of ours and we have a broad foreign policy which has the approval of every section of the House. I wonder whether this going into the details will help anybody or the Opposition. Why should we raise these details and small things here and there? The problem is a big one. Can we not leave matters to the Government in such big questions and can we not have one policy on big matters? In small internal matters, we may have different policies.

MR. SPEAKER: The hon. Member may kindly leave it to the hon. Prime Minister.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: On the question of broad policies, well, broad policies are in our mind. We have to face here a particular situation. Any country which has to face that situation has to stand up to it. There can be no doubt about it. There is no alternative for us but to defend our country's borders and integrity. Having said that, at the same time, we must not, as often happens in such cases, become alarmist and panicky and thereby take wrong action.

Obviously, apart from some past information, I have given the latest information to the House, including the telegram which came to me while I was sitting here. In this telegram, apart from other things, our Ambassador has said:

I pointed out that four persons [it is really three] were still missing as a result of the incident of the 25th August and that on the 26th August, Chinese troops had overrun Longju, which the Chinese knew very well to be within Indian territory. I reiterated our Government's wish that the Chinese Government should take immediate steps to see that there was no assertion of supposed claims by force. Differences should be settled by negotiations.

We have taken the line that minor border incidents and border differences should be settled by negotiations. We must distinguish between this and that broad approach of the Chinese maps which have brushed coloured hundreds of miles of Indian territory. That is totally and manifestly unacceptable and we have made it clear. We stick to the McMahon Line. But it is quite another thing that in this long line there may be minor arguments about a mile here or a mile there. These arguments have been there before the Chinese came to Tibet. Even with the Tibetan authorities, these arguments about a mile of grazing ground here or there have been there. We admit that these are differences which exist and which should be settled. We think we are right, but let us sit round a conference table and settle them. We are prepared to take up any matter like that, but when it comes to huge chunks of territory, it is not a matter for discussion.

The one or two instances that I have stated are, again, according to us clearly intrusion into our territory. But suppose that there is some question of a Tibetan or Chinese case about a mile here or there, well, we are prepared to discuss it. But from such information

as we have received and which I have placed before the House, when their forces come, envelop our check-posts and capture them after firing, it is not the normal peaceful way of approaching these questions, even if there is a dispute. Therefore, this matter becomes a much more serious one than some incidental or accidental border affray.

I think Mr. Khadilkar or someone else asked about what lies behind this. I cannot say; it is not fair for me to guess. It will be guess work, of course; I cannot imagine that all this is a precursor to anything more serious. It seems to me so foolish for anybody, including the Chinese Government, to function in that way, and I do not give them the credit or rather the discredit for folly. Therefore, I do not think they will do it. But so far as we are concerned, we shall naturally be prepared for any eventuality and without fuss or shouting keep vigilant.

Some hon. Member, Dr. Ram Subhag Singh, I think, gave me some advice and gave some advice to our men as to how they should do, where they should air-drop and where they should not. These are things for them to consider, not for us, as to where it is possible, where it is desirable or where it is not.

An hon. Member suggested a discussion on this. I am always in favour of a discussion in this House, but I do not see how a discussion in this case will serve anyone's purpose. When things are happening, I shall place the facts before the House as they take place and if any step is to be indicated, I shall place that also before the House.

MR. VAJPAYEE: May I suggest that the Government should issue a White Paper detailing all these developments, our border disputes with the Chinese and this cartographic aggression; so that the world opinion may be well informed?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I am prepared to consider that. It will take a little time to issue such a paper.

MR. SPEAKER: In view of the elaborate statement made by the hon. Prime Minister, I do not think it is desirable that I should give consent for discussion on these adjournment motions. The consent is refused.

ALLEGED CHINESE PROPAGANDA ABOUT BHUTAN AND SIKKIM

Answering a short-notice question in Lok Sabha on 28 August 1959 as to whether the Government of India had seen reports in the press about Chinese propaganda in Sikkim that Bhutan and Sikkim were part of Chinese territory in the past and were bound to return to the Chinese motherland within the next few years; and if so, the action to be taken to remove the anxiety created by those reports among the people of Sikkim and Bhutan and border territories in India, the Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, said:

We have seen occasional reports in the press to the effect mentioned by the hon. Member. It is not possible for us to check up the authenticity of these reports. Such reports are naturally causing concern to the people of Sikkim and Bhutan and elsewhere in the border regions of India. Our position is quite clear. The Government of India is responsible for the protection of the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan and of the territorial integrity of these two States and any aggression against Bhutan and Sikkim will be considered as aggression against India.

MR. HEM BARUA: May I know whether the Governments of Sikkim and Bhutan have by now apprised our Government of the situation obtaining there? The Prime Minister said that he has seen only newspaper reports.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I can't catch the question.

MR. SPEAKER: Have the Government of Sikkim and Bhutan made representations to this Government that propaganda is being carried on there?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: We have been in touch with both the Governments, naturally. I cannot say exactly whether this particular matter was referred to by them. But the fact remains that, if I may use that word, they are not happy about the situation. They are rather nervous about what is happening roundabout them.

DR. RAM SUBHAG SINGH: As the reports indicate, the Chinese troops are all along the 500 mile border of Bhutan and Tibet; and it has also come to our notice that the traditional route to Bhutan which passes through a portion of Tibet has been closed. In the circumstances, may I know what help the Government of India are going to render to save Bhutan's economy at present? May I also know whether the Defence Ministry has studied the

entire situation from the new position which has been created at present?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: A big question, Sir. It is true that there have been some recent difficulties in a person going to Bhutan from India by the normal route which crossed a little corner of Tibet below Yatung, a route, in fact, by which I went last year, this time or a little later. There will be difficulty for Bhutanese people to cross that route. Therefore, they are using other routes.

There are other routes from India, of course; only they are longer and sometimes more difficult and these routes are being improved. In fact, quite apart from recent incidents, there is a programme of road building in Bhutan, roads from India to Bhutan and within Bhutan, and we are helping them in building those roads.

As for the hon. Member's enquiry about the Defence Ministry, the Defence Ministry no doubt keeps all these things in view and it is difficult for me to discuss what exactly the Defence Ministry may consider right or proper under a certain set of circumstances.

DR. RAM SUBHAG SINGH: May I know whether Government have received any reports of harassment of Bhutan and Sikkim citizens by the Chinese troops or Chinese nationals?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: You mean in Bhutan or Sikkim or outside?

DR. RAM SUBHAG SINGH: On the border also.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: So far as I know, I do not think there has been any incursion of Chinese troops into Bhutan or Sikkim. The Chinese troops came to those borders probably because the refugees were coming through that way, possibly to stop them or in pursuit of them. Probably, they were not more gentle with the refugees. One can imagine that. But I do not think there was any kind of conflict with the Bhutanese as such. It may be that some threats were thrown out occasionally and some Bhutanese have heard them.

DR. RAM SUBHAG SINGH: Will the Prime Minister give us a clear guarantee that in no case the Chinese will be allowed to set up any post in Bhutan or Sikkim as they have done in Ladakh?

MR. SPEAKER: There is no question of guarantee.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is a very odd question. I do not think, not only this poor Prime Minister, any Prime Minister can give guarantees of that type. All we can say is that as I have said already any kind of incursion into Bhutan or Sikkim will

be considered incursion into India, that we shall abide by the assurances we have given to them. How we shall abide by them and in what manner if circumstances arise is a matter for careful consideration. It is not a matter of a direct statement made in this House or elsewhere but of action, if necessity arises, difficult action, very difficult action and action the burden of which will have to be borne by this House. It is not an easy matter in which an easy assurance can be given which may rather sound pompous.

(Some hon. Members rose)

MR. SPEAKER: There are other similar questions.

MR. BRAJ RAJ SINGH: May I know whether we have written to the Chinese Government at Peking about this propaganda and whether we have received any reply to it?

MR. SPEAKER: Propaganda about Bhutan and Sikkim.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Yes, we have specifically written to them about this. Of course, we could not accuse the Chinese Government of propaganda. We have not stated so but we have said to them that such things are reported to us. That we have said.

AN HON. MEMBER: What was the reply?

MR. PANIGRAHI: May I know whether these reports are emanating from Chinese Government sources or sources outside China—these reports about Sikkim and Bhutan?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: These reports mostly come from naturally not Chinese Government sources. That is what I have said. I have said in my reply that it is not possible for us to check up the authenticity of these reports. But they are said to be made by lesser functionaries in Tibet, smaller people who say this.

AN HON. MEMBER: Less than five feet.

MR. SPEAKER: Let us not indulge in such kind of remarks.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: As I said we cannot say if any responsible man has said that. The people in Tibet who come to India repeated that to us in their own turn—that they have heard this kind of thing being said. It is bazaar gossip; one cannot catch it, but it produces some impression on the people. (Interruptions)

CHINESE REPLY TO INDIAN PROTEST

The Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on 4 September 1959 in reply to several calling attention motions:

Yesterday evening (September 3) in fact we received a reply from the Chinese Government to the protest we have made to them. We received it through our Embassy in Peking. It is a fairly long reply and we are examining it fully. But broadly speaking the reply says that they have not committed any aggression, and in fact they have accused us of some aggression on that border and have asked us to withdraw from one or two areas which they claim to be Chinese territory. The rest is an argument but this is the main purport of the reply. We are having that fully examined. As for what the Chinese Foreign Minister said, I believe he did say something to that effect; that is, he more or less supported the line taken up in the reply they have sent us; that is, they have not committed any aggression and in one or two places our patrols have gone into Tibetan Chinese territory.

As for Mr. Ganga Sharan's question as to what is happening on the other side of our border in Sikkim or elsewhere, it is difficult for me to say with any precision. Broadly speaking, there are very considerable numbers of troops, Chinese troops, in Tibet spread out and in the last few weeks or more, many of them are stationed on the Sikkim-India border, originally I think, with the intention perhaps of preventing the refugees from coming into India. So they are there. I cannot say in what numbers they are there. Then there was a reference to certain regions in Ladakh. It is rather difficult for me to make any accurate statement about that. But so far as the corner of the Aksaichin area is concerned, that is the area across which the Chinese built a road two years ago or more, a road from Gartok to Yarkand, which passes through that area, that has been and is claimed by the Chinese as their territory and I believe in their maps too, not the new maps but the old maps, that is shown as their territory. That is disputed and there are two viewpoints about that. I do not know how many Chinese are there. I cannot say because so far as we are concerned, we have no representative, we can have none. It is not an inhabited area so far as area goes. It is at an average of 16,000 to 17,000 feet altitude and

treeless, grassless almost or hardly of any kind, without any living thing there. It is frightfully cold. So I cannot give any information as to how many Chinese may be in that particular corner of Ladakh-Aksaichin area.

MRS. YASHODA REDDY: The Chinese have come into our border and have built air-fields. The Chinese have sent a reply to our protest that we are more on the offensive than they are and even the other day the Russian Minister speaking in the Inter-Parliamentary Union said that they believed that India was on the offensive and not the Chinese. Such statements by the Chinese and the Russians do cause us concern. Has the Prime Minister taken any objection to the statement made by the Russian Minister in a discussion in the Inter-Parliamentary Union saying that India was in the wrong and not China?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: No, Sir, because we have no particular report of that or the context of it. Even the report that has appeared in the press is that that matter was raised at the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Russian representative said that it appeared from the reports he had that India was more at fault than China. Some such phrase appeared. Naturally he must have received reports from China or wherever it is. There is no question of our objecting to every statement that a person makes.

MR. V. K. DHAGE: I did ask another question as to whether the Prime Minister has apprised the three Great Powers with regard to the situation in this regard?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Well, Sir, not directly but as is usual with us, whenever any important matter occurs, we inform our various missions abroad, we send them a report of the facts and the steps we are taking and we ask them wherever necessary to inform the Government concerned there. That is what we have done and in pursuance of that, I suppose some of our Ambassadors abroad brought these matters to the attention of the Governments concerned but there was no direct message from us to the Governments concerned.

MR. GANGA SHARAN SINHA: Does the reply given by the Chinese authorities tally with our facts? Is it true that our people have encroached or infiltrated into their territory or something like that?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: It does not tally with our version of the facts. Obviously that is why we are arguing and we are having this detailed reply and they have mentioned many things in

it—names of places about which we have no information. We are trying to get information. In the next two or three days we will probably get more information so as to be able to reply to them as we propose to do in the course of a few days. May I mention to this House that we are preparing a kind of a White Paper which will contain the correspondence between the Government of India and the Government of China in the last four or five years, ever since our Tibetan treaty. That may not be cent per cent up to date in the sense that if I get a message today, it may not be in it but it will be fairly up to date till the last ten days or so. As soon as it is ready, I hope before the Parliament adjourns, it will be placed on the table of the House.

MR. GANGA SHARAN SINHA: Regarding the information that is being collected, may I request him to place before this House as soon as the information is available because we do not know how many Chinese have come there. Just now he gave some information that in that place there is no habitation.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Yes, but I am afraid I cannot do so because I cannot get any information. It is totally—I will not say totally—but it is not within our reach. It will take, if I sent a party of explorers with exploring kit, about a month to get there.

MR. JASWANT SINGH: Sir, there are also reports in the press that along our Ladakh and Tibetan borders, the Chinese are establishing some bases. Is there any truth in them? Has the Government got any information in regard to that aspect of the matter?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: In Tibet?

MR. CHAIRMAN: On Ladakh and Tibetan borders, he says.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Which side of the border? In their territory or our territory?

MR. JASWANT SINGH: In our territory.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Certainly not, there is no truth in them.

MR. V. K. DHAGE: I welcome the move of the Prime Minister to have a White Paper published on this matter and placed on the table of the House. Would he also consider the possibility of having a discussion on that White Paper before Parliament adjourns?

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: I don't know; it depends on many factors, on the time available and on the desirability of it. I don't know. Once the House sees the White Paper and knows what we are doing, then it will be time enough to consider what further steps should be taken.

INDIA WILL NOT TAKE TIBETAN ISSUE TO UN— PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT

The Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on 4 September 1959 in reply to a non-official resolution urging that India should take the Tibetan issue to the United Nations:

The resolution moved by the hon. Member appears to be a fairly simple one, simply-worded. But as the course of this debate has shown, behind that resolution lie high international issues and big problems with big consequences. Now, I suppose everyone in this House has a feeling of the deepest sympathy at the sufferings of the Tibetan people. There is no doubt about that. As everyone knows, we have given refuge and asylum not only to the Dalai Lama but to nearly 13,000 others. In fact we have given refuge to everyone who came. I cannot remember the case of a single person whom we denied refuge in this case, in regard to Tibet. That itself was evidence of our feelings in this matter.

But feelings apart, our sympathy for the Tibetans apart, what exactly should we do about it? What exactly should we do even, let us say, to give expression to those feelings of sympathy? Some hon. Members have delivered rather brave speeches as to the evil deeds perpetrated by other countries. It is easy enough to talk about them and it is easy enough to find many faults in the ways the countries behave. But, if a country like India has to function, we have to function in a mature way, in a considered way, in a way which at least promises some kind of results. It is absolutely—I should say respectfully—pointless for us to make brave gestures and it is worse than pointless, if these brave gestures react and rebound on us and injure us or injure the cause which we seek to promote.

TIBET'S HISTORY

So far as this question of Tibet is concerned, we may look at it from many points of view: historical, cultural and other contacts with India, China, etc. It is a long and chequered history and one need not go into it. When a country had had a long and chequered history, it gives enough material, it supplies enough material for any party to support any claim. The Chinese claim that Tibet was subject to their sovereignty or suzerainty, I do not know what word

they use, for hundreds of years. The Tibetans claim that they were independent for many periods except when they were forced into some kind of subservience. Now, really this may be interesting to the historical students, but it does not help us. It is a fact, of course, that after a period of 40 years or so, for all practical purposes, ever since the Manchu Dynasty fell or a little after that, Tibet was practically independent; even so not 100 per cent, even so China never gave up her claim. But in effect it was independent.

As I said, it does not help us very much. Of course, if this question arose in the International Court of Justice at The Hague—of course, it will not; such questions do not arise there because national States do not take them there and China, anyhow, has nothing to do with the International Court of Justice at The Hague—they might consider all these questions.

CHINA'S SUZERAINTY

The two or three main considerations are that internationally considered Tibet has not been considered as an independent country. It has been considered an autonomous country but under the suzerainty or sovereignty of China. That was the case before India became independent with the United Kingdom, with Russia—not only the Soviet Union but the Czarist Russia previous to that—and these were the main countries concerned. The rest of the world did not pay the slightest attention to Tibet except that it was some kind of a land of mystery.

That being so, when India became independent and we inherited more or less the position as it was in British days, both the advantages and the disadvantages of it, well, for a moment we carried on. We did not like many things there—I mean to say the extra-territorial privileges that we have there which certainly were relics of British imperialism in Tibet. We did not like that particularly, but we were too busy for the first year or two to interfere with anything.

Then came this Chinese incursion or invasion into Tibet. At no time had we denied Chinese overleadership of Tibet, you might call it what you like. That has been the position all along. Even in recent years we have not denied it. Even after independence, even before the People's Government of China came there we had not denied it. In fact, we had somewhat functioned as if we accepted it.

Now, when this came we had to face a difficult situation in law, and constitutionally speaking we could not say anything because of the position we had accepted and the world had accepted. Nevertheless, we were rather pained and upset at the way things were happening, armies marching and what appeared to be a forcible conquest and occupation of Tibet. We sent some notes in those days, some one or two notes politely worded, expressing the hope that this question would be peacefully solved. I am afraid, the replies we got from the Chinese Government were not equally politely worded at that time. I am speaking from memory . . .

AN HON. MEMBER: That is a fact.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: That is a fact. I am talking about the sequence of events; that I am speaking from memory.

Then, a country, El Salvador, a member of the United Nations, sponsored some kind of a motion on Tibet in the United Nations. It was a motion for the inclusion of the item on the agenda of the General Assembly and with it was a draft resolution condemning what they called, the unprovoked aggression in Tibet and suggesting the appointment of a committee to study the appropriate measures to be taken.

DISCUSSION AT UN

Now, there was some discussion on this question of the inclusion of the item on the agenda. The representative of India, and I believe the representative in this particular case was the Jamsaheb of Nawanagar, pleaded that this matter might be settled peacefully and it would be better not to take it up in this way. He added, I believe, that we had received some assurances from the Chinese Government that they wanted to settle it peacefully by negotiation, and, therefore, the inclusion of this item on the agenda be adjourned. This suggestion was supported by the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Australia, the Soviet Union, and for its own reasons no doubt, even by what might be called Kuomintang China in Formosa. The item was postponed. The postponement was agreed to.

On what basis did the Jamsaheb say that we had received assurances from the Chinese Government? I am sorry I have not got the exact papers with me, but so far as I can remember, we had received a message from the Chinese Government in answer to our representations and to our requests to the effect that they wanted

to settle it by negotiation and in a peaceful way. In fact, I think they had stopped the march of their army somewhere near the eastern borders of Tibet.

Also, some representatives of the Tibetan Government sent by the Dalai Lama were to proceed to Peking to discuss this matter. In those days, until quite recently, the easiest and simplest way for a person going from Lhasa to Peking was via India. It was much more difficult to go via the Gobi desert and all that. In fact, even after the People's Government of China came into power, on several occasions many Chinese travelled via India to Tibet. It was simpler: from Calcutta right up to Gangtok in Sikkim and through the Nathu La onwards. The Tibetan representatives, on their way to Peking, came to Delhi. It was more or less natural. Also, I suppose, they wanted to consult us. This happened ten years ago, and I have no very clear recollection of the sequence of events. I know they remained in Delhi for rather a long time; why exactly, it was not clear to me. Anyhow they did. It was this sequence of events that led us to make that suggestion in the United Nations, and the matter was not discussed.

Afterwards, as a matter of fact, there was no proper negotiation with the team that the Tibetans sent. Long before they reached Peking, the other developments took place in Tibet. I think the Chinese army started marching again and the Dalai Lama and his representatives came to an agreement with them. Maybe, of course, the agreement might have been under compulsion of events, under pressure, but it was an agreement signed on behalf of the Dalai Lama.

May I say this in this connection? The hon. Member Mr. Vajpayee stated that the Dalai Lama came to the 17-point agreement with China because of certain assurances that I gave him and further that this was after the Chinese Prime Minister's visit to India. He has got these things rather mixed up. There was no question of my giving any assurances, and the Chinese Prime Minister had not come to India and I had not gone to China. I had not met the Chinese Prime Minister at the time of this so-called 17-point agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Dalai Lama's Government, whatever it was. So, the question of any assurances from us does not come in at all. The only thing that we accepted was—based on the message received from the Chinese Government—what the Jamsaheb said in the United Nations

Security Council, namely, that the Chinese said they wanted a peaceful settlement of this question.

After that, there was this 17-point agreement in which some stress was laid on the autonomy of Tibet. Again it would be wrong to say that this stress on autonomy was included there because of our pressure and our desire. Certainly, it was our desire undoubtedly, but when the agreement was concluded, we were not there, we were not asked to express our opinion. It was between the Chinese Government and the Tibetans. So, it is not correct to say that they had given us an assurance, which they broke later.

TALKS WITH CHOU EN-LAI

What happened was that, several years afterwards, when Premier Chou En-lai came here, we had talks about Tibet and the Dalai Lama too was here at that time. The talks, I believe, were really initiated by Premier Chou En-lai and he wanted to explain to me—he did explain—what their position was in regard to Tibet, not because he was answering some charge made by me or because he thought that it was incumbent on him to do so, but because he felt—I take it—that we had friendly relations and he had to try to convince me of China's position in this case.

He began by telling me that Tibet had always been a part of the Chinese State, "always" meaning for hundreds and hundreds of years. Occasionally when China was weak, that sovereignty was not exercised properly, but he said Tibet had always been a part of Chinese State. That was his case. He further added, but Tibet is not China proper. It is part of the Chinese State. It is not the Han people there. Chinese are the Han people but these are the Mongols, Manchus, Tibetans, etc. Tibet, he said, is not a province of China. It is an autonomous region of the Chinese State and we want to respect that autonomy. That is what he told me. In fact, he went on to say that some people imagined that we want to thrust communism on Tibet. That is absurd, because the Tibetans, socially speaking, are so backward that communism is very far from the Tibetan state of affairs now. But, he said, certainly it is a very backward State and we want to make them progress socially, economically, etc.

Even, then, i.e. three years ago, some trouble had started internally in Tibet or rather on the eastern border of Tibet, particularly in an area which was not in Tibet proper, but it was Tibetan really in

population—the Kham area which was on the eastern border of Tibet, but inhabited by Tibetans. This portion had been incorporated in China a little ago; I forget when, but not now anyway, but previous to all this. The Tibetans there, the Khampas, did not take kindly to certain Chinese measures, because although the Chinese Government left Tibet proper more or less untouched in the sense of any so-called land reforms or any other reforms, politically they held Tibet firmly. But they did not interfere, that is what Premier Chou En-lai told me: “We did not wish to interfere; let them gradually develop themselves.” But in this eastern part which was considered a part of China—they treated it as a part of China—this ultimately led to the Khampa rebellion there, a kind of guerilla rebellion, which had already lasted for a fair time, a year or more, when Premier Chou En-lai came here three years ago. We did not discuss that. But he referred to it and said: “We do not wish to interfere with the Tibetans, with their internal structure, internal autonomy, social custom, religion or anything; but we would not, of course, tolerate rebellion and foreign interference, etc.” Well, I do not know what he meant or thought when he said foreign interference or imperialist interference, but I find that they had some kind of a link in their minds, not so much, I think, of India having anything to do with it, but of foreign countries, United Kingdom or America somehow making incursions into Tibet, because they had got those countries in their mind. They have not quite realised that the United Kingdom has absolutely no interest in Tibet since they left India. They just cannot reach it. They have no means, no representative there; they have nobody there even to give them any news. And, to my knowledge, neither has the United States, in fact. The only representative in Tibet of any other country is that of India, the Consul-General. Probably the Soviet Union also; possibly also Mongolians. But what I meant to say was there were no Europeans or Americans. Anyhow this is what he told me: the rebellion is going on. But it was more an explanation to me. It was not some kind of an assurance extracted by me from Premier Chou En-lai. I say this because people might say: “Oh, you did this because of that guarantee given to you.” It was not a guarantee in that sense. It was certainly something which, when I heard, pleased me, about the autonomy of Tibet, etc. But I have no business to call him to account saying: “You guaranteed and you are not doing it”; in that sense, though I must say that I was pained

when, because of other developments, the structure of the autonomy broke down completely.

INTERNAL REVOLT

Well, this internal revolt in Tibet gradually spread month after month, year after year. It spread slowly from the east westwards. And I have personally little doubt that the great majority of Tibetans, even though, they did not during this period participate in it, sympathised with it; I have no doubt about it. And that is for obvious reasons, not on any high grounds but for the simple reason that the Tibetans, like others, have a strong nationalist sense, and they resented these when they considered outsiders coming in and upsetting their life and all the structures in which they lived. So, this spread and then other things happened.

One need not go into the detailed history but the trouble in Lhasa itself, partly of course, I think, may have been caused by various activities of the Chinese governors. Where a ruler, an outsider, an alien ruler has to deal with the population which is not friendly, well, the relationship can well be imagined. It is not a healthy relationship. The ruler is afraid, the people are afraid, both of each other. And when fear governs the relations of two parties, it is likely to lead to bad results. In fact, wherever a country is a subject country, that is an unhealthy relationship. Well, that led to this upheaval in Tibet and the Dalai Lama's flight from Lhasa, coming to India and so on and so forth. After that I have no accurate news of what has happened.

I think we may broadly say that there has been strong military pressure on several parts of Tibet and the Tibetans enjoy far from autonomy under the military government there. It may be that the stories that we hear about happenings inside Tibet are exaggerated, because most of the stories inevitably come from refugees, and refugees, however good they may be, having suffered themselves, are apt to give rather a coloured picture, and the picture is not of what they have seen or what they have heard. So, it goes on increasing. So, it may be that the stories are exaggerated. But as a responsible person I cannot repeat these stories till I have some kind of a proof. But whether they are exaggerated or not there can be little doubt that a great deal has happened in Tibet which is deplorable and that the people of Tibet have suffered much and that it can certainly not be said that it is a happy family living together.

INDIA'S APPROACH

Previously when this matter came up before this House I said that our approach to these problems is governed by two or three factors. Among these I mentioned two—our sympathy for the Tibetan people and our desire to maintain friendly relations with China. Now that may appear to be something contradictory and it does in the present context slightly contradict each other. That is the difficulty of the situation. But that does not get away from our basic approach which is governed by these two factors. The third factor, of course, is and always will be the integrity of India and the freedom of India. It is our first duty to protect that.

Why do I say that? Because I want to repeat that any step that we may take now cannot be taken in a huff, if I may say so, because we are angry and we do something regardless of the consequence of that step. We work not only in the present but for the future—for the distant future. I have always thought that it is important, even essential if you like, that these two countries of Asia, India and China, should have friendly and as far as possible cooperative relations. It is a remarkable fact of history—and I do not think you will find it duplicated elsewhere at any time—that during these 2,000 years of relationship between India and China they have not had any kind of military conflict. It has been a cultural relationship. It has been to some extent a trade relationship. It has been a religious association. Throughout these long periods they were not passive countries. They were active, positive countries. They went in those days, not like the later days in India when we did become a passive, inert country, tied down by caste—and do not cross the seas and do not touch this man and do not see that man—that type of country we developed—our people went on adventures. They went all over the South-Eastern seas. They established colonies. They established, not imperialist colonies, but independent colonies. In fact the effect of India all over the South-Eastern region was tremendous. You see it today. So also was the effect of China there. So these two great big powerful countries were constantly meeting and yet there was no conflict. It is a remarkable fact of history. Certainly nowhere in Europe will you find such a thing or for the matter of that in Asia.

Now it seemed to me that in the future it would be a tragedy not only for India, and possibly for China, but for Asia and the world

if we develop some kind of permanent hostility. Natural friendship does not exist if you are weak and if you are looked down upon as a weak country. Friendship cannot exist between the weak and the strong, between a country that is trying to bully and the other who accepts to be bullied. Whether it is an individual or a group or a country that does not happen. It is only when people are more or less equal, when people respect each other that they are friends. So also nations. But subject to that we did work for the friendship of India and China. May I say that in spite of all that has happened and is happening today that is still our objective and we shall continue to work for it. That does not mean that we should surrender in anything that we consider right or that we should hand over bits of territory of India to China to please them. That is not the way to be friends with anybody or to maintain our dignity or self-respect. But in the long run, it is of importance for these two great countries, whatever their internal structures and policies might be, to be friends.

I know that sometimes it is difficult to feel friendly when one hears things that irritate, that anger, when we see that our people have not been treated even courteously, when we receive communications from the Chinese Government, which are singularly lacking in even ordinary politeness. All that is irritating. But, then, it is easy enough for any one to get angry and irritated. It is necessary for people who hold responsible positions not to allow themselves to be irritated, certainly to maintain the dignity of the country and the continuity of our policy too.

PANCH SHEEL EXPLAINED

Many people charge us, "What about your famous Panch Sheel, where are these five principles; dead and gone and buried or cremated?" Well, it is whatever you like. That indicates a completely wrong approach to this question. What is Panch Sheel? Panch Sheel or the five principles—they did not become principles because they were embodied in a treaty between India and China—they stand by themselves, principles of international relationship which we held to be correct, and we shall hold to them even if all the world says "no" to them. Of course, it is obvious that if the other party does not agree to them, that relationship does not subsist. The principles remain true all the same. When people are wise enough, they come back to them. Therefore, there is no question of Panch

Sheel failing. It may be, if you like, the question of India failing or China failing. But, the principles remain. This is the outlook.

If you will permit me to go slightly outside the purview of this resolution, we have to face certain difficult situations on our borders and elsewhere: about the treatment accorded to our people in Tibet by the Chinese authorities. I may inform the House that the first thing that I do every morning is to open a bunch of telegrams, a pretty big bunch. I should imagine that in every bunch there are at least five or six dealing with this affair either from Peking or Lhasa or Gyantse or Yatung, just the latest happenings, the latest developments. Of course, the telegrams we get from Gyantse, Yatung and Lhasa cannot tell us about the happenings in Tibet, because they have no communication with the rest of Tibet. They can only see more or less round about the Consulate or the Trade Agency and tell us what are the happenings today. There are petty problems arising. Almost every morning, usually, at least, I start the day in a not too pleasant mood, because of these messages. I try to overcome that. I am getting accustomed to some extent to do that.

BORDER INCIDENTS

We have got to deal with these difficult problems, these border incidents. If any one asks me, as they sometimes do, what do the border incidents indicate, frankly, I do not know what might be in the minds of the other party: whether it is just local aggressiveness or just to show us our place, if I may use a colloquial phrase, so that we may not get uppish or whether it is something deeper. I do not know.

I might inform the House that only last evening, we received a fairly long reply from the Chinese Government. That is a reply to the protest I had sent a few days ago about these incidents on the North East Frontier border. It is a fairly long reply. It will, naturally, require very careful consideration. But, broadly speaking, the reply is a repudiation of our charge that they had come on our territory, that they had started firing on our patrol there and charging us with having come on their territory and having opened fire on them: that is, complete conflict in the facts, reversal of the facts here.

AN HON. MEMBER: Reversal of the McMahon Line.

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Of course, we shall examine that reply carefully because it is a long and more or less argued note,

with lots of places mentioned and other things. And we shall send them a reply fairly soon, that is, in the next two or three days.

May I also repeat what I said here that before this House rises this session, I hope to place a White Paper containing correspondence between the Chinese Government and our Government ever since the treaty between India and China in regard to Tibet, that is, during the last five years, so that the House may have the background of what has been happening?

Now, all this is there. We have, on the one hand, naturally to protect our borders. And when I say that I want to hold myself, and somewhat restrain my powerful reactions so as not to go too far, in, let us say, military measures and the like; because, when nations get excited and all their prestige is involved, then, step by step, they are driven often in wrong directions. So, we try, at any rate, to balance, balance in the sense of a firm policy where we think we are in the right, nevertheless, with always a door open to accommodation, a door open to a settlement, wherever this is possible.

Broadly speaking, in regard to this border, that is, the border incidents, as I have just mentioned, they say that we have committed aggression. Now, it is a question of fact, whether this village or that village or this little strip of territory is on their side or on our side. Normally, wherever these are relatively petty disputes, well, it does seem to me rather absurd for two great countries or two small countries immediately to rush at each other's throat and to decide whether two miles of territory are on this side or on that side, and especially, two miles of territory in the high mountains, where nobody lives. But where national prestige and dignity is involved, it is not the two miles of territory, it is the nation's dignity and self-respect that become involved in it. And, therefore, this happens. But I do not wish, in so far as I can, to press the issue so far that there is no escape for either country, because their national dignities are involved, except a recourse to arms. That is not, I hope...

DR. RAM SUBHAG SINGH: What is the boundary, according to the latest report? What is the boundary which they have indicated according to the latest reply that we have received from them?

MCMAHON LINE

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: How can I say that without a large map and all kinds of little things about villages and all that? The present dispute about that matter is relatively a small matter;

whether it may be two miles this side or that side is not a very big thing; but I do not know what their map is, here, there and elsewhere. So far as I am concerned, I have often stated how our frontier from the Burma border right up to the Bhutan border is the McMahon Line; we hold by that.

MR. ACHAR: Do they? . .

MR. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: Please allow me to continue. Please do not attach too much importance to what appears in the newspapers. I speak with a little greater authority on this subject.

That is the McMahon Line, and we hold by it, and we think it is highly objectionable, highly improper for the Chinese Government to go on issuing maps colouring half of the North Eastern Frontier Agency, one-third of Assam and one-third of Bhutan as if they belong to China. That is really an affront. I can understand something happening for a little while, and some mistake; but a continuing thing, to be told year after year for ten years that "Oh, well, we shall look into it, when we have leisure" is not a good enough answer.

But having accepted broadly the McMahon Line, I am prepared to discuss any interpretation of the McMahon Line; minor interpretation here and there—that is a different matter—not these big chunks but the minor interpretation whether this hill is there or this little bit is on that side or on this side, on the facts, on the maps, on the evidence available. That I am prepared to discuss with the Chinese Government. I am prepared to have any kind of conciliatory, mediatory process to consider this. I am prepared to have arbitration of any authority agreed to by the two parties about these minor rectifications, where they are challenged by them or by us, whichever the case may be. That is a different matter. I say this because I do not take up that kind of narrow attitude that whatever I say is right and whatever the other person says is wrong. But the broad McMahon Line has to be accepted and so far as we are concerned, it is there and we accept it.

LADAKH'S POSITION

The position about Ladakh is somewhat different. The McMahon Line does not go there. That is governed by ancient treaties over 100 years old between the then ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Gulab Singh, who was a feudatory of the Sikh ruler of the Punjab at the time. This was in the Thirties of the 19th century. On the one side,

there was the treaty of 1842 and on the other side, another between the ruler of Lhasa and the representative of the Emperor of China, which resulted in Ladakh being recognised as a part of Kashmir State.

Now, nobody has challenged that. Nobody challenges it now. But the actual boundary of Ladakh with Tibet was not very carefully defined. It was defined to some extent by British officers who went there. But I rather doubt if they did any careful survey. They marked the line. It has been marked all along in our maps. They did it. As people do not live there, by and large, it does not make any difference. It did not make any difference. At that time, nobody cared about it.

Now, the question arose: We are prepared to sit down and discuss these minor things. But discuss it on what terms? First, treaties, existing maps, etc. Secondly, usage, what has been the usage all these years. Thirdly, geography. By geography, I mean physical features like water-sheds, ridge of a mountain, not a bit of plain divided up. These are convenient features for international boundaries.

I have gone out of my way to refer to these various matters in connection with this resolution which deals with a simpler issue. Coming back to this particular resolution, quite apart from the sympathy which the hon. Mover and some other hon. Members feel for the Tibetans, if we take an action, it should be justifiable in law and in Constitution and we should hope for some results, some results which will help us to achieve the objective aimed at.

Looking at it from the point of view of justification, the United Nations may come into the picture for two reasons. One is, violation of human rights and the other, aggression. Now, violation of human rights applies to those who have accepted the Charter of the United Nations, in other words, those members of the United Nations who have accepted the Charter. Strictly speaking, you cannot apply the Charter to people who have not accepted the Charter, who have not been allowed to come into the United Nations.

Secondly, if you talk about aggression, aggression by one sovereign independent State on another. As I told you, in so far as world affairs are concerned, Tibet has not been acknowledged as an independent State for a considerable time, even long before this happened—much less after. Therefore, it is difficult to justify aggression.

PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES

Now, you may say that these may be rather legal pleas. But I am merely pointing out a constitutional aspect of the difficulties and the procedures involved.

Then, I come to a certain practical aspect. And that is, what good will it achieve? Suppose we get over the legal quibbles and legal difficulties. It may lead to a debate in the General Assembly or the Security Council wherever it is taken up, a debate which will be an acrimonious debate, an angry debate, a debate which will be after the fashion of cold war. Having had the debate what then will the promoters of that debate and that motion do? Nothing more. They will return home. After having brought matters to a higher temperature, fever heat, they will go home. They have done their duty because they can do nothing else.

Obviously, nobody is going to send an army to Tibet or China for that was not done in the case of Hungary which is a part of Europe and which is more allied to European nations. It is fantastic to think they will move in that way in Tibet. Obviously not. So, all that will happen is an expression of strong opinions by some, other countries denying it and the matter being raised to the level of cold war—brought into the domain of cold war—and probably producing reactions on the Chinese Government which are more adverse to Tibet and the Tibetan people than even now. So, the ultimate result is no relief to the Tibetan people but something the reverse of it.

The question, both from the constitutional and the legal point of view, is not clear. In fact, persons who have examined it think that it is difficult to bring it there. And, from the practical point of view also there is no good result. Then, what exactly is the purpose of taking that subject, except may be to satisfy some kind of urge to show sympathy or to show that we are angry. I can understand that urge certainly. But we must not allow the urge to take the reins into its hands and take us away with it to unknown regions and dangerous regions. Therefore, I am unable to accept this resolution and I would suggest to the House also not to accept it.

THE STATE OF BHUTAN

Bhutan is an independent State on the south-eastern flank of the Himalayas. It is bounded by India, Tibet and the small Himalayan State of Sikkim. The area is 18,000 square miles and the population a little over 300,000. The capital is Punakha.

Relations between India and Bhutan are governed by a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship signed in Darjeeling on August 8, 1949, following Indo-Bhutanese talks earlier held in New Delhi. This treaty replaced the earlier one between the British-Indian Government and Bhutan.

It was officially stated that the new treaty was designed to regulate in a friendly manner and upon a solid and durable basis the state of affairs caused by the termination of the British Government's authority in India and promote and foster relations of friendship and neighbourliness between Independent India and Bhutan.

The main features of the treaty are:

(1) India would not interfere in the internal administration of Bhutan; (2) the Government of Bhutan would be guided by the advice of the Government of India in its external relations; (3) in place of compensation granted to Bhutan under the treaties of 1865 and 1910, and a temporary subsidy of 100,000 rupees per annum granted by the Government of India to Bhutan in 1942, India would make an annual payment of 500,000 rupees to Bhutan; (4) India would return to Bhutan an area of 32 square miles in the Dewangiri district; (5) there should be freedom of trade and commerce between Indian and Bhutanese territories; (6) Bhutan would receive all facilities for the carriage, by land and water, of her produce throughout Indian territory; (7) Bhutanese subjects residing in India and Indian subjects resident in Bhutan, would have equal rights with the subjects of the respective Governments.

THE STATE OF SIKKIM

Sikkim is a small Himalayan Kingdom, which is a Protectorate of India. It is bounded by Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal and the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. It has an area of 2,818 square miles and a population of less than 122,000.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs announced in June 1949 that the Government of India had taken over the administration of the Himalayan State of Sikkim at the request of the Maharaja, as an emergency measure to prevent serious disorder arising from a political conflict between the Ruler and his people.

The announcement referred to the history of the political relations between India and Sikkim, which dated from about 1817 and, until the transfer of power in August 1947, were regulated by a treaty of 1861, whilst since the creation of the Indian Dominion relations had been governed by a "standstill" agreement which maintained existing arrangements pending the negotiation of a new treaty. "After the transfer of power in 1947", the announcement continued, "a number of political parties, of which the Sikkim State Congress is numerically the strongest, became active in Sikkim. In February 1949, after the annual session of the State Congress at Rangpo, a number of its leaders were arrested. Their supporters marched to Gangtok [capital of Sikkim] and created a commotion, but the intervention of the Political Officer of the Government of India prevented conflict between the Congress and the Maharaja. The leaders were released and negotiations were started for the formation of an interim Government in which the State Congress would be represented. Earlier in May, an interim Government, in which the Congress leader took office as Chief Minister and his colleagues were included as Ministers, was actually formed. But this settlement proved satisfactory only on the surface. . . . The tension between the Maharaja and the interim Government continued even after the latter had been formed. The Political Officer of the Government of India reported that the State was threatened with disorder which neither the Maharaja nor the Ministry would be able to control."

At the Political Officer's recommendation, the statement said, Dr. Kesar ([then] Indian Deputy Minister for External Affairs) had visited Gangtok at the end of May and had proposed, in view of the

tension between the Ministry and the Maharaja, the possibility of bloodshed, and the danger of a breakdown in the administration, that the Government of India should appoint a Dewan to take over the administration until the situation became normal. He had also informed the Maharaja that the Political Officer might, if necessary, be entrusted with the administration pending the new Dewan's arrival, and had recommended that a small force should be sent to Gangtok to help the Political Officer in maintaining law and order, if required. A company of Indian troops had accordingly been sent to Sikkim on June 2, but on the following day, the Political Officer had reported that the situation was getting worse, and on June 6, the Maharaja had informed the Political Officer that the administration could not be carried out satisfactorily without the Government of India's assistance, requesting him to take over the administration pending the appointment of a Dewan to whom he (the Maharaja) would delegate all powers necessary for carrying on the administration until normal conditions were restored. The Political Officer had informed the Ministers the same day that the Indian Government were assuming responsibility for the administration.

The announcement concluded: "The Government of India have been constrained to take this step in the interest of law and order. As requested by the Maharaja, a Dewan will be sent as soon as possible. The Government of India have no desire that legitimate political activity in the State should be stopped or that the representatives of the people should not be associated with the administration. They are anxious that political development in Sikkim should follow the peaceful and progressive way it has followed in Indian States. They cannot, however, allow disorder to prevail in Sikkim. It is their sincere hope that the present emergency arrangements may be terminated in the near future so that political evolution in Sikkim may take an even and peaceful course."

A new treaty between India and Sikkim, providing for the continuance of the latter State as a Protectorate of India enjoying autonomy in regard to its internal affairs, was signed at Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim, on December 5, 1949.

The treaty cancelled all previous treaties between the British Government and Sikkim which were still legally in force as between India and Sikkim; laid down that India would be responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim and would have

the right to take "such measures as it considered necessary for the defence of Sikkim or the security of India", including the stationing of Indian troops in Sikkim; provided that the external relations of Sikkim would be "conducted and regulated solely by the Government of India", that the Government of Sikkim would have no direct dealings with any foreign power, and that Sikkimese nationals travelling to foreign countries would be treated as Indian-protected persons for the purpose of passports, receiving from Indian representatives abroad the same protection and facilities as Indian nationals; and stipulated that the Government of Sikkim would not levy any import duty, transit duty, or other impost on Indian goods brought into or in transit through Sikkim, with reciprocal treatment for goods of Sikkimese origin brought into India.

The treaty also laid down that India would have the exclusive right of constructing, maintaining and regulating the use of railways, aerodromes, landing grounds, air navigation facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones and wireless installations in Sikkim; that Sikkim might, however, construct, maintain, and regulate the use of railways, aerodromes, landing grounds, and air navigation facilities to such extent as might be agreed to by India; and that India would be entitled to construct and maintain roads in Sikkim for strategic purposes of improving communications with adjacent countries.

The remaining provisions of the treaty confirmed the right of nationals of both countries to enter and move within the other country, as well as to carry on trade and acquire property subject to local regulations; provided for mutual cooperation in legal matters and for extradition proceedings against fugitive offenders of either country; stipulated that India would pay to the Government of Sikkim 300,000 rupees annually "so long as the terms of this treaty are duly observed by the Government of Sikkim", the first payment being made before December 31, 1950; gave the Indian Government the right to appoint a representative at Gangtok; and provided that any dispute in the interpretation of the treaty which could not be resolved by mutual consultation should be referred to the Chief Justice of India for final decision.

The treaty came into force with immediate effect.

(—From the Keesing's Archives)

WORLD JURISTS' REPORT ON GENOCIDE AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GENEVA, JUNE 5

The International Commission of Jurists said in a statement here today that after studying evidence regarding the Chinese suppression of Tibet, it had concluded that there had been a "deliberate violation of fundamental human rights".

A report approved by the Commission said: "There is also a *prima facie* case that on the part of the Chinese, there has been an attempt to destroy the national, ethnical, racial and religious group of Tibetans by killing members of the group and by causing serious bodily harm to members of the group.

"These acts constitute the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention of the United Nations of 1948."

The report on Tibet was prepared, at the request of the Commission, by Mr. Purshottam Trikamdas, Indian member of the Commission.

The International Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organisation with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. It is made up of individual lawyers and legal organisations.

The Commission itself consists of 22 members from different countries under the presidentship of Mr. Joseph T. Thorson, of Canada.

Presenting a summary of his report at a press conference here today Mr. Trikamdas said the Commission had decided to send the report to the United Nations and to ask it to take such action as it might consider appropriate.

INDEPENDENT STATUS OF TIBET

The summary of Mr. Trikamdas's report tracing the history of Tibet states: "From 1912 to 1950 there was no Chinese law, no Chinese judge, no Chinese policeman on the street corner; there was no Chinese newspaper, no Chinese soldier, and even no representative of the Chinese government."

The report recalled that "in 1950 China assured India that China had no intention of incorporating Tibet into China by force or otherwise and was willing to negotiate with Tibet regarding the future relationship of Tibet with China. But a few weeks later

the invasion of Tibet took place—on the 7th of October, 1950. On the 19th October, 1950, Chamdo in Eastern Tibet was captured and on the 24th Peking announced that the forces had been ordered to advance into Tibet to free three million Tibetans from imperialist oppression."

The report referred to the 17-point agreement between Tibet and China concluded on 23rd May, 1951 and recalled that "in 1956 Mr. Chou En-lai assured Mr. Nehru that China did not consider Tibet as a province of China, but as an autonomous region. He also said that it was absurd for anyone to imagine that China was going to force communism on Tibet, though reforms would come progressively. They proposed, however, to postpone the reforms for a considerable time. About that time the Dalai Lama was in India and Mr. Nehru conveyed these assurances."

The report went on to state: "In 1957 Mr. Mao Tse-tung in his so-called hundred flowers speech said that reforms in Tibet would not be introduced during the period 1958-62 and that the introduction of proposed reforms would depend on the wishes of the Tibetan people."

FORCED LABOUR

The report, describing the events in Tibet since the Chinese occupation, said the Communists had systematically tried to destroy all facets of Tibetan life.

The report said that "soon after 1951 the first impact of Chinese control was felt in the feverish construction of roads and highways. The labour for this work was Tibetan men, women and children, laymen and monks, many of them forcibly drafted for the work. It is alleged that up to 200,000 were forced into these labour projects and about one-fourth of them are said to have died from the cold weather, hunger and fatigue." It quoted a witness as reporting: "The financial and physical losses sustained goes into thousands of acres of agricultural land. The Chinese destroyed agricultural lands, irrigation systems and ancient consolidated holdings by indiscriminately using the tracts in the name of highway priority. Numerous religious monuments, shrines, Maniwalls and even houses of poor peasants that were in the path of the highway or road were destroyed."

CHINESE IMMIGRATION

The report stated: "There is no doubt that since 1952 there

has been large-scale Chinese immigration into Tibet, particularly in the North-East and Eastern areas. According to reliable sources, about five million Chinese have already been settled. The present population of Tibet is estimated at 3,000,000 people. The Tibetans naturally feel that as a result of this vast settlement of Chinese in Tibet, a complete destruction of Tibetan identity will be brought about in the foreseeable future. The Chinese immigrants have been brought into Tibet ostensibly for the purpose of bringing wastelands under cultivation, but actually the immigration was followed by large-scale confiscation of lands and buildings belonging to monasteries and private persons, by levies of special taxes on everything the Tibetans possessed—and here the monasteries were discriminated against and subjected to exorbitant taxation—and the depletion of decades-old granaries which affected the most fundamental sensibilities of the Tibetans who regarded them as a religious-like symbol of pride and sign of prosperity."

CAMPAIGN AGAINST RELIGION

The Chinese had tried systematically to destroy private trade and commerce and had conducted a "precise and deliberate" campaign against the Buddhist religion. "We have evidence of instances and cases where the heads of monasteries have been killed, imprisoned, publicly humiliated", the report said. "One case in our files refers to a very highly respected Lama who was stripped and dragged with a rope over a rocky terrain, as a result of which he died."

"In the Kham Province alone, 250 monasteries were destroyed. Cases have been reported of Head Lamas being dragged to death by horses, and a fairly large number sent as prisoners to concentration camps in China."

KILLINGS AND TERROR

The report went on to describe the events leading up to the flight of the Dalai Lama in March, 1959, and said: "Since the rebel area is mountainous and difficult terrain for the army to operate in, large-scale aerial bombing has been resorted to. In the accessible parts veritable terror has been let loose on the population. Reliable estimates of the persons killed come to about 65,000. The number of persons deported is stated to be about 20,000. These figures include the recent massacres in and around

Lhasa. It is reliably reported that after the suppression of the rising in Lhasa all males between the ages of 15 and 60 have been removed from the city to some unknown destination."

COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS

The International Commission, after studying the evidence, reached the following conclusions:

1. From 1950 onwards, a practically independent country has been turned by force into a Chinese province.
2. The terms of the 17-point agreement of 1951 guaranteeing broad autonomy to Tibet have been consistently disregarded.
3. There has been arbitrary confiscation of property belonging to monasteries, private individuals and the Tibetan Government.
4. Freedom of religion has been denied to the Tibetans and the Chinese have been trying to destroy the Buddhist religion in Tibet.
5. The Tibetans have been denied freedom of information.
6. There has also been a systematic policy of killing, imprisonment and deportation of those opposed to the regime.

Mr. Trikamdas said he had compiled the report from interviews with "reliable witnesses from Tibet" and press and radio reports, both Indian and Chinese.



Appendix

DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA

THE BORDER CONTROVERSY

1. Notes exchanged on the great rebellion in Tibet
2. Letters exchanged between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai on the border controversy
3. Indian note to Peking asking for delimitation machinery
4. The press note and map on India-China frontier, issued by the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi
5. *Tass* statement on the border controversy ("Unusual", said Mr. Nehru)
6. The Dalai Lama's cable to the United Nations
7. Resolution on Tibet adopted at the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly



NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA ON THE GREAT REBELLION IN TIBET

From the White Paper published in New Delhi on 7 September 1959

I. Note Given by the Foreign Office of China to the Counsellor of India, 10 July 1958

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of India in China and has the honour to state as follows regarding the exigency of the stepped up subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region carried out by the US and the Chiang Kai-shek clique in collusion with fugitive reactionaries from Tibet using India's Kalimpong as a base.

Since the peaceful liberation of the Tibetan region of China, reactionaries who have fled from Tibet to the Kalimpong area have been carrying on subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region under the instigation and direction of the US and the Chiang Kai-shek clique and in collusion with local reactionaries in Kalimpong. On visit in India at the end of 1956 Premier Chou En-lai called the attention of the Government of India and His Excellency the Prime Minister Nehru to this question. His Excellency the Prime Minister Nehru indicated at the time that if the Chinese Government could produce evidence in this regard, the Government of India would take action. Later, on 12th January 1958 Premier Chou En-lai referred again to this question in an interview with Ambassador R. K. Nehru. On 22nd January 1958 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered to the Indian Embassy in China samples of a reactionary propaganda leaflet sent to Tibet from Kalimpong, which it had collected.

According to reliable material available to the Chinese Government the American-Chiang Kai-shek clique and local special agents and Tibetan reactionaries operating in Kalimpong have recently stepped up their conspiratorial and disruptive activities against the Tibet region of China. Using Kalimpong as a base they are actively inciting and organising a handful of reactionaries hidden in Tibet for an armed revolt there in order to attain the traitorous aim of separating the Tibet region from the People's Republic of China. The

Chinese Government would like hereby to convey to the Government of India certain information concerning the activities of the above-said special agents and reactionaries in Kalimpong as follows:

1. Chief among Tibetan reactionary elements who have fled China are Gyalodenju, Shakapa, Losangjanzan, Thubten Nobo, Alohze and Lukaniona. In collusion with American-Chiang Kai-shek clique and local special agents in Kalimpong they frequently hold meetings in Kalimpong and other Indian cities to plan disruptive activities against Tibet. Gyalodenju has been to the US in 1951. At the instance of the US Thubten Nobo made a special trip from the US to India in the winter of 1956 to take part in the conspiratorial moves of the other Tibetan reactionaries.
2. Under the manipulation of Gyalodenju and others, various reactionary organisations have been set up in Kalimpong under such names as "Tibetan Freedom League", "Kalimpong Tibetan Welfare Conference" and "Buddhist Association". These organisations are used for collecting intelligence from Tibet, carrying out reactionary propaganda against Tibet and expanding the reactionary forces, etc.
3. There is openly published in Kalimpong the *Tibetan Mirror*, a reactionary newspaper hostile to the Chinese Government and people. The Tibetan reactionaries and the organisations under their control also printed various reactionary leaflets and other propaganda material and smuggled them into Tibet. Such newspapers and propaganda material spread vicious rumours and slanders against the Chinese Government, the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese People's Liberation Army and fabricated all sorts of lies, moreover attempted to sow discord between the Han and the Tibetan nationalities of China, between the Chinese Central Government and the Tibetan local authorities as well as between Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. Some of the propaganda material even openly called on the Tibetan people to rise up against the Chinese Government and advocated the separation of Tibet from China. Gyalodenju, Shakapa, Losangjanzan and others wrote to the Lamas of the three big monasteries in Tibet to entice them to participate in their subversive activities.

4. Taking advantage of the fact Kalimpong is situated near Tibet and that few formalities are required for travel across the India-China's Tibet region border, the Tibetan reactionaries and Americans, Chiang Kai-shek clique and local special agents in Kalimpong have continuously dispatched agents and saboteurs to Tibet to contact the hidden reactionaries there. They smuggle weapons and ammunition into Tibet in preparation for armed revolt.
5. The Chiang Kai-shek clique has special agents and organisations in Kalimpong. Among the leading agents is one called Yeh Cheng-yung. They also use Kalimpong as a base to collect intelligence from Tibet, smuggle arms and dispatch agents into Tibet and incite riots in Tibet. They maintain a close contact with the Tibetan reactionaries in Kalimpong and provide Gyalodenju with important maps of Tibet for military use.

The conspiratorial and disruptive activities against the People's Republic of China carried out by the above-said Americans, Chiang Kai-shek clique and local special agents and Tibetan reactionaries in Kalimpong cannot but enrage the Chinese Government and people and put them on the alert. The Chinese Government regards the criminal activities of the above-said reactionaries and special agents as a direct threat to China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and yet another malicious scheme of United States imperialists to create tension in Asia and Africa. It cannot be overlooked that in using Indian territory adjacent to China to perpetrate disruptive activities against the People's Republic of China, the American and Chiang Kai-shek clique special agents have also the hideous object of damaging China-India friendship. In order to shatter the underhand schemes of United States imperialists, defend China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and safeguard China-India friendship, the Chinese Government hereby requests the Government of India to repress the subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region carried out in Kalimpong by American and Chiang Kai-shek clique special agents, Tibetan reactionaries and local special agents. China and India are co-initiators of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, to uphold and propagate which the Government of India has made unremitting efforts. The Chinese Government is confident that the Government of India, pursuing a consis-

tent policy of defending peace and opposing aggression, will accept its request and take effective measures.

2. Note Sent by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Embassy of China in India, 2 August 1958

The Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China and, with reference to the note handed over on July 10, 1958, by His Excellency Lo Kwe-po, Vice-Minister of the People's Republic of China, to Shri K. M. Kannampilly, Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of India at Peking, has the honour to state as follows:

2. As the Government of the People's Republic of China are aware, the Government of India attach the highest importance to friendly relations between India and China. This friendship is traditional and was emphatically reaffirmed in the agreement which was entered upon by the two Governments in 1954. This agreement enunciated the famous five principles which the Government of India faithfully follow in their relationships with China as with all other countries. The Government of India recognise that the Tibetan region is part of the People's Republic of China.

3. The Government of India were therefore greatly surprised by the note which the Government of the People's Republic of China handed over to the Indian Charge d'Affaires at Peking on July 10. They regret to say that the statements contained in this note must have been based on a complete misunderstanding of facts. The Government of India have no evidence that the US Government and the Kuomintang regime are using Kalimpong as a base for disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region. The Government of India will never permit any portion of its territory to be used as a base of activities against any foreign Government, not to speak of the friendly Government of the People's Republic of China.

4. As the Government of the People's Republic of China must be aware, from time immemorial, there has been intercommunication between India and the Tibet region of China through passes on the northern frontier of India. In fact, for centuries the only feasible outlet for that region was through India. Movement of people

between India and Tibet was free and easy. Most of the people living in the Tibet region of China (hereafter referred to as Tibetans) who enter India come here either as traders or pilgrims. This fact was recognised in the 1954 agreement between India and the People's Republic of China. Many Tibetans have been settled in north-east India for years. The Government of India have made it clear to all Tibetans that they will be permitted to stay in India only if they carry on their vocations peacefully.

5. The Government of the People's Republic of China have mentioned six persons by name in their note as among those who are carrying on anti-Chinese activities on Indian territory. Some of these persons have already been warned that if their activities, political or other, are such as to have adverse effect on the relations between India and China, the Government of India will take the severest action against them. The Government of India have no definite evidence that these persons have been indulging in unfriendly activities. Even so, the Government of India propose to warn them again.

6. In their note, the Government of the People's Republic of China state that various reactionary organisations have been set up in Kalimpong under different names. Enquiries made by the Government of India reveal that no organisations or associations with the names mentioned in the note are functioning in Kalimpong. So far as the Government of India are aware there are two associations in Kalimpong of people who formerly lived in the Tibet region of China, namely the Tibetan Association and the Indian Tibetan Association. The first named association has been in existence for about 25 years, the second was formed in September 1954. The aims and objects of both these associations are religious, cultural and social, such as promoting study of Buddhism or rendering medical aid to Tibetans, arranging their funeral rites, etc. The Government of India are not aware that these two associations have been indulging in any undesirable activities such as those mentioned in the Chinese Government's note.

7. The Government of the People's Republic of China refer to a newspaper named the *Tibetan Mirror*. There is no daily or weekly newspaper of that name published in Kalimpong. A monthly periodical called the *Tibetan Mirror* is published there. The editor of this newspaper is not a Chinese but an Indian national. The Government of India have noted with displeasure that some of the

articles published in this periodical are objectionable and calculated to affect the friendly relations between India and China. The law in India is, however, such that it is not easy to take executive or legal action against newspapers and periodicals of this character. There are other newspapers in India which severely criticise other friendly Governments. In fact, strong criticisms are voiced by some newspapers against the Government of India themselves. However, the Government of India are most anxious that an unimportant magazine like the *Tibetan Mirror* should not adversely affect the relations between our two friendly countries and are directing their local officers to administer a severe warning to this periodical. If it continues to create mischief, the Government of India will take whatever other action is feasible.

8. The Government of the People's Republic of China have stated in their note that taking advantage of the liberal travel regulations across the border of India and the Tibet region of China near Kalimpong, weapons and ammunition have been smuggled into Tibet by Tibetan reactionaries, the Americans and followers of the Kuomintang regime. Both the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of India have got Customs Posts and Check Posts on this border. Officers of the Posts under the Government of India have got strict instructions to be particularly vigilant regarding the possible smuggling of articles like arms and ammunition which are contraband according to Indian law. No case of such smuggling of arms and ammunition has been detected by these Indian Check Posts in the locality.

9. The Government of the People's Republic of China have, in their note, referred to the photostat copy of a leaflet in Tibetan language handed over by them to the Indian Embassy at Peking. Though this leaflet was handed over on the 22nd January 1958, the date of its publication given at the bottom is 17 December 1956. This was the time when all manner of people from Tibet came to India in connection with Buddha Jayanti celebrations and the visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. At about this time the Prime Minister of India discussed the entire situation in the Tibet region of China and other relevant matters with His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai. The Government of India did not, therefore, attach any great importance to the circulation of this particular leaflet in December 1956. It is mentioned at the bottom of this leaflet that it was issued by the "Tibetan Welfare Association". It has already been stated

earlier in this note that, according to Government of India's information, no association with this name is functioning in Kalimpong.

10. The Government of the People's Republic of China have stated that there are special agents of the Kuomintang regime in Kalimpong. Their note, however, mentions only one name, namely Yeh Cheng-yung. The Government of India have not been able to trace any such individual in Kalimpong and a preliminary examination of their records shows that no visa to enter India has been issued to any individual of that name. Even so, the Government of India are pursuing their enquiries and will communicate the results later to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China at New Delhi.

11. The Government of India reiterate their friendship for the people and the Government of the People's Republic of China. They have no doubt that the Chinese Government's note is based on misinformation and express the hope that, in the light of the facts now mentioned, the Government of the People's Republic of China will feel assured that India does not and will not permit any activities on its territory directed against the People's Republic of China and that the Government of India are determined to take action under the law of the country against those who indulge in any such illegal activities.

The Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India takes this opportunity of renewing to the Embassy of the People's Republic of China the assurances of its highest consideration.

3. Statement Made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary, 3 August 1958

Tibetan reactionary elements have recently set up in Kalimpong an organisation named "Committee for giving support to resistance against violence". The organisation is now engaged in a signature movement. At the end of July nearly all the Tibetan aristocrats in Kalimpong, rebels from Szechwan and Sikang provinces, the Lamas and nearly all the members of the Tibetan Association and the Indian Tibetan Association put their signatures on a petition. Some of the signatories were compelled to give their signatures.

On the 29th July, fifteen aristocrats and rebels from Tibet held a

meeting. The following are the names of some of the persons who were present:

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Khan Chung Sagapa | 4. Chiang Pa Wang Tui |
| 2. Avang Tum Jun | 5. Chiang Pa Tsin Liang |
| 3. Sokhang Khen Chung | |

They passed a resolution at that meeting in favour of sending an appeal to various countries in the world. The meeting decided to send out the appeal on the 18th June according to the Tibetan calendar, which corresponds to 3rd August, i.e., today. It is stated that after the appeal has been sent, a demonstration will be organised. The main contents of the appeal are a request to the various countries to give assistance and support to the independence of Tibet. In the appeals there would be slanders against China and against the People's Liberation Army.

4. Statement by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of China to the Indian Ambassador, 22 March 1959

We have received a report from our Foreign Affairs Bureau in Lhasa that they were going to meet the Indian Consul General in Lhasa and convey to him following three points:

1. The local Government in Tibet under instigation and support of the imperialists and foreign reactionary elements have torn up the agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet and begun armed revolt by attacking Government offices of the Central Government and the functionaries thereof and the Central Government troops. The Central Government of our country never permit such high treason of the local Government of Tibet and we are certain to put down this revolt. This is entirely an internal affair of China and we shall never permit interference from outside. Tibet is an integral part of China's territory and any intrigue aimed at splitting Tibet away from China is doomed to total failure.

2. We are willing to give protection to the functionaries of the Indian Consulate General at Lhasa and we hope that they will move into and live in the houses which we shall assign to them.

3. It is hoped that the Consul General of India in Lhasa will

inform all Indian nationals in various parts of Tibet to abide by the Chinese laws and, as far as possible, to stay indoors where the revolt is taking place so that no accident may occur. Wherever we have our troops stationed we shall do our best to give protection to Indian nationals. It will be better for Indian nationals to move away from those centres where there are no Central Government troops.

5. Statement made by Foreign Secretary to the
Chinese Ambassador, 26 April 1959

On the 3rd April the Foreign Secretary informed His Excellency the Ambassador that the Dalai Lama with a small party had entered Indian territory on the 31st March. The Dalai Lama had earlier sent a message to the Government of India asking for political asylum in India. The Government of India had, in accordance with international usage, allowed the Dalai Lama and his party to cross into Indian territory and stay in India. The Dalai Lama has since moved with his entourage to Mussoorie where necessary arrangements have been made by the Government of India for his residence.

2. During the last few days a considerable number of other Tibetans have also crossed into Indian territory and sought refuge here. The Government of India have issued strict instructions to disarm such of these persons as are armed.

3. When news was first received of Dalai Lama's entry into India, the Government of India considered it necessary to send a senior officer of the Ministry of External Affairs to the NEFA to meet him and take charge of all arrangements connected with his travel. This officer had the advantage of knowing the Dalai Lama personally, having served as Indian Consul General in Lhasa some years ago. Certain security precautions had to be taken. It was also essential to prevent the Dalai Lama from being troubled by a large number of press correspondents and other elements until after he had some rest and overcome the effects of the physical and mental strain which he had recently undergone. The Dalai Lama reached Mussoorie on April 21.

4. The Government of India have now seen recent reports of speeches delivered in the current session of the National People's Congress in Peking. They have read these reports with regret as

they contain unbecoming and unjustified attacks on the Government of India and their officials and certain allegations which are patently untrue. Thus, it is stated that the Dalai Lama continues to be under duress and that the statements made by him are imposed on him by foreigners. Reference has also been made to so-called "Indian reactionaries" who are supposed to be "working in the footsteps of the British imperialists and have been harbouring expansionist ambitions towards Tibet". The Government of India are distressed to see these reports and to notice that a furious and unworthy campaign has been started in the press and the radio in Peking, the effect of which can only be to do incalculable damage to the friendly relations between India and China. The Government of India would like to state categorically that the statements made by the Dalai Lama are entirely his own and no official of theirs was in any way responsible for them. The Dalai Lama was allowed to enter India at his own request; he is acting entirely on his own and is free to return to his country any time he wishes to do so. If the Chinese Government want to satisfy themselves on this point, they are welcome to send their Ambassador in India or any other emissary to meet the Dalai Lama and necessary facilities will be given to the emissary to discuss with him and ascertain his wishes.

5. The Prime Minister met the Dalai Lama at Mussoorie on the 24th April and had a long talk with him. No member of the Dalai Lama's party was present at this interview. The Dalai Lama assured the Prime Minister that he left Lhasa of his own free will. It appeared to the Prime Minister that the Dalai Lama is still suffering from the after-effects of the great physical and mental strain which he had undergone and has not yet had time to think of his future course of action.

6. It is well known that India has had long standing religious and cultural contacts with the people of Tibet and the people of India are interested in developments there. India has had and has no desire to interfere in internal happenings in Tibet. Because of old contacts, recent tragic events in Tibet have affected the people of India considerably, but it has been made clear by the Prime Minister that there is no question of any interference in the internal affairs of Tibet. As the Government of the People's Republic of China are no doubt aware, there is by law and Constitution complete freedom of expression of opinion in Parliament and the press and elsewhere in India. Opinions are often expressed in severe criti-

cism of the Government of India's policies, as well as other opinions with which the Government are not in agreement.

7. The Prime Minister has declared in Parliament that the Dalai Lama will be accorded respectful treatment in India, but he is not expected to carry on any political activities from this country. The Government of India consider it most unfortunate that the fact of their having given asylum to the Dalai Lama, in exercise of their sovereignty and in accordance with well-known international usage, should have led responsible persons in China to make serious allegations which are unbecoming and entirely void of substance.

6. Note of the Government of China to the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 27 April 1959

The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in India presents its compliments to the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republic of India, and hereby lodges the following serious protest with the Ministry regarding the occurrence in Bombay of Indians insulting the head of state of the People's Republic of China:

At about 4-40 on the afternoon of the 20th April 1959, in Bombay, there were about 80 Indians claiming themselves to be members of the Socialist Party, came to the Consulate-General of the People's Republic of China at Bombay, demonstrated and shouted slogans in front of the Consulate-General and some of them made speeches. They branded China's putting down of the rebellion in her own territory, the Tibet region, as imperialist action and made all sorts of slanders. What is more serious is that they pasted up a portrait of Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, on the wall of the Chinese Consulate-General and carried out wanton insult by throwing tomatoes and rotten eggs at it. While these ruffians were insulting the portrait, the Indian policemen stood by without interfering with them, and pulled off the encircling spectators for the correspondents to take photographs of it. After the ruffians had left, the police officer once again allowed people to take photographs of the portrait and then tore it down and took it away.

Such an act of pasting up the portrait of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China on the wall of the Chinese Consulate-General and throwing tomatoes and rotten eggs at it is a huge

insult to the head of state of the People's Republic of China and the respected and beloved leader of the Chinese people. And while the ruffians were insulting the portrait of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, the policemen of the Bombay local authorities not only did not interfere but pulled off the encircling spectators for correspondents to take photographs of it. After the ruffians had left, the police officer once again allowed people to take photographs of the portrait and then tore it down and took it away. It is evidently an act of connivance. For this the Chinese Government cannot but express its indignation and hereby lodges a serious protest. The Chinese Government requests that the Government of India speedily deals with the matter of insult to the head of state of the People's Republic of China and makes a speedy reply. Such a matter of huge insult to the head of state of the People's Republic of China is what the masses of the six hundred and fifty million Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate, and it must be reasonably settled, otherwise the Chinese people cannot come to a stop with regard to the matter. In case the reply from the Indian Government is not satisfactory, the Embassy is instructed to make it clear that the Chinese Government will again raise this matter to the Indian Government, and the Chinese side will never come to a stop if without a satisfactory settlement of the matter, that is to say, never stop even for one hundred years.

7. Note of the Government of India,
30 April 1959

The Embassy of India, Peking, present their compliments to the Foreign Office of the Government of the People's Republic of China and with reference to the note No. M/129/59 presented to the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India on April 27 by the Chinese Embassy, New Delhi, have the honour to state that investigations have been made into the facts relating to the incident referred to in the note. These facts, which are not wholly as stated in the note of the Embassy, are given below.

2. On the 20th April 1959, a demonstration was organised by the Socialist Party, Bombay Branch. About 75 persons went in procession from the headquarters of the party to the premises of the Chinese Consulate in Bombay. The processionists carried some pla-

cards and shouted slogans. A detachment of the Bombay Police accompanied the procession to prevent violence or any untoward incident. As the procession was otherwise peaceful, the police could not prohibit it altogether. Near the gate of the Consulate building, one of the processionists took out a bunch of memoranda and started distributing them. He also gave a number of these memoranda to some others in the procession for pasting them on the wall and the gate of the Consulate building. The police intervened to prevent this, but suddenly they noticed another person in the procession affixing something on the compound wall. They ran to intervene, but before they succeeded in reaching the particular spot, they found that a small picture of Chairman Mao Tse-tung had already been affixed and a few tomatoes and two eggs had been hurled at the picture. The police officers present stood in front of the picture to save it from further desecration and ordered one of their men to remove it. The picture was on the wall only for a minute or two and was removed by the police. A number of press photographers accompanied the procession and were taking photographs and it is possible that one of them managed to get a snap shot of the particular picture.

3. As a result of the full investigation made by them, the Government of India are satisfied that the police did not connive at the deplorable behaviour of some of the demonstrators. On the contrary, they intervened immediately the particular incident came to their notice and sought to stop further mischief. It is not a fact that the police cleared the way for photographers to take photographs of the picture of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. As the Chinese Government are probably aware, the Chinese Consulate is situated at one of the busiest traffic corners in Bombay. In fact, since the demonstrators were obstructing the traffic, the police endeavoured to clear the way and many of the demonstrators were pushed to the opposite side of the road.

4. The Chinese Government are, no doubt, aware that under the law in India processions cannot be banned so long as they are peaceful. Indeed in Indian cities processions and demonstrations are not unusual. Not unoften they are held even near the Parliament House and the processionists indulge in all manner of slogans against high personages in India. Incidents have occurred in the past when portraits of Mahatma Gandhi and the Prime Minister were taken out by irresponsible persons and treated in an insulting manner. Under the law and Constitution of India a great deal of latitude is

allowed to the people so long as they do not indulge in actual violence.

5. The Government of India would like to point out that the particular procession in Bombay referred to in the Chinese Embassy's note was organised by a party called the Socialist Party which broke away some years ago from the major Socialist Party in India, namely the Praja Socialist Party. This splinter party consists of a small group of irresponsible persons who have no importance in the country and do not in any way reflect the standard of conduct followed by the major political parties in India. In fact it is the definite programme of this party to indulge in highly objectionable behaviour towards Government.

6. Whatever the circumstances and facts, the Government of India deeply regret that discourtesy was shown to a picture of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the respected head of a State with which India has ties of friendship. The incident is undoubtedly deplorable, but as stated above, it is the act of a few persons and there was no question of connivance of the police or Government.

7. The Prime Minister has already expressed the deep regret of Government at this incident in his statement in the Lok Sabha on the 27th April.

8. The Government of India would like to add that while they can understand and appreciate the resentment of the Chinese Government at such an incident, they regret the language used in the Chinese Embassy's memorandum.

8. Statement Made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary, 16 May 1959

Since March 10, 1959 when the former Tibet Local Government and the Tibetan upper class reactionary clique unleashed armed rebellion, there have appeared deplorable abnormalities in the relations between China and India. This situation was caused by the Indian side, yet in his conversation on April 26, 1959 Mr. Dutt, Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, shifted responsibility on to the Chinese side. This is what the Chinese Government absolutely cannot accept.

The Tibet region is an inalienable part of China's territory. The quelling of the rebellion in the Tibet region by the Chinese Govern-

ment and following that, the conducting by it of democratic reforms which the Tibetan people have longed for, are entirely China's internal affairs, in which no foreign country has any right to interfere under whatever pretext or in whatever form. In Tibet, just as in other national minority areas in China, regional national autonomy shall be implemented as stipulated in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. In this matter which is purely China's internal affairs, the Chinese Government has no obligation to give assurances to any foreign country, nor can it tolerate others under the pretext of a so-called different interpretation of autonomy, to obstruct, the Chinese Government's exercise of its State-sovereignty in the Tibet region to make Tibet semi-independent or even to turn it into a sphere of influence of a foreign country or buffer zone.

The above-said is self-evident and undeniable. Nevertheless, there appeared in India, before and after the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, large quantities of words and deeds slandering China and interfering in China's internal affairs. Responsible persons of many Indian political parties, including the National Congress, and not a few Indian publications openly called Tibet a "country", slandered the Chinese Government's putting down the rebellion in Tibet as "practising banditry and imperialism", demanded that the Tibet question be submitted to the United Nations and even proposed the holding of a tripartite conference of India, China and Tibet to settle the Tibet question which can only be handled by the Chinese Government. Most of the political parties in India went so far as to form organisations in support of the Tibetan rebels. Groups of ruffians were allowed to make provocations and disturbances in front of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates General in India, and there even occurred the grave incident of insulting the Head of State of China. These words and deeds were in the nature of serious interference in China's internal affairs and sabotage of Sino-Indian friendship, and this cannot be altered by recourse to any pretext, whether "freedom of speech" or any other "freedoms", even less can the "feeling of kinship derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts with the Tibetan people" be a pretext for these words and deeds. It is obvious that the Chinese people likewise have a "feeling of kinship derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts" towards the Indian people, but China has never used this as a pretext to interfere in India's internal affairs, and will never do so.

The Indian Government has recognised the Tibet region as a part of China's territory and has repeatedly declared that it has no desire to interfere in China's internal affairs. This was worthy of welcome. Nevertheless, responsible members of the Indian Government, though they could not possibly be better acquainted with the situation in Tibet than the Chinese Government, openly expressed doubts about documents published by China officially, refused to accept the Chinese Government's account of the facts, and asserted that the basis of the rebellion in Tibet "must have been a strong feeling of nationalism" and that the upper strata reactionaries in Tibet were not solely responsible for the rebellion. They even charged that "agreement between Tibet and China on the autonomous status of Tibet and the assurances given to India had not been kept" by the Chinese Government, and described the Chinese Government's putting down the rebellion in Tibet as "armed intervention" and as "oppressing and suppressing" the Tibetan people. The Indian Government announced that it had granted political asylum to the Dalai Lama in accordance with international practice and stated that the Dalai Lama was "not expected" to engage in any political activities in India. This would not have caused any dispute. But on April 18 and 22, two statements advocating "independence of Tibet" and directing wanton attacks on the Chinese Government, were issued respectively in Tezpur and Mussoorie in the name of the Dalai Lama. What was particularly surprising, the so-called "statement of the Dalai Lama" of April 18 was not only distributed by an official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs but also carried on official bulletins of Indian Embassies abroad. Such a line of action on the part of the Indian Government could hardly be considered conformable to well-known international practice. The Indian Government insisted that the Dalai Lama was entirely responsible for the two traitorous statements issued in his name. In that case, did not the impressive welcome extended to the Dalai Lama by the Indian Government and the talks Prime Minister Nehru himself held with him mean giving a welcome to a Chinese rebel and holding a meeting with him? All these statements and actions of the Indian Government, no matter what the subjective intentions might be, undoubtedly played an objective role of encouraging the Tibetan rebels.

The facts themselves have completely overthrown the allegation that there is no Indian interference in China's internal affairs. The

Chinese Government and people, having regard for the overall Sino-Indian friendship, for quite a long time exercised utmost forbearance in the hope that the words and deeds occurring in India interfering in China's internal affairs and detrimental to Sino-Indian friendship would end. To the contrary, however, the words and deeds against China and interfering in China's internal affairs coming from the Indian side went from bad to worse and developed to an intolerable extent. Only then did the Chinese people give the reply that was due, in order to safeguard their State sovereignty and oppose outside interference, and also to uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and Sino-Indian friendship. The Chinese people's reply is in the nature of reasoning and is well grounded on fact. All those who have the opportunity of reading a full report of the opinions of the Chinese people will arrive at this conclusion. It is unjustifiable that the Indian Government should have tried in various ways to defend the words and deeds of the Indian side interfering in China's internal affairs and impairing Sino-Indian friendship, while making charges against the proper reply of the Chinese people.

The Dalai Lama was abducted to India by the Tibetan rebels. A most strong proof of this is the three letters he wrote to General Tan Kuan-san, Acting Representative of the Central People's Government in Tibet, before he was abducted out of Lhasa. The so-called "statement of the Dalai Lama", which is full of loopholes, instead of being capable of making one believe that the Dalai Lama is now able to act on his own volition, precisely serves to show that he is still being surrounded and under control. The Chinese Government is greatly concerned about the situation of the Dalai Lama. It is, however, futile for the Chinese Government to send someone to see the Dalai Lama before he has freed himself from encirclement and control. It would be even more inappropriate for the Chinese Government to send someone to see the Dalai Lama, if, as alleged by the Indian Government, he was entirely responsible for the two statements betraying his motherland.

In its relations with India, China has consistently adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and worked for the development of friendly cooperation between the two countries. China has always held that every thing must be done to safeguard the friendly relations between the two great Asian countries, China and India, from being impaired. In spite of the fact that the Indian side brought about this unpleasant argument between the two countries, and the

Indian Government has failed to give a satisfactory reply on the Bombay incident of insulting the Head of State of China, the Chinese side is willing to stop its rebuff as soon as the Indian side stops its words and deeds against China and interfering in China's internal affairs. Prime Minister Nehru has now expressed the wish to end this argument and called on Indian newspapers to exercise restraint and wisdom, this is worthy of welcome. It is the hope of the Chinese Government that the dark clouds overcasting Sino-Indian relations for a time will speedily disperse and that, through the current trial, Sino-Indian friendship, which is of long standing and based on the Five Principles, will develop even better.

On the whole, India is a friend of China, this has been so in the past thousand and more years, and we believe will certainly continue to be so in one thousand, ten thousand years to come. The enemy of the Chinese people lies in the east—the US imperialists have many military bases in Taiwan, in South Korea, Japan and in the Philippines which are all directed against China. China's main attention and policy of struggle are directed to the east, to the west Pacific region, to the vicious and aggressive US imperialism, and not to India or any other country in the Southeast Asia and South Asia. Although the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan have joined the SEATO which is designed to oppose China, we have not treated those three countries as our principal enemy; our principal enemy is US imperialism. India has not taken part in the Southeast Asia Treaty; it is not an opponent, but a friend to our country. China will not be so foolish as to antagonise the United States in the east and again to antagonise India in the west. The putting down of the rebellion and the carrying out of democratic reforms in Tibet will not in the least endanger India. You can wait and see. As the Chinese proverb goes "the strength of a horse is borne out by the distance travelled, and the heart of a person is seen with the lapse of time". You will ultimately see whether relations between the Tibet region of China and India are friendly or hostile by watching three, five, ten, twenty, a hundred... years. We cannot have two centres of attention, nor can we take friend for foe. This is our State policy. The quarrel between our two countries in the past few years, particularly in the last three months, is but an interlude in the course of thousands upon thousands of years of friendships between the two countries and does not warrant a big fuss on the part of the broad masses and the Government authorities of our countries. The principles, positions and

distinctions between right and wrong as set forth in the foregoing paragraphs have to be set forth; otherwise the current difference between our countries cannot be resolved. But so far as the extent of the implication of those words is concerned, it is only temporary and local; that is to say, they refer only to a temporary difference between our two countries and concern solely the region of Tibet. Our Indian friends! What is your mind? Will you be agreeing to our thinking regarding the view that China can only concentrate its main attention eastward of China, but not south-westward of China, nor is it necessary for it to do so. Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the leader of our country, talked on many occasions with Mr. R. K. Nehru, former Indian Ambassador to China, who could well understand and appreciate it. We do not know whether the former Indian Ambassador conveyed this to the Indian authorities. Friends! It seems to us that you too cannot have two fronts. Is it not so? If it is, here then lies the meeting point of our two sides. Will you please think it over? Allow me to take this opportunity to extend my best regards to Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of India.

9. Statement of the Foreign Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador, 23 May 1959

The statement made by the Chinese Ambassador to the Foreign Secretary has been considered. The Foreign Secretary has been directed to make the following reply to the Chinese Ambassador:

1. The Government of India have learned of this statement with regret and surprise. It is not only not in consonance with certain facts, but is also wholly out of keeping with diplomatic usage and the courtesies due to friendly countries. It is a matter of particular surprise and disappointment to them that a Government and people noted for their high culture and politeness should have committed this serious lapse and should have addressed the Government of India in a language which is discourteous and unbecoming even if it were addressed to a hostile country. Since it is addressed to a country which is referred to as friendly, this can only be considered as an act of forgetfulness.
2. We have no desire to enter into a lengthy argument about

facts or opinions, much less about the discourteous language used in the statement made on behalf of the Chinese Government. It has been the consistent practice of the Government of India to treat other countries with courtesy and friendliness, even though any country might express opinions opposed to theirs. With China they have endeavoured to maintain and develop friendly relations and they propose to continue to do so in spite of the discourtesy shown to them by the Chinese Government. This is in consonance with India's past culture and background and Mahatma Gandhi's teachings.

3. In so far as facts are concerned, the Prime Minister made a statement in the Lok Sabha on April 27, 1959, as well as on some subsequent occasions. Those statements give a correct narration of facts, and the Government of India stand by them. They can only regret that the People's Government of China is unable to accept these facts.
4. The Government of India realise that the system of Government in China is different from that prevailing in India: It is the right of the Chinese people to have a Government of their choice, and no one else has a right to interfere; it is also the right of the Indian people to have a Government of their choice, and no one else has a right to interfere. In India, unlike China, the law recognises many parties, and gives protection to the expression of differing opinions. That is a right guaranteed by our Constitution and, contrary to the practice prevailing in China, the Government of India is often criticised and opposed by some sections of the Indian people. It is evident that this freedom of expression, free press and civil liberties in India are not fully appreciated by the Government of China, and hence misunderstandings arise. So far as the Parliament of India is concerned, it is a sovereign body, and each one of its 750 members has perfect freedom to express his or her opinion under the protection of the law, whether anyone likes it or not. The People's Government of China should understand that this is a sovereign Parliament of a sovereign country and it does not submit to any dictation from any outside authority.
5. From the statement made on behalf of the People's Government of China, it appears that, according to them, the Panch Sheel or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence may, or

may not be applied according to convenience or circumstances. This is an approach with which the Government of India are not in agreement. They have proclaimed and adhered to these Principles as matters of basic policy and not of opportunism. They will continue to hold to these principles and endeavour to apply them according to their own thinking.

6. The Government of India do not consider or treat any other country as an enemy country, howsoever much it may differ from it. It is their constant endeavour to develop friendly relations with all countries and try to remove tensions, bitterness and ill will, while adhering to the policy they consider right. In particular, they have endeavoured to cultivate the friendship of the Chinese people and Government in spite of differences of opinion. They have avoided interference with China's internal affairs. They will continue this policy, but this must not be understood to mean that the Government of India will discard or vary any of their own policies under any pressure from outside.

10. Note Given by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Chinese Counsellor in India, 24 July 1959

The attention of the Government of India has been drawn to recent articles being circulated in the Tibet region of China, which contain false statements and are, therefore, likely to create grave misunderstanding between India and China.

2. The *Lhasa Daily* in Tibetan language, on 23rd June, published an article entitled "Gyantse in the history of imperialist design in Tibet". The article gives details of the invasion of Gyantse by British troops in 1904, and proceeds to state as follows:

The place immediately near to the British Imperial Cemetery is the cantonment of Indian Army stationed at Gyantse. The 1954 Agreement between India and China on trade and intercourse specified the withdrawal of the Indian troops from Gyantse. The people of Gyantse could clearly see that the legacy of British imperialism in Tibet was inherited by the Indian expansionist element. During the course of their stay at Gyantse, the Indian Army forcibly took food grains and fodder from the people of Gyantse. The people were forced to do corvée work for them, they had to provide supply, transport, firewood, servants, etc., in return for nothing to the Indian Army. The Indian troops were fond of riding military horses, and they rode rough shod the green fields

of the people and thus destroying the autumn harvest. Officers and men of the Indian troops visited the traitor Phala and held parties and games of Majong. These evil deeds of the Indian Army were very much resented by the people of Gyantse. And though the fire of their anger was burning in the stomach, there was no opportunity for the smoke to come out of the mouth.

3. Similarly an article about Chumbi valley appeared on the 15th June which *inter alia* stated as follows:

According to Tsewang, formerly when they suffered from any ailment, they had not only to send a servant and a horse to fetch the doctor, but the fee charged by the doctor was exorbitantly high. The poor man was helpless to provide such luxury and so when a poor man fell ill, the inevitable was death.

4. The extracts quoted above are factually and historically incorrect. They are obviously intended to damage the friendly relations between the people of India and the nationals of the People's Republic of China. The Government of India emphatically protest against such articles being published in areas where the press is officially controlled and would request that steps be taken to stop such deliberately hostile propaganda against India.

LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN MR. NEHRU AND
MR. CHOU EN-LAI ON BORDER DISPUTES

1. Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the
Prime Minister of China, 14 December 1958

*New Delhi,
December 14, 1958*

His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai,
Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China,
Peking

My Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to you after a long time. We have watched with great interest and admiration the progress made by the People's Government of China in recent years. In particular, we have been deeply interested in the remarkable advance in the yield of rice per hectare as well as in the total yield, as also in the great increase in production of pig iron and steel.

2. As we are faced with somewhat similar problems in our country in regard to rice production and steel manufacture, we would naturally like to benefit by the example of what China has done. For this purpose we decided to send two delegations to China, one consisting of farmers and agricultural specialists and the other of experts in iron and steel. Your Government was good enough to agree to this. It was pointed out however that the next season for rice sowing and cultivation would be in March-April next. We hope to send our farmers and agricultural experts then, if it suits the convenience of your Government. But we shall be sending our iron and steel experts to China fairly soon. I hope that they will learn much from the methods being now employed in China and we could then profit by their experience.

3. My purpose in troubling you with this letter, however, relates to another matter. This is in regard to the border between India and China. You will remember that when the Sino-Indian Agreement in regard to the Tibet region of China was concluded, various outstanding problems, including some relating to our border trade, were considered. A number of mountain passes were mentioned which should be used for purposes of travel between the two coun-

tries. No border questions were raised at that time and we were under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries. In fact we thought that the Sino-Indian Agreement, which was happily concluded in 1954, had settled all outstanding problems between our two countries.

4. Somewhat later, my attention was drawn to some maps published in China. The maps I saw were not very accurate maps, but nevertheless the frontier as roughly drawn in these maps did not correspond with the actual frontier. In fact it ran right across the territory of India in several places. I was surprised to see this, as I had not been aware at any time previously that there was any frontier dispute between our two countries. No mention of this had been made in the course of the Sino-Indian talks which resulted in the Agreement of 1954.

5. Subsequently, in October 1954, I had the privilege of visiting your great country and the happiness to meet you and other leaders of the Chinese People's Republic. We had long talks and it was a pleasure to me to find that we had a great deal in common in our approach and that there was no dispute or problem affecting our relations. In the course of our talks I briefly mentioned to you that I had seen some maps recently published in China which gave a wrong borderline between the two countries. I presumed that this was by some error and told you at the time that so far as India was concerned we were not much worried about the matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter of argument. You were good enough to reply to me that these maps were really reproductions of old pre-liberation maps and that you had had no time to revise them. In view of the many and heavy pre-occupations of your Government, I could understand that this revision had not taken place till then. I expressed the hope that the borderline would be corrected before long.

6. Towards the end of 1956, you did us the honour of paying a visit to India and we had the pleasure of having you in our midst for many days. Part of this time you spent in visiting various parts of India. I had occasion to be with you both in Delhi and during some of your visits, notably to our great river valley project at Bhakra-Nangal. We had long talks and discussed many international issues which were then agitating people's minds and I was happy to know what your views were about them. In the course of these talks you referred to the Sino-Burmese border. You told me about the talks

you had with U Nu at Peking and your desire to settle this problem with the Burmese Government. I had received the same information from U Nu who had told me of your wish to settle this problem to the satisfaction of both countries. It was in this connection that you mentioned to me the Sino-Indian border, and more especially the so-called Mc Mahon Line. This McMahon Line covered a part of the Sino-Burmese border and a large part of the Chinese border with India. I remember your telling me that you did not approve of this border being called the McMahon Line and I replied that I did not like that name either. But for facility of reference we referred to it as such.

7. You told me then that you had accepted this McMahon Line border with Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognise this border with India also. You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so.

8. Immediately after our talk, I had written a minute so that we might have a record of this talk for our personal and confidential use. I am giving below a quotation from this minute:

Premier Chou referred to the McMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by British imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line. They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan authorities about it yet. They proposed to do so.

9. I remember discussing this matter with you at some considerable length. You were good enough to make this point quite clear. I then mentioned that there were no disputes between us about our frontier, but there were certain very minor border problems which were pending settlement. We decided that these petty issues should be settled amicably by representatives of the two Governments meeting together on the basis of established practice and custom as well as watersheds. There was long delay in this meeting taking place, but ultimately a representative of the Chinese Government came to Delhi and discussed one of these petty issues for some time. Unfortunately no settlement about this matter was arrived at then

and it was decided to continue the talks later. I was sorry that these talks had not resulted in a satisfactory agreement so far. The issue is a minor one and I wanted to remove by friendly settlement all matters that affected our two Governments and countries. I had thought then of writing to you on this subject, but I decided not to trouble you over such a petty matter.

10. A few months ago, our attention was drawn again to a map of China published in the magazine *China Pictorial*, which indicated the border with India. This map was also not very clearly defined. But even the rough borderline appeared to us to be wrongly placed. This borderline went right across Indian territory. A large part of our North-East Frontier Agency as well as some other parts which are and have long been well recognised as parts of India and been administered by India in the same way as other parts of our country, were shown to be part of Chinese territory. A considerable region of our neighbour country, Bhutan, in the north-east was also shown as being on the Chinese side. A part of the North-East Frontier Agency which was clearly on the Indian side of what has been known as the McMahon Line, was shown in this map as part of Chinese territory.

11. The magazine containing this map was widely distributed and questions were asked in our Parliament about this. I gave answers to the effect that these maps were merely reproductions of old ones and did not represent the actual facts of the situation.

12. We drew your Government's attention to this map some time ago this year. In a memorandum in reply to us, it has been stated by your Government that in the maps currently published in China, the boundary line between China and neighbouring countries including India, is drawn on the basis of maps published before the liberation. It has further been stated that the Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a survey of the Chinese boundary nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own.

13. I was puzzled by this reply because I thought that there was no major boundary dispute between China and India. There never has been such a dispute so far as we are concerned and in my talks with you in 1954 and subsequently, I had stated this. I could understand four years ago that the Chinese Government, being busy with major matters of national reconstruction, could not find time to revise old maps. But you will appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People's Republic came into power, the continued issue of

these incorrect maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries. I am sure that you will appreciate our difficulties in this matter.

14. I am venturing to write to you on this subject as I feel that any possibility of grave misunderstanding between our countries should be removed as soon as possible. I am anxious, as I am sure you are, that the firm basis of our friendship should not only be maintained but should be strengthened.

May I send you my warm regards and every good wish for the New Year.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

2. Letter from the Prime Minister of China to the
Prime Minister of India, 23 January 1959

Peking,
January 23, 1959

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter dated December 14, 1958, forwarded by Mr. Ambassador Parthasarathi.

Thank you for the credit you gave the achievements of our country in economic construction. It is true that, through the joint efforts of the entire Chinese people, our country made in industrial and agricultural production in 1958 an advance which we describe as a "great leap forward". However, as we started from a very poor economic foundation, our present level of development in production is still very low. It will take us a number of years more of hard work in order to bring about a relatively big change in the economic picture of our country.

Our government heartily welcomes the sending by the Indian Government of two delegations to study our agriculture and iron and steel industry respectively. And as I understand, another delegation has already arrived in China to study our water conservancy and irrigation work. We welcome them to our country and will be glad to provide them with every possible convenience. We also hope to learn from them Indian experience in the respective fields.

The exchange of such specialised delegations and the interflow of experience will undoubtedly be helpful to the economic construction of our countries. We too have always taken a great interest in the progress of India's second five-year plan, and wish it success.

We note with pleasure that, in the past year, friendly cooperation between China and India has undergone further development. I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Chinese Government, to express thanks to the Indian Government for its efforts at the 13th session of the United Nations General Assembly for restoring to China its rightful place in the United Nations. We are also grateful to the Indian Government for its support to our country on the question of Taiwan and the coastal islands.

In your letter you have taken much space to discuss the question of Sino-Indian boundary and thus enabled us to understand better the Indian Government's stand on the question. I would also like now to set forth the views and stand of the Chinese Government.

First of all, I wish to point out that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and the Indian Government. So far as the actual situation is concerned, there are certain differences between the two sides over the border question. In the past few years, questions as to which side certain areas on the Sino-Indian border belong were on more than one occasion taken up between the Chinese and the Indian sides through diplomatic channels. The latest case concerns an area in the southern part of China's Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, which has always been under Chinese jurisdiction. Patrol duties have continually been carried out in that area by the border guards of the Chinese Government. And the Sinkiang-Tibet highway built by our country in 1956 runs through that area. Yet recently the Indian Government claimed that that area was Indian territory. All this shows that border disputes do exist between China and India.

It was true that the border question was not raised in 1954 when negotiations were being held between the Chinese and Indian sides for the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India. This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side, on its part, had had no time to study the question. The Chinese Government has always held that the existence of the border question absolutely should not

affect the development of Sino-Indian friendly relations. We believe that, following proper preparations, this question which has been carried over from the past can certainly be settled reasonably on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence through friendly talks. To this end, the Chinese Government has now proceeded to take certain steps in making preparations.

An important question concerning the Sino-Indian boundary is the question of the so-called McMahon Line. I discussed this with Your Excellency as well as with Prime Minister U Nu. I would now like to explain again the Chinese Government's attitude. As you are aware, the "McMahon Line" was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically, too, it cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has never been recognised by the Chinese Central Government. Although related documents were signed by a representative of the local authorities of the Tibet region of China, the Tibet local authorities were in fact dissatisfied with this unilaterally drawn line. And I have also told you formally about their dissatisfaction. On the other hand, one cannot, of course, fail to take cognisance of the great and encouraging changes: India and Burma, which are concerned in this line, have attained independence successively and become States friendly with China. In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government, on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. All this I have mentioned to you on more than one occasion. However, we believe that, on account of the friendly relations between China and India, a friendly settlement can eventually be found for this section of the boundary line.

Precisely because the boundary between the two countries is not yet formally delimited and some differences exist, it is unavoidable that there should be discrepancies between the boundary lines drawn on the respective maps of the two sides. On the maps currently published in our country, the Chinese boundaries are drawn in the way consistently followed in Chinese maps for the past several decades, if not longer. We do not hold that every portion of this boundary line is drawn on sufficient grounds. But it would be inappropriate for us to make changes without having made surveys and without having consulted the countries concerned. Furthermore, there would be

difficulties in making such changes, because they would give rise to confusion among our people and bring censure on our government. As a matter of fact, our people have also expressed surprise at the way the Sino-Indian boundary, particularly its western section, is drawn on maps published in India. They have asked our government to take up this matter with the Indian Government. Yet we have not done so, but have explained to them the actual situation of the Sino-Indian boundary. With the settlement of the boundary question—which, as our government has repeatedly pointed out, requires surveys and mutual consultations—the problem of drawing the boundary on the maps will also be solved.

In recent years, there occurred between China and India some minor border incidents which are probably difficult to avoid pending the formal delimitation of the boundary. In order to avoid such incidents so far as possible before the boundary is formally delimited, our government would like to propose to the Indian Government that, as a provisional measure, the two sides temporarily maintain the *status quo*, that is to say, each side keep for the time being to the border areas at present under its jurisdiction and not go beyond them. For the differences between the two sides, naturally, a solution may be sought through consultations like those held on the Wu-Je (Hoti) question. As to the negotiations regarding Wu-Je, we also regret very much that no agreement has yet been reached, as we formerly thought a solution would not be difficult to achieve through negotiations and on-the-spot investigations. We still believe that this small question can be settled satisfactorily through the continued efforts of our two sides. The Chinese Government hopes that the above proposal about temporary maintenance of the present state of the boundary between the two sides will be approved of by the Indian Government.

I need not reiterate how highly the Chinese Government and people value Sino-Indian friendship. We will never allow any difference between our two countries to affect this friendship, and we believe that India shares the same views. I hope that this letter will help you get a better understanding of our government's stand on the Sino-Indian boundary question.

With sincere regards,

(Sd.) CHOU EN-LAI,
Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China

3. Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the
Prime Minister of China, 22 March 1959

New Delhi
22nd March, 1959

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Many thanks for your letter of the 23rd January which I have read with the care and attention which it deserves.

2. I am grateful to you for the facilities which your Government accorded to our small delegation which visited China to study your water conservancy methods and programme. Two more delegations—one to study methods for improving agricultural yield and the other to study your iron and steel programme—will shortly be reaching China. I have no doubt that they will benefit from this opportunity of studying the remarkable progress which your country has achieved in these fields.

3. We were glad to receive Mr. Chang Han Fu in India and I do hope that his brief visit was enjoyable and enabled him to see something of our own efforts to develop our national resources. I entirely agree with you that such exchange of visits on both sides can be of great help in resolving the somewhat similar problems which face our respective countries in their endeavour to quicken the rate of our economic progress.

4. On receipt of your letter I have again examined the basis of the determination of the frontier between India and the Tibet region of China. It is true that this frontier has not been demarcated on the ground in all the sectors but I am somewhat surprised to know that this frontier was not accepted at any time by the Government of China. The traditional frontier, as you may be aware, follows the geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range, but apart from this, in most parts, it has the sanction of specific international agreements between the then Governments of India and the Central Government of China. It may perhaps be useful if I draw your attention to some of these agreements:

- (i) *Sikkim*—The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, with the Tibet region of China was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention 1890 and jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895.
- (ii) *The Ladakh Region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir*—A treaty of 1842 between Kashmir on the one hand and the

Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa on the other, mentions the India-China boundary in the Ladakh region. In 1847 the Chinese Government admitted that this boundary was sufficiently and distinctly fixed. The area now claimed by China has always been depicted as part of India on official maps, has been surveyed by Indian officials and even a Chinese map of 1893 shows it as Indian territory.

- (iii) *The McMahon Line*—As you are aware, the so-called McMahon Line runs eastwards from the eastern borders of Bhutan and defines the boundary of China on the one hand and India and Burma on the other. Contrary to what has been reported to you, this line was, in fact, drawn at a Tripartite Conference held at Simla in 1913-1914, between the Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of China, Tibet and India. At the time of acceptance of the delineation of this frontier, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary, in letters exchanged, stated explicitly that he had received orders from Lhasa to agree to the boundary as marked on the map appended to the Convention. The line was drawn after full discussion and was confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters; and there is nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were in any way dissatisfied with the agreed boundary. Moreover, although the Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Conference objected to the boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet and between Tibet and China, there is no mention of any Chinese reservation in respect of the India-Tibet frontier either during the discussions or at the time of their initialling the Convention. This line has the incidental advantage of running along the crest of the High Himalayan Range which forms the natural dividing line between the Tibetan plateau in the north and the sub-montane region in the south. In our previous discussions and particularly during your visit to India in January 1957, we were gratified to note that you were prepared to accept this line as representing the frontier between China and India in this region and I hope that we shall reach an understanding on this basis.

5. Thus, in these three different sectors covering much the larger

part of our boundary with China, there is sufficient authority based on geography, tradition as well as treaties for the boundary as shown in our published maps. The remaining sector from the tri-junction of the Nepal, India and Tibet boundary up to Ladakh is also traditional and follows well-defined geographical features. Here, too, the boundary runs along well-defined watersheds between the river systems in the south and the west on the one hand and north and east on the other. This delineation is confirmed by old revenue records and maps and by the exercise of Indian administrative authority up to the boundary line for decades.

6. As regards Barahoti (which you call Wu-Je), I agree with you that its rightful ownership should be settled by negotiation. During the talks held last year, we provided extensive documentary proofs that this area has been under Indian jurisdiction and lies well within our frontiers. An on-the-spot investigation could hardly throw any useful light until proofs to the contrary could be adduced. Nevertheless, we were agreeable to both sides agreeing not to send their civil and military officials to the area. Unfortunately, your delegation did not agree to our suggestion. I learn that a material change in the situation has since been effected by the dispatch of Chinese civil and military detachments, equipped with arms, to camp in the area, after our own civil party had withdrawn at the beginning of last winter. If the reports that we have received about an armed Chinese party camping and erecting permanent structures in Hoti during winter are correct, it would seem that unilateral action, not in accordance with custom, was being taken in assertion of your claim to the disputed area.

7. I do hope that a study of the foregoing paragraphs will convince you that not only is the delineation of our frontier, as published in our maps, based on natural and geographical features but that it also coincides with tradition and over a large part is confirmed by international agreements. I need hardly add that independent India would be the last country to make any encroachments beyond its well-established frontiers. It was in the confidence that the general question of our common frontier was settled to the satisfaction of both sides that I declared publicly and in Parliament on several occasions that there is no room for doubt about our frontiers as shown in the published maps. We thought that our position was clearly understood and accepted by your Government. However, as unfortunately there is some difference of views between our two

Governments in regard to the delineation of the frontier at some places, I agree that the position as it was before the recent disputes arose should be respected by both sides and that neither side should try to take unilateral action in exercise of what it conceives to be its right. Further, if any possession has been secured recently, the position should be rectified.

8. You will appreciate that the continuing publication of Chinese maps showing considerable parts of Indian and Bhutanese territory as if they were in China is not in accordance with long established usage as well as treaties, and is a matter of great concern to us. As I said in my previous letter, we greatly value our friendship with China. Our two countries evolved the principles of Panch Sheel which has now found widespread acceptance among the other countries in the world. It would be most unfortunate if these frontier questions should now affect the friendly relations existing between our countries. I hope therefore that an early understanding in this matter will be reached.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

4. Letter from Premier Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru,
8 September 1959

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have carefully read Your Excellency's letter dated March 22, 1959. I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question. This had made me somewhat surprised and also made it necessary for me to take a longer period of time to consider how to reply to your letter.

The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history. In tackling this question, one cannot but, first of all, take into account the historical background of British aggression on China when India was under British rule. From the early days, Britain harboured aggressive ambition towards China's Tibet region. It continuously instigated Tibet to separate from China, in an attempt to put under its control a nominally independent Tibet. When this design failed, it applied all sorts of pressures

on China, intending to make Tibet a British sphere of influence, while allowing China to maintain so-called suzerainty over Tibet. In the meantime, using India as its base, Britain conducted extensive territorial expansion into China's Tibet region and even the Sinkiang region. All this constitutes the fundamental reason for the long-term disputes over and non-settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.

China and India are both countries which were long subjected to imperialist aggression. This common experience should have naturally caused China and India to hold an identical view of the above-said historical background and to adopt an attitude of mutual sympathy, mutual understanding and fairness and reasonableness in dealing with the boundary question. The Chinese Government originally thought the Indian Government would take such an attitude. Unexpectedly to the Chinese Government, however, the Indian Government demanded that the Chinese Government give formal recognition to the conditions created by the application of the British policy of aggression against China's Tibet region as the foundation for the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. What is more serious, the Indian Government has applied all sorts of pressure on the Chinese Government, not even scrupling to the use of force to support this demand. At this, the Chinese Government cannot but feel a deep regret.

The Chinese Government has consistently held that an overall settlement of the boundary question should be sought by both sides, taking into account the historical background and existing actualities and adhering to the Five Principles, through friendly negotiations conducted in a well-prepared way step by step.

Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing *status quo* of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, even less by force. As to some of the disputes, provisional agreements concerning isolated places could be reached through negotiations to ensure the tranquillity of the border areas and uphold the friendship of the two countries. This is exactly the basic idea expressed in my January 23, 1959, letter to you. The Chinese Government still considers this to be the way that should be followed by our two countries in settling the boundary question. Judging from Your Excellency's letter of March 22, 1959, it seems you are not completely against this principle.

I would like now to further explain the position of the Chinese

Government in connection with the question raised in Your Excellency's letter and in conjunction with the recent situation along the Sino-Indian border.

1. In my letter to Your Excellency dated January 23, 1959, I pointed out that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. In your letter of March 22, 1959, Your Excellency expressed disagreement to this and tried energetically to prove that most parts of the Sino-Indian boundary had the sanction of specific international agreements between the past Government of India and the Central Government of China. In order to prove that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited, I would like to furnish the following facts:

(a) Concerning the boundary separating China's Sinkiang and Tibet regions from Ladakh:

In 1842, a peace treaty was indeed concluded between the local authorities of China's Tibet and the Kashmir authorities. However, the then Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the conclusion of this treaty, nor did it ratify the treaty afterwards. Moreover, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary. It is clear that this treaty cannot be used to prove that this section of the boundary has been formally delimited by the two sides, even less can it be used as the foundation to ask the Chinese Government to accept the unilateral claim of the Indian Government regarding this section of the boundary.

As to the Chinese Government official's statement made in 1847 to the British representative that this section of the boundary was clear, it can only show that the then Chinese Government had its own clear view regarding this section of the boundary, and cannot be taken as a proof that the boundary between the two sides had already been formally delimited. As a matter of fact, down to 1899, the British Government still proposed to formally delimit this section of the boundary with the Chinese Government, but the Chinese Government did not agree. Your Excellency also said on August 28 this year in India's Lok Sabha: "This was the boundary of the old Kashmir State with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it." It can thus be seen that this section of the boundary has never been delimited.

Between China and Ladakh, however, there does exist a customary line derived from historical traditions, and Chinese maps have always drawn the boundary between China and Ladakh in accordance with this line. The marking of this section of the boundary on the map of "Punjab, Western Himalaya and adjoining parts of Tibet" compiled by the British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of the East India Company (which was attached to the British Major Alexander Cunningham's book *Ladakh* published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps.

Later, British and Indian maps included large tracts of Chinese territory into Ladakh. This was without any legal grounds, nor in conformity with the actual situation of administration by each side all the time.

(b) Concerning the section of the boundary between the Ari area of China's Tibet and India:

It can be seen from your letter that you also agree that this section of the boundary has not been formally delimited by the two countries. Not only so, there have in fact been historical disputes between the two sides over the right to many places in this area. For example, the area of Sang and Tsungsha, south-west of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet, which had always belonged to China, was thirty to forty years back gradually invaded and occupied by the British. The local authorities of China's Tibet took up this matter several times with Britain, without any results. It has thus become an outstanding issue left by history.

(c) Concerning the Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhutan:

The Indian Government insists that this section of the boundary has long been clearly delimited, citing as its grounds that the so-called McMahon Line was jointly delineated by the representatives of the Chinese Government, the Tibet local authorities and the British Government at the 1913-1914 Simla Conference. As I have repeatedly made clear to Your Excellency, the Simla Conference was an important step taken by Britain in its design to detach Tibet from China. At the conference were discussed the so-called boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet and that between Tibet and the rest of China. Contrary to what was said in your letter, the so-called McMahon Line was never discussed at the Simla Conference, but was determined by the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities behind the back of the representative of the Chinese Central Government through an

exchange of secret notes at Delhi on March 24, 1914, that is, prior to the signing of the Simla Treaty. This line was later marked on the map attached to the Simla Treaty as part of the boundary between Tibet and the rest of China. The so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and has never been recognised by any Chinese Central Government and is, therefore, decidedly illegal.

As to the Simla Treaty, it was not formally signed by the representative of the then Chinese Central Government. And this is explicitly noted in the treaty for quite a long time after the exchange of secret notes between Britain and the Tibet local authorities. Britain dared not make public the related documents, nor change the traditional way of drawing this section of the boundary on maps. This illegal line aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. The Tibet local authorities themselves later also expressed their dissatisfaction with this line, and, following the independence of India in 1947, cabled Your Excellency asking India to return all the territory of the Tibet region of China south of this illegal line. This piece of territory corresponds in size to the Chekiang Province of China and is as big as 90,000 square kilometres. Mr. Prime Minister, how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line which would have it relinquish its right and disgrace itself by selling out its territory—and such a large piece of territory as that?

The delineation of the Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhutan in all traditional Chinese maps is a true reflection on the actual situation of the traditional boundary before the appearance of the so-called McMahon Line. Both the map of Tibet and adjacent countries published by the Indian Survey in 1917 and the map attached to the 1929 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* drew this section of the boundary in the same way as the Chinese maps, and it was only in the period around the peaceful liberation of China's Tibet region in 1951 that Indian troops advanced on a large scale into the area south of the so-called McMahon Line. Therefore, the assertion that this section of the boundary has long been clearly delimited is obviously untenable.

In Your Excellency's letter, you also referred to the boundary between China and Sikkim.

Like the boundary between China and Bhutan, this question does not fall within the scope of our present discussion. I would like, however, to take this opportunity to make clear once again that

China is willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan, without committing aggression against each other, and has always respected the proper relations between them and India.

It can be seen from the above that the way the Sino-Indian boundary has always been drawn in maps published in China is not without grounds and that at first British and Indian maps also drew the Sino-Indian boundary roughly in the same way as the Chinese maps. As a matter of fact, it was not Chinese maps, but British and Indian maps that later unilaterally altered the way the Sino-Indian boundary was drawn. Nevertheless since China and India have not delimited their mutual boundary through friendly negotiations and joint surveys, China has not asked India to revise its maps. In 1954, I explained to Your Excellency for the same reason that it would be inappropriate for the Chinese Government to revise the old map right now. Some people in India, however, are raising a big uproar about the maps published in China, attempting to create a pressure of public opinion to force China to accept India's unilateral claims concerning the Sino-Indian boundary. Needless to say, this is neither wise nor worthy.

2. As stated above, the Chinese Government has all along adhered to a clear-cut policy on the Sino-Indian border question: on the one hand, it affirms the fact that the entire Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited, while on the other, it also faces reality, and, taking specially into consideration the friendly relationship between China and India, actively seeks for a settlement, fair and reasonable to both sides, and never tries unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border between the two countries, pending the settlement of the boundary question.

Regarding the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary, as I have stated above, the Chinese Government absolutely does not recognise the so-called McMahon Line, but Chinese troops have never crossed that line. This is for the sake of maintaining amity along the border to facilitate negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, and in no way implies that the Chinese Government has recognised that line. In view of the fact that my former explanation of this point to Your Excellency is obviously misunderstood in Your Excellency's latest two letters to me, I have deemed it necessary once again to make the explanation clearly.

Regarding the western section of the Sino-Indian boundary, China

has strictly abided by the traditional customary line, and, with regard to Indian troops, repeated intrusions into or occupation of Chinese territory, the Chinese Government, acting always in a friendly manner, has dealt with each case in a way befitting it. For example, regarding the invasion of Wu-Je by Indian troops and administrative personnel, the Chinese Government has tried its best to seek a settlement of the question with the Indian Government through negotiations and to avoid a clash. Regarding the Indian troops who invaded the south-western part of China's Sinkiang and the area of Lake Pankong in the Tibet region of China, the Chinese frontier guards, after disarming them, according to international practice, adopted an attitude of reasoning, asking them to leave Chinese territory and returning to them their arms. Regarding the Indian troops' successive invasion and occupation of the areas of Shipki pass, Parigas, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-Sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sangcha and Lapthal, the Chinese Government, after discovering these happenings, invariably conducted thorough and detailed investigations rather than laying charges against the Indian Government immediately and temperamentally. These measures prove that the Chinese Government is exerting its greatest effort to uphold Sino-Indian friendship.

Despite the above-mentioned border incidents caused wholly by the trespassing of Indian troops, until the beginning of this year, the atmosphere along the Sino-Indian border had on the whole been fairly good. The fact that no armed clash had ever occurred along the 2,000 or so kilometers of the Sino-Indian boundary, which is wholly undelimited, is in itself a powerful proof that, given a friendly and reasonable attitude on both sides, amity can be maintained in the border areas and tension ruled out pending the delimitation of the boundary between the two countries.

3. Since the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, however, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeing of a large number of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary. Changing unilaterally the long-existing state of the border between the two countries, they not only overstepped the so-called McMahon Line, as indicated in the map attached to the secret notes exchanged between Britain and the Tibet local authorities, but also exceeded the boundary drawn on

current Indian maps, which is alleged to represent the so-called McMahon Line, but which in many places actually cuts even deeper into Chinese territory than the McMahon Line.

Indian troops invaded and occupied Longju, intruded into Yasher and are still in occupation of Shatze, Khinzemane and Tamaden—all of which are Chinese territory—shielding armed Tibetan rebel bandits in this area. Indian aircraft have also time and again violated China's territorial air near the Sino-Indian border. What is especially regrettable is that not long ago, the Indian troops unlawfully occupying Longju, launched armed attacks on the Chinese frontier guards stationing at Migyitun, leaving no room for the Chinese frontier guards but to fire back in self-defence. This was the first instance of armed clash along the Sino-Indian border.

It can be seen from the above that the tense situation recently arising on the Sino-Indian border was all caused by trespassing and provocations by Indian troops, and that for this the Indian side should be held fully responsible. Nevertheless, the Indian Government has directed all sorts of groundless charges against the Chinese Government, clamouring that China has committed aggression against India and describing the Chinese frontier guards' act of self-defence in the Migyitun area as armed provocation.

Many political figures and propaganda organs in India have seized the occasion to make a great deal of anti-Chinese utterances, some even openly advocating provocative actions of an even larger scale such as bombarding Chinese territory. Thus a second anti-Chinese campaign has been launched in India in six months' time. The fact that India does not recognise the undelimited state of the Sino-Indian boundary and steps up pressure to bear on China militarily, diplomatically and through public opinion cannot but make one suspect that it is the attempt of India to impose upon China its one-sided claims on the boundary question. It must be pointed out that this attempt will never succeed and such action cannot possibly yield any results other than impairing the friendship of the two countries further complicating the boundary question and making it more difficult to settle.

The friendly relations between China and India are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Chinese Government has consistently held that all differences between our two countries must and certainly can be solved through peaceful consultations and should not be allowed to affect the friendly relationship between

the two countries. China looks upon its south-western border as a border of peace and friendship.

I can assure Your Excellency that it is merely for the purpose of preventing remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border back and forth to carry out harassing activities that the Chinese Government has in recent months dispatched guard units to be stationed in the south-eastern part of the Tibet region of China. This is obviously in the interests of ensuring the tranquility of the border and will in no way constitute a threat to India. Your Excellency is one of the initiators of the Five Principles and has made significant contributions to the consolidation and development of Sino-Indian friendship and constantly stressed the importance of this friendship.

This has deeply impressed the Chinese Government and people. I have, therefore, given Your Excellency a systematic explanation of the whole picture of the Sino-Indian boundary. I hope that Your Excellency and the Indian Government will, in accordance with the Chinese Government's request, immediately adopt measures to withdraw the trespassing Indian troops and administrative personnel and restore the long-existing state of the boundary between the two countries. Through this, the temporary tension on the Sino-Indian border would be eased at once and the dark clouds hanging over the relations between our two countries would be speedily dispelled, setting at ease our friends who are concerned for Sino-Indian friendly relations and dealing a blow to those, who are sowing discord in the Sino-Indian relations and creating tension.

With cordial regards,

(Sd.) CHOU EN-LAI

Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China

INDIA ASKS FOR DELIMITATION PROCEDURE

The following message was sent to the Indian Ambassador in Peking for transmission to the Government of China on 9 September 1959, before the receipt of Mr. Chou's letter:

The Government of India have seen the two notes which were received by the Indian Embassy in Peking from the Chinese Government, one relating to the India-China boundary in the neighbourhood of Khinzemane and the other relating to the boundary in the Migyitun area. The Government of India would like to emphasise once more that the so-called McMahon Line definitely represents the boundary between India and the Tibet region of China from the eastern border of Bhutan up to Burma and they stand firmly by it. The circumstances in which the McMahon Line was fixed as the boundary are given in detail in paragraph 4 of the Prime Minister's letter of the 22nd March 1959 to Premier Chou En-lai. This line is by and large in accordance with the geographical features in that area and also with long-established usage. The McMahon Line however departs from well-recognised geographical features at a few places. For example, the international boundary departs from the watershed near Tsari in order to include in Tibet the pilgrimage route of Tsari Nyingpa which is used every year in large numbers by Tibetans. Similarly, the village of Migyitun was included in Tibet in view of the fact that the Tibetans attached considerable importance to this village. The Government of India are prepared to discuss the exact alignment of the McMahon Line at places where it departs from the geographical features marking the international boundary. It would have been helpful if some indication had been given by the Chinese Government of where they think the exact boundary should be demarcated on the ground in the area of Migyitun. In this context the Government of India cannot but express their regret once more that large areas of Indian territory should continue to be shown in official Chinese maps as part of China. It is most extraordinary that the Government of China should not have found time during the last ten years to withdraw these faulty maps. The continued circulation of these maps is a standing threat to India's integrity and evidence of unfriendliness towards India. Obviously no discussion of the India-China border in any sector can proceed on the basis of maps which have no rela-

tion to reality. The position of the Government of India has been clarified in the Prime Minister's letter of the 22nd March 1959 to Premier Chou En-lai.

2. In regard to the specific dispute raised by the Chinese about Khinzemane, the Government of India would like to point out that the boundary line in the particular area follows the crest of the highest mountain range. Khinzemane is south of this range and is obviously part of Indian territory. Reference has been made in the Chinese note to the alleged Chinese territory of "Kechilang" west of "Shatze". The Government of India are unable to identify either of these places in their map. There is however a pasture known as the Droksar pasture which is owned by the Indian village of Lumpo. The villages of Le and Timang within Chinese territory on the other side of the Thangla ridge have been allowed to utilise these grazing pastures and for this privilege the Tibetan village of Le is paying rent in kind to the Indian village of Lumpo. In any case, it is not uncommon for border villages on one side to use by mutual agreement pastures lying on the other side of the international boundary and the exercise of this privilege cannot be regarded as evidence in support of a territorial claim.

3. As regards the position at Longju, as stated above, the McMahon Line runs immediately south of the village of Migyitun which is in Chinese territory. The Government of India cannot accept the position that Longju is part of Migyitun. In fact it is entirely distinct from Migyitun. The Government are also surprised to hear that the Chinese authorities had exercised any administrative jurisdiction over Longju at any time in the past. Obviously the Chinese Government have received wrong reports on the point. It is not a fact that our detachment first fired on Chinese troops. Our definite instruction was that the Indian personnel should use force only in self-defence and we have no reason to think that they did not carry out this instruction. The instruction to the Indian patrol to resist trespassers could never be interpreted to mean that any person found on our territory was immediately to be fired at. Our personnel were to resist pressure brought to bear on them to vacate their position. The fate of all our personnel is not known even now, but we are satisfied from the reports of those who have returned to the base camp that the Chinese encircled and used overpowering force on the detachment at Longju and our personnel had to withdraw under this pressure.

The Government of India have investigated the complaint of intrusion of Indian planes into Chinese territory. The facts are that when the Indian post at Longju was surrounded and attacked by a superior Chinese force some planes were sent to drop supplies to the post. Later, after the post had been overrun and contact with our personnel had been lost, planes were sent to find out the whereabouts of the personnel. We are satisfied that our planes kept entirely on our side of the international border.


4. The Government of India are examining once more the exact alignment of the boundary in the Tamadem area. They would like to assure the Chinese Government that if Tamadem is found not to be within Indian territory the Indian post will be withdrawn from there.

5. However, the Government of India are prepared to discuss with the Chinese Government the exact alignment of the so-called McMahon Line at Khinzemane, the Longju area and the Tamadem area. They request that the *status quo* should be maintained at all these places and that the Chinese personnel should not alter the present position by crossing the Thangla ridge and trying to occupy any territory south of the ridge. Similarly pending examination of the position at Tamadem, force should not be used on the Indian post there. As far as Longju is concerned, the Government of India would be prepared not to send their personnel back to the area provided that the Chinese would also withdraw their forces. This would mean that neither side would have their personnel at Longju.


6. The Government of India attach the highest importance to peaceful coexistence and the continuance of Sino-Indian friendship. They are convinced that if these principles had been acted upon, the Chinese authorities would not have sought to send armed personnel into Indian territory. The Chinese Government have stated in their notes that no violation of Chinese territory will be tolerated. The Government of India have not the remotest wish to trespass into other people's territory. Equally, they cannot possibly withdraw under intimidation from areas which are part of India and will have to prevent illegal intrusion by foreign forces into their territory. There is no truth at all in the allegations that rebel Tibetan elements are operating from Indian territory. In no circumstances will the Government of India allow any foreign element to operate against a friendly Government from their soil. More than 13,000 Tibetans have crossed into Indian territory during

the last five months. They were disarmed immediately they crossed the international boundary. Those who refused to part with their arms were pushed back from Indian territory.


7. Should the Chinese Government accept the proposal for a discussion of the exact delimitation of the border at the places mentioned above, the Government of India would like to know what procedure they would wish to follow. The Government of India agree that pending further discussions the position as stated above should not be altered by either side.



INDIA'S FRONTIER WITH CHINA



F. D. Frontier Division

The precise nature of the Chinese claim to Indian territory has not been stated by Chinese authorities and is not known to the Government of India. In the Chinese maps some parts of Indian territory have been incorrectly shown as part of China. These areas are roughly indicated by slanting lines  in this map and the southern border of these areas as they appear in Chinese maps has been roughly shown by a broken line = = = =

2. The places on the traditional international border where disputes have arisen have also been roughly marked in the map. So is the road built by China across Aksai Chin in Ladakh in North West India.

INDIA'S FRONTIER WITH CHINA

This note and the map opposite were issued by the Director, Press Relations, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, on 28 September 1959. Some portions of the map not relevant to the frontier dispute have been omitted.

India's northern frontier with China extends over 2,500 miles from north-west Kashmir to the tripartite junction of India, Burma and China near the Talu pass. The whole frontier is traditional and well known. In some sectors it has also been demarcated or defined. It runs along the Muztagh and the Karakoram ranges through the Karakoram pass and then along the Kuen Lun ranges to a point east of 80° longitude. Thereafter, it follows the watershed and runs through Lanak pass and along the Changchengmo range. Cutting across the Pangong Tso and the Spanggur Tso, it runs through Chang pass and along the Kailash range. It then turns to the south-west near Demchok and skirting the Hanle mountains cuts across the Para Chu river south of Chumar. It then follows the watershed between the Spiti and the Para Chu and the watershed between the Ganges and the Sutlej to the trijunction of India, Nepal and China. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet is also a watershed, while the crest of the Himalayas forms the boundary between Bhutan and Tibet. The north-east frontier of India, about 700 miles long, from the eastern limits of Bhutan to a point near the Talu pass, is for the most part the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra.

FRONTIER OF KASHMIR WITH TIBET

The frontier in this sector is about 1,100 miles long. About 300 miles of the extreme western sector is covered by the territory of Kashmir which is illegally occupied by Pakistan. The major part of Kashmir's frontier with China runs along well-defined watershed, and the eastern section in particular has been recognized by custom for over three centuries. It was also confirmed by treaties signed between Ladakh and Tibet circa 1684 and in 1842. This boundary includes in India the whole of the Aksai Chin plateau, the Changchengmo valley, and the Pangong, Rupshu and Hanle areas. However, Chinese maps have been showing the boundary in this area much further west so as to include about 6,000 square

miles—the greater part of Aksai Chin, and parts of the Changchongmo valley, and the Pangong, Spanggur Tso and Chang La areas—in Tibet. The road constructed by the Chinese runs for about a hundred miles through the eastern part of Aksai Chin. In September 1957, it was announced that this road had been completed. Indian parties have been arrested near the northern extremity of Aksai Chin in 1958 and in the Spanggur area in 1959.

THE PUNJAB-TIBET FRONTIER

This is about 70 miles in length. In the southern part of this sector, some Chinese maps show the boundary four to five miles west of the traditional boundary, which is the watershed between the Spiti and Para Chu rivers. In 1956 and 1957, Chinese parties visited this area.

THE BOUNDARY OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND UTTAR PRADESH WITH TIBET

It is about 320 miles long and follows well-defined watersheds. In Himachal Pradesh, it is the watershed between the eastern and western tributaries of the Sutlej, and in Uttar Pradesh, that between the Sutlej on the one hand and the Kali, Alakhnanda and Jadhganga on the other. The six passes on the watershed—Shipki, Mana, Niti, Kungri Bingri, Darma, and Lipu Lekh—have been mentioned in the 1954 agreement as passes between India and China. The Great Himalayan Range in this region lies in some places thirty to forty miles south of the watershed. The Nilang-Jadhang area, about a hundred square miles in area, has always been Indian territory.

THE FRONTIER BETWEEN SIKKIM AND TIBET

This was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and was later, in 1895, demarcated on the ground. All Chinese maps seem to show this boundary correctly.

THE FRONTIER OF BHUTAN WITH TIBET

This is a customary boundary and follows the crest of the Himalayan Range for about three hundred miles. Chinese maps level out Bhutan in two sectors in the north and include a considerable part of south-eastern Bhutan in Tibet.

THE NORTH-EASTERN FRONTIER OF INDIA—
THE SO-CALLED MCMAHON LINE

From the eastern border of Bhutan to a point near the Talu pass, our frontier is a customary one which was defined in detail at the Simla Conference of 1914. The line follows the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra, except where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansiri and the Namjang rivers break through. This watershed is for its greater part the Himalayan Range and in other places the highest range in the area. In one place the line departed from the watershed to leave two sacred lakes, the village of Migyitun and a pilgrimage route in Tibet.

The line shown on Chinese maps includes in Tibet nearly 32,000 square miles of our territory in this area. This piece of territory comprises the whole of three Divisions of the North-East Frontier Agency—Kameng, Subansiri and Siang—and the major part of the fourth—the Lohit Frontier Division. In the extreme west it includes a belt of the Assam plains also.

SOVIET VIEWS ON SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTES

On 9 September 1959, the Soviet News Agency, *Tass*, issued a statement on the border disputes between India and China. Mr. Krishna Menon, Indian Defence Minister, described this statement in a speech in Bombay on 10 September as "important", the Soviet Government, for the first time urging settlement of a dispute between a Communist and a non-Communist country by negotiations. Mr. Nehru at his press conference in New Delhi on 11 September described the Soviet statement as an "unusual one" and as "fair"; he said that he "welcomed" and "appreciated" it.

Of late definite political quarters and the press in the Western countries have started a noisy campaign around the incident which recently took place on the Chinese-Indian frontier in the area of the Himalayas.

This campaign obviously has the purpose of driving a wedge between the two biggest countries of Asia—the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India, whose friendship is of great importance for safeguarding peace and international cooperation in Asia and throughout the world.

Its inspirers are trying to discredit the idea of peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems and to prevent the strengthening of the Asian people's solidarity in the struggle for the consolidation of national independence.

The fact is noteworthy that this incident has been seized by those circles in the Western countries, especially in the United States of America, which seek to obstruct a relaxation of international tension and to complicate the situation on the eve of the exchange of visits between Comrade Nikita Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the President of the United States of America. By such tricks they expect to paralyse the desire which is gaining ground in the Western countries for agreement with the Socialist States on questions related to the cessation of the "cold war".

The incident on the Chinese-Indian frontier is certainly deplorable. The Soviet Union maintains friendly relations both with the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India. The Chinese and Soviet peoples are linked by the unbreakable bonds of fraternal friendship based on the great principles of Socialist internationalism. Friendly cooperation between the Soviet Union

and India is successfully developing in keeping with the ideas of peaceful coexistence.

Attempts to cash in on the incident that took place on the Chinese-Indian frontier for the purpose of fanning the "cold war" and crippling friendship between the peoples is worthy of resolute condemnation.

Leading Soviet quarters express the confidence that the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India will not allow the forces which do not want to ease the international climate, but to strain it, which strive to prevent the beginning of relaxation of tension in the relations between States, to capitalise on this incident.

The same quarters express confidence that the two Governments will settle the misunderstandings that have arisen, taking into consideration the mutual interests and in the spirit of the traditional friendship between the peoples of China and India.

This will also help to strengthen the forces supporting peace and international cooperation.

DALAI TAKES TIBET BACK TO THE UN

The text of the cable sent by the Dalai Lama to the United Nations Secretary-General urging UN intervention in Tibet on humanitarian grounds. The cable reached UN headquarters on 9 September 1959, and was circulated by the Secretary-General to member nations.

Your Excellency Mr. Hammarskjöld:

Kindly refer to the proceedings of the General Committee of the United Nations General Assembly held on Friday, 24th November, 1950, at which it was resolved that the consideration of El Salvador's complaint against the invasion of Tibet by foreign forces should be adjourned in order to give the parties the opportunity to arrive at a peaceful settlement. It is with the deepest regret that I am informing you that the act of aggression by Chinese forces has not terminated. On the contrary, the area of aggression has been substantially extended with the result that practically the whole of Tibet is under the occupation of the Chinese forces. I and my Government have made several appeals for a peaceful and friendly settlement, but so far these appeals have been completely ignored. In these circumstances and in view of the inhuman treatment and crimes against humanity and religion to which the people of Tibet are being subjected, I solicit immediate intervention of the United Nations and consideration by the General Assembly on its own initiative of the Tibetan issue, which had been adjourned. In this connection, I and my Government wish to emphasise that Tibet was a sovereign State at the time when her territorial integrity was violated by the Chinese armies in 1950. In support of this contention, the Government of Tibet urge the following:

1. No power or authority was exercised by the Government of China in or over Tibet since the declaration of independence by the 13th Dalai Lama in 1912.

2. The sovereign status of Tibet during this period finds conclusive evidence in the fact that the Government of Tibet concluded as many as five international agreements immediately before and during these years.

3. The Government of Tibet take their stand on the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1914 which recognised the sovereign status of Tibet and accorded the same position to the Tibetan plenipotentiary as was given to the representatives of Great Britain and China.

It is true that this convention imposed certain restrictions on the external sovereignty of Tibet, but these did not deprive her of her international position. Moreover, these restrictions ceased to have any effect on the transfer of power to India.

4. There is no valid and subsisting international agreement under which Tibet or any other Power recognises Chinese suzerainty.

5. The sovereign status of Tibet is equally evident from the fact that during the Second World War Tibet insisted on maintaining her neutrality and only allowed the transport of non-military goods from India to China through Tibet. This position was accepted by the Governments of Great Britain and China.

6. The sovereign status of Tibet has also been acknowledged by other Powers. In 1948, when a trade delegation from the Government of Tibet visited India, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the passports issued by the Tibetan Government were accepted by the Governments of these countries.

Your Excellency, My Government also solicit immediate intervention of the United Nations on humanitarian grounds. Since their violation of the territorial integrity of Tibet, the Chinese forces have committed the following offences against the universally accepted laws of international conduct:

(1) They have dispossessed thousands of Tibetans of their properties and deprived them of every source of livelihood and thus driven them to death and desperation;

(2) Men, women and children have been forced into labour gangs and made to work on military construction without payment or on nominal payment;

(3) They have adopted cruel and inhuman measures for the purpose of sterilising Tibetan men and women with a view to the total extermination of the Tibetan race;

(4) Thousands of innocent people of Tibet have been brutally massacred;

(5) There have been many cases of murder of leading citizens of Tibet without any cause or justification;

(6) Every attempt has been made to destroy our religion and culture. Thousands of monasteries have been razed to the ground and sacred images and articles of religion completely destroyed. Life and property are no longer safe and Lhasa, the capital of the State, is now a dead city.

The sufferings, which my people are undergoing, are beyond description and it is imperatively necessary that this wanton and ruthless murder of my people should be immediately brought to an end.

It is in these circumstances that I appeal to you [Mr. Hammar-skjoeld] and the United Nations in the confident hope that our appeal will receive the consideration which it deserves.

UN ASSEMBLY PASSES TIBET RESOLUTION

On October 21, 1959, the United Nations adopted a joint Malay-
Irish resolution on Tibet, which, without naming the Chinese
People's Republic, deplored the violation of the fundamental human
rights in Tibet and called for their restoration.

Forty-five nations supported the resolution. Nine opposed it.
Twenty-six countries, including India, abstained. Two, Guinea
and Costa Rica, were absent.

The following is the text of the resolution:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling the principles regarding fundamental human rights
and freedom set out in the Charter of the United Nations and in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General
Assembly on December 10, 1948,

"Considering that the fundamental human rights and freedoms
to which the Tibetan people, like all others, are entitled include the
right to civil and religious liberty for all without distinction,

"Mindful also of the distinctive cultural and religious heritage
of the people of Tibet and of the autonomy which they have tradi-
tionally enjoyed,

"Gravely concerned at reports, including the official statements of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental
human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet have been for-
cibly denied them,

"Deploping the effect of these events in increasing international
tensions and embittering the relations between peoples at a time
when earnest and positive efforts are being made by responsible
leaders to reduce tension and improve international relations,

"1. Affirms its belief that respect for the principles of the Charter
and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential for
the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law,

"2. Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the
Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life."

The following is the voting analysis:

Yes (45): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,

Chile, Kuomintang China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Malaya, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the U.S., Uruguay, Venezuela
No (9): Albania, Bulgaria, White Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Ukraine, Soviet Union

Abstentions (26): Afghanistan, Belgium, Britain, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, the Lebanon, Lybia, Morocco, Nepal, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia

Absent (2): Guinea, Costa Rica





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