RADHAKRISHNAN
COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
PRESENTED IN HONOUR
OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY
BY RADHAKRISHNAN

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE
AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE
EAST AND WEST IN RELIGION
RELIGION AND SOCIETY
THE BHAGAVADGITA
EASTERN RELIGIONS AND WESTERN THOUGHT
THE DHAMMAPADA
(Oxford University Press)
INDIA AND CHINA
IS THIS PEACE?
GREAT INDIANS
(Hind Kitabs, Bombay)

EDITED BY RADHAKRISHNAN
MAHATMA GANDHI

EDITED BY RADHAKRISHNAN AND J. H. MUIRHEAD
CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
PROFESSOR S. RADHAKRISHNAN

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Radhakrishnan
COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY PRESENTED IN HONOUR OF HIS SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY

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INTRODUCTION

Even were there no special circumstances to make it a memorable occasion, the sixtieth birthday of Professor Radhakrishnan could not easily be passed without notice by his friends and admirers. Here is an opportunity, not to be missed, to extend congratulations to one who is beloved and respected all over the world, to express gratitude for his leadership in the past, and to wish him many years of rewarding achievement in the broader fields of philosophical reflection and human service which he can now more freely explore.

But this occasion is memorable in a distinctive way. In the light of the anxious and stirring events that are now tumbling after each other on the world scene, and the ominous fear that civilization may not be able to survive much longer its radical disunity, Radhakrishnan's achievement takes on a momentous importance.

To be sure, the immediate threat of wholesale destruction arises not from the cultural cleavage between East and West, but from the hostile split within the Western world itself, together with the tragic inability of the members of that world to tolerate diversity and to envision any other than a violent solution of the rivalry now sharply precipitated. But to any comprehensive and long-range view it is clear that if the West manages to avoid this impending self-destruction it will be because a principle has come to prevail whose most important application will reach beyond the impassioned divergences within the Occident. That principle is that, instead of expressing to the limit our unprecedented capacity for mutual destruction, we shall each allow the other to exist in his own way and gradually increase our insight for the wise ordering of life by learning from one another's partial successes in the vast enterprise of living. In this direction lie not only our possible salvation in the present crisis and the beginning of real strength of the United Nations, but the gradual emergence of a world-perspective which will bind together in harmony of mutual understanding the Orient and the Occident, with their sharply diverse solutions of the problem of life.

Irrespective, however, of whether this principle succeeds in
winning enough persuasive power to avert the catastrophic violence that hangs over us, it has already quietly brought about a significant transformation in the attitudes of intellectual leaders in both the East and the West. If such a calamity has to come, this transformation will go on still more rapidly among the survivors, be they many or few. And in it the thinker honoured in the present volume has been an outstanding pioneer.

Less than a century ago there was no serious eagerness for a shared understanding between East and West except among grammarians and philologists, together with a few unusually broad-minded missionaries. Indeed, what concern existed was apt to be pretty closely limited to the special problems which confronted thinkers in the field of historical scholarship. But since then a notable change has taken place, and its tempo has been steadily increasing. The East has come to realize that for the preservation of its own values, and for assuring them a broader and stabler base, Western science must be mastered. It seems, moreover, that this mastery is not merely a technical matter but must include the philosophy of science, as Western thought has developed it. The West has begun to realize that there are spiritual depths in the Orient which it has not yet plumbed, and that if these were understood a way could be found to overcome its frantic competitiveness and achieve the inner and outer peace it has hitherto lacked. Here there is a growing, though still weak, concern to appreciate the philosophies which interpret life and experience from the point of view of these deeper lessons. This concern is spreading not only among those whose dominant interest is religion but also among philosophic minds, both within and without academic circles. A general comprehension is being achieved that while the Occident has taken the lead in the intelligent exploration of physical nature, to the end that it may be made the most effective possible servant of human needs, it is the Orient that has taken the lead in the intelligent exploration of human personality, with regard to its tremendous moral, social, and metaphysical potentialities. Thus far, each half of the world has been poorer through failure to share what the experience and insight of the other half have to offer. What is needed, it is now more and more clearly perceived, is a wider and profounder pooling of human resources and the philosophical interpretations which clarify the way in which they have been disclosed in each of the world’s cultures, so that no man may any longer miss
INTRODUCTION

participating in the promising values that any man in any part of the world has made available.

That this situation has appeared, and has become as hopeful as it is, is largely due to Radhakrishnan’s genius, understanding, energy, and undiscouraged endeavour. Heir of the great Indian tradition, and fully convinced of its essential validity and challenging significance to the rest of the world, he mastered likewise the Occidental perspective so that he could see things the way a Westerner does and appreciate how the Western mind works. As a result of this synthesis of attitudes and cultural approaches, the books which he has written have a value all their own to the Western enquirer into Indian thought. They open wide the door to an appreciation of the general orientation in which the Indian philosophical distinctions arise and have meaning. They enable the Occidental thinker to catch the inner spirit of Indian philosophy. The two volumes of Radhakrishnan’s Indian Philosophy will long remain a landmark as an interpretation of the Indian mind to the West from this standpoint. It provided exactly what was needed as a foundation, on which more detailed historical exactitude can be secured as Western thinkers become ready for it. The difficult problem in intellectual understanding is to apprehend the genius of a distinctive way of feeling and thinking as a whole, and such apprehension can be mediated effectively only by one who, like Radhakrishnan, has absorbed both perspectives and hence make either intelligible, in terms of the thought forms, to the other.

It is Radhakrishnan’s firm conviction that the essential spiritual truth of all religions and cultures is the same, and that it is possible and necessary for each to understand, tolerate and admire the other’s. He says: “My religious sense did not allow me to speak a rash or profane word of anything which the soul of man holds and has held sacred. This attitude of respect for all creeds, this elementary good manners in matters of spirit, is bred into the marrow of one’s bones by the Hindu tradition, by its experience of centuries.” But for him, “religion is not a creed or code but an insight into reality.” Religion is the life of the inner spirit, and philosophy must lead us to a spiritual view of the universe. An idealist view of life is an absolutist view of spirit. It is the affirmation of the primacy of the spiritual values. And whenever he speaks of the absence of the religious motive in modern civilization, he means the lack of the spiritual note, and makes no refer-
ence, even in intention, to any denominational religion. The primacy of spiritual values, the lack and necessity of the spiritual note in modern civilization, the logical inevitability of a spiritual absolutism in philosophy, the undeniable truth of our inner life or spirit—this is the ever-recurring theme of practically all his books and lectures. He believes that the philosophies of the East in general, and of India in particular, have, from the beginning, upheld the spiritual tradition.

Though Radhakrishnan is never tired of emphasizing the need of a spiritual foundation for our social structure, and of reviving spiritual values in contemporary life, he is not unaware of the social inequalities and maladjustments still existing in some of the countries of the world. The disadvantages of the present status of women in society and the glaring contrasts of poverty and wealth, the loss of humanistic touch and motive in the petrified forms of traditional religions—these also have not escaped his notice. Quite often, he stresses the need for bringing the spiritual insight of ancient religions into closer contact with the pressing problems of our mundane life. He writes: "Religion must establish itself as a rational way of living. If ever the spirit is to be at home in this world and not merely a prisoner or fugitive, secular foundation must be laid deep and preserved worthily. Religion must express itself in reasonable thought, fruitful action, and right social institutions." But by religion he does not mean Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam or Christianity. As for Tagore, "orthodox religion, whether as dogma or ritual, means almost nothing to him."

Radhakrishnan writes towards the end of his Indian Philosophy: "The problem facing Indian philosophy to-day is whether it is to be reduced to a cult, restricted in scope and with no application to the present facts, or whether it is to be made alive or real, so as to become what it should be, one of the great formative elements in human progress, by relating the immensely increased knowledge of modern science to the ancient ideals of Indian philosophers. All signs indicate that the future is bound up with the latter alternative." He says that modern Western civilization is based upon the three Greek ideals of rationalist philosophy, humanist ethics, and nationalist politics. But there is an ideal higher than the three, namely, the life of spirit. Man cannot be understood adequately and be analysed exhaustively in terms of reason alone, or physiological structure alone, or society alone, or even in terms of all the three together. There is something deeper
in him, his inner life, the life of the spirit, from which all the three derive their being, which gives them their meaning, and in the light of which they have to be understood and interpreted. The Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophies were not uninfluenced by Eastern spirituality. But in the former, which has continued to exercise its influence on the philosophies of the West up to the present, and started their grand philosophical tradition, the spiritual note is not the dominant one and one will not be far from the truth if one says that it plays a secondary role. And Neo-Platonism has been ignored by many Western academical philosophers as too mystical and even superstitious. Radhakrishnan thinks that the Western tradition contains three main currents, the Graeco-Roman, the Hebrew and the Indian. To the first are due the elements of rationalism, humanism and authoritarianism; to the second, the elements of moral idealism, devotion to a personal God and other-worldliness; and to the third, the elements of the sense of the indwelling God and the joy of the union with him as the supreme universal spirit. But most of these elements, except the rational and the humanist, have gradually ceased to be active forces in the life of the West; and a philosophy of life, which is to be adequate to our contemporary life, with its one-sided development of science, and of chauvinistic nationalism and other political philosophies, each claiming to be the only correct form of humanism, should harmoniously incorporate and blend the truths of all the factors, under the guidance of the supreme spiritual principle. The problem of reconciling and synthesizing East and West is really the problem of reconciling and synthesizing these different trends of thought and modes of life, which, in varying permutations and combinations, formed different and often conflicting traditions both in the East and the West.

Radhakrishnan, in his various works, has presented the main objective of a world philosophy as a philosophy of life. In fact, he calls his book in which he gives his own views, An Idealist View of Life. His main interest is in life and its problems, not so much in the logical and cosmological questions of judgment, causation, space and time. He says in his address at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy (1926): "We are not so much in need of a keen analysis of particular problems, as those of essence and existence, sense and perspectives, or a pragmatic insistence on methodology and on the futility of metaphysics, interesting as
they all are, but philosophy in the larger sense of the term, a
spiritual view of the universe, broad-based on the results of
sciences and aspirations of humanity." Not that he does not
recognize that even a spiritual philosophy or any other philosophy
of life must have its logical, cosmological and epistemological
doctrines, which have to be systematically developed. But as a
pioneer in the field of comparative philosophy, with his insight
into the deeper motives behind different philosophical traditions,
he has been more anxious to develop a view-point for a compre-
hensive philosophy of life than to work out its details beforehand,
more concerned to point out the guiding principles than to apply
them in detail. This should be the work of the next generation of
philosophers, who will not but be impressed by the immensity
and importance of the task. His main and central teaching is that
the spiritual should be given primacy; and reason and humanism,
or science and man, should be explained in the light of the spiritual.
The true Absolute is the spirit; our attempt to turn reason into
an absolute has ended in some of the unhuman and inhuman
results of science; and a similar view of man as an absolute
has led to conflicting political philosophies and conflagrations.
A true understanding of man requires viewing him from the stand-
point of the spiritual.

These conclusions are reached by Radhakrishnan after a com-
parative estimate of the Eastern and the Western philosophical
traditions. He has been known throughout the world as a liaison
officer between East and West. The editors have thought it fitting
therefore that this volume should be devoted to studies in com-
parative philosophy mainly, in the hope that it would mark the
beginning, in all countries, of a new line of philosophical activity,
which would ultimately result in a systematic and harmonious
synthesis of East and West. Some two or three essays are not
explicit comparisons, but independent syntheses, the approach to
which is made from both Eastern and Western philosophies. And
both kinds of essays are of a piece with the life-work of Radha-
krishnan. Professor Hinman, in his Presidential Address to the
American Philosophical Association, selected for treatment "Two
Representative Idealists: Bosanquet and Radhakrishnan." To be
mentioned along with Bosanquet is a right recognition. And
Radhakrishnan's lecture at the British Academy, in the "Master
Mind" Series, on "Gautama: the Buddha" was acclaimed as a
lecture "on a master mind by a master mind." It is right that this
volume with a purpose be associated with the name of a master mind, a name which not only is inalienably connected with the renaissance in India and an awakening of the West to the spiritual values of the East, but will also equally inalienably be associated with the new line of intellectual activity directed towards a philosophical synthesis of East and West, contributing, in its own way, to the growth of the world community.

The editors intended to present the volume to Radhakrishnan on September 5, 1948, when he completed his sixieth year, which is an auspicious event according to Hindu tradition. But it was thought also that contributors should be selected from all over the world. Due to long distances, inadequate facilities for correspondence for some time after the war, unsettled conditions in some parts of the world like the civil war in China, and some other difficulties, much delay was caused in contacting scholars and thinkers. The editors therefore found it difficult to carry out their project according to programme. But the high purpose of the volume, it is hoped, will justify presenting it, even after the due date, to one whose life is devoted to the cause of philosophy and international understanding.

THE EDITORS
PUBLISHERS' NOTE

Nine of the opening pages were originally occupied by a contribution by Mr. B. K. Mallik which was proofed under the heading of "Foreword." Subsequently, at the request of Professor Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Mr. Mallik's paper was given the new title of "Radhakrishnan and Indian Civilization" and is now included later in the volume. We are giving this explanation for the benefit of Librarians and others, who might justifiably consider that certain pages have been left out of the beginning of the book.
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I

THE PROBLEM OF A WORLD PHILOSOPHY

E. A. BURTT
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I

In the contemporary world there is gradually and haltingly emerging, for the first time in history, a world philosophy.

In one important sense it is already here—namely, as an inclusive perspective in minds which view the world-scene with a superpartisan attitude, and which seek to catch the significance of the stirring events now transpiring in terms of such a perspective. These minds survey the planet-wide turmoil of our day, not with the aim of justifying and protecting any prerogatives for the particular economy, political framework, moral ideals, or religion to which they are habituated, but with the aim of understanding the place and constructive role of each in relation to their living alternatives. They see the world as a theatre in which all these ways of living are struggling to preserve themselves against extinction, and to win if possible a larger opportunity. They assume that each (at least in the case of the civilized peoples) may have an important contribution to make which the rest of the world would do ill to lose in its quest to discover and realize the best life of which men are capable. In a period of heightening international tension this perspective is very difficult to maintain, but none who have clearly caught it will be quite satisfied with any orientation less generous or impartial.

In another, and at least equally important sense, however, this world philosophy remains to be achieved. The inclusive and fair-minded perspective just described provides the psychological matrix and motivation which make its achievement possible, but does not constitute its substance. This substance can begin to appear only when, under the guidance of this perspective, thinkers born and trained in different cultural areas learn specific lessons from each other, share diverse ideas and ideals, growing thus...
toward a mutual appreciative understanding of what each has to offer in the presence of definite issues. Each thinker who participates in such a process is absorbing something of what had hitherto been alien to him, is enlarging his previously more limited viewpoint, and is thus contributing his bit towards the harmonizing synthesis which, in its richest attainable form, would mark the culmination of this growth.

II

Is such a world philosophy desirable? If it is rightly conceived, yes—both desirable and highly important. If it is wrongly conceived, no.

It would not be desirable if it were conceived as a set of doctrines congealing into a rigid creed, which would then be adamant against revision. Nor would its pursuit be desirable if the attitude expressed in that pursuit were, however subtly and unconsciously, an urge to impose one’s own ideas upon others instead of an open-minded readiness to let one’s previous convictions be modified in whatever degree such hospitable exploration might require. A world philosophy pursued and established in this way would be a curse rather than a blessing. The kind of philosophic unity I have in mind is an orchestral and dynamic unity. It is orchestral because its aim is not to extinguish the variety of philosophic viewpoints in favour of exclusive domination by one of them nor even to neglect their distinctive differences in order to concentrate attention on the pale abstractions that all have in common. The ideal is rather that of a rich inclusiveness, preserving all elements that can be preserved together in the interest of constructive growth. It is dynamic, because its purpose is not to establish from among our present competing philosophies a fixed orthodoxy which will then be guarded against future change. It will recognize the inevitability and desirability of new clues to philosophic interpretation constantly appearing, and therefore it will take for granted that the harmonization of clashing diversity is a process that never ends. From this standpoint, what I am describing could be best denoted, not by the substantive “world philosophy,” but by the gerund “world-philosophizing”—i.e. philosophizing as the continual growth in reconciling significant differences on a world-wide basis.

Who could object to world philosophy as thus conceived? It
THE PROBLEM OF A WORLD PHILOSOPHY

means the acceptance of philosophy as it already prosecutes its
task, but with fuller appreciative awareness, on the part of all
philosophers, of speculative happenings in distant regions of the
earth, and a resolute abandonment of dogmatism, protective
partiality, and contentment with a needlessly limited orientation.

Indeed, such philosophizing is not only desirable but highly
important. In the first place, universality is an intrinsic philo-
sophic demand—no philosophy is truly such unless its validity is
assumed to hold without irrational bounds. Now in the past
philosophers have naively believed, especially in the West, that
whatever conclusions meet the criteria of rationality generally
accepted in their part of the world are unqualifiably valid; they
did not realize that those criteria might be seriously affected by
variable cultural forces and therefore lack the universality im-
plicitly assumed. But Occidental thinkers have recently been
forced to see that this sort of relativity is profoundly real. Chal-
lenged by the Freudian psychology, the Marxian dialectic and the
so-called "sociology of knowledge," they have become vividly
aware that all modes of thinking characteristic of a given epoch in
a given culture-area are relative to that culture, and especially to
the dominant interests and class affiliations of its intellectual
leaders. This means that what any group among us has supposed
to be the real universe is a much more limited and provincial
affair than it claims to be; it reflects from first to last all the
narrow and accidental quirks that characterize our own cultural
mentality in its approach to metaphysics. What we have called
the universe is just our own little universe—Western or Islamic or
Indian or Chinese, as the case may be—cozily walled in by our
geographic and cultural boundaries. But to recognize this fact is
to recognize also that philosophy cannot be its true self or realize
its proper genius till it transcends these irrelevant and irrational
limitations. And it becomes clear then that the universe rightly to
be called real is the far vaster affair that would be gradually
approximated precisely through this transcendence—the universe
that waits to be discovered as thinkers from all cultural traditions
open-mindedly pool their several insights and allow them to
become progressively integrated in the most inclusive cosmic
vision that the human mind can co-operatively and consistently
attain.

But it is important for a second reason also. Philosophy has a
distinctive and indispensable role to fill in the task of realizing a
RADHAKRISHNAN

harmonious world community, in which all peoples will peacefully share the quest for the best and fullest life that is open to man on the surface of this planet. Such a world community is impossible in the absence of a mutual confidence between peoples that can only be stably based on deep and appreciative understanding of each other. This kind of understanding cannot be attained by philosophers alone, of course; all the cultural disciplines will have to contribute their part—economics, art, statemanship, psychology, and religion. But philosophy has its share in this task, and it is a very significant one.

The distinctive nature of its role appears when one compares the philosophies of the world from this point of view, and traces their relations to other phases of human culture. Such a comparison quickly reveals the fact that what philosophers call "categories" constitute the form in which each major epoch in the history of each culture-area has expressed its most general ideas and ideals. Consider, for instance, the category of "causality" in Western thought. Throughout the ancient and mediaeval period this category gave clear intellectual expression to the mystic idea that all things come into being from a source which imparts to them something of the perfection which it already possesses. In the modern period this category is abandoned by all Occidental thinkers except steadfast adherents to the so-called "great tradition"; in its place a new concept of causality appears, expressing the idea that all events can be so understood that through knowledge of the past and the present their future occurrence can be exactly predicted and effectively controlled. In both Indian and Chinese thought there is a category somewhat similar to, though not identical with, the first of these concepts; in neither, so far as I am aware, has there been seriously employed any category closely analogous to the second, for this ideal of accurate prediction and external control of nature has remained essentially foreign to dominant Indian and Chinese ways of thinking. The same is the case with other philosophic categories. To take a second example, the category of "substance" in the ancient West expresses both the individualism and the static orientation which were characteristic of the Greek mind in its approach to nature; in modern thought it is more and more boldly replaced by some concept which retains the individualism while abandoning the static ideal. India has had no synonymous concept because to the prevailing strain in her history the individual is ultimately
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illusory rather than real; and China has likewise had none because Chinese philosophy from the very beginning has assumed a dynamic rather than a static cosmology. When we realize that similar considerations apply to the concepts expressing men's basic social ideals and aspirations, it becomes clear that appreciative understanding between cultures must be at the philosophic level if solid foundations of mutual trust and co-operative tolerance are to be established. When there is no sharing of ideas at this level, the highest values to which one culture is committed remain foreign, opaque, and therefore unreasonable to those who have grown up in other cultures. In any crisis which appears to threaten them their champions will see no alternative to an uncompromising defence of these sacred commitments against the perilous pressure by war, if they are accustomed to settling crucial issues thus; if not, at least by shrinking inward to a more inflexible and dogmatic attachment to them. From this viewpoint, world-philosophizing becomes the coping-stone in the arch of intercultural understanding.

III

It is vital to realize at the very commencement of any such enterprise, however, that the building of a world philosophy, even in tentative and partial form, is a laborious process and one haunted by sobering difficulties.

A seductive danger, into which one is constantly tempted, is that of premature synthesis—of taking too seriously inclusive and unifying ideas that come to be suggested before enough of the preliminary spade-work has been done. General notions born at such an early stage have little chance of retaining their initial promise as possible solutions to the problems of world philosophy. It may be necessary for a large number of historical and comparative studies on relatively detailed questions to be pursued before the main features of a valid synthetic concept can be clearly discerned. Furthermore, a considerable number of these studies would need to be pursued co-operatively, in order that Western, Indian, and Chinese philosophers should have a chance to appreciate each other's criteria of relevance, truth, and reality as they present themselves in the joint approach to a concrete issue. In the absence of such systematic co-operation, each is exceedingly likely to be unaware of the extent to which he is taking as absolute
his own previous criteria and is thus in effect imposing culturally limited ways of thinking upon the solution of a common problem. Plausible syntheses can only be proposed by members of a group whose habits of mind have already become internationalized by lengthy participation in the co-operative search for a world philosophy.

I am quite sure that when these dangers are recognized and detailed studies of this sort embarked upon, certain challenging problems of method will be confronted and seen to need some initial solution before the more ambitious part of the programme can be hopefully undertaken. I shall shortly discuss what I take to be the most difficult of these problems, and indicate the general principles by whose aid it seems to me that they will have to be met.

However, it is equally essential to realize that even these preliminary tasks cannot be adequately performed except under the guidance of the clearest ideal of co-operative philosophic impartiality which we are able to form. In the absence of such an ideal the detailed spade-work would not be likely to be carried out in such a way as to provide the data fruitfully usable for impartial comparisons, nor would the difficulties of method be likely to be so solved that the method adopted would ensure the fullest possible constructive contribution towards the world philosophy of the future by each competitor in the field. Hence it is vital to distinguish between the specific results of world philosophizing and the guiding ideal of intercultural co-operation, and to recognize that while the former can only be gradually built up, the perspective determined by the latter must function in the clearest form that it may from the very beginning.

IV

I wish now to centre attention on what I take to be the two most serious problems of method that must be faced in the development of a world philosophy. And it is not the practical problems that I have in mind—although those are difficult enough in their own terms—but certain logical puzzles that will need to be solved. So serious are these that were this not one of the human enterprises in which man must never accept defeat, and in which therefore only the degree of success attainable is in question, we might easily be tempted to regard them as quite insoluble.
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One arises from the circumstance that any comparison of two entities, with respect to some significant set of likenesses and differences, apparently requires their subsumption under a more general concept, of which they then become species. Comparisons that we perform in everyday life make us thoroughly familiar with this principle. When I compare a stick with the edge of my desk I am subsuming them both under the category of objects possessing length; when I compare two alternative purchases that I have in mind I subsume them under the category of things possessing economic value. That this procedure is necessary is especially obvious when the purpose of the comparison is to find out how the entities compared can be brought together consistently in an inclusive whole. How, for example, could a university administrator harmonize two jealous departments, each trying to encroach upon the other's prerogatives, unless he can regard the work of each of them as a special function of some more general purpose which his institution as a whole is endeavouring to fulfil? In such a case the more general concept under which the compared entities are subsumed serves at the beginning of the comparison as a more or less abstract term by which to refer to that inclusive whole, but it will gain richer and more concrete meaning as a result of the comparative analysis itself and the harmonious adjustment to which it leads. When the administrator just mentioned has brought his conflicting departments to terms, so that each of them fills its maximum role in relation to others, he will surely find that the educational aim of the institution as a whole has gained in clarity and definiteness as a result of this process of constructive integration.

Now when our problem is the impartial comparison and inclusive reconciliation of divergent sets of philosophical categories, we meet no special difficulty from this point of view when the philosophies compared have arisen in the same cultural tradition. Some more general concept is always available in that case, although logical ingenuity may be required to discover it. Our linguistic resources will prove competent to provide some overarching term under which the rival ideas can be plausibly conceived as falling. They become limited aspects of it or specifiable functions within it, and as such can be systematically compared and coherently united, with resulting gain to the significance of that term itself. The outstanding illustration of this truth in modern Western philosophy is found in Kant. At the commence-
ment of his labours, what he called the "critical" method served precisely as an abstract methodological term capable merely of bringing together the previously competing empiricism and rationalism on a common base, so that the nature and limits of validity in each could be systematically probed. At the end of his inquiry this bare general concept had acquired the concrete richness of the "transcendental" method, which assigned a determinate role to the two previously competing methodologies within the novel whole of his own developed philosophy.

But when sets of categories belonging to different cultural traditions are in question, where shall we find the general concept needed to perform this role? These categories themselves are difficult enough to handle in this situation; there is no precise equivalent in the language (or languages) of one culture for any philosophical category which has acquired its meaning in another. There is always a puzzling problem how to render such English terms as "mind," "truth," "value," into an Eastern language, and a similar problem in endeavouring to translate "ātman," "karma," "tao," into English. Apparently the meaning of such words embodies and depends upon the distinctive genius of the Anglo-American or the Indian or the Chinese philosophic tradition as a whole; and that distinctive genius in each case is radically different from what it is in the others. What then can be done? How can these concepts be compared?

We might, of course, within any one of the languages involved, find more general terms which might plausibly serve the purpose of their comparative analysis in that language—Professor Northrop does this rather awkwardly but not entirely unsuccessfully with his concepts of the "theoretic and aesthetic components of knowledge."¹ But such concepts would be even more impossible to translate helpfully into an Eastern language than the categories which they are supposed to adjudicate on a common ground; a literal translation would (I should suppose) seem to an Easterner completely irrelevant, and how to get the right non-literal translation poses precisely our problem. It would appear that in order even to commence any fruitful comparative analysis in this situation we need what is as yet non-existent—namely, a universal language shared by all peoples, in terms of which the unique cultural and philosophic genius of each and hence the precise meaning of its categories could be objectively stated. Is it

¹ The Meeting of East and West, p. 439 ff.
perhaps the initial task of world philosophizing to create such a language?

I think I can see the main principle by which the development of such a language would have to be guided if the ideal of impartial co-operation is to be respected. One of the main reasons why the translation of philosophic categories is difficult lies in the fact that each culture, in dealing with certain problems, makes distinctions that other cultures do not and fails to make some that the others do. Take the Western category of "experience," for example, and compare the basic distinctions within it that have been drawn by the West with the basic distinctions drawn in Indian thought. In the former case the major sub-categories are experience through the external senses, or sense perception, and experience through the internal sense, or introspection. Now this distinction is recognized in Indian thought, but there it is relatively unimportant. What is of major importance in its case is that the concept of experience is extended to include not only waking experience (alone recognized in the West, except for the recent influence of Freudianism) but also experience in dreamless sleep, and a still deeper kind of experience¹ that transcends the limitations of the other three kinds alike. It seems to me clear that the guiding principle of a truly universal language would be that terms should be provided by which, initially at least, all these distinctions could be recognized and adequately stated, so that hypotheses dealing with any or all of them could be linguistically formulated.

But what, then, could serve as the inclusive category under which all these distinctions will fall as species? From the point of view of Indian philosophy there would be in this case no problem; its category of "experience"² would presumably suffice. But from the point of view of the West a serious difficulty would arise, since certain of these species of experience—at least, that of dreamless sleep—is inconsistent with its very conception of experience. A more general category would seem to be required, in terms of which any problems arising in this field can be initially formulated in a way which would be impartial to both the Indian and the Western standpoints. Where shall it be found? Of course, a new term could be arbitrarily invented. But while this expedient is often satisfactory in science it would seem to be so unnatural as to be seriously objectionable in philosophy: I doubt whether it

¹ Turiya.
² Anubhava
could perform the role desired, or whether many interested thinkers would be willing to use it. Will the needed category emerge from the sustained effort at impartial comparison itself? Very likely; but can we envision and clarify how it would do so, and thus wisely hasten that emergence?

V

The second problem is closely related to this, but involves an added consideration. I have spoken of each of the great historically developed cultures as having its own characteristic philosophic genius. We have just observed one way in which this genius reveals itself, namely, in the different sets of distinctions made when such key concepts as "experience" are analysed. Well, it reveals itself more clearly in the radical way in which the primary analysis of the material dealt with by philosophic reflection as a whole varies as between India, China, and the West. Because of this sharp variation the meaning and associations of "philosophy" itself change as a thinker passes from one of these culture-areas to any of the others. But it is inevitably in terms of some such basic analysis, explicitly formulated or implicitly presupposed, that all philosophic problems are stated and the answers to them sought. As long, then, as the ultimate patterns in whose terms these tasks are performed differ, not only is no exact translation of philosophic concepts or doctrines possible—not even is there a precise equivalent in one philosophic tradition for any problem raised in another. To describe the situation in the most provocative way, philosophers in different parts of the world are asking vaguely analogous but strictly incomparable questions, and seeking vaguely analogous but ultimately untranslatable answers.

These basic patterns, historically considered, are in each case quite accidental and contingent affairs. In the West the generally accepted pattern is one whose major lines of cleavage separate the three areas of mathematico-logical form, empirical fact, and value. Among the realists and positivists of our day this division tends to be regarded as absolute, while among idealists and pragmatists it is reduced to a relative or functional distinction within a total "reality" or controlling "situation" which overrides it. But even for the latter schools it constitutes the most radical cleavage within that totality, marking off different types of problems, each
to be solved in terms of factors some of which at least are different from those required with the others. Now it is easily demonstrable that this pattern arose from historical circumstances which might have been quite other than they were. The Greek thinkers were moved by an abnormal passion for certainty, as a result of which they disentangled the forms of mathematical inference from the uncertain milieu in which they had previously been embedded. The realm of these forms thus became a focus of systematic attention in a way in which it has not been elsewhere in the world. The early moderns had an equally abnormal curiosity about empirical facts, and how to describe them so that they can be anticipated with maximum probability; with the outcome that these facts became sharply separated from the mathematical structures which had proved after a long struggle impotent to encompass them. Throughout the subsequent period of Western thought it has become increasingly clear that many of the most important matters of life fall outside both these two areas; hence we now have the field of "value," an almost unexplored and rather kaleidoscopic territory whose only definite property perhaps is that it provides a nook for everything that cannot be dealt with by mathematical or empirical science. But, as would be expected by a Martian philosopher impartially surveying the contingencies of earthly history, Indian and Chinese philosophers think in terms of ultimate patterns quite irreducible to this. Their basic analyses have taken shape under the influence of forces and motives different from those which have determined Western philosophic history, but equally accidental from the standpoint of logic.

I shall be bold enough to attempt a brief and tentative characterization of these patterns, to bring out the distinctive essence of each and their major contrasts with each other. In the West, the attention of thinkers has been centred mainly on the external world, moved by an interest in enjoying and exploiting it; when the human personality and its elements have been subjected to study it has been in terms of principles and methods that have achieved their major success in dealing with the physical world. Also, Western thinkers, seduced by the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of reason as a distinct mental faculty, have assumed that there is such a thing as intellectual curiosity, capable of operating unaffected by any other motivation. Moreover, since a considerable variety of ulterior purposes can be served by the results of satisfying this curiosity, the belief has been natural that
theoretic analysis can be significantly performed irrespective of whether or not it is followed by synthesis. Hence the basic distinction and relation assumed is that between mind, conceived as a purely cognitive entity, and the object of its curiosity, conceived after the analogy of a physical event in space and time. The Western philosophic pattern takes its form from the guidance or reflection by these controlling presuppositions, as the process has been historically affected by the contingent factors noted above. In Western philosophy all concepts and assertions gain their ultimate meaning in terms of this context—serious thinking is assumed to be the operation of a theoretical mind, apprehending forms, facts, and values, and always seeking their clearer discrimination and interrelation.

In India, speculative thought has taken a quite different tack. Ever since philosophy began to shape its pattern in the Upanishads, it has taken for granted that the universal and essential problem of life is how each separate individual can achieve oneness with a reality which transcends and includes all things. This reality, which is thus the final end of all existence, is also believed to be the original source from which all frustrating divisions arose. The process of breaking down the separateness and merging with the Absolute is not merely a matter of intellectual realization but one involving the whole personality. Among other things, it requires a moral self-discipline, a conquest of self-seeking desire with the fears, hatreds, and anxieties that accompany it; without such conquest, reason itself will be so distorted by unstable emotions that it cannot guide men towards a clear perception of truth—the psychological and metaphysical truth that really matters. From the Indian point of view everything in experience, including the physical world and all social relationships, finds its significance in this context, and is only adequately interpreted when seen in these terms. Science, considered by itself, gives a valid but merely fragmentary understanding of the world with which it deals; a full comprehension will reveal it as a very partial expression of the Ultimate One in which this basic process of self-realization finds its completion. Thus, here, instead of abstracting a merely cognitive mind, we are dealing with the full-bodied personality of the philosophic thinker; instead of assuming a process of purely theoretical apprehension we are dealing with the attempt at realization of all facts of being; instead of pausing with the results of analysis we
are pressing on to a daring and total synthesis. In brief, we are moving in the radically different context determined by the controlling motivations of mysticism.

Chinese philosophy follows a somewhat different route still. Its primary attention is centred, not on mastering the external world nor on the release from discord of man’s divided self, but on the problems of society as they present themselves to a person of moral earnestness and social responsibility. The world which we need to understand and to which we must adjust ourselves under the guidance of such understanding, is the world of political, educational, and economic relationships; and everything else fills its appropriate role when seen in relation to these social structures. Of unique importance in this social world is the network of our intimate family attachments; it provides both the key to an adequate comprehension of society in general—indeed, of the entire universe—and also the normative model by which we can find our way toward perfect accordance with Heaven and with all men. To philosophize in this context is, then, to proceed under the dominant assumption that the one who philosophizes is neither a pure intellect nor a merely individual seeker after transcendent unity. He is essentially a social being, following the law of nature as disclosed in right family relationships and lured by the creative harmony which would result from the universal practice and fulfilment of that law.

Now each of these philosophic patterns, with its distinctive set of assumptions, determines in its own way the meaning of all categories that are employed within the culture which has produced it, and consequently of all the questions asked and answers sought in terms of those categories. The very basic distinctions drawn in each pattern will then inevitably be different, because they will reflect the unique presuppositions involved, as also the special accidents that have affected the course of their historical development.

If this is so, then the crucial question of philosophic method, once the way has been adequately prepared for confronting it, will be: how can these inclusive but distinctive patterns be impartially integrated—how can the historic process of their mutual assimilation, which is slowly taking place through the interaction of cultures, be intelligently guided and foreshortened?

Again, I believe I can glimpse the valid general principle that would apply here—the principle demanded by the ideal of co-
operative impartiality. That principle would require that we should regard each of these cultural patterns not as an absolute—as a way of thinking to be uncritically held as the only reasonable one—but as a candidate for inclusion in a more comprehensive pattern, which will preserve all that is of constructive value in it and only eliminate what is irreconcilable with elements in other patterns that in the light of experience as a whole clearly demand preservation. In order, however, for this total pattern to serve as a standard to guide such a process of selection and elimination it must be conceived with some definiteness, and how can it be given impartial definiteness in advance? You will suggest, perhaps, that its passage from a vague ideal to a more specific criterion must be attained just through the process of comparing different cultural patterns in detail, to determine which factors in each must be rejected and how the rest can be harmoniously combined. This seems to me exceedingly likely. But if so, how can that comparison be intelligently guided, so that there will be a minimum wastage of time and effort in it?

When I affirmed that these difficult methodological problems must be given an initial solution at the very beginning of any serious effort at world-philosophizing I did not mean, of course, that those who engage in that task would not continually learn further lessons about matters of method as well as about other things. I should take it for granted that they would, and that the procedure of building a world philosophy would itself need to be revised from time to time in the light of such lessons. It seems clear, however, that some method must be employed at the very start, and that our choice of it should be guided by wisdom rather than be an affair of mere chance. How can we choose in such a way as to justify the hope that subsequent revisions of our method will concern only its details and not require abandonment of its basic structure?
II

THE SPIRIT OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

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I

THE PROBLEM

When one studies Oriental philosophy in the writings of modern Oriental scholars and interpreters of the thought of the Orient, one is constantly reminded of a certain "spirit" pervading the whole, no matter how complex the content might appear. Certain common features or elements—problems, methods, conclusions—stand out above the variety. In fact, representative scholars of the philosophy of the East are quite insistent that there is such a spirit of Oriental philosophy (or of Indian philosophy or Chinese philosophy, as the case may be), and one can recognize on the part of these scholars a pride in their philosophical tradition. Frequently one senses an attitude which approaches opposition or antagonism, and many Oriental descriptions of the spirit of Eastern philosophy are directed especially towards the establishment of the unique features of the Oriental tradition and its contrast with the methods and attitudes of Western philosophy.

When one studies Western philosophy, one is not reminded nearly so constantly of what might be called a spirit of the Western philosophical tradition. Almost without exception in instances of a description of the nature of Western philosophy in creative writing and in textbooks, the points of description are stated to be the characteristics of philosophy as such without any recognition of the possibility that they might be characteristics only of Western philosophy and not of other philosophical traditions. It is this lack of consideration of other philosophical traditions which is responsible for the fact that Westerners have not given much serious thought to the specific characteristics of Western philosophy and therefore have not tried to define the spirit of Western thought in its specific and unique character. It has remained, in
the large, for the Oriental scholar to define or describe the spirit of Western philosophy, but confusion has resulted from this because the Easterner is frequently motivated by the spirit of opposition, or at least by that of contrast, and thus almost inevitably indulges in some degree of distortion.

Since the Western mind can no longer afford to be guilty of the provincialism which has characterized it for many centuries, and since representatives of Western philosophy must henceforth be conscious of other philosophical traditions, it is indispensable that Western thinkers give serious consideration to the essentials of their philosophical tradition and attempt to understand that tradition not only in itself but also in the light of its relationships with other philosophical traditions. In this way, the Westerner may be able to understand his own pattern of thought more clearly and more critically; and he may also be able to understand and possibly to appreciate the so-called alien philosophical traditions of the East.

The problem of this paper, then, may be stated as follows: Is there a spirit of Western philosophy which is definitive of and unique to that tradition, and which is distinct from and possibly in conflict with a spirit of Oriental philosophy? This is not a specific study in East-West comparative philosophy as such, but the study is motivated by the possibility that its result may lead to better mutual understanding of East and West in the field of philosophy. It is hoped that the study may reveal the fact that some of the hitherto insurmountable barriers separating East and West may be found not to be insurmountable after all.

II

PREREQUISITES OF ANY CATEGORY OF DESCRIPTION OF A "SPIRIT"

In an accurate determination of the spirit of a philosophy, any category of description which is selected must be definitive and unique.

As definitive, it must point to a doctrine or method without which a specific philosophy or philosopher would fail to fit the given tradition. 1 For example, in any description of the spirit of

1 A philosophical tradition is not describable in terms of geography; the mere fact that one lives in the West is not sufficient to make him and his doctrines "fit" the Western philosophical tradition.
Indian philosophy, the materialistic system, Cārvāka, is always cited as an exception, since it contains doctrines contrary to the general pattern of Indian philosophy as a whole, and does not include doctrines which seem to be characteristic of the Indian philosophical tradition.

The category of description must be unique, because without uniqueness the category would not describe the philosophy in distinction from other philosophies. Uniqueness is even more strongly demanded in this particular study because of the underlying interest in the significance of the spirit of Western philosophy as related to that of Oriental philosophy. If the spirit of Western philosophy should be found to be unique, then the frequently assumed distinctions and contrasts of East and West will be validated; on the other hand, if the spirit of Western philosophy is found not to be unique, the foundation of much of the opposition of East and West will be called into question.

Furthermore, an acceptable description must denote basic common denominators of all major systems and thinkers. This is the method employed almost universally by Indian and Chinese scholars in describing the spirit of their respective philosophical traditions. For example, Professor S. N. Dasgupta lists as common denominators of Indian philosophy: the belief in *karma* and rebirth, *mukti* (emancipation), soul, pessimism with reference to this world, optimism with reference to the goal, and certain basic ethical principles.¹ Professor S. K. Maitra points to "the quest for values . . . a search for what is of greatest value."² Professor M. Hiriyananna indicates certain common ideas of the ideal life for man on earth as found in all major Indian philosophical thought.³ Professor S. Radhakrishnan points out certain general characteristics of Indian philosophy as a whole and certain common doctrines taught by all of the major systems.⁴ Professor B. L. Atreyea similarly lists common basic doctrines.⁵

Authorities on Chinese philosophy follow the same procedure. Professor Fung Yu-lan says, "Since the character of the sage is,

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² *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy*, privately published, Benares, 1947, pp. 2–3.
according to Chinese tradition, one of sageliness within and kingliness without, the task of philosophy is to enable man to develop this kind of character. Therefore, what [Chinese] philosophy discusses is what the Chinese philosophers describe as the *Tao* (Way, or basic principles) of sageliness within and without."¹ This represents the basic problem of Chinese philosophy and therefore reflects the spirit of the whole. Dr. Hu Shih agrees, saying, "... it is the search for the *lao* ... which constitutes the central problem of all Chinese philosophers ..."² Professor W. T. Chan indicates the spirit of Chinese philosophy by pointing to certain ideals of Chinese philosophy "which have been examined throughout Chinese history and have been found valuable" and which thus [constitute] the spirit of Chinese philosophy.³

In like manner writers on Western philosophy often select certain common denominators as the characteristics of philosophy, although, as said above, they do not specifically indicate that these are characteristics exclusively or uniquely of Western philosophy.

Furthermore, the "spirit" of a philosophy must be constant despite change of conditions and time, as well as being present in spite of or above the variety of concepts. There must be a "substance" which remains essentially the same while the form of expression or particular description of that "substance" may vary to fit the time. This is also a favourite method of Indian and Chinese writers, and was also used by Professor F. S. C. Northrop in his recent treatise on the spirit of both the Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.⁴

One other positive way by which the spirit of a philosophical tradition may be determined is by reference to the basic problem or problems which the philosophers of the tradition are trying to solve. This is best illustrated by pointing, as many do, to the constant as well as universal search for *mokṣa* (emancipation) in Indian philosophy. This is such a major problem that Indian philosophy has been called a *mokṣa-śāstra*, a treatise on emancipation. It is unquestionable that this practical motive is the most

⁴ *The Meeting of East and West*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1946, p. 294: "Through all the changes the form is the same; only the content is different."
universal common denominator of Indian philosophical thought; it thus represents at least the foundation of the spirit of Indian philosophy. It is closely related to what Professor Maitra calls the "quest for values." Professor Fung Yu-lan makes a similar point when he says, "There is a main current in the history of Chinese philosophy, which may be called the spirit of Chinese philosophy. In order to understand this spirit, we must first make clear the problem that most Chinese philosophers have tried to solve." ¹

In other words, if it is possible to discover a basic problem with which the philosophers of the Western philosophical tradition are primarily concerned, and to discover certain basic common denominators in terms of methods and conclusions, and to determine methods or conclusions which are present constant despite changes of time and conditions, then it will be possible to determine the spirit of Western philosophy.

There are certain misleading procedures which appear on the surface to be accurate instruments for determining the spirit of the philosophical tradition but which have led only to confusion, distortion, or serious misinterpretation.

To begin with, the spirit of a philosophy cannot be determined by the general culture or pattern of life of a people, race, nation, or continent. The general culture of a people, and such conditions as geography and economics, unquestionably affect the philosophy of that people,² but it is fallacious to identify the two. It is essential to bear in mind that we are studying the characteristic spirit of Western philosophy. Philosophy must not be confused or identified with culture, civilization, politics, economics, international relations, or the way the people act and live in practice. One does not study Christianity by watching so-called Christians in action; nor should one study the characteristics of Western philosophy by noting a practical interest in material gain, gadgets, recreation, sports, and the like. Trends in or characteristics of a culture do not necessarily reflect the thought of the great philosophical masters; nor do they represent the spirit of the philosophy which has been produced in that civilization. Perhaps

¹ A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 6–8.
the underlying fallacy of this method of determining the spirit of a philosophy consists in the doubtful assumption that the philosophy produced by the great thinkers of a given civilization has either been moulded by or has moulded the culture and the living of the people of that civilization.

Much intellectual confusion has resulted from the use of this procedure. For example, Western philosophy has been called materialistic and individualistic. Sri Aurobindo has written, "... the gulf between East and West, India and Europe, is now much less profound and unbridgeable than it was thirty or forty years ago. True, the basic difference still remains unmodified; the life of the West is still chiefly governed by a rationalistic and materialistic idea and preoccupation."¹ (Note the word "life" of the West.)

Professor W. E. Hocking, it seems to me, has been similarly misguided when he writes that the attitude of "the sacredness of personality" and the doctrine of individualism characterize Western philosophy.² The same fallacy is committed by P. D. Shastri, when he speaks of the West's "over-emphasis on individualism."³ Without too much stretching of the imagination, Indian philosophy could be described similarly—and equally fallaciously—as materialistic and individualistic on the same grounds. Such a judgment, however, drawn from social conditions, would be untrue to the essential spirit of Indian philosophy, as such, and thus stands out as a striking example of the fallacy in question.

Another method of determining the spirit of a philosophical tradition is to indicate the "emphases" of that tradition, those doctrines or methods which seem in some way to have gained the greater prominence. While this is admittedly the most fruitful practical method, if one must speak of the spirit of a philosophical tradition, it is clearly unsound as a method of defining such a spirit.⁴ The chief defect of this method is that it over-simplifies, hence falsifies, and thus ignores the richness of thought that may be present. There are obvious emphases in any philosophical tradition, but an emphasis is clearly not the whole of the tradition.

¹ "Is India Civilized?" Arya, Pondicherry, V, p. 336.
² "Value of the Comparative Study of Philosophy," in Philosophy—East and West, pp. 8–10.
⁴ There is real value in determining the emphases of different philosophical traditions, for it is in the light of such emphases that future progress towards a synthesis may be achieved. However, this study is concerned with the question of substantial definition of the spirit of the Western philosophical tradition. In these terms, an emphasis is not acceptable as a definitive description.
and does not therefore represent the full height, depth, or range of the creative mind within the philosophical tradition. For example, Indian philosophy is so widely described as religious or mystical that many believe that Indian philosophy as such is altogether religious or mystical in its orientation. Similarly, to call the West "materialistic" tends to indicate the absence of significant idealism and of all other non-materialistic or anti-materialistic theories. The inaccuracy of such a description is clear. Such a description inevitably leads to unjustifiable criticism and opposition, an attitude not uncommon among Indian philosophers to-day.

Nor, finally, can the spirit of a philosophy be found by probing back into its origins. This might seem to be a sound method, since the originating motive would seem to give a clue to the basic problem to be considered and since the procedures themselves would tend to be determined at the beginning of the philosophical endeavour. Such a method, however, is unsound as a method of discovering the spirit of a philosophical tradition, unless the originating problems and methods, in their essentials, have remained constant throughout the history of the tradition. This method can, at most, provide only a trial effort in the search for the spirit of a philosophy, and it must be abandoned if the originating motives and methods are found to have been discarded or to have been modified significantly in the course of time.

III

THE ABSENCE OF A SPIRIT OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

The thesis of this paper is that there is no spirit of Western philosophy, no unique and substantial spirit definable in terms of unity or invariability of thought with reference to any of the basic aspects of philosophy, its problems, its methods, or the answers and conclusions reached in the form of philosophical doctrines. This conclusion is reached on the basis of the fact that none of the aforementioned acceptable methods of determining the spirit of philosophy produces positive results. There are no common denominators in the form of definitive or indispensable and unique problems, methods, or doctrines. The common denominators of Western philosophy, if there are any at all, are simply the common elements of all philosophy. As the late Prin-
principal A. B. Dhruva has said, "... in Philosophy, there is no such thing as East and West or old and new."

We often speak as if there were a spirit of Western philosophy which has become established, and to which Western thinkers must conform. For example, Professor Hocking says, "It is fortunate... that Oriental and Western philosophies have grown for so long a time in separation. They have become established in their ways of looking at things." Similarly, Professor G. P. Conger, in his warning to speculative philosophers, asks if it is not true that "... they are overtly loyal to traditions and reluctant if not timid about breaking with them." It is natural to think in terms of philosophical traditions, and this tendency is enhanced by the geographical fact of self-identity and unity. However, it sometimes proves extremely embarrassing if one is required to state specifically what one means by the spirit of Western philosophy and is faced with the task of identifying its fundamental and unique characteristics precisely. It is because of the inability to hit upon any problems, methods, or doctrines which in their essentials are fundamental, constant, and unique that I have been forced to adopt the thesis that there is no spirit of Western philosophy.

While it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the positive spirit of Western philosophy, there is abundant evidence to indicate the absence of such a spirit. This evidence falls into three categories: (1) internal evidence drawn from the history and content of Western philosophy; (2) a critical examination of the most prominently proposed descriptions of the so-called spirit of Western philosophy; and (3) a demonstration of the fact that even what might be called an intangible spirit of Western philosophy—in terms of attitudes and concepts which are generally accepted in the West—is much less precise and rigid than interpreters usually realize. Furthermore, this intangible

1 "Value of the Comparative Study of Philosophy," in Philosophy—East and West, p. 7.
1 In fact, despite the opinions of leading Oriental scholars, I should like to question the view that there is a spirit of Indian or Chinese philosophy in any substantial sense. The rich and extensive variety of ideas, methods, and systems in each tradition is unmistakable. It seems most difficult to find unanimity of view on any basic problem in either tradition, and to discover any substantial principle upon which to establish a spirit without doing violence to the great variations of doctrine which have been developed; see below, note 1, p. 61.
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spirit of Western philosophy is not unique, being shared with other philosophical traditions as common elements of all philosophy "East and West or old and new."

IV

INTERNAL EVIDENCE FOR THE ABSENCE OF
A SPIRIT OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy in the West has been what might be called an intellectual adventure. This does not mean that it has been mere play or that it has not been serious or important. It means, rather, that Western philosophy has involved the completely uncontrolled intellectual pursuit of knowledge of reality in the spirit of love of truth and complete freedom of thought, the only restraining influence being a demand for reasonableness—and even that seems to be missing at times in the "adventure of ideas." Professor Northrop speaks of the West's "complete freedom of the imagination" and of the adventure of ideas in which "the originality, the genius, and the glory of the West consist." He warns, however, that this freedom of the imagination does not mean a negative absence of controls, but, instead, a positive adventuresomeness in the pursuit of knowledge by all possible approaches. This adventuresomeness, which seeks out—or should seek—all possible approaches, is well reflected in the almost infinite variety of "systems" in Western philosophy, and in the constant emergence of new philosophical possibilities.

Another indication is the fact that philosophy was born in opposition to tradition with Thales, was reborn in the same spirit with Bacon and the Renaissance, and was given potent antitradition impetus by Descartes with his doctrine of universal doubt. As philosophers we admire Abelard for his fight against the traditionalism of the Church. As philosophers, we condemn St. Augustine for abandoning the conviction of his mind to conform to the tradition of the Church. Philosophy originated in and lives on questioning. To conform to a tradition or a given pattern of thought or a spirit of the past is to the West distinctly unphilosophical, because it is a denial of that openmindedness or freedom of thought without which philosophy cannot survive.

There are no sacred books of the West, no basic texts or classics. There is no authority. Those ancient systems which at times

* The Meeting of East and West, p. 299.
approached the level of authority vary so greatly that there can be no tradition even in that direction. In fact, any system or attitude that approached the enviable status of authority was promptly branded, with Bacon, as an idol or a prejudice. There are no ancient revelations in Western philosophy, constituting, as it were, a truth-mass from which new truths are derived or to which later truths must conform. The Christian Bible does not negate this contention, for certainly Western philosophy has not conformed to that Scripture, although it has been influenced by it. Reason—in some form—has always been the test in philosophy, not Scripture or authority of any kind.

Variety and conflict, not uniformity are the rule in Western philosophy. Even the definitions of philosophy show a marked lack of agreement in basic comprehension of the subject itself, as well as its purpose, content, field, methods, concepts, etc. Definitions of philosophy range from purely academic or disinterested pursuit of the truth to "knowledge is power"; from mere description (called the search for knowledge) to interpretation (called the pursuit of wisdom); from a partner of religion to its greatest enemy; from pure reason to reason aided by non-intellectual insight; from a mere generalization of science to total perspective; from rigid systems to free and unsystematic speculation, as, for example, with Plato, who could hardly qualify as a philosopher if system and pure rationality were the criteria of a philosopher.

It was said above that a clue to the spirit of a philosophical tradition might be the determination of the basic problem with which the philosophers of that tradition are concerned. The philosophers of India have all sought the solution of the practical problem of finding the way to the highest good, chiefly mokṣa or emancipation. The philosophers of China have sought knowledge of the Tao, or the way of life.¹ In contrast, there is no single problem with which Western philosophy has been concerned or which Western philosophers have been unanimously or even generally trying to solve. The Western philosopher has sought the truth about reality, to be sure, but what reality, and why? The answer to these questions produces a great variety of objectives and a great variety of problems which have served as motivation for the pursuit of the truth. At times, in fact, even the truth, in the sense of an absolute truth or truth for its own sake, is cer-

tainly not the object of pursuit. Examples are: the practical and religious periods of ancient philosophy, the Middle Ages, and the positivistic movement of more recent thought, to mention only three examples of major importance which vary from the usual interpretation of the purpose and problem of Western philosophy.

Most important of all indications of the lack of a uniform tradition in Western philosophy is what might be called the doctrinal variety which pervades Western philosophy and persists throughout its history. The demand for rationality may constitute an underlying principle of unity, but the results of the use of reason—as well as the meaning of reason itself, as will be shown later—are as various as one might expect, from "complete freedom of imagination." One writer has said that an outstanding mark of Western philosophy is its revolutionary character.¹ This seems unquestionable. This revolutionary character may be explained in terms of the freedom of speculation which pervades the whole history of Western philosophy and the ever-increasing sum of knowledge, which has constantly forced revision of philosophical generalizations and postulations.

The major consideration here is that this variety is real and serious. The conflict of these various doctrines has been basic and fundamental conflict,² not the noting of aspects of a single truth, which would be the Indian interpretation. In the West, conflicting doctrines and systems are never treated with a "side glance," the way Śri Aurobindo speaks of India's attitude toward materialism.³ Doctrines and systems are not examined and rejected or absorbed as in India, or loosely synthesized for use for what they are worth or rejected as in China; or coloured to fit tradition and synthesized with indigenous thought as in Japan. In Western philosophy, all the multifarious views have been considered seriously and have held the attention and conviction of many significant philosophers. To be sure, there have been recurrent types of philosophy in the West, but these have been many and different and have expressed nearly all possible major philosophical points of view.

Another way of making this point is to say that "anything can

² As one example, see G. P. Conger, "Method and Content in Philosophy," in The Philosophical Review, July 1946, pp. 405–406: "This cleavage between the critical and the speculative philosophers, as they are called, is not a mere difference of opinion. It is a difference of fundamental attitude. It involves basic principles or presuppositions as to what philosophy is and what it is supposed to do. It divides us...".
happen" in Western philosophy—and is almost sure to happen in time. As Professor Hocking has said, "A race of people who could beget so jejune a scheme of thought as logical positivism which declares metaphysical problems meaningless has every reason to listen to the quiet mind of the Orient."

To put a very complex case for "variety" simply: there is no fundamental singleness of mind on any aspect of philosophy, even the status, scope, and meaning of reason or of philosophy itself. Nor is there any singleness of mind concerning philosophy's relation to science, to religion, to life and culture, to politics, to metaphysics, etc. Certainly on such fundamental matters one might expect uniformity if not unanimity of interpretation in a "tradition."

The subject matter or content and the method of philosophy are now recognized to be and to have been in the past problems rather than matters upon which there has been unanimity of opinion and procedure. As Professor George Boas has said, "There is no single subject matter which may be called 'philosophy' and of which the history may be written. Philosophers have from Thales on been interested in a variety of subject matters, but some of them have come to have no relation to what is now called philosophy. Their methods of inquiry have varied as much as their interests. One can, of course, and one should note the rise and fall of these methods and interests."

Furthermore, there is no typical Western solution of any basic problems of philosophy, such as the nature of reality; the status and nature of God; mind-body; the one and the many, faith and reason—which was a problem even in the Middle Ages; scepticism and confidence in reason; the relationship between the natural and the supernatural; freedom and determinism; teleology and mechanism; or any of the major problems in epistemology and ethics.

What Professor Conger notes as a characteristic diversity in present-day thought has been reflected, though to a lesser degree, throughout the history of Western philosophy. Of the contemporary situation in philosophy, he says, "We find social philosophy and philosophy of science and axiology and semantics and philosophy of history and logic and philosophy of religion and metaphysics and philosophy of law and aesthetics and mathe-

1 "Value of the Comparative Study of Philosophy," in Philosophy—East and West, p. 5.
mathematical philosophy and philosophy of literature and sometimes philosophy of life. In each of these specialized and sometimes isolated areas there are local divisions and differences almost without end."

The Greek age supposedly established the "spirit" of Western philosophy, but even in that period many "isms" were developed, from naturalism to humanism, and from pure materialism to pure monistic spiritualism, and practically all intermediate varieties as well. Even in the Middle Ages there were pluralism and monism, spiritualism and materialism, liberty and moral determination, personal and impersonal immortality, resurrection of the body and spirit as well as resurrection of the spirit alone. Such diversities existed despite the rigid control of the supposed tradition of the powerful Church. In modern philosophy the same wide range of completely conflicting doctrines has been very much in evidence, and the evidence is too clear even to require mention.

A mere listing of the major periods of the history of Western philosophy, with their diverse interests, perspectives, and conclusions, would add weight to the already ponderous point—ponderous and well-known but almost invariably forgotten or ignored in facile generalizations about the spirit of Western philosophy.

In view of these many indications of the characteristic variety of doctrines, no writer about Western philosophy could determine the common denominators, the common doctrines, which represent the spirit of Western philosophy, as Radhakrishnan, Dasgupta, and Hiriyanna have done with respect to Indian philosophy, and Fung, Hu, and Chan with respect to Chinese philosophy. There are no such doctrines. In this sense, then, there is no substantial spirit of Western philosophy.

V

SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF PROPOSED "SPIRITS" OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

There have been numerous attempts to describe the spirit of Western philosophy, mostly by Oriental scholars but also occasionally by Occidentals, although in the latter case the description has not been specifically of Western philosophy but, by assump-

tion, of philosophy as such. A second negative approach in the
effort to determine the spirit—or lack of spirit—of Western philo-
sophy is to examine the more prominent and more significant of
these suggested descriptions, and to notice that each fails to meet
the tests laid down above as the indispensable criteria of a defini-
tive and unique "spirit."

Some preliminary observations concerning the proposed descrip-
tions seem advisable. One is that some of these characterizations
are almost caricatures. All are recognizable, however, and
therefore none is wholly incorrect. No attempt, therefore, should
be made to reject the list as a whole or any of the specific descrip-
tions in toto, but the inadequacy of all must be cited. In some
instances the characteristic is patently drawn not from Western
philosophy but from Western civilization or culture or practice.
At most, even the more accurate of these descriptions call attention
to emphases, but emphases, as we have seen, are insufficient
to represent the definitive character of Western philosophy with-
out doing injustice to the variety of ideas which cannot be ignored.
In every case, major opposition and important exceptions are
ignored, and thus the method of indicating the inadequacy of the
given characteristic is made clear and simple, calling for little
elaboration. Detailed examination of all of these proposed character-
izations is hardly necessary to reveal the inadequacy and
inaccuracy of each one of them, and will not be attempted.

While it is denied that these characterizations accurately indicate
the spirit of Western philosophy, they do reflect tendencies in some cases. As suggested above, the citing of such tendencies is
helpful in comparative East-West philosophy; but, for purposes
of exact definition or accurate description, the assigning of
"labels" is clearly unsound. As a matter of fact, in comparative
philosophy, such "branding" of philosophy—East or West—has
served primarily to widen the traditional breach between the two
by exaggerating opposing tendencies. Often, it seems that the
characterizations proposed are derived primarily from the effort
to establish such opposition; otherwise it is most difficult to find
adequate justification for the characterizations proposed.

With these general observations in mind, we are now in a posi-
tion to examine briefly each of the proposed "spirits" of Western
philosophy.

Among the most prominently suggested characterizations of the
spirit of Western philosophy have been the following: (1) aca-
demic—“an intellectual game”; (2) rationalistic or intellectualistic; (3) scientific; (4) materialistic; (5) individualistic; (6) outward-looking; (7) humanistic; (8) irreligious; (9) analytic; and (10) qualitative, in the sense of ascribing definite qualities to ultimate reality. (The first two of these—“academic” and “intellectualistic”—will be treated later in this paper, and the last two will be considered as aspects of the rationalistic character of Western philosophy.)

(1) Scientific.—The contention that Western philosophy is scientific would appear to have two connotations, first, that Western philosophy depends upon the attitudes of science regarding the nature of reality and consists primarily of a philosophical extension to all reality of the scientific assumptions or conclusions about the nature of things; second, that philosophy has adopted the so-called scientific method, which consists fundamentally of setting up certain hypotheses, axioms, or postulates, followed by the deduction of the logically implied consequences of these, and verification by reference to matters of fact. These two interpretations must be examined separately, although there will be unquestioned overlapping of the two.

The general interrelatedness of philosophy and science in the beginning of Western philosophy among the early Greeks is recognized, for at that time philosophy and science were to all intents and purposes identical. It has been contended, also, that the birth of philosophy could not take place prior to the Greeks, because philosophy presupposes scientific knowledge and the Greeks were the first scientists. While in those early days there was no essential distinction between philosophy and science, varying degrees of divorce developed later, until the more modern conception of the relationship was reached, in which philosophy becomes the “science of sciences” and its task merely of synthesizing the first principles or the conclusions of the various exact sciences in order to reach a philosophical generalization based upon scientific facts and theories. The task of philosophy here is simply that of trying “to determine what the important scientific conceptions of our day really mean,” and of constructing

a philosophical conclusion or set of conclusions in terms of the first principles involved in the scientific conceptions.

It is unquestionable that the first of these procedures—the philosophical acceptance of science's views on the nature of things—has been followed by some of the most prominent thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition, but two considerations are of vital significance: (1) that it has not dominated the minds or the systems of many if not most of the outstanding philosophers of the West, and, in fact, has been specifically rejected, either implicitly or explicitly, by idealists—ever since the time of Socrates and Plato in the Phaedo—who have seen in this method the one-sidedness of naturalism; and (2) that it violates the spirit of philosophy as such, which might be called the attitude of "total perspective." It has generally been accepted in the West that philosophy must be based upon observation and study of the data presented by all aspects of the universe.

In the earliest days of Greek philosophy the problem of the relation between philosophy and science did not arise. With Plato, although he demanded that his philosopher-kings must first be trained in the sciences, he did not think that the sciences provided a complete account of reality. He called the philosopher the spectator of all time and all existence. From Aristotle to the Renaissance, the problem did not arise, since the Aristotelian teleological interpretation of science as well as philosophy removed any essential conflict. In the early part of the modern era, Hobbes—and probably Descartes and Spinoza—adopted the view in question, but none of their great successors in the course of modern philosophy followed suit until well along in the development of modern science. But even in this last period the view that philosophy is merely the science of sciences or merely a generalized statement of the first principles of science has been challenged constantly, and thus cannot be accepted as representing the spirit of Western philosophy even in the most scientific age of all times.

Philosophy is much more than a mere unification of the sciences. Philosophy must recognize the significance of science and must not ignore scientific facts—although a Fichte now and then may go even to this extreme. Nevertheless, philosophy stands, not as the servant of the sciences, but rather as their parent and as their perpetual critic, being the only discipline qualified to examine the assumptions, methods, and conclusions of the sciences. In its examination of these, there is no requirement that philosophy
must accept the scientific point of view or its limited perspective as final or complete.

A well-known contrast between philosophy and science is that between the search for wisdom and the search for knowledge, a contrast between interpretation and description, which cannot be ignored. The West as a whole has not accepted the thesis that values are scientific facts in the ordinary sense, or that values can be deduced from a generalization based upon the unification of descriptive systems or partial systems in which value as such has no place. The scientific basis of all philosophy, descriptive and normative, is one possible philosophical attitude, but it is not characteristic of Western philosophy, and actually is of relatively minor importance among the greatest thinkers of the Western tradition.

The other interpretation of Western philosophy which could call for its characterization as "scientific" has to do primarily with method, and has recently come into prominence through the work of Professor Filmer S. C. Northrop in the field of comparative philosophy. His contention is that the West is characterized by the scientific procedure of depending primarily upon "concepts by postulation" as contrasted with the East, where philosophy depends ultimately upon "concepts by intuition." His point is that, despite the variety of the content of Western philosophy, the form has been the same throughout, and that this constant form is that of science. A few excerpts from his writings will make his important points clear.

"The only way yet known to man by which unobservable scientific objects can be handled scientifically is by designating their properties and relations with precision in a set of postulates, then applying formal logic to these postulates to determine what else must be the case if they are true, and then checking these deduced consequences by direct inspection in a crucial controlled experiment. Precisely because Western science is metaphysical, due to its introduction of scientific objects and processes designated by concepts by postulation, logical and mathematical methods are a positive tool absolutely necessary for trustworthy knowledge. . . ."

"The common elements . . . of the nature of Western knowledge [are] (1) an immediately apprehended factor and (2) an inferred

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1 "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy," in *Philosophy—East and West*, p. 213.
theoretically designated component. Without the latter theoretical factor, Western knowledge in all fields would not have its hypothetically a priori, indirectly verified character..."

The originality of the West was "the discovery of an entirely new component of reality beyond the reach of positivistic immediate apprehension and contemplation, which required the introduction of concepts by postulation... and necessitated the development of the formal methods of logic and mathematics combined at the end with crucial experimentation to secure trustworthy knowledge." 2

This interpretation of the basic principles of the method of knowledge employed by a number of Western thinkers is of great value in clarifying the situation and in providing exact terminology with which to compare East and West, but seems to be based upon the fallacy of all such attempts, namely, that of oversimplification. The method strikes one as an ideal even in science, but it is neither a necessary ideal nor the adopted practice in Western philosophy. Most of the criticism of Professor Northrop's thesis has pointed to the significance of intuition, in any of its varied forms, in Western philosophy. 3 It seems, also, that a survey of the great minds in Western philosophical thought would of necessity distort the full procedure in the mind and writings of the great thinkers if their endeavours were reduced to the single basic pattern outlined in the philosophy of "concepts by postulation." Rather, we must agree in part with Professor George Boas, who says, "Very few, if any, philosophers have ever had a system of philosophy in the sense that geometry is a system. Many have had a small group of leading ideas which they think they developed deductively, but upon examination every system turns out to be, from the point of view of subject matter, a group of interests determined by historical accident, and from the point of view of method, a mixture of deduction and non-deduction." 4

In this connection, it may be worth noting also that even if Professor Northrop's case were unquestionable with reference to

1 The Meeting of East and West, p. 300. See also p. 295.
3 For example, see Stuart M. Brown, Jr., "Discussion," in The Philosophical Review, Jan. 1947, pp. 76-81.
the character of Western philosophy, it would still not characterize Western philosophy in a unique fashion. No doubt, concepts by intuition play an important role in some of Indian philosophy, but to identify Oriental thought with the attitude of concepts by intuition is to concentrate excessively upon one aspect of the Oriental tradition despite its great variety. Other writers in this volume are also giving attention to this particular point, and thus it is hardly necessary for the present treatment to enter into all the extensive intricacies of the problem. One more point may be worthy of mention, however, namely, that concepts by postulation are very much in evidence in Oriental philosophy and in all the major systems of India and China—and even Vedānta and Taoism should not be excepted.

Within the field of philosophy proper in India concepts by postulation are used extensively, and, except in the Upaniṣads, even the concept of Brahman is arrived at by this process. Characterization of Indian philosophy as devoid of significant concepts by postulation is based too exclusively upon the identification of Indian philosophy with the Upaniṣads alone. While the Upaniṣads unquestionably provide the ground-work for later Indian philosophical speculation, they are not the whole of Indian philosophy; in fact, all Indian philosophy after the Upaniṣads may possibly be related more closely to the methods of Western rationalism than to the mystical intuition of the seers of the Upaniṣads.

1 See M. Hiriyanā, Outline of Indian Philosophy, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1932, p. 16: "A striking characteristic of Indian thought is its richness and variety. There is no shade of speculation which it does not include." See also Derk Bodde, in his introduction to Fung Yu-lan's A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p. xi: "Chinese philosophy is far wider in scope than either Confucius or Lao Tzu, or even Confucian and Taoist schools. . . . In the course of some twenty-five centuries, Chinese thinkers have touched upon well-nigh all the major subjects that have engaged the attention of philosophers in the West, and though the schools to which they have belonged have often borne the same name through many centuries, their actual ideological content has changed greatly from one age to another.

2 Among the concepts of Indian philosophy which would qualify as concepts by postulation are: the doctrine of rebirth, karma, āpārva, adṛśta, the atoms of the Nyāya and Vaishēṣika systems, prakṛti (or pradhāna), pūruṣa, the guṇas and the tattvātmas (subtile bodies) in the Sāṁkhya system, the principle of cause and effect in Nyāya, Vaishēṣika, and Sāṁkhya, and, possibly, Brahman itself in some systems.

Similarly, the T'ai chi of Taoism and Neo-Confucianism, Yin-yang, and T'ien are some of the basic principles of Chinese philosophy that are concepts by postulation. Even Tao may fit this pattern in some respects. For example, Fung Yu-lan says, 'The Taoists thought that since there are things, there must be that by which all these things came to be. This 'that' is designated by them as Tao, . . . " A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 95–96.
(2) Materialistic.—This characterization hardly deserves consideration. It is rejected almost automatically because of the obvious fallacy involved in the face of the prominence of idealism throughout the history of Western philosophy except at its very beginning. It is rejected also because it has been drawn, not from philosophy itself or from the history of philosophy, but from the way of life of the West—which may or may not in fact fit the description. Full-fledged materialism has occurred very rarely in the history of Western philosophy. On the contrary, it may be contended that idealism, especially in the sense that reality embodies reason and purpose, is "the great tradition" of the West¹ (although this, too, of course, would be a one-sided and therefore an inaccurate description).

(3) Individualistic.—Burtt speaks of "the individualism of the Western thinking" as one of its four basic characteristics, and calls it "excessive individualism."² Hocking says, "Individualism is, or has been, with us a shibboleth."³ Saunders alludes to the "more individualistic West."⁴ Burtt and Conger⁵ both note the Western emphasis upon analysis, and Burtt specifically relates this, as cause or effect, to individualism.⁶ Shastri reflects the Easterner's interpretation when he refers to the West's "over-emphasis on the individual."⁷

Here again is a characterization which has apparently been drawn from life in the West and not from Western philosophy. Western philosophy has no final answer to the problem of the ultimate status of the individual. The problem of the status of the individual is still a problem in Western philosophy. Suffice it to say that philosophical monists of high rank as well as pluralists abound in the history of Western philosophy, and that the present tendency, if it be one, toward democracy and individualism has not even dominated the cultural and political picture in the West, let alone the philosophical tradition.

In this connection, it may also be pointed out that Oriental philosophy is not nearly so monistic as it is often thought to be,

⁵ E. A. Burtt, op. cit., p. 596.
⁷ E. A. Burtt, op. cit., pp. 596-597.
and thus that the West's supposedly characteristic emphasis on the individual is not by any means unique. Chan states that "... Oriental philosophy is at bottom monistic," but he is careful to point to very many of the systems and schools of both Indian and Chinese philosophy which are distinctly pluralistic or in which both the one and the many are real. An unjustified overemphasis on the supposed monism of Oriental philosophy and the West's unique individualism has done much to keep East and West apart.

(4) Outwardness.—By this characterization is intended the West's supposed interest in nature rather than in man, "its tendency to centre primary attention on the external world," its social consciousness, its concentration on principles of social and ethical life rather than on the soul and its destiny.

This rather complicated characterization is, as it is intended to be, a contrast to Indian philosophy's basic search for truth within and for inner self-realization of the truth. As Professor Radhakrishnan has said, "On the whole, the Eastern civilizations are interested not so much in improving the actual conditions as in making the best of this imperfect world, in developing the qualities of cheerfulness and contentment, patience and endurance."

There seem to be two points here: (a) that the West is interested fundamentally in the external world and actions therein, and (b) that the West is interested in understanding reality instead of realizing it within oneself.

It is very difficult to make a case for the first of these contentions. Western philosophy, with its basic attitude of total perspective, is interested not only in nature or in social life, but also in man, his nature, his inner essence, and his destiny. Much of the history of Western philosophy must be overlooked to justify the characterization under consideration. Western metaphysical and ethical idealism and ethical formalism constitute a very

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2 E. A. Burtt, "How Can the Philosophies of East and West Meet?" in The Philosophical Review, November 1948, pp. 597–598.
3 P. T. Raju, "The Western and the Indian Philosophical Traditions," in The Philosophical Review, March 1947: "The western tradition is essentially a philosophy of outwardness and the Indian a philosophy of inwardness" (p. 152); "... Indian philosophy is Atman-centric. ... But western philosophy is society-conscious" (p. 153). P. D. Shastri states this characteristic somewhat differently: "more objective than introspective and subjective," Essentials of Eastern Philosophy, p. 15.
4 Eastern Religions and Western Thought, Oxford University Press, second ed., 1949, P. 257.
serious challenge to this interpretation. Socrates' adopted edict, "Know thyself," is the spirit of much of Western thought, as is all the constant criticism of the naturalistic method and naturalistic conclusions which are based upon that part of the Western perspective which might be called outwardness or interest in the external world. There is no question, of course, that the inner world of man is not the whole of reality to all of the West. The West, for example—through philosophy and science—wishes to understand and to improve both the world and the inner man and not merely the latter.

The second possible interpretation or aspect of this characterization seems to be based upon a confusion of philosophy and religion, and therefore is irrelevant as a description of Western philosophy. The realization of identity with the ultimate and the gaining of spiritual salvation thereby are affairs of religion rather than of philosophy, according to the West.

The characterization under consideration reminds one of rŚi Aurobindo's contrast of East and West wherein the West is interested in "truth of life" whereas India is interested in "truth of spirit." While it may be sound to describe Indian philosophy as interested primarily in truth of spirit, it is very questionable to characterize the West as having exclusive interest or even predominant interest in truth of life. This question is related to another, wherein Western philosophy may be described as thisworldly as contrasted with Indian philosophy which is described as other-worldly. I think the answer of any Western philosopher would be that of Dr. Fung Yu-lan in his reply to a similar characterization of the spirit of Chinese philosophy. Dr. Fung says, "Chinese philosophy, regardless of its different schools of thought, is directly or indirectly concerned with government and ethics. On the surface, therefore, it is concerned chiefly with society, and not with the universe... with man's present life, but not his life in the world to come. This, however, is only a surface view of the matter... So far as the main tenet of this tradition is concerned, if we understand it aright, it cannot be said to be wholly thisworldly, just as, of course, it cannot be said to be wholly otherworldly. It is both of this world and of the other world."1

(5) Irreligious—soulless, unspiritual, irreligious. Much depends

1 Arya, II, pp. 763–765.
2 A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 7–8.
3 See P. D. Shastri, The Essentials of Eastern Philosophy, Ch. 1

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here upon definition, of course, and also upon the probability of
the frequent confusion between Western philosophy and Western
culture or civilization. For example, it may be true, as Professor
Radhakrishnan says, that "... the main tendency of Western
culture is an opposition between man and God, where man resists
the might of God, steals fire from him in the interest of humanity.
In India man is a product of God. The whole world is due to the
sacrifice of God." 1 Professor Radhakrishnan is obviously talking of
Western culture in general and not specifically of Western philo-
sophy.

Western philosophy may be non-religious, but it is not irre-
ligious. Western philosophy may have different methods; it
may have different motives; it may have different attitudes
and approaches, to the problems of reality and life; but
Western philosophy as such is not opposed to religion, is
not irreligious.

Nothing is sacred in Western philosophy. This means that
Western philosophy does not start with dogmas or assumptions,
but questions everything. Western philosophy is just as critical of
the critics of religion as it is of religion itself. There is contrast, to
be sure, but no essential opposition, certainly not in doctrine, and,
more frequently than realized, not even in methods, for much of
Western philosophy, as we shall see, recognizes methods of
searching for the truth which are not opposed to the basic methods
of religion.

Western philosophy has not set as its goal the religious goal of
spiritual salvation, but neither has it rejected that as a proper
goal for man. It has not accepted all the beliefs of religion, but
neither has it rejected them. The beliefs and assumptions of
religion, like those of science and of all other attitudes, are problems of philosophy. If the characterization under consideration is
intended to entail the idea that philosophy is the enemy of reli-
gion, it is grossly inaccurate; on the contrary, there is a wide-
spread conviction that philosophy is the ally of religion against
its critics, chiefly science. While a belief in God (some ultimately
spiritual or purposeful ordering of the universe) and a belief in
the soul as in some way related to that ultimate spiritual principle
do not constitute religion in any full sense, they do constitute the
philosophical minimum without which a religion has no basis.
There are too many great Western philosophers who hold these

1 Indian Philosophy, I, p. 41.
beliefs to ignore them entirely and brand Western philosophy as irreligious.

(6) Humanistic, pragmatic, and realistic. Professor Hocking speaks of "the pragmatic and realistic temper of the West," and Professor Radhakrishnan contrasts "European humanism" and "Asiatic religion." Dr. A. K. Coomaraswamy also pointed out India's interest in the all-important things (with Plato) as contrasted with the West's superficial human and cultural interests.

Western culture may be humanistic, pragmatic, and realistic, as contrasted with a dominant other-worldly motivation and interest, but a closer examination of Western philosophy will not verify this judgment. Great thinkers from Plato to Hegel and beyond must be considerably distorted before they can be made to fit this pattern, and they, rather than the humanists, have dominated the spirit of Western philosophy. Western philosophy is not humanistic in the sense that man, as a mere human being, is the essence of reality. It is not humanistic, pragmatic, or interested solely in the "truth of life" in the sense that only the worldly values are real. In fact, the spiritual values, including the religious, are—if one can speak of "more or less" in this connection—more often than not placed at the top of the scale of values, values which lift man above the world and enable him to achieve true self-realization.

(7) "Positive" (as contrasted with the "negative")—"world-and-life-affirming" in contrast with "world-and-life-denying." This characterization applies chiefly within the field of philosophies of life. On the side of the West, there is no doubt that "life is real and life is earnest" and that man should "live" fully and seek to achieve self-realization and full expression and development of his many-sided nature. On the side of the East, on the contrary, there is the Western interpretation that Eastern philosophy is negative, escapist, other-worldly, and characterized

1 "Value of the Comparative Study of Philosophy," in Philosophy—East and West, p. 4. See also E. L. Schaub's characterization of contemporary Western thought, as "temporalism, pragmatism, and instrumentalism. . . ." "Indian Philosophy in its Divergence from the Spirit of the Contemporary West," in The Open Court, October 1930, p. 598.
2 Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 259.
by renunciation, such that life and living are evils to be escaped rather than positive values.¹

Three brief observations will suffice in comment: (1) that the characterization of the East as "negative"—in terms of which alone the characterization of the West as "positive" has any distinctive meaning—is clearly a false description;² (2) that the West has had as a part of its richness of thought a "negativistic" attitude of significant strength, from the Cynics to Socrates, Plato, Stoics, Neo-Platonists, early Christians,³ Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and recent developments more specifically within the field of the philosophy of religion; and (3) that, while the positive attitude toward life and the "here-and-now" is a strong emphasis of Western philosophy as compared with any negativism, it is not to be identified with worldliness or with the rejection of the more ultimate values of spirit.

VI

IS THERE A CHARACTERISTIC THOUGH NOT UNIQUE SPIRIT OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY?

So far, this study has been able to discern no characteristic or definitive spirit of Western philosophy. It has been found impossible to designate any characteristic which has been definitive of Western philosophy, because of the great variety of attitudes and doctrines which have constituted the substance of Western philosophy. All the proposed characterizations of the spirit of Western philosophy have been rejected because they are based upon either a partial view of the great range of thought in the history of Western philosophy, or upon observations about Western culture and civilization rather than Western philosophy as such. The statement was made early in this chapter that the spirit of Western philosophy, like the spirit of any philosophy, must not only be definitive but also unique. It is now our purpose to look into certain unquestionably significant characteristics of Western philosophy which seem much closer to the spirit of

¹ See W. C. Bell, If a Man Dies, Mrs. Anne Lee Laird, ed., Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1939, pp. 96–98, for a strong statement of the opposition between East and West in this respect.


³ On the negativism of Christianity, see S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, Ch. III, especially pp. 64–114.
Western thought than any characterizations considered so far, but to note than even in these instances, though the characterizations are more accurately symptomatic of Western philosophy, they are not uniquely characteristic of that philosophical tradition. Western philosophy as a whole is the heir of Greek philosophy, and has apparently inherited a vague intangible 'spirit' from its founding fathers. The origins of Western philosophy established a certain general pattern and framework to which Western thought since that time has tended to conform. This spirit consists in the large of three component attitudes: (1) the desire to know or the love of knowledge; (2) freedom of thought; and (3) a demand for rationality or reasonableness.

These characteristics of Western thought in general appear to be much more defensible as constituents of the spirit of Western philosophy than any of the proposed characterizations considered heretofore. Nevertheless, it must be noted—and established—that even these three minimal requirements of Western philosophy are mere tendencies or emphases; that they are not constant characteristics; that they are not invariable in meaning throughout the history of Western philosophy; and, finally, that they are not unique. In other words, even these characteristics, which every Western philosopher will recognize as significant parts of his tradition, do not serve as constituents of an absolute spirit of Western philosophy, nor do they constitute a unique characterization which might serve as an obstacle to a meeting of the minds of East and West.

There seems to be little question that Western philosophy arose, as Plato and Aristotle contend, out of intellectual curiosity, the love of wisdom, or wonder about the nature of reality. There is no doubt also that the theoretical motivation has been extremely prominent throughout much of the history of Western thought. Philosophy is born "when . . . wonder begins to be serious and systematic inquiry. . . ." This tendency stands in very marked contrast to the spirit of Oriental philosophy, where the only common denominator of all philosophy is its practical motivation, whether it be the Indian emphasis in which realizing one's identity with the Absolute takes precedence over knowing about the

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1 See passage referred to below in note 2, page 77 for comprehensive statement of the meaning of philosophy in India, a statement which shows no essential differences from the attitudes of the West.

THE SPIRIT OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

Absolute, or in China where all theories are motivated by their practical application.

The fact of this tendency as well as its basis are seen from the rather constant dread on the part of Western philosophers that a practical motivation might—or inevitably would—constitute a prejudice which would distort objective thinking and would prevent the thinker from reaching the truth. Professor E. A. Burtt thinks that this intellectual motivation or the belief "that 'theory' is distinguishable (and even separable) from 'practice' " "still dominates the Western mind, because almost no one sees how it could be surrendered without paralysing all intellectual endeavour." In the West, from the time of the early post-Socratic ethical period to present-day Pragmatism, the opposite theory has been under suspicion as what might be called philosophy in reverse, the truth being determined in terms of a practical solution of individual or social problems rather than being sought objectively and with complete impartiality.

Despite these unquestioned facts concerning the relative status of theory and practice in Western philosophy, it seems extremely questionable to define the spirit of Western philosophy in terms of this tendency, especially when the characterization lends itself to distortion as "an intellectual exercise" or an "intellectual game." While the love of wisdom has remained a major motivation practically throughout Western philosophy, it has seldom (if ever) taken the form of a purely intellectual game—or even the purely intellectual adventure mentioned earlier in this chapter. Nor can it be said accurately that such a purely academic motive has remained the sole motive or the dominating motive throughout the history of Western philosophy. It may be demonstrated, on the contrary, that many of the greatest philosophers of the West were actually reformers, trying to reach theories which would solve the problems of the day. For example, Plato has been called the diagnosticker of Greece. Also, certainly the entire Greek practical period, the religious period, Francis Bacon, Nietzsche, Dewey, and others—including even Kant, and Fichte—cannot be ignored as significant factors in the history of Western philosophy. These outstanding examples of the contrary spirit and attitude, and the fact just mentioned that many of the greatest

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1 "How Can the Philosophies of East and West Meet?" in The Philosophical Review, November 1948, p. 596.
Western philosophers were fundamentally social or moral reformers seem to be adequate evidence of the over-simplicity and consequent inaccuracy of the charge—and it is just that—that Western philosophy is “academic.”

There has been no unanimity of opinion in the West concerning the basic motivation of philosophy. Every thinker in the history of Western philosophy who has made an effort to study the problems of ethics and moral conduct in general, and who has deliberately worked out in the field of ethics the implications of his metaphysical system, is a distinct example of the application of truth to life, and of the implicit motivation to solve the problems of life, even if that solution take the indirect form of first searching for the truth, and then applying it.

The spirit of Western philosophy on this point has been aptly described by Professor R. B. Perry, who has said that it is the business of philosophy “to discover the nature of the universe and to apply it to the meaning of life,”¹ and by Patrick when he said that “... it is not the purpose of philosophy to try to solve our social, economic, and political problems, but it is its purpose to think carefully and systematically about certain fundamental questions which concern ourselves, our conduct, and the world in which we live.”² There has not been the conscious and exclusive effort to make philosophy practical, or to judge the truth in terms of practical results, but there has been a constant assumption, with Socrates, that man is rational, and that, if the truth is known, it will be followed by rational creatures.

It is perhaps in this sense that philosophy looks at the problem under discussion differently from religion, religion being directly and exclusively interested in the practical aspect of the situation, whereas, in procedure at least, philosophy is seemingly only secondarily interested in the practical problems of man. There may not be nearly such a contrary motivation in philosophy and religion as is often thought; it may be only the procedure which differentiates the two. For example, Professor C. F. Lavell, in describing the rise of Greek philosophy, contrasts the attitudes of religion on the one hand and philosophy and science on the other, and makes the point that it is philosophy and science which really endeavour to solve the problems of life by a direct attack upon them, assuming that understanding will lead to solution, whereas

² G. T. W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 5.
religion solves them by some type or degree of escape from them. This seems to be the general attitude of philosophy in the West, and this is not "academic"; it is merely putting first things first, knowledge of the truth prior to application of the truth to life.

While it is unquestionably true that Western philosophy has been—or at least has appeared to be—less practical in motive than Oriental philosophy, it is questionable whether this attitude is unique to the West. Both Radhakrishnan and Hiriyanma contend that Indian philosophy, like Western philosophy, arose out of wonder and the disinterested search for the truth, and Sri Aurobindo speaks of the "insatiable intellectual curiosity" of the Indian mind, which could produce even such a "freak" as materialistic atheism. The Hymn of Question in Book X of the Rg-Veda in a sense marks the beginning of Indian philosophy. The spirit of this hymn is predominantly one of intellectual wonder—though combined with the inevitable realization of practical implications. Confucius, certainly a major representative of Chinese philosophy, proclaims his love of wisdom as such, although he, too, is unquestionably vitally interested in finding the Tao and solving the personal and social problems of his day. "I was not born a wise man," he said. "I am merely one who is in love with ancient studies and work very hard to learn them."

The love of wisdom is not unique to the West and to its philosophers. There is probably no philosopher, East or West, who has not been possessed by the love of truth and in whom the search for it has not come from an essential drive within himself. As Radhakrishnan says, "... the philosopher is only the lover of wisdom and not its possessor. It is not the end of the voyage that matters, but the voyage itself. To travel is a better thing than to arrive." Despite this fact, however, there has probably been no philosopher, East or West, who has not hoped to see the practical application of his doctrines to the problems of life.

The other two characteristics under discussion—freedom of thought and reasonableness of methods and conclusions—are more definite and more widespread in acceptance in Western philosophy. In fact, the only attitudes that one as a Western

1 A Biography of the Greek People, pp. 132-133.
2 See C. A. Moore, "Comparative Philosophies of Life," in Philosophy—East and West, pp. 266-281.
3 Indian Philosophy, I, p. 22.
5 The Renaissance in India, p. 19.
6 Analects, VII, 19. See also V, 27; VII, 2, 16; XV, 30.
7 Indian Philosophy, II, p. 768.
philosopher would feel tempted to insist upon are complete freedom of thought and the reasonableness of one's procedure and of one's conclusions.

Freedom of thought—and the ensuing flexibility of thought—is an important and characteristic quality of Western philosophy, although one is immediately compelled to qualify this statement by adding that even this is essentially only an ideal in Western philosophy and was not put into practice in any full sense either in the Middle Ages—which can hardly be omitted from the course of Western philosophy as a whole—or even in the minds of some of our greatest thinkers of modern philosophy, who, despite Bacon, had their idols of the theatre in the background of their minds at many crucial points in their philosophical deliberations. Despite these exceptions, it has been the freedom from tradition which has been the only tradition in Western philosophy. Professor Radhakrishnan says that the contributions of Greece were "democracy, individual freedom, [and] intellectual integrity." In different words: freedom of thought in the pursuit of truth. If the West has any tradition, it is this. Socrates, in many ways, is the embodiment of the spirit of Western philosophy, one who demanded and died for the ideal of freedom of thought.

Freedom entails and demands absence of authority and of any advance determination of thought or truth. If the conclusion is already determined, as in the Middle Ages, the activity is not considered fully philosophical. If one's search for the truth is determined by tradition, it is not philosophy. Philosophy demands "the uncommitted mind." Even in the Middle Ages, this demand for open-mindedness could not be denied or killed, and it eventually led to the death of rigidly controlled Scholasticism. Complete freedom of thought prevented common approaches and common conclusions even in the Middle Ages. In the name of freedom of thought, there have been many rebels in the history of Western philosophy, men who led philosophy to progress by insisting upon freedom, and therefore broke with whatever happened to be the spirit or the tradition of the time, from Thales to Thomas Aquinas, to Bacon, to Descartes, to Kant, to to-day.

In addition to the fact that freedom of thought has been only an ideal, there is the additional fact that it is not a unique characteristic of Western philosophy in contrast with Oriental philosophy. The question of traditionalism or authority in Indian

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Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 254.
philosophy, for example, is much too far-reaching to be considered adequately here, but the very great variety of interpretations of that tradition—in the numerous systems of Indian philosophy and in the essentially new systems compiled by self-styled interpreters or commentators—is sufficiently indicative of the freedom of thought in Indian philosophy. So, too, are the numerous systems, the great thinkers, and the keen philosophical debates among the adherents of different points of view in Indian philosophy. One finds nearly all colours of the philosophical rainbow in Indian thought,¹ and this could not be true without substantial freedom of thought.

Freedom of thought is equally a characteristic of Chinese philosophy, despite verbal recognition of ancient wisdom as the model of Confucianist teachings. The variety of philosophical perspectives and the diversity of conclusions in many of these are ample evidence of open-mindedness, which is crucial to philosophy in China despite reverence for the ancients and dependence upon the Classics.

The point seems to be that freedom of thought is essential to all philosophy, East and West. It has been recognized as indispensable to philosophy, and has been very much in evidence in all philosophical traditions—although, as an ideal, it has never been fully actualized in any tradition.

The third major aspect of the vague intangible spirit of Western philosophy now being considered is its use of and dependence upon reason as its essential and almost exclusive method of investigation, exposition, and demonstration, in contrast to the use of and dependence upon some form of intuition.

Practically all definitions of Western philosophy point out specifically its rationalistic character. For example, "... philosophy may be defined as the art of thinking things through. ... It involves thinking logically ... as well as systematically and persistently. ... So it comes about that logic is perhaps the most essential part of the philosopher's equipment."² Irrationality in thinking or in result is rejected in Western philosophy, whether that irrationality stem from intuition, revelation, or reason itself. The West demands that man examine his beliefs. In his thinking he must be reasonable and logically sound. Consistency has been ridiculed, but it cannot be scorned. No further elaboration or justification is required to make a case for the thesis that reason

¹ See above, note 1, p. 61. ² G. T. W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 5.
is unquestionably the major or primary tool of Western philosophy.

In examining this proposed characteristic of the spirit of Western philosophy we are faced with two major questions: (1) Is reason, in any specific and exact sense of that term, truly definitive of the method of Western philosophy, and (2) Is reason, in any sense, unique to Western philosophy, in such a way that it constitutes a characteristic which is incompatible with the basic corresponding characteristics of Oriental thought?

In calling Western philosophy rationalistic, its critic very often interprets this term to be synonymous with "intellectualistic," and its critic and its advocate alike frequently think that philosophy by its very nature demands either proof of a doctrine or its rejection. This is a false interpretation of reason as it is found in Western philosophy. Western philosophy is unquestionably rationalistic, but it is not intellectualistic. Of its basic nature, it does not insist upon or indulge in intellectualism. Reasonableness is its demand. As expressed in court language, one is expected to demonstrate his case "beyond a reasonable doubt." Western philosophy demands explanation and plausibility. It demands that a doctrine be justified in terms of evidence.

Reasonableness, then, rather than intellectualism or rationalism in the sense of absolute proof, more closely approximates the spirit of Western philosophy. The West has often recognized that life and reality in all their aspects are not wholly amenable to reason or logic or intellectualistic procedure. Plato, Fichte, Bergson, are only a few outstanding examples. Socrates, in admitting to Charmides that temperance cannot be defined but is good and should be sought regardless of the difficulty of definition, is a striking example. Plato's admission that scientific reason cannot go all the way to truth is another. The recognition of the eighteenth century as a distinct "age of reason" and of "cold logic" and intellectualism, as distinct from the other centuries in the history of Western philosophy, is still another.

An added consideration, and one that is surprisingly ignored, is the recognition of intuitive knowledge—characterized by immediacy of apprehension—or of some type of higher reason by many of the greatest Western philosophers. This fact constitutes too great a contrast to intellectualism and pure reason to be ignored in any definition of the spirit of Western philosophy.

Pascal was not altogether out of the Western tradition when he
said, "We know the truth not only by the reason but also by the heart." Kant perhaps made the point best when he rejected pure reason but accepted the practical reason, which was not rationalistic but which, nevertheless, was reasonable. His belief in God, freedom, and immortality was also reasonable, although, by his own admission, these can never be "proved." Among the very greatest thinkers of Western philosophy who have used or recognized intuition as such or some type of higher reasoning have been Socrates, Plato, Plotinus, Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Bergson, Locke and Bradley. (In fact, all rationalists are fundamentally intuitionists. Their basic self-evident truths, axioms, definitions, assumptions, etc., upon which their entire systems are founded, are not drawn from experience, nor are they demonstrated. They are immediately or clearly and distinctly known to be true.) An important point to note in these instances is the fact that in most of them intuition is not employed in any subordinate or insignificant role. Instead, it is usually designated or assumed as being essential to reaching the full truth or the ultimate truth.

Intuition has played a much more significant role in Western philosophy than even Westerners seem to have recognized. It seems very questionable, for example, to contend that the characteristic method of Western philosophy is that of dealing in terms of concepts by postulation—which is Professor Northrop's special way of explaining the dominant role of reason in Western philosophy. Not only are there numerous examples of major thinkers who have admittedly made use of intuition either at the beginning of their system or, as it were, at the end, but it might be contended that practically all major "discoveries" in philosophy have stemmed from flashes of intuition or from insight rather than concepts consciously formulated by the process of postulation. It is a more likely interpretation of many of the great ideas of Western philosophy that they originated in inexplicable insights. The view that they arise from the laborious deduction of these concepts from systems of axioms and hypotheses or data of experience is a view for which there is little direct evidence.

Another major consideration in our examination of reason as characteristic of the spirit of Western philosophy is the question as to what is meant by reason. Reason has meant many things to philosophy in the West, so much so that it is impossible to say

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1 Blaise Pascal, *Pensées sur la religion*, Ch. X.
exactly what it means as characteristic of Western philosophy, Reasonableness is the only demand that carries through in all the varied meanings of the term. The exact nature of reason has varied very significantly, for example, from Socrates and Plato to Spinoza, and from Descartes to James. One cannot call any of these irrational or unreasonable in their thinking, and yet one would have great difficulty in identifying them with the type of rationality or rationalism which, in the minds of Westerners and Easterners alike, has been considered an insurmountable methodological barrier between East and West. Even logic is subject to significantly varied interpretations; "logical reasoning" does not of necessity define any rigid method or attitude on the part of Western philosophy as its essential spirit.

Professor W. R. Dennes suggests an analysis of the nature of reason which will serve for the purpose of illustration. He finds that there are four fundamental meanings and processes referred to by "reason."

1 According to Professor Dennes: Reason I is the procedure of observing, comparing, supposing, and experimenting; Reason II is mathematical demonstration, including much that we now consider logic; Reason III is reasoning that analyses and distinguishes meanings but does not purport, prima facie, to establish facts or to make strict (i.e. analytic) logical deductions; and Reason IV is the calm, deliberate, and informed judgment of moral acts, attitudes, rules, and institutions, of works of art, and even of the works of reason themselves—that is, of science, logic, and philosophy conceived as reason in senses I, II, and III, and even in sense IV. (This is what is called by Hume "right reason.") Thus is seen the impossibility of any rigid interpretation of the meaning and processes of reason itself.

One final consideration in connection with reason as characteristic of the spirit of Western philosophy is the fact that reason has been challenged repeatedly and by various types of thinkers, intuitionists, voluntarists, and sceptics, who from time to time have undermined the authority, the efficacy, and the status of reason.

We turn now to the second question of our study of reason, namely: Is reason uniquely characteristic of the spirit of Western philosophy, in contrast to the spirit of Oriental philosophy? It was said earlier in this paper that irrationality in thinking or in result

is rejected in Western philosophy. So is it rejected by man as man, and so is it rejected in the great philosophical traditions of the East. No philosopher can be inconsistent or irrational, although philosophers, East and West, may refuse to submit to the rigidity of any one particular type of formalistic procedure which may in the minds of some, but not of all, seem to constitute the only acceptable meaning of the process.

Western philosophy is rationalistic—in a necessarily guarded sense—because man is rational and reason therefore is natural and indispensable to him in his search for truth. But, similarly, all philosophy is rational for all men are rational. Thus, the rationalism of Western philosophy, while an essential characteristic, is not sufficiently unique to constitute the spirit of Western philosophy. Rationality is of the very spirit of philosophy as such. No philosophy can be irrational, inconsistent, unreasonable.

Indian philosophy, for example, is rational. As Professor Radhakrishnan points out, "The thinkers of India are the inheritors of the great tradition of faith in reason."1 Another philosopher of present-day India has said, "Philosophy . . . is not actuated by any other motive than the desire to know. Its goal is truth, its guide is reason, and its field of investigation is experience of all possible kinds and levels."2

Not only do contemporary Indians speak in terms of the rationality and reasonableness of Indian philosophy, but so also did the great thinkers of the past. A few illustrative examples may be helpful. "A reasonable statement, even of a child, should be accepted, while the unreasonable ones are to be discarded like straw, even though they are made by the Creator Himself. A devotee of Reason should value the words even of ordinary persons, provided they enhance knowledge and are logical, and should throw away those of sages, if they are not such."3 "Truth cannot be known without thinking. . . . Thinking consists in logical investigation into problems."4 "Accept not a religion because it is the oldest; its being oldest is no proof of its being the true one. . . . Accept not a religion because it is the latest, . . . because

1 Indian Philosophy, II, p. 776.
4 Ibid., II, 14, 52; II, 14, 50. See B. L. Atreya, ibid., p. 139.
believed in by the vast majority of mankind, ... [because it is believed in by the chosen few ... [etc.]. Accept a thing and it is] believe in a religion on its own merits. Examine it yourself."

"It is not sound reasoning as it involves self-contradiction."

Reason in the strict sense of logical demonstration abounds in Indian philosophy, especially in the major systems, which range over a wide and varied expanse of philosophical speculation and which have endured as the organized body of Indian philosophy for many centuries. Although this type of reasoning is not present in any pronounced degree in the Upaniṣads, there is evidence of reasonableness and justification and explanation of doctrines throughout the Upaniṣads in the form of analogies, illustrations, etc., which make the doctrines reasonable if not logically demonstrated.

In China, too, reason and strictly logical reasoning have played an important part in the development of philosophy. It is true, perhaps, as many Westerners think, that much of Chinese philosophy has been portrayed on the level of common sense alone and has been presented without system and without demonstration. Speaking of the Chinese people in general, and not exclusively of their philosophers, Florence Ayscough describes them thus: "The Chinese, essentially logical, delight in seeking origins, but they have never been hampered by that passion for proof which so complicates the lives of Occidentals." Dr. Hu's book, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, was written for the specific purpose of explaining the status of logical reasoning in Chinese philosophy. He says, "That philosophy is conditioned by its method, and that the development of philosophy is dependent upon the development of the logical method, are facts which find abundant illustrations in the history of philosophy both of the West and of the East." He states as part of the purpose of his book "... the strongest desire to make my own people see that these methods of the West are not totally alien to the Chinese mind, and that on the contrary, they are the instruments by

1 Swami Rāma Tīrtha, Heart of Rāma, pp. 27 ff., quoted by B. L. Atreyā, ibid., pp. 582–583.
2 Gautama, Nyāya Sūtras, II, 1, 29, Gangānātha, Jhā, trans. Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1939, p. 143. See also I, 1, 40, and I, 2, 7. See also Kāsha Up., I, 2, 6; I, 2, 23; I, 3, 12; and Kena Up., I, 1. Buddhist philosophical texts also abound in elaborate and intricate examples of logical analysis and demonstration.
means of which and in the light of which much of the lost treasures of Chinese philosophy can be recovered.”

The contention that Chinese philosophy is non-rational because it is unsystematic is only partially justified, for there is definite system in some of the classical philosophical texts. Professor Fung Yu-lan answers this contention by pointing out that, although it may be true that there is “briefness and disconnectedness of the sayings and writings” of some of the great Chinese philosophers, there is connectedness in the thought itself. As he says, if there were disconnectedness in the thought itself “there would be no Chinese philosophy. For disconnected thought is hardly worthy of the name of philosophy.”

To be sure, in both China and India there is a tendency—in very different degrees—to hold that ultimate reality cannot be “reached” by discursive or demonstrative reason. There is an ultimate dependence upon intuition in Indian philosophy generally and even in some Chinese philosophy, such as Taoism, Buddhism, and later systems of Neo-Confucianism, where intuition is the only means of reaching knowledge of the ultimate.

Although Indian philosophy contends that the ultimate is beyond the reach of discursive and demonstrative reason, nevertheless, philosophy in India is not irrational or opposed to reason, despite the fact that it appears to be so at times, especially in the words of some modern Indian critics of the rationalism of Western philosophy. Indian absolutism, like Western theology, reaches an ultimate which is marked by a higher degree of rationality, and, furthermore, Indian philosophy, generally, goes one step beyond Western philosophy in its realization of that ultimate truth or reality beyond the mere knowing of it. But, even at its most intuitive heights, Indian philosophy does not conflict with reason, but merely goes beyond it. As Professor Radhakrishnan says, “To be spiritual is not to reject reason, but to go beyond it. It is to think so hard that thinking becomes knowing or viewing, what we might call creative thinking. Philosophy and religion are two aspects of a single movement.”

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1 Introduction, p. 9.  
2 A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 11.  
3 Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, pp. 2. 4.  
4 Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 25. See also Indian Philosophy, II, p. 771; “Thought, when it thinks itself out to the end, becomes religion by being lived and tested by the supreme test of life.” Sri Aurobindo, like others, holds that, even in mysticism, reason is necessary as a preliminary to Self-vision. See The Life Divine, Arya Publishing House, Calcutta, first edition, 1939, I, p. 182; II, part 2, pp. 890-891.

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easy to say there is a God and to prove it, but it is difficult to realize God in the heart.” Some of Indian philosophy—more of it than is generally realized—is interested almost exclusively in saying what is real and in proving it; but when Indian philosophy goes beyond that and realizes God in the hearts of men it has built religiously a superstructure upon the basic structure of philosophy. Indian philosophy may go beyond reason, but it does not go beyond reasonableness. In this connection, it must be kept in mind that in India there is an *ultimate* dependence upon intuition, a dependence upon intuition only at the top of the ladder leading to truth and reality.

Although Indian philosophy frequently tends to ally itself with the supra-rational intuitive heights of the Absolute, the rationality of the ultimate and the rationalism of Hindu philosophy are very obvious. Those great seers who have reached Brahman by the intuitive process of spiritual realization are able, not only to present to others the basic principles of their intuitively derived wisdom, but also to demonstrate the validity or truth of their “vision” by the use of methodical, subtle, and sound reason. Furthermore, the great majority of Indian thinkers who are at the present day Vedântins have not realized Brahman personally. They are Vedântins because of the rational appeal of Vedânta (of their particular type) as against all other systems. Also, negatively, those who reject, say, the Vedânta of Śaṁkara, do so on the same ground of reason. In other words, the tradition of reason is not alien to Indian philosophy, even in its more absolutist form.

The characterization of Western philosophy as rationalistic acquires profound significance, far beyond that applying solely to methodology, through comparison with one of the basic doctrines of the more absolutist tendency in Indian philosophy. The strongest criticisms of the rationalism of the West come from those who see metaphysical implications of the use of reason, as India interprets the reasoning of the West. Consideration of this point focuses attention upon the attitude which may be more characteristic of Western philosophy than any other doctrine and which may be more significant in comparative East-West philosophy than any problem to be faced in the current effort to see ways and means of bringing the two traditions closer together.

When the Indian rejects reason as unable to guide man to the ultimate, it is because of the Indian’s conviction that the ultimate is beyond all characterization, whereas reason in the sense in
which it is being considered demands qualitative distinctions and inevitably leads to a doctrine which applies qualitative characterizations to the ultimate, whatever type of ultimate the theory in question might consider to be the real.

The only characterization that can be applied to Western philosophy as a whole and to practically every major thinker in the Western tradition is that Western philosophy is "determinate" in its concept of the real. In practically every major system of thought and every thinker of top rank in Western philosophy, reality is described as possessing some definite quality or as being some specifically qualitative substance: water, fire, air, the Good, God, matter, mind, mind and matter, spirit, rational, irrational, etc. Thales set the pattern and became the first typical Western philosopher when he described reality in terms of a definite substance or quality. Pythagoras (and possibly Heracleitus as well) formulated this philosophical perspective when he insisted that the principle of the Limit is an essential, if not the essential, principle of reality, thus rejecting the unlimited or the indeterminate in any of its possible senses as an adequate description of the real. (It may be noted, in this connection, that the indeterminate of Anaximander—being a Western indeterminate—was not non-qualitative but was a harmony of all qualities.) Since the days of these early thinkers reality has been given some definite quality or qualities by nearly every significant Western thinker, whether it be one quality, two qualities, all qualities, or all possible qualities, as in the case of Spinoza's infinite number of attributes. Berkeley's inability to accept "matter substance" as real without qualities mirrors the mind of all Western philosophers in their demand for more than "bare Being."

It is not the purpose of this study to trace this doctrine to its possible psychological or historical origins, but it is suggested that the attitude of ascribing specific qualities to reality probably has its basis in a combination of the attitudes and methods of science, reason, and logic—and possibly grammar; or it may be traceable to the general tendency towards analysis. Nevertheless, the

1 E. A. Burtt, "How Can the Philosophies of East and West Meet?" in The Philosophical Review, November 1948, pp. 595-596, G. P. Conger, "An Outline of Indian Philosophy," in Philosophy—East and West, p. 22, and E. L. Schaub, "Indian Philosophy in its Divergence from the Spirit of the Contemporary West," in The Open Court, October 1930, p. 598, call attention to analysis as characteristic of Western thought. Analysis is unquestionably significant in the West but it cannot displace the main purpose of philosophy, which is ultimate synthesis, and it is not unique to the West for all thinking requires analysis.
method used does not seem to have a significant bearing upon the result, for, as has been pointed out in earlier sections of this paper, Western philosophers have not been dominated by any single method in their research, and yet the qualitative nature of the result of their thinking, in terms of the qualitative nature of reality, is universal among them. In other words, no matter what method is employed and no matter what specific type of philosophical doctrine or system results, reality is always considered determinate by Western philosophers. (Western mystics would constitute an exception to this rule, but they also constitute exceptions to Western philosophy, and are not generally accepted as belonging specifically and legitimately to Western philosophy proper. The status of Neo-Platonism in this connection is doubtful.)

The concept of pure being, in a completely abstract and indeterminate sense, has found its way into Western philosophy occasionally, dating back to the Eleatics—and in Western mystics—but this philosophical doctrine has played an insignificant role in the development of Western philosophy. Furthermore, those philosophers who might be thought to consider reality indeterminate, since it is beyond the realm of human knowledge, as in the case of Kant’s “thing-in-itself” and Spencer’s “unknowable,” did not describe the ultimate as non-qualitative but contented themselves simply with saying that man could not know its true nature.

This description of Western philosophy as determinate gains clarification, perhaps, by a contrast with the opposite characterization which is so often made of Oriental philosophy and especially of Indian philosophy. Professor Northrop focuses attention upon the Oriental doctrine of the “undifferentiated continuum” as ultimate reality, in contrast to the West’s acceptance of postulated differentiations as characteristic of reality. He quotes Professor S. N. Dasgupta to the effect that “They found that by whatever means they tried to give a positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, the Brahman, they failed. Positive definitions were impossible.” Professor Northrop comments upon this by saying, “For this reason there is nothing in common between Brahman and ultimate reality as conceived by Democritus, Plato or Aristotle. The atoms of Democritus, the ideas of

* A History of Indian Philosophy, I, p. 44.

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Plato and the forms of Aristotle were definite determinate things, the very antithesis of the unspecifiable Brahman."¹

The same antithesis is found by concentrating upon the Upaniṣadic phrase "neti, neti" (not this, not this). The import of this phrase is most frequently accepted to be the unqualified nature of reality, such that it cannot be defined or described in terms of any specific substance or quality. Professor Radhakrishnan calls the ultimate in India's mysticism "absolutely different" from and "totally other" than the things of the empirical world.² Professor P. T. Raju has made the same point, but he applies the idea to Indian philosophy as a whole, saying, "... ultimate Reality, according to Indian philosophy, is the other to everything conceivable," giving this as his interpretation of neti, neti in the Upaniṣads.³ This indeterminate character of the ultimate in Oriental philosophy gains further clarification by noticing how some Indians apply it in the field of ethics and social philosophy. For example, Śri Aurobindo rejects what the West tends to call spiritual values, such as the intellectual, moral, aesthetic, etc., as truly spiritual, because no such qualities or values can apply to the unqualified absolute spirit.⁴ It is also well known that ethical rules and values are transcended in the state of spiritual realization, which constitutes the goal of the Upaniṣadic philosophy and of the Vedānta. Thus, in the field of metaphysics and in the field of what might be called the application of metaphysical principles to the empirical world of values, this interpretation of Indian philosophy shows a strong contrast with the determinate nature of Western philosophy, and seems to separate the one from the other at the most crucial point of all, namely, one's basic perspective with respect to the nature of the ultimate.

Despite the fact that the determinate character of its concepts of reality represents the definitive characteristic of Western philosophy, and despite the fact that Indian philosophy has been so interpreted that it stands in diametrical opposition to this tendency toward determinateness, the determinate character of the philosophical perspective of the West is not unique, nor is it true that this character isolates Western philosophy from Oriental

¹ "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy," in Philosophy—East and West, p. 196.
² Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 298, 299.
⁴ See Dilip Kumar Roy, Among the Great, Nalanda Publications, Bombay, 1945, pp. 294 ff.
philosophy, even in the more absolutist tendencies in Indian philosophy.

The justification for this statement is the fact that philosophy, in East and in West, generally gives definite qualitative descriptions to reality. Only by concentration upon one special and extreme tendency within Indian philosophy and upon one similar extreme instance in Chinese philosophy, can Oriental philosophy be made to fit the pattern of the undifferentiated continuum. It is very doubtful, in fact, whether the true spirit of Hindu philosophy would hold that Brahma is “totally other” than all characteristics known to man, or that “nei, nei” means the complete absence of all qualities. This is probably the correct interpretation of the extreme mysticism of India and in some of the extreme interpretations of the Upaniṣadic doctrine, but there is abundant evidence in the wide range and variety of Indian philosophical doctrines and systems and sub-systems which would demand the rejection of this thesis as truly descriptive of the spirit of Indian philosophy as a whole.

There are many considerations which call for attention in this connection, but they cannot be treated in this study except very briefly. A major factor in the interpretation of Indian philosophy as uniquely undifferentiated depends upon the mistaken view that the Vedāṇṭa of Śaṅkara represents the essence and the sum-total of Indian philosophy and the necessarily correct interpretation of the Upaniṣads. This is to do serious violence to the richness and variety of the Indian mind, and to ignore, not only the more rationalistic systems and the unorthodox systems, but also many systems within systems, as it were, such as the various schools within Vedāṇṭa, which stand in strong opposition to the extreme tendencies of Śaṅkara.

In the Upaniṣads and even in Śaṅkara, the saṁyupa Brahma as well as the nirguṇa Brahma is real. They are the two Brahmas, neither of which can be ignored in a description of reality in its full sense. Furthermore, as is pointed out in the Śaṁkhya Kārikā, which presents a view that is the only satisfactory interpretation of the māyā doctrine in the Vedāṇṭa, the fact that qualities are not manifested in the empirical world does not mean that they do not exist in reality—they are obviously in reality or they could not become manifested through māyā. The analysis of reality into varying groups of substantial or qualitative categories, as in the Hindu systems of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Śaṁkhya, and
Yoga is certainly an example of the qualitative description of reality. Jainism and Cārvāka are other exceptions to the theory of indeterminate reality. In fact, the constant demand for discriminative knowledge (viveka), especially in Sāṃkhya and Yoga and implied in practically all of Indian philosophy, implies differentiation and discrimination and, therefore, qualification of the essential reality or spirit.

Even the more mystically minded Indian philosophers can hardly escape the attitude of qualitative characterization of that which they call the real, namely, the Self. Though the Atman is often said to be beyond all qualification, nevertheless, it is almost constantly described—substantially rather than qualitatively—as Sāccidānānda (being, consciousness, and bliss). As Rāmānuja says in criticism of Śaṅkara, the Self and consciousness must have some substantial meaning and content. Even the most mystical speak of the real in terms of spirit or spirituality, and this term must carry with it some connotation of the substantial nature of the Self. "Atman" is a name with a distinct meaning. Professor B. L. Atreya is speaking along the same lines of interpretation when he says of the German idealists, "... their philosophy is very much in agreement with the deepest philosophy of India, namely, the Vedānta, ..."1

Furthermore, Chinese philosophy is almost unanimous in ascribing distinctive qualitative marks to reality, with the lone exception of the more mystical aspects of Taoism. As Professor Chan says, "It [the One or ultimate] is determinate in Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, ... and other minor Oriental systems [which would include practically all schools of Chinese philosophy except Taoism], where ultimate reality can be understood in specific terms."2 Other Oriental philosophies in Japan, Persia, and Arabia, except in their most mystical developments, also conform to this qualitative pattern. Thus, here again, an important aspect of Western philosophy is found not to be the exclusive mark of the West and not a category of distinction from or opposition to the philosophy of the East.

1 "Philosophy and Theosophy," in Where Theosophy and Science Meet, p. 115.
In its negative result, this study has failed to discover any clear spirit of Western philosophy which is both definitive and unique. It may therefore be considered to have failed in its purpose. A negative definition is faulty, to be sure, but to attribute distinctive qualities and characteristics to that which has no qualities is even more unacceptable. The temptation to attach a "label" to a philosophical tradition is great, but any label which may be chosen is inadequate and inaccurate, certainly in the case of Western philosophy.

In finding no distinctive and unique spirit of Western philosophy, the study has shown that there is no essential or insurmountable barrier between the philosophies of the East and Western philosophy. There can be a meeting of the minds of East and West, because the minds of East and West are not inscrutable to each other. Philosophically, East and West do not speak foreign languages. They are not aliens, one to the other. They have both explored the full richness of reality and truth, and, though both traditions have developed certain tendencies and have emphasized certain perspectives, they need not be blinded by their traditions to those other attitudes which may be brought into clearer focus by virtue of contact with other philosophical traditions. In this way it may be possible to achieve the synthesis which all philosophers must set as their ideal, for philosophy in East and West must seek the total truth and this is possible only through the total perspective which is essential to all philosophy as its one unique distinction.  

1 It has been said many times in this chapter (a) that there is no spirit of Western philosophy in the sense of basic doctrines, attitudes, or methods which can be called common denominators, and (b) that characteristics of Western culture cannot be used to describe Western philosophy. The facts behind these two observations have led to two possibly interrelated indictments of Western philosophy which it seems appropriate to mention at this point, namely, that Western philosophy constitutes intellectual anarchy and chaos and that it is, possibly for this reason, ineffective as a force capable of guiding the culture and life of Western people. The two points are well combined by Professor W. H. Sheldon, who says, "... the task of philosophy is to see the systems fitted together in one pattern. Until that pattern is discerned and given out to the world, philosophy has no function, because no message, and has forfeited its job of life pilot."

III

THE PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOK IN INDIA AND EUROPE

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Philosophy is nothing but a search for Truth, and as such it can have no geographical or national frontiers. *Prima facie* it sounds absurd that we should talk of Indian philosophy or of European philosophy, all the more so when we do not talk of Indian science or of European science. We recognize that the subject matter of the different sciences is the same all over the world, even though particular species of flora and of fauna may be found only in particular regions, but this does not in the least affect the universal character of botany and zoology. But to pretend that the subject matter of philosophy is as objective as that of science would not at all be consistent with the development of philosophy whether in the East or in the West. In so far as science deals with something that in popular jargon we speak of as matter, something that could affect one or more of our physical senses, something that could be observed or experimented upon, it has a legitimate claim for universal acceptance. Newton and Darwin, Einstein and Max Planck, Curie and Raman have attained an international status, and their work has ceased to be English or German, French or Indian. But as soon as we approach the region of philosophy, we seem to transcend the apparently solid basis of the purely objective, and we deal with categories of thought and notions like God and soul, to which we feel impelled by the logic of our thought, but which we cannot assert to be existing or to be carrying conviction to the man in the street in the sense in which or to the degree in which the scientist succeeds in doing. In the logic of thought there comes in a subtle infiltration of something that is not so palpably objective, something that seems to bring with it an aroma of the past centuries, some peculiarity of thought, some curious mode of approach, that forces us to speak of philosophy as Indian or European, Chinese or Arabic. Philosophy, in spite of its search for Truth, which cannot but be universal, utters
only in some peculiar mode of thought or language and we can appreciate it or even understand it only in terms of the country where it was born. Hence we are forced to speak of Indian philosophy and of European philosophy. Attempts have been made to overcome this nationalism in philosophy and place it on a par with the universalism of science, but all such attempts have so far failed. The fact is that there is a definite contrast between science and philosophy, and though philosophy is more fundamental in the life of man, it cannot hope for that universality of acceptance that has been the reward for science.

This becomes all the more intelligible when we compare poetry and philosophy. It is usually said that all great poetry is and must be universal. How else can we hope to account for the love of Homer and Virgil in England and France, or for the love of Shakespeare in Germany and Russia? That the *Gulestan* of Saadi has appealed to generations of Hindus, and the *Rubaiyat* of Omar Khayyam to generations of Englishmen, that the Irishman Yeats could detect the note of true mysticism in the Indian Tagore, certainly bear witness to the truly universal character of all great poetry. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that all poetry bears the stamp of its author and he in turn cannot but be a child of his country, so much so that it is impossible to appreciate a poet apart from the psychology of his countrymen and the historic traditions of his country. Even the rebellious Byron could leave the shores of England but could not bid good-bye to the love of freedom and of the roaring sea that runs in the very blood of Englishmen. Hence it is that it is unavoidable to speak of English poetry and of Hindu poetry, and of Greek poetry and of Chinese poetry. The universality of human thought and passions is woven by a poet like warp and woof into the setting of a particular scene and epoch.

Philosophy, too, has something of poetry in it. Critics of philosophy are fond of this simile when they want to disparage philosophy, but that is not my motive, for I look upon poets and philosophers alike as the real teachers and prophets of mankind. Behind the imagination of a poet lies a profound insight into the mysteries of nature and of the human heart. Behind the thought of a philosopher lies a deep urge to pierce truth. Philosophy may lack the beauty of poetry, but its sincerity and passion for truth make up for the tortuousness or the difficulty of its language. In the last resort both poetry and philosophy have their birth in the
same zest for life and truth. It is not a mere accident that in the history of nations the earliest writings were both poetry and philosophy, for the mythologies that mark the childhood of nations are but incipient philosophy.

Just as every country has its own verse forms and poetic technique and has its own poetic traditions, it has too its own method of approaching philosophical problems, its own outlook which gives it a peculiar stamp and distinguishes it from the philosophy of other countries. Take for example the philosophy in England and Germany. Both have made full use of their Christian and Graeco-Roman inheritance. Both have common racial affinities. Yet through centuries of differing history and environment they have developed different outlooks which give a peculiar meaning to expressions like "English philosophy" and "German philosophy." The German mind is thorough and is never at peace with itself unless a synoptic view is taken of every problem. A German philosopher, whether idealistic or materialistic, must have his Weltanschauung. No German philosopher is worth the name, or can hope to have a following, unless he gives a rounded systematic shape to his thought. Karl Marx could not write on economics without producing a book that ostensibly bears an economic title, but is in substance a philosophy of history, metaphysical even in its anti-metaphysics, irreligious and yet breathing all the fire of Jewish prophets. So much has this been the case that within a century Das Kapital has come to have the status of a Bible for millions of hungry hordes of labourers, and has even given birth to a State that repudiates the Church, but has all the paraphernalia of a Church.

Quite contrary is the mentality of the English. They are proud of muddling through to success; they have a political constitution which is in theory full of contradictions, but in practice they have made it a brilliant success, the envy and despair of other nations; they sail to distant countries for trade and found an empire, the greatest which the world has seen or is likely to see; apparently unprepared for wars they lose battles and yet emerge victorious in the end. In the light of their history it is intelligible that they should have an instinctive distrust of systems. Their philosophy is thus frankly empirical and analytic, and it has retained this characteristic from the time of Francis Bacon right down till the days of Moore and Russell. There is a story of Henry Sidgwick, of Cambridge fame, which vividly brings out the contrast between
the German and the English outlook in philosophy. A German student was preparing a thesis for the Ph.D. degree on the philosophy of Sidgwick, and he soon found it difficult to say what Sidgwick’s Weltanschauung was. He reverently wrote to Sidgwick himself to find out what it was, and the learned Cantabrian used to recount to his friends with his familiar lisp how he wrote back on a postcard that he had no idea.

Take the French philosophers, with their clear-cut logic and lucid expositions with an almost mathematical precision from the days of Descartes to the days of Bergson and Poincaré. Take Italy with centuries of Scholasticism behind her taking a new birth in philosophy with Vico and still more with Croce and Gentile, with a wide spacious sweep of outlook reminiscent of the glories of the old Roman Empire, portraying the universality of Spirit not as an eternal is but as an eternal becoming. Italian philosophy of the twentieth century was an echo of their newly-found political importance. No wonder if Gentile figured as a minister in Mussolini’s Fascist Government, while England still spoke of freedom through the voice of Russell, and France found in Bergson’s élan vital an inspiration for Syndicalism. Pragmatism could flower as a philosophy only in the economic climate of the United States of America, where work and success mean so much with a plethora of new ideas surging in the minds of the young and old, men and women alike.

If the difference in the philosophic outlook is so marked within the different nations that go to make up Europe and America as well, it need not be a matter for wonder if the philosophic outlook of India is still more markedly different from that of Europe and America, so different, in fact, as to justify the use of expressions like “Indian philosophy” and “European philosophy.” In fact, the very word “philosophy” has a different connotation in Europe and India. In ancient Greece, the home of European philosophy, philo-sophia meant love of wisdom, wisdom that is born of human reasoning about life and nature, so that for centuries, in fact till about a couple of hundred years ago, there was no difference between philosophy and science. Both had the same connotation and the same method, the present-day difference being more a matter of convenience necessitated by the needs of scientific specialization, philosophy reserving to itself the right of unifying the different sciences and of evaluating their results. In spite of the hostility that raged between philosophy and science in Europe
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, on the whole there has been a very healthy relationship between the two, for the arrogance of philosophy has been kept in check by the day-to-day outlook of science; for verily nothing that came within human experience was beyond the pale of a scientific investigation. Ghostly phenomena even have not been just accepted or derided, but subjected to a close inquiry that has become familiar under the name of psychical research. Nor have the pronouncements of the mystics escaped a rigorous scrutiny at the hands of psychologists. Science and philosophy met in Aristotle, and they have met since in Descartes and Leibniz and even to-day in Russell and Whitehead, in Bergson and William James, in Eddington and Max Planck. Eminent physicists do not find it necessary to apologize for dropping into philosophic disquisitions.

But in India philosophy from the beginning has had a different connotation. Indians were capable of acute logical analysis and not blind to the demands of day-to-day life as seen in the full development of Āyurveda as the science of medicine; of Arthashastra as in Kauṭilya, a great master in economics and politics; of architecture and fine arts generally, particularly music and dancing; of mathematics and astronomy and astrology; and of law as in Dharma Śāstras. But the highest place was reserved for Brahma-Vidyā or the knowledge of the Supreme. This knowledge came not from mere reasoning, but from a deep insight which transcends all reasoning. Thus has philosophy in India come to be looked upon as a Darśana or direct vision of the Supreme. The philosopher who merely argues as in the West, is apt to be derided as a mere speculative thinker as opposed to the real jñānī, the man who knows the Supreme through a direct vision or experience. This is a very material difference between the Western and Indian outlook, for the Indian jñānī is apt to be looked upon by the Westerner as a mere dreamer, and his philosophy as mere dogmatism, as has been actually done by Professor Brehier in his Preface to Masson Oursel’s History of Philosophy in the Orient, and even by so sympathetic and erudite a critic as the great Dr. Albert Schweitzer in his thought-provoking Indian Thought and Its Development, not to mention a host of other lesser writers.

The Indian tradition defends this dogmatism on the ground that not every one can claim to be a jñānī, and that a true jñānī has an inner vision developed through a long series of births and
deaths as in the case of a genius like Śaṅkarachārya who in his short life of barely 32 travelled over the length and breadth of India, established mutts (monasteries) in the north and south, east and west, and wrote long and authoritative commentaries on the Upaniṣads and the Gītā, successfully drove out Buddhism and revived the Vedāntic religion. These great achievements could not have been the work of a mere dreamer. They were the result of an intuition which went beyond the dualism of all knowledge and comprehended the pāramārthika (the Supreme and only Reality) behind the shifting scenes of the vyāvahārika or the phenomenal world. If Śaṅkara employed his dialectical gifts to establish the Upaniṣadic truths, these truths themselves were the result of deep tapasya of the great pāśis themselves. Thus arises in Indian philosophy the idea of adhikāra or authority. Not every one can be a jñāni, but only he who has so purified his life as to be worthy of a darsana of the Supreme, and this idea of a purified life does not merely imply a good moral life but even a will to give up all the normal joys of life as found in civic and family life. Thus arises the ideal of a samnyāsa, an ascetic, who has renounced everything in life except the ultimate meaning of life. In the heart of every Hindu even to-day who aspires to mokṣa, there lurks a desire to give up the normal joys of life, as is very beautifully and realistically portrayed by Kipling in his delightful story: The Miracle of Puran Bhagat. The many things which are inexplicable and unintelligible in the life of Gandhiji to a westerner are the very things which have earned him the loyalty and the reverence of millions of his countrymen.

The vision of the Supreme, whether conceived as a personal God or as Brahman though limited to a few select spirits, is open in theory to all who can take up tapasya. This idea has been lost in recent centuries through the subtle greed of the Brahmin, who by definition is a lover of truth and purity but in practice is only the son of a Brahmin by birth. In the days of the Upaniṣads Satyakāma Jābāla was not ashamed to admit that he did not know who his father was, but this very admission was taken to be a token of his being a Brahmin and he was admitted as a pupil by Gautama. Centuries later the leaders of the Bhakti movement sought to establish the right of everyone to attain Vishnu or Šiva through pure devotion irrespective of the caste hierarchy, but this has not succeeded in overcoming the caste prejudices, which have been responsible for the fragmentation of the Hindu com-
munity and rendered it politically too weak to resist foreign onslights.

Thus arises the main fundamental differences between the philosophic outlook in India and in Europe: in Europe philosophy is a hard intellectual exercise to understand the world of our everyday life, while in India it is an attempt to rise above the shifting scenes of this world and to attain freedom from the cycles of birth and death. If this main difference is fully comprehended, it becomes easier to comprehend all the other consequential differences. Attempts have not been lacking, especially in recent years, whether on the part of European or of Indian scholars, to make out that fundamentally philosophy is the same in India and in Europe, and that the differences between the two are really superficial. To Dr. Betty Heimann must be given the credit of not being carried away by the fashion of the day and of insisting that "when we consider the deep elemental differences dividing East from West, all these apparent similarities will be found to be merely accidental." Indeed, far from being accidental they touch the very core of European and Indian life. It will be worth while attempting to show how deep are the differences which emerge consequentially from the fundamental difference noted above, and they may well be summarized under four heads.

I.—Plato found the source of philosophy in simple wonder. Nature generally and human life in particular presented problems which were taken by Plato to be a challenge to human intellect, and it was the business of the philosopher to know more and more. For Socrates, too, the end-all and the be-all of life was to know. "Knowledge is virtue" was a dictum of Socrates which had all the force of an axiom with him. European writers always pride themselves on the fact that in Europe knowledge is an end in itself, that it has no ulterior aim whether in the goods of this life or the joys of a heaven hereafter. The scientist at his best has all his interest in a pure disinterested study of the problems that present themselves to him, though it may be that in the wake of his discoveries may follow practical applications, as in the realms of steam and electricity, which have made Europe and America the richest areas in the world. But to the pure scientist the accrual of such wealth is a mere accident and he would rather go on with his work, poor but independent. To the European philosopher God and immortality may be categories which are logically inevitable,

1 Indian and Western Philosophy, A Study in Contrasts, p. 20.
but they are of no intrinsic importance to philosophy as such. A philosopher is not the less a philosopher because he has no room for God or immortality in his system. That is why the pantheistic Spinoza, the agnostic Voltaire or John Mill and the atheistic Ingersoll command the same honour and respect among philosophers as the theistic Bishop Berkeley or James Ward. Orthodox Christians, of course, can hardly be expected to sympathize with this attitude, and religious bigotry has claimed its victims in thousands. But the martyrdom of Bruno did not put a stop to the development of astronomy, nor the excommunication of Spinoza the development of pantheism. The world of philosophy in Europe may be circumscribed, but within its own domain it knows no limit to its right to pursue knowledge, whatever religion may be in vogue and whatever political ideology may be in force. The pursuit of knowledge is its own reward and its disinterestedness the guarantee of its independence.

In India, on the other hand, there has indeed been an emphasis on knowledge, the jñānī has been looked up to as the real leader of society, but this knowledge has looked upon the sciences as understood in Europe with contempt. Knowledge that contributes only to the betterment of this life by way of increased comforts and luxuries is of no avail. The knowledge that is of real importance is the knowledge that leads us to the feet of Paramātman, for this is the knowledge that destroys our ignorance—and worldly knowledge is only ignorance—and leads to mokṣa. The soul that has gone through endless births and deaths at last wearies of the pleasures of the flesh and seeks to break this seemingly endless chain, and the only way to do this is to attain Brahma-Vidyā. So philosophic knowledge is not an end in itself, it is not disinterested in the European sense of the term, it is really a means to an end, which would be taken in Europe as religion rather than philosophy.

II.—From the aforesaid difference it follows that the relationship between religion and philosophy is conceived in diametrically opposite ways in India and in Europe. The conflict between philosophy and religion in Europe dates from the times of the Greeks. Almost at the birth of Greek philosophy Xenophanes had the courage to be satiric about the gods of his day. But the conflict came to a head when Socrates rebelled against the amorous gods and goddesses of the Greek Pantheon and roused the ire of the professional priests, who could as usual count on the ignorance of
their supporters. Socrates had to pay for his reform with his life, but he succeeded in giving a certain character to the philosophic traditions of Europe. With the emergence of Christianity as a state religion, philosophy as a pure disinterested pursuit of knowledge had to go underground and could subsist only as an appendix of Christian theology. But with Bacon and Descartes the old philosophic independence revived and the conflict between philosophy and religion has been a marked feature of European history right down till our own times. With the emergence of science as an independent subject the traditional conflict has somewhat changed its character and science has had to bear the brunt of attacks by the leaders of Churches. James (Varieties of Religious Experience) and Eucken and a host of other philosophers who have veered round to the religious standpoint have given a common platform to philosophers of the theistic school and the orthodox Christians to fight the excesses of scientists. Even this conflict between science and philosophy has softened because great scientists like Max Planck and others have come to realize the limitations of science and they have been forced to be philosophers. But the historic conflict has come to be resolved on the lines that each of these subjects has its own domain and there need be no conflict so long as religion does not usurp the place of philosophy and science is allowed to go its limited way without encroaching on the rights of philosophy and religion to go their way. This seems to be quite a reasonable attitude to adopt and the traditional independence of philosophy is still maintained. Instead of an open war there is an agreement to differ, but the old historic differences still continue.

In India, on the other hand, it is claimed as a peculiar glory of Indian culture that there has been no conflict between philosophy and religion, in fact, it is claimed there has been an indissoluble bond between the two, so that the man of religion and the philosopher must meet in the same personality. The European is left quite cold by this claim, in fact he considers this alliance between philosophy and religion in India to be a definite weakness of Indian philosophy, for it becomes rather a theology than a philosophy. This difference is so fundamental that it can hardly be overcome. An Indian, and particularly a Brahmin, is born as much in a system of philosophy as in a particular religion, and if he begins the study of philosophy at all he begins it in such a reverent attitude and with such a marked bias that the study of
philosophy as in the West is a new feature introduced by the British system of education.\textsuperscript{1}

That Indian philosophy is really theology is denied very stoutly by Rajasevasakta V. Subrahmanya Iyer of Mysore. Born an advaitin and introduced to Advaita philosophy by a great orthodox religious leader, the late Sringeri Swami, he has been trying to show that genuine philosophy must be independent of religion, that in Śaṅkara himself the \textit{Saguna Brahman} or a personal god is only a part of the phenomenal (if not illusory) world, and that the \textit{Nirguna Brahman} is the only reality and has nothing to do with religion. The main hurdle in his way of thinking is the fact that Śaṅkara did not claim to be an original thinker at all, and his philosophy took the form of commentaries on the generality of Hindu scriptures, particularly the Upaniṣads and the \textit{Gītā}. Mr. Subrahmanya Iyer tries to get over this hurdle by arguing that Śaṅkara was really an independent logical thinker and the object of his commentaries was really to show that his conclusions independently attained are also corroborated by the scriptures. It would be a strange coincidence indeed if every independent conclusion of Śaṅkara could be supported by the chapter and verse of every Upaniṣad and every chapter of the \textit{Gītā}. Mr. Iyer’s attempt is a bold and brilliant one, but has not been taken seriously by many in India. In fact, there is hardly a Hindu philosopher who does not honestly believe that philosophy had its last word in the Upaniṣads and in the commentaries of one or the other of the āchāryas whom he religiously follows. Thus it is that philosophy in India was for centuries more an exposition of the ancient classics than the independent thought of individual thinkers as in ancient Greece or modern Europe and America. Mr. Subrahmanya Iyer’s claim for Śaṅkara or his teacher Gauḍapāda as independent thinkers is not extended by him to other schools of Indian philosophy. In fact, he is fond of dismissing them as mere theologies, thus corroborating the criticism advanced by several European scholars against considering the thought of India as real philosophy. In so far as the ancient scriptures are taken to be the last inspired word of ancient ṛṣis and philosophy taken to be just an exposition of these truths, philosophy in India cannot escape the charge of dogmatism. On the other hand, the traditional Vedāntin in India never tires of sneering at Western philosophy

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Vide} my article on “Philosophy and Religion,” in \textit{The Monist}, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4.
as "mere groping in the dark" and as "attempts at constructive philosophy" and thus as mere speculations. This difference, too, is very marked and is hardly bridgeable.

III.—From the aforesaid differences it also follows that philosophy in India, not being mere knowledge, has an aim beyond knowledge, viz. realization of the highest Upanishadic truth: identity of Brahman and the individual ātman according to Advaita, or the communion between the two according to the other schools of Vedānta, which are theistic in character. In other words, philosophy is not pure knowledge as it is claimed to be in Europe. It is really a means to some ulterior end. Advaita looks upon bhakti (devotion) and karma (actions) as definitely inferior to jñāna or mokṣa, which is the ultimate goal of all Indian thought, however much they may differ in all other details. To this extent it would be justifiable to say that Indian philosophy is pragmatic, though needless to say it is miles away from the pragmatism of worldly success associated with the names of James and Dewey in America and of Schiller in England. Western pragmatism does not bother about the life beyond, though it does attach a pragmatic value to the idea of God or of immortality. With Indian thinkers, Brahman and karma working themselves out in countless births are not a matter to speculate about but a solid reality far more real than the things of sense to which we are apt to attach so much importance in our mundane life. But what is so fundamental to an Indian is apt to be considered by the European as lying outside the region of philosophic thinking. It is very interesting to note that the idea of karma-and-transmigration of soul is common to all systems of Indian philosophy, whether orthodox or heterodox, while it has not found a home in any part of the world beyond the confines of India. Pringle-Pattison's arguments against the whole idea of karma have had no effect on any Indian. Logical subtleties are of no importance when we find in the idea of karma the only means of accounting for the inequalities and sufferings of life.

IV.—These differences of philosophical outlook necessarily result in totally opposed outlooks on life and this is seen most clearly in the domain of morality. Moral principles are, of course, universal and the sanctity of a promise is not different whether in India or Europe, but the metaphysics of morality is different, and that is the only thing of importance when we compare the moral outlook of the Indian and of the European. On the whole the
ethical outlook of the European has been true to the joyous spirit of the ancient Greeks. A certain morbid mood of fatalism was not absent in Greek culture and this we see most clearly in the immortal tragedies of Aeschylus, Euripides and Sophocles, but in Greek philosophy we do not find a note of pessimism. They were lovers of beauty whether of nature or of the human form, and the world has yet to see more beautiful statues of the naked human form than we do in the art of ancient Greece. They loved nature and they found life good. There might have been a certain austerity in the Cynics and more particularly in the Stoics, but even among them there was no other-worldliness. The Good that the philosophers searched for was in the last resort to be found in this life, in a better society, in a better social zeal. This is the glory of Plato’s Republic and of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the two books that have nourished the European ethics of the succeeding centuries. With the introduction of Christianity there did come into European life a feeling of getting away from this wretched world so as to qualify for the heaven of Christ. But this attitude was confined to the leaders of the medieval Church and did not touch the masses, who still continued their old pagan holidays under Christian names, danced and drank and made merry. Christianity softened and in some cases deepened the Graeco-Roman heritage, but has not conquered Europe. In modern Europe, too, the old spirit of a healthy optimism has reigned supreme, except in the pages of Schopenhauer or Hartmann, but their teaching never caught on, for they were outside the European ethical tradition, as much as St. Francis of Assisi was, though on a far higher level. The Idea of the Good was the inspiration of Plato and it has consciously or unconsciously coloured all European metaphysics. Thus it is that self-realization in European ethics has meant a fullness of life so as to get the maximum and the best out of life.

In India the ethical outlook has been totally different. The sufferings of life have produced a certain ennui, a wish, if not always a will, to get away from this world with its “sorry Scheme of Things entire.” The burden of continuously recurring births and deaths hangs heavy on men’s souls, and if karma and rebirth were accepted as axiomatic, there also grew the yearning for a way out of this cycle of births and deaths. The Upanishads showed a way out and so did Buddha and Mahavir. That has been the endless quest of India through the ages and if
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life has been tolerated at all, it is because we cannot escape it. It is a part of the game, for if there is no life in this world there is no mokṣa. It follows that in such an environment and with such an outlook life lost its zest and the economic misfortunes that followed in the wake of foreign conquests made matters worse. But out of evil cometh good, and the impact of the Western culture has given a shake-up and people have begun to feel that problems of life, whether economic or political, should not be sacrificed on the altar of mokṣa. But even to-day the ideal of sanyāsa, giving up the world, has a weird fascination for the Indian mind, and the success of Mahatma Gandhi may be safely attributed to the spirit of sanyāsa that he showed in his life, though in a way unknown before in the history of India. There is a certain sadness in Indian life which is unmistakable. The villager finds rest from his daily toil mostly in listening to the sufferings of Rama, weeping with Sita and exulting in the victory of Rama over Ravana. The learned still continue discussing the meaning of the Upanishads and the Gita. Life in India is very sad, and the gaieties of European life with its late dinners and midnight dances and endless drinks leave on the minds of the orthodox Indians a sense of disgust, mixed at times with pity, and a sense of bewilderment that men and women can waste so much time in endless frivolities.

The contrast in the ethical life of India and Europe is so marked that it is impossible to miss it in spite of many superficial similarities. A generation ago Edward Urwick made a brilliant attempt in his Message of Plato to elucidate Plato’s Republic in terms of Vedāntic philosophy. But Plato remains Plato and the Upanishads remain Upanishads in spite of Urwick. Plato’s psychology bears a very superficial resemblance to the Vedāntic triad of Satwa, Rajas and Tamas. Plato had no idea of karma and mokṣa, which are the very soul of Indian philosophy. His idea was to better this life by vesting power in the hands of philosophers, who were not dreamers but were capable of tackling live men and women and moulding them in the spirit of the ideal State here and now that he wished to create. The Upanishadic thinkers were content to let the current of life flow on as usual with its goods and ills; they had not the reforming zest of Plato. They aimed rather at weaning people from the allures of this life so as to make them more steadfast in their will never to return to this world. Buddha was a genuine reformer, but he was spiritually a foreigner in India and his message soon lapsed till it was absorbed in the main stream of
Hindu life and thought and Buddhism was ultimately exiled from India. The reforming spirit came into India in the nineteenth century with Raja Ram Mohan Roy, and Dayanand Saraswati, Vivekanand and Gandhiji.

Dr. Paul Brunton in his *Indian Philosophy and Modern Culture* tries to show how passages in the Upanishads and the ancient Indian philosophers have their counterparts in modern European writers. Recognizing the different modes of approach to philosophical problems in India and in Europe, he goes on to say: "It is not a question of which method of approach is superior to the other; it is rather a matter for self-congratulation that, on some of the most important topics, the wisest men of the ancient East and the modern West, starting from totally different premises, are beginning to arrive at precisely the same conclusions." But he is also shrewd enough to point out that "no intelligent Westerner is likely to accept in its entirety the astonishing *mélange* of lofty ethics and low customs, subtle wisdom and superstitious ideas, profound thought and priestly barbarism, which a traveller from the Occident finds in India." But in spite of the apparent parallels of thought that Dr. Brunton’s industry has discovered between the ancient East and the modern West, the outlook of the modern European is still true to the traditional European attitude, and the philosophy of India for good or for evil has not touched the soul of Europe. Dr. Betty Heimann with her mastery of Sanskrit is on much more solid ground when she says that "these lonely mystics (St. Francis and his like) are merely transient phenomena in the West, and have never very deeply influenced a world absorbed in political strife, but have only accentuated their own personal aloofness from the masses ... hermits and their few followers were never regarded as adequate representatives of the West." It is difficult to deny that the philosophical climate of India and of Europe has been markedly different. It is still more difficult to say whether in future India and Europe will be able to develop a philosophy as universal as science.

It is an interesting question whether the physical climate of India and Europe has affected the methods and conclusions of their philosophical systems. Dr. Brunton writes: "A fiercely hot and depressingly humid country whose climate causes

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1 Vide my article on "Buddha as a Revolutionary Force in Indian Culture," in *Philosophy* of April 1948.
2 P. 25.
3 *Indian and Western Philosophy*, pp. 131-132.
everyone to shun physical effort, led man naturally to search for part of his satisfaction in contemplative thought and inward life. Dr. Betty Heimann pursues an intriguing contrast. She thinks that India, with her vast mountains and rivers, has been dominated by nature so that man has humbly accepted his place as a “part and parcel of the mighty whole,” and that this has facilitated a cosmic outlook in Indian philosophers. It may be better to put this a bit differently. The bitter cold of Europe has made the people more active and adventurous, and the very limitations of the climate have made the Europeans more careful and keener to get the most out of nature and to subdue it even to their own needs. So the Europeans have become deeply attached to the land they have helped to develop with unremitting toil. They have become patriots and soldiers and sailors, scouring the seven seas. They have literally conquered the world.

India is such a vast continent in herself that every type of climate is to be found within her boundaries: the European climate of lovely Kashmir and the eternal snows of the Himalayas, the milder cold of the Nilgiris, the extreme heat and the bitter cold of the Punjab, the scorching heat of the Ganges plain, and South India—apart from the fine climate of Mysore—which knows only three seasons, the hot, the hotter and the hottest. India has a more regulated rainfall in the monsoon season, though the prosperity of India has often become a gamble in rain. Occasional famines apart, India has abundant food and in places soil is so fertile that little labour is required to produce food. Putting all these factors together we can picture the Indian gazing at the stars and wondering at them and their mysterious force on human affairs. In her warm, enervating climate physical labour does not become particularly attractive and there is an incentive to think. India’s greatest thinkers, apart from the old Vedic and Upanishadic ṛṣis, have been produced in the South. Freed from the need of physical labour, philosophic thought in South India has attained heights hardly surpassed in the history of human thought, but of such a transcendent character as to soar far above the needs of ordinary life. No wonder if philosophy had become the close preserve of a particular caste till the flood-gates of Western education upset the old equilibrium of centuries.

Given the climatic and economic conditions of India, what is the type of philosophy that she could be expected to evolve?

Brunton, Indian Philosophy and Modern Culture, p. 21.
Taken aback by the very peculiar character of Sankara's teaching, Europeans have been apt to take him to be the representative thinker of India. This is the tradition started by Max Müller and has been followed till to-day by scholars like Dr. Paul Brunton, who has been fond of quoting and emphasizing passages from Indian classics which bring out the monistic aspect of Indian thought; but they have been rather one-sided in their interpretation, for they have missed the pluralistic and realistic aspect of Indian thought as represented by the Jainas and the Dvaitins, or the pluralistic basis of Indian life as represented by the orthodox caste system. Dr. Betty Heimann is one of the few European scholars who have not taken Sankara's Advaitism at its face value and has sought to dive a little deeper into foundations of Indian life and thought and has the courage to avow that "In India, then, not singleness, but plurality and manifoldness of form and type have been at every period, from early Kathenotheism to the latest conceptions of divine duality or polarity, the adequate expression of God-Nature." If one had to choose between these two rather contradictory interpretations of Indian thought, one would have to side with Dr. Heimann, as her interpretation is more true to Indian life with the polytheism of the masses, with the caste system which has led to a tragic fragmentation of Hindu society and with the realism of many great Indian thinkers. But her interpretation does hardly any justice to the idealistic and monistic side of Indian philosophy. She even denies idealism in Indian philosophy. "A pure Idealism is ruled out by India's characteristic conceptions of the Divine." "To the Indian mind, then, not logos, but Matter is the transcendental and, at the same time, world-emanating principle." Mr. Subrahmanya Iyer would agree that the word "idealism," with its emphasis on intelligence and thought, is not applicable to Sankara's Advaitism, for his whole philosophy is an attempt to transcend the limitations of intelligence and thought. He prefers to speak of it as realism, though it is a realism far removed from any type of realism known to Western philosophy. But he would not agree with Dr. Heimann in reducing all Indian philosophy to materialism, especially as it has gathered round it odd, and even vulgar associations, in Western philosophy.

Philosophical terminology is always difficult to define, and the terms "idealism" and "realism," as applied to Indian philosophy,

1 Indian and Western Philosophy, p. 39. 2 Ibid., p. 47. 3 Ibid., p. 57.
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will be inexact, and this difficulty of language points to a fundamental cleavage between the philosophy of India and of Europe. To-day there are many in the West as well as in the East who are anxious to overcome this cleavage. In the world as shaped by science to-day the old geographical features have lost their significance. The World geographically has become one, and driven by the threatening political chaos, men and women to-day wistfully look to the One World of Wilkie's dreams. In such a world philosophy will also have to change, if it is to keep true to its mission to be the interpreter of changing life and thought. The West will yet have to accept the ideas of karma and rebirth, and perhaps the subtle scientific genius of the West may yet be able to give these ideas a scientific basis instead of a vague axiomatic character. India, too, on the other hand, may through her contact with the virile West have yet to learn that life is too concrete a fact to be looked upon condescendingly as an evil to be got rid of as soon as possible. Rather India will have to develop a new zest for life in all its richness, and the old advaitic dualism of the pāramārthika and vyāvahārika will have to give place to a new synthesis in which the vyāvahārika will be the manifestation, and not a negation, of the pāramārthika.

Professor Radhakrishnan is a unique figure in the philosophical world to-day. Born to Indian philosophy and nurtured in European philosophy, he has sought to interpret the treasures of Indian philosophy to the Western world. There is bound to be acute differences of opinion as to whether his interpretation is true to the genius of India, but there can be no denying that out of his pioneering attempt may yet arise a new philosophy that will be neither Indian nor European but of the world as science has come to be. This humble essay is an offering of a life-long friend and admirer to the genius of Professor Radhakrishnan on the auspicious occasion of his sixtieth birthday. May he live to have many more birthdays in the service of the world in general and of India in particular.
THE UNITY OF EAST AND WEST

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We have recently relapsed from a beautiful dream of One World into a nightmare of Two Worlds. The tragedy is not entirely the creation of politicians and militarists. All of us have contributed our share. As a matter of fact, given our present-day mentality, no politician or militarist could have done otherwise, for intellectually we have been demanding, in the last hundred years at least, precisely a two-world system, nothing more and nothing less. We have divided the world into East and West and placed them in contrast, opposition, and incompatibility. We have considered the world east of the Mediterranean and the world west of it two separate worlds, distant and unbridgeable. We believe that the West is a world of science, mechanization, nationalism, democracy, materialism, secularism, change, progress, sex equality, industrialism, law, sports, high standard of living, etc., while the East is a world of opposite descriptions. We characterize the West as modern, objective, rational, individualistic, freedom-loving, realistic, logical, active, and expert in the art of doing. On the other hand, we characterize the East as ancient, subjective, intuitive, loyal to the family, conventional, idealistic, mystical, passive, and expert in the art of being. One writer stated that the West has been primarily concerned with the objective world and has therefore been strong in expression, form, action, and power, while the East has been concerned with the subjective world and developed in the direction of being, inwardness, love, inspiration, and mysticism.¹ In the field of art, it is often claimed that the West emphasizes form and colour, expression, logical construction, sensuous qualities, and realism, whereas the East concentrates on the line, rhythm, religious values, abstract beauty, and mysticism. With reference to religious worship, it is said that the Western mind is intensely emotional whereas the Eastern mind is calm. With reference to the mind in general, many writers have

¹ Lawrence Hyde, Isis and Osiris, 1946, pp. 9, 143-144.
insisted that the Western mind is positive, analytical, literal, critical, sceptical, legalistic, and impersonal, while the Eastern mind is imaginative, synthetic, poetic, conformative, authoritarian, relative, and personal. According to Dean Flewelling, the Western concept of time is that of a straight line, while that of the Oriental is cyclic. In short, everything in the world is put in the East-West relationship, and that relationship is considered one of contrast, conflict, and incompatibility.

This habit of seeing the world in contrast is a peculiar vice of the modern man. The responsibility for this degenerated state of mind does not rest entirely with Kipling and his fellow believers in the White Man's Burden. It rests with all of us. After all, we have been insisting that reality must be either spiritual or material, that God must be either infinite or finite, that anybody expressing any opinion must be either a liberal or a reactionary, that a piece of literature, music, or art must be either romantic or classical, that peoples must belong to either a "we" or a "they" group. A personality must be either introvert or extrovert. No wonder we find our world full of diametrical oppositions, in constant conflict, in perpetual crisis. Mentally we have been preparing ourselves for a two-world system, not for One World.

This crime was not committed by the ancient or medieval man. The inhabitants of the ancient world did not feel that the East was mysterious or incompatible. The people of Rome took an active part in fusing the East and the West into a Hellenistic and Oriental culture. It was truly a universal State. The impact of Muslim philosophy upon the medieval mind was the real impact of real thought, which sealed the gap between the East and the West, if there ever was one. No traveller saw as many strange things as did Marco Polo. He did not see contrasts. His feeling was that of wonder, but not of division of the Oriental and Western world. The assumption that the East is a land apart is a modern fallacy. When men thought in universals, as intelligent men thought in the Roman period and the Middle Ages, it was impossible to think of the Orient as separate, antagonistic in spirit and opposite in character. But when the Renaissance put the European mind into the straight jacket of classicism, when the multiplication of sects and the increase of nationalistic States broke down the notion of the Church universal and universal empire; and when

1 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Reflections on the Basic Ideas of East and West, 1935, pp. 33–36, 43–45.
the Industrial Revolution gave Europe its peculiar economy, the Occident built a wall around itself and set up a dichotomy of East and West. History may yet characterize the Age of Reason as an age of darkness after all. For certainly the medieval man had far more accurate reports of the Orient, entertained a more balanced attitude towards the Orient, and had a stronger conviction that the Orient was drawing near to his part of the world, though it was still difficult to get at. But the modern period is distinguished by ignorance and distortion. In the entire nineteenth century, there was not a single European scholar on China or Japan, for James Legge was primarily a translator. The Germans did better with India, but despite Max Müller and his circle, you can get a more accurate account of the Far East before the Renaissance than you can after the reign of Louis XIV. Because of this ignorance and distortion, the world became two halves, each strange and even hostile to the other.

But mankind is living too closely together to allow two worlds. A union has got to be effected. Long ago serious-minded people sought a way out. Count Keyserling, the popular travelling philosopher, for example, who went around the globe in the twenties, found an intolerable schism between the East and the West. He found that Eastern peoples were conventional, static, self-denying, polite but insincere, formal, passive, contented, inexact, indirect, inefficient, correct in conduct but without character, fatalistic, pessimistic, and so on down the line.¹ According to the travelling philosopher, the Easterner stands in sharp contrast to his Western counterpart. That this contrasting situation could not be allowed to go on was obvious, and Count Keyserling’s obvious solution was to Westernize the East.

This line of thought has been continued by many a writer. Perhaps the most eminent and influential one is Albert Schweitzer, who has brought Christianity and Hinduism into sharp contrast. Christian thought, he said, is dynamic and creative. It affirms the reality of the world and the meaningfulness of life. Hindu thought, on the other hand, denies the reality of the world, despairs of human life, poisons the very springs of thought and activity, and exalts death and immobility. It does not create power and purpose directed to high ends. He argued that because of the other-worldliness of Hinduism, its doctrine of life as illusion, its emphasis on ecstasy, its doctrine of salvation through self-discovery rather

¹ Hermann Keyserling, *The Travel Diary of a Philosopher*, 1925.

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than moral development, its goal of escape, its transcendence of
good and evil, and its ethics of inner perfection, Hinduism is non-
ethical and life-and-world-denying.¹ This being the case, nothing
less than complete Christianization will save the Hindus.

Of course, Schweitzer was contrasting Christianity with Hindu-
ism, not West and East. But the contrast of West and East
usually carries a religious connotation, making it identical with
the contrast between Christianity and Hinduism. Also, Schweitzer
was careful to distinguish China and India, conceding that China
was, like the West, life-and-world-affirming. But since India has
so often been taken as representative of the East, the contrast of
life-affirming and life-negating is easily taken to be a general
contrast of the West and the East.

We shall not go into a discussion of Hinduism. Suffice it to
say that Schweitzer’s criticisms have been ably answered by
Radhakrishnan.² Evidently Schweitzer has ignored the Hindu
Four Stages in life, the student and family stages of which provide
ample opportunity for life affirmation. And he has not shown why
ecstasy, self-discovery, and the ethics of inner perfection should
not lead to affirmation of life and the world.

The objection to Schweitzer is not so much his misunder-
standing of the East, it is his division of the world into incompatible
halves and his belief that one must be entirely converted to the
other. His formula is to Westernize the East. But given the two-
fold division of the world and the necessity of one half swallowing
the other, there will be those who would reverse the formula and
Easternize the West. René Guénon, to mention only one, regrets
that the civilization of the modern West has developed along
purely material lines, and this monstrous development, he said,
whose beginning coincides with the so-called Renaissance, has
been accompanied by a corresponding intellectual regress. The
Westerner of today no longer knows what pure intellect is. To
him intelligence is nothing but a means of acting on matter and
turning it to practical ends, and for him science is above all
important in so far as it may be applied to industrial purposes.
But science is false knowledge, Guénon cried, because its rational-
ism implies the negation of metaphysics. “Science,” he said, “in
disavowing the principles and in refusing to re-attach itself to

¹ Albert Schweitzer, Indian Thought and Its Development, 1936, pp. 1–2, 38,
¹¹.
² S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought, 1939, pp. 77–110,
³⁷⁹.
them, robs itself both of the highest guarantee and of the surest direction that it could have; there is no longer anything valid in it except knowledge of details, and as soon as it seeks to rise one degree higher, it becomes dubious and vacillating." In the East, as Guénon sees it, science has a traditional basis, that is, is grounded on certain metaphysical principles. There a science was less esteemed for itself than for the degree in which it expressed a reflection of the higher immutable truth. In order to rouse Western intellectuality from its slumber, he would go to the doctrines of the East, by which he means India rather than China.¹

The idea that Western science needs to be saved by Eastern doctrines is rather surprising, just as surprising as his statement that "the only impression that, for example, mechanical inventions make on most Orientals is one of deep repulsion; certainly it all seems to them far more harmful than beneficial."² But these are minor matters, amusing as they are. What is more serious is that such a viewpoint is a symptom of an intellectual disease that divides the world into two conflicting parts.

Such a viewpoint has grave consequences. First of all, it makes unwarranted generalizations about peoples. Take, for example, the popular view that the West is materialistic while the East is spiritual. To label the West materialistic and not spiritual would be to shut one's eyes to all the great cathedrals and the best of Western paintings, to close one's ears to Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, Mozart's Mass, and Handel's Requiem, and to close one's mind to such important developments as the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. As to the spirituality of the East, it is true that aside from the Charvaka school in India, there has been no materialism in Eastern philosophy to speak of. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how a people like the Chinese, who built a 2,000 mile long wall, who eat sharks' fins and who marry concubines can be very spiritual. Hu Shih confessed that he found no spirituality in China's ignorance, disease, and poverty, but he did see in the manufacturing of automobiles as much spirit as rubber and steel.³ As Radhakrishnan has pointed out, "The West is not devoid of mysticism nor the East of science and public spirit. The distinction, if any, is a relative one, as all empirical distinctions are."⁴

¹ René Guénon, East and West, 1941, pp. 23, 51, 57, 59, 60.
² Ibid., pp. 44, 71.
³ Charles Beard, Whither Mankind?, 1928, p. 28.
⁴ S. Radhakrishnan, East and West in Religion, 1933, pp. 45-46.
Unwarranted generalization is not the only defect of an East versus West viewpoint, however. It also lumps the East or the West into one piece. The variety of Western institutions and cultures is often realized, but few people realize, as does Toynbee, that "the gulfs that divide the Hindu and the Far Eastern civilizations from ours are possibly not so wide as the gulf which divides them from one another." To most people, even to some students of comparative studies of the East and the West, the Orient is a unit, pure and indivisible. To be sure, countries in the East do share certain social, political, and economic problems, such as poverty, inequality of sexes, familism, superstition, absence of representative government, etc. But there is neither homogeneity of language, race, colour or religion other than Buddhism. The Chinese classless society is a far cry from the Indian caste system or Japanese aristocracy. There is much more difference between the humanistic philosophy of China and the religious philosophy of India than there is agreement. The Indian worships the seer, the Chinese worships the scholar; while the Japanese worships the fighting man. It is a well-known fact that Chinese religion and philosophy are this-worldly whereas those of India are other-worldly, in the ordinary sense of these terms. India has developed metaphysics and epistemology to great heights never dreamed of in China or Japan. Immortality in Hinduism and Buddhism means absorption into or identification with the Infinite, while in China, whether in Taoism or in Confucianism, it means ethically the immortality of Wisdom, Work, and Virtue, and religiously spiritual life after death, the length of which depends on the merit of one's earthly existence. In most Indian systems of thought, all particulars are considered dependent, transitory, and indeterminate. To the Chinese, on the contrary, to quote one Neo-Confucianist, "The One and the Many each has its rightful place and determinate character." Buddhism has cut across the Orient, but even there the chief Oriental countries stand apart, for while Japan is predominantly Buddhist, Buddhism in China has played only a minor role and it has become a thing of the past in India.

The error of lumping the East or the West into one piece is clear. It reveals poor perspective, to say the least. But there is a greater harm in contrasting the East and the West. Whether it is intended or not, the contrast leads to correlation of moral qualities

with race, creed, or people. The term "East-West" often has a racial connotation, as equivalent to Yellow and White, as well as a religious connotation. People who see the world in contrast often consider love, progress, restlessness, conservatism, and the like as racial or religious traits. To them, there are such things as Chinese honesty, Japanese trickery, Oriental charm, Oriental evasion, Oriental despotism, etc. No less educated a person than former President Angell of Yale, in expressing his severe condemnation of Russian Communism in 1935, said that "its cruelty is Oriental." Warren Austin, the United States chief representative at the United Nations, in criticizing the chief Russian delegate's tactics, said it was an "Oriental manœuvre." While anthropologists and sociologists are making desperate efforts to disprove racial differences, people who correlate moral or intellectual qualities with race or creed deepen them. They consider democracy peculiarly Western. And, by a simple twist of logic, they consider everything Western democratic. A democratic Russia would be part of the West. But Communist and totalitarian Russia must be Eastern. With such an outlook of contrast and conflict, no wonder the two worlds are drifting further and further apart.

This is not to deny contrasts altogether. Certain contrasts, even general ones, are legitimate. For example, one writer correctly points out that the chief difference between the East and the West is that the latter overcomes scholasticism with the experimental method while the former has yet to free itself from scholasticism, for it has not found the experimental method, has not fully understood it, or has neglected to apply it.¹ Hu Shih rightly maintains that "the difference between the East and the West is fundamentally that of tools, for, he says, while Galileo, Kepler, and Newton worked with balls, telescopes, and prisms, their Chinese contemporaries worked with books, words, and documentary evidences."²

These contrasts are legitimate. But we must not treat them as irreconcilable conflicts, any more than poetry and science are in conflict. Most contrasts, even if they are true, can and should be synthesized into a harmonious whole. Far-sighted world citizens have long heralded the call for synthesis. Tagore, to give one example, advocated a One World built on the harmony of various

¹ George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science, I, 1927, p. 29.
elements. He wanted Eastern mysticism and Western rationalism reconciled. He wanted the Western ideals of law, order, and the spirit of social service and the Oriental spiritual love and beauty combined. "All are equally great and equally necessary for the music of life and the harmony of the universe," he said. "As the mission of the rose lies in the unfoldment of the petals which implies distinctness, so the rose of humanity is perfect only when the diverse races and the nations have evolved their perfected distinct characteristics but all attached to the stem of humanity by the bond of love."

More recently an equally noble attempt was made by Professor Northrop. The fact that his The Meeting of East and West was greeted with seriousness and delight shows that even in our dark age of division there are eyes that see the dim light. Howard Mumford Jones called it one of the most significant, important and great books of the twentieth century. It is so because Northrop attempts to evolve a One World at the most fundamental level, namely, metaphysics, the science of all sciences. This he proposes to do not through Westernizing the East or Orientalizing the West, but through a synthesis of the two.

The synthesis Northrop recommends is that of what he calls concept by postulation and concept by intuition. "Those concepts," says he, "which refer to the aesthetic component for their complete meaning may be termed 'concept by intuition.' A concept by intuition, therefore, is one, the complete meaning of which is given by something immediately apprehendable. . . . There is the totality of the immediate apprehended. This is the aesthetic component of all things in its entirety, with nothing neglected or abstracted. It is more accurately described as the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum. . . . Concepts, on the other hand, which refer to the theoretic component in knowledge, shall be termed concepts by postulation. A concept by postulation is one, therefore, designating some factor in man or nature which, in whole or in part, is not directly observed, the meaning of which may be proposed for it postulationally in some specific deductively formulated theory. The difference between the East and the West may now be stated more precisely. Previously, it has been said that the East concerned itself with the immediately apprehended factor in the nature of things whereas the West has concentrated for the most

part on the doctrinally designated factor. . . . More precisely, however, . . . the East used doctrine built out of concepts of intuition, whereas Western doctrine has tended to be constructed out of concepts by postulation.” 1 From this thesis, and after a long, scholarly, though not always correct discussion of various Western and Eastern cultures, he concludes: “The Orient, for the most part, has investigated things in their aesthetic component; the Occident has investigated these things in their theoretic component. Consequently, each has something unique to contribute to an adequate philosophy and its attendant adequate cultural ideal for the contemporary world. . . . Although the two great civilizations are different in a most fundamental and far-reaching way, there can nonetheless be one world—the world of a single civilization which takes as its criterion of the good a positivistic and theoretically scientific philosophy which conceives of all things, man and nature alike, as composed of the aesthetic component which the Orient has mastered and the theoretic component which it is the genius of the Occident to have pursued.” 2

One can readily see the danger of sharply contrasting the East as intuitive and the West as postulative. Northrop includes under the category of concepts by intuition not only the Buddhist concept of Nirvana, the Taoist concept of Tao, and the Hindu concepts of Brahma and chit but also the Confucian concept of jen, on the ground that in all these concepts, the object is apprehended immediately and in its entirety. While this is true of Buddhism, Taoism, and Hinduism, it is not true of Confucianism, for jen in neo-Confucian metaphysics means “good” or “love,” and only after much thinking, inference, and postulation did neo-Confucianists conclude from particular instances that the cosmic principle was production and reproduction and therefore was good or jen.

Northrop errs in making sweeping generalizations. He also commits the mistake of considering the Orient as one, although he does admit certain differences between India and the Far East. One may sympathize with him, however, for if he has gone too far in contrasting the East and the West, he did so to emphasize the contribution each can make to the synthesis. He is fundamentally sound in insisting that only when complementary aspects of various civilizations are organized into a harmonious whole

2 Ibid., pp. 375–376.
can we expect to have a united and peaceful world. As Radha-krishnan said, "We have in the West the realism of the men of action: in the East the sensitiveness of the artist and imagination of the creative dreamer. The ideal of Western culture, derived from Greek philosophy, is to train men for citizenship that they may be able to realize their full power in the State and for the State. In the East, the good man is one who feels at home in the whole world. Both types are essential, for no spiritual revelation can flourish in an anarchical society." He added, "The intellectual religion of the West with its love of law, order, and definition has its striking virtues as well as its defects, even as the intuitive religion of the East has. The one brings to the common stock prudence, knowledge, and discipline; the other freedom, originality, and courage. The meeting of the two to-day may pave the way for a firm spiritual unity."

Synthesis of opposites is an ideal which we must strive to realize, but it can lead us only half-way to a real One World. Unity needs something more than composition of differences; unity must be built on a universal basis. Fortunately there is such a basis, for in the final analysis, the world is basically one, bound in universal values and universal ideals. To quote Radha-krishnan again, "This pernicious doctrine of fundamental racial differences and national missions is preventing the development of a true human community in spite of the closer linking up of interests and the growing uniformity of customs and forms of life. Science, however, supports the very different view that the fundamental structure of the human mind is uniform in all races. The varied cultures are but dialects of a single speech of the soul. The differences are due to accents, historical circumstances, and stages of development. If we are to find a solution for the differences which divide races and nations to-day, it must be through the recognition of the essential oneness of the modern world, spiritually and socially, economically and politically."

There are many universal values on which a genuine world order can be built. We only need to discuss briefly three fundamental ones. Take, first of all, the ideal of unity. It is common to practically all great systems. We find in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism the One God and the One Kingdom. We find in Buddhism the gospel of universal salvation We find in Hinduism Brahma,

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the One and No Other, of which the multiplicities of the phenomenal world are merely parts. We find in Confucianism the ideal of one world-family. This ideal of unity is so universal among mankind that if we are really true believers in any gospel, we cannot help a feeling of universal brotherhood.

Or take another fundamental human ideal, the sanctity of the individual. The individual has been suppressed in some places at all times, and for some time in all places. But as an ideal it is universal. Some years ago a group of Oxford scholars, being disturbed by the popular but mistaken belief that the individual was respected in the West but suppressed in the East, examined the idea in all cultures. This is what the editor of the symposium had to say: "It was stated that the individual had been discovered by Christianity. Now, apart from the question of whether the Christian religion has done for the individual—admittedly a very great deal—there can be no doubt that the statement is not true to historical facts. The India that produced Buddhism, not to speak of the greater part of the Bhagavad-gita, in the centuries before the Christian era, had plainly been awake to the individual and his soul. In China, from the fifth century on, there were remarkable discoveries made by all sorts of thinkers as to the nature of personality and its value to society. The Hebrews produced their prophets and brought the autodynamic unit face to face with a highly autodynamic Yahweh. As for Greece in the days of its colonial expansion, what was it that eventuated but the coming together of incompatible individuals torn from their traditional environments and so almost compelled to organize the city state with its free citizens? And, if Socrates did not discover the individual, who was there who did?"\(^1\)

Because in traditional India, China, and Japan the parents rather than the young man chose his bride, and because of similar social institutions, the idea has grown that the individual does not exist in the East. People fail to realize that the absence of individual choice in marriage was a matter of prerogatives, which belonged to parents, and according to traditional prerogatives, the same young man had his inalienable right to property inheritance. Certainly the chief concern of Confucius and his followers was the development of a perfect individual, for a good society cannot be established without good individuals. "The commander of three armies," Confucius said, "may be captured,\(^1\) E. R. Hughes, *The Individual in East and West*, pp. 3-4.
but the will of even a common man cannot be destroyed.”  
“Everything is complete in the self,” declared Mencius. To some extent Buddhism denies the self. But as Mrs. Rhys Davids has repeatedly pointed out, the Buddha never denied the empirical self. At any rate, one of the most basic Buddhist doctrines, in China at least, is “salvation in this very body.” Certain Buddhist schools, true to the orthodox concept of the Void, deny the reality of particulars, and along with them, of course, the self. But in the majority of schools as they developed in China and Japan, both the permanent, the one, and the noumenal on the one side, and the transitory, the many, and the phenomenal on the other, are regarded as equally real. “Every colour and every fragrance,” these schools chant in unison, “are the Middle Path.” While Nirvana was described in Hinayana Buddhism as permanence, bliss, and purity, in Mahayana Buddhism it denotes personality as well. In short, the ideal of the dignity of the individual is a universal aspiration, which gives another common ground for building a One World.

Take one more universal ideal, the Golden Rule. Like the ideal of unity, it is found in practically all great systems. In Indian literature one can find at least three versions in the Hindu epic Mahabharata3 and two in the Buddhist classic Dhammapada.4 Lau Tzu taught us to do good to those who are good to us, and also to those who are not good to us.5 The most famous Oriental statement, however, is that of Confucius, “Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you.” Unfortunately, somehow there is the belief in the West that the Confucian axiom is negative, and therefore Confucian ethics, and to some, Chinese ethics in general, are incomplete or inferior.

There can be no doubt that this proverb is stated in the negative form, not once but three times.6 But, in the first place, a negative statement does not necessarily mean a negative idea. In the second place, the Chinese have always understood it to be positive. And in the third place, the saying is not the only statement Confucius made on universal human relationships.

There is no need to go into the relationship between speech and meaning. Positive ideas can be expressed in negative form just as negative ideas can be expressed in positive form. As to how the

1 Analects, IX, p. 25.  
3 XIII, 113, 9; XII, 260, 22; V, 39, 72.  
5 Tao Teh Ching, p. 63.  
6 Analects, XII, 2; XV, 23; The Doctrine of the Mean, XIII.
Chinese have understood the aphorism, a few words may be desirable. If anyone understood Confucius, Mencius certainly did, and he interpreted the adage, by implication at least, as positive. He said that “There is a way to win people’s hearts. It is to give them and keep for them what is liked and do not do to them what is not liked.” 1 The clause “do not do to them” is a verbatim quotation from Confucius, and no one ever doubted that Mencius had the Master in mind. Confucius taught the Golden Rule with special reference to the ruler, along with the principle of “employing the people” in such a way that there will be “general satisfaction throughout the State.” Mencius was talking on the same subject. He added the positive clause “give them . . . what is liked” not because he felt the Confucian statement incomplete but, as most commentators agree, because of the elaborate rhetorical style of his time, particularly his own.

The positive meaning of the Confucian proverb is even more explicitly indicated in the Han Shih Wai Chuan, a book of the second century B.C. containing anecdotes of the sage. It is important to know that the Confucian Golden Rule is inseparable from the central Confucian doctrine of chung shu, which is the doctrine of “being true to the principles of one’s nature and the application of them to others.” This is what the Han Shih Wai Chuan says: “From the fact that the ruler himself does not like starvation and cold, he surely knows that the people like clothing and food. . . . Therefore the way of a superior man is nothing other than being true to the principles of one’s nature and the application of them to others.” The nineteenth-century commentator, Liu Pao-nan, came out even more clearly. He said, “‘Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you.’ Then by necessity we must do to others what we want them to do to us.” 2

As has been said, the negative version is not the only statement Confucius had to make about human relations. He taught us to “love all people overflowingly.” 3 He urged us “when wishing to establish one’s own character, also try to establish the character of others, and when wishing to succeed, also try to help others succeed.” 4 And in the Confucian classic, The Doctrine of the Mean, we find this remarkable passage:

Confucius said, When a man carries out the doctrine of being true to the principles of one’s nature and the application of them to others, he

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1 The Works of Mencius, IV, II, 9.
2 Lun Yu Cheng I.
3 Analects, I, 6
4 Ibid., VI, 28.
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is not far from the moral law. What you do not want others to do to you, do not do to them.

There are four things in the moral life of a man, none of which I have been able to carry out in my life. To serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me. . . . To serve my sovereign as I would expect a minister to serve me. . . . To act towards my elder brothers as I would expect my younger brothers to act towards me. . . . To be the first to behave towards friends as I would expect them to behave towards me: that I have not been able to do."

As neo-Confucianists in the last eight hundred years put it, "Develop one's moral nature to the utmost and put others in the position of oneself."

The point of emphasis in this discussion is not whether Confucian ethics is inferior or superior to others. It is to affirm, with all the power at our command, that moral ideals are universal. On the basis of these universal values, in addition to a synthesis of complementary aspects, a united world should and can be built.

1 The Doctrine of the Mean, XIII.
FROM EMPIRICISM TO MYSTICISM

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"What is philosophy?" The question is one to which philosophers have replied through the ages with uncertain voices. That some relation of the mind to the universe is in question is a presumption indeed common to nearly every philosopher. What the nature of this relation may be admits, however, of very varied views on the part of philosophers. Varied as these views may be, they seem notwithstanding to be divisible into three principal types—the "empirical," the "idealistic," and the "mystical." The aim of this essay is to discuss, with their general characteristics, the philosophical value of these distinct types of philosophy. In relating in this way the philosophical systems of East and West the discussion will, I hope, contribute something to the lifelong work of the eminent philosopher in whose honour this book has been written.

I

EMPIRICISM

Empirical philosophy is the philosophy which appeals most directly to the mind of the "practical" man. Man is first aware of himself as an animal—as a creature that, through the use of his senses, must adapt his body to an ever-changing environment of alluring or alarming physical objects. Through the senses man thus discovers his mind to be related to a world of objects outside him and in this sensuous relation he finds accordingly the mind's original contact with the universe. This contact is not one of his own making. By a turn of the head he may indeed invite Nature to offer him some, and to withhold from him other, of his sensations. But he cannot himself contrive to create them by any power of his own. His mind is like a mirror which, though turned this way or that, still passively reflects the varying objects depicted by Nature upon it. The empirical mind is thus a mind unconscious of any original experience of Nature other than that which Nature itself may have imparted to it. In the West the
English philosopher, Locke, has forcibly expressed this truth of the empirical philosophy. The mind is in origin a nature devoid of "innate ideas"—of ideas originating in the mind independently of sensuous "experience." Clearing his mind of these fictitious ideas Locke accordingly conceived the mind to be in itself a *tabula rasa*—a thing in itself as empty as a mirror in the dark: as blank as an unprinted sheet of paper.

By empirical philosophy Nature is thus conceived as a kind of printing-machine: and the mind as a surface capable of perceiving, through the letters of sensation printed on it, something of the character of the machine. These simple "letters" of sense reveal, however, to the mind no more than the equally simple "letters" resembling them in Nature's printing-machine. Man's practical mind, however, commonly perceives in Nature more than simple "letters"; it perceives rather combinations of such letters—associations of letters of more use than the letters themselves to the practical business of life. It perceives, not bodies only, but also bodies at a "distance" from bodies; not colours and sounds alone, but these combined with bodies in substantial "things"; not bodies moving by chance, but bodies moving in "relation" with others in a manner predictable by itself. Since Nature's single sensations can fall only severally on the mind, the empirical philosopher discerns in these associations of simple sensations an empirical activity of the mind not originally present in it. While the mind must continue a mirror-like thing unable to bear to itself a knowledge of Nature, yet, quickened by Nature, it may, through its power of forming "complex" out of "simple" ideas, acquire the ability to perceive or to infer in Nature complexes of a similar kind: it may turn into meaningful "words" what had first appeared to it as no more than unmeaning "letters." Thus the physical sciences may find their place in the universe of the empirical philosopher; and the medley of Nature's sensible objects may be perceived as interconnected through the complex idea of "cause" and "effect."

Valid as such conclusions may seem, they are, however, conclusions soon "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." The empiricist must argue: "If I meet with Nature only as she reveals herself to my senses, my knowledge of her must be bounded by my sense of her. I try the ground and the ground is there; I lift my foot—and it is there no longer. The world is a thing as impermanent as my sensations of it: and the Himalayas I per-
ceive are the Himalayas only for so long as I perceive them. Unperceived, all they can truly be is something probably like them that would (I may believe) have existed had I been at hand to perceive them." Man has no evidence for the real existence of Nature when he wants the sense of its existence; and the objects of Nature are like ghosts—things to be surely credited only as some actual sensation testifies to their existence. The "phenomenalistic" philosopher is thus the true "empirical" philosopher; and a Nature impermanent and unsubstantial a more logical object of empirical philosophy than one composed of permanent and solid objects.

Man may feel a certain charm in this phenomenal world of protean comings and goings. Yet the empirical philosopher may learn to question the validity even of this wavering object. "To be," Bishop Berkeley observed, "is to be perceived." But what is that which is perceived? Man perceives his sensations; he perceives, for instance, the sensation "red." But does he perceive the exterior red of a poppy?—through an inner, an outer redness? through a subjective, an objective redness? Experience may seem to prove that he does so. Yet is not this to perceive—with a sensation—something not a sensation through the means of a sensation? To add, in short, to a sensation a meaning like the meaning artificially imposed on the meaningless sounds of a human vocabulary? And with what validity can a bare sensation—an unanalysable "simple idea"—acquire a property so manifestly inconsistent with its acknowledged definition?1 What that is which is perceived can thus, for the resolute empirical philosopher, be no more than his own subjective sensations. No passing "phenomena" exist in the world to be perceived by man's passing sensations. No momentary ground exists for man to tread; no momentary colour for his eye to see. To perceive his own sensations is to perceive what is; to perceive more than these is to perceive what is not—to perceive what the empirical philosopher must therefore resolutely reject.

In answer, therefore, to the question, "What is the relation of the mind to Nature?" the empirical philosopher proclaims the truth that there exists for his philosophy no positive relation between them whatever. The function of the philosophic mind is rather to dissociate Nature from itself than to associate itself with Nature; to reject its existence rather than to establish its existence.

1 Cf. Locke, Essays Concerning Human Understanding, II, 2, I.

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Nature is, however, not an easy thing for man to part with and the phenomenalist himself is apt to linger with it like Romeo with his Juliet. Suppose Nature, however, to be as substantial a thing as the vigorous Dr. Johnson conceived it to be; to the empirical philosopher it will still be something other than the thing that man names "Nature." The temporal events composing it cannot be accommodated with the belief that they can be perceived together in associations of a necessary—an inevitable—character. "Conjunction" of events man can perceive; but never (observes Hume) their "connection." 1 If Venus and Mars may be perceived to move together no "connection" between them is ever found to imprint itself on the mind's surface. Given, then, that a simple idea may perceive in Nature something resembling itself, yet there exists no simple idea of "connection" with which to perceive a similar connection in Nature.

The common sense of Locke discerned in the "complex idea" of cause and effect a principle affording a place in the empirical world for the necessary connections of "science." For the reflective empiricist the presence of a "complex idea" in the mind can, however, no more form a valid foundation for science than an absent "simple idea." Nature is, for common sense, a thing-in-itself no more than "conjoined" with the mind. Existing independently of any "innate idea" of her own with respect to it, Nature can only be conceived by the mind as a thing without "connection" with herself—as a being as "loose and separate" from herself as the events her senses perceive in it are one from another. Excepting only that man has a body whose movements he may control at will, the events of Nature must consequently be conceived to follow of themselves the ways they are perceived to follow. What hold, then, has the mind on Nature that she might impose a "law" upon it? How might a thought of the mind control the motions of an indifferent planet? Through a "complex idea" the events of Nature can therefore be conceived to be connected together as little as, through the idea of an unknowable "substance," the several "qualities" of the natural world can be conceived to be combined together in individual physical "things." Chance—not law—is thus king of the empirical world. Natural science cannot control with a "must" and a "cannot" a world of events which, constantly "conjoined" as they are perceived to be, 

1 Cf. Locke, Essays Concerning Human Understanding, II, 2, I.
2 An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect. 58.
are yet never to be conceived as "connected." If chance might seem to imply that the more constantly two events have been perceived conjoined, the less must be the likelihood of their continued conjunction, the empirical philosopher will reply that the "laws" of chance must, in common with all other "laws," be banished from the empirical world.

In the disconnected world the empirical thinker has thus perceived, the connecting "mind" must now appear an unneeded assumption. The entity that man calls "I" would seem to be a thing as inexistente as a "law" of Nature. If Nature's perceptible qualities can intimate no imperceptible "substance" in Nature, the sensations which perceive them would seem to stand as little in need of the support of an imperceptible "Ego." A "thinking thing" is itself not one of the passing sensations which constitute for the empiricist the actual esse of the mind. As an insensible thing, a thinking thing, accordingly, would seem to have as valid a title to "existence." Cogito ergo non sum—I think and therefore I am not—is a conclusion to which the empirical thinker finds his thought naturally drawing him.

In answer therefore to the question, "what is the relation of the mind to Nature?" the empirical philosopher finally determines that there can exist for his philosophy no possible relation between them. On the one side the Nature known to man can be no more than a dream; and on the other, the mind known to him can be no more than an illusion. The function of empirical philosophy is rather to dissolve than to maintain the existence of the "mind" and the "universe"; and with their dissolution to dissolve the relation commonly presumed by philosophers to hold between them. A Hume might echo the words of Prospero when in a vexed moment that sage compared the world and man in it to the unsubstantial pageant of a play:—

These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits, and
Are melted into air, into thin air,
And, like the baseless fabric of their vision,
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yes, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.
II

TRANSITION TO IDEALISM

The resolute empirical thinker now, however, discovers himself in the grasp of an antinomy. We can dissolve his thinking only by means of his thinking; that the thinking "I" is not can only be asserted by the thinking "I" that is not: its existence and its inexistence must be simultaneously affirmed by the empirical thinker. The claim accordingly of Augustine and Descartes, "I think, therefore I am," in freeing thought from this antinomy, admits the possibility of new presumptions respecting the relation of the mind to the universe.

This "thinking 'I'" cannot, however, be an object of the physical world, for empirical philosophy has proved that as it can be no one of the mind's sensations, so it can be no object of the mind's sensations. Still less can a being which knows that it is be identified with an unknowable "substance" of the physical world. If the "I" that thinks exists, it must consequently be an imperceptible "Subject"—a Subject that through no activity of its thought can conceive of transforming itself into an Object.

Were this Subject, however, to be no more than a tabula rasa, it could only become aware of an Object through some imprint of that Object upon it; but thus the conclusions of the empirical philosopher would presently dissolve the seeming world of its knowledge into an "unsubstantial pageant faded." If the Subject is to be more than a tabula rasa, it must thus possess a native ability of its own: in short, it must be endowed with "innate ideas" of a kind to bring it into relation with the objective things of the universe. Locke maintained, with psychological correctness, that the presence of "innate ideas" was not to be observed in infants; they were unacquainted, he perceived, with the laws of thought and the logic of Aristotle. The Subject divined by Augustine and Descartes was, however, not conceived by them to be found in a cradle. If an infant's mind might be compared to a blank sheet of paper, that mind might yet include—like undetected watermarks—innate ideas unrecognized by itself. Infants, they might have argued again, are not born with moustaches; yet, consonantly with their sex, they are found in varying degrees to acquire them. Were the "Subject" to be found in man, it must, then, slowly come to light in him; till grown increasingly aware of it, man
grows thereby increasingly aware of the "innate ideas" that lay once latent, or but undeveloped and potential, in it.

In these "innate ideas" of things the Subject must find the means of relating itself to the universe. Through the use of these ideas it must, with only itself to rely on, spontaneously connect itself with the Objects implied by them.

The Subject aware of them can be in no need to wait, like the empirical mind, for an external object to set it in motion. Through these ideas the Subject must find within it its own cause of motion—following their inward promptings the Subject must be of a nature to go out to the world rather than to await the world's impact upon it; to make the world its partner rather than to find the world a stranger. "For whatsoever," says William of St. Thierry, "is learnt from without, that is, through the senses, is, as it were, a foreign thing and a chance taken into the mind. But that which cometh into the mind of itself... this is inborn in the reason in such manner that it is indeed the reason itself: nor for this knowledge hath it any need of teaching, but... it knoweth it for its natural possession."

Desire is that which moves the mind, and it is therefore through an "intellectual desire" that the Subject must look to make the universe its partner. No longer a bare "intellect," but an expectant lover of the world it is to meet, the subject is therefore rather a vitalized "Self" than an abstract "mind." Acquiescing in the world without willing it, the empirical mind can only find the world a thing "loose and separate"—a thing inevitably parted—from itself. But the "self" looks to discover itself and its world, like Hermia and Helena in the play, "both in one key"—things seeming parted,

But yet an union in partition.

The partner sought by the Self must be something which it recognizes, like itself, to be: for "it is certain that if we knew nothing we should also be nothing" (Spinoza). The "being" of a myth, of an Object of the fancy—though more than a "nothing"—yet in implying a negation of "being" must, like a "nothing," fail to be that which it is the Self's nature to seek. A "being" limited: a "being" here existent and there non-existent; now existent and then non-existent—though more than a myth—yet

1 The Golden Epistle, Ch. 16, Sect. 67 (trans. W. Shewing)
in implying in its turn a want of "being" must fail again to satisfy the reason of the Self. Only a Being as substantial as the philosophical world of the empiricist is unsubstantial; as real as that world is dream-like; as enduring as that world is transitory can therefore be the Being the Self must now unavoidably—now necessarily—find itself seeking. The empirical mind can discern nothing in its nature to require the existence of a world that has come upon it by chance: its "idea" of a thing cannot involve the "being" of that thing. But the Self is of a nature to find a world only as it has itself required that world: the world in itself must be for the Self the same as the world thought by the Self. United by its nature with the world, the Self can therefore do no other than require the existence of a Reality which, answering the Self's inevitable demand, itself "demands everything that perfectly expresses Being" (Spinoza, Letter, 36). As the Self is of no such stuff "as dreams are made on" so the Being it looks to meet can be for it no "baseless fabric of a vision" destined to "melt into air, into thin air."

III

IDEALISM

"Esse," says Eckhart, "est Deus": God is the principal Object of idealistic philosophy as Nature is that of empirical philosophy. Defined as a Being eternal and infinite, God—or Tao or Brahman—is that Object of the universe which "perfectly expresses Being." To beings merely "finite," "Being" may be conceived to be added: while beings merely "temporal" may be conceived to lose their Being. But God—"always, endlessly Complete" (Plotinus)—must by the reason of the Self be conceived an Object to whose Being nothing can be added and from whose Being nothing can be subtracted.

A Being so self-evident to the Self involves it, however, in a difficulty comparable to one encountered by the empirical mind. As the self-evidence of Nature tempts the empirical mind to exclude from its universe the super-sensuous Being of God and of man, so the self-evidence of God tempts the Self to exclude from its universe the inferior being of Nature and Spirits. No one, says Dante,

Who looks upon that light can turn
To other object, willingly, his view.¹

¹ Paradise, XXXIII, pp. 103–104 (trans. Temple Classics).
“Other” Objects accordingly tend to enter the world of the Self rather as things empirically assumed than rationally deduced by it: and are in consequence Objects as peculiar in the world of the Self as Objects other than natural are objects peculiar in the world of the empirical mind.

The idealist may, however, more readily than the empiricist repair the fault natural to his type of philosophy. If desire is not of a nature to pass from things better to things worse, it is its very nature to pass from things worse to things better. The Self may thus be readily conceived to pass through a knowledge of Nature and Spirits to its final knowledge of God. Nature and Spirits may be conceived to form a kind of stair for its desire to climb. “Only the Truth will do”—yet “lured on to seek and grasp an actual causeless Good,” through goods of lower worth the Self may look to reach “the Highest Good of all.”

If its “Highest Good” be not the first of Objects to be known by the Self, some other Object must constitute the Self’s original Object—some “Lowest Good” to which its desire for “Being” naturally attracts it. In his consideration of the nature of “time,” Plotinus has spoken of a Self which “hastens towards its future, dreading to rest, seeking to draw Being to itself.” While the empiricist discovers in a single present sensation deriving from Nature the opening moment of the life of the mind, the idealist finds that moment rather in a series of sensations to be made progressively present to it through the medium of its own energies. For him the “Being” the Self first finds itself seeking is thus, not a single thing like an empirical sensation, but rather such a future series of sensations as a musician foresees as he thinks of producing through his art the successive sounds of a musical composition. As he proceeds with the work he continues, in the words of Plotinus, to “draw being to himself”; ever working for “the increase of his being,” he persistently transforms a future into a present experience which itself, as he transfers his attention to its successor, assumes a less vivid form in his memory.

Such is, accordingly, for the idealist, the first “innate idea” of the Self—an idea which implies that “synthetic” activity of the Self of which Kant has spoken in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Transcendental Analytic, III, 2). The realization of this innate

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or "a priori" idea must, in fulfilling a desire of the Self, give it satisfaction. Enjoying the "Being" its activity is ever making present to it, the Self "hastens towards its future" with the pleasure of a musician passing from note to note of the composition he is performing. The series foreseen by the Self differs, however, essentially from that foreseen by the musician. Although certain musical compositions may appear to the vulgar "interminable," like the rest of man's pursuits the longest of compositions must necessarily have an end. The "future" to which the Self "hastens" is, however, an interminable future. Any limit the Self may attempt to set to it, the Self finds itself at once overpassing. Forced in consequence to draw for ever more and more of "Being" to itself, the Self finds itself, in time, "dreading to rest"—in fear of missing that wholeness of "Being" which it is its nature to win. Enjoying for ever, it yet finds itself as certainly disappointed for ever. For like a magic pot with no top to be brimmed, it may go on storing itself with the "Being" foreseen by it; but whatever store of Being it has won for itself, the store of Being it has still to win remains the same, not less than it was: for all its adding still as much without an end as it was at the beginning.

The series thus endlessly pursued by the Self might be a simple series, like a series of sounds. It might, however, equally be conceived to be a series more to its mind as a lover of "Being"; to be a series, namely, of which each later member—like the successive inflations of an expanding sphere—was foreseen by it to be the increase of an earlier. As such a never-ending series, each, however, must present the same anomaly to the Self—add to its sum what it may, the Self will still be confronted by a future series—simple or expanding—which by no art of its own it can ever make present to itself.

A series, simple or expanding, must therefore be a thing incapable by nature of "perfectly expressing being." The Self must thus conceive as Object—not to be successively made present by it—but an Object rather of a kind whose instant Being comprehends all Being in one Present Now: an Object, in short, that "neither has been nor will be but simply possesses Being" (Plotinus, III, vii, 3); for "Now," in the words of Parmenides, "It is; all at once"—a Being which, surpassing temporal distinctions, is "Eternal." As the "all of Being" that completes the Being of an expansible series such an Object will be a present expansion of Being incapable of further expansion; an expansion therefore
without limit; an expansion of Being, in consequence, not finite, but "Infinite."

This second "innate"—or a priori—idea of the Self acquaints it with an Object exceeding its own temporal and finite experience. The "Being" it vainly sought to draw to "itself" it finds now superseded by a Being it can never itself look to be. Complete and "always all," the Thing the Self has entertained is something as much not the Self as the manifold world of sensuous objects is to the empirical mind a world not itself. The Self's relation to the world is, however, not the relation obtaining between the empirical mind and its world of sensuous objects. The world of the Self is not a world "loose and separate" from the Self, but one united to the Self by the necessities of the Self's own nature. "Seeming parted," it yet forms with the Self, unlike the sensuous world with the empirical mind, a "union in partition."

As a Being which the Self cannot be, this new Object exists for the Self independently of the support of the self. It is not an Object like the Self's expanding series, which to be must be perceived by the Self. As the consummation of a quantitative series it is, however, an Object which must itself possess a quantitative character. This community of character enables the Self to transform its simple series of "inner" experiences into symbols of its Object; through the meaning they thereby acquire the Self learns to "perceive" the outer Object which has become known to it; to gain successive perceptions of it; to give them such an outward-pointing significance as Berkeley found it impossible to assign to the "simple" ideas of the empirical mind.

The Self must at first find itself at rest in an Object which as eternal and infinite satisfies its craving for a Thing that "perfectly expresses Being." In Nature's "boundless spaces beyond and superhuman silences, and profoundest rest" (Leopardi, L'Infinite), the Self enjoys a repose which its own never-resting nature must for ever withhold from it. The Self, however, presently detects in the character of this Being an irretrievable defect. Real as the objects of Nature must naturally appear to the empirical mind, to the Self Nature's Total Reality presently appears as little real as the delusive reality of a vivid reflection—it shows itself rather a "trickery" than the real Truth of Being. For Nature knows not what it is; and knows as little that it is. In itself it is a "nothing" rather than "the All" of Being. Partner of the Self though Nature must be it is thus a partner which, as the Self
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considers it further, "melts" irrevocably before it like the unsubstantial pageant of Prospero.

In a kind of Being that can know that it is, the Self accordingly must now look to make good the defect of a Thing that can not. Through the conception of a self-conscious Being the Self thus reaches another of the successive steps of its rising stairway of knowledge. A third "innate"—or a priori—idea brings it to the higher apprehension of a spirit: of a companion Self: of a Being that, like itself, can declare "I am."

As a lover of "Being" the Self must joyfully conceive a Thing that, more truly than Nature, satisfies its craving for Being. As little, however, as the Self can a "second Self"—or any number of such Selves—be conceived a thing that "perfectly expresses Being." Through a "certain weakness of its nature," it unites with things from which its Self has disappeared, and, "enjoying something through which it exists and from which it derives strength" (Spinoza), it yet enjoys it only through a knowledge that severs its Objects from its own inward experience of them. Lured on to seek a higher good, the Self accordingly now seeks a Self that needs no Being other than its own to complete it:—a Being, accordingly, like Nature, Eternal and Infinite: yet a Being, unlike Nature, Self-aware—a Being knowing what It is and that It is. In one who in Its single Essence unites the perfections of Nature and Spirits the Self divines at last the end of its pursuit. For "the Good which is the Object of the will is therein wholly gathered, and outside It that same thing is defective which therein is perfect" (Dante). The Self that has experience of this Being rests in It gladly: for "love directed towards the Eternal and Infinite feeds the mind with pure joy and is free from all sadness" (Spinoza). It rests in no phantom-being; in no creature of its fancy. Forced by its nature to assert the "Being" of a Thing that wholly is, the Self can only conceive that Being to be in Itself the same as the Thing it must think It to be. By no effort of its reason can the Self accordingly dissolve into a dream That which its reason itself has found to be one with "That whose nature demands everything that perfectly expresses Being."
IV

IDEALISM AND EMPIRICISM

The idealist, however, remains as much an animal as the empiricist. The world the "Self" reveals to him is not the world his senses reveal to him. If the Self can point to an Infinity of Nature incomprehensible to the empirical mind, yet that Infinity is not the Infinity conceived by the Self's a priori idea of it: it is an Infinity despoiled by privation of its natural being—a void in which moving finite bodies form but the empirical and unintelligible residue of the Self's original Object. The Infinite world of "the One" accordingly appears now to the Self as a world merely Ideal: and the actual temporal world as but an incomprehensible world of "the many." A medley of incorporeal beings—of colours, sounds and the like—further perplexes the rational thought of the Self. The Nature now reported to it by unexpected inner experiences of its own appears in consequence a Being which, open to doubt as any of its undeducible and contingent objects must be, is yet a Being not to be disowned by the Self.

The Self could not thus admit of a defect in that Sole Being by the Universe whose nature "perfectly" expresses Being. By no effort of its reason could the Self fail to maintain the integrity of That whose nature constitutes its final end. Were the Being of God to appear to the Self in any degree defective the Self would be forced to fulfil its own nature in a God whose essence still included "everything that perfectly expresses Being." Unlike the Infinite Being of God, the Infinite Being of Nature is, however, an Infinity that leaves the Self a thing still unfulfilled. Not knowing what it is or that it is, Nature's whole Infinitude is nothing to itself at all: the Nature the Self must needs conceive, for the Self's mature reflection, appears a disconcerting "naught" of Being rather than "the All" of Being it must originally appear. The Self cannot support an Object discovered to be thus anomalous, as she must support an Object altogether free from anomaly. Accordingly, irrationalities that may appear in Nature considered as existent cannot compel the Self still to maintain a Nature true to the Self's original conception of it. Admitting the irrationality the Self must rather wonder at it than repudiate it.

Were the empirical world, thus admitted, a world altogether "loose and separate" from the Self, the Self would have no more
hold over its indifferent Objects than the empirical mind: like that mind it could neither criticize the empirical world, nor through any "complex idea" of its own hope to explain and amend it. But, "seeming parted," the empirical world still makes with the Self a "Union in partition": still "en rapport" one with the other, there remains between them an essential connection. Not strangers, but partners, rather, seemingly estranged from each other, the Self and its world may therefore yet be expected to be heard—like Shakespeare's Hermia and Helena—"both warbling of one song, both in one key."

The Unity the Self requires of Nature must accordingly now be expectantly required to manifest itself in the empirical world. The empirical world must show itself to be, not a "many" of members "loose and separate" from one another, but rather a "many-in-unity." What the world must be thought to be the Self accordingly now finds the world to be, a reiterated unity composing the irrational discords of Nature now sings in true tune with the rational voice of the Self. In "the many" the Self discerns now a unity binding together the incorporeal with the corporeal—quality with quantity—in individual physical "things": in "things" the unity of their "species" and "genera," in moving bodies and their combinations the unity of Nature's physical and chemical "laws." "Form," in the words of Plotinus, "has entered, and grouped and co-ordinated what from a diversity was to become a unity."

If the idealist has thus shown that the sciences, invalidated by the thought of a Hume, may be established by the thought of the Self, the empiricist may still challenge him with undiminished importunity. The idealist is plainly an animal: when, then, has the Self he relies on even hinted a word of the body? The possession of such a convenience would seem to be to the Self an adjunct as superfluous as to every man of common sense it must be necessary. If the reason for his embodiment may be allowed by the empiricist to be a thing not given him to know, yet he will rigorously require of the idealist to furnish him with a reason for it.

The idealist must thus look to discern in the thought of the Self a reason for its embodiment. Now there exists (he will observe) in the universe of the Self an Object profoundly disquieting to it. Looking at the world of Nature it has found it strangely wanting in "Being." The science of Nature can do nothing to remedy this defect. No organization of Nature can give awareness to Nature.
The sun has its dignities; but it knows nothing of them. The laws that rule the inanimate world are no laws for itself; and the beauties of science which delight a Newton, a Planck and an Einstein are beauties only for them. The Self, however, is a being aware of herself. Might she not by the gift of herself to Nature raise Nature in the scale of "Being"? Might she not, like an artist, inform with her own spirit the inanimate matter of Nature? Let the Self then attribute this power to other Selves of her universe, and she may find in the world of Nature beings strangely living like herself—shapes which Nature could never have shown her of itself: sounds which it must itself have left unheard. Purposive motions determining Nature's own determined motions might appear with its new shapes and voices: things changing supernaturally within: or moving super-naturally along the ground. Now such things the Idealist may actually perceive as he looks at the world. The trance of Nature has become, it seems, a dance of Nature. Spirit has invaded the world and lifted it above its proper self. If such beings follow Nature's law, they only follow it that it may follow them. Bearers of physical bodies, they bear increasingly to a Nature deprived of a Self the higher "Being" of a Self. More and more endowing Nature with their own super-natural properties, they more and more reveal in Nature the life it has missed, and, by its gradual metamorphosis, increasingly disclose their "other" being in it. A smiling face is more than an object of nature without ceasing to be one. From its Infinite Original Nature has varied only to surpass its Original: by the evolving play of incorporeal Selves on its manifold, Nature has acquired a "Being" more than natural.

Intelligible as the union of a "Self" with a "body" may now appear to the idealist, it yet involves the Self in a fate which threatens to take from her "the power of thinking at all" (Plato, Phaedo, p. 66). The dangers to which the animal body is exposed require of the Self—with the addition of powers proper to the care of the body—the suppression of powers natural to her unembodied condition. The incarnate Self perceives the things of Nature freely. That perception may be related to her body's surroundings this freedom must be necessarily restricted. The fate that well-nigh befell the star-gazing Thales might otherwise readily befall the star-gazing Self. If the incarnate Self cannot see the world with the eye, she must therefore see it not without the eye. The animal can need no organ to apprise it of the Infinite; but it
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must need organs relating its perceptions of the finite to the body it must sustain and preserve. In the free thought of the Self appears, however, a greater danger to the body's maintenance than in her unrestricted "clairvoyance." For the Self is a free thing thinking many another object than the body, and of these objects some may attract the Self more violently than the body. And thus, like Archimedes, she might leave the body exposed without defence to the dangers of the world surrounding it. Such distractions must be rigorously suppressed, that deprived of rational nature that hinders her, she may, with no concern for anything but the interest of her body, spontaneously and choicelessly maintain and perpetuate it.

If the Self can suffer these things because her essential Being is, like Nature's, itself imperfectly rational, she may, however, unlike Nature, become aware of her fault: the hidden life suppressed in her may reawaken in her. The seers and prophets of men, conscious of the "bondage, into which the Self has fallen" are not less conscious of the way of her "deliverance." As she may find herself at times strangely "clairvoyant," so in turn her deadened thought may at times surprisingly revive in her. And thus the "empirical mind"—dependent upon her organs of sense—or ready with the touch of her thought to "dissolve the solemn temples, the great globe itself"—is (the idealist must conclude) but the "self" of his philosophy in a moment of Platonic "forgetfulness" (Republic, X, p. 621). Restored to her true self, she will find again that she is: the "gorgeous palaces" she lost will re-appear to her; and in One who "perfectly expresses Being," she will, the wiser for her fall, discern again in peace a Thing more Actual than eye can see or than hand can handle.¹

V

TRANSITION TO MYSTICISM

At peace as he may be, the idealist, however, now finds himself in the presence of an antinomy as puzzling as that which confronted the empiricist. In denying the mind the empiricist found himself after all required to affirm it. But in affirming the Self

¹ For the development of this theme from a more social and ethical point of view, cf. S. Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (Oxford, 1939); H. N. Spalding, Civilization in East and West (Oxford, 1939); and Three Chinese Thinkers (The National Central Library, Nanking, 1947) by the writer of the present essay.

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the idealist now finds himself after all required to deny it. The Godhead by the Self's own definition of It as "That which perfectly expresses Being," is, as a Totality Eternal and Infinite, the all-inclusive Whole of Being. "Self-identical: always, endlessly Complete" (Plotinus, III, vii, II), in Its Entirety It is "a One without a second" that sums, Alone, all Being in Its Self. There can be in the universe, so long as It is in the universe, no room for anything but Itself. As much an outcast from Being as a physical body lying outside the Wholeness of Infinite Space, every being outside God must be as "less than nothing" beside Him.

God's capture of all "Being," in thus dissolving the Self and every inferior Object of its world, has no less than the empirical mind of Hume made an end of "philosophy." There can no longer be conceived to exist any valid relation between the "mind" and the "universe." If, however, in the Presence of the "One without a second," the Self would willingly renounce its "other" being, it now finds itself, as much as the empirical mind, incapable of such self-denial. In renouncing itself the Self is still maintaining itself; and in saying "I am not" is still saying "I am." Its self-negation cannot therefore be its self-annihilation. If it cannot truly exist as a "second" beside God, it must therefore truly exist in oneness with God. The "I" it cannot be must lose itself a union with that "I" which can alone enjoy a veritable title to "existence." The Self accordingly dreams now to be a One with God rather than to remain a second beside Him. Its former union with the One must cease to be a union "in partition" and must become a union "without partition." The Being the Self found in Another it must look now to be its own Self. The distinction between "Subject" and "Object" must disappear. As "lover longs to blend with the beloved" (Plotinus), so the Self craves now to "gather all its Being and whatever it is from the depths of God" (Eckhart).

And thus looking now to the One to offer it "all that It has, all that It is" (Ruysbroeck), the Self runs in front of its reason and foretells a Being whose Second-lessness is not Its Aloneness. To its longing the "One-Alone" for its completed knowledge of It is to be a "One-Together," and the God whose Being had naughted its own, to be a God whose Being consummates it.
They are blind,” says the poet, “who hope to see by that Reason which is the cause of separation. The House of Reason is very far away.” Looking for “the parting to be parted”; for “the severance to be all severed” (Rumi), the Self accordingly now waits for that Truth beyond reason’s which “only the vision can give” (Plotinus). Not by her own will can she appropriate the Being of another than herself; not by a becoming of herself can she become another than herself. Only by the bliss-bringing Substitution of God for herself; only by His own transforming Gift to her of His own Self can the Self become at last That whose Being must redeem her own “other” and else outcast state. “The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit” (St. John iii. 8). But, as if riven by lightning, the Self that can abide her end hears suddenly “the Affirmation ‘TRUTH’,” and through the Substitution of God for herself, knows swiftly within her that she “hath eternal life, and is passed from death into life” (St. John v. 24).

The Self that has thus “won to the term of all her journeyings” (Plotinus) now perceives anew those inferior Objects of her universe which had seemed to dissolve with herself in the all-extinguishing Presence of God. The philosopher has discovered at last the true relation subsisting between the “mind” and the “universe.” “The cloud-capp’d towers, the gorgeous palaces” now reappear to him secure for ever in the inescapable embrace of God. “Flowing from Him while remaining within Him” (Eckhart)—outcast no longer from His only Being—they are nearer to Himself than any lonelier thought of man can ever keep the things his reason severs from him. “The Infinite Dwelling of the Infinite Being is everywhere: in earth, water, sky and air” (Kabir): “The six cardinal points, reaching into Infinity, are ever included in Tao; an autumn spikelet, in all its minuteness, must carry Tao within itself.” No longer baffled by a lifeless Nature unaware of itself, the Self perceives its being now, “a many-splendoured thing,” in the All sustaining Presence of God. Comprehending the

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1 Kabir (trans. R. Tagore).
2 Augustine (trans. R. Otto, Mysticism East and West, p. 34).
3 Chuang-tse, Ch. XXII (trans. H. A. Giles).
whole world, "both here and beyond the sea, and the abyss and ocean and all things," the Self to whom God has given "His all" beholds "naught save the Power Divine alone, in a manner that beggars description; so that, through excess of marvelling, the soul cries with a loud voice, saying, "This whole world is full of God.""\(^1\)

As near to God as Nature, spiritual creatures flow in turn from Him "while remaining within Him." Won to God’s own sight of man the Self that once knew man as she knew Nature, in part only, sees him with every thing that lives, complete in God: and gone out of herself perceives, in peace, her own self-owned and alien life extinguished in the only life of God. "But when the soul is naughted, then of herself she neither works, nor speaks, nor wills. And in all things it is God who rules and guides her; and she is so full of peace that, though she press her flesh, her nerves, her bones, no other thing comes forth from them than peace."\(^2\)

"Lovers," however, "who admire beauty here do not stay to reflect that it is to be traced, as it must be, to the Beauty There" (Plotinus, V, viii, 8). To the Self "wandering in the before-the-beginning-of-things" (Chuang-tse) there appears an Other World of which the loveliest world of man is but "an image and a shadow." Won to God the Self perceives a Life where "all remains the same within itself, knowing nothing of change, for ever in a Now, since nothing for it has passed away or will come into being, but what it is now, that it is ever" (Plotinus, III, vii, 3). In mystically "flowing forth from God while remaining within Him," the Self that shapes this Life is ignorant of any self-subsistent "I" existing "in and through itself." Of the Self of man that seeks and strives for itself it knows nothing. It has no sense of a Self of its own to be "naughted." A living reflection of the Peace of God, in the Being of God it enjoys beyond the flight of time the life He has appointed to it.

The super-rational tie that keeps this Being One with God’s keeps it also one with all things. "By our part in true knowledge we are those Beings" (Plotinus, VI, v, 7). Atoned itself with all things, now it knows in turn all things atoned with all: as One it sees the things that even as a creature "self-naughted in God" it perceived still as many. "Within Its depths ingathered"—like

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1. B. Angela of Foligno, *The Book of Divine Consolation* (mainly following H. G. Steegmann’s trans.).
Dante as he momentarily shared its ever single Vision—it perceives "together bound by love in one volume the scattered leaves of all the universe . . . as though together fused after such fashion that what I tell of is one simple flame."

The Nature these Beings beheld in God is free from the conflicting plurality that the distant world of human sense startles man's toiling reason. Its quilt of many patches there, lies Here a web without a seam. Here is perceived without "hindrance" the unity of things elsewhere opposed irreconcilably to one another (Gandavyuha Sutra). Estranged no longer from each other, "here" and "there," and "this" and "that" cease to stand in one another's way; and, unconflicting, meet, beyond the sight of reason, in the embrace that holds the creatures of this world in an unbroken concord together. "Here all blades of grass, and wood, and stone, all things are one. . . . Black does not cease to be black nor white white—the opposites coincide without ceasing to be what they are in themselves. . . . In the Kingdom of Heaven all is in all, all is one, and all is ours."1

One with a Nature that is itself a One, the eternal selves are also here without confusion fused with every other; and with a love-without-partition make together an eternal company without-partition. With the penetration of a black that is white and of a white that is black, all alike atone with all "without ceasing to be what they are in themselves." Each has all, and is all, and is with all in a world wherein "no individual is severed from the Whole" (Plotinus, III, ii, 1). Loving one in all things and all things in one, none can find themselves excluded from the universal meeting. "Those drunken with this wine, filled with the nectar, all their soul penetrated by this beauty cannot remain mere gazers; no longer is there a spectator outside gazing on an outside spectacle. The clear-eyed hold the vision within themselves" (Plotinus, V, viii, 10). In the peace of the Eternal World the clear-eyed gaze beyond its beauty to the Peace whose Love impartially unites them. "Tranquil in the fullness of glory"; "lapped in pure light"; "all good and beauty, and everlasting"; the World the Eternal Creature folds in peace is, with its Self, for ever "centred in The One, and pointed towards It . . . never straying from It" (Plotinus, III, vii, 6).

As the empirical mind is but the passing shadow of the mere actual rational Self, so is the rational Self in its turn an unreal

Self until, "her separate essence completely dissolved" (Eckhart), she can say of herself "That art Thou." The mystic self of man hovers uncertainly between the rational Self and the divine. Falling from "the lap of the Godhead" into the world of "reason," he wonders how "after that sojourn in the divine ... it happens that I can now be descending, and how did the soul ever enter my body, the soul which, even within the body, is the high thing it has shown itself to be" (Plotinus, IV, viii, I). But, "like a vase from which has been taken a precious ointment, yet in which the perfume long remains" (Suse), the earthly mystic still remembers what he was—and would still be what he remembers. In the strange grasp of Avidya the mystic strains towards that Self which, lost for a while to him in the world, yet lives eternally in God:

"From non-being lead me to Being.
From darkness lead me to Light.
From death lead me to Deathlessness" ...¹

THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE AND
THE INEVITABLENESS OF
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

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In Chambers's Technical Dictionary, science has been defined as "the ordered arrangement of ascertained knowledge including the methods by which such knowledge is extended and the criteria by which its truth is tested." The older term "natural philosophy" implied the contemplation of natural processes in themselves, but modern science includes such study and control of Nature as is or might be useful to mankind and even proposes control of the destiny of man himself. Speculative science is that branch of science which suggests hypotheses and theories and deduces critical tests whereby unco-ordinated observations and properly ascertained facts may be brought into the body of science proper.

Philosophy in its widest sense means "the explanation of any set of phenomena by reference to its determining principles whether practical, causal or logical." Any theory or reasoned doctrine in this sense may be called "philosophy," and "natural philosophy" would be "physics." But sometimes it is used with a clear ethical implication—as the power and the habit of referring all events and special facts to some general principle and of behaving in the light of this reference. It thus means the working theory of things as exhibited in conduct. Thus, we say: "Even in dire misery he uses his philosophy." It means that the person has in his mind a reference to certain general principles which enables him to endure and suffer calmly what would otherwise excite emotional disturbance.

In another sense, "philosophy" means "an account of the fundamentally real so far as from its consideration laws and truths may be derived applying to all facts and phenomena." In this sense, "philosophy" is called metaphysics. The word "philosophy" is also used to denote a theory of truth, reality or experience.
taken as an organized whole and so giving rise to general principles which unite the various branches or parts of experience into a coherent unity. Gathering together the various elements which constitute the connotation of philosophy it may be defined as a theory of a subject-matter taken as a whole or organized unity containing principles which bind together a variety of particular truths and facts, and requiring a certain harmony of theory and practice. Philosophy has also been defined as a rationalization of experience taken comprehensively in its totality.

If we compare the definition of science as given above with that of philosophy, it will be noticed that there is essentially but little difference between the two, except that the word "philosophy" is often associated with the enquiry regarding the ultimate nature of the world in its aspect of reality and unreality, whereas the word "science" is conventionally confined to the study of the aspects of physical phenomena and the nature of their coherence. Physical phenomena are often susceptible of being accurately measured. But in the study of science we do not merely take account of the elements that can be measured, but also elements that cannot be measured. Thus when a chemist says that chlorine is a yellow gas of pungent odour, the character of yellowness, or that of the pungent odour, cannot be measured. Again, when we note the different shades of colour and associate them with vibrations of different wave-lengths, the nature of the different colours and their shades cannot be measured in any accurate sense. As a matter of fact, the sense-qualities as such, particularly the secondary sense-qualities of colour, taste, touch, scent and audition, cannot be measured with any degree of accuracy. But yet our sense-observation is a fundamental instrument for the study of science.

Philosophy aims to ground itself not only on sense-observations and reasoning, as science does, but it proposes to collect its data from the mental world as well, viz. our ideals and aspirations, pleasure and pain, our sense of good and bad, our faith and, on the whole, the totality of man in his relation to Nature and sometimes to something beyond them both, which may be required as a fundamental assumption for the explanation of the two series of facts. It also includes within its purview the biological facts of life in its relation to its physical basis on the one hand and its fulfilment in the case of a civilized man in a cultural society along

1 See Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy*, pp. 190–191.
with the multitude of social facts that determine the character of man and his destiny. While consistency and coherence is its soul as an enquiry into the nature of truth, it may often have a practical bearing. The practical bearing or the pragmatic side of philosophy involves a co-ordination of such conduct, and the maintenance of such perspectives as are consistent with the philosophical view that one may hold regarding the relation that one has with regard to Nature and the society of man. Thus, though its scope is much wider, and at the same time, though its data cannot often be measurable, yet it is an ordered arrangement of ascertained knowledge including the methods by which such knowledge is extended and it does involve the determination of criteria by which its truth is tested. It also involves, as has already been said, a pragmatic reference with regard to man's relation to his environment and it is not indifferent to the attainment of one's higher aspirations. Like speculative science it suggests hypotheses and theories and tries to deduce, though sometimes rather vaguely, critical tests whereby unco-ordinated observations and properly ascertained facts may be brought together into harmony. The vagueness is due to the fact that most of the data of philosophy, on account of the very wideness of its scope of generalization, are not capable of being measured. Both science and philosophy, however, have to start from common-sense knowledge that is derivable from sense-experience. Since science is engaged in the study of the physical appearances of things, it is often claimed that it is more harmonious and more in consonance with common-sense knowledge than philosophy. Thus, for instance, most systems of idealistic philosophy would regard the common-sense world as being, in some sense, illusory, while we have a normal predilection to think that science preserves for us our experience of the common-sense world as tangible and undeniable.

Let us dig a little more on this point. In our naïve common-sense view we think of matter as possessing certain attributes such as colour and sound which we directly perceive. But in the seventeenth century the theories of light and sound gave a rude shock to our common-sense view of substance and attributes. A scientist would tell us that the rose is not red, but that it transmits something into our eyes, some waves or minute particles, and it is for that reason that we see colours. But science cannot deny that it cannot give us a coherent account of perception of
sense-qualities without dragging in the relation of mind about which latter entity science is precluded by its selective study from making any investigation. No scientist can assert anything regarding the existence of mind, and this entity is not observable either by senses or by any of the scientific instruments. Among philosophers also there is a divergence of opinion regarding the existence of mind as an entity, and the present writer does not believe in the existence of mind or soul as substantial entities. It is therefore illegitimate for science to postulate the existence of mind or the interpretation of the phenomena of experience. In the philosophy of natural science no doctrine of any metaphysical import involving any explanation of the "how" and "why" of thought and sense-awareness, is to be sought beyond Nature. Science is not metaphysics, and any enquiry into reality involving the perceiver and the perceived, is beyond its scope.

Before proceeding further in the discussion I wish to explain the meaning of two terms which I may have to use in course of this discussion: (1) sense-data—colours, sounds, scents, etc., as they objectively exist outside of us as revealed in the common-sense perception, and (2) sense-awareness, meaning our internal and subjective knowledge of these sense-data. We start with the postulate that in dealing with physical science we cannot countenance any theory of psychic additions to the objects known in perception, such as the green grass. A theory of psychic additions would not hold that there are outside us the green grass, the white flower and the like. On the contrary, it would hold that "green" and "white" are mental additions and what exist outside are the molecules, the atoms and the electrons. But as a rule the scientists indulge in the splitting up of Nature into two domains, the domain of physical existence consisting of energy units or energy waves, and the domain of psychic existence consisting of our sense-awareness; and it implicitly denies the real existence, outside of us, of the sense-data. What is given to the scientist is the element of sense-awareness. From this science passes on to affirm the reality of entities of an entirely different order, such as molecules, energy levels and the like, though it is unable to relate the order of sense-awareness, i.e. the psychic order, to the physical order with which it proposes to deal. This divides Nature into two different orders, (1) as apprehended in awareness, and (2) as the cause of awareness, and the two are incommensurate with each other, for neither the theory of conservation of mass nor the theory
of the conservation of energy can explain their causal identity. No doctrine of causal transformation can explain the influence on the alien mind whereby perception of "redness" or "warmth" can be explained. We cannot explain why there is knowledge. The causal enquiry into the nature of knowledge is a metaphysical chimera. It is extremely difficult to connect in terms of any intelligible relation the sense-awareness of "warmth" and "redness" of the fire and the agitated molecules of carbon and oxygen and their radiant energy in the various functioning of the material body. Until these two can be brought into one system of relations, we have a division of Nature into two worlds, of common-sense experience and the scientific perspective, reducing everything into units of energy and their relations.

Let us now see how our ordinary notions of time and space can help us in the matter. It may be urged that perceived redness of the fire and the warmth have definite relations in space and time with the molecules of the fire and the molecules of the body. We may take the absolute view of space and time. In this view, time is the ordered succession of durationless instants which are known to us as the relata in the serial relation which is the time-ordering relation, and the time-ordering relation is merely known to us as relating the instants. This time is known to us independently of any events in time. What happens in time occupies time. The relation of events to time occupied is a fundamental relation of Nature to time. We are aware of two fundamental relations, the time-ordering relation between instants and the time-occupation relation between instants of time and states of Nature which happen at those instants. Our thoughts are in time and so also are the events of Nature. Each instant is irrevocable. It can never recur owing to the very nature of time. But if, on the relative theory, an instant of time is simply a state of Nature at that time and the time-ordering relation is only the relation between such states, then irreversibility of time would seem to mean that an actual state of Nature can never repeat itself. This may be very likely the case but it cannot be demonstrated by proof, and thus such an irreversibility of time would also be undemonstrable. But in the former case the irreversibility of time is regarded as a character of time.

In the absolute theory of space, space is a system of extensionless points which are the relata in space-ordering relations. The axioms of geometry deal with the essential logical charac-
teristics of this relation from which the property of space follows. What happens in space occupies space, and this is true as much of an event as of objects. We have here also two fundamental relations, the space-ordering and the space-occupying relation. But space does not extend beyond Nature in the sense in which time does. Our thoughts seem to be in time but not in space. We cannot talk of a thought as occupying so many cubic feet or cubic inches. The irrevocableness of time has no parallel in space. Moreover, we do not seem to have any knowledge of bare space as a system of entities known to us in and for itself independently of our knowledge of the events of Nature. Space thus seems to be an abstraction of a particular type of unique relation prevailing among natural objects.

It may appear now that the cleavage that was brought about between our experience of the common-sense world and the world of science, may somehow be bridged over. The two worlds may be supposed to occupy the same space and the same time. We may consider that the causal molecular events occupy certain periods of the absolute time and space and that these molecular events influence the mind which thereupon perceives certain colours, sounds, etc., and this perception occupies periods of time and positions of space. Hallucinations occur when there are certain perceptions occupying periods of time and positions of space without the influence of the causal molecular events relevant for producing such perceptions.

Here we are trying to explain the "why" of knowledge, i.e. the cause of knowledge, and not the "what" or the character of the thing known. It is also assumed that we can know time in itself apart from the events related in time and also know space apart from events related in it. A question may further be raised: why causal nature should occupy time and space, why the cause that influences the mind to perceive certain characters, should have the character of the objects or events of Nature. Or, in other words, it raises the important question as to whether the influence of Nature on the mind should itself be a natural event of which we affirm time and space. What does the physicist know about the mind that can lead him to infer that it can be influenced to produce particular effects of a spatio-temporal order? Our thoughts may occupy time but the thoughts are not mind. We never perceive that our mind is occupying particular periods of time. In any case, even thoughts do not occupy space. Under the circum-
stances, how can it be supposed that the influence transmitted by the spatio-temporal molecular events to the molecular structure of the body, can lead the body to exert a spatio-temporal influence on mind which is neither in time nor in space?

Science may be supposed to be engaged in discovering the character of apparent Nature or Nature given in perceptual knowledge, and in doing so it tries to unravel the complex relations between certain energy levels or energy units or molecules or atoms, which, given the body and the mind in working order, invariably precede certain types of perception. But it cannot be urged again and it cannot be demonstrated that the perception of colour or the sense-awareness of colour as occupying a particular space and time, is exactly the same as the space and time in which the molecular events had occurred in the physical world. This short analysis tends to show that the world of space and time as revealed in common perceptual experience, cannot be demonstrated to be the same in which the invariable antecedents as the intramolecular or the intra-atomic events take place in the physical world.

The apparent Nature or Nature as we perceive, appears to be like a dream and the apparent relations of space are dream relations. The supposed causal events in the physical world belong to a causal space which has a different order of reality from the space of ordinary perception. It is thus impossible to demonstrate that the molecules of the grass exist in any determinate spatial relation to the place occupied by the grass we see. Thus, from a wholly different order of reality as given in sense-awareness occurring probably in a spaceless, timeless manner or in an order of time and space of a unique character, the scientist draws his conclusions about an entirely different order of intra-molecular or intra-atomic activity in an entirely different order of time and space, of which we have neither any direct knowledge and which is not inferable either; for all inference assumes a known relation in a system of relations, of a commensurate character. Science tells us that it only can claim the discovery of truth and that common-sense perception is false. If that is so, how can science claim to pass from this falsehood of common-sense perception, which alone is given to the scientist, to the discovery of truth? From the nature of the case there cannot be any instance in which scientific observations can be made with the perfect elimination of all sense knowledge. Yet in this way alone could we have determined the
structure of falsehood as enveloping the kernel of truth. Even if it be assumed that the molecules and atoms of science are purely of a conceptual nature and that there are no such entities in Nature, it would be difficult to say how any proposition of science can be applied to Nature. We thus see that in producing a split between the world given in our sense-perception and the world given in science, science has succeeded in giving us a system of illusions having coherence in themselves even as the most extreme idealists, the propounders of maya, would do. But it cannot claim to have advanced far in the direction towards the discovery of truth as establishing a valid system of relations between the data of knowledge and the knowledge acquired.

The definition of science quoted by us that "it means the ordered arrangement of ascertained knowledge including the methods by which such knowledge is extended and the criteria by which its truth is tested," thus falls to the ground. It is, no doubt, an ordered arrangement but it has no ascertained knowledge. It can, indeed, apply methods by which such knowledge as it possesses can be extended, but as it fails to combine its knowledge in a system of relations, spatio-temporal or otherwise, with the actually observed facts, it lacks coherence and therefore the knowledge it gives is only a system of illusions. It can apply no other criteria of truth than what is available within its own system of relations. It is, no doubt, true that in some cases it may, to some extent, indicate certain relations that it has with observed facts, but it can seldom do it with any degree of accuracy or preciseness for the simple reason of the indemonstrableness of the spatio-temporal structure of the two orders and also because of the fact that sense-characters are not measurable with any degree of accuracy.

The scope of the paper is indeed limited, and it is impossible for me to treat the question of the character of scientific knowledge in further detail from various points of view. But still, I may cursorily make certain observations. Science is supposed to deal with matter and energy. Referring to the previously mentioned technical dictionary, I find that matter is defined as "the substances of which the physical universe is composed." Matter is characterized by gravitational properties and by indestructibility under normal conditions. Mass is defined as "the quantity of matter in a body," and is also regarded as equivalent of inertia or the resistance offered by a body to changes of motion (i.e. acceleration).
THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE

Energy is defined as "the capacity of a body for doing work." Mechanical energy is called potential energy by virtue of the position of a body and it is kinetic energy by virtue of its motion. Both mechanical and electrical energy can be converted into heat, which is regarded as another form of energy. Electricity is defined as "the manifestation of a form of energy believed to be due to the separation or movement of certain constituent parts of an atom known as electrons." Velocity is "the rate of change of position or rate of displacement expressed in feet or centimetres per second." Velocity is a vector quantity, i.e. "for its complete specification, its direction as well as magnitude must be stated."

After these definitions, we proceed to take a ramble in the domain of speculative science. The definition of matter as substance carries us nowhere until we know what is the nature of substance. I am not aware if physics has in any place tried to dig deep into the concept of substance. But at any rate, we find from the definition that matter is the substance of which the universe is made. Yet in the ultimate analysis we are told that the ultimate constructive elements of which the electrons are manifestations, are themselves non-material waves. Thus in giving an account of the ultimate matter-waves, it has been said: "One thing is certain. It cannot be any kind of matter that is vibrating, for the corpuscles of matter, the electrons, are actually constituted out of waves in some other natural medium." Schrodinger assumes that the waves measure by their strength the density of the electric charge possessed by matter and electron. This charge is, therefore, no longer to be imagined as concentrated in the body of the electron, but rather as distributed over the whole wave-structure which is extended without limit but falls off rapidly as we go from the electron like the sand on the vibrating place. . . . We no longer have corpuscles—they are now resolved into a "charged cloud." The electron, regarded as a negative charge, had already dematerialized itself into a form of energy. It is not a charged particle but a unit of negative charge. Now, we are told that the electron is properly manifested by certain waves at the point in which the charge is the densest. Yet it is definitely asserted that these waves are not waves of matter. It is said that they are waves in some other medium. But what is that medium? Throughout the whole course of physics we have been talking of matter and energy, but all of a sudden we begin to talk of waves in some other medium, but we do not know of any other medium. Energy has been
defined as a capacity of matter to do work. With the reduction of matter into energy as electrons the capacity of a substance becomes identical with substance, which is contradictory. It virtually amounts to a complete sacrifice of the doctrine of substance. Again, capacity is an abstract quality, and if this is so how can this abstract quality be regarded as concrete energy having particular structural forms, and how can we conceive of non-mental structural forms which are devoid of matter? With the demolition of the doctrine of substance, the definition of mass as quantity of matter also falls to the ground. Yet we are told that in the presence of mass there is a contortion in space in four dimensions. As a matter of fact, we hear the physicists talking of \( n \) dimensions, or as many dimensions as they please. But what relations have these dimensions to the space that is observable by us? Surely, this multi-dimensional space must be entirely different from the space that we know. If that is so, by what right and by what stretch of extreme imagination can we call that multidimensional \( x \) space space at all? It may be true that by tensor calculations one can reduce the structural qualities of any-dimensional space to any other dimension. But what guarantee is there that this imaginary mathematics, consisting of transformations and computations, leads us to the same order of reality? It is true that the physical order of reality can be referred to in the mental order in terms of thoughts and images. But do they belong to the same order? One may dream in a mutilated manner of one's past experiences and inhibitions, and the psycho-analysts tell us that there is a definite law according to which our inhibited experiences of the past are transformed into dreams. They further tell us that this law is so definite that through the indication of dreams one may decipher inhibited past experiences and thereby treat successfully patients suffering from mental derangements. But can we on that ground identify the dreams with the actual experience as belonging to the same order? Again, if space means anything it means an unalterable series of proximate points extending in all directions, and if this be the notion of space, the notion that space is something that can suffer real contortion must be wholly unintelligible to us. Our ordinary perception makes it quite clear to us that space is entirely different from time, and if this time be regarded as a dimension of space, surely we are not talking in any common-sense manner. It may be argued that, sense or nonsense, we can work it out in terms of mathematical relations. I shall
certainly bow down my head to the great majesty of that science, but I should be quite unable to harmonize that mathematical world with the world that is given to us in our common-sense experience. It is not enough to say that the common-sense world bears some relation to this mathematical world, as even a ghost would bear a relation to human beings, but all the same I cannot help feeling that a ghost is ghostly and not human.

The determination of velocity and position has been for long deemed one of the most important functions of physics. But however accurately it may do so in the sphere of big bodies, it cannot do so satisfactorily in the case of electrons. This incapacity is not such that with better instruments it may never be hoped that it might be done, but the physicists have given up all hope in this direction and Nature has declared her line of halt. This forms, on the one hand, the foundation of the quantum theory, and on the other hand has led to the formulation of the wave theory. Classical physics was wrong in believing that bodies existed to which definite values of energy, and hence impulse and velocity, could be ascribed, without at the same time the position in which, and length of time for which they were under observation, being known. This is not true in the small dimensions given by Planck's constant \( h \). On the contrary, the quantities named are always known inaccurately. If we increase the accuracy in one direction, the inaccuracy in other directions is increased. So both are known only inaccurately. This uncertainty principle has led the present-day scientists to advance the picture of the ultimate constitution of electrons by the hypothesis of waves. The elementary quantum of action \( h \) is now seen to be the measure of the ultimate accuracy with which measurements in space and time, of energy, impulse and velocity can be made. It sets us a limit in principle to the mutually consistent application of these concepts. Physicists had so long been innocent enough to believe that these concepts were valid everywhere in the world without restriction. They were imbued with a preconceived idea that the concepts of the ordinary physics were universal.

All that we have said does not mean that science is a fairy-tale. It only means that the investigations of science aim at determining truths of a particular order which are neither universal in all their aspects nor compatible with the knowledge that may be gained from other sources or from other types of studies and investigations.
Science shares with other studies its incapacity not merely of a temporary nature but affecting the grounds of any hopes of delving deeper into the mysteries of its own order of truth. As in the case of other studies, so here also in science we have been able to discover the limits which Nature has set to extending the bounds of our knowledge. It has further been claimed on behalf of science that it is independent and does not depend upon conceptions that may be formulated in other branches of the study, say, religion and philosophy. We shall now examine this claim as briefly as we can.

We shall not try to distinguish in what we say, any difference between what may be the ideal verdict of science and the statement of great scientists. Jeans, in his work *The Mysterious Universe*, first tries to rouse terror and awe in us by giving us a picture of the mightiness of the universe, and then says: "If, however, we dismiss every trace of anthropomorphism from our minds, there remains no reason for supposing that the present laws were specially selected in order to produce life. They are just as likely, for instance, to have been selected in order to produce magnetism or radio-activity—indeed more likely, since to all appearances physics plays an incomparably greater part in the universe than biology. Viewed strictly from a material standpoint, the utter insignificance of life would seem to go far towards dispelling any idea that it forms a special interest of the Great Architect of the universe." The contradiction in the above passage is obvious even to a cursory reading. On the one hand, Jeans dismisses every trace of anthropomorphism, and on the other hand he speaks of a Great Architect as having selected certain physical laws for the occurrence and possibility of the happening of other physical laws, such as magnetism, etc. Again, Eddington seems to believe in a strange anthropomorphic female Nature whose relation to God or to the Universal mind he never seems squarely to face. Thus he says in his *Science and the Unseen World*: "Looking back over the geological record it would seem that Nature made nearly every possible mistake before she reached her greatest achievement—man. . . . At last she tried a being of no great size, almost defenceless, defective in at least one of the most important sense-organs. One gift she bestowed to save him from threatened extinction—a certain stirring, a restlessness in the organ called brain, and so we come to man." Again, in discussing the indeterminacy and the quantum theories he obscures the discussion
when he says: "Future is not predetermined and Nature has no need to protect herself from giving away plans which she has not yet made." The anthropomorphic tendency is clear and obvious. Jeans definitely offers us an argument for the existence of God and for the spiritual nature of the universe drawn from the present stage of physics. He gives the following quotation from Berkeley, an idealistic philosopher: "All the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any substance without the mind. . . . So long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit." After this quotation, Jeans says: "Modern science seems to me to lead by a very different road to a not altogether dissimilar conclusion." In another place Jeans says: "We cannot claim to have discerned more than a very faint glimmer of light at the best; perhaps it was wholly illusory, for certainly we had to strain our eyes very hard to see anything at all." Eddington also says in The Nature of the Physical World: "The idea of Universal Mind or logos would be, I think, a fairly plausible inference from the present state of scientific theory." He immediately adds: "But if so, all that our enquiry justifies us in asserting is a purely colourless Pantheism. Science cannot tell whether the world spirit is good or evil and its halting argument for the existence of a God might equally well be turned into an argument for the existence of a Devil."

Max Planck, in the conclusion of his work The Philosophy of Physics, says: "It is only when we have planted our feet on the firm ground which can be won only with the help of the experience of the real life that we have a right to feel secure in surrendering to our belief in a philosophy of the world based upon a faith in the rational ordering of the world."

I do not wish any further to dilate upon this theme in this short paper. I wish only to point out that some of those thinkers, at least, who have transcended the purely provincial limits of the study of the physical science have been forced to admit that it must have a bigger and broader aspect through which it can affiliate itself with the other departments of knowledge, such as psychology, philosophy, religion and ethics. After all, the attempt of science is through a system of happy guesses. In the words of Einstein, "Physical concepts are free creations of the
human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavour to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility or the meaning of such a comparison. But he certainly believes that, as his knowledge increases, his picture of reality will become simpler and simpler and will explain a wider and wider range of his sensuous impressions. He may also believe in the existence of the ideal limit of knowledge and that it is approached by the human mind. He may call this ideal limit the objective truth."

In conclusion, I wish to affirm that though science and mathematics in their surprisingly new achievements have discovered many new facts and relations in the world of Nature, yet they belong to a particular order and cannot be regarded as having any superior value to other branches of study. Their discoveries have their limits and they have as much contradiction in their own order as the other branches of study have in their particular orders. Science neither attempts nor has shown any way by which all our experience can be brought together under one system of relations, such as the belief of the scientist in the rational nature of the world might lead us to expect. This simple faith of the scientist so emphatically stressed by Max Planck that the real is the rational, is also the fundamental basis of philosophy and religion. Like a horse with flaps on its eyes the scientist has been wending along an interminable road until he meets obstructions and turns to the right or to the left; but should he take his flaps off and look around, he could only then understand what a small area the traversing road is in the huge and broad landscape that lies all around him. Let the scientist remain satisfied in all humility with the service that he has rendered in his own humble way.
THE VALUATION OF THE HISTORICAL IN EASTERN AND WESTERN THOUGHT

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The assertion is often made that Western thought observes the significance of the historical, but that Eastern thought does not.

I propose to begin by examining this assertion, with a view to discovering its nature, and to ask and as far as possible to answer the following questions. Is the assertion a correct one? If it is not, how did it come to be made?—Is it perhaps partially true?—Or has there ever been a time when it was not true?

Plainly we must begin by considering our terms. What is Eastern and what is Western?

If Europe be merely a jagged peninsula projecting westward from Asia, then there is no such thing as “West” this side of the Atlantic. Yet perhaps we may see some distinction within the massive land-block which runs from Spain to the Pacific seaboard of Asia, and say that if a line be drawn north and south through the Aegean and Suez, east of the latter there is a different valuation of life from what one gets to the west of it. But even for this statement some modification may be demanded by critics. How far, they may say, is such difference as exists a permanent item, and how far is it due to time-lag in diffusion? At the Durbar held in Delhi in 1905 some of the bands of retainers brought to it by the rulers of the princely states wore chain-armour, a form of protective mechanism discarded in Europe since the fourteenth century. Had Lord Mountbatten held a final Durbar, it is safe to say that this feature would no longer have appeared, and probably by this time most of such private armies as still exist have been mechanized. Child marriage has been stigmatized as characteristically Indian: yet it was the accepted custom in aristocratic circles for centuries in Europe. Pope Clement VII personally assisted at the putting to bed of Henri III of France and Catherine de Medici, aged both of them about 14,
with his benediction, and the injunction: "Fa figulioli." Louis XIII and Anne of Austria were married when both under 13, and the Infanta Anna-Maria Victoria married Louis XV when she was 3. Then again, though world-and-life-negation has been regarded as extremely prevalent throughout Asia, with large numbers of mendicant ascetics, hermits, and enclosed orders, there was a period, approximately between about 400 and 1500 A.D., when a similar world-and-life-negation seemed widespread throughout Europe,¹ while it is clear that during a period extending from the first or second century of the Christian era to the end of the fifteenth century there was a strong and clear acceptance and affirmation of life throughout South-East Asia as well as in South India; while in China and Japan life-affirmation has been strong, except in so far as it has been diminished by the spread of Buddhism. Moreover, in Russia, the most Asiatic part of Europe, a largely monastic and world-renouncing form of Christianity has now been overshadowed by a new world-affirming doctrine developed by a German Jew of the Rhineland during his sojourn as a refugee in London, while the new Indian Government is led by men and women many of whom believe in world-affirmation-and-transformation to a degree which is hardly Upanishadic.

It seems, therefore, that it will be wiser not to make sweeping statements about the abiding differences between East and West. If there is any difference which may depend on geography, it is more likely to occur as between equatorial and non-equatorial areas, since thinkers in the heat-belt may well have different ideas about the value of terrestrial life from those living in cold or temperate regions, and even they have often sought relief and solitude in high altitudes where the climate is bracing. The course I shall therefore pursue in this paper will be first to investigate the actual facts about the various areas and sub-areas which exist in the land-block between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and in this particular case to study the facts regarding the valuation of the historical in those regions; and in doing so to consider whether as between different periods there has been any variation in this respect, and whether an exact appreciation of true historical events has fluctuated, so that it has been stronger or weaker at different periods within the same area.

¹ Medieval London had an anchorite or anchoress (the equivalent of a Sadhu) attached to practically every one of its numerous parish churches (almost one per street). Some were walled-in in an "ankerhold," others itinerant.
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It would seem that there are three prerequisites for any valuation of the historical, though other considerations determine how they are utilized or whether they are utilized at all. These prerequisites are folk-memory, keeping of records, and capacity to compare with one another the things that are remembered or recorded.

It is probable that folk-memory is an extremely fragile and variable thing, and that in prehistoric and proto-historic times and among avowedly primitive peoples it hardly exists. Tradition under such conditions is a vague and uncertain possession. Children, child-races, and people at a rudimentary stage of mental development have very short memories. But this is gradually felt to be a serious handicap in life, and indeed, in the struggle for existence, individuals of weak memory are likely to be bred out, while those with strong memories, who are able to record and profit by past experiences, will tend to multiply. At the same time elementary forms of memory-training tend to be resorted to, especially in matters relating to religious observance. It becomes vitally important to say the right words and to perform the correct ritual actions, and these must therefore be memorized and handed on with great care from generation to generation, both in regard to sacrifice and in rites de passage, especially in puberty-initiation.

There is one common element in all early societies, and that is the folk-tale. It may have been merely "pastime with good company."
 In the west of Ireland the impromptu story-teller (so we are told) has still a very important part to play in social life. Some of the stories related may be traditional ones, though the presentation is largely impromptu. All countries know this kind of story, told probably by the light of the fire, and a good substitute among illiterate peoples for the novelette and the cinema or radio-serial. Many hundreds of folk-tales have been collected in recent generations, such as those from the Pancharatra in India, the Kinderund-Haus-Märchen of the brothers Grimm, and the African folktales of Mrs. Baskerville.

It cannot be said, however, that much significance is attached in such tales to the course of events. They may be pleasing and perhaps not entirely improbable fictions, and sometimes they may be morally edifying; but where they are not made up for purely recreational purposes, they are in many cases aetiological

1 The phrase is the title of Henry VIII's famous madrigal.
myths, perhaps at one time taken very seriously as accounting for certain observed physical facts. A human tendency to compose such stories seems universal, and it has its continuation in such Christian folk-tales as the one which explains "why the robin has a red-breast," and in the purely artificial fiction of the type of Mr. Rudyard Kipling's *Just So Stories*, which are partly his own invention, partly adaptations of folk-tales which he picked up during his sojourn in the East.

Yet it is out of the folk-tale that the more serious and dignified myth has developed, and mythology is, so to speak, the background against which alleged true tales of gods and men can be set. Such alleged true tales take shape either as epic poems (e.g. the *Ramayana* and the Northern European sagas) or as dramas (such as have been found in fragmentary condition among the Ras Shamra tablets, and a few early Egyptian pieces edited by Sethe, or after a more highly developed pattern in such Greek tragedies as the *Prometheus Bound* of Aeschylus or the *Bacchae* of Euripides.)

It would seem, however, that in certain specific areas a utilitarian and indeed entirely humanistic development of calendars and records took place, and that where this happened the materials for what we may call selective and interpretative human history came into existence. It is true that the care of such records was usually in the hands of a literate sacerdotal class which may have actually fostered the compilation of the records, but the interest does not seem to have been exclusively religious, and the frequent association of the royal palace with a temple makes it hard to draw the line between royal and ecclesiastical archives. We think naturally of the tablet records of the various Mesopotamian kingdoms, of the references to "chronicles" in Hebrew literatures of the "records of ancient matters" which have been worked up into the Shinto literature of old Japan, and in China, of the Book of History and the multifarious records on which Ssu-ma Chien and his father based their monumental work.

We have still, however, not reached the stages of literary and interpretative historiography, and these arrive only very gradually, and are actuated by two distinct motives, political and religious. The former of these appears in the historical work of Thucydides, who "set himself to compose an accurate narrative of the two great warring powers of the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian confederacy, as a lesson in statesmanship for future genera-
tions,"* the latter pre-eminently in the prophetic histories written by Hebrew divines. It must be admitted frankly that in both cases there is a tendency to modify accounts of events in order to secure a better and more edifying result. History is "written up" either to support a particular political theory or to drive home some moral or religious lesson, and it is not always easy to see where religion ends and politics begin. Thucydides has been described as "the noblest and austerest moralist who has ever written history,"* and in the Chinese chronicles moral interest is by no means lacking (witness the commentaries on the old chronicles). But even in such interpretative writing about past events, there are at least two chief ways in which the task may be carried out. (1) It may on the one hand be undertaken in order to elucidate if possible some general laws, according to which human affairs are directed, and in this case the individual counts for next to nothing, since history is simply the recurrence of similar cycles of events; or (2) it may be undertaken with a sense of the uniqueness of each individual and epoch.

Now it is not unreasonable to say that the first of these two ways of approaching the record of successive events is, with certain variations, common to both sections of our Euro-Asiatic land-block. It may not be so evident in China, but it is certainly present in the Hellenic and in the Indian worlds. Thus Bréhier, expounding the views of Laberthonnière,* says: "The κόσμος of the Greeks, is, as we might say, a world without a history, an eternal order in which time counts for nothing, whether because it leaves that order always self-identical, or because it produces a series of events which always reverts to the same point through an indefinite repetition of cyclical changes. Is not even the history of mankind, according to Aristotle, a perpetual recurrence of the same civilization?" This is not very far removed from the outlook which from the Upanishadic age onward pervades Indian thought, and when we read the words of Lucretius, eadem sunt omnia semper, and recall the cyclic pantheism of the Stoics, we feel that we are in the same world of thought as that of the great vishistādvaita teacher Ramanuja, who speaks of Brahma emitting, sustaining, and reabsorbing the universe, apparently with no special motive beyond the release of surplus energy. Even though it is reasonable to maintain that this cyclic view of the course of

* This, and all other quotations marked *, are to be found in Professor A. E. Taylor's Gifford Lectures; Vol. II, Ch. VIII, "The Ultimate Tension."
events is now most patently to be seen in the teachings of Hindus and Buddhists, it is capable of being transplanted into the Western world, and this is even now being attempted by Mr. Aldous Huxley.\footnote{See *Perennial Philosophy*, pp. 63–4. It is also an element in the work of Professor Arnold Toynbee, to which I shall later refer.} Thus he writes, in his *Perennial Philosophy*: “... the vast numbers of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of whom the Mahayanist theologians speak, are commensurate with the vastness of their cosmology. Time for them is beginningless, and the innumerable universes, every one of them supporting sentient beings of every possible variety, are born, evolve, decay and die, only to repeat the same cycle again and again, until the final inconceivably remote consummation when every sentient being in all the worlds shall have been won to deliverance out of time into eternal Suchness or Buddhahood. This cosmological background to Buddhism has affinities with the world picture of modern astronomy—especially that version of it offered in the lately published theory of Dr. Weizsäcker regarding the formation of planets. If the Weizsäcker hypothesis is correct, the production of a planetary system would be a normal episode in the life of every star. There are forty thousand million stars in our own galactic system alone, and beyond our galaxy other galaxies, indefinitely. If, as we have no choice but to believe, spiritual laws governing consciousness are uniform throughout the whole planet-bearing and presumably life-supporting universe, then there is plenty of room, and at the same time, no doubt, the most agonizing and desperate need, for those redemptive incarnations of suchness upon whose shining multitudes the Mahayanists love to dwell.” I have quoted Mr. Huxley at some length, because I think it is clear from this passage that even he cannot entirely avoid inconsistency in his enthusiasm for the cyclic aspect of Eastern thought. For him, too, there is a purpose in the super-universe, namely the winning of every sentient being in all the worlds to Buddhahood. Mahayana Buddhism is in fact a compromise between treating the course of events as significant and treating it as not so. As distinct from Hinayana Buddhism it has certain affinities with the Christian view-point. Nevertheless, Mr. Huxley’s attitude towards history is intended to be that of *advaita* or at least *vīśīṭadvaita* Hinduism. He speaks of “unfortunate servitude to historic fact,” “idolatrous preoccupation with events and things in time,” and so on, and he quotes with approval the words of Ananda Coomara-
swamy: "The Mahayanist believer is warned—precisely as the worshipper of Krishna is warned (in the Vaishnavite scriptures) that the Krishna Lila is not a history, but a process unfolded for ever in the heart of man—that matters of historical fact are without religious significance," "except," Huxley adds, "in so far as they point to or themselves constitute the means . . . by which men may come to deliverance from selfness and the temporal order."

In spite of all this, within the geographical area which we are considering, a very different influence was at work, that of the Hebrew prophetic genius. The God of the Jew, as has been said, is not natural law, but the Lord of Law and the Lord of History, and Jewish belief regarding the relation of God to history, which began with the record of the episodes of the Covenant, the deliverance from Egypt, and the giving of the Torah, passed on not only into its alleged climax, the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, but also into Islam with its teaching about the Furqan, the night of wonder, and the Day of Judgment. Professor A. E. Taylor reminds us that the κόσμος of pre-Christian Greek thought only became a really historical world under the influence of Christianity and its ancestor Judaism, and that this permeation of Graeco-Roman civilization by a great positive religion is actually the cause to which it is owed that European thought, unlike Indian, has become, as a whole, thoroughly historical. The effects of this are to be seen not only inside but outside the area of our special study. It is a matter of observed fact that wherever the Hebraeo-Christian doctrine about life has been diffused, it has carried with it this particular valuation of the course of events, as containing both continuous and discontinuous Divine activity.

How this impressed a contemporary of the early Christians we may learn from the same essay of M. Bréhier quoted above:* "This . . . [emphasis upon the reality of the sequence of events] was the outstanding peculiarity which impressed the first pagans who took Christianity seriously. What, for example, is the reproach brought against them by Celsus? That they worship a god who is not immutable, since he takes initiatives and decisions in order to meet circumstances, nor yet impassible, since he is touched by pity; that they believe in a kind of myth, that of the Christ, which will not permit of an allegorical interpretation; in other words, it is presented as genuine history, and cannot be made into a symbol of physical law." To quote Taylor again:* "It
is in the end the Jews, to whom were entrusted the oracles of God," from whom the Christian community, and through it, the modern Western world (Romans iii. 2) has learned to think historically, just because Judaism and Christianity are absolutely bound up with convictions about certain historical events as no system of philosophy is. We owe the historical sense, on which we sometimes pride ourselves, to the very peculiarity of the Christian myth which disconcerted Celsius, i.e. the impossibility of sublimating it into a symbol of physical law, to its incorrigible and unabashed concreteness." This concreteness was not achieved entirely without a struggle. In the second generation of the Christian movement there was an earnest attempt on the part of some oriental believers who are usually called Gnostics to allegorize and spiritualize the plain story of the Scriptures, and to divest the Incarnation of God in Jesus of reality. Against this, writers like Bishop Ignatius of Antioch insist that the Incarnation was not a mere appearance or edifying myth, but that Jesus truly was born, and truly suffered; and it was declared false doctrine to say that he did not come in the flesh. Eventually it was found necessary to frame confessions of belief which could be recited by intending disciples, in which the name of the Roman governor of Judaea was inserted, to show that the date of the Incarnation was known. The importance of the principle involved in this has been taken for granted so much that it may surprise some to read an extract from a well-known Oxford professor of political science in the nineteenth century, Sir Walter Raleigh: "It seems absurd to subordinate philosophy to certain historical events in Palestine—more and more absurd to me, I think. The ideas of Christianity are always interesting; but they are all to be found elsewhere and are not, it would seem, the chief part of its attraction." Yet it is probably true that not a few in the West say much the same as Raleigh, though like him they have failed to see that if the attraction in Christianity lies not simply in its ideas but in the events with which they are connected, this tells us something which may just as easily be important as absurd, and that in its apparent absurdity may lie precisely its importance. This is not necessarily the same thing as asserting that the specific Christian claim is true, but rather that the principle of an individual historical event or group of events having permanent cosmic significance is one that is not lightly to be overlooked.

In any case, it is worthy of note that the development of philo-
sophical studies of history has, as a matter of actual fact, only taken place within the sphere of European Christianity. It is true that some of these studies, like the *Outline of History*, by H. G. Wells, and the *History of Europe*, by H. A. L. Fisher, have been in spirit twentieth-century positivist rather than Christian, while the works of Voltaire and Gibbon in the eighteenth century were perhaps on the border-line between Christianity and Deism, and the work of Spengler is romanticist rather than orthodox Christian; but all depend on the assumption that a survey and interpretation of terrestrial happenings is worth while, and that the personalities with whose fortunes those events are bound up are in themselves of some significance as well. The more recent work of Arnold Toynbee, though theoretically neutral, and not written with any special Christian bias, is nevertheless the product of the same assumption. It seems unlikely that similar works would be produced by Hindus or Buddhists, nor is Pandit Nehru's book, *The Discovery of India*, a fair example of such a book, since Nehru's own training is strongly European. On the other hand, a Jew or a Moslem might produce a philosophical history, also a Chinese, if he were a Confucian; and so might a Marxist. The conditions, therefore, would seem to be those created by ideology rather than race, or geographical situation.

Yet as Sir Charles Eliot has remarked, Asiatic doctrine may commend itself to European minds, but it fits awkwardly into European life. This is not so much due to race or geography, because, as I have already pointed out, there was plenty of world-and-life-negation in mediaeval Europe, and much mediaeval mysticism is oriental rather than Christian: it is due to the much greater permeation of Western Europe by the Roman interpretation of Christianity. In modern England the strikingly original and independent mind of Mr. F. H. Bradley has arrived at positions almost identical with many to be found in the *advaita*, and his language and thought show strange resemblances to those of the *Vedānta*. Thus—in Appearance and Reality—we find him saying: “The Absolute has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit, and blossoms. Like our globe it always, and it never, has summer and winter. . . . The Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number. . . . We may be content here to know that we cannot attribute any progress to the Absolute.” Yet it is safe to say that this Absolute idealism has left untouched a very large part of English intellectual life, where it
is still believed that time and progress are not "appearance," but an indiscernible part of Reality. On the other hand, one of the most penetrating intelligences of Cambridge in recent decades, J. Ellis McTaggart,\(^1\) disbelieved in the reality of time, and in the last few years the experimental work of J. W. Dunne and others on the phenomena of precognition has introduced a new and perplexing problem to those who had hitherto believed that successiveness was due to a real indeterminacy in future events, so-called, and that apart from inferential reasoning, whether extended or truncated, no forecast of such events was possible.

In the Western section of our land-block, nevertheless, it has certainly been the case for very many generations that the scrutiny of history has been regarded as a legitimate and profitable study, even though here and there sceptical voices have been raised, such as that of Sir Robert Walpole, who when on a sick bed said: "Don't read me history. I know that can't be true!" and even though scandalous examples of the distortion of history in text-books have been recorded from Nazi Germany. The devaluation of historical studies is still more marked in Hindu and Buddhist areas, though as we shall see, a change of emphasis is gradually developing.

Some light is thrown upon this matter by a brief analysis of the studies of Asiatic students in the University of Cambridge between the years 1900 and 1909, a period when the Historical Tripos was reaching the height of its popularity. During that time the two Regius Professors were successively Lord Acton, an eminent Roman Catholic, and J. B. Bury, an Irish rationalist. The age was one in which the scientific analysis of original documents was at its height, and exactitude in the elucidation of actual events was regarded as the main business of a historian. I give here the analysis, and also the approximate numbers, of Indian students matriculating each year. From these figures it will be seen that while, no doubt, a considerable number of such students were engaged in vocational training for the Civil Service, those who read for a tripos were more inclined to choose law or mathematics, while of the two who during the period under scrutiny took first-class honours in history, one was certainly a

\(^1\) It is difficult to know how far Bradley and McTaggart owed something of their viewpoint to culture-contact with India, via the Germans. McTaggart in any case may have been indebted to Professor S. N. Das Gupta, a friend and former pupil of his.
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Christian, while it is probable that the other had been at a Christian college prior to his coming to England.

This absence of interest in the study of history is not due, we may infer, to lack of principle, but to the actual logical exercise of principle, and to a faithfulness to cultural tradition.

Detailed Statistics

In the period 1901 to 1910, during which the Historical Tripos was greatly increasing in popularity among British students, the proportion of Indian students was as follows:

1901. In Part I, one out of 47, and he a first class.
    In Part II, two out of 42.
1902. In Part I, two out of 60, one of these a Christian, also a first class.
    In Part II, none out of 41.
1903. In Part I, one out of 45.
    In Part II, two out of 49, comprising one Christian and one Moslem.
1904. In Part I, one out of 76. There were also two other Asiatics, a Japanese and a Siamese. The Indian took a first class.
    In Part II, none out of 37.
1906. In Part I, a similar result, though in the same year the Senior Wrangler was an Indian, and there were five other Indians in the Mathematical Tripos.
1907. Only two Indians in the Historical Tripos, against ten in the Law Tripos.
1908. In Part I, one Indian out of 114, and he a Moslem.
    In Part II, none.
    In Part II, one out of 88.

It is, of course, true that a good many Indians came to Cambridge during these years for purely vocational training, and of these we have no similar record, as to their choice of subjects—if, indeed, their examinations left them free to choose; but tutors whom I have consulted say that this preference for studies other than historical is still, as in earlier decades, a marked feature of the Indian student.
The number of Indian students matriculating during the above years is approximately as follows:—

1901. Eight, plus 38 doing vocational training.
1903. Ten, plus 17 doing vocational training.
1904. Fourteen, plus 14 doing vocational training.
1905. Fifteen, plus 14 doing vocational training.
1906. Thirteen, plus 17. (This was Jawaharlal Nehru’s year of matriculation.)
1907. Twenty-seven, plus 12 doing vocational training.
1908. Twenty-seven, plus 19 doing vocational training.
1909. Thirty-one, plus 11.

It is of some interest to compare with these figures the available statistics of Indian and other Eastern Universities having a department of historical studies with a Chair in the subject. (The dates of the respective foundations of these Universities, where ascertainable, are given in brackets):—

Only two Universities are listed as not possessing such a department, to wit Agra, on which the information is dubious, and Benares (1916) which is explicitly described as “a Hindu University.” Aligarh, as a Moslem institution, has an Indian Moslem professor.

Allahabad has two professors.
Andhra (1926) has a staff of 4.
Annamalai, a staff of 5.
Bombay (1857), an old University, has a department “for research in history.”
Calcutta (1857) has two Indian professors, Hindu and Moslem.
Dacca (1921) two professors, Hindu and Moslem.
Delhi (1922) two professors, Hindu and Moslem, and a staff of 16.
Lucknow (1921) two professors, Hindu and Moslem.
Madras (1857) an Indian professor.
Mysore (1916) an Indian professor.
Nagpur (1923) an Indian professor.
Osmania-Hyderabad a Moslem professor.
Panjab-Lahore (1882) an Indian professor.
Travancore (1937) an Indian professor.
Cuttack-Orissa an Indian professor.
Patna (1917): the subsidiary colleges have teachers in history.

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It would appear that the Universities founded immediately after the rising of 1857 were planned on European lines, and consequently provided with faculties of history; but the gap between these foundations and the twentieth-century ones is a long one, and it may be taken that the large number of Universities founded since 1900 points to an interest on the part of the nationalists in higher education, and to a general desire to have the students trained in their home country. It is, therefore, extremely interesting to note that of ten Universities established in India since 1900, only one, which is explicitly a Hindu institution, has not a faculty of history (and my information here may not be up to date). Of course, this does not tell us very much. We have no figures available as to how many students per annum read history in these nine Universities; but at any rate the teaching staff are 100 per cent Indian throughout, and it seems fair to assume that "Indian" in this case means "Hindu," except where Moslem studies are explicitly concerned, or where the college is a Moslem one, though it is, of course, possible that some Indian teachers of history may be Christians.

Yet when all is said and done, the inference may fairly be drawn that the large majority of centres of higher education in India to-day recognize history as a legitimate subject for a degree; and the exception of Benares (assuming that one's information is correct), would simply show that the depreciation of history is in proportion to the strength of orthodox Hindu sentiment. I venture to submit that this is a somewhat interesting conclusion, and that its opposite is to be found in the Western European choice of science or technology in preference to history which has been noticeable in recent decades. Students in Europe and America are coming increasingly to live on the point of the present, and to ignore the past as lacking practical significance, and ideologies which dehumanize are actually increasing this tendency.

The attitude towards history in China must not be judged in the light of either Buddhist or Christian influences, since both came to her from outside, and it is not fair to describe as Chinese that which is due either to Indian or to Anglo-American culture-contacts. If, however, we look at the specifically Chinese types of thought, we shall conclude that the Confucian literature and teaching contain the really native Chinese way of regarding life. It may be objected that this leaves Taoism out of account, but after the introduction of Buddhism into China, Taoism declined
in importance, since the world-renouncing point of view was so much more successfully proclaimed by the newcomer, that whatever contribution Taoism might have had to make to the national life, it made by exercising its influence upon its rival. Apart from this, after the sixth century it became, as is well known, a popular cult, strongly associated with alchemy, astrology, and divination, a religion for the uneducated, treated with contempt, if with tolerance, by the Confucian upper classes. Had China adopted Taoism in its earlier form instead of Confucianism, she might have drawn closer to the advaita standpoint of India. Yen Hui, in conversation with Confucius, said: "I have made some progress, I forget everything." Confucius asked him: "What do you mean by that?" and Yen Hui replied: "I gave up my body and discarded my knowledge. By thus getting rid of my body and my mind I became one with the infinite Tao. This is what I mean by forgetting everything." Chwang Tzu makes a man who is asked how to set the world right reply: "Make excursion in pure simplicity. Identify yourself with non-distinction. Follow the nature of things, and admit no personal bias. Then the world will be in peace." Obviously, such a doctrine had no interest in the world or the course of events, and to put it into practice one had to be either a monk or a rich man who could leave the cares and duties of the world to menials. But China in the main did not take this path, and the Shih Chi, the great literary work of Ssu-ma Tan and Ssu-ma Chien during the Tan period, shows both in the mere fact of its composition and in the mass of ancient historical material which it uses to reconstruct the history of China from the earliest times, that the majority of Chinese saw significance in such a record as the Shih Chi. Yet its message is not in any way meliorist, still less messianic in its outlook. It puts the golden age in the past, in the reigns of the vaguely known emperors Yao and Shun, and like Confucius himself, implies that salvation for the State and individual is to be found in the cultivation of ancient virtue and in admiration of an idealized past epoch. The Shih Chi is said to have set a standard of historical writing which has been copied throughout the course of Chinese history, and it may fairly be said that the principles of textual and higher documentary criticism were discovered and used in the Far East before they had developed in the West. China, therefore, in so far as she is loyal to her Confucianist principles, is more ready to follow the Anglo-American lead in
establishing faculties of history in her many new universities, and
her recognition of a past golden age might incline her to receive
with sympathy the Christian claim about the supreme importance
of a single past event; but with the growth of Chinese Com-
munism a new attitude towards the past may develop, and a new
messianic (because Marxist) expectation with regard to the future.
There seems, however, little likelihood of China's reverting to a
merely cyclic view of existence. The old Yin and Yang philosophy
may have contained a cyclic element, but the study of modern
science by Chinese has put older cosmological ideas out of date.

The influence of the East upon the West needs some notice. In
the eighteenth century the works of the Chinese sages became
known in Europe through Latin translations made by the Jesuits,
and a scrutiny of the works of Voltaire, Leibniz, and Rousseau,
to take only a few examples, will show that such a work as Con-
fucius, Sinarum Philosophus, a translation with commentary, by
Intorcetta the Sicilian Jesuit, had no inconsiderable influence on
the development of Deistic ideas. In the same way, the rendering
of the Persian version of the Upanishads (known as the Oupne-
khata) into Latin by Anquetil du Perron in 1802 made accessible
to European scholars, at least at second or third hand, the modes
of thought characteristic of India in the philosophical period.
Traces of Upanishadic influence are therefore to be found in the
works of such central Europeans as Hegel, Schopenhauer, Fichte,
von Schlegel, and Wilhelm von Humboldt. It was von Schlegel
who translated the Gita into Latin shortly after 1785 (when it
had appeared in an English translation by Charles Wilkins), and
the first German edition with translation is dated 1802. One can
observe a tendency in early nineteenth-century continental philo-
sophy in Europe to favour a return to a cyclic view of the course
of events, and this is evidently due to Upanishadic influences.
From Lessing to Wordsworth there is also a tendency to toy with
the idea of Karma and to interpret life in terms of metempsychosis.
Buddhist influences are to be seen in the writings of the Swiss,
Amiel (mid-nineteenth century). It begins now to be evident to
Europeans that the prevailing view of life in cultured India is one
which sets little store by individual personalities, and thinks that
nothing significant is achieved or lost by the course of events. To
seek to derive knowledge of or contact with Absolute Deity
through any group of historical happenings is for the philosophic
Hindu as idle as it is unnecessary, since every epoch has imme-
diate access to Deity, and the same exalted spiritual states were as possible for Sankara as for any yogi in the twentieth century.

What, we may fairly ask, would have been the course of thought and education in Europe, if Hebraeo-Christian ideas had not prevailed? Supposing that the Roman Empire had remained under the sway of a line of emperors and a body of civil servants who were Stoics or Neo-Platonists, there might have been less interest in history than actually occurred as the result of the establishment of Christianity as the State religion. It is permissible to doubt, however, whether this would have happened apart from Greek influence, since the Roman temperament favoured strongly the emphasis upon historical events (especially as signalizing the intervention of a god), kept anniversaries, and composed annals. This interest in events it transmitted to the Europe of the age which succeeded the fall of the Western Empire, and the effects are seen in the works of the monastic chroniclers, such, for example, as the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, and the Ecclesiastical History of Bede. On the other hand, the debasing and paganizing of the Christian movement during the Dark Ages led for a time to a less scrupulous adherence to the strictly historical, and to the intrusion of much folk-legend and myth; witness the remarkable vogue of apocryphal and legendary extra-canonical additions to the New Testament story and the extravagant 'lives' of the mediaeval saints. All this was tolerated because it was thought edifying, and ministering to piety. In addition, there was the development from the ninth century onwards of a monastic mysticism based on Latin and other translations of the spurious works of Dionysius the Areopagite, which were really the composition of an unknown Syrian of neo-Platonic tendencies. Through this remarkable piece of devout forgery the mediaeval Church became inoculated with a piety which was much more Indian than European, and it is not surprising that readers of Tauler, Ruysbroeck, and Eckhart have felt themselves caught away into an atmosphere which is much more like that of the Upanishads than of the New Testament. Abbot John Chapman is quoted by Aldous Huxley as saying that it is extremely difficult to reconcile mysticism and Christianity, and that for fifteen years he disliked the writings of the Spanish mystic St. John of the Cross and called him a Buddhist. The point here is that the mystic who derives his inspiration from pseudo-Dionysius is prone to think of the Gospel story as "a process for ever unfolded in the
heart of man," whereas that story refuses to be disposed of in such a way: "It must either be accepted or rejected as historical fact. The reaction against myth and mysticism which began with the sixteenth-century reformation in Europe, and which has increased up to the present day, may be described as a more completely logical working out in Western Christendom of the essentially Hebraeo-Christian valuation of the course of events, and it has reached its peak in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the relentlessly scientific editing and scrutiny of documentary and other sources of information as to "what really happened" and the scientific biographies of individuals.

It is always possible for a reaction to occur which will revive in the Western world on a large scale the idea of a weary series of world-cycles, and therewith the tendency to pessimism and world-and-life-negation which goes with it. Once again there may be a revival, even in Christian circles, of identity-mysticism, and once more a flight to the cloister. But it seems more likely that the impact of Marxism will stimulate the increase of an activist and world-transforming Christianity, and perhaps also in the East of a more world-affirming Hinduism, though it is doubtful to what extent Marxism enhances the value of the individual. Meanwhile, I venture to submit that the result of this enquiry so far is to establish that the valuation of the historical is a variable, dependent upon culture and ideology, and not something which is permanently favoured or discouraged by any particular geographical area on the planet.

It may be worth while next to draw attention to some remarks of the late Professor Taylor* regarding the tendency of recent scientific thought to favour the higher valuation of the individual, and to emphasize the significance of the uniqueness and irreversibility of terrestrial happenings. He begins by referring to an address delivered in 1927 by Professor E. T. Whittaker at a mathematical section of the annual meeting of the British Association. Geometry, he said, was formerly imagined to set the stage for the play in which the atoms and molecules of the physicist were the dramatis personae; but now we have come to think of these dramatis personae as making their own stage as they move about. That, says Taylor, means that we now think of our protons and electrons historically, as genuine individuals, with real characters of their own, which determine the situations in which they find themselves; ... on the older, classical view, the physi-
cists' atom could hardly be said to have an intrinsic character of its own; its adventures were prescribed for it by a situation which it did nothing to make. . . . To-day we are told that even the mass of the atom is not strictly invariable, but undergoes modification in the course of its adventures. Taylor would, of course, admit that the atom and its component parts could only in a very rudimentary sense be said to possess character, and to undergo adventures determined by their intrinsic characters. Below the level of the animate there may well be a whole hierarchy of types of individual, all lower than the cabbage, yet all graded among themselves. The richer the type of an individual's individuality, the more will his adventures on his course through history be seen to be determined by his own intrinsic character, and his relations with individuals of his own or a higher type; and it may be suggested that what looks like such an indifferent framework, in reference to the adventures of creatures among their equals and superiors, may be in truth itself a complex of adventures of individuals of poorer types among their equals.

Taylor's remarks should be read in the context of a whole group of comments which have arisen in recent years by way of protest against the reduction of historical studies to the purely scientific grinding out of facts. Thus Professor Butterfield argues: "There is not an essence of history which can be got by evaporating the human and the personal factors, the incidental or momentary or local things, and the circumstantial elements, as though at the bottom of the well there were something absolute, some truth independent of time and circumstance. When he describes the past, the historian has to recapture the richness of the moments, the humanity of the man, the setting of external circumstances, and the implications of events; and far from sweeping them away, he piles up the concrete, the particular, the personal. He studies the changes of things which change, and not the permanence of the mountains and the stars." Although Professor Bury, in the interests of scientific accuracy, declared "History is a science, no less and no more," even he found himself in the end compelled to break with the Positivists, "because," as he says, "they regard history as merely a part of sociology, useful only as enabling one to discover the sociological laws." For Bury, history must be an end in itself, and its scope the determination of the stage in the unique causal series from the most rudimentary to the present state of human civilization. Troeltsch, the early twentieth-century
German philosopher, in his vast unfinished work *Der Historismus und seine Probleme*, declares: "History has freed us from mathematical-mechanical concepts of nature." The American, William James, dismisses the attempt to explain the historical process merely by the transformation of physical energy: "The second law of thermodynamics is wholly irrelevant to history except that it sets a terminus." Finally, Professor H. G. Wood of Birmingham University sums up the whole situation in picturesque fashion: "If he had the time and I had the brain, Mr. Bertrand Russell could explain mathematical physics to me. But it is an illusion to suppose that any advance in mathematical physics could explain Mr. Bertrand Russell to me. . . . I could only hope to reach that, if it were within my reach at all, by adopting the distinctively historical approach." The same presuppositions have made Professor G. M. Trevelyan declare that Clio is truly a Muse, and that only a man with gifts of artistic appreciation and literary expression can be a great historian. "History is a science, but it is at once less and more than a physical science. Like psychology it is inevitably less exact than physics because it is concerned with individuals at a richer and higher level than electrons, but it is also more of a science, because it deals with aspects of human experience which lie for ever outside the type of explanation sought in the physical sciences."

This series of quotations shows clearly that there are two processes at work in modern Western thought. On the one hand, there is an attempt to reduce the scientific study of history to the mere collection and classification of facts of human behaviour and the deduction therefrom of a number of general laws. Against this there is a strong protest. On the other hand, there is a movement within the physical sciences in the direction of a higher valuation of the uniqueness of the several elements in the chain of causal events. As Taylor says, it is somewhat paradoxical that some of our philosophers should be trying to make religion, as they think, truer by the elimination of the historical, in the same age in which they are trying to make physical science truer by its introduction.

Yet it is important to distinguish between two distinct Western ways of approaching history. The Christian, as Bury rightly says, regards the history of the earth as a unique phenomenon in time, the product of an irreversible process ordered by Divine Providence leading up to a definite and desirable goal in the future.

*In his Hulsean lectures.*

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The humanist and rationalist subsequently took over this view, though dissociating it from any connection with Providence or Divine over-ruling. Both Christian and humanist are thus interested in history, but their interest is motivated by entirely different presuppositions. The humanist has up to the present believed that progress towards a definite and desirable goal was inevitable, provided man took himself seriously enough, and that he must and could no doubt correct lapses from seriousness for himself. The Christian, claiming greater realism, has insisted that man has received delegated spontaneity from Deity, but that apart from obedience to the holy will and purpose of Deity he cannot be the successful artist of his own life, so that progress is far from being inevitable, and a planned secularist society may be merely one planned for destruction, like the beautiful gardens of some Papuan villagers, which as soon as they have matured may be at once wrecked by the disorderly and warlike instincts of neighbouring villagers.

The humanist historian counters this assertion by reviving in modified form the earlier idea of cycles. This seems to lie behind the work of Spengler and to some degree that of Toynbee. Both contend that a survey of past civilizations enables us to see them as phenomena each with a definite life-history rather like that of a star as outlined in modern manuals of astronomy. Toynbee sets out to examine some twenty of them and concludes that they all go through certain phases such as "Times of Troubles," etc., leading up to "Roman ecumenical peace," which is bought at so high a price and comes so late that the civilization in question crashes in securing it, only to be replaced by another. Spengler's view is much the same, but so far as can be seen he suggests no way of evading the crash. Toynbee, on the other hand, in his most recent utterance (Listener, June 1948) holds out some hope that once the danger ahead can be seen and struggled against, a new situation may be developed in which civilized man may emerge from his vicious cycle of successive disasters, and preserve his spiritual treasures.¹

This sounds more cheering, yet it is to the Christian only another brand of humanism, and he sees in it nothing but a vain hope.

The reply to it has come from Switzerland, in a work by Dr.

¹ Were it not for this, Toynbee's study of history would seem to be dangerously close to the sociological method of the positivist.
Emil Brunner (Zürich 1941) *Offenbarung und Vernunft*, and this has been followed up by a similar work by Professor O. Cullmann, entitled *Christus und die Zeit* (Zürich 1946). It will suffice to give here Dr. Brunner's argument. There are, he says, various degrees of relation between time and events. The lowest is in the sphere of physics and chemistry. In physics happenings are interconvertible; bodies that are at rest are set in motion, and bodies in motion come to a state of rest. There is no direction to the happenings, and indeed nothing "happens" at all. Everything goes on without aim or end. Organic nature shows us a form of happening which has a special connection with time. Life-processes cannot be reversed. . . . The living happening has a meaning of its own, and takes place once for all in moving from one direction to the other. Yet even this organic life moves in cycles; from the seed comes the tree, and from the tree the fruit, and again from the fruit the seed, and so on in eternal recurrence. Thus strictly speaking we cannot refer to "natural history," since where the same thing continually recurs, there is no history. History only takes place within the human sphere. History unfolds in quite a different way from nature. It undoubtedly includes the organic time of growth and becoming, but it also contains a new element, that of decision. Decisions are made where the mind or spirit, and above all the will, emerge, for this spiritual will creates decisions that cannot be reversed. "The more spiritual will there is, the more decision; and the more history, the more that which is irrevocable. The will is the kernel of personality, and the more personal life becomes, the more relation there is with time."

Yet history, though understood in this sense, is still not the highest stage in the category of events. Even history, when regarded purely as human history, has something in it of a cyclic character. Human beings never get away from the control of the forces with which they struggle, and this conflict goes on in essential terms unchanged from age to age, in spite of the uniqueness of historical happenings. There are, it is true, decisions, but the decisive event does not take place. There are turning points, but the one turning point which might completely deliver the course of human history from its *untergang* does not arrive. There are unique events, but the supremely unique event does not occur. At least it does not occur in the opinion of the humanist historian, although he may feel that it ought to do so. There is no doubt what is needed. It is, of course, not denied that the Divine
activity may be seen in the creative evolution of the universe and in its being sustained from day to day. But something more is needed, namely that the whole and not simply the partial meaning of life should be realized, and that the cosmos should be redeemed from the self-centredness into which it has fallen by its misuse of the spontaneity delegated to it. This would not be what Dr. Inge has called: "God governing the world by occasional coups d'état," though such might be held to be the meaning of the oft-repeated verse from Gita:

Whenever there is a decay of righteousness, O Bharata, and an uprising of unrighteousness, then I emit Myself: in order to save the good and to destroy evil-doers, to establish righteousness I am born from age to age.

It is rather a discontinuous action of the absolute Deity within the world of His perpetual evolution and maintenance, an intensification of His Presence, by which He, the Eternal, breaks into time, the Perfect into the world of imperfection. Even the Gita itself recognizes the transcendence of the Lord as well as His immanence, for we read:

All beings abide in Me but I abide not in them:
I bear these things, yet I abide not in beings;
My own Self is the abode of beings.

Yet, as Brunner points out, in the European mystical pantheistic religion, in the Idealistic acosmism, and in the moralistic religion of the Aufklärung, there is no such divine intrusion into history, and within such a conception of religion the historical element has very little place. To the thought of the Aufklärung the advaita is nearer, to the thought of the orthodox Christian West that of sectarian Hinduism is nearer.

Brunner's reaction to the pessimism of Spengler and Toynbee therefore would be to say that untergang is inevitable as part of the cyclic fate which besets all history organized on a secular basis. It is only the acceptance of the once-for-all Incarnation which can deliver the temporal and ephemeral from evanescence into eternity, "the wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord", and again, "the creature itself shall be delivered from corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Romans vi. 23 and viii. 21).

It has been pointed out that Śri Aurobindo has arrived at somewhat the same position by another path: but I think that
there are important differences. Aurobindo's conception of the New Man who is the continuant of the old man on a higher level, with greater integrity and balance and with a new accession of God in him, is of that which is produced by a further advance in the evolutionary process, not by an irruption of the Eternal into the time process. Moreover, the Christian, typified by Brunner, sees in Christ the new destiny of man realized, and regards the Heilsgeschichte of the Gospel as super-history. Aurobindo expects the New Man in the future, and unless I have misunderstood him, thinks of him less as what used to be called an avatār, than as a stage in the ascent of God from the entropy of self-concealment which preceded it (and in which God descended to begin creation at its lowest level), a stage therefore in the evolutionary process by which God recovers Himself, reversing the order and, so to speak, mounting the steps of the ladder. This, of course, substitutes one vast cyclic movement for a series of such movements, and it is in this respect that Aurobindo seems to me truest to his Hindu heritage, with its belief about life as a great Divine rhythm involving what the Hellenistic world would have called πλατυμός followed by συντολή.¹ But this would make history less easy to study in the ordinary Western sense, and its adoption would bring us back to the very position referred to by Dr. Inge in a recent lecture delivered in London: "The Greek thinkers believed in cycles, a cosmic pulsation of progress and decline. Their universities had no chairs of history." I had not seen that quotation when I composed this paper, but it may serve as a fitting sequel to it.

¹ See Dr. Hari Prasad Sastri in the Listener, May, 1943: "The whole universe is to Hinduism God's projection. It is a manifestation of the Divine Being, is maintained by Him, and He abides in every atom of it. According to His Will, all life emanating from Him must return to Him." The idea is that of a cosmic pilgrimage.
Of the Indian theories of art the most important is the one known as the Rasa theory. References to it are found in very early Sanskrit works, but it was not formulated and clearly expounded until the ninth century A.D.¹ In various directions, it marks an advance on the earlier theories and has virtually superseded them. In one respect, its conception of the aim of art, it is quite unique. The purpose of the present article is to explain the nature of this conception, and briefly to indicate wherein its uniqueness lies. Though the theory applies equally to all the fine arts, it has been particularly well-developed in relation to poetry and the drama; and we shall therefore consider it here mainly from that standpoint. But before we proceed to do so, it is desirable, for the sake of contrast, to make a reference to the general Indian view of poetry so far as it bears on the topic we are to consider.

I

There are two points of view from which the aim of poetry may be considered—one, of the poet, and the other, of the reader of poetry.² But for us, in explaining the distinctive feature of the view taken of it in the Rasa school, it is the latter that is more important. Let us therefore begin by asking the question: What is the use of poetry to its reader? The answer that is almost universally given to this question by Indian writers is pleasure (prīti).³ It may have other uses also for him. For example, it may have some lesson or criticism of life to convey to him; but they are all

¹ This formulation is found in the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana. It was authoritatively commented upon in the tenth century A.D. by Abhinava Gupta. We shall hereafter refer to this work as DA., and our references will be to the first edition of it printed at Bombay in 1891.
² It is not meant by this that the two view-points necessarily differ in every respect.
³ See, e.g., Vāmana's Kāvyālaksāhāra-sūtra, I, i, 5.
more or less remote, unlike pleasure which is its immediate use or value for him. But pleasure here is not to be taken in the abstract; rather, to judge from the explanation given of its nature in Indian works, it stands for a state of the self or a mode of experience of which it is a constant and conspicuous feature. Hence pleasure, by itself, does not constitute the whole of what is experienced at the time of poetic appreciation, but is only an aspect of it. The immediate value of poetry for the reader then is the attainment of this enjoyable experience, and not mere pleasure. That is its primary use, and any other use it may have for him is a further good which poetry brings.

But pleasure, even when thus understood, is an end that is associated with many kinds of activities such, for example, as eating or bathing, which none would place on the same level as poetry. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the two. The distinction depends chiefly on the fact that, though art may eventually be based upon nature, we are, in appreciating the objects it depicts, concerned more with their appearance than with their actual existence. In art, as it has been stated, "we value the semblance above the reality." So the artist selects only those among the features of the object to be depicted that are necessary for making his representation appear like it, and omits all the rest. A painter, for example, does not actually show us the thickness or depth of the things he paints, but yet succeeds in giving us an idea of their solidity. Art objects have consequently no place in the everyday world of space and time; and, owing to this lack of spatio-temporal position or physical status, the question of reality does not apply to them. This does not mean that they are unreal; it only means that the distinction of existence and non-existence does not arise at all in their case.¹

But we should not think that these objects may therefore be of no interest to the reader. They have their own attraction for him, because a certain element of novelty enters into their representation. We have stated that the artist selects those features of the object he deals with which will make it retain its resemblance to the real. But that is not the whole truth, for he has also recourse often to fresh invention. Thus an Indian poet, in referring to the

¹ Cf. the term sadyah ("instantly") used in describing the aim of poetry in Kāyā-prahāka (Bombay Sanskrit Series), p. 8: sadyah para-nirūty. This work will be referred to as KP. hereafter.

² Cf. KP., pp. 102–103, where this point is illustrated by the example of a "painted horse" (citra-luraga).
appearance of the earth on a moonlit night, represents it as “carved out of ivory.” Almost all the writers on poetics lay down that *pratibhāna*, which may be rendered in English as “creative fancy,” is an indispensable condition of genuine poetry. It is “the seed of poetry” (*kavītva-bīja*), according to them. But the Sanskrit word further connotes that the object, so fancied, is experienced *as if* it is being actually perceived—“like a globular fruit,” it is said, “placed on the palm of one’s own hand.” But such invention does not mean the introduction of new features for their own sake. They are not merely pleasant fictions. When a poet, for instance, pictures fairies as dwelling in flowers or a cloud as carrying a message of love, he does so in strict conformity to the total imaginative vision which has inspired him to the creation of the particular work of art. The art object is thus much more than an appearance of the actual. It involves a good deal of mental construction, and far surpasses in quality its counterpart in nature.¹ In other words, the poet idealizes the objects in depicting them; and it is in this process that they are raised to the level of art and acquire aesthetic significance and, though not real, come to be of interest to the reader.

As a result of their idealized character, art objects lose their appeal to the egoistic or practical self and appear the same to all. That is, art appreciation is indifferent not only to the distinction between the real and the unreal, but also to that between desire and aversion. They become impersonal in their appeal, and therefore enjoyable in and for themselves.² It is the complete detachment with which, in consequence, we view them, that makes our attitude then one of pure contemplation. But we must be careful to remember that by describing this attitude as contemplative, we do not mean that it is passive and excludes all activity. The very fact that it is an *appreciative* attitude implies that it is active. The belief that it is passive is the result of mistaking the disinterested for what is totally lacking in interest. But, as we have seen, the art object has its own interest to the spectator; and, so long as his mind is under the selective control of interest,

¹ The following anecdote narrated about a famous painter of modern times brings out this feature very well. When the artist had painted a sunset, somebody said to him, “I never saw a sunset like that”; and he replied, “Don’t you wish you could?”

² Cf. KP., p. 107. This does not, however, mean that the response to them will be the same in the case of all. It will certainly vary, but only according to the aesthetic sensibilities of particular individuals and not according to their other personal peculiarities.
it can by no means be regarded as passive. All that is meant by saying that the art object makes no appeal to the practical self is that our attention then is confined wholly to that object, and that it is not diverted therefrom by any thought of an ulterior use to which it may be put.

This transcendence of the egoistic self in the contemplation of art profoundly alters the nature of the pleasure derived from it. Being altogether divorced from reference to personal interests, one's own or that of others, art experience is free from all the limitations of common pleasure, due to the prejudices of everyday life such as narrow attachment and envy. In a word, the contemplation being disinterested, the pleasure which it yields will be absolutely pure. That is the significance of its description by Indian writers as "higher pleasure" (para-nirvṛtya).¹ And art will yield such pleasure, it should be observed, not only when its subject-matter is pleasant, but even when it is not, as in a tragedy with its representation of unusual suffering and irremediable disaster. The facts poetized may, as parts of the actual world, be the source of pain as well as pleasure; but, when they are contemplated in their idealized form, they should necessarily give rise only to the latter. It is for this reason that pleasure is represented in Indian works as the sole aim of all art.² It means that the spectator, in appreciating art, rises above the duality of pain and pleasure as commonly known, and experiences pure joy. Here we see the differentia of poetic pleasure or, more generally, aesthetic delight.

II

The Rasa school agrees with the above conception of the poetic aim, but it distinguishes between two forms of it; and since the distinction depends upon the view which the school takes of the theme of poetry, we have first to indicate the nature of that view. The theme of poetry, according to the general Indian theory, may be anything. One of the oldest writers on poetics in Sanskrit remarks that there is nothing in the realm of being or in that of

¹ See note I, page 177 above. Cf. the explanation of priti as alaukiha-camat-kāra in DA., p. 203 (com.). In view of this higher character, it would be better to substitute for it a word like "joy" or "delight." But for the sake of uniformity, we shall generally use the word "pleasure" itself.

² KP., 1, 1 (p. 2): (hlādaikamayt). Since no pleasure, as commonly known, answers to this description, it is not a hedonistic view of art, in the accepted sense, that we have here.
thought which does not serve the poet’s purpose. Nor is any distinction made there between one topic and another as regards fitness for poetic treatment. One subject is as good as another, and there is none on which a fine poem might not be written. The Rasa school also admits the suitability of all themes for poetic treatment, but it divides them into two classes—one comprising those that are dominated by some emotion, particularly an elemental one like love and pathos, and the other all the remaining ones; and it holds that, for the purpose of poetic treatment, the first is superior to the second. The exact significance of this bifurcation of themes will become clear as we proceed. For the present, it will suffice to say that there are two types or orders of poetry, according to this school, one dealing with “emotional situations” in life, as we may describe them, and the other dealing with the other situations in life or with objects of external nature; and that the latter is reckoned as relatively inferior poetry. It is in justifying this discrimination that the Rasa school makes the differentiation in the purpose of poetry to which we have just referred. But before attempting to explain it, it is desirable to draw attention to one or two important points concerning emotional situations regarded as the theme of poetry.

A poem of the higher type, we have stated, depicts a situation which is predominantly emotional. This emphasis on the emotional character of the theme may lead one to suppose that the type resembles lyrical poetry, as distinguished (say) from the epic and the drama. The expression “lyrical poetry” does not seem to have any very definite significance. But if, as implied by common usage, it stands for a particular class of poetry and signifies the expression by the poet of his own feelings, we must say that, on neither of these considerations, is the above supposition correct:

In the first place, emotional situations may here be the chief theme of any kind of poetry. In fact, their importance is discussed in the works of the school, particularly with reference to the drama; and the adoption of such a method is fully supported by the facts of India’s literary history. Thus it is a situation of love that is dramatized by Kālidāsa in his famous play of the Śākuntalam; and, in the case of the equally famous play of Bhavabhūti, the Uttara-rāma-caritam which treats of the desertion of Sita by

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1 Bhāmaha’s Kāvyādānkhāra, v. 4.  
2 DA., p. 28; pp. 26–27 (com.).  
3 This class is further divided in a twofold way, but the division is not of importance for us here.  
4 Cf. “Lyric poetry is the expression by the poet of his own feelings”: Ruskin.
her royal husband, it is one of deep pathos. It is not merely
dramas that may choose such topics for treatment; even extensive
epics are not precluded from doing so. Thus the emotional element
serves here as the basis for contrasting different grades, rather
than different forms of poetry. We may adopt any classification of
it we like. Every one of the resulting classes, according to the
present view, will comprise two grades of poetry—one, the higher,
in which the theme is predominantly emotional; and the other
the lower, in which it is not so.

In the next place, the poet’s own feeling, according to the
Rasa view, is never the theme of poetry. This point is usually
explained by reference to the episode narrated in the beginning of
the Rāmāyaṇa about the birth of Sanskrit classical poetry. The
details of the episode are attractive enough to bear repetition,
and they are briefly as follows: On a certain day, in a beautiful
forest bordering on his hermitage, Vālmīki, the future author of
the epic, it is said, chanced to witness a fowler killing one of a
pair of lovely birds that were disporting themselves on the branch
of a tree. The evil-minded fowler had singled out the male bird,
and had brought it down at one stroke. Seeing it lie dead on the
ground, all bathed in blood, its companion began to wail in
plaintive tones. The soft-hearted sage was moved intensely by the
sight; and he burst into song which was full of pathos and which,
according to tradition, became the prelude to the composition of
the first great epic in Sanskrit.

This poetic utterance is apt to be viewed as the expression of
the sage’s sorrow at the sight he witnessed; but writers of the
Rasa school point out that it cannot really be so,¹ for the utter-
ance of personal feeling would be quite different. It is hardly
natural, they say, for one that is tormented by grief to play the
poet. The sage is not preoccupied with his own immediate re-
action to what he saw, but with something else, viz. the objective
scene itself. He is less concerned with his own feelings than with
what has stirred them, and the song gives expression to the
poignancy of the latter. But, as in the case of other poetic themes,
it is not the emotional situation as it actually was (laukika) that
is represented in it. That would by no means constitute art. It is
the situation as it is in the poet’s vision,² or as it has been trans-

¹ Na tu muneḥ soka iti mantavyam: DA., pp. 27–28 (com.).
² Indian writers describe this as “in the poem” (kāya-gata) to distinguish it
from the fact poetized, which is outside it. See DA., p. 56 (com.).
figured by his sensitive nature and imaginative power (alaukika). In other words, the situation is idealized. Absorption in such a situation, for the reason already set forth, means transcending the tensions of ordinary life, and thereby attaining a unique form of experience. It is when the poet is fully under the spell of such experience that he spontaneously expresses himself in the form of poetry.

III

To explain now the nature of the differentiation which the Rasa school makes in the aim of poetry: we have stated that poems may be of two kinds—one with an emotional theme and the other in which the theme is different, like (say) natural scenery:

1 In the latter, there are the words of the poem; and the thoughts and images which they convey form its essential content. It is the disinterested contemplation of them that gives rise to the joy of poetry. This contemplation, as a mental state, involves a subjective as well as an objective factor; and it is the total absorption in the objective factor, forgetting the subjective, that constitutes poetic experience here.

2 But the case is altogether different in the other type of poetry. For the central feature of the situation to be portrayed in it is an emotion; and no emotion is, in its essence, directly describable. The poet cannot therefore communicate it as he can a thought or image. He can only suggest it to the reader, who has already had personal experience of it (for it cannot be made known to any other), by delineating its causes and consequences or, in other words, the objects that prompt it and the reactions which they provoke. That is, the emotional aspect of the situation can be indicated only in an indirect or mediate sense, the media being the thoughts and images, as conveyed by the poet's words, of the

1 Yāvat purṇo na ca etena tāvat naiya vamanayamam: DA., p. 27 (com.).
2 It is not meant that words in a poem always or necessarily form only the medium of conveying thoughts or images. They may, and often do, contribute directly to the beauty of the poem. We are overlooking that point, since our purpose here is to bring out the distinction in aim in the case of the two types of poetry we are considering, and not to explain the nature of either completely.
3 The use of words like "love" and "anger" may convey to a person, who knows their meaning, an idea of the corresponding emotion; but it will be only an idea of it, while what is meant here is a felt emotion. See DA., pp. 24–26.
4 To use technical terms, it will necessarily be vyākṣya. Thoughts and images also may be suggested; but they are, at the same time, expressible and therefore vācyā also.
ART EXPERIENCE

objective constituents of that situation. Thus what, by themselves, form the content in the other type of poetry here become the means to its suggestion. They accordingly occupy a place here similar to the one occupied by words there; and the final aesthetic fact in this type of poetry thereby comes to be, not thoughts and images as in the other, but the emotional mood which they help to induce in the reader. Now, as an emotion is a phase of our own being and not a presentation, this mood cannot be contemplated, but can only be lived through; and it is this inner process of experiencing that is the ultimate meaning or aim in this type of poetry. There is a presentational element involved in this case also, as certainly as there is in the other, and it has, of course, its own poetic quality or beauty, if we like to put it so; but reduced, as it becomes here, to merely a condition of suggesting the emotion, it slides into the margin in our consciousness, instead of occupying the focus as it does there.

Thus the experience for which poetic appreciation stands here is vastly different from that for which it stands in the other type of poetry. It also connotes detached joy; but, while the other experience takes the form of contemplating the poetic object, this one takes the form entirely of an inward realization. The distinction will become clear, if we consider one or two examples. Let us contrast the example, already cited, of imagining the moonlit earth as "carved out of ivory," with the appreciation of Kālidāsa's Cloud Messenger, which depicts the forlorn state of a lover exiled from his home. In the former, there is plainly an external object in the focus of our attention; but in the latter, though it abounds in exquisite pictures of external nature, we have finally to look within in order to appreciate properly its ultimate meaning, viz. the deep anguish of forced separation from the beloved. To take another pair of illustrations, let us compare Milton's description, in the Nativity Hymn, of the rising sun as "in bed curtained with

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1 See DA., pp. 31-32, 190-191.
2 The same may appear to hold good of the other phases of mind also, but it does not. To consider the case of "thought," the only one of them that has a bearing on our subject (see next Note): According to the Indian conception, the term "thought" (jñāna) means "what reveals" (prakāśaka); and, in this sense, thought is always intimately connected with "what is revealed" (prakāśya), viz. the object. Hence the process of thinking, apart from reference to some presentation, is meaningless. When it has meaning, i.e. when it is considered along with the presentational element, it becomes expressible and can also be contemplated. Cf. Arthasastra viṣṇuviṣṇu viśeṣo hi mirākāratavā dhiyām.
3 Ordinarily an emotion, no doubt, is also directed upon some object; but here, as aesthetic activity is not practical in its usual sense, this element is lacking.
cloudy red'' and as pillowing ''his chin upon an orient wave,'' and
Tennyson's well-known lyric, Break, Break, Break, with its poignant
lament for lost love, heightened by a knowledge of the indifference
of the world, as a whole, to the suffering of the individual. In the
former, the reader is engrossed in an object outside himself; but,
in the latter, he has to retreat, as it were, into his inner self to
realize its final emotional import. Both varieties of experience, as
being aesthetic, are marked by a temporary forgetting of the self.
But while in one case, the objective factor is integral to the ulti-
mate poetic experience; in the other, it is not so,1 because it has,
as we have seen, only a marginal significance. That is, the emotion
is experienced here virtually by itself, and the experience may
accordingly be said to transcend, in a sense, the subject-object
relation, and therefore to be of a higher order2 than the mere
contemplation of the other kind of poetry. It is this higher ex-
perience that is called ''Rasa.''

The word ''Rasa'' primarily means ''taste'' or ''savour,'' such
as sweetness; and, by a metaphorical extension, it has been
applied to the type of experience referred to above. The point
of the metaphor is that, as in the case of a taste like sweetness, there
is no knowing of Rasa apart from directly experiencing it.3 This
experience, in addition to having its own affective tone or feeling
of pleasure which is common to all aesthetic appreciation, is, as
we know, predominantly emotional; and it is the latter feature,
viz. the predominance of its emotional quality, that distinguishes
it from the experience derivable from the other type of poetry,
dealing with a subject like natural scenery. It naturally differs
according to the specific kind of emotion portrayed—love, pathos,
fear, wonder and the like; and, on the basis of this internal dif-
fERENCE, Rasa experience is ordinarily divided into eight or nine
kinds. But it is not necessary for our present purpose to enter
into these details. Besides, Rasa is, in its intrinsic nature, but one
according to the best authorities;4 and its so-called varieties are
only different forms of it, due to a difference in their respective
psychological determinants. In its fundamental character, it
signifies a mood of emotional exaltation which, on the ground of

2 It will be noticed that, in thus ascribing a superior status to Rasa experience,
the value of neither the subjective nor the objective factor is denied, since the
need for it of personal experience (remotely) and of appropriate objective accom-
paniments (externally) is fully recognized.
3 Cf. āsvāyamānatā-prānataya bhānti. DA., p. 24 (com.).
4 Cf. Abhinava-bhārañ, pp. 273–274 and 293.
what has been stated so far, may be characterized as quite unique.

It is necessary to dwell further on the nature of this experience, if what is meant by Rasa is to be properly understood. We have shown that when a poet treats of an emotional theme, he never depicts his own feeling, but only that which distinguishes the objective situation occasioning that feeling. This should not be taken to mean that it is the awareness (to revert to our earlier illustration) of the bird’s sorrow at the loss of its mate, even in its idealized form, which constitutes Rasa experience. As already implied, it consists in an ideal revival (udbodhana) in the reader’s mind of a like emotion which, being elemental by hypothesis, may be expected to lie latent in all. Being a revival, it necessarily goes back to his past experience; but it is, at the same time, very much more than a reminiscence. In particular, the emotional situation, owing to the profound transformation which it undergoes in the process of poetic treatment, will throw a new light on that experience and reveal its deeper significance for life as, for instance, in the case of love, in Kālidāsa’s Sākuntalam, which appears first as the manifestation of a natural impulse but is transformed before the play concludes into what has been described as “a spiritual welding of hearts.” To realize such significance fully, the reader’s own efforts become necessary in the way of imaginatively reproducing in his mind the whole situation as it has been depicted by the poet. Rasa experience is thus the outcome more of reconstruction than of remembrance. The whole theory is based on the recognition of an affinity of nature between the poet and the reader of poetry; and, on the basis of this affinity, it is explained that appreciation of poetry is essentially the same as the creation of it. The need for presupposing past experience arises from the peculiar nature of emotion, to which we have already drawn attention, viz., its essential privacy owing to which it remains opaque, as it were, to all those who have not personally felt it. But past experience serves merely as the centre round which the reconstruction takes place; and, in this reconstructed form, it is anything but personal.

The point to be specially noticed here is that emotions are not

1 DA., pp. 56-57 (com.).
2 Nāyakṣya kaveḥ śrotuḥ samāsauḥ bhavah: DA., p. 29 (com.). Cf. “To listen to a harmony is to commune with its composer.”
communicated by the poet to the reader, as it is often assumed. In fact, they cannot be communicated according to the present theory. All that the poet can do is to awaken in him an emotion similar to the one he is depicting. Even this awakening, it should be noted, is not the result of any conscious purpose on the part of the poet. The spontaneous character of all poetic utterance precludes such a supposition. The poet is intent, not upon influencing the reader in this or that way, but upon giving expression, as best he can, to his unique experience. It is this expression that is primary, and the kindling up or waking to life of the emotion in the mind of the reader is more in the nature of its consequence than the result of any set purpose behind it. The reader starts from the poet’s expression; and, if he is competent, that is, if he is sufficiently sensitive and sympathetic, he succeeds in capturing for himself the experience which it embodies. The process whereby such ideal awakening takes place is described. Briefly, the mind of the responsive reader first becomes attuned to the emotional situation portrayed (hydaya-sanīvāda), through one or more of the knowing touches which every good poem is sure to contain; is then absorbed in its portrayal (tanmayī-bhavāna); and this absorption, in the deeper sense already explained, results in the aesthetic rapture of Rasa (rasānubhava).

If this type of poetry were identical with lyrical and with short poems, we might have a relatively simple emotion as its characteristic feature. But when its scope is widened as here, the emotions involved may be very complex indeed. In an epic, for example, practically all the familiar emotions are likely to appear at one stage or another; and, if they are not well co-ordinated, the aesthetic value of the poem will suffer. Hence the exponents of the Rasa view lay down that the treatment of the theme by the poet should be such as to secure the unity of the different emotions suggested—a unity which, they insist, is as important a canon of poetic composition here, as the unity of action is admitted to be in the case of all poetry. Only a single emotion should be represented in a poem as dominant on the whole; and its progressive development from the moment of its emergence to its natural culmination should be methodically delineated. Its many and varied manifestations should be properly related to it, so that its portrayal may become internally coherent. Where other emotions,
not altogether incompatible with it, enter the situation, they should all be synthetically related to it. Everything else also, like the construction of the plot, the interludes, characterization and the poetic imagery in which the artist clothes his ideas should be oriented towards the ruling emotion. Even the diction and the other refinements of style must be appropriate to its nature. In one word, fitness (aucitya) of everything that has any bearing on it is the life-breath of Rasa.¹ This topic occupies considerable space in the works of the school; but, in view of its uniform recognition of the spontaneity of all poetic utterance, the rules formulated in this connection are to be looked upon more as aids in appraising the worth of a poem of this type than as restraints placed upon the freedom of the poet.

But the intrinsic worth of a poem is not all that is needed for its true appreciation. The reader also should be properly equipped for it. No doubt, the emotion depicted in this type of poetry is elemental, and therefore familiar to all. But that only signifies the universality of its appeal. It means that nobody is excluded from appreciating it, merely by virtue of its theme. The reader, in addition to possessing a general artistic aptitude which is required for the appreciation of all poetry, should be specially qualified, if he is to appraise and enjoy a poem of the present type.² These qualifications are compendiously indicated by saying that he should be a sa-hṛdaya,³ a word which cannot easily be rendered in English. It literally means "one of similar heart," and may be taken to signify a person whose insight into the nature of poetry is, in point of depth, next only to that of the poet. In the absence of adequate equipment, he may lose sight of the Rasa aspect and get absorbed in the objective details portrayed by the poet which also, as we said, have a poetic quality of their own. He would then be preferring the externals of true poetry to its essence; or, as Indian critics put it, he would mistake the "body" (śarīra) of poetry for its "soul" (ātman).⁴ To cite a parallel from another of the fine arts, he will be like a person who, in looking on a statue of Buddha in meditative posture, remains satisfied with admiring the beauty, naturalness and proportion of its outward features, but fails to realize the ideal of serenity and calm depicted there, which constitutes its ultimate meaning. It is on this basis, viz. that it is not merely the intrinsic excellence of a poem that is

¹ DA., p. 145.
² Ibid., pp. 18–19 (com.).
³ Ibid., p. 11 (com.).
⁴ Ibid., p. 13 (com.).
required for attaining Rasa experience but also a special capacity for it in the reader, that the present school explains how, though great poets like Kālidāsa have tacitly endorsed the Rasa view by the place of supremacy they have given to emotion in their best works, it took so long for theorists to discover that they had done so.

Such, in brief outline, is the Rasa view advocated by what is known as the "later" (nāvīna) school of art critics in India, as distinguished from the "earlier" (prācīna). We have already drawn attention to one or two important points in the Rasa theory, in which it differs from the generality of aesthetic views. For example, it rejects the very common view that a poet may, and often does, give expression to his own feelings in poetry. Here is another point which is far more important, viz. the discovery that there is an order of poetry which requires a deeper form of appreciation and yields a higher kind of aesthetic experience than is ordinarily acknowledged; and in this discovery, we may say, consists one of the chief contributions of India to the general philosophy of art.
THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL IN EASTERN AND WESTERN THOUGHT

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A familiar and catchy epigram, which seems to soothe the feeling of inferiority of the backward East, characterizes the civilization of the West as materialistic and that of the East as spiritualistic. The West, with its rapid strides in the physical sciences, could quickly raise its standard of living and provide for all sorts of creature comforts. Learning the secrets of nature, Western man has succeeded in many cases in forestalling or minimizing her magnificent activities and in advancing his own material interests and pleasures. The West did not limit science to the physical world alone. Man himself became an object of scientific interest, both as an individual and as a member of the social group. Human psychology was soon linked up with animal psychology, as evolution was deemed to have bridged the discontinuity between man and the lower creation in the field of biology. Over-emphasis and exaggeration regarding the rationality of man and his being a little lower than the angels had a tendency to minimize the importance of his animal heritage and of his instinctual equipment. Comparative anatomy, comparative physiology and comparative psychology have brought out his basic similarity to lower forms of life; and the development of anthropological knowledge has laid down the several stages by which man has ascended from the pithecanthropus erectus condition to the civilized stage. The West did something more. It utilized the knowledge of the different races of mankind to formulate the main structures of societal organization and to show the dependence of its character on environmental conditions, physical and social alike. Sociology could trace the formation of institutions to certain fundamental needs, desires and aversions that are ingrained in human nature all over the world, and assign their variations to certain extraneous factors like climate, location, tradition and social contact, friendly and hostile.

This naturally led to an intimate study of the psychological
nature of man. The theological presuppositions that hedged in psychological studies being gradually discarded, the philosophers could themselves discuss the empirical nature of man without reference to the ultimate origin and destiny of his soul. Evolutionism threw doubts upon the double equipment of soul and mind in man, coming respectively from supernatural and natural sources; and abnormal psychology could point to the fragmentation of human personality in conditions of dissociation as a serious challenge to the belief in a unitary self postulated by philosophy and religion alike. But even before abnormal psychology did its devastating work, analytical and empirical psychology had begun an analysis of consciousness with a view to determining the laws of mental operation and of psychic integration and evolution. It did not feel the necessity of invoking the aid of an entitative spiritual unit to link up psychological happenings and to explains the sense of personal identity.

The cumulative effect of these psychological studies was the loss of interest in a spiritual soul created by God, free in its actions, accountable to the creator for its career on earth, and stringing together its experiences into a unitary personality as bearer of a single moral destiny. The emancipation from rationalistic philosophy and theology is responsible for an intensive empirical study of both physical objects and minds. Descartes could say that, in looking inside, he caught the reality of his spiritual self. But Hume, following the same procedure, failed to catch any soul or self, but found instead a series of psychical states possessing only a semblance but not the substance of a unitary self; in which view he had a large following, including Bertrand Russell, who said that "personality is constructed by relations of the thoughts to each other and to the body," each person being a separate bundle, as it were, of these relations. The inner constitution of each individual man is a very complicated affair, and no proper understanding of its nature can be had from the religious belief in creationism, namely, that a soul was created afresh for each person and put inside the foetus at a certain period of gestation. Traducianism, with its belief in the derivation of the soul from the ancestral psyche, was nearer the mark, inasmuch as it could explain the influence of heredity in determining family resemblances, though its primary concern was to make the doctrine of original sin plausible through the supposition that men have all derived their spiritual substance from the tainted soul of Adam.
and were infected \textit{ab initio}. In us all slumber racial and family traits, which prompt characteristic responses in definite situations and make each of us one of a kind.

We can now take stock of scientific and philosophical approaches from the realistic side. Extraversion has dominated Western philosophic thought from the time of the Greeks; and even when some of the philosophers use spiritualistic terminology, we are not sure if something material is not meant—think, for instance, of Parmenides' Being, Anaxagoras' \textit{Nous}, and the \textit{logos spermatikos} of the Stoics. No wonder that parallelism should prove a favourite dogma in the West, for it enables one to leave matter aside when discussing spirit—a position totally unknown to Eastern thought, which understands materialism, spiritualism and interactionism, but not parallelism, as a solution of the body-mind relation. The West could, because of its interest in things external, develop not only the various physical sciences but also the knowledge of the ways in which the external world affected the apprehending mind. With its gaze still turned outwards, the West could study the reactions of the mind to the revelations from outside and attempt scientific discoveries designed to control natural forces and turn them to practical use. Sensa have become an object of increasing interest to Western philosophers in recent years as ideas and phenomena were to their predecessors—the change in terminology indicates a shift in emphasis from the mental and transcendental aspects to the physical and empirical. The theory of external relations has been similarly designed to emancipate the physical from dependence upon the mental. The different theories of evolution have also tended to attenuate the distinction between the physical and the mental by thinking of mind as an instrument evolved by life when simple and routined adjustments fail. We need to make a passing reference to logical positivism when it is seriously suggested that philosophical questions are really questions of language and not of fact and that philosophical perplexities are at bottom misunderstandings about definitions or rules of use. It is science and not philosophy that deals with factual questions. And if with behaviourism we reduce thinking to subvocal speech or with James reduce our intimate self to some strain sensation in the vocal region, then the last leap to clear off the philosophical and psychical ground would be taken. The mind-stuff theory, psychical atomism, radical empiricism and such other philosophical creeds denied the reality of a unitary
substantial soul but maintained the existence of consciousness. Some modern speculations have tended to banish the psychical altogether as a matter of theory, though they have found it hard to maintain their ground in practice.

If the above sketch represented the only trend of Western thought, then the spiritual would have either evaporated altogether, leaving only the physical behind, or it would have been eviscerated of all significant meaning, being reduced to a supportless series or stream or wave of consciousness. By admitting, as Berkeley does, an over-looking eye holding the universe as the content of its vision, all that we prove is that unknown objects do not exist: the universe becomes a content of the Divine Mind both in its fixity and in its flow, without implying that it is a necessity in the life of God or that any such object of thought furthers any ulterior plan of improvement. The subjective idealists and the solipsists merely initiated this lifeless picture of the universe, only assigning it to some mundane thinking, instead of scaling divine heights. The spiritualistic influence in the West came principally from the Platonic tradition. Though matter could not be entirely denied, its form was dominated from outside by a spiritual principle—the world of Ideas illumined and informed by the Idea of the Good. The Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge was reflected in the Platonic identification of the intelligible and the moral world, of ontology and axiology. True, this bold equation of ultimate fact and absolute value was beyond the comprehension, or not to the liking, of subsequent philosophers; and so this great venture of faith—the ultimate identity of value and existence—was abandoned by Kant, Lange, Lotze, Ritchi, Spencer, Balfour, Benjamin Kidd and others, as Pringle-Pattison has so ably pointed out. But Greek life, with its love of the beautiful and the enjoyable aspects of the world, saved classicism from degenerating into a negative attitude towards the universe; and when Christianity began to emphasize the virtue of renunciation it really combated the life, and not the philosophical thought that was Greece. The Stoic and Neo-Platonic philosophies also were not sympathetic towards the pursuit of pleasure. The triumph of the hedonistic philosophies was really a triumph of human nature over the studied neglect of the joys of life.

But if life triumphed over logic in the matter of determining the main features of the classical attitude towards the world, the
ethical and political sense was responsible for a certain amount of idealism. The intensely logical classical mind was with rare exceptions least prone to mysticism on the one hand and nominalism on the other. The Greek tradition emphasized the rational and socio-ethical life of man and developed his conceptual thinking and law-abiding habit. It taught him to acknowledge the necessity of transcendental elements in philosophic thinking and the objectivity of the social order. But it did not touch his emotional life except by a kind of philosophic irrelevance. Emotion is a disturbance of the soul, and so a detached view of things could be obtained only by practising indifference (ataraxia). Whatever spirituality the soul possesses must come from its rational faculty, and the physical universe would be spiritual to the extent that it would be known by a thinking mind in disguise. So reality, to be spiritual, must either be perceived or be a perciipient, i.e. either mentalism or spiritualism must be the philosophic creed. In this description the Absolute may safely be counted out, for a finite that fulfils either of these conditions would be entitled to be called spiritual even if there be no God. Subjective idealism and pluralistic spiritualism would accordingly both be spiritualistic, even though the former may land us in solipsism and the latter in monadism.

Fortunately, the West became the inheritor of a great religious tradition in addition to the philosophical. The Mediterranean religions, with their pronounced mythological contents, could not long satisfy the thinking section of mankind, which naturally sought intellectual solace in philosophy divorced from religion. Religion was not philosophized and philosophy "religionized," to coin a new expression. In this respect, an instructive comparison may be made between the Mediterranean religions and the Brahmanical. In India, polytheism was not only mastered by henotheism, monolatry and monotheism, but it was virtually superseded by religious mysticism in which the gods faded out of existence as ultimate entities or eternal beings. Their place was taken by the impersonal Brahman—not, however, as a mere philosophic concept-like Being or the Idea or the Good (when this is not personalistically viewed as God), but as the concrete basis of all types of existence, including the Divine. The path was facilitated by the identification of the different gods of the Vedic literature as so many manifestations of a single reality. The monarchical and patriarchic conception of a single deity as supreme overlord or
original source, though not totally absent, did not prove attractive enough to the speculatively inclined in India, as it did in Greece and Rome; and so supplementation to religious belief was made not on mythological but on philosophic lines, and yet the philosophy continued to be religious and did not become secular as it did in Greece. Conversely, the commentators interpreted the aphorisms of a philosophical text like the Brahma-sūtras of Badarayana with a view to defending particular religious standpoints. Thus, on the one hand, religion tended to develop on speculative lines and, on the other, philosophy tended to lend support to definite religious standpoints. This commerce between religion and philosophy from the earliest times one sadly misses in Western thought in general; and that is why the influence of each has to be independently assessed. There was a limited one-way traffic from religion to philosophy in Christological speculations.

Christianity, which itself inherited the noble tradition of Judaism, especially as preached by the prophets of the eighth century B.C. downwards, has supplied a second element of spirituality to Western thought. Hebrew religious thought was dominated almost from the very beginning by the idea that the Jews were the chosen race of a spiritual God who would not brook a rival in worship. This God, though mostly conceived transcendentally, was yet a living God who manifested Himself to His chosen prophets and took an active interest in the welfare of Israel. Originally conceived as a mountain-god, He was latterly looked upon as the ruler of Heaven and earth, and even the Sheol ultimately came to be included within His jurisdiction. Although contact with surrounding religions frequently made the Jews fall prey to polytheism and idolatry, the belief in a single spiritual God, of which Israel was the prophet, maintained its foothold in the best minds of the race and triumphed in the end. Through the ups and downs of political fortune, the Jews held fast to the belief that Divine providence was in operation in human history, and that ultimately all nations would be gathered together in Zion, all quarrels and cruelties would cease, and the lion and the lamb would lie down together in perfect peace. The prophets exhorted men to prepare themselves for such a consummation, for the condition precedent of the Divine advent was the sinlessness of man. The Shekinah would descend to the earth with the removal of sin. The Apocalypses were visions of the day when the distinction between the earthly and the heavenly Jerusalem
would disappear and the Kingdom of God would be established on earth.

If Jewish pride of race had not been accompanied by a sense of sin and the necessity of confessing and expiating the same, spirituality would not have struck such a deep root in the national mind. Israel must set an example of spirituality to the rest of the world if it sincerely believes in the holiness of Yahweh. The old idea that it was a matter of prestige with Him to support Israel whether right or wrong must be abandoned, for Yahweh would use His rod of vengeance in case of moral and religious lapses even on the part of Israel. The righteousness of God goes beyond the observance of Divine commandments or righteousness by the law, and the prophets inveighed against mere formal conformity to the laws without a conscious striving after spiritual perfection. That devotion does not stand in need of sacrifice or material offerings was learnt at bitter cost during the days of the Babylonian exile, for outside the consecrated ground of Jerusalem only prayer, and no material worship, could be made to God. The mystics tried to bring home to the minds of the ungodly, the immoral and unjust that God was much nearer than they fondly believed. The Holy Spirit operates in the minds of men and things, and no act of heroism and good government, and no spiritual quickening or inspiration or insight, would have been possible, had the Spirit or the wisdom of God not operated to preserve the world in existence and guide its destiny. The elect could even feel the sensuous presence of God in the form of light, fire, sound, a dove, glory, image, etc. But the idea of incarnation was repugnant to Jewish, as to Muslim, belief, though Divine attributes like wisdom, power, love and justice or Divine agencies, anthropomorphically viewed, were sometimes supposed to mediate between God and the world. All anthropomorphisms were, however, paraphrased and spiritualized in the Targum literature, to maintain the absolute spirituality of God.

Jewish spirituality was, then, primarily religious and emotional and not intellectual and philosophical inasmuch as God's existence was taken for granted, and only His attributes and modes of manifestation were modified as the conscience of the race developed. We are likely to get a very one-sided view of Hebrew (and Jewish) religion if we are to base our knowledge of it on the attitude of the Christians (e.g. Marcion). The special contribution of Christianity to the spiritual culture of the West was its Christo-
logical speculation—the Logos incarnate, who offered himself as a sacrifice to take away the sins of the world and hasten the advent of the Kingdom of God on earth. It must have sounded as a blasphemy to the Jewish ears to be told that Jesus and Yahweh were one, or that he that had seen Jesus had seen the Father. The apotheosis of Christ (whence his designation "Lord") in the Synoptic Gospels led to the reverse process of his being the incarnation of God in Pauline literature, as of Buddha in Hinayana and Mahayana respectively. The Servant of the Lord, the Son of Man, became the Son of God, and even the Divine Ruler and Judge who was essentially or substantially one with God Himself (and therefore possessing heavenly pre-existence and bodily ascension), the Nicene Creed actually summing up the orthodox belief in the matter. Christ claimed to have the authority to forgive sinners and to enunciate new spiritual laws—powers which Judaism reserved for God alone.

The vitality of Christianity as a spiritual force draws its sustenance from the life and message of Christ himself and from what succeeding ages thought of him. God as Father, though not unknown to later Judaism, was most intensely preached by Christ. God as judge we approach with awe, but God as Father we approach with love and trust. Conversely, the Father in heaven is ever willing to receive back the prodigal son with open arms. God is ever ready to forgive our sins—nay, He so loved the world that He sent His only begotten Son so that He might redeem the sinner by offering Himself as a ransom for mankind. Whoever believes in Christ becomes entitled to everlasting life, but none else; for Christ is the Way and the Life and is the finisher or perfecter of faith. The conviction that Christ directed his message to be spread to all mankind inspired mission work throughout the world, and has had profound influence upon all races and climes down the ages.

The peculiar spiritual contribution of Christianity consists in the emphasis on inner purity as opposed to external conformity, love as opposed to law, spirit as opposed to letter, peaceful persuasion as opposed to religious oppression, prayer and communion as opposed to material offerings and formal worship, faith as opposed to speculation. Though to placate Jewish sentiments the Messianic Kingdom was sometimes conceived in political terms even in the New Testament, the failure of the political mission and Christ's ignominious death on the Cross were
instrumental in turning the attention of the Church increasingly to the spiritual purpose of Christ's coming, namely, to facilitate the advent of the Kingdom of God in the hearts of men, irrespective of their ethical status. Unaided human effort would not remove sin from the world and if, as the Jews believed, the removal of sin was the precondition of God's coming to rule over earth, then humanity would never be saved. So God, out of His super-abounding love, sent Christ to forgive the sinner and make a new life out of him so that the moral regeneration might save him from the clutches of sin.

The nearness of God as implied in Fatherhood was responsible for a confidential approach which, if not alien to Jewish thought, was not equally encouraged there. Besides, the prophethood, being confined to a single individual, was instrumental in establishing such a close identification between God and Christ that acceptance of Jesus and seeing of God became almost synonymous. Mysticism found a more favourable soil in Christianity than in Judaism, because it was easier to establish community of spirit with God become man than with far-off Yahweh. Even erotic mysticism grew in the hearts of "the brides of Christ," and love literally became first law. A God that walked the earth was nearer the hearts and hearths of men, and to disbelieve in him brought greater risk, especially when he offered to take away men's sins. The promise of God to bring the races together received an added significance when the portals of the Christian religion were opened to the whole world. History became a march of spiritualism towards the ultimate establishment of the Kingdom of God, and as an earnest thereof of the thousand years' rule of Christ and his saints. The Zoroastrian conception of an ultimate renovation of the world where sin would be completely banished, found an echo in Jewish and Christian thought. From Orphic and Mithraic mysteries Christianity borrowed elements about sanctification and communion that strengthened the spiritual attitude towards God. The saviour saint could evoke echoes of passion and rapture which Plato's philosophy of the later period, as influenced by Pythagoreanism and developed in Neo-Platonism, could not through its mystic leanings.

The calling by Jesus of men from their vocation and dissociating them from their family life must have had the same effect in the West as Buddha's similarly had in India. The spiritual element had a tendency to be associated with the abjuration of the world
and the suppression of the natural impulses. Judaism, like the Zoroastrian and the ordinary Brahmanical viewpoint, extolled family life and disfavoured asceticism and mortification of the flesh. But Christianity, like Buddhism (and Jainism), sometimes looked upon the body as impure, sex life as vile, and a monastic life of chastity, poverty and obedience as the ideal preparation for human perfection. Naturally, therefore, asceticism and spirituality came to be associated together. People entering holy orders had to become eunuchs in the cause of Christ. This tendency became most noticeable during the Middle Ages when the Church attracted some of the best minds to a life of celibacy. The resistance to the doctrine of Divine immanence in the world was partly responsible for this denial of spirituality to the world. Pantheism and mysticism owed their origin and diffusion more to temperaments and borrowings from foreign sources than to the Jewish tradition and Christian orthodoxy, though it must be admitted that the flooding of inner life by the Holy Spirit and a knowledge of God through communion and love-experience increasingly became a part of the Christian creed. For the same reason ethical spirituality could gain a stronger foothold, as the duality of God and man was favourable for emphasizing the aspect of moral obligation towards a holy God, and establishing ethical relations with one's fellow-men as being pleasing to an ethical deity.

The last spiritual element of Western thought came from the philosophical developments of Christianity. The origin of the world has always been a troublesome speculative problem, and early philosophers could scarcely think of a world without some pre-existent amorphous matter, whether of one kind or many kinds. Matter provided such a convenient explanation for imperfections of all kinds—physical, mental, moral, aesthetic, spiritual, that its assumption could not be rightly resisted. Faced with the problem of reconciling a unitary God with a physical world, Christianity chose creation out of nothing as a part of its religious belief in preference to world-fashioning, emanation, illusory projection, etc., and was immediately faced with the task of explaining evil on a monistic principle. Inevitably it was forced to think of evil as a necessary condition of some ultimate good—at least as not having any survival value. Naturally the question of man's complicity in the origination of evil cropped up, and this brought in its train the question of free will. In this way the
complicated philosophical situation involving the status and value of nature and man in a monistic reference was ushered in. The origin, significance and persistence of matter and its influence on, and knowledge by mind, the original independence and immortality of the finite self and its relation to matter, and the nature of God in itself and in relation to mind and matter, were mutually related problems which necessitated the fixation of the function of each entity. Why there should be a world at all and why it should not have absolute or independent existence, what place matter fills in a spiritual universe and in the minds of finite selves, why the mind should be entangled in a body, and what alteration in the values marks mind and matter in the passage through time are questions that became inextricably bound up with the Christian standpoint. Christological speculations started in the middle of things by assuming the fall of man and the necessity of Redemption through the Descent of Christ. Doceticism made an ineffectual attempt to reduce the whole phenomenon to a show in Christianity as in Buddhism. Christian orthodoxy demanded of man a real struggle with his sinful nature, and did not look with favour on predestination which would throw upon God the responsibility of choosing the elect and reduce man's moral struggle to a sham. If knowledge demands a real object, morality demands a real conquest over one's lower nature, which is constituted by animal propensities ultimately traceable to association with a body.

Post-Kantian idealism had all these Christian ideas in the background. In Hegel it actually used the Biblical terminology of God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Ghost or Spirit as the description of the stages of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, through which the Absolute realizes the potentialities of its Being and rises to absolute consciousness. Fichte had emphasized the moral aspect of a spiritual life and given to matter just enough reality to act as the opposition, by overcoming which spirit came to its own. Schelling's conception of the travail of the Absolute through higher and higher forms of manifestation till it attained consciousness, coupled with the later notion of its original fall from which it was to be redeemed with the march of history, made spirituality of the universe an increasing event. But it was reserved for Hegel to declare that whatever was real was rational so that behind all seemingly chaotic happenings there was a rational method and that history was at bottom an unfolding of the inner dialectic of
the Absolute—a temporal process not ruled by chance or caprice but working out a scheme of evolution inherent in the nature of the rational absolute principle. That in this conception there was latent a belief in a developing God—temporal process being taken in a real sense and not regarded as a mere rehearsal of an eternally accomplished timeless perfection—can be inferred from the fact that post-Hegelian speculation, especially in some noted realistic thinkers, could be as easily affiliated to Hegel’s thought as to the doctrine of evolution. In such absolutistic speculation, the religious element is naturally put into the background and much of scriptural teaching undergoes modification. Creation by Divine fiat, for instance, definitely disappears from view and in its place emerges a belief in the eternity of the world as the objective counterpart of Divine thought.

Western philosophic spiritualism has fastened rather on three fundamental facts. It has equated existence and value, ontology and axiology, by postulating that in reality there is nothing valueless, purposeless, irrational and incoherent. Value is not an imposition of the mind upon a mental stuff or a palliative epithet tagged on to a hostile universe; it is a character of reality which ensures the conservation of the good and the elimination of the evil. Secondly, it has tended to treat all evil as only relative and as having no abiding value. In an ultimate reference evil has no being, though to our limited vision it seems to be the creation of God and to obstruct the realization of Divine purpose. Barring those that have denied even the seeming of evil and those that have ascribed evil to an opposing principle or personality, Western philosophers who are spiritualistically inclined have sought to show evil as really a form of the good, a necessary preparation for the good or a perversion by a finite intelligence of the nature of the infinite based on incomplete understanding, personal self-seeking or want of religious faith. Thirdly, it follows from this that finite things are capable of growing in intellectual and moral stature and apprehending the Divine plan and purpose of the universe in which all seemingly jarring elements find their proper places, and establishing a social concord wherein selfish interests are swallowed up by consideration for the whole. Whether the entire purpose of the universe would be revealed in its details to any finite intelligence, however spiritually advanced, cannot be proved; but it is a cardinal belief of Western spiritualism that the limitations of finite knowledge can be overcome, and things can
be viewed _sub specie aeternitatis_ as forming a completely rational system satisfying all the spiritual demands of the finite soul. Even if the realization of the moral perfection may involve a never-ending progress, the finite being is not denied a vision of the infinite bliss which is its spiritual objective. The pantheistic merger of the finite in the Infinite has not found a profound echo in Western hearts because of the religious duality of God and man, and even Bradley could not discard altogether the conservation of the experience of the finite in some form in the Absolute.

Our survey of Western spiritualism would be incomplete without a reference to the development of ethicism as an independent discipline. Absolute idealism had to face two major problems in the God-man relation. The one is the necessity of finite spirits with limited visions of the scheme of reality. The other is the degree of freedom and initiative possessed by these spirits. The intricate questions regarding the spirituality of God, namely, whether He is Himself a person or merely an Impersonal Experience, whether consciousness belongs to finite beings and even so-called Divine consciousness is in reality human consciousness of a particular kind, whether, if both God and man are conscious, the types of their awareness are the same or similar, whether man derives his knowledge of things through the grace or the necessity of Divine life and, if so, how; whether individuality will have any meaning in an ulterior reference or will be dissolved or distributed in the Absolute which alone abides for ever and for ever, have sorely tormented idealistic philosophers of different times. That man was evolved so that nature might enter into conscious possession of her own beauties through his consciousness gives a teleological explanation of things and perhaps also gives an aesthetic touch to the work of creation, but does not solve satisfactorily the problem as to whether the Divine Artist has a personal enjoyment of His own creation as couched in the Biblical word that God saw that His creations were all good.

But things become more complicated when the exact nature of the contribution of men to the attainment of worldly perfection is in question. This problem will involve two important issues, namely, the reality of time and the problem of human freedom. Christianity, in its anxiety to defend the grace of God, has leaned more towards Augustinianism and Calvinism than towards Pelagianism and Arminianism—the oscillating mind of the
Church in this regard is reflected in its many councils and synods, where the question of the relative value of Divine grace and human effort in determining the spiritual destiny of man perennially cropped up and was not always uniformly decided. The prototype of these squabbles is the controversy about the nature of Christ—whether he was wholly God or wholly man, whether he had two wills and two natures or only one such, and whether baptism made any difference in the relation of the two wills, human and divine, in his personality.

Those who felt that morality could be freed from religious and metaphysical domination naturally voted for spiritualism as a human obligation. Whether man is noumenally free but phenomenally bound, as Kant said, or just the reverse, as Green sometimes taught, whether Divine foreknowledge could be reconciled with human free will or was more allied to fatalism, whether Divine will or Divine knowledge was responsible for determining the nature of the good, as the Scotists and the Thomists respectively believed, whether morality was linked up with a pleasurable hereafter or was a never-ending progress towards perfection, are all transcendental questions to which no final satisfactory reply was possible. So the moral man should either ignore these ultimate questions or keep them in the background of his mind. The Consciers had advised the substitution of the Bible by conscience. The modern ethical movement teaches through its ethical societies that “the moral life involves neither acceptance nor rejection of the belief in any Deity, personal or impersonal, or in a life after death.” Those who attempted to build up a religion of humanity have since been followed by others with similar secularistic tendencies and the religion of man is replacing the religion of God. Duty to fellow-men is still sacred, though the basis is no longer religious but social. Maintenance of social order, and not obedience to Divine law, is the supreme duty of man, and by social order is to be understood not the perpetuation of existing inequalities, class distinctions and special privileges but a harmonious working of social components in which oppression and injustice have no place, facilities for all-round development are available to all irrespective of their status, wealth and education, and the true motive of righteousness is not the fear of God but love of fellow-men. Social service, cosmopolitanism and liberation of the submerged sections from material and spiritual bondage of all kinds sum up the duties of moral man. He should accept a
melioristic creed and work with complete faith in self-help and capacity to mould the course of history and, within the limits of his power, to take and shape the forces of nature.

Let us now turn our gaze to the East with its teeming millions professing other faiths and adoring other ideals. Islam, with its foundations in the Bible (especially the Old Testament), had its religious and social outlook naturally determined by older Semitic traditions, both positively and negatively. It followed the intense monotheism of Judaism in its emphasis upon the unity of God, mostly keeping Him apart from His creation, so that Divine majesty might not be affected by too much familiarity. This God neither begets nor is He begotten—so the relation of father and son must be very cautiously used in reference to Him. He is our Lord and we are His servants; and as what He has destined for man eternally is bound to come to pass, we can only bow to His will in all matters and accept with resignation all that befalls us in the sure conviction that things could not have happened otherwise. The Quran, which is an earthly transcript of the Heavenly copy as revealed to Mohammad through the angel Jibrail (Gabriel) from time to time by a kind of external inspiration (wahi zahir), contains the veritable words of Allah given to man for the last time for his moral rectification and spiritual uplifting. The life of the spirit in Islam is synonymous with following the ordinances of the Quran and the Traditions where the Scripture is silent. The Quran contains noble utterances about the duties of men towards one another—the social legislation being a part of the Scripture as in the Old Testament, which possibly had the code of Hammurabi as its model. The five daily prayers, the compulsory gift to the needy, the keeping of the yearly fast, the pilgrimage to Mecca, together with the acceptance of the unity of Allah and the prophethood of Mohammad, form the five pillars of the faith which every orthodox Mussalman must practise; but devotion outweighs the moral practice in value and submission to the will of Allah and a general attitude of peacefulness towards His creation constitute the correct attitude towards God and man. Although mystical utterances are not totally absent from the Quran, Islam never encouraged antinomianism of any kind or any great leaning towards pantheism, both of which are associated with the Sufi mystics. It discouraged ascetism (the dervishes and fakirs having come into existence later and been patronized by the heterodox and ignorant followers of Islam), and developed fanatical icono-
clasm; but it preached human equality and considerateness towards the poor of the community.

Zoroastrianism, which Islam supplanted in Persia (Iran), was moralistic to the core. It alluded to the fateful choice that the good and the bad spirit made at the beginning, with the effect that the universe may be said to be divided between two warring camps—the followers of Ahura Mazda (Ormuzd) and the retinue of Angra Mainyu (Ahriman)—until a time would come when evil will be finally vanquished and there will be a renovation of the world through the baptism of the molten metal which will cleanse all things at the end. Man must be a fellow-worker with the Good Spirit in ridding the world of all obnoxious elements so that he may deserve to enter into the realm of song and endless light—the heavens successively of Good Thought, Good Word and Good Deed leading thereto. But Lord Wisdom (Ahura Mazda) can be approached only through a recognition of his spiritual retinue—the Amesha Spentas, three of whom represent the Divine nature, namely, Good Thought (Vohu Manah), Righteousness or Order (Asha Vahishta), and Sovereignty (Kshatra Vairya), and the other three, the gifts of God to man, namely, Devotion (Armaiti), Welfare (Haurvatat) and Immortality (Ameratat). To this list must be added Obedience to Religious Lore (Sraosha) as a prerequisite of spiritual life. In post-Gathic literature, which reflects a partial return to submerged polytheism, other spiritual abstractions continued to be personified, such as Religion or Moral Activity (Daena), Justice (Rashnu Razistha), Providence as won by prayer and good action (Baghobakht), Destiny (Bakht, Ashi Vanguh) and such other qualities that make for spiritual progress. Though in later thought some magical and mechanical prescriptions made their appearance, yet on the whole it is the resolute pursuit of truth and morality that characterizes the spiritual life in Zoroastrianism. To wage relentless war against Lie (Druj), Heresy (Taromaiti), Violence (Aeshma), Evil Thought (Aka Manah) and such other unspiritual activities, personified as Evil Spirits (Daevas), to conquer the hostile forces of nature and to lead a normal householder’s life are the ideals set before the faithful. Benevolence and charity, chastity and morality, devotion and strenuous endeavour are the main ingredients of holy living.

Zoroastrianism was religious and moral but it was not mystical. It used the symbol of the Fire (Atar) for religious worship as being
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an emblem of purity, illumination and power, and paid homage to Light (Mithra), the Sun (Hvarekshaeta), the Moon (Maongha) and the stars (specially Tishtrya, Vanant, Satavaesa, and Haptoiringa—probably Sirius, the Great Bear, Vega and Fomalhaut respectively) when the ancient deities returned to favour in a disguised form as Yazatas. But evil was always fought and never appeased, and the moral grandeur of Ahura was never obscured, event though ancestors and guardian angels (Fravashis) began to complicate the pantheon at a later time. The mystical Zervanism could not thrive on Iranian soil and it is only in India that mystically inclined Parsis have found in theosophy a kind of extension of their religious life which, however, the orthodox Parsis abjure and combat.

For a proper blend of mysticism and morality we must travel further afield, namely to China, where two complementary streams of spirituality meet. Lao Tzu, whose mystical utterances bear strange similarity to Upanishadic utterances, taught men to value the transcendental and cultivate quietude and inaction, so that the spirit of the universe might imperceptibly infiltrate men's minds and prompt them to do things by a kind of natural impulse and not by design and deliberation. Vacuity, solitude, meditation, indifference and inactivity are what the sage would practise. The Tao as the Way of Heaven is unobtrusive and impersonalistic, while Tao as the way of men is blatant and personalistic in character. Receptivity and not reaction must be the objective of the spiritually inclined. The Tao is unchanging, nameless and amorphous—almost equivalent to non-being, but it is the beginning of Heaven and earth and all nameable things. To feel one's identity with the indescribable unity is the highest wisdom and virtue. In Tao opposites are reconciled and all perspectives meet—so all things interpenetrate and become one, which should prompt us to love all things equally. To a man in the axis of the Tao, time and distinctions cease to exist, and knowledge shrinks into a kind of non-knowledge for want of discrimination and expression. Life and death have no meaning in the Great Whole, and also for one who has got the mystic enlightenment, and has transcended all distinctions, including those of right and wrong.

The tradition of mysticism did not die out any time in China. Lao Tzu was followed by Chuang Tzu and the authors of the Yi Amplifications and the Chug Yung, who tried to improve upon
the ancient Taoist tradition on the one hand, and mixed it with Confucian tradition on the other. The mystical school of the third and the fourth centuries continued the tradition of Taoism but it, too, gave the pride of place to Confucius, who taught men not merely to know what identification with Heaven was but also to realize it in their lives. The rise of the Mahayana school with its doctrines of Suchness (Bhutatathata) and the Body of Law (Dharmakaya) helped to reinforce the mystical tendency, as both these principles were mostly viewed impersonalistically as the world-ground with which every manifestation is ultimately identical. But the practical Chinese mind was more moral than religious in the devotional sense. The cultivation of the five constant virtues of charity (jen), righteousness (i or yi), propriety (li), wisdom (chih) and sincerity (hsin), whereby one is enabled respectively to practise love and fellow-feeling and the golden rule in one's dealings with society, pursue the ethical and universalistic end in preference to the economic and egoistic, observe decorum in rituals and ceremonies and proper restraint in conduct, use one's intellect in understanding the decrees of Heaven and establishing right relation with the universe at large by developing a spontaneity for correct attitude through practice, and cultivate a habit of truthfulness in dealing with friends. Filial piety and reverence towards Heaven are included in the above five virtues, though Heaven is viewed sometimes as a personal ruler (Shang Ti) and at other times as an impersonal principle (Tien). One need not dabble unnecessarily and excessively in transcendental things: Confucius himself avoided speaking on four subjects, namely, extraordinary things, feats of strength, rebellious disorder, and spirits. Naturally enough, prayer figures little in this system, though Confucius had faith in the validity of the eternal laws of morality and believed that by transgressing these men lost the right and chance of temporal blessings. The maintenance of the five human relationships, namely, of husband and wife, of father and son, of sovereign and subject, of elder and younger brother, and of friend and friend constituted the good life. The causal sequence of a rectified heart, decorous conduct, a well-regulated family and a well-ordered state must be kept in view when regulating one's life. The rulers must also remember that moral lapses in high quarters are responsible for general laxity in society as a whole. Confucianism emphasized the social character of ethical discipline and the necessity of a well-regulated state for
developing personality. The state religion was formal and its character regulated by the status of official ministrants. The common man could worship the ancestral tablets, the lower deities (shen) and the impersonal Tien (but not the personal Shang Ti) with such personifications as he pleased. Apotheosis of saints and sages, including Confucius (K‘ung-foo-tzu) provided additional materials of worship, and when Buddhism came to China it provided a fuller and more satisfactory pantheon and opened the floodgates of devotion and meditation to the religiously famished souls of the moralistic Confucianists. Religion became more personal and the quest of the blessed hereafter became more pronounced. People began to draw their religious inspiration from all the three ways of life—Taoist, Confucian and Buddhist, according to their personal predilections.

Japan, which was deeply influenced by Buddhism and Confucianism alike, developed her spirituality on nationalistic lines with more pronounced loyalty to the crown than China did. The ruler was the descendant of the Supreme Deity in both the places—of Heaven in China and of the Sun-Goddess in Japan, and was also the high priest of the nation. Both had deep reverence for departed ancestors. But Shinto was more naturalistic than moral and, though it deified the forces of nature, it did not moralize them enough, with the effect that Japan had to make large borrowings to feed the hunger for righteousness and devotion of her people from other sources. But while she borrowed mostly from China, she showed surprising originality in developing new sects and effecting compromises with the indigenous creed (Ryoby Shinto). Provision was made to satisfy the religious need of different types of mind—the meditative had their Zen (Dhyāna) Buddhism, while the devotional had their Amida (Amitābha) as refuge. But the paramount interest of the state was never forgotten, though an idealist like Nichiren wanted Japan to be the centre of the Universal Buddhist Church also. Possibly the passing away of old political organizations in both China and Japan will bring about a new spiritual orientation.

But it is to India that we must turn to get a complete picture of the attempt of man to understand the needs of the spirit and bring about a fulfilment of those needs. Brahmanism, which is now the oldest living religion of the world, kept its doors wide open for letting in new ideas in religion and absorbing new populations within its social organization. The pre-Aryan stocks lent
their belief to the conquering Aryans and in turn imbibed their culture. The cult of Siva reinforced the Vedic laudation of Rudra possibly after the Indus Valley civilization had had time to infect the conquerors. The mother goddess might have come both from that source and from the Kolarians, and it has been suggested that Yoga (meditation) and possibly the theory of transmigration came from the pre-Aryan inhabitants of India. It has been suggested also that Jainism and Buddhism might be regarded as continuing the Mohenjo-Daro tradition of meditation in preference to sacrifice to the gods, and that the Upanishadic emphasis upon knowledge and meditation might also have come from an alien source. The absorption of the Vrtyas (fallen, possibly alien races) was regularized by a ceremony in later Vedic times; but later immigrants like the Sakas, the Yavanas, the Pahlavas, the Hunas, the Parasikas, the Gurjaras and others were imperceptibly absorbed and some features of their religions also passed into Hinduism. Some autochthonous deities also effected an entrance into the pantheon. Partly as policy and partly out of an insatiable craving for multiplying gods from the Vedic times downwards, Brahmanism found itself in possession of a multitude of gods and goddesses, and so ritual came to be regarded as a part of spiritual practice. When forests abounded on all sides and cattle constituted the main wealth, the pouring of clarified butter on fire as oblation to the gods was the way of approaching the gods. Sacrifice was really incurring material loss to please the gods who were expected to further the interests of the worshippers both here and hereafter. When image worship was later introduced, the rituals became more gorgeous but the minor gods progressively lost the affection of the populace. Formal worship with material offering to images in temples remained attractive to those who could not understand deep philosophy or appreciate the adoration of a formless divinity with prayers and meditations only. This type of spiritual practice lost favour in course of time through a variety of causes. When the period of the hymns was over, set formulae took their place as laudations, and this proved distasteful to those who were against all types of spiritual barrenness. The sacrifice of animals also touched sensitive hearts, and Jainism and Buddhism made a frontal attack against this practice. As Vedic sacrifices fell into disuse and the new divinities, with the exception of the Sakti goddess, had a new mode of offering evolved for them, cruelty practically disappeared from religious worship, and this
in turn served to modify the Vedic sacrifices themselves, inasmuch as in the meantime vegetarianism had spread among the higher classes due to the acceptance of the principle of *ahimsā* (non-injury) by different religious groups. In the Bhagavadgītā material offering figures lowest as spiritual practice; and ascent is progressively made therefrom to penances, meditations, scriptural study and religious insight. But so long as an image is set up as a symbol, the worship has to be in consonance with the needs of an embodied form; and therefore the good things of the earth, like flowers, incense, fruit, etc., are offered to the gods.

But the personified spirits of nature which the Vedic Aryans worshipped were so transformed in course of time that polytheism and image worship both lost their literalness. Even during Vedic times the question of a supreme god had been mooted; and as an alternative the device of treating each deity as supreme for the time being had been attempted. Then again, personified abstractions jostled with personified powers of nature for the adoration of men as in Zoroastrianism, though on a lesser scale, and even accessories of worship were deified. But what affected the status of gods most was the idea that they were all manifestations of a unitary Being though differently named—a vein of thought which terminated in postulating a One without a second as the ultimate world-ground and in treating all plurality as mere names and forms (*nāmarūpa*) which were illusory in an ultimate reference. The way for this was prepared in the sub-Vedic literature called the *Brāhmaṇas*, where faith in the efficacy of *mantras* (sacred verses) used in worship turned them into veritable incantations which could coerce the gods into beneficent acts and dispense with divine grace for achieving temporal and spiritual benefits. The doctrine of *karma*, when rigidly interpreted, made man the maker of his own destiny and, while making him more moral, tended to make him less devotional; and whatever small place was retained for God in the Brahmanical version of the theory was taken away in the Buddhistic and Jaina version, for boon-giving gods had no function in an autonomous moral law, which provided enjoyment according to the merit of the moral agent, and in Buddhism dispensed with the identity of the soul even, so that *karma* there became an impersonal moral energy capable of acting without reference to any abiding personality. A tradition that even gods are born came down from Vedic times, and to this was added the complementary belief that they die also and that
there has been a succession of gods holding the same title. Heaven was looked upon as a transit camp for moral souls enjoying their well-earned rest and recreation in a pleasurable abode for a period determined by their merit, but returning to fresh embodiment when the merit was exhausted. It is only when we come down to the time of the Purāṇas that devotion returned to its own and reiterated the necessity of surrendering to the will of God (prapatti, saranāgati) whose grace operates without reference to personal merit to save the sinner and who is above the law of karma. Post-Sankarite commentators of the Vedānta Sutras of Bādarāyaṇa, among whom the devotionally inclined South Indians preponderated, possibly because of their temperamental and racial make-up, brought about a religious revival by acknowledging the new scriptures, the Purāṇas and the Bhagavadgīta, as canonical and also the vernacular religious relics of the devout and the mystical souls. Their example was copied by the mediaeval saints of North, East and West India, till a mighty current of devotion swept all over the country and made the lowly in spirit the men of God, thus fulfilling to the letter the Upanishadic dictum that it is divine grace and not much learning or native wit that makes self-realization possible. Or, as the Bhagavadgīta puts it, the vision of God is vouchsafed not unto those who are learned in the Vedas or who perform sacrifices or who make many gifts or who practise austerities but unto those who have single-minded devotion to God, those who labour in the cause of God, those who pray to God, those who are not swayed by personal considerations but serve all equally in a spirit of detachment and harbour no ill-will towards anyone. It is this ideal that the medieval saints, who came from all strata of society, put before themselves and their disciples and hearers.

But the Indians did not forget the importance of taking the whole man into consideration when defining spiritual progress. The body had to be made into an ally and divested of its disturbing character. Elaborate rules were laid down for securing equanimity of mind by a proper control of the bodily functions. Regulation of breath, assumption of correct posture, withdrawal of the senses from objects of the external world, control of the mental process through proper fixation of the gaze, fasting, regulating diet, cleanliness and chastity—these are all essential to induce a spiritual frame of mind. Similarly, speech must not hurt others or hide the truth but must be pleasing and helpful and
measured in quantity and devoted to the acquisition of knowledge through repetition to serve as a true vehicle of spiritual advance. The mind must be tranquil, free from impure and harmful thoughts concentrated and contented and transparent, to serve as the proper medium of noble thoughts and spread the contagion of benignity, dignity and grace. A body that has been so purified in its physiological functions, vocal expressions and mental attitude is fit to be the seat of divinity. In consonance with this idea, the Tantric worshipper places different deities in different parts of the body and conceives of himself as having become identical with the principal divinity, so much so that the materials of worship are placed on the body of the worshipper himself as if he is the God that is being worshipped, thus practising religiously the philosophic precept, “I am the Brahman,” which would sound blasphemous to Semitic faiths even though Christ has said, “I and my Father are one” and “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.” Wandering minstrels and mystic saints have preached the purified and transformed body as the temple not of the finite soul alone but also of God Himself, and some forms of Vaishnavism invariably use the term “divine image” (vigraha) to signify the human body. If all things are Brahman, then even idolatry becomes sanctified (for there is nothing in which God cannot be), let alone the human body.

Those who were devotionally inclined have left a rich legacy of literature in which the constituents of devotional faith have been minutely analysed and bhakti differentiated from knowledge, worship and faith. They have insisted on the personal character of the ultimate principle so that a relation of affection, reverence, dependence and submission may be established between the worshipper and the worshipped. In the Bhagavadgita God is the supreme personality (Purushottama), beyond the transient world (kshara) and beyond the impersonal and immutable Absolute (akshara), who is the only object of adoration. In all Vaishnava systems the duality of man and God has been recognized and the state of deliverance has been identified with the enjoyment of God, not absorption in Him. True, there was difference of opinion as to how God would be enjoyed, whether in a spirit of resignation to His will (sānta), or in a spirit of service to Him (dāsya), or in a spirit of friendliness or comradeship (sakhyya) with the distance between God and man diminished, or with a feeling of tenderness bordering on parental love (vātsalya) and a rapturous emotion
(mādhurya) akin to the passionate attachment of lovers. God had incarnated Himself many times to save the sinners, to uphold the righteous and to punish iniquity. Buddhism and Jainism, which did not believe in God or Incarnation, could still believe that Buddhhas and Tirthankaras had come again and again to preach the true law which had been forgotten by men in course of time, so that men may rectify their conduct. The preceptor who can open men's eyes to the imperishable truths of the spirit—the guru—is worthy of the highest reverence, for the book of religion needs a trained instructor and cannot be read by all. In fact, without Divine grace spiritual illumination would not come to anyone, and without guru's help to most.

Those who were intellectually inclined naturally did not think that emotional rapture was the proper method of attaining God. It is ignorance that is responsible for all our woes and entanglements, and it is knowledge that alone can dispel ignorance which is responsible for our mistaking evanescents things for eternal ones, impure things for pure ones, painful things for pleasurable entities, and not-self for self. To know one's self one must cultivate the habit of dispassion and get beyond love and hate alike. The transcendence of duality in all forms is the correct spiritual attitude—like a steady flame the mind must not be swayed in any direction. Even ordinary morality suffers from heteronomy inasmuch as it aspires after good ends. The pleasures of Heaven are as much hedonistic motives as the desirable things of the world are. A wise man must abjure even transmundane attractions, and try to obtain mental equipoise, so that good and evil might go equally unnoticed. To rise above wants of all kinds, to defy all kinds of privation, to be a detached spectator of the world drama even as enacted in one's own life and to reduce personal activity to nullity are the ways of spiritual living. To know that the things that take shape before our eyes are mere shows (māyā), behind which the non-changing reality hides itself, and to realize one's identity with this primal changeless unity behind the seeming diversity of nature are the methods of regaining the truth of one's being. Distinctions are meaningless, finites are reality-less and the duality of the finite and the infinite is an illusion in an ultimate reference. There is one reality without a second (ekame-vādviityam), an impartible essence that negates differences of all kinds inside and out, and this undifferentiated unity is Brahman, the all-comprehensive unique Being with whom (or which) the
finite is to realize its oneness by a kind of absolute experience. Thus self-knowledge and Brahman are identical in character, for in the very act of knowing ourselves we expand ourselves to infinity till we lose ourselves altogether in Brahman. It is this philosophy which the Upanishads preach according to Sankarāchārya, though in a composite literature like the Upanishads, it is not difficult to find support for theistic views also.

It is obvious that this high philosophy cannot be the common man’s creed, and so the thinkers of India wisely decreed that life and thought are relative to the levels of spirituality attained. All are not competent (adhipāri) to search after Brahman—men must plod patiently the tedious path of spiritual discipline by performing the duties of their station according to their varṇa (caste or type) and āśrama (stage of life). While the ignorant should not be disturbed in their simple faith, the wise should not stick to an outworn creed when truth has dawned upon their mind. Images and even gods themselves have no meaning to a man who has realized the falsity of plurality in all forms. Religious prescriptions as laid down in the scriptures have no binding force; and they are free to disregard the duties of their original caste and the five sacrifices enjoined as duties on householders, namely, to read the scriptures, to offer oblations to the manes, to worship the gods, to feed the animals and to entertain the guests (panchamahāyajna). Even the simple rites performed by the forest recluse (which men above fifty were expected to be) could be abandoned and the life of a wandering mendicant could be adopted so that a life of complete detachment might be embraced. In Buddha’s time these parivrājakas (wanderers) belonged to all castes, and some of them gathered round themselves considerable bands of disciples.

Spiritual discipline took the form not only of understanding the nature of reality but also of controlling the thoughts, emotions and impulses so that a complete development of personality might take place. Strangely enough, the moral discipline was most severe among the Buddhists and Jainas, who had originally no theistic bias in the ordinary sense of the term, though latterly both succumbed to some sort of devotional attitude. Right belief, right aspiration, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right rapture constitute the noble eight-fold path which Buddha laid down as the indispensable prerequisite of the spiritual life. He taught moderation in
all matters as the foundation of a correct attitude towards the world, which means avoiding the two extremes of indulgence and mortification of the flesh. Disbelief in the reality of a substantial soul does not imply rejection of the moral law, which grinds out the moral destiny of succeeding generations relentlessly. Knowledge consists in seeing through the spiritual bondage which starts with ignorance and ends with repeated births and deaths. The cycle of samsāra must be ended by the attainment of nirvāṇa, which, if not anything more, is certainly inclusive of the extinction of all desires.

Māhāyanism, which developed speculative features and posited a Dharmakāya (Body of the Law) of the Buddha in addition to his earthly manifestation (Nirmāṇakāya) and heavenly pre-existence almost as a god (Sambhogakāya), propounded new concepts of the spiritual life. The Dharmakāya hovered between Brahman and Isvara of Brahmanism, and Buddha was invested not only with supreme wisdom (prajñā) but also with surpassing pity for the suffering world (karuṇa). A new ideal of spiritual life sprang up in the doctrine of the Bodhisattva which every devout soul was advised to become by practising virtue and straining every nerve to save the sinner by spreading enlightenment and morality and by turning over his own merit for the salvation of his erring brethren, if necessary. One's own salvation is a selfish quest unless supplemented by an endeavour to rescue the sinners and lead them all to the land of bliss and final liberation.

The Jaina ideal is not much different so far as theism is concerned; for, according to it, there is no God, and when we adore religious prophets and heroes we are not praying for blessings but remembering their virtues and instilling them in our own hearts. The "three jewels" (triratna)—right faith in the Jinas, right knowledge of their doctrines, and right conduct which is almost synonymous with ascetic practices—sum up the ingredients of the spiritual life. The cardinal virtues of India—non-injury, truthfulness, non-stealing, chastity, and renunciation—turn up in Jainism as in Buddhism and the Yoga system, though the final objectives differ in some respects, the Jainas positing a realm of perfect enlightenment, unending bliss, undisturbed quiescence and complete actionlessness for the saved. In all these systems, as in the Kaṭha Upanishad, the way of the good (śreyas) is distinguished from the way of the pleasant (preyas), and people are advised to follow the path of renunciation (nivṛtti), for desires fulfilled bring
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more desires in their train and make for bondage. If action has to be performed, then it must be done without a view to personal gain. In the theistic systems karma for its own sake is recommended, and the religious man is advised to dedicate the fruits of action to God.

It cannot be gainsaid that the message of India to the world has a great moral for mankind. To lessen pretensions rather than increase success, as William James pointed out, is the best means of securing a self-feeling. Limitation of wants will automatically minimize conflict of interests, class war and international jealousy and rivalry. In a word which has become classic, the wise man is advised to practise the four sublime meditations (brahmavīhārabhāvana) of joy at the happiness of others (maitrī), pity at the distress of others (karuṇā), delight at the virtuous conduct of others (mудīतā), and indifference at the vicious behaviour of others (upeкśhā). When insight pervades human dealings and morality follows closely on the heels of wisdom, all temptations to aggrandize oneself at the cost of others end. When finally it is realized that all beings are identified through their common origin in God or Brahman, the whole world becomes an expanded self of the agent and egoism and altruism coincide. Such a mystic vision may come through Divine grace; but preparation for such enlightenment is in the hands of all. Evil tendencies have got to be checked and a proper gradation of values established, if the spirit is to triumph over matter.

Whether the East is more quietistic and the West more active it is immaterial to discuss, for active charity is not unknown in the East nor passive contemplation in the West. Perhaps a more fundamental distinction is the more theistic attitude of the West and the more pantheistic and abnegatory attitude of the East. Temporal and external things have counted for less in the estimation of all spiritually-minded people all over the world, and their conviction that bodily difference has no bearing on the ultimate sameness of all spirits has enabled them all to preach a message which is not reserved for a special class or a particular clime. Peace on earth and good-will towards men sum up their life’s philosophy and their never-ceasing prayer is that the kingdom of God or the Holy Spirit descend on earth so that humanity may become one family with identical interests and common endeavour after good life. May their dream of universal happiness be fulfilled.
REALITY AND IDEALITY IN THE WESTERN AND THE INDIAN IDEALISTIC THOUGHT

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Every enquiry into reality has to face an initial paradox which may be presented in the form of a dilemma. If reality is external to knowledge, no enquiry can start; if, on the other hand, reality is within knowledge, the enquiry is gratuitous. It is, no doubt, a plausible reply to say that the alternatives are not exhaustive and that it is possible to escape between the horns of the dilemma by distinguishing unreflective from reflective knowledge and then insist that though we have, before the enquiry, a sort of vague, unreflective knowledge of reality, yet the aim of philosophy is to convert it into clear and distinct apprehension. Reality accordingly may be said to be neither wholly external to knowledge nor wholly within it, and philosophy does not represent a passage from ignorance to knowledge nor does it stultify itself by aiming at what is already an accomplished fact.

This reply, however, though favoured by many philosophers, ancient and modern, does not go to the root of the paradox. Granted that the function of philosophy is to convert incomplete into complete knowledge, yet this does not explain how this intellectual conversion is ever possible. That philosophy, like science, has its root in the rational demand for clear and systematic knowledge which is not satisfied by what goes under the name of common sense; or that reality reveals itself gradually through the ever-progressive process of unification and systematization, may be admitted. But this admission leaves unresolved the paradox of either denying that there is any progress in knowledge at all or affirming that philosophy aims at accomplishing the apparently impossible feat of converting ignorance into knowledge. For, if reality had been really external to knowledge, there could be neither the desire to know it nor the belief that in knowledge there is a progressive approximation to it. Thus
ignorance of reality can by no means be converted into knowledge; but, on the other hand, if we had known what reality is by reference to which the stages of knowledge are to be measured, the quest of reality loses its *raison d'être*.

The only way, therefore, in which the paradox is capable of being resolved is to catch the dilemma by both the horns, rather than try to escape between them, and thus realize that Reality is inside as well as outside of knowledge. The distinction between knowledge that is inadequate at one stage and that which is less inadequate at another stage presupposes an *absolute* criterion by which we measure the distance that separates knowledge at a particular stage from reality, and this criterion of absolute knowledge, far from being attainable at a future time, must be already in our possession to enable us to adjudicate upon the degree of approximation of knowledge to reality. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility of growing knowledge; it would be absurd to deny the plain fact that our knowledge of the universe develops, and that there is a sense in which knowledge involves a temporal process. But, on the other hand, it ought to be equally plain that the concept of the development and gradual approximation of knowledge to reality carries with it the implicit admission that in certain respects we are in possession of an absolute knowledge of reality which itself is not subject to growth or any form of the temporal process. This non-temporal absolute knowledge is the eternal fulcrum without which the ever-progressive knowledge of reality would miss its support. Every sound metaphysics must be based upon the clear recognition of this double aspect of knowledge or of reality. It must, in other words, recognize that knowledge regarded *sub specie temporis* has, for its logical basis or presupposition, certain principles which, on that account, may be said to be supra-temporal, and, as such, constituting a body of knowledge regarded *sub specie aeternitatis*. This, of course, is not intended to mean that everyone is clearly conscious of them, any more than it would be correct to say that everyone who thinks or speaks is clearly conscious of the laws of logic or of grammar, which none the less govern his thinking or speaking. All it means is that none could ever know that knowledge is gradually progressing towards perfection, or that Reality is being gradually revealed through knowledge, except on the basis of a vague knowledge of what perfect knowledge must be in its general features.
We must, however, in the interest of a further elucidation of this double aspect of knowledge make a briefer reference to one or two dominant tendencies of contemporary thought representing a sort of revolt against the supra-temporal principles of knowledge and reality. Knowledge, it has been contended, is not only through and through historical, it is only one aspect, and for the matter of that not the most important aspect, of human life and experience. The function of metaphysical analysis is to interpret life as a whole in all its richness and manifestations without abstraction and mutilation. One of the most distinguished philosophers to have attempted this reinterpretation of life is W. Dilthey, whose revolt against the previous metaphysical constructions on the ground of their separation from life and mutilated foundation has moulded the characteristic outlook of German philosophy represented by Jaspers and Heidegger. His diagnosis of the causes of the decline of metaphysics after Hegel, based upon a scholarly analysis of the previous systems, results in the interesting discovery that the whole of what he calls uncuttulated experience or “kultur” has never been made the basis of philosophy; on the contrary, philosophy has been modelled on the analogy of objective, geometrical thinking separated from the life of humanity. It is this separation of philosophy from man’s attitude towards life, from his Weltanschauung, that has brought the decline of metaphysics. The proposal of Dilthey, therefore, is to replace The Critique of Pure Reason by a Critique of Historical Reason, and to revise the prevailing epistemology, which confines itself to the forms of thought, in the light of the “kultur” which is formed more by the ethical and social factors of life than by abstract thought.

Dilthey’s reaction against the older type of philosophy represents only one form of the general reaction, its other forms being reflected in the thoughts of many other contemporary philosophers, within and outside Germany. Thus, for instance, Husserl and his followers insist on the recognition of the “essentials” in the physical things as well as in memory, imagination, aesthetic enjoyment, ethical values, etc.; Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Heidegger seek to replace the purely theoretical epistemology by an “existential” analysis and “existential” thinking; A. N. Whitehead finds in Kant’s analysis of knowledge a fruitless endeavour to show that “the world emerges from the subject,” arising out of Kant’s failure to realize that “the subject emerges from the
world," and that it is "a superject rather than a subject"; and R. G. Collingwood refuses to accept Kant's analysis in the Transcendental Analytic except when it is interpreted as "an historical study of the absolute presuppositions" of the natural science of Kant's own time.

An adequate critical estimate of these highly critical adventures being out of the question within the prescribed space, we have selected, almost at random, only such remarks as are not only representative of the general reaction against the old epistemology, but are valuable for appreciating some vital points on which the new outlook differs from the old. In what follows an attempt will be made in a general way to stress some points of the old epistemology which do not appear to have received the attention they deserved. It is not, of course, denied that there is in it an aspect of intricate ruggedness and an unhealthy reluctance to push the issues to their legitimate consequences, and these circumstances alone would justify new enterprises. But as far as we can see, there does not seem to be much justification for ignoring altogether the value of the old structure and, in the name of reform, demolishing it to its foundation.

This over-emphasis on the historical method and the historical aspect of knowledge flings to the winds Kant's famous distinction between the problem of quid facti and quid juris. Even if it be conceded that what brought about the philosophical crisis after Hegel was the assumption that a Weltanschauung is susceptible of logical proof—an assumption born of the ignorance of the truth that every system of philosophy, like art and religion, is a particular expression of the Weltanschauung—does this discovery nullify the distinction between the problem of origin and the problem of validity? The assertion of a particular origin of philosophy, no matter what theory of the origin is favoured by the philosopher, makes, by virtue of the mere fact that it is an assertion, a claim to be true. This truth-claim cannot be justified by reference to the origin of philosophy. In other words, every theory of the origin of philosophy has epistemological implications which refuse to be explained by the laws that govern the origin. It may, no doubt, be said in reply that even the truth of a theory of origin has to be guaranteed by history; it is not by a static logic that the historical origin of philosophy is to be judged because a historical fact needs a dynamic logic for asserting its truth. Such a reply, if we were to avoid confusion of issues, does not solve the
problem of validity; on the contrary, it renders the problem of validity in respect of the origin of philosophy doubly insoluble; because, while the assertion that philosophy originates from \textit{Weltanschauung} is based upon the unproved assumption that it is a true doctrine of its origin, the reply adds to it the further assumption, equally unproved, that the truth of the particular doctrine of the origin of philosophy is itself to be proved by history, which, when put in plain language, means that an assumption is true because, as a matter of fact, it has been made by some people or a generation of people. This, again, signifies that the truth of an assumption is not susceptible of proof. This \textit{reductio ad absurdum} of what has been called dynamic logic, far from being accepted as its fundamental defect, is sometimes swallowed and taken to be its merit. Thus, for instance, Collingwood has repeatedly reminded his readers that the logical efficacy of a supposition does not depend upon the truth of what is supposed, or even on its being thought true, but only on its being supposed. It is difficult to surmise what would be his reply if it had been pointed out to him that in that case he forfeits his right to question the suppositions of the static logic.

The latent self-contradiction of dynamic logic and of the exclusively historical method may be brought forth from another side. Every historical account has for its foundation these very principles of which a historical origin is explained; to put it in another form, except in the presupposed universal truths of the first principles of knowledge, every historical account loses its meaning and foundation. A historical account of causality, for example, has, on pain of being unintelligible, to accept the universal validity of the causal connection between one stage of history and that which follows it. If, on the contrary, one stage could be conceived as being followed by any other conceivable stage without a fixed rule, we could not intelligibly think that one phase of history "changes into another because the first phase was in unstable equilibrium and had in itself the seeds of change" (Collingwood). In face of this irrepressibility of causality in a historical account, to seek to prove that causality is a mere "absolute presupposition" in the Pickwickian sense in which Collingwood uses the phrase, is to waste ingenuity over an irrelevant issue. It is, in fact, a case of that same \textit{hysteron proteron} which vitiated Hume's proof of the illusory nature of causality.

That the historical method is only a modified form of the
empirical and inductive method is clearly brought forth by Dilthey's observation that the function of philosophy must be "empirically deduced from history" and that all knowledge must originate from the historical life of humanity. He does not, apparently, see that empiricism, whatever form it may assume, is a philosophical position of which Hume has already shown the bottom. An empirical deduction of the nature and function of philosophy will never give us a philosophy of philosophy; what it is capable of yielding is the historical lesson that scepticism is the inevitable consequence of a purely empirical study. Locke's empiricism inevitably developed into a sceptical paradox, but its classical implication has been evidently lost upon the apostles of the historical method in philosophy.

It is difficult to enter into a critical estimate of the phenomenological method in philosophy in view of the divergent purposes for which it has been used by Husserl, on the one hand, and his followers on the other. What is, however, clear is that Husserl's distinction between fact and essence, and his view on the intuition of the "essentials" aim at stripping experience of all the features that are involved in referring it to reality. Whether such a phenomenal reduction of the "bracketing" is ever possible or not, and whether there can be any analysis of such a radical type that the focussed essences discovered by it will remain unchanged and uneffected even when experience comes to have a reference to reality, may be questioned, and in fact they have led to a protracted controversy, in the history of Indian and Western philosophy, on the role of thought in experience. But even if it be granted that the phenomena are beyond the region of validity or invalidity, this itself claims to be a true assertion, and, as such, cannot be indifferent to the conditions which make an assertion true. Thus the epistemological problem about the conditions which every true assertion must satisfy is not solved by the phenomenological method, whatever its value might be in a special science.

This confusion between epistemology and a special science is also implied by the claim of "existential thinking" to offer a deeper knowledge of reality than the older type of epistemology which was concerned with the forms of the understanding. Even if it is true that "Existenz," as distinct from existence, is called forth by the attitude of the individual and his momentous decision when confronted with the critical situations of life, this can
hardly be taken to be the clue to the solution of the problem of truth and the implications involved in the truth-claim of an assertion. The starting point of thought may be the inner decisions of the individual, or instinct, sense-data, etc.; but none of them can be identified with thought or the principles of logical thinking. Thought, which is involved in thinking of anything, and the epistemological principles involved by every systematic account of the inner decisions cannot be denied, except when we refuse to think or refuse to give a systematic account of these decisions. It is, therefore, wrong to think that "existential thinking" is a kind of thinking different from, and superior to, that type of thinking analysed by the older type of epistemologists, like Hegel and his followers. Thought being the universal presupposition of every doctrine of reality, it cannot be criticized ab extra, nor can its principles be denied; to do so would be tantamount either to refusing to think or to reasserting unconsciously what is consciously denied. Thought may so far be called svayam-siddha as distinct from the agantuka items of knowledge.

It also follows from this line of analysis that "thought," as used in psychology, has hardly anything to do with "thought" as it figures in epistemology. Psychology takes "thought" in the sense of one item by the side of the other items, such as feeling, volition, will, etc., while in epistemology it is the svayam-siddha universal supporting and giving meaning to all the items or particular psychical processes which form the subject-matter of psychology. It is the ambiguity in the term "thought" which lends plausibility to the doctrine of existential thinking. No proposal to reform the old epistemology is likely to be fruitful while the terms "thought," "knowledge," "self," etc., are used by its critics in a sense entirely different from that in which they were used by the so-called epistemologists. Such a proposal would be like that of first injecting the germs of a disease into a patient and then setting about curing him.

As another illustration of the confusion of epistemology with psychology to which even philosophers of recognized ability may easily fall prey, we may refer to A. N. Whitehead's view, quoted above, that the subject emerges from the world. Whitehead, of course, cannot be unfamiliar with the revolution Kant brought about in epistemology by his theory of transcendental apperception with its implication of the double aspect of mind, namely, mind as one object among other objects, and mind as the ultimate
presupposition of all objects. Nor can he be unfamiliar with the fact that the term "subject," as it is used in the idealistic analysis of knowledge, does not convey the same meaning as "mind" does in a psychological analysis. The relation between mind and matter, for example, is not identical with the relation between subject and object. The subject-object relation, on the contrary, is the most generic relation which is presupposed by every specific relation, such as the mind-matter relation. A full discussion of Whitehead's theory of knowledge would need a much greater space than is at our disposal; yet we shall not be far wrong when we remark that he has, rather too uncritically, accepted the psychological analysis of knowledge which, on account of its obviousness and its easy appeal to unreflective common sense, has influenced the common theories of knowledge. That in his polemic against the idealist's account of "the subject-object structure of experience," or the "known-knower relation," he is not doing sufficient justice to the distinction, the idealists have always been careful to make between the subject-object relation and an inter-objective relation like the mind-matter relation, is sufficiently evident from such remarks as that "the basis of experience is emotional," that "all knowledge is conscious discrimination of objects experienced," and that "consciousness is the crown of experience only occasionally attained, not its necessary base," etc.

The long-drawn-out controversy between naturalism and idealism and the triumph of the naturalistic method of analysis in contemporary epistemology indicates nothing more than this: that language, though indispensable for self-analysis as well as for communication, yet presents an obstacle which it is difficult even for able thinkers to surmount entirely. That knowledge or consciousness is a three-term relation involving that which knows, that which is known, and the process of knowledge, is apparently too simple an analysis to be replaced by another, or to need an elaborate defence; yet its utter inadequacy for providing the basis of a sound epistemology is concealed from us by the structure of language and by the forms assumed by thought when they are dictated, too exclusively, by the grammatical forms of language. And then, instead of realizing that thought, knowledge or consciousness is the foundational principle which invests each term of the triple distinction with meaning and significance, we fall into the error of supposing that knowledge is the product of a certain type of relation between one thing and another. And once
the false analysis is on the scene, it gives rise to insuperable difficulties needing for their resolution a number of fanciful and far-fetched hypotheses. "My thought," "my knowledge," "my consciousness," are some of the phrases that have been the breeding ground of inextricable quandaries in epistemology; yet they are but the natural offspring of the triputi (triple division). Whitehead's analysis of knowledge along with his explanation of prehension as involving three factors is directly born of the perverse implication of this triputi.

In a triple distinction the foundationality of thought is missed, leading to its identification with one of the superstructural items; thought is accordingly dislocated from its transcendental locale and placed alongside of the items supported by it. This serious mistake, which may be called the fallacy of transcendental dislocation, is ingrained in our natural objectivistic attitude of mind looking always forward to what lies before it and thus missing what lies at the foundation of knowledge. And the result is the disastrous transference of the characters of the object of thought or consciousness to thought itself, known as adhyāsa in Indian philosophy. This transcendental dislocation or adhyāsa, so characteristic of the realistic and empirical analysis of knowledge, generates a radically wrong perspective foredooming the quest of reality to an inevitable failure. It is as impossible to have a correct notion of consciousness by ascribing to it the characters of the objects presented to it as to gauge the infinite space by means of the properties of a triangle or to take measure of mahākāśa by using the ghatakāśa as our units.

What we are driving at is that a foundational principle, such as thought or consciousness, can neither be denied nor refuted; it is an irrepressible principle possessed of a phoenix's vitality and surviving the blows of the deadliest missiles of destructive criticism. All anti-intellectual and sceptical contentions owe their plausibility to an unconscious dislocation of thought and the consequent adhyāsa. A successful suppression of this natural tendency would reveal that even scepticism and agnosticism feed upon the principles of thought, and they, like every variety of anti-intellectualism, are essentially parasitical in nature, drawing their sustenance from the laws of thought and principles of reason. As every philosophical position is developed in response to the demand of thought or reason which is believed to remain unsatisfied by the rival positions in opposition to which it is developed,
the universal laws of reason are not susceptible of doubt or refutation, proof or disproof. They are, as we have said above, svayam-siddha. The recent attempts to develop philosophy on the basis of the historical method, or on that of "existential thinking," in their polemic against the older epistemology, have confused the svayam-siddha with the āganṭuka principles, and this confusion has arisen out of the dislocation of the former from their foundational position.

That one of the gravest dangers to correct analysis lies in the tendency of ordinary thought to conform to the grammatical structure of language has been recognized by many philosophers, Indian and Western. In particular, it produces what is known in the Pātañjala system as vikalpavṛtti, a kind of illusion of difference in thought corresponding to which there is no difference in reality. Hence again, the Buddhists compared language to a soiled garment which conceals the gem of truth, and the "advaita" philosophers recommended piercing through the veil of Māyā, of which name and form are the constituent elements. Whitehead's misinterpretation of the subject-object structure of experience is a brilliant instance of the ascription of a mere vikalpavṛtti to reality. In fact, he here sails on the same boat with a large number of philosophers, both Indian and Western, who have been slow to appreciate the great value of Kant's criticism of rational psychology or of the "advaita" philosophers' warning against the misapplication of the categories of substance and causality to the self.

We may now realize the shortcomings of a democratic conception of the universe according to which knowledge is the relation of compresence between the knower and the known, or subject and object, or, again, between thought and the object of thought. The situation does not change in the least if in place of these dualities, knowledge is taken, as in contemporary realism, to be a relation between mental acts and objects. In these empirico-realistic approaches and the consequent democratic conception of knowledge, the mistake lies in placing the transcendental principles on a level with the objects conditioned by them, and this mistake is analogous to placing the Law of Non-Contradiction on a level with the judgments which it conditions. But has the idealist approach been altogether free from this mistaken dislocation?

Here, again, we have to be brief, and must, therefore, restrict ourselves to a few observations on F. H. Bradley's criticism of thought. One of the main difficulties in interpreting Bradley's
position lies in the circumstance that he is constantly affirming unconsciously what he is consciously denying. Thus, for example, he himself makes a large number of assertions about reality and yet this does not prevent him from anathematizing judgment; similarly, while claiming absolute validity for his own philosophy, he condemns philosophy as a self-discrepant appearance and truth as not being quite true; while believing that his own theory of the Absolute is the result of consistent thinking, he yet seeks to expose the claim of the Law of Non-Contradiction to be an absolute criterion except in the field of theory. He does not appear to see that the method of destructive dialectic is baffled by the irrepressible principles. If the Law of Non-Contradiction, for example, is such that its truth is reasserted in the very process of its refutation—and this is rightly taken by him as an absolute criterion—then it is but wasted ingenuity to proceed to show that it is a mere assumption which has validity in theory alone, and, as such, this law, though intellectually corrigible, may be corrected by passing outside the intellect. Is it at all possible to attach any meaning to supra-intellectual corrigibility of a principle which is intellectually incorrigible? If it be admitted that we cannot “proceed to judge at all” without being forced “at a certain point to assume infallibility,” it is merely a play of words to assert at the same time that this infallibility is restricted to our theoretical function alone. The mischief here is due to Bradley’s adherence to the antiquated faculty psychology according to which intellect is only one faculty in the midst of other faculties having thought as its function. This interpretation of “thought” runs counter to the meaning it carries with his brother idealists. In a significant passage, Hegel, for instance, remarks: “Thought has a different part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty of thought, one among a crowd of other faculties, such as perception, conception and will, with which it stands on the same level” (Logic, Wallace’s translation, p. 46). Thought, in its objective meaning, is the Nous, it is not a subjective process; we must, therefore, realize that “Man is a being that thinks,” and, as a thinker, he is “universal,” and “feels his own universality.” Similarly, Bradley admits that thought cannot assert “the existence of any content which was not an actual or possible object of thought,” and that even “thatness seems a distinction made by thought.” From this it would follow that thought, as the universal background of all distinctions, cannot be identified with a parti-
cular faculty; on the contrary, it is the universal, irrepressible, transcendental principle lying at the foundation of all that we can ever think of and of all distinctions existing between one object and another. But the admission remains as a passing insight which is brought to birth in Bradley whose dialectic predilection always veils from his view the transcendental locale of the foundational principles leading to their misplacement along-side of what they condition. And once the misplacement is there, the transference of the characters of the one to the other follows as a matter of course. This *adhyāsa* is further illustrated by his discussion of the ideality of finite existences.

That the finite things are self-transcendent, and, as such, cannot be absolutely real, has been recognized by philosophers of widely divergent traditions. In Indian philosophy its detection dates as far back as from Nāgārjuna and the other Buddhists. Their interpretation of the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) brought out the absolute relativity of the finite things which are pressed into the service of the *nairāmyavāda* (doctrine of no-soul) of their tradition. The conclusion which was drawn from the ideality of the finite was that the ultimate reality was *Śūnya* (void). In the “advaita” school, on the other hand, the recognition of the ideality of finite existences led to the belief that the Infinite was an unconditioned conscious principle in which there is no distinction, not even the distinction between knowledge and existence. Bradley’s remedy for the disease of ideality comes very close to that of the “advaita” tradition. He is obviously dissatisfied with the Hegelian conception of reality. For Hegel, reality lies neither in the mere individual taken by itself, nor in the mere particular related to other particulars. Reality “lies in the relation, or the principle of relation itself—in the universal which differentiates or particularizes itself and yet is one with itself, not by the absence of difference, but rather by means of the difference, which it at once asserts and overcomes.” Thus unity and difference are the inseparable aspects of reality. When the unity is absolutely separated from the differences, the “one” is separated from the “many,” both terms are deprived of their meaning. Hence, Hegel calls the Absolute a spiritual unity which conveys “the idea of antagonism overcome, contradiction reconciled, unity realized through the struggle and conflict of elements, which, in the first aspect of them, are opposed to each other.”
Bradley's dissatisfaction with Hegel's remedy for the ideality of finite things is reflected in his contention that the whole which reconciles all contradictions is not to be found on the relational level of thought. It is true that thought desires an ideal which will be an individual, self-subsistent reality, but thought itself being dualistic and relational, it cannot reach the non-relational whole, and has consequently to commit suicide. "Reality, and self-transcendence, or, as we may call it, ideality, cannot as such be the ultimate character of Reality; but all finite existence is incurably relative and ideal." "Finite elements are joined by what divides, and are divided by what joins them." Identity, he remarks, is a fact, but not real ultimately, and similarly, difference is phenomenal and not ultimate. Bradley, therefore, distinguishes phenomenal identity or factual identity and phenomenal difference from the ultimate unity of reality. It is true, he continues, that unity, in its more proper sense, is known only as contradistinguished from plurality. Unity, therefore, as an aspect over against and defined by another aspect, is itself but appearance. And in this sense, the real cannot be properly called one. But reality, while owning plurality, is yet above it. Such a "one" is not "defined as against" plurality but "absorbing" plurality "together with the one-sided unity which forms its opposite." This non-relational unity is realized, Bradley says elsewhere, in "feeling which is not an object"; in all experience and at all moments "the entirety of what comes to us, however much distinguished and relational, is felt as comprised within a unity which itself is not relational" (Truth and Reality, p. 178). Thus Bradley, while accepting and defending the Hegelian principle of unity of opposites over against the principle of abstract identity, yet thinks that the Hegelian principle itself does not apply to the ultimate reality.

Proceeding on these lines, Bradley finally arrives at the famous doctrine of immediate experience which is considered as opening "the one road to the solution of ultimate problems." Immediate experience, he contends, is "an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one." And "the entire relational consciousness," it is supposed, "is experienced as falling within a direct awareness" which is "itself non-relational." It can neither be explained nor described, because "description necessarily means translation into objective terms and relations." That this comes very close to the "advaita" view of reality as the aparoksha anubhuti in which
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consciousness is being and being is consciousness, is too obvious to need elucidation.

The conclusion Bradley should have drawn from his analysis of immediate experience, and which he does not draw explicitly, is that the term "thought" when used in the transcendental sense, falls beyond the relational description, and yet, it supplies the basis or āśraya of every object of thought that is necessarily ideal. Whether this non-relational foundation of knowledge should be called thought or consciousness, or direct awareness, is after all a matter of nomenclature. What, however, is important to note in the present context is that "thought," as used by the idealists, does not connote a subjective process of mind; on the contrary, every subjective process—such as thought, feeling, will—is grounded in the objective thought or Nous, as Hegel had observed. If Bradley had consistently adhered to this transcendental meaning of "thought," he could easily realize that ideality is an inalienable feature of all finite things, yet it would be a disastrous adhyāsa to characterize thought itself as ideal.

It may have been apparent by this time that the contemporary theories of knowledge which seek to replace the old epistemology have not done full justice to its doctrine of transcendental principles and to the method of transcendental analysis which aims at drawing our attention to the foundation without objectifying what lies there. As a result, there arises the fatal mistake of ascribing to the foundational principles those characteristics which belong to the superstructural entities. Origin and destruction, growth and evolution, causality and ideality—all these are universally valid within the world of finite entities; they are altogether inapplicable to the ultimate foundational reality. But, on the other hand, reality does not reside, like Kant's Thing-in-itself or Plato's Ideas, in a world lying beyond the world of finite objects, nor does it reduce itself to a mere naught. That which gives meaning to the finite cannot be a meaningless abstraction simply on the ground that it resists the mechanism of ordinary definition. Definition is always delimitation and, as such, implies a limit; to attach a "what" to a "that" is to limit the latter by another "that." This mutual delimitation, however, through which the finite entities are invested with meaning would be impossible in the case of the Infinite Principle on the basis of which the mutual delimitation of the finite entities is possible. The Infinite is not externally determined: this is true. But does it

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follow from this that it is internally determined? The concept of internal determination still implies difference, and, as difference itself is a relation, the terms between which it obtains must fall within a unity which itself must be beyond all relations, including the relation of difference.

If the foregoing analysis of Infinite Unity is correct, then, the foundational reality may be called thought, knowledge, or consciousness, free from ideality, relativity or self-transcendence. There could be no knowledge of the self-transcendence of the finite if knowledge had been itself ideal or self-transcendent; or, to put the same thing in a different form, there could be no thought of the ideality of the finite if thought itself had been ideal. This, again, is another way of saying that all that we can ever know or think points to an Infinite Knowledge or Integral Knowledge, beyond all relations, external or internal, which can as little be denied while we affirm the finite as the infinite space while we affirm the geometrical figures.
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

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I

1. The importance of the concept of consciousness: The concept of consciousness is an important one for my system of philosophy. It is the key to the solution of some of the most important and difficult philosophical problems. In general, it determines our whole attitude towards the nature of Ultimate Reality. A materialist denies the very existence of consciousness. For him, reality is all physical. At the other extremity is the Advaitic system of Indian philosophy, which regards consciousness as the sole reality. All other phenomena, both physical and mental, are just appearances of this reality. Between these two extreme views lie all the other systems of thought which recognize consciousness more or less, and attach varying importance to it in the system of things. An attempt is made in these pages to explain and to justify the Advaitic view as the only right and consistent view of consciousness. In the process, we shall critically examine all those other views which naturally lead up to it.

2. Consciousness as an epiphenomenon: The materialist denies the independent existence of consciousness. He cannot, of course, deny mental phenomena altogether. Only, he regards them as dependent upon physiological or neurological processes. Consciousness is a by-product of certain processes in the brain. The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, they would say. Or to change the metaphor, consciousness is to the body what the whistle is to the steam-engine.

In psychology, this view has led in modern times to behaviourism. The behaviour of the organism is all that is given to observation and scientific study; and this behaviour can fully and wholly be explained in terms of certain reflexes. There is determinism here as there is determinism in the physical world outside. There
is no entity, called consciousness or spirit, which can initiate a bodily movement on its own account, or interfere in the causally determined series of bodily reactions. There is no freedom anywhere. The realm of reality is coextensive with the realm of causality—just the opposite of what Advaitism would hold. Mental facts of some sort, such as images or pain, are not denied. But they are regarded as private to the individual. They cannot be scientifically studied. The so-called method of introspection is not a proper method of knowledge at all. There are no public objects which it can tackle and study objectively. Psychology as a science must outgrow this antiquated method, and ignore the facts which it is supposed to study. Psychology is not a science of the mind or the psyche, but a science of behaviour.

3. Epistemological realisms: The crude form of ontological materialism has been replaced in modern times by a subtler form. The problem is treated epistemologically. We thus get a form of thoroughgoing epistemological realism. Consciousness is not denied altogether, but its function is so restricted and explained that we can do without consciousness in the accepted sense. We can study consciousness only in the knowledge-situation; for that is its pre-eminent function. In that situation, the object is everything. There is no other entity called consciousness. There is no dualism of matter on the one hand, and mind or spirit on the other. There is a real monism. The only other entity required is the body. The difference between an object of which we are said to be conscious and one of which we are not, is that the former is related to a body and defined by a specific reaction of its nervous system, while the latter is not thus related and defined. This relatedness and definition is all that there is over and above the object in a knowledge-situation, and it is a function of the nervous system. What we know at a time is a certain cross-section of the physical world. This cross-section, defined by the various systems, is all that we should understand by consciousness. A flash-light does nothing more. It defines a cross-section of reality. But the flash-light is not the consciousness. What is defined by it is the consciousness. In short, the physical world and the physical organism which forms a part of it are the only ultimate reality. What we call "being conscious" is to be understood in terms of a certain relationship between these two—the world outside and the organism responsive to it. There is no problem, in knowledge, of relating two heterogeneous entities, called matter and spirit.
It is a strict metaphysical monism based upon a realistic epistemology.

3(a). Criticism of materialism: Metaphysical monism is a necessity of thought. But can we have it at the level of matter? Facts of experience prove otherwise. Matter and consciousness are diametrically opposed in nature. Consciousness is like light. It reveals itself and reveals other things. Matter is darkness, which reveals neither itself nor other things. They are so incompatible and opposed to each other that they can never reside together in the same locus. How can consciousness, then, emerge out of matter, or be a quality of matter, or reside in matter? In fact, consciousness is a higher form of reality inasmuch as it reveals matter itself as material, i.e. as dead. Inert and unintelligent matter, on the other hand, has no such fundamental relation to consciousness, and provides no sort of evidence for its reality. It is passive and unintelligent. In the realistic account of knowledge given above, the nervous response can define a cross-section of the physical world only in so far as it is an intelligent response, and not a blind physical reaction such as any chemical substance is capable of. This intelligent response cannot be a quality of the matter which constitutes the nervous system. Intelligence, speaking metaphorically, may be said to ride on matter as on a vehicle, but it cannot be a quality of matter. The heterogeneity of matter and consciousness is an original datum of our experience. We ignore it only at the peril of intelligent discourse. Those who do not recognize the heterogeneity to begin with, have no right to speak of monism of any kind. They have no problem of reconciliation or of unification. Monism for them is a mere dogma. It has solved no problem.

4. Mind as the entelechy or the intelligent principle of the body: Consciousness may not be an evolute of matter or a quality of matter. It may be an original reality. But can we not agree that it is not an independent entity? It is dependent upon the body. Mind is not a distinct entity or substance encased in the body. For that would lead to a materialistic view of the mind. We should be obliged to think of it as a stuff put away in a box. To save its spiritual character and to do justice to the facts of experience, we must conceive a more organic relation between it and the body. The mind is the entelechy or the informing principle of the body. The entelechy cannot subsist of itself. It is like the form which can only subsist in matter. In other words, the mind can
only function in and through the body. An embodied mind is the only mind there is. Accordingly, the mind cannot survive the body. There can be no such thing as a disembodied mind or a disembodied spirit. Spiritualism, and all that goes with it, are pure nonsense. Instead of the spirit or the soul having an independent existence and growing a body for itself, it would be truer to say that the body grows a soul. The body can be independent, at least so far as its physical basis is concerned, not so the soul.

This is another revision of materialism. The Cārvākas of Hindu philosophy thought likewise. When the body is dissolved at death, it is the end of the soul. Nothing whatsoever is left except what we can see. And yet, strangely, this entelechy-notion of the mind is supposed to rise above the materialistic view and to be an answer to it. It is a view which is too empirical and too short-sighted. It does not take into account the supremacy of mind over matter, and the sense of realism and significance which the former brings to the latter.

5. Theologians' view of the relation of the soul and the body: Is there then a soul encased in the body, as the theologians say? It is argued against this, that the artificial union of the soul and the body is like the union of a ghost and a corpse. The two are so distinct that they cannot possibly get united into a single and integrated entity. But what is wrong about this image? The corpse as united to the ghost is no longer a corpse, but a living thing. It becomes an instrument of the spirit and a vehicle for its activities. When it has ceased to be this, it is truly a corpse which we burn or bury. This view of the relationship of two distinct entities, matter and spirit, prakṛti and puruṣa, is by no means absurd. The spirit itself is embodied. But its goal is not an embodied existence. It must give up attachment to the body and its cravings in order to be free. This is the spirit behind Hindu religion and philosophy, and it is the theologians' goal.

We no longer think of the life here as the end of all life. Our vision is carried beyond the immediate needs and the necessities of the body to values everlasting. Religion and morality get a meaning. In fact, religion is impossible without a belief in the hereafter. If there is no hereafter, there is no inducement to sacrifice our present and mundane interests for a greater or a higher good. Self-sacrifice as a principle of individual or social conduct disappears. And the one stabilizing force in society, the disinterested service of man for the greater glory of God or for
the achievement of an intrinsic, ultimate and lasting good, ceases to operate. In this respect, the theologians are more socialistic than the socialists, who derive their philosophy for the improvement of society from purely scientific and materialistic considerations.

In any case, it is evident that belief in the distinctness of the soul from the body shifts the emphasis from the latter to the former. The life of the soul, because it extends beyond the life of the body, becomes more important than the latter. We can more significantly say, in the words of the Bible, "thou dost not live by bread alone." Our whole valuation is reversed. The soul grows a body for itself, not vice versa. It is only a sojourner here. Its goal is far and distant. Our present life is only a preparation for death and what lies beyond. Immortality is the birthright of the soul. What we further demand is to add value to existence. The tabernacle of the body is valuable only in so far as it enshrines the soul, whose larger purposes it must serve. The soul throws away the body, as we do tattered clothes which have worn thin and served their purpose, or as the snake throws away its useless outer skin. It is a view in conformity with common sense, scripture, and even with national requirements up to a point. There is certainly no evidence against this view except a certain amount of muddled thinking. The house does not throw up its occupant who then proceeds falsely to own and to possess it. The sense of possession is clear evidence of the distinctness of the possessor and that which is possessed. And then if the soul does not survive the body, why not make merry now and enjoy life to the fullest? There can be no question of any higher or ulterior values. It becomes purely a matter of taste whether I take pleasure in physical and carnal enjoyments, or in the so-called higher joys of art, morality and religion. The end is the same. Each one has lived according to his desires. There is no supernatural existence which may be affected one way or other by our present activities and the motives which inspire them. Religion and morality without an independent soul-life make nonsense.

It is true that the theologians' view of the soul is not free from a touch of materialism. Only a body that can occupy space can be enclosed within another body. The completely disembodied cannot be enclosed. Accordingly, we are obliged to conceive of the soul that leaves the body at death as possessing a rarefied or a subtler body. This materialistic implication of the conception of
the soul, we shall seek to dispel in the sequel. We shall replace the notion of the soul by the notion of the intelligent and absolute Self. Here we want to insist that the dualism of the soul and the body involves a more advanced and refined view of the soul than the alternative view that the soul and the values which it achieves are real only in the body. The soul has a life of its own independent of the body. It gathers merit and demerit, dharma and adharma, in its empirical existence. This dharma acts as the invisible cause of our present well-being and future destiny. We make or mar our destiny, and the stake is divine joy. The superphysical reality of the soul is the only guarantee of a religious and a serious attitude towards life and things.

Religion may be all superstition. But experience is not superstition. It is the ground of truth. This experience requires that consciousness, which is a fact, must be grounded not in matter, which is directly opposed to it in nature, but in an intelligent principle which we call the soul. The soul by itself may be mythical; for no one has ever seen it or known it. But the soul as the basis of conscious experience, or as that in which this experience arises, is not mythical. Experience, without a substantival basis, is in the air. It requires a medium in which it can occur. If we do not supply a substantival basis to it in the form of the soul, we have to supply it in the form of matter. That which occurs is a mode of substance. We cannot do without substance. If consciousness arises in matter or in a spatio-temporal occasion, we have reverted to materialism, reversed the values of existence, and committed the fallacy of misplaced concretion. Matter by itself is an abstraction. It is vacuous reality. It cannot be the substantival basis of experience itself. The real basis of experience is to be found in that which owns experience. All experience is my experience. It is I that knows, feels, wills, etc. It is this I, then, in which all experience is grounded. There is evident sameness in this ground. The I that sees a flower is the I that later smells it, and so on. I go back to the past and review it in memory as the experience of the self-identical myself. In fact, the awareness of self-identity is inalienable from the awareness of myself. There may be reasons against this view, not very cogent ones in our opinion. But prima facie at least there is a case for identity and therefore for substantival existence of the I in some sense. We call this substantival existence of the I by the neutral term “soul.” The soul thus becomes the ground of consciousness.
II

6. Denial of pure consciousness: The fact of consciousness as something quite distinct from a purely physical or physiological process may be recognized. Consciousness is something *sui generis*, requiring a spiritual substance for its basis. But consciousness, as we know it, is not itself a substance. It is not something static. There is no such thing as pure consciousness. Consciousness is something dynamic and flowing. It is a series of acts or states. It may be pictured as a stream without the implication of something substantival and self-identical moving in the stream. There is more properly *becoming* in it, which means that one entity dies in order that the succeeding should be born.

There are philosophers who have held a somewhat different view about consciousness. They have argued that consciousness as such is a real entity. In the knowledge-situation, we can find this entity. There is the object outside, and there is the awareness of this object. Things are there whether we know them or not. But when we know them, they get related to awareness. This relation is quite external to the two entities. On analysis, therefore, we can find the object on the one hand, and awareness on the other. We can find its awareness, if we sufficiently attend to it, and if we know that it is there. Only we must remember that this awareness is too diaphanous, so that when we want to look *at* it, we merely look *through* it.

This view of the dualism in knowledge appears to us to be an exaggerated one. No amount of attending ever discloses awareness as such. It does not stand up to our introspective view. Introspection only discloses definite entities, e.g. knowledge of A, a feeling of pain, etc. These facts, distinct, separate and successive, are all that we know as constituting the stuff of mind or the stuff of consciousness. Pure consciousness is never our object. Those who think otherwise merely prove that the method of introspection is slippery and unreliable, and that introspectively we tend to perceive what we want to perceive.

It might appear strange that we should reject the reality of pure consciousness, when it is the very object of this paper to establish that reality. But we cannot worship at the shrine of false god. Consciousness as known would not be consciousness, even as god who is finite would not be acceptable to us as a real

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god. If consciousness is real, it is real only as the Absolute Subject, never as object.

7. Do we not know consciousness?: It may now be said that we are attaching some special significance to the concept of consciousness when we call it pure. Consciousness is a term in a relation, the relation of knowledge. In this relation, we do find consciousness as it is, without any modification. It is quite pure as far as it goes. We are, for example, aware of blue. This awareness we know. It is distinct from blue. At the same time, awareness is not blue. It is unmodified by its object. It is in the same sense that we know, whether we know red, blue or violet, or some other sense datum altogether. We can thus be said to know pure awareness as a factor in knowledge. There is no mystery about it. All we can say is that it is a unique entity.

Now it appears to us that this view is at least questionable. We take it for granted that we can directly know any piece of knowledge, such as awareness of blue, and analyse it for what it is into its elements. But we contend that the awareness of anything whatsoever is never known directly in its complete subjectivity. The knowing itself is never known. It is only when we cease to know, and we reflect back, that we may be said to become aware of a knowing. As it is said, all introspection is retrospection. In other words, direct knowledge of awareness or consciousness of anything is ruled out. Reflective knowledge is not direct, and its object is not awareness as such, but some kind of mental event which we call a knowing. Where is that pure and unmodified awareness which is the same whether it is related to red or to blue, or to any sensible object whatsoever? It is a misleading analysis of knowledge according to which we not only know an object A, but we also know the "knowing" of A.

Some philosophers have found a way out of this difficulty. They recognize that knowing is not in its turn known. They therefore make a distinction between knowledge by contemplation and knowledge by enjoyment. The object A is contemplated. But its knowledge is not in its turn contemplated, but enjoyed. Now it appears to us that the use of a term which is quite appropriate for feeling is unwarranted to describe a species of knowledge. It helps merely to confuse the issue. The subjectivity of knowledge is neither known nor is it felt. When we feel, we can still make a distinction between feeling and that which is felt, although the subject and the object are more intimately related here. But the
knowledge of anything is not even felt to be distinct from the supposed enjoying of it, for the very simple reason that it is not known in any sense. The enjoying variety of knowledge is a misnomer. It involves a confusion between knowledge and feeling.

8. The sense in which consciousness is undeniable: We do not, and cannot, know knowing itself. But we do not on that account deny knowledge of things. Only our reason for this belief is different.

We do not accept the view that there are only two factors in knowledge, an object and an unmodified awareness. Such an awareness cannot take mental note of the object, and cannot therefore know it in the simple sense. This taking note is an act of the mind, determined in an important sense by its object. We cannot separate the act from the object of the act. The act of knowing A is distinct from the act of knowing B. They are distinct mental events. They are objects of a kind. There is no real knowing in them. One object cannot know another object. They are not instances of awareness as such, which is the proper subject.

We are accordingly obliged to go beyond the acts to the awareness in them. We speak of the acts as different but not of the awareness as different. Awareness is just the same whatever we may happen to know. Thus we have to make a distinction where none was suspected. We speak of the act of knowing as though it is a simple and ultimate entity. We have to break up this entity into a mental occurrence which we may be said to know, and which is different for every different object and assumes the form of that object, and awareness as such which we do not know, which is not a mental event of any kind, which is never different whatever may be the nature of the object, and which is unchanging and immutable like substance.

We cannot deny the reality of knowledge. But it is only in this sense that we must admit it. There is something in it which we know, the mental occurrence; and there is something which we do not know, the non-mental and non-occurring awareness. It is the latter that is the reality of knowledge. The act by itself cannot know. It is not by nature intelligent. It is only as it can reflect pure consciousness in itself or get identified with it, that it acquires the intelligent character. We say that the act is the knower, the thought is the thinker. It is a misapprehension. The mind, like the sense-organs, is an instrument of knowledge only. It is not the real knower. We commonly say the eye sees. Similarly, we say the mind knows. But it is only a metaphor. Neither the eye sees,
nor the mind knows. The seer is beyond the eye; the eye is only an instrument of seeing. The real knower is beyond the mind: the mind is only an instrument of knowledge. Those philosophers, therefore, who search for the reality of the self in the mind through the method of introspection, search for it in the wrong way. It is not at all surprising that they do not find it, and conclude that there is no such thing as the self. The truth is that the real self, partaking of the nature of pure awareness, is not an empirical entity which we could know through empirical methods such as introspective evidence.

9. **Mental life necessitates a non-mental awareness**: We take it for granted that we know introspectively mental acts at least. But how is this possible? There is no compresence between introspective knowledge and that which it presumes to know. The later cannot know the earlier. There is only one way in which the past can be known; and that is memory. But memory presupposes direct awareness at an earlier moment of time. Can we provide for this on the basis of a temporal series in which no term is co-present with another? Evidently not. How, then, do we account for the knowledge of the terms of the series?

The philosophers of the Nyaya school argue that every act of knowledge is invariably and immediately followed by another, which is the knowing of the first act (*anuvyavasāya*). My knowledge of A, for example, is immediately followed by another piece of knowledge which is the knowing of my "knowing of it." The objection that the successor cannot know the predecessor may be circumvented in some way. It may be said that no empty interval of time is involved between them, and that they are contiguous so that the later almost contacts the earlier. But this is a make-shift and device. The two entities, the knower and the known, are either successive or they are simultaneous. There is no middle position. And either course would be suicidal. Some philosophers hold that the memory of the immediate past is absolutely certain, and is as good as direct perception. But memory is not perception; and if it is a case of memory, then who perceives the original act?

Granting the Nyaya contention that the later somehow knows the earlier through some mysterious transference or communication as some European philosophers seem to think, we shall have to suppose a whole series of acts of greater and greater complexity going on almost to infinity as a result of a single knowing, so that
we cannot attend to anything else in life. To obviate this difficulty, we shall have to say that an act of knowledge need not be followed by another act, which is the knowing of the first act. It is purely a matter of convenience and of subjective interest. We may seek to know a particular mental act or we may not. It is only in the former case that we initiate another act, which is the knowing of the first. This means that the original act of knowledge may occur without being known at all. In that case, the act is lost to our knowledge for ever. Since it is not known immediately after its occurrence, it is never known at all, and cannot be remembered later on. In this way, most of our ordinary knowledge should be lost to us for ever, for we are rarely interested at the time in knowing it. Unless there is some kind of knowledge which is inevitable at the time the act occurs, we can give no satisfactory account of our knowledge of mental life. Is there any alternative to a non-mental and a higher kind of awareness which is present at the time the act occurs, and which does not pass away when the act passes away? How this awareness, which is itself pure, actless and timeless, reveals that which is in time is another question, which may be differently answered. But the necessity of this awareness cannot be denied.

10. Universal consciousness as conceived by Western idealists: A higher sort of consciousness, or universal consciousness, which is not in time, has been recognized by many Western idealists. They have argued that a temporal succession cannot be known except by a non-temporal consciousness. In order to know that A and B are successive, there must be a consciousness which first apprehends A, then it apprehends B, and finally it holds A and B together in the apprehension of their succession. This consciousness itself cannot change in the process and must be regarded as timeless. While we cannot deny that such a consciousness is demanded by the knowledge of a temporal series, we cannot accept the view that this consciousness itself must be active. A consciousness which is active apprehends A, it is determined in a particular way through the exercise of this particular function. When it apprehends B, it is differently determined. When it apprehends the succession of A and B, it is determined in a still different way. How can we say that the consciousness remains the same throughout and is unchanging? If the different acts really belong to consciousness and are part and parcel of it, then the acts make a difference to it. In fact, in place of a self-identical unity of
consciousness, we get only a succession of acts. A timeless consciousness could not act. It would have to be a pure and actless awareness beyond the mind. The European idealists fail to distinguish between its awareness and thought, which is a function of the mind. Thought is universal in so far as meanings are concerned. But my thinking is different from your thinking; and my thinking at one time is different from my thinking at another time. There is nothing timeless about it. Timeless thought is a contradiction in terms.

II. The distinction of transcendental consciousness and empirical consciousness: When we know an object, the self that knows stands related to the object. It makes use of certain means or methods (pramāṇas) of knowledge. This self may therefore be called the pramātā, the actual knower that knows in an empirical way. It discovers the object; or alternatively, we might say that it gives form to the object. This self and its actual awareness are both evidently empirical in character. But they are not the whole thing. They pass away, and we know it. Beyond this is an awareness which does not pass away, and which we cannot know; for there is no other awareness to know it. Any other awareness would be just a sub species, and therefore quite empirical in character. This ultimate consciousness, which we cannot know, is the only transcendental consciousness there is. We may call it the sākṣi. Like pure radiance, it remains unrelated and unaffected by the objects which it lights up or reveals.

Kant also found a transcendental element in all knowledge. But it was not transcendental in our sense of the term. The purely formal or logical element in knowledge he called transcendental. He discovered it through a certain analysis of knowledge. Indeed, the process of knowledge could not be analysed. For knowledge does not proceed in distinctive steps to a climax. He therefore caught hold of certain judgments in use or the judgments of completed knowledge, and read his formal or transcendental element into them. In any case, he discovered the transcendental; and to that extent, it is really empirical. The transcendental unity of apperception is just the active ego, which would be quite empirical in our sense of the term. There is nothing really transcendental in Kant's philosophy, except his critical standpoint, which he failed fully to recognize. He ought to have gone a step further, and retreated further into himself, and raised the question, how is criticism of knowledge itself possible? It is possible because there
is an awareness of knowledge, which itself is non-empirical, transcendental, pure and above criticism. It is from this standpoint alone that empirical knowledge or experience is any datum at all and a possible subject for criticism.

12. Pure consciousness as the thing-in-itself: We have said that we do not know consciousness proper, either in the form of knowledge of things or in the form of pure awareness. What we know is the act, which is dead, past and unintelligent. But can anything be real which we do not know, and which is not even a fit object of knowledge? When philosophers reject the reality of pure consciousness, it is on the ground that no such thing is discoverable in our experience. What is not known, and not knowable, is nothing.

It is now evident that this argument proceeds on the assumption that the reality of knowledge is the basis of the reality of anything whatsoever. In other words, the reality of knowledge itself cannot be denied, and is therefore ultimate reality. Knowledge is the proof of reality. But if knowledge is the only proof, what proof can we give of knowledge itself? Proof must stop somewhere, and it can only stop with what is self-proved and requires no proof. The reality of knowledge, then, and therefore of consciousness as such, has to be taken for granted as unquestioned and as self-evident, in order to raise the very question of the reality of anything whatsoever. Here there is the reality of something which we do not, and cannot know, but which yet provides the ground and the proof of the reality of other things.

We may admit this reality in some sense. But our doubts are not at rest. Is consciousness some kind of stuff quite static and passive in itself? As far as we seem to know consciousness at all, it is the very opposite of a stuff. It is something essentially dynamic. It is of the nature of thought, which never merely is. It is, only in so far as it posits something or creates something and thereby transcends its mere subjectivity. The self is dynamic spirit. It is of the nature of thought, or Idea, or Absolute Spirit. It would be wrong to say that I am consciousness or awareness merely as such. I am conscious only as I function consciously. If I exercise no intelligent function, I lapse into unconsciousness. The reality of consciousness, then, is the reality of a creative function or activity, not the reality of a substance.

This view is quite justifiable empirically. Consciousness is equated with the conscious act, or the explicit awareness of a
content involving thought, with the possibility of self-consciousness. Where self-consciousness is ruled out, consciousness also is ruled out. Any immediate awareness in which thought has no part is lost to us. We do not regard it as an instance of consciousness. Philosophers have, therefore, coined other words for this kind of blind or unthinking awareness. They have called it immediate feeling, or prehension, etc. Consciousness is reserved for conscious acts, which are only possible in higher animals, particularly man.

But we are not here concerned with levels of consciousness which we can empirically distinguish. We are concerned with what all these levels presuppose. Is there not an awareness which remains unbroken and uninterrupted, whatever the level of consciousness? What moves and changes is merely an expression at the mental level of what is unmoving and unchanging. As we have said before, the latter reveals the former, and makes its awareness and its criticism possible. We can only criticize “knowledge at the empirical level,” but not from that level itself. Unless we can rise to a higher and non-empirical level, we cannot take experience as a whole as the subject-matter of our criticism. Our problem may not be the Kantian problem of the limits of all knowledge. It may be the fundamental problem of all epistemology, namely, the adequacy of our knowledge to reality as such. But all epistemological criticism involves a transcendental standpoint. We shall find in the end that this standpoint is no other than the standpoint of pure awareness, which alone is truly transcendental. It is beyond criticism, because it cannot be known. We can criticize, only when we are, perhaps unconsciously, certain of a higher truth. Kant felt that in his analysis of knowledge, he was face to face with certain absolute certainties. The transcendental scheme which he delineated was absolutely certain to him. It is not so to us. It is to us merely a factual affair, or something which he seemed to perceive through his reflective imagination. The only real certainty there is is the certainty of that pure awareness, which no one ever perceives, but which is presupposed by all perception, including the seeming perceptions of the reflective imagination.

We are thus obliged to go from the notion of consciousness as act to the notion of consciousness as actless. The latter is the only real consciousness, the former is so only metaphorically. The analogy is that of fire and the red-hot iron in contact with it. The iron is said to burn. But what burns in it is the fire which is
no part of its own nature. Pure consciousness is the fire. It is the only real knower.

13. The notion of soul and its relation to consciousness: It is recognized by many philosophers that the series of mental acts or events is not the whole reality of the subject. There is something beyond the series, which is relatively permanent and stable. They call it the soul. The soul is not essentially conscious. It is certainly not consciousness merely as such. It is capable of producing consciousness or of becoming conscious. Consciousness is an impermanent quality of the soul. According to the Nyaya view, when our object is presented to our senses, and when the mind through attention connects the object with the soul, consciousness arises in the latter. Similarly, according to Lotze, the soul reacts intelligently only when it is stimulated from outside. The soul is not an ever-present awareness. But then how is consciousness produced in it? Consciousness cannot be produced in mere matter which is opposed to it in nature; and a soul which is not conscious by its own nature is as good as mere matter, however fine or subtle. As a matter of fact, consciousness cannot be produced. If it could be produced, how could there be any awareness of this production?

We are thus compelled to substitute for the notion of the soul, the notion of the intelligent self. This self is not conscious, but it is pure consciousness itself. It never, therefore, ceases to be conscious, and never goes to sleep. What goes to sleep is the mind. What wakes up is the mind. The self is like the eternal flame that is never extinguished. It is the light that is always present and always radiant. It lights our knowledge of things, which is an empirical or mental affair. It equally lights our ignorance of things, as when we confidently assert that we do not know certain things. It could not be hidden or covered up. It reveals the covering itself, ignorance itself. We recognize this light of intelligence, when it is reflected by some object or held up by an empirical situation which we are said to know. In truth, it shines even in darkness. But the darkness knows it not.

III

14. The ontological status of consciousness: Different things are differently related to our knowledge, and thereby they derive a certain ontological character. (a) There are things which are not
known by us and which offer no problem of knowledge whatso-
ever. They do not represent any meaning. These are things such
as a hare's horn, a sky flower, etc. We regard them as simply
unreal. They are at the bottom of the ladder. Technically they
may be called tucchā, i.e. non-significant.
(b) There are certain other things which also are not known.
But they are not wholly unrelated to knowledge. They represent
a certain meaning, and offer a problem. Accordingly, we take
them to be in some sense real, although not known. These are
things such as atoms, electrons, etc. When we use these terms, we
mean certain entities which are only inferred. An atom is not
exactly known. It is certainly not known as any material mass is
known. We study the constitution of the atom in the laboratory
and even break it up. But it cannot be said that the atom or its
constituents, the electrons, etc., are actually seen or known. What
is known are certain effects produced by them, and these effects
are visible effects, like matter in mass. No one has photographed
an electron. What is photographed is a certain visible effect pro-
duced by it, a streak of light that traces the movement of the
electron. Electrons, etc., are only hypothetical entities. We can
never expect to know them perceptually or directly. They repre-
sent certain workable ideas in science. We do not demand any
direct proof of them, for we know that none will ever be forth-
coming. They have a scientific value, and therefore reality of a
sort.
(c) There are other things which are known just in the ordinary
way, through some kind of direct evidence, which is practically
and socially true. These are the ordinary sensible objects. Our
knowledge of them is only relatively true; for it is mediated and
subjective. Doubt and error cannot, therefore, be completely
eliminated from it. The ontological status of things that are thus
known is not that of reality pure and simple or ultimate reality.
It is the status of practical reality or vyāvahāric sattā. Philo-
osophy seeks a higher reality or absolute reality.
(d) Finally, there is the reality of knowledge itself, or of aware-
ness which is present in all knowledge. We do not know this
awareness. And yet it cannot be denied. We always speak of it as
something quite immediate. Unlike things which are unreal and
things which are hypothetical, it is not known but at the same time
immediate in all our speaking. Unlike things which are known,
there is demand for proof, when something can be known objec-
tively; and what is thus known can always be doubted or misperceived. Awareness or consciousness cannot be known objectively, and there is no scope for any doubt or error with respect to it. Whatever the nature of the object that is known, and whether that object is real or illusory, the awareness involved in the knowledge of it is necessarily true and absolutely true. When we are aware of the illusory, the awareness itself is not illusory—it reveals the illusory itself and is therefore unaffected by it. Here, then, we get something that is absolutely certain and true, and therefore pre-eminently and ultimately real. The ontological status of consciousness is that of absolute and unconditioned reality.

15. Consciousness as self-revealing or svap rakāśa: There is in Indian philosophy a school of thought, pūrva-mimāṁsa, which holds the view that knowledge is never known, but that it is self-revealing. It criticizes the Nyaya view that nothing is real that is not objective and that cannot be known. Knowledge itself is not further known. It is in a sense self-known. The factors that are necessary to constitute it knowledge of an object are the factors that are necessary to constitute it knowledge of itself. No new factors or sāmagri are needed for its self-knowledge. We have no need to enter upon a further process of knowing in which new factors will come into operation. In other words, knowledge which reveals the object simultaneously reveals itself. All prima facie knowledge has this character. It is svap rakāśa.

A piece of knowledge can be analysed into three factors. There is the object, the self that knows, and knowledge itself that relates the other two entities. Of these three factors, knowledge occupies a special position. It reveals the object, it reveals the self, and it reveals itself—all at the same time. The example given is that of an earthen lamp with oil and wick. When the wick is lighted, the light given by it lights the objects outside. It also lights the whole paraphernalia of the lamp containing the light. And lastly, it reveals itself. We do not require another light to reveal the light of the original lamp. The same is true about knowledge. It is like light simultaneously revealing itself, the object and the subject. There is no knowledge of knowledge.

We only want to add in this connection that the knowledge which is self-revealing in this sense is not a mental act or vytti, which is itself in a way known. It is pure consciousness alone. Further, this consciousness does not reveal the knowing self. It is
the real knower in the last analysis. There is no other knower. This knower reveals the subject, understood as an act or a function of mind; and through the subject, it reveals the object. But no one reveals it. For who can know the knower? It is truly self-revealing—being unknown, it is capable of entering into our use and our speech as what is quite immediate (ajñāte sati aparokṣa vyavahārayogyatvam).

16. Truth as self-revealing and as self-evident: We have said that knowledge is self-revealing in a certain sense. But knowledge is of reality. So far it is either true or false. Can we now say that the truth or the falsity of knowledge is also self-revealing? It is evident that falsity is not self-revealing. A piece of knowledge is false, when the falsity of it is revealed by some other piece of knowledge which cancels it. In other words, false knowledge is not self-revealing in its falsity. It requires a true piece of knowledge to expose it for what it is.

Can we say the same thing about a true piece of knowledge, namely that it requires another piece of knowledge to reveal its truth? It is argued by some philosophers that it does. Truth, like falsehood, is not self-revealing. A piece of knowledge is not known to be true in itself or by itself. It has only a claim to truth. But this claim has got to be substantiated. The claim may prove to be false when we know better. There is need for confirming knowledge. We often, therefore, go to work to substantiate the claim through further knowledge the moment a doubt arises. This process of substantiation or confirmation crystallizes itself into the coherence theory of truth. An isolated piece of knowledge is neither true nor false. Truth and falsehood can only be determined through a reference to the rest of our experience. To the extent to which a piece of knowledge is in conflict with this experience, it is clearly false. But in so far as it remains unaffected by it and keeps intact, it may be said to be true. We might even go further and say that no piece of knowledge is absolutely true or absolutely false. It invariably undergoes a certain amount of change or modification in the context of the whole. At the same time, it retains some truth, and contributes its quota to the meaning of the whole. It is thus both true and false. There is such a thing as "degrees of truth and falsity."

This view is not free from difficulties. If true knowledge requires another piece of knowledge to confirm it, what about the confirming knowledge? Will it not require to be confirmed in its
turn? The process will not stop and truth will not be attained. Logically, it involves us in a vicious circle or in a vicious infinite series. No piece of knowledge can really add anything to the internal evidentness and the truth of another piece of knowledge. The process of confirmation has no logical value. It has only a psychological and a practical value. Again the view that there are degrees of truth and falsity is opposed both to common sense and to reason. There can be no compromise and no middle position between truth and falsehood. The coherence notion of truth is not logical, although it is offered by philosophers who make much of the logic of consistency. They refuse to face the possibility that falsehood, too, may be self-consistent and coherent. A dream-world has an internal order, however fantastic. Falsehood can imitate truth in this respect.

Truth is not like falsehood. It must be self-evidently true or not true at all. It does not require any outside confirmation. While therefore false knowledge requires to be revealed by another, true knowledge ought to be self-revealing—to know is to know as true. We have to add that no empirical piece of knowledge can ever be self-evidently true or even self-revealing. Pure consciousness alone has this character. To know it in some sense would be to know the truth as self-revealing and as self-evident.

17. Self-consciousness and truth: Some philosophers have argued that to know the self is to know the truth. Our knowledge here is quite immediate and direct. The self knows itself. The idea that the knower can know himself is not quite absurd. The knower knows himself as object. For Hegel, truth consists in the Absolute Idea knowing Itself as object. It is the highest form of self-consciousness.

We cannot agree with the view that the subject can become its own object, or that one and the same thing can be both subject and object at the same time. Self-consciousness is on a par with all object-consciousness. We agree with Kant that the self that we know is a phenomenal entity, not a noumenal entity. More than that our self-consciousness, like all object-consciousness, can be illusory in character. The self that is known is a certain subjective function. This function is fundamentally related to the object. If the object is illusory, the subjective function is illusory also. There are subjective illusions as there are objective illusions. A subjective illusion is one in which the subjective act itself is taken to have a character different from that which it really
possesses. Thus, for example, when we know an illusory object, we take the act to be cognitive, while in reality it is only imaginative. We imagine an illusory snake where there is only a rope and we take this imagination to be a fact of cognition. The same is to be said about the self that functions. We take the imagining self to be a knowing self. Self-consciousness, thus, is no exception to all object-consciousness, and does not give us self-evident truth. We must go beyond the subject-object dualism to the pure consciousness that reveals it.

18. How can pure consciousness know?: We have spoken of the pure consciousness as the only real knower. But since it is actless and of the nature of being, it cannot function and it cannot actually know. Its knowledge of anything is as good as no knowledge. It cannot make for objectivity.

We contend that it is the only knower, but that when it is an object that it knows, it takes on an accidental adjunct or upādhi in order to know it. It does not know an object without this upādhi and entirely by itself. It is like the eye that cannot see without spectacles. The power of seeing is in the eye, not in the spectacles. Yet the spectacles, in so far as they become related to the eye, become the means of seeing. It is the eye that sees, not the spectacles. In the same way, pure consciousness alone knows. But it requires outside aids. It requires the ego or the I-form which functions through thought. It requires thought, and the sense-organs which are the gateways of the mind. None of these entities, taken singly or together, can really know. But when they are in the relation of false identity with pure intelligence, they acquire a new character. We say the ego knows, etc. We confuse the instruments of intelligence with intelligence itself. We see nothing beyond the instruments in an analysis of knowledge, and we conclude that there is really nothing. Pure intelligence is for us a myth. It is at best an abstraction, purely conceptual in character, called "consciousness-in-general." We fail to see the reality of the self who sees with the eye, thinks with the mind or buddhi, and knows with the ego. As long as we see the instruments, we cannot see the wielder of the instruments; for in respect of these, it is truly transcendental. The eye cannot see the seer, nor can thought know the thinker. It is only when we reject the empirical approach, that we can intuit pure consciousness as it is. But then we can intuit nothing beside it—no instruments, and no objects. For the relation in which it enters is never a real relation as between two
distinct and independent entities. The only relation in which it enters is the relation of false identity, which entails that the entities in this relation cannot be separated and known as related. We cannot simultaneously know the illusory and its ground as two distinct entities in relation. If we know the illusory, we do not know the ground, and vice versa. The same is true about pure consciousness, and the entities to which it is said to be related.

On this view, the ultimate dualism is not that of the body and the mind. The body and the mind both belong to the unintelligent and the empirical sphere. There is no problem of relating them, there is no gulf between them. There is a close internal relation between them. What lies beyond them and is directly opposed to them in nature is pure consciousness. But this can stand in no real relation to them. It can only stand in the relation of false identity or ādhyāsika tādātmaya, which leaves it unaffected by the relation. It is a pure revelation which reveals all states of the body and the mind without itself being in any state. If the body or the mind is in pain, pure consciousness reveals the pain thereof. If the pain is annulled through its own intensity, as often happens, pure consciousness reveals the state of unconsciousness which has thus supervened. It reveals all states of the psycho-physical organism, including slumber, which is a cessation of mental life. It is thus independent of the psycho-physical organism; and since death itself is something which happens to the psycho-physical organism, it is truly deathless. It is by nature that immortal existence which, in the words of the scripture, is not killed by the sword, nor wetted by water, dried by the wind, consumed by fire, etc. In this sense, the embodied spirit is ever and always disembodied in reality. It is through ignorance and error that we take it to be a prisoner of the body and therefore subject to its vicissitudes.

IV

19. The different situations in our experience which necessarily indicate pure consciousness: We are familiar with knowledge at the empirical level. Here an object is presented; a method of knowledge, such as perception, inference, etc., is brought into operation to reveal the same, and there is the subject that knows. The three are called respectively—prameya, pramāna, and pramātā. There are certain other things, however, which also we know,
but the knowledge of which cannot be explained through the above mechanism.

(a) We have already alluded to our awareness of "knowing an object." When I know an object A, this knowing of A is not known in the ordinary way through the operation of some pramāṇa, for the simple reason that there is no inner sense to which such an object may be said to be presented. There is no passage here from the ignorance of the object to the knowledge of it. It would not be true to say that the knowing of A is first unknown, and that through some process of knowledge it is unconcerned and made known. Either it is necessarily and always known, or it is simply not there. There is no third alternative for it, namely, that it is, but that it is not known yet. It is directly in relation to pure consciousness. There is no method or process of knowledge which can be said to intervene between its reality and its knowledge.

My knowledge of "the knowing of A," however, is not the knowledge of an unrelated object. It is relative to my "ignorance of A." Pure consciousness reveals both simultaneously as necessarily related objects. Thought can function within empirical knowledge in order to give form to the objects known in it; it cannot function with regard to the empirical knowledge itself and know it as its object.

(b) What is true of the acts of knowledge is also true of pleasure and pain. It can never be the case that there is pain, but there is no knowledge of pain. To have the pain is to be aware of the pain. No process of knowledge is required to reveal it for what it is. It is known by pure consciousness.

(c) We know the state of deep and dreamless slumber, called susūpti. It is evident that when we are in this state, thought has ceased to function, and the knowledge of the state in the ordinary thinking way is out of the question. And yet we know the state quite definitely as part of our own experience. When we wake up, we declare that we slept soundly and blissfully, and further that we did not know anything then. Evidently, this direct awareness cannot be a result of the operations of thought which are at a standstill in sleep. There is no kind of pramāṇa or empirical means of knowledge which can reveal sleep to us, a state of absolute ignorance. It is only a non-empirical and pure awareness beyond the mind that can reveal the absence of the mind and of its activities.

Pure consciousness reveals sleep not as an unrelated object. If
we slept and slept and never woke up, we should not know that we ever slept. We know this, because we wake up. What pure consciousness then reveals is not sleep merely as such, but the *transition* from sleep to wakefulness, whereby both these states are simultaneously known. Thought itself cannot possibly know the transition from its own absence to its own activity.

(d) We are aware of our ignorance of many things in the state of wakefulness. I am ignorant, for example, of what is going on in the star Sirius; I am ignorant of what is going on in your mind; I am ignorant of what is contained in a box lying in front of me, etc. This awareness of ignorance, too, is not possible through the operation of any *pramāṇa*. A *pramāṇa* would have to reveal not only my ignorance, but also the object of which I am said to be ignorant; and this would dissipate the ignorance. How, then, could I be aware of my ignorance of a thing? The fact is that our awareness of ignorance is incompatible with the knowledge achieved through a *pramāṇa*. Besides, it is quite evident that ignorance does not require to be uncovered or discovered through a process of knowledge. It does not require to be related to consciousness. It is always and essentially thus related. There is no time when there is ignorance, but no relation to our awareness. Our awareness of it is quite direct and immediate.

It is now arguable that there are infinite things in the universe of which we are ignorant, but that we are not aware of this ignorance. There are stars which have not yet come to our view. There are people and regions on earth of which we have never heard. We cannot formulate our ignorance about them, and are not aware of ignorance. All that this proves, however, is that ignorance is a *related* object. Taken as unrelated, it is no object of any kind, and we simply cannot be aware of it—its being and the being of pure awareness coincide.

Ignorance is related to knowledge. It is only when I know a thing that I become simultaneously aware of my ignorance of it *till then*. This ignorance is beginningless, but the beginningless ignorance becomes our object only when knowledge arises. Thus what the pure consciousness reveals is the transition from ignorance to knowledge, and not each state in turn and in succession. This also ensures that our prior ignorance relates to the very thing of which we are later said to have knowledge. In other words, we directly and simultaneously know the object as first unknown and then as known.
It may here be said that our awareness of ignorance does not necessarily arise after knowledge. We can be aware of ignorance before knowledge has arisen. Before I know the contents of your pocket, for example, I am aware that I am ignorant of those contents. Here, evidently, there is ignorance without knowledge. It will, however, be admitted that I have some knowledge in this situation. I know you, I know your pocket, I know that the pocket has an inside, and I know that a thing contained in it must have the limitations of the pocket, etc. It is a case then of knowledge limited by ignorance. All our empirical knowledge is thus limited. If I know the front of a sheet of paper held before me, I do not know the back part. If I know a chair from one angle, its view from the opposite angle is shut out from me, and so on. So far I know, beyond it I do not know. My knowledge is selective, and necessarily implies my ignorance of what lies beyond my purview. It is in this sense that I am aware of ignorance. It is still correlated to knowledge. Its object is the indefinite that lies beyond what is defined by knowledge. Here it would be meaningless to say that I am ignorant of this or that thing, or that I am ignorant of the very thing of which I later come to have knowledge. There is no common object for both knowledge and ignorance. Once I have drawn the line of knowledge, that line has divided reality for me into two separate spheres—the definite which I know, and the indefinite which I do not. Ignorance is once again related to knowledge.

(e) We are aware of the illusory. The illusory cannot be known in the ordinary way. It is not a matter for pramâna or a valid means of knowledge, which only uncovers an existing thing, or a thing that exists independently of the knowledge of it. The illusory does not thus exist. It exists only in knowledge and for knowledge. For it, to be is to be known. It is necessarily related to knowledge. We cannot say of it that it may be known or it may not be known. It is what it is, only as known. Accordingly, no process of knowledge is needed in order to know it. It is known directly and immediately to a consciousness which does not operate through any pramâna. Thought is present here not as a function of knowledge, but as a function of creative imagination which makes the illusory. The awareness of the illusory is beyond thought.

The illusory, once again, is not known as an unrelated object. If it is taken as unrelated, its illusoriness would not emerge. If
for instance, we saw a snake, which was in fact illusory, and we turned back and ran away without further investigation, the illusoriness of it would not be revealed to us. We would naturally speak of it to our friends as an ordinary snake, and even warn them against it. The snake, being in fact illusory, is not known as illusory. There is no awareness of the illusory. This is only possible when, and if, we bring in the cancelling knowledge. Our awareness of the illusory then is not independent of, and prior to our awareness of the cancelling knowledge. The consciousness which reveals the one simultaneously reveals the other; for it is consciousness of the cancellation or bādha. It is a non-empirical and pure consciousness above thought, which reveals the relatedness itself.

20. The nature of pure consciousness that demands to be known: We have said that pure consciousness is self-revealing or svapra-kāśa. But although we cannot know it in the ordinary way, we need to realize it as the absolute reality.

(a) Since it is a pure revelation, it has no state or modification of its own. It is truly called nirvikāra citta. It reveals the states of the mind and their succession. Accordingly, it is of the nature of being that is immutable and unchanging. It is a sort of super-awareness beyond the mind. The mind sleeps, but this awareness does not.

(b) It is unborn (aja). If we can know the birth of anything, consciousness is before it. Who can know the birth of consciousness? There never was a time when consciousness was not. To know it is to know it as the ancient one, that is before all things. What is born also passes away. It is necessarily impermanent; and the impermanent is essentially unintelligent or jāda. The Buddhistic doctrine of anatta, or not-self, naturally follows from its doctrine of momentariness or kṣanikatva.

(c) It is not capable of being known or proved to be real (ameya). For who can know the knower? It is presupposed by everything that is known to be real. We can doubt the latter, we cannot doubt the former; for it reveals the doubt itself.

(d) It is infinite (ananta). It is not an element in a manifold or one among many. Indeed, it appears as though there is a pure consciousness in you, and there is a pure consciousness in me, and so on. This is an illusion. What cannot be known cannot form part of a manifold. The svapra-kāśa cannot be known. If it is a mere known it would cease to be svapra-kāśa. Our individuality is a product of certain limitations which render it an object of a
kind. There are accordingly many individuals. But the pure awareness in the individual has no such limitations. Accordingly, it is the same identical awareness in all individuals. There cannot be two entities of this kind. We make differences in it through the accidents of the body and the mind. They are purely imaginary differences. Consciousness is in this sense without difference and infinite in character. It is the real self of all individuals.

(e) Pure consciousness is immortal. It may now be said that all consciousness ceases when the mind ceases to function. Who can then vouchsafe for the continued existence of consciousness when all life ceases at death? But death, like sleep, can only enter our experience as something that happens to the psycho-physical organism. It cannot touch pure consciousness, which is beyond this organism. If it could affect it in any way, we should have no possible experience of death itself. We can only experience death as an indefinite sleep. But duration has no meaning here. Where there is no mental activity and no tension of any kind, there is no duration. An indefinite sleep is just like ordinary sleep; and this sleep is nothing if it is not known as an interval between two states of wakefulness. Death must be likewise in its essential logical form. It is rightly called the twin-brother of sleep. Death is but a sleep, not an end of all life. We throw off the body as we do worn-out clothes. Pure consciousness is by its very nature deathless and immortal.

(f) Pure consciousness is the Absolute: pure consciousness we have seen is intolerant of any difference, the moment it is distinguished, it is distorted, and it ceases to be itself. It is the reality behind the world of matter and of individual selves. It is the ground of these. We know the world, and we know other selves, as long as we do not know pure consciousness, which is the universal self. Pure consciousness is like the wall with pictures painted on it. We see the pictures and fall in love with them. We do not see the wall. And yet it is the existent reality in front of us, not the pictures. The pictures are in point of reality just the wall itself, and nothing apart from the wall. The pictures are real only in conceptual enjoyment, not in point of fact and truth. The lines and the paint are part of the wall, and yet we call a part of the wall "a lion," another part "a beautiful meadow," etc. We see the wall, and yet we see it not; we think we see the pictures, and are engrossed by the reality of the pictures. In point of fact, there is no lion, and no meadow; there is only one smooth and even
wall, in which one part of the wall is just like another part—just bricks, mortar and paint. In the same way, pure consciousness is the ultimate reality, ever present, ever immediate. Through ignorance of this reality, we have made distinctions in it, and created an endless variety of names and forms which constitute the entire world of our experience. But this world which alone arrests our attention is not the reality, but just a matter of imagination. Knowledge of the reality ought to dissipate the creations of our imagination.

(g) Pure consciousness is the bliss of the Self. We seek joy in things outside. We seek it at the mental plane. Here we have certain desires and certain interests which we seek to satisfy through some kind of activity. We know the joy of *becoming*, we do not know the joy of *being*. But there is no comparison between the joys of the mind, dependent, impermanent and negative in character—and the joy of the Self which has no limit, which cannot be exceeded, and which cannot be lost, being the nature of the Self Itself. The latter alone can fulfil. It is the highest value, not the momentary attractions and fascinations of the mind. There is a joy above the mind, where the mind rests in peace; for it has nothing to achieve and nothing to do. Such is the joy that is immanent in the nature of pure consciousness, and is that consciousness.
The note that has persistently rung in my ears for over a quarter of a century coincided in its date of origin with my sudden acquaintance with Radhakrishnan in the year 1923, the year I got back home after a stay in Oxford for eleven long years. By its persistence alone even a novice in the school of prophecy, whatever its historic form, would take it either as a message or a prophecy; to me it is at least a symbol with its base deep down in the heart of my ancestry. I never can hear it except with breathless expectation as people in the tropics listen to a tidal wave or a storm as it sweeps on from a distance as an opening prelude to some fresh, quickening flood or downpour that sweeps away the decrepit, worn out and the dead. It firmly assures me that a new spring is on the way, urging the blossoms after long centuries to break through the heavy clouds that still lie pressing on their heads.

Would it be unseemly if I placed Radhakrishnan somewhere in the neighbourhood of this imminent springtide? Could not one find the very keynote of his whole career in the vivid message which this long-expected flood must be bearing in its bosom?

Personally, I have found nothing in him so constant and firm as his eagerness that this flood as it skirts our shores should reach out to every other shore and clime, that it should ruthlessly cleanse all lands of all the impurities that had ever settled on them. Most unmistakably I find him to be a Hindu above everything else and that is perhaps the only true and faithful description of him. In him, if one goes to his deepest roots, one will find nothing but the life of the spirit ruling; nothing that is not of the spirit touches him. Even those who know him but little would not miss the patent fact that he moves on like a pilgrim in the tortuous, labyrinthine mazes of political life. And those who know him well enough would unhesitatingly claim that he is ever on the watch.
for the blue moment when the lotus of his beloved Krishna will bloom again in the deep waters of his ancestral calm. And if divine grace is vouchsafed to him when his round on this earth is done, he will crave for nothing but the rare chance of closing his eyes on the steady, radiant light from the blue waters shimmering in the glow from Krishna’s crimson feet in the creamy rapture of the lotus.

It was exactly when the long night of the last stretch of our humiliation was definitely on the wane that Radhakrishnan was born. The European onslaught had passed its peak, and the stupor that lay like a heavy mantle on the world of the elite was slowly but steadily lifting. The Indian mind had already tested the cultural and spiritual value of the Western creed. The mood which ruled it now was one of exploiting that creed if that were possible. Its violent and persuasive phases, disproportionate as they were, were not a preparation for the advent of Gandhi’s movement which was to restore confidence in the whole country and begin a true revival of the Indian faith.

The time had come for reorganizing the great classic work, so well begun by Vivekananda almost a decade before Radhakrishnan was born. The wisdom of India from now on had to be conscientiously delivered to the Western world if only to dissipate finally the long illusion that the creed of the European was the only true creed for the human race. It was time for the Western mind to realize that the European experiment in Asia for the last two centuries had failed as it was inevitable that it should. The hour indeed had struck for what may be called a strategic, cultural move. There was no alternative for the Indian but to join issue with the real authorities on the European claim. As a matter of sheer necessity, the pompous European in Asia had to be cut off from his base and, perhaps, a fresh basis for a new life between the European and the Asian would be laid if that very desirable end could be reached.

It was in this urgent, strategic move that Radhakrishnan, still very young, was called upon to take a leading, prominent part. The youth in him, with a fresh dominant faith, was offered the rare chance to carry that movement right into the heart of European life. It was for him as a philosopher and historian to deliver with authority the Indian message straight to the seats of learning, to compare notes wherever possible with the leading European minds and firmly to challenge the absolutism of the European
claim. It was indeed a mission for a healthy, mutual understanding between Europe and Asia; its keynote was to convince the European that there was no room in Asia for Christianity, Democracy and Individualism in the senses in which the European minds took them.

The Upton Lectures which Radhakrishnan delivered in Manchester College, Oxford, at the invitation of L. P. Jacks, marked the first serious beginning of his long, sustained effort to restate the case for the Indian outlook. The restatement had fallen due for two special reasons:—(1) the average European mind had never had a clear and precise statement on it which was easily intelligible, (2) whatever view about the Indian outlook was known in Europe, it was overlaid with uncalled-for interpretations which the Orientalist and the missionary between them unavoidably produced. No Orientalist, much less a missionary, could possibly escape the nemesis of what is called the conditioned mind, since neither the stock from which they descended nor the social or cultural milieu in which they were brought up permitted a dispassionate or rational approach to the Hindu view. The Hindu proverbially was the opposite pole of the European, while the Christian was at considerable variance with the Hindu on the score of the "creed" which was the direct result of the Christian's audacious, historic attempt to compromise the mystical faith. Europe, naturally, had no legitimate or accurate account of the Hindu ideal; it made no difference if the Theosophist and the German savants sought hard to acclimatize it in Europe. There was a clear need for a restatement of the Hindu case and this was supplied by the Upton Lectures in which a concise and robust account was given which any European could follow. Here began the renaissance of Hindu civilization in the very heart of Europe.

It is for others, however, to trace the gradual and steady development of this renaissance by recording the varied activities of Radhakrishnan in the course of a long period. They yielded an enormous contribution; and to-day after a quarter of a century there is a large clientele in Europe who judge Indian civilization totally on the authority of Radhakrishnan. Both scholars of great distinction and the intellectual public form this clientele and it is not possible to-day that the Orientalist or missionary who still cultivate the old archaic views on Indian thought should fasten their opinion on the European mind without an instant challenge even from their own clientele.
The culmination of this period, however, was not reached till Radhakrishnan was offered a permanent Chair in the University of Oxford. It was indisputably a historic event in the annals of the University. To say the least of it, the founding of this Chair was a tacit acknowledgement that Radhakrishnan had succeeded in establishing in Europe the case for the Indian outlook and so created a European need for fresh and much fuller knowledge of the Indian civilization. And thereby a whole principle was conceded as to what should be the nature of the authority who had the right to preach and teach the essentials of a civilization. The principle was that the authority for formulating and teaching the essentials belongs to those who profess and practise it as a matter of faith, as if by an implicit mandate from the nature of the culture. The case for the missionary was instantly gone and the Orientalist survived only as an enquirer or critic rather than as an authority. Still it may seem rather strange that it should have been left to the ultra-conservative mind of Oxford to see the light on such a deep intellectual point. The fact is that it did while others did not. The University, however, was nobly led into this clear vision by the breadth of view of at least one English gentleman, Mr. H. N. Spalding, the founder of the Chair. How at times some individuals seem to consolidate in themselves what a whole community has been struggling to express for a whole generation! Even Oxford University was grateful to him for articulating what many of its members had been groping after and at least a good portion of the English community frankly wanted. One almost wished every university in every land had a Spalding to stimulate their "faculties" with broader vision and incidentally to lay the foundation for truth.

The leadership of Radhakrishnan, however, in the renaissance of Indian thought in Europe did not mean merely a restatement of the Indian case in its philosophic and historic setting. It was by no means a wholly academic function although the raison d'etre of it lay in carrying the Indian thought to the seats of learning. It was, indeed, from its very inception a many-sided function. The foundation of it was no doubt laid by Radhakrishnan’s pioneer work in his two volumes of Indian philosophy. But scholarly preaching on the esoteric and mystical aspects of the Indian spirit soon came to constitute its main feature as gradually Radhakrishnan had to deal with the larger educated public outside the pale of the universities. And it was here that Radhakrishnan’s
special gift as a speaker came out. In recalling the Indian esoteric claims out of his intimate spiritual experiences and profound scholarship for the benefit of his audiences he was lavish on his spontaneous outpouring of soul. The audience swayed at times to his chant; and one felt as if the barrier between the East and West was gone.

Soon, however, the duty and function of a statesman was added to his academic efforts and preaching. By the exigencies of unusual conditions he had to play the part of a scholarly mediator between India and England, and that on issues that were at once delicate and responsible. And if I am allowed to quote a very astute Jewish authority, Radhakrishnan easily outvalled the achievements of cardinals in the Catholic Church. As a direct consequence of the varied, multiple calls on him, however, he had to move about constantly, skirting the whole of the inhabited globe year in and year out. As if by an age-old tradition of his ancestry, he had to cut himself off from the roots of the home in which he was born and find a shelter as a bird of passage in the wide world of humanity. Nothing, however, gave him greater joy than to mediate between the jarring and incompatible types of manhood who inhabited the two hemispheres of Asia and Europe.

Yet in realizing all these multifarious duties his one aim has been to make the world free from the virus of conflict and hatred by the establishment of peace.

There is no occasion, however, to call him an ascetic in a technical, orthodox sense. We do not have to deal with an ascetic in him. His food is very simple indeed, but it does not suffer from the ascetic scruple. His garment, again, is equally simple but it never dwindles into the proportion of the ascetic pattern. His hair, again, is never combed but it never aspires to Siva's "knotted pile." In fact, "Drewie" of the High is trusted to keep it from running unduly wild. He entertains all and sundry with strictly simple and vegetarian fare but he does season it with brilliant talk. Not even a Bishop or Archbishop, not to talk of Cabinet Ministers and Generals, escape the stimulating effect of tenuous discourse. In fact, like the sages of old who practised asceticism within the four walls of a social home, he is a loving husband to a devoted spouse, an affectionate father to brilliant children, a trusted friend and servant to all in the community in which he lives. There is no position which he did not or could not have held, and yet any authority that he ever exercises sits lightly on
him. He is approachable to all and sundry and at all hours of the
day and evening. Even his secretary, however energetic, cannot
get the chance of wielding a part of his delegated power.

Whether all these evident marks of humility and simplicity
make of him a prototype of Janaka Rishi in our modern age, I
leave it to my readers to decide. But not even Jānaki, the Rishi’s
adopted daughter, could have had a more loving or affectionate
mother than Radhakrishnan’s children. It is a joy to me to note
that his wife in this difficult century has been an embodiment
of the type a Hindu woman is expected to reach. Some say that the
days and nights she has spent with her husband under the same
roof can be counted on one’s fingers. They were joined in nuptial
tie when they were young and if he had one blessing in his earthly
life to which he could trace his life of purity, steadfastness and
loyalty, that blessing was brought to his life by his wife. What-
ever the stature of Janaka in the sphere of pure living, one can-
not miss the fact that Radhakrishnan comes very close to it.
His ever-bounding energy in spite of his frugal meals may make
him undergo discipline of his own making and in varied forms.
His days since he was young might have abounded in depressions
of spirit and perpetual occasions for religious calm in the midst of
varied foreign and discordant challenge. But he kept to the true
path at enormous sacrifices and administered the affairs of the
State or the University with a calm and goodwill which would do
credit to Janaka if he lived in our modern age.

His detachment of spirit, again, might not compare with that
of the orthodox ascetic, but he certainly was not attached to the
joys and values of life which any position could offer him. He sat
at the table at All Souls and even said Grace, but he was rarely in
the Common Room after dinner. The Gaudies, the peak of self-
glorification in University life, were not an attraction to him. The
Hall dinner fed him with macaroni and every variation of boiled
cabbage, while the rest of the table was creaking under the
weight of the choicest delicacies which culinary art and English
imagination, whatever that might mean, could easily concoct. Some
say that he used his private key to go out of the College by the
back door when he found the front door jammed by celebrities.
And as for walking on the lawn in the College quad, he never did it,
except when he was wrapped up in his thoughts arguing with some
Christian divine or slashing some new-fangled theories of Positivist
logic. His detachment took the form of a perpetual oblivion of the
surroundings to which twentieth-century existence brought him. He reminded me of a judge who wrote his judgment in the dead of night, fast asleep in bed, after having listened in the day to the counsels of both sides who gave indisputable evidences about the case. The court, the case and the counsels all disappeared and the judgment was born immaculate and pure. Nobody, however, has told me that he had his nightly rounds in the beautiful surroundings of Oxford when the last hoot of the motor had faded away, or chanted his hymns not only while taking his morning bath to the delight of the Fellows of all faiths and descriptions, but also in the long stretch of bewitched stone carved out of moonlight, called "the High." But I have eminent authority to vouchsafe for the fact that the High reverberates at some unearthly hour with echoes which his chants produced. What this means to this historic haunt of quite other chants I do not know. But Radhakrishnan cannot help chanting "Rama" and "Krishna," even perhaps in saying Grace, though it was never done to exorcise ghosts as it is sometimes done in his native home. Nobody, at any rate, would accuse him of the fear of ghosts in Oxford.

But whether he is chanting hymns in his bath or holding classes to teach the Vedanta or Dhammapada or addressing statesmen to bring politics back again right within the realm of the spirit, he is intent on one fixed aim, the re-establishment of the Indian outlook of life in the heart of the human family. The sole burthen of his exhortation is that the society of man must go back to the life of peace, toleration and purity. There must be an end of distrust, hatred and ill-will. The conflict of interests must cease. In no way should the spirit of independence raise its head at the cost of fellowship, unity and harmony. Instead, the sense of solidarity must prevail, and above all the human aspiration to claim divinity as its birthright must once again return. "Would to God," he would pray, "that all differences might disappear in this one, united profundity of aspiration and goal."

India is free to-day to cultivate her own mission and Radhakrishnan is convinced that the mission will be fulfilled. There will be a new age and, if necessary, a new formulation of his ancestral goal. Even if the life of the spirit has to be redefined, it will be redefined. The discipline that his beloved country has gone through since she lost her independence centuries ago was but an earnest of that formulation. Perhaps another Buddha, another Gita will arise. Perhaps the fulfilment of Gandhi's mission,
whatever its form, was also an indication of this promise about the future. It is India's part by all historic records to bring together the races and civilizations of the earth, to offer them a common meeting ground on which they could live and radiate light into one another's sphere. It is for her to transmute discords into differences, to replace the effort to live at the expense of one's neighbour by the effort to live with his consent and finally to abolish warfare in whatever form it may appear.

It is pre-eminently with this ideal and outlook that Radhakrishnan is truly identified. My own impression of him is that he will not choose any one specific expression of that ideal whether in thought, practice or emotion, as a dogma. He is prepared even to write off the whole of our history as sheer experiment if the main outlook still remains unsolved by them. Two things he will never do. He will not change his outlook for the spirit of independence which forsakes unity and peace in the desert. Nor will he tolerate sham or sheer mechanism in the place of real fulfilment.

Catchwords like socialism and capitalism or autocracy and democracy literally do not appeal to him. Whatever ideology will bring about peace and harmony he will accept. If, indeed, suffering and nothing but suffering will bring about that harmony, he will welcome suffering.

Most unmistakably, Radhakrishnan would advocate any experiment or discipline if it were indispensable as a prelude to full achievement. And that is perhaps the chief reason why he has been mostly propagating the ideal and making the world familiar with the setting in which the ideal so far has been vigorously put. His own suggestions as to the solution of age-long problems are found in his many writings. Personally, I cannot help believing that his is strictly an open mind, although there is not even a shade of scepticism in it. On the contrary, I am fully convinced that he will not allow anything to stand in the way of his deep faith in the ideal so clearly enshrined in his ancestry.

(1) The individual is Absolute himself although he is nothing but an illusion here and now. He does not seek a mediator. Rather he becomes at times a Prophet to himself.

(2) The home of illusion, again, which is life, can be made safe for the quest and fulfilment of truth only by harmony, unity, toleration. It cannot be served by conflict and warfare.

There can be no question, however, but that he is a great critic,
and the basis on which his criticism stands is that the historic expression of the faith must, at any cost, be preserved and kept in absolute purity. It should not, in any circumstances, be confused with a belief or claim which challenges it. In other words, that which holds to intolerance and violence must go. Instead, the great doctrine, compassion with restraint and renunciation, should be the guiding principle of all life. Under no circumstances should life on earth be taken as the sole and only value and truth.

It may sound strange, but I cannot help thinking that Radhakrishnan is only biding time. As if all that even the very gifted amongst us can achieve at the moment is to escape pollution and corruption and to concentrate on the one need of strict self-preservation. Energy has to be preserved at all costs and not wasted in fruitless self-enjoyment, since the great moment of fulfilment is in the future.

It is my most sincere desire as a friend of his to wish him that fulfilment. I feel convinced that peace in the human home is coming and certainly the night of discipline will ere long close for ever. The light will burst through the clouds and Radhakrishnan can assure himself that from the depth of the blue waters with the creamy shimmering crimson of the lotus will rise again Krishna, his Prophet for the human race.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTRUISM IN CONFUCIANISM (THE INFLUENCE OF UNIVERSALISM ON CONFUCIANISM)

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The history of a philosophical concept is often more enlightening than its original nature. Even geniuses are not infallible and may need correction. Occasionally an important concept receives centuries of discussion and emerges changed in its nature. I shall here attempt to recount such a development concerning Confucius' fundamental concept, that of jen.

This term has been translated variously, for example: benevolence (Legge, etc.), perfect virtue (Legge), the Good (Waley), or humanity (a popular translation to-day). Confucius himself, however, defined it by the ordinary Chinese word for love, ai, saying that it meant "love others" (Analects XII, xxii). I shall accordingly translate it as "benevolent love."

Before his time, the word jen had not been used commonly, even in literature. Its use indicates that it had denoted the bountiful kindness of an ideal ruler to his inferiors. Evidently Confucius did not wish to use the ordinary word for love, because of certain undesirable connotations, just as the writers of the Greek New Testament did not use the common Greek words eros or Philos, but chose a less common term, agape. Confucius' choice of an unusual word has misled many modern translators.

In one case, moreover, Confucius made a pun with the word for "man," which is also pronounced jen, although written quite differently: "If one is jen (human), but does not possess jen (benevolent love), can he conduct himself properly... or appreciate good music and poetry?" (An. III, iii). Confucius intended to imply merely that love, or sympathy with others, is a quite human quality and is prerequisite for moral conduct and even for artistic appreciation. This pun has misled some translators to interpret jen as "humaneness" or "humanity." But jen denotes far more than mere "humanity," a fact easily shown by a study
of its use. Such a translation is, moreover, unable to account for the later development of this concept.

Confucius made benevolent love the centre of his ethical teaching. Once, when asked the meaning of *jen*, he replied, "Do not do to others what you would not like yourself" (*An. XII*, ii). This statement of the Golden Rule is negative only in form—Chinese style prefers a negative to a positive form, saying "not good" instead of "bad," etc. Confucius interpreted his Golden Rule positively. "To be able from one's own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others—this may be called the method of benevolent love" (*An. VI*, xxviii, 3). He also used the word "reciprocity" (*shu*) to denote this virtue. When he was asked, "Is there any one word that can serve as an absolute and life-long rule of conduct?" he replied, "Would not reciprocity (*shu*) do? Do not do to others what you yourself would not wish done to you" (*An. XV*, xxiii). Thus benevolent love (*jen*) is exemplified in the Golden Rule and is summed up in the word "reciprocity (*shu*)"—here there is plainly a unification of the whole of morality under one concept. We have then in primitive Confucianism the same attitude as in primitive Christianity—the whole of morality is summed up in the one notion of love for others. It is, then, not surprising that occasionally we find Confucius using *jen* to mean "perfect morality," so that Legge at times translated *jen* as "perfect virtue." That interpretation is implied in the conception of a *sumnum* virtue, such as *jen* in Confucius' thought.

But Confucius' conception of *jen*, or benevolent love, was not the same as the Christian ideal of equal love to all men. Ancient China was a feudal country and Confucius was a man of his time. *Jen* denoted benevolence rather than love. It was the attitude of a bountiful lord to his inferiors—the superior manifests a benevolent kindness. For the inferior to be benevolent to his superior would be presumption—the inferior should instead manifest the attitude of loyal obedience. This aristocratic distinction has clung to Confucianism throughout its history and is one reason that Confucianism is so much in disfavour in republican China to-day.

Confucius was moreover a practical man, who recognized that people love most the people closest to them, especially their parents and relatives. So he qualified his teaching of love to state that it is correct to love relatives more than others. This is a quite natural human attitude, which came to be stressed in China perhaps more than Confucius intended. One day, when Confucius
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was visiting the Duke of a neighbouring state, "the Duke... observed to Confucius, 'Among us there are persons so upright that when a father appropriates another man's sheep, his son bears witness of it.' Confucius replied, 'Upright persons among us are different. A father will screen his son and a son will screen his father—and there is uprightness in that'" (An. XIII, xviii).

This attitude of special love towards one's own family and clan was part of Confucius' ideal: "when gentlemen are munificent (du) to their relatives, then the common people are stirred to benevolent love (jen)" (An. VIII, ii, 2). Benevolent love is then graded, greater to those closer to oneself and lesser to more distant persons. The Confucian virtues of filial piety (hsiao) and brotherly respectfulness (ti)—special care for those in one's family—are consequences of this emphasis upon graded love.

To sum up: Confucius made fundamental to his ethical teaching the conception of love for others. But it was a graded love. His grandson emphasized "the decreasing measures of love to more distant relatives" (Doctrine of the Mean, XX, 5). We must now see what happened in subsequent ages to this central conception of graded love.

Mo-Tzu (ca. 475–393), who was born about the time that Confucius died, seems to have been trained in the Confucian school. But he was willing to think for himself, disagreed with some of the Confucian teachings, and had to leave his state for another one. He accepted the Confucian teaching of love for others as central to ethics. But China was being destroyed by the continual wars between the great noble clans, all of whom were closely related, much as were Europe's royal families. He furthermore saw that a graded love can actually be the cause of crime:

A thief loves (ai) his own family and does not love other families, hence he steals from other families in order to benefit his own family. Each grandee loves his own clan and does not love other clans, hence he causes disturbances to other clans in order to benefit his own clan. Each feudal lord loves his own state and does not love other states, so he attacks other states in order to benefit his own state. The causes of all disturbances... lie herein. ... It is always from want of equal love to all. (Mei, p. 79.)

The thief and aggressor are not without any love. Their love is merely restricted. Because their loves are graded so sharply, fixed upon their own persons or their own states, instead of upon all equally, they rob or attack other persons or states, so Mo-Tzu took
the important step of broadening Confucius' *jen* into his own fundamental concept of equal love for all (*jienai*). He moreover reinforced it by the religious teaching that there is a single supreme God, who loves all men equally and wants men likewise to love each other equally. Only by so doing can the evils of this world be removed. Here is the highest possible standard of morality combined with a logical and trenchant attack upon the Confucian doctrine. For almost two centuries the debate went on between the Confucians and the Mohists.

Mencius (372–298), the doughty champion of Confucius, replied that equal love for all is unnatural. People naturally love their own parents more than those of others. Everyone has certain special duties to his own parents. Anyone who does not recognize his special relationships to his family is less than human—a beast. Mo-Tzu's philosophy is then bestial. It was an effective answer to Mo-Tzu, even if not a logical one. Mo-Tzu had not discussed the relationship of family duties to his teaching of equal love to all. Neither did Jesus of Nazareth.

Through Mencius' powerful influence, Mo-Tzu became the arch-heretic of all times. Filial piety (*hsiao*), with its teaching of a necessarily graded love, was elevated to be a central virtue. Nevertheless, Mo-Tzu's trenchant argument left its impression even upon Confucian literature. In the *Classic of Filial Piety* (*Hsiaojing*), a Confucian tract that became a universally used primary textbook, there is the statement that the ancient sages "took the lead in influencing the people by means of their universal love (*bo-ai*)" (Ch. vii)—a term different from that used by Mo-Tzu, but clearly expressing his notion. So Mo-Tzu's equal love to all was relegated to the golden age, while Confucius' graded love was taught as appropriate to the contemporary world. It implies the subsidiary virtue of specially loving or favouring one's relatives (*tsin-tsins*).

When, in the last century B.C., China became officially a Confucian State, the superior was naturally expected to be an example to his people. He accordingly put his relatives in high positions. His paternal relatives were possible rivals for the throne, so they were ennobled, carefully watched, and kept out of the government. But his maternal relatives, especially his eldest maternal uncle, could be relied upon. This man was usually given the key position in the government. His power depended upon his relationship to the emperor. He knew that he would be displaced when
another emperor came to the throne, so he carefully protected his nephew. But he and his clan had to prepare for the future. He knew that he must acquire enough wealth during his nephew's reign to make his clan permanently rich and influential. Corruption was consequently inevitable. This uncle could not, moreover, be removed from power by the emperor, since to do so would be violating the duty of loving or favouring one's relatives. So nepotism, corruption, and misgovernment spread through the bureaucracy. The increasing discontent of the people thereupon produced rebellions and the eventual downfall of the dynasty. The inadequacy of a graded love has been an important factor in the decay of dynasty after dynasty. There has been a typical cycle in Chinese history that has frequently manifested itself. A new dynasty produced reforms and called capable persons to office. Confucianism furnishes an excellent training for government office. Hence it finally became the official philosophy. But when, accordingly, the imperial relatives came to power, the administration decayed. Nepotism could not be stopped, because the Confucian official philosophy approved of it.

This ancient defect in Confucianism had its repercussions. With the fall of the Han dynasty, Confucianism lost its hold upon intellectual leaders. First philosophical Taoism, then Buddhism took its place as the dominant cult.

This fundamental ethical inadequacy underlies the repeated break-up of China during the first millennium A.D. With an honest bureaucracy, China could ward off any invader as long as the people remained loyal to the throne. In the period B.C. the Huns were the northern neighbours of the Chinese. But the Chinese resisted and finally subjugated them, driving west those who would not submit, where they eventually conquered much of Europe. But after Confucianism had dominated the government for three centuries, the remaining Huns conquered China. With a corrupt bureaucracy, China could resist no organized enemy or movement.

Six centuries after Confucianism had ceased to be dominant, there appeared Han Yu (A.D. 768–824), one of the greatest Chinese litterateurs. In his time, the deficiencies of Taoism and Buddhism were beginning to be realized by intelligent men. He did more than any other individual to revive the influence of Confucianism. He was, however, quite ready to think for himself. Buddhism had for centuries been teaching an overspreading compassion for all
beings, which had proved attractive to the Chinese. Han Yu, moreover, read Mo-Tzu and approved of him. He even wrote a brief essay praising Mo-Tzu. But the influence of Mencius was too strong to allow a general acceptance of this view. Han Yu's most widely-read philosophical essay begins thus: "A universal love (bo-ai) constitutes benevolent love (jen); to practise this virtue constitutes righteousness (yi), and to follow this virtue constitutes the Confucian way (tao)." Here is a new emphasis in Confucian ethics. Morality is again unified under one concept, this time not of graded benevolent love, but of universal love for all. Without this new orientation, Confucianism might indeed not have again secured the approval of intelligent men. Confucian traditionalists could moreover not object to this teaching, since the term "universal love" is found in one of the ancient and by this time authoritative Confucian classics, that of Filial Piety. Han Yu's statement became authoritative for the Neo-Confucian school, of which he was the precursor. In his thinking, the term jen had lost its connotation of aristocratic "benevolence" and meant general "love for others."

Jou Dun-yi of Lien-hei (1017–1073), who actually founded the subsequently dominant Neo-Confucian school, repeated Han Yu's statement that love (ai) constitutes benevolence (jen). He stressed one of the virtues subordinate to universal love, namely, public-spiritedness or impartiality (gung). "The way of a sage is to be completely impartial (gung)" (Tung-shu, Ch. 37). "He who is impartial with regard to himself is impartial towards others. I have not heard of anyone who is partial to himself and is able to be impartial towards others" (Ibid., Ch. 21). Here is a complete denial of the ancient Confucian virtue of special love towards one's relatives (tsin-tsin). Universal love now became orthodox Confucianism.

Jang Dzai of Heng-chu (1020–1077), a younger contemporary who also became an important Neo-Confucian leader, went still further. Like Jou Dun-yi, he adopted a universal pantheism, similar to that in certain Buddhist philosophies. Being a Confucian, he however drew ethical conclusions from this pantheism. The universe is one whole, of which you and I are merely temporary manifestations. Hence there is no place for any real distinction between mine and thine and no justification for any selfishness. "He who enlarges his mind is able to treat equally all living beings in the universe" (Works 2, 21; Ch. 7). This may be
called the pantheistic argument for altruism. It became standard in Neo-Confucianism. "All people are my brothers, all things are my relations" (The Western Inscription). Bolder than his predecessors, Jang Dzai actually used and approved of Mo-Tzu’s term "equal love for all (jien-ai)" (2: 17b). He popularized the ancient saying, "All within the four seas (which encompass the habitable earth) are brothers" (An. XII, v. 4). This statement well represents the ethical attitude of Neo-Confucianism.

Thus in reformed Confucianism, under the influence of Mo-Tzu and Buddhism, there was a remarkable broadening of Confucian ethics. Bitter experience of the evils that graded love had brought upon the country, together with prodding from criticism, led intelligent Confucian leaders to reverse the traditional attitude and teach "universal love" and "impartiality," instead of the earlier virtue of "favouring one's relatives."

But, alas, human nature does not find easy such a high ideal as universal love. The Neo-Confucians were, moreover, unable to contradict the ancient and lower ideal. For Confucianism is fundamentally an authoritarian philosophy, which rests, for its validity, upon the ipse dixit of ancient sages. Neo-Confucianism could only reinterpret ancient terms, saying that Confucius' word, jen, actually meant "universal love." It could not, however, deny the plain meaning of various passages in the ancient classics urging that one's relatives should be favoured. In the Middle Ages, in China as in Europe, new ideas were not approved nor desired. Consequently, when the learned Chu Hsi (1130–1200) compiled and systematized the Neo-Confucian teaching, he was compelled to adjust it to the ancient doctrine. In his comment upon Jang Dzai's statement that the universe is one family, Chu Hsi wrote: "Although the universe is one family and China is one person in that universal family, yet Jang Dzai does not fall into the error of Mo-Tzu's equal love for all (jien-ai). . . . He puts forward the richness of loving one's relatives (more than other persons) by means of the great impartiality of non-individuality (anatman, wu-wo)" (Jang Dzai's Works, 1: 7a). So Chu Hsi brought back into Neo-Confucianism the ancient ideal of graded love and placed it alongside the new Neo-Confucian ideal of universal love. Since his time, these two ideals have persisted together. Both are held to have been justified by ancient authority. Whichever one is chosen depends upon one's individual predilection. Thus individual selfishness was by no means exorcized from Confucian teaching.
Chu Hsi was not the last great Neo-Confucian. Wang Shou-ren of Yang-ming (1472-1529) was in many respects the greatest of all, especially in his own character. An objective idealist and monist, he declared that there is only one true reality, which is universal Mind. The central virtue is love or jen, which he supported by the pantheistic argument for altruism. "A great-minded man considers that heaven, earth, and all things form one unity. He views the world as one family and China as one individual in it. If he makes a distinction in it between you and me on account of figure or bone-structure (i.e. wealth or race), he is a small-minded man" (Henke, p. 204). "Prince and minister, husband and wife, friend and friend, even mountains, rivers, gods, spirits, birds, animals, plants, and trees, to all we should be truly affectionate (tsin), in order to attain to the love (jen) which makes us all one unity" (ibid., 206). Virtue then consists in a moral love for others and vice consists in selfishness. Here is a high moral teaching indeed.

Nor was this mere exhortation. While Wang Shou-ren was once exiled from the court and a minor official among barbarians, an epidemic laid low his retinue. He himself nursed his ill servants, Chinese and barbarians alike, himself chopping wood, carrying water, and cooking for them, regardless of his superior position. No wonder he was loved by all!

But Wang Shou-ren's moral idealism has remained in China devoid of official support. Political considerations had made Chu Hsi's philosophy authoritative and Wang Shou-ren was declared heterodox. Although that ban was later lifted, yet Chu Hsi continued to dominate official Confucian dogma, until the Chinese Revolution freed the Chinese mind.

The political consequences of this justification of qualified selfishness continued to manifest themselves. Nepotism and favouritism led to corruption and the eventual fall of dynasties. But the Neo-Confucian emphasis upon universal love and impartiality slowed up this process. It is noteworthy that during the last half-millennium there have been only two dynasties, both of which have been officially Confucian; the present Republic, has adopted no philosophic code.

To sum up the developments of these more than two millennia: Confucius made central in ethics the high moral concept of love for others. But, in an endeavour to make it congenial to human nature, he qualified it by making it a graded love, greater to those
closer to oneself. There consequently came to be an emphasis upon filial piety and favouring one’s relatives. Mo-Tzu, however, pointed out the necessity of equal love for all. But human nature does not desire over-high ideals. Mo-Tzu’s ideal made little permanent impression in ancient times. But the Chinese are a practical people, who put their philosophies to the test of practical experience. This test demonstrated that Confucianism, in spite of its great moral eminence, nevertheless contained a vital defect. So Neo-Confucians were driven to the same conclusion of universal altruism as that adopted by the best Occidental thought. Yet the Chinese did not remain upon these heights. Alongside this new universal altruism there was also perpetuated in Confucian dogma the same graded love that had been so congenial in ancient days. Chinese family loyalties are still the source of much of China’s trouble. History has shown that Mo-Tzu was right. But we can hardly criticize the Chinese. Can we show that we have lived up to our highest ideals much better than the Chinese have lived up to their doctrine of universal love?
ON "KO-YI," THE EARLIEST METHOD BY WHICH INDIAN BUDDHISM AND CHINESE THOUGHT WERE SYNTHESIZED

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Ko-yi was the first method by which Chinese scholars attempted to synthesize Indian Buddhism and Chinese thought. This term, together with its definition, appears in the Kao-seng-chuan (by the bronze Hui-Chiao of the Liang Dynasty). The biography of Chu Fa-Ya, in chuan 5 of this work, contains the following paragraph:

"At that time, all the followers of Ya were well versed in secular literature, but were not good at Buddhist reasoning. Therefore Ya, together with K'ang Fa-Lang and others, taking the Shih-shu (categories) which were within the scriptures, compared and paired them with the outer books, thus making instances (examples) to promote understanding; this he called "Ko-yi." And P'i-Fou, T'an-Hsiang and others also made use of Ko-yi in order to instruct their disciples."

The term "Ko-yi," thus defined, very seldom appears in Chinese Buddhist books; it designates the method used by the Chinese devotees of Buddhism prior to the Western Chin Dynasty; with the advent of the Eastern Chin, learned Buddhists discovered its defects and discarded it. Therefore there were very few men who knew it. Three aspects of this method, discernible in the paragraph just quoted, should be noted:

1 Translated into English by M. C. Rogers, M.A., University of California.
2 Ko-yi: = the equation of concepts: the Wade-Giles system of romanization is used throughout this article.
3 Taisho edition of Tripitaka (Taishō Daiōkyō, abbrev., Taishō), Vol. 50, P. 347.
4 "Ya" and "Fa-ya" are abbreviated forms of "Chu Fa-Ya"; similarly, "An" and "Tao-An" are used for "Shih Tao-An," and "Tai" and "Fa-Tai" for "Chu-Fa-T'ai." All these three learned Buddhists are of the Chin Dynasty (262-420 A.D.).
5 "And": chi B; some texts have nai B, which does not make sense in this context.

Vide the article "The Doctrine of Chih Min-Tu," by Professor Tehen Yin-Koh, in Ts'ai Yuan-Pei Hsien-Sheng Chinien-ts'e. (Studies presented to Ts'ai Yuan-Pei on his sixty-fifth birthday, Peiping, 1933.)
ON "KO-YI"

(1) Ko-yi was a method used for teaching students. Chu Fa-Ya, K'ang Fa-Lang, and others used it for this purpose, as did P'i-Fou, T'an-Hsiang and still other men; its use, then, was widespread. Moreover, it can be surmised from the wording of the quotation that P'i-Fou and T'an Hsiang were juniors of Fa-Ya, perhaps his students, while K'ang Fa-Lang was his co-worker and equal.

(2) In Ko-yi, ideas originally Chinese are made use of; they are compared with those of Buddhism, in order to enable a student familiar with Chinese concepts to come to a full understanding of the doctrines in India. By the "secular literature" referred to in the quotation is meant the "this-worldly" works of China as contrasted with the supermundane doctrines of Buddhism. Moreover, from the standpoint of Buddhism in both India and China, a proper designation of the Buddhist scriptures was "Inner Books" (Chinese "nei-shu"), while the books of Chinese origin were "Outer Books" (Waishu). Chu Fa-Ya's students were Chinese and had already an understanding of Chinese concepts; hence Chu Fa-Ya taught them to use these concepts for purposes of comparison, in order to bring them to a full understanding of Indian thought. Not only did the students approach their studies in this way, but the Buddhist teachers of that were, from the outset, well versed in Chinese learning. Chu Fa-Ya's biography in the Kao-seng-chuan says:

"When [Chu Fa-Ya] was young, he was good in the 'outer studies' ('wai-hsüeh'); when he grew up, he became versed in Buddhist thought."

It says further:

"[He] lectured on the 'outer books' and on the Buddhist scriptures, both alternately and in mutual association. Each time he, together with Tao-An and Fa-T'ai, unravelled the knots of perplexity and resolved doubts, they jointly exhausted the essential purport of the scriptures."

Probably Fa-Ya had originally arrived at his understanding of the Buddhist works from the standpoint of comparison with Chinese thought.

(3) Of precisely what does the Ko-yi method consist? It is not simply a broad, general comparison of Chinese and Indian thought; rather it is a very detailed process by which each of the ideas or terms of the respective regions are individually compared and equated. "Ko," in this context, has the meaning of "to match" or "to measure"; "yi" means "name," "term," or "concept";
"Ko-yi" is (the method or scheme of) matching ideas (or terms), or "the equation of ideas."

Buddhism, from the time of Sakyamuni, stressed analysis. Therefore, in the Buddhist books, we have many and various analyses of human life and the universe. The products of these analyses are the "categories of the Dharmas" ("Fa-shu," lit. "dharma-numbers"), or, as they were called by the early Chinese Buddhists, the "categories of things" ("Shih-shu," lit. "thing-numbers"). The Commentary on the *Wen-hsüeh-pien* (Literature Section) of the *Shih-shuo-hsin-yü* says:

"By 'shih-shu' is meant such classes as: Wu-yin (the five Skandhas), Shih-érh-ju (the twelve Āyatanas), Ssu-ti (the four Satyas), Shih-érh-yin-yüan (the twelve-fold Pratītya-samutpāda), Wu-ken (the five Êndriyas), Wu-li (the five Balas), Ch'i-chueh (the Seven Bodhyangas)."

The early Chinese converts to Buddhism, on reading the Buddhist books, must have got the impression of an overwhelming abundance of enumerations of numbered ideas and terms; these were not only troublesome, but were difficult to understand. Because of this, men like Fa-Ya searched out similar analyses from the Chinese books; they compared them with the Indian ones and fashioned a great many "instances" ("examples"), by means of which understanding was produced in the minds of their disciples. Just how Fa-Ya worked them out is not now known; however, in the Buddhist books of the period between the Han and the Chin, the Indian concept of four elements (the Mahābhūtas) was often interpreted in terms of the Chinese five elements (Wu-hsing); such a comparison of the categories of the two countries may be taken as an example of Ko-yi. It is probable that also in the Han and Three Kingdoms periods many of the Buddhist ideas were explained in this way,¹ and were somehow made identical with Chinese concepts. We may also conjecture that some of the "instances" of Chu Fa-Ya's Ko-yi are attributable

¹ Hui-Jui, in his *Yü-i-lun* (Ch'u-san-tsang-chi-chi, Ch. 5, Taishô, Vol. 55, p. 41), said:

"At the end of the Han and the beginning of the Wei ... the worthies who sought the essence of [Buddhist] ideas began to have [fixed] lecturing places. They extravagantly enlarged [their lectures] by means of Ko-yi and pedantically distorted them by pairing explanations (p'ei shuo)."

It seems that here, "Ko-yi" and "P'ei shuo" refer to one and the same method. Thus it is apparent that in Han and Wei times expounding the scriptures frequently consisted of pairing Chinese and Indian terms and explaining them side-by-side. It was Chu Fa-Ya, in the Western Chin, who practised this systematically and on a large scale.
to the comparisons sporadically made by the Buddhists of the preceding age. It is not known whether or not the results of this method of comparison, item by item and set by set, of the Chinese and Indian terms or concepts, were ever written down as textbooks by Fa-Ya. However, we can be sure that Fa-Ya and his colleagues, in their oral expositions of the scriptures, had a detailed and definite method of comparative procedure, as a result of which, moreover, they gave numerous instances for the purpose of promoting the full understanding of their students. Such, in general, was the method of Ko-yi.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the origin of this method, it would be well to note the time and place in which it flourished. The dates of Chu Fa-Ya’s birth and death are unknown. However, according to statements in the Kao-seng-chuan, he and Tao-An were both students of Chu Fo-T’u-Ch’eng, and Fa-T’ai was at one time a fellow-student of Tao-An; it is further stated that Fa-Ya’s disciple T’an was respected by Shih-Hsüan. Tao-An was born in 312 A.D. and died in 385; Shih-Hsüan was killed in 348. Therefore Fa-Ya was somewhat earlier than Tao-An; he lived in the latter half of the third century and the first half of the fourth. He was a man of Ho-chien, and once founded a temple in Kao-i. The Ming-seng-chuan-ch’ao ("Selections from the Biographies of Illustrious Monks") calls him "Chu Fa-Ya of Chung-Shan" ("Chung-shan Chu Fa-Ya"). K’ang Fa-Lang who, together with him, made use of Ko-yi in teaching scriptures, also lived in Chung-shan. Chu Fa-Ya’s student T’an-Hai was respected by Shih-Hsüan, hence we know that he had been in the Later Chao capital, Yeh. Chu Fa-Ya’s master, Chu Fo-T’u-Ch’eng, also did most of his preaching in Yeh. These places are all north of the Yellow River and are the places where Chu Fa-Ya’s fellow-students Tao-An and Fa-T’ai spent the early part of their lives; this, then, is the region where the Ko-yi method flourished. In the time of

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1 In Chu Fo-T’u-Ch’eng’s biography, Kao-seng-chuan, Ch. 10 (Taishô, Vol. 50, p. 387), it is stated that Fa-Ya and Tao-An were Chu Fo-T’u-Ch’eng’s disciples; Chu Fa-T’ai’s biography, Ch. 5 of the same work (Taishô, Vol. 50, p. 354) says that Fa-T’ai was a fellow-student of Tao-An.

2 In modern Hopei, Pei-hsiang hsien.

3 In modern Hopei, Ho-chien hsien.

4 In modern Hopei, Pei-hsiang hsien.

5 Chu Fo-T’u-Cheng’s biography also refers to him thus. Chung-shan is, in modern Hopei, Ting hsien.

6 Vide the biography of K’ang Fa-Lang, Kao-seng-chuan, Ch. 5 (Taishô, Vol. 50, p. 347).

7 In modern Honan, Ling-chang hsien.
the Western Chin, the region north of the Yellow River was the most important one from the standpoint of Chinese Buddhism; all the Eastern Chin Buddhism of both north and south was later to be influenced by it.

As for the origin of the Ko-yi method: in the first place, traces of it can be discerned in the pattern of Han thought. The scholars were very fond of matching concepts with concepts. Both the Confucianists of that time (e.g. Tung Chung-Shu, ca. 179–104 B.C.) and the Taoist thinkers (e.g. Huai-nan Wang, d. 122 B.C.) freely borrowed from the Yin-yang school of ancient philosophy; they made use of the dual principles Yin and Yang, the five elements (wu-hsing), the four seasons (ssu-shih), the five notes (wuyin), the twelve lunar months (shih-érh-yüeh), the twelve semitones (shih-érh-li), the ten heavenly stems (t’ien-kan), the twelve earthly branches (ti-ch’ih), etc., and paired them one with another. Even up to the Western Chin, this was the type of learning which, with its accompanying methodology, was taught, and was very familiar to the scholars. Although it was a new epoch in which Chu Fa-Ya and his colleagues lived, still they had not renounced the pattern of Han Dynasty thought. For example, the works which Tao-An wrote when he was in the region north of the Yellow River (312–365 A.D.) were (I think) deeply coloured by the Han learning.

Secondly, the origin of the Ko-yi method is probably related to the nature of the Buddhist studies which came into vogue in the closing years of the Han Dynasty. In the time of Huan-ti of the Han, the famous Parthian monk An Shih-Kao came to Loyang (148 A.D.). He seems to have been the first learned man of the West to come to China, and the first to translate a considerable number of sacred books. According to the earliest records, he was an Abhidharma Master and was deeply versed in the section of meditations (dhyāna) which are expounded in the Abhidharma. Tao-An’s Preface to the An-p’an-shou-i-ching (Ānāpāna-smrtyupas-thāna-sūtra)\(^1\) says:

"An Shih-Kao studied widely and searched out the ancient ways; he specialized in the learning of the A-p’i-t’an; in the books which he produced, the Ch’an shu (the categories concerning dhyāna, lit. the Ch’an-numbers) are set forth with greatest completeness."

"A-p’i-t’an" is a transcription of Abhidharma; by "shu" is meant "Shih-shu" (Categories of things) or "Fa-shu" (Categories of the

\(^1\) Vide Seng-Yu's Ch’u-san-tsang-chi-chi, Ch. 6 (Taishô, Vol. 55, p. 43).
dharmas); hence, "Ch’an-shu" has reference to the Shih-shu or Fa-shu of the Ch’an (dhyāna). The Abhidharma spoken of here presumably followed the arrangement of Mātrka, i.e. the whole book is arranged by divisions and subdivisions according to the serial order of Shih-shu or Fa-shu. This is precisely the case with such works as the *Yin-ch’ih-ju-ching*,¹ which he translated; in the beginning of this work, the Law of the Buddha is divided into three parts:

(1) Yin, i.e. the five Skandhas.
(2) Ch’ih, i.e. the eighteen Dhātus.
(3) Ju, i.e. the twelve Āyatanas.

Then, under "the five Skandhas," are listed:

(1) Rūpa
(2) Vedanā, etc. etc.

Further, under "Rūpa," the ten kinds are explained:

(1) Visual Organs
(2) Colour, etc. etc.

This manner of enumeration and exposition by divisions and subdivisions continues throughout the whole book. Indeed, it may have been the original format of the Abhidharma books of Buddhism,² and we know of not a few still extant books in the Chinese Abhidharma-piṭaka which are arranged in this way.

An Shih-Kao was a specialist in the third piṭaka; therefore, after coming to China, he gave lectures according to the serial arrangement of the Abhidharma, that is to say, he orally explained to his Chinese pupils the categories, one by one, in divisions and subdivisions as they were set down in the original Indian texts, e.g. the *Yin-ch’ih-ju-ching* referred to above. We learn from Sung-Yu’s *Ch’u-san-tsang chi-chī*³ that among An Shih-Kao’s works there was a Ching (sūtra) called *A-han-k’ou-chich-shih-ērh-yin-yūan* (i.e. a sūtra orally expounded, on the twelve-fold Pratītya-

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¹ *Taishō*, No. 603 (Vol. 15). This work is designated as ching (sūtra), but really should be classified as Abhidharma. In fact, in its preface, Tao-An said that it was written after the compilation of the Tripiṭaka, and hence cannot be properly called a sūtra.

² In fact, during the period of the Six Dynasties, the term "Shu-lun" ("Number Dissertations") was frequently used to designate the Lun-tsang (Abhidharma-piṭaka) or the Hsiao-ch’eng-lun (Hīnayāna Abhidharma, especially of the Sarvāstivadins); Hīnayāna Abhidharma study or learning was frequently referred to as "Shu-hsüeh" (Study of the Numbers).

samutpāda in the Āgama), and also that Tao-An, in his bibliography of Buddhist scriptures, said that An Shih-Kao wrote the following Chings (sūtras):

- the Ssu-ti (four Satya)
- the K'ou-chieh ("Orally expounded," and abbreviation of the sūtra on the twelve-fold Pratītya-samutpāda referred to above)
- the Shih-ssu-i (the fourteen Smṛti?)
- the Chiu-shih-pa-chieh (the ninety-eight Anuśaya).

The significant fact to be noted here is that all the works listed deal with categories or numbered sets of the dharmas; hence, as written by An Shih-Kao, they have really the character of the Abhidharma, though designated as "Ching" (sūtras). On the basis of this we may conclude that in both his oral and written instructions, An Shih-Kao often adopted the procedure of item-by-item exposition in accordance with the arrangement of the categories in the Abhidharma books.

Moreover, the Preface to the Sha-mi-shih hui-chang-chü (a commentary on the Ten Wisdoms of the Śramaṇera), by An Shih-Kao's disciple Yen Fou-Tiao says:

"Things cannot be defined without being put into the categories" (lit. "the numbers").

And again:

"Only about the Ten Wisdoms of the Śramaṇera did we not hear [An Shih-Kao's] explanation in detail."

From these statements we can conjecture that An Shih-Kao laid much stress on the importance of a clear knowledge of the Shih-shu for the proper comprehension of Buddhist thought, and that his lectures consisted of item-by-item expositions of the categories of the Dharmas, with the exception of the Ten Wisdoms of the Śramaṇera, with which, as his disciple complains, he did not deal very thoroughly.

An Shih-Kao’s influence prior to the Western Chin was very great. Tao-An, in the works which he wrote while living in the

1 Ch’u-san-tsang-chi-chi, Ch. 10 (Taishō, Vol. 55, p. 69). Yen Fou-Tiao is the earliest known Chinese Buddhist monk; the name he used, "Fou-Tiao," seems to be of Indian origin; there was, in fact, another monk, Fou-Tiao, of the Chin, who was said to be an Indian.

2 Chih Ch'an (or Chih Lo-Chia-Ch'an), a younger contemporary of An Shih-Kao, also had great influence at that time.
ON "KO-YI"

region north of the Yellow River, expressed great esteem for him. At that time, his studies were devoted especially to An Shih-Kao's works and the Ch'an-shu (the Categories of dhyāna or meditations).¹

In his Preface to the Shih-fa-Chü-i,² Tao-An said that the Buddha's great disciple Maudgalyāyana paid good attention to the knowledge of the categories (the numbers), and that An Shih-Kao, among those teachers who came to China, applied his genius to this subject; he also reported that no learned man of India would neglect to study the Abhidharma, which was the depository or treasury of the categories. He expressed his agreement with Yen Fou-Tiao by saying, "there is no clearer knowledge than the delineation of the categories (i.e. the numbers)." We may safely conclude, therefore, that under the influence of such a great Master as An Shih-Kao, the Chinese scholars of the period from the Han to the Western Chin frequently gave their lectures on Buddhist doctrine in the form of item-by-item exposition of the categories.³

We have seen that the time-honoured practice of the Han scholars was to match or pair concepts with concepts, and that the fashion of the Buddhists from the Han to the Western Chin was to expound item-by-item the Shih-shu or "Categories of things." Since the meanings of the Indian categories were not easily grasped by the Chinese devotees, they sought better understanding by interpreting them in terms of Chinese concepts. Such matching, or establishing one-to-one correspondence between Indian and Chinese ideas, is not to be wondered at; the precedent was already firmly established by the Han scholars among whom such a practice, involving only Chinese concepts, had flourished for

¹ As to what the proponents of Ko-yi (Chu Fa-Ya, K'ang Fa-Lang, Pi-Fou, and T'an-Hsiang) were studying at that time there is no historical record; however, their studies were probably not very different from those with which Tao-An was occupied. Moreover, K'ang Fa-Lang's disciple Ling-Shao "was especially good at the Ch'an-shu"; this is precisely the learning for which An Shih-Kao was famous.

² Taishō, Vol. 55, p. 70. "Shih-fa" here means "the dharma of the tens" (or possibly "the dharma of the numbers up to ten"). "Chu," in the T'ang Dynasty translations, is equivalent to "padārtha" (usual English rendering, "Categories"). Hence, Tao-An's Shih-fa-chü-i, now lost, may be a work "On the Categories of the Tens," and probably is of the same nature as the Daśāutta, 34, Digha-nikāya, i.e. the Shih-shang-ching in the Chinese Dighāgama, Taishō, Vol. 1, pp. 52–57; cf. op. cit., pp. 233–241, a translation by An Shih-Kao.

³ At least since the time of Three Kingdoms, the Buddhist lectures were conducted by a "Master of the Law" ("Fa-shih"), with an assistant ("Tu-chiang"). This is also connected with the method of instruction according to the categories, see my History, pp. 117–118.
hundreds of years.\textsuperscript{1} Chu Fa-Ya and his fellow-workers extensively and systematically compared ideas or terms indigenous to China with similar Indian categories (Fa-shu or Shih-shu), and thus supplied their students with a great many instances of equations of ideas or terms in order to bring about their complete understanding; they called this method Ko-yi.

Such seems to be the origin of Ko-yi as it flourished north of the Yellow River during the Western Chin Dynasty. However, when the Chinese scholars had studied the Buddhist scriptures a little longer and penetrated a little more deeply, they gradually became aware that the method had its defects. The \textit{Kao-seng-chuan}, Ch. 5, biography of Sen-Kuang,\textsuperscript{2} says that when Tao-An and Seng-Kuang were living together at Fei-lung-shan\textsuperscript{3} (ca. 394)

"An said, 'The Ko-yi [practised by] our elders was frequently contrary to reason.' Kuang said, 'Let us aim at happy analyses; why [should it be] permitted [to us] to pass judgment on the savants of former generations?' An said, 'In propagating and bringing to light the [Buddhist] doctrines (li-chiao), we should make them fit-and-proper (yun-ch'ieh). As long as we all strive to beat the drum of the Law, what matters it whether we are earlier or later?'")

From the use here of the words "elders" (hsien-shiu) and "the savants of former generations" (hsien-ta), it can be seen that the period in which the Ko-yi method flourished was somewhat earlier than Tao-An. In fact, as we have already noted, such matching was done sporadically long before Chu Fa-Ya's extensive systematization of it. Moreover, the use of the term "analysis" (fen-hsi, "to divide and discriminate") is significant: it indicated the analytical character of the item-by-item comparison of the Shih-shu of Indian Buddhism with the native Chinese concepts.

Moreover, Tao-An, in giving the reason for his opposition to Ko-yi, says that the explanations of the Buddhist scriptures should be "fit-and-proper" (yun-ch'ieh). In the Ko-yi method, comparisons were made in which not only the numbers, but also the meanings were different, e.g. the comparison of the Chinese Wu-hsing (five elements) with the Buddhist Mahābhūtas (four elements); naturally, it was difficult to make such comparisons

\textsuperscript{1} The reason for the Han scholars' practice was, of course, different from that of the Buddhists, who paired the Chinese concepts with the Indian ones; this subject need not be discussed here.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Taishō}, Vol. 50, p. 33. "Seng-hsien" is an alternate form of the name "Seng-Kuang," the character "hsien" being graphically similar to "kuang."

\textsuperscript{3} A mountain in Yung-shih hsien, modern Hopei.
fit-and-proper.” Furthermore, the Preface to the Commentary on the Vimalakirti-sūtra (P’i-mo-lo-chich-t’i-ching-i-shu-hsü),¹ written by Seng-Jui (Tao-An’s disciple) in the last years of the Chin Dynasty, says: “Ko-yi is pedantic, and diverges from the original texts.” It was inevitable that the matching of ideas and terms would frequently be wide of the mark, and would not coincide with the original ideas.

It seems that the reason why Tao-An said that this method was not “fit-and-proper” was because it was frequently “contrary to reason.” Here we have an idea that goes to a deeper level. It is a noteworthy fact that concentration solely on the similarity between the concepts and terms of two different kinds of thought (whether they have their origin in two different individuals or in two countries) cannot bring about a synthesis of them; it is essential to look for the identity of their basic theories or fundamental principles. Comparisons merely of terms and concepts inevitably result in confusion and distortion, or, as Tao An said, in the state of being “contrary to reason,” and hence the profundity or essential heart of the philosopher’s thought or of the religious teacher’s doctrine remains unfathomed. That which demands closest attention is the reason or principle; it is more important to comprehend the deeper meanings implicit in a system of thought than to have a superficial knowledge of its concepts or terms. Because the thinkers of the Wei Chin Era (the Three Kingdoms period plus the Eastern and Western Chin, i.e. A.D. 220–419) realized this point, they began to adopt a new method, which may be called “The distinction of words and meanings.”² This new method of procedure played an important part in the transformation of the whole cultural character and philosophical spirit of the Han into the spirit which characterized the new age of the Wei-Chin. After Tao-An, it was also applied to the work of synthesizing Indian Buddhism with Chinese thought; for this reason, Ko-yi was not referred to again.³

In the Northern Wei (386–535), however, a priest named T’an-Ching, between the years 454–464 wrote a spurious sūtra

¹ Ch’u-san-tsang-chi-chi, Ch. 8; Taishó, Vol. 55, p. 59.
² Regarding this new method, see the author’s article, “Yen-i-chih-pien” (“The Distinction of Words and Meanings”), distributed in mimeographed form by Peking University, 1942.
³ The words “Ko-yi” appear once in the biography of Kumārajīva, in the Kao-seng-chüan, Ch. 2 (Taishó, Vol. 50, p. 332); here, however, Hui-Chiao (author of the Kao-seng-chüan) seems to have forgotten the original meaning of the term.
called *T’i-wei-po-li-ching*,¹ in which the Chinese five cardinal virtues (Wu-ch’ang) were compared with the five precepts of the Buddhist Upāsakas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Virtues</th>
<th>Five Precepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humaneness</td>
<td>Not to take life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Righteousness</td>
<td>Not to commit adultery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propriety</td>
<td>Not to drink intoxicating liquor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisdom</td>
<td>Not to steal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sincerity</td>
<td>Not to lie</td>
</tr>
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In addition to these, he paired together, also after the fashion of Han philosophy, the Wu-hsing (five elements), the Wu-hsing (five planets), etc.;² truly this sort of matching has the appearance of Ko-yi. In view of this fact, it is evident that, in matching concepts with concepts and terms with terms, Chu Fa-Ya and his colleagues were carrying on one of the practices of Han scholarship. With the advent of the Wei-Chin era, a new philosophy, Hsiian-hsüeh (commonly translated “Mysticism”), became dominant; it emphasized profound searching for first principles and regarded with contempt the matching of concepts; it is not surprising, therefore, that its proponents, who used the new method of “the distinction of words and meanings,” would discover the defects of Ko-yi. However, the “Teaching for Human Beings and Deities” (Jen-t’ien-chiao), which was the theme of the spurious *T’i-wei-po-li-ching*, was frequently expounded by the Buddhists of later generations.³ Therefore, if T’an-Ching’s matching can be called Ko-yi, then Ko-yi, at least in this one instance, was adopted by the later Chinese Buddhism.

¹ I.e. the *Sūtra of Trapusa and Ballika*. Trapusa and Ballika were two merchants to whom the Buddha, immediately after his enlightenment, preached a sermon on the moral conduct of human beings and deities (de-va).
² For details, vide the author’s *History of Chinese Buddhism*, pp. 811–817.
³ For example, this doctrine was frequently used by the writers of the Hua-yen-tsung (the Hua-yen Sect) as an important part of the Law of the Buddha.
PERSONALISTIC METAPHYSICS OF THE SELF: ITS DISTINCTIVE FEATURES

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I

Whether in the Orient or in the Occident, philosophy everywhere has been concerned about metaphysics. Even the current positivistic attempt to refute all metaphysics is itself a concern about metaphysics and a tribute to its persistence. In whatever guise it appears, metaphysics is an attempt to define what is truly and completely real, in contrast with what is illusory or merely apparent or fragmentary. The metaphysical examination of anything is, therefore, the attempt clearly to relate it to our truest and fullest understanding of the real as a whole.

The basic metaphysical problem is the question, "What am I?" Since every being that can ask a question is a self, the problem of the self is the basis and root of all problems. It is the "problematic situation" (to quote Dewey) par excellence. Many men of science, it is true, as well as men of religion, in all ages, have believed that they could begin with the object rather than the subject, with things or God or the Absolute rather than with man. It is, of course, a fact that any self or experient (jñātā) may direct its primary attention to what philosophers have called The Other. The experient may very well be at times more interested in the object experienced than it is in its own experiencing; and surely our experiencing is not all that there is. A purely subjective, egocentric view of experience is abnormal, partial, and irrational. But a purely objective view, however natural it may be for primitive man, or the extrovert, or the behaviourist, is just as abnormal, partial, and irrational as is a purely subjective view. In fact, a purely objective view is, in a sense, impossible; for any view of any object as seen by any self is the view which that self holds in the light of its interpretation of the evidence available in its own experience. A self cannot appeal directly to the experience of any
other self, or directly to the "object." He must secure his social and objective knowledge at second-hand, as reflected in his own experience, which is his only direct evidence, his only possible starting point. His relations to society and to the universe are, of course, far more rational and far more precious than his own private and personal self could ever be alone. But these relations find their focus in the self. The problem of the self is indeed the very foundation of all metaphysics, speculative and practical.

No wonder that Anaxagoras, Greek discoverer of *Nous*, saw rational self as the ruling power in all things! No wonder that the Greek Sophists declared that the human self is "the measure of all things"! Nor is it surprising that Plato and Wordsworth found in the self traces of eternal and heavenly truth, so that the soul came "trailing clouds of glory," or that Indian genius has seen in every self a spark of the Cosmic Self, Brahma.

The question "What am I?" is answered in many languages and accents, but all the answers ever given by man have one principle in common, namely: "I am more than now appears." Memory binds me to a past that is no longer present; purpose points me to a future that does not yet appear. If a thinker is materialistic, he makes the amazing assertion: "I am not at all the thinking, feeling, willing, perceiving, remembering or purposing that now appear; rather I am brain, although my brain has never appeared to me," so that the materialist is as much a devotee of the unseen as is the most ardent mystic. Whether I am a psycho-analyst or an inquirer into lofty realms of spiritual attainment, I agree that "I am more than appears"; for I may declare that I am in large part not conscious, but subconscious or unconscious reality, or I may aspire to the superconscious as my true being and my highest fulfilment. If I think at all, I must acknowledge that I am an effect of mostly unknown causes and a cause of mostly unknown effects. I am, now, it is true, what actually appears, but I am also the possibility of who knows what further appearances.

"I am more than now appears." Whatever the "more" may be, I am driven to acknowledge it by what now actually appears. There is the "I" of what Hegel calls *Schein*, which we may translate as "the shining present." There is also my larger "I" that includes all the "more." There is, by the same logic, the larger whole of the universe of which I (past, present, and future) am somehow a member. For my experience is objective as well as subjective; it is itself, yet refers to objects that are not itself,
now or perhaps ever. So far as the present stage of our argument is concerned, it matters not one whit whether we call this larger whole Nature or God, Brahma or Absolute, Reality or The Unknowable, nor does it matter how we view our relations to it. What is certain is that the I of the shining present, the "datum self," is dependent on a larger whole, both social and cosmic; and I somehow find my fulfillment in this larger whole. As Leibniz held, every monad mirrors the universe; or, to quote Whitehead, every actual occasion prehends all other actual occasions. The shining present reflects light from beyond. The self interacts with its world, and is unintelligible without it.

Thus we may add to the truth, "I am more than appears," the further truth, "I transcend myself," a principle which Francisco Romero, among others, has been emphasizing. Just as I transcend present appearance to find my fuller self, so I transcend myself to find my comrades, my world, or my God. The self, then, is an appearance that transcends itself. No thinker dare treat his self lightly. To quote Cervantes in Don Quixote (Pt. II, Bk. IV, Ch. Lxxiv), "Ne se ha de burlar el hombre con el alma"; that is, "A man must not jest with his soul."

The fundamental position of the self in reality and in philosophy is secure; but the historical positions of millions of selves and societies of selves all over the world are most precarious. It is not the task of this paper to discuss the social and economic miseries of humanity, except to point out that every social, political and economic situation is what it is because human selves, individually and corporately, have met the facts of their experience (presented to them by the larger whole) with one kind of thought, feeling, and will rather than with another. Human selves are at the root of all social systems and of all changes in systems; in fact, they are both root and tree, even if they are not soil, rain, and sunshine. A philosophy that is to be humanly useful must shed some light on the nature and purpose of selves and their function in the universe. In the light of such a philosophy there would be afforded new light and new hope of lessening the violence and injustice now prevalent in human life.

This paper is intended to set forth the outlines of a personalistic metaphysics of the self. Personalism is a name that has come to be widely used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The term has been popularized by J. Grote, W. Stern, Walt Whitman, Renouvier, B. P. Bowne, M. W. Calkins, Mounier, Maritain, and
others. It designates a philosophy that makes personality or selfhood the key to all reality. There is at present a tendency to extend the term to cover every movement that emphasizes the importance and the freedom of the self. Thus the thought of Nietzsche, and also existentialism, even in the extreme form advocated by Sartre, have been called personalism. Here, however, it will be used to designate that type of idealism which defines all reality as a society of selves or persons, with a cosmic person as its central, vivifying, creative force. Personalism is to be contrasted with any form of impersonal or agnostic idealism, such as that of Śankara in India or F. H. Bradley in England. The systems of Ramanuja, Madhva (except for *Jaḍa Prakṛti*), Berkeley, Leibniz, Hegel, Lotze, Royce, and Bowne, for example, are personalistic, however much they differ in detail. Even Whitehead is essentially personalistic. The personalist thinks of a personality as a complex, but unified and self-identifying self-experience; and the human personality is viewed as being in constant interaction and communication with the rest of the personal universe. The human self or person, for example, is, in the present stage of its existence, dependent on the body; but the body is viewed as activity of the mind of God (or, in the tradition of Leibnizian panpsychistic personalism, as an assemblage of monads or psychoids or psychic cells which are inferior selves), and all interaction with the body is part of the person’s interaction with God, while all of nature is part of God’s own personal active experience.

If a personalistic metaphysics of the self is to be set forth, it is well to preface it by an account of some of the first principles of personalism. These principles are those of an important current of philosophical tradition in both Occident and Orient; but the appeal of these principles is not to geography or to the authority of any philosophical or religious tradition. They stand or fall with the accuracy of the empirical observations on which they rest, and with rational coherence of the interpretation of those observations.

First, then, let us speak of the data of personalism. Its view of the data might be called "radical empiricism," to borrow a phrase from William James. "Empiricism," because it appeals to given experience as its starting point; "radical" because it includes the whole of that experience, and not some limited, favoured area or fragment of it. Evidence of the senses is empirical and
must be included among the data of personalism. But to restrict experience to the sensory is to deny the evidence of experience. Traditional empiricism is highly unempirical. No actual self ever consisted of sense experience alone, whatever Condillac may have tried to imagine. Every self senses; but in addition, every self remembers, strives (James called the self "a fighter for ends"), thinks, feels, and wills. Every self experiences many values and disvalues, as well as sensory facts. Many selves experience God as a living reality; they attain "realization." Radical empiricism is the demand that all these data be included in our philosophy.

Secondly, personalism calls for a method adequate to the data. The word "synoptic" characterizes personalistic method in the broadest sense. Synoptic method is an inclusive method. Its goal is the comprehension of wholes, as wholes. Obviously a whole is impossible without parts. Hence synopsis—the grasp of the whole—presupposes analysis, the description of the parts. But synopsis is always the goal of thought. The arrow of intelligibility must fly from whole to part and back again to the whole. A point of space, when conceived simply, is indistinguishable from an instant of time. Each is simple location. Neither is fully understood until it is related to the whole from which it was analysed. The arrow of intelligibility must fly back to the spatial whole or the temporal whole—or the personal whole—before the results of analysis can be interpreted. The synoptic method thus includes and transcends analysis. It also includes and transcends intuition. Every moment of consciousness is, in a sense, a complex of intuitions. Every intuition must be given due weight. But no intuition should be viewed analytically or abstractly, apart from a concrete, synoptic view of the whole situation under consideration. Similarly, synoptic method, as will readily be seen, includes and transcends the full use of both inductive and deductive methods, although its empirical data and function cause it to be more closely akin to the inductive.

The third principle of personalism is its criterion of truth, which is very closely related to its synoptic method. That criterion is coherence, and specifically, empirical coherence. It is possible to view coherence as meaning a rigidly necessary deductive system. But, since empirical data cannot be deduced from each other or from anything else, the concept of logically necessary deduction, while admirable as far as it goes, is inadequate both for science and for philosophy. It is, as Matthew Arnold and B. P. Bowne
agree, a system "of rigour and vigour" that does not do justice to our experimental or our interpretative knowledge of the real world. Hence recourse must be had to empirical coherence, which is the effort of the mind to face its experience as a whole and to discover and test the most inclusive, most systematic, and most consistent hypothesis which it can find. Personalism, therefore, cannot lay claim to absolute logical necessity, nor to finality. In not pretending to absolute necessity, it departs from traditional rationalism; in testing all hypothetical truth claims by their coherence with experience and with each other, it departs from all irrationalism, unless it be irrationalism to admit that there are facts which cannot be deduced from premises that do not contain them.

The fourth principle of personalism is its dualistic epistemology. To be concise, this epistemology starts with a present claim of knowledge, an idea, of some self. As we have seen, it is a universal truth that "I transcend myself." As applied to epistemology this means that any idea which claims to be knowledge refers to something beyond that present idea which is its object. Whether I know about zero—that great mathematical discovery of India—or about the events of yesterday, or about my own nervous system, or about the heights of Mount Everest, or about a fountain pen in my hand, I have in every case to assert that I mean something more and other than my present thought or sensation. All knowledge refers to reality. Every idea has a referent. Every sign signifies something. To clarify this dualistic feature of knowledge—so ably defended by A. O. Lovejoy in The Revolt against Dualism—the present experience or "idea" of the knower may be called "the situation experienced," while the object referred to may be called "the situation believed in." Epistemologically, then, even my own past is a situation believed in, although metaphysically it may be an integral part of my total self. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish the epistemological dualism of personalistic thought from metaphysical dualism, which concerns a very different problem.

The fifth principle of personalism is its metaphysics, which is its very core. It is, of course, impossible to define and defend a whole system of metaphysics in a few sentences. Yet, for our present purposes, a few sentences must suffice. The metaphysics of the personalism under consideration is through and through idealistic, and is in harmony with a large portion of the ideal-
istic argument of Radhakrishnan. This idealism views all of nature as mind; the energies of "matter" are aspects of the will of the Cosmic Mind. The universe is a society of persons. Everything that we call "impersonal" is really an aspect of personal reality. For example, an "impersonal view" is a fair, just, and unprejudiced view of persons by persons. "Impersonal reality" is reality viewed in abstraction from its membership in a mind; thus, we may view an apple as impersonal when we find it useful to abstract from the fact that it is really God's will in action. For idealism, ultimately all relations are personal relations; all reality is personal reality.

It follows from its idealism that, secondly, personalism is a qualitative monism. In a personalistic universe all the variety of being is capable of being included without reduction under the category of conscious experience. We have explored but a narrow range of conscious experience; it includes, however, a vast variety. Space, time, all sense qualia, moral obligations, sufferings, hopes, change, permanence, purpose, frustration, reason, ecstasy—even the "unconscious" and the "superconscious"—are examples of conscious experience in its various levels and qualities. The thesis of personalism is that conscious personality is the only category capable of including within its scope the entire complex of actual and possible being. Hence personalism is a qualitative monism—which also includes all possible diversity, yet without introducing the impossible diversity of unexperienceable being (such as matter is supposed by materialists to be).

While epistemologically dualistic and qualitatively monistic, personalism is, thirdly, quantitatively pluralistic. That is, the personalist holds that the universe is a society of many communicating and interacting persons and selves rather than a single self containing the many as its parts. Śankara, Hegel, and Royce—to mention only a few—are quantitative monists, who hold that all finite selves are but members or aspects of the one Absolute Self. The personalistic view, which is held by many thinkers in India, as well as by many Occidentals, is called dualism in India. If there is any self other than the Absolute Self, there are at least two selves in the universe; hence, dualism. God and the Other, God and the world—even a world of persons—constitute a duality for Indian thought. But Occidental personalists lay stress on the many-ness of the persons other than God, and prefer to speak of a quantitative pluralism rather than of dualism.
Occidental pluralistic personalists and Oriental monists would agree about the physical world of nature; it is wholly in God, his work or—as some Hindus would say—his play, līlā. The difference would come in the assertion of a plurality of persons. This plurality is asserted for two special reasons; first, it seems incoherent to include in a good and wise God all the error, ignorance, and moral evil that we find in human selves; and second, because social relations, and especially the relations of love and co-operation between person and person, lose their meaning when personal distinctness is denied and all persons melt into one. The personalistic view embodies the respect for individual personality which one finds in the Kantian ethics and in democratic practice, as well as in bhakti.

Finally, personalistic metaphysics is axiological. The real universe is not merely the order of nature which, although it be divine activity, is subject to technological exploitation. Just as the human self includes the experience of values, so the cosmic self is an experience of values—of truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness, as well as of lesser intrinsic values and processes of instrumental value. Values exist only as they are experienced in some mind. A distinction, however, should be made between values and norms. A true value is an actual experience of what ought to be. A norm, on the other hand, is the Platonic Idea, the true definition or the rational ideal of what ought to be. All norms are known to God, and are realized by him in his values. Norms are but imperfectly known to man, and are still more imperfectly realized. To know a norm is not to possess a value; a norm is but an imperative or a pointer showing the direction in which true value may be found. The purpose of personalistic universe is the eternal conservation and increase of values in accordance with norms. The simplest statement of the axiological goal is: reason and love, or coherent love. In a society of persons, creative co-operation, mutual respect, loving devotion to truth, and the highest possible attainment of the experience of God, constitute the purposive substance of metaphysical reality.

II

The foregoing sketch renders available a vocabulary for a more specific discussion of personality. A further remark will clarify terms already used. A conscious being—that is, any complex of
consciousness that is aware of its complexity and unity—is called a self or an experient. Any self or experient that is able to judge itself rationally and to strive for ideal values is a person or personality or mind.

Let us now examine the self or personality as it appears in immediate experience or “the shining present.” Whitehead calls such experience an “actual occasion”; Royce uses the phrase “time span.” Others speak of the “specious present” or the “datum self.” All of these terms intend to convey or imply the idea that the minimum possible self is an experience of real duration (durée réelle). There is no simple indivisible instant of self-experience. Every self endures in time as a unitas multiplex (W. Stern). To put it otherwise, the self in its lowest terms is at once a unitary experience and a succession of experiences. In one conscious grasp, many details are comprehended as the unitary structure of one self.

The first and most basic characteristic of the self, accordingly, is its temporality indissolubly connected with time-transcendence. In order to grasp any sentence or any sensory whole or any series of events, the mind must be aware, in one actual present, both of parts and of whole. It must grasp the temporal succession of the parts, and their total meaning in one act of Gestalt-experience. Thus every time-span is also time-transcendence. Likewise, every present experience transcends present time by an explicit or implicit reference to past time or future time. Memory, on the one hand, and anticipation and purpose, on the other, are always present in consciousness and always are temporal experiences with transtemporal reference. Even experience of the so-called timeless illustrates this same principle. The timeless truth of \((x + y)^2 = x^2 + 2xy + y^2\) must, when known, be known in a temporal experience which transcends time; and its timeless truth means simply that it is true at all times.

A second trait of all selves is that they experience both space and transcendence of space. Most of our sense-perceptions are a grasp of spatial dimensions, although the space reference in olfactory and auditory sensation is often vague. But there are noteworthy differences between temporal and spatial experience. Temporal experience is necessary to the existence of a self under any conceivable condition. If time were abolished, nothing that could be called a self would remain. Further, every aspect of a self’s experience is temporal. But if space were abolished, a self
might conceivably exist as a thinker of arithmetic and algebra (if not of geometry), an acknowederer of duty and harmony, and a lover of God and man. In short, selves as we know them have both spatial and non-spatial experiences. Further, they transcend space, either by abstraction from all space (as when one considers the nature of universals or values) or by trans-spatial reference to absent or imaginary spaces. Time-experience seems necessary for all possible worlds that stand in any relation to us; space experience is perhaps necessary only for a space-world, or as one aspect of a larger non-spatial world.

A third elementary feature of selves as we know them is sensation. Sensation lacks logical necessity; it is "given." Sensations differ among different experiencers. Some experiencers are blind, some colour-blind, some deaf, some tone-deaf. There is no proof that sensations to which different selves give the same name are, in fact, identical in quality. Sensation has often been condemned as a source of illusion or deception rather than knowledge, or as a source of depravity rather than of ideal aspiration. But despite its limitations and its perils, sensation is a fundamental function of every human experience. Sensation is the point of interaction between the self and the wider realm of nature. For the personalist, therefore, it is one of the foci of communication between God and man. Sensation is a sign to a self that something not his will is acting on him and in him. It is erroneous to view sensation as an event in sense organs. It is an event in, of, and for an experiencer. Every sensation is an integral part of some self, and has its existence subjectively, i.e. in a subject. But sense as immediately experienced is also an example of the principle of self-transcendence, for every sensation points to some objective source as its cause, and to some objective reality as its referent.

In the fourth place, every self experiences feeling—that is, liking or disliking, approval or disapproval, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. All feeling is present experience, or, as Alexander calls it, enjoyment. Feelings are sometimes casual, accidental, and haphazard. More often they are organized by habit, interest, or purpose. Although always immediate, present, and subjective in its being, feeling may seek purely subjective satisfactions or it may seek objective satisfactions. Thus we may speak of feeling as self-centred or as other-centred. A self may be interested chiefly in itself, or chiefly in its relations to others. On the lowest level of
fragmentary satisfaction, it may be God-centred. But wherever feeling finds its centre, it is an undeniable and an immediately present self-experience.

Fifth, will is a function of every self. Will is effort, as William James thought, a fight for ends. More simply, it is choice, a "saying yes or saying no," as Hans Driesch viewed it. Some religions regard will as evil, and doubtless much will is futile, irrational, and empty. Yet as long as there is conscious being of any kind, there is always will—either revolt or acquiescence. If will were lacking, there would be neither a desire for change of state nor a desire for continuance of the state in which we are. Will is integral to every self at every stage of its development. Will may be blind or seeing, selfish or unselfish, secular or worshipful; but at all levels, to be is to will. Personalism challenges the belief of some religions that will is always selfish desire and is always a source of unhappiness and evil. The will of a self is not necessarily a selfish will. Will may be self-centred or community-centred; it may be directed toward man alone, or toward God; it may be good or evil. When it is evil, the evil derives not from the bare fact that it is will, but from the intent and direction of the will. Will is the rudder of personality, or rather the pilot who directs the rudder. Whether the pilot steers toward the rocks or toward the harbour, he is still the pilot.

A sixth trait of the personal self is thought. There are doubtless elementary selves that do not think; and there are times when a fully developed person is not engaged in reasoning. But the power to think is essential to a person. To judge and to be able to test one's judgments by appeal to experience and logic is a mark of a true person. This does not assume that only human beings are persons. Quite possibly some so-called lower animals can think, and can test first impressions by further inquiry into experience. If so, such animals are persons, however elementary. Personalists believe that God is a superhuman person. But if any being lacks the power to reason, such a being is a subpersonal self. Thought is what enables a person to move from mere opinion or random desire to knowledge and rational control, although no stage of knowledge is final, for experience is inexhaustible.

Seventh, every self is a union of change and identity—what William Stern calls *unitas multiplex*. Every moment of self-experience, no matter how short, is a changing multiplicity: it contains complex processes of perception, memory, imagination,
desire, and more, and it endures for a measurable time—and therefore changes. Likewise, every self-experience, no matter how long-enduring, is an identity as well as a multiplicity. I experience myself as one self-identifying, self-remembering being no matter how much variety enters into my consciousness. To assert the changing variety alone is to deny the actual bond of experienced unity and identity which every self feels immediately. To assert the changeless identity alone is to make the changing variety unreal and unintelligible. Personality combines in experience what never could be combined in abstract impersonal theory.

The personalist finds in this complex-unity of self the key to the ultimate unity of being. The universe of experience could never be understood as the outcome of units such as electrons, protons, positrons, and neutrons; whereas electrons and the like can be understood as aspects or processes of personal experience; not of human experience alone, it is true, but of the objective divine experience. The principle of personality is one that forbids mere subjectivism because every person refers beyond himself to a world. Every self transcends itself, first, by the intent of all of its purposes and acts of knowledge; second, by its continual interaction with what lies beyond it; and, third, by its interpersonal community and co-operation with other selves. A remark is here in order with reference to those who try to explain the reference to objective reality without reference to the self. They often argue that we designate objects by the act of pointing. But it must be urged that the referent of any act of pointing must always be in doubt apart from purpose. What, exactly, is selected by the pointing finger? What, exactly, is the terminus of the pointing? All pointing is dependent for its meaning on its relation to the self-transcending purpose of the mind that guides the finger. The guiding mind is the interpreter. To this problem of self-transcendence we now turn our attention.

III

Personalists find, as we have said, that every self transcends itself. No self, whether personal or subpersonal, is conscious only of itself and its subjective states. It is true that every self experiences itself and only itself directly and immediately. If this were not true, there would be no point in speaking of self-transcendence, objective reference, or love. If knowledge of the real, whether
perceptual or conceptual, were immediate and direct, then there would be no transcendence. Everything would be immanent in one magnificent solipsism. But such a view of immanence cannot be derived from the fact that all of my experience is mine. R. B. Perry's "egocentric predicament" is overcome as soon as one inspects the meaning of self-experience.

The self always refers to what is not itself. Traditionally this has been called the reference of ego to non-ego. *Caveat lector.* There is a slippery ambiguity in the term "non-ego." It suggests that every self refers to something which is not a self. However, idealistic philosophy (and especially personalistic idealism) has shown that it is highly reasonable to assume that the non-ego is other-self. What is not my self is then your self or God's self. But in no sense does this imply a reduction or denial of the experience of transcendence. Every self, when it knows anything, transcends the moment of knowing by asserting that it knows something; and that something is the object known, not the mere knowing of it. A. N. Whitehead has called the simplest basic act of such knowledge of reality by the name "prehension," in contrast to the more complex apprehension or comprehension.

Transcendence, objective reference, prehension—whatever name we use—denotes the fundamental fact that mind reaches beyond itself to assert an interrelation with further reality. From this cognitive, experiential situation, however, nothing can be inferred about the nature of the beyond without further reflection. A claim of transcendence, however universal, is but a claim which must be adjudicated before the Supreme Court of reason.

There is no doubt that the claims of transcendent reference have both a physical order and a spiritual order as their objects. Whitehead suggests this fact by his postulate that every actual occasion has both a physical and a mental pole. The self asserts a spatio-temporal order, which is the object of the physical sciences. It also asserts a spiritual or an ideal order of purposes, values, and norms. The fact of this twofold reference is too familiar to require elaboration. In Western philosophy it has often led to irreducible dualisms, such as Plato's worlds of phenomena and of noumena, or of Descartes' thinking and extended things. But such dualistic theories, be it remembered, are always theories and not given facts of experience. If the dualism to which he held led a mind as great as Plato's to baffled conjectures about any possible relation between the two realms, and if the acute Descartes' dualism led
him to surrender reason when he declared interaction between
matter and mind to be impossible (yet possible via the pineal
gland), then it would appear that dualism in the sense of the
assertion of two (or more) discontinuous and radically different
kinds of being is a theoretical invention of the mind that causes
more trouble than it is worth.

Personalistic philosophers postulate that every self at every
level transcends itself by affirming a world beyond; but they also
postulate that the world beyond any one self is a world of other
selves. It is given in the experience of every normal human self
that space and time and energy—the constituents of a physical
world—can and do exist in personal consciousness. The personal-
istic philosopher avoids suppositions that go beyond any possible
verification in any experience anywhere; and the supposal that
there is a world of matter or impersonal and unconscious energy is
such a supposal. Therefore (and for many other reasons) a per-
sonalist affirms that the coherent order of nature discovered by
men of science is the experience of a coherent cosmic mind; and
that, likewise, the coherent spiritual order discovered by students
of value reveals the purposes and achievements of a normative
mind. There is no good reason to deny that the cosmic mind and
the normative mind are one supreme, universal person, God. But
there are many personalists who insist that so-called "finite"
selves, at any level, have a self-existence of their own, so that
they are no part of the divine mind, now or ever. To include
human selves in the mind of God is to ascribe to God all of the
ignorance, error, and limitation which finite minds experience,
and this would make the Absolute God the most incoherent of
beings. Hence Occidental personalists mostly take a social view
in metaphysics rather than a monistic or singularistic one. The
universe is a society of selves and persons with a Supreme Person
as its cause and guiding purpose. Oriental philosophers often call
this view dualism—but it is an idealistic "dualism" sharply to be
distinguished from the Occidental dualism of matter and mind,
which all personalists reject.

In the light of this discussion it has perhaps become clearer
what is meant when it is said that every self transcends itself. To
be specific, let us summarize. (1) Every moment of an individual
self, even when it is remembering its own past or planning its
own future, transcends the moment of experience and refers to
what is now absent. (2) When a self refers to any other self, human,
sub-human, or super-human, it is referring to experiencers other than itself and to experiences which it can never have as its own, however well it may know about them. (3) When a self refers to objects, events, or processes in the realm of physical nature, it refers to an order of experience in the mind of God. (4) When a self refers to a spiritual order of true values, it refers either to the ideal norms which God acknowledges as valid for realization or to those persons, human and divine, who co-operate in the realization of such norms. These items include all of the actual and possible objects or realities which are experienceable, thinkable or mentionable. Hence the personalist finds in his interpretation of the transcendent reference of self a sound metaphysics which sets forth a reality that transcends the experience of any particular self, yet does not transcend the entire society of persons.1

IV

From the transcendent reference of self it is a logical next step to the assertion of interpersonal relations. Personality is individual. It experiences itself. But it stands in social, that is, interpersonal relations. These relations may involve the "I and thou" which Martin Buber has so brilliantly interpreted; and the "thou" may be a human friend or the Divine Being. Or they may involve a larger group—a family, a nation, a world, the Kingdom of God—with the collective interests and communitarian experiences which such a group entails. A person, then, stands in a wide variety of interpersonal relations without ceasing to be a person or becoming absorbed into his relations. When these relations are rightly ordered, they enlarge and enhance the person.

First of all, it should be noted that persons are in continual interaction with each other, whether they know it or not. We initiate causes, and we suffer effects. Every act that every person performs affects other persons to some extent. The Divine Person is in endless interaction with every human person. But I, the

1 The view opposed to idealism is usually called realism, and it includes various types of materialism, naturalism, and dualism. The arguments on which such systems rest are, briefly stated: (1) The appeal to instinctive recognition of "matter" (but instinct is a feeble criterion of truth). (2) The assertion that analysis yields simple entities that are real but not conscious (but analysis must be supplemented by synopsis, which restores the unity of personal consciousness). (3) The appeal to a supposed intuition is exempt from criticism. (4) The postulate that non-mental reality is given (but this runs counter to the fact that only the self is given, as well as to the experience of self-transcendence).
human individual, may not understand. I may not even think of
the labour of millions of men, which has produced and transmitted
every word in every language. I may eat my food and wear my
clothes and enjoy my home without a thought of the toil of others
which has prepared these things, and made them available to me.
All of life, then, is interaction with others

But mere interaction, even with the Divine Lord of all Being,
is relatively unimportant unless it is understood. Interpersonal
interaction rests for its meaning on interpersonal communication.
Persons communicate with other persons—by gestures and signs,
by emotions and thought, by languages, by books and newspa-
papers, by telegraph, by telephone, and radio. It cannot be our
task to elucidate here the problems of communication. Suffice it to
say that every person communicates in many ways with many
other persons. In a sense, he "prehends" all humanity.

Communication leads to action. Interpersonal action is either
some degree of co-operation or some degree of conflict. Communi-
cation misunderstood usually leads to conflict. Communication
understood may lead to still more serious conflict, if it is clearly
seen that conflicting ends are sought by the communicating
persons. As long as persons are persons, with their individual
freedom and pride and their social needs, there is bound to be a
certain amount of conflict among them. It is the task of philo-
sophy and of religion to control the irrational desires of men, and
to exalt their aspirations to a point where conflict will be reduced
to a minimum.

The levels of interpersonal relations, next, may be summarized
as follows: (1) the level of mere causation—receptivity or action
without awareness of the other persons affecting us or being
affected by us; (2) the level of sympathy and antipathy—liking or
disliking what others communicate to us; (3) the level of under-
standing—where the other person or group is properly interpreted,
yet perhaps all the more disliked; and (4) the level of love. This is
the highest interpersonal relation, and presupposes the previously
mentioned ones. Love at its best includes understanding, respect
for personality, ethical co-operation for the highest goods, and
that religious exaltation and harmony with the divine which is
often called realization or bliss.

From this conception of interpersonal relations there follows a
social theory which can only be mentioned. Man's social goal
cannot be a pluralistic individualism in which each seeks his own
good. This is anarchy and selfishness, and is a betrayal of men's self-transcendence and interpersonal experiences. Still less can the social goal be a monistic totalitarianism, in which the person loses his freedom and becomes the economic and political tool of a small group of co-ordinators. The best statement of the goal is perhaps to call it organic pluralism—the recognition that we belong together in an interpersonal community, yet that we all have individual existence and personal rights. This may also be called social personalism or democratic socialism. But it remains for the future to work out concretely the social forms of personal existence.

V

The personalistic metaphysics of the self which has been sketched has yielded an enriched and developing view of personality. The personal self has been set forth as a complex unity of consciousness, analogous to what is affirmed in the Indian formula of "sat-chit-ānanda." The person is able to reason and to experience ideal values. All communication rests on the appeal to this potential reason and these potential ideal values. Yet the personalism here set forth declares that the individual is not the dew-drop that "slips into the shining sea." The individual person remains self-identical in his highest scientific, philosophical, ideal, and religious experiences. He is free within limits set by his past and by all the data which God gives him through nature and society. He is, within these limits, a responsible self. The goal of the universe is not the merging of all persons into one, but the interpersonal development of all persons in the creation and enjoyment of values. The universe is thus a "creative advance," to quote Whitehead again. The ultimate category is social; the goal of the universe is inexhaustible, developing love.
A NATURALISTIC GARLAND FOR RADHAKRISHNAN

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I

The man whose birthday we celebrate internationally in this pleasant fashion occupies an outstanding position in the world of philosophy. Through his brilliant teaching, writing, and platform appearances, to say nothing of his public services, he has made a place for himself and his doctrines the like of which it would be hard to find in our time. Certainly he is one of the two or three greatest living idealist philosophers; many would rank him first. For him the inner life is the centre and heart of everything. The world of sense at most is fragile, and thought at best points us to an integral intuition of spiritual reality. As Radhakrishnan speaks or writes, his words glow with deep conviction, and the hearer or the reader feels himself in the presence of one who has achieved Insight.

II

His field of influence has been so wide that it suggests an attempt briefly to survey the past and present states of comparative philosophy.

From the great days of the Upanishads, India has been the ancestral and traditional home of idealism, the conviction that Ultimate Reality is in some sense mental or spiritual. The Upanishads are not altogether consistent, and they are not of uniform value. They are like a shower of meteors; some are ablaze with light, others are burned out, mere dust from the past. Those which are incandescent bring us the supreme conviction: Brahman alone is real, and Ātman, the self, after all its wanderings have been completed and its partial truths have been summed up, merges with Brahman in the supreme mystical union open to those who pay the price to achieve it.
Indian idealism, as if enkindled by the meteor fall, burns in the various schools and forms of the Vedânta. The advaitins, led by Sankara, try as hard as they can to be uncompromising: Brahman, the One, is One without a second. Others deviate somewhat from this and, following Ramanuja, discover more contrast within the One and develop what amount to the values of theism there. It is this latter tradition which Radhakrishnan has championed and spread throughout the world. Apart from the Vedânta, the others of the “six systems” are as such not conspicuous in India. Yoga, where it remains in a pure state, apart from its importations, is more Vedântist than anything else.

Buddhist philosophy takes its rise in India and wherever it develops remains essentially true to its origin. It is, on the whole, a set of variations on the theme of Indian idealism. Sometimes it is quite subjective, even nihilistic, sometimes it is socially or mystically or cosmically minded. It is notoriously hard for a Western mind to follow, but the Western mind which attempts the task need not expect to be led outside the bounds of idealism.

Chinese philosophy presents a different view of the world. The part of Chinese thought which has received most attention is the Confucian humanism, according to which man is to attend to his ordinary everyday duties and leave spirits and speculations alone. This, however, is a narrow view of Confucianism. It is true that the Master was chiefly interested in man, but he never supposed that man existed in a vacuum. Man belongs rather in the vast frame of “Heaven”—the heavens of the astronomer, not of the theologian. Confucianism is not merely a humanism but a naturalistic humanism—more accurately still, it is a cosmical humanism. On the side of naturalism or cosmicism the other great Chinese philosophy, Taoism, complements Confucianism—one might say, plays Yin to its Yang. Taoism emphasizes the way (Tao) of nature, the great frame of the universe around us. Measured as against this frame man is so puny and his best efforts are so futile that instead of striving he should, as we might say, take it easy—take it not so much in his human, Confucian stride as in the stride and tempo of the cosmos. The cosmos includes all trends in all directions and a man will get farther toward a given goal if he moves in the direction opposite to that of the goal. Taoism is shot through with paradox. In the course of it the mystic Chuang-Tse arrives by his own route at a teaching which reminds one of the Upanishads. A man, says Chuang-Tse, may become one with the universe.
Sometimes a high abstraction is necessary for a broad view. Viewed in high abstraction one can say that the great philosophies which have developed to the east of the Persian Gulf have been predominantly and ultimately monistic, whether the monism was Indian and spiritualistic or Chinese and naturalistic.

Continuing the high abstraction, it appears that the main lines of Western philosophies—that is, those which have developed to the West of the Persian Gulf—have been determined first, not by monisms but by the dualistic supernaturalism of the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religions, believed to have come by revelation. This supernaturalism has been first served and then modified by Greek thought and its outworkings. The Greeks went in for empirical investigations and rational explanations of things. The Greeks were distant cousins of the Hindus, but, except for Parmenides, there is little monism among them. Plato pictured an ideal realm contrasted with the world of ordinary things, and Aristotle was so much under Plato’s influence that he, too, may be regarded virtually as a dualist. Medieval Western thought was thus doubly dualistic; Greek investigations and reasonings were used (and sometimes misused) to substantiate the authoritative revealed supernaturalisms. So firmly was this double dualism fixed upon the West that it has persisted through all recent changes and is probably as prevalent there as Vedāntism in India or Confucianism in China.

By comparison with the orthodox and classical dualism, modern European and American philosophy is a minority report. It begins, around 1600, with modifications or revolts, at first directed not against the dualism or supernaturalism but against the authoritarianism which had been used to support it. Descartes was partly, and Francis Bacon was more completely a child of the Renaissance. Descartes, supplementing rather than supplanting supernaturalism, looks within his own experience rather than to the Church or the Bible for a basis of his certainty and proceeds by introspection, while Bacon, denying the authority of Aristotle, looks to external nature and begins to develop experimental and inductive methods for the study of nature.

The successors of Descartes (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) investigate the workings of the mind and lead, by various epistemological exercises, to the idealistic philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. The exercises consist first in assuming some deep difference between subject and object, then broadening the
gulf, and then attempting to close it by absorbing it into mind or stretching mind to cover it. But somehow the fracture fails to knit and mind is left either embarrassed or over-confident when confronted by nature.

If this last seems like an overstatement, let us recall that Hegel’s philosophy of Nature, although not without occasional scientific corroboration, was so fantastic that British and American Hegelianism developed virtually without it, and became philosophies of Idea and Spirit. Again, pragmatism, the vigorous American child of idealism, has not succeeded in giving a clear and straightforward account of those parts of nature, above all the data of astronomy, which are outside the range of human control. Phenomenology must confine itself to an analysis of experience rather than nature. Positivism typically forces nature into the sciences but makes the sciences consist of propositions. Semantics tends to reduce both science and philosophy to linguistic signs.

In the meantime, even since 1600, empiricists who follow Bacon and catch the old Greek empirical gleam have studied nature without stopping for epistemology, on which the idealist arguments so pointedly and crucially depend. The result has been the towering structure of the natural sciences. Physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, physiology, neurology (which the epistemologist forgot or conveniently overlooked), psychology, and sociology have piled wonder upon wonder. Subject as all their observations and measurements are to possible error, and statistical as the so-called laws turn out to be, everywhere there are structures more and more dependable and processes more and more predictable.

It should be added that among contemporary Western attempts to meet the challenge of naturalism, there is now current in the West an over-emotional and war-conditioned neosupernaturalism which either sets intellect aside as incapable of dealing with super-revelation or seeks by a tortuous dialectic, somehow reminiscent of Sankara’s difficulties with Maya, to out-reason reason in the service of theology. Arrayed against this in the contemporary lists is a resolute humanism which, somewhat like a partially understood Confucianism, emphasizes man and his affairs as if the universe did not greatly matter.

Granting that, since it may be expected that the universe will assert itself, both these present tendencies are in the long run
temporary, it appears that in the West a new naturalism, monistic, empirical, realistic, matter-of-fact, is in the making. It is potentially so strong that in the face of it for many thoughtful men supernaturalism is beginning to collapse and idealism is beginning to evaporate. Gradually, as the world becomes known in its own right and in these empirical ways, it becomes more and more evident that supernaturalism has impoverished the natural by arrogating to itself everything creative and good; that the subjective idealists have contracted the natural, by reducing it to experience; and that the objective idealists have distorted it by attempting to picture it as Mind.

The new naturalism is a long way from the naïve intuitive naturalism of the Chinese sages. It seems to be long way, too, from Indian idealism and from Radhakrishnan. Judged from this angle in the West, Radhakrishnan speaks with a philosophy moving and appealing. He awakens memories of some of our great traditions, but does not adequately estimate our progress in understanding the world around us, which cannot so easily be set aside. In short, China in one way and India in another, viewed from at least one angle in the West, fail to do justice to the natural universe in all its ways and claims.

III

If this were all, I should not try to contribute to this volume; I would be the last to lay a hand on my brother Parmenides, especially on his birthday. But I believe that there is far more to say and that Western naturalism may bring him an offering not altogether inappropriate.

The fact is that historically, if we go back far enough, Indian idealism, Chinese naturalism, and the various philosophies of the West have an all-but-forgotten common doctrine, almost a common denominator, which I believe may serve as a starting point for realignment and new understanding. This is the doctrine that man is somehow a “microcosm,” a little world, in one way or another repeating or epitomizing features of the macrocosm, or great world, the universe. In India in one form or another it comes all the way from the Ṛg Veda through the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads into popular Hinduism. In China it is ancient and widespread, but as far as I know it has not been described in

\footnote{For a brief survey of this development, see Asiatic Society of Bengal, *Journal and Proceedings*, N.S., 29, 1934, pp. 255–270.}
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connected fashion. In the West some traces of it are found in most philosophies which attempt any study of the universe apart from studies of the possibility or the methods of knowing. It should be made plain that the historic expressions of the view are notable now only for their age, diffusion, and variety. Taken literally they are outgrown and quite untenable.

IV

What is needed appears to me to be a fresh study of the data of the several sciences—a study not confined to any one field of specialization but prepared to recognize running through them all some characteristics which are deep-seated and essential enough to be principles. The study of such principles constitutes metaphysics in the more adequate sense of the term, and frees the discipline from the unfortunate confusion with the metempirical. One such principle which is now widely if not universally recognized is that of evolution, the development of later forms of matter, life, and mind by the operation of inherent causes. Evolution provides for development and spontaneity, if not progress, but the progress as ordinarily described is loose and random, if not chaotic; it really offers surprisingly little for any constructive philosophy of man and his place in the universe.

I believe that we need to examine the data of evolutionism more carefully and that when we do so certain resemblances of structure and process, both detailed and sweeping, begin to appear between the various levels and realms of matter, life, and mind. The course of evolution, when carefully and comprehensively studied, is not a mere hodge-podge of cosmic forces, but is a much more regular and consistent deployment of them. It may be represented by the successive coils of a regularly constructed spiral. The repetitions of structure process, through a bewillicering detail of individuations, interactions, disintegrations, aggregations, integrations, and differentiations, indicate that the cosmos of the sciences is marked not merely by evolution but by an orderly resemblance of structures and processes which I call "epitomization." The world of matter in motion, etc., is epitomized by that of living organisms, and both are epitomized by the nervous systems at work, i.e. by what naturalists regard as mind.  

1 The evidence and argument for these statements is far too long and complicated to be included here. I have worked it out in some detail in some of my books and have a more adequate discussion in preparation.
The passage from level to level and from realm to realm of matter, life, and mind is accomplished essentially by successive integrations or combinations of units of one level to form units of the next, i.e. by combinations of parts to form wholes. In such a combination a whole is not, as too often said, “more than the sum of its parts”; the simple fact is that a whole has properties other than those of the parts taken separately. In a complete account much would also be said for the counter-process of differentiation, in which portions of a whole are rearranged to form structured parts at lower levels, but for the present let some consideration of integration suffice.

In the process, for example, electrons, protons, etc., are integrated in atoms; the atoms have atomic properties, such as valence, not found in the electrons and protons separately. Some atoms are in turn integrated in molecules and astronomical bodies like stars and planets. Such bodies form larger systems like clusters and galaxies. Going back a bit in the series, within the planet earth, and presumably within others somewhere, some carbon atoms are integrated with other atoms to form organic compounds which by new integrations, here known as syntheses, give rise to amino acids, polypeptides, proteins, enzymes, genes, viruses, and cells. Unicellular organisms in due time and appropriate circumstances form multi-cellular organisms; the latter by successive new societal integrations form tribes, nations, and, let us hope, some time a great inclusive United Nations. Again, going back a bit in the series, within the metazoa there are more and more inclusive co-ordinations of cells resulting in the specialization of neurons, which by their successive combinations achieve what Sherrington calls “the integrative action of the nervous system.” Just as the levels of life are characterized by their distinctive properties, so are the levels of mind characterized by theirs—including consciousness, feeling, emotion, thought, freedom, and value.

All the way through the levels of matter, life, and mind the integration is cumulative. In the integrations of material systems and in the living organisms there is, as we may say, presentation; in the integrations characteristic of mind there is to be sure some presentation of elements to one another. To say that the great difference between mind and matter is self-transcendence is to turn the components inside out. The great difference is not that what is in mind is, so to speak, at the same time outside it, but that what is outside it is represented as if it were within. According
to a naturalistic view, the fact that a self can represent itself can be made to appear more mysterious than it really is, and self-representation and projection can be misinterpreted as self-transcendence. It should by all means be emphasized, however, that for such a naturalism the various grades of self-consciousness and resources of the inner life are genuinely available; without them, human personality would not be itself. It is not necessary to regard them as accruing from some supernatural order, or to transform the natural universe into a mental reality in order to accommodate them. Recognition of their naturalistic origin and reference may help to correct exaggerations and extravagances in their development. It should be emphasized, too, that for such a naturalism the cumulative feature of successive integrations appears as its climax in human personality. The total reactions of human personality to the world have their own unique quality.

This, reached by a naturalistic route, is the machinery of Radhakrishnan's "integral experience" or intuition.

It may appear that, granting the genuineness of such a process of intuition, the content of it if reached in any naturalistic way can only be material, physical, chemical, mathematical—or anything but spiritual. Here I think we need an overhauling of the term "spiritual." If not entangled in lingering associations with the ghostly, it has come to be thought of as necessarily pertaining to mind, or at least to something different from matter. Any taint of naturalism is commonly held to be antagonistic, if not fatal to the spiritual life.

If naturalism were merely reductive and pulverized the world into the data of physics and chemistry, or if it were merely positivistic and dodged the issue by recourse to a logical physicalism, the charge might be true. But a naturalism such as above described in its very words acknowledges a cosmic integrative process. The problem of "what began the process?" may be left open; beginnings and endings are as likely to mark the horizons of our thought as any limits for the universe.

For the cosmic integrative process, the data are right before our eyes, for empirical study and rational interpretation such as the Greeks in all their glory were not equipped to give. This "integrative process," in fact, runs so close to the supernaturalist creationism and to idealist teleology that the distinction is difficult to make out. Bergson adumbrates the integrative process in his élan, but in attempting to describe it has recourse to vitalism.
in biology and apparently to supernaturalism in theology. Samuel Alexander discerns the process in his Nisus, but supplements it by the prospective level of "deity." (When I asked him why he did that he answered: "That was the only way I could make God personal.") Whitehead, in an empiricism overlaid with rationalism and verging on panpsychism, recognizes a creative advance and various "societies" of entities, but sees all this in a frame of Platonism and supernaturalism which is essentially traditional.

If, however, the integrative process is taken at its natural cumulative face value, without supplementing it by the supernatural or transfiguring it in terms of mind, we have a great Structure of structures proceeding cosmically as a larger parallel for mind in us. It is vastly greater than we are, and is able to command our complete adjustment. Whether it is personal or not, at least our adjustment to it must be personal, and total. This total adjustment constitutes religion. It does not amount to pantheism, because any adjustment is ambivalent, with both a positive and a negative phase. We adjust ourselves to any object positively and in and by the same act necessarily adjust ourselves to other objects negatively. In the major adjustment of religion we adjust ourselves positively toward the good—that is, the wholesome, the integrative process in nature and in history—and negatively toward the non-good or the not-yet-good. Thus a duality belongs naturally within a naturalistic monism. (Perhaps in a similar way the qualified Vedānta of Ramanuja may be said to belong within the advaitism of Sankara.) The religious adjustment, thus understood, appears in its natural relation to the aesthetic adjustment. Religion is more complete aesthesis, as philosophy is a more complete science.

There is more to say on the question of personal qualities of the Real, but what has just been said at least avoids some of the difficulties which both supernaturalism and idealism encounter in many minds. The way is open for a rich natural life in the universe which has produced us and is our home.

This total adjustment affords a new meaning for the spiritual. The conviction deepens that in olden times men who never understood either matter or spirit took for granted that they were opposites, and developed the view until supernaturalism became, as Santayana says, a clumsy conjunction of an automaton with a ghost. When the time came (in India in the Upanishads and in the West in Spinoza, Berkeley, and Hegel) for a reinterpretation of
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del spiritual, it was still regarded as psychological and as somehow pervasive rather than cumulative and integrative. Understood in this latter way, spirit marks differences of level in the universe as matter, integrated through the levels of life and mind, takes on the new properties which culminate in personality. Spirituality is difference of level in each of us as we rise to actualize our potentialities. The supernatural turns out to be the superior-in-nature. The world of nature, although it is like a mind, is not itself a Great Mind; both the Upanishads and Hegel, in ascribing to Brahman and the Absolute some but not all the properties of mind, had difficulty there. The world is not a Great Mind, but the mind is a little world, a microcosm which by all the ways of perception and thinking and intuition, of science and philosophy and religion, is to find its place and kinship with the rest. And this view, once more, is not so far from Radhakrishnan.

V

Any attempt at rapprochement between Indian and Western philosophy must somewhere deal with a doctrine which, while practically taken for granted in India, is in the West usually either denied or avoided like the bubonic plague—I mean, the doctrine of reincarnation. Western supernaturalism, with its firmly entrenched doctrines that man has here and now his one chance for salvation and eternal life, excludes reincarnation. Western empirical science, with its indications that living organisms are complex compounds of carbon, may be said to be completely sceptical about it. Fechner has urged something of the sort on panpsychist grounds, as McTaggart has in a frame of pluralistic idealistic idealism and Boodin in one of cosmic idealism, but for naturalism the empirical barrier appears to be too high and to stand as a kind of doctrinal Himalaya between the West and India.

Let us see first that any statement about life after death deals in some sense with another world and must from any ordinary view seem fantastic. All Western philosophies have some difficulty here and if they touch the question they must be speculative. But having recognized this, we may go on to say that reincarnation is possible even on a naturalistic basis. We cannot give the whole argument here, but if, as Lloyd Morgan says, and as the data of epitomization indicate, life stands to matter in the

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same kind of relation as mind stands to life, we have only to note some of the broader implications of the saying. The living organism, let us say, is a collection of compounds of carbon; but, like the Confucian humanism, this compound does not arise or continue in a vacuum. Life belongs in the earth and is a process and function of the earth. Its process and function in the earth is at a lower stage of integration like the process and function of mind in the organism. The death of an organism in the earth proceeds on the same principle as the discharge of a nervous pattern in an organism. The latter is the process which goes on as a speaker speaks, and which is going on at this moment as these lines are written. But the writing of these lines, with the discharge of the nervous patterns which it involves, belongs in a larger, a societal frame. I write for some prospective reader to read. Language is diphasic. Patterns discharged here are matched by patterns set up over there in India. So the death process is diphasic; death here is matched by life somewhere else.

I once saw the never-to-be-forgotten Mahatma Gandhi, when an admirer tried to hang a garland of flowers around his neck, take the garland off because he preferred one made of skeins of cotton thread which another admirer had spun. It might well be expected that for Radhakrishnan’s birthday one would bring him some fragrant new development of idealism rather than these spinnings of science; none the less, I hope that my dear friend and great colleague may find something in this garland of naturalism which will not be altogether unfitting, but which may be welcome, after all.
Philosophy of the Body: A New Approach to the Body Problem from Western and Indian Philosophies

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The body has been regarded, by some ancient thinkers of the East and the West, as the epitome of the universe. Yet it has seldom obtained the attention it deserves from modern philosophers. At any rate it has not received half the attention the soul has. But there is no doubt that it is of fundamental importance as much for a correct conception of the soul and the world, as for a philosophical control of life. The subject offers to me diverse vistas of interesting speculation. I shall attempt to follow some of these and present my ideas briefly in this paper.

I

Origin, Growth and Decay of the Body

Even if we start with the ordinary biological account of the origin of the body by the combination of two kinds of cells we have to ponder over the long series of wonderfully regular and harmonious behaviour of the cells by which they combine together and select and assimilate from the environment those kinds and quantities of substances which would form a body possessing exactly the shape, colour, size, constitution and other peculiarities present in the race and the family of the parents. When again we consider the innumerable and nicely adjusted parts by the orderly growth of which each one of the highly complex organs like the eyes, the ears, the heart, the lungs, the digesting apparatus, etc., is constituted and consider also the general harmonious interrelation present among these different organs, we can scarcely think that the body comes into existence and develops by a series of happy accidents. We are forced to
admit, unless we are too credulous or superficial, that the body could not grow and be what it is but for some inherent force which can initiate, control and co-ordinate the various processes and direct them towards the realization of definite forms and ends by continuous selective effort. We have also to admit that the various materials which go to the formation of the body are controlled and organized by this force.

To say that all these intricate processes are due to heredity, is little more than giving a name to the controlling force without explaining it. But as in other cases so also here the technical name for the phenomenon is apt to pass for an explanation and dull further curiosity about it. Really, however, reflection on the meaning of heredity makes us think of the subtle, but wonderful force in the seed which selects from the environment at appropriate moments the exact material necessary for the constitution of the body of each of the innumerable members of the particular species and family, and organizes it and directs it in such a way that it grows, develops and decays in a particular manner, and also generates during its life the germs for the continuation of the individual through successive generations that last sometimes for thousands of years. Such and other implications of heredity all the more strengthen the view previously stated, namely that the facts about the body cannot be explained away as a series of accidents. On the contrary, we feel justified in admitting the guiding influence of a subtle power behind the origin, growth and decay of the body as well as its work of reproduction.

A similar conclusion is also forced on us when we think of the numberless processes like chewing, salivation, peristaltic motion, secretion of bile and the gastric juices, assimilation, excretion, circulation of blood, breathing, oxygenation, defence, repair and the different kinds of reaction of the body to light, cold and heat, etc. These and other complicated processes without which neither the preservation of the body nor its successful adjustment to the environment would be possible require a harmonious co-operation among its different parts and accurate adjustment of long chains of means and ends which cannot be explained as chance coincidences.¹

Such reflections on the origin, development and functioning of

¹ Refuting Dr. Julian Huxley's view, Sir Arthur Keith says, "Living protoplasm, even in its simplest form, is purposive; . . . I feel certain . . . the genes themselves . . . are . . . purposive in their action," Essays on Human Evolution, pp. 14-15.
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the body cannot fail, then, to impress on us the lessons (1) that the subtle force inherent in the germ cell has wonderful power of organizing the material of which the perceptible and gross body is found to be composed, and (2) that this force is not blind, but purposive, its work being selection, regulation and continued evolution of means for meeting a series of ends.

We may be reminded here of the general Indian idea found in Buddha, Jaina, Sankhya and other schools, that our gross body is the result of subtle tendencies (samskāras) and that evolution takes place, here, from the subtler to the grosser. Of Western thinkers Bergson also holds a similar view. The organism is for him the product of the subtle vital urge. Both these kinds of views agree to reject the ordinary idea of the formation of the body by the mere mechanical aggregation of the visible parts. There is, of course, the difference between the general Indian and the general Western theory on an important point, namely that whereas the former would trace the force that initiates the formation of the body to the past life of the individual, the latter would trace it to the individual’s ancestors.

Though any elaborate discussion of this subject is not possible here, it may be mentioned briefly that the two views are not irreconcilable. In fact, the Western view, based on the observation of the obvious relation and similarity between the child and its ancestors, is not foreign to the Indian mind. The Sanskrit word for child, santāna, means continuity (of ancestral line). There are so many statements, again, in the different scriptures, the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas, etc., to the effect that the husband is reborn as the child through the wife, the self is born as son, etc. If the Indian philosopher’s hypothesis of pre-existence of the individual in another body is otherwise found acceptable, it is quite possible to think that the present body is the result of the union of two streams, individual and parental, this union being made possible by the individual and parents’ inherent inclinations (samskāras or karmas) coinciding. To clarify this point with one of the many possible examples of the coincidence of multiple lines of inclinations: a university by its own conscious and unconscious traditions and policies, attracts teachers and students, each one of which pursues his conscious and unconscious inclinations, and the three sides meet and co-operate, yet the object of each party is fulfilled.

Those Indian thinkers, like the Naiyayikas and other theists,
who think that it is not possible for blind tendencies born of the individual's previous action to seek out the family, environment, etc., birth into which would exactly suit them, take recourse to God for bringing about such coincidence. They find it easier to reconcile the law of heredity and the law of Karma, and their task is, in some respects, similar to that of the Western theists who would like to believe both in the natural law of evolution and the divine creation of man.

But to come back to the main point, after this incidental digression, our body, as it is outwardly seen, is the visible expression of an inner force which works in a definite direction and realizes a series of ends through a series of well-adjusted means. It is true that we find different propensities and inclinations in the body, e.g. towards eating, excreting, moving, resting, waking, sleeping, speaking, laughing, sneezing, coughing, and so on. Some of these also appear to be antagonistic. Yet all of these form on the whole such a balance and harmony and combine to make the body such a unit having a regular direction of growth, development and decay that we may regard the apparently different forces as the expressions of the same basic force along different complementary paths. This is like our regarding apparently different currents between two banks making for one course and towards one destination, as one river. Or, to come nearer home, the forces found in the body are one just as the visible body is almost universally regarded as one in spite of its possessing many cells, as well as different visible parts, in some of which there may even be malignant growth like cancer feeding upon the other members.

To cut short the discussion, the problem whether the bodily force is one or many is like the question whether the ultimate reality is one or many. Neither of them can be answered unless it is first settled what kind or degree of unity would make a thing one. For we call a heap of stones one, a building made of those stones one, a tree with many branches, roots, etc., one, the mind as one, and so on, but surely we do not find the same degree of unity in all of them. The different tendencies expressed in the formation of the body and in its outward behaviour are so inseparably co-ordinated and so harmoniously serve common purposes that the unity of the body has been regarded as the very ideal of unity and called organic unity. These tendencies can thus be said to be the functions of one force.
II
THE BODY AS OUR LINK WITH THE WORLD

Another interesting line of speculation about the body is its relation to the world. Apparently the body is clearly bounded off by the skin from the rest of the world. But a moment’s reflection shows that its existence is inseparably one with the outer world. It is common knowledge that the cells, the ultimate living material units of the body, complete their individual cycle of growth and decay much sooner than the body as a whole, so that within a few years the old set of cells gradually gives place to a completely new set. The body is entirely renewed. The cells are all formed out of the external world—from the light, air, water and food which are supplied by the latter. The body is thus made out of the stuff of the world and is dependent on it.

It is also evident from this—what we saw in the previous section—that the matter which apparently passes for the body is not an abiding factor, still less the basic factor. It is a mere aggregation of the cells which have been formed by the selective life-force out of the world and are also given back to the world to make room for newly-formed cells. The body thus appears to be a changing tool selectively created by the life-force out of the world, and does not really wall us off from it.

We must admit, then, that the position of the body in the world is like that of an eddy in a river. The eddy appears to have a contour and configuration of its own and thus to be separate from the river, but in fact it is being constantly fed out of and emptied into the river, and has no basically distinct existence of its own. In other words, the energy underlying the body is an integral part of that which underlies the matter that appears to constitute the world. The body is not a closed system, but really continuous with the world. This conclusion is supported by the modern physical conception of matter as electrical energy and the world as a field of intimately interrelated waves of energy.

The view is further strengthened when we consider the sensory-motor structure of the body. The sensory system is tuned to the external stimuli and receives constantly the inflowing energy from the outer world, but only to turn it back to the world through its diverse motor paths, completing thus a cycle of influx and efflux of energy.
Looking again to the digesting and assimilating functions of the body we find, further, that the dead food that is received by the body from the outer world is converted, by the metabolic process, into its living parts. We find here that the body not only overcomes the boundary between the inner and the outer, but also between life and death. It disproves the absoluteness of the distinction between inorganic and organic by converting the former into the latter. But by the death of the body cells, and also of the body as a whole, the same truth is proved by the reverse process, by the reduction of the living into the dead.

The interchangeability of the inner and the outer, and the dead and the living observable in the bodily phenomena removes thus the misconception of our isolated existence. The body is sometimes described as the prison-house because it is mistaken to be a bounded and isolated lump of flesh and bone. But when we see it in its proper perspective we are able to dispel this wrong idea; it is found to be a living link with the world around us, more a liberator than a fetter.

III

THE BODY AS THE MEASURE

But while it is the body which links us up with the world, every body does it in its own way. Each body, composed as it is, serves as the peculiar measure of knowledge, action, enjoyment and valuation.

Our knowledge of the world depends on the number and nature of the sense organs. An animal’s body, as the Jainas point out, may have only one sense (tactual), or two senses (tactual and gustatory), or three senses (tactual, gustatory and olfactory), or four senses (tactual, gustatory, olfactory and visual) or five senses (tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory). Necessarily, therefore, knowledge through each kind of body would be limited by the number of the senses; and the knowledge of each animal would be substantially different. Even human beings differ in the constitution of their sense organs, in spite of their normally having the five senses. Totally or partially colour-blind persons, for example, have different kinds of eyes than the normal people, and their knowledge of the world is consequently different from that of the latter. If we had developed one more sense our notion of the world could have been much different from the
present, as the example of evolution of the eyes would show. The eyes were acquired by animals very late in the course of evolution; yet an animal having eyes, such as the human being, is led by visual knowledge. Vision presents the world as consisting of things with clear-cut boundaries, separate from the body and other objects. Depending mostly on this we believe that the world is an aggregate of discrete and separate objects. We are thus led, in our conception of the world, by the senses we possess. They are the measure of our knowledge of the world.

The body is also the measure and regulator of our actions. We can create changes in the outer world through the body, but usually only through a few organs which Indian philosophers have enumerated as five, the organs of speech,prehension, locomotion, exertion and reproduction. Our action is limited by the number, nature and capacity of the motor organs.

Our enjoyment of the world arises mostly out of our knowledge and action. It is, therefore, indirectly dependent on the senses and motor organs. The body has, therefore, been described in Indian systems as the organ and abode of enjoyment (bhogāyatana).

Valuation is closely related to enjoyment. While the crow values dirt, and the vulture values carrion, man abhors them, and what one man with a strong power of digestion values another fears and avoids like poison. What is harmonious with the senses, nerves and the general state of the body is nice and beautiful. It would be found thus that our valuation also largely depends on the organs and the general constitution of the body. The body is, therefore, the measure of values as well.

Speaking of the body's part in action, enjoyment and valuation we should particularly mention the part played by the glandular system which determines the general tone, activity and attitude of the individual and determines, in a word, his personality. A little change in the secretion of the glands may change a dull man into an active one, a gloomy person to a cheerful one and effect a phenomenal change in his action, enjoyment and his appreciation of values.

On the whole, then, the body is found to measure out for the individual his share of the opportunities that the world offers for knowledge, activity and enjoyment. But, as we have seen in a previous section, the body itself is a tool created by a force with definite direction and tendencies. The different organs—senses,
nerves, muscles, glands and the rest—are the products of this vital force. They grow and work as a team to fulfil the cravings of the creating force. The five senses of men, comparative biology would tell us, develop out of the primitive epithelial cell—the cell of which our skin is made—by gradual differentiation. The old Naiyāyikas of India regarded also the skin (tvak) as the basic sense necessary for sense perception in general. The Sānkhya and the Vedānta regard all the organs (indriyas) of knowledge and action, including the internal ones, as products of gradual differentiation of the same urge for enjoyment (bhoga-vāsanā).

IV
KNOWLEDGE OF THE BODY

Our knowledge of the body is primarily derived from vision, which reveals it as a circumscribed figure having a position in the extended visual space. It is seen as being outside of, and excluded by, other objects, even by the ground on which it rests. This visual knowledge of the body, as well as of other objects, is responsible for our thinking that we are confined to a limited portion of the world and that the world consists of mutually exclusive material objects.

Fortunately, however, there is another way of knowing the body. We can understand the matter with an example given by Bergson; we can see our arm move successively through different positions and we can also feel the movement from within (even if we close our eyes). In the first case each position of the arm is found outside another, just as each instant of time corresponding to the different positions is thought to be external to another. But in the second case the movement is not presented in the form of an extended series, but as a continuous act.

What is true of an arm, is true of the body as a whole. We can feel the existence of the body even without the outer senses by closing, for example, our eyes. The body is reduced thereby to a mass of intermingling and interpenetrating experiences of diverse kinds which do not appear outside one another, provided we also succeed in the difficult task of keeping out the visual image of the body in accordance with which all experiences are mentally sorted out, even on the closing of the eyes, and allotted to different portions of space outside one another. If we can successfully ex-
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clude the visual image of the body and the external world then our bodily feelings mingle also with the tactual, olfactory and auditory sensations of the outer world. The body is not experienced as having an isolated existence outside other objects. Our continuity with and inseparability from the world are also in this way deeply impressed on us.

By comparing and contrasting the inner and outer notions of the body—the body as felt and the body as seen—we realize a very interesting and instructive fact. That which is felt from within as a mass of intermingling experiences is seen from without as an extended body occupying space, and having its parts outside one another. This helps us to understand how the unextended and the extended, the mind and the body, may quite be the two aspects of one fundamental reality. Mere closing of the eyes, suppression of the visual image, dissolves the solid, extended body to a fluid mass of feelings, which again can be projected out in space by simply opening our eyes.

One's knowledge of one's own body is, however, very poor. By our eyes we can see only the outer surface of the body, but not even the whole of it. Our internal knowledge of the body is still poorer. We are so much occupied with the outer view and base so much of our life on it that the inner view comes only as an occasional intrusion, particularly when there is something wrong with the body and there is some feeling of pain, stress or strain. Our chief internal feeling arises from the movement of any part of the body, or the body as a whole. This is our experience of the body in action. Kinaesthetic feeling is, therefore, sometimes used almost as synonymous with somatic feeling. But we have also other bodily feelings like general well-being and its opposite, depression, and also exhilaration, alertness, buoyancy, heaviness, dullness, exhaustion, etc. We also feel certain tendencies towards action and enjoyment, as would be evident from English expressions like "I don't [or do] feel like eating, drinking, playing," etc.

Repeated practice or addiction creates some habits of the body which tend towards the repetition of those actions. If these tendencies do not get the necessary outlet at the habitual hour, the body has a peculiar feeling of missing the desired thing—food, drink, narcotic, beverage, exercise, etc. Some of these feelings become so strong that they cease to be simply negative and become positively painful. Such, for example, are the feelings of
hunger, thirst and many other wants which are expressed by the English phrases, "hunger for," "thirst after," "itch for."

It may also be noted that when we use our sense organs for the knowledge of external objects, the sense experience that we have contains not only the knowledge of the object, but also of the condition of the sense in action. We can notice this particularly when there is some maladjustment either within the different parts of the organ as a result of disease (e.g. opacity of the lenses of the eyes, thickening of the ear-drums) or between the organ and the object (e.g. too strong light, too hot object). For in such cases there is a positive painful feeling in the organ of knowledge. It is reasonable to judge from this that the ease, pleasure or comfort felt in different sense perceptions contains as its component the feeling arising from the senses as well, being either the result of their internal health or their harmonious relations with the objects.

The body, again, the barometer of emotion, particularly the violent ones which warm, chill, shake, strain the body. We can feel these conditions of the body directly. By successful control and pacification of anger, jealousy, ill will, greed, etc., not only the mind but also the body can be put at ease. So "bodily ease" is described by Buddha as one of the results of deeper concentration (jhaana or dhayna) attained after the overcoming of all passions.

In spite of these various feelings by which we can know our body from within, our knowledge is very limited. There are many parts of the body about which we do not have any explicit and distinct feeling, though we may reasonably suppose that the feelings arising from each part of the body mingle together to make the general bodily tone of a particular moment. But with voluntary concentration of attention we can raise into full and distinct consciousness the feelings about many parts which are otherwise generally outside the focus of consciousness. We can thus fix attention, for example, on the neglected little toe of the right leg, or the scalp of the head or the navel. In the Yoga, and more particularly in the Tantra (or Sakta) philosophy of India, practice of attention on different parts of the body is recommended for the attainment of concentration and even for supernormal powers. It is claimed about concentration in general that if it can be fully developed it is possible to know all about the object concentrated upon, be it a part of our body or anything outside. But even in the light of normal experience we can under-
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stand at least so far that by concentration we can bring into the clear focus of consciousness what was dimly felt before. But the best way of feeling clearly the existence and condition of a member of the body is to move it if we can and throw it into action.

V

CONTROL OF THE BODY

Generally we think that the body is ours and we can do with it what we will. This idea is caused by our ability to move the major limbs and with them the entire body from one place to another. But a little thought shows that our control—that is, the mastery of our will—over the body is as meagre as our knowledge of it. The most vital organs on which the existence of the body depends—the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the stomach and the intestines—function without our conscious guidance. So also does a major part of the nervous system.

Even in the cases of voluntary movement our control is only partial. When my leg moves as the result of my desire to walk, or my tongue moves as a result of my desire to speak, I am unconscious of the processes—the activity of the cerebral centres, of the different motor nerves and of the muscles—which must take place between my desiring and the overt act. The self-conscious dweller of the house knows little of its internal mechanism, which maintains and repairs itself mostly without his guidance. He has simply to put on the switch of desire and many things are done for him; but he does not know how.

This is the description of what happens in normal health. But there are times, fortunately rare, when paralysis of the limbs happens and the unhappy dweller, once proud of being the owner, helplessly looks on the body as a mere spectator. His desire to use it and move it remains altogether uncomplied.

But this story of the diminution of control must be counter-balanced by that of the opposite fact, the possibility of its increase. By repeated practice and exercise, control is gained on parts which are normally beyond control. The feats of muscle-dancing, moving the ears, etc., by some physical-culturists and others, the control of breath even by ordinary persons, the control of automatic nervous system claimed by the yogins and similar things show that we can increase our conscious control over the
body to a large extent, though we may not fully control the body as some yogins claim to be able to do. The influence of hypnotic suggestion in the control of certain future behaviour of the subject, as also of auto-suggestion in respect of one's own life, are facts which would seem also to suggest that the conscious will can, by some intense effort, sink into the unconscious level of life so as to work in a desired but unperceived way.

VI

THE BODY, THE EGO AND THE SOUL

Other persons locate me where my body is seen, and I do the same about them. Each one of us is thus confined mutually to a portion of space occupied by the body. An outsider sees almost the entire outline of my body; in any case he sees much more of it than I can. He can also observe more about my overt acts, how I stand, walk, speak, laugh and use my limbs. He has, therefore, a greater external knowledge of my body and distinguishes me from others by these seen peculiarities.

Though I am at a disadvantage in this respect, the partial outer knowledge I have of the body is amply supplemented by two other things, which my neighbour lacks about me, and by which I am so intimately wedded to the body. First, I have the inner knowledge of the body by the many bodily feelings, previously mentioned, which others lack about me. Secondly, I can normally move and use my body in a way others cannot. I have thus a sense of peculiar identification with the body. I own it and caress it—even if it be the ugliest, the most diseased, disfigured and painful body in the world. The body's interest and cravings, pleasures and pains, friends and enemies are all mine. The body is my first love. I can attend to and think of others only when the minimum of attention required for the body has been paid. My love for others is an outflow of surplus energy—that which can be spared by the body after its vital needs are satisfied. This is realized when the body faces a crisis and I become altogether listless and lose interest in the surrounding things and people that used to be the dearest in normal health. It is natural, therefore, that I should think as though I am nothing but the body, and that some philosophers (like the Chārvakas, the materialists) also should identify me completely with the body.

But this view cannot be accepted as final. The main diffi-
culties that create doubt about this identity are what we discussed already, that we possess neither full knowledge of, nor full control over, the body. How can I say that I am the body if I do not even know what I consist of, or if I am only a helpless spectator of some parts of the body which I cannot move or control? It would seem from this, that "I" am not the whole of the body; it may be that I am identical with a part of the body. But even this qualified conclusion is opposed by the fact that whereas I often feel and, therefore, say that this body is mine, I never feel that I belong to the body, as I should if I were a part of it. As between the body and I, owning or possessing is the exclusive predicate of the "I," not of the body. I own as mine many things, persons and places even outside the body. It is not reasonable, therefore, that I should be considered identical with a part or whole of the body.

Yet I cannot so easily brush aside the usual and normal feeling and behaviour as though I were identical with the body. The uncertain variable relation between the body and me calls for a revision of the ordinary ideas about both these terms of the relation.

We should observe and realize that just as the body, on closer view, is found to be not really a closed system but continuous with the universe, I also am not confined to any fixed boundary. I can change or increase the range of my identification to an incredible extent. Within the body itself, those parts which are generally beyond my knowledge and control are also capable of being known and controlled and I can consciously own them as my own. Even now, if a pin is run through any such usually unknown or uncontrolled member of the body, say the appendix (which is sometimes regarded as superfluous), I would scream in pain and feel and complain that I have been seriously hurt. There can be no more tangible proof than this to show that even such an unclaimed member is mine. But the range of my affection can be extended even beyond the body to the members of the family, the society, the country, the world of living beings and even inanimate objects like dress, furniture, house and property. With any of these I do or can identify myself. If my child or wife or property or country is injured or threatened I feel hurt or worried and complain often as bitterly as when my body is affected.

These facts point to the conclusion that though the feeling of the ego is at first associated with the body as its basis, it gradually
spreads through the lines that link the body to the world and to those contents of the world with which the interest of the body is directly or indirectly connected. So we can understand how I can exclusively own the body and yet go far beyond it. As the body is limited to superficial view, so am I. But as the body is really one with the universe, so am I too. The first is the view of the man in the street. The second would be the view of those who care to look deeper and wider into facts.

But if we were to say only this, there would be a serious misconception that the body is the ultimate basis of the ego. We would then be ignoring what we learnt previously, namely that the body itself is a tool, a means created by a deeper force, and it also changes with the needs of its creator—grows, develops, multiplies, and withers away. It would be more accurate, then, to suppose that the ego-consciousness is also the product of that ultimate force which organizes the body, refreshes it from moment to moment and retracts it too when death of the particular organism is needed for the continuation of its progress through new lines and centres.

That I am not absolutely tied to this body’s interest, but can overgrow it to serve the wider interest of that of which the body is created tool is amply proved by the rare, but the most memorable facts of human history—the voluntary sacrifice of the body by martyrs who command the highest admiration of their fellow-beings. Such examples show that the self can sacrifice the body to obey the urge of some more basic principle to which the body also is subservient.

If consciousness be the name of the higher processes of thinking, feeling and willing which we find in man, we have to say that the basic force works unconsciously through the body. For the body, as we saw, grows and maintains itself automatically without thought or conscious plan. But if sensitivity, selective reaction and purposeful activity be the signs of consciousness then every part of the body can be said to be conscious and so also the force working in the body. So long as higher consciousness is not necessary vital force acts without it, carrying on activities automatically. But when such a method fails it evolves the higher one of reflection and thoughtful planning. The feeling of “I” evolves only then. It is the self-reference of the basic force by reflection (or turning back) on itself. It owns the body as the expression of itself. So the “I” is nothing but that self-conscious
force. I can therefore say, "this body is mine" and not "I am the body's."

In a previous section we explained how the different tendencies which are manifested in the same body may be regarded as one force because of forming one integrated system. But as this force underlying a particular body is inseparable from the energy system underlying the world, all animal bodies and inanimate objects are inseparably interconnected. Each eddy is created by a few currents which belong to the system of currents that compose one river. But even the apparently different systems of currents, that is, even different rivers, flowing east, west, north and south, are ultimately intelligible as the diverse manifestations of the one basic force of gravitation—the attraction of the water by mother earth towards her bosom.

So long as I am identified with the particular body in its ordinary limited aspect, and opposed to others, I function as the ego. But I, in my wider aspect, am above such narrow limitation and identical with the basic force underlying my body and continuous with the world outside. In this aspect I may be called the soul—that is the underlying reality of the body as well as the world apparently outside of, but really one with, the body.

The consciousness of the life force as the "I" is needed for the protection and welfare of the body. The ego-consciousness fulfils a biological need and is not to be deprecated. But if the ego is not enlightened and fails to realize that even the interest of the body cannot be served well without understanding its organic relation with the rest of the world, and without harmonizing the body with nature and its interest with the interest of society, it leads the body to conflict, misery and ruin. There is, therefore, a biological urge behind the body-minded ego to widen its outlook. A life of ideal harmony demands that I should realize through the body, and in conformity with its best interests, the inseparable connection and continuity of the body with the rest of the world, and develop thus the sense of my identity and harmony with the universe. This would create in me the feeling of wholeness—the feeling of missing nothing without which perfect health is unattainable.
CONCLUSION

The philosophy of the body that we can formulate by gathering the ideas of the different sections of this paper can be summed up now. The body is not a self-enclosed, isolated and static mass of matter walling off the individual from the universe. But, on the contrary, it is an ever-changing product of creative energy underlying the world out of which it is constantly made and into which it is constantly emptied, so that it is as inseparable from the world as an eddy is from a river. To contemplate this truth is to realize that the body is not a prison house but a living link of the individual with the universe. The inner view of the body, again, makes us feel that the body, as a mass of experiences, intermingles with those about the world and is inseparable from the latter. The body is thus felt to be not outside of other objects, but to be inextricably mingled with them.

The body cannot, moreover, be regarded as an accidental product. It is a tool of the basic force which evolves it, changes it, remakes it, multiplies it and ultimately withdraws it, all by a long and complex chain of wonderfully adjusted means and ends.

The body, properly considered, demonstrates the interchangeability of life and death—organic and inorganic matter—and shows further that matter and mind, the extended and the non-extended, are but two phases of the same reality.

The ego which claims to own the body, knows little of it, and has little control over it, though such knowledge and control can be indefinitely increased. The consciousness of the ego which emerges through the body is at first a protective mechanism of the basic life-force in the interest of the body. It fails of its purpose if it does not realize the unity of the body, through the basic force, with the world outside.

The feeling that the body is integral to the universe creates a sense of wholeness that can help the body to attain perfect health. It also generates the confidence that if we can learn the art of tapping, training and controlling the energy underlying this finite centre, we can increasingly draw upon the infinite energy which underlies the universe and which is continuous with the bodily energy. If by special effort of the will we can own, control and move parts of the body previously unclaimed and uncontrolled, there is no obstacle to the speculation that by a similar but more intensified and protracted effort it might be possible to
control things in the world, ordinarily supposed to be outside of my body, but with which I am really one and with which I can identify myself, by overcoming the false notion of my isolation and limitation.

The body, which is continuous with the universe and is a centre through which the universal energy acts and manifests itself, may be utilized as a lever to change the universe by a proper training of thought and will.

Again, the fact that the body is formed, changed and entirely rebuilt by the change of cells, several times after birth, and multiplied in other centres (the offspring) and finally allowed to disintegrate, points to the probability that the life-force behind this purposeful series of processes, can similarly form a new body after death to satisfy fresh inclinations if there be any.

These are some of the ideas that we can gather from the different vistas of speculation that the thought about the body in its diverse aspects open to us. We have purposely confined ourselves to the body and refrained from linking up our thoughts with the metaphysics of the soul or the universe as a whole. The almost universal depreciation of body-consciousness (ātmanabuddhi) in Indian philosophy has created the wrong tendency to underrate the importance of the body. One of the purposes of this paper is to dispel this wrong idea. The body is the basis of our existence here as the Upanishads correctly recognized, and the first step in the philosophy of man is a proper understanding of its true nature—not only its limitations, but also its infinite potentialities.
Three concepts are basic to the growth of science. First, there must be the belief that the universe is one homogeneous whole and not divided into realms with divergent laws. Second, there must be the belief that laws of nature are uniform and not subject to change or mutation. Third, there must be an equally insistent belief in the value of the individual instance. If any of these conditions is missing, there can be no general scientific progress even though there may still be individual instances of great scientists.

The first and second concepts are clearly interrelated and may, in fact, be regarded as two facets of the same fact. Without a monistic universe there can be no universal law. If there were two or more worlds, their plurality would be based on distinction, and they would be distinct only in so far as they were governed by different laws. Universality of law, therefore, depends on the uniformity of the universe. Laws of nature cannot be uniform unless the nature they seek to express is itself uniform.

Belief in the uniformity of nature can be violated in one of the two following ways. If the universe is regarded as the realm of different and perhaps rival gods who challenge one another's authority, it is obvious that there can be no uniform laws governing its entire expanse. The uniformity of nature would again break down if a distinction were recognized between the natural and the supernatural. If they are distinct regions, there must obviously be different laws in the two realms. Insistence on "One World" is, therefore, an essential condition for the growth of scientific thought.

This conception of the unity of nature first expresses itself in religious faith. Most of the earlier religions recognized rival gods who held sway over distinct regions. Thus, there was the god of the sea. The Old Testament shows traces of early modes of thought.
when its prophets appeal to the "God of our fathers" and seek His help in overcoming the gods of others. In the course of time, the multitudes of gods were replaced by the concept of one God, a Supreme Being who is unique and Lord of all creation. All religions show a tendency of moving from the conception of many gods to that of one God, but nowhere is this so marked as in the case of the Semitic religions which originated in desert lands. Nor is this surprising. The desert, with its vast brooding skies and the vast, unbroken expanse of the plains below, naturally impresses upon the mind a sense of the unity of the universe. All distinctions tend to be blurred in the desert and we have the overpowering sense of a Presence in which all individuality is lost.

One God meant one universe and therefore one law. Belief in the unity of Godhead was, therefore, one of the conditions for the emergence of science, but by itself it was not enough. In the earlier Semitic religions, this sense of the unity of God did not overcome the distinction between the phenomenal and the transcendent. This is seen in their emphasis on the value of the miracle. The essence of a miracle is that it is against the general run of the law. Recognition of a miracle is, therefore, a denial of the uniformity of nature and is evidence of reliance on faith rather than on reason.

Both Christian and Jewish thought accepted miracles and supernatural manifestations of power as essential ingredients of religious faith. Their prophets were extraordinary men who commanded extraordinary devotion by their extraordinary deeds. They were not only holy men but men possessed of superhuman vision. They claimed that they had insight into the unseen world and could, in the light of that insight, influence the course of events in the seen world. The fact that such deeds were extraordinary and required departure from the natural law was further evidence of their supernatural gifts and status.

Such an attitude of mind may be conducive to the growth of religious fervour, but it cannot help in the evolution of a scientific temper. We no doubt say that there are exceptions to every law, but a scientist cannot rest until he has found an explanation for the seeming exception. In fact, science owes its advance to the observation of some instance which seems to be an exception, but on a closer scrutiny proves to be the manifestation of a wider and more general law which supersedes the first.

Belief in the unfailing uniformity of nature is thus an essential
condition of the growth of science. Science does not, therefore, permit the incursion of the individual to break the chain of causality. Nor can it permit the intrusion of supernatural factors which are not amenable to human reason. The unity of nature, therefore, must apply not only to the entire known world but also to the world which is yet unknown. In fact, the generality of a scientific law is itself a claim that it will apply to observed as well as to all hitherto unobserved cases.

Even the conception of a uniform world in which there is no distinction of natural and supernatural is not, however, enough. There must be an equal emphasis on the value of the individual or the single instance. If the conception of uniformity of nature were enough, science would have developed as soon as there was a belief in the unity of God. In that case, science would have been a theoretical discipline in which conclusions would be derived deductively from certain general premises. Science is, however, essentially inductive.

The formulation of general principles has not by itself led to the progress of science. It is only when general principles have been wedded to brute facts, or in the alternative, the observation of a number of instances has led to the formulation of a general theory, that there has been scientific advance. The empirical had to acquire a new dignity before science could emerge. Man's attention had to turn from the consideration of unearthly glory to the contemplation of the familiar world, from speculation on transcendent and logical truths to the observation of the variety and grandeur of the perceptible world.

The importance of the individual to the growth of scientific thought is also seen in the constant demand for the verification of every general law. This is what constitutes the essence of the inductive or experimental method. Deductive thought is content to develop the implications of a concept in disregard of all considerations except that of inner consistency. Inductive thought confronts the concept with experience. Since concepts must from their very nature be general while experience is always experience of the particular, the essence of verification is the reference of general principles to particular facts. Consideration of the individual instance, therefore, becomes essential for the progress of science.

Without this constant challenge of the single instance, the value of experience as the basis of all knowledge would be lost. A
new gulf would thus be created between the rational and the empirical. If all knowledge could be built from certain fundamental truths, we would, by a devious route, come back to the position where the truths of reason would be distinct from the truths of fact. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural must be overcome before there can be the beginning of science. We must similarly bridge the distinction between the rational and the empirical in order to ensure the progress of science.

These three conditions, namely, the unity of nature, the denial of any distinction between the natural and the supernatural and the recognition of the value of the individual are, therefore, essential conditions for the growth of science. If any one of these factors is missing, one of the essential ingredients for the scientific temper would be absent. In such context, men of extraordinary genius may anticipate some of the findings of latter science, but there will be no general scientific advance. This has, in fact, been the case till about the beginnings of the present millennium. There have been brilliant scientists and speculators in ancient India, China, Egypt and Greece, but like solitary stars in the firmament they have shone in splendid isolation.

II

The present millennium is pre-eminently the age of science. It is also the period which has seen the greatest advance in democratic ideals. The parallelism between the progress of science and democracy is not accidental. From the homogeneity and unity of the world follows the universal application of moral and political laws. From the uniformity of the laws of nature follows the equality of all before the law. From the emphasis on the particular instance follows the recognition of the dignity of the individual human being.

If we try to analyse the underlying ideas of democracy, the first principle which attracts our attention is its emphasis on the unity of law. There can be no democracy unless the same law applies to all. Its relation to the unity of Godhead in religious thought is obvious. Ages passed before humanity attained to the conception of a unitary God. It also took ages before humanity achieved the conception of the unity of law. In fact, the conception of unitary law could not arise till the establishment of the
unity of the universe. If there were different gods who held sway in different regions of the world, it was obvious that the same law could not apply to all men.

Unquestioning belief in the plurality of gods explains the paradox that even systems which at first sight appear democratic show, on closer inspection, an utter indifference to the concept of the unity of law. Often described as democratic, Greek polity fails in the test, as it recognized different laws for different classes of citizens. The distinction of slave and freeman was a denial of the universal applicability of law. Roman law was based on a gradation of rights and obligations dependent upon the differing status of the different members of the State. The Roman citizen had rights to which his less fortunate fellows could make no claim.

Democracy presupposes not only the unity of law, but also equality of all before the law. This is, in fact, a corollary from the first principle. It, however, leads to the repudiation of birth and caste and is thus the first breach in the citadel of status. Primitive society is ruled by custom. Custom grows through the repetition of similar situations, and presupposes the sanctity of status. Because the emphasis is on repetition, custom tends to become a rule of thumb which ignores the rationale of the rule. Different rules are, therefore, framed without seeking to discover the principle underlying the rules. Custom is, therefore, always diverse and leads to the creation of a diversity of rules for different people on different occasions.

So long as custom is the governing principle, society must, perform be divided into strata with divergent rights and privileges. Unification of society can commence only with the growing application of the laws of reason to the affairs of man. The theory of Divine Right of Kings was a direct contradiction of all claims to equality before the law. Yet Europe finally repudiated it only as late as the seventeenth century. The principle that the same law applies to all and applies in the same way, therefore, constitutes a revolution in human outlook. It is a substitution of persuasion for authority, of reason for revelation.

This mental revolution brought with it a recognition of the dignity of the individual. We have already drawn attention to the insistence on the importance of the particular in scientific thought. The growing importance of the individual in political theory and practice is its immediate corollary. So long as thought is deductive and the intellect delights in the abstract and the universal, the
individual hardly exists for it. The capacity to submerge the particular in the general brings with it a toleration of inequality and even social inequity. Science rebels against such deductive thought and restores the status of the individual by its constant appeal to verification. Verification, as we have already seen, is an assertion of the particular against the claims of general law. There can be no democracy where the particular is only a function of the universal.

One seeming paradox of democracy requires to be explained. One of the basic concepts of democracy is the assertion of the dignity of the individual. Another equally basic concept is, however, the triumph of the will of the majority over the will of the individual. The contradiction is, however, only apparent. The second concept is a logical development of the first. If all individuals are equal before the law and enjoy equal dignity, it is obvious that no single will can, as such, prevail over any other will. In case of difference between different wills, the claim of any individual will to qualitative superiority is ruled out. The only possible alternative is to decide action in terms of quantity, i.e. in accordance with the dictates of the majority of individual wills.

This assertion of the individual first expressed itself in the formulation of political rights. The ancient Hindu concept of society emphasized community even at the cost of the individual. Islam tried to give greater liberty to the individual without, however, relaxing the demands of the community. The Chinese conception aimed at achieving a balance, while in early Christianity, the emphasis upon the individual at times went to anarchic lengths. Generally speaking, however, the individual was subordinated to society till the beginnings of the seventeenth century. It was seventeenth-century Europe that, for the first time, posed the individual against the community.

The influence of the Reformation and early capitalism encouraged the emphasis upon individual liberty and initiative. Pre-Reformation Christian thought demanded the submission of the individual intellect to the commands of the Church. Feudal society compelled the obedience of the individual to obligations imposed on him by the accident of birth. In a revolt against such restrictive influences, liberty came to be identified with the absence of restraint. It would, however, be a mistake to regard the conception as merely negative. The positive content of the concept lies in the exercise of initiative and enterprise. The
emphasis on the community in the earlier concepts has, however, persisted and in fact reached its culmination in the modern conception of totalitarian States.

There is one other way in which the advent of science leads directly to the growth of democracy. In the past, two different conceptions of human rights could, and sometimes did, exist side by side. Because of lack of communication, they could even be unaware of one another. There were also different systems of rights for different people within the same country. As each system of civilization was more or less a self-contained universe, the dispossessed classes within it were unaware of even the existence of a different system and reconciled themselves to their fate. The progress of science has made the continuation of such a state of affairs unimaginable. Whatever happens in one corner of the globe has an almost immediate repercussion on every other part. A comparison of conditions in different areas compels a movement towards uniformity not only between countries but also within each country itself. Divergent conceptions of human rights have no place in the world of modern science.

Society is based on the individual’s need for security. Liberty is an essentially social concept and as such has no significance outside society. In moments of crisis, the demands of security take precedence over the demands of liberty. Once, however, the minimum requirements of security are satisfied, the individual attaches greater importance to the claims of liberty. From this derived the decisive importance of political democracy. The community as a whole must decide both what constitutes the minimum human requirements and what degree of control and authority may vest in the State to secure them. It is true that political democracy loses much of its significance without economic and social freedom. A residue of liberty even then exists, and there are hopes for its future expansion. Without political democracy the very possibility of social and economic democracy is destroyed. Political democracy is, therefore, the basis of all claims of the individual.

The constant appeal to verification in science is an appeal to the individual or the particular instance. It is an assertion of the status of the particular against the claim of the general law. In democracy the claim of the individual to liberty is equally an assertion of his importance against the dictates of the community. The homogeneity in the nature of the universe demands that
there can be no preferential treatment for any group or individual. Applied to the realm of human conduct, this gives us democracy in which all men are equal in the eyes of the law. What appeared as scientific temper in the sphere of thought, appeared as the democratic spirit in the world of politics.

III

The greatest triumphs of science and democracy have been achieved since the seventeenth century. Anticipations of these triumphs are, however, perceptible from the beginnings of the present millennium. What is more significant is that progress is almost continuous and uninterrupted during this period. One of the essential characteristics of scientific progress is its continuity. Every succeeding generation inherits the achievements of its predecessors and adds something new to them. Any sudden breach of continuity in scientific progress would, therefore, tend to suggest an absence of "scientific climate," though even in such conditions a genius might achieve magnificent results. The fact that progress is continuous for the last thousand years or so suggests the emergence of some new factor or force which changed the attitude of men towards nature and its problems.

We have indicated above the dominant principles that govern the growth of both science and democracy. Analysis of the basic concepts of Islam shows a remarkable similarity to these principles. This affinity, combined with the fact that the triumphant progress of science follows soon after the emergence of Islam, lends strong force to the suggestion of causal connection between them. What lends plausibility to this hypothesis is not so much the number of individual Arab scientists who flourished, as the unbroken continuity in the development of science since the advent of Islam.

The first presupposition of both science and democracy is the existence of a unitary world. Islam emphasized unity of the Godhead in a manner which has rarely been equalled by any other religion. "There is no God but God," proclaims Islam. It has carried this urge for the unity of God so far as to deny that there is any religion but one. Each country and each age had its own prophet. Each prophet preached to his own people in his own language. The language, the people and the period may be different, but the religion was the same in every case. Islam has,
therefore, repudiated the idea than an individual is the founder of any religious faith. It has categorically stated that Muhammad is only one among the many servants of God. When, on the analogy of Christianity, European writers describe Islam as Muhammadanism or the religion of Muhammad, Muslims repudiate the description and insist that it is equally the religion of Abraham and Moses and Jesus and a hundred other named and unnamed prophets.

Islam's claim to universality follows from this emphasis on the unity of God. It holds that, as a religion valid for all times, it must reveal the eternal nature of truth. Truth cannot be changed though the processes of time may overlay it with accretions that hide or distort its real nature. Such accretions must be removed in order to discover its pristine glory. This, in the opinion of Islam, is the main function of the prophets.

Basically, therefore, all religions are the same. The reason why they appear as different is that in the course of time they have been distorted in different ways in different countries. No one can deny that ideas do change in course of time. The whole effort of philosophy to fix thought in stable forms is doomed to failure from the very nature of the case. Concepts change in the very process of articulation. Communication introduces a further element of uncertainty in the nature of our ideas. Islam's contention that the nature of religion has changed again and again in the course of time is, therefore, not surprising. What is surprising is the claim often put forward in its behalf that it is the final form and hence there will be no need for any more prophets to rediscover the nature of eternal truth. But of this more hereafter.

Emphasis on the unity of God and, therefore, of nature broke down the distinction between the natural and the supernatural. We have seen the influence of this idea on the progress of science and democracy. In the field of religious experience, it led to the breakdown of the distinction between the secular and the religious. Islam is noted for its emphasis on the unity of all aspects of life. It recognizes no distinction between politics and religion, between economics and worship. In the words of the Quran: "The whole of the universe is a place of worship."

The conception of a common law for the whole of the universe left no room for miracles. Nor did it leave any room for the conception of the prophet as a superman. The Quran asserted again and again that Muhammad was a man amongst men and was
subject to all the laws that govern ordinary human beings. When an eclipse coincided with the death of his only son, the unbelieving Quraish held it as a portent and wanted to accept Islam through superstitious fear. Muhammad's reply was characteristic of the new rationalism. He said that the sun and moon obey the laws of God and pay no heed to the sorrows and joys of either a prophet or a common man.

One of the greatest Arab philosophers, Ibn-Rushd, commonly known as Averroes, distinguished himself by his insistence on the uniformity of nature. He did for Islam what Spinoza tried to do for Hebraism. His *Faslal Maqal*, shows in some respects a remarkable anticipation of Spinoza's conception of the laws of nature. What is common to both is the insistence on an unfailing uniformity. Spinoza wrote his *Ethics* in the form of geometric propositions to show the uniformity of all thought. Ibn-Rushd was also a philosopher distinguished for the mathematical bias of his thought. This similarity is not perhaps accidental, as one of the most important disciples of Ibn-Rushd was Musa-bin-Maimun. Musa wrote in Hebrew and his work, known throughout Spain and thus accessible to European scholars of the day, may well have influenced Spinoza.

The unity of God and the denial of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural emphasize the universality of reason. Since God is one and reason seeks to express His nature, the laws of reason cannot but be the same for all. We have already seen that this cannot by itself guarantee the progress of science without the recognition of the particular instance. We find evidence of this reverence for the particular in Islam's attitude towards the phenomenal. By denying the distinction between the phenomenal and the transcendent, Muslim religious thought values nature not as a symbol of something hidden but for its own sake. When the reality of the empirical is recognized, the particular comes to its own, for the empirical is always revealed in particular as the human personality. Its ultimate truth is recognized by the Quran when it says: "Man is trustee of the free personality which he accepts at his peril."

The overriding unity of God thus seems to be challenged by the uniqueness of the individual. Arab thought faced this difficulty in its own way. The Wajudi philosophers tried to continue the Platonic tradition and gave a pantheistic picture of the universe. This was, however, against the prevailing spirit of Islam. Accord-
ing to its teaching the individual cannot be regarded as a mere element in a universal system, but has an independent status of his own. The Shahide philosophers held that the individual is real and maintains his identity even when confronted with the Absolute. They seek to illustrate this truth by a beautiful analogy. Stars may be shut out of our view by the sunlight, but the existence of the sun cannot cancel the existence of the stars.

This emphasis on the reality of the individual is, in fact, one of the features that distinguishes Islamic philosophy from earlier schools of thought. Islamic thought was greatly influenced by the Greeks, particularly by Aristotle. With all their reverence for his logic, the Muslim philosophers could not, however, accept this emphasis on mere deductive reasoning. Ibn-Taimiyya tried to refute Aristotelian logic on the ground that it does not recognize the contribution of experience to knowledge. He pointed out that empirical knowledge is invariably direct and immediate. It is not through an inference that we recognize the particular but, on the contrary, it is the knowledge of the particular which makes an inference possible. He, therefore, rejected Aristotle’s scheme of major and minor premises and insisted that they are superfluous to the processes of our reasoning.

The Quran proclaimed that to reason is the prerogative of man. It is, therefore, incumbent on him to understand before he accepts. Substitution of reason for blind faith is the essence of the scientific temper. Islam and science are, therefore, both manifestations of a new rationality. That the relation between them has not always been seen is due to the incursion of extraneous elements in Muslim religious thought. We have already referred to one instance of this. In spite of Islam’s recognition of the change and mutation to which all human thought is subject, many of its adherents have claimed that it is immune from that general law.

An exception violates the unity of law. Muslim rationalists have, therefore, sought to find an explanation for this seeming inconsistency. They have argued that Islam changed the basis of religion from faith to reason. So long as religion was based on unquestioning faith, it was subject to variations following from differences in individual character and temperament. Changing times made changes in them inevitable. When, however, religious faith was based on reason, the scope of variation was ruled out. Reason from its very nature is universal and, therefore, what is once accepted by reason as true must always be true. With the shift
of emphasis to reason, Islam had, therefore, done away with the need of repeated rediscovery of Truth by a succession of prophets.

The line of defence is attractive and even plausible. One may concede that, in theory, a truth of reason is always true. This, however, overlooks the distinction between thought and articulation. However perfect the articulation, it is never transparent. On the one hand, the articulation may carry with it suggestions and associations that are not intrinsic to the thought. On the other, some element of thought always eludes all our attempts to articulate it. The difficulty is further enhanced by the distinction between expression and communication. However fully we may express ourselves, can we ever communicate all that we intend? Perfect communication would mean absence of all distinction between the communicator and the communicant. Absence of distinction would mean identity, which rules out the need or even the possibility of communication. Hence even the truest concept of reason must suffer a double distortion, once in the very act of articulation and again in the process of communicating it to other minds.

Islam’s appeal to reason cannot, therefore, justify the rejection of the need for continual restatements of the eternal truth. The Quran rejected the Jewish claim that the teaching of Moses was final. This it did on the ground that the truth must be continually rediscovered and restated to meet the requirements of changing times. There was, therefore, no reason to suppose that God’s revelation of truth to mankind would stop at any stage. By the same logic which demanded repeated enunciation of the truth before the advent of the prophet of Islam, new formulations will be necessary even after him.

Muhammad’s shift of the emphasis from faith to reason has, however, effected one important change. Prophets of the past depended upon appeals to supernatural manifestations of power. They based their authority on revelation which was beyond the reach of our reason. The prophet of Islam laid down that religion must be based on reason, not authority. It followed from this that there was no longer the need of a prophet in the old sense for guiding men back to the path of religion and truth.

In fact, the Quran makes hardly any reference to the conception of Muhammad as the last of the prophets. There is only one verse in which occurs the phrase Khatim-un-Nabbein or “Seal of the Prophets.” Some theologians have interpreted it to mean that Muhammad is the last of the prophets. It may, with equal justifi-
cation, be interpreted to mean that his teaching is a confirmation of the teaching of earlier prophets. Nor do the most authentic of the Hadith—those collected by Bokhari—anywhere state that there would be no prophet after Muhammad. Such claims occur in later Hadith, which, however, contain other statements that are open to doubt.

The most plausible explanation seems to be that such claims were made for Muhammad as a counter-blast to the claims made for their prophets by Jewish Rabbis and Christian priests. The Jews and the Christians often claimed that Moses and Jesus are the final teachers of mankind and not a jot of their teachings can be changed. Muslim theologians, especially some who were converted Jews or Christians, felt that at least an equal claim must be made for Muhammad. This, however, runs against the spirit of enquiry and experiment with which the Quran is instinct. A sense of this incompatibility led to a softening of the claim and the assertion that Muhammad would be followed by reformers but not prophets. This modification is itself evidence of a marked change in attitude. The age of miracles of faith was over. The age of the triumphs of science had begun.

There is thus no room for doubt regarding the affinity between the basic concepts of Islam and the principles which govern science. One can now understand why the progress of science has been almost continuous since its advent. Most religious teachers insist on unquestioning acceptance of what they say. The Quran admonishes Muhammad to understand and to explain so that faith may not be blind. The Quran declares that discrimination between truth and falsehood is the prime object of creation. According to it, the world is the result neither of an accident nor a whim of a god or gods. The universe has a purpose and design, and it is the task of the intellect to find it out. Belief in design reinforced the concept of a unitary law. Together, they created an atmosphere of rationality in which the human intellect sought and found answers to the riddles of the universe in terms of reason alone.

IV

Islam’s emphasis on the unity of God was the basis of its scientific outlook. It was equally the foundation of its democratic temper. The universality of reason demands from all rational beings the same behaviour in the same circumstances. So far as men are
rational, they are equal in the sight of God. There is no distinction between man and man on the plane of humanity. That this equality and brotherhood was extended to all Muslims and not to all mankind is only due to the fact that the implications of universality were not fully worked out.

Islam, however, realized the concept of equality both in theory and practice so far as Muslims are concerned. This in itself is a remarkable achievement in advance of the practice of most other religions. In theory, every religion recognizes the principle of fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man. In practice, however, the fatherhood of God has remained an article of faith hardly ever applied to the daily transactions of life. Clash of colour and inequalities of birth, station and wealth have attenuated the ideal almost beyond recognition.

Even its worst enemies have, however, been forced to admit that Islam broke down the barriers of colour and birth among Muslims. Not only in the formal act of worship but also in daily social intercourse, the darkest Nubian from the heart of Africa enjoys equality with the haughtiest of the Quraish or the most race-conscious of the blue-eyed and fair Aryan. Bernard Shaw has paradoxically but truly said that the real test of democracy is inter-marriageability. In formal worship, one can adopt an attitude of equality as one puts on ceremonial robes on formal occasions. The semblance of equality in political and economic life can also be deceptive. Even inter-dining may be a mere outward show reserved for special occasions. Inter-marriageability is, however, a test which permits no subterfuge.

Reverence for the empirical fact is another reason for Islam's insistence on the equality of man in the eyes of God and society. With the vista of life hereafter stretching to infinity, the indignities of the present life can be tolerated or ignored. If life here and now is of supreme importance, it is necessary that the individual must realize his dignity here and now. This also explains the absence of any priestly class in Islam.

In most ancient religious and social systems, priests acted as intermediaries between man and God. Like intermediaries in the secular world, they acquired power out of all proportion to the services they rendered. They were repositories of knowledge and alone knew the mystic rites by which the unseen powers that govern our destinies can be propitiated. Priests enjoyed power without responsibility. If power corrupts, power without respon-
sibility corrupts even more. A hierarchy of priestly classes invariably degenerates into an oligarchy of conservatism and tyranny. By doing away with the priestly class, Islam raised the dignity and status of the individual and freed him from one of the most pernicious forms of mental slavery.

This urge for democracy found institutional expression in several innovations introduced by Islam. The first and foremost of these was the recognition of women as legal entities capable of holding property in their own right. Pre-Muslim religious and social systems have given a high moral or spiritual position to women. Economic independence is, however, at the basis of all social status and this the pre-Islamic woman did not enjoy. Her incapacity to hold property, therefore, made her a nonentity in civil law. It is true that the rights given to women were not in all respects identical with those of men, but, nevertheless, the first breach had been made in the citadel of privilege. The recognition of her independent economic status marks a new extension of democracy to the difference of sex.

Islam recognized that nothing is so dangerous to social solidarity as persistent economic inequality. Maldistribution of wealth is in any case a cause of discontent and unrest. Its continued existence divides society into classes which, unless counteracted in time, develop into a division of caste. There are two possible methods for preventing such development. One is by abolition of all private property and expropriation of wealth now in private hands. This is the method which Communism upholds in theory and practice. An alternative method is to create checks on the accumulation of property and ensure that wealth does not rest in private hands but circulates in society continually. It is the latter method that Islam chose.

The Muslim law of inheritance has often been criticized by jurists as tending to too much division of property and constant changes in social stratification. There is an Arab proverb that when a Moslem dies, even his cat inherits a portion. This tendency to continual division of wealth and consequent impoverishment of the idle rich is, however, the result of deliberate policy. The aim of that policy is to prevent the continuation of property in the hands of single families. The Muslim law of inheritance acts as an infallible check upon the growth of unearned income. It is thus an instrument for preserving the fluidity of the social system through the continuous dispersal of family riches.
The second instrument for circulation of communal wealth was the institution of *Zakat* or compulsory payment to the communal fund. The idea that the wealthy must contribute for purposes of social welfare is ancient. What is novel in the *Zakat* is the element of compulsion applied to such payment. Equally significant is the idea of relating it to the actual wealth of the donor. Two and a half per cent of one's income may seem to be a very moderate proportion to the taxpayer in 1950, but we have to remember that this ratio was fixed over thirteen centuries ago. Observed in the spirit and not merely in the letter, this institution, in combination with the law of inheritance, operates against the stagnation of wealth in family pools and frees property from the bonds of birth and vested interest.

We have referred to the freedom of marriage which Islam introduced among all its adherents. This, as we have already seen, is both a test and a guarantee of democracy. Islamic conception of *Zakat* and inheritance also contribute towards the same end. Nor can we overlook the importance of the abolition of tribal and family names as an instrument for enforcing equality within the community. Inequality of wealth tends to ossify into classes and castes, but the tendency is minimized, if not altogether checked, by the elimination of marks which perpetuate the distinction. Family name is a sure harbinger of family pride. It immediately places the individual and defines his status in society, not by his personal qualities, but by the position accorded to him in the social hierarchy by the accident of birth. Abolition of the tribal or the family name obliterates such marks and tends to concentrate attention on the individual himself.

The close analogy between the basic concepts of science, democracy and Islam has been briefly indicated above. There are, no doubt, differences in their emphasis on different aspects of these concepts. Such variations, as well as the fact that the basic principles were not always worked to their logical conclusion, account for the time-lag between their manifestation. They must, however, be regarded as a common movement of human thought, in which the impulse towards generalization and unity was matched by the increasing realization of the importance of the particular and the individual. The relation of the universal to the particular is one of the perennial problems of philosophy. Science, democracy and Islam mark three distinct but closely related attempts to solve that problem.
THE GITA'S CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF KANT

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I am glad to be given this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of Dr. Radhakrishnan's work by contributing an article to the volume which is being published to commemorate his sixtieth birthday. I was wondering what subject would be most suitable for this purpose. Eventually I decided upon the one the name of which appears on the top of this page, firstly because the organizers of this volume wanted to have an article which was a comparative study of some aspect of Eastern and Western philosophy, and secondly, because no other subject seemed to me to show in such a striking manner the similarities as well as differences in the philosophical outlook of the East and the West.

TWO KINDS OF FREEDOM: FREEDOM OF MAN AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL

Before I begin, I should like to draw attention to a fundamental difference between two kinds of freedom—the freedom of man and the freedom of the will—failure to recognize which is the cause of considerable confusion. This is especially the case when we compare the Indian conception of freedom with that in vogue at present in the West.

There is not only a difference between the two freedoms, but there is also antagonism between the two. That is to say, the freedom of man may mean the abrogation of the freedom of the will, and vice versa. Man is free when he is liberated from the bondage of the senses. But then he loses what is usually meant by the freedom of the will, that is to say, freedom to do good as well as evil, because evil-doing is the result of the domination of the senses, and therefore it is not possible for a man who is completely
free from this domination to do evil. Conversely, the man who possesses freedom of the will, that is, who can act rightly as well as wrongly, is not a free man and is still in bondage of his senses. Indian philosophy without any exception has understood freedom to mean the freedom of man, and all its discussion of freedom has centred round the question as to how this freedom is to be obtained and what its characteristics are.

This difference between the two kinds of freedom cannot, however, be looked upon as constituting the difference between the Indian and the Western views of freedom. For the Western view of freedom has also been for considerable periods of history the same as the Indian view. That is to say, it has also taken freedom to mean freedom of man. It is only comparatively recently that the problem of freedom has come to mean in the West the problem of free choice, that is, the power to choose evil as well as good.

**BOTH THESE KINDS OF FREEDOM ARE FOUND IN KANT**

It is a great service which Sidgwick has done to the understanding of Kant's ethics by pointing out that both the kinds of freedom mentioned above are found in Kant. That freedom which I have called freedom of the will has been given the designation "neutral freedom" by Sidgwick, and that which I have called freedom of man is given by him the name "rational freedom." And he very clearly points out that both these kinds of freedom are found in Kant. To quote his own words: "My aim is to show that, in different parts of Kant's exposition of his doctrine, two essentially different conceptions are expressed by the same word freedom; while yet he does not appear to be conscious of any variation in the meaning of the term. In the one sense, Freedom = Rationality, so that a man is free in proportion as he acts in accordance with Reason. I do not in the least object to this use of the term Freedom, on account of its deviation from ordinary usage. On the contrary, I think it has much support in men's natural expression of ordinary moral experience in discourse. . . . But what English defenders of man's free agency have generally been concerned to maintain, is that 'man has a freedom of choice between good and evil,' which is realized or manifested when he deliberately chooses evil just as much as when he de-

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liberately chooses good; and it is clear that if we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say, in the same sense of the term, that it is by his free choice that he acts irrationally when he does so act. . . . If this be admitted, the next thing is to show that Kant does use the term in this double way. In arguing this, it will be convenient to have names for what we admit to be two distinct ideas. Accordingly, the kind of freedom which I first mentioned—which a man is said to manifest more in proportion as he acts more under the guidance of reason—shall be referred to as 'Good' or 'Rational Freedom,' and the freedom that is manifested in choosing between good and evil shall be called 'Neutral' or 'Moral Freedom.'" He goes on: "Speaking broadly, I may say that, wherever Kant has to connect the notion of Freedom with that of Moral Responsibility or moral imputation, he, like all other moralists who have maintained Free Will in this connection, means (chiefly, but not solely) Neutral Freedom—Freedom exhibited in choosing wrong as much as in choosing right. Indeed, in such passages it is with the freedom of the wrong-chooser that he is primarily concerned; since it is the wrong-chooser that he especially wishes to prevent from shifting his responsibility on to causes beyond his control. On the other hand, when what he has to prove is the possibility of disinterested obedience to Law as such, without the intervention of sensible impulses, when he seeks to exhibit the independence of Reason in influencing choice then in many though not all his statements he explicitly identifies Freedom with this independence of Reason, and thus clearly implies the proposition that a man is free in proportion as he acts rationally."

In his first view of freedom Kant contrasts human beings with natural objects. The former he calls free causes, that is to say, causes which are not subject to the causality of anything other than themselves. The latter form a system of natural causes, where one event is determined by another event. Of course, human beings are free causes only so far as their moral life is concerned; in other respects, they are, exactly like natural objects, subject to the causality of agencies other than themselves. As free causes, they are ends in themselves, that is to say, they cannot be treated as means to anything else. They are also autonomous, that is to say, subject to their own rule, and not to the rule of anything other than themselves. They, in fact, form what Kant

1 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th edition, Appendix, p. 513.
has called a "kingdom of ends" or a union of self-legislative beings, which represents Kant's conception of ideal society.

This view of freedom, it may be observed, is purely negative. That is to say, it indicates what freedom is not, rather than what it is. It emphasizes the fact that if there is any determination by any external agency, then there cannot be any freedom. But it does not give any positive content to freedom.

Kant's second view of freedom, what Sidgwick has called rational freedom, is more prominent in his ethical writings than the first. Under the influence of this second view, Kant makes no distinction between Will and Reason. Thus, in a passage in his *Metaphysic of Ethics*, he says: "Everything in the world acts according to laws; an intelligent will alone has the prerogative of acting according to the representation of laws, i.e. has a Will: and since, to deduce actions from laws, Reason is required, it follows that Will is nothing else than practical Reason." Similarly, in a passage in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, he speaks of "the objective reality of a pure Will, or, which is the same thing, a pure practical reason." Now if Will is the same as Reason, then there is no possibility of willing a wrong act; the only way, therefore, in which a wrong act can be committed is through the domination of feelings and passions, when the will is temporarily held in abeyance. Wilful wrong-doing would be ruled out on this view of freedom. But it would be ruled out, not for the reason which made Socrates rule it out, namely, because virtue is knowledge, but because Will and Reason are identical. The proposition "Virtue is Knowledge" is not possible for Kant, because he has put knowledge on a lower level than virtue, for, in his view, Reason does not shine in its full glory in knowledge, being under the necessity of having to pass through the medium of sense, whereas in virtue Reason exhibits itself in all its splendour.

Kant's second view of freedom he shares with the older rationalists, like Plato and Spinoza. Plato in his *Phaedo* calls deliverance from the bondage of the body, that is, everything which is sen- suous, true freedom, and therefore says that the philosopher, far from fearing death, rather welcomes it. So also Spinoza conceives freedom in the same manner. Thus, he says, in connection with the demonstration of Prop. 57 of the fourth part of his *Ethics*, "A free man, that is to say, a man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone, is not led by the fear of death." So again, in the

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demonstration of the next proposition, he says, "I have said that the man who is free is led by Reason alone." For Spinoza, as is clear from the above quotations, freedom and rationality mean the same thing. Inversely, bondage is described by him as subjection to emotions and passions. "The impotence of man," he says in the preface to the fourth part of *Ethics*, "to govern or restrain the effects I call bondage, for a man who is under this control is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse, although he sees the better before him."

It is possible, no doubt, to reconcile Kant's first view of freedom with the second with the help of the conception of a graded Self. One may then say that freedom means self-determination, as Kant says in his first view of freedom, but Self may have all grades, from a mere animal Self to the Self of Pure Reason, and in its final form, therefore, self-determination means nothing else than determination by Pure Reason, which is Kant’s second view of freedom. Mackenzie, in fact, has made this reconciliation, and has called freedom, meaning determination by Pure Reason, highest freedom, but he has done this from the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy. It should be remembered, however, that this view of a graded Self does not find any place in the Kantian philosophy, although it is a commonplace of Hegel's philosophy.

**THE GITA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS KANT'S FIRST FREEDOM**

Coming now to the Gita, the first freedom of Kant, that is to say the freedom which is realized in both right and wrong actions, is one which it will not touch with a pair of tongs. Exactly as in the quotation I have made from Spinoza, the Gita looks upon wrong actions as the result of a man's bondage—bondage to the passions. In Chapter 3, verse 37, it clearly points out what it considers to be the cause of wrong action: "It is desire, it is wrath begotten by the quality of *rajas*, all-consuming, all-polluting, know thou this as our enemy here on earth." And the remedy which it proposes for getting rid of wrong actions it indicates in verse 47 of the same chapter as follows: "Therefore, O best of the Bharatas, mastering first the senses, do thou slay this thing of

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sin, destructive of wisdom and knowledge." The perfect mastery over the senses and the complete eradication of sin, however, are in its view only possible through supra-rational consciousness, as stated in verse 43 of the same chapter: "Thus awakening by the understanding to the Highest which is even the discerning mind, restraining the self by the Self, slay thou, O mighty-armed, this enemy in the form of desire, who is so hard to assail."

The ordinary sensuous consciousness creates bondage, and even Buddhi or Reason is not in a position to give complete freedom from bondage. Consequently, it is necessary to ascend to supra-rational consciousness if one wants to be completely free. This takes us to a standpoint higher than that of Kant's rational freedom. This is also indicated by the words "restraining the self by the Self." The lower self is to be controlled by the Higher Self which is even higher than Reason (see the previous verse, where it is stated that "greater than Reason is He"). The same thing is said in 6. 5: "Raise the self by the Self."

It should be noticed clearly that there is no identification here, as in Kant's second view of freedom, of Will and Reason, and consequently, no attempt to rule out deliberate wrong-doing. Deliberate wrong-doing, in fact, is, as the Gita points out in the sixteenth chapter, normal for men of the āsurika type. And most men—and even Arjuna—are of this type. One of the main characteristics of such men is excess of egoism, as stated in verses 13–16 of this chapter: "They say to themselves, 'This much wealth is secured by me to-day and now I shall realize this ambition. So much wealth is already with me, and yet again, this shall be mine. That enemy has been slain by me and I shall kill those others too. I am the lord of all, the enjoyer of all power: I am endowed with all supernatural powers, and am mighty and happy. I am wealthy and own a large family; who else is like unto me? I will sacrifice to the Gods, I will give alms, I will make merry.' Thus blinded by ignorance, enveloped in the mesh of delusion and addicted to the enjoyment of sensuous pleasures, their mind bewildered by numerous thoughts, these men of a devilish disposition fall into the foulest hell." From this point of view, even

I have given here Mrs. Besant's translation. She has translated the words "Jñāna" and "vijñāna," respectively, by "wisdom" and "knowledge." These words, however, mean, respectively, knowledge of universal truth and knowledge of particular facts.

I have given here Mr. Anil Baran Ray's translation as we find it in his book, The Message of the Gita, as it brings out clearly the supra-rational character of the emancipating knowledge.
Arjuna, as I have already said, must be regarded as of the āsurika type, for his chief failing is excess of egoism, as shown in verse 59 of the eighteenth chapter: "If, taking your stand upon egoism, you think 'I will not fight,' then vain is this resolve of yours; Nature will force you to act."

It is clear, therefore, that deliberate wrong-doing is not denied by the Gita; only, it will not call it a sign of freedom. It will not go into ecstasies over it as some Western ethical writers do. It looks upon it as a sure sign of bondage. Freedom of the will, in the sense of the power to do wrong acts, is a curse, rather than a blessing, from the standpoint of the Gita. Arjuna enjoyed it to his heart's content before his instruction by Lord Kṛṣṇa. But was he happy? Far from it. It was only when he voluntarily relinquished this false freedom for the sake of his true freedom, and could say (Gita, 18. 73) "By Thy Grace, O Lord, my delusion is gone and wisdom has dawned upon me. I will do Thy bidding," that he became happy. Man's spiritual ascent consists in his renouncing this freedom of the will for the sake of enjoying his true freedom, which consists in union with God. This is the message of the Gita, which looks at the whole of man's life from this one standpoint of union with God.

There are, however, some limitations—and fortunately so—according to the Gita, to man's enjoying this freedom of the will, that is, of doing evil. In the analysis of voluntary action which is given in verses 13-16 of the eighteenth chapter, five factors are mentioned which are responsible for the production of action. These are: (1) the body, (2) the doer, (3) the various instruments, (4) the many kinds of efforts, and (5) Fate. Fate (daiva) here means, as I have shown in my book The Spirit of Indian Philosophy, in the chapter entitled "The Śādhanā of the Bhagavad-gītā," the all-controlling power of God. The agent is only one of the causes, and cannot arrogate to himself the position of being the sole determinant of action. The Gita, therefore, says in verse 16 of this chapter, "Notwithstanding this, however, he who, having an impure mind regards himself as the sole author of his actions, he of perverted intellect seeth not." A man, consequently, is not

1 According to Śri Aurobindo's interpretation of the word, it means "the influence of the Power or powers other than the human factors, other than the visible mechanism of Nature, that stand behind these and modify the work and dispose its fruits in the steps of act and consequence" (The Message of the Gita, by Anil Baran Ray, p. 228). My interpretation of the word fits in very well with this. Only, instead of "the Power or powers other than the human factors," I take it to mean the Supreme Power of God.
the sole author of his actions, and he has always to remember that no action is possible without the all-controlling guidance of God. This puts a definite limit to man's freedom of the will. The Gita does not regard human beings as the ultimate authors of their actions, for to do so would be to relegate God to a position of relative inferiority vis-à-vis human beings. It does not believe in an inane God who has renounced all powers and is merely a benevolent spectator. It calls God (13. 23) "Supervisor and Permitter, Supporter, Enjoyer, the great Lord," and also (9. 18), "the Path, Supporter, Lord, Witness, Abode, Shelter, Friend, Origin, Dissolution, Treasure-house, Imperishable Seed."

The Gita, therefore, does not regard men as sole authors of their actions, their authorship being limited by the overlordship of God. There are two verses, however, in the eleventh chapter which at first sight seem to take away from man even this limited authorship of his actions. These are verses 33–34 of the eleventh chapter and run as follows:

"Therefore stand up! Win for thyself renown, Conquer thy foes, enjoy the wealth-filled realm, Be thou the instrumental cause, left-handed one. Drona and Bhism and Jayadratha, Karna and all the other warriors here, Are slain by Me. Destroy them fearlessly. Fight! thou shalt crush thy rivals in the field."

They seem to suggest that man is really powerless to do anything as everything is done by God Himself. But really they do not suggest any such thing. Why do we say that they suggest that man is absolutely powerless to do anything? Is it because it is said that human beings are "instrumental causes"? But Spinoza also similarly said that every idea of any human being (and consequently also every act of every human being, for, according to Spinoza, will and idea are identical) is dependent upon the eternal and infinite essence of God, and, therefore, upon His will. Yet John Caird has shown in his book on Spinoza (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics Series) that this does not mean that human beings have no freedom. To quote his own words, "When we ask what in his (Spinoza's) system is the relation of the finite world and individual finite things to God, the question is not settled simply by referring to his doctrine that all things exist in God, and that modes or finite things have no existence or operation
independently of the infinite substance. Spinozism is not at once proved to be pantheistic by such expressions as these. For every system that is not dualistic, and for which the terms infinite and finite have any meaning, is pantheistic to the extent of holding that the world has no absolute or independent existence, and that the ultimate explanation of all things is to be found in God. Before pronouncing Spinoza a pantheist, therefore, the point to be determined is not whether he ascribes independent reality to finite things, but whether he ascribes to them any reality at all."

In the light of what Caird says here in connection with similar views of Spinoza, it is clear that merely because the Gita calls human beings "instrumental causes" it cannot be said that it wants to take away all freedom from them. As I have said in my book The Spirit of Indian Philosophy, "Let us face the question squarely. What exactly is meant when it is claimed that human beings are free? Is it meant that they enjoy absolute freedom even when they are limited, particular individual beings? That is, of course, ridiculous, for it involves a contradiction in terms. All that can be claimed is that these finite individuals must be given a chance of being other than they are and of acting otherwise than they do, that is, of being other than mere finite, individual, particular beings and of acting otherwise than in a way contrary to the objective moral order. In other words, what can be claimed is that every finite individual must have freedom to improve himself, to rise above his limitations and ultimately to be one with God Himself. This freedom no one can assert that the Gita denies." Moreover, these verses do not impose any new limitation to human freedom not contemplated in the verses I quoted before. They only make explicit the nature of the daivī factor present in every human action. They only say that this daiva is the ultimate determining cause of all human actions. But if this is so, then human beings become only instrumental causes.

To sum up this part of our discussions of the respective attitudes of the Gita and Kant towards what Sidgwick calls "neutral freedom," which is the first view of freedom held by Kant: The Gita imposes more limitations upon this freedom than Kant does. Kant, in fact, imposes no limitations beyond what are imposed by the physical conditions under which man lives. There is no place for daiva in Kant’s philosophy. Moreover, for the Gita it is no freedom at all but bondage. Arjuna enjoyed this kind of freedom
THE GITA'S CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM

before his instruction by Lord Kṛṣṇa., but he gladly surrendered it at the end of his instruction for the sake of the true freedom which consists in placing oneself in the hands of God.

THE GITA'S VIEWS ON RATIONAL FREEDOM
AS COMPARED WITH THOSE OF KANT

Coming now to Kant's second freedom, which Sidgwick calls rational freedom, this comes somewhat close to the Gita's conception of freedom. For the Gita, like Kant, enjoins the suppression of desires and passions. It is the man who has obtained complete mastery over his desires and impulses whom the Gita treats as a free man, whether he is called sthitaprajña or bhaktimān or trīguṇātīta. The free man, in fact, in the view of the Gita, is a yogin, and the characteristics of all yogins, whether karmayogins or jñānayogins or bhaktiyogins are, on the negative side, all alike. That is to say, they all mean complete extirpation of whatever binds a man to sensuous objects. For example, the characteristics of the sthitaprajña or the sāmkhyayogin, as stated in 2. 56–57 are that "his mind is free from anxiety amid pains," that "he is indifferent to pleasures, loosed from passion, fear and anger" and is "of stable mind," "indifferent everywhere to whatever happens, either good or bad," "has no likes or dislikes," and "is well-poised." Similarly, the characteristics of the bhaktimān are described in 12. 17–19 as follows:

"He who neither loveth nor hateth, nor grieveth, nor desireth, renouncing good and evil, full of devotion, he is dear to Me.

"Alike to foe and friend, and also in fame and ignominy, alike in pleasures and pains, devoid of attachment.

"Taking equally praise and reproach, silent, wholly content with whatever cometh, homeless, firm in mind, full of devotion, that man is dear to Me."

Exactly similar characteristics are given of the trīguṇātīta in 14. 24–25:

"Balanced in pleasure and pain, self-reliant, to whom a lump of earth, a stone and gold are alike, the same to those who are dear and to those who are not dear, firm, the same in censure and in praise.

"The same in honour and ignominy, the same to friend and foe, abandoning all undertakings—he is said to have transcended the gunas."

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On the negative side, therefore, there is very great similarity between the Kantian conception of rational freedom and the Gita’s idea of freedom. Just as for Kant autonomy means freedom from the sway of pleasures and impulses, so also for the Gita it means freedom from the bondage of the senses. But what about the positive side? Here there is a great difference between the standpoint of Kant and that of the Gita. This difference is due to the difference in their respective philosophical outlooks. For the Gita it is not enough to be free from the bondage of the senses. Freedom from the bondage of the senses is, in its view, only a means to something positive. This positive thing is realization of one’s union with God. Even in the verses which I have just quoted from the Gita, where the characteristics of the bhaktimān are described mostly from the negative side, there occur the words “dear to me.” These words “dear to me” indicate the Gita’s angle of vision. They do not find a place in Kant’s account of freedom. For the Gita that man is only free who is dear to God. Such words as “dear to me,” “enters into my being” (13. 19), “reaches Brahmanirvana” (2. 72) give the positive characteristics of freedom, which may be otherwise expressed as union with God.

This positive characteristic is missing in Kant, and this constitutes the main defect of his ethics. This defect is the same as the barrenness of the moral law, which is universally regarded as the chief weakness of the Kantian ethics, for freedom means with Kant nothing else than the realization of the moral law, which, however, is absolutely devoid of content. This contentlessness of the moral law is, indeed, an offshoot of his purely abstract conception of Self or Reason. Self in Kant’s philosophy is so abstract that it cannot join itself to any object or to any other self. It is, in fact, the bare identity of itself with itself, the pure “I am I,” which is incapable alike of giving any objective or social consciousness. It is indeed like a baby which can only suck its own fingers. This barrenness of Self or Reason1 is responsible for his declaring knowledge phenomenal and also for pronouncing the realization of the moral law in this world impossible without extraneous aid.

For the Gita freedom is not identity with such a Self or Reason but identity with something wider and broader than this. The Reason of Kant is an individual and isolated Reason which is

1 See my article, The Logic of the Real (Proceedings of the Second Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress), for the consequences of Kant’s view of Self.
incapable of effecting either a junction with the world of objects or with the world of subjects. It hangs, as it were, in mid-air. Identity with such a Reason cannot mean freedom. We have to pass beyond this to the Universal Reason if freedom is to be attained. As I have already pointed out, the Gita visualizes a Supra-rational Consciousness which alone is competent to give freedom. The characteristics of such a consciousness, as described in Gita 6. 29 and 6. 30, is that "it sees itself in everything and everything in itself." The Kantian Reason is not in a position to offer us this consciousness, and consequently, with its help it is not possible to attain freedom. It is a home détenu, not allowed to go beyond its own narrow sphere. The Gita impresses upon us the necessity of going beyond such a narrow Reason. But when we do so we shall cross the boundary of morality and step into that of religion.

We may thus express the difference between the Kantian view of freedom and that of the Gita by saying that the latter means the identity of the moral life with the religious, whereas the former does not. The Gita's view is a consequence of the synoptic view of human life adopted by it. The Gita looks upon man's life as a whole. It does not divide it into watertight compartments such as economic, moral, religious, etc. It does not consider moral life to be complete until it enables one to have realization of union with God.

It is otherwise with Kant. For him the fundamental truths of religion, such as the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, are only postulates of morality. There is a world of difference between treating them as postulates and looking upon them as the culmination of the moral life. For Kant moral life rests upon an antinomy, the antinomy being inherent in the idea of its being realized, for realization means objectification in the world of sense, whereas the moral law is the pure expression of reason and contains no element of sense. On account of this antinomy, the moral law cannot realize itself, and its realization, therefore, depends upon conditions which are external to the moral law. Hence the necessity of moral postulates. These postulates are the conditions under which the moral law can realize itself in a sensuous world. Broadly speaking, these conditions are those which make possible a combination of virtue and happiness, that is to say, the idea of a sumnum bonum which combines in itself the idea of a supremum bonum or the highest good, that is, virtue, and
that of a *consummatum bonum* or a whole and complete good that includes happiness. The required conditions, therefore, which make it possible for the moral law to realize itself, are those which make possible a combination of virtue and happiness. In order to understand how this combination is possible, we have to make a distinction between phenomena and noumena—a distinction which has already proved itself very useful, inasmuch as it has enabled us in the *Critique of Pure Reason* to get over the antinomy between natural necessity and freedom. As Caird puts it (*The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, 2nd edition, Vol. II, p. 171), "If we look merely to the connection of events with each other as phenomena in the world of sense, we must recognize that there is no necessary connection between the virtuous will, as manifesting itself in certain actions in the phenomenal world, and happiness as a resulting state. But if we think of ourselves as noumena in an intelligible world, and of the relation of our noumenal existence, we can conceive that the virtuous Will, if not immediately, yet mediately (through an intelligible Author of nature) may be necessarily combined with happiness as an effect in the world of sense, though this combination would be quite accidental if we looked to the world of sense alone. It appears, therefore, that the antinomy which arises when we try to connect virtue and happiness (such a connection being necessary according to natural laws) is due to a confusion between the relations of phenomena to each other and the relation of things in themselves to these phenomena. An intelligible Author of nature, therefore, is one of the postulates which make the realization of moral life possible. Immortality of the soul is another, for before we realize the combination of virtue and happiness, it is necessary to realize virtue. And as the realization of virtue is impossible in the brief span of this life, there must be other lives also after the end of this one. In other words, the continued existence of the soul after death is the necessary condition for the realization of virtue. Thus the two great truths of religion, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, are necessary conditions for the realization of the moral law."

Thus, God and the immortality of the soul are truths which exist for Kant only for the sake of the moral life. What is this but a form of occasionalism as bad as that of Berkeley or Descartes? Poor Berkeley was subjected to no end of ridicule for suggesting that God exists in order to make the continued existence of things possible. But the great Immanuel Kant has so far gone scot-free,
although he suggested something no less monstrous, namely, that God and the soul exist only for the sake of the moral life. It is true he made a different approach to these truths in his Critique of Judgment and presented nature itself as revealing a Divine Purpose, but this presentation has only value as giving us a subjective satisfaction and does not entitle us to say that nature as an objective Reality is itself governed by any Teleological Idea. Nor is the position very much improved in his essay on The Idea of Universal History and his treatise on Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason.

The contrast with the position of the Gita is here very glaring. For the Gita it is not God who exists for the moral life but it is the moral life which exists for God. The Gita declares in unequivocal terms the hand of God in every action of man:

"The Lord dwelleth in the hearts of all beings and by His Māyā, he turns them round and round, as if mounted on a potter's wheel.

"In Him take refuge with all thy being, O Bhārata; by His grace thou shalt obtain supreme peace and the eternal status." (18. 61–62.)

In still more emphatic terms it declares:

"Abandoning all duties, take shelter in Me alone. I will liberate thee from all sins." (18. 66.)

Thinking of oneself as the sole determining factor in one's action (without which for Kant no moral action is possible) is for the Gita a sign of egoism and its abrogation a supreme necessity:

"Fixing thy thought on Me, thou shalt, by My grace, overcome all difficulties; but if from egoism, thou wilt not listen to me, thou shalt perish." (18. 58.)

The Gita's standpoint is theocentric, whereas the Kantian standpoint is not only anthropocentric but extremely individualistic. Kant looks at the problem of morality from the standpoint of the individual human consciousness. He has not been able to rise even to the social standpoint, not to speak of the cosmic and supracosmic standpoint, of the Gita.
THE RELATION BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

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For centuries the Orient has had to reckon with and adjust itself to the ideas and attendant acts of the Occident. Recent events in Asia signify that the Asian peoples henceforth intend to speak for themselves and to insist upon Western peoples' listening to and reckoning with what they say. This means that forthwith the practical issues of the world can be understood and effectively resolved only if they are envisaged as exemplifying and entailing a meeting of Oriental and Occidental ideologies.

To understand a given ideology is to analyse it into and grasp its basic assumptions. Philosophy is but the name for the basic assumptions of any subject-matter. Hence, the importance of becoming clear with respect to the relation between Eastern and Western philosophy.

For the purposes of this paper we shall restrict the expression "Oriental philosophy" to the four major Far Eastern systems—Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. The Middle Eastern Mohammadan element in Oriental philosophy, since Mohammadanism is one of the three major Semitic theistic religions, will be regarded as in part a special case of a Western type of philosophy and theology and in part a compound of Western philosophy and theology and of Far Eastern philosophical and religious doctrine.

Two main positions have been affirmed with respect to the relation between Oriental and Occidental philosophy and with respect to what must be assumed if the two civilizations are to meet, as they are now meeting, without conflict ideologically and mutual destruction economically, politically, and militarily. The first and the most generally accepted of these two main positions is that at bottom the philosophies of the two cultures are identical, all differences being secondary and even superficial.
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The other position, which this paper will defend, is that the traditional philosophies of these two great polar civilizations of the world rest on basically different assumptions, both of which are true.

One logical point of very important practical consequences may be noted immediately. The defenders of the first position often affirm that, unless their position is correct, no reconciliation is possible between the East and the West, the assumption being that if the ideologies or basic philosophical premises of two cultures are different, then in the meeting of these two cultures one or the other must give way. The present ideological and political conflict in modern Western civilization between the Marxist Soviet Communist philosophy and the different philosophy of the traditional modern Western democracies seems to support this conclusion. What this overlooks, however, is that there can be two possible relations between the different basic philosophical premises of two different cultures or civilizations. As had been demonstrated in my recent book *The Meeting of East and West*, and as is obvious logically, the premises of two different systems may be (1) different but compatible, or they may be (2) different and incompatible. The latter possibility happens to be the case with respect to Marxist Soviet Russian Communism and the philosophy of the traditional modern Western democracies. This is the reason why reference to the latter conflict carries the weight it does with respect to the thesis that if two civilizations rest on different philosophies, conflict rather than reconciliation is inescapable. But as the foregoing analysis has shown, this is not the only possibility in the case of two basically different philosophical assumptions of two cultures. The assumptions may be different yet compatible.

The matter may be put algebraically. To show that $W$ can be reconciled with $E$ it is not necessary to show that $W = E$ is the case. $W$ can also be reconciled with $E$ if $W + E$ is the case. This means that reconciliation may be achieved between the civilizations and underlying philosophical premises of the Occident and the Orient by establishing either of two different formulae as true for the civilization of the world as a whole: the formula $W = E$ or the formula $W + E$. The latter formula permits the premises

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of the basic philosophies underlying the East and the West to be
different yet compatible.

Certain preliminary empirical considerations suggest that the
formula \( W + E \) is the true one. If the basic philosophical and
religious premises of the traditional East and the traditional West
are identical, then it becomes very difficult to explain why the
way of life, the religious institutions, and the art-forms of the
two civilizations should be so different or why the peoples of these
different civilizations have failed to understand one another in
the past. Wrong as we believe Kipling was with respect to the
future, he was certainly right with respect to the past.

Moral and humanistic considerations indicate the acceptance of
the equation \( W = E \) to be equally unfortunate. For if the philo-
sophies of the East and the West are at bottom identical, then
philosophers, religious leaders, and cultural anthropologists in the
two parts of the world have nothing basically important to learn
from one another. Furthermore, since, as the studies of many
cultural anthropologists and the inquiry carried through in my
Meeting of East and West have demonstrated, one's philosophical
premises define one's aims and values, the totality of values
which the different cultures of the world contribute to the civiliza-
tion of the world as a whole becomes very much less on the
first thesis than on the second. If \( W = E \), then the basic values
contributed by Oriental civilization and the basic values con-
tributed by Occidental civilization are identical. Thus nothing is to
be gained by combining the two systems of philosophy and the
two attendant sets of values. But if \( W \) and \( E \) are different yet
properly related by the relation of addition, according to the
expression \( W + E \), then the present meeting of East and West
can be a peaceful meeting which enriches the stock of philosophical
assumptions and the attendant cultural values of both parties to
the meeting. Each can learn something basically novel and en-
riching in philosophy, religion, and culture from the other.

But, of course, both of the foregoing considerations are irrelevant
if in fact the basic assumptions of traditional Oriental philosophy
are identical with those of traditional Western philosophy. Thus,
much as we might want the relation \( W + E \) rather than \( W = E \)
to be the case, our wants are irrelevant if an examination of the
premises of these two major philosophical developments of the
world shows the two sets of premises to be identical. To the
results of such an examination we now turn.
EASTERN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

We may best begin by taking an instance of the type of evidence which has led many Oriental thinkers and some Western thinkers to affirm that there is nothing in Oriental philosophy that cannot be found in Western philosophy and, conversely, nothing in traditional Western philosophy that cannot be found in the Orient. Such an instance is the thesis asserted in Indian, in Greek Democritean and Platonic, and in modern Idealistic philosophy that the true self, true reality, and the divine being are not given in but instead transcend the data of the senses. Text after text from systems of philosophy in the Eastern and Western worlds can be found to support this thesis. Ananda Coomaraswamy’s *Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought* contains many sentences of this type from Oriental and Western texts, piled up to establish the conclusion that $W = E$.

The sentences of the texts are there. They cannot be denied. Furthermore, even when the Sanskrit and the Greek or Latin are presented as Coomaraswamy presents both in English, no quarrel can be made, except occasionally, with the faithfulness of the translations so far as the Sanskrit-English or Greek- or Latin-English renderings are concerned. It would seem that one has no choice but to accept the conclusion that $W = E$.

Two considerations, however, must give one pause. It might very well be that there is an identical philosophy in the Orient for every specific philosophy in the West, and conversely, but that, nevertheless, the basic influential philosophies of these two parts of the world are different. In the Western world, for example, there have been a large number of different philosophies constructed, some of which have captured a majority of the people and gone into the definition of religious, economic, and political institutions, whereas others have been accepted and used as the guide to a way of life by only a very few devoted adherents. The philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas in the medieval Roman Catholic world as compared with the philosophy of Democritus in that period is an example in the West. Similarly, in the Orient countless Indian philosophers have pointed out that certain of their early philosophers developed a materialistic philosophy, but that the latter philosophy never captured people and had an influence comparable with its influence in the West. Thus it is quite possible that every philosophy in one part of the world has been developed also in the other part and yet that the philosophies

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actually moulding the two different civilizations of the East and the West which are now meeting should be basically different, the *predominant* philosophy in the East being other than the *predominant* philosophy in the West.

Coomaraswamy, however, maintains that the dominant philosophy in the West up through St. Thomas Aquinas is identical with that in the Orient. Thus, if he is right, at least for the pre-modern portion of Western civilization, the expression \( W = E \) rather than \( W + E \) defines the relation between traditional Eastern and traditional Western philosophy.

Other scholars have agreed with Coomaraswamy's thesis in support of the equation \( W = E \). Among these scholars, at least in many of his interpretations of Hindu doctrine, is the distinguished Professor Radhakrishnan, whom this volume is honouring. Deussen also must, in part at least, be added to the list. But such support turns out to be a liability rather than an asset with respect to this thesis. For the philosophy in the West which Deussen finds to be identical with that of India is the philosophy of Kant, who denied ontological knowledge, rather than that of St. Thomas and Aristotle, who made ontology basic. And in the case of Professor Radhakrishnan it is the Oxford semi-Hegelian absolute devoid of Hegel's dialectic rather than either the Kantian theoretical or practical *a priori* or the Thomistic, Aristotelian final cause with which Brahman and Ātman are, in part at least, identified. One must be slightly suspicious, therefore, of scholars who affirm an identity between Oriental and Western philosophical doctrines when the Western systems which they assert to be identical with the predominant philosophical systems of Hindu philosophy turn out to be not merely different but mutually contradictory. Certainly the latter relation of mutual incompatibility is the relation holding between the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, and the British Hegelians Green, Bosanquet, and Bradley.

Why, we may well ask, should scholars defending the identity between Eastern and Western philosophical doctrines pick such contradictory Western systems as identical with the predominant Vedāntā philosophy of Hinduism? The answer to this question brings us back to the dictionary renderings of the meanings of philosophical terms when one reads them in linguistic sentences. At this point the concrete example previously instanced becomes most relevant. Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and the Hegelians affirm that more than the senses are required to get
trustworthy and philosophically complete knowledge, just as do the major Far Eastern philosophies. But certainly in the case of Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel at least, quite different things are meant by this thesis. Is it not even more likely that quite different things from what either Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, or Hegel affirmed, are meant by the verbally similar theses of Oriental philosophy?

In the case of Democritus, this is obvious, since for him what transcended the senses were the atoms of the materialist and, as has been noted above, certainly the philosophy of Vedânta, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are not materialistic in the Democritean sense. May not the transcendental factors of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and the British absolute idealists be as different from the Oriental transcendental Brahman, Ātman, Nirvāṇa, Tao, or Jen as they are from one another or from the transcendent atoms of Democritus?

Enough evidence is now at hand, confirmed by both Oriental and Western investigators, to force us to answer this question in the affirmative. An affirmative answer, it is to be noted, establishes the true relation between the basic philosophies of the East and West to be $W + E$ rather than $W = E$.

It is important to note, before considering this evidence, what this means in terms of the methods of scholarship. Put very bluntly, it entails that traditional methods of scholarship in comparative philosophy are necessary but not sufficient. They neglect the fact that philosophical terms have different meanings in different philosophical systems. Consequently, when a Sinologist accurately renders a Chinese symbol into English as “mind,” and all the other symbols in a Chinese sentence into English in the same accurate manner, so that verbally one has an English sentence translated from a Chinese philosophical text which is identical with an English sentence from some Western philosophical text, this verbal identity by itself does not warrant the conclusion that there is an identity of philosophical meanings in the two cases. For what the word “mind” means in a given Chinese philosophy may be fundamentally different from what the word “mind” means in any Western philosophy. And the same thing may be true of all the other words in the verbally identical sentences taken from Chinese, Hindu, and Western philosophical texts. Thus the type of evidence such as that which Coomaraswamy has piled up in his aforementioned book, and
which purely philologically trained scholars compile, is, for the most part, inadequate to establish the identity of doctrine between any two philosophical systems, whether these systems be Western, Eastern, or both Western and Eastern.

The additional prerequisite is to be found in the primitive ideas of any two systems being compared. Primitive ideas are the ideas in any system taken as basic, elementary, or undefined in terms of which all other ideas in the system are defined and understood. This means that before any conclusions about identity or difference can be drawn from verbally identical sentences in two different philosophers' systems, one must take the sentence and ask of it two questions: (1) What must each word in this mean, assuming the entities and relations which the one particular philosopher affirms to be primitive?—and (2) What must each word in this sentence mean, assuming the factors as basic which the other philosopher affirms to be primitive? Consequently, before we can say anything about the relation between verbally identical sentences in the texts of Eastern and Western philosophers we must analyse the two philosophical systems as a whole to determine the basic primitive ideas or assumptions of each. If these primitive concepts turn out to be identical in the two philosophical systems, then verbally identical sentences in the texts of the two philosophers establish the relation of identity between the two philosophical systems. Conversely, if the primitive assumptions of the two philosophers' systems are different, then verbally identical sentences in two philosophical theories are evidences of a difference rather than an identity between the two philosophical doctrines.¹

It remains to show that this is the case with respect to specific sentences verbally identical in Eastern and Western philosophical theories. We shall begin with our previous example: the sentence "True reality transcends the senses."

It is to be noted that there is nothing in the sentence to indicate that the factor which transcends the specific data of the senses is the same factor in Oriental philosophy as in the traditional Western philosophies in question. Consequently, even from a purely linguistic standpoint the identity of sentences does not

¹ For more detailed development of this conclusion and its consequences, see my chapter in Philosophy: East and West, ed. by Charles A. Moore, Princeton University Press, 1940; also The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, Chs. III–VI and XXIII–XXIV, and The Meeting of East and West, Chs. VIII–XII.
guarantee an identity of philosophical meaning. The transcendence may be of a quite different kind in the two cases.

There is ample evidence that this is the case. The Oriental treatises almost universally¹ agree that the transcendent factor has two characteristics. First, it is immediately apprehended. Second, it is indeterminate in character.

The first of these two characteristics needs to be understood in methodological terms. By immediacy in the Oriental sense is meant the intuition of denotative experience, not the intellectual immediacy of the theoretic connotative intuition of ideas. Thus the Orient is continuously telling one that logical methods such as the Socratic and Platonic method of dichotomy or the Aristotelian method of genera and species or the Platonic dialectical method of formal analysis, or the Cartesian rational method in the formal logical sense of the word "rational," can never convey the ultimate reality which transcends the data of the senses. As the Upanishads often put it, it was here all the while. It merely has to be found among all the other things in the immediacy of one's concrete denotative, existential experience.

One hardly needs to point out that it is of the essence of the Platonic reality which transcends the senses that one can get to it first only by the scientific method of hypothesis, which takes one from the all-embracing denotative, existential world of immediacy to the imaginatively conceived world constituted of the "mathematicals" and then by passing on with a second rationalistic logical method called dialectic in which, to use Socrates' words, "one drops all images," grasping the transcendent reality purely in terms of ideas, without any recourse to denotative, existential sensations or images. Clearly, this is a transcendent reality two degrees removed from the concrete, denotative, existential continuum of immediacy which was here all the while and present before the Western formal logical methods made articulate by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were applied. In other words, the transcendental factor of Oriental philosophy is something immediately and denotatively present before the Western logical methods of hypothesis and dialectic are applied; whereas the transcendental factor in Western philosophy is something connotatively known to which the logical, dialectical scientific and philosophical methods of the West take one and without which this Western transcendental reality cannot be known. As

¹ See footnote on previous page.
Socrates says explicitly in Book VII of the *Republic*, it is only by applying the Western scientific method of hypothesis to the immediately apprehended world of immediacy, thereby arriving at the hypothetical, indirectly verified knowledge designated in scientific hypotheses of the Western type and by applying the method of dialectic to these hypotheses that one arrives at true knowledge and the factor which transcends the immediately apprehended data of the senses.

To be sure, Socrates says also that what one arrives at by these two logical methods can be known only by being it and by means of immediate intuition. But this Socratic, Platonic, Western type of intuition, as he makes explicit, is an intellectual intuition of connotative universals; it is not the intuition of the Orient which, even in the case of Nirvāṇa and Tao and Brahman and Jen, is an intuition of an existential denotative particular. To be sure also, Socrates and Plato, in the doctrine of reminiscence, say that what is known in the final intuition was there all along, momentarily forgotten and merely recalled. But again what was there all the time is a connotative and intellectually known reality, not a denotative, existential particular. It is the great merit of the method of pure description (*reine Beschreibung*) of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy in the recent modern West to have shown that connotative universals, or what he termed *Wesen*, are immediately apprehended just as much as are the Western nominalists' and the Orientals' denotative, existential particulars.

The meaning of the term "existential" requires special attention. Throughout this paper it is used in the sense of the existentialist philosophy of Heidegger and Sartre, as meaning that reality, in part at least, is a unique, purely denotative particular, not something designated by a class concept or universal, requiring something like Plato's intellectual reminiscence, Aristotle's active intellect, Kant's *a-priori* forms and categories, or Hegel's absolute concrete universal in order to be known. In other words, the aesthetic or existential intuition gives reality solely as an instance *qua* instance, never as the instance of universal or general rule. It is identical with Aristotle's prime matter, which is the individuating component in things. The intellectual intuition, on the other hand, gives reality as a universal *qua* universal or general rule of which the particular reality given to the existential intuition is an instance. The thesis of the paper that $W + E$ is the case is in these terms the thesis that the reality of the aesthetic or
existential intuition, and the reality of the intellectual intuition, both exist and contain factors transcending the senses and that neither can be derived from the other.¹

What this means is that there are two types of intuition, and since intuition always involves immediacy, and immediacy is the essence of mysticism, there are two types of mysticism in the world, the one the intuition and mysticism of the empirical, particular, existential Oriental type, the other the intuition of the formal, logical, intellectual Platonic type. The former intuition exhibits empirically immediate reality, from which the logical, formal, scientific, and philosophical methods of the West take their inception. The intellectual intuition reveals reality as known only by means of ideas and theory expressed in terms of general laws or propositions involving terms which are universals rather than particulars, and requiring the scientific and philosophical methods of the West for their discovery and verification.

Since the existential, denotative, exclusively empirical reality of the Oriental intuition is the continuum of immediacy which is shot through with feeling, containing the transitory sensed pains, pleasures, colours, sounds, and odours which are the raw materials with which the artist works, it seems appropriate, as was indicated in The Meeting of East and West, to term the reality known by the Oriental intuition the aesthetic,² or existential, component of reality. In accordance with this usage the Oriental intuition may be distinguished from the Western intuition by being termed the aesthetic or existential intuition.

Since Western scientific and philosophical knowledge entails the use of hypothesis and the introduction of entities and relations not immediately apprehended empirically by the existential, or aesthetic, intuition, but instead known only by means of ideas, logically formulated propositions, and theory, it is appropriate to designate this component of reality which transcends the senses as the theoretic component. Accordingly, Western intuition is

¹ For this thesis as applied merely to the contemporary Western existentialists and Hegel, without any reference to the attendantly different meanings of transcendence, see a paper by Paul Weiss in the Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VIII, pp. 206-216, entitled "Existenz and Hegel." For the importance of the aesthetic or existential intuition in Spanish and Latin-American as well as Oriental culture, see The Meeting of East and West, pp. 15-65 and 461-464.

² This use of the word "aesthetic" to designate the concrete has been misunderstood by some, but not all, Eastern and Western readers of my Meeting of East and West. I hope the addition of the adjective "existential" will prevent this misunderstanding.
appropriately designated as the theoretic intuition or the intuition of the connotative intellect in contradistinction to the Oriental existential or aesthetic intuition.

But, it may be asked, if Oriental knowledge and the reality which it designates are known purely empirically with denotative, existential immediacy, how then can the Oriental speak about a true self and a true reality which transcend the data of the senses? The answer to this question has been given previously in my article entitled "The Complementary Emphases of Oriental Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy" and in The Meeting of East and West. A careful examination of what we immediately apprehend in the existential, purely denotative, exclusively empirical sense of immediate apprehension indicates that more is given than the diverse differentiated data of the senses. There is also the immediately apprehended continuum, the periphery of which, as William James in the West and the philosophers of the East have emphasized, is indeterminate. Any determinate data given through any one of the specific senses is always immediately apprehended in this all-embracing continuum. Moreover, the specific senses give only the transitory differentiations in this immediately apprehended continuum—not the continuum itself. Thus in the realm of the purely denotative component of reality of the exclusively empirical aesthetic intuition there is a factor which transcends the data of the senses. This factor is the ocean of empirical immediacy considered apart from the determinate waves given by the specific senses which distinguish one part of the ocean from another. The sensed waves come and go and hence are transitory. But no matter how often and inevitably the waves come into being and pass out of being, the ocean of existential, purely denotative immediacy remains. Moreover, it is immediately apprehended by all observers; in fact, each observer as knower is immersed in it. Hence it is common knowledge, the same for all men, thereby escaping the relativity attaching to knowledge of the sensed differentiations within it also, it is the immortal part of the knower, hence his true self or ātman, as well as the immortal part or Brahman, of the object known. Furthermore, when this immortal part of the knower and of the object is known apart from the transitory sensed portion of the self (purusha) and the transitory sensed portion of the object (prakṛti) the distinction between knower and object known vanishes.

1 Philosophy: East and West, edited by Charles A. Moore, loc. cit.
Hence, Brahman or the cosmical principle in the universal and ātman or the psychical principle in the self are one.

This ocean or continuum of immediacy, since it is immediately apprehended by the purely existential, or aesthetic, intuition, without any recourse to the Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian, or modern scientific intellectual theoretic intuition, is appropriately called the aesthetic or existential continuum. And since the part of this continuum which transcends the senses is undifferentiated, the transcendental reality of Oriental philosophy and religion is appropriately denoted as the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum. Thus, solely within the realm of the exclusively empirical knowledge of the aesthetic or existential intuition, there is ample meaning for the Oriental thesis that there is a reality transcending the data of the senses.

The reality transcending the data of the senses for the Western scientist and philosopher, however, is of a fundamentally different kind, as its previous relation to the logical methods of Western science and philosophy clearly indicate. When the Westerner asserts that there is a reality transcending the data of the senses, he does not mean another empirical factor in the realm of the denotative, existential immediacy of the aesthetic intuition. In other words, he does not mean a factor in the aesthetic continuum. He means, instead, a component of reality not grasped by the denotative aesthetic intuition at all—a reality which cannot be shown, which can only be said.

But even a reality which is known theoretically rather than purely empirically must none the less be known with immediacy. For otherwise the knower could not contact it, even in thought. But this immediacy in the Western sense is the immediacy to the formal intellect, not the denotative, purely empirical aesthetic, existential immediacy of the Orient.

The transcendent reality of the Westerner presupposes and requires the empirical reality of the Oriental for its verification but not for its meaning. The transcendent reality of the Oriental does not require the existence of the transcendent reality of the West. Descartes' attempt to deduce the theoretically known Western transcendent factor from the indubitable existential doubting failed. Thus Orientals have been able to affirm that the Western type of reality arrived at by logical methods is illusory. But the fact that the Oriental existential transcendent reality does not imply the Western theoretic transcendent factor does
not prove that the latter is illusory and non-existent. It proves merely that if there is evidence, as there is, for the Western theoretically known transcendent reality, as well as for the Oriental existential transcendent reality, then philosophical assumptions in addition to those of the Orient are required.

The Oriental transcendent factor differs from the Western transcendent factor in another respect. It is indeterminate, whereas the Western transcendent reality is determinate. To use the language of Plato’s *Philebus*, the Oriental transcendent factor is the indeterminate continuum of the class of the infinite, whereas the Western transcendent factor is the class of the determinate limit. It is precisely because the Western transcendent reality is determinate in character that there is the determinate theistic divinity of the West who comes into the Oriental intuitive world of existential aesthetic immediacy to literally reorganize, reorder, and reconstruct its differentiations. The Oriental transcendent indeterminate factor cannot transform and reorganize the determinate empirical world of existential immediacy; it can merely enable one to live in the midst of the *de facto* existential differentiations with equanimity. Thus the Western transcendent factor was not in the world of existential immediacy all the while, needing merely to be pointed out, as is the case with the Oriental Nirvana, Brahman, Âtman, *Tao*, and *Jen*. Instead, it only gets into the world of empirical immediacy when grasped by bodily men as an idea of the good and used by them to guide their bodily conduct and their social behaviour in ways that transform and reorganize the empirically given determinate existential particulars. Put in Western theological language, it only becomes evident in the aesthetic, existential continuum of the Oriental intuition when a divinely constituted being miraculously exhibits divinity empirically in historical, earthly time.

Recently certain Indian scholars have come to this same conclusion with respect to the difference between the basic primitive factors in Oriental and Western philosophy. A notable instance appears in A. C. Mukherji’s *The Nature of the Self*. After indicating that the true self, according to Sankara, “is neither an object of external nor of internal perception, yet its reality cannot be denied,”1 then Mr. Mukerji notes, in turning to Sankara’s explanation of the Absolute or *Brahman*, that “the self is given in an immediate ex-

perience, it is also an Absolute Immediate Experience."\textsuperscript{1} This makes it clear that the factor in Indian philosophy which transcends the senses is the immediately apprehended transcendent factor of the aesthetic or existential intuition, not the theoretically conceived transcendent factor of the Western theoretic intuition.

Mr. Mukerji also draws this conclusion, for he immediately writes, "It is evident then that there is a deep chasm between the advaita absolutism and its modern (Western) type. Immediate experience is the very heart of Sankara's absolutism, whereas Hegel would never tolerate pure immediacy in absolutism, and this was at the root of his well-known criticism of the unmittelbare Wissen of Jacobi."\textsuperscript{2} Mr. Mukerji adds, "Sankara's absolutism is nothing if it is shorn of immediate experience."\textsuperscript{3}

Mr. Mukerji's conclusion is all the more telling because in the earlier chapter of his volume he has worked through and shown an acute understanding of Kant, Hegel, and the British Hegelians, Green, E. Caird, Bradley, and Bosanquet. That the Absolute of Sankara which transcends the senses is not to be identified with the Platonic transcendent reality of ancient Western philosophy Mr. Mukerji notes also. The latter type of Absolute, he writes, "cannot serve as an explanatory principle of human . . . experience. . . . The Absolute," he continues, "that may be of any use for interpreting ordinary experience must be an immanent principle, and not the denizen of an alien world like the world of Plato's ideas."\textsuperscript{4}

Returning again to a consideration of modern idealism, Mr. Mukerji concludes, "The fundamental difference between these two types of absolutism lies in this that while Hegelian absolutism will not tolerate immediate experience as a test of truth and reality, the central point in the doctrine of self which is expounded here (the traditional Hindu doctrine as formulated by Sankara) consists in its emphasis on immediacy. Even J. Royce, the distinguished absolutist of America, who recognizes in mysticism a definite philosophical attitude, rejects it as unsatisfactory for its unmediated immediacy. Consequently, the apparent similarity between the language of Hegelian absolutism with that of the advaita position must not be construed as a fundamental identity of views, though many interpreters of Sankara have fallen into this mistake."\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1} A. C. Mukerji, The Nature of the Self, The Indian Press, Allahabad, 1938, p. 262. \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 265. \textsuperscript{3} Ibid., p. 266. \textsuperscript{4} Ibid., p. 306. \textsuperscript{5} Ibid., pp. 310-311.
Mr. Mukerji notes also that the Oriental transcendent factor differs from the Western transcendent factor not merely with respect to the difference between immediately experienced reality and reality known only theoretically by means of ideas, but also with respect to the difference between indeterminate reality. The Oriental transcendent reality, Mr. Mukerji notes, is indeterminate whereas he adds that "so far as Hegel himself is concerned, it is but common knowledge that Reality, for him, is not to be found in the Indeterminate Being which is taken to be indistinguishable from pure Nothing."¹

Nor does Bradley help those who would attempt to establish an identity between the basic philosophy of the Orient and that of the traditional Greek or modern West. "The only modern absolutist," Mr. Mukerji writes, "who has tried to develop a doctrine of Reality through a combination of the doctrine of the concrete universal with immediate experience is F. H. Bradley, and he has failed utterly and unmistakably [as Mr. Mukerji has shown in a previous chapter of his book], and this ought to be taken as an important lesson by subsequent philosophers. The truth is that they are inherently irreconcilable."² It appears, therefore, that certain Indian scholars, quite independently, have come to the same conclusion as that expressed by the present writer in the publications referred to earlier in this paper.

With respect to Mr. Mukerji's thesis to the effect that the Hegelian absolute and immediacy of experience are irreconcilable, one important qualification is to be noted. They are irreconcilable if one attempts, as Bradley did, to identify the transcendent reality of the theoretic intuition with the immanent factor transcending the senses of the aesthetic intuition. But there is no need of relating these two things by the relation of identity. Even when it becomes clear, as the foregoing considerations have indicated, that the basic philosophy of the traditional East is different from that of the traditional West, the two are nevertheless not necessarily irreconcilable. But transcendent factors can exist and be real if the relation between them is $W + E$.

It has been the genius of Oriental civilization to have demonstrated the existence of the factor transcending the senses which is immediately apprehended by the denotative, existential, aesthetic intuition. It is the genius of the West to have demon-

² Ibid., pp. 311–312.
strated that there is a reality transcending the senses knowable only by means of ideas to the connotative theoretic intuition. The East and the West together, therefore, demonstrate that both realities exist.

The crucial question: are these two different realities, the one discovered and formulated by Eastern sages, the other by Western men of wisdom, compatible or incompatible? An examination of the relation between them should answer this important question.

In Chapter XII of my *Meeting of East and West* the relation between these two components of reality has been investigated and determined. This relation is the two-termed relation of epistemic correlation, rather than the traditionally assumed threetermed relation of appearance. This means that the West cannot dismiss the Oriental, indeterminate, immediately experienced factor transcending the senses as mere appearance or as evil, as Plato, Aristotle, Galilei, Newton, Hegel, and Royce tended to do. Nor can the Orient dismiss the Western determinate, theoretically known, transcendent reality as illusory and unreal. In short, the basic predominant philosophies of the Orient and the Occident are different, yet both civilizations can combine without conflict because the formula which relates them is \( W + E \).

Important moral, cultural, and practical consequences of this conclusion must not be overlooked. It enables that Western philosophers and religious leaders must give up their prevalent notion that Eastern philosophy at best only says vaguely what Western philosophy says clearly and that Oriental religion only says imperfectly or negatively what Western religion says perfectly and positively. There are basic philosophical and religious truths in the Orient that are not in the West. It entails, also, conversely, that Oriental philosophers and religious sages must give up their prevalent notion that all the philosophical and religious truths and values defining the ends of life are in the Orient and that all the Orient needs to learn from the West are its instrumental, technological values of applied science. Western science generates not merely its applications in engineering and technology but also its theory of man as scientific knower and reality as scientifically known, thereby verifying and sustaining Western philosophy and religion with its theoretic transcendentental factor of the intellectual intuition. This theoretic transcendent reality of the intellectual intuition defines ends and values quite different from and in addition to the ends and values given by the
transcendent reality of the Oriental denotative existential intuition. In short, Western science, philosophy, and religion have unique values, goals, and ends as well as efficient instruments to contribute to the Orient. There are basic truths and values in the West which are not in the Orient. The whole truth is W + E, neither W = E nor W is merely instrumental to E.
THE UNIVERSAL IN THE WESTERN AND THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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I

Hegel said long ago that, in Western philosophy, Socrates emancipated the concept from existence, whereas in Indian philosophy the concept remains merged in existence; Professor Northrop now says that the universal in Western philosophy is conceptual, whereas in the philosophies of the East it is intuitive and aesthetic. It would be profitable therefore to probe into the problem, study how the two universals differ and see how they can be made to fit into each other. The importance of the problem is obvious to all those who feel that the oneness of our world now needs a world philosophy.

It is the opinion of some Western thinkers that the Socratic emancipation of the concept or universal from existence is responsible for the progress of science and scientific thought in the West and that the absence of a similar emancipation in the East explains its lack of interest in science. To this may be contrasted the view of those who think that Greek thought is not particularly favourable to positive science. For instance, G. J. Frazer writes: "He [Plato] assumed that there is an absolute Beauty, Greatness, etc., and maintained that the cause of things being beautiful, good, great, etc., was that they partook of the absolute Beauty, etc. . . . This . . . is extremely interesting and instructive as throwing light not only on Platonic philosophy, but also upon the modes of Greek thought in general, and particularly as helping to account for the acknowledged failure of the Greeks in the domain of the physical science."¹ "For that long passivity which must precede the discovery of natural laws a more phlegmatic and less intellectual nature than that of the Greeks was needed, and such a nature was supplied by the northern nations."² But why have the

¹ Plato's Ideal Theory, pp. 63-64.
² Ibid., p. 65.
Greeks failed in the domain of physical science? Though Socrates was the first to discover the concept or the universal, he did not give us a systematic philosophy of his own; and almost everything that we know of him, we know through his disciple, Plato, the first great philosopher of the West. But Plato's interest, like that of every other Greek thinker, was ethical. Lutoslawski writes: "The character of Socrates' philosophy was also mainly ethical, and this authorizes us to see the predominance of Socratic influence in those dialogues which are limited to ethical enquiry. Plato's own philosophy has another character: he was rather a politician, a metaphysician and a logician than a simple moralist. He set perfection above mere virtue, and even despised the traditional virtue of the common citizen, which was the starting-point of Socratic ethics." 1 The distinction which Lutoslawski here draws is not of importance for our present discussion. Whether it is perfection or the ethical standard of the common man, it is the norm in which both Socrates and Plato were interested; and their attitude is therefore not naturalistic but ethical in the wider rationalized sense of the word. Ritter also writes: "It can readily be seen from the account which this dialogue [Parmenides] gives that Plato, from the time he began to transcend the individual experiences and to seek to ground them in universal concepts, did not at first care to demand originals for the concrete objects. He began with the concepts of form and value—these above all appeared to him to be incontestably rightly formed—and the dispute about the concepts of moral values was to him, as a disciple of Socrates, of the greatest importance and its clarification the most pressing need." 2 That is why in many of the earlier dialogues there are no ideas (universals) of material and evil things. Neither in the Phaedrus, 3 nor even in the Phaedo, 4 does Plato show interest in them. Even in the Republic Plato does not discuss them; the Ideas of material things are admitted only in the the Xth Book. Frazer therefore rightly concludes that Plato did not start the Ideal theory "as a means of explaining all our general notions." 5

Plato's Ideas are therefore forms and values. And forms were values. The nature of a thing can be understood from a normal conception of it; and the normal conception thus becomes the

1 Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic, p. 196.
2 The Essence of Plato's Philosophy, p. 159.
3 Plato's Ideal Theory, p. 48.
4 Ibid., p. 58.
5 Ibid., p. 51.
norm or ideal. This is the view reached by Plato in his *Statesman*. But the norm again supplies the truth of the object; for what the object truly is can be known only through its normal conception. Further, the Idea is being also. Plato's starting point is his dissatisfaction with the relativity of knowledge gained through sense experience. The objects of sense perception are changing and are relative to the percipient, whereas the universals do not change and are common to all percipients. What a thing truly is can be known only when it is abstracted from the relativity of sense perception. In truth, a thing therefore is the universal and the universal is the object of reason. Consequently, the universal alone has being; the particular partakes of non-being in so far as it is vitiated by relativity and change.

As the being of an object is its Idea, the Idea is therefore self-subsistent. It is a substance, for substance is what subsists by itself and is permanent.\(^1\) Thus the Idea is the unconditioned reality;\(^2\) and as an Ideal, it is the absolutely existing substance.\(^3\) Thus Idea, Ideal, value, form, universal, Being, Substance, Truth, and Reality become identical in Plato's philosophy.

The Idea is stable and eternal. It is the perfection and completion of what is actual. The actual strives to complete itself and so to become the Ideal. The Ideal or Idea thus becomes dynamic, though itself belongs to the realm of static Being. It is a final cause. Causation, therefore, in Plato's philosophy, is not a horizontal process, in which one actual thing acts upon another actual thing, but a vertical process, in which each actual thing strives to realize its Idea.

But the realm of Ideas is not a realm of isolated entities. Ideas are related to each other as parts of a whole.\(^4\) But how are we to establish the interconnections between the Ideas? Windelband says that our knowledge of the systematic connection and order in the realm of Ideas is obscure.\(^5\) For Plato, the Idea of the Good is the highest all-embracing Idea: it realizes all the rest in itself. But its content is not clear. It is the final cause of everything, the absolute end of all reality. The world of Ideas as a whole, and in particular the highest Idea, the Idea of the Good, is the final cause of all occurrence. Plato designates it as the World-reason (*nous*) or as the Deity.\(^6\)

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\(^1\) Lutoslawski, *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, p. 222.
This dominant ethical motive of Plato's philosophy left the confusion uncleared not only, as Zeller says, between reason and efficient cause, but also between the final and efficient cause, and further between the class concept and particular on the one side and the ideal and the actual on the other. We do not raise the question whether Plato is right or wrong; our interest lies only in noting this peculiar and important point. The Idea is not only the ideal but also the class concept. The interconnections between the Ideas, therefore, should correspond to the interconnections between classes. The hierarchy of Ideas should correspond to the hierarchy of genera and species. But what, then, would be the principle controlling the subsumption of the lower under the higher class? Plato supplies us no logical criterion. Windelband writes: "The subordination of the other Ideas to the highest Idea (the Good) is accordingly not the logical subordination of a particular Idea under the general, but the teleological of the means to the end." Plato's classification, therefore, can be neither logical nor natural but teleological. The genus is not more abstract than the species but more perfect. Plato would not, for instance, classify man under animal, but under what man ought to be. Yet he did not draw a distinction between the natural and teleological classification. He has a reason therefor. If the concept of man is that of the normal man, the Idea of man would be the norm with the help of which man is recognized and under which individual men are classified. Similarly, the Idea higher than that of man must also be a norm. Consequently, this classification would be a classification of norms and ideals, of means and ends, but not of natural genera and species.

Dialectic, says Zeller, has a double task, the formation of concepts and their classification. The method by which Plato attempts to form concepts is clear. Socrates used dialectic to form them. Plato developed and transformed it into a sort of intuition that works by recollecting. But how are the particulars to be deduced from their Idea? Plato has no understandable method. The Idea is the norm of the particular, is its Being, Truth and Reality. Then what would the particular be with reference to the Idea? Plato drew the natural conclusion from his premises:

1 Plato and the Older Academy, p. 285.
2 Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 250, and Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, p. 238.
3 Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 122.
4 Plato and the Older Academy, p. 198.
5 Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 117.
particular is an imperfect copy of the Idea, its imitation. The particular exists in so far as it partakes of the Idea, which is Being. It is a combination of Being and non-Being. The lower can be deduced from the higher by introducing non-Being, that is, negation or privation. The lower has less of Being than the higher.

Plato's classification and deduction, though they may be consistent with the predominant ethical motive of his philosophy, could not be regarded by modern philosophers as logical and scientific. Aristotle, with his logical bent of mind, was naturally dissatisfied with Plato. He wanted to make the relation between the general and the particular logical. Plato made the way from the particular to the general clear. But the way from the general to the particular was not at all clear, because it was not logical. Aristotle felt that the particular should be capable of being derived from the general. Hence he formulated the syllogism. Still, the starting point of the syllogism, the major premise, was obtained by dialectic. The development of induction, in the modern sense of the term, belongs to the sixteenth century and after, but not to the age of the Greeks.

The advance which Aristotle made from Plato lies in the former's bringing down the Idea from the mythical realm to the realm of actuality. Ideas do not have a life of their own, but are to be found in the particulars. The Idea is a real object, an object in its perfect state, towards which the less perfect objects of its class progress. So, as Windelband says, the "relation between the lower to the higher is development. But the final cause, not separated from the phenomena, is also an object. The essence (Idea) is thus an object. The essence unfolds in the phenomena themselves." Windelband further says: "The central point of the Aristotelian philosophy lies, therefore, in the new conception of the cosmic process as the realization of the essence in the phenomenon, and the respect in which it is opposed to the earlier explanation of Nature consists therefore in carrying through in conceptions the teleology which Plato had only set up as postulate, and developed in mythical, figurative forms." Thus nature becomes an interconnected system of living beings, in which matter develops from form to form until it becomes the highest Being, namely, the Deity. But matter is not non-Being, as Plato maintained; and there is nothing which is absolute matter. The distinction between

1 Windelband, History of Philosophy, p. 133.
2 Ibid., p. 139.
3 Ibid., p. 140.
4 Ibid., p. 139, and Werner Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 93 and 118.
matter and form is only relative. As against the Platonic doctrine, *universalia ante rem*, Aristotle upheld the doctrine, *universalia in re*. But the highest Idea is a pure form; it is the thought of thought, self-consciousness, the Deity. It is the soul in its purity. The soul, according to Aristotle, is not detached from the body or matter, but is its form. The distinction between body and soul is the distinction between matter and form. Aristotle calls the soul or mind the entelechy of the body.

Though Aristotle introduced syllogism, he was not able to reconcile the method of deducing the particular from the universal with that of deriving the universal from the particulars. For the former requires that the universal should be treated as a class concept possessing only characteristics belonging to all the members of the class; but the latter method demands that the universal should be the *telos* or the final cause of the particular. The same difficulty is met with, whether the relation considered is that between the particular and the universal or that between the genus and the species. For instance, it would be absurd to say that the genus animal is the final cause of the species man; but in any syllogism and a corresponding classification we treat animal as a higher class than man. This difficulty has finally to be traced, as in Plato’s philosophy, to the dominant ethical motive of the whole of Greek philosophy, including Aristotle’s.

In medieval philosophy, the theories of Plato and Aristotle were adopted by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Whichever theory was adopted, the general tendency was to equate God to Being and deduce the world by applying the principle of non-Being. This was the fashion of Neo-Platonism, inherited by medieval thinkers. Another feature of medieval philosophy is treating the Ideas as existing in the mind of God. Further, the Greek way of treating the Idea as the final cause or perfection of the actual, and of equating it to Being easily led to Anselm’s metaphysical argument for the existence of God. For God is the perfection of everything actual, and perfection is identical with Being; so God is Being and must have Being. If once we grant that the universal is the norm and that the norm alone has Being, we cannot escape the conclusion that God, as the perfection of everything, possesses the fullest Being.

In medieval philosophy, nominalism and conceptualism also have strong supporters in Marcianus Capella, Boethius and Roscellinus. Abelard attempted to reconcile the three doctrines,
universalia ante rem, in re, and post rem, by saying that the first is true with reference to the divine mind, the second with reference to nature, and the third with reference to human knowledge. As Ideas in the mind of God, the universals exist before the individuals; they exist in the individuals as likenesses of their essential characteristics; and they exist after things in the human understanding as concepts and predicates obtained by comparison and abstraction. Both conceptualism and nominalism are forms of the doctrine universalia post rem.

In the beginning of modern European philosophy, the controversy about the reality of the universals took the form of the controversy about the reality of innate ideas, Locke upholding their unreality and Leibnitz their reality. The supporters of their reality maintained that all ideas including those of objects like horses and chairs, were innate; and their rivals contended that none was innate. Leibnitz treated all cognitions as innate and Locke said that all knowledge was derived from direct experience. The universals were naturally concepts for the latter, obtained by abstraction from the particulars; but Leibnitz, like Plato, tended to treat the perception of particulars as imperfect thought.

Kant tried to reconcile the two views by identifying the innate ideas with categories, and reached the Platonic conception of the Idea as the ideal or perfection of the particular in his theory of the Ideas of Reason. Categories belong to the understanding, but Ideas to reason. Categories build up Nature and form its constituent parts, but Ideas are above Nature and experience, and are only regulative principles of experience. Kant's Ideas, though they are final causes and ideals in a sense like Plato's, have no Being. Hence we find no attempt in Kant to deduce the world of plurality from the highest Idea by introducing the principle of negation or non-Being into it. But he felt that the highest Idea seemed to be derivable as if by a series of pro-syllogisms from the lower; while Aristotle felt that the lower should be deduced syllogistically from the higher. But the details of the deduction were not worked out by either.

In Kant's philosophy, neither the categories nor the Ideas are obtained by comparison and abstraction from the particulars, but by the critical or transcendental method as postulates. But while the Supreme Ideal of Reason has the Platonic import of perfection, the categories do not have it; and though they are said to constitute experience, they are treated as if they have a life of
their own in the percipient subject apart from the particulars. The Ideas thus would always be ante rem, but the categories would be both ante rem and in re.

The British Hegelians, particularly Bradley and Bosanquet, brought to the forefront the problem of the concrete universal. The controversy shifted from realism versus conceptualism to the abstract versus concrete universal. In the conceptual reconstruction of the world in their philosophy, the Absolute includes everything, and as such subsists by itself without deriving its subsistence from anything outside. And as containing everything, it is the concrete and the only ultimate individual. It is both conceptual and sensuous. Any of its elements taken by itself is an abstraction from the rest, and so cannot subsist by itself. And as individuality implies self-subsistence, no isolated element can be an individual. What is real, therefore, is only the individual. Bradley says: "The abstract universal and the abstract particular are what does not exist. The concrete particular and the concrete universal both have reality, and they are different names for the individual." And Bosanquet includes under the concrete universal the generic concept as opposed to the accidental predicate, the individual as opposed to what is usually regarded as the universal, and system as opposed to class. This is the logical result of the attempt to reconstruct reality conceptually, which is another name for philosophical explanation of the universe.

Even if we do not identify the concrete universal with the Absolute Individual, the former must be such as to contain not only the principle determining its kinds, that is, not only the principle of differentiation, but also the principle of the existence or Being of the differentiations. Foster gives the Roman Catholic Church, the Renaissance, etc., as examples. The general tendency of all these views is characterized by the desire to see the universal in reality itself and to treat it not only as Being and as conferring Being upon its kinds but also as determining them and so as dynamic. This is the old Platonic aim in its naturalistic form. But we should say that, in Bradley and Bosanquet, the Absolute, which is the only true concrete universal, assumes the role of Kant's Supreme Ideal of Reason and so retains the features of the perfectionism of Plato and Aristotle. But whereas Kant's Ideal

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remains detached from the concrete world, the Absolute is often spoken of as the World as a Whole.

The very idea of the concrete universal implies that there are universals which are abstract. But the abstract universals include not only the conceptual abstractions, like redness, but also universals less perfect and complete than the Absolute, universals that cannot determine their own differentiation, and those that do not contain the principle of existence of their kinds.

Reference should be made here to the views of Santayana and Whitehead. Santayana calls the universals by the name essences. They belong neither to the subject nor to the object, and do not exist as such. In his philosophy, they are therefore devoid of Being, though eternal. Whitehead calls them eternal objects, deprives them of existence, and relegates them to the realm of possibility. Though Whitehead claims that his philosophy is Platonic, he practically reverses Plato's position in treating universals as abstractions and depriving them of Being. Possibility is infinite; the eternal objects have an infinite number of interrelations. But all the interrelations are not actualized. In fact, actuality is due to an arbitrary limit put upon these interrelations, and the arbitrator is God. Just as, in Aristotle, God arbitrarily imparts movement to the static realm of Being, in Whitehead's philosophy God arbitrarily puts a check to the realm of possibility in order to actualize it.

II

So far some of the important views about the universal in Western philosophy have been given. Ancient Indian philosophy has a fairly large number of theories of the universal. Their controversies compare favourably in their dialectical subtleties with the Western. Hegel's remark may mislead some into thinking that Indian thought did not formulate definite theories of the universal. It did formulate its theories, but in its own way and with its own aims, which are not altogether alien to those of Western philosophy.

The school that tenaciously upheld the reality of the universal is the Nyāya. Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtras, is assigned by some scholars to the third century B.C., and by some others to the third century A.D. The Vaiseshikasūtras of Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiseshika school, are assigned by some to a century earlier or a century later. Both schools are realistic. The
sūtras are aphorisms systematically elaborating the views held and discussed for a long time. So the doctrine itself must have been older than the sūtras.

Gautama defines the universal (jāti, sāmānya) as what produces similar cognitions. Commentators further elaborate it by saying that the universal is what is eternal and inheres (samaveta) in many. The Naiyāyikas, or the followers of the Nyāya school, did not develop the method of induction as the sixteenth-century Western philosophers did for obtaining the universal. Plato, we have already pointed out, transformed the Socratic dialectic into his doctrine of Reminiscence for the cognition of the universal. The particular, which is an imitation of the universal, reminds us of the latter. What is remembered is naturally not perceived. But for Aristotle, the universal is perceived in the particular, because it exists in the particular. According to the Naiyāyikas also, the universal is perceived, not merely remembered; but while Aristotle says that it exists in the individual and is its very Being, the Naiyāyikas would say that it does not exist, but inheres in the individual. It is not only not the Being of the individual, but itself does not possess Being. In fact, Being (sattā) itself is one of the universals that inheres in individuals. Both for Plato and Aristotle, the universal is Substance itself; but for the Naiyāyikas, Substance is a different category from the universal. We may say that it is somewhat akin to the essence of Santayana’s, with the addition that Being itself is such an essence. The Naiyāyikas say that the universal has no Being (sattā); only Substance (dravya), Quality (guna), and Activity (karma) possess Being (sattā). Being is the highest universal (para). But by “highest universal” they do not mean that it is the universal of all universals as the genus is of the species, but that it is found in all substances, qualities and activities.

The Nyāya school accepts seven categories of reality, Substance, Quality, Activity, Universal, Particular, Inherence, and Negation. The rival schools raised the question how the universal, etc., can be real if the first three only possess Being. Some of the later Naiyāyikas therefore attributed Being to all. Some conferred it only upon Substance, but some refused it to all, identifying it with knowability, which may be called Being or by any other name.

If the universal inheres in the particular and is perceived by

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1 Samānaprasavātmīhā jāti (Nyāyasūtras, II, 2, 38).

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our senses, how are the senses able to contact the universal, which has no Being? In Plato, this question does not arise at all; the universal, according to him, is not perceived but remembered. In Aristotle, there is no difficulty; because the universal is the Being or the Substance of the individual. But for the Naiyāyikas, it created a problem, as the universal has no Being and is different from Substance. They therefore postulated a peculiar kind of sense contact called *samvogasamavāya* (contact-cum-inherence). Thus the nature of the relation between a sense and any substance is contact; of that between the sense and what inheres in that substance is contact-cum-inherence. But not only universals but also qualities and activities inheres in substances. So the universal belonging to a quality inhering in a substance is perceived by a sense through the relation of contact-cum-inherence-cum-inherence. The Naiyāyikas, who were thoroughgoing realists, never doubted that senses can come into contact even with what only inheres but never exists.

But does everything in the universe possess a universal? In Western philosophy, also, this question was raised. Some could not admit universals—if the universal was to be a real entity and not a mere concept or name—for ugly and imperfect things, some for material and empirical things; and the British Hegelians developed the theory that the only concrete universal is the Absolute. The Naiyāyikas also felt that everything in the universe could not have a universal and they formulated six conditions. First, there should be many particulars under the universal; for instance, space, which is one, cannot have a universal like spatiality (*ākāśatva*). Secondly, if a universal denotes the same particulars as another, then one of the two cannot be a distinct universal; for instance, dog-ness and caninity cannot be two universals. In the third place, there should be no confusion or commingling of the universals (*samkara*); for instance, body-ness (*sarīratva*) cannot be a universal, for it is found both where earthness (*prthvītva*) inheres and where it does not inhere. Fourthly, there should be no infinite regress; for instance, though horse-ness (*aśvatva*) is a universal, there cannot be a universal like horse-ness-ness (*aśvatvatva*), as postulating a universal in this way would lead to infinite regress. In the fifth place, the postulated universal should not destroy the very nature of the object; for this reason particularity (*viśeshatva*) is not a universal, because the particular is what is ultimately distinguished from everything else and, if there is a universal in
it, the universal would imply something common to that particular and at least another and so negates the very nature of the particular. It may be asked: Are we not using the word particularity? The Naiyāyikas reply, Yes, but particularity, like spatiality, is not a universal (jāti) but an upādhi (condition). Lastly, there can be no universal if it is to have no relation with the particular; absence-ness (abhāvatva), for instance, is not a universal, because absence is not a positive entity with which the supposed universal can have the relation of inherence. A universal can inhere only in those entities in which Being (sattā) inheres.

An important peculiarity of the Indian philosophical tradition is that the reality of the universal is upheld by realists and not by idealists. In Western philosophy, some who upheld its reality are the greatest idealists. But in Indian philosophy, both the orthodox and the Buddhist idealists denied its reality. The Naiyāyikas, even those who attributed Being to them, barred the way to classification by denying the inherence of one universal in another and by refusing to recognize as universals those entities like bodyness by saying that they introduce confusion into the denotation of the universals. Thus, though the universals were regarded as existing in the mind of God, their togetherness in no way led to their interrelationship, and the Naiyāyikas left them as a mere plurality without turning them into members of a system. And by treating Being as one of many universals, they maintained the curious position that our senses first come into contact with Substance and then with Being.

A universal like cow-ness is perceived by the senses themselves. But how is a universal proposition, which could be made a major premise, perceived? In Greek philosophy, the process by which the universal and a universal proposition are obtained is the same. It is dialectic or reminiscence. But the Naiyāyikas say that, though the universal is perceived, the universal proposition is obtained through that universal by a process of contact called sāmānya-lakshaṇā pratyāsatti. When a horse is perceived, the universal horse-ness becomes the form (prakāra) of the cognition (jñāna) of the horse. And through this form the plurality of horses presents itself before our mind. Similarly, when a red horse is perceived, red horses present themselves before our mind. For the Naiyāyikas, perception is always of the form of judgment: it is not of the form, "the red horse," but of the form, "the horse is red." So every particular proposition can lead to its universal
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form. Indeed, to check wrong generalizations, the Naiyāyikas invented a negative method called *tarka*, which is the indirect proof of the Western logic. *Tarka* assumes the opposite and deduces an absurdity. The general tendency is to grasp intuitively the major premise—a process which is not called reminiscence—and then check it by negative methods rather than positively deduce it by the examination and comparison of many instances.

The Vaiseshika and the Naiyāyika schools are generally classed together and hyphenated. Their views are, on almost all points, the same. However, there are some peculiar features of the Vaiseshika theory. Kaṇāda, though admitting the reality of the universal, says that both the universal and the particular are relative to buddhi (understanding). Further, the distinction also between the universal and the particular is relative.¹ For each universal is distinguished from the others by being a particular. The universal is of two kinds, the absolute and the relative. Being (*sattā*) is absolute; substantiality (*dravyatva*), etc., are relative. Though every universal is a universal from one point of view and a particular from another, the highest universal, Being, is a universal only² and never a particular. We here see an outcome of rationalism in the Vaiseshika system. Some possibility of classifying the universals and particulars and discovering their interconnectedness is admitted. Being is the highest universal without being a particular; at the lowest level of the atom, we find the particular that is not a universal; in between come universals which are particulars also. The Vaiseshikas did not attempt a systematic classification, though tacitly admitting its possibility; and they did not see the deeper implication of Absolute Idealism in that admission; and to the end they remained bare pluralists.

The greatest opponents of the doctrine of the reality of the universal are the Buddhists. All the arguments advanced against the reality of the universal in Western philosophy are urged by the Buddhists against the Nyāya-Vaiseshika doctrine,³ and the latter give an elaborate defence of their position.⁴ The Buddhists maintain that the universal is only a *vikalpa* (artificial construct of imagination without a corresponding reality). Further, they

¹ *Parantu sāmānyam vīsheshasamjñām api labhate*. See Upaskara on the Vaiśe-
shika-sūtras, I, 2, 3.
say that its nature is not positive but negative (apoha). The function of the so-called universal like horse-ness in a horse is to differentiate it from other objects like the cow and so to negate cow-ness, etc., in it. The function of a word like horse is also just the same. The Buddhists, therefore, are nominalists, and at the most conceptualists.

The Advaita refuses to admit the reality of the universal as a separate entity from the particulars. For it, the only reality is Brahman, which is universal and eternal. Everything else has only a relative being. Yet the Advaita would have no objection to conceding phenomenal reality to universals. They can have a relative reality, not absolute. The Advaita is inclined to treating the universal as form (ākyti) of the particular. Form is permanent compared with the particular, but is transient compared with the Brahman.

Almost all the other schools maintain the reality of the universal in one form or another. All the Mimāmsakas contend that the universal is real. Kumārila says that Being (sattā) is the highest universal (mahāsāmānyam), and every universal is a form of Being and is therefore not a negative entity (apoha), as the Buddhists maintain.¹ It may be called universal (sāmānyam), form (ākyti), genus (jāti), and energy (śakti, power).² No universal can have its own universal; for instance, cow-ness cannot have cow-ness-ness in it. Some say that a universal is an entity (vastu), and so can have in it another universal to be called entity-ness (vastutvā). But Kumārila rejects this view as it leads to infinite regress; for even entity-ness will be an entity (vastu) and have entity-ness again in it.³ Further, he does not accept the Naiyāyika view that the universals are found everywhere. Like Whitehead's eternal objects, the universals, according to the Naiyāyikas, float about everywhere in the world, waiting for a particular to bring them down to the realm of actuality. But Kumārila says that the universals are found only in the particulars and they do not float about in the intervening spaces.⁴ This is a natural conclusion from Kumārila's view that all universals are different forms of Being. For as all universals are Being, the universals supposed to exist between the individuals cannot claim to be universals, for they lack Being. The same would have been the conclusion from the Vaiseshika view. In fact, later Naiyāyikas,

who joined the Vaiśešikas and formed the hyphenated Nyāya-Vaiśešika school, held the latter’s doctrine. Kumārila denies that structure or structural identity (samsthāna) can be a universal, for samsthāna is found in toys also, and we shall have to treat a toy cow as a real cow.

While the Naiyāyikas maintain that the relation between the universal and the individual is inherence (samavya), Kumārila says that it is both identity and difference (bhedābheda). Just as a forest (vana) is cognized without cognizing particular trees, so also a universal can be cognized without cognizing the individuals. But the universal is not completely detached from the individuals and is therefore both identical with them and yet different from them.

But Prabhākara, another Mīmāṃsaka, thinks like the Naiyāyikas, that the universal is completely different from the particulars and the relation between the universal and the individual is inherence (samavāya). But he differs from the Naiyāyikas in holding that inherence is not an eternal relation, for when one of the two terms of the relation, the individual, is not eternal, the relation cannot be eternal. Further, he denies that Being (sattā) is a universal. We see cows and horses, and so we see cow-ness and horse-ness also. But we do not see beings as such, and so there is no evidence for the reality of a universal to be called Being.

The Jaina also regard the universal as real. They divide it into two kinds, the horizontal (tiryak) and the vertical (ūrdhva). The horizontal universal is the similarity or similar development in several instances and the vertical universal is the identity that persists between the prior and posterior states of an object. The former is static and the latter dynamic.

Patanjali, the author of the Yogasūtras, identifies the universal with structural identity (samsthāna) and maintains its reality. The universal cow-ness is recognized in a cow by its structural pattern. Now the universal cannot be different from the pattern, for if the latter also is recognized with the help of a universal (other than the pattern), then the universal also will have to be recognized with the help of another and so on ad infinitum. So we have to say that the individual is recognized through its structural form, which must be the same as the universal, and similarity of

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1 See Visvanatha, Kārikāvalī, 8 and 9.
2 Ślokavārtika, p. 618.
3 Ibid., see the chapter on Vanavāda.
4 Pramāṇanayatattvālokhānakāra, V, 3-5.
form (sārūpya). The Sānkhya doctrine of Kapila is also the same as that of Patanjali; which is not accepted by the schools given above, except by Jainism and by Rāmānuja among the Vedāntins.

The Sābdikas—and Bhartṛhari is one of them—who identify the Word with the Brahman, advocate a unique theory. Just as some Western philosophers identify the Word not only with Speech but also with Reason or Logos, which is not an abstract concept but Being, so also some Indian philosophers call the Brahman in the immediately next stage in the descent to the world by the name Sabdabrahman or Sound-Brahman. It corresponds roughly to what the Sānkhya calls the Mahat and the Kathopanishad calls Mahān Atma. Its nature is pure sattā or Being. It splits into different universals like cow-ness, horse-ness, etc., through different relations, and assumes the forms of the different worlds. It is the same as sphota, the universal of the word. This school believes in a sort of universal called sphota for every word also like “cow,” “horse” and “man.” For though these words are uttered by different persons at different times with different intonations, pitch, etc., they are recognized to be the same; and though the syllables of the word are uttered in succession, they are comprehended together; and both facts can be explained only by postulating a unitary word-universal called sphota. This is reasonable: for if the Logos (Sabdabrahman) is both Word and Reason, for every universal there will be a word-aspect and reason-aspect. The former is sphota and the latter jāti. But both are essentially the same and called by the same name by the Sābdikas. Further, as the Logos (Sabdabrahman) is Being (sattā), all the universals are forms of Being, and the particular therefore is non-Being (asat). The individual is a combination of Being (sat) and non-Being (asat).

In Indian philosophy, questions like whether the word means the universal or the individual were also discussed. The older Naiyāyikas maintained that a word means the individual qualified by the universal and so both. The Neo-Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, maintain that the word means the individual only. The Vedāntins also hold the same view. Some say that common terms like cow mean the universal, proper names the individual, and descriptive terms like the “possessor of the dewlap” the form (ākṛti). The Sābdikas contend that each word has three meanings (saktitrāyam), the universal (jāti), the individual (vyakti), and the form (ākṛti). Patanjali and Kapila maintain that the word means
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only the form (ākṛti). Prabhākara and Kumārila say that the word means only the universal; the individual is known only by inference through the universal (ākṣhepa).

III

In the above section, an attempt has been made to present some of the important doctrines of the universal in Indian thought, without entering into details of the controversies between rival schools, which display great logical and dialectical acumen. Hegel, indeed, was not acquainted with these theories and controversies, and so he felt that the universal was not emancipated from existence in Indian thought. The reader can now see that not only was the universal emancipated from Being but also was itself divested of Being by Prabhākara and his followers in particular, who refused to admit that Being (sattā) is the highest universal and all other universals are divisions within it. Further, the Naiyāyikas do not identify Being and Substance, as Plato and Aristotle did. Yet both the Naiyāyikas and Prabhākara and his followers were realists, not conceptualists or nominalists. Another important point is that Being (sattā) itself is a universal that is found in the individuals. The Indian thinkers who uphold the reality of the universal do not say that it is found in Being (sattā), that is, Being does not have a universal in it; and most of them are not idealists.

It would be difficult to accept Professor Northrop's contention also, if we are to apply it to all Indian schools and treat it as a generalization without exceptions. He says that the universal of Eastern philosophy is aesthetic, intuitive and existential, while that of Western philosophy is rational, postulational, and detached from existence. Unlike Hegel, he does not contend that the universal in Eastern philosophy is not emancipated from existence, but that it is an existential universal. It is difficult to fix the meaning of "existential universal." If it means a universal that is existing or existence itself in one of its forms, there are Indian philosophers who deny it. Further, even those Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas who treat Being (sattā) as the highest universal, do not view the world as its transformation, for such a view would contradict their theory of ultimate eternal atoms.

Now, should we say that the universal in Western philosophy has no Being or is not Being or a form of Being but has only con-
ceptual content? This question would be raised by many Oriental and Occidental readers of Professor Northrop's brilliant work, *The Meeting of East and West*. To say that it has no Being or is not existent would raise the epistemological question whether this universal has anything corresponding in reality. Not even the physical scientist would say that corresponding to his formula there is nothing in reality. When he experiments he works with a universal existing in nature. He may have his formula in his mind; but there should be an existential universal corresponding to it. His discoveries are discoveries of existential universals. All science, when completed and perfected, reduces itself to a system of mathematics; and Russell says that mathematical reasoning has little to do with the existential aspect of its propositions. But Whitehead contends that even mathematics, as an instrument of experimentation upon reality, must have something to do with reality. And even if we say that the universal of mathematics has nothing to do with reality, should we say the same with regard to the universals of nature? And if mathematics deals with the universals of nature also, must they not possess the being which nature possesses? Apart from modern science and mathematics, what should we say about the universal in Greek philosophy? We have seen that, for both Plato and Aristotle, the universal is Being and is therefore existence.

It is true that, though the same words and concepts are used in the Western and Eastern philosophies, their connotations need not be the same. But it is risky to argue that they cannot be the same. Sometimes, they are the same, and other times not. When expressions are the same, unless we are able to show on other grounds than that they belong to two different traditions that they do not mean the same, we should not assume their difference. All philosophers deal with the same universe, and attempt to explain the same objects. Hence arises confusion in their concepts. We have already noted the confusion between the logical and the teleological classification of concepts in Plato and Aristotle. Similar confusions are plentiful in Indian philosophy also. Further, many would deny that the universal of all medieval philosophers and mystics of Europe is only theoretical and has no Being. Very likely, Professor Northrop is referring to modern Western philosophy, and not to the medieval and ancient also. But we should not forget that most modern Western philosophers trace their intellectual heritage to Plato and Aristotle, and might be in-
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heriting the same confusion. Medieval philosophy might have emphasized one trend and modern philosophy another, and both philosophers might be thinking that they are Platonists or Aristotelians.

The words "intuitive" and "aesthetic" also make it hard to understand Professor Northrop's meaning. It is not the intention of the author to advance the criticism as to how a universal can be intuitive. Professor Northrop's meaning must be something deeper. In Western philosophy, the word intuition does not have a specific meaning. If it means direct perception, we have it in Aristotle and most of those who hold the doctrine of

\[ \text{in re} \]

The universal is perceived along with the individual and so is intuited. Even for those who hold that the universal is the sum of the qualities that are common to the individuals, the universal is intuited. The adjective aesthetic also does not convey a definite meaning. It may mean "belonging to sensation" or "belonging to our appreciative sense of the beautiful." Certainly, Professor Northrop does not mean the second, for there are universals that have little to do with the beautiful. Nor shall we be right if we limit the universal in Indian philosophy to what is sensed only.

So many readers would feel that Professor Northrop means something profound and significant in his differentiation, but that his adjectives do not express his meaning. Many Indians think that the starting point and motive of the Indian philosophical tradition is different from that of the Western, and that for a world culture which will enable man to see life as a whole, and will offer him a balanced outlook on life and remove its one-sidedness, the two traditions should be harmoniously synthesized. But they do not think that Professor Northrop's adjectives adequately express the nature of the universal in Indian philosophy.

Though we have pointed out that the theory of theoretical, conceptual and non-existential universals is not new to Indian philosophy, it should be said that, on the whole, it does not belong to the general Upanishadic tradition, including Buddhism. And because of the general tendency to view the universal as theoretical, conceptual and non-existential, both the Advaita and Buddhism refused to admit its reality. For if the universal is real, it must have Being and so it must be the same as the individual, which is due to a split in the original Being, according to the Advaita, of the Brahman and, according to Buddhism, in the
original Vijnāna. Though the Mimāmsakas, following Kumārila, say that the original Great Being (mahāsattā) split into several beings, the lower universals, they are not prepared to admit the implied monism of the theory that this original sattā is identical with the Brahman and that the individuals and the material world are only its forms. But we have seen that the Sābdikas admitted as much except that they treated the individual as partly unreal. The Mimāmsakas are very close followers of the Vedas and the Brahmans, but not so much of the Upanishads, and that is why they could not write a commentary on the Brahmasūtras—which was regarded as absolutely necessary for establishing the claim to be Upanishadic. The Nyāya and the Vaiseshika also failed to write commentaries, because their doctrines did not fit in with the Upanishads, though the two schools quote passages from the Upanishads in support of some of their doctrines, and are treated as orthodox.

In view of the above complications, how are we to characterize the Indian theories as a whole, so that we can see what contribution they can make when brought for synthesis with Western theories? Professor Northrop has used now and then the adjective spiritual also with reference to the Eastern outlook. But its meaning also is not definite in his book; and the Indian reader naturally feels much vagueness about it. Perhaps his meaning is more clear to the Western readers. Further, he says that what the Oriental would call religion the Westerner would call aesthetics. But the Eastern reader would regard this characterization as despiritualizing his religion. To the Eastern mind, aesthetic does not exhaust the nature of the spiritual. The spiritual for the East is more profound, more important and more dynamic, creative and powerful than what the word aesthetic means either to the West or to the East. We have seen the tendency in Greek philosophy for the universal to become identified with what Aristotle called the final cause. And though Plato and Aristotle identified it with Being or Substance, they do not seem to have identified it with the material cause. But for the Upanishads, the Absolute Spirit is the material cause as well, because it is the material that assumes the forms of the world and is its Being; it is the final cause because it is higher (para), as the Kathopanishad says, than anything in the world; it is the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) by creating the world out of itself through its own

1 The Meeting of East and West, p. 400.
desire; it is the formal cause, because, though without form, it is the source of the forms (rupāṇi) of the world; it is the instrumental cause (dvārakāraṇa), because its own power (śakti) is its means for articulating and differentiating the world; and it is the supporting cause (ādharakāraṇa), because it is the support of the vast multiplicity of the world of names and forms. We have already noticed that the Sābdikas, who are Advaitins of a sort and one of the orthodox schools, tell us that both name and form are just aspects of the universal (jāti), and that the universal alone is real (satyam) and not the individual.

The tendency to identify the spiritual with the ethical or the aesthetic is foreign to the East, which will not accept the identification. For instance, religion is not valued for its ethical or aesthetic values. Religion is valued and man is exhorted to realize God not as a means to the realization of the ethical and aesthetic values but as the highest value, as higher than the ethical and aesthetic values. They are only means to the values of religion, and there are processes of transforming them into religious values through further sublimation. Moreover, if the religious values are the same as the ethical and aesthetic values, then Truth will not be a value of religion. For Truth in Indian thought is the same as Being: it is both satyam and sat. Truth, Being and Reality mean the same. But ethical and aesthetic values are mostly human and social constructs, realizable but not yet actual, and hence cannot be sat (Being) or satyam (Truth). But the religious value, which is inward, is Truth, Fact and Reality; yet it is what has to be realized, the Good, and so an ethical value also, a norm; and it is what fully satisfies our being and so the Beautiful also. Indian writers on aesthetics treat natural and artistic beauty as a reflection of the Brahman, the nature of which includes ānanda (bliss), rasa (aesthetic pleasure).

There is another point peculiar to Indian philosophy. Even those schools that accept the reality of the universal, do not accept it in the same sense. For the Naiyāyikas, it is different from similarity (sārūpya), form (ākṛti), structural identity (sams-śāna). Kumārila accepts the first two also, but Patanjali the last alone.

When we are comparing the universal in Eastern and Western philosophical traditions, it would not be of much avail to compare the discussions of its nature in both. In both, we find conceptualism, nominalism and realism. The presence of these doctrines
not merely will not give a clue to the peculiarities of the two
traditions but, on the other hand, will prove an impediment to
understanding them. We should, therefore, consider the categories
which the two traditions used and the way they used them for explain-
ing the universe. This, I feel, is an important principle to be fol-
lowed in comparative philosophy and its study.

Though the Upanishads and the Buddhist schools deny the
reality of the universal, they have their own categories for the
explanation of the world. For instance, though the Buddhists
maintain that Being (sattā) is momentary, they say that sams-
kāras or vāsanās (latent forces) continue through several moments
of Being. Further, the Buddhists speak of various classes of
dharmas, dhātus, āyatanas, and skandhas (entities, elements, bases
of experience, and aggregates), twelve classes of links of causation
of the world for the individual, and four kinds of truth. Indeed,
they do not treat any of these as eternal. So far as the present
discussion is concerned, it is not of primary importance whether
the Buddhists are nominalists or conceptualists. They may say
that the so-called class is only a name for a number of things that
are similar. We need not now ask them whether this similarity
has at least as much relative objectivity as the individuals. But
their samskāras at least possess that objectivity and continue
through several successive fleeting drops of Being. And they do
make a classification of Being. The Advaitins, on the other hand,
have no objection to admitting the reality of the universal, provided
the reality is only relative and not absolute. The Upanishads say
that forms (rupāni) issue forth from the Brahman along with
names (nāmāni) and activities (karmāni). The followers of the
Āgamas also, who turned Vedantic like Ramanuja, accept the reality
of the universal in one form or another. The Saiva, the
Sākta and the Pancharātra Āgamas give each its own number of
categories or tattvas. The Nyāya and the Vaiseshika call them
padārthas. From our point of view, it matters little whether a
category has only one instance or more, whether it is called jāti
or upādhi; for we are evaluating the characteristic feature of the
tradition as a whole. Indeed, the last-mentioned two schools have
their own standpoints for classifying reality, the former being
logical and the latter metaphysical.
When there are so many views and so much discussion about the universal, it is perhaps not safe to say that the universal in Eastern philosophy is not theoretic. Yet it cannot be denied that it has its own colouring, its own associations and peculiarities. An attempt may be made, therefore, to present its nature as distinct from the nature of the universal in Western philosophy.

It may not be unnecessary to remind again that, in the author's opinion, the difference between the Western and Indian philosophies is a difference of dominant trends, interests, motives and standpoints. But all the philosophies attempt to explain the same universe and, whether consistently or inconsistently, force everything into their own perspective. Hence, confusion arises, some explanations appear ununderstandable if not absurd, and the claims of the philosophies appear to be unreasonable. Some of the Western philosophers have already noticed the confusion between the ethical and the logical explanations of the universal in both Plato and Aristotle. And in view of the adoption of both Platonism and Aristotelianism by the medieval philosophers for their theological explanations, we shall not be wrong in saying that there is further confusion with the theological universal also. Both for Plato and Aristotle, the highest universal is the fullest Being; and for Christian philosophy, as Gilson says, God is Being itself, and the Greek equation of perfection to Being admirably suited St. Anselm for framing his ontological argument.

How are we to detect the difference between the three universals? What are their differentia? For this discussion we shall take only the real universals, not artificial, conceptual abstractions. Generally, the logical and natural universals are identified. But the logical universal may be an artificial one like the one used in the classification of books according to size. It may be a mere conceptual abstraction also. But the natural universal belongs to nature herself and is the result of natural evolution. It is the genus of its species and individuals. It suits well Aristotle's conception of definition, which gives the genus and differentia, and his doctrine of classification.¹ The higher covers a larger number

¹ We need not here enter into the discussion of the problem whether classification will not lead to systematization, as Bosanquet would say, or to a theory as Lotze would. A deeper probing into the problem would bring us back again to the question of fact versus the norm.
of species and individuals than the lower. It may contain the potentiality of its differentiations within itself. As belonging to nature, it has Being; it is existential and concrete. It is real, not in the sense of the ideal, but in the sense of the actual. It would not be right to say that the universal horse is a mere concept. It is a form of life that evolved in the course of natural evolution and so belongs to nature herself. It is therefore actual, existential in the spermatozoon of the horse, and potential in that of the ancestors of the horse. It is dynamic, not merely static. It is both the efficient and formal cause of the individual. At this level we cannot equate perfection to Being. The perfect may or may not be actual. Our definition of the horse would indeed be the definition of the normal horse, and only so would give us the norm of the horse; it tells us what qualities an animal must possess if it is to be a horse. But what a horse ought to be is just what would fit in to the naturalistic classification of the animal world; and the species higher than the horse would not be latter's final cause. It would be absurd to say that "animal" is more perfect than "mammal," and "mammal" than "man"; or that "mammal" is the final cause of "man" and "animal" of "mammal."

But the ethical universal is the final cause of its species and individuals. It is more perfect than they. It is their ideal. Not being completely actual, from the naturalistic point of view, it has less or no Being. It is something to be realized, not yet a fact. Indeed, its definition is based upon the basis of something actual; it is derived from something factual. Yet it is that into which the actual is yet to be transformed. So it is a formal cause also. From the standpoint of the actual, it is the yet to be realized and so the possible. In the ethical realm, the ideal and the actual are not yet one: value and existence are yet different. But because of the confusion noted already in Greek thought, they are identified: the Ideal is equated not only to the genus but also to Being. Plato thought of the particular only in negative terms, as the Limit and non-Being; and Aristotle thought of it as potentiality. If potentiality is possibility, then matter is the realm of possibility. But this tendency is just the opposite of the contemporary tendency to treat the realm of the universal as the realm of the possible. Whitehead's philosophy is an outstanding example of the contemporary view.

But the identification of the Ideal and Being holds good in the realm of the theological universal. God as Being is the highest
universal. Indeed most of the medieval thinkers were prone to treat God as containing the universals or Ideas and not as himself being an Idea. As Supreme Perfection, he is the Good, but not the Idea of the Good; he is the source of Laws but is not himself a Law. Yet in either case he is Being. But if Being and perfection are identified, what would be the nature of the less perfect? It will have less of Being, and so contain an element of non-Being or negation or Limit; and if God is Truth, whatever is not God must contain an element of falsity. The lower can be derived from the higher only by the application of the principle of negation. Whether every negation is determination or every determination a negation, the method of deriving the lower from the higher is the application of the principle of negation. This is what Plotinus, Spinoza and Hegel did, each in his own way.

Thus the three kinds of universal have their own peculiarities. In the first or naturalistic universal, the lower contains the higher and something more. The higher may contain potentially the differentia of the lower, but they are actual only in the lower. They are still possibilities. Of course, both the higher and the lower may have Being. In the realm of ethical universals, the higher has less or no Being; the higher is based upon the Being of the lower but may not be actual. The actual may be potentially the ideal but is not the ideal. The relation between the lower and the higher is teleological. In the case of the theological universal, the higher is both Being and Perfection of the lower. It is teleological as well as substantial. Both have Being, and the higher is within the lower.

It is true that even in the realm of the natural universals, the universal within any individual is the latter's norm, and the relation between the two may be teleological. But the relation between this universal and the higher is not teleological. In the ethical realm the whole hierarchy is teleological. In the theological realm, also the same is the case; but here all universals have Being, the higher and higher having more and more of it; whereas in the ethical realm, the higher and higher have less and less of Being.

Being derived from the same realm of the actual, all the three universals must be interconnected. And it would be the task of metaphysics to discover their interrelation, so that our philosophy of life can take due notice of the three and be not adversely affected by the one left out.
The universal found in Indian philosophy is akin to the third type. It would be more appropriate to call it spiritual than theological. There will, perhaps, be an objection to identifying the two. It may be said that Western theology is more or less applied Platonism or Aristotelianism, and has the tinge of the theoretic in it. But whether applied to the spiritual or the natural, the universal in philosophy would be theoretic also, and it gets its differentia from the realm to which it is applied. Many scholars are of the opinion that Greek philosophy, particularly Plato’s, was influenced by Oriental thought. Gomperz says that of the two strands of Greek thought, the Apollonian and the Orphic, the latter is Oriental. The dominance of the latter over the former is particularly apparent in Plotinus and Neo-Platonism, which was absorbed and assimilated by the medieval thinkers, and later became an important strain in Christian theology. The influence of the Upanishadic thought on Schopenhauer is undoubtful, which is an indication of the impression which Indian thought, however small a part of it might have reached the country at that time, made upon the German philosophical minds. There are some who believe that Fichte, Schelling and Hegel also were influenced by the Upanishadic ideas, though they might have used them in their own way.

The Upanishadas, or the avowed followers of the Upanishads in India, Sankara and his followers, say that there is only one universal and that is the Brahman. It alone is eternal. They do not admit that the other universals are eternal. If we accept transient universals, they have no objection to admitting them in their own way. They would call them ākṛti, rūpa or form. The Upanishads say that everything is nāma (name) and rūpa (form). The Brahman is Being (sattā) and lends its own Being to the lower entities.

The above view can easily be misinterpreted and misunderstood. Western philosophy, on the whole, tended to treat Being as an abstract concept. Hegel called it the poorest concept. So long as we look upon Being as the most common element of all existent things, it would be the poorest concept. But when, for instance, God was identified with Being by the medieval thinkers, they could not have thought like Hegel. Nor could Greek thinkers, who identified Being with perfection, think so. Even those Indian

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1 See the author’s “The Western and Indian Philosophical Traditions,” The Philosophical Review, March 1947.
schools that treated Being (sattā) as a universal different from the Brahman or Isvara, thought of it as the most common feature. But their view is, indeed, not Upanishadic. For all such philosophies, Being is an abstraction.

If Being is concrete and not abstract, real and not conceptual, where are we to find it? Most of the Western philosophers did not raise this question, and did not care for the problem. A few who might have raised the problem were dubbed mystics and their philosophy was undervalued. McTaggart, among the modern Hegelians, for instance, said that metaphysics must end in mysticism. But among certain philosophical circles this statement is enough to render the philosophy suspicious.

It is really unfortunate that Western philosophers call Indian philosophy mysticism. The word mysticism in the West has no definite meaning, and philosophically it has fewer creditable associations than derogatory. Like the word Māyā, it has become not merely descriptive but evaluatory. The use of the term has, therefore, become a hindrance to proper understanding of Indian thought. Indian philosophy was not satisfied with merely speculatively constructing the nature of reality. It raised the question how and where to discover it if it is not just as we see it around us. Where are we to discover Being, which it Perfection itself? As Hegel did not raise this question, his Absolute remained speculative, conceptual. Even Being was a concept for him. In Indian philosophy, also, the attempt is made to prove Brahman with the help of reason. The Advaitins use the postulational method (arthāpatī) and show that Brahman is the ultimate postulate. They show that the world is not ultimately real; and as what is not real presupposes a reality, the world presupposes Brahman. Though Being or Brahman is thus postulated, they say that it is to be discovered and experienced. This attitude is empirical towards the super-empirical.

Where can we come into direct contact with Being itself? Indian philosophy took seriously the view that this Being is to be discovered in our innermost hearts (antarhydaya). Even Christ declared that God resided in our hearts. But his utterance remained a sort of metaphor, and Western philosophers did not take it seriously. But having taken it seriously, Indian philosophers had to discuss how God resides in our hearts, what role he, as the ultimate reality, plays there, how he divides itself, through our hearts, into this manifold world. Philosophy does not end with
the postulation of Being, but works out how the world came out of Being.

Here heart (hrdaya) should not be identified with the physical object called by that name. It means the inner part of our being, often interpreted by the commentators as buddhi, which is translated generally by the word understanding. But this translation does not adequately express the meaning of the original, not because buddhi does not perform that function, but because buddhi is not a function of manas (mind) but a higher entity inclusive of manas. It is actually a higher category. But though higher, it is inner to, and deeper than manas.

When we speak of “inner,” our imagination immediately pictures something within our chest or brain. But mind, as we are accustomed to think, is not confined to the body. Body may have its correlations with mind; but mind is much more than the body. The centre of our mind or the centre of man is not in the body, but outside it. It is truer to say that body is a part of mind, than that mind is a part of body. We can better understand this position in terms, to a certain extent, of Leibnitz’s monads. Every monad is a microcosm, of which the physical body also forms a part. When the Upanishads speak of the centre of the heart, they speak of a centre like that of a microcosm.

Because Being is inner to man, it is both psychological and metaphysical. Being, which is the source of everything, should be the source of both our physical and psychical natures. It is therefore not only meta-physical but also meta-psychical. The split into the physical and the psychical is a split within it. It can be approached from either; rather it should be approached from both. It is continuous not only with the psychical but also with the physical. In Western philosophy, the words psychical and mental mean generally, and are associated with, the non-objective, and the non-objective with the shadowy. That is why Indian philosophers would object to the use of the word psychical with regard to the Atman or the Brahman, and say that it is spiritual. It is what supplies Being to both the physical and the psychical; or rather it is what splits into the two—which is the reason for the correlation of the two. This process of splitting is neither physical nor logical analysis, but one of its own kind. It would be as justifiable to say that Being is physical as to say that it is psychical, because both are its own forms.

In the hierarchy of the spiritual universals, the higher is not
only what is inclusive of the lower but also what is inner to it. The highest, therefore, is the innermost. The Vedântins would not accept the Neo-Hegelian conception of the Absolute as the World as a Whole in the literal sense of the words. The World as a Whole consists of an indefinite number of objects standing side by side and may correspond to what Spinoza calls natura naturata. But this is merely a logical concept, not spiritual. It is not understood as belonging to our inner nature. Indian schools differ from each other in working out the stages between the innermost and outermost reality. These differences cannot be presented now. But as an example, we may consider the Sânkhya theory, which is incorporated by most of the Vedântic and Æama systems with varying modifications. According to this school, out of the Ego (âhamkâra) issue forth manas (mind), the organs of sense and action, and the subtle elements, and out of the subtle elements the gross elements. In other words, the Ego divides itself into the mental and physical counterparts including the body. But by this division, the Ego is not destroyed. Higher than the Ego and deeper within it lies buddhi or mahat. We need not discuss the nature and meaning of these categories further. Even this reference is enough to show the nature and working of the spiritual universal.

In the Upanishads, also, we find the same, though not a systematic, account. The Kathopanishad gives a hierarchy, which is very instructive. It says that objects are higher than the senses, manas (mind) higher than the objects, buddhi (understanding) higher than manas, mahân ātmā (Great Self) higher than buddhi, avyakta (the unmanifest) higher than mahân ātmā, and purusha higher than avyakta. The higher is at the same time the inner and yet the more inclusive. This classification of the categories (tattvas) is accepted by almost all the Upanishadic and the Vaishnava, Saiva and Sâkta schools and is indicative of the true nature of the universal in Indian philosophy.

We can appreciate Professor Northrop's intérpretation of the universal of Eastern philosophies as aesthetic in this way: The reality which Indian philosophy, for instance, proposes to study is the inner. So the universals it uses are inner to our being. Hence they have a psychic tinge, though they are more than psychical. We may say that there is something aesthetic about them, though they are much more than what the word aesthetic means in Western or Eastern philosophy. The world spiritual, in the
sense indicated above, would be more acceptable to Indian readers.

Now, the spiritual universal can be and is understood as a postulate also. For each higher is, for thought, a postulate of the lower. It is theoretical also; because it too has a theory. It is true that Western philosophers in general, particularly the modern and the contemporary, treat the theories of the universal belonging to the natural and ethical realms as meant for practice, and the theory of the universal of the still higher realm—which they would call philosophical, as they hesitate to use the words theological and spiritual—for intellectual satisfaction. But Indian philosophy was mainly interested in the last and developed its theory with a view to practice.

If a synthesis of the Eastern and Western theories of the universal is to be systematically accomplished, we should find the clue in the above or a similar analysis. I say "similar," because one or more other forms of the universal may be discovered. As the difference between the three above universals is due to the differences between the dominant realms and trends of thought, it would be more advantageous to isolate the trends, study the nature of the universals consistent with them, and then attempt their synthesis. Nor is it safe to leave them in isolation. The philosophy which the world of to-day needs is a philosophy that gives to each universal its due prominence, and presents all in their proper relations to each other. Man belongs to the natural, ethical and spiritual realms at once; so long as he lives in this world each has its importance for him. A harmonious synthesis of East and West would be a harmonious synthesis of the three, in which each finds its proper place. The task should no longer be left to random and casual attempts. Academical philosophers would confer one of the greatest benefits upon the world by applying themselves deliberately and systematically to this work. And it has been the life-work of Professor S. Radhakrishnan, in whose honour this volume is being published and who, true to the ancient Indian tradition, is never wearied of emphasizing the primacy of spiritual values, to make the world feel the need for the new synthesis and prepare the ground for its welcome. May this contribution accord with his life's mission!